Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-23-00069-CV

John J. PARKER Jr.,

Appellant

v.

OHIO DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

Appellee

From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12-298A

Honorable Kirsten Cohoon, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Dissenting Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 30, 2024

REVERSED AND REMANDED

This appeal concerns a business dispute that resulted in litigation between appellant John 

J. Parker, Jr. and appellee Ohio Development, LLC (“Ohio Development”). The trial court granted 

Ohio Development’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss on the ground that Parker’s claims had no basis 

in law. On appeal, Parker asserts the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because 

(1) Ohio Development did not move on his live pleadings; (2) the trial court considered evidence 
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attached to the motion in contravention of Rule 91a.6;

1 and (3) applying the Rule 91a standard, his 

dismissed claims allege a basis in law and fact. We reverse and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND2

From September 1990 until October 2005, Parker, his father, and several related entities 

controlled nearly 1900 acres of land in western Kendall County, Texas, commonly known as 

Tapatio Springs. Of those entities, the primary companies relevant to this appeal are (1) Tapatio 

Springs Real Estate Holdings, Ltd. (“TSREH”) and (2) a real estate partnership, Kendall County 

Development Company, Ltd. (“KCDC”).

The Investor

In mid-2005, Michael Shalit approached Parker about partnering in TSREH. After due 

diligence, Parker agreed to partner with Shalit to obtain a needed capital infusion. Prior to closing

on the partnership deal, Shalit infused TSREH with money; Shalit’s loan was secured by a 

conveyance of land inside the development from KCDC to Shalit. The parties intended Shalit to 

re-convey the property back to KCSC after the partnership deal closed. Shortly after the deal 

closed, all but one of the properties were returned to KCDC.

Shalit and his then-wife, Robyn Shalit, owned and controlled several entities. The TSREH 

partnership closing involved a complex series of arrangements between various related entities 

that essentially resulted in Parker and his father, on the one hand, and the Shalits, on the other 

hand, assuming a 50/50 partnership in all aspects of Tapatio Springs development. Shalit assumed 

the role of general partner in both KCDC and TSREH, and Parker was a limited partner. After 

1 As explained below, this contention is only relevant to Ohio Development’s capacity affirmative defense. 2 Because we are required to accept Parker’s factual allegations as true, our background is premised on Parker’s fifth 

amended petition. Our recitation should not be taken as an endorsement of its veracity beyond the context of our 

review.
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Shalit assumed the role of general partner, he began a course of self-dealing and siphoning money 

out of the partnerships; much of the self-dealing involved shell corporations controlled by Shalit

through transactions violating the partnership agreements.

The Property

A 370-acre undeveloped area owned by KCDC lays in the northwest portion of Tapatio 

Springs. Lakeland West Capital held the note on the parcel. After the note came due, the holder 

refused to re-finance, the note was purchased by Ohio Development, and the property went into 

foreclosure. Ohio Development appointed William Harmeyer as substitute trustee. At the start of 

the February 13, 2014 foreclosure sale, Shalit appeared at the courthouse with a check to bring the 

note then-held by Ohio Development current and stop the foreclosure proceeding, and Harmeyer

and Shalit entered the courthouse to work out the details.

However, Shalit’s check was a sham. Several hours later—after competing bidders 

departed the courthouse—Shalit and Harmeyer returned outside and auctioned the property. 

Because of the scheme, Ohio Development (represented by its appointed substitute trustee, 

Harmeyer) was the sole remaining bidder, and Ohio Development purchased the note in a “friendly 

foreclosure” that deprived KCDC of the auction value of the 370-acre property.

The Lawsuit

During litigation with Shalit, Parker discovered newly acquired information establishing

Ohio Development is a shell company controlled by Shalit. Within months of foreclosure, Ohio 

Development granted Shalit, individually, an option to repurchase the property at a discount off 

its fair market value. Shalit and Ohio Development’s scheme deprived KCDC of the money it 

would have received at a fair auction of the property and allowed Shalit to individually acquire the 

property below fair market value. Later, in 2017, Shalit conveyed additional properties from 

KCDC to Ohio Development without an exchange of consideration.
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In his fifth amended petition, Parker, derivatively on behalf of KCDC, asserted claims for 

common law fraud and civil conspiracy against Ohio Development. Parker alleged derivative 

standing as a limited partner on the basis that KCDC’s general partner, Shalit, would not bring 

claims on behalf of KCDC against himself and his shell company, Ohio Development, and the 

court-appointed receiver had stated to Parker’s counsel that she would rather not bring the claims.

The trial court dismissed Parker’s derivative claims against Ohio Development as having no basis 

in law. After the order was made final, this appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 91a provides parties a procedural vehicle to dismiss baseless causes of action. TEX.

R. CIV. P. 91a.1. Although claims may be factually or legally baseless, the only issue in this appeal

is whether Parker’s claims have no basis in law. “A cause of action has no basis in law if the 

allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the 

claimant to the relief sought.” Id. To establish a cause of action lacks a basis in law, the defendant

must establish the plaintiff’s claim is foreclosed as a matter of law because either (1) the cause of 

action in the petition is not recognized by Texas law or (2) the cause of action is recognized, but 

the plaintiff has alleged facts that defeat those claims under settled law—in other words, the 

plaintiff has “pleaded itself out of court.” In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2021, no pet.). A motion to dismiss must “state specifically the reasons the cause of 

action has no basis in law, no basis in fact, or both.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.2. “Rule 91a establishes 

a dismissal procedure that falls between the special exception procedure under Rules 90 and 91 

and summary judgment procedure under Rule 166a.” Id. at 25. Rule 91a and Rule 166a are wholly 

different procedural vehicles. See In re Shire, 633 S.W.3d at 11–28 (surveying the evolution of 

and distinguishing dismissal and pleading challenges under Rules 90, 91, 91a, and 166a).
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“In ruling on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, a court may not consider evidence but ‘must 

decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together with any [permitted] 

pleading exhibits.’” In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021)

(citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6).

“We review the merits of a Rule 91a ruling de novo; whether a defendant is entitled to 

dismissal under the facts alleged is a legal question.” Id. We construe the pleadings liberally in 

favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s intent, accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, 

and, if needed, draw reasonable inferences from the factual allegations to determine if the 

pleadings state, as applicable here, a basis in law. Vasquez v. Legend Nat. Gas III, LP, 492 S.W.3d 

448, 450 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1).

ANALYSIS

Before turning to the merits of the 91a motion, we first address Parker’s contention that his 

amended pleadings defeated Ohio Development’s motion.

What Effect did Parker’s Pleadings Amendment Have on Ohio Development’s 91a Motion?

On appeal, Parker argues:

After Ohio Development filed its Motion to Dismiss, Parker filed 

his Fifth Amended Petition, clarifying the derivative nature of his 

claims against Ohio Development. Ohio Development never moved 

to Dismiss Parker’s Fifth Amended Petition. Pursuant to Rule 

91a.5(b), Ohio Development did not file an Amended Rule 91a 

Motion to Dismiss. Ohio Development’s Motion only attacks 

Parker’s Fourth Amended Petition and is therefore of no 

consequence to Parker’s Fifth Amended Petition.

We reject Parker’s argument based on the plain text of Rule 91a. Parker filed his fifth 

amended petition on September 29, 2021, and the court heard the motion on October 8, 2021. 

Because Parker amended the challenged causes of action more than three days before the date of 

the hearing, Ohio Development could elect, before the date of the hearing, to (1) withdraw the 
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motion; (2) amend the motion directed to the amended cause of action; or (3) stand on the motion.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(b). Absent the agreement of the parties, the trial court was required to 

rule on the motion unless Ohio Development withdrew the motion or Parker timely nonsuited the 

challenged claims. See id. R. 91a.5(a), (c).

Put to the election of withdrawing or amending its motion, Ohio Development chose to 

stand on its existing motion. Therefore, the trial court’s mandatory consideration of the motion 

required the trial court to apply factual allegations contained in the live pleading—the fifth 

amended petition—to the pending motion to dismiss.

3 Consequently, our de novo review likewise 

considers factual allegations alleged in the fifth amended petition. See In re Farmers, 621 S.W.3d 

at 266.

Parker’s Causes of Action4

Having determined the scope of our review, we next turn to the causes of action alleged in 

the fifth amended petition.

Common Law Fraud

In its motion to dismiss, Ohio Development asserts Parker has “not pleaded any 

representation (allegedly false or otherwise) made by [Ohio Development] to [Parker], and ha[s]

failed to plead any of the other elements of a claim for common-law fraud, including reliance or 

injury.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.2 (requiring motion to “state specifically the reasons the cause of 

action has no basis in law”). Thus, Ohio Development concludes, Parker’s fraud claim is legally 

baseless. We disagree.

3 The fourth amended petition is no longer regarded as a part of the pleading in the record of this cause. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 65 (absent exceptions inapplicable here, “[u]nless the substituted instrument shall be set aside on exceptions, 

the instrument for which it is substituted shall no longer be regarded as a part of the pleading in the record of the 

cause”) (emphasis added). 4 Ohio Development also moved to dismiss claims of statutory fraud and fraudulent transfer; however, those claims 

were not asserted in the fifth amended petition. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(c) (trial court must rule on motion unless 

cause of action has been nonsuited).
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As stated, to establish a cause of action lacks a basis in law, Ohio Development must 

establish Parker’s common law fraud claim is foreclosed as a matter of law because either (1) fraud

is not recognized by Texas law or (2) fraud is recognized, but Parker has alleged facts that defeat 

the claim under settled law. See In re Shire, 633 S.W.3d at 18. As to the first prong, common law 

fraud is a recognized cause of action under Texas law. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. 

Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001). As a result, to establish Parker’s fraud claim lacks a basis 

in law, Ohio Development must establish it is foreclosed as a matter of law because Parker pleaded

himself out of court by alleging facts that defeat his fraud claim under settled law—that his fraud 

claim is legally impossible. In re Shire, 633 S.W.3d at 18. After reviewing the pleadings and 

drawing reasonable inferences from the factual allegations, we cannot discern facts by which 

Parker pleaded himself out of court.

In truth, Ohio Development’s motion “asserts that the petition fails to state enough detail 

regarding the facts upon which the claim is based. This is not an argument upon which dismissal 

can be granted under Rule 91a.” Id. at 35. Rather, Ohio Development’s contention that Parker

failed to sufficiently plead elements of its claim “falls squarely within the special exception 

procedure.”5 See id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 91). Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in

dismissing Parker’s fraud claim under Rule 91a. See id.

Civil Conspiracy

Parker first alleged civil conspiracy in his fifth amended petition, and because it elected 

not to amend its motion, Ohio Development did not move to dismiss the claim. Although dismissal 

5 The distinction between special exception dismissal and Rule 91a dismissal is not a matter of hyper-technicality. It 

is well-settled that parties subjected to curable pleading complaints under the special exception procedure are entitled 

to an opportunity to replead before dismissal is appropriate, and in such a case, dismissal is without prejudice. See In 

re Shire, 633 S.W.3d at 13. Here, the trial court dismissed Parker’s claims with prejudice and without affording Parker 

an opportunity to cure alleged defects.
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of a cause of action not subject to the motion to dismiss would typically constitute error, conspiracy 

is a “derivative tort” rather than an independent cause of action. 1st & Trinity Super Majority, LLC 

v. Milligan, 657 S.W.3d 349, 372 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.). To prevail on a civil 

conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant was liable for some underlying tort. Id. It 

follows the dismissal of Parker’s underlying fraud claim should result in the dismissal of his civil 

conspiracy claim. But because we have held the trial court erred in dismissing Parker’s underlying 

fraud claim, and because Ohio Development did not seek dismissal of Parker’s civil conspiracy 

claim, we hold the trial court erred in dismissing Parker’s civil conspiracy claim.

Ohio Development’s Affirmative Defenses6

Having determined Parker’s derivative fraud and conspiracy claims survive 91a dismissal, 

we turn to whether they are nevertheless foreclosed by Ohio Development’s affirmative defenses.

Statute of Limitations

Ohio Development was first joined as a party on April 16, 2021. In its motion to dismiss, 

Ohio Development asserts the statute of limitations precludes recovery on Parker’s claims because 

it lapsed no later than four years after the February 13, 2014 foreclosure sale of the 370-acre tract.7

On appeal, Ohio Development further argues Parker failed to sufficiently plead the discovery rule.

As we have explained, to the extent Ohio Development complains about a lack of fair 

notice or specificity in Parker’s pleadings relating to the invocation of the discovery rule, those 

complaints are appropriately addressed through special exceptions procedure. See In re Shire, 633 

6 Ohio Development also moved to dismiss Parker’s claims on the basis that he individually lacked standing; however, 

Parker only asserts derivative claims against Ohio Development in the fifth amended petition under the title “FRAUD 

– CONSPIRACY / SHALIT & OHIO DEVELOPMENT DERIVATIVE CLAIMS BROUGHT ON BEHALF 

OF KCDC.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(c) (trial court must rule on motion unless cause of action has been nonsuited). 7 Fraud is subject to a four-year limitations period, and the limitations period for conspiracy is the same as the 

underlying tort—here, four years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.004(a)(4) (fraud); Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro 

Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. 2019) (conspiracy).
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S.W.3d at 35. The question before us is, considering Parker’s factual allegations, whether Ohio 

Development’s limitations defense renders Parker’s claims legally impossible.

Parker does not plead a specific date when he discovered Ohio Development was Shalit’s 

shell company. However, construing the pleadings liberally in favor of Parker, looking to his 

intent, and drawing reasonable inferences from the pleaded facts, we can reasonably discern: 

(1) after becoming general partner of KCDC, Shalit undertook a course of self-dealing directly to 

himself and to shell companies controlled by him; (2) based on new information acquired during 

litigation with Shalit, Parker discovered Ohio Development is a shell company controlled by 

Shalit; and (3) Shalit’s control of Ohio Development was concealed from Parker through a 

sophisticated web of related entities. See Vasquez, 492 S.W.3d at 450.

Applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude Ohio Development failed to 

demonstrate the application of the statute of limitations renders Parker’s claim legally baseless.

See In re Shire, 633 S.W.3d at 21 (“[I]f the defendant cannot demonstrate that the plaintiff’s 

recovery on the claim in its petition are foreclosed as a matter of law, then it may still move for 

summary judgment, but it is not entitled to dismissal under Rule 91a.”).

Capacity

Before we address the merits of Ohio Development’s capacity argument, we must first 

consider Parker’s assertion that the trial court erred in considering evidence attached to the motion

relevant to Ohio Development’s capacity affirmative defense.

Can Ohio Development’s Answer be Considered?

On appeal, Parker argues, “Having the trial court consider evidence in a Motion to Dismiss 

is also not allowed. Defendant cannot attach evidence to a responsive pleading and then point to 

the attached evidence to support a Rule 91a Motion.” In response, Ohio Development correctly
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points out that, relevant to this appeal, the motion made only one reference to its answer—

specifically, the receivership order entered by the trial court attached to the answer.

In Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., the supreme court 

clarified the appropriate scope of Rule 91a review:

Rule 91a limits a court’s factual inquiry to the plaintiff’s pleadings 

but does not so limit the court’s legal inquiry. In deciding a Rule 91a 

motion, a court may consider the defendant’s pleadings if doing so 

is necessary to make the legal determination of whether an 

affirmative defense is properly before the court. We therefore 

conclude that Rule 91a permits motions to dismiss based on 

affirmative defenses “if the allegations, taken as true, together with 

inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant 

to the relief sought.” Of course, some affirmative defenses will not 

be conclusively established by the facts in a plaintiff’s petition. 

Because Rule 91a does not allow consideration of evidence, such 

defenses are not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss.

595 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Tex. 2020) (internal citation omitted). Applied here, the trial court could 

properly consider Ohio Development’s answer to make the legal determination of whether 

capacity is properly before the court (and it was). In accord with the plain text of Rule 91a, Bethel

instructs the trial court to limit its factual inquiry to the plaintiff’s pleadings. Therefore, the trial 

court could not have considered factual allegations or evidence beyond Parker’s pleadings in ruling 

on the motion. We note, however, nothing in the record indicates the trial court exceeded the scope 

of review by considering facts or evidence outside of the petition.

The dissent would hold Parker failed to preserve error by not objecting to Ohio 

Development attaching its answer to its motion. However, under these facts, we need not reach the 

question of whether error preservation is required under Rule 91a.6.

8 See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 

8 We express no opinion as to whether and how preservation is required where the record establishes the trial court 

considered evidence in contravention of Rule 91a.6. Compare Sw. Airlines Pilots Ass’n v. Boeing Co., No. 05-21-

00598-CV, 2022 WL 16735379, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2022, pet. filed) (implicitly acknowledging 

preservation requirement under Rule 91a.6 by concluding party preserved error by reciting standard of review in 

response to motion), with Davis v. Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co., No. 05-21-00092-CV, 2023 WL 3735115, at *5 (Tex. 
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(opinion should be brief as practicable and address raised issues necessary to final disposition). 

Under Bethel, (1) the trial court could consider Ohio Development’s answer to make the legal 

determination of whether capacity was before the court; (2) there is no indication in the record the 

trial court exceeded its authority by considering anything beyond factual allegations asserted in 

the fifth amended petition; (3) properly considered, the answer was not “evidence” prohibited by 

Rule 91a.6; and, therefore, (4) Parker did not need to object in the trial court.

That we need not reach the issue of preservation on this record is underscored by contrast 

with Owings v. Kelly, No. 07-20-00115-CV, 2020 WL 6588610, at *2 n.1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

Nov. 10, 2020, no pet.). In Owings, the appellate court wrote:

That the court requested evidence (i.e., the prior judgment) at the 

hearing is rather clear. Equally clear is that the Owingses failed to 

object to the request. So, any complaint they had regarding the 

court’s request was and is waived.

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Thus, in Owings, the record reflected the trial 

court requested and improperly considered evidence, and our sister court held that the plaintiff 

waived complaint by failing to object when the judge explicitly erred in open court.

By contrast, here, Ohio Development attached its answer to the motion to dismiss, and the 

trial court unquestionably could have properly considered the answer to determine whether 

capacity was before it. Further, this record contains no reporter’s record of the hearing evidencing 

the trial court’s misuse of the answer as the trial court used evidence in Owings. And, perhaps 

more importantly, the trial court’s order here does not recite that it considered evidence in ruling 

on the motion.

App.—Dallas May 31, 2023, no pet.) (implicitly rejecting preservation requirement under Rule 91a.6), and id. at *8 

(Pedersen, J., dissenting) (dissenting on basis of failure to preserve under Rule 91a.6).
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In other words, because the trial court’s consideration (and our de novo review) of the 

answer is limited to the legal inquiry of whether the affirmative defense of capacity is before the 

court, the result of the 91a analysis is unaffected whether legal inquiry is taken by judicial notice 

of the answer in the court’s file or the attachment of the answer to the motion to dismiss. Parker 

need not have—and could not have successfully—objected to the legal inquiry of whether capacity 

was properly before the trial court.9 We next turn to the merits.

Merits of Capacity Defense

According to Ohio Development’s motion, Parker individually lacks capacity because the 

receivership order awards exclusive authority to the receiver to pursue claims.10 But Parker’s fifth 

amended petition does not assert the claims individually; they were instead brought derivatively 

on behalf of KCDC. Under the title “FRAUD – CONSPIRACY / SHALIT & OHIO 

DEVELOPMENT DERIVATIVE CLAIMS BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF KCDC,” Parker 

particularly pled:

Ohio Development bid in its debt to purchase the property 

depriving KCDC of the actual auction value of the property. As 

further evidence of its conspiracy, shortly after purchasing the

property, Ohio Development gave Shalit an option to purchase the 

property at a discount off its fair market value. . . .

Shalit and Ohio Development conspired to defraud KCDC out of 

the money it would have received at a fair auction of the 

property. . . .

Parker was a limited partner at all times relevant to this lawsuit in 

KCDC. Pursuant to Texas Business Organizations Code § 153.402, 

Parker has standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of 

KCDC. Pursuant to TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 153.401, it is unlikely 

the general partner of KCDC, being Mr. Shalit, would bring these 

9 Citing Bethel for the proposition “the trial court may properly consider Ohio’s First Amended Answer” to “make the 

legal determination of whether an affirmative defense is properly before the court,” Ohio Development argued “Ohio 

Development’s attached evidence is not in contravention of Rule 91a” (emphasis in original). 10 The motion defines “Plaintiffs” as “Jack Parker” and “Jay Parker,” or collectively “the Parkers.” With respect to 

capacity, the motion asserts (interchangeably) that “Plaintiffs” and “the Parkers” (being defined as the individual 

human-beings Jack Parker and Jay Parker) lack capacity.
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claims since he is named as being liable for this conspiracy against 

KCDC. Additionally, the Court appointed Successor Receiver has 

indicated to the undersigned she would rather not bring these claims. 

Thus, the derivative action on behalf of KCDC is the only way 

Parker is able to redress the partnership’s claims against Shalit 

and Ohio Development. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 153.403.

[Emphasis added throughout.]

To be clear, Parker’s claims were first classified as derivative in the fifth amended petition. 

Yet, Ohio Development chose to stand on its existing motion to dismiss (aimed only at Parker’s 

individual allegations in the fourth amended petition) notwithstanding these substantive 

amendments. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(b). To the extent the trial court dismissed Parker’s 

derivative claims based on a lack of capacity, it was inappropriate under Rule 91a because the 

motion was directed only to individual claims, but Parker only alleged his claims derivatively on 

behalf of KCDC.

Nevertheless, had Ohio Development amended its motion to address the claims 

derivatively, given the factual allegations in the pleadings discussed above, the trial court would 

have erred in dismissing Parker’s derivative claims under Rule 91a on the basis of capacity.

Applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude Ohio Development failed to 

demonstrate Parker’s claim is legally baseless because of a lack of capacity. See In re Shire, 633 

S.W.3d at 21 (“[I]f the defendant cannot demonstrate that the plaintiff’s recovery on the claim in 

its petition are foreclosed as a matter of law, then it may still move for summary judgment, but it 

is not entitled to dismissal under Rule 91a.”).

CONCLUSION

Parker’s fifth amended petition alleged common law fraud and civil conspiracy claims 

against Ohio Development derivatively on behalf of KCDC. Taking legal notice of Ohio 

Development’s defenses and taking the factual allegations in Parker’s petition as true, Parker’s 
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derivative claims state a basis in law. We accordingly reverse the order of the trial court and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice