IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

April 10, 2019 Session

ROBERT JOHNSON v. MEMPHIS GUITAR SPA, LLC

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT-002687-17 Rhynette N. Hurd, Judge

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No. W2018-00665-COA-R3-CV

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After losing in general sessions court, Plaintiff attempted to appeal the judgment to the 

circuit court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a counterclaim in the circuit court. 

Plaintiff’s appeal was thereafter dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 

it was not perfected in a timely manner. The circuit court then entered a default judgment 

against the Plaintiff based upon Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the counterclaim. Plaintiff 

appeals, arguing that the circuit court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the 

counterclaim upon the dismissal of the appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B.

GOLDIN and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

Ted I. Jones, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert Johnson.

David I. Feigelson and Logan A. Klauss, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, 

Memphis Guitar Spa, LLC.

OPINION 

BACKGROUND

Robert Johnson (“Appellant”) initiated the present action on February 10, 2017, by 

filing a civil warrant in the Shelby County General Sessions Court (“general sessions

court”) against The Memphis Guitar Spa, LLC (“Appellee”). The civil warrant alleged 

that Appellee was liable for conversion, breach of contract, and damage to Appellant’s 

personal property.1 Appellee then filed a cross civil warrant against Appellee. On May 

 

1

Specifically, the warrant alleges “damages to personal property and musical instruments left for 

05/23/2019
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31, 2017, the general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of Appellee, as well as a 

voluntary nonsuit as to Appellee’s cross warrant. Thereafter, Appellant attempted to 

appeal the general sessions judgment to the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“trial court” 

or “circuit court”) by filing a notice of appeal on June 12, 2017. However, Appellant did 

not pay the cost bond associated with the appeal until June 13, 2017, one day later, and 

outside of the ten-day window for perfecting an appeal to the circuit court. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 27-5-108(a)(1) (“Any party may appeal from a decision of the general 

sessions court to the circuit court of the county within a period of ten (10) days on 

complying with this chapter.”).

Due to this omission, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss on June 30, 2017 

asserting that Appellant’s late payment rendered the appeal from the general sessions 

court untimely, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the 

matter. Appellant did not respond to the motion to dismiss. Appellee then filed, on 

August 18, 2017, a counterclaim against Appellant alleging breach of contract based 

upon what Appellee asserts is a different set of facts from that of Appellant’s initial 

claim.

2

Therein, Appellee asserted that it had expended labor and resources repairing 

guitars belonging to Appellant based upon an oral agreement between the parties. 

Appellee alleged that it had never been paid by Appellant for this work, and requested 

that it be awarded compensatory damages as well as pre- and post-judgment interest.

On August 25, 2017, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss, agreeing 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant’s original appeal from the general 

sessions court. Then, on October 13, 2017, Appellee filed a motion for default judgment 

alleging that Appellant had not answered Appellee’s counter-complaint in a timely 

manner, and that as such Appellee was entitled to a judgment in its favor. Appellant 

thereafter filed an answer on October 30, 2017, wherein he denied the substantive 

allegations in Appellee’s counterclaim and asserted the affirmative defenses of laches, 

estoppel, and the statute of frauds. Appellant did not, however, file a response to 

Appellee’s motion for default judgment.

After a hearing on November 17, 2017, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion 

for default judgment based upon Appellant’s failure to answer the counterclaim in a 

timely manner, and his failure to respond to the motion for default judgment all together. 

The issue of damages, however, was reserved for an evidentiary hearing to be held later. 

At this hearing, held on February 21, 2018, the trial court briefly addressed whether it 

could retain subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim since the initial appeal had 

been dismissed. Apparently concluding that it could, the trial court proceeded to hear 

testimony from a witness of Appellee, and then orally ruled that Appellee was entitled to 

 

service and repair which have not been returned or repaired.” 

2 Appellee maintains on appeal that the counterclaim at issue is a permissive counterclaim rather 

than a compulsory counterclaim. Appellant does not dispute this characterization.
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compensatory damages of $2,487.50, plus interest. An order was entered March 13, 2018, 

reflecting that the total damages awarded to Appellee were $3,256.92. Appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal to this Court on April 12, 2018.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Appellant raises only one issue for review: Whether the trial court erred in 

awarding a default judgment against Appellant. 

ANALYSIS

In arguing that the trial court erred in granting judgment in favor of Appellee, 

Appellant’s argument can essentially be divided into two theories: (1) that the trial court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claim due to the dismissal of the general 

sessions appeal; and (2) that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to 

insufficient service of process.3 We begin, as we must, with the issue of the trial court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction.

In addressing subject matter jurisdiction, our supreme court has previously 

explained: 

The concept of subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s lawful 

authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it. See Meighan v. 

U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tenn. 

1996); Standard Sur. & Casualty Co. v. Sloan, 180 Tenn. 220, 230, 173 

S.W.2d 436, 440 (1943). Subject matter jurisdiction involves the nature of 

the cause of action and the relief sought, see Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 

674, 675 (Tenn. 1994), and can only be conferred on a court by 

constitutional or legislative act. See Kane v. Kane, 547 S.W.2d 559, 560 

(Tenn. 1977); Computer Shoppe, Inc. v. State, 780 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1989). Since a determination of whether subject 

matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law, our standard of review is de 

novo, without a presumption of correctness. See Nelson v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999).

Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000). 

The present action originally came to the circuit court on appeal from the general 

sessions court. As such, no one disputes that had Appellant timely perfected an appeal to 

the circuit court, the circuit court would have had subject matter jurisdiction over the 

 

3 As noted infra, Appellant’s argument is not well-supported. The general basis of Appellant’s 

argument, however, is clear from his brief.
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action. See Griffin v. Campbell, 439 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tenn. 2014) (recognizing that

Tennessee law “confers on the circuit court ‘appellate jurisdiction of all suits and actions, 

of whatsoever nature, unless otherwise provided, instituted before any inferior 

jurisdiction, whether brought by appeal, certiorari, or in any manner prescribed by law.’”) 

(citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-112); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108(a)(1) (“Any 

party may appeal from a decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court of the 

county within a period of ten (10) days on complying with this chapter.”). There is 

likewise no dispute that due to Appellant’s failure to timely pay the bond for costs, the 

circuit court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant’s claim. Griffin, 

439 S.W.3d at 902 (“[F]iling a bond within the ten-day period is a condition precedent to 

the timely perfection of an appeal.”) (citing Love v. Coll. Level Assessment Servs. Inc., 

928 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tenn. 1996) (acknowledging that timely perfection of an appeal from 

a general sessions court is mandatory and that the circuit court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction otherwise)). 

The question now facing this Court, however, is whether the circuit court 

maintained subject matter jurisdiction over Appellee’s counterclaim, despite the fact that 

the original appeal from general sessions court was dismissed by the circuit court for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. In Appellant’s view, because his appeal was dismissed, 

“there was absolutely no jurisdiction for a counterclaim, and Appellee should have been 

required to file a separate, new, and independent suit.”4 Appellant essentially avers that 

his general sessions appeal and Appellee’s permissive counterclaim filed in the circuit 

court are somehow inextricably linked, such that the dismissal of the general sessions 

appeal likewise demands dismissal of the permissive counterclaim. 

In contrast, Appellee asserts that the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction 

over Appellee’s counterclaim because “a circuit court has the authority to separate claims 

over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction from counterclaims over which it does 

have subject matter jurisdiction.” In support, Appellee relies on this Court’s opinion in 

Bevels v. Tubbs, No. W2012-02375-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 6212222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Aug. 22, 2013), as well as Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 42.04 and 13.09. Having 

 

4 As a threshold matter, we note that Appellant has cited no law in support of his position, aside 

from Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 13.01, which addresses compulsory counterclaims and is thus 

inapplicable to the present case. Although it is certainly not this Court’s role “to research or construct a 

litigant’s case or arguments for him or her,” we proceed to consider the merits of this appeal in light of 

the fact that Appellee was able to fully brief this argument and the dispositive issue is the trial court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction. Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’ Resp. of Supreme Court, 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 

2010); Dishmon v. Shelby State Cmty. Coll., 15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“Among the 

issues most commonly considered by appellate courts on their own motion is the trial court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction.”) (internal citations omitted); Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tenn. 1994) 

(“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived”). Under different circumstances, however, an argument 

as “skeletal” as Appellant’s would likely be considered waived. Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 615 (“[W]here a 

party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal 

argument, the issue is waived.”). 
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reviewed the record on appeal and the applicable law, we are persuaded by Appellee’s 

position. 

In Bevels, we addressed a factual situation analogous the present case. The 

original suit in Bevels was brought in general sessions court when a landlord filed a civil 

warrant against his tenants for unpaid rent. Id. at *1. In response, the tenants sought to 

have the action removed to the circuit court on the basis that they had a substantial 

defense to the landlord’s claim and they planned on bringing a counterclaim that would 

exceed the jurisdictional limits of general sessions court. Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. 16-

15-732 (commonly known as “the removal statute”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-501(d)(1) 

(2009) (establishing the jurisdictional limit of the general sessions court)). In the 

application for removal, the tenants alleged that they posted a sufficient cost bond; in 

reality, the tenants paid the general sessions court clerk $150.00, as requested by that 

office. Id. at *4.The general sessions court granted the removal motion and the case was 

transferred to circuit court. Id. at *2. The tenants filed an answer, counterclaim, and thirdparty complaint in the circuit court. Id. The tenants paid $325.00 for court costs at the 

time they filed these pleadings. Id. 

The litigation proceeded in a typical fashion until April 2012, when the circuit 

court sua sponte directed the parties to show cause as to why the matter should not be 

remanded back to the general sessions court in light of concerns that the trial court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *3. This concern was based upon two different issues: 

(1) the tenants’ failure to file a sufficient cost bond, and (2) the fact that the removal 

statute the tenants relied on in transferring the case from the general sessions court was 

inapplicable to Shelby County at the time.5Id. The trial court’s “show cause order did not 

differentiate between the [o]wner’s original claim and [t]enants’ counterclaim; it simply 

referred to ‘the within cause.’” Id.

The tenants objected to the suggestion that the trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction, but alternatively “asked the circuit court to retain jurisdiction over the 

counterclaim even if it remanded the original claim to general sessions court.”6Id. In 

contrast, the landlord argued that the circuit court lacked authority to bifurcate the issues 

and had “no jurisdiction over the cause of action” as a whole. Id. at *4. After a hearing, 

the circuit court ruled that both the lack of a sufficient cost bond and the inapplicability of 

the removal statute deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the landlord’s 

complaint. Id. at *5 (describing the trial court’s decision as “that it lacked subject matter 

 

5

The inapplicability of the removal statute was related to a provision in that statute stating that it 

did not apply “in any county having a population of not less than seven hundred seventy thousand 

(770,000) nor more than seven hundred eighty thousand (780,000), according to the federal census of 

1980 or any subsequent federal census.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-732.

6 There was never any dispute that had the tenants’ counterclaim been filed as a separate, 

independent action in the circuit court, the circuit court would have properly had subject matter 

jurisdiction over the claim. 
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jurisdiction”); see also Brief of Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Appellants, at xvii, Bevels 

v. Tubbs, 2013 WL 6212222 (No. W2012-02375-COA-R3-CV) (“In that Order, the court 

found that it lacked jurisdiction on the grounds that the removal statute, [section] 16-15-

732 does not apply in Shelby County, and that [tenants] had failed to comply with Bond 

requirements set forth in [section] 16-15-732.”). As such, the circuit court remanded the 

landlord’s claims back to the general sessions court. Id. 

The circuit court, however, dismissed tenants’ counterclaim and third-party 

complaint as “legal nullities.” Id. In reaching this result, the circuit court concluded that 

“[w]ithout initial jurisdiction, all pleadings documented in this court are to be deemed 

null and void[,]” and further concluded that it could not rule on the motion to bifurcate 

because “[t]he motion is rendered not only void but moot.” Id. The tenants appealed the

dismissal of their counterclaim and third-party claim to this Court.7

On appeal, we first addressed the trial court’s conclusion that it lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over the original action due to the lack of a sufficient cost bond. We

concluded that the trial court erred in determining that the tenants’ cost bond was 

insufficient in light of a recent opinion of this Court. See Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & 

Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Feb. 15, 2013), reversed in part by Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A., 439 S.W.3d 

899, 904 (Tenn. 2014) (holding that the cost bond statute is unambiguous and is satisfied 

by the payment of “the standard court cost of $150.00 for appeals to the circuit court” 

plus state and local litigation taxes). Because the parties did not appeal the remand of the 

landlord’s claims to the general sessions court, we did not address whether the trial court 

erred in its conclusion that the requirements of the removal statute also precluded the trial 

court from exercising jurisdiction over the appeal.8 Bevels, 2013 WL 6212222, at *11 

(“We specifically note that our holding herein does not address the propriety of the trial 

court’s remand of the original claim, so that portion of the order remains intact.”).

Next, we considered the tenants’ argument that even if the initial appeal from 

general sessions court was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court 

still had the authority to proceed on the counterclaim pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of 

Civil Procedure. On this point, we agreed with the tenants. Indeed, we held that a circuit 

court has the authority to bifurcate claims over which it has no jurisdiction from claims 

 

7 The landlord promptly nonsuited his remaining claim upon remand to the trial court. Due to the 

expiration of the statute of limitations and the trial court’s dismissal of their counterclaim and third-party 

complaint, the tenants were effectively deprived of “seeking recourse” in any court. Id. at *9.

8 Although the tenants raised the issue of the constitutionality and applicability of the removal 

statute, they also argued that this contention was “alternative” to their primary argument. As discussed at 

length infra, the tenants’ primary argument was that the trial court had the authority to bifurcate the 

claims and retain jurisdiction only over the counterclaim; because this Court ultimately agreed with the 

tenants, we simply did not address the removal statute.
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over which it does have jurisdiction. In reaching this result, we relied primarily on the 

language of Rules 42.02 and 13.09 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure:

Tenants’ overarching issue of whether the Circuit Court erred in 

dismissing their counterclaim and third-party complaint as void does, 

indeed, implicate Rules 42.02 and 13.09 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Rule 42.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

The court for convenience or to avoid prejudice may in jury 

trials order a separate trial of any one or more claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims, or issues on 

which a jury trial has been waived by all parties. For the same 

purposes the Court may, in nonjury trials, order a separate 

trial of any one or more claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, 

third-party claims, or issues.[9] 

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 42.02. Rule 13.09 in turn refers to Rule 42; Rule 

13.09 provides that when a court separates claims under Rule 42, a 

judgment may be rendered on a counterclaim even if the original claim 

from which it was separated is dismissed, so long as the court had subject 

matter jurisdiction over the claim:

If the court orders separate trials as provided in Rule 42, 

judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered 

in accordance with the terms of Rule 54 when the court has 

jurisdiction to do so, even if the claims of the opposing party 

may have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.[10] 

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 13.09. The advisory commission comment following Rule 

13.09 discusses the interplay between these rules. It explains that “Rule 42 

empowers the court, in order to avoid inconvenience or prejudice to a party, 

to order separate trials of one or more cross-claims, counterclaims, 

etc.,” while “Rule 13.09 empowers the court to enter judgment on a crossclaim or counterclaim, even though the claims of the opposing party have 

been already disposed of.”

Bevels, 2013 WL 6212222, at *8. 

Based on the foregoing, the Bevels court concluded that the circuit court had the 

authority “to render a judgment in the separate counterclaim, even when the original 

 

9 Rule 42.02 has not been amended since the Bevels decision.

10 Again, Rule 13.09 has not been amended since the Bevels decision.
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lawsuit was dismissed.” Id. at *11. The fact that the general sessions appeal had been 

disposed of for lack of subject matter jurisdiction therefore had no effect on the 

application of Rules 13.09 and 42.02. Instead, we essentially held that the circuit court 

had the discretion to separate the claims and retain jurisdiction over the counterclaim

despite the fact that the trial court purportedly lacked jurisdiction over the originating 

claims; thus, it was “plain error” to declare the tenants’ counterclaim null and void. Id. at 

*10. In so holding, we also noted the “strong preference embodied in the Tennessee 

Rules of Civil Procedure for cases stating a valid legal claim to be decided on their 

merits.” Id. at *11. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was vacated and remanded so 

that the circuit court could decide, in its discretion, whether to exercise jurisdiction over 

the tenants’ counterclaim. Id. 

In analyzing Bevels, several points are important to keep in mind. First, the trial 

court’s ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction was based not solely on the lack of 

a sufficient cost bond, but also on the inapplicability of the removal statute. Id. at *5. As 

such, the reversal of the trial court’s ruling on the cost bond issue had no effect on the 

trial court’s ultimate ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the landlord’s 

original action. Likewise, we did not overturn this ruling, and in fact described this 

portion of the trial court’s order as “remain[ing] intact.” Id. at *11. Consequently, the 

Bevels opinion’s discussion of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the 

counterclaim and third-party complaint essentially assumes that the trial court was in fact 

deprived of jurisdiction of the original claims raised by the landlord. Indeed, nothing in 

Bevels suggests that this Court’s ultimate ruling that the trial court had continuing subject 

matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim and third-party complaint was the result of any

purported error in the trial court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the landlord’s

original complaint. Rather, this Court’s decision that the trial court could retain 

jurisdiction over these claims was based on this Court’s interpretation of the Tennessee 

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although there are superficial distinctions between the case-at-bar and Bevels, we 

must conclude that its reasoning is persuasive in this case. While the original complaint 

was merely remanded in Bevels, rather than dismissed, the disposition of both original 

claims resulted from the trial court’s determination that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction. In Bevels, however, the court held that the treatment of the original claim 

that originated in general sessions court was not dispositive of the viability of a 

counterclaim filed in circuit court. Instead, under Bevels and the applicable rules of civil 

procedure, a counterclaim may be viable notwithstanding the fact that “the claims of the 

opposing party have been already disposed of,’” even where that disposition was the 

result of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *8 (quoting Tenn. R. Civ. P. 13.09 

advisory committee’s cmt.). Rather, that claim should be treated and judged separately 

from the dismissed claim. 
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Reviewing Appellee’s counterclaim independent of the general sessions appeal

reveals that the trial court was correct to retain subject matter jurisdiction. There is no 

dispute in this case that Appellee’s counterclaim could have been brought as an 

independent action in the circuit court, and that the circuit court could have properly 

exercised jurisdiction over the claim. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (“The circuit 

court is a court of general jurisdiction, and the judge of the circuit court shall administer 

right and justice according to law, in all cases where the jurisdiction is not conferred upon 

another tribunal.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-113 (“Notwithstanding any law to the 

contrary, contracts for goods or services between individuals, partnerships, associations, 

corporations, governmental entities or limited liability companies are enforceable in 

either circuit or chancery court in the county where: (1) The defendant may be found; (2) 

The contract was executed; (3) The goods were provided or were to be provided; or (4) 

Services were rendered or were to be rendered.”). The dismissal of the Appellant’s

separate claim originating in general sessions court simply had no effect on the trial 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Appellee’s separate claim, as granted by the 

Tennessee General Assembly. 

Under the persuasive reasoning in Bevels, the dismissal of the general sessions 

appeal in this situation does not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to 

adjudicate the counterclaim, as “Rule 13.09 permits the [c]ircuit court to render a 

judgment in the separate counterclaim, even when the original lawsuit is dismissed.” 

Bevels, 2013 WL 6212222, at *11. Simply put, the dismissal of a general sessions appeal, 

even on the basis of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, does not require the trial court to 

likewise dismiss any separate claims where the trial court has an independent basis to 

exercise jurisdiction over those claims. Moreover, given Appellant’s inadequate briefing 

of this issue, we see no reason to depart from the persuasive authority and result arrived 

at by this Court in Bevels. The trial court was therefore well within its discretion in 

retaining jurisdiction over Appellee’s counterclaim notwithstanding the dismissal of the 

general sessions appeal. 

Finally, we briefly address Appellant’s second argument on appeal. As previously 

discussed, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting a default judgment 

against Appellant due to a deficiency in the service of process of Appellee’s counter 

complaint. This assertion is problematic for several reasons.

First, Appellant answered Appellee’s counterclaim after both the countercomplaint and the motion for default judgment had been filed, and never raised the issue 

of insufficient process or service of process in the answer. It is well-settled that when a 

litigant files an answer to a complaint and does not therein or by separate motion raise the 

issue of insufficiency of process, that defense is waived. See generally Tenn. R. Civ. P. 

12.02 & 12.08; see also Faulks v. Crowder, 99 S.W.3d 116, 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) 

(concluding that the plaintiff waived the affirmative defense of insufficient service of 

process where issue was raised years after service was issued and after plaintiff’s answer 
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had been filed); Town of Huntsville v. Scott Cty., 269 S.W.3d 57, 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2008) (“Insufficiency of service of process does not render the filing a nullity; instead, it 

is merely a defense that must be asserted . . . and if the defense of insufficiency of 

process is not properly asserted, the issue is waived.”); Dye v. Murphy, No. W2003-

01521-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 350660, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (“[A] party who files 

a motion or responsive pleading but does not raise the defenses of personal jurisdiction, 

improper venue, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service is deemed to have 

waived those defenses.”). Accordingly, because Appellant failed to raise the issues of 

insufficient process and service of process in his answer to Appellee’s counter-complaint, 

these defenses are waived.

Likewise, Appellant raises the issue of insufficient process and service of process 

for the first time on appeal. It is well-settled that this Court does not consider issues 

raised in this manner, as our jurisdiction is appellate only. Fayne v. Vincent, 301 S.W.3d 

162, 171 (Tenn. 2009) (citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tenn. 2009); Dye v. 

Witco Corp., 216 S.W.3d 317, 321 (Tenn. 2007); Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 403 

(Tenn. 1996)). In light of the foregoing, we need not address Appellant’s argument that 

he was never properly served with Appellee’s counter-complaint. 

Appellee does not raise any arguments in this appeal that the granting of the 

default judgment or the award of damages was flawed in any other respect. Having 

determined that both arguments raised by the Appellant are without merit, the order of 

the trial court granting Appellee’s motion for default judgment is affirmed in all respects. 

CONCLUSION

The order of the Shelby County Circuit Court is hereby affirmed, and this case 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are 

taxed to Appellant, Robert Johnson, for which execution may issue if necessary. 

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE