LEVEL

Technical leput .485

THE EFFECTS OF REPEATED ENGAGEMENT

-M SIMULATION EXERCISES ON INDIVIDUAL

AND COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE -

I 5 ,

Rolerl to.UlZen

SIMULATION SYSTEMS TECHNICAL AREA

g DTIC

ELECTEN-E

JUL 7 1981

_.S

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

-'Augi.#BO 8

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The Effects of Repeated Engagement Simulation

Exercises on Individual and Collective Performance -. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUIMBER

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Engagement Simulation; Tactical Training; Tactical Training Systems;

Collective Performance Measurement; Tactical Skills

with varying miss ions and terrain against ;I constant Iv improving Ioponvl't.

The results of this research ind icate that col Oct ivi tact ical performanlct

DD I JA)f7 1473 EDITION! OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE UNCIASS I Fl III

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is improved by repeated engagement simulation exercises. III thet. spec if ic

conditions tested, rifle squad members defending against a series of 15

rifle platoons in a movement- to-conltac t mission tended to suffer increasod

casualiIes when they caused miore casuait ieS . Sqluad MPMbL1 _. var ied cons i dtr -

ablyv among eachi other in terms of casualt ies produced. The squad c o I I-(t;ve

improved over time in their rate of producing enemy casualties, hut did no(t

improve in avoiding enemy fire. The squad collectively inflicted more

casualties from some defensive posit ions than would be expected by chance.

Acssion 

For

NTIS GE.A Jt

DTIC TAB

Dist .b". :1

%*CuRI'Y (C AISIFI, A110% V- -f, WI.- ['I. .. .
Technical Report 485

THE EFFECTS OF REPEATED ENGAGEMENT

SIMULATION EXERCISES ON INDIVIDUAL

AND COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE

Robert H. Sulzen

Submitted by:

Frank J. Harris, Chief

SIMULATION SYSTEMS TECHNICAL AREA

Approved by:

Edgar M. Johnson, Director

ORGANI7ATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria. Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Departmen't of the Army

August 1980

Army Project Number Simulation Systems Effectiveness

20162722A791

AwfOPW for putiic rniiON: dwtirsutOm unlimmsd.

iii
ARI Research Reports and Technical Reports are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and for other research and mriiary agencies. Any findings ready

for inmplementation at the time of publication are presented in the last part

of the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommendations for official action normatiy are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

iv
FOREWORD

In 1972, the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ART) initiated research which led to the development of a training

method now known as tactical engagement simulation training. A tactical training environment has been created; huwever, definitive training guidance has

not accompanied the training system. In order to provide effective training

guidance, information is needed on the skills relevant to tactical performance

on the modern battlefield and how these skills relate to one another. This

research systematically investigated individual and collective tactical skill

acquisition, holding constant the variables of terrain, mission, and skill of

the opposition. The research was conducted in response to the requirements of

Army Project 2QI62722A791 as a part of a larger program of research in tactical

training for the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

The research was made possible through the active support of the 3d

Infantry (Old Guard). Thanks are due to the officers and men of the Old

Guard, especially CPT Dean Cash who served as senior controller for all field

exercises and ensured that data collection procedures were followed. The

following members of the research staff participated in the data collection

effort: John J. Bosley, Frank King, Peter W.J. Onoszko, and Earl S. Stein.

Finally, Robert G. Wanschura and Peter J. Paternoster contributed to the development and explication of the indices of collective performance.

OS I PHz AL . ER

ecj nical Director

V
THE EFFECTS OF REPEATED ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION EXERCISES

ON INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE

BRIEF--

Requirement:

To determine the effects of repeated engagement simulation exercises upon

the performance of individuals and their small units against a series of novice,

opponents, keeping the terrain/mission constant. This is part of an effort to

identify tactical skills related to successful combat mission performance and

to determine the relationship among such variables and differing combat environments.

Procedure:

A rifle squad of nine men with a defensive mission established five

positions in an area of 2000 by 200 meters. The squad was then opposed in a

series of engagement simulation exercises by 15 different rifle platoons

(average strength 30 men) with a movement-to-contact mission. The location of

each squad member was recorded for each exercise, along with the casualties

inflicted and incurred. Measures for individual and collective tactical performance were developed for the rifle squad.

Findings:

Individual soldiers tended to suffer increased casualities when th,.v

caused more casualties. The squad as a group became progressivelv more eff,-

tive at inflicting casualties; however, they did not measurably improve in

avoiding enemy fire. Different defensive positions contributed unequally t,

casualties inflicted.

Utilization of Findings:

The results provide evidence for a ,radual improvement in col letet iv

tactical achievement during repeated trials, as measured lv an indeix hea;1vilx

weighting casualties inflicted. Army units should provide repeated opirtunities for soldiers and small units to practice tactical ki I l durio.

engagement simulation exercises.

vii
I

THE EFFECTS OF REPEATED ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION EXERCISES

ON INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1

METHOD ........................................................ 2

Subjects ................................................. 2

Procedure ................................................ 2

RESULTS ....................................................... 3

Individual Performance ..................................... 3

Defensive Position .......................................... 3

Collective Performance ..................................... 6

D ISCUSSION .................................................... 13

REFERENCES .................................................... 16

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Measures of individual squad

member performance ............................. 4

2. Casualties inflicted from varying

defensive positions ............................. 5

3. Chi-square analysis of expected and

observed casualties inflicted

from each defensive position ................... 8

4. Casualties inflicted bv individual from

varving positions ..............................

5. Weekly mean participation in each

pos ition .......................................

iiiCIWNG PAU& BLANK-NOT Fl"i.Z)

L y
I

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Defensive positions .................................. 7

2. Weekly mean achievement

index for defending squad ....................... 10

3. Weekly mean conservation

index for defending squad ....................... 12

4. Weekly mean effectiveness

index for defending squad ....................... 14

X
lFHE IFFECIS OF RlI'A lED EN(;A(EMENT S IMULAF [ON EXERCISE~S

ON MNDIV LB A! AND COLLECTIVE PERFOR-NANCE

T NIROIIUCT I )N

Tactic~al enga),ment simulat ion is a training method introduc ed inuto( theik

Army in 1972 to stress the combat environment in which individua,-ls :nol in its

must operate on the, battlefield. Unlike ''live fire'' exercises (whe-re the oni V

enemy is a series of inianimate targets) or "'blank fire" exerc iseswhe

fir ing effects are, at best, at subj ect ive estimate by an ump ire), engac erer

simulation Prov ides at real ist ic and objective simuilat ion of weapon effects culd

weaOpon s ignatuires t or two opposing sides in free-play exercises (w:ord aind

Root, 1977).

Expe r ience inl thet fi el1d has shown that repea ted engagetment si mulIatin

c.xc rci1ses have p rod riced imp roved tacticial unit per fornc e. :n it s rece ivilrig

3 weeks ofIegcee s inn[at ion train inrg perform bet te r t hai on i t s r e e i v iing

I week of engaZgemen~t simulat ion train ing (Root, Epstein, ut al , I 9i6). fin

more recent tes.,t, r ifle squads rece iv inv 3 dlays of engagemtent sir-1ui at ionl

training demonstrated greater tacticail proficiency than rif le siiiads receiving,

i days of convent imal training (Banks, Hardy, Scott, Kress, , Id q-/-,77

Mel iza, Scott , and Epstein, 1 97? ; Scot t, Ba-nks , Ihardy, & S i Izcn, I7) A

a ts wi isS onducte.d with tank plaitoons uppo)rted b,' 0~ :itrmtr

miss;il 1v c ions whe Lre1 th11e un it s rcc e ived 5 dayvs ungacueme nt siml it ion tri iiiing and performeitd bet ter thanl comparabhle unlits given -5 days o f C'OnrlvIlt 11) 1, 11

training (Scott, Mel iza, Hardyv, Banks,, & Word, 1979; Sco,(tt, Mel iza , hhajrl,j

Baniks, 1979).

The -i fucts aof training on nd iv iduail and colIlect ive performance duti i n

thet engagement s imulat ion process have been d iff~i cult to measure. 1.9 i i Ic t,1ot I i

sidles are improving, it is har-d to measure1- tile performance of onp s ide--t he

sinev relat ive performance today may einmpovument over ve-St rcl~c.i:

mance because the opponent has also improved.

[het miss ions assigned to) training units have a definite vft c (t in1 t hi

o Ut comeI. lDefunders have at decided advantage over alttackers, accor-d inc t1Am

doct r inc ( liepar tmun t of the Army, 1 97hhb) and resea rch evidence (Root it .1.

1970). [lie --ra ining, transfer effect ot' one. imission on another is unknown:l.

Enmgageme~nt ,;imiilat ion training is ''ph cal lv condor ted onl vary trip tierr:,ii

to enable the t rainees to I earn thle soccific te-chniqJues Janpli i rb to d1itl-r

en1t terrain. Resarih has indicated that troops adapt to variations inl t iet

terraiin by e mployiT i o'mre long-rainge mcvn il the open ind ;or' it rot

weapons in the wools (Root and Erwin, 106) inice terrain is olt' en hioridL

rem exertcise ti exercise, iti if~it o 'iiirilll 'ti'tiit

impruivk-ment s ;ire. ittr n uit alt to reetdpractice or terra in :idoit tvo kcmci I.
Iheit res-.eir Ii ohjeic tive was to mcasure tact ical skill Acquinn; t n, wli Itc~introl I inc jiontent Skill1, tasctical mi ss ion, Anid te'rra in.

METHOD

ThO unit for invest i at on wats a rifle squad formed to se-rve, AS tht.

defend 1mg OP1'1K (opposing, force) against r ifle platoons conduct inc mi()'((Tlet -

to-contact missiens. Mui squad was made uip of ninme men rang inup in rank fri r

piiVatk. first Class to) stat!f Sergeant. 'he OlPFOR ;(Iuid %,AS; formned fro)m at

battalion scouit platoon. Dlur inm the course of tho- test, some men were sisnt

And Six sublin) t es~t-1 from1 tile( I)ttal ion scout ulatoon- filled in from onu

f u r t i ' , 's

l'he I - r i I t plIatoons scrv ine as thle oppo(s ft ion W'ere rec iuV :11 n t'tr--

n Il eva Iliiat i on ! o r t he mov,me t -t o-contatt m iss ion (Depar tmen t o f t he ArIm'.,

19 7 ha . rha 1 f t uLen p lat oons ranged i n s ize f rem 2 2 to 3 7 men , w it h -iean 0.

30 . 5 3.

I he oliKsqjuad prepared Oct ens lye posit ions and selected an 01)Si'rvat i~l

1)o s t e C. for waIrd o! o thel main I ine of defense. Tile Squtad wa1sintued o

detel-tnd ilo t ht, sampe manner ! or uat h) )f t he 1 5 Ji jffIere nt tecst ed p)l1atoons . A

15 r im vio4 rps p I At on was run Against the squad f or tw prel ini narv (onor' Isiu

dlU r I nYW Cek I to wor k 0Ul theIn o exerC iSev( cn t r ol p)ruc edu revs foL)r the u1 P 1 :l itomsI

to bt' te-stedl. lerrsiin wats kept constant by uiluc oniv mearaaprx a

2(100 mi -!Of ,i )! roll ug aind wovoded te-rrinl Ait hort N.1. 1Hi1ll, VA.

!sill plito"1 arr ivil for test ins At anl aseinl7 v arI sit on" od t, l th'.

I 1e 1 I wis ,- v Uin n tM unccemen ai L t s;imri la io 11)r h h cf i .:i tI I the (,T- mo'em'n I - f,

nT)t A"ct m1]i Ss;io or de Can IId Iecan the iu exe rci se. (hne mi is S ion '01S co("Id u' ti c I

dI foI ,r 3 c (1nSt.c I It. i ye dlivs, I we ek. hAIsI exerc i Seo was conduc Ied inl st Lo~io

hi teMnc 'J7,emu't s, i MIIait L i1inlprocedures as outl mned in the- aplirlprisitt i'inuC

(1 i Army In! antryv Nchoo, 1973) . Control lers w~ere traiined t o ASisutsSc-i i i. I -

t i , 5 baSi-d o n t 1Wi -Mp I oxV'm'n1t of) t the fo0l loin1g 1) We'al)unS r i ,'I, Imaliti it I

hand grenades, i' svmore mlinus, L.AWS (iJ guIt Ant i-tank EaotIand no1r tA it -

ire w, i S l)n' con trolle I(,r fo,)r ea-Ich1 g roup o1 t our it 0 iemns ruttdstlit' f ' T i' Au'( .7e Tl t S i u I a it iont p rjc ed urecs.

Ai liti t )IIt r, I S t At ion kep ( s)L ;i CassI-;II'I v rP01 lit, r ruc 't tiI'u h t noti (',I

.I S il I II Io 1 t ''m thIIe casiisIltv , arid theI fir er . A' V oI , win: I~1 S I I

t ili or ) tir intl di rict f irt ri is ion11s reqtI' d !)v I) uth side'- t h,, ttut'sh-t

ro'utd s f i rid, And t lit' , ss ItL i (-S I at L st-r(' iullsud P;) c i - ret ct i to.

(,)I I t urs ,, r -, ord (id'h lii' t S s -i' Ift i dctit 't i ( -~ I I t i i i-il ~ k

(i ir i tiv tici I ' rl i'I , A' s d t ho' iSuli I t i ('s in! lit It'd itid I i lu '-.( . '1( d

ci Ir hrt mis-u';4tl 1 U h I ( 1 op'i i i n i v' i I 11u;iI i 1 1An cI Ii t l i V( so I I s put 1 1i-ifl

ri.o ' lr's
As part of the same test, additional data were col leted from the oppos in,

r iflIe pl atoon units concerning the effects of leader hoard-game p1 av onl t he

initijal engagement simulation exerc ise (Suizen, Ste in, and Jones, in prep;irat ion)

RE SULI S

Individual Performance

The performyance'L Of each squad member was recorded for the 15S exerc ise~s

dur ing Week 2 through Week 6. rhe measures included the casualtiesi that

each squad member inifl1icteod upon the attacking platoon, the number of times

tic became aI casualty, and the number of t ines hie- part icipated in the 15

exerc ises (Table 1) . Iwo measures of performance were developed for iose

with these data--mean casualties infl icted per particuipation, and mealn

casualties suffered per participation. Individual squad members varied

cons iderablIy in the mean number of casualties inflicted per participlation,

with a ralnge of .31 to 8.13 and a mean of 2.9). he meanl casualt les- suiffered had a range~ of .33 to .80 and aI meani of A

Inspec(-t ion ofI da ta on casual1t i us inf1 I i Itt Vd I )reveals tha fiv

of the, ninu squad members (Individuals A throu,; infli K ted 87 of thle

casualties; six of the squad members (Individa ilA throig,,h F) inf] icted 9!4

of the eniemyI casual ties. These six squald i~ l 1icted aIt least two

catSUAlties per partic ipat ion, whi I the ;(,ni<ts~ uad erJ r inlflIicted less than one.

Oine object ive of combat operat ions- isn t' 7x IX f't f OW'n WLiipofl5 upon thI e enemy; thI e nat uril yr' Yr;z Ii ffet

Of enem we~apo n s. 11nS pectL i on o f the cas t i a Y- P pir t iI pit i On

ind icates that success in causing enemy sA te 1 tI dtscce

in aviVOd i ng U1n1nM f ire. I n fac t, theire' I I ears t -' :i r dii t momen11t or rel,1t ionl

oif .8(0 b~etween casnl'It ies i nflIi cteLd and asIlt ie tIn nui- rLd sign ; if i, ant ait

the .01 l evel' ) . In ef fec t, the more2 enemy cIsual It e;U prodhed ')" I smiuad

member, the more I ikelv hie was to become aI cas-u i I tv i. insetlf

Iwo individuals (B and] F) were e~xcept ionS. to this g.,eneral rilec. Although individuals B and 1: cause-d more than two casual t ies pe r part ic Iit ion, tin] ike the others in this category they suf ered less than . ) caisuilt i( es per part i c ipat ion. Both these men were non- comm is sined o t f c cr5- (ont

was aI serge-ant, F-S5, and the ot her was aI staff sergeant , 11-6)

Defens ive, l'os it ion

Inspec t i oIn o f ca sua I t v data rela;Ited to det ens i ye pos i t ion sugg ,ested Ai

di t fecr e nt ia e c-f f ect iv e neI-ss- i d ef enis iv e 1) s i t i onIis o c cupi)e d (Tabl) 1e 2 ). Squa11 1d

membe rs i n pos i tion I and 2 per formed at about the explec ted ratt e (2 .88 c u

alt ios inflicted per participation). However, performance at posit io~ns 3

aInd 4 was; well be low that rate, and performance at posit ion 5 was, well ihove

it.
4-j

4j L.! C-c ~ cj ~ e~ W44 c) I. f! ' ~ ' (! -t C

SCJU) 'H-

~4

ct C'! Lf! Cl r- C'! LI) C

V') a:) C') 

(1) C") C') C'! 

C'

0

U) 1

C, 4I

(Nj If) 1-4 c -4 00 a: a: -7 C'

Cl

4-14

I-q 24Th Cm 'Cn < a U 41 cz
~~0 ' a~c~ 

0 -ccn (.

00 4-,4

o Lo

-4 ca

-4 m 00

0 (nr 00 0H

'4- 0 Aj

0 fl

C:--

0-1

0-0 r- 41I

0 H0

> L"U Q) .,

4 .14 4-1

'-4 0

0~~Q 4- -. UW 

U) 0- C)C C

14 - '-

00 ' c - 0

C) 41 l

U)0 0n.

00 wI- 00 0 x4 

Wu- uN co 4. H) 0-4 -

-0(, '-40 -

m Z F-4 ,-4u
Figure I shows the defensive positions on a scale map with boundaries.

Position I and 2 were on the defensive right side and forward. Pos it ions 3

and 4 were on the defensive left and rearward. Position 5 was the observation

post or ()' and was well forward of the other positions in one of three Iocat ions. The barbed wire on both flanks of the main defensive positions served

to funnel the attackers into the defensive position.

A chi-square analysis was made with the distribution of observed casualties inflicted from each position and the distribution of casualtiets

inflicted that could be expected (Table 3). The chi-square analysis shlwed a

significant difference between the distributions of casualties inflicted.

The members of the defending rifle squad differed considerably from each

other in terms of casualties inflicted, as shown in Table 1. However, review

of positioning data showed that most individuals occupied at least tw,, different positions. One individual occupied all five positions, and his performance in casualties inflicted (Table 4) p-trallels the general nattern 01-

casualties inflicted by all squad members as shown in Table 2 (position 5

l&2 3 &4 ).

Table 5 provides data on the mean number of times a specific pos ition oIr

area was occupied by the defending rifle squad members. Although there wert,

some constraints on the squad members, they were relativelv free to ock-upv the

positions as they chose. Table 5 indicates shifts in squad member position

preferences.

Col lect-ive Performance

Two perfformance indices were developed for use on the casuailtv dati. An

"Achievement" index (Equation 1) considered casualties produced (by dir ct and

indirect fire) and the number of persons in the exercise (m inus persoont.] I,)st

and seltf-infl icted casualties).

G:as A- Gas (1I)

Af = eg

N-(Gas - )

esi N el

where: Af- Friendly achievement index

Gas = Enemv casualt ies from di r -t I irI, c ,-I.t ,nc

(as = Fnemv casualties from indirect t irt wt,'tJo0n

N =[ t1 1 number ot (01 LTIV Inen - r run 11 C e

(as S. I f -i nf l i ct e.d e.nemy Casun I t i ,!

N o lo(ta I number (i n mv Icr-nnI I,,t

(uWci ertain ,Is to ltc;it i(,n

H.r~ it;., d l , r 1 I .c , ,qu ! ; i, ,ll-} x i . - ,l -i, ' ;,, ., 11

4 1 MiIltI
INI

it i'mf

7
14 U"

c- Lf

crc* Gox

c* - C.

Id-

.-4

U, CL

Li -2 -
Fable 4. Casualties Inflicted by Individual E a

from Varying Positions

Defensive Position

17___ 2 3 45 To tal1

Casualties Inflicted 9 5 0 0 27 41

Participations 4 2 2 1 4 13

Mean Casualties Inflicted 2.25 3.S 0 0 6.75 3.15

Per Participation

aIndividual F was the oniv member of the defending squad to participate from

al 11 jive pos it ions.

Table 5. Weekly Mean Participation in Each Position

Po s it i onl

Week I nt) daita ava ili e

Week 2 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.7

Week i 1.0 2.0 1.7 1 .3 1.0

week 42. 7 2.7 .7 2.0 1.0

Week 54.0) 1.7 02.0 1.0

Week 6 . 1.7 1 3 L.7 1.0

Iotkl Meanl 2.91 2.0) 1.1 1.7 1.1

'3To t.i I n umber iat pa rt i pa n t ; ou(up1)v in), it pos it i on d ur i np a week d iv id ed 1)

the nitmher of texer i ses in thle we-k.

9
I

i

'C

~X2 C

II I

'~1

V

()
were run per week except for the first week when the two preparatory exercises

were conducted). With the exception of the second week, the mean Achievement

index (Figure 2) shows a gradual improvement from .74 to 1.0 and demonstrates

what appears to be collective improvement over time.

A second performance index, the "Conservation" index (Equation 2),

considered the avoidance of casualties (total personnel less casualties from

all causes) and personnel lost. Personnel lost or misoriented were not

counted for or against the conserving unit since they were not direct battle

losses.

Nf - (Casfn + Casfg + Casfsi + Nfl) (2)

Nf N fl

where: Cf = Friendly conservation index

N = Total number of friendly personnel

f

Casfn = Friendly casualties from direct fire

Cas fg= Friendly casualties from indirect fire

CaSfsi = Self-inflicted friendly casualties

N Total number of friendly personnel lost

fi (uncertain as to location)

The defending rifle squad's Conservation index was calculated for etch

exercise, and then weekly means were calculated as shown in Figure 3. Al -

though the Achievement index shows a gradual improvement over time, the onservation index shows only a slight increase over time.

An index (Equation 3) was also develooed for "Effectiveness," which is

a function of both the Achievement and the Conservation indices. In the

development of the Effectiveness index it was decided that there were two

effects: one was due to Conservation and the second was due to the interaction of Conservation and Achievement. It was further decided that the, tw,

effects were additive. The Conservation effect was developed to be more

v;aluable when there were fewer casualties; this was done bv making the C )nservation effect quadratic. For the interact ion effect of Conservat ion ind

Achievement a change in Conservation was viewed as more important when hv c 1s

of Achitvement were higher. Tierefore, a multiplicative re I ation sh it p ewet ,

change in (onstrvation and change in Achievement was chosen. li', result is I

larger product diffe rence for higher Achievement levels than for lower Ah i(x,-

ment levels. lhe effectiveness index is:

E = C2 + CA (I)

where: E = El feet i veness

C = Conservat ion as dtef ined by IEquat ion (

A = Achievement as defined Iv Fquat itot (I

III
I

um

-4

CC,:

-z

I I I I - ~- r-~ -C r~ -4 ~ C~j -

0

4-)

00

0

1 2
The Effectiveness index was plotted by weekly mean for the defending

rifle squad in the same manner as the Achievement and Conservat ion nd ice~s

(Figure Z ). fInspect ion shows that the Effectiveness plot closely foll1ow., thlt,

plot of the Conservat ion index.

DISCUSS IoN

The significant posit ive correlation between casualties imti ct ed 1!ld

casualties suffe-red is not a militari lv desirable relationship . A more .. desi rabl1e resul t would be a negative correl at ion indicating, that i ncrkets in

skill in causing casualties leads also to skill in avoiding casualt it'- (asOcc urs with f ib ter pilot aces) . A siilar pattern appears in t he ctt 1 1 t ivtmeasures of squad performance; the squad improves over time inl terns of enemyv

casualties inflicted but shows no improvement in avoiding enemv fire. '.'l1a t

le-ads to these resuLts? It is possible only to speculate as to probabic

causes, such as insufficient or inappropriate training. If the train inc ' w:Is,

nlsu fi i en lt , thlen add it ional t ra in ing may produce an improved e f fctivet

inldex-N. If the training was inappropriate, what specific training lpraict ice 5;O

inaippro)r iate? The training was repeated pract ice of engaging an oppiosinug

force. If coot intued lprac tice reinforces incorrect behavior, it would seen

lotg ical to chang!e some aspect of the stimulus situation. EnrgagementsinIaion providecs an envi roniment with real i.st ic casualty assessment. Howeverl, t lie

negaitive consequences of engagement s imulat ion for the part ic ipants art' no

more severe than thiose of a basketball game. Thie negat ive consequence.s of

combat , wh i ch engagement s imula t ion seeks to model , are real , permanen t, 101d

dreaded by the part icipamnts.

Risk-taking, behavior in games and inl combat is moderated by thecot

quenc es . Althbough engagement s imuolat ion port rays Combat casualityvassoe

the resulIts are mild and r isk-tak ing behavior may d if fer from combat r isk--

t ak ing behavior, i nvali idat ing the engagement s imulat ion model . If thle engag'-.erit s imulat ion model is part ial1 v inval i d, con ti nued use a )f Ot mode I

w ilIl p roduice some nega ti ye t rain inrg (s uch as higher than usual r isk t ak illn

behIV it. or) . 1, the engagement s imulIat ion t rain ing model has i nvalIi d aspcts,

hat produce neva tive training, t hose as pee ts need to be chang ed. A t cc hnit;pitto imp rove conserva tion mi ght be to reward indiv idual and colICC t iV" ec ooS(t rva t itt n otr s ur v i vab1 i I it v wh i I v pun i Sht i rig' inappropriate or lii gli r isk- taking.,

behiyitr. Successful tinit performance, as measured lby the lffltrt hti~ 0>

thtvtltoltt( here, wi I I increase the number of survi vors duiiring comlt s, imulit

htet ter toab I ing, the on it to cont i nue the mniss ion.

lit- dill ert-nit hal effect iveness of the defensive positittns, ~tiirdl

ciStia It its int I itted, in the reported resulI]ts may be caused lV t 1111171'k- ('1

fat t im. t4ne fit tour niiigut be thle at t los of the Oppoin rg si dt. (so. I 1,

mitvin1 , itr muir i Iv t twardI tine s ide of the defenise) . Ibis possili I it %, '

pitr ted by the fi(t that nmtst at t.aiki ig pl atolons appuroachled pas t Ps it it'1l

(the utbservat ion post ) totward ptts it ittns I and 2. Further support 1or the

tttuttent itil thit Ptt sit iotnis oictup ied prov ide dif firing tuppti rtutn it its t ' int I i, i

tasakl It ie(-s mix' be( sotun ii k-)I Litl , wltit(it rcIef et s ann uioltruis io nVlt1ut4r 0

,,quad niemiht psi t i to prtoftrent'-. Aft t r ptO 5 ition )t was (cc up it I 1v to, 5e F 1 iii
1

'C

C

C

Q

U-.

C

- 2

I I I I I cc 'C '-1 c-i c~ -c

-J

.f.

UC

.- ' -c

14
the f irst two e'XLrc i ses , the exerc isoe d irector or dered tha't th lit it jun, iet

occupIied by 0u1V ()ne Manl. The othter four posit ions we re ox , u p i ed :it thc

discretion of the squad. A logical distrihut ion would Ibe two menl to pu

t ion (as was the mean di1st ribhution dur ing Week 2) . However, diuring sub seiien t

weeks-, soldiers shiowed a greater preference for posit ions I and 2. Asso I I t)

thaizIt s oodicr s wa nt ed t o i )f Ii ict m o re casuiIalIt ie s, th11e ir p ru e cr(-n c(-t or pus),i -

t i ons- I anIiid 2 mayI r ef I Lc t a p)re c onc e ived ( e ffe ct i v en (s-s a t t. i h ut ed t o t I j use;t

pos i t io)ns .

Thle sh i f t in squad member part ic i pat ion between !Week t) and kti( 1

5)shows aI trend away from posit ion I hack toward pos it ion 3. P o'c

the defending squad suffered more casualIt ies from indirec t fire (mur t irs,) tli-n

in any, Other week. Mainy of these casual ties wore suffered around pus itin 1,

Oni v two squad members at pos it ion I could get inside the hunker wIt s'

aidded protect ion from Iidirec t f ire . The add it ional1 squad members, airourd

posit ion I could not get into thle hunker and were more eyposed to enemv hor

vat ion and fi re (boh)ti d irec t and inud irect ). The shi1ft awa'. f rom- 'si

during 1%eek h fol lowing the heavV casualties of Week " isl a ostI d-j

st rat ion of adapt ive behav ior h v thle de fend ing squad.

Ano thler rea-soni for dlif f erent ial de f ensivwe effect ivenes .s max' e t hi

indlividu it skills of thet soldiers occupy ing 1 spec ific posit ions,, Ithuil

p reviit)' IV nlote.d , mos t Men oc 'uo)i ed alt Ileaist two d i ff1ereiit pos.,it is anid toh

one who occcupied all positions ha.,d a pa)ttern of success that fo 1 1owed the,

colIlect ive pat tern) .

A f inl pu )0'S ih)I e Cause fur squal~d members inflIicted more casuali t ic rot-'

someu defensive- posit ions than from others could he thet militarv ;i)toi tl;K

t' Lr ra in (such as oh sorvat ion, f iold s of fire, cover and c onceci Irint .L. Ass7 iin g, the ml i Itar-, aspects Of the(- terrain have an elvect, it Should beL ti I I

to pre-d iit di fferential sulccess inl advanrlc.

[lie resulits of this study prowvide ev idence for a -radual impov(emn-it in

maI x miz invn enemy~ casul It los (,ich levetient ) bv a tact icail unit repeat inc t I

sme mSS ion onl the L saime ter rai n w I I I ci 1g o pposed by nov ice i t

sizres of d iwiilua and col I C(t iVe' t it ical peroracehaeben c

Hlie studyv provides; e'vidcTe thait con!t il"notd prat-ii ice in the current , uml'aIt

simrulaitionI does not ncsirlvimpro)ve odes abilitv to suirvivc. \

d i ffe rent defenlsive puttios or a wairlet v ui jiiiss ,il1l reasons,, onti il 0t

unequail IV to csaties".
R"FERIEN ("E;S

Banks, J. H., Hardy, (;. ). , Scott, T. L). , Kress, G. & Word, 1.. V. AIMA RA.

v~ilidation for rifle squads: Mission accomplishment. A ! Re ;t.,erch

Report 1192, October 1977.

Department of the Army. Armv Training and Evaluat i c 'rcrar, Ii ght

Intantrv Battalions (Infantry, Airborne, Air .\s saIt and B an :er

ARTEP 7-15, Washington, DC, April 1976. (a)

Department of the Army , Field Manual 1I -'), 0p,'rati n ,. 'I-;s!: tn, I ,

July 1976. (b)

Meliza, L. L. , Scott, T. 1., & Eps;tein_ K. I. RVA1 ,kAV I id~ i i:

rifle squads 11: Tact i cal performan k2c. A, R' 1'

March 1979.

Root, R. T., Epstein, K. I., Steinheiser, L. ii., Ii,.

SuIzen, R. H1., Burgess, C. G;., Mirabcll, 1

E., 111. Initial validation of RwIIAIN si t A!

Europe . ARI Research Report 1191, ctol-cr 71-tl.

Rout, R. 1., & Erwin, I). E. Engagement SiinnltiL :,n: \ i :2 i,: :7.1t 

(or the learning of complex tactical ski I ] 1 . ,a-,nt 1 I i,

Military O~peration, Rese arch Soc'ittv )' th :' ---f (1'rt 1: 1::-: 

Virginia, December 1976.

Scott, T. D., Meli-'.a, L. L., Htardy, (;. D., Banks, .. IH., 1', ' ,rI , .

REALTRAIN validation for Armor/Anti-Armor teans . AP, I a{c-4, rch e;o,rt

1204, March 1979.

Scott, T. )., Banks, ,. i., Hardv, ;. I., ulnen, B H . R I.RAI N ; Validation for rifle squads III: lacti a p r m('a;II I Ourim', d.r i 2 Tl)t-t

contact. ARI Research Report 121 3, Juilv 11).

Scott, T. I)., Meliza, 1.. 1,., Hiardy, . I)., , Baniks, i. i. .A r te,/A t i-A rn r

team tactical performance. ARI Research !B'pert .' I,, in!lv,

hrivt-r, E. L.., Mathers, B. L., Griffin, C. In,.s, 1) B. ,., Rn!, I.

Root, R. T. , Haves, ,1. F. REIAIIA IN: .\ n110d ttIn (t tn a t i cl

trlining of sinall unit s. AMI T(clmnic. lei-t K-,, .. lcr 1BK7

.;ul; en, R. II., Stetini, F. S., and tones;, I). ['h 1. I i1. I t, 1I t,

leader tactic.l tra ining tchniqiwes on rit l I ',1in ' r 'rnr . .j)

ARI Research Report in grep.rat ion, 1980.

IS Army ni antrv S4chool. Squald Conimba't Oper.t ions xer, i s,. 1 i n kt ati: i,, i)

(SCOPIS , Ir.ining I) Circular 7-,'. L0nt Bnning., ",,!t ,; 1 1 I .

o -, ! , f . f . , S R o t , B . I . ' H i 1 : m ! e n g a g e m n t n I n i l a t i t: ! , I

1c rn i nt . A.\rrv I ri il n rr, ', p r t :'nm.in m d I mu h! I I , I t I ." 
D ISTR IBUT ION.

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