IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 16–0851

Filed April 20, 2018

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

NOAH RILEY CROOKS,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County, Gregg R. 

Rosenbladt and James M. Drew, Judges. 

Defendant convicted of second-degree murder as a youthful 

offender for offense he committed at age thirteen challenges his fifty-year 

prison sentence imposed at age eighteen. AFFIRMED. 

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers and 

Denise A. Timmins, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

In this appeal, we must decide challenges to Iowa’s youthful 

offender laws raised by a defendant who at age thirteen fatally shot his 

mother. The State prosecuted him as a youthful offender in district

court, and a jury found him guilty of second-degree murder. When he 

reached age eighteen, the district court sentenced him to an 

indeterminate prison term of up to fifty years (with no mandatory 

minimum). The defendant raises statutory and constitutional challenges 

to his prosecution and sentence, arguing that as a thirteen-year-old 

offender, his case should have remained in juvenile court and that at age 

eighteen he should have been released on probation or placed in a 

transitional facility rather than prison. 

We retained his appeal and, for the reasons explained below, affirm 

his conviction as a youthful offender and his fifty-year indeterminate 

sentence with immediate parole eligibility. We conclude the district court 

properly exercised its discretion based on an individualized assessment 

of this defendant under a constitutional statutory scheme. We 

acknowledge sentencing reform efforts nationwide to raise the minimum 

age for prosecution in adult court. But under our constitutional 

separation of powers, those efforts should be directed to the legislature. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

On the evening of March 24, 2012, Noah Crooks was at home with 

his mother, Gretchen Crooks. Noah was thirteen years old and an eighth 

grader at Osage Middle School. He had no prior criminal record. The 

Crooks lived in rural Osage, in Mitchell County. Gretchen worked as a 

nurse at Mercy Hospital in Mason City and was studying to get her 

master’s degree at the University of Iowa. Noah’s father, William Crooks, 
3

worked at Cargill Kitchen Solutions in Mason City. William and 

Gretchen had been married for seventeen years. 

William was at a work-related party away from home that evening

when Noah loaded a .22 caliber rifle upstairs. Noah took the loaded rifle

downstairs and saw his mother in the kitchen facing away from him. 

She was making dinner for him. Noah later told a child psychiatrist that 

he could not shoot her at that moment because it would not be 

honorable to shoot his mother in the back. Noah returned upstairs until 

his mother called up to say his dinner was ready. He returned

downstairs with the rifle and this time found his mother sitting on the

living room sofa studying her coursework. Noah shot her twenty-two 

times, killing her.

Noah sent his dad a text message at 7:30 p.m. The message 

stated, “Dad, this is Noah. I killed Mom accidentally. I regret it. Come 

home now please.” William thought Noah was joking and replied, “Okay. 

Just throw her in the grove. We will take care of her later.” 

Noah called 911 and told the Mitchell County dispatcher, Barbara 

Michael, “I killed my mom with my twenty-two.” He admitted he “shot 

her . . . with twenty rounds maybe.” Noah also said, “I, I tried to rape 

her. . . . I didn’t do it. I tried to rape her, I couldn’t do it.” Noah talked 

to the dispatcher about his concerns over his own future, stating,

I’m never gonna be able to marry. . . . I’m never gonna get, 

be able to get a good job now, ‘cause it’ll be on my 

resume. . . . I mean, I’ll barely be able to get a job like 

McDonald’s. I mean I had plans of going to Michigan State 

University to get an engineering job, making my own car 

company. That’s all down the drain now. 

Deputy Jeff Huftalin was dispatched to the Crooks’s residence and 

knocked on the front door. Noah answered the door while he was still on 

the phone with the dispatcher. Deputy Huftalin asked Noah where his 
4

mother was. Noah told him she was in the living room and that the gun 

was on a chair. Deputy Huftalin asked Noah to sit on the porch while he

entered the house. Deputy Huftalin found Gretchen slouched on the 

couch; he could see bullet holes in her chest. Gretchen’s pajama top was 

unbuttoned, and she was naked from the waist down. Deputy Huftalin 

confirmed that Gretchen was dead. He handcuffed Noah and put him in 

the backseat of the patrol car. 

Deputy Huftalin called William to tell him there had been an 

accident in his house and that he needed to come home. Upon arrival, 

William was told that Gretchen was dead and that Noah had shot her. 

The State filed a delinquency petition four days later, alleging that

Crooks, age thirteen, committed the delinquent acts of first-degree 

murder and assault with the intent to commit sexual abuse. The State 

requested that the juvenile court waive jurisdiction so that Crooks could 

be tried as a youthful offender in adult court, as provided in Iowa Code 

section 232.45(7) (2011). Crooks filed a motion to dismiss, challenging 

the juvenile court’s statutory authority to waive jurisdiction over a 

thirteen-year-old. The juvenile court denied the motion. Crooks then 

filed a second motion to dismiss, this time asserting the youthful 

offender statute was unconstitutional. The juvenile court denied this 

motion, finding Crooks failed to establish that the statute was 

unconstitutional. 

At the waiver-of-jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court made the 

three findings required by Iowa Code section 232.45(7)(a) for transfer to 

district court: (1) Crooks was fifteen years of age or younger, (2) there 

was probable cause that Crooks committed the forcible felonies alleged in 

the petition, and (3) the State had established that there were no 

reasonable prospects for rehabilitating Crooks prior to his eighteenth 
5

birthday if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction. The juvenile court 

waived jurisdiction over Crooks and transferred the case to the district

court for Noah’s prosecution as a youthful offender. 

The State filed a trial information in district court, alleging murder 

in the first degree and assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. The 

jury trial began on April 30, 2013. Crooks raised the defenses of insanity 

and diminished responsibility. On May 13, the jury returned a verdict 

finding him guilty of murder in the second degree and not guilty of 

assault with the intent to commit sexual abuse. The court placed him on 

youthful offender status and transferred his supervision to the juvenile 

court for disposition under Iowa Code section 232.52. 

After conducting a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court 

transferred guardianship of Crooks to the director of the Department of 

Human Services for placement at the State Training School in Eldora. 

Crooks was under the supervision of the juvenile court until his 

eighteenth birthday. The juvenile court conducted yearly review 

hearings, and Crooks remained at the State Training School. He 

attended school and participated in mental health treatment. He

graduated from high school on May 29, 2015. 

In April 2016, the juvenile court officer (JCO) filed a youthful 

offender report, and the juvenile court reported to the district court as 

required by Iowa Code section 232.56. The report noted that throughout 

his time at Eldora, Crooks tried to avoid addressing why he killed his 

mother. The JCO mentioned that when Crooks’s father confronted him

about his matricide, he responded that “[he] thought we would be better 

off without her.” The JCO report elaborated,

During a recent family meeting on April 14, 2016 with his 

father and counselors, Noah was asked again about why he 

killed his mother. He responded by saying, “I didn’t think of 
6

the consequences. I didn’t think anything would happen. I 

thought I would maybe get grounded.” This question has 

been asked of Noah throughout his therapy time at the State 

Training School. Any answer Noah could give would not be 

an acceptable answer to his father and family members. 

The district court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI). The PSI

report recommended incarceration:

The defendant was 13 years of age when he shot and 

killed his mother. He will turn 18 on 07/29/16. Prior to his 

arrest on the instant offense he had no criminal history. He 

was involved in counseling with his family and was placed on 

psychotropic medication for a couple of years. There are 

reports he made comments to his peers at school about 

killing his mother and it would appear he bullied other 

children from time to time. It is also noted he was cruel to 

animals and may have burned down his grandmother’s 

home when he was 5–6 years of age. These types of 

behaviors are disturbing for a child of his age. He admitted 

he was “arrogant and stuck up” and didn’t really think 

anything bad was going to happen to him when he killed his 

mother. 

The defendant professes that he came from a good 

home and loved his family, yet he shot and killed his mother 

in their own home. He stated he was not angry at her and 

reported he was close to his mother. His behavior at the 

State Training School has been pretty unremarkable with a 

few minor violations. According to the defendant, he has 

had no major behavioral issues at the training school 

because he knows the rules and doesn’t want to suffer the 

consequences that would come as a result of negative 

choices he might make. He graduated from high school and 

has dreams of attending college. 

The real concern is for public safety and how the 

defendant will conduct himself if allowed to return to society. 

No one can predict the future behavior of an individual with 

any certainty. He has been in institutional settings since the 

age of 13 and has learned to follow rules and modify his 

behavior in a structured setting. The concern is will others 

be placed at risk and will he create more victims in the 

future? If the defendant could offer a plausible explanation 

for why he shot and killed his mother, that might offer some 

insight into his thoughts and actions that day, but he can 

give no explanation for why he did what he did. For the 

protection of society, it is recommended the defendant be 

supervised at a higher level of supervision than what 

community based supervision can provide. 
7

In light of the above it is respectfully recommended 

that the defendant be sentenced to a period of forty-five (45) 

years to the custody of the Director of the Department of 

Corrections.1

The district court held a hearing on May 6 to determine Crooks’s

status after his eighteenth birthday. The attorneys presented 

arguments. The State requested a fifty-year indeterminate sentence with 

no mandatory minimum. Crooks’s attorney told the court,

You only have two options under the statute itself. The first 

is to continue the youthful offender status itself or discharge 

him. That’s it. There aren’t — In the event that you 

continue the youthful offender status itself, then you have 

other options. You can place him on probation. You can 

confine him. You can do a number — You can suspend the 

sentence and you can provide all types of restrictions on 

probation, but that’s it. And that’s the position that we’ve 

taken. 

His attorney further argued that any confinement or probation could not 

exceed five years, with credit provided for time served. He did not 

specifically request placement in a transitional facility. 

Crooks read to the court a statement he wrote in which he 

described the groups he voluntarily joined at the State Training School 

and expressed his regret for taking his mother’s life. He apologized to the 

people he hurt through his actions. Several family members gave victimimpact statements. His uncle (the victim’s brother) requested the 

maximum sentence, and his maternal grandmother emphasized that he 

“doesn’t have real empathy.” William, the defendant’s father, spoke last:

[F]or four years we never talked about Gretchen, not once. 

He never had any remorse about his mom. I’d push him. . . .

[H]e just wanted her out of his life because he can play video 

games. . . . [F]our years isn’t long enough to pay for a 

wonderful woman who did so much at the hospital, for all of 

 1A forty-five-year recommended sentence allowed Crooks five years of sentencing 

credit for his time institutionalized at Eldora. 
8

us, who were all of our rocks that we had to rely on. I — he 

needs to pay for his mother’s life. 

And I know that’s hard to say, but it’s just what it is, 

kid. It’s time you face the piper, I guess, and letting you out 

today would ruin so many more lives. It honestly would. 

The court determined that probation was not justified:

[T]he common theme throughout the documents that 

have been submitted, and even comments made here today, 

is that there has been a surprising lack of an emotional 

response from Noah, something showing appropriate 

remorse, empathy, which is understanding the feelings of the 

other people who have been affected by your actions. And I 

recognize that you are a young person, and there’s a reason 

we treat young people differently. It’s because sometimes 

emotionally they aren’t developed enough to maybe respond 

in the appropriate way; but it is — it is very apparent to me, 

in reviewing the evidence, that for one reason or another, 

Noah, you just don’t want to deal with this, with what you’ve 

done; and at some point in time you’re going to have to, but 

it doesn’t appear to me that that’s happened yet. You’ve got 

some ground yet to cover and I think that there’s work left to 

be done so I don’t believe that a straight discharge at this 

time is appropriate. 

. . . . 

At this point I do not see sufficient evidence to 

convince me that Noah has been rehabilitated. The nature 

and circumstances of this offense, coupled with the lack of 

emotion, remorse, and empathy, indicates that there is a lot 

of ground to cover. There have been some recent 

expressions of remorse and attempts to show empathy, and I 

hope that those are sincere, but the fact that they are so 

recent causes me to wonder. And, Noah, going forward you’ll 

have the opportunity to prove to everybody that you mean 

what you say. You’ve heard the saying “actions speak louder 

than words,” and I suspect that’s what your family is waiting 

for, and I know that’s what the rest of us will be looking for 

as well. 

I’m also concerned, when we talk about the 

appropriateness of street probation, that you have made the 

comment that you really don’t think you have any need for 

future services. You made a comment, when asked whether

you perhaps would want to return to the Training School to 

speak some day after you’ve been rehabilitated, you didn’t 

really think so or you hoped not, I think were your words. 

You changed your answer after you were pressed on it a little 

bit, but those comments are concerning to me, that you still 
9

don’t have a full appreciation for what you’ve done and the 

legitimacy of everyone’s concerns. 

I am hopeful, but I’m not yet convinced, that it is safe 

for you to be free despite your young age. The lack of an 

appropriate emotional response, the lack of empathy, the 

lack of something that even approaches an adequate 

explanation for why this happened could be an indication 

that you just don’t care. We just don’t know yet. That’s the 

point, we don’t know. And I don’t believe it’s appropriate to 

release you on probation until we can be confident that that 

isn’t the situation, but rather that you do care and that we 

don’t have to worry about something like this happening 

down the road. And, in short, we need more time so that we 

can be confident in that determination.

So I do believe that the imposition of a sentence with 

incarceration is appropriate, and to that end it is necessary 

that I enter conviction. 

The court entered judgment for murder in the second degree. The court 

sentenced Crooks to an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed 

fifty years without any mandatory minimum sentence.2 Crooks was 

therefore immediately eligible for parole.

Crooks appealed. On appeal, he argues that Iowa Code section 

232.45(7)(a) (2011) does not provide statutory authority to try a thirteenyear-old as a youthful offender. He also contends sections 232.45(7) and 

907.3A violate article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibiting 

cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, he argues that the sentencing 

court abused its discretion by incarcerating him. We retained his appeal. 

II. Standard of Review. 

“[W]e review the juvenile court’s interpretation of statutes for 

correction of errors at law.” In re A.M., 856 N.W.2d 365, 370 (Iowa 2014). 

Our review of constitutional challenges to a statute is de novo. State v. 

 2The court also ordered Noah to pay $150,000 in victim restitution. See State v. 

Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 624 (Iowa 2017) (rejecting constitutional challenges to the 

$150,000 minimum restitution imposed on juvenile homicide offenders). Noah does not 

challenge the restitution on appeal. 
10

Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Iowa 2013). “We review the district 

court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 

269, 272 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 

(Iowa 2010)). 

III. Analysis.

Crooks raises several challenges to the youthful offender provisions 

of the Iowa Code. We begin by providing a brief overview of the statutory 

scheme. We then consider whether the statutes permitted the juvenile 

court to waive jurisdiction over Crooks at age thirteen for prosecution as 

a youthful offender in district court. Because we conclude the juvenile 

court was statutorily authorized to do so, we next address his claim that 

the youthful offender statutes constitute cruel and unusual punishment 

in violation of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. We conclude 

that the waiver provisions do not constitute punishment, and we decline 

to impose a categorical bar on prosecuting thirteen-year-olds as youthful 

offenders in district court. Finally, we reject his claims that the district 

court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of incarceration with 

no mandatory minimum. 

A. Overview of the Youthful Offender Statutes. The youthful 

offender statutes were enacted in 1997 as part of comprehensive

legislation related to juvenile justice. See generally 1997 Iowa Acts 

ch. 126 (entitled Juvenile Justice and Youthful Offenders). Generally, 

“[t]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings 

concerning a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act 

unless otherwise provided by law . . . .” Iowa Code § 232.8(1)(a). 

However, the juvenile court may transfer cases to adult court. 

After the filing of a petition which alleges that a child has 

committed a delinquent act on the basis of an alleged 

commission of a public offense and before an adjudicatory 
11

hearing on the merits of the petition is held, the county 

attorney or the child may file a motion requesting the court 

to waive its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged 

commission of the public offense or for the purpose of 

prosecution of the child as an adult or a youthful offender. 

Id. § 232.45(1). Section 232.45(7)(a) sets forth the findings required for

the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction over a child who then can be 

prosecuted as a youthful offender in district court.

At the conclusion of the waiver hearing and after considering 

the best interests of the child and the best interests of the 

community the court may, in order that the child may be 

prosecuted as a youthful offender, waive its jurisdiction over 

the child if all of the following apply:

(1) The child is fifteen years of age or younger.

(2) The court determines . . . that there is probable 

cause to believe that the child has committed a delinquent 

act which would constitute a public offense under section 

232.8, subsection 1, paragraph “c”, notwithstanding the 

application of that paragraph to children aged sixteen or 

older. 

(3) The court determines that the state has 

established that there are not reasonable prospects for 

rehabilitating the child, prior to the child’s eighteenth 

birthday, if the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the 

child and the child enters into a plea agreement, is a party to 

a consent decree, or is adjudicated to have committed the 

delinquent act. 

Id. § 232.45(7)(a) (emphasis added).3 The juvenile court, however, can 

waive its jurisdiction over the child for prosecution as an adult only when 

“[t]he child is fourteen years of age or older” and other conditions are 

met. Id. § 232.45(6). 

 3Subparagraph (1) was amended in 2013 to require that 

[t]he child is twelve through fifteen years of age or the child is ten or 

eleven years of age and has been charged with a public offense that 

would be classified as a class “A” felony if committed by an adult. 

2013 Iowa Acts ch. 42, § 5 (codified at Iowa Code § 232.45(7)(a)(1) (2014)). 
12

B. The Applicability of Iowa Code Section 232.45(7)(a) to 

Thirteen-Year-Old Offenders. Crooks argues that Iowa Code section 

232.45(7)(a) does not allow the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction over a 

thirteen-year-old child to be tried as a youthful offender in district court. 

He contends that, when related statutes are read together as a whole, 

section 232.45(7)(a) is ambiguous. We disagree and conclude the 

statutes unambiguously allow prosecution of a thirteen-year-old as a 

youthful offender. “[O]ur starting point in statutory interpretation is to 

determine if the language has a plain and clear meaning within the 

context of the circumstances presented by the dispute.” McGill v. Fish, 

790 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Iowa 2010). 

Crooks emphasizes the different language used for the “traditional” 

waiver for prosecution as an adult and waiver for prosecution as a

youthful offender. Compare Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(a) (“fourteen years of 

age or older” to be prosecuted as an adult (emphasis added)), with id.

§ 232.45(7)(a)(1) (“fifteen years of age or younger” to be prosecuted as a 

youthful offender (emphasis added)). He encourages us to read these 

provisions together as setting a lower age limit—a “floor”—of fourteen for 

children who can be prosecuted as youthful offenders. Subsections 6(a) 

and 7(a) describe waiver processes with quite different consequences, 

and we decline to impose the lower age limit for prosecution as an adult

on the subsection regarding prosecution as a youthful offender. The 

legislature used different language in describing age limits throughout 

the statute and knows how to set a lower age limit. See, e.g., id.

§ 232.52(2)(e) (“at least twelve years of age”); id. § 232.54(1)(h)(1) (“age 

fourteen or over”). The legislature chose to include thirteen-year-olds 

within the youthful-offender waiver provision. 
13

We see no ambiguity in the phrase “fifteen years of age or younger” 

whether read in isolation or in context of the entire statutory scheme. 

We conclude the juvenile court could properly waive jurisdiction over 

Crooks, who was age thirteen when he killed his mother, to allow his 

prosecution in district court as a youthful offender.

C. The Constitutionality of Iowa Code Sections 232.45(7)(a) 

and 907.3A. Crooks argues that Iowa Code sections 232.45(7)(a) and 

907.3A—when applied to an offender age thirteen at the time of the 

crime—violate article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibiting

“cruel and unusual punishment.” Under our de novo review of 

constitutional challenges to legislative enactments,

we must remember that statutes are cloaked with a 

presumption of constitutionality. The challenger bears a 

heavy burden, because it must prove the unconstitutionality 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, “the challenger must 

refute every reasonable basis upon which the statute could 

be found to be constitutional.” Furthermore, if the statute is 

capable of being construed in more than one manner, one of 

which is constitutional, we must adopt that construction. 

Thompson, 836 N.W.2d at 483 (quoting State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 

661 (Iowa 2005)). 

We first address Crooks’s claim that the waiver of a child to district 

court for prosecution as a youthful offender under section 232.45(7) 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Then we address his 

challenge to his fifty-year indeterminate sentence imposed under section 

907.3A. 

1. Whether the waiver process of section 232.45(7) constitutes 

punishment. Crooks claims the waiver process constitutes punishment 

because the decision to waive jurisdiction transfers a child from the 

juvenile system, which focuses on rehabilitation, to the adult system, 

which emphasizes incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence. See In re 
14

M.M.C., 564 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 1997) (“[T]he primary goal of juvenile 

justice in Iowa is rehabilitation, not punishment.”); see also State v. 

Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 646 (Iowa 2012) (identifying “four legitimate 

penological justifications: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 

rehabilitation” (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71, 130 S. Ct. 

2011, 2028 (2010))). The statutory waiver changes the forum from 

juvenile court to district court, but with built-in protections for youthful 

offenders. 

In order to waive jurisdiction for the child to be tried as a youthful 

offender, the juvenile court must make an individualized finding that

“there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child, prior to 

the child’s eighteenth birthday, if the juvenile court retains jurisdiction 

over the child.” Iowa Code § 232.45(7)(a)(3) (2011). After jurisdiction is 

transferred from the juvenile court, the district court “shall, upon a plea 

of guilty or a verdict of guilty, defer sentence of a youthful offender . . . 

[and] transfer supervision of the youthful offender to the juvenile court 

for disposition in accordance with section 232.52.” Id. § 907.3A(1) 

(emphasis added).4 A youthful offender is treated the same as a child 

retained in the juvenile system until the child approaches age eighteen. 

At that point, 

 4The legislature amended section 907.3A in 2013. See 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 42, 

§ 15 (adding language directing court to consider a presentence investigation report, if 

ordered, and renumbering the sentencing options for clarity). At the May 6, 2016 

sentencing hearing, the court indicated the 2011 Code applied, and the parties agreed. 

With regard to the sentencing options, the State noted, “The 2013 Code is clearly 

written better than the 2011 Code section, and it’s the State’s opinion that that was the 

purpose of amending the statute. We don’t believe that the 2013 [amendment] added 

anything different[;] it just is easier to read.” The court agreed that the amendments 

“merely clarified the 2011 statute” and concluded that both statutes provided “the same 

options to the court.” We rely on the 2011 Code applied by the district court and the 

parties but would reach the same conclusions under the 2013 amendment. 
15

[t]he court shall hold a hearing prior to a youthful offender’s 

eighteenth birthday to determine whether the youthful 

offender shall continue on youthful offender status after the 

youthful offender’s eighteenth birthday under the 

supervision of the court or be discharged. . . . The court 

shall make its decision after considering the services 

available to the youthful offender, the evidence presented, 

the juvenile court’s report, the interests of the youthful 

offender, and interests of the community. 

Id. § 907.3A(2). Adult punishment is discretionary with the district 

court, which has the options of discharging the youthful offender, 

“continu[ing] the youthful offender deferred sentence[,] or enter[ing] a 

sentence, which may be a suspended sentence.”5 Id. § 907.3A(2)–(3). As 

a result, the decision to waive jurisdiction over a child for prosecution as 

a youthful offender does not automatically subject the child to adult 

criminal sanctions. Instead, the youthful offender provisions allow the 

courts to wait until the child is nearly eighteen—and to see whether the 

rehabilitative services provided in the juvenile system have been 

effective—before determining how to proceed. 

Waiver of a child for prosecution as a youthful offender is not a 

decision to abandon efforts to rehabilitate the child. To the contrary, the 

statutory scheme allows the state to focus on rehabilitating the child 

while at the same time giving the state the option to retain supervision of 

the child after the child’s eighteenth birthday if the court finds the child 

cannot be rehabilitated within that time. The court is required to make 

 5Section 907.3A(3) limits the term of probation.

[I]f the district court either continues the youthful offender deferred 

sentence or enters a sentence, suspends the sentence, and places the 

youthful offender on probation, the term of formal supervision shall 

commence upon entry of the order by the district court and may 

continue for a period not to exceed five years. 

Id. § 907.3A(3). The court could decide to impose a sentence of incarceration for a term 

of years but does not have to do so. See id. 
16

specific findings at each step of the process and has discretion with 

regard to the disposition, including when the child reaches age eighteen. 

We hold that the waiver process does not constitute punishment for 

purposes of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. 

Other courts have held waiver statutes allowing prosecution of 

juveniles in adult court are not “punishment” for constitutional 

purposes. See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 385 P.3d 5, 9 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016) 

(“Being waived into adult court, whether mandatory or discretionary, is 

not a punishment.”); People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 550–51 (Ill. 

2014) (concluding that the automatic transfer statute does not impose 

punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment or the analogous 

state constitutional provision); State v. Mays, 18 N.E.3d 850, 861 (Ohio 

Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that provisions governing “whether a juvenile 

case must be transferred to adult court for adjudication” do not impose 

punishment); cf. State v. Rodriguez, 71 P.3d 919, 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2003) (concluding that the transfer statute “does not subject th[e] 

juvenile to enhanced punished [but instead] subjects the juvenile to the 

adult criminal justice system”). 

Crooks cites no case holding that a waiver statute transferring a 

juvenile to adult court constitutes punishment under an Eighth 

Amendment or comparable state constitutional analysis. He relies on 

language in three cases that tangentially support his claim. In R.H. v. 

State, the Alaska Court of Appeals explained,

Nor can juvenile waiver proceedings realistically be 

said to affect “only the forum where the issue of guilt will be 

adjudicated.” A juvenile waiver proceeding is the only 

available avenue by which the state may seek to prosecute a 

child as an adult. 
17

777 P.2d 204, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). R.H. involved a claim that 

“court-ordered evaluations infringed [R.H.’s] right to be free from 

compelled self-incrimination”—not a claim that being tried as an adult 

constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 208. The Alaska

court was distinguishing juvenile waiver hearings from competency 

proceedings in order to determine whether the court erred in requiring 

“R.H. to submit to a psychiatric evaluation for the purpose of 

determining his amenability to treatment as a child.” Id. at 210–11.

Crooks also cites Ramona R. v. Superior Court, in which the 

California Supreme Court held that under the California Constitution, 

“testimony a minor gives at a fitness hearing . . . may not be used against 

him at a subsequent trial of the offense.” 693 P.2d 789, 795 (Cal. 1985)

(en banc). In support of this holding, the court stated that “the 

certification of a juvenile offender to an adult court has been accurately 

characterized as ‘the worst punishment the juvenile system is 

empowered to inflict.’ ” Id. (quoting Note, Separating the Criminal from 

the Delinquent: Due Process in Certification Procedure, 40 S. Cal. L. Rev. 

158, 162 (1967)). The Ramona R. court was not addressing a claim of 

cruel and unusual punishment but was instead considering whether “the 

[trial] court erred in refusing to grant [the minor defendant] immunity 

from use at trial of any statements she made in the fitness hearing or to 

her probation officer.” Id. at 790. Finally, Crooks cites the dissent in 

People v. Hana, stating “[t]here can . . . be no question regarding the 

punitive nature of the decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction over [Hana].” 

504 N.W.2d 166, 181 (Mich. 1993) (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). The 

Michigan Supreme Court majority concluded that Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment protections do not apply to juvenile waiver hearings to
18

determine whether the defendant should be prosecuted as a juvenile or 

as an adult. Id. at 169, 174 (majority opinion). The dissent concluded,

I would remand this case to the juvenile court for a hearing 

to determine whether the statements and confessions 

introduced and considered at phase II of [Hana]’s juvenile 

waiver hearing were obtained in violation of his Fifth 

Amendment right to remain silent or his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel. 

Id. at 183 (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). The Hana court was not 

addressing a claim that the waiver constituted cruel and unusual 

punishment. 

Moreover, in all three cases, the child would be tried as an adult

and faced either life imprisonment or a prison sentence with a lengthy

mandatory minimum. See R.H., 777 P.2d at 210 (ninety-nine year

sentence with a mandatory minimum of twenty years); Ramona R., 693 

P.2d at 795 (life imprisonment); Hana, 504 N.W.2d at 181 (mandatory life 

sentence without parole). By contrast, Crooks was tried as a youthful 

offender rather than as an adult and received a prison sentence with 

immediate parole eligibility and no mandatory minimum. None of these

decisions persuade us that Iowa’s waiver provision for youthful offenders 

constitutes punishment within the meaning of article I, section 17 of the 

Iowa Constitution, much less cruel and unusual punishment. 

2. Crooks’s categorical challenge to the sentence imposed under 

section 907.3A. Crooks claims that sentencing a thirteen-year-old as a 

youthful offender under section 907.3A violates article I, section 17 of the 

Iowa Constitution. He urges us to adopt a categorical bar on imposing 

punishment upon a child under the age of fourteen in adult court. We 

begin our analysis with a brief overview of federal and state 

jurisprudence on the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as it 

relates to juvenile sentencing.
19

The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth 

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as it relates to 

juvenile sentencing in a trilogy of cases, expanding the categorical 

challenges available to juvenile offenders challenging the death penalty 

or mandatory sentences of life without parole. See generally Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 

130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183 

(2005). In Roper, the Supreme Court addressed the differences between 

juveniles and adults, including that juveniles lack maturity and “are 

more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 

pressures.” 543 U.S. at 569–70, 125 S. Ct. at 1195. The Court held that 

“[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death 

penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes 

were committed.” Id. at 578, 125 S. Ct. at 1200. In Graham, the Court 

held a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender for a 

nonhomicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment. 560 U.S. at 82, 

130 S. Ct. at 2034. In Miller, the Court held that a mandatory life 

sentence for homicide without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth 

Amendment. 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 

We have applied the Roper–Graham–Miller reasoning under the 

Iowa Constitution and “built upon it and extended its principles.” State 

v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 832 (Iowa 2016). We held that the Iowa 

Constitution requires an individualized sentencing hearing before 

sentencing a juvenile offender to a lengthy mandatory minimum sentence 

of imprisonment. See State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013)

(reversing thirty-five year mandatory minimum without the possibility of 

parole); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013) (reversing 52.5-year 

mandatory minimum prison term). Then, in State v. Lyle, we held that 
20

any automatic mandatory minimum prison sentences for juvenile 

offenders is unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment 

clause of article I, section 17. 854 N.W.2d 378, 402–04 (Iowa 2014) 

(holding an individualized sentencing hearing applying the Miller factors 

is required for the imposition of a minimum sentence before parole 

eligibility). In Sweet, we adopted “a categorical rule that juvenile 

offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.” 

879 N.W.2d at 839.6 

Crooks asks us to “take the next logical step and define at what 

age a child may be subject to adult prosecution and punishment” by 

adopting a categorical bar on sentencing an eighteen-year old in adult 

court for a crime committed at age thirteen. In considering whether to 

adopt a categorical approach to a class of offenders under the cruel and 

 6In response to Miller and related Iowa caselaw, the Iowa General Assembly in 

2015 amended the statutory provisions relating to the sentencing of juveniles who 

commit class “A” felonies. See Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 840 (Cady, C.J., concurring 

specially) (explaining that the 2015 amendment, which provided for a hearing and 

identified circumstances the court must consider, “addressed the constitutional 

deficiency identified in Miller and in our cases that followed”). The previous version of 

the statute required a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years for a juvenile 

convicted of a class “A” felony that was not first-degree murder and prohibited parole 

for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder. Iowa Code § 902.1(2) (2015). Under the 

amended statute, a juvenile who commits first-degree murder shall be sentenced to 

(1) life without parole unless the governor commutes the sentence to a term of years,

(2) life with the possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of confinement, or 

(3) life with the possibility of parole (with no minimum term of confinement). 2015 Iowa 

Acts ch. 65, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(a) (2016)). A juvenile who commits a 

class “A” felony that is not first-degree murder shall be sentenced to either (1) life with 

the possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of confinement or (2) life with the 

possibility of parole (with no minimum term of confinement). 2015 Iowa Acts ch. 65, 

§ 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 902.1(3)(a) (2016)). Sweet’s categorical prohibition on lifewithout-parole sentences for juvenile offenders eliminated that sentencing option in the 

2015 enactment. See Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 840 (“[T]he new statutory scheme adopted 

by our legislature for sentencing juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder to 

life without the possibility of parole violates the cruel and unusual punishment 

clause.”). State v. Zarate rejected a facial challenge to the remaining provisions of 

section 902.1(2). ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2018). 
21

unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17, we apply the two-step 

approach used by the United States Supreme Court under the Eighth 

Amendment. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 835 (majority opinion). We first 

consider whether there is a consensus—or at least an emerging 

consensus—to guide our consideration of the question. Id. We then 

“exercise our independent judgment to determine whether to follow a 

categorical approach.” Id. In exercising our independent judgment, we 

are “guided by ‘the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and 

by [our] own understanding and interpretation of the [Iowa 

Constitution’s] text, history, meaning, and purpose.’ ” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 

at 386 (alterations in original) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 130 

S. Ct. at 2022). We also “consider ‘the culpability of the offenders at 

issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity 

of the punishment in question.’ ” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 67, 

130 S. Ct. at 2026).

“Substantial deference is afforded the legislature in setting the 

penalty for crimes.” State v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa 2000) 

(rejecting constitutional challenges to fifty-year indeterminate sentence 

for second-degree murder).7 In Lyle, we discussed in the context of 

 7The United States Supreme Court has observed that “the ‘clearest and most 

reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the 

country’s legislatures.’ ” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 

(2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989), 

abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 2252); see also 

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174–76, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925–26 (1976) (basing Eighth 

Amendment analysis on state legislative judgments as reflecting the moral values of the 

American people). Chief Justice Roberts recently noted,

This Court’s precedents have emphasized the importance of state 

legislative judgments in giving content to the Eighth Amendment ban on 

cruel and unusual punishment. . . . The “clearest and most reliable 

objective evidence of contemporary values” comes from state legislative 

judgments. Such legislative judgments are critical because in “a 

democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to 
22

juvenile sentencing the deference owed to the elected branches under our 

separation of powers and reiterated that “[l]egislative judgments can be 

‘the most reliable objective indicators of community standards for 

purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.’ ” 

854 N.W.2d at 388 (quoting State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 873 

(Iowa 2009)). We added, “Just as we typically ‘owe substantial deference 

to the penalties the legislature has established for various crimes,’ we 

owe equal deference to the legislature when it expands the discretion of 

the court in juvenile sentencing.” Id. (quoting Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 650). 

We elaborated on the importance of the discretion afforded our courts 

when adjudicating juvenile offenders:

Here, the legislative decision to back away from mandatory 

sentencing for most crimes committed by juveniles weakens 

the notion of a consensus in favor of the practice of blindly 

sentencing juveniles based on the crime committed. In fact, 

it helps illustrate a building consensus in this state to treat 

juveniles in our courts differently than adults. 

Actually, the statutory recognition of the need for some 

discretion when sentencing juveniles is consistent with our 

overall approach in the past in dealing with juveniles. 

Primarily, the juvenile justice chapter of our Code gives 

courts considerable discretion to take action in the best 

interests of the child. 

Id. Iowa’s youthful offender statutes require appropriate factual findings

for discretionary, individualized waiver, and sentencing determinations. 

_______________________

the will and consequently the moral values of the people.” And we have 

focused on state enactments in this realm because of the “deference we 

owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system

. . . where the specification of punishments is concerned.” For these 

reasons, we have described state legislative judgments as providing 

“essential instruction” in conducting the Eighth Amendment inquiry. 

Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1056–57 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., 

dissenting) (first quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312, 122 S. Ct. at 2247; then quoting 

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175, 96 S. Ct. at 2926; then quoting id. at 176, 96 S. Ct. at 2926; 

then quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 564, 125 S. Ct. at 1192).
23

See Iowa Code § 232.45(7)(a); id. § 907.3A(2). For that reason, we 

uphold the legislature’s enactment permitting prosecution of thirteenyear-old defendants as youthful offenders in district court upon the 

requisite judicial findings. 

Crooks acknowledges that twenty-one states authorize children 

under the age of fourteen to be prosecuted and punished as adults.8 He 

 8See Alaska Stat. Ann. § 47.12.100 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess. 

& 4th Spec. Sess. of the 30th Leg.) (no lower age limit); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-

518(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 85 of the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 71st Gen. Assemb. 

(2018)) (age twelve or older for discretionary waiver for specified offenses); Ga. Code 

Ann. §§ 15-11-560 to -561 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Sess. of Gen. Assemb.) (age 

thirteen or older for exclusive adult jurisdiction for specified offenses and for 

discretionary transfer for specified offenses); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 20-508 to -509 (West, 

Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 64th Idaho Leg.) (under age fourteen for 

discretionary waiver for specified offenses); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/5-805(3), -

810 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-582 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (age thirteen or older 

for discretionary wavier and for extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution); Me. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (Westlaw through ch. 351 of the 2017 2d Reg. Sess.) (no 

lower age limit); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-151, -157 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. 

Sess.) (age thirteen or older for exclusive adult jurisdiction for specified offenses; age 

thirteen and older for discretionary waiver); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.071 (West, Westlaw 

through 2d Extraordinary Sess. of the 99th Gen. Assemb.) (age twelve or older for 

discretionary transfer); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206 (West, Westlaw through 2017 

Sess.) (age twelve or older for discretionary transfer for specified offenses); Nev. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. § 62B.390 (West, Westlaw through 79th Reg. Sess. (2017)) (age thirteen or 

older for discretionary transfer for murder or attempted murder); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§ 628:1(II) (Westlaw through ch. 7 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (age thirteen or older for 

discretionary waiver for specified offenses); N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00(2) (McKinney, 

Westlaw through L.2018, ch. 1 to 3) (age thirteen or older to be criminally responsible 

for specified offenses); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7B-2200 (West, Westlaw through 2017 

Reg. Sess.) (age thirteen or older for transfer for felonies); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A, § 2-

5-101 (West, Westlaw through ch. 6 & 7 of 2d Extraordinary Sess. of the 56th Leg.) 

(child age thirteen or older charged with first-degree murder shall be considered an 

adult); 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Ann. § 6302 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Act

10) (excluding murder from the definition of “delinquent act”); 14 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 

14-1-7 to -7.1 (West, Westlaw through ch. 480 of the Jan. 2017 Sess.) (no lower age 

limit for discretionary waiver for offense punishable by life imprisonment if committed

by an adult); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1210 (Westlaw through 2018 Act No. 133) (no 

lower age limit for discretionary transfer for murder or criminal sexual conduct); S.D. 

Codified Laws § 26-8C-2 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. effective Mar. 23, 2018 & 

Supreme Court Rule 17-12) (age ten or older to be “delinquent child”); id. § 26-11-4 

(delinquent child charged with felony may be tried in circuit court); Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 37-1-134 (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess., effective through Mar. 22, 

2018) (no lower age limit for discretionary waiver for specified offenses); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
24

also concedes that there appears to be no consensus on the minimum 

age to hold children criminally responsible. But he notes that 

“consensus is not dispositive.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 387 (alteration 

omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421, 128 S. Ct. 

2641, 2650 (2008)). 

Crooks relies on a recent study authored by Jeree Thomas, Policy 

Director at the Campaign for Youth Justice (CFYJ), entitled Raising the 

Bar: State Trends in Keeping Youth Out of Adult Courts (2015-2017), 

http://cfyj.org/images/A-StateTrends_Report-Web.pdf. The focus of that 

report is on legislative reform efforts. See id. at 38. The report cites no 

judicial decisions invalidating enactments allowing or requiring transfer 

of youthful offenders to adult court. Rather, the report urges state 

legislatures to raise the minimum age for prosecution as adults. See id. 

at 7–8 (noting “[f]our states have passed laws to raise the age of juvenile 

court jurisdiction so that 16- and/or 17-year-olds are not automatically 

prosecuted as adults”). The report also advocates restoring judicial 

discretion on waiver and transfer decisions lacking in many states. See 

id. at 35. The Iowa youthful offender laws already provide for such

judicial discretion. We agree with the CFYJ that policy-based arguments 

for juvenile sentencing reform should be directed to the legislature. 

We next exercise our independent judgment. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 

at 386. In doing so, we decline to adopt the categorical bar Crooks

requests because the individualized protections available to youthful 

offenders do not offend Lyle or its progeny. The juvenile court must 

_______________________

tit. 33, § 5204 (West, Westlaw through Adjourned Sess. of the 2017–2018 Vt. Gen. 

Assemb.) (age twelve to fourteen for discretionary transfer for specified offenses); Wis. 

Stat. Ann. § 938.183 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 142) (age ten or older for 

exclusive adult court jurisdiction for specified offenses). 
25

conduct an individualized hearing and consider specified factors before 

deciding to waive jurisdiction to permit the defendant to be tried as a 

youthful offender. After the youthful offender is found guilty, the district 

court must transfer supervision back to the juvenile court for disposition 

under section 232.52, which requires the juvenile court to “enter the 

least restrictive dispositional order appropriate” in view of additional 

factors. Then, the district court, after conducting another individualized 

hearing prior to the youthful offender’s eighteenth birthday, has the 

discretion to select one of four sentencing options: (1) discharge the 

youthful offender from the court’s jurisdiction, (2) continue the deferred 

sentence for a term not to exceed five years, (3) impose a suspended 

sentence and place the youthful offender on probation for a period not to 

exceed five years, or (4) impose an indeterminate sentence with or 

without a mandatory minimum. See Iowa Code § 907.3A. These 

statutorily mandated individualized hearings are consistent with the

constitutional protections we required in Lyle. 

In Miller, the United States Supreme Court explained that “the 

discretion available to a judge at the transfer stage cannot substitute for 

discretion at post-trial sentencing in adult court—and so cannot satisfy 

the Eighth Amendment.” 567 U.S. at 489, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. The Court 

elaborated,

Even when States give transfer-stage discretion to 

judges, it has limited utility. First, the decisionmaker 

typically will have only partial information at this early, 

pretrial stage about either the child or the circumstances of 

his offense. . . . The key moment for the exercise of 

discretion is the transfer—and as Miller’s case shows, the 

judge often does not know then what she will learn, about 

the offender or the offense, over the course of the 

proceedings. 

Second and still more important, the question at 

transfer hearings may differ dramatically from the issue at a 
26

post-trial sentencing. Because many juvenile systems 

require that the offender be released at a particular age or 

after a certain number of years, transfer decisions often 

present a choice between extremes: light punishment as a 

child or standard sentencing as an adult (here, life without 

parole). In many States, for example, a child convicted in 

juvenile court must be released from custody by the age of 

21. Discretionary sentencing in adult court would provide 

different options: There, a judge or jury could choose, rather 

than a life-without-parole sentence, a lifetime prison term 

with the possibility of parole or a lengthy term of years. [I]t 

is easy to imagine a judge deciding that a minor deserves a 

(much) harsher sentence than he would receive in juvenile 

court, while still not thinking life-without-parole appropriate. 

Id. at 488–89, 132 S. Ct. at 2474–75 (citations omitted). 

We conclude the Iowa youthful offender statutes provide the 

discretionary, individualized posttrial sentencing that Miller requires. 

Indeed, the Iowa statutes go beyond what Miller requires: instead of the 

district court imposing a sentence immediately after the initial 

determination of guilt, the district court is required to transfer 

supervision of the youthful offender back to the juvenile court until he or 

she reaches age eighteen. Only upon the offender’s eighteenth birthday 

does the district court select among the sentencing options in section 

907.3A. This provides additional time (nearly five years from age thirteen 

for Crooks) to track the juvenile offender’s progress towards 

rehabilitation before imposing any prison sentence. We reject Crooks’s

challenge to section 907.3A under article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution. 

D. The District Court’s Discretion to Impose the Prison 

Sentence. Crooks also claims the district court abused its discretion in 

imposing a sentence of an indeterminate term of incarceration not to 

exceed fifty years. As quoted above, the court explained in great detail

the reasons for its sentence. Crooks argues the district court abused its 

discretion in three ways: (1) by overlooking other available options 
27

besides incarceration or street probation, (2) by failing to apply the 

Miller/Lyle factors, and (3) by imposing incarceration. We address each 

of these claims in turn. 

1. Considering the available options. Crooks claims the district 

court failed to recognize the sentencing options available and therefore 

failed to properly exercise its discretion. Cf. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 272 

(“When a sentence is not mandatory, the district court must exercise its 

discretion . . . .” (quoting State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 433 (Iowa 

2005))). He specifically points to the judge’s statements, “I’ve got 

probation on the one hand or I’ve got an indeterminate term not to 

exceed 50 years on the other hand,” and “[s]o, simply stated, I have two 

options at this point in time. One is some type of street probation and 

the other would be a term of incarceration.”

Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong 

presumption in their favor. State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 

2015). “A defendant therefore has the burden to provide a record 

showing that the court abused its discretion.” State v. Ayers, 590 

N.W.2d 25, 29 (Iowa 1999). Crooks has failed to meet this burden. The 

record shows that the district court was aware of the options available to 

it. The court knew that discharge was an option and explicitly rejected 

that option: “I don’t believe that a straight discharge at this time is 

appropriate.” The court also acknowledged the five-year limit on 

probation and stated, “I’m also concerned, when we talk about the 

appropriateness of street probation, that you have made the comment 

that you really don’t think you have any need for future services.” This 

shows the court understood that it could impose conditions on 

probation. 
28

Additionally, “a sentencing court need only explain its reasons for 

selecting the sentence imposed and need not explain its reasons for 

rejecting a particular sentencing option.” Id. at 28. The court explained 

why it was imposing incarceration:

I am hopeful, but I’m not yet convinced, that it is safe 

for you to be free despite your young age. The lack of an 

appropriate emotional response, the lack of empathy, the 

lack of something that even approaches an adequate 

explanation for why this happened could be an indication 

that you just don’t care. We just don’t know yet. That’s the 

point, we don’t know. And I don’t believe it’s appropriate to 

release you on probation until we can be confident that that 

isn’t the situation, but rather that you do care and that we 

don’t have to worry about something like this happening 

down the road. And, in short, we need more time so that we 

can be confident in that determination. 

So I do believe that the imposition of a sentence with 

incarceration is appropriate, and to that end it is necessary 

that I enter conviction. 

The court did not fail to consider the available options and explained why 

it selected the sentence it imposed. The court therefore did not abuse its 

discretion. 

2. Failing to consider the Miller/Lyle factors. Crooks also claims 

that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the 

Miller factors. He cites Null for the proposition that, in sentencing a 

juvenile as an adult when a mandatory minimum sentence is an option, 

the district court must also “undertake an analysis of ‘[e]verything . . .

said in Roper and Graham’ about youth.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74 

(alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 476, 132 S. Ct. at 

2467). Under Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the 

Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life sentences without the 

possibility of parole for offenders under eighteen at the time of their 

crimes. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. These factors are
29

(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful 

behavior, such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 

appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the particular 

“family and home environment” that surround the youth; (3) 

the circumstances of the particular crime and all 

circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role

in the commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for 

youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal 

process; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the 

capacity for change. 

Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132 

S. Ct. at 2468). In Lyle, we extended the holding of Miller to require the 

district court to expressly consider the Miller/Lyle factors before 

imposing any mandatory minimum sentence on a juvenile offender. Id.

(“[T]he portion of the statutory schema requiring a juvenile to serve 

seventy percent of the period of incarceration before parole eligibility may 

not be imposed without a prior determination by the district court that 

the minimum period of incarceration without parole is warranted under 

the factors identified in Miller and further explained in Null.”). In State v. 

Roby, we required the district court to consider “the relevant mitigating 

factors of youth” before imposing a minimum term of incarceration before 

the juvenile offender is eligible for parole. 897 N.W.2d 127, 148 (Iowa 

2017). In State v. White, we emphasized the importance of expert 

testimony to support a minimum period of incarceration. 903 N.W.2d 

331, 333 (Iowa 2017). 

Crooks argues on appeal that, because a minimum period of 

incarceration before parole eligibility was an available option, the district 

court was required to consider the Miller/Lyle factors “on the record.”

The State responds that the court is only required to consider the 

Miller/Lyle factors if it contemplates imposing a mandatory minimum 

sentence. In State v. Propps, we expressly “decline[d] to extend the 

requirement of a Miller individualized sentencing hearing to juvenile 
30

defendants who are not subject to a mandatory minimum period of 

incarceration.” 897 N.W.2d 91, 104 (Iowa 2017). We explained,

Because an indeterminate sentence allows for immediate 

eligibility for parole, a juvenile is able to demonstrate to the 

parole board whether he or she appreciated the harm done 

and utilized the options available for reform. If rehabilitation 

has not yet occurred, the parole board may make the 

decision to continue incarceration until the juvenile has 

demonstrated through his or her own actions the ability to 

appreciate the severity of the crime. This is consistent with 

the approach of our prior holdings in the area of juvenile 

sentencing, because it allows for a realistic and meaningful 

opportunity for parole upon the juvenile’s demonstration of 

maturity and rehabilitation.

Id. at 102. We therefore held that “a meaningful, reasonable, and 

immediate opportunity for parole . . . is all that is required under our 

decision in Lyle and the United States and Iowa Constitutions.” Id. at 

104. As the concurring opinion observed, “[t]he constitutional 

protections we have recognized do not target mandatory incarceration of 

juvenile offenders, but [their] mandatory incarceration . . . with no 

opportunity during the period of incarceration to show the greater 

likelihood of rehabilitation and reform has occurred.” Id. at 105 (Cady, 

C.J., specially concurring); cf. State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 622, 

626 (Iowa 2017) (declining to require consideration of Miller/Lyle factors 

before imposing $150,000 restitution award on a juvenile homicide 

offender). 

When sentencing Crooks, the district court expressly declined to 

consider imposing a mandatory minimum. 

[I]f incarceration is ordered there’s no mandatory minimum. 

The State is not seeking that. . . . And so when I sentence 

someone to incarceration I don’t say, “I sentence you to 50 

years,” I say, “I sentence you to an indeterminate term not to 

exceed 50 years,” and at that point in time the Board of 

Parole takes over and makes a determination as to when a 

person should be released from prison. And so it’s important 
31

to keep in mind that even though people throw around 50 

years, it doesn’t mean 50 years, at least not necessarily. 

Under Propps, no hearing on the Miller/Lyle factors was required to 

sentence Crooks to prison with immediate eligibility for parole. 897 

N.W.2d at 102, 104. 

Nevertheless, we reiterate that “[a] sentencing court is to consider 

any mitigating circumstances relating to a defendant.” State v. Witham, 

583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998). These include the circumstances of 

youth and, specifically, any applicable Miller/Lyle factors. See State v. 

Zarate, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2018) (“We also hold that the district 

court’s consideration of any potential aggravating factors . . . shall align 

with our juvenile sentencing jurisprudence so as not to overwhelm the 

mitigating factors associated with youth, especially the five factors of 

youth set forth in Lyle.”). Once the sentencing court declines to impose a 

minimum period of incarceration without parole, the Miller/Lyle factors 

remain relevant in considering the remaining sentencing options, along 

with all other mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Yet the court is 

not required to specifically examine and apply each factor on the record

at this point but considers all relevant factors in exercising its discretion 

to select the proper sentencing option. We may find an abuse of 

discretion “[i]f a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that 

should have received significant weight.” Zarate, ___ N.W.2d at ___

(alteration in original) (quoting Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 138). 

The record reveals the sentencing court addressed a variety of 

factors in response to the evidence and argument presented by Crooks, 

including those Miller/Lyle factors identified by Crooks. We find no 

abuse of discretion. As a result, we turn to address the final argument 
32

by Crooks that the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing 

incarceration.

3. Imposing sentence of incarceration. Crooks additionally claims 

the district court abused its discretion by imposing incarceration. He

asserts that the court imposed incarceration based on “the belief that 

Crooks is not rehabilitated and poses a potential danger to society” and 

that the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing does not support 

this conclusion. We disagree. 

The court was required to “make its decision after considering the 

services available to the youthful offender, the evidence presented, the 

juvenile court’s report, the interests of the youthful offender, and 

interests of the community.” Iowa Code § 907.3A(2). “[O]ur task on 

appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but 

to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” 

State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. 

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002)). A district court has not 

abused its discretion if the evidence supports the sentence. Id. 

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing a sentence of incarceration. Dr. Michael Taylor, who evaluated 

Crooks in 2012, emphasized in his August 12, 2012 report,

With a strong degree of medical certainty, I can state 

that the prospects for rehabilitating Noah Crooks prior to his 

eighteenth birthday are nil. He has no psychiatric illness 

(which had any impact on his actions) which might be 

treated—absent a brain transplant. He appears to not be 

capable of experiencing guilt and/or remorse. He is not 

capable of considering the impact that his actions might 

have on others—except himself. His actions vis-à-vis the 

murder of his mother were part and parcel of deeplyingrained personality traits which have been present for 

years, despite his relative youth, and will continue to be 

present for the foreseeable future. There is no treatment 

known to man that can change these personality traits as 

Noah grows older. It is highly probable, however, that Noah 
33

will become more skilled at “saying the right things” to cover 

up his severe psychopathology until he is no longer in a 

secure facility. 

Dr. Augspurger, a psychiatrist who evaluated Crooks both in 2013 and 

in 2016, concluded after the 2016 evaluation that Crooks does not have 

a diagnosable mental disorder. Dr. Augspurger stated that “it cannot 

still be said that [Crooks] is developing an Antisocial Personality Disorder 

since he has not outwardly displayed evidence for the behavior required 

to substantiate such a diagnostic development since admission [at the 

State Training School].” But Dr. Augspurger concluded,

This could all be illusion, but it could just as well be reality 

and I would certainly rather have him being productive and 

behaving in a prosocial manner compared with the opposite. 

If one believes in the purpose of having a separate juvenile 

judicial system, that it is possible and desirable to educate 

and train young people in the hopes of changing them, then 

one must be hopeful that he is a successful product of that 

system. However, I have no ability to predict the future and 

cannot offer assurances one way or the other. 

Dr. Augspurger’s equivocal opinions did not compel the district court to 

discharge Crooks or release him on probation. The district court acted 

within its discretion by imposing an indeterminate sentence of 

incarceration not to exceed fifty years, with immediate eligibility for 

parole and no mandatory minimum term. 

IV. Disposition. 

For these reasons, we affirm Crooks’s judgment of conviction and 

sentence. 

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except Appel, Wiggins, and Hecht, JJ., who 

concur in part and dissent in part.
34

#16–0851, State v. Crooks

APPEL, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur with the majority’s disposition with respect to some 

aspects of this case, but would vacate the decision of the district court 

and remand the case for consideration of the Lyle factors before 

convicting and sentencing Crooks. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 

404 n.10 (Iowa 2014); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78, 

132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).

I. Statutory Interpretation Regarding Age Floor.

On the question of statutory interpretation, I agree with the 

majority that the legislature did not establish a floor for the age of a child 

who might be treated as a youthful offender. Iowa Code section 232.45 

(2011) sets out two paths for waiving children into district court. Under 

section 232.45(6), a child who is fourteen years of age or older may be 

tried as an adult. Under section 232.45(7)(a), a child who is fifteen years 

of age or younger may be tried as a youthful offender. The notion that a 

juvenile transfer statute has no lower limit is not a stranger to the law. 

See Miller, 567 U.S. at 486 & n.14, 132 S. Ct. at 2473 & n.14 (citing 

statutes). We should be hesitant to read language into a statute absent a 

compelling reason to do so. See State v. Nicoletto, 862 N.W.2d 621, 625 

(Iowa 2015); State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 177–78 & n.6 (Iowa 2013); 

see also State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 150 (Iowa 2018) (Appel, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part).

II. Categorical Constitutional Attack on Trying Thirteen-YearOlds as Youthful Offenders.

The notion that juvenile offenders should be subject to transfer 

with adult criminal sanction regimes has been subject to attack in the 

literature. One prominent authority has argued that juvenile offenders 
35

should never be integrated with adult offenders and should not be 

incarcerated beyond the age of twenty-five. See Christopher Slobogin, 

Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and Expanded 

Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 103, 104–05, 131 (2013). 

Other attacks on transfer of children to adult court focus on automatic 

transfers, transfers arising out of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 

and the imposition of mandatory sentencing schemes applicable to 

adults upon transfer. See Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children Are Different: 

Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 

Cal. L. Rev. Cir. 92, 102–03 (2013).

The lack of an age floor in a statute that may lead to transfer is 

potentially problematic as certainly at some point very young children 

simply cannot be held criminally culpable consistent with the cruel and 

unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution. The Iowa statute, however, allows district courts to make 

the question of whether a thirteen-year-old child is potentially exposed to 

criminal sanctions on a case-by-case basis. See Iowa Code § 232.45(9).9

Sometimes, however, case-by-case evaluations under multifactor 

tests are so arbitrary that a categorical rule is preferable and even 

constitutionally required. This is particularly true when we attempt to 

predict future behavior. In State v. Sweet, for instance, we announced a 

categorical rule that life without the possibility of parole for juvenile 

offenders would not be permitted in large part because it was simply 

impossible to determine with any accuracy which juvenile offender is so 

 9The common law set a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit any 

felony at the age of fourteen. Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can 

Malice Supply the Want of Years?, 86 Tulane L. Rev. 309, 317 (2011). The common law 

allowed the presumption to be rebutted by strong and clear evidence that the juvenile 

possessed the necessary understanding and judgment to form criminal intent. Id.
36

incorrigible that no “second look” should be permitted. 879 N.W.2d 811, 

838–39 (Iowa 2016). Given the very high stakes, we declined to allow life 

without the possibility of parole to be imposed by a trial court through 

what would necessarily be a highly inaccurate and unreliable case-bycase assessment. Id. at 839.

The question in this case for the purpose of the relatively narrow 

constitutional question presented is whether a district court can, with 

any degree of reliability, determine which offending children who are 

thirteen years of age are not likely to be rehabilitated by age eighteen. 

While Sweet teaches us to exercise great caution before making broad 

declarations about future behavior, the issue in this case is different 

from Sweet in three critical respects.

First, the nature of the prediction required under the statute, 

though difficult, is less problematic than in Sweet. The question of 

determining which child will need rehabilitative services after five years 

of juvenile rehabilitation is at least arguably less troublesome than 

predicting who will ultimately be found to be incorrigible or irredeemably 

corrupt after full character development and maturity. While there is a 

professional consensus among psychiatrists that accurate, long-term 

assessment of juveniles is impossible, there is no such consensus on the 

inability to assess those who need relatively short-term rehabilitative 

services. See id. at 838–39 (noting that professional psychologists 

disclaim the ability to accurately predict which juveniles will be 

incapable of rehabilitation).

Second, the statute contains a look-back provision. Iowa Code 

§ 907.3A(2). As a result, the consequences of an initial determination 

that a child will be treated as a youthful offender does not eliminate a 

timely second look but, in fact, embraces it. Prior to the second look, the 
37

child will be in the hands of juvenile authorities charged with providing 

appropriate services and not in the hands of adult correctional officials 

meting out punishment. Id. § 907.3A(1). The second-look feature of the 

statute thus provides a critical check on the potential of arbitrary and 

irrational imposition of incarceration on a child. The statute thus does 

not provide for automatic transfer into adult court, an approach that 

would be constitutionally suspect because of the absence of an 

individualized determination under Miller and Lyle principles.

Third, the consequence of the determination that a child is a 

youthful offender is less consequential than in Sweet. In Sweet, the 

consequence was incarceration for life with no meaningful opportunity to 

show rehabilitation and maturity. 879 N.W.2d at 840 (Cady, C.J., 

concurring specially). Here, a youthful offender, even if ultimately 

subject to a criminal sentence, is not exposed to a mandatory minimum 

adult sentence because of our ruling in Lyle barring the mandatory 

imposition of minimum sentences for children. As a result, the 

consequence of being found to be a youthful offender and ultimately 

subject to a criminal penalty does not lead to an arbitrary and irrational 

imposition of an adult mandatory minimum sentence on a child.

Yet, it must be recognized that transfer statutes may ultimately 

pose certain risks. For instance, a youth who is ultimately incarcerated 

may lack access to resources sufficient to provide a reasonable means to 

achieve maturity and rehabilitation. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 

362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (“The absence of an affirmative program of 

training and rehabilitation may have constitutional significance where in 

the absence of such a program conditions and practices exist which 

actually militate against reform and rehabilitation.”), aff’d 442 F.2d 304 

(8th Cir. 1971); Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for 
38

Release: Graham, Miller and California’s Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 

40 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 245, 286 (2016) (emphasizing that 

access to rehabilitative programs are essential to providing juvenile 

offenders a meaningful opportunity for release); Sally Terry Green, 

Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the States 

Must Provide Meaningful Opportunities for Release, 16 Berkeley J. Crim. 

L. 1, 26 (2011) (providing education and treatment programs “comply 

with Graham’s mandate for meaningful opportunity for release”); 

Elizabeth Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional 

Framework, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 675, 712 (2016) [hereinafter Scott] (“[A] 

meaningful opportunity to reform requires a correctional setting that 

promotes healthy psychological development.”). That, however, is not so 

much a categorical challenge to the Iowa transfer statute as it is a factbased challenge to conditions of incarceration.

Although the statute approaches the border of constitutionality, in 

light of its limiting features, I am not prepared to say, at least at this 

time, that the statute is categorically infirm in this case under article I, 

section 17 of the Iowa Constitution at least as applied to thirteen-yearold children. The lower the age of the child, of course, the greater the 

risk of crossing the constitutional line, and it may well be that at age 

thirteen we are very close to it. Nonetheless, at present, I am inclined 

not to strike it down on the grounds that the implementation of the 

statute with respect to thirteen-year-olds is so irrational as to 

categorically amount to cruel and unusual punishment under article I, 

section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Instead of categorically striking 

down the statute, I think the better course is to permit challenges on an 

as-applied basis. No as-applied challenge is raised in this case. I would 

revisit the issue, however, if in practice, application of Miller and Lyle
39

principles on discretionary decisions under the statute prove arbitrary, 

inconsistent, or unworkable.

III. Challenges to District Court Sentencing.

A. Awareness of Sentencing Options. The first issue is whether 

the district court recognized the breadth of its discretion under the 

applicable statute. If the district court did not recognize the scope of its 

discretion, a remand for resentencing is required. State v. Thomas, 547 

N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1996) (per curiam); State v. Sandifer, 570 N.W.2d 

256, 257 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). The defendant bears the burden of 

showing that the district court was unaware of its discretion to impose a 

particular sentence. State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Iowa 1999).

Under the statute, the district court has several options for 

disposition of a youthful offender—

[T]he court may continue the youthful offender deferred 

sentence or enter a sentence, which may be a suspended 

sentence. . . . [I]f the district court either continues the 

youthful offender deferred sentence or enters a sentence, 

suspends the sentence, and places the youthful offender on 

probation, the term of formal supervision shall commence 

upon entry of the order by the district court and may 

continue for a period not to exceed five years. If the district 

court enters a sentence of confinement, and the youthful 

offender was previously placed in secure confinement by the 

juvenile court under the terms of the initial disposition order 

or any modification to the initial disposition order, the 

person shall receive credit for any time spent in secure 

confinement.

Iowa Code § 907.3A(3).

At the hearing on sentencing, the district court made extensive 

comments. The commentary twice affirmatively stated that the court 

believed the choice was between incarceration and some type of street

probation. The district court said,
40

So, simply stated, I have two options at this point in time. 

One is some type of street probation and the other would be 

a term of incarceration . . . . 

Then, after observing the statute was “not particularly well drafted,” the 

district court declared, “I’ve got probation on the one hand or I’ve got an 

indeterminate term not to exceed 50 years on the other hand.” There is 

nothing in the record to show that these affirmative statements regarding 

limited options were based on anything other than the district court’s 

view of the statute.

The statute, however, authorized the district court to defer or 

suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation, with the 

level of supervision to be determined under section 901B.1 by the district 

department of corrections. Id. § 907.3A(3); id. § 901B.1. Section 901B.1 

provides for a corrections continuum of varying levels of restrictiveness, 

including community-based and residential treatment facilities. Id.

§ 901B.1(1)(c)(1). Similarly, section 907.3A(3) provides that the district 

court could have deferred or suspended the sentence and placed Crooks 

on probation with such terms and conditions that it chose, including 

commitment to an alternate jail facility or a community-based correction 

residential treatment facility. Id. § 907.3A(3).

The district court, twice, stated on the record that the choices were 

“street probation” or incarceration. Nothing in the transcript of the 

sentencing or dispositional hearing indicates that the district court 

understood it had the possibility of confining Crooks under the 

corrections continuum of Iowa Code section 901B.1 and that such 

confinement could include a residential treatment facility or communitybased correction facility. Indeed, the entire discussion of the district 

court on sentencing suggests that it considered only two options, street 

probation or incarceration. For instance, the district court stated, “I 
41

don’t believe it’s appropriate to release you on probation” as driving the 

court into a sentencing option without considering other dispositions.

It may be, of course, that the district court was, in fact, 

subjectively aware of the other options, but we can only proceed by 

analyzing the affirmative statements made on the record in this case. 

The record suggests the district court believed it had two stark choices 

and not a continuum of choices. I would thus remand for resentencing. 

See Thomas, 547 N.W.2d at 225 (noting it would be an abuse of 

discretion in sentencing if the district court was unaware of its discretion 

in imposing sentencing options); Sandifer, 570 N.W.2d at 257 (explaining 

the record must reveal the sentencing court in fact exercised discretion 

in regard to the range of sentencing options).

B. Consideration of Lyle Factors. The next question is whether 

the court abused its discretion in sentencing Crooks. Under our 

caselaw, the district court must consider any mitigating factors. See, 

e.g., State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 102 (Iowa 2017); State v. Witham, 

583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam); State v. Draper, 457 

N.W.2d 600, 605 (Iowa 1990).

We have repeatedly said “children are constitutionally different 

from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 395 

(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S. Ct. at 2464); see also Propps, 897 

N.W.2d at 99; State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 119 (Iowa 2013). The 

differences include “distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and 

environmental vulnerabilities,” Miller, 567 U.S. at 473, 132 S. Ct. at 

2465, including a “lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of 

responsibility, vulnerability to peer pressure, and the less fixed nature of 

the juvenile’s character,” State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 74 (Iowa 2013); 

see also Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 832–33; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115 n.6. 
42

We have emphasized that the constitutionally significant distinction 

between adults and children is applicable to all crimes, not just some 

crimes. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 831; Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 399; Null, 836 

N.W.2d at 71.10

As noted by the leading recognized authorities in the field, the 

developmental principle that children are constitutionally different has 

broad application. See Scott, 88 Temp. L. Rev. at 707–12 (urging broad 

application of developmental principle that children are different and 

citing Lyle as example). The principle is applicable to other sanctions 

and not just the severe sanctions discussed in the cases of the United 

States Supreme Court. Id. at 707. Indeed, the principle that children 

are different should inform “policies regulating the sentencing of 

juveniles whenever they are dealt with in the adult system.” Id. It makes 

no sense at all to say, for instance, that the mitigating characteristics of 

youth apply only for minimum sentencing and not, for instance, for 

discretionary sentencing for a term of years. See Barry C. Feld, The 

Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the Time, 11 

Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 107, 147 (2013). The majority correctly finds that 

the features of children described in Lyle and our other juvenile cases are 

mitigating factors that must be considered in any and all contexts 

involving discretionary sentencing of defendants who committed crimes 

 10We have repeatedly applied the principle that children are constitutionally 

different in factual settings beyond Roper, Graham, and Miller. In Null, we applied the 

children-are-different principle in the context of aggregate sentencing. 836 N.W.2d at 

73. In Lyle, we applied the children-are-different principle to categorically strike down 

mandatory minimums. 854 N.W.2d at 400. In Sweet, we applied the children-aredifferent principle to categorically strike down life-without-the-possibility-of-parole 

sentences. 879 N.W.2d at 839.
43

as children. This makes sense in a criminal justice system where 

culpability is a cornerstone of proportional punishment.11

The remaining question is whether we should require a district 

court to make specific findings regarding consideration of the mitigating 

factors of youth when sentencing children in adult court. We have 

required such specific findings in the context of the case-by-case 

determination of whether a sentencing court should impose an adult 

minimum sentence on a child offender. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 

557 (Iowa 2015); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71, 74. We have stated that Miller

requires “more than a generalized notion of taking age into consideration 

as a factor in sentencing.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402 n.8 (quoting Null, 

836 N.W.2d at 74). We require consideration of

(1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of 

youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 

appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and 

home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the 

circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent 

of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way 

familial and peer pressures may have affected [the youth]”; 

(4) the “incompetencies associated with youth—for example, 

[the youth’s] inability to deal with police officers or 

prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or [the youth’s]

incapacity to assist [the youth’s] own attorneys”; and (5) “the 

possibility of rehabilitation.”

 11At the district court, Crooks argued that the imposition of a fifty-year prison 

term went against the common law tradition that young children could not form intent 

and that the sentence “would run counter to the recent scholarly literature on the 

subject of juvenile punishment, and which literature the Iowa Supreme Court relied 

upon in its recent cruel and unusual punishment cases dealing with juvenile 

offenders.” Crooks further cited Graham v. Florida as outlining the features of youth to 

be considered in sentencing, namely their lack of maturity, social development, and risk 

analysis ability, as well as their susceptibility to familial and peer pressure. 560 U.S. 

48, 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
44

Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 570 (alterations in original) (quoting Ragland, 836 

N.W.2d at 115 n.6); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132 S. Ct. at 

2468.

The requirement of specific findings on mitigating factors in the 

minimum-sentencing context serves three purposes. It ensures that the 

mitigating Lyle and Miller factors of youth have been considered, that the 

Lyle and Miller factors are treated as mitigating and not aggravating 

factors, and that the heinous character of the crimes has not, as the 

United States Supreme Court has cautioned, overwhelmed the Lyle and 

Miller factors. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 

1197 (2005).

It is true that the context of this case is not identical to that faced 

by courts considering minimum sentences. A minimum sentence is an 

all-or-nothing proposition—either the adult minimum sentence applies or 

it does not. Further, when an adult minimum sentence is imposed on a 

child offender, there is no possibility of revisiting the issue if the 

predictions of future character development prove wrong.

Yet, in this case, the district court faced a wide range of options 

with dramatically different consequences on the child offender. As the 

district court correctly pointed out at the sentencing hearing, the child 

offender in this case will have the possibility of parole. In that sense, the 

sentence in this case does not have the highly inflexible character of an 

adult minimum sentence. But the differences between the available 

options in this case are truly dramatic and are not less consequential 

than the imposition of an adult minimum sentence on a child.

Although the context is different, I think the three purposes of 

requiring specific findings apply here. I do not think it is too much to 

ask that in these invariably difficult cases, district courts provide a 
45

specific explanation of how the plastic characteristics of youth played 

into the sentencing in this case. We will thus not be required, on appeal, 

to peer into an empty box in evaluating how the district court 

approached this key sentencing consideration. Although it is true that 

we have said in a pre-Lyle case that a sentencing court generally is not 

required to give reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options, see 

State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713–14 (Iowa 1995), we have announced 

an exception to that rule in our juvenile cases to ensure that sentencing 

of child offenders occurs within constitutional guardrails, see Seats, 865 

N.W.2d at 557; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71, 74. I would apply that concept 

here as well.

IV. Conclusion.

For the above reasons, I would vacate the sentence of the district 

court and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., join this concurrence in part and dissent 

in part.