J-A02035-16 

2016 PA Super 114

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

ERIC JAY LEED :

:

Appellant :

: No. 1231 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 16, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-36-CR-0002136-2014 

BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

OPINION BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JUNE 01, 2016

Appellant, Eric Jay Leed, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

twenty to sixty months’ imprisonment imposed in the Lancaster County 

Court of Common Pleas for possession with intent to deliver1 marijuana 

(“PWID”). He claims a statement that a canine sweep was conducted one 

year before the application for a search warrant requires all evidence against 

him be suppressed. We hold that a reviewing court (1) may consider the 

entirety of the affidavit of probable cause to determine whether the 

challenged statement constitutes a typographical error and (2) find a 

substantial basis supports the issuing authority’s probable cause 

determination, notwithstanding that error. We thus affirm. 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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The relevant facts of this case follow. On March 21, 2014, Detective 

Anthony Lombardo of the Lancaster County Drug Task Force applied for and 

executed a search warrant for Appellant’s storage unit. Detective 

Lombardo’s affidavit of probable cause set forth the following relevant 

allegations, which we reproduce with minor alterations:

3. That during the month of September 2012, your Affiant 

spoke with a Reliable Confidential Informant (CI#1), 

whose information has led to at least (2) prior arrests and 

convictions for felony violations of the PA Controlled 

Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act.. CI#1 related 

that he/she has knowledge of a white male, [Appellant], 

who is in the business of selling large amounts of powder 

cocaine and Marijuana in the Lancaster City area. CI#1 

additionally related that [Appellant] lives at 1223 Union St. 

Lancaster. CI#1 knew this information to be true because 

he/she had purchased cocaine from [Appellant] as recently 

September 2012. CI#1 has demonstrated his/her 

knowledge of controlled substances, to specifically include 

cocaine and Marijuana, its packaging, pricing and 

terminology.

4. That during the month of September 2012, your Affiant 

obtained a PENNDOT photograph of [Appellant, which] 

CI#1 positively identified . . . as being same individual 

known to him/her as described in paragraphs #3.

5. That during the month of February 2014, Det. Gregory 

Macey of the Lancaster County Drug Task Force, spoke 

with a Reliable Confidential Informant (CI#2), whose 

information has led to at least (1) prior arrest and 

conviction for felony violations of the PA Controlled 

Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act.. CI#2 related 

that he/she has knowledge of a white male, [Appellant], 

who is in the business of selling large amounts of powder 

cocaine and Marijuana. CI#2 has demonstrated his/her 

knowledge of controlled substances, to specifically include 

Cocaine and Marijuana, its packaging, pricing and 

terminology.
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6. That during the month of February 2014, Det. Greg 

Macey of the Lancaster County Drug Task Force obtained a 

PENNDOT photograph of [Appellant, which] CI#2 positively 

identified . . . as being same individual known to him/her 

as described in paragraphs #5.

7. That during the month of March 2014, Agents from the 

Drug Enforcement Administration Harrisburg Resident 

Office spoke with a citizen in good standing within the 

community. The named citizen, who wished to remain 

anonymous, stated that [Appellant] was making frequent 

short term trips to storage unit #503 located within Lanco 

Mini Storage located at 1813 Old Philadelphia Pike, 

Lancaster, PA.

8. That on 21 March 2014, Michael Neff of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration spoke with the manager of 

Lanco Mini Storage. The manager advised that [Appellant] 

is the sole lessee of unit #503 at Lanco Mini Storage 

located at 1813 Old Philadelphia Pike, Lancaster, PA and 

has been so since renting the unit in August 2013. The 

manager further stated that the last time that Leed 

accessed the unit was on March 20, 2014.

9. That Off Billiter of the Manheim Township Police 

Department, attended a six week handler and K9 

certification course in Canada conducted by Baden K9 in 

Apr-May 2008. Both handler and K9 receive recertifications and twice monthly training. They have 

attended courses and certifications of both handler and K9 

to include[ a Baden K9 Patrol & Narcotics recertification on 

December 9, 2008, and numerous other certifications 

between December 8, 2010, and February 24, 2012].

10. That on March 21, 2013, your Affiant requested Officer 

Billiter and his K9 partner Ruger, of the Manheim Twp 

Police Department to conduct K9 sweep of unit #503 at 

Lanco Mini Storage located at 1813 Old Philadelphia Pike, 

Lancaster, PA for the presence of narcotics. At approx. 

1644 hrs, Officer Billiter and K9 Ruger conducted a sweep 

of random storage units to include unit#503. Each and 

every time Ruger alerted on unit#503 and Officer Billiter 

advised your Affiant that K9 Ruger had alerted on the unit, 

indicating the presence of narcotics. 
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11. That your Affiant respectfully requests that a Search 

Warrant be granted for Unit#503 located at Lanco Mini 

Storage, 1813 Old Philadelphia Pike 

Aff. of Probable Cause, 3/21/14, at ¶¶ 3-11. An assistant district attorney 

approved the warrant application. Appl. for Search Warrant and 

Authorization, 3/21/14, at 1. A magisterial district judge issued a search 

warrant at 7:00 p.m. on March 21, 2014. Id. 

Officers searched Appellant’s storage unit at 7:11 p.m. that same day 

and seized approximately fifteen pounds of marijuana, $9,900, plastic bags, 

and a scale. See N.T. Trial, 5/4/15, at 12-13. Additionally, officers 

discovered Appellant’s personal documents, including a bank statement and 

an income tax return, inside the unit. See Aff. of Probable Cause, 3/23/14, 

at ¶ 3. Relying, in part, on the evidence from the storage unit, officers 

obtained a second search warrant for Appellant’s bank records on March 23, 

2014. See id. at ¶¶ 3, 9. 

On March 31, 2014, Detective Lombardo filed a criminal complaint 

charging Appellant with PWID.2 Appellant was arrested on April 2, 2014. On 

April 4, 2014, officers obtained a third search warrant for Appellant’s 

mother’s residence. The issuance of the third warrant was based on the 

evidence obtained from the previous two searches, as well as a recorded 

 

2 Appellant was also charged with possession of paraphernalia, 35 P.S. § 

780-113(a)(32), but that charge was withdrawn before the filing of the 

information. 
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telephone conversation between Appellant and his mother while Appellant 

was in the county jail. See Aff. of Probable Cause, 4/4/14, at ¶¶ 3, 14, 15. 

The third search warrant resulted in the seizure of an additional $8,900 and 

a cellphone from a safe in his mother’s residence. 

On July 8, 2014, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which 

included a motion to suppress the evidence from his storage unit. On 

November 24, 2014, the trial court convened a suppression hearing. 

Appellant’s counsel argued the March 21, 2014 warrant for his storage unit 

was “stale” and “the affidavit of probable cause fail[ed] to state specifically 

enough information to warrant the [magisterial district judge] to issue the 

search warrant.” N.T., 11/24/14, at 3-4. Appellant’s argument focused on 

Paragraphs 3, 4, and 10 of the affidavit of probable cause. See id. at 4. 

The trial court summarized Appellant’s “staleness issues” as “the indication 

on the search warrant that it was March 21, 2013 that the K-9 search was 

conducted[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Counsel further claimed the defect in 

the March 21 warrant tainted the evidence recovered under the subsequent 

warrants for his bank account and his mother’s home. See id. 

The Commonwealth, over Appellant’s objection, called Detective 

Lombardo to testify that the canine sweep occurred on “March 21, 2014, the 

same day that [the detective] completed the search warrant or application.” 

Id. at 4-5, 7 (emphasis added). When asked by the Commonwealth 

whether the March 21, 2013 date in the affidavit of probable cause was “a 
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typographical error,” the detective replied, “Yes.” Id. at 7. Appellant did 

not cross-examine the detective or present further evidence. The court 

ordered the parties to submit briefs, and both parties complied.

On February 23, 2015, the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression 

motion. The court concluded it would not consider Officer Lombardo’s 

testimony at the suppression hearing. Trial Ct. Op., 2/23/15, at 6-7 & n.5. 

Nevertheless, it found that “when reviewing the four corners of the 

application in a common sense and realistic fashion, it is clear that the K9 

sweep took place on March 21, 2014 and that the indication that it occurred 

on March 21, 2013 reflects an obvious typographical error.” Id. at 11. The 

court cited numerous cases in which our courts “have infused common sense 

into their review of affidavits submitted in support of search-warrant 

applications.” Id. at 8-10. The court acknowledged the case law was not 

“precisely on-point with the facts of the instant case . . . .” Id. at 11. 

However, it applied “guiding principles” to determine the existence of a 

typographical error and find the canine sweep occurred on March 21, 2014, 

the same day Detective Lombardo applied for the first search warrant. Id. 

Thus, the court determined that “the magist[erial] district judge . . . could 

reasonably have concluded that there was sufficient probable cause to issue 

the warrant” to search Appellant’s storage unit. Id. 

On May 4, 2015, Appellant proceeded to a stipulated nonjury trial at 

which the trial court found him guilty. On July 16, 2015, the court 
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sentenced Appellant to twenty to sixty months’ imprisonment for PWID and 

granted his motion for bail pending appeal. Appellant timely filed a notice of 

appeal and complied with the court’s order to submit a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement.

Appellant presents the following question for review: 

Whether the [trial] court erred as a matter of law when it 

determined a magisterial district justice had a substantial 

basis to conclude that the affidavit of probable cause for a 

storage unit warrant contained sufficient facts amounting 

to probable cause when any finding of probable cause 

required ignoring or changing an explicit date contained in 

the warrant’s affidavit? 

Appellant’s Brief at viii.

Appellant presents three arguments in support of his claim of error. 

First, he contends “the affidavit of probable cause for the [March 21, 2014] 

warrant at issue [did] not provide probable cause to believe, at the time of 

its issuance, that contraband would be located at [his] storage unit . . . .” 

Id. at 18. Appellant observes “the only allegation of any sales being made 

to a specific informant” was two years old. Id. at 15. Further, the face of 

the March 21, 2014 affidavit of probable cause indicated that the canine 

sweep occurred in March 2013, which was (1) “prior to when Appellant was 

even the lessee of the unit[,]” (2) “without any suspicion related to the 

storage unit itself or a connection to Appellant[,]” and (3) “one year prior to 

the application and issuance of the search warrant.” Id. The remaining 

allegations from February and March 2014, he notes, consisted of general 
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reports that he was selling drugs, regularly visited the storage unit, and was 

the lessee of the unit. Id. at 16-17. Thus, Appellant claims the allegations 

were stale and did “not provide specific information regarding the presence 

of contraband at the storage at the time the warrant was issued.” Id. at 16. 

Second, Appellant contends there was “no specific factual support 

contained within the affidavit’s four corners to conclude exactly when or if a 

canine sweep was conducted at any time other than was explicitly and 

specifically represented in the affidavit of probable cause.” Id. at 20. He 

emphasizes that the contents of the affidavit must be “sworn to before the 

issuing authority” and taken as true. Id. at 19-20 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 

203(B)). Therefore, he asserts an issuing authority—and implicitly, a 

reviewing court—cannot be permitted to “edit the contents of an affidavit.” 

Id. at 20. He further suggests that “permitting a magist[erial district 

judge] to act as a rubber stamp for the Commonwealth by allowing [the 

issuing authority] to ‘gloss over’ an affidavit’s contents and simply issue a 

warrant would deny [a defendant’s] state and federal protections.” Id. at 

20, 27. Appellant also distinguishes the case law regarding omissions and 

mistakes cited by the trial court. Id. at 22-24. In so doing, he proposes 

that a court may “fill gap(s) left by omitted information,” but cannot “edit or 

change” the allegations to find probable cause. Id. at 24. 

Third, in a single paragraph, Appellant states the search warrants for 

his bank account and his mother’s residence were tainted by the illegality of 
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the March 21st warrant. Id. at 27. He concludes that “the warrants 

subsequently executed on [his] savings account and on his familial residence 

were direct results of the seizures occurring from the storage unit search on 

March 21, 2014.” Id.

The Commonwealth responds by citing the principle that “[a] search 

warrant affidavit ‘is to be tested by the court with a common sense and a 

realistic manner, and not subjected to overly technical interpretations; the 

magistrate’s determination of probable cause is to be accorded great 

deference on review.’” Commonwealth’s Brief at 9 (citations omitted). 

Further, it notes this Court has held that “‘[t]he chronology established by 

the affidavit of probable cause must be evaluated according to a common 

sense determination.’” Id. (citations omitted). According to the 

Commonwealth, “[c]ase law supports the [trial] court’s reasoning” and the 

court properly interpreted the chronological indicators in the affidavit of 

probable cause to conclude that “the K9 sweep took place on March 21, 

2014” and “the indication that it occurred on March 21, 2013 reflects an 

obvious typographical error.” Id. at 10 (citing Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12).

For the reasons that follow, we discern no error of law in the trial 

court’s use of a common sense and realistic approach to conclude that 

probable cause existed within the four corners of the challenged affidavit. 

See Trial Ct. Op. at 11. Furthermore, the record supported the court’s 

factual findings that the reference to “March 21, 2013” was a typographical 
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error and the canine sweep occurred on March 21, 2014. We reject 

Appellant’s suggestion that the requirement that the affiant swear to the 

statements in the affidavit precludes a reviewing court from (1) discerning 

the existence of a typographical error and (2) evaluating the circumstances 

surrounding the error to determine an issue of fact material to probable 

cause. 

The following precepts govern our review:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to 

the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether 

the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. . . . Where, as here, the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on 

allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s 

legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate 

court, whose duty it is to determine if the 

suppression court properly applied the law to the 

facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts 

below are subject to our plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-62 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citation omitted). 

“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the 

affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information 

are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 

belief that a search should be conducted.” Id. at 362. 

[A]ge of the information supporting a warrant application 

is a factor in determining probable cause. If too old, the 

information is stale, and probable cause may no longer 

exist. Age alone, however, does not determine staleness. 
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The determination of probable cause is not merely an 

exercise in counting the days or even months between the 

facts relied on and the issuance of the warrant. Rather, 

we must also examine the nature of the crime and the 

type of evidence.

Id. at 363 (citation and emphasis omitted). 

As to Appellant’s initial staleness claim, the record reveals the 

allegations from 2014 included a confidential informant’s report that “he/she 

ha[d] knowledge of [Appellant], who is in the business of selling large 

amounts of powder cocaine and Marijuana.” Aff. of Probable Cause, 

3/21/14, at ¶ 5 (relating the report of “CI#2”). A citizen also reported that 

Appellant “was making frequent trips” to his storage unit. Id. at ¶ 7. Police 

obtained information that Appellant was the sole lessee of the unit since 

August 2013 and last accessed the unit on March 20, 2014. Id. at ¶ 8. 

However, the last reported observation of Appellant selling a controlled 

substance dated back to September 2012. Id. at ¶ 3 (asserting “CI#1 knew 

this information to be true because he/she had purchased cocaine from 

[Appellant] as recently September 2012”). 

Therefore, had the canine sweep occurred on March 21, 2013—five 

months before Appellant leased the unit and one year before the application 

for the search warrant—the logical connection between Appellant’s alleged 

criminal conduct in 2014 and the possibility that his storage unit contained 

evidence would be untenable. Accordingly, Appellant’s first argument—that 

the information on the face of the affidavit was stale—has arguable merit. 
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Further, the timing of the canine sweep constitutes an issue of fact material 

to the question of probable cause.3 

We thus turn to the crux of this appeal, namely, the trial court’s 

determinations that the March 21, 2013 date was a typographical error and 

the magisterial district judge could find probable cause notwithstanding that 

error. As noted by the parties and the trial court, there is ample case law 

holding that a warrant may be upheld notwithstanding (1) a magisterial 

district judge’s typographical errors, see Commonwealth v. Swint, 389 

A.2d 654, 656-57 (Pa. Super. 1978) (discussing error in the magisterial 

district judge’s dating of the issuance of the warrant); Commonwealth v. 

Chinea, 371 A.2d 944, 945-46 (Pa. Super. 1977) (same), (2) incorrect 

addresses of the places to be searched, see Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 858 A.2d 1255, 1247-48 (Pa. Super. 2004) (discussing error 

in the affiant’s notation of the address of the premises to be searched);

Commonwealth v. Belenky, 777 A.2d 483, 487 (Pa. Super. 2001) (same), 

or (3) omissions regarding the timeframe of the alleged criminal activity. 

See Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 A.2d 802, 804 (Pa. 1986) (discussing 

omissions regarding when an informant observed criminal activity);

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 916 A.2d 679, 685-86 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(same); Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 564 A.2d 1270, 1271 (Pa. Super. 

 

3

Indeed, the Commonwealth does not argue that probable cause could be 

found even if Detective Lombardo’s references to the canine sweep were 

omitted.
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1989) (same); accord Commonwealth v. Ruey, 892 A.2d 802, 811, 815 

(Pa. 2006) (applying “common-sense distinction between the absence of 

probable cause and the mere lack of a full and complete articulation of the 

same” to hold affiant’s omissions of references regarding the credibility and 

reliability of EMS personnel and hospital at which the defendant was 

admitted did not negate the magisterial district judge’s probable cause 

determination). 

However, as Appellant and the trial court recognized, the above-cited 

cases involved (1) “technical” errors that did not affect the issuing 

authority’s determination of probable cause, (2) omissions resolved upon the 

presumption that the underlying allegations of criminal activity were recent, 

and (3) errors that were cured by other allegations in the affidavit of 

probable cause. Those differences, however, do not give rise to a 

meaningful legal distinction in light of the guiding principles governing a 

probable cause determination.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 

A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), adopted the “more practical” test for probable cause 

set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 

213 (1983). See Gray, 503 A.2d at 925-26 (discussing Gates, Spinelli v. 

United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 

(1964)). Recognizing that probable cause is based on “the factual and 

practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
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men, not legal technicians, act,” both the United States and the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have emphasized that “probable cause 

determinations must be based on common sense non-technical analysis.” 

See id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus,

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 

including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of 

persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing 

court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 

“substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause 

existed.”

Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39). 

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recognized “the informal, 

often hurried context in which [a test for probable cause] must be applied . . 

. .” See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.

[A]ffidavits are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the 

midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical 

requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under 

common law pleading have no proper place in this area. 

Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been 

issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and 

who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial 

refinement of the nature of probable cause.

Id. at 235 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Further,

after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an 

affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A 

magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be 

paid great deference by reviewing courts. A grudging or 
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negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants[ ] is 

inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong 

preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; 

courts should not invalidate . . . warrant[s] by interpreting 

affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a 

commonsense, manner. 

Id. at 236 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Instantly, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the affidavit of probable cause recited 

the qualifications of the affiant, Detective Lombardo, and the general 

practices of “[p]ossessors and sellers of illegal drugs.” Aff. of Probable 

Cause, 3/21/14, at ¶¶ 1-2. However, Paragraphs 3 and 4 referred to the 

report by CI#1 and the identification of Appellant in September of 2012. Id.

at ¶¶ 3-4. Notably, the reference to the canine sweep did not follow the 

information obtained in September of 2012. 

Paragraphs 5 and 6 referred to the reports by CI#2 and the 

identification of Appellant in February 2014. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Paragraph 7 

contained the a citizen’s report, in March of 2014, that Appellant made 

numerous trips to the storage unit. Id. at ¶ 7. Paragraph 8 stated an 

investigator spoke with the manager of the storage facility on March 21, 

2014, and confirmed Appellant was the lessee of the storage unit since 

August of 2013. Id. at ¶ 8.

Paragraph 9 was an anomaly. Similar to Paragraphs 1 and 2, 

however, Paragraph introduced the magisterial district judge to a police 

officer, Officer Billiter, and recited his qualifications to conduct a canine 
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sweep. Id. at ¶ 9. Paragraph 9 also contained an extensive recitation of 

the certifications Officer Billiter received between 2008 and 2012. Id.

In Paragraph 10, Detective Lombardo alleged that Officer Billiter and 

his canine partner, Ruger, conducted a sweep around the storage unit. Id.

at ¶ 10. Paragraph 10 contained the language at issue in this appeal: “on 

March 21, 2013, your Affiant requested Officer Billiter and his K9 partner 

Ruger, of the Manheim Twp Police Department to conduct K9 sweep . . . .” 

Id. That sweep occurred at 4:44 p.m., and Ruger alerted to the presence of 

narcotics. Id. 

Notably, the essential allegations regarding Appellant’s criminal 

activity in Paragraphs 3 through 8 and 10 were set forth in chronological 

order. See id. at ¶¶ 3-8, 10. Paragraph 10, however, was the only 

paragraph containing an express reference to the time of day when an event 

occurred. See id. at ¶ 10. Moreover, it was the final substantive paragraph 

before the request for the warrant in Paragraph 11. 

The trial court’s finding that Detective Lombardo’s statement the 

canine sweep occurred on March 21, 2013, was a typographical error is thus 

supported by an application of common sense. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; 

Gray, 502 A.2d at 925-26. It is reasonable to believe the error escaped 

detection by the detective, the reviewing assistant district attorney, and the 

magisterial district judge, in light of chronological structure of the affidavit 

and its placement on the last page of the affidavit immediately before the 
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request for the warrant. Considering “the informal, often hurried context” of 

the application process, we do not fault the parties for overlooking the error. 

Cf. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. 

We also agree with the trial court that the affidavit of probable cause 

contained sufficient chronological milestones to believe that the canine 

sweep occurred immediately before Detective Lombardo applied for and 

obtained the search warrant at 7:00 p.m., on March 21, 2014. The 

allegations, as well as the indication that the sweep occurred at a specific 

time, all suggest that the canine sweep was the final event before the 

detective sought the search warrant. Indeed, it would defy common sense 

to believe Detective Lombardo squandered police resources on a sweep of 

the storage unit in March 2013, one year before the allegations Appellant 

was visiting his storage unit frequently and the March 21, 2014 interview of 

the facility’s manager that confirmed Appellant’s link to the specific unit. 

Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion or error in the trial court’s 

conclusions that the reference to “March 21, 2013” was a typographical error 

and that the error did not invalidate the warrant. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 

235-36, 238-39. The court was entitled to consider the totality of the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit of probable cause. See id. at 238-

39; Gray, 503 A.2d at 925. As the record supports the court’s findings of 

fact and its conclusion that the issuing authority had a substantial basis 
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reveals no error of law, we discern no basis to disturb the court’s 

determinations. See Hoppert, 39 A.3d at 361-62. 

As to Appellant’s remaining arguments, we find his reliance on the 

“sworn to” requirements of the affidavit unpersuasive. Appellant’s 

suggestion that the presumption that an affiant’s allegations must be 

considered true to preclude a court from recognizing a typographical error is 

hypertechnical. Moreover, it fails to accommodate for the practical 

considerations that underlie the well-settled common sense approach. See

Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-36. Similarly, Appellant’s argument that the trial 

court’s recognition of typographical errors diminishes the role of the issuing 

authority as a neutral arbiter is belied by the precept that a reviewing court 

should not take a grudging approach to warrants. See id. at 236. Indeed, 

where, as here, the circumstances suggest the error was overlooked, 

Appellant’s assertions that the issuing authority abdicated its proper role as 

a neutral arbiter and acted solely as a “rubber stamp” are baseless.

Finally, because Appellant has not demonstrated that the March 21, 

2014 search warrant was improperly issued, no relief is due on his claim that 

the subsequent two warrants for his bank account and his mother’s 

residence were tainted. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/1/2016