ENVIRONMENTAL 

SATELLITES

Focused Attention Needed 

to Improve Mitigation 

Strategies for Satellite 

Coverage Gaps 

Statement of David A. Powner, Director 

Information Technology Management Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittees on 

Environment and Oversight, House 

Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Thursday, September 19, 2013

GAO-13-865T

United States Government Accountability Office
 

Page 1 GAO-13-865T 

Chairman Broun, Chairman Stewart, Ranking Member Maffei, Ranking 

Member Bonamici, and Members of the Subcommittees:

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on two 

satellite program acquisitions within the Department of Commerce’s 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Both the Joint 

Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary Operational 

Environment Satellite-R series (GOES-R) programs are meant to replace 

current operational satellite programs, and both are considered critical to 

the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for 

weather forecasting.

As requested, this statement summarizes our two reports being released 

today on (1) the JPSS program’s status and plans, schedule quality, and 

gap mitigation strategies, and (2) the GOES-R program’s status, 

requirements management, and contingency planning.1 In preparing this 

testimony, we relied on the work supporting those reports. They each 

contain a detailed overview of our objectives, scope, and methodology, 

including the steps we took to assess the reliability of cost and schedule 

data. As noted in those reports, we found that the JPSS data on schedule 

milestones and estimated savings, and GOES-R data on schedules and 

cost reserves were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. All of our work 

for the reports was performed in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Since the 1960s, the United States has used polar-orbiting and 

geostationary satellites to observe the earth and its land, ocean, 

atmosphere, and space environments. Polar-orbiting satellites constantly 

circle the earth in a nearly north-south orbit, providing global coverage of 

conditions that affect the weather and climate. As the earth rotates 

 

1

GAO, Polar Weather Satellites: NOAA Identified Ways to Mitigate Data Gaps, but 

Contingency Plans and Schedules Require Further Attention, GAO-13-676 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 11, 2013) and GAO, Geostationary Weather Satellites: Progress Made, but 

Weaknesses in Scheduling, Contingency Planning, and Communicating with Users Needs 

to be Addressed, GAO-13-597 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2013).

 

Background 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-865T 

beneath it, each polar-orbiting satellite views the entire earth’s surface 

twice a day. In contrast, geostationary satellites maintain a fixed position 

relative to the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space.

Both types of satellites provide a valuable perspective of the environment 

and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable. 

Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems, 

satellites have become an indispensable part of monitoring and 

forecasting weather and climate. For example, polar-orbiting satellites 

provide the data that go into numerical weather prediction models, which 

are a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including 

forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. Geostationary satellites 

provide the graphical images used to identify current weather patterns 

and provide short-term warning. These weather products and models are 

used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that 

communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate its 

effects.

Federal agencies are currently planning and executing major satellite 

acquisition programs to replace existing polar and geostationary satellite 

systems that are nearing the end of their expected life spans. However, 

these programs have troubled legacies of cost increases, missed 

milestones, technical problems, and management challenges that have 

resulted in reduced functionality and major delays to planned launch 

dates over time. We and others—including an independent review team 

reporting to the Department of Commerce and its Inspector General—

have raised concerns that problems and delays on environmental satellite 

acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite 

data used in weather forecasts and warnings. According to officials at 

NOAA, a polar satellite data gap would result in less accurate and timely 

weather forecasts and warnings of extreme events, such as hurricanes, 

storm surge and floods. Such degradation in forecasts and warnings

would place lives, property, and our nation’s critical infrastructures in 

danger. The importance of having such data available was highlighted in 

2012 by the advance warnings of the path, timing, and intensity of 

Superstorm Sandy. Given the criticality of satellite data to weather 

forecasts, concerns that problems and delays on the new satellite 

acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite 

data, and the impact of such gaps on the health and safety of the U.S. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-865T 

population, we concluded that the potential gap in weather satellite data is 

a high-risk area and we added it to our High-Risk List in February 2013.2

For over forty years, the United States has operated two separate 

operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite series, which is managed by 

NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, which is 

managed by the Air Force.3 Currently, there is one operational Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite and two operational Defense 

Meteorological Satellite Program satellites that are positioned so that they 

cross the equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. 

In addition, the government relies on data from a European satellite, 

called the Meteorological Operational satellite.4

With the expectation that combining the Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite program and the Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a 

May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive5

 

2

Every two years at the start of a new Congress, GAO calls attention to agencies and 

program areas that are high risk due to their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, an d 

mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation. See GAO, High Risk Series: An 

Update, 

required NOAA and the 

Department of Defense (DOD) to converge the two satellite programs into 

a single satellite program—the National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environment Satellite System (NPOESS)—capable of satisfying both 

civilian and military requirements. To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, 

and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formed a 

tri-agency integrated program office. However, in the years after the 

program was initiated, NPOESS encountered significant technical 

challenges in sensor development, program cost growth, and schedule 

GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2013).

3

NOAA provides command and control for both the Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite and Defense Meteorological Satellite Program satellites after they 

are in orbit.

4

The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites’ MetOp 

program is a series of three polar-orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. 

MetOp satellites are planned to be flown sequentially over 14 years. The first of these 

satellites was launched in 2006, the second was launched in 2012, and the final satellite in 

the series is expected to launch in 2017.

5

Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.

Events Leading to the JPSS 

Program
 

Page 4 GAO-13-865T 

delays. Specifically, within 8 years of the contract’s award, program costs 

grew by over $8 billion, and launch schedules were delayed by over 5 

years. In addition, as a result of a 2006 restructuring of the program, the 

agencies reduced the program’s functionality by decreasing the number 

of originally planned satellites, orbits, and instruments.

Even after this restructuring, however, the program continued to 

encounter technical issues, management challenges, schedule delays, 

and further cost increases. Therefore, in August 2009, the Executive 

Office of the President formed a task force, led by the Office of Science 

and Technology Policy, to investigate the management and acquisition 

options that would improve the program. As a result of this review, the 

Director of Office of Science and Technology Policy announced in 

February 2010 that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly procure 

NPOESS;6

When this decision was announced, NOAA and NASA immediately began 

planning for a new satellite program in the afternoon orbit—called JPSS—

and DOD began planning for a new satellite program in the morning 

orbit—called the Defense Weather Satellite System, which has since 

been canceled.

instead, each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite 

system. Specifically, NOAA would be responsible for the afternoon orbit, 

and DOD would be responsible for the early morning orbit. The 

partnership with the European satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit 

would continue as planned.

7 After the February 2010 decision to disband NPOESS, 

NOAA established a program office to guide the development and launch 

of the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (S-NPP) satellite8

 

6

The announcement accompanied the release of the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget

—a 

demonstration satellite that was developed under NPOESS and managed 

by NASA—as well as the two planned JPSS satellites, known as JPSS-1 

and JPSS-2. NOAA also worked with NASA to establish its program office 

to oversee the acquisition, system engineering, and integration of the 

satellite program. NOAA estimates that the life cycle costs for the JPSS 

request.

7

After the decision to disband NPOESS, DOD established its Defense Weather Satellite 

System program office and modified its contracts accordingly before deciding in early 

2012 to terminate the program and reassess its requirements (as directed by Congress).

8

Originally called the NPOESS Preparatory Project, in January 2012 the name of the 

satellite was changed to the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership satellite.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-865T 

program will be $11.3 billion through fiscal year 2025. The current 

anticipated launch date for the first JPSS satellite is March 2017, with a 

second satellite to be launched in December 2022.

Over the last several years, we have issued a series of reports on the 

NPOESS program—and the transition to JPSS—that highlight the 

technical issues, cost growth, key management challenges, and key risks 

of transitioning from NPOESS to JPSS.9 In these reports, we made 

multiple recommendations to, among other things, improve executivelevel oversight and establish mitigation plans for risks associated with 

pending polar satellite data gaps. NOAA has taken steps to address our 

recommendations, including taking action to improve executive-level 

oversight and in working to establish a contingency plan to mitigate 

potential gaps in polar satellite data. We subsequently assessed NOAA’s 

progress in implementing both of these recommendations in our reports 

being issued today.

In addition to the polar-orbiting satellites, NOAA operates GOES as a 

two-satellite geostationary satellite system that is primarily focused on the 

United States. The GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that 

NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned to replace existing weather 

satellites that will likely reach the end of their useful lives in about 2015.

NOAA is responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall mission 

success. The NOAA Program Management Council, which is chaired by 

NOAA’s Deputy Undersecretary, is the program oversight body for the 

GOES-R program. However, since it relies on NASA’s acquisition 

experience and technical expertise to help ensure the success of its 

 

9

See, for example, GAO, Environmental Satellites: Focused Attention Needed to Mitigate 

Program Risks, GAO-12-841T (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2012); Polar-orbiting 

Environmental Satellites: Changing Requirements, Technical Issues, and Looming Data 

Gaps Require Focused Attention, GAO-12-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2012); Polar 

Satellites: Agencies Need to Address Potential Gaps in Weather and Climate Data 

Coverage, GAO-11-945T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2011); Polar-orbiting 

Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize 

the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data, GAO-10-558 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 

2010); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity 

at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-Agency Decision Making, GAO-09-772T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009); and Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With 

Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-Agency 

Decision Making, GAO-09-564 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009).

Overview of the GOES-R 

Program
 

Page 6 GAO-13-865T 

programs, NOAA implemented an integrated program management 

structure with NASA for the GOES-R program. Within the program office, 

there are two project offices that manage key components of the GOES-R 

system. NOAA has delegated responsibility to NASA to manage the Flight 

Project Office, including awarding and managing the spacecraft contract 

and delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The Ground 

Project Office, managed by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground System 

contract and satellite data product development and distribution.

NOAA has made a number of changes to the program since 2006, 

including the removal of certain satellite data products and a critical 

instrument (the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite). In February 2011, as 

part of its fiscal year 2012 budget request, NOAA requested funding to 

begin development for two additional satellites in the GOES-R series. The 

program estimates that the development for all four satellites in the 

GOES-R series is to cost $10.9 billion through 2036. In August 2013, 

NOAA announced that it would delay the launch of the GOES-R and S 

satellites from October 2015 and February 2017 to the second quarter of 

fiscal year 2016 and the third quarter of fiscal year 2017, respectively. 

These are the current anticipated launch dates of the first two GOES-R 

satellites; the last satellite in the series is planned for launch in 2024.

In September 2010, we recommended that NOAA develop and document 

continuity plans for the operation of geostationary satellites that include 

the implementation procedures, resources, staff roles, and time tables 

needed to transition to a single satellite, a foreign satellite, or other 

solution.10

In June 2012, we reported that, in order to oversee GOES-R contingency 

funding, senior managers at NOAA should have greater insight into the 

amount of contingency reserves

In September 2011, the GOES-R program provided a draft 

plan documenting a strategy for conducting operations if there were only 

a single operational satellite.

11

 

10GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Improvements Needed in 

Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key Users, 

set aside for each satellite in the 

GAO-10-799 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

1, 2010). 

11A contingency reserve provides program managers ready access to funding in order to 

resolve problems as they occur and may be necessary to cover increased costs resulting 

from unexpected design complexity, incomplete requirements, or other uncertainties. See 

GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009).
 

Page 7 GAO-13-865T 

program and detailed information on how reserves are being used on 

both the flight and ground components. We recommended that the 

program assess and report to the NOAA Program Management Council 

the reserves needed for completing remaining development for each 

satellite in the series. We also found that unresolved schedule 

deficiencies remain in portions of the program’s integrated master 

schedule, including subordinate schedules for the spacecraft and core 

ground system.12 We recommended that the program address shortfalls 

in schedule management practices, and NOAA has since taken steps to 

improve these practices. We subsequently assessed NOAA’s progress in 

implementing both of these recommendations in our reports being issued 

today.

NOAA has made progress towards JPSS program objectives of 

sustaining the continuity of NOAA’s polar-orbiting satellite capabilities 

through the S-NPP, JPSS-1, and JPSS-2 satellites by (1) delivering 

S-NPP data to weather forecasters and (2) completing significant 

instrument and spacecraft development for the JPSS-1 satellite. 

However, the program has experienced delays on the ground system 

schedules for the JPSS-1 satellite. Moreover, the program is revising its 

scope and objectives to reduce costs and prioritize NOAA’s weather 

mission.

The JPSS program has made progress on S-NPP since its launch. For 

example, in November 2012 the office completed an interim backup 

command and control facility that could protect the health and safety of 

the satellite if unexpected issues occurred at the primary mission 

operations facility. Also, since completing satellite activation and 

commissioning activities in March 2012, the JPSS program has been 

working to calibrate and validate S-NPP products in order to make them 

precise enough for use in weather-related operations by October 2013. 

While the program office plans to have 18 products validated for 

operational use by the end of September 2013, it is behind schedule for 

other products. Specifically, the program expects to complete validating 

35 S-NPP products by the end of September 2014 and one other product 

 

12GAO, Geostationary Weather Satellites: Design Progress Made, but Schedule 

Uncertainty Needs to be Addressed, GAO-12-576, (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2012). 

The JPSS Program 

Has Made Progress, 

but Faces 

Development 

Challenges, Has 

Weaknesses in 

Schedule Quality, and 

Lacks a 

Comprehensive 

Contingency Plan
 

Page 8 GAO-13-865T 

by the end of September 2015, almost one and two years later than 

originally planned.

In order to sustain polar-orbiting earth observation capabilities beyond 

S-NPP, the program is working to complete development of the JPSS-1 

systems in preparation for a March 2017 launch date. To manage this 

initiative, the program office organized its responsibilities into two 

separate projects: (1) the flight project, which includes sensors, 

spacecraft, and launch vehicles and (2) the ground project, which 

includes ground-based data processing and command and control 

systems. JPSS projects and components are at various stages of system 

development. The flight project has nearly completed instrument 

hardware development for the JPSS-1 satellite and has begun testing 

certain instruments. Key testing milestones and delivery dates for the 

instruments and spacecraft have generally held constant since the last 

key decision point in July 2012, and both the instruments and the 

spacecraft are generally meeting expected technical performance. All 

instruments are scheduled to be delivered to the spacecraft by 2014. 

Also, the flight project completed a major design review for the JPSS-1 

satellite’s spacecraft.

The JPSS ground project has also made progress in developing the 

ground system components. However, the ground project experienced 

delays in its planned schedule due to issues with the availability of 

facilities required for hardware installation, software development, and 

testing. Consequently, the program has replanned the ground project 

schedule and is merging the next two major software releases. As a 

result, any complications in the merged ground system upgrades could 

affect the system’s readiness to support the JPSS-1 launch date.

While NOAA is moving forward to complete product development on the 

S-NPP satellite and system development on the JPSS-1 satellite, the 

agency recently made major revisions to the program’s scope and 

planned capabilities and is moving to implement other scope changes as 

it finalizes its plans pending coordination with congressional committees. 

We previously reported that, as part of its fiscal year 2013 budget 

process, NOAA was considering removing selected elements of the 

program in order to reduce total program costs from $14.6 billion to $12.9 

billion.13

 

13

By October 2012, NOAA had reduced the program’s scope by, 

GAO-12-604. 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-865T 

among other things, reducing the previously planned network of fifteen 

ground-based receptor stations to two receptor sites at the north pole and 

two sites at the south pole and increasing the time it takes to obtain 

satellite data and deliver it to the end user on JPSS-2 from 30 minutes to 

80 minutes.14 More recently, as proposed by the administration, NOAA 

began implementing additional changes in the program’s scope and 

objectives in order to meet the agency’s highest-priority needs for 

weather forecasting and reduce program costs from $12.9 billion to $11.3 

billion. In this latest round of revisions, NOAA revised the program’s 

scope by, among other things, transferring requirements for certain 

climate sensors to NASA, creating a new Polar Free Flyer program within 

NOAA that would be responsible for missions supporting continued solar 

measurements and user service systems, and reducing the JPSS 

program’s mission life cycle by 3 years—from 2028 to 2025. The changes 

NOAA implemented over the last 2 years will have an impact on those 

who rely on polar satellite data. Specifically, satellite data products will be 

delivered more slowly than anticipated because of the reduction in the 

number of ground stations, and military users may not obtain the variety 

of products once anticipated at the rates anticipated because of the 

removal of their ground-based processing subsystems. As NOAA moves 

to implement these program changes, it will be important to assess and 

understand the impact the changes will have on satellite data users.

According to our draft guidance on best practices in scheduling,15

 

14In January 2013, program officials revised this delay to 96 minutes to more precisely 

reflect the time it takes to send products from the ground system to the end users.

the 

success of a program depends, in part, on having an integrated and 

reliable master schedule that defines when and how long work will occur 

and how each activity is related to the others. The JPSS program office 

provided a preliminary integrated master schedule in June 2013, but this 

schedule is incomplete. The schedule contains the scope of work for key 

program components, such as the JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 satellites and the 

ground system, and cites linkages to more detailed component 

schedules. However, significant weaknesses exist in the program’s 

schedule. Specifically, about one-third of the schedule is missing logical 

relationships called dependencies that are needed to depict the sequence 

15GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, 

GAO-12-120G (exposure draft) (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012).

Integration Problems and 

Other Weaknesses Reduce 

JPSS Schedule Quality and 

Confidence 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-865T 

in which activities occur. Complete network logic between all activities is 

essential if the schedule is to correctly forecast the start and end dates of 

activities within the plan. Program documentation acknowledges that this 

schedule is not yet complete and the program office plans to refine it over 

time. Until the program office completes its integrated schedule and 

includes logically linked sequences of activities, it will lack the information 

it needs to effectively monitor development progress, manage 

dependencies, and forecast the JPSS-1 satellite’s completion and launch.

While the program plans to refine its integrated master schedule, three 

component schedules supporting the JPSS-1 mission—VIIRS, the 

spacecraft, and the ground system—varied in their implementation of 

characteristics of high-quality, reliable schedules. Each schedule had 

strengths and weaknesses with respect to sound scheduling practices, 

but VIIRS was a stronger schedule with fewer weaknesses compared to 

the ground system and spacecraft schedules. The following table 

identifies the quality of each of the selected JPSS-1 component 

schedules based on the extent to which they met ten best practices of 

high-quality and reliable schedules.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-865T 

Table 1: Assessment of JPSS-1 Component Schedule Quality

Schedule characteristic or best practice Ground system Spacecraft VIIRS

Comprehensive

Capturing all activities ◕ ◑ ◕

Assigning resources to all activities ◕ ◕ ◕

Establishing the duration of all activities ◕ ◑ ●

Well-constructed

Sequencing all activities ◕ ◑ ◕

Confirming that the critical path is valid ◔ ◑ ◕

Ensuring reasonable total float ◑ ◑ ◕

Credible

Verifying that the schedule can be traced horizontally and vertically ◑ ◑ ◕

Conducting a schedule risk analysis ◔ ◑ ◑

Controlled

Updating the schedule using actual progress and logic ◕ ◕ ●

Maintaining a baseline schedule ◕ ◑ ◕

Source: GAO analysis of detailed schedules and related documentation for the VIIRS instrument, spacecraft, and ground system.

●=Met: The program office or contractor provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire 

criterion.

◕=Substantially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies a large 

portion of the criterion.

◑=Partially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies about half of the 

criterion.

◔=Minimally met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies a small portion 

of the criterion.

○=Not met: The program office or contractor provided no evidence that satisfies any of the 

criterion.

The inconsistency in quality among the three schedules has multiple 

causes, including the lack of documented explanations for certain 

practices and schedule management and reporting requirements that 

varied across contractors. Since the reliability of an integrated schedule 

depends in part on the reliability of its subordinate schedules, schedule 

quality weaknesses in these schedules will transfer to an integrated 

master schedule derived from them. Consequently, the extent to which 

there are quality weaknesses in JPSS-1 support schedules further 

constrains the program’s ability to monitor progress, manage key 

dependencies, and forecast completion dates. Until the program office 

addresses the scheduling shortfalls in its component schedules, it will 

lack the information it needs to effectively monitor development progress, 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-865T 

manage dependencies, and forecast the JPSS-1 satellite’s completion 

and launch.

The JPSS program office used data from flight project component 

schedules as inputs when it recently conducted a schedule risk analysis 

on the JPSS-1 mission schedule (and launch date) through NASA’s joint 

cost and schedule confidence level (JCL) process.16 The JCL 

implemented by the JPSS program office represents a best practice in 

schedule management for establishing a credible schedule and reflects a 

robust schedule risk analysis conducted on key JPSS-1 schedule 

components. Based on the results of the JCL, the program office reports 

that its level of confidence in the JPSS-1 schedule is 70 percent and that 

it has sufficient schedule reserve to maintain a launch date of no later 

than March 2017. However, the program office’s level of confidence in the 

JPSS-1 schedule may be overly optimistic for two key reasons. First, the 

model that the program office used was based on flight project activities 

rather than an integrated schedule consisting of flight, ground, program 

office, and other activities relevant to the development and launch of 

JPSS-1. As a result, the JPSS program office’s confidence level 

projections do not factor in the ongoing scheduling issues that are 

impacting the ground project. Second, there are concerns regarding the 

spacecraft schedule’s quality as identified above. Factoring in these 

concerns, the confidence of the JPSS-1 satellite’s schedule and projected 

launch date would be lower. Until the program office conducts a schedule 

risk analysis on an integrated schedule that includes the entire scope of 

effort and addresses quality shortfalls of relevant component schedules, it 

will have less assurance of meeting the planned March 2017 launch date 

for JPSS-1.

 

16The JCL is a probabilistic analysis that includes, among other things, all cost and 

schedule elements, incorporates and quantifies potential risks, assesses the impacts of 

cost and schedule to date, and addresses available annual resources to arrive at 

development cost and schedule estimates associated with various confidence levels.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-865T 

In recent years, NOAA officials have communicated publicly and often 

about the risk of a polar satellite data gap. Currently, the program 

estimates that there will be a gap of about a year and a half from the time 

when the current Suomi NPP satellite reaches the end of its expected 

lifespan and when the JPSS-1 satellite will be in orbit and operational. 

Satellite data gaps in the morning or afternoon polar orbits would lead to 

less accurate and timely weather forecasting; as a result, advanced 

warning of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm surges, and 

floods—would be affected. See figure 1 for a depiction of a potential gap 

in the afternoon orbit lasting 17 months.

Figure 1: A Potential Gap in Polar Environmental Satellite Coverage in the 

Afternoon Orbit

Government and industry best practices call for the development of 

contingency plans to maintain an organization’s essential functions in the 

case of an adverse event and to reduce or control negative impacts from 

such risks.17 In October 2012, in response to our earlier 

recommendations to establish mitigation plans,18

 

17See GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning, 

NOAA established a 

mitigation plan to address the impact of potential gaps in polar afternoon 

GAO/AIMD-10.1.19 (Washington, D.C.: August 1998); National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, NIST 800-34

(Gaithersburg, Md.: May 2010); Software Engineering Institute, CMMI® for Acquisition, 

Version 1.3, (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010).

18GAO-12-604. 

NOAA Has Analyzed 

Alternatives for 

Addressing Gaps in 

Satellite Data, but Lacks a 

Comprehensive 

Contingency Plan
 

Page 14 GAO-13-865T 

satellite data. This plan identifies alternatives for mitigating the risk of a 

14- to 18-month gap in the afternoon orbit beginning in March 2016, 

between the current polar satellite and the JPSS-1 satellite. However, 

NOAA did not implement the actions identified in its mitigation plan and 

decided to identify additional alternatives. In October 2012, at the 

direction of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and 

Atmosphere (who is also the Administrator of NOAA), NOAA contracted 

for a detailed technical assessment of alternatives to mitigate the 

degradation of products caused by a gap in satellite data in the afternoon 

polar orbit. This assessment solicited input from experts within and 

outside of NOAA and resulted in a range of alternatives that included 

relying on existing polar satellites, making improvements to the forecast 

models, and relying on the use of a foreign satellite.

By documenting its mitigation plan and conducting a study on additional 

alternatives, NOAA has taken positive steps towards establishing a 

contingency plan for handling the potential impact of satellite data gaps in 

the afternoon polar orbit. However, NOAA does not yet have a 

comprehensive contingency plan because it has not yet selected the 

strategies to be implemented or established procedures and actions to 

implement the selected strategies. In addition, there are shortfalls in the 

agency’s current plans as compared to government and industry best 

practices, such as not always identifying specific actions with defined 

roles and responsibilities, timelines, and triggers. Moreover, multiple 

steps remain in testing, validating, and implementing the contingency 

plan. NOAA officials stated that the agency is continuing to work on 

refinements to its gap mitigation plan, and that they anticipate issuing an 

updated plan in fall 2013 that will reflect the additional alternatives. While 

NOAA expects to update its plan, the agency does not yet have a 

schedule for adding key elements—such as specific actions, roles and 

responsibilities, timelines, and triggers—for each alternative. Until NOAA 

establishes a comprehensive contingency plan that integrates its 

strategies and addresses the elements identified above to improve its 

plans, it may not be sufficiently prepared to mitigate potential gaps in 

polar satellite coverage.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-865T 

The GOES-R program has completed its design and made progress in 

building flight and ground components. Specifically, the program 

completed critical design reviews for the flight and ground projects and for 

the overall program between April and November 2012. The GOES-R 

flight components are in various stages leading up to the system 

integration review, with five of six completing a key environmental testing 

review. In addition, the program began building the spacecraft in February 

2013. On the GOES-R core ground system, a prototype for the operations 

module was delivered in late 2012 and is now being used for initial testing 

and training.

The program has also installed antenna dishes at NOAA’s primary 

satellite communications site, and completed two key reviews of antennas 

at the GOES remote backup site. After the completion of design, and as 

the spacecraft and instruments are developed, NASA plans to conduct 

several interim reviews and tests before proceeding to the next major 

program-level review, the system integration review.

However, the program has delayed several key milestones. Over the past 

12 to 18 months, both the flight and ground segments experienced delays 

in planned dates for programwide milestones. More recently, in August 

2013, the program announced that it would delay the launch of the first 

two satellites in the program. Specifically, the launch of the GOES-R 

satellite would be delayed from October 2015 to the quarter ending March 

2016, and that the expected GOES-S satellite launch date would be 

delayed from February 2017 to the quarter ending June 2017.

The GOES-R program is also experiencing technical issues on the flight 

and ground projects that could cause further schedule delays. For 

example, the electronics unit of the Geostationary Lightning Mapper flight 

instrument experienced problems during testing, which led the program 

office to delay the tests. The program is considering several options to 

address this issue, including using the electronics unit being developed 

for a later GOES-R satellite to allow key components to proceed with 

testing. If the issue cannot be resolved, it would affect the instrument’s 

performance. As a result, the program is also considering excluding the 

Geostationary Lightning Mapper from the first GOES-R satellite. It plans 

to make its decision on whether or not to include the instrument in late 

2013. The removal of this instrument would cause a significant reduction 

in the satellite’s functionality.

The program has reported that it is on track to stay within its $10.9 billion 

life cycle cost estimate. However, program officials reported that, while 

GOES-R Has Made 

Development 

Progress, but 

Continues to 

Experience Milestone

Delays and 

Weaknesses in 

Scheduling Practices 

and Contingency 

Planning 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-865T 

the program is currently operating without cost overruns on any of its 

main components, program life cycle costs may increase by $150 to $300 

million if full funding in the current fiscal year is not received.

While some improvements have been made, the GOES-R program 

continues to demonstrate weaknesses in the development of component 

schedules, which have the potential to cause further delays in meeting 

milestone timelines. In the time since our previous work on examining 

program schedules in June 2012, it has since improved selected 

practices on its spacecraft and core ground schedules. For example, 

NOAA has since included all subcontractor activities in the core ground 

schedule, and allocated a higher percentage of activities to resources in 

its schedules. As a result of these improvements, the program has 

increased the reliability of its schedules, and also decreased the risk of 

further delaying satellite launch dates due to incorrect schedule data.

However, the program’s performance on other scheduling best practices 

stayed the same or worsened. For example, both the spacecraft and core 

ground schedules have issues with sequencing remaining activities and 

integration between activities. Without the right linkages, activities that 

slip early in the schedule do not transmit delays to activities that should 

depend on them. Both schedules also have a very high average of total 

float time for detailed activities.19 Such high values of total float time can 

falsely depict true project status, making it difficult to determine which 

activities drive key milestone dates. Finally, the project’s critical path does 

not match up with activities that make up the driving path20

Taken together, delays in key milestones, technical issues, and 

weaknesses in schedule practices could lead to further delays in the 

launch date of the first GOES-R satellite, currently planned to occur by 

March 2016.

on the core 

ground schedule. Without a valid critical path to the end of the schedule, 

management cannot focus on activities that will have a detrimental effect 

on the key project milestones and deliveries if they slip.

 

19Total float time is the amount of time an activity can be delayed or extended before the 

delay affects its successors or the program’s finish date.

20A driving path is the longest path of successive activities that drives the finish date for a 

key milestone. The driving path often corresponds to a schedule’s critical path. 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-865T 

Launch delays such as the one recently experienced by the GOES-R 

program also increase the time that NOAA is without an on-orbit backup 

satellite. This is significant because, in April 2015, NOAA expects to retire 

one of its operational satellites and move its back-up satellite into 

operations. The recent delay in expected launch of the first GOES-R 

satellite from October 2015 to as late as March 2016 increases the 

projected gap in backup coverage to just short of two years. Also, the first 

satellite is now expected to complete its post-launch testing by 

September 2016, only five months before NOAA expects to retire the 

GOES-15 satellite. If launch of the first satellite were to have a further slip 

of more than five months, a gap in satellite coverage could occur. Figure 

2 shows current anticipated operational and test periods for the two most 

recent series of GOES satellites.

Figure 2: Potential Gap in Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite 

Coverage

Note: The GOES-R and GOES-S launch dates reflect the end of the quarters listed in NOAA’s latest 

launch estimates. Thus, GOES-R is listed as launching by March 2016, and GOES-S by June 2017.

Because of the expected imminent use of the current on-orbit back-up 

satellite, a launch delay to GOES-R would also increase the potential for 

a gap in GOES satellite coverage should one of the two operational 

satellites (GOES-14 or -15) fail prematurely (see graphic)—a scenario 

given a 36 percent likelihood of occurring by an independent review team. 

Without a full complement of operational GOES satellites, the nation’s 

Launch Delays Increase 

the Risk of a Satellite 

Coverage Gap, and 

Weaknesses in 

Contingency Plans 

Increase the Impact of a 

Coverage Gap
 

Page 18 GAO-13-865T 

ability to maintain the continuity of data required for effective weather 

forecasting could be compromised. This, in turn, could put the public, 

property, and the economy at risk.

The impact of a gap in satellite coverage may also increase based on 

issues with NOAA’s current contingency plans. Government and industry 

best practices call for the development of contingency plans to maintain 

an organization’s essential functions in the case of an adverse event.21

NOAA has established contingency plans for the loss of its GOES 

satellites and ground systems that are generally in accordance with best 

practices. Specifically, NOAA identified failure scenarios, recovery 

priorities, and minimum levels of acceptable performance. NOAA 

provided a final version of its satellite plan in December 2012 that 

included scenarios for three, two, and one operational satellites. It also 

established contingency plans that identify solutions and high-level 

activities and triggers to implement the solutions.

These practices include key elements such as identifying and selecting 

strategies to address failure scenarios, developing procedures to 

implement selected strategies, and involving affected stakeholders.

However, these plans are missing key elements. For example, NOAA has 

not demonstrated that the contingency strategies for both its satellite and 

ground systems are based on an assessment of costs, benefits, and 

impact on users. Furthermore, NOAA did not work with the user 

community to address potential reductions in capabilities under 

contingency scenarios or identify alternative solutions for preventing a 

delay in the GOES-R launch date. In addition, while NOAA’s failure 

scenarios for its satellite system are based on the number of available 

satellites—and the loss of a backup satellite caused by a delayed GOESR launch would fit into these scenarios—the agency did not identify 

alternative solutions or time lines for preventing a GOES-R launch delay. 

Until NOAA addresses the shortfalls in its contingency plans and 

procedures, the plans may not work as intended in an emergency and 

 

21See GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning, 

GAO/AIMD-10.1.19 (Washington, D.C.: August 1998); National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, NIST-800-34

(Gaithersburg, Md.: May 2010); Software Engineering Institute, CMMI® for Acquisition, 

Version 1.3, (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010).
 

Page 19 GAO-13-865T 

satellite data users may not obtain the information they need to perform 

their missions.

Both the JPSS and GOES-R programs continue to carry risks of future 

launch delays and potential gaps in satellite coverage; implementing the 

recommendations in our accompanying reports should help mitigate 

those risks. In the JPSS report being released today, we recommend, 

among other things, that NOAA

• establish a complete JPSS program integrated master schedule that 

includes a logically linked sequence of activities;

• address the shortfalls in the ground system and spacecraft 

component schedules outlined in our report;

• after completing the integrated master schedule and addressing 

shortfalls in component schedules, update the joint cost and schedule 

confidence level for JPSS-1, if warranted and justified; and

• establish a comprehensive contingency plan for potential satellite data 

gaps in the polar orbit that is consistent with contingency planning 

best practices identified in our report. The plan should include, for 

example, specific contingency actions with defined roles and 

responsibilities, timelines, and triggers; analysis of the impact of lost 

data from the morning orbits; and identification of opportunities to 

accelerate the calibration and validation phase of JPSS-1.

In the GOES-R report being released today, we recommend, among 

other things, that NOAA

• given the likely gap in availability of an on-orbit GOES backup satellite 

in 2015 and 2016, address the weaknesses identified in our report on 

the core ground system and the spacecraft schedules. These 

weaknesses include, but are not limited to, sequencing all activities, 

ensuring there are adequate resources for the activities, and 

conducting a schedule risk analysis and

• revise the satellite and ground system contingency plans to address 

weaknesses identified in our report, including providing more 

information on the potential impact of a satellite failure, identifying 

alternative solutions for preventing a delay in GOES-R launch as well 

as time lines for implementing those solutions, and coordinating with 

key external stakeholders on contingency strategies.

Implementation of 

Recommendations 

Should Help Mitigate 

Program Risks
 

Page 20 GAO-13-865T 

On both reports, NOAA agreed with our recommendations and identified 

steps it is taking to implement them.

In summary, NOAA has made progress on both the JPSS and GOES-R 

programs, but key challenges remain to ensure that potential gaps in 

satellite data are minimized or mitigated. On the JPSS program, NOAA 

has made noteworthy progress in using S-NPP data in weather forecasts 

and developing the JPSS-1 satellite. However, NOAA does not expect to 

validate key S-NPP products until nearly 3 years after the satellite’s 

launch, and there are remaining issues with the JPSS schedule that 

decrease the confidence that JPSS-1 will launch by March 2017 as 

planned. On the GOES-R program, progress in completing the system’s 

design has been accompanied by continuing milestone delays, including 

delays in the launch dates for both the GOES-R and GOES-S satellites. 

The potential for further milestone delays also exists due to remaining 

weaknesses in developing and maintaining key program schedules. 

Faced with an anticipated gap in the polar satellite program and a 

potential gap in the geostationary satellite program, NOAA has taken 

steps to study alternatives and establish mitigation plans. However, the 

agency does not yet have comprehensive contingency plans that identify 

specific actions with defined timelines, and triggers. Until NOAA 

establishes comprehensive contingency plans that addresses these 

shortfalls, its plans for mitigating potential gaps may not be effective in 

avoiding significant impacts to its weather mission.

Chairman Broun, Chairman Stewart, Ranking Member Maffei, Ranking 

Member Bonamici, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes 

my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions 

that you may have at this time.

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please 

contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. 

Other key contributors include Colleen Phillips (assistant director), Shaun 

Byrnes, Lynn Espedido, Nancy Glover, Franklin Jackson, Joshua Leiling, 

and Meredith Raymond.

GAO Contact and 

Staff

Acknowledgments 

(311293)
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