AFGHANISTAN

Key Oversight Issues for 

USAID Development Efforts

Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 

Director, International Affairs and Trade

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1:30 p.m. EDT

Thursday, March 13, 2014

GAO-14-448T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-448T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

March 13, 2014

AFGHANISTAN

Key Oversight Issues for USAID Development Efforts 

Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. government has been 

engaged in efforts in Afghanistan since 

declaring a global war on terrorism that 

targeted al Qaeda, its affiliates, and 

other violent extremists. The U.S. effort 

has involved a whole of government 

approach to disrupt, dismantle, and 

defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates and 

strengthen Afghanistan so that it can 

never again be a haven for terrorists. 

This approach includes USAID’s

development assistance and 

reconstruction efforts, which to date 

have invested over $15 billion in 

Afghanistan since 2002.

To assist Congress in its oversight, 

GAO has issued over 50 products in 

the past 5 years focusing on U.S. 

efforts in Afghanistan. This testimony 

summarizes the findings from those 

products related to USAID efforts in 

Afghanistan and discusses: (1) levels 

of U.S. direct assistance and need for 

continued oversight, (2) the importance 

of routine monitoring and evaluation of 

USAID projects in Afghanistan, and (3) 

the need for mitigation planning for 

how USAID will continue to operate in 

Afghanistan after the withdrawal of 

U.S. combat troops.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new 

recommendations but has made 

numerous recommendations in prior 

reports aimed at improving USAID’s 

oversight and accountability of U.S. 

assistance to Afghanistan. USAID has 

generally concurred with these 

recommendations and has taken or 

plans to take steps to address them.

What GAO Found

In 2010, the United States pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its 

development aid directly through the Afghan government budget within 2 years. 

This direct assistance is intended to help develop the capacity of Afghan 

government ministries to manage programs and funds. Using bilateral 

agreements and multilateral trust funds, the United States more than tripled its 

direct assistance awards to Afghanistan in the first year of the pledge, going from 

over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to over $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. The 

U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) most current reporting 

shows that for fiscal year 2012 the agency provided over $800 million in mission 

funds through direct assistance. In 2013, GAO reported that while USAID had 

established and generally complied with various financial and other controls in its 

direct assistance agreements, it had not always assessed the risks in providing 

direct assistance before awarding funds. USAID has taken steps in response to 

GAO’s recommendations to help ensure the accountability of direct assistance 

funds provided to the Afghan government. Recently, the Special Inspector 

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that USAID 

determined that seven ministries were unable to manage direct assistance funds 

without a risk mitigation strategy in place. However, SIGAR reported that USAID 

approved assistance for the ministries, but did not mitigate for all identified risks. 

GAO has previously reported on systemic weaknesses in USAID’s monitoring

and evaluation of programs carried out by its implementing partners in 

Afghanistan. For example, although USAID collected progress reports from 

implementing partners for agriculture and water projects, it did not always 

analyze and interpret data to, among other things, inform future decisions. 

USAID has undertaken some efforts to improve its monitoring and evaluation of 

the billions of dollars invested towards development projects in Afghanistan. 

GAO and other oversight agencies, however, have highlighted gaps that show 

USAID continued to inconsistently apply performance management procedures, 

falls short in maintaining institutional knowledge, and needs to improve oversight 

of contractors. 

USAID’s ability to conduct its mission and the challenges it has faced in providing 

oversight and monitoring of its development projects in Afghanistan are likely to 

be exacerbated by the planned withdrawal of U.S. and coalition combat troops 

from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. The United States is currently transitioning 

from counterinsurgency and stability operations toward more traditional 

diplomatic and development activities. As U.S. combat troops withdraw from 

Afghanistan, provincial reconstruction teams will continue to decline in number, 

thus challenging USAID’s opportunities to directly monitor and evaluate programs 

in certain parts of Afghanistan. To prepare for the possible lack of USAID 

personnel in the field, USAID has undertaken various planning efforts to mitigate 

against potential challenges. For example, USAID is planning to implement a 

remote monitoring program that will use contractors to verify activities that 

implementing partners have completed. As the United States plans for the 

withdrawal of its combat troops and the transition from an integrated civilian and 

military effort to a civilian-led presence, GAO believes it is important to have 

safeguards in place to help ensure sustainment of the gains made by U.S. and 

coalition investments.

View GAO-14-448T. For more information, 

contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 

512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov
Page 1 GAO-14-448T 

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss key issues relating to the U.S. Agency 

for International Development’s (USAID) efforts in Afghanistan. As this 

subcommittee is aware, the U.S. government has been engaged in a 

number of efforts in Afghanistan since declaring, after 9/11, a global war 

on terrorism that targets al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other violent 

extremists, including groups operating along the Afghanistan/Pakistan 

border and in the tribal areas of Pakistan. U.S. efforts have focused on a 

whole of government approach that calls for the use of all elements of 

national power to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates 

and strengthen Afghanistan so that it can never again be a haven for 

terrorists. This approach includes USAID’s development assistance and 

reconstruction efforts, which to date have invested over $15 billion in U.S. 

taxpayers’ funds since 2002 in Afghanistan.

Today I would like to highlight three issues relating to USAID’s efforts in 

Afghanistan that were outlined in our most recent key issues report 

provided to the 113th Congress, the Administration, and U.S. agencies, 

including USAID.1

• First, the continued need for oversight and accountability of U.S. 

funds, including those USAID has provided as a part of U.S. efforts to 

build the capacity of the Afghan government;

These issues are:

• second, the importance of routine monitoring and evaluation of USAID 

development projects to guide and ensure the most efficient and 

effective use of U.S. funds; and

• third, the need for mitigation planning for how USAID will continue to 

operate under a civilian-led presence following the scheduled 

withdrawal of U.S and coalition combat troops from Afghanistan.

The key issues report summarizes the work we have reported on in over 

50 issued products in the past 5 years related to U.S. efforts in 

 1 GAO, Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues, GAO-13-218SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 

2013) and GAO, Contingency Contracting: State and USAID Made Progress Assessing 

and Implementing Changes, but Further Actions Needed, GAO-14-229 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 14, 2014) for updated work regarding oversight of contracts in Afghanistan. 
Page 2 GAO-14-448T 

Afghanistan. Detailed information on the scope and methodology for our 

prior work can be found in the reports we have cited throughout this 

statement. We conducted the work that this statement is based on in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provided a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

USAID has undertaken various programs and activities in support of the 

United States’ and coalition partners’ goals to reconstruct Afghanistan 

and build the country’s institutional capacity. These programs and 

activities have focused on, among other things, (1) enhancing and 

developing Afghanistan’s economy—notably Afghanistan’s agricultural, 

water sectors, energy, and transportation; and (2) building Afghanistan’s 

institutional capacity to govern; provide economic livelihood to its people; 

and address longstanding issues of corruption. USAID plays a vital role in 

the United States’ whole of government approach towards its strategic 

goals for Afghanistan—to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its 

affiliates and strengthen Afghanistan so that it can never again be a 

haven for terrorists. However, the dangerous security environment, 

prevalence of corruption, and limited capacity of the Afghan government, 

continue to threaten the achievement of U.S. goals:

• Dangerous security environment. Afghanistan’s security environment 

continues to challenge the Afghan government’s and international 

community’s efforts. In our 2013 key issues report, we noted that in 

December 2009 the U.S. President, recognizing that the situation in 

Afghanistan had become more grave, announced his decision to 

deploy additional troops to Afghanistan to disrupt and defeat 

extremists.2 The security situation in Afghanistan, as measured by 

enemy-initiated attacks on U.S. and coalition forces, Afghan security 

forces, and non-combatants, while declining recently, has remained 

relatively high compared to the number of daily enemy-initiated 

attacks before the surge of U.S. combat forces.

 2 GAO-13-218SP, Enclosure I.

Background: 

Challenges to 

USAID’s Efforts in 

Afghanistan
Page 3 GAO-14-448T 

• Prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan. Corruption in Afghanistan 

continues to undermine security and Afghan citizens’ belief in their 

government, and has raised concerns about the effective and efficient 

use of U.S. reconstruction dollars. Afghanistan is ranked at the bottom 

of Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perception Index of 

countries worldwide.3 The United States and Afghanistan have 

undertaken various efforts to attempt to address the challenges 

associated with corruption in the country.4

• Limited Afghan capacity. While we have reported that the Afghan 

government has increased its generation of revenue, it remains 

heavily reliant on the United States and other international donors to 

fund its public expenditures and continued reconstruction efforts.5

These challenges are likely to play an even larger role in USAID’s efforts 

within Afghanistan as U.S. and international combat forces continue to 

withdraw.

The 

United States continues to undertake efforts to improve Afghanistan’s 

ministerial and public financial management capacity to develop a 

budget, expend funds, and increase accountability and transparency.

In 2010, the United States pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its 

development aid through the Afghan government budget within 2 years.6

 3 Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. (Berlin, Germany: Dec. 

3, 2013). 

Such direct assistance is intended to help develop the capacity of Afghan 

government ministries to manage programs and funds, which are used for 

a range of government expenses and activities, including operating costs, 

salaries, development programs, and infrastructure projects. Using 

bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds, the United States more 

than tripled its direct assistance awards to Afghanistan in the first year of 

4 In the fall of 2010, USAID initiated an Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan (A3) 

report that provides detailed research into how best to protect USAID development funds 

from being diverted from their intended use. The results of this research are 31 

recommendations in four categories for the USAID mission in Afghanistan to implement: 

award mechanisms; vetting; financial controls; and project oversight.

5 GAO-13-218SP, Enclosure V.

6 USAID has established a 5-year goal of providing 30 percent of mission funds worldwide 

for direct assistance by 2015. 

Oversight and 

Accountability of U.S. 

Funds to Support 

Afghanistan
Page 4 GAO-14-448T 

the pledge (fiscal year 2010), from over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to 

over $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. The most recently available data from 

USAID reports that for fiscal year 2012 the agency provided over $800 

million in mission funds through direct assistance awards.7

To provide a higher level of accountability for U.S. and international 

assistance funds, the Afghan government and the international 

community agreed at the Tokyo Conference in 20128 to implement 

accountability mechanisms including the Mutual Accountability 

Framework, which was designed to ensure that the Afghan government is 

achieving governance and development goals. Going forward, the Afghan

government and the international community are expected to monitor 

performance in five major areas of governance and development and 

determine a time line for achieving the framework’s goals. Additionally, 

following the Tokyo Conference, the Afghan President presented an 

anticorruption decree enumerating specific actions that the Afghan 

government will take to improve governance and the rule of law. For fiscal 

year 2012, Congress conditioned the availability of funds for direct 

assistance to Afghanistan on a detailed notification to Congress9

concerning efforts to protect direct assistance funds from waste, fraud, 

and abuse.10

In fiscal year 2011, Congress required that the Secretary of State certify 

that Afghan ministries have been assessed and considered qualified to 

manage such funds.11

 7 At the time of this testimony, fiscal year 2013 data had not yet been completely validated 

by USAID and thus were not available. According to USAID officials, the agency will 

publish fiscal year 2013 data in spring 2014.

We noted in our 2013 key issues report that while 

8 The United States and over 70 partners met in Tokyo, Japan from July 7-9, 2012 to 

underline continued support for Afghanistan’s efforts to strengthen itself and provide a 

more peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for its people.

9 Pub. L. No. 112-74, Div. I, § 7031(a). 

10 For example, the 2012 limitation on direct assistance specified that funds may be made 

available for direct assistance “only if...each implementing agency or ministry to receive 

assistance has been assessed and is considered to have the systems required to manage 

such assistance and any identified vulnerabilities or weaknesses of such agency or 

ministry have been addressed.” Furthermore, the limitation states that funds be made 

available only if “effective monitoring and evaluation systems are in place to ensure that 

such assistance is used for its intended purposes and no level of acceptable fraud is 

assumed.” See Pub. L. No. 112-74, Div. I, § 7031(a)(1).

11 Pub. L. No. 112-10, Div. B. § 2121(b). 
Page 5 GAO-14-448T 

USAID had established and generally complied with various financial and 

other controls in its direct assistance agreements (such as requiring 

Afghan ministries to maintain separate bank accounts and records 

subject to audit) in 2011, it had not always assessed the risks in providing 

direct assistance before awarding funds.12

These policies require pre-award risk assessments for all bilateral direct 

assistance awards, periodic reassessment, and risk mitigation measures, 

as appropriate. USAID has since awarded millions of dollars in direct 

assistance funds to Afghan government entities and since our 2011 

review completed risk assessments prior to awarding the funds in at least 

two cases in compliance with its updated policies. The Special Inspector 

General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), however, recently reported 

that although USAID determined that seven Afghan ministries were 

unable to manage direct assistance funds without a risk mitigation 

strategy in place and that the mission would not award direct assistance 

to them “under normal circumstances”; USAID approved direct assistance 

for these ministries without mitigating for all identified risks.

For example, USAID had not 

completed pre-award risk assessments in two of the eight cases of 

bilateral assistance we identified, despite the USAID administrator’s prior 

commitment to Congress that the agency would not proceed with direct 

assistance to an Afghan public institution before assessing its capabilities. 

USAID took steps to respond to our recommendations to address these 

issues, including issuing new agency policies on risk assessments.

13

We also highlighted in a previous report that USAID generally relies on 

the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program to ensure 

accountability over U.S. direct assistance provided multilaterally through 

the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and 

Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, but we found that USAID had not 

consistently complied with its risk assessment policies in awarding funds 

to ARTF.

USAID 

commented to SIGAR’s report that the mission had taken steps to 

mitigate the risks they identified.

14

 12

For example, USAID did not conduct a risk assessment before 

GAO-13-218SP, Enclosure VI. 

13 SIGAR, Direct Assistance: USAID Has Taken Positive Action to Assess Afghan 

Ministries’ Ability to Manage Donor Funds, but Concerns Remain, SIGAR-14-32-AR 

(Arlington, Va: Jan. 30, 2014). 

14 GAO, Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to 

Afghanistan Government, GAO-11-710 (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2011). 
Page 6 GAO-14-448T 

awarding an additional $1.3 billion to ARTF and it was determined that 

USAID had not conducted pre-award risk assessments in the last 12 

instances in which it awarded funds during the period 2005 to 2010. 

USAID has since ensured adherence with its policies for assessing risks 

associated with multilateral trust funds in awarding funds to ARTF. In 

accordance with its policies for awarding funds to public international 

organizations, in March 2012, USAID awarded about $371 million to 

ARTF and conducted a risk assessment prior to awarding the funds.

USAID has undertaken some efforts to improve its management of the 

billions of dollars provided to U.S. development programs in Afghanistan, 

but various factors, such as inconsistencies in its application of 

performance management procedures, shortfalls in maintaining 

institutional knowledge, and needed improvements related to the 

oversight and management of contractors, may continue to challenge 

USAID’s ability to monitor and evaluate program effectiveness.

With respect to inconsistencies in its application of performance 

management procedures, in our 2013 key issues report, we noted that 

USAID did not consistently follow its established performance 

management and evaluation procedures with regard to its agriculture and 

water sector projects.15 For example, only two of the seven USAIDfunded agricultural programs included in our related review had targets 

for all of their performance indicators. In response to our 

recommendations to improve oversight and monitoring, USAID took 

several steps, including issuing a new performance monitoring plan and 

approving its implementing partners’ performance targets. However, 

questions concerning USAID’s oversight have endured. In June 2013, 

SIGAR reported that poor coordination, waste, and mismanagement for 

an agriculture project were allowed to occur because USAID did not 

exercise effective oversight of its implementing partner.16

 15

In addition, the 

GAO-13-218SP, Enclosure VII. See also GAO, Afghanistan Development: 

Enhancements to Performance Management and Evaluation Efforts Could Improve 

USAID’s Agriculture Programs, GAO-10-368 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010); and 

Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector Increasing, but 

Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination, GAO-11-138 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 15, 2010). 

16 SIGAR, Southern Regional Agricultural Development Program Had Poor Coordination, 

Waste, and Mismanagement, SIGAR Alert 13-2 (Arlington, Va: June 27, 2013). 

Monitoring and 

Evaluation of USAID 

Development Projects
Page 7 GAO-14-448T 

USAID Mission in Afghanistan, in its Fiscal Year 2013 Federal Managers’

Financial Integrity Act of 1982 Annual Certification, noted the inadequacy 

of monitoring program/project implementation by designated USAID staff 

for the tenth year in a row (since fiscal year 2003).

We also previously reported that while USAID had conducted an 

evaluation, as required by USAID’s policy, covering three of the eight 

agriculture programs we reviewed, the extent to which USAID used the 

evaluation to enhance current or future programs was unclear.

17

With respect to institutional knowledge, USAID has also historically faced 

obstacles in Afghanistan. Frequent staff rotations and high turnover have 

made it difficult for USAID to fully analyze and interpret performance data 

for its programs. In its most recent annual certification required by the 

Federal Manager’s Financial Integrity Act of 1982, USAID identified a 

significant deficiency related to its foreign service nationals. According to 

the report, the majority of foreign service nationals in Afghanistan have 

applied for special immigrant visas to the United States, leaving the 

agency at risk of losing a majority of that staff, further complicating the 

challenges of the high rotation rate among U.S. personnel at the 

embassy. USAID has attempted to address some of these issues by 

requiring program monitoring officials in Afghanistan to maintain program 

documentation in electronic files on a shared drive for use by current and 

incoming staff.

In 

addition, although USAID collected progress reports from implementing 

partners for agriculture and water projects, it did not always analyze and 

interpret the data to further institutional learning, inform current programs, 

and shape future planning. We made several recommendations to 

address these gaps, which USAID has implemented.

With respect to oversight and management of contractors in Afghanistan, 

in February 2014, we reported that USAID identified needed 

improvements.18

• USAID identified increasing the submission of contractor performance 

evaluations as one of the agency’s highest acquisition priorities. To do 

For example:

 17 GAO-10-368.

18 GAO-14-229.
Page 8 GAO-14-448T 

so, USAID established quarterly targets for reporting in the contractor 

past performance database to measure its progress.

• USAID also established a nonpermissive environment19

However, we found that USAID did not assess whether the procedures 

and practices created by the missions or offices that operate in 

contingency environments, such as Afghanistan, should be reflected in 

agency-wide policy or guidance. As a result, USAID may have missed 

opportunities to leverage its institutional knowledge, and we 

recommended that USAID further assess contingency contracting related 

procedures and practices. In response to our recommendation, USAID 

plans to create a supplementary group to its nonpermissive environment 

working group that will reach out to missions, offices, and contracting 

personnel with contingency operations experience to collect and 

disseminate a set of best practices for contracting in support of 

contingency operations and other potentially dangerous or uncertain 

environments. These actions afford USAID another opportunity to 

improve contractor oversight and better leverage its institutional 

knowledge to improve program monitoring and evaluation efforts.

working 

group in October 2013 to develop a compendium of best practices 

and lessons learned for implementing and monitoring projects in 

nonpermissive environments; an operations security toolkit that will 

include tools for enhanced monitoring, and possibly a field information 

technology support package; and a targeted set of training and 

learning tools that focus on how USAID prepares staff for managing 

risks inherent in working in overseas contingency environments.

USAID’s ability to conduct its mission and the challenges it has faced in 

providing oversight and monitoring of its development projects in 

Afghanistan are likely to be exacerbated by the planned withdrawal of 

U.S. and coalition combat troops from Afghanistan. Plans for the United 

States’ post-combat presence in Afghanistan, scheduled to begin in 

January 2015, have been developed by the Departments of State (State) 

and Defense (DOD) and are currently being reviewed by the U.S. 

National Security Council Staff. According to U.S. strategic documents, 

 19 USAID officials have also developed a working definition of nonpermissive 

environment—any environment in which USAID operates where security concerns are 

elevated or its ability to implement or monitor programs is limited.

Planning for Future 

Development Efforts 

in Afghanistan
Page 9 GAO-14-448T 

the United States is transitioning from counterinsurgency and stability 

operations toward more traditional diplomatic and development activities. 

Planning is complicated, however, by the absence of a finalized Bilateral 

Security Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan, which is 

needed if the United States is to maintain a military presence in the 

country. The number and role of remaining military personnel have not 

yet been determined by the Administration. State has noted that it is 

concurrently planning for a possible continued U.S. military presence and 

for a situation in which no military troops remain after the deadline of 

December 31, 2014.

In February 2012, we reported that the U.S. civilian presence in 

Afghanistan and the deployment of civilians to Afghan provinces and 

districts were crucial to U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan 

government to provide essential services to its people with limited 

international support.20

While USAID, as an agency, has experience working in insecure 

environments in other parts of the world, alternative oversight 

mechanisms may need to be in place and adhered to so that monitoring 

and evaluation of projects continue as U.S. combat troops withdraw from 

Afghanistan. In February 2014, we reported that USAID officials have 

acknowledged that they may be challenged to adequately monitor project 

progress as the U.S. military presence draws down, but are taking steps 

to counter diminished access to development projects in insecure 

environments after U.S. combat troops withdraw.

Provincial reconstruction teams, led and secured 

by the U.S. military and coalition members, have helped to enable USAID 

to access less secure regions of Afghanistan. As U.S. combat troops 

continue to withdraw from Afghanistan, provincial reconstruction teams 

will continue to decline in number, thus challenging USAID’s opportunities 

to directly monitor and evaluate programs in certain parts of Afghanistan.

21

 20 GAO, Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S. Civilian 

Presence, 

To prepare for the 

possible lack of USAID personnel in the field, the agency is planning to 

implement a remote monitoring program in Afghanistan that will use 

contractors to verify activities that implementing partners have completed. 

This initiative will rely on various monitoring methods, including third-party 

monitors, Global Positioning System tracking, photography, and data 

GAO-12-285 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2012). 

21 GAO-14-229. 
Page 10 GAO-14-448T 

collections with mobile devices. To implement this initiative, USAID 

issued a draft request for proposals in May 2013 publicizing its intent to 

negotiate as many as three contracts. According to USAID officials, as of 

the first quarter of fiscal year 2014, the agency was in the process of 

finalizing the request for proposals.

In closing, as the United States plans for the withdrawal of its combat 

troops and the transition from an integrated civilian and military effort to a 

civilian-led presence, it is important to have safeguards in place to help 

ensure sustainment of the gains made by U.S. and coalition investments. 

These include taking steps to ensure that the billions of dollars spent in 

Afghanistan do not become subject to terrorist control or a culture of 

corruption that the Afghan government, the United States, and its 

coalition partners have worked to prevent. As we, and others, have 

highlighted, this requires:

• the continued U.S. agency oversight and accountability of U.S. funds, 

including those invested as part of USAID’s mission in Afghanistan;

• ensuring that USAID consistently implements its monitoring and 

evaluation policies for managing its programs in Afghanistan; and

• the ability to mitigate potential challenges that are likely to result from 

the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition combat forces.

These steps may help to better ensure that the United States has 

accountability over the substantial funds that it has already invested and 

could be valuable to guiding future U.S. and USAID efforts in Afghanistan, 

while also serving as valuable lessons learned for future U.S. efforts. In 

the absence of consistent application of its performance management 

and evaluation procedures, USAID’s programs are more vulnerable to 

corruption, waste, fraud, and abuse.

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.
Page 11 GAO-14-448T 

For further information on this statement, please contact Charles Michael 

Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331. In addition, contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this 

testimony include Timothy DiNapoli (Director), Hynek Kalkus (Assistant 

Director), Walter W. Russell (Assistant Director), Christopher J. Mulkins, 

Brandon Hunt, Jessica Drucker, and Mark Dowling.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments

(321018)
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