Te* Repci Rout 499

INFORMATION FLOW IN BATTALION

COMMAND GROUPS

Ira T.Kl. D TIC

-E '

ARI FIELD UNIT AT FORT LFAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Li

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Junt 1980

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INFORMATION FLOW IN BATTALION COMMAND GROUPS

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Ira T. Kaplan

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Battalion comman~d group Information flow

Battle simulation Performance evaluation

Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS) Team training Communication patterns

-- ;-Information flow in battalion command groups was measured via a questionnaire based on infornation presented during the brigade briefing. Data

from 13 groups showed that a substantial amount of information was lost in

the processes of communication and remembering. Averaged over all command

groups, there were consistent differences in the percentage of available

required information conmiunicated through particular channels, varying from

17% to 80%. Among battalion commanders, those who transmitted more information received less froui their staffs. The fact that information loss was

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concentrated in specific, identifiable areas, indicates that efforts to improve communication can be focused where they are needed.I

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Technical Report 499

INFORMATION FLOW IN BATTALION COMMAND GROUPSA'°"°°,io Fo_° 

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iv oA
FOREWORD

The Fort Leavenworth Field Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute for

the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducts a research program in support

of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), which includes the Combined Arms Training

Developments Activity (CATRADA), the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity

(CACDA), and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

The CATRADA-related efforts encompass the identification of critical command group performance requirements at battalion, brigade, and division levels,

the development of procedures for measuring the training effectiveness of battle

simulations, and the development of specifications for more effective command

and control training systems through experimentation with current simulations.

The present investigation extended the development of performance measures

and the identification of training requirements reported earlier. Previous reports have described an assessment methodology based on the Command Group/Staff

Module of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and the results of

using that methodology to measure the performance of battalion command groups

in the Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS). This paper describes

the application of a procedure designed to measure the effectiveness of intragroup communication--an important facet of command group performance, which is

not directly addressed by the ARTEP.

This investigation is responsive to the objectives of Army Project

2Q263744A795 and to the special requirements of CATRADA concerned with the development of procedures for measuring command group performance and the identification of critical command group performance requirements. These special requirements are expressed in Human Resources Need 80-94, Technical Assistance in

the Evaluation of Training Effectiveness arid Cost Analysis of the Army Training

Battle Simulation System (ARTBASS).

LTC Frank McGurk and the staff of the Automated Command Training Division

of the Battle Simulations Development Directorate, CATRADA,at Fort Leavenworth,

provided invaluable aid in developing measures of command group performance and

conducted the exercises on which this research is based.

Technical Director

-i

v
INFORMATION FLOW IN BATTALION COMMAND GROUPS

BRIEF

Requirement:

To develop meaningful measures and methods of measurement of command group

performance that can be used (a) to diagnose deficiencies and provide feedback

to participants in command group training exercises, (b) to identify training

requirements common to incumbent command groups, and (c) to help evaluate the

relative effectiveness of alternative command group training systems and

strategies.

Procedure:

Thirteen U.S. Army battalion groups participated in simulated combat exercises generated by the Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS). At

the beginning of each exercise, each principal member of the command group was

briefed separately by his brigade counterpart, except for the commander and S3

who were briefed together. During these briefings, certain unique items of information were presented to each member. Then the members worked together for

3 to 4 houTs to develop a plan which they presented to their company commanders.

Subsequently, the group members and company commanders answered a multiplechoice test based on the unique information originally presented in the brigade

briefing. By analyzing their responses, it was possible to trace the flow of

information through the battalion command group.

Findings:

A substantial amount of information was lost in the processes of communication and remembering. The command group members recalled 81% of the information that was presented to them directly by their brigade counterparts. They

recalled only 63% of the required information that was available to them from

other members of the command group. Averaged over all groups, there was a distinctive pattern of strong and weak communication channels. The battalion commanders and S3's were relatively good transmitters and receivers. The FSO's

and S4's were better receivers than transmitters, while the reverse was true

for the S2's. The Sl's usually had the lowest transmission and reception scores.

Among battalion commanders, those who transmitted the most information, generally received the least information from their staffs. [The observation that

information loss was concentrated in specific, identifiable channels allows efforts in improving communications to be focused where they are needed.]

vii LJ1A- -
Utilization of Findings:

The information-flow measurement methodology developed in this research

has been incorporated into the CATTS training exercise. It is used, together

with other performance measures, to provide feedback to the groups that are exercised, and to build up a data base on the common strengths and weaknesses of

incumbent battalion command groups, which helps to specify the Army's command

group training requirements. It also contributes to the development of a comK!. prehensive assessment methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of future

command group training systems.

vii

r

*

t

II

ii

"i viii

. .
INFORMATION FLOW IN BATTALION COMMAND GROUPS

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION ............... ............................. 1

Background . ............. 1

Purpose ............... ............................... 2

METHOD ................. ................................ 2

Participants ............... ............................ 2

Battle Simulation ............ .. ........................ 3

Procedure.. ............... 3

Questionnaire ......... ..... .. ......................... 3

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ................... .................. 6

Communication for the Command Group as a Whole ...... ............ 6

Intragroup Communication Channels ......... .................. 8

Individual Differences ........ ........................ . 11

Future Research .......... ........................... . 13

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS ........ ........................ 15

REFERENCES ............ ............................... 17

APPENDIX A. INFORMATION FLOW QUESTIONNAIRE .... ............... .. 19

B. SCORING KEY FOR INFORMATION FLOW QUESTIONNAIRE ....... . 27

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Number of required items to be transmitted to each

receiver .......... ........................... 5

2. Intragroup communication percentage of available

required items recalled by each receiver averaged

over 13 battalion command groups ....... ............... 9

3. Intragroup communication analysis of variance summary 9......

4. Correlation of intragroup reception of available

required information with other measures of communication . . . 13

B-1. Scoring key for information flow questionnaire ........ . 27

ix

.. .... . ...... ---
CONTENTS~ (Continued) ____________

Page

LIST OF FIGUR~ES

Figure 1. Flow of information from 0900 to 1700 hours on the

first day of a CATTS exercise.....................4

21. A filter model of commnunication...... .... . .. .. .. . . ....

3. Best and worst intragroup communication channels .. ....... 10

4. Intragroup communicat .6z. of available required information:

reception by battalion commanders (BC's) versus transmission

by BC's and S3' . ... ...................... 14

xA
INFORMATION FLOW IN BATTALION COMMAND GROUPS

INTRODUCTION

Background

In the Fall of 1975, a concerted effort was begun to improve the effectiveness of command group training in the U.S. Army. The Combined Arms Center (CAC)

at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., was charged with the responsibility of developing

trairning programs for battalion and higher comanders and their staffs. At the

same time, the continued development of battle simulations, which had been conducted at several different locations, was centralized under CAC at Fort Leavenworth. The Combined Arms Training Developments Activity (CATRADA) was subsequently established by CAC to carry out its command group training development

effort. One product of this effort is the Command Group/Staff ARTEPs (Army

Training and Evaluation Programs), which specify the tasks, conditions, and

standards that command groups must accomplish in combat. A second major thrust

is the evaluation and refinement of battle simulations, like the Computer Assisted Map Maneuver System (CAMMS) and the Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS), and the development of new systems, like the Army Training Battle Simulation System (ARTBASS), all of which are designed to provide realistic

training experiences for commanders and their staffs (Battle Simulations and

the ARTEP, 1977).

The development of performance measures is an essential step in the process of training development. Performance measures are necessary to diagnose

deficiencies and to provide the trainees with feedback, to identify common

training requirements, and to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative trainV ing systems. The ARI Field Unit at Fort Leavenworth has collaborated with the

Automated Command Training Division (ACTD) of CATRADA to develop a methodology

for measuring command group performance, based on the battalion Command Group/

Staff ARTEP. This methodology was used to provide feedback to battalion command qroups in CATTS exercises, and to determine which ARTEP subtasks were most

commonly deficient and most highly correlated with overall performance measures;

thereby to determine empirically which subtasks are most critical for training

(Barber & Kaplan, 1979; Kaplan & Barber, 1979). More recently, ARI and ACTD

have developed a way to measure intragroup communication, a potentially important facet of command group performance, which is not directly addressed by the

ARTEP.

Intragroup communication makes the difference between a collection of individuals working independently and an organized group that functions as a team.

Fisher (1974) contends that communication is the defining property of a group

and the basis for its entire organization and functioning. Many experiments

(Hare, 1976, Chap. 12) have shown that communication patterns influence group

productivity and satisfaction.

Communication constitutes much of a command group's observable behavior.

Olmstead, Christensen, and Lackey (1973) analyzed the performance of battalion

command groups in simulated combat by recording all their conmunications (radio,

written, and face-to-face) and categorizing them under seven processes, derived

from Schein's adaptive coping cycle (1972). Ratings of command group

t :,:' ~ ~ ~ ........... ...... .... ' ; ' : : :- : ' "'' '' ' ' ' ... .. 'i' | i i :

1
affectiveness were significantly correlated with performancL measures for five

of the seven processes: sensing, communicating information, decision making,

communicating implementation, and coping. Multiple correlation showed that

communicating infoimation contributed more to effectiveness than did any of the

other processes.

Henriksen et al. (1980) identified comunication as one of five categories

of leader skills and leader-group interaction processes that influenced unit

performance in engagement simulations, i.e., battlefield exercises with realistically simulated weapons effects. The other categories were management, probl.n solving, tactical, and technical skills. Both the communication of planned

information and the pursuit, reception, and transmission of new information were

essential. The authors descri'.ed several situations where failure to transmit

information resulted in frienely losses and mission failure, and effective communication contributed to successful tactical operations.

Purpose

In view of the probable importance of communication for command group effectiveness, ACTD and ARI at Fort Leavenworth have undertaken the development

of procedures to measure information flow during simulated combat exercises.

The planning stage was chosen as the initial focus of our efforts, because information input to the battalion command group follows a script during the

planning stage; whereas information generated during the battle is subject to

considerable variation. Work is in progress, however, to extend the information measurement approach to the execution stage of the battle. This research

is part of a larger effort to develop measures of command group performance that

can be used to provide feedback to participants in training exercises and to

guide the development of command group training systems.

The present investigation addressed the following questions:

1. How much information was lost during the planning stage?

2. Where was the information lost, i.e., in which communication channels?

*3. How were various measures of communication performance correlated with

one another as a function of individual differences?

MFTHOD

Participants

Thirteen U.S. Army battalion command groups each participated in a simulated combat exercise. Each group had seven principal members: the battalion

commander, Sl, S2, S3, b4, fire support officer (FSO), and air liaison officer

(ALO); plus about ten other officers, NCO's, and enlisted men, who assisted the

principal staff members and operated radio and telephone equipment. Two company

commanders also came with the battalion command group to serve as playercontrollers during the exercise. The roles of other company and brigade level

personnel were played by CATTS controllers.

2
Battle Simulation

The Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS) is a computer-driven

battle-simulation system that creates a realistic environment for training battalion commanders and their stafts. The computer simulates the actions of units

in combat, calculating movement, visibility, and weapons effects in real time,

so that events in the simulated battle are responsive to the command group's

decisions and actions. Professional controllers mediate between the command

group and the computer, playing the roles of higher- (brigade) and lower- (company) level personnel. Because of their experience conducting many similar exercises, the CATTS controllers were able to identify items of information that

command groups needed to plan and prepare for the battle.

Procedure

The procedure developed to measure information flow is illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of the exercise, each principal member of the battalion

command group was briefed individually by his brigade (controller) counterpart,

except for the commander and 53 who were briefed together. Then the members of

the battalion command group worked together for 3 to 4 hours to develop a plan

and write the operations order, which they briefed to the company commanders.

After about 2 hours of preparation for the simulated battle that was to be

played the following day, the principal members of the battalion command group

and their company commanders answered a multiple-choice questionnaire based on

information presented in the brigade briefing.

,: • measures of information flow were derived from the responses to the questionnaire, on the assumption that correct recall--or, more precisely, recognition--indicated that the respondent had received the item. When an item was

recalled by the person to whom it had been presented in the brigade briefing,

it was assumed to be available for further communication within the battalion

command group.

Questionnaire

The items of information on which the questionnaire was based were identified by a three-step procedure: First, each brigade controller listed the principal items that he presented to his battalin counterpart during the brigade

briefing. Then, the controllers determined which of these items were unique,

in the sense that no other controller presented the item to any other member of

the command group. The third step was to decide who else, other than the direct

receiver, needed to know each item. For example, during the briefing, the brigade S4 told the battalion S4 that the speed limit on the open highway was

40 mph. No one else received this information directly, but, in the opinion of

the controllers, the battalion S4 should have shared it with his commander and

the Sl during the planning process, and then passed it on to the company commanders in the operations order. The first two steps were completely objective,

because the brigade briefing was given from a script. The distinction between

required and nonrequired information was based on the controllers' expert judgement. As described below, the resalts supported the controllers' judgement.

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The questionnaire, reproduced in Appendix A, comprised 35 items. Each

question had four alternative responses: one correct, two incorrect, and the

fourth, "unknown." The instructions were to answer "unknown," rather than to

guess. Each item of nformation addressed by the questionnaire wa. presented

to a particular member of the command group during the brigade bi-ifing. All

the items presented in the brigade briefing were required by the persons who

received them. Most of these items were also needed by persons who did not receive them directly, but who could receive them later through intragroup communication. The persons who required each item are identified in Appendix B.

Table 1 shows how many items were requireu by each persoti. The first row

of numbers in the table indicates how many items were presented directly by the

controllers in the brigade briefing, i.e., five to the battalion commander (BC)

and the S3, four to the Si, etc. The lower part of the table shows how many

items each person required from persons who received them directly, i.e., the

battalion commander needed 3 items that were presented to the SI, 11 that were

presented to the S2, etc. The battalion commander and S3 are listed together

as transmitters of intragroup information, because they received the same information during the brigade briefing. The company commanders (CC) were not

present during the brigade briefing, so they received all their information

indirectly--through the battalion command group.

Table I

Number of Required Items to be Transmitted to Each Receiver

Receiver

Transmitter BC S1 S2 S3 S4 PSO ALO CC

Items Presented During The Brigade Briefing

Controller 5a 4 15 5a 4 3 4 0

Items to be Received via Intragroup Communication

BC &S3 - 0 3 - 0 3 3 5

Sl 3 - 1 2 2 1 1 2

S2 11 3 - 9 3 4 6 8

S4 2 2 2 1 - 0 0 3

FSO 2 0 1 2 0 - 1 1

ALO 4 0 1 4 0 2 - 0

aThe same five items were presented to the battalion commander

(BC) and the S3, who were briefed together.

5

... .... ._. . .,I
RE SULTS AND DISCUSSION

In describing the results, it is helpful to differentiate between direct

and indirect, intergroup and intragroup communication. Direct communication

occurs between two persons, without an intermediary, e.g., from the brigade S2

to the battalion S2. In the present situation, the intergroup communication,

from brigade to battalion, was also direct communication. Indirect communication is transmitted through an inte-tnmediary, e.g... from the brigade S2 through

the battalion S2 to the battalion commander. Thus, indirect conimunication consisted of intergroup communication followed by intragroup communication.

Communication for the Command Group as a Whole

Averaged over all 13 coimmna groups, 81% of tne information presented in

the brigade briefing was recalled by the p'rsons who received it directly. Of

this 81%, 48% was recalled by persons who received it indirectly, through one

or more intermediaries; so that 39% of the original information was received

through indirect communication. In computational terms, intergroup communication multiplied by intragroup comnunication equals indirect communication.

The successive loss of information in intergroup and intragroup communication is illustrated by the "filter model" in Figure 2. This model compares the

flow of information through the battalion command 7roup to the passage of light

through a series of filters, which represent the processes of transmission and

reception. In the brigade briefing (Figure 2a), th" controllers used a script

and played the same roles repeatedly, so there was pxisumably no loss in transmission. The command group members required all the iformation they received

directly, and they subsequently recalled 81% of it. During intragroup communication, however, the members may not have transmitted all the information they

had received, so information may have been lost in transmission as well as in

reception. In addition, the command group members and company commanders did

not require all the informition available to them indirectly. The end result

was that only 39% of the information originally presented was ultimately recalled by perscns who received it indirectly.

Like a color filter that selectively transmits certain wavelengths of

light, intragroup conmunication selectively conveyed required information better than nonrequired information. Required and nonrequired information are

shown separately in Figure 2b, to indicate that 63% of the required information

available for intragroup communication was later recalled, compared to only 37%

of the available information that was not required by the receiver. (It is just

a coincidence that the two percentages sum to 100%.)

According to the preceding analysis, information passes through three filters in the course of indLrect communication: direct reception followed by intragroup transmission and reception. It is interesting to note that the combined effect of the last two processes was very nearly twice that of the first.

Consider that if each filter transmitted 80% of the information that it received, the last two filters together would transmit 64% (80% x 80% = 64%).

Tese values are close to those actually obtained for the direct reception of

required information (81%) and for intragroup communication of required information (63%). This equi.valence does not prove that intragroup transmission and

reception were necessarily equal, only that their combined effect was

approximately twice tha: of d:L.cect reception alone.

6
Direct Required

reception and not

of required required

information information

a K R

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1100" ,p 81% )fl1p 39% 1

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Brigade Intragroup

Briefing Communicatiun

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e~ 3s ___ __M p

177
The classification of information as required or not required was based on

the CATTS controllers' expert judgement of what each command group member needed

to know. Their judgement was su,3ported by the result that required information

was recalled much better than information that was classified as not required.

Further support for the controllers' judgement was provided by analysis of the

errors for required and nonrequired items. Errors were either of omission ("unknown") or of commission (wrong answers). For required items, 35% of the errors

were commission errors, compared to 23% for items that were not required. Apparently, when persons did not know the correct answers, they were more likely

to guess at required items than at items that were not required.

Intragroup Communication Channels

During the brigade briefing, communication was largely one-to-one: the

brigade officer spoke and his battalion counterpart listened. In intragroup

communication, on the other hand, everyone spoke and listened to several persons in turn. The different intragroup communication channels varied widely

with respect to the percentage of available required information that was recalled. An item was considered available for intragroup communication only when

it was recalled by the person who received it directly. Table 2 shows how much

available required information was received through each of the 32 channels for

which intragroup communication was measured. Since the battalion commander and

the S3 received the same information during the brigade briefing, they had common communication scores as transmitters of information, and there was no measure of communication between them. The company commanders did not receive any

information during the brigade briefing, so there was no measure of communication from them. For the intragroup communication channels that were measured,

recall varied from 17% for communication from the S4 to the Si to 80% for communication from the S2 to the FSO. The analysis of variance summarized in

Table 3 showed that the variation among communication channels was significant

beyond the .01 level. Variation among groups was significant beyond the .05

level.

The differences among channels were larger than the differences among command groups. Averaged over each group, the recall of available required information varied from 44% to 76%, compared to the 17% to 80% range across channels.

Examination of the data showed that the relative effectiveness of the various

channels was fairly consistent across groups: the poorest channels had consistently low scores, while the most effective channels had relatively high scores

in every command group.

Figure 3 illustrates the eight best and six worst intragroup communication

channels. Each channel is represented by a vector, pointing from transmitter

to receiver, whose length is proportional to the percentage of available required information recalled by the receiver. The battalion commander and S3

and the 52 were good transmitters, with good reciprocal communication between

them. In contrast, the S1 and S4 were poor transmitters. Communication between

the S2 and the FSO was asymmetrical: the FSO received 80% of the information he

needed from the 52, but the 62 received only 25% of the information he needed

from the FSO.

8
Table 2

InL agroup Communication

Percentage of Available Required Items Recalled by Each Receiver

Averaged over 13 Battalion Command Groups

r : ~Receiver em ' *Mean

Transmitter BC S1 S2 S3 54 FSO A1,0 CC Transmission

BC S3 - - 69 - - 79 75 78 76

Si 42 - 44 37 59 56 63 37 45

S2 78 58 - 71 72 80 57 66 69

S4 58 17 50 62 - - - 35 45

FSO 58 - 25 55 - - 50 41 47

ALO 65 - 36 60 - 62 - - 60

Meana

Reception 68 52 51 63 67 74 62 61 63

aThe mean transmission and reception scores are weighted averages of the

row and column recall scores, respectively; weighted according to the number

of items on which eitch component score was based.

Table 3

Intragroup Communication

Analysis of Variance Summary

Source MS df F

Communication Channels 3635.07 31 2.81**

Command Groups 2499.18 12 1.93*

Error (Interaction) 1292.59 324

*p < " 5 **p < .Ol

9
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Figure 3. Best and worst intragroup communication channels.

The length of each vector is proportional to the

percentage of available required information

communicated. The eight best channels (69 to

80%) are represented by solid lines; the six

worst (17 to 37%), by broken lines.

10

o.1
The impression given by consideration of the best and worst intragroup

communication channels, that the commander, S3 and S2 were better transmitters--

or were more listened to--th&A the Si and $4, is confirmed by the mean transmission scores in Table 2. These scores, in the rightmost column of Table 2,

are intragroup communication scores averaged over all the receivers for a given

transmitter. Since different numbers of required items were available for

transmission to each receiver, the component scores were weighted according to

the number of available required items on which they were based. Although it

is convenient to call them transmission scores, these averages indicate how much

the transmitters were listened to, as well as how effectively they presented

their information. Similar considerations apply to the calculation and interpretation of the mean reception scores. The S1 and S2 may have been poor receivers because they were not listening or because they were not spoken to.

The mean intragroup communication score for available required information,

averaged over all channels, was 63%. This percentage, which appears in the

lower right corner of Table 2, occurs also in Figure 2b, as the required intragroup communication score for the command group as a whole.

The rank order of transmission scores for the members of the command group

reflected the importance of their roles in the exercise. The battalion commander and the S3, who were the highest ranking members of the group (lieutenant cclonel (0-5) and major (0-4), respectively), were the most listened to (76%

transmission). This result agrees with reports that higher status individuals

exert more influence (Torrance, 1954) and receive more attention (Wheeler, 1964;

Butler & Miller, 1965) than other group members. The other command group members were usually captains (O-3s), but they differed with respect to the importance of their information for the exercise. The S2 (69% transmission) had the

most relevant information (intelligence), while the S1 and S4 (both 45% transmission) had the least relevant information (personnel administration and logistics). The S4 might have been more important in a field exercise, when he

would have been responsible for real food, supplies, and equipment. The FSO

should have received more attention than he did, based on the importance of his

information. The CATES controllers commented that the FSO was seldom suffitciently involved in preparation of the operations order, perhaps because he was

not a regular member of the command group. Like the ALO, he was assigned to

the group just for the exercise.

Individual Differences

There were large individual differences in communication performance.

Among S2's, for example, direct reception varied from 53% to 93%, while intragroup reception of available required information varied from 20% to 100%. To

investigate how the more effective communicators differed from those who were

less effective, several relationships between different measures of communication were calculated and tested for significance. In particular, correlations

(Pearson r's) were calculated for the relationships between intragroup reception

of available required information and three other measures of performance, to

answer the following questions:

K i1
S-1F1

1. Direct versus intragroup reception of available required information.

Did individuals who received more information in the brigade briefing

also receive more information through intragroup communication? If

recall scores were determined largely by a general ability to receive

and remember information, then direct and intragroup recall scores

would be positively correlated. If other factors were more important

(e.g., performance of the transmitter, content of the items), then

there would be little or no correlation.

2. Intragroup reception of available information: required versus not

required. Did individuals who recalled more required information recall more, or less, nonrequired information, i.e., did they have a

larger capacity for both types of information, or did they employ selective attention to receive more required information by receiving

less information that was not required?

3. Transmission versus reception of intragroup required information. Were

better receivers also better transmitters, or was there a trade-off

between transmission and reception, so that one occurred at the expense

of the other?

The answers to these questions can be found in Table 4. First, there was

no consistent or significant relationship between direct and intragroup reception for any position in the command gronp. Second, there was usually a positive relationship between intragroup reception of required and nonrequired information, but the correlations were not statistically significant, except for

the S3. This result clearly contradicts the hypothesis that greater recall of

required information was accompanied by decreased recall of information that

was not required. With regard to the third question, the only significant relationship was a negative correlation for the battalion commander. This relationship is sufficiently interesting to deserve further discussion.

7 Figure 4 shows a reciprocal relationship between transmission and reception. Battalion commanders who tanmitted the most information, received the

least information from their staffs; and those who received the most, transmitted the least. (Each transmission score represents the combined performance of

a commander and his S3, because they were initially briefed together.) The

slope of the fitted regression line is very nearly -1 (b = -1.05), which means

that there was a literal trade-off between transmission and reception. A possible mechanism for this relationship was observed in the case of the occasional

commander who dominated his staff to the extent of interrupting and correcting

them while they were speaking, which may have discouraged them from transmitting

information to him. At the other extreme was the commander who appeared to assume the attitude of an observer, while his staff did most of the planning.

Bass, Klaus, and McGowan (1979) assert that a manager's leadership style is reflected in his pattern of communication. Specifically, the directive style of

leadership is defined in terms of one-way communication from the leader to his

subordinates. The directive leader tells his subordinates what to do and how

to do it. On the other hand, attentive listening is characteristic of a good

consulting style. The decisions of the consultative leader reflect the information he has acquired from his subordinates.

12

------------------------------------------------------------- "-
Table 4

Correlation of Intragroup Reception

of Available Required Information with

Other Measures of Communication

Other Measures of Comunication

Direct Intragroup Intragroup

Reception Reception Transmission

Position of Available of Available of Available

of Required Not Required Required

Individual Information Information Information.

BC .44 (13) -.01 (13) -.68* (13)

Si -.40 (13) .39 (13) .20 (13)

S2 -.25 (13) .23 (13) .00 (13)

S3 -.30 (13) .73** (13) -.29 (13)

S4 .22 (13) .43 (13) .43 (13)

FSO .25 (13) .05 (13) .31 (12)

ALO .11 (i1) .57 (11) .40 (11)

CC - - .03 (24) - -

Note: The numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of pairs on which

each correlation is based.

*k < .05. **2p < .01.

Whether there is an optimum balance between transmission and reception is

a question for further research. Experiments have shown, however, that when a

leader participates in discussion and encourages equal participation by all

members, the result is greater group agreement, greater influence of the leader

on the members, and more satisfaction in the task for both leader ard followers

(Hare, 1976, p. 274).

Future Research

Work is now in progress to determine the validity of the information flow

methodology and to enlarge its area of application. One aspect of validity is

the degree to which the method actually measures communication. This question

is being addressed by gathering data on the correlations between the information

flow measures and the players' own estimates of how much information they need

to transmit and receive from every other member of the group, plus their own

perceptions of the percentages of required information that they actually do

transmit and receive. Another aspect of validity, the correlation of information measures with other measures of performa,,ce, is being investigated by obtaining the controllers' exnert judgement of how well the players perform during the exercise. If the initial results on validity are encouraging, the

methodology will be extended to the execution stage of the exercise.

13

.. . ... .. .. .. . .. .. .... ...... . .. .......... .. . ... ... 
LWPM

100

r = -.68

0 b = -1.05

90-

0

0

0

80

0 0

70

5 -0

50

400

40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Transmission(%

Figure 4. Intragroup communication of available required

information: reception by battalion commanders (BC's)

versus transmission by BC's and S3's.

14
At present, the measurement of information flow is limited to the plannig

and preparation stages of the battle. It is more difficult to measure information flow durino the battle, because the events are less predictable. Whereas

the content of the brigade briefing is fixed for a given scenario, the events

of the computer-simulated battle vary in response to the command groups' decisions and actions. Nevertheless, efforts will be made to identify key events

that can be expected to occur in every simulated battle, and to develop probes,

i.e., prewritten messages that can be transmitted by the controllers to the

players at appropriate times during any exercise. Corresponding questions will

be written for each key event and probe message to determine whether each group

member receives the information. In addition to having the players complete a

questionnaire at the end of the day, the controllers will measure information

flow during the exercise by asking questions in their roles as brigade officers

and company commanders.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

A substantial amount of information was lost in the process of communication. Battalion command group members recalled 81% of the information presented

to them by their brigade counterparts, but only 63% of the required information

available to them from the other members of their own group. Much of the information loss was concentrated in specific intragroup conrmunication channels.

In the six poorest channels, recall of available required information varied

from 17% to 37%. It was also observed that the most important members of the

group were listened to the most, and that battalion commanders who transmitted

the most information, received the least information from their staffs.

Providing command groups with diagnostic feedback about their patterns of

communication may enable them to take corrective actions to improve the transmission and reception of required information. Given the potential contribution

of communication to group performance, it is possible that improving this component of their performance may increase the command group's overall

effectiveness.

15

...............................................
FI

REFERENCES

Barber, H. F. and Kaplan, I. T. Battalion command group performance in

simulated combat. ARI Technical Paper 353, March 1979.

Bass, B. M., Klaus, R., and McGowan, R. Communication, managerial style and

success. Syracuse, New York: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public

Affairs, September, 1979.

Battle simulations and the ARTEP. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combined Arms

Training Developments Activity, 18-461, November 1977.

Butler, D. C. and Miller, N. Power to reward and punish in social interaction,

Journal of Experimental Social Psycholoa, 1965, 1, 311-322.

Command group/staff module. Army training and evaluation program for mechanized infantry/tank task force, No. 71-2. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters,

Department of the Army, 17 June 1977.

Hare, A. P. Handbook of small group research (2d ed.). New York: Free Press,

1976.

Henriksen, K. F., Jones, D. R., Jr., Hannaman, D. L., Wylie, P. B., Shriver,

E. L., Hammill, B. W., and Sulzen, R. H. Identification of combat unit

leader skills and leader-group interaction processes. ARI Technical Report

440, January 1980.

Kz'plan, I. T. and Barber, H. F. Training battalion coi mand groups in simulated

combat: Identification and measurement of critical performances. ARI

Technical Paper 376, June 1979.

Olmstead, J. A., Christeuben, H. E., and Lackey, L. L. Components of organizatlonal competence: Test of a conceptual framework. (HumRRO Technical

Report 73-19). Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization,

August 1973.

Schein, E. H. Organizational psychology (2d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:

Prentice-Hall, 1970.

Torrance, E. P. Some consequences of power differences on decisior making in

permanent and temporary three-man groups. Washington State College,

Research Studies, 1954, 22, 130-140.

Wheeler, L. S. Information seeking as a power strategy. Journal of Social

Psychology, 1964, 62, 125-130.

17

&M
,APPENDIX A

INFORMATION FLOW QUESTIONNAIRE

SELF-EVALUATION (PLANNING STAGE)

(Sinai)

Purpose: This questionnaire is designed to provide information to assist in

the analysis of lessons learned during CATTS exercises.

Instructions: Answer all questions. If you did not receive the information

asked for, answer unknown. DO NOT GUESS!! Parts of this questionnaire

will cover material to which you did not have access.

1. REMS available for the operation are: A. Air droppable

B. Artillery deliverable

C. Hand emplaced

D. Unknown

2. Air Recce assets will be controlled by: A. Bn

B. Bde

C. Div

A D. Unknown

3. The covering force is authorized to A. OPFOR are positively identifiec

* fire across the Suez Canal when: B. The OPFOR reach the west bank

of the Canal

C. Fired upon

D. Unknown

19
4. ADA weapons control status at the A. Free

beginning of the operation was: B. Tight

WFAPONS C. Hold

D. Unknown

5. OPFOR opposite of Division sector A. 77th CAA

are believed to be units of the: B. 11th CAA

C. 46th Tank Div

D. Unknown

6. The primary avenue of approach into A. Hwy 11

the Brigade sector is: B. Hwy 33

C. Hlwy 44

D. Unknown

7. CAS should be reserved for lucrative A. 2

targets. Groups of armor vehicles B. 5

of less than are not good CAS C. 10

targets. D. Unknown

8. The initial FSCL is the: A. West bank of the Suez Canal

B. Fast bank of the Sue. Canal

C. FEBA

D. Unknown

9. The curfew in effect 1j: A. Sundown to Sunrise

B. 2200 - 0300

C. 2000 - 0600

D. Unknown

20
l I _4'L.X

10. The speed limit on the open hi$ hwav is: A. 25 mph

B. 40 mph

C. 55 mph

D. Unknown

11. A bath, clothing, and wash point is A. Bn Field Trains

located with: B. Bde Trains

C. DISCOM

D. Unknoxn

12. The main attack for the opposing forces A. Mitla Pass

will be directed towards the: B. Suez Canal

C. Giddi Pass

D. Unknown

13. During the first 12 hours of A. USAF

hostilities, air superiority will be B. Abar Forces

held by: C. Air parity will be maintained

D. Unknown

14. The effect of the Sinai climate will A. Not change

the number of non-combat B. Double

casualties. C. Triple

D. Unknown

15. The current TF requirement is to: A. Defend the Suez Canal

B. Delay the enemy forward of

tle MBA

C. Retain the Mitla Pass

D. Unknown

21
,. Guerrilla activities in the Brigade A. Increased

sector have in the past few B. Decreased

days. C. Not been reported

D. Unknown

17. The combat efficiency of the Abar A. High

forces is expected to be: B. Low

C. Medium, because of equipment

shortages

P. Unknown

18. Trafficability in the AO east of A. Generally poor

the canal is: B. Good except for an area within

3 km of the canal

C. Poor because the wadies cannot

be crossed

D. Unknown

19. Replacement availability status is: A. Individual replacements are

available at Division

B. Unit replacements with equipment

are available as Division assets

C. Replacement channels have .ot

been established

D. Unknown

22

"*..... . im
20. The graves registration collection A. With the 3d Field Hospital

point is located: B. Vicinity Battalion Combat Trains

C. Vicinity Brigade Trains

D. Unknown

21. Prior to initiation of hostilities, A. 100

the OPFOR were estimated to be at B. 90

% strength. C. 65

D. Unknown

22. Within the past 24 hours, OPFOR air A. Not been reported

recce missions along the West bank B. Increased

have: C. Decreased

D. Unknown

23. Abar forces have the capability to A. Only chemical weapons will be

employ nuclear as well as chemical employed

and biological weapons. Currently, B. Nuclear weapons will be used

indications are that: C. Abar forces do not plan to use

these weapons

D. Unknown

24. RSF personnel in sector are located: A. Along the berm east of the Canal

B. Only in the built up areas East

of the Canal

C. All RSF personnel have been moved

out of the AO

D. Unknown

23

* ,- ,-.- .,-,. .- "-- * - - - - -- -- --.-- -. - - . ..
25. The route to be used when moving from A. Highway 52

the Assembly Areas forward to the FEBA B. Route Gold

is: C. Highway 33

D. Unknown

26. The number of air sorties allocated to A. 50

the Division per day is: B. 135

C. 16

D. Unknown

27. The time required to change the A. 30 minutes

ordnance on an aircraft in response to B. 1 hour

a special ordnance request is: C. 4 hours

D. Unknown

28. The response time for an air sortie A. 30 minutes

for aircraft on strip alert is: B. 5 minutes

C. 1 hour

D. Unknown

29. An immediate smoke mission must be A. Co/Tm

approved at level. B. Bn/TF

C. Bde

D. Unknown

30. There is a shortage of artillery A. HE

rounds in the theater: B. WP

C. Illum

D. Unknown

24
F

31. "F" nets will be opened: A. When the artillery battalion is in

position

B. When the FIST team chief has

positively identified a target

as hostile

C. Upon contact with the enemy U

D. Unknown

32. The Suez Canal: A. Can be forded by T62 tanks

B. Can be crossed by T62 tanks using

snorkeling equipment

C. Can be crossed by T62 tanks only

with bridging assistance

D. Unknown

33. 1rigade EEI will be distributed to A. RATT

battalions via: B. OPORD

C. Messenger

D. Unknown

34. The CSR for TOW rounds is: A. 9 rounds/wpn/day

B. 50 rounds/wpn/day

C. No CSR on TOW

D. Unknown

35. The division light line is A. The FEBA

located at: B. The brigade rear boundary

C. The division rear boundary

D. Unknown

25

L
APPENDIX B

The following table indicates the letter of the correct response to eachl

question, the position of the person to whom the information was presented

directly in the brigade briefing, and the positions of persons who should

have received that information indirectly via intragroup communication.

Table B-1

Scoring Key for Information Flow Questionnaire

i!Number Question Correct Position of Receiver Response

BC Sl S2 S3 S4 FSO ALO CC

1 C D

2 C T D I

3 C D I D I I I

4 B D I D I I I

5 B D

6 B I D I I I I T

7 C I I I I D

8 A I I I D I

9 C I D I I I I I I

10 B I I D I

11 B D

12 C I D I I I

13 B I D I I I

14 C I DI

15 B D I D I

16 C I D I I

17 A I I D I I I I I

18 B I I D I I I

19 B I D I I

2U C D I

21 A D I

22 B I D

23 C I D I I

24 C I D I I

25 C D D I I I

26 A I I I D

27 C I I D

28 A I I D

29 A D D I

30 C x I D

31 C D

32 C I D I I

33 A D

34 A I I I D I

35 C I I D I

27
Abbreviations: BC - battalion commnander

F'SO - fire support officer

IALO - air liaison officer

CC - company commander

D - direct receiver

I - indirect receiver

28
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