IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : 

 : Case No. 2:12-CR-220 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : JUDGE MARBLEY 

 v. : 

 : 

KARIN A. HAZEL, : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

ORDER AND OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Karin Hazel’s Motion to Suppress Evidence 

(“First Motion”) (Doc. 9-1) and Supplemental Motion to Suppress Evidence and Requesting a 

Franks Hearing (“Second Motion”) (Doc. 20). The Government opposes both motions. For the 

following reasons, Defendant’s motions are DENIED. 

II. BACKGROUND1

 On June 27, 2011, law enforcement agents executed a search warrant for 6960 Pearce 

Lane (“6960 Pearce”), a single family residence in Canal Winchester, Ohio. The magistrate 

judge issued the search warrant on June 24, 2011. Attachment A to the warrant described the 

place to be searched, 6960 Pearce, and Attachment B described the property to be seized. 

Attachment B authorized agents to search for personal and business records, in paper and 

electronic form, as well as computer system hardware in the name of Karin Hazel and/or her 

company, Cap City investment Group, LLC (“CCIG”). Alleged violations included bank fraud, 

conspiracy to defraud the United States, interstate wire fraud, and making fraudulent and false 

 

1

 These are the facts as understood by the magistrate judge at the time she issued the search warrant. Defendant’s 

allegations that the search warrant contained misrepresentations are addressed in a following section. 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 1 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
2

statements to U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development relating to Federal Housing 

Administration (“FHA”) mortgage transactions. 

 The search warrant was supported by a thirteen-page affidavit signed by Special Agent 

Steven Tsourkas (“SA Tsourkas”) of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentOffice of Inspector General (“HUD-OIG”). The affidavit detailed the investigation that led SA 

Tsourkas to conclude CCIG was located at 6960 Pearce, and that evidence of the aforementioned 

violations would be found there. 

 In May and June 2011, HUD-OIG Special Agents conducted seven interviews and 

obtained two recorded conversations as part of their investigation into two different property 

schemes allegedly connected to Defendant: “Pearce Property Scheme” and “CCIG Investment 

Property Scheme.” 

 In June 2011, two conversations between Defendant and her husband, Corey Hazel, (“C. 

Hazel”) were recorded at the jail where C. Hazel was imprisoned for mortgage and fraud 

offenses. On June 8, 2011, Defendant informed C. Hazel of a criminal investigation into some of 

her property transactions. On June 12, 2011, C. Hazel, referencing a previous conversation, 

instructed Defendant “that she might want to take the hard drive out [of her computer] and 

replace it. . . [and] that he knows [Defendant] is familiar with people who fix computers, and that 

person should be able to replace the hard drive.” (Doc. 13-1, at 13.) SA Tsourkas applied for the 

search warrant twelve days later, on June 24, 2011. 

A. Pearce Property Scheme Allegations 

 Two witnesses, Lee Ann Mahone and Jim Smith, were interviewed in June 2011 

regarding the Pearce Property Scheme. Mahone met Defendant over 20 years ago and, though 

she occasionally helped Defendant with office duties, she was never a CCIG employee. Mahone 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 2 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
3

indicated that Defendant was the owner of CCIG and that CCIG’s office was located at 6960 

Pearce. Agents also showed Mahone documents in the 6960 Pearce loan file. She identified the 

following documents as fraudulent: two documents verifying Mahone’s employment with CCIG, 

a letter written on Defendant’s behalf bearing Mahone’s signature, and a CCIG check and 

paystub issued to Hazel with Mahone’s signature. 

 Jim Smith was a contract employee of Defendant and did work at Defendant’s residence, 

6960 Pearce. Smith indicated that “he did not perform even $6,000 work of work on 6960 

Pearce.” (Doc. 20.) He was shown documents in 6960 Pearce loan file and identified the 

following as fraudulent: a mechanics lien signed by Smith, a letter written by Smith on CCIG’s 

behalf, an invoice requesting payment for work at 6960 Pearce, and a check issued as payment of 

the aforementioned lien in the amount of $36,000. Smith stated that the work he completed on 

6960 Pearce was worth much less than $36,000, “not even close to the invoice amount of 

approximately $36,000.” (Doc. 13-1, at 10.) He identified the check purportedly paid over to 

him as the same one he picked up and delivered to Defendant, at her request, six to twelve 

months after his employment ended. Smith indicated that CCIG’s office was located on April 

Lane, not at 6960 Pearce. 

B. CCIG Investment Property Scheme Allegations 

 Five witnesses were interviewed in May and June 2011 regarding the CCIG Property 

Scheme. Paul Kokos Jr., a loan officer, worked on several loans for CCIG’s investors, 

completing five. He identified Defendant as the owner of CCIG and also identified a ‘typical’ 

payoff letter from a CCIG loan file. He described the process of working with Hazel, the 

refinancing scenario, and the method of ownership transfer Defendant used. Defendant provided 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 3 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
4

Kokos with preliminary information, names of appraisers, rental income information on loan 

applications, and supporting documentation, by telephone, fax, and email. 

 Earl Deas (“Deas”) purchased a parcel of property from Defendant in May 2007. He 

identified the fraudulent information in the loan application, adding that he had provided the 

correct information to Hazel. Deas believed the loan to be for purchase, but actually it was used 

for refinancing. He was unaware that Defendant had purchased the same property two months 

earlier, in March 2007, for $25,000 less than the loan amount. 

 Three other named witnesses, each one either an investor or borrower completed 

purchases with CCIG. They were told that CCIG purchased distressed properties in the 

Columbus, Ohio area, and that the properties could be purchased with no money paid out of 

pocket. 

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

Hazel asserts three bases for excluding the evidence discovered during the search of 6960 

Pearce on September 27, 2011: (1) the supporting affidavit failed to establish probable cause 

because it contained insufficient factual information; (2) the supporting affidavit relied upon 

stale information; and (3) even if the supporting affidavit did establish probable cause, the 

evidence discovered should be excluded because the search warrant was so fatally defective that 

no reasonable law enforcement officer could believe the warrant was valid. 

Additionally, Hazel challenges the affidavit itself on the grounds that it contains factual 

misrepresentations and omissions. She argues that if the Government's warrant application had 

contained only the accurate information, it would have been insufficient for a magistrate to find 

probable cause. Hazel contends she is entitled to a hearing, under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 

154 (1978), to test the validity of the affidavit. 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 4 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
5

In the Sixth Circuit, to determine whether an allegedly false statement in an affidavit was 

necessary for the finding of probable cause, "the law requires both redaction of false statements 

from the affidavit and consideration of material omitted from the affidavit in order to determine 

whether there was probable cause for a search warrant." United States v. Wilson, 501 Fed.Appx. 

416, 421 (6th Cir. 2012). Put another way, this Court must first decide whether there was 

probable cause to issue the warrant based on the application as originally presented to the 

magistrate judge, and then decide whether there is still probable cause once the false statements 

are excised. 

A. Probable Cause

 The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant issue only “upon probable cause, 

supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 

persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Before a magistrate judge issues a 

search warrant, there must be a finding of probable cause. United States v. Jackson, 470 F.3d 

299, 306 (6th Cir. 2006). Probable cause rests on more than mere suspicion, but less than a 

“prima facie showing, of criminal activity.” Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969), 

citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). The issuing magistrate looks at the “totality of the 

circumstances. . . to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him...there is a fair probability that contraband or 

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 

(1983). 

“[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial 

basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238-239. The magistrate’s ruling is 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 5 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
6

accorded “great deference.” Id. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 

(1969)). 

Defendant contends that the supporting affidavit in this case, issued June 24, 2011, did 

not provide sufficient information for a magistrate to find probable cause because it: (1) 

contained only “bare bones” information; (2) failed to establish a nexus; and (3) was based on 

stale information. 

1. “Bare Bones” Information

 Defendant argues that the supporting affidavit is based on ‘bare bones” information. She 

lists a number of missing details she believes are significant, including: when the office moved to 

6960 Pearce; whether CCIG’s documents moved with the office; what constitutes the office; and 

whether Defendant retained possession of the relevant documents when the search warrant was 

issued. While the affidavit did lack those details, “[t]he affidavit is judged on the adequacy of 

what it does contain, not on what it lacks, or on what a critic might say should have been added.” 

United States v. Brown, 715 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Allen, 211 

F.3d 970, 975 (6th Cir. 2000)). 

 “An affidavit that states suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions, without providing some 

underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, is a 

‘bare bones’ affidavit.” U.S. v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1378 (6th Cir. 1996). Veracity, reliability, 

and basis of knowledge are interrelated, not independent, issues that the magistrate can use in 

determining the “commonsense, practical question” of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 

(1983). Detailed descriptions of first-hand observations, along with a witness’s choice to reveal 

her name, can be used as indicia of their reliability by the issuing judge. U.S. v. Jackson 470 F.3d 

299, 307 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. v. McCraven, 401 F.3d 692, 697 (6th Cir. 2005). 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 6 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
7

In this case, the affidavit included SA Tsourkas’s qualifications, the contents of two jail 

recordings between Defendant and C. Hazel, and seven interviews with named witnesses. Two 

witnesses, Mahone and Smith, identified falsified documents in the Pearce property loan file. 

Kokos recounted completing multiple loan applications with the Defendant, using appraisers 

recommended by Hazel. Deas identified as fraudulent the loan application for the property he 

purchased with Hazel. In sum, the information in the affidavit upon which the magistrate relied 

amounted to significantly more than “bare bones” information. 

2. Nexus

Defendant also argues that the affidavit was insufficient to support a finding of probable 

cause because it failed to establish a nexus between the evidence sought and 6960 Pearce. 

Specifically, Defendant contends there was insufficient information to show the evidence 

actually existed and, even if it did, no basis for concluding that evidence was located at 6960 

Pearce. 

 To establish probable cause, "there must...be a 'nexus between the place to be searched 

and the evidence sought.'" United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744 (quoting Carpenter, 360 F.3d 

at 594 (6th Cir. 2005)). The Sixth Circuit has held that a supporting affidavit need not 

conclusively prove a nexus; it only has to provide a factual basis for a magistrate reasonably to 

infer the evidence sought is at the location to be searched. United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 

490, 503 (6th Cir. 2001). 

With regard to a nexus between the evidence sought and 6960 Pearce, this Court “does 

not need Supreme Court precedent to support the simple fact that records of illegal business 

activity are usually kept at either a business location or at the defendant's home. Likewise, 

personal financial records are also usually stored at a person's home or place of business.” United 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 7 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
8

States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 572 (6th Cir. 2006). The original record in front of the 

magistrate showed: Smith and Mahone stated the CCIG office was at 6960 Pearce,2

 Hazel 

purchased 6960 Pearce in 2009 and allegedly fraudulent documents were in the loan file for 6960 

Pearce. Since 2009, Hazel had access to digital and paper loan records and she had access to a 

computer at 6960 Pearce. The affidavit also detailed SA Tsouraks’s experience, and his 

conclusion that the office was located at 6960 Pearce, which a magistrate can rely on when 

assessing “the probable location of the evidence.” Abboud, 438 F.3d at 572. SA Tsourkas’s 

experience was not even necessary for the magistrate judge reasonably to infer that a suspect 

accused of Given the facts on the record as well as common sense, the magistrate could 

reasonably infer the evidence sought would be at 6960 Pearce. 

3. Staleness

Defendant further contends that the affidavit contained only stale information which was, 

thus, insufficient for the magistrate to make a probable cause determination. It is axiomatic that 

stale information cannot be used in a probable cause determination. United States v. Brooks, 594 

F.3d 488, (6th. Cir 2010) (citing United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 923 (6th Cir. 1998)). For 

a particular crime, staleness is determined by the “inherent nature of the crime.” Id. The Sixth 

Circuit holds that there are four relevant factors in determining staleness: 

[1] the character of the crime (chance encounter in the night or regenerating 

conspiracy?), [2] the criminal (nomadic or entrenched?), [3] the thing to be seized 

(perishable and easily transferable or of enduring utility to its holder?) [4] the 

place to be searched (mere criminal forum of convenience or secure operational 

base?). 

United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Abboud, 438 F.3d at 572-

73). 

 

2

 To the extent the affidavit was inaccurate as to Smith’s statements, that issue is addressed in the next section. 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 8 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
9

 Here, all four factors weigh against Defendant’s staleness contentions. The alleged 

crimes, fraud and conspiracy, are generally carried out over a long period of time. Furthermore, 

the affidavit establishes, through witnesses and documents, the repetition of the alleged crimes. 

In 2007 Defendant sold a property that, unbeknownst to the buyers, she had purchased two 

months prior for $25,000 less than her sale price. The buyers identified the loan application as 

fraudulent. The loan file for her residence purchased in 2009, 6960 Pearce, also contained 

fraudulent documents. Defendant exchanged with Kokos digital and electronic paperwork for 

multiple loans. Hazel also instructed Kokos to use particular appraisers. Considered together, 

this evidence indicates that the Defendant’s allegedly fraudulent business practices were 

continuous and ongoing. “If an affidavit recites activity indicating protracted or continuous 

conduct, time is of less significance.” United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 822 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1382 (6th Cir. 1988)). The affidavit indicated 

Defendant was clearly not nomadic. She had been conducting business in the Columbus-area 

since 2007 and purchased 6960 Pearce as her primary residence in 2009. 

 Furthermore the search warrant sought a type of evidence, personal and business records 

in paper and electronic form, which the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held defy staleness claims. 

Business records are a type of evidence that could be reasonably “expected to be kept there for 

long periods of time.” Id., at 573 (quoting United States. v. McManus, 719 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 

(6th Cir. 1983)). In United States v. Word, the Sixth Circuit held that it could not “conclude that 

the search warrant contained stale information when the events alleged in the affidavit were of a 

continuing nature and the documents sought were business records prepared and kept in the 

ordinary course of business.” 806 F.2d 658, 662 (6th Cir.1986). Subsequently, in Abboud, the 

Court observed “the fact that by nature one keeps business and financial records for extended 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 9 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
10

periods of time. The entire point in creating such records is for preservation.” 438 F.3d at 574. 

The panel concluded that, “[a]s a result, the warrant was not stale.” Id. 

Although it is a significant point in Defendant’s favor that two years elapsed between the 

alleged criminal activity and the search warrant issuance, the length of time alone is not 

dispositive. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-211 (1932). The Sixth Circuit has held that 

three years between alleged bank fraud and the warrant application did not render the 

information stale because “where the items to be seized are created for the purpose of 

preservation, as are business records, the passage of time is less significant.” Abboud, 438 F.3d at 

572–73 (quoting United States v. Ninety–Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty–Two Dollars and 

Fifty–Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137, 148 (3d Cir. 2002)). Additionally, FHA loan records show 

6960 Pearce was not simply a criminal forum of convenience, but also Hazel’s primary 

residence, where many, if not most, people store their financial records. 

Hence, despite the two-year period between the alleged criminal conduct at the issuance 

of the warrant, this Court finds all four factors weigh against Defendant’s staleness claims. 

Accordingly, the supporting affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate judge to 

make a probable cause determination. The affidavit did not provide merely “bare bones” 

information. It adequately demonstrated a nexus between the evidence and 6960 Pearce and was 

not stale. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized Pursuant to the Warrant is, 

therefore, DENIED.

3

 Upon finding a substantial basis for probable cause, the Court now 

considers whether Defendant has sufficiently impugned the underlying affidavit so that she is 

entitled to a Franks hearing. 

 

3

 Since the Court finds that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis to make a probable cause determination, the 

Court does not reach the question of Leon’s good-faith exception to the warrant requirement. 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 10 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
11

B. Franks Hearing

Defendant requests a Franks hearing and argues that the warrant’s supporting affidavit 

contained factual misrepresentations and omitted material information that, if corrected, would 

have negated a probable cause finding. A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing when she 

“makes a substantial preliminary showing that a [1] false statement [2] knowingly and 

intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant 

affidavit, and [3] . . . the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” 

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). 

1. False Statements 

Hazel alleges that the affidavit contains both factual misrepresentations and omissions. 

“False statements” may also include material omissions for Franks purposes. United States v. 

Castillo, 287 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002). Still, “affidavits with potentially material omissions . . 

. are much less likely to merit a Franks hearing than are affidavits including allegedly false 

statements.” Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir. 1998). Charges of material 

omissions will merit a Franks hearing only in “rare instances.” Id. 

Defendant, comparing recent witness affidavits with the memoranda of the original 

interviews (“MOI”) from three years ago, alleges the following factual misrepresentations were 

included in the affidavit: Mahone never stated the office was at 6960 Pearce; Smith stated the 

office was on April Lane; Smith’s repair work for Hazel was incorrectly categorized as 

“cosmetic;” Kokos received answers on the loan applications from both borrowers and 

Defendant; Deas’s wife was interviewed as well and remembered the loan was for a refinance; 

Deas did not supply loan information to Hazel; and though Hazel did provide Kokos with the 

names of appraisers, Kokos checked their names against the bank’s ‘black list.” 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 11 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
12

Hazel’s comparison of the MOIs with the recent affidavits does show that the search 

warrant affidavit contained false statements, to the effect that Smith and Mahone stated the 

CCIG office was located at 6960 Pearce, and that Deas did supply the loan information directly 

to Kokos. Hazel has additionally established the following information was omitted from the 

supporting affidavit: that Kokos checked Hazel’s recommended appraisers against a black list, 

and that Nora Deas was also interviewed and appeared aware that the loan she applied for was 

for a refinance. 

Defendant fails to establish, however, that the categorization of Smith’s work as 

“cosmetic” and Kokos’s statement that Hazel provided answers to loan application questions 

were false statements. As for the repair work performed by Smith, Defendant merely describes it 

and concludes that in her opinion it was not cosmetic. With regard to the answers on loan 

applications, the affidavit states “[t]he borrower, as well as Hazel would provide the supporting 

documentation required by the lender.” (Doc. 13-1., at 10.). Kokos’s recollection two years 

later that he obtained “loan verification information from prospective borrowers to be submitted 

to the lenders” does not show that the statement in the supporting affidavit is false, nor even 

contradict it. Kokos may well have received answers from both borrowers and Defendant. 

2. Knowingly and Intentionally, or with Reckless Disregard for the Truth 

In addition to showing that the affidavit included false information, Hazel “must make a 

‘substantial preliminary showing’ that the false statements originated with the government 

affiant, not with the informants, or that the government affiant repeated the stories of the affiant 

with reckless indifference to the truth.” United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 

1988)). Although Defendant has not shown SA Tsourkas’s stated the false information with 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 12 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
13

reckless indifference to the truth, Hazel has shown the misrepresentations originated with the 

government, not with either Smith or Mahone. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 155-156. 

3. Materiality 

In determining whether these misrepresentations and omissions were material to the 

magistrate’s probable cause determination, "the law requires both redaction of false statements 

from the affidavit and consideration of material omitted from the affidavit in order to determine 

whether there was probable cause for a search warrant." United States v. Wilson, 501 Fed. Appx. 

416, 421 (6th Cir. 2012). Defendant contends the factual record, adjusted for the 

misrepresentations and omissions, fails to establish a nexus between 6960 Pearce and the 

evidence sought, as well as a nexus between 6960 Pearce and the alleged criminal activity. 

As stated above, to establish probable cause, "there must...be a 'nexus between the place 

to be searched and the evidence sought.'" United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744 (quoting 

Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 594 (6th Cir. 2005)). Additionally “[t]here must...be a nexus...between 

the item to be seized and the criminal behavior.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967). 

A supporting affidavit need not conclusively prove a nexus; it only has to provide a factual basis 

for a magistrate reasonably to infer the evidence sought is at the location to be searched. United 

States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 503 (6th Cir. 2001). 

With regard to a nexus between the evidence sought and 6960 Pearce, after the Court 

adjusts the facts recited by the supporting affidavit to reflect the misrepresentations and 

omissions, it still shows: the Defendant purchased 6960 Pearce in 2009; Smith stated the office 

was on April Lane; and SA Tsourkas concluded the evidence sought would be at 6960 Pearce. 

Although these adjustments weaken the nexus showing, based on the particular fraud crimes 

alleged and the fact that the evidence sought was financial records, the supporting affidavit 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 13 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
14

would still have provided the magistrate a sufficient factual basis to infer the evidence sought 

would be at 6960 Pearce. 

Hazel bought 6960 Pearce and there were fraudulent documents contained in the loan file 

for the property. She exchanged loan documents with Kokos and instructed him to use certain 

appraisers, with Kokos subsequently checking their names against a ‘black list.’ Two jail 

recordings between Defendant and her husband establish that Hazel possessed a computer. 

Neither E. Deas, nor N. Deas was aware that two months prior to their purchase, Defendant had 

purchased the property she subsequently sold them for $25,000 less than their loan amount. 

They also confirmed that the loan application contained fraudulent information. Additionally, 

Defendant points to no statement that contradicts Smith’s position that his work related to 6960 

Pearce had a total value of much less than $36,000. These facts suggest that Defendant executed 

a criminal scheme in which she falsely represented that work was performed on her own home in 

order to receive cash back after the sale. They also suggest that she possessed fraudulent loan 

documents and that she was making false representations with regard to other properties. 

While no single fact here would have sufficed to show probable cause, together there was 

a basis for the magistrate’s issuance of the search warrant. The key issue is the subtle nature of 

the crimes and the evidence of them. Documents which show a suspect has committed financial 

fraud appear innocuous on the surface and they may be stored within similarly innocuous 

devices, such as computers or flash drive. These devices are highly mobile and one cannot 

expect SA Tsourkas to have known, from moment to moment, whether they were on Hazel’s 

person, in her car, or in her home office. Still, the home office was the most likely place, as SA 

Tsourkas knew from his experience. The most circumstantial evidence here is, in a way, the 

most damning. In what reads as an intentionally vague and secretive conversation between 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 14 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
15

Hazel and her husband, her husband advised her to do something about her computer’s harddrive, and even have it replaced. If Hazel had acted swiftly on that suggestion, the evidence of 

her alleged crimes might have been permanently lost. That statement essentially forced the 

government’s hand as it could not risk the spoliation of evidence. Certainly, recent information 

that a witness had seen Hazel working on loan applications on her home computer would have 

provided a stronger basis for the magistrate to find a nexus to 6960 Pearce and, thus, probable 

cause for the warrant. The law does not require the best evidence for a magistrate to find 

probable cause, however, only sufficient evidence. Based on the specific facts of this case, the 

nature of the alleged frauds, and the type of evidence sought, the Court finds that even with the 

supporting affidavit corrected to reflect factual errors, the magistrate judge had a sufficient basis 

to issue the search warrant. The false statements were, thus, not material to the magistrate’s 

determination and do not provide a basis for this Court to order a Franks hearing. Defendant’s 

request for a Franks hearing is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Karin Hazel’s Motion to Suppress Evidence and 

request for a Franks Hearing are DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Algenon L. Marbley 

 ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: August 5, 2013 

Case: 2:12-cr-00220-ALM Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/05/13 Page: 15 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>