United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 28, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-20714

CARL R. PRUETT; SCOTT MARTIN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants,

versus

HARRIS COUNTY BAIL BOND BOARD; HARRIS COUNTY,

Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

--------------------

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

In response to the Petition for Rehearing filed by the

defendants, we withdraw the prior panel opinion in its entirety and

substitute the following.

Two bail bondsmen challenged a Texas statute restricting

solicitation of potential customers as a denial of their First

Amendment rights. The district court agreed. Concluding that all

but one of the restrictions violates the bondsmen’s right to

commercial speech, we affirm, reverse, and remand, all in part.

I
1 The Board, a creature of Texas statute, is responsible for supervising

and regulating the bond business and enforcing bond rules and statutes. TEX.

OCC. CODE § 1704.101, .102 (2005). The State of Texas declined to intervene,

hence Harris County and the Board (“Harris County”) defend the statute. 

2

Bail bondsmen Carl Pruett and Scott Martin filed this § 1983

action against Harris County and the Harris County Bail Bond

Board,1 challenging on various federal and state constitutional

grounds, including the First Amendment, a Texas statute governing

solicitation of customers, TEX. OCC. CODE § 1704.109 (2003). That

statute provides:

(a) A board by rule may regulate solicitations or

advertisements by or on behalf of bail bond sureties to

protect:

(1) the public from:

(A) harassment;

(B) fraud;

(C) misrepresentation; or

(D) threats to public safety; or

(2) the safety of law enforcement officers.

(b) A bail bond surety, an agent of a corporate surety or

an employee of the surety or agent may not make, cause to

be made, or benefit from unsolicited contact:

(1) through any means, including in person, by

telephone, by electronic methods, or in writing, to

solicit bonding business related to an individual

with an outstanding arrest warrant that has not

been executed, unless the bail bond surety or agent

for a corporate surety has an existing bail bond on

the individual; or

(2) in person or by telephone to solicit bonding

business:

(A) that occurs between the hours of 9 p.m.

and 9 a.m.; or

(B) within 24 hours after:
3

(i) the execution of an arrest warrant on

the individual; or

(ii) an arrest without a warrant on the

individual.

(c) This section does not apply to a solicitation or

unsolicited contact related to a Class C misdemeanor.

The plaintiffs challenge subsection (b), which contains two

prohibitions. Subsection (b)(1) prohibits any solicitation

regarding an outstanding warrant, unless the subject of the warrant

is a previous customer. Subsection (b)(2) restricts the time of

solicitation after arrest, prohibiting solicitation in person or by

phone from 9:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m., or within 24 hours after a

person has been arrested, either with or without a warrant. The

statute does not prevent attorneys, law enforcement officials, or

anyone else from alerting someone that he’s the subject of an open

warrant. Law enforcement officials frequently send letters to

petty defendants giving notice of open warrants against them,

hoping they’ll turn themselves in. 

Bondsmen use several methods to solicit business. One

particularly useful tool is the Harris County Justice Information

Management System (JIMS), a computer system accessible to the

public through terminals and the Internet which provides, inter

alia, names and addresses of persons arrested and subjects of

arrest warrants. Given the public’s ease of access to JIMS, Harris

County waits 48 hours after an arrest warrant is issued to post the

information about the warrant on JIMS, allowing law enforcement

officers to execute the warrant first. 
2 In early 2001, Harris County adopted by local rule solicitation

restrictions similar to those of current § 109(b). Later that year, the Texas

legislature enacted the original version of § 109, which allowed local boards

to regulate solicitation. In 2002, plaintiff Pruett challenged the local

rules in state court. The trial court held the rules unconstitutional, see

Harris County Bail Bond Board v. Pruett, No. 01-02-01043-CV, 2004 WL 2307362

(Tex. App. -Houston [1 Dist.] Oct. 14, 2004, no pet. h.), the appellate court

partially reversed, 177 S.W. 3d 260 (Tex. App. 2005), and the case is pending

before the Supreme Court of Texas. The present case involves current §

109(b), which was enacted in 2003 but concerns issues similar to those in the

state court case. However, the present case involves a central issue of

federal constitutional law, and although we abstain from ruling on issues of

Texas constitutional law, see Railroad Com. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496

(1941), we rarely abstain from ruling on federal constitutional law, see

Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987); Colorado River Water Conservation

Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and do not do so here.

3 421 U.S. 809 (1975).

4

The district court granted the bondsmen’s motion for summary

judgment, holding the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its

enforcement. It granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for fees,

awarding them $50,000 plus $25,000 in the event of appeal. Harris

County appeals the judgment, including the award of fees, and

plaintiffs cross-appeal the award of fees, asking for more.2

II

The metaphor of political speech finding its place in the

marketplace of ideas proved to be a powerful if inexact force,

drawing speech in its myriad presentations under the umbrella of

First Amendment protection —— the force of the metaphor itself a

validating testament to the power of an idea so strong as to invite

confusion of metaphorical imagery with defining principle. And in

1975, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bigelow v. Virginia,

3

speech in the marketplace of actual goods itself gained protection,

albeit as “less valuable speech,” termed “commercial speech.” It
4 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,

425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976).

5 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com. of New York,

447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). The parties quarrel about what level of scrutiny

Central Hudson mandates. Citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.

484 (1996), the plaintiffs urge something “akin to strict scrutiny.” 44

Liquormart, however, was a plurality opinion involving “a blanket prohibition

against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful product,” id. at 504,

and there’s no blanket prohibition here. In any event, the Supreme Court has

called Central Hudson a form of “intermediate” scrutiny. See Edenfield v.

Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993); see also Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515

U.S. 618, 623 (1995); cf. Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357,

374 (2002) (describing the test as “significantly stricter” than rational

basis). The precise label for the level of scrutiny embodied in Central

Hudson is irrelevant, however - we just apply the test. Likewise, the

plaintiffs’ assertion that the Central Hudson test isn’t the same as the time,

place, and manner test, while true, see Speaks v. Kruse, 445 F.3d 396, 400

n.10 (5th Cir. 2006), is axiomatic.

The plaintiffs also suggest that strict scrutiny should apply because

the restrictions here are content-based. This argument has no merit - §

1704.109 is a classic restriction on a category of commercial speech, a

restriction that involves methods, times, and subjects of solicitation and

does not have as a goal the suppression of speech. See, e.g., Speaks, 445

F.3d at 400 (examining similar restriction on chiropractor solicitation as a

restriction on commercial speech).

5

signifies that commercial speech did not displace otherwise

protected speech in gaining First Amendment protection. That a

book or article is sold or a column is written for compensation

does not eliminate its protection.4 In sum, commercial speech,

with its lesser protection, is at bottom advertising. As the

parties and the court below recognized, § 1704.109 is a restriction

on commercial speech.

Restrictions on commercial speech are analyzed under the

framework of Central Hudson.

5 The government may ban misleading

commercial speech and commercial speech related to illegal

activity. “If the communication is neither misleading nor related

to unlawful activity, the government’s power is more
6 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.

7 Id.

8 Id. 

9 Id. Despite the language of the third prong, the Supreme Court and,

thus, this court do not require that the state use the least-restrictive

means. See, e.g., Speaks, 445 F.3d at 401 n.14.

10 See Speaks, 445 F.3d at 399.

11 63 F.3d 358, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1995). Harris County also relies on

BGHA, LLC v. City of Universal City, Texas, 340 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2003)

(discussing J&B Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 152 F.3d 362, 371 (5th

6

circumscribed.”6 First, “[t]he State must assert a substantial

interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.”7

Second, “the restriction must directly advance the state interest

involved.”8 Third, “if the governmental interest could be served

as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the

excessive restrictions cannot survive.”9 We review the lower

court’s application of this test de novo.

10

Before we apply Central Hudson to the two restrictions at

issue, we address a fundamental dispute coloring much of the

parties’ arguments and the lower court’s ruling. The plaintiffs

argue that only evidence created before enactment of § 1704.109 and

relied upon or cited by the legislature in passing it can be

considered under Central Hudson. Consequently, they argue, because

the legislative record behind § 1704.109 is bare, it cannot survive

scrutiny. Harris County disagrees, offering testimony and

affidavits introduced in the court below and arguing that Moore v.

Morales11 relied upon testimony at trial in ascertaining the
Cir. 1998), which allowed the city to justify an ordinance based on evidence

adduced at trial).

12 507 U.S. 761, 768, 770 (1993); see also Went for It, 515 U.S. at 624

(quoting Edenfield). The plaintiffs cite to other cases, like U.S. West, Inc.

v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999), which simply restate this rule.

13 See supra note 6.

7

justification for a statute. The district court agreed with the

plaintiffs, although it held that § 1704.109 failed scrutiny even

considering Harris County’s additional evidence.

Central Hudson does not require that evidence used to satisfy

its strictures exist pre-enactment. Plaintiffs rely heavily on the

statements in Edenfield v. Fane that a statute cannot be justified

“by mere speculation or conjecture” and that “the Central Hudson

standard does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put

forward by the State with other suppositions.”12 Those statements,

however, only distinguish between rational basis review, under

which a court can, and should if necessary, confect its own reasons

to justify a statute, and Central Hudson review, under which a

court can consider only the reasons proffered by the state. While

with commercial speech the state need not demonstrate that its

regulatory means were the least intrusive on protected speech,13 it

must at least articulate regulatory objectives to be served. But

that doesn’t mean the state can proffer only reasons locatable in

the legislative record. Indeed, in Moore, our most relevant case,

the court’s language shows that it considered post-enactment
14 63 F.3d 358, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating “[b]efore us is

extensive evidence” and, twice, “[t]hey testified”). In their brief,

plaintiffs suggest that this “evidence” and “testimony” was actually preenactment “evidence” and “testimony,” presumably created in connection with

the legislation itself. The district court’s ruling, however, makes clear

that the evidence was developed at trial. See Moore v. Morales, 843 F. Supp.

1124 (S.D. Tex. 1994).

15 See Illusions-Dallas Private Club, Inc. v. Steen, 482 F.3d 299 (5th

Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that legislative record or statutory preamble

was necessary to discern a content-neutral purpose for statute); J&B Entm’t,

Inc. v. City of Jackson, 152 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 1998) (allowing use of

evidence of secondary effects developed pre-enactment or adduced at trial). 

Plaintiffs cite other cases that seem to disagree, see Peek-a-Boo Lounge of

Bradentown, Inc. v. Manatee City, 337 F.3d 1251, 1265-67 (11th Cir. 2003);

Hickerson v. City of New York, 146 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1998); 11126

Baltimore Blvd. v. Prince George’s County, 886 F.2d 1415, 1423 (4th Cir.

1989), judgment vacated by 496 U.S. 901 (1990); SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton,

317 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2003); D.H.L. Associates v. O’Gorman, 199 F.3d 50,

57-58 (1st Cir. 1999), but those cases aren’t controlling, of course. 

8

evidence in analyzing a Central Hudson claim.14 Even with a First

Amendment doctrine calling for “intermediate scrutiny” such as

regulation of sexually-oriented businesses, where the argument to

disallow post-enactment evidence as justification for a statute has

some logical purpose, we have specifically rejected the plaintiffs’

contention that evidence of purpose must be drawn only from a

contemporaneously generated legislative record. And there the

threshold question is whether the legislative body is regulating

protected activity or its effects.15 We consider the testimony and

affidavits introduced by Harris County in the court below, as the

district court did in the alternative.

A

We turn first to subsection (b)(1), which prevents

solicitation regarding outstanding warrants unless the bondsman has

a prior relationship with the party. Harris County concedes that
16 The plaintiffs argue that the legislature’s purpose in enacting § 109

was to hinder competition between large, affiliated bondsmen and independent

bondsmen, but their evidence largely relies upon claims that the legislature

responded to strong anti-competitive lobbying by Pruett’s and Martin’s

competitors, International Fidelity Insurance Company. In any event, even if

the impulses behind § 109 were anti-competitive, § 109 could still be

supported by other, legitimate interests.

17 See, e.g., Affidavit of Sergeant Larry Hall. (Hall, employed by the

Harris County Sheriff’s office since 1976, described the County’s notification

policy, which allows the County to “wean out possibly dangerous misdemeanants

and send notification letters only to non-threatening, non-serious

misdemeanants who are likely to save Harris County money and serve public

policy by voluntarily coming in and making appropriate arrangements . . . . “)

9

the solicitations at issue are neither deceptive nor relate to

illegal activity. Next, under the first prong of Central Hudson,

Harris County asserts as substantial interests the diminishment of:

1) the flight risk for felony offenders and high-level misdemeanor

offenders; 2) the risk of harm to officers, defendants, and

bystanders when such defendants are arrested; 3) the risk of harm

to victims, family members, or witnesses from retribution; and 4)

the potential for destruction of evidence, interests alluded to in

the statute itself.16 The district court found that these interests

were substantial. We agree, although to the extent that Harris

County itself notifies non-serious offenders of open warrants

against them - and the evidence shows that Harris County does this

regularly17 - the interests are not substantial at all. Deferring

that concern to the third prong, where it more easily fits, and

assuming the interests are substantial in the abstract, we turn to

the second prong.

Under the second prong, Harris County must show that (b)(1)

directly advances these interests. Witnesses for Harris County
18 See, e.g., Oral Deposition of Alvin W. Berry (“The element of

surprise . . . does not give the defendant or the person to be arrested the

ability to either flee or to resist.”); Affidavit of James Fitzgerald

(describing how a murder suspect fled after receiving solicitation from a

bondsman and was missing for about six days before being apprehended);

Affidavit of Rodney Marcotte (“[A]fter apprehending suspects, they have

indicated to me that they fled immediately after receiving notice of

solicitation by one or more bondsmen.”); Affidavit of Sergeant Kent Radney

(describing how a suspect, aware that he would be arrested, greeted police

officers with open fire).

19 Cross-Examination of Bruce Douglas Carr, discussing how the incident

discussed in Sergeant Radney’s affidavit occurred in 1988, prior to the

implementation of JIMS. See also Affidavit of Kent Radney (describing the gun

battle, which occurred in October 1988).

10

testified that executing arrest warrants is dangerous, that

maintaining the “element of surprise” is important in decreasing

the target’s ability to flee, resist, harm people, or destroy

evidence, and that bondsman solicitation has, in certain past

anecdotal incidents, tipped off criminals and caused problems.18

Although other Harris County witnesses testified that they knew of

no instances where bondsman solicitation had caused a problem, and

the bondsmen’s main expert witness testified similarly, we accept

as true the testimony supporting the County, given the procedural

posture of this case. We note, however, that the record does not

indicate the date of many of the incidents described and fails to

reflect, in several instances, which incidents occurred before

institution of the 48-hour JIMS window. At least one anecdote,

however, references an individual suspected of manufacturing

methamphetamine who had received a tip that he would be arrested

and opened fire on police officers when they arrived to arrest him

in 1988.19 Presumably such a suspect would be targeted, and
20 The bondsmen also argue that (b)(1) does not directly advance the

stated interests because it excludes bondsmen with an “existing business

relationship.” Essentially, they argue that (b)(1) does not go far enough and

should not have this exclusion, as some of their witnesses testified. This

argument sounds in underinclusivity, and thus may relate more properly to

prong three, but in any event we agree with the court in Harris County Bail

Bond Board v. Pruett, 177 S.W. 3d 260,273-74 (Tex. App. 2005), that this

exception is not problematic. First, that court construed “existing business

relationship” to mean that “the bondsman involved has in place an existing,

current bond on the person requiring another bond.” That definition controls

here. As the court noted, such a bondsman would want to contact the person

because the new warrant might affect his current bond. Moreover, as the court

noted, it would be impractical to allow the bondsman to discuss the existing

bond but not the possibility of a new bond, and it is unlikely a bondsman

would contact someone who he thought would run away because that might lead to

forfeiture of the original bond.

21 See supra note 9.

22 See Speaks v. Kruse, 445 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2006).

11

hopefully caught, within the 48-hour period preceding posting on

JIMS. Nevertheless, we accept at this point that (b)(1) directly

advances the state’s interests.20

However, even assuming that (b)(1) advances the stated

interests, (b)(1) fails prong three of Central Hudson. While that

prong does not require that the state employ the least-restrictive

means to accomplish its goals,21 it does require a good fit between

the means and the goals. Consequently, in determining whether “the

means are in proportion to the interests they purport to serve,”22

it is relevant that other, less-restrictive and more-tailored means

exist. The district court found that Harris County could advance

the stated interests by the more narrow means of: 1) increasing the

number of officers executing warrants, thereby arresting risky

offenders before the 48-hour JIMS window expires; 2) extending the

48-hour window; and 3) screening targets for those who could be
23 After all, whether Harris County could extend the 48-hour JIMS

blackout period is irrelevant. The question is whether § 109 is

constitutional as written; indeed, other counties may not have a JIMS-type

system at all. We, and the Supreme Court, often assume in analyzing whether

statutes pass constitutional muster that the legislature could enact a more

narrowly tailored means. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Federation of the Blind

of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) (“In contrast to the prophylactic,

imprecise, and unduly burdensome rule the State has adopted to reduce its

alleged donor misperception, more benign and narrowly tailored options are

available.”); Lindsay v. San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1110-11 (5th Cir. 1987)

(“For purposes of this opinion, we can assume, arguendo, that the traffic

safety interest could be furthered by means of a more narrowly tailored

ordinance.”)

24 See Speaks v. Kruse, 445 F.3d 396, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2006).

25 Of course, the witnesses were asked whether extending the 48-hour

JIMS period would help, but exactly why a blackout of a certain length might

exist is irrelevant.

12

notified. The County complains that the first two alternatives are

impractical and the third outside the Texas legislature’s control.

The first may be impractical. But the second is not, in the

district court’s form or in the form we address - wherein the

legislature could alter § 109 to include a time limit on

solicitation, with a window prior to solicitation that would give

police officers time to act.23 And here, we note that restrictions

on commercial speech without any time limitation are inherently

suspect.24 Furthermore, some of the County’s own witnesses

testified that giving law enforcement 72 or 96 hours or so after

arrest to serve a warrant before bondsmen could solicit would

greatly serve the County’s stated interest.25 In short, (b)(1) is

not narrowly tailored because it prohibits solicitation of targets

days, weeks, or even months after warrants are issued. 

Furthermore, we agree with the district court that it is

telling that Harris County itself, through the Sheriff’s
26 In 2002, a Sheriff’s Department Sergeant testified that five nightclerks in the Warrants Division send “more than 20" and perhaps as many as 100

of those letters every night, yielding 7,300 to 36,500 a year. We recognize

the tension in our holding that what the Texas legislature, not Harris County,

can do regarding a time limit is relevant, but also looking to whom Harris

County notifies. We look to what Harris County does only to illuminate why it

is possible for the statute itself to screen certain targets more finely than

the Class C misdemeanor exclusion that it currently contains.

27 Harris County Constables notify many Class C misdemeanor targets, who

are exempted from § 109. The bondsmen introduced evidence from the

constables’ websites suggesting that they notify certain Class A and B

misdemeanor targets as well, and this appears to be true, although the

evidence isn’t entirely clear. It’s undisputed that the Houston Police

Department notifies certain targets, although it’s unclear what categories of

targets, and does not apprise the Sheriff’s Department of whom it notifies. 

In addition, anyone can call the county clerk and ask whether a warrant exists

for someone, and various agencies release names and data through posters,

press releases, and broadcast media outlets, but these forms of notification

seem less relevant because anyone who cares to find out if he has a warrant is

not the type of person about whom Harris County professes concern, and because

agencies’ publicizing information about certain targets occurs, presumably,

after they have tried to catch a target and he has become a fugitive.

13

Department, notifies thousands of people every year of open

warrants against them,26 as do other law enforcement agencies in the

County27 - Harris County cannot give such notice itself and then

claim that restricting notice by others is necessary to the safety

of its officers and the public and the prevention of flight. The

County urges that it notifies only people charged with “nonserious” misdemeanors, excluding people accused of assaultive

crimes, crimes involving family violence, crimes against the

person, or any crime of an aggravated nature. The record reveals

that the Sheriff’s Department does not notify people in this

excluded group of assaultative crimes, or people charged with

felonies, wanted for revocation of weekend service or off-work

hours, wanted for sentencing, wanted for capias profine that
28 Also excluded from receiving notification are those with an unknown

name, address, or other personal information.

14

includes jail time, or wanted in another jurisdiction.28 Yet

through that screen still fall many Class A and Class B misdemeanor

targets, who escape the Class C misdemeanor exclusion of § 109,

including oft-sought targets of bondsmen solicitation like petty

thieves, people who write hot checks, drivers on suspended

licenses, and certain DWI offenders. Harris County urges that the

statute’s exclusion of only Class C misdemeanor targets is

reasonable because certain Class A and Class B misdemeanors can

result in jail of up to 180 or 360 days, even if they are nonviolent, rendering the suspects of such crimes liable to run. That

may be true, and we do not cast the legislature’s choice to exclude

only Class C misdemeanors as unreasonable. However, under the

narrow-tailoring test of Central Hudson we note that, as Harris

County has done, (b)(1) could reasonably allow solicitation of

certain Class A and B misdemeanor targets, those not liable to run.

Combined with its temporal breadth, the breadth of crimes covered

by (b)(1) is simply too broad. We do not hold that Harris County

cannot serve its objectives by more narrowly drawn means. Rather,

we hold that Harris County has not yet engaged in the narrow

tailoring demanded by the First Amendment.

B

We turn next to subsection (b)(2), which prevents solicitation

in-person or by phone between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. and within 24
29 In analyzing the second prong on Central Hudson, the district court

concluded that § 37.02(a)(2) covers only solicitations of a “consumer good or

service,” and that bail bonding isn’t such a good or service. Although we

don’t pass on the question, we note that § 37.02(a)(2) seems to cover bail

bonding, as the Texas Court of Appeals held in Pruett’s related case, see

Harris County Bail Bond Board v. Pruett, 177 S.W. 3d 260, 275-76 (Tex. App.

2005).

30 See Speaks, 445 F.3d at 400 n.13.

15

hours after arrest. Harris County contends first that (b)(2)(A)

regulates conduct that was already unlawful under the general

statute prohibiting solicitation between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m.

and before noon on Sundays, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 37.02(a)(2), hence

under the threshold inquiry of Central Hudson, (b)(2)(B) survives

as a ban on speech relating to illegal activity.29 This

bootstrapping argument fails. The threshold inquiry asks whether

the speech is misleading or the product or service spoken about is

illegal, and here the speech isn’t misleading and the product or

service itself - bail bonding - isn’t illegal. That § 37.02(a)(2)

itself bans speech doesn’t save (b)(2)(B). And so we turn to the

Central Hudson prongs.

Harris County asserts as its substantial interest for (b)(2)

the prevention of harassing solicitation, essentially what we have

elsewhere called the interest of “privacy,” a sufficient interest.30

But Harris County’s argument finds difficulty when its interest is

stated more narrowly as the prevention of harassment through bail

solicitation and the promotion of privacy of families of persons

targeted for arrest. It now differs from solicitation held to be
31 See, e.g., id., at 400 n.13, 398-99 (discussing how “[p]rivacy and

the protection of citizens against undue influence are valid substantial state

interests” but striking down a Louisiana statute preventing direct

solicitation of recent accident victims by health care providers as

insufficiently narrowly tailored). 

32 Harris County provides no evidence about the nature of the

complaints’ pre- and post-rule change, preventing any useful conclusion from

the reduction in complaints.

16

a valid target of legislation.31 We defer this concern to the next

prong, again assuming the interests are substantial in the

abstract.

We conclude that the 24-hour window of (b)(2)(B) does not

directly advance the state’s interest. Harris County offers an

affidavit from an employee of the Harris County District Attorney’s

Office, Kathleen Braddock, stating that the 24-hour period after

arrest is the time during which harassing bond solicitations are

the worst and that citizen complaints “declined drastically” after

Harris County changed its local rules, before the enactment of §

109, to contain essentially what is now § 109. It also offers

testimony from four citizens upset at solicitation calls they

received. This is insufficient evidence to show that the 24-hour

rule directly advances state interests. First, Harris County does

not connect the reduction in citizen complaints to the 24-hour

rule, as opposed to the other aspects of the amended local rules,

particularly the nighttime solicitation ban that we uphold later.32

Indeed, Braddock’s affidavit in the paragraph discussing the 24-

hour ban highlights the harassing nature of calls between,

especially, midnight and 5 a.m., and three of the four citizens who
33 The record does not show when the fourth citizen received the

unwelcome call.

34 Harris County presents evidence to the contrary, where individuals

argue that they prefer to receive news about a family member being in jail

from another family member. Additionally, Harris County argues that many

detained suspects are permitted to make a telephone call to family members.

Other evidence, however, such as the testimony of criminal defense attorney

Albert Fong, suggests that the many people who are contacted by bondsmen

regarding a relative in jail have expressed “gratitude” rather than

indignation upon receiving this information. Regardless, this is not the crux

of our argument, as we focus on the 24-hour window’s effect of stifling an

unacceptably large proportion of bondsman speech.

17

testified regarding the 24-hour period stated that they received

the unwelcome calls between 9 p.m. and 9 a.m.33 We hold later that

Harris County can ban such nighttime calls. Second, to whatever

extent the testimony of the citizens can be read to cover daytime

solicitation, we give credence to the common-sense argument that

most families would like to know when their members are in jail.34

Third, Braddock’s conclusory statement that solicitation is the

worst in the 24-hour period after arrest is insufficient. Notably,

the district court held that Harris County fails to explain why,

with the implementation of a 24-hour rule, harassing solicitations

won’t simply begin on the 25th hour. Harris County now offers an

explanation which it urges is implicit in Braddock’s statement that

most harassing solicitation occurs during the first 24 hours

following arrest: most people who can afford bond will seek out a

bondsman during the first 24 hours, hence bondsmen will have little

incentive to call after that period. Even if true, it is no

response to an attack on a restriction on speech that the

restriction essentially bans all speech. The argument that most

bondsmen desire to contact potential customers right away helps
35 The benefits attending commercial speech flow not just to the

speaker, for increased consumer knowledge about any product aids consumer

choice and increases competition.

36 See supra note 26.

18

explain why solicitation soon after arrest might be prevalent, and

therefore harassing, but it also counsels that such a restriction,

which prevents speech when it is the most valuable for the speaker

and the potential customer,35 should be viewed with some skepticism.

Given the record as a whole, we cannot conclude that Harris County

has shown that the 24-hour ban directly serves the interest in

privacy. 

All that remains is the 9:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. restriction.

The district court struck that down with the rest of § 109(b), but

its rationale for doing so is unclear, although the court seemed to

rely partly on its conclusion that the general solicitation timing

statute, § 37.02(a)(2), didn’t apply to bail bonding. We don’t

decide that question,36 although we note that if § 37.02(a)(2)

covers bail bonding, then presumably we can’t strike down (b)(2)(A)

without striking down § 37.02(a)(2), at least “as applied” to bail

bonding. We don’t face that dilemma because we conclude that

(b)(2)(A) survives Central Hudson scrutiny. Prohibiting in-person

and telephone solicitation at late hours directly and substantially

furthers privacy and the prevention of harassing solicitation, and

is narrowly tailored to furthering that goal. A nighttime

prohibition is inevitably underinclusive because privacy may be

lost and harassing solicitation made during the day, but surely the
37 See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455

U.S. 489, 498 (1982).

19

state’s interest is more powerful at night. Indeed, we’ve found no

successful challenges to general nighttime solicitation bans.

III

The plaintiffs also attacked § 109 below on vagueness, equal

protection, and Texas law grounds. The district court never

addressed these arguments after concluding that § 109 violated the

First Amendment. The plaintiffs raise the vagueness and equal

protection challenges again on appeal. Hence we must address the

vagueness and equal protection arguments as they pertain to

(b)(2)(A), the subsection of § 109 most resistant to those

arguments. First, (b)(2)(A) is not unconstitutionally vague; two

specific types of solicitation of a specific service are banned

during a specific time.37 Second, the plaintiffs’ equal protection

argument relies entirely on the distinction in (b)(1) between

bondsmen with existing client relationships and bondsmen without

such relationship - a distinction irrelevant to (b)(2)(A).

Consequently, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to plaintiffs, except for that part enjoining the

enforcement of (b)(2)(A), which we reverse.

IV

After addressing the merits, the district court ordered the

bondsmen to file a request for fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The bondsmen requested almost $200,000. The defendants argued that
38 See Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. City of League City, Tex., 488 F.3d

613, 623 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining the “special circumstances” exception of

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (quoting a Senate Report behind

§ 1988 that “a prevailing plaintiff ‘should ordinarily recover an attorney's

fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust’”)).

39 Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Correction, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978)

(holding that a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional).

20

“special circumstances” should preclude or reduce any award,38 and

they also attacked specific line-items submitted by the bondsmen.

The court took no issue with the line-items, but it noted its

concern with whether any award should issue given that “(a) Harris

County is not involved in the regulation of bail bondsmen; (b) the

Harris County Bail Bond Board is not a policy making body; it

merely enforces the laws and policies of the state of Texas; and

(c) neither Harris County nor the Bail Bond Board enforced the

statute against the plaintiffs.” The court then awarded what it

called “nominal” fees, $50,000, with $25,000 more in the event of

appeal. In its August 18, 2005 notice of appeal, Harris County

appealed both the underlying merits and the award of fees, urging

again that “special circumstances” exist precluding any award of

fees. After later, unsuccessful attempts to modify that award, the

plaintiffs cross-appealed the issue of fees, asking that we award

more money or remand with instructions to award more money because

the court’s three findings quoted above were erroneous. 

At the outset, the parties skirmish over whether the

bondsmen’s cross-appeal was timely.39 We need not address this

issue because Harris County’s appeal, including an appeal of fees

awarded, was timely, and that appeal focused on the same question -
40 The parties dispute whether defendants did, or were about to, enforce

§ 109 against them.

41 Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637 (5th Cir. 1979).

42 The district court declared § 109 unconstitutional, found that

defendants were liable under § 1983 for “depriving plaintiffs of their

constitutional rights,” and enjoined defendants from enforcing the statute.

The only point on which the court disagreed with plaintiffs was on their

request for damages; it granted an injunction in lieu of damages. The court

also declined to address plaintiffs’ alternative claims, since it found the

statute unconstitutional under their First Amendment claim.

43 Defendants relied on the Hensley case in their response to

plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, arguing that “‘special circumstances .

. . would render . . . an award [of attorney fees and costs] ‘unjust.’”

Defendants Harris County Bail Bond Board’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Recover Attorney Fees, Expert Fees and Expenses (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at

429 (1983)).

21

whether and to what extent the district court could consider the

fact that defendants were not the promulgator, or arguably the

enforcer,40 of the statute at issue. 

We review a district court’s determination of special

circumstances for abuse of discretion;41 although this is a highly

deferential standard of review, we find here that because

plaintiffs fully succeeded in the case below,42 the court’s award

of “nominal” attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs based on defendants’

lack of participation in policymaking or regulation of bondsmen was

an erroneous interpretation of the special circumstances that the

Court in Hensley43 indicates could render an award unjust. 

We have held that given the strong policy behind § 1988 of

awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs, defendants must make an

“extremely strong showing” of special circumstances to avoid paying
44 See Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. City of League City, Tex., 488 F.3d

613, 623 (5th Cir. 2007).

45 Espino v. Besteiro, 708 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing

Ellwest Stereo Theatre, Inc. V. Jackson, 653 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. 1981)). 

46 See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 278 (5th Cir. 2000)

(noting that § 1988 provides fees under a “private attorney general theory”);

Williams v. Hanover Hous. Auth., 113 F.3d 1294, 1301-02 (1st Cir. 1997)(“The

circuits are in agreement . . . that defendants’ good faith reliance even on

settled law . . . is not a ‘special circumstance’ warranting a denial of

attorneys’ fees under § 1988.”); Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99, 104-05 (7th

Cir. 1985) (holding that defendants’“good faith” is not sufficient and that

local official’s enforcement of state law he thought valid was not

sufficient); Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1149-52 (11th Cir. 1985)

(concluding that state agency which merely enforced federal law and did not

write policy failed to present “special circumstances” to justify denial of

all fees). In essence, as long as a plaintiff’s lawsuit played some role in

his eventually obtaining relief - as opposed to, say, a defendant who

gratuitously confers relief - he can recover fees. See Lampher, 755 F.2d at

104-05.

47 We find only one case, from the Third Circuit, that has allowed a

partial reduction of fees in lieu of all-out elimination of fees under the

special circumstances test; the court wrote this opinion directly after the

Hensley decision, when few other interpretations of that case were available.

See Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir.

1983)(“[W]e note that Hensley was announced after the filing of the district

court opinion in the instant case so that the court below did not have the

benefit of the Supreme Court's latest teachings.”)

22

attorneys’ fees44 and that “the discretion to deny § 1988 fees is

. . . extremely narrow.”45 That a defendant does not promulgate a

policy does not eliminate the costs the plaintiff had to bear in

securing his rights, hence even defendants lacking culpability and

acting in good faith should pay attorneys’ fees.46 Defendants here

failed to make an extremely strong showing of special

circumstances. Even if defendants had made an extremely strong

showing that rose to the level of special circumstances, this

circuit has never held that such “special circumstances” can serve

to reduce, and not fully eliminate, an award of fees.47
48 See supra note 42, discussing plaintiffs’ success on all claims with

the minor exception of the court’s decision to grant an injunction, not

damages. Even if the court, in its discretion, had considered this minor

exception as a “failure” on a claim, the court did not conduct the correct

Hensley analysis for partial success but rather (it appears) relied more

generally on the special circumstances exception to substantially reduce the

award. Additionally, even if the court had conducted a Hensley analysis for

partial success, plaintiffs would likely have merited a full fee award under

the applicable Hensley test because plaintiffs soundly won the majority of

their claims. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 (“Where a lawsuit consists of

related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his

attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each

contention raised.”)

49 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436.

50 Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,

789-90 (1989), (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). 

23

The district court would have had more discretion to reduce

the County’s attorneys’ fees in the case below if plaintiffs had

partially rather than fully succeeded on their claims,48 as they

have on appeal. Under Hensley’s standard for partial success (a

different standard than the “special circumstances” that

occasionally allow a defendant to avoid attorneys’ fees

altogether), a court may award reduced fees to plaintiffs that are

prevailing parties but have lost on some claims.49 The court may

use its “equitable discretion” to “arrive at a reasonable fee

award, either by attempting to identify specific hours that should

be eliminated or by simply reducing the award to account for the

limited success of the plaintiff.”50 Plaintiffs did not have

“partial success” in the district court, however; they won their

case yet they received nominal fees. 

Because the court erred in applying the special circumstances

test in the case below, and because Harris County has now prevailed
51 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (explaining that, under § 1988, a party

cannot recover fees for legal services on unsuccessful claims, although

sometimes unsuccessful and successful claims can be so related as to warrant

fees for time spent on the combined claims).

24

on one issue, we must vacate and remand the award of fees to allow

the district court to award fees appropriate to plaintiffs’ now

partial success in both the district court as well as on appeal.51

We AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART the district court’s

decision on the merits. We VACATE AND REMAND the district court’s

award of fees for further consideration.