IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 4, 2020

FRANCINE S. LABBE v. JAMES ERIC KARN II

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County

No. 17D1728 Kyle E. Hedrick, Judge

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No. E2019-01408-COA-R3-CV

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The appeal arises from a divorce. Acting pro se, the former husband seeks review, of 

what we cannot be certain. Because his brief falls well short of the requirements of both 

the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the

appeal. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN 

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON II, J., joined.

James Eric Karn II, Chattanooga, Tennessee, pro se appellant.

No brief filed on behalf of the appellee, Francine S. Labbe.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

In 2017, Francine Newell Labbe filed for divorce from James Eric Karn II. When 

Mr. Karn failed to timely respond to her complaint, Ms. Labbe moved for and obtained a 

default against Mr. Karn. But the entry of a default judgment had to await an evidentiary 

hearing. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. Within a few days after the court granted the 

default, before an evidentiary hearing could be set, Mr. Karn filed a pro se answer and 

counter-complaint. He also sought on several occasions to set aside the default, but the 

court declined, apparently due to Mr. Karn’s failure to appear for the hearing on his 

initial motion to set aside. 

 

1 Under the rules of this Court, as a memorandum opinion, this opinion may not be published, 

“cited[,] or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.” Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10. 

03/20/2020
2

Very late in the proceedings, counsel did appear on behalf of Mr. Karn. And the 

court over “the strenuous objection” of Mr. Karn’s counsel set a final hearing on the 

default judgment. Following that hearing in July 2019, the court entered a final decree of 

divorce, which granted Ms. Labbe a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital 

conduct. The final decree incorporated a permanent parenting plan for the parties’ minor 

child, set child support, and established a child support arrearage. The court also divided 

the marital property, which included only personalty and marital debt. No alimony was 

awarded because neither party requested alimony.

On appeal, Mr. Karn’s six-page brief opens with the following three statements:

1. At no time was an evidentiary hearing or fact-finding hearing ever held 

in which I was allowed to meaningfully participate, offer testimony, 

provide evidence, provide supporting witnesses, or to offer any 

countervailing evidence of any kind whatsoever.

2. I was at all times denied the right to have legal counsel participate on 

my behalf in any of the procedural processes related to the circuit court 

proceeding.

3. I was at no time permitted to file any pleading or other document in 

support of my position(s) with regard to the matters before the circuit 

court. 

The brief then repeats each statement using slightly different wording followed by what 

might be characterized as argument. 

We are mindful that Mr. Karn is not a lawyer and that he may have little legal 

training or familiarity with the judicial system other than the present action. A party is 

entitled to fair treatment by our courts when they decide to represent themselves; but 

“[p]ro se litigants are not . . . entitled to shift the burden of litigating their case to the 

courts.” Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). 

Although pro se litigants are afforded a certain amount of leeway, we cannot entirely 

excuse them from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules imposed on 

represented parties. Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the 

appellant’s brief contains, among other things, a statement of the issues presented for 

review, an argument, references to the record, and citations to legal authority. See Tenn. 

R. App. P. 27(a) (listing the required contents in the appellant’s brief). Additionally, 

Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee requires that any written 

argument made in the appellant’s brief contain, with appropriate references to the record, 

“the alleged erroneous action of the trial court,” “how such alleged error was seasonably 

called to the attention of the trial judge,” how the “appellant was prejudiced by such 

alleged error,” and “a statement of each determinative fact relied upon.” Tenn. Ct. App. 
3

R. 6(a) (listing the required contents in appellate arguments); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 

27(a)(7) (requiring the argument section of the appellant’s brief to set forth “the 

contentions . . . with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, including 

the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities 

and appropriate references to the record . . . relied on”). 

Mr. Karn’s brief fails to comply with the rules in so many respects it is easier to 

identify those the brief arguably complies with rather than those it does not. Beyond 

what might be characterized as a statement of issues and argument, the brief is deficient 

in most other respects. Among the more significant deficiencies is the lack of citations to 

the record supporting Mr. Karn’s claims. The technical record, which is the only record 

of the proceedings before us, contradicts his claims that he was denied legal counsel and 

that he was not permitted to file pleadings in support of his positions. And Mr. Karn has 

failed to supply us with either a transcript or a statement of the evidence leaving us 

unable to consider his claim that he was denied the opportunity to offer evidence at the 

hearing on the final decree of divorce. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). 

When an appellant has failed to comply with the rules and his brief is this 

deficient, dismissal of the appeal is appropriate. See Duchow v. Whalen, 872 S.W.2d 

692, 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (dismissing appeal for failure to comply with appellate 

rules); cf. Crowe v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry. Co., 1 S.W.2d 781, 781 (Tenn. 1928) (“Th[e 

Tennessee Supreme C]ourt will not adjudge the Court of Appeals in error for refusing to 

consider a case upon its merits, where the appellant has not complied with the rules of 

that court.”). So we dismiss Mr. Karn’s appeal.

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W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE