*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARCUS H.*

(AC 39379)

(AC 40796)

Prescott, Bright and Norcott, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of assault in the second degree

with a motor vehicle, risk of injury to a child, reckless endangerment

in the first degree, reckless driving, operating a motor vehicle while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor, interfering with an officer

and increasing speed in an attempt to escape or elude a police officer,

the defendant appealed to this court. During jury selection, the defendant

moved for a continuance to replace his private attorney, W, with another

private attorney. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant

requested to represent himself. After concluding that the defendant

knowingly and voluntarily had waived his right to counsel, the court

granted his request and appointed W as the defendant’s standby counsel.

The defendant thereafter filed an application for a public defender, but

the public defender’s office concluded that he was not eligible for its

services. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s

application for a public defender, implicitly finding that the defendant

was not indigent and, thus, that he was not entitled to a public defender.

The defendant thereafter proceeded with the trial self-represented. After

several days of trial, the state asked the court to raise the defendant’s

bond because he had failed to appear for trial on a previous day. The

court raised the defendant’s bond, and when he was unable to post it,

the defendant was taken into custody by the judicial marshals and was

placed in leg shackles. After a recess, the defendant did not request

that the court order that his shackles be removed for the trial and, when

the trial resumed, he was seated in a manner in which his shackles were

not visible to the jury. The jury, however, briefly could see that he was

wearing shackles on his ankles when he stood up to approach a witness.

The jury was then immediately excused at the prosecutor’s request,

and the court ordered the judicial marshals to remove the defendant’s

shackles. After the jury returned, it was instructed by the court not to

consider the shackles in its deliberations. On the defendant’s appeal to

this court, held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court violated

his constitutional right to counsel and, therefore, to due process, by

denying his application for the appointment of a public defender; that

court’s implicit finding that the defendant was not indigent was not

clearly erroneous and was supported by the evidence in the record,

which indicated that the defendant had the financial ability at the time

of his request for a public defender to secure competent legal representation, as he had obtained a private attorney, W, who was ready, willing

and able to continue to represent him throughout the trial, and the

trial court, therefore, properly denied the defendant’s request for the

appointment of a public defender.

2. The defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process by failing to order, sua sponte, a judicial

marshal to remove his shackles during the trial was unavailing, the

defendant having failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional

violation that deprived him of a fair trial: the defendant did not have a

constitutional right that obligated the trial court to inquire as to whether

he was shackled and to order, sua sponte, that his shackles be removed,

as the defendant’s failure to object to being tried before the jury in

shackles was sufficient to negate the compulsion necessary to establish

a constitutional violation, and his request for the judicial marshals to

remove his shackles was inadequate to alert the court that he wanted

them to be removed; moreover, the defendant was not compelled to

stand trial before the jury while visibly shackled, as he had the option

to remain seated and to request that a marshal bring the court, or any

witnesses, his documents, but, instead, he asked permission to approach

the witness, voluntarily exposing his shackles to the jury, even though
he obviously was aware that he was shackled and that the jury would

be able to observe the shackles, and this court was not persuaded that

the jury’s brief exposure to the defendant in leg shackles, together with

the trial court’s curative instruction, denied the defendant of a fair trial;

furthermore, the defendant’s reliance on the rule of practice (§ 42-46)

that requires the judicial authority to employ reasonable efforts to conceal such restraints from the view of the jurors was unavailing, as the

rules of practice are not a source of constitutional rights for which the

failure to follow establishes a constitutional violation.

Argued January 14—officially released June 4, 2019

Procedural History

Two part substitute information charging the defendant, in the first part, with two counts each of the crimes

of risk of injury to a child and reckless endangerment

in the first degree, and with the crimes of assault in the

second degree with a motor vehicle, reckless driving,

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of

intoxicating liquor or drugs, operating a motor vehicle

with an elevated blood alcohol content, interfering with

an officer and increasing speed in an attempt to escape

or elude a police officer, and, in the second part, with

previously having been convicted of operating a motor

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor

or drugs, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of New London, geographical area number ten,

where the court, Jongbloed, J., denied the defendant’s

application for the appointment of a public defender;

thereafter, the first part of the information was tried

to the jury; verdict and judgment of guilty; subsequently,

the defendant was presented to the court on a plea of

guilty to the second part of the information; thereafter,

the court vacated the conviction of operating a motor

vehicle with an elevated blood alcohol content, and

the defendant appealed to this court; subsequently, the

court, Jongbloed, J., issued an articulation of its decision. Appeal dismissed in AC 39379; affirmed.

Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

Jennifer F. Miller, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were, Michael L. Regan, state’s

attorney, and Sarah Bowman, assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. The defendant, Marcus H., appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury

trial, of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60d, two

counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General

Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), two counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63, reckless driving in violation of General

Statutes § 14-222, operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1), operating a motor vehicle

with an elevated blood alcohol content in violation of

General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (2),1

interfering with an

officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a, and

increasing speed in an attempt to escape or elude a

police officer in violation of General Statutes § 14-223

(b). The defendant claims on appeal that the court

improperly (1) violated his constitutional right to counsel by denying his application for the appointment of

a public defender and (2) violated his constitutional

right to due process when it did not order, sua sponte,

a judicial marshal to remove his leg shackles during

the trial.2 We are not persuaded by the defendant’s

claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.3

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. In the early morning of May 25, 2014, a motorist

driving behind the defendant observed that his car

remained stopped through two cycles of a stoplight. The

motorist pulled over, exited her car, and approached

the passenger side of the defendant’s car. She observed

the defendant sleeping or unconscious in the driver seat

and two young girls in car seats in the back of the

car. The motorist woke up the defendant, who then

drove off.

Due to concern for the children’s safety, the motorist

called the police and informed them that she thought

that the defendant was intoxicated. On the basis of the

information provided by the motorist, the police station

issued a ‘‘be on the lookout’’ report over their radio

system for a black Acura with a black male operator

and two females in the back seat. Officer Jason Pudvah

saw a car that matched the description from the report

idling at a nearby gas station. Pudvah approached the

car and observed the defendant slumped over in the

driver’s seat and his two and four year old daughters

in the backseat. Pudvah knocked on the window and

spoke with the defendant. After requesting the defendant’s information, Pudvah returned to his vehicle.

While Pudvah was speaking with police dispatch, the

defendant drove off at a high rate of speed.

Pudvah initially pursued the defendant but stopped

due to fear for the children’s safety and in the hope
that the defendant would slow down. Further down the

road, the defendant lost control of his car and crashed

into a telephone pole. The car became airborne and

landed upside down in a residential swimming pool.

As a result of the accident, the defendant’s younger

daughter suffered serious injuries to her arm and his

older daughter sustained an ankle injury.

After the trial, during which the defendant represented himself, a jury found the defendant guilty of all

charges, and the court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Thereafter, the defendant

pleaded guilty to being a subsequent offender to

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of

intoxicating liquor in violation of § 14-227a (g) (2). The

trial court, Jongbloed, J., sentenced the defendant to a

total effective term of twenty-three years of incarceration, execution suspended after fourteen and one-half

years, followed by five years of probation with special

conditions. This appeal followed. Additional facts will

be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court violated his

constitutional right to counsel and, therefore, to due

process, by denying his application for the appointment

of a public defender. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. On the first day of jury selection on February

18, 2016,4

the defendant requested a continuance to

replace his private attorney, Attorney John Williams,

with another private attorney. Specifically, he claimed

that he had a dispute with Attorney Williams regarding

payment of attorney’s fees, and he did not believe that

Attorney Williams would represent him properly. Attorney Williams informed the court that he had ‘‘told [the

defendant] expressly and more than once that under

no circumstances would his [lack of payment] in any

way, shape, or form affect [his] commitment to [the

defendant].’’ The court denied the motion for a continuance and stated that ‘‘[Attorney] Williams is going to

honor his professional obligations under all circumstances and represent [the defendant] to the best of

his ability.’’

After the court denied the motion for a continuance,

the defendant requested to represent himself. The court

canvassed the defendant regarding his decision to represent himself, including inquiring as to whether he

understood the dangers of self-representation. After

concluding that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, the court granted his

request. The court then appointed Attorney Williams

as the defendant’s standby counsel. Jury selection

thereafter commenced, with the defendant representing

himself. That afternoon, the defendant applied for a

public defender.
The next day, the court held a hearing on the defendant’s request for appointment of a public defender.

The assistant state’s attorney, the defendant, Attorney

Williams, and Attorney Sean Kelly from the public

defender’s office were present at the hearing. Attorney

Kelly stated that, after reviewing the defendant’s application, the defendant was not eligible for their services

and that the Office of the Public Defender did not seek

to be appointed in the case.

The defendant argued that he was financially eligible

for the services of a public defender. Specifically, he

argued that, although he was able to post bonds and

had retained private counsel in the past, his financial

situation had changed so that he had ‘‘the right to free

counsel . . . on the state’s dollar.’’ Attorney Kelly

stated that the public defender’s office considers many

factors when making a decision regarding a defendant’s

eligibility, including whether the defendant is receiving

support from others. After evaluating the defendant’s

application, the public defender’s office concluded that

his circumstances did not warrant appointment of a

public defender.

The defendant initially posted a $25,000 surety bond.

His bond subsequently was increased to a $75,000

surety bond, which he also posted. Therefore, the defendant was not in custody and was living with his mother

at the time he applied for a public defender. Attorney

Kelly noted that the defendant’s ability to post bond

and to obtain private counsel ‘‘shows a pattern where,

if there’s money needed, money comes . . . .’’ The

defendant himself stated that the money from his initial

payment to Attorney Williams came from his mother.

Attorney Kelly also noted that this was the second private attorney the defendant had retained in the case

and that the defendant had posted significant bonds on

two prior occasions. These facts taken together led the

public defender’s office to conclude that the defendant

was not indigent.

The defendant responded to Attorney Kelly by stating

that he still owed money to both of his private attorneys

and had balances on both bonds. Finally, he restated

that he believed that Attorney Williams, who was present and available to represent him, would be ineffective. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

denied the defendant’s request. In denying the defendant’s request, the court stated: ‘‘Under all the circumstances, [the public defender’s office is] not seeking to

be appointed. I am not going to appoint the public

defender’s office to represent you. We’ll continue your

appearance pro se with standby counsel by Attorney

Williams.’’5 The defendant continued to trial representing himself, with the assistance of Attorney Williams

as standby counsel.

We begin with the relevant law and standard of review
that govern this claim. Practice Book § 37-6 (a) provides

in relevant part: ‘‘If the judicial authority determines

after investigation by the public defender that the defendant is indigent, the judicial authority may designate

the public defender or a special public defender to

represent the defendant . . . . If the public defender

or his or her office determines that a defendant is not

eligible to receive the services of a public defender, the

defendant may appeal the public defender’s decision

to the judicial authority in accordance with General

Statutes § 51-297 (g). The judicial authority may not

appoint the public defender unless the judicial authority

finds the defendant indigent following such appeal.

. . .’’

Our Supreme Court in State v. Henderson, 307 Conn.

533, 540–41, 55 A.3d 291 (2012), stated: ‘‘[T]he trial

court’s assessment of the defendant’s offer of proof

pertaining to whether he was indigent and was, therefore, eligible for state funded . . . assistance, is a factual determination subject to a clearly erroneous

standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is clearly

erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to

support it . . . or when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . .

‘‘It is the duty of the state to provide adequate means

to assure that no indigent [defendant] accused lacks

full opportunity for his defense . . . . The right to legal

and financial assistance at state expense is, however,

not unlimited. Defendants seeking such assistance must

satisfy the court as to their indigency . . . . This has

largely been accomplished through [public defender

services] . . . which has promulgated guidelines that

are instructive as to the threshold indigency determination. . . .

‘‘[General Statutes §] 51-297 (a) requires the public

defender’s office to investigate the financial status of

an individual requesting representation on the basis of

indigency, whereby the individual must, under oath or

affirmation, set forth his liabilities, assets, income and

sources thereof. . . . [General Statutes §] 51-296 (a)

requires that, [i]n any criminal action . . . the court

before which the matter is pending shall, if it determines

after investigation by the public defender or his office

that a defendant is indigent as defined under this chapter, designate a public defender . . . to represent such

indigent defendant . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.)

Section 51-297 (f) provides in relevant part: ‘‘As used

in this chapter, ‘indigent defendant’ means . . . a person who is formally charged with the commission of a

crime punishable by imprisonment and who does not

have the financial ability at the time of his request for

representation to secure competent legal representa-
tion and to provide other necessary expenses of legal

representation . . . .’’

Here, there is evidence in the record to support the

court’s implicit finding that the defendant was not indigent and, thus, not entitled to the appointment of a

public defender. The most probative evidence in the

record that the defendant had the financial ability at

the time of his request for a public defender to secure

competent legal representation was that he, in fact, had

obtained a private attorney who was ready, willing, and

able to continue to represent him throughout the trial.

On this fact alone, we conclude that the trial court’s

finding that the defendant was not indigent is not clearly

erroneous, and, thus, this claim warrants no further

discussion.6 Accordingly, we conclude that the court

properly denied the defendant’s application for the

appointment of a public defender.7

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court violated

his constitutional right to due process by failing to

order, sua sponte, a judicial marshal to remove his

shackles during the trial. The defendant states that this

aspect of his claim does not implicate the court’s denial

of his motion for a mistrial.8

Instead, he invites this

court to focus on whether the trial court violated his

right to due process by failing to order, sua sponte, that

his shackles be removed. Although this claim is not

preserved because it was not raised to the trial court,

we nevertheless review it under State v. Golding, 213

Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A. 2d 823 (1989), as modified

by In re Yasiel R, 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188

(2015).9 We conclude that the trial court, under the

circumstances of this case, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights by failing to order, sua sponte,

that his shackles be removed. Therefore, the defendant’s claim fails under the third prong of Golding,

which requires that he demonstrate that ‘‘the alleged

constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived

the defendant of a fair trial . . . .’’10 Id., 240.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. On Monday, February 29, 2016, after several days

of trial, the state asked the court to raise the defendant’s

bond because he had failed to appear for trial on the

previous Friday. After argument, the court raised the

defendant’s bond to require that he post an additional

$50,000 in cash. The defendant was unable to post the

increased bond, and he, therefore, was taken into custody by the judicial marshals. The court took a recess,

during which the marshals shackled the defendant.

The record is unclear whether the court knew, at the

time that it returned from the recess, that the defendant

was wearing leg shackles. Nevertheless, after the

recess, the defendant did not request that the court

order that his shackles be removed. The defendant did
object, however, to going forward with the trial because

he was not feeling well. The court proceeded with the

trial but granted the defendant permission to remain

seated in order to accommodate any illness.

The trial resumed, and the defendant was seated in

a manner in which his leg shackles were not visible

to the jury.11 At some point, however, the defendant

requested permission to approach a witness. After being

granted permission, the defendant stood up and started

to approach the witness, at which time, the jury briefly

could see that the defendant was wearing shackles on

his ankles. At the request of the prosecutor, the jury

immediately was excused. Once the jury was excused,

the prosecutor requested that the defendant’s shackles

be removed. At this time, the court ordered the judicial

marshals to remove the defendant’s shackles. The

defendant immediately moved for a mistrial. In opposition to the motion, the prosecutor argued that the defendant knew that the shackles would be visible to the

jury when he stood up and that he could have brought

the issue to the court’s attention.

The court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. In denying the motion, the court stated that the

defendant failed to request that the court order that his

shackles be removed. The court also stated that it would

give a limiting instruction regarding the shackles to the

jury upon the defendant’s request. The defendant then

requested a limiting instruction regarding the shackles,

which the court granted. After the jury returned, it was

instructed not to consider the shackles in its deliberations.12 The following day, the defendant renewed his

motion for a mistrial. The prosecutor argued that a

mistrial was not warranted because the jury’s exposure

to the shackles was brief and the court’s response to

the situation was immediate. Further, the prosecutor

stated that the limiting instruction was an appropriate

remedy. The court, again, denied the defendant’s

motion.

We begin with a discussion of the law applicable to

the defendant’s claim. ‘‘Central to the right to a fair

trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is the principle that one accused of a crime is

entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely

on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not

on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued

custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof

at trial. . . . This does not mean, however, that every

practice tending to single out the accused from everyone else in the courtroom must be struck down.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567, 106 S. Ct. 1340,

89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986).

‘‘As a general proposition, a criminal defendant has

the right to appear in court free from physical restraints.

. . . Grounded in the common law, this right evolved
in order to preserve the presumption favoring a criminal

defendant’s innocence, while eliminating any detrimental effects to the defendant that could result if he were

physically restrained in the courtroom. . . . The right

to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the

Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The presumption of

innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution,

is a basic component of a fair trial under our system

of criminal justice. . . . In order to implement that presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may

undermine the fairness of the factfinding process. In the

administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully

guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to

be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Put another way, for the presumption to be effective, courts must guard against practices

which unnecessarily mark the defendant as a dangerous

character or suggest that his guilt is a foregone conclusion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Woolcock, 201 Conn. 605, 612–13, 518

A.2d 1377 (1986).

‘‘In order for a criminal defendant to enjoy the maximum benefit of the presumption of innocence, our

courts should make every reasonable effort to present

the defendant before the jury in a manner that does

not suggest, expressly or impliedly, that he or she is a

dangerous character whose guilt is a foregone conclusion. . . . The negative connotations of restraints, nevertheless, are without significance unless the fact of the

restraints comes to the attention of the jury.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brawley, 321 Conn.

583, 588, 137 A.3d 757 (2016).

In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626, 125 S. Ct. 2007,

161 L. Ed. 2d 953 (2005), the United States Supreme

Court stated that ‘‘[t]he law has long forbidden routine

use of visible shackles during the guilt phase [of a

criminal trial] . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The court further noted that ‘‘[c]ourts and commentators share close

to a consensus that, during the guilt phase of a trial, a

criminal defendant has a right to remain free of physical

restraints that are visible to the jury; that the right has

a constitutional dimension; but that the right may be

overcome in a particular instance by essential state

interests such as physical security, escape prevention,

or courtroom decorum.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 628.

Furthermore, the court held that ‘‘the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical

restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are

justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.’’

(Emphasis added.) Id., 629.

Turning to the defendant’s claim, he argues that,

because the court knew that he was taken into custody

on the morning of February 29, 2016, it should have

determined whether he was shackled in the courtroom
and then ordered that the shackles be removed before

the jury entered. The defendant’s claim that he had a

constitutional right obligating the trial court to inquire,

sua sponte, whether he was shackled is misplaced in

light of well established law.13 Whether the defendant

was or was not shackled, however, is not the critical

question. Instead the critical question for purposes of

the defendant’s constitutional claim is whether the

defendant was unnecessarily compelled to stand trial

before a jury while visibly shackled.

This case is analogous to Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.

501, 502, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976), in which

the respondent claimed that his right to due process

was violated because he was tried before a jury while

wearing prison attire. Prison attire implicates the same

due process concerns as shackles, as they both may

have an erosive effect on the defendant’s presumption

of innocence. See State v. Rose, 305 Conn. 594, 622, 46

A.3d 139 (2012) (Zarella, J., dissenting) (‘‘A juror might

associate prison attire with an increased likelihood that

the defendant had committed the crime. In that sense,

the harm is similar to that caused by requiring a defendant to remain visibly shackled . . . .’’).

In Estelle, the record was ‘‘clear that no objection

was made to the trial judge concerning the jail attire

either before or . . . during the trial.’’ Estelle v. Williams, supra, 425 U.S. 509–10. The court noted that the

respondent had raised this issue with the jail attendant

prior to trial, but not to the trial judge. Id., 510. The

court held that ‘‘although the State cannot, consistently

with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused

to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable

prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the

court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever

reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.’’

(Emphasis added.) Id., 512–13. Further, the court in

Estelle held that the trial court was not obligated to

inquire of the respondent or his counsel regarding

whether he was deliberately choosing to be tried while

wearing prison attire. Id., 512. Therefore, the court

found no constitutional violation and reversed the judgment that had set aside the respondent’s conviction.

Id. The court in Estelle noted that ‘‘the courts have

refused to embrace a mechanical rule vitiating any conviction, regardless of the circumstances, where the

accused appeared before the jury in prison garb.

Instead, they have recognized that the particular evil

proscribed is compelling a defendant, against his will,

to be tried in jail attire.’’ Id., 507.

In the present case, the defendant never requested

that the court order the judicial marshals to remove

his shackles. Therefore, as in Estelle, the defendant’s

constitutional right to due process was not violated

because the defendant’s failure to make an objection
to the court was sufficient to negate the compulsion

necessary to establish a constitutional violation. The

present case is readily distinguishable from those relied

on by the defendant in which the respective courts

affirmatively ordered, or refused to remove after objection, restraints or prison attire.14

The defendant definitively knew that he was shackled, yet, he did not request that the court order that the

judicial marshals remove his shackles. The defendant

argues that he asked the judicial marshals to remove

his shackles. That request, however, was inadequate to

alert the court that he wished to have his shackles

removed.15 Once the trial resumed after the defendant

was taken into custody, he was seated in a manner in

which his shackles were concealed. At this point, the

defendant had the opportunity to request the court to

order that his shackles be removed but failed to do so.

The defendant also had the option to remain seated

and request that a marshal bring the court, or any witnesses, his documents. The defendant had, in fact, utilized the judicial marshals to hand documents to the

court earlier that day. Instead, the defendant asked

permission to approach the witness, voluntarily

exposing his shackles to the jury. When the defendant

approached the witness, he obviously was aware that

he was shackled and that the jury would be able to

observe the shackles.16

Additionally, the defendant has not provided any case

law that stands for the proposition that a defendant’s

right to due process is violated if the jury is briefly

exposed to facts that would lead it to believe that the

defendant is in custody. In the present case, when the

defendant revealed to the jury that he was shackled,

the prosecutor immediately requested that the jury be

excused. Once the jury was excused, the court ordered

the judicial marshals to remove the defendant’s shackles. Therefore, the shackles were visible to the jury for

only a brief period of time. Upon the jury’s return to

the courtroom, the court gave a curative instruction

regarding the shackles, the adequacy of which the

defendant has not challenged.

Our conclusion that the jury’s brief exposure to the

defendant in shackles did not violate his constitutional

rights is supported by authority from other jurisdictions. For example, in Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d

1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002), a defendant claimed that his

constitutional right to due process was violated because

he was physically restrained by the state in the presence

of the jury. Specifically, jurors saw the defendant in the

hallway at the entrance to the courtroom in handcuffs

and other restraints. Id., 1133. The reviewing court

stated that ‘‘[t]he jury’s ‘brief or inadvertent glimpse’ of

a shackled defendant is not inherently or presumptively

prejudicial, nor has [the defendant] made a sufficient

showing of actual prejudice.’’ Id.
Additionally, in United States v. Jones, 468 F.3d 704,

706 (10th Cir. 2006), a defendant claimed that his right

to due process was violated because a juror briefly saw

him in leg shackles during the afternoon break on the

second day of trial. The court held that there was no

due process violation and stated that, ‘‘[i]n itself, a

juror’s brief view of a defendant in shackles does not

qualify as a due process violation worthy of a new trial.’’

Id., 709.

We agree with the courts in Ghent and Jones, that a

jury’s brief or inadvertent glimpse of a shackled defendant is not inherently or presumptively unconstitutional. Unlike cases in which the defendant was ordered

to remain shackled throughout the entirety of the trial,

here, the exposure lasted for only a brief period of time.

We are not convinced that the brief exposure to the

jury of the defendant with shackles on his ankles, paired

with a curative instruction, denied the defendant of a

fair trial.

Finally, we are not persuaded by the defendant’s reliance on Practice Book § 42-46,17 which provides that

reasonable efforts shall be employed to conceal such

restraints from the view of the jurors. See footnote 17

of this opinion. The rules of practice, however, are not

a source of constitutional rights, for which the failure

to follow establishes a constitutional violation. See General Statutes § 51-14 (a) (noting that rules of practice

and procedure ‘‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify

any substantive right’’).

In conclusion, we are not persuaded that the defendant had a constitutional right obligating the court to

order, sua sponte, that his shackles be removed. Furthermore, we are not convinced that the defendant was

compelled to stand trial before a jury while visibly

shackled. Accordingly, the defendant has not demonstrated that a constitutional violation exists and that

he was deprived of a fair trial.

The judgment in AC 40790 is affirmed; the appeal in

AC 39379 is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the

victims or others through whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained.

See General Statutes § 54-86e.

1 The court vacated the conviction of operating a motor vehicle with an

elevated blood alcohol content in violation of § 14-227a (a) (2), and sentenced

the defendant on the conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1). See State

v. Lopez, 177 Conn. App. 651, 668–69, 173 A.3d 485 (2017) (‘‘[t]he legislative

history reflects that the two subdivisions of § 14-227a (a) describe alternative

means for committing the same offense of illegally operating a motor vehicle

while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs’’), cert. denied, 327

Conn. 989, 175 A.3d 563 (2017).

2 The petitioner appears to predicate his claims on the fifth, sixth, and

fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8,

of the Connecticut constitution. Because he has not provided an independent

analysis of his state constitutional claims under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn.
672, 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we deem them abandoned. See, e.g.,

Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 507 n.9, 72 A.3d 367 (2013) (‘‘we will not

entertain a state constitutional claim unless the defendant has provided an

independent analysis under the particular provisions of the state constitution

at issue’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, we analyze the

defendant’s claims under the federal constitution only.

3 The defendant filed AC 39379 before the imposition of his sentence.

Practice Book § 61-6 (a) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The defendant [in a

criminal case] may appeal from a conviction for an offense when the conviction has become a final judgment. The conviction becomes a final judgment

after the imposition of sentence. . . .’’ See also State v. Fielding, 296 Conn.

26, 36, 994 A.2d 96 (2010) (‘‘[i]n a criminal proceeding, there is no final

judgment until the imposition of a sentence’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in AC 39379 for lack of a final

judgment. In any event, all of the issues that were raised in AC 39379 are

addressed in this opinion.

4

Jury selection originally occurred on October 14 and 15, 2015. On November 16, 2015, however, the court granted a motion for a competency evaluation of the defendant. On the basis of the evaluation, the court found that

the defendant was competent to stand trial. Due to the evaluation, the trial

was postponed and a second jury selection occurred on February 18, 19,

and 22, 2016.

5 Although the court did not explain why it concluded that the defendant

was not entitled to a public defender, it appears that, on the basis of the

arguments presented to it, it implicitly found that the defendant was not

indigent.

6 Because we conclude that the trial court’s finding that the defendant

had the requisite ability to obtain private counsel was not clearly erroneous

on the basis of the fact he previously had done so, we need not reach

the defendant’s assertion that the public defender’s office should not have

considered the resources of the defendant’s family in determining that he

was ineligible for the services of a public defender.

7 Even if the defendant had established his indigency, the court would

not have been obligated to replace Attorney Williams with a public defender.

See Sekou v. Warden, 216 Conn. 678, 686, 583 A.2d 1277 (1990) (criminal

defendant’s right to counsel of choice does not grant defendant an unlimited

opportunity to obtain alternative counsel on eve of trial). Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel

could not have been violated when competent counsel, Attorney Williams,

appeared with the defendant for trial and was fully prepared to represent the

defendant through the conclusion of the trial. Furthermore, the defendant’s

application for a public defender was not filed in order to secure any particular attorney of the defendant’s choosing but merely sought to get someone

other than Attorney Williams. A defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel on

the eve of trial or a disagreement over trial strategy does not entitle a

defendant to the appointment of new counsel. State v. Morico, 14 Conn.

App. 144–45, 539 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 812, 546 A.2d 281 (1988).

Whether to allow a defendant to replace counsel in such circumstances is

left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id.

8 The defendant notes in his appellate brief, however, that if we were to

disagree with his due process claim, then ‘‘[we] would reach the issue of

whether a mistrial should have been granted once the shackles became

obvious.’’ This sentence is the only mention within the defendant’s main

brief of this claim regarding the propriety of the court’s denial of his motion

for a mistrial. He makes no mention of it in his reply brief. Moreover,

this claim is not accompanied by any supporting arguments or citations

to relevant authority. Therefore, this claim is inadequately briefed by the

defendant, and we decline to review it. See In re Elijah C., 326 Conn. 480,

495, 165 A.3d 1149 (2017) (‘‘Ordinarily, [c]laims are inadequately briefed

when they are merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare assertion.

. . . Claims are also inadequately briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or

no citations from the record . . . .’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]);

see also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control,

266 Conn. 108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003) (appellate courts ‘‘are not required

to review issues that have been improperly presented . . . through an inadequate brief’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

9 The defendant argues that his due process claim is preserved by his

motion for a mistrial, or alternatively, that it is reviewable pursuant to State

v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 233. We disagree that his due process claim
as framed on appeal was preserved by his motion for a mistrial because he

never claimed in his motion that the court had an obligation to order, sua

sponte, that his shackles be removed. Nevertheless, because his claim is

arguably of constitutional magnitude, we review it pursuant to Golding.

Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error

not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the

record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of

constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3)

the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state

has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation

beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions,

the defendant’s claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is free . . . to respond

to the defendant’s [Golding] claim by focusing on whichever condition is

most relevant in the particular circumstances.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Id., 239–40.

10 Because we review the defendant’s claim under Golding we need not

undergo plain error analysis. See State v. Abraham, 64 Conn. App. 384, 408,

780 A.2d 223 (‘‘[b]ecause this claim is unpreserved, our review is limited to

either plain error review; see Practice Book § 60-5; or review pursuant to

the Golding doctrine’’), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 917, 782 A.2d 1246 (2001).

We also decline the defendant’s invitation to exercise our supervisory authority over the administration of justice.

11 Although the court did not make any specific factual finding regarding

the visibility of the defendant’s shackles while he remained seated, the

defendant states in his brief that the shackles became visible only when he

stood up and began to approach the witness.

12 The court stated: ‘‘Ladies and gentlemen, I’m just going to give you a

brief instruction. You may have noticed that the defendant did have on

shackles as he walked out to show a document, to have a document marked

for identification, and let me just indicate to you that I am instructing you

that you’re not to speculate as to any reasons for that and it’s nothing that

should factor into your deliberations and nothing that should be considered

by you in any way.’’

13 Although it may have been a ‘‘best practice’’ for the court to have

inquired, sua sponte, whether the defendant in fact was shackled after he

failed to post the increased bond, the defendant has not persuaded us that

it was constitutionally required to make such an inquiry.

14 See State v. Brawley, supra, 321 Conn. 583 (trial court ordered that

defendant be shackled during trial); State v. Rose, supra, 305 Conn. 599

(trial court compelled defendant to stand trial in identifiable prison clothing

and shackles); State v. Shashaty, 251 Conn. 768, 799, 742 A.2d 786 (trial

court ordered that defendant remain in shackles during jury selection and

trial), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1094, 120 S. Ct. 1734, 146 L. Ed 2d 653 (1999);

State v. White, 229 Conn. 125, 144–46, 640 A.2d 572 (1994) (trial court

ordered that defendant be shackled during trial, ‘‘acquiescing’’ to sheriff’s

recommendation without analysis or justification); State v. Williams, 195

Conn. 1, 9–10, 485 A.2d 570 (1985) (trial court ruled that defendant remain

in leg restraints during course of jury selection).

15 The defendant argues that the trial court’s inaction constituted ‘‘tacit

acceptance’’ of the judicial marshal’s actions and is the equivalent of an

affirmative shackling order. See State v. White, 229 Conn. 125, 144–46, 640

A.2d 572 (1994). In White, our Supreme Court held that the trial court

improperly had ‘‘acquiesced’’ in the judicial marshal’s recommendation to

shackle the defendants. Id., 146. In White, however, the defendants specifically requested that the court order their shackles removed, and the court

denied their request. Id., 144. Further, the defendants renewed their objection

to the court on several occasions and filed affidavits before and after the

trial regarding their complaints. Id., 145–46. Therefore, White wholly is

distinguishable from the present case. Additionally, in Estelle v. Williams,

supra, 425 U.S. 510, the respondent made a request regarding his prison

attire to a jail attendant, which was not sufficient to notify the court of

his request.

16 When the defendant was canvassed by the court regarding his decision

to represent himself, he stated that he understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. One such risk was his lack of understanding

as to how to raise properly the question of whether the shackles should be

removed so that they would not be visible to the jury when he approached

a witness.

17 Practice Book § 42-46 provides the court with a statutory framework
when making a determination to employ reasonable means of restraint on

a defendant. Practice Book § 42-46 provides: ‘‘(a) Reasonable means of

restraint may be employed if the judicial authority finds such restraint

reasonably necessary to maintain order. If restraints appear potentially necessary and the circumstances permit, the judicial authority may conduct an

evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury before ordering such

restraints. The judicial authority may rely on information other than that

formally admitted into evidence. Such information shall be placed on the

record outside the presence of the jury and the defendant given the opportunity to respond to it.

‘‘(b) In ordering the use of restraints or denying a request to remove them,

the judicial authority shall detail its reasons on the record outside the

presence of the jury. The nature and duration of the restraints employed

shall be those reasonable necessary under the circumstances. All reasonable

efforts shall be employed to conceal such restraints from the view of the

jurors. Upon request, the judicial authority shall instruct the jurors that

restraint is not to be considered in assessing the evidence or in the determination of the case.’’