a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, 

Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate

September 2002 SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION

Fugitive Felon 

Program Could 

Benefit from Better 

Use of Technology

GAO-02-346
Page i GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Technological and Other Barriers Contribute to Inefficiencies in the 

Fugitive Felon Program 8

SSA’s Efforts to Obtain Data-Matching Agreements Have Not 

Resulted in Comprehensive Data 17

Legislation Prohibiting OASI and DI Benefits for Fugitive Felons 

Could Have a Substantial Impact on the Program 21

Increased Reliance on Other Agencies’ Databases Could Help 

Enhance Fugitive Felon Program Operations 23

Conclusions 25

Recommendations for Executive Action 26

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 35

Appendix II: Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching Process 38

Appendix III: Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in Apprehending 

Fugitives and Preventing Them from Receiving SSI 

Payments 41

Appendix IV: Comments from the Social Security Administration 43

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice 49

Figures Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA’s Fugitive 

Felon Program 7

Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program Process 10

Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated) 15

Figure 4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements 19
Contents

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Abbreviations

BOP Bureau of Prisons

CMPPA Computer Matching Privacy and Protection Act

EVS Enumeration Verification System

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GAO U.S. General Accounting Office

ITC Information Technology Center

NCC National Computer Center

NCIC National Crime Information Center

OASI/DI Old Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance

OIG Office of Inspector General

PRWORA Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 

Act

SSA Social Security Administration

SSI Supplemental Security Income 

USMS U.S. Marshals Service
Page 1 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

September 6, 2002 Letr

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Finance

United States Senate

Dear Senator Grassley:

The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, administered by the 

Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest cash assistance 

program in the United States. For fiscal year 2002, SSA expects to pay SSI 

benefits totaling approximately $31.5 billion to more than 6 million 

financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled. Under the 

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,1

any individuals fleeing to avoid prosecution or confinement after 

conviction for a crime that is a felony or who violate a condition of 

probation or parole imposed under federal or state law are ineligible to 

receive SSI benefits. SSA has the authority to suspend such benefits when 

these individuals are identified. Further, under certain conditions, the act 

allows SSA to disclose information on these individuals to law enforcement 

agencies to aid in their location and apprehension. 

In August 1996, SSA established the fugitive felon program to facilitate 

identifying individuals in violation of the act and help protect the integrity 

of the SSI program and ensure the public’s safety. SSA, state and local 

governments, and federal law enforcement agencies rely on numerous 

databases and information systems to carry out the fugitive felon program. 

Accordingly, you requested that we review the technological aspects of the 

program to (1) identify technological barriers restricting (a) data matching 

between SSA’s and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) databases 

and (b) ongoing efforts by SSA to obtain data-matching agreements with 

state and local law enforcement agencies; (2) assess the technological 

impact on SSA and the FBI should Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) 

and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits be included in legislation restricting 

payments to fugitive felons; and (3) determine whether other databases, 

such as those maintained by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons 

1

Pub. L. No. 104-193, 202 Stat. 2105, 2186 (1996), commonly known as the Welfare Reform 

Act. 
Page 2 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

and the U.S. Marshals Service, can provide additional support to the 

fugitive felon program. 

In performing this review, we analyzed key documentation maintained by 

SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons, and the U.S. Marshals Service. These 

included data-matching policies and standards, operational and security 

procedures, and technical infrastructure descriptions associated with the 

fugitive felon program. We also analyzed data-matching agreements and 

laws regulating data-matching activities with state and local law 

enforcement agencies. We conducted site visits and telephone conferences 

with 17 state and local law enforcement agencies to determine their 

involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify any technological 

barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and efficiently share data 

with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess issues and concerns 

affecting their efforts to negotiate data-matching agreements with SSA. In 

addition, we interviewed officials at SSA’s Headquarters, Office of 

Inspector General, and National Computer Center; at the FBI’s Criminal 

Justice Information Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia, and its 

Information Technology Center in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and at the 

Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service. Our review focused on the 

ways in which information technology is being used to achieve fugitive 

felon program efficiencies, but did not assess the program’s effectiveness. 

We plan to issue a report later this year that will in part address the 

program’s effectiveness. We performed our review from August 2001 

through May 2002, in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Additional details concerning the objectives, scope, and 

methodology of our review are contained in appendix I.

Results in Brief Since becoming operational in August 1996, the fugitive felon program has 

provided a valuable service by helping SSA to identify and prevent 

payments to ineligible SSI benefits recipients and helping law enforcement 

agencies to locate and apprehend fugitive felons. Nevertheless, several 

technological and other barriers are contributing to inefficiencies in the 

program’s operations. As currently administered, the processing of fugitive 

warrant information to identify ineligible SSI recipients is complex and 

fragmented, involving numerous organizations performing multiple steps 

to obtain and act on the information. In addition, while matches of fugitive 

warrant records against SSI recipient files are conducted using computers, 

most of the essential tasks of sharing and verifying warrant information are 

performed manually. For example, SSA currently lacks the capability to 

accept warrant information from law enforcement agencies on line; thus, 
Page 3 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, and some participating state law 

enforcement agencies must download this information from their 

databases and information systems onto electronic media, such as 

cartridges and tapes, and send it to SSA via the U.S. mail or FedEx. In 

addition, certain information systems that SSA and the FBI use in 

processing matched data are not interoperable or compatible, thus also 

hindering the efficient exchange of warrant information. Collectively, the 

manual activities in processing warrant information have resulted in an 

inefficient and time-consuming operation that, based on our analysis of the 

process used, can take up to 165 days to complete (from SSA’s receipt of 

warrant information until SSI benefits are suspended). Contributing to 

these inefficiencies is that no one office within SSA has been designated to 

oversee and manage the overall performance of the fugitive felon program. 

Consequently, no program officials could explain the overall data sharing 

and matching process. 

Largely because of SSA’s and states’ limited uses of information technology 

to support the fugitive felon program, many state law enforcement 

agencies have been reluctant to enter into data-matching agreements with 

SSA. According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among the factors 

that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements were that 

some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant information 

and SSA’s guidance for formatting, downloading, and manually transmitting 

the information created additional resource requirements that some states 

were unable to meet. In addition, some states report warrant information 

on a voluntary basis, and some states that have signed agreements have not 

yet submitted any data to SSA. SSA officials acknowledged that the 

agency’s efforts to obtain comprehensive warrant information have not 

yielded anticipated results.

The enactment of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive 

felons could increase SSA’s recovery of improperly paid benefits and 

prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing justice. However, 

the additional matches of warrant records against OASI and DI recipient 

files could substantially increase the data processing workloads of both 

SSA and the FBI’s Information Technology Center. The center plays a major 

role in verifying the accuracy of warrant records and supplies fugitives’ 

addresses to law enforcement agencies. SSA and FBI officials recognize the 

need for additional information technology support to conduct computer 

matches of warrant information against the OASI and DI recipient files. 

However, at the conclusion of our review, neither SSA nor the FBI had yet 
Page 4 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

initiated evaluations to assess the anticipated technological impact on their 

operations. 

SSA may be able to improve the fugitive felon program’s operational 

efficiency and outcomes by exploring its existing telecommunications 

connectivity supporting other federal, state, and local programs. SSA 

currently has direct, on-line connections with every state that transmits 

and receives data supporting various other programs, including its program 

to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners. In addition, while SSA 

does not currently have telecommunications connectivity with the FBI’s 

National Crime Information Center—a national database of warrant and 

other criminal information—agency officials believed this database could 

offer a more comprehensive and readily accessible means of obtaining 

outstanding warrant information from the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, and 

state agencies. However, all states report warrant information to this 

database voluntarily. Further, while SSA officials viewed the database as a 

potential single source of comprehensive warrant information, they had 

not assessed the feasibility of this alternative or other options for using online connections with federal, state, and local agencies to more efficiently 

obtain the information. 

To ensure that the fugitive felon program is positioned to meet its current 

and future obligations toward preventing payments of SSI benefits to 

fugitive felons, we are making recommendations to the Commissioner of 

Social Security that include (1) designating a program office and manager 

to oversee and direct the program; (2) fully assessing the program’s current 

operations and performance; and (3) examining and proposing options for 

using technology to automate currently manual functions involved in 

exchanging fugitive warrant information.

SSA and the Department of Justice provided written comments on a draft 

of our report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes IV and V. In its 

comments, SSA expressed disappointment with our report and generally 

disagreed with our recommendations. Among its specific comments, SSA 

disagreed with the need for a program manager and additional monitoring 

and analysis of the program’s operations. Given the complexities of the 

fugitive felon processes, we continue to believe that SSA’s program could 

benefit from more focused program management and additional 

monitoring and analysis to identify process improvements and 

technological enhancements. In addition, as part of continual monitoring 

and analysis, SSA needs to identify aggregate tracking data to assess the 
Page 5 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

program’s overall cost and performance. The Department of Justice 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

Background Under the SSI program, SSA pays monthly benefits to individuals who have 

limited assets and income and are aged, blind, or disabled. These benefits 

are funded by general tax revenues and based on financial need. SSA has 

estimated that, during fiscal year 2002, it will make SSI benefits payments 

totaling approximately $31.5 billion to about 6.4 million individuals. Since 

1997, we have designated SSI a high-risk program because of its 

susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse and SSA’s insufficient management 

oversight.2

 Long-standing concerns regarding program abuses and 

mismanagement, increasing overpayments, and the inability to recover 

outstanding SSI debt have led to congressional criticism of SSA’s ability to 

effectively manage and ensure the program’s integrity.

In addition to SSI, SSA administers the OASI and DI programs—together 

commonly known as Social Security. These are entitlement programs 

funded from trust funds supported by taxes that workers pay on their 

wages. OASI provides monthly cash retirement to workers and their 

dependents or, when workers die, benefits to their survivors. The DI 

program provides monthly cash benefits to workers and their dependents 

when workers are disabled. In fiscal year 2002, the OASI and DI programs 

collectively are expected to pay approximately $447 billion in benefits to 

about 46 million eligible workers, dependents, and survivors.

In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 

Act (PRWORA) prohibited fugitive felons from collecting SSI benefits. 

Specifically, under the law, an individual is ineligible to receive SSI 

payments during any month in which he or she is

• fleeing to avoid prosecution for a crime that is a felony under the laws of 

the place from which the person flees,3

2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: 

Social Security Administration, GAO-01-261 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001).

3

A felony is a serious offense that is usually punishable by imprisonment for more than 

1 year.
Page 6 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

• fleeing to avoid custody or confinement after conviction for a crime that 

is a felony under the laws of the place from which the person flees, or

• violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under federal or 

state law.4

PRWORA provides SSA with the authority to suspend SSI payments to 

fugitive felons and parole and probation violators and to provide 

information to law enforcement agencies to aid in locating and 

apprehending these individuals. The act does not provide similar authority 

for OASI and DI benefits payments. 

In response to PRWORA, SSA established the fugitive felon program and 

entered into a partnership with its Office of Inspector General (OIG). SSA’s 

OIG, with its 63 field divisions and offices, has both program integrity and 

law enforcement functions and is the primary interface between SSA and 

law enforcement entities. It can investigate and make arrests for program 

fraud in collaboration with other law enforcement agencies pursuing SSI 

recipients engaging in criminal activities. 

Beyond OIG, numerous other offices also assist in implementing the 

program. As shown in figure 1, these include SSA’s offices of operations, 

disability and income security programs, and systems; its regional and field 

offices; and the FBI’s Information Technology Center in Fort Monmouth, 

New Jersey. Congress does not appropriate funds to administer the fugitive 

felon program. Rather, according to SSA officials, each participating SSA 

office (for example, the office of operations and OIG) and the FBI 

Information Technology Center use existing funding to support the 

program.

4

Parole is a conditional release from imprisonment that allows parolees to serve the 

remainder of their term outside the confines of a penal institution if they satisfactorily 

comply with all terms and conditions provided. Probation is a type of sentence imposed by a 

court for the commission of a crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is released into 

the community under the supervision of a probation officer. Violation of probation can 

result in probation being revoked and a sentence of confinement imposed.
Page 7 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA’s Fugitive Felon Program

a

In commenting on our draft report, SSA stated that, as part of an Office of Systems’ reorganization, 

the Office of Systems Analysis and the Office of Information Management have been replaced by the 

Office of Earnings, Enumeration and Administrative Systems; the Office of Systems Design and 

Development has been replaced by the Office of Disability and Supplemental Security Income 

Systems. 

Source: GAO analysis based on SSA’s data.
Page 8 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Under the fugitive felon program, SSA relies on warrant information from 

available federal and state sources to identify ineligible SSI recipients on its 

rolls. SSA receives federal and state warrant information from several 

sources, including (1) the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC); 

(2) state and local law enforcement agencies; and (3) the U.S. Marshals 

Service (USMS). SSA receives warrant information from the FBI and USMS 

under memorandums of understanding and from certain state and local law 

enforcement agencies under matching agreements that establish 

conditions for SSA’s use of the warrant information in its matching 

operations. According to SSA, in calendar year 2001, it received 

approximately 27 million warrant records from these federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies. Of these, about 2 million records were 

eligible to be matched against SSI benefits files.5

 Appendix II provides a 

detailed description of the fugitive felon data-matching process. 

OIG reports that, since 1996, the fugitive felon program data matching 

operations (manual and automated) have helped identify about 45,000 

fugitives who were paid approximately $82 million in SSI benefits; of these 

fugitives, approximately 5,000 were subsequently apprehended. Appendix 

III presents selected cases in which fugitives were apprehended and SSI 

benefits were suspended as a result of the fugitive felon program.

Technological and 

Other Barriers 

Contribute to 

Inefficiencies in the 

Fugitive Felon 

Program 

In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces several 

technological and other barriers that create inefficiencies in its processing 

of fugitive warrant information to identify ineligible SSI recipients. These 

barriers include a complex, multistep process to obtain and act on fugitive 

warrant information and a heavily manual approach to accomplishing 

critical program tasks, such as exchanging and verifying warrant 

information. In addition, where information systems are used to support 

the program, many of them are not interoperable or capable of exchanging 

data electronically. Consequently, key portions of the data-matching 

process are complicated and time-consuming. Contributing to this situation 

is that SSA has not designated a single, central point of management 

accountability to direct the fugitive felon program’s operations.

5

According to SSA data, during an initial screening of these records against information it 

had on all holders and applicants of Social Security numbers, a majority of the 

approximately 27 million warrant records that it actually received could not be verified 

against a Social Security number or other vital information, and therefore, were not 

included in its match against files identifying SSI recipients. 
Page 9 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Fugitive Felon DataMatching Process Is 

Complex and Highly

Manual

The steps in administering the fugitive felon program—from the point that 

SSA receives the fugitive warrant information through the suspension of 

SSI benefits—are complicated and include many back-and-forth exchanges 

of warrant information among the participating entities. At the time of our 

review, each of the organizations participating in the program had 

responsibility for distinct segments of the tasks involved in processing 

fugitive warrant information received from federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies. However, there was no single entity within SSA that 

was able to provide a full explanation of the complete chain of activities 

comprising the data sharing and matching process; as a result, we mapped 

the process ourselves. We have depicted this overall process in figure 2.
Page 10 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program Process
Page 11 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Source: GAO analysis.
Page 12 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

As figure 2 illustrates, SSA receives warrant records (usually on a monthly 

basis) from the FBI’s national repository—NCIC—and from USMS and 

state and local law enforcement agencies. Using its Enumeration 

Verification System, SSA matches the warrant records against its master 

files of Social Security number holders and applications to verify identity 

information, such as the name, date of birth, and Social Security number of 

the individual for whom the warrant was issued. Of those records for which 

identities can be verified, OIG screens the data to eliminate 

misdemeanors.6

 Then, a second match is conducted against files 

maintained in SSA’s supplemental security record to determine which of 

the fugitives are receiving SSI benefits. The results of the second match 

(addresses of the fugitive benefits recipients) are forwarded to OIG for 

further processing. 

OIG and its field offices work with the FBI’s Information Technology 

Center (ITC) to verify that the felony, probation, or parole violation 

warrants are active and that the appropriate individuals have been 

identified. Once verifications are made, ITC provides address information 

about each SSI recipient (called “leads”) to the appropriate federal, state, 

or local law enforcement agency so that it can locate and apprehend the 

individual. After action by the law enforcement agency, OIG refers its 

findings to the appropriate SSA field offices, which initiate suspension of 

SSI benefits.

In this process, SSA relies on its mainframe computers and systems to 

match the fugitive warrant information that it receives against the master 

files of Social Security number holders and applications and the 

supplemental security record. Most other steps, including sharing the 

warrant information used in the matching process, are performed 

manually. For example, SSA does not have a telecommunications capability 

that would allow it to accept warrant information on line. As a result, the 

FBI, USMS, and state and local law enforcement agencies must download 

warrant information from their respective databases and information 

systems onto various electronic media (such as cartridges, tapes, and CDROMS) and send this information to SSA via the U.S. mail or FedEx. 

Depending on the type of media used, two separate SSA offices—the Office 

of Central Operations and the Office of Telecommunications and Systems 

6

PRWORA does not specifically address, and SSA does not conduct data matches of, 

misdemeanor charges, with the exception of high misdemeanors, which are considered 

felonies under the laws of New Jersey. 
Page 13 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Operations—receive, log, and upload the information onto SSA’s 

mainframe computer to begin the matching process. 

Beyond manually sharing warrant information, many of the steps in 

verifying and referring information contained in the matched records also 

are performed manually. For example, to accurately identify and locate 

fugitives, SSA’s field offices, OIG, and the FBI’s ITC exchange numerous 

forms with law enforcement agencies.7

 However, none of these forms are 

automated, requiring SSA and ITC staff to manually prepare and fax or mail 

them to the appropriate entities. 

In addition, both OIG’s and ITC’s program activities are supported by 

distinct systems that are not interoperable or compatible, thus further 

preventing the efficient exchange of information. Specifically, OIG’s 

allegation and case investigative system and ITC’s automated case support 

system are used, respectively, to assign case and allegation numbers to 

matched records and to verify duplicate instances of matched data. 

However, these systems cannot electronically share the matched records 

on which both offices must act. Rather, the OIG must download files 

containing matched records and mail them to ITC. Further, OIG’s system 

uses Microsoft Word and ITC’s system uses Corel WordPerfect; thus, when 

ITC receives the files, it must convert them to a usable format to be able to 

process the warrant information.

Manual Processes Have 

Resulted in a TimeConsuming Operation 

The various manual interventions in processing fugitive warrants all 

contribute to a time-consuming operation that is less than optimally 

efficient. According to program officials, the warrant files that federal and 

state law enforcement agencies send to SSA sometimes are not formatted 

in accordance with SSA’s specifications and must be returned to the 

agencies for correction, delaying action on matching these files. In 

addition, the electronic media containing warrant records are sometimes 

lost during the mail delivery process or are misplaced before being entered 

into SSA’s computers. As a result, this time-sensitive information may go 

unaccounted for a number of days. SSA had not determined the extent to 

which warrant records are being lost or mishandled and over what length 

of time, but program officials acknowledged that the longer it takes to 

match the warrant information, the greater the opportunity for fugitives to 

7

These forms include the OI-5B (Referral Form), OI-5C (Law Enforcement Certification 

Form), OI-5D (Investigative Certification Form), and OI-5E (SSA Feedback Form).
Page 14 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

remain unaccounted for and to continue to receive SSI benefits payments. 

Further, the officials stated that the manual steps involved in verifying 

fugitives’ identities and obtaining address information for referring leads to 

law enforcement agencies often slow the overall process of locating and 

apprehending fugitives.

SSA officials were unable to tell us how much time was actually required to 

complete the processing of fugitive warrants. However, our analysis of data 

that SSA provided on its existing procedures found that the steps required 

to fully process a case that did not involve circumstances such as lost or 

mishandled files, or improperly formatted warrant information received 

from states reporting warrant information for the first time, could take up 

to 165 days.8

 This approximate processing time could be increased up to an 

additional 70 days if the fugitive SSI recipient decides to appeal SSA’s 

decision to suspend benefits. 

As figure 3 shows, the approximate processing time includes about 65 days 

during which SSA and the FBI’s ITC conduct matches and initial 

verifications of warrant information and refer leads to law enforcement 

agencies.9

 The approximate time also includes a total of 90 days that is 

devoted to ensuring that individuals are correctly identified and that their 

privacy and other rights are protected—60 days that state and local law 

enforcement agencies are allowed to locate and apprehend fugitives before 

SSA serves notice that benefits will be suspended and 30 days during which 

OIG field offices conduct additional verifications prior to sending 

summaries of actions taken on matched records to SSA field offices for 

suspension of benefits. Program officials informed us that state and local 

law enforcement agencies originally were allowed 14 days to locate and 

apprehend fugitives; however, the number of days allowed was increased 

to 60 to provide these agencies more time to identify and certify actions 

taken on the fugitives. According to SSA, one of the difficulties with data 

matches is that, because fleeing felons often use aliases, law enforcement 

agencies frequently do not have accurate Social Security numbers or 

identifying information for them. Moreover, unlike prisoners, fleeing felons 

are not incarcerated and may not have been convicted of a crime. 

8

The approximate processing days were compiled based on our analysis of information 

provided by several SSA offices involved in the process. To confirm the validity of our 

timeline estimate, we shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA officials.

9

The approximate 65 days includes certain unaccounted for activities, such as uploading and 

initial processing, screening for misdemeanors, and sorting duplicate warrant records.
Page 15 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Consequently, the time devoted to manually verifying the currency of 

warrant information is vital for ensuring that the correct individuals are 

identified and apprehended.

Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated)

Source: GAO analysis of SSA data.

Program officials added that some manual verifications of warrant 

information are necessary to help ensure the program’s integrity. However, 

automating key tasks, such as the capability to accept warrant information 

from other agencies’ databases on line, could help eliminate much of the 

time devoted to initially processing and matching warrant information and 
Page 16 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

verifying and referring leads that results from the matched records (now 

estimated to take about 65 days). 

At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials told us that they had recently 

begun considering options to automate manual processes in the field 

offices. For example, they stated that the agency was considering

eliminating many of the field offices’ benefits suspension activities, such as 

providing due process notices and preparing OIG final reports and, instead, 

performing these activities in one regional office with the use of 

computers. 

Although SSA’s consideration of options for improving the fugitive felon 

process is a positive step, the agency has not analyzed or mapped its 

existing fugitive felon data sharing and matching process. Without doing 

so, SSA lacks critical information needed for targeting processes that are 

most in need of improvement, setting realistic improvement goals, and 

ensuring that it selects an appropriate approach for improving its manual 

operations. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires agency heads to 

analyze, revise, and improve mission-related and administrative processes 

before making significant investments in supporting information 

technology. Further, an agency should have an overall business process 

improvement strategy that provides a means to coordinate and integrate 

the various reengineering and improvement projects, set priorities, and 

make appropriate budget decisions. By doing so, an agency can better 

position itself to maximize the potential of technology to improve 

performance, rather than simply automating inefficient processes. 

SSA Could Benefit from 

Clear and Unified 

Management Accountability 

to Direct the Fugitive Felon 

Program

Although the fugitive felon program is achieving results, it could benefit 

from increased management accountability. SSA relies on multiple 

agencies and offices to implement the fugitive felon program. However, 

there is no unified source of management accountability to provide the 

consistent oversight and program continuity that is essential to sustaining 

program success. Consequently, staff assigned to administer the program 

offered conflicting accounts as to what program tasks were being 

performed and by whom. For example, program officials identified three 

different SSA offices—operations, program support, and OIG—as having 

responsibility for leading the program; yet no officials in these offices could 

explain the overall data-matching process or had decision-making and 

oversight responsibility for the other participating entities. 
Page 17 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

In addition, critical data needed to make informed decisions about the 

program’s operations, such as technological capabilities, program costs 

and benefits, and resource requirements, were not being captured. For 

example, none of the participating SSA and FBI offices could state with 

certainty the amount of time they devoted to processing fugitive warrant 

records. As discussed earlier, no one office within SSA had mapped the 

overall fugitive felon data sharing and matching process to 

comprehensively assess how many days were required from SSA’s receipt 

of warrant information until SSI benefits payments to fugitive felons were 

actually suspended. Further, although the program has been in place for 6 

years, program officials were unable to provide data on the total costs of 

the program. 

In discussing their management of the fugitive felon program, SSA officials 

acknowledged that the program lacked unified management accountability. 

An OIG official stated that, while the agency had initially decided that both 

headquarters offices and OIG would jointly administer the program, these 

offices had only recently begun considering ways to improve their 

management of the program. The agency was considering the development 

of a management board to oversee and address program issues and 

concerns. However, it had not developed any specific tasks or milestones 

for this improvement effort. Given the inherent complexity of the fugitive 

felon program and the many entities involved in its implementation, 

effective management of operations and data is essential for determining 

how best to achieve and sustain future program operations and reporting.

SSA’s Efforts to Obtain 

Data-Matching 

Agreements Have Not 

Resulted in 

Comprehensive Data

Having complete and comprehensive warrant information from states is 

crucial to ensuring that the objectives of the fugitive felon program are 

achieved. Yet, according to SSA, states currently report warrant 

information to NCIC on a voluntary basis; therefore, not all outstanding 

warrants are being included in the FBI’s NCIC database—a prime source of 

SSA’s matching information. Since May 2000, SSA has been taking steps to 

obtain more comprehensive state and local information by pursuing datamatching agreements with states that do not report all of their warrant 

information to NCIC. However, a number of these states have been 

reluctant to enter into agreements or, once they have, have not always 

abided by them, largely because of SSA’s and the states’ concerns regarding 

the lack of information technology and adequate resources to support the 

program.
Page 18 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

SSA considers states to be fully reporting warrant information to NCIC if 

they submit information on all felonies and parole or probation violators. 

States are considered to be partially reporting warrant information if, for 

example, they report felonies but not parole and probation violators.10 As of 

May 2002 (the latest month for which data were available), SSA had 

identified 21 states and the District of Columbia as fully reporting warrant 

information to NCIC and 29 states as partially reporting warrant 

information. 

In pursuing data-matching agreements to obtain all of the states’ warrant 

information,11 SSA reported as of May 2002 that it had signed agreements 

with 18 states12 and was in various stages of negotiating agreements with 5 

other states. SSA had been unsuccessful in reaching agreements with 3 

states, all of which had declined to enter into the agreements. It had not yet 

begun negotiating agreements with 6 additional states. Figure 4 reflects the 

status of SSA’s attempts to obtain data-matching agreements with the states 

as of May 2002.

10According to two states that SSA identified as fully reporting to NCIC (Florida and 

Kansas), most, but not all, felony warrants are reported to this database because the 

submission of felony warrants is at the discretion of local agencies within these states.

11At the time that SSA began pursuing data matching agreements, three states (Maryland, 

New York, and Pennsylvania) did not maintain central repositories of state and local 

warrant information. Therefore, to obtain a majority of the states’ warrant information, SSA 

negotiated agreements with their largest local law enforcement agencies.

12This number includes 3 states (Delaware, Indiana, and New Jersey) identified as 

submitting all of their warrant information to NCIC, but from which SSA, for various 

reasons, negotiated agreements to also directly obtain data.
Page 19 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Figure 4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements

a

The states that SSA is pursuing agreements with include 3 (Delaware, Indiana, and New Jersey) 

identified as submitting all of their warrant information to NCIC, but from which SSA, for various 

reasons, negotiated agreements to also directly obtain data.

b

SSA does not pursue data-matching agreements with states that fully report to NCIC.

Source: SSA.
Page 20 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

SSA and state officials cited various factors—often related to their uses of 

information technology—that had made negotiating data-matching 

agreements difficult. For example, in explaining their decision to decline an 

agreement, Iowa officials stated that, because SSA does not have the 

capability to receive fugitive warrant records on line, state officials would 

have to reformat, download to electronic media, and mail the warrant 

information to SSA Headquarters. The officials believed that doing so 

would not be cost-effective and, thus, elected to continue their practice of 

submitting paper printouts of warrant information to the SSA OIG field 

office in Des Moines. In Florida, officials explained that their state had not 

entered an agreement with SSA and instead was fully reporting warrant 

information to NCIC because of SSA’s specifications for formatting and 

downloading the warrant information onto electronic media. They 

expressed concern that additional resources would be required to perform 

these formatting tasks and manually provide the warrant information to 

SSA. 

Further, SSA and state officials noted that negotiating data-matching 

agreements had been hindered by the lack of centralized databases or 

repositories of warrant information in some state and local law 

enforcement agencies. For example, officials in Oklahoma told us that 

because that state lacked a central repository, they did not want to enter 

into a data-matching agreement with SSA. The officials explained that not 

all of the states’ approximately 700 local law enforcement offices currently 

report all of their warrant information at the state level and to NCIC. Thus, 

to meet the intent of a data-matching agreement, each local agency would 

have to provide their warrant information directly to SSA. However, most 

local law enforcement agencies within the state do not have central 

repositories for reporting the information to SSA. 

Idaho officials added that, in addition to lacking a central repository, they 

had chosen not to sign a data-matching agreement with SSA because of 

privacy considerations. Specifically, the officials expressed concerns with 

the privacy and security implications of submitting sensitive warrant 

information via the U.S. mail. 

Even when agreements had been reached, however, SSA had not fully 

achieved its objective of obtaining comprehensive warrant information 

from the states. Specifically, at the time of our review, of the 18 states with 

which SSA had signed agreements, only 9 were actually submitting warrant 

information to the agency. According to SSA, the remaining 9 states that 

had signed agreements but had not yet sent warrant information provided 
Page 21 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

similar reasons for not complying with the agreements. These included 

states’ concerns about the privacy and security of the warrant information 

and difficulties complying with SSA’s record layout or formatting 

requirements. In addition, although having agreed to submit warrant 

information to SSA, 3 states (Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Colorado) later 

decided instead to report all warrant information to NCIC.

At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials acknowledged that the 

process for obtaining data-matching agreements was difficult and had not 

yielded the results that they had anticipated. States essentially provide 

warrant information on a voluntary basis, and the agreements are intended 

primarily to protect states’ data from unauthorized disclosure and use. 

Nonetheless, SSA officials believed that, in the absence of a single and 

complete source of fugitive warrant records from all states, the datamatching agreements were necessary for ensuring that the agency could 

obtain comprehensive warrant information. We agree that comprehensive 

warrant information is vital to the success of the fugitive felon program. 

However, the data-matching agreements have not ensured that SSA will 

obtain the comprehensive warrant information that it seeks. 

Legislation Prohibiting 

OASI and DI Benefits 

for Fugitive Felons 

Could Have a 

Substantial Impact on 

the Program

Under current statutory provisions, fugitives are prohibited from receiving 

SSI benefits, but can continue to be paid OASI and DI benefits. Specifically, 

SSA maintains address information on fugitives receiving SSI, OASI, and DI 

benefits, but can only share information with law enforcement agencies on 

those fugitives receiving SSI. However, the increasing realization that OASI 

and DI benefits payments may also finance a potentially dangerous 

fugitive’s flight from justice has prompted the Congress to pursue 

implementing provisions to prohibit payments to fugitives in these 

programs as well.13

Implementing a nonpayment provision would also permit SSA to share 

address information on fugitives who receive OASI and DI benefits. In its 

own consideration of such a measure, OIG projected that doing so could 

result in substantial savings to the OASI and DI programs. Specifically, in 

an August 2000 study, OIG estimated that between August 1996 and June 

13In February 2002, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Ways and 

Means Committee, Subcommittee on Social Security introduced legislation (H.R. 4070) to 

deny Title II (OASI and DI) benefits to fugitive felons and persons fleeing prosecution. In 

April 2002, a similar bill (S. 2387) was introduced before the Senate Finance Committee.
Page 22 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

1999, about 17,300 fugitives had been paid at least $108 million in OASI and 

DI benefits. In August 2001, the office revised its estimates, projecting that 

OASI and DI benefits amounting to approximately $40 million would be 

paid to fugitives through October 2001, and in each additional year that 

legislation was not enacted to prohibit such benefits payments—for a 5-

year total payout of approximately $198 million. 

Should this legislative proposal be enacted, the fugitive felon program’s 

workload could increase substantially. SSA officials acknowledged that the 

additional OASI and DI files could significantly increase the program’s datamatching activities. According to an analysis that the OIG performed, the 

enactment of the legislative proposal would result in three times the 

current work level of SSI matches. 

The FBI believed that implementing the legislation could have varying 

effects on its operations. Specifically, officials in the Criminal Justice 

Information Services Division, which manages the NCIC database, stated 

that implementing the provision would have no technological impact on 

that organization’s ability to provide SSA fugitive warrant information. 

They anticipated that the database would continue to supply SSA with 

warrant records received daily from state and local law enforcement 

agencies. However, FBI and SSA OIG officials stated that the additional 

matched records for OASI and DI recipients could substantially increase 

ITC’s workload associated with verifying the accuracy of the matched 

records and supplying fugitives’ addresses to law enforcement agencies. 

Further, based on its study, OIG officials, and those of the FBI, believed 

that ITC’s workforce would have to increase substantially—from the 

current staff of 7 to about 60—to accommodate the additional workload 

associated with handling all the leads generated through the matching 

process. 

With the potential for workload increases in the fugitive felon program, 

SSA and ITC officials recognized that additional information systems 

support would be needed to conduct computer matches of warrant 

information against the OASI and DI recipient files. However, neither SSA 

nor the FBI had yet initiated any evaluations to assess the anticipated 

technological impact on their operations. Such an assessment is critical to 

helping SSA make an informed decision regarding its ability to ensure that 

comprehensive and efficient data-matching operations would continue 

under expanded operations. As discussed in our investment guide, good
Page 23 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

decisions require good data.14 Consequently, having solid data on a 

program’s operations is essential for making informed decisions 

concerning workload management and the technological solutions needed 

to sustain efficient and effective performance.

Increased Reliance on 

Other Agencies’ 

Databases Could Help 

Enhance Fugitive 

Felon Program 

Operations 

As SSA proceeds with implementing the fugitive felon program, having 

efficient and effectively run operations will be essential to achieving 

sustained program results. SSA officials have acknowledged inefficiencies 

in the existing fugitive felon processes and have indicated that they expect 

to rely more heavily on information technology to help improve the 

program’s operations and outcomes. Information systems and databases 

maintained by some of the federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies that currently participate in the fugitive felon program could offer 

SSA opportunities for more efficiently obtaining warrant information to 

enhance the program. 

Much of the foundation for using information technology to improve the 

fugitive felon processes may already exist among state and local agencies 

participating in other programs. According to SSA systems officials, SSA 

currently has a direct, dedicated on-line connection with every state’s 

department of social services.15 States use these lines to submit information 

to SSA covering various programs, such as child support enforcement. 

Similarly, as part of the prisoner program, some state and local prison 

facilities send federal prisoner data to SSA on line to aid in suspending SSI, 

OASI, and DI benefits to incarcerated inmates.16

In discussing the exchange of states’ fugitive warrant information, SSA 

officials told us that they had not evaluated how on-line connections with 

state and local agencies could be used to receive information supporting 

the fugitive felon program. They indicated that implementing an on-line 

14U.S General Accounting Office, Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide for Evaluating 

Federal Agencies’ IT Investment Decision-making, GAO/AIMD-10.1.13 (Washington, D.C.: 

February 1997).

15SSA’s receipt of state and local agencies’ data via dedicated on-line connections primarily 

involve batch, rather than real-time, transfers of data.

16In response to PRWORA, SSA also instituted the prisoner program. Under this program, 

SSA has agreements with state and local correctional facilities to obtain information that is 

used to suspend SSI and OASI and DI benefits to prisoners.
Page 24 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

connection to receive fugitive warrant information from each state law 

enforcement agency would require each state to have access to a secure 

(encrypted), dedicated telecommunications line with SSA. They believed 

that data compatibility and privacy issues would also need to be addressed. 

Nonetheless, at the conclusion of our review, an SSA official told us that 

the agency had reached agreement with one state—Connecticut—to 

exchange fugitive felon data via electronic file transfer. According to the 

official, Connecticut is preparing to submit data via a Connect:Direct 

electronic file transfer method, in which data will be encrypted and sent 

from one mainframe computer to another over dedicated lines.

An alternative to each state sending data would be increased reliance on 

the NCIC database, which could provide a comprehensive and readily 

accessible means of attaining outstanding warrant records from the FBI, 

USMS, and from the states. According to FBI data, NCIC’s technical 

infrastructure includes high-level security controls and validation and 

confirmation procedures for all warrant information exchanged with the 

database. In addition, it is designed to interact in an on-line, real-time 

capacity with other information systems and databases, including those of 

USMS and all 50 states. For example, states transmit warrant data to NCIC 

via state criminal justice systems that are linked to the FBI Criminal Justice 

Information Services’ network.17 As discussed earlier, all states transmit all 

or some portion of their warrant information on line to the NCIC database 

each month.

Within the Department of Justice, USMS relies on on-line connections to 

transmit fugitive warrant information to NCIC. Like many state and local 

law enforcement agencies, USMS transmits to NCIC the same warrant 

information that it sends to SSA via U.S. mail. On the other hand, SSA 

officials stated that the Bureau of Prison’s database of incarcerated 

inmates, which supports SSA’s prisoner program, could not be used to 

effectively support the fugitive felon program, because that database does 

not maintain information on the status of fugitive felons.

Both SSA and its OIG officials believed that having a single source of 

warrant information would help make the data-matching process less 

laborious and eliminate processing inefficiencies. Accordingly, in 

17These systems, called control terminal agencies, provide statewide services such as 

overseeing the transmission of all warrant information within a state, controlling security, 

and providing information security program training.
Page 25 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

November 2001, OIG recommended to Congress the need for a national 

warrant database. In addition, at the conclusion of our review, SSA officials 

told us they that they viewed the NCIC database as a potential single source 

of warrant information to support the fugitive felon program. The officials 

believed that receiving USMS’s and state and local law enforcement 

agencies’ warrant information on line via NCIC could potentially eliminate 

much of the duplicate warrant information that now contributes to the 

program’s inefficiencies. For example, according to federal, state, and local 

law enforcement officials, USMS and all states currently transmit all or 

some of their warrant information to the FBI’s NCIC. Thus, when the FBI 

downloads warrant information from this database to mail to SSA, the 

information duplicates some of that which federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies also send to SSA. Fugitive felon program officials 

reported that, in calendar year 2001, SSA received approximately 60,000 

duplicate warrant records (approximately 5,000 warrant records per 

month) as a result of these dual exchanges.

SSA officials noted, however, that achieving a single source of fugitive 

warrant information would require that SSA have the capability to accept 

data from NCIC on line. At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials 

stated that the agency had not explored using an on-line connection to 

NCIC to enhance the sharing of fugitive warrant information. In addition, 

they stated that, for NCIC to be effective as a single source of 

comprehensive warrant information, state agencies would have to be 

willing to report that portion of warrant information to NCIC that SSA 

currently must obtain from them under data-matching agreements. 

However, according to FBI officials, there is no statute or regulation 

requiring the states to fully report warrant information to NCIC; rather, 

states report information to this database voluntarily. 

Conclusions In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces significant 

technological and other barriers to achieving and sustaining efficient and 

effective program operations and, ultimately, helping SSI overcome its 

high-risk status. While the program has helped prevent SSI benefits 

payments to fugitives, its complex and manually intensive processes have 

resulted in operational inefficiencies that could hinder the program’s longterm success. Further, difficulties in negotiating data-matching agreements 

with the states have hindered SSA’s efforts to obtain comprehensive 

warrant information needed to fulfill program objectives. In the absence of 

essential management accountability, SSA lacks critical data needed to 

make informed decisions about the program’s processes and activities, as 
Page 26 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

well as existing and future plans for technology supporting the program. 

Overcoming these inefficiencies and limitations will be critical to ensuring 

that the fugitive felon program is organized and implemented to achieve the 

greatest possible results and that SSA is effectively positioned to fulfill its 

potentially broader role in preventing OASI and DI benefits payments to 

fugitives. 

SSA officials recognized that increased program efficiency and outcomes 

could result from more substantial uses of information technology to 

perform key data sharing and verification functions and to streamline datamatching operations. Further, given the potential increase in SSA’s 

workload that could result from implementing an OASI and DI nonpayment 

provision, having the necessary information technology to support its 

operations will be even more critical. SSA already has a proven capability 

to share data on line with federal, state, and local agencies in support of 

other programs. However, SSA has taken few steps toward examining its 

current data-matching operations and approaches to obtaining warrant 

information or exploring how best to use technology to enhance the overall 

fugitive felon process. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To improve the fugitive felon program’s operational efficiency and ensure 

sustained, long-term success in identifying fugitive SSI beneficiaries, we 

recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security designate a program 

management office and program manager to direct, monitor, and control 

the program’s activities and progress. In addition, we recommend that the 

commissioner direct the program management office and manager to 

• conduct a detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program’s current 

operations and performance, including a complete analysis of the 

organizations, processes, information flows, and time frames required to 

administer the program, a full accounting of the program’s costs, 

estimated and actual program benefits, and current workload 

requirements;

• identify and prioritize, based on its assessment, those fugitive felon 

processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for resolving 

technological and administrative barriers preventing their efficient 

operation; 

• continue to examine and propose options for using technology to 

automate the currently manual functions involved in exchanging 
Page 27 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

fugitive warrant information with federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies and in completing the verifications and referral of 

this information, including assessing alternatives to using data-matching 

agreements to obtain fugitive warrant information, and determining 

whether on-line connections with state and local law enforcement 

agencies and/or direct telecommunications connections with the FBI’s 

NCIC database could offer viable and more efficient means of sharing 

warrant information; and 

• assess the anticipated technological impact on fugitive felon operations 

from the implementation of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits 

payments to fugitives, including identifying the additional information 

systems support that would be needed to conduct and process leads 

resulting from computer matches of warrant information against these 

benefits recipients’ files.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the 

Commissioner of Social Security (see app. IV) and from the Director, Audit 

Liaison Office, Justice Management Division, Department of Justice (see 

app. V). The Commissioner of Social Security expressed disappointment 

with our report and generally disagreed with our recommendations. The 

Department of Justice provided technical comments, which we have 

incorporated, as appropriate.

Regarding the commissioner’s statement expressing disappointment in our 

report, we believe our report provides a fair assessment of the efficiency of 

the fugitive felon program. We identify those areas in which improvements 

can be made that can benefit SSA’s future efforts at streamlining the 

program’s inefficient processes, improving performance and operations, 

and applying technology, where appropriate. 

In SSA’s comments, the commissioner also stated that the report implied 

that neither SSA nor the OIG had a vision for the fugitive felon program and 

did not mention that SSA and OIG had embraced the program without startup funding or additional resources. We recognize the valuable role that SSA 

plays in implementing the fugitive felon program to prevent benefits 

payments to ineligible SSI recipients. In pointing out technological and 

other barriers to the program’s operations, our intent was not to imply that 

SSA and other participating components lack a vision for the program. 

Rather, given the program’s complexity and multiple entities involved in its 

administration, we believe it is important to highlight critical conditions 
Page 28 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

and operational inefficiencies necessitating SSA’s continual attention in 

order to ensure sustained program success. Also, our report does recognize 

that funding has not been appropriated to administer the program. SSA, as 

a steward of the program, has a responsibility to ensure that it consistently 

carries out all aspects of the fugitive felon data-matching operations in an 

efficient manner. 

Regarding our recommendation to designate a program management office 

and program manager to direct, monitor, and control the program’s 

activities and progress, SSA disagreed that an agency-wide program 

manager was necessary. SSA stated that managers within its office of 

operations and OIG are responsible for the program and that all involved 

offices are aware of the overall process and individual office 

responsibilities. Further, SSA stated that the Inspector General Act does 

not allow its OIG to take direction from or participate in administrative 

decisions that appropriately belong to SSA. In addition, regarding our 

statement that no program official could explain the overall data sharing 

and matching process, SSA disagreed, stating that OIG and SSA officials are 

able to explain the process in its entirety. SSA also stated that, to ensure all 

involved offices are aware of the overall process and individual office 

responsibilities, it had released a detailed process description and provided 

a copy to us. Further, SSA added that because its officials had chosen not to 

answer questions pertaining to other components’ work during our review, 

we had mistakenly inferred that no one within the agency could explain the 

overall process.

We recognize that the fugitive felon program is a joint effort and that there 

are responsible and knowledgeable managers within each of the 

participating components involved in administering the program. Our 

recommendation is intended to ensure a unified management oversight 

capability for the fugitive felon program that does not currently exist. It is 

not intended to prescribe the exact nature or form of that management 

oversight capability. With respect to comments regarding possible 

limitations on joint efforts as a result of the Inspector General Act, the Act 

does not prohibit coordination of joint action between the OIG and the 

head of the establishment involved to ensure efficiency of operation and to 

avoid duplication of effort, nor do we believe that such coordination would 

affect OIG’s personal and professional independence. In this respect, as we 

noted in our report, an OIG official has commented on the need for 

improved coordination and management of the fugitive felon program. 

That official also noted that OIG had already begun to work with SSA’s 

Office of Operations to improve management of the program.
Page 29 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Further, during our review, it was evident that management and staff in 

each component could explain the distinct segments of tasks that they 

were responsible for accomplishing; however, we could not identify any 

officials within these organizations who had a clear perspective of overall 

program performance and operations. As our report noted, staff within the 

SSA and OIG offices provided conflicting accounts of the fugitive felon 

data-matching process. While we acknowledge that SSA revised its policy 

instructions in April 2002, outlining involved offices’ roles and 

responsibilities, these instructions do not address SSA’s overall fugitive 

felon processes. In addition, we were unable to identify any aggregate 

tracking data to assess the program’s overall cost and performance. Given 

the multiple agencies and offices involved in administering this complex 

program, we continue to believe that having a unified source of 

accountability and authority for the program is essential to effectively and 

consistently oversee its progress and ensure that informed decisions are 

being made about its implementation. In discussing our findings on May 10, 

2002, SSA and OIG officials agreed that the program lacked uniform 

management accountability and stated that they had just recently begun 

considering the development of a management board to oversee and 

address program management issues and concerns. 

SSA also disagreed with our recommendation that called for it to conduct a 

detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program’s current operations and 

performance, including a full accounting of the program’s costs and 

benefits and workload requirements. SSA stated that its analysis of the 

program’s operations is an ongoing process and that enhancements are 

made when deemed necessary. SSA further stated that it had completed 

many of the tasks cited in our recommendation prior to starting the 

matching process in calendar year 1999, and that OIG has regularly 

reported its performance in the program. We agree that ongoing monitoring 

and analysis of the program’s operations is essential for ensuring that 

management is informed of the program’s cost and progress and to assess 

risks to overall performance. However, during our review, SSA could not 

demonstrate that it had made an aggregate assessment of the program’s 

current operations and performance, including an awareness of the 

processes, information flows, and time involved in administering the 

program, as well as a full accounting of its costs and requirements. Such 

information is vital for making informed decisions about the program’s 

progress and for determining where process improvements are needed and 

how best to achieve them. The fugitive felon program has been in place 

since 1996 (with computerized matching since 1999), giving SSA sufficient 

opportunities to perform these necessary and critical assessments. Further, 
Page 30 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

while SSA stated that OIG has regularly reported its performance in the 

fugitive felon program, it is important that SSA conduct its own program 

assessment that includes all participating components, which ensures that 

the program can be consistently and comprehensively controlled and 

managed. 

Regarding the need for an assessment, SSA stated that it had completed a 

cost-benefit analysis of the fugitive felon program in January 2001. Our 

review of the two-page summary found that it lacked substantial 

information about the program’s overall costs and benefits. An operations 

official who provided the document told us that the summary had 

constituted only a rough estimate, rather than an accurate reflection, of the 

program’s costs and benefits, and that it had been developed only for the 

purpose of renewing SSA’s computer-matching program. The official added 

that the development of actual cost and benefits data for the fugitive felon 

program would require significantly more time than had been invested in 

preparing the current summary. 

SSA believed that our recommendation to identify and prioritize those 

fugitive felon processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for 

resolving technological and administrative barriers preventing their 

efficient operation is unnecessary, stating that it provides for these actions 

during normal operations. The agency added that it has a number of efforts 

under way to automate some of the fugitive felon processes. However, SSA 

stated that there are some manual processes in the program that contribute 

to minor interruptions to the fugitive felon process. 

While SSA stated that it has undertaken efforts to automate some fugitive 

felon processes, it needs to develop a strategy for resolving the 

technological and administrative barriers affecting the program’s 

operations. As our report notes, an overall business process improvement 

strategy will better position SSA to prioritize and integrate its various 

reengineering and improvement projects and, thus, maximize the potential 

of technology to improve the program’s performance. Further, at the 

conclusion of our review, SSA provided us with documentation outlining 

discussions to automate field office functions. However, the information 

provided did not include enough detail on the initiative that it said was 

being undertaken; therefore, we could not comment on these 

developments. We recognize that there are many steps within the fugitive 

felon process that must be completed manually. While we agree that some 

of these manual processes are necessary, our report notes that technology 

may enhance the program. Given our assessment of the length of the 
Page 31 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

process (approximately 165 days), we continue to believe that SSA needs 

to perform a complete analysis of the fugitive felon program to identify 

areas for improvement, as well as areas where technology can be used to 

support more efficient operations.

SSA found potential merit in our recommendation that it examine and 

propose options for using technology to automate the currently manual 

functions involved in exchanging fugitive warrant information with federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies and in determining the most 

efficient means of sharing warrant information. Although our 

recommendation included determining whether direct telecommunication 

connections with the FBI’s NCIC could offer a viable solution, SSA believed 

that the creation of a single national warrant database would be a better 

solution to efficiently sharing warrant information. SSA stated that its OIG 

had testified before the Congress on the benefits that would be derived if 

such a database were established. SSA added that NCIC would be effective 

as a single source of comprehensive warrant information only if entry of 

states’ warrant information became mandatory. 

We acknowledge in our report that the states enter warrant information 

into NCIC voluntarily and agree that this could be an impediment to 

achieving a comprehensive information repository. Nonetheless, achieving 

an optimal solution will in large measure depend on SSA examining the 

strengths and limitations of all of the potential alternatives to sharing 

warrant information, including NCIC. Accordingly, this recommendation 

remains in our report. However, we have also incorporated language 

reflecting SSA’s views regarding a national warrant database. 

Also in its response to this recommendation and in additional comments, 

SSA noted several instances where it believed we had made incorrect 

assumptions regarding the fugitive felon process. SSA disagreed with our 

assertion that it cannot determine the amount of time that is actually 

required to complete the processing of fugitive warrants and stated that it 

was able to track the number of days it takes for each individual subject 

(fugitive) to be processed. In addition, SSA stated that our analysis of the 

fugitive felon processing timeline had incorrectly considered start-up/test 

file processing times that can be associated with states’ first submissions of 

warrant files, thus accounting for our approximation of 165 days. We 

acknowledge that SSA has been able to track fugitive warrant information 

on a subject-by-subject basis; however, our review did not find that SSA 

had performed any aggregate tracking of the time required to process 

fugitive warrants—data that would be helpful to SSA in gauging the 
Page 32 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

program’s performance. Also, as our report noted, our analysis was limited 

to case processing data that did not involve lost, mishandled, or improperly 

formatted data. However, we have amended our report to specifically 

reflect that we also did not include trial and error times for states reporting 

warrant information for the first time. 

In addition, SSA interpreted our discussion of states’ perspectives 

regarding fugitive felon data formatting and transmission requirements as 

an implication that the requirements were unduly restrictive. However, we 

recognize the importance of prescribed standards for ensuring consistent 

reporting of warrant information and other computerized data. In this 

regard, our report aims only to highlight some of the circumstances that 

currently prevent SSA from receiving comprehensive warrant information 

from state and local law enforcement agencies.

Further, SSA stated that our report had included erroneous information 

about the agency’s on-line connections with states’ departments of social 

service and in describing its data exchanges with the Bureau of Prisons. 

SSA stated that the agency has dedicated lines connecting to each state and 

that these lines are used to exchange batch files, and that real-time 

transfers are not occurring as indicated in our report. Based on 

documentation that SSA’s Office of Systems provided, we determined that 

SSA has direct, dedicated on-line connections with every state’s 

department of social services. However, we do not imply in our report that 

on-line connections mean real-time connections. We have added language 

to clarify that SSA’s existing on-line connections with state and local 

agencies primarily involve batch, rather than real-time, transfers of data.

Finally, regarding our recommendation that SSA assess the anticipated 

technological impact on fugitive felon operations from the implementation 

of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments to fugitives, SSA 

stated that it and the OIG have already completed this task. In particular, 

SSA stated that a joint SSA/OIG analysis of state and federal warrant files 

had been started in January 2001 to determine what impact OASI and DI 

legislation would have on the program. According to SSA, this analysis had 

determined that the legislation would affect staff resources, but would not 

affect its need for technology. Further, SSA stated that this information had 

been shared with us during our review. 

While conducting our review, OIG officials did inform us that they had 

performed an analysis to assess the impact of the OASI and DI legislation 

on fugitive felon program operations; however, by the conclusion of our 
Page 33 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

review, the officials had not met our request for documentation supporting 

this analysis. OIG officials subsequently provided the analysis to us while 

reviewing and commenting on our draft report. We agreed to review the 

analysis and make revisions to our report, as necessary. Our review of the 

analysis found that OIG’s main objective had been to determine the 

increase in the current fugitive felon program workload. However, the 

analysis did not include any discussion of the technological implications 

resulting from the OASI and DI legislation. Further, SSA commented that, 

in June 2001, its Office of Systems had estimated that adding OASI and DI 

to the fugitive felon program would require about 8 work years, but that the 

agency did not envision any major new or unique information technology 

expenditures. In discussing the impact of the legislation during our review, 

SSA did not inform us of the Office of Systems’ projection or of 

documentation supporting this evaluation. Thus, while we have modified 

our report to reflect that OIG had performed analysis that assessed the 

workload impact resulting from the OASI and DI legislation, we continue to 

believe that additional assessment is necessary to determine whether and 

what information systems support would be required to meet the broader 

mission.

Beyond these comments, SSA offered clarifications to table 1, which listed 

the organizations tasked with implementing the fugitive felon program and 

to the definition of “high misdemeanors” discussed in footnote 6 to the 

report. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Commissioner of Social Security and to the Director, Office of Management 

and Budget. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.
Page 34 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Should you or your office have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-6253, or Valerie Melvin, Assistant Director, at (202) 

512-6304. We can also be reached by E-mail at willemssenj@gao.gov and 

melvinv@gao.gov, respectively. Individuals making key contributions to 

this report were Nabajyoti Barkakati, Mary J. Dorsey, Sophia Harrison, 

David L. McClure, Valerie C. Melvin, Tammi Nguyen, Henry Sutanto, and 

Eric Trout. 

Sincerely yours,

Joel C. Willemssen

Managing Director, Information Technology Issues
Page 35 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

Our objectives were to examine the technological aspects of the fugitive 

felon program in order to (1) identify technological barriers restricting (a) 

data matching between the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) databases and (b) ongoing efforts 

by SSA to obtain data-matching agreements with state and local law 

enforcement agencies; (2) assess the technological impact on SSA and the 

FBI should Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability 

Insurance (DI) benefits be included in legislation restricting payments to 

fugitive felons; and (3) determine whether other databases, such as those 

maintained by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. 

Marshals Service, can provide additional support to the fugitive felon 

program. 

To understand the fugitive felon data-matching process, we obtained and 

analyzed various documentation maintained by SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of 

Prisons and the U.S. Marshals Service. These documents described data 

sharing and matching policies, operational and security procedures, and 

the technical infrastructure supporting the fugitive felon program. We 

complemented our understanding of the data-matching process by 

arranging a demonstration with SearchSoftwareAmerica, an industry 

leader with expertise in data-matching software, to understand how datamatching software works in a database environment. 

At the time of our review, SSA did not have documentation showing the 

flow of warrant information through the fugitive felon data-matching 

process, requiring that we map the process ourselves. To accomplish this, 

we relied on the results of our document analyses and used business 

process flow software to construct a graphical presentation of the fugitive 

felon program’s process flow. We provided copies of the completed 

business process flowchart to SSA Headquarters offices and its Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) to verify the accuracy of our process depiction 

and incorporated changes based on their review and comments. In 

addition, to further confirm the process, we interviewed agency officials in 

all of the offices involved in administering the fugitive felon program. 

These included SSA’s OIG and office of operations, SSA and OIG field 

offices, and the FBI Information Technology Center (ITC) in Fort 

Monmouth, New Jersey.

Also, because SSA had not performed an analysis to determine how many 

days it took to process warrant information, we determined the 

approximate number of days involved in the process from the receipt of 

warrant information from federal, state, and local law enforcement 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

agencies until the suspension of fugitives’ SSI benefits. We derived the 

number of days by performing a detailed analysis of documentation 

obtained from various SSA offices. For example, we reviewed completed 

samples of incoming data included on log sheets from both the Office of 

Central Operations and Office of Telecommunications and Systems 

Operations to calculate the approximate number of days it took these 

offices to process the warrant data from its receipt until they forwarded it 

to OIG. We also interviewed officials in SSA Headquarters, its OIG, and the 

FBI ITC regarding the number of days involved in processing fugitive 

warrants. We shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA 

officials to confirm the validity of our processing timeline estimate.

To identify technological barriers restricting data matching between SSA’s 

and the FBI’s databases, we relied on our detailed analysis of SSA’s fugitive 

felon process and assessed information describing its supporting technical 

infrastructure. We also analyzed documentation describing the FBI’s 

repository of fugitives and other criminals—the National Crime 

Information Center (NCIC)—along with the agency’s approach to providing 

warrant information to SSA. To support our analysis, we applied various 

guidance, including Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, 

Appendix I: Federal Agency Responsibilities for Maintaining Records 

about Individuals and Appendix II, Security of Federal Automated 

Information Resources; and National Institute of Standards and 

Technology computer security guidance. 

Regarding SSA’s ongoing efforts to obtain data-matching agreements with 

state and local law enforcement agencies, we applied the Computer 

Matching Privacy and Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988 (P. L. 100-503), 

amending the Privacy Act (5 U. S. C. 552a); data-matching agreements fall 

under the provisions of the Act, which protects unauthorized disclosures of 

computerized data through data matching. In addition, we applied the 

Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93-579), which stipulates provisions for protecting 

individuals from unauthorized disclosure of non-computerized 

information. We also applied knowledge gained through our detailed 

analysis of the fugitive felon process, as well as SSA’s model data-matching 

agreements, reports documenting the status of negotiations between SSA 

and state and local law enforcement agencies, and other policy and 

procedural documentation. We conducted site visits and telephone 

conferences with 17 randomly selected state and local law enforcement 

agencies—Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 

Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, 

Oklahoma, Oregon, and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania—to determine 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

their involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify any technological 

barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and efficiently share data 

with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess issues and concerns 

affecting their efforts to negotiate data-matching agreements with SSA.

To assess the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should legislation 

be enacted to prohibit fugitives from receiving OASI and DI benefits 

payments, we analyzed applicable laws: the Personal Responsibility and 

Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P. L. 104-193), amending Title 

XVI of the Social Security Act, as well as OASI and DI legislation proposed 

by the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate. We also assessed SSA 

OIG reports and testimony that highlighted the Inspector General’s position 

regarding proposed legislation prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments 

to fugitive felons and determined SSA’s decisions and actions regarding the 

potential impact of such proposed legislation. In addition, as part of our 

analysis, we considered our recent correspondence to the House 

Committee on Way and Means, which reported on whether SSA has the 

authority to deny OASI and DI benefits to fugitive felons and provide law 

enforcement agencies with the current addresses and Social Security 

numbers of OASI and DI beneficiaries who are fugitive felons.18 Finally, to 

determine whether other databases, such as those maintained by the 

Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service could 

provide additional support to the fugitive felon program, we obtained and 

analyzed documentation describing the agreements between SSA’s OIG and 

these agencies. In addition, we analyzed systems documentation pertaining 

to the Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service’s databases, as well as 

the FBI’s NCIC and state and local law enforcement agencies’ databases. 

This documentation included data standards, reporting requirements 

(memoranda of understanding and data-matching agreements), policies, 

and procedures. We also interviewed pertinent management and staff of 

SSA’s Headquarters, field offices, and OIG; the FBI Criminal Justice 

Information Services Division; the U.S. Marshals Service; and the Bureau of 

Prisons to gain an understanding of how their databases could be used to 

support the fugitive felon program. 

We conducted our review from August 2001 through May 2002, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

18U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security Programs: The Scope of SSA’s Authority 

to Deny Benefits to Fugitive Felons and to Release Information about OASI and DI 

Beneficiaries Who Are Fugitive Felons, GAO-02-459R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2002).
Page 38 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Appendix II

Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching 

Process ApendxiI

Under the fugitive felon program, the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), 

and state and local law enforcement agencies download warrant 

information from their respective databases onto electronic media, such as 

cartridges, diskettes, and CD-ROMs, and send it to SSA via the U.S. mail or 

FedEx. Warrant information contained on diskettes, paper, and CD-ROMs 

is sent to SSA’s Office of Central Operations (any warrant information 

received on paper is keyed to diskette), whereas warrant information 

contained on tapes, cartridges, or electronic files is sent to SSA’s Office of 

Telecommunications and Systems Operations. Upon receipt, staff in these 

two offices upload the warrant information onto SSA’s mainframe 

computer, located at its National Computer Center (NCC), to begin the 

data-matching process. 

As part of the data-matching operations, the NCC staff makes backup 

copies of the warrant information and processes the data in overnight 

batches, using SSA’s Enumeration Verification System (EVS) to verify 

fugitives’ names, Social Security numbers, sex, and birth dates. The NCC 

staff then notifies SSA’s OIG that the data files are in production. The OIG is 

responsible for ensuring that the data files include only individuals charged 

with felony and parole or probation violations; it deletes any files naming 

individuals charged with misdemeanors.

Following OIG’s review, NCC staff processes the data files against the 

supplemental security record to identify fugitives receiving SSI benefits 

payments. The records of fugitives identified—called matched records—

are then returned to the OIG for further processing.

OIG enters the files containing the matched records into its allegation and 

case investigative system and assigns case numbers to them. Case numbers 

are assigned based on whether the records represent “exact” matches or 

“good” matches.19 OIG then sends the records containing exact matches 

(on electronic media via FedEx) to the FBI’s ITC in Fort Monmouth, New 

Jersey and to USMS for additional processing. OIG also notifies its field 

offices via E-mail that exact and good matches have been entered into its 

allegation and case investigative system. 

19Exact matches are those having only one person with a particular name, Social Security 

number, date of birth, and sex. Good matches are those having one or two of the data 

elements, such as name and date of birth, but not a Social Security number. Good matches 

require the OIG field offices to perform additional identification and verification.
Appendix II

Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching 

Process

Page 39 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Upon receiving the exact matches, ITC staff then verifies the address and 

status of each individual named in the NCIC matched warrant records to 

determine whether the warrants are still active, using a personal computer 

to access and query fugitives’ records that are maintained in the NCIC 

database. ITC staff does not query NCIC to determine whether states’ 

matched warrant records are still active, but rather processes and mails the 

records to the applicable states for their verification. ITC staff also obtains 

from the NCIC database address information on the law enforcement 

agencies that originally issued the arrest warrants on the individuals named 

in the warrants and manually type each originating law enforcement 

agency’s address onto a cover letter. The staff then uses the address 

information to mail the “leads,” together with the cover letter, law 

enforcement referral form (OI-5B), and the law enforcement certification 

form (OI-5C) to the originating law enforcement agencies for their use in 

locating and apprehending the fugitives. According to OIG, ITC generally 

requires approximately 30 days to process the matched records. 

State and local law enforcement agencies use information contained in the 

“leads” to locate the fugitive felons and then return certification forms to 

ITC indicating the action they have taken on the warrant. Before acting to 

suspend SSI benefits, SSA generally allows the originating law enforcement 

agencies 60 days to apprehend a fugitive based on the leads provided. By 

allowing this “sunset” phase, SSA avoids letting fugitives know that their 

status and whereabouts have been revealed before law enforcement 

authorities can arrest them. 

When ITC receives the certification forms from the law enforcement 

agencies indicating the status of the warrants, it forwards the forms to the 

appropriate OIG field offices. OIG agents have 30 days from the time that 

the forms are returned to them to work the cases (a case consists of 50 

subjects or felons) or perform additional verifications, enter the 

information from these forms into the allegation and case investigative 

system, complete summary and benefits suspension forms, and mail the 

forms to SSA field offices. If law enforcement agencies do not return 

certification forms indicating the status of the arrest warrant to ITC within 

60 days, OIG agents follow up with the law enforcement agencies either by 

letter or telephone to determine whether the warrant is still active. OIG 

agents also perform additional identification activities for good matches 

and send these matches to SSA field offices, where staff query the 

supplemental security record for verification. If records cannot be verified 

using the supplemental security record, OIG contacts the law enforcement 

agencies for verification. If, after contacting law enforcement agencies, 
Appendix II

Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching 

Process

Page 40 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

warrants still cannot be verified, records are either destroyed or mailed 

back to the originating law enforcement agencies and a note is attached to 

records contained in the allegation and case investigative system.

Once warrant records are verified and are determined to be still active, OIG 

agents refer them to the appropriate SSA field offices, where action is 

taken to suspend the fugitive’s SSI benefits, calculate the amount of 

overpayment, and update the SSI files. SSA officials told us that the process 

to suspend SSI benefits payments takes approximately 10 days. 

Based on our analysis of data that SSA provided about its process, we 

determined that from the date on which SSA first receives warrant data 

from the law enforcement agencies to when it identifies fugitives who 

receive SSI benefits, locates and apprehends them, and then suspends SSI 

benefits, the process can take up to 165 days.20 This approximate 

processing time includes 35 days for SSA systems, operations, and OIG 

staff to process the matches, 30 days for ITC to verify and batch process 

warrants, 60 days for state and local law enforcements agencies to locate 

and apprehend fugitives before SSA serves notice of benefits suspension, 

30 days for OIG field offices to act on information received from the law 

enforcement agencies, and 10 days for processing the suspension of 

benefits.

Following the suspension of benefits, fugitive SSI recipients are given due 

process. That is, fugitive SSI recipients have 10 days to contact SSA for a 

continuance of benefits and 60 days to appeal the suspension. If the fugitive 

loses the appeal, SSA will suspend the SSI benefits and again update the 

supplemental security record. SSA’s NCC runs master tapes once a month 

and submits them to the Department of the Treasury, informing it of any 

updated information. Treasury discontinues issuing checks to the identified 

fugitive felons.

20The approximate processing days were compiled based on our analysis of information 

provided by several SSA offices involved in the process. Our analysis considered the steps 

required to fully process a case that did not involve circumstances such as lost, mishandled, 

or improperly formatted warrant information. To confirm the validity of our timeline 

estimate, we shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA and FBI officials.
Page 41 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Appendix III

Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in 

Apprehending Fugitives and Preventing Them 

from Receiving SSI Payments ApendxiI

SSA reports that, since its inception in August 1996, the fugitive felon 

program has been instrumental in helping identify approximately 45,000 

fugitives who improperly collected at least $82 million in Supplemental 

Security Income (SSI) benefits. In addition, SSA reports that, as a result of 

sharing fugitive warrant information, officer and public safety throughout 

the United States has increased. According to SSA’s OIG, among those 

fugitives who have been identified as receiving SSI benefits, more than 

5,000 have been apprehended since the fugitive felon program began. 

The following cases highlight examples of how the fugitive felon program 

has contributed to identifying and apprehending fugitives and preventing 

improper payments of SSI benefits:

• On February 8, 2001, authorities arrested two fugitives as a result of 

computer matching between SSA’s OIG and the FBI’s NCIC. Agents from 

OIG’s New York field division, state troopers from New Jersey, and 

deputies from the Essex County, New York sheriff’s office, arrested one 

fugitive wanted on arson charges and a second wanted on charges of 

producing and distributing a dangerous controlled substance. Both 

fugitives were remanded to the custody of the Essex County jail, and 

these cases resulted in the suspension of the fugitives’ SSI benefits.

• In New York, the field division of SSA’s OIG used leads from matched 

fugitive warrant records to identify a fugitive wanted by the Union 

County, New Jersey sheriff’s office on a burglary charge. This fugitive, 

arrested in June 2001, with the assistance of an FBI agent, had 13 prior 

arrests and 5 prior convictions, including one for homicide. This case 

resulted in SSI benefits suspension.

• Under the direction of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District 

of Michigan, agents from the OIG Detroit office participated in an 

operation that focused on locating and arresting 400 adult and juvenile 

chronic violent offenders. The 3-day operation resulted in the arrest of 

82 individuals—67 of whom were receiving SSI benefits. The 

apprehended individuals were wanted for offenses ranging from 

criminal sexual conduct to armed robbery and assault with intent to do 

bodily harm.

• In California on December 7, 2000, the Operation Pretenders Task 

Force, (composed of agents from the SSA OIG, U.S. Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, and California state parole), assisted by 

California’s Department of Health Services and Department of Motor 
Appendix III

Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in 

Apprehending Fugitives and Preventing 

Them from Receiving SSI Payments

Page 42 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Vehicles, arrested a registered child sex offender for a parole violation. 

The fugitive had eluded officials for approximately 5 years by assuming 

the identity of his deceased brother and had applied for and received SSI 

benefits under the assumed identity. On January 31, 2001, a grand jury 

indicted him on two counts of false statements for SSI benefits, two 

counts of fraudulent use of a Social Security number, and three counts 

of identity theft.
Page 43 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Appendix IV

Comments from the Social Security 

Administration ApendxiIV
Appendix IV

Comments from the Social Security 

Administration

Page 44 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration
Appendix IV

Comments from the Social Security 

Administration

Page 45 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration
Appendix IV

Comments from the Social Security 

Administration

Page 46 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration
Appendix IV

Comments from the Social Security 

Administration

Page 47 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration
Appendix IV

Comments from the Social Security 

Administration

Page 48 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Now on p. 7.

Now on p. 12.
Page 49 GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Justice ApendxiV

(310420)
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