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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 EASTERN DIVISION 

FREEDOM BANC MORTGAGE 

SERVICES, INC., 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 2:11-cv-01073 

 v. JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST 

 Magistrate Judge Deavers 

NORMA LYNN O’HARRA, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

 OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court for consideration of O’Harra’s motion for sanctions and 

fees against Freedom Banc Mortgage Services (ECF No. 66), Freedom Banc Mortgage 

Services’s memorandum in opposition (ECF No. 76), and O’Harra’s reply memorandum (ECF 

No. 77). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the motion for sanctions and fees. 

I. Background

 Freedom Banc Mortgage Services (“FBMS”) is an Ohio corporation not in good 

standing. Norma Lynn O’Harra (“O’Harra”) is a former employee of FBMS and the only 

defendant seeking sanctions and fees. The parties before this Court have a sordid litigation 

history. In 2009, FBMS filed a complaint against O’Harra alleging breach of contract, unjust 

enrichment, and fraud. Freedom Banc Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. O’Harra, Franklin C.P. No. 

09CVC-09-14624 (Ohio C.P. Ct. Sept. 29, 2009). The complaint alleged that O’Harra was paid 

to complete work, but FBMS later discovered that she had overstated the numbers of hours that 

she worked and did not complete the work she was paid to perform. Id. FBMS was awarded 

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default judgment and O’Harra was ordered to pay $24,354.04. Freedom Banc Mortg. Servs., 

Inc. v. O’Harra, Franklin C.P. No. 09CVC-09-14624 (Ohio C.P. Ct. May 25, 2010). The default 

judgment and award were subsequently vacated. Freedom Banc Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. O’Harra, 

Franklin C.P. No. 09CVC-09-14624 (Ohio C.P. Ct. Aug. 27, 2012). The case was later 

dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Freedom Banc Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. 

O’Harra, Franklin C.P. No. 09CVC-09-14624 (Ohio C.P. Ct. May 9, 2013). 

 In January 2011, FBMS, through Laura Harris, filed a complaint against O’Harra in the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Freedom Banc Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. O’Harra, 

Franklin C.P. No. 11CVH01-1198 (Ohio C.P. Ct. Jan. 26, 2011). The complaint alleged that 

O’Harra “hacked” into FBMS’s computer system and remotely accessed files without 

permission. Id. Laura Harris is the wife of FBMS’s president, Stephen Harris. Mrs. Harris is 

not an attorney and was not legally allowed to file a lawsuit for FBMS. The court dismissed the 

complaint sua sponte. Freedom Banc Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. O’Harra, Franklin C.P. No. 

11CVH01-1198 (Ohio C.P. Ct. Jan. 17, 2012). 

 In July 2011, Laura Harris again filled a complaint against O’Harra for unauthorized use 

of property, invasion of privacy, and vandalism based on the same allegations of computer 

tampering as 11CVH01-1198 and on additional allegation of tampering with the Harris family’s 

home computers. Harris v. O’Harra, Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-009011 (Ohio C.P. Ct. July 21, 

2011). Laura Harris voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice in February 2012. Harris 

v. O’Harra, Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-009011 (Ohio C.P. Ct. Feb. 3, 2012). 

 FBMS, with proper legal representation, filed Case No. 2:11-cv-01073 against O’Harra 

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and the other named defendants on December 1, 2011. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint alleges 

violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy 

Act, trespass, conversion, conspiracy, and negligent supervision and discipline. (Id. at Page ID # 

5-9.) The complaint is based on roughly the same allegations that underlie the state court cases, 

mainly that O’Harra “hacked” FBMS’s computers and servers. (Id. at Page ID # 1-5.) The 

complaint also alleges that O’Harra’s actions caused system failures on the computers, and 

ultimately led FBMS to cease to conduct business in December 2010. (Id. at Page ID # 5.) 

 Since filing Case No. 2:11-cv-01073, FBMS has employed several different attorneys. 

Its first attorney, David T. Ball, withdrew from representation on July 23, 2012 after being 

terminated by Stephen Harris. (ECF No. 35.) FBMS next employed attorneys Christopher T. 

Junga and Mark Andrew Chuparkoff. Junga and Chuparkoff withdrew February 1, 2013 based 

on irreconcilable differences with FBMS. (ECF No. 51.) FBMS is currently represented by 

Nathan D. Painter. 

 FBMS entered a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(a), signed by counsel for all parties. (ECF No. 73.) The case was terminated on 

May 8, 2013. The only remaining matter before the Court is this motion for sanctions. The 

remainder of this opinion will address only Case No. 2:11-cv-01073 and defendant O’Harra 

unless otherwise indicated. 

II. Standards Involved

 O’Harra is seeking sanctions and fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Ohio 

Revised Code 2323.51, and the inherent powers of this Court. O’Harra requests that this Court 

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(1) dismiss the instant case; (2) award reasonable attorneys fees and costs against FBMS and 

FBMS’s counsel, jointly and severally; (3) enjoin FBMS from filing additional complaints 

against O’Harra without leave of the Court; and (4) grant any additional relief which is just and 

equitable. This Court will not address the first request because the case has already been 

dismissed pursuant to the above mentioned stipulation, or the third request because, in its 

memorandum in opposition, FBMS has already agreed to be “enjoined from commencing suit 

against O’Harra in the U.S. District Court without leave of the Court.” (ECF No. 76 at Page ID 

# 1106-07.) 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 gives the Court the power to impose sanctions on 

parties, attorneys, and law firms. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). Rule 11 states four grounds for 

imposing sanctions, but only two are relevant to the motion currently before this Court. Rule 

11(b) states: 

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an 

attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's 

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 

circumstances: 

 (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to 

 harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 

 litigation; [and] 

 (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 

 specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after 

 a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery[.] 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). If the Court finds that Rule 11 has been violated then it can, but does not 

have to, impose sanctions on the attorneys and FBMS. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). See also Hill v. 

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Mr. Money Fin. Co. & First Citizens Banc Corp., 309 F. App’x 950, 965 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(explaining that the imposition of sanctions for violations of Rule 11 is discretionary, not 

mandatory). Rule 11 does not apply to “disclosures and discovery requests, responses, 

objections, and motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d). 

 Courts are given great discretion in determining if sanctions are warranted. Mann v. G & 

G Mfg., Inc., 900 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1990). An attorney’s actions are subject to an objective 

reasonableness standard under Rule 11. Id. The proper question is whether the attorney’s 

conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. (quoting Century Prods., Inc. v. Sutter, 837 

F.2d 247, 253 (6th Cir. 1988)). The circumstances should be viewed at the time the pleading or 

motion was filled and not with the benefit of hindsight. Id. (quoting INVST Fin. Grp., Inc. v. 

Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 401 (6th Cir. 1987)). 

 The Court may sanction represented parties under Rule 11. Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel 

Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 398 (6th Cir. 2009). The imposition of sanctions on a represented 

party is a “harsh remedy” that should be saved for “unusual circumstances” and with “sensitivity 

to the facts of the case and the party’s financial situation.” Rodriquez v. Credit Bureau of 

Ypsilanti, 14 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Milam, 855 F.2d 739, 743 (11th 

Cir. 1988)). See also Rentz, 556 F.3d at 398 (stating that courts have generally declined to 

impose sanctions on represented parties). 

 Ohio Rev. Code §2323.51 is not applied in federal courts. It cannot provide alternative or 

additional grounds for the imposition of sanctions and fees. First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford 

Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 501, 529-30 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court holding 

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that Ohio Rev. Code §2323.51 is inapplicable in federal court because it is procedural, rather 

than substantive law). See also Collins v. Allen, No. 1:04-cv-572, 2005 WL 1073369, at *2 (S.D. 

Ohio Mar. 16, 2005); Pettrey v. Enter. Title Agency, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-1504, 2006 WL 3342633, 

at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2006). 

III. Discussion 

 This Court concludes that neither sanctions nor fees are warranted from the facts of this 

case. The attorneys’ conduct, while not exemplary, was not objectively unreasonable under the 

circumstances; and FBMS did not engage in conduct egregious enough to warrant sanctions. 

Additionally, O’Harra offers the Court little more than conclusory statements to support its Rule 

11 claims. 

 FBMS’s counsel, collectively, was not unreasonable in filing the instant case. O’Harra 

points to the multiple state court cases as a clear sign that this litigation was initiated only to 

harass her. It is not clear from the circumstances that this litigation was initiated to harass the 

defendants or for any other improper purpose. O’Harra bases her conclusion on state court cases 

No. 11CVH01-1198 and No. 11-cv-009011. See generally Section I ante. Both cases were filed 

by Laura Harris, who is not an attorney, and dismissed, either on procedural grounds or 

voluntarily. It would not be unreasonable for an attorney to believe that FBMS had a proper 

purpose, and was not simply seeking to harass O’Harra. 

 The lack of evidence is likewise not a reason to sanction FBMS’s attorneys. Computer 

hacking is difficult to prove. It was not unreasonable under the circumstances for the attorneys 

to have relied on FBMS’s factual claims in filing Case No. 2:11-cv-01073. The law does not 

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require attorneys to be computer forensics experts in order to determine if a claim has merit. The 

attorney is only required to have an objectively reasonable belief that a claim “will likely have 

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). FBMS did provide evidence to the police, and presumably its attorneys, that 

there was “malware and malicious software on his computer.” (ECF No. 66-4 at Page ID # 979.) 

The inability of FBMS to provide causal evidence prior to discovery does not mean it was 

unreasonable for counsel to believe such evidence existed. 

 It was not objectively unreasonable for the attorneys to continue to prosecute the case. 

Unfortunately there was a lot of change in representation that led to delays in discovery and 

prosecution of the case. But FBMS ultimately dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It is not 

clear that the delays were intended to harass, delay, or increase litigation costs. The allegations 

O’Harra makes are conclusory and based only on the fact that FBMS has previously pursued 

similar litigation in state court and that causal evidence was not discovered immediately. 

O’Harra’s statements do not prove that the attorneys, any or all of them, acted beyond what was 

reasonable under the circumstances. 

 Furthermore, O’Harra has failed to provide this Court with enough to detail to conclude 

what costs, if any, were caused by delays in the litigation. O’Harra’s attorney’s bill (ECF No. 

74-1) is vague and seems to include material that “represents general research not properly 

billable to a single client,” and that was not billed to O’Harra. (ECF No. 74 at Page ID # 1090.) 

The bill does not specify what actions, by which counsel, caused O’Harra to incur which 

charges. There are too many FBMS counsel that would ultimately be liable for costs that their 

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actions did not create. FBMS’s counsel could have been far more diligent, but their actions do 

not necessitate that Rule 11 sanctions be levied against them. 

 As for FBMS itself, it is not clear that FBMS knowingly pursued claims that lacked 

factual support or that FBMS was using this litigation to harass O’Harra. And even if sanctions 

were warranted, the imposition of sanctions against FBMS would be an exercise in futility. 

FBMS, the only named plaintiff, is a defunct business that could not likely foot a $15,000 bill for 

fees. See Ohio Secretary of State Corporation Details, http://www2.sos.state.oh.us/pls/bsqry/ 

f?p=100:7:0::NO:7:P7_CHARTER_NUM:1306555 (last visited July 12, 2013). Moreover, the 

allegations made by O’Harra are conclusory and fail to show that FBMS engaged in conduct that 

warrants sanctions. 

 This Court recognizes its inherent authority to impose sanctions. Having concluded, 

however, that sanctions are inappropriate under Rule 11 and that the circumstances of FBMS and 

its counsel would render the imposition of joint and several liability unjust, the Court declines to 

exercise its power. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant O’Harra’s motion for sanctions 

and fees. (ECF No. 66.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Gregory L. Frost 

 GREGORY L. FROST 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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