IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

 EASTERN DIVISION

Dwight Freeman, :

 Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:11-cv-878

 v. : JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST

 Magistrate Judge Kemp

Gary C. Mohr, et al., :

 Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on the defendants’ motion to

compel plaintiff Dwight Freeman to pay the full filing fee for

this case. Mr. Freeman has responded to the motion. For the

following reasons, the Court will recommend that the motion be

granted and that Mr. Freeman be required to pay the full filing

fee or suffer dismissal.

I. 

By order dated March 28, 2012, the Court granted Mr. Freeman

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In his complaint Mr.

Freeman, a state prisoner housed at the Ohio State Penitentiary

in Youngstown, asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for alleged

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs involving a

hernia and pinched nerves in his neck. On April 17, 2012,

defendants filed their motion to compel full payment of the

filing fee. Following the filing of that motion, Mr. Freeman

filed a notice of voluntary dismissal based on a tentative

settlement of this and other cases which he had filed. He later

moved to withdraw that notice and reopen this case. By order

dated September 6, 2012, the Court granted Mr. Freeman’s motion

to reopen, reinstated the motion to compel, and directed the

issuance of this Report and Recommendation. 

II.

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In their motion, defendants contend that Mr. Freeman has had

three or more prior cases dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

If that is so, under the so-called “three strikes” provision of

the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), he is not

entitled to proceed in forma pauperis unless he can show that he

is in imminent danger of serious harm. Although Mr. Freeman

claims to be able to satisfy this standard, defendants argue

that, with respect to his complaints of neck pain, Mr. Freeman

currently is litigating that issue in Case No. 2:08-cv-71 filed

in this Court and, with respect to his hernia, this is a not a

dangerous situation. They assert that Mr. Freeman simply

disagrees with the diagnosis that the hernia is reducible without

the need for surgery. 

In response, Mr. Freeman does not dispute that he is subject

to the three-strikes rule, but argues that he has met the

imminent danger exception allowing him to proceed in forma

pauperis. It is evident from his response that Mr. Freeman is,

as defendants contend, quite familiar with the concept of

imminent danger and some of his response is virtually a word for

word recitation of language addressing this issue as set forth in

previous opinions of this Court. Specifically, Mr. Freeman notes

the Sixth Circuit holding in Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 2011 WL

11055652 (6th Cir. 2011), that the denial of medical treatment

can satisfy the imminent danger requirement of §1915(g). 

Further, he cites to Jackson v. Jackson, 335 Fed. Appx. 14 (11th

Cir. 2009) for its holding that the failure to provide hernia

surgery satisfied the requirement. He also cites to Case No.

2:08-cv-71 as an example of his claim of medical indifference

meeting the imminent danger requirement. The Court must

therefore determine whether he or defendants have the better of

this argument. 

III.

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Under that portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

codified at 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), the so-called “three strikes”

rule, a prisoner may not bring a suit in forma pauperis if that

prisoner “has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court

of the United States that was dismissed on the ground that it is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of

serious physical injury.” Thus, he is not entitled to proceed in

forma pauperis and to pay the filing fee in installments unless

he can demonstrate that he meets the “imminent danger”

requirement of §1915(g). Otherwise, he must pay the entire

filing fee (currently $350.00) at the outset of the case. As

discussed above, there is no dispute here that Mr. Freeman is a

“three strikes” prisoner. A quick Westlaw search easily confirms

this. Consequently, the only issue before the Court is whether

Mr. Freeman has demonstrated that he is in imminent danger of

serious physical injury.

 For purposes of determining whether a pleading satisfies

this exception, the Court considers whether the plaintiff is in

imminent danger at the time of the filing of the complaint.

Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416 F. Appx. 560, 562 (6th Cir. March 28,

2011) (table)(noting that “the plain language of §1915(g)

requires the imminent danger to be contemporaneous with the

complaint's filing”). Although the Court of Appeals has not

offered a precise definition of “imminent danger,” it has

suggested that the threat of serious physical injury “must be

real and proximate.” Rittner v. Kinder, 290 Fed.Appx. 796, 797

(6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2008). Moreover, “[a]llegations that the

prisoner has faced danger in the past and allegations that are

conclusory, ridiculous, or clearly baseless do not suffice to

allege imminent harm.” Tucker v. Pentrich, 2012 WL 1700701, at

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*1 (6th Cir. May 15, 2012), citing Rittner, supra.

In this Circuit, the denial of medical treatment can, under

certain circumstances, satisfy the imminent danger requirement. 

See, e.g., Vandiver, 416 Fed.Appx. at 563 (6th Cir. March 28,

2011) (alleged failure to treat diabetes and Hepatitis C), citing

Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 6–7 (D.C. Cir.

2006)(alleged failure to treat hepatitis C). Other Courts of

Appeals outside this Circuit likewise have found that the denial

of treatment may result in the imminent danger of serious

physical injury within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1915(g). For

example, in Jackson v. Jackson, 335 Fed.Appx. 14, 15 (11th Cir.

2009), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the

denial of hernia surgery met the imminent danger of serious

physical injury requirement, and it also found the requirement

satisfied in Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir.

2004) as a result of the withdrawal of treatment for HIV and

Hepatitis C, both chronic and possibly fatal diseases. Further,

the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has found that

“heart palpitations, chest pains, labored breathing, choking

sensations, and paralysis in ... legs and back” as a result of

the denial of medication constituted serious physical injury. 

Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Additionally, the failure to treat severe chronic pain has been

found to satisfy the imminent danger requirement under specific

circumstances. Freeman v. Collins, Case No. 2:08–cv–71, 2011 WL

1397594, *6 (S.D. Ohio April 12, 2011) (Deavers, M.J.); Perez v.

Sullivan, 2005 WL 3434395, *2 (W.D. Wis. December 13, 2005). 

Mr. Freeman devotes approximately seven and one-half pages

of his complaint to repeated assertions that he is subject to

imminent danger as a result of various defendants’ deliberate

indifference to his need for a hernia repair and his neck pain. 

His complaint contains the following allegations. On December 6,

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2010, he was seen at the surgery clinic for a hernia which was

causing him severe pain and vomiting. On January 10, 2011, he

had a “tela-med pre-operation with OSU surgeons” and was told

surgery would be scheduled “ASAP.” On February 24, 2011, certain

defendants refused Mr. Freeman’s surgery. On February 16, 2011,

Mr. Freeman was seen by a surgeon at OSU for his neck pain. On

June 8, 2011, he had an MRI and CAT scan which indicated that he

had pinched nerves in his neck. According to Mr. Freeman,

various defendants then conspired to prevent him from returning

to see the neurosurgeon as scheduled on July 7, 2011. 

Mr. Freeman attached to his complaint a 28-page exhibit

detailing his efforts to utilize the grievance process to address

the medical issues identified in the complaint. Included within

these pages are dispositions of grievances and one decision of

the Chief Inspector on Appeal. This information reveals the

following. According to the decision of the Chief Inspector on

appeal, dated August 4, 2011, a review of the CMC MOSS database,

Mr. Freeman’s electronic health records, his medical records

provided by the HCA, and his commissary records, the surgery

clinic noted that he had had a hernia repair 15 years earlier and

that he had told the physician that he had a recurrent hernia for

three months with nausea and vomiting for two weeks. See

Complaint, Exhibit 1, p.1. The exam revealed that the “hernia is

reducible and abdomen otherwise soft and non-tender.” Id. When

Mr. Freeman was seen by surgery via telemedicine for his hernia,

he told the doctor that “the hernia was painful and [he] desired

repair.” The report noted that the hernia was “reducible” and

that Mr. Freeman had “no bowel/bladder dysfunctions” and that he

“tolerated a regular diet.” Id. On February 24, 2011, Mr.

Freeman was seen for shoulder/neck pain and eye contusion and was

told at that time that the “umbilical hernia surgery would not be

done since the hernia was reducible per his collegial review

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consult with central office physicians and Advanced Level

Providers.” Id. at pp. 1-2. Mr. Freeman was seen on April 18,

2011, for various complaints, including his hernia and was told

that his hernia was “reducible” and did not require surgery. Id.

at p.2. Mr. Freeman was seen in CCC July 12, 2011, and no acute

symptoms were noted relating to his abdomen. Id. He was told

that his hernia surgery was an elective procedure which would not

be authorized by central office collegial review. Id. Based on

this information, the Chief Inspector affirmed the denial of Mr.

Freeman’s grievance but encouraged him to remain in contact with

the medical staff regarding his symptoms. Id. 

A disposition of grievance dated August 19, 2011, states

that a review of Mr. Freeman’s medical file with the HCA

indicated that he had been seen on July 29, 30, and August 6, 11,

and 12, 2011. See Complaint, Exhibit 1, p.23. Further, Mr.

Freeman has orders for several medications including prednisone,

baclofen, neurontin, muscle relaxer, and analgesic balm. Id. 

There is also a response dated February 28, 2011, on a

complaint resolution form that indicates that Mr. Freeman has

been repeatedly instructed on how to reduce the hernia and that

lying flat would help the pain. See Complaint, Exhibit 1, pp. 14-

15. A disposition of grievance dated May 18, 2011, notes that

Mr. Freeman’s medical healthcare is being monitored. 

Taking all of the above into account, the essence of Mr.

Freeman's complaint is simply that he disagrees with the opinions

of the medical personnel who have examined him. Such allegations

are insufficient to satisfy the imminent danger requirement of 28

U.S.C. §1915(g). Numerous other courts have reached the same

conclusion in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Watley v.

Escobar, 2010 WL 1643801 (N.D. Ohio April 22, 2010) (no imminent

danger where plaintiff received medical treatment but disagreed

with conclusions of medical personnel); James v. Hunter, 2009 WL

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3052131, *3 (S.D Alabama September 18, 2009) (disagreement with

medical treatment provided does not satisfy §1915(g) exception);

Joyner v. Fish, 2008 WL 2646691 (W.D.Va. July 3, 2008) (imminent

danger not demonstrated when plaintiff had been given thorough

medical treatment, never been denied doctor visit, and been

advised to take medication but disagreed with opinions of medical

professionals); Baugh v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 2008 WL

4831783, n. 1 (E.D.Mo. November 5, 2008) (no imminent danger

where plaintiff admitted he was offered treatment for medical

conditions but disagreed with offered treatment); Brown v. Beard,

492 F.Supp.2d 474, 478 (E.D.Pa. June 27, 2007) (prisoner was not

in imminent danger when disputing the quality of treatment he was

receiving for various medical conditions).

In short, Mr. Freeman has failed to show that he was under

imminent danger of serious physical injury as defined by §1915(g)

for purposes of his current complaint. First, with respect to

his neck pain or pinched nerve, Mr. Freeman’s complaint is simply

that the defendants refused to send him for a follow-up

appointment. This bare allegation, without more, does not

suggest imminent danger. Further, while the Court recognizes

that in Jackson, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had

met the imminent danger exception with respect to allegations

concerning his need for hernia surgery, Mr. Freeman’s case is

easily distinguishable. The exhibits Mr. Freeman attached to his

complaint indicate that he has been seen by medical personnel

repeatedly, has been prescribed various medications, is

requesting an elective procedure, has been advised about reducing

his hernia, and that his institution is monitoring his

healthcare. Similarly, this case is distinguishable from Case

No. 2:08-cv-71 because that case involved medical treatment

received by Mr. Freeman while housed at a different institution. 

Thus, defendants’ motion should be granted. 

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IV. 

For all the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends

that the pending motion to compel payment of the full filing fee

(#9) be granted and that Mr. Freeman be required to pay the

entire $350.00 filing fee. The Court further recommends that, if

Mr. Freeman fails to pay the entire filing fee within thirty days

of an order adopting this Report and Recommendation, this action

be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and that

Mr.Freeman still be assessed the $350.00 filing fee. See, e.g.,

Cohen v. Growse, 2011 WL 947085, *5–6 (E.D.Ky. March 14, 2011);

see also In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 2002).

V. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen days of the date of this Report, file

and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,

together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A judge

of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper

objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify,

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein,

may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).

 The parties are specifically advised that failure to object

to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the

right to have the district judge review the Report and

Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the

right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the

Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).

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/s/ Terence P. Kemp 

United States Magistrate Judge

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