### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 23, 200 8 S es sio n JEAN NE W. F ICKLE v. JA MES ED WAR D F ICKLE
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-002203-05 R obert L. Childers, Judge

No. W2007-01509-C OA-R3-C V - Filed August 19, 2008

Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Aff irme d; and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and W A LTER C. K URTZ , S R

. J., joined.
Stevan L. Black a nd Vickie Ha rdy Jones, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, James Edw ard Fickle.
Mitchell D. Moskovitz and Mary Morgan Whitfield, Memphis, Tennessee for the a ppellee, Je anne W. Fickle.
OP IN ION

I n this divorce action, Husband appea ls the t rial court’s valuation of his closely held stock
an d t h e c l a s s i f

i c a t i o no f i t s a p p r e c i a t i o na s m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y; t h e $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 aw ar d o f a l i m o n y in solido to Wi fe to a c c ount fo r he r int e re st in the a pp re c iatio n of that stoc k; the awa rd of $1 ,5 00 pe r m on th in transitional alimony for 60 months; and the awa rd t o Wife of $25,000 in attorney ’s fe es incurr ed throug h trial and of $1,500 in attorney ’s fe es incurr ed in def ending ag ainst husband’s mot ion to alter
or a me nd the jud g me nt. We a ff

ir m.
J ames Edwa

rd F ickle (H usband) a

nd J eanne W. Fickle (Wife) had bee n marrie d
a pp ro xima te ly

thi rt e e n y e ars wh e n Wif e fi le d th e c ompl aint

fo r d ivo rc e , a lle g ingina pp ro pr iate marital conduc t a

nd irrec oncilable differ ence s, on April 21, 2005. On August 9, 2005, the trial court enter ed a consent order between the parties to halve the equity in the marital re sidence . Husband re

financ ed the mortg ag e, re mained in the home, a nd paid Wife $120,843.13 for he r half. Wife a pplied a portion of that amount toward a dow n pay ment on a home f

or her sel f. Hu s b and answ ere d the complaint and the tria l took place f rom Fe bruar

y 19, 2007, to Febr

uary 21, 2007.The par t i es di s put e t he exa ct am ount of W i f e’ s i ncom e. The t r i al cour t neve r m ade a s p eci fi c f i ndi ng 1

r ega r di ng t hi s poi nt but f ocus ed i ns t ea d on t he r el at i ve di f f er enc e bet w ee n he r i ncom e and H us band’ s e ar ni ngs
. The
r ec or d r eve al s t hat he r 2007 i ncom e w as rou ghl y $70, 000, but f or t he s ake of a nal ys i s he r e, w e w i l l us e t he $72, 914 f i gu r e ur ged b y H usband. U l t i m at el y, how ever , t hi s proves t o be a di s t i nct i on w i t ho ut a di f f er ence.

W e not e t hat i n hi s am ended re sp o n ses t o t he f i r s t s et of i nt er r og at ori es , H usband re po r t ed a gr oss ea r ned 2 i ncom e of

$166, 719 f or t he f i r s t t hr ee qua r t er s of 2006.

W e not e t hat t hi s ca l cul at i on di d no t ac coun t f or t he equal di vi s i on of t he equi t y i n t he m ar i t al r es i dence. 3
-2- At the time of trial, Husba nd was 67 y ear s old, and Wife was 61 y ear s old. No children we re born o f t h e m ar riag e. Wife wa s employ ed as a senior proje ct manag er at First Tenne ssee with a projec ted 2007 income of $72,914. Husband, a p ro fessor at the Univer sity of Memphis, taug ht 1 during the usual school ter m, duri ng summer school, and throug h an online cour se, and e arne d at least $101,000 in 2006. Husband e arns a n additional $20,000 per y ear throug h a consulting 2 ag ree ment with Yale Unive rsity . He is also under contra ct to write numer ous books from which he will e arn a dditional income, but he has a lrea dy rec eived a

pproxi mately

$125,000 in advanc es fr om two org anizations, the United States Fore st Service and the Alabama For estry Association. At the time of trial, Husband ha d begun work on both publications but testified they wer e less than halfw ay complete. Upon c ompletion of the publications, Husband will r ece ive another $75,000 in total from bo th o rg anizatio ns . Si mil arl y , h e re c e ive s a pp ro xima te ly $2 ,0 72 pe r m on th i n So c ia l Se c ur ity income. F inally , Husband rece ives far m income each y ear from two I ndiana properties owne d by DMF Prope rties, I nc., a c orporation he wholly owns.
Th e tr ia l ju dg e g ra

nte d th e div or c e to Wi fe up on the sti pu late d g ro un d o f i nap pr op ri a te marital conduc t, rende red a bench r uling on F ebrua

ry 28, 2007, and enter ed the final dec ree on the following April 13. T h e co u rt awa rded Wife $75,000 a limony in solido for he r intere st in the
a pp re c ia tio n o f t

he I nd iana

pr op e rt y . T he tr ia l c ourt

the n a wa rd e d Wif e $1 ,5 00 per mo nt h in transitional alimony

for a period of 60 months (or upon her r ece ipt of a portion of Husba nd’s p e n s i o n , w h i c h e v e r

o c c u r r e d f i r s t )

. F i n a l l y, i taw ar d e d W i f e $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 a s a l i m o n y in solido for
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s b a se d in pa rt up on Hu sb and ’s dil a tor y ta c tic s thr ou g ho ut d isc ov e ry and tr ia l. It a lso
awa rd e d to Hu sb and

a $3 8, 74 9 lo an to DM F Pr op e rt ie s, I nc. , a nd c re dit e d $ 7, 50 0 to him

fo r h is dissipation of marital assets in furthe ranc e of a n extramarital af

fair.
Acc ording to the trial court’ s val u at i o ns, it awarde d to Wi fe $220,525, or 51% of the ne t marital estate , and it awa

rded to Husband $212,118, or 49% of t he same . These f igur es included the allocation of ma

rital debt to the parties; the alim ony awa rds for attorney ’s fees and a pprec iation of the far mland; the assessment of $7,500 to H usband for the dissipation of mar ital assets; and the loan to DMF Proper

ties, I nc. I n contra st to the roug hly eq u al d i v i s i o n of marital a ssets, the listing of 3 separ ate a ssets ref

lected a signific ant disparity : Husband owne d separ ate as s et s v al u ed at approximately

$699,678, wher eas Wife’ s separ ate a ssets totaled approximately $97,356.
Wife filed a motion to alter or a mend before entry of t he final order, a nd Husband filed a

23- pa g e mot ion to a lte r or a me nd tw o we e ks a ft e r e ntr y of the fi na l de c re e
. Th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d b oth-3-

mot ion s and

or de re d H us ba

nd to p ay $1 ,5 00 of Wif e ’s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in c ur

re d in de fe nd inga g a ins t his moti on to alter or a

mend. Husband the n filed his notice of a ppeal on July

9, 2007.
Issues Presented
Hu sb and ra ise s th e fo llo wi ngtw e lve iss ue s o n a pp e a l:
1. Whether the trial court err ed in ide ntify ing the appre ciation of th e India na far m land commonly

known as the Cass County and W hite County

proper ties as marital pr operty

rathe r than the ap p reciation of DMF Properties, Inc., wher e DM F P ro p er t ies, I nc., wa s stipulated to be the owner of the Indiana far m land;

2

. Whethe r

th e tr ia l c o u rt e r

r e d in f in d in g th a t t

h e r e w a s a

s u b s ta n tia l contribution by

Wife to the appre ciation of the I ndiana f arm land;
3. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in i n cluding $254,000, the stipulated
a pp re c iatio n o f t

he I nd iana

fa rm land , a s a mari ta l a sse t;
4. Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in ord e ri ng Hu sb and to pay to Wife a lim ony in solido in t he amount of $75,000 to re prese nt Wi fe’ s m ar i t al interest in the appre ciation of the Indiana f arm land;

5. Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in inc lud ingHu sb and ’s de bt t o D MF Pr op e rt ie s, I nc. of $38,749 in the m arital e state and in a war ding this “a sset” to Husband;
6. Whether the trial court err ed in identifying poc ket cha ng e which w as being saved f or the c olleg e educ ation of Husband’ s g randchild as a mar ital asset and in valuing said pocke t chang e at $5,000;

7. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in awa rding Wife transitional alimony in the
a mou nt o f $ 1, 50 0 p e r m on th f

or a pe ri od of 60 c on se c uti ve mon ths ;
8. Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in f ind ingthat H us ba

nd dis sip a te d ma

ri ta l a sse ts totaling $7,500 a

nd in a war ding this sum to H usband as a division of marital p r o p e rt y;
9. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in or dering Husband to pa y the sum of $25,000 to Wi fe ’s a tto rn e y

fo r atto rn e y [’s ] fe e s a

nd su it e xpe ns e s;
10. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in awa rding Wife attorney [’s] fee s in the amount of $1,500 alleg edly incurre d by her in de fendingag ainst Husband’s motion to alter or a

mend;-4-

11

. Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in

de nyingHu sb and ’s re qu e st f or a tto rn e y [’s ] fee s associate d wi th the filing a nd prese ntation of his motion t o alter or amend a nd his defense of Wife’s motion to alter or amend; and

12

. Whe the r H us ba

nd sh ou ld b e awa

rd e d h is atto rn e y [’s ] fe e s in c ur re d in pr os e c uti ngthi s a

pp e a l.

I n s tark c on tr a st, Wif

e ra ise s o nly

on e iss ue fo r o ur

re vie w, a s f

oll ow s: [W hether Wife should] be aw arde d h e r re asonable attorney [’s] fee s and suit expenses inc ur re d in de fe nd ingthi s a

pp e a l.
Sta nda rd of Re v ie w
This case primarily

involves a di s p u t e o v er the classification, valuation, and division of marital asse ts, all of which ar e questions of fa ct. We acc ord g rea t weig ht to the trial court’s division of marital assets and will not disturb that decision unless “the distribution lacks proper evidentiar

y support or results in some err or of law or misapplication of statutory require ments and proc edure s.” Keyt v. Key t , 2 4 4 S

. W

. 3 d

3 2 1 , 3 2 7 (T en n
. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g He rre ra v . H e rre ra , 944 S.W .2d 379, 389 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 6) ). I nd e e d, we re vie w the tr ia l c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s de novo on the re cord with a pre sum ption of corr ectne ss and will overturn them only when the pr eponder ance of the
e vid e nc e is oth e rw ise

. Te nn . R. App . P. 13 (d ); Union Carbide v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 3 )

. W h e n a t r i a l c o u rt ' s f a c tu a l f i n d i n g s r e s to ni t s a s s e s s m e n to f a w i t n e s s ' s c r e d i b i l i t y, we wi ll r e -e va luate the a sse ssm e nt on ly wh e n c le ar and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e to the c on tr ary e xists

. Sirc yv . M e tro . G ov ’t

of N as hv ill e , 1 8 2 S

. W

. 3 d

8 1 5 , 8 1 8 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g W ells v. Tenn. Bd . o f R e ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999) ).

H u s b an d a l s o c h a l l e n g e s t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s aw ar d o f t r an s i t i o n a l a l i m o n y an d

a l i m o n y in solido for attorney ’s fe es. B eca use the for

m and amoun t of an a limony awa rd lies within the sound discretion o f t he trial c ourt, appe llate cour ts will not overturn suc h awa rds abse nt an abuse of discretion. Riggs v. Riggs , 25 0 S. W.3 d 4 53 , 4 57 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 7) ; Lindsey v. Lindsey , 976 S.W .2d 175, 180 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). A dditionally , an aw ard of attorney ' s fee s is within t he trial court' s discretion, and this Court will not interfe re with suc h an awa rd absent a clea

r showing of an abuse of discretion. Aaron v. Aaron , 9 0 9 S

. W

. 2 d 4 0 8 , 4 1 1 (T en n
. 1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t i n g Storey v . Storey , 835 S.W. 2d 59 3, 59 7 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 2) ; Crouch v. Crouch , 385 S.W .2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964)).

I n contra st to the above standards, no pr esumption of corr ectne ss attache s to a trial cour t’s conclusions of law

. Keyt , 244 S.W .3d at 327.-5- Anal y sis
Al tho ug h H us ba

nd ra ise s nume ro us is su es on a pp e a l, t he pr ima ry po int s o f d isp ute in t

his
c a se inv olv e tw o tr a c ts o f I nd iana fa rm land ow ne d by DM F Pr op e rt ie s, I nc ., of wh ic h H us ba nd is 1 0 0 % s h ar e h o l d e r , a n d t h e $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 aw ar d o f a l i m o n y in solido to Wi fe f or her interest in the appre ciation of that separate property

. Husband also contends that the trial cour t erre d in including
a $3 8, 74 9 lo an to DM F Pr op e rt ie s, I nc . a s a mari ta l a sse t and

awa rd ingit t o h im. Additionally , Husband a sserts that an a war d to Wi fe of

attorney ’s fe es in the amount of $25,000 was error; that Wife doe s not need tra nsitional alimony

in the amount of $1,500 per month; that he did not dissipate assets in the amount of $7,500 ( althoug h he plainly admits the ext rama

rital aff air); a nd that his “pocke t chang e” w as a separ ate asset totaling far less than $5,000. He f urther
c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s awa rd of $1 ,5 00 in a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Wif e fo r havin g to de fe nd

a g a ins t his mot ion

to a lte r o r a

me nd . F ina lly , b oth

pa rt ie s se e k atto rn e y ’s fe e s o n a pp e a l. We no w t

ur n to eac h issue raised by

Husband.

I. DMF Properties, Inc. and th e $75,000 Award of Alim ony in S olido Husband disputes the c ourt’s valuation of hi s interest in the land as w ell as its classification of the incr ease in market value as m arital property

. The parties stipulated that the land had inc rea sed in value by

$254,000 during the course of the parties’ marria g e. The trial c ourt found $186,000 of the land’s va lue to be sepa rate proper

ty and t h e i ncre ase of

$254,000 to be marital prope rty . The parties do not dispute these values on appea l. I nstead, Husba

nd contends that the a sset in question is his st ock in DMF Properties, not the l and it self; according to Husband, because Wife introduced no evide n ce as t o t h e i ncre ase in va lue (or va lue at all) of the stock, the trial judg e’s a war d of $75,000 of alimony

in solido was in er

ror. Husba

nd asser ts that e ven if the asse t in question were the land itself, Wife did not contribute to its apprec iatio n i n v al u e and cannot claim it as marital proper ty

. T h e t r i a l c o u rtaw ar d e d

W i f e $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 i na l i m o n y in solido for her inter est in the appre ciation of the fa rm land owne d by

Husband throug h his c l o s el y h eld cor poration, DMF Properties, Inc. Whe n th e c ourt

re nd e re d it s b e nc h r

uli ngto t his e ff e c t, i t st a te d a s f

oll ow s:
Wit h ref ere nce to the division of mar ital assets, the wife claims a mar ital int e re st i n th e I nd iana

fa rm s o wn e d b y

the hu sb and

throug h D MF Pr op e rt ie s, I ncorpor ated. The va lue of DMF Properties, Incorpor ated is re ally the value of

the fa rm land

. Th e a mou

nt of a pp re c iatio n of the land sti pu late d by the pa rt ies is 25 4, 00 0 d oll ars
. The husband c onsistently

spent marital fu

n d s f o r th e ma in te n a n c e , u p k e e p and taxes on the I ndiana properties. I n addition, the wife’s contributions as a wa g e ea rner during the m arr iag e enabled the husband t o spend m arital income on prese rving and i mp r o v i n g t h e In d i an a

p r o p e rt y.-6- Whil e the wif

e wa s employ ed, she pla

nned her vac ation time in a manner that
a llo we d h e r t o tr a vel wi th h us ba nd to s e min ars and

c on ve nti on s to he lp h im i n promoting his books and tra veled with him to c onduct rese arc h, interviews, a nd the wife e ntertaine d for the husba nd. Whil e laid off

from her e mploy

ment, the wife worke d during t h e m ar ri ag e as home maker and fur ther c ontributed to husband’s writing car eer
. Th e Court ha s con sid e re d the duratio n of the marr ia g e , th e pa rt ie s’ a g e , th e ir ph y sic a l and

me nta l hea lth , the ir vo c a tio na l skill s, the ir e arn ingc a pa c ity , th e ir

e state a t th e tim e of

the marr ia g e , a

nd no w, the fi na

nc ia l li a bil iti e s and

the fi na nc ia l ne e ds , the re lative ability

of ea ch par

ty for future acquisitions of capital a ssets and income,
eac h party ’s contributi ons to the ac quisiti on, prese rvation, appr eciation, deprec iation or dissi p ati on of the mar ital or separ ate pr operty including c ontributions as ho me make r o r w a g e e arn e r, the va lue of the pa rt ie s’ se pa rate pr op e rt

y , th e e c on omi c c ir c ums tances of ea c h p art y and the a mou nt o f s oc ia l se c ur ity

be ne fi ts a

va ila ble to eac h party

. Considering all these fa ctors, the Court orde rs the husband to pa y to wife the sum of 75,000 for he r marital inter est in the appre ciation in the Indiana f arms. We now turn to the arguments Husband ha s advanc ed, addr essing first the threshold que stion of classification.
Classi fication of the Appreciation in Hu sband’s St ock in DMF Properties, Inc.
Husband c ontends that the incre ase in land va lue was attributable solely to market c onditions and that the a

pprec iation in value is his separate prope rty . He a sserts that Wife had nothing to do with the proper

ty and, in fa ct, had ne ver se en it befor e. He lease s the proper ty to a t enant f

arme r and share s t h e ex penses of

crop pr oduction with him, routinely paying the expenses in advanc e. Ac c or din g to h is a g re e me nt w ith the te na nt fa rm e r, the te na

nt fa rm s the land and

su pp lie s e qu ipm e nt, labor, a nd fuel. Husba

nd splits t he cost of se ed and f ertilizer and re ceive s half the pr ocee ds in return. Wif e c on te nd s th a t ma

ri tal fun ds we re us e d f

or the a dv anc e pa

y me nt o f e xpe ns e s and

that th os e pa y me nts c on sti tut e d a c on tr ibutio n to the land ’s pr e se rv a tio n a nd a pp re c iatio n in

va lue . Sh e a lso highlig hts her employ

ment outside the home for eleve n y ears, her a ssistance in proof rea ding he r husband’s wor

k, and her enter taining his business collea g ues.
The Te nnessee Code provides that the inc ome from a nd the appr eci ati on in value of a sp ou se ’s se pa

rate pr op e rt

y c an b e c ome mari ta l pro pert y whe re bo th s po us e s h a ve su bs tanti a lly contributed to its preser

vation and appr eciation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(b)( 1)(B ) (2005)

. Those contr ibutions m ay

be dire ct or indirect. Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121 (b)( 1)(D) (2005. Even so, they must be both “rea l and sig nificant” and connected in some way to the asset’s a

pprec iation in value. Keyt v. Key t , 244 S.W .3d 321, 329 (Tenn. 2007)

.H u sb a n d sta te d th a t t h e “ o n ly a sse t o f D M F is t h e lan d .” 4

The r e c or d i nc l ud e s c he c ks w r i t t e n t o t he c ou nt y t r e a s ur e r f or $9 68

. 41 a nd $9 , 86 8. 41 , a s w e l l a s a check 5

w r i t t en on a j oi nt a cc ount t o t he U ni t ed St at es Tre as ur y ( f or 2002 t axe s r el at ed t o t he f ar m ) i n t he am ount of $2, 077. 75.

For exam pl e, a key cr i t er i on not ed i n bo t h app r ai s al s of t he f ar m l and w as s oi l product i vi t y. W e a l s o no t e t hat 6 b o th a p p ra ise rs a g re e d th a t t h e h ig h e st a n d b e st u se o f th e lan d w a s to fa rm it

. -7- I n th is c a se , th e so le a sse t of the c or po ratio n, wh ic h is its e lf

wh oll y ow ne d by

Hu sb and , is far m land. Even thoug h there is a far m chec king a ccoun t , i t ap p ear s that far m-related funds and 4 marital funds we re suf

ficiently commingle d in that acc ount so as to rende r i t a marital asse t. On
cross-e x amination, Husband c oncede d that over the course of ni ne y ear s, $150,499 of marital f unds
were d ep o s i t ed into this acc ount. He fur ther testified that over that same period he paid betwe en $18,000 and $19,0 0 0 o f famil y expenditures from the f arm a ccount. Husba

nd also proff

ere d evidenc e at tria l that marital funds had g one towar d crop pr oduction expenses, including se ed, fer tiliz er a nd the like. Yet, he ar gu es t h at the income f rom the cr ops have a lway s exceede d the (adva nced) expenses and have enric hed the mar ital estate by approximately

$68,000.
There was no t es t i m ony

at trial that the incr ease in value wa s solely marke t driven, and Hu sb and te sti fi e d th a t th e re wa s n o d e ve lop me nt p ote nti a l f or the land . H us ba

nd and Wif e dis pu te the amount spent on ditch improvements on th e l and. Husband conce ded that appr ox imately two to t hr e e y e ars pr ior

to t ri a l, h e sp lit

the c os t of

dig g ingdr a ina g e dit c he s with the te na nt, bu t he c ou ld not rec all the amount spent on the pro j ect. In response to Wi fe’ s alleg ation that they had spent $30,000 on ditches, Husband stated that they had dis cussed making those improve ments but never did.
The trial c ourt found that Husband had paid for the upkeep, for improvements, and for taxes on the fa rm from mar ital funds. The re cord c ontains additional support for this finding, including copies of chec ks for tax pay ments. We cannot conclude that the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the

5 trial court’ s impli cit conclusion that Wife made s ub s t an t i al contributions to the prese rvation and appre ciation of the f

arm land. In this case, Husba nd not only

advanc ed cr op production expenses to the tenant fa

rmer, but he and W ife appare ntly bore the risk as we ll, ag ree ing to split the proce eds rathe r than c ollect a f

ix ed re nt. We have no doubt that the continued profitability of a f arm ope ration
s erv es t o i n cr ea s e t h e l an d ’s v al u e, p ar t i cu l ar l y wh er e t h e o n l y

ap p ar en tu s e o f t h e l an d

i s fa rm i n g. 6 The routine a dvance of expenses for the fa rming operation is, i n our opinion, a rea l a nd substantial contribution made throug h the use of the F ickles’ mar ital funds. Fur ther, they paid the prope rty

taxes from mar ital funds. Finally , althoug h they offe red c onflict i ng testimony reg ardingditch improvements to the prope rty , we c an only presume that the trial court ba sed its conclusion on a
cre dibilit y

assessment of H usband and of W i fe an d a determination that Wi fe’ s testimony proved more pe rsuasive. We a

re ha rd pre ssed to find clea

r and c onvincing evidenc e to the contr ary
.I n usi ng t he net as s et m et ho d of val uat i on , t he expert r el i ed up on t he l and app r ai s al s provi ded b y t he part i es 7

an d u p o n t h e c o rp o rate tax retu rn s. -8- V aluati on of the St

ock’s Apprec iation
Hu sb and vig or ou sly cha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s va luatio n o f t he a pp re c iatio n in

DM F Properties, Inc., stock. At trial, Husba nd’s expert testified t hat t he value of t he st ock at the be g inning of th ei r m arr iag e wa s $139,380, but that as of Nove mber of 2007, it wa s worth $286,387 , 7 notwithstanding the incre as e i n v al ue of the land. The e x pert e x plained that seve ral fa ctors connec ted with valuing corpor ate stock impac ted these numbe rs: that fair ma rket va lue contemplate s a sale o f th e a s s e t; th a t a

s a le o f th e la n d w o u ld r e s u lt in th e le v y o f s ig n if ic an t t a xe s , in c lu d ing capital g ains taxes, thus reducing the value of the cor porate stock; that, if the proc eeds w ere distributed to the sha

reholde r, they would ag ain be taxed at the dividend or normal income ta x rate ; and that a va luation of the stock of a closely held cor poration would re quire a

15-25% discount for marke tability . On cr oss-examination, the ex pert stated how he ar rived at the lower f

igur e: he reduc ed the a

ppraised va lue of the land by the corpor ate debt owed to H usband ($38,749, as listed
on the tax re turn), further reduc ed it by some $64,000 of estimated taxes upon the sale of the land, and then discounte d that value b y 1 5 % fo r m arke tability . Husband ha d testified that he ha d no intention of selling the pr operty ; the expert conce ded this fac t and explained that, none theless, the net asset method c ontemplated a sa le of the la nd.
Rather than adopt t he expert’s va luation of the cor porate stock, the trial cour t instead used the stipulated land value that was ba sed upon re cent a ppraisals. The trial court c oncluded that “[t] he value of DMF Prope rties, I ncorpor ated is re ally the va l ue of the far

m land. The amount of appre ciation of the la

nd stipulated by

the par ties is 254,000 dollars.” In Po we ll v . P owe ll, this Court addre ssed the question of how to prope rly value a closely held cor poration for

this very purpose: [I n W allace v. W

allace , 733 S.W .2d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987), this Court] opined th a t “ [d ]e te r

mi n in g th e v a lu e o f a

c lo s e ly h e ld c o r p o r a ti o nis n o t a

ne xa c t s c ie n c e [, ]” . . . and that “[t]here ar e a number of acc eptable me thods available to de termine the
v al u e o f a corporation.” . . . T he choic e of the proper method or combination of methods depends upon the unique circ umstances of eac h corpor ation.

Po we ll v . P owe ll , 124 S.W .3d 100, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)( citations omitt ed). In this case, the trial court wa s clea

rly not persuade d by

Husband’s e x pert to adopt the lowe r stock value as he ha d proposed. In valuing a mar ital asset, the trial c ourt may assig n an a s s et value within the ra ng e of values supported by

the evidenc e. Id. at 105. The evidenc e does not pr eponder ate ag ainst the trial court’s a doption of the s t i p u l at ed ap p rec iation in value wher e the land is the sole a sset of the corpor ation, which is itself wholly owned by

Husband.-9- Treatm ent of Corporate Debt
Husband a dditionally

argues that the c orporate debt of $38,749 pay able to him should either be deduc ted from the stock value or eliminated a s a marital a sset. This loan beca me an issue by virtue of Husba

nd’s ex pert’s use of the c orporate tax return. Ther e is no evidenc e in the re cord reg ardingwhat use w as made of the loan pr ocee ds. I n fac t, Husband, the sole sha reholde r, testified that he wa s not even a

war e of the loan and de scribed it as a n “ac counting proce dure.”
We find that Husband’s a

rg ument reg ardingthe valuation of the stock lacks mer it. However persua sive Husband’ s argument reg arding the awa rd of the loan to him may

be – and e ven assuming the awa rd wa s err or – we are still unable to concl u d e t h at the trial cour t’s division of the marital estate w as inequitable.

II. $7 ,5 00 Ass essme nt f

or Di ssi pa tio n of Ma rit al A sse ts
Husband a dditionally challeng es anothe r fa ctor impac ting the division of the mar ital estate: the tr ia l c ourt ’s a sse ssm e nt o f $ 7, 50 0 to him fo r d iss ipatio n o f m ari ta l a sse ts. Th e re is n o d isp ute that H us ba

nd e ng a g e d in

an e xt ram ari tal affa ir

pr ior to t he tim e of

tr ia l. Wi fe lis te d $ 7, 50 0 a s a mari ta l a sse t in

he r R ule XIV( c ) a ff

ida vit , in dicatin g th a t H us ba nd ha d s pe nt at le a st t

his muc h in tr a ve l e xpe ns e s and

g if ts f or his pa ra mou r. I n his am e nd e d an sw e rs to the fi rs t se t of int e rr og a tor ie s, Husband listed the following trips he took w ith Jean Oury (Ms. Oury ) and the expenses he incur red:
On a tr ip to A la s k a

in Ju ly o f 2 0 0 5 , H u s b an d

p a id M s
. O u r y ’ s a ir p la n e ti c k e t. He also paid for

some meals and e ntertainment in the amount of $1,000.

I n Fe bruar

y of 2006, Husband trave led to L ittle Rock, A rkansa s, with Ms. Oury but
s t at edt h at t h e F o re s tHi s t o ry S o ci et y p ai d fo r e v ery t h i n g.
I n May of 2006, he trave led to I ndianapolis, I ndiana, and listed $300 as t o tal
e xpe ns e s.
I n J uly and August of 2006, Husband aga i n t ra v eled to Alaska with Ms. Oury and pa id f or he r a ir fa re (a pp ro xima te ly

$1 ,0 00 ) a

nd fo r s ome sig hts e e inge xcurs ion s.
I n Augus t of 200 6, Hu sb and tr a ve le d to Conn e c tic ut an d Ne w Hamps hir e wi th M s. Oury . He a sserted that she paid for her own airfa

re but that Ya le Univer sity paid for the re st of the trip.
On th ree oc c a sio ns in S e pte mbe r a nd Oc tob e r o f 2 00 6, Hu sb and too k M s. Oury

to B a ton Rou g e , L ou isi ana

fo r L SU fo otba ll g a me s. He e sti mate d e a c h tr ip t o c os t approximately

$400 eac h.-10-

At trial, Wife provided a

listi ng of Husband’ s expenses compiled from his financial r ecor ds from January

to Oct o b er of 2006. In Fe bruar y of 2006, Husband spe nt $100 at Gould’s Day Spa. Ms. O ury testified that Husband had purcha sed a Gould’s g ift cer tificate for he r, and Wife testified he had ne ver g iven her

any thing f rom Gould’s.
The exhibi t pr ovides an e x tensive list of Marc h 2006 expenses totaling $5,437.42 incur red
on Hu sb and ’s tr ip to Ut ah, Ne w M e xico , a nd Ok laho ma . I t a lso re ve a ls $ 55 0 f or Or ph e um t ic ke ts; May 2006 expenses totaling $543.38 on a trip to I ndiana; $727 of ex penses incur red at the I ndy

500; another $321.16 incurre d on a trip to I ndiana; expenses assoc iated with trips t o Pennsy lvania, Ore g on, an d Al as k a totaling $8,867.87; $2,209.78 spent on a trip to Connecticut and Ne w Hampshire; $3,424.19 in expenses re lated to three trips to Baton Roug e, L ouisiana; and $427 spent
on Gra nd Prix tickets. These e x penses total $22,689.80. Wife also provide d a similar bre akdown fo r 2 00 5, and

that li st i nc lud e d a

$5 00 c ha rg e in N ov e mbe r fo r Or

ph e um tic ke ts a s we ll a s at le a st $5,000 in cumulative expenses re lated to B aton Roug e trips. Ms. Oury testified that Husband had spent money on her but c ould only be as spe cific a s “a lot less” than $10,000. She conf irmed that they

trave led twice to Alaska: the first time he paid for her a irfar e, for the room, meals, tours, and e x cursions. On the se cond trip, Ms. Oury testified that she p a id f o r h e r o w na ir f ar e
. Sh e a ls o s tate d

th a t t h e y tr a v e le d to U ta h in M ar c h o f

2 0 0 6 , and Hu sb and dr ov e he r the re and pa id f or he r m e a ls. She c on fi rm e d th a t th e y tr a ve le d to I nd iana

po lis in May of 2006, and later to Connecticut a nd New H ampshire, a lthough she paid her airfa re. She
conce ded that he pur chase d Orphe um tickets for them, took he r to L SU g ames approximately five or six times, a

nd g ave her some jewelr

y , g ift cer tificates to Talbots and Gould’s Da y spa, and a cloak.
When asked how much m oney he had spent on Ms. Oury in total, Husband did not know, but te s ti f ie d th a t it w a s d e f

in it e ly le s s th an $ 2 5 , 0 0 0

. Wh e n a s k e d if it w a s mo r e o r le s s than $5,000, Hu sb and c on c e de d h e c ou ld n ot s ay . H us ba nd te sti fi e d th a t, w iththe e xce pti on of the L SU v isi ts, all of his trips were work-r elated; that his expenses we re pa id f o r b y the var ious org anizations sending him to thos e locations; and tha t Ms. Oury usually stay ed in his room, thus avoiding a ny additional expenses to him. As for the L SU g ames, Husband testified that he had a lway s travele d to B a ton Rou g e fo r t

he g a me s and

that Ms . O ur

y ’s pr e se nc e the re a dd e d ve ry little to h is u su a l c os ts.
F or e xamp le , H us ba

nd te sti fi e d a s f

oll ow s:
Ibo ug ht [M s. Our y ] an air plan e tic ke t f or the fi rs t tr ip t o A la sk a . A nd that w a s I think – Iknow it was under $1,000. The re st of that trip was expen s e, s o Ispent nothing. We did take a couple of littl e si de trips and little cruise thing s. Those we re $1 50 , $ 20 0. Som e thi nglik e that. M e a ls, I do n’ t kn owho w you wo uld tot a l th a t. But a s Isaid, that was mostly expense.For exam pl e, he ass er t ed t hat Y al e U ni vers i t y pai d f or hi s t r i ps t o C on nect i cut an d N ew H am pshi r e a nd t hat 8
t he U

. S. Fores t Ser vi ce pai d for hi s r es ear ch t r i ps t o A l as ka and t o on e t r i p t o B at on Ro ug e. -11- Hu sb and a dd re sse d e a ch tr ip , inc lud ingthe L SU g a me s, the tr ip t o A rk ans a s, and the tr ip t o Conne c tic ut a

nd Ne w Ha

mps hir e , in thi s fa sh ion

. I n e sse nc e , h e state d th a t mo st o f t he tr a ve l c os ts we re c ov e re d b y

the sp on so ri ng or g anizatio n of the re se arc h he wa s c on du c tin g in t ho se loc a tio ns
. 8

Am on g the fa c tor s th a t c ourt s ma y c on sid e r whe n f

a sh ion ingan e qu ita

ble d i v i s i o no f

a m ar i t a l e s t a t e i s a

p art y' s d i s s i p a t i o no f

t h e m ar i t a l o r

s e p ar a t e p r o p e rt y. Tenn

. Co d e A n n
. § 3 6

- 4

- 1 2 1 ( c ) ( 5 )

. E v e nth o u g h n o s tatuto r y d e f in it io nof “dissipation” exist s, the term has a common meaning in the context of divorce. The
conce pt of dissipation is base d on waste.

. . . Dissipation of marital prope rty occur s wh en o n e spouse use s marital prope rty , frivolously and without justification, for a purpose unr elated to the marria g e and at a time when the marria g e is br eakingdown.

. . . Dissipation involves intentional or purposef ul conduct . . . that has the eff ect of reduc ing the funds ava ilable for e quitable distribution. . . . Whether a pa

rticular c ourse of

conduct c onstitut es a dissipation depends on the par ticular fa cts of the case
. . . . The party claiming that dissipation has occurr ed ha s th e burd e n o f p e rs ua sio n a nd the ini tial b ur de n o f p ro du c tio n. Af te r t he pa rt y all eg ing dissipation establishes a prima fa cie c ase that marital funds have been dissipated, the burde n shifts t o t h e p ar ty who spent the money

to present e vidence sufficie nt to show that the challeng ed expenditures we re a ppropriate

. Altman v. Altman , 181 S.W .3d 676, 681–82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)( citations omitt ed).

I n t h i s case , Wife made a prima fa cie c ase of

dissipation of marital assets. Ther e is no qu e sti on that H us ba

nd tr a ve le d e xten siv e ly with M s. Oury or that H us ba

nd sp e nt m ari ta l f

un ds in further ance of an e x tramar ital affa ir. Wife submitt ed deta iled fi n an cial information reg arding Hu sb and ’s e xpe ns e s o n v ari ou s tr ips he un dis pu te dly too k with Ms. Oury
. Hu sb and did no t c a lc ulate an e xac t a mou

nt to c ounte r Wif

e ’s e sti mate of $7 ,5 00 , bu t ins te a d te sti fi e d th a t th e ma jor ity of his expense s o nth o s e tr ip s w e r e p a id b y th e o r g an iz a ti o n s th a t h a d h ir e d h im to c o n d u c t r esea rch. Although this makes sense in theory , Husband ne ver pr offe red a ny financ ial information showing the re imbursement of the expenses ref lected on his pe rsonal ac counts. Given our sta ndard of revie w, we cannot s ay the evidence preponder ates ag ainst the t rial court’s assessment of $7,500 to Husba nd for the dissipation of mar ital assets.

III
. Awa rd

of $5 ,0 00 fo r Ca sh o n Ha nd
Hu sb and a lso take s is su e wi th the tr ia l cou rt ’s awa rd of $5 ,0 00 of “ c a sh on ha nd ” to h im i n the division of the marital estate

. I n her Rule XI V(c ) aff idavit, Wife listed $5,000 of “ cash on ha nd”
as a marital asset. By “ca sh on hand,” Wi fe meant a chang e collection that Husband had saved ove r the cour se of their

marria g e. Althoug h Husband ne ither listed this money in a ny form prior to trial-12-

nor counte d it before the trial’s c onclusion, he did testify that the total was less t h an $ 5 , 0 00. He further stated that the money

was his sepa

rate proper

ty beca use, consistent with his f

amily tradition, he was saving it to g ive to his g randc hild f or colleg e spendingmoney . Wife testified that Husband
a lw ay s sa ve d w hate ve r c ha

ng e he ha d an d co lle c te d it thr ou g ho ut the ir marr ia g e
. She wa s unc e rt a in as t o t h e t rue a

mount and had ar

rived at $5,000 by

approximating a dollar

per da y for the thirte en y ear s they

wer e mar

ried. T h en , in an af

fidavit ac company

ing his motion to alter or a mend the judgme nt, Husband asse rted t h at he had c ounted the money and disce rned tha

t it tot aled approximately

$1,100.
Husband fir st contends that the money is his separ ate proper ty beca use he intended to give it to his g randc hild for colleg e expenses. Ye t, he neither cites author ity nor adva nces a ny argument explaining why

an intention to give awa y cash on ha

nd should transmute the ca sh from marital proper ty to separate prope rty . We find this ar g ument lacks merit. Husband next contends that the trial court e rre d in valuing the amount of cash on hand. We ag ree that Wife’s testimony reg arding the value is speculative at best. Nonethele ss, such a va luation error would not rende r the division of marital pr operty

inequitable.

IV . T ra nsit ion al A limony

and Alimony in So lid o f or Atto rne y ’s Fe es
T h e t r i a l c o u r

taw ar d e d t o W i f e t r an s i t i o n a l a l i m o n y an d a l i m o n y in solido fo r atto rn e y ’s fe e s. Whe n r e nd e ri nghis be nc h r uli ngon bo th a wa rd s, the tr ia l ju dg e state d a s f oll ow s:
Wit h ref ere nce to spousal support, the pa rties’ divorc e leaves the wife in an
e c on omi c a lly

dis a dv anta g e d f

ina nc ia l po sit ion . Sh e ha s v ir tua lly no se parate pr op e rt y up on wh ic h s he may

re ly a s a dd iti on a l f

inancial su pp ort or

to b e us e d in paying f or her attorney ’s fe es in this matter.
Th e hu sb and

e arn s su bs tanti a lly mor e inc ome tha n th e wi fe . T he hu sb and

is not economica lly

disadvantag ed. He rec eives income from his 3 7 -y ear employ er, va ri ou s b oo k d e a ls, so c ia l se c ur ity inc ome , Y a le Un ive rs ity , a nd inc ome fr om h is separ ate pr operty

. The Court has also considere d the parties’ ag e[s] , their mental a nd phy sical condition. Ithink their ag es ar e 67 and 61, r espec tively . The husband is 67 and the wife is 61. They

are both in relatively

g ood mental and phy sical hea lth. Ihave considere d the standar d of living the y established duringthe marr iag e. The y enjoy ed a fa irly high sta ndard of living, re latively

speaking

. The Court has c onsidered the duration of the ma rriag e – they

marrie d in 1993, Ibelieve it wa s – and the pa rties’ sepa

rate assets. T h e wife has shown a ne ed for spou s a l s u

p p o rt i no r d e r

to a d ju s t t o th e e c o n o mi c c o n s e qu e n c e s o f th e divorce

. Ag ain, the par

ties were marrie d 14 y ear s. The husband, a g ain, has a g reater e arning
c a pa c ity and a g re a te r c a

pa c ity to a c qu ir e futur e a sse ts tha n th e wi fe do e s.-13- Th e Court fi nd s th a t r e ha

bil itatio n in

thi s c a se is n ot n e c e ssa

ry , b ut t he Court , ag ain, finds the ec onomically -disadvanta g ed wife needs a ssistance to adjust to the economic c onsequenc es of this divorce

. The Court will order the husband to pay transitional alimony

in the amount of [1,500] for the period of 60 months . . . . The pay ments will terminate upon the date the wi fe be g ins re c e ivi ng he r sha re of the hu sb and ’s mon thl y re tir e me nt b e ne fi ts a ft e r h is r e tir e me nt f

ro m hi s e mpl oy

me nt w iththe State of

Te nn e sse e . The pa

y me nts will also terminate upon the death of t he wife but not upon the death of the husband.

Re g ard inga tto rn e y ’s fe e s, sin c e the div or c e w i l l l e a ve the wi fe a t a fi na nc ia lly disadvantag ed position relative to husband, wife is in need of an a war d of attorne y ’s fe e s and hu sb and ha s th e a bil ity to p ay a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
I n a dd iti on , hus ba

nd ha s n ot b e e n f

or thc omi ngin h is r e sp on se s to int er ro gat ories and his testimony befor e the divorc e re fer ee a nd in his deposition testimony . This has requir ed the wif e to dig further

and to do a g reat deal more work throug h her attorney

than would have been r equire d if husban d h ad simply been honest and for

thcoming in his answe rs and pr ovided the information requested wi tho ut r e qu ir ingwi fe to f ile mot ion s to c omp e l ans we rs to i nte rr og a tor ie s.
The wife has incurr ed attorne y ’s fe es of a pprox imately

30,000 dollars exclusive of t he fees incurred f or the two-da

y trial. She has also incur

red e x penses of appr ox imately

3,500 dollars. The Court orde rs the husband to pay the wife 25,000 i na t t o r n e y’ s f e e s a s a l i m o n y in solido

.

Trans itiona l Ali

mony
Hu sb and c ha lle ng e s th e tr ans iti on a l a lim ony awa rd by arguing that Wif

e is n ot f ina nc ia lly disadvantag ed. He char g es that by applying only

$69,000 of her

$120,000 proce eds fr om the marital
re sid e nc e tow ard

he r n e w h ome , s he inf

late d h e r mon th ly ho us e no te and he r m on thl y

e xpe ns e s. Husband furt h er ar gu es that Wife had no sig nificant de bt and estimated he r 2007 salar y to equal $72,913.

Be cause the form and amount of an alimony awa rd lies within the sound discretion of the tr ial court, a ppellate c ourts will not overturn such a war ds absent an a

buse of discr etion. Riggs v . Riggs , 25 0 S.W. 3d 45 3, 45 7 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 7) ; Lindsey v. Lindsey , 976 S.W. 2d 17 5, 18 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 97 ). Th e re le va

nt statut or

y fa c tor s th e tr ia l c ourt

mus t c on sid e r whe n d e c idi ngwh e the r t o aw ar d al i m o n y i n cl u d e t h e f

o l l o wi n g: (1) The re lative ea

rning capa city , obliga

tions, needs, and f

inancial r esourc es of ea ch par

ty including inc ome from pension, profit s haring or retirement plans and
a ll o the r s ourc e s;-14- (2) The relative education and train i n g of ea ch par ty , the ability

and opportunity

of ea ch par

ty to secure such educ ation and training, a nd the nec essity

of a p ar t y t o s ec u re fu rt h er

edu ca t i o nan d

t ra i n i n g t o i m p r o v e s u ch p ar t y ’s ea rn i n gs c a pa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l; (3) The duration of the ma rriag e; ( 4 ) T h e a g e an d

m e n t a l c o n d i t i o no f

e a c h p art y; (5) The phy sical condition of ea ch par ty , including, but not limited to, phy sical disability

or inca pacity due to a c hronic de bilitating disease ; (6) The extent to which it w o u l d b e undesirable for a party to seek
e mpl oy me nt o uts ide the ho me be c a us e su c h pa

rt y wi ll b e c us tod ian o f a

min or c hil d of the mar

riag e; (7) The separ ate a ssets of ea ch par ty , both re al and per sonal, tang ible and intang ible; (8) The provisions made with reg ard to the marital prope rty as def ined in § 36-4-121; (9) The standard of

living of the parties e stablished during the marr iag e; (1 0) Th e e xten t to wh ic h e a c h p art y ha s ma de s uch tang ibl e and int ang ibl e c on tr ibutio ns to t

he marr ia g e a s m o n e t a

r y a n d h o m e m a k e r c on tr ibutio ns , a

nd tang ibl e and intang ible contributions by a par ty to the education, training or incre ased e arning p o w e r o f t h e o t h e r p art y; (11) The re lative fa

ult of the parties in c ases whe re the court, in its discretion, deems it appropr iate to do so; and (12) Such other fac tors, including the tax consequence s to eac h party , as ar e ne c e ssa ry to c on sid e r t

he e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-121(i)( 2005). The most important fac tors are the disadvanta ged s p o u s e’s ne ed and the obligor spouse’s ab i l i t y to pay

. Robertson v. Robe rtson , 7 6 S. W.3 d 3 37 , 3 42 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W. 3d 72 1, 73 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; Sullivan v . Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Of these two fac tors, the disadvantag ed spouse' s need is the threshold consider ation. Aaron v. Aaron , 90 9 S.W.2 d 408 , 4 10 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; W atte rs v . W

atte rs , 22 S.W .3d 817, 821 (Tenn. Ct. App.1999).
The re cord r evea ls that from the Univer sity o f M em phis, Yale Unive rsity , and Social Security , Husband e arne d a minimum of $ 145,000 per y ear . This fig ure doe s not include the portion of his $1 25 ,0 00 bo ok

a dv anc e s ac tua lly e arn e d at th e tim e of tr ia l ( he ha d c omp le te d s ome wh e re le ss tha n h a lf of the wo rk ), no r d id i t in c lud e annua l in c ome fr om D MF Pr op e rt ie s, I nc . H us ba nd e xpe c ts to rec eive an additional $75,000 upon completion of the two books under contra ct and ha s sever al other book c ontrac t s
. M oreove r, ac cordingto the trial court’ s calc ulations, Husband owns
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 6 9 9 , 6 7 8 i ns e p ar a t e p r o p e rt y.W i f e cont ends s he s pent t hi s am ount of m oney a s fol l ow s : appr oxi m at el y $15, 487 on a t t or ney’ s f ee s , $23, 000 9

o n repair s, m a intenan ce, fi x t u res , an d furnit u re f o r her ne w ho m e, an d t h e b al an ce o n l i v i n g ex p en ses i n cl u d i n g l i fe i nsur ance, hom eow ner’ s i nsur ance, and car m ai nt enance. -15- Husband stipulated to inappropr iate m ar i tal conduct but testified to and ma de no sec ret of his e xtramari ta l r e latio ns hip in p ub lic . A s a lr e a dy dis c us se d, Hu sb and

a lso dis sip a te d ma

ri ta l a sse ts in further ance of that af

fair.

I n contra st, W ife e arne d app ro x i m at ely $72,000 in 2007 from Fir st Tennessee . The va lue of her separ ate pr operty

totaled appr ox imately

$97,356, $79,5 0 0 o f which was attributable to the equity in her ne w home. Al t h o u gh Hu sband make s much of her use of only

$69,000 for a

down pay ment on her home and of the disappear ance of the re maining $51,000, this diffe renc e does not 9
a lte r t he tr ia l c ourt ’s c on c lus ion s r e g ard ingHu sb and ’s su pe ri or earn ing c a

pa c ity , th e dis pa

ri ty in separat e as sets, Wife’s nee d for f inancial a ssistance, the pa rties’ mar ital standard of living, or Husband’s e x tramar ital affa ir. The trial court expressly considere d the statutory fac tors in making this award, a

nd we c annot conc lude that the trial c ourt’s aw ard c onstitut es an a buse of discr etion.
Attorn ey’ s Fees
Hus b an d also cha lleng es the trial c ourt’s aw ards, $25,000 a nd $1,500 respe ctively , of
a t t o r n e y’ s f e e s t o W i f

e
. It i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t an aw ar d o f a t t o r n e y’ s f e e s c o n s t i t u t e s a l i m o n y in solido

. Se e He rre ra v . H e rre ra , 944 S.W .2d 3 7 9 , 3 9 0 (T enn. Ct. App. 1996). Additionally , an awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s is wi thi n th e tr ia l c ourt ’s dis c re tio n, and thi s Co ur t w ill no t in te rf

e re wi th such an a war d absent a clea

r showing of a

n abuse of

discretion. Aaron , 909 S.W .2d at 411 (c iting Storey v . Storey , 835 S.W. 2d 59 3, 59 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A

pp . 1 99 2) ; Crouch v. Crouch , 385 S.W .2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964))

. Suc h a n a wa rd is a pp ro pr iate wh e n the on e se e kin g a tto rn e y ’s fe e s la c ks su ff ic ie nt f un ds to aff ord his or her

own leg al expenses, Houghland v. Houghland , 8 44 S.W. 2d 61 9, 62 3 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1992), or w ould have to deplete his or her resour ces in or der to pa y them. Ha rwe ll v . H

ar we ll , 612 S.W .2d 182, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). Thus, the cour t may proper ly order the husband to pay the wife ' s attorney ' s fee s where the re cord suppor ts the wife’ s n ee d for such an aw ard a nd the husband’s a

bility to pay it. See Riggs v. Riggs , 25 0 S.W. 3d 45 3, 46 0 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 7) ; Ha rwe ll , 612 S.W .2d at 185.
We f ind no a bu se of dis c re tio n in this aw ard

. As no te d b y the tr ia l c ourt , th e re c or d is re ple te with examples of Husband’s re fusal to produce documents, omission of information, provision of inacc urate discovery

response s, and g ener al dishonesty in t h e p ro ceeding s. We find no abuse of dis c re tio n w he n, a s h e re , one sp ou se ’s ob str uc tio nis t ta c tic s f

or c e the oth e r, e c on omi c a lly dis a dv anta g e d s po us e to inc ur su bs tanti a l and unne c e ssa

ry a tto rn e y ’s fe e s h e or

sh e wo uld

oth e rw ise strug g le to pay

. See Gillam v

. Gi llam , 7 76 S.W. 2d 81 , 8 6- 87 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 98 8) (a wa rd ingto wife $32,000 in attorney ’s fe es, all but $5,000 of the total incurre d, inflated in larg e par t beca use of-16-

husband’s dilatory

tactics throug hout the proce eding s). We acc ording ly a f f ir m t h e tria l c o u

r t’ s awa rd of $2 6, 50 0 f

or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Both pa rties see k attorney ’s fe es on appeal, but , exercising our di scre tion in thi s matter, we decline both r equests.

Conc lusi on
Gi ve n o ur

sta nd ard of re vie w a nd the de fe re nc e a c c or de d to de c isi on s o f t ri a l c ourt s in div idi ngmari ta l e state s and awa rd inga lim ony , w e c ann ot s ay that th e e vi d e n c e p r e p o n d e r a t e s a g a ins t the prope rty

division i n this case or

that the awa

rds of a limony

constituted an abuse of di s cretion. The re cord revea ls that the t rial court noted and care fully weig hed the statutory

fac tors as re quired. Fur ther, a lthough the e vidence might support anothe r re sult, it does not preponde rate ag ainst the one
rea ched by

the trial cour

t.
For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the trial cour

t’s judgme nt. Costs of this a ppeal a re ta x ed t o t h e A p p e l l an t , J a m e s E dw ar d F i c k l e , an d

h i s s u r e t y, f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n s h a l l i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE