Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Glenn Charles Lewis, Miscellaneous Docket

AG No. 80, September Term, 2012

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT – Respondent Glenn

Charles Lewis violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”)

in his capacity as representative of Lee-Ann Slosser. Lewis did not attend scheduled

settlement conferences, made misrepresentations to his client and ignored her requests for

updates, ignored his client’s attempts to get him to withdraw his representation, kept an

unearned fee, charged an unreasonable fee, and did not deposit and maintain his client’s

funds in trust or create the required records of such funds. Such conduct violated MLRPC

Rule 1.1, MLRPC Rule 1.3, MLRPC Rule 1.4, MLRPC Rule 1.5, MLRPC Rule 1.15,

MLRPC Rule 1.16, MLRPC Rule 8.1, MLRPC Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and Maryland Rule

16-606.1. Taken together, Lewis’s violations warrant disbarment.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 28357M

Argued: January 9, 2014

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Misc. Docket AG No. 80

September Term, 2012

 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION

OF MARYLAND

v.

GLENN CHARLES LEWIS

 

Barbera, C.J.

Harrell

Battaglia

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts,

JJ.

 

Opinion by Adkins, J.

 

Filed: February 27, 2014
Petitioner, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“AGC”), acting through Bar

Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against

Respondent, Glenn Charles Lewis. Bar Counsel alleged that Lewis, in connection with his

representation of Lee-Ann Slosser, engaged in professional misconduct as defined by

Maryland Rule 16-701(i) and violated the following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of

Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”), as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812: (1) Rule 1.1

(Competence); (2) Rule 1.3 (Diligence); (3) Rule 1.4 (Communication); (4) Rule 1.5 (Fees);

(5) Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); (6) Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terminating

Representation); (7) Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); (8) Rule 8.4(a), (b),

(c), and (d) (Misconduct); and (9) Maryland Rule 16-606.1 (Attorney trust account recordkeeping). Following a hearing before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the hearing

judge found that Lewis violated all of these rules, with the exception of Rule 8.4(b), which

charge the AGC dropped after the hearing. 

THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS

The disciplinary hearing was held before a judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery

County. Petitioner’s counsel appeared and presented evidence. Lewis failed to appear. The

hearing judge made the following findings of fact based upon clear and convincing evidence:

Background

Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the State of

Maryland on January 12, 2000. Respondent was admitted to the

Bar of the State of Virginia on September 23, 1977 and the

District of Columbia on May 26, 1978. Respondent was placed

on interim suspension from the Virginia Bar on December 27,

2011 for failure to respond to a Bar Counsel subpoena. In
March 2012, Respondent was administratively suspended from

the Virginia Bar for non-compliance with CLE requirements.

For many years, Respondent maintained a practice, The

Lewis Law Firm, in the District of Columbia focusing on family

law. Respondent abandoned his law practice in the fall of 2011. 

On December 29, 2011, Respondent and his wife filed a Petition

for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. 

Representation of Lee-Ann Slosser

On January 11, 2011, Kenneth Slosser, through his

attorney Wendy H. Schwartz, Esquire, filed a Complaint for

Limited Divorce in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

naming his wife, Lee-Ann Slosser as defendant (Slosser v.

Slosser Case No. 91547FL). On January 30, 2011, Ms. Slosser

retained Respondent and his firm, The Lewis Law Firm, PC, to

represent her. Ms. Slosser paid a retainer agreement in the

amount of $60,000. On March 25, 2011, the Respondent filed

Defendant’s Answer and Counter-Claim for Limited Divorce.

On April 26, 2011, Respondent and one of his associates,

Nupur S. Bal, Esquire, appeared on behalf of Ms. Slosser at a

scheduling conference. Ms. Bal is a member of the District of

Columbia bar and was admitted pro hac vice by consent order

dated June 1, 2011. The consent order provided that the

Respondent’s presence may be waived for any proceeding. By

order dated June 1, 2011 the parties were directed to attend

mediation. On August 19, 2011 both parties filed pretrial

statements. 

Following the filing of the initial pleadings, the parties

exchanged written discovery and designated expert witnesses. 

There were some discovery disputes which resulted in the filing

of a motion for sanctions by Ms. Schwartz based on

Respondent’s complete failure to provide responses to written

discovery, and a motion to compel by Respondent. Respondent

never filed an opposition or response to Ms. Schwartz’s motion

for sanctions. Both motions were set for hearing to be held on

October 12, 2011. 

2
On September 23, 2011, the parties attended mediation. 

Mr. Slosser was present with Ms. Schwartz and Ms. Slosser was

present with Respondent. On September 23, 2011, Respondent

appeared one half hour late for mediation.

On September 24, 2011, the parties appeared for the

second day of mediation. Respondent failed to appear without

providing any explanation or prior notice to Ms. Slosser. Ms.

Slosser did not consent to Respondent’s failure to appear at the

second day of mediation. Ms. Bal appeared in his place and an

oral settlement agreement was reached. Following mediation,

the parties, through counsel were [able] to reduce the terms of

the settlement to writing.

On or about October 5, 2011, Ms. Bal left the Lewis Law

Firm. By Line filed October 5, 2011, Ms. Bal withdrew from

Ms. Slosser’s case. By Joint Line filed October 11, 2011, the

parties withdrew the pending discovery motions. The Joint Line

was signed by Ms. Bal rather than Respondent.

Ms. Schwartz prepared a draft settlement agreement

which was sen[t] to Respondent by email on October 13, 2011. 

Respondent, without explanation, waited until October 20, 2011

to contact Ms. Slosser regarding the draft settlement agreement. 

As of October 20, 2011, the Respondent had not read the

settlement agreement. On October 20, 2011, Ms. Slosser and

the Respondent reached an agreement about specific points and

concerns in the settlement agreement to be raised with Ms.

Schwartz. On October 20, 2011, Respondent promised Ms.

Slosser that he would contact Ms. Schwartz the following day

to finalize the settlement agreement. Time was of the essence

as trial was still scheduled for November 14, 2011. As of

October 24, 2011, the Respondent had failed to contact Ms.

Schwartz and sent a “draft” email to Ms. Slosser directed to Ms.

Schwartz for approval. The draft email was inflammatory and

directly contradictory to Ms. Slosser’s wishes as expressed in

the October 20 telephone call. Additionally, the draft email

contained inaccurate information. The draft email accused Ms.

Schwartz and her associate of delay and intentionally failing to

send a schedule to the agreement. By email dated October 24,

3
2011, Ms. Slosser pointed out that the missing schedule

contained information already negotiated by Mr. and Ms.

Slosser. The draft email was written by the Respondent to

delay; as of October 24, 2011, the Respondent had not made the

changes to the draft settlement agreement as requested by Ms.

Slosser and agreed to by the Respondent.

On October 26, 2011, Ms. Slosser and the Respondent

had a telephone conversation. During the October 26

conversation, the Respondent revealed that he had not yet

spoken to Ms. Schwartz or made any changes to the draft

settlement agreement. Ms. Slosser became upset with the

Respondent and instructed him to immediately edit the draft

settlement agreement as he had represented he would. The

Respondent assured Ms. Slosser that he would edit the draft

settlement agreement and send his edits to her for review. The

Respondent never sent Ms. Slosser any edits to the draft

settlement agreement. Instead, on October 26, 2011,

Respondent emailed Ms. Schwartz claiming to have devoted

“considerable effort” to his revisions and promising his

revisions would be provided to her the following day. The

Respondent forwarded his October 26, 2011 email to Ms.

Schwartz to Ms. Slosser claiming, inter alia, that he would

continue to “work hard.” On October 27, 2011, Respondent

failed to provide an edited draft settlement agreement to either

Ms. Slosser or Ms. Schwartz. Ms. Slosser did not receive any

communication from the Respondent until October 31, 2011. 

On October 31, 2011, the Respondent emailed Ms. Slosser and

stated that he would “be in touch.” On October 31, 2011, the

Respondent also emailed Ms. Schwartz and again promised that

his revisions to the draft settlement agreement would be

provided later that day. Following October 31, Ms. Slosser

attempted to contact the Respondent at both his office and on his

cellular phone. The mailboxes for both phones were “full” and

would not accept messages. 

Between October 31, 2011 and the scheduled trial date,

November 14, 2011, Respondent failed to respond to Ms.

Slosser’s requests for information and efforts to communicate

with him. Ms. Slosser experienced considerable consternation

4
over Respondent’s abandonment of her case and was forced to

retain new counsel and incur additional attorney’s fees.

On or about November 10, 2011, unable to contact

Respondent, with a trial date pending and no settlement

agreement in place, Ms. Slosser retained Margaret J.

McK[i]nney, Esquire. Ms. McK[i]nn[e]y made several efforts

to reach Respondent by telephone and email requesting, on

behalf of Ms. Slosser, that he sign a line substituting counsel

and withdraw from the Slosser matter. Unable to reach

Respondent, on November 10, 2011, Ms. McK[i]nney entered

her appearance on behalf of Ms. Slosser as co-counsel. Ms.

McK[i]nney was able to complete the settlement agreement for

Ms. Slosser and, by judgment dated March 16, 2012, Ms. and

Mr. Slosser were granted a judgment of absolute divorce.

On November 14, 2011, the scheduled trial date, Ms.

Slosser received an email from the Respondent attaching his

“final version” of the settlement agreement, acknowledging that

Ms. Slosser had retained new counsel, apologizing and

acknowledging his delay in editing the settlement agreement. 

The November 14, [sic] email attempted to minimize the impact

of his delay and abandonment on Ms. Slosser and her concern

about the pending trial date. 

On November 16, 2011, Ms. McKinney emailed the

Respondent requesting, on behalf of Ms. Slosser, that he

withdraw his appearance from the case and providing hi[m] with

a line for his signature. The Respondent never responded to Ms.

McKinney’s email and never filed a line withdrawing his

appearance.

Upon termination of the representation, Respondent

failed to take any steps to protect Ms. Slosser’s interests. He

failed to return her client file and any unearned fee. He

abandoned the representation within weeks of the scheduled trial

date without finalizing a settlement and failed and refused to file

a line withdrawing his appearance.

Between January 30, 2011 and August 31, 2011,

5
Respondent charged Ms. Slosser $201,330 for his services. 

Based on a review of the court file, Ms. Schwartz[’s] billing

records and the Respondent’s billing records the court finds that

the fees charged by the Respondent were unreasonable. 

At the outset of the representation, Ms. Slosser paid the

Respondent a $60,000 retainer fee. Respondent failed to deposit

and maintain Ms. Slosser’s funds in trust until earned and failed

to create records as required by the Maryland Rules reflecting

the receipt, maintenance and disbursement of Complainant’s

funds. Respondent misappropriated funds belonging to Ms.

Slosser for his personal benefit.

Bar Counsel Investigation

On January 17, 2012, Bar Counsel received Ms. Slosser’s

complaint regarding the Respondent. On February 10, 2012,

Bar Counsel forwarded a copy of Ms. Slosser’s complaint to

Respondent and requested a written response within fifteen (15)

days. The February 10 letter was sent to Respondent’s address

listed with the Client Protection Fund. On March 15, 2012, no

response having been received, Bar Counsel sent a second letter

to Respondent at the address listed with the Client Protection

Fund by certified mail return receipt. The March 15 letter

enclosed the complaint and the February 10 letter and requested

a written response within ten (10) days. 

On May 1, 2012, Robert C. Versis, Investigator for the

Petitioner, contacted the Respondent by telephone. The

Respondent informed Mr. Versis that he was currently receiving

mail at his home address and provided same to Mr. Versis. On

May 2, 2012, no response having been received to the March 15

letter, Bar Counsel sent a letter by certified mail return receipt,

restricted delivery to Respondent’s home address. The May 2

letter enclosed the previous letters and was received by “Cara

Lewis” on May 5, 2012. As of May 5, 2012, Cara Lewis resided

at the Respondent’s residence. The May 2, 2012 letter requested

a written response to the complaint as well as a copy of Ms.

Slosser’s file and all records created and maintained by

Respondent pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-606.1 for the receipt

6
and disbursement of Ms. Slosser’s funds. The information was

to be provided to Bar Counsel no later than May 16, 2012. 

No response having been received, Mr. Versis attempted

to contact the Respondent by telephone on May 18, 21, 22, 23,

25 and 29, 2012 and by email on May 22, 2012. The

Respondent did not respond to Mr. Versis’s email or voicemail

message. On May 30, 2012, no response having been received

to Bar Counsel’s letter of May 2, 2012, Mr. Versis personally

served Respondent at his home with copies of the complaint and

letters of February 10, March 15 and May 2, 2012. Respondent

failed to provide any written response to Bar Counsel.

From these facts, the hearing judge found that Lewis violated the following rules:

Rule 1.1. Competence.

MLRPC 1.1 provides: “A lawyer shall provide competent

representation to a client. Competent representation requires the

legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably

necessary for the representation.”

Respondent violated Rule 1.1 when he failed to act with

the required thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary

for the representation of Ms. Slosser as outlined in the

discussion of Rule 1.3 below.

Rule 1.3. Diligence.

MLRPC 1.3 provides: “A lawyer shall act with

reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”

Respondent violated Rule 1.3 when he failed to appear

for mediation on September 24, 2011 without Ms. Slosser’s

consent, when he abandoned Ms. Slosser’s case, when he failed

to timely review the draft settlement agreement, when he fail[ed]

to timely revise the draft settlement agreement and submit it to

either his client for review or opposing counsel for consideration

despite repeated promises to do [the] same, and when he failed

to withdraw his representation as requested by his client.

7
Rule 1.4. Communication.

MLRPC 1.4 provides:

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance

with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined

in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these Rules;

(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the

matter;

(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;

and 

(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the

lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects

assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of

Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably

necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions

regarding the representation.

Respondent violated Rule 1.4 when he failed to

communicate with Ms. Slosser that he would not appear for

mediation on September 24, 2011, when he failed to timely

respond to Ms. Slosser’s requests for information about

revisions to the draft settlement agreement, when he failed to

respond to Ms. Slosser, through successor counsel, regarding the

termination of the representation and request that he withdraw

his appearance.

Rule 1.5. Fees.

MLRPC 1.5(a) provides:

A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an

unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The

fact[or]s to be considered in determining the reasonableness of

a fee include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the

questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal

service properly;

8
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance

of the particular employment will preclude other employment of

the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal

services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the

circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with

the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or

lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the

fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall

be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or

within a reasonable time after commencing the representation,

except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented

client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate

of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.

Respondent violated Rule 1.5 when he charged and

collected an unreasonable fee from Ms. Slosser for the

representation provided. A review of the court file reveals that

the work the Respondent did on behalf of Ms. Slosser, does not

justify the fees charged and collected. Respondent filed an

answer and counter-claim. He propounded discovery but failed

to respond to discovery propounded by the plaintiff/counterdefendant. Respondent filed a motion to compel but failed to

file a response to the plaintiff/counter-defendant’s motion for

sanctions. Respondent designated an expert witness and filed a

pre-trial statement but no further discovery was done. No

depositions were noted or taken and, as discussed above,

Respondent failed to appear for the second day of mediation and

failed to review and revise the draft settlement agreement

prepared by opposing counsel. Additionally, the court reviewed

the billing statement of opposing counsel which is

approximately 1/4 of the amount charged by the Respondent for

representation in the same matter. Respondent’s own billing

statements do not support a conclusion that the fees charged and

9
collected were reasonable.

Rule 1.15. Safekeeping Property.

MLRPC 1.15 provides:

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that

is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation

separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in

a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600

of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and

maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other

property shall be identified specifically as such and

appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and

distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records

of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the

lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years

after the date the record was created.

[* * *]

(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in

writing, to a different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal

fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client

trust account and may withdraw those funds for the lawyer’s

own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.

(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or

third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the

client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise

permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall

deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds or other

property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,

upon request by the client or third person, shall render promptly

a full accounting regarding such property. 

Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) when he failed to

deposit and maintain Ms. Slosser’s retainer fee in trust until

earned without receiving informed consent, confirmed in

writing, to a different arrangement from Ms. Slosser. 

10
Rule 1.16. Declining or Terminating Representation.

MLRPC 1.16 provides:

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent

a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw

from the representation of a client if:

(1) the representation will result in violation of the Maryland

Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs

the lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or

(3) the lawyer is discharged[.]

[* * *]

(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall

take[]steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a

client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,

allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering

papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding

any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned

or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client

to the extent permitted by other law. 

The Respondent violated Rule 1.16(a) when he failed to

withdraw from the representation of Ms. Slosser despite

repeated requests and when he abandoned the representation of

Ms. Slosser without notice during a critical period of time of the

representation causing both emotional and financial harm to his

client. The Respondent violated Rule 1.16[(d)] when, following

termination by and abandonment of Ms. Slosser, the Respondent

failed to provide a copy of Ms. Slosser’s file or return any

unearned fees to her.

 

Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.

MLRPC 8.1 provides:

An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a

lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in

11
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

[* * *]

(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension

known by the person to have aris[en] in the matter, or knowingly

fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an

admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does

not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by

Rule 1.6.

Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b) each time he failed to

respond[] to Bar Counsel’s lawful demand for information

including Bar Counsel’s letters dated February 10, 2012, March

15, 2012 and May 2, 2012. Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b)

when he failed to respond to Mr. Versis’ phone calls and email

messages of May 18, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 29, 2012. 

Rule 8.4. Misconduct.

MLRPC 8.4 provides:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of

Professional Conduct,

[* * *]

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of

justice[.]

The Court, as discussed herein, having concluded that

Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 8.4(c),

and (d) concludes that Respondent has also committed

misconduct in violation of Rule 8.4(a). See Att’y Griev.

Comm’n v. Foltz, 411 Md. 359, 411, 983 A.2d 434, 465 (2009)

(internal citations omitted). 

12
Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) when he charged an

unreasonable fee, when h[e] misappropriated funds belong[ing]

to Ms. Slosser for his personal benefit and when he made

misrepresentations to both Ms. Slosser and opposing counsel

related to the status of his review and revision of the settlement

agreement. 

Respondent’s conduct, taken as a whole, violates Rule

8.4(d).

[Maryland] Rule 16-606.1. Attorney trust account recordkeeping

Title 16, Courts, Judges, and Attorneys, Rule 16-606.1 provides:

(a) Creation of records. The following records shall be created

and maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of

clients or of third persons:

(1) Attorney trust account identification. An identification of all

attorney trust accounts maintained, including the name of the

financial institution, account number, account name, date the

account was opened, date the account was closed, and an

agreement with the financial institution establishing each

account and its interest-bearing nature. 

(2) Deposits and disbursements. A record for each account that

chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements, as

follows:

(A) for each deposit, a record made at or near the time of the

deposit that shows (i) the date of the deposit, (ii) the amount,

(iii) the identity of the client or third person for whom the funds

were deposited, and (iv) the purpose of the deposit; 

(B) for each disbursement, including a disbursement made by

electronic transfer, a record made at or near the time of

disbursement that shows (i) the date of the disbursement, (ii) the

amount, (iii) the payee, (iv) the identity of the client or third

person for whom the disbursement was made (if not the payee),

and (v) the purpose of the disbursement;

(C) for each disbursement made by electronic transfer, a written

memorandum authorizing the transaction and identifying the

attorney responsible for the transaction.

13
(3) Client matter records. A record for each client matter in

which the attorney receives fund[s] in trust, as follows:

(A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that

shows (i) the date of the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the amount

of the deposit or disbursement; (iii) the purpose for which the

funds are intended; (iv) for a disbursement, the payee and the

check number or other payment identification; and (v) the

balance of funds remaining in the account in connection with the

matter; and

(B) an identification of the person to whom the unused portion

of a fee or expense deposit is to be returned whenever it is to be

returned to a person other than the client

(4) Record of funds of the attorney. A record that identifies the

funds of the attorney held in each attorney trust account as

permitted by Rule 16-607 b.

(b) Monthly reconciliation. An attorney shall cause to be

created a monthly reconciliation of all attorney trust account

records, client matter records, records of funds of the attorney

held in an attorney trust account as permitted by Rule 16-607 b,

and the adjusted month-end financial institution statement

balance[.] The adjusted month-end financial institution

statement balance is computed by adding subsequent deposits to

and subtracting subsequent disbursements from the financial

institution’s month-end statement balance. 

(c) Electronic records. Whenever the records required by this

Rule are created or maintained using electronic means, there

must be an ability to print a paper copy of the records upon a

reasonable request to do so. 

(d) Records to be maintained. Financial institution month-end

statements, any canceled checks or copies of canceled checks

provided with a financial institution month-end statement,

duplicate deposit slips or deposit receipts generated by the

financial [institution], and records created in accordance with

section (a) of this Rule shall be maintained for a period of at

least five years after the [date] the record was created. 

The Respondent violated Rule 16-606.1 when he failed

to create records reflecting the receipt, maintenance and

disbursement of Ms. Slosser’s funds. 

14
Mitigation

No evidence related to mitigation was offered and the

court finds no mitigation. 

DISCUSSION

As we recently explained:

“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and

complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the

record.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147,

167, 994 A.2d 928, 940 (2010) (citations omitted). “We accept

a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they

are clearly erroneous.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415

Md. 696, 706, 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010). That deference is

appropriate because the hearing judge is in a position to assess

the demeanor-based credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 707, 4

A.3d at 964. In that regard, “[t]he hearing judge is permitted to

‘pick and choose which evidence to rely upon’ from a

conflicting array when determining findings of fact.” Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085,

1095 (2006) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361

Md. 234, 253, 760 A.2d 1108, 1118 (2000)).

We review de novo the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions of

law. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 351, 368,

952 A.2d 226, 236 (2008). In other words, “the ultimate

determination . . . as to an attorney’s alleged misconduct is

reserved for this Court.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield,

369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 764 (2002). In that regard, we

examine the record to ascertain whether there was sufficient

evidence to support the hearing judge’s legal conclusions, by a

“clear and convincing” standard of proof. Att’y Grievance

Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54, 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007). 

Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 427 Md. 15, 27–28, 45 A.3d 281, 288 (2012).

EXCEPTIONS

15
Neither Lewis nor Petitioner note any exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of

fact or conclusions of law. Thus, pursuant to Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A), we shall accept

those findings of fact as established. (“If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the

findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.”). 

Additionally, based on our de novo review, we agree with the hearing judge that Lewis

violated the following provisions of the MLRPC: Rule 1.1, Rule 1.3, Rule 1.4, Rule 1.5, Rule

1.15(a), Rule 1.16(a) and (b), Rule 8.1(b), Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and Maryland Rule 16-

606.1. Accordingly, we proceed to the determination of the appropriate sanction. 

SANCTION

Bar Counsel recommends that Lewis be disbarred. They direct our attention to six

aggravating factors found in Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) (“the Standards”). First, pursuant to Standard 9.22(b),

Bar Counsel characterizes Lewis’s misconduct as resulting, at least partially, from a

dishonest or selfish motive. Bar Counsel also points to Lewis’s substantial experience in the

practice of law (Standard 9.22(i)), his pattern of misconduct (Standard 9.22(c)), his multiple

offenses (Standard 9.22(d)), his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct

(Standard 9.22 (g)), his failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information, and his

indifference to making restitution (Standard 9.22(e), (j)). 

Petitioner then directs our attention to Standard 4.41. This provides that:

Disbarment is generally appropriate when: (a) a lawyer

abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious

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injury to a client; or (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform

services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious

injury to a client; or (c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect

with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client. 

 

Petitioner then explains that Lewis abandoned Ms. Slosser’s case at a time that could

have caused her serious injury, knowingly failed to perform the services for which he was

hired, and engaged in a pattern of neglect. Bar Counsel reiterates the hearing judge’s

findings that Lewis’s neglect, abandonment and misrepresentations happened during a

critical litigation period, during the short period of time between mediation and trial. This

behavior led to his client having to incur additional fees to retain new counsel, as well as

much personal consternation.

In determining the appropriate sanction in attorney discipline matters, we are guided

by our “interest in protecting the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.” 

Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 595, 876 A.2d 642, 660 (2005)

(citations omitted). Because of this, our purpose in deciding the appropriate sanction is not

to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public, and “deter other lawyers from engaging in

similar misconduct.” Pennington, 387 Md. at 596, 876 A.2d at 660. 

This Court often looks to the aggravating factors found in Standard 9.22 of the

Standards for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction. Att’y Grievance Comm’n

v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 176–77, 994 A.2d 928, 945–46 (2010) (citing Att’y Grievance

Comm’n v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 167–68, 939 A.2d 732, 747 (2008)). Here, we find Lewis’s

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conduct to be particularly egregious and deleterious to not only his client, but to the public

perception of lawyers at-large. Lewis’s multiple misrepresentations to his client evidence

a lack of basic integrity that demonstrates a danger to any member of the public that would

seek his services. As we held in Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, “[h]onesty and

dishonesty are, or are not, present in any attorney's character. Disbarment ordinarily should

be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.” 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488

(2001). Pertaining to Lewis’s failure to communicate with Ms. Slosser, his subsequent

abandonment of Ms. Slosser, his repeated ignoring of Ms. Slosser’s requests for status

updates, and his failure to return her files and unearned fees, we are guided by our holding

in Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Heung Sik Park, 427 Md. 180, 46 A.3d 1153 (2012). In that

case, we held that:

[D]isbarment is the appropriate sanction when an attorney

abandons a client by failing to pursue the client's interests,

failing to communicate with the client, ignoring a client's

repeated requests for status updates, terminating the

representation without notice by failing wholly to provide

effective services, and failing to return unearned fees. 

Heung Sik Park, 427 Md. at 196, 46 A.3d at 1162. In this case the relevant facts are nearly

identical. Lewis did not attend scheduled settlement conferences, made misrepresentations

to his client and ignored her requests for updates, ignored his client’s attempts to get him to

withdraw his representation, kept an unearned fee, charged an unreasonable fee, and did not

deposit and maintain his client’s funds in trust or create the required records of such funds. 

Accordingly, we order disbarment. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL

PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK

OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF

ALL TR A N SCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO

MARYLAND RULE 16–761(b), FOR WHICH

SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF

THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION

OF MARYLAND AGAINST GLENN CHARLES

LEWIS. 

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