Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1606-CR-1269 | June 23, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Karen Celestino-Horseman

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brandon Lonnell Spinks,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

June 23, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1606-CR-1269

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marc Rothenberg, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G02-1512-F3-45587

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] Brandon Spinks appeals his conviction for criminal confinement as a Level 3 

felony. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 

evidence of (1) the victim’s identification of her attacker to emergency medical 

providers and (2) a recorded jail call between Spinks and his six-year-old son.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On the afternoon of December 20, 2015, Doris Elliott became worried about 

her daughter E.C. upon talking with a friend and being unable to reach E.C. by 

phone. Elliott lived in Hammond, and E.C. lived in Indianapolis with her three 

young children.1 After IMPD denied her request to check on her daughter’s 

welfare, Elliott contacted her daughter Erica Battle, who also lived in 

Indianapolis. She encouraged Battle to check on her sister.

[4] That evening, Battle and a cousin went to E.C.’s house and knocked on doors 

and windows and yelled for E.C. They received no response. Battle also called 

E.C.’s cellphone and landline a number of times. Eventually, after Battle had 

returned to her own home, Spinks answered the landline. He indicated that he 

and E.C. had “got[ten] into it” that morning and that she had left around 8:30 

a.m. Transcript at 164. When Battle stated that she was going to come over to 

 

1

Spinks is the father of the two oldest children – a son born in 2009 and a daughter born in 2010.
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see the kids, Spinks told her to hold on and then he hung up the phone. He did 

not answer Battle’s return calls.

[5] Thereafter, Battle went back to E.C.’s home. No one answered the door, so she 

called the police for a welfare check. Around 10:25 p.m., officers knocked and 

walked the perimeter. They determined that they did not have cause to force 

entry but indicated that the family could do so if they felt strongly about it. 

Battle then called her mother again to decide what to do, and Elliott said to kick 

the door down. Battle recruited others to help in the effort.

[6] After several kicks to the front door, Spinks yelled from inside and told them to

stop. Spinks argued with the group through the door and stated that E.C. was 

alright. Battle eventually saw E.C. through a window and believed she looked 

frightened. The group then moved to the back of the home and broke through 

the sliding glass door. E.C. ran out with the children, as Battle and others 

struggled with Spinks until he fled the scene. E.C. “just kept crying and kept 

crying” and said she thought she was going to die. Id. at 175. She had injuries 

all over her body, including more than a dozen lacerations from being whipped 

with a cord, a blunt-force injury to her head, multiple bruises, and hair pulled 

out from the scalp.

[7] Police returned to the home shortly after 11:30 p.m., and E.C. was transported 

to the hospital. While being treated for her multiple injuries, E.C. informed her 

nurse that the father of her children had assaulted her over a period of several 

hours that day. Similarly, E.C. told her treating physician that her child’s father 
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caused her injuries. E.C. indicated that she was pressing charges and assured 

her medical providers that she had a safe place to stay. E.C.’s nurse provided 

her with information on domestic violence upon her release, and E.C. left the 

hospital with a female friend or relative.

[8] On December 23, 2015, the State charged Spinks with a number of counts 

related to the assault, several of which were later dismissed. Following a jury 

trial, Spinks was convicted of Level 3 felony criminal confinement.2 On May 

18, 2016, the trial court sentenced Spinks to thirteen years, with ten years 

executed in the Department of Correction, one year in community corrections, 

and two years suspended to probation. On appeal, Spinks challenges the 

admission of certain evidence at trial. Additional information will be provided 

below as needed.

Standard of Review

[9] A trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence is squarely within 

that court’s discretion, and we afford it great deference on appeal. VanPatten v. 

State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ind. 2013). We will not reverse such a decision

unless it is clearly contrary to the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

of the case or misinterprets the law. Id.

 

2 The jury found him guilty of two additional counts for which the trial court did not enter convictions due to 

double jeopardy concerns.
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Discussion & Decision

1. Statement to Medical Providers

[10] Spinks challenges evidence that was admitted pursuant to the hearsay exception 

for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment – Indiana 

Evidence Rule 803(4). Specifically, the nurse and doctor who treated E.C. 

testified, over Spinks’s objection, to statements made by E.C. regarding the 

identity of her attacker. Spinks argues that “the identity of the alleged assailant 

was not necessary for medical treatment or diagnosis.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. 

[11] Evid. R. 803(4) permits statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis 

or treatment to be admitted into evidence, even when the declarant is available. 

The rule requires that the statement:

(A) is made by a person seeking medical diagnosis or treatment;

(B) is made for--and is reasonably pertinent to--medical diagnosis 

or treatment; and

(C) describes medical history; past or present symptoms, pain or 

sensations; their inception; or their general cause.

Id. The exception is grounded in a belief that the declarant’s self-interest in 

obtaining proper medical treatment makes such a statement reliable enough for 

admission at trial. VanPatten, 986 N.E.2d at 260.

This belief of reliability, though, necessitates a two-step analysis 

for admission under Rule 803(4): First, “is the declarant 

motivated to provide truthful information in order to promote 

diagnosis and treatment,” and second, “is the content of the 
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statement such that an expert in the field would reasonably rely 

on it in rendering diagnosis or treatment.”

Id. (quoting McClain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. 1996)). 

[12] Although statements attributing fault or establishing a perpetrator’s identity are 

usually inadmissible under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception, this 

is not true for cases involving child abuse, sexual assault, or domestic violence. 

Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 752, 759 (Ind. 2016); Perry v. State, 956 N.E.2d 41, 49 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Given the unique nature of domestic violence cases, our 

Supreme Court has recognized that “identifying attackers is integral to the 

standard of care for ‘medical treatment’ of domestic abuse victims.” Ward, 50 

N.E.3d at 761. Indeed, “patient safety is a ‘critical’ part of the comprehensive 

standard of care for treating victims of domestic violence.” Id. at 763.

The standard of care for “medical treatment” of domestic abuse 

goes beyond physical injuries, and even beyond immediate 

outcomes like who takes a victim home or what medications a 

patient receives. Rather, it requires nurses and physicians to rely 

on information obtained from patients to triage their injuries –

both mental and physical – and implement comprehensive 

treatment plans. Doctors and nurses need to know the identity of 

the perpetrator when treating a victim of domestic violence.

Id. (emphasis in original).

[13] Nothing in the particular circumstances of this case leads us away from our 

Supreme Court’s conclusion in Ward that identifying a domestic violence 
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victim’s attacker is integral to the medical standard of care for such cases.

3

 

Here, the nurse testified that knowing the identity of the attacker “is helpful in 

providing resources for the patient” and ensuring their safety in the hospital by 

alerting security and making the patient’s chart private. Transcript at 259. 

Similarly, E.C.’s doctor testified that treating the patient as a whole (that is,

beyond their physical injuries) includes addressing the patient’s safety and 

emotional needs. Cole’s statements to her nurse and doctor in the emergency 

room regarding the identity of her attacker were properly admitted under Evid. 

R. 803(4).

2. Recorded Jail Call

[14] Spinks also challenges the admission of a redacted recording of a jail call 

between himself and his six-year-old son, B.S.J.4 The child’s speech on the 

recording is muddled and difficult to understand. Spinks, however, understood 

B.S.J.’s statements to him as follows: “Don’t kill my Momma” and “I’m gonna 

beat you up.” Exhibits, State’s Exhibit 52-R. When B.S.J. then inquired as to 

where Spinks was, Spinks indicated that he was in jail and that “Daddy messed 

up” and “Daddy made a uh-oh.” Id. Spinks claims that B.S.J.’s statements 

 

3 Contrary to Spinks’s assertion on appeal, the holding in Ward is not limited to statements obtained by 

forensic nurses. 

4

Spinks initiated the call from the Marion County Jail by calling a third party who in turn called E.C. In this 

three-way call, Spinks spoke with E.C. and B.S.J. The recording admitted into evidence was substantially 

redacted.
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should have been redacted from the recording because they were more 

prejudicial than probative. 

[15] Indiana Evidence Rule 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence 

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of 

the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 

delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” “Evaluation of whether 

the probative value of an evidentiary matter is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice is a discretionary task best performed by the trial 

court.” Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[16] Here, B.S.J.’s declarations during the jail call with Spinks provided context for 

Spinks’s subsequent (unchallenged) statement to the child that he was in jail 

because he had messed up. In other words, the child’s prompts made it more 

probable that Spinks was referring to the charged offenses when he made his 

admission. While the probative value of this evidence may be low, so too was 

its prejudicial effect. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion in this regard.

[17] Judgment affirmed.

Baker, J. and Pyle, J., concur.