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NO. 12-22-00183-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

IN THE INTEREST OF

D.A. AND G.A., 

CHILDREN

§

§ 

§ 

APPEAL FROM THE 420TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

C.P. and M.A. appeal the termination of their parental rights. They each present six 

issues on appeal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

C.P. is the father and M.A. is the mother of D.A. and G.A. On June 19, 2020, the 

Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed an original petition for 

protection of D.A. and G.A., for conservatorship, and for termination of C.P.’s and M.A.’s 

parental rights. The Department was appointed temporary managing conservator of the children. 

Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an agreed final order in a suit affecting the 

parent-child relationship (the Agreed Order) in January 2021. The Agreed Order appointed the 

Department as permanent managing conservator of the children and M.A. and C.P. were 

appointed possessory conservators. The Agreed Order also provided that M.A.’s and C.P.’s 

access would be at the Department’s discretion. 

On February 14, 2022, the Department filed a petition to modify the Agreed Order, 

alleging that the circumstances of the children, parent, sole managing conservator, possessory 

conservator, or other party affected by the Agreed Order have materially and substantially 

changed. The Department requested termination of M.A.’s and C.P.’s parental rights. 

At the conclusion of a trial on the merits, the trial court found, by clear and convincing 

evidence C.P. engaged in one or more of the acts or omissions necessary to support termination 
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of his parental rights under subsections (D), (E), (N) and (O) of Texas Family Code Section 

161.001(b)(1). The trial court also found that termination of the parent-child relationship 

between C.P. and the children is in the children’s best interest. Based on these findings, the trial

court ordered that the parent-child relationship between C.P. and the children be terminated. 

The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence M.A. engaged in one or 

more of the acts or omissions necessary to support termination of her parental rights under 

subsections (D), (E), (N) and (O) of Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1). The trial court 

found that termination of the parent-child relationship between M.A. and the children is in the 

children’s best interest. Based on these findings, the trial court ordered that the parent-child 

relationship between M.A. and the children be terminated.

This appeal followed. 

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Involuntary termination of parental rights embodies fundamental constitutional rights.

Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex. App.–Austin 2000), pet. denied per curiam, 53 

S.W.3d 684 (Tex. 2001); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, writ 

denied). Because a termination action “permanently sunders” the bonds between a parent and 

child, the proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 

1976); In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.). 

Section 161.001 of the Family Code permits a court to order termination of parental 

rights if two elements are established. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2022); In re 

J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d 234, 237 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.). First, the parent must have 

engaged in any one of the acts or omissions itemized in the second subsection of the statute. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1); Green v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 25 

S.W.3d 213, 219 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237. Second,

termination must be in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); In re 

J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237. Both elements must be established by clear and convincing evidence, 

and proof of one element does not alleviate the petitioner’s burden of proving the other. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; Wiley, 543 S.W.2d at 351; In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237. 

The clear and convincing standard for termination of parental rights is both 

constitutionally and statutorily mandated. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; In re J.J., 911 
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S.W.2d at 439. Clear and convincing evidence means “the measure or degree of proof that will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations 

sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 2019). The burden of proof is 

upon the party seeking the deprivation of parental rights. In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 240. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When confronted with both a legal and factual sufficiency challenge, an appellate court 

must first review the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Glover v. Tex. Gen. Indem. Co., 619 

S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1981); In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no 

pet.). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must look at all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm 

belief or conviction that its findings were true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). 

We must assume that the fact finder settled disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable 

fact finder could do so and disregard all evidence that a reasonable fact finder could have 

disbelieved or found incredible. Id. 

The appropriate standard for reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge to the termination

findings is whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the petitioner's allegations. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 

2002). In determining whether the fact finder has met this standard, an appellate court considers 

all the evidence in the record, both that in support of and contrary to the trial court’s findings. Id. 

at 27-29. Further, an appellate court should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a 

reasonable fact finder could not have reconciled that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In 

re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 965 S.W.2d 575, 

580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied). 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

In their first issue, M.A. and C.P. urge that the evidence is insufficient to show a material 

change in circumstances. They do not request any specific relief under this issue or analyze the 

evidence under any particular standard of review. Accordingly, it is unclear whether M.A.’s and 

C.P.’s first issue directly attacks the final order or is intended to affect the scope of review of 
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their other sufficiency points. See In re D.N., 405 S.W.3d 863, 870 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, 

no pet.) (“[T]o rely on acts or omissions evidence of which has been presented to the trial court 

prior to the earlier order denying termination, the Department must garner sufficient evidence of 

section 161.004’s elements, including a material and substantial change of the parties’ 

circumstances.”). 

We assume without deciding that the Department was required to prove a material and 

substantial change to rely on evidence of acts or omissions occurring before the trial court’s prior 

order. See id. at 869–70. Because we ultimately consider evidence of acts and omissions 

occurring before the date of the trial court’s prior order when evaluating the sufficiency of the 

evidence to prove the children’s best interest and the predicate ground for termination, we will 

review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a material and 

substantial change in circumstances.

Applicable Law

When, as here, the Department seeks termination after a trial court’s prior denial of 

termination, the trial court may terminate parental rights by following the familiar procedure 

under Section 161.001 of the Family Code, or the court may terminate parental rights under 

Section 161.004. See In re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d 60, 89 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, 

pet. denied). Section 161.001 provides the typical avenue for termination, when a court may 

terminate based on findings that (1) the parent committed one or more acts specifically named in 

the Family Code as grounds for termination, and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest.

See In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). 

Section 161.004 provides an alternative method for termination following the rendition of an 

order that previously denied termination if (1) termination is in the child’s best interest, (2) the 

new petition to terminate was filed after the date of the prior order denying termination; (3) the 

parent committed an act listed under Section 161.001 before the date of the prior order denying 

termination; and (4) the circumstances of the child, parent, sole managing conservator, 

possessory conservator, or other party affected by the order have materially and substantially 

changed since the date of the order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.004(a) (West 2022). At a 

hearing under this section, “the court may consider evidence presented at a previous hearing in a 

suit for termination of the parent-child relationship of the parent with respect to the same child.” 

Id. § 161.004(b).
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“[T]here are no definite guidelines as to what constitutes a ‘material and substantial 

change in circumstances’ to terminate parental rights under section 161.004.” In re A.L.H., 515 

S.W.3d at 89. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals has determined that a material and substantial 

change existed when the parent was adjudicated guilty of a crime and sentenced to prison after 

the prior order, and when a parent failed to complete a family service plan by failing to visit the 

child and attend medical appointments. See In re M.J.W., No. 14-16-00276-CV, 2016 WL 

4206046, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also

In re C.A.C., No. 14-12-00396-CV, 2012 WL 4465234, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Sept. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

Analysis

In this case, the Department requested termination under both Sections 161.001 and 

161.004. The Department specifically alleged that the circumstances of the children materially 

and substantially changed since the prior order. And there is no evidence the Department 

abandoned any of its pleadings at trial. The Department clearly relied on actions that both 

predated and postdated the prior termination order. M.A. and C.P. seem to attack the lack of a 

specific finding that the circumstances changed. However, absent findings on these ultimate 

issues, we presume the trial court made all fact findings necessary to support the order of 

termination. Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no 

pet.); see In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 678 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). 

The testimony at trial showed that, at the time of the Agreed Order, the Department 

intended to place the children with their maternal grandmother in South Dakota. However, after 

the entry of the Agreed Order, the grandmother contacted caseworker Macee Skillern and 

informed her that “she would not feel safe with [C.P.] being involved with the children if they 

were placed in her home.” The grandmother did not feel like she could keep the children safe if 

C.P. knew where they were placed. The Department then attempted to contact C.P. and M.A. to 

set up visitation and a new service plan. However, according to Skillern, the parents were “very 

difficult to locate” and contact. Skillern testified that neither parent engaged with the new 

services or the Department. We conclude that these facts, which are undisputed, demonstrate a 

material and substantial change in the circumstances of the children, the Department, and the

future placement of the children after the Agreed Order. M.A.’s and C.P.’s first issue is 

overruled. 
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TERMINATION UNDER SECTION 161.001(B)(1)(D) AND (E)

In their second and third issues, M.A. and C.P. argue the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient to terminate their parental rights pursuant to subsections (D) and (E) of Texas Family 

Code Section 161.001(b)(1). 

Applicable Law

The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to 

remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the 

child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection (D) addresses the child’s 

surroundings and environment. In re N.R., 101 S.W.3d 771, 775-76 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 

2003, no pet.). The child’s “environment” refers to the suitability of the child’s living conditions 

as well as the conduct of parents or others in the home. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). The relevant time frame to determine whether 

there is clear and convincing evidence of endangerment is before the child was removed. Ybarra 

v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs., 869 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no 

pet.). Further, subsection (D) permits termination based upon only a single act or omission. In re 

R.D., 955 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. denied). 

The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent has engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed the child with 

persons who engaged in conduct, that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the 

child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). It is not necessary that the parent know for 

certain that the child is in an endangering environment; rather, awareness of the potential for 

danger and a disregard of the risk is enough to show endangering conduct. Interest of J.H., No. 

09-20-00056-CV, 2020 WL 4516860, at *10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 6, 2020, no pet.) 

(mem. op.); see Interest of E.S., No. 12-20-00282-CV, 2021 WL 2483788, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Tyler June 17, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Finally, the need for permanence is a paramount 

consideration for the child’s present and future physical and emotional needs. In re N.K., 99 

S.W.3d 295, 301 n.9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.); In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d at 200. 

“Endanger” means to expose to loss or injury or to jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t of Human 

Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 811 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). It is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the 
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child actually suffers injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d at 440. When 

seeking termination under subsection (D), the Department must show that the child’s living 

conditions pose a real threat of injury or harm. In re N.R., 101 S.W.3d at 776; Ybarra, 869 

S.W.2d at 577. Further, there must be a connection between the conditions and the resulting 

danger to the child’s emotional or physical well-being. Ybarra, 869 S.W.2d at 577-78. It is 

sufficient that the parent was aware of the potential for danger to the child in such environment 

and disregarded that risk. In re N.R., 101 S.W.3d at 776. In other words, conduct that 

demonstrates awareness of an endangering environment is sufficient to show endangerment.

Interest of T.A., No. 12-20-00276-CV, 2021 WL 2182316 at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 28, 

2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We have previously concluded it is illogical to reason that 

inappropriate, debauching, unlawful, or unnatural conduct of persons who live in the home of a 

child, or with whom a child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in his home, is not 

inherently a part of the “conditions and surroundings” of that place or home. In re B.R., 822 

S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991, writ denied). Subsection (D) is designed to protect a 

child from precisely such an environment. Id.

Subsection (E) requires us to look at the parent’s conduct alone, including actions, 

omissions, or the parent’s failure to act. In re D.J., 100 S.W.3d 658, 662 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2003, pet. denied); In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d at 811. Termination under subsection (E) must be 

based on more than a single act or omission. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d at 812; In re D.T., 34 

S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). A voluntary, deliberate, and 

conscious “course of conduct” by the parent that endangers the child’s physical and emotional 

well-being is required. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d at 812; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 634.

As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability 

endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child. In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 

503 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.); In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2004, pet. denied). Endangering conduct is not limited to actions directed towards the 

child. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. It necessarily follows that the endangering conduct may include 

the parent’s actions before the child’s birth and while the parent had custody of older children.

See id. (stating that although endanger means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the 

possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the parent’s 

conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury); see also In re M.N.G., 
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147 S.W.3d 521, 536 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (holding that courts may look 

to parental conduct both before and after child’s birth to determine whether termination is 

appropriate). Further, the conduct may occur before the child’s birth and both before and after 

the child has been removed by the Department. Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective 

Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). 

Analysis

 M.A. and C.P. argue on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support termination 

under both subsections (D) and (E). Specifically, they urge the evidence since the Agreed Order 

showed that the children were in a foster home and that the Department was the only entity 

allowed to make decisions about the children. Relying on their Section 161.004 argument, they 

do not contend the evidence is insufficient to show they committed actions prior to the Agreed 

Order.

Alice Wilson, a Department investigator, testified that the Department received a referral 

in June 2020 because M.A. had been hospitalized while in Galveston. The referral stated that 

M.A. “had been beaten for two days” by C.P. “because she had purchased the incorrect diapers.” 

The referral also indicated M.A. admitted to using methamphetamine two days prior. Wilson 

testified that she was unable to find the children but was able to contact M.A. by phone. M.A. 

was staying at a shelter and asked Wilson for her help locating the children. M.A. and the 

children lived in South Dakota and were visiting family in Texas at the time. According to 

Wilson, M.A. had no memory of the events which led to her being found injured in a hotel 

stairwell. M.A. also claimed to have consumed “a great deal of alcohol” and could not recall 

how she sustained her injuries. When Wilson contacted C.P., he would not disclose the 

children’s location. Wilson stated that the children were eventually located, with law 

enforcement’s help, with their maternal aunt in Nacogdoches. Wilson testified that M.A. left the 

shelter with C.P. C.P. was arrested in Galveston in connection with the assault. Wilson stated 

that she attempted to work with M.A. to find a suitable placement for the children; however, 

M.A. was unable to provide a relative or fictive-kin placement. Wilson testified that she 

understood that the children witnessed the assault on M.A. because the family was together at the 

beach. And based on that information, she believed the children were endangered by the 

domestic violence between M.A. and C.P. 
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Skillern testified that, following the children’s removal, M.A. and C.P. resided in 

Nacogdoches until they moved to the Dallas area in February 2021. According to Skillern, the 

couple was “transient” and did not have a permanent address until March. During the case, the 

Department completed a reunification assessment and requested a monitored return of the 

children to M.A. and C.P. The children were placed with M.A. and C.P. in October 2021. 

Skillern testified that M.A. was pregnant during the case and gave birth in late September or 

early October. The baby died shortly thereafter. According to Skillern, M.A. and C.P. caused 

the death by inappropriately co-sleeping with the baby, even though there was a crib or bassinet

available in the apartment. D.A. and G.A. were removed from the monitored return after the 

baby’s death and returned to foster care in November. Skillern testified that G.A. had cigarette 

burns on her legs, which were still healing one month after removal. She also testified that there 

was an active criminal investigation relating to the cigarette burns. In addition, D.A. had 

reverted to being “very shy and uncomfortable around males” following the second removal. 

D.A.’s fear of males had improved by the time of trial.

Based on the evidence, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that 

M.A. and C.P. engaged in domestic violence, caused the death of a child, and burned G.A. with a 

cigarette. Therefore, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we 

hold that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that M.A. and 

C.P. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or 

surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that they engaged in 

conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered 

the children’s physical or emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), 

(E). Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support 

termination of C.P.’s and M.A.’s parental rights under subsections (D) and (E) of Texas Family 

Code Section 161.001(b). Accordingly, we overrule C.P.’s and M.A.’s second and third issues as 

to subsections (D) and (E) of Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b) and need not address their

fourth and fifth issues regarding termination under subsections (N) and (O). See TEX. R. APP. P.

47.1.
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BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN

In C.P.’s and M.A.’s sixth issue, they argue the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient to support a finding that termination of their parental rights is in the children’s best 

interest. In determining the best interest of the child, a number of factors have been considered, 

including (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and 

in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the 

parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these 

individuals; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the 

acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a 

proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 

S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). 

The family code also provides a list of factors that we will consider in conjunction with 

the above-mentioned Holley factors. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b) (West 2022). 

These include (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the magnitude, 

frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (3) the results of psychiatric, 

psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family 

members, or others who have access to the child’s home; (4) whether there is a history of 

substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (5) the 

willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services 

and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (6) the 

willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal 

changes within a reasonable period of time; (7) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate 

parenting skills; and (8) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended 

family and friends is available to the child. See id. § 263.307(b)(1), (3), (6), (8), (10), (11), (12), 

(13).

The evidence need not prove all statutory or Holley factors in order to show that 

termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; In re 

J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 848 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). In other words, the 

best interest of the child does not require proof of any unique set of factors nor limit proof to any 

specific factors. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d at 814. Undisputed evidence of just one factor may be 

sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.
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In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d at 507. But the presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor 

will not support such a finding. Id. Evidence supporting termination of parental rights is also 

probative in determining whether termination is in the best interest of the child. See In re C.H., 

89 S.W.3d at 28-29. We apply the statutory and Holley factors below.

Analysis

At the time of trial, D.A. was four years old and G.A. was two years old. Although the 

Department made visits with the children available, M.A. and C.P. were both inconsistent with 

visitation. Skillern testified that they attended seven visits between the two of them over the 

seventeen months of the case. Both parents were offered more than ten visits after the failed 

monitored returned; however, C.P. attended one and M.A. attended two. 

Skillern testified that the children are doing well in their current foster placement, where 

they have been since the failed monitored return. She further testified that the foster parents 

wish to adopt the children. 

As discussed above, the evidence reflected that M.A. and C.P. engaged in domestic 

violence around the children and were unable to locate their children following M.A.’s 

hospitalization in Galveston. Under their supervision, G.A. suffered cigarette burns, which took 

more than one month to heal. And the couple was reportedly responsible for the death of another 

child. Following the failed monitored return, C.P. told Skillern that the children should have 

never been returned to them. 

The evidence also showed that M.A. and C.P. completed some of their court-ordered 

services. However, they did not complete all of them. And they failed to engage with the 

Department near the end of the case.

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s best interest 

finding and applying the statutory and Holley factors, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact 

could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of M.A.’s and C.P.’s parental 

rights was in the best interest of the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); In re 

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; see also In re W.S.M., 107 S.W.3d 772, 773 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 

2003, no pet.) (overwhelming and undisputed evidence of endangerment sufficient to support

best interest finding). Accordingly, we overrule C.P.’s and M.A.’s sixth issue regarding best 

interest.
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DISPOSITION

Having overruled M.A.’s and C.P.’s first, second, third, and sixth issues, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

GREG NEELEY

Justice

Opinion delivered September 30, 2022. 

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
13 

COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 

NO. 12-22-00183-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF D. A. AND G. A., CHILDREN

Appeal from the 420th District Court 

of Nacogdoches County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. C2035984) 

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment. 

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of 

the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below 

for observance. 

Greg Neeley, Justice. 

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.