TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-23-00039-CV

Elizabeth Weston, Appellant

v.

Graham Weston, Appellee

FROM THE 22ND DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

NO. C2020-1814A, THE HONORABLE DIB WALDRIP, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Elizabeth Weston appeals from the trial court’s final decree of divorce dissolving 

her marriage to Graham Weston and dividing their community estate. We will affirm the trial 

court’s decree.

BACKGROUND

In October 2020, Elizabeth1filed a petition for divorce. Graham filed a 

counterpetition for divorce seeking, among other things, confirmation of his separate property. 

Elizabeth amended her petition four times, ultimately alleging claims for breach of fiduciary duty 

and fraud. The case was eventually tried to a jury after pending for almost two years; the issues at 

1

 Because the parties share a surname, we will refer to them by their given names 

for clarity.
2

trial principally involved separate property claims and valuation and division of a large community 

estate. The trial court appointed a special master to assist with many discovery disputes resulting 

in the parties’ filing motions to compel and motions for protective orders. Relevant to Elizabeth’s 

appeal, in April 2021 the trial court held a hearing on motions to compel filed by both Elizabeth 

and Graham. Elizabeth sought to compel production of bank and other financial records dating 

back 26 years to 1994, the year Elizabeth and Graham married. Elizabeth’s counsel argued that 

because Elizabeth and Graham married on December 31, 1994, records from that date forward 

were relevant to the division of the community estate. Counsel for Graham requested that the court 

initially set a shorter period for discoverable financial records and, if specific transactions 

warranted discovery from an earlier period, permit targeted discovery on those specific 

transactions. Graham’s counsel explained:

[T]he idea that you go back 26 years for everything you have, that’s probably 

overbroad. I mean most of what happened 26 years ago makes no difference. So 

it makes more sense to start out with what may be a three- or a five-year period. 

And then after you evaluate that—have your forensic accountant evaluate that, they 

say, well, this particular transaction occurred 12 years ago and I want to see that. 

Okay. Well then, we go look up what we have on that transaction.

Graham’s counsel stated that, in his personal experience with large estates, the standard practice 

was to start out with a shorter period and, if there is reason to go back in time to review particular 

issues or transactions, conduct further investigation regarding the issue or transaction. The trial 

court determined that the discovery period would initially be from January 1, 2015, forward but 

stated that any party could seek discovery from earlier periods as to specific transactions. The 

court stated: “And obviously, both sides can come to me and say we need to do something beyond 

that date or prior to that date and I’ll certainly listen.” Close to a year later, Elizabeth filed a motion 
3

to modify the court’s discovery order, arguing that permitting discovery “to at least as far back as 

the union of the parties on December 31, 1994, [was] necessary and proper” to effectuate a just 

and right division of the community estate. Rather than identify specific transactions or issues

warranting further investigation, Elizabeth again requested the court to permit global discovery of 

financial records dating back to December 31, 1994. By this time, the court had appointed a special 

master for discovery issues. The master held a hearing on Elizabeth’s motion. At the hearing, 

Elizabeth’s then-counsel stated that the parties had agreed to conduct earlier discovery on some

issues and had resolved some individual discovery disputes. The master denied Elizabeth’s request 

to change the discovery cutoff date of January 1, 2015, but reiterated that any party could come 

back to the court and seek further discovery as to specific transactions. The master proposed a 

procedure called “Request for Discovery Prior to 2015 for Specific Items” pursuant to which 

Elizabeth’s counsel could request specific items prior to the 2015 cutoff date and explain the need 

for further discovery. Graham’s counsel agreed to respond to any such requests within a week, 

and counsel for Elizabeth and Graham agreed to the discovery process. The record does not 

indicate, however, that Elizabeth or her counsel ever made such a request or asked the court for 

discovery of specific financial records prior to the 2015 cutoff date.

As the case proceeded, Elizabeth was represented by more than 20 different 

attorneys from different law firms. In June 2022, Elizabeth’s last four sets of lawyers moved, 

and were permitted by the court, to withdraw from the representation. Although not thereafter 

represented by counsel, Elizabeth repeatedly informed the court at hearings that she “was not 

appearing pro se” and that she “did not wish to proceed without counsel.” The court advised 

Elizabeth that if the obstacle to retaining counsel was financial, she should move for temporary 

orders to provide her with additional funds as the court could not act sua sponte. Elizabeth never 
4

retained new counsel in the trial court, did not provide the court with information about her 

attempts to do so, and did not suggest a revised scheduling order or other accommodation that 

would enable her to retain counsel. Instead, she continued to state her objection to proceeding 

without counsel and insisting that she was not appearing pro se.

In May 2022, when Elizabeth was still represented by counsel, Graham moved to 

strike sixteen of her nineteen designated testifying experts, arguing that the designations were 

inadequate and no reports had been produced. On June 21, 2022, the court extended the deadlines 

for filing expert disclosures, set deadlines for Elizabeth and Graham to notice depositions of fact 

witnesses, and set dates for the depositions of experts. All but one of Elizabeth’s experts failed to 

appear for deposition, and Elizabeth would not authorize the one expert who did appear for his 

deposition, Nick Mears, to answer questions. In his deposition, Mears stated:

I am sorry. While I am making a physical appearance today, ready, willing, and 

able, it is my understanding the client has not given counsel authorization for me to 

proceed. So while present and willing, I will not be proceeding for the deposition 

today.

I wanted to be here, like I said, ready, willing, and able, hopeful in the event that 

everyone would be cooperating. So if I did have authorization, I would be here 

giving my deposition here today.

Mears further informed Graham’s counsel that, because not authorized to do so by Elizabeth, he 

would not answer any questions about the work he was retained to perform or any related analysis.

On July 22, 2022, the court ordered Elizabeth to present two of her retained experts 

for depositions during the week of July 25 at one of three designated locations. When Elizabeth 

failed to present the experts for depositions as ordered, Graham again moved to strike the experts’ 
5

testimony at trial. The court heard arguments on the motion to strike Elizabeth’s experts on 

August 8, 2022, five weeks before the trial setting. Graham’s counsel explained to the court:

At a high level, I would say to the Court that Mrs. Weston has been given numerous 

chances to accomplish the discovery, many of those chances occurring while 

she was represented by counsel. Others have occurred since then. But this is a 

longstanding, repeated problem that has occurred in this case about discovery.

And as we’ve been quite transparent with the Court, we’ve asked you to do things 

in the past in the nature of building a track record and building blocks of sanctions 

that we told the Court and Mrs. Weston that we were going to—at some point come 

to you and ask you to strike these experts from the record and her ability to use 

them at trial. That is today. We are now at that point, Judge.

Graham’s counsel then detailed the history of unsuccessful attempts to obtain discovery from 

Elizabeth’s experts. In response to Graham’s counsel’s argument, Elizabeth stated that “I cannot 

proceed further because I do not have the law—I do not have an attorney,” and that she “could not 

proceed further.” When asked if she wanted to provide any testimony at the hearing, Elizabeth 

stated that she “cannot proceed under oath without an attorney.” After the hearing, the trial court 

signed an order directing Elizabeth to provide dates for expert depositions and produce their 

reports by August 19, 2022, or their testimony would be stricken. Elizabeth did not comply with 

the court’s order and Graham filed another motion to strike her experts. After a hearing, the court 

granted the motion and struck the testimony of Elizabeth’s experts.

A similar series of events resulted in the trial court’s ordering that Elizabeth would 

not be permitted to testify as a witness at trial. The court had previously ordered that Elizabeth 

and Graham would be deposed in two stages with the first stage being limited to nonfinancial 

matters. After Elizabeth filed motions to quash two notices of deposition Graham served on her, 

Graham moved to compel her deposition and asked the court to set a date for the deposition. After 
6

the court ordered that Elizabeth’s stage one and stage two depositions take place on August 1 and 

August 3, 2022, Graham served her with notices. Elizabeth appeared for the first deposition but 

refused to answer any questions, instead asserting as a blanket objection that she “was not 

representing herself,” “wanted a lawyer,” and could not “go forward” with the deposition without 

counsel. Elizabeth appeared for the second deposition but left the room after Graham’s counsel 

asked her to state her name for the record. Graham then filed a motion for sanctions, which the 

court heard on August 8, 2022. The court signed an order directing Elizabeth to appear for 

depositions on August 22 and 23 and further ordered that the special master attend the deposition 

to “make rulings as any disputes arise.” When Elizabeth failed to comply with the court’s order, 

Graham again filed a motion for sanctions asking the court to either strike Elizabeth’s pleadings 

or limit her trial testimony to what she had stated at her August 1 deposition. After a hearing on 

that motion, the court declined to strike Elizabeth’s pleadings but ordered her to appear for 

depositions on September 6 and 7 and cautioned her that if she did not participate in the deposition 

her testimony would be stricken from the trial. Elizabeth did not comply with the court’s order 

and her deposition did not go forward.

In July 2022, Graham filed a motion for partial summary judgment that his interests 

in certain family trusts were his separate property. The motion was supported by trust documents 

and sworn declarations of Graham and one of his expert witnesses who traced the trusts and their 

assets from inception through the present. Although the trial court provided Elizabeth an extension 

of time to respond to the summary judgment motion, she failed to do so. The court signed an order 

granting the motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment that the trusts were Graham’s 

separate property and therefore could not be considered in the division of the community estate. 

Graham filed a second set of summary judgment motions in August 2022, asking the court to 
7

confirm that certain assets, business interests, and real property constituted his separate property. 

As were the earlier motions for summary judgment, these were supported by sworn declarations 

of expert witnesses who traced the assets, business interests, and real property from inception 

through the present. Elizabeth responded by filing a motion for continuance of the summary 

judgment hearing on the ground that her counsel had been permitted to withdraw from representing 

her and asserting that her prior counsel committed legal malpractice. Elizabeth asked the court for 

a continuance of any proceedings related to the case until she had obtained replacement counsel; 

something she had been advised repeatedly by the court to do and had provided no information 

to the court about what efforts she had undertaken to secure replacement counsel. Elizabeth 

submitted no summary judgment evidence related to the issues presented in Graham’s motions. 

After a hearing, the court granted the second set of summary judgment motions.

The case was set for trial on September 21, 2022, its seventh trial setting. The day 

before the trial, Elizabeth moved to recuse the trial judge, complaining mainly that she was 

prejudiced by her previous counsels’ withdrawals and that she should not be required to proceed 

to trial without representation. Elizabeth again alleged that her previous counsel had committed 

legal malpractice. Graham countered that Elizabeth’s motion was procedurally and substantively 

defective and complained mainly of the trial court’s rulings, which Graham maintained was not a 

ground for recusing a judge. The motion was referred to a former Travis County district judge 

who, after a hearing, denied the motion to recuse.

On September 21, the court held a pretrial hearing to determine whether Elizabeth 

was represented by counsel or would proceed pro se. Elizabeth informed the court that she had 

not been able to retain counsel to represent her in the proceeding and, although she objected to it 

on the ground that it violated her due process rights, Elizabeth stated that she was appearing pro se. 
8

The court then took up Graham’s motion in limine, which included requests to exclude testimony 

from any of Elizabeth’s expert witnesses whose testimony had been stricken or who were not 

timely disclosed and to exclude testimony from anyone not on a witness list that Elizabeth was to 

have provided by September 14. The court granted the motion in limine. The court determined 

that because it had previously stricken Elizabeth’s expert witnesses’ testimony as well as any 

testimony from Elizabeth not given in a deposition, and because Elizabeth had failed to provide a 

witness list, the result was that Elizabeth could not call any witnesses at trial.

The court then proceeded to conduct voir dire, during which Elizabeth questioned 

potential jurors regarding their experiences with divorce and other matters. A jury was seated and 

the court asked Elizabeth “what witnesses would we anticipate being called that have been properly 

noticed?” Elizabeth stated that she had no witnesses to call, and the court sent the jury back to the 

jury room. Elizabeth then rested her case, and Graham moved for a directed verdict on Elizabeth’s

affirmative claims against him, including claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and promissory 

estoppel. The court granted a directed verdict as to all of Elizabeth’s affirmative claims.

The issue of valuation of community assets was then tried to the jury. Graham 

presented testimony from business valuation expert John Camp; forensic accountant Cynthia 

Nguyen; Graham’s counsel Veronica Wolfe, who testified regarding Graham’s claim for waste and 

excessive attorneys’ fees he asserted was caused by Elizabeth and her counsels’ conduct; and 

Graham’s counsel Richard Orsinger, who testified regarding the reasonableness and necessity of 

Graham’s legal fees in the case and provided additional testimony regarding Graham’s claim for 

waste and excessive attorneys’ fees caused by Elizabeth and her counsel’s conduct.

The jury rendered its verdict on the character and valuation of the marital assets. 

The jury found that Graham was entitled to reimbursement from the community estate in the 
9

amount of approximately $6.7 million and found that the community estate was entitled to $8 

million because of Elizabeth’s waste of community assets. The jury did not determine the division 

of the marital estate—that issue was tried to the court. Graham testified to the court regarding 

his proposed property division, confirming that he was proposing that Elizabeth receive 100% of 

the value of the community estate (approximately $13.6 million). Graham then tried to testify 

regarding the division of the parties’ personal property. Elizabeth objected on the ground that she 

needed more time to prepare, and the court postponed the hearing until October 12. Graham had 

provided a list of their personal property with his proposal for its division and the court asked 

Elizabeth to review the list in advance and identify any items that she would not object to being 

awarded to Graham. Elizabeth failed to do so, and at the October 12 hearing the court and the 

parties discussed the disposition of the items of personal property. Elizabeth objected to every 

proposal Graham made, including proposals to give her 100% of certain community assets. 

The court ultimately divided the community estate in a manner it found to be just and right and 

granted the divorce.

The court signed the Final Decree of Divorce on October 21. The decree divided 

the community estate and confirmed separate property of Elizabeth and Graham. The court also 

divided the parties’ personal property including furniture, firearms, gym equipment, books, and 

art. The court also filed extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law including:

FOF 129: On September 26, 2022, [Graham] offered his proposal to divide the 

community estate and testified that he wanted [Elizabeth] to receive 100% of the 

community value as indicated on his proposal, which was admitted as Exhibit 13.

FOF 130: On October 12, 2022, the Court gave the parties the opportunity to 

provide testimony on the Murff factors. [Graham’s] counsel stated testimony on 

Murff factors was unnecessary because [Graham] proposed to give [Elizabeth] 

100% of the community estate. [Elizabeth] declined to give any testimony despite 
10

the opportunity to do so.

FOF 131: The Court took into consideration the below factors in making a 

determination of a just and right division. The Court finds that the following is a 

just and right division of the parties’ marital estate, having due regard for the rights 

of each party, including based on the following findings of the jury:

a. [Graham] contributed $6,252,217.13 of his separate property stock to 

Tuscany Partners, Ltd. (a community property entity);

b. [Graham] paid $432,461.20 from his separate property funds to reduce 

community property debt; and

c. [Elizabeth] committed constructive fraud or waste that depleted the 

community estate by $8,000,000.00.

FOF 159: Exhibit E on the Divorce Decree allocated the property listed in Exhibits 

15, 16, and 17. [Graham] was awarded items he requested that were in [Elizabeth’s] 

possession that [Elizabeth] did not request be awarded to her. [Graham] was 

awarded all personal property in his possession not listed in the Divorce Decree. 

[Elizabeth] was awarded all personal property she requested to keep from 

[Graham’s] list, all items from [Carowest] Headquarters Storage, all items on 

Exhibit 17, and all personal property in [Elizabeth’s] possession not listed in the 

Divorce Decree.

COL 27: As the Jury determined that [Elizabeth] committed actual or constructive 

fraud on the community, it calculated the value by which the community estate was 

depleted as a result of the fraud on the community and calculated the amount of the 

reconstituted estate. The Court divided the value of the reconstituted estate between 

the parties in a manner the Court deems just and right. Tex. Fam. Code § 7.009.

COL 29: During trial Respondent presented evidence to establish that the total 

marital estate subject to division by the Court is valued at $13,142,912. [Elizabeth] 

did not controvert this evidence. Of that amount, [Elizabeth] was awarded 

$14,202.620 (108.06% of the community estate), and [Graham] was awarded 

($1,059,708) (-8.06% of the community estate).

COL 32: The division of the community estate is favorable to [Elizabeth].

This appeal followed.
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DISCUSSION

Elizabeth, appearing pro se, filed an appellant’s brief that fails in many respects to 

comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (brief must 

contain clear and concise argument for contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities 

and to record). While Elizabeth’s brief identifies six “Issues Presented,” these issues are not 

supported by argument providing citations to authorities or to the record. Elizabeth’s Argument 

section in her brief is approximately one page in length and cites to one case, Zagorski v. Zagorski, 

116 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied), to support the general 

statement that an appellate court will reverse a trial court’s judgment when the trial court has 

abused its discretion in a manner that materially affects the just and right division of property. 

Elizabeth’s argument section does not contain a single citation to the record, which is composed

of a clerk’s record of close to 9,000 pages and a 57-volume reporter’s record. While courts 

construe the briefing standards liberally, they also require adherence to Rule 38.1’s minimum 

requirements. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. VATR Const. LLC, 418 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2013, no pet.) (“Appellate courts must construe briefing requirements reasonably and liberally, but 

a party asserting error on appeal still must put forth some specific argument and analysis showing 

that the record and the law support his contention.); Urquhart v. Marsaw, No. 05-19-00855-CV, 

2020 WL 3046202, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 8, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Adequate briefing 

relevant to the issues is minimally required for this Court to review the proceedings below.”). This 

is the case even when the appellant is appearing pro se. See id. (“Initially, we must note a pro se 

litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws 

and rules of procedure.”). Additionally, courts are under no “duty to make an independent search 

of the record to determine whether an assertion of error is valid. Borisov v. Keels, No. 01-15-
12

00522-CV, 2016 WL 3022603, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 26, 2016, pet. denied)

(mem. op.); see also Urquhart, 2020 WL 3046202, at *1 (court “cannot speculate as to the

substance of the specific issues appellant claims we must address” and “has no duty to perform an 

independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether the error complained 

of occurred”). Inadequate briefing presents nothing for this court to review. See Urquhart, 

2020 WL 3046202, at *1 (“Here, appellant’s brief fails to meet the minimum requirements of 

rule 38.1. As such, nothing is preserved for our review.”).

Despite Elizabeth’s brief’s shortcomings, we will address the issues we can discern 

she had raised in her statement of “Issues Presented” and review the record to determine whether 

the trial court abused its discretion in a manner that materially affected a just and right division of 

the marital estate. Specifically, we will determine (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion 

in setting a cutoff date for discovery of January 1, 2015, rather than December 31, 1994, as 

Elizabeth requested, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Elizabeth’s 

expert witness testimony at trial, leading to a directed verdict on her affirmative claims against 

Graham.2

2

 In doing so, we are guided by Elizabeth’s reply brief, filed by an attorney she retained 

after the appellee’s brief was filed in this appeal, which confirms that these are Elizabeth’s chief 

complaints. We disagree, however, that the issues presented in Elizabeth’s opening brief raised 

the question of whether the trial court erred by not granting Elizabeth’s request to continue the trial 

until she secured legal representation, and we will not address that issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1, 

38.2; Cebcor Serv. Corp. v. Landscape Design & Constr., Inc., 270 S.W.3d 328, 334 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“a party may not present arguments for the first time in its reply brief”); 

Yazdchi v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 177 S.W.3d 399, 404 n.18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, 

pet. denied) (declining to consider arguments made for first time in reply brief).
13

Discovery Cutoff

As previously discussed, the trial court held a hearing in April 2021 on Elizabeth’s 

motion to compel production of certain banking and financial records. The issue before the court 

was how far back in time could Elizabeth’s request for such records go. Elizabeth contended that

she should be permitted to discover records from the present back to December 31, 1994, when 

the parties married, because all such information was relevant. Graham proposed that the court 

set a shorter period for discovery in the first instance and, if specific transactions warranted it, 

Elizabeth could seek targeted discovery pertaining to the specific transaction. The court agreed 

that “a reasonable timeframe is appropriate” and ordered that discovery go forward for a six-year

time period beginning January 1, 2015, and explained that any party could seek discovery from 

earlier time periods as to specific transactions. A year later, Elizabeth asked the court to reconsider 

its ruling and permit blanket discovery from December 31, 1994, to the present. Elizabeth did not, 

however, identify any specific transactions or items that she wished to investigate further or what 

category of documents she wanted to discover from the time period preceding January 1, 2015.

The special master heard Elizabeth’s motion and, again, explained that any party could seek earlier 

discovery as to specific transactions, but denied the motion for blanket discovery going back to 

December 31, 1994. The record also reflects that, before the motion to modify was filed, the 

parties did reach agreement regarding certain issues preceding the 2015 discovery cutoff date and 

that Graham had produced certain financial statements and tax documents dating back to 1998.

The special master suggested a process called “Request for Discovery Prior to 2015 

for Specific Items” whereby Elizabeth’s counsel could request discovery of specific items 

preceding the 2015 cutoff date and Graham’s counsel would respond to that request within one 

week. Counsel for both parties agreed to the proposed discovery process, but neither Elizabeth’s 
14

counsel nor Elizabeth pro se made any such request or returned to the court to seek further 

discovery preceding the cutoff date. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by setting an initial 

discovery period going back to January 1, 2015, and allowing Elizabeth to seek further relevant 

discovery of specific transactions upon request to Graham or by order of the court. Elizabeth never 

availed herself of the process for obtaining further discovery and has not demonstrated that the 

trial court’s discovery rulings constitute a basis for any reversible error. 

Expert Witnesses’ Testimony

Elizabeth asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding her expert 

witnesses’ testimony at trial, which led to a directed verdict on her affirmative claims against 

Graham. She asserts that this effectively denied her a jury trial on her counterclaims. As described 

above, Elizabeth repeatedly refused to provide expert reports, tender experts for deposition, permit 

them to testify when they did appear, and refused herself to participate in her deposition. The court 

granted Elizabeth many extensions of time and opportunities to provide expert reports and tender 

experts for deposition. When she failed to do so, the court did not abuse its discretion in striking 

their testimony from trial. See Fort Brown Villas III Condo. Ass’n v. Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d 879, 

881-82 (Tex. 2009) (affirming trial court’s exclusion of untimely disclosed expert and noting 

that “hard deadlines” established by discovery cutoffs ensure that evidence presented at summary 

judgment and trial are consistent); Villegas v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 120 S.W.3d 26, 34-35 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (affirming trial court’s decision to strike late-filed 

supplemental expert materials); Matagorda Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Burwell, 94 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 189 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. 2006)

(per curiam) (“The exclusion of the evidence is the sole remedy for not timely supplementing 
15

discovery.”). Moreover, Elizabeth made no offer of proof describing even the general substance 

of the expected expert witness testimony to permit this Court to determine whether the excluded 

expert testimony was relevant on a material issue related to her counterclaims such that the 

exclusion of that testimony probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See, e.g., 

Watts v. Oliver, 396 S.W.3d 124, 128-29 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

CONCLUSION

Elizabeth has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in its 

division of the marital estate. We have also reviewed the extraordinarily voluminous record, 

including the testimony submitted to support Graham’s motions for summary judgment confirming 

certain of his property to be separate property, the testimony regarding the valuation of various 

components of the marital estate, and the trial court’s determinations of how to divide the parties’ 

financial and tangible property. The court’s determinations are supported by the evidence 

presented at trial as are the trial court’s findings that the division of the marital estate favored 

Elizabeth. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce.

__________________________________________

Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Smith

Affirmed

Filed: August 30, 2024