[Cite as InfoCision Mgt. Corp. v. Donor Car Center, Inc., 2016-Ohio-789.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

INFOCISION MANAGEMENT 

CORPORATION, CARL ALBRIGHT, 

AND AYANNA MILLS 

 Appellants 

 v. 

DONOR CARE CENTER, INC., et al. 

 Appellees 

C.A. No. 27034 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. 2010-03-1587 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: March 2, 2016 

 

OSOWIK, Judge. 

{¶1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas 

which arose from appellants’ claims of misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of a nondisclosure agreement. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

{¶2} The undisputed facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal are as follows. 

Appellant InfoCision Management Corporation (“InfoCision”) provides telemarketing services 

to nonprofit organizations. InfoCision and Donor Care are competitors. Appellees Donor Care 

and Synergy Direct Marketing Solutions, LLC (“Synergy”) are wholly-owned subsidiaries of 

appellee Ameridial Enterprises (“Ameridial”). Donor Care works with Synergy, a consulting 

firm that provides fundraising advice to nonprofit organizations. Donor Care and Synergy also 

share common executives and other employees, some of whom are former employees of 

InfoCision. Those include appellees Alexander Stavarz, a former InfoCision employee who is 
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president of both Donor Care and Synergy; Curtis Stern, Synergy’s vice-president, who formerly 

worked as InfoCision’s director of marketing, and Justin Henry, a Synergy account manager, 

formerly an InfoCision account representative. 

{¶3} In March 2010, InfoCision filed suit against former employee Kevin Johnson, 

Synergy, Donor Care, Stavarz, Stern, Henry, Ameridial and Patricia Zachman (Ameridial’s vicepresident). InfoCision alleged in the trial court that Synergy and Donor Care decided in 2008 to 

compete for two of InfoCision’s nonprofit accounts—the American Center for Law and Justice 

(“ACLJ”) and the World Harvest Church. The record reflects that in early 2008, Synergy 

recruited InfoCision employee Kevin Johnson, who had experience with the ACLJ account, to 

become its director of strategic fundraising. After leaving InfoCision to join Synergy, Johnson 

focused primarily on Donor Care projects. 

{¶4} InfoCision alleged that after Johnson moved to Synergy/Donor Care, he sought 

information on how his former employer was performing on the World Harvest Church account 

from his friend Kevin Cooper, who was then working for InfoCision. Ultimately, Cooper 

provided Johnson with a “script” used by InfoCision solicitors on an appeals campaign, a daily 

“progress report” on the ACLJ campaign, a “segment report” containing information on donor 

demographics, and various statistics regarding InfoCision’s performance on an account for the 

World Harvest Church. 

{¶5} InfoCision eventually conducted an investigation of Johnson’s and Cooper’s 

actions and confronted Cooper, who confessed and resigned. Cooper admitted that he divulged 

private, confidential and proprietary information to Donor Care’s employee Kevin Johnson, at 

various times between June and August 2008. InfoCision alleged that Johnson had stolen 

proprietary information regarding the ACLJ and World Harvest Church accounts, and that the 
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other Synergy and Donor Care defendants had either authorized him to do so or ratified the 

“theft” after the fact, using the information to gain a competitive advantage. 

{¶6} In May 2010, Donor Care filed a counterclaim against InfoCision, Carl Albright 

(president and CEO of InfoCision) and Ayanna Mills (an InfoCision call center supervisor who 

had previously worked for Donor Care), alleging unfair competition and misappropriation of 

trade secrets. Donor Care also brought a third-party complaint against Ayanna Mills and Carl 

Albright for unfair competition, misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duty. 

{¶7} Synergy filed a counterclaim as well against InfoCision alleging unfair 

competition and tortious interference. The unfair competition and tortious interference 

counterclaims were based on InfoCision’s filing of the lawsuit. 

{¶8} After considering various motions for summary judgment, the trial court allowed 

InfoCision’s claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with contract and 

business relationship, and breach of nondisclosure agreement (alleged against Johnson only) to 

go to the jury. Further, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ameridial and 

Zachman. 

{¶9} A two-week jury trial began on July 25, 2011. On August 5, 2011, the jury 

returned verdicts in favor of Donor Care and Synergy, essentially finding that Donor Care had 

not misappropriated InfoCision’s trade secrets. The jury found in InfoCision’s favor on its 

breach of nondisclosure agreement and tortious interference claims against Kevin Johnson. The 

jury also found for Synergy and Donor care on their counterclaims for unfair competition and for 

Synergy against InfoCision and Albright on Synergy’s counterclaim for tortious interference. 

{¶10} Additionally, the jury awarded Donor Care and Synergy “all attorneys’ fees 

incurred.” Following a hearing to determine the amount of attorney fees, the trial court awarded 
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Synergy $215,075.50 from InfoCision and Albright. The trial court awarded Donor Care, 

Zachman and Ameridial (all represented by the same counsel) $149,292 in attorney fees from 

InfoCision and Mills pursuant to R.C. 1333.64, which allows such an award if a party brings a 

trade secret misappropriation claim in bad faith. 

{¶11} The trial court further awarded punitive damages to Synergy and Donor Care on 

their unfair competition counterclaims in an amount equal to twice the attorney fees—$430,151 

to Synergy and $298,584 to Donor Care, Ameridial and Zachman jointly. 

{¶12} On August 22, 2011, InfoCision filed a Civ.R. 50(B) motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, motion for a new trial, pursuant to Civ.R. 59. 

InfoCision moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) on Donor Care’s claims 

for unfair competition, tortious interference with business relations and breach of fiduciary duty. 

InfoCision also moved for JNOV on its own claim for tortious interference with the nondisclosure agreements. By judgment entry filed November 22, 2011, the trial court found that 

InfoCision was not entitled to JNOV on any of the verdicts rendered by the jury. The trial court 

also found that there was substantial, competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict on 

Synergy’s claim for tortious interference with business relations, its verdict on Synergy’s and 

Donor Care’s unfair competition claims, and the verdict on InfoCision’s claim against Synergy 

and Donor Care for tortious interference with its non-disclosure agreement. 

{¶13} On August 3, 2012, InfoCision again moved for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict on Donor Care’s and Synergy’s counterclaims or, in the alternative, for remittitur of the 

court’s punitive damage awards. It argued, inter alia, that the counterclaims failed as a matter of 

law because InfoCision’s lawsuit was objectively reasonable and because Donor Care and 

Synergy had presented no evidence of damages with the exception of their attorney fees. On 
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August 16, 2012, Donor Care filed a brief in opposition in which it argued that the motion for 

JNOV, remittitur and new trial was untimely and that InfoCision’s recent filings were frivolous. 

On January 7, 2013, the trial court denied InfoCision’s motion. 

{¶14} Because several abandoned claims remained of record on the docket, and to 

render the trial court’s judgment final, on July 8, 2013, the trial court entered its final judgment 

entry, confirming and memorializing its previous rulings on attorney fees, punitive damages, and 

sanctions in favor of the Donor Care defendants and resolving all claims. 

{¶15} Appellants timely appealed, setting forth the following assignments of error: 

 I. The trial court erred in denying JNOV on Donor Care and Synergy’s 

counterclaims. 

 II. The trial court’s punitive-damage awards were not supported by law or 

fact and violated due process. 

 III. The trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to Donor Care and 

Synergy under R.C. 1333.64. 

 IV. The trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to the Donor Care 

defendants under R.C. 2323.51. 

 V. A new trial is required on InfoCision’s tortious interference claims 

because the court failed to instruct the jury on ratification. 

{¶16} In support of their first assignment of error, appellants assert that a JNOV as to 

Synergy’s counterclaims was required because the trial court’s holdings, the jury verdict and the 

facts all showed that InfoCision’s lawsuit was objectively reasonable, and because Donor Care 

and Synergy presented no evidence of compensatory damages. 

{¶17} In order to rule on this claimed error, we must examine the procedural history of 

this matter beginning with the jury’s verdicts. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Donor Care 

and the other defendants on August 5, 2011, and the trial court entered judgment on each verdict 

on August 11, 2011. On August 22, 2011, InfoCision moved for JNOV and/or new trial 
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(“JNOV-1”). In support, InfoCision argued that the defendants did not prove any actual 

damages, which barred their counterclaims; the finding regarding the tortious interference claim 

was flawed; defendants’ counterclaim for unfair competition was improper because the tort could 

not be based upon the filing of a lawsuit with probable cause, and Kevin Johnson’s tortious 

conduct must be imputed to his employers. 

{¶18} All parties fully briefed the first JNOV motion and the trial court denied it in its 

entirety on November 22, 2011, finding that substantial, competent evidence existed to support 

each of the jury’s findings. 

{¶19} After entry of judgment on the verdicts, defendants-appellees moved on August 

30, 2011, to have their attorney fees and punitive damages determined by the trial court in 

accordance with the jury’s verdicts. On August 30, 2011, Patricia Zachman and Ameridial also 

moved for sanctions against InfoCision pursuant to R.C. 2323.51, asserting that InfoCision held 

them as party defendants despite the lack of any evidence against them. 

{¶20} The issues were extensively briefed by both parties and an evidentiary hearing 

was held on February 23, 2012. On March 21, 2012, InfoCision filed another brief—a “PostHearing Reply”—regarding punitive damages and other legal issues that were raised at the 

evidentiary hearing. InfoCision argued that there was no competent proof of “actual malice” 

required for an award of punitive damages. 

{¶21} On May 16, 2012, the trial court awarded attorney fees and punitive damages to 

Donor Care and the other defendants by way of a comprehensive judgment entry addressing the 

evidence and arguments presented in support of attorney fees and punitive damages. The trial 

court stated: “The jury awarded attorney fees as compensatory damages. The Court is not going 

to re-litigate the facts.” 
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{¶22} On May 22, 2012, InfoCision moved for reduction of the award of attorney fees 

and punitive damages due to the accidental inclusion of expert fees in the awards to Donor Care. 

Donor Care acknowledged the error and consented to the reduction, whereupon a nunc pro tunc 

was entered on July 20, 2012. 

{¶23} On August 3, 2012, InfoCision, through new counsel, filed a second motion for 

new trial, remittitur and JNOV (“JNOV-2”). The motion set forth several arguments, including: 

defendants did not prove any actual damages, which barred their counterclaims; defendants’ 

counterclaim for unfair competition was improper because the tort cannot be based upon the 

filing of a lawsuit with probable cause; the trial court failed to apply the appropriate factors in 

awarding punitive damages; the punitive damages awarded were excessive and should be subject 

to remittitur; the punitive damages were improper because only “legal” and not “actual” malice 

was proven; the sanctions to Ameridial and Zachman were improper because InfoCision had 

probable cause to pursue its claims against them, and a new trial was required on the tortious 

interference claims because no jury instruction on “ratification” was given. 

{¶24} In its January 7, 2013 judgment entry, the trial court stated that it had already 

addressed, in its November 22, 2011 judgment entry, the issues presented in InfoCision, Albright 

and Mill’s second motion for JNOV, remittitur and new trial. The court further stated: 

 Prior to issuing its November 22, 2011 Judgment Entry, the Court fully 

considered the facts of this matter, the parties’ arguments, and applicable law. 

While InfoCision has asked the court to consider the Sixth District’s recent ruling 

in Leadscope, this ruling does not change the Court’s analysis and holding. 

Considering that the Court already issued a ruling, InfoCision, Albright and Mills’ 

August 3, 2012 Motion is essentially a motion for reconsideration and/or an 

attempted appeal. 

{¶25} Appellants’ first assignment of error is not well-taken for several reasons as set 

forth by the trial court. First, as is evident from the facts summarized above, the motion was 
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untimely. Both Civ.R. 50(A) and 59 require that such a motion be filed within 14 days of the 

entry of judgment. However, InfoCision’s JNOV-2 was not filed until almost one year after 

judgment was entered on the verdicts, over nine months after JNOV-1 was denied, over five 

months after the trial court ruled on the post-trial motions and ordered an evidentiary hearing, 

and over 11 weeks after the trial court addressed the remaining issues concerning attorney fees 

and punitive damages. 

{¶26} There was no entry of judgment under Civ.R. 50(B) or 59 within 14 days of 

InfoCision’s second JNOV motion that would have permitted the motion to be considered by the 

trial court. The proper time to move for JNOV or a new trial was within 14 days of the trial 

court’s entry of judgment upon the jury verdict of August 9, 2010, which InfoCision did in 

JNOV-1. The trial court rejected the arguments and denied the motion after full consideration of 

the merits. 

{¶27} Additionally, InfoCision’s JNOV-2 is improper pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B) because 

the judgment entry as to the final amount of compensatory and punitive damages was issued by 

the trial court, not a jury. Civ.R. 50(B) “governs motions for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict; however, as the term ‘verdict’ implies, it only applies to cases tried by jury.” Freeman 

v. Wilkinson, 65 Ohio St.3d 307, 309, 603 N.E.2d 993, 995 (1992). The “verdict” in favor of 

appellees was rendered as a final judgment on August 9, 2011; an objection to the trial court’s 

May 16, 2012 judgment entry pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B) is not applicable since the entry was not a 

“verdict.” Id. at 309. 

{¶28} As to the attorney fees and punitive damages, InfoCision should have filed 

JNOV-2 within 14 days of the May 16, 2012 judgment. InfoCision did not do that, choosing 

instead to move for a minor remittitur on the award to Donor Care (to which Donor Care 
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consented). Then, with new counsel, InfoCision began to reargue issues that had already been 

fully briefed and argued by the parties and ruled on by the trial court. At the time JNOV-2 was 

filed, the trial court had already ruled that Synergy and Donor Care had proven a right to 

compensatory damages. 

{¶29} The trial court’s dismissal of InfoCision’s JNOV-2 was proper as the motion was 

duplicative and untimely, as set forth above. Accordingly, appellants’ first assignment of error is 

not well-taken. 

{¶30} Appellants’ second, third and fourth assignments of error will be considered 

together as they are interrelated. 

{¶31} In its second assignment of error, InfoCision asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion in awarding punitive damages. InfoCision argues that the punitive damage awards 

were not supported by law or fact and violated due process. Appellants’ third and fourth 

assignments of error challenge the trial court’s awards of attorney fees to Donor Care and 

Synergy under R.C. 1333.64 and to Donor Care under R.C. 2323.51. 

{¶32} We will first consider the issue of attorney fees challenged in assignments of error 

Nos. 3 and 4, since it was those awards, ordered as compensatory damages, which then became 

the basis for the punitive damages challenged in assignment of error No. 2. 

{¶33} R.C. 1333.63(A) allows a party to recover damages for the misappropriation of its 

trade secrets. R.C. 1333.63(B) provides that if “willful and malicious misappropriation exists, 

the court may award punitive or exemplary damages in an amount not exceeding three times any 

award made under division (A) of this section.” R.C. 1333.64 provides, in relevant part, that 

“the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, if * * * (C) willful and 

malicious misappropriation exists.” In light of the “may award” language used in R.C. 
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1333.64(C), the decision whether to award punitive damages or attorney fees under those 

provisions rests within the trial court’s discretion, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal 

absent an abuse thereof. Becker Equip., Inc. v. Flynn, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-12-313, 

2004-Ohio-1190, ¶ 11. 

{¶34} As to R.C. 1333.64, the record reflects that the trial court had a reasonable basis 

to award attorney fees to Donor Care and Synergy under the statute. The jury found in favor of 

Donor Care and Synergy on InfoCision’s misappropriation claim. In so doing, and as evidenced 

by the instructions to the jury, the jury necessarily found that InfoCision had brought its claims 

maliciously and without good faith for the purpose of harassing and injuring both Synergy and 

Donor Care. The jury was instructed as follows: 

 InfoCision [has] engaged in malicious acts by way of instituting this 

litigation against Defendants where: 

 (1) The action was not founded in good faith; and 

 (2) The action was instituted for the purpose of harassing and injuring the 

aggrieved party; and 

 (3) The aggrieved party was Plaintiff’s competitor. 

{¶35} With the above instruction, the jury found in favor of Donor Care on its unfair 

competition claim. Given the jury’s findings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding attorney fees. The record includes testimony that Carl Albright admitted that none of 

the information or documents provided by Cooper to Johnson constituted trade secrets; 

InfoCision had not lost any business or suffered lost profits as a result of Cooper’s actions; 

Albright’s source of information (Mills) was a liar and fraudster rewarded for providing 

information and confidential Donor Care documents with an InfoCision job, benefits and 

privileges, despite InfoCision’s earlier policy barring Mills from being re-hired; and Albright 

wanted to crush Donor Care and put it out of business by running up legal fees. 
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{¶36} That testimony, combined with the jury’s findings that InfoCision lacked good 

faith and probable cause, is sufficient to support the statutory award of attorney fees to Donor 

Care. 

{¶37} Further, as to the award of attorney fees to Synergy pursuant to R.C. 1333.64, 

based on the jury’s findings in favor of Synergy on its unfair competition and misappropriation 

claims following the instructions as cited above, the trial court was well within its discretion to 

award attorney fees under this statute. 

{¶38} InfoCision, in its fourth assignment of error, also asserts that the trial court 

improperly awarded attorney fees to Donor Care under R.C. 2323.51, which provides for an 

award of attorney fees to “any party adversely affected by frivolous conduct.” 

{¶39} The record reflects that InfoCision never came forward with credible evidence of 

misappropriation of trade secrets by Zachman or Ameridial. Although the legal expenses 

incurred were reflected in the bills submitted at the February 21, 2012 hearing, InfoCision’s 

conduct was nonetheless sanctionable. And since the legal fees were already considered and 

properly awarded to Donor Care pursuant to R.C. 1333.64 as discussed above, any argument 

further challenging the award under R.C. 2323.51 is without merit. Appellants’ third and fourth 

assignments of error are not well-taken. 

{¶40} In their second assignment of error, appellants challenge the trial court’s punitive 

damage awards. A decision to award punitive damages is subject to an abuse of discretion 

standard of review. Kemp v. Kemp, 161 Ohio App.3d 671, 2005-Ohio-3120, 831 N.E.2d 1038 

(5th Dist.). The term abuse of discretion infers more than an error of law or judgment; it implies 

that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 
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{¶41} “An award of punitive damages, under Ohio law, is warranted in a tort case upon 

a finding of actual malice, fraud, oppression, or insult on the part of the defendant.” Berge v. 

Columbus Comm. Cable Access, 136 Ohio App.3d 281, 316, 736 N.E.2d 517 (10th Dist.1999). 

The following guideposts are to be considered when awarding punitive damages: “the 

reprehensibility of the tortfeasor’s conduct, the ration of punitive damages to compensatory 

damages, and the civil penalties authorized in comparable cases.” Id.

{¶42} The record reflects that the trial court’s opinion in support of the award of 

punitive damages, included in its May 16, 2013 judgment entry, was based on extensive postverdict motions and briefing, a hearing on attorney fees and other damages, and pre- and posthearing briefing. The trial court’s judgment entry reflects that it considered all arguments 

presented by the parties and cited the proper standard in assessing the punitive damages. 

Further, the parties agreed, as reflected in the judgment entries of November 22, 2011 and May 

16, 2012, that the trial court would make the determination of attorney fees and punitive 

damages if warranted by the jury’s verdict. In this case, the jury determined that InfoCision 

acted in bad faith with an intent to harass and injure Synergy and Donor Care. The jury found 

that InfoCision engaged in malicious acts by filing the lawsuit, that the lawsuit was not brought 

in good faith, that the lawsuit was brought for the purpose of harassing and injuring, and that 

InfoCision did not have probable cause to bring the action. Accordingly, the trial court properly 

found that punitive damages should be awarded and appellants’ second assignment of error is not 

well-taken. 

{¶43} In their fifth assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to instruct the jury on ratification, thereby warranting a new trial. 

Generally, requested jury instructions should be given if they are a correct statement of the law 
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as applied to the facts of the case. Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 575 

N.E.2d 828 (1991). “[A] court’s instruction to the jury should be addressed to the actual issues 

in the case as posited by the evidence and the pleadings.” State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St.2d 266, 

271, 421 N.E.2d 157 (1981). Further, a determination as to jury instructions is a matter left to 

the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. 

{¶44} Civ.R. 51(A) requires that proposed jury instructions be submitted “at the close of 

evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs.” The purpose of 

this requirement is to allow sufficient time for the court and opposing counsel to “fairly examine 

and pass upon them.” Morgan v. Sheppard, 188 N.E.2d 808, 816 (8th Dist.1963). 

{¶45} The record reflects that in its March 31, 2011 case management order, the trial 

court set an “earlier time” for the submission of written jury instructions and instructed they be 

filed and exchanged on or before July 13, 2011: “[T]he Court hereby Orders as follows...A 

JURY TRIAL has been scheduled for July 25, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. Any motions in limine, jury 

instructions, and witness/exhibit lists shall be field with the Court and exchanged between the 

parties on or before the Final Pretrial scheduled for July 13, 2011.” 

{¶46} InfoCision filed its proposed jury instructions on July 13, 2011, requesting 

instruction pursuant to five sections of the standard Ohio Jury Instructions. InfoCision did not 

request or reserve the right to amend or add instructions. The record further reflects that during 

opening statements, counsel for InfoCision suggested that Synergy may have ratified the conduct 

of its employee Kevin Johnson. Other than that, the record shows no further discussion of 

agency ratification by InfoCision. 

{¶47} On July 29, 2011, the trial court provided the parties with a draft of the jury 

instructions. An instruction on ratification was not included. On August 1, 2011, when the 
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parties and the trial court began discussions regarding the draft jury instructions, InfoCision did 

not express a desire for a ratification charge. However, the following day InfoCision filed a 

modified proposed jury instruction on the issue of ratification. The next day, during final 

discussions on the instructions, InfoCision noted an objection to the lack of a ratification 

instruction without elaborating; the issue was not discussed. 

{¶48} Upon review of the record with regard to the issue of ratification, we find that 

InfoCision failed to comply with the trial court’s instruction to file and exchange written 

proposed jury instructions on or before July 13, 2011. InfoCision filed an untimely instruction 

based upon an issue it had not presented at trial. A possible instruction on ratification was not 

discussed prior to InfoCision’s statement that it objected to the lack of same on the next to last 

day of trial. As stated above, the only mention of the issue of ratification occurred during 

opening statements when InfoCision’s counsel suggested that Synergy may have ratified the 

conduct of its employees. 

{¶49} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s decision to not include a jury 

instruction on ratification was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and, therefore, was 

not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, appellants’ fifth assignment of error is not well-taken. 

{¶50} Upon the consideration of the foregoing, the judgment of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellants pursuant to 

App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
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 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellants. 

 

 THOMAS J. OSOWIK 

 FOR THE COURT 

SINGER, J. 

YARBROUGH, J. 

CONCUR. 

(Judges Arlene Singer, Thomas J. Osowik, and Stephen A. Yarbrough, Sixth District Court of 

Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.) 

APPEARANCES: 

THOMAS D. WARREN and G. KARL FANTER, Attorneys at Law, for Appellants. 

JOHN J. RAMBACHER, STEPHEN P. GRIFFIN and MICHAEL J. KAHLENBERG, Attorneys 

at Law, for Appellees. 

JAMES M. MCHUGH, Attorney at Law, for Appellees.