UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES E. LUNDEEN, SR.,

Plaintiff,

-v- Case No.: 2:11-CV-1128 

JUDGE SMITH

Magistrate Judge King

THE STATE MEDICAL BOARD OF OHIO,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff James E. Lundeen initiated this action to challenge the permanent revocation of his

medical license by Defendant, the State Medical Board of Ohio (“the Board”). He seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief. 

On May 8, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”)

(Doc. 19) proposing that Plaintiff’s pending motions be denied and this action dismissed in its

entirety. Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R & R (Docs. 20, 21).1

 Defendant

subsequently filed a Notice of Additional Development, with a state court ruling attached, which

Plaintiff opposed by filing a Motion to Strike (Doc. 24). 

The Court, having reviewed the record de novo, finds for the reasons that follow that

Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. Therefore, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED, and

the R & R is ADOPTED and AFFIRMED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary

1 Plaintiff’s objections, titled Verified Response in Opposition to Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, were filed in duplicate on the docket. 

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injunction (Doc. 6), motion for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction (Doc. 13), and

motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 16) are DENIED. Further, as the Court reached its

decision without considering Defendant’s Notice of Additional Development or the state court

decision underpinning Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, the Motion to Strike (Doc. 24) is DENIED as

MOOT.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

When objections are received to a Magistrate Judge’s R & R on a dispositive matter, the

assigned District Judge “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that

has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After review, the District Judge “may

accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the

matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). General

objections are insufficient to preserve any issues for review. Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). 

II. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that a large part of Plaintiff’s opposition to the

Magistrate Judge’s R & R amounts to political conspiracy theories and unsupported factual

inferences and opinions. These are not proper means of objecting to the R & R, let alone

admissible evidence, and have been disregarded by the Court. See, e.g., Risch v. Royal Oak Police

Dept., 581 F.3d 383, 398 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur law is well-established that rumors, conclusory

allegations and subjective beliefs ... are wholly insufficient evidence . . . .”); Begun v. Ohio State

Med. Bd., 872 F.2d 1023, 1989 WL 34047, at *1 (6th Cir. ) (“[P]laintiff’s unwarranted factual

inferences and conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim.”). With that

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said, the Court will now address the two categories of objections properly before the Court for

review: jurisdiction and abstention.

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the Court lacks both subject

matter and personal jurisdiction over Defendant State Medical Board of Ohio. The Magistrate

Judge found no subject matter jurisdiction due to the Eleventh Amendment bar prohibiting suit by

a private citizen against a state, including agencies of the state. The Magistrate Judge also found

no personal jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to complete service of process in conformance

with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 4.2. 

For the first time in this action, Plaintiff claims that the intended party-defendant is Richard

Whitehouse, in his official capacity as the Executive Director of the Board, rather than the Board

itself. The Court finds this sudden revelation to be a disingenuous attempt to avoid the Eleventh

Amendment bar applicable to Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff specifically captioned the defendant in his

Complaint as “The State Medical Board of Ohio, C/o Richard A. Whitehouse, Exec. Director.” 

(Doc. 2). Even though Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, Plaintiff clearly knew enough to properly title

his case—when he has intended to sue state officials in their personal and/or official capacities in

other cases before this Court, he has aptly specified it in the case caption.2

 And since the inception

of this lawsuit, the Ohio Attorney General’s Office has clearly stated its representation on behalf of

the Board, not Mr. Whitehouse; yet Plaintiff never once, in all of his filings with the Court,

attempted to clarify any alleged misunderstanding until after the Magistrate Judge correctly

2

 See, e.g., Lundeen v. Buehrer, Case No. 2:11-cv-363 (“Stephen P. Buehrer, personal capacity Defendant

and Stephen P. Buehrer, Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, official capacity Defendant . . .

.”); Lundeen v. Ridge, Case No. 2:11-cv-430 (“John S. Ridge, personal capacity Defendant and John S. Ridge,

official capacity Defendant”); Lundeen v. Talmadge, Case No. 2:11-cv-484 (“Lance A. Talmadge, MD, official

capacity, Board Member, State Medical Board of Ohio . . . .”). 

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recommended dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court also agrees with the Magistrate Judge that there is no personal jurisdiction over

Defendant Board because Plaintiff has failed to perfect service of process in the almost seven

months that this action has been pending. Plaintiff’s claims that service has been waived because

Defendant had “actual notice” and “material involvement” have no merit. And, ironically, if the

Court were to treat Mr. Whitehouse as the real party-defendant, as Plaintiff requests, Plaintiff

would have an even weaker argument as to personal jurisdiction since Mr. Whitehouse has never

even entered an appearance in this matter. 

Plaintiff additionally objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that federal abstention, as

articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), applies to this case. The Magistrate Judge

found each of the three Younger factors satisfied and no exceptions counseling against abstention. 

Even were the Court to adopt Plaintiff’s argument that he actually sued Mr. Whitehouse in his

official capacity, rather than the Board, for prospective injunctive relief, the same abstention

analysis would still apply.

Plaintiff’s objections to abstention focus on two main issues: adequacy of the state forum

and alleged bad-faith harassment of the state proceedings.3

 First, Plaintiff disagrees with the

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise

constitutional challenges. But as highlighted by the Magistrate Judge, Ohio courts entertain appeals

of Board decisions based on federal constitutional issues, and this Court has specifically held that

3

 Plaintiff also generally objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that “the mere fact that §4731.22

may not expressly require a particular mental element does not render the statute so flagrantly and patently

violative of express constitutional prohibitions that equitable relief is warranted notwithstanding the Younger

analysis.” Plaintiff does not offer any new insight, but only references the Court to his earlier briefing. The Court

agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis on this issue. 

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such state appeals provide an adequate forum to satisfy Younger. Plaintiff’s continued belief that

the “high-profile” nature of his case is an “unusual circumstance” making the state proceedings

inadequate simply has no merit. Also, just because all of Plaintiff’s prior state court actions have

failed does not change this analysis. Younger simply requires having the opportunity to seek relief

on federal constitutional grounds; it is not a guarantee of success on the merits. 

Second, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that none of the recognized

Younger exceptions apply. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the state proceeding was motivated by

a desire to harass and conducted in bad faith. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611

(1975). Notably, however, Plaintiff never addressed this exception when discussing Younger in

earlier filings in this action. Even had Plaintiff raised this exception for the Magistrate Judge’s

consideration, the Court would still find it inapplicable to Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff has made no

attempt to provide admissible evidence that the Board’s proceedings to permanently revoke his

license, or the subsequent appeal before the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, were initiated

to harass or conducted in a bad faith manner. Thus, the Magistrate Judge correctly applied

Younger, and this Court agrees that abstention is appropriate in this matter. 

III. CONCLUSION

Having carefully reviewed the record, the Report and Recommendation, and Plaintiff’s

objections, the Court agrees with the conclusion of the United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s

objections (Doc. 20) are DENIED. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 19) is ADOPTED

and AFFIRMED. All of Plaintiff’s pending motions (Docs. 6, 13, 16, 24) are DENIED. This

action is hereby DISMISSED. 

The Clerk shall enter FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant and close this case. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ George C. Smith 

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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