Filed 3/28/23 In re K.Z. CA2/8

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re K.Z., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

B318145

(Los Angeles County 

Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP04512E)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.Z.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. Terry T. Truong, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Appellant D.Z. (Father) challenges the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional and dispositional orders of January 26, 2022. The 

juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over then four-year-old K.Z. 

after finding Father had a long-standing and unresolved history

of violent behavior that placed K.Z. at risk of serious physical 

harm under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1).

1 It also found jurisdiction over K.Z. based on 

K.Z.’s mother’s (Mother) failure to protect, and conduct by the 

father toward some of K.Z.’s siblings. 

Father appealed, contending that the evidence does not 

support the jurisdictional finding as to him, and that the court 

inappropriately shifted the burden of proof to him.

2 Mother did 

not appeal. 

We reverse, concluding there is insufficient evidence of a 

nexus between Father’s past violent acts and risk of serious 

physical harm to K.Z. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father is the presumed Father of K.Z. K.Z. was born in 

January 2018.

I. Petitions and Detention Hearing.

K.Z. is one of Mother’s five children who were subject to the 

dependency petition. The other children have different fathers 

than K.Z. Only K.Z. is the subject of this appeal. 

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

2 We do not address Father’s argument as to burden because 

we find in his favor that the evidence in support of jurisdiction 

was insufficient. 
3

In September 2021, the Los Angeles Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition after a 

report by one of K.Z.’s siblings that the sibling’s father sexually 

abused her. This petition did not mention Father. 

In November 2021, DCFS filed a first amended petition

that added allegation “b-7.” This is the only allegation regarding

Father. That same month, DCFS filed a second amended 

petition. This petition had the same allegation as to Father, 

except that it inserted Father’s name into the count. Count b-7 

read:

“The child [K.Z.]’s father, [D.Z.], has a long-standing and 

unresolved history of violent behavior, including a history of 

convictions which include participat[ing] in criminal street gang 

activity, robbery in the second degree which resulted in a [nine] 

year prison term, force/assault with a deadly weapon not a 

firearm, which resulted in a two year prison term, and wet 

reckless driving. The father [D.Z.]’s unresolved history of violent 

behavior endangers the child’s physical safety and emotional 

health, safety and well-being and creates a detrimental home 

environment, placing the child [K.Z.] at risk of physical and 

emotional harm and damage.”

At the detention hearing held on September 30, 2021, the 

juvenile court detained K.Z. from Father. K.Z. remained in the 

care of Mother. 

II. Prior Referrals Involving Father.

In October 2019, a reporting party reported domestic 

violence between Mother and Father. When questioned by 

DCFS, both parents denied the allegations. Mother specifically 

denied being afraid of Father, denied that he raped her, and 

denied that he had kidnapped “the baby.” DCFS found no 
4

evidence of physical abuse. The referral was closed as 

unfounded. 

In January 2020, DCFS contacted Mother based on reports 

that Father emotionally abused K.Z. This referral was deemed 

inconclusive after DCFS was unable to make contact with the 

family. 

In March 2021, DCFS received a referral that Father 

emotionally abused K.Z. and his siblings. The referral stated 

that Father lived with his “new girlfriend.” Mother reported that 

Father “usually” had “ ‘exchanging words’ ” with his girlfriend 

when Mother went to pick up K.Z. Mother reported that Father 

told her that on one occasion he had to “knock” his girlfriend 

“out.” Father denied that he and the girlfriend argued in K.Z.’s 

presence. The referral was closed as inconclusive.

III. Investigation.

A. Statements by Father.

In December 2021, Father filed a statement regarding 

parentage. In it, he outlined his activities with K.Z., which 

included playing in the park, going to the beach, going to 

carnivals, shopping, reading, coloring, and attending medical and 

dental appointments. He also stated that he provided clothing, 

food, and shelter for K.Z. Father reported that after K.Z. was 

born, he, Mother and K.Z. lived together on and off, for 

approximately two years. He stated that K.Z. lived with him

from January through April 2021. He also used FaceTime to call 

K.Z. when he was not with him. 

DCFS interviewed Father twice. In November 2021, 

Father reported that he was now residing in Arizona and had 

been there for five months. He stated that all he had on his 
5

record was a robbery conviction from when he was younger and 

went to prison for seven years.

B. Statements by Mother.

In DCFS interviews with Mother, Mother reported that 

Father was aggressive and he had hit her on one occasion, but 

she could not remember if law enforcement was involved. Mother

also reported that Father raped her. Mother told DCFS that 

Father had made “death threats” to her current partner. Finally, 

Mother reported that Father had “broken” into her apartment

once and “took” K.Z. The record does not indicate when any of 

these events took place. 

Mother also said that she was afraid of Father. She said 

she went to Arizona to give birth to a second child she had with 

Father because she was afraid Father would force himself on her. 

According to Mother, K.Z. had never lived with Father. In

November 2021, Mother reported that sometime in “April” (of 

what year is unclear) K.Z. had slept over at Father’s house 

“frequently” for about three weeks. Mother denied K.Z. having 

any regular contact with Father.

Mother also reported that Mother and Father are no longer 

together and had not been together since the end of 2018. 

Prior to this dependency proceeding, there were no custody 

orders in place regarding K.Z., and Mother and Father shared 

custody.

C. Father’s Criminal Convictions.

Father’s criminal history reflects numerous arrests, 

warrants, probation violations, and felony convictions. In 2004, 

Father was convicted of taking a vehicle without the owner’s 

consent. In 2008, Father was convicted of participating in street 

gang activity and of second degree robbery. In 2016, Father was 
6

convicted of an unspecified charge. In 2017, Father was 

convicted of felony assault with a deadly weapon with force likely 

to produce great bodily injury. That same year, Father was also 

convicted of false imprisonment. In 2019, Father was convicted 

of reckless driving for driving under the influence. 

IV. Jurisdiction and Disposition.

The juvenile court held a combined adjudication and

disposition hearing on January 26, 2022. 

The court sustained allegation b-7 as pled. It found that 

“[w]ith regards to count b[-]7 and [father], while a parent[’s]

criminal history alone is not sufficient for the court to sustain a 

count, I do believe in this case [father’s] criminal history is 

relevant to his conduct and the mother’s fear of [father] as well as 

his relationship—or non-exist[ant] relationship with K.Z. at this 

point. His criminal history which includes robbery and assault 

with a deadly weapon are—a history that would place a three 

year old in danger given that I have no evidence presented by 

[Father] to show me that he has redeemed or that he has resolved 

the issues that resulted in his convictions.” 

The court then moved to disposition and removed K.Z. from 

Father. The court ordered enhancement services and parenting 

classes for Father. Upon Father’s counsel’s request, the juvenile 

court struck case plan requirements, recommended by DCFS,

that Father attend anger management classes. 

This appeal by Father followed. Mother did not appeal. 

V. Father’s Request for Judicial Notice of Final Orders.

Father requests that we take judicial notice of the 

September 14, 2022 Judicial Review Hearing Order and 

Restraining Order-Juvenile, and the September 19, 2022 

Juvenile Custody Order Hearing Minute Order and Custody 
7

Order Final Judgment. We grant the request and take judicial 

notice of the information in these final orders because they are

records of a court of this state and are relevant to the question of 

justiciability. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Jordache 

Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 

739, 748, fn. 6 [courts will take judicial notice of only relevant 

matter].) Specifically, they are relevant to the question of 

possible prejudice to Father from the jurisdictional order. In the 

relevant Final Orders, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction 

and granted Mother sole legal and physical custody of K.Z. We 

decline to take judicial notice of the other orders because they are 

not relevant to whether we should review this decision on the 

merits, which is the purpose of Father’s request for judicial 

notice. 

DISCUSSION

Father contends that the evidence does not support the 

juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1) over K.Z. based upon Father’s actions. Father 

also argues that the juvenile court erred in shifting the burden of 

proof to him from DCFS. He further asserts that we should 

review the merits of his appeal because the jurisdictional finding 

against him served as the basis for the dispositional order 

removing K.Z. from Father, and the order could be prejudicial to 

Father. Father also appeals the dispositional order, arguing it 

should be reversed because the jurisdictional order was in error.

DCFS argues that the evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s jurisdictional finding as to Father and the court did not 

shift the burden of proof to Father. 

I. Father’s Appeal Is Justiciable.

We begin by addressing whether Father’s appeal is 

justiciable. 
8

Father appealed the juvenile court’s assumption of 

jurisdiction, but the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction in 

September 2022. Our Supreme Court recently clarified that even 

where the juvenile court has terminated jurisdiction, where a 

jurisdictional finding serves as the basis for dispositional orders 

that are also challenged on appeal, “the appeal is not moot.” (In 

re D.P. (Jan. 19, 2023, S267429) 14 Cal.5th 266 at p. 278 (In re 

D.P.).) Father’s appeal of the jurisdictional order has therefore 

not been rendered moot by the juvenile court’s subsequent 

termination of jurisdiction. 

In addition, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over 

K.Z. not only due to Father’s actions alleged in count b-7, but also 

by sustaining a count regarding Mother and several counts 

involving the father of some of Mother’s other children. Mother 

does not appeal. “[W]here jurisdictional findings have been made 

as to both parents but only one parent brings a challenge, the 

appeal may be rendered moot.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 285.) Regardless, still we have discretion to address the merits 

of a jurisdictional challenge by only one parent, where, as here, 

the jurisdictional ruling has impacted current dependency 

proceedings or could otherwise be prejudicial to the appellant. 

(Id. at p. 286) 

Here, in sustaining count b-7, the juvenile court found that

Father had a long-standing and unresolved history of violent 

behavior that endangered K.Z. This finding was the basis for the 

dispositional order removing K.Z. from Father’s custody, so it has 

impacted the current dependency proceeding. (See In re D.P., 

supra, 14Cal.5th at p. 286.) In addition, the juvenile court in its 

final orders gave Mother sole legal and physical custody, with 

monitored visitation for Father. This is also evidence of an 
9

impact on the current proceedings and prejudice to Father. We 

therefore exercise our discretion to consider Father’s appeal even 

though Mother did not appeal.

3 (See ibid.) 

II. Standard of Review.

We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and 

dispositional orders for substantial evidence. (In re R.T. (2017) 

3 Cal.5th 622, 633 (R.T.).) We draw all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the findings and orders of the juvenile court. We do not 

reweigh the evidence or reassess credibility. (Ibid.) “Substantial 

evidence is evidence that is ‘reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value’; such that a reasonable trier of fact could make such 

findings.” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199.) 

Substantial evidence “ ‘is not synonymous with any evidence. 

[Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence 

need not be affirmed on appeal.’ ” (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 

7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)

III. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the Juvenile 

Court’s Jurisdictional Finding.

The record does not contain substantial evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1). 

Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), a juvenile court may 

exercise jurisdiction over a child if the “child has suffered, or 

there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious 

3 DCFS filed its brief on October 14, 2022, after the juvenile 

court terminated jurisdiction on September 19, 2022. DCFS did 

not argue that we lack jurisdiction, or otherwise assert that we 

should dismiss Father’s appeal as moot. We take this as an 

indication that DCFS has no objection to our review of this 

matter on the merits. 
10

physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] [t]he failure or 

inability of [his or her] parent . . . to adequately supervise or 

protect the child,’ or by “[t]he inability of the parent . . . to provide 

regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness, 

developmental disability, or substance abuse.” (§ 300, 

subd. (b)(1).) 

A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision 

(b)(1), requires DCFS to demonstrate the following three 

elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) neglectful 

conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and 

(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of 

serious physical harm or illness. (In re Joaquin C. (2017) 

15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561; see also R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624.) 

These elements must be established as of the time of the 

jurisdictional hearing. (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 

1022.) “[P]revious acts . . . , standing alone, do not establish a 

substantial risk of future harm; there must be some reason 

beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.” (In re 

Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 15, citing In re Ricardo L.

(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 565.) 

We find insufficient evidence that at the time of the 

jurisdictional hearing, K.Z. was at substantial risk of serious 

harm due to Father’s violent history. The evidence of Father’s 

violent history consists of his criminal convictions, domestic 

violence concerning Mother and his girlfriend, death threats to

Mother’s “current” partner, and breaking into Mother’s house to 

take K.Z. But the record does not establish a nexus between 

these acts and a substantial risk of serious physical harm to K.Z.

at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. With the exception of 

the break-in, there is no evidence that K.Z. or any child was 
11

present or otherwise at-risk during Father’s prior violent acts. 

Additionally, the record does not indicate when many of Father’s

acts took place. We therefore cannot conclude on this record, 

which is largely devoid of dates and pertinent details, that there 

is substantial evidence that at the time of the jurisdictional 

hearing Father’s violent history posed a substantial risk of 

serious harm to K.Z.

As the trial court recognized, Father’s criminal history, 

standing alone, is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. 

DCFS “ ‘has the burden of showing specifically how the minor[] 

ha[s] been or will be harmed’ ” (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 

767, 775), which requires showing “an actual nexus” between the 

parent’s conduct “and any specifically identified, substantial, 

current risk of serious physical harm” (ibid.) to the child. Father 

has an extensive criminal history. But Father’s criminal history 

does not give rise to an inference that K.Z. faces a specifically 

identified, substantial risk of harm. (See ibid.) There is no 

evidence that Father’s crimes harmed or put K.Z. or any child at 

risk of harm. There is no evidence any of his crimes involved 

children or were in the presence of children. Thus, it is 

speculative to conclude that any future criminal conduct by 

Father will put K.Z. at substantial risk of serious harm. (See id.

at p. 776 [“although we acknowledge that, on an abstract level, 

violent crime is incompatible with child safety, DCFS cannot use 

such generalities to satisfy its burden of proving an ‘identified, 

specific hazard in the child’s environment’ that poses a 

substantial risk of serious physical harm to him”], italics 

omitted.) 

There is also evidence that Father engaged in domestic 

violence with Mother. There is evidence that Father raped 
12

Mother and hit her on one occasion. In cases of domestic 

violence, there can be a finding of a nexus between past violence 

and a risk of future violence to the child sufficient to support 

jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (In re Jesus M.

(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 112–113; In re R.C. (2012) 

210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 

575–576.) Jurisdiction can be appropriate under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1), because “[c]hildren can be ‘put in a position of 

physical danger from [domestic] violence’ because, ‘for example, 

they could wander into the room where it was occurring and be 

accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or 

leg . . . .’ ” (In re E.B., at p. 576.) But the existence of past 

domestic violence alone is not enough to support jurisdiction. 

DCFS must provide evidence that the domestic violence is 

“ongoing or likely to continue” and that it “directly harmed the 

child physically or placed the child at risk of physical harm.” 

(In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 (Daisy H.), 

disapproved of on another ground in In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 

at p. 278; accord, In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453.)

Here, there is no evidence that the domestic violence between 

Father and Mother directly harmed K.Z. or placed him at risk of 

physical harm because there is no evidence as to his whereabouts 

when the domestic violence took place. 

It is also unclear when the domestic violence between 

Mother and Father took place, such as to support a finding that it 

is ongoing or likely to continue. There was a report of domestic 

violence in 2019, which was found unfounded. Mother told DCFS

that her relationship with Father was over by the end of 2018. 

Father was not convicted of any crime involving domestic 

violence. Drawing all inferences in favor of the juvenile court’s 
13

decision as we must, there is no evidence that Father’s domestic 

violence against Mother continued past 2019. Father and Mother 

are no longer together, so any assumption that their domestic 

violence will reoccur, and that it will place K.Z. at harm, is 

speculation. (Cf. In re Ma.V. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 11, 21 

[reversing the juvenile court because its findings were based on 

“stale” acts of domestic violence that had occurred on an ongoing 

basis but had last occurred 10 months earlier, and the 

relationship between Mother and the abuser had ended].) In 

other words, the parents’ domestic violence does not support 

jurisdiction because there is “no evidence that [K.Z. was]

physically exposed to the past violence between [the parents] and 

no evidence of any ongoing violence between the parents who are 

now separated.” (Daisy H., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.) 

There is also evidence of domestic violence between Father 

and a girlfriend. This girlfriend was Father’s “current” girlfriend 

as of March 2021, but we do not know if their relationship 

continued. In March 2021, Mother reported that Father 

“usually” had “ ‘exchanging words’ ” with this girlfriend when he 

came to Mother’s residence to pick up K.Z. She also said that

Father told Mother on one occasion that he “knock[ed]” his

girlfriend “out.” The record does not reflect whether K.Z. was 

present when Father knocked his girlfriend out. Nor is there any

evidence that the relationship between Father and the girlfriend 

ever harmed K.Z. or placed him at risk of physical harm. (In re 

Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 606 [no evidence that domestic 

violence incident took place in presence of the children, so 

physical danger was minimal].) Moreover, the timing of this 

domestic violence between Father and his girlfriend was unclear

as Mother did not provide a date or timeframe for the acts. 
14

In addition, there is no evidence it was likely to continue as of the 

time of the jurisdictional hearing in late January 2022. (See In re 

Ma.V., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 21.) Instead, the evidence 

suggests otherwise. Father previously lived with this girlfriend 

in San Bernadino, California. At the time of the jurisdictional 

hearing, however, Father had been living in Arizona for at least 

seven months. As DCFS stated in the Jurisdiction/Disposition 

Report, “Father resides in Arizona and it is unclear as to the 

amount of involvement he has had in the child [K.Z.’s] life.”

Father also made death threats to Mother’s “current” 

partner, which Mother reported to DCFS in November 2021. 

There is no evidence of a nexus between these threats and a 

specific, serious risk of substantial harm to K.Z. at the time of the 

jurisdictional hearing. (See In re J.N., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 775.) Like Father’s criminal history, although the death 

threats suggest a risk that Father could be violent to Mother’s 

partner, there is no evidence of a specific risk of harm to K.Z. 

While on an “abstract level” death threats certainly are 

“incompatible with child safety . . . such generalities” are not 

evidence of an “ ‘identified, specific hazard in the child’s 

environment’ that poses a substantial risk of serious physical 

harm to him.” (Id. at p. 776, italics omitted.) The conclusion that 

Father would have carried out such an act in a way that would 

have placed K.Z. at risk of harm is “mere speculation.” (In re

Emily L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 15; In re J.N., at p. 776.) 

Moreover, because we do not know when these threats took place, 

we do not know if they posed a current threat to K.Z. at the time 

of the jurisdictional hearing. 

Finally, we address Father’s break-in. Mother stated that 

Father broke into her home and took K.Z. This is evidence of a 
15

potentially violent act by Father for which K.Z. was present.

There is no evidence that K.Z., or anyone, was actually harmed or 

at risk of being harmed. There is no evidence of how Father 

entered the home, or in what context. The record is bereft of any 

details that could potentially provide evidence of a risk of harm to 

K.Z. In addition, the parents shared custody of K.Z. at the time, 

so the simple fact of Father taking K.Z. does not raise an 

inference that Father placed him at substantial risk of serious 

physical harm. Thus, the only inference of violence and risk of 

harm to K.Z. is the fact that Father “broke in.” 

Moreover, we do not know when this event took place. 

The evidence we do have suggests it may have taken place in 

2019, when Mother refuted a reported kidnapping by Father. 

This is approximately three years before the jurisdictional 

hearing. There is no pattern of Father taking K.Z. without 

permission or breaking into a home where K.Z. or any child is 

present. There is no reason beyond mere speculation to believe 

that Father would break into Mother’s home and take K.Z. again. 

DCFS makes various arguments that there is substantial 

evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding as 

to Father. First, DCFS argues that Mother’s allegations must be 

taken as credible, and we agree. 

Second, DCFS argues that Father’s criminal history is not 

stale, pointing to his conviction for false imprisonment and 

assault with a deadly weapon in 2017, and to his 2019 conviction 

for driving under the influence. In the four years between K.Z.’s 

birth and the jurisdictional hearing, Father’s only conviction was 

for driving under the influence. There is no indication that K.Z. 

was in the car when this took place. There is no evidence of a 

nexus between Father’s reckless driving and harm to K.Z. at the 
16

time of the jurisdictional hearing approximately three years 

later. For example, there is no evidence that Father continued to 

drive under the influence. (Cf. In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 

840, 850 [“That there were two arrests and at least one conviction

[for driving under the influence] within a year of the referral

shows Mother’s substance abuse is now spilling over into areas 

that will pose a substantial risk of physical harm to L.W.”], italics 

added]; see also In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 728

[rejecting argument that physical harm to a child is “presumed 

from a parent’s substance abuse under the dependency statutes”], 

italics omitted.)

Finally, DCFS points to K.Z.’s young age at the time of the 

jurisdictional hearing. DCFS argues that K.Z. was too young to 

protect himself from Father’s relatively recent criminal 

convictions, and therefore jurisdiction is warranted. In support, 

DCFS cites In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 

which is inapplicable. In re Christopher R. concerned a mother

with a seven-year history of drug abuse, including while 

pregnant. There was evidence of direct harm to the child by the 

mother ingesting drugs while pregnant and some evidence the 

mother was not properly caring for her children due to drug use. 

(Id. at pp. 1212–1213, 1217–1219.) Here, there is no evidence 

that Father’s remote criminal acts that occurred outside of any 

child’s presence had any impact on K.Z.’s physical safety, or were

likely to place him at risk in the future. 

We recognize that Father has a long history of violent acts. 

But the record is devoid of evidence that these acts have a nexus 

with substantial risk of serious harm to K.Z. While we are deeply 

concerned by the evidence that Father raped Mother, and hit 

Mother and his girlfriend each once, there is no evidence K.Z. was 
17

present for any of these events. The record is devoid of detail 

that discloses the timing of these acts or any facts to elucidate 

any potential nexus to support jurisdiction. This may be a failure 

to compile an adequate record by DCFS, but we must take the 

facts as we find them. Although we can draw reasonable

inferences in favor of the juvenile court’s decision, we cannot 

draw inferences where there is no evidence to support them. We 

are also troubled that Father broke into Mother’s home and took

K.Z., but there is no detail in the record regarding this event, and 

the timing of this break-in appears to be years old. With no 

evidence that K.Z. was at risk of harm from the break-in or that 

this stale act was likely to reoccur, this fact does not support 

jurisdiction. Additionally, with a record largely devoid of dates

and specifics, we cannot find that on the whole, Father’s past 

violent acts were not stale at the time of the jurisdictional 

hearing. A decision supported by a “ ‘mere scintilla of evidence 

need not be affirmed on appeal.’ ” (In re Yolanda L., supra, 

7 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.) 

In sum, the record does not support an actual nexus 

between Father’s violent history and any specifically identified, 

substantial, risk of serious harm to K.Z. at the time of the 

jurisdictional hearing such as to support the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1).

IV. Dispositional Order.

Father contends that because the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional finding was improper, the dispositional order 

premised on the findings must be reversed. We agree. Because 

we reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, we also 

reverse the dispositional order. (See In re E.B., supra, 184 

Cal.App.4th at p. 578, disapproved of on other grounds in 
18

Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, fn. 4 [holding 

substantial evidence standard of review applies to jurisdictional 

findings and dispositional orders].)

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional order of the juvenile court is reversed as 

to Father and its related findings are vacated. The matter is 

remanded to the juvenile court with directions to dismiss the 

petition as to Father.

VIRAMONTES, J.

I concur:

STRATTON, P. J.
1

WILEY, J., Dissenting.

Substantial evidence supported the finding that the father’s 

unresolved history of violence put his son K.Z. at risk of harm. 

The evidence is in three categories.

I

First are witness statements about the father.

1. The father broke into the mother’s apartment and took K.Z., 

who is the subject of this appeal. 

2. The father committed domestic violence against the mother.

3. He raped her.

4. She fled to another state for fear he would “find me and 

force himself upon me.”

5. He hit her. 

6. He threatened to kill her current male companion.

7. He knocked out his new girlfriend.

8. K.Z.’s mother is afraid of him.

9. He is a very aggressive person.

10. He was very upset the mother told the Department he 

is aggressive. 

11. He has a violent temper. 

12. He told the Department "All I have on my record is a 

robbery case when I was younger." That was not so, as will 

appear shortly.

At the adjudication hearing, the father was present with his 

attorney. The court asked how the father would like to proceed. 

The father’s attorney declined to offer witnesses or evidence on 

the father’s behalf.
2

II

The record contains the father’s 15-page criminal history, 

which began when he was 11 years old and has continued for 

more than two decades. 

1. His juvenile record contains many clashes with the law, 

including a wardship for battery with serious bodily injury. 

2. At age 21, he was cited for criminal violation of a court 

order, but the case was dismissed for lack of evidence. 

3. When the father was 23, he was convicted of multiple 

crimes, including robbery, assault with a gang allegation, 

and vehicle theft. He received multiple sentences, resulting 

in a combined term of nine years. The father went to 

prison.

4. By age 30, he was out of prison and back in legal trouble. 

He was arrested for domestic violence and was granted 

probation on a reduced charge of felony false imprisonment.

5. At age 32, he was convicted of assault likely to cause great 

bodily injury – also a violation of his probation. The father 

received a two-year sentence for these offenses and went 

back to prison. 

6. At age 34, when K.Z. was a one-year-old, the father faced 

charges of driving under the influence. He was convicted of 

reckless driving, went to jail, and received another three 

years’ probation.

III

The third category of evidence is three previous complaints 

to the Department about the father’s physical and emotional 

abuse of the young child K.Z.

1. The father was reported in October 2019 for emotionally 

abusing K.Z.. The reporting party was concerned that the 
3

father was physically abusing the mother and that K.Z. and 

his siblings would suffer emotional or physical abuse during 

these episodes of domestic violence. The mother denied all 

the accusations, and the Department concluded the report 

was unfounded. 

2. He was reported in January 2020 for emotionally abusing 

K.Z. An investigator spoke to the mother on the telephone 

“but the mother ended the communication and would not 

answer any further contact.” The Department eventually 

deemed the matter “inconclusive” because there was no 

other way to contact the family. 

3. He was reported in March 2021 for emotionally abusing the 

mother’s five children, including K.Z. The Department 

disposed of the report as “inconclusive” but gave no explicit 

reason for this conclusion.

This pattern, including the mother’s denials, is not no 

evidence. It is some evidence. 

This pattern is familiar to bench officers in juvenile courts 

who hear and learn about domestic violence in many, many cases.

Domestic violence is violence between people living together 

in an intimate relationship. (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 

892, 895, fn. 1 (Brown).) Domestic violence is a serious social and 

legal problem in the United States, occurring in every economic, 

racial, and ethnic group. Compared to other crimes, domestic 

violence is vastly underreported. Until recent decades, it was 

largely hidden from public examination. A fundamental 

difference between domestic violence and other violence (such as 

street violence) is domestic violence happens within ongoing 

relationships expected to be protective, supportive, and nurturing. 

The ties between victim and abuser often are strong emotional 
4

bonds, and victims frequently feel a sense of loyalty to their 

abusers. (Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 898–899.) Often 

abusers use psychological, emotional, or verbal abuse to control 

their victims. (Id. at p. 907.) Victims commonly rely on their 

abusers for financial support for themselves and their children.

Victims who report abuse to authorities may later protect 

the abuser by denying or recanting their own reports. This 

presents an exceptional challenge for authorities. (Brown, supra, 

33 Cal.4th at p. 899.)

In the Brown case, an expert explained domestic violence 

victims, after describing the violence to police, often later 

repudiate their descriptions. There is typically “anywhere 

between 24 and 48 hours where victims will be truthful about 

what occurred because they’re still angry, they’re still scared.” 

But after they have had time to think about it, they commonly

change their reports. About 80 to 85 percent of victims recant at 

some point in the process. Some victims will say they lied to 

authorities; almost all will attempt to minimize their experience. 

(Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 897; see also id. at p. 903 [quoting 

another expert who testified that, about 80 percent of the time, a 

woman who has experienced a first assault by a boyfriend, 

husband, or lover will recant, change, or minimize her story].)

Denying and recanting are common because they are 

logical. Victims may still care for their abusers and may be 

hoping the abuser will not do it again. (Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 

at p. 897.) The abuser or the abuser’s family may be pressuring or 

threatening the victim. (Ibid.)

Professionals familiar with domestic violence understand 

victims logically may deny or recant to protect themselves because 

denying or recanting can appease the abuser.
5

The juvenile court was entitled to consider this series of 

complaints against father about his conduct towards K.Z. as part 

of the whole record.

IV

This substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding. 

The father says there is no nexus to the child. This claim 

disregards his taking of K.Z., or reimagines it in some way 

contrary to the standard of review.

The nonconsensual taking of a young child from his mother 

in her apartment is hardly benign. This child was present when 

the father took him. So too was the nonconsenting mother. 

Thus a rapist—a rapist with a lengthy and violent criminal 

history— confronted his rape victim and her young son in their 

home and took the son from his mother against her will. 

To speculate this interaction was anodyne mistakes our 

standard of review. (See In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 

[draw all reasonable inferences to support the dependency court’s 

order; review the record in the light most favorable to that court’s 

determinations; do not reweigh the evidence or exercise 

independent judgment].)

The father’s suggestion this child-taking posed no risk of 

harm to the young child is against the weight of the evidence. 

The juvenile court was not required to wait until this young boy is 

seriously abused or injured to take the steps necessary to protect 

him. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)

I would affirm.

WILEY, J.