Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : MICHAEL J. SPENCER GREGORY F. ZOELLER Monroe County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Bloomington, Indiana RICHARD C. WEBSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


## IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JAMES A. CROUCH , ) ) Appellant

- Defendant , ) ) vs. ) No. 53A05

- 1208

- CR

- 417 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee

- Plaintiff

. )

APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT The Honorable Mary Ellen Diekhoff , Judge Cause No. 53C0 5

- 0505

- FC

- 278

January 30, 2013 MEMORANDUM DECISION

– NOT FOR PUBLICATION BAKER, Judge2

In this case, the appellant, James Crouch, contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to six years of incarceration after he violated s everal conditions of a drug treatment program. Crouch further alleges that his sentence was inappropriate when considering the nature of the offense and his character. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him and tha t the two

- year sentence was not inappropriate.
FACTS On May 10, 2005, Bloomington Police Officer Scott Reynolds was dispatched to a Monroe County Bank branch after receiving a f orgery report . When Officer Reynolds arrived, he spoke with Timothy Frazier, the branch manager, who informed him that Crouch was at the bank and had forged several checks totaling more than $3000 on the account of his grandmother, Donna Oswald. When Officer Reynolds spoke with Oswald, she confirmed that Crouch had stolen

some blank checks from her, and that she had not written any checks to Crouch. After Crouch was transported to the Bloomington Police Department, he admitted that he stole several checks from h is grandmother, forged at least eight of them, and cashed them at

v arious locations in the Bloomington area. Crouch also later admitted to using the money to purchase drugs.
Crouc h was arrested and charged with forgery, a class C felony, and theft, a class D felony. Thereafter, on June 20, 2005, Crouch pleaded guil ty to the forgery charge3

pursuant to a written plea agreement. Crouch was admitted to the Monroe County Drug
Treatment Court as part of the plea agreement. The trial court deferred the judgment and sentence for a period of two years. Although Crouch co ntinuously violated various terms of the program, he
continued to participate until May 5, 2012. Crouch ultimately admitted the violations and the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing in accordance with the provisions of the plea agreement

. It det ermined that Crouch’s violations of the rules of the drug treatment
program were aggravating factors that warranted an increased sentence. As a result, Crouch was sentenced to a six

- year term of incarceration in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Crouch now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Abuse of Discretion Crouch first claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because it declined to consider his decision to plea d guilty and his remorse as mitigating factors. Cro uch contends that we should “reweigh the aggravating and mitigating
circumstanc es ” that the trial court found. Appellant’s Br. p. 5. Notwithstanding Crouch’s contention, we note that in Anglemyer v. State , 868 N.E.2d 482, 49 1 (Ind. 2007), our Supreme Cour t held that “because the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence

. . . , a trial court can not now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh ’ such factors.” Thus, “ [ t ] he relative weight or4

value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.” Id. Accordingly, in light of the holding in Anglemyer , we decline Crouch’s request t o reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors that the trial

court found

. We also note that the finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory and rests wit h in the trial court’s discretion. Storey v. State , 875 N.E.2d 243, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The trial court does not have to afford the same credit or weight to the proffered mitigating circumstances as the defendant suggests. Thacker v. State , 709 N.E.2d 3, 10 (Ind. 1999). An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is significant and clearly supported by the record. Gray v. State , 790 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Additionally, not every guilty plea is a significant mitigating circumst ance that must be credited by a trial court. Trueblood v. State , 715 N.E.2d 1242, 1257 (Ind. 1999). A guilty plea does not rise to the level of significant mitigation where the defendant has received a substantial benefit from the plea or where the evi dence against him is such that the decision to plead guilty is merely a pragmatic one. Powell v. State , 895 N.E.2d 1259,
1262

- 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The evidence established that Crouch was arrested at the bank where he was in the process of attempting to cash a forged check. Appellant’s App. p . 8. The check was one of several that he stole from his grandmother, and Crouch admitted his crime to the5

police. In light of these circumstances, it is apparent that Crouch’s decision to plead guilty to the ch arged offense was merely a pragmatic one . Crouch also received a substantial benefit from the plea, in that the charge of class D felony theft was dismissed and he received a sentence deferral of two years while he participated in the drug program. And if Crouch successfully completed the program, the remaining charges would be dismissed. Had Crouch not pleaded guilty, he would n ot have had the benefit of this program. As a result, Crouc h received substantial benefits from his guilty plea. In light of these circumstances, Crouch has failed t o show that the trial court should have considered his decision to plead guilty as a significant mitigating factor. Crouch also contends that the trial court should have considered his remorse as a significant miti gating factor. In the pre

- sentence investigation report, Crouch expressed regret that he victimized and inflicted emotional distress on his grandmother. PSI at 12.
However , our review of the sentencing transcript reveals no expression of remorse, even

t hough Crouch’s g randmother was present and testified on his behalf. In short, there is no evidence in the record that Crouch apologize d for his acts . In fact, he only expressed remorse that he failed to complete the drug court program. The trial court was in the best position to judge the sincerity of Crouch’s alleged
remorsefulness. Pickens v. State , 767 N.E.2d 530, 535 (Ind. 2002). Here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in not finding remorse as a significant mitigating circu mstance. See Price v. State , 765 N.E.2d 1245, 1253 (Ind. 2002) (finding no error6

in the trial court’s failure to accept remorse as a mitigating factor because the statement of remorse was equivocal). As a result, Crouch’s claim fails , and we conclude t hat the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him. II. Appropriateness of Sentence Crouch also c laims that his sentence is inappropriate when considering the nature of his offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “ [t] he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the tr ial court’ s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The defe ndant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State , 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We note that the advisory sentence for a class C felony is four years, the minimum sentence is two years, and the maxim um sentence is ten years. Ind. Code § 35

- 50

- 2

- 6. As stated above, Crouch ultimately received a sentence of six years. When examining the nature of the offense, the evidence established that Crouch stole several of his grandmother’s checks, forged them, a nd cashed at least eight of them at various locations in Bloomington . Appellant’s App. p. 8

- 9. Crouch used the money that he obtained from the forgeries to subsidize his drug habit. PSI at 8. In short, Crouch’s nature of the offense argument avails him of nothing. Crouch’s character is revealed by the nature and circumstance of his crime and his behavior while in the Drug Treatment Program. In addition to stealing and forging7

checks, Crouch admitted to violating a condition of the Drug Treatment Court Program by leaving the State on numerous occasions without permission to meet his girlfriend in Kentucky. Crouch, who was driving a vehicle without a license, claimed that he had to get to and from work. However, Crouch was apprehended when he was drivin g back from Kentucky after visiting his girlfriend. While in the Drug Treatment Program, Crouch continuously failed to complete the program and his participation was extended from two years to seven years before it was finally terminated in May 2012. Als o, even though Crouch’s criminal history is not extensive, he ha d accumulated one felony and one misdemeanor conviction prior to the instant case. In short, Crouch’s history demonstrates that he fails to abide by the law and take responsibility for his be havior.
We conclude that Crouch failed to demonstrate that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. As a result, we decline Crouch’s
invitation to revise his sentence or set the sentence aside. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. RILEY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.