IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William B. Boyle, Jr., : Petitioner :

:

v. :

: Unemployment Compensation : Board of Review

, : No. 303 C.D. 201 6 Respondent : Submitted: August 5 , 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JU BELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY FILED: October 24, 2016

William B. Boyle, Jr. (Claimant) , pro se, petitions this Court for review

of the Un employment Compensation (UC) Board of Review’s (UCBR) January 28,
2016 order affirming the Referee’s decision denying Claimant UC benefits under

Section 402(e) of the UC Law (Law). 1 Essentially, the issue for this Court’s review is

whether the UCBR erred in determining that Claimant committed willful

misconduct. 2 After review, we affirm.

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended , 43 P.S. § 802(e) (referring to willful misconduct)

.

2 Claimant’s Statement of the Questions Involved contains five questions:
1. Were the findings and claims factual? . . .
2. Did the [R] eferee fully grasp the scope of business and nature
of sales calls? . . .
3. Was it proven that [Claimant] did not work full days as stated
i n [the] original letter of appeal? . . .
4. Was [Claimant] at a disadvantage being on the phone for [the] appeal hearing while [ the ] other party [was] present with [the] [R] eferee? . . .2 Claimant was employed by Exeter Supply Co., Inc. (Employer) as a full

time salesman from February 2005 through October 28 , 201 5

. Claimant’s
compensation included a $35, 000.00 annual salary plus commission. Claimant was

required to start his workday at 8:00 a.m. making sales calls

, and to work until at least
4:00 p.m. Claimant’s position also often required him to take salesperson s with

specific expertise regarding part icular Employer products (Specialty Salesperson

, Specialty Salespeople ) along with him on sales calls in his territory. In those

circumstances, Employer repeatedly informed Claimant that when he was traveling

with a Specialty Salesperson , he was required to fill his day with sales calls

. Claimant was aware that he was responsible for contacting Employer’s general

manager Randy Moore (Moore) or sales manager Marc Miller (Miller) if he would be

traveling with a Specialty Salesperson without having a full da y of calls scheduled.

On October 7, 2015, Claimant traveled with a Specialty Salesperson,

ma king his last call shortly after 1:00 p.m. On October 15, 2015, 3 Claimant traveled

with a Specialty Salesperson, ma king his last call shortly after 12:00 p.m. On

October 27, 2015, Claimant traveled with a Specialty Salesperson and parted ways

with him at approximately 2:00 p.m. , informing the Specialty Salesperson that he

needed to get home. On these dates, Claimant did not inform Moore or Miller that he

did n ot have a full day of sales calls scheduled for the Specialty Salesperson. On

October 28, 2015, a fter learning of these incidents, Employer’s president Robert

Diefenderfer (Diefenderfer) discharged Claimant due to ending his workday s early

,

5. Did [Claimant’s former employer , Exeter Supply Co

. , Inc., ] prove willf

ul misconduct . . . ? Claimant’s Br. at 5. These issues are subsumed within the issue of whether the UCBR erred in determining that Claimant committed willful misconduct.

3 Finding of Fact 7 incorrectly references a date of October 5, 2015. T he testimony reflect s that the incident actually occurred on October 15, 2015.3

and for failin g to fill his days as required when working with the Specialty

Salespeople.

Claimant applied for UC benefits. On November 16 , 201 5 , the

Duquesne UC Service Center found Claimant eligible for UC benefits. Employer

appealed and, on December 11, 2015 , a Re feree hearing was held. Claimant

participated by telephone, and Employer’s witnesses appeared in person. On

December 15 , 2015, the Referee reversed the UC Service Center’s determination and

found Claimant ineligible for benefits under Section 402(e) of t he Law. Claimant

appealed to the UCBR. On January 28, 2016 , the UCBR affirmed the Referee’s

decision. Claimant appealed to this Court. 4

Claimant contends that the UCBR erred when it held that Employer

established willful misconduct. Specifically, Clai mant argue s that the UCBR did not

accurately comprehend the nature of his sales position, and that Employer failed to

prove that he terminated his work days early since, according to Claimant, he

returned home to do paperwork and prepare quotes for Employe r

. Instead, Claimant

assert s “all that was proven was that [Claimant] did not complete [a] full day WITH

others

. ” Claimant’ s Br. at 8.

Section 402(e) of the Law disqualifies an employee from UC benefits

for any week “ [i]n which his unemployment is due to his discharge or temporary

suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his work [.] ” 43 P.S. §

802(e).

4 “This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether errors of law w ere committed.” Stugart v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review , 85 A.3d 606, 608 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).4 The law is well

- established that:

The employer bears the burden of proving willful misconduct in order to disqualify a claimant fr om receiving benefits. Where the claimant ’ s misconduct is based on the violation of an employer ’ s rule or policy, the employer bears the burden of establishing both the existence of the rule or policy and its violation by the claimant. Once the employer has established the rule and its violation, the burden shifts to the claimant to demonstrate either that the rule is unreasonable or that good cause existed to violate the rule. Whether a claimant has good cause to violate an employer ’ s rule or policy is a question of law subject to this

court ’ s review and should be viewed in light of all of the attendant circumstances.

Docherty v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review , 898 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2006) (citations omitted).

A determination of what cond uct will rise to the level of willful misconduct requires a consideration of ‘all of the circumstances, including the reasons for the [claimant ’ s] noncompliance with the employer ’ s directives.’ Navickas [ v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review ]

, . . . 787 A.2 d 284 [, 288 (Pa. 2001)] (quoting Rebel v. Unemployment Comp [

. ] B [ d .] of Review,

. . . 723 A.2d 156, 158 ( [Pa.] 1998)) (emphasis added). Where the action of the claimant is justifiable or reasonable under the circumstances, i.e., where the claimant has goo d cause for violating the rule, it is not willful misconduct because it cannot properly be charged as a willful disregard of the employer ’ s interest or rules or of the standard of conduct which the employer has a right to expect.

Docherty , 898 A.2d at 120 9 (citations omitted).

This Court has explained:

In [UC] matters, ‘ the [UCBR] is the ultimate fact finder and is empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses. ’ Owoc v. Unemployment Comp [

. ] B [ d. ] of Review, 809 A.2d 441, 443 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). ‘ Findings made by the [UCBR] are5 conclusive and binding on appeal if the record, examined as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support the findings. ’ Id.

Goppman v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review , 845 A.2 d 946, 947 n.2 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2004).

Substantial evidence is relevant evidence upon which a reasonable mind could base a conclusion. In deciding whether there is substantial evidence to support the [UCBR’s] findings, this Court must examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the prevailing party , in this case, the [e]mployer, giving that party the benefit of any inferences which can logically and reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

Sanders v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review , 739 A.2d 616, 618 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1999).

In Findings of Fact 5 and 6, t he UCBR found that Claimant was aware

that he was required to schedule full days of sales calls when traveling with Specialty

Salespeople and

, if and when he did not have a full day of sales calls sche duled, he

was required to contact Moore or Miller

. These findings are supported by

Diefenderfer ’s

, Moore ’s and Claimant’s testimony. See Certified Record (C.R.) Item

8, Notes of Testimony, December 11, 2015 (N.T.) at 6, 7, 14, 27

. In Findings of Fact

7 through 11 , the UCBR found that

, on specific dates, Claimant traveled with a

Specialty Salesperson, failed to have a full day of sales calls, and returned home

before 4:00 p.m. These findings are supported by the testimony of Specialty

Salespersons Brenda n Line (Line) and Kevin Rowe

. See N.T. at 25

- 26, 21

- 22.

Further, in Finding of Fact 12, the UCBR found that on the subject dates, Claimant

failed to inform Moore and Miller that he did not have a full day of sales calls

scheduled for the Specialty Salespe ople. This finding is supported by Claimant’s

admission that he did not notify Employer on the dates in question

. See N.T. at 30.

Further, the Referee and the UCBR did not find Claimant’s testimony credible that on6

the days he returned home early, he co ntinued to work on paperwork and quotes. See

C

. R

. Item 9

, Referee’s Decision/Order, December 15, 2015 at 2, C

. R

. Item 12, UCBR

Order, January 28, 2016 at 1. The UCBR was free to judge witness credibility and

make factual findings based on the testimony. Goppman

.

The record contains substantial evidence that Claimant was aware of
Employer’s directive s that he work a full day and that he schedule a full day of sales

calls when traveling with a Specialty Salesperson, or notify Employer otherwise . The

re cord evidence also establishes that Claimant failed to comply with those directives

. Thus, we must consider whether Claimant demonstrate d good cause for violating
Employer’s directive s

.

In his brief, Claimant asserts that he had good cause for not adheri ng to
Employer’s rules. First, he maintains that his car broke down on October 5, 2015

and

, therefore, he was unable to continue his sales calls. (It is unclear whether

Claimant wa s actually referring to October 15, 2015

. ) Claimant states that he can

of fer documentary evidence proving that his car was towed to a repair shop on that

date . However, the UCBR did not find Claimant to be a credible witness, and the

certified record does not contain any such documentary evidence.

The Hearing Notice mailed on November 25, 2015, notified Claimant

that he would participate by telephone and that he was required to submit any

documents to be used at the hear ing at least five days before the December 11, 2015

hearing. See C

. R

. Item 7, Notice of Hearing, November 25, 2015 at 1. Se ction

101.130(e) of the UCBR ’s regulations states:

When any testimony will be given from or with the aid of a document not previously distributed to the parties by the tribunal, the party expecting to introduce the document shall deliver it to the tribunal, and the tribunal shall distribute it to each other party and, if known, counsel or authorized agent before or at the beginning of the testimony. The tribunal may require that the documents be delivered up to 57 days in advance of the h earing. See § 101.131(h) (relating to conduct of a telephone hearing).

34 Pa. Code § 101.130 (e)

.

This Court has explained:

The UCBR’s regulation at 34 Pa.Code § 101.130 sets forth the procedure for receiving testimony from a witness by telephone. Secti on 101.130(e) requires that, before such a witness testifies from, or with the aid of, a document, the party offering the testimony must have provided the document to the opposing party. Where a party fails to provide the document as required by section 1 01.130(e), the document ‘may not be admitted nor testimony given or taken from it unless consent has been requested from and given by all parties

. Testimony taken or given in violation of this subsection will be excluded from consideration, as will the do cument.’ 34 Pa.Code § 101.131(h)

. . . . Ellis v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review , 749 A.2d 1028, 1032 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2000) ( emphasis and footnote omitted). Although Claimant stated in his brief to this
Court that “he can obtain proof from both AAA and [t he repair shop] to

substantiate[,]” his claim, such document s are not part of the record evidence

, and

therefore

, we are precluded from relying on it . Claimant’s Br. at 12.

Claimant also contends that an October 27, 2015 sales call was cancelled

at the l ast minute by the client

, and that he has a document demonstrating th e same

.
Claimant sought to offer this document at the hearing, however, was precluded from

doing so or discussing it because he failed to produce it before the hearing as set forth

in th e hearing notice and in accordance with the UCBR ’s regulations and this Court’s

case law

. See N.T. at 15

- 16. Claimant acknowledged at the hearing that he did not

submit the document regarding the October 27, 2015 sales call before the hearing.

See N.T. at 15. “This Court may not consider any evidence that is not part of the
certified record on appeal.” Pa

. Turnpike Comm ’ n v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of

Review , 991 A.2d 971, 974 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).8 Claimant further alleges that

, after learning last min ute that the October

27, 2015 appointment was cancel l ed, he notified Line that he had no sales calls

scheduled for him, but Line insisted on accompanying him anyway. E ven assuming

Claimant’s statement was true, Claimant offered no explanation for his admi tted

failure to notify Employer ’s general manager or sales manager that he had no

appointments scheduled for Line or the other Specialty Salespeople on the dates at

issue :

R[eferee:] Sir, is there any reason you weren’t contacting

[Miller] or [Moore] when these situations would come up when you would be out with these [S]pecialty [S]alespeople and you weren’t able to fill the day?

C[laimant:] No. It was probably

– it obviously was not what I should have done. I did fill my day as best I could with them an d like I said, things come up during the day with sales. I know that if they part ways with me and I part ways with them[,] it does not mean either of us are done working. As a territory manager, I just wanted to make sure my territory was covered. I pr obably should have communicated a little bit better and I understand that.

N.T. at 30. Based on the record evidence , Claimant failed to demonstrate good cause

for violat ing Employer’s directives. Accordingly , we conclude that substantial

evidence support s the UCBR’s determination that Claimant was properly denied UC

benefits for engaging in willful misconduct. 5

For all of the above reasons, the UCBR’s order is affirmed.

___________________________ ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

5 Claimant maintains that he was at a disadvantage at the hearing because he participated by telephone. However, Claimant stated at said hearing that h e had no objection to doing so

. See N.T.
at 1.IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William B. Boyle, Jr., : Petitioner :

:

v. :

: Unemployment Compensation : Board of Review, : No. 303 C.D. 2016 Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 24 th day of October , 201 6

, the Unemployment

Compensa tion Board of Review’s January 28, 2016 order is affirmed.

___________________________ ANNE E. COVEY, Judge