U.S. Department of 

Transportation

Federal Railroad 

Administration

Railroad Infrastructure Trespass Detection 

Performance Guidelines

Office of Research

and Development

Washington, DC 20590

DOT/FRA/ORD-11/01 Final Report

January 2011

Safety of Highway Railroad Grade Crossings
NOTICE

The United States Government does not endorse products or 

manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers’ names appear herein 

solely because they are considered essential to the objective of 

this report.

NOTICE

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the 

Department of Transportation in the interest of information 

exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for 

its contents or use thereof.
i 

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 

maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 

suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, 

and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE

January 2011

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

Technical Report

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Railroad Infrastructure Trespass Detection Performance Guidelines

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

RR97/DB069

RR97A1/EG220

RR97A1/FG220

6. AUTHOR(S)

Marco P. daSilva

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Department of Transportation

Research and Innovative Technology Administration

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

Cambridge, MA 02142

8.PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 

REPORT NUMBER

DOT-VNTSC-FRA-09-03

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Railroad Administration

Office of Research and Development

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

DOT/FRA/ORD-11/01

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Safety of Highway-Railroad Grade Crossings series

Program Manager: Leonard Allen

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

This document is available to the public through the FRA website at http://www.fra.dot.gov. 

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, under the direction of the 

Federal Railroad Administration, conducted a 3-year demonstration of an automated prototype railroad infrastructure security 

system on a railroad bridge in the town of Pittsford, NY [1]. The main objective was to demonstrate a stand-alone, video-based 

trespass monitoring and deterrent system for railroad infrastructure applications using commercial off-the-shelf technology. The 

final report, entitled “Railroad Infrastructure Trespassing Detection Systems Research in Pittsford, New York,” details the 

project location, system technology and operation, system costs, results, potential benefits, and lessons learned. The results 

indicate this interactive system could serve as a model or prototype railroad infrastructure security system for other railroad 

rights-of-way or bridges deemed prone to intrusion. Additionally, the authors’ recommendation to develop performance 

guidelines for this type of system is contained in this document. 

14. SUBJECT TERMS

Obstacle detection, obstacle intrusion systems, intrusion detection, alternative detection 

technology systems, Right-of-way, trespass detection, deterrent system, railroad, railroad bridge, 

security, security system, motion detectors.

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

24

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OF REPORT

Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

298-102
ii

METRIC/ENGLISH CONVERSION FACTORS

ENGLISH TO METRIC METRIC TO ENGLISH

LENGTH (APPROXIMATE) LENGTH (APPROXIMATE)

1 inch (in) = 2.5 centimeters (cm) 1 millimeter (mm) = 0.04 inch (in)

1 foot (ft) = 30 centimeters (cm) 1 centimeter (cm) = 0.4 inch (in)

1 yard (yd) = 0.9 meter (m) 1 meter (m) = 3.3 feet (ft)

1 mile (mi) = 1.6 kilometers (km) 1 meter (m) = 1.1 yards (yd)

1 kilometer (km) = 0.6 mile (mi)

AREA (APPROXIMATE) AREA (APPROXIMATE)

1 square inch (sq in, in2) = 6.5 square centimeters (cm2) 1 square centimeter (cm2) = 0.16 square inch (sq in, in2) 

1 square foot (sq ft, ft2) = 0.09 square meter (m2) 1 square meter (m2) = 1.2 square yards (sq yd, yd2) 

1 square yard (sq yd, yd2) = 0.8 square meter (m2) 1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.4 square mile (sq mi, mi2) 

1 square mile (sq mi, mi2) = 2.6 square kilometers (km2) 10,000 square meters (m2) = 1 hectare (ha) = 2.5 acres

1 acre = 0.4 hectare (he) = 4,000 square meters (m2) 

MASS - WEIGHT (APPROXIMATE) MASS - WEIGHT (APPROXIMATE)

1 ounce (oz) = 28 grams (gm) 1 gram (gm) = 0.036 ounce (oz)

1 pound (lb) = 0.45 kilogram (kg) 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2 pounds (lb)

1 short ton = 2,000 

pounds (lb)

= 0.9 tonne (t) 1 tonne (t) =

=

1,000 kilograms (kg)

1.1 short tons

VOLUME (APPROXIMATE) VOLUME (APPROXIMATE)

1 teaspoon (tsp) = 5 milliliters (ml) 1 milliliter (ml) = 0.03 fluid ounce (fl oz)

1 tablespoon (tbsp) = 15 milliliters (ml) 1 liter (l) = 2.1 pints (pt)

1 fluid ounce (fl oz) = 30 milliliters (ml) 1 liter (l) = 1.06 quarts (qt)

1 cup (c) = 0.24 liter (l) 1 liter (l) = 0.26 gallon (gal)

1 pint (pt) = 0.47 liter (l)

1 quart (qt) = 0.96 liter (l)

1 gallon (gal) = 3.8 liters (l)

1 cubic foot (cu ft, ft3) = 0.03 cubic meter (m3) 1 cubic meter (m3) = 36 cubic feet (cu ft, ft3) 

1 cubic yard (cu yd, yd3) = 0.76 cubic meter (m3) 1 cubic meter (m3) = 1.3 cubic yards (cu yd, yd3)

TEMPERATURE (EXACT) TEMPERATURE (EXACT)

[(x-32)(5/9)] °F = y °C [(9/5) y + 32] °C = x °F

QUICK INCH - CENTIMETER LENGTH CONVERSION

0 1 2 3 4 5

Inches

Centimeters 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 987 1110 1312

QUICK FAHRENHEIT - CELSIUS TEMPERATURE CONVERSIO

 -40° -22° -4° 14° 32° 50° 68° 86° 104° 122° 140° 158° 176° 194° 212°

 

°F

 °C -40° -30° -20° -10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90° 100°

For more exact and or other conversion factors, see NIST Miscellaneous Publication 286, Units of Weights and 

Measures.

Price $2.50 SD Catalog No. C13 10286 Updated 6/17/98
iii

Acknowledgments

Under sponsorship from the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) Federal 

Railroad Administration (FRA) Office of Railroad Safety, the USDOT Research and Innovative 

Technology Administration’s John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe 

Center), demonstrated an automated prototype railroad infrastructure security system on a railroad 

bridge and developed performance guidelines based on that research. The author of this document, 

which delineates those performance guidelines, is Mr. Marco P. daSilva. The author wishes to 

thank Ron Ries, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, for his guidance and support. 

The author gratefully acknowledges the overall direction provided by Anya A. Carroll, Principal 

Investigator of the Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety Research Program, Systems Engineering 

and Safety Division, USDOT Volpe Center. This project was conducted under the auspices of the 

Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety Research Program, Systems Engineering and Safety 

Division, Volpe Center. 
iv

Contents

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1

2. Assessing the Problem ........................................................................................................... 2

2.1. Factors Contributing to Trespassing on Railroad ROWs ................................................ 3

2.2. Engineering Countermeasures ......................................................................................... 3

2.3. Technology Concepts....................................................................................................... 4

3. Trespass Detection/Deterrent System Design ........................................................................ 5

3.1. Initial Planning ................................................................................................................. 5

3.2. Site Survey ....................................................................................................................... 5

3.3. System Design ................................................................................................................. 6

4. Performance Guidelines ......................................................................................................... 7

4.1. Atmospheric Conditions .................................................................................................. 7

4.2. Lighting ............................................................................................................................ 7

4.3. Communications .............................................................................................................. 7

4.4. Sensor and Other Components Housing .......................................................................... 8

4.5 Sensing Functions ............................................................................................................ 9

5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 11

6. References ............................................................................................................................ 12

Appendix A - Site Survey Form ................................................................................................... 13

Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................................................... 17
v 

Figures

Figure 1. Railroad Trespass/Grade Crossing Fatalities (1990–2006) [2] ...................................... 2 

Figure 2. NEMA outdoor enclosure housing Pittsford System components [5] ........................... 8 
1 

1. Introduction

The U.S. Department of Transportation Research and Innovative Technology 

Administration’s John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, under the 

direction of the Federal Railroad Administration, was tasked with demonstrating an 

automated, prototype railroad infrastructure security system on a railroad bridge in 

Pittsford, NY. The main objective was to demonstrate a stand-alone, video-based 

trespass monitoring and deterrent system for railroad infrastructure applications using 

commercial off-the-shelf technology. The system was installed in summer 2001 and 

initially intended to run for 1 year. The evaluation period was eventually extended for an 

additional 2 years, and a further year for monitoring purposes only. 

The prototype system was then transferred to CSX Railroad during its fifth year of 

operation (November 2005). A final report was published in August 2006 [1]. The 

report details the project location, system technology and operation, system costs, results, 

potential benefits, and lessons learned. The results indicated this interactive system could 

serve as a model railroad infrastructure security system for other railroad rights-of-way

(ROWs) or bridges deemed prone to intrusion. The development of function-based 

performance guidelines for these types of systems was one of the recommendations 

delineated by the authors of the final report [1]. 

Function-based performance guidelines are defined as a set of recommendations that 

specify the expected outcomes of the technology performance or system but do not 

provide physical component specifications. A wealth of information was collected 

during the 4+ year duration of the Pittsford project, and much of it was used to enhance 

the operational capabilities of the system throughout the life of the project, especially in 

terms of increasing system component reliability and positive detection rate. The various 

observations made throughout the course of the project, along with the Pittsford system 

prototype results and lessons learned, provide an excellent resource from which a set of 

performance guidelines can be developed for similar future railway safety and security 

systems. The purpose of these guidelines is to assist local authorities and railroads that 

are considering the use of such stand-alone systems to minimize trespass on the railroad’s 

ROW. These guidelines were drafted from the analysis of a proven and effective 

trespassing detection and deterrent system field-tested and evaluated in Pittsford, NY [1]. 
2 

2. Assessing the Problem

Trespass on railroad ROWs has long been a safety concern, especially since many tragic 

incidents involve children and young adults. About 500 people per year sustain fatal 

injuries as a result of trespassing on our Nation’s railroads. Figure 1 displays the number 

of trespass-related as well as highway-rail grade crossing-related fatalities per year from 

1990 through 2006 [2]. As shown in Figure 1, crossing-related fatalities have steadily 

decreased over the years while trespass-related fatalities have not. In fact, aside from 

slight yearly fluctuations, trespass fatalities have stayed at about the 500-per-year level. 

Figure 1. Railroad Trespass/Grade Crossing Fatalities (1990–2006) [2] 

Another developing concern is railway security, which has been gaining much attention 

since the terrorist events of September 2001, as well as later train bombings in Madrid, 

Moscow, and London. Securing the rolling stock as well as the infrastructure (track and 

signals/switches, bridges, tunnels, and facilities) has become a top priority within the rail 

industry, as well as within all levels of government. Many new technologies and 

integrated systems have been recently developed to deal with this particular issue [3]. 

Although developed for a slightly different situation, these systems can be viewed in the 

same light as the trespass and deterrent systems. Therefore, the guidelines set forth in 

this report can and should also be used for similar security-related detection and deterrent 

systems.

A fatal incident involving two young teenagers was the catalyst for the trespass detection 

work conducted in Pittsford, NY [1]. That tragedy drove the research effort that resulted 

in the development of these performance guidelines for similar intrusion detection and 

deterrent systems. Once a particular location has been targeted, the first step should be to 

assess the trespassing problem.
3 

2.1. Factors Contributing to Trespassing on Railroad ROWs

Trespass on the railroad ROWs occurs because of many circumstances. An important 

deciding factor for trespass concerns the layout and features of the railroad location, for 

example, whether it is a crossing, bridge, or tunnel. Once a particular location of interest 

has been identified, an initial site survey should be conducted to identify conditions that 

may be present and contribute to trespass. Such conditions may include but are not 

limited to:

• Accessibility (poor or no fencing, no landscaping, proximity to school, or other 

heavily trafficked attractions)

• Poor visibility (curve/crest near accessible areas, location not easily visible from 

nearest road or developments)

• Shortcut potential (fastest way between popular destinations) 

Anecdotal historic information about trespassing at specific locations should also be 

gathered from the local police, town representatives, and even the local media. However, 

as noted in the Pittsford final report [1], this information is not necessarily correct. In 

that study, local sources indicated that the trespassing was mostly done by teenagers 

loitering on the bridge. Upon review of 3 years worth of trespass data gathered by the 

system installed at the Pittsford location, it became very clear that many of the trespassers 

were, in fact, adults or a combination of adults and small children that were using the 

bridge as a shortcut between the two sides of the canal. Very few trespass events 

involved teenagers using the location to loiter. The correct information can be of great 

value, especially to local railroad safety campaigns.

2.2. Engineering Countermeasures

The site survey results should be reviewed to determine the factors contributing to 

trespassing at that specific location and identify appropriate countermeasures that should 

be implemented to reduce or eliminate the trespass problem. A trespass detection and 

deterrent system is one of many countermeasures available that may be effective in 

preventing or mitigating the consequences of trespass. There may be other potential 

solutions, aside from installing a technology system, that could alleviate the trespass 

problem at the location. The site survey can also reveal factors that would make 

installing a technology-based system very difficult, such as the lack of power, 

communications, or viable sensor placement locations. 

Other countermeasures can be initially more expensive but can prove to be more costeffective in the long term. Some examples are:

• More effective signage

• Better fencing, landscaping (e.g., rows of bushes) 

• Dedicated pedestrian/cyclist path above/under/parallel to ROW

If these other methods don’t apply to the particular situation, then an infrastructure-based 

trespass detection and deterrent system should be designed specifically for the location. 

In some instances, it still may be beneficial to incorporate other countermeasures (such as 
4 

fencing) along with the technology system. Once the decision is made regarding 

appropriate countermeasures, then the design phase of the project can begin. 

2.3. Technology Concepts

A wide variety of technologies have been used for trespass detection in many operational 

environments including on railroad ROWs. Integrated systems have also been fieldtested in recent years, including the system recently evaluated at the Pittsford, NY, 

location. A report entitled “State-of-The-Art Technologies for Intrusion and Obstacle 

Detection for Railroad Operations” contains a comprehensive list of existing and 

potential technology solutions that could be considered for use as intruder and obstacle 

detection systems or that are capable of performing integral functions within such 

systems [3]. The most common technologies currently in use throughout the 

transportation and security industries in obstacle and intrusion detection include radar, 

magnetic, infrared, and video motion detection sensors. 

Many technical lessons were learned throughout the evaluation period of the system 

installed at Pittsford, NY, and were documented in the final report entitled “Railroad 

Infrastructure Trespassing Detection Systems Research in Pittsford, New York” [1]. 

Some of these lessons were based on current railroad operational procedures and directly 

apply to the technology concepts considered for use around the railroad environment. 

The two major technology-related findings, described in detail in the Pittsford report [1], 

are as follows:

• The use of proven technology increases the probability of success. Many 

technology solutions currently exist throughout the transportation and security 

industries. Some have been successfully used for extended periods of time, 

whereas others are newer concepts that may still prove to be less effective. 

Therefore, the use of proven technology, even if not cutting-edge, may be a better 

choice for the project. 

• The use of a broadband communications infrastructure (or better) for 

communication of trespass events increases the probability of detection of the 

event. A broadband connection between the wayside equipment and monitoring 

station enables constant live video surveillance and instantaneous alarm 

notification and allows a frequent image refresh rate. Anything less than 

broadband, including dial-up and digital subscriber line (DSL), may cause delays 

in video transmission because of significantly slower video refresh rates as well as 

inferior video quality. Wireless data transmission options should be considered if 

no existing communications infrastructure exists or if dial-up is the only option at 

or near the location. 
5 

3. Trespass Detection/Deterrent System Design

Even though this section does not directly address performance guidelines, which are 

discussed in Section 4, it does provide direction for the preliminary work that should be 

conducted prior to the selection of any particular system design. The two major tasks, 

initial planning and site survey, are described below.

3.1. Initial Planning

The first step in designing any system is to properly identify all stakeholders and include 

them throughout the entire process in the form of a public-private-partnership (P3) to 

resolve any safety concerns. The Canadian Government developed such a P3 called 

“Direction 2006” aimed at reducing trespass and crossing incidents and published a very 

useful guide for community-involved trespass prevention on railroads [4]. Typical 

stakeholders include but are not limited to: 

• Railroad companies (property owners and users of the infrastructure)

• City/Town representatives (Mayor’s Office, Engineering/Planning Department, 

Police, Public Works Departments) 

• Utility companies (power, telephone, cable/other communications) 

• Community representatives 

• Other organizations 

• General public 

Once the stakeholders are identified, a meeting should be held and key issues shared 

among all involved. The outcomes of the stakeholder meeting may include but are not 

limited to:

• Designating a point-of-contact for each stakeholder

• Defining the expectations of the system—what will the system do? Identify 

trespass event(s)? Notify who? Deter trespassers? 

o Clear statement of the objectives

o Concept of Operations of the system 

• Defining the stakeholder level of expected involvement and associated 

responsibilities

• Providing input to some site survey observations 

3.2. Site Survey

A comprehensive site survey should be completed before any decisions are made on what 

type of system should be installed. Particular attention should be given to: 

• Railroad and city/town plats (denoting property lines) 

• Police reports and city/town understanding of the trespass problem at that location 

o Gives anecdotal (not necessarily accurate but still useful) historical 

perspective on trespassing characteristics and patterns.

o Provides useful information on the potential for vandalism to equipment. 
6 

• Easement agreements

• Availability of electricity

• Availability of telephone/DSL/broadband 

• Rail traffic patterns (passenger, freight, mixed) and frequency (regular, 

infrequent) 

• Average and maximum train speed at that location

• Number of entry points (bridge/tunnel) and area to be monitored 

• Potential system placement locations

• Atmospheric considerations (mount and weatherize components accordingly) 

• Lighting (or lack of it, indicating the probable use of infrared (IR) illumination)

An important observation from the site survey is the definition of the detection zone. A 

well-defined detection zone should be identified before the system design proceeds so 

that the system design accounts for the specific requirements of the site. Great care 

should be taken to identify all of the entry/exit points as well as potential false alarm 

triggers. Such triggers could include vegetation, boats or vehicle traffic (if at a bridge 

location), and large animals. Once the detection zone and all other observations have 

been gathered from the site survey, a sample of which is attached in Appendix A, the 

system design process can begin. 

3.3. System Design

This paper does not provide guidance on system design or the use of specific 

technologies. However, the performance guidelines contained in Section 4 should be 

considered during the design stage. Other more general procedural recommendations, as 

noted below, should also be weighed. 

The system’s design and installation plans should be presented to the stakeholder 

committee for comments, especially from local authorities, affected utilities, and railroad 

companies. These plans should be in accordance with all local and State building codes 

as well as the product manufacturers’ specifications. They should detail the physical 

placement of all sensor and communication components, all associated conduit and utility 

service connection points, and any other physical design components. 

Revisions recommended by the committee should be incorporated into the design and 

again presented to the committee for approval. Once the committee is in agreement, 

proper local construction permitting should be sought for the installation. The system’s 

installation should begin only after stakeholder committee approval and issuance of the 

proper permitting. 

The development and operation of trespass detection systems can be handled in one of 

two ways. Either the local authority—the town, city, or State—can elect to be 

responsible for the system operations or it can outsource this activity to a private 

contractor. If the latter is chosen, the local authority should establish a well-drafted 

contract delineating the contractor’s responsibilities and requirements as well as clear 

operation and maintenance plans and protocols. 
7

4. Performance Guidelines

Various system performance issues were identified throughout the operational period of 

the trespass detection and deterrent system installed at the railroad bridge location in 

Pittsford, NY. The results from that research aided in the development of function-based 

performance guidelines delineated herein. These guidelines are not designed to address 

specific types of devices or component technologies. They refer, however, to the basic 

functionality and operation of trespass detection and deterrent systems. 

If the site survey results, as described in Subsection 3.2, indicate that an infrastructurebased trespasser detection and deterrent system should be installed, then the following

elements should be considered.

4.1. Atmospheric Conditions

The system should be designed to withstand the rigors of year-round environmental 

conditions at the location. It should function in all weather and ambient lighting 

conditions, including day, night, sunrise, and sunset conditions. The wayside cabinet 

should be well ventilated, especially if inside temperatures reach above 80 degrees 

Fahrenheit. The wayside cabinet should also be heated if temperatures are expected to 

reach below freezing, less than 32 degrees Fahrenheit. The Pittsford System experienced 

both of these conditions, and therefore, the wayside cabinet was equipped with both a 

heater and fan, and these were activated accordingly as part of the seasonal maintenance 

procedures [5]. 

4.2. Lighting

Determine lighting conditions at the location to be monitored. Specific attention should 

be given to the monitored area and whether there exists sufficient nighttime lighting for 

the proper operation of image-based sensors, if such are used. If insufficient lighting is 

available, determine whether it can be provided from existing curbside/overhead lighting 

poles. If this is not feasible, then determine whether floodlighting should be incorporated 

into the design of the system or if IR illumination should be used instead. Particular 

attention should be given to placement of extra lighting to avoid interfering with railroad 

operations.

4.3. Communications

Depending on the concept of operations laid out for the trespass detection system, the 

appropriate communications component should be incorporated into the system design. 

A reliable communication link should be established using the most suitable option 

available at the location. The system’s design and concept of operations should indicate 

the necessary bandwidth needed for relaying all of the necessary information to the 

appropriate channels, whether they are the local authorities, a local monitoring station, 

the maintenance personnel, or the railroad company as well as for real-time audible 

warning notification to the trespasser(s). Common options are telephone lines (DSL), 

broadband, fiber-optic, and microwave. (The site survey should have noted the 

availability of the first three options.)
8 

4.4. Sensor and Other Components Housing

All wayside-mounted processing and communication equipment should be housed in 

National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) compliant weatherproof outdoor 

enclosures intended to house electrical circuits and components [6]. These weather and 

damage resistant cabinets should also be equipped with a locking mechanism to ward off 

potential vandalism. The cabinet should also be grounded and equipped with surge 

suppressors. Consideration should also be given to installing a lightning rod above all 

equipment poles especially if the area is prone to lightning strikes or the poles stand 

higher than the surrounding structures and landscape. Figure 2 shows the enclosure used 

to house the various wayside-mounted components of the Pittsford system [5]. 

Figure 2. NEMA Outdoor Enclosure Housing Pittsford System Components [5]

All external sensors should be pole-mounted out of reach of potential trespassers, at least 

10 feet off the ground, and installed in weatherproof and damage-resistant enclosures if 

not already manufactured to those specifications. This guideline should also be in 

accordance with sensor performance specifications, especially in relation to each sensor’s 

field of detection. The sensors should be placed at a suitable location to both satisfy this 

guideline and also provide adequate coverage of the detection zone. 
9 

4.5 Sensing Functions

The trespass detection sensing package of the system, which is composed of all of the 

wayside sensors, should adhere to the following recommendations: 

• Achieve 100 percent trespass detection rate within the detection zone, which 

should be well defined per the site survey. 

• Minimize false alarm rate (mask out trains, hi-rail vehicles, boats, animals). 

o The system should have a false alarm rate of less than 1 per true alarm. 

Ideally, the false alarm rate should achieve a tolerance level of 0. 

However, because of the nature of the local environment and sensors used, 

there may be a significant false alarm rate. If so, care must be taken to 

minimize its occurrence and determine the effect on the system’s 

operation, especially if human operators are involved. 

• Issue a warning to monitoring station and trespasser if trespassing is detected 

within the detection zone. 

o Auditory warning to the trespasser should be focused in the direction of 

the detection zone and loud enough to be heard within the entire detection 

zone. The auditory warning should not, however, be a nuisance to nearby 

homes or businesses.

• Objects outside the detection zone must not cause an alarm or warning to be 

issued. 

• Incorporate local recording as well as sensor and system data transmission. 

o This capability is critical for remote system maintenance. It is also 

invaluable for reviewing system and alarm activity, analyzing system 

performance, and performing forensic research.

• Reduce or eliminate system failures through fail-safe design. 

o System should be able to self-diagnose a failure 

o System should have a means to alert the monitoring station when a system 

failure condition is detected. 

o System should have a reboot utility that can be activated remotely. The 

remote reboot capability should be applied to both the wayside system 

controller as well as individual sensor components. As evidenced 

throughout the Pittsford, NY, system evaluation, components sometimes 

failed but regained their functionality after a reboot. 

• Ensure component redundancy. 

o Redundancy should be incorporated into as many components as possible. 

A typical system relies on various sensors and other components that are 

each an integral part of the overall system. Failure in any of these parts 

may render the whole system inoperable. The system’s design should 
10 

incorporate redundant sensors and other components. This ultimately 

increases the reliability of the overall system.

• Protect public safety. 

o System must pose no threat to human safety and must meet or exceed all 

regulations for the provided technologies. 

• Avoid electronic interference. 

o Sensing subsystem should not interfere electronically (emit 

electromagnetic interference that would interfere with normal railroad 

operations) or visually with any other system on the ROW or on 

authorized railway users (locomotives, hi-rail vehicles)—especially IR 

lamps that may glow red at nighttime, which may interfere with the 

railroad visual signaling system cues.

• Develop and share an operations plan. 

o Protocols must be developed to address the range of operational situations 

from the positive detection of intruders or obstacles on the ROW to false 

detection or failure of the warning system. These protocols must be 

shared with all entities that interact with the system (railroad companies, 

monitoring station, police, and others). This core group of stakeholders 

should provide input to the development of the initial operational plans. 

Additionally, the group should provide feedback while the system is 

operational so that improvements to the plans can be incorporated during 

periodic reviews. 

• Create a site-specific maintenance plan.

o A site-specific system maintenance plan should include plans for regular 

inspections as well as for preventative maintenance and cleaning. 
11 

5. Conclusion

This performance guidance document has been developed to assist local authorities and 

railroads that are considering the use of stand-alone trespass detection and deterrent 

systems similar to the one installed and evaluated at a railroad bridge in Pittsford, NY. 

The various observations made throughout the course of the operation and evaluation of 

that prototype system, which has been in operation since 2001, provided an excellent 

resource from which this set of performance guidelines were developed for similar future 

railroad safety and/or security systems. The guidelines presented in this document, 

ranging from overall system operation to specific sensor issues, should provide a valuable 

tool for future work in the area of public safety within the railroad operating 

environment. 
12 

6. References

[1] daSilva, M. P., Carroll, A., & Baron, W. Railroad Infrastructure Trespassing 

Detection Systems Research in Pittsford, New York. Report No. DOT/FRA/ORD06/03. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, August 2006.

[2] http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/, viewed September 14, 2007. 

[3] daSilva, M. P., Carroll, A., & Baron, W. State of The Art Technologies for 

Intrusion and Obstacle Detection for Railroad Operations. Report No. 

DOT/FRA/ORD-07/06. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, 

February 2007. 

[4] http://www.direction2006.com/documents/pdf/en_TrespGuide2003.pdf, viewed 

June 26, 2007. 

[5] daSilva, M. P., Carroll, A., & Baron, W. Railroad Infrastructure Trespasser 

Detection Research. 2005 National Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety Training 

Conference, Austin, TX, November 6-9, 2005. 

[6] http://www.nema.org/, viewed June 26, 2007. 
13 

Appendix A. Site Survey Form

If Crossing, location or over/underpass, Street or Highway Name: 

County: Township: City: 

If Crossing, ID: Milepost: Survey Date: 

Detection System Proposed 

by: 

State Local Government Railroad Private or 

Public Agency Individual

Name of Proposing Agency: 

1.2.1 Site Survey Team

Team Member Title Agency

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.2.2 Roadway Data (If Crossing Location)

Total number of lanes crossing railway: 

Span across Roadway (ft):

______________________

______________________

Warning Devices: Gates Lights Other Train Activated Crossbucks 

Stop sign None Other 

AADT: _____________ Posted Speed Limit: _______ mph

Type of Development: Residential Commercial Industrial Rural

Sight Obstruction: Yes No Crossing Angle: 0-29 30-59 60-90

1.2.3 Railroad Data

Railroad Responsible for location: ___________________________________________

Number of Tracks: ____________ Total Trains per Day: _________

Maximum Train Timetable: ________ mph

Type of Trains: Freight Commuter Passenger Other 

1.2.4 Five-Year Accident History

Date Fatality Injury Property Damage

Total
14 

Describe signage, fencing, and strategic (trespass-deterring) landscaping at the location. Could 

this be improved? 

Define all detection zones and potential issues for each detection zone (obstructions, very wide 

area...):

Nearest electrical service location for each detection zone: 

Nearest telephone service location for each detection zone and communications options (DSL, 

broadband...): 

Artificial lighting conditions (nearest light poles):

Can existing infrastructure (bridge components, tunnel walls, existing poles) be used to mount 

detection system components? 

Other Observations: 
15 

Location Sketches: 
16 

Location Sketches (continued): 

Samples

Satellite image © Google 
17 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AADT annual average daily traffic

DSL digital subscriber line

IR infrared

NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association

P3 public-private partnership

ROW right-of-way