109TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 78

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968

(commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty’’), under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Article II of the Treaty, ‘‘not to receive the transfer from

any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons

or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices’’;

Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the

International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application

of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June

19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Safeguards

Agreement’’), which requires Iran to report the importation and use of nuclear material, to declare nuclear facilities, and to accept safeguards on nuclear materials and

activities to ensure that such materials and activities are

not diverted to any military purpose and are used for

peaceful purposes and activities;
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SCON 78 ES

Whereas Iran signed the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy

Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection

with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons at Vienna on December 18, 2003 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Additional Protocol’’);

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing

an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years

and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, carried out over 110 unreported experiments to

produce uranium metal, separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities and activities;

Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director General of the IAEA on November 10, 2003, of its decision

to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,

and stated that the suspension would cover all activities

at the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all

feed material for enrichment, and the importation of any

enrichment-related items;

Whereas in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the

Government of Iran specified the scope of suspension of

its enrichment and reprocessing activities, which the

IAEA was invited to verify, including the suspension of

the operation or testing or any centrifuges, either with or

without nuclear material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment

Plant at Natanz, the suspension of further introduction

of nuclear material into any centrifuges, the suspension

of the installation of new centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel

Enrichment Plant and the installation of centrifuges at

the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and, to the extent
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practicable, the withdrawal of nuclear material from any

centrifuge enrichment facility;

Whereas on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran informed the IAEA of its decision to expand the scope and

clarify the nature of its decision to suspend to the furthest extent possible the assembly and testing of centrifuges and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components, including those related to existing contracts, informed the IAEA that any components that are manufactured under existing contracts that cannot be suspended

will be stored and placed under IAEA seal, invited the

IAEA to verify these measures, and confirmed that the

suspension of enrichment activities applied to all facilities

in Iran;

Whereas in November 2004, the Governments of the United

Kingdom, France, and Germany entered into an agreement with Iran on Iran’s nuclear program (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Paris Agreement’’), securing a formal

commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily

suspend uranium enrichment operations in exchange for

discussions on economic, technological, political, and security issues;

Whereas the Department of State has reported for a decade

on Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism and has declared

in its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism that

Iran ‘‘remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2004’’;

Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed,

in an October 26, 2005, speech, his hope for ‘‘a world

without America’’ and his desire ‘‘to wipe Israel off the

map’’ and has subsequently denied the existence of the

holocaust;
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Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires

the IAEA Board of Governors to report the noncompliance of any member of the IAEA with its IAEA safeguards obligations to all members and to the Security

Council and General Assembly of the United Nations;

Whereas Article III.B–4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies

that ‘‘if in connection with the activities of the Agency

there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify

the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace

and security’’;

Whereas on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution finding that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with the

Safeguards Agreement constitute noncompliance in the

context of Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and

that matters concerning Iran’s nuclear program have

given rise to questions that are within the competence of

the Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace

and security;

Whereas on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran announced that it planned to restart its nuclear research efforts, nullifying the Paris Agreement;

Whereas in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence

of IAEA inspectors, began to remove IAEA seals from

the enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran;

Whereas Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom Jack

Straw warned Iranian officials that they were ‘‘pushing

their luck’’ by removing the United Nations seals that
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were placed on the Natanz facility by the IAEA 2 years

earlier;

Whereas President of France Jacques Chirac said that the

Governments of Iran and North Korea risk making a

‘‘serious error’’ by pursuing nuclear activities in defiance

of international agreements;

Whereas Foreign Minister of Germany Frank-Walter

Steinmeier said that the Government of Iran had

‘‘crossed lines which it knew would not remain without

consequences’’;

Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, ‘‘It is

obvious that if Iran cannot be brought to live up to its

international obligations, in fact, the IAEA Statute would

indicate that Iran would have to be referred to the U.N.

Security Council.’’;

Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, ‘‘The Iranian government and nation has no fear of the Western ballyhoo

and will continue its nuclear programs with decisiveness

and wisdom.’’; and

Whereas the United States has joined with the Governments

of Britain, France, and Germany in calling for a meeting

of the IAEA Board of Governors to discuss Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations: Now,

therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives

2 concurring), That Congress—

3 (1) condemns the many failures of the Govern4 ment of Iran to comply faithfully with its nuclear

5 nonproliferation obligations, including its obligations

6 under the Safeguards Agreement (as reported by the
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1 Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board

2 of Governors since 2003), its suspension commit3 ments under the Paris Agreement, and prior com4 mitments to the EU–3 to suspend all enrichment5 and reprocessing-related activities;

6 (2) commends the efforts of the Governments of

7 France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to seek

8 a meaningful and credible suspension of Iran’s

9 enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities and

10 to find a diplomatic means to address the non11 compliance of the Government of Iran with its obli12 gations, requirements, and commitments related to

13 nuclear non-proliferation;

14 (3) strongly urges the IAEA Board of Gov15 ernors, at its special meeting on February 2, 2006,

16 to order that Iran’s noncompliance with its safe17 guards obligations be reported to the United Nations

18 Security Council; and

19 (4) calls on all members of the United Nations

20 Security Council, in particular the Russian Federa21 tion and the People’s Republic of China, to act expe22 ditiously to consider any report of Iran’s noncompli23 ance in fulfillment of the mandate of the Security

24 Council to respond to and deal with situations bear-
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1 ing on the maintenance of international peace and

2 security.

Passed the Senate January 27, 2006.

Attest:

Secretary.
109TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 78

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Condemning the Government of Iran for violating

Iran to the United Nations Security Council.tions and expressing support for efforts to reportits international nuclear nonproliferation obliga-