THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Shannon Earl Garland, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-002085

Appeal From Greenville County

Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5920

Heard February 8, 2022 – Filed July 6, 2022

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, 

for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 

Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of 

Columbia, and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of 

Greenville, all for Respondent.

MCDONALD, J.: Shannon Garland appeals his convictions for exposure of 

private parts in a lewd and lascivious manner, criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with 

a minor in the first degree, and CSC with a minor in the third degree, arguing the 

circuit court erred in allowing the minor's (Minor) therapist to testify as an expert 

in child sex abuse dynamics. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History
Minor's mother (Mother) began dating Garland when Minor was in the second 

grade. A year and a half later, Mother, Minor, and Garland moved into a mobile 

home on Minor's maternal grandmother's (Grandmother) property. After Mother 

and Garland failed to pay rent or utilities for a year, Grandmother asked them to 

leave. At trial, Minor testified Garland began sexually abusing her when the 

family lived in the trailer on Grandmother's property. 

Mother, Garland, and Minor then moved into a home on a friend's property, but the 

friend asked them to leave after they failed to pay rent. The friend's neighbor 

allowed them to move in with her, and the three remained with the neighbor for 

five or six months. The neighbor asked them to leave after Garland and Mother 

got into a fight and left Minor at the neighbor's house. Once the family moved out, 

the neighbor called the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) 

because she had concerns that at nine years old, Minor "knew a whole lot of things 

that she shouldn't have known. Drugs, pills, sex." 

Eventually, Mother moved into a motel with Garland, and Minor moved in with 

Grandmother. On Mother's Day in 2016, Grandmother took Minor to visit Mother 

at the motel. While Minor was visiting, Mother left her alone at the motel with 

Garland, who began watching pornography on his phone while in the room with 

Minor. Garland asked Minor to sit on his lap, but Minor told him no. Garland 

then came towards Minor and tried to pull her pants off, but Minor pushed him 

away with her feet. 

When Grandmother picked up Minor from the motel, Minor was quiet, which was 

unusual following her visits with Mother. The following week, Minor's school 

guidance counselor informed Grandmother that she had alerted DSS because 

Minor disclosed sexual abuse. Later that day, Minor told Grandmother about 

Garland's behavior at the motel. Grandmother reported Minor's disclosure to 

Mother, but Mother did not believe the disclosure to be true. 

DSS referred the case to an investigator, who sent Minor to the Julie Valentine 

Center for a forensic interview. In the interview, Minor disclosed that Garland had 

sexually abused her at the motel on Mother's Day. 

In January 2017, Minor disclosed additional allegations of abuse to Grandmother. 

These disclosures involved Garland's abuse at the trailer on Grandmother's 

property and at the home on the friend's property. Grandmother informed Minor's 
therapist, Erica Van Wagner, who notified law enforcement of the additional 

allegations, and Minor participated in another forensic interview.

Garland testified at his trial and denied all allegations. Ultimately, the jury found 

Garland guilty of first-degree CSC with a minor, third-degree CSC with a minor, 

and exposure of private parts in a lewd and lascivious manner. The circuit court 

sentenced Garland concurrently to twenty-eight years' imprisonment for 

first-degree CSC with a minor, fifteen years for third-degree CSC with a minor, 

and six months for exposure of private parts in a lewd and lascivious manner.

Standard of Review

"The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a 

manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice." State v. 

Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 349, 737 S.E.2d 490, 494–95 (2013) (quoting State v. 

Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.E.2d 845, 847–48 (2006)). "The trial court's 

decision to admit expert testimony will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse 

of discretion." State v. Makins, 433 S.C. 494, 500, 860 S.E.2d 666, 670 (2021) 

(quoting State v. Price, 368 S.C. 494, 498, 629 S.E.2d 363, 365 (2006)). "An 

abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the circuit court are either 

controlled by an error of law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions." 

State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 106, 771 S.E.2d 336, 338 (2015). 

Law and Analysis

Garland argues the circuit court erred in allowing Van Wagner, who was Minor's 

therapist, to testify as an expert on child sex abuse dynamics and the treatment of 

children for trauma and sex abuse. Garland further asserts the State failed to 

demonstrate Van Wagner's testimony was reliable, and that her testimony served to 

improperly vouch for Minor's credibility. We disagree. 

"All expert testimony must satisfy the Rule 702 criteria, and that includes the trial 

court's gatekeeping function in ensuring the proposed expert testimony meets a 

reliability threshold for the jury's ultimate consideration." State v. White, 382 S.C. 

265, 270, 676 S.E.2d 684, 686 (2009). Rule 702 provides, "If scientific, technical, 

or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 

of an opinion or otherwise." Rule 702, SCRE. "Under White, two threshold 
determinations must be made. First, the qualifications of the expert must be 

sufficient, and second, there must be a determination that the expert's testimony 

will be reliable." Chavis, 412 S.C. at 106–07, 771 S.E.2d at 339. There is no 

formulaic approach applicable to the evaluation of nonscientific expert evidence, 

as the "foundational reliability requirement for expert testimony does not lend itself 

to a one-size-fits-all approach." White, 382 S.C. at 274, 676 S.E.2d at 688. 

Garland objected to qualifying Van Wagner as an expert and requested a proffer of 

her proposed testimony so the circuit court could consider both Van Wagner's 

qualifications and the reliability of her testimony. The State proffered Van 

Wagner's testimony that she was a mental health therapist with Greenville Mental 

Health Center, where she supervised the center's DSS program. Van Wagner has a 

Bachelor's Degree and Master's Degree in social work, is a licensed independent 

social worker with a clinical practice focus, has been employed by the Department 

of Mental Health for eighteen years, and has treated over 4,000 patients during the 

course of her career. Van Wagner participates in weekly meetings with 

psychiatrists and other clinicians to collaborate on complicated cases. She uses 

trauma focused cognitive behavioral therapy in treating children who have been 

sexually abused. 

The State moved to qualify Van Wagner as an expert "in the treatment of children 

with trauma, including but not limited to sex abuse and then child sex abuse 

dynamics," explaining Van Wagner would briefly testify that she treated Minor but 

would not testify about Minor's symptoms or diagnosis. The State continued, "She 

is merely going to say that she talked to Minor [and] that she counseled her. She 

was seeing her for sexual abuse disclosures, she had a treatment plan for her, and 

then, the time and place of her disclosure." The circuit court responded:

Okay. Is it relevant to your case to introduce all of those 

additional—that additional information regarding the 

treatment plan and all of those materials? What I want to 

do is distance her as much as possible from this actual 

case if she's going to talk about the phenomenon in 

general. Because what we're trying to do, and you know, 

we're trying to avoid as much as possible any situation 

where there is appearance of vouching. 

The State admitted discussion of the treatment plan was not necessary but asserted 

Van Wagner was important to establish the time and place of Minor's disclosure to 

the therapist. 
Garland opposed the State's motion, arguing the State's attempt to present Minor's 

treating therapist as both its abuse disclosure and abuse dynamics witness would 

violate Kromah1 because testimony by such a dual witness would implicitly vouch 

for Minor's credibility. Garland asserted Van Wagner could not be a proper blind 

expert because she had a "sincere interest" in Minor's well-being as her therapist. 

Garland further argued Van Wagner's reliability was suspect because she elicited 

information during her counseling sessions that would be used at trial. 

The circuit court expressed its preference that the State present Van Wagner as 

either a blind expert or a fact witness—not as a dual witness. The State responded 

it would rather present Van Wagner as a blind expert but noted other witnesses had 

already testified that Van Wagner treated Minor. The circuit court explained it was 

limiting Van Wagner's testimony to address Garland's concern regarding the risk of 

implicit vouching.

Prior to Van Wagner's testimony before the jury, Garland renewed his objection, 

which the circuit court overruled. Van Wagner testified about grooming, types of 

disclosure, delayed disclosure, trauma, symptoms of trauma, and coping 

mechanisms for people who have experienced trauma. She did not testify about 

Minor specifically or address her treatment. 

"Expert testimony on rape trauma may be more crucial in situations where children 

are victims. The inexperience and impressionability of children often render them 

unable to effectively articulate the events giving rise to criminal sexual behavior."

State v. White, 361 S.C. 407, 414–15, 605 S.E.2d 540, 544 (2004). While our 

supreme court has recognized an expertise in child abuse assessment, it has 

cautioned that "allow[ing] the person who examined the child to testify to the 

characteristics of victims runs the risk that the expert will vouch for the alleged 

victim's credibility." State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212, 218–19, 776 S.E.2d 76, 79 

(2015). The better practice "is not to have the individual who examined the alleged 

victim testify, but rather to call an independent expert." Id. at 218, 776 S.E.2d at 

79. But see Makins, 433 S.C. at 505, 860 S.E.2d at 672 (reiterating the bolstering 

risks presented by dual experts but finding no reversible error in admitting expert 

testimony addressing both the characteristics of abused children and the child 

victim's treatment).

 

1 401 S.C. at 358-360, 737 S.E.2d at 499–500 (reiterating that it is improper for an 

expert to testify as to the credibility of a child witness in a sexual abuse case and 

describing the kinds of statements a witness should avoid at trial).
In Makins, the supreme court found the testimony of Kristin Rich, the minor 

victim's therapist, did not improperly bolster the victim's testimony. Id. The court 

noted:

Rich never testified she advised Minor about the 

importance of being truthful, never testified directly as to 

Minor's truthfulness, and never opined Minor's behavior 

indicated truthfulness. While Rich was allowed to 

confirm she treated Minor, she was not allowed to 

explain why she was treating Minor, detail her treatment 

of Minor, or testify as to her diagnosis of Minor. Rich 

only addressed the circumstances of Minor's disclosure 

of abuse and the drawing Minor produced in therapy.

Id. at 503, 860 S.E.2d at 671.

Pursuant to the supreme court's analysis in Makins, we find the circuit court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing Van Wagner to testify as an expert in child trauma 

and sexual abuse dynamics. Garland argues the State failed to satisfy White's 

reliability requirement because Van Wagner was Minor's treating therapist. 

However, for this court to deem Van Wagner's testimony unreliable on the sole 

basis that Van Wagner treated Minor would implicate the bright line rule rejected 

in Makins—prohibiting a treating therapist from ever testifying as an abuse 

dynamics expert in child sex abuse cases. Here, the circuit court limited the State 

to presenting Van Wagner as a general abuse dynamics and trauma expert and did 

not permit her to discuss "her personal counseling and provision of services to this 

specific victim in this case." Thus, the admission of Van Wagner's testimony 

presented a lesser danger of implicit vouching than that of therapist Rich in 

Makins. 

This case is distinguishable from Chavis, in which the supreme court addressed the 

reliability of testimony by a forensic interviewer offered as an expert in the field of 

child abuse assessments. There, the interviewer also testified as to a disclosure of 

defendant's abuse by the victim's stepsister. 412 S.C. at 106–07, 771 S.E.2d at 

338–39. Van Wagner was not qualified as an expert in forensic interviewing; 

rather, she testified as an expert in sex abuse dynamics generally and explained 

concepts related to child sexual abuse and trauma. She did not address Minor's 

disclosures. The reliability concerns in Chavis were based on the interviewer's 
problematic application of the RATAC2 protocol in the interview with the victim's 

stepsister, whereas here, Garland argued Van Wagner was not reliable as the abuse 

dynamics expert solely because she was Minor's treating therapist. 

Moreover, we find Van Wagner did not impermissibly vouch for Minor's 

credibility in her testimony. In addressing Garland's objections, the circuit court 

carefully analyzed the potential vouching issues and minimized the risk of 

vouching by prohibiting Van Wagner from testifying she treated Minor; the State 

presented evidence of the times and places of the abuse through other fact 

witnesses. The only evidence presented at trial connecting Van Wagner to Minor 

were comments from other witnesses noting Van Wagner was Minor's therapist, 

and Garland did not object in these instances. Without more, Garland's argument 

that these references by other witnesses transformed Van Wagner's general 

dynamics testimony into vouching or improper bolstering does not convince us that 

the circuit court erred in admitting Van Wagner's testimony. See Makins, 433 S.C. 

at 503, 860 S.E.2d E.2d at 671 ("To suggest Rich's simple affirmation that she 

provided therapy to Minor can singularly constitute improper bolstering is a bridge 

too far. In this specific context, Rich's 'yes' alone, without more, did not convey to 

the jury that Rich believed Minor."). 

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS and HEWITT, JJ., concur. 

 

2 RATAC is an acronym for Rapport, Anatomy, Touch, Abuse Scenario, and 

Closure.