Technical Report 457

METHODS OF EVALUATING1 TANK PLATOON

BATTLE RUN PERFORMANCE

MCC George R. Wheaton, Ted W. Allen, and Eugene Johnson IlIl

Amnerican Institutes for Research

Eugene H. Drucker, Patrick Ford, and Roy C. Campbell

Human Resources Research Organization

and

G. Gary Boycan

US Army Research Institute

SIMULATION SYSTEMS TECHNICAL AREA

DTIC

U. S. Army LResearch Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

May 1980

Approved for p-iblic release; dostribution unlimited.

---------------------------- 20_ 045
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

FRANKLIN A. HART

JOSEiPH ZEII)NFR Colonel, US Army

Te.chnical Director Commander

NOTICES

D I STHI BIIT ION Pf'rrnaiv distriuioofa this re~potI has been made by AR I Please address correspondence

conCerrinq jlfstrtlitition, of reporfs to U S. Army Roesarch institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

ATTN: PERt TP, 5001 Eisenhowser Avenue. Alexandria, Virginia 22333.

FINAL ISPOSITION This report may be destroyed when it is no longer needed, Please do not return it to

the U S. Army Research I nstituto for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

NOTE The findings i" this reort ae not to be construeid as on official Department of the Army Position

unless so designated by other cuttrorizod documents.

fI
UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (*r i.fIar--

READ INSTRUCTIONS REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMP'LETING FORM

I. REPORT NUMBER 2.GV CESSION No. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

Technical Report 4iw / . 3~ 1,'

4TITLE (and Subtitle) 5 ITV fF REPORT &PERIOD COVERfO

JETHODS OF VALUATING TANK PLATOON BATTLE RUN Final Ker t8/8-1,1/79

PERFORMANCF, ME

IR-/ 10-1/79FR

7. AUTHOR(.) '87 6 CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBtR(-)

G. R. Wheaton, '. W. Allen, & E. Johnson Mlt

(AIR); E. H. Drucker, P. Ford, & R. C. Campll '/ h MDA903-78-C-2Zk1 l

(HumRRO); G. C. Boycan (ARI)

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK

American Institutes for Research'AE WOKUINMBR

1055 Thomas Jefferson St. N.W. /,,2I34A8

Washington, DC 20007

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS I -WOT0k6!---

Director of Training Development ( ~M., L80 '

US Army Armor School ILkMMrPAE

Fort Knox, KY 40121 221

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADORESSI'l different f-oo Controing Office) I5. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)

US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Unclassified

and Social Sciences, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue,

Alexandria, VA 22333 15.. DECLASSI FICATION! DOWNGRADING

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20. If different fro,, Report)

IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on .,rer.. aid* If necessry and identify by block noM ber)

Tank Platoon Performance Standards

Platoon Gunnery Board Gam ing

Tank Gunnery D~e Iph i

Battle Run MilIitarv Simulation

Eva I tia t i on

20. AS TRACTco@ r~~t rseft It nv~caa..cy ad Idenify by block nuotbar)

.- :This report descrifbes the development of methods for the assessment o~f

tank platoon battle run performance. The aims of this first phase were to

generatt Iobitctivfe performance measures, to explore alternative data collection procedures, and to specify scoring and interpretation procedures.

Performance measures were developed for 54 different performance constructs

in the offensive battle run and 43 different performance constructs in thl

defensive battle run. Video taping of battle runs was explored as an

alternative to traditional data collection procedures. The report cI ii

D I * 1473 EDITION OF f NOV 65IS OSOLETE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF TNIS PAGE (Whn .r. EtF cd)
tNCLASSI1Fl ED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(Whew Dae. 8n-etcd)

- item 20 (continued)

with a discussion of the procedures involved in using photomnap board-gaming

simulations to generate performance standards in terms of which to score and

interpret platoon proficiency.

ii IINCLAS SI V I EM)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(Wh-' I).(- VrW-,d)
Technical Report 457

METHODS OF EVALUATING TANK PLATOON

BATTLE RUN PERFORMANCE

George R. Wheaton, Ted W. Allen, and Eugene Johnson II I

American Institutes for Research

Eugene H. Drucker, Patrick Ford, and Roy C. Campbell

Human Resources Research Organization

and

G. Gary Boycan

US Army Research Institute

Submitted by:

Frank J. Harris, Chief

SIMULATION SYSTEMS TECHNICAL AREA

Approved by

James D. Baker. Aclinq Divrctof

ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue. Alexandria. Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

May 1980

Army Project Number Combat Pefformance Standards

20163743A773

AM 0 owdr oublic Moem: distribution unhlrmiv.
ARI Research Reports and Technical Reports are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and for other research and military agencies. Any findings ready

for implementation at the time of publication are presented in the last part

of the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

iv
FOREWORD

One of the research efforts of the Simulation Systems 1'echnical Area

of the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI)

has been in the development of combat performance standards for evaluating

the results of unit training. This report present!" research on methods of

evaluating tank platoon battle run performance, the final current qualifying test in armor gunnery training. It is the most recent part of a

larger project of updating the tank gunnery qualification testing system,

done for the Director of Training Developments, U.S. Army Armor School,

Fort Knox, Ky. The work was done under Contract MDA903-C-2031 with the

American Institutes for Research, Linder Army Project 2Q163743A780 (FY 79,

Training Development for Battlefield Effectiveness), and through the

cooperative efforts of personnel from ARI, the American Institutes for

*'esearch, Human Resources Research Organization, and the Armor School.

JO PH ERI

Teclnical Director

vo

U--

VL
METHODS OF EVALUATING PLATOON BATTLE RUN PERFORMANCE

BRIEF

Requirement:

To develop improved techniques for evaluating tank platoon battle

run performance, the final test in current armor crew training. Objectives

were to define nonsubjective performance measures for tank sections and

platoons, to develop and test potential data collection procedures, and to

specify procedures for analyzing, interpreting, and establishing standards

for platoon performance measures.

Procedure:

Descriptions of several different battle runs were reviewed for (1)

content (test environment, tactical situation, scope of operation); (2)

types of gunnery exercises in the battle run; (3) the evaluation system

used, including evaluation purposes, aspects of performance addressed, and

scoring procedures. This review provided a perspective for conducting

mission analyses and deriving performance constructs and measures.

A candidate set of objective measures was derived in three stages.

First, a mission failure analysis pinpointed possible reasons for a platoon's failure to accomplish its mission, to focus attention on platoon

activities directly related to success or failure. Second, a conventional

front-end mission analysis concentrated on platoon activities identified

during the background review. Finally, the platoon tasks and activities

identified were translated into performance constructs and measures.

Existing constructs and measures were adapted to the battle run context

whenever possible.

The feasibility of videotaping platoon battle runs was explored as

an alternative to traditional methods for collecting evaluative data.

Videotapes of offensive battle runs were made at Fort Carson, Co. and

Fort Knox, Ky.

Finally, the feasibility of using a photomap board-game simulation

of battle runs, to generate platoon gunnery standards was explored. Two

techniques were studied, one involving single players and the other using a

Delphi mode of play.

Findings:

The review showed clearly that gunnery Tables I-VIII focused on marksmanship but the latest battle runs (Table IX) focus on tactics. This

distinction is crucial in evaluating performance. Battle run performance

measures have largely been ambiguous or so abstract that evaluations have

been subjective.

vii Pi1ECEWnG A CE T I LIM
The mission analyses enabled identification of 54 different performance

constructs for which performance measures would be desirable in the offensive battle run and 43 in the defensive battle run; 38 of these were common

to both. Candidate performance measures were developed, as far as possible, for maximum quantifiability and objectivity.

Videotaping of platoon performance during a battle run proved to

be a feasible data collection alternative Linder proper conditions (qualified trained camera oeprators, adequate visibility). Trained evaluators

will still be needed.

The board-game simulation provided promising results, with interesting

individual differences in the single-player mode and readily achieved

consensus in the Delphi mode. These techniques demonstrated good potential

for generating performance, standards adapted to specific areas.

Utilization of Findi gs:

These analyses present a systematic exploration of what constructs

should be measured and what measurement techniques might be used. Scores

can b? aggregated to determine qualification or to diagnose deficiencies.

The cost-efficient implementation procedures suggested should improve the

evaluation of tank platoons.

v~i
METHODS OF EVALUATING TANK PLATOON BATTLE RUN PERFORMANCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

I INTRODUCTION ......... ................... 1

Statement of the Problem ...... ............ 3

II BACKGROUND .......... .................... 5

Content of Battle Runs ...... ............. 5

Platoon Gunnery Exercises .... ............ 12

The Performance Evaluation System ... ........ .16

Conclusions ....... ................... 23

III CONSTRUCTS AND MEASURES ..... .............. 25

Inverted Mission Analysis .... ............ 25

Front End Analysis ..... ............... 29

Specification of Constructs and Measures . . .. 31

IV COLLECTION OF PERFORMANCE DATA .... .......... 65

Battle Run Implementation .... ............ 65

Data Collection ....... ................. 66

V INTERPRETATION OF PERFORMANCE DATA .. ........ .71

Specification of Standards .... ........... 71

Aggregation of Scores ..... .............. 73

VI REFERENCES ........ .................... 85

Appendixes

A Scope of Battle Runs Defined by Component "Tasks"

B Frequency of Target Types in Offensive and Defensive

Battle Run Target Arrays

C Measurement Constructs

D Performance Measures

E Offensive and Defensive Inverted Mission Analyses

F Offensive and Defensive Battle Run Task Analyses

G Map Play Exercise - Individual and Delphi Modes

ix
LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page

1 Summary Data for Target Arrays in Offensive

and Defensive Battle Runs ... ........... 15

2 Measurement Constructs in the Offensive Battle

Run by Phase and Component .... ........... .33

3 Measurement Constructs in the Defensive Battle

Run by Phase and Component .... ........... .. 34

4 Sample Platoon Battle Run Offense (Day) ...... .36

5 Sample Platoon Battle Run Defense (Night) . . . . 53

6 Aggregation of Offensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance ........ .76

7 Aggregation of Defensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance ........ .80

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page

1 Basic company team offensive major mission

operations ......... ................... 10

2 Basic company team defensive major mission

operations ....... .................... 11

x
METHODS OF EVALUATING TANK PLATOON BATTLE RUN PERFORMANCE

I. INTRODUCTION

As described in current Army doctrine, training and evaluation of tank gunnery in armor units proceeds in three logically sequenced phases. The first focuses on training the

individual armor crewman to perform a basic set of enabling

tasks and concludes when he exhibits a satisfactory level of

proficiency on the Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test (FM 17-12,

1977). In the second phase the focus shifts to the training

and evaluation of crews. Upon completion of their training

crews are required to demonstrate their competence in tank

gunnery/marksmanship by service firing Table VIII for record

(Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2, 1978; Wheaton, Fingerman, &

Boycan, 1978). In the third phase the focus expands again,

from the single crew to the coordinated actions of the two

to five crews comprising the tank section/platoon. As the

culmination to this third stage platoons are required to

demonstrate a prescribed level of proficiency on Table IX,

the platoon battle run.

The platoon battle run is a relatively new concept.

Only seven years ago there was no Table IX (FM 17-12, 1972);

gunnery training culminated in crew qualification on Table

VIII. But with the publication of TC 17-12-5 (1975), battle

runs (one for sections and one for the platoon) were recommended, primarily as follow-on training activities. They

were to be conducted once individual crews had demonstrated

their ability to shoot on Table VIII, and were specifically

designed to support the training and evaluation missions

of ARTEP's (17-35, Tank Battalion and Combined Arms Task

Force, 1975; and 7-45, Mechanized Infantry Battalion and

Combined Arms Task Force, 1975). More recent versions of

Table IX (e.g., Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2, 1978) are, as

indicated above, administered primarily for the purpose of

documenting platoon competence in small unit gunnery. Platoon qualification is the final hurdle, to be achieved before

the platoon participates in follow-on training and evaluation activities with the company team.

The content of Table IX has evolved from recommendations

of armor subject-matter experts. Realizing that comprehensive and exhaustive testing of platoon gunnery skills in

all tactical situations is impossible because of resource

constraints, the designers of Table IX have attempted to

distill the essence of platoon gunnery into a manageable set

% i1
1

of exercises. Toward this end, a relatively small number

of tactical scenarios have been developed that portray both

offensive and defensive platoon missions. In turn, each

mission consists of major mission operations or phases or

tasks, many of which have also been identified in formal

descriptions of tank platoon and company team operations

(e.g., Warnick, O'Brien, Kraemer, Healy & Campbell, 1974a,

b; Bessemer, 1979).

Richness of content is further enhanced by providing for

a relatively large number of gunnery engagements. These

represent mission-related tactical situations in which the

platoon (and each section) engages specified mixes of enemy

targets representing threat arrays likely to be encountered

on the battlefield. In the aggregate the situations represent a challenging, small-unit firing course in which the

tactical application of gunnery skills, developed in earlier

tables, is combined with tactical maneuver and decision making.

Quick target hits on multiple targets, teamwork in getting

those hits, the ability of the unit to shift, distribute,

and control its fires, tactical movement, and maneuvering

to take advantage of the terrain are all emphasized.

Platoons fire Table IX a number of times, initially

using dry-fire and subcaliber techniques to practice their

gunnery skills (including REALTRAIN as advocated in TC 17-

12-5, 1975). Eventually they fire the battle run for qualification, using service ammunition. Evaluation of a platoon's

performance on these occasions is based on a variety of measures and scoring procedures depending upon the particular

version of Table IX under consideration. The measures themselves range from those that are reasonably objective and

reliable (e.g., the number of holes in a target, the number

of unexpended main gun rounds) to those that appear highly

subjective (e.g., judgment of effective control of fire,

judgment of proper technique of movement). The scoring procedures include some that award points for certain levels

of proficiency as well as others that assess performance of

each task or exercise on a GO/NO GO basis.

The performance data collected during the battle run

are used to make decisions about training deficiencies, as

1The term exercise as used in this report refers to a grouping of one or more logically-related tasks. For example,

there are preparation-of-fire-plan and movement exercises.

When used in the gunnery context the term applies to target

arrays rather than to individual targets.

2
well as qualification. In the first case the intent is to

pinpoint those areas of performance in which platoon strengths

and weaknesses lie. Specific deficiencies that are uncovered

are then singled out for remedial training. In the second

case a decision is made about the platoon's overall level of

competence. Qualified platoons presumably possess the types

and levels of proficiency which enable them to participate

in and contribute to tactical missions undertaken by the

company team or battalion.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Given the overwhelming importance of effective platoon

gunnery to success on the battlefield, ways must be explored

of improving the evaluation of tank platoon gunnery performance.

Toward this end, the U.S. Army Research Institute is supporting

a program of research having three broad objectives. The

first is to define more objective measures of section/platoon

gunnery performance. The second is to develop and test alternative data collection procedures. The third is to specify

methods for analyzing and interpreting Table IX test results.

Achievement of these objectives is important because of a number of problems and deficiencies in the battle runs that are

currently available.

The first problem is one of content. What should be

included under the rubric--"tank platoon gunnery?" In developing battle runs the intent has obviously been to include a

fairly wide variety of offensive and defensive exercises in

which a number of platoon gunnery skills are to be demonstrated.

However, the relevance and comprehensiveness of the exercises/

skills that comprise Table IX are unknown. This is because

explicit rationales have not been used to include (and exclude)

specific kinds of content. As a consequence, analyses are

needed of the specific team activities and skills that underlie platoon performance in different mission scenarios.

Assuming that sections and platoons are required to demonstrate proficiency on a meaningful set of exercises/skills,

a second major problem arises--objective measures of performance are required. At present, number of target hits, and

elapsed engagement time are the only two truly objective measures of performance obtained. Other critical skills such as

control of movement, use of terrain, and distribution of fire

are evaluated subjectively. Accordingly, analyses are needed

that specify objective measures for the activities/skills

selected for evaluation during a battle run. At issue is the

accuracy, reliability, and validity with which estimates of

section/platoon proficiency can be generated.

3
A third problem, related closely to the second, is the

lack of procedures for collecting objective, quantitative performance data in the field. Insofar as possible, subjective

estimates need to be replaced by more objective data. When

subjective data must be used, anchored-rating scales, multiple,

observers, video/audio recordings, etc., should be considered

as ways of improving measurement reliability. These approaches

must be tailored to the specific skills and measures upon

which evaluation of platoon performance is to rest.

A fourth problem is that procedures for processing and

interpreting obtained performance data are at a rudimentary

level of development. Several different scoring approaches

are conceivable, and a number of these have actually been used.

But the relationships between the resulting scores and a platoon's training deficiencies or assumed success in combat are

not well understood and need to be explored.

A final issue is how to accomplish Table IX objectives

effectively and.yet cope with the inordinate expense of

running tanks and expending live main gun ammunition. The

answer to the question probably lies in supplementing anu in

some cases substituting subcaliber for main gun firing. The

limitations and advantages of doing so need to be analyzed.

Also, use of live rounds must. be limited to training only

those skilled performance where live rounds are absolutely

essential to skill acquisition/rmaintenance/measurement. This

is particularly true because of the recent evolution of engagement simulation (SCOPES, REALTRAIN, MILES) which may eventually

play a role in the total tank gunnery qualification system.

The remainder of this report summarizes a year's research

on the problems listed above. In the next section, the history

of the evolution of the battle run, from 1975 to the present

time, is presented. The presentation is intended to provide

the reader with a better understanding of and appreciation

for the task analyses that were conducted. Three subsequent

sections describe the development of candidate sets of measures

for use in offensive and defensive battle runs, and discuss

implementation of battle runs, data collection systems, and

approaches to interpretation of performance data.

4
II. BACKGROUND

Descriptions of tank platoon battle runs and associated

gunnery techniques are available in numerous publications

(e.g., TC 17-12-5, 1975; FM 17-12, 1977; FM 17-12-2, 1977;

FM 17-12-4, 1977; FM 71-1, 1977; Draft FM 17-12-1, February

and May, 1978; Draft FM 17-12, Change 2, 1978; Draft FM 17-12-2,

Change 2, 1978; and Draft ARTEP 71-2, Chapter 8, Appendix 29T,

1978). These descriptions were reviewed in an attempt to

identify a number of issues bearing on ways of improving the

evaluation of tank platoon gunnery performance, and to resolve

those issues explicitly.

The review is organized into three general topics. The

first concerns the content of battle runs and includes the

test environment, the nature of the larger tactical situation

within which battle runs presumably occur, and the scope of

the missions/operations/tasks that are portrayed. The second

topic deals with the types of gunnery exercises that comprise

Table IX and make it distinct from Table VIII. The third

and most critical topic concerns the performance evaluation

system itself and addresses the purposes of evaluation, the

aspects of performance to be assessed, and the procedures for

scoring platoons.

CONTENT OF BATTLE RUNS

Agreement on a number of assumptions is necessary

in order to define the domain of platoon behaviors for which

performance measures are to be generated. Put simply, we

must agree on what it is we want to measure before measures,

data collection procedures, and scoring approaches can be

considered meaningfully.

The test environment. In the earliest versions of Table

IX (TC 17-12-5, 1975) a scenario was employed in which the

platoon (and sections) maneuvered across terrain toward an

objective, engaging a variety of targets along the way.

Although the test setting was clearly tactical in nature,

evaluation of performance was primarily focused on gunnery.

Current Table IX's (Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2, 1978;

Draft ARTEP 71-2, 1978) focus on platoon tactical performance.

The goal of the test is to require the platoon to incorporate

tactical decision making and maneuver with gunnery in coordinated response to a one-sided, controlled OPFOR (assumed or

simulated) tactical scenario. This type of highly realistic

and tactically oriented battle run, both in concept and in

manner of implementation, makes evaluation of performance an

extremely difficult enterprise.

5
The tactical nature of current battle runs produces a test

in which many different kinds of platoon performance contribute to the test score. Proficiency, as reflected in any

given performance measure, may vary because of actions taken

(or not taken) by any one of the individual tank commanders,

the platoon sergeant, or the platoon leader.1 Similarly,pro- ficiency is likely to represent the resultant of several

different kinds of skills or behaviors (e.g., distribution of

fire, selection of overwatch position, issuance of appropriate

platoon fire commands). As a consequence, because of the multidimensional nature of platoon performance, it may be difficult

in any particular exercise to unravel the specific training

deficiencies that lead to a missed target, or to ineffective

control of fire, etc.

In order to deal with this complexity, an alternative approach

to evaluating tactics would be one in which individual aspects

of platoon performance were evaluated separately. For example,

exercises (either within a single test or across a series of

tests) would establish competence in such areas as the ability

of the tank commander to prioritize targets, the ability of

the platoon to employ patterns of fire, etc. Once competence

in these enabling tasks had been demonstrated, the platoon

could bring them all to bear during the course of a fullfledged battle run. This type of approach has been used, in

fact, to develop a test of tank crew marksmanship in lieu of

an evaluation of "gunnery" as conducted in the Crew Combat

Qualification Course (Wheaton, Fingerman, & Boycan, 1978).

Current approaches to the impZementation of battle runs

also make evaluation of performance difficult. A flexible

and dynamic test environment is recommended within which

to evaluate the platoon's tactics. For example, indirect

fire support may be called upon, at the discretion of the

platoon leader. Smoke screens may be laid down if and when

there is an advantage in doing so. Maximum use of all available terrain is encouraged. In addition, to insure scenarios

that are "new" and continually challenging, test controllers

are urged to vary target positions and combinations, to change

avenues of approach by reconfiguring such features as simulated mine fields, and to choose new assembly areas and start

points. Finally, tactical realism is served by uniquely

iThe actions of individual crew members may also have an

impact on platoon performance. To the extent that they, are

relevant they will manifest themselves in the behavior of

individual tanks (e.g., tank A-2 did not fire from defilade--

because its driver did not analyze the terrain properly).

6
adapting the range design and layout of Table IX to the specific terrain available at each test site.

Thus, in both concept and implementation, battle runs

have evolved into complex test environments in which different

kinds of behavior interact with the different external characteristics of terrain, weather, etc. to influence platoon

performance. The emphasis is on the evaluation of different

platoon tactical skills that are tacitly assumed to transcend the specifics of the firing course on which the platoon

is tested. The development of objective performance measures

must take this environment into consideration rather than

the more structured and simplistic settings that might be

conceived.

The tactical situation. In most of the battle runs

developed to date the platoon exercises are usually viewed

as being embedded in a larger company team, battalion, or task

force operation. This larger tactical context was not evident in the earliest battle run (TC 17-12-5, 1975). Platoons

simply engaged targets while moving toward an "objective."

Soon thereafter, however, in FM 17-12 (1977) the enemy situation was described in general terms, the platoon leader was

informed of the presence of another friendly platoon on his

flank, and he was told of the availability of supporting

mortar and artillery fires should he have need for them. In

the latest battle runs (Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2, 1978; Draft

ARTEP 71-2, 1978) the tank platoon is clearly operating within

a company team tactical context. In fact, in the latter document the platoon is provided with scout elements which it is

to use and is required to communicate extensively with thp

company team commander.

The larger tactical perspective reflected in the most

recent battle runs is entirely consistent with doctrine concerning the role(s) of the tank platoon in a tank and mechanized infantry company team operation (FM 71-1, 1977). The

point is important for it establishes that the latest battle

runs are fundamentally different from the earliest Table

IX's. They do not simply address distribution and control

of fire (as is currently practiced and evaluated on subcaliber Table V-P), but also require the platoon to accomplish

specific missions. This fact provides a rationale for evaluating platoon oerformance not only in terms of tactical

enabling skills (e.g., distribution of fire, use of terrain)

but also in terms of mission outcomes (e.g., whether the

objective is seized, casualties inflicted/sustained, etc.).

In fact, it may be possible to specify mission-related outcome

measures (e.g., ammunition or fuel remaining) that characterize

the platoon's ability to continue to function on the battlefield, as one component of a company-team engaged in a larger

and unfolding mission.

7
Scope of missions. Most of the references recommend that

at least two battle runs be practiced by the platoon--one

based on an offensive mission scenario, the other on a defensive mission scenario. The original section and platoon

battle runs described in TC 17-12-5 (1975) are based solely

on an offensive concept; moreover, they do not represent formal

mission scenarios in the sense that later Table IX's do.

In FM 17-12 (1977) two scenarios are presented, one based

on an offensive, movement-to-contact and hasty attack mission,

the other on a defend-battle-position, delaying action mission.

The suggestion is also made that the two runs be practiced

under different conditions of illumination--the offensive run

during the day and the defensive run at night. Ammunition is

allocated for service firing of either the offensive or the

defensive Table IX as the qualification run. Similar missions

are prescribed in the supplements to FM 17-12 (1977). The

only notable deviation is in Draft FM 17-12-1 (May, 1978) in

which both the offensive and defensive runs are conducted for

qualification of XMl platoons.

Recent changes in FM 17-12 (i.e., Draft FM 17-12, Change 2,

1978; Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2, 1978) continue to prescribe

the same general types of mission, but a third scenario has

been added--defensive mission during daylight. Qualification

involves service firing of any one of the three. The Draft

ARTEP (ARTEP 71-2, 1978) prescribes the live firing of two

battle runs representing the same types of missions described

above. The night defensive mission is used together with

either the daylight attack or the daylight defensive scenario.

Considered collectively, the battle run scenarios in use

during the past four years encompass a rather limited set of

missions. For example, other analyses (Warnick, O'Brien,

Kraemer, Healy, & Campbell, 1974a) have identified five

general kinds of missions derived from an overall statement

of the TOE armor company mission--"to close with and destroy

enemy forces, using fire, maneuver, and shock effect (p. 5)."

Of these five general missions (i.e., reconnaissance, security,

retrograde, offensive, and defensive), only the latter two

have been used to structure battle runs. In other words,

Table IX's are designed to focus on a relatively circumscribed

domain of armor platoon performance, and are thus limited in

scope.

The restriction in scope is even more apparent when the

operations comprising the offensive and defensive missions are

considered. Other analyses have parsed the general missions

into component major functional areas termed major mission

operations (Warnick, O'Brien, Kraemer, Healy, & Campbell, 1974a;

8
Bessemer & Kraemer, 1979). Schemas depicting the major operations performed by the company team, and by extension the

platoon, are presented in Figures 1 and 2 for offensive and

defensive missions. Of the nine offensive mission operations

shown in Figure 1, five are represented in various battle

runs (e.g., those connected by heavier lines). Three of

these are core operations that are found in most offensive

Table IX's (i.e., "Conduct Movement to Contact", "Take Action

on Contact," and "Conduct Hasty Attack"). The most recent

Table IX's also make some provision for two others: "Plan

Offensive Operation" and "Consolidate After an Attack." Of

the nine defensive operations shown in Figure 2, most battle

runs provide for evaluation of performance in three: "Occupy

Assigned Sector/Battle Position," "Defend Battle Position,"

and "Displace to Alternate Battle Positionl." To a very

limited extent one current defensive Table IX also provides

for evaluation of the platoon's ability to "Plan the Defensive Operation," as well as to "Reorganize After the Defense."

At an even more detailed level of analysis it is conceptually possible to decompose the relevant mission operations

into constituent duties, tasks, or subtasks (Warnick, O'Brien,

Kraemer, Healy, & Campbell, 1974b; O'Brien, Kraemer, & Haggard,

1975). These specific entities presumably represent the

actual procedures or actions that a platoon must accomplish

in order to carry out major mission operations, thereby completing the mission. Platoon battle run tasks, therefore,

define the scope of Table IX's in terms of the specific kinds

of performance to be evaluated.

All of the battle runs were scrutinized to determine

their precise scope of coverage at the "task" level. The

review was conducted not only to establish which component

activities were pinpointed for evaluation but also to determine what kinds of descriptive terminology were used. The

specific terms used, the battle runs to which they apply,

and the relationships among them are described in Appendix A.

This analysis revealed the extent to which descriptions

of content have become more detailed and specific as battle

runs have evolved. For example, the content of an earlier

offensive battle run (FM 17-12, 1977) was decomposed into

five phases. In a later version (Draft FM 17-12-2, Change

2, 1978) the same general content was described in terms of

1The term "supplemental" should probably be used instead of

"alternate." The distinction is between displacing from

the primary to a supplemental battle position and moving

between primary and alternate firing positions within a

battle position.

9
Operation

ConementDa elbrt

ToCntc Attack

(1.)8 (.6

asty Aftior AnByPs

Attack Con~Atac JCd(r

(1.9)

Figur 1. Bsic cmpanytem oAnsvmaomisnoprtn.

(After Bessemer and Kramer, 1979)

10
Plan

Defensive

Operation

(2.1)

tI

Occupy Conduct Conduct Conduct

Assigned Covering Fixing Delaying

Sector/Battle Force Force Force

Position Operation Operation Operation

(2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.6)

Defend ADterae on Conduct Battle Altenattea CounterPosition Position Attac:k

(2.5) (2.7) (2.8)

'Conduct a

Withdrawal

Operation

(2.9)

Figure 2. Basic company/team defensive major mission operations.

(After Bessemer and Kramer, 1979)

11
10 fairly specific tasks. This change in level of description is important since it implies that an evaluation of

performance must correspondingly become more detailed and

broader in scope.

Summary. Although the domain of platoon performance is

extremely broad in character, its evaluation has been limited

in scope, as defined by the content of the offensive and defensive battle runs that have been developed to date. Only

selected missions and major mission operations have been used

as contexts within which to evaluate platoon performance, and

these have remained more or less the same in successive versions of Table IX.

While the basic substrate of Table IX has remained the

same, two changes in emphasis have occurred that have major

implications for the aspects of platoon performance that are

to be evaluated. As originally conceived, Table IX was a

test of platoon gunnery; as such it was the natural sequel

to the Table VIII crew evaluation. To enhance platoons'

acceptance of the battle run its realism was increased by

embedding it within the context of a "tactical mission."

In the past four years, however, emphasis has shifted to

evaluating a platoon's conduct of the tactical mission per

se, of which gunnery is but one component or enabling skill.

In light of this change, the focus of the current project

was expanded in an attempt to provide for the evaluation of

other aspects of platoon tactical performance, in addition

to gunnery.

The second change in emphasis was the level of detail

with which the battle run missions were articulated. Not

only were scenarios developed that involved performance in

addition to gunnery, but these other aspects were described

in terms of fairly detailed tasks and activities. As a consequence of this gradual change, the most recent offensiveday and defensive-night battle runs (i.e., Draft FM 17-12-2,

Change 2, 1978) are the most inclusive in terms of content.

Because these are the most comprehensive to date, they were

adopted as the model battle runs upon which to base the

definition of performance constructs and measures.

PLATOON GUNNERY EXERCISES

At the very heart of the offensive and defensive battle

runs lie the various gunnery exercises that the platoon

must perform. These were also reviewed in order to develop

potentially relevant measures, especially those reflecting

kinds of gunnery performance not evaluated during Table VIII

crew qualification. The review considered the kinds of targets that are presented within given arrays as well as the

12
numbers of targets and arrays. Detailed results of the review

are presented in Appendix B.

Characteristics of targets and arrays. As indicated

in Appendix B, many types of threat targets are used in the

different offensive battle runs. These include main gun

targets (e.g., tanks, antitank weapons, ATG's, BMP's and

BRDM's), coax targets (e.g., ATGM's, troops), and .50 caliber targets (e.g., trucks and helicopters). In addition,

situations are included which require the delivery of selfscreening direct fire and area suppressive machinegun fire.

This diversity is particularly evident in the two most recent

battle runs.

Two other trends are also evident. In keeping with the

view that U.S. forces may have to fight outnumbered, even

when on the offensive, most of the battle runs represent

the threat in multi-target arrays. In TC 17-12-5 (1975)

multiple targets are depicted but there are relatively few

targets in any array. 1 A shift then occurs in the supplements

to FM 17-12 (1977) that may be noted in all subsequent battle

runs; most of the target arrays involve two or more targets.

The second trend is in the composition of these multi-target

arrays. Most of the supplements to FM 17-12 (1977) depict

arrays containing targets belonging to the same class (e.g.,

four HIND, or three tanks, etc.). While using some of these

arrays, the two most recent offensive battle runs also use

arrays containing highly realistic mixes of targets (e.g.,

one BRDM and one ATGM team; four tanks, three ATGM teams,

and dismounted troops, etc.). These arrays reflect the

current emphasis on realistic portrayal of the threat which

will require platoons/sections/crews to prioritize and engage

multiple targets in order of danger.

Diversity of targets and target arrays also characterizes the defensive battle runs. Each array involves some

form of multiple targets. As described in the supplements

to FM 17-12 (1977) the platoon in the defense primarily

encounters sets of combinations of BMP's, tanks, ATGM's and

troops. Again, in the two latest battle runs more diversity

is evident in the attacking threat force (e.g., one threat

motorized rifle company consisting of eight BMP's, four tanks,

and troops and a second threat company comprised of six BMP's,

two tanks, and troops). Arrays such as these should place

a premium on target prioritization and distribution and control of platoon fire.

1 The scenarios depict multiple-target arrays but the scoring

forms are based on single target engagements.

13
Numbers of targets and arrays. Table 1 summarizes information about numbers of targets and target arrays in the

offensive and defensive battle runs. Two features of this

table are particularly salient. The first and perhaps the

most striking is the large number of engagements (targets)

involved in these Table IX's. While in the defense the platoon engages targets reflecting odds that range from 5:1 to

more than 11:1! The way in which the defensive scenario

is implemented partially explains how such a large number

of targets come to be presented. The basic attacking force

is portrayed repeatedly in waves at closer and closer ranges.

Each wave presumably contains large numbers of targets reflecting the onslaught of OPFOR's attack. Another aspect of the

explanation is that the threat forces are projected to vastly

outnumber our own, and these force ratios are realistically

presented in the battle runs.

Large numbers of engagements also characterize the offensive Table IX's. But these are spread over three or four

segments of the mission (e.g., movement to contact, hasty

attack, assault, etc.), a fact which tends to dilute them.

The only significant concentration of threat targets typically

is found in the assault stage of the attack. Even here the

concentration is reasonably small. 1

The second important feature of Table 1 is the number

of arrays in which targets appear. In all of the battle runs,

whether offensive or defensive, relatively few arrays are

used, resulting in a relatively large target/array ratio.

The extent to which this ratio increases as the more recent

Table IX's are considered is an index of the emphasis being

put on multiple target engagements and the related distribution and control of fire skills. The 31 offensive main

gun and machinegun targets recommended in Draft FM 17-12-2,

Change 2 (1978) appear in a total of seven arrays. Draft

ARTEP 71-2 (1978) calls for 38 targets in eight arrays. In

the defensive missions recommended for these same two Table

IX's, target-to-array ratios of 51/2 and 57/2 are prescribed,

respectively.

In summary the gunnery exercises appear to offer ample

opportunities to evaluate platoon gunnery per se. Multiple

target arrays are presented that represent different mixes

of threat. Other engagement conditions such as target range,

1In keeping with doctrine, larger threat forces would compel

the platoon to break off the action or by-pass the position.

14
Table 1. SUMNVARY DTA FOR TARGFT ARRAYS IN OFFESVL AN: DEFENSIVE BA--7ELE RUNS

SOURCES

I c

II 'T -cc r- 00 ccev cc N '-

N I I I r-N Ln N- r-4r - r-

- In E rn In E0 Ez E0L E6

OFFENSIVE BATtLE RUI S * **

#of total targets - - _ - - -

# of total taraet arrays - -

of main qun targets 22 1L

# of main gun target arrays 1

of machineoun targets _ .- ..-..

of machanegun target arrays "

DEFENI-VE BATLE RUNS * **** *** *****

r of total targets -.

of total target arrays

t of main gun targets

of main gum target arrays

t of machineaun targets

of mahinegun target arrays

The Fm does not present tables for the platoon, although it does contain a chapter on

platoon distribution and control of fire.

Specific target arrays are described in FM 17-12-2 (3/77).

Specific target arrays are described in FM 17-12-2, Change 2, DRAFT (8/78).

The TC does not present a defensive battle run.

Battle runs are presented for both day and night in the manual. Only information frcn

the night batt>u run is presented here.

15
and type of illumination are realistically varied. The

implementation of such exercises, however, appears fraught

with difficulties, especially in the offensive missions.

As oi.s reads through the scenarios (for example, the

offensive battle run in 17-12, 1977) one is greatly impressed

with the dynamic realism of Table IX. For example, while

the light section is bounding it is fired upon by a threat

tank platoon; the overwatching heavy section returns their

fire while the light section maneuvers; etc. Such descriptions, provided on a fanciful or post hoc basis, belie the

difficulty of controlling the battle run to insure that this

specific type of exercise occurs, and recurs when the battle

run is administered to other platoons. For the purpose of

identifying objective measures of platoon performance it is

assumed that the types of gunnery exercises portrayed in

Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2 (1978) and in Draft ARTEP 71-2,

Chapter 8, Appendix 29T (1978) can in fact be implemented.

THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM

As described so far, armor platoons conduct offensive

and defensive missions during battle runs that occur within

the context of a larger tactical operation. While participating in Table IX the platoon undertakes a number of

major mission operations that consist of component activities

and tasks. During these operations the platoon moves, shoots,

and communicates in a hostile environment containing complex

arrays of threat targets.

The purpose of this large-scale and expensive staging

is to provide a training and evaluation setting within which

to obtain measures of platoon performance. As the final

step in the review of battle runs, therefore, the underlying

performance evaluation system was examined. Specifically,

attention focused on: the purposes for which estimates of

platoon proficiency are needed; the kinds of performance

constructs and performance measures that are used; and the

procedures recommended for assigning scores and applying

standards of performance.

Purposes of performance measurement. Platoon performance is evaluated for two reasons as previously mentioned.

The first is to diagnose deficiencies in platoon performance.

Ideally, the remediation of these weaknesses will be the

focal point of subsequent platoon training which continues

until the next evaluation takes place. The section and

platoon battle runs first proposed in TC 17-12-5 (1975) were

expressly designed for this purpose as indicated by the

16
"standards" given for performance. For example, the platoon/

section should be able to:

1. engage multiple targets in priority of

danger to the platoon/section with the

appropriate weapon,

2. meet crew time of engagement standards

for the type tank shooting,

3. engage targets and conserve ammunition

by accurate distribution of fires,

4. shift section fires in 10 seconds to

suppress an area target, and

5. employ suppressive fire and maneuver,

using terrain to maximum advantage to

destroy multiple targets in any tactical

situation.

In fact, these statements are not performance standards

(with the exception of #2, and possibly #4); rather they

are general specifications of training objectives whose

accomplishment by the platoon is to be assessed periodically.

Testing the platoons will determine whether they can: 1)

prioritize targets, 2) shoot fast, 3) distribute fires, 4)

shift fires, and 5) employ suppressive fire and maneuver.

Performance evaluation for this purpose is an implicit aspect

of all Table IX's. It is intended to give the unit commander

diagnostic information about different dimensions of platoon

performance. He is told not only whether a platoon is qualified, but also, in the event it is not, what the underlying

causes probably are. How well Table IX's support the diagnosis of deficiencies will be addressed below when the measures themselves are considered.

The second reason for evaluating platoon performance

is to establish the platoon's level of qualification or

competence with respect to certain kinds of operations/tasks/

behaviors presumably required in combat or in supporting a

higher unit in its mission(s). Beginning with the battle

run described in FM 17-12 (1977) virtually all Table IX's

coming after TC 17-12-5 (1975) support qualification of

platoons. Nevertheless, the Army does not yet have a formal,

Army-wide awards system for recognizing platoon gunnery

qualification.

The procedures used to determine platoon qualification

are still evolving. For example, as is evident in Appendixes

A and B, the content of Table IX, on which the qualification

17
judgment is based, is continually being modified. As will

be discussed shortly, the measures of performance have also

undergone change. Some of the references urge the local

commander to select the specific Table IX (day or night,

offensive or defensive) to be used for the service firing

qualification run. Similarly, different categories of

qualification are recognized (e.g., "Distinguished", "Qualified", "Unqualified", or "Qualified/Unqualified"). Some

Table IX's use point-scoring systems while others use

criterion-referenced approaches.

In summary, evaluation of platoon performance is undertaken to determine qualification and to diagnose deficiencies

in performance. These dual purposes should drive the development of relevant performance constructs and measures.

Performance constructs and measures. Each platoon

battle run is designed and conducted to permit evaluation

of certain aspects of tank platoon performance but not others.

At a rather gross level of description the mission(s), major

mission operations, and tasks comprising a battle run serve

to define a delimited domain of performance which is of

interest. But in order to develop performance measures that

are objective and sharply focused, a much more detailed level

of description is required. Toward this end specific measurement constructs or concepts must be used to label and

functionally describe those aspects of performance singled

out for evaluation. They indicate what it is that is to

be evaluated or measured and in Table IX might include such

notions as distribution of platoon fire or use of terrain.

Collectively, these constructs define a performance model

which dictates the testing rationale and stimulates the

development of performance measures (Flanagan 1951; Mirabella,

1977).

The performance measures represent operationalized

versions of the abstract measurement constructs and are the

empirical referents for the constructs. They indicate how

measurement is to be accomplished and constitute the means

by which a platoon's proficiency with respect to a given

construct can be inferred and characterized. For example,

measures for the constructs cited above might include:

nuiaber of tanks firing at each target, number of targets in

each array not engaged; rate of travel (kph) across open

terrain, percentage of hull exposed to an (enemy) observer,

etc.

Without further preamble, the battle runs were reviewed

to determine what models, measurement constructs, and measures have been promulgated in the past. This portion of

the overall review was deemed especially important to the

task of increasing the objectivity of measures.

18
None of the documents addressing platoon battle runs

formally and explicitly describes a model of platoon gunnery

performance. Furthermore, there is little or no documentation of the ways in which implied models of platoon gunnery

performance have been used to develop the test rationale or

the testing environment. As a result the linkages (rationales)

between constructs and measures are weak or nonexistent.

Similarly, the "chicken" (test stimuli) and "egg" (test

response) problem cannot be put into perspective. 1

Measurement constructs referred to in the various battle

runs (either in the text of the source documents or in the

Table IX descriptions) are listed in Appendix C. Overall,

some 152 separate measurement constructs are listed that

differ with respect to the general type of performance involved

and/or in the level of specificity achieved. It was possible

to categorize 136 of these under eight general kinds of higherorder platoon performance including:

o Preparation and Planning--Offensive Mission

* Preparation and Planning--Defensive Mission

0 Techniques of Movement

9 Use of Terrain

o Fire and Maneuver

o Distribution of Platoon Fires

e Engagement of Multiple Targets, and

o Use of Proper Reporting Techniques.

The earlier battle runs (i.e., TC 17-12-5, the 1977 FM

17-12, FM 17-12-2, and FM 17-12-4 series) involve roughly 50

different constructs, of which more than half lie within the

iFor example, it is unclear whether designers of Table IX's

first develop the exercises and then look for applicable

measurement constructs or whether they start with the constructs and design the test exercises to elicit the kinds of

performance that are of interest. In most cases a combination of the two approaches has probably been used. Exactly

which approach has been used is an important piece of information since it bears on the relevance and comprehensiveness

of the constructs and measures that are enumerated. An

evaluation of the relevance and comprehensiveness of constructs

and measures found in various battle runs is beyond the scope

of the present research. The working assumption is that the

exercises and constructs comprising the battle runs under

review (particularly those in Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2,

1978) can be used to define a relevant and reasondbly comprehensive set of performance measures.

19
category representing engagement of multiple targets. Other

kinds of performance, including mission planning, fire and

maneuver, and reporting are rarely if ever represented in

these first efforts. In the later battle runs (Draft FM

17-12-2, Change 2; Draft ARTEP 71-2) a change in emphasis is

apparent. Although fewer constructs are found in these battle

runs (e g., 35 to 40 in the various offensive and defensive

missions) more of the eight major performance categories

listed above tend to be represented. (Notable exceptions

are the lack of emphasis on reporting techniques in Draft

FM 17-12-2, Change 2, and on distribution of platoon fire in

Draft ARTEP 71-21.) Correspondingly, these most recent

Table IX's place less emphasis on constructs within the

engagement-of-multiple-targets category--particularly those

dealing with technique of machinegun fire. Such performance

is after all associated with the actions and gunnery skills

of an individual crew rather than the section(s) or platoon.

In virtually all of the major areas of performance the

subordinate constructs are stated too vaguely and at too

general a level to provide for the derivation of useful performance measures. Specifically, although the measurement

constructs defining the actual test content of Table IX's

are usually alluded to, they are seldom explicitly stated

or clearly articulated. This fact can have several potential

consequences including the following: the recommended performance measures, like the constructs which they represent,

may be highly subjective; because the constructs are sometimes compound in nature the measures may involve more than

one measurement operation and thus be "impure"; occasionally

because the constructs are so vague they may simply not be

measured. The cataloging of performance measures was undertaken with these possible pitfalls in mind.

1Performance in this latter Table IX is evaluated with respect

to the satisfactory accomplishment of specified tasks carried

out under particular conditions. As an example, the platoon must neutralize at least 21 out of 30 threat tank targets in an array within a specified amount of time. It is

assumed that in order to attain or exceed this level of

performance the platoon must be able to distribute its fires.

But measurement constructs explicitly dealing with distribution of fire have been omitted, making diagnostic evaluation

in this area difficult if not impossible. This is a serious

matter since the major purpose of this ARTEP Table IX is not

to determine whether the platoon gets a "GO" on a particular

gunnery exercise but rather to uncover training deficiencies

(in such areas as distribution of platoon fires).

20
Performance measures explicitly or implicitly used in

the various battle runs are listed in Appendix D. The 107

measures that were identified have been grouped into categories reflecting the eight general measurement constructs

previously mentioned. In spite of the relatively large

number of measures, relatively few are actually used to

characterize performance in a given battle run. For example,

in TC 17-12-5 (1975) 21 measures are used, half of which

focus on gunnery skills involved in the engagement of multiple

targets. In the 1977 gunnery manual and supplements, 18 and

13 measures are used in the offensive and defensive battle

runs respectively. In each of these sets over half of the

measures address engagement of multiple targets. In the

latest battle runs more measures are used (i.e., 25 and 28

in the offensive and defensive runs described in Draft FM

17-12-2, Change 2, 1978; 19 and 37 in Draft ARTEP 71-2, 1978)

but, as shown in Appendix D, relatively fewer of these concentrate on aspects of gunnery per se.

The evolution in measures reflects the changing nature

of the constructs underlying the battle runs. For example,

the measures used in the earlier battle runs do not represent

all eight of the major areas of performance. In the latest

battle runs the measures are more widely and evenly distributed across the various metaconstructs (with the possible

exceptions of distribution of fire and fire and maneuver).

The most important aspect of Appendix D, however, is

the highly subjective nature of the measures. In most cases

the measures simply represent restatements of measurement

constructs (e.g., platoon moves from attack position deployed).

As such there is seldom an indication of how measurement is

to be accomplished or upon which specific attributes or

variables the measurement is to be predicated. Obvious

exceptions to this rule are measures relating to the speed

and accuracy of engagements, for example, in which elapsed

time and target hits are ascertained. Generally, however,

the constructs are at best not explicitly specified. At

worst they are unknown.

The tendency to confuse constructs with measures and

to offer measures that are not tied to observable attributes

or variables is fostered in the later battle runs by the

format used to describe the exercises. Starting with FM

17-12-1 (1978) the platoon is expected to perform a series

of tasks, under specified conditions, to prescribed standards.

1The number of measures reported for both defensive battle

runs is inflated because in each case day and night scenarios

were combined to arrive at a total fiqure.

21
Typically, the task statement itself is rather amorphous, but

is usually broken down into several more specific measurement

constructs that are listed under the task standards. One of

dozens of examples that could be cited is the seventh task

in the offensive battle run of Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2

(1978). The platoon is to "continue the attack and react

to the threat" (the task statement); the threat consists of

"three BMP's at 1100-1400m" (the conditions statement). In

performing this task under the conditions given, the platoon

is required to satisfy five standards: 1) hit/kill BMP's

within 40 seconds; 2) employ fire and maneuver; and obtain

satisfactory subjective evaluations on 3) control of fire,

4) report procedures, and 5) movement technique and use of

terrain. But, with the exception of the first one, these

standards really list the constructs believed to be involved

in performance of the task. In many instances, although

enumerated under the standards column, the constructs are

identified as subtasks and appear in the form ..." the platoon will .... " Such subtask statements, although clearly

not performance measures, are prevalent in the list of "measures" comprising Appendix D.

The entries in Appendixes C and D represent the many

different kinds of performance that have been considered for

evaluation within the context of Table IX. Many of the constructs and measures associated with the earlier battle runs

actually reflect the performance of individual crews or even

crewmen, particularly in gunnery. These have not been included in the later Table IX's nor will they be emphasized in

the present effort. The balance of the constructs and measures, while conceivably relevant and useful as a point of

departure, are basically unacceptable. They do not represent

the detailed and objective performance measures that are

required.

Scoring procedures. A criterion-referenced scoring

approach has replaced the point-scoring systems used in

earlier battle runs (TC 17-12-5, 1975; FM 17-12, 1977). This

rather dramatic shift has come about for two reasons. First,

it was virtually impossible to determine what component

exercises or tasks the platoon could perform competently,

given an aggregate point score representing performance on

several exercises. In fact, a platoon might fail completely

on one or more tasks and yet still receive a "passing" total

score (see Wheaton, Fingerman, & Boycan, 1978 for a more

detailed discussion of this problem). Second, the pointscoring approach did not provide for diagnosis of specific

deficiencies contributing to substandard performance. The

training value of the battle runs was diminished because

of this limitation.

22

-Amm -
The criterion-referenced scoring approach used in the

later battle runs is consistent with the task/conditions/

standards characterization of Table IX exercises. In order

to qualify, a platoon must demonstrate its competence by

receiving a "GO" on some percentage of the exercises comprising either the offensive or defensive battle run. Whether

a "GO" is received or not is dependent upon satisfactory

accomplishment of the one or more standards specified for

each task or exercise. Accordingly, in this scoring system

most emphasis is placed on successful completion of the task

as indicated by outcome measures of performance. For example,

the platoon must hit/kill 70% or more of the targets in an

array within a 40- or 60-second interval.

To complement an assessment of the outcomes of performance, the latest battle runs also provide for an evaluation

of more process-oriented, enabling kinds of performance that

are high in diagnostic value. These measures are then used

to identify areas in which the platoon is weak, essentially

independent of the outcomes on a particular task. For

example, in the offensive exercise cited above, the platoon

must exhibit satisfactory control of fire, fire and maneuver,

etc. in addition to meeting the hit/kill standard. The

challenge is to make both kinds of measures more objective.

CONCLUSIONS

Several battle runs have been reviewed at length

from different perspectives in order to provide a framework

within which to specify objective measures of platoon performance. In essence, the framework represents a set of

explicit assumptions about the missions, mission operations

and tasks to be portrayed in battle runs and about the types

of behavior to be addressed by the evaluation system.

The composition of battle runs has changed radically

during the past four years. Both offensive and defensive

scenarios are now used to portray selected kinds of major

mission operations. These operations are in turn elaborated

into more detailed activities or tasks. To the extent that

only one subset of all the possible missions and operations

is used in their portrayal, the battle runs might be viewed

as being restricted in scope. But this view is illusory,

for the battle runs represent extremely complex test environments in which a wide range of platoon performance can be

evaluated.

As the battle runs have evolved there has been a chanqe

in emphasis from platoon gunnery to platoon tactics. This

shift is evident in the design of Table IX's as well as in

23
the way they are conducted. Performance on any task or the

outcome of any engagement may be a function of the crew,

the platoon sergeant, the platoon leader, or of the platoon

in its entirety. The underlying components of performance

are multi-dimensional, involving not only gunnery but also

tactical decision making and maneuver. In keeping with

this tactical emphasis the battle runs are embedded within

a larger operational context and are conducted in a highly

flexible manner to enhance realism.

The most significant finding emerging from the review

is that today's battle runs represent a substantially different

kind of evaluation than is attempted in the preceding eight

gunnery tables. The performance domain is much broader and

includes many areas of performance that are simply not

addressed in these prior and prerequisite training and evaluation exercises. The original Table IX's, that stressed tank

gunnery and movement skills, have evolved into much more

comprehensive scenarios where the target behaviors involve

not only gunnery and movement but also mission preparation

and planning, use of supporting forces, after-operation

reorganization, etc. The target behaviors, however, are

typically not specified in the detailed, clearly articulated

manner that is necessary. Accordingly, there is unnecessary

ambiguity with respect to the specific constructs of platoon

performance that are being evaluated. Similarly, performance

measures are specified in the abstract, leadinq to evaluations

which may often be unnecessarily subjective.

To address this problem the current effort must necessarily deal with platoon gunnery in the highly tactical

setting within which it now exists. Therefore, the specification of performance measures will be undertaken within

the specific context of the missions, major mission operations, and tasks comprising the offensive day and defensive

night battle runs described in Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2

(1978). Choice of a particular battle run is necessary to

keep the effort within manageable bounds. The one that has

been selected is highly representative of those that will

probably be used for the next several years.

24
III. CONSTRUCTS AND MEASURES

The compilation of a candidate set of constructs and

objective measures to support evaluation of tank platoon

battle run performance was accomplished in three stages.

In the first, a mission failure (or inverted mission) analysis was carried out. Its purpose was to pinpoint those

aspects of platoon performance that could logically be

implicated as potential reasons for a platoon's failure to

accomplish its mission. In essence, by working backward

from assumed failures on selected mission outcome criteria,

this analysis attempted to focus attention (and subsequent

evaluation) on that subset of platoon activities directly

related to successful or unsuccessful mission outcomes. In

the second stage a more conventional, front end, mission task

analysis was conducted to portray the activities in which

an armor platoon engages while conducting specific types of

operations. This analysis was anticipated to be more inclusive than the inverted mission analysis. To keep it focused

on aspects of performance of relevance during battle runs,

platoon activities involving the eight meta-constructs

identified during the background review were emphasized. In

the third stage the platoon tasks and activities identified

in the mission analyses were translated into performance

constructs and measures. Toward this end the attempt was

made, insofar as possible, to make use of existing constructs

and measures by refining or otherwise adapting them to the

platoon battle run context.

INVERTED MISSION ANALYSIS

The inverted mission analysis attempted to capitalize

on the idea that it might be easier to specify the causes of

unsatisfactory mission outcomes than it would be to state

unambiguously the behaviors that are required to assure

mission success. By working backward from hypothesized

unsuccessful outcomes, it might be possible to derive a

hierarchically organized set of activities. Each activity

would be referenced to unsuccessful mission performance by

being causally linked to a failure to adequately perform the

activity that immediately precedes it in the hierarchy. In

essence, the method would generate for each performance

failure a list of possible causes. Each cause in turn would

become a performance failure for which other possible causes

would be generated. The analysis would continue in this

fashion until the causes of failure at the platoon level were

exhausted.

25

• ,I
.tiu. Two inverted mission analyses were performed

in an attempt to identify tank platoon performance measures--

an analysis of an offensive mission and an analysis of a

defensive mission. Both missions were modeled after the

Table IX exercises described in Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2,

1978.

The first step in performing each of these analyses was

to specify overall outcome standards for mission success.

The particular standards that were specified were judged to

be reasonable given the mission statements. For the offensive battle run, the standards specified were: (1) to secure

the objective within one hour of crossing the LD; (2) to

secure the objective with a minimum of three operational

tanks with full crews; and (3) to be able to continue the

attack within 30 minutes of securing the objective. The

standards for the defensive battle run were: (1) to be able

to maintain the defensive position for a specified time; and

(2) to move to a subsequent battle position, when the order

is given, with a minimum of three operational tanks with

full crews.

Once the standards were specified, the assumption was

made for the purpose of conducting the analysis that the

platoon failed to meet these standards during the battle

run. First-order causes served as the initial outcomes from

which the hierarchical chain of causal linkages began. For

the offensive battle run, these first-order causes of mission

failure or combat failure criteria were: (i) insufficient

remaining ammunition to complete or continue mission; (2)

too few surviving tanks; (3) securing the objective too

late; and (4) too few enemy destroyed. For the defensive

battle run the combat failure criteria were: (1) too few

surviving tanks; (2) insufficient remaining ammunication to

complete or continue mission; (3) disengaging too early;

and (4) enemy force too large.

The combat failure criteria listed above represent the

suggestions made by armor experts concerning the criteria

with which tank platoons could be evaluated. Not all of

these criteria would necessarily be relevant for all missions.

Depending upon the mission itself end the conditions under

which it would be performed, some or all of these criteria

would be applicable. However, for a specific mission, the

experts disagreed among themselves regarding the importance

of each criterion. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the

analyses, it was assumed that all of the combat failure

criteria were relevant.

Since each combat failure criterion was the outcome

representing a first-order cause of failure within the

26
hierarchy, the next step was to generate the outcomes that

could have caused each of the failures. For example, in the

offensive battle run, lists of outcomes were prepared specifying the performances that could have led to insufficient

ammunition, too few surviving tanks, an objective that was

secured too late, and/or too few enemy destroyed. For

example, the second-order causes for too few surviving tanks

were (1) self-inflicted losses, (2) mechanical losses, (3)

enemy inflicted losses, (4) terrain losses, and (5) tanks

being lost en route.

Once the second-order causes of failure were generated,

the next step was to generate third-order causes. This was

accomplished by specifying the third-order outcomes that

could have led to each second-order failure. For example,

enemy inflicted losses could have been due to (1) being hit

by an enemy round or (2) hitting a minefield. Once the

third-order causes of failure were specified, fourth-order

causes were generated. Thus, being hit by an enemy round

could have been caused by (1) failure to detect the enemy,

(2) failure to destroy the enemy, (3) failure to reduce

vulnerability, and (4) failure to evade missiles. The analysis was then continued by generating fifth- and lower-order

causes until the outcome was the result of a crew or individual action rather than a platoon action.

Because the concept of IMA was novel, a flexible approach

was used in performing it. A group approach was tried at

first. Three persons familiar with armor exercises attempted

to work together to generate the causal linkages. However,

it was observed that the task was not conducive to a group

effort. The fact that different persons with the group

concentrated on different portions of the analysis made it

difficult to maintain cohesive interaction. Therefore, each

of the participants was assigned one or two of the combat

failure criteria and worked alone on that portion of the

analysis.

Once the analyses were finished, the next step was to

identify omissions. This was done by examining descriptions

of critical incidents reported by veterans ot armored combat

(Boldovici, Kraemer, Reeves, & Healy, 1975). Causes of

unit failure identified in the critical incidents were compared with those generated in the inverted mission analyses.

Causes that had been omitted from the analyses but that

appeared relevant for the platoon battle run were inserted

as appropriate.

Once Lhu revisions were completed, each analysis was

examined in a group situation by the team of analysts. The

27
focus was on the adequacy of the causal linkages. Attempts

were made to identify outcomes that were omitted from the

analysis or to identify outcomes that were not in the proper

causal sequence. Following these reviews, corrections were

made as necessary.

I1'CSUZtO. The results of the two inverted mission analyses are contained in Appendix E. The various nodes in each

branching diagram provide opportunities for measurement of

platoon performance, the level of measurement proceeding

from fairly general to rather detailed behaviors. Considering the "failures" associated with the offensive mission,

two features of the results are clear. The number of nodes

identified as potentially contributing to mission failure is

large, including some 286 options arrayed across the four

mission failure criteria (i.e., insufficient ammunition,

too few survivors, too late, too few enemy destroyed).

Fortunately, however, many of these nodes are redundant with

others, a finding suggesting the possibility of defining a

subset of measures which is of a manageable size.

The redundance is even more apparent when results of

the defensive mission analysis are considered. In this case

it is possible to identify whole branches of failures that

were uncovered in the earlier, offensive analysis.

In spite of the promising nature of these results, the

decision was made not to base the development of performance

constructs and measures exclusively on them. They exhibited

three shortcomings which argued for the use of other complementary approaches as well. First, the results did not

represent the relatively small subset of relevant performance constructs that had been hoped for. Even with the

considerable redundancy which existed, there was a formidable

number of constructs with which to deal. Second, the nodes

in the analyses had intentionally been construed as successively finer outcomes (e.g., tank fires out of sector) rather

than as processes (e.g., platoon distribution of fire). The

outcomes frequently resisted analyst attempts to induce

culprit processes, activities, or tasks that would more

readily permit the derivation of constructs and measures.

Third, the results did not differentiate among components

of the platoon that might be responsible for failure on a

particular combat criterion. Differentiations, although

potentially valuable, were not made between the Platoon

Leader, Section Leaders, sections, and platoon.

To address these shortcomings front end mission task

analyses were also undertaken. These results were in effect

merged with those from the inverted mission analyses to

derive performance constructs and measures.

28

Low-. b=1
FRONT END ANALYSIS

Mission-oriented task analyses were conducted for the

same two battle run scenarios that had been examined in the

inverted mission analysis. The offensive scenario, based

on a movement-to-contact and hasty attack/assault mission,

begins with the Company Team Commander's issuance of an

OPORD in an assembly area and terminates when the platoon

secures an objective. It takes place during daylight.

The defensive scenario, patterned after a conduct-reliefin-place, defend, and delay mission, starts with occupation

of a battle position and ends with the movement to and

defense of a supplemental battle position. It is conducted

at night.

i,:. The framework for the analyses was initially

based on a detailed inventory of armor platoon tasks

developed in earlier research (Warnick, O'Brien, Kraemer,

Healy, & Campbell, 1974a, b). While the inventory was

extensive, many of the tasks and subtasks contained within

it were related to major mission operations other than those

comprising the target battle runs (e.g., attack from march

column, conduct screening operation, etc.) Nevertheless,

there was enough overlap between the major mission operations in the inventory and in the battle runs to provide

a solid point of departure.

Staff familiar with armor operations and with current

Army documentation in the area performed the analyses. In

both scenarios the mission was decomposed into reasonably

self-contained phases prior to more detailed examination.

The offensive mission'phases consisted of Preparation and

Planning, Movement to Contact, Assault, and Consolidation

and Reorganization. Five phases were represented in the

defense including Preparation and Traveling, Occupation

of Battle Position, Defense of Battle Position, Movement

to Supplemental Battle Position, and Defense of Supplemental Battle Position.

Within each of these mission phases the analysts

attempted to balance two concerns. First, they tried to

identify and include tasks that, while not actually performed in the prototype battle runs (e.g., Conduct Tactical

Road March), did help to define and structure the mission

context. Such tasks were not converted into constructs

or measures in subsequent stages although the Army might

choose to do so in the future, were the domain of platoon

performance examined in Table IX to be expanded still further. Second, the analysts attempted to keep the domain

within reasonable bounds. Thus, they attempted to define

a platoon domain of performance that represented more than

29
"platoon gunnery" but far less than the range of tasks

contained in either the Warnick et al. inventory or the

many platoon missions evaluated in ARTEPs.

Toward this. end the analysts elaborated the missions

phase by phase. Within a phase they concentrated on thosc

meta-constructs that appeared to represent the gist of

battle runs that have been offered to date. While the

decisions were necessarily arbitrary, the general rule of

thumb was to include rather than exclude tasks or subtasks.

Preliminary descriptions of each phase were reviewed with

other staff to identify omissions of content as well as to

eliminate content judged to lie outside the domain of performance implied by the two scenarios. Revisions were then

undertaken as necessary.

Results. The outcomes of the offensive and defensive

battle run task analyses are presented in Appendix F. Each

mission has been analyzed into its constituent phases (e.g.,

PREPARATION AND PLANNING), tasks (e.g., DEPART ASSEMBLY AREA),

and subtasks (e.g., Platoon Leader sets up overwatch and

bounding sections). In developing this progressively more

detailed description, the analyses were essentially terminated whenever activities within a particular task were

encountered that represented actions of individual crewmen

within separate tanks. As a consequence the analyses deal

with those team behaviors or skills that involve: the platoon as a whole; the sections, addressed as heavy and light or

overwatching and bounding; the Platoon Leader; and the section

leaders (i.e., Platoon Leader for the heavy section and

platoon sergeant for the light section). The emphasis in

these analyses, of course, is on enabling activities and

processes rather than on the causally-linked outcomes described

in the analogous inverted mission analyses.

In considering the details of the task analyses (Appendix

F) some key features are of interest. First, many of the

subtasks identified within the offensive and defensive

missions represent unique events. They occur but once during

the course of a battle run mission (e.g., the set of subtasks

comprising the Platoon Leader's troop leading procedures

during the PREPARATION AND PLANNING phase). ! vertheless,

their potential impact on s bsequent mission performance may

be substantial. Second, there are many other subtasks (e.g.,

Designated section bounds) that presumably can occur several

times. How many times they actually arise will certainly be

constrained by the physical layout of different battle run

facilities, and will depend on the responses of individual

platoons. Third, as in the inverted mission analyses, there

is a gratifying amount of redundancy in even the most detailed

30

Al!

Whwi "' - I
descriptors. This is true not only within phases ot missions

but between phases and between missions as well.

Like the inverted mission analyses which preceded them,

the front end task analyses were designed to make explicit

the types of behavior which a platoon might exhibit under

the general rubric of "battle run." This specification

yielded a working definition of the domain of platoon battle

run performance and provided the basis for subsequent generation of performance constructs and measures.

SPECIFICATION OF CONSTRUCTS AND MEASURES

Method. The specification of tank platoon performance

constructs and measures involved three activities. First,

results of the inverted mission analyses and the missionoriented task analyses were compared. The purpose of this

step was to evaluate the relevance of the task-analytically

derived platoon activities. At issue was the extent to which

poor performance on specific subtasks could be hypothetically

linked to the kinds of outcomes associated with mission

failures as listed independently in the inverted mission

analyses. In general, this process substantiated the relevance of the task analysis results. 1 As mentioned earlier

some tasks were not relevant although they had been included

to provide a somewhat larger context within which to view

battle run activities. These tasks were not addressed when

specifying constructs and measures.

The second step involved the compilation of all constructs and measures associated with previous battle runs

and recommended for use in companion settings such as company

team REALTRAIN missions (USACDC Pam 71-1, 1973; Scott, Meliza,

Hardy & Banks, 1979; Scott, Meliza, Hardy, Banks, & Word,

1978; Medlin, 1979: and CAC Memorandum, 1979). These lists

were referred to repeatedly when deriving constructs and

measures for the tasks and subtasks comprising the offensive

and defensive battle runs.

iParenthetically, the task analyses, which were specifically

focused on major areas of presumably relevant platoon performance (i.e., on the eight meta-constructs), were felt to

be more inclusive than the results of the inverted mission

analyses. It could be argued that tasks not initially

identified in the front end analyses but implicated in the

inverted analyses represented oversights. A strong case

for their inclusion could always be made.

31
The third step was the actual specification of constructs

and measures, an effort that was undertaken by the same analysts who had performed the mission-oriented task analyses.

The translation of subtasks into constructs and measures

proved to be reasonably straightforward because of the level

of detail achieved in the task analyses. In providing the

specification the analysts explicitly addressed the battle run content defined by the offensive day and defensive night

missions in Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2 (1978).

Results. The outcomes of the specification are represented in Tables 2 and 3 in terms of the constructs used to

represent performance, and within each mission phase, the

specific components to which the constructs apply. In the

offensive battle run (Table 2) 54 different constructs were

identified for which a specification of measures would be

desirable. In the first or PLANNING AND PREPARATION phase

these primarily represented activities undertaken by the

platoon as a whole (P) and by the Platoon Leader (PL).

During MOVEMENT TO CONTACT the focus shifted dramatically

to the sections (OWS and BS) and the section leaders (SL).

During the final two phases the emphasis was again on the

platoon and Platoon Leader.

In the defensive battle run (Table 3) 43 different constructs were identified, 38 of which were also included in

the offensive battle run. In the defense the constructs

were primarily associated with the platoon and Platoon

Leader. When movement to a supplemental position was undertaken the constructs involved sections and section leaders.

The detailed articulation of how the various performance

constructs relate to the different unit components is presented in Tables 4 and 5 for the offensive and defensive

scenarios, respectively. These tables show the linkages

between battle run tasks, constructs, and measures based

on the same type of format found in Draft FM 17-12-2, Change

2 (1978). The first column in both tables contains a listing

of mission phases, tasks, and subtasks. In the second

column the conditions are described under which performance

would presumably occur. The constructs associated with a

given subtask are listed in the third column. In the fourth

column the measures used to operationalize each construct

are presented. Performance standards are indicated in the

fifth and final column. The information in these last two

columns represents the crux of the measurement specification

process.

The candidate performance measures described in Tables

4 and 5 have been developed, insofar as possible, to maximize their quantifiability and objectivity. These goals

32
-i

t = -_ .

r3
'I

- Al

N N

;

w~

N NNN NN.

I '1

- N

.1 -

N I

* NNNNN NNNN 7 j

3

V "p

NNN

4 I

I, C 4

' - -

~r 370

q m - 4- - -

- ~1 ~ I if - X~. j.. & 1' ~~-'-' .4 0 ~

4 COW

' ~

I I 4,'-4,CC

- r tiff) ~ 4~.e

34

'4 . *1
were not achieved in every case as indicated by the "subjective evaluation" label preceding some of the measures. In

many cases, however, such measures may prove to be perfectly

defensible and entirely adequate. Such an event is likely

given the level of detail with which these measures, as

opposed to some of those suggested in the past, have been

specified. Indications of high inter-evaluator agreement

would be the desideratum. In those cases where such agreement is unlikely or in fact cannot be obtained, revisions

will have to be instituted which increase objectivity.

Tables 4 and 5 represent the major outcome of the first

phase of research. They suggest what should be measured in

offensive and defensive battle runs and how that measurement

should be accomplished. Subsequent sections deal briefly

with ways of implementing battle runs that have implications

for which measures can be obtained, ways of collecting performance data in the field, and ways of specifying standards

and interpreting observed levels of platoon performance.

35

I
Z, r c . z0- z. Z. 3.-

2 0 C c c- CmC 

>~ C v 0 >. c

C 0 [80 v*

11 U I 0

-M0 000 .

;c I.

0 .

40h. 0 0 4 4 0 , 0 * V7

00 0> Cu

k8 0O1

30 0

363
Q. x 0 V

10 M - 4

- Q. it

211

-3 4.I

.0~~ ',0).

4. 4..4. ~ 'I4.00

o ~ 0 ~ " 037
0 o t o t 0 0-

J, '00 to v , 0 X

4' M...0 o 0 0 0

to t7

3 7

8 38-4 2o
C.. 0

>. Ic

-t V2 I 0- 1. 01

-0 V -U -C, 2

0 C

I 39

imam. ~ >
.4141 .241. .4141 1.21 14 -

z-!. Z-2: ~ £

2.411.1 -- )~. 2Oa.-

.~V41 <01041. 204 -- 1.41 .. 4141 41

Oc 41 041 - 041

* .--.. a e--.- .441a

* -a.- '~41a.. '-aW -

-c I ac a 0 ~ a ~ ... 41Z 4.41' ~ ZI cc- cv''v 4141 .8"4 - 10 01~ C...'V

* 41.41- 41. 4.41 41., IC 4U a a 0 41 CC .41 4 a .41 - a 41 -41> -4141- ~ . 41

0-' . a

1 i k~ 0 41.4141 WE 04 .' 41'~ 4. -r 41* - 41:£

41 ~ 4. a

OV0 4141 a .40.

a0-. ~4102 ~-a. -~ 41

v.'414 - 410 41 4.400. 0.41* 0411 0 - - .4

.' 41 0 ~0 o~a ~ 0

ol 00 a 00 0 041 . 0.. 41.

~ ~00~ ~a a OCZ

410041 aCCa a4..'4 a

... 41.041 41 ~.- . - 0 C41.

0 41 C a 41 0

41 -l 41 4 - 10 C 'V - .4 11

a a .4

41 'a

a 41 0 " a.' 41 41 30 - ~41 0 0 a -41

13 41 4.41 ~' C 0 341 ~. W

41 041

a

- 410 o 0.'

a

.02 41

(4 (4

4.' ~ - - :5 a z a :.--

~I ~ 41 z C 4 - 041. ~ 41

u a

a .~ ~i .0 -.

~2 0.40~ ~'I ~

4141 -.. >E a 4G~ ~~a- 41 41 .. ~. ~

CI '441~' C' ' 4414 41- 4 -aa

,a ; a 1041

~ 'a

-l 4.O ~2 - 41'

- . .

40
0. - - -

*0 - ~- A 0

'0- 3- 0-3 ~

3

- - I N ~ s- o'-

~'0 nrs-. 0-->- 0'-0 U> 04, -03. ... 40 4,0 '0

0 0 A4 3-- A~ 0 >4,

0.0 000 co'Z3 '0~'o-wZ>o > ~ ~>''0 ~

C, CL

0 0 0 0 0-

* 0 0, 2 '3

I 0 -

CL

0 >- 2 0.~ 00 0 4,0S 0- o*0 V., 0' 0

.03 * >4, 0.

- 0~ 0~ ~0

0 0

j E o o 0 m

CL '0 oo.~

00

0.>. ~4,

.3 VOL

0) QLOL k' 4,4, -s

-o 'I >0 CL-C 00 C..! '0 L.L~J 0

- z C-CO '0

- * ~'0 4,3 1 SC--C

o zo.

4-. 4,

o - 0 0

C- v 0' -

j4. 4,411 C 0 >4, -

- - 0"00

.2 ~ - >,

0 0

0- QL 4 L. 0 3

~ 4 'C 0'

o 0 4, ~0 CLZ

~- f- oot o.j 340~QLOG

-C->

05 C..'

o3o~

.0230

4,U C .3-0 CLO'

3 .002

-COO>'.'

1) >0~0 4, 4,

4, 314,0> CC ~~-oo-.L0

0 CL I 2' - H 4. -0 0 - CL 4 30 00

0- ~ A

- 40-C 0.3 3.0:. 0-. 04 -~

'N N -, '0 5"

4. - - - -, -' 0 0 -

- *0 - -

4, CL . -

4'
e--

W.= -c C . C

0 0 41 -0 "0 ) - C

xa CCC 0.

0) 10 O.1 00

0

0 -

.42'
-: ~7C

a,~~2 . 27 

3 c 2t

~Im

C~ ~ a~43

loo
~.-, - - -

.14 . . . .' - 2l .. ,.~ -, -, " - - 2) -N

02) . . . -

2) 3M 212' W - - - -~ N

2) 2) 4

212 ~ A -

.2) 3

3 -

2) -

I 4

2) .~ - --

Al A . II' 4 2)

-I -~ 2) 2). - II, I .- :4 Ii ~ ZZ~ 1 II 2) 2)

ii 2) .4

- A' I III -~ ,0 .4 ).)*2)* 2~ ~ A - - ~ a.~ 2) 9 iii I ~ ill 2) 2).-,

~ A 3 I Al) 0'

2)4.4 I

3 2)- 3 213 -~ 2) ~ 0 .4 44- 44 4421 '4 3 I ~ A 2) .1~ .42)

... 2~ NA2).A ~ - 2)2) I.

21 > ~ - - - '4

2)2- Al 2)2)

.. ~Z 01) ~ .44440 4'0 .43

.4 . 44 14 '4 - - 2) 2) f444 2)4~ 

0 T

N ~ 2)1 2)

21 21 21

2) 43.343' ~3'

.2 3'

'~ 21.1

~ ~ 210 2) .0

.~ 2). 2)44 0)0 3. ~ 3'

A A -- -- 2) .4 -D ~42) -. ~ .~ 44 .42) *4'4 2) 112) - -

- 21 3' 2)2)2132)2) ~ .~ 2 J~3 '4,3 '4 2) - -'

~,- Al -

02) Al,

3 2) 33' -

3.21

3>. 30 -~ 3 .

2)11 '-2)

* j'4 '42)

N N

21~2) Al - -

3 -'02)

.444~2)-

4*~4,3.444

A '4 I - 2) '2)

3 2) - Al 3 A 2) 1-4 4 2)

- a2) )

3 :3

3 .4

-2) -4

2) ,. 4

Ii 2

2),. 2)243

N . -a 51J N .2) ~ . -

2)4 N 2- - . -'

N z 4 4'

I. N

44
0 10 O -on 

.1 41 I 1n , 7 17,,. 4

-~1. 0 ~ ~ ~ 4

-:~~~ ~ 4>' * 4 .0140

we u.5 ' ' x -A. 1!n 0 r j.I 

0~~ . I

41 4, Owl I:

4 . 0 1 'a. U 0- 0

o .

taa

wo 04 I W4 

41 ~ ~ ~ S4 ~ Ij.44111 .
-. A. w u' 0

,01 -0

41.~ C 1u0

42 4-4 -.:6 t4 3- . 4 1 4 1 , 1 ,

I 7, 4, H 00

41 00 . 30 1.4, 1, t u, - u 

12,

V 446
Eow 0

u n -C w .

z 

c

-I

u0

I N47 N 
- 5,

00

00

N N -

C - - . . U, - - - ,- -,

00 V -

o - - - . . - - -

to 0 0 a a a U U U -- a A .~ .~

- - ~o. to to to 0

-. 0 -, 'S U

- a, a

*0 5- 0 0 0 U

* 0. 4 0 C - -

0 0 0 tt J

0 0 0 -

* ~ ~ .~ 2 O a S U a a. 00 tO

-~ U 'Vt 'V

00 0 00~.

0~ -a S a. . .- .a - -

r~o to .0 - U t) , -- ~. a to *O a 0 0- ~

- . 0- C 0'V - ~0 C

C. .2 - a... o'a a'a, U Ct

N N 0 00 aC 0 00 Oj '.0 0 U" .

to ~ - '.q:

00 00 Ut 000~..- 0

0

~ I Co. a

to ,-t, 0~0 ~j..0.0 of.. OM 0V4 0

~.,C 0~O0 00000

0 0'V~ - a~a 0 -0 - *o..-0 aCO '0

NO 0.OOU£ a 0a.ta ,.~ - Ot U

~ ~t ! ~

- a - ~ - 0

S 00

a- ~ 0 - I-S - - - ~

.. 'V a a

~ ~ 0

.! ~ .~ -a

5 ~.. U 0

I-, ~I ~ - to

.~0 0....0. C-

-' - 2 to

I .0

0.' fi -.

43
Z' I

c0 0 1

0 U

?W -6 0 -0 

t zC

CC u 0

CC0a

49
4' - .. N

N 4, . . ±2.~Z 414.- -.

.41, . . .4 4, 4, N N

4,0 - - 04.Q'~ 4 ,L~. - N

- N N - - N

* - 2~

NI - -~

4-'- - - 14- - - 41 41 C. 4, 41 41 41 C c--c 4' 4' - ~ teN 1'. 40 141

82. 0

41 N

41~ 4,

- 4. 4'

41 I 41 NNNN41

-NI ~. III

I -

* 411 0 4,.

* 0' 0 --

.. 2l

2' 000CC

;.~

Na 41.

4.41- 41 4CXXNN

440 4. UCsUUU

I U - 41 -

N * N

N 0~.41 - - ... - N

4

LN

* 00-' . . 4.~ --

- .~'J ~4 N N -4 -v * COO'

- 41. - - - 4

0 .' .4' 41 4, 41 4,

3.0 4, 4, -

* I .14- 1 I I N N N

f-. N N N f--

F , I -

V N 41 - N C 41 -.

0 41 1. -

N - ~

410 - 41 -

* I. 41~ 4 0 '4 41. - 41 4'

,~4.4 N~ - 41 N 4.

- - - 4 - .. - U N

.&I E ~ 4' 4' - 4' 0' 41 41.' .. N N 0 11 41 4, 0 I - ' - 414.

41 ..1 41

-. 41414141' -

ON 0410~4t 04.0

I ~ 3. 4,Q.4,00. 43.0.4.54.41 3.

41

~4,41

04.0

4- 8I~

4,0

0'~

04.4.

F.c0 *4

04.

F' - - 4 *4 -

9- 041

N 4' .1: 41 4141

-~ ~. j<

01 - - 4, 4 --

N - 0 N

-. *4- 4. 1

- -- 1--

12

5' - 4- -

50

- ~ .
4: ,.~ 4

- .4: 4,4:4

-'4:-?)

a.. -: - -

Cl - - - - z . - - 0.'44

.44,4 -

- *i t ~ -~ 0 -- 4 4:0 .4,Q 4, A w n4,'

4, Ad

4,'

4: II

4: c Cl - 4,1

o

- 2I 4, 4: 4: 0 0

44 ~ ~4: - 0 -

4, - S

* 3 - * 044: ~z. C

4,j * 4: 0.-C - 4, 4.4-4 04, - - C 4,44, ~ , 4,4: - 4: 00 4,0N0 to * . .~4:-4-4S n.. & 2~ * 4 4, 4, 4:4, * 4:.4 . . . . 4:~ - - 0 ..... Nf~ 4,4: 4, 4: - - 04: 2 ~2 ..444 0.- 4,. .4:4:4:

4, 4: 40 4, ~4, 4: 44 -44: 4: 4:4 to 4,0

4: 4:

0

- 4:~ , r 4:0 - 0

± j ~ 0 ~'

5. 4~.4 4, -

4,4,.. 444, .t4 20- .- 4, 4: - 04:

-0 -

0- -c 04:4, 04~ - A 4,-4

:I'~ S.- ~'

4,-' ~ 4,0.-

0-4 -4' 0-4 ~ I-, S - -, 4,414:0

~ii 41 414 4 - - 4- ' 4:

'2 -

4, ~ ~a. !~Z - 4: 51

~' S 4, 4:

C 4,4 04,.' ' ~t; ~'I 4, ~..I - - 4, I .. ~ 4,4, 0

~ 53~ 4,4,0 -

a .41.41

4, I 4, 4: ~t;~ 4,

,~~~ -o;~~

.-. l~:

to ~2--' 4,4,4:

4.. - 44

31

4- 4 - '-,...
Y5

cf u

25

-INA
LII

'c -14.2C

4 4.

%4 114 10 14

LI M4

141C1.I 4 4 53
ZII

10 0L

4,~ > 77

> 0Ct4 M ,

-1 10 04,

30u C.4 0 4

1. 0.0-

IWI

C40

I IF

4, 54
j

-1 - .t.

A Cc C. -

44

Ut - 4=

I A -

C. -

C 34

q-1 £ -- U.

Z 4

z - -

4' - 4.

-4 -

- ,' U -. 2!

~ C., 4

U ... IC ~-: ~i 4',. - 4 I 4

-4, RI .4. ,- CA

* .~ S . c 7 SC *i :~ j A -

* 2 4 U 0.4.

- 0C4..~ 04 4 o * *OU 4-, - ~,4 -U IC Ut U

.~-.-0 --. 4 ~ ~ U -c - 4,~ ~ 4

I P!~ II~ -n UC6$ C C!4 3..~ 4V ec, o U OCJVU 4' ZOW~L~) ~ .5 404.! ~O V.44 C

0 . 5-

- ~-.

C 1 4.

0

- C

a' 4 ~

w-z~ ~I 0.~ C 4 *5 4U

0.4. 0 C

- :4

4. -u

U 5~

4.4.4 9 iii 5-

W4Ot~

~ &

S 4 -~ 4'

3 444-0 .~4 ~ I-

-S -4 0 4 - 4!-~@ 0 4 ~

A~ 4.ac

U,, 4U~ - 0 4 U CA -5 0.UC -- -

00 4~ 4.44 4.fl
*0.4. 4'

0 o 0 0 - .4 44 U

-J 0.. -' o~0 0 0

4. 4. -00 0'>. *0

~4.

- k~- 00~ 4.00~

~ 4.4,. 0- 00 0 4)..

~> 0.0 >0

I,.

I H ~I!~ '4,

:4 ,

4.44 4,40 II ~ - 4' 4.. 4' 0 4.4.4 4.4' .40.4.

'5.4 5'0 O~0' 4.4 - 0 - .44- .0~ 0 0 C 4.44. 0404. g -, :4.0 4' ~ 

- .4 0... 0 4.400 &44 -I - 4'. 4' 0 - 40 100 :2 ~ 004' 5 44- * 0 - 0 0 >4'

4~-4 00

.444 - 4,440 -~ 00

0 0

VI 04 .05 22 4'~ >4' 0 5

.4~V .~

4 - 4.0 44 005 >44 4' 540 04' 4. 44 >00 0 54.4 4 *.0 044 4) 0> 4'5~ .004.44' 44~ ~~44- S ~ 0! 0 .4.04' 00 5 I

- 0 4' 0 :4

2 0

O 0

0

- 4' * ~2tI ~ 0. MV

*44. ~ 40

4,4' 

~ 

44

~ 0 ~> 4.

40

2

0

1.

0

2

8, -

0 4.

4' 4" 44 4.. 40

40 S

- - 0 0 4. 4. 44 0 - 4' - 4, -4 - .4' .0 0 4 44

0 '-4 4. :4 04. ~,. ~2 - 40 4' 444. 2 0 .4! 00 5.'

420 00 4' 0-.,~ 0 4.0 .. 0' 0 0 4'.0 -40-4 4' ~44 044 0.4 21 -~ 

000 00-4 4... 44 - ..... ~ .4' 00 40.4 0..44' 0.4

40 >4 '0 N -. N 4' C4 -

'.4 -4 . . : : 2; 2;

36
00 >04. _u 0 40 .- , 0

- 2 t)-) I) 41, I E; -. 3

M1 r00 4 .4 0M .,)

0 l.,O 1 0 7.10. 81 Z. . -C Z..)-

~ 14 412 4, ~ ~ 40 00

4,NN.0 OPPPOO .- '-.~0 4 0. 0

4,340-4P0~~0~ .. 14, 400r

&~~~ a04 ,- U

OP 44 0 1 .

U00 7 04 c 

o-4 v , . ~ -4 0-

0 u 0 p U, C

'00 20 C61 , ~ , 4

0 4 4 w-0). 0

M!4', 0

4,41- 4 044, , p P57
w1 I 

0. o. oL 'M t ~ 'o

0 0 0 0 0 cL z4 

.0~~1. ~00 -0 -. 1

0 0 0 0 0W' v

~~4 0) N 4 0.00.. ~~0. . 00 . 4.00

~~Q c.~0 0

V 0

10 2 1. I

a 10 -r1 0 - -0 -

0 -1 0 . - MVO > a 0

0 4. 0 0 0 -

44~ 0 .0. u 

.40 0 C -0 1. 0 La84 -

88t 0a0 LaU

V4 0 ~04 0 ..

as 8 I0

* 0~~~. SI c . . 000 04

96 t..U40 0. 44 4 40 . 0

M - MO 00 41 114 OU.5
CE I -

C. 0... '00 C . CL) .

CC~~~4 G~0- : E.~~ ~C.5~j - ~~- 0 C. 40

'4 .,

o 0

*~r 0.*

* 0

0

0C t

Ca 0 g

00 0 0 0. CA 0 0

-. ~ .CC M o ~ a V 

-4 i 0 u~ SC 4c

C - -

- 0 0

0 0 - '. oI I -0 1 -'01

.4 SC C 0 C

0 C.CC

&JC~ 0 0: -. 4 4b4

59O
8 - U.- C

0

0 c

17-4 1

10 17

j a a 00
00 0 

c a' 

40 o IV

f. 0o. IC U

4 CCU C c00

a, 0

v 0 0

> C

01

0 C.

00 0

.44~

-- C ; C

4 614 C 0.4
U.1 VS 0e 0u u5 v.41 4

0N~ V t-v Z !L 1! 7u r

1 z. 0 1. 0 4~

A Q, 041 0 0 0 5

N 0 ..0 4l '0

o al 26U. 10 10

-- 'o - A~ 

0 0 0u 03 0. - 5 tO0 

hC . I v0 

10 a S l' 0 0.' 4 0 0 41 or*4I

00

0 C0

a 4 V V'04 0 141..

Sc .41 1 0

v- 00 V

.100

*w 3 u- 4 

C. 562

I 'VW '
0 0

-- 02

o-~ o-0i0 ~ o~oow

0 0 0 .i0 ~ U O a0OV 0 

0 o

- V 0 0 C6

'oa 0 0 0 le a, -0

14 u 00- 00 0 4 I 10 

0 UC f 0 4

J 0- 000

0~ go 4 £ 0I 0 6

*~~~ ~ uf. . i 0

76 00 SC 0

636
I -.

.. ~

I

a

I- 1"

~ zo.~

~~zt ,~

~ i~~i ~~. ~a V - 0-

ii' I IlJi*

5~

,c~., S I ~ ~

0 0.0 ~~-W OS a 10 0~ .4

~ ~ I- . I -

'A S ~ I)

* *a~ - S ~-.O ~ -

0

*

~ Ok 'a - ~ 0~ - ~.- .~ 'A .2 I4 a

* 0 I- S

'A -

'-," S 'A

4 4- I- a ~ S ~ .2 ~a .40 sJ*tAI

~ ~ z

- ~I0 0 0 0

L - .~ ..~ -

64

(0 -' "a
IV. COLLECTION OF PERFORMANCE DATA

The host of constructs and measures presented in the

preceding section were derived under a "best case" set of

assumptions. During the specification process an idealized

view of both the offensive and defensive scenarios was maintained to insure that all conceivably relevant constructs

and measures were considered. In doing so the potential

restrictions and limitations that might be encountered at an

actual battle run facility were purposely ignored. However,

in discussing potentially useful performance data collection

techniques and procedures, such restrictions need to be considered. The pragmatics involved in actually implementing

a battle run will impact directly on what aspects of platoon

performance can be evaluated. That is, at any particular

facility d subset of the constructs and measures in Tables

4 and 5 may apply. This subset will in turn dictate what

data collection procedures are likely to be useful at that

facility. Both issues are considered below.

BATTLE RUN IMPLEMENTATION

The constructs and measures presented in Tables 4 and

5 can be divided into two basic sets. The first contains

entries that are universal in nature. They are subject to

no restrictions and theoretically can be addressed at any

battle run facility. Perhaps the best general examples of

this first set are the Platoon Leader planning activities

leading up to and including issuance of the OPORD, and the

platoon's RTP and CEOI behavior. The constructs and measures

in the second and larger set are not generally applicable.

They are subject to a variety of limitations, most of which

surround the size and nature of the terrain on which the

battle run is to be conducted and attendant safety considerations. Examples in this second set would include platoon/

section tactical movement. For instance, the controlled

firing lanes in use at Grafenw6rh preclude assessment of the

platoon's overwatch and bounding performance. Similarly,

at virtually all facilities safety precautions associated with

live firing preclude firing by the overwatch section.

These and many similar constraints indicate just how

unique each facility's implementation of a battle run really

is. At each location the opportunities for measurement

presented in TableF 4 and 5 must be carefully culled in order

to identify that set of constructs and measures on which to

base the platoon's evaluation. Under such conditions standardizing the content of the test across facilities may be

virtually impossible.

65
Given that one has considered what can be evaluated

at a particular facility the next issue becomes one of

determining precisely how to implement the test. Major alternatives include service firing, subcaliber firing, or dry

firing the battle run. The use of an engagement simulation

approach based on systems like REALTRAIN or MILES is another

possibility. Decisions are also required about the nature of

the target arrays that will be presented as well as what kinds

of targets are to be used (e.g., pop-up and knock-down).

Each of these decisions in turn will have an impact on what

data collection techniques seem reasonable. Again, the data

collection procedures that prove most feasible and effective

will presumably vary from site to site. Accordingly, in the

first phase of research general data collection strategies

were considered.

DATA COLLECTION

The data collection procedures typically used in Table IX

parallel those used in the preceding eight gunnery tests and

training exercises. One or more evaluator personnel accompany

the tanks on their missions and record their impressions of

platoon performance on appropriate score sheets. Typically

the task of the evaluator(s) is to monitor platoon performance

with respect to a fairly limited set of behaviors. In the

past these behaviors have ranged from those that were fairly

objective and reasonably well articulated (e.g., 70% target

hit/kills) to those that were extremely subjective (e.g.,

maintain command). Some as in Tables 4 and 5 are reasonably

discrete and occur infrequently (e.g., platoon leader issuance

of spot reports). These can be monitored rather well, even

when the number of evaluators is small. Others are more

continuous, occurring throughout the course of the battle

run (e.g., movement technique). They are correspondingly

harder to measure because the evaluator(s) must aggregate or

otherwise monitor (i.e., sample) the performance of the platoon

on that dimension over time. Similarly, many such behaviors

involve the coordinated actions of the whole platoon, actions

which a single observer may not be in a position to observe,

or which multiple observers may not be readily able to

collate.

Finally, the task of the evaluator(s) is made even more

difficult by the imposition of regulations designed to maximize safety and minimize evaluator influence on platoon actions.

Accordingly, at many testing sites evaluator personnel are

not permitted to ride on the tank turret or bustle. Instead,

they must follow Lb;iJ the tanks in jeeps or APCs; they are

usually required to follow the trailing section as well.

These requirements often make it virtually impossible to

observe all that is going on because of the inferior vantage

points the restrictions impose on evaluatnr personnel.

66
In the current phase of research the feasibility of

video-taping platoon battle runs was explored as one possible

alternative or adjunct to the typical use of evaluator personnel. To evaluate the video-taping procedures under a

range of conditions, arrangements were made to tape offensive

battle runs at two different locations exhibiting pronounced

variations in terrain.

Method, Fort Carson, Colorado. Arrangements were made

to video-tape platoon battle runs at Ft. Carson in mid

November, 1978. Toward this end project staff reviewed the

OIC's plans for the runs, traversed the actual terrain to

become familiar with target arrays and locations, and chose

vantage points from which to video-tape.

The equipment consisted of a battery-pack-powered, portable, black-and-white, Sony Rover video camera and recorder

system. The camera was equipped with a zoom lens (15mm -

150mm), and an external microphone which recorded signals

from a radio set tuned to the platoon net. The recorder

accepted standard video tape cassettes. A telephoto, singlelens-reflex, 35mm camera system served as a backup and was

used to highlight events of particular interest.

The equipment was mounted high on a hillside which

provided a reasonably unobstructed view, North, along the

battle run area for approximately 4000m. A very slight dogleg to the east, and a knoll in the middle of the course,

were the only obstacles to an otherwise excellent view. The

hillside was behind and approximately 200m from the Line of

Departure.

Five offensive platoon battle runs were video-taped

using the Sony system in the location described above. Taping

occurred on two consecutive days from early morning until late

afternoon. Weather conditions were sunny and clear with

occasional periods of light snow that reduced visibility,

limiting taping to the first 2000m or so of the course.

Method, Fort Knox, Kentuckj. Arrangements were made

to video-tape Master Gunner platoon battle runs in February,

1979, at Ft. Knox's St. Vith range. Building on the earlier

Ft. Carson experience and on prior reconnaissance of the

St. Vith facility, an ambitious video-taping was undertaken.

Two battle runs were taped, a dry-fire practice run and a

livefire service ammunition run.

During the livefire run, taping was attempted from

three vantage points. One crew was stationed at the St. Vith

tower to capture the platoon's approach to the final assault

position and its subsequent assault on the objective. A

second crew was positioned in an APC at the LD. This crew

67
taped the platoon as it proceeded from the LD to the AP. A

third crew in an APC followed the Platoon Leader's tank and

the OIC's APC down range, through the entire battle run.

In the dry-fire run, taping crews were again positioned

at the St. Vith tower and at the LD. Two additional crews

occupied Threat positions and focused on the platoon as it

approached their positions, one of which was on top of the

objective. The assumption was that this approach would

facilitate subsequent evaluation of performance, particularly

in maneuver and in use of cover and concealment. The equipment was essentially the same as used at Ft. Carson. Taping

occurred on one day from early morning to mid afternoon.

The weather was intermittantly cloudy. The course was conducted through heavily wooded areas.

Hesuzts. Video and audio tapes obtained from both

sites were analyzed with respect to how well the approach

might supply the kinds of data needed to support the performance evaluation system. The findings fall into three general

areas including the mechanics of video-taping, the potential

utility of the approach from a data collection viewpoint,

and its potential utility as a training/debriefing device.

Video tapes from Ft. Carson were generally encouraging

but revealed a number of "techniques" needing improvement.

The battery packs occasionally acted up because of thc cold

weather. Taping of the platoon radio net was less than

optimal because of failure to obtain the full TC-crew,

TC-section leader, section leader-Platoon leader, Platoon

Leader-senior evaluator net. Most sc.:ious was an inability

to reach a compromise between the actions of the full platoon

(with the wide-angle lens) and those of a platoon element

(with the telephoto capability). Also annoying was an

inability to properly judge best levels of contrast using

only the camera viewfinder.

Video tapes of the Master Gunner platoon battle runs

also uncovered several problems in technique. Taping from

moving vehicles was not productive either in terms of image

quality or in terms of the rather limited portion of the

platoon that could be photographed. Furthermore, even in

the stationary APC's the power supply was a problem. The

video recorder and camera system exerted a considerable

drain on the APC's batteries. As a consequence the engine

had to be run to maintain a charge. The resulting noise

interfered with the pick up of audio communications through

the video camera microphone. These problems are soluble.

There is one problem, however, that is less easy to deal

with. The camera lenses that are currently availablc are not

of a sufficiently lonq focal lenqth to capture the detail of

68
platoon behaviors. As an example, the concept of locating a

camera in a threat position is extremely appealing; but one

would then like to be able to spot the platoon at the longest

range possible. Relatively short focal length lenses make

this task difficult if not impossible either during taping

or subsequent playback. Conversely, there are cases in which

a shorter focal length, wider angle lens is useful. The answer

appears to lie in the eventual development of zoom lenses

having greater telescopic capability.

In terms of its utility for data collection, videotaping of battle runs appears to be a useful adjunct to the

use of evaluator personnel who travel down range with the

platoon. It seems particularly useful in getting at aspects

of performance having to do with deployment, platoo./section

integrity, movement techniques, requests for indirect fire,

reporting techniques, etc. (The latter aspects of performance

could be gotten at simply by audio-tapinq, of course.) These

behaviors are more holistic in nature and require the evaluator

to consider the relative position of tanks within sections,

and of one section to the other. The overview provided by

video-taping, given that cameras can be mounted in good overwatch p)ositions, should prove helpful in evaluating performance.

More microscopic aspects of performance are not as amenable to evaluation from video tapes. This is partly a function

of the inadequate telescopic capability presently available.

For example, it is difficult if not impossible to get at such

aspects of performance as fire control, distribution, or effect.

Nor can one make adequate determinations about the degree of

cover afforded by various hull-defilade positions. Needless

to say, none of these measures can be collected at night.

Perhaps the most promising use for video-taping lies in

its rapid feedback capabilities. At both Ft. Carson and

Ft. Knox it was possible to play back the battle run just

completed by a platoon. This immediate playback was of great

interest to the participating crews and was taken advantage of

by evaluator personnel when pointing out particularly effective or ineffective performance to the platoon.

An extension of this idea, and one being actively pursued

under the current project, is the video-taping of especially

poor and then exemplary battle runs for teaching purposes.

This approach offers promise in illustrating the differences

between poor and good performance, particularly along some of

the more holistic dimensions.

Implc'ations. Given certain assumptions, video-taping

of platoon performance during conduct of a battle run represents

one procedure for obtaining data that otherwise are hard to

collect. The assumptions include the use of qualified/trained

69
cameramen, adequate power sources, guidelines with respect

to what aspects of platoon performance are to be taped, and

adequate visibility in terms of vantage point, intervening

terrain, and weather. The terrain requirements in particular

suggest that this procedure may be particularly well suited

to some locales but not to others.

In the process of observing and taping some eight

different battle runs it still appears that the key data collection procedure must necessarily involve the use of trained

evaluator personnel who accompany the platoon on its mission.

Improved evaluation seems to depend less on sophisticated

advancements in technology and more on what evaluators are

told to look for or to make judgments about. Given that

they are to make aided or unaided judgments about specific

and objective aspects of platoon performance, several steps

need to be taken.

Multiple observers are required, particularly in order

to assess the many aspects of platoon gunnery. One approach

would be to have one evaluator per tank, plus a chief evaluator

to maintain control and to insure safety. Arrangements may

have to be made to locate evaluators unobtrusively on the

tanks. This step may be necessary in order to place evaluators in a position that permits them to observe key aspects

of platoon performance. Whenever possible, attempts should

be made to tape record the platoon radio net. These modest

changes may have a big impact on the quality and quantity

of evaluative data that can be obtained from battle runs.

70
V. INTERPRETATION OF PERFORMANCE DATA

One essential ingredient of a performance assessment

system consists of a set of objective and relevant measures

of performance. A second ingredient is provision for the

appropriate kinds and amounts of high quality data for each

measure. A third essential ingredient is a framework within

which to evaluate the obtained performance data, making

decisions about how good or bad the performance is, and whether

it is or is not acceptable. The framework is provided by

performance standards or benchmarks and a method for aggregating the resulting scores to reach training-diagnostic and/or

qualification decisions.

SPECIFICATION OF STANDARDS

In theory it is possible to assign at least two entirely

different kinds of standards to performance data associated

with the constructs and measures presented in Tables 4 and 5.

The first is a training-system standard and is referenced to

expectations about what the (platoon's) level of proficiency

should be at different levels of experience or after different

amounts of training. Such standards are usually developed on

the basis of past experience with similar training programs

and may either be norm-referenced (e.g., "after a given amount

of practice the typicaZ platoon is usually at about this level

of proficiency"), or criterion-referenced (e.g., "midway

through the program a platoon must have mastered x, y, and z if it expects to graduate on time").

The second type of standard is usually referenced to the

combat environment. It represe:its a performance requirement,

and as such is the level of proficiency required to cope with

threat capabilities, independent of the performance expectations that one may have for troops during or upon completion

of the training process. The combat-referenced standards

should be criterion-referenced (e.g., "platoons must deliver

fire within five seconds," a level of performance necessary

on the battlefield). In spite of this the standards are often

thought of in norm-referenced terms (e.g., "this platoon's

opening time is eight seconds which places it in the top 30

percent of all platoons"). Clearly, both training-system

and combat frames of reference are needed to support training

and evaluation of platoon battle run performance.

Returning again to Tables 4 and 5 it will be noted that

entries in the fifth or "STANDARDS" column are of three basic

varieties. The first type, of which there are relatively

few examples, represents levels of performance that are deemed

necessary and/or sufficient as indicated by current doctrine.

71
For instance the dictum "fire first fast" has been specified

in terms of a five-second opening time. Standards of this

type, which are anchored solidly in doctrine, are presumably

of the combat-referenced variety.

The second type of standard supplied in Tables 4 and 5

is of the checklist variety and may be either combat or trainingsystem referenced. The performance in question usually requires

some product such as the issuance of an OPORD. One measurement

construct, therefore, is the completeness of the OPORD, as

indicated by measures that address the six basic elements of

such an order. In this example, the standard is simply the

requirement that all six elements of the order be included.

The third and most interesting type of standard in Tables

4 and 5 is one which must be empirically determined. These

have been indicated by the statement that the standard is

"to be determined (by some procedure) at each battle run facility." At issue is the fact that the standard will vary as a

function of the specific setting in which the battle run will

be conducted. The standard will also fluctuate according to

the level of experience or training that is specified (e.g.,

Master Gunner platoon level of proficiency, AOB platoon level

of proficiency, combat experienced platoon level of proficiency).

The key is to forecast what performance will look like under

a given set of conditions. These forecasts can then be used

as standards for evaluating platoons that perform under the

same conditions.

A number of different methods for developing forecasts

presumably exist. One approach is to use a panel of military

experts who are required to arrive at a consensual judgment

as in the Delphi technique (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; Girshick,

Kaplan, & Skogstad, 1950; Gordon & Helmer, 1964; North, 1968).

Another approach is to have various military subjects (e.g.,

battle run evaluators, instructors, students, or field units)

play board games that represent simulations of battle run

missions.

Pilot research has been conducted during this first

phase of the project to determine the feasibility of using

board-gaming and board-gaming with Delphi procedures to develop

training-system-referenced standards for the kinds of constructs and measures included in Tables 4 and 5. The board

game in use is based on a 1:3125 photomap of terrain at

Fort Carson, Colorado. The map and an accompanying set of

gaming rules were developed in related research addressing

combined arms tactical exercises (Medlin, 1979).

72

! -
Using a variant of the original rules, pilot groups of

Master Gunner and AOB students have carried out offensive

battle run missions on the Fort Carson photomap. The basic

offensive scenario is patterned after the one described in

FM 17-12-2, Change 2 (1978). The game is limited to one

player at a time, whose moves, made in response to a developing

tactical situation and in accordance with the game's rules,

are carefully recorded. To date the patterns of responses,

particularly in such holistic aspects of performance as

maneuver routes and the location of preplanned fire, show

a good deal of consistency. This outcome is very encouraging j

and suggests the feasibility of using the approach to set

training-system-referenced performance benchmarks or standards.

Pilot research is also underway in which Delphi groups of

instructor personnel are being asked to play the battle run

in order to develop "school solutions" for both offensive

and defensive scenarios. Both types of study are discussed

in Appendix G.

AGGREGATION OF SCORES

Assuming the availability of data on a variety of platoon

battle run performance measures, and of standards in terms of

which to interpret different levels of proficiency, the final

step is to aggregate all of the discrete statements about proficiency into more global or summary pronouncements. Toward

this end methods are required for the aggregation of pass/

fail scores on separate aspects of performance into one or more

summary scores. Similarly, ways are needed of interpreting

the many discrete scores that will be of value for training

diagnosis.

Scoring for qualification. The principal reason given

for annual exposure of tank platoons to Table IX is platoon

qualification. In one sense qualification implies eligibility

to participate in subsequent training exercises at the company

or battalion level. In another it suggests that a qualified

olatoon is one which is combat ready, either capable of ,ntering

into combat or, once in combat, capable of succeeding. In

still another sense to qualify means to be fit, to exhibit

a required degree of ability.

It is this last definition which is basic. To qualify

a platoon must reach or exceed a certain level of ability

which is prerequisite and essential. Within the domain of

platoon battle runs the concept of "a certain level of ability"

assumes two distinct meanings. First, each time the platoon

engages in a type of behavior (e.g., target prioritization)

selected for evaluation, the platoon's proficiency must equal

or exceed generally agreed upon standards. Second, the platoon

must demonstrate its capacity to meet such standards on a

large proportion of the occasions in which the behavior is

exhibited.

73
The first step in scoring for qualification is to apply

the appropriate standards to each type of battle run performance every time it occurs. For example, if the measure under

consideration reflected the light section's prioritization of

threat targets, a -co*:e of "1" would be assigned each time

the section performec. in accordance with standards and a "0"

would be given whenever it did not do so. The need for aggregation arises for those measures on which performance is

evaluated several times during the course of the battle run.

Having had several opportunities to neutralize targets for

example, there will be a sequence of "ls" and "Os" that describes

the platoon's (or section's) performance. The purpose of

aggregation is to reduce such an array of information to a

single state'ent which summarizes the level of performance

demonstrated (e.g., threat targets were prioritized correctly

in four of six offensive engagements).

However, a theoretically complex psychometric problem

underlies the aggregation of scores. At issue is whether

the individual items measure the same construct, permitting a

pooling or aggregation which is logically meaningful. In the

extreme, were no form of aggregation defensible, performance

would have to be considered on an item by item basis. Empirical

procedures such as Rasch modelling can be used to shed light

on this issue by scaling test items. These procedures,

however, cannot be applied until a prototype of the test has

been used to generate data. They also require large amounts

of data obtained from repeated tests of the same platoons.

Consequently, development of aggregation procedures for qualification on a test like Table IX must proceed on rational

grounds.

Two alternatives suggest themselves. The first would

assume that platoon gunnery represents a single construct. It

would further assume that the various measures used to characterize Table IX performance can, by definition, be pooled to

provide an estimate of performance based on a single aggregate

score. The Table IX presented in FM 17-12-2 (1977), for

example, makes this assumption and aggregates point scores

across engagement, and even more significantly, across gunnery

skills. The second approach assumes that platoon gunnery can

be divided into a number of components representing different

kinds of skills or aspects of performance. In this approach,

scores be-onging to each category would be aggregated to

represent each component, and platoon competence would be

evaluated in terms cf each. This alternative assumption

underlies the Table IX described in Draft FM 17-12-2, Change 2

(1978). In order to qualify, the "Platoon must have hit 70%

of the targets and have received satisfactory evaluations for

control of fire, movemeit techniques, use of terrain, command

and control, and repo/ting procedures "(p. 71). The

74
domain of battle run performance is assumed to be multifaceted.

Demonstrated competence with respect to each facet is required

for qualification.

Based on the results of the present research, the domain

of performance comprising the offensive platoon battle run

has been expanded to include 10 separate facets:

Preparation and Planning

Techniques of Movement

Use of Terrain

Fire and Maneuver

Distribution of Fires

Engagement of Multiple Targets

Reporting Techniques

Security

ATGM Counteraction Drill

Indirect Fire

The defensive mission includes these same facets with the

exception of the ATGM Counteraction Drill.

Satisfactory performance within each aspect of battle

run performance is indicated by receiving a GO on each performance construct falling within that area. (The measures

and standards used to evaluate each construct within each

mission and phase appear in Tables 4 and 5.) The manner

in which the separate constructs contribute to each aspect

of performance is shown in Tables 6 and 7. The standard

for qualification is stringent. A NO GO on any constituent

performance construct results in a NO GO for the more general

aspect of platoon performance.

Many of the constructs, dependinq upon the particular

battle run facility, will come into play several times during

the course of the test (e.g., prioritization of threat targets). In these cases a GO in Table 6 or 7 must be based on

some proportion of GOs for the construct in question. This

value, which can be arbitrarily chosen should be reasonably

demanding. For example, the following criteria might be

employed:

% at Standard to

No. of Occasions Receive a GO

1 100%

2 100%

3 100%

4 75%

5 80%

The general rule might be that the standard be met at least

70% of the time.

75
Table 6

Aggregation of Offensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance

NO

GO GO

FACET 1 - PREPARATION AND PLANNING

Phase I - Preparation and Planninj

P Maintenance of Integrity

P Intraplatoon Communication

P Preparation for Operation

PL Command & Control of Forces

PL Completeness of Warning Order

PL Timeliness of Warning Order

PL Planning of Operation

PL Location of OPORD

PL Timeliness of OPORD

PL Completeness of OPORD

Phase IV - ConsoZidation and ieorjam:ati,

P Intraplatoon Communication

P Redistribution of Ammunition

FACET 2 - TECHNIQUES OF MOVEMENT

Phase I - Preparation and I'Zanninj

P Maintenance of Inteqrity

P Dispersion

P Tactical Deployment

P Tactical Formation

SL Command & Control of Forces

PL Control of Movement

Phase II - Mooement to Contact

BS Maintenance of Integrity

BS Dispersion

BSL Command & Control of Forces

PL Control of Movement

BSL Control of Movement

OWSL Assignment of Sectors of Observation

OWSL Assignment of Sectors of Fire

PL Effectiveness of OW Position

PL Designation of Next OW Position

Phaac 1/ I - AsaI t

S Maintenance of Integrity

P Dispersion

P Tactical Formation

PL Command & Control of Forces

SL Command & Control of Forces

SL Control of Movement

P Sweeps Objective

PL Assignment of Sectors of Observation

P1, Assignment of Sectors of Fire

76

fI
Table 6 (cont'd.)

Aggregation of Offensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance

NO

GO GO

FACET 3 - USE OF TERRAIN

Phase I - Preparation and Planning

P Use of Covered Routes

P Use of Concealed Routes

P Speed of Movement in Open Areas

Phase II - Movement to Contact

OWS Reduction of Vulnerability

BS Reduction of Vulnerability

BS Use of Covered Routes

BS Speed of Movement in Open Areas

BS Rate of Movement to New OW

PL Designation of a Covered Route

PL Designation of a Concealed Route

Phase III - Assault

P Reduction of Vulnerability

P Use of Covered Routes

P Use of Concealed Routes

P Speed of Movement in Open Areas

PL Designation of a Covered Route

PL Designation of a Concealed Route

P Skylining

P Rate of Assault

PL Designation of Assault Position

FACET 4 - FIRE AND MANEUVER

BS Reconnaissance by Fire

OWSL Control of Suppressive Fire

FACET 5 -DISTRIBUTION OF PLATOON FIRE

Phase ii - Movement to Contact

OWS Pattern of Fire

BS Pattern of Fire

OWS Distribution of Fire

BS Distribution of Fire

BSL Unit Fire Command

OWSL Unit Fire Command

Phuise III - AssauZt

P Pattern of Fire

P Distribution of Fire

PL Fire Command

77 i
Table 6 (cont'd.)

Aggregation of Offensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance

NO

GO GO

FACET 6 - ENGAGEMENT OF MULTIPLE TARGETS

Phase II - Movement to Contact

P Target Acquisition

BS Stabilized Gunnery

OWS Target Prioritization

BS Target Prioritization

OWS Speed of Fire

BS Speed of Fire

BS Marking for Overwatch

OWS Suppression of Targets

BS Suppression of Targets

OWS Target Neutralization

BS Target Neutralization

Phase III - Assault

P Stabilized Gunnery

P Target Prioritization

P Speed of Fire

P Target Neutralization

P Massing Fire Power

FACET 7 - REPORTING TECHNIQUES

Phase I - Preparation and Planning

P Visual Signalling

Phase II - Movement to Contact

P Visual Signalling

PL Communication

OWSL Communication

BSL Communication

PL Spot Report

Phase 11 - Assault

PL Communication

PL Situation Report

'FACET 8 - SECURITY

Phase, I - Pru-parotion and Planning

P Reduction of Vulnerability

78
Table 6 (-cont-d.)

Aggregation of Offensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance

NO

GO GO

Phase II - Movement to Contact

P Reduction of Vulnerability

Phase III - AssauZt

Closed Hatches

FACET 9 - ATGM COUNTERACTION DRILL

Phase II - Movement to Contact

Bounding Tanks Duck

Bounding Tanks Dodge

Bounding Tanks Zig-Zag

Phase III - Assaula

Bounding Tanks Zig-Zag

FACET 10 - INDIRECT FIRE

Phase 'I - Mo,'1 "wnt to Contact

OWSL Request for Indirect Fire

OWSL Adjust Indirect Fire

I'haoe III - Assault

PL Request for Indirect Fire

PL Adjust Indirect Fire

PL Shift Indirect Fire

79

LI
Table 7

Aggregation of Defensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance

NO

GO GO

FACET 1 - PREPARATION AND PLANNING

Phase I - Preparation and Traveling

P Maintenance of Integrity

Intraplatoon Communication - Platoon

P Preparation for Operation

PL Command & Control of Forces

PL Completeness of Warning Order

PL Timeliness of Warning Order

PL Planning of Operation

PL Location of OPORD

PL Timeliness of OPORD

PL Completeness of OPORD

Phase I - Oooz'py Battle Position

Intraplatoon Communication - Platoon

Intraplatoon Communication - Platoon Leader

P Preparation for Operation

PL Planning of Operation

FACET 2 - TECHNIQUES uF MOVEMENT

Phase I - Preparation and i Lanni~2

S Maintenance of Integrity

P Speed of Movement in Open Areas

P Dispersion

PL Visual Signalling

SL Visual Signalling

PL Control of Movement

Z." eJ I I - 1 (, 1 Z"t" ;,. ,1 , '

Tank Reduction of Vulnerability

BS Maintenance of Interity

BS Speed of Movement in Open Arca.

BS Dispersion

BS Visual Signalling

PL Control of Movement

BSL Control of Movement

BSL Rate of Movement to New OW

80

-', d
Table 7 (cont'd.)

Aggregation of Defensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance

NO

GO GO

FACET 3 - USE OF TERRAIN

Phase I - Preparation and Traveling

P Use of Covered Routes

P Use of Concealed Routes

Phase II - Occupy Battle Position

PL Designation of a Covered Route

PL Designation of a Concealed Route

PL Selection of Unrestricted Positions

PL Selection of Covered & Concealed Positions

Phase III (and V) - Defense of BattZe Position

(and SuppZemental Position)

PL Control of Movement

Phase IV - Movement to Supplemental Position

OW Section Reduction of Vulnerability

BS Use of Covered Routes

BS Use of Cohcealed Routes

FACET 4 - FIRE AND MANEUVER

Phase IV - Movement to SupplementaZ Position

BS Rate of Movement to New OW

OWSL Assignment of Sectors of Observation

OWSL Assignment of Sectors of Fire

PL Effectiveness of OW Position

FACET 5 - DISTRIBUTION OF PLATOON FIRE

Phase III (and V) - Defense of Pittle Position

(and Supplemental Position)

P Pattern of Fire

P Distribution of Fire

PL Unit Fire Command

Phase IV - Movement to 'J;,pZcnmtaz1 Posi"tion

OW Section Unit Fire Command

81
Table 7 (cont'd.)

Aggregation of Defensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance

NO

GO GO

FACET 6 - ENGAGEMENT OF MULTIPLE TARGETS

Phase III (and V) - Defense of Battle Position

(and Supplemental Position)

P Target Acquisition

P Use of IR Flicker

P Target Prioritization

P Speed of Fire

P Target Neutralization

PL Request Illumination

Phase IV - Movement to Supplemental Position

OWSL Control of Suppressive Fire

FACET 7 - PROPER REPORTING TECHNIQUES

Phase III (and V) - Defense of Battle Position

(and Supplemental Position)

PL Communication

PL Spot Report

Phase IV - Movement to Supplemental Position

OWSL Communication

FACET Q - SECURITY

Phase I - Preparation and Traveling

P Reduction of Vulnerability

Phase II - Occupy Battle Position

P Reduction of Vulnerability

Phase rII (and V) - Defense of Battle Position

(and Supplemental Position)

P Closed Hatches in Response to Incoming

Artillery

82
Table 7 (cont'd.)

Aggregation of Defensive Performance Constructs

within Facets of Platoon Performance

NO

GO GO

FACET 9 - INDIRECT FIRE

Phase III (and V) - Defense of Battle Position

(and Supplemental Position)

PL Request for Indirect Fire

PL Adjust Indirect Fire

Phase IV- Movement to Supplemental Position

OWSL Request for Indirect Fire

OWSL Adjust Indirect Fire

83
Aggregation for Diagnosis. While training diagnosis can

and should be concerned with both proficiencies and deficiencies, assume for the moment that the latter are of particular

concern to a training manager. In this case, when confronted

with the data collected during a run through Table IX, he

must address those measures on which performance was below

training and/or combat standards. In one particular instance

the diagnosis of the cause of the problem and the implications

for future training might be direct and obvious (eg., "the

platoon wasted ammunition in servicing the multiple targets

because the indicated cross-fire pattern was neither ordered

nor used"). In other instances (e.g., where cross-fire was

ordered and used but still too few targets were neutralized)

the nature of the difficulty might be far less obvious. In

such cases the diagnostic process would have to continue at

a more microanalytic level of performance data (e.g., When

cross-fire was applied did each gunner apply appropriate lead?).

84
1

VI. REFERENCES

Bessemer, D. & Kraemer, R. Company team major mission operations. Fort

Knox, KY: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences, Fort Knox Field Unit, 1979.

Boldovici, J. A., Kraemer, R. E., Reeves, J. R. & Healy, R. D. Critical

incidents are reported by veterans of armored combat. Final Report.

Fort Knox, KY: Human Resources Research Organization, 1975.

Dalkey, N., & Helmer, 0. An experimental application of the Delphi method

to the use of experts. Management Science, 1963, 9, 458-467.

Flanagan, J. C. Use of comprehensive rationales. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 1951, 11, 151-155.

Girshick, M., Kaplan, A., & Skogstad, A. The prediction of social and

technological events. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1950, 93-110.

Gordon, T., & Helmer, 0. Report on a long-range forecasting study.

Washington, D.C.: The Rand Corporation, 1964.

Medlin, S. M. Behavioral forecasting for REALTRAIN combined arms. Technical

Paper 365. Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, May 1979. (AD A075 407)

Mirabella, A. Criterion-referenced system approach to evaluation of combat

units. Paper presented to the Military Testing Association Conference,

San Antonio, TX, 1977. Also printed as ART Research Memorandum 78-21,

September 1978. (AD A077 968)

North, H. Q. Technology, the chicken--corporate goals, the egg. In J. R.

Bright (Ed.), Technological forecasting for industry and government,

Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.

O'Brien, R. E., Kraemer, R. E., & Haggard, D. F. Procedures for the

derivation of mission-relevant unit task statements. Technical

Report 75-4. Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization,

1975.

Scott, T. D., Meliza, L. L., Hardy, G. D., & Banks, J. H. Armor/antiarmor team tactical performance. Research Report 1218. Alexandria,

VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,

July 1979. (AD A075 354)

U.S. Army Armor School. Tank gunnery. FM 17-12, Change 2 (Draft).

Fort Knox, KY: Author, 1978.

U.S. Army Armor School. Tank gunnery. FM 17-12-2, Cbqnge 2 (Draft).

Fort Knox, KY: Author, 1978.

85

tI
U.S. Army Armor School. Tank gunnery training. TC 17-12-5. Fort

Knox, KY: Author, 1975.

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Combat mission analysis for the

National Training Center (NTC). Fort Leavenworth, KS: Author, 1979.

U.S. Army Europe. Training and evaluation outline, tank (cavalry) platoon,

battle run. ARTEP 71-2, Chapter 8, Appendix 29T. Heidelberg, Cer.:

Author, 1978.

U.S. Army Headquarters U.S. Army Armor Center. Tank gunnery for XM1

main battle tank. FM 17-12-1 (Draft). Washington, D.C.: Author,

1978.

U.S. Army Headquarters Combat Developments Command. Force develcpment:

the measurement of effectiveness. Fort Belvoir, VA: Author, 1973.

U.S. Army Headquarters Department of the Army. Mechanized infantry

battalion and combined arms task force. ARTEP 7-45. Washington, D.C.:

Author, 1975.

U.S. Army Headquarters Department of the Army. Tank and mechanized

infantry company team. FM 71-1. Washington, D.C.: Author, 1977.

U.S. Army Headquarters Department of the Army. Tank battalion and combined

arms task force. ARTEP 17-35. Washington, D.C.: Author, 1975.

U.S. Army Headquarters Department of the Army. Tank gunnery. FM 17-12.

Washington, D.C.: Author, 1972.

U.S. Army Headquarters Department of the Army. Tank gunnery. FM 17-12.

Washington, D.C.: Author, 1977.

U.S. Army Headquarters Department of the Army. Tank gunnery for M60,

M6OAI (AOS), and M48A5 tanks. FM 17-12-2. Washington, D.C.:

Author, 1977.

U.S. Army Headquarters Department of the Army. Tank gunnery M60A2.

FM 17-12-4. Washington, D.C.: Author, 1977.

Warnick, W. L., O'Brien, R. E., Kraemer, R. E., Healy, R. D., & Campbell,

R. C. The validation of the task inventory of the tank company,

platoon, and crew and the development of conditions and standards

of the task inventory. Vols. I & II. Fort Knox, KY: Human Resources

Research Organization, 1974a, b.

Wheaton, R. G., Fingerman, P. W., & Boycan, G. G. Development of a model

tank gunnery test. Technical Report 7S-A24. Alexandria, VA:

US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,

August 1978. (AD A061 153)

86
APPENDIX A

Scope of Battle Runs Defined by

Component "Tasks"
APPENDIX A: SCOPE OF BATTLE RUNS DEFINED BY COMPONENT "TASKS"

As shown in Table A-i, in each of the six offensive

Table IX's examined, the battle run is segmented into component parts for descriptive and/or scoring purposes. The

descriptive bases used include: phases (two Table IX's,

with four and five phases); tasks within phases (one Table

IX comprised of two phases containing four and three tasks);

tasks within performance objectives (one Table IX with two

performance objectives based on five and three tasks); and

tasks (two Table IX's containing 10 and five tasks). Components of the five defensive battle runs also vary widely.

As shown in Table A-2 their descriptive bases include:

phases (one Table IX with four phases); phases within a

battle position (one Table IX with 10 phases distributed over

two battle positions); tasks within performance objectives

(one Table IX with three performance objectives consisting

of two, three, and one task, respectively); and tasks (two

Table IX's with 10 and 12 tasks).

Since the battle runs in Tables A-1 and A-2 are arranged

from left to right in chronological order, one can see how

terminology has evolved (e.g., from phases to tasks) and

how the more recent Table IX's have increased in scope.

In both tables the "task" descriptive labels in the

left-hand column have been arranged from top to bottom in a

logical sequencing of activities. The first six labels in

Table A-1 represent activities involved in planning and

preparation for an offensive mission, beginning with the

issuance of appropriate orders (e.g., Troop Leading Procedures) and ending when the platoon crosses the line of

departure (e.g., Attack). The next 16 activities involve

movement from the line of departure to contact with the

enemy and reaction to the enemy threat. The third set of

four labels concerns an assault upon an objective while

the final three activities involve consolidation of the

objective and/or preparation of a hasty defense. The battle

runs do not explicitly address major mission operations,

but from this analysis it is clear that the detailed labels

can easily be grouped into categories of mission operations

resembling those depicted in Figure 1.

The same is generally true for the defensive battle

runs presented in Table A-2. While agreement is not perfect, especially with respect to defense from a supplemental battle position, most terms can be grouped into categories corresponding to major mission operations depicted

in Figure 2. The first term, "Troop Leading Procedures,"

has been placed in the "Plan Defensive Operation" category.

The next four terms involve the actual occupation of a

A-1
battle position. The next 13 describe activities involved

in the defense of a battle position. These are followed

by 12 labels having to do with displacement to a supplemental battle position. The next set of nine activities

involves defense of the supplemental position while the

final term, applying to only one of the battle runs, is

concerned with reorganization.

A-2

S r
Table A-I. DESCRIPTICNS AND SECG1ENI7S OF OFFT SIVE BATTLE L.2NS

SOUTCES

Lfl -M ' -4~ CD -4~ mN am N-

- -1 -4 - - r.4 LA -4 m -4

DECIVE LABEIS N -A .4 -N -t .4

PLAN OFENSIVE OPERATICN * ** *** ***

Task-troop leading, procedures

Tjsk-prepare to attack

Task-prepare to attack, conduct

preccnbat checks

Task-cross the SP

Task-mve thru the attack

positicn

Task-attack _

CDNDUCr MVEMENT TO CCNTACT &

HA=T A=C

Phase 1 - Movement from LD to

contact

Mbvement to contact phase

Task-rrove to contact

Performance objective #1-taskplatoon will move, conduct a

recon by fire, make contact

with threat security elaents

& take action on contact

Phase 2 - continue to engage

threat

Phase 3 - continue to engage

threat

Task-eMploy mnovnt techniques

Task-reconnaissance by fire

Task-employ fire & maneuver

Task-maintain camunications

Task-react to eneny threat,

eaploy movement technique

A-3
Table A-I. DESCRIPTICN'S AND SECZENTS OF OFFENSIVE BATTLE RUNS (cont'd.)

SOURCES

Lr N 7 .- 4~ Co -4~ 00 Q Co 0ev

II I I I - I C N1 4 N1 IN 1. -4C,1 1 1 

ESCRIPrIVE LAMLS ~ r> _

Task-engage threat targets on the move

Task-platoon continues attackreacts to threat

Phase 4-engage threat on

objective

mvement to objective phase

Task-nove to objective

CODNDJCT ASSAULT

Phase 5-assault

Performance objective #2-taskplatoon will nove & engaae/

seize part of a threat rifle

platoon (reinforced) strong

point

Intenrediate task-assault

Task-assault

CONSOLIDATE AFTER AN ATTAK

Task-occupy hasty position

Task-hasty defense

Task-eploy direct fire

The FM does not contain gunnery tables for the platoon, although it does contain a chapte:

on platoon distribution and control of fire.

The platuon battie run is desimatad as Table X. Table IX is a section hattie run that

is virtually identical to the platoon ran.

The platoon battle run exercises are graphically portrayed in ChaDter 20, . 17-12 (3/77)

and fall within the five phases presented in that document. Each section (heavy and ligh

carries out eiqht guinery exercises.

InformuUan Li, piatAi uttrie runs is presenti in supplenunts to this publication

(i.e., DRAF-A FT! 17-12-2 Chance 2).

A-4
Table A-2. DESCRIPTIONS AMD SEGqENFS OF DEFNSIVE B1,TILE RUNS

Ln ~~ rq 1- .- 4 M C 4 0 r

11 11 rq Ct-14 " vC1, 14

,-4 --4 r-4 4(N C 4 f -4 r- o -l D

DESCRPTIVE LABEIS

Task-occupy battle posit-ion

PIerfor~runoe ubject-ive ;FlTask: occupy baittle position

jccupy phase - -- __ __

DF&V M~TTUE POSITION

Task: Identify & report OPFOR

vehicles

Task: Wittlraw security element

initial battle position: 1st

engagement phase

Task: Engage 2 threat tank o.

Task: Engage 3 threat tank co.

Performrance objective tl

Task: Diploy direct fire

Task: Engage OPFOR (longrange)

PWIASE 11

7ask: Engiaue OPMTR (mid-range)

Initial1 battle position: 2nd

enciageet phase

Initial battle position: 3rd

encqagETrent phase

Initial battle position: 4th

engagemeCnt phase___ ___ _____

A-5~
Table A-2. DESCRIPTIONS AND SEQWIENTS Or DMMSIVE R.'z=E RUINS (cont'd.

SODURIES

C14 C, C,4r- Ir C O0 r " + 1N AN (N1 (N -1 ( N., .-II -erf-4 oN e4 .Ln ooet4 - Takco 

EESCIPIVE LABELS.4- .Z-r- .- N -r -

DISPLACT TO SUJPPL 10TA1; BA=

Initial battle position:

Diseno-Ae phase

Per-forriance object-ive r12 - Task.

Disengaae, e vloy fire,

maneuver

Movement bet-ven battle position pha-e

Performance obiective #2 - Task:

Move between battle positicns

Task: Move to subsequent battlf

position/enploy coax while

moving

Task: Move to subsequent battli

position/esploy direct fire

Task: Engage OPFOR (mid &

short range) while movinq

Task: %bove to subsequent battli

position

Performance objective #2 - Task

Maintain ccmmr n cations

Task: Communicate

Phase III

Phase IV ,_

DETEND S _?PI%1JARY BATTLE

Pos IT. I(

Subsequent battle position:

ist em aqement phase

Task: Encaue threat while

under chemical attack

A-6
Table A-2. DESC.RPTINS AND SEGEWS OF DEFSNSV BAT]LE RUNS (cont'd.)

SOURCES

Tak Dcn te r;mn 41 C OC4 0Nr

-41 ~ r' C-4 

I Ir ir- -r N 4. rN ri rn '-.4 ~ - N.~C

,)4CRPI -ABr- ,-1J 4-I4 ~n

Task: Decontaminate

Task: Enqage OPFOj iclose

range)

Task: Defend from s bseqent

position

Performoance objective 43 -

Task: Erploy direct fire

Subsequent battle position:

2nd engagement phase

Task: -ngage 2 threat motorized rifle co. & dsmunted

troops

Subsequent battle positions:

Z3rd engagement phase

RMR kNIZE AFTER A DEFENSE

Task: Reorganize 0' replenish

,he Fm does not contain gunnery tables for the platoon, although it does oontain a chapter on platoon distribution and control of fire.

The TC does not present a defensive battle run.

The platoon battle run exercises are graphically portrayed in Chapter 20, FM 17-12 (3/77)

and fall witnan the four phases presented in that document. Each section (heavy and

light) carries out three gunnery exercises.

* nformation on platoon battle runs is presented in supplements to this publication

(i.e., DPAFt F1,1 17-12-2, Change 2).

A-7
APPENDIX B

Frequency of Target Types in

Offensive and Defensive

Battle Run Target Arrays
Table B-1. FREQUENCY OF TARGET TYPES IN OFFENSIVE BATTLE RUN TARGET ARRAYS*

SOURCES

TYE ARE F 

,-41 CNt Ln 0

r C4 . r, .L r- r

TARGET ARRAYS

ARASCONTAINING A SINGLE *

TYPE OF TARGET

a. SINGLE TARGET

Anti-tank

Tanks

Troops

Truck

b. TWO OR MORE TAR.GETS

Anti-tanks . .

ATGs

ATC.4 s

HIND/HIPs... .

Tanks :' ;

Troops ]

The numbers in the body of the table represent t-he frequency of each target type. SemicoI ons

separate different arrays in a battle run that contain the same target type, and commas separate target types within the same array. For example "3;2" represents two different

arrays containing 3 and 2, respectively, of the same type of target; however, "3,2" repres-no.io array with 3 of the first type of target and 2 of the second type of target. Brackets

s;ojw the order of frequency when all targets in an array are not presented simultaneously.

Thus, 3,5 represents the presentation of I of target tyre I and 3 of tarcet tyne

[,21 followed by 2 of target type II, for a total of 3 of target I and 5 of

target iI.

B-I
Table B-I. FREQUENCY OF TARGET TYPES IN OFFENSIVE BATTLE RUN TARGET ARRAYS (cont'd.)

SOURCES

-Ln C1 -0- co m C 0r4r- N 

(N Aj 11e N rCN'N JC11NN (v r\1 -n .- ('4 1fl M. 1- 0( I

I I I I r--- I

TARG:ET ARRAYSa,5

7. -.:RRAYE CONTAINING MULTIPLE

TYPES DF TARGETS

ATGR, BM4P - -

ATGM, BRDM "

BRDM, HINZ)

Ir.fantry, PG positions

kifle squad, tank .

Tank, troops

ATGM, tank, troops

HIND, tank, troops

-II.SCREENING & SUPPRESSION

Self screen

Area suppression

The FM does not present tables for the platoon, although it does contain a chapter on

platoon distribution and control of fire.

Specific targ-t arrays arc described in FM 17-12-2 (3/77).

Specific target arrays are described in FM 17-12-2, Change 2, DRAFT (8/78).

B-2

I l d,
Table B-2 FREQUECY OF TAM TYPES IN DEFENSIVE BAT-LE RJN TARGET ARRAYS*

SOURCES

N C14 CINI N I. NN (N r-4 -4 00 14.. N CON r-NN -4 , . ,4 , ,- ,-4 ,,

I I I I I

TA=I ARRAYS

I. ARRAYS COAINING A S..N ** ***   ** *** **,**

TYPE OF TARGET

a. Single target

b. Two or more targets

BMPs . r

Tanks 5;7 7 5,

Il. ARRAYS CO]TA!NING .MULTTIP

TYPES OF TARGET

Anti-tank, tank .

BMP, anti-tank

SP gun ,MP, 

BP, tankl ~ -'I2-; -,1;

Rifle squad, tank

The ntunbers in the body of the table represent the frequency of each target type. Semicolons

separate arrays containing the same weapon type in a battle run, and carmas separate weapon

types within the same array. For exanple "3;2" represents two different arrays containing 3

and 2, respectively, of the same type of weapon, however, "3,2" represents one array with 3

of the first type of weapon and 2 of the second type of weapon. Brackets show the order of frequency when all weapons in an array are not presented ismultaneously. Thus, 3,5 ,3

represents the presentation of 3 of weapon type I and 3 of weapon type II, followed 1,2

by 2 of weapon type II, for a total of 3 of weapon I and 5 of weapon II.

B-3
Table B-2. FREQUENCY OF TA= TYPES IN DEFENSIVE BATIE RLN TARGET ARRAYS (cont'd.)

Ln (N -W ,-4~ 00 ~ -40 (4

N ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 N 'NcJN 1- 4 C N-4C ' ~ A A , '" 1-1\f " ,, -4 - 4 - -4 (-N .- 41f Ln r- CO- o r-4

A I r, I II I,

TARGET ARRAYS r_ _p_ -4 rM- n- C3 USBMP, tank, troops

BP, tank, SP gun I,4

BMP, tank, ZSU 23-4

Anti-tank, BMP, rifle

squad, tank 3 3

BMP, HIND, tank, troops

The FM does not present tables for the platoon, although it does contain a chapter on platoon distribution and con-trol of fire.

The TC does not present a defensive battle run.

Specific target arrays are described in FM 17-12-2, Change 2, DRAFT (8/78).

Battle runs are presented for both day and night in the manual. Only infonnation from

the night battle run is shown here.

u,--4
APPENDIX C

Measurement Constructs

Measurement constructs explicitly or implicitly referred

to in the various battle runs are listed in the following

table. Given the missions, operations, "tasks" and target

arrays described earlier in Appendixes A and B, the labels in

the left-hand column of the appendix indicate what aspects of

performance have been mentioned, presumably for evaluation

and measurement.

A few constructs have not been included in the list because

of their compound or amorphous nature. Examples include:

"tactical application of maneuver with gunnery" (TC 17-12-5); "employ suppressive fires and maneuver using terrain to maximum

advantage to destroy multiple targets in any tactical situation"

(TC 17-12-5); "teamwork" (FM 17-12-1); and "platoon leader

controls the forces of his platoon" (TC 17-12-5). Parenthetically, the last construct also serves as a performance measure

which is scored on the basis of evaluator judgment.

A checkmark (/) in a given column indicates that the

construct is used in both the offensive and defensive platoon

battle run. When this is not the case, the mission to which

the construct applies is identified by entering "0" for offensive scenario or "D" for defensive scenario.
I % (I 1 -

r, ( g , ,

I I !

(N (NN Z(N zN -4 u -1 - -4 P4 C rX4

I Ln r 4J ; 4 ,, J 7 ,-0 CD

MEASUREMENT CONSTRUCTS r - - r 4 r 4 C c C 4 r

Preparation & Planning - Offensive Mission 0 0

Platoon integrity maintained 0

PL/PS conduct precombat checks 0 0

Crews & equipment were prepared for missions 0 0

Weapons 0

Vehicles 0

Radios 0

Men 0

PL issues order to key subordinates 0

PL issued OPORD 0 0

OPORD contained all essential elements 0

OPORD to key subordinates 0

PL issues warning order

Missions

Critical times

Instructions to ready platoon

PL conducts recon & coordinates with FIST 0

Platoon is ready to move in 1 hour 0

Platoon crosses SP on time 0

Platoon crosses LD on time 0 0

Preparation & Planning - Defensive Mission

PL conducts recon D

PL coordinates with platoon on position D

PL issues defense order to key subordinates D

Platoon is ready to move in 2 hours D

Occupy battle position D D

Platoon moves into position without hesitatio; D D

Platoon maintains signal & light discipline D

Disseminate intelligence D

Establish security on arrival at BP D

Exchange range cards D

Prepare a platoon fire plan D

Covers all assigned TRPs D

Covers all assigned sectors D

Cover avenues of approach

Select P, A & S positions

PL recon S BP J

PL selects routes to subseq. BP for plato n D

C-i

Now
r IMEASUREMENT CONSTRUCTS -4r E_ 4 4r 44Ct CNNN U a(N4r

PL briefs platoon D

Target servicing D

Movement to subsequent BP D

Occupation complete in time limit D D

Techniques of Movement 0

Platoon conducted tactical movement to the SP 0

Platoon occupies position using appropriate

formation enroute D

Platoon deployed 0 0

Move by sections I

Move as rapidly between engagements as tactical situation permits v

Sections move at 30 kph+

Platoon leader controls movement 0 D

Platoon continues to advance 0

All vehicles continue to move in the assault 0

Dispersion of tasks in the assault _

Use of Terrain v

Platoon leader proficiency in moving his

platoon using the terrain

Choose route best supporting mission V

Use covered routes D 0 O 

Use concealed routes O

Occupation of individual tank position

Provides 3600 observation

Provides unrestricted field of fire

Hull-down or turret down if possible 0 D

Speed of occupation

Select at least one alternate pos. per tank D

Return to defi lade after firing D

Move between primary & alternate positions D D 0

Move to subsequent BP D D D

Bounding element moves promptly to cover 0

Tactical use of self-screening smoke 0

Effectiveness

C-2

A,
r - 4 13

MEASUREMENT CONSTRUCTS ON ri MM

Smoke covers all crews

Disengage with smoke screen D

Fire only when obscured D

Speed v

r- /

Fire & Maneuver / ' V V'

Set up overwatch & bounding elements0

Sections mutually support with overwatchO

Use overwatch fires O O

Use bounding fires 0

Bounding 0

Support by fire0

Engagement of Multiple Targets VV

Detect & engage all visible threat targets 0:

Engage in priority of danger

Engage with appropriate weapon

Main gun speed of engagement VV

Battlesight speed

Precision speed

Adjusted platoon battlesight speed

Adjusted platoon precision speed

Service array withlin time limit

Main gun accuracy (direct fire)

Machinegun speed of engagement0

Machinegun opening timeV

Service array within time limit0

Machinegun target effect0 v

Area target

Point target

Suppression00

Accuracy of suppression 0

Rate of fire alrs

Coverage

Machinegun technique of fire

Area target V V ' I

Z-pattern f

Walk into target s V v V

c-3
N-44N 

C'JNN 0-, ~CN 0 ,4 r- -

MEASUPYE4ENT CONSTRUJCTS

-4 q-4 -4 -4 4&4 r-N 4 .J 0 44 

Moving point target

Steady tracer stream into target v

Steady lead

Proper rate of fire

Static point target 4

Proper adjustment V

Correct rate of fire

Suppressive fire

Correct rate of fire

Correct length of fire

Engage outnumbered

Engage threat at long range D

Engage under NBC conditions D D

Prepare vehicle for NBC attack

Employ weapons while masked D

Distribution of Platoon Fires Y

Control of platocn fires

Platoon leader proficiency in distributing his main gun fires

Pattern of fire

Engage targets according to unit SOP 0

Shift suppressive fire

Speed of shifting suppressive fire

Conservation of ammunition

Use of Proper Reporting Techniques

Maintain communications

Spot reports on all enemy contact

to higher unit

in unit SOP

including enemy location O

Use proper RTP

Send status reports D

Incoming artillery fire I

Promptly at opening & close of _ngmt. I

At beginning & end of displacement D

Use correct CECI

C-4
II- I I I

asC-4 cxrN x .-4 .. r- 4 r rI I NI I I V- ¢

MEASUREMENT CONSTRUCTS 4 O 4 M - - - - 4 r 4 4' r- 4- C %W [j, : " wI Ln w 4 1 w" -

C1-

Miscellaneous

Provide illumination

PL controls mortar/artillery illum. D D

PL use of his own searchlight

Use passive/IR D

Supporting fires

PL calls for supporting fires

Control indirect and other fires

Use indirect and other fires

Use during displacement

OW shifts fire for suppres./obscur. D

Close hatches incoming artillery D 2

Close hatches in assault 0 0

React to threat

moves objective

Assault objective V

Occupy hasty position 0

Consolidation procedures 0

Redistribute amnunition )

C- 5
APPENDIX D

Performance Measures

Performance measures implicitly or explicitly associated

with the various battle runs are presented in the accompanying

table. When a measure is used in both an offensive and

defensive scenario a checkmark (V) is entered in the appropriate column. When the measure applies to one or the other,

this fact is duly noted by entering "0" for offensive scenario

or "D" for defensive scenario.

I,
4 K

I I II '

I I I I I - -

PMFORMANCE MEASURES - 4 r I r- 4 C 44 r'

~ ~~ LA 4 W W r~ -4

Preparation and Planning - Offensive Mission

Platoon integrity maintained in assembly area 0

Platoon leader/platoon sergeant conducted

precombat checks (weapons, radios, vehicles,

men) 0 0

Crews & equipment were prepared for mission

(no uncorrected faults) 0 0

Platoon leader issued OPORD 0

OPORD contained all essential elements 0

Platoon crosses the SP on time 0

Platoon crosses the LD on tine 0 0

Platoon leader issues warning order stating

mission, critical times, instructions to

key subs

Platoon leader conducts reconnaissance and

coordinates with FIST 0

Time in minutes before platoon is ready to

move

Preparation and Planning - Defensive Mission

Platoon established security upon arrival at

the BP D

Time in minutes to:

occupy hull down primary positions 0 ) D

select at least one alternate position

per tank ) D D

close fields of fire D

prepare a platoon fire plan covering all

assigned TRPs, sectors 0 D D

exchange range cards D

cover avenues of approach 0

improve concealment as feasible D

rehearse target servicing D

Platoon leader conducts recon & coordinates

with platoon on position

Platoon moves into position without hesitation, using appropriate formation(s)

enroute & preserving signal & light discipline

Platoon disseminates intelligence

D-1
I

r-4 (

'-5 1 4I -I--IC

Time in minutes that platoon is ready for

actionD

Platoon leader makes tentative plan based on

team order & a map reconD

Platoon leader coordinates any changes with

the CT w

Platoon leader plans movement to subsequent

position D

Recon Select subsequent routesD positions D

Platoon leader briefs platoon on target servicing & movement to susequent BP's Lf

Techniques of Movement

A tank exposes its flank tc, . tarqet ! :

points)

-se of p roper techniques (:f move~ment -i-'

ecc-ive evaluation) C

The platoon moves rapidly between eafr

as the tactical situation permitC; . C,

Platoon leader controls movement b

Rate of section movement in kph (3, klC )

All vehicles continue to move in t.it.

- assault- 0

platoon uses overwatch and displaces bw

sectionsD

Platoon moves from attack p~osition dey-loyed 0

Platoon movement technique and use of

terrain (S.E.) C

Platoon conducts tactical movement to thD SP 0

Platoon deploys at the SP t

Aegree of confusion or hesitation during

disp)icement

D-2
I-4,' ,--- f-i

C'4I -4 

rf 0 ,- M 0,=. , ,-- c W.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES r r 4 a 4

E,4 ME E4 4X 0_ U U -

Use of Terrain

Time to self-screen with smoke (seconds

points) V

Effectiveness of self-screening smoke (subjective evaluation) D D

Extent to which a tank is obscured by smoke

when it fires D

Rate of movement when an unobscured tank

fires D

Time to occupy a firing position by each

crew (seconds)

Degree to which tank is in a hull-down or turret

down position if possible (S.E.) 0 D

Degrees of observation provided by each

fighting position (360)

Degree of restriction in each tank's field

of fire

Amount of cover and concealment provided by

routes used (S.E.)

Degree to which the route chosen supports

the maneuver 0 D

Time for crews to return to defilade positions after firing (seconds) D

Platoon leader issues order to displace to

subsecruent BP D

Platoon displaces to subsequent BP over previously selected routes and occupies BP D

Effectiveness of use of terrain (subjective

evaluation) D

Employ direct fire from primary and alternate positions D

Number of engagements fired from one positionD

D-3
C I L

N r-4 C-4 5N (N

PERFORMANCE MIEASURES 4) ) -

.- ~N - -~~444 r, LW~ LW.

Engagement of Multiple Targets

Time to hit main gun battlesight target(s)

(seconds - points)

Time to hit main gun precision target(s)

(seconds - points)

Time to hit main gun battlesight target(s)/no.

of targets/no. of tanks (seconds - points)

Time to hit main gun precision target(s)/no. of

targets/no, of tanks (seconds - points)

Time to hit main gun target(s) in array

(seconds vs. time limit)

Number of main gun battlesight targets in array

hit ( points)

Number of main gun precision targets in array

hit ( points)

Number of main gun targets in array hit (4, %)

Time to achieve effect on machinegun targets

(seconds - points; vs. time limit) 0

Machinegun area target effect (fourths or fifths

of target coverage) C 4

Machinegun point target effect (one or more traces through target) 0 0

Machinegun suppressive fire effect (accuracy,

rate of fire, area coverage) 0 0 0

Machinegun area target technique of fire (Zpattern, walking tracer stream) 4

Machinegun moving point target technique of

fire (steady stream, steady lead, rate)

Machinegun stationary point target technique

of fire (adjustment, rate) 0

Machinegun suppressive technique of fire (10-

to 15-rounds bursts every 5-10 secs. for 1

min.) 0

Number of visible threat targets detected and

engaged (100%) 0

D-4
~-4 - r- 44 44 rlIC IO

II

4- 4-4 2 0U

PERFORMANCE MEASURES J~i

-ire and Maneuver

Sections mutually support with overwatch 0

Platoon moves from attack position with a

section in overwatch0

Platoon sets up overwatch and bounding elements 0 one section fires from overwatch while the

other maneuvers 0

Bounding (subjective evaluation)

Distribution of Platoon Fires

Number of tanks shooting at same target (more

than one - cut points)

Number of unexpended main gun rounds ( - points,

0 - cut points) 4

Number of unexpended machinegun rounds (0 - cut

points) 4

Effectiveness of control of main gun fire

(subjective evaluation)

Control of fire (subjective evaluation) _

Use of Proper Reporting Techniques

Transmit spot report on all enemy contact to

higher unit in unit SOP format 0

Location of enemy must be included in spot

report 0

Use of proper radiotelephone procedures 0

Send spot and status reports using correct unit

SOP, RTP, and CEOI (S.E.) D 0

Platoon reports incoming fire D

Platoon reports promptly on opening and close

of engagement D

Platoon reports on beginning and execution of

displacement order D

Communications discipline maintained D

Reports to CTC correct OPFOR AFV identification,

location, and time of sighting D

Platoon communicates as appropriate by wire,

visual signals, radio D

D-5
r -4N N

i I I

ON N N 0 C14CD -

I I I I ) Ci -

PERFORMANCE MEASURES -4 -4

Miscellaneous

Platoon leader's performance in controling the

forces of his platoon

Control of indirect and other fires (subjective

evaluation)

use of indirect and other fire during displacemen t D

Maintain command (subjective evaluation) D

Prepare vehicles for NBC attack D

Employ weapons while masked D

Close hatches

Employ indirect flare illumination D

Passive/IR (subjective evaluation) D

Consolidate position 0

Redistribute ammunition 0

Request indirect fire and illumination D

Platoon calls for indirect fire to suppress

OPFOR (correct & complete call) D

Platoon preserves light discipline D D

Platoon uses cover, concealment, suppression,

and teamwork 0

Platoon shifts indirect fire to vicinity of

target 0

Platoon loader hits target with indirect fire

in three adjustments D

Platoon masks on order and remains masked

until all clear announced D

Platoon opens hatches and sprays against contamination D

Platoon, after testing, unmasks D

Platoon reorganizes, maintains, resupplies &

evacuates as required D

D-6
APPENDIX E

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE

INVERTED MISSION ANALYSES

9.
u1

CC. 4j L. a Er

C"" a,

a~C:

. ru

c),C. - CN - c~-

C,, r

-~ ~ ~ ~ ( ~ ~ J C ~ . ~ -4U- ~ C c C 

L. >< 4. C- a) uC 0

::0 EC) C OD'J 

u-t' *C 4.C C 0US 4

to VL) 5 04 ocC

X~C 0-- c<.- = ; C c)~-) u 0 a-04u

>'O V. 0U z- 04

C *-W CL.C >- C C- Q

0 r. >0 E4 m 0 C a. w)4 -

CC 0 U ~ 1r. a) J0m0~ 

R $- C... =L 0 C ) c Crd

U: c aC. 0: m30~ r- wCrCA C0 oc.

CCI--C -o U 4 C-0 -Z

z CC ~ C4-. w 44C

IC C I11 1111 -I CUw II40 

44CC4-4- .. C0 C 0CUU CC'.OLO

CC4~>' 4-4C ~ .-o 4 - 444 00

4E-1
-S 0-

accacc

o

Q 00

-a 70 0~

w' r

C~- -ce- a -

E- 7- W, OC cr

a- I

11 aC E- tr r, '
6+ ,

* ,. .. ..

2,.,

0d V

CC±. 2.2.-.__<

-- - CC C,

, 0-,.,. ,r * ' 

r. ,..

-- , . 2. - . .C

C -- .C .. 

2

_6+ 6.6
-

~c. C

- t* C C -C.

C C

~C

C.

aCC~C.

Cc

E - .C C.

S. Cr

- C.

C.

1. -z___________________________________________

a C-

* C-

- Cr C

- C .C--.C~ C £

*C~~£- C -

I __________ C-~ a - C.- C

C C. . C Cr C.

Cr ~C. Cr C.C CC. CC.C C~C.CCt : C.C C.

C CCr C. CC CC C

H~C.

S. CC.: -~ £EO

- a. C. - - C

C CL

C.. ..~ -.

- C. CC' C.A.. C' CCC

C-C. -

C.~C. CC

CC- C'

C.>. t.OC-C. C -C ~.a C

-C-C.- -

CCC CC~*~~-~ S.C.

-'C-C '--C, ~-

________________ 

C 

______________ 

C

I Cd Cr' CC.. .. CS -. CC

~*C.C C.~S. CrCa _________ -. C -CCSC' C-CC CC C) .C ~ C. CC C.'~ - - .- -- ~~ C- CCC - ' a-C-C. '.'-~-- C~Cr-C. - - C. LLC.'.t

S. C U - a CChS C- -C.C .

C-S CC~C CCC

CE '=. ~'...CCi - CC' ~.CC C. C. C CCC. ~...- CC

E- 4
t: C - C C

'--C--

~

I -~

I i C

- E

C I

C - C

- C. C C. f

- I

- EE

C

C

~ C-C

I- ~ I- IC

I I - C.. C

z r 

C.

2

C.

C. C C .~

& CC C.C.

C -at

CL C.

C. _______________ C

K. ~~0 CC20.

CC. I.C.C

* CC.

~

C C- IC.

C -. o

CC I

r

:FKG I

- I

- ~ S.. C:

-I1%

-& - C - C e

K> E-5
lr ....... ........... .... .. ........ . .. ... .... ...... .. . . ... . "

,.--- .-,

'-S, F._'

E.t

i =g[ =

H C: -'

i .~

V,
* - - -

-. Ct

~C~- ~

-~~j ~

ce-.

-c

* ~ -

C -

Cr.-

.C C - -

-C'-

C-- -

C P

C C.

P -~ C ~-P - - .C

~.' p.' ~- C

:; - - C C

P ~ C ~.C.-

L~. -C I-C

C. iN .e~fI - I L.. C. ~

1.' -~ 0 CC .- t,-- -~ C - -~ *~~Cu- ~-C k... C. C

CC I~

,.0 ~ *CC.'0 ~ ... C.- P - i L CUC & = - - . ~C - - IL C.?.. CC -

P. C C C C.C * t~ r.~

C --- C.- 2

P

~ -V CC

- Il CC

C C

C- C

P C -

C

C C COP

- C.

-- C

CO - C- - ~-p -- C

-U,- - C-C

CC CC 1Q~) C
I --

,_- -

II I,,-

. C, C. I- , C. . C

- 5-- -. -c

-E -

. . . . . . . . . .- , - -- -- C." h

- . eN - =I C

-' - - 1"Z
FCr

I It

- -- - - - - -(.-'----- - -

-~ - C 

L 0

E-9
_ - o -f--

* I _I

C -

C. CE

- .rc-
I 

~ I -

C

C

~

C 

C

I 

-

C

C

C.. I C.

-c

C. C

C.

C.

C.

±

CC

CCC

Cu

£ C.

Ci S CI.)C

OCO

I

Ci

C.

E-ll

I
-C;

c-c

C C.Z

-SC; -5--

C-C;

CC

S

C; - C;-

1~~ = C; - I ~

-S I-C~

C - ~ SC;)

I__ C

C; -~C 5-

= '-

- I S-c C-S

- I

I I - I ± 5CC

- I

______ OS

I ~ CC -~

I ~ s-c

if £a* & ~j

S

CC. I I C- -C.

-~C. I

-C;-

C; -. 0.-

E- 12
S- c C. 

r > , CC -I r '

= cc 0

Er. c-~ I C-(1.C

0 v.$-C. 00 rj 'r

0 > w . 'C- Q C

(r. >, 0c a

r- C co -. -C.r. cr c -

- ,- z~ 0 N 0 (11x . C.L

c tt0 :

- -o.~ . 0cr

0C. r- m~ w III2C Ij 0 .. vE

z-0 v 0~ 0-' U.)4c0- 0. -t .4wm tr

r* -- ccC/. .. 0-- 4C).~

.00. C0 0 ow0 -m0 C. -- -72cz 

to; ~C CC. - 0 ~~

0~-.~ 4~ ~ C.~.-C. ~L. .

o~-o - ~ ~~E-13
o~ -

~ ax

z

z

w

- CC,-' C

Cc

E-J-4
~- 0. 2 C

_______________ - 0~~

-c ~. I- C'-

I C~

0 -- 022

22C. .- 2.J ....- 'C20.a-' 22" 22~ 22

,~c~c:cc CCC

~-~r U- ~ ~~cE2EC- .~.C.C

I-

- 2 0. 2 2

2 ~. 2.220.

t.2 eb.CJO IC. C- II

Cr I

2-0

C

2 2

2- K 00 C -~

I .~ 2 ~W

2.2~- - 2.2 CCC -. I~.2C. 0.

z ECU ~ ?.IOCC

- ~ -?

tVCCC. h.C

~ 22 C.~-222 >~ 2 C- C 0 2-~ C 22'. 002

220

C 0 C I~E CC.

2 ~'

C

0 00 CC

- -CCC.

2 2

Q, :~ 222-

2 0

2-2 CC

- *2

2 2C

C

* 20 C C~ ~

cc ,- "C

E-15

e 2

C. CC

-o: C

- 2 C. C
C a.

a.

*V OLC. ~a. c~ ~ -a.-

- -r r..~ ~

- O~a.

* -. r

* C C

a.: -

*CO~~ *= U~ ~--~= a. a.~

0 ~CC

* - a. I -

a. ~ ~ - a..- a. a.

-,a.~- COCO ~

C

0

~C

a..-

- -V

2 C~C a.

-a. C a. -V - 0 V

I a~5

0-.. 0

CC

--

2 -Ca' a. a.ea.~

.2

I a. - -V U~ ~ Fl-a. b.a.fiJ a.' -: a.o .- 2 ~ C -'*0~ ~-

0

C

-a.

o 0 2

a.

C

-a.

a. ,.. C.

- a. - COC - La..-. -

-a.

E-i6 U. C

2
I.

* 4 ~, C.

- 4' -

C ~ I * C- 4-"-,.--

-~ I -~ C~ a~ I ~

o -

z Io.~ - I I,

z C ~- - ~ C,.- C a. - r C. *i a:

E~a.C

~ ca a. 70-] C 04 ~- ~-

C * I

a ~ .- a, -

L.C

~. C~4

~ ~:.C. -

-a:

C..>

.... ~ a: C.- a,

4. CO .C

a: > ~. .~

~C.C4.4.

I a:

Wa:

a: ~ ~C.

-- H E-17

I..--

C.
-c

0~

-c.c.

I I

I -~

SS K ~ I C

S

~

E-1C

~.
APPENDIX F

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE

BATTLE RUN

TASK ANALYSES

(SAMPLES)
OFFENSIVE MISSION

PHASES, TASKS, SUBTASKS, AND MEASUREMENT CONSTRUCTS

PHASE I - PREPARATION AND PLANNING

1.0 TASK - CONDUCT TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

Subtasks 1.1 Platoon Leader Receives Warning Order

1.2 Platoon Leader Transmits Warning Order

1.3 Platoon Leader Receives March Order

1.4 Platoon Leader Transmits March Order

1.5 Platoon Moves Out of Rear Area

1.6 Platoon Maintains March Discipline

1.7 Platoon Maintains March Security

1.8 Platoon Conducts Halts

2.0 TASK - OCCUPY ASSEMBLY AREA

Subtasks 2.1 Platoon Closes on Assembly Area

2.2 Platoon Establishes Local Area

2.3 Platoon Establishes Dismounted Sentries

2.4 Platoon Establishes Mounted Sentries

2.5 Platoon Practices Light, Noise, and Movement Discipline

2.6 Platoon Maintains Listening Silence

2.7 Platoon Establishes Concealment

2.8 Platoon Organizes Defense

3.0 TASK - PREPARE FOR AND PLAN OPERATION

Subtasks 3.1 Troop Leading Procedures

3.1.1 Platoon Leader Receives the Mission

3.1.2 Platoon Leader Assembles Key Subordinates

3.1.3 Platoon Leader Issues a Warning Order

3.1.4 Platoon Disseminates Warning Order

3.1.5 Platoon Leader Makes a Tentative Plan

3.1.5.1 Platoon leader analyzes mission

3.1.5.2 Platoon leader makes estimate of

the situation

3.1.5.3 Platoon leader formulates plan

3.1.6 Platoon Leader Starts Necessary Movement

3.1.7 Platoon Leader Reconnoiters

3.1.7.1 Platoon leader plans the reconnaissance

3.1.7.2 Platoon leader conducts local

reconnaissance

3.1.7.3 Platoon leader conducts mat'

reconnaissance

3.1.7.4 Platoon leader identifies control

measures in the offense

F-I
3.1.8 Platoon Leader Completes the Plan

3.1.8.1 Platoon leader plans scheme of

maneuver

3.1.8.2 Platoon leader plans fire support

3.1.8.3 Platoon leader coordinates plan

with C/T CO

3.1.9 Platoon Leader Assembles Key Subordinates

3.1.10 Platoon Leader Issues OPORD

3.1.11 Platoon Disseminates OPORD

3.2 Platoon Leader/Sergeant Conducts Precombat

Checks

4.0 TASK - DEPART ASSEMBLY AREA

Subtasks 4.1 Platoon Removes Camouflage

4.2 Platoon Conducts Security Check of Area

4.3 Platoon Moves Out of Assembly Area

4.3.1 Platoon Uses Terrain

4.3.1.1 Platoon uses covered routes

4.3.1.2 Platoon uses concealed routes

4.3.1.3 Platoon does not skyline

4.3.1.4 Platoon crosses open areas as

rapidly as possible

4.3.1.5 Tanks use separate routes

4.3.2 Platoon Leader Controls Movement

4.3.2.1 Platoon leader designates route

for platoon

4.3.2.1.1 Platoon leader designates

a covered route

4.3.2.1.2 Platoon leader designates

a concealed route

4.3.2.1.2.1 Platoon leader avoids

obvious avenues of

approach

4.3.2.1.2.2 Platoon leader avoids

large open areas

4.3.2.1.2.3 Platoon leader avoids

obstacles

4.3.2.2 Platoon leader orders platoon to

move out

4.3.2.3 Platoon follows route designated

by platoon leader

4.3.2.4 Platoon crosses start point on time

4.3.2.5 Platoon conducts tactical movement to the attack position

4.3.2.5.1 Tanks maintain dispersion

4.3.2.5.2 Tanks maintain visual contact with section leaders

F-2
4.3.2.6 Platoon deploys at the attack

position

4.3.2.7 Sections maintain integrity

4.3.2.8 Platoon leader sets up overwatch

and bounding sections

4.3.2.9 Platoon leader and platoon sergeant communicate

4.3.2.9.1 Tanks within sections communicate by hand and arm signals

4.3.2.9.2 Sections communicate by flag

signals

4.3.2.9.3 Listening silence is maintained

4.3.2.10 Platoon crosses line of departure

on time

I

F- 3
PHASE II - MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

1.0 TASK - CONDUCT TACTICAL MOVEMENT

Subtasks 1.1 Platoon Moves in Sections Using Bounding

Overwatch

1.1.1 Designated Section Overwatches (OW)

1.1.1.1 OW section leader assigns areas

of responsibility vis-a-vis

possible enemy positions

1.1.1.1.1 OW section leader assigns

fields of observation

1.1.1.1.2 OW section leader assigns

fields of fire

1.1.1.2 OW section leader places vehicles

in covered, hull-defilade positions

1.1.2 Platoon Leader Controls Movement

1.1.2.1 Platoon leader indicates checkpoint (new OW) to bounding (B)

section

1.1.2.2 Platoon leader designates route

for B section

1.1.2.2.1 Platoon leader designates

a covered route

1.1.2.2.2 Platoon leader designates

a concealed route

1.1.2.2.2.1 Platoon leader avoids

obvious avenues of

approach

1.1.2.2.2.2 Platoon leader avoids

large open areas

1.1.2.2.2.3 Platoon leader avoids

obstacles

1.1.2.3 Platoon leader orders B section

to bound

1.1.3 Designated Section (B) Bounds

1.1.3.1 B section uses terrain

1.1.3.1.1 B section uses covered routes

1.1.3.1.2 B section uses concealed routes

1.1.3.1.3 B section does not skyline

1.1.3.1.4 B section crosses open areas

as rapidly as possible

1.1.3.1.5 Tanks use separate routes

1.1.3.2 B section leader controls movement

1.1.3.2.1 B section follows route

designated by platoon leader

1.1.3.2.2 Tanks maintain dispersion

1.1.3.2.3 Tanks maintain visual contact with section leader

F-4
1.1.3.2.4 B section maintains integrity

1.1.3.2.5 B section moves as rapidly

as possible to OW position

1.1.4 B Section Overwatches

1.1.4.1 B section leader assigns areas of

responsibility vis-a-vis

possible enemy positions

1.1.4.1.1 B section leader assigns

fields of observation

1.1.4.1.2 B section leader assigns

fields of fire

1.1.4.2 B section leader places vehicles

in covered, hull-defilade positions

1.1.4.3 B section leader reports occupation of OW with flag signals

1.1.5 Platoon Leader Selects Next OW Position

1.1.5.1 Platoon leader chooses next OW

based on terrain

1.1.5.2 Platoon leader chooses next OW

based on own OW weapon range

1.1.6 OW Section (-) Bounds to New OW Position

1.1.3.1

1.1:4.2

1.1.7 Platoon Leader Designates OW & B Sections

1.1

1:1.7

1.2 Platoon Takes Active Countermeasures to

Support B Section

1.2.1 OW Section Leader Controls Direct Fire

1.2.1.1 OW section leader issues section

fire command

1.2.1.2 OW section places direct fire on

likely enemy positions

1.2.1.3 OW section leader shifts direct

fire to other likely enemy

positions

1.2.1.3.1 OW section suppresses with HEP

1.2.1.3.2 OW section suppresses with mgs

1.2.1.3.3 OW section obscures with smoke

1.2.2 OW Section Leader Controls Indirect Fire

1.2.2.1 OW section leader requests

indirect fire

F-5
1.2.2.1.1 OW sect.cr. leader requests

suppressive fire

1.2.2.1.2 OW section leader requests

obscurational fire

1.2.2.2 OW section leader supplies TRP data

1.2.2.3 OW section leader adjusts

indirect fire

1.2.2.4 OW section leader uses proper

RTP and CEOI

1.2.3 B Section TCs Suppress Likely Enemy

Positions with Reconnaissance by

(Machinegun) Fire

1.2.4 B Section Tanks Make Abrupt Speed and

Direction Changes

1.2.5 B Section Tanks Employ Self-Screening

Smoke

1.2.6 B Section Tanks Reduce Smoke Plumes

from Heaters and Exhausts

1.3 Platoon Leader Maintains Control

1.3.1 Sections Maintain Integrity

1.3.2 Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant

Communicate

1.3.2.1 Tanks within sections communicate

by hand and arm signals

1.3.2.2 Sections communicate by flag

signals

1.3.2.3 Listening silence is maintained

2.0 TASK - PLATOON REACTS TO CONTACT

Subtasks 2.1 Platoon Employs Fire and Maneuver

2.1.1 Platoon Acquires All Visible Targets

2.1.2 Bounding Section Maneuvers to Cover

2.1.2.1 B section uses terrain

2.1.2.1.1 B section uses covered route

2.1.2.1.2 B section uses concealed route

2.1.2.1.3 B section does not skyline

2.1.2.1.4 B section crosses open area

as rapidly as possible

2.1.2.1.5 B tanks use separate routes

2.1.2.2 B section uses ATGM counteraction

drill

2.1.2.2.1 B tanks duck

2.1.2.2.2 B tanks dodge

2.1.2.2.3 B tanks zig and zag

2.1.2.3 B section moves rapidly to

closest cover

2.1.2.4 B section moves into covered,

hull-defilade positions

F-6
2.1.2.4.1 B tanks maintain dispersion

2.1.2.4.2 B tanks maintain visual contact with section leader

2.1.2.4.3 B section maintains integrity

2.1.3 Bounding Section Engages on the Move

2.1.3.1 B section engages in stabilized mode

2.1.3.2 B section engages targets in

priority of danger

2.1.3.3 B section fires first fast

2.1.3.4 B section marks target(s) with

tracers or WP

2.1.3.5 B section suppresses/destroys

target(s)

2.1.4 Bounding Section Engages from Defilade

2.1.4.1 B section leader controls direct

fire

S2.1.4.1.i B section leader issues

section fire command

2.1.4.1.2 B section distributes fire

2.1.4.1.2.1 B section uses appropriate pattern of fire

2.1.4.1.2.2 B section distributes

fire as commanded

2.1.4.1.3 B section leader uses proper

RTP and CEOI

2.1.4.2 B section neutralizes target(s)

2.1.4.2.1 B section engages target(s)

in priority of danger

2.1.4.2.2 B section fires (first) fast

2.1.4.2.3 B section suppresses/destroys

target(s)

2.1.5 OW Section Supports by Direct Fire

2.1.5.1 OW section leader controls

direct fire

2.1.5.1.1 OW section leader issues

section fire command

2.1.5.1.2 OW section distributes fire

2.1.5.1.2.1 OW section uses appropriate pattern of fire

2.1.5.1.2.2 OW section distributes

fire as commanded

2.1.5.1.3 OW section leader uses proper

RTP and CEOI

2.1.5.2 OW section neutralizes target(s)

F-7
2.1.5.2.1 OW section engages target(s)

in priority of danger

2.1.5.2.2 OW section fires (first) fast

2.1.5.2.3 OW section suppresses/destroys

target(s)

2.1.6 OW Section Supports by Indirect Fire

2.1.6.1 OW section leader controls indirect fire

2.1.6.1.1 OW section leader requests

indirect fire

2.1.6.1.1.1 OW section leader

requests suppressive fire

2.1.6.1.1.2 OW section leader requests obscurational fire

2.1.6.1.2 OW section leader supplies

TRP data

2.1.6.1.3 OW section leader adjusts

indirect fire

2.1.6.1.4 OW section leader uses proper

RTP and CEOI

2.1.7 Platoon Leader Issues Spot Report

2.1.7.1 Platoon leader submits accurate

and complete report

2.1.7.2 Platoon leader uses proper RTP

and CEOI

F-8
PHASE III - ASSAULT

1.0 TASK - DEPLOY AT ASSAULT POSITION

Subtasks 1.1 Platoon Moves into Assault Position

1.1.1 Platoon Leader Controls Movement

1.1.1.1 Platoon leader designates positions to platoon

1.1.1.2 Platoon leader designates routes

for platoon

1.1.1.2.1 Platoon leader designates

a covered route

1.1.1.2.2 Platoon leader designates

a concealed route

1.1.1.2.2.1 Platoon leader avoids

obvious avenues of

approach

1.1.1.2.2.2 Platoon leader avoids

large open areas

1.1.1.2.2.3 Platoon leader avoids

obstacles

1.1.1.3 Platoon leader orders deployment

at the assault position

1.1.2 Platoon Moves into Position

1.1.2.1 Platoon uses terrain

1.1.2.1.1 Platoon uses covered routes

1.1.2.1.2 Platoon uses concealed routes

1.1.2.1.3 Platoon does not skyline

1.1.2.1.4 Platoon crosses open areas

as rapidly as possible

1.1.2.1.5 Tanks use separate routes

1.1.2.2 Section leaders control movement

1.1.2.2.1 Sections follow routes designated by platoon leader

1.1.2.2.2 Tanks maintain dispersion

1.1.2.2.3 Tanks maintain visual contact with section leaders

1..1.2.2.4 Sections maintain integrity

1.1.2.2.5 Sections move as rapidly as

possible to assault positions

1.2 Platoon Executes Assault on Objective

1.2.1 Platoon Leader Orders Assault on Objective

1.2.2 Platoon Bounds to Objective

1.2.2.1 Platoon uses terrain

1.1.2.1.1

1.1.2.1.5

1.1.2.1.6 Tanks close hatches

F-9
1.2.2.2 Section leaders control movement

1.1.2.2.1

1.1.2.2.3

1.2.2.2.1 Tanks move as rapidly as

possible to the objective

1.2.2.2.2 Tanks do not stop in the

assault

1.2.2.3 Sections use ATGM counteraction

drills

1.2.2.3.1 Tanks duck

1.2.2.3.2 Tanks dodge

1.2.2.3.3 Tanks zig and zag

1.2.3 Platoon Engages Target(s) on Objective

1.2.3.1 Platoon leader controls indirect

fire

1.2.3.1.1 Platoon leader requests

indirect fire

1.2.3.1.1.1 Platoon leader requests

suppressive fire

1.2.3.1.1.2 Platoon leader requests

obscurational fire

1.2.3.1.2 Platoon leader supplies

TRP data

1.2.3.1.3 Platoon leader adjusts

indirect fire

1.2.3.1.4 Platoon leader shifts

indirect fire

1.2.3.1.5 Platoon leader uses proper

RTP and CEOI

1.2.3.2 Platoon leader controls direct

fire

1.2.3.2.1 Platoon engages in stabilized mode

1.2.3.2.2 Platoon leader issues platoon

fire command

1.2.3.2.3 Platoon distributes fire

1.2.3.2.3.1 Platoon uses appropriate pattern of fire

1.2.3.2.3.2 Platoon distributes

fire as commanded

1.2.3.2.3.3 Platoon masses fire

power

1.2.3.2.4 Platoon leader uses proper

RTP and CEOI

F-10
1.2.3.3 Platoon neutralizes target(s)

1.2.3.3.1 Platoon engages target(s)

in priority of danger

1.2.3.3.2 Platoon fires (first) fast

1.2.3.3.3 Platoon suppresses/destroys

target(s)

1.3 Platoon Occupies Objective

1.3.1 Platoon Moves Rapidly to Closest Cover

1.3.2 Platoon Moves into Covered Hull-Defilade

Positions

1.3.2.1 Tanks maintain dispersion

1.3.2.2 Tanks maintain visual contact

with section leaders

1.3.2.3 Sections maintain integrity

1.3.3 Platoon Leader Assigns Areas of Responsibility Vis-a-Vis Possible Enemy

Positions

1.3.3.1 Platoon leader assigns fields of

observation

1.3.3.2 Platoon leader assigns fields of

fire

1.3.4 Platoon Leader Issues Situation Report

1.3.4.1 Platoon leader submits accurate

and complete report

1.3.4.2 Platoon leader uses proper RTP

and CEOI

F-11 I kA -
PHASE IV - CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION AFTER AN ATTACK

1.0 TASK - CONSOLIDATE POSITION

Subtasks 1.1 Platoon Prepares for a Counterattack

1.2 Platoon Prepares to Continue Attack

2.0 TASK - REORGANIZE

Subtasks 2.1 Platoon Reports

2.1.1 Losses

2.1.2 Ammo Expenditures

2.1.3 Fuel Status

2.1.4 Vehicle Condition

2.2 Platoon Redistributes Supplies and Equipment

2.3 Platoon Restores Communications with Units

Out of Contact

2.4 Perform Maintenance Checks and Emergency

Repairs

F-12

mI
DEFENSIVE MISSION

PHASES, TASKS, SUBTASKS, AND MEASUREMENT CONSTRUCTS

PHASE I - PREPARATION AND TRAVELING

1.0 TASK - CONDUCT TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

Subtasks 1.1 Platoon Leader Receives Warning Order

1.2 Platoon Leader Transmits Warning Order

1.3 Platoon Leader Receives March Order

1.4 Platoon Leader Transmits March Order

1.5 Platoon Moves Out of Rear Area

1.6 Platoon Maintains March Discipline

1.7 Platoon Maintains March Security

1.8 Platoon Conducts Halts

2.0 TASK - OCCUPY ASSEMBLY AREA

Subtasks 2.1 Platoon Closes on Assembly Area

2.2 Platoon Establishes Local Area

2.3 Platoon Establishes Dismounted Sentries

2.4 Platoon Establishes Mounted Sentries

2.5 Platoon Practices Light, Noise, and Movement Discipline

2.6 Platoon Maintains Listening Silence

2.7 Platoon Establishes Concealment

2.8 Platoon Organizes Defense

3.0 TASK - PREPARE FOR AND PLAN OPERATION

Subtasks 3.1 Troop Leading Procedures

3.1.1 Platoon Leader Receives the Mission

3.1.2 Platoon Leader Assembles Key Subordinates

3.1.3 Platoon Leader Issues a Warning Order

3.1.4 Platoon Disseminates Warning Order

3.1.5 Platoon Leader Conducts Map Reconnaissance

3.1.6 Platoon Leader Makes a Tentative Plan

3.1.6.1 Platoon leader analyzes mission

3.1.6.2 Platoon leader makes estimate of

the situation

3.1.6.3 Platoon leader formulates plan

3.1.7 Platoon Leader Completes the Plan for

Relief

3.1.8 Platoon Leader Assembles Key Subordinates

3.1.9 Platoon Leader Issues OPORD

3.1.10 Platoon Disseminates OPORD

3.2 Platoon Leader/Sergeant Conducts Precombat

Checks

F-13
4.0 TASK - DEPART ASSEMBLY AREA

Subtasks 4.1 Platoon Removes Camouflage

4.2 Platoon Conducts Security Check of Area

4.3 Platoon Moves Out of Assembly Area

4.3.1 Platoon Uses Terrain

4.3.1.1 Platoon uses covered routes

4.3.1.2 Platoon uses concealed routes

4.3.1.3 Platoon does not skyline

4.3.1.4 Platoon crosses open areas as

rapidly as possible

4.3.1.5 Tanks use separate routes

4.3.2 Platoon Leader Controls Movement

4.3.2.1 Platoon leader designates route

for platoon

4.3.2.1.1 Platoon leader designates

a covered route

4.3.2.1.2 Platoon leader designates

a concealed route

4.3.2.1.2.1 Platoon leader avoids

obvious avenues of

approach

4.3.2.1.2.2 Platoon leader avoids

large cpen areas

4.3.2.1.2.3 Platoon leader avoids

obstacles

4.3.2.2 Platoon leader orders platoon to

move out

4.3.2.3 Platoon follows route designated

by platoon leader

4.3.2.4 Platoon conducts tactical movement to the battle position

4.3.2.4.1 Tanks maintain dispersion

4.3.2.4.2 Tanks maintain visual contact with section leaders

4.3.2.4.3 Platoon moves by travelinq

4.3.2.5 Sections maintain integrity

4.3.2.6 Platoon leader and platoon sergeant communicate

4.3.2.6.1 Tanks within sections communicate by hand and arm signals

4.3.2.6.2 Sections communicate by flag

signals

4.3.2.6.3 Listening silence is maintained

4.3.2.7 Platoon reaches battle positions or

time

F-14
PHASE II - OCCUPY BATTLE POSITION

2.0 TASK - CONDUCT RELIEF IN PLACE

Subtasks 2.1 Coordination of Relief

2.1.1 Exchange of Password

2.1.2 Receipt of Map Overlays and Sectors of

Responsibility by Relieving Platoon

Leader

2.1.3 Platoon Leaders Coordinate Withdrawal

Route

2.1.4 Platoon Leaders Coordinate Withdrawal

Time

2.1.5 Platoon Sergeant Visits Each Tank

Position

2.1.6 Platoon Exchanges Range Cards for

Primary and Alternate Positions

2.2 Platoon Moves Into Primary Battle Positions

2.2.1 Tanks Take Up Position Without Hesitation

2.2.1.1 Loaders ground guide tanks into

position

2.2.1.2 Section leaders place vehicles

in covered, turret-defilade positions

2.2.2 Tanks Maintain Dispersion

2.2.3 Sections Maintain Integrity

2.3 Platoon Establishes Dismounted Sentries

2.4 Platoon Establishes Mounted Sentries

2.5 Platoon Lays Wire for Communication

2.5.1 All Tanks Connected on Hot Loop

2.5.2 Dismounted Sentries Connected on Hot Loop

2.6 Platoon Inspects Alternate Positions

2.6.1 Tank Commanders Walk Ground to Alternate

Positions

2.6.2 Tanks Rehearse Movement to Alternate

Positions

2.7 Platoon Practices Light, Noise, and Movement Discipline

3.0 TASK - PREPARE AND PLAN DEFENSE

Subtask 3.1 Troop Leading Procedures

3.1.1 Platoon Leader Reconnoiters

3.1.1.1 Platoon leader plans the reconnaissance

3.1.1.2 Platoon leader conducts local reconnaissance

3.1.1.3 Platoon leader conducts map reconnaissance

F-15
3.1.1.4 Platoon leader identifies target

reference points (TRPs)

3.1.2 Platoon Leader Completes the Plan

3.1.3 Platoon Leader Selects Supplemental

Positions

3.1.3.1 Positions have unrestricted

observation and field of fire

3.1.3.2 Positions provide opportunity to

open fire at maximum ranges

3.1.3.3 Positions cover all assigned

sectors

3.1.3.4 Coordination of positions provides

overlapping fires

3.1.3.5 Positions provide hull-down or

turret-down cover

3.1.3.6 Positions provide concealment

3.1.3.7 Positions avoid major terrain

features

3.1.3.8 Positions accessible by covered

and concealed routes

3.1.4 Platoon Leader Develops a Fire Plan

3.1.4.1 Platoon leader assigns vehicle

positions and sectors of fire

3.1.4.2 Platoon leader designates TRPs to

tank commanders

3.1.4.3 Platoon leader integrates information from tank commanders about

targets in each TC's sector

3.1.4.4 Platoon leader plans indirect fire

and illumination

3.1.4.5 Platoon leader coordinates fire

plan with C/T CO

3.1.4.6 Platoon leader distributes platoon

fire plan with tank commanders

3.1.4.7 Platoon rehearses fire plan

3.1.5 Platoon Leader Plans Movement to Supplemental Battle Positions

3.1.5.1 Movement uses covered routes

3.1.5.2 Movement uses concealed routes

3.1.6 Platoon Leader Briefs Platoon on Movement

to Supplemental Battle Positions

3.1.6.1 Platoon leader indicates routes

3.1.6.2 Platoon leader indicates checkpoints

(new OW positions) for bounding

section

F-16
PHASE III - DEFENSE OF BATTLE POSITION

1.0 TASK - PLATOON REACTS TO CONTACT

Subtasks 1.1 Platoon Acquires All Visible Targets

1.2 Platoon Leader Controls Indirect Fire

1.2.1 Platoon Leader Requests Indirect Fire

1.2.1.1 Platoon leader requests suppressive/

destructive fire

1.2.1.2 Platoon leader supplies TRP data

1.2.1.3 Platoon leader adjusts indirect fire

1.2.1.4 Platoon leader shifts indirect fire

1.2.1.5 Platoon leader uses proper RTP and

CEOI

1.3 Platoon Leader Controls Direct Fire

1.3.1 Platoon Leader Requests Illumination

1.3.1.1 Platoon leader supplies TRP data

1.3.1.2 Platoon leader uses proper RTP and

CEOI

1.3.2 Platoon Uses IR Flicker Illumination

Techniques as Needed

1.3.3 Platoon Leader Issues Fire Command

1.3.3.1 Fire command contains alert element

1.3.3.2 Fire command delineates ammunition,

weapon, or searchlight

1.3.3.3 Fire command identifies target

1.3.3.4 Fire command gives direction of

target if needed

1.3.3.5 Fire command gives range if accurate assessment possible

1.3.3.6 Fire command gives execution

1.3.4 Platoon Distributes Fire

1.3.4.1 Platoon/sections use appropriate

pattern of fire

1.3.4.2 Platoon/sections distribute fire

as needed

1.3.4.2.1 Platoon/sections use nearest

half

1.3.4.2.2 Platoon/sections use sector

of fire

1.3.4.2.3 Platoon/sections use engagement area

1.3.5 Platoon Leader Uses Proper RTP and CEOI

1.4 Platoon Neutralizes Target(s)

1.4.1 Platoon Engages Target(s) in Priority

of Danger

F-17
1.4.2 Platoon Fires (first) Fast

1.4.3 Platoon Suppresses/Destroys Target(s)

1.5 Platoon Leader Controls Movement

1.5.1 Tanks Move From Primary Position To

Alternate Position After Each Engagement

1.5.2 Tanks Return To Turret Defilade After

Each Engagement

1.6 Platoon Leader Issues Spot Report

1.6.1 Spot Report Contacts Identifying Call

Sign for Platoon Leader

1.6.2 Spot Report Contains Time of Report

1.6.3 Spot Report Contains Identification of

Target and Location

1.6.4 Spot Report Indicates Target's Activity

1.6.5 Spot Report Indicates Platoon's Action

With Regard to Target

1.6.6 Platoon Leader Uses Proper RTP and CEOI

FHASE IV - MOVEMENT TO SUPPLEMENTAL BATTLE POSITION

1.0 TASK - CONDUCT TACTICAL MOVEMENT

Subtasks 1.1 Platoon Leader Initiates Movement to Supplemental Battle Position

1.2 Platoon Moves in Sections Using Bounding

Overwatch

1.2.1 Platoon Leader Designates Bounding (B)

and Overwatch (OW) Sections

1.2.2 Designated Section Overwatches

1.2.3 Platoon Leader Controls Movement

1.2.3.1 Platoon leader orders B section to

bound

1.2.4 Designated Section (B) Bounds

1.2.4.1 B section uses terrain

1.2.4.1.1 B section uses covered routes

1.2.4.1.2 B section uses concealed routes

1.2.4.1.3 B section does not skyline

1.2.4.1.4 B section crosses open areas

as rapidly as possible

1.2.4.1.5 Tanks use separate routes

F-18
1.2.4.2 B section leader controls movement

1.2.4.2.1 B section follows route

designated by platoon leader

1.2.4.2.2 Tanks maintain dispersion

1.2.4.2.3 Tanks maintain visual contact with section leader

1.2.4.2.4 B section maintains integrity

1.2.4.2.5 B section moves as rapidly

as possible to OW (supplemental battle) position

1.2.5 B Section Overwatches

1.2.5.1 B section leader assigns areas of

responsibility vis-a-vis

1.2.5.2 B section leader reports occupation of OW (supplemental battle

position)

1.2.6 OW Section (-) Bounds to New OW Position

1.2.3.1

1.2.5.2

1.2.7 Platoon Leader Designates OW & B Sections

1.2

1.2.7

1.3 Platoon Takes Active Countermeasures to

Support B Section

1.3.1 OW Section Leader Controls Direct Fire

1.3.1.1 OW section leader issues section

fire command

1.3.1.2 OW section places direct fire on

enemy positions

1.3.1.3 OW section leader shifts direct

fire tc other enemy positions as

needed

1.3.1.3.1 OW section suppresses with HEP

1.3.1.3.2 OW section suppresses with mgs

1.3.1.3.3 OW section obscures with smoke

F-19
1.3.2 OW Section Leader Controls Indirect Fire

1.3.2.1 OW section leader requests indirect

fire

1.3.2.1.1 OW section leader requests

suppressive fire

1.3.2.1.2 OW section leader requests

obscurational fire

1.3.2.2 OW section leader supplies TRP data

1.3.2.3 OW section leader adjusts indirect

fire

1.3.2.4 OW section leader uses proper

RTP and CEOI

1.3.3 B Section TCs Suppress Likely Enemy

Positions with Reconnaissance by

(Machinegun) Fire

1.3.4 B Section Tanks Make Abrupt Speed and

Direction Changes

1.3.5 B Section Tanks Employ Self-Screening

Smoke

1.4 Platoon Leader Maintains Control

1.4.1 Platoon Closes Hatches During Incoming

Artillery

1.4.2 Sections Maintain Integrity

1.4.3 Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant

Communicate

1.4.3.1 Tanks within sections communicate

by filtered lights

1.4.3.2 Sections communicate by radio

1.4.3.3 Proper RTP and CEOI is used

1.4.4 Light and Noise Discipline Maintained

PHASE V - DEFENSE OF SUPPLEMENTAL BATTLE POSITION

Subtasks 1.1 Platoon Acquires All Visible Targets

1.2 Platoon Leader Controls Indirect Fire

1.3 Platoon Leader Requests Illumination

1.4 Platoon Neutralizes Target(s)

1.5 Platoon Leader Controls Movement

1.6 Platoon Leader Issues Spot Report

F-20
APPENDIX G

MAP-PLAYER EXERCISE (MPE):

SINGLE-PLAYER AND DELPHI MODES
In this Appendix the development and tryout of the MapPlayer Exercise (MPE) are described for an offensive platoon

battle run. The purpose of this activity was to examine the

feasibility of basing the generation of platoon gunnery standards on a map simulation of an offensive mission. A singleplayer and a Delphi mode of play were investigated.

MPE DEVELOPMENT

The MPE used was adapted from an ARI-developed game used

in conjunction with REALTRAIN exercises conducted at Fort

Carson, Colorado. The map used in the ARI game was used for the

MPE and the engagement rules for that exercise formed the basic

structure of the MPE.

MPE materiaZs. The map is a 1:50,000 orthophotomap of

Fort Carson. The photomap is an aerial photograph with overprint grid lines, contour lines, and symbols for topographic

and man-made features. This map was blown up approximately

400 times so that one grid square (1000 meters) measures 32cm

(12 5/8"). Playing pieces for MPE were 1:285 scale models of

M60AI, T62, BRDM and ATGM used to depict friendly tanks and

threat vehicles. Movement rules were displayed on a cardboard

template that players used for planning movement and planning

preplotted fires.

PreZiminary triaZs. The initial work in developing the

offensive scenario did not proceed with a specific scenario in

mind. Rather two of the staff members tried a variety of

of missions on a variety of areas on the map. One staff member

studied a section of the MPA, outlined a brief oral order and

acted as controller. The other staff member played the game

using the ARI rules. Staff members then discussed what had

occurred, the player's rationale and the controller's rationale. A variety of missions including attacks, movement to

contact, and security were examined.

An intuitive process was used to determine whether a

trial MPE showed promise. Missions and terrain that offered a

variety of movement routes and overwatch Positions, a readily

discernable objective, and some realistic potential positions

for threat locations were considered for further development.

These promising missions were then replayed with other staff

associates.

Friendly forces always consisted of one tank platoon

(5 tanks). Artillery was generally not employed during the

preliminary trials. Exercises were run in almost all map

directions (north-south, south-north, east-west and northeast to south-west). The largest areas of the map used

G-1
measured about 4000 x 4000 meters. This was generally the limit

of the playing field that was reasonably available on the largescale map as well as the outside limit for a realistic platoon

operation. Approximately 30 missions were run during the preliminary trial phase.

Specific scenario. The goal of the preliminary trials

was to develop a scenario that was generally parallel to the

Sample Platoon Battle Run Offense (Day) contained in (DRAFT)

Change 2, FM 17-12-2 and as employed on the Ft. Knox, Kentucky

battle run. The scenario as outlined in FM 17-12-2 is very

general. Friendly forces consist of 1 tank platoon (5 tanks)

with no cross reinforcement, attachments or support. (The

Ft. Knox battle run provides for 4.2" mortar support.) The

platoon starts in an assembly area and is given an order to

seize part of a company team objective. No specific distances

(from the assembly area to the objective) are mentioned in Lhe

FM, but maximum engagement distance is 1800-2000 meters. The

Ft. Knox battle run conforms with this general outline with the

exception that the move from the assembly area to the attack

position is an administrative move.

The MPE scenario is set up as a south-north n3.atoon

attack on a prominent hill mass that has been identified as the

objective and is approximately 3000 meters from the assembly

area. The platoon zone width does not exceed 2000 meters.

Although the platoon is operating as part of a company team, it

is operating without reinforcement or cross attachment, although

in the final version of the OPORD, artillery (155) support is

allowed.

The section for play includes a variety of terrain conditions. Woods, open areas, hills, trail networks and streams

are all represented. The left (west) boundary is an easily identifiable hard surface road that is off limits to the platoon.

The east boundary, while not as easily identifiable, consists

of a trail network. An operation order was developed to support

the scenario.

Initially, two scenarios were developed--each involving

an attack, but otherwise quite different. The second scenario

involved terrain that was quite flat and unvegetated. The objective was the only piece of high, wooded ground in the area.

One stream and two trails bisected the designated maneuver area.

No threat was employed as part of this second scenario.

The intention of the second scenario was to help the MPE

player become familiar with the map scale, movement,and function

of the controller--a "dry run" to assure familiarity with the

mechanics of MPE. The second scenario was run with the first

four players, then abandoned. MPE is not complicated enouqh

G-2
to warrant a dry run and the extra time required (15 to 30

minutes) for this run seriously cut into the limited time that

players were available. Even if more time were available with

future players, it would not appear that there are enough benefits from this scenario to warrant its reintroduction.

Operation order. An operation order was prepared for each

scenario. This "Frag" order was based on OPORD used for the

REALTRAIN Validation for Armor/Anti-Armor Teams with modifications as necessary to meet the MPE requirements. The printed

OPORD is handed to the player along with a 1:50,000 topographic

military map of the area, for use during the player's planning

phase. No overlay was provided for the 1:50,000 scale map. it

should be noted that the OPORD is marked by an absence of

control measures, such as phase lines, check points, attack

position, and limiting lines. While this lack did not seem to

influence the MPE, some consideration should be given to the

introduction of some control measures to add to the realism of

the event. As a minimum an LD should be specified on an overlay.

The OPORD used with the primary scenario was as follows:

Contact with OPFOR has been lost. At last

light yesterday air OPs reported enemy tanks and

ATM in the vicinity of 099718 and enemy BRDMs and

BMPs on the trail network in the vicinity of 077713.

A 155 Battalion is in DS of our Battalion TF. We

have an ASR allowing you 4 HE missions and 3 smoke

missions. Our company team will provide the

Advance Guard for our TF. You are designated the

Point of the Advance Guard. You will move at HHour from your assembly area at your present location (073700). You will seize and hold the key

terrain centered at 095726 and destroy any opposing

force contacted. You will occupy this position

until ordered to move to the northeast. Your west

boundary is the highway. This highway is off limits.

Your east boundary is a line running from 102704 to

103718. Any questions?

Time is now H-Hour minus You must

have your preplanned fires in to me by H-Hour

minus

Threat. The threat appeared to cause the greatest problems

during the MPE. FM 17-12-2 Change 2 (Draft) lists the following

threat arrays for the Sample Platoon Battle Run Offense (Day):

G-3

I
Threat Action

Number Type Range or Condition

4 BMP 1000-1400m Fire on platoon

1 ATGM Team 600-800m Unk

1 BRDM 800-1000m Unk

3 BMP 1100-1400m Unk

4 T62 1800-2000m Unk

3 ATGM Team 800-i000m Unk

Troops 400m Dismounted

2 T62 1200-1600m Moving (on objective)

2 T62 Unk Hulldown (on objective)

2 T62 800-1000m Hulldown (on objective)

3 Rifle Squads 800-1000m On objective

3 T62 1000-1400m Hulldown (on objective)

2 Rifle Squads 600-800m On objective

Experience during the initial staff tryouts indicated a

need to reduce the size and frequency of the threat to allow

realistic maneuver and reactions. Further, the full threat in

a maneuver area as small as the MPE employs (3000 x 2000 meters)

is not realistic. Thus, the following threat array was portrayed:

1. 4 BMP

2. 3 BMP

3. 1 ATGM team

1 BRDM

4. 4 T62 (hulldown)

5. 4 T62 (hulldown on objective)

This array was modified after some subjects were run through the

MPE. The 3 BMP were eliminated; the 4 T62 (hulldown) were

changed to 3 T62 (exposed). The 4 T62 hulldown (on the objective)

were changed to 3 T62 hulldown. These changes were made because

of the numerous complaints that the threat could not realistically

be engaged by a tank platoon. Even after these adjustments were

made, players still criticized this aspect of the MPE.

G-4
The four enemy locations were preplotted and remained standardized for all runs. The controller introduced the threat by

placing the enemy miniatures on the board when he wanted them to

engage or be seen by the friendly forces. The range of engagement depended somewhat on the route the player took; however,

the BMP engagements varied from 800-1400m, T62 from 1000-1800m,

the BRDM from 500-1500m, and ATGM from 500-1500m. If a player

selected a route that would not expose him to the preplanned

enemy position, that threat was not introduced. Likewise, a

mis .ile threat was not introduced if the player exposed his

tanks within approximately 500 meters. The controller decided

when to (for example) open fire, fire on the lead tank or wait

until more tanks were exposed. The controller also announced

which friendly tanks were being engaged. During the preliminary

trials and pilot runs, all threat action consisted of firina

on the friendly tanks; there were no threats that were not

engaging. This may have been an error and may have added to

the players' perception of the threat as too overwhelming.

Future applications should vary the actions of the threat as

exposed but not engaging, flank moving, withdrawing, moving

into position or other variations that would not only reduce

the apparent overwhelming nature of the threat but also elicit

differing reactions on the part of the players.

RuZes for A1

PIE. The ARI-developed rules were the point of

departure for the MPE. The ARI rules, however, were designed

for a combined arms team engagement using an opposing-forces

players concept such as REALTRAIN and involved casualty assessment. These rules were more thorough and complex than what was

needed for MPE so rule adjustments were made.

One major change from the ARI rules was the Kf'riiuitiou

th' hx o',rla. as a control measure. Its use was not

deemed necessary because of the relatively simple requirements

of MPE ds compared with the complexity of the ARI game. The

MPE experience showed that the absence of the hexes did not

adversely affect the control of the game although the hexes

probably would have enhanced the efficiency and fidelity of

the transcript of the play.

The controller watched r',om,:nt and informed the player if

he moved too far. Some minor variations on movement were allowed

or enforced during play depending upon the terrain and method

of movement. For example, if all tanks crossed a stream at

the same point (tracking behind the lead tank) they were allowed

to move faster than if they each crossed the stream at different

points. Likewise, movement rates through vegetated areas were

adjusted depending on the density of the vegetation.

G-5
*1

All requests to the team commander for assistance reinforcement or relief from the mission were denied. Artillery fires

were denied after four HE missions and two smoke missions.

No friendly casualties were assessed. This decision was

made after experimentation during the initial phases with

varying threats. Assessment of casualties would have soon produced a situation where the friendly platoon would have been

effectively eliminated as a combat entity far short of the objective.

Inflicted casualties were not assessed per se.

After the friendly force responded to the enemy engagement by

fire and maneuver and "develop the situation" to the satisfaction of the controller, the enemy forces either withdrew or

failed to deliver any further fires.

IntervisibiZity was decided by the controller. Generally

in trees, the tanks could not see the enemy, be seen, or fire.

On the edges of woodlines, they had concealment but could fire

and receive fire. Decisions on the terrain features were made

as the specific situation arose.

Artillery fire was allowed for up to four missions of HE and

two of smoke. Time to deliver various requests for fire were

noted in the rules and explained to players again when they were

requested.

PILOT STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL-PLAYER MODE

The primary purpose of this pilot study was to determine

whether players could adapt to the two-dimensionil medium and

demonstrate realistic maneuvers. The secondary purpose was

to determine whether the data that MPE yielded would be valuable

for deriving standards for Table IX performance.

Subjects. Nine subjects, four experienced and five inexperienced, played the offensive MPE. The experienced group

included three ILT and one SFC. All of the experienced players

had participated in battle run exercises as Platoon Leader or

Platoon Sergeant.

The inexperienced players were members of the Armor Officer

Basic (AOB) course. All had completed classwork, terrain

board practical exercises, and REALTRAIN field exercises on

offensive operations. Three had fired Table IX, one as Platoon

Leader. Four of the inexperienced subjects had prior service

but none had prior service in Armor. All of the inexperienced

subjects rated themselves as among the top one-third of their

AOB class in map reading skill.

G-6
All subjects volunteered for the pilot study. No effort

was made to select representative samples.

Game procedures. The player was first given a verbal

orientation on the rules of the game along with the purpose of

the game. The emphasis during the orientation was that the

player need not be too concerned with remembering the rules;

they were reiterated and enforced as necessary during the play

by the controller.

The player was then given the OPORD and as much time as

he required to complete his planning and request his preplanned

fires. (This rarely took more than 5 or 6 minutes.) The controller wrote down the preplot locations as announced by the

player. The tanks were positioned in the assembly area. The

player was asked to identify which tank would be his (platoon

leader) and which would be his platoon sergeant's (tanks were

color coded on the back deck).

Two controllers were used during the game. One of the

controllers concentrated on the movement of the player and

introduced and controlled the threat force. The other controller

recorded the movements and actions of the player by section

and where applicable, by individual tank.

The player was allowed to move his tanks at a one move

per minute rate. Usually, the controller would have to prompt

each move, but otherwise the controller did not interfere with

a move unless the player exceeded the movement rates or threat

action was introduced. When threat action was introduced in

the "middle" of a move (for example, when a tank or section

was emerging from a wood line approximately midway in the length

of their move) the player was normally allowed to complete

that move (of that section if vehicles were moving by section).

The player's vehicles were then "backed up" to the point that it

was decided the enemy action would take place and the threat

was introduced and its actions described to the player. The

player was then allowed to complete that move.

.;Uitaibilit; of map. After completing the MPE, each player

was asked if the map medium posed any problems. No one said

that it did. In fact, four players (two experienced and two

inexperienced) commented that the map may be too easy compared

to actual terrain since platoon leaders have no opportunity

to become lost. It is important to remember that all nine

players volunteered for the pilot knowing that the exercise was

on a map. Subjects were probably more confident in their ability

to read maps than most players would be. That confidence was

probably justified.

G-7
The most important indicator of the suitability of the

map as a medium for an offensive battle run was the reasonableness of the schemes of maneuver followed by the inexperienced

players. As is discussed below, the maneuver techniques were

fairly consistent and realistic. There is no evidence to contradict the contention that the players adapted to the medium

and executed the mission as they had planned.

Despite the fact that results of the pilot argue for the

suitability of the map, two reservations remain. First, a map

probably cannot be a neutral medium for comparing groups with

different amounts of experience. Experienced Armor officers

and NCOs are likely to have much more experience with maps,

both as part of operations and in map exercises, than will

inexperienced soldiers. Second, although players apparently

can execute their plans faithfully on a map, they may not adapt

their plans to take advantage of terrain as they would on the

ground. The maneuver on the map, though reasonable, may not

correspond to movement on terrain.

Representative data. Although the data from the pilot

were secondary to checking the feasibility of the method, the

type of data MPE can yield is central to its future application.

The pilot suggests that at least three aspects of an offensive

operation can be studied:

" Indirect Fire planning

* Route of attack

" Overwatch techniques

Artillery played a major role in the conduct of the operation. Table G-1 shows the distribution of four classes of

effective preplots for indirect fire.

TABLE G-1

Indirect Fire Preplots

Preplot Preplot in Preplot Preolot within 400

Subject on Obj Front of ObJ on Meters o f En

1 1 1 1 1

21 1 1 1

31 1

4 1 2

1 3I 1

11

5 1 G-8 1 2
Except for one member of the inexperienced group, types of preplots would consistently distinguish between the two groups.

In the play of MPE the main benefit of planned fire on enemy

locations is that it saves time--one or two moves rather than

three for new targets. If casualty assessment is added,

artillery will probably play a larger role. With the size of

the threat, artillery support is essential to assure opportunities for movement.

Figure G-1 shows the routes that the heavy section of each

experienced player followed during the MPE. Except for one

player, the routes are very similar. The rationale behind the

exception was that the wooded areas (through which the other

players went) provided so much protection to the enemy that he

wanted to avoid them altogether.

Figure G-2 shows the routes followed by the heavy sections

of the inexperienced players. Comparison with the routes of

the experienced players indicated consistent differences in

moving to wooded areas and in traveling on trails. Although

the differences between the groups appear to be consistent,

one should be reluctant to conclude that the routes represent

different criterion levels. It is tempting, however, to note

that the experienced players, except one, appear reluctant to

expose themselves to the open area east of the road.

The quality of the transcript of the play was not sufficient

to allow the evaluation of specific overwatch positions. But

two tendencies suggest that there are differences in the techniques of the two groups that MPE can measure. Table G-2 shows

the number of turns where there was no effort at overwatch.

Even assuming equally sufficient overwatch positions, the

inexperienced players tended to move uncovered more often than

the experienced players.

TABLE G-2

Numtber of Times Prior to Assault

That Both Sections Mfvved During the Sane Turn

Experienced Inexperienced

Simultaneous Simultaneous

Subject Turns MIves Subject Turns Moves

1 27 0 1 25 5

2 27 3 2 27 4

3 24 3 3 29 4

4 10 3 4 27 5 ~ ~5 20 4 Mean 2 2.25 52

Mean 25.6

G-9
0I

G-1 0- 

I

.
%; -

Figure G-2. Routes of heavy sections -inexperienced.

G-11
The pilot results also indicated a difference in the size

of the bounds. The data in Table G-3 show that inexperienced

players were more likely to take short bounds. In most cases

250 meters represented one minute's movement.

TABLE G-3

Distance of Bounds

(Treating All Bounds As Successive)

Experienced Subjects Inexperienced Subjects

1 700m 1 1000m 4 250

1000 250 250

2 500 2 500 250

700 600 600

700 3 250 600

500 250 5 250

3 600 500 600

250 400 600

700 200 250

4 250 250 250

600 600

Mean 414

Mean 591

Summary of single-player mode. Experience with the pilot

study of the single-player mode of MPE is encouraging. The

experienced and inexperienced players who participated were

able to adapt to the map medium and conduct rational offensive

operations. Further, the pilot results do not contradict the

assumption that experienced PL perform better on a battle run

than inexperienced PL.

Several problems remain with the format of MPE. A method

of assessing casualties in light of the overwhelming enemy threat,

while still allowing the evaluation of movement, is the highest

priority. Another need is a technique for assessinq fields

of fire and concealment of specific overwatch positions. Without solving these problems the benefits of MPE for setting

battle run standards are limited. But the experience with the

pilot suggests that there is enough potential to justify further

development.

G-12
PILOT STUDY OF DELPHI MODE

This second study was conducted as a further development

of the Map-Player Exercise (MPE). The objectives of the study

were to develop and test a method for using an interacting

group of military experts to play MPE, thus generating terrainspecific examples of ARTEP standard level performance. The

study focus included the group play technique, the direction

and control of group-interaction, the development of group data

collection methods, and the solicitation of military expert

reaction to the purposes and techniques of the MPE-Delphi Mode.

Players and controllers. Two instructors from the U.S.

Army Armor Szhool volunteered to play the MPE during a single

session lasting approximately three hours. Three project staff

conducted the session and consisted of one controller and two

controller-data collectors. The controller enforced the game

rules, determined intervisability, and introduced the players

(P) to the threat force. One controller-data collector recorded

collective P movement and action on a move-by-move data log.

The other controller-data collector operated the tape recorder

and recorded P movement on the collective photomap game board.

Both controller-data collectors employed Delphi interaction

control procedures.

Procedures. Each P was seated at a table on which lay a

copy of the large-scale photomap, the 1:50,000 scale topographic

map, a specially marked copy of Sample Platoon Battle Run

Offense (Day) (Table 4), MPE rules, data collection forms, and

other task-related materials. Ps read instructions which

informed them about the purpose of the experimental session and

about the general procedures to be followed. Any questions

raised were answered. Ps were then instructed to read the

Sample Platoon Battle Run and to pay particular attention to

the marked tasks and measures, viz., those which might be performed

and measured using the MPE simulation. Ps were told that they

could refer to the Sample Platoon Battle Run at any time during

the ensuing session. Any questions raised were answered. Ps

then were instructed in the procedures for playing MPE-Delphi,

as follows.

They were first briefed on the rules of MPE. Ps carried

out a series of practice moves on the photomap board. When Ps

had no further questions about MPE, the pilot run of MPE-Delphi

was initiated.

Step 1. Ps individually planned a maneuver scheme and

indirect fire missions using the 1:50,000 scale map after

receiving the OPORD. The photomap was available for simulated

terrain reconnaissance. Ps indicated the maneuver route for

G-13
the platoon, overwatch (OW) positions, likely threat positions,

and indirect fire sites on the 1:50,000 scale map.

Step 2. Ps in collective mode presented and discussed

their individually developed plans, each explicating his

rationale for various aspects of his plan. After about 10

minutes of discussion, Delphi controllers instructed Ps to

adopt one of the plans in toto or to consolidate the two plans

into a collective plan.

Step 3. Ps independently made the first move of the

mission, moving five individual tanks. (Moving individual

tanks was abandoned after a few moves as impractical given the

scale of the map board relative to the scale of the tanks and

considering the time required. Subsequently, two tanks were

moved--one representing the heavy section (HS) and one representing the light section (LS).) Ps wrote down any fire or

communication taking place during a move on an individual moveby-move data log. Ps sat at two separate stations.

Step 4. Ps in collective mode presented, discussed, and

consolidated their independent moves into a collective move.

The collective move was recorded on the collective photomap

board. HS and LS moves were symbolized by a square and a

circle, respectively. The move number was written inside the

symbol. The final position of each move was recorded; a line

indicating the route taken between successive final positions

was recorded on the collective photomap board.

MPE-Delphi continued with the independent move, discussion,

consolidation, collective move cycle. If after P discussion

and Delphi controller probing, consolidation or in toto move

selection was not achieved, one of P's moves was selected by

chance.

Threat engagements were not introduced during the independent move step. Only when a colleQLive move resulted in threat

force intervisibility with friendly force within effective

weapon range was an engagement introduced by the controller.

After an engagement was introduced Ps independently made engagement action decisions. Then, following discussion, probing,

etc. a collective engagement action decision was achieved and

recorded. PL commands and communications were recorded on a

move-by-move data form; engagement maneuver was recorded on

the collective photomap.

The Delphi controller task included the following aspects:

i) Ensure that individiaZ decision-making is done independently. It is important that each P enters the discussion

step with an independently taken decision to serve as a concretized anchor point for other Ps to react to. Co-evaluation

of decisions is facilitated when each P has a structured

G-14
decision to defend and other structured decisions to criticize.

2) Cue and faciliate P interaction. Solicit opinions

from each P. Help balance out unequal dominance relationships

among Ps.

3) Get the Ps to state the dimensions which they used

in making their decisions. If Ps do not raise pertinent dimensions in free discussion, probe for the dimensions.

If probing does not result in externalization of potentially

relevant dimensi.ons, then ask Ps about the relevance of candidate dimensions.

4) Elicit from each P his prioritization of the dimensions

of the decision space; then elicit a collective prioritization.

Both 3) and 4) facilitate group movement from intuitive-based

decision-making discussion to an analytic-based decision-making

discussion.

5) Terminate group discussion when the basis for decisionmaking is clear to Ps. Apply chance-selection-of-move decision

alternative when consolidation is not achieved. The timely

application of chance selection procedures during an impasse

between or among Ps forestalls resolution by dominance and

keeps Ps on coequal terms. Interaction control measures as

above are critical to the Delphi process when participants

interact directly.

Delphi conduct of mission. A consolidation of independently developed plans was adopted by Ps. The plan called for

a N.E. maneuver axis from the assembly area to an assault position 1200m S.W. of the objective. From the assembly area the

initial 800m was covered in traveling overwatch (OW). The

remaining distance to the assault position was covered in bounding OW, with bounds of 400m or less. Wooded areas and a stream

bed were used for concealment. Five TRP's were preplotted.

The following moves occurred:

Movos 1-8 - Call TRP 2 on the objective. Move by sections in traveling OW N.E. 1100m to a LS OW position.

Moves 9-10 - HS bounds N.E. 400m. HS enters stream bed

during bound. LS is in OW. HS takes up OW position.

Move 11 - LS engaged by 4 BMP after moving off of OW position (moving to join HS). HS from OW position maneuvers and

engages BMP's with HEP and HEAT. LS maneuvers back to OW

position. TRP 3 is called.

G-15

G-15
Moves 12-14 - LS moves N.E. 350m to join HS on OW position.

Moves 15-16 - LS begins a bound N.E. with HS in OW. At

beginning of move 16 LS is engaged by 3 exposed T62's. From

OW HS engages T62's with SABOT. LS seeks hulldown defilade.

A danger-close HE indirect fire mission is called.

Moves 17-22 - The platoon moves by bounding OW to assault

position. The bounds are less than 400m. HE/smoke is called

on objective. The platoon waits for smoke.

Move 23 - The smoke mission comes in. The platoon begins

on-line assault with PL in center. The platoon uses fire and

maneuver to objective at top speed, and as violently as possible.

Discussion and conclusions. The performance of the Delphi

group is characterized by:

1) simultaneous section movement only when contact is

unlikely or during assault,

2) bounds of 400m or less,

3) well integrated use of artillery and smoke,

4) maximum use of available concealment and cover, and

5) use of OW continuously to assault position.

These performance characteristics seem to indicate a clear

embodiment of ARTEP standard level behavior. However, several

Delphi panels would have to be run to determine the performance

bandwidth of standard level behavior.

Protocols of sufficient detail were not available from

the runs of the nine players comprising the single-player MPE

pilot study to allow comparisons with MPE Delphi performance.

Several Ps from the first pilot study seem to have selected

an axis of advance similar to that chosen by the MPE Delphi

panel, but section interplay data are not available and are

critical to comparisons.

The results of this initial ground-breaking application

of Delphi techniques to the MPE are encouraging. Play was

smooth and can clearly be made smoother. P interaction was

fruitful in explicating dimensions of the decision space pertinent to ARTEP standard level performance. There is room

for improvement in Delphi control techniques. As experience

is gained control can become more systematized and Probinq techniques more comprehensive. but d good start to build on

has been made that has excellent P acceptability. The Ps

G-1 6
were highly cooperative and enthusiastic throughout the session.

Both thought that MPE-Delphi was a useful technique for generating examples of standard level behavior for the platoon battle

run. Both volunteered for future MPE-Delphi sessions.

G-1

G- 17
DISTRIBUTION

I US ARMY CINCP-AL SJPPUHI tiKuUP eLHSUN'JLL !,IVISIOUN

I HUOA ATTN: PI,1M(

I HIU. FLATA ATTN: A1CAT-uP-W

e~ HO)A WELARLH ONJ S1UUIlt (FC

I MILITAPY OCC(IPArL:)NAL UrVLLOPMFNI OIV U,,PC-MSP-U. HM 952 MUFMAN ML 1C

'. (JA, (MHA ANLJ L)

I MU VMATA IFCH-NICA&L LIMHAKjY

I HU)A r'MILF. HUi~j WLSUUKHLLS UFVLLOI'MENT AV

I HiU )A ATTN: UAMI-TST

I lIS4 AVIATION SY',T;EMS COUMU ATriN: UHSAV-/sR

I US'I COwAUCOM ATTNJ: AMSL-A-HH

I IuS' ARPAUCOM ATT'J: ATFL-LU-AC

1 HLAUUAM1LPS US IAI-HINE LUHI-S AIIN: CJUE P47MI

I HE4[OUUARTLR59 U, 4AWINL LUHPS ATTN: ULuo mPI-28

d US ARMY LUPOPL ANJ SEVtNII1 ARMY

1I SF INFANTRY OLVISIUN ANU I. PILLY AT i': AAFZN-I)PT-T

I ISi INILLLI(;ENL- A'aU StLUITY *UMMANI, AT N: IAOIIS-TiN(,

e il THAnOUL IICMWACAL LlIMAHY

I NAVAL TRAININ(, rUJIPMLN'I LLN AIIN: 1t.LMfICAL LIISRY

I MII ITAWY OCCUPJAII)NAL UtVtLPMI.N I 0V ATTN: UAPC-MSP-'-,, RM 8seC, .,UFPMAN tiLUI

I Mb ITALSY UCCUPI.AIJ1NAL ULVLLOPMF'41 UIV ATTN: UAPt.-MSP-Fl, mm Sb2C, -,OFFMAN hLI'U I

IMIIIIAPY UCCLIPA113NAL utVLLUPMFNI 0kv ATTN: UAPC-MSP-T. RM b5.?C. -.O PMAN tiLI', I

1 AT-I INFANTRY uL'JISION

I HkJ0A T ANK' F OHLr MANAILMLNT JU L

I MJ )A AT TN: DAS,,-.'Im

I NAVAL ?,IN SYS1LA COMMA14t)

L I? J UAmCOM Kt'S4 Cttk

I IT. BEN~JAMIN MAMMHISUN, IN 4b~Ib

I US'I FOWLtS COMM.oND AFLt - OLF'IIIY LMJr.1 wI STAFF FUN IIJ(,ilTICS

I 0)I.LCIOHATF OF INAlNINU ATTN: AIZW-1

I O)I--oCTrNAIF OF CU1itAT UtVLLOPMFN1S) AIIN: ATZA-L)

I HU-1ARCOM MAWINt CUHPS LIAISON UFCL

I I)E-'AkT. LNI (I ml AWMY OS) ARMy INIt.L~lfItiCk * SLCURITY CUMMANIn

I US DARrOM TECtlilIAL L14HAHY

I WJS, Myi~ILF MAIrM -ILL ktAUINESS LUMMANJ ATTN: URS)mI-NTN

I ARTAUS ATTN: ULCM-fOS-Iu

I US14 IOi.jcts CUMM.'NU

I PM TWAntE /

I UJS MILl IAHY UISINICT O WAbMINI,IUN UFL )F- EQUAL CIPPOwTUNITY

I NAVAL CIVILIAN PLFASONNtL L-UMU tSUUO1M4N I-D UIV

2U AN[ LIAISON IlT-jL:

I IT"i AH-AY TPAINIrju CENTtik

I MU IA, ICSOPS U~vII THAi'iq'iu

I HUiIAs ICSOPS T.-AININC, 0IMICIOLSUIL

I HUPIA9 nLSLOI MaI',ITENANCL MANAr,LMLNT

I H(J,)A, oCS STUO'r 3 Fl Id

I uSiCUE r ATTN; ATP-L-LA-t MuMAN FA~lok5

I SACHAMFNIO ALC/.W1CHH

I INIFER-9iNIV SFMI'44-? UN iNMILD PU,)LLS * U

I (IASA (ISOA) DEW1111 FOR SLILNC. A14U TFCMNoLO(,Y

I ()FC OF NAVAL RtSLAkCM

I Af 4WL /I MT

I AFHRL/i ML

I Alo FO'QCt HUMAN H;SOUML,-S LAtb 44ITN: AFMH.L/TSH

I 6S Po Ak4L/TMM

I NAVY PINSUNNtL AND 0 LLNIk.N UlkLCIJH ()f PWRUAMS

I NAiy PFWSONNIL AN) 0 UL114ILH /

e OF(: OF NAVAL WLiL.CH PLWMSNNVL ANtL IHA114INU. RLSEARCM PHUO,HAMS

1 -c OF NAVAL NM1,tAkCM MShI. oIHt.C]OR MPjk5 * 1IAININU, PSCH PRO(,S

I Ot1C OF NAVAL 14L'tAH(tl WP'uJJELi OILLI' fIVIRNMLNIAL PHVSIOLOt,Y

G-19

AM1M Ah W-w
I Or U NAVAL kNb. 0HU- ()(.I AT 10 L t tI-IrvNLb)S Pi.

I NAvAL AtHUSPACL M;IILAL HNokh LAO AIT'J (C.UL L51)

I ',AVAL al RUSPACL M;OILAL HtbLH LAt3 AJ~lUw. k ANUjLH kSF/.NCm

I U.oEAU OF NiAVAL P HSUNIO L SLI~vllIIHL AU)vISUH (PLW.*.-UN)

I fAVAL AtNUSNA~t NA OCAL KSLII LAO MtIJSPA(:I P )YCM1ULUUY Ut..lAklmkFq

U!SoA TNauuC 5,YSIhN5 ANALYSli ALIVIIY All.: ATAA-TLA

I ,iLAUUUAkTLWSq L AST 0 UAWJ Ct-ilt 1 , l-SY~-l.ji (,ICAL MSCtl H"-

I UiS, RtESEAkCH AN,, lFCilNuUU LA.. AlTN: u.~vLL-AS

I tiS.% LN(,INI:FH TU-JNAi.1IL L.tlS ATTN: .IL-,.SL

I 1 T VISION LA,, ATTIN: L)NHtL-.jv-SLb

I USA IHAININ(, tiU - H)

I lis A HUPOArq EN61OLt..lINu LAO

i OSA MATNjHI S-,. ArNtLy::IS A-I IVIIY ,.TTN: UW SY-N

I HATlELJt.-TLUMMJtI- AbUNA1UHIS IACII AL TECHNICAL U C

I 11S.1 ANCIll Ibli L:N A IIN. AMSTL-l'L-ta

I LISA AkrTIC It-SI C;N AlAN: S1E~t-I'L-Nml

I tIS. COtiCLIPIS ANAILYtSI AoLY ATTIN: MUCA-..

I uS., CU~iCLPTS ANALYSIS A,,ILT ATTNq* mUCA-JI,

I I)LJ4NSc LANWlAU, INSIIL FUNLIbN LAN%-aI, LLN

I HOi wHAIH ilyV Ui- 4 UHUHT~ij1AhNY

I US.ACAClOA ATTN: ATILCA-tI-L

I LSACACnA ATTN: AlILLA-L1m

I USiCAC'.A ATTN: TILLA-LI-A

I tSlCACIA ATTN: AIZLLA-LA

I US% Nbfri [EVEL * STANUAkUILA Up*, U.K.

I P-iA NATICK PtbL.H'Il IINOL) LVELUPMLNI CJMMrvIUjl CHItL, rIFHAV SLItlfCLS Oly. OU SrI L.N

I OASU., F AN() E l AND) L3) MILIIMNY ASAIPo FINt Pu NIN TLLHNOL

ITNAJANA ATTN: )AJSUNl

INAVAL AIN SYSIL.S LUMMAU ATlr,j: AIN-D.3l i

I llb XLELL TF Ctl IdAL L IhNUNY

I u)SAAWL LIHPAkY

I -.UlANilI ASO( RT~tto ISCH Ukt,~ (It.UNFiUi LI JHA)?Y

I St.VILLF RLS.AL - ZPUN4IIUN

1 11S1 fWAUUC SYSIMt. ANALftIS ACTIVITY AtT T.: AIAA-SL ITTCH [ItlNAkY

I tIIFUWk4Lu SENVIi LS UNIT I l lt riLALTH )C UIPARbIt.NT OF PSYCIIHY

I lISA CUi~UfN SY-,1--MS LUMM#MNU JWIN: CJMMaTl IL.CN"ICAL I IrINAHY

I HU IAN wt!>UI NLE ' HSI~ O- N, IIIUMNI-UI

I HIJANNO WLSTFRN I.It-NANT

I -IATftLiI t EPUNIlS LItikMNY

I NAlTi CIYNPUPAT II)

I -IA mi CINNUNA IIU , VIN: LitlNANY U

I P,AIFC I IHNAWY. ANt-b'

I 6k 4NIN,,LN LINNA-,Y AITI.: MI/-. L L.h 131.3

1 CEITEP FUN NAVAl ANALYSIS)

I NAVAL HLALTH N!>lli (AN LIIINANY

I NAIPAL pINSnNNEL x At-J 1) L LI'NMNY Alr-: COUJE V?OIL

I A14 IWLt HUMAN ?l;SUHt-S LAb mWIN: AF.l.t/UT

I HiO. I'l. MUACHULii AIIN: ItLN wit DIV

I USA ACAUEMy Ut 1tALIH S(ILf4LtS SITIMSJN i IHHAMY (M)lCUMNTbI

I '6C-40UL OFSYI.' ANU LOUI"OlI, AlI I N: Al I T/L SCM

I ENIC PIPUCESINU A'lip ktEttN'Ct FIL AC.AUIjIlIONS LIHNAWTAN

I IE.JANlTHENI U1- 1It N4AVY INAINII,u ANAL TbI'* ANU EVALUATION UP.

I NAtIONAL CLImTEH NJ HILIII SIATIS)TICS /

I lSAlA litI (0F b' SAV IUNAL '.ILI Af,L) LtAlct)S.. IN

I IS NAVY CLPET !> WPJWl mtS)LIINLI LHAtoY

I OLo UDmINION UNIV;HNSI1Y PtNFI...ANLL ASS,,MtN LAHIINATONY

I WSA CUMANI, ANu t,;hEHAL S (UF 'LL~ut AIIN: L114NAHY

I 11S. rNANbt.'lIAIfo'4 SCHIJUL USA INANSP It(. If Mt 4 ) NSCN Ct N

I N'440fC PHU(WAM~ -'ANAitW IUN l1UM~l- PI'lJNm ArICt

i isSA AlI- INCA I' (-i.ICAL HLakMhCM It"At-... i IttNI.NY

6,-?0
I WS.A IIFLU ARTY *AU/

I NAT CLFAHZN(,HOU') t-OR , NIAL Hpt-LIH IWO~i PAHKLAiNN IL[,)

I ii 1FFXAS CEN FJk LOMr4ONICAT jON HSC't

I I NS'1II11I IL F OR Ut -IENSE. Ai4AL YSLS

I USA TRAINING sOIP:NT CL~qlL$ UFvLL SY~ilEris TNU * DLVICES LIHEIR1ORAIL

I AF INL IELHNOLOD'V )tC (H)

I USA MONAILITY Eu~ii.MENT H NDJ U t..MMANL) ATTN: UkOmE-1g,

I D)A US ARMY RFETHL4141NU t3UL RLSFMIHCH * LVOLuATIUN ONR

I tuS MILITARY ACLAY LhIHAHY

I MAqdNE CORPS IN131ITUTE

1 NAVAL qAFLTY LLATEH /I

I USAAVNr AND) FT* HJLKLR ATTN: AILUI-ES

I (IS ARMY AV?\ INU~ LIHPARY lITN: LIIILF ~IHPARIAN I US.,% Alw. ULFENSL SCHOOL A11N: AlSA-Ul

I USAAVNr ATTN %T~tj-u

I US MILITAHY ACA ELiY O C Ur MbItIAHY LLAIIFRSIIIP

I US MILITARY ACA)EY UOiRLLIOR or INSTITTIONAL R!S-CH

I tiSA Aiw IJEFENSE S.CH-OOL AIIN: AISA-CL)-MS

I UJS.AVS-LIt1RAkY-.JOCOm&-NIS

i tu5l AIw ULFFNSL t3AND AIIN: FILL!S REL-4SIjORy

iI uSI INWANIPY 6U;ARD AITr1j; ATLb-lI-1S-l

i USA INTELLIGENL. Ct-N ANLJ : Lr FUULATIDNAI- ALVISOR

I U SA U~nNANCE Lr" AND) SQ-i ATTN: ATSL-ILM-C

1 USA ARmOR SCHOOL ATTN: A[Sb-UT-IP

I IISA AR 40N CENTL-M DIHLLI.TOATL or CUMHAI i-LVLLOPMtNlS

I NAVAL POS1(,wAOO. T; SQ- ATTN: ooOULLY KNtjx LIBRARY (COIF 14?'4)

1 IJS A 1ANSPORTA11UN SLIIOUL DLPi0Y ASS). cOMMANUAWT LI)IC(A. TLCHNOLO.Y

I USA SI(,NAL SCHOL AND t- . (,0RDil, ATTN: 1,TZH-ET

I IJSA UUARTLPMASh R SCH ATTN: ATbm-UT-IM-;,l

1 1) n MlillAPY PUI.JCE bCHOOL ATTNq: LIHP(Aky

I USA ARmuR SCHOOL EVAL HUNCH, UIREClJHAT- UF INSTRUCTTON

I CHIE ()1 NAVAL t.UJCAIIUN AND INLJ

I US4xSl~-S STAPF ANW) FACULTY DLV AND) IN~v DITV

I HU AICAPTI) TRI%1\4INU SYSILMS IULVEL0P14LNT

IUSA INs;IIUTE FuN MILITARY ASSISTANCE ATTN: ATSU-TU-TA

I USAISI) ATTN: A~bIE-UT-L

I US ARMY ARMOR S0HJUL UIRLLTURAiL OF 1HAININ(6

I USA AIW UEFENSL SCHOOL AIIN: AILC-UH

I ujSa kJARTLWMASI H SCHOOL DlR~tWHAI OF TRAININU ULVEIOIJMINTS

I US COAST 60ARD ALAUEMY ATTIN: 1-AULT CJUNStLOR WDICK SLIMAK)

I USAl TWAINSIOWT AI I UN SCHOOL DINI ORH OF TPAININU

I LJSi INFANTPY SC..OJL LltiRAR)

I US i INFANTRY S~-iojt ATTN: AISH-1-V

1 US ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL AITN: AISH--CO

I UIS., INFANTPY SLIU'JL AIIN: ATS IL)OT

I USA INFANTWY SC-4UDL ATTN: AISH-LV

I lJS4 MIt ITARY PULICI! SCHOOL/THAININU CENTfW ATTN: ATIN-PTS

I iJSk MuIJAPY PULIC SCHlUL/TRAININLIU CENru-W UI. COMBAT OLVLORMENT

I ui MliITARY POLICL hCHOOL/TRAININb CENTI W DIR. TRAINING PLVtLOPMt-Ni

1 ui MIt ITAPY PULICt SCHOOL/TRATNINb cENTFR AT TN: ATLN-ACL

I US, INCTIILTk OF ADMINISTRATION ATTN: Wl'SIULNT IWAINTNG MANAULMENI

I NY$: LIHRAkY

1 US FIFLU ART IL-Ly ,CtIUUL mOwRis swITi LIBRARY

I iJS~ INSTIT'Tk OF AI)MINIST$MT1ON ALAUEMIC LIBIRARY

I USA WA4 CULL~bE ATTN: LIUHAHY

1 IJS 1 ARmOR ',CHOUL (OSARMd) AT Ij: LItHA$Y

I US COAST bLAWD ACAIEMY LloRARY

i USA TRANbPORTATIO'N SCHOOL TRANSt-'ORTAIIO , SCHOOL LI(BRAPY

I OR(,ANI.7ATIONAL t-tClIVENLSS Tpju CEN * S(H ATTN: LIHWARIAN

I US ARMY INTELLI.iL4CE CtAER * SCHOOUL ATT%: ATSI-TD

i US ARMY lNTFLLIl-r'Lf~ CtEI1LH * CHOOL A1114: ATSI-WM-M

G-21
I US:x FIFLU ART ILLL4Y SCH-UUL ULO-LL]UHAIL O CUUHSL A)v + IRAININU,

4 BRITISH EMAASSY 4HI11b'1 ULFLNCL STAF

e Ck.\AUI&N JOINT IF

I CIJLS (w~) L18RARY~

I FRFNCH MILITARY ATTACHL

I AUiTRIAN tmBASby MILITARY ANI) AIM AT IAC.4j

.3 CANAUIAN UkFENCF LIA1SU~i STAPF ATTN: Luir.SELLOR, DEIENcE W ANIU D

I ROYAL tATt1RLANoS tMbAS )Y mILTIAHY ATIAu t*

1 CANAUIAN FORCES bASE CONNWALLIS ATTN: PFRSONNLL %LLLCTION

e CA'JAL)1AN FORCES 3EIHSUNNtL APPL KSCH1 UNIT

I AR4Y PFRSONNLL ,LSI:AkCH LSJAkbLlS?1MLNT

I AWAY PFRSONNLL HLSI:ACH LbolAk3LTSHMLNT API SLILNFIFIC COORI.INATION O ICLL

b LI,4RARy OF C0Ut~S$ EACHANbL ANU tIFI DIV I D)EoENSF TLCHN1CtL INFORMAIIUN CLN ATTN: )TIC-TC

154 Il.4RARY OF CUNL~gLSS U1NI1 UOCUi,4LNTS EXPi-EITINb PHOJICT

I FOITON, R AND) U MA(3AZIN. ATTN: UNCOL-LN

I US GOVFRNMENT P"IN~IINti UPI LIHNANY9 ;)Uig IC UUCUMENTS DFPARIMtNT

I US GOVERNMENT PkNTIN6, U~l. LIMIKAkY A'4U LTATUTORY, LIM DIV (SLLU

1 THF: ARMY LIbRAKY

J/

G- 22