IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0937

Filed December 20, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAKE ROBERT SKAHILL,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica 

Zrinyi Ackley, Judge.

Jake Skahill appeals his convictions for second-degree sexual abuse, 

lascivious acts with a child, and enticing a minor. CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED;

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ashley Stewart, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Gamble, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
2

GAMBLE, Senior Judge.

Jake Skahill appeals his convictions for second-degree sexual abuse, in 

violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(1)(b) (2018); lascivious acts with a child, in 

violation of section 709.8(1)(a); and enticing a minor, in violation of section 

710.10(1). Skahill asserts the court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the 

presiding judge and in imposing consecutive sentences without adequate reasons. 

Background Facts.

Our supreme court vacated Skahill’s convictions after a prior trial 

concerning the same charges involving allegations made in 2018 that Skahill 

sexually abused his seven-year-old daughter K.W.1 State v. Skahill, 966 N.W.2d 

1, 4 (Iowa 2021). The supreme court concluded K.W.’s recorded Child Protection 

Center (CPC) forensic interviews were not admissible under the medical diagnosis 

exception. Id. at 10 (finding the interview was not conducted to seek a medical 

diagnosis). Nor were they admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay 

rule. Id. at 10, 15 (finding there are five requirements to the residual exception—

“trustworthiness, materiality, necessity, service of the interests of justice, and 

notice”—all of which must be satisfied—and finding error because necessity had 

not been shown); cf. State v. Maldonado, 993 N.W.2d 379, 385–89 (Iowa Ct. App. 

2023) (affirming admissibility of CPC interview under residual exception where all 

five requirements were shown). Because the court could not conclude admitting 

1 This is actually the third trial—the first ended in a mistrial due to the jury seeing 

evidence it should not have; the second trial ended with convictions, which were 

appealed, the convictions vacated, and the case sent back for this third trial. 
3

the interviews at trial was harmless error, the court remanded to the district court 

for retrial. Skahill, 966 N.W.2d at 17.

The district court ordered Skahill’s transport to jail on November 30, 2021. 

Skahill posted bond on January 18, 2022. That same day, the State filed a motion 

for bond modification, asserting the complaining witness “is in fear of the 

[d]efendant” and asking that the court require Skahill to report to pretrial services 

and be subject to GPS monitoring to ensure he made no contact with the child. 

On January 19, the court, by the same judge who had presided at the earlier trials,

granted the State’s motion to require pretrial services “[b]ased on the nature of the 

charges.” On January 20, Skahill filed a resistance to the motion for bond 

modification and request for hearing, asserting the court had not provided 

adequate reasons for imposing different conditions of bond than before the 

previous trial and he had not been given appropriate notice or had the opportunity 

“to weigh in on the matter.” On January 25, the court filed a written order, stating 

in part:

Now that the Defendant has posted the cash bond, he is 

required to report to [the Department of Correctional Services 

(DCS)]. Standard pre-trial services are required, that in the case of 

a sex offender allegation require ankle monitoring. Additionally, the 

Defendant has always been subject to a no contact order and the 

court reiterated the conditions in its order. Violation of the no contact 

order is mandatory arrest per statute.

The court will set a hearing however, to allow argument from 

the Defendant concerning the DCS requirements and how he 

believes he is exempt from the standard requirements for pretrial

release conditions.

The court set Skahill’s objections for hearing but declined to modify its prior order 

after that hearing.
4

Recusal.

The trial was scheduled to begin on April 26. On April 15, Skahill filed 

several motions, including a motion to disqualify the judge. Skahill asserted, 

“Based on the court’s actions and statements the court has made on the record, 

the Defendant is concerned the court is not neutral, detached or impartial,” citing 

statements made by the judge at his 2019 sentencing hearing, the pretrial 

conditions of bond, and the judge’s statements at the bond review hearing. 

At the combined pretrial hearing, the court rejected the motion to disqualify, 

stating: 

I had considered the possibility of maybe just having a whole clean 

slate, Mr. Skahill, so you just start completely over, but because it 

was a remand, the further that I thought about it and the research 

that I did over the weekend, if the supreme court had thought that I 

needed to step down, it would have directed that, and it didn’t. The 

commentary that is quoted in the motion was commentary 

subsequent to two jury trials in a sentencing order. The second 

commentary was relative to the manner of approaching a request 

from the State to have you on the GPS monitoring system. I have 

no bias in this case from my perspective. All I want is the evidence 

to come out properly. I never intended for my rulings to cause the 

difficulties that we’ve had now in bringing this back again. I really 

just want the facts to be portrayed as they are. I want the jury to be 

able to render a decision be it one way or the other. I think that you

deserve to have justice, you deserve to have your life directed in the 

manner in which it needs to be, as well as does the named victim 

and her family from her maternal side, so I will deny the Motion for 

Recusal.[2]

2 The terms “motion to disqualify” and “motion to recuse” are used interchangeably. 

See Taylor v. State, 632 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 2001) (noting “recusal” is a 

synonym of “disqualification”). 

We also note, subsequent to this trial, our rules of criminal procedure were 

amended to no longer address motions for change of judge.

Former rule 2.11(9) authorized a “motion for change of 

judge” . . . . References to the motion of change of judge have been 

deleted from revised rule 2.11 because they have been superseded 

by other sources of law relating to recusal and disqualification. See, 

e.g., Iowa Ct. R. 51:2.11. While a litigant should certainly move for 
5

On appeal, Skahill repeats his claims of bias made at the time of the pretrial 

hearing. But he also argues a “second instance of perceived bias took place during 

the trial with an exchange between defense counsel and the district court,” which 

he asserts “amplifies” the court’s inability to separate information provided in the 

previous trials.” And he adds, “The final and arguably the most ardent example of 

potential bias occurred during Skahill’s sentencing hearing . . . .”3 

Our supreme court has stated, “There is a constitutional right to have a 

neutral and detached judge.” State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994). 

“Before recusal is necessary, actual prejudice must be shown.” State v. Biddle, 

652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002). Because Skahill sought the court’s 

disqualification, it is his burden to show grounds for recusal existed. See id. 

“We review a judge’s decision on a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion.” 

State v. Trane, 984 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Iowa 2023) (citation omitted). When 

applying this standard, we are reminded “there is as much obligation for a judge 

not to recuse when there is no occasion for the judge to do so” as there is for the 

disqualification of a judge when a legal ground for doing so arises, 

that is not the only way for disqualification to occur.

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(4) cmt.

3 Skahill did not renew his motion to recuse during trial or at sentencing, so these 

additional allegations were never considered by the district court, and we do not 

consider them on appeal concerning the issue of recusal. See State v. Bynum, 

937 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Iowa 2020). However, we do consider the district court’s 

statements at sentencing in determining whether a sentencing error occurred. See 

State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2010) (“[E]rrors in sentencing may 

be challenged on direct appeal even in the absence of an objection in the district 

court.”).
6

judge to recuse when there is. Id. at 434 (emphasis added) (cleaned up for 

readability).4

A judge should recuse when the judge’s impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned. This is an objective test. Actual prejudice 

must be shown before recusal is necessary, and speculation is not 

sufficient. 

A judge’s impartiality might be questioned when the judge has 

a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. But only personal 

bias or prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source constitutes 

a disqualifying factor. Judicial predilection or an attitude of mind 

resulting from the facts learned by the judge from the judge’s 

participation in the case is not a disqualifying factor.

Id. (emphasis added) (cleaned up for readability). 

Skahill’s complaints do not address “personal bias or prejudice stemming 

from an extrajudicial source.” Id. Rather, Skahill argues the court’s knowledge 

from his prior trials has tainted its ability to be unbiased. See In re C.L.C., 798 

N.W.2d 329, 337 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (“[O]pinions formed by a judge ‘on the basis 

of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or 

of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless 

they display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 

impossible.’” (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). 

Skahill’s complaints are similar to those made by the defendant and rejected 

by our supreme court in Trane:

We have considered all of [defendant]’s arguments, including his 

claims that the judge engaged in combative dialogue towards 

[defendant]’s counsel, assumed the role of prosecutor, threatened to 

eject attendees supporting [defendant], and made impermissible 

statements during sentencing. From our review of the record, 

however, we find no statements or actions suggesting that the judge 

acted from “personal bias or prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial 

4 We use the parenthetical (cleaned up for readability) to note all internal quotation 

marks, citations, and alterations have been omitted. 
7

source.” We note also that the judge issued a written order 

explaining his reasons for declining to recuse. In that order, we find 

no reasons to think that the court’s decision was “based on untenable 

grounds” or that the court “acted unreasonably.” Rather, the judge 

carefully considered [defendant]’s arguments—and also “examine[d 

his] own conscience”—before concluding there was “no basis for the 

recusal motion.”

984 N.W.2d at 434. For the same reasons noted in Trane, we conclude Skahill 

has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by denying his recusal 

motion. 

Trial and Sentencing.

At trial, evidence was presented that when K.W. was seven years old, she 

divided her time between her mother’s house and Skahill’s house. Each parent 

also had other children with different partners. K.W. recalled a time when she was 

sitting on Skahill’s lap on a chair in his living room. Skahill “told the kids to go 

upstairs,” which they did, and he told her to “stay downstairs.” K.W. testified Skahill 

“took his penis from his pants, and then he told me to suck it, and I said no, and 

then he told me to wiggle it, and then I did.” Skahill then put his hands inside of 

K.W.’s pants, underneath her underwear, and touched her “private parts.” Skahill 

was interrupted when his wife came home. He told K.W. “not to tell anybody, that 

it’s our little secret.” 

But K.W. told her mother what Skahill had done when they were together a 

few days later. The mother dropped K.W.’s brothers off at their grandmother’s 

house and took K.W. to the emergency room, where K.W. told the doctor she was 

sleeping in a chair and woke up with her father touching her and “her bottom hurts.”

K.W. displayed a “[s]hort linear mucosal wound inferior and to the left of the urethral 

opening.” K.W.’s mother took K.W. to the CPC the next day. 
8

Skahill did not testify at trial. The defense called CPC medical director 

Regina Butteris to testify; she stated she did not see an injury to K.W.’s genitals 

when she examined her one day after K.W. visited the emergency room. 

Dr. Butteris testified that it would not be uncommon for the genital area to heal

quickly.

The jury convicted Skahill of second-degree sexual abuse, lascivious acts 

with a minor, and enticing a minor. Skahill filed motions in arrest of judgment and 

for new trial. 

At the combined hearing on posttrial motions and sentencing, the court 

stated:

As you all know, I have sat now three times as the presiding 

judicial officer over the trial in this case, and I will honestly admit, it’s 

very difficult to keep everything compartmentalized, but listening to 

the testimony from the most recent trial, I do find that the jury was 

able to make a decision. They had appropriate standards to follow, 

and based on the weight of what I find to also be credible evidence, 

I do believe that the verdict rendered . . . has been supported by 

favorable testimony that concludes the verdicts are credible. I agree 

with the State that there is nothing that supports the Motion in Arrest 

of Judgment under the Rules of Criminal Procedure. So for those 

reasons, the Court denies both motions, and therefore, I am 

prepared to proceed to sentencing.

The court noted that the updated presentence investigation (PSI) report 

recommendation was that the court impose the statutory prison terms to run 

concurrently for a twenty-five-year term. The court also noted the enticement and 

lascivious-acts convictions merged for a single term of ten years and the seconddegree sexual abuse term carried a twenty-five-year term. 

The State recommended that the court impose consecutive sentences, 

noting the “unique case” that had “seen a mistrial, a trial, an appeal, and now a 
9

retrial. It has lived and survived with the obstacles in the court system created by 

COVID, and the victim here has shown that she is a survivor also.”

The defense objected to two paragraphs of the PSI that had been used in 

the prior proceedings, which “specifically refer to all of the statements that were 

contained within the CPC interview, which were not admitted during the course of

this trial, so we would ask the Court to not consider those, that they would be 

impermissible and non-prudent conduct at this point.” The defense recommended 

that the court impose concurrent sentences as recommended by the department 

of corrections in the PSI. Defense counsel asserted, 

The State’s recommendation for a consecutive sentence at this point

would seem to punish Mr. Skahill for exercising his constitutional 

rights of which he was entitled to and what the [s]upreme [c]ourt 

found that he was eligible for, and so at this point, entering a 

consecutive sentence would be—would appear to be a punishment 

for him following the rights that he is entitled to by law.

K.W. and her mother provided victim impact statements. The mother stated 

K.W. “not only suffered at [Skahill’s] hands from the sexual abuse but continues—

but he continues to cause harm by denying the truth for years and forcing her to 

tell her story over and over again.” 

The court then imposed sentence, stating:

As a result of the jury’s findings, the Court is hereby entering 

the convictions for Counts I, II, and III already delineated with Code

sections, and as I indicated, Counts II and III merge together. I do 

believe that the harm that has been suffered for this young lady, it is 

immense, and I said it before, that you can continue to believe that it

didn’t happen, but she believes it, and she’s testified over and over 

and over again about what happened. Each time individuals have 

attempted to try to find ways to make her feel inappropriate, make 

her feel like she does not know what she’s talking about, and to make 

her feel bad for what has occurred. She was [seven]. It’s a long 

price. I want you to think about that. [Seven]. You took away so 

much from her. I take my own personal responsibility for what was 
10

done here when I made my CPC ruling. I was trying to do what was 

fair, what was appropriate under the law, and what provided both you 

and her an appropriate remedy for representation in the court 

system. The Court of Appeals agreed with me, the [Iowa] Supreme 

Court did not. They felt that the CPC was an inappropriate manner 

and mechanism to present this information. I will say now on this 

record clearly, I disagree with them. I know I have to follow that law, 

and I did. But I disagree with them. Children who suffer at the hands 

of an older individual that perpetrated a sexual assault on them need 

to be protected. And [K.W.]’s mother is absolutely right. You’ve had 

lots of rights here. I’ve given you every possible mechanism to keep 

information before the juries. Every possible mechanism. But she 

hasn’t been protected at all, and it’s a real shame. After sitting on 

this bench for almost [twenty] years, it is a real shame to me that the 

court system continues to ignore victims, the trauma that they suffer, 

the harm that will never leave them. So having the CPC and giving 

them an opportunity to take away some of that and to only have her 

have to tell that story one time is a much better concept than making 

her come back over and over and over and over again. And your 

attorney is right. It is your right. The Constitution is there for a 

reason. But in the final end of the day, you have to think about what

you did. You have to think about the harm. And you have to live with 

that. It’s unfortunate that she has to also. And I’ve watched this 

young lady from the cute, cuddly and loving and bubbly little girl that 

she was in that CPC exam to come up here as a strong [eleven]-

year-old, that if you didn’t know age-wise, you could say she was a 

much more mature [sixteen]- or [seventeen]-year-old. She’s 

eloquent, and she asked you a lot of very pertinent questions, and

you have the right not to say anything, but you have yet to say, I’m 

sorry about the process. I didn’t ask you, at any point in time, to 

admit anything, and neither did she. But you’ve never even just 

apologized for the process. And to say that a [seven]-year-old would 

be able to make all of this up just because she wanted to put you

through this, you’ve never thought about it in the reverse. And I think 

it’s unfortunate. And I will apologize again to the family. If it goes up 

on appeal, and the [Iowa] Supreme Court once again decides that I 

did the wrong thing, I am sorry. I do believe that she deserves

protection, and I do believe that information needs to be before the 

jury. They need to know what’s the information so that they can 

balance it and they can weigh the credibility. I repeat over and over 

to them that that’s their job. And my faith in the criminal justice 

system has grown much stronger in the last year, since COVID has 

hit. I’ve seen juries put so much effort into rendering their decisions, 

and yours as well, as did the other jury. They never took this lightly. 

They were all extremely thought out, extremely heartfelt decisions 

and discussions that were had, and I appreciate very much what they 

did to try to syphon through all that they had before them. But I will 
11

repeat to you again, they found her credible. And at some point, 

maybe when you get to that stage, you’ll be able to tell her you’re 

sorry for the process. Because she’s lost a lot.

Considering all the statutory requirements that the Court has 

before it, the [twenty-five]-year term for Count I will be imposed. I 

don’t have any discretion in that regard. With regard to the two 

counts that merge for the [ten] years, I find that it’s appropriate at this 

phase to require that they be served consecutively. I think that that 

provides the most protection for the community, protection for the 

victim. I think that provides the rehabilitation that’s necessary for the 

Defendant. It gives him the opportunity for all of the necessary

treatment and therapy. That will include the sex offender therapy. 

On appeal, Skahill contends his due process right to a neutral and detached 

judge was violated when the district court imposed a harsher sentence than 

imposed after the prior trial without an appropriate explanation. 

“A claim of vindictiveness in sentencing implicates constitutional guarantees 

of due process, making our review of that issue de novo.” State v. Mitchell, 670 

N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 2003). Where a harsher sentence is imposed upon 

reconviction, “for the purpose of punishing a defendant for exercising his rights in 

seeking to have the conviction set aside is a flagrant violation of due process of 

law,’ the utmost scrutiny must be applied to ensure that the second sentence was 

not the product of vindictiveness.” Id. at 423 (citation omitted)

The Mitchell court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s “baseline 

approach to vindictiveness questions”:

Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a 

defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must 

play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since 

the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a 

defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his 

first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed 

of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the 

sentencing judge.

In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have 

concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence 
12

upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must 

affirmatively appear.[5] Those reasons must be based upon objective 

information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the 

defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing 

proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence 

is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional 

legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on 

appeal.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 

(1969)). 

Without conceding vindictiveness, the State acknowledges the district court 

did not affirmatively state its reasons for imposing a more severe sentence after 

retrial and agrees this case must be remanded for resentencing. And we cannot 

say Skahill’s successful appeal played no part in the court’s imposition of a harsher 

sentence. As quoted above, the sentencing court made mention numerous times 

about the appeal, the retrial, and the need for the child to repeat her testimony. 

The court identified no conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time 

of the original sentencing proceeding in support of the harsher sentence. 

Consequently, we affirm the convictions, vacate the sentence, and remand for 

resentencing before a different judge. 

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED 

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

5 But note, “when a different judge sentences a defendant after a retrial, and that 

judge articulates logical, nonvindictive reasons for the sentence, there simply is no 

sound basis to presume that the sentence is the product of judicial vindictiveness.” 

Mitchell, 670 N.W.2d at 424 (citation omitted).