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82–466 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–51] 

ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT 

CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH 

THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 25, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, July 25, 2013, Acquisition and Development Challenges Associated 

with the Littoral Combat Ship ............................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, July 25, 2013 .......................................................................................... 41 

THURSDAY, JULY 25, 2013 

ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH 

THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Subcommittee on 

Seapower and Projection Forces ......................................................................... 3 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Francis, Paul L., Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office .............................................................. 9 

Hunt, VADM Richard W., USN, Director, Navy Staff, Department of Defense . 4 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), Department of Defense ................................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 45 

Francis, Paul L. ................................................................................................ 62 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with VADM Richard W. Hunt ........................ 47 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 77 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 81 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 83 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 81 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 89 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 84 

(1) 

ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES 

ASSOCIATED WITH THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 25, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome all our Members and our distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on the 

acquisition and development challenges associated with the Littoral 

Combat Ship [LCS]. 

Concurrent with our hearing this morning, the Government Accountability Office [GAO] released a report entitled ‘‘Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial 

Unknowns about Capabilities, Use and Cost.’’ In this report GAO 

expresses concern about the design stability of the platform and 

concern about the program goals of the mission modules. Until 

these issues are clarified, GAO has recommended Congress consider restricting future funding to the program for the construction 

of additional seaframes until certain conditions are met. 

This is not the first time that we have received reports critical 

of the LCS program. The Perez report was a report commissioned 

by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations to assess and review the 

Navy readiness to receive, employ, and deploy the Littoral Combat 

Ship. This report, conducted in early 2012, was also critical of the 

LCS program both in terms of concepts and implementation. Specific concerns included in this report include the concept of operations, manning, maintenance, modularity, mission package capability, training, and commonality were identified. 

The Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation [DOT&E] has 

also expressed concerns about the survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship and indicated that LCS 1 is not expected to be survivable 

in combat, and unable to maintain mission capability after taking 

a significant hit in a hostile combat environment. The testing program associated with this first class is also lagging. 

I would be remiss if I did not mention the engineering casualties 

that LCS 1 is encountering during the deployment to Singapore. 

While expected in the first class, the sheer number of casualties associated with LCS 1 is troubling and needs to be quickly addressed. 
2 

At a time of reducing resources, the Navy is planning to even more 

heavily rely on this lower cost alternative. I believe it is incumbent 

on this subcommittee to ensure that we have the most capable 

lower cost alternative that is relevant to the combatant commanders in time of conflict. 

I also believe that criticism of the LCS program is warranted. 

From this most recent GAO report to the Perez report, and even 

DOT&E assessment, they all provide an alternative view as to how 

to best manage the acquisition and development of this effort. But 

let me emphasize that none of these reports disputes the necessity 

to rapidly field the capabilities proposed by the Littoral Combat 

Ship, and I look forward to doing my part to make sure that we 

methodically and expeditiously field the right LCS capability to the 

fleet in the years ahead. 

Today we are honored to have as our witnesses the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, 

the Honorable Sean Stackley—Mr. Stackley, thank you for being 

here and for your dedication to our country; the Director of the 

Navy Staff and Chairman of the Littoral Combat Ship Council, 

Vice Admiral Richard Hunt, and, Admiral Hunt, we thank you for 

your service to this country and for taking time to be with us 

today; and the Managing Director of Acquisition and Sourcing 

Management, Government Accountability Office, Mr. Paul Francis. 

And, Mr. Francis, thank you and your entire team for the good 

work that they do in bringing these issues forward. 

And we thank you all for being here. I couldn’t think of a better 

panel to assist our subcommittee in reviewing this issue, and I 

hope that at the end of this hearing, that we will be best able to 

provide a firm direction as to the path forward with the LCS program. 

And before I recognize Mr. Courtney, I want to just make one 

other comment, and it is this: I hear from time to time people saying, well, isn’t this really problematic, because we have a difference 

within the Navy even about the LCS; that we have people that are 

raising different issues, and they are not on the same sheet of 

music? And I want to just tell you all I take a totally different view 

of that. I want to applaud you all for being able to come to the 

table, having divergent points of view, being willing to really ask 

the tough questions and put them on the table, and I think that 

is what makes our Navy so strong and capable is our ability to do 

that. So I just want to thank you all for your willingness to not 

come in here in an adversarial role where each person has to put 

forward their own side, but that we can really ask these tough 

questions and get answers, because in the end we want the best 

vessels for our Navy and for the American people, and I want to 

applaud you all for trying to do that. 

And after saying that, it is my privilege now to recognize the acting ranking member, I guess we would say today, or the vice ranking member Mr. Courtney, someone who is very committed to the 

Navy, and for any remarks that he might have. Mr. Courtney. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for organizing this hearing. And I couldn’t agree with you more. We have 

an outstanding panel here today, who have been here in the past 

to talk about this issue over the last number of years, and, again, 

we look forward to an update, particularly in light of the GAO report. 

Today the subcommittee meets in open session to hear testimony 

on the acquisition and development challenges associated with the 

Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS is a critical element of the Navy’s 

long-term shipbuilding plan and our national security strategy. 

However, 9 years into the program, many of us on this subcommittee and many of our colleagues in the House have serious 

questions regarding the LCS concept of operations; its manning, 

maintenance, and sustainment concepts; and its survivability in a 

combat environment. Given how critical this platform is to the 

Navy’s ability to meet critical-mission areas in the decades ahead, 

it is important that we get this right. 

Based on the Navy’s assurances that its revised acquisition strategy would provide an affordable transformational ship for the future, Congress agreed to funding additional LCS seaframes at the 

same time that the Navy continued its planned period of experimentation, testing, and evaluation. Now, however, we find a program facing cost growth, schedule delays, and problems with delivering intended capabilities, as GAO noted in their report released 

today. These issues and others lead us to examine where the program stands now, where it is heading, and what steps all of us 

here today can do to ensure its success. 

The GAO’s report that we will discuss today raises several important questions that the Navy and this panel will need to sort 

out. For instance, is proceeding with procurement of so many seaframes so far ahead of availability of the antisubmarine, mine 

countermeasure, and surface warfare mission modules the best and 

most cost-effective approach? 

Second, with regards to the GAO’s recommendation that Congress halt progress on future ships pending further study and oversight, what impact would such an approach have on existing contracts and ongoing efforts to reduce costs? 

Third, is it good fiscal judgment and sea-building practice to continue with the planned purchase of seaframes over the next 2 to 

3 fiscal years when design changes that could result from further 

developmental and operational testing and evaluation could drive 

up costs? 

With regards to recent news from the LCS deployment in Singapore, how should Congress respond to the reliability issues with 

the Freedom’s variant diesel engines, which have experienced multiple instances of loss of power during deployments? 

Finally, given the expertise and experience of our witnesses 

today, I hope you can help us put the challenges of this LCS in 

proper historical context relative to those experienced in other shipbuilding programs in the earlier years. Ultimately this panel will 

have to make some tough choices in the coming years regarding the 
4 

right balance between getting the fleet, the platforms, and capability it so urgently needs, while ensuring that we do all we can 

as good stewards of our increasingly limited fiscal resources. I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses and to a robust discussion 

of this important program. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Just a couple of procedural matters. I ask unanimous consent 

that nonsubcommittee members, if any, be allowed to participate in 

today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there any objection? 

Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be recognized 

at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

I also ask unanimous consent that other committee and noncommittee members be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after 

all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there any objection to that? 

Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be recognized 

at the appropriate times for 5 minutes. 

With that, Secretary, we are glad to have you here, and we are 

going to give you the floor. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Mr. Chairman Forbes, Representative 

Courtney, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today alongside Vice Admiral Hunt to address the Littoral Combat Ship program. With the 

permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide a brief statement and submit a separate formal statement for the record. 

Mr. FORBES. And your written statements of all the witnesses 

will be made part of the record. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Thank you, sir. 

In view of the witnesses today, myself and Vice Admiral Hunt, 

I am going to ask that Vice Admiral Hunt provide his statement 

first to address the need for LCS in terms of requirements, and I 

will follow to talk about where we are programmatically and our 

proposal for the way ahead. 

Mr. FORBES. And we are happy to do that. Admiral, as we mentioned at the beginning, we appreciate your service. Thank you for 

being here, and we would like to turn the floor over to you then 

right now. 

STATEMENT OF VADM RICHARD W. HUNT, USN, DIRECTOR, 

NAVY STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral HUNT. Thank you, Chairman Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, if you could pull that mike just a little bit 

closer. I know they are kind of tricky sometimes. Make sure it is 

turned on. 

Admiral HUNT. How about this? 

Mr. FORBES. That is great. 

Admiral HUNT. Chairman Forbes, distinguished members of the 

subcommittee and other distinguished Members, first of all, I want 

to thank you for holding this hearing on the Littoral Combat Ship, 

and I appreciate the opening statements. It is exactly where we 

want to go is take this to the next level and make sure we have 
5 

got the right program for the fleet, and I am personally confident 

that we do. 

In my years in the Navy, I have had the honor of serving as a 

numbered fleet commander. I was the 3rd Fleet commander that 

took delivery of USS Freedom several years ago. I have been the 

Surface Force Type commander, which is responsible for man training and equipment of all of our surface Navy ships. I have had 

command of a frigate; I have had command of a cruiser; a strike 

group command. But perhaps most insightful for the hearing that 

we are having today is I was a precommissioning engineer on USS 

Underwood, FFG–36, and lived the life of introducing a new ship 

class to the fleet with the challenges that that brings. 

I think really the grouping of those past experiences give me a 

kind of a unique perspective to address the topic that we are looking at today. 

The Littoral Combat Ship provides our Navy with vitally important capabilities and is key to the future of all naval operations. 

LCS, with its speed, shallow draft, and persistence, coupled with 

the modular architecture, offers the ability to operate in the 

inshore environment and the near-land battlespace. It will take us 

to improve our Navy’s global reach further than we have today. Its 

affordable and its reconfigurable mission—focused-mission warship 

design is core to handling the swarming surface threat, the 

countermine challenges that we have, and submarines in the contested littorals. LCS meets that threat today and has the flexibility 

to continue to improve and face upcoming threats in the future. 

We certainly intend to take LCS into harm’s way. LCS is a warship that has credible combat systems. If damaged in combat, she 

is built to survive and then withdraw. In terms of aviation and unmanned system, this ship has more aviation and off-board vehicle 

capability than any surface combatant of comparable size in the 

world. 

I want to be clear on this fact: LCS will deploy with effective 

mission modules. Each of LCS’s three mission modules—the 

antisurface warfare, the mine countermeasures, and antisubmarine 

warfare—offers credible combat power greater than what we have 

today. 

With that in mind, I would like to give just a quick thumbnail 

sketch of these capabilities. I would offer I have had the opportunity to talk to all of our forward fleet commanders, the 7th Fleet 

commander in the western Pacific, the 5th Fleet commander in the 

Gulf, and the 6th Fleet commander in the Mediterranean, and 

what I am about to say they all agree with and recognize the importance. 

For the antisurface warfare capability, we provide an armed SH– 

60 Romeo helicopter. We will eventually provide Fire Scout VTUAV 

[Vertical Take-Off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle]. 

It comes with two highly effective 30-millimeter cannons, and that 

supplements the core 57-millimeter main gun. This gives LCS a capability that is equal to or exceeds any of our small combatants 

that we have today. 

The package additionally includes two 11-meter RHIBs, which 

are rigid hull inflatable boats, and comes with a dedicated boarding 

team when configured in this manner. The 11-meter RHIBs are a 
6 

great enhancement over the 7-meter RHIBs that we have predominantly in the fleet and allow us to conduct maritime interdiction 

operations in antipiracy actions, a point made very specifically to 

me the other day by our 5th Fleet commander. 

For mine countermeasures [MCM], the initial increment will be 

about twice as effective as what we have on our MCM–1 class 

Avenger mine sweeps, and it comes with more precise sonar capability for rapid hunting and, therefore, avoiding of mines, which is 

clearly where we are going in the 5th Fleet AOR [area of responsibility]. As we go through the enhancements, the capability will expand to about three times the capability of what we currently have 

in inventory, and we do that without putting the ship and, therefore, our sailors into the minefield, enhancing their safety. 

And finally, our antisubmarine warfare capabilities are equally 

impressive. It comes both with passive and active towed arrays and 

variable-depth sonars to provide a tremendous capability not only 

where we could escort our battle groups at sea, but specifically designed to be effective in the littoral. 

So we have really developed and produced a terrific capability. 

It is the right thing to do, and I stand forward looking forward to 

your questions here as we go throughout the hearing. 

Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Hunt and Secretary 

Stackley can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thank you. I am sure the Members are 

going to look forward to asking you a number of questions in just 

a few moments. 

And, Mr. Secretary, tell us the status of the program now. We 

know the admiral has told us why we need it, and let us hear 

where we are going. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, thank you. 

And I am going to start by putting this in the context of the overall shipbuilding requirements. So I will start with the fact that today’s Navy is a battle force of 286 ships, about half of which are 

underway on any given day, providing maritime security, missile 

defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance as needed, where 

needed. They are conducting antipiracy patrols, global partnership 

stations, humanitarian assistance, and all the while they are training and repairing for the next deployment, the next operation. 

And whether measured by the breadth and pace of today’s operations or by the defense strategy’s call for increased naval presence 

from the Middle East to the Pacific, the broad range of missions 

your Navy is called upon to perform relies upon a fleet that—as 

outlined by the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] in his report to 

Congress earlier this year—a fleet that is globally present, operating forward, a fleet made of a balanced mix of ships, a fleet that 

is 306 ships in number. 

The Navy’s objective to reach the 300-ship level by the end of 

this decade is more an imperative than a goal if your fleet is to 

meet the missions called for by the Nation, while sustaining the 
7 

operational tempo that we have all grown to expect of our ships 

and sailors. This requires that we build that balanced mix of ships 

per the CNO’s requirements at a rate of about 10 ships per year, 

and that we not merely control costs, but that we drive down costs 

in each of our new construction programs. 

The Littoral Combat Ship, or LCS, is central to this strategy. 

The LCS’s high speed and low draft design make the ship uniquely 

qualified for operations ranging from open ocean to coastal or littoral waters. The investment in automated systems and low-maintenance design make the ship capable of operations at manning 

levels of less than half that of the ships she will replace. The seaframe designed to naval vessel rules with an installed combat system capable of meeting the ship’s self-defense requirements provides a level of survivability matched to the threat in which she 

will operate. And, most importantly, the modular mission package 

design, call it flexibility, call it agility, the LCS’s ability to put to 

sea with a warfare system and crew tailored to meet its assigned 

mission is a classic force multiplier. 

Today three distinct mission packages are in development and 

testing: surface warfare mission package designed to meet the 

emerging threat proposed by fast inshore attack craft; mine countermeasures mission package designed to close a critical, absolutely 

critical, warfighting gap in mine warfare; and an antisubmarine 

warfare mission package designed to provide greater capacity to 

combat the growing threat posed by the proliferation of increasingly quiet attack submarines. 

Each of these mission packages has made significant strides this 

past year towards respective operational test milestones. In fact, 

today the USS Freedom, LCS 1, deployed to the western Pacific 

with the first increment of the surface warfare mission package on 

board, is meeting the combatant commander’s demands in that theater of operations. Meanwhile, the USS Independence, LCS 2, operating in her home port of San Diego, is serving as the operational 

test ship for the first increment of the mine countermeasures mission package and soon will be joined by the USS Fort Worth, LCS 3, 

operating with the developmental model of the next increment of 

the surface warfare mission package. 

The Navy’s strategy for delivering of these mission modules is a 

textbook case of best practices. First, the mission modules are designed with an open architecture, which provides the ability to upgrade rapidly as new technologies emerge, and which provides the 

ability to compete future upgrades throughout the ship’s life. 

Second, mission modules are integrated into the ship via standard interfaces, which means that upgrades to the mission modules 

are accomplished without impacting the ship. This breakthrough 

design approach provides the LCS with the unique ability to upgrade its mission systems without lengthy, costly, disruptive depot 

modernization periods required by other ship classes. 

Third, mission modules can be rapidly swapped out if called for 

by a change to the ship’s anticipated mission. 

And fourth, employing these design characteristics, the Navy is 

able to field mission packages utilizing an incremental fielding plan 

that manages risks, while providing urgently needed capability and 

capacity. 
8 

Specifically, by leveraging mature technologies and off-the-shelf 

systems, the first increments of LCS mission packages provide 

much-needed capacity, exceeding that available in the fleet today. 

Meanwhile we continue to develop new technologies and systems 

needed to fill gaps in today’s warfighting capabilities for incorporation in later increments. 

Today the mission packages are on track to deliver the capability 

needed by the Navy, and they are doing so within the cost targets 

established for the program. In fact, the greatest risk to our mission package program is not technical. Today the greatest risk is 

that posed by the disruption and delay caused by stop and start, 

and slowdown caused by continuing resolutions, sequestration, and 

other budget reductions. 

With specific regard to LCS ship or seaframe production, lessons 

learned from the lead ships have been thoroughly incorporated into 

the production plan. Lead ship design deficiencies have been corrected, and the design is very stable, very stable, with design 

changes reduced by 80 to 90 percent in follow ships. 

The significant facility improvements and investment in workforce training made by each shipyard has resulted in greatly improved efficiency in each ship’s construction. The vendor base is 

leveraging the stability provided by the long-term LCS contract to 

drive down costs. By every measure quality is high, meeting and 

exceeding standards set by the Naval Sea Systems Command and 

the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey, and overall the dualblock buy, contracts for 10 ships over 5 years at each of the shipbuilders, is delivering on the $2.9 billion savings announced at 

award. 

In summary, LCS provides the capacity the Navy needs today to 

fill critical gaps in our warfighting ability, and as we continue to 

field future increments of LCS mission packages, we will be able 

to provide much-needed capabilities that do not exist in the fleet 

today. 

The LCS program was initiated with critical flaws, we are all 

aware of that; however, current execution of the LCS program is 

following best practices in acquisition. Holding requirements stable, 

holding the design stable, leveraging competition to the fullest, our 

costs are under control and greatly improved, and contained within 

fixed-price contracts. Risk is well managed by leveraging mature 

technologies and employing an incremental approach to upgrading 

the program’s modular mission systems. Now is not the time to 

slow the program and add costs. 

We have decisions to make before we proceed in fiscal year 2016 

beyond the current block buy. We will take a fully informed business and warfighting-based approach to these decisions, and we are 

committed to working with Congress to provide transparency as we 

formulate these decisions. 

This is our most affordable warship program. It is on a critical 

path to meeting the Navy’s force structure requirements as outlined by the Chief of Naval Operations. There are challenges yet 

ahead, and there is need for further improvement, as there is in 

each of our shipbuilding and aviation programs, but we believe we 

have properly assessed these challenges, and we are going about 

the business of meeting these challenges with a degree of rigor and 
9 

discipline and, too, urgency matched to the critical need for these 

ships in the fleet. 

We thank you for your past support, we urge your continued support, we welcome your oversight, and we look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley and Admiral 

Hunt can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Francis. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. FRANCIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Courtney, members of the subcommittee and 

other Members, good morning. And I am happy to be here to participate in the discussion of the Littoral Combat Ship. I think we 

are all well aware of the unique capabilities and features that the 

ship offers, and I think we would all like to see the ship reach its 

full potential. I will give you a quick snapshot of where we see the 

program today in terms of seaframes, mission modules, and the 

concept of operations. 

I think of the three, the seaframes are the furthest along, and 

I would agree with what Mr. Stackley said about the production of 

the ships being under control, costs being under control; I think design in pretty good shape. There is significant testing yet to be 

done, shock trials and survivability trials, and then testing out the 

combat system, and the Navy is looking at some design changes for 

the future, doing some studies on that. So we will need to see the 

effects of those. 

On the mission modules, they have had a much tougher go of it. 

They have not done that well in testing. There is quite a bit to go 

yet on the mission modules, and I wouldn’t say that the configuration of the modules, particularly regarding the mine countermeasures, is stable at this point. 

I think the long pole in the tent right now is the concept of operations, which involves the manning, the swapping out of the mission modules in theater, and the maintenance support concept, 

which is basically off the ship and on shore. The ship itself is not 

going to have much onboard maintenance capability. And while I 

see the seaframes and the modules as giving the ship its technical 

ability, it is really the CONOPS [concept of operations] that give 

it its capability. So those abilities won’t be able to be brought to 

bear unless the support of the ship works. So at this point I think 

one can be hopeful, but not yet confident that the ship is going to 

deliver on its full capability. 

Let me switch now briefly to oversight. In my view, the primary 

oversight mechanisms that we applied to major weapons systems 

have not been applied on the LCS program, and let me give you 

some examples. When a program starts, you would do typically an 

analysis of alternatives and then pick the best alternative. In the 

case of LCS, the ship was picked first, and then the analysis of alternatives done afterwards. 
10 

In shipbuilding you have a sequence where you do design, and 

then you do construction. When we started LCS, we did design and 

construction concurrently. 

In shipbuilding you have a Milestone B decision that authorizes 

the detailed design and construction of the lead ship. When we had 

Milestone B on the LCS, we had already 24 ships under contract. 

On the mission modules, those are weapons systems, Milestone B 

on a weapons system authorizes the beginning of engineering development. Now, we haven’t had a Milestone B on mission modules 

yet, but two of them are already in production. 

And then finally, law and policy says before you go into full-rate 

production, a program has to go through operational testing. I 

would say that the LCS today is in full-rate production. We authorized four ships a year in 2012, which is the full rate anticipated, 

yet operational testing is not going to occur until 2019. 

So, in my view, the strategy up to this point on LCS has been 

buy before fly, and at this point we are producing at full rate, yet 

we are still experimenting with the ship. I think the Department 

of Defense has instituted a number of mechanisms to try to do reviews, cost studies, Defense Acquisition Board reviews every year, 

but I believe, in my view, that these are workarounds for the oversight mechanisms that were not used. 

So what do we do now? I think we have to look at the program 

the way it is. It is a ship in full-rate production, but its operational 

effectiveness will not be demonstrated for years to come. That is 

where we are. We have to look at the ship today as being substantially bought already, so you are going to have to provide the support it requires, whether it is crew changes, whether it is mission 

module updates, whether it is additional spares. We already know 

we need additional manning on shore to do the offshore maintenance. So you will have to provide that for the ships already done. 

In my mind, the report we have issued today makes rather modest recommendations on the program. We say, put strings on the 

fiscal year 2014 money, and have the Navy come back and tell you 

what design changes are we anticipating on the ship. We also ask 

the Navy to come back and say—to tell you what are the relative 

advantages and disadvantages of each ship as they perform each 

mission. Now, the Navy is already doing studies on these. It should 

be pretty easy to do, and you ought to know it, so I don’t see that 

as halting the program. These are things I think the Navy could 

do as a condition for getting the money. 

We have also made other recommendations that would be relevant to the 2016 block buy. This is the next block of ships. It is 

a very big decision coming up. What we have recommended is keep 

the production of the ships to a minimum rate during that block 

buy at least until we get through operational testing, and in line 

with that, we say, hey, keep the mission modules’ production rate 

minimum so—just enough to support testing. 

Now, the Department does not agree with us on that and says, 

hey, we are in full rate, we are making four a year, we have great 

prices. If we slow it down, prices are going to go up, and we have 

to produce the mission modules to keep pace with the ships. I 

would just ask you to be wary of that dynamic because it creates, 
11 

in my mind, irreversible momentum to go forward and can tie your 

hands. So just be wary of that. 

So what can you do? I think about you having a very good window for oversight over the next 2 years. In spring of 2015, you will 

have to consider the Navy’s proposal for the 2016 block buy, so 

your dates actually come a little bit faster than you might otherwise think. At that point I think you can employ some of the mechanisms that we have recommended on the 2014 and 2015 buy to 

get the Navy to provide you information that you need to make the 

decisions on those two ships, and I would pay particular attention 

to what the Navy proposes for the block 2016 buy. For example, if 

that proposal came in for a large number of ships or a number of 

ships that, say, went beyond operational testing, then I think your 

hands really could be tied in oversight because we will have locked 

in the bulk of the program. 

So in closing I would say you have some leverage between now 

and the spring of 2015. Use it. And I wouldn’t be too overcome by 

concerns that this is going to be devastating to the program. I don’t 

think it is. 

So, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Courtney, that concludes my remarks. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Francis, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis can be found in the Appendix on page 62.] 

Mr. FORBES. And to all of our panelists, we want to just tell you 

how much again we appreciate you being here. We also understand 

you represent large teams behind you. As we thank you, we are 

also thanking the professionalism that they bring today. 

I want to just tell you, today is not a deposition, so we don’t want 

to have a situation we are asking questions, and you feel like you 

have to get out without answering anything in a short period of 

time. We want you to have that discussion. 

I am going to defer all of my questions because this is one of the 

most bipartisan subcommittees probably we have in Congress. We 

have enormous respect for each other. A lot of expertise represented in this room today. I want to make sure all of our Members can ask their questions. 

With that, I would like to ask unanimous consent that we can 

reduce our time from 5 minutes to 4 minutes, because I think we 

have votes sit at 11 o’clock coming up, and I want to make sure 

we can get as many Members in as possible. I think Mr. Courtney 

has agreed to that. Is there any objection to that? If not, we will 

reduce our time to 4 minutes. 

I will ask maybe some questions in between just to link up with 

the previous questions. If any of you want to comment, just let me 

know, give me a signal. We want to make sure you get whatever 

you need on the record. 

With that, I would like to go first to my good friend Mr. Courtney 

for his questions. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, I know we 

have a lot of attendance here today, so I am going to try to keep 

my questions very brief and succinct. 

Again just, Mr. Stackley, I was wondering if you could just kind 

of help us sort of understand the study suggestion that came out 

of GAO where they, again, suggested to Congress that we restrict 
12 

funding until studies have been complete. Are these studies actually under way? Are they close to being finished, I mean? And what 

do you see as the impact; is it neutral or is it significant if such 

a restriction was put into place, again just on the studies? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. So first on the studies. Every shipbuilding program that we have got we have got ongoing studies in 

terms of looking at what further capabilities do we need to bring 

to the ship, what is the cost associated with bringing that capability, what is the impact to the program, and then what is the best 

way for incorporating those upgrades if it is determined that the 

cost is well worth the added capability? 

So specifically for the LCS program, I would characterize we 

have three not so much studies, but we are doing three looks at 

the program. First is the continuation of correction of deficiencies. 

You know, we have the first ship out on deployment, and one of 

the things that we are gaining from that deployment is lessons 

learned in terms of extended persistent operations in theater, what 

do we need to do different going forward to improve its performance. 

Chairman Forbes, in your statement you made reference to the 

SSDGs [ship service diesel generators]. That is probably the most 

significant design deficiency that we are dealing with today. We do 

have reliability issues that we have identified, we have fixes in 

place on the follow ships, and as LCS 1 continues its deployment, 

we will be incorporating those fixes on LCS 1 to address that issue. 

So there are correction of deficiencies that are ongoing. 

The second is I will call it commonality. We want to achieve 

greater commonality with fleet standard systems and across the 

class, so we are looking at two areas in which commonality have 

big bang for the buck. One is what we call C4I, or our command, 

control, communications information systems; and the second is in 

the combat system itself. 

So we have done studies in terms of what alternatives we would 

look at. The open architecture design of the LCS gives us great 

ability to bring forward those type of upgrades without significant 

disruption to the platform, and now we are going at looking at the 

specific details in terms of what changes would be required to the 

platform, what timeframe makes sense to do that, and what is the 

associated cost. 

So, for example, we look at the fiscal year 2016 procurement as 

that would be a likely time to incorporate upgrades in that regard. 

We do this very thoughtfully, we do it through a configuration 

steering board, we go through the rigor of the design and the cost 

estimating, and we work with the shipbuilders to ensure it does not 

set us backwards. 

The third area would be in the mission modules themselves. As 

I described in my opening statement, what we are doing today is 

we are leveraging off-the-shelf technologies for the early increments, and we are also continuing with development of new technologies. In that development of new technologies arena, we have 

had a couple of setbacks. We have relied on systems that were either being procured by one of the other services that we were going 

to leverage, specifically the non-line-of-sight missile that the Army 

was producing or developing to produce. They have cancelled that 
13 

program, so we are moving on with the development of an alternative surface-to-surface mission module capability for a future 

LCS increment. 

So those are the three types of studies that are ongoing, and we 

are doing this in broad daylight. We are not doing this behind 

closed doors. We are doing it in broad daylight. We welcome the 

oversight, we welcome the insight that we can provide to you all, 

because we are going to be coming back to you at least annually 

with a budget to discuss and propose future investments in those 

regards. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

And just one other sort of housekeeping question. Again, the 

GAO recommendation was to buy sort of a minimum quantity of 

ships to preserve the industrial base until full production—full-rate 

production design decision is made. In the Navy’s response you 

state that the Navy plans to buy LCS seaframes in accordance with 

the most recent long-range shipbuilding plan. 

So I guess the question is, again, in your testimony you said we 

are building four a year right now, but the shipbuilding plan, when 

we checked that, it was two a year for 2016 and 2018. Again, is 

that the number for those years, two? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. So both the shipbuilding 

plan and the President’s budget that was submitted for 2014 FYDP 

[Future Years Defense Program], we continue with the block buy 

through 2015, which is four per year, and the budget and the longrange plan lays up a reduction to two per year. 

So let me go to the specific, the second half of your question, 

which is, well, what would the impact be of slowing down the program, taking a pause, or delaying in 2014 while we continue to do 

further studies? Well, the impact would be many-fold. First, there 

is going to be an impact to the fleet because the fleet needs the capability, and this is delaying getting the capability out there. 

Second, there is an impact associated with the cost to the program. Any delay in any shipbuilding program is going to have a 

cost impact, and so we have to decide, is it worth that impact. As 

I described, we believe that the seaframe production is very stable. 

We are going forward with off-the-shelf technologies on the mission 

packages, which we are developing. So to delay the fiscal year 2014 

ships, which would be delivering in the 2017, 2018 timeframe, to 

await completion of later increments developmental testing, I think 

that is going in the absolute wrong direction. We will be incurring 

unnecessary added cost on the program associated with that disruption. What we would rather be doing is sitting down with Congress as we submit future budgets and walking through in great 

detail exactly where we are, why we believe this is the exact right 

thing to do for the Navy and the Nation, and look for your support 

in that regard. 

Third impact beyond just the loss of the capability and the added 

cost is the industrial base. Both of these shipbuilders have done an 

outstanding job of responding to the issues and the failures on the 

lead ship to train up a skilled crew, to make investments in their 

facilities, to hit the targets that we set with the block buy, and 

right now they are getting up on the governor for steady-state production. Again, to insert a pause, a break in that production in the 
14 

shipbuilding program is going to have impact not just to the cost, 

but to that workforce, that skilled workforce, that we have got in 

place. I do not recommend that. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Francis, you wanted to respond to that? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

I think the things Mr. Stackley just talked about, the studies 

they are doing, I think that is basically the essence of our recommendation, to come back and tell you what they have in mind 

and when, and recall that the seaframe is doing well now because 

it is coming down its learning curve. So of real importance would 

be are we considering any design changes for the 2016 block that 

could interrupt that learning curve and maybe change prices? 

So that is the essence of our recommendation. The Navy has 

until March before it actually gets that next block under way. I 

think there is plenty of time. So I don’t envision a scenario where 

the 2014 buy actually gets held up pending these studies. I think 

the Navy could in pretty good time give you the information you 

need. 

And then on the shipbuilding plan, the numbers are going on, as 

Mr. Stackley said, from 2016 on, are less than four ships a year, 

so I don’t know if there is a down select envisioned out there. If 

there isn’t, then that rate would comport with our other recommendations, which is keep the rate at—the minimum sustained 

rate would be between two and three ships a year until operational 

testing. So we might be in violent agreement. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay, thank you. 

Gentlemen—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would like to have that—— 

Mr. FORBES. Oh, sure, yeah. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would like to have that on the record: 

GAO said they are in agreement with the Navy. 

Mr. FORBES. Notice he said ‘‘violent agreement.’’ 

Mr. Runyan is recognized for 4 minutes. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Stackley kind of answered my first question about increased 

costs, but the next one kind of deals with it also, too. Admiral 

Hunt, talking about the Freedom getting back underway less than 

a day after a generator issue, is that problem more systemic, and 

does it increase the costs of future ships to fix it? 

Admiral HUNT. I think the most recent casualties that we have 

had to Freedom are things that you get in normal operations, quite 

frankly. So we have a first of, you know, ship out there going 

through the paces. It is one of the reasons why we wanted to get 

Freedom on deployment out there in a real-world operating situation as quickly as we did. 

I am very encouraged in the fact that the maintenance team in 

place is able to take these casualties, repair them in stride, and get 

the ship back under way. I would be more concerned if we had casualties that we found were surprising us, we didn’t have the right 

ILS [integrated logistics support], the logistic support, in place, and 

we had big delays. We have not seen that. 

So this is, first of all, I think, expected. You know, one of the 

things that we have asked is we have gone back and, to put some 
15 

historical context in this, taken a look at the FFG–7 program, the 

Arleigh Burke program, Ticonderoga. I may have the exact timeframe wrong, but Arleigh Burke when she first deployed, I think, 

ended up in a shipyard overseas in the Mediterranean for almost 

2 months. We are not seeing that kind of stuff at all. 

So I think we do have a good program in place, and we are 

adapting. We are learning, and we are putting the things that we 

learn straight into follow-on ships in a very useful way. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, can I add to that? 

Mr. RUNYAN. Sure. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Specifically with regard to the ship service 

diesel generators, first the requirement. Those generators are required to perform at 800 hours of operation between failures. 

Today what our experience is is 450 hours between failures. So 

that is the symptom of the problem. We have three known issues, 

one associated with the governor on the generator, one associated 

with the cooler that goes with the generator, and one associated 

with the size of the piping that is associated with coolant flow. 

There are fixes for all three. They are not all incorporated in LCS 1 

today, but they are all being incorporated on the follow ships of 

that variant. So today we are working through these interruptions 

in terms of the ship’s operations, if you will, to incorporate these 

failures. We have got to fix that. 

The good news is that the ship is designed with four diesel generators. It requires two under operations plus one in stand-by, so 

there is redundancy in the system to overcome some of the shortfall 

in the operational availability, and there are fixes in place, and 

those fixes are largely contained to that package unit that shows 

up from the vendor, and they are being incorporated by the vendor. 

So the impact on the ship side will be minimized. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you. 

And I don’t know if Mr. Francis can answer this question, but 

I think it is kind of—I won’t use the phrase ‘‘problematic,’’ but it 

is something I think we are walking down when you talk about our 

acquisition process. I think another member of the Armed Services 

Committee, Ms. Duckworth, raises a question about concurrency in, 

you know, development. Are we kind of walking down the same 

path with the LCS as the F–35 in that realm and kind of don’t 

know what the future holds? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Runyan, I think there are some similarities 

there. I mean, it has been concurrent. I think problems with the 

generator that we just talked about, I don’t think you minimize 

those, but I think these are things that the Navy is going to solve, 

you know. I don’t think those are show stoppers. 

But I think the discussion we are having today with 24 ships 

under contract and a number delivered and under construction, I 

think, sets a little different context. If we were talking about what 

don’t we know about the configuration of the modules, and what 

they will be able to do, does the operational concept work, are we 

going to be able to swap the mission modules out in theater, if we 

were having this discussion 5 years ago on the first ship, I would 

say, hey, we are learning as we are going, and it is a pretty good 

strategy. At this point we are so far down the pike, we are quite 
16 

concurrent, and as I mentioned in my opening statement, our oversight tools are rather limited. 

So this is, I think, emblematic of the acquisition process. This is 

how things go. So there is, I think, bigger things to do in the future 

about the acquisition process, and part of it is you have to put 

money on the table to get a program going, and generally money 

goes on the table about 2 years before the program starts. So it 

goes on the table on the basis of promises, promises about we think 

we are going to be five times better than anything we have, and 

we don’t think it is going to cost much. As those promises get reduced over time, then we are way down the pike, and that is where 

we are. 

So I think it is systemic. I think we put people in difficult positions in the Department because you have to be able to justify your 

program that way, and it is optimism, and it gets embedded. So, 

yes, we are playing out, I think, what is typical in the acquisition 

culture. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Francis, the time is up. And let me just point 

out to our Members, we are told our floor votes are going to be 

ratcheted up a little quicker. In consultation with Mr. Courtney, we 

would like to ask unanimous consent we can reduce our time to 3 

minutes each. I just want to get as many Members in as possible. 

Any objection? 

We will reduce it to 3 minutes. And if you can, try to focus on 

one question. And we don’t want to cut you guys off, but if you can 

make your answers as succinct as possible because we have a lot 

of Members that want to get their questions in. 

And with that, we recognize Mr. Johnson from Georgia for 3 minutes. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Stackley, you indicated that design costs are under control 

and—or design and costs are under control, but there are some design changes that are being considered. 

And then, Mr. Francis, you indicated that for 2014 fiscal year, we 

should hold the money and ask for any design changes, and you 

also recommended that we keep the block 2016 buy, keep it at a 

minimum amount. 

What I would like to ask Secretary Stackley is can you tell us 

what would be the impact on the Navy in terms of meeting its future requirements if this committee were to follow the recommendations of Mr. Francis? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, and we did some clarification in 

terms of his recommendation and my earlier response. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And then I would like to get Mr. Francis’ rebuttal, 

if you will. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Our plan to continue with procurement of the block buy, which would mean four ships in 2014 and 

another four ships in 2015, is central to, one, getting the capability 

that is in the CNO’s requirements letter to Congress, and is filling 

a shortfall that we have today in terms of overall force structure, 

getting up to the 300 ships. Those four ships in 2014 and four ships 

in 2015 with the capability they bring, we need those for operational considerations, and then, as earlier discussed, disrupting 

that flow in the shipyard and the vendor base will drive costs into 
17 

the program, which is exactly what we are trying to avoid. So that 

is a short description of what the impact would be. 

Understanding what Mr. Francis described earlier in terms of 

providing more information, more insight to Congress in terms of 

where the Navy is going before we put those ships under award, 

under contract, we welcome that, and, in fact, we have monthly reports to Congress we are providing, we have quarterly reports to 

Congress we are providing, we have annual reports to Congress we 

are providing, we have briefings. We will provide you full insight, 

full daylight in terms of where we are going and the considerations 

that we are considering, the issues that are under consideration. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Francis. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, sir. I think we are squared away on what our 

recommendation means. I would be surprised and disappointed if 

it actually did result in holding off the 2014 buy, because the studies are in place, and I think the answers could be given. 

We pegged that to the 2014 money just as a forcing mechanism 

so that the Navy could come by or come back to you in good time. 

Really, the things that we are talking about will affect most directly the 2016 buy, but you should have some time to consider 

that. So I think if the Navy comes forward with that information, 

I don’t see why the contract couldn’t be awarded, and you will have 

the information. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Johnson’s questions are excellent questions. We 

may ask you guys to expand a little bit on those in written form, 

if you would, after this hearing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 77.] 

Mr. FORBES. And now we recognize the gentleman from Colorado 

Mr. Coffman for 3 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Hunt, we have two separate shipbuilders building Littoral Combat Ship, and I have read some analysis that this is really going to take, require separate crew training. Is that criticism 

valid? I mean, are these ships by these two different builders really 

that different that require separate crew training? 

Admiral HUNT. There will clearly be some differences in the 

training, but fundamentally the training that we have established 

and set up in the schoolhouse in San Diego is very similar; same 

instructors walking through folks. The differences is primarily 

going to be operating the consoles that they have. That is something that is achievable. It is programmed in right now, and I 

think we will manage that very satisfactorily. 

Mr. COFFMAN. So as we proceed, then, that a sailor on one variant of this class of ship, would they be expected, then, to proceed 

with their career in that same variant, or can they cross over easily? 

Admiral HUNT. You know, again, it is going to depend on exactly 

what kind of sailor that we are talking about. So diesels are different, gas turbines are different. There will be a different training 

in that. But within the Navy we do that quite often. When you go 

between cruisers and destroyers and frigates, there are changes. Is 
18 

that a major impact? I don’t believe it is. I think it is something 

that we are going to work through. It is clearly within the realm 

of the training system that we have set up right now. 

Mr. COFFMAN. When you talk about the open architecture of the 

Littoral Combat Ship, I mean, really how significant is that in reducing costs in the long run, because we do service life extension 

programs all the time on other ships. Secretary Stackley, would 

you want to—— 

Admiral HUNT. If I could, I would love to take that. 

I think that is the essence of the program. I think it is vitally 

important. I have lived my entire Navy career where we have made 

changes, and we routinely do, especially in combat systems, to 

Navy ships, and when we do them on the older legacy ships, we 

rip out everything to bare metal. We pull cables, we take it out, 

we rebuild it. I have seen it, I have lived it as the type commander 

on cruisers. You walk into a space, and it is completely bare metal. 

That is a very expensive way to upgrade and is really one of the 

biggest challenges that we have in the Navy in modernization. The 

modularity and open systems architecture that this ship provides 

is the entryway to the way the Navy must do ship construction in 

the future. 

I am very encouraged by what we have got. I think you are going 

to see more and more of this, and it is going to be a huge force multiplier not only from the cost perspective—and I will yield to Mr. 

Stackley on that—but equally important from a combat systems 

enhancement, the reliability and safety that we get from it. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I just want to provide a couple crystal-clear 

examples. First the combat system. Now, this is the core of the 

ship’s weapon system; two different versions, both of them are described as open. One is Lockheed Martin variant, and the other 

variant is a Northrop Grumman variant on the LCS 2. 

So what we did to challenge this was we took the LCS 2 combat 

system, we dropped the software that came with it, and we brought 

the Navy’s Ship Self-Defense System [SSDS] software to the system, loaded it up, and demonstrated that we could drive that combat system with the Navy’s SSDS system, and then likewise 

porting over to the Lockheed Martin version. So now we have 

choices. When you talk about commonality, we have choices in 

terms of loading up the combat system for LCS 1, LCS 2 to drive 

commonality and figure out what gives us best capability and cost. 

That is software. 

On the hardware side, describe the non-line-of-sight [NLOS] missile cancellation. We were able to quickly move over and look at 

other missile systems to fit the exact same form, fit and function 

that was provided by NLOS, and without disrupting the ship, we 

are developing and testing different missiles to go in its place without missing stride in terms of the IOC [initial operating capability] 

date for that capability. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, is 

recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think this subcommittee and the committee as a whole has a 

like/hate relationship. We like it, and we hate hearing about it all 
19 

the time. And I have been here in my 13th year along with Mr. 

Forbes, and it hasn’t been that long since I have been hearing 

about it, but it has been about half that time. And it is usually 

never 100 percent positive or 100 percent negative, but we just 

keep hearing about it. And this today is just the next chapter in 

a long book, a book I want to finish, and I want you all to finish. 

I want to stop reading this book. 

But I am concerned that this is turning into a 52-ship Beta program. I keep hearing about we are deploying, but we are testing 

while we are deploying, in the hopes and eventuality we will have 

fully operational platforms with the modules in place, using them. 

But we don’t have the modules in place, and we are still out deploying and testing the platforms we have. 

So the first question I have for Mr. Stackley is—maybe I am 

wrong, and I have been wrong on a lot of things—how similar is 

this deploy and test model to other classes of ships? We do it on 

other platforms or other programs that sometimes works and sometimes don’t, but we are talking about a multimillion-dollar platform 

here, so how similar is this? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me describe that I have been 

involved with every lead ship since the late 1970s that the U.S. 

Navy has fielded either as a sailor, as a designer, as a production 

manager, as a program manager, as an oversight member in the 

Senate Armed Services Committee and in this job. This is the way 

we bring ships to the fleet. We do not have a prototype. We do not 

have a prototype. LCS 1 is the prototype for this class. That is the 

way ships are built and fielded. 

The development that is going on in parallel with deploying the 

ship—this is for future upgrades and increments that have been 

laid out in the mission modules; not to the ship itself, to the mission modules that bring that weapon system capability—but if you 

look at the early increments, those capabilities are in the fleet 

today. It is the 60 helicopter; it is the AQS–20 Alpha sensor that 

protects the mine. Remote mine-hunting system, she has demonstrated her ability to hit her IOC date. 

You go right on down the list of early capabilities, the 30-millimeter gun, they are in the fleet today. We are not talking about 

developing concurrent with building; we are talking about integrating these capabilities into the mission package, completing the 

test program, and getting it out into the fleet. The risk in these 

early increments is very low, very well managed. 

There are some developments for later increments that we are 

breaking new ground, and that is why they are coming in later increments, and we are not trying to do ‘‘Big Bang’’ approach in the 

early instantiation. 

So this is the way we field ships. We did get out of the blocks 

wrong on this program, absolutely, and that is why you are reading 

that book over and over again, but we have corrected those issues. 

We have to make sure we don’t backslide, and we, again, welcome 

your oversight as we continue to march down this path. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. The chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, Mr. 

Wittman, is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
20 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. 

Secretary Stackley, I want to get right to an issue of survivability, I want to give you some examples. If you go to 1987, USS 

Stark was hit by two Exocet missiles, killing 37 sailors. The ship 

didn’t sink; made temporary repairs, made its way home under its 

own power. In 1988, USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a naval mine in 

Persian Gulf. The ship didn’t sink. It made it out of the minefield 

under its own power. In 2000, we all know the story of the USS 

Cole was attacked by terrorists in Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors. 

The ship didn’t sink. We all know the story of how it was put on 

a drydock ship, repaired, back into service today. In 2006, the INS 

Hanit, an Israeli Navy Sa’ar 5 corvette built in the United States, 

was hit by a Charlie-802 antiship missile killing four sailors. The 

ship didn’t sink. 

Let me ask you this: The Navy plans to do survivability trials in 

2014 and 2015 on LCS. The Navy’s Director, though, of Operational 

Tests and Evaluation has reported the LCS is not expected to 

maintain mission capability after taking a significant hit in hostile 

combat environment. 

My question is this: By the time the Navy completes these LCS 

capability and survivability trials, the Navy will have either procured or have under contract more than half of the ships in this 

class. The question is this: Will LCS 1 or LCS 2 survive a hit from 

an Exocet missile, a mine, a Charlie-802 antiship missile, or a 

small boat packed with high-energy explosives? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me first describe that we don’t 

wait for the final test to determine how we are faring. So every aspect of the design and the testing of each component, each element 

of a ship leads to that final exam associated with the total ship’s 

survivability trials and the ship shock trial, just as in every other 

shipbuilding program. And every piece of analysis, every aspect of 

the design data says that we are going to meet the survivability 

requirements established for the LCS. 

Now, first, each of the examples that you described, they took a 

hit, and they came home safely. They did not carry on their mission. They did not carry on their mission. When we talk about the 

level of survivability for the LCS, it has to be able to, one, defend 

itself. And there is a threshold requirement of what it needs to be 

able to defend itself against, whether it is an Exocet, whether it is 

a fast attack craft that is approaching the ship. So it designed to 

meet that threat. Then if it takes a hit, it is designed to survive 

through watertight subdivision design, through advanced firefighting systems, to automated systems that respond immediately 

to the impact and contain the impact. It is designed to survive that 

and then be brought home safely. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Wittman, may I just comment? One of the 

things on the LCS regarding survivability, and you are right, the 

final tests are in 2014 and beyond, but the expectations of the ship 

have been lowered over time. So I think originally when chapter 1 

of the book, if you will, we are talking about the ship being able 

to go into areas where there was access denial and so forth and 

hostile environment, that has been backed off to benign low-threat 

environment. So that is a hedge against survivability. And also I 

think the thought was it was going to be a self-sufficient surface 
21 

combatant. It wasn’t necessarily going to need a destroyer or cruiser to help it with certain threats. I think we backed off on that as 

well. It will need it. 

So two things are going on. There is the survivability of the 

seaframe itself, and then adjustments to what situations we are 

going to put the seaframe in. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentleman. 

Admiral HUNT. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on that? 

Mr. FORBES. Absolutely. 

Admiral HUNT. The two things for survivability. First of all, as 

naval officers we fight our group. It is not individual ships; we put 

it together. The cruisers protect the aircraft carrier; the aircraft 

themselves protect the larger group. So we work in a layered system, if you will. 

It is incumbent upon that leader, whether he is a strike group 

commander or a fleet commander, to make sure that he does that 

in as safe an operational situation that he can make, and he will 

do so. 

This ship is designed exactly to be the right survivability in the 

right operations that we are going to put it in. It truly is. It was 

designed with lower RCS, radar cross-section. It has got speed. It 

can maneuver rapidly. All that contributes directly to self-defense 

from a ship driver perspective. So I feel very comfortable with that. 

The kind of missions that we get it if it goes into a higher-threat 

environment, it will come with that protection, and that is coalition 

protection. The course that I am teaching right now up in Newport, 

Rhode Island, at the war college for our next-generation fleet commanders, it talks about how we do that and how we think about 

it. So I am comfortable there. 

From the ship perspective itself, when we modified the initial design to follow enabled vessel rules, we enhanced and increased the 

survivability of the ship itself. The firefighting system is solid. The 

configuration of the ship, the way she is built, is solid. It is good 

enough to protect our sailors and extract yourself from that dangerous situation, and that is really it. 

Mr. FORBES. And we need to go to Mr. Hunter from California. 

He is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First question is concerning the NLOS system that you no longer 

do, and have you heard the Brimstone missile? You all just did a 

test with the Brimstone and hit four small boats, swarm in the 

LCS, and what have you thought about that for a replacement. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, we have taken a good look at the 

Brimstone. It has got some desirable qualities. But I can’t tell 

you—— 

Mr. HUNTER. It is relatively inexpensive. 

Secretary STACKLEY. It is relatively inexpensive, but I cannot tell 

you that we are running to that missile. We have other alternatives that are in the mix, yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Number two, what type of ships would you put in 

if you had to go up against China, if you had to go up against a 
22 

China or a North Korea? Would you use the LCS, or would you use 

more destroyers and subs? What type of ships would you use? 

Admiral HUNT. For part of that operation, I would absolutely use 

LCS. So it is interesting right now, again, we are doing a war game 

that is part of the scenario that we are looking at, LCS is part of 

the mix. You know, for the initial phase to be in the theater and 

sense the environment before hostilities may occur, we would use 

all the assets available. 

So she is a sensor, she has got speed, she can, you know, link 

that information back to the larger group, and she provides those 

unique capabilities in each one of the mission modules that the 

fleet commander would then tailor, depending on how the operational concept developed that could be used. So from the surface 

to the ASW to the mine, I would expect all those capabilities will 

be added to the mix. 

Mr. HUNTER. If you don’t know what the modules do yet because 

they don’t exist as modular, for them to be able to be plugged in, 

how do you know what the conduct of operations would be if you 

don’t have the module? 

Admiral HUNT. I think we have a good idea what the initial increments of those modules will provide. We certainly have the surface module right now on Freedom in Singapore. 

Mr. HUNTER. But you would have to replace the NLOS on surface module, right? So you don’t really have it; you kind of have 

it. You don’t really have anything. You kind of have—— 

Admiral HUNT. That is an additional capability. What she provides right now is equal to what you have on an FFG. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, then, why get a new ship if what you have 

is just equal, right? 

Admiral HUNT. Because the FFGs are timing out from a costing 

perspective, modernization, and being able to adapt it. 

Mr. HUNTER. My question is, though, if you had to go up against 

a China or a North Korea, the LCS is not the best ship for that 

scenario. It is not the best type of ship. Now, you could use anything. You could use a RHIB, you could use an unmanned underwater vehicle, you could use a whole lot of stuff. But I have talked 

to a number of admirals and Navy experts that say the LCS is not 

what you want there. It is great for the Strait of Hormuz, it is 

great for other areas, but with the Asia pivot it is not what you 

want. You want more cruisers. You want more subs that have survivability against the long-range threat that China provides. 

Admiral HUNT. Two things, Congressman. The first is we set the 

stage before the conflict begins. LCS is absolutely key to that. And 

I just had a 2-hour discussion with our 7th Fleet commander, who 

absolutely is ecstatic about what else he has us doing in theater 

right now and the contribution that it provides. 

And the second piece is—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I don’t understand, though. What the LCS has done 

in theater so far is dock at a harbor that other ships couldn’t dock 

at because it has a very shallow draft, right? So it has done that. 

It has gone to some other docks. 

Admiral HUNT. And she is out operating in the CARAT [Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training] exercises throughout the region. 
23 

Mr. HUNTER. Doing doughnuts, right? Going really fast in circles? That is what the ship driver said a couple days ago, right? 

Admiral HUNT. She is out performing the missions as desired by 

our 7th Fleet commander. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. To the witnesses, I hate to impose on you, but we 

have a vote on the floor that is going to probably run about 40 minutes. What are your schedules like? Can you take a recess and let 

us come back? I know it is tough on your schedules, but we have 

got a few Members that really would like to ask just a couple more 

questions. How are your schedules? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, we are at your service. 

Mr. FORBES. We apologize for that. They don’t call us and ask 

us if the votes are convenient now. But we will recess until the 

votes are completed, and then we will reconvene for whatever questions that remain. 

Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FORBES. Let me thank our witnesses for their patience in allowing us to get through that cycle of votes. And at this particular 

point in time, we would like to recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Hunt, a key criticism of the GAO report was the Littoral 

Combat Ship program is that the Navy did not have yet a decision 

on how it is to be used. As the leader of LCS Council for over a 

year now and a veteran surface warfare officer, is there any question in your mind as to how this ship will be employed? 

Admiral HUNT. Thank you for that question. 

No, there isn’t. I think we know very accurately how we are 

going to employ the ship with each of the modules. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would you describe those, please? 

Admiral HUNT. Certainly. The surface mission capability will be 

in the littoral, meaning in close to land. It will provide with its gun 

capability initially, and then, when you add on top of that the missile capability, the ability to go out and interdict small boats and 

small vessels that would be potentially opposing us as we moved 

amphibious ships or an aircraft carrier through choke points. 

The second piece that that capability provides is it has excellent 

capability exceeding what we have now in our maritime interdiction operations, meaning taking a boarding party and going over 

doing antipiracy or anti-weapons-of-mass-destruction movement, 

the kinds of things that we are doing routinely in the Gulf of Aden, 

the Horn of Africa and around the waters of the Persian Gulf right 

now. 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand that a key component of LCS concept 

is the mission package; however, does the Navy have a plan for utilizing seaframe without the mission packages as well? 

Admiral HUNT. No, it does not. In every instant of seeing how 

we would operate the platforms today, it would always be inherently with one of the three mission packages. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Stackley, the GAO has criticized the Navy’s 

LCS program business case, stating that questions remain on cost, 
24 

the time needed to develop and field the system, and its anticipated 

capabilities. Will you address each of those three items? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. In terms of cost, the program’s cost 

performance today is very well understood and well behaved both 

in terms of the seaframes of the ship production and in terms of 

the mission packages. 

I think one of the questions or concerns from the GAO has to 

deal with we will call it the program baseline that we are measuring against. We owe that to Congress, and we will bring that forward. In fact, Mr. Francis described that we get to go to a Milestone B long before this hearing was scheduled. In fact, we had the 

mission module Milestone B scheduled for this week where we did 

go through all those details to lock them into a formal document 

that will come forward to the Hill. 

In the interim we do report annually inside of what is referred 

to as a selective acquisition record to Congress, and we are performing well within those costs that we are projecting. Good learning, good cost performance. 

The second aspect I think you raised was schedule, with regards 

to schedule, again, ship production and mission modules. On the 

ship production side, we have adjusted schedules at the both of the 

shipyards on the order of 4 to 6 months for the early ships in the 

block buy, the smart thing to do. What we did not want to do was 

to incur costs or cost risk because of overly aggressive schedules 

within the shipyards. 

The start-up of production on the block buys was somewhat disrupted by a gap that had occurred between the first couple of LCS 

ships and the decision to go forward with the block buy, and because of that disruption and the transition from earlier lead ships 

to that stable design that we are insisting upon to support production of the subsequent ships, there was, in fact, lag time that led 

to some schedule delay. We believe we have got that well captured, 

and today both Marinette up in Wisconsin and also in Alabama are 

performing in accordance with those schedules. Got to keep a 

watchful eye on it because we are continuing to ramp up in production, but we think we have schedule stability in place, and it is 

supporting our cost projections. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

I want to ask you, you described earlier before we had to break 

for votes your history in the shipbuilding business, and that what 

you are doing with this system is consistent with what you have 

always done. Were you surprised at the GAO’s observation that 

this was somehow outside the norm? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I think GAO did a lengthy review of the 

LCS program that I think extended over 12 to 16 months. When 

I read the report, read their findings, my first reaction is we need 

to spend more time with the GAO to outline exactly what we are 

doing and why we are doing it. And we owe that to GAO, we owe 

that to Congress. 

Shipbuilding is different from other acquisition. It is. LCS is different from other shipbuilding programs. And so by virtue of that 

fact, we have to explain why those differences make sense, and 

why we are on that path. 
25 

The second aspect of it is GAO asks a lot of questions in their 

report, critical questions. They are fair, and rather than providing 

a short and concise response, I think we need to engage with Congress and further with the GAO and provide the detailed responses 

that they warrant, because they are important for you all to understand where we are going, and that is necessary for us to earn and 

expect your support. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Speier is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for your 

service to our country, all of you, and for the important work that 

we are addressing here today. 

Mr. Francis, I am truly struck by your earlier testimony, and it 

reminds me a little bit of our lives in that Admiral Hunt in 2010 

told Congress that the dual-acquisition strategy would save money. 

Now we hear the Navy is considering changes to increase the commonality between the two variants, as I recall it, these were two 

great alternatives that were being suggested, and so we really 

wanted both of them. It would be like any one of us saying, gosh, 

the Lamborghini is beautiful, and the Ferrari is beautiful; let us 

buy both of them, except for the fact that it costs a lot of money. 

And I am troubled by the fact that we are purchasing first and 

testing second, and I think the taxpayers of this country expect us 

to be frugal in the way we move forward with this effort. 

Now, the GAO had originally suggested that we go slow. I actually took that GAO recommendation and turned it into an amendment, which was held not to be in order by the Rules Committee 

when the NDA was taken up on the floor. So having had that happen, but having the good and sound recommendations that you 

have offered, how do we make sure that this 2-year oversight opportunity that we have is actually exercised in a way that we just 

don’t say at the end of 2 years, well, too bad, we missed the window, we are going to build all these ships, they are not going to 

meet the standards, they are going to cost—the cost overruns are 

going to be extraordinary, and that is just the way it is? 

I mean, we as Congress, we as this committee, I believe, have a 

responsibility to make sure that what we are building makes sense, 

makes sense for the long term. And I feel that there is this rush 

to construction, and we will worry about the details later. 

So could you comment on that, please? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Definitely. 

We made a recommendation in August of 2010 that because 

operational testing was slipping, there were some problems with 

the mission modules at that point, and the ships and the modules 

were kind of getting out of sync. We recommended to the Department, resequence these and get them back in line so that you know 

what the combined capability of the seaframes and mission modules are before you get into operational testing. Now, the Department agreed with that, but since then the seaframes, if anything, 

have gone faster, the modules slower. 

Ms. SPEIER. So they agree, but they then don’t follow through 

with what they say? 

Mr. FRANCIS. No. The strategy that they embarked on was a different strategy than what we had recommended. 
26 

Ms. SPEIER. So how do we trust anything? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Well, I think you have to hold the Department accountable. I mean, we can talk about, for example, mission modules, but it takes four increments for those mission modules to 

meet minimum capability. So the things we are talking about what 

we know now does not meet minimum capability for the Navy. It 

will be 2017 and 2019 respectively before those increments are 

operationally tested. 

So I think that is where I say you have to exercise prudence in 

how many ships and modules you approve before they have gone 

through that. 

Ms. SPEIER. We are full speed ahead right now. That is what the 

NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] recommends. That is 

not what you recommend. The Navy certainly recommends that. 

And I guess I want you to give us a road map on what we should 

do if we are going to do a diligent job on oversight over the next 

2 years. What would you provide us as a road map? 

Mr. FRANCIS. A couple of things. We mentioned the studies that 

we think the Navy should report back to you on on potential design 

changes. You should know that in the next—in this 2-year window; 

an approved program baseline for each of the increments of the 

mission modules. I don’t think we can afford to—you know, as we 

have learned with the modules, if something doesn’t work we have 

a different game plan; if this doesn’t work, we have a different 

game plan. 

I think you should be able to hold the Department accountable. 

You said you were going to do this this year and this this year, and 

hold them accountable for that. And I would take a real hard look 

at the 2016 block buy. If that is too many ships or takes you past 

operational testing, I think you have yielded a lot of your oversight 

authority. So that would be the outlines of what I would say. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Ribble is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to especially 

thank you and ranking vice member, Vice Chair Courtney, for allowing me to come in. 

I also want to thank the witnesses for being here today, especially the GAO. You know, oversight is an important part of what 

Congress does, and it is part of our responsibility to do this, but 

I would say as well that a lot of what I have read in the report 

is eerily similar to other reports on other shipbuilding programs. 

And so shipbuilding is a process, not just something that today we 

are going to do it, and tomorrow it is there and it is perfect. There 

is a process that goes on. 

And the report that you gave on LCS is similar to those reports 

that GAO did in the 1970s, and other programs that became very 

successful in the 1990s, and another ship that became very successful. And so in one degree where I might take and have some disagreement with some of the findings in the report, I think the report is important, because it sharpens all of us. It helps us move 

forward and make improvements to the Navy response, Congress’ 

response, and things go forward. So thank you for submitting the 

report and your testimony this morning. 
27 

Mr. Stackley, I appreciate you being here, and I would like to 

talk just a little bit about the cost of the ship and what a delay 

in production might do for that cost. It can either improve cost or 

delay it. LCS 1 cost the Federal taxpayers $637 million, way, way 

above budget. However, the LCS 5 had dropped down to $437 million, LCS 11 is at $358 million, and LCS 15 at $348 million, all 

trends going in the right direction; in fact, nearly a 50 percent reduction in cost over the course of the project. 

What would a delay do to that? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The most critical aspect for any 

major weapon system program when it comes to cost is stability, 

stability requirements, stability of design and stability of funding. 

Any disruption to the production of the LCS, or any other major 

weapons system program for that matter, but more so in shipbuilding, you are going to suffer—first you are going to lose the capability that you are going after. You are going to suffer cost 

growth that starts in the vendor base, because the vendor base, 

which is a national vendor base, is going to be stopping production 

particularly on any unique components that are associated with 

that ship program, and then it is going to hit the shipyard itself 

where the workforce, the skilled workforce, that you are building 

up, in this particular case the LCS program, they are going to have 

to stop and start again, and you have to deal with hiring and firing 

cycles, green labor and things of that nature. 

It is extraordinarily disruptive, and the unique case of shipbuilding where you are in a 4- or 5- and, in certain cases, carriers 

where get up into the 9-year range of when you start and complete 

construction, you have got to ensure stability of that production 

workforce going from ship to ship to ship, or you are just going to 

continue to suffer sawtooth in cost growth. 

So that is one of the things we guard against, and the way we 

guard against it is to drive stability into the program. The LCS 1 

and LCS 2, the front end of this program, absolutely not stable. The 

design was not complete, the requirements were moving, the production workforce was not ready, the government was not ready, 

and that is why you saw a $637 million number at the start of the 

program. 

We have worked to nail down all those aspects that bring stability, and then lock it in the long-term agreement associated with 

the block buy so that the vendor base, the shipbuilder and the government can all pull in the same direction to drive costs down to 

where we are now taking a ship that started off in the $600–$700 

million range, and we are locked into a fixed-price contract at 

prices that are half of that years later. 

Mr. RIBBLE. It is clearly going the right direction. 

Admiral Hunt, the U.S. Navy has been at the forefront of national defense, well, since the beginning of the Navy. Thank you for 

your service and the work that you have been doing. 

What impact would a delay have on the Navy’s ability to meet 

its future requirements? 

Admiral HUNT. The LCS will immediately provide capability forward. Initially it is one of getting out there and developing contact. 

It is the presence piece, which is essential from all the forward 

numbered fleet commanders’ perspective. So we are out there de-
28 

veloping relationships with allies, with countries that are deciding 

which camp to play in, and we are sending signals to those who 

could be adversaries. 

So presence is first and foremost on what we do day in and day 

out. When you combine that with the capability that each of the 

mission modules bring, credible combat capability, a huge force 

multiplier that will immediately go into the calculus that those 

numbered fleet commanders will use in operating within their area 

of responsibility. 

And I would make the point that each one of the first increments 

meets or exceeds current capability that we have in the United 

States Navy. So while it is true that some of them have up to four 

increments, and we are providing capability that we may not demonstrate fully until towards the end of this decade, that first increment that will be developed in the next year or so for all of those 

meets or exceeds everything we have, and that is an important 

piece that can’t be overlooked. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Yes, Mr. Francis. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think the things that Mr. Stackley said are true 

in terms of bringing the cost of the ship down, but, again, I think 

we have to remember it is a first-in-class ship of a new class of 

ships. So we have some questions on the mission modules, but, you 

know, even if you said the seaframes worked just the way they are 

supposed to and the modules worked the way that they are supposed to, we still have the operational concept. Is that going to 

work? Are we going to be able to do the maintenance concept the 

way we think of it? 

The real question if I look in terms of cost risk, I think seaframes 

the least risk, modules are a higher risk, O&S [operations and support] costs are probably the biggest risk. So it is not just a firstin-class ship, it is a first in class of a new class and a new concept 

of operations. And we are in rate production, so the caution I would 

offer is the business imperatives for keeping things the way they 

are should not outweigh the programmatic and testing imperatives 

that will prove, can the ship work. 

Mr. FORBES. We have been joined by ranking member Mr. McIntyre. He has graciously deferred his questions so Mr. Bonner can 

ask his at this time. So we recognize Mr. Bonner for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as others have 

said, thank you for holding this hearing. And to our witnesses, 

thank you. I think it has been very enlightening, the questions 

have been thoughtful, and the responses have certainly been appropriate, I think, to help answer some of the questions about this 

very important program. 

There have been several comments made by some of our colleagues, Mr. Chairman, and so I am going to try to ask one question of the admiral, and then I am going to let him answer it. But 

I am going to offer a quick observation before he does. 

One of the comments was that it appears that LCS might be of 

little value to the Asia pivot strategy. So my question would be, 

what else does the Navy do in the South Pacific beside planning 
29 

on fighting big wars? I mean, are there not any other missions the 

Navy does? And you can think about that as I am opining about 

some other facts. 

I mean, I am in the last few days of my tenure in Congress. I 

have worked up here for 18 years, I have served for 10 years, it 

has been the greatest honor of my life. One thing that I have been 

struck by is the fact that we really never know when we wake up 

what the day holds. And I certainly can’t look into my crystal ball, 

I don’t know if the GAO can. My father worked with the GAO 

when he was going to law school a long, long time ago, so I hold 

you in great respect. But I don’t know that any of us are really that 

qualified to predict what the world’s challenges are, but here are 

some facts. 

There are 217,000 miles of inshore coastline, the littorals, around 

the world. Our Navy can’t be every place, obviously, but only our 

Navy, only our military can provide the stability that the world 

needs. And it is hard for me to see, and I know the chairman has 

talked about the concern he has and many of us have about the 

decreasing number in the fleet. We have got, what, 285 ships 

today? I was with the former Navy Secretary a few weeks ago, who 

worked for President Reagan when we were shooting for a 600-fleet 

Navy. 

My friend and colleague from California talked about comparison 

between the Ferrari and Lamborghini. I would say that the LCS 

isn’t either, not compared to the cruisers, to the destroyers and 

other ships that we have which are also a vital part, but I would 

say it is probably more like a Malibu or a Taurus. It provides a 

function, especially in those inshore waters that perhaps we don’t 

need the more expensive Lamborghini or Ferrari to provide that 

mission. 

So I would be happy to now ask the question, and if the Admiral 

or any of the panelists to provide an answer. 

Admiral HUNT. Congressman, thank you for that question. It is 

a very insightful one, and it speaks exactly to the way I think that 

the Navy over the next decade or two is going to contribute directly 

to our national defense. 

The Navy does more than fight these wars. Ideally we will shape 

and understand an area that we are operating in to prevent the 

conflict. We do that by contact. We do that by contact with other 

nations. To have contact we must have presence. 

Your comments on being out and about, I think, are exactly 

right. The influence that we have by having proportional capability 

with nations around the world is absolutely essential. That is how 

you develop the relationships, develop trust and confidence between the nations. 

There is some question in the Western Pacific right now on the 

resolve of the United States. The presence of Freedom in Singapore 

is being used by Admiral Haney, our fleet commander in Pearl 

Harbor, and by Admiral Swift, the 7th Fleet commander out there, 

and they see great value. 

The ship operates by exercises and by conducting operations with 

those national partners out there. And what we are getting in feedback is that it resonates with those potential partner nations, and 
30 

they see that as commitment of the United States to be in the region, and that contributes directly to increased stability. 

So one of the key advantages that we get from LCS is the unit 

cost is low, the number of people manning them and still providing 

credible combat power is low, which is good for lifecycle costs, and 

the ability to operate at sea in the manning construct that we use 

of having two ships, three crews and rotating them gives us about 

50 percent optempo [operational tempo], which is much higher than 

the standard one-third that we get. So for about 52 LCS, I get the 

equivalent presence of about 100 destroyer or cruiser ships. And I 

would offer that the smaller ship of the lower draft allows us to 

reach many of the places that we can’t get in and develop that contact and relationship with others right now. 

Vitally important, you can only do that if the nations you operate 

respect that credible combat power. That is what you get right now 

on that first increment of LCS surface warfare module. That is exactly what you will get with the MCM mission module, which is 

going to be hugely important and send a signal in the 5th Fleet 

area of responsibility, and I am confident we will see the same 

thing with the antisubmarine module. 

Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. And this committee would like to thank Mr. Bonner 

for his service. We know you will be leaving us soon and get to 

sleep in your bed more instead of traveling back and forth. But you 

have done a great job for your constituents and for your country, 

and we appreciate that service. 

And we appreciate all the questions. I just have a few, and then 

Mr. McIntyre may have a few that he would like to wrap up with. 

And I come in a unique position, because I am not predisposed one 

way or the other. I want to try to make sure we are answering the 

questions. 

I think my friend sitting to my right, Mr. Hunter, would probably suggest that—not that the LCS is not a good ship, but sometimes we get the impression it is like we walked into a department 

store, and we saw this wonderful thing, and we bought it, and we 

get home and say, now what do we do with it? You know, it can 

do so many different things. 

And I think we heard today, we talk about presence, and that 

is a very valuable thing that we need to address. In fact, we had 

Admiral Roughead, who testified just yesterday, who talked about 

the importance of process as we make this shift. We have also 

heard Admiral Roughead talk about the enormous delays we have 

in being able to get anything deployed. From the concept to when 

we do it, sometimes that can be as much as 22 years. And this is 

not an infant. I mean, we have been dealing with LCS for over a 

decade, fair assessment, I think, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Hunter raised a good question to just put on the table, Admiral. If we get into a major conflict—and that is what we have to 

constantly be recognizing; just as Mr. Bonner said, we don’t always 

know what we end up with on any given day—presence may not 

be enough. I mean, we may need to look at capability there. And 

then again I think Mr. Francis at least raises a good question: 
31 

What happens if the operational testing comes in wrong, and we 

have already locked into making all of these purchases? 

So I guess while what I would throw out to each of you to weigh 

in on is a couple of things. Number one, how do we strike that balance? Do we have the right balance? 

And number two, has the Department done the analysis, not just 

to say what we can do with the LCS, I know it feels pretty comfortable with that, but what we really are going to need 10 years 

down the road, 15 years down the road. Because as you guys know, 

when we see these shipbuilding plans, they are fantasies because 

we are a billion dollars short of where we can build them, so we 

are not going to be able to build all those things. 

And then particularly I would like you to laser in on the development schedule for the modules versus the seaframes, are we on 

track there? Do we need to kind of modify that? What sometimes 

we worry about is our schedules, they are going to create a situation where we deliver an immature mission module, because, you 

know, we have had some people raise the fact that by the time we 

get our mission modules, we might have used 25 percent of the 

whole life of some of these seaframes. 

So could any of the three of you address those as you deem appropriate? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Mr. Chairman, let me go ahead and get 

started and then allow Admiral Hunt and Mr. Francis to join. 

First operational test risk. The entire strategy for LCS development seaframe plus mission modules is a risk-management approach where, by breaking down the mission modules into these increments, we are bringing to the fleet a capability that is today off 

the shelf, it is off the shelf. So the risk is not a technical, there is 

not discovery involved. What we are doing is we are integrating offthe-shelf capabilities onto a platform that was not designed as a 

truck, it was a truck—space, weight, power, cooling—to handle 

these mission modules. And it becomes an engineering issue associated with the details, those interfaces, and operating on and off the 

ship as opposed to an operational test risk where we are going to 

take a high-risk new system out and determine whether or not it 

works. 

We know these systems are going to work. We know they are 

going to work. The 60 [SH–60] works today. It is the workhorse for 

the fleet. The remote mine-hunting system, we have demonstrated 

800 hours of operational testing of that system, and so it is well 

beyond its mean time between failures that we were targeting for. 

The AQS–20 Alpha sonar associated with the mine countermeasure mission package, that is a 20-year-old sonar. We know exactly how it works, and what we are doing is a preplan product improvement so that we can get it to the next level of capability. 

The 30-millimeter gun works. It is on the LPD–17 class. 

You write down the list of those systems that we are bringing in 

that first increment, the systems work. The risk is extremely well 

managed. We are working the engineering details of integrating 

those capabilities into that platform with the trained crew, and 

demonstrating its operational performance against those key performance parameters. 
32 

Mr. Francis is exactly right. We don’t meet the final level of capability that we are targeting for the program until the fourth increment of mine countermeasures, third of the surface warfare, and 

really off the bat with ASW [antisubmarine warfare]. But those are 

planned, those are scheduled, and we are executing in accordance 

with those schedules except for the impact of sequestration, continuing resolution and budget reductions, which is putting our test 

program at risk, because when we pull that much money out of our 

test program, that slows us down, and we are having to try to recover gracefully from that. 

Mr. FORBES. Let me let you take just a breath there. Just a 

minute. I want to come back to you, Admiral. 

But, Mr. Francis, you have heard the Secretary’s very logical, rational reasoning there. What was your response to that? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I see things differently, Mr. Chairman. If we go 

through what we are learning on the mission modules, and let us 

just take mine countermeasures I was going through here, the 

sonar is an off-the-shelf system, but the shelf is a little dusty. The 

sonar has not been able to detect mines as we have expected. It has 

had some false positives. It needs preplanned product improvement. We have some operational work-arounds. The same is true 

for each of the four systems in that first increment. They haven’t 

worked the way we thought. We also thought that the OASIS [Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep] system was going to 

be able to be towed by the MH–60, and that has been scrapped. 

I am not offering this up as, gee, this means the program is terrible, but it means we are learning as we go, and things may not 

work out the way that we thought. 

On surface warfare, Mr. Hunter brought up the issue about the 

missile that gives that ship the stand-off range for the littorals. So 

that is the part we don’t know yet. That is going to be a TBD [to 

be determined]. 

I don’t think we can be confident that mission modules are going 

to do what they say they are going to do. And this is also developmental testing. This is very structured, benign environment testing, experts and maintainers from the contractors present. That is 

not what the operational concept is going to be. 

So there is a reason that the law was created for operational 

testing. There is a reason there is a Director of Operational Testing 

Evaluation who reports to the Congress and the Secretary of Defense. So what is going on now is not a substitute for operational 

testing. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, I know you love this program, and I say 

that in a good way, because you should. What is your response to 

Mr. Francis? 

Admiral HUNT. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to respond 

here. Let me just walk through the different modules and give you 

my perception. 

Again, with the surface warfare module as it exists right now, we 

do have the guns on there that are equal to the equivalent replacement platform if you look at it for a specific capability, which would 

be the FFG–7, Oliver Hazard Perry class. She additionally comes 

with an SH–60 Romeo armed helicopter. That provides us the 

reach and stand-off capability. And eventually we will be aug-
33 

mented by the missile system when we replace NLOS. But providing the helicopter and providing the guns right now is greater 

capability than what we currently have, so I am very comfortable 

with that, and I think that will be used in a very good way, and 

it will continue to get better as we evolve. 

The MCM [mine countermeasures] capability, we have had some 

reliability problems with the sonar. We are working our way 

through there. We plan on taking that IOC [initial operational capability] testing here in fiscal year 2015. And I think we will demonstrate that that gives us about twice the capability for hunting 

than we currently have on Avenger class. 

That is very important as we kind of take a look at the CONOPS 

on how 5th Fleet and 7th Fleet would use this. It is hunting and 

avoiding in round 1; neutralizing probably in round 2, and only 

when you must. And the fact that we do this without putting the 

ship in the minefield greatly provides security to our sailors. So, 

again, I think we know how we are going to use that, and it provides value added. 

For ASW, not only does it provide an excellent, excellent littoral 

in the shallower waters capability, the fact that we have this variable depth sonar so we can go below this layer and get better visibility into submarines, that will develop into a capability where the 

ship fights alongside the carrier strike group in different phases. 

To Congressman Hunter’s, you know, comments about how you 

would use this in a Western Pacific scenario, I would very much 

appreciate the opportunity, sir, to come back and at a classified 

level walk through that and give you some of the ideas that we are 

looking at. We are developing those; we continue to do that. Again, 

as I said, we are doing that war game right now today in Newport, 

Rhode Island. We will wrap that up on Friday. We continue to 

evolve that using the capabilities in different ways. 

When you ask, is LCS going to work in the Western Pacific? Yes, 

I think the surface module works very, very well with what we 

have got in the initial evolution of a potential spark to warfare. 

The ASW platform will be good for being out and about should 

things go hot, and a very important thing in protecting the carrier 

and the amphibious ships. And the MCM capability that she provides may be at the wrap-up at the end. The fact that she can do 

all of those, understanding you have to time-sequence it, war is not 

an immediate overnight thing, it takes time, and that is part of the 

logistics aspect of tying it together in an effective way, and we are 

looking at doing that. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, I don’t want to speak for Mr. Hunter or 

for my good friend the ranking member, but I think at least all 

three of us would love to have not just that briefing, but I think 

the committee would love to have a briefing. 

Mr. Secretary, I know that you are the guy that builds the ships 

once they tell you what we need to build, you know, but at some 

point in time we would love for the Department to come over and 

give us a laydown of this is what we think the risks are, this is 

why we need these capabilities, this is the projection, so we are 

looking at that in a holistic picture. What we want to make sure 

we are not doing is creating a strategy by acquisition. You know, 
34 

we want to make sure we have the strategy, and then we are getting what we need to to get. 

And, Mr. Secretary, one criticism that has come forward is that 

we do have two designs. Those designs are moving in a similar 

path. I had the privilege of going out and seeing both of them back 

to back, near Mr. Hunter’s home turf, and they are incredibly different. And when you ask both crews which one is best, needless 

to say, it is the one they are on. But then they said something 

unique: We may have to have a hybrid of the two. But I think what 

Mr. Francis would say, without putting words in his mouth, is that 

you are committing to buying all of this. At what point in time do 

we sit back and say, well, do we need some design changes on 

these vessels, and by the time we get to know what we need, have 

we already locked in to what we are going to buy? 

So how are we protecting against that, Mr. Secretary, and do you 

see any proposed design changes that might be forthcoming? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. We are capturing lessons learned, 

and we are looking at opportunities. Mr. Francis described studies 

that we are doing. In fact, as previously discussed, we are specifically looking at C4, command, control, communications, computer, 

and information systems, as well as the combat system, looking at 

individual elements, plus the command and decision system that 

rides on the network. Those are the principal areas. 

In the specific case of LCS 1, we discuss the ship service diesel 

generators. We are looking real hard at the design that we have 

in place and making the upgrades to that design that are necessary 

to support the platform better. 

So those evaluations are taking place. I described loading the 

combat management system onboard the LCS 2 variant with two 

other versions that are more common to the Navy. We are on that 

path. We are looking at the individual components associated with 

the combat system and just evaluating is this meeting our needs 

most effectively; are there other alternatives that we should consider; and if so, what is the cost, what is the benefit; and what 

would be the strategy for incorporating those without driving costs 

into the program? 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, would not Mr. Francis come back 

and say that was his point, that we are looking at these modification designs, but are we going to be locked in too far on our buy? 

Mr. Francis, let me not put words in your mouth. What would 

your response to that be? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think that is a fair characterization, Mr. Chairman. So to these, I think these are changes to the existing designs 

that could be considered. Will they affect the learning curves that 

we have enjoyed on the current ships? There is, I think, the question, then, going forward in block 16, which could be flight 1 of the 

ship, if we are looking at the shipbuilding plan, the 30-year plan, 

it has lower quantities. Is that going to a single design, whether 

it be a hybrid design or one of the other two? That would be much 

more significant. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. McIntyre, do you have any questions that you 

would like to pose? 
35 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. I know our time is running short, 

and I will just ask quickly, and thank you for conducting this hearing. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your commitment to helping our U.S. 

Navy continue to be the best that it is; in fact, in the entire world. 

Having been upon LCS 1, the USS Freedom, it is an impressive 

ship, very interesting, and obviously, with the capabilities that it 

has, something that we want to make sure that we continue to support. 

I have a couple of quick questions. The Joint High Speed Vessel 

[JHSV] has been added to the LCS Council’s purview. How are 

these programs related, and does this mean the Navy is considering adding the Joint High Speed Vessel to meet some of the LCS 

missions? 

Admiral HUNT. The CNO made a decision to add the JHSV program to the LCS Council because he was impressed with, I think, 

the degree that we were digging into the program, finding new 

ways to improve it. He liked the process aspect of it. So he asked 

us to take a look at JHSV, one, because there is some commonality 

with LCS 2, where there may be some efficiencies; and then, two, 

take a look at what we could do with what I will call roll-on and 

tie-down capabilities to potentially enhance the capability of that 

platform to do other missions. 

So you have got this group of folks that has been gathered and 

working LCS for almost a year now. With a lot of thought and different ideas, it is a quick adjustment to roll in another similar size, 

shape of a different mission ship and take a good hard look at that 

and see what are the opportunities, again, for efficiencies and, two, 

to utilize as comparable ways to interact with LCS, and there certainly are many. We could include that in maintenance packages 

or training packages afloat when we start operating the LCS in 

small groups forward. 

So we are exploring things, a little programmatic change, a lot 

of research and idea, then to come back, be considered, and take 

it through the normal process that we have for any shipbuilding 

program. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. How long is that evaluation going to take, do you 

think? 

Admiral HUNT. It is open-ended. Right now we are kind of targeting having this thing wrapped in about a 6-month period, but 

I haven’t been given a completion date by CNO. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Secondly, there have been a number of press reports referring to internal Navy studies questioning the combat capability of the LCS. I don’t know if we quite hit that head-on today. 

And as we are wrapping up, maybe we ought to go in and hit it 

head-on so those questions don’t linger. 

What design and requirement changes to the LCS Council—is 

the LCS Council considering to address these concerns? I know you 

were touching some on that in answering Mr. Forbes’ questions, 

but I just want to make sure there is nothing else out there. And 

what impact would these changes have on the seaframes themselves? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me go ahead and take that one. 
36 

First off, both versions, installed combat systems, meet the requirements. And what we are doing is we are looking at alternatives to improve upon that, either improve upon that capability, 

or drive some further commonality with the broader fleet. So in 

that regard, we are specifically, as I described, looking at the communication suite. The LCS specification, we did not specify what 

communication suite to install onboard. 

Com [communication] suites are volatile in terms of technology. 

The rate of change of technology out there for a communication 

suite insists that we are going to be continually upgrading these 

systems in the ship’s life. And so we are taking a look at, okay, if 

we are going to be refreshing and upgrading the communication 

suite, then is there a point of incorporation where we take a more 

standard common suite in the Navy and then, when we upgrade, 

replace it with that standard suite? And, in fact, we are on that 

path. 

And now when you talk about what is the impact, we are talking 

about cabinets in the—basically cabinets landing on foundations 

and potentially some antennas. We are going through what that 

means in terms of drawings, in terms of production, in terms of 

equipment procurement, so we will have both a cost and schedule 

assessment in that regard. 

On the combat systems side, we are looking at a couple of areas. 

One is one of the principal batteries on the ship, which is in the 

self-defense system. Today LCS 1 and LCS 2, we have different systems that we are going to move to a common system, referred to 

as SeaRAM. It is basically a RAM [Rolling Airframe Missile] missile launcher mounted with a close-in weapons system radar system, gun mount, and that provides tremendous capability with 

minimal impact to the ship, but some price delta in terms of the 

cost of the equipment. Well worth the investment, and so we are 

committed to heading down that path. Otherwise we are taking a 

look at the different three-dimensional air search radars on board 

and assessing and comparing those to determine does it make 

sense to go to a common design in that arena. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Chairman, can I offer one comment on that? 

Mr. FORBES. Absolutely. 

Mr. FRANCIS. One of the things we haven’t talked about in design, and it is more, I would say, mundane than combat systems 

and so forth, is we have added 20 berths, I believe, to this ship. 

To be determined, then, is how to do the habitability requirements 

that go with it, you know, the water, the food, the storage and so 

forth, if you are going to house that many more sailors. That could 

have design implications because of the space limitations on the 

ship. So not as glamorous, but something that would have to be 

looked at. 

Secretary STACKLEY. And I would just counter, this isn’t point/ 

counterpoint, but we added the bunks with a clear view on what 

the capacity was of the installed capacity for habitability on the 

ship, because to go beyond that, in fact we would be looking at 

extra chill boxes, extra stowage for the crew gear and things of this 

nature. So we believe right now we have it about balanced, and if 
37 

we go beyond that, in fact, we are going to have to take a look at 

the installed habitability. 

Mr. FORBES. And it is not point/counterpoint, but it is question 

and answer, and we appreciate you guys doing that. 

I want to come back to what I started with and to say that I 

have absolutely no problem that we don’t all agree on this. I think 

that is the strength of our Navy and the strength of our way of government, that we can ask these questions and get answers. I want 

to compliment all three of you for your professionalism, the teams 

that work with you, and for your ability to come in here and give 

us information. You know, we don’t always get that. You all have 

been wonderful throughout this in answering the tough questions. 

The other thing I want to say is I have incredible admiration for 

my friend Mr. Larsen, but I disagree a little bit with the fact that 

I don’t want to read any more about this book. I want to read about 

this book for years to come, I want to read about the stories of how 

the LCS saved lives and defended this country, and that is why we 

are doing this, because sometimes the first few chapters are the 

heavy reading you have got to get through, and that is what we 

are all working through now, to make sure that we have a happy 

ending to this saga as it goes forward. 

And the other thing is while we believe in this program, we don’t 

want to wake up and have half our Navy LCSs. You know, I think 

none of us want that. We want to make sure we get the right mix, 

the right balance as we do it. 

So I want to thank all of you. I told you at the beginning, also, 

I want to give you the final wrap-up of anything you think we 

didn’t cover that we should have, any comments that you think 

were misconstrued. This is your chance. And, Admiral, if we can 

start with you, because that is where we started our hearing, love 

to give you the last word, and then we will go right on down the 

line. 

Admiral HUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 

opportunity. 

Again, I think we have covered most of the points that I wanted 

to get in there, but I would tell you, this is the capability that we 

need forward. We need numbers, and we need presence out there. 

The capability that we have in the existing mission modules and 

those that are quickly to follow, to include the MCM, is one that 

is vitally necessary, and it will be used. And our forward fleet commanders are planning on using this capability in a very important 

way. 

I feel confident that the hulls themselves are going to be a great 

platform in which different payloads, the mission modules, will 

hopefully continue to evolve for the life of the ship. As Mr. Stackley 

has pointed out, most of the components that go into mission modules are from other existing programs and have proven capability. 

It is a matter of tying them together now and making sure that we 

can operate them in a proper way. To really demonstrate that, I 

want to get them forward in the waters that they are going to operate. That is hugely important to those of us that sail ships, and we 

are ready to do that. 
38 

We are going to deliver a good product. I am very confident in 

the program, the leadership that we have, and I really appreciate 

the opportunity to be here, Congressman. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, just a few comments. 

Clearly the program had missteps at the front end of the program, clearly. But the objective was well placed, and we have spent 

time and effort, the Department plus the Congress, to get the program back on the right track, and we believe that that is where 

we are. We believe that the performance continues to improve on 

the program, and while we have different assessments of risk that 

remains, we believe, in fact, we have got a good risk-mitigation 

plan in place. 

The GAO has raised some critical questions, as I described earlier. Rather than answer those in short statements, what we owe 

you and we commit to you is to come back and go through in detail 

what our plan is, why we believe it makes sense, and look for your 

continued support. 

And finally, I will end where I started, which is today we are at 

286 ships. The requirement is 306 ships. We don’t get there without completing this program. It is the most affordable ship in the 

Navy. It does deliver capability; not simply capability that we need 

near term, far term, but filling critical gaps that today place 

vulnerabilities in terms of our ability to perform our mission 

around the world. And so we hold this as a priority inside of our 

shipbuilding program, and we are committed to executing and retiring those risks that we have discussed today. 

Mr. FORBES. Good, and thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Francis, I think you would probably say ditto to everything 

they said, and then you would say but, and we are going to let you 

do the wrap-up. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a pleasure 

to be involved in the discussion, and I think, as you know, while 

we have differences, I really respect what Mr. Stackley and Admiral Hunt are doing. And I think we are all interested in the ship 

reaching its full potential, so we are all part of the same government. 

I would say, you know, to pick up on Mr. Stackley’s metaphor, 

if the program is on track, that is good, but we don’t want it to be 

on rails that we can’t make adjustments that we may have to make 

in the future. 

And I just end on the note, let us not forget about the maintenance concept. You know, in other programs, other ships, aircraft, 

if the components aren’t as reliable, they need more maintenance, 

need more spares, you can overpower that situation with more assets. But LCS will have an austere crew. It is not going to have 

a lot of space for spares on the ship. It has to be reliant on offshore 

support for the ship to stay operational. So there is no real plan 

B there, and let us just keep that in mind as we go forward. I think 

working out that maintenance concept and making sure that crew 

can handle that ship and keep it operational that far away from 

its log [logistical] support, very important. 
39 

Mr. FORBES. We thank you for your questions you raise, valid 

good questions; Admiral, for your passion for this program. Mr. 

Secretary, thank you for your commitment to say you are going to 

come back and give us those responses so that we make sure the 

program is going in the direction that we need to go. 

And with that, Mr. McIntyre, if you don’t have any other comments—— 

Mr. MCINTYRE. No. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Then we are adjourned. Thank you all 

very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 25, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 25, 2013 

(45) 

Statement of Congressman J. Randy Forbes 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces 

Acquisition and Development Challenges Associated with the 

Littoral Combat Ship 

July 25, 2013 

I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished panel of experts 

to today's hearing, that will focus on the acquisition and development challenges 

associated with the Littoral Combat Ship. 

Concurrent with our hearing this morning, the Government Accountability 

Office released a report entitled "Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat 

Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use and Cost". In 

this report, GAO expresses concern about the design stability of the platform and 

concern about the program goals ofthe mission modules. Until these issues are 

clarified, GAO has recommended Congress consider "restricting future funding to 

the program for the construction of additional seaframes" until certain conditions 

are met. 

This is not the first time that we have received reports critical ofthe LCS 

program. The "Perez report" was a report commissioned by the Vice Chief of 

Naval Operations to assess and review the Navy readiness to receive, employ and 

deploy the Littoral Combat Ship. This report, conducted in early 2012, was also 

critical of the LCS program both in tcrms of concepts and implementation. 

Specific concerns included in this report include the concept of operations, 

manning, maintenance, modularity, Mission Package capability, training, and 

commonality were identified. 

The Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation has also expressed 

concerns about the survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship and indicated that 

LCS 1 is "not expected to be survivable" in combat and unable to "maintain 

mission capability after taking a significant hit in a hostile combat environment." 

The testing program associated with this first of class is also lagging. 
46 

I would be remiss if I did not mention the engineering casualties that LCS 1 

is encountering during the deployment to Singapore. While expected in the tirst of 

class, the sheer number of casualties associated with LCS 1 is troubling and needs 

to be quickly addressed. 

In a time of reducing resources, the Navy is planning to even more heavily 

rely on this lower cost alternative. I believe it is incumbent on this subcommittee 

to ensure that we have the most capable, lower cost alternative that is relevant to 

the combatant commanders in time of conflict. 

I also believe that criticism of the LCS program is warranted. From this 

most recent GAO report, to the Perez report and even the DOT &E assessment, 

they all provide an alternative view as to how to best manage the acquisition and 

development of this effort. But let me emphasize that none ofthese reports 

disputes the necessity to rapidly field the capabilities proposed by the Littoral 

Combat Ship. I look forward to doing my part to make sure that we methodically 

and expeditiously field the right LCS capability to the fleet in the years ahead. 

Today we are honored to have as our witnesses: 

the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 

Acquisition, Honorable Sean Stackley; 

the Director of the Navy Staff and the Chairman of the Littoral Combat 

Ship Council Vice Admiral Richard Hunt; and 

the Managing Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, 

Government Accountability Office, Mr Paul Francis. Gentlemen, thank you all for 

being here. 

I could not think of a better panel to assist our subcommittee in reviewing 

this issue. I hope that at the end of this hearing that we will be best able to provide 

a firm direction as to the path forward with the LCS program. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Mclntyre, the distinguished 

gentleman from North Carolina, for any remarks he may have. 
47 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED 

BY TIlE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES 

COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER & 

PROJECTION FORCES 

STATEMENT 

OF 

THE HONORABLE SEAN J. STACKLEY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NA VY 

(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION) 

AND 

V ADM RICHARD HUNT 

DIRECTOR, NAVY STAFF 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER & PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

ON 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS 

DATE: JULY 25, 2013 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER & PROJECTION FORCES 
48 

Mr. Chairman, distingnished members ofthe Subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you and discuss the current status of the Littoral Combat Ship 

(LCS) program, specifically to discuss the overall concept, the process of how the program is 

being executed and the chance to provide the current status on both the LCS Seaframes and 

Mission Package procuremcnt. 

First, the Navy would like to would like to thank the Subcommittee for its continued 

intcrested in naval shipbuilding and the LCS program. In particular, the Navy appreciates the 

opportunity to provide the Services' assessment of the various issues raised of1ate as well as 

provide an update on the tremendous progress we have made in the program over the last few 

years. 

Introduction 

As you know, the LCS program is of critical importance to our Navy. With its great speed and 

interchangeable modules, the ship will provide unprecedented warfighting flexibility. LCS is 

one of the cornerstones of the future Navy, and provides critical capability to the fleet. This fast, 

agile, focused-mission platform is designed for operation in near-shore environments, yet is 

capable of open-ocean operation. It is designed to defeat asymmetric "anti-access" threats such 

as mines, quiet diesel submarines and fast surface craft. The modular design integrated into a 

completely functional weapon system promises to deliver a warship class that will be effective, 

and allow LCS to be tailored specifically for the mission at hand - flexible solutions delivering 

needed capabilities to ever evolving threats. 

These ships expand the battle space by complementing our inherent blue water capability and 

filling war fighting gaps in the littorals and strategic choke points around the world. LCS design 

characteristics (speed, agility, shallow draft, payload capacity, reconfigurablc mission spaces, 

air/water craft capabilities) combined with its core C41, sensors, and weapons systems make it an 

ideal platfonn for engaging in Maritime Security Operations. Each ship has been designed in 

accordance with overarching objectives for reducing total ownership cost, which is also critical 

in the current budget environment. 
49 

Concept 

The LCS's originally envisioned concept of operations called for the ship to perfonn littoral antisurface warfare (SUW) against small boats and craft, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) against 

diesel submarines operating in shallow littoral waters, mine countermeasures (MCM), and a 

range of inherent "mobility related" missions in peacetime. The ships were envisioned to be 

modular and reconfigurable, each capable ofperfOiming SUW, ASW, and MCM. The seaframes 

would serve as a platfonn for mission packages that could be changed, modified, or removed in a 

short period of time. 

Since the original vision, the concept remains unchanged as does the modular strategy that 

delivers cost effective capability to the Fleet. The LCS program comprises two variants of the 

seaframe and three mission packages, each employing incremental fielding strategies. The two 

searrame variants (commonly referred to by the respective lead ship names, FREEDOM and 

INDEPENDENCE) each meet the requirements established within the progranl's Capability 

Development Document (CDD). Through the construction and lessons learned associated with 

the first of class, each has achieved the degree of stability and maturity necessary to ensure 

efficient production of follow ships. Perhaps most importantly, by virtue of sustaining two 

production lines, the Navy has successfully employed competition in this program to such extent 

that the unit cost in production is being steadily reduced. At roughly one-third the unit cost of 

our large surface combatant program, the competitive dual sourcing strategy for LCS has 

provided the Navy with a viable approach to affordably increasing our force while also 

addressing warfighting gaps. 

The modular strategy for mission packages is a breakthrough concept for delivering cost 

effective capability by employing mature technologies to meet today's warfighting requirements 

while also providing tremendous flexibility to rapidly employ developing technologies to counter 

emerging threats or otherwise close gaps today, and in the future. The Navy has initially selected 

three mission packages for the LCS program: Mine Countermeasures, Anti-Surface Warfare, 

and Anti-Submarine Warfare. In order to deliver these capabilities in the capacity needed, and 

with an eye on controlling cost and risk, the Navy is employing an incremental fielding strategy 

wherein the first increment leverages mature technologies and existing programs of record to 

provide a level of performance exceeding that available in the fleet today. Subsequent 

2 
50 

increments of the mission packages will further augment this capability and capacity by 

introducing developing technologies and systems which will largely fill gaps in today's 

warfighting capabilities. It is the Navy's intent to deploy both FREEDOM and 

INDEPENDENCE variants with Increment I mission packages when each ship of the LCS 

program is ready to deploy. Later deploying ships will be equipped with subsequent mission 

package increments as their respective developing technologies are tielded. 

Process 

The entire LCS program, as defined by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-

approved LCS Flight 0+ Capability Development Document (COD), defines the ends state 

requirements for the mission package increments as well as the requirements for the seaframe. 

Both seaframe variants are designed to meet the con specified requirements and support all 

three types of mission packages. Each variant is built to be compliant with the LCS Interface 

Control Document (ICD), which governs the interface between the ship and any current or future 

mission package. This incremental approach minimizes concun'ency risk while allowing the 

flexibility which the modular concept provides. The nine mission package "increments" (4 

MCM,4 SUW, I ASW) represent time-phased fielding of capability aboard both variants ofLCS 

seaframes. This time phased-fielding of capability is fundamental as it allows the Navy to 

rapidly field systems as they are matured instead of waiting for the final capability delivery. The 

major systems that comprise mission packages are already established as individual programs, 

with their own Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs) including cost, schedule and perfonnance 

objectives and thresholds. One APB for the entire mission package program, which integrates 

these programs for LCS, is appropriate and compliant with law, regulation, and policy. The APB 

will include well-defined, quantitative cost, schedule and perfonnance thresholds and objectives 

for the mission packages. In accordance with thc COD and the incremcntal approach, these 

targets will be met through thc final, time-phased capabilities fielded for the MCM, SUW, and 

ASW mission packages. This is similar to the approach used for other programs which provide 

time-phased capability for platfonns. The time-phased fielding of capability and the associated 

pcrfonnance metrics to conduct testing against will be defined in the Capability Production 

Documents currently under development for each mission package. 

3 
51 

Future seaframe contract awards will be predicated on meeting seaframe requirements, including 

the requirement to embark any ICD compliant mission package, in the most cost effective way. 

As the Navy prepares for the next procurement of ships, developmental and operational testing 

ofthe capabilities of each seaframe variant and associated mission package is being conducted 

and the results will be used to inform future program decisions. In addition, the Navy will have 

return cost data from the initial ships of the block buy to further inform the Fiscal Year (FY) 

2016 procurement. The Defense Acquisition Board, chaired by USD(A T &L), will review the 

next seaframe procurement prior to Request for Proposal (RFP) release. The Navy, in 

conjunction with USD(AT&L), will execute the normal, rigorous process to ensure that the 

procurement meets with the specified requirements and that the costs are well understood. 

As the Navy continues to build LCS seaframes, the LCS mission package procurements are 

phased to meet the number of LCS Sealrames. To keep pace with the LCS seali'ames currently 

under contract or remaining under the current block buy through Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, the 

Navy must procurc mission package at a rate necessary to support, 1) developmental and initial 

operational test and evaluation of the two LCS variants, 2) developmental and operational testing 

of each incremental mission package capability as it is integrated and fielded, 3) Fleet crew 

training needs, and 4) operational LCS units with the tailored capabilities required for seatrame 

deployments. It is important to note that it is not a one-to-one ratio of mission package to LCS 

Seaframes. In FY 2014 for example, there will be four seaframes delivered to the fleet with a 

total of 10 mission packages (5 MCM and 5 SUW) delivered and available for use. The 

additional mission packages will support not only operational deployments, but account for the 

additional needs of training, and maintenance as well as developmental and operational testing. 

Allordability remains a key factor in acquiring the needed future capacity of these highly flexible 

and capable ships. The Navy remains on course to deliver thcse seaframes in the quantities 

needed through the execution of the two competitive block buy contracts (tor 10 seaframes of 

each version) awarded in FY 2010. The average cost of both LCS variants - including basic 

construction, Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), and change orders - across the 10-

seaframe procurement over the five year period falls under the Congressionally-mandated cost 

4 
52 

cap of $480 million per seaframe (FY 2009 dollars). The dual block buy award strategy afforded 

the Navy an opportunity to award up to 20 sean'ames between FY 2010 and 2015 under fixedprice type contracts resulting in a savings of $2.9 billion. 

The dual award strategy also stabilized the LCS program and its associated industrial base, 

increased the seaframe procurement rate to support operational requirements, promoted 

efficiency in the industrial base from the vendors to system providers to the shipyards, while 

sustaining competition, and providcd potential Foreign Military Sales opportunities. The Navy is 

also aggressively pursuing commonality between the two variants, with particular focus on 

weapon systems, sensors, and C41 equipment. There are several on-going studies that will 

identifY non-recurring integration costs, insertion points, and total ownership costs in order to 

assess the optimal insertion points. 

LCS capabilities address specific and validated capability gaps in Surfacc Warfare, Mine 

Countermeasures, and Anti-Submarine Warfare. The concept of operations and design 

specifications for LCS were developed to meet these gaps with focused mission packages that 

deploy manned and unmanned vehicles to execute a variety of missions. Three (3) MineCountermeasure (MCM) mission packages, four (4) Surface Warfare (SUW) mission packages 

have been delivered. The Surface Warfare and Anti-Submarine Warfare mission packages 

remain on schedule to reach Initial Operational Capability (lOC) in FY 2014 and FY 2016, 

respectively. Sequestration, combined with recent Congressional marks and rescissions, will 

impact the operational test schedule for the Mine Countermeasures mission package. The Navy 

is working to minimize this impact and will advise the defense committees of any changes to 

meeting the IOC date for this essential capability. The FY 2014 President's Budget requests 

approximately $347 million in Research and Development and Other Procurement funding for 

continued development of mission packages, procurement of common mission module 

equipment and procurement of four mission packages. The Navy will continue to incrementally 

field additional mission package capabilities to the Fleet as they mature. 

Seaframe and Module Package Status 

To date, the Navy has delivered USS FREEDOM (LCS I), USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) and 

USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3). CORONADO (LCS 4) will deliver this Fall. LCS I is currently 

5 
53 

deployed with the Surface Warfare (SUW) mission package and will have morc than a year of 

operational peIibrmance demonstrating the integration of the LCS seaframe and SUW mission 

package. LCS I is currently on deployment to Singapore and has completed two key events, 

IMDEX (Intcrnational Maritime Defense Exhibition) and CARAT (Cooperation Afloat 

Readiness and Training) Malaysia, with CARAT Singapore, SEACA T (Southeast Asia 

Cooperation and Training), regional TSC (Theater Security Cooperation) port visits and Fleetdirected operations still planned for the remainder of the deployment. 

The Navy is already constructing lessons learned [rom the Singapore deployment which will be 

applied to LCS 3 as she prepares for a deployment that is planned for the fourth quarter ofFY 

2013. Whilc only three months into the Western Pacific deployment, valuable data with regard to 

optimal manning and the maintenance balance between ship's force and shore support is being 

gathered, and repair coordination, logistics, and communications between all commands from 

San Diego to Singapore have already been refined with continual gains in efficiency. LCS 2 has 

becn the test platfOlID conducting extensive testing of the integration of the Mine 

Countermeasure (MCM) mission package. The linchpin of the MCM package, the Remote 

Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) now has over 850 hours of Reliability Growth Program over 

the span of 47 missions and 5 months, which has shown Mean Time Between Operational 

Mission Failure substantially exceeding requirements. Overall the Navy will have procured 13 

mission packages, seven of which will have delivered by the end ofFY 2013. As stated 

previously, these mission packages are required to complete development ofthe mission package 

capabilities as well as to support operational testing. LCS 3 is in the process of wrapping up its' 

post delivery period as the seafl'ame will complete Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) in July of 

2013. She will officially transition to the fleet in the fall of2013. 

Commonality between the variants has been a focus of the program over the last two years. The 

Navy plans to incorporate Navy C4I programs of record instead of contractor furnished 

equipment into the hulls. Specific examples include ADNS Increment III, Navy Multiband 

Terminal (NMT), Common Data Link Management System (CDLMS), and Digital Modular 

Radio (DMR). The program is also assessing options and cost to implement a common network 

across both variants including the ability to transition to a common combat management system. 

6 
54 

While many of these initiatives may be greatly afIected by the CUlTent budget environment, the 

Navy continues planning to implement these improvements to the program. 

LCS Council 

In August 2012, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established the Littoral Combat Ship 

(LCS) Council with 3-star nag officer membership from requirements, acquisition, and Fleet 

stakeholders with the objective of driving actions and coordinating all administrative control 

responsibilities for the LCS Class to ensure LCS is ready to meet its assigned missions. 

Fundamentally, the Council was constituted and empowered to bridge "gaps and seams" that 

may exist or arise between various stakeholders, warfare and mission communities and, 

supporting activities across the requirements, acquisition, and Fleet enterprise to ensure the 

successful procurement, development, manning, training, sustainment and operational 

employment of the LCS Class ships, their associated Mission Packages, and shore infrastructure. 

Fleet Introduction and Sustainment 

Sustainment planning for the LCS Class began early in the Ship Program's design and 

development phases. As the program evolved and ships began to deliver, a separate program 

office was created for LCS Fleet Introduction and Sustainment. This office applies feedhack 

from the ships' crews, the Littoral Combat Ship Squadron (LCSRON), Fleet input, Board of 

Inspection and Survey (INSURV) reports, and recommendations and direction from senior navy 

officials, including the LCS Council to continually address strategies and procedures for 

manning, training, maintenance, and supply support, based on operations of the ships as they 

enter service. 

The program office's sustainment approach ensures execution of the CONOPS - The United 

States Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) maintains a robust "Platform Wholeness" Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS) to delineate requirements and assign responsibilities for all aspects of 

LCS support to achieve "platform wholeness." This designation includes the full range of 

manpower, training, logistics; maintenance and shore support to establish the ship in the Fleet, 

sustain it, and ensure its readiness over the Class life cycle. Lessons lcarned, from the operation 

7 
55 

and support ofthe first ships of the class, are being incorporated into LCS platform strategies and 

practices, ensuring continued refinement. 

Due to its limited crew size, LCS operates under a unique maintenance concept. Currently, the 

prime ship design and shipbuilding contractors manage ship maintenance under Interim Support 

Plans (ISPs), which are elements of the shipbuilding contracts. The ISP is a post-delivery 

maintenance and sustainment contract vehicle providing contractor-led LCS maintenance 

support while collecting data for future sustainment planning and contracts. The ISP includes 

contractor-provided facilities and Preventive Maintenance (PM), as well as engineering support 

for LCS unique systems. 

The LCS maintenance organization structure consists of two major elements: Ship and Mission 

Packages. The Squadron-led Maintenance Support Team (MST) manages ship maintenance and 

the Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs) manage ISP execution. The MST consists of Sailors 

and Navy program office personnel who manage the CUlTent Ship's Maintenance Project 

(CSMP), ISP Facilities Maintenance (FM)/PM scheduling, Casualty Reports (CASREPs) and 

reach-back to maintenance providers. The RMC manages Intermediate Level (I-Level) 

maintenance, contracting and oversight of Depot Level (D-Level) maintenance (including 

maintenance covered by the [SP). The [SP contractors perform selected Organizational Level (0-

Level) maintenance. 

As a follow-on to the [SPs, the Program Office will use organic and contracted support via 

Sustainment Execution Contracts and Planning Yard Services Contracts. The program office has 

issued two RFPs for these efforts and will award them in FY 14. These two vehicles will form 

the crux of the planning and sustainment requirements necessary to ensure the Class' success and 

lifecycle expectations. 

As intended and designed, Littoral Combat Ship's reduced manning and rotational crew 

construct, combined with enhanced training and shore support, reduces manpower cost and 

provides greater presence than current surface combatants. The rotational crewing concept for 

LCS is three crews for every two ships with one deployed. The COD Key Performance 

Parameter (KPP) for core crew manning is (Threshold: 50; Objective: 40). Ongoing studies are 

considering revision to the rotational crewing concept. 

8 
56 

Reduced manning is enabled by shipboard automation, robust training and transitioning many 

administrative and maintenance functions ashore, relying on distance support. Enabling 

automated systems include fire detection and suppression systems, automated engine room and 

engineering controls, enhanced Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) systems for selected 

critical equipment and electronic navigation systems. The primary shore support facilities for 

LCS are the LCS Training Facility (L TF) and the Mission Package Support Facility (MPSF). 

LCS is employing a new training strategy that supports a "Train to Qualify" (T2Q) KPP. T2Q 

dictates that an individual reports to the ship ready to stand watch and perform all assigned 

duties. The strategy applies high fidelity shore-based trainers and simulators to support training 

requirements for both hull variants. A mixture of shore-based trainers, simulators, at-sea training 

and certification opportunities ensure the proficiency of follow-on crews. Qualifications and 

celiitications are monitored and refreshed during ot1:hull training periods using repeatable 

measures, metrics and standards. This will enable crews to retain high levels of qualification. 

The LCS Program is continually addressing strategies and procedures for manning, training, 

maintenance, and supply support, based on operations of the ships as they enter service. The 

LCS Program will apply feedback from the ships' crews, the LCSRON, Fleet input, INSURV 

reports, and recommendations and direction from senior navy officials, including the LCS 

Council. As sustainment procedures evolve, changes will be retlected in future revisions to this 

Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP). 

Fleet Perspective 

The Littoral Combat Ship and its embarked Mission Packages bring needed capabilities to our 

Navy. The present surfacc tleet of Frigates, Destroyers and Cruisers provide Navy an ability to 

reach into all four comers of the globe. Littoral Combat Ships, with their speed, shallow draft, 

modular architecture and the ability to contest the inshore environment or near-land battlespace 

will take that global reach even further. 

Our primary combatants of destroyers, cruisers, submarines and aircratl catTiers are essential to 

the defense of our nation. During times of heightened tension, the presence of a United States 

naval vessel off the shores of an allied nation can reassure, while also sending a strong message 

9 
57 

to would-be belligerent actors. Continuous forward presence can also be very expensive and not 

necessarily essential all the time as we continually balance asset demand against available 

resources. This is where the Littoral Combat Ship fits perfectly into our future engagement 

strategy affordable, focused, and tailored combat capability. 

Our multi-mission AEGIS destroyers and cruisers are technological marvels that are manned, 

trained, and equipped to fight multi-threat, open ocean major combat operations. The Littoral 

Combat Ship is a more affordable and equally effective alternative for missions that do not 

require a multi-mission, billion dollar-plus warship. further, Littoral Combat Ships will allow 

the Arleigh Burke class destroyer and Ticonderoga class cruiser to focus on the high-end 

missions they are designed to execute. As an example, for the acquisition and operating price of 

a single destroyer manned with 300 Sailors, Navy will be able to deploy four Littoral Combat 

Ships, able to operate together as a coordinated surface action group, or sent to the four corners 

of a region to maximize forward presence. The Littoral Combat Ship will be able to maintain a 

persistent presence, while U.S.-based cruisers and destroyers will only spend a fraction oftheir 

service life deployed overseas. From forward operating bases, LCS will be able to engage our 

partners and work with our allies consistently. Further, when called upon in crises, LCS have the 

ability to get to contested areas without requiring open ocean, heavy lift transport, providing a 

stronger and persistent presence of United States' interest in the region. 

The Littoral Combat Ship Program, which pairs a ship with a modular mission package, is a ship 

that can serve a multitude of roles. The modular concept and interface design between the ships 

and mission packages offer the opportunity for the incremental delivery of improved capabilities. 

While Navy describes the mission package program in terms of defined increments, each mission 

package will continue to develop and deliver improvement, well beyond the current capabilities 

that arc presently in the Fleet. 

By having the flexibility to swap out mission packages, Navy has a ship that can adapt to meet 

the ever-changing spectrum of mission requirements. 

Procuring the Littoral Combat Ship means Navy does not have to continue to sustain the aging 

Avenger class Mine Countermeasure ships. Instead, the Mine Countermeasure mission package 

can be loaded into the Littoral Combat Ships as required. Then, when needed, the same Littoral 

10 
58 

Combat Ship could embark an Anti-Submarine Warfare mission package in order to search for 

submarines or embark a Surface Warfare mission package to conduct surface warfare missions. 

The ship's reconfigurable and modular mission packages are tailored to meet the requirements of 

specific warfare areas, meaning Navy is getting the capability of more than one ship with each 

Littoral Combat Ship procured. 

In the 3:2: 1 manning model, three crews rotate between two Littoral Combat Ships, with one 

ship forward operating around the globe. Under this concept, with 52 Littoral Combat Ships, 

Navy will be able to continually forward-operate 26 Littoral Combat Ships. In the current 

deployment model for single-crewed cruisers. destroyers and frigates, it would take more than 

one hundred ships to maintain the equivalent level of presence of 52 Littoral Combat Ships. The 

Littoral Combat Ships remains an economical method to address warfighting capability gaps 

while providing sizable global forward presence. 

USS FREEDOM (LCS I) and USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) were constructed and delivered 

using Research & Development dollars and resulted in two competing ship designs. Navy's 

intent is to take the knowledge gained in the build, test, and operation of these first ships to 

inform future program changes. This is why USS FREEDOM's deployment to the Southeast 

Asian Pacific Region was essential to take the first step in the executing the concept of LCS 

persistent forward operations. 

Navy remains committed to delivering and sustaining warships that are operationally ready, 

combat effective and cost efficient. Since its inception, an emphasis has been placed on the 

affordability ofthe program from the construction cost ofthe ship itself to the minimal manning 

construct to reduce the life-cycle costs of operating the ships. The Littoral Combat Ship is the 

affordable means to maintain a strong naval fleet. 

In thc challenging fiscal environment our nation faces today-with sequestration enacted and the 

Department of Defense budget shrinking- the Littoral Combat Ship is a prudent investment 

where Navy is getting more than its money's worth. The Littoral Combat Ship is a 3,000 ton 

warship that is being operated with a crew off ewer than 100 sailors at 1/3 the cost of a dcstroyer, 

1/4 the cost of an attack submarine, and 1130 the cost of an aircrall carrier. The Fiscal Year 2014 

average target cost per ship is approximately $340M. 

II 
59 

The Littoral Combat Ship is a critical component to our surface fleet. The ships will be able to 

sail into ports too shallow for cruisers and destroyers and they will show the United States flag in 

places where our ships have never been before. The Littoral Combat Ship provides muchneeded capability to the United States Navy. 

Summary 

Moving forward the Navy plans on continuing to leverage the modular strategy for the LCS 

program. The modular strategy is a breakthrough concept for delivering cost effective capability 

by employing mature technologies to meet today's warfighting requirements while also 

providing tremendous flexibility to rapidly employ developing technologies to counter emerging 

threats or otherwise close gaps today, and in the future. The Navy plans on procuring 52 LCS 

seaframes in accordance with the most recent long range shipbuilding plan while balancing 

available funding with achieving the lowest possible pricing to the government. The Navy plans 

to continue to procure LCS seaframes through the remainder of the Block Buy in FY 2015 and 

the start ofthe next procurement in FY 20 I 6. The Navy plans to procure LCS seaframes in 

accordance with the most recent long range shipbuilding plan while balancing available funding 

with achieving the lowest possible pricing to the government. The future acquisition decisions 

will be informed with an up-to-date Service Cost Position and "should cost" assessment. The 

Defense Acquisition Executive will detennine whether a new GSD Cost Analysis and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) will be needed to inform the decision. 

Contracts for ships in FY 20 16 and beyond will be infonned by actual cost returns, not estimates, 

for eight delivered seaframes and an additional 16 seafi'ames under contract, but not delivered by 

FY 2016. The Joint Staff; along with the Navy staff; plans to conduct a requirements assessment 

study which will serve as a revalidation of the LCS capabilities definition document. No 

changes to LCS seaframe requirements are envisioned in the near tenn as both LCS classes meet 

Navy requirements. No changes are planned for LCS mission packages that will affect near-tcnn 

testing or fielding of mission package systems. 

We thank you for your continued support of the Navy and Marine Corps as well as the LCS 

Program. With your continued support, you will help the Navy deliver not only an atlordable, 

but highly capable and flexible warship to the Fleet and our Nation. 

12 
60 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(Research, Development and Acquisition) 

7/2812008 - Present 

The Honorable Sean J. Stackley 

Sean J< Stackley assumed the duties of assistant secretary of the Navy (ASN) (Research, 

Development & Acquisition (ROA» following his confirmation by the Senate in July 2008, 

As the Navy's acquisition executive, Mr. Stackley is responsible for the research, 

development and acquisition of Navy and Marine Corps platforms and warfare systems 

which includes oversight of more than 100,000 people and an annual budget in excess of 

$50 billion. 

Prior to his appointment to ASN (RDA), Mr. Stackley served as a professional staff 

member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During his tenure with the Committee, 

he was responsible for overseeing Navy and Marine Corps programs, U.S. Transportation 

Command matters and related policy for the Seapower Subcommittee. He also advised on 

Navy and Marine Corps operations & maintenance, science & technology and acquisition 

policy, 

Mr. Stackley began his career as a Navy surface warfare officer, serving in engineering 

and combat systems assignments aboard USS John Young (DO 973). Upon completing his warfare qualifications, he was 

designated as an engineering duty officer and served in a series of industrial, fleet, program office and headquarters assignments in 

ship design and construction, maintenance, logistics and acquisition policy. 

From 2001 to 2005, Mr. Stackley served as the Navy's LPD 17 program manager, with responsibility for all aspects of procurement 

for this major ship program. Having served earlier in his career as production officer for the USS Arleigh Burke (DOG 51) and 

project Naval architect overseeing structural design for the Canadian Patrol Frigate, HMCS Halifax (FFH 330), he had the unique 

experience of having performed a principal role in the design, construction. test and delivery of three first-of-class warships. 

Mr. Stackley was commissioned and graduated with distinction from the United States Naval Academy in 1979, with a Bachelor of 

Science in Mechanical Engineering. He holds the degrees of Ocean Engineer and Master of Science, Mechanical Engineering from 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Mr. Stackley earned certification as professional engineer. Commonwealth of Virginia, in 

1994. 
61 

Vice Admiral Richard W. HlInt 

Director, Navy Staff 

Vice Adm. Hunt graduated from the University of WisconsinMadison in 1975 with a Bachelor of Science in Bacteriology. He 

was commissioned in February 1976 through the Officer 

Candidate School Program in Newport, R.I. He attended the 

Naval Post Graduate School, receiving a Master of Science in 

Telecommunications Systems Management in March 1988. 

Hunt served in USS Sampson (DDG 10), USS Underwood 

(FFG 36) and USS Roark (FF 1053). As commanding officer of 

USS Cramme/in (FFG 37) from August 1993 to May 1995, 

deployed as part of the Kitty Hawk Battle Group in support of 

Korean Contingency Operations. Following his command tour, 

he served as assistant chief of staff for Operations and Plans 

for Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 2, deploying twice to 

the Mediterranean Sea/Arabian Gulf as part of the George 

Washington Battle Group. He served as commanding officer, 

USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) and air warfare commander for the 

Enterprise Battle Group from December 1999 to July 2001. In July 2005, he assumed command of 

Carrier Strike Group Six. Additionally, he served as commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of 

Africa, United States Central Command from April 2006 to February 2007; Commander, U.S. 3rd 

Fleet from June 2009 to April 2011, and commander, Naval Surface Forces/Commander, Naval 

Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet from June 2011 to July 2012. He became director, Navy Staff in 

August 2012. 

Shore assignments include: assistant professor Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps Unit, The 

Ohio State University; communications systems officer for Command, Control, Communications, and 

Computer Systems Directorate (J6), Joint Staff; executive assistant to director Surface Warfare 

(N86); executive assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff of Naval Operations for Resources, 

Requirements and Assessments (N8), and Executive Assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

He additionally served as deputy director, Strategy & Policy, Joint Staff (J5) and director, 

Programming Division (N80), Navy Staff. 

Personal decorations include the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service 

Medal, Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy and 

Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Joint Service Achievement Medal, Navy and Marine Corps 

Achievement Medal, and various service medals and unit awards. 

10 
62 

For Relea..;;e on Delivery 

Exp('ctcd at 9::{O a.Ill. EDT 

Thursday, July 25, 2013 

GAO-13-738T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Seapower 

and Projection Forces, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

NAVY SHIPBUILDING 

Significant Investments in 

the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial 

Unknowns about 

Capabilities, Use, and Cost 

Statement of Paul L. Francis, Managing Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
63 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Mcintyre, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today as you examine issues related to the 

Department of the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)-a program framed 

by a revolutionary approach to shipbuilding acquisition and naval 

operations. The LCS consists of the ship-called a seaframe-and 

mission modules, which, when integrated with the seaframe and 

supplemented with aviation support, provide mission capability. 1 Unlike 

other Navy surface combatants, which generally have fixed mission 

systems, LCS is intended to be reconfigurable to perform three primary 

missions: surface warfare (SUW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and 

anti-submarine warfare (ASW). These modules are intended to give the 

Navy flexibility to change equipment in the field to meet different mission 

needs and incorporate new technology to address emerging threats. 

Further, LCS is envisioned to have a smaller crew by relying instead on 

shore-based support for its administrative and maintenance needs. The 

total estimated acquisition cost of the LCS program is over $40 billion in 

2010 dollars. In total, the Navy plans to buy 52 seaframes and 64 mission 

packages. GAO has previously reported on a number of challenges 

related to the LCS program, including cost growth, schedule delays, and 

problems with delivering intended capabilities. 2 My remarks today are 

based on our most recent report, which is being released at this hearing, 

titled Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat 

Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and 

Cost.' 

The Navy's acquisition strategy for LCS seaframes has changed several 

times over the past decade. The original plan was to fund one or two 

initial ships, and then spend time experimenting with the seaframes and 

overall LCS concept before ultimately selecting one seaframe design. The 

Navy changed this strategy in 2010, however, and has continued to buy 

1When one or more mission modules are integrated with aviation capability it is referred to 

as a mission package, 

2GAO, Navy's Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will 

Determine Eventual Capabilities, GAO~10~523 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2010). 

3GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue 

Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use. and Cost, GAO-13-530 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 25,2013). 

Page 1 GAO·13·738T 
64 

seaframes from two different shipbuilding teams-each with different 

design variations. One is led by Lockheed Martin-which builds its ships 

at Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wisconsin-and the other is led by 

Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama4 The two designs reflect different 

contractor solutions to the same set of performance requirements. The 

most notable difference is that the Lockheed Martin Freedom variant 

(LCS 1 and other odd-numbered seaframes) is a monohull design with a 

steel hull and aluminum superstructure, while the Austal USA 

Independence variant (LCS 2 and other even-numbered seaframes) is an 

aluminum trimaran.' The Navy is developing the mission packages in 

increments in order to field capabilities faster. The Navy plans on 

ultimately fielding one ASW increment and four MCM and SUW 

increments. 

The Navy has accepted delivery of the first three seaframes and has 

spent several years completing various test and maintenance events on 

the first two-USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2). 

USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) was delivered in June 2012. During this time, we 

and others reported on a number of problems with the seaframes and 

their equipment, as well as challenges related to the development of 

mission module technologies. In light of these issues, we were asked to 

conduct a broad evaluation of the LCS program. Our report addresses (1) 

the Navy's progress in producing and testing LCS seaframes and any 

remaining risks; (2) the Navy's progress in developing, producing, and 

testing LCS mission modules and any remaining risks; and (3) any risks 

in the Navy's acquisition strategy for the integrated LCS program. To 

address these issues. we evaluated acquisition and requirements 

documents, testing plans, and delivery schedules for the two seaframe 

variants and the various mission modules. We also interviewed 

Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy officials, visited both shipyards, 

and toured the three LCS ships that have been delivered to the Navy to 

date. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 

4For LeS 2 and LeS 4. General Dynamics was the prime contractor for the Austal USAbuilt ships. General Dynamics and Austal USA ended their teaming arrangement in 2010. 

Austal USA is the prime contractor for the 10 other even-numbered seaframes currently 

under contract. 

5A trimaran is a ship that has three separate hulls. The Navy is now referring to the 

Independence-class variant as a slender stabilized monohull design. 

Page 2 GAO·13·738T 
65 

Seaframe Progress 

Mission Module 

Progress 

government auditing standards. 6 The key points from our report are 

summarized below. 

We found that the Navy has made progress in addressing some of the 

early design and construction problems on the LCS 1 and LCS 2 

seaframes, and quality defects and unit costs are declining, now that the 

seaframes are in steady production. Based on projected learning curves, 

shipyard performance can be expected to continue to improve over time. 

This expected progress could, however, be disrupted, as the Navy is 

considering potentially significant seaframe design changes. For 

example, the Navy is currently studying changes to increase the 

commonality of systems and equipment between the two ship variants, 

primarily with regard to the ships' combat management systems, and add 

new capabilities. In addition, the Navy still has outstanding gaps in its 

knowledge about how the unique designs of the two variants will perform 

in certain conditions. The lead ship of the Freedom class is currently on 

an extended deployment to Southeast ASia, and the Navy views this as 

an important opportunity to demonstrate some of the ship's capabilities 

and allow the crew to obtain first-hand experience with operations. Yet, 

developmental testing of the seaframes is ongoing, and neither variant 

has completed shock and survivability testing, which will demonstrate that 

the ship designs can safely absorb and control damage. Importantly, 

operational testing of the LCS with its mission modules is several years 

away, which I will discuss later. Late discoveries of problems while the 

seaframes continue to be constructed could lead to further design 

changes. 

The Navy continues to buy early increments of LCS mission packages 

before (1) defining requirements and cost, schedule, and performance 

goals for each increment, as currently required by DOD policy and (2) 

completing developmental testing, which to date has identified problems 

with system performance. This evolutionary acquisition strategy, which 

delivers improving levels of capability over several increments, offers 

warfighters improved capability as it is available. However, the 

requirements for the increments have not yet been defined, and the 

increments will provide performance below the Navy's minimum needs for 

years to come. In addition, the Navy does not plan to demonstrate that 

6For detailed information about our scope and methodology, please see GAO-13-530. 

Page 3 GAO·13·738T 
66 

Acquisition Strategy 

and Business Case 

Risks 

the MCM and SUW packages can meet minimum-termed "threshold"-

requirements until their final increments are fielded in 2017 and 2019, 

respectively.7 By that time, the Navy will have already procured more than 

24 MCM and SUW mission packages. Further, developmental testing to 

date-especially for the systems comprising the MCM package-has 

shown performance problems. Internal Navy studies and wargames have 

also raised concerns with the overall effectiveness of each mission 

package based on inherent seaframe or mission module limitations. 

Significant questions remain about the LCS program and its underlying 

business case, even as seaframe and mission package procurements 

continue. Elements of the LCS business case-including its cost and its 

anticipated capabilities-have degraded over time. Given the program's 

cost growth and schedule delays, the congressional cost cap has 

increased from $220 million in fiscal year 2006, to $480 million in fiscal 

year 2010 per ship.8 Expected capabilities have lessened from optimistic, 

early assumptions to more tempered and reserved assumptions. While 

more explicit examples of specific capabilities that changed are classified, 

table 1 depicts some significant examples of the changes in Navy 

statements about LCS's capability from early in the program to today. 

7The Navy plans to meet the threshold performance levels for the ASW package in 2016. 

This is the first and only increment of that module. 

8The $220 million cap applied to the fifth and sixth ships of the class. Pub. L. No. 109-

163, § 124. The $480 million cap applies beginning in fiscal year 2011. Pub. L. No. 111-

84. § 121 (2009). GAO·10·523. 

Page 4 GAO·13-738T 
67 

Table 1: Evolution of Navy Statements about Littoral Combat Ship (lCS) Capability 

How LCS will deploy 

Wi!! gain initial entry and provide assured 

access-or ability to enter contested spacesand be employable and sustainable throughout 

the battlespace regardless of anti-access or areadenial environments. 

Will be a self-sufficient combatant designed to 

fight and win in shallow water and near-land 

environments without risking larger combatants in 

constricted areas. 

performing and in a 

combat scenario. 

Not to be employed outside a benign, low-threat 

environment unless escorted by a multi-mission 

combatant providing credible anti-air, antisurface. and anti-submarine protection. 

Lacks the ability to operate independently in 

combat. Wit! have to be well protected by multimission combatants. Multiple LCSs will likely 

have to operate in a coordinated strike attack 

group fashion for mutual support. 

How mission package swaps Mission packages will be quickly swapped out in Mission packages can be swapped within 72 

will be utilized an expeditionary theater in a matter of days. hours if aU the equipment and personnel are in 

theater, which may take significantly longer. An 

LCS executing a package swap could be 

unavailable for between 12-29 days. 

lCS concept of 

Significant unknowns related to key LCS operations and support concepts 

may also affect the cost of the program and soundness of the business 

case. Several of the key concepts that underpin the program-such as 

employing modular weapon systems, highly reduced manning levels, and 

heavy reliance on shore-based contractor maintenance-represent 

innovative approaches that have not yet been validated through 

operations. Changes to any of the above concepts could affect the LCS 

program and employment of the ships. For example, the Navy may learn 

that one seaframe variant is more useful in certain mission sets or 

operating areas than the other. 

Finally, the Navy continues to pursue an acquisition strategy that commits 

to the purchase of significant numbers of ships and mission packages 

before sufficient knowledge is available, especially testing, as illustrated 

in figure 1. 

Page 5 GAO·13·738T 
68 

Figure 1: Alignment of Planned littoral Combat Ship Seaframe Contract and Test 

Activities 

Solicit proposals and 

source selectIOn 

$ouroo" GAO allaiYSlsof Navy data 

Contract award 

For example, operational testing will demonstrate whether the mission 

packages, integrated with the seaframes, can meet the Navy's 

performance requirements. However, as shown in figure 1, based on the 

current strategy, by the time key operational tests are completedplanned to occur in fiscal year 2019-the Navy will have purchased 33 

seaframes-more than half of the planned number. The Navy already has 

24 of the planned 52 seaframes under contract, and plans to award 

further contracts in 2016, before DOD makes a formal decision about full 

rate production of the ships in 2019. The congressional timeframe for 

making decisions regarding the Navy's next planned buy is even shorter: 

the authority and funding the Navy needs to proceed with the 2016 

contracts will be presented to Congress in the spring of 2015. 

In conclusion, the current LCS program is not the program envisioned 

over a decade ago. Initial cost estimates have been significantly 

exceeded and the supporting business case continues to evolve. I believe 

the LCS class is a novel concept with features that could influence the 

designs of future Navy ships and all parties would like to see the ships 

succeed with those features. On that score, the Navy has a great deal of 

learning to do about the ships, the integrated capability that they are 

intended to provide when equipped with the mission packages, and how 

the overall LCS concept will be implemented. Today, the Navy continues 

to learn about the seaframe design, cost, and performance. But, it still 

does not know how well the ships will perform their missions, how well its 

unique crewing and maintenance concepts will work, or how much it will 

cost to equip and support the ship. Further, the Navy is still considering 

changes to the ships' design and determining whether or not there are 

even advantages to having two ship designs. These are things the Navy 

Page 6 GAO·13·738T 
69 

and Congress should know before contracting for more than half of the 

ships. The deficiencies we have identified are not criticisms of progress in 

the sense that things should have gone more smoothly or quickly-some 

issues are expected as part of the discovery process with a new class of 

ships. At issue, rather, is the misalignment of the program's progress with 

acquisition decisions, and with key decisions being made well before 

requisite knowledge is available. This is especially true for LCS, which is 

well into production at the same time it is still an experimental concept. 

In our report, we make several recommendations to DOD. For example, 

we recommended that DOD limit future seaframe acquisitions until it 

completes a full-rate production review, and that the Navy limit mission 

module purchases to the minimum quantities required to support 

operational testing. We also recommended that DOD report to Congress 

on the relative advantages of each seaframe variant for each key LCS 

mission prior to awarding any additional seaframe contracts. In its written 

response, DOD did not agree with our recommendations aimed at 

slowing the pace of seaframe and mission package procurements. The 

Navy cited the need to buy ships at the planned pace to keep pricing low 

and saw no value in reducing production until the full-rate production 

decision. We continue to believe that the acquisition approach for this 

program, with large quantities of ships and modules being bought ahead 

of key test events, is risky, especially for a new class of ship, like LCS. 

DOD agreed that the Navy could, if requested by Congress, report on the 

performance of each seaframe variant against current LCS requirements. 

However, this response did not address the intent of our 

recommendation, which was to provide an assessment of the relative 

costs and advantages and disadvantages of the variants against 

operational and mission needs in order to help inform future procurement 

decisions. A complete discussion of DOD's comments and our evaluation 

are provided in the report. 

Our report also includes two matters for congressional consideration. 

First, to ensure that continued LCS investments are informed by 

adequate knowledge, Congress should consider restricting funding for 

additional seaframes until the Navy completes ongoing technical and 

design studies related to potential changes in LCS requirements, 

capabilities, and the commonality of systems on the two seaframe 

variants. Second, to ensure timely and complete information on the 

capabilities of each seaframe variant prior to making decisions about 

future LCS procurements, Congress should consider requiring DOD to 

report on the relative advantages of each variant in carrying out the three 

primary LCS missions. 

Page 7 GAO·13·738T 
70 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(121164) 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Mcintyre, and Members of the 

Subcommittee this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions that you or other members of the 

subcommittee may have at this time. 

For questions about this statement, please contact Paul Francis at (202) 

512-4841, or at francisp@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

include: Michele Mackin (Director), Ron Schwenn (Assistant Director); 

Diana Moldafsky (Assistant Director); Kristine Hassinger, Amber Keyser, 

and C. James Madar. 

PageS GAO-13·738T 
71 

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73 

Paul L. Francis 

Managing Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

Paul Francis is Managing Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management. He has been 

with GAO for over 36 years, with most of his work experience being in the area of major 

weapon acquisitions. He has been a member of the Senior Executive Service since 2002. He 

has conducted or been involved with reviews of many individual weapon programs, 

including Army helicopters, Future Combat Systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, tactical 

communications, shipbuilding programs, and missile defense. He has also conducted or 

been involved with cross-cutting reviews, several of which involved benchmarking with 

leading commercial firms and successful Department of Defense programs. These included 

acquisition culture, transition to production, technology maturation, requirements setting, 

supplier relationships, integrated product teams, requirements setting, training, test and 

evaluation, earned value management, milestone authorization, and affordability. He has 

done work in the areas of wartime medical requirements and detection oflandmines and 

unexploded ordnance. He has testified before congressional committees numerous times. 

Mr. Francis spent one year with the House Science and Technology Committee early in his 

career. 

Mr. Francis has a Bachelor's degree in Accounting (University of Scranton); a Masters 

Degree in Public Administration (George Washington University) and a Senior Executive 

Fellow, (Kennedy School of Government). 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 25, 2013 

(77) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral HUNT. The Navy is in the process of developing 

the acquisition strategy for the post block buy ships (Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 and out). 

Additional information will be provided once the strategy has been developed, estimated to be in late FY 2014. [See page 17.] 

Mr. FRANCIS. We believe our recommendations are reasonable and important for 

ensuring well informed acquisition decisions that meet the Navy’s needs. In regards 

to the fiscal year 2014 budget under consideration, we suggested that Congress consider restricting funding for construction of additional seaframes until the Navy: 

• completes the ongoing LCS technical and design studies, 

• determines the impacts of making any changes resulting from these studies on 

the cost and designs of future LCS seaframes, and 

• reports to Congress on cost-benefit analyses of changes to the seaframes to 

change requirements and/or capabilities and to improve commonality of systems, and the Navy’s plan moving forward to improve commonality. 

Waiting until the Navy has presented this information better ensures that there 

is adequate knowledge to support seaframe construction because the results of these 

studies may indicate the potential for additional design changes that may have cost 

implications. As shown in the table below, the Navy planned to have all of the studies completed by the start of fiscal year 2014. Therefore, we would expect the Navy 

to be able to report the results to Congress before any fiscal year 2014 funding restrictions would take effect. 

Studies Referred to in GAO Report Navy’s Estimated Completion Date 

Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) commonality 

feasibility study 

Completed 

Common Combat Management System Study Completed 

Flight 1 technical trade study (including habitability) Completed 

Flight 1 capabilities study Completed 

Since these studies should be complete the Navy should be able to meet this proposed reporting requirement prior to March 31, 2014—the last day that the Navy 

can contractually award funding to the shipyards in fiscal year 2014 without compromising its obligations to the shipyards. 

With regards to plans beyond 2016, we recommended that the Navy buy only 

seaframes at the minimum sustaining rate—which the Navy defines as 1 to 2 ships 

per yard per year—until it successfully completes a full-rate production decision review in order to ensure that decision makers are adequately informed prior to committing to future seaframe buying decisions. DOD disagreed with this recommendation, stating that delaying or slowing future procurements to a minimum sustaining 

rate is unnecessary and will cause an increase in prices. However, DOD also stated 

that it plans to procure future seaframes in accordance with the Annual Long-Range 

Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels that supported the fiscal year 2014 budget 

submission which indicates that the Navy plans to procure 2 to 3 ships per year 

from 2016 to 2027. If the Navy adheres to its current long range shipbuilding plan 

and continues to buy seaframes from both shipyards as it has been doing, then our 

recommendation is consistent with the Navy’s future procurement plan. But if the 

Navy makes significant changes to its future procurement plan, such as opting to 

downselect to one shipyard (which could increase the rate above the minimum sustaining rate for one shipyard) or planning a large block buy, we would recommend 

that the Navy first gain key knowledge from operational testing results. We would 

again caution that while slowing production might result in an increase in seaframe 
78 

unit prices, the cost to the government of buying ships before validating performance and ensuring that the seaframes still meet the Navy’s needs might be much 

greater. Since the Navy is not currently under contract for any LCS seaframes beyond 2015, it currently has no longer term contractual obligations to these shipyards 

that could be impacted. [See page 17.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 25, 2013 

(81) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. Please comment on the capabilities of the ALaMO system, the 

threats it addresses, it’s development timeline and funding profile. 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral HUNT. The Advanced Low Cost Munitions Ordnance (ALaMO) system is currently in science and technology demonstration by industry but after successful development it is projected to provide all-weather operation and improved lethality over existing 57mm ammunition. Once developed, 

ALaMO would provide an extended engagement range and guidance, making it an 

improved counter-small boat capability. The system uses a combination of two channel, multi-band sensor for target acquisition and Guided Integration Fuzing (GIF) 

in order to maximize warhead lethality. 

ALaMO is not an acquisition Program of Record and therefore not currently funded. The estimated development cost to conduct Engineering Manufacturing and Development over a five year period is estimated to be $225M. The notional development timeline would lead to Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) of 

ALaMO in the early part of the fifth year, with an Initial Operational Capability 

(IOC) later in that same year. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. DOD disagreed with GAO’s recommendation to only buy the minimum quantity of ships to preserve the industrial base until a full-rate production 

review is held in 2019. The Navy’s most recent long-range shipbuilding plan states 

that the Navy intends on purchasing two ships per year in fiscal years 2016–2018, 

followed by three ships per year in 2019. This is the minimum rate if there are two 

shipyards building LCS. Does the Navy’s disagreement with the GAO recommendation mean that it has chosen to downselect to one shipyard as part of its acquisition 

strategy going forward? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral HUNT. The Navy’s decision to continue procuring two ships per Fiscal Year in FYs 2016–2018, followed by three ships per year 

in FY 2019, reflects the need to remain on the critical path to meeting the Navy’s 

Force Structure requirements as outlined by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). 

The LCS shipbuilding profile is in alignment with the CNO’s 2012 Navy Force 

Structure Requirement and does not reflect the outcome of an acquisition strategy. 

While the Navy is mindful of the need to preserve the industrial base, the Navy 

disagreed with GAO’s recommendation due to the need to maintain the flexibility 

to consider the appropriate procurement strategy in the context of the industrial 

base as well as Department of Defense Strategic Guidance and the CNO’s Force 

Structure Requirement. 

Mr. FORBES. The former Under Secretary of the Navy and others have noted that 

each variant may be better suited for certain regions and missions; has the Navy 

begun to assess the relative advantages of each seaframe design and how will this 

affect the next contract award? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral HUNT. The Navy is evaluating its follow-on acquisition strategy, which includes assessing the advantages of each seaframe design. 

As part of this acquisition strategy, the Navy will consider a number of factors in 

making its decision including maintaining competition, overall cost and affordability, each variant’s operational performance, as well as the industrial base. All 

of these factors will be assessed in the context of how to best meet the CNO’s Force 

Structure Requirement. 

To date, both LCS variants provide the operational capability required by the 

Navy and the Navy’s decision to continue production of both variants of ships was 

founded on the additional savings achieved in procurement as well as the benefit 

to the industrial base. As the two designs become more prevalent in the Fleet and 

gain additional operational time, the Navy may find that some capabilities are enhanced on one variant over the other and will evolve the ships as has been done 

with past shipbuilding programs. 

Mr. FORBES. Developmental testing to date of the mission modules—especially the 

mine counter measures mission module—has shown continued performance prob-
82 

lems, with the technologies generally not operating as intended. If the mission modules do not perform as expected in operational testing, how will this affect the 

Navy’s planned purchase of seaframes and/or mission packages? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral HUNT. Navy is committed to achieving Initial 

Operational Capability (IOC) for the three Littoral Combat Ship Mission Packages, 

and following IOC each mission package will continue to provide improved 

warfighting capabilities to the Fleet. 

Through time-phased fielding of capability, Navy will be able to rapidly field systems as they mature rather than waiting for the final capability delivery. Further, 

the flexibility of this concept is that if a technology does not meet a specified requirement, a determination can be made to use the technology because of the operational value it provides, or a different technology can be inserted into the mission 

package without having to start a new system program. Currently the capabilities 

of the initial increment of each Mission Module exceeds capabilities existing in today’s fleet. The result is a savings in both reduced fielding time and overall cost. 

As Navy prepares for the next procurement of LCS ships, developmental and 

operational testing of the capabilities of each LCS Class and associated Mission 

Package is being conducted and the results will be used to inform future program 

decisions. 

Mr. FORBES. In your 2010 testimony before the Congress, you note that the block 

buy strategy for seaframe procurement did not require the Navy to buy any ships 

after the first year and did not have termination costs, thereby enabling the Congress and the Navy to have continual oversight. Given the issues highlighted in 

GAO’s recent report, shouldn’t we exercise this oversight and allow the Navy to 

pause and figure out the design and capabilities that it wants in these ships? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral HUNT. Navy does not believe a pause is warranted in construction of the Littoral Combat Ships or the Mission Packages. The 

required capability of the ships and Mission Packages is well defined within its Capabilities Development Document (CDD) and it is this capability that has been delivered to Navy with the commissioning of USS FREEDOM (LCS 1), USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2), USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3) and soon, USS CORONADO 

(LCS 4). 

Since the 2010 testimony, significant strides have been made in addressing key 

risks to ship production. For example, lessons learned from the lead ships have been 

captured and thoroughly incorporated into the production planning and processes. 

Lead ship design deficiencies have been corrected and the design is very stable, with 

design changes reduced by 80 to 90 percent in the follow ships. Both shipyards have 

also made substantial investments in facility improvements and workforce training 

which have greatly improved the accuracy and efficiency in each ship’s construction. 

The larger vendor base is also leveraging the stability provided by the long-term 

LCS contract to drive down cost. As a result of these improvements, the ship costs 

are under control and are contained within the fixed-price contracts which limit the 

Government’s liability. 

The LCS procurement strategy has not changed since the Block Buy awards in 

December 2010. Navy will not be required to pay termination or cancellation costs 

if the FY 2014 and FY 2015 ship contracts are not funded. However, there are additional costs Navy would be required to pay if the FY 2014 and FY 2015 Block Buy 

ships are not funded. Cost for all ships under contract will be increased due to impact of lost shipyard workload, inefficiencies, and production breaks in the vendor 

base. The Navy’s liability in this case extends to the contract ceiling for LCS 5–LCS 

16. Additionally, in the event of lost workload at Austal USA, the Joint High Speed 

Vessel program cost would increase. Further, insofar as these ships were procured 

within the framework of the highly competitive fixed price contracts, Navy risks significant cost increases to procure these ships in future years (which would be necessary to meet Navy’s requirement). Most importantly, a pause in seaframe procurement would cause a significant impact on meeting Navy’s Force Structure for small 

surface combatants. LCS is central to meeting the Force Structure requirement and 

pausing production would exacerbate Navy’s challenge in building to the right mix 

of ships as detailed in the 30 year shipbuilding plan. 

Mr. FORBES. Why was the Navy delegated acquisition authority for the mission 

modules program from OSD? What steps do you intend on taking to manage that 

program, given its continued performance problems, delays in achieving milestones 

and aggressive acquisition approach? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral HUNT. On October 3, 2012, USD(AT&L) signed 

an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) designating the Littoral Combat Ship 

(LCS) Mission Module Program as an ACAT IC program and delegating the Milestone Decision Authority to the Navy. USD(AT&L) retained approval authority for 
83 

the initial Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) for the LCS Mission Module Program. 

The Navy will execute the normal, rigorous process to ensure that the Mission 

Module procurement meets the specified requirements, and that the costs are well 

understood. The Navy continues to perform annual Navy Gate Review and Defense 

Acquisition Board Integrated Program Reviews with USD(AT&L). Additionally, the 

Navy will continue to rely on the LCS Council, with 3-star flag officer membership 

from requirements, acquisition and fleet stakeholders, to drive actions and coordinate all administrative control responsibilities. 

The LCS Mission Modules are currently on track to deliver the capability needed 

by the Navy, and they are doing so within the cost targets established for the program. The greatest risk to the program is not technical, it is the risk posed by disruption and delay caused by continuing resolutions, sequestration and other budget 

reductions. 

Mr. FORBES. The GAO report clearly lays out the delays in the development and 

integration of the surface-to-surface missile for the Surface Warfare Mission Package. According to the report, the Navy plans to procure just one Griffin unit with 

eight Griffin IIB missiles by 2015, but now even this plan has been delayed and 

may be reconsidered. What is the way forward on the surface-to-surface missile? Is 

the Navy planning to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives to determine the best 

long-term material solution for this critical component of the Surface Warfare package? 

Admiral HUNT. The Navy suspended Surface-to-Surface Missile Module (SSMM) 

Increment 1 (Griffin) activities during Fiscal Year 2013 in order to assess alternative solutions which could provide increased range and capability. The Navy is 

also planning on conducting a SSMM Resources and Requirements Review board 

(R3B) in October 2013. 

These events will help determine the SSMM path forward and revised timeline. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. My understanding of the LCS program is that the ship is critical 

to the Navy’s network-centric warfare and intended to replace three other classes 

of aging ships. Understanding the costs, schedule, and performance items associated 

with the sustainment of this program is important for us in Congress to make informed decisions about the future of the programs. Focusing on the interesting developments in USV and UUV technologies being integrated with the mission packages, I am concerned by the recent July 2013 GAO report that states, ‘‘they do not 

believe the Navy has adequate knowledge about how integrated mission module systems onboard an LCS will perform in an operational environment.’’ Additionally, the 

GAO report asserts that the Navy will not be able to meet threshold capabilities 

defined in its requirements documentation with mission modules integrated with 

the seaframes until 2019. I’d be interested in your assessment of how these critical 

technologies are being implemented within the LCS program given the setbacks 

within the Mine Countermeasure Modules (MCM). 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and Surface Warfare 

(SUW) Mission Packages are being delivered incrementally for purposes of controlling cost and risk while fielding initial capability in the most rapid manner practicable. 

The initial increments for both of these Mission Packages meet or exceed current 

capabilities in the Fleet today. Each of these Mission Packages brings credible combat capability to the Fleet now for SUW and for MCM in FY 2015. 

Increment I of the MCM Mission Package uses a semi-submersible vehicle called 

the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV), which tows the AQS–20A minehunting 

sonar set. This system is called Remote Minehunting System (RMS) and can operate 

under remote control, or execute a programmed search in an autonomous mode to 

find mines either in the water volume or on the bottom. This system has accumulated over 850 hours of successful testing to date and is scheduled for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY 2015. Increment II will incorporate an unmanned 

surface vehicle to conduct sustained influence minesweeping capability, and is 

scheduled for IOC in FY 2017. The last planned increment will use the Knifefish 

Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) for buried mind detection, and is scheduled for 

IOC in FY 2019. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. We recently held a hearing on the Asia-Pacific Rebalance; I’d be 

interested in hearing your thoughts on how the LCS would be utilized within an 

A2/AD environment. 
84 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral HUNT. LCS, with a surface, anti-submarine, or 

mine countermeasures Mission Package embarked, is designed to conduct littoral 

operations within an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. LCS will be a 

vital component of any A2/AD operations, whether clearing mines, identifying 

enemy submarines or protecting high value units from hostile, swarming surface 

craft. Littoral Combat Ships are able to respond to threats quickly with speed (40 

plus knots), maneuverability, a shallow draft and the unique capacity to respond 

with a variety of networked off-board systems. 

LCS is designed to operate independently or in surface action groups in low-tomedium threat environments. As a small surface combatant, LCS was not envisioned to operate independently in a high air threat environment. Rather, LCS will 

be networked as part of a battle force including multi-mission, deep water surface 

combatants and air assets to defend against elevated A2/AD threats such as highvolume Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) raids, Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles 

(ASBMs), and tactical air threats. While LCS has a very capable self-defense capability, in situations where the threat of complex and high volume anti-ship missile 

attack is high, LCS will operate with Strike Group assets or area air defense capable ships. 

In addition to Mission Package weapons and systems, LCS will use its speed, organic weapons (including 57mm gun, decoys, chaff, and the RAM and SeaRAM missile system) and sensors to counter surface and air threats in the littorals. Further, 

LCS has equal or greater self-defense capability compared to today’s small surface 

combatants including Frigates, Mine Countermeasure Ships and Coastal Patrol 

Craft. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. We recently held a hearing on the Asia-Pacific Rebalance; I’d be 

interested in hearing your thoughts on how the LCS would be utilized within an 

A2/AD environment. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Since GAO has not completed work on this topic, we would suggest 

that you please direct this question to the Navy for a response. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. Much of the savings and efficiencies of the LCS, the forward deployment plan, the mission modules, personnel reductions, logistics supply chains 

are all ‘‘works in progress’’. When do you expect to have this complete ‘‘LCS system’’ 

up and running—that means enough mission modules that have been tested and 

proven deployed to the appropriate location with the correct personnel to support 

them and the supply chain necessary for this bold concept of operations? When this 

entire system is up and running and the expected efficiencies are finally realized— 

the LCS hulls will be 10/15 years, over one third of their hull life will be expired 

before the efficiencies of the LCS are fully realized? 

Secretary STACKLEY. By Fiscal Year 2016, all three mission packages will have 

achieved Initial Operating Capacity (IOC). By Fiscal Year 2018, the support facilities for Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and the mission modules will be operational 

on both East and West Coasts and in two forward operating stations. 

In the 3:2:1 rotational crewing concept, three crews rotate between two LCS, with 

one ship for every two LCS operating forward, providing persistent presence in the 

Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM) areas of responsibility. Under this concept, with 52 LCS, Navy will be able to continually forwardoperate 26 LCS. In the current Navy deployment model for single-crewed cruisers, 

destroyers and frigates, the Navy would require more than one hundred ships to 

maintain the equivalent level of presence of 52 LCS. The LCS program remains an 

economical method to address warfighting capability gaps while providing sizable 

global forward presence. 

In Fiscal Year 2018, the Navy’s fleet will include 20 LCS. USS FREEDOM (LCS 

1) and USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2), which delivered in 2008 and 2010, respectively, will be the only two LCS that will be near the 10 year point of their service 

life. 

By contrast, LCS 5—LCS 20, will be less than four years old at the point when 

the LCS system is ‘‘up and running’’ with tested and fully supported ships and Mission Packages. 

Mr. WITTMAN. How has the Navy ensured compliance with Title 10 maintenance 

requirements for U.S. homeported ships while supporting LCS 1 forward deployed? 

And, what will be the ultimate plan for supporting multiple hulls in both Singapore 

and Bahrain? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Title 10 Section 7310 states ‘‘A naval vessel the homeport 

of which is in the United States or Guam may not be overhauled, repaired, or main-
85 

tained in a shipyard outside the United States or Guam, other than in the case of 

voyage repairs.’’ USS FREEDOM’s homeport during the current deployment to the 

Western Pacific remains San Diego, and therefore the Navy is providing required 

labor and technical expertise for regularly scheduled Preventive Maintenance Availability Periods (PMAV’s) and Restricted Availability Periods (RAV’s) via fly away 

teams consisting of United States based labor sources. 

Navy has ensured compliance with Title 10 maintenance requirements by using 

U.S.-based ‘‘flyaway teams’’ of U.S. contractors (prime/subprime) for ship and mission module maintenance. Lockheed Martin (LM) also maintains a team in Singapore in order to coordinate logistics, scheduling, planning, quality assurance, liaison 

with local contractors and Navy, and supervise facilities maintenance. Emergent 

maintenance, or voyage repairs, can be performed by either flyaway teams or local 

contractors in accordance with Title 10. 

The Navy’s ultimate plan for supporting multiple hulls in Singapore and Bahrain 

is to have permanent facilities in place at those locations, which will provide storage, staging and laydown of required tools, parts and equipment, as well as providing workshops for U.S. Navy personnel and contractor teams. The ultimate composition of maintenance teams remains to be determined, but the Navy will continue 

to follow all current and future Title 10 regulations. 

Mr. WITTMAN. VADM Hunt, how critical is the ASW mission module to the LCS 

mission? In 2008 the Navy cancelled the ASW project on LCS after the module 

showed that it did not contribute significantly to ASW capabilities. The Navy 

changed the requirements for the module to include a capability that would function 

in deep-water escort missions of high-value ships and submarines? VADM Hunt, the 

LCS has been pitched to us as a littoral combat ship that would operate at high 

speed and independently deploy. With the ASW module, is the idea now to integrate 

LCS into a Strike Group type scenario for escort duty? I can buy the MCM and 

SUW modules and filling the MCM and PC gaps in the fleet, but the frigate replacement seems like a stretch to me. Is the ASW module a bridge to far? You have 22 

Cruisers and 62 (and counting) DDGs that have advanced ASW combat systems 

suites. Is this a needed capability in the LCS? 

Admiral HUNT. The LCS’s ASW Mission Package (MP) is critical to the LCS mission and to the Fleet’s overall ASW capability. LCS is capable of prosecuting a 

threat submarine from detection to engagement, on its own or in concert with other 

ships. The change from a static, barrier ASW capability to a mobile, ‘‘in-stride’’ ASW 

capability allows an ASW MP-equipped LCS to operate as part of a Strike Group 

if required. In that case, the LCS’s ASW capabilities would complement those of the 

other ships and aviation assets to better defend aircraft carriers and other highvalue ships. LCS significantly enhances the ASW Commander’s capability to maintain undersea battlespace awareness, counter quiet threat submarines, and protect 

critical Fleet assets. 

LCS with an ASW MP provides this enhanced capability not only in deep water 

with a Strike Group, but also in littoral regions where FFG 7/CG 47/DDG 51 Class 

ships may have limited access. 

The LCS, equipped with an ASW Mission Package, provides greater ASW capability than the current FFG 7, CG 47, and DDG 51 classes, particularly in a littoral 

environment. Those ships carry hull-mounted SONAR whose effectiveness is limited 

against a submarine hiding below an acoustic layer defined by temperature and 

pressure. The ASW MP provides a variable-depth SONAR that can be placed below 

this layer to detect these threats. This SONAR also provides a continuously-active 

acoustic source to provide an uninterrupted flow of data to the LCS. Current 

SONAR systems employed on other Navy ships must transmit pulsed signals 

through the water, listen, and then transmit again. This provides a less detailed 

SONAR ‘‘picture’’ to the ship. Together with the variable-depth SONAR, the continuously-active acoustic source allows an LCS to both detect submarines at longer 

ranges and better detect submarines that are able to hide from currently-fielded 

SONAR systems. The ASW MP also provides a towed torpedo decoy system, the 

Light Weight Tow persistent torpedo decoy system, that has the equivalent 

functionality of the AN/SLQ–25 NIXIE employed by the FFG 7, CG 47, and DDG 

51 classes, but which has an operating envelope that supports lower speed and 

shallower water operation. Finally, the LCS also is able to operate its sensors at 

a higher speed than those classes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral Hunt, in light of the Admiral Wray report from last year 

which highlighted various long-term sustainment challenges, can you please provide 

specific examples of how the LCS Council has addressed some of these shortfalls 

and affected change for long-term sustainment of the platform? 

Admiral HUNT. The LCS Council has been an integral leadership body in addressing the shortfalls identified in Admiral Wray’s report. Issues addressed by the LCS 
86 

Council include a variety of solutions designed to improve reliability and 

sustainment of the ship and its equipment. Some examples are improving hydraulic 

systems reliability, for the INDEPENDENCE class ships, installing redesigned 

water jet controls for increased robustness to FREEEDOM (LCS 1) and adding electrical feedback loops to replace mechanical cables on INDEPENDENCE class ships 

(LCS 2 & 4 scheduled for post-delivery installation). 

In order to ensure the long-term material sustainment of LCS, Class Maintenance 

Plans (CMPs) for both FREEDOM and INDEPENDENCE classes were created by 

the shipbuilders. Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program 

(SURFMEPP) engineers conduct a continuous technical review of the plans to ensure accuracy. A Maintenance Efficiency Review (MER) was completed in March 

2013, resulting in the realignment of FREEEDOM (LCS 1) Planned Maintenance 

between the core crew and ashore maintenance teams. This ensures required upkeep is fully accomplished with proper accountability and quality assurance measures with plans to realign planned maintenance on INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) in 

the future. 

Per LCS Council decision, the Navy added ten additional crew members to the 

core-crew to increase organic capacity for preventative and corrective maintenance 

in order to further enhance organic maintenance accomplishment rates. FREEDOM’s current deployment is a test-bed for several improved maintenance efforts 

yielding positive results. Specifically, installed Reliability Engineering/Condition 

Based Maintenance (RE/CBM) sensors identified material deficiencies in the ship’s 

air compressors prior to catastrophic failure, allowing for a preemptive repair (vice 

an unplanned industrial availability) and increasing the time the equipment was 

available for use. 

Mr. WITTMAN. VADM Hunt, as of last month you have contracted 24 seaframes 

and procured 8 mission modules. You are on track to have a total of 52 seaframes 

and maintaining a balance of 16 ASW, 24 MCM, and 24 SUW modules. What is the 

target for optimal and efficient manning for the hulls and the modules? 

Admiral HUNT. As Navy gains operational experience with LCS, the Navy will 

continue to refine the optimal number of billets and rates of Sailors in the LCS core 

crew and Mission Package detachments. The OPNAV Readiness Review that was 

conducted by RADM Perez, as well as multiple war games and studies, have demonstrated the need for additional core crew. The additional sailors will increase 

operational flexibility, enhance embarked maintenance capability, and support robust shipboard Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) missions when in stationed 

in austere forward locations. 

As a result of these reviews and studies, USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) deployed to the 

Western Pacific in early 2013 with ten additional core crew members. Navy leadership will use the lessons learned from this deployment to inform any permanent 

manning changes. Navy also recently decided to add five Sailors to the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package detachment, increasing the total number of 

personnel from 15 to 20. This decision was made to ensure the detachment is able 

to fully meet the maintenance and handling requirements of the unmanned vehicles 

that are the center of the MCM Mission Package. The change was made based upon 

lessons learned during operational tests and evaluations. The number of Sailors for 

each Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package detachment remains at 15 Sailors, 

while the Surface Warfare Mission Package manning requirement remains at 19 

Sailors. 

The potential increases in the core crew and the Mission Package are not significant departures from the minimal manning construct. The core crew is still within 

the threshold requirement of 50 personnel, and total crew manning remains below 

the threshold of 100 total Sailors. 

Mr. WITTMAN. VADM Hunt, what is the estimated procurement cost and life cycle 

maintenance cost of one mine warfare mission module? One hull costs $460–$480M 

a piece, while module cost seems to be in the range of $45–$59M a piece. We want 

this ship to replace the PCs, the MCMs, and the FFGs . . . Can this ship really replace the FFG mission? Would it be as or more affordable/cost effective to build a 

new FFG? 

Admiral HUNT. Based on the Navy’s official Service Cost Position of 6 February 

2013, the Mine Countermeasures Mission Package has an initial procurement cost 

of $97.7M per unit, with an estimated ‘‘life cycle maintenance’’ cost of $340.1M over 

30 years that includes costs for operation and sustainment, replacement/attrition/ 

technology refresh, and disposal. 

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be more capable than the Oliver Hazard 

Perry Class Frigate (FFG), Patrol Craft (PC), and Mine Countermeasure (MCM) 

ships. The Navy’s strategy calls for a ship to be capable of operating in a wide range 

of environments ranging from the open ocean to coastal or littoral waters. The LCS’s 
87 

high speed and low draft design make the ship uniquely qualified to operate in this 

wide range of environments. While both of these design features are key capabilities, the ship’s true capability is its flexibility to be configured to perform any of 

the capabilities resident in an FFG, PC or MCM, and the LCS will be able to do 

so with capability that exceeds that of any of these current platforms. 

The Surface Warfare (SUW) capability of the LCS is far superior to that of an 

FFG or PC. The embarked armed helicopter, 30mm and 57mm guns, as well as 

LCS’s much greater speed give LCS a superior counter-swarm capability. The Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) will further improve over time as an extended range missile capability is phased into the ship’s arsenal. A SUW Mission 

Package (MP) is also configured so that LCS can conduct Visit Board Search and 

Seizure (VBSS), Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) as proficiently as an FFG, and in certain mission 

areas, with increased capabilities. 

When comparing a legacy MCM ship to an LCS, the MCM MP will almost double 

Navy’s legacy capability when the first increment meets its Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY 2015. For example, the Remote Minehunting System (RMS) 

will provide autonomous clearance of a minefield, taking the ship and the crew out 

of harm’s way while doing so at an increased clearance rate over the MCM’s. Future 

increments will further improve the Navy’s ability to find and clear minefields 

throughout the water column as well as in the beach landing zone. 

The Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) MP-configured LCS will also provide far 

greater ASW capability than the FFG 7 Class. The LCS ASW MP complements and 

expands the detection ranges of today’s Strike Group through unique systems such 

as a variable depth, continuously active sonar system. With improved detection 

ranges and its ability to operate sensors at increased speeds, LCS significantly enhances the ASW Commander’s capability to maintain undersea battlespace awareness, counter quiet submarines, and protect critical Fleet assets. LCS with ASW MP 

provides this enhanced capability not only in deep water with a Strike Group, but 

also in littoral regions. The ASW MP’s Light Weight Towed Torpedo Decoy will provide superior torpedo defense capability than the AN/SLQ–25 Nixie system carried 

by the FFG. 

A new FFG Class would be neither affordable nor able to be fielded in a timely 

manner compared to the current LCS Class. The Navy would be forced to incur the 

high cost and lengthy process of starting a new ship acquisition. Additionally, the 

legacy ships would have to undergo a costly Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) 

during the restart of a new program until the replacement FFGs are in-service. The 

Navy would also be left without a key future component to its global forward presence. The LCS program includes the 3:2:1 rotational crewing concept that provides 

for three crews to rotate between two LCS, with one ship for every two LCS operating forward. This concept provides persistent presence in the Pacific Command 

(PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM) areas of responsibility. Under the rotational crewing concept, with 52 LCS, Navy will be able to continually forward-operate 26 LCS. In the current Navy deployment model for single-crewed cruisers, destroyers and frigates, the Navy would require more than one hundred ships to maintain the equivalent level of presence of 52 LCS. The LCS program remains an economical method to address warfighting capability gaps while providing sizable global forward presence. The LCS program is the Navy’s most affordable warship program, and the ship is on the critical path to meeting the Navy’s force structure requirements as outlined by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Mr. WITTMAN. In April the Chief of Navy Reserve testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee 

‘‘The Navy Reserve provides daily operational support and is a potent force multiplier that is leveraged on a daily basis to support Navy missions. Examples of the 

Navy Reserve’s support to Navy and Joint Warfighting efforts include: 

• Reserve Sailors are currently augmenting the first LCS deployment aboard USS 

Freedom (LCS–1).’’ 

VADM Hunt, how do you see the Navy Reserve force augmenting the Active duty 

force in the future and as more hulls and modules enter the fleet? With all options 

on the table to find efficiencies and cost savings, do reserve units and Sailors offer 

a long-term force multiplier to the LCS community and do you see this capability 

growing in the future? 

Admiral HUNT. The Navy Reserve provides essential operational support to the 

Fleet. The LCS Council has been studying further use of the Navy Reserve with the 

Littoral Combat Ship program as more ships and mission modules enter the Fleet. 

Navy leadership has determined Reserve Component Sailors will serve in conjunction with the Mission Packages and Aviation Detachments, including the unmanned 

Fire Scout system. 
88 

Reserve Component Sailors provide CONUS/OCONUS maintenance of Mission 

Packages and Littoral Combat Ships. With respect to LCS Aviation Detachments, 

the Reserve Component cannot assume the entire mission, but they can provide limited Aviation Detachment support as well as Fire Scout training at shore bases. 

In Fiscal Year 2013, Reserve Component manning entailed 387 billets in 13 detachments throughout the country, providing administrative, logistics, training, 

maintenance and watch standing support. Future plans anticipate growth to approximately 1000 billets in 20 detachments providing a minimum of 20,000 man 

days of support per year. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral, in response to a question posed at a HASC hearing in 

February 2012 about LCS crew swap, you mentioned that the most significant savings associated with flying ship crews overseas is the cost avoidance of the fuel required for the ship transiting and the cost of the associated support ships. Transporting a ship’s crew—even a relatively small LCS crew—between the United States 

and a foreign port seems to present a significant logistical challenge. Commercial 

aviation is expensive, lacks flexibility, and is not a viable option in an environment 

of heightened tensions or conflict. 

You stated that the Navy was examining the viability of using Navy Unique Fleet 

Essential Airlift (NUFEA) to transport crews, cargo and support personnel in both 

peacetime and wartime for OCONUS LCS crew swaps. According to your statement, 

the Navy could leverage its own air logistics capability to enhance operational readiness at a significant cost savings. 

a. You have recently completed a crew swap of USS FREEDOM (LCS–1). Did the 

Navy use its NUFEA capability to accomplish this swap? 

b. If so, did you find that the utilization of air logistics assets controlled and operated by Navy was a force enhancer and effectively supported the operational capabilities of LCS 1? 

c. Your initial analysis concluded that using Navy air logistics assets would also 

be more cost effective than commercial means. Considering the crew swap model is 

in place to save steaming dollars and you have found that Navy airlift can execute 

the mission at a low relatively low cost, does the Navy plan to pursue the crew swap 

model with any other class of ships? 

Admiral HUNT. On July 31, 2013, Navy executed the very first Littoral Combat 

Ship (LCS) crew swap evolution. A single Navy C–40A Clipper, a Navy Unique Fleet 

Essential Airlift (NUFEA) asset, was used to execute the crew swap. The USS 

FREEDOM (LCS 1) Blue Crew—consisting of 76 personnel from ship’s company, 

mission module detachment, and aviation detachment personnel—was safely delivered to Paya Lebar Air Base in Singapore. Following a successful turnover of the 

ship, the LCS 1 Gold Crew was returned to Continental United States (CONUS) on 

August 07, 2013, utilizing the Navy C–40A aircraft. 

The Navy determined that NUFEA provided the most operationally effective and 

fiscally efficient method to execute the LCS crew swap mission. The flexibility and 

responsiveness of Navy’s organic airlift assets were critical success factors for this 

mission. The operational schedule of a forward deployed surface combatant, especially in the Pacific Area of Responsibility, is extremely dynamic and subject to the 

demands of ever-changing world events. This requires air logistics support that is 

flexible and able to respond quickly as the ship’s operational schedule changes. 

Since Navy operates and schedules NUFEA assets to support Navy’s mission, they 

are uniquely suited to fulfill this requirement. 

Cost analysis was an important consideration when determining how to source 

the LCS crew swap mission. Examination of the options revealed that Navy saved 

a significant amount of money using its own airlift vice relying on other airlift options (e.g. commercial, contract or other services’ flights). The LCS crew swap model 

was developed to save ship steaming and maintenance dollars, and NUFEA is an 

important part of this model. 

In addition to being the most cost effective mechanism to execute this air logistics 

requirement, utilizing the Navy’s NUFEA assets enabled FREEDOM’s crews to 

maintain crew integrity throughout the evolution. This permitted an entire crew-tocrew turnover, instead of having to conduct the turnover in multiple iterations if 

the crew were unable to travel as a unit. Keeping the crew intact during the airlift 

mission was also essential to ensure force protection—and therefore safety—of 

FREEDOM’s crews. 

Due to the success of the first crew swap, Navy plans to use NUFEA assets to 

execute future LCS crew swap missions. There are no plans to conduct crew swap 

with other classes of ship, but if that option were pursued by Navy leadership, 

NUFEA would be a logical choice. 
89 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. My office has been told that the LCS 1 deployment to Singapore relied 

more heavily upon a ship rider than is typical for the Navy, and that some are concerned this may be undermining the ability of the sailors to operate the ship in the 

future. Are contractors performing functions that should be performed by sailors so 

they can operate their own ship? How do you know if the training pipeline is working if contractors are supplementing the crew? 

Admiral HUNT. During the deployment of USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) to the Western 

Pacific there have been Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on board providing technical 

assistance to the crew as required. SMEs aboard USS FREEDOM are not performing any functions assigned to the officers or enlisted Sailors of FREEDOM’s 

crew. 

The first overseas deployment of USS FREEDOM will provide lessons learned 

which will be examined and applied as needed to the shore based training curriculums in preparation for follow on LCS crew operations and deployments. 

Ms. SPEIER. What oversight plan would you recommend for Congress between now 

and the next block buy decision? Please includes dates of key decision points, information Congress should know before those decision points, and possible indicators 

of increased cost, schedule, and general program risk. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Congress has several options for providing oversight between now 

and the next block buy decision in 2016. We highlighted a number of these options 

in our recent report (GAO–13–530) and they are also reflected in the table below. 

As shown in the table below, in each fiscal year from now (fiscal year 2013) 

through fiscal year 2015, Congress is faced with a number of decisions regarding 

the future of the LCS program, including authorizing and appropriating seaframes 

and mission modules, and ultimately authorizing the next block buy contract. At the 

same time, the Navy plans to complete a series of events over the next couple of 

years, including tests and trials, as well as submissions of Milestone documentation 

and analytical studies—each of which represent opportunities to gain further insight 

into the program’s performance and enable Congress to make well informed funding 

decisions (see ‘‘Navy Events/Oversight Opportunities’’). Milestone documentation 

may provide an indication of increased cost, schedule, and program risk. For example, consistent with our recommendation, Congress may choose to request that the 

Navy submit an approved acquisition program baseline for the mission modules that 

accounts for the threshold and objective cost, schedule, and performance targets for 

each mission module increment before authorizing future mission module procurements. 

Fiscal 

Year 

Congressional 

Decision 

Navy Events/Oversight 

Opportunities GAO Recommendations 

2013 Authorize and appropriate FY14 

funding: 4 ships, 

4 mission packages 

• LCS 1 Singapore deployment 

• LCS 4 Acceptance Trials 

• Aluminum structure testing 

(survivability) 

• Mission Module Milestone B 

(including approval of cost, 

schedule, performance baseline and test plans) 

• Capability Production Documents (requirements) for 

Mission Package Increments • Studies evaluating changes 

to increase commonality 

and add capability and requirements 

• Defense Acquisition Board 

(DAB) In-process Review 

(annual OSD–AT&L review 

of program) 

• Submission of Long Range 

Shipbuilding Plan 

Restrict FY14 ship funding 

until Navy: 

• Completes ongoing technical 

and design studies 

• Determines impacts of design changes 

• Reports on plans to improve 

commonality 

• Reports on cost-benefit 

analysis of seaframe 

changes; commonality improvements 

Buy minimum number of 

modules needed for operational testing. 
90 

Fiscal 

Year 

Congressional 

Decision 

Navy Events/Oversight 

Opportunities GAO Recommendations 

2014 Authorize and appropriate FY15 

funding: 4 ships, 

4 mission packages 

• SUW Inc I and Inc II Operational Testing (Freedom 

variant) 

• DOT&E operational assessments 

• Total Ship Survivability 

Trials (Freedom variant) 

• Capability requirements for 

next Block Buy contract 

finalized 

• Contract award for longterm maintenance 

• DAB In-process Review (annual AT&L review of program) 

• Submission of Long Range 

Shipbuilding Plan 

If the Navy is approved by 

USD AT&L to award additional seaframe block buy contracts for LCS 25 and beyond, 

ensure that it only procures 

the minimum sustaining rate 

(1 ship per year for each shipyard) until successful completion of full-rate production review (scheduled for FY19) 

Require Navy to report on relative advantages of each 

seaframe before awarding the 

next Block Buy contract. 

Buy minimum number of 

modules needed for operational testing. 

2015 Authorize and appropriate FY16 

funding: 2 ships, 

6 mission packages 

Authorize next 

seaframe contract(s) (Second 

Block Buy contract) 

• Acquisition strategy for 

next Block Buy contract finalized • Solicit proposals and source 

selection for next Block Buy 

contract 

• SUW Inc I and Inc II Operational Testing (Independence variant) 

• MCM Inc I Operational 

Testing (Independence variant) 

• DOT&E operational assessments 

• Total Ship Survivability 

Trials (Independence variant) 

• DAB In-process Review (annual AT&L review of program) 

• Submission of Long Range 

Shipbuilding Plan 

If the Navy is approved by 

USD AT&L to award additional seaframe block buy contracts for LCS 25 and beyond, 

ensure that it only procures 

the minimum sustaining rate 

(1 ship per year for each shipyard) until successful completion of full-rate production review (scheduled for FY19) 

Require Navy to report on relative advantages of each 

seaframe before awarding the 

next Block Buy contract. 

Buy minimum number of 

modules needed for operational testing. 

Æ