Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-DR-128 |December 10, 2015 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Bryan L. Ciyou

Ciyou & Dixon, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

APPELLEE PRO SE

Billie Lavoie

Beech Grove, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert Noyd,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Billie (Noyd) Lavoie,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 10, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1503-DR-128

Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable 

John F. Hanley, Judge

The Honorable 

Christopher B. Haile, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D11-1405-DR-16383

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] Billie (Noyd) Lavoie (“Mother”) filed a petition for dissolution in Indiana, 

asking for custody of the parties’ two children. Robert Noyd (“Father”) filed a
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motion to dismiss Mother’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

which the trial court denied. Following the trial court’s denial of Father’s 

motion to correct error, he now appeals and raises several issues that we 

consolidate and restate as: whether the trial court erred when it determined that 

Indiana had jurisdiction of the matter and, thereafter, granted Mother’s petition 

for dissolution and custody of the children. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The parties married in January 2005. They have two minor children, one born 

in 2005 and another born in 2008. In July 2009, the parties separated. What 

occurred at that time with the children is disputed: According to Mother, when 

she and Father separated, she took the children with her to Beech Grove, 

Indiana, but that Father “obtained the children from her” “under the guise of 

wanting the children to attend a family reunion,” and refused to return them to 

her. Appellant’s App. at 52. Father states that when the parties separated, 

Mother “left without the Children,” went to Indiana, and “Father and the 

Children remained in Rock Island County, Illinois.” Id. at 33. 

[4] On January 3, 2011, while the children were in Illinois with Father, he initiated 

a child support action through the Illinois Department of Healthcare and 

Family Services (“HFS Department”) in Rock Island County, Illinois (“Rock 

Island County action”). The matter came for hearing on February 9, 2011; 

Mother appeared pro se, and Father did not appear. The trial court’s entry on 
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that date stated, in part, that Mother lived in Indianapolis, maintained 

insurance on the two children, and was “trying to file for divorce[.]” Id. at 47. 

It further stated, that Father “is here but is hiding out w/kids.” Id. The trial 

court entered a support order on February 9, 2011 (“February 2011 Support 

Order”), requiring Mother to pay $100 per week plus an arrearage amount.1 In 

April 2011, the matter came for hearing, at which Mother and Father both 

appeared in person. The trial court issued an order (“April 2011 Support 

Order”), stating that Mother “has actual custody of kids,” but “due to the IL

support order entered 2-9-11 and pursuant to 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(2) [Father] has 

legal physical custody of the children.” Id. at 45; see also id. at 47 (entry stating

that “she has children” but “he has legal custody” because a support order was 

entered). The trial court’s entry also provided, “Support order entered for 

[Father] until final custody decision in a divorce case.” Id. at 47 (emphasis added).

[5] In February 2012, the parties attempted to reconcile, and Father moved to 

Indiana with the children. Mother, Father, and the children lived together in 

Beech Grove. In January 2013, Father filed a “Cancellation Request” with the 

HFS Department, stating that he desired to cancel the services of the child 

support division of the HFS Department. Pet’r’s Ex. 1.

[6] The parties lived together in Indiana for over two years, but their attempt at 

reconciliation failed, and on May 16, 2014, Mother filed a petition for 

 

1 A copy of the February 2011 Support Order is not included in the record before us.
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dissolution of marriage, which also sought custody of the two children. 

Approximately a week later, Father left with the children and went to Sherrard, 

Illinois, which is in Mercer County. On August 4, 2014, the Indiana 

dissolution court scheduled a preliminary hearing for August 22, 2014. 

[7] Two days before that hearing was set to occur, Father filed in Mercer County, 

Illinois a petition for order of protection against Mother, seeking protection for 

himself and the two children. The Mercer County court issued an emergency 

order of protection on August 20, effective through September 4, 2014, and a 

hearing was set for that date. Among other things, the temporary emergency 

order of protection granted Father “the physical care and possession” of the two 

children and ordered Mother not to remove them from Father’s care. Pet’r’s Ex.

1.

[8] On August 22, 2014, the Indiana dissolution court conducted a preliminary 

hearing on Mother’s petition for dissolution. Mother appeared in person, and 

Father appeared by counsel. Prior to the hearing, Father had sent to the trial 

court the April 2011 Support Order from Rock Island County, and he 

represented to the trial court that the February 2011 Support Order, which was 

referenced in the April 2011 order, awarded him custody of the children. 

Mother disagreed and told the trial court that the Rock Island order was “just 

for child support,” and “[T]here’s no custody paperwork.” Tr. at 8. Father’s 

counsel advised the Indiana dissolution court of the then-existing emergency 

order of protection recently issued by the Mercer County court, and he argued 

that the Mercer County court thereby had jurisdiction of the matter, including 
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custody of the children. Upon the trial court’s questioning, Mother stated that 

the children had been attending Beech Grove schools for the prior two school 

years, school resumed on July 31, and since they had missed so many school 

days already, the Beech Grove schools had reported the situation to the Indiana 

Department of Child Services. Father’s counsel advised the trial court that 

Father had just enrolled the children in school in Illinois on Monday, August 

18. The trial court expressed concern about the situation to Father’s counsel:

[I]f your client’s playing games with this Court, there will be 

severe consequences, okay? If he [] snatched these kids and ran 

over to Illinois and filed for a Protective Order, and is going to 

play this game, and just enrolled them in school[,] then I’m not 

having that.

Id. at 10. Mother testified under oath that she had not seen her children in 83 

days and that “I have asked him and asked him and asked him . . . He will not 

let me see them.” Id. at 13. The trial court advised that, based on the testimony 

of Mother and documentary evidence from the Beech Grove schools indicating 

that the children had been attending there, it was “inclined” to grant Mother 

temporary custody, but declined to do so at that time because the Mercer 

County court had issued the order of protection and “checked off some things 

regarding custody[.]” Id. at 14, 17. Therefore, the trial court stated that it 

intended to contact the Mercer County court to share the fact that “these kids 

have been living in Indiana,” that “they have been spirited over to Illinois by 

[Father,] and that the State of Indiana “has jurisdiction.” Id. at 16. The 

following day, the Indiana dissolution court issued a preliminary order 
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(“Preliminary Order”), awarding temporary custody to Mother and directing 

Father to immediately transport the children back to Indiana or to arrange 

transfer of them to Mother. The Preliminary Order provided that Father was 

entitled to parenting time in Indiana.

[9] On September 3, 2014, the Indiana dissolution court held a second preliminary 

hearing. Mother appeared in person, and Father appeared by counsel, who 

advised the dissolution court that he had faxed the trial court’s Preliminary 

Order to Father and discussed it with him. Counsel advised that Father had 

consulted with two attorneys in Illinois, who told Father not to come back or 

bring the children back to Indiana, as that would be a violation of the Mercer 

County’s order of protection. Counsel told the dissolution court, “[H]e claims 

that he has custody in Illinois.” Id. at 22. The dissolution court replied that he 

had spoken with the Mercer County judge, who issued the ex-parte protection 

order and “I don’t think the Judge is particularly amused at the game that 

[Father] . . . played and got custody.” Id. at 23. The Indiana dissolution court 

further stated that Indiana had jurisdiction, and the Mercer County court 

“agreed to defer to us on this.” Id. at 23, 26 (“that Judge . . . is in agreement 

that we have jurisdiction”). Mother stated that she planned to attend the 

September 4 hearing in Mercer County to contest the order of protection, and 

the Indiana dissolution court instructed her to bring with her the Indiana 

dissolution court’s Preliminary Order granting her temporary custody of the 

children. 
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[10] On September 8, 2014, Mother filed a verified petition for contempt in the 

Indiana dissolution court because Father had not returned the children to 

Indiana or to Mother’s custody. She averred that she appeared in Mercer 

County, Illinois for the September 4 hearing on the order of protection and that 

the Mercer County court “dropped the order and said that Indiana has 

jurisdiction.” Appellant’s App. at 17. However, Illinois law enforcement would 

not permit Mother to take the children because of the existence of Father’s 

February 2011 Support Order.

[11] On September 30, 2014, Father filed in the Indiana dissolution court a Motion 

to Dismiss the custody portion of Mother’s dissolution petition for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Father’s argument was that the Rock Island County 

court’s April 2011 Support order “awarded Father legal custody of the minor 

children,” “that Father’s legal custody has remained in effect,” and that 

although the dissolution court talked to Mercer County, it was, in fact, Rock 

Island County that made the initial jurisdictional determination. Id. at 20. 

Father asserted that, regardless, the Indiana dissolution court should have 

allowed the parties to participate in the communication or otherwise make a 

record of it pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-21-4-4. 

[12] On October 1, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s petition for 

contempt and Father’s motion to dismiss. Mother appeared in person, and 

Father appeared by telephone. Father’s counsel was also present at the hearing. 

The trial court expressed its finding that Indiana possessed jurisdiction, 

explaining, “You were living here for 2 years and [] this was the home state of 
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the children. This state has jurisdiction.” Tr. at 40. The trial court told the 

parties that it had spoken with the Mercer County judge that had issued the exparte order of protection and, “[H]e agreed[.] We have jurisdiction.” Id. With 

regard to Father’s motion to dismiss, Father’s counsel argued that, because of 

the February 2011 Support Order (issued by Rock Island County), the current 

situation was not an initial custody determination, but rather was a 

modification of an existing custody order that required a showing of changed 

circumstances. Counsel further argued that neither the parties nor Father’s 

counsel had an opportunity to participate in the dissolution court’s conversation 

with the Mercer County court, nor was there any record made of that 

communication as required by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), and, therefore, the Indiana court’s finding of 

jurisdiction was not proper. On October 3, the dissolution court denied 

Father’s motion to dismiss, found that it possessed jurisdiction over the parties 

to dissolve their marriage and determine custody of their children, and directed 

Father that he had until Saturday, October 5 at 6:00 p.m. to deliver the children 

to Mother. 

[13] On October 6, Mother filed an emergency motion for contempt, as Father had 

not yet returned the children to her. On October 7, 2014, the dissolution court 

held a contempt hearing. Mother appeared in person, and Father appeared by 

counsel. The trial judge spoke to Father, who “said he was not bringing the 
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children.” Affidavit of Court Reporter.

2

 The dissolution court found Father in 

contempt, issued a bench warrant for his arrest, and suspended his parenting 

time with the children.

[14] On November 19, 2014, the Indiana dissolution court held a final hearing. 

Mother was present in person; Father was not present in person or by counsel. 

Mother testified that she did not know where Father was living as “he will not 

give me the address.” Tr. at 53. She further testified that her only contact with 

the children was talking to them “for a couple minutes” before bedtime. Id. 

She also testified that she had filed in the Mercer County court a motion to 

domesticate the Indiana court’s judgment, but Father filed a motion to quash 

and that a hearing had been set for December 8. Mother also told the Indiana 

dissolution court that Father filed for dissolution in Illinois. 

[15] According to Mother’s testimony, Father also had re-opened the Rock Island 

County child support case and obtained a child support order, and Mother

thereafter filed in Rock Island County a Petition to Change Venues or to 

Modify Child Support. On November 26, 2014, the Rock Island County court 

entered minutes recognizing that Mother “got permanent custody of children” 

on November 19, and it continued the matter until January 7, 2015 for Mother 

 

2

In preparing his appeal, Father requested that the court reporter transcribe various hearings, including the 

October 7, 2014 contempt hearing. The court reporter submitted an Affidavit to this court averring that she 

was unable to play the audio from the hearing which was about five minutes in length, but she was able to 

locate the “log notes” of the hearing, which she transcribed and submitted to this court as an attachment to 

her Affidavit. She contacted two outside word processing agencies, who were unable to recover the audio 

from the October 7 hearing. 
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to amend her petition to include “exemplified copies of the custody papers.” 

Appellant’s App. at 47.

[16] On December 18, Father filed in the Indiana dissolution court a Verified

Motion to Correct Errors, Relief from Judgment, and to Dismiss Default 

Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction (“Motion to Correct Error”). In his motion, 

Father argued, among other things: (1) the Rock Island County Support 

Orders, either or both of them, “awarded legal and physical custody of the 

Children” to Father; (2) jurisdiction “was never transferred or relinquished” 

from Rock Island County; (3) Rock Island County, not Mercer County, “is the 

county which issued Orders regarding support and custody”; and (4) therefore, 

Rock Island County has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction. Appellant’s App.

at 33, 35, 40. The Indiana dissolution court denied Father’s Motion to Correct 

Error on February 4, 2015,3 and he now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[17] We generally review rulings on motions to correct error for an abuse of 

discretion. French v. French, 821 N.E.2d 891, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). An 

abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or the reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom. Lighty v. Lighty, 879 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

Our standard of review for appeal of a motion to correct error directs us to 

 

3

Father states that his motion was deemed denied on February 2, 2014.
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consider the propriety of the court’s decision on the underlying order, here the 

denial of Father’s motion to dismiss. Id. 

Rock Island County Child Support Proceedings 

[18] Father’s primary argument on appeal is that the Rock Island County February 

2011 Support Order “awarded” custody to Father and that, therefore, Rock 

Island County is the county with exclusive and continuing jurisdiction of the 

matter of the custody of the children, rendering the Indiana dissolution court’s 

custody determination void. Appellant’s Br. at 8, 24, 31, 32, 33; see also id. at 9 

(characterizing Rock Island County support order as “custody decree”). We 

reject Father’s claim for a number of reasons.

[19] As an initial matter, although Father repeatedly claims that he was “awarded” 

custody in Rock Island County’s February 2011 Support Order, he did not 

provide the Indiana dissolution court or this court with a copy of that order. He 

thereby failed to comply with our appellate rules. See Ind. Appellate Rule 

50(A)(2) (appellant’s appendix shall contain copies of pleadings that are 

necessary for resolution of the issues raised on appeal.) The record does include 

the Rock Island County’s April 2011 Support Order, which refers to the prior

February 2011 Support Order:

[Mother] has actual custody of kids but due to the IL support 

order entered 2-9-11 and pursuant to 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(2) 

[Father] has legal physical custody of the children.

Appellant’s App. at 45. The referenced Illinois statute (“Section 14(a)(2)”) states:
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If a judgment of parentage contains no explicit award of custody, 

the establishment of a support obligation or of visitation rights in 

one parent shall be considered a judgment granting custody to 

the other parent. If the parentage judgment contains no such 

provisions, custody shall be presumed to be with the mother[.]

750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 45/14(a)(2). Section 14(a)(2) appears in Illinois’s 

Parentage Act, which is intended to apply to such matters as establishment of 

paternity. See In re N.C., 12 N.E.3d 23, 33 (Ill. 2014) (“The Parentage Act 

creates a statutory mechanism for legally establishing a parent-child 

relationship.”); In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d 698, 706 (Ill. 2013) (“The 

Parentage Act establishes comprehensive scheme for determining paternity and 

for establishing custody, visitation and child support obligations in connection 

with a judgment of paternity.”). Here, Mother and Father were married in 

2011, and paternity was not an issue. Therefore, we question the applicability 

of Section 14(a)(2) to the present situation. However, even assuming Section 

14(a)(2) applies to the facts of the present case, an Illinois appellate court in In re 

B.B., 960 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Ill. Ct. App. 2011), examined that statute and 

determined that a child support order obtained by HFS Department was not a 

“custody judgment” as contemplated by Section 14(a)(2). 

[20] In that case, a mother filed a petition in 2002 to establish paternity. In March 

2003, the court issued a temporary child support order, and in June 2004, it 

granted the petition to establish paternity, but because the parties were 

reconciled and living together at that time, no support order was entered. Id. at 

648. Later, in January 2010, the HFS Department filed a petition to intervene 
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and sought an order of child support.4 In April 2010, the trial court entered a 

temporary order of support, and following a hearing, the court entered a 

permanent child support order in May 2010. Id. at 649. The next month, the 

father filed a petition for custody, and the mother filed a motion to dismiss; her 

argument was that the April 2010 temporary support order granted her custody 

pursuant to Section 14(a)(2) of the Illinois Parentage Act, and that because the 

father’s request for custody was within two years of that judgment, Illinois law 

required the father to allege and prove that the children were endangered in 

their present environment. The trial court initially determined that the May 

2010 child support order was a custody judgment, but it thereafter reconsidered 

and determined that the June 2004 parentage order, which entered an order of 

paternity, was a custody judgment, and thus, it had been more than two years 

since the prior order. Id. The trial court ultimately awarded custody of the 

children to the father. Id. at 651. The mother appealed, claiming that the trial 

court erred in finding that the May 2010 support order was not a custody 

judgment. That is, she claimed that the May 2010 support order “was a 

judgment awarding her custody of the children” pursuant to the language of 

Section 14(a)(2) of Parentage Act. Id. 

[21] On appeal, the In re B.B. court interpreted Section 14(a)(2) and determined, 

“Section 14(a)(2) of the Parentage Act expressly applies to parentage judgments

 

4

Father’s responsive pleading noted that no prior court order had assigned custody of the children to either 

party, but he acknowledged that the mother had physical custody of them. 
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and does not address temporary child-support orders entered before the parentage 

judgment or support orders after a final parentage judgment.” Id. at 653

(emphasis added). That is, the court found that neither the May 2010 

permanent child-support order nor the prior temporary child-support order 

constituted a custody judgment under section 14(a)(2) of the Parentage Act. Id. 

[22] Here, as in In re B.B., the HFS Department petitioned for child support, and the 

Rock Island County court issued an order of support in February 2011 and in 

April 2011. Father argues, as did the mother in In re B.B., that either or both of 

those support orders constituted a custody determination. Applying the 

principles of In re B.B. to the present case, we find that Rock Island County’s 

Support Orders were not custody judgments under Illinois law, and neither of 

the Support Orders established custody. 

[23] We find further support for our decision in that regard because, similar to 

Indiana’s statutory scheme for determining child custody, Illinois’s Parentage 

Act provides that custody shall be determined “in accordance with the relevant 

provisions of Illinois’s Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act,” and Section 

602(a) of the Marriage Act requires courts to determine custody in accordance 

with the best interest of the minor and considering all relevant factors, including 

the ten factors enumerated therein. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 45/14(a)(1); 750 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/602(a). Here, Father presented no evidence to the Indiana 

dissolution court that the Rock Island County court considered the best 

interests of the children. Indeed, the Rock Island County court explicitly 

recognized in its case history entry that the support order was being entered 
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“until final custody decision in a divorce case.” Appellant’s App. at 47 (emphasis 

added). From this, we can infer that the Rock Island County court recognized 

the likelihood of, if not the need for, a subsequent custody determination in a 

dissolution case.5 

[24] To the extent that Father argues that Mother’s request for custody in her 

petition for dissolution was actually a modification of custody, as opposed to an 

initial determination, and consequently, she needed to, but failed to, prove that 

there had been a change in circumstances as required by statute, we have 

already found that the prior child support orders were not custody judgments. 

Therefore, we reject Father’s claim that Mother’s request for custody was a 

request for modification of custody. Similarly, we find that Father has failed to 

establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded custody to 

Mother and when it granted him no parenting time until he presents himself to 

the Indiana dissolution court. The trial court’s August 2014 preliminary order 

awarded temporary custody to Mother, ordered Father to “immediately 

transport the Children back to Indiana,” and granted Father “parenting time in 

Indiana but the children shall not be removed from the state[.]” Id. at 16. 

Father did not return the children. The dissolution court’s October 3 order 

again stated that Father “shall [] have parenting time with the children under 

the Indiana Guidelines,” but ordered him to return he children, which Father

 

5 We note that because Father had filed in January 2013 a request in the Rock Island County child support 

case to “cancel [his] case[,]” the support case may have been closed at the time of the Indiana dissolution 

court’s decree. Pet’r’s Ex. 1. 
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told the trial court he would not do. Id. at 24. After Father did not return them 

as ordered, the trial court suspended Father’s parenting time and thereafter 

ordered he was not granted parenting time “until he presents himself to this 

Court and requests parenting time.” Id. at 8. The trial court’s approach was 

reasonable and tailored to the situation, allowing for Father to present himself 

to the court and present evidence. We find no abuse of discretion.

UCCJEA

[25] On appeal, Father argues, as he did in his motion to dismiss, that the Indiana 

dissolution court violated the UCCJEA when it spoke with the Mercer County 

court following the August 22, 2014 preliminary hearing in this matter and 

before it issued its ruling later that day granting temporary custody of the 

children to Mother. Specifically, Father argues that “when a jurisdictional 

question arises in a cross-state child custody matter,” Indiana Code section 31-

21-4-1 allows an Indiana trial court to communicate with the court of the other 

state that is purported to have jurisdiction, and if such communication occurs, 

Indiana Code section 31-21-4-4 requires: “A record must be made of a 

communication,” and the parties must be informed and granted access to the 

record. Appellant’s Br. at 14. He argues that because there was no record of the 

communication, his due process rights were violated. 

[26] Based on the circumstances before us, we reject Father’s claim that reversal is 

necessary for failure to comply with the UCCJEA. Father does not argue, nor 

do we find, that the Mercer County court made a custody determination when 

it, on an ex-parte petition for an order of protection, checked off boxes on a 
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form indicating that, until a hearing could be held on the matter, the children 

would be in Father’s custody. Indeed, Father concedes, “Mercer County, 

Illinois, merely had jurisdiction of an emergency nature to address the Petition 

for a Protective Order that Father filed in 2014.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Although 

Father argues that the Indiana dissolution court erred when it failed to record 

the conversation with the Mercer County court, he acknowledges “that [Mercer 

County] may not have had jurisdiction in the first place for which it could 

relinquish same to the State of Indiana,” and “Thus, the telephonic judicial 

conference to determine jurisdiction occurred with the wrong tribunal.” Id. at 

18, 25. Father nevertheless asks us to reverse for further proceedings “to 

determine whether Rock Island County, Illinois, or the State of Indiana has 

jurisdiction to enter Orders regarding the custody of the minor children[.]” 

Appellant’s Br. at 19. It is thus undisputed that Mercer County did not have 

jurisdiction. Consequently, any failure to record the conversation with the 

Mercer County Court was not fatal to the Indiana court’s subsequent 

dissolution and custody order.

[27] Furthermore, even if the Mercer County court’s order of protection could be 

considered in some sense a determination of custody, and the UCCJEA 

applied, that order was temporary, expiring by its terms on September 4, 2014, 

when, after the hearing, the Mercer County court dismissed the protection 

order. The record before us indicates that Mother subsequently filed, on 

November 29, in the Mercer County court an Amended Petition to 

Domesticate Foreign Judgment, which the court granted on December 18, 
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2014.

6 See Appellant’s App. at 51 (Mother’s avers in her verified response to 

Father’s motion to correct error that Mercer County court domesticated 

Indiana dissolution court’s judgment). Indiana Code section 31-21-5-1 provides 

that, under the UCCJEA, the “home state” of the child is the state where the 

child has resided for the previous six months prior to the date of the filing of the 

proceeding, and subsection 3 provides that an Indiana court may assume 

jurisdiction when it is determined that the foreign state no longer has 

jurisdiction. Given the record before us, we conclude that the Mercer County 

protection order proceedings did not create an interstate custodial issue that 

implicated the UCCJEA, such that any failure by the dissolution court to make 

a record of the phone call did not result in reversible error, and even if the 

UCCJEA did apply, Indiana was the proper home state. 

[28] As the Indiana dissolution court stated numerous times, the parties – Mother, 

Father, and the two children – lived here in Indiana for over two years, Mother 

filed for dissolution in May 2014 while all parties were living here, and days 

after she filed, Father left. No prior custody determination had been made 

before the Indiana dissolution court issued its decree and award of custody. 

Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied Father’s motion to correct error. 

 

6 Mother states in her brief that, on that date, while accompanied by a local sheriff, she obtained custody of 

the children from Father. Appellee’s Br. at 5. Father likewise acknowledges that, following the Final Decree, 

the children were transferred to Mother’s custody. Appellant’s Br. at 6.
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[29] Affirmed.7

Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

 

7

Father’s Motion to Strike Appellee’s Brief and/or for Appellate Attorney Fees is denied by separate order.