Connor Grp LLP Major Site Plan & CU Approval 

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION

Count 1, Municipal DRB Multiple Types (74-6-13 Vtec) 

Title: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Motion 3) 

Filer: Connor Group, LLP 

Attorney: William A. Fead 

Filed Date: January 24, 2014 

Response in Opposition filed on 02/28/2014 by Attorney Paul S. Gillies for Appellants Mark 

Prent, et al. 

Reply filed on 03/11/2014 by Attorney William A. Fead for Appellee Connor Group, LLP 

The motion is DENIED. 

The pending appeal is set for a multi-day trial beginning on May 7, 2014. Applicant 

Connor Group, LLP (“Applicant”) seeks summary judgment on one of several legal issues raised 

in the Statement of Questions filed by Appellants Peter D. Ford, Susan Prent, and Mark Prent 

(“Appellants”). Specifically, Applicant asks this Court to conclude that its plan to demolish the 

Smith House portion of its property conforms to the pre-conditions for demolition of historic 

structures established in §§ 706 and 708 of the Land Development Regulations for the City of 

Saint Albans (“Regulations”). 

We will grant summary judgment to a moving party (here, Applicant) only if that party 

shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” V.R.C.P. 56(a); V.R.E.C.P. 5(a)(2). In ruling on a summary 

judgment motion, the Court is directed to “accept as true the [factual] allegations made in 

opposition to the motion for summary judgment,” as long as they are supported by reference 

to admissible evidence, and to give the non-moving party (here, Appellants) the benefit of all 

reasonable doubts and inferences. Robertson v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 2004 VT 15, ¶ 15, 176 Vt. 

356; see V.R.C.P. 56(c). 

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION

Vermont Unit Docket No. 74-6-13 Vtec
Connor Group, LLC Major Site Plan & CU Approval, No. 74-6-13 Vtec (EO on Partial Summ. J.) P. 2 of 3. 

Applicant notes that its pending motion does not request summary judgment on the 

questions of whether the proposed new development conforms to the applicable conditional 

use and site plan review standards in the Regulations.1

In fact, Applicant’s motion for partial summary judgment appears to focus on 

Regulations § 708(a)(8)(e)(i), which requires that an applicant present an assessment and 

inventory of the historic structure and its gardens, landscaping, and outbuildings, as well as 

further evidence that all efforts had been exhausted to salvage the historic structure. 

The Court conducted multi-day hearings on Appellants’ motion to stay demolition of the 

Smith House. The first two days resulted in the parties stipulating to a temporary stay; when 

that stay expired, Appellants filed a subsequent motion for a continued stay. After several 

more days of evidentiary hearings, this Court denied Appellants’ request. See Entry Order of 

Nov. 20, 2013. 

This procedural background provides important context for our ruling on the pending 

motion. In particular, although the Court denied Appellants’ motion for a continued stay at the 

conclusion of the November 18, 2013 hearing, the Court did not specifically authorize Applicant 

to demolish the Smith House. In fact, the Court cautioned Applicant at the conclusion of the 

hearing that if it proceeded with demolition while this appeal was pending, it did so at its peril, 

since no final authorization has been issued on Applicant’s request to demolish the Smith 

House portion of the building. 

In support of its pending request for a judgment authorizing the planned demolition, 

Applicant has submitted an affidavit from its historic preservation consultant, Suzanne C. 

Jamele, as well as Ms. Jamele’s initial and supplemental Historic Documentation Reports. 

Appellants have submitted a critique of Ms. Jamele’s report, prepared by their expert, 

Thomas Keefe. Mr. Keefe’s report does not serve as an independent historic documentation 

report, but it identifies perceived deficiencies of Ms. Jamele’s report. Mr. Keefe also references 

and cites to a rehabilitation evaluation he prepared at Applicant’s request. 

We recognize that Appellants’ most recent presentation does not present contradicting 

facts, but rather suggests that Applicant’s presentation is insufficient. However, in his most 

recent assessment, Appellants’ expert references a prior evaluation he completed for a possible 

Smith House rehabilitation; his current assessment includes citations to the rehabilitative 

possibilities for the Smith House. While this evidence is sparse, we conclude that, when viewed 

in a most favorable light, Appellants’ proffered evidence is sufficient to overcome Applicant’s 

allegation that it has satisfied § 708(a)(8)(e)(i). Because we conclude that there is a genuine 

dispute of material fact and that Applicant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

regarding conformance with § 708(a)(8)(e)(i), we DENY the pending motion for partial summary 

judgment and look forward to the parties’ presentation of admissible evidence at trial. 

 

1

 Applicant recently filed a separate motion, seeking judgment on Appellants’ remaining legal issues. We will 

afford Appellants an abbreviated opportunity to respond to this new motion, given the pending trial date. We 

request that Appellants file their response to this recently filed motion no later than 4:00 p.m. on Monday, April 

28, 2014. 
Connor Group, LLC Major Site Plan & CU Approval, No. 74-6-13 Vtec (EO on Partial Summ. J.) P. 3 of 3. 

So ordered. 

Electronically signed on April 21, 2014 at 01:47 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 7(d). 

________________________________ 

Thomas S. Durkin, Judge 

Environmental Division 

Notifications: 

Paul S. Gillies (ERN 3786), Attorney for Appellant Peter D. Ford 

Paul S. Gillies (ERN 3786), Attorney for Appellant Susan Prent 

Paul S. Gillies (ERN 3786), Attorney for Appellant Mark Prent 

William A. Fead (ERN 4606), Attorney for Appellee Connor Group, LLP 

Co-Counsel for party 5 David Bond 

rkane