IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER D. BAILEY, THOMAS 

A. KRAMER, BRET COLLIER, 

Individually, on behalf of all others 

similarly situated, and for the benefit of 

the Plan,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT 

CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:11-CV-0554

JUDGE PETER C. ECONOMUS

Magistrate Judge Norah M. King

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendants United States Enrichment 

Corporation and Severance Plan for Salaried Employees of United States Enrichment 

Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 27.) In the Second

Amended Complaint (doc. # 26), Plaintiffs Christopher D. Bailey, Thomas A. Kramer, and Bret 

Collier bring three claims arising under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Specifically, Plaintiffs bring the action on behalf of 

themselves and all participants and beneficiaries of the Severance Plan for Salaried Employees of 

United States Enrichment Corporation. For the following reasons, Defendants motion is 

GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification (doc. # 35) is dismissed as MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant USEC Company (“USEC” or 

“the Company”) maintained a facility in Portsmouth, Ohio, where Plaintiffs and putative class 

members were salaried employees. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 13.) The Company 

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established the Severance Plan for Salaried Employees of United States Enrichment Corporation

(“the Plan”) as a self-insured ERISA welfare plan with an effective date of May 18, 1999. (Id., 

Exh. A.) According to its summary plan description,1 the Plan provides for severance benefits 

under certain conditions, as stated therein:

You may be eligible for severance benefits under the Plan, 

including severance pay, if you are a salaried employee, as defined 

by the Company, who is voluntarily or involuntarily terminated 

for reasons other than cause and solely as a result of a Reduction in 

Force. You may also be eligible for severance benefits under the 

Plan, including termination pay, if (i) you are a salaried employee 

who has received long term disability benefits from the Company 

for 24 months, (ii) the Company determines, in its discretion, that 

you are totally disabled, and (iii) you are voluntarily or 

involuntarily terminated for reasons other than cause as a result of 

a Reduction in Force. The Company has the sole discretionary 

authority to determine who is eligible for severance benefits.

(Id., Exh. A, page 1, bold emphasis added; underlining in original.)

Sometime in August 2010, the Company initiated a reduction in force (“RIF”) of its 

employees. (Id., ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs and putative class members were USEC salaried employees 

who were subject to the RIF and, ultimately, were re-employed by Fluor-B&W Portsmouth LLC 

“Fluor”). Before actual terminations began, the Company—apparently in response to queries 

about available severance benefits—sent a letter addressed to “Portsmouth Site Salaried 

Employees” (“the Letter”) clarifying the terms of the Plan as follows: 

The Company has determined that the salaried employees who 

transition their employment to [Fluor] will receive employment 

with [Fluor] where continuity of employment with credit for prior 

length of service is preserved under substantially equal conditions 

 

1 Plaintiffs do not attach a complete copy of the Plan to the Second Amended Complaint. However, there is no 

dispute that the summary plan description accurately sets forth the Plan’s provisions. In addition, there is no dispute 

that the Plan falls within ERISA’s purview.

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of employment. The Company views severance benefits as a 

bridge for departing employees who do not have substantially 

comparable employment opportunities after they leave the 

Company.

(Id., Exh. F, emphasis added.) In other words, the Company determined that any salaried USEC 

employee who transitioned his or her employment to Fluor was, by definition, employed under 

“substantially equal conditions of employment” and, therefore, not eligible for severance 

benefits.

Even so, the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that, despite their employment at Fluor,

they do fall within the scope of eligibility. In support of this assertion, they first argue that that 

Plan guarantees participation to salaried employees who were terminated solely as a result of the 

RIF. (Mem. In Opp., page 12.)

The Plan therefore provides a definition for who is eligible to 

receive severance, states that those employees will receive 

severance, and gives Defendants the discretion to interpret the 

criteria it has established for eligibility. It does not give 

Defendants unfettered discretion to deny benefits to employees 

who are “eligible” under the criteria set forth in the Plan, as they 

claim.

(Id., citing to Exh. A, emphasis sic.)

Plaintiffs also point to a document titled “Human Resources Administration, Termination 

of Employment.” (Second Amended Complaint, Exh. B.) This document (hereinafter referred to 

as the “HR document”) sets forth general guidelines regarding reduction in force occurrences. 

Plaintiffs cite to Section 6.3 which states: “Employees who are laid off because of an 

[Involuntary Reduction in Force] shall receive a severance pay” calculated under a particular 

formula. (Id., page 7, emphasis added.) Other noteworthy sections of the HR document state:

6.3.4 Salaried employees must sign and return a “General Release 

and Waiver” in order to receive a severance payment under any of 

the provisions of this practice.

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6.3.5 Severance pay benefits are not payable when an employee is 

employed by or receives an offer of employment where continuity 

of employment with credit for prior length of service is preserved 

under substantially equal conditions of employment.

(Id., page 10.) 

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other former salaried USEC employees who 

transitioned employment to Fluor, brought this action asserting three claims against Defendants: 

Count One, Claim for Benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1) and (a)(3); Count Two, Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty under ERISA § 502 and § 409; and Count Three, Interference with Protected 

Rights under ERISA §§ 502, 510 and 29 U.S.C. § 1140.2

 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a complaint may be 

dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because a motion under 

Rule 12(b)(6) is directed solely to the complaint itself, Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 

705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir. 1983), the focus is on whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer 

evidence to support the claims, rather than on whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. 

Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 184 (2005) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 4l6 

U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “is to allow a 

defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if 

everything alleged in the complaint is true.” Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993).

 

2 Plaintiffs allege other facts related to their claims of breach of fiduciary duty and interference with protected rights, 

but as this Court finds that Plaintiffs are not eligible for benefits, all of their claims fail and a recitation of the alleged 

facts is not necessary. Similarly, this Court need not reach Defendants’ arguments regarding proper party defendant 

and exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

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If there is an absence of law to support the type of claim made, or if the facts alleged are 

insufficient to state a valid claim, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar 

to relief, dismissal of the action is proper. Little v. UNUMProvident Corp., 196 F. Supp.2d 659, 

662 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1978)). 

The function of the complaint is to afford the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); 

Lewis v. ACB Business Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998). A complaint need not set 

down in detail all the particularities of a plaintiff's claim. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.” However, “Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff 

armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 1949. See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007) (“A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is not enough). The 

complaint “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material 

elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy 

Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original). 

Legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” that give rise to an 

inference that the defendant is, in fact, liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 

1949-50. The factual allegations must show more than a possibility that the defendant acted 

unlawfully. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” 

Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

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When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must construe 

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded material 

allegations in the complaint as true. See Scheuer, 4l6 U.S. at 236; Arrow v. Federal Reserve 

Bank of St. Louis, 358 F.3d 392, 393 (6th Cir. 2004); Mayer, 988 F.2d at 638. The court will 

indulge all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the pleading. See Saglioccolo v. 

Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 1997). However, it will not accept conclusions of 

law or unwarranted inferences cast in the form of factual allegations. See Gregory v. Shelby 

County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000); Lewis, 135 F.3d at 405.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

ERISA provides “a panoply of remedial devices for participants and beneficiaries of 

benefit plans.” Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 (1989) (citing 

Massachusetts Mutual Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted; emphasis added). Plaintiffs assert that they and putative class members are Plan 

participants who are owed severance benefits and the concomitant fiduciary obligations of the 

Company as Plan Administrator. Defendant USEC asserts that Plaintiffs and putative class 

members are not Plan participants and therefore cannot state a claim for relief under ERISA. 

Therein lies the dispute. 

Courts should interpret ERISA plan provisions “according to their plain meaning, in an 

ordinary and popular sense.” Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 1998). In 

applying this “plain meaning analysis,” a court “must give effect to the unambiguous terms of an 

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ERISA plan.” Lake v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 73 F.3d 1372, 1379 (6th Cir. 1996). ERISA 

welfare benefits are not presumed to have vested, unlike pension benefits.3 “Until benefits have 

vested, employers may modify or terminate them, whether or not they have reserved the right to 

do so.” Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 248 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 

1059 (1997). ERISA defines “participant” as follows:

The term “participant” means any employee or former employee of 

an employer, or any member or former member of an employee 

organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of 

any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees 

of such employer or members of such organization, or whose 

beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). A participant may bring a civil action “(B) to recover benefits due to him 

under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of his plan, or to clarify his 

rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

A. Claim for Benefits

The Plan states unequivocally that the Company has “sole discretion” to determine 

eligibility. (Exh. A, page 1.) It makes no guarantees with regard to eligibility, stating only that 

an employee may be eligible if he or she is a salaried employee who is terminated by a reduction 

 

3 In Adams v. Avondale, the Sixth Circuit noted as follows:

Although Congress considered imposing vesting requirements on welfare benefits, it decided to limit vesting to 

pension plans in order to keep costs within reasonable limits. Apparently, Congress chose not to impose vesting 

requirements on welfare benefit plans for fear that placing such a burden on employers would inhibit the 

establishment of such plans. In drawing the line between employer actions subject to the fiduciary duty requirement 

and those not, we must avoid any rule that would have the effect of undermining Congress’ considered decision that 

welfare benefit plans not be subject to a vesting requirement. We are compelled, therefore, to reject plaintiffs’ 

proposed rule that welfare benefits plans such as the one before us be amended or terminated only when such action 

would be in the best interests of the employees. . . . Instead, we employ the rule . . . that a company does not act in a 

fiduciary capacity when deciding to amend or terminated a welfare benefits plan. 

905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

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in force. There is no other reasonable interpretation of “may” in this context. The Company 

could have obligated itself to provide severance benefits to all—“You shall be eligible for 

severance benefits under the Plan if you are a salaried employee”—but it did not. Additionally, 

under the terms of the Plan, the Company reserved the right to “to amend and/or terminate the 

Plan at any time, in any manner, for any reason.” (Exh. A, page 4.) This language underscores 

not only that the benefits have not vested, but also that the terms can change.

Plaintiffs agree that the Plan provides severance benefits only to “certain eligible 

employees” and that the Company has “the sole discretionary authority to determine who is 

eligible for severance benefits.” (Mem. In Opp., page 12, citing to Exh. A, page 1.) Notably, 

Plaintiffs point out that the Plan gives the Company “the discretion to interpret the criteria it has 

established for eligibility.” (Id., page 12, emphasis added.) That is precisely what the Company 

did: it interpreted its criteria of “salaried employees who were terminated as the result of the 

RIF” as those who did not secure comparable employment, unlike those who were re-employed 

by Fluor. As explained in the Letter to Portsmouth Site Salaried Employees:

The Company has determined that the salaried employees who 

transition their employment to [Fluor] will receive employment 

with [Fluor] where continuity of employment with credit for prior 

length of service is preserved under substantially equal conditions 

of employment. The Company views severance benefits as a 

bridge for departing employees who do not have substantially 

comparable employment opportunities after they leave the 

Company.

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Plaintiffs argue that Section 6.3 of the HR document4 requires the Company to pay 

severance benefits to them and to the putative class members: “Employees who are laid off 

because of an [Involuntary Reduction in Force] shall receive a severance pay” based on a 

particular calculation. (Exh. B, page 7, emphasis added.) However, Plaintiffs ignore another 

noteworthy section of the HR document that states as follows:

6.3.5 Severance pay benefits are not payable when an employee is 

employed by or receives an offer of employment where continuity 

of employment with credit for prior length of service is preserved 

under substantially equal conditions of employment.

(Id., page 10, emphasis added.) Thus, the HR document contemplates severance benefits not 

being provided to a subclass of departing employees. That subclass is further defined by the 

Letter. The Letter defines “continuity of employment with credit for prior length of service is 

preserved under substantially equal conditions of employment” as employment at Fluor. There 

is no dispute that all Plaintiffs and putative class members were hired by Fluor upon termination 

at the Company. Further, Plaintiffs do not allege that their employment responsibilities are

substantially different from their prior responsibilities at the Company. Instead, their allegations 

of unequal employment conditions focus exclusively on benefits—pension benefits, severance 

benefits, and vacation time. Plaintiffs offer no case law to support any inference that benefits 

such as vacation pay are the equivalent to equal-employment conditions such as title and 

 

4 Plaintiffs assert that this Court must accept as true its “allegation” that the Plan incorporated the HR document by 

reference, and, therefore “the terms of that document determines [sic] eligibility under the Plan.” (Mem. In Opp., 

page 19.) In fact, this Court need not accept as true legal conclusions such as these. Legal conclusions “must be 

supported by factual allegations” that give rise to an inference that the defendant is, in fact, liable for the misconduct 

alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. However, a discussion of contract law is not necessary at this time because 

even if the HR document were incorporated, its language underscores that severance benefits may not be payable to 

all salaried employees who are terminated under a RIF. 

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responsibility. Consequently, in the absence of allegations that their job titles and 

responsibilities are substantially unequal at Fluor, there is no reasonable inference to be drawn 

that favors Plaintiffs. 

Ultimately, Plaintiffs’ claim for benefits stems from their unsupported belief that their

interpretation of eligibility is a permitted alternate definition. Yet, they offer no case law to 

support this proposition; nor do they offer case law to refute that the Company’s “sole discretion 

to determine eligibility” means anything other than “sole discretion.” Thus, the Company was 

acting within its discretion to exclude from the pool of Plan participants those salaried employees 

who were terminated as a result of the RIF and who transitioned employment to Fluor—in other 

words: Plaintiffs and other putative class members. As a result, Plaintiffs are not “participants” 

in the Plan and, thus, cannot state a claim for benefits.

Plaintiffs also make a claim, in the alternative, under ERISA § 502(a)(3), “under the 

equitable doctrine of surcharge, estoppel and any other applicable subsections of ERISA § 502 

and request any and all remedies the Court deems appropriate, including, but not limited to, 

contract reformation.” (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 135.) Such an action may be brought by 

a “participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary” and, as discussed, supra, Plaintiffs are not participants 

in the Plan. Therefore, they cannot state a claim for relief.

B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Nor do Plaintiffs state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In Count Two, Plaintiffs 

claim that Defendant USEC, in its capacity as Plan Administrator, breached its fiduciary duty by 

denying severance benefits to Plaintiffs, attempting to force Plaintiffs and other putative class 

members to sign resignation letters, and refusing to explain why severance benefits were not 

paid. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 154.) In addition, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants 

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breached their fiduciary duty by failing to perform an investigation to determine the basis of the 

decision to deny benefits by acting in a manner that put business interests ahead of paying 

severance benefits to them. (Id., ¶¶ 159 – 162.) 

ERISA sets forth the fiduciary responsibility with respect to employee benefits plans at 

29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1104. The statute requires the following standard of care:

[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan

solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and—

(A) for the exclusive purpose of:

(i) providing benefits to participants and their 

beneficiaries; and

(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering 

the plan;

(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 

circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in 

a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in 

the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with 

like aims. . . . 

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (emphasis added). As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs must show that the 

Company’s definition of “eligible participant” constituted a “fiduciary act” for the purposes of 

ERISA. The word “fiduciary” is defined by ERISA as follows:

[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he 

exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control 

respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or 

control respecting management or disposition of its assets, . . . or 

(iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary 

responsibility in the management of such plan.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). ERISA distinguishes between the “administration” of welfare benefits 

plans and the “establishment,” “amendment,” or “termination” of the plans. As noted by the 

Supreme Court, “[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any 

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reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. 

Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1996) (citing Adams v. Avondale, 905 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 

1990)); see also Musto v. American General Corp., 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 

490 U.S. 1020 (1989) (“The case law, in any event, makes it clear that when an employer 

decides to establish, amend, or terminate a benefits plan, as opposed to managing any assets of 

the plan and administering the plan in accordance with its terms, its actions are not to be judged 

by fiduciary standards”); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882 (1996) (“Because the defined 

functions in the definition of fiduciary do not include plan design, an employer may decide to 

amend an employee benefit plan without being subject to fiduciary review”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Thus, the case law makes clear that by establishing the Plan and later amending 

or further defining eligibility, the Company did not act as a fiduciary. Plaintiffs do not make any 

allegations relating to the Company’ management of the Plan; rather, their allegations relate to 

the Company’s refusal to provide benefits as the result of its determination of eligibility under 

the Plan.

Plaintiffs’ other allegations of breach of fiduciary duty also lack viability. These 

allegations are without factual support or, interestingly, are accompanied by contrary factual 

support. For example, Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants have refused to explain why 

severance benefits were not paid is contradicted by many of their own exhibits: the Letter, letters 

denying Plaintiffs Kramer and Collier’s appeals, and, to some extent, the Plan itself. In addition, 

their claim that Defendant attempted to force them to sign resignation letters to foreclose their 

access to severance benefits is refuted by the Plan, which states that a participant may be eligible 

whether “voluntarily or involuntarily terminated for reasons other than cause and solely as a 

result of a Reduction in Force.”

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C. Interference with Protected Rights

Last, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant USEC interfered with “their attainment of severance 

benefits.” (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶164-170.) Again, Plaintiffs’ claim falls well short of 

stating a claim for relief, primarily because as non-participants, they have no right to severance 

benefits under the Plan. 

Even if they were participants, Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to state a claim. To state a 

claim under ERISA § 510, a plaintiff “must show that an employer had a specific intent to 

violate ERISA.” Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 865 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). ERISA makes it unlawful to “discharge, fine, suspend, expel, 

discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering 

with the attainment of any right” to benefits. Clark v. Walgreen Co., 424 Fed. Appx. 467, 474-

75 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1140). To plead a prima facie case, a plaintiff must 

allege the following: “(1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the purpose of interfering 

(3) with the attainment of any right to which the employee may become entitled.” Id. at 865 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants instructed human resources personnel to 

misrepresent their benefits status “by holding meetings to convince class members to draft and 

sign resignation letters in order to circumvent payment of severance under the Plan” and to 

threaten withholding of vacation pay” until the letters were signed. (Second Amended 

Complaint, ¶¶ 167 - 169.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants attempted to “collude” 

with unnamed “third parties” to develop “strategies to avoid or lessen the payment of severance 

benefits.” (Mem. In. Opp., page 37, citing Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 39 - 40, 42.) These 

vague allegations are unsupported factually and fail to make a prima facie case. This Court 

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cannot discern how Defendants were motivated to coerce Plaintiffs and others to sign resignation 

letters when the Plan specifically provides for severance benefits even in the event of voluntary 

termination. Moreover, Plaintiffs provide no factual support for their allegation that Defendants’ 

actions were taken for the purpose of interfering with their severance rights. Mere determination 

that Plaintiffs were not eligible for severance benefits does not equate to an intent to violate 

ERISA. As a result, this Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under ERISA § 510. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 27.) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification 

is rendered MOOT. (Doc. # 35.) The Court ORDERS that the Second Amended Complaint 

(doc. # 23-1) be hereby DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor 

of Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Peter C. Economus______________

PETER C. ECONOMUS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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