, 

• 

THE 

INSPECTORS'GENERAL 

1777·1903 

David A. Clary and 

Joseph W. A. Whitehome 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 

OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 

1777-1903 

by 

David A. Clary 

and 

Joseph W. A. Whitehorne 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

AND 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1987 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Clary, David A. 

The Inspectors General of the United States Anny , 

1777- 1903. 

Bibliography: p. 

Includes index. 

I. Military inspectors general- United States- History. 

2. United States. Army. Office of the Inspector General 

- History. I. Whitehorne, Joseph W. A., 1943-

II. Title. 

UB243.C56 1987 355.6'3'0973 86-25931 

CMH Pub 70-16 

First Printing-CMH Pub 70-16 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
Foreword 

The Office of The Inspector General, with its attendant inspection and investigating functions, has been a part of the Army for nearly two hundred and ten 

years. It has served throughout that period as the eyes and ears of the Army's 

leaders and often as the Army's conscience as well. As such, it has come into 

contact with nearly every issue, problem or triumph in which the Army has 

been involved. As a consequence, the inspectorate has achieved a unique 

insight into the Army's development and history. Despite this involvement, 

few soldiers and even fewer citizens know of inspector general activities or 

their value and influence in making the Army more effective, efficient, and 

humane. 

Inspectors general, past and present, have every right to be proud of the 

record of their organization. Until now, access to that record and the perspective it can give to military events has not been available. This volume begins to 

change that by telling the story of one of the oldest elements of the Army staff. 

It also tells the story of the United States Army as inspectors have seen it. With 

this book, it is hoped that inspectors, soldiers, and interested readers all will 

better understand what the inspectorate has done and, in so doing, will develop 

ideas as to what it can do now and in the future. This is a story that has long 

merited telling. It is hoped that its appearance will enhance the inspectorate's 

capability to assist, train, and generally contribute to continued improvements 

in the modem Army. 

Washington, D.C. 

16 May 1986 

iii 

NATHANIEL R. THOMPSON, JR. 

Lieutenant General, USA 

The Inspector General 

Preface 

An army's history encompasses far more than a description of the battles 

fought or a listing of the wars won and lost. Like any complex organization, a 

larger part of its story rests with a description of the development and relationship of those elements that combine to give it character and to support it in its 

endless preparations to carry out its missions. In fact, most of an army's 

history necessarily should deal with its daily record over long years of peace, 

interspersed rarely with conflict. The record of the United States Army shows 

that it, too, has spent most of its time at peace. And even in war, some of its 

greatest accomplishments have been outside the realm of combat. The record 

of these more prosaic achievements is often lost because of their undramatic 

nature, despite their importance to the full organization. Futhermore, the long 

periods of peace seldom have been given exclusively to the preparation for war. 

Civil missions, equipment testing and procurement, and the countless small 

tasks given to keeping a large group of men assembled and available compose 

the bulk of an army's experience. Therefore, it follows that the story of an 

army is not simply an account of military events, but the chronicle of an 

organization. Great captains and blunderers, heroes and cowards-all have 

their day when battle comes. But in the longer periods between battles, the 

military organization must remain intact and ready. It must eat, sleep, house 

and clothe itself, train itself, stay healthy, and remain on good behavior. Many 

people-soldiers, all skilled professionals, but few of them listed among the 

great captains-must spend their time ensuring the well-being and effectiveness 

of the Army . 

This is an account of one group of those soldiers, the inspectors general of 

the United States Army, from the eighteenth century until the early years of the 

twentieth. Their responsibility was to ensure that the highest authorities knew 

always the state of the Army-how well it fed and clothed itself, trained itself, 

and the rest. In the words of one senior inspector, "to touch most firmly those 

things the generals most need to know. " They were an essential part of those 

unsung elements that kept the Army intact in peacetime, and organized and 

ready for conflict when wartime came. When war did come, they were expected to oversee the expansion of the force, to teach and enforce its standards, 

and to assist in its management and improvement when necessary-and, again, 

to keep the highest authorities advised on the condition of the Army. The 

inspectors general were instrumental in making the Army what it was. It was 

v 
their vision as reported to the War Department that formed the basis for many 

far-reaching decisions. Accordingly, the history offered here is not only an 

account of the activities of the inspectors general, but also it is the story of the 

Army from a unique perspective. 

Several themes run through the story: One is the natural tension existing 

between the Army and the government it serves. The inspectors general often 

found themselves affected by this division. They were really the only officials 

in a position to know firsthand what was going on throughout the Army . That 

made them important to the highest military commander, who needed such 

information in order to exercise command effectively. But, the information of 

inspectors general was equally valuable to civilian members of government 

who had valid reasons for needing to know the state of the Army. This tension 

was a major factor in the life of the inspectorate until the divided authority over 

the military was resolved by reforms in 1903; however, to a lesser extent it 

persists to the present day. Another theme of the inspectors general history is 

organizational. Although it remained strictly military in perspective and objective, 

the inspectorate became increasingly structured over the years. Much of its 

history gravitated around the formalization of an inspection bureaucracy, especially after the Civil War. Symbolic of this were the growing efforts to create an 

Inspector General's Department. Such a department was never established by 

law; however, the effort to create one was nevertheless successful. The need for 

the function performed by the inspectorate was such that over time it became an 

institutional part of the Army without anyone realizing that no direct official act 

had caused itto exist. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Inspector 

General's Department was an enduring part of the Army, established on the 

assumption that it had been authorized since the days of von Steuben and 

Hamilton. Underlying the theme of organizational development, there is yet 

another thread. This has to do with the practical issues of doing business. 

Topics such as the confidentiality of investigations, proximity to the commander, 

and scope of activity have been matters of concern from the beginning of the 

American inspection effort. The precedents set by their resolution have determined the way inspectors conduct their business to the present day. 

In a way, the inspectorate has been a kind of bureaucratic laboratory. For 

over two hundred years, inspectors have been performing essentially the same 

missions for the same larger organization. The technology and other outward 

appearances may change, but the problems and issues have been constant. The 

inspectors inspect, investigate, assist, and teach; and have done so since 1778. 

All the various issues of organization, such as integrity and confidentiality have 

been discussed since Valley Forge. A modem inspector need only search the 

history of his predecessors to discover that there is rarely such a thing as a 

"new" issue. Invariably, he will find that five or ten or twenty or more years 

earlier the same issue had appeared, had been discussed, and had been resolved. 

vi 
This cycle of issues has been a regular feature of the inspector general experience, 

of which every inspector need be aware. The old saying that we study history to 

avoid the sense of panic when confronting something new to us never has been 

proved more true than when viewing the record of the inspectors general. 

This project grew out of the personal interest of Lt. Gen. Richard G. Trefry, 

The Inspector General, 1977-1983, who appreciates the value of history to 

current public administration. He was interested in a document of his 

organization's existence as well as a record of the roots of contemporary practices and relationships. The universal growth of interest in inspection activities 

throughout the government made it imperative in his view to gather the scattered information about the United States Army's inspectors general into a 

coherent whole. Otherwise, the Army's extensive experience and established 

procedures and relationships could neither be shared nor defended. The decision was made to present the history in chronological parts, the first ending in 

1903. This volume covers that early period. It was prepared in first draft by 

David A. Clary, who developed the basic structure of the book. Joseph 

Whitehorne assisted in the research and continued it while rewriting the draft to 

add new information and to develop various points. He also guided the work 

through the stages of editing and production. General Trefry's successor, Lt. 

Gen. Nathaniel R. Thompson, Jr., continued to underscore the importance of 

the historical effort and gave it his welcome support. This work is written with 

the serving inspectors general in mind. We recognize that there will be few 

historians in this group, but we are equally certain that all soldiers recognize the 

value of the experience of their predecessors. It is our hope that this history will 

serve the practical purpose of explaining how inspection in the Army evolved 

and why things are done the way they are. Above all, we hope the reasons for 

the existence of a separate inspectorate, its traditions, and its place in history 

become apparent. They provide a guide and an inspiration to meet the challenges of the present. 

No one who undertakes a project on this scale can work without the assistance of a great many others. It is impossible personally to thank all the 

librarians and archivists who aided in the research. Among those who deserve 

special mention are Michael Musick, Charles Shaughnessy, Old Army and 

Navy Branch, and Sara Jackson, National Historical Records Publications 

Commission, all at the National Archives, Washington, D.C.; John Slonaker, 

Richard Sommers, David Keough, Valerie Metzler, Norma Umbrell, and Dennis Vetock of the United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, Pennsylvania; Alice Wickizer and her staff of the Government Documents and Publications Department, Indiana University Library, Bloomington, 

Indiana; and Marilyn Irwin, Lily Library and Rare Books and Manuscripts 

Repository, Bloomington, Indiana. Ronald B. Hartzer ran down some elusive 

publications, and Jesse B. Clary handled the mechanical production of the first 

vii 
draft. Thanks also are due to Lt. Gen. Richard G. Trefry, TIG, USA (retired); 

David Trask, Center of Military History, Department of the Army; and Jay 

Luvaas, Army War College, who read the draft. Special thanks go to the 

members of the Inspector General word processing center for typing the untold 

number of drafts leading to the final form: Lynne M. Reid, Denise P. Lindsey, 

Mary A. Lorber, Crystal L. Smith, Tracy D. Cotton, Theresa K. Middleton, 

and Denise R. Jones. Last, but not least, our deepest appreciation to Rae T. 

Panella, Anna B. Wittig , Cheryl A. Morai, and Arthur S. Hardyman of the 

Center of Military History for their superb, conscientious efforts in editing the 

manuscript into publishable form. All the foregoing deserve a measure of credit 

for any merits in the final product. Blame for any shortcomings should not be 

laid at the door of those good people, however, but at our own. 

Washington, D.C. 

16 May 1986 

viii 

DA VID A. CLARY 

JOSEPH W. A. WHITEHORNE 
Contents 

Page 

INTRODUCTION: ORIGINS OF MILITARY INSPECTION ..... 3 

Military Self-examination . . .......................... 3 

European Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 

American Situation-British Example .................... 5 

American Traditions ............... . ..... . ... . ..... 7 

Part One: A Tradition of Inspection, 1775-1821 

Chapter 

1. THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY, 1775-1778 ..... .. . .... 11 

A Militia Army ..................... .. . ..... ... 11 

Organizational Problems ................... . ... .. 12 

Inadequate Staff Support ......... . ............ .. . 14 

Disorganization in the Line ............ . .... .. .. .. 14 

Congress Takes a Hand .... . . . . ... ...... . .. . ..... 16 

Congress Becomes More Active. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

Recruitments in France . . . . . . ... ................ . 17 

The First Inspector General ....... . .... . .... . ..... 18 

The Second Inspector General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 

The Campaign of 1777 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 

Inspector General Conway ............. . . .. . . ..... 22 

Valley Forge . ... . ... . . .. .. . . .. . .......... . . .. 31 

2. STEUBEN AT VALLEY FORGE, 1777-1778 ..... .. .. .. . 33 

A Volunteer for the American Cause ... . .. . .......... 33 

Steuben's Challenge ... ... . ............. . .... ... 36 

Steuben Trains the Troops ........... .. .. .. .... . .. 38 

The First Regulation .. . .............. . .. ... ... . . 40 

Proving the Worth of Training . ........ ... ....... .. 42 

Inspector General Steuben ............. . .......... 43 

ix 
Chapter Page 

3. DEFINING THE INSPECTOR'S ROLE, 1778-1779 45 

Limiting the Inspector's Authority ................... 45 

Steuben Tries To Assert Himself ....... .. ... . .... ... 46 

Steuben's Blue Book .................... ........ 48 

Charter for the Inspector General . .. . ... ... ... .. ... . 50 

4. INSPECTION AND THE AMERICAN VICTORY, 

1780-1784 ...... ................. .. ... ........ 52 

The Inspector's Authority Widens ....... . ........ . .. 52 

Reducing the Army and the Inspectorate ............... 56 

Demobilization and Border Defense . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 

Steuben's Legacy ................ . ..... . .... . .. 59 

5. DECLINE, REVIVAL, AND VICISSITUDES OF 

INSPECTION, 1784-1798 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 

Very Little Army To Inspect ... .. . ... ............. . 61 

Birth of the United States Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 

Anthony Wayne and Inspection ..................... 64 

James Wilkinson and the Army ... . .. .... . .......... 69 

6. HAMILTON AND THE PROVISIONAL 

ARMY, 1798-1800 73 

Establishing an Army for War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

The Inspector General as Second in Command .......... 75 

Inspector General Hamilton ......... .. ........ .. .. 77 

Hamilton and the Paper Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 

Hamilton and the Real Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 

Hamilton and the Army of the Future ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 

7. DISGRACE OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL, 1801- 1813 84 

The Jeffersonian Army ............. ... . .......... 84 

The Adjutant and the Inspector ...... .. . ............ 87 

The Madisonian Army ........................... 89 

Facing Another War ................... ......... 90 

Reestablishment ............................... 91 

Smyth Goes to War ..... . ... ... . . . . ... .......... 94 

The Office Is Abolished ....................... ... 96 

x 
Chapter Page 

8. ORIGINS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT 

AND INSPECTOR, 18l3-1815 ...................... 98 

Army Reformation, Inspectorate Restoration .......... . . 98 

Adjutant and Inspector General Pike ..... . ........ . .. 103 

The Inspectorate and the Army After Pike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 

The Adjutant and Inspector General's Office ..... . ... .. . 107 

Adjutant and Inspector General Parker .. ... . . . ....... III 

9. END OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, 1816-1821 ... . ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 

A General Staff and New Inspectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 

The State of the Army .. ......................... 118 

Calhoun and Army Reform ........... . ....... . .... 121 

Inspectors and Army Reduction ..................... 123 

Part Two: The Inspectors General of the Army, 

1821-1881 

10. ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 1821-1825 l31 

Choosing and Regulating the Inspector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 

Inspecting the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l36 

Gaines: The Commander as Inspector ................ 140 

The Inspector and Property Management . .. ........... 142 

More Changes in the Inspectorate ................... 143 

A New Inspector General .. . .. ... ... . .. .... . .. . ... 145 

11. INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE 

COMMANDER, 1826-1849 149 

The Nation's Military Forces ...................... 149 

The Inspectorate and the Commanding General . . . . . . . . . . 151 

Reporting the State of the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 

The Productive Inspector Wool ..... . ..... .. ... .. ... 154 

Gaines, Congress, and Disciplinary Reform ............ 156 

Powers alld Agents of the Commanding General ..... .... 157 

More Attempts at Army Reform ... ....... .... .... . .. 159 

The Inspectors and Army Control . . . ..... . .......... 160 

The Inspectorate and the Seminole Wars ... . ... .. ... .. 164 

xi 
Chapter Page 

Decline of the Commanding General ................. 167 

New Commander and Divided Inspectorate .. . . . . . . . . . . . 172 

Another War-No Central Inspectorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 

The Place of the Inspector General .. ................ 181 

12. INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS, 1849-1861 .... .... 183 

The Army's Continued Mission ...... ... ............ 183 

A Leaderless Army ........................... .. 185 

An Energetic Inspector . . .............. : . . . . . . . . . . 190 

The Secretary's Inspector ................... . . . . . . 192 

Living Conditions ...................... . . .... . . 193 

A Busy Decade for Churchill .... ..... ........... .. 194 

Regulations and the Inspector General ........ .... .... 200 

Another War-The Inspectors Depart .......... .... . . . 201 

13. THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL 

WAR, 1861-1865 204 

Inspectors Without Portfolio ...... .. . .. .... .. .... . . 204 

Class of 1861: Inspectors General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 

Class of 1861: Assistant 1 nspectors .......... . ...... . 209 

1nspectors Without an Inspectorate . ........ .. . .... .. 213 

A Presence in Washington ...... . .. ........ ....... 217 

Scattering the Inspectors' Attention . . ........ ... ..... 218 

Bringing the Inspectors Into Line .. . .. .. ........ .. .. 220 

The Washington Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 

An Undefined Inspectorate .. . ....... .......... .... 227 

The 1nspectorate at War's End ..................... 228 

14. SECURING A PERMANENT PLACE, 1865-1866 .. . . . . . . . 232 

New Orders for the Inspectors ... ........... .. .... . 234 

Reduction of the Regular Establishment . ... ........... 238 

Serving the Secretary of War .. . ....... ... ....... .. 239 

The Subsistence Sales List ...... ... ........ .... ... 240 

A Symbol of Permanence ..................... .. .. 241 

15 . FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY, 1867-1869 .... .. 242 

Founding a Bureau ............... . . . . . ..... .... 242 

Making the Organization Useful .... ... ... .. . ..... . . 244 

Taking Charge of the Inspectorate . ........... ....... 246 

xii 
Chapter Page 

A Formal Bureau is Acknowledged .................. 249 

The Inspectorate and Army Reorganization ............. 252 

Continuing the Routine .......................... 256 

The Senior Inspector Takes Over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 

Part Three: A Tradition of an Inspection 

Department, 1881-1898 

16. MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE 

DEPARTMENT, 1870-1881 ........................ 265 

The Commanding General's Ordeal .... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 265 

Marcy Tries To Assert His Authority ................. 266 

The Inspectorate Declines .................. .. .... 269 

An Independent Inspectorate ....................... 271 

Reducing the Army and the Inspectorate ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 

Marcy Loses Control ........ .. ... .... .. ... .. .... 274 

The Inspector General's Department Emerges .. . .... .... 277 

Another Reorganization Scare ...................... 279 

Marcy's Last Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281 

Special Investigations and Services .................. 283 

Property Inspection ............................. 285 

Disbursing Accounts ..... .............. . ........ 287 

Other Occupations of the Inspectors ................. 289 

The Old Soldier Retires ..... .................. .. . 292 

17. PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD, 1881-1889 294 

Portents of Reform ......... . .. ................ . 294 

Breckinridge Joins the Department . ....... .. ..... ... 295 

The Department Enlarged and Ratified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 

Davis Has a Brief Reign .... .... ... .. ......... ... 300 

Baird Succeeds Davis ....... .. ................ . . 302 

Breckinridge Takes Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 305 

Special Investigations in the I880s .................. 306 

Soldiers' Home, Military Prison, Cemeteries . . . . . . . . . . .. 309 

Military Colleges .............................. 311 

Disbursing Accounts ............................ 312 

Property Inspections ......... .. ................. 314 

The Sales List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 

Signs of Change ............................ . .. 315 

xiii 
Chapter Page 

18. BRECKINRIDGE'S WIDENING SCOPE, 1889-1898 318 

New Department Under New Leadership . ........ ..... 318 

Ending Sunday Inspections ........ . ............... 320 

Building a Definite Sphere ...... ................ .. 322 

A Setback and Renewed Advance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 

An Uncertain New Patron .................. ...... 329 

Independence Gained. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 

Independence Lost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332 

19. THE DEPARTMENT IN SERVICE TO THE 

SECRETARY, 1889-1898 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 

Paragraph 955 .......... .. .. ....... ........... 335 

West Point ......... . ......................... 337 

The Military Prison .............................. 337 

The Soldiers' Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338 

Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers . . ... ... .. ... ... 339 

Disbursing Accounts .. ............. .. ... ...... .. 341 

Property Inspections ................. . . .... .... . 342 

Military Colleges ........... . ... . . .. . . ......... 343 

The National Guard ............... . ............ 345 

Balancing Two Interests ............ . .... .... .. ... 348 

20. REFORM DURING THE BRECKINRIDGE ERA, 

1889-1898 .................................... 350 

Soldier Life and Discipline ......... ........ . .... .. 350 

Educating the Enlisted Men ....................... 351 

Military Training ...... .. ............... .. .. ... 352 

Supply Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 

The Army, the Inspectors-Ready for War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 

Part Four: The Inspector General's Department of 

the New Army, 1898-1903 

2l. INSPECTION DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN, 1898 

The Situation in 1898 

361 

361 

Where Were the Inspectors? .......... . .. ... .. ..... 363 

The Whereabouts of General Breckinridge ........ ..... 369 

The Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 

xiv 
Chapter Page 

22. INSPECTING THE NEW ARMY 376 

Breckinridge and the Dodge Commission ..... ......... 376 

Increasing the Army Temporarily ........ .... ....... 378 

Serving the Secretary's Interest in Economy ... ......... 379 

Military Colleges and the National Guard .... ......... 380 

Old Business and New .............. .. ......... .. 383 

The State of the New Army ........ . . ... . .. ...... .. 384 

Inspecting a Worldwide Army .. ............... ..... 385 

Supply Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 

The Inspector General's Wide View . . .... ............ 387 

23. INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE . 

WAR DEPARTMENT, 1898-1903 ........... .... .... . 389 

Secretary Root Takes Charge ...... . .... . .. ... ..... 389 

The General-Staff Idea and Inspection ......... .. .... . 393 

The General Staff Bill . . .................. ...... . 396 

Breckinridge Saves His Department . ... . ............. 400 

A Charter for the Future ... . ...... ............... 402 

The Veterans Depart . .. .............. .... ....... 406 

Appendixes 

A. INSPECTORS GENERAL 411 

B. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 415 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 431 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . .. ... .. ....... .. .. .. ..... 451 

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 453 

Maps 

No. 

1. Military Departments, October 1850 189 

xv 
No. Page 

2. Military Divisions, April 1870 ....................... 268 

3. Military Divisions, December 1880 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 307 

Illustrations 

Maj . Gen. Thomas Conway ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 

Maj . Gen. Friedrich von Steuben . ........... . ......... . . 36 

Maj . William North ....... . ............... . . . .. .. ... 51 

Capt. Edward Butler .............. . .. .. ... . .... . .... . 67 

Maj. Thomas H. Cushing . ..... . . .......... .. ......... 70 

Maj. Gen. Alexander Hamilton .... .... ..... .... . ..... . . 78 

Brig. Gen. Alexander Smyth ........ . .... .... .. .. . .. .. . 93 

Brig. Gen. Zebulon M. Pike .. . .. ...... . ............... 105 

Brig. Gen. William H. Winder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 

Battle of New Orleans, 1815 ... ... ... . ........ . ..... . . . 112 

Brig. Gen. Daniel Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 

Col. John E. Wool ........... . ... . ........ .. ... . .. . . 117 

Col. James Gadsden .. . .... . . ........ .. ... . .. . . . . . .. . 126 

Col. George Croghan . . ...... . ..... . ............. . ... 146 

Battle of Moncaco Lake, 1837 ... . . .. . ... . ... . .... . .. . .. 165 

Defense of Quartermaster's Train on the Chihuahua Column, 

1847 ..... ....... ...... . ..................... .. 178 

Col. Ethan A. Hitchcock ............... ... ........ . . . . 180 

Ringgold's Battery at Palo Alto, 1846 . ... . .. . . . .. . . . .... .. 185 

The Assault on Chapultapec, 1847 ..................... . . 187 

Col. George A. McCall .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 

Ascending the Tablelands of Texas . . ....... ... ... . ... .. .. 196 

Col. Joseph K. F. Mansfield ........................... 202 

Commissary Department Baggage Train, 1861 .......... . .... 205 

Brig. Gen. Randolph B. Marcy . . ......... . ............. 207 

Col. Henry Van Rensselaer .. . .... . . ... . .......... . ... . 209 

Col. Edmund Schriver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 221 

Going Into Battery Before Petersburg, 1865 . . .. . .. . ...... . .. 223 

Col. James A. Hardie .... . ................... . ... ... . 225 

Ohio Infantry at the Bloody Angle, 1864 ...... . ............ 230 

Charge of the Fifth Regulars at Gaines Mills, Va., 1862 .. . . . .. . 235 

Brig. Gen. Delos B. Sacket . ... .. ......... . .... . . ...... 282 

Brig. Gen. Nelson H. Davis .... . ................... . .. 301 

Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird ................ .. ........... 303 

Brig. Gen. Roger Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 316 

xvi 
Page 

Infantry Tactical Drill, 1892 ... . . . ........ .. .. .. ... . ... 322 

Inspection at Proving Ground, 1892 . ......... . ....... . . . . 328 

Eighteenth Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment at the 

Allegheny Co. Centennial, 1888 ....... . ... ... . ... ... .. 345 

Inspection of Engineer Troops, 1892 .......... ... .. . .. . ... 347 

Maj. Gen. Joseph C. Breckinridge .. ... . .... .. ... ..... . .. 353 

Inspector General Insignia, 1895-1961 .... .......... . .. .. . 355 

Bloody Ford, Cuba, 1898 ... .. .. ... . . . .......... .. . ... 370 

Second Kansas National Guard, 1898 .. . . .. . . . .. . .... .. ... 381 

Brig. Gen. Peter D. Vroom . .. .. .. ... . ............. .. .. 407 

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: The cover Steuben at Valley 

Forge (Edwin Austin Abbey) (cover for the softbound version of this book) is 

from the Pennsylvania Museum and Historical Commission; portrait of Baron 

von Steuben (Ralph Earl) is from the New York State Historical Association, 

Cooperstown; portrait of William North (Charles Willson Peale, gift of Dexter 

M. Ferry, Jr. , copyright, Founders Society) is from the Detroit Institute of Arts; 

portraits of Alexander Hamilton (artist unknown) and Thomas H. Cushing 

(Ezra Ames) is courtesy of The Society of the Cincinnati, Washington, D.C.; 

portrait of William Winder is from B. J. Lossing's Field Book of the War of 

1812; portrait of Zebulon Pike is from the Independence National Historical 

Park Collection, Philadelphia; portraits of Croghan, Conway, Butler, Gadsden, 

Sacket, Davis, and Baird are from the U.S. Army Signal Corps; portrait of 

Alexander Smyth is from the U.S. Army, DAIG, Washington, D.C.; portraits 

of John E. Wool and Ethan A. Hitchcock are from the Special Collections, 

University of Texas at Arlington Library; portraits of Hardie, Van Rensselaer, 

Mansfield, McCall, Jones, Marcy, and Vroom are from the National Archives; 

portrait of Joseph C. Breckinridge is from the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; the following illustrations are from William 

Walton's The Army and Navy of the United States from the Period of the 

Revolution to the Present Day, Inspection of Engineer Troops: 1892 (W. T. 

Trego), The Battle of Moncaco Lake: 1837 (Gilbert Gaul), Ringgold's Battery 

at Palo Alto: 8 May 1846 (W. T. Trego), The Assault on Chapultapec: 12 

September 1847 (Andre Castaigne), Defense of Quartermaster's Train on the 

Chihuahua Column: 1847 (artist unknown), Commissary Department Baggage 

Train: 21 July 1861 (W. T. Trego), Charge of the 5th Regulars at Gaines Mills, 

Virginia: 27 June 1862 (W. T. Trego), Ohio Infantry at the Bloody Angle: 12 

May 1864 (Andre Castaigne), Going into Battery Before Petersburg: 1865 (W. 

T. Trego), Inspection at Proving Ground: 1892 (V. Perard), Infantry Tactical 

Drill: Summer 1892 (N. G. Ferris); portrait of Edmund Schriver is from Collection of the Newark Museum; Eighteenth Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment at the 

xvii 
Allegheny Co.: 1888 Centennial is from DAIG, Washington, D.C.; Second 

Kansas National Guard field inspection photograph: 1898, courtesy of John 

Hyson; Bloody Ford, Cuba (Charles Johnson Post), Battle of New Orleans 

(artist unknown), and Ascending the Tablelands of Texas (artist unknown) 

photographs are from the Army Art Collection; Inspector General Insignia: 

1895-1961 (Ronald M. Shuler); portrait of Daniel Parker is from Hazen Memorial Library, Shirley, Massachusetts. 

xviii 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 

OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 

1777-1903 

INTRODUCTION 

Origins of Military Inspection 

In 1777, George Washington determined that the Continental Army required 

the services of an inspector general. At about the same time, the Continental 

Congress decided that it also needed an inspector general, to keep the government informed about military affairs. In that instance, both commander and 

government perceived a fundamental need for military information. Their respective desires, however, were as much conflicting as mutual, reflecting a tension 

between army and government that, when it came to military inspection, had 

arisen many times before in other countries. The relationship of the inspectors 

to the military chain of command and to representatives of the government was 

a delicate one. The need for commanders to have full authority and flexibility 

within their units had to be balanced with the government's need for information about its forces. The resolution of this balance would determine to a large 

extent the degree of control exercised by either element. The inspectors' proximity to their commanders and the amount of information passed between them 

and to those outside the chain has been an issue to the present time. 

Military Self-Examination 

To ensure success, a commander must know intimately the strengths and 

limitations of his military force and its readiness to express his will. In peace or 

war, the competent commander knows how many men he has, how they are 

organized, and how well they are trained and ready for movement or combat. 

He keeps track of the quantities and qualities of arms and ammunition, and the 

equally essential food, shelter, and transportation of his force. Warfare is a 

personal art, no matter on how grand a scale. Successful armies evidence high 

morale, which might be equated with devotion to the job of soldiering. Because 

little things can seriously erode morale, the commander must know how well 

his men are housed, clothed, and fed; whether discipline is fair and appropriate; 

and whether officers are fit for their assignments. Military duty, in peace and 

war, may be directed by commanders, but it depends upon private soldiers; the 

commander must know whether his soldiers are content to do their duty. 

In Western armies during the past three centuries, the gathering of information about a commander's own force has become formalized in the term 

inspection. That formalization, often by the assignment of inspection duties to a 

particular agency, does not contradict the fact that inspection has long been 

viewed as integral to command. Thus, as Charles James defined inspection in 
4 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

1802, it is "a strict examination, a close survey. It likewise signifies 

superintendence," he continued. "In a military sense it admits of both 

interpretations, and may be considered under two specific heads, each of which 

branches out into a variety of general, regimental, and company duties." 1 The 

term inspector-general, defined as "an officer at the head of a system of 

inspection, having under him a body of inspectors; a superintendent of a system 

of inspection," was in the English language by 1702, and until the late nineteenth 

century usually meant a military official, after which it transferred to police and 

other civil organizations. British Army regulations used the term inspecting 

general for the same official in the 1790s, but inspector-general seems to have 

been more common. Inspectors general were assigned particularly to categories 

of regiments (infantry or cavalry) in British service, and the general definition 

of their duties was to monitor or to direct training and efficiency, and to report 

formally upon their observations. 2 /nspector enjoyed usage in America as early 

as 1685, when "inspectors of brick" were appointed in Boston to monitor the 

quality of brick offered for sale. The inspector as an internal authority of civil 

agencies dates in America from as early as 1711, when Boston appointed 

inspectors of schools. Not a nation with a permanent military force, the United 

States did not hear native use of the term inspector-general until 1777. The next 

usage, inspector of police (1778). followed the adoption of the term in the 

American military. 3 

European Examples 

In the West, the first modem military inspectors were two French inspecteurs 

appointed in 1668-an inspector general of infantry and an inspector general of 

cavalry. Louis XIV expanded the system during his reign, appointing additional inspectors general, assigned to geographical departments. Their duties 

were to review the troops once a month and to report to the king. They 

examined everything, including books and records, and were told especially to 

remove from the ranks soldiers unfit for duty. Observing France's military 

prowess during Louis' reign, the rest of Europe adopted the idea. Despite this 

prominence, the French inspectors general did not have regular military 

commissions, but were answerable directly to the sovereign. In wartime, 

however, the king's inspectors general ranked equivalent to generals, brigadiers, 

or colonels. They were strictly the sovereign's agents in the army; they did not 

inspect the king's personal troops or the artillery. By the late eighteenth century, 

I. Charles James, A New and Enlarged Military Dictionary, or, Alphabetical Explanation of 

Technical Terms (London: Military Library, 1802). Dictionary references in this volume are to 

entries for the words discussed, unless otherwise stated. 

2. Ibid. The hyphenated form "inspector-general" persisted in the United States Army into the 

20th century. 

3. A Dictionary of American English on Historical Principles, 4 vols. (Chicago: University of 

Chicago Press, 1938-44) (hereafter cited as DAE); A Dictionary of Americanisms on Historical 

Principles, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) (hereafter cited as DAHP). The 

DAHP mostly follows the DAE on "inspector," with some American jargon and slang variations. 
ORIGINS OF MILITARY INSPECTION 5 

they numbered eleven inspectors general of cavalry and eleven of infantry. 

France's army also had a regularly commissioned inspecteur de construction, 

who was predominantly a supervisory engineer, approving plans for fortifications and the like.

4 

Perhaps no other person in the modern period came so close to embodying 

Machiavelli's vision of the prince as commander and head of state as did 

Frederick the Great of Prussia. Instead of appointing a general to command the 

whole army, he filled the role himself. At the same time, he remained sovereign of his state. By the 1770s he had perceived that if he was to meet both 

responsibilities he must appoint others to serve as his eyes and ears in the army: 

Inasmuch as one individual cannot supervise all of these details of regimental service 

I have appointed an inspector to look after each unit. These officers are responsible for 

the execution of instructions issued to the troops. They also are the instrument whereby 

equality of discipline is attained, so that one man is treated as another without undue 

mildness or severity. The inspectors report to me regarding the conduct of the officers, 

bring those to my attention who through bad behavior, negligence, and stupidity are 

courting dismissal, and recommend those who have earned distinction through their 

industry or talent. They inspect the regiments frequently, have them drill, improve their 

shortcomings, and hold the reviews if governmental duties prevent my traveling in the 

province myself. And finally, they preside over muster days and see to it that the cantons 

will not be deceived by the captains, which in former days happened only too often. 5 

Of the inspection duties listed by Frederick II, only the last was of purely 

civil concern--of greater moment to the state than to the army. The others 

covered the very things that every good commander needed to know about his 

troops. Although this information was also of interest to the government that 

paid for the army, it was that about which commanders could be particularly 

sensitive, especially when they felt their own authority challenged. Frederick 

avoided civil-military conflict over inspection because he was the supreme 

military as well as civil authority. Had that not been the case, and had eighteenthcentury France not been so authoritarian, both the French and Prussian systems 

would have generated disputes between soldiers and their governments. 

The American Situation and the British Example 

By the mid-eighteenth century, military inspection had become essential to 

modern armies. The tactics of the day, founded on volley fire and massed 

bayonet charges, required stern discipline and extensive drill and training. But 

careful training meant a high public investment in each soldier. 6 Inspection as a 

monitor of public investment in the army became increasingly concerned with 

troop drill and tactical proficiency. Thus, when the rebellious Americans formed 

their own armies in the 1770s, they soon perceived a need for training, and with 

4. James, Military Dictionary. 

5. Frederick II ("the Great") of Prussia, Frederick the Great on the Art of War, ed. and trans. 

Jay Luvaas (New York: Free Press, 1966), 79. 

6. Russell F. Weigiey, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 

19-20. 
6 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

this need the importance of inspection. Before the uprising was two years old, 

the military command had come to appreciate the importance of inspection as a 

function of command, and particularly as a monitor of martial readiness. At 

about the same time, the civil power, embodied in the Continental Congress, 

seized upon inspection as a way to oversee the military establishment. As might 

have been predicted, government and commander soon came into conflict over 

the person and role of the inspector. The United States imported a number of 

French, Prussian, and other European officers in the early years of the 

Revolution. But the country resisted the importation of French or Prussian inspection systems, because the confederation of more or less independent states 

lacked a supreme autocrat. Besides, the country was essentially English in 

tradition and outlook, no matter the rebellion . British armies had greatly 

impressed Americans with their effectiveness in the French and Indian War, 

and British training manuals were in the native tongue. Deliberately following 

tradition, the United States modeled its army on that of Britain. 7 

At least as far as military leaders were concerned, one aspect of the British 

military establishment compatible with American sentiments was its inspection 

system. The British government was not as unstructured as that of the United 

States, but neither was it as authoritarian as that of France or Prussia. The civil 

power in Britain supervised the military by the appointment of high officials 

and by the control of the purse. Commanders were held accountable for the 

public interests in economy and propriety; that accountability made propriety a 

command responsibility. Inspection, therefore, was integrated with command 

and at the same time supported the public interest in an efficient and properly 

behaved army. Through it, the interests of commanders and politicians were 

expected to be served equally. 

By the late eighteenth century, the British Army had inspecting field officers 

of districts, officers detailed from the line to monitor distribution of monies and 

supervise recruiting officers in their districts. With press-gangs an important 

source of recruits, recruitment had to be supervised to avoid excesses that 

would bring forth violent public reaction . Inspecting field officers could also 

order detachment courts-martial, and would supervise medical examinations of 

recruits. The recruiting service as a whole came under its own inspector general, 

whose regulations and procedures were binding even on regiments that did their 

own recruiting.

8 In other cases, the British Army also detailed officers as 

inspectors of clothing, who compared delivered uniforms with standard patterns, 

and there was a permanent inspector of hospitals, who was the surgeon general's 

principal subordinate. One other person in the army who bore the title inspectorgeneral was the inspector general of cavalry. He was a general officer who 

inspected all cavalry regiments, reported the condition of the horses, and received 

regular accountings from all corps. He answered to the commander in chief, 

and was the sole inspector of any cavalry regiment about to be disbanded. 9 The 

7. Ibid. , 22- 23. 

8. James, Military Dictionary. 

9. Ibid. 
ORIGINS OF MILITARY INSPECTION 7 

variety of functions meant that inspection in the British Anny of the late eighteenth century was not a fonnal bureaucracy, but an activity to which officers 

were assigned when necessary and when the activity was outside the nonnal 

course of military service . Otherwise, inspection was a function of command. 

The British establishment called for a great deal of responsibility to be delegated downward- sergeants actually trained the troops, for instance-with 

accountability upward ensured by rigorous, periodic inspections. At each stage 

of the command pyramid, an officer used inspection to ensure that those below 

him were on the job. 

In the British routine, a general inspection was made annually by generals 

commanding districts, and included a complete examination of all regiments in 

each district. Each regimental commander was to make a regimental inspection 

monthly, while every Monday morning company commanders or subalterns 

were to hold a "private inspection of companies." Other regular examinations 

included .. inspection of necessaries," or all property supposed to be in the 

hands of soldiers, and "private inspection of arms" before every general parade. 

Regardless of level, every inspection was all encompassing. Each soldier was 

individually examined, along with his clothing, arms, and property; each unit's 

books were reviewed; and evidences of training and discipline were put on 

review. Housing, food, medical care, transportation, and general administration were also objects of inspection. 10 The British system of inspection was 

only partly useful as a model for the Continental Anny of America. It depended 

upon a corps of officers and noncommissioned officers of long experience, 

supervising sufficiently cowed, lifelong soldiers. It was also practical only for 

an organization long trained and essentially unifonn in procedure. By itself, the 

British system would not accomplish much in the wildly diverse gatherings of 

short-tenn militia and volunteers who composed the first rebellious forces. Nor 

could it do much even for a Continental Army without much collective 

experience, facing immediate challenges from a determined and competent 

enemy. 

American Traditions 

Most of all, the British system of inspection would be ineffective as a 

means of control without the hard discipline and penalties for desertion that 

held the British ranks together. The thirteen colonies entered the Revolution 

with faith in the militia, every citizen providing his share of the common 

defense. Instead of press-gangs and iron discipline, the army of the Revolution 

began with exhortations. For example, the militia regulations of Massachusetts 

stated that it was the pride and duty of every citizen to defend his country. An 

army created out of such sentiments could not be modeled on any European 

system, although it might borrow and adapt such European ways as suited 

American realities. The early American army was a product of its own colonial 

10. Ibid. 
8 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

traditions, and had to be molded in a manner that accorded with its heritage. 

The British system of inspections as a means of command accountability and 

control was suitable enough, but it did not answer for the inexperience of 

officers and men in the American service. The Prussian system of inspection 

appeared to offer a possible monitor of training, but it did not answer the 

problems created by the variety of colonial units and practices. The French idea 

of the inspector general suggested a mechanism for uniformity, but it was 

coupled with the threat of interference in the chain of command. 11 

None of the European examples, working as they did in experienced professional armies, was wholly useful to the army of the American Revolution. All 

other considerations aside, when it came time to form a permanent army for the 

American cause, it had to be an integrated force with a common organization 

and tactics. Above all, it had to be trained so far as it could be in the 

circumstances. When the Continental Army's leaders considered the problems 

of organization, tactics, and training of a regular force in 1777, they looked 

naturally to European inspection systems for ideas, but they also looked to 

American experience. This in its own way was as extensive as that in the 

mother country . The Massachusetts Bay colony had been the first to form its 

militia into regiments (one per county), in 1636. Three years later, Virginia 

imposed uniform regulations on its militia. Those were the first American 

efforts to form military organizations on something larger than merely local 

defense. In each case, the two colonies perceived that uniform tactics and 

training were essential if the militia units were ever to be proficient alone, or 

able to join into larger formations. Massachusetts placed each regiment under a 

sergeant major, who was assisted by a muster master. Virginia appointed a 

muster master-general to enforce its regulations, although captains were responsible for training their men (with no time set aside by law for drilling). 12 As it 

happened, the militia organizations of the colonies left much to be desired as 

military forces. But they were familiar and comfortable, and they offered 

American precedents to modify European examples. When ·the Continental 

Army obtained its first real inspector general, he turned out to be a Prussian 

recruited in France who labored to adapt British ways to American conditions. 

But it is a fitting comment on the strength of colonial traditions that this man 

made his greatest contribution to the cause, and is best remembered today, as 

the man who trained the Continental Army-the job of a muster master-general. 

11. The Exercisefor the Militia of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay (1758), as quoted in 

Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North 

America, 1607-1763 (New York: Macmillan , 1973), 89. 

12. Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," Military Affairs 22 (summer 

1958): 78. 
Part One 

A Tradition of Inspection, 1775-1821 

CHAPTER 1 

The First American Army 

(1775-1778) 

The frrst wholly American anny came into existence almost inadvertently, 

as a product of circumstances and cautious reaction. It was, accordingly, characterized by organizational and administrative shortcomings that often bordered 

on the chaotic . The American army came about as a result of the rush of events 

beginning with the fighting at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, in April 

1775. Royal governments collapsed one after the other in each colony while 

military confrontation with crown forces became a certainty. 1 The Congress 

attempted to establish a military force and appointed George Washington to its 

command. He was widely respected as a military authority, in a country where 

there were comparatively few trained soldiers.2 He was in fact a scholar of 

military arts, and had been acquiring and reading military treatises for over a 

quarter of a century. He took his studies seriously, urging others to do the 

same. Equally important, he had had experience with British regular forces 

during the French and Indian War. Also interesting was the beginning of his 

military career: His first commission, November 1752, was as one of four 

district adjutants in Virginia-his duties those of an instructor and an inspector. 3 

A Militia Army 

Washington accepted command of "all the Continental forces" on 16 June 

1775 . But he did not assume charge of an army, even in name. Even the 

Continental forces (as opposed to those of the various colonies) were anything 

but a regular military force. In authorizing the muster of troops under its 

I. Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and 

Practice, 1763-1789 (New York: Macmillan, 1971),68. See also John Shy, "American Society and 

Its War for Independence," in Don Higginbotham, ed., Reconsideration of the Revolutionary War: 

Selected Essays (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978), 72-82. 

2. Merrill Jensen, The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution 1763-1776 

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 605-13; Shy, "American Society," 72- 82. 

3. Oliver L. Spaulding, Jr., "The Military Studies of George Washington," American Historical Review, 29 (July 1924): 675-80. For Washington's early military career, see James Thomas 

Fiexner, George Washington: The Forge of Experience, 1732-1775 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965); 

for his career in the Revolution, see James Thomas Flexner, George Washington in the American 

Revolution (1775-1783) (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968). . 
12 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

sponsorship to aid the forces around Boston, Congress merely asked for 10 

companies of riflemen (6 from Pennsylvania and 2 each from Maryland and 

Virginia), of specified complement. "Continental" they might be, but they 

were merely the old colonial militia in broader trappings.4 As it developed, 

militia in any form proved less than a complete answer to the colonies' collective need for armed forces. The reason was an imperfect understanding of the 

militia tradition, owing to the lapse of decades since the militia had been both 

necessary and appropriately employed. When conflict with Indians was frequent throughout the colonies in the late seventeenth century, the militia organizations had been maintained at a fairly high degree of readiness. 5 But when the 

Indian danger receded from the seaboard during the eighteenth century, the 

necessity for armed readiness abated and the quality of most militia declined . 

Worsening relations with the mother country in the 1760s forced a retransformation of militia toward the original military purpose. The return to old values, 

however, was not quite complete by April 1775 , and even in the first clashes 

with British troops several militia units distinguished themselves for their 

failures.

6 Whatever its shortcomings as a fighting force, the less than complete 

subordination of militia to the high command offered a degree of political 

security to the Continental Congress that its members could not feel with a 

professional army. Congress was from the outset fearful of the specter of 

Cromwell's new model army, which had supported Cromwell against Parliament in establishing a British military dictatorship in the seventeenth century. 

The congressional delegates took great pains to assert their authority over the 

army, controlling the principal officers and binding Washington to hold councils of war with them over every major decision. 

Organizational Problems 

When it assigned Washington to the head of the Continental forces, Congress appointed a committee to prepare his instructions. The members also 

established the organization of the line command and staff departments, authorizing two major generals and eight brigadiers under Washington, with an Adjutant General's Department and offices of Commissary General, Quartermaster 

General, and Paymaster General. Although that Continental organization was 

at first superimposed upon the collection of militia and volunteers around 

Boston, by 30 June Congress had decided to authorize the first increment of 

what would be the Continental Army, for which it adopted a modified version 

of the British Articles of War. When Washington reached Boston on 4 July 

1775 , he issued a general order announcing that the " Troops of the United 

4. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 29. When the Continental Anny was fonned, 

the ten companies became the 1st Continental Regiment. 5. Morton, "Origins of Military Policy, " 80. 

6. Ronald L. Boucher, "The Colonial Militia as a Social Institution: Salem Massachusetts, 

1764-1775 ," Military Affairs 37 (December 1973): 125- 30. See also Don Higginbotham, "The 

American Militia: A Traditional Institution with Revolutionary Responsibilities," in Higginbotham, Reconsideration of the Revolutionary War, 83-103. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 13 

Provinces of North America" were thereafter under the authority of the Continental Congress. 7 

It soon became apparent, however, that the "Troops ofthe United Provinces" 

were scarcely under anyone's authority, and barely worthy of the title of troops. 

Washington had been led to expect that he would find 24,500 New England 

soldiers when he arrived at Boston. When he asked for an exact figure , he was 

told that about 18,000 to 20,000 men were around Boston. After he insisted 

upon an accurate count, he finally learned that he had under him 16,600 

privates and noncommissioned officers, with only 13,743 infantry and 585 

artillery men present and fit for duty. Worse, it had taken over a week to 

produce those numbers. Bungled staff work that made counting heads so difficult was but a symptom of the chaos that characterized the early revolutionary 

army. Because the forces were largely militia units from the colonies, along 

with less than adequately prepared collections of volunteers and adventurers, 

there was no uniformity in the sizes of organizations, procedures, drills (for 

those units that tried to drill at all), appearance, or equipment. Especially 

debilitating was a generally poor selection of officers. 8 

The development of a strong officer corps was a problem only partially 

solved during the Revolution, and then mainly in the regular formations of the 

Continental Army. The reasons were many, foremost among them probably the 

general absence of military tradition and experience in the colonies. In militia 

organizations, company officers who could be voted in and out of their positions at the whim of their men could not be expected to be an outstanding lot. 

Regardless of organization, officership tended to be a reward for social position 

in civilian life, and some "gentlemen" were wont to pursue military duty only 

so far as it suited them. Whatever the reasons, the chief defect of the Continental Army was the generally low quality of its combat leaders. Only a handful of 

general officers were truly proficient, and even some of the better ones had 

flawed characters. Nor were there enough good junior officers and noncommissioned officers to institute an effective level of training. Although the situation 

improved somewhat after the first years of the war, the undependable officer 

corps was one reason why Washington adopted fabian tactics against the British. 

Even in 1775, the Army's leaders regarded experience as an essential 

qualification for high military position. To some extent, it was possible to fill 

certain high positions with men who had solid military backgrounds, despite 

the penchant of Congress to use other considerations in making appointments. 

Of 13 general officers commissioned in 1775, all had had war experience, 8 as 

lieutenant colonels or higher. Like Washington, many of those had seen service 

in the French and Indian War. Of 73 general officers in the Revolution, 16 had 

held commissions in European armies, while only 21 had had no military 

experience before 1775. But there were limits to how much talent could be 

drawn from Europe. American officers had strong nativist feelings, and the 

7. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 29-30; Jensen, Founding of a Nation , 605- 13. 

8. For an excellent overview of the early army disorganization, see William A. Ganoe, History 

of the United States Army, rev. ed. (New York: Appleton-Century; 1942), 2-9. 
14 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

larger share of Europeans who offered their services proved to be unemployed 

(often unemployable) adventurers. 

9 

Inadequate Staff Support 

Capable officers were in such short supply that many of the best potential 

staff officers simply had to be employed in line commands. That left staff 

services woefully wanting. Maj . Gen. Horatio Gates served as Washington's 

Adjutant General from June 1775 to June 1776, but thereafter was too valuable 

for such a role. His successors were little more than military secretaries, so 

Washington usually served as his own staff. 10 For technical services, Congress 

managed to provide enough engineers and other specialists, mostly by enlistment of Europeans. But Congress could also be meddlesome, appointing supervisory boards and investigating committees to assert its supremacy over the 

army. The delegates had a propensity for second-guessing the commander's 

judgment on the appointment of high officers, especially when the war was 

quiescent. When disaster threatened, however, the Congress was inclined to 

look to Washington for advice. 11 

Of essential staff services, supply was the most chaotic operation of the 

Continental Army during the Revolution. Except for small arms, artillery, and 

ammunition- which were usually ample-the troops often wanted for nearly 

everything throughout the war, suffering from shortages of food, forage, fuel, 

straw, clothing and blankets, shoes, and vehicles for transport. That the Army's 

needs could not be met can be attributed to unsound currencies, limited domestic materials and manufactures, absence of popular support, congressional 

interference or inaction, and ineptitude. The inexperienced Americans seemed 

unable to develop a smoothly working administrative system for army supply. 

The Quartermaster Department, repeatedly reorganized, had several changes in 

leadership, and came into frequent conflict with departments for purchasing, 

for clothing, and for subsistence-which themselves were in a constant state of 

flux. Nonetheless, it developed during the war a sounder organization and 

working procedure than it would have for many decades thereafter. 12 

Disorganization in the Line 

The line organization of the early Continental Army was nearly as chaotic 

as its logistical arrangements. In 1775 it comprised 38 regiments of widely 

9. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 64-65; Sidney Forman, "Why the United 

States Military Academy Was Established in 1802," Military Affairs 29 (spring 1965): 17-18; 

Robert Kenneth Wright, Jr., "Organization and Doctrine in the Continental Army, 1774 to 1784" 

(Ph.D. dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1980), 203-05; Richard Kohn, "American 

Generals of the Revolution: Subordination and Restraint," in Higginbotham, Reconsideration of 

the Revolutionary War, 104-23. . 

10. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 49--50. 

11. Ibid., 44-45. 

12. Ibid., 51-61; Ema Risch, Quartermaster Support of t}le Army: A History of the Corps, 

1775-1939 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1962), 1-73. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 15 

ranging sizes (600 to 1,000 men), according to the practices of the various 

colonies. Washington reorganized the force into 6 brigades (usually of 6 regiments each), and into 2 divisions of 2 brigades each. Brigades, divisions, and 

regiments were essentially administrative units. The tactical designation of the 

regiment was the battalion, the main unit of maneuver in an army that would 

fight as a tactical whole. In outlining his organization, Washington followed 

contemporary European practices, in which tactical formations between the 

battalion and the whole army (that is, brigades and divisions) remained uncommon until the 1790s.13 

To keep his soldiers in line, Washington favored the sort of harsh discipline 

common in the British Army, with an emphasis on corporal punishment. The 

death penalty was limited to treason, mutiny, and desertion, but the lash was 

freely used. Washington also approved unauthorized punishments, such as 

running the gauntlet, but he generally evinced a distaste for punishment as a 

necessary evil. He showed restraint in approving death sentences, hoping that 

their rarity would increase the deterrent effect. 14 Traditionally, har-sh punishments were used as a form of cohesion in the military forces of the day. The 

Continental Army required more than stem punishments to hold it together, 

however. Above aU, if militia, state, and continental units were to function as 

an army, they required a common system of tactics and training. But that was 

nowhere in sight in the uprising's first year. There was no central tactical drill 

standard and the various published British books were in scarce supply. Few 

officers were experienced enough to conduct drills and training from memory. 

Colonel Timothy Pickering produced the first American tactical manual, for the 

militia of Essex County, Massachusetts, in 1775. Not just a compilation of 

European texts, Pickering's volume offered several original ideas, with simplified maneuvers. It was adopted by the state of Massachusetts in 1776, and was 

much copied by other American units. Nonetheless, a general system for the 

whole American army was still lacking. 15 

The Army was divided by more than disorganization and absence of central 

tactical guidance. As Washington sought to assemble Continental units answerable to the Continental Congress, he found himself in competition with the 

colonies. New England, especially, offered lavish inducements to meet its 

quota of men. Massachusetts established an exceedingly generous daily food 

ration, and further determined that each militia private should receive $36.00 

per month in pay. The Continental Army could not compete with that; it could 

muster only about 9,000 troops along with 14,000 militia to meet the invasion 

of New York by British and Hessian forces during the summer of 1776. 16 The 

13. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 62; Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 

7- 12. 

14. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 63; Maurer, "Military Justice Under General 

Washington," Military Affairs 28 (spring 1964): 8-16. 

15 . Henry Knox to John Adams, 13 May 76, quoted in Forman, "Why the United States 

Military Academy Was Established," 18; Joseph R. Riling, Baron Von Steuben and His Regulations (Philadelphia: Ray Riling Arms Books, 1966), 1-2. 

16. Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 13-14. 
16 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

results were dismaying, regulars and militia alike falling back before the British 

and Hessians. Some did well enough, but generally the sorry New York campaign seemed to prove that American troops were no match for European 

professionals. The militia evaporated, and what was left of the Continental 

Army was scheduled to expire with most of the enlistments at the end of the 

year. I? 

Congress Takes a Hand 

Congress, meanwhile, had been at work. Early in the year, bowing to 

Washington's wishes, it had re-formed the Continental Army, giving it a compact form of 28 regiments, theoretically of 728 officers and men each. All units 

were to have Continental (not state) designations. But the elimination of surplus, 

undersized regiments excluded some officers and discouraged reenlistments, 

while the Continental designations cooled ardor in state governments. More 

positively, Congress had appointed a committee of seven to look into creating a 

war office. That came to nothing until strong appeals from Washington led to 

the establishment of the Board of War and Ordnance on 12 June. The board was 

responsible for recruitment and levies upon the states (which proved to be an 

impossible job), as well as all congressional correspondence related to the war. 

In practice, it concerned itself with preparing estimates of supplies, accounting 

for material on hand, and establishing manufacturing of arms-"continual 

employment, not to say drudgery," in the words of John Adams. 18 

Washington ended the discouraging chain of events with unexpected successes at Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, driving the British and Hessians 

from most of the state. These gave hope to the Army's supporters and encouraged new enlistments to the rapidly dwindling force .

19 There were definite 

signs of improvement when after recovering New Jersey , the Continental Army 

settled into winter quarters at Morristown to await the coming maneuver season. 

The manpower question was momentarily solved, but the matter of training and 

tactics had not yet been addressed. The British were now fully committed to a 

military solution to the Revolution, and the stunning rebuff following upon 

their triumph around New York put their pride at stake. The warm afterglow of 

Trenton notwithstanding, 1777 promised to be another year of trial for Washington and his army. The Commander in Chief knew he must develop some means 

of effective training, discipline, and organization, lest the Army's fortunes 

plummet once again . Washington labored through the winter and spring of 

1777 to assemble a respectable army, but the flush of spirit following upon 

Trenton and Princeton faded quickly and recruitment proceeded slowly. Many 

17. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 35-37; Higginbotham, War of American 

Independence, 148-65. 

18. Weigley, History of the United States Army , 46, 62-63 . 

19. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 39-40; Higginbotham, War of American 

Independence, 165- 71; Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, 7 vols. (New York: Scribner, 

1948), 4: 332- 35, 404-05. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 17 

men enlisted in state programs for service in militia as home guards which 

contributed almost nothing to the national cause but obstruction.

20 

By 1777, from a military point of view, the Continental Army's general 

officers preferred a larger regular army with less reliance than formerly on 

militia, though there were others in Congress and elsewhere who held the 

opposite opinion. Compromises dictated by events fixed the Revolutionary 

army as a mixed force by the end of 1777, which continued to the end of the 

war. It became so ingrained in national consciousness that the mixed force 

formed the basis for Washington's proposed peacetime establishment in 1783. 21 

Congress Becomes More Active 

The Revolution was at a crisis in 1777, however, and Congress became 

more active in its attempts to develop and support an effective military force to 

confront the British challenge . Some of its actions took the form of tinkering 

with things best left to the Commander in Chief, but delegates noticed "the 

absence of a regular inspector. " On 18 April 1777, Congress' 'requested" one 

general to " inspect the magazines of provisions under the care of Commissary 

Wharton. ,>22 Inventory control is always important to military logistics; however, 

of more pressing moment to Congress was the ineffectiveness of the Board of 

War and Ordnance, a source of unrewarding drudgery for its members. After 

considering replacing it with a number of boards of people not members of 

Congress, the legislators at last produced a re-formed Board of War on 18 July 

1777, a group of three delegates. But those appointed to the duty mostly did not 

want it, and it was not until early 1778 that the board met for the first time. It 

effectively ceased to exist within a year, although Congress added two members to the cipher in October 1778. 23 The unproductive panel could do no good, 

but it did offer a platform for persons inclined to interfere in the Continental 

Army. 

Recruitments in France 

Congress had a more profound effect upon the Continental Army in 1777 

through the actions of its agents in Paris, Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin. 

Europe happened to be in a lull between wars, and the continent was replete 

with unemployed, often merely self-styled soldiers looking for adventure and 

20. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 40. 

21. Paul David Nelson , "Citizen Soldiers or Regulars: The Views of American General 

Officers on the Military Establishment, 1775-1781 ," Military Affairs 43 (October 1972): 126-32. 

22. Worthington C. Ford et a!., eds., Journal of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 34 

vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934-37), 18 Apr 77 (hereafter cited as JCC) . See 

also Raphael P. Thian, Legislative History of the General Staff of the Army of the United States (Its 

Organization, Duties, Pay, and AllolVances), from 1775 to 1901 , S. Doc. 229, 56th Cong., 2d 

sess., 1901 , 87. This appears to be the first use of the term " inspector" by the Continental 

Congress. 

23 . Weigley, History of the United States Army, 46-47. 
18 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

glory- and if they could get them, high military rank and peacetime nobility. 

The American Revolution was f\cross the sea, but it offered the only possibility 

for such ambitions. Especially after the Declaration of Independence in July 

1776, Deane and Franklin were constantly besieged by Europeans looking for 

commissions in the American service. Most were without merit, or merely 

looking for adventure. Many were exceedingly persistent. Wrote Franklin to 

one, " If, therefore, you have the least remaining kindness for me, if you would 

not help to drive me out of France, for God's sake, my dear friend, let this your 

twenty-third application be your last. ,,24 

The American commissioners for a time had the authority--or assumed that 

they did- to commit the Congress to granting commissions to Europeans whose 

services might be valuable. A number of officers crossed the Atlantic fmnly 

believing that their commissions were in hand. The only defense against them, 

until Congress cut back on foreign recruiting later in 1777, was the judgment of 

the American agents. Franklin proved himself discreet and a fair judge of 

talent. Deane, however, was more easily fooled into accepting highly imaginative credentials and offering some fantastic commitments to questionable 

volunteers. The parade of foreigners was sufficiently large, and enough of them 

were incompetent or offensive, that Washington cast a cold eye on the whole 

business. In fact, he had a real dread of too many foreign officers in his army. 

Besides the expense and nuisance involved, he was most worried about the 

foreigners driving out good American officers, and about possible spying. 25 

The First Inspector General 

One of Franklin's more impressive finds was Augustin Mottin de la Balme, 

who arrived in America in the spring of 1777. He bore a letter from Franklin to 

John Hancock introducing him as a man of high character and an experienced 

cavalryman who might be useful in forming a mounted branch for the Continental 

Army. Mottin de la Balme was in fact an able cavalry officer, with experience 

in the French gendarmerie as an instructor of cavalry during the Seven Years' 

War, then ten years of service in the French Army as an inspector of academies. 

He retired as a major, with pension, in 1773, and was the author of several 

books, including two accepted as authoritative on cavalry training and tactics. 

In 1777, at the age of forty-one, he presented himself to Franklin and sought his 

military fortune in America. 26 

24. Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 41 . For Franklin's various missions to Paris in 

the period of the Revolution, See David Schoenbrun, Triumph in Paris: The Exploits of Benjamin 

Franklin (New York: Harper & Row, 1976). 

25. For a succinct analysis of Washington's reaction to the foreigners that descended upon him 

in 1777, see Fonnan, "Why the United States Military Academy Was Established," 18. 

26. Mark M. Boatner III, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution (New York: David McKay, 

1974), 74~9; Gilbert Bodinier, Dictionnaire des Officiers de l' armee royale qui ont combattu aux 

Etats-Unis pendant la guerre d'/ndependence 1776-1783 (Vincennes: Bureau d'histoire, 1982), 

355- 56. See Appendix B. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMy 19 

Congress respected Frankli~'s judgment, and was dutifully impressed with 

Mottin de la Balme's credentials, handsome bearing, and zeal for the American 

cause. The legislators appointed the French cavalry expert a lieutenant-colonel 

of horse on 26 May 1777. But the minuscule mounted force of the American 

army was equivalent only to four small regiments, dispersed mainly as messengers and escorts. That was a small stage for a performer of de la Balme's 

energy, and in all likelihood it probably had no place for an additional lieutenant colonel. Possibly at the Frenchman's urging (he was not shy about forcing 

himself on Congress' attention), the delegates gave him what appeared to be a 

grander role in the cause, and introduced a new term into the lexicon of 

American public letters. On 8 July 1777, Congress "Resolved, That LieutenantColonel Mottin de la Balme be appointed inspector-general of the cavalry of the 

United States of America, with the rank and pay of colonel. ,,27 Exactly what 

Congress meant by the term inspector-general was not apparent in the record of 

the appointment. There is, however, reason to believe that the delegates had 

begun to fish for titles that would suit the pretensions of some of the more 

promising (or demanding) European volunteers, without committing the American authorities to' too many general officers hips for foreigners at the expense of 

natives. The title inspector-general of the cavalry acknowledged de la Balme's 

expertise, and implied a high advisory capacity without power of command 

over Americans. The rank of colonel accorded with the probable size of any 

Continental cavalry force, which was bound to be modest. 

Mottin de la Balme clearly perceived himself as the organizer and trainer of 

the American mounted force, although it is not apparent that he made much 

progress toward that end. He revealed his conception of his assignment when 

he left it. On 3 October, upon learning that the Polish volunteer Casimir Pulaski 

had been appointed chief of cavalry, the Frenchman fired off to Congress a 

letter of resignation. He had not crossed the ocean, he said, to train cavalry that 

would be led into battle by someone with less experience, zeal, courage, and 

knowledge of cavalry service than he. Congress noted his resignation on Ii 

October 1777, but did not proceed with accepting it until 13 February 1778. De 

la Balme was left with his rank of colonel, and was otherwise informed that his 

services were no longer required; however, such was his interest in the rebellion that he continued to volunteer his services until he was killed in action in 

1780. 28 

27. Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, 748-49; ICC, 26 May and 8 Jul 77; 

Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the Un ited States Army. From Its 

Organization, September 29, 1789 to March 2, 1903, 2 vols. (1903; reprint, Urbana: University of 

Illinois Press, 1965), 1:84. 

28. Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, 749; ICC, 11 Oct 77, 13 Feb 78. It 

should be observed that the end of de la Balme's service has been reported as 11 October 1777, 

with no record of further tenure. Heitman, Historical Register, 1:38, 84. See also J.P. Sanger, 

"The Inspector-General's Department," in Theo. F. Rodenbaugh and William L. Haskin, eds., 

The Army of the United States . .. (New York: Maynard, Merrill, 1896), 12-32, and the Annual 

Report of the Inspector General 1900 (hereafter cited as ARIG), "app. L, H. Doc . 2, 56th Cong., 2d 

sess. 1, pt. 3: 228. See Appendix B. 
20 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The Second Inspector General 

Less fortunate than Mottin de la Balme's American career, at least for the 

American cause, was that of Philippe Charles Jean Baptiste Tronson du Coudray, 

also a veteran of the French Army. Tronson du Coudray was an artillerist, and 

like Mottin de la Balme was an author of standard references in his specialty. 

Born in 1738, educated first as a mining engineer, he rose steadily in the ranks, 

and after the Corsican campaign of 1768-1769 became an adjutant of artillery. 

He had at least once commanded a brigade of artillery before offering his 

services to Silas Deane late in 1776. Deane offered him a commission as major 

general and chief of artillery and engineers in the American forces, blithely 

ignoring the fact that Brig. Gen. Henry Knox was the chief of artillery under 

Washington. 

That mistake could have been resolved amicably enough, but for Tronson 

du Coudray's own personality. He was well connected in French court circles, 

and was accustomed to having his own way. Worse, he was exceedingly 

pompous, supercilious, and a general troublemaker, a veteran of thirty duels. 

He arrived in America in June 1777 with a retinue of eighteen officers and ten 

sergeants, bearing written information from Deane that he was to be in charge 

of all artillery. Upon hearing that news, Brig. Gen. Henry Knox, Maj. Gen. 

Nathanael Greene, and Maj. Gen. John Sullivan threatened to resign. Washington exercised his persuasive powers to the fullest to keep his three generals. 

Meanwhile, he protested to Congress the imposition upon him of an officer of 

whose qualifications he knew nothing. Washington's displeasure was aggravated by information from trusted French officers that Tronson du Coudray 

might not be the engineer he claimed. 29 Nevertheless, du Coudray pressed his 

claim, while Washington struggled to keep his principal commanders from 

walking off in a huff. Congress, meanwhile, was in the middle, inclined to 

uphold the commitments of its agent in Paris, but not altogether willing to 

dismiss the protests of the American officers as without justification. The 

legislators dispatched du Coudray to make a study of the defenses of Philadelphia along the Delaware River, which resulted in excellent reports but no real 

action. On 16 July 1777, the delegates appointed a committee of three members 

to negotiate some sort of acceptable arrangement with the Frenchman. 3o 

29. Webster's American Military Biographies (Springfield, Mass. : G. C. Merriam, 1978), 106 

(hereafter cited as AMB); Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 41; Flexner, Washington in the 

Revolution, 195; James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783-1812 (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1947), 11; Wright, "Organization and Doctrine," 205; Howard C. Rice, 

Jr., and Anne S. K. Brown, trans. and eds. , The American Campaigns of Rochambeau' s Army, 

1780,1781 , 1782,1783,2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press; Providence: Brown University Press, 1972), 1:50; Bodinier, Dictionnaire des Officiers, 403-04. See also Paul K. Walker, 

Engineers of 1ndependence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in the American 

Revolution, 1775-1783 (Washington: Corps of Engineers , 1981),8-17, and Schoenbrun, Triumph in 

Paris, 90--93 , 110, 158. 

30. lCC, 16 Jul 77. See also Thian, Legislative History, 87: For Tronson du Coudray's 

reports, with commentary, see Walker, Engineers of Independence, 148-55; "Coudray's Observations on Forts for Defense of the Delaware, July 1777," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 

Biography, 24 (1900): 343-47; and Worthington C. Ford, ed., "Defenses of Philadelphia," 

Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 18 (1894): 334-37. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 21 

On 11 August, Congress reached a compromise, appointing Tronson du 

Coudray "inspector-general of ordnance and military manufactories, with the 

rank of major-general. " Just exactly what he was to do was to be determined by 

a committee of four members of Congress. Meanwhile, inserting the temperamental Frenchman into the Continental Army, and at that making him a major 

general over the heads of so many Americans, was a prescription for trouble in 

Washington's command. But the troublesome "volunteer" solved the entire 

problem with a characteristic demonstration of his martial dash on 16 September 1777. He is said to have galloped his horse onto a ferry on the Schuylkill 

River with so much vigor that he landed in the water on the other side and 

drowned. 3 I 

Congress never had a chance to define the duties of its inspector general of 

ordnance and military manufactories. Presumably he would offer technical 

oversight in the manufacture of artillery hardware, and du Coudray did have 

some abilities in that area. But the energetic Frenchman was more inclined to 

haunt the field of action with the main army . He was in practice, then, a highly 

ranked supernumerary. In fact, his title and rank were most likely a congressional compromise, giving him the show of agreement with Deane's commitment to him, without any substance that would have discomfited Washington or 

his American officers. The title inspector-general was mere flattery that meant 

nothing in military terms. 

The Campaign of 1777 

Meaningless titles adorning temperamental foreigners did Washington's 

cause little good during the campaign of 1777. He had more important things 

on his mind, and was understandably impatient with the nuisances that Silas 

Deane's beneficiaries could cause. He remained concerned principally with 

being ready for the campaign about to open. The' Continental Army, albeit 

loosely organized and mostly amateur, had nonetheless benefited from the 

experience of the previous year. The initiative in 1777 rested with the British. 

Washington was not sufficiently confident in his force's martial ability to make 

the first move. The British, for their part, had determined to put down the 

Revolution by force, and must therefore take the offensive. Washington was 

content to let them do that, reacting according to his army's abilities but careful 

always to keep the Continental Army alive as the main embodiment of the 

struggle. 

The British, amazingly, accommodated him. Instead of pursuing the Continental Army as the core of the uprising, the British sought territorial gains. 

Worse, they cast off their advantages of size, experience, and logistical support 

31. lCC, 11 Aug 77; Thian , Legis/ative History, 87; Flexner, Washington in the Revolution, 

195; Rice and Brown, American Campaigns, 1: 50; Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 

228. Various sources give the date ofdu Coudray's death as 8,11,13 , 15 , 16, or 17 September. 

Heitman accepts 15 September. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 38, 329. Most French sources, 

however, record it as the 16th. 
22 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

by dividing their forces and immobilizing them so that separate parts could not 

support each other. A complicated, two-pronged invasion of upper New York 

under Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne, intended vaguely to isolate New England, 

was so obviously dangerous to them that Washington felt no concern about it. 

He sent a force under Horatio Gates to assist the terrain in bringing Burgoyne to 

grief. The main army followed Washington out to meet Maj. Gen. Sir William 

Howe's campaign against Philadelphia. Howe's force sailed from New York 

and up Chesapeake Bay, and in late August began its march through hostile 

territory stripped of provisions. Washington moved to confront the challenge, 

suffering defeats at Brandywine and Germantown in September and early 

October. Congress decamped from Philadelphia to establish a temporary capital 

at York, Pennsylvania, and the British occupied Philadelphia for the winter. 

Meanwhile, Burgoyne came to grief at Saratoga, New York, where he surrendered his forces on 17 October. 32 

Superficially, the results of the campaigns of 1777 appeared mixed, with 

the balance in favor of the British. That balance actually lay the other way. The 

capture of Burgoyne's force was a serious military loss, and a worse political 

one, for the British. Nor had the royal forces had things all their own way 

farther south. Howe's hostile reception in Pennsylvania had revealed clearly 

that there was no widespread loyalist support in the colonies, no matter how 

lukewarm was public support for the American effort. Washington had met 

tactical defeat, but he had proved himself skillful enough as a battlefield 

commander, and his soldiers had fought stoutly enough to give their opponents 

a resounding shock. The Continental Army was still together, and with .more 

experience and training it could become a redoubtable force on the battlefield. 

There were members of Congress, however, who were not so convinced, 

driven as they were from their homes in the city. The positive aspects of the 

main army's defeats were not apparent to those not soldiers. Moreover, it was 

patently simple to draw a contrast between Washington's losses and Gates' 

victory. The cause of the Revolution was fraught with discontent in high 

places, a situation made for grumbling, encouraging change for the sake of 

change-and fertile ground for the seeds of personal ambitions. It was in that 

climate that the Office of the Inspector General of the Continental Army came 

into being. 

Inspector General Conway 

One of Washington's officers was Brig. Gen. Thomas Conway, who was 

present at the battles of Brandywine and Germantown. 33 Conway was another 

of Silas Deane's contributions to the American cause. Born in Ireland in 1735, 

he was reared and educated in France, whose army he entered in 1749. A 

32. The campaigns of 1777 are covered in Higginbotham, War of American Independence, 

175-203. 

33 . Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 44. This story may be apocryphal , although not 

inconsistent with Conway's character. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 

colonel by 1772, he had seen service 

in campaigns in Gennany in 1760 and 

1761. Supposedly a talented disciplinarian, especially with infantry, in 

April 1777 he made his way to America on Deane's recommendation, and 

was appointed brigadier general in the 

Continental Anny on 13 May. Conway was a large man with a chinless, 

rather popeyed face, much given to 

posturing and to intrigue. He had an 

ability to impress people at first meeting, giving rise to a general belief 

among civilians that he possessed 

great military talents. But he soon 

wore out his welcome with his pomposity and ceaseless bragging about 

his own merits. In time, his skills as a 

disciplinarian proved to be more those 

of a bully. He quickly established 

himself as a thorn in Washington's 

23 

MAJ. GEN. THOMAS CONWAY. Inspector General of the Continental 

Army, 13 December 1777-28 April 

1778. 

side, one of the few people towards whom the Commander in Chief ever 

expressed personal animosity.34 Conway's talent, said Washington, "exists 

more in his own imagination, than in reality. " He was also the junior brigadier 

general, and Washington predicted that to promote him over the heads of all 

others would cause most of them to resign, with good reason. In conclusion, 

Washington said he saw such a move imposing so many morale problems that 

his job would be impossible, hinting that he would resign. 35 The Commander in 

Chief would brook no repetition of the Tronson du Coudray business. 

Washington probably believed that he had scuttled Conway's personal efforts 

at advancement, and turned his attention to the organization of his military 

force. The Continental Anny was vastly better than it had been a year earlier, 

but it was still woefully untrained and loosely organized for the challenges it 

faced. Washington had been serving for too long as his own staff, and could not 

give his undivided attention to everything. Apparently he had decided by October 1777 that he needed an additional staff officer with oversight in all training 

and maneuvers, and attendant regulations. It is likely that he had learned 

34. Dictionary of American Biography, 20 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1928-36), 4:365-66 

(hereafter cited as DAB); Flexner, Washington in the Revolution, 262-268; Weigley, History of the 

United States Army, 50-51; Bodinier, Dictionnaire des Officiers, 105-06. See Appendix B. 

35. Washlngton to Richard Henry Lee, 17 Oct 77. in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of 

George Washington , From the Original Manuscript Sources, 39 vols. (Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 1931-44),9: 387-89. See also Henry Steele Cornmager and Richard B. Morris, 

eds., The Spirit of Seventy-six . .. , 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), 1: 652-53 . 
24 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

enough from European officers in his camp to become generally familiar with 

the services of inspectors general in foreign establishments. 

Washington called a council of fourteen general officers on 29 October, and 

asked them among other things, "Will the office of Inspector-General to our 

Army, for the purpose principally of establishing one uniform set of maneuvers 

and manual, be advisable as the time of the adjutant-general seems to be totally 

engaged with other business?" General John Sullivan replied that an accomplished drillmaster familiar with large units would be a great asset, anyone less 

qualified would be more trouble then he was worth. 36 The other officers were of 

like sentiments, and all signed a statement that such an officer was desirable, 

the manual of regulations to be first agreed upon by the Commander in Chief, 

or a board of officers appointed for the purpose. Washington passed the record 

of the council to Congress, with a recommendation that the position of Inspector General be established. 37 

Washington revealed very clearly his conception of what an inspector general should be. The officer was to superintend the training of the whole army, 

ensuring troop proficiency in a common set of tactics-really a sort of 

"drillmaster general." He had formerly entrusted responsibility for training to 

the Commander in Chief's first agent, the Adjutant General. That was probably 

an understandable influence of his own first military experience, as an adjutant 

in Virginia, his duties being those of an instructor and inspector of training. But 

Washington's own council had had to remind him of the need to subordinate the 

Inspector General to the Commander in Chief-the latter, not the inspector, 

should effect regulations. As proposed to Congress, the Inspector General 

would be the commander's agency for the promotion of tactical efficiency in 

the Army. The inspector's duties consequently would be quite specific: 

Washington's first conception of the Inspector General was limited in scope, 

but it focused on the Army's greatest immediate needs. It was bound to evolve 

in practice as part of the Commander in Chief's evolutionary development of 

army organization. But it tumed out that there were others in Congress who 

~eized upon the inspector-general proposal as a means to accomplish more-to 

reform things besides training and to tighten congressional control over the 

Army. 

Washington's proposal lent itself more immediately to the ambitions of 

Thomas Conway. Present at the council of officers, he was the first to let 

Congress know that he would like the new job. 38 Even before he had done so, 

he had begun to make himself known to people in power. Conway apparently 

believed that Gates' star was on the rise after the victory at Saratoga, while 

Washington's was about to fall. He decided to ingratiate himself with Gates, 

and wrote him a flattering letter that disparaged Washington. Already there 

were mutterings in the Congress that the cause might be served better with 

36. Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 228 . 

37. Ibid. 

38. Ibid., 228-29. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 25 

Gates in command than with Washington. They remained nothing more than 

idle mutterings, and not even Gates put much stock in them. Gates' aide, Maj . 

James Wilkinson, had ambitions of his own. When the general heard from 

Conway, Wilkinson was greatly amused. Wilkinson stopped at the headquarters of Brig. Gen. William Alexander (Lord Stirling) at the end of October, and 

feeling the effects of alcohol, he grew voluble. After Stirling learned what 

Conway had been about, he relayed the information to Washington. 39 Conway 

had transcended the bounds of contemporary decency, and on 9 November 

Washington confronted him in a blunt letter with what he had heard.4o 

As November passed, members of Washington's staff began to believe that 

there was a plot afoot in Congress to replace him with Gates. There was in fact 

no organized conspiracy, but there were those who saw fit to advance Gates' 

cause, and for various reasons, Conway's name seemed to be frequently 

mentioned. Washington's staff, in particular Alexander Hamilton, persuaded 

him to deter any plotters with a series of strong letters. They were probably 

more alarmed when Gates was appointed to the Board of War on 27 November, 

and in any case Washington had made it well known by the end of the month 

that he wanted to hear the last of Conway. 41 . 

Meanwhile, Conway had developed the habit of threatening to resign if he 

did not receive what he believed he deserved. That alarmed some members of 

Congress who still thought that Conway was a man of rare talent, an asset to the 

cause, and they actively sought a suitable assignment for him. 42 Their opportunity came on 13 December 1777, when the Continental Congress authorized the 

appointment of inspectors general, "essential to the promoton of discipline in 

the American Army, and to the reformation of the various abuses which prevail 

in the different departments ... agreeable to the practice of the best disciplined 

European armies." There were to be two inspectors general, who were to be 

"experienced and vigilant general officers, who are acquainted with whatever 

relates to the general economy, manoeuvers, and discipline of a well-regulated 

army. " 

The duties of the inspectors general were "to review, from time to time, the 

troops, and to see that every officer and soldier be instructed in the exercise and 

manoeuvers which may be established by the board of war, that the rules of 

discipline be strictly observed, and that the officers command their soldiers 

properly and do them justice." The inspectors general were required to notify 

regimental commanders of the time for their reviews, and the commanders 

were to prepare a number of returns according to models furnished by the 

inspectors. The returns were to inventory clothing; arms and accoutennents; 

39. Samuel White Patterson, Horatio Gates: Defender of American Liberties (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1941),216-19; Commager and Morris, Spirit ofSevellty-Six, 651-52. 

40. Washington to Conway, 9 Nov 77, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing tall , 10: 29; Commager 

and Morris, Spirit of Seventy-Six, 653. 

41. Commager and Morris, Spirit of Seventy-Six, 651 -52 . 

42. Henry Laurens to Lafayette, 6 Dec 77, in Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to 

Congress, 1774- 1789, 8 vols. (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976-81), 8:383. 
26 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

recruits, with an account of recruiting money expended; the number and names 

of wounded men, identifying those fit for the invalid corps and those unfit for 

any service; losses by "death, desertion, or otherwise"; pay and rations; and all 

officers, "with observations upon the behavior, capacity, and assiduity of 

every individual." Regimental field officers were all to sign the returns before 

presenting them to the inspectors general, who were likewise to sign them and 

transmit them to Congress. 

The congressional resolution also required that the inspectors general make 

their reviews at the beginning and end of every campaign, and at other times as . 

the Commander in Chief miglit direct. But they would also make their inspections "as they themselves shall severally judge proper, or shall receive orders 

for that purpose from the board of war, first giving notice thereof to the 

Commander in Chief, and obtaining his leave for reviewing the said troops." 

More explicitly, Congress resolved that the inspectors general personally interview and observe unit members and their equipment down to the smallest detail 

necessary to give a clear understanding of the unit's condition. And Congress 

did not stop there. Inspection reports were to be prepared in triplicate, one copy 

for the inspector general concerned, one for the major of the regiment inspected, 

the third to Congress. Almost as an afterthought, the resolution directed the 

inspectors general to examine pay books, reporting to Congress any signs of 

"malversation or mismanagement," and announced that the "commissioners 

of the war office" would prepare any additional regulations for the Office of 

the Inspector General. Lastly, Congress resolved that two inspectors general be 

appointed for the moment, and elected Conway to be one of them. No one was 

ever advanced for the other position. The delegates closed their long resolution 

authorizing the addition of another major general in the Army, appointing 

Conway to the new vacancy. 43 

There were a number of questionable aspects of the position of the Inspector 

General as established on 13 December 1777. Foremost among them was the 

fact that the Continental Army was no longer big enough to hold both Thomas 

Conway and George Washington, and some of the framers of the resolution 

knew it. But the actual substance of the Inspector General's position was very 

Jefective from a military perspective. That may have reflected Conway's own 

contributions, as it is likely that he proposed the Inspector General as a potential field agent of the Board of War. By such means he could gamer the position 

for himself and with it-what he wanted all along-his promotion to major 

general. Whether in Conway's hands or not, the Inspector General's office as 

defined 13 December represented a serious threat to Washington's control of 

the Army.44 

The establishment of the Inspector General's position probably had been 

influenced by a number of factors. One was the recommendation of Washington and his generals that it be established, to reform the training and discipline 

43. lCC, 13 Dec 77. See also Thian, Legislative History, 87-88. 

44. Wright, "Organization and Doctrine," 195-96; Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 

229. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMy 27 

of the army; Washington's recommendation had mentioned in passing the 

preparation of regulations. Another probable influence on the resolution was 

dissatisfaction on the part of some delegates over the way the war had gone; 

some of them may have preferred Gates in Washington's position, and may 

have believed that elevating Conway would encourage Washington to resign. 

Thus, the inspectorship became in some minds secondary to a change in army 

leadership. Allied with that was the feeling on the part of congressmen that 

Conway actually deserved an elevated position. For many members of Congress the inspectorship probably was of primary importance as a possible way 

to reform the military establishment. The solution they adopted-making the 

Inspector General a congressional agent within the army-also happened to suit 

both Conway's selfish purposes and those of Gates' proponents. That perhaps 

was secondary to the greater number of delegates. So recently driven out of 

Philadelphia, they believed that the army should be made to work better. 

Momentarily losing confidence in Washington, Congress thought it could do 

the job itself. 

In asking for an inspector general, Washington implicitly acknowledged 

that the Army needed improvement. As commander, he wanted to undertake 

that improvement, and sought an inspector general to use as his tool. As 

commander, he expected to be held responsible for every aspect of military 

service to the country. The resolution establishing the Inspector General, 

however, did not hold the Commander in Chief responsible for the regulation or 

training of the army. It may be assumed that Congress would continue to hold 

Washington accountable for the army's performance, but the resolution would 

have undermined seriously his ability to control those under him. It did not give 

Washington control over the means of improvement. To begin with, the inspectors general were under the control of the Board of War, and not at all answerable to the army commander. The results of their inspections, for instance, 

were to be communicated directly to the Congress; the Commander in Chief 

would not receive a copy. Inspectors determined their own schedules, or were 

under orders of the Board of War, although the Commander in Chief would 

direct them to make reviews. Moreover, the manner in which inspections were 

to be conducted meant that regimental commanders would be accountable for 

administration and discipline to the inspector, not to their superior commanders. 

Altogether, those procedures nearly erased the normal chain of command, 

except as subordinate commanders were willing to follow purely military orders. 

As a matter of civil supervision of the military, the resolution establishing 

the inspectors general went impossibly beyond the line of discretion in another 

very important regard. It reserved to the Board of War the authority to establish 

the "exercise and manoeuvers" to be practiced in the army. The Commander 

in Chief was not allowed to regulate his own force or determine such matters as 

small-unit tactics or even the standard march cadence. He could not even 

supervise instruction in the tactics imposed by the Board of War. That was the 

duty of the board's agents, the inspectors general. The latter was probably the 

most serious defect of the whole arrangement. Establishing the inspectors gen-
28 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

eral as political inquisitors attached to the army was troublesome enough, 

although Washington probably could have found a way to live with it in 

practice (by managing to have communications routed through his hands, for 

instance). But granting to the Board of War the power to regulate the army 

without reference to the Commander in Chief was simply unacceptable. Taken 

to its logical conclusions, the resolution of 13 December would have effectively 

eliminated the command authority of the Commander in Chief. It would have 

transformed the Continental Army into a disunited collection of regiments 

politically monitored. As Alexander Hamilton observed later, at the least the 

system would produce confusion, inaction, and delays.45 

An inspector general answerable to the Board of War but not to the Commander in Chief was a classic formula for conflict between the civil power and 

the military. But for the moment, that was almost an academic question. The 

immediate issue was that Congress had imposed upon Washington an officer it 

knew was utterly unacceptable to him and to most American officers. That 

Conway was a political appointee and not a line officer was irrelevant. Conway 

was in, and that was all that seemed to matter: "Conway is made a Majr. Genl. 

& Inspector of the Army," Francis Lightfoot Lee told his brother as soon as it 

happened. 46 His message was much discussed in the first few days after the 

resolution passed. 

Telling Gen. William Whipple the news of Conway's appointment as the 

Inspector General, Delegate William Ellery said, "I am in hopes that the 

measures adopted and adopting will enable our army to take the field early in 

the Spring under great advantages. ,,47 That was a fairly common sentiment. A 

few people who would have liked to see Gates in Washington's position may 

have sponsored Conway in the hopes that his appointment would force W ashington to resign. But it is likely that they were indeed very few. The majority 

apparently believed Conway's reputation as a disciplinary expert, and probably 

accepted his general concept of the Inspector General as the recommendation of 

an authority. They were awakened soon enough, but it remained to be seen how 

Washington would react when Conway presented himself at headquarters. 

Conway arrived at Washington's camp at Valley Forge at the end of 

December, prepared to assume his duties as Inspector General. The Commander in Chief received him unenthusiastically. Looking over Conway's 

credentials, Washington observed that the Board of War's instructions said that 

the board was to furnish a set of regulations for maneuvering the troops. When 

he asked Conway if he had those instructions with him, the Inspector General 

replied that he did not. Washington avowed that Conway could not possibly 

serve as Inspector General until the instructions arrived; he then had an aide 

show Conway to the door. 48 Effectively locked out of the Continental Army, 

45. Friedrich Kapp, The Life of Frederick William Von Steubell, Major General in the Revolutionary Army, 2d ed. (New York: Mason Brothers, 1859), 121-22. 

46. Francis Lightfoot Lee to Richard Henry Lee, 15 Dec 77, in Smith, Letters, 8:417. 

47. William Ellery to William Whippif;, 21 Dec 77, in Smith, Letters, 8:453. 

48. Flexner, Washillgton in the Revolution, 258-59, 262-63. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 29 

Conway left for York on 31 December to complain to his supporters in Congress. 

Two days later, Washington wrote to Congress opposing Conway's appointment and Conway's version of the inspectorship. He enclosed a record of the 

council of generals on 29 October, which he said showed' 'the office of InspectorGeneral was a matter not of such modem date as General Conway maintains it 

to be, and that it was one of the regulations in view to reform the Army." He 

thus suggested that the report of the October meeting should have been acted on 

rust, without considering Conway. The officers he had intended to recommend 

for the position were those "foreign officers who had commissions and no 

commands, and who were of ability . . . particularly the Baron d' Arendt, with 

whom the idea originated, and whose capacity seemed to be well admitted. ,,49 

The next day, 3 January 1778, Washington had again to write to Congress 

to present his version of his meeting with Conway, in answer to Conway's 

official complaints. The letter was unusually blunt, but carefully crafted to 

place Washington on the higher and his antagonist on the lower plane of public 

conduct: 

If General Conway means, by cool receptions .. . that I did not receive him in the 

language of a warm and cordial friend, I readily confess the charge. I did not, nor shall I 

ever, till I am capable of the arts of dissimulation. These I despise, and my feelings will 

not permit me to make professions of friendship to the man I deem my enemy and whose 

system of conduct forbids it. At the same time truth authorizes me to say, that he was 

received and treated with the proper respect to his official character, and that he has had 

no cause to justify the assertion, that he could not expect any support for fulfilling the 

duties of his appointment. 50 

Washington's partisans had by that time firmly established in their own 

minds, and in those of others, the notion that there was a conspiracy afoot to get 

rid of Washington-with full awareness of the unseemly connotations of that 

term. Gates and Washington exchanged a protracted correspondence, with the 

former denying any complicity in plots of whose existence he claimed no 

knowledge. The propounders of the conspiracy story then portrayed Gates as 

almost a fool, his manipulators that much worse for using him. Another part of 

the counterattack against Conway was a concerted effort to discredit him among 

his former proponents. Regarding his supposed military talents, Conway proved 

to be his own worst enemy, his manner soon trying the patience of everyone in 

York. When Congress proposed in January 1778 to mount an expedition against 

Canada under Lafayette, Conway was advanced as second in command, possibly to get him out of town. But Lafayette refused to accept him in that 

capacity, and he finally was reduced to accompanying him as third in command. 

Conway's continued scheming for a separate command, coupled with his disfavor among most of the high officers of the Army, prevented him from achieving his ambitions. 51 He was thoroughly discredited by this time. The President 

49. Sanger says that Baron d' Arendt was a Prussian officer and colonel of the German regiment and an aide-de-camp to Washington . Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 229. 

50. Washington to Pres of Cong, 3 Jan 78, quoted in John McAuley Palmer, General Von 

Steuben (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 133. -

51. DAB, 4: 366. 
30 THE INSPECfORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

of Congress, Henry Laurens, had once looked upon Conway with favor. He 

finally put an end to all talk of a "cabal" against Washington, in a letter to his 

son John Laurens, one of Washington's aides, who showed it to the Commander in Chief. It became apparent that the whole affray was mostly idle talk 

from a handful of malcontents, of whom only Thomas Mifflin and Conway 

showed any real malice toward Washington. That ended the assertions from 

Washington's officers regarding cabals and plots. They did, however, claim 

victory. "The poor and shallow politicians," crowed Nathanael Greene, 

"unmasked their batteries before they were ready to attempt any execution. ,,52 

The business was nearly completed, except for the dispatch of Conway, still 

technically the Army's Inspector General. He had become almost a pariah, in 

his own words "ordered from place to place." The unfortunate expatriate 

Irishman blundered one last time, again offering his resignation. To his chagrin, 

on 28 April 1778, Congress voted to accept it. Conway exploded to Gates, "I 

had no thoughts of resigning," then spent the next several weeks in rather 

deranged attempts to persuade Congress to reconsider. In a duel with Brig. Gen. 

John Cadwalader near Philadelphia on 4 July 1778, Conway took a bullet in the 

mouth . Thinking he was dying, he wrote to Washington to apologize "for 

having done, written, or said anything disagreeable" to his excellency. He did 

not perish, however, and within a year resumed his career in the French Army.53 

With his departure, the incident of the "Conway cabal" was over, but not 

forgotten. It appears that there never was a real conspiracy to ur,::;eat Washington, 

merely some varied dissatisfactions with his performance as Commander in 

·Chief. It is clear, however, that Washington and his partisans really believed 

that there was a plot to get rid of him. At least, they claimed that there was in 

order to strengthen their own case. But aside from giving historians something 

to speculate about over the next two centuries, the whole turmoil surrounding 

Washington and Conway in 1777 and 1778 had some fortunate effects for the 

American cause. Among others, it left Washington virtually immune to criticism for the remainder of the war. 54 

Equally important, and another aspect of the turmoil surrounding Conway 

that should not be forgotten, was the concept of the Inspector General itself. 

Washington and his supporters probably would not have raised such a controversy if the only issue at stake had been Conway's personal ambition for high 

rank. As Washington demonstrated at the end of December, Conway's guns 

were easy to spike. The Commander in Chief probably realized that it was but a 

matter of time before Conway's record and personality removed him from the 

52. Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The Politics of Command in the American Revolution (Syracuse: 

Syracuse University Press, 1975), 201-02; Greene as quoted in Hugh F. Rankin, The American 

Revolution (New York: Putnam), 174. For an excellent discussion of the "Conway Cabal," see 

Rossie, The Politics of Command, 188-202. 

53. Patterson, Horatio Gates, 265-69; Rankin, American Revolution, 174. See Appendix B. 

54. The prevailing wisdom for some time has been that there in fact was no "cabal" as such. 

For typical accounts, see Flexner, Washington in the Revolution, 241-77, and Higginbotham, War 

of American Independence , 216-22. 
THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMy 31 

scene. The question remains: Why then the outcry in Washington's camp 

against Conway, the insinuations that he was part of a vicious plot to overthrow 

the Commander in Chief? The reason has less to do with Conway than with the 

concept of Inspector General that the Congress, with Conway's assistance, had 

propounded. In defming the office the way it did on 13 December, Congress 

had inadvertently posed the real threat to Washington's command of the Army. 

Washington and his officers may have sought to discredit Conway as a way of 

discrediting the office of Inspector General as then presented. They succeeded. 

The aftermath of the Conway episode both strengthened and clarified the 

position of the Commander in Chief. To begin with, it ensured that Washington 

would be allowed to select his own Inspector General in the future. Never again 

would Congress try to impose on him in such a high position someone he either 

did not know or did not want. More fundamentally, the whole myth of the 

"cabal" tainted any proposals to insert into the Army agents not subject to the 

orders of the Commander in Chief. Congress' conception made the Inspector 

General one of its own agents reporting independently about what went on- and 

worse, imposing regulations on the regiments without the knowledge of the 

army commander. After the Conway affair, the very idea suggested intrigue 

and an undermining of the Revolutionary cause. In fact, Congress became so 

sensitive about interference in Washington's command that early in 1778 its 

pertinent committees hesitated to visit Valley Forge, even on the most urgent 

business. 55 

Washington emerged from the Conway controversy solidly in control, and 

politically almost above reproach. He had also established the Commander in 

Chief as the sole military authority accountable to the civil power, in so doing 

founding a strong American tradition of separation between the military and 

political spheres. And Washington had not forgotten his original purpose. He 

had destroyed the office of Inspector General as a political intrusion into his 

chain of command; if Congress wanted to know the state of the Army, it would 

have to ask the Commander in Chief. There remained the need to establish an 

inspectorate commensurate with the authority of the army commander. 

Washington, not Conway or anyone else, would now define the role of the 

Inspector General-first, as the drillmaster-general he had originally proposed; 

later, in every way the eyes and ears of the Commander in Chief. But in the 

meantime, he had to find someone who could fill the job. 

Valley Forge 

While the Conway controversy continued, the Continental Army had more 

pressing needs. Washington decided to go into winter quarters in December 

1777, despite complaints from York that he should do something about the 

British occupation of Philadelphia. But the troops had gone as far as they were 

55. Higginbotham, War of American Independence, 220. 
32 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

able without relief. Col. John Laurens wrote his father Henry Laurens describing the exhaustion and privations of the soldiers and the need to give them 

minimum comforts so they could be properly trained and rested. 56 The hardships of the Continental Anny at Valley Forge which he described have become 

part of the American legend, but they were real enough. Food, clothing, shoes, 

blankets-nearly everything was in short supply or nonexistent. Conditions 

were aggravated by an unusually early and severe winter. Men greatly fatigued 

and underfed labored for two weeks to erect huts of fence rails and poles 

chinked with clay, moss, or straw. But even in that they were defeated, as straw 

was in such short supply'that many thatched roofs went unfinished, and men had 

to sleep on brush or bare ground. When combined with the other deprivationslargely owing to a breakdown in transportation-such conditions help to explain 

why fully a third of the 9,OOO-man army was declared unfit for duty at the end 

of December 1777.57 

As cries of "No meat! No meat!" echoed through the camp, Washington 

sat down on 23 December and literally begged Congress for help. "What then 

is to become of the Army this Winter?" He asked, "and if we are as often 

without Provisions now, as with it, what is to become of us in the Spring, when 

our force will be collected, with the aid perhaps of the Militia, to take advantage of an early campaign before the Enemy can be reinforced?,,58 Washington 

and the soldiers received their answer, piece by precious piece, as the transportation jam began to break early in 1778. The army never had enough to eat or 

wear that winter, but it gradually got more, enough to survive. As provisions 

arrived and the troops became fit for duty, the Commander in Chief turned his 

attention again to the need for regulation and training. That raised anew the 

question of the Inspector General. The answer to that question appeared disguised most improbably in the form of yet another' 'volunteer" from Europe, a 

man professing not only high military attainment but nobility as well. 

56. John Laurens to Henry Laurens, 3 Dec 77, in Commager and Morris, Spirit of Seventy-Six, 

1:639. 

57. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 29-35; Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 50-53; 

Charles Knowles Bolton, The Private Soldier Under Washington (New York: Scribner, 1902),75; 

John B. Trussell, Jr., Birthplace of an Army: A Study of the Valley Forge Encampments (Harrisburg: 

Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1976). See also the selection of original reports 

in Trussell, Birthplace of an Army, 641-44. 

58. Washington to Pres ofCong, 23 Dec 77, in Commager and Morris, Spirit of Seventy-Six, I: 

644. 
CHAPTER 2 

Steuben at Valley Forge 

(1777-1778) 

Born in Magdeburg, Prussia, on 17 September 1730, Friedrich W. A. von 

Steuben would grow up to become one of the better known figures of the 

American Revolution, a legend in his own time and after. Long familiar to 

schoolchildren as the Prussian who drilled the Continental Army at Valley 

Forge, his memory has served as the principal inspiration for the Inspector 

General's Department of the United States Army, its successor, and other 

organizations patterned after it. His genuine concern for individuals, personal 

integrity, and willingness to devote his time to the training of those less experienced epitomized the standards expected of those who followed him. The 

relationship he eventually developed with the commander in chief remains the 

pattern for modem military inspectors. It will be seen that the system and 

attitudes he developed set a permanent precedent still largely followed. 

A Volunteer for the American Cause 

Steuben entered the Prussian Army at the age of seventeen, eventually 

serving with credit in the Seven Years' War as an infantry officer, then as a 

staff officer. He was assigned to the general staff in 1761, and soon attained the 

rank of captain- his highest position in Prussian service. In January and February 1762 he received two personal letters from Frederick the Great, thanking 

him for certain minor services. That most unusual compliment to a junior 

officer was followed by a confidential assignment connected to Prussian negotiations with the Russians; then in May 1762, to assignment to the royal headquarters as a general staff officer and one of the king's aides-de-camp. Despite this 

modest prominence, Steuben became neither a lieutenant general nor one of the 

king's favorites, as he later claimed. But he did bring credit upon himself for 

his skills and energy. Most important, he acquired experience in the duties of a 

general staff, something almost unknown outside Prussia. After the Seven 

Years' War, he became chamberlain at the court of Hohenzollem-Hechingen, 

where he received a knighthood and the honorific title Freiherr (baron). But his 

prince's fortunes declined toward bankruptcy, and by 1775 Steuben was once 

again out of work and seriously in debt. After unsuccessful attempts to enter the 

service of France, Austria, and the Margrave of Baden, Steuben encountered an 
34 THE INSPECfORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

acquaintance of Benjamin Franklin who suggested the American cause as a 

possible outlet for the Prussian's military ambitions- not to mention a remedy 

for his penury. 

Steuben arrived in Paris during the early summer of 1777, armed with 

letters to Franklin and others. It so happened that his reputation as a trained 

Prussian staff officer preceded him, and had been noticed by the French minister of war, the Comte de St. Germain, then engaged in introducing Prussian 

methods into France's army . St. Germain recommended Steuben to Franklin as 

just the sort of man the American cause needed, a practical expert on training, 

organization, and military administration. Franklin and Silas Deane were easily 

persuaded of Steuben's abilities, and given his financial straits, they may have 

believed that the Prussian would serve the United States more eagerly and 

faithfully than some of the aristocratic Europeans who had preceded him. The 

administrative and organizational skills which he would bring to America were 

such that he could be of value without threatening the positions of established 

commanders. He certainly needed the work. 

Deane, Franklin, St. Germain, and the French author and merchant, Caron 

de Beaumarchais, it appears, were all involved in negotiations with Steuben. 

Since Steuben needed the employment for his pocketbook's sake, while his ego 

required a certain minimum status for its own well-being, restrictions on the 

American agents caused difficulty. Congress had limited the commissioners' 

authority, no longer allowing them to enter into contracts on Congress' behalf, 

nor even to guarantee rank or pay- two previous licenses that had brought 

some decidedly sorry " volunteers" to the American cause. Steuben, of course, 

was not likely to venture across the ocean without some assurances, and in any 

case could not afford to make the trip on his own. Beaumarchais removed the 

fundamental obstacle by arranging for his corporation, Hortalez and Company, 

to advance Steuben's traveling expenses. Reimbursement was no concern. The 

French and American recruiters believed that Steuben's own abilities would 

cause Congress to recognize and reward his value to the Revolutionary cause. 

They may also have believed that presenting him as a distinguished volunteer 

not demanding position and pelf would contrast strikingly with the likes of 

Tronson du Coudray. That the arrangement was unavoidable in the circumstances, along with the fact that Steuben was desperate for employment, could 

be glossed over. Steuben would appear as a man of rare talent and high position, 

who acted at great personal sacrifice solely out of dedication to the American 

cause--a royalist nobleman turned democrat. 

It was probably Franklin who supervised the refmement of Steuben's resume. 

Fearing that Steuben's actual highest rank of captain would be unimpressive in 

Congress (and as likely, believing that it did not fairly represent his considerable talents) Franklin and the others elevated Steuben to the status of "a 

Lieutenant General in the King of Prussia's service," as Franklin wrote to 

Washington in September 1777. When Steuben left Marseilles on 26 September, 

he carried with him letters from Franklin, Deane, and ~eaumarchais to Henry 

Laurens, Robert Morris, and others of influence, who were told that the 
STEUBEN AT VALLEY FORGE 35 

"lieutenant general" had been as much as the right-hand man of Frederick the 

Great. 1 Steuben's introduction to the fledgling United States of America was 

disingenuous, but not really to his discredit. It is clear that the American and 

French parties in Paris perceived his potential value to the Revolutionary cause, 

so much so that they were willing to go to extraordinary lengths to win him a 

good reception in the New World. That would not be possible if Congress saw 

him as the unemployed fugitive from debt collectors that he was, especially 

since he followed a number of Europeans with grand reputations but poor 

records of performance. Franklin at least perceived that, given a chance, Steuben would prove his value. As events demonstrated, he did? 

Following his arrival at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 6 December Steuben wrote to Congress to volunteer his services. He asked only payment for his 

expenses, and if the outcome of the war was successful, reimbursement for the 

loss of his own European income (neglecting to mention that he had none). He 

wanted merely, he promised, to serve Washington as he had the King of Prussia 

in seven campaigns. Writing to Washington the same day, Steuben asked only 

to be granted citizenship in return for his services. After having served the King 

of Prussia, Steuben avowed, Washington was the sole person under whom he 

would wish to follow his profession of arms. 3 His letter to Congress created an 

immediate favorable re·action. In York, Henry Laurens, President of the Continental Congress, was decidedly impressed with Steuben's credentials. On 14 

January he wrote him to acknowledge his letter to Congress and report that the 

delegates had that day "Resolved an Act ... requesting you to join General 

Washington as soon as you can make it convenient to your Self." Congress had 

in fact presented Steuben with a brevet rank of captain, to protect him should he 

be taken by the British. But Laurens warned the arriving nobleman not to 

expect too much because of the Continental Army's hard conditions at Valley 

Forge. He said even Washington was living in a rude hut. 4 Laurens apparently 

believed that Steuben was so lofty of station, and the fortunes of the Continental Army so low, that the foreigner might quail at the thought of sharing the 

miseries of Valley Forge . He wanted to do what was possible to keep Steuben 

for the cause. In contrast, Washington's caution appeared a more realistic 

attitude in the circumstances. The Commander in Chief evidently knew by 

early January that Steuben was not all that he had been claimed to be, and word 

soon reached the Prussian that a part, at least, of his disguise had slipped. 

5 

I. For the best account of Steuben's early years, see Palmer, General Steuben, 9-102, which is 

summarized in Palmer's entry on Steuben in the DAB, 17: 601-04, and for the most recent scholarly 

account of Steuben's career, see Philander D. Chase, "Baron Von Steuben in the War of 

Independence" (ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1973), which focuses on his time in America. 

2. Horst Dippel, Germany and the American Revolution. 1770-1800: A Sociohistorical 1nvestigalion of Late Eighteenth-CetUury Political Thinking, trans. Bernhard A. Uhlendorf (Chapel Hill: 

University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 1l0-II. 

3. Kapp, Life of Steuben, 95-97; Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 54. 

4. Laurens to Steuben, 14 Jan 78, in Smith, Letters, 8:594. 

5. Steuben to Hamilton, 27 Jan 90, quoted in Kapp, Life of Steuben, 74. 
36 

MAJ. GEN. FRIEDRICH W. A. VON 

STEUBEN. Inspector General of 

the main army, 28 March 1778-15 

April 1784. 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Washington proposed to reserve 

judgment on Steuben, but he knew 

that action was required immediately 

to reform his army. The Conway controversy was drawing to an end, so he 

arranged for a congressional committee to visit Valley Forge in late January to help develop a plan for army 

administration. The need for an inspector general was still uppermost in 

his mind. In a letter to the committee 

on 28 January, he revealed that his 

original conception of that position, 

more or less a drillmaster-general with 

assistants down to brigade level, was 

still firm. 6 Despite his need, Washington did not rush into filling the position before careful scrutiny of the latest forei.gn volunteer after his arrival 

in camp. Steuben left York 19 February, and arrived at Valley Forge 

on the 23d. His reception there was merely polite, in contrast t.o events in 

York.? Steuben was an immediate success in the camp, and his military competence was apparent in his first encounters with Washington and his generals. 

Steuben's questionable credentials seemed unimportant after he had demonstrated his proficiency. In short, Steuben's combination of skill with agreeability made credible the office of the Inspector General so recently abused in the 

Conway controversy. Steuben soon won over the skeptical Washington and his 

officers. He became the obvious candidate for Inspector General, although after 

the Conway episode Washington and Nathanael Greene agreed that it would not 

be wise to make Steuben a major general, he still had to prove himself. 8 

Steuben's ChaLLenge 

It would require a combination of competence and good humor to grapple 

with the problems facing ~he Continental Army, which was at a low ebb in 

February 1778. "The situation of the camp is such that in all human probability 

the army must soon dissolve," Brig. Gen. James Mitchell Varnum predicted to 

6. Sanger, " Inspector-General's Department, " 229-30. 

7. Palmer, General Steuben, 129- 30; Flexner, Washillgtoll ill the Revolutioll , 286-87. Palmer 

effectively demolishes the legend that Steuben was received grandly at Valley Forge, while Flexner 

believes the older tradition. Steuben was honored with a number of receptions in towns between 

York and Valley Forge. Kapp, Life of Steuben, 104-05. 

8. Theodore Thayer, Nathallael Greene: Strategist of the Americall Revolutioll (New York: 

Twayne, 1960), 225. 
STEUBEN AT V ALLEY FORGE 37 

Greene before Steuben's arrival. There was no meat, the horses were dying, 

and the bare country surrounding was a poor location for a camp. Varnum 

averred that either the army must be moved to where it could be supplied, or 

disband. 9 Steuben, beginning work as an adviser to Washington, proclaimed 

the money department "a mere farce," and said that paying quartermaster 

agents a commission according to what they spent was a prescription for waste. 

He proposed a staff overhaul to reform army supply, but nothing came of his 

suggestion. IO There were many problems of discipline, supply, and training 

which he observed on his arrival at Valley Forge. He soon became involved in 

some aspect of their resolution regardless of who had the theoretical responsibility. II 

Things were even worse than they looked. To begin with, there was no 

uniform organization of the army. "I have seen a: regiment consisting of thirty 

men, and a company of one corporal!" said Steuben. "Nothing was so difficult, 

and often so impossible as to get a correct list of the state or return of any 

company, regiment, or corps." As serious was the loss of firearms, carried 

away not only by deserters but by men whose terms of service had expired. 

Henry Knox told Steuben that the magazines supplied 5,000 to 8,000 muskets 

in every campaign, just to replace those that had been carted home. Nor were 

the troops well managed. Many of the troops were scattered on various fatigue 

details while several thousand more were being used as officers' servants. 12 

This manpower had to be restored to the tactical units to gain the full benefit of 

training. The situation was such that Steuben took it upon himself to prescribe 

an overhaul of army discipline, and to define the role of the Inspector General. 

He perceived more clearly than Washington that European methods of discipline could not simply be imposed upon the American army, because of differences in fundamental organization and an absence of national regulations and 

authorities. Steuben dismissed, for instance, the individual manual of arms as a 

waste of ammunition (he emphasized platoon firing), and observed, "In our 

European armies a man who has been drilled for three months is called a recruit; 

here, in two months I must have a soldier." Steuben proposed to simplify the 

drill manuals, and developed a new system that leavened British rigidity with 

French and Prussian practicality. Regarding the Inspector General, he maintained that, unlike in Europe, that officer must depart from purely military 

inspection and must also examine financial accounts. At least, someone must 

do so for the American army. 13 

9. Varnum to Greene, 12 Feb 78, in Commager and Morris, Spirit of Seventy·Six, 1: 650-51. 

10. Kapp, Life of Steuben, 114--15, 123. 

11 . John McAuley Palmer, Washington, Lincoln, Wi/son: Three War Statesmen (Garden City, 

N.Y., Doubleday, Doran, 1930),47. 

12. Kapp , Life of Steuben, 115-17. 

13. Ibid., 123; Robert K. Wright, Jr., The Continental Army (Washington: Department of the 

Army, 1982), 140-42. National authorities in Europe had other means of ensuring financial 

accountability, leaving inspectors to observe purely military questions of efficiency and performance. 

No strong central authority existed in the United States or even, as regarded staff services, in the 

Army. Steuben wanted the Inspector General's purview in the Continental Army to be comprehensive. 
38 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

It became steadily more apparent that Steuben would be placed in charge of 

the Army's reformation. He focused on first things first: "I found it useless to 

trouble myself about the many things which I could not remedy. I directed my 

attention to the organization and discipline of the army . . . . I found here 

neither rules, nor regulations, nor system, nor minister at war, nor pardon, nor 

reward .... All this required an immediate remedy. But how to commence, 

was the question." 14 The most pressing issue was training in the basics of 

soldiering. Thus, Steuben for the moment confined the role of the Inspector 

General to that of a drillmaster-general. That was a wise decision, for at the 

time the Continental Army knew neither how to drill nor how to march, limiting its performance on campaign and in battle. Henry Knox had recently 

established in New Jersey a gunnery school. That could eventually pay dividends for the artillery, but it did nothing for the infantry, which must rely on 

antiquated British manuals dating from as early as 1727.15 

Steuben Trains the Troops 

By the middle of March, Washington had determined to let Steuben show 

what he could do, reserving the Inspector General's position as a reward for 

success. Washington let him determine his approach for himself, and then 

followed his advice. Steuben decided to start small. On 17 March 1778, Washington ordered an additional 100 men to be attached to the Commander in 

Chief's guard; since the latter were all from Virginia, the others were to come 

from all other states. The men selected were to be of "robust constitution," and 

"well limbed, formed for activity, and men of established character for sobriety and fidelity. They must be Americans born." 16 What those men were to 

experience was new in the Continental Army, and their reactions were naturally 

varied. The guard participated in the Continental Army's grand entertainment 

for the spring of 1778--Steuben training the troops-which from the first day 

attracted sizable crowds. Training of the Commander in Chief's guard commenced on 19 March, with Steuben in charge. Steuben himself trained one 

squad first, then set his subinspectors, whom Washington had been appointing 

for several days, to drill other squads, while he supervised. Once the squads 

were trained, Steuben drilled them as a company, starting each day with squad 

drills, and ending with company exercises. 17 

From the outset Steuben devised an American body of tactics. He taught a 

greatly simplified manual of arms, because there was no time to follow elaborate European practices. He also disapproved of the British-inspired distance 

between the soldiers and American officers, who had been wont to leave 

14. As quoted in Kapp. Life of Steuben. 123. 

15. Fonnan. "Why the United States Military Academy Was Established." 19; Riling. Steuben 

and Regulations. 1; Wright. Continental Army. 140-42. 

16. Orders. GHQ. Valley Forge. 17 Mar 78. in Ganoe. History of the United States Army. 55-

56. 

17. Palmer. General Steuben. 144-45. 
STEUBEN AT V ALLEY FORGE 39 

instruction to sergeants. Steuben not only offered a good example, but specifically instructed officers in how to train their own men. After the model guard 

company was ready, he extended his system to battalions, then brigades, and in 

three weeks was able to maneuver an entire division for Washington. His 

inspectors were his agents. 18 The results of the training were impressive and it 

did not take long to persuade Washington that Steuben knew what he was 

doing. Three days after the new drilling began, on 22 March, Washington 

issued orders to the Army paving the way for Steuben's advent as Inspector 

General by directing unit commanders to stop all drills under systems then in 

use and to begin preparations to use Steuben's methods. A few days later, he 

directed them to begin practicing under Steuben's supervision. 19 At that time, 

Washington also appointed four lieutenant colonels to act as subinspectors, 

while the next day he appointed brigade inspectors for all brigades. 2o On 28 

March he appointed Steuben Inspector-General. 

Washington told Congress on 30 April that, given his longstanding desire to 

institute an inspectorship, he had "set on foot a temporary institution, which 

from the success that has hitherto attended it, gives me the most flattering 

expectations, and will I hope obtain [Congress'] approbation." The "Baron de 

Steuben," he said, had at Washington's request agreed "with the greatest 

chearfulness [sic]" to "take the office of Inspector General." He recounted 

Steuben's training of the demonstration company, and reported the appointment of the pyramid of subinspectors and brigade inspectors following Steuben's 

instructions. He asked for approval of the organization, and extra pay for all 

inspecting officers. Lastly, Washington implied that Steuben had persuaded 

him to adopt a somewhat broader conception of the role of inspector general 

than that of a mere "drillmaster-general" making the office more comprehensive. 21 When it came to appointing foreign officers to high places, the late 

request was characteristic of Washington's caution; he waited until the end of 

April to ask Congress for a permanent berth for Steuben. But the Prussian had 

long since proved himself, so ably in fact that Washington could consider a 

major genera1cy for him without expectation ' of the kind of outrage among 

American generals that had accompanied Tronson du Coudray's similar promotion in the line or Conway's as a staff officer. Steuben had accomplished much 

during the month of April, extending his operations on a large scale, with 

increasingly complex maneuvers. 22 

18. Palmer, Washington, Lincoln, Wilson, 48 . 

19. Orders, GHQ, Valley Forge, 22 Mar 78, in Thian, Legislative History, 89; ibid., 24 Mar 

78, in Palmer, General Steuben, 150. 

20. Orders, GHQ, Valley Forge, 28, 29 Mar 78, in Thian, Legislative History, 89. From the 

outset, the variously designated assistant inspectors general and brigade inspectors met with Steuben's 

approval: "Among the many obligations which lowe to General Washington, I shall always 

esteem it among the greatest, the selection which he made among the officers to aid me in this 

work." Kapp, Life of Steuben, 125. 

21. Washington to Pres of Cong, 30 Apr 78, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11: 

328--31. 

22. Kapp, Life of Steuben, 128. 
40 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

It was not, of course, quite so simple. Steuben's lack of English caused him 

difficulty from the beginning. He developed his American drill regulations 

from his European background and his observation of American circumstances, 

then wrote the instructions in French. Pierre Duponceau, his secretary, translated them into literary English, but he was no military man. Washington's 

aides John Laurens and Alexander Hamilton then edited the instructions into 

military parlance, and Steuben memorized the text as well as his broken English 

allowed. He had a gift for languages, but he could not pick up a new one 

instantly.23 Steuben's language difficulty was resolved quickly . According to 

Col. Alexander Scammell, "At the first parade, the troops neither understanding the command, nor how to follow in a movement, to which they had not 

been accustomed even with their instructor at their head, were getting fast into 

confusion." At this moment Capt. Benjamin Walker, then of the 2d New York 

Regiment, advanced from his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the 

order to the troops. Captain Walker very soon became Steuben's aide in charge 

of correspondence and other documents. 24 

The training extended from the Commander in Chief's guard to the entire 

army, and the work came under the immediate direction of the lower inspectors 

and troop commanders. As the regiments were training, Steuben galloped about 

the camp, supervising. Steuben shocked AmeFican officers by personally 

teaching men the manual of arms and drill, but his success helped to convince 

them. Previously, as he recalled, " [T]he captains and colonels did not consider 

their companies and regiments as corps confided to them by the United States 

for the care of the men as well as the preservation of order and discipline. The 

idea they had of their duty was that officers had only to mount guard and put 

themselves at the head of their regiment or company when they were going into 

action." With Washington's support, Steuben set out to involve officers in 

training, making the subordinate inspectors-a body of officers drilled by 

Steuben- his agents. 

The First Regulation 

Supervising drill was but an immediate part of the Inspector General's 

duties. Much more important was the formulation of a body of regulations upon 

which drill and other military necessities were to be based. The contents of 

Steuben's regulations were an improvisation, melding foreign and domestic 

principles and Steuben's creativity into a system fit for American conditions. 

No less an improvisation was the way the regulations were first distributed. A 

unique solution was reached to assure rapid production: There were no printing 

presses at Valley Forge, while circumstances demanded the fastest possible 

dissemination of the regulations. The team of Steuben, Duponceau, Laurens, 

23 . Palmer, General Steuben, 140. 

24. Scammell to Gen John Sullivan, 8 Apr 78, quoted in Riling , Steuben and Regulations, 8; 

Joseph B. Doyle, Frederick William von Steuben and the American Revolution (Steuben"ille, 

Ohio: H.C. Cook, 1913), 360. See Appendix B. 
STEUBEN AT V ALLEY FORGE 41 

and Hamilton-joined in time by Lafayette, Greene, Walker, and others of 

Steuben's and Washington's entourages-prepared the instructions a chapter at 

a time. To distribute the drill regulations, brigade inspectors wrote out copies 

for themselves, then entered copies in the orderly books of the brigades and 

each regiment. From regimental orderly books copies were made for each 

company, from which each officer and drillmaster made his own copy. It 

required two to three days for each chapter to be distributed. Meanwhile, 

Steuben taught, supervised, and wrote. The first rudimentary regulations as 

transcribed were a combination of exact instructions for various maneuvers and 

timely advice for inspectors and other officers. Surviving examples demonstrate that Steuben's penchant for detail was all-encompassing, while his literary committee produced texts of great exactitude and clarity. Captain Nathaniel 

Webb's orderly book, for example, recorded the basic drill, and included such 

elementary things as when to start drill, how to stand, and how to form in 

ranks, as well as more complex maneuvers. 25 

One of the fortunate aspects of Steuben's regimen in April 1778 was a 

thorough overhaul of the Continental Army's organization. His first objective 

was training, but few regiments were ever full enough to serve as training units. 

The fluctuating personnel situation of the force also made continuous training 

advisable. Steuben divided the brigades into provisional training battalions of 

112 to 224 privates, subdivided into companies and platoons, with officers and 

noncommissioned officers assigned appropriately. The regiments no longer 

matched the battalions, but when Steuben was finished with them, the latter had 

become uniformly known quantities able to maneuver in battle with calculable 

results. Thereafter, Steuben's organization made it possible to muster effective 

battalions for battle no matter how depleted the Army was.

26 

Steuben also perceived that the American units had difficulty in going from 

column of march into line of battle. The source of the problem was the customary marching formation of a column of files ("Indian file"), stringing the force 

out impossibly. That was one reason why many units had arrived late at the 

recent battles of Brandywine and Germantown. Steuben moved quickly to 

correct that bad habit, training battalions to occupy no more road space than 

they would require room in battle. At his instigation, on 10 April Washington 

outlawed the column of files. Thereafter, in all situations all sizes of units were 

to march exactly as they were taught on the drill field . The result was an army 

that marched faster and deployed faster for battle. 27 Steuben also wanted the 

Army to fight as well as to march, and that required weapons instruction. He 

prepared and taught a simplified manual of arms, with many fewer movements 

than those of European armies, and emphasized the use of the bayonet, the 

essential infantry assault weapon of the day . Previously lacking the discipline 

essential to bayonet charges, American soldiers had shied away from the 

25. Palmer, General Steuben, 180-81. 

26. Ibid., 152-54; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 64. 

27. Palmer, General Steuben, 156-57; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 64. 
42 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

weapons. Steuben himself observed that their chief utility in the Continental 

Army was as spits for roasting meat. He turned the Americans into confident 

bayonet fighters, something they demonstrated within a few weeks at Monmouth and the next year at Stony Point. 28 

Steuben's 1778 regulations represented a thorough reform of army administration as well as tactics, and were the first truly comprehensive set of rules the 

American army had. Informally distributed as they were, they taught the soldiers how to stand at attention, march, and behave in unison; and units how to 

form, and disengage from, larger units. More broadly, they set forth rules for 

camp sanitation, company administration, and daily routine. In property management alone, Steuben's regulations paid their way. To stop the massive 

losses of arms to deserters and to men mustered out, Steuben required that 

weapons remain with unit colors. Before he arrived the Army lost thousands of 

muskets every year; in 1779, it lost twenty. 29 Rules were also applied to military 

inspection, which was made a subject of the regulations. But it was not presented as an activity of designated inspectors, rather as a function of command. 

The regulations made inspection a routine duty of company commanders. At 

"troop beating," company officers were to "inspect into the dress of their 

men," to "see that the clothes are whole and put on properly, their hair 

combed, their acouterments properly fixed and every article about them in the 

greatest order." Steuben founded the army's long tradition of the Saturday 

morning inspection, when captains were to "examine into the state of the 

men's necessaries. ,,30 

Proving the Worth of Training 

It was in refining the technical skills of the Continental Army that Steuben 

made his major contribution to the American cause in the spring of 1778. That 

had its own secondary, but very important, effect in raising morale. The intense 

training had been the great amusement of the Valley Forge encampment, beginning with Steuben's entertaining mannerisms. But as his labors, and those of his 

assistants and the troop commanders, began to produce results, when the Army 

mastered what had previously been difficult, the force felt a confidence it had 

never before known. The training routine also offered opportunities for healthy 

rivalries and prideful displays. By the end of April, the Continental Army was 

eager to demonstrate its achievements. 31 

The first positive result of Steuben's efforts appeared on 19 May, when 

Lafayette with 2,200 continentals and 800 militia were almost cut off by 

British forces at Barren Hill, across the Schuylkill River. To get out of the trap 

required a quick retreat, something the old straggling columns could never have 

28. Palmer, General Steuben, 151-52. 

29. Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 56-58, 61. 

30. Ibid., 58 . 

31. F1exner, Washington in the Revolution, 289. 
STEUBEN AT V ALLEY FORGE 43 

done. The British moved in for a predictable kill. But Lafayette merely gave an 

order, and the troops moved as Steuben had taught them, denying the British 

easy victory. 32 This small incident did not demonstrate that the Continental 

Army was a match for the British, merely that it could move as an army should. 

Steuben had worked wonders, but Washington still had on his hands a force 

that must avoid open challenges to an enemy superior in efficiency. Nor could 

Steuben, Washington, or anyone else change the hard fact that the best units' 

had the best officers, while the others were content with lower standards of 

performance. 33 The officers with the drive and sense of professionalism necessary to recognize the value of Steuben's instructions, were the ones who applied 

them most effectively to their units. 

Inspector General Steuben 

In any event, Steuben had long since proved his value to the cause, and was 

fumly emplaced as the Inspector General. Washington had followed his letter 

to Congress of 30 April with a plan for the inspectorship; in it he showed his 

wish that it develop a system of manual and maneuvers, prepare all necessary 

regulations, and see that they were observed. Inspectors were to be "the instructors and censors of the Army in everything connected with its discipline and 

management," he said, in a reflection of Steuben's broader conception. The 

Inspector General, Washington proposed, was to serve under the Commander 

in Chief. His chief deputies were to inspect wings or divisions under the orders 

of major generals, while brigade inspectors would serve brigade commanders. 34 

Washington desired inspection to be a function of command, inspectors to 

be subordinate to commanders, and he wanted no revival of the Conway version of the inspector as political overseer. 'Nevertheless he maintained a strong 

functional relationship within the inspectorate. Inspectors might inspect at the 

orders of commanders, but they were to do so exactly as the senior inspector 

ordained. His orders of 4 May 1778 explicitly directed subordinate inspectors 

to look to Steuben for all technical direction to assure standardization in all 

procedures in the Army.35 With these orders, Washington at least ended the 

menace of interference in his command associated with the earlier version of the 

Inspector General's duties. On 5 May 1778, Congress approved his plan for "a 

well-organized inspectorship" in general terms, without the pointed details that 

had made Conway such a menace. The resolution otherwise appointed Steuben 

to be Inspector General, with rank and pay of a major general, including back 

pay for his services since February; established two ranks of inspectors under 

the Inspector General, one for two or more brigades, the other for brigades; 

authorized additional pay for inspectors because of the demands of their duties; 

32. Palmer, General Steuben, 169-70. 

33 . Weigley, History of the United States Army, 64. 

34. Sanger, "!nspector-General's Department," 231. 

35. Orders, GHQ, Valley Forge, 4 May 78, in Kapp, Life of Steuben, 134. 
44 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

and authorized Washington to appoint all inspectors below the Inspector 

General. 36 

Washington announced Steuben's appointment at a reception following a 

grand review for the French, and later in orders to the Army on 9 May. Steuben 

had hitherto served as a gentleman volunteer. The immediate necessity for his 

unfettered services-not to mention his likable nature-had permitted him to 

get along well with Washington's generals. But, appointing him a major general, 

albeit in a carefully stated staff position, raised some of the resentments that 

had characterized the appointments of Tronson du Coudray and Conway. Additional unhappiness had been building since early April over the interruption of 

command associated with Steuben's training methods. Although Washington 

had managed to soothe feelings while supporting his Inspector General, he 

realized that sooner or later the commanders, not the inspectors, would have to 

command their own troopS.37 Despite these unsolved matters, Steuben himself 

was not finished. And despite his own broader conception of the position, the 

Inspector General had so far been little more than a "drillmaster-general." 

That had been so because it had been necessary, but a permanent training 

system was now in place that did not require Steuben's full-time involvement. 

The regulations existed only in the orderly books. Furthermore, a real system of 

inspections, except as a function of unit command, had not yet been developed. 

Nor had the Inspector General's "department"-in the sense of a sphere of 

activity, as the word usually meant at the time-been defined. The issue remained 

of great interest because Washington at last had an inspector general acceptableand subordinate-to himself. He now perceived that that officer must be more 

than a chief drillmaster, but exactly how much more remained to be determined. 

Steuben had accomplished much as a volunteer. But now that he was officially 

on the payroll, his efforts to determine his place in the Army were bound to 

bruise some egos, including his own. 

36 . lCC, 5 May 78 . See also Thian, Legislative History, 89-90, and Sanger, "InspectorGeneral's Department," 231. 

37. Orders, GHQ, Valley Forge, 9 May 78, in Thian, Legislative History, 90; Palmer, General 

Steuben, 167-69. 
CHAPTER 3 

Defining the Inspector's Role 

(1778-1779) 

Steuben's promotion may have encouraged the Prussian to think about a 

possible command in the line. Without a doubt, his transformation from volunteer to major general caused some American officers to fear that he harbored 

such ambitions. An explanation of relationships was definitely in order. The 

role of the Inspector General and the extent of his authority was unclear to the 

officers of the line. It was further evident that the functions of Steuben's 

position had not been developed thoroughly by the Congress either. The way in 

which solutions would be reached would determine the continued usefulness of 

the Inspector General to the Army. 

Limiting the Inspector's Authority 

Determining the exact status of the new Inspector General and his relationship to commanders and other inspectors required further work. Congress continued to appoint senior officers as inspectors of forces other than Washington's, 

without reference to Steuben although the recent law implied that Steuben 

should have technical supervision over them. 1 Washington, also, continued to 

define the roles of his inspectors. On 4 June, he assigned the four subinspectors 

to various line divisions for field operations, saying that since they had no 

specific commands, they would act as adjutants general while on the march. 

That established a principle, eventually to become permanent in the Continental 

Army, that inspectors were to handle paper work and act as adjutants along 

with their inspection duties. 2 But it further reduced Steuben's control over 

junior inspectors, who were in fact considerably less subordinate to him than 

they had been in April. 

Steuben was at the same time advancing his own designs for his position. 

By early June 1778, he had proposed a plan of legal authority for the Inspector 

I. lCC, 14 May , 14 Oct, 4 Dec 78; Thinn , Legislative History, 90, 90n. The resolution of 

authority is discussed briefly below. 

2. Orders, GHQ, Valley Forge, in Thian, Legislative History, 90; Wright, "Organization and 

Doctrine," 233-35; Wright, Continental Army, 144--45. On 16 May 1778, Congress directed the 

Quartermaster General to furnish Steuben "with two good horses for his use. " lCC, 26 May 78 . 
46 THE INSPECfORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

General that would in effect have made the position equal to that of the Commander in Chief, answering separately to Congress. That was too much for 

some officers, who already believed the Inspector General had too wide a 

reach. Hamilton said that the novelty of the office excited questions about its 

boundaries, the extent of its operations alarmed the officers of every rank for 

their rights, and that their jealousies and discontents were rising to a height that 

threatened to overturn the whole plan. 3 These senior officers' concerns caused 

Washington to publish a general order on 15 June 1778 to regulate Steuben's 

operations, curbing the independence that had accelerated training but interrupted command. 4 The new regulations were to stand until "the duties of the 

office of Inspector-General shall be defined and fixed by Congress. ,,5 They 

began with a synopsis of the Inspector General's functions. Inspectors were to 

prescribe rules and standards for drill and maneuvers, and set policies for 

garrison and camp routine. They also monitored all guards and camp security 

and determined all necessary rules and procedures. 

That was a sweeping purview, but the powers of the Inspector General were 

tightly confined. The order further specified that the commander approve and 

authorize any rules generated by an inspector. All orders were to be communicated through the Adjutant General to subordinate inspectors, who were to 

relay them to division and brigade commanders. In addition, divisional and 

brigade inspectors were to "assist in their execution" (of maneuvers and 

exercises) "under the immediate orders of the major-generals, brigadiers, and 

colonels commanding. ,,6 This order of 15 June established a principle that 

would govern in the United States Army over the next two centuries. It was, in 

short, that inspection is a function of command, and that the inspector is an 

agent of the commander. Although the subordination of the Inspector General 

to the army commander would be challenged many times, it was not until the 

late nineteenth century that the fundamental principle was seriously threatened 

with compromise. Even then an attempt to grant independence to the Inspector 

General, as an agent of the civil power, failed to overcome the strength of the 

deeply rooted tradition. 

Steuben Tries To Assert Himself 

Steuben challenged the check on his authority, first by seeking a line 

command, then by attempting to free the Inspector General from the army 

commander. He made his move after his contributions during the spring of 

1778 had proved their value in the Monmouth Campaign and while he briefly 

commanded three brigades after the Battle of Monmouth. But the resentment 

against having any foreigner high in the line persisted, and frustrated him. 

3. Palmer, General Steuben, 172-74; Hamilton as quoted in Sanger, "Inspector-General's 

Department," 232. 

4. Palmer, General Steuben, 172-74. 

5. Orders, GHQ. Valley Forge. 15 Jun 78. in Thian, Legislative History, 90-91. 

6. Ibid. 
DEFINING THE INSPECTOR'S ROLE 47 

When he court-martialed an. officer for disrespectful conduct, the man was 

acquitted . Washington ordered Steuben to relinquish his command as soon as 

• the normally assigned commander returned from temporary duty. But the Prussian protested, asking to be given a permanent position in the line. 7 He was not 

pleased with the restrictions inherent in the 15 June order and he asked Washington for permission to go to Philadelphia on personal business, hoping to lobby 

with Congress to improve his situation. 8 Washington agreed but asked Steuben 

to take with him a copy of his 15 June order along with a letter to Laurens. 

Steuben s original objective changed when, upon his arrival in Philadelphia, 

several powerful friends informed him that they agreed with Washington on 

denying a line command for him. But ~hey supported the Prussian's desire to be 

chief of all inspectors, which Congress soon granted. Mollified, Steuben meanwhile set about lobbying for a charter for his inspector general's department. 

He suggested that his office should answer to the Board of War, reporting to 

both the board and to the Commander in Chief, with differences between the 

Inspector General and the commander to be resolved by the board. 

In August a committee of Congress proposed a plan for the Inspector 

General's activity much as Steuben had outlined, and asked Washington to 

comment. While the Commander in Chief praised the adoption of many fundamental principles of inspection, he condemned the direct communication between 

the inspectorate and the Board of War on the grounds that inspectors would 

thereby be independent of commanders. When the c.ommittee finally produced 

a plan for the Inspector General (in February 1779), it was a compromise, but 

one acceptable to Washington and Steuben both.9 This compromise meant that 

by the end of the summer of 1778, Steuben and Washington were agreed . The 

Inspector General had come to see that his office should not have powers of 

command. Thus began his most useful period. Over the following years, Steuben would become much more than a drillmaster-general. He would be a staff 

officer in the fullest sense, Washington's most important source of support. 

Because of his training in the Prussian Army, he was able to offer the best staff 

advice available in the world. Given his experience, ability, and views on an 

administrative hierarchy, no British or French officer could have equaled him. 10 

So Steuben resumed the training program. More fundamentally , he laid the 

groundwork for the full scope of the Inspector General's activity, beginning 

with the institution of a system of inspection. Without awaiting the action from 

Congress, Steuben established an inspection service for the whole army, in 

service to the Commander in Chief. He and his subordinate inspectors visited 

7. Palmer, General Steuben, 91-92; Washington to Pres of Cong, 26 lui 78, in Fitzpatrick, 

Writings of Washington, 12: 235; Thian, Legislative History , 90. 

B. Palmer, General Steuben, 174-76, 192-93. 

9. Steuben's Philadelphia adventure is discussed in Palmer, General Steuben, 195- 96; see also 

Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 232-33, and lCC, 20 Aug 78. For Washington's 

commentary on Steuben's design, see Washington to Pres ofCong, 12 Sep 78, and "Observations 

on Congress's Plan for the Inspector General's Department," both in Fitzpatrick, Writings of 

Washington, 12: 436-44. 

10. Palmer, General Steuben, 195-99; Palmer, Washington, Lincoln, Wilson, 44. 
48 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

all organizations, reporting all defects in discipline, administration, supplies, 

and equipment. His criticism was constructive, and because he was not a threat 

to the line, it was accepted well enough. His results he transcribed for 

Washington, while his prestige gave him authority without the necessity of 

powers of command. 11 It was in instituting his inspection service that Steuben 

laid the foundation for the fundamental function of the future inspectors general 

of the United States Army. He went at it in customary fashion, participating 

personally, applying great energy with patient exactitude. His aide William 

North described Steuben the inspector as being fair and extremely thorough. He 

set high standards and insisted on their being met to the point that doing so 

became instinctive throughout the force. North knew of officers spending their 

own pay to keep their men looking as they should so as not to embarass their 

units' reputations. 12 

Steuben's Blue Book 

The Army settled into winter quarters late in 1778, with training and the 

inspection service running under their own power. Steuben turned his attention 

to the publication of drill regulations in final form. The preparation of regulations for the manual of arms and maneuver had been among the Inspector 

General's first duties, one which preceded even training. But late in 1778 the 

regulations comprised only the scattered entries in orderly books produced 

during the Valley Forge training period in the spring. If uniformity of movement was to become permanent in the Army, its guiding rules had to appear in 

more durable and accessible form. It was decided therefore to codify them in a 

publication. To do this, Steuben and his literary committee, in particular 

Duponceau and Walker, began work late in 1778 in Philadelphia, where they 

took up residence for the duration of the job. The first half of the text went to 

Washington on 26 February 1779, the remainder on 11 March. Washington 

approved this immediately, followed on 29 March by Congress, which authorized printing and distribution. Those concerned were so delighted with Steuben's 

product that on 5 April Congress passed a resolution honoring him for the 

improvements his efforts promised. 13 Steuben next turned to the task of getting 

his regulations printed and distributed. To supplement his text, he appended 

explicit drawings of the manual of arms and basic troop movements, prepared 

by Pierre Charles L'Enfant, a military engineer and architect, who later gained 

fame as the city planner of Washington, D.c. 14 

Steuben and his staff met with a great deal of frustration in printing and 

binding the ReguLations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the 

United States, which they had hoped to have available by spring. The printing 

industry suffered from shortages of paper, ink, and other materials, but bind11. Palmer, GeneraL Steuben, 198-99. 

12. Thian, Legislative History , 89n. 

13 . Palmer, General Steuben, 202-04; Thian, Legislative History, 93-94; lCC, 5 Apr 79. 

14. Riling, Steuben and Regulatiolls, 9. 
DEFINING THE INSPECTOR'S ROLE 49 

ing proved to be the major obstacle as production dragged through the summer 

and into the fall of 1779. High-quality materials were scarce, and at last the 

binders adopted substitutes in order to get the job done. Among the substitutions was blue paper for half-covers, instead of full leather. That accident gave 

Steuben's regulations the name they would bear thereafter-Steuben's "blue 

book." Recalled William North in 1814, "except the Bible , it was held in the 

highest estimation." 15 In final form, the blue book presented complete infantry 

drill regulations, and more. It also offered regulations for field service, the 

basics of organization, essential commands and movements, marching, camp 

layout, and sanitation----:-all stated simply and directly. It was all the manual the 

Continental Army needed, with instructions for everyone from colonel to private, 

in concise but explicit form. It was also an immediate and enduring success, 

with at least seventy-five editions published through 1809, as well as uncounted 

militia manuals largely based upon it. 16 

The Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United 

States were a literary refinement of the first drafts reproduced in so many 

orderly books during 1778. They were ideally formed for an army in which 

training of recruits was a constant burden. The heart of Steuben's regulations 

was his simplified and carefully described and illustrated Manual Exercise, 

what is today called the manual of arms. It was eminently workable, and like 

the rest of the text, well suited to the American army. 17 But the blue book also 

guided the officers. Chapter 20, "Of the Inspection of the Men, their Dress, 

Necessaries, Arms, Accoutrements and Ammunition," established a tradition 

of inspection and observance on the part of company officers that endured 

through the following centuries. The blue book placed great emphasis on inspection as a function of command. Officers were to examine arms and ammunition 

every day, while noncommissioned officers were to supervise the personal 

hygiene of the men. Captains were required to make general inspections of their 

companies every Saturday morning. As a reflection of Steuben's philosophy, 

inspection was indeed integral to command because it was the best means 

whereby an officer could learn about his men and the state of their equipment. J 8 

It was the chief tool of the commander. 

However, the blue book was almost silent about the formal inspectorate 

represented by the Inspector General. It offered nothing about authorities or 

questions of line and staff. Rather, the regulations told how an inspection 

should be conducted, with the inspector passing along the front of a battalion 

from right to left, accompanied by the commander and his staff, proceeding 

down to the inspection of companies. That completed, the colonel was to form 

15 . North, as quoted in Riling, Steuben alld Regulatiolls, 15- 18. 

16. Riling, Steuben and Regulations, 19-21, 27-31 ; Palmer, Gelleral Steuben , 202-04; 

Regulatiolls/or the Order and Discipline a/the Troops o/the United States (Philadelphia: Styner & 

Cist, 1779). The bulk of Riling is a facsimile reproduction of this first Styner & Cist printing. 

17. Regulations/or Order and Disciplille. 16--30. 

18. Ibid., 88- 90. Some of the language appeared almost unchanged in the Army's first comprehensive set of general regulations after the Revolution , produced by Winfield Scott in 1821. 
50 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

his battalion and cause it to perform any exercise or maneuvers the inspector 

thought proper to order. That may have been a practical working manual for 

inspectors, but it gave them no advice when a commander challenged their 

presence or requests. 19 

A Charter for the Inspector General 

While Steuben was working to produce the blue book, Congress at last 

produced a charter for the Inspector General, on 18 February 1779. It passed a 

resolution which authorized the position with rank of major general and specified that forming a system of regulations for maneuvers and discipline was the 

inspectors' principal task. The Inspector General and subordinate inspectors 

were also to inspect troops for efficiency and appearance when directed to do so 

by their commanders. General Washington was authorized to appoint as many 

subinspectors as he desired. Each brigade major was to double as brigade 

inspector for his own brigade, thus perpetuating the combination of adjutant 

and inspector begun at various levels the year before. The resolution put an end 

to more than a year of dispute over the role and authority of the Inspector 

General and his assistants. The Inspector General reported to the Commander 

in Chief, who gave him his orders. His reports were directed to the commander, 

with a copy to the Board of War. The commander was firmly in control of all 

officers of his command, appointment of the Inspector General being no more 

subject to the Congress than the nominal veto power that governed all general 

officers. The inspector, simply put, was clearly the unfettered agent of the 

commander.2o 

The Inspector General's charter of February 1779 was a very workable 

compromise of competing interests and ambitions. It removed the occasion for 

civil interference in command that had been inherent in earlier definitions of the 

Inspector General. Within the Army, it neatly resolved the tensions between 

line and staff that would have been aggravated if the Inspector General had 

headed a separate organization comparable to that of the Quartermaster General. 

At each step of the command pyramid, commanders had inspectors serving as 

their eyes and ears, monitoring those under them, and each command level was 

subject to similar inspection from the level above. That was acceptable because 

the inspector from above was seen as the agent of the superior. commander , not 

a power to himself, and because inspection standards, set by the Inspector 

General, were uniform throughout the Army. 

Meanwhile, Steuben completed his part in the blue book production and 

rejoined the Continental Army at Middlebrook, New Jersey, on 27 April 1779. 

Shortly thereafter, he made, at Washington's behest, a special inspection of the 

whole Army, looking particularly for understrength regiments. That led to a 

consolidation in order to keep at full strength the training and maneuver battal19. Ibid., 126-27. 

20. lCC, 18 Feb 79. See also Thian, Legislative History, 92-93. 
DEFINING THE INSPECTOR'S ROLE 

ions that Steuben had developed the 

year before. It seemed that the Inspector General was beginning to demonstrate his usefulness for all sorts of 

special assignments. For instance, he 

also formed a special light infantry 

force (later commanded by Anthony 

Wayne). This unit was trained for special assault and skirmishing duties derived from Steuben's knowledge of 

equivalent French and German forces 

such as Chasseurs and Jaegers. Steuben added Capt. William North to his 

staff in May, completing an exceedingly close trio that included also Ben 

WalkerY North would continue the 

inspectorate after the breakup of the 

Continental Army in 1783. This completion of his staff meant that Steu51 

MAJ. WILLIAM NORTH. Inspector of 

Troops, 15 April 1784-25 June 1788. 

ben's inspection service came into full flower during 1779, allowing detailed 

inspections of everything and everyone in the army. Through the mechanism of 

inspection, Steuben and his assistants were able to enforce accountability for 

supplies, using the individual soldiers' books and company books, which he 

and his aides compared against each other. Special attention went to the care of 

the sick. In short order, the monthly general inspection was an essential part of 

the army routine. 22 Steuben's inspection system promoted economy sufficiently 

that in June and July Congress awarded inspectors extra pay and allowances. 

And, as a mark of Steuben's rising influence , the Congress was to expand 

Steuben's sphere further. 

21. Palmer, General Steuben , 207-10. See Appendix B 

22. Palmer, General Steuben , 210-11. 
CHAPTER 4 

Inspection and the American 

Victory 

(1780-1784) 

The Continental Army endured a ghastly winter at Morristown, New Jersey, 

in 1779 and 1780, its officers and men experiencing great hardships because of 

problems in the staff departments and in the response of Congress to them. The 

need for action led to changes in the Army structure to meet the crisis. Critical 

breakdowns in supply, transport, and administration revealed the lack of depth 

and experience in the staff departments. It was only natural that a growing 

number of these duties would fall on one of the few officers available with the 

knowledge and background to attend to them properly. The recognition that 

these functions had to be performed to avert greater crisis muted any protests as 

to the expansion of the Inspector General's sphere. 

The Inspector's Authority Widens 

By early 1780, Steuben had made the Inspector General the chief administrator and virtual chief of staff of the Army; his counterparts at the lower levels 

were the lesser inspectors. As de facto chief of staff, he became the Commander in Chief's principal agent for bargaining with Congress, often representing Washington at meetings in Philadelphia. Thus, while the fortunes of the 

Continental Army waned, those of the Inspector General continued to rise. 

Since Steuben's appearance at Valley Forge, the Inspector General had served 

largely as a "muster master-general," mustering, organizing, and training 

troops. The inspectorate had since received a number of administrative 

redirections, but the mustering of troops-to a great extent, verifying the presence of men for pay, rations, and other disbursements-was integral to their 

inspection. The Continental Army's Mustering Department, therefore, had 

become superfluous. So, on 12 January 1780, Congress resolved that the mustering of the troops be performed by the inspectors of the Army. I This absorption of the Mustering Department was but a part of Steuben's expansion of his 

sphere of interest. He had been gaining strength at the expense of other depart1. fCC, 12 Jan 80. See also Thian, Legis/alive History , 95. 
INSPECTION AND THE AMERICAN VICTORY 53 

ments for several months, and in particular had preempted the pursuits of the 

Adjutant General in January 1778, who had succumbed to Steuben's charm 

when the latter arrived at Valley Forge. The two worked together to standardize 

army paper work, inevitably mixing the interests of their two departments. In 

May 1779 Congress reduced the members of the Adjutant General's Department to the Adjutant General, two assistants, and a clerk, and in June it directed 

the Adjutant General to serve as assistant inspector general. Six months after 

absorbing the Mustering Department, Steuben moved to gather in the last of the 

Adjutant General's province. On 7 May 1780 the Inspector General proposed a 

plan for the new Inspecting and Mustering Department, which subordinated the 

Adjutant General to the Inspector General. Washington endorsed the proposal, 

and on 14 July recommended it to Congress as essential. 2 

Congress adopted Steuben's "Plan of the Inspecting and Mustering 

Department" on 25 September 1780, with only minor changes. 3 In the future, 

the Inspector General would be appointed by Congress, and allowed two secretaries in addition to the aides he was permitted from the line of the Army. Also 

with the main army, there was to be one assistant inspector general, "who 

shall be adjutant-general for the time being.,,4 Each separate army of two or 

more divisions would also have an assistant inspector general, who would 

further serve as deputy adjutant general. The resolution further prescribed one 

inspector to each division, one to the corps of cavalry, and one to the corps of 

artillery. Inspectors were to come, when possible, from the line of colonels and 

lieutenant colonels, and were to be given additional compensation while serving as inspectors. In addition, a subinspector was to be assigned to every 

brigade, and one each to the corps of cavalry and the corps of artillery, if the 

commander so desired. Subinspectors were to be taken from the line of majors 

in their brigades. The Commander in Chief or army commander was also 

permitted to appoint inspectors and sub inspectors for active service militia on 

the same basis as the appointments that were allowed to the continentals. 

Congress vested greater authority in the Inspector General in 1780 than it 

had in February 1779, making him the source of the Army's regulations and 

policies. The Inspector General and his assistants were required to review and 

muster the troops once a month, examining the number and condition of the 

men, their discipline, clothes, arms, accouterments, and camp equipage; verifying the number of rations drawn; and singling out soldiers or recruits unfit for 

service, finally reporting all to the commanding officer. No soldier could be 

discharged or transferred, however, unless the paper work was signed by the 

major general, brigadier, or commandant, and a surgeon's certificate attached. 

Commanders were also to prepare three muster rolls at the time of inspection, 

signing and swearing to them. Each roll was to be certified by the mustering 

2. Wright, Continental Army, 145; Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 234-35. An 

important part of the plan was increased compensation for inspectors, which Washington defended 

vigorously . 

3. The resolution appears in ICC, 25 Sep 80. 

4. Ibid . 
54 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

(inspecting) officer, with a copy each to the commander, the mustering officer, 

and the regimental paymaster. Procedures for accountability to Congress were 

also clarified in that the monthly muster abstracts were to be forwarded to the 

Commander in Chief, with a copy to the Board of War. 

Congress built a number of financial safeguards into the inspection and 

mustering system. No commander could muster his own regiment; that had to 

be done by another inspector assigned by the Inspector General. Assistant 

inspectors general in separate armies were to heed the instructions of the Inspector 

General. The commissary of issues was directed to deliver to the Inspector 

General or the latter's agent an account of rations actually issued. All muster 

rolls were to be sworn to before a general officer, and the resolution specified the 

wording of the oath. Inspectors could demand from commanders all papers and 

vouchers relating to the enlistments and musters of the troops. Inspectors also 

were to keep accounts with the commanding officers of all arms and accouterments delivered and returned. Officers of the inspectorship retained their rights 

of command and promotion in the line. But they were to suspend exercise of 

their commands while serving as inspectors, or were authorized to command by 

the Commander in Chief. They were also exempt from routine duties so they 

could devote themselves fully to inspection. 

The Inspector General was expected to visit every element of the army to 

assure uniformity. tIe was also to keep books registering documents passing 

through his office and to maintain copies of all resolutions of Congress and 

regulations of the Board of War. All regulations relating to the Inspecting and 

. Mustering Department were to be approved by Congress. But, if circumstances 

required, the Inspector General could, with the "approbation" of the Commander in Chief, proclaim temporary regulations, subject to later cDngressional 

approval. Finally, the resolution continued Steuben in office, and empowered 

him to appoint all officers for the inspection service, subject to the approval of 

the Commander in Chief. 5 

The plan for the Inspecting and Mustering Department was comprehensive . 

In one act, Steuben supervised a system which had a chance to deal with the 

almost chaotic circumstances of the Continental Army. The whole purpose was 

to ensure economy and efficiency hy controlling such abuses as the fraudulent 

issues of rations. The plan also showed congressional disinterest in interfering 

with Washington's powers of command. The subordination of the Inspector 

General to the Commander in Chief was complete. For instance, inspection 

abstracts no longer went equally to the Commander in Chief and the Board of 

War ~ Instead, they were transmitted explicitly to the former, with a copy to the 

latter. On the other hand, Congress retained its final power of approval or 

rejection, while leaving the initiation of orders and regulations up to the 

commander. Despite these changes, the plan also ratified a more powerful 

Inspector General. He answered to the Commander in Chief, but within the 

Army establishment he enjoyed a great deal of independence and influence5. Ibid. 
INSPECTION AND THE AMERICAN VICTORY 55 

not least because, controlling the Adjutant General, he controlled the Army's 

communications and paper work. Unlike the earlier definition of his authorities, 

the new plan allowed the Inspector General to assign inspectors as he thought 

fit, subject to his technical direction. This relationship was structured in such a 

way that it safeguarded the integrity of command. In military matters, commanders still ruled their troops and were., nonetheless, subject to a full and 

independent inquiry on matters of concern to the Commander in Chief. 

Steuben had been rebuffed when he tried to establish an independent inspectorate in 1778. But by September 1780, he had achieved a position of influence 

that would have been inconceivable two years before . His tactics may have 

been fabian, but more likely he was able to gain his expanded position because 

his plan seemed to be the best solution to the Army's administrative problems. 

At the same time, his record and his clear subordination to Washington made 

him a man who could be trusted not to abuse his wide powers. Steuben had 

started in the Continental Army as a "drillmaster-general" before becoming 

a "muster master-general." Then, as his title implied, he was the Commander 

in Chief's principal inspector. But by September 1780 he had become much 

more, in fact the second most important man in the Army. The merger of the 

departments was but a symbol of the fact that everything related to the management of the army, excepting only the initiation of military orders, was within 

his purview. His abilities had continued to attract new responsibilities until he 

was now Washington's chief source of information and advice. It was in the 

nature of things that even military orders would reflect his influence. His plan 

put him at the head of a large staff organization, so Steuben's effects on 

operations became more than the product of one man. The Inspecting and 

Mustering Department established in September 1780 may actually be viewed 

as the American army's first form of a general staff. 

Shortly after the enlarged department was established, Steuben was assigned 

to an independent command in Virginia. He was expected to provide support 

to Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene's forces operating against Lord Cornwallis in 

the Southern Department. Steuben did not do well in this position. He was 

unable to inspire the local militia to rally, nor was he able to enlist the sympathy 

or support of state officials, many of whom he antagonized. Then, in June 

1781 , while in command of a scratch force of militia and a few continentals, he 

was defeated by a British force at Point of Fork, Virginia. 6 Thus, in the only 

independent command of his career, Steuben was a failure on the field of 

combat. Worse, however, was the larger fiasco of his entire service in Virginia. 

It was not the Old Dominion alone that could bear responsibility for Steuben's 

inability to raise men, arms, and supplies. He may have been one of the best 

staff officers in the world during his day, but Steuben lacked the diplomatic and 

political skills necessary to succeed in Virginia in 1781. He had alienated 

nearly everyone who should have supported him. 

6. Hugh F. Rankin , The War of the Revolution in Virginia (Williamsburg: Virginia Independence Bicentennial Commission, 1979), 16-17,21,36-39,41-43, 66,73-74. 
56 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

Fortunately, the indecisive operations in central Virginia did not hinder the 

entrapment of Cornwallis at Yorktown and his subsequent surrender on 19 

October. With the exception of a few minor scattered engagements thereafter, 

the war in real terms was over. It took another two years, however, to complete 

the negotiations to end the conflict officially. Consequently, the United States 

had to keep an army in the field. Washington returned the main army to 

positions in the Hudson Highlands in order to contain the strongest British 

forces based in New York City. Greene's Army of the South remained mostly 

in the Carolinas where its elements operated against Tory forces and guarded 

British enclaves in the coastal cities. The last of these, Charleston, was evacuated in December 1782, and the remnants of Greene's force garrisoned it until 

disbandment the next August. The primary concern of the army everywhere 

starting in 1781 was an orderly dissolution. 

Reducing the Army and the Inspectorate 

Before victory had even seemed possible, on 7 February 1781 Congress 

established a consolidated War Department under a "Secretary at War" (a 

British title dating from the reign of Charles II), answerable to Congress. 

7 The 

new department assumed the record-keeping and liaison activities of the Board 

of War. It was required to investigate the "present state" of the army, and to 

transmit and execute the military orders of Congress. But civilian fears of the 

military retarded the selection of a secretary until 30 October. Then, Congress 

selected a general, Benjamin Lincoln, who had a reasonably good record and 

had demonstrated ability as an administrator. The division of authority between 

Washington and Lincoln was not clear, but the two usually worked well together. 

They conflicted over only one issue: the inspectorate. 8 

Lincoln believed that the greatest deficiencies in the army lay in the Inspector General's Department, whose officers were encumbered by not only line 

command but also inspections, leaving them little time to forward their returns. 

As a corrective measure, he asked inspectors to report directly to him. When 

Washington learned of that, he ordered them to report only to the Commander 

in Chief. Lincoln's demand, he said, would in effect make the inspectors and 

those they reported on independent of the army commander. 9 Despite Washington's intervention, staff services in the Continental Army came increasingly 

under civilian control during the war's last two years. Superintendent of Finance 

Robert Morris gradually took over the purchasing responsibilities of all supply 

departments. He turned increasingly to contracting for rations, and abolished 

the army commissariat. Difficulties with contractors, however, continued, and 

even as the Army and its programs were reduced, many things remained in 

7. The title of Secretary at War was changed to Secretary of War in 1789. 

8. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 48. 

9. Ibid.; Harry M. Ward, The Department of War, 1781-1795 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), 16. 
INSPECTION AND THE AMERICAN VICTORY 57 

short supply, especially clothing. On 7 May 1782, to correct abuses in the 

supply system, Congress provided for the appointment of inspectors of contracts and supplies for the two armies. They were to report fraud, neglect of 

duty, or other misconduct threatening public property to the Inspector General. 

The acting inspectors of the two armies, Col. Ezekial Cornell in the main army 

and Col. Francis Mentges in the Southern Army, became inspectors of contracts and supplies. 10 

Washington began to reduce the size of the Army after Yorktown, placing 

Steuben in charge of the program. The Inspector General began with a general 

effort to re-form units into compact sizes, eliminating officers when their 

number exceeded that required by the number of men under their command. 

The reduction of the Army entailed a reduction also in the Inspecting and 

Mustering Department. On 10 January 1782, Congress repealed its resolution 

of 25 September 1780 and set forth a revised "Plan for Conducting the 

Inspector's Department." Somewhat briefer than the earlier charter, the new 

plan followed much the same spirit. The Inspector General was to be appointed 

by Congress from among the general officers, and was allowed only one secretary, 

taken from the line and given the pay and emoluments of an aide-de-camp. 

Each separate army was to have one inspector, taken from the field officers of 

the line. The plan did not include assistants, sub inspectors , or the like. 1 I 

The Inspector General or inspector of a separate army was, as directed by 

the Commander in Chief or army commander, to review and muster the troops 

"of every denomination in service," in accustomed fashion, examining men, 

horses, and property and reporting "deficiencies, neglects, and abuses, and, if 

possible, the manner in which they happened; and at the same time pointing out 

the alterations and amendments they may think necessary in any branch of the 

military system." After every review, the commander was to exercise his 

troops in the manual and evolutions for the inspector, and the latter would 

report on their discipline. If the inspector wished to see a certain maneuver, he 

had to furnish a plan in advance to the commander, who might or might not 

comply "as he may think proper." 12 

At every review, company commanders had to submit enlistment papers 

and three copies of the muster rolls (signed but no longer sworn to) to the 

inspector, who would transmit them upward as before. The inspector was to 

transmit immediately an abstract of the musters to the commander, who was to 

send a duplicate to the Secretary at War. The inspector was also to report men 

unfit for service, the previous procedures for discharge remaining in force except 

that now the army commander or Commander in Chief's signature was required. 

The inspectors were authorized to receive returns of supplies from the Quartermaster General and the Clothier General. In addition, inspectors were also 

expected to visit military hospitals to determine their condition and advise the 

10. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 70-73; Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 236. 

II. JCC, 10 Jan 82. 

12. Ibid . 
58 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

commander. The Inspector General himself, again, was expected to visit every 

part of the Army to see that uniformity prevailed. Congress intended also to 

ensure subordination of the inspectorate to the army commander, and diligence 

in inspection by specifically saying inspectors were subject only to the orders of 

Congress, The Secretary at War, the Commander in Chief, or the commanding 

officer of a separate army. The Inspector General was to specify the form of all 

returns. Each inspector of a separate army was further permitted to take an 

officer from the line of captains or subalterns to assist him. Finally, Congress 

continued Steuben as Inspector General. 13 As a result, during most of 1782, the 

strength of the department included the Inspector General, two assistant inspectors general, two assistant inspectors, and twelve brigade inspectors. 14 

The new organization was greatly consolidated and simplified, essentially 

in accord with precedent. Its primary emphasis, however, had shifted from the 

proclamation of regulations to inspl!ction, in particular, to monitoring training 

and economy. That inspectors dealt equally with commanders, the Secretary at 

War, and Congress, however, represented a blurring of the distinction between 

civil oversight of the military and military command principles. In practice, 

Washington's continued personal requirement that inspectors report only to him 

avoided any dangers of interference in his command. His interest in daily 

events sustained his policy on the inspectorate. This was shown when the Army 

encamped in New York and monthly musters and inspections became the 

established routine. Washington issued frequent orders commenting on the 

inspection reports, usually expressing his pleasure at good reports and his hope 

that, in a typical instance, "any little irregularities which have crept into the 

service may be immediately remedied." 15 Such orders made up a substantial 

share of those issued during the Army's last encampment. 

Demobilization and Border Defense 

Congress took no action regarding a permanent military establishment in 

1783. On the contrary, most of the delegates were eager to dispose of what 

'U1lly the United States had left. It was motivated not only on the grounds of 

economy, or because many believed that the conclusion of peace with Britain 

made a military force unnecessary, but also, persistent fears about the threats an 

army posed to public liberies prevented Congress from even approaching 

agreement on the nation's permanent military needs. Those fears were aggravated in March when a group of army officers issued the "Newburgh 

Addresses," demanding their financial and political rights in an ominously 

threatening manner. Washington calmed the tempers of his officers, and the 

13. Ibid. 

14. Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 235-36; Ward, Departmeflt of War, 235. 

15. Edward C. Boynton, compo and ed., General Orders of George Washington, Commander 

in Chief of the Army of the Revolution. Issued at Newburgh on the Hudson. 1782-1783 (1909; 

reprint. Harrison. N.Y.: Harbor Hill, 1973). The typical order cited was issued 5 June 1782. Ibid. 

27. 
INSPECTION AND THE AMERICAN VICTORY 59 

crisis passed. But two months later a group of officers gathered in Steuben's 

quarters to form the Society of the Cincinnati, once again arousing groundless 

but nevertheless real fears of a military or aristocratic counterrevolution. 

Meanwhile, Washington reported that the enlisted men were rioting and insulting their officers; they wanted their pay and discharges. By the middle of June, 

all but about seven hundred of them had been released, but without having been 

paid. 16 

The Continental Army melted away after the peace with Britain, but not all 

of its business was concluded. Steuben carried important burdens during the 

transition to peacetime. Washington sent him to Canada in July 1783 to arrange 

for the transfer of military posts in the United States from British to American 

control. 17 Steuben next turned his attention to the details of demobilization. 

Henry Knox commanded the troops remaining in service, but he lacked an 

inspector. On Steuben's recommendation, his aide William North became inspector for Knox's troops in October 1783. Freed of inspection duties, the Inspector 

General himself spent the months of October and November supervising the 

dissolution of posts, issuing orders for the transport and care of the sick and 

invalids, and emptying the remaining hospitals. In short, Steuben disbanded 

the Continental Army. IS When Commander in Chief George Washington prepared to return to civilian life, his last official letter , that of 23 December 1783, 

was to Steuben: "I wish to make use of this last moment of my public life to 

signify in the strongest terms my entire approbation of your conduct, and to 

express my sense of the obligation the public is under to you, for your faithful 

and meritorious service." 19 Steuben entered civilian life the following April. 

Steuben's Legacy 

Steuben had made a remarkable contribution to the first army of the United 

States, and he left to its successors a rich legacy. The most famous of his 

achievements were the training program at Valley Forge and the manual of 

tactical and administrative regulations that evolved from it. They entitled him to 

a share of credit for the American victory equal to that of any other major 

general. Nor did the impact of his achievements stop with the Revolution, for 

Steuben's blue book enjoyed currency for decades, and profoundly influenced 

16. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 77- 78. A good, concise summary appears in 

Higginbotham, War of American Illdependellce, 409-12, whereas a recent, popular account is 

James W. Wensyel, "The Newburgh Conspiracy," American Heritage , 32 (April-May 1980): 

40-47. A recent, full history of the Society of the Cincinnati is Minor Myers, Jr., Liberty Without 

Anarchy: A History of the Society of the Cincinnati (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 

1982). The organization began as a social group of Continental Army officers, with some political 

overtones. Following the Newburgh addresses, its very existence caused the more fearful parts of 

the public to suspect a plot with antidemocratic intentions. 

17. Steuben to Washington, 23 Aug 83 (from Saratoga), and Frederic Haldimand to Washington, 

11 Aug 83, both in Jared Sparks, ed., Correspondence of the American Revolution . . . , 4 vols. 

(Boston: Little, Brown, 1853), 4: 3~0, 41---43. 

18. Kapp, Life of Steuben, 524. 

19. Washington to Steuben, 23 Dec 83, quoted in Thian , Legislative History, 85 . 
60 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

later army regulations.. . Steuben also left his stamp on the office of Inspector 

General. Some of his influences lasted only a generation; for example, the 

custom that the Inspector General was effectively the chief of staff or alter ego 

of the Commander in Chief. For three decades after the Revolution, when the 

United States addressed the establishment of an army, it referred to the Continental Army as its prototype. In 1798, and again in 1812-1813, the general 

second in command to the nominal army commander received the title' 'Inspector 

General," mostly because that was what Washington had called his most 

visible assistant. That Steuben had actually been a staff officer most of the 

time, rather than a commander of troops, was irrelevant. There was magic in 

the evocation of things as they were in the Continental Army. 

Thanks to Washington and Steuben (and the legacy of the Conway affair), 

military inspection in the United States Army would remain a function of 

command; it never became an external political agency intruding itself into the 

Army . The army commander lost control of the staff departments during the 

nineteenth century, but the Inspector General remained his servant, his eyes 

and ears in the military line organization. The inspector answered to the 

commander, while the commander remained solely accountable for the efficiency of his command. In addition, Steuben also established the principle that 

inspection should concern itself with more than purely military efficiency and 

should extend throughout the Army's staff departments and services. As long 

as that principle was observed, there was in fact one command authority over 

the entire U.S. Army, one person answerable to the public for all the Army did. 

When the principle eroded, the commander's control of staff departments slipped 

away and the War Department fragmented into a collection of bureaus. As 

oversight for the entire organization passed increasingly to the Secretary of War 

late in the nineteenth century, the force of Steuben's principle of comprehensive examination drew the Inspector General into service to the Secretary of 

War. Thanks to Steuben, a system of inspection was regarded as essential to the 

management of the army, regardless of the focus of authority. Those developments lay in the distant future in 1784, when the American army practically 

disappeared . When the army again grew and became a permanent function of 

the government of the United States, the example of Steuben and the Continental Army ensured that a system of inspection would develop with it. 
CHAPTER 5 

Decline, Revival, and Vicissitudes 

of Inspection 

(1784-1798) 

In 1784, the little army that remained in regular service had only the eighty 

privates and their officers guarding stores that the War Department wanted to 

sell off. The twenty-five men at Fort Pitt were commanded by a lieutenant who 

believed that his duty was to guard, not preserve, the stores. The hoard of 

powder at the fort deteriorated while the soldiers occupied themselves with 

nonmilitary pursuits. The fifty-five men at West Point were more efficient. 

They were the remnants of Alexander Hamilton's battery of the Continental 

Army, under the command of Capt. John Doughty, highest ranking officer 

continued in service. The stores they guarded were for the most part useless 

surplus left over from the war. 

Very Little Army To Inspect 

Whether William North accomplished much as inspector during the first 

years after the Revolution is not now apparent, although the fragmentary evidence suggests that he did very little. He lived for a time, after the war, with 

Steuben in New York, then the seat of government, and busied himself improving his social position. Serving in such a minuscule army, his paper work at the 

War Department would have taken little time. Although North had been brevetted a major on 11 September 1783, Congress did not increase his pay in 

recognition of his position as inspector until 22 March 1785. That measure 

may have been intended to encourage him to travel on duty , but North was 

known to take only one official journey-he was sent to inspect troops camped 

on the Mingo River, in Ohio, in 1786. At the conclusion of that journey, 

Congress probably granted North a pennanent promotion to major. North married the daughter of the mayor of New York City on 14 October 1787, and 

ceased to serve as inspector as of 28 October. He spent the next few years 

developing a rich estate near Schenectady and pursuing his political career. 

But, as later events demonstrated, he never lost touch with the army, nor gave 

up his hopes for military advancement. I 

I. lCC, 22 Mar 85; Thian , Legislative Histol)', 103; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 38, 751; 

Doyle, Steuben, 356--60; DAB, 7: 563-64. 
62 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The office of inspector thus remained vacant for five years with Congress 

discontinuing the office of inspector of troops on 25 June 1788, telling the 

Secretary at War to develop some other means of inspection. Secretary Knox 

told Congress a month later that the recruits then being raised in Connecticut, 

New Jersey, and Pennsylvania would be mustered and inspected by Mr. John 

Stagg, chief clerk of the War Department, who was a Continental Army veteran, 

formerly a brigade major. Paralleling his activities were those of Francis Mentges, 

who continued to serve as inspector of contracts as he had since 1782. Except 

for their labors, inspections of troops in service were incumbent upon majors of 

regiments-in other words, the American army was militia, conducted as militia always had been. There was no real general inspectorate, nor even a semblance of one until at least 1792.2 

Birth of the United States Army 

A revitalized American army, however, appeared a real possibility early in 

1789. William North, among others, hoped to be a part of it. But he was soon 

discouraged, believing that the future would follow the course of politics and 

favoritism. He complained to Steuben that the army as proposed was too small 

and was dominated by Henry Knox. 3 The army did not start out as something 

that a man of North's ambition would want to make a career in. Congress 

established the War Department on 7 August 1789; Knox continued in office, 

thereafter answering to the President instead of directly to Congress. He gained 

an extra clerk in 1790, and by 1792 had a staff of ten people--"-still inadequate 

to supervise a widely scattered force. On 29 September 1789, Congress legalized the army of 700 three-year men it earlier had called for, together with the 

artillery companies already in existence. An authorized 886 officers and men 

were to be arrayed in an infantry regiment of eight companies and an artillery 

battalion of four. But only 672 men were actually in service. To supplement 

them, the President was authorized to call out militia when needed to fight 

Indians. Thus the United States Anny had its uneasy birth. Congress clearly 

regarded it as, at best, a distasteful necessity, and at worst a threat to the 

republic. 4 

Congress was hostile to an increase in national military programs because, 

among other reasons, the national budget was always under a strain. Equally 

pertinent, most congressmen's districts were east of the Appalachian Mountains, 

where Indians posed no threat to their constituents. The frontier could not be 

ignored indefinitely, however. Encouraged by the British still occupying posts 

2. lCC, 25 Jun 88; Thian, Legislative History, 103; Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 

237; Knox to Pres of Cong, 3 Jul 88, quoted in both Thian, Legislative History, 103 , and Sanger, 

" Inspector General's Department," 237; Heitman, Historical Register, I: 38. Thian erroneously 

attributes Knox's letter to Washington. 

3. North to Steuben, 8 Jan 89, in Doyle, Steuben, 359. 

4. Ward, Department of War, 101-04; Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 41-42; Weigley, 

History of the United States Army, 88-89; Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 560. 
DECLINE, REVIVAL, AND VICISSITUDES OF INSPECTION 63 

in American territory in the Northwest, the large and powerful tribes there by 

1790 demanded a curtailment of white settlement. In fact, they wanted it driven 

back to the line of the Ohio River. Harassing settlers, soldiers, and peace 

delegations, they began to do just that. It occurred to Congress that the campaigns of the Indians might be an opening wedge for British advances against 

the United States.

5 Consequently, it was as stimulated to action as it could be to 

act expeditiously. On 8 December 1790, Washington asked for an expanded 

U.S. Army, and Congress gave it to him just four months later, on 3 March 

179l. A second infantry regiment was authorized, along with two regiments of 

six-month volunteers and such militia as the President cared to call out. In the 

Army organization, Congress permitted a major general, a brigadier general, a 

quartermaster, and a chaplain. Most staff services were provided by brigade 

majors, adjutants, regimental paymasters, and quartermasters detailed from the 

line. There was no formal provision for an inspectorate. A provision of the 

previous year authorizing two inspectors remained in force, but the vacancies 

were not filled. 6 

Arthur St. Clair became major general commanding the Army-that is, 

leader of the planned expedition into the Northwest-in March 1791. Mr. Francis 

Mentges, still serving as inspector of contracts, was the closest thing the War 

Department had to an inspector general. Mentges' management of supply contracting proved to be as poor as the management of troops and militia in the 

hands of St. Clair. The expedition did not start until September, and it ran into an 

ambush on 4 November that left 672 men dead-about half the force. The 

remainder, including the supply contractors, ran for their lives, scattering most 

of the Army's inventory to the winds. In the aftermath, the six-month levies 

went home without pay, while a committee of Congress railed at "the gross and 

various mismanagements and neglects in the Quartermaster's and contractors' 

departments.,,7 In amongst this chaos, many of the duties associated with 

inspectors continued to be carried out. Besides the mustering and inspecting 

duties that probably were fulfilled by brigade majors, the St. Clair expedition 

had, by accident, a general inspector. He was Lt. Col. Winthrop Sargent, 

territorial secretary in the Northwest and perforce a political ally of Govemor St. 

Clair. Sargent was St. Clair's Adjutant General, but because of his disagreeable 

nature, officers hesitated to report to the commander through him. To remove 

him as an irritation, St. Clair used him a great deal to inspect militia outposts 

5. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 42-43; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 90. 

The Secretary of War was responsible for Indian as well as military affairs. 

6. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 91; Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 561. This 

legislation has erroneously been cited as the authorization for the position of Adjutant and Inspector 

General. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 123n. The position actually dates from 5 

March 1792, but was not filled while that legislation was in force . 

7. Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 237; Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the 

Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier 1783-1846 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969),22-27; 

Risch, Quartermaster Support, 99-100. 
64 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

and detachments. He was wounded, but survived the debacle of November 

1791. 8 

The St. Claw disaster induced yet another army reorganization. On 5 March 

1792, Congress authorized recruitment of the two infantry regiments and the 

artillery battalion to full strength, and an additional three infantry regiments to 

serve for three years, along with four troops of dragoons. To promote 

recruitment, the law ended deductions for clothing and medical services, and 

offered an enlistment bounty of $8.00. On the advice of Treasury Secretary 

Alexander Hamilton, Congress sought to end corruption and inefficiency in 

contracting by transferring to the Treasury Department responsibility for purchase of army supplies. That ended the function of the War Department's 

inspectors of contracts, and set the stage for bureaucratic squabbles that would 

bedevil army supply for several years. 9 

Anthony Wayne and Inspection 

Secretary Knox, in 1790, had proposed the creation of a "legion" to guard 

the frontier, and now urged Washington to form the Legion of the United 

States. By 4 September, Maj . Gen. Anthony Wayne-who took command 12 

April, to date from 5 March-had organized his force sufficiently in western 

Pennsylvania to proclaim the formation of the Legion. Congress was notified 

on 27 December, although the Legion was not completed until the spring of 

1793. 10 ... Wayne, as always, was a competent and energetic man. The Legion 

organization-arranged in four sublegions-was a compact, manageable force 

for what lay ahead. This was once again no permanent military establishment, 

but like the Continental Army was a field force with an immediate mission: to 

meet the enemy in the Northwest. The distinct command structure permitted a 

systematic recruitment of the Legion, which Wayne simultaneously set about 

training. By late 1792 he had assembled his force for training at a place he 

called Legionville, west of Pittsburgh. Wayne ignored those who wanted action 

before his force was prepared. Instead, he concentrated on everything from 

basic drill, march and battlefield movements to camp sanitation and property 

accountability---<:onsciously modeling his program on that of Steuben in the 

Continental Army. In fact, he asked for a supply of Steuben's regulations. In 

September, Knox told him that "Baron Steubens [sic] blue book is out of 

print-but we will have an edition printed with all expedition. ,,11 His stress on 

8. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 104-05; Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 24. For 

Sargent's own record of the expedition, see "Winthrop Sargent's Diary While With General Arthur 

St. Clair's Expedition Against the Indians," Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, 33 

(July 1924): 237-73. 

9. An Act making further and more ejfecfllal provisiollfor the protection ofthefrontiers of the 

United States, Statutes at Large I, sec. 7, 241 (1792); Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 125; 

Ward, Department of War, 143-44; Risch, Quartennaster Support, 100. 

10. I Stat. 241; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 139. See also the excellent background 

summary in Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 28-29. 

11 . Spaulding, Ullited States Army, 120; Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 130-37; Knox to 

Wayne, 21 Sep 92, in Richard C. Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne, a Name in Arms; Soldier, Diplomat, 
DECLINE, REVIVAL, AND VICISSITUDES OF INSPECTION 65 

basics and his insistence on standards meant that Wayne brought a strong system 

of inspection back into the Army, along with Steuben's regulations. Section 7 

of the act of 5 March 1792 provided that the Adjutant General would also 

undertake the duties of inspector. Until a permanent tenant of the office could 

be found, on 10 March 1792 Lt. Henry DeButts was designated to act as adjutant 

and inspector; he was listed in that capacity until 23 February 1793, although 

his functions in the office overlapped those of others. 12 

The Adjutant General, who was also to carry the duties of inspector, was 

known as the "Adjutant and Inspector General" by the time the Legion was 

formed. The origins of the combined office probably lay in congressmen's 

memories that, under Steuben, Washington had been served by such a consolidated functionary during the Revolution . In an age when military paper work, 

burdensome as it could be, remained relatively limited, the combination of the 

functions of records management, mustering, and inspection probably worked 

well enough. It certainly ensured that, at each level, inspection would remain 

an agency of the commander, not a power to itself. Knox apparently offered the 

position of Adjutant General to Winthrop Sargent in April 1792, but without 

enough attached rank to induce him to give up his political position. The office 

therefore went empty, and in fact never was filled as originally constituted. 

Knox nonetheless believed it an important one, for he told Wayne on 20 July 

that he would do all he could to find another qualified officer. 13 

Wayne, more clearly even than Washington, made inspection an extension 

of his own will as commander. Lacking a permanent Adjutant and Inspector 

General, he employed his aides Capt. Henry DeButts, Maj. Michael Rudulph , 

Capt. Edward Butler, and Maj . John Mills as his inspectors, sometimes one or 

another, sometimes all of them. They oversaw and actually conducted training, 

as had Steuben and his agents in 1778; they inspected detachments, recruits, 

and supplies; they interceded where transportation bogged down; and they, in 

fact, served in his absence wherever, whenever, and however Wayne thought 

fit. Each of Wayne's inspectors was a veteran of the Continental Army. In fact, 

each had spent the formative part of his adulthood in the military. That they all 

returned to the Army at the earliest opportunity suggests that they may never 

have quite adjusted to civilian life. Eagerness to return to the uniform and a 

cause fitted them for Wayne's purposes. Their attraction toward the military, 

moreover, permitted an unnoticed transfer of the rather loose inspectorate from 

Def ender of Expansion Westward of a Nation : The Wayne-Knox-Pickering Correspondence 

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1960), 105. For a good summary of the challenge 

Wayne faced as he tried to assemble the Legion from unpromising materials, see Prucha, Sword of 

the Republic, 30--32. 

12. An Act making further and more effectual provisionfor the protection of the frontiers of the 

United States, Statutes at Large I, sec. 7,241 (1 792); Heitman, Historical Register, I :38. Heitman's 

source for DeButts' appointment is not apparent, and in fact the office is not shown in the entry on 

DeButts' career, Heitman , Historical Register, 1:363 . 

13. Thian , Legislative History , 85; Ward , Department of War, 145 ; Knox to Wayne, 20 Jul 

92, in Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 43 . 
66 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

the War Department to the staff of the Commanding General. This was because 

of Wayne's methods in preparing for the forthcoming campaign. As commander, 

Wayne instituted a training regime for the Legion modeled on that developed 

by Steuben for the Continental Army. His aides, as inspectors, were also his 

training officers, Rudulph first among them. The major general held his authority or that of his aides unassailable in the training program: "I am informed," 

he told Knox, "that Capt Stake has taken some umbrage at Major Rudulph's 

interference with the discipline of his Troop-if upon reflection, he shou'd 

persist in his intention to resign, I will most certainly indulge him, Altho' I 

know him to be a most Gallant Officer. ,,14 

The inspector, in other words, was the agent of the commander, and the 

commander would not tolerate even the suggestion of intercession in his 

organization by the Secretary of War or anyone else on behalf of a disgruntled 

officer. Wayne did not have to tell Knox not to interfere in his command. 

Rather, he let his officers know that Rudulph's orders were Wayne's orders, 

not those of a mere major-and not liable to cancellation by anyone other than 

Wayne. With this kind of command support, Wayne's training and inspection 

program started well, but it was improvised. By 28 September the major 

general felt the lack of a formal first assistant. With DeButts holding the seat of 

acting adjutant and inspector, but serving elsewhere, Wayne appointed Capt. 

Edward Butler "Deputy Adjutant & Inspector General protem [sic] . .. . " 

Soon after, answering the commander's pleas for a permanent tenant in the 

post, Knox told Wayne that "The Adjutant General will not be appointed until 

the arrival of the President which will be on the fourteenth [of October]." 15 

Wayne, therefore, continued to improvise. Butler served him as adjutant (that 

is, as secretary and office manager) while Rudulph served as his training officer 

and chief troubleshooter. 

Of all Wayne's aides, Butler was the least fortunate choice. Officers generally complained about his arrogance and purported incompetence, but Wayne 

retained him anyway. 16 Early in 1793, when Wayne established a pattern of 

sharing or rotating the duties of adjutant and inspector among his aides, Butler 

was included. His work was mostly that of an adjutant, the most important 

being the delivery of orders for training drills. Butler and Rudulph had been 

joined by Capt. John Mills, who impressed Wayne as he had Knox. The shortage of good officers complained about by Wayne in his letters to the Secretary 

perhaps explains Butler's continued service as adjutant, despite his defects. 

Knox, meanwhile, was still trying to locate a permanent Adjutant and 

Inspector General. On 19 January 1793, he asked Wayne, "Would Colonel 

Sproat make a good Adjutant General and be acceptable to the Army?" Wayne 

responded on 31 January that he hardly knew the man, and doubted that the rest 

14. Wayne to Knox, 28 Sep 92, in Knopf, Anthony Wayne , 109. 

IS. Wayne to Knox, 18 Sep 92, and Knox to Wayne,S Oct 92, both in Knopf, AllIhony 

Wayne, 108--09, 114. 

16. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 156. 
DECLINE, REVIVAL, AND VICISSITUDES OF INSPECTION 67 

of the Anny did either. But he earnestly desired that the position be 

filled. 17 Although he continued to be 

hampered by the absence of competent senior officers, Wayne had his 

training program in high gear throughout 1793 and on into the following 

year. As soon as a supply of Steuben's 

blue book was available, he had 

handed every officer a copy and saw 

they used it. The British, meanwhile, 

continued to supply and to encourage 

the Indians north of the Ohio River to 

disregard American overtures and to 

insist on the withdrawal of all whites 

from their lands. While this increase 

in hostile activity alarmed many in 

the government, "Mad Anthony" 

Wayne refused to launch an impetuous campaign until his Legion was 

ready . On 11 September he learned 

CAPT. EDWARD BUTLER. Inspector 

of the Army, 18 July 1793-13 

May 1794; 1 August 1796-27 

February 1797. 

that the "procrastinated and fruitless, but absolutely necessary negociations 

[sic] with the Indians" that had taken all summer, had broken down. By the 

summer of 1794, he planned, he would have an efficient military force at hand. 

Meanwhile, perhaps thankful for the extra training period because the season 

was too late for a campaign, Wayne spent the fall and winter moving the 

Legion into advanced positions in Indian country. 18 

As Wayne prepared for the a,pproaching war, he made a last effort to fill in 

his principal staff position. He nominated John Mills for the job in March 1794. 

"It is hoped," Knox assured him, " that Major Mills's nomination to the office 

of Adjutant & Inspector will be productive of all the advantages incident to so 

important an office." But the nomination brought no results, except for Mills' 

appointment as Acting Adjutant and Inspector on 13 May. 19 Thus did Mills 

replace the contentious Butler, but the latter remained on Wayne's staff as an 

aide and inspector. Wayne was so short of competent staff officers that he had 

to use those available in unusual ways. A principal duty of an inspector was to 

muster troops to verify their presence for payment of wages. As the Legion, 

national volunteers, and militia began to mobilize for campaign early in the 

17. Knox to Wayne , 19 Jan 93 , and Wayne to Knox, 31 Jan 93, both in Knopf, Anthony 

Wayne, 175 , 179- 80. 

18. Prucha, Sword of the Republic , 34-36; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 93; 

Reginald Horsman , " The British Indian Department and the Resistance to General Anthony Wayne, 

1793- 1795 ," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 49 (September 1962): 269- 90. 

19. Knox to Wayne, 31 Mar 94 , in Knopf, Anthony Wayne , 316; Heitman, Historical Register, 

J: 38 . 
68 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

summer of 1794, and the army gathered its supplies, Wayne was hampered by 

shortages of competent paymasters as well as other staff assistants. That, combined with regional economic peculiarities, caused him to find some odd employment for his aide Butler. Wayne informed Knox on 10 June that he was using 

Butler as a courier taking the muster-in pay to volunteers in Kentucky. 20 

Wayne was determined to get the job done, no matter what it required. His 

flexibility and determination paid off in August 1794. On 20 August, in a 

perfectly executed bayonet charge against a strong, but unknown to Wayne, 

weakly manned, position at Fallen Timbers, Ohio, the Legion of the United 

States won a swift, stunning victory over the Miami Indians. The shock of the 

Legion's advance was so great that, when the losers sought the protection of 

Fort Miami, the British garrison locked them OUt. 21 The distinguished performance at Fallen Timbers of the officers of Wayne's improvised inspectoratethat is, his personal staff including aides-de-camp Henry DeButts, Capt. T. 

Lewis, and Lt. William Henry Harrison, along with Acting Adjutant and Inspector John Mills-was the incentive for Wayne's writing to Knox on 28 August of 

their "most essential services by communicating my orders in every direction 

& by their Conduct & bravery exciting the troops to press for Victory. ,>22 At this 

moment of triumph, however, the Legion of the United States threatened to 

dissolve, especially as enlistments expired. The volunteers left first, and Butler 

was ordered to muster and discharge the Kentucky troops. Wayne railed at 

Knox to help keep the Legion at full strength, and to garrison the several posts 

in the Northwest, but Knox refused to test congressional willingness to do so in 

poor economy. 23 

Wayne's success in Ohio, the waning fortunes of the Legion notwithstanding, 

probably ensured the permanence of the United States Army. The Legion and 

its predecessors had traditionally been established as a short-term measurelike the Continental Army, they had existed to take the field against a particular 

enemy. The failure of the earlier armies to achieve success, compared with the 

outcome of Wayne's regimen, demonstrated that a trained force of regulars 

must always be at hand, lest it take another two years to prepare for the next 

emergency. Furthermore, it appeared likely that the British would soon abandon 

their posts-irrthe Northwest. The American frontier territories must therefore be 

garrisoned; militia had not done that effectively in the past. But as Wayne's 

Legion deteriorated, so did the system of training and inspection with which he 

had managed it. Once again, a uniformed functionary occupied himself with 

paper work. It was too small a job for Mills, who was succeeded by Maj. 

Jonathan Haskell of the 4th Sublegion on 27 February 1796. He in tum was 

replaced on 1 August by Edward Butler. 24 

20. Wayne (at Greeneville) to Knox , 10 Jun 94, in ~opf, AnthollY Wayne, 340. 

21. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 173-76; Prucha , Sword of the Republic, 36-38. 

22. Wayne to Knox , 28 Aug 94, in Knopf, AllthollY Wayne, 353. 

23. Wayne to Knox , 17 Oct 94, in Knopf, AllthollY Wayne, 360; Prucha, Sword of the Republic , 

37-38. 

24. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 38; The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography 

(New York: James T. White, 1909), 12: 336 (hereafter cited as NCAB). 
DECLINE, REVIVAL, AND VICISSITUDES OF INSPECTION 

James Wilkinson and the Army 

69 

The Army had been redesignated a "Legion" in 1792 because the terminology was current, and possibly in a romantic evocation of the ancient Roman 

Republic. As Wayne organized and trained it, the Legion was a compact, 

flexible tactical force, four self-contained little armies under one command. 

But with the war over, the Legion was poorly organized to garrison the many 

posts of the Northwest, including those abandoned by the British in 1796. 

Accordingly, the Legion of the United States became the United States Army 

on 30 May 1796. As reorganized 1 November, the authorized force of 3,359 

officers and men was arrayed in four regiments of infantry, a small body of 

light dragoons, and a Corps of Artillerists and Engineers. The reduction of 

strength from the U.S. Legion's authorized 5,414 was no small matter in the 

reorganization. 

The legislation re-forming the United States Army also established a 

general staff, which included one major general, one brigadier general, two 

aides-de-camp, and a brigade major, Quartermaster General, Paymaster 

General and' 'one inspector, who shall do the duty of Adjutant GeneraL" The 

inspector, quartermaster; and paymaster might be taken from the line, or from 

civilian life. However, Congress decreed "That the general staff as authorized 

by this ·act shall continue in service until the 4th day of next March, and no 

longer. ,,25 Wayne's emphasis on an inspector as adjutant and aide-de-camp to 

the commander was in principle realized in the organization, but there was 

nothing permanent about it. The position of "inspector, who shall do the duty 

of Adjutant General," remained as ill-defined as it had ever been. Without a 

Commanding General with Wayne's ability to make good use of staff officers, 

the position was ineffective, almost unnoticed. Inevitably, the clerical duties of 

an Adjutant General, for which the inspector was a misnamed, lower-paid 

substitute, took precedence over all other responsibilities. Even Butler may 

have become bored as he returned to his regiment in February 1797. He was 

replaced 27 February as Acting Adjutant and Inspector by another veteran of 

the Revolution, Maj . Thomas H. Cushing of the 1st Infantry.26 

Cushing was hardly in his new assignment before Congress revised it. On 3 

March 1797, the act of the year before was repealed, so far as it related to the 

major general and his staff. The United States Army was now to be headed by a 

brigadier general, who was supported by a staff of officers whose purposes 

were exceedingly vague, even obscure . They included a brigade major, a 

brigade inspector, a Quartermaster General, a Paymaster General, and a Judge 

Advocate. The basic functions of the latter three had been defined by custom, 

but the responsibilities of the brigade major and brigade inspector were not 

specified. Furthermore, the legislation said that the brigadier general could 

25 . An Act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States, Statutes at 

Large I, sec. 3, sec. 12- 14,483 (1796); Thian, Legislative History , 104; Heitman, Historical 

Register, 1: 139, 2: 563. 

26. Heitman , Historical Register, 1: 348; NCAB, 12: 560. See Appendix B. 
70 

MAJ. THOMAS H. CUSHING. Inspector of the Army, 27 February 

1797-22 May 1798, and Acting AdTHE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

choose his "inspector from the captains and subalterns in the line," entitling them to extra pay and emoluments. Since Cushing had retained his 

position in the line, Wilkinson ignored 

his rank and permitted the major to 

remain as inspector. 27 

James Wilkinson was the Army's 

brigadier general who discovered that 

his inspector was occupied with military paper work-if, indeed, he was 

occupied with anything. In the absence of any equivalent of a modem 

Inspector General, the brigade inspector notwithstanding, Wilkinson had to 

tour the army to discover conditions 

for himself. What he found displeased 

him. The smart fighting force that had 

triumphed at Fallen Timbers had by 

1797 become little more than a collecJutant and Inspector General, 15 

June 1800-26 March 1802. 

tion of small ineffectual bands scattered throughout the wilderness. The 

absence of enforced standards was very clear and Wilkinson's experience as his 

own inspector general left him fuming with indignation as he returned east later 

in 1797. He was appalled at the condition of the army-and, most likely, 

equally upset that the state of things had been unknown to him before his 

personal inspection. If anyone in the army possessed the strength of will for 

realignment, it was Wilkinson . But he needed to know at all times what was 

deficient before he could order its correction. Given the widely scattered army 

and the absence of any real inspectorate , that was impossible. 

The U.S. Army organized in 1796 had , without anyone quite realizing it at 

the time , a mission without precedent in its own history. The Continentai 

Army, the improvised forces that succeeded it, the Legion of the United Statesall had been formed to take the field against an enemy. They were fighting 

forces motivated, not always well, to maintain efficiency. Most important, they 

were fairly cohesive bodies, relatively speaking, under the eyes of their 

commanders. The Continental Army was sufficiently large that the commander 

needed an extra set of eyes. He gave himself, with the approval of Congress, an 

Inspector General and organization to keep the Army in view. The temporary 

27. An Act to Amend and Repeal in Part the Act Entitled "An Act to Ascertain and Fix the 

Miliary Establishment of the United States," approved 3 Mar 97, Statutes at Large I, sec . 2 

(1797); Thian , Legislative History, 86; Heitman , HistoricaL Register, I: 38, 2: 564. This legislation 

was continued by further legislation 27 Apr 98, but the Anny's organization was immediately 

thereafter overtaken by other events. 
DECLINE, REVIVAL, AND VICISSITUDES OF INSPECTION 71 

armies that followed the Revolution had little in the way of a formal inspectorate, 

but they were compact enough that their commanders could observe most parts 

of them; these forces' failures were due to circumstances, including incompetent 

leadership, and not to lack of inspection. 

Anthony Wayne had revitalized the principles of inspection for the Legion of 

the United States. But perhaps because the position of the chief inspector was 

never formally occupied, his inspectorate was personal and improvised. A 

small, coordinated group of staff officers acted as his personal agents, his eyes 

and ears, and messengers. He needed nothing more elaborate, because the 

Legion was mostly within his view. Wayne established very firmly a principle 

that inspection was the agency of the commander, the t~ol by which he made 

his army do his will. But it would appear that Congress and the War Department did not perceive the important role that Wayne's improvised inspectorate 

played in forging the Legion. Rather, they noticed how well he got along 

without a formally constituted organization for inspection. They therefore 

neglected to provide for effective inspection in the' new army organization. 

If the United States Army had remained a compact body, as the Legion of 

the United States had been , Wilkinson might have managed to keep his finger 

on all parts. Congress did not afford him any aides he might use as inspectors, 

and Wilkinson was not the sort of person who attracted a devoted staff. 

Nevertheless, with an army in the field, he could keep himself informed of its 

condition, and assert his control. But his army in 1797 was an army in name 

only. It was no longer a recognizable marching force supervised directly by its 

leader. Rather, it was on its way to becoming a continental constabulary, 

dispersed across the wilderness in small units, most of them unable to communicate with one another. Wilkinson might be the nominal commander of that 

scattering of armed bands, but it was impossible for him to keep them all in 

view at anyone time. Since the commander could not be everywhere at once, 

he would require assistance if he was to know what was going on in the Army. 

The mission that would occupy the Army for most of the nineteenth centurypolicing the West-had begun to take shape by 1797, not deliberately, but 

circumstantially. The organization established by Congress would have sufficed 

for a consolidated marching force. It was inadequate for a frontier constabulary 

in which local commanders were prone to regulate their own forces as they saw 

fit. Its greatest administrative shortcoming was the absence of any systematic 

way of keeping the commanding general informed, so that he could oversee the 

efficiency of his army. So, as an unhappy Wilkinson ended his tour of inspection as in 1797, it is likely that he gave some thought to the Army's administrative defects. At the least, he must have concluded that he needed some means 

of knowing what those unrestrained satraps, the post commanders, were up 

to--and some way of ensuring that they served the public interest before their 

own. 

Before anything could come of Wilkinson's frustrated complaints, war 

threatened once again. Congress addressed the reconsolidation of the army into 

a fighting force. To oversee national mobilization, the lawmakers revived 
72 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Washington's former rank of lieutenant general. Congress also remembered the 

Commanding General's principal assistant during the Revolution, and decided 

that the lieutenant general's second in command should be called the "Inspector 

General. " 
CHAPTER 6 

Hamilton and the Provisional Army 

(1798-1800) 

Wilkinson retained Thomas Cushing as his brigade inspector under the act 

of 3 March 1797, ignoring the law's restriction of his right of appointment to 

junior officers. That apparently left his inspector without the compensation to 

which he would have been entitled since he was a major rather than a captain or 

subaltern. It took a special law on 22 May 1798, amending the 1797 legislation, 

to pay Cushing and thus allow Wilkinson to retain the inspector he wanted. I 

Thereafter, Wilkinson's chosen inspector vanished amid a flurry of real and 

apparent changes in army organization. 

Establishing an Army for War 

From March to July 1798 , Congress passed at least twenty pieces of legislation aimed at strengthening the national defense. The object of military attention at that time was France, with which relations had been deteriorating for 

some time. Among the new developments was an expanded fortification construction program, real and potential increases in the Regular Army, and a 

so-called provisional army that grew and grew over the next year, but only on 

paper. This was a reaction to the conflict in Europe beginning with the revolution in France. These wars with revolutionary France had, since the early 

1790s, their own unhappy effects on relations between the United States and 

various foreign powers. Britain indulged in customary highhandedness on the 

seas, capturing American sailors on their own ships and impressing them into 

British naval service. As the United States and Britain edged toward war over 

that issue, danger was averted by Wayne's victory in the Northwest and the Jay 

Treaty of 1794. In the treaty, the British agreed to evacuate the posts they 

occupied on American soil and to arbitrate debts left over from the Revolution. 

The French overreacted to the Jay Treaty, assuming it meant more than it 

really did in terms of Anglo-American relations, because of the decided 

Anglophilia of leading Federalists in the United States. An American delega1. An Act to amend the Act illlituled [sic} "An Act to amelld and repeal in part the act intituled 

~n act to ascertain alld fix the military establishment of the United States. o. Statutes at Large 1, 

sec. 1-2, 531 (1798); Thian, Legislative History, 105. See Appendix B. 
74 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

tion that went to Paris late in 1796 was at first rebuffed, then in 1797 met with 

an insulting demand for loans and a hefty bribe for the three French agents 

identified by the Americans as " X, Y, and Z. " The aftermath of the "XYZ 

Affair" was an increase in tensions that led Federalists to demand that the 

United States prepare for war. 2 One of the most prominent Federalists, Alexander Hamilton, was the strongest advocate of an expanded army. In February 

1798 he prepared a proposal, which Secretary of War James McHenry sent to 

Congress on the 15th, to increase the Regular Army to 20,000 enlisted men, 

and to provide for a provisional army of 30,000. That brought only piecemeal 

legislation over the next month .

3 

The authorized strength of the army stood at 3,870 enlisted men and 289 

officers on 27 April 1798, although the actual complement was considerably 

less. On 28 May, Congress authorized the President to raise a " Provisional 

Army," by expanding the Regular Army to a maximum of 10,000 enlisted 

men. The general staff of the army would comprise a lieutenant general with 

four aides-de-camp and two secretaries, an unspecified number of major generals with four aides among them, and an Inspector General, an Adjutant General, a 

Quartermaster General, a Paymaster General, and a Physician General. The 

Inspector General was to have the rank of major general, and was entitled to 

appoint two aides with the rank of major. The President could also appoint 

assistant inspectors and subinspectors wherever needed. The consent of the 

Senate was required for appointment of the Inspector General, although if the 

President believed it advisable to fill the position while the Senate was not in 

session, he was empowered to do so temporarily . In addition, the Inspector 

General and other new officers could " continue in commission during such 

term only as the President shall judge requisite for the public service. " Finally, 

no officer appointed under the legislation was entitled to pay until actually 

called into service.

4 . .. The position of the Inspector General of the provisional army ~as clearly modeled on what developed during the Revolutionthe Adjutant General, for instance, was ranked brigadier general, and would 

probably have been subordinated to the Inspector General. Like Steuben, the 

new Inspector General would effectively be chief of staff to the lieutenant 

general, and at the same time head of an inspectorate reaching down to the 

brigade level. But as events soon demonstrated, the intention was to have a new 

Inspector General who was more than a chief of staff. 

2. Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 108; Weigley, History of the United States 

Army, 98-104; Freeman, George Washington, 7: 521- 34; Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of 

John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 

Press, 1957),308-33; Page Smith, John Adams, 2 vols. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1962), 

2:973-83; Bernhard Knollenberg, "John Adams, Knox, and Washington," Proceedings of the 

American Antiquarian Society, 56 (October 1946): pI. 2, 207- 38. 

3. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S . Army, 222- 23. Fort McHenry at Baltimore, Maryland, was named for President Adams' Secretary of War, James McHenry. 4. An Act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a provisional Army, Statutes at 

Large I, sec. 6, 7, 9, 10, 558 (1798); Heitman, Historical Register, 2:564-65; Thian, Legislative 

History , 105- 06 . 
HAMILTON AND THE PROVISIONAL ARMY 75 

A number of Federalists promoting an expanded army had ambitions of 

their own-Hamilton being first among them. The principal check upon their 

designs lay not in the opposition of the Republicans, but rather in their own 

camp. President John Adams was suspicious of the intentions of Hamilton and 

others, and not at all enthusiastic about the creation of a larger army. His 

influence ensured that the provisional army was not so large as its promoters 

desired, nor that he would be forced to call it into existence. As leading 

Federalists fell into sordid squabbling over who would or would not be among 

the major generals-with Hamilton and Charles Cotesworth Pinckey always 

near the top of the list-Adams' limited interest in calling up the provisional 

army declined toward nullity. In the end, he never felt it necessary to raise the 

force to its authorized strength.

5 

The nation could think of only one man to command the new army---George 

Washington. Hamilton-whose most recent military association with the old 

general (except for endless correspondence on martial subjects) was as his 

adjutant during the Whiskey Rebellion-put up the appearance of favoring the 

former president's appointment. Washington, however, was averse to the whole 

idea, and not at all enamored of Hamilton's strong views. He replied firmly to 

all inquiries that he was reluctant to assume the office of commander in chief, 

but was willing if need be-provided he could pick his own subordinate 

commanders, free of the political brawling among Federalists with military 

ambitions. Washington pointedly did not mention Hamilton for any position in 

the army.6 

The Inspector General as Second in Command 

Hamilton lost no time in gathering support for his own attempt to take 

effective control of the provisional army. It was obvious to him, and to everyone else concerned, that Washington, if he accepted command, would at most 

be a figurehead, his second in command would be the real controller of the 

army. The former President's influence was great, however, and Hamilton 

sought it in his own behalf.7 Hamilton's desire to playa major role was 

obvious, and so strong that he managed to change the conception of the Inspector General's position in the Army: "Inspector General, with a command in the 

line," he had defined it to Washington. Before long, everyone who competed 

with Hamilton for the position of second in command sought the job of inspector general. In that interpretation, the Inspector General would in fact be the 

commander of the army, in the expected absence of Washington. That was not 

the role played by Steuben in the Continental Army, and this probably was not 

the role envisioned by Congress when it reestablished the title. But by June 

5. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 224-25. 

6. James Thomas Flexner, George Washington: Anguish and Farewell (1793-1799) (Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1972), 393-96. 

7. Hamilton to Washington, 2 Jun 98, in Richard B. Morris, ed., Alexander Hamilton and the 

Founding of the Nation (New York: Dial Press, 1957), 438-39. 
76 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

1798 , "Inspector General" was a title of convenience for the second in 

command, and not at all the title of a staff officer in charge of a system of 

inspection. AdanJs soon became alarmed by what he perceived as too many 

plots to give control of the provisional army to Hamilton, whom he had his own 

reasons to distrust. In addition, he believed that the navy was more important 

than a larger army. So the President dragged his feet throughout June, showing 

no inclination to call out the provisional army . Finally, to confound the 

Hamiltonians, Adams nominated Washington, without the latter's knowledge, 

to the lieutenant general's position on 2 July . Congress approved unanimously 

five days later, while Adams and McHenry exerted great efforts to persuade 

Washington to accept. The old soldier finally agreed, on the condition that he 

have no duty or pay until he actually took to the field. He never did. 8 

Washington nevertheless was drawn into the political maelstrom brewing 

over the appointment of his principal staff and subordinate commanders. His 

inspector, quartermaster, adjutant, and chief of artillerists and engineers, he 

told McHenry on 5 July, "ought to be men of the most respectable character 

and of first rate abilities, " as the Commander in Chief must rely on their knowledge to form his own decisions. Washington went on to say that all must be 

men of unquestionable integrity and prudence with his fullest confidence. The 

Inspector General, Washington made clear, should be an upstanding characterimplicitly, not the sort inclined to the kind of political maneuvers then occupying Hamilton and others interested in the job. Furthermore, Washington wanted 

the Inspector General's role to be like Steuben'S, not a line officer as Hamilton 

had suggested. 9 Washington wanted the Inspector General to do Steuben's job. 

One of the major generals of the line should serve as his second in command. 

But he did not reckon with the redefinition of the Inspector General worked by 

the influence of Hamilton. Besides Hamilton's focus on that position, it is 

likely that those hungering after position realized that the next-and perhaps 

last, if the troops were not raised-general officer's post to be filled would be 

that of the Inspector General. That officer would control the organization of the 

army-including the selection of officers. 

There were other obvious candidates for second in command, in Washington's opinion. But Hamilton had powerful political forces arrayed in his support. 

Accordingly , under McHenry's prodding, Washington agreed to accept three 

major generals: in descending order, Hamilton, Charles C. Pinckney, and 

Henry Knox . He immediately wrote Hamilton a letter describing the patriotic 

reasons for giving way to Pinckney. Hamilton knew he had won , however, and 

stood firm. President Adams was forced by political circumstances to go along, 

and on 18 July 1798 Hamilton became Inspector General, therefore the senior 

major general and second in command to Washington . 10 

8. Flexner, Washington: Anguish and Farewell , 390-400; Jacobs, Beginning o/the U.S . Army, 

223. 

9. Washington to James McHenry, 5 Jul 98 , quoted in Thian, Legislative History , 4. 

10. These negotiations are discussed in Flexner, Washington: Anguish and Farewell, 40~2. 
HAMILTON AND THE PROVISIONAL ARMY 77 

As the result of additional legislation in July, the Inspector General appeared 

as in the legislation of 28 May, but with a somewhat altered organization. He 

was entitled to 2 aides and 2 assistant inspectors taken from the line, while the 

Adjutant General also received 2 assistants. Lastly, the legislation empowered 

the President to appoint 4 teachers of the arts and sciences for the instr:uction of 

the artillerists and engineers. 11 The power of the new Inspector General was for 

the moment secure, but not because of the legislation of 16 July. Hamilton was 

the senior officer on the job, for Pinckney's commission as major general 

dated from one day after his own, 19 July. So long as Washington showed no 

inclination to exercise his own powers, Hamilton was preeminent. 12 

Inspector General Hamilton 

At least potentially, Hamilton carried more authority over the army than 

anyone who ever bore the title Inspector General before or after him. But his 

authority meant nothing unless the expanded army came into being. "At present there is no more prospect of seeing a French army here than there is in 

Heaven, ,., snorted President Adams, refusing to mobilize. Hamilton apparently 

did not disagree, but he did everything he could to override Adams' decision 

not to raise the army. He worked hard over the next months to recruit the new 

regiments. Stymied at that, he sought to commission enough officers to command 30,000 soldiers. Besides incurring the fearful wrath of the Republicans, 

the differences between Adams and Hamilton over the Army issue produced a 

split in the Federalist Party that led to its electoral defeat in 1800.13 

Hamilton was the dominant figure in the United States ArnlY for two years. 

But what were his intentions? The Republicans, remembering Hamilton's previous utterances, his role in the Whiskey Rebellion, and the recent passage of the 

Alien and Sedition Acts, believed that he planned to establish an authoritarian 

government by military means. When he hinted at such a notion in 1799, even 

his friends, including Gouverneur Morris, believed the same. At the least, 

Hamilton appeared bent on using his position to the disadvantage of the 

Republicans, whom he rigorously excluded from commissions, with the apparent acquiescence of Washington and McHenry . Adams predicted that that 

would backfire, and he proved correct. 14 

II. An Act to augment the Army of the United States, Statutes at Large I, sec. 3--4, 604 (1798); 

Thian, Legislative History , 106; Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 566. For his aides, Hamilton 

eventually appointed Capt. George Izard and Lt. Ethan Allen Brown; Jacob Brown later served as 

his military secretary. Sanger, "Inspector General's Department," 238-39. 

12. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 793. 

13. Kurtz, Presidency of John Adams, 308; Adams as quoted in Smith, John Adams, 2: 983; 

William H. Gaines, Jr., " The Forgotten Army: Recruiting for a National Emergency (1799-1800)," 

Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 56 (July 1948): 267-79. 

14. Leonard D. White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History (New York: 

Macmillan , 1954), 275; Kurtz, Presidency of John Adams, 330; Smith, John Adams, 2: 983, 

1004-07, 1033- 34. Weigley believes that Hamilton intended all along to use the military as a 

political instrument to impose the kind of strong central government he believed the country 

needed. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 102-03. 
78 

MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER HAMILTON . 

Inspector General, 25 July 1798-15 

June 1800. 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

On the other hand, aside from his 

excessive partisanship and unrestrained tongue, Hamilton made no 

positive movements to dominate the 

country. Just exactly what his intentions were for the new army remain 

unclear. He conceived of his position 

as one in which he could form and 

discipline the new regiments, molding them to his desires-absolute control of the army, if not the country. 

Being head of a large standing army 

. likely Suited Hamilton's romantic 

dreams, and there was always the possibility that military triumph might 

give him a permanent position of influence in national politics. 15 Whatever his ultimate objectives, Hamilton was immediately the dominant 

power in the army. He tried early to 

take over the War Department. McHenry wrote Hamilton on 25 July to tell him 

of his appointment as Inspector General. He wrote Washington at the same time 

to tell him that the President had gone home for the summer, and that it was 

planned to have Hamilton revise the army regulations. 16 As soon as Hamilton 

received the news in New York of his appointment on the 28th, he went to 

Philadelphia at once, presuming from his old friendship with McHenry that he 

would have complete control of matters. On the 30th, he offered to relieve the 

Secretary of War of the "vast mass of details" he must look after. But McHenry 

kept the department's reins in his own hands. Hamilton therefore returned 

home, writing Washington a letter criticizing McHenry rather harshly. 17 

Hamilton reached an uneasy truce with McHenry, whom he soon began to 

bombard with suggestions: As a major general, he outranked Brigadier General 

Wilkinson, although he had urged the latter's promotion. Washington refused 

to support that, and nothing came of the suggestion. In any event, Wilkinson 

proved subordinate enough, and the two got along well after Wilkinson reached 

New York in early August. Hamilton's actual relationship to the Regular Army 

was unclear because of a blurred chain of command, but the relations between 

15 . Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military 

Establishment in America, 1798-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1957), 252-54. Kohn finds no basis 

for believing that Hamilton wanted to take over the country. 

16. Bernard C. Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry, Secretary of War 

under Washington and Adams (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers, 1907),316,319. 

17 . Ibid., 319-20; Hamilton to McHenry, 28, 30 Jul 98, in Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The 

Works of Alexander Hamilton, 9 vols. (New York: Putnam, 1885-86), 6: 90, 91 . 
HAMILTON AND THE PROVISIONAL ARMY 79 

the two officers were tranquil. Wilkinson occupied himself with his regular 

duties, while Hamilton looked to the future . He became a one-man general 

staff, planning, organizing, and looking forward to the day he would command 

the provisional army-and so occupying most of 1798. But the longer Adams 

declined to call out the new army, the more Hamilton's frustration grew. 18 

Hamilton and the Paper Army 

Legislation of 3 March 1799 contained a number of features apparently 

intended to curb Hamilton's ambition . The new position of General of the 

Armies of the United States, for instance, was a redesignation of the top post 

created as a suggested protection from the designs of the Inspector General. But 

the aging Washington was still the logical candidate, so Hamilton enjoyed his 

seniority and · a dominant position that would have allowed him to overcome 

that vague obstacle. It is also apparent that a provision limiting his extra pay to 

$50.00, "in full compensation for extra services and expenses in the execution 

of his office," was a suggestion that Congress would hear from Hamilton no 

Steubenesque postwar plea for extra reward. Despite these minor limitations, 

the Inspector General emerged in a commanding position, controlling not only 

his own apparatus but also that of the Adjutant General, at least so far as the 

latter was his deputy. That control was realized at lower levels, where deputy 

inspectors general were ex officio deputy adjutants general in the armies to 

which they were attached. Hamilton, in other words, appointed and owned the 

Adjutant General's staff. That did not seem to bother William North, one-time 

inspector, who became Adjutant General 19 July 1798; he remained until 

discharged 15 June 1800. 

The organization of 3 March 1799 was Hamilton's high point, integrating 

the Regular Army and any provisional force into one gigantic establishment 

with the Inspector General at its center. But once again, it was an exercise of 

paper work and a distinctly hollow victory in the political push and pull of the 

times. Washington never became General of the Armies of the United States, 

continuing in the inactive commission of lieutenant general until his death in 

December 1799. Not even the Quartermaster General was promoted as authorized to major general. 19 President Adams refused to raise additional troops, and 

Congress showed little inclination to pay for them. Moreover, the idea of a 

51,000-man army with no w,ar to fight was absurd in 1799. Not even at the 

height of its crises or triumphs had the Continental Army been able to attract 

anywhere near such a complement. Hamilton, with McHenry's considerable 

assistance, had created a potentially magnificent army , but in reality it lacked 

substance. 

Hamilton never saw his expanded army, but it was not for want of trying on 

his part. He had come to an accommodation with McHenry, and bombarded the 

18. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 227-29. 

19. Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 567. 
80 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Secretary with an endless series of proposals and suggestions, many of them 

reflected in McHenry's message to Congress in December. Hamilton maintained his predictions of an impending war with France. One of his principal 

concerns was the nation's failure to shore up coastal defenses, and he urged 

major efforts to fjnance and build them. 20 The strength of an enlarged army also 

remained of great concern to him. By then, the nation's failure to meet what he 

believed to be an obvious threat from France caused Hamilton to abandon what 

little faith he had in the country's people. He avowed that national conscription 

by lot among all persons 18 to 45 years old would be required "in case of 

invasion," the number necessary to complete the entire army of 50,000. He 

believed a draft essential, even in the event of a direct assault by a foreign 

power dismissing the militia as not worth consideration. 21 

Hamilton and the Real Army 

No enemy invaded the United States, and Hamilton's "entire army of fifty 

thousand" never rose, however coerced, to meet it. The growing futility of 

planning for an army of paper soldiers ultimately caused Hamilton to tum his 

attention to the real army. The first sign of his new interest was mixed-the 

publishing of regulations for a uniform that would clothe the grand army if it 

was raised but for the moment would clothe the present force. On 9 January 

1799, the clothing of soldiers from the Commander in Chief to the lowest 

private was specified by the War Department. The Inspector General, 

particularly, stood out. He, his aides, and inspectors general, especially, were 

"to be distinguished by a blue plume. ,,22 His interest in the uniform showed 

that Hamilton's attention had passed increasingly to the small army already in 

existence. On 4 February 1799, he received command of all troops in the 

Northwest and the Great Lakes. 23 But Hamilton had already begun to sound 

like a commander, one with the eye of an inspector. He had, for instance, 

drafted a blistering circular letter to the commander at West Point on the subject 

of discipline, accusing him of tolerating laxity and low standards among his 

troops. 24 

Despite Hamilton's best efforts, the morale of the army remained low 

through 1799, and the quality and efficiency of the troops probably declined as 

well. The majority of troops in the Southwest were sick during the summer, and 

work on fortifications stalled. Things were somewhat better on the East Coast 

and north of the Ohio River, but the old problems persisted not only of indiscipline and self-interested officers but also of generally inadequate supplies that 

20. Washington to McHenry, 13 Dec 98, in Morris, Hamilton and the Founding, 439. This 

letter was drafted by Hamilton. 

21. Hamilton to James Gunn, 22 Dec 98, in Morris, Hamilton and the Founding, 439. 

22. Orders, War Office, 9 Jan 99, in U.S. War Department, Uniform o/the Army o/the United 

States; Hamilton to McHenry, 18 May 99, in Morris, Hamilton and the Founding. 443. 

23. Sanger, "Inspector General's Department," 238-39. 

24. Hamilton to Commanding Officer at West Point and Dependencies (Circular), 30 Jan 99, 

in Morris, Hamilton and the Founding, 441-42. 
HAMILTON AND THE PROVISIONAL ARMY 81 

were of poor quality as well. Hamilton protested vigorously, demanding reforms 

in supply procedures, but McHenry was not to be budged.

25 

Hamilton and the Army of the Future 

Hamilton spent most of his time in the office instead of inspecting, still 

harboring hopes of a grand army. Consequently, he found time to ponder larger 

questions of the nation's military establishment. Cavalry, he told McHenry in 

July, was never well understood in the United States, whereas there were 

various theories of the "system" of cavalry in Europe. He believed it very 

important to experiment, and to devise a system of cavalry "adapted to the 

geographical circumstances of the country. For this purpose alone a small body 

of cavalry is indispensable." But he got none. In September, Hamilton urged 

the establishment of a "corps of invalids" for retired or disabled soldiers, 

suggesting that the United States was "perhaps the only country in which an 

institution of this nature is not to be found-a circumstance, which, if continued, 

will be discreditable ." He also proposed a school for children of men in the 

Army and Navy, but still met only deafness.

26 McHenry was probably weary of 

Hamilton's grand vision of a great army, and no longer inclined to support even 

the smallest gestures toward achieving it. But the Secretary of War was receptive to another of Hamilton's projects-the establishment of a national military 

academy. 

Hamilton had long promoted a system of military instruction, belaboring 

the idea with Washington in 1796. On 23 November 1799, he gave McHenry 

an elaborate plan for a complete military school system. A "fundamental" 

school with a two-year course would provide basic education to officer candidates for all branches of the Army and the Navy. Branch schools would continue 

the instruction for the artillerists and engineers, the cavalry, the infantry, and 

the Navy. There were to be professors of mathematics, geography, natural 

philosophy (physical sciences), and chemistry (including mineralogy). The 

school faculties would also include architects and drawing masters, riding 

masters, and fencing masters. To preside over the educational system, Hamilton called for a "director-general." The proposal was an immediate success 

among Hamilton's superiors. Washington endorsed it, as did President Adams 

in a strong, almost contentious statement to Congress in January 1800. When 

Congress asked McHenry what the educational structure would cost, he was 

able to demonstrate that its promotion of efficiency would save money. Submitting construction cost estimates for school facilities, McHenry persuaded Congress in the strongest terms. Hamilton's plans met approval in the Senate, but 

the House of Representatives left for recess and delayed its consideration of the 

measure until the following December. There the academy idea rested. 27 

25. Jacobs, Beginnillg of the U.S. Army, 228-32, 233-34. 

26. Hamilton to McHenry, 2 Jul, 17 Sep 99, in Morris, Hamilton alld the Founding, 443, 445 . 

27. Hamilton to Washington, I Dec 96, and Hamilton to McHenry, 23 Nov 99, in Morris, 

Hamilton and the Founding, 438, 445-46; Fonnan, "Why the United States Military Academy 

Was Established, " 23-25. 
82 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The campaign to raise a large army had opened a wide division in the ranks 

of the Federalists since 1798. By early 1800, Adams' efforts to end tensions 

with France-the justification for the great army-served to worsen conflicts in 

the party ranks. The President was persuaded by early spring that McHenry and 

others in his cabinet were conspiring against him, even working against his 

reelection. So Adams cleaned house, among other things demanding McHenry's 

resignation on 5 May. But the President had difficulties locating a qualified 

successor. At last, after several knowledgeable individuals declined the honor, 

Samuel Dexter agreed to become Secretary of War as of 13 May, the effective 

date of McHenry's resignation. But he was reluctant to move into the office, 

and the War Department remained leaderless. Brigadier General Wilkinson, 

never slow to detect the way the winds blew, began to curry favor among the 

Jeffersonian Republicans, and ran the War Department. 28 

Hamilton's last hopes for military glory had by that time been dashed, and 

the Inspector General was out of office. On 14 May 1800, Congress repealed 

most of its military measures of the previous two years, discharged most of the 

men recruited, and reduced the Army to an authorized 4,436 officers and 

men-and thereafter budgeted for only about 3,400. Among other casualties of 

that legislation was the office of the Inspector General, which was disbanded. 

Except for the existence of an Inspector of Fortifications and an Inspector of 

Artillery and a few other staff officers, the general staff resembled its former 

self. A brigadier general headed the organization, and under him again were the 

ill-defined brigade major and brigade inspector. Even the Adjutant General 

disappeared from the organizational listing. 29 As a result of these changes, 

Hamilton requested permission on 13 May to resign his commission as of 1 

June. He was turned down, because it was believed advisable for him to muster 

out personally the larger bodies of troops then to be discharged. That was his 

only real service as an inspector in the traditional sense, and it was probably 

thrust on him because of his political relations with the theoretical forces he had 

created. The discharges having been completed, Hamilton's resignation was 

accepted on 15 June. Thomas H. Cushing returned the same day to his role as 

"Acting Adjutant and Inspector." He took up residence in the new capital of 

Washington in the District of Columbia, and resumed his former routine. 30 

Hamilton left his mark on the U. S. Army, because he was a man of 

instinctive military sense and of wide interests and unbounded energy. His 

hopes for a military academy would soon be realized, although not exactly as 

he had proposed. His exhortations on discipline were welcome, and came at a 

time when the Army most needed them. Hamilton's abandonment of brutality 

in favor of incarceration for deserters had long-reaching effects, starting the 

28. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 239-40. 

29. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 38,2: 568; Thian, Legislative History, 86. The Inspectors 

of Artillery and Fortifications were to be detailed from the line. 

30. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 38; Thian, Legislative History, 86; Sanger, "InspectorGeneral's Department," 239. Hamilton became president general of the Society of the Cincinnati 

and resumed pursuit of rus ambitions through conventional methods. 
HAMILTON AND THE PROVISIONAL ARMY 83 

Army on the road away from corporal punishment, eventually making 

"guardhouse" synonymous with "jail" in the minds of many, both military 

and civilian. But as his frustrated efforts to expand the Army reflected, the 

Inspector General left no lasting imprint on army organization. Hamilton was 

Inspector General in name only, at least if the term is to connote the head of a 

system of inspection. He was in effect the dominant officer of the organization, 

and behaved as a commander so far as the Secretary of War permitted him to . 

But the army he hoped to raise never came forth, and his role as commander 

went unrealized. Although Hamilton the Inspector General contributed little to 

the evolution of the U.S . Army's inspectorate, his possession of that title did 

have its own curious effects. Because of Hamilton, the title of Inspector General was divorced from inspection, and unalterably attached to the chain of 

command. When next the term Inspector General appeared, it would denote the 

Secretary of War's principal commander. The Army was to lack a commanding 

general for many years, and the Inspector General became its totem head. The 

precedent for this leadership requirement in 1812, as in 1798, reached back to 

the Continental Army, as misconceived by the nation's leaders. But Hamilton's 

title really ratified that use of the term. 

Meanwhile, the Army tried to recover from its brush with partisan politics. 

Wilkinson moved to set right what he had believed wrong in army administration. 

The country was divided into twelve military districts for purposes of administration on 30 November 1800. There was also an attempt to ensure the honesty 

of inspection and mustering. The order prescribing the districts said that "the 

muster and inspection of a garrison should not be made by any officer belonging to it. ,,31 The clear implication was that someone else must be assigned to 

inspection and mustering. The recognition that it was desirable for the army to 

have within it a disinterested group of officers in order to avoid conflicts of 

interest and to gauge efficiency was clearly recognized in this provision. It was 

an unintentional endorsement of Washington's concept of inspection which, 

eventually, would require a formal system. 

31. John R. Parsons, Jr., History of Inspection in the Armed Forces (Washington: Department 

of Defense, 1981), 15 . 
CHAPTER 7 

Disgrace of an Inspector General 

(1801-1813) 

The accession of Thomas Jefferson to the presidency in March 1801 signified one of the major political transitions in American history. Liberal republicanism was supplanting centrist, conservative federalism. It was no accident 

that the new order of things had its effects on the army, for the military 

establishment had been a point of contention between political parties for some 

time. The Federalists founded the military system during the early national 

period, and they remained its defenders. They argued strongly for a large navy, 

coast and border defenses, and an adequate Regular Army. They were somewhat divided over what adequate might mean, but at the least they wanted the 

country to field enough soldiers to garrison the Indian country and to ensure 

preparedness for the next war. I 

The Jeffersonian Army 

The Republicans, under Jefferson's leadership, were of quite a different 

mind. Jefferson was hostile to the idea of a standing army, seeing it as an 

inherent menace to public safety. Had he been able, he would have eliminated 

the army altogether in favor of a universal system of militia. But the Militia Act 

of 1792 proved unenforceable, so the Regular Army endured as a necessary 

evil. Jefferson remained ambivalent-he reduced the Army as soon as he could 

after taking office, although he later proved willing enough to expand it when 

foreign affairs appeared dangerous. His chosen successor, President James 

Madison, and a thoroughly Jeffersonian Congress raised the Regular Army to 

the highest authorized strength it would achieve before 1898.2 Both presidents 

showed an interest in the functions of the army . Thus, if Jefferson had any 

l. Donald R. Hickey , " Federalist Defense Policy in the Age of Jefferson, 1801- 1812, " 

Military Affairs, 45 (April 1981): 63-70. 

2. Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 108; Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 236; 

Ward, Department of War, 132-33; Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801-1829 (New York: Macmillan, 1959),212- 13; Weigley, History of the United 

States Army, \04-05 . See also Samuel P. Huntington , The Soldier alld the State: The Theory and 

Politics of Civil-Military Relatiolls (New York: Vintage, 1964), 196-98, and Dumas Malone, 

Jefferson alld the Ordeal of Liberty (New York: Little, Brown, 1962). 
DISGRACE OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL 85 

ambitions for the Army, he desired that it be useful to the nation. To that end, 

he and Hamilton, cooperating for the moment, arranged for the establishment 

of a national military academy. They sowed the seeds of a future professionalism with that deed, but for some years the Army's chief distinction was its 

dedication to the laborious and nonstrategic activities of road building, river 

clearing, and exploration- habits firmly established during the Jeffersonian 

years. Otherwise, the Army declined drastically while Jefferson was in office- a 

victim not so much of Republican malice as of presidential neglect. Jefferson 

had other things to think about, and remained indifferent to army administration, 

which he left up to the Secretary of War. 

The position of Secretary of War would have challenged the most energetic 

of men. From 1798-when procurement authority, except for the actual execution of contracts, returned to the War Department from the Treasury-to 1812, 

it was generally believed that the small size of the Army made it unnecessary to 

maintain in peacetime the staff departments required in wartime. So the Secretary of War served personally as Quartermaster General, Commissary General , 

Master of Ordnance, Indian Commissioner, Commissioner of Pensions, and 

Commissioner of Public Lands. He bought all supplies, but only after funds had 

been appropriated by Congress, which required that all procurement be conducted on a yearly basis. For subsistence, Anthony Wayne had urged in the late 

1790s "the absolute necessity of some [more] effectual and certain mode of 

supplying the Army than that of private Contract," but the contract system 

continued. The system did not, perhaps could not, work , with the Army scattered all over a nearly roadless country, lacking any real supply organization 

worthy of the name. Some officers protested the constant shortage of food , 

clothing, and shelter, and described the living conditions of the men as 

"inhuman. ,,3 

Merely to administer the disorder of the War Department was nearly 

impossible. But the Secretary of War's situation was made even worse by the 

fact that he was also effectively the army commander. In keeping with 

Jeffersonian sentiments, no officer was allowed to command the whole army 

until 1821. That may have been intended to prevent an ambitious general from 

marching on Washington and seizing control of the country. More immediately, 

in Jefferson's administration the absence of a single commander prevented 

Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson from taking over the Army. Although Wilkinson 

was the senior officer in the United States Army, no one in the administration 

trusted him, despite his attempts to curry their favor. 4 

Jefferson appointed Henry Dearborn to superintend the War Department 

and its many and conflicting interests. Once a physician, Dearborn had been a 

Massachusetts Minuteman in 1775, then a gallant and energetic soldier who 

3. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 225-29, 236, 252-53; Risch, Quartermaster Support, 

11~19; White, The Jeffersonians, 215-28. 

4. William B. Skelton, "The Commanding General and the Problem of Command in the 

United States Army, 1821-1841," Military Affairs, 34 (December 1970): 117. 
86 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

had finished the Revolution as a lieutenant colonel. But by 1801, he was a 

superannuated drudge even more thrifty than Jefferson.5 He remained, however, 

an advocate of a small, well trained, national army to oppose outside aggression. 

The militia in his and Jefferson's view was sufficient only for the maintenance 

of internal order. This philosophy, in part, explains his interest in the active 

army despite his constricting views on economy. 

Before Dearborn could curtail him, Wilkinson attempted early in the Jefferson Administration to assert his authority over the Army. He did so by attacking 

one of its symbols: the queues sported by one and all in defiance of changing · 

tonsorial customs. Wilkinson ordered hair to be cut short, on the grounds of 

cleanliness and neatness, on 30 April 1801. Officers and men alike protested 

strongly losing their pigtails, but despite some cases of resistance, eventually 

they complied. 6 Thereafter, the Jeffersonians progressively exerted their control over the Army, and tried to displace Wilkinson. They began by trying to 

professionalize the Army, then by reducing it. Adams had appointed a mathematics teacher for the artillerists and engineers, under the legislation of 1798, in 

January 1801. The Jefferson Administration continued the policy of employing 

a few teachers, mostly well-qualified Europeans. On 12 May 1801, Dearborn 

told Wilkinson that the President had decided to establish a military school at 

West Point with Maj. Jonathan Williams as the inspector of fortifications. 7 The 

position of Inspector of Fortifications, although first conceived to do what the 

title implied on behalf of the Secretary of War, became a misnomer. The 

incumbent was more a school principal than a superintendent of fortifications. 8 

The United States Military Academy at West Point was one of Jefferson's 

long-term objectives for the improvement of the Army. But it was of a piece 

with one of his immediate goals-reduction of the military force so far as 

circumstances would permit. On 19 December 1801, the Army numbered 248 

officers, 9 cadets, and 3,794 enlisted men, in 4 regiments of infantry, 2 of 

artillery and engineers, and 2 companies of light dragoons. Still relying on the 

militia for peacetime security, Jefferson believed the active army was excessive 

for its mission of policing the frontier and guarding arsenals. 9 As a consequence, 

Jefferson proposed a "Military Peace Establishment," and Congress debated 

the subject during the first three months of 1802. Some members of the House 

of Representatives believed that Jefferson's cuts in the Army were too modest. 

They focused particularly on the provision of an aide-de-camp to the brigadier 

general, an office one of them described as a "perfect sinecure." But the 

5. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 245-46; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 363. 

6. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 261-62. 

7. Dearborn to Wilkinson, 12 May 01, quoted in Forman, "Why the United States Military 

Academy Was Established." 

8. See Appendix B. 

9. Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 108; Jacobs, Beginning oflhe U.S. AmIY, 236. 

See also A.D. Schenck, "The United States Army in the Year 1810," Journal of the Military 

Service Institution of the United States, 32 (1911): 443-44. 
DISGRACE OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL 87 

opponents decided not to fight the bill on that issue alone. It was nevertheless 

plain that Congress wanted no elaborate staff system for the Army. 10 

The act of 16 March 1802 reduced the number of infantry regiments from 4 

to 2, cut the artillery to 1 regiment, eliminated the small mounted force , and 

established the Corps of Engineers. Infantry regiments had but 1 battalion, 

arrayed in 10 companies composed of 4 officers and 76 enlisted men. The 

artillery had 4 battalions, each with 5 companies of 3 officers and 76 enlisted 

men. The general staff was headed by the brigadier general, who was entitled to 

an aide and whose only immediate assistants were an "Adjutant and Inspector 

of the Army" and a "Paymaster of the Army," each detailed from the line. 

Beneath them stood the Army's roster of paymasters, assistant paymasters, 

military agents, surgeons, and surgeons' mates. I I Wilkinson, too, suffered 

from the new arrangement. The law allowed him a salary of $225.00 per 

month, with rations, expenses, or other compensation. That was not enough to 

permit him to pursue his most important duty, which was to inspect the Army. 

Always resourceful, however, the brigadier general managed to supplement his 

income; a War Department accountant reported in 1811 that he had embezzled 

$7,891.03 from various official accounts.12 

The Adjutant and the Inspector 

Wilkinson had always placed great stock in inspection as a tool of command, 

serving as his own Inspector General since the 1790s. He now lacked the 

wherewithal to inspect and even a semblance of power to command. As the 

small Army passively existed during the first decade of the nineteenth century, 

Wilkinson turned his attention progressively toward more rewarding interests. 

He had always been a man of questionable character, but he soon became 

positively sinister. He got himself placed on a pension from the Spanish government in exchange for occasional information and possible future services. 

Later, he became involved in Vice-President Aaron Burr's vague plot to create 

an independent western empire, turning informer when the plot was revealed. 

His shadowy conduct was indicative of the small demands made on his official 

time. 

The brigadier general was a functional nonentity whose position might as 

well not have been filled. Dearborn ran the Army, bypassing Wilkinson as 

much as possible. Although he was wont to handle much of his own correspondence, the Secretary used the Adjutant and Inspector of the Army as his 

office assistant and delegate. Thomas Cushing remained in that position until 

April 1807. He served Dearborn, not Wilkinson, and the Army soon learned 

10. Debates, 21 Jan 02, in Thomas Hart Benton, Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, 

From 1789-1856, 16 vols. (New York: Appleton, 1857- 1861), 2: 535- 86. 

II. An Actfixing the military peace establishment of the United States, Statutes at Large 2, sec. 

3-4, 132 (1802); Thian, Legislative History, 107; Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 569. 

12. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 254. 
88 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

that the Adjutant and Inspector spoke for the Secretary, not for himself and not 

for Wilkinson. It was perhaps fitting, therefore, that Fort Dearborn, at Chicago, 

was established and so-named in response to instructions in Cushing's hand. 13 

This arrangement with the Adjutant and Inspector spending his time as the 

Secretary's adjutant, and with the frustrated Wilkinson ineffective meant that 

the Army had no real inspectorate. That was not because its force was too 

small, which it was, but because there was no reason in Dearborn's mind to 

institute a formal inspection. But in the absence of critical review, the Army's 

situation encouraged inefficiency. The force was down to 2,732 men in 1805, 

scattered among forty-three posts. The largest group was the 375-man garrison 

at New Orleans, the next largest the 220 men at Detroit. The smallest post 

numbered 3 men at Fredericktown, Maryland. Thus the Army existed in name 

only. 14 

The War Department staff produced one piece of worthwhile paper work in 

1806, when the Articles of War were revised. The original code had been 

adopted in 1776 and revised slightly in 1786. The new version, mostly an 

inventory of crimes and misdemeanors, reflected the more liberal spirit of the 

times by curbing the arbitrary brutality that had characterized Army justice. 

This more enlightened approach to military punishment can be seen as having 

its origins in some of Alexander Hamilton's recommendations while he was 

inspector. The continuity of ideas in the Army may be seen in that the text 

survived with only the most minor alterations into the 1890s. In fact, although 

there were various amendments, no wholly new code was adopted until 1916.

15 

Cushing returned to his line command and was succeeded as Adjutant and 

Inspector by Maj . Abimael Youngs Nicoll, an artillerist, on 2 April 1807. 

Nicoll had the distinction of being the first of the Army's hierarchy young 

enough not to have been a veteran of the Revolution-although he was the son 

of one. He was a graduate of Princeton and also a medical doctor, but he had 

been an artillerist since 1791 and a major since 1804. His relative youth brought 

him limited influence among the older men inhabiting the War Department. As 

had Cushing, he served mostly as the Secretary's adjutant. 16 Nicoll arrived in 

'Vashington during a time of increasing tensions between the United States and 

Britain. Jefferson had to admit by 1808 that the militia system was a failure, for 

the states were unable to raise the units requested of them. So the President 

asked Congress to triple the size of the Regular Army to nearly 10,000 men. 

13. Cushing to Commander at Detroit, 9 Mar 03 , Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 255 . 

14. Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (New York: Putnam, 

1956; reprint, New York: New American Library, n.d.), 59. 

15. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 272-73; Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier 

Between Two Wars: Army Life and Reforms, 1865- 1898 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 3-5 . 

The Anny also adopted its increasingly confused system of brevet commissions in 1806. Ganoe, 

History of the United States Army, 121; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 110- 11. 

16. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 748; A. Elwood Corning, "Little Known Facts and Well 

Known Folks of Newburgh and Vicinity," Newburgh, New York, News, 8 June 1940, clipping in 

IG biographical files, Office of the Inspector General. 
DISGRACE OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL 89 

Congress complied on 12 March 1808, setting the Army's strength at a maximum 9,921 officers and men. The force included 5 new infantry regiments, 1 

regiment of riflemen , and I each of light dragoons, artillerists, and light artillery, 

along with the small Corps of Engineers. There was also new money for coastal 

fortifications, and $200,000 for state militias. Despite this surge of activity, the 

office of Adjutant and Inspector was unaffected by the legislation. Inspection , 

however, was, at least in principle. When a "suitable proportion of the troops 

authorized by this act shall be raised, " the President was authorized to appoint 

two brigade inspectors, taken from the line. They, presumably, were to be 

shared by the three brigadier generals. The brigade inspectors and all other staff 

officers were to be United States citizens. But except for them, the Army had a 

no more real staff than it had before. 17 

The Madisonian Army 

Despite the legislation, the government was not committed wholeheartedly 

to an increase in the army, nor even to making it more efficient. Recruiting 

lagged, as a new administration-that of James Madison-took office in 1809. 

Madison was even more equivocal toward the army than Jefferson had been. 

Only 6,744 officers and men were in service by 1812, not the authorized 

10,000. This neglect could not be justified with the growing tensions between 

the United States and Great Britain. While Madison pursued a wavering foreign 

policy and a vacillating policy on the military for three years, relations with the 

British deteriorated fitfully , compelling the President in 1810 to recommend 

filling out the Regular Army and assembling equipment for 20,000 volunteers 

and 100,000 militia . But he offered a budget that made that impossible, so 

nothing happened. Madison's Secretary of War, meanwhile, tried to take control of the War Department. Like Dearborn, William Eustis was a former 

physician, and a parsimonious individual. But he lacked even Dearborn's capabilities as an administrator. The growing but still small Army continued to 

vegetate. 18 

While the army as a whole went from bad to worse, the Adjutant and 

Inspector enjoyed a somewhat stronger position. By 1809, orders of the War 

Department were routinely issued from the "Inspector's Office." They ranged 

from the important to the routine. On 27 April 1809, all officers on furlough or 

absent from their corps were to report without delay to the Adjutant and Inspector, 

Nicoll, to explain the authority for their absence. Thereafter they were to report 

monthly . On 17 July, Nicoll was granted furlough, and Lt. Col. John Whiting 

17 . An Act to raise for a limited time an additional military force, Statutes at Large 2, sec . 

3-4,8-9,481 (1808); approved 12 March 1808,2 Stat. 481 ; Thian, Legislative History , 107- 08; 

Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 570--71; White, The Jeffersonians, 213, 531-35; Weigley , History 

of the United States Army, 109. 

18. Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 342-43; Irving Brant, James Madison, 6 vols. 

(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill , 1941-1961),5: 123-29,437; Weigley, History of the Un ited States 

Army, 112. 
90 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

of the 4th Infantry was appointed to assume the duties of the Adjutant and 

Inspector of the United States Army. 19 The importance of the inspectorate was 

clear when Congress decreed on 30 April 1810 that the Inspector of the Army 

was among the officers of the United States whose letters and packets" shall be 

received and conveyed by post free of postage. " That reflected the volume of 

the Adjutant and Inspector's correspondence, for he served more as adjutant 

than as inspector. Nicoll was not about to make more of the office than that, 

because he was absent during most of 1811. When Nicoll took another furlough 

on 25 June 1811, Eustis told Col. William Beall to act as Adjutant and Inspector. 

Five days later, the duty again went to Col. John Whiting. Nicoll was again 

absent from his command on 30 August, with Capt. James Gibson acting in his 

place. Eustis wearied of ordering changes of addresses in Nicoll's office and 

demanded, "Until further orders all letters and returns for that office will be 

simply addressed 'to the Adjutant and Inspector of the Army.' ,,20 

Facing Another War 

Meanwhile, war with Britain appeared ever more likely. But Madison and 

Congress vacillated once again. When the President brought himself to ask for 

10,000 additional regulars, 50,000 federal volunteers, and $3 million to pay for 

it all in 1811, Congress authorized a Regular Army of 25,000, a volunteer army 

of 30,000, and a budget of $1 million. But the government was reluctant to 

implement the legislation, so nothing important came of that flurry of 

lawmaking. 21 This lack of firm activity was to be regretted when war finally 

erupted in June 1812. It burst upon an American nation that was decidedly 

belligerent but, except for a sufficiently empowered central government, no 

more prepared for military adventure than it had been in 1775. The tiny Regular 

Army of less than 7,000 men was scattered among small outposts. The troops 

were mostly untrained and commanded by men of little talent or energy, a 

mixture of aging veterans of the Revolution and well-connected men drawn 

from civilian life. There were only seventy-one graduates of West Point available. 

The administrative apparatus for army supply was insufficient for peacetime, 

and hopelessly inadequate for a continental war. Furthermore, there was little 

19. General Order (GO), Inspector's Office, 27 Apr 09, and Orders, W. Eustis, 17 Jul 09, both 

in U.S. War Department, General Orders Relating to Inspection, and the Inspector General's 

Department, collected by A.C. Quisenberry (n.p., 1893) (hereafter cited as GORI&IG). This 

remarkable compendium was assembled by the Inspector General's chief clerk in 1893 and was 

updated at irregular intervals over the next decade and a half. Athough one of the records of the 

Inspector General's Office, it was for some unknown reason not incorporated into the body of that 

office's records in the National Archives. The original reposes in the staff offices of the Navy and 

Old Army Branch Office of the National Archives, Washington, D.C., and comprises every general order affecting inspection, beginning with the two cited above. A copy is in DAIG. 

20. An Act regulating the post-office establishmem, Statutes at Large 2, sec. 24, 592 (1810); 

Thian, Legislative History, 108; Orders, W. Eustis, 25 Jun, 30 Jun, and 30 Aug II , all in 

GORI&IG. 

21. Brant, James Madison, 5: 396-401; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 114-115. 
DISGRACE OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL 91 

vigorous direction given by the Congress. It knew instinctively that it must 

prepare for war. To do so it drew upon fading recollections of the Revolution, 

and acted with an incredible combination of meddling and bungling. The 

lawmakers' intense preoccupation with minor details knew no limits; on 11 

January 1812, for example, they fixed the exact amount of soap and candles to 

be provided to enlisted men with their rations. 22 

The Army appeared adequate in June 1812, but only on paper. When war 

was declared on the 18th, its authorized force included 17 regiments of infantry, 4 

of artillery, 2 of dragoons, 1 of riflemen, and the Corps of Engineers. But 

except for 7 infantry and 2 artillery regiments, and part of the dragoons and 

engineers, most of the army was recently authorized and as yet unraised . The 

organization of regiments varied from" 10 to 18 companies each until Congress 

standardized them on the 23d-25 infantry regiments then were all to have 10 

companies of 90 privates each. The states were also asked to place their militia 

on call. 23 Nor was the army organized or staffed to wage a big war. The 

average age of its generals was about sixty years. And as had been the case 

since Wilkinson was shunted aside, there was no commander of the whole U.S. 

Army. Secretary Eustis supervised nine military districts, each under a general 

officer. 24 

A serious problem of the organization was Congress' persistent tampering 

with the military supply system, which in 1812 was in a state of collapse. 

Legislation fixing the peacetime military establishment on 16 March 1812 

abolished the positions of quartermasters and turned their duties over to yet 

another system of "military agents," intended to be directed by the Secretary 

of War. The lawmakers reversed themselves twelve days later-at least for the 

war emergency-and established a Quartermaster Department headed by a 

Quartermaster General. But the department was divided into eight districts, 

only four of which (all north of the Potomac) were accountable to the Quartermaster General; the others answered to the Secretary of War via military 

commanders. The fIrst Quartermaster General, an old soldier of the Revolution, 

lasted less than a year. 25 

Reestablishment 

It was in this distressing context that the title of Inspector General reappeared in the United States Army. Congress began to prepare for war on 11 

22. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 115; David A. Clary, These Relics of Barbarism: 

A History of Fumiture ... ", 31; Clifford L. Egan, "The Origins of the War of 1812: Three 

Decades of Historical Writing," Military Affairs, 38 (April 1974): 72-75; U.S. War Department, 

Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Military Laws and Rules and Regulations for the Armies 

of the United States (Washington: n.p., 1813), 75 (hereafter cited as 1813 Regulations). 

23. Marvin A Kriedberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United 

States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955),44-47; Weigley, History of 

the United States Army, 118-19. 

24. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 119; Kriedberg and Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization, 46. 

25. L.D. Ingersoll, A History of the War Department of the United States . .. (Washington: 

Francis B. Mohun, 1879), 181; Risch, Quartermaster Support, 136-39. 
92 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

January 1812, much as it had in 1798. Legislation authorized the appointment 

of "one Inspector General," with the rank and pay of a brigadier general. He 

was permitted two assistant inspectors, taken from the line, with the compensation of lieutenant colonels. An officer detached to serve as an assistant to the 

Inspector General was not to lose his rank as a result. Finally, the law required 

that no staff officer appointed under its provisions could receive pay until 

actually called into service. The whole law was lifted almost bodily from that 

which had enabled Hamilton to become Inspector General despite the misgivings of others. 26 Even though Congress did not specify the functions of the 

Inspector General, the War Department did, revealing that the office bore not 

only Steuben's indelible stamp but also a small touch of Hamilton's. The 

"Regulation of the Duties of the General Staff," 4 May 1812 specified that the 

inspector would note discipline, facilities, and equipment and would also conduct musters and examine financial accounts. 27 

The statement of duties was explicit enough, but it actually served to 

complicate further the chain of command. An inspector, as Washington and the 

reluctant Steuben had defined the job, was supposed to monitor discipline; but 

the new regulations said he was" to superintend and enforce discipline, " which 

was the job of a commander acting on the reports of an inspector. That provision in the War Department regulation probably reflected the memory of 

Hamilton's tenure in the office. So did , it is likely, the first duty-to organize 

the Army-although Steuben's role at Valley Forge may have helped to legitimize that provision. Nevertheless, with no commander other than the Secretary 

of War, the Inspector General's real place in the scheme of things remained to 

be seen. 

On 16 May 1812, Congress authorized the President to appoint, from 

among the captains and subalterns of the line, "so many subinspectors as the 

service may require, not exceeding one to each brigade." On 26 June, Congress authorized two brigade inspectors taken from the line , one permanent 

inspector general, two assistant inspectors general taken from the line, and an 

Adjutant and Inspector of the Army also taken from the line. The distinction 

between the new brigade inspectors and the subinspectors previously authorized for brigades was not immediately apparent. By that point, not even the 

lawmakers, it appears, knew just whom they were talking about. 28 Nevertheless, 

Congress and the War Department had to come to grips with the office of 

Inspector General, for the nation had already declared war on Britain, as of 18 

June. The preoccupation with details persisted anyway. On 6 July, Congress 

allowed the President to appoint a Deputy Inspector General in any army other 

26. All Act to raise an additional military force, Statutes at Large 2, sec. 4-6, 25, 671 (1812); 

Thian, Legislative History, 108. 

27 . Regulation of the Duties of the General Staff, Adjutant General's Office (hereafter cited as 

AGO), 4 May 1812, in GORI&IG. 

28. All Act makillgfurther provision for the Army of the Ullited States, Statutes at Large 2, sec. 

3,735 (1812); All Act respecting the pay of the Army of the Ullited States, Statutes at Large 2, sec. 

1,782 (1812); Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 572- 73; Thian, Legislative History, 108. 
DISGRACE OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL 

than that in which the Inspector General served. The Inspector General's 

mail remained free from postage. 29 

Eustis selected an Inspector General that same day. A week later, on 

14 July, he announced he had appointed Col. Alexander Smyth of the 

Rifle Regiment to be Inspector General of the Army with the rank of 

brigadier general. Eustis' instruction 

suggested that Smyth would have 

power to command. As for the Adjutant and Inspector of the Army, Eustis 

put him out of business in the same 

order, placing Major Nicoll under the 

Adjutant General, Thomas Cushing, 

as one of his assistants. 30 Smyth was 

the third Inspector General, so-called, 

of the United States Army. He was 

the first to disgrace himself in the 

position-so thoroughly that the job 

93 

BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER SMYTH. Inspector General, 6 July 1812-3 

March 1813 . 

was abolished in order to get rid of him. But in July 1812, he appeared a not 

illogical candidate for the office. 

Alexander Smyth was born in Ireland in 1765, migrating with his minister 

father to Virginia at about the start of the American Revolution. Educated at 

home, then in the law, he became a deputy county clerk when he was 20 years 

old, and was admitted to the bar four years later. He practiced law throughout 

his life, and was active in Virginia politics as well. From 1792 to 1809, he was 

a member of the Virginia legislature, in the upper house during the last year. 

Probably because of Smyth's political connections, the Virginian President 

Jefferson (exponent of the citizen-soldier) commissioned him colonel of the 

Rifle Regiment, 8 July 1808. He was ordered to Washington in 1811 "to 

prepare a system of discipline for the army. " His work was published the next 

year as Regulations for the Field Exercise, Manoeuvres, and Conduct of the 

Infantry of the United States, approved by the War Department. His reputation 

as the author of a drill manual apparently impressed Eustis, or someone. It 

should actually have served as a warning . Smyth's regulations were merely an 

abridged translation of the French Army's infantry regulations of 1791, not 

wholly applicable to American practice. The colonel's contribution to the cause 

29 . An Act making fllrth er provisions for the Army of the United States, and other purposes, 

Statutes at Large 2, sec. 2-3, 784 (1812); Thian , Legislative History , 109 . 

30. Orders, W. Eustis, 14 lui 12, in GORI&IG. Thomas Cushing, former Adjutant and 

Inspector, was now Adjutant General; William North had been offered the post but had declined it. 

On 16 Iuly , Eustis appointed Capt. William King, of the 15th Infantry assistant to the Inspector 

General. Orders, W. Eustis, 16 lui 12, GORI&IG. 
94 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

of discipline, accordingly, was not much. Steuben's regulations remained such 

as the Army had, republished in 1808 and again in 1812, accompanied by some 

of Dearborn's penny-wise economy regulations. Several private imprints were 

also published. However, among the old veterans designating themselves military men in 1812, Eustis did not have many candidates to undertake the Inspector General's first duty. That was to organize the Army-which was then 

totally unorganized. Smyth had produced a volume of regulations-however 

useless, they were credentials.

3 1 

The new Inspector General was a handsome man, whose rather boyish good 

looks reflected a similar character. He was addicted to comically pompous 

bombast that most people treated with ridicule, although Eustis may have been 

favorably impressed with so many brave words. Winfield Scott, who was 

among those unfortunate enough to serve under Smyth, later characterized him 

with a great deal of charity, but clearly enough to demonstrate what kind of 

man had become the Inspector General. Scott felt that Smyth had no talent for 

command, and, although able in some fields, his tendency to brag and his 

pomposity made him ridiculous in the eyes of his soldiersP 

Smyth Goes to War 

Smyth was less an inspector general than Hamilton had been, his title 

notwithstanding. His rank was just brigadier general, so he was not the senior 

officer of the Army; at the time, no one was, although the various Revolutionary veterans commissioned as brigadiers claimed seniority by tenure. Eustis 

tried to run the war himself, handing out inadequate orders to the various 

theater commanders and department heads. If Smyth had had the ability or the 

inclination to fulfill his mandate under the legislation establishing his office, he 

might have been of real service--despite Eustis' ineptitude and the general 

atmosphere of chaos. But Smyth wanted glory, and Eustis permitted him to 

pursue it. The Inspector General left for the battlefield in early September, 

leaving no one behind to organize the army or to fulfill any of the other duties 

expected of an inspector general. The small staff remaining in Washington 

processed returns and did other paper work. 

The proponents of war against Britain had had one great aim in view from 

the 'Outset-the annexation of Canada. To that end, they had fanned hastily 

organized forces of regulars and militia across the northern border. In the east, 

31. DAB, 9: 373-74; Heitman , Historical Register, I: 905; 1808 Regulations; U.S. War 

Department, An Act Jar Establishing Rules and Articles Jar the Government oj the Armies oj the 

United States (Washington: R.C. Weightman, 1812); Virgil Ney, Evolution oJ the United States 

Army Field Manual: Valley Forge to Vietnam, Appendix B, Report of the Field Manual Review 

Board (Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: U.S. Combat Development Command, 1966), 7-8. The 1812 

Regulations apparently do not differ from the 1808 Regulations. Smyth has been dismissed as "just 

a commonplace braggart without redeeming qualities," Jacobs, Beginning oj the U.S. Army, 

384-85. 

32. Winfield Scott, Memoirs oj Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D., 2 vols. (New York: Sheldon, 

1864), I: 54n. 
DISGRACE OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL 95 

troops under Gen. Henry Dearborn-the ailing former Secretary of War had 

donned uniform, along with many other vintage warriors of the Revolutionwere to attack Montreal along the Lake Champlain route. In the center, Stephen 

Van Rensselaer, a major general of New York militia, was to invade Canada 

across the Niagara River frontier. To the west, Brig. Gen. William Hullanother veteran of the Revolution-was to take an expedition out of Detroit 

into Upper Canada. 

Inadequate preparation and incompetent leadership had begun to corrode 

the entire enterprise by late summer. Hull allowed himself to be outfoxed by 

much smaller British and Canadian forces, and on 16 August surrendered 

Detroit and all troops under his nominal command without firing a shot. The 

British and their Indian allies followed that with a brutal campaign that left 

them in control of Lake Erie and the Michigan country. Hull's performance was 

disgraceful, and earned him a court-martial and a death sentence for cowardice--

remitted only because of his record during the Revolution. After their triumph, 

the victorious British under General Isaac Brock rebounded to the Niagara 

River, which he and about a thousand men reached on 23 August. They dug 

into strong defensive positions anchored by Fort George. The goal of taking 

Canada, if not the safety of the United States, seemed imperiled. It was to the 

Niagara that Alexander Smyth went to the rescue. 33 At this point, Hull's sorry 

showing, when combined with problems in the forces along the eastern frontiers, 

unruly and disorganized combinations of regulars and volunteers, and growing 

chaos in supplies and financing, should have impelled the government to halt, 

take stock, plan a course for the future, and organize the Army to follow its 

plan. But the nation's leaders did nothing of the kind, and accordingly gave the 

Inspector General little to do as inspector general. With another impetuous dash 

at the border in the making, Smyth determined to be a part of it. 

Dearborn established himself in Albany to organize supplies and reinforcements. Van Rensselaer faced Brock over the Niagara, tom between his own 

reluctance and fears of a British attack on the one hand, and Dearborn's demands 

for action on the other. His force grew throughout September, and when Smyth 

arrived with 1,700 regulars at the end of the month, the American position was 

secure. Van Rensselaer had about 8,000 troops altogether, half of them regulars, 

facing about a thousand regulars and 1,200 militia and Indians strung along the 

river opposite. Smyth refused to cooperate with Van Rensselaer because the 

latter was not a regular. Van Rensselaer was not the sort of man inclined to 

court-martial the insubordinate Smyth, as he should have. Thus the results of 

his generalship were not surprising-he launched a cross-river assault against 

Queenston Heights on 13 October. 34 

33 . For the general course of the war, see the recent account of Pierre Berton, The Invasion of 

Canada, 1812-1813 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980) as well as Henry Adams, History of the United 

StateS During the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, 9 vols. (New York: Scribner, 

1889-1891), pertinent parts of which are contained in Harvey A. DeWeerd, ed., The War of 1812 

(Washington: Infantry Journal, 1944). 

34. Berton, Invasion of Canada, 21~9. British General Brock died in the action. 
96 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The better American troops, in particular regulars led by Winfield Scott, 

fought gallantly, but the battle of Queenston Heights was a debacle. Van 

Rensselaer left the Army, and Smyth became the senior officer on the Niagara 

frontier. "I must not be defeated," he declared when he took command, and 

ordered construction of enough boats to take 4,000 men to the Canadian shore. 

That was ridiculous, for half of his army was unfit to fight and most of his 

regulars were untrained recruits; furthermore, his hospitals and cemeteries were 

full and militia desertions exceeded a hundred men per night. Nevertheless, 

Smyth tried to launch a new invasion, predicting martial glory. He was ridiculed by his disenchanted soldiers. After weeks of indecision, he made two 

remarkably inept efforts, fully anticipated by the British, to launch attacks 

across the Niagara River. The lack of leadership, poor preparation, and demonstrated indecision infuriated the exasperated American soldiers. On 27 November, 

following the second invasion try, the troops were demoralized. 35 What happened next was described by, among others, Maj. John L. Thompson who said 

that all military discipline collapsed. 36 That was an understatement. Smyth's 

army exploded in rage. Officers broke their swords, and privates their muskets. 

The militia ran wild, shouting and firing their weapons. Before long they 

focused on the cause of their discontent, and began shooting at Smyth's tent, 

riddling it. One of his aides was almost killed, having his belt and cap shot 

away. Smyth increased his personal guard, then moved his headquarters repeatedly to protect his life. His continued service in the Army was impossible, and 

political~y unacceptable. 

The Office Is Abolished 

Smyth asked for leave to return home to Virginia, and Dearborn, with the 

hearty support of Eustis, granted it to him. The office of Inspector General, 

thoroughly debased by his performance, disappeared with him. On 3 March 

1813 Congress abolished it, replacing it with an Inspector General's Department headed by an adjutant and inspector general. Smyth held no commission 

in the line, so he was' 'disbanded," no longer an officer. The erstwhile Inspector General asked to be returned to the Army, to "die, if Heaven wills it, in the 

defence of his country. " His petition was denied, but Smyth did not disappear 

entirely from the Army's future. Beginning in 1817, he served in the House of 

Representatives for all but one term until his death in 1830. His committee 

assignments included military affairs. 37 Alexander Smyth, one of the strangest 

people ever to don a general's uniform in the American army, was not totally to 

blame for his failure. Because he was incompetent, he was least able to judge 

35. Ibid., 257-62. 

36. As quoted in Ganoe, History of the Ullited States Army, 126. Other officers, including 

Peter B. Porter, offered strikingly similar descriptions. 

37. All Act for the better organizatioll of the gelleral staff of the Army of the Ullited States, 

Statutes at Large 2, sec. 1-4, II, 819 (1813); Sanger, "Inspector General's Department," 241. 

DAB, 9: 374. Smyth's role in later army legislation is discussed below. 
DISGRACE OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL 97 

his own limitations. Responsibility for his assignment as Inspector General, 

and for allowing him to neglect the proper duties of that office, rested with the 

Madison Administration, and, in particular with Secretary of War Eustis. 

The American army's education did not have to be so difficult. Not only 

were the wherewithall and the talent available to create a respectable military 

organization, the tools were also at hand. One would have been a consolidated 

system of command, under a single Commanding General. Granted, that posed 

political difficulties, and Eustis was at least wise enough to realize that none of 

the most prominent candidates for such a position was competent enough to 

make it effective. But although Eustis was a poor substitute, he continued to 

function as a commander in a rather loose way. The Army never was consolidated during the war. A unifying factor still available to Eustis--{)r to a commander if he had located one-was the office of the Inspector General. As 

constituted in the legislation, that official enjoyed wide powers, and in the 

absence of a Commanding General could have organized the Army and made it 

efficient. He would at least have made it possible to know how many men were 

in service; where they were, and how efficient they were, in order more 

effectively to dispose of them. Given that only 12 percent of the Army during 

the war were regulars or long-term volunteers, the rest being militia, a coordinated system of training and inspection, such as Steuben had developed during 

the Revolution , should have seemed essential. 38 Thanks to Smyth, however, 

the office of Inspector General disappeared in early 1813, and with it its 

potential utility in training and organizing the Army. And thanks to Eustis, who 

had treated the position as merely another commission without reference to its 

stated purpose, its value to the Army had never been tested. 

38. H.A. DeWeerd , " The Federalization of Our Army ," Military Affairs, 6 (1942): 143-52. 
CHAPTER 8 

Origins of the Office of the Adjutant 

and Inspector 

(1813-1815) 

The American cause was enhanced in December 1812, when William Eustis 

stepped down as Secretary of War. He was succeeded on 13 January 1813 by 

John Armstrong. The new Secretary accomplished some good. Unfortunately, 

his efforts could not overcome the problems imposed by his own personality. 

He did not have the support of the Congress or most of the cabinet because of 

his reputation as a plotter and critic against politicians with whom he disagreed. 

His irascible, unsympathetic nature quickly alienated most of the senior anny 

commanders and those few in the government willing to give him a chance. 

Without support, his indecisiveness and his penchant to overmanage left the 

Army no firm direction when it was most needed. 

Army Reformation, Inspectorate Restoration 

Armstrong was energetic, with results both good and ill for the Army and 

for the cause. He had been a major critic of the administration's handling of the 

war. When Eustis departed under fire from Congress, Madison appointed 

Armstrong, a veteran of the Revolution, hoping the New Yorker would bring 

Northern support and do a better job. Although Armstrong spent much of his 

secretarial energy in plots to displace the leadership of the Republican Party, 

more serious, for the war effort, was his sometimes unfounded faith in his own 

military ability. Eustis had never permitted anyone else to command the Army, 

and had tried (0 manage the war from the War Department on his own. But at 

least he had not tried to play general himself. Armstrong, however, neglected 

his true office, and at least twice took to the field during campaigns, thoroughly 

scrambling command relationships with his presence and his orders. Needless 

to say, anny command was never unified during his tenure. 

Even the Secretary's martial pretensions had their beneficial effects, however. 

He perceived early that, as de facto commander, he required competent staff ' 

support. He encouraged Congress in March 1813 to foHow through on a Eustis 

proposal to provide the Secretary with a general staff to furnish all administrative services. Unlike their predecessors, the new staff officers were to be based 
ORIGINS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR 99 

in Washington; they were the permanent management staff of the War 

Department. The result of that, and some of Armstrong's other reforms, was a 

considerable improvement in supply and logistics-although they remained 

inadequate throughout the war. More immediately beneficial to the Army was 

Armstrong's effort to eliminate superannuated, incompetent generals from the 

roster, which the enemy had serendipitously begun during the way of 1812. 

The generals newly appointed were, with some exceptions, energetic, efficient, 

and competent. They were also younger than their predecessors; under Armstrong their average age declined to thirty-six years by 1814.1 Armstrong's 

most visible contribution to army organization was the act of 3 March 1813, 

which increased the force to 57,351 officers and men and authorized a simple 

form of a general staff. Among its members were 1 adjutant general and 

inspector general along with 8 inspectors general and 16 assistant inspectors 

general. There were also a separate medical staff, Quartermaster Department, 

and Ordnance Department. 2 

The legislation used the word department in its two current senses. As a 

separate bureaucratic organization or subdivision of a larger organization, the 

word identified the establishments of Quartermaster and Ordnance, both termed 

departments. That usage was relatively recent, and apparently an Americanism. 

More common at the time was the definition of department as a sphere of 

a(:tivity. It was in that sense that the legislation referred to staff activities such 

as those of the inspectors and adjutants.

3 The Inspector General's Department, 

as an organization, therefore was not established in the 1813 legislation. Although 

it may not have been a formal organization, the Inspector General's activity 

was a welcome restoration within the Army. The legislation said that the 

departments of the Adjutant General and the Inspector General would include 

an "Adjutant and Inspector-General, with the rank, pay, and emolument of a 

I. Concise Dictionary oj American Biography, 2d ed. (New York: Scribner, 1977),29 (hereafter 

cited as CDAB); Weigley, History oj the United States Army, 121-23; White, The Jeffersonians, 

237-38; Brant, James Madison, 6:68 , 167,261; E. Edward Skeen, John Armstrong Jr. , A Biography (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981),53. The legislation of Annstrong's period 

is discussed below. For Armstrong's presentation of his wartime record, see John Armstrong, 

Notices oj the War oj 1812,2 vols. (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1840). 

2. 2 Stat. 819; Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 574-75 . Regarding training, riding masters and 

sword masters continued in the Dragoons. 

3. The OxJord English Dictionary (hereafter cited as OED) lists the first use of the term to 

identify the major divisions of government in a statement by George Washington in 1791. Its 

application to a lesser bureaucratic organization, as opposed to a sphere of activity or interest, 

apparently originated with the establishment of the Ordnance and Quartermaster's Departments on 

3 March 1813 . It should be noted that standard references, including Heitman's Historical Register 

and such texts as the National Archives inventory of the Records of the Office of the Inspector 

General, state that the Inspector General's Department was created in the 1813 legislation . Not only 

is that an error in etymology, but a close examination of the law and of resulting army organization 

demonstrates that no such organization came into existence at that time. It may also be observed 

that the formation of separate departments was still tentative in 1813: Only the Ordnance Department had an apparent chief, the Commissary General of Ordnance. There were eight' 'QuartermasterGenerals [sic]." Purchasing came under one Commissary General of Purchases, with deputies and 

assistants, but was not distinguished from the general staff. The medical staff had preeminent a 

Physician and Surgeon-General and an Apothecary-General. 
100 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

brigadier general," along with the inspectors general, adjutants general, and 

assistants of each title. Inspectors general were to have the "brevet rank and 

pay and emoluments of a colonel of infantry , " while assistant inspectors general were treated as brevet majors of cavalry. The latter were to be taken from 

the line, while inspectors general "may be taken from the line or not, as the 

President may deem expedient. " Finally, the appointment of the highest officer, 

the Adjutant and Inspector General, was to be accomplished rather indirectly, 

Congress formally decreeing' 'That the President of the United States be, and is 

hereby, authorized, if he shall deem it expedient, to assign one of the brigadiersgeneral to the principal Army of the United States, who shall, in such case, act 

as Adjutant and Inspector-General, and as chief of staff of such Army .,,4 The 

legislation continued the two brigade inspectors, taken from the line and previously in existence, but did not regard them as part of the Inspector General's 

"department. " Since there were only thirteen brigade majors authorized, it may 

be assumed that brigade inspectors functioned as brigade majors-that is, as 

adjutants and aides or secretaries to the brigadier generals. The role of the 

Adjutant and Inspector General, however, was clearly specified in the law. He 

was not the head of a War Department organization, but specifically the chief 

of staff for the main army---effectively Steuben's role, although without such 

specific authorization. After Smyth's poor performance, it is likely that Congress wanted no more inspectors general in position of command. 

The distribution of inspectors general and assistant inspectors general, when 

compared with the number of general officers, suggested that the former were 

to serve as inspectors, possibly chiefs of staff, to major generals---ordinarily, 

district commanders. The assistants performed like services for brigadier 

generals, who were mostly field commanders. The inspectors had no separate 

existence as a group , and no central coordinating authority. Inspection, 

accordingly, was restored as a function of command, as it had been under 

Washington and Wayne. The Adjutant and Inspector General was a linguistic 

anomaly, probably adopted as a way of vacating Smyth's hold on office. The 

officer functioned as did other inspectors general and adjutants general. His 

title signified only his place in the most important field army , although there 

could have been an inspector general and an adjutant general immediately 

under him in that army. To clarify the duties of inspectors general and others, 

Congress also adopted "Rules and Regulations of the Army for 1813." The 

regulations were essentially Steubenesque, but they elaborated on various staff 

services. The duties of inspectors general were summarized as follows: "These 

will be divided under the following heads, viz: Mustering and inspecting troops 

of the line, and militia detachments serving with them; Selecting places of 

encampment, and posting guards; Superintending the police of the camp and of 

the march; Inspecting parades; and Making half yearly confidential reports to 

4. An Act for the better organization of the general staff of the Army of the United States, 

Statutes at Large 2, sec . 1-4, 11 , 819 (1813). 
ORIGINS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR 101 

the War Department, of the state of the Anny, division, or detachment, to 

which they belong.,,5 

Steuben would for the most part have recognized the duties of inspectors 

general in 1813, and been comfortable with them. He might have been startled, 

however, by the inspectors' power to issue orders in some circumstances, and 

Washington would have blanched at independent communications between 

inspectors and the War Department. In the absence of a single army commander, 

however, the War Department merely stepped into the place Washington would 

have filled. The integrity of command was not in principle compromised, 

except as an army commander might regard his inspector as a War Department 

spy. That was because each commander was required to review and comment 

upon the reports before they were forwarded to the War Department. 

Mustering and inspection were the first of the duties of inspectors general, 

imposed in order to correct the chaotic lack of infonnation on manpower that 

had characterized the Anny in 1812. Inspectors general were to muster troops 

once every two months before they were paid. Pay was to be issued according 

to muster rolls signed by an inspector general or his assistant, or in their 

absence by a designated officer. Three copies of muster rolls were to be prepared: 

one for the district paymaster and two for the War Department (one for the 

department's accountant, the other for the Paymaster General). Semiannual 

musters of the whole Anny, "whether regular or militia, " were to be made on 

or before 1 January and 1 July, "and rolls thereof, in alphabetical order, forwarded to the War Department as promptly therafter as possible." Mustering 

clearly was an accounting device for the War Department, independent of army 

commanders. Inspection, however, was a tool of command. Inspections were 

to be of two types, "stated and occasional. " The former were to take place at 

the end of every month, the latter "as often as the General commanding the 

district, the Chief of the Staff, or the Inspector General, may think proper." 

Both focused on anns, equipment, clothing, and all other objects of economic 

concern. Anny horses were to be inspected quarterly. Unfit animals were to be 

branded in the presence of an inspector and given to the Quartennaster Department for sale. A return of every inspection was to be filed in the appropriate 

Inspector General's office, "for the infonnation of the general commanding the 

district, and half yearly returns of inspection shall be made to the War 

5. Rilles alld Regulations of the Army for 1813 , Doc. 125, 13th Cong., 1st sess., Americall 

State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 1 (1813) (hereafter cited as ASP-MA) I. The War Department, 

through the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, published these as Military LalVs and Rules 

alld Regulations for the Armies of the Ullited States (1813 Regulatiolls, previously cited), with 

additional material. It appears that they first became public in Niles' Weekly Register, which 

published the regulations serially in early 1813. Those governing Adjutants General, Inspectors 

General, the Topographical Engineers, the Purchasing Department, and the army uniform appeared 

on 22 May. Niles' Weekly Register, 4 (22 May 1813): 187-89. Regarding uniforms, the regulations 

of 1813 made only one distinction for inspectors. Along with adjutants and other staff officers, 

they were "permitted to embroider the button holes of the collar only." United States War Department, Unifonn a/the AnllY a/the United States, IlLustrated, from 1774-1889 (Washington: Quartermaster General's Office, 1889). 
102 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Department. " The inspectors were also expected to be responsible for camp 

selection and security, control of prisoners, supervision of sutlers, and enforcement of march discipline. 6 

These latter duties were some of the more curious parts of the regulations. 

To begin with, inspectors served their commanders as provosts and legal officers as well as inspectors. That answered the absence of law enforcement and 

judicial officers in the army establishment, but it was a considerable extension 

of the inspector's authority. Steuben had drawn upon himself and his subordinates whatever staff services were either unprovided or which he could absorb, 

in effect becoming both staff and chief of staff. The 1813 regulations made 

mandatory such a broadened roll of the inspector. Even more interesting was 

the granting to inspectors of the power to punish disorderliness or deviation 

from the order of march. That was clearly and traditionally a command power. 

So long as inspectors remained loyal agents of commanders, as Wayne's 

inspectors had, it would work well enough. But the power held the potential 

for a division of authority within a command that could have serious, disruptive 

effects on the organization. Officers and men must not only answer to their 

supervisors, but to inspectors as well. The duty of inspecting parades, as 

described by the regulations, made the inspector the eyes of the commander in 

the daily review. 

In selecting places for encampment and posting guards, the regulations very 

briefly made inspectors agents of their commanders: "This duty shall be performed under the directions of the commanding general; and the Inspector, in 

performing it, shall call to his aid an officer from each corps of engineers. " The 

latter provision meant that both construction and topographical engineers were 

to be involved in the layout of camps. The confidential half-yearly reports to 

the War Department were clearly a device by which the department hoped to 

acquire factual information on the efficiency and honesty of its military units. 

7 

The 1813 regulations, the most extensive guidance inspectors had yet received, 

owed a great deal to Steuben's legacy. While they stressed thoroughness and 

unbiased frankness, more interesting is what they did not say. They did not 

mention the preparation of regulations or training. As recently as 1812, the 

preparation of regulations and the organization and training of the army were 

among the first duties of the Inspector General. But without a single inspector 

general for the whole u.S. Army-the Adjutant General was a grandly titled 

inspector, adjutant, and chief of staff for one of the field armies-such a duty 

could not be fulfilled by the inspectorate. And an inspectorate, thanks to the 

1813 regulations, is what the Inspector General's department had finally become, 

free of responsibilities more properly placed elsewhere. Preparation of regula6. Rules and Regulations of the Army for 1813, Doc. 125, 13th Cong., 1st sess., 1813 , 

ASP-MA, 16:384. 

7. The 1813 regulations of the War Department had a further provision governing inspectors. 

When the militia drafts of 100 men gathered and were organized as a company, each unit was to be 

mustered and inspected by an inspector general, assistant inspector general, or designated Regular 

Army officer, the muster report to serve as the basis for pay. 1813 Regulations, 239-40. 
ORIGINS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR 103 

tions for congressional approval rested with the War Department staff, while 

training was the responsibility of line commanders. Inspectors were to monitor 

adherence to the former and the efficiency of the latter, free of vested interest in 

either. 

Another break with the past occurred in 1813. The administrative function 

of the adjutant had long dominated inspection. When the staff was small, it 

generally had little time for inspection. But when the Inspector General had 

been revived in 1798 and again in 1812, he dominated the Adjutant General, as 

Steuben had in the Continental Army. In 1813, however, the function of 

Adjutant General finally achieved its status as the first and most important of 

staff services, a logical reflection of its control of official communications. 

While adjutants general in 1813 were entitled to $90.00 per month in pay, 

$30.00 worth of forage, and six rations, inspectors general received just $75.00 

in pay, $12.00 in forage, and six rations.s 

The new inspectorate should have been of immeasurable value in organizing the large army Congress called for in March. But that proved difficult to 

demonstrate, because the recruiting effort was a dismal failure. Congress had 

increased the Army to an authorized forty-four infantry regiments and over 

57,000 officers and men, and in addition had invited members of volunteer and 

militia formations to enlist in the Regular Army for one year. But by the end of 

1813, no more than 20,000 regulars were on hand. 9 

Adjutant and Inspector General Pike 

The War Department, meanwhile, used the new position of Adjutant and 

Inspector General where it appeared that help was needed most-in the northern theater of the war. Henry Dearborn continued in nominal command in New 

York, but he was impotent to command the forces under him. He claimed 

illness as his excuse for inaction, and wanted to retire. He was no source of 

inspiration for his troops, who called him "Granny.,,10 Despite his evident 

infirmities, Congress and the War Department wanted action in Dearborn's 

theater, and the old general could not offer it personally. Rather than replace 

him, Armstrong gave him a chief of staff. Zebulon Montgomery Pike was 

promoted to brigadier general on 12 March 1813, assigned to Dearborn's army, 

and named Adjutant and Inspector General. The appointment may have come 

as a surprise to many observers. On the surface, Pike appeared almost as odd a 

person for such an assignment as Smyth before him. He had greater military 

experience than Smyth, but his only combat had come in a confused action on 

8. Niles' Weekly Register, 4 (8 May 13): 158. 

9. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 48-51; Weigley, History of the 

United States Army, 120. 

10. Pierre Berton, Flames Across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 1813-1814 

(Boston, Little, Brown, 1981), 41. 
104 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

the Canadian border in November 1812, when his troops got lost in darkness 

and shot at one another. 1 1 

Pike was born in 1770, the some of an army officer. He became a cadet in 

his father's regiment while a boy and then a lieutenant in 1799. His rise in the 

small army was steady, making captain in 1806, major in 1808, and lieutenant 

colonel in 1809, all in the Infantry. After serving briefly as a quartermaster 

officer, Pike became a colonel on 6 July 1812.12 He was fairly well known to 

the public before 1812, because of his adventures as an explorer. Wilkinson 

sent him from Saint Louis to discover the source of the Mississippi River in 

1805 . He returned a few months fater with erroneous findings. Wilkinson next 

sent him into Spanish territory at the head of an exploring party in 1806. That 

was, of course, an illegal invasion of a foreign domain , and it came to grief 

when Pike and his men were captured and interned for several months. 

Pike, however, was what Smyth merely professed to be: an effective 

commander. He was bold, even impetuous. He had eloped with his cousin, 

infuriating her rich father, and declared, "Whilst I have breath I will never be 

the slave to any." Like Smyth, Pike lusted for fame and glory and was devoted 

to the grand tum of phrase, but fortunately not to purple proclamations. When 

he became adjutant general and inspector general, he wrote to his father that he 

hoped to be "the happy mortal destined to tum the scale of war. " Failing that, 

"may my fall be like Wolfe's-to sleep in the arms of victory. " To his patron 

Wilkinson he wrote, "If we go into Canada, you will hear of my fame or of my 

death. For I am determined to seek the 'Bubble' even in the cannon's mouth." 13 

When Pike arrived at Sackets Harbor, Dearborn handed him command of 

an attack on York, capital of Upper Canada on the north shore of Lake Ontario. 

It was a complicated land and naval assault, but Pike had everything well in 

hand from the embarkation to the landings on 27 April 1813. Supported by fire 

from ships, his troops advanced smartly through thick woods, destroying a 

force of British grenadiers, then pushing into the town's outer works. They 

seized a battery in a sharp fight, then advanced against a blockhouse from 

which the British withdrew, even though it held a large ammunition magazine 

that the commander did not want to fall into American hands. Therefore he had 

a fuse train lit, without taking care to warn either his own men or the Americans. 

As Pike sat down with his maps to plan his next move and interrogate a 

II. W. Eugene Hollon, The Lost Pathfinder: Zebuloll Montgomery Pike (Norman: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1949), 205- 06. 

12. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 792; DAB, 7:599-600; ibid. , 40. On Pike's career, see 

Hollon , The Lost Pathfinder, and on Pike's New York period in particular, W. Eugene Hollon, 

"Zebulon M. Pike and the New York Campaign, 1813 ," New York History, 60 (July 1949): 

275-95 . Important sources on his earlier period are Donald Jackson, ed., The Journals of Zebulon 

MOlllgomery Pike, With Leiters and Related Documents, 2 vols. (Norman: University of Oklahoma 

Press, 1966); Elliott Coues, ed ., The Expeditions of Zebulon MontgomelY Pike ; 3 vols. (New York: 

Harper, 1895); and Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 88-94. See also Donald Jackson , "How Lost 

'Was Zebulon Pike?" American Heritage, 16 (February 1965): 1~15 , 75-80. 

13. Both quotes in Hollon, "Zebulon M. Pike and the New York Campaign," 27 and 202. The 

allusion was to British General James Wolfe, who died during his victory at Quebec in 1759. 
ORIGINS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR 105 

BRIG. GEN. ZEBULON M. PIKE. Adjutant and Inspector General, 12 

March 1813-27 April 1813 . 

prisoner, the magazine erupted in a 

gigantic, deadly fountain of timbers 

and stone. Over 100 Americans and 

40 British troops, mostly local militia, 

were killed outright. 

Pike was among the casualties, 

crushed by a huge boulder. When others rushed to his aid, it is reported on 

good authority that he said, "Push 

on, my brave fellows, and avenge 

your general! " As he was carried from 

the field to the ship where he died, 

the soldiers gave him a resounding 

cheer. His last official act was to receive the news that the Stars and 

Stripes had risen over the blockhouse, 

even as the enemy fled. 14 This display of gallantry and leadership in 

Pike's last hours as Adjutant and Inspector General could not have been 

more different from Smyth's. That he 

received the cheers of his men, rather than their gunfire, demonstrated that he 

was a good appointment. But like Smyth, he had never done anything remotely 

suggested by his title: He was a troop commander. Ultimately, he was not even 

remembered for that, but for Pike's Peak, a mountain named for him that he did 

not discover and had not climbed. 

The Inspectorate and the Army After Pike 

Pike's death left a vacancy in the War Department as well as in Dearborn's 

command. Armstrong apparently wanted an adjutant and inspector general at 

hand to be his own chief of staff. When he asked for one while Pike was in the 

North, he was turned down on the ground that there could be only one Adjutant 

and Inspector General, who must be either appointed and confirmed in that 

office or a brigadier general designated by the President. Neither came forth for 

a year after Pike's death. In the interim, the office was served by successive 

assistant adjutants general. 15 Despite the absence of formal, presidential and 

legislative action for the senior position, Armstrong did manage to appoint a 

14. Berton, Flames Across the Border, 46-51; Hollon, "Zebulon M. Pike and the New York 

Campaign," 275- 95. Pike's commission as brigadier general arrived after his death , so he actually 

was a locally brevetted brigadier during the campaign against York. 

15. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 39; Thian, Legislative History, 86. Those handling the 

affairs of the office were Maj. C. K. Gardner until 30 December 1813, and Col. J. DeB. Walbach 

from that date until 28 May 1814. Walbach was relieved by Maj. John R. Bell, assistant inspector 

general. 
106 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

number of inspectors general (colonels) and assistant inspectors general (majors) 

during 1813, the twelfth and the last named in August. There were six of each 

rank, and except for one they were all assigned to the headquarters ofthe several 

districts. Abimael Y. Nicoll, who doubtless had never left the Washington 

office, was the senior inspector general, assigned to duty in the War Department. 16 Nicoll probably continued to serve as an adjutant to the Secretary of 

War. 

The Army's inspectorate began to prove its value late in 1813 and into 

1814. Here and there the troops became more efficient, better regulated. That 

made up for the failure of the recruiting program, so on 30 March 1814 

Congress continued the general staff in the same form as the year before. The 

lawmakers ceased trying to inflate the paper army, being satisfied with the 

addition of a regiment of coast defense troops in July 1813 and three more 

regiments of riflemen in March 1814, raising the authorized force to 62,274 

officers and men . But recruiting lagged until a British invasion threatened. 

The Regular Army included about 35,000 men by September 1814, while about 

the same number of militiamen were available for extended duty. They were 

supplemented by hundreds of thousands of militia theoretically available in 

their own districts to repel raids and invasions. 17 Manpower, however, had not 

'been the Army's major problem. The improvement of the Army depended upon 

the character of the various commanders, who thanks to Armstrong's appointments and the passage of relics like Dearborn were an increasingly effective lot 

overall. It is clear that some of them regarded inspectors general and assistant 

inspectors general principally as training officers, although the regulations did 

not assign that duty to them. Nonetheless, training was required, and that role 

was ordained for inspectors by tradition reaching back to the Revolution. 

For instance, Winfield Scott, commanding the left division of the 9th Military District in the North, established a celebrated camp of instruction in New 

York in March 1814. There he trained the forces that stood up against the 

British regulars at Chippewa and Lundy's Lane later in the year. Scott, an 

adjutant, had originally assigned the training program to the district inspector, 

Maj. Azor Orne. But he was compelled to assume responsibility for the program personally when his commander, Maj . Gen. Jacob Brown, ordered Orne 

to join him at Sackets Harbor. This reassignment had little practical effect. In 

fact, Orne could never have done better than Scott. Housing 3,000 regulars and 

volunteers in tents, Scott put them through a rigorous program of drill and 

instruction, and turned them into a formidable military force-a far cry from 

the chaotic mobs that had carried the burden of war thus far. The program was 

16. Army Register, i813; Doc. 125 , 13th Cong. , 1st sess. (1813), ASP·MA , 16:384; Niles' 

Weekly Register 4 (I May 1813): 14~7 . Sylvester Churchill, a future inspector general, became 

an assistant inspector 29 August 1813, and served on the staffs of Wilkinson, Izard , and Macomb 

during the war. He became acting adjutant general of the Champlain Department in 1815. Franklin 

Hunter Churchill, Sketch of the Life of Bvt. Brig. Gen. Sylvester Churchill, inspector General U.S. 

Army, ... (New York: Willis McDonald , 1888), 16-17. 

17. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 121 ; Heitman, Historical Register, 2:567-77. 
ORIGINS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR 107 

BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM H. WINDER. 

Adjutant and Inspector General, 9 

May 1814-2 July 1814. 

complete, from battle maneuvers 

down to the smallest details. Remembering the earlier problems, Scott 

made camp and field police and sanitation, and personal hygiene, part of 

his course. Meanwhile, he also gathered supplies, obtained intelligence 

about the enemy, and did all the other 

preliminary work for the coming campaign. IS 

The Adjutant and Inspector 

General's Office 

Thanks to Armstrong's interest in 

attaching the Adjutant and Inspector 

General to his own retinue, that vacant office became his chief administrative agency by early 1814, actually 

issuing orders to the Army. That was 

not what Congress had intended for 

the position, but it answered the Secretary's need for an adjutant general senior 

to all others. With inspecting officers otherwise occupied, the Adjutant and 

Inspector General's Office frequently assigned line officers to muster and inspect troops, usually retroactively-in other words, to afford the soldiers back 

pay.19 The vacancy was filled finally on 9 May 1814, when the President 

appointed Brig. Gen. William H. Winder to the office of Adjutant and Inspector General. Winder was a prominent Maryland attorney who had been commissioned a lieutenant colonel of infantry 16 March 1812, colonel four months 

later, and brigadier general on 12 March 1813. The 39-year-old general may 

have appeared to be one of the Army's rising young stars. He had served 

creditably enough on the northern frontier, but his actual military experience 

was very limited. Winder had been captured in his only action and paroled in 

June 1813, and was unavailable for field service until June 1814. His appoint18. Jeffrey Kimball, "The Battle of Chippewa: Infantry Tactics in the War of 1812, " Military 

Affairs, 31 (winter 1967-68): 169-86; Charles Winslow Elliott, Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the 

Man (New York: Macmillan, 1937), 146-53; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 129. See 

also Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field·Book of the War of 1812,2 vols. (New York: Harper & 

Bros., 1860), 802, for Maj. Thomas S. Jessup's account of the training of the 25th Infantry under 

Scott's direction. 

19. Orders, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 19 Apr 14 and 27" Apr 14, in GORI&IG. 

The first-cited order appointed officers to muster and inspect troops at posts in the 5th Military 

District for March and April. The second-cited order appointed Lt. F. Baden of the Ordnance 

Department to muster and inspect troops at Greenleaf's Point, Washington, D.C., for the months 

of March and April. 
108 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

ment as Adjutant and Inspector General, accordingly, may have served merely 

to find work for an officer otherwise unemployable. In any case, Winder had 

started high in the army, and risen fast. "It is a misfortune," Winfield Scott 

recalled of Winder's situation, "to begin a new career with too much rank, or 

rather, too late in life. ,,20 Winder's appointment evidently displaced Maj. John 

R. Bell, who had been the most recent interim tenant of the office. On 24 May, 

the War Department ordered, "Major J.R. Bell, Acting Inspector General, will 

perform the duties of Adjutant General in the room for Colonel Walback until 

further orders. ,,21 

At least potentially, the Adjutant and Inspector General in the War Department stood at the top of two pyramids-one of adjutants general, the other of 

inspectors general. Winder could therefore have been the chief of staff of the 

Secretary of War, who remained a poor substitute for a Commanding General. 

In actuality, however, the two did not get along, and both were swiftly overtaken by events. The staff of adjutants and inspectors continued to run the 

office in the War Department. By the summer of 1814, among their paper 

work were fruits of the inspectorate established the year before-in particular, 

half yearly confidential reports to the War Department. Two such documents 

survive for the period ending 30 June 1814. 

Assistant Inspector General Nathaniel N. Hall reported on Sackets Harbor, 

under the command of Brig. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines, following almost point 

by point the format required in the regulations. The 1st Regiment of Light 

Dragoons, he said, showed good discipline, and had their papers in order. In 

the 2d Regiment, however, the papers were in a "confused state," with even 

records of terms of enlistment lost; that caused the men to complain. Hall did 

believe that a new commander, recently appointed, was working to improve 

things in that regiment. Artillerists at Sackets Harbor impressed Hall very 

favorably. He praised their commander, saying that the discipline of his troops 

and their drill was as good as any in the service . Generally, however, Hall 

complained that troops at Sackets Harbor followed drill manuals selected personally by the various company officers, with a general absence of uniformity. 

Turning to the infantry, the men of the 13th Regiment, said Hall, were mostly 

green, but were developing well under the influence of a common drill manual 

for the regiment. The 29th Infantry was' 'destitute of discipline in general," by 

which Hall meant proficiency in drill more than deportment, although he said 

the men also lacked the "habit of obedience." The regimental major was 

"destitute of the qualifications for an officer," while "the rank and file almost 

to a man are lousy," there barracks in a "filthy state," and the sickness rate 

high. 

Hall was more pleased with the 1st Rifle Regiment, which he said was well 

led and drilled. Provisions, however, were "very indifferent," mostly inferior 

20. DAB, 10: 382-83; AMB, 485; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 1049; Scott, Memoirs, 1: 

92. 

21. Orders, War Department, 24 May 1814, in GORl&IG. 
ORIGINS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR 109 

at Sackets Harbor, although the forage supply was good. The general hospital 

was maintained in a "remarkably high state," while some of the regimental 

hospitals exhibited an "indifferent state," the artillery hospital a notable 

exception. Hall discovered "no errors" in courts-martial in the command, and 

said that the weapons on hand were sufficient but old. Finally, he reported that 

he had mustered the command for their pay. 22 

Major Daniel Hughes conducted a tour of military posts in the 7th Military 

District before returning to line command 1 June 1814. He found the barracks 

at New Orleans "large, airy and commodious," capable of holding 700 men. 

One building, he said, needed new floors, and there were some surface draining 

problems. The garrison had been there for six months, during which he had 

inspected it several times, and was improving steadily in its efficiency. The 

men's health was good, better than it had been in the past, while the general 

hospital was in fine order, "extremely well conducted" by a surgeon, mate, and 

two civilian physicians under contract. But the quartermaster, Hughes 

complained, was uncooperative, his refusal to provide straw, mosquito bars, 

and other necessities causing the sick to suffer needlessly. Hughes also made 

similar reports on conditions at Fort Saint Charles and Fort Claiborne: Hughes' 

itinerant inspectorate was a taste of things to come for the Army's inspectors. 

Once the war ended, the large forces would disband, and what was left of the 

U.S. Army would disperse in small posts across the continent. Inspection 

would be their chief contact with the higher military establishment. As prophetic as Hughes' routine were some of his comments. He closed his report 

with a complaint that would recur for decades: The troops of the 2d Infantry, 

he said, were overworked building posts that were soon abandoned. "This duty 

had considerably thinned the ranks of the Regiment. ,,23 

The adjutants and inspectors in the War Department processed the flow of 

inspection reports, musters, and other paper, but it appeared that there was 

nothing for the Adjutant and Inspector General to do. Under the law, Winder 

should have borne that title only as chief of staff of the main army. Armstrong, 

however, wanted a chief of staff of his own. But it soon became apparent that 

he did not want Winder. ... If anyone filled the role of Adjutant and Inspector 

General as Congress had conceived it, it was Winfield Scott, who had become 

Dearborn's Adjutant General during 1813. General Brown had replaced the 

doddering Dearborn by the summer of 1814, while Scott in his camp of instruction had created the first thoroughly trained, professional body of American 

soldiers since Anthony Wayne's Legion of the United States. Brown and Scott 

took their troops into Canada in July, beating British regulars at Chippewa on 

the 3d in a brutal, stand-up confrontation. A greater battle occurred on the 25th 

22. Nathaniel N. Hall, Confidential Report of the State of the Post of Sackets Harbour, now 

under the immediate command of Brig. Gen . Gaines, of the commanding officers of the Regiments, 

Corps & detachments & their Staff and the progress made by each corps or detachment, 30 June 

1814, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG-159. 

23. Confidential Report of Maj. D. Hughes, the Asst Inspector Genl of the Posts and Troops in 

the 7th Military District, ending 30 June 1814, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG- 159. 
110 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

at Lundy's Lane, where Scott took an important' hill in a murderous series of 

charges, then beat off three great counterattacks. The Americans proved that 

they could stand up to the best professionals in the world, but they were as 

bruised as the enemy. Among the casualties were Brown and Scott, both 

wounded, and the Americans retired from the field during the night. 24 

Scott,therefore, was Pike's real successor. He was that in his official 

position, and in practice. He earned the title by virtue of his place and his 

activities in the main army. But there is no evidence that he was ever considered 

for the job. Winder had the title before Scott's labors had borne fruit. In any 

case, Scott was the last person who would have willingly played servant to 

Armstrong. For better or worse, Winder was Adjutant and Inspector General of 

the Army. Thanks to Secretary Armstrong, it proved to be for the worse. 

Armstrong was, as usual, engaged in a series of plots and conspiracies to 

undermine the Republican Virginia dynasty . He wished that New Yorkers and 

other friends might rise, to carry him into the White House on their shoulders. 

But for a year he had found himself frustrated at every tum by a Virginian, 

Secretary of State James Monroe. They feuded ceaselessly. In fact, they had 

but one point of agreement-that Washington was safe from British attack. 

But the capital's safety began to erode in April, when Napoleon conceded 

defeat, leaving the British almost unlimited manpower with which to wage the 

American war. President Madison had peace commissioners at work in Europe, 

but they made little headway. Madison received news from them on 26 June 

that " there can be no doubt that if the war continues, as great a portion of that 

disposable force as will be competent to the objects of the British government 

will be employed in America. ,,25 When it became apparent that Washington, 

D.C. , itself could be threatened by this enlarged British force, President Madison took it upon himself to plan for his capital's defense. In addition to issuing 

calls for militia, he created a new military district, the 10th, to which he named 

Winder as commander. Winder was picked both because he was available and 

because he was the nephew of the governor of Maryland whose state would 

have to provide the bulk of the militia if the British attacked. Winder assumed 

command on 2 July 1814, stepping down from the Adjutant and Inspector 

General position at the same time. He was disastrously defeated at Bladensburg 

in August, after which the British burned Washington's public buildings. Winder 

lingered in the Army after that until his honorable discharge in June 1815.26 

24. These actions are admirably placed in the context of the Army's evolution in Weigley, 

History of the United States Army, 129-30. See also Louis L. Babcock, The War of 1812 on the 

Niagara Frontier (Buffalo, New York: Buffalo Historical Society, 1927); Ernest Cruikshank, The 

Battle of Lundy's Lane (Welland, Ontario: Lundy's Lane Historical Society, 1893); Berton, Flames 

Across the Border, 317-59; and chapter 3 in Fletcher Pratt, Eleven Generals: A Study in American 

Command (New York: Sloane, 1949). 

25. Walter Lord, The Dawn's Early Light (New York: Norton , 1972), 17-18. 

26. AMB, 485; DAB, 10: 382; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 1049. 
ORIGINS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR 111 

Adjutant and Inspector General Parker 

Winder had not served long enough as Adjutant and Inspector General, nor 

had he enjoyed sufficient support from the Secretary of War, to define the 

office. The adjutants and inspectors composing the office staff continued their 

routine as if he had never been present. Armstrong, meanwhile, became the 

target of immediate public outrage over the occupation of Washington, which 

the British evacuated after vandalizing it. Monroe became interim Secretary of 

War on 17 August, and Armstrong resigned on 3 September. The interim 

Secretary of War also remained Secretary of State, and was spread thin by his 

attempts to manage the entire administration while also cultivating his presidential ambitions. He therefore needed staff support more than had Armstrong, and 

at last consolidated them in the office of the Adjutant and Inspector General, 

which by late September was the issuing address of the Army's orders. 27 

Daniel Parker was appointed Adjutant and Inspector General, with the rank 

of brigadier general, on 22 November 1814, as confirmed by the Senate. He 

was at the time chief clerk of the War Department, and apparently had been an 

aide to Secretary Armstrong during the battle of Bladensburg. A native of 

Massachusetts, Parker had spent the first decade of the century on his 1,200-acre 

estate near Paris, in France. There, despite his questionable relationship with 

Mrs. Henry Preble, he was regarded by Parisians as an informal American 

minister to France. William Crawford, Minister to France in 1813 and, later, 

Secretary of War, spent considerable time at Parker's estate. 28 Parker was not a 

military man, and evidently Monroe did not want one. He was an administrator 

with well-developed political connections, well suited to preside over office 

details. When he announced Parker's appointment as Adjutant and Inspector 

General, Monroe said clearly, "This office is considered as connected with this 

Department, and unconnected with the line of the Army.' ,29 That is what 

Armstrong had wanted all along. 

An effective administrative organization was especially required, because 

the Army was about to demobilize, with all of the procedures and paper work 

that discharge of a large and varied force entailed. Peace commissioners set to 

work in earnest at Ghent, Belgium, in the fall of 1814, their demands shifting 

with each news of events on the several battle fronts. The war finally appeared 

a frustrating stalemate, and in December peace was concluded on the basis of 

27. See, for instance, the order of the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office that appointed 

an infantry officer to " muster and inspect" two regiments " from the time they were last mustered 

up to September 30, 1814" and the one that transferred Assistant Inspector General Maj. George P. 

Peters to the Adjutant General's Department as an assistant adjutant general, to rank from 29 

August 1813, which appear to be the only such orders from that period. Orders, Adjutant and 

Inspector General's Office, 26 Sep and 28 Sep 1814, in GORI&IG. 

28. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 796; Lord, Dawn's Early Light, 171; Francis S. Drake, 

Dictionary of American Biography Including Men of the Time (Boston: James R. Osgood , 1872), 

687; Chase C. Mooney , William H. Crawford. 1712- 1834 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 

1974), 58-59. Parker's time in France overlapped Armstrong's. 

29. Orders, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 23 Nov 14, in GORI&IG. 
112 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. Andrew Jackson's inspector at this fight, Maj. 

Arthur P. Hayne, was cited for gallantry and credited with organizing the 

motley forces available for victory . 

the status quo ante bellum, the diplomats' way of saying there was no change. 

Two weeks later, as if to seal the treaty but in ignorance of it, Andrew Jackson 

won a stunning victory over the British near New Orleans. Nevertheless, dismissal of the Army began late in 1814, and accelerated after the Treaty of 

Ghent. There is some reason to believe that Parker may have assumed functional control over the disparate force of adjutants and inspectors, and in January he added at least one assistant inspector general, by transfer, tO'the staff at 

the War Department. The War Department ordered on 21 February that no 

soldier enlisted for the duration could leave his regiment before he was mustered, 

inspected, and paid by an inspector general "or officer doing that duty." The 

inspector was to send to the Adjutant and Inspector General's office all certificates 

of service-connected disability, for filing pending pension applications.

3o 

With Madison increasingly distracted, Parker became the chief administrative official of the Army, at least so far as personnel was concerned. His 

responsibilities expanded after 3 March 1815, when Congress ordered drastic 

reductions in the Army, down to 12,383 officers and men. The act was a 

stopgap measure, reflecting disagreement on how small the Army should be, 

until a permanent decision could be made. The discharges contemplated were 

nevertheless wholesale, cutting the force to eight infantry regiments, one light 

artillery regiment, a corps of heavy artillery, a rifle regiment, and the Corps of 

30. Orders, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, II Jan and 21 Feb 15, in GORI&IG. 
ORIGINS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR 113 

Engineers. The dragoons were gone, as were the staff services and departments 

necessary to implement the discharge, let alone manage the Army. Of the 

inspectorate, there remained only four brigade inspectors, taken from the line, 

with no apparent presence in Washington .

3 1 The reductions were too drastic, 

particularly the elimination of almost the entire staff. Monroe left the War 

Department in March, and his successor was not immediately in sight. President Madison therefore ordered the' 'provisional" retention of critical positions, 

including the Quartermaster General and the Adjutant and Inspector General. 

Daniel Parker was retained to preside over the dissolution of the Army, but only 

" until circumstances will permit of [his] discharge, without material injury to 

the service," as the War Department put it officially. 32 

The roster of adjutants and inspectors declined, despite the retentions in 

high places. Parker began to shift those remaining to where he believed them to 

be most needed. In April, for instance, Col. A. P. Hayne, a past and future 

Inspector General, was assigned as an adjutant general to replace another who 

had resigned. 33 The pressure of demobilization paper work had begun to make 

adjutants more useful than inspectors. Accurate records and accounts were very 

important because the great question facing the officer corps was who would 

and who would not be retained in service. In a reversal of tradition, the failures 

of the early part of the war had led to prejudice against officers of the prewar 

period, the implication being that seniority would count against a man's chances 

of continued service. A board of general officers assembled to select those to be 

retained expressed alarm at the difficulty of the task, and the extent of dismissals and reductions in rank that would occur. 34 

The peace establishment was finally announced on 2 December 1815 . It 

showed an adjutant and inspector general on the general staff. The Army also 

included two adjutants general and four brigade inspectors, "officers of the 

line." Also during the year, Scott's Exercise codified by a board of officers 

under Winfield Scott, finally supplanted Steuben's blue book, replacing it with 

tactics reflecting French inspiration. The U.S. Army was theoretically prepared 

to fight the war just ended. 35 .. . But the Army was not ready for peace, at least 

in the eyes of Congress. Further reductions were in store, and the provisional 

arrangements for army administration were questionable. The new Secretary of 

War, William Crawford, recommended a permanent staff structure for the War 

Department in 1815, but no one heard him.36 Short of the obvious, there were 

even more difficult choices ahead at the end of 1815. Some way had to be 

31. An Actfixing fh e military peace establishment offhe United States, Sfafllfes af Large 3, sec . 

3, 224 (1815); Thian, Legislative History, 110; Weigley , History of the United States Army, 139; 

Carlton B. Smith, "Congressional Attitudes Toward Military Preparedness During the Monroe 

Administration," Military Affairs, 40 (February 1976): 22- 23 . 

32. Mooney, William H. Crawford, 80; Heitman , Historical Register, 2: 578-79; Orders, 

Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 17 May 15 , as quoted in Thian , Legislative History, 110. 

33. Orders, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office , 5 Apr 15, in GORI&IG. 

34 . . Niles' Weekly Register, 8 (29 Apr 1815): 146. 

35. Ibid., 9 (30 Dec 15): 301; Ney, Evolution of the Field Manual, 8. 

36. Risch, Quartermaster Support , 178-79. 
114 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

found to ensure that no incompetents or· drunkards remained in the officer 

corps. Moreover, there was reason to believe that there were far more able and 

efficient candidates than there would be places for in the coming years. How, 

then, to select the better from the merely good? 

A possible answer would present itself before long. It was the Army's 

inspectorate, finally shaped into effectiveness during the war, but falling apart 

in the aftermath. Inspection reports offered an opportunity to see who the good 

officers really were, based on their character and performance, and on the 

efficiency of their subordinates. Parker had before him an opportunity to demonstrate the importance of inspection as a permanent activity in the Army. In the 

event, he did so, and when the military establishment hit its statistical bottom, 

inspection remained separately and permanently accounted for. But the Adjutant and Inspector General was not able to demonstrate his own necessity. His 

office passed from existence . 
CHAPTER 9 

End of the Adjutant and Inspector General 

(1816--1821) 

William H. Crawford-like Armstrong, an old associate of Daniel Parkerbecame Secretary of War 15 August 1815. He held the job a little over a year, 

leaving 22 October 1816. He was hardly a full-time secretary, being considerably preoccupied with his ambitions of occupying the White House. Because he 

was too busy to run the War Department personally he needed an effective 

staff, but the staff he enjoyed was likely to disappear at any time-it rested only 

on the provisional arrangements made by the President in 1815. Experience 

during the war had shown that it was no longer possible for one man with a few 

clerks to run the Army with any effectiveness. Crawford therefore argued 

strongly for a permanent general staff, and on 24 April 1816 Congress gave 

him that staff. 

A General Staff and New Inspectors 

The new legislation substantially ratified Madison's provisional staff, retaining most important officers and services. Parker was secure, the law affirming 

the position of Adjutant and Inspector General. There was also to be one 

inspector general, and an "assistant . .. to every brigade, which shall supersede the brigade ... inspectors now existing." 1 The legislation further set up 

I. Mooney, William H. Crawford, 8~81; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 133; 

Risch, Quartermaster Support, 178-79; An Act for Organizing the General Staff and Making 

Further Provisions for the Army of the United States, approved 24 April 1816, 3 Stat. 297; Thian, 

LegisLative History, 110. On 15 March 1816, incidentally, the Army uniform was completely 

respecified . Only passing attention was given to inspectors and other staff officers, who were to 

wear the same "cocked hats without feathers, yellow gilt bullets buttons, and buttonholes in the 

herring bone fashion" as general officers. In addition, "All General Officers will be permitted to 

embroider the buttonholes. The Adjutant Generals [sic], Inspectors General, Quartermaster General and their deputies and assistants, will be permitted to embroider the buttonholes of the collar 

and cuffs only." When the uniform was next respecified, 27 March 1821, inspectors remained 

similarly undistinguished in their dress. In the following decades, iuspectors general w<;>re the 

uniform of their rank, decorated as specified for general staff officers. Orders, Adjutant and 

Inspector General's Office, 15 Mar 16 and 27 Mar 21, and subsequent regulations, in Uniform of 

the Army of the United States. The first distinction for officers of the Inspector General's Department appeared with the uniform regulations of 1872, when they and officers of other departments 

were to have initials embroidered onto the shoulder knots of dress uniforms--' 'I. D. " for inspectors, 

"A.D." for adjutants, "M.D." for medical officers, and so on, the " D" meaning "Department." 

That practice continued in subsequent uniform regulations. 
116 

BRIG. GEN. DANIEL PARKER. Inspector General, 22 November 

1814-1 June 1821. 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

two large geographic divisions, North 

and South, each headed by a major 

general. Each of these divisions was 

divided into two subdistricts headed 

by brigadier generals. It would appear that the intention of the law was 

to give each major general his own 

inspector general and each brigadier 

an assistant inspector general. It could 

not be that simple, however, because 

although the law included two adjutants general who could be assigned 

each to a division, there was only one 

new inspector general cited in the law. 

He could not be paired so easily with 

the continued position of the Adjutant and Inspector General filled by 

Daniel Parker. Parker had become the 

Army's chief administrator by then, 

the equivalent of what the Adjutant 

General later became. There was no 

way he could be spared from his existing functions at the War Department; 

consequently, one of the division commanders could not have his own inspector officially. It will be seen that this limitation was not observed; each major 

general assured that the size and trappings of his staff mirrored that of his 

colleague. 

Arthur P. Hayne, at twenty-six , became the first person to occupy the new 

position of Inspector General on 3 May 1816. A native of South Carolina, 

Hayne had entered the Army as a lieutenant of dragoons in 1808 and was 

promoted to captain the next year. He was assigned as Inspector General with 

the rank and compensation of colonel on 12 April 1814, although his line 

promotion to major did not occur until 1 August. Probably to raise his pay, 

Hayne was reassigned as an adjutant general 1 March 1815, to date from the 

beginning of his inspectorate. He reverted to the status of Inspector General 

with his new appointment, 3 May 1816, retaining the rank and pay of a colonel. 

Hayne had been Andrew Jackson's Inspector General during the war and 

since its end. His conduct during the campaign against the Creeks had been 

commendable, while his actions during the battle of New Orleans earned him a 

brevet as lieutenant colonel (his permanent rank remained major, even while he 

was an inspector). Hayne was effective in upholding Jackson's standards, 

which demonstrated that, through training , leadership, and efficient staff 

supervision, good armies could be forged from militia, volunteers, and regulars 

alike. Since Hayne still served Jackson in 1816, and Jackson commanded the 

Division of the South, Hayne was assigned to that division. His appointment, 
END OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL 117 

COL. JOHN E. WOOL Inspector General, 29 April 1816-25 June 1841 . 

therefore, was merely a formality ratifying Jackson's staff arrangements. 2 

Then with Congress threatening to reduce the Army yet further, its higher 

officers were sensitive about their own 

survival, and exceedingly jealous of 

prerogative and appearance. Jacob 

Brown, commanding the Northern 

Division, was not about to let himself 

be outclassed by his counterpart in 

the South. In fact, Brown preempted 

Jackson with his acquisition of an inspector general on 29 April. Lt. Col. 

(Maj .) John Ellis Wool, a New 

Yorker, got the job. He had raised 

and led a company of volunteers from 

Troy, New York, when the War of 

1812 opened. He became a captain of 

the 13th Infantry in April 1812, then 

major in the 29th Infantry a year later. 

Wool was seriously wounded in the 

attack on Queenston, and it was on 11 September 1814 that he gained his brevet 

as lieutenant colonel for gallant conduct at the Battle of Plattsburgh. After the 

war, on 17 May 1815, he was assigned to the 6th Infantry, where he became 

inspector general for the Northern Division. 

There was no legitimate place for an inspector general other than the one 

Hayne occupied. Nevertheless, like Hayne, Wool was an inspector general 

with the rank of colonel. Exactly how Wool attained his inspectorate is not 

clear. Why, however, is readily apparent--one major general was not to be 

denied something enjoyed by the other. The bigger the staff, the greater the 

general, and Brown was senior to Jackson. In any case, Wool served as Brown's 

inspector general for five years before his status was confirmed. The illegality 

of his promotion apparently caught up with him in the meantime. He was 

reduced to the lineal rank of lieutenant colonel of the 6th Infantry on 20 May 

1820, to date from 10 February 1818, the reason for that date not apparent in 

the records. Wool remained on the books of the 6th Infantry as a lieutenant 

colonel until 1 June 1821. He continued as inspector general, however, and in 

fact bore that title for a quarter century, until 184l. 3 

2. John Howard Brown, ed. , Lamb's Biographical Dictionary of the United States (Boston: 

James H. Lamb, 1900),3:611- 12 (hereafter cited as LBD); Who Was Who in American History: 

The Military (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, 1975), 246; Heitman , Historical Register, I: 515. 

3. DAB, 10: 513-14; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 1059-60; William Barrett Skelton, "The 

United States Army, 1821-1837: An Institutional History" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern 

University , 1968),78-79. For Wool 's career, in general, see Harwood P. Hinton , "The Military 

Career of John Ellis Wool, 1812-1863" (Ph.D. dissertation , University of Wisconsin, 1960), 

which emphasizes his wartime experiences. 
118 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The State of the Army 

The anny that the two inspectors general examined in the years after the 

War of 1812 was a loosely organized collection of armed bands distributed 

around the country. Soldiers occupied small posts built with their own hands, 

using materials drawn from the surrounding forests and tools provided by the 

quartennasters. Thanks to the war and advances in metallurgy, there was a 

better stock of tools, so saw wood became increasingly important in post 

construction. But the structures were primitive, mostly timber-frame, not too 

well built to begin with, and quick to deteriorate-the Anny's general housing 

custom for the next half century and more. The appropriations to support 

military post construction were inadequate until 1817, and they were tenninated completely for five years beginning in 1820. Barracks rooms were tiny, 

and very crowded. The continuing high rate of desertion was understandablethe men ran away from conditions that no self-respecting person would tolerate. 4 

Construction was not the only burden on the soldier. The Adjutant and 

Inspector General's Office issued a general order on 11 September 1818 directing all posts to establish vegetable gardens, and "more extensive cultivation" 

at certain designated posts, with careful records to be kept. The purpose of the 

order was to "promote the health of the troops" by providing cheap sources of 

fresh food. But it led to agricultural operations at some places that surpassed the 

abuses of the prewar period and finally had inspectors general utterly frustrated. 

There was accordingly little that was military about the Anny's routine by 

1818 . Niles' Register reported in December that since April the 6th Infantry, at 

Plattsburgh, New York, had perfonned 25 ,716 days of manuallabor--exclusive 

of military duty or agricultural pursuits. 5 Not only did the burden of labor make 

military life unrewarding, but a commentary in the press in 1816 reflected the 

kind of administrative inefficiency that did little to reduce the desertion rate: "It 

is positively stated in a western paper that the troops at Detroit, Michilimachinac, 

&c have not received one dollar of their pittance of pay for the last fifteen 

months. WE HOPE THIS IS NOT TRUE. But the mere suspicion of such a 

thing is degrading to the character of government, and ought to be repelled. ,,6 

Henry Clay had a rather different point of view . He told his colleagues in 

the House of Representatives in January 1817 that he still thought the government paid more money and got less military services than any other country in 

the world, and his object was to know if any proper expenditure of the military 

department might not be retrenched. 7 In fact, a "proper examination" was then 

under way, as reflected in the semiannual reports of inspectors general, assistant inspectors general, and acting assistant irispectors general who were hard at 

4. Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 175; Risch, Quartermaster Support , 210; Clary, "These 

Relics," 31-40, 249-54. 

5. GO, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, II Sep 18, reprinted in Niles' Register, 15 (3 

October 1818): 91; the labor report appeared in Niles' Register, 15 (19 December 1818): 294. 

6. Niles' Register, 10 (17 August 1816): 415. 

7. Benton, Abridgement of the Debates (10 January 1817),5: 685 . 
END OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL 119 

work before Clay spoke, producing confidential and nonconfidential reports 

that described the condition of the Army's buildings, the efficiency of its 

troops, and-increasingly-the character of its officers. Capt. James Pratt, in 

the Northe~ Division, discovered little evidence of wasteful spending, but 

considerable efficiency in an underbudgeted organization. Fort Shelby, for 

instance, was' 'fast falling to decay, while the Company composing its garrison 

maintains its high standing. " Another company, commanded by a second 

lieutenant, "has improved in Arms and dress to a considerable degree , tho 

more destitute of Clothing than any other Compy." Pratt's report was not 

confidential, so his characterizations of officers were mostly overly complimentary. 8 

Pratt was only acting as an inspector. Major John M. Davis, however, had 

been an assistant inspector general since October 1814, and knew how to be 

critical when his reports were protected by confidentiality. He forwarded to the 

Secretary of War, through the inspector general of the Division of the South, 

his semiannual confidential report on the units within his purview, on 30 April 

1817. He covered all bases. Camp Montgomery, for instance, had " tolerably 

good barracks" built from materials from an abandoned post. Eliminating post 

stockades, he suggested, would "add much to the health and comfort of the 

troops." Another new post was a "square log work with Block Houses at 

diagonal angles," with barracks around the square. Provisions there were in 

short supply because of poor roads. 

Davis reported the construction of new posts all over his district, which he 

thought proper because of possible attacks by Seminole Indians. Confronting 

that threat were units "under excellent discipline. " In general, he said of the 

1st Brigade (4th and 7th Infantry): "They are in habits of obedience, the 

prescribed uniform is strictly adhered to, and the [illegible] of interior economy 

appears to be their greatest care-notwithstanding all the economy that can 

possibly be used the expenditures may appear great, yet I cannot well see how 

the[y] could in any way be curtailed." The officers, he said, were able and 

willing, the food furnished by contractors good, and the forage not so good. In 

addition to the description part of his report, Davis appended, as required, a 

confidential report on the brigade officers, most of whom he described very 

favorably-"among the best Officers in the Army," and "both valuable officers and well acquainted with their duty" being typical comments. But of Lt. 

Col. William McRae of the Artillery, he said, "Is a good meaning innocent 

man, attentive to his personal appearance, of good Character-a good police 

officer-not very well calculated for active service [,] rather slow, and not very 

systematic. " Davis noted charges placed against one officer for being absent 

without leave, while another had "disgraced himself" by setting an armed 

8. ARJG, Semi-annual Report of Capt. James Pratt, 15 Jan 17, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, 

RG 159. Pratt spelled the place's name "Shelty," which must be erroneous, for there is record of 

neither post nor officer by that name. At various times Fort Shelby existed at Detroit, Mich., Rock 

Island, Ill., and Prairie du Chien, Wisc. Pratt's inspection report is the only one to survive from the 

Northern Division during this period. Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 544. 
120 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

party against a citizen. They beat the man up in the middle of the night, and the 

responsible officer earned himself a court-martial. Yet another officer was 

under arrest for "charges that appear more of a personal nature than from the 

good of the service," so Davis expressed hopes for a verdict of acquittal. 9 

Hayne, as Divisional Inspector, processed and forwarded the reports of 

assistants, and also prepared his own. Further reductions in the Army apparently were pending, so character assessments of officers were first among his 

services to his commander, Jackson, and to the War Department, for whom he 

prepared confidential reports yearly. They listed every officer in the Southern 

Division, each assessed in a capsule report. Hayne's assessments varied in their 

usefulness, although some could be quite frank. Brigadier General Edmund P. 

Gaines, he said in November 1817, was "An Officer of long experience, in 

whose Department the utmost harmony prevails, & whose correct conduct has 

long won the esteem of all under his command." Gaines was a powerful man, 

and Hayne trod lightly around him. He was more frank discussing Assistant 

Adjutant General Clinton Wright, "An Officer of intelligence-heretofore his 

conduct has been marked by too much levity, but of late, I understand, very 

much altered for the better." Assistant Inspector General Davis was " An 

officer of experience & distinction." 10 

Most officers received favorable comments from Hayne, but the exceptions 

were notable. William McRae was "An officer of correct deportment but not 

calculated for the Army." Major George M. Brooke was "An Officer of much 

distinction & bravery, but of very dissipated habits." Major John Hicks was 

"An Ordinary officer," while Maj. James Bankhead was "An intelligent man, 

but not a good Officer," and Capt. William Bailey was" An ordinary officer. 

Genl Gaines & Maj . Davis, both state he has disgraced himself. " Eighth 

Department commander Eleazer W. McDonald was "An Officer of dissipated 

habits." II Hayne's confidential report accompanied voluminous nonconfidential descriptions of the men and posts of the Southern Division. Those comprised capsule descriptions of the physical condition and military usefulness of 

the several posts, and included discussion of "progress made in military 

discipline" and of the staff services. Hayne was especially energetic in 1817, 

recommending replacement of subsistence contracting by a Commissariat Department (which took place in 1818), raising the pay of subalterns, and proposing a 

new set of general regulations he had prepared himself. 12 

9. Jno. M. Davis to Hayne, 30 Apr 17 , Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

10. Hayne, Confidential Report of the Southern Division of the Army , 1817, approved 27 Nov 

17 by Andrew Jackson , Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

II. Ibid. 

12. Hayne, State of the Posts in the 6th and 7th Military Department, and State of the Posts in 

the 8th Military Department, with a note on the 9th Department, approved 27 Nov 17 by Andrew 

Jackson, Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. Brown of the Northern Division evidently did not 

see fit to forward Wool's reports to Washington, as none survive in the records for this period. 

Assistant Inspector General G.H. Marigault of the Northern army resigned 17 June 1817, and was 

replaced by Capt. John Biddle of the Artillery, promoted to major. GO, Adjutant and Inspector 

General's Office, 19 Jun 17, in GORI&IG. In the Southern Division, meanwhile, Jackson was 
END OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL 121 

Calhoun and Army Reform 

The Army's inspectorate worked efficiently enough throughout 1817, but 

the War Department did not. President James Monroe experienced difficulty in 

finding a Secretary of War: Several people turned it down before John C. 

Calhoun entered the post on 8 October 1817. The job had been vacant for a 

year, and was occupied only part-time much longer. In fact, Calhoun was the 

first permanent head of the War Department since Armstrong had left in 

disgrace. J3 The Secretary's job had been hard to fill because it was a monumental challenge, one not likely to prove rewarding in the country's antimilitary 

political climate. The War Department faced a debt of $45 million in unsettled 

accounts, and overlooked a military force scattered everywhere and apparently 

beyond control. But Calhoun was undeterred, and reduced the outstanding 

accounts to $3 million and brought the Army into some semblance of order. 

During his tenure, the staff services were strengthened and given permanent 

form, the Military Academy made great advances as the heart of growing 

professionalism, and the Corps of Engineers spent $3 million on modem coastal 

fortifications. The Secretary's success was not unmixed, however. He was 

unable to have the Regular Army reorganized exactly as he wanted it, an 

"expansible" core of national defense. His fortification program diminished 

after the first rush, and soon after Congress authorized Calhoun's proposed line 

of posts up the Missouri River, it halved the program for reasons of economy. 

Nevertheless, the number of posts had grown to seventy-three by 1818-up 

from twenty-seven in 1801. 14 

Calhoun believed that the Army's peacetime pursuit should be preparing for 

war. The success of generals like Harrison, Jackson, and others in assembling 

efficient formations of volunteers and regulars during the War of 1812 had 

persuaded him that the Regular Army should be the potential heart of any 

mobilization. He therefore wanted to organize the peacetime Army so that it 

could be expansible in an emergency, gaining size and efficiency quickly while 

additional units took form. That, he believed, would prevent the chaos that had 

characterized the 1812 period, as well as the disasters that had befallen 

disorganized, untrained masses when they confronted a determined enemy. 

engaged in a private war with the Spanish in Florida during 1817, eventually leading to annexation 

of that territory. For a recent account, see Virginia Bergman Peters, The Florida Wars (Hamden, 

Conn.: Archon Books, 1979). With military activity, Jackson needed an efficient inspectorate. 

13. Smith, "Congressional Attitudes Toward Military, " 23. 

14. Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhollll, Natiollalist, 1782-1828 (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 

1944), 138- 39, 149, 167-85 , 203-16, 248; White, The Jeffersonians, 256-59; Oliver Lyman 

Spaulding, The United States Army in War and Peace (New York: Putnam, 1937), 154; Leonard D. 

White, The Jacksollialls: A Stlldy ill Administrative History, 1829- 1861 (New York: Macmillan , 

1954),203-12; Weigley, Historyojthe United States Army, 133-34, 143, 144-53, 153-56, 158-59, 

163- 64. See also Vincent 1. ·Fisher, "Mr. Calhoun's Army, " Military Review, 37 (September 

1957): 52-58. 
122 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

An effective wartime Army required more than fighting units. At its head 

must be a competent organization to oversee supplies, logistics, ordnance, and 

other necessary staff services. Calhoun had little patience with the feeling 

prevalent in Congress that staff services were essential only in wartime. Rather, 

he said, they were equally essential during peace if they were to be available for 

war. He repeatedly stressed the need for an effective general staff, functioning 

in peacetime, ready for war. 15 In using the term "general staff," Calhoun did 

not mean the sort of planning and coordinating establishment associated with 

modem armies; that idea had only begun to take form in Europe. Rather, he 

referred collectively to the bodies of specialists responsible for the leadership of 

the Army, and in particular for the management of its material needs, such as 

quartermasters, surgeons, and ordnance specialists. They, he believed, required 

permanent organizations as efficient and as expansible as should be the fighting 

units. 

John Williams, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 

asked Calhoun on II February 1818 to submit his suggestions for organizing 

the U.S. Army. When Calhoun replied, he not only gained his permanent 

general staff, but set off another ferocious debate over how big the Army 

should be. Despite the furor, the lawmakers did recognize the need to provide 

some form of permanent staff to manage the War Department. The legislation 

of 14 April 1818 established separate departments headed by the Quartermaster 

General, the Surgeon General, the Commissary General of Purchases, and 

others, including a new' Commissary General of Subsistence-who thereafter 

superintended the supply of rations, ending the discredited contract system at 

last. What was left of the general staff, so-called, was the roster of general 

officers and others not assigned by department, including adjutants and 

inspectors. The latter received only one notice in the legislation in which the 

pay of inspectors general of divisions was equated to that of adjutants general at 

the same level. 16 Calhoun's new staff departments gave him the advice and 

information he wanted for a unified management of the Army but, in doing so, 

they introduced certain distinctions between staff and line that would grow into 

major difficulties in the future. In fact, trouble erupted immediately, as Calhoun and General Jackson fell into dispute over control of staff department 

officers assigned to the Southern Division. 17 Inspectors general remained as 

they were before; however, they did not constitute a separate department answering to the Secretary alone. No such disputes centered upon their accountability-at 

least not yet. 

15. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 134. 

16. Smith, "Congressional Attitudes Toward Military, " 23; Ingersoll, History of the War 

Department, 182; An Act Regulating the Staff of the Army, approved 14 April 1818, 3 Stat. 426; 

Thian, Legis/ative History, 110. 

17. White, Jeffersonians, 238-50; Risch, Quartermaster Support, 181-88; Weigley, History of 

the United States Army, 134-37. See also P.M. Ashburn, History of the Medical Department of the 

United States (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1929), and Ingersoll, History of the War Department, on 

the early history of various staff departments. 
END OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL 123 

Congress, meanwhile, told Calhoun to prepare a plan to reduce the Army to 

6,000 officers and men-about half the then authorized force . He replied in 

December with his plan for an expandable army, but Congress would not hear 

of it. Congressional concern over the cost of the military increased during the 

depression of 1819. Although the War Department budget had fallen from $16 

million in 1816 to less than $9 million since 1817, there remained a deficit of 

$45 million in unsettled accounts-nearly half the national debt. Many in Congress believed the country was not getting its money's worth from the War 

Department, and Calhoun admitted that little had been done previously to give 

exactness, economy, and dispatch to its monied transactions. But Congress 

generally believed that the military was inherently wasteful, and buried itself in 

proposals for army reorganization that all promised economy. 18 

Congress showed some attention to the welfare of enlisted men, even as it 

tried to reduce the army budget. The lawmakers probably observed the connection between the growing volume of manual labor and the climbing desertion 

rate, and decreed on 2 March 1819 that the soldiers be given extra pay if 

required to do such labor for more than ten consecutive days.19 The law had 

little practical effect, despite its good intentions. Some officers quickly discovered clever ways to cheat the men· of their extra-duty pay- successive· 

nine-day assignments, for instance, were complained of for decades-but the 

extra pay contributed to the Army's growing costliness as it pursued its far-flung 

activities. General Henry Atkinson, for instance, embarked on an .ambitious 

expedition up the Missouri River beginning in 1819, and indulged in a lot of 

expensive experiments with steamboats. The costs quickly got out of hand, 

greatly exceeding appropriations. Thereafter, the Quartermaster Department's 

principal expense was the provision of transportation, which usually caused it 

to ask Congress for supplemental funding. 20 

Inspectors and Army Reduction 

Inspector General Hayne of the Southern Division suggested in 1819 that 

the Army was wasteful. Too many officers were inefficient: "An officer of 

amiable disposition, but wants industry," he said of a typical example. He 

believed that the posts were wastefully allowed to deteriorate and that troops 

were not necessarily placed where the real Indian danger was. The pattern of 

small posts scattered everywhere, Hayne believed, was an utter waste of money. 

In the Missouri country, he favored a few large posts, and the use of a disposable force of mounted men to patrol the distances between them. Cavalry, he 

maintained, was more efficient on the plains than dispersed infantry. But all 

18. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 140-43; Smith, "Congressional Attitudes 

Toward Military," 23 . 

19. As quoted in Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 156. 

20. Roger L. Nichols, "Anny Contributions to River Transportation, 1818-1825," Military 

Affairs, 33 (April 1969): 242-49; Risch, Quartermaster Support, 188-93, 204-09. 
124 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Congress could see at the time was the cost of horses. Hayne's suggestions 

were totally unheeded. 21 

John M. Davis continued as an assistant inspector general in the Southern 

Division in 1820, but now he reported directly to Parker in Washington. Davis 

had become more critical of the Anny and its situation. Fort Scott, Georgia, he 

had found in a miserable condition when he visited it-so bad that he left the 

place and returned after things had been cleaned up. But the division's posts 

were nearly all shabby and dilapidated, affecting morale. Discipline, Davis 

said, was as good as could be expected in the Anny's sorry circumstances. 

Courts-martial were becoming more common, and he believed them wasteful. 

Trials were held for trivial offenses, and the difficulty of assembling officers to 

hold courts at tiny garrisons cost money and took time. He believed that 

commanding officers should examine charges brought before them carefully 

before calling for courts. In other matters, Davis believed supply to be generally well managed, although he complained that many cannon carriages were 

being allowed to deteriorate needlessly. 

Davis found cause to speak favorably of most of the division's officers. But 

he delivered real tirades about several whom he thought should be cashiered for 

infractions, including a considerable amount of embezzlement. His report for 

1820, in fact, was almost a long bill of indictment against a fair percentage of 

the officer corps. But dishonesty aside, he also found cause to revise Hayne's 

fonner high estimation of General Gaines. 

This officer in many respects is remarkably circumspect in his conduct, and attentive to 

his duty and personal appearance, but I think he falls far short of that noble Independent 

disposition which ought to characterize a General in the American Army-I think he 

possesses a great deal of vanity, duplicity, and in many instances has suffered himself to 

be led astray from the common path of rectitude by those who ought to have but little 

influence over him. 22 

The reports of inspectors general confirmed what many in Congress 

suspected-the Anny was not as efficient as it should be, and a substantial 

share of its officers might as well be dismissed in the public interest. At least in 

that respect, the inspectorate demonstrated its value. But the most influential 

inspector general, Hayne, resigned at the end of September 1820, to embark on 

a political career. He was replaced as inspector general of the Southern Division by James Gadsden, 1 October. Gadsden, who would later become famous 

for the Gadsden Purchase of land from Mexico in 1853, was appointed to 

satisfy Jackson, and to balance the appointment of Roger Jones, at the behest of 

21. Hayne, Confidential Report of the Southern Division of the Anny under the Command of 

Major General Andrew Jackson, for the year 1819, approved October 1819, in Inspection Reports 

1814-1842, RG 159. Assessing the character of officers, Hayne noticed a future Inspector General, 

Capt. S.B. Archer of the Artillery: "In many respects, a first rate Officer. " 

22. Jno. M. Davis, AIG, to Daniel Parker, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office (hereafter 

cited as A&IGO), Confidential Report for the half year ending 30 June 1820, Inspection Reports 

1814-1842, RG 159. 
END OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL 125 

Brown, as adjutant general in the Northern Division. Both became colonels, 

although the permanent rank of each was only captain. 23 

Jackson and Brown, with other generals, competed for positions in an army 

that all knew wquld soon be much smaller. Calhoun was at work on a new 

proposal for army organization, and thanks to what he had already accomplished, 

the influence of staff officers in the War Department was growing. Brown and 

Jackson therefore wanted to put their proteges in line for influential positions, 

and may have begun to believe that a position of Commanding General was in 

the offing. Nonetheless, Jackson had more immediate reasons to think about his 

inspectors. When assistant inspectors general like Davis were able to communicate directly with the Adjutant and Inspector General, they were out of the 

control of the district commanders. Moreover, it was apparent that inspection 

reports would play a roll in determining which officers would remain in the 

Army after its reduction. The division commanders wanted to have a hand in 

those determinations-and they most definitely did not want Parker to have 

influence in their commands. As Jackson may have suspected, inspectors sang 

a different tune in their confidential reports when they went to Washington 

directly- as reflected in Davis' critical judgment of Gaines. 

Jackson was struggling with Calhoun anyway over the control of staff 

officers in his division. He was not about to relinquish control of officers who 

were theoretically part of his own command staff, instead of in a separate 

department. The Adjutant and Inspector General in that instance quickly lost 

his private line of sight into the divisions. On 20 October 1820, by order of the 

Secretary, Parker told the Army that inspectors should report only through their 

division commanders to the War Department. 24 The order substantially changed 

command relationships. It gave division commanders Brown and Jackson power 

in two ways. First, they closed off an independent channel of communications, 

hence a potential source of outside interference, in their subordinates. Second, 

their power over their subordinates was increased by making the assistant 

inspectors general agents of the division commanders, removed from control by 

the brigadier generals-Davis might now speak as freely to Jackson as to 

Parker about Gaines, because the latter would no longer see his confidential 

reports. Inspection was reinforced as a tool of command, but it became a tool 

denied, in any formal sense, to generals lower than division commanders. 

The struggle to reduce the Army, meanwhile, had become more intense. It 

resumed early in 1820 with an unsuccessful attempt to gut the appropriations 

bill for coastal defense. Members of Congress had also apparently become 

aware of inspectors' criticism of army officers, and reaffirmed their determination to decrease the size of the officer corps. The House of Representatives 

passed a resolution on 11 May directing the Secretary of War to submit a plan 

23. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 441, 582; J. Patrick Hughes, "The Adjutant General's 

Office, 1821-1861: A Study in Administrative History" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 

1977),27. Gadsden was an engineer, Jones an artillerist. 

24. GO, A&IGO, 20 Oct 20, in GORI&IG. 
126 

for reducing the Army to 6,000 enlisted men. That measure was a compromise offered by Henry Clay as a 

substitute for a very explicit bill that 

would have slashed the Army and its 

budget arbitrarily-elirninating all but 

three generals and ending most staff 

positions, leaving but one Inspector 

General, one Adjutant General, and 

the department heads. 25 

Calhoun answered the House resolution by proposing a 6,OOO-man army 

and a revised organization of the general staff. His separate departments 

remained, while the general staff 

would also remain in large part unchanged. In other words, Calhoun 

proposed to retain virtually the entire 

army overhead. Of the various adjutants and inspectors, excluding the 

Adjutant and Inspector General, he 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

COL. JAMES GADSDEN. Inspector 

General, I October 1820-13 August 

1821. 

said, "All except three are officers of the line, and it is contemplated to hirvethem all of the line as vacancies occur. ,,26 The House received Calhoun's plan 

on 12 December 1820, and immediately went to work on its own ideas. A bill 

reported out of committee on 28 December offered a staff comprising one each 

of the following: brigadier general (with an aide-de-camp), Adjutant General 

(with an assistant adjutant general), assistant inspector general, Quartermaster 

General, Judge Advocate, Paymaster General, Commissary General of Purchases (with an assistant commissary general of purchases), Commissary General of Subsistence, Surgeon General, and Apothecary General. There would 

be two storekeepers, but no Adjutant and Inspector General, and no Inspector 

General. 27 

The opposing positions were thus set, and the debate opened. It centered 

almost entirely on the need for economy and general opposition to budgetary 

deficits. Those lawmakers favoring a large army and navy could not deny the 

25 . Smith, "Congressional Attitudes Toward Military," 23; David Ted Childress, "The Anny 

in Transition: The United States Anny, 1815-1846" (Ph.D. dissertation, Mississippi State University, 

1974),384-85; U.S. Congress, Annals oj Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess. (11 May 20),2232-33. 

The proposed legislation would eliminate the Adjutant and Inspector General and all assistant 

adjutants and inspectors, among other positions. 

26. The Organization oj the Army, H. Doc . 31, 16th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: Gales & 

Seaton, 1820). The three exceptions were two adjutants general of divisions and Inspector General 

Gadsden. Wool had already been relegated to a line position, effective two years earlier. 

27. Annals oj Congress, 16th Cong. , 2d sess. (12 Dec 20), 607 (28 Dec 20),687. Giving staff 

officers titles as "assistants" would permit giving them lower rank and pay than the full title would 

accord. 
END OF THE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL 127 

need for economy, and were reduced to suggesting lamely that there was no 

problem in the present arrangement. Just below the surface lay lingering fears 

of standing armies, which numerous speakers described as inherently dangerous to liberty. Their opponents stressed the likelihood of future wars, and the 

need to prepare for them. But no one wanted to abolish the United States Army 

altogether, or to make it utterly ineffective. The result was a compromise, 

developed by the Senate. That split the difference between Calhoun and the 

House, reducing the Army by 50 percent and cutting its appropriations. 28 

The act of2 March 1821 reduced the Army by half, to an authorized 6,126 

officers and men. Much of the hierarchy vanished from the organization, including the Adjutant and Inspector General. The line consisted of seven regiments 

of infantry and four of artillery. There was a Corps of Engineers and a Corps of 

Topographical Engineers, along with three separate departments-Medical, 

Pay, and Purchasing. The Quartermaster and Commissary were so reduced and 

interdependent that they were departments in common parlance only, although 

each eventually resumed its former status. Otherwise, the general staff comprised one major general and two brigadier generals (with four aides among 

them), an Adjutant General, and two inspectors general, the latter "with the 

rank, pay, and emoluments of coionels of cavalry. ,,29 Although a staff was 

substantially preserved, Calhoun was not pleased with the outcome, but he had 

not really lost the issue. True, his hopes for an expansible Army had been 

dashed, and the remaining staff was too meager to perform its prescribed 

duties, let alone to prepare for future wars. The U.S. Army and its budget had 

been reduced sharply, but in the circumstances they had to be. Nor could 

persistent fear of standing armies be erased entirely. But what emerged was a 

permanent army, effectively organized for its mission, and supported by 

Monroe's and Calhoun's arguments that it would always be necessary because 

wars would inevitably occur. 30 

The two inspectors general were expected to play important roles in the new 

army. They had, in fact, been established somewhat as substitutes for all the 

generals Calhoun wanted. Instead of two major generals, now there was one, 

and he would need to be well informed. The army might be smaller, but it 

remained so scattered that not even three generals could apprise themselves 

unaided . . . . The immediate question became who should the inspectors general be? Given the circumstances, this was the primary concern of the officers 

who feared for their employment. Jobs needed to be defined only after they 

were secure. Gadsden was already in one position, and logically could continue. 

Wool was condu.cting the same activity, but without a formal position. Parker 

28. Smith, "Congressional Attitudes Toward Military," 23-:25; Skelton, "Commanding 

General," 117- 18. 

29 . An Act to reduce andfu the military peace establishment oj the United States, Statutes at 

Large 3, sec. 6, 615 (1821); Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 580-81; Thian, Legislative History, 

110. See also Risch, Quartermaster Support, 195-97. The organization had no cavalry. The 

provision governed compensation for forage, because inspectors were expected to travel. 

30. Smith, "Congressional Attitudes Toward Army," 25. . 
128 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

was about to lose his office, but he had never been an inspector anyway, he had 

mostly been an adjutant. There were already two adjutants general, so Parker 

might not be the best candidate for the single Adjutant General's position that 

remained but the resourceful bureaucrat was never in peril. When the job of 

Paymaster General opened on 1 June 1821, Parker immediately moved into it. 31 

Wool, then, might be equally secure. One inspector general's position was 

open, and with Parker accommodated, Wool was an obvious candidate. Calhoun 

moved quickly to establish the new organization. There was only one major 

general, so divisions were no longer appropriate. The President replaced them 

on 17 May with two departments, Eastern and Western-berths for the two 

brigadier generals. Effective 15 June 1821, Jacob Brown-senior major general before the reduction-moved to the War Department, establishing the 

office of Commanding General. 32 That opened another question affecting the 

two inspectors general: Would they move to the two departments, or would they 

answer to the Commanding General? The three generals all had strong opinions 

on that subject. 

31. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 38. 

32. Skelton, "Commanding General," 117-18; Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 

242. 
Part Two 

The Inspectors General of the Army 

(1821-1881) 

CHAPTER 10 

Establishing the Inspectors General 

(1821-1825) 

The reduction of the Army as ordered by Congress happened swiftly, because 

by June 1821 appropriations were available for only a small force-not even as 

large as Congress had authorized the Army to be. The Army numbered 8,942 

officers and men in December 1820; a year later the figure stood at 5,746. The 

number of active officers had fallen from 712 to 530. Reductions continued the 

following year, when the U.S. Army's residue was 5,211 people, including 

512 officers. It was the second drastic reduction in six years, and it left the 

officer corps shaken and uncertain. 1 While it happened, officers scrambled 

furiously for position and influence, seeing one another as rivals. Every vacant 

commission was the object of attention that bordered on the paranoid. 

Choosing and Regulating the Inspector 

The posts of Adjutant General and Inspector General received particular 

scrutiny. They were bound to exert a great deal of influence in the small 

military hierarchy . The Secretary of War wanted them filled with capable 

officers, amenable to his wishes. The new Commanding General wanted the 

positions occupied by loyal officers, subject to his orders. The brigadier generals, 

Edmund P. Gaines and Winfield Scott, wanted the occupants of the offices to 

be friendly to them. Others, including the retiring Andrew Jackson, saw the 

positions as havens for their proteges. The politics of the officer corps, 

accordingly, caused Secretary Calhoun to move carefully, and to strike 

. compromises. 

John Wool apparently continued as a de facto inspector general, with his 

permanent base in the 6th Infantry, until 1 June 1821. As of that date, he 

occupied one of'the two positions established for inspectors general. Calhoun 

had by that time decided to attach the inspectors general to the War Department, 

depriving the department commanders of those positions. Wool was a protege of 

Jacob Brown, new Commanding General and old rival of Andrew Jackson. 

I. Strength figures used are those given in Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 626. See also 

Childress, " Army in Transition ," 282-84, for effects on the officer corps. 
132 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Wool's installation as a permanent inspector general was probably interpreted 

as a favor to Brown and his supporters in the officer corps. Jackson, however, 

was not without his own influence, despite his retirement. He also had a protege-James Gadsden, already a permanent inspector general. Gadsden balanced Wool in that position, but as Adjutant General he might offer a more 

effective counterweight to the Brown party in the army command. The position 

of Adjutant General, in any case, could not be filled casually. The logical 

candidate, on the grounds of ability, was Roger Jones. But he was another 

Brown protege, and for that reason his appointment, after Wool's, might divide 

the Army. 

When Parker became Paymaster General 1 June 1821, after the abolition of 

the office of Adjutant and Inspector General, the Secretary ordered 1st Lt. 

Edmund Kirby to perform the duties of Adjutant General until the office was 

filled. Calhoun had by then probably selected Gadsden for the job, and had 

already ordered him to Washington. Gadsden was in Florida, but was actively 

campaigning for the assignment. He wrote to Calhoun on 18 July to report his 

rather leisurely progress to assume his post as Inspector General: "I have 

reported myself to you," he said, "as I am at a loss to know whether under the 

new organization of the Army the Inspectors are to obey the Instructions & 

report to the Major Genl commanding the Army, or the Brigadiers of 

Departments. A hint from you however on the subject, and I will report myself 

directly as the regulations prescribe." Gadsden knew very well what his reporting relations were to be, and by that letter merely certified his independence of 

the department commanders and his direct connection to the War Department. 

Calhoun replied on 25 July 1821, "The Inspectors, as well as the Adjutant 

General, are immediately attached to the Major General." The Secretary also 

granted Gadsden's request for leave for his health's sake, and told him that he 

had been appointed Adjutant General. In due course, orders announced 

Gadsden's appointment as Adjutant General, to date from 13 August 1821. 2 

Jackson was satisfied, the large question of the Adjutant General was answered, 

and the smaller question of who would replace Gadsden was opened. 

Jacob Brown and Andrew Jackson had proteges more important than Gadsden or Wool. They were the two brigadier generals, Brown's man Scott and 

Jackson's man Gaines. They had their own ulterior motives, and as department 

commanders were not pleased at the prospect that the Commanding General 

might have too much power over them. Scott focused first on the threat that the 

War Department's inspectors general might pose to his own independence 

when he wrote to Calhoun on 12 April 1821 to raise the question of the two 

inspectors general. He said that their continued existence was unnecessary in 

the new army organization. If they were attached to the War Department, he 

2. Gadsden to Calhoun, 18 Ju121, and Calhoun to Gadsden, 25 Ju121, in Robert Meriwether 

and W. Edwin Hemphill, eds. , The Papers of John C. Calhoun, 13 vols. (Columbia: University of 

South Carolina Press, 1959-1980),6: 263-64, 280; GO No. 21, Adjutant General's Office (hereafter 

AGO), n.d., 1821, in GORJ&IG. Erroneously it has been stated that the Adjutant General whose 

position was not abolished took over the job. Skelton, "United States Army," 76. 
ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 133 

suggested that the Adjutant General handle everything that the Adjutant and 

Inspector General had overseen before reduction. If the inspectors general 

served the commander as roving inspectors of the department, "This would be 

in a great deal to supersede the Brigadiers; to place an inferior rank over a 

superior which would be absurd. It would show to the Congress & to the 

country, that either the Brigadiers or the Inspector General [sic] are useless." 

Brigadier generals, Scott said, were already required to make their own 

inspections, and should not themselves be inspected by colonels. 3 

With the establishment of the departments imminent, Scott raised the subject again on 9 May. He declared in a long letter to Calhoun reviewing his 

objections that to have inspectors general, ranking as colonels, inspecting brigadier generals would be insulting to the generals. Again he said he could see no 

reason for having inspectors at all, since the brigadier generals must inspect 

their own departments. But this time the practical Scott took a new tack. Since 

the brigadier generals' staffs were short, he saiq, putting the inspectors general 

on the department commanders' staff would be a good idea. At least, no officer 

would be inspected by an inferior. 4 . . . In one of the last orders he published as 

Adjutant and Inspector General, Parker announced op 17 May 1821 the establishment of the Western Department, commanded by Gaines, and the Eastern 

Department, under Scott. Major General Brown's headquarters was fixed at the 

District of Columbia. The headquarters of the Eastern Department would be at 

Governors Island, New York, while the Western would lodge at Louisville, 

Kentucky, "when the Generals are not on visits of inspection and tours of 

duty. " Lest Scott think he had scored a triumph, on 19 May Calhoun wrote him 

that the President had decided that the inspectors general should' 'be attached to 

the Major General commanding the Army. You will therefore insert the enclosed 

among the regulations now in press."5 The "enclosed" was a regulation, dated 

18 May, authored by Calhoun himself. Scott was in charge of preparing the 

Army's first comprehensive new set of general regulations since Steuben's. He 

would, in fact, receive credit for authorship. But Calhoun's Regulation Concerning Inspections in the Army was an independent contribution. Scott might 

not have liked it, but he did as he was told. The regulation defined the Army's 

inspectorate: 

The Inspectors General are under the direction of the Major General of the Army. 

Whenever they commence a tour of inspection, they will communicate information of its 

commencement to the General commanding the Department to be inspected; and on the 

termination of the tour, they will transmit a copy of the confidential report to the General 

Commanding the Department, who will transmit it to the Major General, after making 

remarks in writing upon such parts of it as he may think proper to notice. The reports of 

the Inspectors to be considered strictly confidential. 6 

3. Scott to Calhoun, 13 Apr 21, in Meriwether and Hemphill, Papers 0/ Calhollll, 6: 48-49. 

4. Scott to Calhoun, 9 May 21, in Meriwether and Hemphill, Papers o/Calhollll, 6: 103-06. 

5. GO, A&IGO, 17 May 21, in GORI&IG; Calhoun to Scott, 19 May 21, in Meriwether and 

Hemphill, Papers o/Calhollll, 6:132. 

6. John C. Calhoun, " Regulation Concerning Inspections in the Army," 18 May 21, in 

Meriwether and Hemphill, Papers o/Calhollll, 6: 126. The identical text appeared in U.S . War 

(Continued) 
134 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

That provision ratified the communications of inspectors established previously in Calhoun's compromise with Jackson. It established the authority of 

the Commanding General to oversee the brigadiers, and at the same time 

reassured the department commanders that they would know what the inspectors said about them and their commands. Calhoun's regulation also supported 

Scott's contention that department commanders should serve as their own 

inspectors, and at the same time clarified their subordination to the Commanding General. Department commanders were to inspect all posts and forces 

under them every two years, and report to the major general "such facts 

connected with the connection of their Departments as they may judge 

necessary. ,,7 Colonels and field officers of artillery were also to inspect their 

regiments regularly under the orders of department commanders, at least once 

every six months. Calhoun's regulation reaffirmed very strongly that inspection 

was a function of command, and a responsibility of every commander. Inspection by an agent of higher authority would not be a substitute for, or an interference with, the authority of a lesser commander. Only the Commanding 

General enjoyed the services of his own, formally designated inspectors general; 

brigadier generals and lower commanders must provide such services for 

themselves. In either case, inspectors were but agents of commanders, not 

powers unto themselves. 

Objects of inspection specified in the regulation included frontier defense, 

repairs needed at posts, new posts needed, the resources of the country, and 

communications difficulties. Inspectors were to look specifically at police, 

discipline, instruction, service, and general administration of the posts, the last 

of which was defined by the regulations. The' 'form and course of inspections" 

were outlined, beginning with general reviews, basic parade ground maneuvers, 

and examinations of troops front and back, along with their knapsacks and 

contents, weapons, ammunition, and so on. Commanders, not irispectors, issued 

the requisite orders. After troop examinations, the men could be paid. Then the 

inspectors were to move on to hospitals, magazines, quarters, sutlers' shops, 

and other facilities. Scott's text provided details on what an inspector should 

look for in barracks: how bunks, bedding, equipment, and other objects were to 

be arranged, including the case of culinary equipment. "Memoranda of censure" 

would report all deficiencies. Finally, when inspectors were not present, post 

commanders were to conduct the same complete examination monthly. 8 Scott's 

1821 regulations also required that captains inspect their companies every 

Su.nday, and lieutenants their sections every Thursday. Surgeons were to conduct their own inspections of their hospitals on Sunday. As if that were not 

enough, officers were also to make daily visits to the men's quarters, while the 

(Continued) 

Department, General Regulations for the Army; or, Military Institutes (Philadelphia: M. Carey & 

Sons, 1821), 325 (hereafter cited as 1821 Regulations). 

7. Calhoun, "Regulation Concerning Inspections," in Meriwether and Hemphill, Papers of 

Calhoun, 6:126. 

8. 1821 Regulations, 60-68. 
ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 135 

visits of post commanders were to be frequent. Uniforms were to be kept clean, 

and underwear changed three times a week in midsummer and twice a week 

(Sundays and Thursdays) the rest of the year. The men were to wash their hands 

and faces daily after fatigue, "shave themselves (if necessary), and brush or 

comb their heads."9 Scott clearly believed that inspection was the commander's 

most important management tool. From general to corporal, every leader was 

an inspector, satisfying himself that the men under him did what they were told, 

and that all was in order. Scott's formal integration of inspection into the 

process of command exceeded even the words and examples of Steuben and 

Wayne before him. His success in his camp of instruction during the war, and 

his acknowledged intellectual powers, made Scott an authority on troop 

management. Thanks to his regulations, in the United States Army inspection 

was management. 

The importance Scott placed on inspection may have influenced his opposition to the inspectors general. Certainly his attempt to deny to the Commanding 

General something he regarded as essential to command was impertinent, and 

most probably it arose from a sense of his own authority as a prospective 

department commander. But more subtly, Scott may have been suspicious of 

the commander's first duty. A less than diligent commander, he may have 

feared, might neglect his proper attention to his command, believing that dispatch of an inspector general was sufficient oversight of the troops. A lazy 

commander, accordingly, might not even make sufficient use of an inspector's 

findings, leaving the command with a commander in title only. Conversely, an 

inspector not constantly responsive to the commander might develop ambitions 

of his own. 

The Army's inspectorate was about to enter some of its finer hours. Inspection would be absolutely essential over the coming decades if the Army was to 

be kept well in hand. The force was thoroughly scattered in small outposts, and 

for want of roads or good mail service, practically out of communication with 

its titular head in Washington. Whether inspection succeeded in making a real 

contribution to army management ultimately depended upon the character and 

authority of the Commanding General, as well as the industry of the inspectors 

general. So long as the Commanding General was a person who took his duty 

seriously, and was allowed to do so, inspection was his handmaiden, the eye of 

the leader. But when the Commanding General was not inclined to exercise 

his powers of command, or was not allowed to, inspection provided information, 

but otherwise served little purpose. In those circumstances, the inspector defined 

his own job. An ambitious inspector general could establish his own niche in 

the bureaucracy, while an inattentive officer could let the function wither away. 

It is more than a little ironic that inspection's golden age ended while Scott 

himself was an almost powerless Commanding General. 

In 1821, those developments lay far ahead. For the moment, Calhoun 

merely wanted to establish the inspectorate on a sound footing. He told the 

9. Ibid ., 47-48, 68. 
136 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

President on 18 August 1821 that since Gadsden had become Adjutant General, 

the position of one inspector general was open. There were three applicants for 

the job, he said, and two others known to want it. The Secretary believed the 

position too important to fill casually because the quality of the army would 

depend largely on the quality of the individual selected to assure that standards 

were being met. Calhoun observed of the candidates that two were scheduled 

for promotion in the line, while another-Roger Jones, Brown's old Adjutant 

General and protege-had exerted too much political influence to suit the 

Secretary. He told the President that he favored Col. Abram Eustis and Bvt. 

Maj . Samuel B. Archer---especially the latter, who was the junior officer on the 

list. 10 

Calhouns's recommendations brought no response. He reminded President 

Monroe two months later that they still must give attention to the appointment 

of an inspector general as an early inspection of the Army in the South was 

advisable . In addition, Col. Robert Butler had been grumbling about his position in the army since reduction. Perhaps, Calhoun suggested, making him an 

inspector general might satisfy him and his influential friends. II Nevertheless, 

B vt. Maj. Samuel B. Archer, of the Artillery, was appointed an inspector 

general, with the rank of colonel, on 10 November. He accepted 12 November. 

Archer was about thirty years old when he became an inspector general, a 

Virginian who had entered the U.S. Army as an artillery captain in 1812. His 

conduct during the war had earned him commendations, including a brevet for 

gallantry in action . He had drawn the favorable notice of Inspector General 

Hayne, among others, since the war. Like Gadsden before him, he came from 

Jackson and Gaines' part of the Army, balancing Wool, who came from 

Brown's. 12 

Inspecting the Army 

When the staff of inspectors general was complete, Calhoun redefined their 

duties on 5 December 1821. Wool was given the responsibility to inspect all 

infantry posts and units. Archer was directed to inspect all artillery garrisons 

and the ordnance activities such as arsenals and foundries that supported them. 

Each officer was required to submit annual reports. 13 The reasons behind this 

division of responsibility are open to speculation. It may be that the specialization of the two inspectors general might have eased tensions between the 

Commanding General and the department commanders. On the one hand, 

10. Calhoun to James Monroe, 18 Aug 21 , in Meriwether and Hemphill, Papers of Calhoun, 

6: 348- 50. -

11. Calhoun to Monroe, 14 Oct 21, in Meriwether and Hemphill, Papers of Calhoun, 6: 436. 

12. GO No . 43, AGO, 21 Nov 21, in GORI&IG; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 168; James 

Grant Wilson and John Fiske, eds., Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography (New York: 

Appleton, 1888), 87. Calhoun wrote a letter to Archer on 10 November, but it has disappeared; 

Archer's reply of the 12th survives. Meriwether and Hemphill, Papers of Calhoun , 6: 504. See 

Appendix B. 

13. GO No. 55, AGO, 5 Dec 21, in GORI&IG. 
ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 137 

neither department commander needed to fear that an inspector general would 

be assigned full-time as his personal supervisor or spy. On the other hand, the 

arrangement prevented an inspector from coming too much under the influence 

of a brigadier general-inspection cut across department lines-thus denying 

any hint that Wool was Scott's or Brown's man, or Archer Gaines' . . . . The 

specialization of the inspectors may have served other ends as well. Calhoun 

and Brown alike may have decided to assign each man to the inspectorate 

where his particular skills would make him the best observer. Calhoun was 

greatly interested in the progress of coastal defense-the province of artillery 

and manufacturers-and not especially pleased with the general neglect of 

fortifications and heavy ordnance by an army preoccupied with the frontier. 

That may be why he preferred a capable artillerist like Archer for the inspector 

general's position. 

Brown also had interests. He viewed himself as Commanding General in 

fact as well as in title, and set about trying to define his position at the head of 

the Army. He wanted to perfect the military establishment, and for that he 

needed information. Over the next few years, he wrote volumes of reports 

suggesting reforms, based on his own observations and on those of the inspectors general, as well as those of department commanders. 14 Brown, in other 

words, was the kind of Commanding General the department commander, 

Scott, feared because he used inspectors general as his eyes in the departments. 

He was also the sort of general that Scott the military theorist applauded, 

because he used inspectors general as his personal agents, taking inspection 

seriously and acting upon their findings. Archer went right to work with a 

vengeance, starting with Fort Stockton at Norfolk Harbor, Virginia, in December. 

He returned with his first annual report on 3 November 1822, having visited 

forts on the east and Gulf coasts and in Louisiana, at Springfield Armory and 

Watervliet Arsenal, at Plattsburgh, Niagara, Detroit, Pittsburgh Arsenal, and 

Baton Rouge, and points in between. His report took the form almost of a 

journal, describing each post in tum, with a staccato listing of inefficiencies 

and errors-mostly unelaborated adjectives. He established his pattern at Fort 

Stockton, whose entry was typical of the others: 

Preparation of the Company Messes indifferent. Parade and Grounds appended to the 

Fort, indifferent as to cleanliness. Quarters the same. Arms in the hands of the company 

injured by injudicious cleaning, bright but not in good firing order. Appearance of the 

Company under arms respectable . Gun carriages on the platforms rotten past repair. The 

platforms in the same situation . Gun carriages, under the Sheds, and their implements 

very well preserved. The Black Hole [prison], small low and damp. The Arsenal and 

Storehouses good and sufficient, but very badly arranged. Books well kept and preserved. 

The Company books of the new Regulations not received. Magazine damp, powder very 

well piled. Hospital in good order the supplies abundant. 15 

The headings in Archer's report were police, discipline, instruction, service, 

and administration. Altogether, he usually filled a page for each post inspected. 

14. Skelton, "Commanding General," 118. 

15. Archer, Report for 1822, 3 Nov 22 , in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 
138 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

He found many substandard conditions, although some places received definite 

praise. The poor quality of the mess and general sloppiness of quarters and 

grounds drew the most notice from him, while the best he could say about 

instruction at the posts was "tolerable." Discipline he usually described simply 

as "good," while service-that is fatigue duty-was "fair" or "regular," 

meaning it was shared by all in just measure. Archer complained frequently, 

however, that the time devoted to construction and other fatigue duty prevented 

the troops from drilling. Nevertheless, his recommendations were only of the 

most incidental sort. 16 

Archer's first report opened up subjects that were to occupy inspectors for 

decades to come. The storage of ordnance property, for instance, he found 

inadequate even at Springfield Armory, while at the New Orleans Ordnance 

Depot in May 1822: "The Ordnance Stores &c. in charge of Lt. Ward are 

heaped together in such absolute confusion that it is impossible to form an 

accurate idea of the quantity, or of the quality of the greater part of them, to do 

either they should be removed and arranged, which with the force he has under 

his command would require some weeks to perform. Every thing that I have 

been able to examine is in very bad order. ,,17 ... Unserviceable property was 

another problem. Archer found at every post quantities of property which 

should have been disposed of. But he opposed the current policy of selling it, 

which he said brought in only "a mere trifle," and was a practice that could be 

used to cover possession of stolen government goods. He also suggested that 

there was danger of "fraudulent substitution" of property going on sale, while 

the disposal itself made it easy to "conceal miss-management [sic] by disposing of that which should never have been received." ... Archer found his 

particular specialty, the artillery, woefully inefficient. He recommended concentrating artillery units for training, even if that left many posts vacant. Saying 

that in wartime heavy artillery units were necessarily isolated, Archer suggested that they should spend peacetime in training. That was impossible because 

of the scattering and isolation of the companies .... Archer also had some 

ideas on officers' pay and "emoluments," or extra compensation for things like 

forage, rations, and quarters. "The emoluments of officers should always be 

increased with their rank" in order to provide incentive, he said. "The hope, of 

bettering ones [sic] situation, will make [an officer] submit to any discipline, 

and will lead him to engage cheerfully in any enterprise however laborious or 

hazardous, but when this hope is extinct or rendered too remote, the principal 

incentive to action is destroyed, how much worse then is it, when the consequence of promotion to rank, is the diminution of emolument, yet this is generally the case when a Lieutenant of Artillery is advanced to the grade of Captain," 

which usually meant assignment to a staff position without the compensation 

that came from service with troops. IS 

16. Ibid . 

17. Ibid. 

18. Ibid. 
ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 139 

As required, Archer characterized the officers he encountered, listing by 

name those of bad habits who ought to be dropped or disciplined. Drinking was 

the most common shortcoming. But, said the Inspector General, "the vice, 

which has from all times been supposed common among Military Men, I mean 

excessive drinking, is scarcely known among the officers of the American 

Army." He then belied his own generalization. "Drunkenness, excessive, 

periodically," he said of one officer, and "Confirmed sot" and "Habitual 

indulgence in more liquor than his constitution can bear" he said of more than 

one. 19 Other officers were conducting inspections also because obviously Archer 

could not be everywhere. Asserting his own authority, General Scott detailed 

several officers to make inspections of arsenals and artillery units during 1822. 

They produced reports similar to those of post inspections, although the level of 

detail varied according to the inspector. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Jacob 

Hindman made a thorough inspection of every artillery company in the northeast, 

discovering the usual variations in quality of mess and other aspects of 

administration. The most defective company was at West Point. Scott highly 

approved Hindman's report, and in sending it to Washington recommended 

moving the troops out of West Point. Hindman and Scott also echoed something that Archer complained of- that officers promoted to posts at arsenals 

had little to do, "are without occupation except as storekeepers or tum-keys. ,,20 

Archer's complaints about the mismanagement of public property brought a 

response from headquarters. Brown added to the duties of inspectors on 19 May 

1823: " Hereafter the Inspecting Officers at the stated musters at the end of 

every second month, will examine, and note on the respective inspection returns, 

whether the officers commanding companies, and others charged with public 

property, furnish within the time prescribed the accounts, reports, returns, 

estimates and statements required by the Regulations. ,,21 That was the beginning of a role for inspectors in property management that would increase 

steadily in future years. Property and logistical issues often dominated inspectors' 

concerns as seen when Archer's peregrination resumed in December 1822. His 

annual tour began with an inspection of the armory at Harpers Ferry. " This 

Manufactory, considering it is a public institution, is certainly well managed, " 

he said with an inadvertent touch of sarcasm. Archer was in fact fascinated by 

what he saw there, and devoted much of his report for 1823 to a long, gratuitous 

description of how muskets were manufactured. That completed, the Inspector 

General went to Norfolk Harbor in April, then to posts in the Carolinas, New 

York City, Boston Harbor, Portsmouth, Maine, and upstate New York. Visiting Springfield Armory, Archer inspected the artillery company at West Point, 

19. Ibid. Archer listed quite a number of drunkards. 

20. Reports of Lt. Col. William Lindsay , 3d Artillery Inspector, Dec 22, approved " and 

suggestions adhered to" by Scott, Feb 23 , and Hindman to Scott, approved Feb 23, and 

endorsements, both in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

21. GO No. 38, AGO, 29 May 23 , in GORI&IG. That was one of the earliest orders issued "By 

order of Major General Brown," instead of by order of the Secretary of War or without attribution. 
140 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

then ended his tour at the Baltimore Arsenal. He did not inspect the Gulf Coast 

in 1823. 22 

The two major subjects of 1823 were the artillery and Fort Sullivan at 

Eastport, Maine. The former had not improved much since the previous year, 

and could only be "considered. . . as indifferent Infantry," in Archer's opinion. 

The men simply had not been trained to handle cannon, and only one company, 

thanks to its energetic commander, had held some form of training exercises. 

Archer said the reason for such negligence was that officers had not been 

trained in artillery duties, and in current circumstances had no call to learn 

them. On the positive side, most artillery units had improved the police of their 

stations. As for Fort Sullivan, where Archer arrived in July, "This Post should 

be abandoned, it is perfectly useless in time of war, or Peace .... It can afford 

no protection to the Town of Eastport during war, on the contrary it would then 

be absolutely necessary to remove the Garrison from the Island to save it from 

capture. ,,23 It was with similar comments that Archer had by 1823 established a 

comfortable routine as the Army's official tourist. His journeying around the 

Army occupied eight to nine months, after which he produced reports that were 

more commentary than description, bursts of quick characterizations without 

much elaboration. Wool, presumably, was doing much the same for infantry 

stations in the interior, although none of his reports from the early 1820s 

survives. Wool later would prove his value in other ways, and would become 

progressively less a roving inspector and more a chief assistant to the Commanding General. 

Gaines: The Commander as Inspector 

The army was so scattered, and the country so difficult to traverse, that two 

inspectors general could not cover everything in a year. The regulations required 

department commanders to make their own examinations, and that both Scott 

and Gaines did. Scott, however, never forwarded his own inspection reports to 

Washington, although he did pass on reports of inspections of artillery units 

conducted by his subordinates. 24 Gaines was more punctilious than Scott in 

submitting his annual reports. He soon made them semiannual, and long treatises that combined factual description of men and military posts with discourses on the state of the country and of the army. In his report for 1823, 

Gaines named the units in the Western Department, listed their locations, and 

described the positions of military posts. He also offered recommendations on 

establishing and expanding posts, especially to protect the Baton Rouge Arsenal, 

which he believed susceptible to isolation in the event of a slave rebellion-a 

danger he took seriously. Gaines also described the defenses of the Mississippi 

22. Archer, Notes of a Tour of Inspection Commencing 10 Dec 22 (Report for 1823), in 

Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

23 . Ibid . Incidentally, the post was finally closed in 1873. 

24. No inspection reports by Scott survive in the records, which are replete with those of 

Gaines. 
ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 141 

River, and reported his findings during personal inspections of his posts; Baton 

Rouge received his most thorough scrutiny that year, its shabby hospital "but a 

mere shell." The department commander's reports filled in many details obscure 

to hurried inspectors general, with considerable attention to the condition of 

troops, rates of disease, and other important subjects, including the geography 

of the country west of the Mississippi. 

Gaines was wide-ranging and verbose in his reports, never giving a su~ject 

a paragraph when a chapter could be written. His most elaborate essay in 1823 

was on the lower Mississippi River. After detailed descriptions of supply depots 

and fortifications-he wanted more of the latter at the river's mouth-Gaines 

described the prevalence of diseases in the region. He gave the greatest attention to the hazards to navigation on the Mississippi, ending with an impassioned plea for a program to clear obstructions from the river. That, he said, 

would be justified on both commercial and military grounds, and in demonstration he described how it could be done and what he believed it would cost. 

Thanks to the opinions of Gaines and others, the following year Congress 

passed the first Rivers and Harbors Act, directing the Corps of Engineers to 

improve navigable rivers generally. 25 Gaines was equally full of suggestions on 

traditionally military topics. He advised General Brown on how to handle the 

Army's horrendous rate of desertion. The root cause, he said, was inattention 

by officers. Company commanders should know the character of their men, and 

keep watch over them off as well as on duty. Gaines believed that the abolition 

of stripes and lashes-whipping-as punishment for desertion had happened 

too quickly, producing an utter absence of restraint. He wanted to restore 

corporal punishment for" incorrigible drunkards and deserters, " but opposed it 

for slight offenses. After closely reviewing the punishments used by European 

armies, Gaines said, "And I am convinced that shooting must occasionally be 

restored to in our service; as no punishment short of death, possesses a sufficient degree of terror to prevent the crime of desertion. ,,26. 

Gaines was a hard man, of the old school, but he could not talk the 

government into restoring the death penalty for desertion in peacetime. More 

positively, however, he demonstrated as effectively as anyone since Anthony 

Wayne that inspection could be an effective tool of command, and that a 

properly conducted personal inspection could inspire a commander to think 

about larger issues affecting the army. He put so much store in inspection-not 

just as an implement of management, but as source of information on the 

scattered, almost invisible military units under him-that on 1 June 1824 he 

issued an order requiring all subordinate commanders to submit regular reports 

on the state and condition of their commands. Those reports gave him an 

25. Gaines to Adjutant General (hereafter AG), Report for 1823, 28 Dec 23, in Inspection 

Reports 1814-1842, RG 159; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 166. 

26. Gaines Report for 1823, RG 159. 
142 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

immediate briefing on his units after he arrived in the Eastern Department in 

1824, and some of them he transmitted to Washington for Brown's benefit. 27 

The Inspector and Property Management 

The inspectors general, meanwhile, found their activities redefined slightly. 

Brown may have felt them slipping from his control, or wanted their assistance 

when they were not on tour. He ordered on 3 August 1824, "When not engaged 

in tours of inspection the Inspectors General will, in future , be stationed at 

General Headquarters." The same order required that, beginning 1 January 

1825, all officers responsible for ordnance property were to submit quarterly 

inventories as instructed by the Ordnance Department, "which inventories, 

when verified by the inspector general of Artillery [Archer], will be by him 

transmitted to the War Department.' ,28 Archer's paper work expanded with that 

order. Another order six days later further tightened the War Department's 

control over' 'ordnance, ordnance stores, and munitions of war of all kinds." It 

directed inspectors general on their next tours to submit, along with their 

reports, schedules of ordnance property required for all posts, "both upon the 

peace and war establishments"-in other words, what was needed for the 

present, and what would be needed in an emergency. The inspectors were to 

consult with post commanders in preparing estimates, and to consider not only 

obvious military requirements but contributing factors such as local transportation difficulties. Wool was to prepare estimates for the infantry, and Archer, for 

artillery posts. 29 

The War Department, to prevent waste and theft, and under the pressure of 

tight budgets, continued to strengthen its control over public property in 1824 

and 1825. After a jurisdictional dispute with the Commissary General of 

Purchases, Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup instituted a system of 

accountability for clothing and equipment issued throughout the Army in 1824; 

it became law in 1826, and remained essentially unchanged until World War II. 

The system standardized the distribution of regular issues, and required keeping 

a record on each soldier-an evocation of practices in Steuben's "little book" 

of the Revolution. The records, of course, were subject to examination by 

inspectors general. 30 

Congress lent a hand in property control on 3 March 1825 by authorizing 

the sale of unserviceable ordnance, arms, and military stores. To ensure that 

declarations of un serviceability were independent and honest, Congress ordered 

that "the inspection or survey of the unserviceable stores shall be made by an 

27. An early example is from Lt. Col. W. Lawrence, commander of Madison Barracks, to 

Gaines. "Report of the State and Condition of My Command," 1 July 1824, in Inspection Reports 

1814--1842, RG 159. Gaines and Scott alternated in command of the two departments for several 

years. 

28 . GO No. 55, AGO, 3 Aug 24, in GORI&IG. 

29. GO No . 60, AGO, 9 Aug 24, in GORI&IG. 

30. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 199. 
ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 143 

inspector-general or such other officer or officers as the Secretary of War may 

appoint for that purpose." That was a significant, new, and long-lasting, 

responsibility for inspectors, as well as the first of a succession of services they 

were to perform for the Secretary of War rather than for the Commanding 

General. 31 The War Department implemented the legislation on 13 July 1825, 

telling post commanders to prepare returns of their unserviceable property, 

which they were to describe. "As there may be a great difference in the 'stores' 

considered 'unserviceable,' " said the order, "in degree as well as in nature, 

the inspecting officer will describe the condition of every article examined, and 

in his remarks suggest in what manner it may best conduce to the public interest 

to dispose of them. " Inspections were to be conducted by an inspector general 

"when practicable," but for any post or arsenal not visited by an inspector 

general before 31 October, the commander or other officer designated by the 

War Department could perform the duty, transmitting his returns to the Adjutant General by 5 November. 32 

The new law and regulations were at the time a reasonable attempt to stem 

the waste and abuses that continued to deplete the War Department budget. But 

they led to a system of excessive accountability, with officers continually 

fearful of accusations of fraud or mismanagement, for which they were financially liable. Every tent or teacup that outlived its usefulness was subject to 

inspection, condemnation, consignment by boards, and sale or destructionwith elaborate records and statements at every stage of the process, all of which 

involved inspectors general or other designees. Worthless materials accumulated at every post, in the care of officers afraid to get rid of them lest they make 

a mistake. The burdens of inspectors general multiplied at the same time, their 

attention shifting from military efficiency to property forms and procedures. 

The change in emphasis, just beginning in 1825, was reflected in a general 

order which suspended the inspection returns that formerly had been the chief 

record of men present and absent. They were replaced by company muster 

rolls, forwarded directly to the Adjutant General without clearance by inspectors general. 33 The latter lost a role in mustering that they had carried since 

the Revolution. 

More Changes in the Inspectorate 

The day before Congress put inspectors into the property-condemnation 

business, the War Department revised its management of the inspectors general. 

The division of assignments between Archer, who examined the artillery, and 

Wool, touring the infantry, had not worked well, because it kept both inspectors away from their desks for too long. New orders on 2 March 1825 rescinded 

the earlier specialization and directed the two officers alternately to inspect 

31. An Act to authorize the saLe of unserviceabLe ordnance, arms alld military stores, Statutes 

at Large 4, sec. 2, 127 (l!r.l5); Thian, Legis/ative History, III. 

32. GO No . 58, AGO, 13 Jul 25, in GORI&IG. 

33. GO No . 53, AGO, 8 Jul 25, in GORI&IG. 
144 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

posts throughout the entire army. 34 Even with this new arrangement, both 

officers remained firmly under the control of the Commanding General although 

the alternate inspection requirement may have been an effort to head off subordinate commanders' fears of domination . 

In the case of property management, the War Department regarded formal 

inspection as a way of controlling expenses. But inspection itself was expensive, 

because of travel expenses. So the department kept inspectors general at home 

in alternate years, and generally reduced the amount of inspection in the Army. 

Scott revised the regulations slightly, the new volume appearing in 1825. The 

revisions had some changes affecting inspection: Department commanders were 

still required to make tours of inspection, but "as often as may be required by 

the War Department, or general-in-chief," with every post still to be visited at 

least once every two years. Artillery inspections remained as required in 1821, 

and in fact the "form and course of inspections," to the smallest detail, remained 

unchanged. Weekly company inspections were still to be made on Sundays. 

Regarding the " Inspectors' Department, " the 1825 regulations repeated the 

text of 1821, with a signficant difference that increased the influence of the 

Commanding General and limited that of department commanders. The last 

sentence of the first paragraph now read: "The reports of the inspectors will be 

considered strictly confidential, so far as they relate to the character and habits 

of officers. In other respects, they will be subject, under the discretion of the 

general-in-chief, to be communicated to the commands affected by them, with 

a view to the correction of abuses. ,,35 

Inspection might as well have been cut back by 1825, for it had become 

almost perfunctory. Archer did not begin his tour until 21 March, at least three 

months behind his usual schedule, and he visited only a few posts along the 

Mississippi River and Red River. The thin substance of his report was another 

succession of unelaborated adjectives, the most signal comment a complaint 

that the ' 'rapid destruction of Arms in the hands of the troops is an evil which 

requires a prompt and efficient remedy. " His remedy was to end the frequent 

changes of hands to whom weapons were assigned. Artillery field officers, 

meanwhile, continued to tour their companies as required. They examined men 

and behavior, but for the most part ignored physical facilities. Typically, the 

colonels believed that their regiments looked good. 36 As far as some of the 

Army hierarchy was concerned, these official inspection reports were of little 

value. Archer, for instance, paid very little attention to the condition of the 

34. GO No. 16, AGO, 2 Mar 25, in GORI&IG. 

35 . U.S. War Department General Regulationsjor the Army; or, Military Illstitlites. Revised 

by Major·General SCOII (Washington: Davis and Force, 1825), 61-68 , 367. As written in 1821, the 

sentence read: "The reports of the Inspectors to be considered strictly confidential." Copies of the 

general regulations were to be sent to all staff and field officers and all company commanders, 

" who will exhibit them at inspections." (p . 408 of 1825 Regulations). 

36. Archer, " Report of a Tour of Inspection of the Western Department of the Army of the 

United States, Commencing 21 March 1825" (Report for 1825), n.d., and a typical artillery report, 

Col. W. K. Armistead , 3d Artillery, " Report of Inspection, 13 January 1825," both in Inspection 

Reports 1814-1825, RG 159. 
ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 145 

army's physical plant, which had been deteriorating for five years since 1820, 

when Congress imposed a moratorium on construction. Many posts were on the 

verge of collapse by 1825. 

The Quartermaster Department was unable to obtain an accurate picture of 

physical conditions from the inspectors general, so it made its own survey iil 

1825, examining all military posts in order to support its request for a renewal 

of construction appropriations. The resulting descriptions were in very general 

terms, stressing the need for improvement. One point stood out, however. 

Apparently the way the army laid floors (or washed them) caused them to 

deteriorate quickly. The survey report repeatedly referred to the deplorable 

state of the floors at post after post, even in buildings otherwise described as in 

good condition. When the report did not condemn the flooring, it said that it 

had been' 'recently repaired.' , 37 The reports made it evident that governmental 

economizing had clearly gone too far, and the shabby state of troop housing 

was an important contributor to the high rate of desertion. If the inspectors 

general had pointed that out, corrective measures might have been instituted 

earlier. Things began to improve slightly only when the Quartermaster Department revealed the extent of the structural deterioration . The quartermasters 

were allowed to resume making repairs and building new barracks in 1825 , 

although most of the work was done by the troops. 

A New Inspector General 

While Congress debated building appropriations, the Army's inspectorate 

underwent changes. Samuel B. Archer died on 11 December 1825. On the 

17th , orders declared, "As a testimony of respect for the memory of Colonel 

Archer, late an Inspector General, in the Army, and an officer of distinguished 

merit, the officers of the General Staff will wear crepe and the hilts of their 

swords for the period of thirty days." The Army learned on the last day of the 

year that, on 21 December, it had acquired a new inspector general, George 

Croghan. 38 . . . George Croghan was a remarkable character. He was born near 

Louisville, Kentucky, 15 November 1791, the son of a veteran of the Revolution, 

Maj . William Croghan. George was no relation to the famous eighteenthcentury Indian agent, George Croghan, but he was nephew, through his mother, 

to George Rogers Clark and William Clark. His uncles' famous exploits inspired 

the young Croghan with notions of a military career, upon which he embarked 

at the earliest opportunity. Volunteering in campaigns against the Indians beginning in 1810, Croghan served as aide to William Henry Harrison at the Battle of 

Tippecanoe in 1811. That earned him, at Harrison's instigation, a commission 

as captain in the 17th Infantry 12 March 1812. He became a major just over a 

37. State of Barracks, Quarters &c . occupied by the troops, or in charge of the Quartennasters 

Department, April 1825, Records of the Office of the Quartennaster General (hereafter ROQMG), 

Miscellaneous Records Relating to Reservations and to Buildings 1819- 1865, RG 92, National 

Archives. 

38. GO No . 86, AGO, 17 Dec 25, and GO No . 89, AGO, 31 Dec 25, in GORI&IG. 
146 

COL. GEORGE CROGHAN. Inspector 

General, 21 December 1825-25 September 1849. 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

year later. Croghan served with such 

distinction in the defense of Fort 

Meigs in May 1813 that Harrison put 

him in command of Fort Stephenson, 

on the lower Sandusky River, with 

orders to bum and abandon the dilapidated old place if a strong enemy force 

approached. But the 21-year-old major defied those orders, barely talking 

his way out of a court-martial, and 

determined to hold Fort Stephenson 

with about 160 men and a cannon. 

He did just that when the British at-

'tacked in August, and became an instant and enduring national hero. The 

anniversary of the battle of Fort Stephenson was celebrated for over a century (Croghan was reinterred on the 

site in 1906), and in 1835 Congress 

struck a medal in Croghan's honor 

and gave each of his officers a sword 

as token of the nation's thanks. He was brevetted for his defense of Fort 

Stephenson, and became a lieutenant colonel before the end of the war. But he 

found no home in the peacetime army, and resigned his commission in 1817. 

He had married into the wealthy Livingston family of New York in 1816, and 

in 1817 moved to New Orleans, where his wife's relatives were well connected. 

Croghan drifted for the next few years, and fell into a number of bad habits, 

from which his own and his wife's family protected him thereafter. Their 

influence secured him the position of Postmaster of New Orleans in 1824. 

Croghan was a well-educated man , graduate of the College of William and 

Mary in 1810, and extremely well-read. He was thoroughly versed in military 

subjects and much else, and in fact was one of the more literate inspectors 

general ever. His intelligence, drive, and critical eye and tongue fitted him well 

for his new position. His positive traits were truly strong, for they compensated 

for some serious defects. As the defender of Fort Stephenson in 1813, he was 

the very model of the dashing young officer of romantic fiction. He had a 

handsome, almost beautiful, face with soft eyes and a warm but determined 

expression. But the George Croghan of 1825 showed signs of dissipation, the 

eyes clouded and the face puffed. He became addicted to liquor and gambling 

while resident in New Orleans, and remained so for life. 39 He develope'd a habit 

of getting drunk, then allowing himself to be drawn into card games, signing 

39. Francis Paul Prucha, ed., Army Life on the Western Frontier: Selections From the Official 

Reports Made Between 1826 and 1845 by Colonel George Croghan (Norman: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1958), xiii-xxviii; DAB, 2: 557; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 46-47, 339. 
ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 147 

promissory notes he would not have acknowledged sober. He was a source of 

continual embarrassment to his family during his years as inspector general. He 

became the object of so many official complaints that his colleague, Inspector 

General Wool, several times was sent to investigate, returning with unfavorable 

reports. Each time, Croghan reformed for a while, and when sober he was a 

most effective inspector. 4o 

Croghan served as Inspector General for more than twenty-three years, 

despite his defects. He kept his job because he usually performed it well, if not 

always on time, and because he enjoyed considerable protection. First among 

his guardians was his sister's husband, Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup. 

Croghan started borrowing money from Jesup the day before the latter's wedding in June 1822, when he received $1,250 to cover gambling debts. Jesup 

remained loyal for his wife's sake, however, and an easy touch for Croghan 

until the latter's death. The extent of his helpfulness was demonstrated in 1825, 

when it became necessary to clear Croghan's record so he could become Inspector 

General. Croghan's drinking and gambling had caused him to dip into the till 

while he was postmaster at New Orleans. In the easy climate of the times, that 

was not stealing, because he intended to pay it back, with the help of friends 

and family if necessary. Jesup went into debt in 1825 to cover $8,000 that 

Croghan owed the Post Office Department; it took five years for Croghan to 

pay him back, during which time he borrowed more. 41 

Croghan was recommended for the post of Inspector General by several 

important people when Archer died . His sponsors included William Henry 

Harrison and at least seven congressmen and senators, all of whom interceded' 

with Secretary of War James Barbour. They had been trying for some time to 

get Croghan a government appointed in recognition of his war record, and at 

one time talked of a diplomatic assignment to Mexico. After his financial 

difficulties as postmaster, a return to the Army seemed to be a good idea. But 

Croghan himself expressed some uncertainty about the position of Inspector 

General. 42 He was nevertheless determined to succeed, and perhaps for the 

moment equally determined to reform. But at the same time, Croghan knew 

that his appointment from civilian life would bruise some feelings in the army . 

That was inevitable, given the politics of the officer corps, and the shortage of 

colonelcies. Croghan told Jesup early in February 1826 that he was grateful to 

all those who had gotten him the opportunity and he knew he would have to 

work hard to prove himself in the face of inevitable resentments from active 

officersY His appointment ushered the Army's inspectorate into a long period 

of stability, free of the politics and tensions associated with commissions. 

40. Prucha, Army Life, xx. 

41. The remarkable relationship between Croghan and Jesup was brought to light by Chester L. 

Kieffer, Maligned General: The Biography of Thomas Sidney Jesup (San Rafael, California: 

Presidio Press, 1979), 98, Ill. Jesup remained Croghan's ceaseless defender within the War 

Department. 

42. Prucha, Army Life, xix. 

43. Ibid ., xixn. 
148 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

Croghan served until 1849, while his colleague Wool remained until 1841. 

Only one other person, Sylvester Churchill, served as Inspector General before 

the Mexican War. The three men together carried the title of Inspector General 

for a total of sixty-eight years. It was during their tenure that inspection passed 

through a golden age, before undergoing vast alterations . 

• 
CHAPTER 11 

Inspection and the Fortunes 

of the Commander 

(1826-1849) 

American public attitudes toward the Army had begun to moderate by 

1826. With the force reduced to insignificance, perceptions of any military 

threat to public liberty gradually vanished. The North American Review was 

typical of prevailing opinion in saying in 1826 that the Army was a reliable part 

of a greater community and nothing to be feared. 1 The relatively small size of 

the force and its deployment beyond the visibility of most of society unquestionably contributed to this reduction in public concern and interest. This was the 

position of the frontier army, with a few notable exceptions, for the remainder 

of the century. 

The Nation's Military Forces 

The Review's editorial may have been somewhat forward-looking at the 

time, but it did suggest the start of changing sentiments. At the same time, it 

passed over the fact that the army was not "mingled" with the nation, but was 

banished in small bands to the wilderness, where it was to watch the Indians. In 

any case, there had been a shift from outspoken fear and rejection of the 

military to an attitude of benign neglect. America could safely ignore its army. 

However, the military could not be ignored entirely because according to the 

chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in January 1826, about 

nine hundred soldiers deserted from the army every year, and this cost the 

public a fortune in wasted training and lost pay and equipment. Punishment by 

such means as the ball and chain and hard labor had not worked, the chairman 

reported, and something better must be attempted. He spoke in support of a bill 

to reduce desertion by increasing the pay of privates, and retaining part of it 

until the end of enlistment. There was only limited objection on the floor, 

mostly to increased pay for men who reenlisted, although some members 

objected to the withholding of pay as being unfair. The bill, a renewed War 

I. North American RevielV, 23 (n.s., 14 October 1826): 245-74, reprinted in Russell F. 

Weigley, ed. , The American Military: Readings in History of the Military in American Society 

(Reading , Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969),71-77. 
150 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Department proposal, passed to its third reading, but no new law appeared in 

1826.

2 The militia received equally fitful attention from Congress, which in 

1826 told Secretary of War James Barbour to draw up a system of tactics and 

exercises for militia cavalry and artillery. Barbour established a board of regular and militia officers, chaired by Winfield Scott, to prepare the manuals. 

Meanwhile, he seized the opportunity to examine the condition of the militia 

officers, and others. He found that volunteers were widely regarded as more 

efficient troops than the militia, which in most states did not amount to much 

more than lists of names on outdated rosters. The scheduled militia musters, in 

fact, were generally disfavored as "schools of vice"; furthermore, there was no 

uniformity among the militia of the various states. 

One of Barbour's respondents was former Inspector General Alexander 

Smyth, who was as usual out of step with the majority. His attitude had 

changed since 1813-now he wanted to improve the militia, in order to abolish 

the need for volunteer formations. Training the militia officers was sufficient, 

he said, to make militia effective. Another respondent was Alexander Macomb, 

hero of the battle of Plattsburgh, current Chief of Engineers, and future Commanding General. He offered an idea that decades later would become the pet 

cause of an inspector general- the recruitment of apprentice battalions. Macomb 

suggested that the army should accept boys fourteen to sixteen years old, 

apprenticed by their parents for fifteen years, during which time they would be 

trained to become noncommissioned officers. Not only would the army gain 

properly trained noncoms, Macomb averred, but it could return them to society 

at the end of their apprenticeship as potential leaders of militia. Although it 

was a novel idea, nothing came of it. The board of officers proposed several 

reforms, including reducing the number of men obliged to militia duty , making 

training more uniform, and so on, but the whole question came to naught in 

Congress, which took no action on any of the proposals. 3 

While Congress vacillated, the army went about its way. Croghan entered 

upon his duties as Inspector General early in 1826, and on 17 May was ordered 

to inspect pos.ts on the upper Mississippi and Missouri rivers. He returned in 

October, ready to submit his report, and was somewhat at a loss on how to go 

about it. The regulations required certain topics to be addressed under separate 

headings, but there was some informality when it came to the format of the 

Inspector General's annual report. Adjutant General Roger Jones told Croghan 

that the reports were "constructed according to the dictate of the Inspector 

General himself." With that advice, Croghan submitted a long, and very 

engaging, first report. 4 

Congress renewed the privilege of free postage for inspectors general on 2 

March 1827. That removed any obstacle to transmission of their reports, as 

2. Benton, Abridgeme11l of Debates (12 January 1826), 8: 371- 74. 

3. John K. Mahon, "A Board of Officers Considers the Condition of the Militia in 1826," 

Military Affairs, 15 (summer 1951): 85- 94. 

4. Prucha, Army Life, xx, xxiv (quoting Jones to Croghan, 3 Oct 26). Croghan's first report was Croghan, "Report of a Tour of Inspection during the Summer & Fall of 1826," n.d. (Report 

for 1826), in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 151 

they were handed their instructions on 27 March. Also, it was recognition of 

their role as an important element of the staff. Wool was told to inspect all posts 

on the seaboard, from Maine to Virginia, while Croghan went to posts of the 

7th Infantry in Arkansas, and stations along the Mississippi from New Orleans, 

Louisiana, to Fort Snelling, Minnesota, stopping by the Pittsburgh Arsenal on 

his way. Both were to depart "with as little delay as the season will permit," 

and to inspect all recruiting stations along their routes. 5 

Croghan was a replacement for Archer, who had concentrated on artillery 

and ordnance, but by 1827 Wool had made that area his principal object of 

attention. He considered it the most important part of the army. Wool had spent 

the winter of 1826 and 1827 developing a new classification of ordnance and 

ordnance stores, in order to raise their importance to equal other departments of 

the U.S. Army. That became his pet project for the year, and he was fairly 

outraged when the War Department failed to release the new classifications 

before he left on his inspection tour. They were issued at last, after his return, 

forcing him to repeat some inspections of arsenals. That delayed his report by 

three weeks, but he was happy to tell General Brown that he had observed 

overall, gradual improvements in the Ordnance Department-arsenal buildings 

were good, stores well cared for. 6 

The Inspectorate and the Commanding General 

Wool's report was the last that Brown was to see, as the Commanding 

General died on 24 February 1828. He had been the one unifying force in an 

army that was really two armed camps. Edmund P. Gaines, in the Eastern 

Department, commanded 2,530 officers and men at twenty-seven posts, while 

Winfield Scott, in the Western Department, oversaw 2,203 officers and men at 

sixteen posts. Each department commander hated the other, perceiving correctly that he was a rival for the post of Commanding General. Gaines and Scott 

were strong-minded men, each surrounded by friends and regarded balefully by 

legions of enemies. As the Seqetary of War considered which of the two to 

make Commanding General, it became apparent that either one, if disappointed, 

would stir up trouble that could wreck the organization. 7 In this atmosphere, the 

Senate Military Affairs Committee defined the role of Commanding General on 

19 March 1828. He was a "medium of communication" between the government and the Army, keeping the former aware of military matters. He supervised discipline and ensured efficiency. He dire"ted the recruiting service and 

the Artillery School. The commander also was to study American terrain in 

preparation for war, and to coordinate national mobilization. The statement 

5. An Act ammendatory of the act regulating the Post-Office Departmefll, Statutes at Large 4, 

sec. 4, 238 (1827). 

6. Wool, "Confidential Report to General Brown," 16 Nov 27, in Inspection Reports 

1814-1842, RG 159. 

7. Watson, " Congressional Attitudes Toward Military," 615; Skelton, "Commanding 

General," 119. 
152 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

said nothing about the Commanding General's relations with the Secretary of 

War or with the staff departments. It remained for the next tenant to determine 

what the office of the Commanding General really meant, and where the 

inspectors general stood in relation to the highest office. 8 

The next Commanding General surprised everyone. He appeared during a 

confusing change of leadership at the War Department. Secretary Barbour 

resigned as of 23 May 1828. The next day, the President promoted Alexander 

Macomb, Chief of Engineers, to the rank of major general---{)ver the heads of 

Gaines and Scott. Peter B. Porter-who had once fought a duel with Alexander 

Smyth-became Secretary of War on 26 May. Macomb became Commanding 

General three days later. His appointment averted the dangers of the GainesScott rivalry, but it angered both. Scott, characteristically, resigned in a huff. 

Porter managed to smooth his ruffled feathers enough to get a retraction, but 

Scott refused to have anything to do with Macomb except as strictly required by 

military duty. Scott, as feared, proved to be a source of dissension·in the officer 

corps, but at least he did not lead a mutiny.9 So Macomb entered office 

determined to make the Commanding General as much a reality as a title. He 

decided to make the inspectors general agents in his cause. But they were 

absent on their annual tours when he took office, sent off under orders issued 19 

April. As Macomb sized up his inspectors from afar, Croghan picked that 

moment to succumb to his old weakness. He was to tour posts on the Great 

Lakes, in the Northeast (usually Wool's territory), at West Point, and down the 

East Coast. Croghan showed up at New London, Connecticut, too drunk to 

inspect the command. The commanding officer asked Quartermaster General" 

Jesup to intercede. Evidently Jesup delivered a stem lecture, but within a year 

reports again circulated about Croghan's drinking and gambling. Moreover, he 

failed to tum in 1m annual report for 1828. Probably because of that series of 

events, Macomb placed his trust in Wool. Meanwhile, Gaines joined Scott in 

bypassing the new Commanding General, submitting to the Secretary of War a 

long, gratuitous report on the Indian menace and how to manage it. 10 

Amid that turmoil, the inspectors general acquired an additional power in 

April 1829, one that they had exercised occasionally since the Revolution. If a 

soldier was regarded as unfit for service on account of wounds, disease, or 

infirmity, the senior surgeon of his station was to provide the man's captain 

with a certificate of disability. When the captain presented that to an inspector 

8. Skelton, "Commanding General," 119. 

9. Ibid., 119; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 16, 680,800; Elliott, Winfield Scott, 241-49; 

Weigley, History of the United States Army, 170. 

10. GO No. 14, AGO, 19 Apr 28, in GORI&IG; Chester L. Kieffer, Maligned General: The 

Biography of Thomas Sidney Jesup (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1979), 111-12; Croghan's 

report dated 1828 , an enclosure with Croghan to Macomb, 26 Aug 36 and postscript dated 1 Dec 36 

(Report for 1836), in Inspection Reports, 1814-1842, RG 159; Edmund P. Gaines, "Indian 

Department," submitted to the Department of War 1 Ju128, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 

159. Why the latter was filed with inspection reports is not apparent, as it was really what would 

now be called a position paper. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 153 

general or post or regimental commander, either could grant a dischargeY 

However, discharges were a minor issue; the inspectors' first duty was to 

inspect. Croghan was dutifully dispatched to the West in the spring of 1829, 

while Wool passed a more interesting year. Macomb told them both on 16 May 

to inspect the conduct of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men, 

according to the regulations, and to make an assessment of the condition and 

efficiency of each individual and unit. He then gave them a list of specific 

points to consider. These included not only such traditional things as unit 

appearance and discipline but also requirements for inspectors to gauge the 

effectiveness of general orders and to recommend changes to the Articles of 

War. 12 

Croghan was delighted with Macomb's instructions. He took the opportunity to suggest to the Commanding General that he would not repeat his deplorable performance of 1828, promising strict adherence to the new requirements. 

He said he welcomed them as being much more helpful than previous guidelines for inspections. 13 Croghan's previous reports had in fact been long, detailed, 

and of high literary quality-that is, when he had himself well enough organized to get his reports in. But he adopted Macomb's listed points beginning in 

1829 and his report that year was especially informative and engagingly 

presented. 14 They remain an exceptional documentary of the role, appearance 

and functions of the army as it began nearly a century of specialization in 

guarding the expanding frontier. 

Reporting the State of the Army 

Wool and Croghan were inspectors general during a unique period in the 

history of the U. S. Army . The force was widely scattered, and the authorities in 

Washington had substantially one source of knowing what went on at the 

isolated posts-the inspectors general. Furthermore, during Macomb's tenure 

as Commanding General, what the inspectors general had to say about the 

condition of the army was held in the highest regard, because it was the 

principal source of information that Macomb needed to assume control of his 

organization. Visits from the inspectors general, Macomb's personal representatives, were annual reminders that there was a Commanding General, and his 

desires were to be observed. 

The Macomb years were a high point for the U. S. Army's inspectorate. The 

force was small-two men-but it was integrated, centrally directed, and a real 

II. GO No . 7, AGO, 23 Apr 29 , in GORI&IG; Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department, " 

243 . 

12. Macomb to Wool and Croghan , 16 May 29 , as quoted in Prucha, Army Life , xxiv- xxvi. 

The original is in Letter Book, Volume I, Records of the Headquarters of the Army, RG J08, 

National Archives. 

13. Croghan to Macomb, 13 Jun 29, quoted in Prucha, Army Life, xxvin. 

14. Croghan , Report of Tour of Inspection during the Spring and Summer of 1829, n.d . 

(Report for 1829), in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 
154 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

agency of the highest authority. It also had almost a monopoly on information 

about conditions in the scattered outposts that housed most of the troops. But 

neither circumstances outlasted Croghan and Wool. With the waning fortunes 

of the Commanding General, the place and purpose of the inspectors general 

became uncertain. After a while they were not Washington's only source of 

important information. Paper work and reporting systems multiplied throughout 

the nineteenth century, and the War Department had many ways of knowing 

where appropriations went, and how the public interest was or was not being 

served. Other staffs, including th~ Quartermaster Department and, especially, 

the Medical Department, developed their own inspection and reporting 

procedures, and eventually provided a wealth of detail on the personal and 

material state of the army. Therefore, the reports o,f the inspectors general 

during the quarter century preceding the Mexican War are unique in their 

importance, in the context of the time and in their informative value. They are 

often the only contemporary sources of information on conditions in the army, 

and they established patterns for generations of inspection reports that would 

follow them. They are also personal documents, expressions of the personalities of their authors. That makes them human, and therefore interesting. 

Wool and Croghan followed a common set of rules, but they had different 

assignments and vastly different literary styles: Wool spent most of his time on 

the seacoasts and at Ordnance Department facilities, and concentrated on the 

improvement of ordnance and artillery. He contented himself with generalities 

about most other subjects, or ignored them altogether. He was also reluctant to 

point out deficiencies if he believed that they would be corrected without notice 

for the record. His reports, therefore, seldom make compelling reading. Croghan 

was quite another sort of man. He spent most of his time roaming the frontiers, 

where the majority of the army was scattered. He had to be more informative 

because the troops he surveyed were the farthest removed from headquarters. 

Croghan's educated style was characterized by a high sense of military propriety and a fine gift for controlled outrage. He presented the fullest picture of the 

army's social fabric and geographic setting and a very diverting one. 

The Productive Inspector Wool 

Wool lacked Croghan's easy literary style, but he was a far more productive 

inspector. Under "verbal instructions" from the Commanding General, he 

inspected the Artillery School of Practice at Fort Monroe, Virginia, in March 

1829. He found there a new organization and a new commander, both improvements since his last visit. The officers, he said, were generally adept, although 

some were nervous during the inspection. Nevyrtheless, Wool was displeased 

that there was still more emphasis on infantry drill than on artillery practice, 

and he recommended some changes to make the place an effective service 

school. 15 Wool's scope was not limited to routine garrison visits. He also 

15 . Wool to Macomb, 13 Apr 29, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 155 

served the Secretary of War. From March through May 1829, he, a civilian 

official, and a lieutenant composed a board of inspectors to look into contracts 

at Harpers Ferry Arsenal, and to review the character of the superintendent. 

They discovered that diligent inspectors had been systematically fired from the 

arsenal, while lax ones remained. Furthermore, the superintendent owed money 

to a number of employees. He permitted a great deal of absence from work, 

while many defective muskets had been produced, with significant amounts of 

materials disappearing. The superintendent also was involved in some questionable real estate deals, and there was considerable conflict of interest among his 

employees. Among the abuses the board discovered were payments on warrants 

for work not done. At the least, said Wool and his colleagues, the superintendent was negligent. More directly, they found' 'a want of honesty and integrity 

on his part." Wool wrote the board's report. 16 The energetic inspector further 

devoted himself to another ordnance related task. Wool's major project for 

1829 was the preparation of a detailed inventory of what ordnance property 

should be on hand at twenty-two garrisoned posts. From cannons to storage 

boxes, he prepared a catalog for every post, with explanatory remarks. It was a 

remarkable piece of work, winning the endorsement of the Ordnance Department the following year. 17 

While completing those assignments, Wool also managed to find time to 

make a regular tour of inspection. He visited the armories at Harpers Ferry and 

Springfield, and a host of arsenals and ordnance depots. Not surprisingly, given 

his orientation, he focused on the need to upgrade ordnance operations, which 

involved complicated financial and technical considerations. He recommended 

strengthening the Ordnance Department, and wanted to gather the scattered 

property supposed to be under its control, to "preserve it from waste and 

destruction." Wool also urged disposal of mountains of unserviceable ordnance property, although he said the job would be "difficult of execution." 

Nevertheless, he claimed that his personal exertions had served to improve 

things considerably. 18 In addition to his study on property, Wool submitted a 

separate report of his inspections in 1829 of military posts from Florida to New 

York and also New England. In it, he explained for Macomb's benefit his personal philosophy on the inspector's critical role in promoting efficiency: 

I have uniformly made it my duty to notice all errors at the time of inspection, and not to 

mention them in my reports, unless they were of importance, provided the officers 

manifested a disposition to correct them. This mode I think preferable to confidential 

reports, which would scarcely be necessary if the inspecting Officers of Regiments 

would in their tours enforce a more rigid compliance with the regulations of the Army. 19 

16. Wool to Secretary of War, 26, 28 May 29, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

17. Wool, "Estimate of Ordnance & Ordnance supplies for Military posts garrisoned in time of 

peace," 21 Oct 29, and Lt. Col. George Bomford, Ordnance, to Lt. Samuel Cooper, 4th Artillery, 14 

May 30, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

18. Wool to Macomb, 31 Oct 29, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

19. Wool to Macomb, 10 Nov 29, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 
156 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Wool's disinclination to recount deficiencies made his reports less entertaining than Croghan's, but they were instructive nevertheless. He was not reluctant to criticize when he thought criticism was merited, and he was especially 

displeased with the poor performance of the artillery colonels. They were to 

inspect their scattered companies regularly, and in the process keep them at a 

high state. As far as Wool was concerned, the artillery was in poor condition, 

and the colonels were to blame as they were not doing their job. 2o His reports 

were of great value because by then inspection was well established in the 

American army as a tool of command. It was the only tool of command in the 

artillery, since the companies were never assembled as regiments in one place 

where their colonels could supervise them directly. Wool believed that the 

colonels neglected their duty, and took it upon himself to reform the artillery 

and heavy ordnance. He wore himself out in the process, and by the fall of 1829 

was incapacitated with a "severe headache" which threatened to delay his 

annual report, but the tireless inspector general overcame the pain and put his 

report into the mail on time. 21 

Gaines, Congress, and Disciplinary Reform 

General Gaines, meanwhile, continued to produce his own voluminous 

inspection reports. His report on the Western Department and Remarks Concerning the Militia of the United States were published by Congress early in 

1829, while later in the year, after another change of station, he sent in a 

140-page report of inspection of the Eastern Department. 22 Gaines was faithful 

in his reporting, and as sweeping as ever. He focused his critical eye on the 

Ordnance Department and what it ought to be, subsistence and its organization, 

the Quartermaster Department, and other services. He also offered chapters on 

such topics as "sickly southern posts," books and records, the officer's oath of 

office, and anything else that came to his mind. His reports were mainly 

vehicles for recommendations, especially on the disposition of troops. In 1829 

he gave a lot of attention to border and seacoast defenses, many of which he 

believed served no valid purpose. He recommended concentrating on harbor 

defense-an idea that finally became defense policy in the later 1800s. The 

wide-ranging general also believed that too much leeway was granted courtsmartial, whose capricious punishments made miscreants "incorrigible." He 

recommended reform of punishments, forbidding cruelties like branding, as 

well as demeaning treatment of convicts. On the other hand, he asked for a 

return of lashing as a punishment. 23 

20. Ibid. 

21. Wool to Macomb, 11 Nov 29 (two letters), in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

22. Edmund P. Gaines, "Report of a General Inspection of the Military Posts of the Western 

Department, and Remarks Concerning the Militia of the United States," Military Affairs (Mil. 

Aff.) Doc. 407, 20th Cong., 2d sess. (1829), ASP, 19; Gaines, "Report of an Inspection of the 

United States Forces and Military Posts in the Eastern Department .. . for the half Year Ending 

December 31st, 1829," received n.d. January 1830, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

23 . Gaines, .. Report of an Inspection of. . . the Eastern Department for. . . 1829, " cited in 

previous note. Gaines suggested that southern posts should be garrisoned by soldiers native to the 

South, who would be used to climate and resistant to its diseases. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 157 

Gaines was not alone in believing that the army should examine its disciplinary systems. The desertion rate was too high, and Congress again showed its 

concern. Congressman Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina and Senator Thomas 

Hart Benton of Missouri thought that the country and the U.S . Army would be 

better off without the United States Military Academy. They believed that that 

institution manufactured an isolated class of petty autocrats, who created conditions favoring desertion . Macon said he felt the academy created a gulf between 

officers and men and also denied the opportunity for qualified soldiers to rise to 

commissions. 24 Macon had a point, and Secretary of War John H. Eaton was 

inclined to agree with him. The country had long placed its faith in the militia, 

which presumed that every man could become a soldier. Every man by the 

same token could also become an officer in the militia. Why, therefore, should 

the officer corps of the Regular Army be restricted to a narrow class of people, 

frustrating the ambitions of potentially good officers in its own ranks? Those 

frustrations, some people believed, made a career as an enlisted man a dead 

end, and probably contributed to desertion . 

As Congress debated improvements to the army's personnel situation, its 

official hope for national defense remained in the militia. But beginning about 

1830, events occurred that undermined the last legislative props holding up the 

militia's increasingly hollow shell. Most states had long imposed fines for 

failure to appear properly equipped for militia day. Overdue militia fines were a 

principal reason that men were imprisoned for debt. But in the three decades 

before the Civil War, militia fines were repealed in state after state-first as 

part of a movement to end debt imprisonment, then as part of a general decline 

in militia. State militias were an avowed sham by 1860, existing only in the 

statute books and rarely performing musters. 25 

Powers and the Agents of the Commanding General 

The quiet fading of the militia reinforced the importance of the Regular 

Army, which had problems of its own. Macomb had decided by 1830 to take 

firm control of the military establishment as part of a general reform. The War 

Department already showed tendencies of becoming a collection of independent bureaucracies, each reporting to the Secretary of War, with a Commanding General who commanded nothing. Of all the high army officials, only the 

inspectors general owed their principal loyalty to Macomb. So he determined to 

use them in his campaign to take charge of the army. Croghan proved undependable once again. Macomb dispatched him on a regular tour of inspection on 23 

March 1830, to gather the information the Commanding General needed to 

oversee the field force . Having visited only Forts Preble and Sullivan and 

Hancock Barracks in the Northeast by early May, Croghan begged relief from 

24. Macon to Benton, 1831 , as quoted in Richard L. Watson, .Jr. , "Congressional Attitudes 

Toward Military Preparedness, 1829-1898", Military Affairs, 40 (December 1976): 617-18. 

25. Lena London, "The Militia Fine 1830-1860," Military Affairs, 15 (fall 1951): 133-44. 
158 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

his orders because of "family afflictions." Macomb let him go home, and 

received only a fragmentary apnual report that year. 26 That probably confirmed 

Wool's status, apparent the next year, as Macomb's right-hand man, with 

Croghan relegated to the status of roving reporter. 

In 1830 Macomb set about making the army's bureau heads subordinate to 

the Commanding General. His first target was the Adjutant General, who as 

controller of the Army's communications and general administration acted by 

that time as if the Commanding General did not exist-for instance by issuing 

orders in the latter's name, but without his knowledge. In the end, Macomb 

court-martialed Adjutant General Roger Jones for insubordination. To Jones' 

utter surprise, he was reprimanded by the court. After that, it was Macomb 

who defined the Adjutant General's duties, enforcing subordination to the 

Commanding General. Jones, good soldier and sagacious bureaucrat that he 

was, admitted defeat-probably content in the knowledge that Macomb would 

not always be Commanding General.

27 With Jones well in hand, beginning in 

1831 Macomb used his clearly subordinate inspectors general and their inspections as a means of asserting his authority over the other staff department elements. 

He began with the most independent of all, his former province, the Corps of 

Engineers. His first blow was to order Wool to inspect the Military Academy, 

the corps' exclusive domain. The academy superintendent, Sylvanus Thayer, 

protested, as did the Chief of Engineers, but Macomb and Wool succeeded. 28 

Wool traveled all over the country that year, from New Orleans to Maine, 

and merely included West Point in his rounds--emphasizing that his visit there 

was a proper part of his ordinary routine. He generally found much to applaud 

in the United States Army that year, except for slovenly troops at Niagara, New 

York. West Point gave him an opportunity to aver the necessity for cavalry in 

the army, and to suggest that cavalry exercises be added to academy drills. He 

prefaced a long, critical discourse on the strengths and weaknesses of the West 

Point drill program, for which he offered improvements, with a statement of 

how his inspection of the academy was conducted so as not to offend the 

superintendent too much. He specified that he restricted his interest to military 

topics and facilities only and closed with praise for the appearance of the Corps 

of Cadets. 29 This visit to West Point and the roaming of most of the country on 

an inspection tour were only part of Wool's activities that year. The energetic 

inspector general also continued his crusade for the reform of the ordnance 

26. Croghan to Sir, Oct 30 (Report for 1830), in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. It 

should be noted that Prucha, in Army Life, xxiii, says that Croghan asked for and received several 

postponements of his departure until it was too late to inspect at all, and therefore made no tour in 

1830. Actually, however, he reported on the three posts visited in April and May, after which he 

probably attended to his fami ly problems. The report is apparently fragmentary; the last pages and 

signature block have not survived, and it is easy to miss as the work of Croghan. 

27. Skelton, "Commanding General," 119. 

28. Ibid ., 119-20. 

29. Wool to Macomb, 24 Oct 31 (Report for 1831), in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

That his inspection was confined to purely military training meant that he did not presume to 

question the academic curriculum or its teaching . 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 159 

establishment. Late in October he evidently believed that he had been criticized 

by Secretary of War Lewis Cass for some of his recommendations. In a letter to 

Macomb, he defended his good intentions by denying that any private concerns 

influenced his work. He emphasized the fact that the Ordnance Department 

took the majority of his time, and that he was "almost constantly engaged" in 

his work. He appended to his letter a report calling for more independent 

inspections as a way of improving the Army, and objecting to regimental 

inspections by colonels and lieutenant colonels, who he said got "in the way of 

the Inspectors General." He had also seen a British rifle battalion during the 

year, and thought it a good model for the United States Army to follow. He 

suggested further that American uniforms were inferior in cut to the British. 30 

Wool also put up a good front for the Secretary, writing directly to Cass the 

same day he wrote to Macomb. He recommended that the Secretary of War 

establish a permanent board of officers to act on improvements in weapons and 

other equipment, and reviewed his own work in helping the Ordnance Department gain control over its scattered property. He also presented Cass with a 

general review of the condition of forts and armories, and went on to call for 

more rules to govern sutlers. 31 This relatively uncontroversial tone characterized the next reporting year. While Wool was thus engaged, Croghan roamed 

over the West, around the Great Lakes, and across the New York frontier 

during the summer and fall, returning with a routine report. Gaines, meanwhile, 

took a break from his customary personal inspection, sending a subordinate to 

examine the 2d and 5th Infantry regiments, company by company. He transmitted the resulting report, which featured none of Gaines' usual exhortations, on 

to Macomb.32 Macomb and the Corps of Engineers maintained a quiet truce 

through 1832, while his inspectors general were comparatively inactive. Because 

of illness in his family, Croghan delayed his departure several times, then did 

not inspect at all during the year. Nor does Wool appear to have done anything 

worth reporting. 33 Unprogrammed delays and the thoroughness of inspections in 

previous years ruled against any major new observations. 

More Attempts at Army Reform 

The U.S. Army continued in low repute in Congress that year. Ambrose H. 

Sevier, delegate from Arkansas Territory, told the House of Representatives 

that its ranks comprised the "refuse of society, collected in the cities and 

seaport towns; many of them broken down with years and infirmities." They 

were certainly a drunken lot, and in 1832 Secretary Cass moved to raise the 

Army's level of sobriety. After trying unsuccessfully to offer one cent a day in 

30. Wool to Macomb, 31 Oct 31 , in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

31. Wool to Cass, 31 Oct 31 , in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

32. Croghan, " A tour of Inspection during the Summer and fall of 1831," Croghan to 

Macomb, 11 Nov 31 (Report for 1831), and Brig. Gen . H. Brady to Gaines, n.d., dated 1831 on 

endorsement, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

33. Prucha, Army Life, xxiii. No reports by either Croghan or Wool survive for 1832. 
160 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

lieu of the gill of whiskey, he added coffee and sugar to the rations as voluntary 

substitutes for liquor, and barred sutlers from selling "spirituous liquors" to 

the troops.34 More substantial reforms were needed than voluntary temperance 

and Congress finally tried to set things right. It raised the authorized force to 

7,129 officers and men in 1832, and added a battalion of mounted rangers to 

patrol the prairies. The following year, on 2 March 1833, the force rose to 

7,194 officers and men, while the rangers became a regiment of dragoons. The 

same legislation at last answered the War Department's request for an attack on 

desertion. Congress abolished the enlistment bounty, reduced the term of enlistment from five years to three, and raised a private's monthly pay from $4.00 to 

$6.00 retaining the extra dollars for the first two years to discourage desertion. 

Reenlistment earned a man two months extra pay and the full $6.00 per month 

from the start of his second term. The law also provided that no man convicted 

of a crime could thereafter be recruited. Lastly, however, the lawmakers turned 

down Quartermaster General Jesup's request for something to improve the lot 

of officers in the frequently moving army. He wanted to provide furniture for 

their quarters, something Congress allowed in the navy but not the army, and 

he would be echoed in later years by inspectors general. 35 

Other minor attempts to improve the U.S. Army took place in 1833, some 

of them affecting the inspectors general. On 13 November, the War Department reiterated its orders of 1829, permitting inspectors general to discharge 

soldiers on a surgeon's certificate of disability . The same order ended the 

weekly Sunday inspections of companies and hospitals, moving the day to 

Saturday. Croghan recommended a year later a return of the weekly inspections 

to Sunday, because there was no longer "order and sobriety formerly observed 

on that day. ' ,36 Whatever he thought, giving the soldiers a day off made enlisted 

life slightly less disagreeable. The change did not last long, however, and it 

ultimately took an inspector general with a different attitude to compel the army 

permanently to grant its soldiers a day of rest. 

The Inspectors and Army Control 

Croghan roamed the West that year, while Wool devoted his attention to 

inspections of artillery and ordnance operations. Once again, he inspected the 

34. Watson, "Congressional Attitudes Toward Military," 616,619. It is stated that "ardent 

spirits" were actually removed from the ration, effective 2 November 1832. Ganoe, History of the 

United States Army, 172. 

35. Heitman , Historical Register, 2: 582-85; Watson, "Congressional Attitudes Toward 

Military," 623; Grace, History of the United States Army, 173; Otis E. Young, "The United States 

Mounted Ranger Battalion, 1832- 1833," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 41 (December 

1954): 453-70; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 159-60; Annual Report of the Quartermaster General (hereafter cited as ARQMG) 1833, in Mil. Aff. Doc. 551, 23d Cong., 1st sess. 

(1833), ASP, 20. The formation of dragoons was encouraged by the Black Hawk War, fought more 

on the prairies than in the forests. 

36. GO No. 107, AGO, 13 Nov 33, in GORI&IG; Croghan to Commanding General (CG), 15 

Nov 34 (Report for 1834), in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. The role ofinspectorGeneral 

Breckinridge in ending Sunday inspections is discussed below. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 161 

cadets at West Point. His repeated presence there increased the tensions between 

Macomb and the Corps of Engineers. West Point was long the corps' private 

preserve, offering an education that was not military, but was dominated by 

engineering and associated fields like mathematics and natural philosophy, 

added to a general education. The superiority of engineering was drummed into 

the heads of the cadets,37 and any intrusion by Macomb or his agents threatened 

to undermine that philosophy. Macomb challenged the Corps of Engineers 

directly in 1834 and 1835, when he and Wool together inspected a number of 

the corps' fortification construction projects. That set off an uproar of complaints. 

According to Wool, there was "but one opinion among all the officers & that 

was extremely adverse to General Macomb's interference in any respect with 

the Corps of Engineers. " But Macomb stood firm, going so far as to order the 

arrest of a captain at New York Harbor who refused to answer questions about 

his work. 38 The engineers maintained that theirs was a highly technical occupation not understandable by anyone else. Wool, who had immersed himself in 

the equally technical chemistry and physics of munitions manufacture, thought 

otherwise. He was not interested in questions of engineering, but in common 

sense and sound economy. What he discovered in his inspections embarrassed 

the corps. 

Fort Delaware, Delaware, under construction in 1834, was a typical case. 

Wool visited the place in July 1834, and reported immediately to "My dear 

General," as he addressed Macomb. The place was in sad condition, badly 

deteriorated, although there was a large crew at work on a seawall and other 

structures. Wool looked carefully at construction expenses, and confessing that 

he was not an "Engineer by profession," he stated that there was a lot of 

wastage of sound materials in the demolition of old structures and construction 

of new ones. As for his right to raise such questions, he concluded, "although 

as I have before stated, not an 'Engineer by profession,' [I] shall hereafter give 

my opinion at length. ,,39 

While Wool affronted the Corps of Engineers, Croghan also was more 

active than he was formerly, in 1834 touring posts around the Great Lakes and 

in the upper Mississippi Valley. He offered a substantial annual report, prefaced with a set of recommendations " presumed upon ocular proof of the 

existence of certain evils and abuses that require immediate correction." He 

suggested requiring that servants of officers be mustered to support their pay; 

establishing post gardens at all posts, to be cultivated by men on detail; prohibiting company and private gardens at posts unless cultivated by civilians; repealing the law permitting extra-duty pay for men working for the staff departments; 

appointing sutlers to regiments instead of to posts; requiring that all sutlers be 

37 . Croghan to Macomb, 9 Dec 33 (Report for 1833), and Wool to Macomb, 23 Nov 33 

(Report for 1833), in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159; James L. Morrison, Jr., "Educating 

the Civil War Generals: West Point, 1833--1861, " Military Affairs, 38 (September 1974): lOB-II. 

Morrison offers an excellent study of the West Point curriculum before the Civil War. 

38. Skelton, " Commanding General, " 120. 

39. Wool to Macomb, 31 Jul 34, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 
162 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

army veterans; rescinding the order banning liquor from camp or garrison; and 

finally, repealing the order that prohibited Sunday inspections. 4o 

When he received Croghan's report, Macomb was hard at work on a revision of the general regulations of the army. The revised regulations appeared in 

1835, and demonstrated his triumph over the Corps of Engineers and the clear 

supremacy of the Commanding General. That was symbolized in the right of 

his inspectors general to inspect staff departments and installations under staff 

supervision. The long article on the "Inspector's Department" began: 

1. It is through this department that the Secretary of War, and the Commanding 

General, are to be made acquainted with the actual state and condition of the army, and 

more especially the character and proficiency of the officers. 

2. It is, therefore, made the duty of the Inspectors General, critically to inspect, as 

often as the Secretary of War or the Commanding General may direct, every branch 

connected with the military service, including the armories, arsenals, military posts, the 

departments of the staff, the department of the Commissary General of Purchases, the 

Military Academy at West Point, and the troops in general. At the end of every tour, or 

by the 15th of November in each year, they will transmit to the Commanding General, to 

be laid before the Secretary of War, reports of all that may have passed under their 

observation during their inspections. 41 

Specific headings were then given, accounting for virtually every bureau or 

function in the army. Each heading was followed by a paragraph giving a 

detailed list of things inspectors were to look for. The details were to a great 

extent derived both from the 1813 regulations and from Macomb's instructions 

of a few years previous, but with much more elaboration, and some changes. 

Regarding officers, for instance, the inspectors general were still in general 

terms to state whether they were honest, sober, and efficient, but the confidential reports characterizing them, which had been usual in years before, were not 

required. In fact, no such lists had been prepared since the conclusion of army 

reduction in the early 1820s. Inspectors general now were to make a special 

report on any officer deemed unfit for duty. The inspectors' approach was even 

more circumspect in other cases. In that of the staff departments, Macomb still 

felt it necessary to tread lightly around the Corps of Engineers. That department 

was not specifically mentioned in the article on the Inspector's Department. 

The Military Academy was the only Corps of Engineers program identified, 

although phrases like "other staff departments" and "other disbursing officers" 

clearly brought the corps within reach. Construction, however, was not a 

specific object of attention, although repairs to structures were. Except for 

actual fortifications, however, construction and repair was a Quartermaster 

Department responsibility. 42 

40. Croghan to Macomb, 15 Nov 34 (Report for 1834), in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 

159. 

41. U.S. War Department, General Regulations for the Army of the United States; Also, The 

Rules and Articles of War, and Extracts from Laws Relating to Them (Washington: By Authority of 

the War Department, 1835), 131-37 (cited hereafter as 1835 Regulations). 

42. Ibid. , 133. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 163 

The regulations for the Inspector's Department also set forth "Additional 

Duties of Inspectors General, when with an Army, including Militia and 

Volunteers, on active Service and in the Field." Those merely restated the 

broad staff duties given inspectors general in 1813, except that (probably to 

satisfy the Corps of Engineers) the inspectors general no longer supervised 

camp layout and location. The mustering and evaluation of militia and volunteer forces remained a prominent duty, as did inspection of condemned 

property.43 As had been the case under the 1813 regulations, inspectors general 

were told to arrange their reports under the headings listed in the regulations, 

"and not blend the whole together, with one general remark. Each inspection 

report should be complete in itself, and contain a full and faithful representation, 

with such suggestions as they may consider necessary for the improvement of 

all the objects to which their attention may be directed. ,,44 

The regulations governing inspection procedures were substantially the same 

as those of 1825, although somewhat more generalized on what to look for in 

quarters, and giving more attention to inspection of post records. Post commanders were to inspect their posts monthly, while captains were to inspect 

their companies weekly (on Saturday) and lieutenants their sections every 

Wednesday. Hospitals also were to be inspected on Saturday, while the men 

were always to be inspected before being mustered for payment. There was also 

greater encouragement for personal cleanliness than there had been in previous 

regulations. 45 Inspectors general, under the 1835 regulations, were extensions 

of the will of the commander in chief. In peacetime, they were his eyes and his 

agents. In war or in the field, they served as chief of staff for the field army. 

Macomb evidently wanted his inspectors general respected as his emissaries. 

He would observe military custom regarding rank, but he would allow no 

failure to acknowledge the authority of the inspector to do his job. 

Macomb had made his point in the new regulations, and apparently reneged 

in forcing his attentions on the Corps of Engineers. Wool spent the spring and 

summer touring a number of forts and arsenals, but he toured no construction 

projects and did not visit West Point. Of the troops in general, he reported "no 

material change since the inspections of 1834, either in appearance, discipline, 

police, or in the Company or Battalion drill." Wool was preoccupied with 

ordnance anyway, as evidenced by his special short report on arsenals in the 

Northeast. 46 Croghan made no regular tour of inspection in 1835, possibly 

because of a cholera epidemic. At the request of the Secretary of War, however, 

he made a special inspection of Fort Des Moines and other defenses in the 

region in October. He recommended that the "establishment at Rock Island" 

be "broken up," and tried to enlist Macomb's support for that in case the 

Secretary disagreed. Croghan also took the occasion to object to a proposed 

43. Ibid., 136-37. 

44. Ibid. , 137. 

45. Ibid., 67-70. 

46. Wool to Macomb, 16 Oct 35 (Report for 1835), and Wool to Macomb, 4 Jun 35, in 

Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 
164 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

dragoon excursion beyond the Rockies under Col. Henry Dodge, as "it would 

end in the destruction and disbandment of the Corps. He might depart well 

mounted, but he would most assuredly return on foot.' ,47 

The War Department issued a manual of instructions and regulations for 

militia and volunteers early in 1836. It was prepared at Macomb's request by 

Assistant Adjutant General Samuel Cooper, regulations having long since ceased 

to be the responsibility of inspectors general. Regarding inspections, the pertinent sections were verbatim copies of the text of the Regular Army's 1835 

regulations. 48 The manual was a last attempt to impose some order on manpower mobilization before the next emergency. It appeared none too soon, but 

was still largely disregarded at the state level. Virtually each militia, and even 

elements within each, carried on with their own particular drills and methods of . 

operation. 

The Inspectorate and the Seminole Wars 

War with the Seminoles broke out in Florida in 1836, and the Army was 

woefully unprepared, its actual strength down to about 6,000--with only a little 

over 4,000 present and fit for duty. About a quarter of the force was rushed to 

the war zone, greatly straining the logistical system, while stretching the troops 

very thinly over other regions. Despite minor increases-another dragoon regiment and more ordnance officers---Congress did not expand the authorized 

strength of the army for two years. The war, it was assumed, could be conducted with volunteers. Congress and the Army alike underestimated the 

Seminoles.

49 The emergency, if it had been perceived as such as the time, could 

have been an opportunity to test out the new definitions of Commanding General and inspector general under the 1835 regulations. But the War Department 

looked elsewhere. In fact, its big project for 1836 was a great military road 

from Fort Jesup, Lousiana, to Fort Snelling, Minnesota, punctuated with posts 

from which troops would patrol the Indian frontier. Opposition rose against the 

idea within a year, and by 1841 the project was dead. Only the section of road 

from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Towson was constructed. 50 

The War Department's attention was also taken up with the Cherokee 

Indians. Instead of sending Wool to perform the Inspector General's duty in the 

war zone in Florida, the Secretary sent him t9 the Cherokee country to see 

47. Croghan to Macomb, 25 Jan 36, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. It is suggested 

that cholera cut Croghan's tour short with the one post of Des Moines. Actually, there was no 

regular tour that year, perhaps because of the cholera. When Croghan went to Des Moines in 

October, the season was safe, after the first frost. Prucha, Army Life , 180. 

48. U.S. War Department, A Concise System of Instructions and Regulations for the Militia 

and Volunteers of the United States . .. (Philadelphia: Robert P. DeSilver, 1836). See pp. 65-67 

for inspection regulations. 

49. Elliott, Winfield SCOII, 288- 310; Spaulding, United States Army, 162-63; Weigley , History 

of the United States Army, 161-62; Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 286-87, 626. 

50. Harold L. Nelson, "Military Roads for War and Peace-I791- 1836, " Military Affairs, 19 

(spring 1958): 11-14. Croghan, for one, pointed out the folly of running lines of communication 

parallel to a potential fighting front. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 165 

THE BATTLE OF MONCACO LAKE, 1837. Inspectors John E. WooL and 

SyLvester Churchill were prominent in deaLing with administrative aspects of 

the SeminoLe Wars. 

whether the Indians would observe the Treaty of New Echota, which require.d 

their removal to west of the Mississippi . Wool was empowered to command 

Tennessee volunteers, and could call out others if the Indians started any 

trouble. He requested regulars, but he did not get them. Wool sympathized with 

the Cherokees' being tom from their homes and forced away to a strange 

country. "The whole scene since I have been in this country," he wrote on 10 

September 1836, "has been nothing but a heart-rending one, and such a one as 

I would be glad to get rid of as soon as circumstances will permit." When he 

tried to protect some Cherokees in Alabama, where their oppression by whites 

was the worst, the governor and state legislature charged him with usurping 

the power of civil authorities. The President had to refer the charges to an army 

court of inquiry , which cleared the Inspector General in September 1837. 51 It 

was not a good precedent that at the very moment the Inspector General's 

position was most clearly defined and placed under the Commanding General, 

the Secretary called Wool away for an assignment that another officer could 

have carried out. It was, of course, a testimonial to Wool's military and diplomatic abilities, and he was worthy of the assignment. But the diversion also 

suggested that the role of Inspector General was not regarded as very important 

when other tasks beckoned. Wool's assignment to the Cherokees in 1836 was 

not the last time that a Secretary of War would hand an inspector general a 

mission mainly because the officer appeared to be available. 

51. Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 263-64. 
166 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

As if the Cherokee problem were not enough, Wool was further distracted 

by his own financial interests. The military law of 1802 permitted extra rations 

for post commanders. The War Department had gradually extended the standard double rations to heads of staff departments, beginning in 1821. The 

department denied Wool's request for double rations in 1829, at the same time 

it approved that of the former clerk of the department, retroactively to 1822-1825. 

Wool was not a department head, but he was the senior inspector general. The 

Secretary of War decided in 1833 that he had been unfairly treated, and started 

giving him double rations. Wool then advanced a claim in Congress for retroactive payment, and Secretary of War Cass supported him. The House Committee 

on Military Affairs, impressed by Wool's record, also agreed and decreed that 

he receive rations retroactively for the same period as other staff officers. That 

conclusion was reached while Wool was engaged with the Cherokee problem. 52 

While Wool was occupied away from the fighting in 1836, his colleague, 

Croghan, was equally diverted. He made a desultory tour of four posts on the 

Missouri and Mississippi rivers in the fall, then failed to get his report in on 

time. He attempted to make up for that by sending Macomb his annual inspection report for 1828, saying that the original had been in his trunk when it was 

stolen from a steamboat, and he had reconstructed the document from memory. 53 

With the Army's inspectors general otherwise occupied, commanders in the 

war zone improvised. They assigned the inspector's duty to at least two officers 

who would find themselves in similar positions later. Captain Ethan Allen 

Hitchcock, Gaines' assistant adjutant general, was assigned as acting inspector 

general of a force of 1,100 men under Col. Persifor F. Smith which was sent to 

Tampa in January 1836 as a reinforcement. In that capacity he wrote an account 

of a reconnaissance of the Dade massacre site on 22 February. Hitchcock would 

find himself a decade later an inspector general in Scott's force in Mexico. 54 

Major Sylvester Churchill, of the 3d Artillery, gained similar inspection 

experience. He spent five years, 1836 to 1841, periodically serving as acting 

inspector general for the troops in Florida and working for Generals Thomas S. 

Jesup and Zachary Taylor, successive commanders there. His duties included 

inspecting troops and posts and mustering volunteers in and out of service. As 

inspector general for the Army of the South in 1836, he spent most of his time 

traveling to muster in volunteers. He discovered that even that had its hazards 

when he was hit by a tree, felled by a settler who gave no warning. Knocked 

from his horse and severely bruised, Churchill suffered from the injury the rest 

52. all Claim of an Inspector General of the Army for atl Allowance of Double Rations, Doc. 

622, 24th Cong., 1st sess. (1836), ASP- MA, 6. 

53 . Croghan to Macomb, 16 Aug 36, postscript I Dec 36 (Report for 1836), and enclosure 

dated 1828, in Inspection Reports 1814--1842, RG 159. 

54. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Fifty Years ill Camp alld Field: Diary of Ethall Allen Hitchcock, 

W. A. Croffut, ed. (New York: Putnam, 1909),86-89,89-91. Hitchcock's service in Florida was cut short in March, when Gaines sent him to Natchitoches, Louisiana, to observe the rebellion in 

Texas. His private opinion of that situation, written before the Texan victory at San Jacinto, has 

been published as Marshall M. True, ed., "Ethan Allen Hitchcock and the Texas Rebellion: A 

Letter Home," Vermont History, 45 (spring 1977): 102--06. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 167 

of his life-much of which he spent as an inspector general of the Army. He, 

too, was involved in aspects of the Indian removal and then later was made a 

subdistrict commander near Saint Augustine. 55 ... The principle of inspection 

worked well enough in the early mobilization of volunteers for the Second 

Seminole War, but a centrally directed inspectorate had nothing to do with it. In 

fact, as was to happen again in later wars, the Army's inspectorate fell apart. It 

failed to offer the Commanding General oversight on the whole army, and only 

incidentally contributed to the war effort. 

Decline of the Commanding General 

The war did not go well, and partly as a result, Macomb's control over the 

army began to slip. Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett, late in 1837, proposed a 

reorganization of the U. S. Army, with all staff services under Macomb, whose 

role would have vaguely resembled that of the Chief of Staff created in 1903. 

Macomb was the chief influence on the proposal, which grew out of his struggle to define the role of the Commanding General. The actual direction of 

military operations would have rested with field commanders, reporting to the 

Secretary through the Commanding General. 56 Although nothing came of 

Poinsett's proposal, he had already implemented the idea so far as possible. In 

an order redistributing the troops on 19 May 1837, the War Department changed 

the boundaries of Gaines' and Scott's domains, which were at that time called 

military divisions, comprising seven geographical departments. The headquarters of the Eastern Division (headed by Winfield Scott) was fixed at Elizabethtown, New Jersey, while the Western Division (headed by Edmund P. Gaines) 

lodged at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri-neither very close to the scene of the 

Second Seminole War. The order further attached one of the inspectors general 

to each as "chief of the staff," to perform the duties of adjutant and inspector 

general. Accordingly, Inspector General Wool was assigned to the Eastern 

Division, and Inspector General Croghan to the Western Division. Each was . 

subject to the orders of his division commander. 57 

Poinsett had at one stroke made the Commanding General a cipher. The 

commander's control over the staff d~partments vanished because he no longer 

had the inspectors general as his agents. His control over the line of the army 

had always been strained, given the attitudes of Scott and Gaines. With the 

inspectors general transferred to the division commanders, Macomb knew only 

what those commanders wanted him to know, except such reports as they were 

specifically required to send him. Macomb was never able to gain back what he 

had lost in his attempts to consolidate authority in the Commanding General, 

55. Churchill, Sketch a/Life a/Churchill, 31-32, 36-37. As discussed previously, Churchill 

had been an assistant inspector general from 1813 to 1815 . General Jesup was the Quartermaster 

General, commander in the battle zone because he wanted a field command, because the greatest 

difficulties were logishcal, and because the war was not supposed to be worth the full-time 

presence of the Commanding General. About a quarter of the Army was involved. 

56. Skelton, "Commanding General," 120. 

57. GO No. 32, AGO, 19 May 37, in GORl&IG. 
168 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

even after the inspectors general returned to his staff, and the central inspectorate that he had established was also demolished. The inspectors general ceased 

inspecting. Wool for a time was occupied with the Cherokees; he then joined 

Scott as a chief of staff who soon had another improvised assignment. Croghan 

made no inspections in 1837, spending his time mustering volunteers for the 

Second Seminole War. 58 

Croghan-reporting to Gaines, not Macomb--resumed his inspection tours 

in 1838, but Wool did not. During trouble on the Canadian border following the 

destruction of an American boat, the Caroline, Scott went to Buffalo in January 

as a mediator. He sent Wool to Vermont to preserve the peace in an area where 

local sentiment was strong for the "Patriots," groups of men, mostly Canadians, 

whose raids took them into Canada during a rebellion there that winter. Wool 

mustered volunteers and sent them to intercept arms and ammunition destined 

for Canada and also supported local authorities in thwarting Patriot activities in 

northern Vermont. But the absence of Regular Army troops in the area made it 

impossible for the United States to keep faith with Britain. A frustrated Wool 

was back in Washington by June, begging for troops for the border. 59 

Congress, meanwhile, had taken up the question of expanding the army, 

which was seemingly ineffectual with the Seminoles. The Senate debated a bill 

to expand the army in January. Its chief proponent was Thomas Hart Benton, 

who especially wanted to increase the Corps of Engineers, the Corps of Topographical Engineers, and the Ordnance Department. Opponents of the bill were 

equivocal, but were generally united in opposing increases in the officer corps; 

some favored expansion of the enlisted force only. But Benton had his way 

with expansions in the staff departments, and held forth through several attempts 

to table the item. 60 Herewith, the product of the debate was the act of 5 July 

1838, which with supplemental legislation two days later raised the authorized 

force to 12,539 officers and men. One section governed the army's inspectorate: 

"The President is authorized to appoint two assistant adjutants-general, with 

the brevet rank of captain, who shall be taken from the line of the army, and in 

addition to their own shall perform the duties of assistant inspectors-general 

when the circumstances of the service may require. ,,61 

That combination of inspectors' and adjutants' positions was a reversion to 

the days of the War of 1812 and even the Revolution. It also followed the 

precedent established the year before by Poinsett, making each inspector general a divisional chief of staff and an adjutant and inspector general. It was 

inevitable, in the nature of things, that adjutants/inspectors would spend most 

of their time as adjutants. But the legislation did have a fortunate side-effect. It 

58. Prucha, Army Life , 180. 

59. Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 315-18. 

60. Congressional Globe, 25th Cong., 2d sess. (24 January 1838), 133. Benton also wanted to 

end the practice of army engineers working for private concerns, and introduced an amendment to 

that end. 

61. An Act to increase the present military establishment of the United States and for other 

purposes, Statutes at Large 5, sec. 7, 256 (1838). 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 169 

permitted a return of the inspectors general to the War Department on the 

assumption that the increases caused by Benton's recent law would provide 

adequate division staffs. 62 Thus did Wool and Croghan return although never 

again would they be Macomb's instruments of control over the army. The 

reason was not just because of the interruption caused by their transfer to the 

divisions: Macomb was becoming powerless as the unintended consequence of 

some of Poinsett's reform efforts. Poinsett was not consciously bent on weakening the power of the Commanding General. Rather, he wanted to strengthen the 

office, that being as part of his general reform of the military establishment. 

But his actions had the opposite effect. 

Poinsett was the most energetic and forceful Secretary of War in many 

years, a widely traveled man of great insight. He proposed a comprehensive 

overhaul of the militia system, and a more modem organization of the Regular 

Army . When Congress would not concur, he did what was in his power. He 

sent the Ordnance Board to study European systems in 1840, and made a tour 

of his own the same year. His findings strengthened the army's supply 

organizations, and also caused him to remark that the American army was "the 

best paid, the best fed, the best clothed, and the worst lodged army in 

Christendom. ,,63 That attitude caused him to formulate the Army's first policy 

on housing and construction in 1838, a year in which he also returned light 

artillery to the force. Poinsett was such a dynamic personality that power 

naturally gravitated to him, the staff departments looked to the Secretary, and 

the Army slipped away from Macomb. Then, too, Macomb's inspectors general were not much help to him after they returned from the divisions. Wool 

continued his preoccupation with ordnance, and naturally gravitated toward 

Poinsett, who shared his interest in improving that staff service. Croghan, 

meanwhile, again fell victim to his weakness in 1838 and 1839. Jesup remained 

in debt, bailing his brother-in-law out of his gambling losses. If he was ever 

inclined to wash his hands of the dissipated inspector general, he kept his 

feelings to himself, out of love for his wife, Croghan's sister. 64 

If either Croghan or Wool conducted a regular tour of inspection in 1839, 

no record survives. Apparently, as far as the War Department was concerned, 

the inspectors general were to roam from post to post, determining whether 

commanders adhered to department policy. However, that policy could change 

capriciously. The department ordered post commanders on 18 March 1839 to 

enforce the regulations requiring sutlers to procure the "Soldier's Book" and 

make it available to the troops. Inspectors general were to report to "General 

Head Quarters" those sutlers who did not stock the publication, and companies 

that were without them. But just a month later, the department determined that 

every recruit would receive a copy of the Soldier's Book (the personal record of 

62. GO No. 58, AGO, 13 Dec 38, in GORI&IG. 

63. J. Fred Rippy, Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile American (Durham: Duke University Press, 

1935), 175- 77; Spaulding, United States Army, 165-66; Weigley, History of the United States 

Army, 156, 171-72. 

64. Kieffer, Maligned General, 112. 
170 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

clothing and equipment, and other information) before joining his regiment, 

with its cost deducted from his first pay. What the inspectors general were to 

make of that was not explained. 65 

Mustering was a serious business to the cost-conscious War Department. It 

entailed substantially a counting of the men of a given unit, verifying their dates 

of enlistment and terms of qualifying active service during the calendar period 

for which the muster was conducted. The muster served as the basis for payment, 

ensuring that no one be paid for service not provided, as well as a headcounr to 

verify unit strength. That was an especially important activity when volunteers 

individually and in units came and went constantly, as during a war. Mustering 

also served the political interest in ensuring that volunteers remained throughout their lawful terms, and equally that no one was forced to stay longer than 

his period of enlistment. This was not always done by commanders with the 

desired degree of accuracy. Macomb expressed his displeasure during 1839 that 

commanding officers were not performing their mustering duty as required and 

were often delegating it to others. So in October he issued new orders: Officers 

of the Inspector General's or Adjutant General's Department when practicable 

were to muster troops every two months for payment. Otherwise, "well qualified officers ofthe line" assigned by a general commanding an army, division, 

or department were to muster the men . The regulations also specified that 

inspections were to be made at every muster. Furthermore, reviews and field 

exercises and maneuvers were to precede the musters and monthly inspections. 

It was the responsibility of inspectors general, adjutants general, and commanding officers to ensure that all regulations governing inspections were observed, 

and that men and officers were properly equipped and in full dress uniform. 

Lastly, the Soldier's Book was to be accounted for at every muster and 

inspection, the inspector observing that all entries had been properly made, and 

that each man had his book. 66 

That order was an implication that the army's field commanders needed 

help from a knowledgeable source like the inspectorate. Hitherto, the inspectors had not CVt:11 provided the most elementary advice ensuring that the payroll 

was properly disbursed. Shortcomings most likely had existed ·in the volunteer 

formations and new units of regulars formed since 1838, but in general the 

Army had had no systematic inspection to show them. Offsetting this, Poinsett 

relieved the inspectors general of the burden of examining unserviceable ordnance property in December. Now it was to be inspected by a designated 

Ordnance Department officer. Inspectors general were to continue as before to 

inspect armories, arsenals, and depots and to report their observations. But 

neither they nor the ordnance officers had the authority to dispose of con65. GO No. II, AGO, 18 Mar 37 , in GORI&IG; GO No. 26, AGO, 23 Apr 39, in Orders and 

Circulars 1797- 1910, RG 94. Regarding inspections in 1839, Francis Paul Prucha conducted a 

thorough search of RG 159 and RG 94 , and could find no record of what Croghan did that year. 

Prucha, Army Life, 180. 

66. GO No . 54, AGO, 22 Oct 39, in GORI&IG. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 171 

demned stores. No condemned ordnance materials could be disposed of without 

a special order of the President-a recent instruction from Congress. 67 

The inspectors general resumed their routines in 1840, but their potential 

influence over the United States Army waned with that of Commanding General 

Macomb. The latter's loss of power was symbolized in the new general regulations issued in 1841, indicating that he had lost his fight to curb the independence of the Corps of Engineers. The regulations governing inspectors general 

were substantially the same as they had been in 1835, except in one respect: The 

United States Military Academy was conspicuously absent from the general 

statement of their purview- it was now under the regulations for the Corps of 

Engineers, the final regulation being "the superintendence and inspection of 

the Military Academy." Another significant alteration was the return of the 

weekly company and hospital inspection to Sunday, depriving the men of their 

day off.68 

It was apparent that the tide was against Macomb, and that the Corps of 

Engineers was triumphantly independent of his oversight. He still retained his 

two inspectors general, however, and might have used them to restore some of 

his lost authority. But the Commanding General himself was in failing health 

by 1841 , and his inspectors general were anything but helpful. Wool was 

distracted by his own ambitions, while Croghan's conduct became disgraceful. 

In fact, Croghan'S drunkenness and financial difficulties aroused so many 

complaints that in 1841 Macomb ordered Wool to investigate his colleague. 

Wool returned a very unfavorable report. When the Secretary of War was on 

the verge of dismissing Croghan, however, it appeared that he reformed himself somewhat, and General Gaines interceded in his behalf. Croghan therefore 

escaped disciplinary action and remained an inspector general. But if he made a 

tour that year, he left no record of it. 69 

Wool was scheduled for promotion to brigadier general whenever Gaines or 

Scott replaced Macomb , whose death was expected at any time. Macomb 

became increasingly ineffective, so Secretary of War John Bell, who took 

office on 5 March, gradually assumed the managerial duties that his predecessors had shared with the Commanding General. The Secretary intended to pick 

Wool's successor personally. He summoned Maj. Ethan Allen Hitchcock to 

Washington to meet with him in May. Bell told Hitchcock that he had been 

"much talked of" for the position of an inspector general. Winfield Scott, 

however, had strongly opposed Hitchcock, distrusting him since the time some 

incidents had occurred between the two, and because of his long association 

with Scott's rival, Gaines. Hitchcock advised Bell not to overrule Scott, and 

when the Secretary offered him the leadership of the Indian Bureau, he also 

declined that. 7o Hitchcock was still at the War Department on 25 June. He 

67. GO No. 63 , AGO, 6 Dec 39, in GORI&IG. 

68. U.S. War Department, General Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1841 

(Washington: by authority of the War Department, 1841), 148-54, 155 (hereafter cited as 1841 

Regulations) . 

69. Prucha , Army Life , xx, 180. 

70. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 139-31. 
172 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

recorded in his diary that day, "Major-General Macomb died to-day at half past 

2 p.m.-paralysis-third stroke." On the 29th, he wrote, "The General was 

buried yesterday in the Congressional graveyard about mid-day. Procession 

nearly a mile long, marshalled by General Jesup. ,,71 

New Commander and Divided Inspectorate 

The Commanding General's position also died that day, although its title 

and rank lived on. Scott and Gaines both claimed the position by reason of 

seniority. The commission of each acutally dated from exactly the same time. 

Gaines, however, preceded Scott on the list, while Scott held a brevet commission older than Gaines'. Each was a capable man with serious personality 

defects; each also retained his partisans. Neither had earned any credit in the 

Seminole wars-both, in fact, had been reprimanded for personal feuding that 

bungled their two expeditions in 1836-although Gaines' association with the 

frustrating conflict was longer. Whatever the reason, Scott became major general as of the date of Macomb's death, and Commanding General 5 July 1841. 

Gaines, however, was not without influence in the new order, and to everyone's 

surprise refused to resign from the Army. 72 

Wool became a brigadier general with Scott's promotion, and vacated the 

position of inspector general. What probably ensued was an attempt to balance 

the egos of Scott and Gaines. The inspector general's position was the only 

opening in the War Department hierarchy, the other bureau chiefs secure until 

they chose to leave. Because of Wool's special interests, it was probably 

determined that the new inspector general should also be an artillerist, who was 

otherwise qualified for the position. It was probably also desired that the new 

man be acceptable to Gaines. On 15 September 1841, the War Department 

announced the appointment of Sylvester Churchill, effective 25 June.

73 Whether 

Churchill was actually Gaines' man is open to speculation. Gaines was probably as familiar with him as he was with Croghan, because Churchill had spent 

some of the previous five years as inspector general of the main army in 

Florida, which kept him active in Gaines' territory. At least, Gaines posed no 

strong objection to the appointment. 

Churchill was born at Woodstock, Vermont, on 2 August 1783. He grew up 

on his father's farm and began a career as the publisher of a small local 

newspaper. However, in March 1812 he accepted a commission in the 3d 

Artillery, remaining in the Army for the rest of his life. He first served under 

Dearborn's command on the east side of Lake Champlain. In August 1813 he 

was promoted to captain and was transferred to the staff of General Wade 

71. Ibid., 133. 

72. Elliott, Winfield Scott, 241-49; James w. Silver, "Edmund Pendleton Gaines and Frontier 

Problems," Journal of the Southern Historical Association 1 (1935): 320-44; White, Jacksonians, 

191-94; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 161, 170; Heitman, Historical Register, 2: 

870. 

73. GO No. 53, AGO, 15 Sep 41, in GORI&IG. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 173 

Hampton, first as ordnance officer, then as inspector general. For the remainder 

of the war he served as inspector on various senior staffs at Niagara and 

Plattsburgh, New York, rising to the rank of temporary major. He reverted to 

captain at war's end, rejoining the 3d Artillery at Plattsburgh. He then served 

from 1816 to 1824 as commander of the artillery defenses of New York City, 

based at Fort Columbus. While there, he was transferred to the 1st Artillery. 

From 1824 to 1828 he commanded the Allegheny Arsenal at Pittsburgh, 

Pennsylvania, then. rejoined his regiment at Fort Johnson, Wilmington, North 

Carolina, to command Company D until 1835. He was promoted to major that 

year and reassigned to Fort Sullivan, Eastport, Maine. However, the outbreak 

of the Second Seminole War brought him to the South again. He first served on 

Jesup's staff as acting inspector general, spending most of his time mustering 

militia and volunteer forces. In June of 1836, as an additional duty, he commanded one of the columns evacuating the Cherokees from northern Alabama. 

He joined his regiment in 1838, commanding it as infantry in operations along 

the Saint Johns River. He ultimately became a subdistrict commander in the 

Saint Augustine area. He had shown himself to be an able and courageous field 

commander and administrator. 74 

Unlike Wool and Croghan, Churchill did not become an inspector general 

on the strength of a war record. Rather, his was a record of quiet competence 

and ability in a variety of responsible positions. He was respected and liked by 

all with whom he had served. That may have been his strongest qualification 

for the position, because it meant that he had earned no important enemies 

during three decades in the Army. Accordingly, and because of his seniority, 

nobody questioned Churchill's entitlement to a colonelcy and appointment as 

an inspector general. His career, particularly the last five years, had given him 

more pertinent experience than that possessed by any other candidate. 

Churchill was 58 years old in 1841, eight years older than the deteriorating 

Croghan. The two together could not promise to provide as vigorous an inspectorate as before. The U.S. Army as a whole was becoming burdened with aging 

veterans of the last war, much as the Army of 1812 has been dominated by 

relics of the Revolution. Given the increasing independence of the staff 

departments, the strong sense of prerogative shown by the brigadier generalsWool and, especially, Gaines-and the gravitation of power into the hands of 

the Secretary of War, it is not likely that Scott could have restored the power of 

the Commanding General even if either he or his inspectors had been younger. 

And then, circumstances were not promising for a strong inspectorate in any 

case. Scott had long maintained that inspectors general were unnecessary, that 

commanders should do their own inspecting. His attitude as a department 

commander had helped to weaken the position of Commanding General by the 

74. Churchill, Sketch of Life of Churchill, passim; Brown, LBD, 2: 5; S. H. Churchill and 

N. W. Churchill, The Churchill FamiLy in America (n .p.: Family of G. Churchill, n.d.), 98-99; 

Swan Dana Henry, The History of Woodstock, Vermont, 1761-1886 (Woodstock: Woodstock 

Foundation, 1980), 45-46; Heitman, HistoricaL Register, 1: 301. 
174 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

time he inherited it. Like Macomb, Scott could have used the inspectors general 

to 'gain influence, but when he took office he showed no inclination to do so. 

He was a suspicious, cantankerous man, who saw enemies behind every tree 

and interpreted even compliments as personal attacks. Scott had not selected his 

inspectors general-they were in fact better known to Gaines than to himself-so 

he evidently placed little confidence in them. The Army's central inspectorate, 

already debilitated by the disruptions of the Second Seminole War, thus declined 

during Scott's tenure as Commanding General. As time went on, the inspectors 

all became more agents of the Secretary of War than they were'of the Commanding General. 

The trend began very soon: The Secretary of War apparently wanted regular 

inspections to go forth, and at the same time wanted Croghan to be more 

dutiful. Croghan accordingly was required to send his inspection reports directly 

to the Commanding General from each post as he inspected it in 1842. Instead of 

an inspection report that year, Croghan submitted at least nine separate letters 

from locations ranging from Detroit to Fort Leavenworth.

75 Also, the Secretary 

took a page from Macomb's book, and ordered the inspectors general to examine the business practices of the Corps of Engineers. The army was told in a 

general order on 1 June 1842 that the duties of the inspectors general, or 

officers acting as inspectors, included the examination and inspection of all 

supplies and materials procured for the construction of forts, or for harbor and 

river improvements, and all the related engineer property. They were also to 

examine all extracts and financial arrangements made by the Corps of Engineers and the Quartermaster's Department. 76 That order represented a significant expansion of the Inspector General's purview. Its purpose, however, was 

not to serve the interests of the Commanding General, but was to serve those of 

the Secretary, who was understandably interested in what the staff departments 

did with their appropriations. In tightening the accountability of those departments to the Secretary of War, the order further undermined the Commanding 

General's influence over the whole Army. He was left in nominal command of 

the line formations, superior in rank to all other officers, but that brought him 

nothing except courtesies. 

There were now, in a sense, two commanders of the Army. The Commanding General theoretically commanded the troops, although in fact the division 

commanders exercised that power, and they had under them the department 

commanders. The Secretary of War commanded the War Department, which 

75. Croghan's reports for 1842 are as follows: Detroit and Detroit Arsenal, n.d. June; Fort 

Gratiot, 21 June; Fort Brady, 25 June; Fort Mackinac, 28 and 29 June; Fort Crawford , II July; Fort 

Snelling, 16 July; Fort Atkinson, 27 July; Prairie du Chien, 29 July; and Fort L~avenworth, 16 

August, in Inspection Reports 1814-1842, RG 159. 

76. GO No . 32, AGO, I June 42, in GORI&IG; Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 

243, dates the Secretary's original order to May. Paragraph 835 of the general regulations was the 

general statement of duty for inspectors general, including: " by the 15th of November of each year, 

the Inspectors-General will make and transmit to the Commanding-General, to be laid before the 

Secretary of War, reports of all that may have passed under their observation during their 

inspections." 1841 Regulations, 148--49. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 175 

was a collection of bureaus whose officials happened to wear unifonns although 

they enjoyed considerable independence. The inspectors general were perforce 

divided. When they inspected troops, they served the Commanding General; 

when they inspected staff operations, they served the Secretary. That their 

reports all went to the Commanding General before going to the Secretary was 

a mere fonnality because the Secretary was not in fact a commander. He was, 

however, the voice of the government that the Anny served. The divided 

inspectorate was therefore no longer an extension of the commander's will. It 

was a mechanism for civil oversight of a department of government- the 

bureaus of the War Department. Only to the extent that the inspectors general 

represented the Commanding General among the army line could they be 

regarded as functionaries of command, and because the Commanding General 

lacked any real command powers, the extension of his powers through the 

inspectors general was moot. 

What began to develop in the 1840s, therefore, was a gradual transfonnation of the role of inspectors general. They would orient themselves increasingly in coming decades toward the administrative interests of the Secretary 

because that was where their services were needed and because that was the 

source of power and direction in the War Department. Inspectors general would 

endeavor to perfonn two jobs: as inspectors for the commanders and as agents 

of the political power. Their real place in the military establishment was therefore inadequately defined, and they could not be what Steuben had been or 

what Macomb had wanted them to be. Then, despite the pulling from two 

directions, inspectors general, unlike other staff officers, tended to think of 

themselves as military men rather than bureaucrats. Their orientation prevented 

their aligning themselves completely with the Secretary, as demonstrated by the 

record when Congress tried to abolish one of their positions. 77 

The end of the Second Seminole War pennitted a reduction in the Anny, 

and on 23 August 1842, Congress exercised its option. The authorized force 

was cut by a third, to 8,613 officers and men, and thereafter Congress held 

down appropriations so sternly that not even repairs of barracks, except for 

emergencies, could be ordered during fiscal year 1844. One provision of the 

legislation abolished the office of one of the inspectors general, this occurring 

within one month after passage of the act. However, since the Secretary of 

War had decided to use the inspectors general to monitor the disbursements of 

the staff departments, he would not lightly give up one of them. Secretary John 

C. Spencer, who had replaced Bell in the fall of 1841 and then expanded the 

purview of the inspectors general, observed that the legislation did not tell him 

how to discharge the extra inspector. So he kept Churchill, the junior of the 

two, in office. His successors (there were four secretaries in all between 1841 

and 1845) followed suit-Secretary James M. Porter pointed out in his annual 

77. An Act respecting the organization of the Army, andfor other purposes, Statutes at Large 

5, sec. 4, 512 (1842); Thian, Legislative History, lll; Weigley , History of the Ullited States Army, 

163; Risch, Quartermaster Support, 237- 38. 
176 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

report for 1843 that the act of 23 August 1842 had abolished a number of 

offices, and had directed the discharge of all but the one Inspector General. 

But, he said, the appropriations acts since that time had continued to support 

two inspectors general. He recommended that that part of the act be repealed, 

because he needed both his inspectors general. 

The House Committee on Military Affairs looked into the services and 

history of inspectors general in the United States Army, observed that comparable officials served all European armies, and concluded that the information 

they provided was essential to the War Department. The members concluded 

that two independent inspectors general with at least the rank of colonel were 

essential, and recommended repealing the part of the law in question. The 

committee's reasoning reflected military , more than War Department, thinking 

about the status of inspectors general, stressing the need for impartiality: 

"Officers who are connected with a particular regiment or corps, might be 

tempted to favor their own, or to disparage others; and, whether they did or not, 

would be liable to such imputations. In either event, their efficiency would be 

impaired, and discontents and heartbumings excited in the army. ,, 78 

As a deliberative body, Congress moved slowly. When President James K. 

Polk handed Churchill an honorable discharge in 1845, Secretary of War William L. Marcy went to Congress to try to get him back. A bill for that purpose 

passed the House of Representatives and reached the floor of the Senate on 8 

January 1846. It attracted only one speaker, a member of the Committee on 

Military Affairs, who read letters from the Secretary of War and General Scott 

on the matter. He also observed that repeal of the 1842 measure had been urged 

by every Secretary of War since its passage, and said that his committee had 

found " abundant evidence that the officer discharged was not only a worthy 

officer, but that he was one whose conduct had met the approbation both of the 

Secretary of War and of the President of the United States." The committee 

would have preferred to see Churchill restored, but forebore making such a 

specific recommendation. On the strength of the panel's recommendation, the 

bill repealing the 1842 measure passed "without further delay," and became 

law 12 April 1846. Churchill was restored to his position, without loss of time, 

although Churchill's being restored as an inspector general did have its ironic 

aspects. 79 The number and rank of the inspectors general were all explained and 

justified in purely military terms. But the position was restored mostly because 

the Secretary, not the Commanding General, needed it. 

Churchill's temporary absence was made worse by Croghan's recurrent 

difficulties. There might as well have been no inspector general in 1845, with 

78. Inspectors General of the Army , House Report (H. Rpt.) 321, 18th Cong., 1st sess. 

(1844). The report also includes the various statements of the Secretaries of War asking for 

restoration of the position. 

79 . Congressional Globe, 29th Cong. , 1st sess. (8 January 1846), 163; An Act to repeal the act 

which abolished the office of one of the inspectors-general of the Army, alld to revive and establish 

said office, Statutes at Large 9, sec. 1,2 (1846); Thian, Legislative History, III; Churchill and 

Churchill, Churchill Family , 98- 99. The third source wrongly attributes Churchill's discharge to 

presidential malice; Polk more likely acted to bring the issue to a head. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 177 

Croghan in that position. His chronic indebtedness, mostly for gambling, kept 

most of his pay vouchers pledged to creditors. Serious mismanagement of 

Croghan's accounts became apparent in 1845, and he was charged with illegally receiving double payment. Charges and specifications were prepared and 

submitted to a court-martial, but Croghan sought to exonerate himself with a 

letter of explanation. After correspondence among the Secretary of War, the 

Adjutant General, the Paymaster General, and the President- but not, it is 

worth noting, any correspondence involving the Commanding General-the 

charges were dropped by President Polk, and the court-martial did not sit. 

Croghan was saved once again.80 

Another War-No Central Inspectorate 

The restoration of Churchill and the rescue of Croghan came none too 

soon, because on 13 May 1846 Congress declared war on Mexico. Subsequent 

legislation provided for a greatly expanded Regular Army, which grew from 

about 8,500 early in 1846 to 30,476 officers and men during the war. This force 

was supplemented by 73,532 volunteers. Unlike previous wars, the Mexican 

War was fought by long-term soldiers, regulars and long-term volunteers making up nine-tenths of the total force. In establishing that pattern for future wars, 

Congress adopted another-it relieved the wartime citizen-soldiers of some of 

the nuisances that afflicted regulars in peacetime . Sutlers were deprived of their 

liens on soldiers' pay, and were not allowed to sit at pay tables during the war. 

The sutlers' fists returned to the soldiers' pockets at the conclusion of the 

peace, however. 81 Another precedent for future wars developed in 1846, although 

it reflected what had happened in 1836. The Army's central inspectorate disappeared with the outbreak of hostilities. The expanded force still had but two 

inspectors general, and they made no tours of inspection. Croghan mustered 

volunteers in the South, then he joined Zachary Taylor's army on its way to 

Mexico. His self-destruction had finally caught up with him, and he was sick 

by the time he reached Monterrey, where he lost twenty pounds within two 

weeks. Bedeviled by family and financial problems, he spent more than a year 

looking for a way to leave Mexico. 82 

Churchill was also sent out to muster volunteers, which he did in several 

western states from late May to mid-July, accompanied by Lt. Richard P. 

Hammond, who in one way or another had been assistant to him for three years. 

After gathering the volunteers, Churchill joined Wool at San Antonio on 29 

August, and spent the next month there. "I was most busily employed in camp 

and at Hd. Qrs.," he wrote in his journal, "inspecting men and horses for 

80. Prucha, Army Life, xx-xxi. 

81. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 70-77; Weigley, History of the 

United States Army, 182-83; H. A. DeWeerd, "The Federalization of Our Army," Military Affairs, 

6 (1942): 147; Alfred J. Tapson, "The Sutler and the Soldier," Military Affairs, 21 (winter 1957): 

175. 

82.· Prucha, Arm.)' Life, xxi, 180. 
178 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

DEFENSE OF QUARTERMASTER'S TRAIN ON THE CHIHUAHUA COLUMN, 

1847. This was the responsibility of Inspector General Churchill who 

served as the column's chief of staff. 

discharge, getting the muster rolls in and examining them, regulating camp 

duties and many important matters confided to me by Gen'l Wool. ,,83 Churchill 

was, in other words, for the time being Wool's inspector general and chief of 

staff, as the regulations directed. When the army moved south, however, he 

became more a troop commander on the march, harking back to an inspector's 

functions under Steuben. For the remainder of the war, he acted much like 

Wool's second in command, ultimately earning a brevet commission as brigadier general for " gallant and meritorious conduct" at the battle of Buena Vista, 

in February 1847. 

Croghan and Churchill performed valuable services, but those services 

were of value only to parts of the Army. There was not even the pretense of a 

central army inspectorate in their absence; nor was there any attempt to fill in 

behind them. Granted, most of the U. S. Army was in the war zone, but even 

there, no one suggested establishing a central system of inspection. Each army 

commander established his own. The Commanding General was not included 

in many central functions, languishing in Washington without authority to 

assume overall military direction of the war. When Scott did go to Mexico, it 

was as commander of a field army, not as Commanding General of the United 

States Army-inspectors general serving a meaningless Commanding General 

probably would have served no useful purpose in those circumstances. But, 

83. Churchill, Sketch of Life of ChllrchiLl, 54, 106-07; K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War. 

1846- 1848 (New York: Macmillan. 1974), 146-47 , 149; Heitman , Historical Register, \:' 301. 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 179 

again, when an emergency occurred, the War Department had decided that the 

central inspectorate was unimportant. The inspectors general were available for 

assignment in the field, because there was no concept of anything better for 

them to do. 

The absurdity of the Commanding General's position was affirmed in the 

next set of general regulations, issued in 1847, which offered an exceedingly 

vague and contradictory statement of his authority. Article X. said tha~ the 

Commanding General was in charge of the military establishment' 'in all that 

regards its discipline and military control. Its fiscal arrangements properly 

belong to the administrative departments of the staff, and to the Treasury 

Department under the direction of the Secretary of War." The Commanding 

General, however, watched over "every thing which enters into the expenses 

of the military establishment, whether personal or material," including the 

Military Academy. He also supervised preparation of budget estimates, "in 

carrying into effect these important duties, he will call to his counsel and 

assistance the staff, and those officers proper in his opinion to be employed in 

verifying and inspecting all the objects which may require attention," using the 

rules and regulations of the U. S. Army and the law as his guide. The power of 

the Commanding General, in other words, was whatever the Secretary and the 

bureau heads let him have, which was not likely to be much. 84 

As for the Inspector's Department, its regulations remained as before, while 

the Commanding General remained its theoretical point of contact with the 

Secretary. Field commanders were required to submit regular reports on the 

Indians, but inspectors general w'ere not asked to observe the same subject. The 

forms of inspections remained as they had been for years, although their form 

was simplified, with explicit statements on how to give commands and the 

sequence for reviews. -Troops were to be mustered and inspected every two 

months for payment, by an inspector general, an adjutant general, or someone 

specially designated. Every man was to be accounted for, and the inspection 

form was to include remarks on discipline, appearance, and so on. 85 These 

regulations had no overt effects on the inspectors general. The Army's inspectorate remained on paper much as it had been since 1835. But later as the 

influence of the Commanding General was eroding, so was the explicit role of 

the inspectors general. If there was to be an audience for their reports, it had to 

be the Secretary, who had the power to act on them, and not the Commanding 

General, who lacked such power. In any case, with a war in process their were 

evidently more important things than inspection, even for the Secretary's benefit. 

Inspectors general became mustering agents and field commanders, or assistants to other generals'. 

There may have been no formal inspectorate extending from the War Department down to the brigade level, but inspection nevertheless remained important 

84. U.S. War Department, General Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1847 

(Washington: J. and G . S. Gideon, 1847), 8-9 (hereafter cited as 1847 Regulations). 

85. Ibid., 16-17,81-85, 179-85. 
180 

COL. ETHAN A. HITCHCOCK. Inspector General, Mexico expedition, 

1847-1848. 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

to commanders. Commanding General Scott, who commanded nothing, 

might get along without such assistance, but General Scott, commanding the army invading Mexico in 

1847, needed an inspector general. 

Reconciling after years of feuds, Scott 

and Ethan Allen Hitchcock became 

friendly early in 1847. Hitchcock 

wrote in his diary on 5 February, 

"Was told to-day at Brazos by General Scott to consider myself his Inspector-General. Order to be issued 

and printed in Tampico. The General 

told me to do whatever I thought 

proper as Inspector-General and use 

his name as authority.' ,86 

Hitchock apparently let the regulations guide him on what was 

"proper," and Scott followed suit. 

Hitchcock in effect became chief of 

staff to the commander and the general factotum that, since 1813, regulations 

had conceived an inspector general to be when with an army in the field . Scott 

gave Hitchcock "charge of the provost guard and the examination of all suspected persons brought in," at Vera Cruz on 14 March. Scott sent Hitchcock 

out on the 26th to receive the bearer of a white flag proposing the city's 

surrender. The inspector general had yet other duties on the 29th, processing 

Mexican prisoners of war and receiving the paroles of their officers.

87 Despite 

such special activities, Hitchcock spent most of his time as an inspector and 

expediter, seeing that the whole command was always ready for battIe; ensuring that sufficient arms, equipment, and animals were on hand; supervising 

camp sanitation to prevent disease; ordering brigades and divisions out for 

inspection; and so on. 88 Whenever a general officer was in the field at the head 

of troops, he had someone detailed to him as inspector general. Hitchcock's 

routine was repeated in almost every brigade, division, and army, ably or not 

according to the abilities of the officer assigned. But they were agents of the 

commanders they served, unconnected with a central inspectorate for the military establishment as a whole, because one did not exist. Their communications 

went to their commanders, and no further. In the field, at least, inspection was 

a function of command, as Washington and Steuben had wanted it to be. But 

the only central guidance came from the regulations, and not from any higher 

inspectorate. 

86. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 236. 

87. Ibid. , 240, 246, 247---48. 

88 . Ibid. , 254; Bauer, Mexican War, 268 . 
INSPECTION AND THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDER 181 

The Place of the Inspector General 

In 1848, as the war ended, Fayette Robinson produced a two-volume description of the United States Army for the benefit of citizens whose interest in 

things military had been roused by recent events. The Adjutant General, he 

said, was the "most important" staff officer under the Commanding General. 

"The next branch of the staff in dignity, and the only other one whose functions 

are purely military, is that of the Inspectors-General. This is the smallest of all 

the departments, being composed of but two officers, each of whom has the 

rank of colonel of cavalry. ,,89 Of course, the inspectors general did not constitute a department, for they were not formally so organized. Robinson said that 

they were to make frequent visits to posts and units, inspecting personnel and 

material. "They may report on anything-the character, moral and physical, 

of officers, nature of defences, health of posts, and the countless minutiae 

which make up the sum of the service. Their reports being the result of individual examination, are of course only valuable as such, in proportion to the 

estimate placed on the character and standing of the inspectors-general. ,,90 

Although able to describe their functions, Robinson was somewhat at a loss to 

say where the inspectors general really fit into the larger scheme of things. 

Theoretically, he said, the senior inspector general might be the chief of staff of 

the Army under the Commanding General, albeit his potential authority had 

been usurped by the seniority of other heads. But, as happened in Mexico and 

was countenanced in the regulations, Robinson observed that when someone 

was detailed as inspector general of a particular field army, he was the chief of 

staff. 

Not even the positive Robinson could fail to acknowledge that inspection 

was not regarded as sufficiently important to spread it thoroughly across the 

army. There had once been a system of inspections by brigade and division 

inspectors, he said, but not for many years. That was because the army was so 

scattered that such offices could not function. "In the interim," he concluded, 

" the duty of inspection has been confined to the inspectors-general of the 

whole army, and the generals and other officers commanding military departments and territorial divisions. ,,91 Robinson gauged the state of things at the 

end of the war accurately, although inadvertently. Without a central power at 

the head of the army, the value of a central inspectorate was questionable. The 

place of the inspectors general in the future would continue to be defined in 

conjunction with that of the Commanding General. But because they had already 

begun to serve the Secretary of War, their fortunes would not necessarily rise 

and fall along with those of the Commanding General. They would become less 

and less an extension of the commander, and more and more an agent of the 

War Department. 

89. Fayette Robinson, An Accollnt of the Organization of the Army of the United States, 2 vols. 

(Philadelphia: E. H. Butler, 1848), \: 39-40. 

90 . Ibid . 

91. Ibid. 
182 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The Army at the end of the Mexican War was transformed from its previous 

incarnation. It was organized on paper much as before. But in fact it was more 

widely scattered than it had ever been, broadcast across the entire continent. 

The more the force dispersed, the less likely it became that Scott or anyone else 

could take control of it. At the same time, its greater dispersal made inspection 

even more important, if there was to be any hope of anyone's knowing what 

was going on. And conditions had changed. The Army had always had a high 

rate of desertion, for instance, but in California, throngs of soldiers left after 

1848, bound for the gold fields. "The struggle between right and six dollars a 

month and wrong and seventy-five dollars a day is rather a severe one," 

observed a newspaper. 92 The U. S. Army, and its inspectorate, must adapt to 

the new state of affairs. This transition began with the passing of George 

Croghan. The exhausted Croghan returned briefly to Kentucky at the end of the 

war, thence to New Orleans. There he died on 8 January 1849, victim of a 

cholera epidemic . 93 He had been the last of Macomb's inspectors general, and 

the last, no matter his personal defects, who remembered how important and 

effective inspection once had been to the Commanding General. 

92. Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania, Daily Dispatch, 16 December 1848, quoted in Ralph P. Bieber, 

"California Gold Mania," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 35 (June 1848): 12. 

93. Prucha, Army Life, xxi. 
CHAPTER 12 

Inspection Between the Wars 

(1849-1861) 

The U.S. Army had grown to nearly 100,000 men during the Mexican War. 

Observing previous experience , Congress could be expected to diminish the 

force and again to refuse to deal effectively with the Army's expensive needs. 

And it did, cutting strength to 10,763 by 1850. But this time, the Army could 

not be reduced so easily to near nonexistence, as had happened after previous 

wars. The Mexican War had transformed the United States into a truly continental 

nation with continental military obligations that had to be served. White Americans flooded into the newly conquered territories, and their demands for protection from increasingly belligerent native people could not be denied for long. 

By 1855 the authorized strength of the Army stood at 12,698, with the President permitted to enlist more by expanding the size of companies in the western 

territories. The theoretical authorized force was 18,318 officers and men. I 

The Army's Continued Mission 

The vastness of the territories gained from Mexico, and the urgency of their 

military needs, made the Army a continental police force, stationed mostly at 

small, scattered outposts. There were only 2,109 officers and men at 33 stations 

east of the Mississippi in 1850, as compared to 6,385 at 67 posts west of that 

river, not counting others at depots, West Point, and recruiting rendezvous and 

in transit. At least 32 new posts were established in territories acquired from 

Mexico before the middle of 1849, and construction and repair budgets exploded 

despite congressional opposition. In fiscal year 1851 the Quartermaster Department spent three times as much for barracks and quarters as it had in 1844. The 

burden was enormous, because shifting frontier needs required frequent chc:nges 

in the locations of posts. 2 

The military budget was difficult to control during the years immediately 

after the war, especially in the Quartermaster's Department. During the middle 

I. Kreidberg and Henry , History of Military Mobilization, 70-77; Risch, Quartermaster SIIPport, 301 ; Heitman , Historical Register, 2: 594-97. The outstanding study of the Army's frontier 

military mission after the Mexican War is Robert M. Utley, Frolltiersmell ill Bille: The Ullited 

States Army alld the Illdiall , 1848- 1865 (New York: Macmillan , 1967). 

2. Risch, Qllartermaster SlIpport, 30 I, 304; Spaulding, The Ullited States Army ill War and 

Peace , 229- 30. 
184 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

and late 1850s the Division of the Pacific, where costs were extremely high 

during the gold rush , annually spent twice what Congress had appropriated . 

Even as early as 1850 the transportation costs of the Anny, grown in size 50 

percent since 1844, had increased by 1,500 percent. Yet shortages of all essential requirements were everywhere the rule. This was because congressional 

appropriations never kept pace with realities, thus forcing the War Department 

regularly to seek supplemental appropriations to cover "arrearages." In 1850, 

Secretary of War Charles M. Conrad stoutly defended the requested Quartermaster Department budget of $4,295,000 (five times the 1844 appropriation) 

against the inevitable congressional reductions, and gave the legislators a lecture on the facts of life. He predicted that disbursements would reach $5 million 

by 1852, and pointed out that they routinely exceeded appropriations, something he regarded as administratively dangerous. Conrad urged in the strongest 

terms that for once the money be appropriated before it was spent. 3 

Congress did not entirely ignore the needs of the nation's soldiers, of 

course. But in what would become a tradition, the lawmakers tended to overlook the incumbents in favor of gestures toward the citizen veterans, dead and 

living, of the war just past. Congress appropriated funds for a United States 

military cemetery in Mexico City in 1850, creating a precedent for the future 

care of battlefield dead, and a future object of concern for inspectors general. It 

authorized the United States Soldiers' Home in 1851 to provide a refuge for 

destitute veterans of the Regular Army, supported by modest deductions from 

each soldier's monthly pay.4 Eventually inspection of this home became also an 

item of interest for the inspectors general and one of the few duties performed 

by them by law for the Secretary. 

The U.S. Army's new circumstances strained its budget enormously, with 

the single greatest cost being transportation. Everything conceivable was 

attempted to reduce shipping costs, including rigorous calculations of what 

must be transported-the total equipment and arms for a mounted soldier, for 

instance, weighed seventy-eight pounds, of which two blankets (one for the 

horse ," the other for the man) weighed exactly nine pounds. The War Department issued orders on 8 January 1851 to institute large-scale farming at all 

posts-to reduce the need to ship food, and to tum a profit from sales of 

produce. The abandonment of Forts Kearney and Laramie on the northern 

Great Plains was proposed solely on the grounds that farming was not believed 

possible at either location. Unlike the military farming of the 1820s, long 

discredited, now operations were to be conducted on a commercial scale. 

3. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 304, 306, 309--17; Anllual Report of the Secretary of War 

1855 (hereafter cited as ARSecWar) , Sen. Ex. Doc. I, 31st Cong., 2d sess., pt. 2, pp. 8-9. Of the over $4 million requested, all but $530,247 for the seven old departments of the Army was destined 

for the four new departments of Oregon, California, New Mexico, and Texas. ARSecWar 1850, 

109. 

4. Edward Steer, "Genesis of American Graves Registration 1861- 1870," Military Affairs, 12 

(fall 1948): 149--61; Foner, Soldier Between Wars, 72. The cemetery at Mexico City still exists, 

representing the nation's first formal attention to its dead soldiers. 
INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS 185 

RINGGOLD'S BATTERY AT PALO ALTO, 8 MAY 1846. The mustering and 

forwarding of volunteer regiments to Zachary Taylor's army was a major 

duty for inspectors early in the M exican War. 

Produce would be sold at a profit, the soldiers having a share. The idea was to 

attract a civilian population that could eventually supply the army's needs 

locally , so that no longer would everything have to be shipped from the East. 

However, the program never really got started.s 

A Leaderless Army 

The Army was so widely scattered, with its expenses growing so greatly, 

that some means had to be developed to bring it all under control. The inspectors general potentially were a valuable source of information to that end, but 

their performance depended upon where the controlling authority would stand, 

especially since the office of Commanding General had lapsed while Winfield 

Scott commanded the invasion of Mexico. Afterwards, as Zachary Taylor 

approached the presidency, Scott forbore trying to give orders to his future 

Commander in Chief, and installed himself in New York City as commander of 

the Eastern Division while Taylor commanded the Western Division. After 

Taylor's inauguration , Scott was reinvested as Commanding General, but he 

refused to leave New York. He took his position seriously and literally, and 

tried to prevent civilian interference in his command. When Taylor died in July 

1850, Scott returned to Washington, where he ran for President in 1852 against 

5. Annual Report of the Quartermaster General 1851 (hereafter cited as ARQMG), and 

ARSecWar 1851 , both S. Ex. Doc. I, 32d Cong., 1st sess., 108- 13 , 161 , 164-65, 253. 
186 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

another Mexican War general, Franklin Pierce, and lost. By the spring of 1851, 

the headquarters of the army was back in New York, where Scott remained 

until the Civil War. He spent the duration of the Pierce Administration in a 

vicious feud with Secretary of War Jefferson Davis-a vigorous, far-thinking 

reformer in the mold of Calhoun and Poinsett, although vastly more temperamental--over questions of authority and subordination. If the army had a 

master during the 1850s, it was the Secretary. 6 When Scott was reassigned to 

command the United States Army on 10 May 1849, the two senior brigadier 

generals were put in charge of the Eastern and Western divisions. "The Inspectors General of the Army," said the order announcing the assignments, "will 

report for duty [by letter] to the Major General Commanding-in-Chief.,,7 

At the time, however, only one of the inspectors general, Sylvester Churchill, 

was active. He apparently remained based at the War Department in Washington, 

working in the vacuum that existed between the Secretary of War and the 

Commanding General. Croghan's position continued vacant for over a year. 

Finally, Maj . George A. McCall of the 3d Infantry was assigned as the other 

inspector general, with the rank of colonel, on 10 June 1850. McCall had 

graduated from West Point in 1822 and made captain in 1836. He served for a 

while as aide to Edmund P. Gaines. During the first year of the Mexican War 

he was twice brevetted for gallantry, then he served as an assistant adjutant 

general with a brevet rank of major. He ended the war as a major in the 3d 

Infantry. His appointment was partly a matter of convenience, because his 

regiment was in New Mexico and partly because he was a favorite of President 

Taylor; also, the Secretary of War desperately wanted information about that 

territory. Whatever the motivation, McCall went to New Mexico with instructions to examine political conditions, including the territory's statehood 

movement. 8 

McCall conducted the first general inspection of posts in the 9th Military 

Department, comprising the territory of New Mexico (the present states of 

New Mexico and Arizona, and some adjoining lands), during 1850. His regular 

inspections were rather perfunctory and were restricted to the most essential 

details of each post, never looking beyond their boundaries. But New Mexico 

was a volatile province, overrun by hostile Indians and inhabited by a mysterious and restless population chafing under American military rule. The Secretary of War, and the Congress, wanted to know more about what was going on 

there. So McCall spent most of the year under the Secretary's orders, preparing 

two special reports on New Mexico. One, submitted 15 July 1850, provided a 

6. Elliott, Winfield Scott, 426-28, 648- 58; White, Jacksonians, 190-96; Weigley, History of 

the United States Army, 189-94. On Jefferson Davis, see Hudson Strode, Jeffersoll Davis, American Patriot, 1808-1861 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), especially 245-80. 

7. GO No. 27, AGO, 10 May 49, in GORI&IG. The order was published in Niles' National 

Register, 75 (16 May 1849): 305. 

8. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 653. See also the introductory material in Robert W. Frazer, ed., New Mexico in 1850: A Military View by Colonel George Archibald McCall (Norman: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1968). 
INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS 

general description of the territory, 

its Indians, and its non-Indian 

people- emphasizing population, 

customs, and institutions. The second, 

forwarded on 16 December, covered 

much the same ground, but focused 

on the territory's military needs. Early 

in 1851, McCall's reports went to 

Congress for its information. 9 

Inspector General McCall was in 

1850 the agent of the Secretary of 

War, not of the Commanding General. His reports were intended for 

the Secretary, and were addressed to 

the Adjutant General. The latter circumstance was symbolic of Scott's 

declining control over the Army, but 

it was not new. During the 1840s, 

after Macomb's death, the reports of 

inspectors general increasingly were 

addressed to the Adjutant General, the 

old tradition of confidential reports 

directly to the Commanding General 

187 

THE ASSAULT ON CHAPULTAPEC, 12 

SEPTEMBER 1847. Commanding 

General Winfield Scott deemed the 

use of inspectors essential to the success of his forces. 

fading away. And then, if the Adjutant General was subordinate to the Commanding General, that would have been nothing more than the custom that 

governed most other military paper work. But with Scott separating himself 

from the War Department, the Adjutant General became increasingly a channel of information for the Secretary, rather than for the Commanding General. 

The incumbent Adjutant General was Roger Jones. Earlier, Jones had lost a bid 

for bureaucratic autonomy when Macomb had been Commanding General. 

But, with the passing of Macomb and with Scott's self-exile from Washington, 

Jones' influence gradually increased to the point that he became one of the most 

important uniformed advisers to the Secretary. One of the results of this shift of 

power was that the inspectors became separated more and more from the 

Commanding General. Instructions for the inspectors general began to come 

through the Adjutant General, "by order of the Secretary of War," Scott was 

effectively excluded from much influence over inspectors' activities. After he 

returned to Washington in 1850, Scott made one last, feeble attempt to reclaim 

his inspectors general, at the same time that the Secretary wanted the inspectorate revitalized. On 16 October 1850, Churchill was assigned to inspect the 

9. McCall's reports were published as Report of the Secretary of War Communicating, in 

Compliallce with a Resolutioll of the Senate, Colollel McCall's Reports ill Relatioll to New Mexico, 

S. Ex. Doc. 26, 31st Cong., 2d sess. (1851), and more recently in Frazer, New Mexico ill 1850. 
188 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Eastern Division, McCall the new Pacific Division, and Bvt. Maj. Samuel 

Cooper the Western Division. That arrangement was revoked two months later, 

and new orders announced that "The Inspectors General of the Army are 

attached to General Headquarters, and will hereafter inspect, in regular rotation, 

the three Military Geographical Divisions." The three officers had the same 

divisional assignments, "after which they will report in person to the Generalin-Chief for further instructions." 10 

Scott, like Macomb before him, may have feared that the inspectors general 

would become too attached to the division commanders, and planned to rotate 

them to prevent that. But if he hoped to use the officers to secure his control 

over the Army, or as a counterweight to the increasing power of the Secretary 

of War, he did not have the men with which to do it. Churchill was sixty-seven 

years old in 1851. Inspecting the Eastern Division along with carrying out the 

Secretary's special inquiries was as much as he could handle. Rotating him to 

one of the wilderness divisions was not a promising prospect. McCall was in 

declining health, in his fifties and a slow starter (he did not make his inspection 

of the Pacific Division until 1852). 11 And Samuel Cooper was yet another odd 

commodity-he had graduated from West Point in 1815, had become an 

artillerist, did not make captain until 1836, and remained in that rank until 

1852. He became an assistant adjutant general by brevet in 1838, then lieutenant 

colonel and assistant adjutant general in 1847. He earned a brevet for 

" meritorious conduct particularly.in the performance of his duties in the prosecution of the war with Mexico," a rather bland acknowledgment of bland 

performance when others earned so much more. 12 Cooper was in his late fifties, 

and was preoccupied with his own ambitions-succession to the aging Adjutant 

General Jones. In 1852, the War Department directed Churchill to inspect posts 

in the Western Division, McCall those on the Pacific-and Cooper to complete 

the inspections required of him in 1850. He apparently never got the job done, 

because he succeeded Roger Jones as Adjutant General on 15 JUly.13 ... 

Scott's inspectorate was of little value to him. Churchill and McCall moved at 

their own pace, largely doing the Secretary's bidding while Cooper was devoted 

to the interests of the Adjutant General. Scott himself was along in years, 

becoming increasingly indisposed physically, and was preoccupied with his 

prerogatives as Commanding General. If the western commands had not been 

in more energetic hands and if the Indians had not compelled a continued 

military vigilance, the Army would have reverted to the inadequate organization that marred it preceding the War of 1812. 

Cooper's assignment to inspection signified the recognition that a twoofficer force could not cover the greatly expanded army alone. But perhaps 

because Cooper's accomplishments were nil, the experiment of assigning an 

10. GO No. 38, AGO, 16 Oct 50, and GO No. 55, AGO, 17 Dec 50, in GORI&IG. 

II . Robert W. Frazer, ed., Mansfield on the Condition of the Western Forts, 1853-54 (Nonnan: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), xxvii, documenting McCall's rounds. 

12. Heitman , Historical Register, 1: 326; GO No. 13, AGO, n.d. 1852, in GORI&IG. 

13 . Heitman , Historical Register, 1:326. 
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 

OCTOBER 1850 

c:J STATES 

c=J TERRITORIES 

o 400 I I 

Miles 

MAP 1 

DEPARTMENT OF 

TEXAS 
190 

COL. GEORGE A. MCCALL. Inspector General, 10 June 1850-29 April 

1853. 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, l777-1903 

acting inspector general was not tried 

again until late 1853, and then at the 

Secretary's instigation. Cooper himself helped to continue the undermining of Scott's authority by sustaining 

the independence of the Adjutant 

General's Office after he succeeded 

Roger Jones. The power of the position was derived from the Secretary 

of War rather than from the Commanding General. In the end, however, his loyalties lay elsewhere. He 

resigned from the United States Army 

in March 1861, during the secession 

crisis. He joined the Army of the 

Confederate States of America, to become its adjutant and inspector general. 14 ••• Even the more productive 

inspector general, McCall, failed 

when he was most needed. The Secretary of War determined in 1853 that a 

change of command was needed in the 9th Military Department (New Mexico), 

where there was widespread civilian dissatisfaction with the incumbent and a 

legacy of political and military misbehavior. McCall was ordered to inspect the 

department in anticipation of the change, but instead, he resigned on 22 April 

for reasons of health. He later served with the Union forces as a brigadier 

general of volunteers in the early days of the Civil War until poor health again 

forced his resignation. The appointment of a new inspector general was immediately necessary . 15 

An Energetic Inspector 

Joseph K. F. Mansfield got the job, courtesy of Secretary of War Jefferson 

Davis, on 28 May 1853. Mansfield had been born in Connecticut in 1803, 

making him well along in years for the time although younger than Churchill. 

He had graduated in the West Point class of 1822 as McCall had, but he had a 

much better academic record. That auspicious beginning earned Mansfield a 

commission in the Corps of Engineers, which customarily took the academy's 

brightest and most energetic graduates. His rise in the small corps was slow, 

and he did not become a captain until 1838. He spent most of the decades· 

before the Mexican War working on the construction of coastal fortifications. 

Mansfield served during the war as chief engineer for the army of General 

14. Ibid. 

15 . Frazer, Mansfield 0 11 Conditioll, xxix. 
INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS 191 

Zachary Taylor, beginning as supervisor of the construction of Fort Brown, 

Texas. His "gallant and distinguished service in the defense of Fort Brown" 

earned him a brevet as a major, "gallant and meritorious conduct" in the 

battles around Monterrey made him a brevet lieutenant colonel, while similar 

conduct at the Battle of Buena Vista gained him a brevet colonelcy. Mansfield's 

performance during the war also drew the notice of Jefferson Davis, then 

serving in Taylor's army. When Secretary Davis needed an inspector general in 

1853, he handed the post to Mansfield, who since 1848 had been in Washington as a member of the Army's Board of Engineers for Fortifications, then a 

very active and important body. 16 

Mansfield proved himself an exceedingly energetic and productive inspector general, but there was no possibility that Scott, in the style of Macomb, 

could use him to restore the power of the Commanding General. The new 

inspector general departed immediately on his first tour, and spent most of the 

next few years traveling throughout the West and preparing his reports. Besides, 

he was Secretary Davis' personal choice for the assignment, and the suspicious 

Scott probably regarded him as the Secretary's man. He proved in fact to be his 

own man, and a good one. But no one person could by himself constitute a 

unified inspectorate for a constabulary distributed over millions of square miles. 

The army was really a police force, with a chief in name only. The real 

decision-making power over daily operations rested with local post commanders, 

whose direction was from department and divisional commanders. It was to 

these officials that Mansfield proved himself most useful. When he was 

inspecting, they knew how many men they had, how efficient they were, how 

they were supplied and equipped, and how well they lived. And Mansfield was 

a peripatetic inspector: He toured New Mexico Territory in 1853, the Division 

of the Pacific in 1854, and the Department of Texas in 1856. In 1857 Mansfield 

served as Inspector General with the army sent to keep order in Utah during the 

"Mormon War"; another expression of the War Department's belief that in an 

emergency an inspector general was available because he was not occupied 

with anything important. Mansfield returned to his regular tour next year, 

inspecting the departments of California and Oregon in 1858 and 1859, then 

moving on to Texas, where he remained through 1860 and into 186l. 17 

Mansfield was a fitting successor to George Croghan. Although he lacked 

Croghan's literary gifts and sense of controlled outrage when something affronted 

his sensibilities, he compensated with his greater diligence and sobriety. His 

reports were readable enough, and highly informative. They combined 

travelogue, inspection, and commentary-a running narrative of his journey 

with comments on the countryside, punctuated with reports of the condition of 

posts and garrisons, followed by remarks on subjects of general interest to the 

army command. 18 Mansfield's typical inspection of a post included a head 

16. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 688; Frazer, Mansfield on Condition, xxviii-xxix. 

17. Frazer, Mansfield on Condition, xxix. 

18. Ibid., comprises Mansfield's reports for 1853 and 1854, along with some special reports to 

John E. Wool, commanding on the Pacific Coast. See also Martin L. Crimmins, ed., "Colonel 

(Continued) 
192 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

count (those present, absent, sick, those in the guardhouse, and so on) then 

characterized in general terms the discipline and instruction of the command, 

arms and equipment, condition of buildings, medical services, the funds remaining for subsistence and quartermaster operations, the fort's environment, and 

the abilities of the officers (whom he usually commended). Engineer that he 

was, Mansfield included detailed plats of the posts that he inspected, and-with 

apparently no objections from former fellow engineers-he gave careful attention to coastal fortification construction projects supervised by the Corps of 

Engineers. His emphasis was always on military readiness: whether the post 

was properly located, what the proximate dangers were, what the garrison 

should be-and so on. 

Mansfield's "general remarks applicable to the whole command" sometimes echoed those of Croghan. He complained in 1853 that the clothing was 

"defective in cut," recommended a new knapsack and canteen, strongly recommended a new field tent he had observed (complete with diagrams), evaluated 

the Army's wagons and its "worthless" gum elastic whips, proposed additions 

to the rations, and otherwise ranged over every conceivable subject. Among the 

matters that caught his eye was the attempt to revive military agriculture. His 

feelings on that issue would have brought applause from George Croghan. He 

said it took the soldiers away from training and turned them into farmers, 

causing them to neglect all other duties in the effort to make a profit. 19 Whatever Mansfield's influence, the new farming program faded rather quickly. 

That was partly because he was not alone in his sentiments, but mostly because 

it was a failure. When he inspected in New Mexico, the farming program there 

was $14,000 in debt and declining rapidly. Despite their best efforts, Mansfield 

and Churchill could not inspect the whole army all the time. Scott, however, 

made the best of the situation. He traveled a lot on his own, and he managed to 

enforce the orders of 1849 and 1850 that the inspectors general addressed their 

annual reports to him, although Mansfield made some inspections on behalf of 

department commanders. 20 

The Secretary's Inspector 

While Scott presumed to monopolize the time of his inspectors general, the 

Secretary of War sought to develop his own sources of information. He dispatched Bvt. Capt. Edward R. S. Canby, assistant adjutant general, on 30 

November 1853 to make "minute" inspections of arse~als , depots, and mil i-

(Continued) 

J.K.F. Mansfield's Report of the Inspection of the Department of Texas in 1856," Southwestern 

Historical Quarterly, 42 (October 1938-April 1939): 122-48,215-57,351-87. 

19. Ibid., 58-68, quotation on page 63. 

20. See ibid., 81. In 1854, Mansfield began his report by saying that he "sailed from New 

York," possibly implying that his duty station was with Scott there. He reported to the department 

commander at the start of his inspection, however, and wrote numerous separate reports to department commander John Wool during 1854, copies of which he inclIJded with his report to Scott, but 

at Wool's request. Ibid., 18~97. 
INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS 193 

tary posts on the Arkansas and Red rivers. Canby began at Little Rock Arsenal, 

then gradually extended his tour along the Gulf Coast to Florida, visiting 

twenty-nine places by July 1854. The experience exhausted Canby, making 

him so ill that it took almost a year for him to submit a 150-page report. He was 

apparently regarded as an acting inspector general, but he reported to the 

Adjutant General for the benefit of the Secretary. 21 

Canby confessed to the Secretary that he started out with only the vaguest 

idea of what to do, possessing but a theoretical notion of what an inspector 

general was. He did well enough, however, addressing matters small and large. 

Among his major complaints was that he found no post where the records were 

complete. He recommended, as would a later inspector general, that when a 

post was abandoned its records should be transferred to a safe repository for 

permanent retention. Canby further identified weaknesses in the status of the 

units he inspected. 

He believed that the troops were uniformly untrained, for three reasons: 

Post commanders changed too frequently, too much extra duty left the ranks too 

thin for training, and the scattering of troops in small bodies made training 

impossible . He was neither the first nor the last inspector to urge consolidation 

of military posts. "This is not only essential to the attainment of a proper 

degree of instruction and discipline," he said, "but is perfectly compatible 

with the objects-the protection of the frontier and the control of the Indians for 

which the troops are employed in the Indian country.' ,22 

Living Conditions 

Canby, unlike Mansfield, did not pay much notice to the living conditions 

of the soldiers. But because of the overstressed army budget and the frequently 

shifting post locations, those conditions were often miserable. Quartermaster 

General Jesup begged Congress, in the strongest terms, in 1853 to give him a 

bigger budget to provide "better accommodations than have been provided for 

[officers and men] heretofore." Suitable housing standards had been set in 

navy and marine barracks and at arsenals, he said, but not at very many military 

postS. 23 Scott joined in commenting about the condition of the army's housing 

during the 1850s. It was the one issue that aroused utterances from the Commanding General that clearly were based on the comments of inspectors general. 

Mansfield encountered a few places where conditions were tolerable under the 

circumstances, but Fort Conrad, New Mexico, was more typical. He said in 

1853 that the quarters of both officers and soldiers were falling to pieces, that 

the timbers had rotted away, that some of the troops were in tents, and that the 

public storehouses were worthless. Concerning the Presidio of San Francisco in 

21. Max L. Heyman , Jr., Prudellf Soldier: A Biography of Major General E. R. Cal/by, 

1817-1873 (Glendale, California: Clark, 1959), 87-94. 

22. Ibid., quotation on pages 90--91. 

23 . ARQMG 1853, S. Ex. Doc. I, 33d Cong., 1st sess., 2:132. For a detailed survey of army 

housing in the 1850s, see Clary, "These Relics," 48- 66, 164--75, 264--71. 
194 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

1854, he reported that the adobe buildings left by the Mexican government 

were miserable but that they were well kept. At San Diego he found the 

quarters of the soldiers to be worthless. And so it went, as the underbudgeted 

troops labored to throw together rude shelters and to tend to their other duties as 

well. 24 

Scott heard complaints from all sides about conditions in the West. On his 

own tours (and from Churchill) he learned that the few artillerists in the East 

were huddled in casemates, little more than man-made caves, at the coastal 

forts. In 1856, meanwhile, a commission of officers was dispatched to observe 

the war in the Crimea and to visit military establishments in Europe. The 

deplorable condition of sanitation in the war zone contrasted dramatically with 

the high quality of barracks and hospitals in the European military posts, and 

the whole tour only aggravated the American army's unhappiness about its own 

shabby physical plant. General Scott vented that frustration the following year 

when he asserted that the low quality of the quarters provided for the army was 

a principal cause "of desertion, disease, and mortality." The men, he said, 

lived in casemates in the coastal fortifications, and on the frontier "either in 

tents (winter as well as summer) or such miserable bush and mud huts as they 

have hastily constructed for the moment. " But he acknowledged that the problem was only partly soluble, because the constant movement of the frontier of 

settlement made it inadvisable to establish permanent quarters for the army. 25 

A Busy Decade for Churchill 

Although affected by the physical problems imposed by his increased age, 

Sylvester Churchill also continued to be relatively active during the 1850s.26 In 

1851 and again in 1859, he made extensive inspections of the area east of the 

Mississippi River, encompassing the Department of the East. In the intervening 

years, he was engaged in several special investigations and inspections desired 

by the secretaries of war. He inspected Springfield Armory in 1853 to evaluate 

the quality of the weapons being completely assembled for the first time on the 

principles of mass production. He gathered a group of active and retired artisans to examine the 1853 model rifle and to compare it to earlier, individually 

manufactured pieces. All of them pronounced the new weapon equal to or 

better than the older models. Churchill's report heartily endorsed the new 

system of interchangeable parts, recommending its continuance as more economical and efficient than the older system. In 1856 and 1858 he visited Florida 

and then Minnesota to investigate and report on the origins and prospects of 

Indian troubles that concerned the Secretary of War. During the latter visit, he 

assisted the governor of Minnesota to conduct a conference with the Sioux and 

24. Frazer, Mansfield on Condition, passim, quotations on pages 51, 135, 143-44. 

25. ARSecWar 1856, House (H.) Ex . Doc. 1, 34th Cong., 3d sess., 16; Annual Report of the 

Commanding General 1857 (ARComGen) , S. Ex . Doc. 1, 35th Cong., 1st sess., 49. 

26. Material on Sylvester Churchill is drawn from an article by the author in Civil War History , 

vol. 32, June 1986, pp. 159-168, courtesy of Kent State University Press. 
INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS 195 

the Chippewa. His reports were thorough descriptions and analyses of the 

situations he observed, accompanied with supporting documents and clippings. 

He visited Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1855 with Bvt. Brig. Gen. Newman S. Clarke 

to investigate irregularities incident to the development of the military reservation around the fortY 

Churchill was even more involved in the conduct" of special boards and 

projects for the Secretary. He began to pick up numerous complaints about the 

army uniform while mustering out the Mexican War volunteers. To these were 

added similar remarks gathered from officers with whom he talked on a tour 

inspecting Fort Columbus, New York, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Jefferson 

Barracks, Missouri, in the fall of 1848. In March 1849, he wrote a lengthy 

description of their recommendations and complaints to the Commanding General suggesting favorable consideration. The officers felt that the uniforms 

looked old-fashioned, were too hot, and were impracticable for field duty. 

Simultaneously, he advised the Secretary of War, who requested that he serve 

as a board of one to review the various uniform changes proposed. Secretary 

George W. Crawford expressed the view that Churchill's long experience and 

reputation for good sense qualified him to make the necessary decisions. Churchill replied two days later saying he was familiar with the proposals, concurred 

in the changes as having come from those affected the most, and recommended 

their adoption. When the changes were approved in February 1850, the Secretary of War, through the Adjutant General, asked Churchill to have prepared 

the lithographic drawings to be distributed to manufacturers. 28 

Perhaps for Churchill the most time-consuming and frustrating project of 

the decade was the creation of a revised drill manual that he began on his own 

initiative. He was inspired in 1851 while observing Company A of the 3d 

Artillery at Fort Trumbull, Connecticut, conduct bayonet drill as described in a 

French work translated by the then Capt. George B. McClellan. He liked what 

he saw and considered it a great improvement over current u.S. practices. 29 

Then, in January 1852, Adjutant General Roger Jones included Churchill among 

the bureau and department heads in a circular directing them all in the name of 

the General-in-Chief to submit recommended changes to the 1841 Army regulations that affected their respective departments. 30 Churchill replied on 11 February with a detailed review of the regulations as they affected the inspectors 

general. He also included some suggested changes in other areas, the need for 

which he had noted in the course of his inspections. Before submitting the 

papers, Churchill coordinated his response with fellow inspectors George A. 

McCall and Samuel Cooper, incorporating their views with his. Adjutant General Jones acknowledged his response with the offhand, informal note that 

27. Franklin H. Churchill, ibid., 134-36. 

28. Sylvester Churchill, Ltr to General-in-Chief, 29 Mar 49; Ltr to Secy of War, 27 Mar 49; Ltr 

from AGO, 27 Feb 50. Collection of Churchill Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa. 

(hereafter referred to as Churchill Papers). 

29. Franklin H. Churchill, ibid., 134. 

30. Cir, Army HQ, AGO, IS Jan 52, Churchill Papers. 
196 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

ASCENDING THE TABLELANDS OF TEXAS. The exploration of the transMississippi area and the inspection of the units in the new territories were 

major concerns of the inspectors in the 1850s. 

perhaps Churchill should sometime correlate his views with comments addressing the 1841 regulations and their partially revised 1847 version. 31 

Those experiences seem to have inspired Churchill to give increasing thought 

to the need for a really thorough review and overhaul of the Army regulations 

and the existing drill manuals. Whatever the case may be, he had written one 

complete draft and was in the process of rewriting that by the middle of 1856. 

His objective was to clearly and unequivocably state in one manual all the 

movements and procedures for all tactical and ceremonial drills, parades, and 

inspections, to include such things as salutes and honors. In order to come up 

with an acceptable consensus, he not only plumbed his own experience, but 

also queried regular and militia officers and the foreign attaches in Washington. 

Like Steuben with his famous blue book, he wanted a simple, accurate manual 

to train all American troops in a standardized drill. His work was sufficiently 

complete in January 1857 for a portion of it to be submitted to Secretary of War 

Jefferson Davis for his official sanction and agreement so the project could 

move forward to completion. Davis reviewed the draft, returning it to Churchill 

the next month. He directed Churchill to continue his work and formally submit 

it to the War Department. 32 ... After further work and coordination, on 27 

31. Sylvester Churchill, Ltr to Bv!. Maj. Gen. R. Jones, 11 Feb 52; Ltrfrom R. Jones, AG, 12 

Feb 52, Churchill Papers. 

32. Sylvester Churchill, Ltr to Jefferson Davis, 15 Jan 57; Ltr from Jefferson Davis to Secy of 

War, 27 Feb 57, Churchill Papers. 
INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS 197 

March 1858 , Churchill sent out what must have been one of the earliest preprinted questionnaires, consisting of a circular containing fourteen questions 

with multiple-choice answers and a place for remarks. The questions were 

tailored to address specific issues raised by criticisms of the earlier drafts. The 

circular was mailed to 105 regular and 20 militia officers along with an explanatory note and a request for prompt reply . The addressees included the adjutants 

general of Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia as well as such distinguished individuals as Bvt. Maj. Gen . Ethan A. Hitchcock, Prof. Denis Mahan, 

and former Capt. George B. McClellan. 33 

The warmth and high regard for Churchill held by men from many parts of 

the country was reflected in the responses that began to come in. For example, 

a reply from a fellow Vermonter and prominent scholar and politician, George P. 

Marsh , was lighthearted and humorous, deprecating his ability to match 

Churchill's military knowledge. He did say he thought a proposed revision was 

an excellent idea needed to "revive a martial spirit among the militia. The 

decay of which I think a dangerous evil." Churchill also got a reply from 

Illinois Governor William A. Bissell whom he had known since Mexican War 

days when Bissell commanded the 1st Illinois Volunteers in Wool's Column. 

Bissell said the manual looked good to him, but he did not feel his thirteen 

months military service qualified him to be critical of Churchill's greater 

experience. After warmly reminiscing about their days soldiering together, 

Bissell mentioned that many Illinois militiamen were eager to get in on the 

campaign against the Mormons. He estimated the state could raise about forty 

regiments to go to Utah . He concluded, "We are great soldiers, always ready to 

go," but he predicted an early end to the Utah campaign. 34 

Churchill's fellow inspector, Col. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, also wrote him 

an encouraging note after reviewing the 27 March circular. Mansfield deferred 

to Churchill's greater experience as an inspector, as well, and urged him not to 

let the opinions expressed in replies to the circulars to influence his sound 

judgment too much. Mansfield agreed with Churchill that such a total overhaul 

of the drill regulations was necessary and long overdue.

35 During all this, 

Churchill left his final draft with Winfield Scott at his headquarters in New 

York for review. Scott returned it after several weeks without comment, but he 

later told Churchill (in December 1858) that he would have a board of officers 

examine it once Churchill had it completed. As the author of a drill manual then 

very much in vogue, Scott was less than enthusiastic at the prospect of having it 

superseded. Churchill formally submitted the final draft for War Department 

approval on 21 February 1859. In his letter of transmittal, Churchill said he had 

amplified topics that were only alluded to in the Army regulations and he had 

33. Sylvester Churchill, Ltr Bk entry 27 Mar 58, Churchill Papers. 

34. Sylvester Churchill, Ltr from George P. Marsh, Burlington, VI. , 2 Apr 58; Ltr from Wm. 

A. Bissell, Springfield, Ill., 22 Apr 58, Churchill Papers. 

35. Sylvester Churchill, Ltr from Joseph K. F. Mansfield, colonel and inspector general, USA, 

Middletown, Conn., 11 May 58, Churchill Papers. 
198 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

simplified and standardized other drills and ceremonies. He cited his extensive 

consultations, surveys, and coordination while preparing the manual, concluding that his experiences as an inspector since 1812 had convinced him that a 

new standard manual was necessary. He included a synopsis of responses from 

his circular. 36 

Scott returned the draft requesting additions on the types of gun salutes to 

be used for various dignitaries. After further research and writing, Churchill 

resubmitted the final draft. The proposed manual was then reviewed by a board 

of officers whose deliberations lasted from 10 November to 5 December 1859. 

It approved the manual with a few minor changes. The manuscript was then 

further examined by Adjutant General Cooper and by Col. Joseph E. Johnston, 

acting inspector general, in what must have been one of the latter's few actions 

as an inspector before becoming Quartermaster General. They recommended 

approval as well. Accordingly, Secretary of War John B. Floyd wrote to the 

chairman of the Senate Military Committee in May 1860 requesting the necessary appropriation to cover publishing costs. As it turned out, Floyd got no 

answer, and in what must have been one of his last acts before resigning, he 

repeated his request in a similar letter on 28 December. 37 

The tensions generated by the ~ecession crisis began to affect the smooth 

progress of Churchill's project. The first sign of this was the congressional 

reluctance to appropriate money for any military purposes followed by Secretary Floyd's resignation. Even though the manual had gone through the full 

approval procedure, Floyd's successor, Secretary Joseph Holt, declined to 

authorize its publication because he was an interim appointee and did not feel it 

his place to make a decision of such lasting consequence. Hearing this, the 

Lippincott Company of Philadelphia, which had won the printing bid, offered 

to print the manual at its cost if the War Department would guarantee the 

purchase of 1,500 copies at 75 cents each. Secretary Holt declined to go even 

this far, and there the matter had to rest until the departure of the Buchanan 

cabinet. 38 Thus the story belongs to the Civil War period, although it is best 

completed here. 

Churchill brought up the matter of the manual in a talk with Simon Cameron, 

Lincoln's Secretary of War, shortly after he came into office . When Samuel 

Cooper resigned to join the Confederacy, Churchill also explained the situation 

to the new Adjutant General, Brig. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas. After the firing on 

Fort Sumter, Churchill formally wrote Secretary Cameron, saying that Lincoln's 

call for 75,000 militiamen made the publication of an updated drill manual even 

more urgent. He felt that all responsible army and militia officers agreed to the 

need because the existing regulations and manuals were contradictory, unclear, 

36. Sylvester Churchill, Ltrs to Col. S. Cooper, AGO, Washington, 29 Jan 59 and 21 Feb 59, 

Churchill Papers. 

37. Sylvester Churchill, Ltr from W. A. Nichols, Asst AG, Washington, 5 Dec 59; Ltrs from 

John B. Floyd, Secy of War to chairman, Military Committee, U.S. Senate, 23 May 60 and 28 Dec 

60, Churchill Papers. 

38. Sylvester Churchill, Memo , I Mar 61, Churchill Papers. 
INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS 199 

and in very short supply. Churchill said his long experience as an inspector, in 

seeing what was needed, combined with the rigid scrutiny by numerous senior 

officers to whom he had subjected his drafts, made his book a valuable means 

for assuring early and proper organization of the mustering forces. Churchill 

stressed that immediate printing was still possible if the Secretary approved and 

authorized the expenditure. 39 Despite this plea, again no money was forthcoming. 

By this time, Churchill was beginning to feel the full ravages of his seventyeight years and he was preparing to go on an extended leave before his scheduled September retirement. His physical afflictions and the disappointment of 

not being able to serve actively did not deter him from trying to see his manual 

published. He wrote his successor in the inspectorate, Maj . Gen. George B. 

McClellan's father-in-law, Col. Randolph B. Marcy, in September 1861, outlining the saga of the approved draft. He sent Marcy a full copy and urged him 

to push for its publication. Churchill again stressed that such a standard manual 

would be of great value in training the newly forming armies. He felt that 

Marcy's status as inspector general might help get the project renewed. Fully 

retired by now, Churchill was dividing his time between his Washington residence and that of his daughter and her husband in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

4o 

Marcy and McClellan appear to have given some brief attention to the 

manual among their other duties during the fall of 1861 . Finally, in February 

1862, General McClellan appointed another formal board consisting of Maj . 

Gens. Irvin McDowell and Fitz-John Porter, and Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin to meet with Churchill and then to review the manual for possible adoption. 

They convened for a day on 11 February at Churchill's Washington residence. 

The next day, the board members consulted with McClellan, saying that the 

demands on their time prevented a thorough review of the manual and they 

suggested deferring any action. McClellan agreed, adjourning the board to a 

later date which never came. General Franklin was tasked with informing 

Churchill and thanking him for his courtesy and interest. 41 . .. Churchill made 

his final attempt to get the manual published when he saw that his old friend 

and commander, former inspector Maj. Gen . John E. Wool, had been appointed in June 1862 to develop a large camp of instruction near Annapolis, 

Maryland. Churchill wrote Wool that month, regretting that ill health prevented 

his active role in the war. He reviewed the history of his manuscript, saying the 

one way he might help the cause would be to assist Wool in getting it published 

for use in training the great forces being raised. When Wool expressed polite 

interest, Churchill replied in July with a summary of the manual's contents, 

recounting his view that it would be a valuable asset for training new troops. 

39. Sylvester Churchill, Ltr to Simon Cameron, Secy of War, Washington, 19 Apr 61, Churchill Papers. 

40. Sylvester Churchill, Ltr to Col. R. B. Marcy, IG, USA, Washington, 24 Sep 61 , Churchill 

Papers. 

41. Sylvester Churchill, Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Special Orders (SO) No . 40, 10 

Feb 62; Ltrfrom W. B. Franklin, Brig. Gen. ofVols., Camp Williams, Va. , 13 Feb 62. Churchill 

Papers. 
200 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Wool was unable to act on Churchill's hopes because of greater demands on 

his time that summer. 42 

Churchill died on 7 December 1862 and hope of getting his manual published died with him. The manuscript and supporting papers remained in the 

possession of his son-in-law; Spencer F. Baird of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, until 

1872 when he donated them to the War Department. The final insult to the 

project came the next year when the War Department returned the papers to Mr. 

Baird as being of no use. One can only speculate on the effect the manual 

would have had on the quality of the untrained hordes thrown into battle by the 

Federals in the early years of the Civil War and to Churchill's reputation as 

perhaps a second Steuben. The absence of a standard drill manual in the Federal 

forces was one of the greatest problems in the first year of the war. It unquestionably impeded the efficiency of the units sent into combat and delayed the 

training both of officers and of men . The disregard for Churchill's project was 

one of the many tragedies in a tragic era. 

Regulations and the Inspector General 

While Churchill was working on his drill manual, the U.S. Army received a 

new set of general regulations in 1855, reissued essentially unchanged in 1857. 

It had little impact on the inspectors general. One interesting development was 

the increasing use of the term "department" in refer to the inspectorate. Properly speaking, this word still meant a sphere of activity more than an organization, 

but the context showed the growing tendency to regard the inspectors general as 

a formal department. 43 Even though no separate body of regulations existed for 

the Inspector General's Department, as was true for other departments, regulations for inspections did exist as did a brief statement of inspecting officers' 

duties, honors due the troops, forms for inspections, and other details that 

echoed previous regulations. The content of inspection reports was redescribed, 

much shortened from the 1840 regulations, at Churchill's recommendation. 44 

Once again, inspectors were required to comment on the efficiency and 

abilities of the officers they saw. In addition , when property or stores were 

reported as unserviceable, they were to be examined by an inspector general or 

other officer appointed by the Secretary of War. Separate inventories were to 

show the disposition and exact condition of each article inspected. Objects 

determined to be unserviceable after inspection could be sold at auction. No 

officer could drop property from his returns until it was condemned after 

inspection and ordered to be dropped. That was cumbersome, but it was the sort 

of reform that Croghan had demanded years earlier. The War Department 

42. Sylvester Churchill, War Dept GO No. 59, 5 Jun 62; Ltrs. to Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, Cdg 

Distr and Camp of Instruction, Carlisle, Pa., 17 Jun and 7 Jul 62, Churchill Papers. 

43. U.S . War Dept, Regulations for the Army of United States and for Qllartermaster's 

Department (Washington: A.O.P. Nicholson, 1855), and Regulations for the Army of the United 

States, 1857 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1857), 2-3. 

44 . 1857 Regulations, 63 . 
INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS 201 

simplified matters further on 15 June 1857, probably because there were not 

enough inspectors general to go around. The required inspections of unserviceable property, said the department, "will, unless otherwise ordered, be made 

by the commanding officers of posts. ,,45 

The 1855 and 1857 regulations neglected to establish the place of the 

inspectors general in the U. S. Army, in peace and in war, as explicitly as had 

their predecessors. There was an apparent assumption that they served the 

Commanding General, but the same assumption governed all other staff officers. 

If the inspections and reports were to have any apparent purpose, it was to 

encourage efficiency in the methods of inspection, and only incidentally to 

inform higher authorities of what was discovered. Given the War Department's 

primacy over the line of command, its economic interests gained ascendancy 

over the military interests of the Commanding General. Inspectors general 

appeared destined to become, by degrees, the Secretary of War's auditors. 

Promoting this impression was the War Department's amendment to the regulations in 1858 which permitted inspectors general to take one servant on their 

tours, with the government compensating for the servant's transportation costs. 

Secretary of War John B. Floyd proposed the next year to increase the number 

of brigadier generals in the Army to ten. Congress asked, "What do you want 

with ten brigadier generals?" The Secretary answered that one was to command each of six departments, one was to serve as Adjutant General, one was 

to serve as Quartermaster General, and two were to serve as inspectors general. 

That is, the War Department proposed to promote the inspectors general, but 

. not to increase their number. Neither, in any event, happened. 46. 

The Army did not get its ten brigadier generals in 1859. Legislation proposed the next year would have allowed a total of eight, the inspectors general 

not among them. In fact, the purpose of the bill, prepared in the Senate, was to 

eliminate the administrative staff of the Army, making a total reduction in the 

staff departments of 60 officers, and of 73 in ordnance and the Corps of 

Engineers-matched by additions of 76 officers to the regiments. The inspectors general and the Pay Department would be abolished completely. The duties 

of the latter were to be filled by the Quartermaster Department. The inspectorate, 

apparently, would have ceased to exist. In any event, nothing came of that 

measure either, and the Army retained its organization and its inspectors general until the start of the Civil War. 47 

Another War-The Inspectors Depart 

The army that the Senate proposed to reorganize in 1860 was hopelessly 

scattered. Its actual strength that year stood at 16,006 officers and men-929 of 

45. 1857 Regulations, 119; GO No . 8, AGO, 15 Jun 57, in GORI&IG. 

46. GO No.3 , AGO, 24 Mar 58, in GORI&IG; Reorganization of the Army, H. Misc . Doc. 29 , 

53d Cong., 2d sess. (1859). 

47. U.S . Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs and the Militia, Report to accompany Bill S. 61, S. Rpt. 21, 36th Cong., 1st sess. (1860). 
202 

them in the Department of the East, 

13,143 broadcast over the rest of the 

continent, and others at depots, West 

Point, recruit rendezvous, and in 

transit. Such a dispersed organization 

required more inspection, not less, if 

it was ever to be cohesive. Accordingly, on 6 March 1860 the War Department had appointed Bvt. Col. Joseph E. Johnston "to duty as Acting 

Inspector General of the Army, according to his brevet rank. " But Quartermaster General Jesup died in early 

June, and on the 20th of June Johnston replaced him. He spent a distracted year in that position before 

going over to the Confederacy. 48 

The threat of civil war became a 

reality in 1861, and the Army prepared itself with a new issue of the 

general regulations although, for the 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

COL. JOSEPH K. F. MANSFIELD. Inspector General, 29 May 1857- 14 

May 1861. 

inspectors general, they remained unchanged since 1855. The Inspector General's 

Department had no separate section but the duties of its officers were briefly 

described. Inspection, however, was thoroughly integrated into command. Regulations for troops on campaign made inspection down to the company level the 

duty of brigadier generals, who reported to their division commanders. The 

chief purpose was to track regimental strength and readiness. Recruits at depots 

and in parties were to be mustered, inspected, and paid as were all other troops. 

Commanding officers were to inspect all recruits, and form boards of 

inspection- consisting of commanding officer, medical officer, and three 

other senior officers-to review men unfit or disqualified for service. Elsewhere, 

public works were to be inspected annually by "such officers of the corps [of 

Engineers] as the Secretary of War shall designate," while the Ordnance Department managed its own technical inspections. That was the epitaph for 

Macomb's attempt to subordinate the Corps of Engineers. 49 

The role of the inspectors general in the corning war was yet to be determined. 

In the preceding conflict they had been detailed as mustering officers, assembling and forwarding volunteer formations. But in the Civil War, they were 

eliminated from that duty at the outset, as the responsibility for recruiting was 

48. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 301, 332-33; GO No.5, AGO, 6 Mar 60 , in GORI&IG. 

49. U.S. War Department, Revised Regulations for the Army of the United States. 1861 

(Philadelphia: J.G.L. Brown, 1861),40-41,46--49,71,72-73, 138-39,370,387. The regulations 

for the first time accounted (on p. 120) for inspection of waterborne troop transports, although the 

inspection was to be a technical one. 
INSPECTION BETWEEN THE WARS 203 

turned over to Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase. The program then 

ran afoul of political considerations. When a board of officers recommended to 

Chase that regiments be established on three battalions-keeping two in the line 

by rotation, while the third battalion was recruiting and training-he accepted 

the idea only for the regulars, but rejected it roundly for volunteers. In fact, the 

idea was not even applied to the regulars, which re-formed in three-battalion 

reg"iments, but with all battalions on line. The proposal would have limited the 

total number of regiments by keeping them all fully manned, and accordingly 

would have limited the number of commissions that state governors could 

grant. There was no role for the inspectors general in any of that. 50 . . . In any 

case, there were no inspectors general available for mustering when the war 

became serious in the spring of 1861. Sylvester Churchill, yielding to age, 

reluctantly had taken leave in April, retiring on 25 September 1861.51 Joseph 

K. F. Mansfield relinquished his inspectorate soon after Churchill did, and died 

even sooner than his colleague. He was in the Department of Texas when the 

secession crisis broke there, when the department commander, Brig. Gen. 

David Twiggs, surrendered all his troops to the state's rebels without a struggle. 

Mansfield managed to return to Washington, where he received a brevet as 

brigadier general on 6 May, and a full commission in that rank on 14 May 

1861. As energetic and gallant as ever, Mansfield died 17 September 1862, of 

wounds received at the Battle of Antietam. 52 

The Army and its inspectorate were about to be transformed by war once 

again, and by its aftermath. But this time the inspectorate would start with a 

clean slate. No inspectors general remained from the old regime, and in fact the 

old regime itself came to an end on 1 November, when Scott, returned from 

New York at last, retired. All that remained to guide their successors were the 

regulations, and those left the true role of the inspectors general begging for 

definition. In the last war the inspectorate had fallen apart, its two-man staff 

dispatched to other duties. With manpower short in 1861, as it always was in 

emergencies, it appeared likely that the new inspectors general, whoever they 

were, could easily scatter to the winds. 

50. Armin Rappaport, "The Replacement System During the Civil War," Military Affairs, 15 

(summer 1951): 95-106. Volunteer regiments remained in the old ten-company format, an unavoidable reality in face of strong sentiments among the states, which provided the regiments and 

commissioned their officers. 

51. Churchill, Sketch of Life of Churchill, 58-59; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 301. 

52. Frazer, Mansfield on Condition, xxix; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 688. Twiggs, 

incidentally, was dismissed from the Army, and went over to the Confederacy, which made him a 

major general. He died in July 1862. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 976. 
CHAPTER 13 

The Inspectorate During the Civil War 

(1861-1865) 

As the government acted in haste to raise and organize a great United States 

Army during the summer of 1861, it gave passing attention to the military 

inspectorate. On 3 August, Congress empowered the President to appoint, with 

the consent of the Senate, five assistant inspectors general, "with the rank and 

pay of majors of cavalry ... to have the pay, rank, and allowance and perform 

the duties of similar officers in the present military establishment." Another 

grab-bag of provisions masquerading as legislation-among other things-the 

abolishment of the lash as punishment in the Army-said three days later' 'That 

the President of the United States is hereby authorized to appoint two additional 

inspectors-general to have the same rank and receive the same pay and allowances as now provided by law for inspectors-general. " But another law enacted 

the same day repealed that very provision. 

1 

Inspectors Without Portfolio 

If the distracted War Department hierarchy examined that legislation closely, 

all it could have discovered was confusion. The five assistant inspectors general, 

ranked as majors, were to have the compensation and were to perform the 

duties of "similar officers" already in the organization. But the only "similar" 

officers were two colonels, entitled inspectors general. There had been no 

assistant inspectors general for many years. There was further confusion over 

the number of inspectors general desired. In principle, two positions for inspectors general already existed: Churchill was soon to vacate his office by retirement and Mansfield had already left to command troops, although he apparently retained his permanent commission as an inspector general. The 6 August 

legislation offered two more inspectors general before evidently snatching them 

aw.ay. The number of inspectors who could be appointed at Churchill's retirement ranged, according to interpretation, from as few as one to as many as 

1. An Act providing for the better organization of the military establishment, Statlltes at Large 

12, sec . 2, 287 (1861); An Act to promote the efficiency of the Engineer and Topographical Engineer Corps and for other purposes, Statutes at Large 12, sec. 4, 317 (1861); An Act to promote 

the efficiency of the Engineer and Topographical Engineer Corps, andfor other purposes, Statlltes 

at Large 12, sec . 3,318 (1861); Legislative History, 111-12. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 205 

COMMISSARY DEPARTMENT BAGGAGE TRAIN, 21 JULY 186l. Procurement 

and logistical support were a major concern for Civil War inspectors. 

four. The War Department appointed three, until Mansfield's death made his 

position available as well. 

The appointment and early disposition of the inspectors general and assistant inspectors general demonstrated that the War Department had no interest in 

establishing a unified , central inspectorate serving a unified, central command. 

Much as in 1812, the department proposed to direct the war itself, via theater 

commanders, although there was a succession of nominal commanding generals from Scott to Ulysses S. Grant-the latter finally exerting some central 

military control over all theaters. The title of Commanding General was an 

honor to the lead player, but gave him no power to direct the whole military 

play. So that inspectors general in the Civil War could be something different 

from their predecessors in the earlier conflicts, a fully empowered Commanding General might have made them his means of enforcing control over the 

army. So too might the Secretary of War have done so, had he planned to retain 

military control in his own hands. But what actually happened was something 

less. Inspectors general were appointed because the appointees were deemed 

worthy of promotion to colonel, regardless of their intended f~.mctions . They, 

and especially assistant inspectors general, were also appointed because the 

Secretary needed capable aides to serve him in roles ranging from messenger 

boys to confidential agents. Only inadvertently was there planted the seed of a 

centralized inspectorate. 
206 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Class of 1861: Inspectors General 

A review of the careers of the principal characters shows that the new 

inspectors general and assistant inspectors general were a varied group; they 

played equally varied parts in the wartime drama. The first officer promoted to 

inspector general was Randolph B. Marcy, assigned on 9 August 1861 . Born in 

Massachusetts in 1812, Marcy graduated from West Point in 1832, and was 

among the twenty-nine cadets of that class who volunteered to go along with 

General Scott's "Northwestern Army" to put down the Sacs and Foxes in the 

Black Hawk War during the summer of 1832. That expedition was broken up 

because of cholera. 

Marcy then went to the 5th Infantry, not making captain until 1846. He 

spent the intervening period, except for two short stints as a recruiting officer, 

in Michigan and Wisconsin. In 1846, he went to Texas, where he served during 

the military occupation and the opening skirmishes of the Mexican War. But he 

was soon assigned to duty as a recruiting officer, and although he returned to 

Texas in 1847, he remained out of the fighting and accordingly missed the 

promotions, brevets, and reputation-building that the war offered to others. He 

ended the conflict as he had begun it, a captain. After that, Marcy roamed the 

Southwest for the next twelve years, becoming one of the more famous of the 

Army's many explorers and adventurers in the interwar period. He escorted an 

immigrant train and opened a new trail from Arkansas to New Mexico in 1849, 

and two years later led an expedition to establish sites for new military posts in 

the Southwest. In 1852, assisted by a young second lieutenant, George B. 

McClellan, Marcy led an exploration of the headwaters of the Red and Canadian rivers. Two years later, he surveyed the Indian lands of Texas. His reports 

of his adventures were published by Congress, and enjoyed great popularity. 

After brief service fighting the Seminoles in Florida, in 1857 Marcy accompanied the expedition into Utah to subdue the Mormons during the' 'Mormon 

War." That force had to winter at Fort Bridger under very distressing conditions, 

its supplies cut off by Mormon raiders. Marcy led about one hundred men on a 

heroic 1 ,300-mile round trip through unknown wilderness, during the worst 

winter in memory, to bring relief to the force . That exploit drew the extended 

attention and admiration of the Secretary of War, who devoted a substantial 

part of his annual report to an account of Marcy's dramatic adventure. It also 

earned Marcy an appointment as acting inspector general for the Department of 

Utah . Late in 1858, he was assigned to Scott's headquarters at New York to 

prepare a guidebook for the westward-moving emigrants, published by the War 

Department in 1859 as The Prairie Traveler. He was rewarded with promotion 

to major and assignment as a paymaster, and he served in the Northwest until 

May 1861. 2 

2. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 689; AMB , 272; DAB 6: 273- 74; Spaulding, United States 

Army , 237- 38; Cecil Eby, "That Disgraceful Affair, the Black Hawk War" (New York: Norton , 

1973), 217; Ezra 1. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge: 

Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 311. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 

Marcy was a large, handsome man 

who affected the cheek whiskers and 

mustache that became popular during 

the Civil War. He looked like a soldier and acted the part. He was energetic and-as his career demonstrated- bravely adventurous, a biggame hunter until his death. The new 

inspector general was also an affable 

man, a fund of anecdotes and generally popular among those who knew 

him. All those qualities might have 

fitted him for the role of inspector 

general, but in 'addition, according to 

Washington's long -time observer Ben: 

207 

Perley Poore, Marcy was known as 

an experienced military counselor. 3 It 

was as a counselor that Marcy spent 

his first year and more as inspector 

general. The commander he served 

was his former partner in adventure, 

George B. McClellan, now a major 

BRIG. GEN. RANDOLPH B. MARCY . 

Inspector General and 

General of the Army, 

1861- 2 January 1881. 

Inspector 

9 August 

general. Marcy owed his appointment not to his character or qualifications, but 

to simple nepotism. McClellan had married Marcy's daughter Mary Ellen in 

1860, and in June 1861 decided to ensure that his father-in-law would not spend 

the Civil War ignominiously as he had passed the Mexican War. McClellan 

invited Marcy to join him at Cincinnati that month to serve as his chief of staff 

during the campaign in western Virginia. This campaign's success propelled 

McClellan's rise to Commanding General of the Army.4 

Making Marcy an inspector general in August 1861 was not in any way a 

restaffing of the Army's inspectorate. It was instead an exercise in expediencytaking a current vacancy merely to promote McClellan's chief of staff to colonel, 

followed by Marcy's appointment as brigadier general of volunteers on 23 

3. Ben: Perley Poore , Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis, 2 

vols. (Philadelphia: Hubbard, 1886),2: 90-91. "Ben: Perley Poore" was the special affectation of 

one of Washington's most famous journalists and raconteurs, publisher of many essential catalogues of government documents. A more recent account of the Washington scene during the war is 

Margaret Leech, Reveille in Washington, 1860-1865 (New York: Harper, 1941). 

4. Warner, Generals in Bille, 311; Marcy to George W. Cullum, 12 Nov 65, Cullum Files, 

United States Military Academy Archives, West Point, New York (hereafter cited as USMA 

Archives). Marcy , understandably, did not credit his family connection with his appointments, but 

he was widely known in Washington as McClellan's father-in-law. Poore, Perley's Reminiscences, 

2: 90-91. Until Grant became Commanding General in 1864, the highest officer was usually in 

command of the Army of the Potomac , and only nominally head of all military forces. McClellan 

relinquished command of the whole army on 11 March 1862, and was followed by Henry W. 

Halleck in the position of Commanding General. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 17. 
208 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

September. The latter promotion, however, not being confirmed by the Senate, 

expired the following July. The Senate, it appears, was not as inclined to 

indulge McClellan's family as was the President. Marcy's next appointment as 

brigadier general, 13 September 1862, also expired under senatorial inaction, 

on 4 March 1863. McClellan was by that time thoroughly discredited, and his 

disrepute affected those around him. 5 So Marcy was thus inspector general in 

title only while he actually served as chief of staff for the Army of the Potomac 

until 7 November 1862, shortly after McClellan had been removed from 

command. During that time, one of his principal activities was to relay 

McClellan's excuses for failure or inaction and other bad news to the War 

Department and the President. The emissary's duties were not happy ones, and 

Marcy regularly endured Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton's furious outbursts about McClellan's failures. 6 Although Marcy went into limbo after 

McClellan's dismissal, he was too capable and well liked to remain hidden for 

long. After a while, he took up duties more appropriate to an inspector general. 

Eventually, he was to become the first senior inspector general to enjoy a 

higher rank than his colleagues. 

Second to Marcy among the new inspectors general was Delos B. Sacket, a 

cavalryman who became a colonel and an inspector general 1 October 1861. A 

New Yorker, Sacket graduated from West Point in 1845 and entered the 

dragoons. As a brevet second lieutenant, he took part in the occupation and 

battles in Texas in 1846, earning his brevet for "gallant and meritorious 

conduct, " then participated in the battle of Monterrey. He spent the rest of the 

war and its aftermath on frontier duty, mostly in New Mexico. Beginning in 

December 1850, Sacket spent five years as an assistant instructor of cavalry 

tactics at the Military Academy, then served successively as a recruiter, in 

garrison at Fort Leavenworth, on a board to revise the army regulations, as an 

inspector of horses and mules, and again on the frontier, fighting Indians. He 

was promoted to captain in 1855, and in 1861 , after a year of leave in Europe, 

to major in January and to lieutenant colonel in May. 

In fairly swift order, Sacket spent 1861 as an acting inspector general for 

the Department of Washington, then as a mustering and disbursing officer at 

New York City. While in New York, he was ' appointed a colonel, and an 

inspector general on 1 October. Two months later, on 13 December, he was 

appointed as the inspector general for the Army of the Potomac. Sacket, unlike 

Marcy, was able to survive McClellan's dismissal, but not that of his successor, 

Ambrose E. Burnside. He returned to Washington on 10 January 1863 and 

established the Inspector General's Office. 7 Sacket was a melancholy-looking 

5. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 689; Warner, Generals in Blue , 311 . 

6. Bruce Catton , Terrible SWift Sword (Garden City, New York: Doubleday , 1963), 195,304, 

describes some typical encounters between Marcy and the Lincoln Administration. 

7. Heitman , Historical Register, 1: 856; George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the 

Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., 3d edition (Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin , 1891), 2: 234-36. Sacker's actions during the battle of Antietam draw notice in 

several places in Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Bailie of Antietam (New York: 

Tichnor and Fields, 1983). 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 209 

COL. HENRY V AN RENSSELAER. 

Inspector General, 12 November 

1861-23 March 1864. 

man whose energy belied his appearance. He served with credit as an inspector general throughout the war. 

Alone among those appointed in 

1861 , he secured his position by 

merit, and lived up to his title. He 

succeeded Marcy as senior inspector 

general in 1881. 

The third and last inspector general of 1861, Hen'ry Van Rensselaer, 

was another matter. A member of a 

prominent New York family, he had 

graduated from West Point in 1831, 

but had resigned his commission within six months. He was among the 

numbers of politically connected former officers who presented themselves to the cause in 1861 , and received an appointment as colonel and 

"additional aide-de-camp" on 5 

August. Honorably discharged on 1 

November, Van Rensselaer became a colonel and an inspector general eleven 

days later. He was an uncertain quantity, who thought himself bound for glory 

at the head of troops. His influence gained him appointment as a brigadier 

general of volunteers early in 1862, but the commission expired later in the year 

when the Senate refused to ratify it. Van Rensselaer was in his fifties and 

apparently not in good health. He drifted until his death on 23 March 1864, 

leaving behind an undistinguished record. 8 

Class of 1861,' Assistant Inspectors 

The President began to appoint assistant inspectors general on 11 November 

1861. They were a mixed lot, although mostly creditable individuals. Their 

records during the war were also mixed, but reflected the many ways in which 

inspectors were employed in the conflict. Some, including Absalom Baird, 

John Buford, and James Totten, had little or no service as inspectors. They 

secured volunteer commissions as generals, and served as line commanders. 

Baird became a gallant leader and a winner of the Medal of Honor. Buford was 

a prominent cavalry commander, contributor to the Confederate entanglement 

at Gettysburg, who died of exposure and exhaustion in 1863, at the age of 

thirty-seven. Totten won distinction as a general, then reverted to the post of 

assistant inspector general after the war. Other assistant inspectors general 

spent most of the war at their jobs, inspecting troops. James Hardie became one 

8. Heitman , Historical Register, I: 983; GO No . 181, AGO, I Nov 62, in GORI&IG. 
210 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

of the earliest bureaucrats of the inspectorate, Nelson Davis spent most of the 

war inspecting troops in the Army of the Potomac, while Roger Jones went 

wherever the Secretary of War sent him.

9 Three wartime assistant inspectors 

general later became senior inspectors general. Nelson Davis, appointed an 

assistant inspector general on 12 November 1861, graduated from West Point 

in 1846. He served as an infantry officer in the invasion of Mexico at Vera Cruz 

and the campaigns against Mexico City, during which he earned a brevet for 

"gallant and meritorious conduct" in battle. He spent the 1850s on the frontier 

in California and the Great Plains, rising to captain in 1855. His native state of 

Massachusetts appointed him a colonel of the 7th Massachusetts Infantry in 

1861, but he resigned that post to become an assistant inspector general in 

November. 

Davis spent the winter of 1861 to 1862 inspecting troops in the Army of the 

Potomac, and then in March became inspector of an army corps. After being 

attached to headquarters of the Army of the Potomac during the peninsula 

campaign, Davis was shifted from place to place-wherever an inspector or 

officer was needed-in the Army of the Potomac, carrying on the tradition of 

the inspector as available manpower. His "gallant and meritorious services" at 

the battle of Gettysburg in 1863 earned him a brevet lieutenant colonelcy. 

Davis next was assigned as an inspector general for the Department of New 

Mexico in November 1863. He spent the next two years, in his own words, 

"making Special investigations by Orders dpt. Comd'r. and Sec. War, exploring country, locating Mily Posts, directing movement of troops, scouting after 

Indians-in three attacks on Indians killing 51 and taking prisoners [sic] 16--

arms, ammunition, property of various kinds captured, including $660.00 in 

gold." Once again, Davis' "gallant and meritorious services in action with the 

Apache Indians, Arizona," earned him a third brevet commission. 10 The quietly 

able Davis was not untypical of the crop of assistant inspectors general appointed 

in November 1861. He was in his forties, and had behind him a solid career as 

an infantry officer. He was intelligent and flexible, fit not only to be an 

inspector, but also for whatever assignments might come upon him. Service in 

the Southwest was an odd, frequently grueling ordeal during the Civil War, and 

Davis came through it well. By the time he became senior inspector general in 

the 1880s, his appearance was that of a large, calm, comfortable man. 

Absalom Baird, who became an assistant inspector general the same day as 

Davis, 12 November, followed a somewhat different course during the Civil 

War. Of all the officers putatively in the Army's inspectorate, he compiled the 

9. Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 244, offers a thumbnail sketch, not wholly 

accurate, of the wartime activities of inspectors general and assistant inspectors general. See Appendix B. 

10. Cullum, Biographical Register, 2: 298--300; Heitman, Historical Register, I: 359; Nelson 

H. Davis, "Summary of Services," 26 Mar 65, Cullum Files, USMA Archives. The variety of 

Davis' service in New Mexico is suggested by his role as the government's emissary in peace 

negotiations with the Apaches, who were in serious rebellion during the 1860s. The episode is 

recounted in Jacob Piatt Dunn, Massacres of the MOllntains: A History of the Indian Wars of the 

Far West (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1886), 390-91. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 211 

most distinguished record-not as an inspector, but as a combat commander. 

He was a Pennsylvanian, who came from a prominent family with a strong 

military heritage. His grandfather was a surgeon in the Continental Army, and 

his great grandfather had fought in the French and Indian War. Baird initially 

intended to become a lawyer, but when trouble threatened between the United 

States and Mexico, he applied to the United States Military Academy; he 

graduated in 1849. The war then was over, and Barid went into the artillery, 

spending three years in campaigns against the Seminoles, then several more 

years on the Texas frontier. Promotions were slow for officers without war 

records in the 1850s, and he was still :-J first lieutenant when the Civil War 

broke out. Soon thereafter, Baird was appointed an assistant adjutant general 

with the brevet rank of captain in May 1861, and became a divisional adjutant 

in time for the battle of Bull Run. He was a permanent captain and an assistant 

adjutant general as of 3 August, before becoming a major and assistant inspector general on 12 November. 

Baird's career in the inspectorate began inauspiciously. Until March 1862, 

he was assigned to the War Department staff as a functionary who managed to 

develop a sound understanding of the volunteers who were making up the 

majority of the wartime Army. He was then assigned as an inspector general 

and chief of staff of IV Corps, Army of the Potomac, taking an active part in 

operations on the Virginia Peninsula. He performed so ably that he was made a 

brigadier general of volunteers in April 1862 and sent to Kentucky, where 

immediately he led his brigade during the capture of Cumberland Gap in June. 

That earned him command of a division in the Army of Kentucky, and he 

organized his new force and had it ready within a month. Baird participated in 

various actions in Kentucky and Tennessee until August 1863 when, at the 

request of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, he and his division were transferred 

to Thomas' XIV Corps. 

Then Baird came into his own. He was thirty-nine years old, energetic, and 

ambitious; popular with his men because he was a just, albeit hard, disciplinarian; 

and an aggressive commander. Baird led his division in the battle of 

Chickamauga in September, the first to enter and the last to leave the battle, 

repelling stout enemy attacks and sustaining heavy casualties. The erstwhile 

inspector led by personal example, and earned the first of many brevets at 

Chickamauga. His gallantry in the November assault on Missionary Ridge, 

near Chattanooga, earned him another. In the Atlanta campaign the next spring, 

Baird and his division were under fire every day for four months. At the battle 

of Jonesboro, he took personal command of one of his brigades and successfully stormed the enemy entrenchments. That earned him another brevet (he 

received five, in all, during the war) and a recommendation from General 

William T. Sherman that he be promoted to major general. It also brought him, 

thirty years later, the Medal of Honor. 

Baird remained with Sherman until the end of the war, then spent a period 

as an assistant commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau before reverting in 

1866 to his old rank-almost forgotten--of major and assistant inspector general. 
212 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

He followed Davis as a senior inspector general in the 1880s, but he was more 

fittingly Marcy's successor. By this time, this tall, dignified old soldier, like 

Marcy , was inclined to look to the past. Unlike Marcy, he was too reserved to 

be a great storyteller. 11 Baird's career was singular, but not unusual for a 

wartime inspector; several others spent more time commanding than inspecting. 

Roger Jones, however, started out uniquely: He was made an assistant 

inspector general as a reward for heroism. Like Baird, he spent comparatively 

little time inspecting. But his wartime career was nevertheless ordinary, and not 

detached from the inspectorate. Jones was born in 1831, the son of Adjutant 

General Roger Jones. The younger Jones was destined for a military career, 

entering West Point at the minimum age of sixteen. Following graduation in 

1851, his next decade was undistinguished. He was still a lieutenant of cavalry 

when the war started, his only special experience four years as regimental 

adjutant. Except for two years as an instructor at West Point and two assignments to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Jones spent the 1850s in the Southwest. 

Jones led about fifty recruits from Carlisle Barracks to Harpers Ferry, West 

Virginia, in January 1861, with orders to guard the place and its stores from 

Rebels, destroying the weapons and ammunition there if necessary to prevent 

their capture. He learned of the approach of the enemy on 18 April, sent out a 

call for aid, and announced his determination to destroy what he could not 

defend . That night, with more than a thousand Virginia troops at his doorstep, 

he qestroyed the arsenal and its contents (including 15,000 muskets), and 

withdrew in the darkness with only four casualties. His steadiness in the face of 

overwhelming odds earned him the official thanks of the government. Jones 

became a captain and an assistant quartermaster general on 23 April. He spent 

the next several months in the Quartermaster General's Office, except for a few 

weeks as chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac. On 11 November 

1861, he became a major and an assistant inspector general. He served as a War 

Department functionary until 17 July 1862, when he became an assistant inspector general for the Army of Virginia. He was relieved from that post on 1 

September, and until June 1863 was in New York helping to organize and 

forward volunteer troops to the field. New York's draft riots interrupted recruiting work in the city, and Jones returned to service with the Secretary of War. 

As far as Jones was concerned, from September 1862 to the end of the war, he 

generally was on unimportant duty, away from the armies in the field. Like 

several other inspectors, Jones spent most of the war as a minor functionary in a 

department-full. 

Jones had an unremarkable career partly because of lack of opportunity, but 

mostly because he lacked the ambition and will to advance his own interests. 

II. DAB, I: 507-08; Mark M. Boatner III, Civil War Dictionary (New York: McKay, 1974), 

507- 08; Heitman, Historical Register, I: 182- 83; Joseph P. Sanger, "Absolom Baird," Annual' 

Reunion of the Association of Graduates, 1905 (West Point: Association of Graduates, 1905), 

114-24; John A. Baird, Jr., Profile of a Hero: The Story of Absolom Baird, His Family, and the 

American Military Tradition (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1977); Baird, undated statement (early 1866), in 

Cullum Files, USMA Archives. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 213 

He was a quiet, reserved, calm, and exceedingly polite man whose face bespoke 

peaceful dignity. He was well liked, if not widely known . One of his West 

Point contemporaries remarked, "His whole life in the army, like that in the 

family circle, revealed only the charm of the lovely character with which nature 

and early family training endowed him." He was a "quiet, firm, conscientious 

soldier, ever alert in the performance of his duties, and always performing them 

with gentleness and distinguished courtesy." He lived "an admirable life full 

of grace and dignity. " Although these values made close friendships, they were 

not the stuff of which glorious military careers were forged. He became senior 

inspector general solely as a result of promotion by seniority, and served less 

than a week in 1888 before taking leave for what proved to be terminal illness. 12 

Inspectors Without an Inspectorate 

The appointment of inspectors general and assistant inspectors general during the fall of 1861 provided the officers who would preside over the Army's 

inspectorate during the quarter-century following the war. But it did not, as the 

varied careers of the appointees demonstrated, establish a formal inspection 

department for the wartime Army. The officers served in various capacities 

during the war, according to their talents or as the Secretary of War desired. 

And despite the presence of one or several of them in the War Department 

offices, there was not even a permanent office of the Inspector General in the 

department until January 1863. This lack of structure may be seen by the fact 

that the inspector general appointments appear to have been made, in the main, 

because the positions were vacant, and the candidates seemed worthy enough. 

But the inspector's job remained to be defined as the war advanced. Nevertheless, 

largely aside from the institution of inspectors general, inspection went forth. 

The regulations vested that responsibility in commanders, without clearly stating the place of inspectors general in the establishment. Armies, corps, divisions, 

brigades, and geographical divisions and departments almost all had inspectors 

general, assistant inspectors general, or acting assistant inspectors general, 

during the war, in the early period usually selected by the commanders. The 

formally designated inspectors were attached partly to armies or corps here and 

there, but mostly they did the bidding of the Secretary of War. Therefore, the 

army was inspected frequently by other officers from the line. 13 

The loose band of inspectors had no organization at the end of 1861, merely 

undefined purposes and varied assignments. But as the war advanced, a succession of small developments forced the evolution of an organization for the 

inspectorate , and a clearer definition of the inspectors' place and purpose. 

12. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 582; "A Classmate, Roger Jones," AnnuaL Reunion of 

the Association of Graduates, 1889 (West Point: Association of Graduates, 1889), 74-77; Roger 

Jones to George w . Cullum, 10 May 66 , Cullum Files, USMA Archives. 

13. It may be observed that Sanger is unaware of the gradual evolution of the inspectorate 

during the war, and even of the fact that it lacked the rudiments of an organization until 1863. 

Sanger, " Inspector-General's Department," 244. 
214 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Much went on without them. For instance, after receiving evidence of corrupt 

or negligent inspecting at an arsenal, the Secretary of War in February 1862 

directed the Quartermaster General to overhaul his own inspection system, 

making it incumbent on all Quartermaster Department officers to report evidence of fraud on the part of contractors, or "where Inspectors have neglected 

their duty." In April 1862, legislation establishing the Medical Department 

assigned a Medical Inspector General, with the rank of colonel of cavalry, to 

the support of the Surgeon General. 14 Also during the second year of the war, 

Congress established programs without references to the inspectors general, but 

which eventually would require their official attention. The President was 

authorized on l7 July 1862 to buy grounds for national cemeteries "and cause 

them to be securely enclosed." That same year, the shortage of officers impelled 

Congress to include military instruction in the curriculum of colleges founded 

under the Land Grant Act. That farsighted provision for future volunteer officers was for some time ignored by the War Department, with each college 

remaining autonomous. But eventually, the department would want to know 

what the military college programs were doing , and turned to its inspectorate to 

provide this service . 15 More directly, Congress and the War Department added 

incidentally to the duties of inspectors general, focusing on problems as they 

developed but lacking any apparent general plan. In January 1862, for instance, 

the department grew concerned that some men were shirking combat by masquerading as musicians. Many regimental bands were of a low order in any 

case. "Inspectors General, while on their tours," ordered the Secretary, "will 

inspect the bands of all regiments, and discharge all men mustered therewith 

who are not musicians. " That raised the question-never addressed in that 

context~f whether those officers had the authority to discharge soldiers, or 

even to transfer them within regiments. 16 

On 19 March 1862, Congress constituted the Inspectors General of the 

Army as a board of officers who were to prepare a schedule of articles that 

sutlers were to carry for the volunteer service. An extensive list of suggested 

items was provided in the regulation and the sale of all intoxicants was prohibited. 

Perhaps it was the presumed detachment and objectivity of the inspectors, but 

other than that why they received that particular assignment was not clear, 

unless it was believed that they had nothing better to do. Dispersed as the three 

inspectors general were, the War Department dutifully ordered them to prepare 

the list of 21 March, and instructed brigade staff officers, with divisional 

approval, to fix sutlers' prices. The inspectors general were also told to inspect 

sutlers' operations every fifteen days, or cause them to be inspected by "some 

14. Russell F. Weigley , Quartermaster General of the Union Army : A Biography of M. C. 

Meigs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 213; Ganoe, History of the United States 

Army, 178. 

IS . Act of 17 July 1862, 12 Stat. 596, quoted in Steere, " Genesis of Graves Registration, " 

lSI; Lyons and Masland, "The Origins of the ROTC," Military Affair, 23 (spring 1959), 2-3 . 

16. GO No . 4, AGO, 18 Jan 62, in GORI&IG. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 215 

competent officer," who was to report his findings to the appropriate inspector 

general. 17 

Whenever a problem arose, the War Department seemed inclined to assign 

an inspector to it. Cavalry was a growing subject of concern in 1862, because it 

did not always measure up to the Confederates' and, most important, because 

horses and equipment were expensive. The Secretary of War directed on 14 

August that no one would be mustered into the cavalry service without being 

given a test of horsemanship and knowledge of horse care. 18 That, of course, 

was a duty of mustering officers rather than inspectors. But some of the inspectors (Roger Jones being one of them) served as mustering officers, as directed 

by the Secretary of War. The attention of inspectors general was directed more 

specifically to cavalry on 20 November, when all corps, division, and brigade 

commanders were instructed to order a special inspection of their cavalry by the 

end of the month. They were to report to the War Department the names of all 

officers whose horses appeared neglected or unfit, so that the officers could be 

dismissed from the service. Any commanders who had not already designated 

their inspecting officers presumably did so then, at least for that singular 

purpose. 19 

By that time, most of the people who carried the title of inspector general in 

some form were line officers detailed to inspection duty. The body of formally 

designated inspectors was too small to reach every brigade , or even every full 

field army, and many of them were busy mustering or conducting investigations ordered by the Secretary of War. Nearly 1,400 other officers were on 

orders at one time or another to perform various types of inspection duties. The 

only common ties these men had with the formally appointed inspectors were the 

regulations and orders which invoked similar inspection procedures. The 

inspectorate, in other words, still lacked an organization. Not even the organization of the larger fighting forces was uniformly established in the various 

regular and volunteer formations. 

By 1862, the major fighting and command unit of the Army was usually the 

army corps, a grouping of divisions. But corps had not under the law been 

provided with staffs adequate to their emerging role on the battlefield. In fact, 

staff services were generally inadequate in the larger fighting units, and it was 

not only the inspectors general who fell into an undefined status. Adjutant 

General Lorenzo Thomas complained to Congress that adjutants general held 

too low a rank, for by law he could not recruit them from grades above 

lieutenant. The generally low rank of adjutants general made them ineffective 

and subject to the caprice of nearly every other functionary. "As a consequence, 

then, of the very inferior rank held by these officers," said Thomas, "they are 

thrust aside from their rightful positions. Inspectors general, additional aides-de17. The full text of the legislation appears in U.S. War Department, Revised Ullited States 

Army Regulatiolls of 1861 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1863), 529-31. See also GO 

No. 27, AGO, 21 Mar 62, which also reproduced the legislation, in GORI&IG. 

18. GO No . lOS, AGO, 14 Aug 62, in GORI&IG. 

19. GO No. 192, AGO, 20 Nov 62, in GORI&IG. 
216 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

camp, and officers of the line, are not only put over their heads, but actually put 

into their places. ,,20 Inspectors, in other words, often functioned as adjutants, 

merely because the latter lacked the status to be completely effective. That was 

another fruit of the absence of definition for the inspectorate, and of the generally inadequate provision of staffs for the combat organizations. 

Congress moved to re-form the corps organization on 17 July 1862, when it 

determined that each army corps would have a staff comprised of an assistant 

adjutant general, a quartermaster, a commissary of subsistence, and an assistant 

inspector general-all to rank as lieutenant colonel and all assigned by the 

President from the Army or volunteer forces. Nine assistant inspectors general 

had been appointed and assigned to the staffs of major generals by 1 November 

1862. Interestingly, they did not come from the number of the majors previously appointed as assistant inspectors general. Those who had not already 

moved into the volunteer organizations (as had Baird) remained in the Regular 

Army at their lower, but permanent, rank. 21 The War Department simplified 

and improved the appointment of army corps staffs on 23 December. The staff 

officers authorized in July were thereafter to be attached permanently to their 

units, not to their particular commanders. In addition, heads of the War Department bureaus were permitted to designate an adjutant general, quartermaster, 

commissary of subsistence and inspector general for each army corps. When it 

looked to the implementation of that order, the War Department probably noticed 

for the first time that it had no Inspector General's Bureau. 22 

There were assistant inspectors general available at the War Department, 

but the Secretary of War was in the habit of dispatching them to wherever he 

needed information. Nelson Davis, for instance, spent January 1863 making a 

special examination of a mutinous unit of the Army of the Cumberland, the 

Anderson Cavalry, at the Secretary's orders. He found merit in the men's 

complaints that they had been misled about their assignment, but believed that 

examples should be made of the more rebellious ringleaders.23 The available 

assistant inspectors general were therefore too useful to restrict to performing 

desk work at the War Department. In any case, they were junior to the three 

20. Reorganization of the Adjutant General's Department, H. Misc. Doc. 73., 37th Cong., 2d 

sess. (1862). 

21. An Act to amend the act calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress 

insurrection, and repel invasion, approved February twenty-eighth, seventeen hundred and ninetyfive, and the act ammendatory thereof, and for other purposes, Statutes at Large 12, sec. 10,597 

(1862); Thian, Legislative History, 112; GO No. 91, AGO, 29 Jul 62, and GO No . 181 , AGO, 1 

Nov 62, in GORI&IG. General Order No. 181 , also announced the death of Joseph K. F. Mansfield at Antietam, 18 September 1862, and the fact that appointments as brigadier generals of 

volunteers for Henry Van Rensselaer and Stewart Van Vliet (a Quartermaster major) had expired 17 

July. 

22. GO No . 212, AGO, 23 Dec 62, in GORI&IG. When the regulations were reissued in 1863, 

that was the only noticeable change affecting the organization of inspectors general since 1861. 

1863 Regulations, 513. 

23. Davis to AG, 4 Feb 63, in U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation 

of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Amlies, 70 vols. in 128 books (Washington: 

Government Printing Office, 1881-1900), 1st ser., vol. 20, pI. 2:345-75 (hereafter cited as OR). 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 217 

inspectors general. Of the latter, Marcy was the senior and the logical candidate 

to hold forth in Washington. But he was for the moment serving as a brigadier 

general of volunteers. Moreover, his reputation was tarnished by his son-inlaw's failures and he was decidedly out of favor with the Washington establishment, including Secretary of War Edwin M . Stanton. 

Marcy would not have been a good addition to the War Department staff in 

that climate, so he was allowed to drift for a few months. Because he was an 

active man, one who enjoyed roaming the country, the War Department could 

not ignore him. Thus, from July 1863 until September 1865, he was constantly 

engaged in inspecting posts in the departments of the Northwest, Missouri, 

Arkansas, Mississippi, and the Gulf. His reports were in the fashion established 

by Croghan and Mansfield, although without the elaborate details and 

recommendations. They were addressed to the Adjutant General, not to a chief 

inspector at the War Department. 24 

A Presence in Washington 

Before Marcy was dispatched to the western theater, Delos B. Sacket was 

reassigned from the Army of the Potomac to the War Department, on 10 

January 1863. He was given no formal title, merely being placed in charge of 

the paper work of inspectors general at the War Department level. For 

convenience, he was commonly identified as the inspector general on duty at 

the War Department or at the U.S. Army headquarters. Because he was junior 

by date of commission to Marcy, he could not be regarded as the senior or 

supervisory inspector general, let alone as the Inspector General of the Army, 

counterpart to the Adjutant General. Nevertheless, even Marcy eventually 

regarded Sacket's position as "the office of the supervising inspector general at 

the headquarters of the army.' ,25 

Sacket's assignment to Washington cannot be regarded as the birth of the 

Inspector General's Department. It was, however, at least its starting point. 

Like a well-planted seed, the little organization took root and grew, and was 

thereafter a permanent fixture of the War Department establishment. In the 

course of events, when the staff had acquired the trappings of other staffs, it 

was generally assumed that it had always been there, a department or bureau 

equivalent to the establishments of the Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, 

and others. Sacket probably had no visions of founding a permanent bureau 

when he started work at the War Department. Rather, he found himself buried 

24. Warner, Generals in Bille , 311; Marcy to George W. Cullum, 12 Nov 65, Cullum Files, 

USMA Archives. Marcy's first report was of inspections of posts in the Department of the Northwest. He worked from New York, and in 1863 toured the department from July to October, at 

which point he asked for further orders. Marcy to AG, 2 Nov 63, and Report (166 pages) dated 15 

Oct 63, in Letters Received 1863-1894, Records of the Inspector General (ROIG) , RG 159, 

National Archives. 

25. Cullum, Biographical Register, 2: 235; Annual Report oJ the Inspector General (hereafter 

cited asARIG) 1869, H. Ex. Doc. I, 41st Cong., 2d sess., vol. I, pt. 2:176. 
218 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, l777-1903 

in paper work. The Inspector General, at the request of the Adjutant General, 

made all final decisions correcting regimental muster rolls, showing in particular the effective dates of officers' commissions-the basis for their pay in 

volunteer regiments. It was tedious and demanding work, and not at all pleasing to Sacket. 26 In addition Sacket had other onerous burdens, while his fellows 

enjoyed great adventure and pursued promotions in the war. He provided the 

Adjutant General with exceedingly detailed reviews of the money and property 

accounts of Quartermaster Department officers, never finding more than very 

minor discrepancies. Another duty was review of pension applications. A typical case involved "Private Phillip [sic] Cole," who had lost an arm at Antietam. 

Sacket reviewed the man's record, and sent it on to the Adjutant General for 

further information and forwarding to the Pension Bureau with a favorable 

recommendation. The paper work multiplied endlessly. 27 

Sacket needed help. On 9 April 1863, he asked that Private Harris H. 

Stewart of the Rhode Island Light Artillery be detailed to duty in his office as a 

clerk. He asked on 7 June that an assistant inspector general, preferably Nelson 

Davis, also be assigned to his office. If that could not be done permanently, he 

wanted at least a temporary assistant while he served on the Invalid Board, to 

which he had recently been appointed. The Adjutant General's Office told him 

two days later that Davis could not be spared from the Army of the Potomac, and 

that there was no other officer available. Sacket obtained no professional assistance that year. 28 

Scattering the Inspectors' Attention 

Sacket's difficulties were complicated by the fact that Secretary Stanton 

persisted in treating inspectors as if they were always available to satisfy his 

concerns. In May 1863, Stanton assigned Sacket and a surgeon to a special 

inspection of the sanitary condition of Washington and its suburbs, and to offer 

recommendations to prevent disease. They began with an interview with the 

mayor, who published clean-up notices to citizens. The city was replete with 

nuisances, and short on provisions for dealing with sewage. Dead animals were 

;eldom buried properly, and all the corrals were adjoined by mountains of 

manure. Slaughterhouses adorned the environs of military hospitals and the 

Navy Yard, and streets went unrepaired. All Sacket could do was to urge that 

the city enforce the laws already on the books, and press others to clean up the 

26. For typical examples, correcting muster roll entries for officers of the 103d New York 

Volunteers, see Sacket to Maj. R. Ringgold, 19 Feb 63, and Sacket to AG, 19 Mar 63, in Letters 

Sent 1863-1889, ROIG, RG 159. 

27. A typical Quartermaster account examination is Sacket to Adjutant General, 20 May 1863, 

and the Cole case is covered in Sack,et to Assistant Adjutant General Samuel Breck, 10 June 1863, 

both in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

28. Sacket to AG, 9 Apr and 7 Jun 63, in Letters Sent, 1863-1889, RG 159, and Ass!. AG E.D. 

Townsend to Sacket, 9 Jun 63 , in Letters Received, 1863-1894, RG 159. He did obtain Private 

Stewart, however. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 219 

noisome capital city. 29 Sacket had no sooner finished combing Washington's 

filth than the Secretary, on 26 May, appointed him to the newly established 

Board to Organize the Invalid Corps. That was not his last assignment to such a 

body, as he also served on the Board to Retire Disabled Officers while trying to 

hold down his chair as an inspector general. 30 

The duties of inspectors general and their counterparts continued to increase 

during 1863. On 22 May, in connection with the raising of "colored" troopsfederal and state volunteer regiments of black men-the War Department determined that three or more field officers would be detailed as inspectors to 

supervise the organization of colored units at places to be designated in the 

northern and western states. The department ordered on 25 June that any officer 

presenting property for condemnation certify that it had not previously been 

condemned. The inspector was to brand, chisel, cut, or punch "I.e." 

("Inspected-Condemned," the initials required to mark condemned property as 

late as the 1940s) onto the property. If the inspector's findings were later 

disapproved, the marks were to be canceled and a certificate was to be presented to the accountable officer. And on 7 August, an order establishing 

transportation allowances and marching rations required that within one week 

of the order inspectors of armies and army corps were to report directly to the 

Adjutant General "every violation of this order, certifying in their reports that 

they have thoroughly inspected the several commands, and have reported therein 

every deviation from this order in regard to allowance of transportation. ,,31 .. . 

The inspectors' attention was scattered further upon the establishment of the 

Cavalry Bureau on 28 July 1863. That organization was an attempt by the War 

Department to approach the needs of the mounted force more systematically. 

The new bureau was to supervise the organizing and equipping of cavalry 

regiments, and virtually all other requirements unique to the mounted service. 

But the Cavalry Bureau also required information on the current state of the 

Army's cavalry forces. The order establishing the bureau directed that copies of 

all inspection reports covering cavalry troops be sent to the Cavalry Bureau. 

Thereafter, all cavalry units were to receive detailed inspection at the end of 

every month, and the report was to describe each unit's service during the 

month. Special attention was to be paid to the horses, classifying them into four 

groups: totally unfit for any use; unfit for cavalry, but useful for draft or herding 

(these to be turned over to the Quartermaster Department); unfit or nearly unfit, 

but could be rehabilitated (these to be sent to remount depots); and serviceable 

animals. Reports of cavalry inspections were to be sent to the Cavalry Bureau 

29. Sacket and Medical Inspector Richard H. Collidge, to Surgeon General, 10 May 63, in 

Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

30. Sacket to AG, 7 Jun 63, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159; Cullum, Biographical 

Register, 2: 236. The Invalid Corps harked back to a predecessor during the Revolution. It was an 

attempt to preserve manpower by forming units of wounded soldiers who could undertake undemanding duties and free able men for the front. 

31. GO No. 143 , AGO, 22 May 63; GO No. 113, AGO, 25 Jun 63; and GO No. 274, AGO, 7 

Aug 63, in GORI&IG. 
220 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

through field army or department commanders. 32 The establishment of the 

Cavalry Bureau probably owed something to British practices, which had an 

Inspector General of Cavalry superintending the special needs of mounted 

units. But the American bureau chief mostly supervised a supply agency, and 

had very little in the way of an inspection service of his own. The business of 

providing him with current information rested with the inspectors general and 

assistant inspectors general, who found themselves going over part of the same 

ground twice when they examined cavalry-providing some information for 

their commanders, and some for the Cavalry Bureau. 

Bringing the Inspectors Into Line 

By the summer of 1863, the War Department was evidently determined to 

have the Army's inspectorate more systematically arranged and directed. The 

staffs of all corps included inspectors, and beneath them acting inspectors 

reviewing most divisions and brigades. The assistant inspectors general assigned 

to corps and field armies (a field army had only one inspector general on duty) 

were permanent War Department representatives on corps and army staffs. The 

order of December 1862 had in fact charged War Department staff bureaus with 

the selection of corps staffs. Assistant inspectors general and inspectors general 

alike were required, after Sacket's move to Washington, to submit routinely 

two kinds of reports: One was a summary of the condition of the forces within 

their purview; the other was a monthly account of what each of them was 

doing, and where. The inspectorate had become so scattered by special assignments and movements among stations that the War Department had lost track of 

its officers. Because of this dispersal, substantive reports of the military forces 

only occasionally reached the Washington office before mid-1863; they usually 

remained with field commanders. But one of the reasons Sacket was assigned 

to the War Department was to consolidate the results of inspections and prepare 

regular reports on the condition of the entire army. By the spring of 1863, he 

had distributed report forms to all inspectors, and responses began to arrive 

with middling regularity. But Sacket was soon distracted by the Invalid Board 

and other special assignments, and the consolidation task floundered . The 

Inspector General confessed to the Adjutant General in October that his other 

duties made it very difficult to monitor the incoming reports. He offered 

either to consolidate or to extract them for use by the rest of the staff. 33 

There were, however, difficulties, caused especially by assistant inspectors 

general who could not follow instructions. The return submitted in October by 

Lt. Col. James H. Strong of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina was 

worse than most. "The Grand Totals of the several columns should always 

agree according to the directions given on the margins of the report," Sacket 

32. GO No. 237 , AGO, 28 Jul 63, in GORI&IG. 

33 . Sacket to Assistant Adjutant General Col. I.C. Kelton, 21 Oct 63, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, 

RG 159. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CiVIL WAR 221 

told Strong, continuing, "the number 

and caliber of guns should always be 

given, and the names of all Officers 

absent especially those absent without leave, with the authority date &c. 

written in full.' ,34 Sacket had another 

means of monitoring the inspectors in 

the field. Besides requiring inspectors to report the results of their inspections, the regulations also required that they account for their own 

activities by means of monthly reports 

to the War Department. Very few of 

them did that, until the Adjutant General demanded that Sacket enforce the 

requirement. He then sent identical 

letters to nearly all his inspectors, exhorting them to get their reports in 

promptly as required and to assure 

that they were accurate. 35 

All the War Department wanted 

COL. EDMUND SCHRIVER. Inspector 

General, I3 March 1863-4 January 

1881 . 

to know from its inspectors each month was their location, their activities 

during the month, and any changes of place or assignment; in other words, 

what they were doing and where. The requirement, however, was not heeded 

by many of the inspectors in the field, largely because they were too inexperienced to know to keep current with new regulations. Consequently, Sacket had 

to issue several explanatory letters specifying what he expected to receive from 

them. 36 The assistant inspectors general were not alone in their ignorance. 

Colonel Edmund Schriver, inspector general of the Army of the Potomac, the 

only inspector general working with a field army (while Marcy toured western 

posts in prewar fashion, and Sacket was desk bound in Washington) also did 

not appreciate what Sacket was trying to do, and asked for an explanation. 

At Mansfield's death at Antietam in September 1862, his permanent position of inspector general became vacant. And when Sacket left the Army of the 

Potomac in January 1863, it became necessary to appoint an inspector general 

to replace him. Schriver occupied Mansfield's slot as of 13 March 1863, and 

remained inspector general of the Army of the Potomac to the end of the war. 

He earned two brevets (to major general) for "faithful and meritorious service" 

during the conflict. 37 He was a West Point graduate, class of 1833, who had 

34. Sacket to Strong, 14 Nov 63, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

35. Sacket to Marcy, 6 Nov 63, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

36. Sacket to Strong, 18 Nov 63 , in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. The file contains a very 

large number of identical letters to other assistant inspectors general. 

37. Heitman, Historical Register, l: 866. 
222 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

enjoyed a successful career in the artillery before resigning in 1846 to become a 

railroad executive. He returned to the army in May 1861, serving as an infantry 

officer and corps chief of staff until he was appointed an inspector general in 

1863. Schriver was a strong-willed man, who did not take lightly instructions 

from an unknown authority in the War Department. But Sacket let him know 

clearly that he must send his monthly reports of personal activities, just as other 

inspectors were required to do, saying he was no different from any other 

inspector and must comply with the regulations. 38 

Although not purposely, the enforcement of the monthly reporting requirement was another small step toward putting together an Inspector General's 

Department as a formal organization. Sacket's duty station represented a presence for the inspectorate at the top of the Army's pyramid. The reporting 

requirements connected all inspecting officers-formerly just a group of staff 

officers serving in discrete field units-to War Department headquarters. That 

was a long way from assembling them into a formal , let alone hierarchical, 

structure, but at least a new linking was developing. Inspectors general and 

assistant inspectors general mostly still obeyed their commanders, but they now 

had a slight attachment unique to them as inspectors. This distinctiveness ofthe 

Inspector General's Department was exceedingly tenuous, within the department and within itself. As late as January 1864, Sacket had to ask the Adjutant 

General to inform him of any orders assigning assistant inspectors general to 

different commands-supposedly his own responsibility to determine. His 

anomalous status is shown by his having to make a special request for a list of 

the geographical departments and districts to keep current with changing 

structures. 39 

Sacket's control over the inspectors was not much greater. In January 1864, 

he again demanded monthly returns from dozens of assistant inspectors general, 

and in fact many of them continued negligent to the end of the war. Nevertheless, 

early in February Sacket was able to tell the Adjutant General's Office, "I have 

the honor to enclose Reports of the Inspector General Dept USA for the months 

of 1863. Major Gen Buford is accounted for from memory his Report having 

never been received. The Reports of the Volunteer Inspectors have not all been 

received. If meeting with your approbation I can send them as they now stand 

trusting hereafter to forward them regularly. ' ,40 

Although officers like Buford and Baird were serving as line commanders, 

they remained on the books as assistant inspectors general and were required to 

report their activities anyway. The delinquency of such officers was understandable, but a number of persons actually employed as inspectors were equally 

38. Sacket to Schriver, 20 Nov 63, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

39. Sacket to AG, 5 Jan 64 (misdated 1863), and Sacket to Asst. AG Maj. Samuel Breck, 

12 Jan 64, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

40. Sacket to Asst. IG, U.S. Volunteers (USV), 5th, 8th, 22d, and 23d Army Corps, 15 Jan 

64; to Lt. Col. G.A. Kensel , AIG, 15 Jan 64; to Capt. Walter Cutting, 20 Jan 64; to Lt. Col. G.A. 

Kensel, 22 Jan 64; and many others of like import throughout the year; and Sacket to Asst. AG Maj. 

Samuel Breck, 7 Feb 64, all in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
THE INS PECTORA TE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 223 

GOING INTO BATTERY BEFORE PETERSBURG, 1865. Ordnance production 

was a traditional special item of inspection throughout the 19th century. 

negligent. Those who took their assignments seriously were certainly busy. 

" My position made it my duty to understand the condition of discipline, 

administration , and command in the forces gathered about Chattanooga," 

recalled James H. Wilson, inspector general for the gigantic army under Ulysses 

S. Grant in Tennessee. He was sufficiently conscientious that the monthly report 

of activities was but a minor extra burden for him. Wilson never received a 

demanding letter from Sacket. 4J 

The general uncommunicativeness of the assistant inspectors general left 

Sacket in the dark when it came to knowing just who was inspecting the army. 

On 12 April 1864, the " Inspector General's Bureau" asked all assistant inspectors general in all departments and field armies for a list of all inspectors. "This 

list should contain the names of all Officers performing Inspection duty," the 

recipients were told, " whether members of the Inspector General's Department, 

or acting temporarily in that capacity, together with the . . . command to which 

they are attached. ' ,42 

That was probably an impossible order, because inspections in the combat 

and occupation zones took many forms, under many names. Orders issued in 

41. Wilson quoted in Baird, Profile of a Hero , 140. Wilson went on to become a brigadier 

general of volunteers in 1863 , and major general two years later, earning several brevets as a 

gallant commander. He left the Army in 1870, but returned in 1898, became a very efficient 

general in Cuba, and retired a brigadier general of the Regular Army in 1901 . Heitman, Historical 

Register, 1: 1046. 

42. IG to AG, 12 Apr 64, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
224 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

the District of Tennessee in 1864 mentioned assistant inspectors of blockhouses, 

under the district's inspector of fortifications, along with inspectors and assistant inspectors for railroad defenses, Department of the Cumberland. Their 

relation to the regular inspectorate was doubtful. 43 Independent groups of War 

Department inspectors also began to develop. For example, there was a growing inspectorate in the Quartermaster Department, entirely unrelated to the 

inspectorate over which Sacket tried to preside. Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs had six inspectors by 1864, all colonels, reporting directly to 

himself. They visited armies, depots, and military posts inspecting quartermaster officers and their duties, to detect abuses. Their reports were an important 

part of the information Meigs used to make decisions. When legislation reorganized the Quartermaster Department into nine divisions on 4 July 1864, the 

eighth division was "Inspection," its purpose to monitor honesty and quality 

assurance in the department's procurement and supply activities. 44 

The Washington Office 

With a growing body of paper work to process, along with other responsibilities, Sacket found himself overwhelmed and in need of more clerical 

assistance. He asked the assistant adjutant general in early February 1864 for a 

fourth class clerk for his office, in case Congress let the War Department hire 

more clerks. Later in the month, he wrote directly to Senator William Sprague, 

saying that he had asked for a clerk for his office, and asking the senator to use 

his influence to get Private Harris H. Stewart the job. Stewart, the disabled 

soldier assigned at Sacket's request, had been working since April 1863, so 

productively that Sacket wanted to retain him. "He came to me a total Stranger 

highly recommended by good and gallant Soldiers," Sacket said, "and has 

proved himself worthy in every respect of their recommendations. ,,45 Sacket's 

duties involved the particular as well as the general. In January 1864 he had to 

inform the commander of Fort Randall, Dakota Territory, that the regulations 

requiring property inspections and condemnation applied to volunteer as well as 

regular officers. He advised the post commander to appoint an officer to inspect 

some unserviceable property, and to forward the report to the department 

commander for a final decision. 46 

In March, Sacket initiated a recommendation to the Secretary of War that an 

assistant commissary general of subsistence, Amos B. Eaton of New York, be 

assigned to conduct a special investigation of staff departments in the Department of the South. When the Secretary concurred, Sacket produced exceed-

. 43. See copies of orders appointing Arthur L. Conger, 115th Ohio, to both types of assistant 

inspector positions, II Jun, 24 Jul, and 7 Oct 64, in Arthur L. Conger Papers, United States Army 

Military History Institute (hereafter MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania . 

44. Weigley , Quartermaster General, 223, 234;GO No. 231, AGO, 18 Jul64 (reorganizing 

the Quartermaster Department), in GORI&IG. 

45. Sacket to Asst AG, II Feb 64, and Sacket to Hon. William Sprague, 20 Feb 64, in Letters 

Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

46. Sacket to Maj. Thomas N. Shephard, 16 Jan 64, in Inspection Reports 1863-1889, RG 159. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 225 

COL. JAMES A. HARDIE. Inspector 

General, 24 March 1864-14 December 1876. 

ingly detailed instructions and a flurry 

of authorizing letters. Regular inspection reports he had received raised 

considerable concern about the conduct of financial disbursements and 

transportation in the South. 47 The 

growing number of special investigations for the Secretary of War finally 

liberated Sacket from the Washington office. In April an onslaught of 

orders dispatched several officers to 

examine various reported shortcomings in disbursements and supply 

operations. Lt. Col. J.F. Marsh, of 

the Veterans Reserve Corps was dispatched to all posts where prisoners 

of war were held. Capt. Elisha H. 

Ludington was to examine the accounts of Quartermaster and Subsistence Department officers in Washington, D.C. By 20 April that had 

earned Ludington a berth in the inspectorate as major and assistant inspector 

general. Sacket, meanwhile, went off to inspect the Commissary Department's 

operations in the departments of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the 

Arkansas. 48 

Of all the assignments, Marsh's activities proved to be the most interesting. 

His reports on prison camps began to arrive in late April, each one endorsed in 

the Inspector General's Office for the information of the Commissary General 

of Prisoners, the endorsements noting what orders had been given to correct 

shortcomings. And they were numerous, affecting almost every aspect of prison 

administration. Security, discipline, and conditions often were woeful. Marsh's 

inspection led the Inspector General's Office to recommend dismissal of a 

departmental provost marshal general, based in Saint Louis, for "neglect of 

duty" resulting in several poorly managed prisons.

49 Unlike Marsh, Sacket was 

apparently so happy to be free of Washington that he was not inclined to find 

fault as he made his rounds. He gave high praise to the military prison at 

Memphis, Tennessee, in June 1864, applauding the commander and reporting 

47. Sacket to Secy of War, 31 Mar 64, to Eaton, I Apr 64, to CG, Dept of the South, and to 

others, 2 Apr 64, and to Eaton, 2 Apr 64, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

48. There is a variety of letters during April 1864 on these subjects in Letters Sent 1863-1889, 

RG 159. Ludington had joined the Army as an infantry captain in August 1861. He had been 

brevetted for "gallant and meritorious service" and twice more for "faithful and meritorious 

service." He remained an assistant inspector general and a major until he retired on 27 March 

. 1879. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 646. Heitman has no record of J. F. Marsh or anyone of 

similar name. 

49. See the severaI endorsements, and IG to Secy of War, 19 Apr 64, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, 

RG 159. 
226 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

that conditions were excellent there. But Marsh and a special commission that 

followed him had criticized the place thoroughly. Sacket was formally asked to 

explain the vast discrepancies between his report and all others. 50 

The man who asked Sacket to explain himself was James A. Hardie, an 

inspector whose presence had made it possible for Sacket to leave the office on 

the first of April. Hardie was the last inspector general (colonel) appointed 

during the Civil War. His commission dated from 24 March 1864, the day after 

Van Rensselaer died. 

A New Yorker, Hardie had graduated from West Point in 1843. He was an 

artillerist, although he spent the Mexican War as a major of volunteers in the 

1st New York Infantry, and became a captain in 1857. On 28 September 1861, 

he was elevated to the provisional status of lieutenant colonel and additional 

aide-de-camp. He held the grade until his appointment as Inspector General, 

but not without interruptions. Hardie was appointed a brigadier general of 

volunteers on 29 November 1862, but the assignment was revoked on 22 

January 1863. On 19 February 1863 he became an assistant adjutant general 

with the rank of major. When Van Rensselaer died, therefore, and with the 

Secretary of War inclined to let Sacket go out of town, Hardie was available in 

the War Department. He became a new inspector general, bringing the complement to the maximum authorized four. More than available, he was competent, 

earning two brevets for "distinguished and faithful service" during the war and 

"faithful, meritorious and distinguished service in the Inspector General's 

Department," the Washington chair of which he held down until 1866. Hardie 

remained an inspector general until his death in 1876.

51 

Hardie, like Sacket before him, found himself fully occupied as the duties 

of inspectors multiplied. On 24 March 1864, the War Department decried once 

again the "existing evils in the waste and destruction of Cavalry horses." It 

ordered a board of three officers, to be appointed by the Secretary, to inspect all 

mounted troops in all armies. The board was to report to the Adjutant Generalapparently the department did not think to put the Inspector General's Office at 

the center of a special inspection-all units that neglected or wasted horses and 

therefore should be dismounted or broken up. A month later, the department 

ordered all government horses to be turned in to the Quartermaster Department. 

Thereafter, no one was permitted to use a government horse or vehicle without 

written authorization from the Adjutant General's Office. The Offices of the 

Quartermaster General and Inspector General were both required to enforce the 

order through their department mechanisms. 52 Hardie sent copies of the second 

order to twenty-one officers of the inspectorate on 27 April, telling them that 

the Secretary of War directed a special effort at the next monthly inspection to 

find whether any officer was using a horse or vehicle for an unauthorized 

purpose. Such cases were to be reported to the Inspector General's Office 

50. IG to Sacket, 25 Jun 64 , in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

51. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 499-500. 

52. GO No. 119, AGO, 24 Mar 64, and GO No. 177, AGO, 23 Apr 64, in GORI&IG. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CiVIL WAR 227 

without delay. " Any infractions of the order coming within the observation of 

inspecting officers at any time," he said, "will be promptly reported.' ,53 

An Undefined Inspectorate 

The paper blizzard was unsettling to Hardie, who had had the Washington 

office duty descend upon him unexpectedly. This newest inspector general and 

Edmund Schriver corresponded concerning the uncertainties about the role of 

an Inspector General-but agreed that the Inspector General's Department 

should be an important part of the Army. Nevertheless, as Hardie pointed out, 

"In our military legislation, no provision has been made for such a department, 

there being only so many independent Inspectors." Hardie believed that the 

inspectorate's lack of achievement was due to deficiencies of organization. 

Failure to develop some system of inspection, he said, was a major lapse on the 

part of the inspectors. Hardie believed Schriver at the Army of the Potomac had 

gone further than anyone else in trying to systematize his inspectorate. He had 

given his inspectors rules and independence, and had overcome the natural 

reluctance of line officers to be inspected. Hardie doubted that a really independent inspectorate was possible at corps and division levels, and that inspectors 

at those levels would remain alter egos of the commanders they served. He 

thought a thoroughly independent Inspector General's Department might be a 

good idea, but one not likely to become reality; commanders would always 

want to control their inspectors, not have them agents of some higher or 

independent authority. In the meantime, Hardie asserted that the flurry of 

orders governing inspections merely multiplied paper work and diverted the 

inspectors' attention from the main issues of military efficiency. 54 

But the War Department was apparently more interested in economy than in 

military efficiency, and Hardie had to comply with its priorities as he struggled 

manfully to define his place in the department's establishment. In April, when 

he learned that a special War Department commission was investigating the 

ethics of New York City disbursing officers, he asked to see' 'notes or memorandum however rough or laconic, provided they be complete, of such frauds or 

improper transaction as may have come to [the commission's] notice affecting 

the fidelity, and honesty of any disbursing Officer of the Government within 

the sphere of [the commission's] observation." Such matters were, after all, 

the special interest of the inspectors general. 55 Even more than Sacket, Hardie 

found himself distracted from his duties in the inspectorate to answer to the 

authority of the Secretary of War. It appears that he spent much of the summer 

of 1864 acting as a special agent of the Secretary, conveying Stanton's messages and instructions to field army commanders. By using Hardie that way, 

Stanton was able to bypass the normal channel of communications- and the 

53. IG to Totten et aI., 27 Apr 64, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

54. Hardie to Schriver, 9 Apr 64, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

55. IG to Col. H.S. Olcott, 19 Apr 64, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
228 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

nominal chain of command. Much of his traffic was aimed at General William 

T. Sherman, then involved in a campaign of devastation against Atlanta, 

Georgia. 56 

However the Secretary might burden him with trifles, Hardie did his best to 

create some order in the Army's scattered inspectorate. He poured over every 

report that came into his office, and used his findings to try to impose some 

standards on work in the field. In July, for instance, various inspection reports 

of regiments at New Orleans described the same units as t.rained and untrained, 

ignorant of the regulations and well drilled in them, neat and sloppy, and so on. 

Hardie asked the assistant inspector general for the Department of the Gulf to 

"ascertain the exact condition of the Regts. referred to, and report the facts to 

this office, and be pleased to call upon the officers concerned, for an explanation of the discrepancy in their reports. ,,57 In another case, he rebuked an assistant inspector general in August for falling down on the job by not submitting 

reports explicit enough to allow positive action on the irregularities noted. 58 

Hardie also had to become an arbiter of the inspectorate's frequently vague 

procedures. For instance, Hardie explained to a departmental assistant inspector 

general that he must inspect quartermaster and commissary depots if they were 

part of his department. If they had been established by orders from the War 

Department, and reported directly to the Quartermaster General or Commissary 

General of Subsistence, instead of to departmental quartermasters or commissaries, then the departmental inspector could not inspect the depots unless specially assigned by the War Department. 59 

The Inspectorate at War's End 

So the affairs of the Washington office went until the end of the war. 

Preparing for peace, in early April 1865 the War Department recast the Army 

from a collection of field forces into the customary peacetime departments and 

districts- geographical compartments being the traditional means of administration. The staff of a department or district commander was limited to an assistant 

adjutant general, an assistant inspector general, a chief quartermaster, a chief 

commissary of subsistence, a medical director, a judge advocate, and two 

aides-de-camp. Thereafter, armies and departments were to hold inspection the 

last day of each month, the reports to be forwarded to the Adjutant General's 

Office in Washington. 6o 

Hardie by that time enjoyed the assistance of Elisha H. Ludington, who had 

never strayed far from the Washington office anyway . Hardie was formally in 

charge of the office, Ludington signing letters by "direction" or "order" of 

56. See OR, 1st ser., vol. 20, pI. 5: 247,278-289, 300, for examples of these communications, 

which had nothing at all to do with the normal concerns of an inspector general. 

57. IG to Lt. Col. W.S. Abert, 14 Jul 64, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

58. IG to Asst IG Lt. Col. A. Von Schroder, 8 Aug 64, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

59. IG to Maj. T.J. McKenny, 10 Aug 64, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

60. GO No. 54, AGO, 6 Apr 65, in GORI&IG. 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 229 

Hardie. In that manner, Ludington picked up a large share of the work throughout 1865, beginning with a repetition of the request that all divisional and 

departmental assistant inspectors general forward a complete list of inspectors 

within their purviews. He did that simply by sending them a copy of Hardie's 

earlier request of 12 April 1864. 61 This office was further augmented when 

Hardie and Ludington were joined late in 1865 by acting assistant inspector 

general Kilburn Knox, an infantry captain brevetted for "gallant and efficient 

service in the attack on Atlanta." The office had by that time settled into a 

routine and was almost indistinguishable from Washington's ink-splashing 

norm. 62 

In November, the office once again asked the assistant inspector general for 

the Department of Texas to provide a complete list of inspectors, while a flurry 

of letters asked division and department assistant inspectors general for copies 

of all department and division orders, to complete the Inspector General's files. 

Meanwhile, when inspectors discovered twelve cases of fraud and collusion 

involving quartermaster officers and supply contractors in Philadelphia, Hardie 

asked for authority to send Ludington to pursue the investigation and to interview the presumed culprits. The Secretary of War approved. 63 Lastly, permanent officers of the inspectorate not still in service to certain generals were 

dispatched to new stations. There were two of them in 1865, and typically their 

assignments reflected the War Department's divided feelings on whether Inspectors General were more valuable as inspectors or as something else. Absalom 

Baird was appointed Assistant Commissioner of Refugees, Freedmen, and 

Abandoned Lands for the state of Louisiana on 1 November. On 2 December, 

Roger Jones became Inspector General of the Military Division of the 

Mississippi. 64 There was nothing permanent about their arrangement, because 

there was nothing permanent about the Army. Peace was at hand once again, 

and the military force was bound to shrink to the minimum possible size. As 

had happened before, it appeared likely that the lessons of the war and of 

mobilization would be forgotten, as Congress and the public sought to embrace 

the pleasures of peacetime. The Army was soon involved in an occupation of 

the defeated South and in a demonstration on the Mexican border, but mostly 

(as it had been after the last two wars) the Army was banished to the wilderness, 

where it confronted increasingly violent Indian resistance. 

The legacy of the Civil War was mixed for the inspectors general. On the 

positive side, their number had increased and their positions were filled by 

61. Ludington to Sir, 20 Jul 65 , in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

62. IG to Asst. QMCapt. 1. M. Moore, 160ct65;Knox to Asst. QMCapt. J. H. Crowell, 190ct 

and 21 Oct 65; IG to John Potts, chief clerk of the War Department, 7 Nov 65; to Capt. James M. 

Moore, 7 Nov 65; to Capt. J. H. Crowell, 10 Nov 65; and to John Potts, 10 Nov 65; and Knox to 

Capt. James M. Moore, 16 Nov 65; all in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

63. Knox to Actg. Asst. IG Dept of Texas, 9 Nov 65; letters to divisional and departmental 

assistant inspectors general, Nov and Dec 65; and Hardie to Secy of War, 12 Dec 65 , and 

endorsements; all in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

64. Baird, undated statement (early 1866), and Jones to George H. Cullum, 10 May 66, in 

Cullum Files, USMA Archives. 
230 

good officers with long careers ahead 

of them. Equally promising, if not so 

obvious, they now had a full-time 

presence in the War Department. 

They were increasingly regarded as 

an Inspector General's Department, 

although Hardie for one realized that 

there was no such thing. Their presence in Washington had given them 

direct communication with the Secretary of War, who had found inspectors general to be very useful in a 

variety of roles. They had been his 

chief insight into the military establishment, and-like Hardie in 1864-

convenient personal agents when he 

wanted his own interests served. Service to the Secretary naturally promised permanence for the inspectorate . 

That came at a certain price, however. 

Stanton's use of the inspectors increased the gravitation of the inspectorate toward the Secretary and away 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

OHIO INFANTRY AT THE BLOODY 

ANGLE, 12 MAY 1864. The quality 

of leaders routinely was evaluated 

by inspectors throughout the 19th 

century. 

from the Commanding General. When Commanding General Grant moved to 

Washington to take his place after the war, it remained to be seen whether the 

power of the inspectors general would be aligned with him, or with the Secretary of War. 

On the more negative side, the record of the inspectorate during the war had 

not been altogether good. There were inspectors for all major command 

organizations, but they had been a varied lot, ranging from the diligent and 

effective to the barely competent. They all inspected, but not all of them did it 

well. Hardie perceived correctly in 1864 that part of the blame could be laid to 

an absence of organization, with a concomitant lack of central guidance and 

definite procedures. Even without a formal organization, the inspectorate could 

have performed better and more uniformly if it had been sufficiently regulated. 

The assignment of an inspector general to the War Department partly alleviated 

the shortcomings in the field , but could not eliminate them. This absence of any 

formal organization was the reason that, when the war started, the inspectorate 

dissolved, rather as it had in 1846. This time, however, it managed to recover 

part of its strength, especially after the Secretary demanded reports to his 

office, and put Sacket in place to reinforce his demands. But that came only 

after the Secretary had nearly disrupted inspection by letting inspectors become 

commanders without filling in behind them, and by sending one or another 

inspector off on secretarial errands. The whole operation bore an appearance of 

impermanence or expediency. The real inspectorate was established piecemeal, 
THE INSPECTORATE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 231 

by field commanders. Even with one of the permanent officers in Washington, 

there was little real strength to tie it all together. This absence of structure 

meant that the experience of the war was mostly improvisation for the inspectors general. There was little about it that promised to be useful in the return to 

peacetime policing of the frontier. As the Army shrank and again took up its 

peacetime routine, necessity compelled the development of an inspectorate 

appropriate to its circumstances. As things worked out, it did so by organizational means. The Inspector General's Department finally became an organization as well as a name. 
CHAPTER 14 

Securing a Permanent Place 

(1865-1866) 

After the Civil War, the U.S . Army experienced the most precipitous 

strength reduction it had ever known. Most of the force was temporary, consisting of volunteers and draftees brought into service for the duration of the war. 

These men left with dramatic speed. Over seven hundred thousand were mustered out by August 1865 while another three hundred thousand were gone by 

November 1866. A small remainder augmented the Regular Army until December 1867 when it, too, was gone. The Regular Army had been a small part of 

these vast forces with 40,000 men authorized and an actual strength of around 

34,000 men at war's end in April 1865. In brief defiance of tradition, it actually 

grew for a period after the war. The West was aflame with Indian troubles; 

Mexico was in the hands of the French; and Congress directed the military 

occupation of the defeated southern states. As a result, in July 1866 the authorized size of the Regular Army was raised to 54,641, a figure nearly matched by 

its actual strength within a year. I 

As might be expected, the swiftly changing Army was in turmoil. The 

government believed that the great force available in April 1865 was a useful 

means of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine to persuade the French to withdraw 

from Mexico. Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan was dispatched to Louisiana and 

Texas to make a demonstration of strength on the border. Other large forces 

were shipped to the West to quell a number of Indian uprisings. However, the 

volunteers who made up the largest share of the Army expected to go home. 

They had enlisted to subdue Rebels, not Frenchmen or Indians, and they 

voiced their complaints in the centers of political power. The troop movements 

of 1865 thus fell into confusion, in no small part because they occurred simultaneously with the mustering out of volunteer regiments. Any campaigns planned 

for that year were undone by chaos and shortages of manpower. 2 

A few major construction projects were begun during the next few years, 

but the army too often proved to be its own worse enemy. Posts started in Texas 

I. ARSecWar 1865 , H. Ex. Doc. I, 39th Cong., 1st sess., pt. I: I, 19,21; ARSecWar 1866, 

H. Ex. Doc. I, 39th Cong. , 2d sess., 3- 6; ARSecWar 1867, H. Ex. Doc. I, 40th Cong, 2d sess., 

416; Weigley , History of the United States Army, 262; Heitman , Historical Register, 1: 598- 605, 

626 . 

2. Richard N. Ellis, "Volunteer Soldiers in the West, 1865 ," Military Affairs, 34 (April 

1970): 53- 56. 
SECURING A PERMANENT PLACE 233 

in 1867, for instance, were rather nicely designed, in comparison with earlier 

examples. But they were built under inept supervision because the Quartermaster Department was not allowed to send officers to direct the work; some of 

them were sited on inhospitable ground, and some buildings began to come 

apart even before they were finished. Worse, the money ran out before the 

projects were completed, and not all the buildings planned were started. Only 

two of six projected barracks at Fort Davis, Texas, were reasonably finished by 

the spring of 1868 , and the unprotected adobe walls of a third were left to 

weather away for several years. And other similar mishaps occurred elsewhere, 

worsened by inconsistent and generally inadequate appropriations for construction and repairs. The result was that there were too few barracks for too many 

men. As authorized by regulations, the minimum-space requirements for enlisted 

men were totally inadequate. 3 

Sherman, commanding the Division of the West, made the Army's housing 

his special cause. In 1866, he sent Inspector General Sacket on a special tour of 

posts on the upper Missouri, to examine the barbarous living conditions of the 

soldiers, and to provide ammunition for his own bombardment of the Quartermaster Department. Sherman himself, eyeing the sod barracks at Fort Sedgwick, 

Colorado, said, "Surely , had the southern planters put their negroes in such 

hovels, a sample would, ere this, have been carried to Boston and exhibited as 

illustrative of the cruelty and inhumanity of the man-masters. " The Quartermaster 

Department's own James F. Rusling agreed. "Dirt, dampness, disease, vermin," 

he told Meigs, "all infest such structures, and the United States Government, I 

take it, means better than that by the faithful troops that serve it." The poor 

sanitary condition of the Army's housing was reflected in serious cholera 

epidemics in 1866 and 1867. The surgeons attributed those calamities to 

overcrowding, poor diet, dirty water, and inadequate waste disposal. 4 In some 

cases, better accommodations might have been provided in rented buildings. 

But on 10 March 1866, the War Department made that impossible when it 

ordered all rented quarters to be vacated and the troops collected in regular 

posts. Housing allowances permitted by regulations were to be strictly observed, 

"Inspectors General," said the department, "will give their special attention of 

all commanding officers to the absolute necessity for economy, and will embrace 

it in their official reports to their respective headquarters.,,5 As the years 

passed, housing, its quality as well as its quantity, became a subject of increasing concern to inspectors. 

In 1866, the Regular Army, abandoned by the volunteers, was growing and 

disorganized, scattered across the wilderness in small bands. The troops hud3. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 488. 

4. Robert G. Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West (Nonnan: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1956),51-52; Shennan and Rusling quoted in Risch, Quartermaster 

Support, 484; Ramon S. Powers and Gene Younger, "Cholera and the Anny in the West: Treatment and Control in 1866 and 1867," Military Affairs, 39 (April 1975): 49-54. Sackers report was 

published in H. Ex. Doc. 23, 39th Cong., 2d sess. (1866). 

5. GO No . 14, AGO, 10 Mar 66, in GORI&IG. 
234 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

died in cramped, unsanitary, bug-infested shacks, and spent much of their time 

and energy in trying to hold their quarters together. They were poorly trained, 

indifferently fed, and not a happy group of men. They were also a varied lot, in 

keeping with tradition mostly societal misfits. George A. Forsyth said of a 

detachment he commanded that it included "a bookkeeper, a farm boy, a 

dentist, and a blacksmith, a young man of position trying to gain a commission 

and a salesman ruined by drink, an ivory carver and a Bowery tough.,,6 Furthermore the well-being of the soldiers received only indifferent attention from 

Congress, which refused to appropriate enough money to house them decently. 

Extraduty pay was reauthorized in 1866 for work beyond ten days for the 

Quartermaster or another department-such work took most of the soldier's 

time at most posts. Mechanics (skilled craftsmen) received 35 cents a day, 

while laborers earned 20 cents. The scale was not raised until 1884, but that 

made little difference', because the soldiers were routinely deprived of the 

chance for the extra pay by successive nine-day assignments. 7 Also in 1866, 

Congress made a gesture at improving the intellect of the soldiers, when it 

authorized construction of schools and libraries at military posts. If no space 

was available, the Quartermaster Department could erect a building with the 

approval of the Secretary of War. The department interpreted the law as not 

applying to temporary posts-the Army had few of any other kind , and none in 

the West. With that, aggravated by low appropriations, little attention was 

given to instruction in "the common English branches of education" until 

1877, Meanwhile, Congress authorized the detail of army officers to provide 

military instruction at land-grant colleges and military schools. But the Army 

showed little interest in that for some time. Finally, by 1866 the national 

cemeteries had become such a major class of property that the Quartermaster 

General saw fit to recommend some more permanent attention to their administration than had been devoted theretofore. 8 

New Orders for the Inspectors 

Post schools, military colleges, and cemeteries eventually would become 

important subjects for inspectors general. But the inspectorate was more concerned in 1866 with establishing itself and defining its role in the Army. New 

orders on 22 January set forth detailed regulations and instructions for inspections of troops and military commands, infantry, artillery, cavalry, posts and 

garrisons, transports, administrative and disbursing departments, ordnance and 

stores, the Medical Department, and property presented for condemnation as 

well as for the stated monthly inspections and reports. The very detailed order 

6. George A. Forsyth , The Story of the Soldier (New York: Brampton Society, 1908),91. 

7. Foner, Soldier Between Wars, 16-17. Extraduty pay had first been authorized in the 1820s 

(see above). 

8. Risch, Quartermaster SlIpport, 489; Robert D. Miewald , " The Army Post Schools: A 

Report from the Bureaucratic Wars," Military Affairs, 39 (February 1975): 8- 11; Lyons and 

Masland, "Origins of ROTC, " 3-4; Steere, "Genesis of Graves Registration ," 160. 
SECURING A PERMANENT PLACE 235 

CHARGE OF THE 5TH REGULARS AT GAINES MILLS, VA . , 27 JUNE 1862. 

The care of horses during the Civil War became a special item of interest requiring a distinct inspection program. 

stressed the close relationships of the inspectors to the Secretary or their commanders and specified that their sphere should be aU-encompassing, limited 

only by specific orders. This was the strongest statement of authority for the 

inspectorate since the days of Macomb, although he might not have approved 

of the Secretary's evident ascendance over the Commanding General. Nevertheless, inspectors were· clearly agents of the highest authority in the Armyexcept when they were "assigned to specific commands as Inspectors." That 

was an important exception, because in the coming years most of the inspectorate would be so assigned. 

The order outlined in general terms what inspectors were to look for, 

providing the most convenient handbook to date for officers newly detailed to 

inspection duties. Except for the stated monthly inspections, inspection reports 

were to be held confidential, for the eyes of the commander only on whose staff 

an inspector served, with the stipulations that reports "may be withdrawn if 

desired. " Inspecting officers had to know the regulations and pertinent laws: 

"Great care must be taken by Inspecting Officers," said the order, "that no 

injustice be done to organizations or individuals by reports not fuUy sustained 

by personal and thorough examination." It also said that "Inspectors will give 

orders only when specifically authorized to do so, and will then give them in 

the name of the officer authorizing it. " When inspecting troops and commands, 

the inspector was specifically to present himself to the local commander, give 

him a copy of his order authorizing the inspection, and interview him. His 
236 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

examination was to cover the appearance and bearing of troops, officers, arms 

and equipment, supplies, health, diet-all the subjects that had occupied inspectors for generations, with special matters unique to infantry, artillery, and 

cavalry. At a post or garrison, inspectors were not only to determine how well 

the place was run and how well the troops were managed and military exercises 

conducted, but also to examine the handling of funds, the condition of buildings and hospitals, and the burden of labor imposed on the troops. Enlisted men 

were to be given notice that they could bring complaints to the inspector 

without officers present. The order also outlined the inspection of transports 

(physical condition and administrative matters like contracts), the administrative and disbursing departments (including habits of the officers as well as their 

accounts), ordnance and stores, the general operations of the Medical Department ("strictly medical inspections [were to] be made by the medical officers 

under the direction of the Surgeon General"), and property offered for condemnation (according to the orders issued in 1863). The order did not mention the 

Corps of Engineers, which by implication was not within an inspector general's 

purview. In addition, monthly inspections were required, on the last day of the 

month, for all commands less than brigade-size-something that had to be 

accomplished by others, since there were not enough inspectors general to go 

around. 9 

The order of January 1866 was a clearer statement of procedure than inspectors had enjoyed before . But it was not a charter for the "Inspection 

Department, " which had yet to become a reality. Authorizations for inspections remained poorly defined somewhere between the Commanding General 

and the Secretary of War, although the implication of most of the order was that 

it would serve military more than civilian purposes. The order also included 

long-overdue encouragements to professionalism (inspectors must know the 

regulations, for instance) and it safeguarded the authority of inspectors to do 

their jobs once they had been ordered to embark upon them. But there was no 

clearly defined, separate inspectorate overseeing the Army. Rather, inspection 

occurred in discrete units surrounding commanders who could order them. 

Department and division commanders, by implication, established their own 

inspectorates, and nothing compelled them to relay their findings to higher 

authority. Nor did anything in the order require inspectors in lesser commands 

to communicate to the Inspector General's Office in Washington although the 

army regulations still carried this requirement. Inspectors general and assistant 

inspectors general were required to make monthly reports of their activities if 

they were detached from their duties in the inspectorate. Assistant inspectors 

general Nelson Davis and James Totten were taken to task by the Washington 

office in July 1866, because they had neglected that requirement. 10 

9. GO No.5, AGO, 22 Jan 66, in GORI&IG. 

10. Ludington to Davis, 12 Jul 66, and to Totten, 12 Jul 66, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 

159. 
SECURING A PERMANENT PLACE 237 

The inspectorate was scattered about the country. Sacket was at New York 

City in the early part of 1866, while Baird moved from the Freedman's Bureau 

to command of the Department of Louisiana on 23 May. He was on the scene 

when riots erupted in New Orleans on 30 June, and had to acknowledge responsibility for the events that led to the uproar. That cost him his post when his 

department was dissolved on 17 August. Baird became inspector general on 

General Sheridan's staff, continuing there after being mustered out of volunteer 

service on 1 September. The inspectorate reclaimed him on 17 September, 

assigning him as assistant inspector general on duty in the Department of the 

Lakes. He arrived at Detroit, the department headquarters, on 1 Decemberthe last of the wartime inspectors to return to the fold of the inspectorate. 11 

Hardie remained in charge of the Inspector General's Office in Washington 

during the early part of the year, still assisted by Ludington. Edmund Schriver 

joined them on 10 April 1866, and by virtue of seniority took charge. Hardie 

had signed his correspondence, and allowed Ludington to refer to him, as 

"Inspector General, USA. " Schriver henceforth signed himself "the Inspector 

General of the Army." 12 

That change in nomenclature reflected Schriver's own ambition. He set out 

immediately to win status for his "department" equal to all others in the army 

hierarchy. On 22 May, Schriver, Hardie, and Ludington jointly proposed a 

regulation allowing to inspectors general and assistant inspectors general the 

same number of rooms for offices as that provided to other staff officers. Their 

own establishment in Washington had good space in a rented building, they 

said, but the subject was not addressed in the regulations. "Before the War, the 

Inspection Service was not what it is now," they said. "Offices were not 

perhaps so much of a necessity as they must be henceforth." Schriver clearly 

wanted to establish permanence and official respect for the inspectorate, although 

the joint request for office space related mostly to inspectors stationed at the 

department and division headquarters. 13 In future years the objection would be 

frequent that inspectors did not need bureaucratic overhead, because if they 

were on the job, they were in the field. Certainly they were, throughout 1866. 

But most of them were not permanent inspection officers, more commonly 

others were assigned to this duty. William B. Hazen, acting inspector general 

for the Department of the Platte, was a typical example. He enjoyed the duty so 

much that he continued in it after being appointed colonel of the 38th Infantry. 

In August he inspected posts on the Bozeman Road and upper Missouri River: 

His report was exceedingly critical, and provided the foundation for his reputation as being, in the words of a contemporary, prone to offer "unwanted 

criticism of his superiors." But when Hazen visited Fort Phil Kearny in late 

11 . Ludington to Sacket, 22 Jan 66, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159; Baird to George W. 

Cullum, 14 Oct 66, in Cullum Files, USMA Archives; Baird, Profile of a Hero, 181- 86, 198 . 

12. Ludington to Capt. John T. Ritter, 10 Apr 66, and all subsequent correspondence document 

the change, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

13. Schriver, Hardie, and Ludington to Asst. AG E. D. Townsend, 22 May 66, in Letters 

Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
238 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

August, the post commander said that "his visit was greatly enjoyed by us 

all. ,,14 

Service as acting inspector general could be pleasant or unpleasant, or a 

mixture of the two. Most officers welcomed the opportunity to undertake the 

work, because it was a break from the routine, and educational as well. Over 

the coming years, officers detailed to the duty would constitute a major part of . 

the official inspectorate. If inspection broke the routine for officers, it did so 

equally for enlisted men. They led monotonous lives, especially at the western 

posts, and rarely saw an officer higher than captain. Inspectors could be 

visiting celebrities: When Hazen passed through Fort Laramie, Wyoming, in 

May 1866, at least one private was delighted enough to write his sister about it 

in an excited letter giving all the details. 15 

Reduction of the Regular Establishment 

In 1866 it appeared that the functions of acting inspectors general might be 

abolished, as Congress debated an increase in the Army. But if Schriver hoped 

to see a force of inspectors large enough to serve the entire military establishment, 

organized into a formal department, his ambitions were dashed on 28 July. 

Although legislation raised the authorized strength of the Army to 54,641 

officers and men, in an exercise in Reconstruction politics, the law also declared 

that the existing regulations would remain in force until Congress acted on a 

new code, to be prepared by the Secretary of War. The law omitted the inspectors general and the Signal Corps from the calculation of staff departments. 

Departments were headed by brigadier generals. The Signal Corps had one 

colonel. There were also to be five assistant inspectors general: three colonels 

and two majors. That merely kept the incumbents in place, and prevented their 

organizing into a formal department. 16 

Schriver reported in October 1866 that all assistant inspectors general authorized by the act of 17 July 1862 had been mustered out, the only officers 

remaining being' 'those of the regular establishment. " None of the five majors 

had yet been promoted to lieutenant colonel. Schriver was assigned to inspection of the Military Academy, Hardie to "special duty" at the War Department, 

Sacket to the Department of the Cumberland, and Marcy to Sherman's Division 

of the Missouri. Assistant inspectors general were at the Distri~t of New Mexico, 

the Department of the East, the Division of the Pacific, the Department of the 

14. William Reed , "William Babcock Hazen: Cunnudgeon or Crusader," in Ray Brandes, 

ed., Troopers West: Military & Indian Affairs on the American Frontier (San Diego: Frontier 

Heritage Press, 1970), 137-38; Henry B. Carrington, Ab-sa-ra-Iro, Land of Massacre: Being the 

Experience of an Officer's Wife on the Plains, 3d ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1878), 134. 

15. Hervey Johnson to Sister Abie, 20 May 66, in William E. Unrau, ed., Tending the Talking 

Wire: A Buck Soldier's View of Indian Country 1863- 1866 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah 

Press, 1979), 337. 

16. AnAct to increase andiu: the military peace establishment of the United States, Statutes at 

Large 14, sec. 11,332 (1866); Thian, Legislative History, 112; Ganoe, History of the United States 

Army, 307--D8; Revised Army Regulations, H. Rpt. 85, 42d Cong., 3d sess. (1873). 
SECURING A PERMANENT PLACE 239 

Lakes, and one (Ludington) in charge of the Inspector General's Office in 

Washington. 17 "The Inspection Service of the army has not been changed in 

the character by the return to a condition of peace," Schriver said in October 

1866. "The system developed during the war, meeting as nearly as practicable 

all demands, is continued." However, orders issued in 1865 authorized the 

detail of officers as acting assistant inspectors general for all departments and 

divisions not having a permanent inspector assigned to them. That continued in 

1866, unaffected by the legislation of 28 July , and "the operations of the 

Inspector General's department are extended to every military command." 18 

Serving the Secretary of War 

From Schriver's standpoint, not much really had changed. Edwin M. Stanton remained Secretary of War, and he continued to use the inspectors general 

as it suited him. The big project for 1866 was a raft of investigations of alleged 

peculations and contract irregularities in the Quartermaster Department late in 

the war. The Inspector General's Office generated scores of letters, mainly 

asking Quartermaster Department officers and contractors for information and 

clarification. A major investigation involved the sales of surplus property since 

May 1865, totaling millions of dollars. Hardie and Ludington pored through the 

records, but could find only minor delinquencies in the accounts. Nevertheless, 

they told the Secretary that there was insufficient accountability in the Quartermaster Department's procedures. 19 

Schriver himself went off on a special inspection of family barracks maintained by the Freedman's Bureau in Washington for former slaves. He urged 

that better records be kept of families housed there, both as a means of ensuring 

War Department control of the former slaves before they were sent on to 

permanent homes, and as a way to limit overcrowding.

2o Most of the special 

inspections ordered during 1866 covered subj ects like "posts and troops," 

" fort and troops." Some were directed at various "irregularities," occasionally "alleged frauds connected with the subsistence and quartermaster's 

departments." One special investigation examined the "alleged malfeasance of 

Sutler Seitz" at Fort Washington, Maryland, while another in South Carolina 

reviewed the' 'Condition of society as existing between the white population 

and freedmen , etc." Regular officers of the inspectorate made most of the 

special inquiries, although a few were conducted by officers detailed from the 

17. ARIG 1866, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 39th Cong. , 2d Sess., 33. Schriver did not mention names in 

his annual report; they are deduced from other information. Davis was in New Mexico, Baird at the 

Lakes, Jones in the Pacific Division, and Totten in the East. Schriver's assignment to the Military 

Academy reflec ted the removal of that institution from the Corps of Engineers and placement under 

the direct supervision of the Secretary of War, who appointed a Board of Visitors to help improve 

and guide its education programs. 

18. Ibid. , 32. 

19. Hardie and Ludington to Secy of War, 26 May 1866, and reams of other correspondence 

on Quartermaster issues, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG- 159. 

20. Schriver to Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, 30 November 1866, in Letters Sent 

1863-1889, RG- 159. 
240 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

line or from staff departments. Their reports were, Schriver said, "confidential 

in character, [and] are not, as a rule, of record in this office. ,,2 1 

The Subsistence Sales List 

Although Schriver was assigned to be the Secretary of War's inspector of 

the United States Military Academy, he actually spent most of his time in 

Washington where Ludington was nominally in charge of the office. In that 

location, Schriver acted as if he were head of the Inspector General's Department, 

and in doing so took charge of a new responsibility of the four inspectors 

general (colonels), imposed by the legislation of 28 July 1866. They were 

required' 'to designate, from time to time, what articles shall be kept by the 

Subsistence Department for sale to enlisted men"; the department's chief 

responsibility was to procure, distribute, and issue rations for enlisted men. 22 

But in addition, it carried extra items for sale to officers at military posts, 

especially where household goods and foodstuffs could not be purchased locally. 

The law now extended the same services to enlisted men, mostly as a means of 

breaking the monopoly of sutlers. 

Schriver told his colleagues on 20 November 1866 that the Commissary 

General of Subsistence had asked him to prepare regulations implementing the 

law. Schriver therefore asked all inspectors general to send proposed lists of 

items and their general views to his office. In his opinion, the list should vary 

from post to post according to location and "absolute wants." Posts near cities 

where men could buy everything should stock fewer goods than isolated stations. 

Schriver also believed that much of what sutlers carried was superfluous or 

harmful to the men. His own list carried articles categorized as "for toilet," 

cleaning of arms, "stationery etc.," clothing, and miscellaneous items.23 

Schriver received contradictory lists from Marcy and Sacket; while Hardie was 

agreeable to his desires. Suggesting that the inspectors general should be unanimous in their recommendations, Schriver sent a draft compromise list to Marcy 

and Sacket for approval: It included lists of toilet articles, arms cleaning supplies, 

clothing, stationery, " sporting articles," and miscellaneous articles. Items usually carried by sutlers were excluded. Schriver also recommended that the 

Subsistence Department be required to sell to enlisted men the same kinds of 

supplies it made available to officers. At very remote posts, the department 

should also be required to stock dry goods, house-furnishing articles, and 

kitchen utensils. Marcy and Sacket agreed to every particular, so Sacket's 

report with its lists and recommendations went forward the last day of 1866. 24 

21. Ibid. , 32-33 , 34--36. 

22. An Act to increase and fix the military peace establishment of the U.S., Statlltes at Large 

14, sec. II , 332 (1866). This provision was repealed a few years later. Thian , Legislative Histol)', 

112. The inspiration for this new activity probably was the wartime designation of items to be 

cmried by sutlers of volunteer regiments. 

23. Schriver, Circular, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 20 November 1866, in Letters 

Sent 1863-1889 , RG-159. 

24. Schriver to Marcy and Sacket, 18 December, and Schriver to AG, 31 Dec 66, with enclosures, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG-159. 
SECURING A PERMANENT PLACE 241 

A Symbol of Permanence 

The rather odd duty of preparing the subsistence sales list was a formal 

recognition of the presumed expertise of the inspectors general. But giving 

them that responsibility did not treat them as a department or bureau, because it 

did not require a department head to speak for his organization . The inspectors 

general, in that instance, were merely a committee of equals. Nevertheless, 

Schriver managed to give the inspectorate one more trapping of a bureau in 

1866, when he published the first Annual Report of the Inspector General's 

Department. All other departments had prepared annual reports since 1822, 

which were published with the annual report of the Secretary of War. Publication of the Inspector General's report in 1866 was a welcome affirmation that 

the inspectors general were a permanent part of the establishment, and not just a 

collection of officers. It did not constitute them as a department, but it was 

another and very symbolic step in that direction. 25 Schriver's brief first annual 

report presented a general overview of the inspectorate and the stations of its 

officers; it included as well an excellent presentation on the mechanism of the 

regular" stated monthly " inspections of the Army. 

Schriver also initiated in his report for 1866 what would become a routine, 

annual lament. "The clerical labor in this office has very materially decreased ," 

he said , "and a corresponding reduction of employees has been made. There 

are now but two clerks and one messenger retained. " He did not, of course, 

believe that constituted a sufficient staff. The Inspector General's Department 

may not yet have become a formal bureaucracy, but it was beginning to sound 

like one. In any case, by the end of 1866 that incipient department was securely 

in place, blessed by the Secretary of War. "The Officers of the InspectorGeneral's Department, " Stanton told the President, "are now those of the 

regular establishment, and they are all engaged in their legitimate duties of 

stated and special inspections. No [special] appropriation is required for this 

service." The inspectors general had survived the war, and were an integral 

and permanent part of the Army. 26 

25. ARIG 1866. The report originated in a memorandum from Schriver to the Adjutant 

General presenting a "synopsis of the operations" of the Inspector General's Department during 

the year ending 20 October 1866. Schriver to AG, 20 Oct 66 , and ind , in Letters Sent 1863-

1889, RG- 159. Inspectors General had made annual reports since before the 

1820s, but the rep0l1s had been the privileged information of the Commanding General. 

26. Ibid., 33; Stanton to the President, 14 Nov 66, in OR 3d ser. , vol. 5, p. 1038. 
CHAPTER 15 

Foundations of a Bureaucracy 

(1867- 1869) 

If there was any doubt that Schriver had begun, since early 1866, to regard 

himself as the head of a formal department, it was dispelled by his second 

annual report in 1867. He sounded like a full-fledged bureau chief intent on 

expanding his domain, devoting most of his brief text to a complaint that the 

Inspector General's Department was too small. That was a defect not to be 

remedied by the detail of a few line officers to inspection. Schriver felt that full 

satisfactory results could be gotten only by assignment of adequate numbers of 

permanent officers. The record of the war, he claimed, demonstrated the ill 

effects of inexperience in inspection; a thoroughly professional inspection service could have saved millions of dollars. More serious than any monetary 

waste , said Schriver, was the inefficiency of troops caused by an absence of 

inspection. I 

Founding a Bureau 

Edmund Schriver was a soldier by training but an adminstrator by inclination. 

He very much wanted to see his organization established on some permanent 

basis, equal to the other departments of the Army. Not altogether incidentally, 

he may have perceived the personal benefits of prestige, security, and protection from interference that bureaucratic formality would have provided. He 

probably believed more positively that a formal embodiment would make it 

possible for the inspectorate to become a permanent and more productive part 

of the War Department organization. After he arrived in Washington, the 

history of the Inspector General often became less a military story and more a 

managerial chronicle. There had been relatively little qualitative change in the 

inspectors' essential military function; that is, inspection, since the time of 

Steuben. Nor were the procedures of inspection likely to evolve significantly in 

the future. The dominating impulse in the inspectorate after the Civil War, 

accordingly, was to establish a permanent department structure and then to 

preserve and expand its domain. The arguments advanced by Schriver and his 

successors were familiar, echoing those justifying counterparts as diverse as the 

I. ARIG 1867, H. Ex. Doc. I, 401h Cong., 2d sess. , 489- 90. 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 243 

Quartermaster General and the Chief of Engineers. Inspection was essential to 

the Army and to the War Department, and therefore demanded sufficient people and resources to serve the essential ends. Inspection was a demanding 

professional occupation that required full-time specialists; officers detailed to 

the duty were amateurs, who could not perform it as well as those who drew on 

a life's career of study and practice. Inspection was a technical specialty that 

must be protected from interference and the self-promoting demands of others; 

in other words, the inspectorate must be independent. 

If the claims made for inspection were true, then the argument for a separate 

inspection department was valid. A separate department could organize and 

direct inspection on a professionally correct basis. Inspectors could become 

increasingly skilled and productive, and the client Army would benefit from 

their improved services. Inspectors could be freed from special-interest demands 

and threats, and their products would be the pure fruits of technical ability, 

untainted by politicial or selfish interests, free of unseemly compromise. Given 

the claims were true, this argument did have a negative aspect. Decrying the 

absence of organization (or enough manpower and budget) could be a convenient way of blaming others for the inspectorate's failures or unproductiveness. 

An organization, once established, can take on a life of its own, and ultimately 

find much of its energies diverted to its own sustenance. That may be expressed 

in attempts to increase the staff and budget and to expand the purview of the 

organization merely to raise its prestige and that of its leader. In extreme 

circumstances, the organization's entire energy can be devoted to self-justification or self-protection. 

The postwar momentum toward a separate Inspector General's Department 

had a ramification that was accorded little consideration at the time , by the 

inspectors or by anyone else. Washington and Steuben had made inspection an 

integral function of command. Wayne had reinforced that principle, and Macomb 

had revived it. Even as late as the Civil War and its aftermath, inspectors served 

commanders, although after 1863 they increasingly catered also to higher 

inspectors. The Commanding General had no real authority over the staff 

departments, not even over that of the Adjutant General. But he did have 

nominal control-shared with the Secretary of War--over the higher inspectors 

general. If the inspectorate were to be separated into its own department, the 

senior inspector general could distance himself from the Commanding General, 

and look to the Secretary of War as his source of power, as was already 

happening in Schriver's time. A separate department could in an extreme case 

divide all inspectors from commanders, so that inspectors would serve the 

interests of inspectors. How these conflicting tendencies and competing interests would sort themselves out, Schriver did not consider. He merely started the 

campaign for a separate department. It remained for others to bring it into being 

in later years, and to leave to their successors the duty of preserving the 

organization once it was established. 
244 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

Making the Organization Useful 

Schriver devoted only a part of his energies to a crusade for a separate 

department. He continued as inspector general assigned to the United States 

Military Academy in 1867. His report on the academy that year comprised 

mostly an endorsement of recommendations offered by its Board of Visitors. 

The most important demanded an increase in the corps of cadets, because not 

enough officers were being produced to meet the Army's needs. Schriver and 

the board also believed that the academy's superintendent should receive the 

compensation of a brigadier general. Because the' 'public records and archives 

of the academy are in constant peril from fire," Schriver recommended construction of a fireproof building. Repairs to a wharf and the erection of a stable, 

he said, were also "absolutely necessary .,,2 

Schriver reported no changes of station for the inspectors in 1867, although 

Nelson Davis, assigned to New Mexico, had " just gone on leave of absence." 

Two of the assistant inspectors general had been promoted to lieutenant colonel 

during the year. They'were Roger Jones and Nelson Davis, both promoted from 

major on 13 June. 3 Schriver, Hardie, and Ludington remained in Washington at 

the Secretary's beck and call . The others continued as departmental or divisional inspectors, at the behest of the commanders. But Marcy, inspector 

general of Sherman's gigantic Division of the Missouri--everything between 

the Mississippi and the states of the Pacific Coast, and scene of most conflicts 

with the Indians-was less an inspector than a roaming observer and "experienced military counselor" for Sherman, as he had been for McClellan. Among 

his adventures in 1867, Marcy attended a conference of army and Navajo 

leaders to determine the future of the "experiment" that had uprooted them 

from their homes and planted them at Bosque Redondo, in eastern New Mexico. 

There, they were supposed to have become "civilized" agriculturists. The 

Indians were finally permitted to make a " long walk," as they recall it, home. 4 

Marcy's vast experience on the frontier, unmatched by that of anyone else 

in the inspectorate, induced him to prepare a paper of guidance on how to report 

on Indian tribes. He sent it to Schriver at the end of 1866. Schriver was then 

working on "Rules for the Inspection Service," to be included in the next 

revision of the regulations, and early in January wrote Marcy that he wanted to 

add the discourse on Indians to the new rules. Schriver then gave Marcy an 

essay of his own, concerning whether inspectors should be empowered to 

administer oaths. He said that he had administered oaths during investigations 

without the legal power to do so, and declared himself loath to request such 

authority. He ended his discourse with a statement that revealed who Schriver 

thought was in charge of the Inspector General's Department-and which 

Marcy, his senior, might have received as an insult, had he not been enjoying 

2. Ibid ., 490-91. 

3. Ibid. , 489; Heitman, Historical Register, I: 359, 582. 

4. Marcy's activities at Bosque Redondo are covered briefly in Gerald Thompson, The Army 

and the Navajo (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 142. 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 245 

his western adventures so thoroughly: "1 shall always be happy to receive 

suggestions about Department matters from yoU.,,5 

That letter showed both the strengths and the weaknesses of Schriver's 

views. On the one hand, he had a clear idea of the proper place of inspectors, 

and did not want their energies dissipated or their identities clouded by an 

extension of their authority. On the other hand, he lacked at least part of the 

ambitious bureaucrat's penchant for increasing his authority and expanding his 

purview. (His successors would take a different view of the power to administer 

oaths.) But he ended his letter with a clever piece of phrasing that underscored 

his own ascendancy in the embryonic Inspector General's Department. 

Meanwhile, he made his organization increasingly useful to the Secretary of 

War, whatever the Secretary's interests might be . When the Secretary of the 

Interior asked the War Department to provide housing for a large delegation of 

Sioux Indians scheduled to visit the nation's capital, Stanton handed the job to 

Schriver. He and Ludington were to confer with a number of officials, find an 

unoccupied barracks, and inspect it along with Interior Department representatives. When that was completed, Schriver made a full report for the Secretary's 

information. 6 

Also at the Secretary's request, Schriver sent Hardie off in January to 

investigate the qualifications of several bidders on construction contracts at 

Schuylkill Arsenal. Hardie returned with a report ranking them in order, based 

on background and reputation for such things as good work, surety, and business experience . In early February, when a fire alarm was raised in the War 

Department building, Stanton ordered Schriver to learn the cause. Schriver 

blamed mismanagement by the building's fireman, who had blown a steam 

valve by forgetting to open a return pipe after lighting the boiler. Schriver 

recommended corrective procedures. Later that month the Inspector General 

was charged with conveying captured Confederate property to the Secretary of 

the Treasury. When Schriver first attempted to do so, the Treasury's secretary 

was too busy, and he had to postpone an examination of the property inventory. 7 

Another special service to Secretary Stanton involved claims for damages and 

debts arising out of the war, which took most of Hardie's time . The trails of 

some cases had grown very cold by 1867. Hardie was handed a maddeningly 

frustrating example in early April, and was reduced to probing the memory of a 

cavalry officer then stationed in Baltimore in the hopes of getting something to 

go on. 8 

Schriver showed himself to be an increasingly able administrator. Proving 

his organization's usefulness to the Secretary of War was a means of ensuring 

its permanence , and its eventual growth . The Inspector General's Department 

became a repository for duties not clearly falling within the purview of another 

5. Schriver to Marcy, II Jan 67, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

6. Schriver to Ludington , 16 Jan 67, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

7. Hardie to Secy of War, 4 Feb 67; Schriverto AG, 7 Feb 67; and Schriver to Secy of War, 27 

Feb 67 , in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

8. Hardie to Capt. George T. Robinson, 3 Apr 67 , in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 
246 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

bureau. When Congress formalized the system of national cemeteries on 22 

February 1867, it required the Secretary to have them inspected annually by 

"some officer of the army , not under the rank of major," who would report 

their condition. That duty eventually ended up in the inspectorate (although the 

Quartermaster Department managed the cemeteries) because the inspectorate 

was an increasingly important adjunct to the War Department. Additional duties, 

of course, were ready-made justifications for additional inspectors 9 

Taking Charge of the Inspectorate 

Schriver also worked to increase his control over the inspectorate . When the 

Department of the East developed a system of property inspections that he 

considered especially sound, he sent a copy of the implementing order to every 

departmental inspector in the country, urging its adoption as a uniform approach 

to the problem. One acting assistant inspector general took that as an excuse to 

abandon inspections of troops, so Schriver had Ludington affirm that' 'the stated 

monthly Inspections of troops by subordinate Inspectors will not be discontinued. 

The department inspector will personally inspect each command once in three 

months, and oftener if practicable . It is desired that he will intrust to subordinate officers only such Inspections as he is unable to make himself." 10 Then 

Schriver issued a circular in April containing considerable administrative fine 

tuning. Acting assistant inspectors general were cautioned not to use the headj ng " Inspector General's Department" or "Inspector General's Office" on 

their communications. Instead, they should put "Acting Assistant Inspector 

General's Office" beneath the military department on their letterheads. Lastly, 

saying that he was gearing up for his department's inspection mission, the 

Inspector General asked all other staff departments for a complete set of their 

publications. II 

Schriver thus established the Washington office's position as the final arbiter of rules and procedures. For example he had Ludington return a letter from 

Absalom Baird in May, correcting his erroneous actions affecting the disposal 

of Ordnance property . The Washington office was accepted as the reviewer and 

interpreter of all rules as they pertained to inspectors. 12 In all, Schriver was 

determined to defend his domain. He told Hardie to review a new set of infantry 

tactics proposed by Emory Upton , and authorized him to go directly to General 

Grant with objections to one paragraph. The offending passage said that if a 

9. GO No.8, AGO, 27 Feb 67, in GORI&IG. 

10. Ludington to Sir, and Incls, 13 Feb 67; to Maj. James D. Roy, Actg Asst IG, Dept of the 

South, 23 Mar 67; to Chief of Engineers, 20 Mar 67 ; to Quartermaster General , 20 Mar 67; to Chief 

of Ordnance, 20 Mar 67, all in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

II . Cir, IGO, I Apr 67, in GORI&IG. The Department of the East's property inspection 

procedure involved quarterly examinations by the departmental inspector or an assistant, inventory 

reports for unserviceable property, and special instructions to others detailed to such inspections. It 

eventually became the standard for propel1y inspections throughout the Army. 

12. Ludington, Ind on Ltr of Absolom Baird, of 27 Apr 67, returning it to Baird, 7 May 67 , 

in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 247 

battalion was to be reviewed by an inspector junior in rank to the commander, 

the latter should "receive" the review. Hardie thought that reflected ignorance 

of the place of the inspector, whose rank was irrelevant because he had no 

power of command. The inspector should be understood instead as the eyes of 

the superior officer who ordered the inspection. As far as Hardie was concerned, 

Upton's proposal "trammelled" the authority of the inspector. It would allow 

him to see only what the commander wanted him to see, instead of what the 

higher authority most wanted to know , which was how well that commander 

could lead and maneuver his troops. Hardie said that the current regulations 

omitted only the personal salute from the commander leading the troops to an 

inspector junior in rank, but left the latter free to inspect without restriction . He 

saw no reason to change that procedure. 13 

Schriver demonstrated his organization'S usefulness to the Army by assuming the mantle of arbiter of protocol. One typical question came from a quartermaster who wanted to know the proper uniform for staff officers in artillery 

regiments. Schriver began his response with, "My individual opinion- I am 

unauthorized to give any other. " Since the officers belonged neither to batteries 

nor to the General Staff, he said, they should not wear the uniform of either. The 

only thing left was' 'the ordinary uniform prescribed for the Artillery Officer. ,,14 

But Schriver's first concern was with the integrity of the Inspector General's 

procedures. He took important steps in two areas in late 1867. One was to 

protect the confidentiality of inspectors' reports, including those made by officers not permanently part of his department. Bvt. Col. Andrew J. Alexander had 

inspected troops in New Mexico while Nelson Davis was on leave, and apparently offered some disparaging remarks about Davis. The criticisms were leaked 

by the Adjutant General's Office, and Davis asked for a copy of the report so he 

could defend himself. Schriver turned him down, telling him that General 

Grant thought his own "inadvertance" had wronged Alexander by betraying 

the confidentiality of the report. Grant therefore told Schriver to soothe the 

ruffled feathers of both inspectors. 15 

The other important area in which Schriver sought improvement was ensuring that inspections produced results in the form of corrected deficiencieswhat is now called follow-up. Inspection reports that did not say what happened 

to correct shortcomings detected during inspection were returned to their authors. 

A typical example went back to an acting assistant inspector general because it 

lacked "any letter of advice or any notification of the action, if known, taken 

by the Dept. Comdr. for the correction of the irregularities reported ." Follow-up, 

Schriver believed, was essential not only to the effectiveness of inspection, but 

to the survival of the inspectorate . In December 1867, he told the inspectors to 

give him information that would support his case for a formal Inspector General's 

13. Hardie to Grant, 2 Jul 67 , in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

14. Schri ver to Lt. James L. Shennan, 28 Sep 67, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889 , RG 159. 

15. Asst AG E. D. Townsend to Davis, true copy to [GO , 22 Oct 67, and Schriver to Davis and 

to Asst QMG H. M. Enas through the QMG, true copy to Alexander, 5 Nov 67, in Letters Sent 

1867- 1889 , RG 159. 
248 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Department. He particularly wanted to know about improvements and economies derived from inspecting. 16 

By the end of 1867, Schriver had gone far toward establishing the Inspector 

General's Department as a reality, if not as a legal forn1ality. In doing so, he set 

a pattern for his successors, and created the arguments that they would use in 

pursuing the goal of a separate department. Congress had also been at work 

earlier that year. Reacting to complaints arising out of the war, it abolished the 

army's sutlers. That increased the importance of the Subsistence Department 

sales list maintained by the inspectors general, and eventually would give the 

inspectorate much to think about when it considered the amenities to which 

enlisted men were entitled. Also in 1867, Congress introduced black regiments 

into the Regular Army. Schriver would in due course have something to say 

about that as well. 17 

Inspection continued relatively unchanged into 1868, with inspectors making their rounds and writing their reports according to formulas that reached 

back to the days of Arthur P. Hayne. Marcy remained in the Division of the 

Missouri, serving more as Sherman's general factotum than as an inspector. He 

continued to devote his attention to finding a new home for the Navajo Indians, 

and his official writings became increasingly laden with reminiscences and 

references to his explorations before the Civil War. 18 Roger Jones, at the 

Division of the Pacific, included the new American possession of Alaska in his 

rounds in 1868, while Sacket continued his routine at the Department of the 

Cumberland. Hardie spent more than a year at the Washington office working 

full-time on investigations of claims arising out of the war. Schriver announced 

in October the War Department's intention to relieve Hardie "as soon as his 

services can be dispensed with, and to assign him to the charge of the inspection service on the Pacific Coast." The only other change in the permanent 

complement of the inspectorate was the transfer of Baird to the Department of 

the Dakota, and Ludington to the Department of the South. Otherwise, departments lacking a permanent inspector general received acting assistant inspectors general--{)fficers detailed from the line for inspection duty. At least thirteen were so assigned that year. "Their services have proved valuable and have 

been attended with good results," Schriver said blandly. 19 

16. Schriver, Ind on report of inspection of Camps Watson, Logan, and Harney, 22 Sep 67, 

submitted by Bv!. Col. Marcus A. Reno, 16 Nov 67, and Schriver, Cir, IGO, 11 Dec 67 , in Letters 

Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. Reno was later to become famous as a survivor of the battle of the Little 

Bighorn, and then to become notorious for misbehavior that ended in his court-martial. 

17. Tapson , "Sutler and Soldier," 181. 

18. ARIG 1868, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 40th Cong., 3d sess., 776 . Early in 1868, Marcy reported that 

former Choctaw and Cherokee lands in the Washita Mountains (Oklahoma) would be suitable for 

resettlement of the Navajos, whom he recommended be moved there. His report, laced with 

references to his prewar explorations, was picked up with interest by Army alld Navy JOllmal, 5 (25 

Apr 68): 571. 

19. ARIG 1868, 776-77. 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 249 

A Formal Bureau Is Acknowledged 

Schriver said in his annual report for 1868 that the entire U.S. Army had 

been inspected, and that "the result has been an evident improvement in the 

discipline and carefulness in the disposition of the public moneys and property. " 

Such self-generated praise was another tradition established by Schriver; it 

would be characteristic of the annual reports thereafter. Schriver promoted his 

program further, proclaiming that inspection was essential to the successful 

management of all armies. Inspection duties required experience, he claimed 

once again, and he announced that details to inspection duties would be limited 

to officers with a decade or more experience. "It is hoped," he concluded, 

"that this mode of detail will bring to the inspection service a sufficiency of 

officers properly suited therefor, and will obviate the necessity, at least for the 

present, of an increase of the regular organization. ' ,20 What he referred to was a 

general order issued on 19 October 1868. It was a masterpiece of compromise, 

and on the whole a personal and official triumph for Schriver. At least for the 

moment he had to forego temporarily his campaign for a larger permanent force 

for the inspectorate. But Schriver himself gained from a formal affirmation 

(one had been lacking theretofore) that he be assigned to the War Department 

and in charge of the "Inspection Bureau," as well as to inspection of the 

Military Academy. The positions of all other permanent officers were likewise 

ratified by the order, but no one else received such an endorsement of his 

personal ambition as did Schriver. He was clearly and officially the supervisor 

of the inspectorate. 

Schriver gained not only for himself but also for his interest in bringing about 

a formal Inspector General's Department. Divisions and departments lacking 

permanent inspectors were each to be inspected by a field officer with ten years 

of experience. It was in how such officers were to be selected, and in the way 

the Washington office could deal with them, that Schriver gained the most. The 

inspection process began with each division or department commander, who 

nominated three candidates to serve as acting assistant inspector general. The 

War Department--Dbviously meaning Schriver's office-would then select the 

acting inspector for each department or division. The officers so selected could 

not be relieved except by orders of the War Department or the Commanding 

General. And to extend Schriver's control over the inspectorate, the order 

concluded that the permanent officers, especially at division level, could direct 

the detailed officers, especially at the department level. Schriver presided over 

all in the Washington office . 2 1 Thus he had, with that order, achieved everything 

essential to a separate inspection department except for its formal recognition. 

Like quartermasters, inspectors were regarded as members of a distinct staff, 

with their own chain of communications apart from the Regular Army chain of 

command. Schriver's purpose quite obviously was to continue toward assem20. Ibid. , 777. Note the qualification "at least for the present. " 

21. GO No. 87, AGO, 19 Oct 68 , in GORI&IG. 
250 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

bling a formal department. But the order was also another step in removing 

inspection from command, because commanders no longer enjoyed the unqualified services of inspectors as extensions of their own wills. Inspectors now 

served other masters, in a chain of communications that extended to the Secretary of War, the powerless Commanding General being of little account. George 

Washington, remembering the Conway affair, might have focused on the new 

arrangement as a symptom of the Commanding General's powerlessness. 

Schriver had preceded the 19 October order with some minor moves that 

benefited the inspectors. On 25 August 1868, inspectors in the divisions of the 

Missouri and the Pacific became entitled to spring wagons, reserved for their 

exclusive use where the only mode of transportation available was animals or 

vehicles of the Quartermaster Department. But the free use of a vehicle was 

regarded as payment in full for transportation costs (figured by mileage). Also 

in August, Schriver added a number of fancy foodstuffs to the subsistence sales 

list, gaining the favor of officers and men-except, probably of those in the 

Subsistence Department. And on 21 September, he sent a circular to all his 

officers to point out the special position of inspectors in the evaluation of 

incompetent officers. Inspectors had special familiarity with army personnel, 

Schriver pointed out. They accordingly had a special duty "to aid the War 

Department in every proper way in its efforts to relieve the Army of Officers 

who unfit themselves for the service by indulgence in vicious habits. ' ,22 More 

important was Schriver's other major accomplishment during the year-the 

promulgation of the rules for inspection he had been working on since early 

1867. They appeared on 2 November 1868, offering instructions for inspectors 

similar to, but more concise than, the general order issued in 1866. The rules 

presented a basic outline of inspection duties and schedules, and required the 

use of prescribed forms (which could be expanded with additional information) 

for all reports. Economy in the management of public funds and property, said 

the rules, was of paramount importance to inspectors. Only they could condemn property, so they were advised to be cautious. 

Troops were to be inspected before going into the field, and inspectors were 

required to learn the regulations governing all branches of the Army. In addition, 

in the first report after the issue of the rules, inspectors were to report carefully 

on the Indian situation in their respective purviews, following guidelines drawn 

on those Marcy had sent to Schriver. Inspectors were also to gather geographical inforn1ation as they traveled, and forward it to Washington. To increase 

Schriver's control over the inspectorate , inspecting officers were required to 

keep good records, to submit their annual reports by 1 October, and to report to 

22. GO No. 75 , AGO, 25 Aug 68, in GORI&IG; Schriver to Marcy, Sacket, and Hardie, 29 

Aug 68, and Schriver, Cir, IGO, 26 Sep 68, in Letters Sent 1868- 1889, RG l59. In a minor 

development, GO No. 20, AGO, 2 1 May 68, in GORI&IG, said "Inspection reports of medical 

property will hereafter be referred to the Medical Director [of each department] before being acted 

upon by Department Commanders. " That was a sign not so much of a loss of control of property 

condemnation by inspectors, as of the increasing tendency of the Medical Department to win 

control of its own affairs in every particular. 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 251 

the Inspector General's Office in Washington their arrival at every assigned 

station. 23 However, Sacket noticed that Schriver's rules did not emerge from 

the War Department as a general order. Schriver had originally wanted his rules 

included in the next issue of the regulations, but those were hopelessly entangled 

in the bureaucracy. A general order would have had the same effect, and would 

have anticipated wholesale new regulations. Schriver apparently was not able 

to win the unqualified backing of the War Department for his rules, and he tried 

to impose them on the inspectorate in a brazen assertion of his own will-after 

carefully gaining the Secretary's approval. It was the first test of his power to 

direct subordinate inspectors under the 19 October general order. When Sacket 

called Schriver's bluff, the latter lamely responded that his circular should be 

treated as guidance to inspectors and commanding generals. 24 Making necessity 

a virtue, Schriver maintained that the rules, with the approval of the Secretary, 

were merely internal guidance for the inspection "department," similar to the 

internal governance of other staff departments, and need not take the form of a 

general order. The implication, however, was that inspectors should treat them 

as if they were orders. But the episode revealed that Schriver was not in as 

strong a position as he would like when it came to commanding the inspectorate. 

Sacket had had the temerity to question his action; until there was a clear 

organizational pyramid peaking with a senior in Washington, there could be no 

true inspection department. 

It did not take Schriver long to butt heads with Sacket, in a circumstance 

where he could clearly affirm his own authority: On 2 December, he wired 

Sacket, who had transferred to the Division of the Atlantic on 29 October, to 

investigate and repolt on an accidental fire at Fort La Fayette, in New York 

Harbor. 25 Schriver had addressed Sacket at his last reported location. Paragraph 

X of his rules required inspectors to report their station and employment to the 

Inspector General's Office of the War Department every month. They were 

also to send copies of all orders given them for tours of inspection, including 

dates of departure and return. Despite that requirement, Schriver received a 

response from a third party that Sacket was out of the office. He immediately 

tracked down the wandering inspector general and fired off a stern rebuke to 

remind him to comply with reporting requirements. 26 Sacket finally replied two 

weeks later on 19 December, saying that a copy of his inspection orders had 

gone routinely to the Adjutant General's Office, and he believed that was 

sufficient notice of his whereabouts. Schriver retorted immediately that the 

purpose of paragraph X was to keep the Secretary of War advised of the status 

of every inspector, so that he fnight know whether the officer was immediately 

available- as had been the case with Fort La Fayette. Routine copies of orders 

23. Schriver, Cir, IGO, 2 Nov 68 , in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. This is also reproduced 

in GORI&IG. 

24 . Schriver to Sacket, 23 Nov 68, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

25. Schriver to Sacket, 2 Dec 68, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

26. Schriver to Sacket, 5 Dec 68 , in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 
252 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

in the Adjutant General's Office, Schriver said, did not suffice to keep the 

Secretary of War informed , because routine paper work did not come to his 

daily attention, " nor are the means of administering the details of the Inspection service obtained through the Adjutant General's Office . » 27 

Sacket's feelings may have been bruised, but Schriver was triumphant. 

With the backing of the Secretary of War, he had established the dominance of 

the Washington office over the entire inspectorate. Whoever held the chair 

there was effectively the head of the inspectorate- and in fact, if not in name, 

head of an inspector general's department. But Schriver was not the senior 

inspector general; Marcy was. In the rank-conscious Army, it was only a matter 

of time before it became necessary for the senior officer to put on his mantle. 

Marcy was having a thoroughly good time, roaming the West alone and with 

Sherman. But with the election of Grant to the presidency in 1868, Sherman 

was going to have to return from the wilderness to take up the amorphous post 

of Commanding General. Marcy's idyll could not long outlast Sherman's, so 

Schriver's days as head of the inspectorate were numbered. 

The Inspectorate and Army Reorganization 

Schriver remained in office long enough to see his organization through the 

trauma of another Army-wide reorganization. By early 1869, Congress was 

bent on a drastic reduction in the military force. But the legislature now numbered among its members quite a few who had been officers during the Civil 

War, and who took upon themselves the manner of military experts. One of 

them was James A. Garfield who, as chairman of the House Committee on 

Military Affairs, offered an ambitious plan for a thorough overhaul of the Army 

in January 1869. Taking testimony from the War Department hierarchy, most 

of which it ignored, Garfield's committee followed its own muse and concluded that the staff departments were' 'too numerous and too large in proportion to the line of the army. " The legislators also believed that there were too 

many officers in higher grades. 

Some of the proposed reforms would come later, such as merger of the Pay, 

Commissary, and Subsistence Departments. Equally farseeing was the committee's desire to make staff officers subordinate to the Commanding General. 

Other proposals, however, stood no chance of success; for example, merger of 

the Signal Corps into the Corps of Engineers and transfer to the latter of the 

Department of the Treasury's coast survey, and consolidation of the Ordnance 

Department and the artillery . The committee also proposed (against vehement 

War Department opposition) consolidation of the Adjutant General's and the 

Inspector General's Departments. But its proposal came to naught. The 

committee's only immediate contribution to the Army was the elimination of 

brevet promotions, although its desire to revoke brevets previously awarded 

went begging. 28 The committee's justification for merging the Adjutant General's 

27 . Schriver to Sacket, 22 Dec 68, in Inspection Reports 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

28. Arm)' Organization, H. Rpt. 33, 40th Cong. , 3d sess. (1869). 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 253 

and the Inspector General's Departments was that both dealt with aspects of 

personnel. Their merger would also bring about some economies in manpower. 29 

That throwback to the early nineteenth century would be heard again into the 

early twentieth century. The proposed merger obviated testimony regarding the 

substantial differences between the two assignments; Hardie for one had pointed 

out that at departmental headquarters' 'the adjutant general must be habitually 

present [while] the inspector general must be habitually absent." But the committee seemed more concerned in its questioning with the fact that the paper 

work of inspectors went forward wholly outside the channel of communications 

managed by the Adjutant General. 

Schriver and Hardie both testified at length before the committee on 25 

January . They had done much homework. Probably at Schriver's instructions, 

Hardie prepared histories of the Adjutant General and the Inspector General, 

with which he prefaced his testimony. His own department, understandably, 

received the longer treatment. Its chronology was up-to-date, but the bulk of 

the history focused on the Revolutionary period. Thanks to Hardie and Schriver, 

by 1869 the inspectorate had placed its roots very firmly in the soil tilled by 

Steuben. 30 Hardie's testimony offered a fine assessment of the work of the 

inspectorate, and of the Inspector General's Department's view of itself. In 

offering a general account of what the inspectorate did, Hardie especially 

underscored inspection's importance. Schriver, who probably approved Hardie's 

testimony in advance, must have been pleased. Hardie stressed the universal 

aspects of inspection and the value to the public and to commanders in knowing 

the condition of units. He testified that he saw no value in merging the two 

departments because, contrary to the committee's view, the two functions 

represented were not interchangeable. The missions of each required specific 

expertise and demanded flexibility on the part of the inspector so that he might 

go immediately to where he was needed. He could not be chained to a 

headquarters. The committee was particularly concerned that inspectors did not 

route their reports through the Adjutant General. To this, Hardie replied that the 

reports were intended only for commanders and were often confidential, never 

rising above the headquarters where appropriate action could be taken. He 

further pointed out that the Inspector General's Department was far from 

overstaffed given the volume of work that it accomplished. 31 Hardie was a 

conservative man who, like most of his uniformed contemporaries, favored no 

changes in the military establishment. He advised against proposed mergers of 

the Quartermaster, Subsistence, and Pay departments; the Ordnance organiza29 . Ibid. 

30. Ibid. Hardie 's history of the Inspector General's Department apparently was the beginning 

of a historical consciousness in the organization, and the first revival of Steuben's memory in order 

to serve the department's current purposes. The rather terse institutional histories were updated 

periodically, and became an annual exercise early in the 20th century. The best example is Sanger, 

"Inspector-General's Department," which fails to mention Hardie's work , although it is clearly 

based on the earlier history. 

31. Army Organization (1869). 
254 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

tions of the Army and the Navy; the coast survey and the Corps of Engineers; 

and other suggested consolidations. He based his objections on the understanding that each activity was distinct and governed by regulations that only specialists could understand. American technical services, he maintained, were more 

efficient than some of the combined services in European armed forces. 

Schriver followed Hardie to the witness chair. He lost no time in defending 

the department, even asking for its enlargement. After that opening, the committee asked Schriver whether the inspectors based in Washington in fact 

performed duties "that belong usually to the Adjutant General's department." 

He countered quickly by saying that there was "only one inspector here, and he 

performs appropriate duties, having charge of the inspection office and serving 

as inspector of the Military Academy, some of whose duties are similar to those 

of an adjutant general. I am that officer, but when not so engaged I am usefully 

employed in assisting the Secretary of War in certain branches of business 

which would require the special detail of an officer were I not serving as above. 

I am available for, and do make, special investigations and inspections under 

the Secretary's orders." Hardie's presence, he said, was accidental, because 

the Secretary had to detail someone to investigate claims against the War 

Department. Hardie had been assigned to the Pacific Coast, and would leave 

when his present duties were finished. When asked to whom as Inspector 

General he was responsible, Schriver said, "To the Secretary of the War and 

the General of the army." When asked if he reported to the Adj utant General, 

he merely said, "No." He also explained that all inspection reports were 

forwarded to him and that he called the attention of the Secretary, the Commanding General, and other officials to the parts of reports that concerned them 

"from time to time." Schriver then revealed the rather dubious status of his 

informal department, when it came to the Army's customary promotion 

procedures. He pointed out that assistant inspectors could not be promoted into 

vacancies created by departing inspectors because the Inspector General's Department had not been formally authorized by law. Schriver, like Hardie, objected 

to proposed consolidations of various staff departments, on the grounds that 

their missions were distinct and that it would be impossible for one person to 

adequately supervise them all , especially in wartime. Those objections would, 

by the early twentieth century, become hackneyed, but no less strongly voiced. 

In the meantime, Schriver, hoping to become head of a bureau, was not about 

to antagonize the influential heads of other bureaus by proposing the loss of any 

of their jobs, whatever the administrative efficiencies involved. 

The committee was also concerned with the way the Army paid its troops, 

which was every two months (suggested as a cause of their disaffection for 

nearly half a century). So the members naturally looked to the Inspector General to provide an informed opinion. Schriver revealed himself to be a hardnosed character of the old school, and generally unreceptive to any changes. He 

urged fewer pay periods on the premise that blocked pay would keep soldiers 

from deserting. The committee, unmoved, continued to favor some kind of 

reform. Then, ranging over other subjects at the committee's request, Schriver 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 255 

testified that he believed organizations of veteran reserves or invalids to be 

useful only during a big war, when much rear-echelon light duty was required 

and manpower was short. Such units should be abolished in peacetime, for they 

served no useful purpose, he averred. However, any influence Schriver may 

have had with the committee, several of whose members were Radical Republicans devoted to the elevation of the masses of former slaves, was eroded when 

he answered questions about the new black regiments. Like many of his white 

contemporaries, Schriver believed that black men were not ready for military 

service. He said he would rather not have any black units on the rolls because 

enough whites could be enlisted for all military needs. He said " antagonisms" 

between races would be better avoided if there were no black units in the army. 

He also was of the opinion that blacks would not make good NCO's, nor were 

they as physically fit as whites. Whatever his personal feelings about the 

qualities of black troops, his remarks reflected a central dilemma in the argument for an Inspector General's Department. He offered only one fact that 

could be represented as deriving from systematic inspection- that among poorly 

educated former slaves few men were prepared to be noncommissioned officers. 

Everything else was an opinion or an unsupported assertion. When Garfield 

asked Schriver for evidence of "antagonism which must always exist between 

white and black troops," he could offer no examples. 32 

Schriver and his successors who argued for a separate and independent 

inspection bureau placed great stock in the need for specialization, experience, 

and professional freedom for the inspector. That was as if inspection were a 

scientific profession- like engineering or forestry, for which similar claims 

were often advanced in the late nineteenth century. In fact, inspection was and 

is subjective, and its subjective nature surfaced most vividly whenever an 

inspector was asked for advice on policy. That the recommendations of an 

inspector, in other words, rested as much on the outlook of the inspector as on 

any objective facts is demonstrated by Schriver's belief that men should be paid 

infrequently; others before and after him believed just the opposite- both sides 

claiming the same evidence in support of their positions. The argument for an 

independent inspectorate was neyer persuasive so long as it was based on an 

assertion that inspectors were scientific specialists working on professional 

principles unaffected by the political or philosophical perspectives of the world 

at large. The facts, simply, countered the argument, and supported those opposed 

to an independent inspector general. Schriver might more successfully have 

advanced his case by acknowledging the subjective nature of inspection. Then 

he could have emphasized the beneficial effects of experience, prestige, and 

protection from interference on reducing subjectivity , personal or imposed, 

which accordingly would make the results of inspection more objective . When 

such arguments were advanced in the future, they proved to be more persuasive . 

In any event, Schriver lost most of his skirmishes with the House Military 

Affairs Committee. But he won the war. Congress reduced the United States 

32. Ibid. 
256 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Anny on 3 March 1869, but it left the inspectors general and the adjutants 

general in their respective spheres. The legislation in fact accomplished little 

more than a drastic reduction in the authorized force-including the reduction, 

by consolidation, of the six "colored" regiments to just four-to a total of 

37,313 officers and men. The staff departments emerged fairly unscathed, 

retaining virtually all their complements of officers, but their size remained 

large enough that regiments continued to be gutted by the detail of officers to 

other duties. The Inspector General's Department, now so-called (but still not 

established by law), retained its four colonels, three lieutenant colonels, and two 

majors. But thereafter, no promotions were penn it ted in the Adjutant General's, 

Inspector General's, Quartennaster, Subsistence, Medical, Pay, and Ordnance 

departments, or in the Corps of Engineers.33 

Continuing the Routine 

While Congress deliberated, Schriver's organization continued its varied 

routine. In February the Secretary of War decided that the Quartennaster Department had too many employees and too much rented property in the Washington 

area, so he sent Hardie to find out why. Hardie was also told that he should look 

for means to save money on such expenditures. That turned into a complete 

investigation of all expenditures and disbursements of the quartennaster depot 

at Washington. The Secretary called a few days later for a special investigation 

of reported timber thefts on the Fort Gratiot military reservation in Michigan, 

and Schriver dispatched the departmental acting assistant inspector general. 34 

Schriver also continued to defend his operations with his customary vigor. 

When quartennaster and commissary depot heads objected to the use of the 

Inspector General's new inventory and inspection fonns for condemned property 

instead of the forms of their own departments, Schriver reminded them firmly 

that general orders had required use of the "fonn furnished from Inspector 

General's Office, Washington. " He also called for a republication of the regulations governing property condemnation in order to end such confusions and 

conflicts. 35 

Property condemnations received increasing attention, and the inspectors 

general emerged on top of the whole question. Property managing officers, 

especially in the Quartennaster Department, had a variety of forms serving 

overlapping purposes of their own department, the inspectors general, the 

Department of the Treasury, and other authorities. The appearance of a new 

33. An Act making appropriations for the support a/the Army for the year ending June 

thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy, and for other purposes, Statutes at Large 15, sec. 6, 315 

(1869): Thian, Legislative HistOlY, 112; Heitman, Historical Register, I: 606-09. The four regiments of the Veterans Reserve Corps, a largely meaningless organization anyway , were abolished, 

while the total number of infantry regiments fell from 41 to 25, including 2 of blacks where there 

had been 4. The 10 cavalry regiments (2 black) remained. Companies increased in size. 

34. Schriver to Hardie, I Feb and 2 Feb 69 , and Schriver to Ino. D. Hardin , 6 Feb 69 , in 

Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

35. Schriver to Ludington, 4 Feb 69, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 257 

Inspector General's inventory and inspection report form confused many 

quartermasters, particularly on the issue of accountability to the Treasury when 

property was disposed of. The Quartermaster General complained to Schriver, 

but while the latter acknowledged that the " desirability of simplifying the 

system ... in any safe and practicable manner will surely not be disputed, " he 

remained firm in his intention to add his form to the surfeit of paper. Schriver 

obtained the issue of a general order in early March, reminding inspecting 

officers "that there is hardly any species of material however worn, which 

cannot be put to some use ." Thereafter, no property with any salable value was 

to be disposed of without special reason. The Army's shrinking budget was 

making it a pioneer in the recycling of used goods. 36 

Schriver enjoyed his final triumph as head of the inspectorate on 17 February 1869, when a general order permitted to inspectors general, assistant inspectors general, judge advocates, and chief commissaries of military departments 

the same allowances of office rooms and heating fuel as the regulations afforded 

to assistant adjutants general at the departments. 37 In trappings, if not in fact, 

the inspectorate resembled a formal department more closely than ever. By this 

time its de facto existence was acknowledged without question by legislators 

and army officers alike. Much of this can be attributed to Schriver's efforts at 

organization. However, equally instrumental in this phenomenon was the War 

Department's need for a sound inspection service. 

The Senior Inspector Takes Over 

Ulysses S. Grant became President 4 March 1869, and relinquished the 

office of Commanding General, which Sherman assumed four days later. Not 

much later, the senior inspector general came east-Marcy was ordered to 

Washington to take charge of the Inspector General's War Department office 

on 15 March, and began to sign its correspondence on the 20th. New orders on 

12 April assigned all the inspectors general and assistant inspectors general, 

with Marcy formally coming to the' 'Headquarters of the Army," which he had 

already done. Schriver remained located there, assigned to the Secretary of War 

and to inspection of the Military Academy. 38 

Marcy devoted himself dutifully to the Washington office's paper work, 

although his heart continued to look west to the scenes of his adventures. One 

of his earliest duties was to notify his inspectors that, on 10 April 1869, 

Congress had given officers of the Inspector General's Department authority to 

administer oaths to affidavits taken during investigations of frauds or misconduct. 

36. Schriver to Quartennaster General, 25 Feb 69, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159; GO 

No.8, AGO, 3 Mar 69, in GORI&IG. 

37. GO No.5 , AGO, 17 Feb 69, in GORI&IG. 

38. Weigley , History of the United States Army, 559; ARIG 1869, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 41st Cong., 

2d sess., pI. 2, I: 175; GO No. 34, AGO, 12 Apr 69, in GORI&IG. The first mail signed by Marcy 

in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159, is dated 20 March preceded by letters signed by Schriver on 25 

February. 
258 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

He reminded all officers on 27 May that orders since 1851 had required captains to write onto company musters and payrolls the paymaster's calculation of 

pay. Paymasters were not to be allowed to do that themselves. Marcy soon 

became bogged down in the minutiae that Schriver had found so enjoyable 

although, as he had told Marcy many months before, he had not wanted the 

inspectors to be required to issue oaths.39 But in other respects, Schriver's 

influence lived on in the Washington office. A general order issued on 21 June 

reflected his attitudes more than Marcy's, as the latter appeared less inclined 

than his predecessor to take absolute control of the inspectorate. Inspectors, 

thereafter, while making their rounds in the field and at posts, were to send off 

their reports immediately, from each station inspected. And reflecting Schriver's 

interest in follow-up , inspectors were to endorse on their reports what remedies 

commanding officers had applied to correct deficiences. All commanders up 

the chain of communication also were to endorse their comments and corrective 

measures on nonconfidential reports. Finally, the paper work of inspectors was 

made uniform by the order. Schriver had not been able to finalize procedures 

for reporting condemned property, causing property departments to complain 

about the new form he had issued earlier in the year, but things were almost as 

he had wanted them to be .

40 

General Sherman told Marcy to look into the question of who was to issue 

inventory and inspection forms. The Inspector General said that the regulations 

had not changed since 1863, and did not say which office was responsible. 

However, he told the Adjutant General, General Order No.5 of 1866 said that 

the Inspector General's Office was to prescribe forms. He defended the form 

devised there as "so simple and contains such ample directions" that even 

inexperienced officers had no trouble with it. The Subsistence Department had 

its own form, which Marcy thought no better than his own . He accordingly 

recommended the general adoption of the Inspector General's form to end the 

duplication and confusion. 41 Marcy was nothing if not diplomatic, so he set out 

to mend relations with the supply departments. He ordered a revision in the 

inventory and inspection report form, and in August sent it out for comment, 

offering it as the single property form for the whole Army. Schriver, resting on 

his prerogatives, would not have thought of such a civility. The Inspector 

General's Office was the only source of inventory and inspection forms for all 

species of property by the end of 1869, those of the other bureaus no longer 

being current. Marcy estimated that the supply of forms to the Army would 

increase his annual postage by $406.08, to cover the shipment of blank forms to 

all recipients. 42 

39. Marcy, Cir, IGO, 27 May 69, and Cir, IGO, 27 May 69, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 

159. 

40. GO No. 55, AGO, 21 Jun 69, in GORI&IG. 

41. Marcy to AG, 10 Jul 69, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

42 . Marcy to Chief of Ordnance, Quartemlaster General, Commissary General of Subsistence, 

Chief of Engineers, and Surgeon General, 24 Aug 69, and Marcy to Adjutant General, 13 Dec 69, 

in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. Why the fonns could not be mailed postage-free is not clear. 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 259 

Marcy issued his first annual report in October 1869. He proved rather more 

prolix than Schriver. Sacket, he said, had transferred to the Division of the 

Atlantic in October 1868, while Schriver had continued to inspect the Military 

Academy since his relief from the Washington office in March. "He has also 

acted as staff officer under the direction of the Secretary of War." Hardie had 

been in the Division of the Missouri since 26 April, supervising its inspectorate 

and serving both the division commander and the Commanding General of the 

Army. Davis had left New Mexico for the Department of the Missouri on 23 

December 1868 and had spent most of that year inspecting its posts "and 

collecting information in regard to Indian raids upon the borders of Kansas, the 

destitution of the settlers, and their necessities for government aid resulting 

therefrom. ,,43 

Marcy had absorbed enough of Schriver's outlook that he lost no time in 

selling the importance of inspection and calling for an increase in his department. 

He said in his report that division and department commanders' duties prevented them from personally visiting every post and unit in their far-flung 

commands. Consequently, a sufficient number of proficient inspectors was 

essential as a reliable source of information for the commanders. 44 All inspecting officers, said Marcy, were under the direction of the commanders to whose 

staffs they were attached. They received only technical instruction from their 

superiors in the inspection service. They made inspection according to the 

judgments of their commanders, and copies of all their reports "except such as 

are of a strictly confidential character" were transmitted by way of the commanders to the Inspector General's Office, with the action the commander had 

taken "for the rectification of such evils or irregularities as have been brought 

to their attention indorsed [sic ] thereon." Marcy then examined the reports and 

extracted from them information that should be brought to the notice of War 

Department authorities. Thus, he said, the Secretary of War and the Commanding General were kept informed of the state of the Army at every post and 

station. 45 

In support of his implicit argument that more inspectors were required, 

Marcy said, "Under existing regulations and orders inspectors are the only 

officers authorized to inspect public property with a view to its condemnation, 

which duty alone involves a great amount of labor and time ." Despite that 

burden, he said that inspection was working , because the reports showed 

"continued improvement in the discipline and efficiency of the troops, as well 

as the promotion of a more discriminating and careful regard for the economical 

43. ARIG 1869 , 175. Of the assistant inspectors general, Totten had transferred from the 

Department of the East to the Division of the South. Roger Jones continued in the Division of the 

Pacific , earning high praise for his thorough reports. Baird had moved from the Department of the 

Lakes to the Department of the Dakota I October 1868 , while Ludington went from the Department 

of the South to the Division of the Pacific on I April 1869. Eight departments and three districts 

were served by acting inspectors- I colonel, 5 lieutenant colonels, 7 majors, 15 captains, and 4 

lieutenants. 

44. Ibid ., 176. 

45. Ibid. , 176-77. 
260 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

application of public money and property." He quoted in demonstration the 

statement of a department commander that the labors of Roger Jones "have 

resulted in great saving to the government. ' ,46 Marcy was devoted to platitudinous praise of the ever improving condition of the Army, but he could admit 

that the state of training was not all that it should be. He blamed that on 

circumstances, but pointed out improvements made by his inspectors. These 

successes launched Marcy on a sermon about the importance of inspection, 

which led him to the conclusion that Schriver had voiced before: that the 

number of regular inspectors was too small, especially given the many duties 

thrust upon them. It was nearly impossible to inspect every post once a year, 

whereas the posts should be visited twice a year as was done in European 

armies. The use of acting inspectors was of limited value, Marcy opined, 

because inspectors needed time to study the regulations, and to gain the educational benefit of long experience on the job. The judgment of detailed officers 

was also suspect. Because most of the Army's officers were young, detail of 

field officers was detrimental to the regiments, while junior officers were 

ineffective inspectors because "neither they nor their opinions would, as a 

general rule, command much respect from the troops." Marcy 's solution, 

predictably enough, was to enlarge the permanent inspectorate. In a call so bold 

that even Schriver might have gasped, Marcy asked for enough assistant inspectors general to cover every division and department- six additional appointments in all. Since Congress had recently cut the army by nearly a third , and 

seriously considered eliminating a separate inspectorate , Marcy's optimism 

was clearly unfounded. 47 

By late 1869 Marcy was as firmly in charge of the inspectorate as he was 

capable. He was clearly influenced by the legacy of Schriver, but he was not 

the same sort of born bureaucrat as his predecessor. Nevertheless, he carried on 

in Schriver's spirit, proving his organization's usefulness to others and seeing 

to its well-being. In November, he assumed the role of arbiter of questions of 

"relative rank" among officers when decisions of the Adjutant General were 

appealed to the Secretary of War, reviewing the facts and presenting his opinion to the Commanding General. In December, he reaffirmed the right of 

inspectors in the West to the exclusive use of spring wagons for their travel. 48 

The differences between Schriver and Marcy were reflected in their separate 

ways of compiling the Subsistence Department sales list. Schriver had simply 

prepared the list, sent it to his colleagues for comment and ratification , and got 

the minor business over with easily . Marcy, however, found agreement hard to 

come by. When the Subsistence Department proposed a number of changesmainly deletion-in December, Marcy and Schriver agreed readily enough, but 

Hardie dissented vigorously. Marcy asked Sacket to comment, telling him that 

46. Ibid. , 177. 

47. Ibid., 177-78. 

48. Marcy to Sherman, 22 Nov and 21 Dec 69, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159; GO No. 

81, AGO, 20 Dec 69, in GORI&IG. 
FOUNDATIONS OF A BUREAUCRACY 261 

if he agreed with Hardie the inspectors general would be split (they were a 

committee, not a board with a chairman, in this responsibility). It required a 

number of flow charts and memoranda before a final sales list was worked out. 

The Commissary General of Subsistence had proposed 30 deletions and 6 

additions, reducing the list from 84 items to 63 . The inspectors general finally 

settled on a total of 77 items to be offered for sale to officers and men. 49 So 

Marcy 's leadership of the inspectorate was marked by a style quite different 

from that of Schriver for, although he shared his predecessor's interest in a 

larger and more formal department, he was not as bureaucratically oriented and 

accordingly was not inclined to make the issue the center of his existence. 

Schriver focused on the administration of his organization; Marcy was inclined 

to look more toward the condition of the Army as reflected in the reports 

coming across his desk. But the nostalgic old soldier had been in uniform for 

nearly four decades, and he was not inclined to find fault, whatever the facts 

told him . 

The Army was scattered among 255 military posts in 1869. Its living 

conditions were atrocious, and that coupled with overwork and the lure of 

economic opportunity in the West raised desertion to phenomenal rates. The 

scale of the desertion problem had been demonstrated in 1868 when a first 

sergeant led thirty men in a midnight mass escape from the 7th Cavalry. Yet 

Marcy, in his first annual report, observed only continuing improvement. 50 In 

fact, just before Marcy moved to Washington , the New York Tribulle of 19 

February 1869 discussed the Army's desertion problem. The paper printed a 

letter from a deserter who complained that his company commander had put 

him in the guardhouse when he refused to serve as a menial, leaving him 

without food until he had to yield . "At times," said the deserter, "I felt like 

dying-the situation was so humbling to me who went into the army for love of 

my country , only to have to black a brute's boots and look after him when a 

return blow was death. It was hard .. . . Self respect was destroyed, it was 

misery. So, Mr. Greeley, I deserted, and glad I did it, and only sorry I did not 

do it sooner and defy the consequences. ,,5 1 That Marcy was somehow different 

from Schriver was reflected in his response to reports like that. Reflecting on 

practices early in his career, Marcy could see no validity to the soldier's 

complaint. In fact, repeal of the law forbidding officers to use enlisted men as 

their personal servants became his great crusade. Nothing seemed as important 

to him as that- not even the signal development of his time in Washington, the 

final emergence of an Inspector General's Department. 

49. Marcy to Hardie, 15 Dec and 16 Dec 69; and Marcy to Sacket, 28 Dec 69, with accompanying attachments and memorandullls, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889 , RG 159. 

50. Weigley , History of the United States Army, 267 ; Don Rickey , Forty Miles a Day on Beans 

alld Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars (Nomlan: University of Oklahoma Press, 

1963), 150. Rickey records the mass desertion and a number of other interesting anecdotes illustrating the problem. 

5!. Quoted in Foner, Soldier Between Wars , 62- 63. 

Part Three 

A Tradition of an Inspection 

Department, 1881-1898 

CHAPTER 16 

Marcy and the Advent of the Department 

(1870- 1881) 

When William Tecumseh Sherman accepted the post of Commanding General in 1869, he did so with the understanding that he would serve in fact as 

well as in name; that is, that the Commanding General supervise the entire 

United States Army , staff and line. His old friend and new Commander in 

Chief, President Ulysses S. Grant, directed Acting Secretary of War John M. 

Schofield (himself a general in the Regular Army) to issue an order to that 

effect. But Schofield left the job at about the time Sherman arrived in 

Washington , in March 1869. Schofield was replaced by Grant's old chief of 

staff, John A. Rawlins, who told the President that the law required the 

Secretary's direct supervision over the staff bureaus. So Grant rescinded 

Schofield's order, and the volatile Sherman's temper was assuaged only by the 

fact that Rawlins was too ill to be very active . All secretarial orders went 

through the Commanding General's Office . 

The Commanding General's Ordeal 

Rawlins was followed in September 1869 by William W. Belknap, an 

ambitious man determined to wield every power at his command. Sherman 

found himself ignored as the Secretary directed the bureaus, and was increasingly upset as Belknap began to interfere in the command of the uniformed 

army by granting leaves of absence , transfers, and discharges. Belknap soon 

began to badger Sherman openly, and allied himself with powers in Congress 

not all favorably inclined toward the Commanding General. A crisis was reached 

when Belknap removed a post trader and replaced him with one of his own 

supporters, a man unacceptable to the garrison. When Sherman reinstated the 

former trader, Belknap persuaded Congress to remove control of post traders 

from the Commanding General's hands, and reimposed his favorite. Sherman 

then removed himself to Saint Louis, much as Scott earlier had decamped for 

New York. He finally left on a tour of Europe, while Belknap remained completely in control of the War Department and of the Army . Later, to Sherman's 

gratification, evidence surfaced in 1876 that Secretary Belknap had been 

profiteering, specifically by selling post traderships for his own profit. The 

public and Congress were outraged, and Belknap resigned to avoid impeachment. 
266 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

He was followed by a series of unassertive secretaries, the first of whom, 

Alphonso Taft, begged Sherman to return to Washington. The triumphant 

Commanding General did so, the orders announcing his return reserving to him 

complete authority (under the President) for the military control and discipline 

of the Army. Over the next few years, until his retirement in 1882, Sherman 

made the office of Commanding General an important one, although its relationship with the Secretary was not yet clarified. I 

Marcy Tries To Assert His Authority 

It was in that distressing context that Randolph B. Marcy served as senior 

inspector general, and tried to establish a place for his emerging Inspector 

General's Department. That place had to be found in the shifting balance of 

power between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General. Even after 

Sherman was restored to his position, the power of the Secretary of War 

remained formidable. Marcy's first opportunity to clarify his position appeared 

on 15 July 1870, when Congress (while cutting the Army's authorized force 

slightly , to 35,353 officers and men) told the War Department to develop a new 

set of general regulations and to submit them for congressional approval. The 

Secretary eventually appointed a board of officers to draw up a revised code, 

which went to Congress 17 February 1873 although it received no action. 2 

Before the board was assembled, the Secretary asked bureau heads on 26 

August 1870 to recommend regulations to govern their operations. Marcy sent 

up proposed regulations for the Inspector General's Department five days later. 

The regulations fell under three main heads: The "Inspection Service," under 

the laws and the orders of the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, 

"provides for the inspection of the Army, and of all matters relating to its 

operations." That was a sweeping grant of purview. Under " Assignment of 

Inspectors," the regulations would place the senior inspector general "near the 

person of the General in Chief" and under his immediate orders. Inspectors 

general and assistant inspectors general were to be assigned to the commanders 

of arnlies, divisions, and departments, and to other duties as the Secretary and 

Commanding General desired. When there were not enough permanent inspectors available, the regulations would permit the detail of officers from the line, 

the larger departments being entitled to two inspectors. The regulations also 

provided for acting inspectors when corps, divisions, and brigades were formed 

in field armies. As for reporting, the text mostly repeated the circular of rules 

distributed during Schriver's reign. The "Duties of Inspectors" called for a 

complete inspection of every aspect of the Army and the way it functioned. The 

"Special Duties oflnspectors" extended to "every branch of military affairs," 

1. Lloyd Lewis, Shermall, Fightillg Prophet (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1958),601- 25; 

William T. Shemlan , Personal Memoirs of W. T. Shermall , 2 vols. (New York; Webster, 1892; 

reprinted Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957),2: 44 1- 63; Basil H. Liddell Hart, Shermall: 

Soldier, Realist, Americall (New York: Praeger, 1958),4 12- 19. 

2. Revised Arm)' Regulations, H. Rpt. 85 , 42d Cong ., 3d sess. (1873). 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 267 

the sphere of inquiry being limited only by specific orders. Finally, the bulk of 

the regulations were long instructions on the inspection of troops, administrative and disbursing departments, the Ordnance Department, the Medical 

Department, property presented for condemnation, and such.3 

Marcy had, it appears, become influenced by Schriver's administrative 

legacy. But its effects on him were not altogether positive. From the standpoint 

of what an inspectorate should be- the eyes of the commander- his proposed 

regulations were a disavowal of a tradition reaching back to Steuben, which had 

been eroded in recent decades. Marcy's regulations would have denied to 

Sherman something that Macomb had enjoyed: an inspectorate loyal only to 

himself, a tool with which he could assert his authority as Commanding General. 

Marcy wanted to be close to the Secretary also. It was not the good of the Army 

nor the integrity of its command that came first in Marcy's proposal; his 

regulations were an assertion of organizational integrity and independence which, 

with control theoretically divided between the Secretary and the Commanding 

General, gave the inspectorate considerable self-identity, find influence. Everything would be within the inspectorate's reach, and virtually no one but the 

Secretary could restrain its actions. 

Despite high hopes, Marcy's proposal came to nothing , so he turned his 

attention to exerting greater control over his organization. That was not easy. 

Schriver contined as a free agent serving the Secretary of War independently, 

while also inspecting West Point. Sacket spent the last part of 1869 on "special 

duty in the State Department," although otherwise he inspected posts and 

department headquarters in the Division of the Atlantic. Hardie left Marcy's 

control for an extended period in September 1870, when the Secretary dispatched him to examine claims arising out of Indian wars in Montana . The 

assistant inspectors general continued in their customary routines, supplemented 

by eighteen line officers detailed to inspection . But it was among the assistants 

that the inspectorate suffered its first casualty due to the law reducing the force 

by attrition remaining in effect. 4 James Totten, inspector in the Division of the 

South, resigned 22 July 1870. 5 Because the law did not allow this position to be 

filled, Marcy could do nothing about Totten's departure so he turned his attention to bringing the other inspectors into line. 

When it came to asserting his own primacy in the inspectorate, Marcy 

began to sound increasingly like Schriver. He wanted inspectors to know that 

he was in charge, and was not beyond sarcasm to make his point. When he 

learned that James H. Carleton, acting assistant inspector general for the Department of Texas, was writing "Notes for Inspecting Officers" to guide subordinate inspectors, Marcy told him, "The greater part of the information embraced 

3. " Regulations for the Government of the Inspector General 's Department. Submitted to the 

Secretary of War [by Marcy) 31 Aug 70, " in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

4. ARIG 1870 , H. Ex. Doc. I, 41st Cong., 3d sess., vol. I, pt 2: 9 1- 92. Ludington transferred 

from the Division of the Pacific to the Department of the Columbia late in 1869. 

5. Marcy to Fry, 26 Jan 70, Marcy to Totten, 18 Feb 70, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159; 

ARIG 1870 , 92; Heitman , Historical Register, I: 966. See Appendix B. 
u.. 

o 

z 

o 

U5 

'> 

(5 

~ 8] 

- .,. a: (/) 0 

w t:: rJ) 

I- a: ~ <{ a: .- I- w :;; (/) I- DO 0 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 269 

in your notes outside the report is contained in the Army Regulations, and if the 

Officers concerned in the inspections do not take the trouble to read the Regulations and Orders I doubt if they would read the extracts upon the report. ,,6 

Like Schriver, Marcy was concerned about follow-up . He wrote to several 

department commanders to call their attention to general orders issued 21 

January 1869 "and to say that unless the previous corrections that have been 

applied by Subordinates through whose offices the Inspection reports have passed 

are endorsed thereon, it is impossible to determine what action is necessary on 

the part of authorities here." When inspection reports showed an excessive 

number of horses, mules, vehicles, and civilian employees in the Quartermaster's 

Department at two posts in the Department of the Platte, Marcy refused to 

accept the reports from the departmental acting assistant inspector general 

because this inspector had not considered whether the numbers were necessary. 

"This matter should have been investigated and reported upon by you provided 

your orders contemplated a general inspection of those Posts," he said, knowing that the orders did just that, "in order that the attention of the proper 

authorities here might be called to the facts.,,7 

The Inspectorate Declines 

Even as Marcy tried to extend the influence of his inspectorate, and his own 

control over it, the War Department's tight budget interrupted him. The Secretary placed some curbs on the inspection service on 28 September 1870 by 

limiting the funds available for inspection tours and the number of officers who 

could travel. 8 That order appeared while Marcy was out of town, Marcy having 

persuaded the Secretary on 31 August to dispatch him on an inspection of the 

posts in the Department of the Lakes. The bulk of his inspection report on this 

particular trip was an ordinary account of each post in turn. His report was 

laced also with allusions to his past, especially when he visited posts such as 

Forts Mackinac and Gratiot where he had once lived. 9 

Very few important events punctuated the history of the inspectorate during 

1871. Rather, a gradual fading of the influence of the Inspector General's 

Department continued, thanks to Marcy'S preoccupation with other matters. 

Schriver remained the Secretary's assistant, while Hardie (nominally assigned 

to the Division of the Missouri) continued working on war claims arising out of 

the Montana Indian War of 1867 , and as a "commissioner of Congress," 

investigating various wartime claims in Kansas and assessing the value of the 

Army 's property at Fort Leavenworth. Assistant inspector general Davis was 

absent on leave the first half of the year, after which he was occupied with 

6. Marcy to Carleton, 12 Jul 70, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

7. Marcy to Bv!. Maj. Gen. J. J. Reynolds and to Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield , both 20 Jun 70, 

and to Maj. N. B. Sweitzer, 31 Aug 70, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

8. GO No. 11 3, AGO, 28 Sep 70, in GORI&IG. 

9. Marcy's report is Marcy to Adjutant General E. D. Townsend , 8 Oct 70, in Letters Sent 

1863- 1889, RG 159. 
270 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

"special duty in New Mexico, and on other important duties under the orders of 

the department commander." Absalom Baird filled in behind Totten in the 

Division of the South, while Ludington's failure to see his posts in the Department of the Columbia more than once a year was attributed to transportation 

difficulties and the distances involved. 10 

The Army's inspectorate, under Marcy's inattentive leadership, was not in 

high repute . It could be, and was, represented as a disconnected lot of placefillers headed by a wandering storyteller. "Cui Bono" ("for whose benefit?" 

or "to what purpose?") wrote to the editor of the Army and Navy Journal in 

September 1871 to castigate "that parasite of the Army called the Inspector 

General's Department. " As far as that correspondent was concerned, the Inspector General's Department merely generated tons of useless, excessively detailed 

and analyzed reports. II Such sentiments were ominous at a time when Congress 

remained dissatisfied with the size and organization of the Army. A bill to 

reorganize the army staff appeared in the Senate and was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs on 11 December. The legislation proposed to the 

Senate actually would have permitted an increase in the number of inspectors 

general over the minimum they were to attain by attrition . But support for the 

inspectorate was on the wane, symbolized significantly early in 1872 when the 

Army and Navy Journal announced itself in favor of a consolidation of the 

offices of Adjutant General and Inspector General. 12 

Marcy apparently began to appreciate the vulnerability of his organization, 

and attempted a recovery. At the end of January he wrote the Secretary of War 

an impassioned argument for an independent inspectorate. Independence, said 

Marcy, was essential to the reliability of inspection . Inspectors should not be so 

placed that they were overly influenced by their commanders. Instead, they 

should be enabled to report freely, even if their findings were unfavorable to a 

department or its commanding officer. He claimed in support of his case that 

department and division commanders were suppressing confidential reports that 

the Secretary should see. 13 Marcy asked Belknap to revise the regulations to 

place the four inspectors general directly under the Secretary and the Commanding General, assigning the four assistant inspectors general to divisions and 

major departments. That was a bold grab for independent authority, and a clear 

attempt to establish a true department by connecting it to the Secretary of War. 

As Marcy pushed for an independent inspectorate, his campaign was interrupted by an outbreak of selfishness within his own organization. Nelson Davis 

had been one of the assistant inspectors general, ranking as major, appointed in 

November 1861; he became a lieutenant colonel in 1867. He developed an 

ingenious argument that he had been unfairly deprived of promotion to full 

10. ARIG 1871, H. Ex. Doc. I, 42d Cong., 2d sess., vol. 1, pt.2: 109- 10. 

II. Army and Navy Journal, 9 (2 September 1871): 39; Congressional Globe, 42d Cong., 2d 

sess. (II December 1871): 56. 

12. Army and Navy Journal, 9 (10 February 1872): 418. 

13. Marcy to Secy of War, 30 Jan 72, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 
·MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 271 

colonel and an inspector general in 1864. He took his case to Congress in 

March 1872. 14 

Congress was, by 1872, in the middle of the Reconstruction period, accustomed to dealing directly in matters of army management. The lawmakers 

decided on 8 June that Davis had been entitled to promotion under legislation 

enacted in 1851 (which required promotion by seniority within corps) and by 

the Army's own regulations. Congress authorized the President to promote him 

to colonel and inspector general so as to precede Hardie, whom the legislation 

protected from loss of rank or pay. That raised the number of inspectors general 

to five , so the law also forbade any further promotions to that grade until the 

number reverted to four. 15 This was tantamount to a legislative finding that the 

Inspector General's Department was a duly constituted corps or bureau of the 

Army- at least, that promotion of its officers should be governed as if it were. 

That was a novel interpretation, one that not even the inspectors general had 

hitherto believed valid. 

An Independent Inspectorate 

Marcy, meanwhile, resumed his campaign for independence, and on 5 

October 1872, he got it. To ensure that the War Department was kept informed 

of the personnel and materiel condition of the Army, said a general order, the 

inspectors general were to be assigned with one in Washington, in charge of the 

Inspection Office in the War Department, and the others assigned to stations 

after some brief training at the Headquarters of the Army. These officers were 

to receive instructions directly from, and report directly to, the Secretary of 

War and the General of the Army. 16 The senior inspectorate was now the 

personal agency of the Secretary of War, the current source of power. The 

mention of the Commanding General was a meaningless gesture, especially 

when Sherman then was based in Saint Louis. As surely as Conway would have 

been an agent for the Board of War, Marcy had become much the same for 

Belknap. It appeared that it was just a matter of time before there was an 

Inspector General's Department as permanent, prestigious, and independent as 

that of the Quartermaster General . Inspection seemed destined to part irrevocably from command. 

The order attaching the inspectors general to the War Department clarified 

Marcy's position as senior inspector general. He soon began to assert himself. 

Early in November, he assigned Schriver, Sacket, and Hardie to thorough tours 

of certain geographical departments. He had asked the War Department bureaus 

what they would like to have inspected, and they generally emphasized finan14. The testimony was covered with great relish by Army and Navy Journal, 9 (30 March 

1872): 524. 

15 . All Act to authorize all appointmelll ill the Inspector-General's Departmellt, Statutes at 

Large 17, sec. 1,338 (1872): Thian, Legislative History, 113; Heitman, HistoricaL Register, I: 

359. 

16. GO No. 87, AGO, 5 Oct 72, in GORI&IG. 
272 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

cial accounts. The inspectors general were advised to present themselves to the 

department commanders, to make any inspections those officers might request, 

and to report their findings to the commanders, with a copy to the Inspector 

General at Washington. The inspectors general, in other words, were to assist 

the department commanders, while serving the Washington office. 17 

Marcy had been involved also in the preparation of the regulations for 

uniforms that took effect in 1872, and it was perhaps through his influence that 

staff officers, including the Inspectors General, acquired a new distinction: 

"Whenever the full dress coat is worn by officers on duty the prescribed 

epaullettes or shoulder knots will be attached. Letters to be embroidered on 

shoulder knots in old English: A.D. Adjutant General's Department, J.D. Inspector General's Department. ,, 18 This new insignia symbolized the growing independence of the inspectorate, while Marcy also began to restore his influence in 

the War Department. Beginning late in 1872 and on into the next year, the 

number of letters he addressed directly to the Secretary of War, instead of to the 

Adjutant General, increased, most of them offering formal opinions, advice, or 

information as requested. 19 Marcy was by then thoroughly independent of the 

command structure. He all but ignored the division commanders, merely informing them when his officers would enter their territories. Only after he had 

reported inspection findings to the Secretary of War and dispatChed the inspectors general to their next assignments did Marcy send the Commanding General an extract of their reports. It was rarely substantive, merely stating how 

successful his inspectors were. 20 At the peak of his independence from the 

Commander and his connection to the Secretary early in 1873, Marcy received 

only one minor reversal: On 17 January the Secretary of War affirmed that the 

battalion, post, and depot at Willetts Point, New York, was under the orders of 

the Chief of Engineers, and not under those of any department or division 

commanders. Inspectors acting under the orders of department or division 

commanders were not to inspect any engineer establishments. Once again the 

engineers were protected from independent review. 2 1 

Marcy fared better with the House Committee on Military Affairs, which in 

1869 had proposed a consolidation of the Adjutant General's and Inspector 

General's Offices. Just four years later, in February 1873, the panel reversed 

itself. The committee found no need for substantial changes in staff organization, 

despite generally favorable opinion in the army line for the establishment of a 

single supply department combining the Quartermaster's, Pay, and Subsistence 

I7. Marcy, identical letters to Schriver, Sacket, and Hardie, 5 Nov 72, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, 

RG 159. 

18 . Uniform and Dress of the Army of the United States, 1872, in Uniform oJ the Army oj/he 

United States. 

19. See for instance Marcy to the several inspectors general, assigning them to stations, 20 Feb 

73, Marcy to Secy of War, and attachments, 13 Mar 73, and Marcy to Schriver, Sacket, and 

Hardie, 18 Mar 73, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

20. Marcy to Generals Schofield and Pope, 18 Mar 73, and Marcy to Sherman, n.d. 1873, in 

Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

21. GO No.9, AGO, I7 Jan 73, in GORI&IG. 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 273 

Departments. The members did, however, propose a system of rotating details 

between line and staff that would appear again early in the twentieth century, 

and the establishment of bureaus for infantry, artillery, and cavalry. In respect 

to the Adjutant General and the Inspector General, the committee acknowledged the differences between the duties of the Adjutant General that tied him 

to a post and those of the Inspector General that required he be free to travel 

anywhere. The broader scope of the inspector's duties and the need for a more 

extensive knowledge of Army functions was noted also. "An excellent adjutant 

might be a poor inspector, while an excellent inspector could not fail to be a 

good adjutant. " The committee further concluded that inspectors had to remain 

free from association with any other department and in an agency of their own 

to provide the best service.

22 In other words, a separate and independent inspectorate was judged essential to assuring worthwhile inspection. The opinions of 

officers responding to a questionnaire circulated by the House committee late in 

1872 generally opposed merging the duties of the Adjutant General with those 

of the Inspector General. Most of the officers pointed out that the duties of the 

two positions were "dissimilar," and that adjutants had to remain in headquarters while inspectors must be absent most of the time. Although most of the 

officers opposed merging the duties of the Inspector General with those of the 

Adjutant General, the Inspector General's Department did not win a round of 

applause from the Army's leaders.

23 Most of them could probably have gotten 

along happily without an Inspector General, but they were loath to see one part 

of the organization nullified because it could just as easily be their own. 

Reducing the Army and the Inspectorate 

Things did not remain peaceful for the Army on Capitol Hill. On 16 January 

1874, Senator John Logan, a bitter personal enemy of General Sherman, introduced Senate Bill 321 affecting aspects of the strength and organization of the 

Army .24 The bill had much to say about the Army's staff organization. For the 

Inspector General's Department it provided one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, 

and two majors. It allowed the Secretary of War to detail no more than four line 

officers as assistant inspectors general, "and no new appointment shall be 

made in the Inspector-General's Department until the number of inspectorsgeneral is reduced to five." Logan explained that the bill merely fixed the 

future size of the departments, would not cause the discharge of any incumbent, 

and would increase no department except for an additional position in the 

Commissary Department. The departments would all be reduced by not filling 

vacancies as they occurred. The Senate agreed, passing "A Bill Reorganizing 

the Staff Corps of the Army on 13 June. ,,25 The House of Representatives 

22. Army Staff Organization , H. Rpt. 74, 42d Cong., 3d sess. (1873). The questionnaire 

responses discussed immediately below are presented in the same document. 

23 . Ibid. 

24. Congressional Record, 43d Cong., 1st sess. (16 January 1874): 695; (28 April 1874): 3423; 

and (13 June 1874): 4941. 

25 . Ibid. (13 June 1874): 4941-42. 
274 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

approved the bill ten days later. 26 Approved by the President the same day, the 

legislation reduced the inspectorate to five officers as Logan had wanted, with 

the reduction achieved by attrition. As far as the inspectorate was concerned, 

the law seemed finally to have settled on a ceiling of five officers, implying 

but not stating specifically that they were all to be entitled inspector general. 

The inspectorate's temporary force also was reduced, the law saying that a 

maximum of four line officers could be detailed' 'to act as inspectors-general. ,>27 

The officers of the Inspector General's Department took the reduction as a 

cruel, ungentlemanly blow. Five years later, the normally serene Roger Jones 

gave the Clerk of the House of Representatives a bitter account of how, in his 

opinion, the bill was promoted by members of other departments for their own 

purposes while most inspectors were away from Washington and could not 

defend their interests.

28 The severe reduction in Marcy's department indicated 

that his independence and increasing ties to the Secretary had earned him no 

friends in the Army and little influence in Congress. 

Marcy Loses Control 

Despite the reduction in strength, 1874 was not a completely bad year for 

the Inspector General's Department. Congress that year adopted the Revised 

Statutes, a recompilation of all the nation's laws. In specifying the Army, the 

revised legislation treated the Inspector General's Department as if it were a 

reality. The War Department's official historian deduced that the department's 

establishment dated from that event. Actually, however, Congress never deliberately created such an organization; rather it came into being through custom 

and practice. But by the time the second edition of the Revised Statutes appeared 

in 1878, the Inspector General's Department was legislatively entrenched. 29 

Whatever the implication of the Revised Statutes, the Inspector General's Department was little more than a name . It lacked a clearly assigned principal charged 

with its management and its policy. When Marcy functioned as a bureau chief, 

it was largely as a conduit for the Secretary's orders. The number of individual 

assignments of inspectors general, mostly for special investigations, increased 

and this increase continued into 1875. Sacket went off to audit books at two 

arsenals, while Davis made miscellaneous investigations in Texas, Hardie did 

the same in New Mexico and Arizona, and Schriver in the Department of the 

26. Ibid. (23 June 1874): 5442-43. 

27. All Act reorgallizillg the several staff corps ill the Army, Statutes at Large 183 , sec. I, 6, 

244 (1874); Thian , Legislative History , 113-14. The permanent complement under the law was I 

colonel, 2 lieutenant colonels, and 2 majors. 

28. Jones to Robert J. Stevens, 21 Jan 79 , in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

29. Ingersoll, History of the War Departmelll , 145-46; Rev . Stat. 2d ed. , sec. 1094; Thian, 

Legislative History, 114. The revised legislation mostly treated inspectors general as individuals or 

as a group, but did include the Inspector General's Department as among the things that composed 

the Army . 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 275 

Missouri. The coordinated visits across departments that Marcy had previously 

organized had come to an end. 3o 

In his wish to establish a formal Inspector General's Department with 

himself as its head, Marcy shared Schriver's inclinations. But he had lacked the 

latter's bureaucratic skills. Marcy's continual distraction by official and personal interests repeatedly interrupted his control of the organization, and made 

him ineffective when the organization was threatened by others. Even his 

attempt to gain status by attaining independence for inspectors general backfired. 

Belknap soon began to regard them more as a group of individual agents rather 

than as a consolidated unit, and wrested control of them from Marcy. Worse, 

the attainment of " independence" under the Secretary soon erased the credit of 

Marcy's organization in the Army. Belknap had departed in disgrace by early 

1876, and Sherman returned in triumph. 

Sherman agreed to reestablish himself in Washington only on his own 

terms. He could not take control of the supply departments, but he did manage 

to get the line Army into his uncontested hands. On 6 April 1876, orders 

announcing that the headquarters of the Army was reestablished at Washington 

said that all orders from the President through the Secretary of War would be 

promulgated to the Army by the Commanding General. The departments of the 

Adjutant General and the Inspector General would thereafter "report to [the 

Commanding General] and be under his control in all matters relating thereto." 

Beginning with that order, the Adjutant General no longer signed the Army's 

instruction "By order of the Secretary of War." Now it ",as "By command of 

General Sherman.' ,31 Sherman also imposed his views by reassigning the inspectors general on 29 May 1876, calling the attention of division and department 

commanders to the general orders governing inspections issued in 1869. Reports 

of inspections thereafter were to be forwarded via the Adjutant General to the 

Inspector General's office at Army headquarters. Inspectors were told to note in 

their reports the remedies that commanders had instituted for deficiencies they 

identified, while other high-ranking inspectors were to endorse their own actions 

on each report. Things were as they had been before Marcy had won his 

short-lived independence. The order left Marcy in charge of the Washington 

office: Hardie was retrieved from special investigations and claims work to 

serve as his assistant; Schriver terminated special investigations of disbursements and recruiting depots, and went to the Department of the Pacific; Davis 

also ceased the Secretary's work and went to the Division of the Atlantic; and 

Sacket similarly went to the Division of the Missouri. Of the assistant inspectors general, Jones had already left the Division of the Pacific for the Division 

30. For examples, see Inspector General USA (no signature) to Sacket, 26 Feb; to Davis, 4 

Mar; to Hardie, 4 Mar; and to Schriver, n.d. Apr and 12 Apr, all in 1875, in Letters Sent 

1863-1889, RG 159. 

31. GO No. 28, AGO, 6 Apr 76, in GORI&IG; ARIG 1876, H. Ex. Doc. I, 44th Cong., 2d 

sess., vol. I, pt. 2 : 74; Thomas H. S. Hamersly, Complete Army Register for 100 Years (1779-1879) 

(Washington: Hamersly, 1881), pI. 2, 271. Beginning in 1876 Marcy's annual reports were no 

longer addressed to the Secretary of War. 
276 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

of the Atlantic in February, and was unaffected. The same was true of Baird in 

the Division of the Missouri, while the order moved Ludington from the Department of the Platte to the Division of the Pacific. Released by the Secretary, the 

inspectors general once again worked for the Commanding General and his 

subordinate division and department commanders. 32 

The Army and its inspectorate suffered further blows in 1876. Congress, 

which had been whittling away at the military force throughout the 1870s, 

reduced the authorized force to 27,472 officers and men on 26 June, with a 

ceiling on enlisted men of 25,000. Reconstruction was drawing to an end, and 

Congress desired to keep the U.S. Army at its minimum size. Budgets dropped 

accordingly. Congress set new rules for reimbursement of travel expenses in 

July, substituting actual costs for mileage. For the hard-traveling inspectors, 

that was particularly distressing. 33 Marcy was annoyed about what had happened to his inspectorate in the recent past. Complaining that the 1874 legislation reduced his department to five officers by attrition, leaving only one of 

them a colonel, he observed that no inspectors general since the War of 1812 

had been ranked less than colonel. He also asserted that the work could not be 

done properly by officers of inferior rank. "Indeed," he said, "it cannot be 

expected that officers of experience and high rank will cheerfully submit to the 

criticisms of inspectors who are much junior to themselves." The present 

complement, he said, was barely sufficient and should be raised to pre-1874 

levels. If Congress would not go along with that, Marcy asked at least that all 

five inspectors be graded colonels, while line officers detailed as departmental 

inspectors be selected from among the Army's majors. 34 

Denied the outward signs of a large staff and spacious offices that connoted 

bureaucratic status, Marcy was forced to watch his inspectorate erode: When 

Hardie died on 14 December 1876, the 1874 legislation prevented his being 

replaced. 35 Marcy even had to prepare a special testimonial to help Mrs. Hardie 

gain her widow's pension. In early January, the Senate discussed clarifying a 

conflict in legislation governing the number of inspectors general and, after a 

long, rather pointless discussion, it voted to amend the law to permit no promotions until the Inspector General's Department consisted of only four officers. 36 

In such a climate the Army, and its inspectorate, drifted. Marcy made some 

efforts to restore his former independence, but that required a direct connection 

to the Secretary of War. After Belknap's resignation in March 1876, there was 

no Secretary of comparable energy and influence. In fact, when George W. 

McCrary took office in March 1877, he was Belknap's third successor in a 

year. 37 

32. GO No. 45, AGO, 29 May 76, in GORI&IG; ARIG 1876, 73- 74. 

33. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 267; Heitman, Historical Register, 612- 13; 

GO No. 97, AGO, 8 Sep 76, in GORI&IG. 

34. AR1G 1876, 77- 78. 

35. Ibid., 78; Marcy to Secy of War, 4 Jun 77, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

36. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 500; Marcy to Mrs. J. A. Hardie, I Jan 77, in Letters Sent 

1863-1889, RG 159; Congressional Record, 44th Cong., 2d sess. (10 January 1877): 530--31. 

37. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 287, 557 . 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 277 

Shortly after McCrary arrived at the War Department, Marcy delivered to 

him a' short statement on the size, role, and function of the Inspector General's 

Department, along with the current assignments of its officers. He uttered a 

strong plea for his lost independence. Bureau heads, he told McCrary, should 

be able to communicate with the Secretary or with post commanders in their 

areas of official interest without going through the Adjutant General's Office, 

unless some action by the Commanding General was required . That, Marcy 

said, would avoid " necessary circumlocution . .,38 To achieve efficient staff 

departments, Marcy believed that ultimate independence, including the authority to give orders to their own officers, was required . Sherman's ascendance 

over the uniformed Army prevailed despite Marcy's desires. In fact, it stabilized the Inspector General's Department. No changes of station and few extraordinary assignments were made during 1877. Marcy's greatest break from the 

routine was to serve as a pallbearer for the funeral and reburial of George A. 

Custer, loser of the battle of the Little Bighorn in June 1876. 39 

The Inspector General's Department Emerges 

One of the principal bureaucratic and political weaknesses of the Inspector 

General's Department was that its chief was not specifically desigriated by law. 

Marcy was the senior inspector general by date of his commission, and its 

presumed leader by virtue of assignment to the Washington office. But he was 

not formally the head of a department, and his position could not be equated 

with that of the Quartermaster General or the Adjutant General, who outranked 

their subordinates and represented their departments by virtue of something 

more than date of commission. The War Department and the Commanding 

General alike were accustomed to thinking of the inspectors general as many 

independently functioning colonels. 

Marcy, frustrated in trying to establish his organization as a semiautonomous department undenhe Secretary of War, in 1877 decided to try a different 

approach . After once again complaining about the relatively few and lowranking inspectors, he concluded his annual report with the heartfelt lament that 

his duties were equal to that of the other department chiefs, all of whom were 

brigadier generals. He felt that the senior inspector should also be in that grade 

to symbolize his department's importance. 4o Marcy's motives in raising the 

38 . Marcy , "Memorandum submitted by Inspector General Marcy for the Infomlation of the 

Honorable The Secretary of War, " 17 Mar 77, and Marcy to Secy of War, 17 Apr 77 , in Letters 

Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

39. ARlG 1877, H. Ex. Doc. I, 45th Cong., 2d sess., vol. I, pI. 2: 51-52; Telg, Marcy to 

Mrs. E. B. Custer, 1 Oct 77, and Marcy, draft of remarks upon proposed rules and regulations for 

Ordnance Department submitted to the Secy of War by Inspector General Marcy, II Aug 77 , in 

Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

40. ARlG 1877, 54. Actually, Marcy was not the only bureau chief not a brigadier general. The 

Chief Signal Officer was regarded as the head of the Signal Service-a quasi bureau at that point, 

but formally established, as the Inspector General's Department was not- but he was only a 

colonel. Heitman , Historical Register, 1: 44, and 2: 612. 
278 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

issue of his rank probably were twofold. On the one hand, he had his own 

interests at stake; on the other, he knew that the Inspector General's Department would never be fully recognized until its leader could deal with the other 

bureau chiefs on equal terms. Colonels simply did not prevail over generals as 

interbureau rivalries grew increasingly serious. Marcy's promotion became the 

most important business of the Inspector General's Department for over a year; 

otherwise no important changes occurred in the organization. 41 On 13 March, 

asking for a "simple act of justice," he sent the Secretary a resume of his 

career, testimonials from his former superiors, and a letter of support from 

Sherman, who portrayed the Inspector General as the alter ego of the Commanding General. Secretary McCrary sent the whole package to Congress the same 

day, along with his own statement of support for Marcy's position. 42 

The Senate Committee on Military Affairs, after hearing Marcy's personal 

appeal, observed on 2 April that the Inspector General's Department was the 

only department in the Army with a chief ranked lower than brigadier general. 

The committee members saw no reason for such a discrimination to exist, and 

recommended that Marcy get his promotion. 43 Congressional solicitude for 

Marcy's status was remarkable. It came from a body that recently had almost 

subsumed Marcy's operations into those of the Adjutant General, and had 

threatened to reduce the inspectorate to a four-man force headed by a solitary 

colonel. When the Senate considered Marcy's promotion on 25 April, a member of the Military Affairs Committee avowed that, while Marcy's record should 

be acknowledged, the real purpose of the measure was to put the head of the 

Inspector General's Department on a par with other staff chiefs. He observed in 

response to questions that the promotion would entail no increase of duties; it 

would just raise Marcy's pay. The committee had already amended a bill 

authorizing such a promotion in the inspectorate to prevent an increase of rank 

of any subordinate officer in the act of 23 June 1874, he said, and the panel 

passed the measure unanimously. Satisfied with that, the whole Senate agreed 

to the amendment and passed the bill. 44 

On 12 December 1878 Congress declared that the rank of the senior inspector general of the United States Army would be brigadier general. The Adjutant 

General announced the news to the Army on 27 December, by publishing the 

act in general orders. 45 If it could be said that there was a year in which the 

Inspector General's Department really came into being as a formal organization, 

41. There were again no changes of assignment of the permanent officers during 1878, and 

most inspection was performed by the usual rotation of officers detailed from the line-seven that 

year, for the first time all of field grade ARIG 1878 H. Ex. Doc. 1, 45th Cong., 3d sess., vo!' 1, pt. 

2: 30-31. 

42. Marcy to Secy of War, 13 Mar 78, Sherman, "opinion," 13 Mar 78, and McCrary to 

George E Spencer, chainnan, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 13 Mar 78, all in Letters Sent 

1863- 1889, RG 159. 

43. Report (to accompany bill S. 824), S. Rpt. 221, 45th Cong., 2d sess. (1878). 

44. Congressional Record, 45th Cong., 2d sess. (25 April 1878): 2842. 

45. An Act Establishing the Rank of the Senior Inspector-General, approved 12 December 

1878,20 Stat. 257; Thian, Legislative History , 114; GO No. 92, AGO, 27 Dec 78, in GORI&IG. 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 279 

that year was most likely 1878. The discussion in the Senate of Marcy's 

promotion showed that the whole justification rested on Marcy's position as the 

head of a department. The legislation raising him treated him only as the senior 

among inspectors general. However, it also limited the rank of other officers of 

the Inspector General's Department. 

While it debated Marcy's betterment, Congress also issued the second 

edition of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Section 1094 declared as it 

had in 1874 that "An Inspector-General's Department" was a component of 

the Army. But the rest of the nation's body of law addressed inspectors general 

only as so many individuals, not as part of an organization. Congress had never 

formally created it, but the Inspector General's Department nevertheless existed, 

with all the trappings of the War Department's other staff bureaucracies, including a bureau chief who shared a brigadier's stars with people like the Commissary General of Subsistence. 46 Even before his promotion, Marcy behaved as a 

bureau chief should. When he saw the draft of the War Department appropriations request for fiscal year 1879, he protested that the measure would reduce 

the pay of his messenger by $120.00 per year. The man was a nineteen-year 

army veteran, he said, who had worked in the office since 1863, and was 

chiefly responsible for the burden of packing and mailing the large volume of 

blank inspection forms and other important products of the organization. Marcy 

also tried, and failed, to get a third office, but instead he had to move out of the 

two he already had. 47 

Another Reorganization Scare 

Marcy's elevation went forward during a period when Congress once again 

grappled with the further reduction and possible reorganization of the Army . 

Congressman Henry B. Banning, a Civil War hero, introduced a bill late in 

1877 to reduce the Army to 20,000 enlisted men by July 1878, cutting the 

number of cavalry regiments to six, artillery to four, and infantry to fifteen. The 

size of mounted regiments would be increased at the expense of the infantry and 

the artillery. Among the bilI's provisions, the Inspector General's Department 

would be reduced to one Inspector General with the rank of colonel and two 

assistant inspectors general ranked lieutenant colonel. Inspection of the Army 

would generally be performed by line officers on detail, not to exceed one to a 

department. The House Committee on Military Affairs once again surveyed 

opinion among army officers to find answers to its questions. Regarding the 

inspectorate, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock responded by sending a copy 

of a letter he had written to an earlier request in 1876, which among other 

things called for a substantial inspectorate of experienced and high-ranking 

officers. Marcy also presented his views. He said that it was a mistake to 

believe that only cavalry could chase Indians, and that having mounted men 

46. Revised Statutes, 2d ed., sees. 1094, 1131, 1194, 1348; Thian, Legislative History, 114. 

47. Marey to Seey of War, 17 Apr and 5 Dee 78, in Letters Sent 1868-1889, RG 159. 
280 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

compose over half the Army would be a serious mistake. Marcy wanted to 

preserve as well the regimental organization of the artillery, mostly because it 

served as infantry on the frontier. Urging the importance of strong staff organizations as preparation for war, he advised against any changes in the present 

staff organization, especially consolidations. 

Marcy continued with a renewed plea for his own independence. Control of 

staff departments, he said, should rest with the Secretary of War administratively, 

and with the Commanding General militarily, but commanders of field armies 

and geographical divisions and departments should have absolute control over 

their own staffs. The only changes Marcy recommended in the staff departments were, predictably, more inspectors general for his own, all of them 

ranked at least as colonels. Finally, he said that getting rid of laundresses in the 

Army and reducing the retired list would save $100,000 per year.

48 Whatever 

Marcy thought, Congress was determined to overhaul the Army, or at least the 

former Civil War generals among its members were so determined. A joint 

committee of members of the House and Senate assembled in June 1878 to hold 

hearings and consider the many issues. The committee members were ready 

with a legislative bill by November. The measure began by proposing to reduce 

the number of generals in the Army from eleven to six, including the elimination of the offices of general and lieutenant general when the incumbents 

(Sherman and Sheridan) retired. 

The proposed legislation would consolidate the Inspector General's Department and the Adjutant General's Department into a new "general staff" 

organization, reducing the total number of officers there by six. All other staff 

departments, except for the Corps of Engineers, also would be drastically 

reduced. The measure would eliminate two regiments of cavalry and seven of 

infantry, and would give each regiment four battalions, of which only three 

would be organized (in the infantry and artillery, only two manned) in peacetime. 

The enlisted force would remain limited to 25,000 men, while the retired list 

would be permitted an unrestricted increase. There were many other provisions 

in the awesomely comprehensive bill-the Ordnance Department, for instance, 

would be prohibited from manufacturing its own supplies, post traders would 

be abolished, generals would be required to retire at age sixty-five, others at 

age sixty-two, and so on. All members of the joint committee were Civil War 

veterans, who felt assured that they knew what was best. 49 

Inspector General Marcy, newly commissioned as a brigadier general, saw 

his organization threatened on every side in 1879. The joint committee was not 

the only part of the Congress that tried to reduce the military force. The House 

of Representatives devised its own bill, which among other things would retain 

an Inspector General's Department, but would reduce it to one colonel, one 

48. Reorganization of the Army, H. Misc. Doc . 56, 45th Cong., 2d sess. (1878); Marcy to the 

Hon. Levi Maish, Edward S. Bragg, Henry White, Subcommittee on Military Affairs, House of 

Representatives, 1 Jan 78, delivered to clerk of Military Committee, 8 Jan 78, by messenger, in 

Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

49. Reorganization of the Army, H. Rpt. 3, 45th Cong., 3d sess. (1878). 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 281 

lieutenant colonel, and two majors. The Committee on Appropriations asked 

Roger Jones to comment on the measure's possible effects on military efficiency. 

He responded with Marcy's by-now customary long discourse on the Inspector 

General's Department, its history, its size, and its importance, emphasizing 

that all inspectors be awarded colonelcies. The department had already been 

cut too far in 1874, he said, attributing the deed to the "machinations of other 

Staff offices. ,,50 The move for reorganization declined as quickly as it arose. 

By 1879, the army was arrayed in eight departments, eleven districts, and three 

divisions, and it remained that way. The Secretary of War vouched for the 

importance of inspection in August by requiring that every post, station, and 

command be inspected at least once a year by division and department inspectors. 

In addition, post, station, and other permanent commanders were to make 

similar inspections annually in early September, and to forward their reports to 

the Inspector General's Office in Washington. The order included a blank form 

to be used in commanders' inspection reports. That year division and department inspectors were also told to report occasionally on the number and duties 

of the army's civilian employees, especially when the number appeared 

excessive. The complement of the Inspector General's Department, meanwhile, 

declined further when Ludington retired on 27 March. 51 

Marcy's Last Year 

Marcy's last year as Inspector General was 1880. Evidently satisfied with 

his promotion, he ceased trying to reassert his independence from Sherman and 

settled into a comfortable routine. His department continued as it had been for 

some time. Marcy remained in Washington, although he made several inspections of disbursing accounts at the Secretary's behest. Schriver was at the 

Division of the Pacific; Davis was at the Division of the Atlantic. Of the 

assistant inspectors general, Jones, Marcy's assistant in Washington, performed 

important services under the orders of the Secretary of War. Baird was in the 

Division of the Missouri. Two lieutenant colonels, four majors, and one captain 

performed most inspections to which officers had to be detailed. With "very 

few exceptions, " said Marcy, all garrisoned posts were inspected that year. He 

continued to maintain that the force of permanent inspectors was too small and 

issued one more call for more inspectors at higher ranks. He also requested 

authority to assign clerks for inspectors at department or division headquarters. 52 

Of all the inspectors general, Sacket had the most interesting year in 1880. 

He was relieved from his duty in the Division of the Missouri on 1 July and 

assigned as a member of a board of officers in Washington to examine and 

50. Jones to Robert J. Stevens, clerk, House Committee on Appropriations, 21 Jan 79, in 

Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

51. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 267; Sanger, " Inspector-General's Department," 246; GO No . 106, AGO, 9 Dec 79, in GORI&IG; Heitman, Historical Register, I: 646. 

52 . ARIG 1880, H. Ex. Doc. I, 43d Cong., 3d sess., pI. 2, I: 48-5\. 
282 

BRIG. GEN. DELOS B. SACKET. Inspector General, of the Army, 2 January 1881-8 March 1885. 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

report on the codification of the Regulations of the Army.53 The War Department had , at last, decided to force 

the issue of the Army's dormant regulations. Marcy spent his last year in 

office in a futile attempt to straighten 

out the status of the Inspector General's Department. Several laws had 

put conflicting ceilings on the number and ranks of the department's 

officers. As attrition continued, the 

correct figure needed to be determined. Secretary McCrary agreed, 

and in fact wanted to raise the legislated ceiling from four to seven. 

Marcy, of course, was delighted, and 

together they proposed new legislation to the Senate in 1879 and early 

1880. But McCrary left office at the 

end of 1879, and Marcy had to explain the whole thing to the new Secretary of War, Alexander Ramsay. When he did so, in May, he took the 

opportunity to set the proposed new ceiling at eight officers, suggesting that 

McCrary had favored that as well. Ramsay, however, was unenthusiastic. In a 

last effort, Marcy said that with his approaching retirement the law would not 

permit the Secretary to appoint any new inspectors. If Schriver retired also, 

however, the Secretary could appoint one, but the new inspector could be only 

an assistant in the grade of major. Again Marcy urged an increase in the 

inspectorate, but he had to leave office frustrated on that point, as he had been 

for years. 54 Despite claims of understrength, the inspectorate gained another 

minor responsibility when a general order declared on 9 April 1880 that the 

periodicals, newspapers, and school books provided by the Quartermaster's 

Department were for the use of enlisted men. They were not to be taken from 

post libraries or school rooms, and officers were entitled to use the materials 

only when duty forbade use by enlisted men. All officers, however, were 

encouraged to promote study and learning among their men. Inspecting officers 

were to inquire into observance of the order and to report any violations. 55 

53. ARIG 1880, 48. 

54. Marcy to Hon. T. F. Randolph, chainnan, Committee on Military Affairs, United States 

Senate , 30 Apr 80, enclosing copy of McCrary to Randolph , II Dec 79; and Marcy to Secy of War, 

10 May, 14 Jul, and 8 Nov 80, all in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

55. GO No. 23, AGO, 9 Apr 80, in GORI&IG. The distribution of reading matter was ordered 

in 1878 and began in 1879. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 489-90; ARSecWar 1881, H. Ex. Doc. 

1, 47th Cong., 1st sess., pI. 2: 23. 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 283 

Special Investigations and Services 

One of the most important duties of inspectors general, especially while 

Belknap was in office, was to undertake special investigations and other services for the Secretary of War. Marcy, for instance, provided official opinions. 

In 1871, he evaluated the claim of an officer for commutation of fuel and 

quarters and gave his views on issues like authorizing the transportation of 

horses and on questions of relative rank. He also provided official criticisms of 

new cavalry tactics and recommended explorations of some mountains in Texas. 56 

Marcy recommended to the Secretary in 1873 that the volume and excessive 

number of returns and other paper work be reduced, especially in the 

Quartermaster's Department. Two years later, he advised the Secretary on 

review of court-martial judgments regarding officers convicted of misconduct, 

and looked into cases where accusations of intemperance had been made. In 

1877, in the case of a lieutenant convicted of negligent loss of some govemmentowned property, Marcy recommended leniency because the court record did 

not show the value of the property lost or destroyed. His advice was to uphold 

part of the man's conviction but to offer leniency in punishment. And in 1878, 

he made a special project of constructing the regulations to cover transfer of 

officers from one corps or regiment to another. He also drafted a general order 

to resolve questions of relative rank in such circumstances. 57 In a unique case, 

under orders of the Commanding General, Marcy published the annual Outline 

Description of Military Posts in 1872, usually a function of the Quartermaster 

General. The reason he did so is not apparent, for Marcy's compilation was less 

complete in its descriptive content than the Quartermaster General's Outline 

Description prepared that year. 58 

The special investigations done for the Secretary were time-consuming, and 

even Congress felt free to request them too. In 1874, the lawmakers 

requested an investigation of the expenses incurred by the territory of Dakota in 

raising volunteer forces during the Indian uprising of 1862 and also a list of 

private claims against the government. Inspector General Hardie undertook the 

work and discovered that the utter chaos of events was reflected in the equally 

chaotic records. In the end, he was able to find only about half the claims 

valid. 59 Matters of conduct were also the objects of inspectors' interest. A 

56. Marcy to Adjutant General E. D. Townsend, 4 Feb 71; to Secy of War, 8 Feb and 14 Feb 

71; and to Sherman, 4 Mar and 15 Mar 71, all in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

57. Marcy, endorsement on communications of Secy of War and QMG, 25 Sep 73; IG to Secy 

of War, 15 May 75; IG to Sacket, 21, 22, and 28 Jun 75; IG to Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock, 22 Jun 

75; IG to Col. 1. B. Fry, 28 Jun 75; Marcy to Secy of War, 6 Mar 77 and 22 Apr 78, all in Letters 

Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

58. U.S. War Department, Outline Description of the Posts and Stations of Troops in the 

Geographical Divisions and Departmellls of the United States, compiled by Inspector General 

R. B. Marcy by Order of the General in Chief of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 

1872); U.S. War Department, Quartermaster General's Office, Outline Description of u.s. Military Posts and Stations in the Year 1871 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872). 

59. Hardie's report, accompanied by 130 pages of documents, appeared as Dakota Indian War 

Claims of 1862, H. Ex . Doc. 286, 43d Cong., 1st sess. (1874). 
284 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

general order in 1874 made misbehaving officers the subjects of special 

investigations, although every attempt was made to ensure that no man be 

slandered. When an inspector had to investigate an officer, he was to inform the 

subject of the accusations and give him an opportunity to present his own case 

in writing so that it might accompany the inspector's report. 60 Consequently, 

"Rumors injurious to the reputation of an officer or liable to produce mischief 

if incorrect" were not reported by Inspectors without careful investigation and 

definite ascertainment .of facts. 

Some special investigations were impossible. In 1875 the Inspector General's 

Office tried to defend the Army in a six-year-old case, arising from the supposed delivery by a contractor of stolen cattle at Camp Supply in Indian territory. 

Working under the Secretary's orders, the inspectors general were reduced to 

asking the current post commander whether anybody in the neighborhood remembered the incident. They learned nothing, and the aggrieved owner of the cattle 

put through his claim. 61 A rare foray into engineer matters occurred at the 

surprising request of the Chief of Engineers when, in 1876, Marcy ordered 

Hardie to make a special investigation into citizens' complaints about the 

personal habits and conduct of a Corps of Engineers officer in Wisconsin. The 

next year, at the Secretary's orders, Marcy himself went to Salt Lake City, 

Utah, to look into requests of two churches for army land at Fort Douglas, to be 

used as a public cemetery. In this case, Marcy advised granting the request and 

approving the churches' plan of operation. His officers also looked into rumors 

of Indian depredations in Arizona in 1877, and discovered them to be 

unfounded. 62 

Reflecting his divided supervision, in 1878 Marcy was ordered by the 

Secretary of War and directed by the Commanding General to investigate a 

petition for conveyance of part of the reservation at Fort McHenry, Maryland, 

and to examine the possibility of reclaiming land there by filling in the harbor. 

He also made a long and detailed study for the Secretary on the issue of 

transferring the Indian Bureau from the Department of the Interior back to the 

War Department, its original location. He favored the move, citing the Army's 

previous good performance, its honesty, and the location of its posts in Indian 

country. In other investigations that year, Marcy examined the availability of 

quarters at Washington Arsenal, and the feasibility of moving interred bodies 

from the post cemetery at Fort McHenry to a national cemetery (he favored the 

move). Acting under the Secretary's orders, Col. Roger Jones made a special 

investigation into charges that the civilian superintendent of the national cemetery at Winchester, Virginia, was a drunkard and a gambler. Jones declared the 

charges unfounded and the superintendent a model citizen63 

60. GO No . 5, AGO, 23 Jan 74, in GORI&IG. 

61. IG to CO, Camp Supply, 12 Oct 75, and IG, Ind on Inspector General Hardie's Report, 

n.d. Dec 75, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

62. Marcy, Ind on Ltr of Chief of Engineers, n.d. Feb 76, and Marcy to Secy of War, 28 Sep 

76, both in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159; ARIG 1877, 54. 

63. Marcy to Adjutant General E.D. Townsend, 4 Mar and 25 Jul 78; Marcy endorsement on 

communication from Capt. J.e. Breckinridge, 25 Oct 78; Marcy to Sherman, 16 Nov 78; Jones to AG, 

9 Dec 78, all in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 285 

The department stayed busy in the area of special investigations, usually at 

the Secretary's behest. When citizens in New Mexico accused Bvt. Maj . Gen. 

Edward Hatch of dereliction of duty and various sorts of negligence in association with the uprising of Apaches under Victorio, Marcy dispatched Maj. John 

J. Coppinger, an acting assistant inspector general, to investigate. Coppinger 

declared the charges baseless and Hatch's record commendable. Marcy himself 

went to investigate conflicts of authority reported to the Secretary at Washington Arsenal. He found that petty feuding occurred there between artillery and 

ordnance officers because of a divided command. That, he said, was an invitation for trouble. The two commanding officers were irreconcilable, and unless 

one was moved out or a field officer put over them, there was no possibility of 

any harmony developing . 64 The artillery commander at Washington Arsenal 

was Capt. Joseph C. Breckinridge. Marcy did not know it, but Breckinridge 

would eventually become an inspector general and succeed him as the head of 

the inspectorate. In the interim, when Marcy examined ungarrisoned Fort 

McHenry 's fitness to house troops in May 1880, he suggested moving 

Breckinridge's unit there to end the divided command at Washington Arsenal. 

That would also free space at the latter location for a national repository of the 

nation's official records. 65 

Special investigations continued a varied responsibility throughout Marcy's 

term. During June of 1880, at the Secretary's orders, Jones examined complaints about the quality of the men's food at Fort Whipple, Virginia. The 

Secretary had received an anonymous letter, but Jones found few complaints 

among the soldiers. Marcy undertook his last special investigation in December 

1880, when the Secretary sent him to Fort Wingate, New Mexico, to see what 

additional buildings were needed there. As with most other special investigations, 

that was something that could more economically have been determined by the 

local inspector, but it showed how thoroughly the inspectors general remained 

the personal agents of the Secretary of War.

66 

Property Inspections 

The inspectors' secretarial assignments were varied and unpredictable. More 

enduring, and in their view more important, was their responsibility for the 

Army's property and its management---especially its condemnation when 

unserviceable . That responsibility grew steadily and came into its own during 

Marcy's tenure. In 1870, Marcy reviewed and clarified the procedures for 

boards of survey determining the condition of property, especially as they 

64. Special Report of Major J. J. Coppinger, Actg Asst IG, in ARComGell, H. Ex . Doc. 1, 

46th Cong., 3d sess., vol. 1, pI. 2: 104-05; Marcy to Secy of War, 11 Feb 80, in Letters 

Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

65. Marcy to General of the Army , 10 May 80, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

66. Jones to Marcy, 18 Jun 80, and Marcy to Secy of War, 28 Dec 80, in Letters Sent 

1863- 1889, RG 159. Jones' letter was a rare instance of an inspector on special assignment 

reporting to Marcy instead of to the Secretary directly . 
286 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

affected an officer's accountability. The regulations, he admitted, were vague. 

That same year, at the Secretary's request, Marcy gave the Adjutant General's 

Office a clarification of the relative roles of inspectors and boards of survey. 

One was not a substitute for the other, he pointed out. While inspectors condemned property, boards fixed responsibility for any damage or loss. 67 

By 1875, the property condemnation activities of inspectors had produced 

enough information to support a general order declaring that the troops were 

not taking care of the Army's goods. The order enjoined greater care and 

supervision, especially over weapons. Property was to be brought before an 

inspector only if it was unserviceable, not merely because it was ugly. Objects 

going to depots were to be packed carefully to avoid further injury. Inspectors 

general, when inspecting unserviceable property, also were to report whether 

the responsible officers had exercised "due care." Finally, only obsolete arms 

and ammunition could be sold, not any ,45-caliber weapons or ammunition. 

Another order that year forbade condemnation of canteens merely because the 

covers, straps, or corks were worn out or missing. Troops were to repair such 

damages, while officers were to make timely requisitions for replacement parts. 68 

An 1876 order stated that the copies of property inventory and inspection 

reports, required since 1869 to be kept in inspectors' offices at division and 

department headquarters, were no longer required. In 1877, the Secretary ordered 

that all public property found by inspectors to be worthless and without monetary value was to be destroyed in the concerned inspector's presence. "The 

action of an Inspector, on property of this character," said the order, "will be 

final, and his inspection report on the same will be a valid voucher for the 

officer responsible for the property. In the discharge of the duty devolved upon 

Inspectors in this regulation, they are reminded they will continue to be regarded 

as answerable that their action is proper and judicious according to the circumstances of the case.' ,69 That measure was undoubtedly a relief to hundreds of 

property-managing officers, but it increased the burden of accountability resting on inspectors general. Later in 1877, another order instructed medical 

officers to ensure that hospital bedding and other property was not used for 

other than hospital purposes, or outside hospital buildings. All borrowed property was to be returned to hospitals, and an accounting made to the Surgeon 

General. "Inspectors will carefully note and report every instance in which 

these orders are violated or neglected," warned the Secretary of War. 70 

Orders governing property continued to multiply. In 1878 orders declared 

that property condemned by an inspector, or by a board of survey, could not be 

purchased by the officer accountable for it or by any officer involved in the 

condemnation. Another order said that articles of clothing found incomplete but 

in good condition could not be presented to an inspector for condemnation, but 

67. Marcy, Ind, 15 Jan 70, and Marcy, Ind on Communication of General Schofield, 24 Jan 

70, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

68. GO No . 55, AGO, 29 Apr 75, and GO No. 58, AGO, 11 May 75, in GORI&IG. 

69. GO No. 40, AGO, 11 May 76, and GO No. 85, AGO, 8 Sep 77, in GORI&IG. 

70. GO No. 99, AGO, 22 Oct 77, in GORI&IG. 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 287 

should be returned to a depot for completion, or fixed locally. The next year, 

the advertisement and sale of condemned horses was limited to a ten-day period; 

if the condemned animals were not sold, they were to be shot on the eleventh 

day. The Quartermaster General was to be informed of either event. Inspectors 

were to exercise greater care in branding the animals "I.e.," which meant 

Inspected-Condemned. Meanwhile, Roger Jones discovered that many officers 

avoided the condemnation process by transferring worn-out goods to depots; he 

thought such objects should go before an inspector before transfer. Finally, in 

1880 two new orders required boards of survey to examine damaged property at 

depots before presenting it to an inspector. 71 

Disbursing Accounts 

Long before Marcy left office, the inspectors general had become the War 

Department's chief agency for safeguarding its public property. They had also 

become the chief examiners of the thousands of separate financial accounts kept 

by disbursing officers. In early 1872, the department distributed the Department of the Treasury's "Instruction Relative to Public Moneys and Official 

Checks of United States Disbursing Officers." Further orders the next year 

required that reports of inspections of the accounts of disbursing officers were 

to be filed where they could be reviewed by the commander ordering the 

inspections. Any discrepancies between officers' statements and inspectors' 

verifications were to be reported to the Adjutant General via the Inspector 

General in Washington. Under those orders, inspectors scrutinized the accounts 

of all disbursing officers, verifying them against statements from the Treasury 

and from authorized money depositories. Marcy complained that some of the 

depositories, mostly regional banks, did not furnish statements. Nevertheless, 

he thought the system would prevent losses to the government, "and it is 

gratifying to state that no embezzlement and but three cases of misapplication 

of funds have been reported during the year, the latter being small sums which 

probably will not result in ~ny loss to the Government. ,,72 

In April 1874, Congress directed the Secretary of War to audit the books of 

all officers handling appropriated money. The audits were to be done by inspectors general or others detailed for that purpose, provided the latter were not 

connected with the department or corps making the disbursements. The requirement greatly expanded the duties of the Inspector General's Department. At 

first the law was interpreted as requiring monthly inspections, but that was soon 

changed to inspections once every two months. A flurry of orders finally settled 

on requiring six examinations of every account in a year. Besides the monstrous 

work load, inspectors found themselves liable for any frauds or losses which 

71. GO No. 45, AGO, 2 Jul 78; GO No. 89, AGO, 9 Dec 78; GO No. 35, AGO, 26 Mar 79; 

GO No. 29, AGO, 29 Apr 80; and GO No. 79, AGO, 2 Dec 80, all in GORI&IG; and Jones to AG, 

15 Sep 79, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

72. GO No. I, AGO, 9 Jan 72, and Cir, AGO, 25 Jun 73, conveying and elaborating on GO 

No. 87, in GORI&IG; ARlG 1873, 86-87. 
288 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

"an active vigilance on their part might have detected"- a novel and distressing transfer of culpability from an embezzler to his examiner. This ignored the 

fact that inspectors were not public accountants or auditors, but merely observers of whether officers complied with the law in keeping books and making 

deposits. 73 

Examinations of accounts were the prime occupation of inspectors general 

by 1875, and most of their correspondence related to that activity. The exceedingly dull routine revealed only a few minor discrepancies, and was interrupted 

when disbursing officers occasionally were not present when they should have 

been and had to be summoned for their audits. Uncooperative depositories and 

unhelpful Treasury Department operatives were reported to the Secretary of 

War. The following year, Marcy could only say that the procedure had revealed 

that accounts were kept well and that money was handled properly. Recent 

changes in travel cost compensation procedures, however, had complicated matters unnecessarily. In reality, reports of account inspections were not always 

being made, so Marcy persuaded the Secretary to specifically order department 

commanders to require regular inspections. And to his relief, in July the Secretary changed the inspection schedule from a bimonthly one to a quarterly one .

74 

"These inspections," Marcy said in 1877, "have promoted care in the system 

of keeping accounts, as well as having inculcated a more faithful compliance 

with the laws and the Treasury regulations affecting disbursements and deposits. " 

To that end, the Secretary told division commanders to order inspections of the 

accounts of officers not under their commands but within their territory; that 

is, at facilities of staff departments. The burden on the inspectors increased 

steadily, but only occasionally did they find anything wrong, other than clerical 

errors (all "promptly rectified," reported Marcy). In 1880, Inspector Nelson 

Davis alone examined disbursements exceeding $4 million, and felt compelled 

to call for a uniform system of keeping cash and checkbooks. 75 

No matter how the inspectors general justified their existence as the alter 

ego of the Army's commander, the growing burden of account inspections 

increasingly compelled them to move from purely military concerns to those of 

the Secretary in regard to financial economy and propriety. The Army's disbursements were large enough, and scattered among so many recipients, that 

some sort of regular supervision was essential. But the institution of account 

inspections after 1874 was undoubtedly excessive; it is questionable whether 

the total saved in corrected errors and the rare detections of fraud equaled the 

73 . An Act to provide for the inspection of the disbursements of appropriations made by officers 

of the Army, Statutes at Large 18.3, sec . 1,33 (1874); GO No. 33, AGO, 28 Apr 74, GO No . 45 , 

AGO, 22 May 74 , and GO No. 64, AGO, 23 Jun 74, all in GORI&IG; AR/G 1874, H. Ex. Doc. I, 

43d Cong., 2d sess., pI. 2, 1:93. 

74. IG USA to Secy of War, 24 Nov 74, and reams of letters and endorsements in the months 

following , and AG, identical letters to all department and division commanders, 13 Jul 76, in 

Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159; ARIG 1876, 76; GO No. 67 , AGO, 25 Jul 76 , in GORI&IG. 

75. ARIG 1877, 54; Adjutant General E. D. Townsend, identical letters to department and 

division commanders, 20 Dec 77 , in Letters Sent 1863-1899, RG 159;ARIG 1878, 31 ;ARIG 1880, 

49. 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 289 

cost of the inspections. Not only did the system tum the inspectorate into an 

auditing service, it was insulting to the Army as a whole. There were some 

dishonest men in uniform, as there were in any group, but the vast majority of 

officers were honest and conscientious. Many of them were young and prone to 

make errors, for no person could ever grasp all of the Army's complicated 

accounting procedures, but they were not as a group likely to plunder the public 

treasury. Nevertheless, as the years passed, the inspectors general began to 

emphasize increasingly the importance of their accounting work. That was to a 

great extent a means of building a reputation as necessary by catering to the 

economical sentiments of politicians. In due course, account inspection would 

be presented as a principal justification for the inspectorate, with the unfortunate implication that, but for the inspectors general, the Army's officers would 

send the country into bankruptcy. Given that attitude, it is not surprising that 

inspectors general also complained increasingly that officers resisted inspection. 

Other Occupations of the Inspectors 

Account examinations were not the only paramilitary occupation of the 

inspectors general. Throughout the 1870s they remained the authors of the 

Subsistence Department's sales list. In 1872, Marcy reviewed the history of the 

abolition of sutlers in 1866-1867 and of the sales list, considering whether post 

traders might be done away with. He thought it might be useful for the Subsistence Department to carry all items then stocked by traders, but they lacked the 

storage space. Nevertheless, he advised expanding the list beyond its present 

seventy-two items. 76 

The inspectors general's control over the list gained the inspectors attention 

from the growing processed food industry. In a typical encounter, early in 1880 

Marcy received political pressure urging upon him the merits of Tobin's Chili 

Sauce and "Florida Orange Marmalade." He politely turned the proffers aside 

with a promise to investigate the goods. Somewhat later, the inspectors general 

acceded to the Commissary General's request that canned crabs and shrimp be 

substituted for lobster when desired. In Marcy's last connection with the list, 

the Inspectors General unanimously turned down a request for additions that 

they believed similar to items already carried. The Secretary of War concurred. 77 

That the entire body of inspectors general could spend weeks debating whether 

to add a bottle of chili sauce to the list might now seem remarkable, but it was a 

matter of law. The list was certainly a wasteful use of their time, but it reflected 

the rather vague ideas Congress and the War Department continued to hold 

about what inspectors general were for. Simply put, they were handed whatever 

did not neatly fit someone else's pigeonhole, or were told to act when an 

76. Marcy , " Memorandum upon the subject of supply Officers and enlisted men of the Army 

with Articles not pertaining to the Army ration ," n.d. Jul 72, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

77. Marcy to Hon. C. Upson, House of Representatives, 5 Jan 80, Marcy to Mr. L. Warrock, 

15 Jan 80, and increasing correspondence from industry in succeeding months, all in Letters Sent 

1863-1889, RG 159. 
290 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

independent voice in someone else's activity (in the present case, that of 

Subsistence) was thought to be desirable. Nor was the devotion of high talent to 

something like the sales list unremarkable at the time. This was the same U.S. 

Army in which a broken teacup had to be accounted for separately, taken before 

an inspector, condemned, and disposed of-with a form for every move-before 

it could leave some unfortunate officer's accountability. Although the inspectors general might deliberate over the matter, the Secretary of War himself had 

to give the sales list his personal attention and final approval. 

Much more estimable than subsistance minutiae was the growing system of 

national cemeteries. The Secretary of War directed in 1876 that division commanders order the inspectors general assigned to their commands to inspect all 

seventy-three national cemeteries, and send their reports to the Inspector General in Washington. The "whole subject" was consolidated in the Quartermaster's Department, but inspectors general were to make annual inspections 

"in the course of their tours of inspection." The Secretary sent Marcy himself 

out the next year to visit some cemeteries, and he returned with simple, detailed 

physical descriptions but few recommendations. He was by that time saying 

repeatedly in his annual report that the cemeteries were "in excellent order" 

and that the superintendents were doing their jobs well. It was obvious by 1879 

that the cemetery visits were a waste of the inspectors' time, so the Secretary 

ordered the annual examinations dispensed with, unless specifically ordered. 

Soon thereafter, inspectors were told to examine post cemeteries when they 

inspected military postS. 78 

Another miscellaneous duty of the inspectors general was the United States 

Military Prison, established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under legislation 

passed in 1873. The law establishing the prison required that "one of the 

inspectors of the Army shall, at least once in three months, visit the prison" to 

make a complete inspection. Most of the quarterly inspections during the 1870s 

were made by Marcy himself, as the Secretary of War directed. The growing 

institution employed the latest in penology, the men well housed and increasingly 

productive in making things like shoes, chairs, and kitchenware for the Army. 

Marcy was enthusiastic about the place, and never found anything to complain 

about. If he ever had any influence on its operations, it is not evident in his 

reports, which over a seven-year period read very much alike. 79 The inspectors 

general examined the Military Prison because the law told them to. Unlike the 

commissary sales list, the prison was something that both Congress and the 

Secretary of War believed to be very important. Therefore they wanted the best 

information about it, from a reliable source . 

78. AG, identical letters to division commanders, 3 Aug 76; AG to Marcy, 16 May 77, and 

Marcy to Secy of War, 6 Jun 77, all in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159; ARIG 1876, 74-75; ARIG 

1878,32; ARIG 1879,32; GO No. 68, AGO, 25 Jui 76, GO No. 84, AGO, 14 Aug 79, Cir, AGO, 

29 Sep 79, and GO No. 61, AGO, 18 Jun 79, all in GORI&IG. 79. An Act to provide for the establishment of a military prison andfor its government, Statutes 

at Large 17, sec. 5, 582 (1873); Thian, Legislative History, 113; GO No. 12, AGO, 19 Feb 77, in 

GORI&IG; ARIG 1878, 32; ARIG 1879, 32; Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 291 

Something not held in as high regard during the 1870s was the potential 

wartime army represented in the National Guard and the expanding range of 

colleges or universities offering military instruction. To most regular officers, 

the growing National Guard was nothing more than the discredited militia with 

a new label. It was, in fact, something else, because it was completely voluntary. 

Military formations began to appear in one state after another in the 1870s, 

manned by young men from society's middle and upper reaches and fueled with 

a remarkable military spirit that sometimes appalled their war-weary elders. 

They did their best to train and equip themselves, and endeavored to attain 

proficiency. In 1879 they formed the National Guard Association to serve as 

their political lobby, and increasingly the Guard asked for attention from the 

Regular Army. However, it received no such notice for most of the 1870s, 

except for occasional expressions of disdain. But the great national railway 

strikes of 1877 brought the Regular Army into an unaccustomed role, that of 

keeping civil order. Few regular officers thought that the Army was well 

adapted for that role. Over the next few years, their professional journals filled 

with talk about civil disorders, but the regulars were happy enough to leave the 

job to the National Guard. The guardsmen prospered from public fears of 

radicals and anarchists, who were blamed often for labor unrest, and spent 

about a third of their time after 1877 on strike duty. Marcy's son-in-law McClellan perceived as early as 1878 that the Guard might have a greater value than he 

presumed and he urged federal assistance and support for the developing new 

units. 80 

The Regular Army's official involvement with the National Guard began 

only at the end of Marcy's time. During the summer of 1880, the Secretary sent 

Roger Jones to attend the encampment of the Connecticut National Guard. 

Jones' long report was favorable to what he had seen, although not by any 

means uncritical. His most important recommendation was that the officers 

spend more time studying tactics. 81 The National Guard became a subject of 

increasing importance for the Inspectors General after Marcy's time. Another 

such matter was military education in the colleges. Marcy himself initiated the 

Army's first attention to that subject early in 1880, when the Secretary dispatched him to four colleges in Pennsylvania where army officers served on the 

faculties. Colleges and officers, he said, both were doing their part. Because 

Pennsylvania's quota of officers had been exceeded, Marcy recommended 

removing one from a certain college because it had two West Point graduates 

on its civilian faculty. 82 

80. McClellan quoted in Frederick P. Todd, "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its 

History ," Military Affairs, 5 (1941): 159. Besides Todd's article, the foregoing summary is based 

on Graham A. Cosmas, "From Order to Chaos: The War Department, the National Guard, and 

Military Policy, 1898," Military Affairs, 29 (fall 1965): 105-21. 

81. Jones to AG, 6 Sep 80, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

82. Marcy to Secy of War, 9 Feb 80, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. After 1880, college 

inspections grew in response to the need to keep track of the federal property at the institutions. 
292 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Things like the property procedures and the national cemeteries were important objects of the inspectors' attention during the 1870s, but Marcy and his 

associates were military men first. It was the men of the Army who claimed 

first place in their attention. The inspectorate continued on its rounds among the 

posts and garrisons throughout Marcy's tenure, looking into every aspect of 

soldier life and military affairs. But they did so from a perspective formed in 

the "old army" before the Civil War. Winds of change were blowing in the 

1870s, especially in the management of the enlisted men. Marcy, for one, did 

not approve of all that was beginning to happen in the Army. 83 

The Old Soldier Retires 

Marcy's views on reform were, characteristically, a rearguard action, with 

his trying vainly to preserve the memory of the rugged past from the advance of 

changing times. He was too much a soldier of the old army to adapt happily to 

the conditions of the new army. He must have found one cause for satisfaction 

as he faced retirement, beyond his stabilization of the Inspector General's 

Department and the elevation of its chief to brigadier general. The permanent 

officers behind him on the scale of seniority were, in order, Delos B. Sacket, 

Nelson H. Davis, and Absalom Baird. They also were veterans of the old army. 

Marcy could be confident that they would keep the faith, defending the old 

virtues from the frivolities of the new generation. 

Marcy retired from the Army 2 January 1881. He left behind him an 

Inspector General's Department, or at least the makings of one, something the 

Army had never formally had before. It was up to his successors to preserve the 

department and to define its mission more fully. For whatever he accomplished, 

Marcy had not really forged a systematic organization. Although he had systematized many things, especially property procedures, and had ensured his 

organization's permanence, inspection itself had not been improved. In his own 

service as an inspector, he was inclined to act on his personal sentiments, rather 

than on an objective examination of what was before him. He remained too 

much the man of action to measure up to Joseph P. Sanger's description of the 

ideal inspector: "The best characteristic of an inspector next to thoroughness is 

impartiality and absolute reticence," wrote future inspector Sanger in 1880. 

" He should remember that it is his duty simply to examine and report facts, and 

that if he forms opinions they are to be expressed first to his general, or the 

officer who ordered the inspection. ,,84 As it happened, Inspector General Marcy 

too often had proven unable to so contain himself, although he remained an 

estimable man . A general order on 3 January 1881 announcing his retirement 

83. On army reform generally in the I 870s see Donna Marie Thomas, Army Reform in America: 

The Crucial Years, 1876-1881 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1981), and Donna 

Thomas, " Ambrose E. 'Burnside and Army Reform, 1850-1881 ," Rhode Islalld History , 37 

(1978): 3-13. 

84. J. P. Sanger, "The Duties of Staff Officers," United Service, 2 (June 1880): 754-73. 

Edmund Schriver retired immediately after Marcy, and therefore is not listed above among Marcy's 

successors . 
MARCY AND THE ADVENT OF THE DEPARTMENT 293 

said that ' 'throughout his long period of constant duty, the career of BrigadierGeneral Marcy has been marked by distinguished military service. " The bestknown inspector general after Steuben, "military counsellor" and storyteller, 

popular author and noted big-game hunter, old soldier from the old army, 

Randolph B. Marcy retired to West Orange, New Jersey, where he died 2 

November 1887.

85 

85 . GO No . 1, 3 Jan 81, in GORI&IG; ARIG 1881, 75; DAB , 6: 274. 
CHAPTER 17 

Passing of the Old Guard 

(1881-1889) 

When Marcy left the Army in 1881, the military force was scattered among 

190 posts, 16 arsenals, 3 recruiting depots, and an engineer depot. Eighty-four 

of those installations were on the Great Lakes or the Atlantic or Gulf Coasts; 11 

were on the Pacific coast; and the remaining 115 were scattered inland. The 

Army was still very much in a posture to fight the Indian Wars of the 1860s and 

1870s. 1 The needs of its scattered condition were diminishing rapidly. Yet, 

pressures against redeployment prevented any immediate readjustment to the 

new circumstances. Concurrent with the fading of the frontier came the first 

pressures for institutional reform and reorganization necessary to meet the 

perceived demands of the new era. 

Portents of Reform 

Nothing else in its administrative history was so reflective of the Army's 

difficulty in breaking with the past than its lack of a modem code of regulations. 

Two full decades had elapsed since the last revision of the general regulations. 

The previous edition, based on earlier rules of the 1840s, had appeared in 1861, 

followed by only a simple reissue with minor amendments two years later. That 

volume remained in force until 1881, but was increasingly inapt. At least three 

times since the Civil War, efforts had been made to develop a new code of 

regulations, but they were frustrated repeatedly by bureaucratic and political 

turmoil during the period of Reconstruction. The difficulties grew out of the 

ceaseless debates over the size of the permanent military establishment. The 

stalemate was finally broken by the appropriations act of 23 June 1879, authorizing and directing the Secretary of War to codify and establish all regulations 

and orders in force. The U. S. Army therefore marked the advent of its modernization with the publication, in 1881, of a new edition of its general regulations. 2 

For the inspectorate, the new regulations offered little that was new. They 

were in fact much the same as those of 1863, adding changes made by general 

1. ARComGen 1881, H. Ex. Doc. I, 47th Cong., 1st sess. , vol. I, pt.2: 36. 

2. U.S. War Department, Regulations of the Army of the United States and General Orders in 

Force on the 17th of February 1881 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881) (hereafter 

cited as 1881 Regulations). 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 295 

order during the 1870s. Substantially they described the schedules of inspections by inspectors general and various commanding officers. Inspectors still 

were not to give orders unless expressly authorized, nor were they to indulge in 

"informal conversation" regarding their inspections. As they had been for 

some time by orders, inspectors were enjoined from using hearsay against 

individuals or organizations. In investigating charges, they were to offer the 

accused an opportunity to present his own case. Otherwise, the new regulations 

concisely listed the subjects of inspections of posts and troops. Marcy's former 

emphasis on reporting the Indian situation was dropped, except for a general 

reference to the number and disposition of Indian tribes. The detailed text's 

guidance for quarterly inspections of disbursements, transports, and condemned 

property, however, had increased in a reflection of that growing part of an 

inspector's sphere. 3 

Breckinridge Joins the Department 

General Marcy's departure marked a period of change for the Inspector 

General's Department. Edmund Schriver also retired in January, being over 

sixty-two years old and therefore eligible for the retired list. For the first time in 

many years, that created a vacancy in the Inspector General's Department. 4 

Delos B. Sacket, next after Schriver in the order of seniority, was Marcy's 

proper successor. There was, however, some unexplained delay in his 

confirmation. Not until 20 April did the War Department announce his assignment as senior inspector general, effective 2 January (the date Marcy left); he 

had, however, been in the Washington office since January. The same order 

announced that Capt. Joseph C. Breckinridge of the 2d Artillery had been 

appointed assistant inspector general with the rank of major, to date from 19 

January, replacing Schriver. Breckinridge was assigned to the Military Division of the Pacific, after an orientation in Washington. 5 

Breckinridge was the artillery officer who had been unable to get along with 

his Ordnance counterpart at Washington Arsenal during the 1870s. As that 

incident suggested, he was a man of strong will, sensitive about his prerogatives and determined to have his own way. Born in Maryland and raised in 

Kentucky, he was a member of Kentucky's most prominent family. His relatives figured on both sides of the Civil War in military and political capacities, 

and others were represented in state and national politics and journalism. Breckinridge joined the Army as lieutenant and aide-de-camp of volunteers in 1861, 

then accepted a regular commission as a second lieutenant of the 2d Artillery in 

1862. He was captured before Atlanta fell and spent the last months of the war 

as a prisoner. A lieutenant by the end of the war, he did not become a captain 

3. 1881 Regulations, passim. 

· 4. AR1G 1881, H. Ex. Doc. t, 47th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 1, pI. 2: 75. ARIG 1881 says that 

Schriver was retired 19 January; Heitman, Historical Register, I: 866, dates it 4 January , two days 

after Marcy's departure. 

5. GO No. 37, AGO, 20 Apr 81; ARIG 1881 , 74, 75. 
296 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

until 1874, and moved from that position to his majority in the Inspector 

General's Department seven years later. He earned two brevets for "gallant and 

meritorious service" during the Civil War. 6 

Breckinridge's personality would become more apparent later. For the 

moment, he was a harbinger of change in the Inspector General's Department, 

whose other officers had been secure in their positions since the Civil War. All 

were growing older, and none had personally commanded troops since the war. 

Breckinridge, however, like the acting inspectors, was a troop commander, 

sensitive to the realities of life in troop units and isolated garrisons. Moreover, 

he was an artillerist, whose men suffered the Army's worst conditions, men 

dismayed by an absence of clear identity as artillerists, indifferently trained, 

and most likely required to inhabit those man-made caves, the casemates, at the 

major fortifications. Breckinridge was very much in touch with the Army, and 

he was inclined to use his position to do something about what he believed was 

wrong. 

Breckinridge's arrival was accompanied by a general reorganization of the 

inspectorate. Baird had spent so long in the West that he fairly begged to be 

assigned to the Washington office. Sacket agreed, although Baird's presence in 

the head office would leave few permanent officers out among the Army. In 

April 1881 Sacket told the Secretary of War that he would prefer to have all his 

officers at headquarters, where they would be available for special assignments. 

The Inspector General's Department was too small, had been "for many 

decades," he said, and in the circumstances, central assignment would be most 

advisable. 7 The Secretary concurred, but only in part. Baird was established as 

assistant in the Inspector General's Office as of 1 July 1881. Thereafter, he was 

in charge of the office whenever the senior inspector was out of town. The 

Secretary would not allow concentration of the entire department there, however. 

Breckinridge went to the Division of the Pacific on the same day, and Jones, 

who had been in Washington for a long time, to the Division of the Atlantic. 

Davis moved from the Atlantic to the Division of the Missouri, which had been 

established since the late 1860s as the proper place for the second-most senior 

inspector general. 8 

Sacket was the nominal head of his department, but his authority to dispose 

of its staff as he thought fit was limited. The Secretary believed that the greater 

number of the permanent inspectors should be assigned to the divisions to 

pursue regular duties. In order to meet this requirement, the inspectorate relied 

upon the four acting inspectors general who had been authorized since 1874. 

These men were used to fill the additional spaces which required an inspector in 

excess of authorized IG strength. One of these officers detailed as an acting 

inspector got into a situation which led Sacket early in his tenure to make a case 

for independence for all inspectors. In January 1881, this officer, assigned as a 

6. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 242. 

7. Sacket, Ind on application of Lt. Col. Baird , 16 Apr 81, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

8. ARIG 1881 , 74-75. 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 297 

departmental inspector in the Military Division of the Missouri, had to comment unfavorably on an action of the colonel commanding the regiment to 

which he would return after his detail. This obviously posed an uncomfortable 

and embarrassing conflict of interest to both officers. The Inspector General's 

Office, acting after a strong comment from Baird, went to the Commanding 

General to request an end to details of line officers as inspectors in departments 

where their regiments and permanent commanders were located. 9 

Most of Sacket's first year on the job was taken up with ordinary matters. 

He wrote to the four acting assistant inspectors general in March to advise 

them, while inspecting troops, to identify officers especially qualified for special details such as staff assignments, surveys, and the like. In May, responding 

to a request, Sacket submitted a thorough plan for simplification of the Army's 

profuse returns, rolls, books, and other paper work. His suggestions, however, 

were limited only to format; they would have eliminated or consolidated 

nothing. 10 Because he was not willing to commence his job with major challenges to the existing order, the new senior inspector looked first to his 

surroundings. The appropriations act of 3 March 1881 allowed him one clerk of 

class four, and one assistant messenger, for a total payroll of $2,520. He asked 

for more, to put his office on the "same status" as other staff offices, because 

he found the repeated need to borrow clerks from other departments humiliating. 

"The officers of this department are gentlemen of rank and of many years' 

service, and their status should not be that of beggars," he said. 11 

Sacket also asked, not surprisingly, for a larger complement of officers for 

the Inspector General's Department, requesting nine additional majors. In contrast to the Marcy years, when the department was in repeated danger of 

vanishing from sight, Sacket's first year brought him welcome help. Secretary 

of War Robert Todd Lincoln supported his views, urging that the nine officers 

be allowed. Then, each division and department would have one inspector. 12 

General Sherman concurred most heartily with Sacket's request, asking further 

that the President be allowed to select any additions to the Inspector General's 

Department from the majors as well as the captains of the line. 13 Thus did 

Sacket's campaign to increase his department receive some hope of success late 

in 1882. The House Committee on Military Affairs took issue on 27 December 

with the Adjutant General's interpretation of the 1870 law promoting Marcy. 

The Adjutant General contended that the measure would abolish the rank of 

colonel behind the senior inspector general, leaving the department with I 

brigadier general, 2 lieutenant colonels, and 2 majors. The committee reviewed 

the history of the Inspector General's Department and the repeated assertions of 

9. Roger Jones to General of the Army , 29 Jan 81, in Letters Sent 1863-1881, RG 159. 

10. Sacket to Sir, 10 Mar 81, and Sacket to AG, 24 May 81, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 

159. 

11. GO No . 28, AGO, 12 Mar 81 , in GORI&IG; ARIG 1881,80. Sacket asked for $4,800 per 

year to hire three clerks at the division headquarters. 

12. ARSecWar1881, 7. 

13. ARComGefl 1881,34-35. 
298 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

the War Department that more officers were needed. The committee foresaw 

consolidation of the Army's posts, and suggested that a total of 9 officers would 

suffice. In substitution for an alternative bill, which the committee thought had 

too many colonels and lieutenant colonels, it proposed a complement of 1 

colonel, 2 lieutenant colonels, and 5 majors under the senior inspector general. 14 

Sacket did some inspecting, of a sort, on his own in 1882, and played a small 

part in a significant development in the history of conservation in the United 

States. He accompanied General Sheridan on a tour of the most scenic parts of 

Sheridan's Division of the Missouri during August and September and was 

particularly taken by Yellowstone National Park, which he called "Wonder 

Land" in his annual report. The reservation was then a decade old, and indifferently administered. When Sacket returned from his long journey (3,307 miles, 

mostly by train) he found himself regarded as an authority on the first national 

park. At the end of the year Senator Benjamin Harrison asked him his opinion 

on a number of issues affecting Yellowstone, including proposed leases of land 

there and its transportation and management requirements. The Inspector General recommended in the strongest terms the stationing of troops in the park to 

fight forest fires and to protect the thermal wonders. A troop of cavalry would 

suffice, he said. Based on this, on 17 August 1886, one troop of cavalry arrived 

in the park, and thr~e days later its captain became acting superintendent. That 

was the start of national park management by the Army that would continue 

until the establishment of the National Park Service in 1916. The military not 

only protected the growing number of parks from fire and trespass, and regulated visitors, but it also undertook the construction of roads and other improvements and supervised private development by permittees. That history all started 

with Sacket's junket to "Wonder Land" in 1882. 15 

Success for the Inspector General's Department seemed assured in 1883, 

when Sacket was listed casually among those bureau chiefs entitled to receive 

copies of orders and circulars issued by division and geographic department 

headquarters. However, little else was new because the bills to expand the 

department failed in a short session of Congress, causing Sacket to issue another 

plea for more officers. His permanent complement remained where they had 

been sent in 1881, and all posts were inspected. Sacket revealed how he was 

able to circumvent the law limiting the number of officers detailed to inspection 

to four. Department commanders assigned four others to serve as acting assistant inspectors general. 16 ... Near the end of the year, Breckinridge made a 

14. Inspector General's Departmellt of the Army, H. Rpt. 1839, 47th Cong., 2d sess. (1882). 

The Army and Navy Joumai gave extended treatment to the committee's finding that the Inspector 

General's Department should be increased by additional majors. Army and Navy Journal, 20 (30 

December 1882): 486-87. 

IS. ARlG 1882 , 76-77; Sacket to G. G. Vest, U. S. Senate, 3 Jan 83, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, 

RG 159. The principal study of the Army 's administration of the National Parks is H. Duane 

Hampton , HolY the U.S. Cavalry Saved Ollr National Parks (Bloomington: Indiana University 

Press, 1971). 

16. GO No. 76, AGO, 24 Oct 83, in GORI&IG; ARIG 1883, H. Ex . Doc. I, 48th Cong., 1st 

sess., vol. I, pt.2: 98-103. On the last day of the year, the annual inspection of posts by commanders was clarified further. Cir, AGO, 31 Dec 83, referring to letter, 19 Dec 83, 4915 AGO, 1883, in 

GORI&IG. 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 299 

suggestion that revealed viewpoints in the Inspector General's Department 

indicative of the growing difference between officers of the old army and those 

of the new army. The weekly inspection of companies had been scheduled for 

Sunday since 1841, after a brief period in the 1830s when Macomb had given 

the men a day off. Breckinridge believed that an unnecessary and onerous 

imposition upon the soldiers, and proposed that it be moved to Thursday. 

Sacket opposed any such change, and compared the Sunday ritual to the sprucing up of children on that day in civilian family life. Breckinridge let the matter 

rest there, but he did not forget it. 17 

Sacket's hopes for expansion of his department revived early in 1884, when 

the House Committee on Military Affairs expressed its belief that the present 

force was grossly inadequate for its assignment. More generous than before, 

the committee recommended increasing the permanent force to 11 officers-l 

brigadier general, 2 colonels, 2 lieutenant colonels, and 6 majors-and wanted 

to lift the ceiling on details from the line . The department's majors, said the 

committee, should be promoted from among the captains of the line, and "all 

other promotions [including those to brigadier general] shall be by seniority in 

the corps." Almost echoing Marcy, the committee expressed the opinion that 

inspectors should be permanent and of sufficiently high rank. "In one word," 

said the panel's report, "the inspection of officers of high rank by those far 

below them is liable to be accompanied by circumstances which may prejudice 

good order and military discipline ." 18 However, nothing came of the congressional activity. The only change in the Inspector General's Department in 1884 

was the dispatch of Breckinridge to his home on sick leave in May. A lieutenant 

colonel of infantry was detailed to substitute for him. Sacket again said nearly 

every post was inspected, and that things as usual were greatly improving. 

Target practice, he said, had received increasing emphasis, with good results. 

Sacket had managed an increase in his clerical force that year: 1 class-four 

clerk, 1 class-one clerk, and 1 assistant messenger, for a payroll of $3,725-

but he said it was not enough, and again "request[ed] that some prompt action 

be taken to afford the relief so urgently demanded." 19 

The Department Enlarged and Ratified 

Sacket's request that additions be made to his department was finally 

answered, although not without a last-minute hesitation. On 20 January 1885, 

the Senate passed H. R. 10 17, a bill previously passed by the House to add two 

officers to the Inspector General's Department. The Senate Committee on 

Miltary Affairs strongly endorsed the increase on the floor; and expressed its 

agreement with its counterpart in the House. The legislation passed without 

17. Sacket to Breckinridge, 21 Dec 83, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

18. Reorganization of the Inspector-Genera/'s Department, H. Rpt. 330, 48th Cong., 1st 

sess. (1884). 

19. ARlG 1884, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 48th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 1, pt. 2: 81-84, 97; GO No. 69, 

AGO, 14 lui 84, in GORI&IG. 
300 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

substantive comment except for the committee's report, and went to President 

Chester A. Arthur. Approved on 5 February, the law increased the complement 

of the department while also specifying grades and promotion procedures. 20 

That legislation finally removed the conflicts and ambiguities in the law governing the Inspector General's Department. It did not formally establish such an 

organization-no law ever did-but it ratified the department's existence and 

affirmed that it should be governed by the the rules applicable to all other staff 

departments. It also clarified the complement of the department: The number of 

officers now stood at seven, and any conflicting earlier legislation was repealed. 

That was not as much as Sacket would have preferred, but it was more than his 

department had enjoyed for some time. The requirement that promotions occur 

within the bureau ratified one of the inspectorate's long-standing watchwords, 

that inspection is a specialty requiring permanence and experience. 

An interesting part of the law, one not explained either in its text or in the 

legislative history behind it, was the quiet dropping of the grade of assistant 

inspector general. All permanent inspectors, from major to brigadier general, 

were thereafter to be entitled inspectors general. For the majors, this did not 

quite constitute a promotion to colonel, something Marcy and Sacket believed 

to be the minimum proper rank for an inspector general, but it was the next best 

thing in terms of prestige. This legislation expanding the Inspector General's 

Department was followed by a reallocation of personnel. The assistant inspectors general moved up on 5 February. Roger Jones became a colonel, and Joseph 

Breckinridge, a lieutenant colonel. Two line officers became majors and inspectors general in the department's permanent complement on 19 February. One 

was Robert P. Hughes of the 3d Infantry, who had already proved himself 

energetic and effective as an acting inspector. The other was Edward M. Heyl 

of the 4th Cavalry. On 2 March 1885, Hughes was assigned to the Department 

of the Dakota, Heyl to the Department of Texas. Only majors, each was called 

inspector general, just as their superiors were. 21 

Davis Has a Brief Reign 

The expansion of the Inspector General's Department was a triumph for 

Sacket, but it was his last. The senior Inspector General died on 8 March 1885. 

In the words of Absalom Baird, Sacket's loss was "deeply felt and sincerely 

mourned . . . . As a man, his exemplary character and charming social qualities 

made him respected and loved by all who knew him." His death, however, 

was beneficial to his colleagues. On 11 March, Nelson Davis became brigadier 

20. Congressional Record, 48th Cong. , 2d sess. (20 January 1885), 849; Message From the 

President of the United States, Returning a Bill H . R. 101 7 Relating to the Inspector-General's 

Department of the Army, H. Ex . Doc . 155, 48th Cong., 2d sess. (1885); An Act Relative to the 

Inspector-General's Department of the Army, approved 5 February 1885, 23 Stal. 297; Thian, 

Legislative History, 115; GO No. 17, AGO, 18 Feb 85, in GORI&IG. See aisoARIG 1885, H. Ex. 

Doc. I, 49th Cong., 1st sess., vol. I, pI. 2: 102. 

2!. ARIG 1885, 102-03. See Appendix B. 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 

general and senior inspector general; 

Baird became a colonel behind Davis; 

Hughes, so recently a major, became 

lieutenant colonel behind Baird. Capt. 

George H. Burton, 21st Infantry, was 

appointed inspector general with the 

rank of major, filling Hughes' former 

position on 27 March 1885. Burton 

was as promising an acquisition as 

Hughes. He remained in the Inspector General's Department thereafter, 

and was the first Inspector General of 

the Army in the new staff organization instituted in 1903.

22 

Burton became Davis' assistant in 

the Washington office on 2 April 

1885. After the reorganization of late 

winter, the inspectors general were 

assigned on 16 April as follows: Jones 

to the Division of the Atlantic and 

Department of the East; Baird to the 

301 

BRIG. GEN. NELSON H. DAVIS. Inspector General of the Army, 11 

March 1885-20 September 1885. 

Division of the Missouri; and Hughes to the Division of the Pacific and Department of California. Hey I was assigned to the Department of Texas, while 

Burton left Washington for the Department of the Missouri. Acting inspectors 

general, four in all, took up duties in the Departments of the Dakota, the Platte, 

Arizona, and the Columbia. The detailed officers were two majors and two 

lieutenant colonels. The order assigning the officers contained two provisions 

that would have pleased Sacket immensely. One was the entitlement of each 

division or department inspector to one general-service clerk with the rank of 

corporal and one private to serve as messenger. The other was an order allowing direct communication between the senior inspector and inspectors in the 

field. 23 That verified the inspectorate's status as a regular staff department , and 

suggested the independence that Marcy and Sacket had so greatly desired. 

Nelson Davis never had a chance to take hold of the Inspector General's 

Department, with its larger complement and partial autonomy. His sixty-fourth 

birthday was 20 September 1885. He had to retire, and who should replace him 

became the question. The seniority system, it turned out, offered no clear 

answer, because the system had been muddled by Davis' and Baird's special 

promotions years before. Davis evidently assumed that Jones would be his 

successor, because in August he asked the Secretary of War to detail Jones to 

the Washington office to write the annual report.24 

22 . ARIG 1885, 103 . See Appendix B. 

23 . GO No. 47 , 16 Apr 85, in GORI&IG;ARIG 1885, 104. The closed channel of communication was a privilege held by all other staff departments, but rarely before granted to the inspectorate, 

which recurrently had to route all correspondence through the Adjutant General's organization. 

24. Davis to Secy of War, 13 Aug 85, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
302 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Baird Succeeds Davis 

When Davis actually retired, the President promoted Absalom Baird to his 

place, as of 20 September. That ended what the Army and Navy Journal 

described as "one of the most spirited, and yet friendly, contests ever known 

between two officers." Jones was senior to Baird on the department's list, but 

he was junior in the line. In a friendly exchange of letters, Baird made known 

his intention to seek the promotion, while Jones responded with his sympathy 

and support for Baird's feelings, and with a declaration that he could not in 

principle favor promotion of someone else arguably not his senior. The Journal 

suggested that the deciding issue between the two was age. Baird was scheduled for retirement during the current administration of President Grover 

Cleveland, while Jones had seven years yet to serve. He was therefore practically guaranteed the position of senior inspector general when Baird retired, 

while the converse appointment would have prevented Baird from ever getting 

his general's star. 25 

Davis' departure and Baird's elevation set off another round of reassignments and promotions in the Inspector General's Department. The fast-rising 

Breckinridge became a colonel on 22 September, and Heyl, a lieutenant colonel. 

Capt. Henry J. Farnsworth, 8th Cavalry, became a major and inspector general 

behind Heyl. Breckinridge moved to the Division of the Missouri on 10 October, 

and on 15 November Farnsworth was assigned to the Washington office. Over 

the next year, four departments continued to be served by acting inspectors 

general. 26 

Baird was not the instinctive bureaucrat that Schriver had been, nor was he 

as forceful as Marcy or Sacket. In fact, the gallant combat leader of the Civil 

War had aged into 'something much more mellow. His erect bearing, sweeping 

white mustaches, and tall beaver hat made him a noticeable figure at the War 

Department, and a popular one. But he was not the sort of person to make great 

innovations. Baird reveled in technical assignments. He was delighted early in 

1886 when he and the Quartermaster General were assigned jointly to produce 

an official publication describing the army uniform. He felt that was a proper 

use of his time, because inspectors were always answering questions about the 

uniform regulations and ceremonies. It also gave him another opportunity to 

discourse on scores of minor questions, often with no conclusion. 27 Neither 

did Baird conduct himself as the leader of a staff department. He complained to 

the Adjutant General early in 1886 of the discontent in the Army about the 

inspectors general, and the moves afoot to limit their authority. The chief 

threat, he believed, was Emory Upton's infantry tactics, which limited the 

inspector's actions at reviews. Baird felt called upon to expand the role of 

inspectors under the regulations that, unlike Upton's text, were to govern the 

25. ARSecWar 1885, 12; Army and Navy Journal , 23 (26 September 1885): 167. No one had 

shown such solicitude toward Schriver. 

26. ARIG 1886, H. Ex. Doc. I , 49th Cong., 2d sess. vol. I , pI. 2: 106. See Appendix B. 

27. See Baird to AG, 12 Feb 86, and to QMG, 19 Feb '86, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 

BRIG. GEN. ABSALOM BAIRD. Inspector GeneraL of the Army, 20 

September 1885-20 August 1888. 

303 

army. He then produced a long discourse on the role of an inspector general as an alter ego of the commander 

and so on. Most problems in inspection, he averred, were caused by misbehaving department and division 

commanders. They detailed officers 

to inspect their own colonels, for 

instance, or allowed confidential inspection reports to circulate in department or division headquarters for staff 

review. Commanders, Baird implied, 

were the enemies of inspectors. That 

was a novel position, and one not 

likely to win support for the Inspector 

General's Department. 28 

Baird's second annual report reflected this outlook. The four officers 

detailed to inspection, he said, were 

fine men; he would like to retain them 

permanently. To that end, he recommended adding 6 captains to the Inspector General's Department, 4 to replace 

those on detail and 2 as assistants in the Washington office. Baird noted briefly 

that all posts had been inspected during the year, as had all financial books, and 

then got down to the most important business. His officers traveled constantly, 

he said, and had to pay 15 to 20 percent of their expenses because the compensation allowed them by law was too little. Moreover, the Inspector General's 

Department was treated unfairly by its not having its own clerks: "No other 

branch of the staff is hampered in this way. A young captain in the Subsistence 

or Quartem1aster's Department has all the assistance he demands, limited only 

by the amount of work he has to perform. The Inspector-General's Department 

alone is left with undefined and doubtful rights in this regard. ,,29 And Baird 

occasionally got himself into bureaucratic difficulties. He received a reproof 

from the Commanding General in February 1887 after having direct correspondence with the Quartermaster General on a purely fiscal matter. Communications involving two departments were to go through the Adjutant General's 

Office. Baird protested to the Secretary of War, referring to a circular issued by 

Secretary George W. McCrary on 2 April 1877, and underscoring the Inspector 

General's dual relationship to the Secretary of War and the Commanding General. 

Although his position in that regard was like that of the Adjutant General, Baird 

28. Baird to AG, 10 Feb 86, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

29. He also said, " There is no more urgent and crying need in the Army than a new revision of 

the Anny Regulation ... " ARIG 1886, 11 2. 
304 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

said that the Inspector General necessarily had greater difficulty in balancing 

the two relationships.30 

Baird attempted to extend his department's purview in July 1887, when he 

reminded the Secretary that all posts and stations were to be inspected annually by divisional or departmental inspectors and the reports forwarded to 

the Inspector General in Washington. There was, he said, one post not under a 

division or department that had never been inspected. He therefore recommended that the post and battalion of the Corps of Engineers at Willetts Point, 

New York, be inspected and the findings reported to the Secretary of War. He 

got nowhere with that suggestion. 31 But, the Inspector General's Department 

did receive a new, if ordinary, responsibility during the summer, following the 

creation of the Hospital Corps. The corpsmen were excused from attendance at 

review, parades, or any other military duty. They were to be inspected and 

mustered at the hospitals they were attached to. The implementing order specified that officers of the Inspector General's Department, among others, would 

examine the members of the Hospital Corps and the company bearers to determine their efficiency during regular inspections. 32 

Baird's biggest interest in 1887 was not the American army, but rather the 

French. The French authorities invited foreign officers to observe their maneuvers in September, and the War Department sent Inspector General Baird. 

Along with the Commandant of Cadets at West Point, Baird spent about two 

months overseas. Six months after his return he submitted a nineteen-page report 

of his observations. His chief conclusion was that the three-battalion infantry 

regiment, something the Army's leaders had been begging for since the Civil 

War, was a bad idea. The French also, in a diplomatic nicety, wanted to confer 

honors on the leaders of visiting delegations. American law, however, forbade 

acceptance of foreign offices without action in Congress. Baird worked earnestly, 

and on 19 October 1888 a joint resolution of Congress authorized him to accept 

from the President of France a diploma honoring him as Commander of the 

National Order of the Legion of Honor. For Baird and his family, it was the 

high point of his entire career. 33 

Baird was scheduled for retirement in August 1888. He spent the time 

remaining to him more actively than he had the period before, often in opposition to proposed changes. The Secretary of War had at last persuaded Congress 

to consider legislation reorganizing the Army, based on a 3-battalion infantry 

regiment. When it came his tum to comment, Baird cited his forty-three years 

of experience in the Army-like Marcy, Baird was inclined to remind everyone 

within earshot that he had been around in the old days-and reaffirming his 

opposition to any changes in the organization. The I-battalion infantry regi30. Baird to AG, 28 Feb 87, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 31. Baird to Secy of War, II Ju187, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

32. GO No. 56, AGO, II Aug 87, in GORI&IG. 

33. Baird to AG, 15 Mar 88, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159; GO No. 88, AGO, 29 Oct 88 

(printing the resolution), in GORI&IG. Baird, Profile of a Hero, reflects great pride over Baird's 

French honor. 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 305 

ment had always worked well, he said, and the 3-battalion organization was a · 

mistake. He preferred large companies (l00 men) in strong battalions, with the 

main maneuver force a 5-battalion brigade. The French troops he had observed 

were arrayed in 3-battalion regiments, but Baird said those had worked only 

because their battalions were large; that is, 2 regiments formed a brigade. But 

in Baird's opinion, command difficulties made the 3-battalion regiment the 

weakest part of the French system. As for artillery, Baird did favor a change, 

abandoning regiments in favor of one large corps, with a two-gun section the 

basic unit. But in general, Baird opposed all reorganization proposals, maintaining that the Army as organized in 1865 had been the best institution possible. 34 

In a more positive vein, Baird recommended that the status of the Army's 

veterinary surgeons be established by law, and he drafted a bill to that end. He 

also was successful in persuading the Secretary and Maj. Gen. Philip H. 

Sheridan, who had replaced Sherman in 1883, to urge Congress to expand the 

Inspector General's Department once again. The lawmakers considered such 

legislation, but did not act immediately. And because divisional or departmental inspectors might be reluctant to undertake the work critically, Baird recommended that divisional or departmental headquarters be inspected occasionally 

by a high-ranking officer answering to the Secretary of War. His purpose was 

partly selfish. He wanted to make a farewell journey around the army, and the 

Secretary of War allowed the senior inspector general to go on an eleven-stop 

tour of the country. 35 

Breckinridge Takes Charge 

Baird retired because of age on 20 August 1888, his tenure marking a 

period of quiet stability in his department. He was replaced by his old "friendly" 

rival, Roger Jones, a reserved, introspective individual suffering ill health, who 

did not promise to infuse the organization with much energy either. On 1 

September 1888, he went home-the ailing man never returned; he died at Fort 

Monroe, Virginia, on 26 January 1889. 36 The Army also lost its Commanding 

General in August 1888, when Sheridan died on the 5th. John M. Schofield 

was detailed to the command of the Army on 14 August. It remained for a 

new Commanding General and a new Inspector General to work out their 

34. Baird, endorsement on communication of the Secretary of War referring for remark as to 

merits or demerits, H. R. Bills No. 1177 and 1347, 10 Feb 88, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

35. Baird to CG, 20 Feb 88, and to AG, 25 Apr 88, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159; Secy 

of War William C. Endicott to William C. P. Breckinridge, 17 Mar 88, Endicott to R. W. 

Townshed, 17 Mar 88, and General Sheridan to Secy of War 17 Feb 88, in Inspector·General's 

Department, H. Rpl. 4091 , 50th Cong., 2d sess. (1889). In March 1888, orders directed every 

post commander to inventory all books received from the Adjutant General's Office, and to do so 

annually. Inspecting officers were supposed to verify books on hand as compared with the inventory, 

condemn and destroy unserviceable books, and report their actions in their inspection reports. GO 

No. 12, 5 Mar 88, in GORI&IG. 

36: ARIG1889, H. Ex . Doc. I, 5lstCong., Istsess. vol. I, pI. 2: 118 ;AllIllIaIReunion o/the 

Association o/Graduates 1889, 77. Jones' ailment is described in the sources only as a "serious 

illness ... 
306 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

relationship not only between themselves but also to the Secretary of War. All 

such questions had drifted in recent years, because of weak direction from all 

three parties. Schofield observed in his memoirs that by the time of Sheridan's 

death, the Commanding General had long since ceased to command. 

Not even the Secretary of War was exercising much control of military 

affairs in 1888. Each department chief was in effect his own Secretary of War 

and, with the concurrence of the titular Secretary, could issue orders in his own 

name with the full weight of the War Department behind him. Only the Adjutant General bothered to use the name of the Secretary of War or the Commanding General. As far as Schofield was concerned, the only course was to transform his own office into that of a chief of staff to the Secretary. To that end he 

cracked down on the Adjutant General, forbidding the latter from continuing 

to issue orders in Schofield's or the Secretary's name without either's knowledge. 

But with Jones incapacitated by illness, there was little that Schofield could do 

about the Inspector General's Department for the moment. 37 

Baird's retirement and Jones' elevation caused another series of shifts in the 

Inspector General's Department. Robert P. Hughes became a colonel on 31 

August, and George H. Burton a lieutenant colonel. Capt. Henry W. Lawton, 

4th Cavalry, hero of the campaign against Geronimo, was appointed major and 

inspector general on 2 October. Hughes was for a time temporarily in charge of 

the office while Jones was out, and authored the 1888 annual report. Heyl 

moved to the Division of the Pacific, while Lawton was temporarily assigned to 

Washington. Burton had gone to the Department of Arizona before Baird's 

retirement. 38 This rapid shuffling of the Inspector General's Department had 

accelerated the rise of Joseph C. Breckinridge. On 27 October, as the senior 

officer under Jones, he was moved to the Washington office to assume 

responsibility for the department in the latter's extended absence. He was by 

the end of the month, as he signed his correspondence, "in charge." He wasted 

no time in writing a very forceful appeal for an increase in the Inspector 

General's Department, urging the Secretary in the strongest terms to support 

legislation to that end. After the drifting of recent years, it was apparent that 

when Breckinridge became senior inspector general, the department was destined to receive strong leadership. 39 

Special Investigations in the I880s 

During the time of Breckinridge's rise, the decade of the 1880s, the inspectors general continued to perform a number of services that had become traditional for them in recent years. A few new duties were added as well. One 

37. ARSecWar 1888, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 50th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 1, pt. 2: 4; John M. Schofield, 

Forty-Six Years ill the Army (New York: Century, 1897), 468-70; Russell F. Weigley, "The 

Military Thought of John M. Schofield," Military Affairs, 23 (summer 1959): 82-83. 

38. ARIG 1888, H. Ex. Doc . I, 50th Cong., 2d sess. vol. 1, pt. 2: 98-99. See Appendix B. 

39. ARlG 1889, 118; Breckinridge to Secy of War, 1 Dec 88, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 

159. Breckinridge' s signature begins appearing on correspondence 30 October, preceded by Hughes' . 
MILITARY DIVISIONS 

DECEMBER 1880 

c:::=:J STATES 

C:::J TERRITORIES 

o 400 I [ 

Miles 

MAP 3 

DEPARTMENT OF 

WEST POINT 

11877-82) 
308 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

responsibility customary since the Civil War, that is, special investigations for 

the Secretary, continued to be imposed, but it declined in proportion to the 

other departmental activities. The secretaries of the 1880s were not as interested as their predecessors in maintaining their own personal corps of 

investigators. The inspectors general were more closely associated with the 

Commanding General and the uniformed Army during the decade, and, besides, 

they were mostly assigned to divisions and departments. 

There were some special assignments, however, especially during the early 

part of the decade. In 1881, when the Surgeon General complained about the 

conditions in which his clerical staff worked, the Secretary of War sent Roger 

Jones to make a "sanitary inspection" of the room occupied by the Medical 

Department's clerks. He found 136 people and 17,000 volumes of records 

crammed into insufficient space, the place's oxygen further consumed by the 

gaslights with which it was illuminated. Conditions, in other words, were 

beastly, the air almost poisonous. Jones pronounced them unhealthy, and urged 

immediate relief. 4o However, The Army's Signal Service became the object of 

the greatest number of special investigations on the Secretary's behalf. That 

was because it was new, and engaged in the mysterious arts of telegraphy, 

meteorology, and other arcana. Its staffing was also erratic, which caused 

personnel problems, while its telegraphic operations involved a lot of money 

generated in thousands of small message charges. Moreover, the Signal Service, 

like the Corps of Engineers, was a self-contained technical establishment that 

paralleled, but was uncontrolled by, the rest of the Army. It therefore needed 

watching, and unlike the Corps of Engineers was not well enough established 

or powerful enough to resist inspections. 

Absalom Baird's first special assignment in the Washington office in 1881 

was to investigate the Signal Service, beginning with its fiscal operations. His 

first recommendation was that a certain captain be assigned as the service's 

auditor of accounts, and that an incompetent lieutenant detailed to the work be 

sent back to his regiment. Meanwhile, the Chief Signal Officer objected to 

inspections of his organization by the inspectors general. His justification, 

echoing those of Ordnance and the Engineers over many years, was that his 

agency was specialized, accessible only to specialists. Sacket responded smartly 

that he had no objection to signal officers inspecting purely technical matters, 

but he insisted that inspectors general be allowed to inspect Signal Service 

operations as they made the rounds of military postS. 41 

Most of the Signal Service's facilities were small telegraph and weather 

stations at military posts. They were the responsibility of the Signal Service, 

not the post commanders, who were in that context unwilling landlords. The 

Signal Service establishment depended on a scattering of young officers, each 

of whom supervised a number of stations under the immediate management of 

40. Jones to Secy of War, 18 Feb 81, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

41. Baird to AG, 24 Oct 81, and to IG, 10 Nov 81; Sacket, Ind on Llr from Chief Signal 

Officer, 24 Oct 81; all in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 309 

enlisted men. By 1883, the Inspector General's Department was involved in 

one squabble after another over the subject of inspections of Signal Service 

operations. At the same time, it appears that telegraph operators routinely 

pocketed "line receipts," and there was no way Signal Service officers over 

them could be held accountable for the widespread embezzlement. That did 

little to encourage tighter supervision in an organization that was very 100se.42 

So, responding to the reports of inspectors and complaints from line commanders, 

the Secretary of War exerted his jurisdiction on the Signal Service at the end of 

1883. Department commanders were told to extend their authority to include 

Signal Service men in their territories. The control was not to interfere with 

signal duties, but was to ensure proper milil"' y behavior on the part of signalmen. 

For that purpose, an immediate general inspection of all departmental Signal 

Service operations was ordered, except that inspectors were not permitted to 

examine telegrams, books, 01 matters related to weather and money accounts. 43 

It proved impossible to bring the Signal Service completely in line with the 

ordinary standards of the Army. Its enlisted men were technically proficient, 

and by training and situation, independent. The service's officers were also 

capable technicians, but not necessarily good managers of men who sometimes 

bordered on the rebellious. In 1885 Baird was sent to make a special investigation at Fort Myer, Virginia, the service's home base. A garrison court-martial 

there had tried a very large number of men for insubordinate behavior. Baird 

believed that the men had been tried wrongfully, and that they had legitimate 

grievances. But, except for the chief signal officer, the entire commissioned 

complement of the Signal Service was a gathering of second lieutenants too 

green to handle wisely the odd collection of individualists that comprised the 

enlisted force. Baird concluded that if the men at Fort Myer had been permitted 

to take their complaints to the Chief Signal Officer, the whole contretemps 

would have been avoided. 44 

Soldiers' Home , Military Prison, Cemeteries 

Another special investigation eventually led to a permanent assignment for 

the Inspector General. The United States Soldiers' Home was established by 

Congress in the 1850s to provide a refuge for retired enlisted men otherwise 

unable to take care of themselves. Located in Washington, D. C., the establishment was supported by deductions from the pay of active soldiers, and was 

modeled on similar institutions in Europe. It first came to the attention of the 

inspectors general in 1882, when Baird was sent to look into alleged conflicts 

of interest involving contracts to supply meat. He found some unseemly overlaps in the contractor's selling of meat to officers running the home and his 

contract with the home itself.45 Subsequently, Congress imposed a code of 

42. See, for instance, Baird, Ind on papers, responsibility of certain officers for public funds, 

4 May 83, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

43. GO No. 105, AGO, 29 Dec 83, in GORI&IG. 

44. Baird to AG, 31 Dec 85, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 

45. Baird to AG, 12 Dec 82, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
310 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

regulations on the home in March 1883. This code directed "that the InspectorGeneral of the Army shall, in person, once in each year thoroughly inspect the 

Home, its records, accounts, management, discipline, and sanitary condition, 

and shall report thereon in writing, together with such suggestions as he desires 

to make." By "Inspector-General of the Army" Congress clearly meant the 

senior inspector general, who had occasionally been referred to in that way, but 

never before in the law. That the senior inspector himself was to examine the 

home may have underscored the care Congress wanted the place to be shown, 

but it was an assignment that could have been filled as well by any inspector. 

Nevertheless, Sacket and his successors dutifully made their annual visits each 

fall, beginning in 1883. Interest in Soldiers' Home activities remained at a high 

level. For instance, in 1885, General Sheridan sent Baird to investigate anonymous complaints about the food at the Soldiers' Home. Baird made several 

surprise mealtime visits, and found no grounds for complaint. Otherwise, the 

Soldiers' Home became an ordinary part of the senior Inspector General's 

routine, although its inspection was reported with unusual meticulousness and 

an eye to administrative improvement. More worth noting is the fact that the 

inspection of the home was a duty that the Inspector General owed directly to 

the Secretary of War. The reports were not brought to the attention of the 

Commanding General; they were addressed to the Secretary. The legislated 

authority for the annual inspection was a further wedge into the divided 

subordination of the Inspector General's Department to two masters. 46 

The inspection of the Military Prison was already routine by the 1880s. In a 

typical comment, Sacket said in 1881 "the government of the convicts is 

humane and kind, but withal firm and uniform." The place was clean and in 

good order and well supplied, while the convicts were busy making boots, 

shoes, harnesses and barracks chairs for the Army . The place needed either 

expansion or limits on its population. Sometimes the inspection caused the 

visiting officers to ponder more fundamental questions, as when Jones said in 

1881 that the absence of uniformity of sentences throughout the Army was 

brought home to him on a visit to the prison. Penal reform was needed, he said. 

Otherwise, the inspections were ordinary, but far from perfunctory. 47 Because 

of growing interest in army reform, the Secretary made the Military Prison his 

personal concern. In 1883, new regulations for the prison, replacing a code 

adopted in 1877, called for the place to be inspected every three months by one 

of the inspectors of the Army, who was to report to the Secretary. The inspectors (Davis most often) dutifully related what they found, observing the expanding 

work program and physical plant. But when Baird became senior inspector 

46. An Act Prescribing Regulations for the Soldier's Home Located at Washington, in the District of Columbia, and for Other Purposes, approved 3 March 1883, 22 Stat. 564; GO No. 24, 

AGO, II Apr 83, in GORI&IG; Baird to Sheridan, 22 Jan 85, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

The annual inspection reports were often published in ARSecWar. The National Home for Disabled 

Volunteer Soldiers, a separate establishment, was created later, and is discussed later. 

47. ARIG 81, 78; Jones to AG, 18 Mar 81, and Sacket to AG, 20 Jul 81, in Letters Sent 

1863-1889, RG 159; ARlG 1882,72-73. 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 311 

general; his resistance to modem leniencies came through. The Military Prison, 

he said, had proved a failure in its purpose, and should be discontinued and the 

inmates returned to the ball-and-chain routine of post guardhouses. He felt the 

recent experiments absorbed too much manpower which could be used better 

elsewhere. Nevertheless, the prison continued past Baird's time, and in 1888 

the quarterly secretarial inspections were continued in new regulations. 48 

The inspection of national cemeteries became in the 1880s another duty the 

Inspector General's Department accrued from the Secretary of War, not the 

Commanding General. In 1882 Sacket declared these cemeteries a marked 

contrast to the disgraceful condition of most post cemeteries, and asked that 

the latter be upgraded. But he found the special inspection of the national 

properties an onerous duty, and asked that the governing regulation be revoked. 

The Secretary agreed, and in February 1882 required that national cemeteries, 

and other army installations, be inspected annually by division or department 

inspectors under the direction of their commanders. By 1883 the Quartermaster 

Department was spending over $8,000 per year at post cemeteries, and vastly 

more at the national cemeteries, transferring remains, repairing headboards, 

and building fences. With such heavy Quartermaster involvement in cemetery 

management, in 1883 the Secretary permitted department commanders to designate Quartermaster Department officers in charge of national cemeteries 

to be their special inspectors. For several years, then, national cemeteries 

became the least of the concerns touching the Inspector General's Department. 49 

Sacket was not the type of administrator to perceive the utility of national 

cemetery inspections as another direct connection to the Secretary of War and 

a justification for greater bureaucratic independence under the Secretary. He 

merely saw the duty as a waste of his department's time because no more 

than a perfunctory inspection was required. His successors were only slightly 

quicker to realize that the growing system of military colleges might provide 

the occasion for an expansion of authority, and manpower, in the Inspector 

General's Department. 

Military Colleges 

The Army as a whole gave civilian military instruction little notice for 

several years. A few incidental inspections of Regular Army officers detailed to 

colleges had been made during Marcy's last year, but no systematic attempt 

was made to inspect them until the mid-1880s. Baird visited several colleges in 

Ohio in 1884, but was not enthusiastic at.first. In July 1884, when Congress 

permitted the detail of as many as forty officers as presidents, superintendents, 

or professors at colleges or universities, followed by the assignment of thirty48. GO No. 100, AGO, 21 Dec 83 , and GO No.5, AGO, 4 Feb 88, in GORI&IG; ARSecWar 

1884, H. Ex. Doc . 1, 48th Cong. , 2d sess., vol. 1, pt 2: 10; ARIG 1884, 84; ARIG 1886, III. 

49. ARIG 1882, 70; Sacket to AG, 30 Jan 82, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159; GO No . 17, 

AGO, 9 Feb 82, and GO No. 73, AGO, 20 Oct 83 , in GORI&IG; ARQMG 1883, H. Ex. Doc. I, 

48th Cong. , 1st sess., vol. I, pt. 2: 561. 
312 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

nine officers and the transfer of ordnance and stores to thirty-seven colleges, 

Baird recommended an inspection progI."am to protect the federal interest. The 

Inspector General's Department was directed to inspect the college programs in 

1885. Although no inspections had yet been made, Baird expected them to be 

worthwhile. 50 Division and department inspectors general began to examine 

colleges with military programs annually in February 1886. Before long , the 

great number of such programs put most inspections in the hands of officers, 

mostly young, detailed especially to the purpose. 

A number of thoughtful officers believed that collegiate military instruction 

would not only provide potential officers in future wars, but would inculcate 

military virtues and sympathy for the Army among society'S leaders. Even 

Baird had become an advocate of military colleges by 1887. That year, he said, 

his officers had inspected nearly all the colleges before the travel budget ran 

out. He believed that colleges receiving federal personnel and assistance should 

be subject to a code of regulations that defined the duties of detailed officers 

and specified what was expected of the colleges in return for the loan of an 

officer and equipment. Baird also urged a maximum four-year detail for 

instructors, and the issue of a federal diploma to the students'. But there were 

limits to Baird's enthusiasm, as there were to any new venture. He feared that 

officers might come to enjoy campus life rather too much, when they should be 

with their regiments. "The fact is," he said, "every officer should be in the 

place to which his commission assigns him, and when it becomes distasteful to 

him he ought to retire. ,,5 1 

Baird's temporary successors (Jones being sick at home) were somewhat 

more favorably inclined. Inspection reports showed that a number of colleges 

had introduced target practice, but not enough ammunition was provided. The 

colleges would become the source of officers for any great emergency, said the 

annual report of the Inspector General's Department, and ensuring the proficiency of the new officers would be wise because "fire tactics" had replaced 

"shock tactics" on the battlefield. The report accordingly recommended giving the colleges all the ammunition they wanted, in the hope that rifle competitions would become a popular college sport. As with the National Guard, 

college military instruction increasingly would become an object of the Inspector General's attention in the following years. 52 

Disbursing Accounts 

Inspection of the accounts of disbursing officers was an old subject for the 

inspectors general, but it also grew steadily, and virtually all books were gone 

over in tedious detail every year. In 1881 the Adjutant General asked that 

50. ARIG 1886, 113; Baird to AG 31 Mar 84, in Letters Sent 1863-1889; ARIG 1885, 117. 

Sanger, " !nspector-General's Department," 246, mistakenly says that inspections of the colleges 

were assigned to the department in June 1886. 

51. ARIG 1887, 112- 13 . 

52. ARIG 1888, 118 . 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 313 

divisional and departmental inspectors be directed to make quarterly inspections of the contingent expense accounts of Adjutant General's Department 

officers at the geographic headquarters. During that year (fiscal year 1882), 

under the 1874 legislation, the Inspector General's Department audited all 

accounts, covering disbursements totaling $53,854,922.86,92 percent of which 

was verified by the department's permanent or acting inspectors and the rest by 

special inspectors. "This large aggregate, " Sacket explained, "is caused by 

the fact that much of the funds was transferred from one officer to another, and 

thus became several times the subject of examination. ,,53 In 1883 Sacket reported 

that the inspections revealed public funds "have generally been disbursed 

properly. One exception is noted, where official action has been taken and the 

offender convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary. " The Paymaster General 

that year reported the dismissal of a paymaster "for misappropriation of the 

public funds." The man "was a defaulter in the sum of $5,452. The amount 

was made good to the United States during the progress of his trial. " That was 

a triumph for the inspectors. In 1884, Sacket recommended some protection for 

officers, especially in the Corp of Engineers, who carried large amounts of cash 

as payment for civilians and were thus vulnerable to robbery or accidents. As for 

the Army generally, the inspectors had detected several cases of fraud, ending 

with the dismissal of misbehaving officers, but the Army suffered scandal for 

their work. The most prevalent offense was duplication of pay accounts by 

drawing pay from more than one paymaster. Sacket believed that could be 

ended by giving each paymaster an exclusive list of the officers he must pay, 

revising the lists whenever officers transferred. 54 

The account inspections were a monstrous burden, and a growing one. The 

load was in fact excessive for inspectors and audited officers alike, so in August 

1885 the War Department reduced the inspection schedule from six times a year 

to "once every four months, allowing a reasonable interval between any two 

examinations," beginning in fiscal year 1886 (which had begun the month 

before). The inspection system was amended once again the following March, 

although the thrice-yearly schedule remained, "at irregular intervals." Division and department commanders were to order inspections of the books of officers under their command, by their regular inspectors or others detailed 

to the duty. But disbursing officers not under the geographic commanders, that 

is, staff department officers answering to the War Department, were inspected 

in a national system. The Inspector General in Washington would inform division and department inspectors of those staff officers. The lesser inspectors 

were to submit to Washington a plan for inspecting those officers, and to request orders. They would be ordered to such inspections by the War Department, 

and would send their reports directly to the Inspector General's Office in 

Washington. 55 

53. AG to IG, 28 Oct 81, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159; ARIG 1882 , 67 . 

54. ARIG 1883, 99; AR Paymaster General 1883, H. Ex. Doc . 1, 48th Cong. , 1st sess., vol. 

1, pt. 2: 633; ARIG 1884, 94-95 , 96-97. 

55. GO No. 87, AGO, 7 Aug 85, and GO No. 14, AGO, 29 Mar 86, in GORl&IG. 
314 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The inspection of accounts had been part of the department's divided accountability to the Secretary of War and the Commanding General. Previously it had 

gone forward in one system, relying mainly on the department inspectors. But 

staff department officers at depots and other War Department installations had 

resisted inspection by officers under the order of geographic department or 

division commanders. The commanders had no direct authority over those staff 

officers, who answered to their chiefs in Washington. The new order introduced in 1886 resolved that dilemma, and also gave the Secretary an independent look into the operations of the staff departments, which spent most. of the 

Army's money. It also gave the Inspector General's Department a closer connection to the Secretary of War, and another range of activity wholly separate from 

the concerns of the Commanding General. Now even departmental inspectors 

served two masters, which was bound to have its influence in later years as the 

Inspector General's Department continued to seek recognition as an independent staff department comparable to all others. More immediately, the arrangement was politically useful to the Secretary. When the Washington Post, in July 

1887, quoted a Second Comptroller of the Treasury as claiming that books of 

some army and navy paymasters had not been examined in five years, Baird 

was able to send the news clipping and a detailed refutation to the Secretary of 

War- along with a list of all paymasters and the date each was last audited. 56 

Property Inspections 

Inspections of condemned property were another old responsibility of the 

inspectors general. They gave little scope for the expansion of departmental 

influence, however, so they were considered merely routine. They were mostly 

the subject of endless meddling at the hands of the money-conscious War 

Department. Orders announced in 1881 that subsistence stores not fit to eat but 

having value in manufacturing or as animal food were not to be destroyed after 

condemnation, but were to be advertised and sold instead. If the items were 

dangerous to purchasers or consumers, their unfitness as human food must be 

part of the sale notice. Inspectors were required to certify that any subsistence 

stores condemned had no monetary value at or near the military post where they 

were located. 57 Other orders in 1882 announced technical changes in the marking of condemned property and the methods of canceling the inspectors "I.C." 

Trivial alterations in property condemnation procedures continued to appear 

the principle governing subsistence stores was extended to all property that 

year, inspectors being allowed to order the destruction of unserviceable property only if they certified it was worthless. In addition, the inspection of 

unserviceable ordnance property was restricted to Ordnance Department officers. 

Two years later, unserviceable telescopes and signaling gear issued to compa56. Baird to Secy of War, 23 Ju187, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

57. GO No. 56, AGO, 21 Jun 81 , in GORI&IG. 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 315 

nies was similarly removed from the purview of inspectors. It was to be reported 

to the Chief Signal Officer, who would order its disposition. 58 

The War Department never lost an opportunity to save a dollar. It declared 

in 1886, "Inspecting officers will not order the destruction of any saddles until 

the action of the Secretary of War is had upon the inspection reports, as there is 

a good market with constant demand for the unserviceable Army saddle even 

when only the tree remains." When inspectors were less than diligent the War 

Department was aware of it. In 1888 a decision of the Secretary of War 

reminded inspectors that they must state in their certificate of inspection, if such 

was the case, that the property was worthless, had no monetary value near the 

depot where it was housed, and had been destroyed in the inspector's presence. 59 

The Sales List 

Another old responsibility, that of preparing the Subsistence Department 

sales list, gradually fell away during the 1880s. It was still the responsibility of 

the inspectors general under the law, but they were more interested in other 

things. It was through Marcy's efforts that, in January 1881, the Secretary of 

War ordered the Subsistence Department at all posts to stock clothes and hair 

brushes, combs, towels, needles, and thread. At recruit depots, the sales inventory was also to include tin plates and cups, knives and forks, and button sticks 

(hooks) and brushes. Once the supplies were on hand, stoppages against the 

men's pay in favor of post traders was to cease "absolutely." But a month 

later, the Secretary directed the Ordnance Department to furnish to soldiers as 

regular equipment tin silverware and a meat can, plate, cup, and button sticks 

and brushes. Those objects therefore fell off the subsistence list. The inspectors 

general continued to tamper with the list during the decade, but it received 

progressively less attention. 60 

Signs of Change 

Hughes' 1889 report and the advent of Joseph C. Breckinridge, who expected 

his brigadier general's stars at any moment, were both indications of new things 

to come. Breckinridge soon demonstrated that Hughes' insights were not really 

exceptional, but rather the epitome of the new class of inspectors who had so 

recently taken over the Inspector General's Department. That a different style 

would now characterize the Inspector General's Department was suggested 

with respect to a specific item, that is, horses, something dear to the heart 

of the bluegrass Kentuckian , Breckinridge. When he learned that authority had 

58. GO No.4, AGO, 16 Jan 82; GO No.5, AGO, 17 Jan 82; GO No. 22, AGO, 8 Mar 82; and 

GO No. 125, AGO, 20 Nov 84, all in GORJ&IG. 

59. Decision of Secy of War, 2 Mar 86, in Cir No . 3, AGO, 14 Apr 86, and Decisioll ofSecy of 

War, 7 May 88 , in GO No.5, AGO, 9 Jun 88, both in GORJ&IG. 

60. GO No. 2, AGO, 4 Jan 81, and GO No. 14, AGO, 7 Feb 81 , in GORI&IG; Davis to Secy 

of War, through AG, 30 Apr 85, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 
316 

, 

-, 

~ • 

" "-• • 

• • 

~. • • 

• • 

• • 

BRIG. GEN. ROGER JONES. Inspector General of the Army, 20 August 

1888-26 January 1889. 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

been granted for the Army to buy 

horses, Breckinridge stepped in uninvited to urge that none over seven 

years of age be bought, at least for 

the artillery.61 Neither Sacket nor 

Baird would have done any such 

thing; they would have permitted the 

purchase by the proper authorities. 

They would have observed the results 

of the purchase, and if the animals 

were especially defective might even 

have said so in guarded terms. The 

old-timers would never have taken it 

upon themselves to step in and advise 

preventive measures before a problem arose . But the class of 1861 was 

gone now. Breckinridge's department 

had for over two decades been a center of conservatism in the Army. He 

wanted to make it a wellspring of 

progressivism. He also set out to make 

it a truly independent bureau of the War Department. How far he would get 

with either depended, in the final analysis, upon his own strengths and 

limitations. 

The declining interest of the Inspectors General in items like the sales list 

reflected their growing interest in greater things. No longer a purely military 

eye on the Army, the Inspector General's Department was becoming the War 

Department's chief auditor of accounts. Its attention also was expanding beyond 

the War Department, encompassing military colleges and the National Guard. 

It was a far different organization from the one that Marcy and the others had 

composed in 1861 and led since the Civil War. Its differences were reflected in 

changes in its personnel: Roger Jones had been the last of the inspectorate's 

class of 1861 , the inspectors general and assistant inspectors general appointed 

during the Civil War's first year. These men had been veterans of the old army 

before the war, so that great conflict, although an instructive experience for 

them, was not a formative one. They all recognized intellectually that times 

must change, in the Army as elsewhere, but they all instinctively preferred 

things as they once had been. Sometimes, as when Marcy resisted modem 

barracks lighting or Baird the three-battalion regiment, the inspectors general 

bordered on the reactionary . Despite their conservatism, however, the Army 

did begin to reform in the decades after the Civil War. The inspectors general, 

sometimes grumbling, sometimes optimistic, went along, but they were never 

leaders of reform. 

61. Breckinridge to AG, 28 Dec 88, in Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. 
PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD 317 

Jones was replaced on 30 January 1889 by Breckinridge. Like Jones, Breckinridge was a veteran of the Civil War, but the resemblance goes no further. The 

war had been the start of Breckinridge's military career, which had begun in 

volunteer service, not at West Point. Furthermore, Breckinridge had spent most 

of the postwar period as a troop commander, not as an inspector. Behind 

Breckinridge was a completely new generation of inspectors general. None had 

much of an emotional investment in the way things once had been. None had 

been in the Army before the. war, and all had joined the Inspector General's 

Department since the early 1880s. Not all of them had even been veterans of the 

war, nor had all of them begun their careers at West Point, or even as officers. 

They were, in fact, creatures of the new army, and bound to share its emerging 

outlook. And last, Breckinridge and the others were far younger than Marcy's 

company of old warriors. They were certain to make their energy felt, and 

wanted only an equally energetic leader to make them effective. Breckinridge 

promised to be that man, but it remained to be seen just what kind of a leader he 

really was. 

When Breckinridge took over the Inspector General's Department, the Army 

was at the midpoint of a slow, painful transition. A small frontier constabulary , 

long accustomed to life in the wilderness, earnestly wanted to become a modem 

military force and neighbor to the civilized parts of the nation . The inspectors 

general had watched the changes creeping up for the past decade, altering the 

conditions that had been accepted before the Civil War. If Breckinridge was the 

character he appeared to be, the inspectors general would not merely watch 

changes come in the future , but would labor to bring them about. The old 

inspectorate was gone. A new Inspector General's Department had arrived . 
CHAPTER 18 

Breckinridge's Widening Scope 

(1889-1898) 

Roger Jones' death on 26 January 1889 had been preceded by that of Henry J. 

Farnsworth on 19 November 1888. The two events initiated another rearrangement of personnel within the department, and two appointments to keep 

its complement at full strength. Breckinridge became senior inspector general 

on 30 January 1889. Edward Heyl was promoted to colonel and Henry W. 

Lawton to lieutenant colonel on 12 February. To fill Farnsworth's vacancy, 

Capt. Peter D. Vroom, 3d Cavalry, had already become a major and an inspector general, on 10 December 1888. On 12 February 1889, Capt. Joseph P. 

Sanger, 1st Artillery, joined the department, also as a major and an inspector 

general. I Experienced troop leaders who had entered the army during or after 

the Civil War were beginning to fill the inspectorate's ranks. 

New Department Under New Leadership 

Vroom had entered the Army as first lieutenant and adjutant of the 1st New 

Jersey Infantry in 1862. He resigned that position to become a major in the 2d 

New Jersey Cavalry, where he remained until mustered out in October 1865. 

He earned a brevet in the interim for •• gallant and meritorious service during 

the war. " He joined the Regular Army in February 1866 as a second lieutenant 

and was promoted to first lieutenant within five months, in the 3d Cavalry. His 

experience included half a year as regimental commissary and two and a half 

years as regimental adjutant before his promotion to captain in May 1876. 

Vroom was a solid officer with an unremarkable career, who may never have 

become a major had it not been for the opportunity in the Inspector General's 

Department. He pursued an equally steady course there, rising through the 

seniority system until a graveyard promotion to senior inspector general, with 

the rank of brigadier general just one day before he retired on 12 April 1903. 2 

Sanger had entered the service in much the same fashion as Vroom, as a 

second lieutenant of the 1st Michigan Infantry in May 1861. There the similarity 

ended, for Sanger was anything but an ordinary man. The Michigan native was 

I. ARlG 1889, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 51st Cong., 1st sess., vol. 1, pI. 2: 118. 

2. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 990. 
BRECKINRIDGE'S WIDENING SCOPE 319 

inducted into the Regular Army on 5 August 1861 as a second lieutenant of the 

1st Artillery, and was promoted to first lieutenant in October. He earned two 

brevets for gallantry during the Civil War while serving with the Army of the 

Potomac. Sanger spent two years as regimental adjutant of the 1st Artillery 

before his promotion to captain in 1875, retaining that rank for three weeks 

after his promotion to the Inspector General's Department in 1889. By the time 

he arrived in the inspectorate, he was already well known as a thoughtful 

contributor to the professional literature of the military, with articles on many 

subjects to his credit. He was also a great favorite of the Commanding General, 

John M. Schofield, serving him as aide in the Division of the Atlantic in 1886 

and after. Schofield recalled that his work on improving the instruction of 

artillery with new weapons was "ably and zealously assisted" by the labors of 

Sanger, whom he invited to write a summary of the work for the general's 

memoirs. Schofield approved Sanger's promotion to inspector general and 

declared it "well-merited." In 1895, Sanger was again attached to Schofield as 

an aide-de-camp (with the rank of lieutenant colonel) during the general's 

farewell tour of the Army before retirement. He authored the commander's tour 

report. 3 Sanger, thanks to his literary inclinations, became the department's 

first official historian, something that earned him Breckinridge's gratitude 

because, as chief, he justified his department's very existence with arguments 

from history. Sanger followed the course of the seniority system in the department only so far, however, becoming a lieutenant colonel in July 1898. Meanwhile he had already served as a lieutenant colonel and inspector general of 

volunteers for one month; then he became a brigadier general of volunteers 

during the Spanish American War. Mustered out of volunteer service in June 

1899, Sanger returned to the inspectorate, where he became a colonel in February 1901. He had proved his military merits during the war, and was promoted 

to brigadier general of the line in July 1902, having a distinguished career 

thereafter. 4 

When the Army received a new senior inspector general in 1889, a revision 

of its general regulations had occurred as well. The Army's stated inspections, 

including company inspections on Sundays, were defined as they had been 

before, except that company commanders were now enjoined additionally to 

make daily inspections of barracks and kitchens, while surgeons did the same in 

hospitals. Post commanders were to inspect their facilities in July, reporting to 

the Inspector General in Washington on forms furnished for the purpose. 

"Methods of Inspection" had been revised somewhat, but the content of reports 

remained traditional, with added attention to subjects like post gardens. The 

regulations emphasized that inspection reports should discuss the remedies 

instituted for any deficiencies reported. The reports were to go to the Inspector 

General in Washington "through the regular channels," but only commanding 

3. Ibid., 1: 859; Schofield, Forty-Six Years, 458-60. Many of the important documents in the 

John M. Schofield papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, dating from the 1880s and 

1890s were produced by Sanger, including the report of Schofield's farewell inspection. 

4. Ibid. 
320 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

officers could forward confidential reports. The extended attention to subjects 

like disbursing accounts and condemned property reflected the War Department's 

endless tampering with minor details, for property alone took up two full pages 

in the new regulations. 5 

Having disposed his people and examined the new regulations, Breckinridge began to assert himself. He was the only officer to attain a general's stars 

before 1898 who had ranked less than captain in the reorganization of 1866. Of 

course, a series of deaths and retirements in the inspectorate had enabled his 

rise, which otherwise would have been impossible under the hard rule of 

seniority. But it is not beyond reason to suspect that Breckinridge calculated the 

odds, or at least counted the scheduled retirements ahead of him, before seeking a position in the Inspector General's Department. If anyone in the Army 

had the personal ambition and energy to make the system work in his own 

behalf, that man was Breckinridge. 6 He used this energy in a long campaign to 

establish the independence of the Inspector General's Department, and to raise 

its' strength and prestige. Much of that effort involved careful maneuvers within 

the split leadership of the War Department. The Inspector General answered 

jointly to the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army. 

Breckinridge adjusted to the contradictions in that divided authority by moving 

away from the weaker power (the Commanding General) and closer to the 

stronger (the Secretary of War). Redfield Proctor became Secretary of War 5 

March 1889. He was a man of known reformist inclinations, and, in fact, 

proved himself able to carry through the sorts of real reforms that secretaries 

like Lincoln had only talked about. Breckinridge had reformist tendencies of 

his own, compatible with Proctor's views. 

Ending Sunday Inspections 

On 8 March 1889, three days after Proctor took office, Breckinridge personally handed the Secretary a "Draft of a proposed General Order amending the 

Regulations, " together with' 'Memoranda in connection with draft of General 

Order submitted to Secty of War March 8, 1889." Breckinridge proposed to 

end the weekly inspection of companies on Sundays, moving the procedure to 

Saturday morning and giving the soldiers a day and a half off every weekend. 

He told Proctor that Sunday had been a day of rest in the Army previously, by 

orders of two Presidents. "If President Washington and Lincoln do not represent the best sentiment of the American people when they addressed the Army 

on this subject, then to whose instructions ought the Army to conform?" he 

5. U.S. War Department, Regulationsfor the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 

1889). 

6. The recognition that Breckinridge was the only person to become general before 1898 who 

had not started at least as a captain in 1866 is in Arthur P. Wade, "Roads to the Top-An Analysis 

of General-Officer Selection in the United States Army, 1789-1898," Military Affairs, 40 (December 

1976): 162--63. 
BRECKINRIDGE'S WIDENING SCOPE 321 

asked with his distinctive flourish.7 He had, in fact, proposed the same thing 

several years before, and had been squelched by Sacket. But aside from its 

accord with his own sentiments as a former battery commander, it was definitely an idea whose time had come. Proctor was taken with it immediately, 

and very quickly word spread that the Secretary was preparing an order to 

abolish Sunday inspections and exercises. However, many high-ranking officers protested, saying that a day of leisure for the soldiers would cause nothing 

but trouble. Schofield, however, favored the change, so Proctor decided to 

pursue the idea, but cautiously. 8 

Breckinridge personally handed Proctor a draft of the proposed general 

order on 7 June. His text cited President Lincoln's establishment in 1862 of 

Sunday as a day of rest. Proctor took the order to the White House the same 

day. President Benjamin Harrison imposed it in his capacity as Commander in 

Chief of the Army and the Navy. Weekly inspections were moved to Saturday 

morning, and Saturday afternoon became a holiday for sports and recreation. 

Soldiers were to have no work on Sunday except guard and police duty. Any 

change in general orders in the future would have to be presidential. 9 

Proctor's caution was justified, because the order met with widespread 

resistance. Breckinridge told him on 6 August of the various ways in which 

officers defied or subverted the order, and suggested one way of enforcing that 

inspections be held on Saturday was to order company commanders to submit 

weekly reports of their inspections. He provided a draft of a general order to 

that effect. In October he recommended that the Secretary approve the request 

of the superintendent of the Military Academy that the cadets' Sunday dress 

parade (which with preparation took three hours) be dispensed with, thus reinforcing the spirit of the general order across the Army. Breckinridge went so far 

as to propose ending the cadets' Saturday evening parade. Finally, in February 

1890 Schofield interdicted the widespread defiance of the order, which had 

permitted routine inspections without arms on Sundays. Some captains had 

turned that into a full-blown inspection, so Schofield ordered them to do all 

such things only on Saturday. 10 By his efforts to abolish Sunday inspections, 

Breckinridge had accomplished a significant change. For the Army the new 

order represented a fundamental change in the management of the enlisted men. 

The conditions of enlisted life were unpleasant enough, given the Army's 

7. "Draft of a proposed General Order amending the Regulations handed to the Secretary of 

War in person by General J.C. Breckinridge Inspector General March 8/89," and "Memoranda in 

connection with draft of General order submitted to Secty of War March 8, 1889," in Letters Sent 

1863-1889, RG 159. 

8. Foner, in Soldier Between Wars, 91, summarizes the situation , but is evidently unaware of 

Breckinridge's role . 

9. "Draft of an order relative to Sunday Inspections handed by General J.C. Breckinridge 

Inspector General, in person to the Secretary of War June 7,1889," in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 

159; GO 50, AGO, 12 Jun 89, announcing the President's order of 7 Jun 89, in GORI&IG; Foner, 

Soldier Between Wars, 91. 

10. Breckinridge to Secy of War, and Incls, 6 Aug 89, and Memo handed to Secy of War by 

Inspector General Breckinridge, 16 Oct 89, in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159; Cir No.2, AGO, 

12 Mar 90, conveying: Decision of the Commanding General, 15 February 1890, in GORI&IG. 
322 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

INFANTRY TACTICAL DRILL, SUMMER 1892. Observation of exercises became a part of each general inspection. 

circumstances, but it was a major grievance to the soldiers that the Army never 

gave them any rest. That complaint was answered at a stroke. More fundamentally, for the first time the Army had officially told the men that it trusted them 

to act as soldiers without constant supervision. Some of the officers may have 

grumbled, but the enlisted men felt that at last they were treated with some 

respect. The eI.ld of Sunday inspections was a major step in the current transformation of the Army. 

Building a Definite Sphere 

In June 1889 Breckinridge persuaded the Secretary to add West Point to the 

list of posts to be examined by the Inspector General's Department. He ordered 

the first inspection in JUly. He then asserted strongly that his office, not that of 

the Adjutant General, was the proper repository for inspection reports on military colleges, and, by extension for all inspection reports. As the activities of 

the inspectorate increased, he resumed in the strongest terms, his customary 

appeals for more clerks for the inspectors general at the various geographical 

headquarters. 11 So Breckinridge had unfettered control of all inspection during 

his first year in office. His was the designated office to receive reports of 

11. Breckinridge Ind or Ltr of Col. J.G. Parke, 19 Jun 89, and chief clerk of the War Department, 

Ind on same, 24 Jun 89; Breckinridge to IG USA, Governors Island, 5 Jul 89; Breckinridge, Ind on 

Ltr of AG requesting originals or full copies of inspection reports of colleges, 15 Ju189; and Breckinridge to Secy of War, 16 Aug 89, all in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 
BRECKINRIDGE'S WIDENING SCOPE 323 

National Guard inspections, inspections of the recruiting service, and even the 

construction projects of the Corps of Engineers. As he frequently apprised the 

Adjutant General, he was very close to the Secretary of War. He told Proctor 

early in November that he hoped that year to have the first complete inspection 

of all branches of the Army. On 22 November he handed the Secretary a draft 

of an order directing the Inspector General's Department to inspect all army 

facilities not under divisional or departmental commanders, or not otherwise 

provided for in the regulations. That especially included the facilities of the 

Corps of Engineers and the Ordnance Department. 12 Thanks to Breckinridge 

and Proctor, paragraph 955 of the general regulations was revised to say that 

the entire military establishment was to be inspected annually. That included 

public works under the Corps of Engineers as well as the arsenals, armories, 

depots, and other facilities of the several staff departments, in addition to the 

entire uniformed Army in all its posts and stations. 

There were other additions to the department's responsibilities during 

Breckinridge's first year. The duty of inspecting the accounts of the War 

Department's Supply Division was transferred from the Quartermaster to the 

Inspector General on 19 January 1889, apparently because the establishment 

was, in the main, operated by the Quartermaster. Breckinridge's purview over 

the Signal Service was extended in February, when orders appeared to train 

officers and men in signaling. Every post was to be visited annually by an 

inspector so that the signaling efficiency of all officers and enlisted men who 

had had instruction and practice could be rated. Divisional and departmental 

commanders were told in August to inscribe on inspection reports the instructions intended to remedy defects. Finally, in September the Secretary expressed 

his displeasure that the ban on hard liquor had not been enforced. Moreover, 

post traders thenceforth could sell light wine and beer only in unbroken packages, 

and then only to officers or post canteens. Inspectors' reports were to set forth 

any violations of the order, and remedies were to be instituted. 13 

Breckinridge appreciated the value of symbolism, and no detail was too 

insignificant to escape his notice. The Army's uniform regulations were reissued on 5 May 1889, accommodating changes made since the last general 

revision in 1881. Officers of the Adjutant General's and Inspector General's 

Departments and aides-de-camp to general officers wore the same shoulder 

knots-gold cord on a blue cloth ground, and aiguillette. Officers of other staff 

corps wore the same shoulder knot, but without the aiguillette. Most staff 

departments identified themselves with initials, as they had since 1872, but the 

Signal Corps now displayed two crossed signal flags and a burning torch, the 

12. Breckinridge to AG 14 Nov and 16 Nov 89 (two letters); Breckingridge, Ind forwarding to 

Secy of War copies of letters and endorsements relative to the inspection of West Point and Willetts 

Point, N.Y., II Nov 89; copy (of order) received by Secy of War from IG, 22 Nov 89, all in Letters 

Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. See also Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department," 247. 

13. Orders, Secy of War, 19 Jan 89; GO No. 19, AGO, 20 Feb 89; Cir No.7, AGO, 3 Aug 89, 

conveying: Decision of the Secretary of War, 5 July 1889; and GO No . 75, 27 Sep 89, all in 

GORI&IG. 
324 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Corps of Engineers a turreted castle, and the Ordnance Department a shell and 

flame. Officers of arms wore crossed muskets, sabers, or cannons. The age of 

insignia had dawned, and Breckinridge wanted to be a part of it. He complained 

to the Adjutant General on 22 July 1889, "If something is deemed necessary on 

our shoulder knots and epaulettes, it should not be anything like a lettered brand 

that is placed upon public animals and property . . .. I will be glad to submit an 

approved design to have an acceptable insignia made from. " Receiving approval, 

he solicited designs for insignia from several jewelers and uniform manufacturers. 

First Lieutenant William P. Van Ness suggested a fasces as a fitting symbol for 

the Inspector General's Department. An axe enclosed in a bundle of rods, it 

was a sign of public office in ancient Rome. (Until made disreputable by the 

Fascists of Benito Mussolini during the twentieth century, the fasces long stood 

as an emblem of civil authority, and of unity forged from diversity.) Breckinridge concurred with Van Ness and collaborated with Mr. C. H. Ourand of the 

Adjutant General's Office, an authority on such symbolism, to develop the final 

design. Breckinridge gave his department a motto, Droit et Avant, emblazoned 

on the insignia, which reportedly came from the family coat of arms of Joseph P. 

Sanger, the newest inspector. Breckinridge said he wanted something that 

would express the sentiment, "Be sure you are right, then go ahead," which 

strongly exemplified his attitude toward life. The French phrase (literally' 'Right 

and Forward") expressed this adequately . 

Breckinridge was ready to present his proposed insignia to the Secretary of 

War on 14 February 1890. It comprised a crossed sword and fasces surmounted 

by a wreath bearing the motto. The sword, of course, symbolized military 

power, but it was subordinated to the fasces, the emblem of civil authoritysymbolic of the image Breckinridge wished to promote for his department. The 

wreath, combining ancient symbols of peace and honor, was composed of two 

branches, an olive branch on the left and a laurel on the right, which were tied 

at the base by a ribbon . The Secretary approved the new insignia a few days 

later and it was authorized to be worn beginning on 23 May. 14 The adoption of 

unique insignia was only one way in which Breckinridge stressed his department's distinctiveness. Another symbol of the inspectorate's changing role in 

1890 was Breckinridge's issuing of two annual reports-{)ne to the Commanding General and a longer one to the Secretary of War. Although the two 

overlapped somewhat, Breckinridge constructed them so that they reflected the 

separate and significant spheres of inspection that related to one, not both, of 

his masters. He continued this practice until just before he retired. 15 

Breckinridge had carved out a considerable position for himself, enjoying 

close association with the Secretary. But he remained subject to the orders of 

14. The history of the insignia is presented in "A Brief History ofInsignia, Branch of Service, 

Officers, Inspector General," (duplicated, files in OIG at the Pentagon), which includes Breckinridge to Secy of War, 14 Feb 90, Ind by Asst AG, 20 Feb 90, endorsement by Secy of War, 26 Feb 

90, and the original design, with specifications, issued 15 Jun 64 and 20 Jun 66. 

15 . For purposes of convenience , both will be cited as ARIG. Only twice, in 1900 and 1901, 

did they have overlapping page numbers, although sometimes they were in different volumes of the 

War Department annual reports. For those two years the exact report will be reflected in citations. 
BRECKINRIDGE'S WIDENING SCOPE 325 

the Commanding General, whereas most of his officers were answerable to the 

divisional commanders. The officers of the Inspector General's Department, 

supplemented by a shifting group of acting inspectors general, remained stable 

during most of 1890. Vroom moved from the Department of the Platte to the 

Department of the Missouri on 9 September to replace Sanger, who had spent 

most of the year in the Washington office and was officially transferred there 

from the Division of the Missouri. The part of Breckinridge's scope visible in 

Washington (in bureau circles, the most important part) had thereby increased. 16 

Despite this, the number of officers in the Inspector General's Department, 

Breckinridge told a sympathetic Secretary, was " utterly inadequate" for all the 

duties imposed upon them. The few details of officers from the line were not 

enough help he said; besides, some inspections could not be done by transients, 

·it required experienced personnel. A bill then before Congress would add six 

officers, two of them field-grade, to the department, and Breckinridge yearned 

for its passage. The volume of the department's work, he said, had grown 

phenomenally, and if the inspecting officers decided to obey the law limiting 

their workdays to eight hours, it would not get done. He was equally strong on 

his proclaimed need for clerical assistance to replace the "uncertain detail of 

general-service men." Good, permanent civilian clerks under full control of the 

Inspector General's Department, he claimed, were essential, and he offered a . 

full page of examples on how the lack of clerical assistance hampered the 

department's labors. 17 

Breckinridge continued to increase his department's authority and its 

work load. Every inspector was told in January 1891 to give each commander, 

at the end of an inspection, a written statement of deficiencies detected, which 

was to be kept on file for future information. The commanding officer was told 

to report to the officer who ordered the inspection not only the remedies he had 

applied but also the recommendations for actions beyond his ability to effect 

them. That statement was to be forwarded to the headquarters of the Army. 

Every officer required to take action on inspection findings was to note on the 

report his actions, and to make a supplementary report to army headquarters for 

the information of the Commanding General. After the Commanding General 

was satisfied, all reports were to be filed with the Inspector General's Office. 

Like his predecessors, Breckinridge was obsessed with follow-up: the positive 

effects of inspection, in terms of administrative action. But he was also establishing his authority over inspection by keeping the paper work safe in his own 

hands.

18 

Breckinridge maintained later in the year that he had solved the problem of 

follow-up: 

Remedial action usually follows inspections swiftly and surely. The inspector, without 

unnecessary delay, furnishes commanding officers of posts a memorandum of the defects 

16. ARIG 1890,119- 21 , 122- 23 . 

17. Ibid ., 123-25 . The department's payroll for fiscal year 1891 was $29,500. GO No. 69, 

AGO, 27 Jun 90, in GORI&IG. 

18. GO No. II , AGO, 30 Jan 91, in GORJ&IG. 
326 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

and irregularities which came under his notice during inspection, and commanding 

officers report what remedial action they have applied in each instance; and if no such 

action has been applied, then they explain why it has not. The benefits arising from such 

speedy, intelligent, and concerted action are great, and must necessarily grow greater 

and more far-reaching in their effects as the system becomes familiar and perfected. 19 

The senior inspector general was proud of the work his men accomplished, 

because it was considerable. The work of the inspectors general in 1891, 

Breckinridge explained to Schofield, was divided into two classes: those for the 

Secretary of War and those for the department commanders in the Anny line. 

Only permanent officers of the department, he said, were entrusted with the 

matters of interest to the Secretary. These included such things as inspections of 

cemeteries, rivers and harbors, depots, and the recruiting service. In all, during 

fiscal year 1891, permanent and detailed department members had inspected 

740 money accounts representing a value of $63 million. They had also looked 

at 87 line posts, 41 bureau posts and depots, 5 prisons, 53 military units at 

colleges and universities, 63 public works, 61 national cemeteries, 36 recruiting rendezvous and 21 special investigations had been made. During this same 

period, inspectors had filed about 1,600 inventory and inspection reports involving over $1,800,000 worth of property. 20 

The Army's big event during fiscal year 1891 was the winter campaign 

against the Sioux Indians at Wounded Knee in South Dakota. Breckinridge 

never mentioned the battle there, or the loss of life that had stunned the nation. 

Rather, to him the whole campaign showed a need for exercise in cold-weather 

mobilization. Staff and line both, he said, had performed well, while the 

Medical Corps deserved special mention. "These larger concentrations are as 

readily made habitual as the mere company affairs," maintained the Inspector 

General "and familiarity with them is essential before an organization can be 

called an army, or be considered either instructed or equipped to meet modem 

requirements; and the concentration of the past winter was so well considered 

and conducted as to deserve special study. ,,21 

A Setback and Renewed Advance 

Redfield Proctor resigned from the War Department in November 1891 to 

take a seat in the Senate. He had been a popular man in the Army, its most 

productive reformer in recent times. During his relatively brief period in office, 

the post consolidation program had made progress, work had started on modem 

coastal defenses, and the lives of the enlisted men had been improved. Proctor's 

departure deprived Breckinridge of a patron. The Inspector General had greatly 

expanded his power and influence during the previous two years, an impossible 

19. ARIG 1891 , 10. 

20. Ibid., 23-24. 

21. Ibid. , 19. 
BRECKINRIDGE'S WIDENING SCOPE 327 

feat without making enemies or at least incurring the resentment of others. 

Breckinridge, in a memorandum to the files, wisely predicted trouble. 22 

Proctor was replaced on 17 December by Stephen B. Elkins, who remained 

until March 1893. Breckinridge enjoyed Elkins' warm support during his 

secretaryship, but the close personal relationship and patronage he had received 

from Proctor was lacking. Adroit as he was, the Inspector General managed to 

survive Proctor's departure with only one important loss to his power. Congress 

had directed in March 1891 that the Inspector General's Department provide 

detailed supervision of the receipts and disbursements of the new National 

Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. This modest increase was offset when 

Secretary Elkins removed an important aspect of inspection activities. Officers 

and staff departments chafing under the Inspector General's increased oversight 

had become decidedly restive since Secretary Proctor had departed. No department was more fiercely protective of its own independence than the Corps of 

Engineers, one of the more effective combatants in the War Department's 

bureaucratic dogfighting. The Chief of Engineers curtailed Breckinridge's 

increasing scope on 5 July 1892, when that part of paragraph 955 of the 

regulations authorizing the Inspector General's Department to inspect engineering works was revoked. The responsibility for inspections reverted to the Chief 

of Engineers and his commanders of engineer divisions. All Breckinridge salvaged was continued authority to inspect Engineer disbursements and financial 

accounts. 23 

Much of the increase in the department's work load could be attributed to 

duties imposed by Congress. But in fact Breckinridge himself was generating 

additional work, especially by having secretaries of war assign it. One of his 

motives was an honest belief, shared by others, that inspection was beneficial 

to the Army and the War Department. Equally strong in Breckinridge's thinking was that aqditional work represented both an expansion of influence for his 

department and a justification for its increase in size and budget. By 1893, he 

had added to his store of justifications for increase of his department a growing 

series of arguments from history. His staff, that year, had prepared a brief 

history of the Inspector General's Department since 1778, which allowed him 

to refer to the glories of his predecessors, reaching back to "Baron Steuben, 

practically the first Inspector-General of the Army. " The history was the work 

of clerk A. C. Quisenberry, who compiled a documentary record and a list of 

all inspecting officers. Breckinridge used this example to show inspection as 

one of the training grounds for the great military leaders of all wars; 2 major 

generals, 7 brigadier generals, 18 colonels, 118 lieutenant colonels, and 149 

majors of the Regular Army, he pointed out, had performed inspection duty 

during the Civil War. 24 

22. Breckinridge, Memo, 6 Nov 91, in Letters Sent 1891-1894, Records of the Inspector 

General's Office (hereafter cited as RIGO) , RG 159; Cir No.3, AGO, 5 Dec 91, conveying: 

Decision of the Commanding General, 21 Nov 91, in GORI&IG. 

23 . GO No. 45, AGO, 5 Jul 92 , in GORI&IG. 

24. ARIG 1893 ,6. In June 1893, Breckinridge told the Secretary that Quisenberry was working on the project, had gone through all War Department records, and needed authority to examine 

(Continued) 
328 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

INSPECTION AT PROVING GROUND, 12-INCH HOWITZER ON CANET CARRIAGE, 

1892. The activities of the Coast Artillery Corps increased in inspection importance at the end of the 19th century. 

Quisenberry's history soon fell into the hands of Joseph P. Sanger, the 

inspectorate's most prolific writer. In 1895 , Sanger expanded the text into a 

narrative history of the Inspector General's Department, which was published 

the next year in a project of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 

The Army of the United States: HistoricaL Sketches of Staff and Line with 

Portraits of GeneraLs-in-Chief, and which Breckinridge reproduced in 1900 as 

an appendix to his annual report. Thus Breckinridge, as Inspector General, 

once again demonstrated that he was a highly imaginative bureau chief by using 

history to justify his current policies. What was interesting about the published 

versions of Sanger's history was that they were abridged, because Sanger told 

the editors to cut it if it was too long. What was not printed was a biased closing 

that argued at length for a bigger, higher ranked, and above all thoroughly 

independent Inspector General's Department. Independence, Sanger claimed 

(probably reflecting Breckinridge's influence) was necessary because of the 

fragmented War Department organization, little of which answered to the Commanding General. If each War Department bureau had its own inspection 

(Continued) 

the records of the State Department (the government's chief record keeper for much of the 19th 

century). Breckinridge to Secy of War, 7 lun 93, in Letters Sent 1891-1894, RG 159. The main 

fru it of Quisenberry's labors is: General Orders Relating to Inspection and the Inspector General's 

Department (GORI&IG). Some of his notes covering the late I 860s are now in RG 159, entry 26, 

box 6, file 323 miscellaneous, RIGO, Secret Correspondence 1917- 1934, National Archives, 

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. 
BRECKINRIDGE'S WIDENING SCOPE 329 

system, the result would be further fragmentation which would reduce the 

possibility of the Secretary or Commanding General receiving unbiased 

information. Sanger argued that it was thus particularly important for the Secretary to have his own separate Inspector General's Department to maintain 

control of War Department affairs through the information provided by its 

impartial observers. 25 

The interests of the eclectic Breckinridge knew no bounds. Unlike his 

predecessors, he felt no compunction about offering broad recommendations 

for the improvement of the military force, even if they involved the terrifying 

prospect of a reorganization. Breckinridge was one of the first of the Army's 

top leaders to call for the establishment of a modem general staff, although the 

idea had been current in American military circles for some time. The Inspector 

General's version of a "higher general staff" was so couched that it posed no 

bureaucratic threat to the "lower general staff," for his own organizational 

mandate included the following specification: "The simple thing we need is 

that one branch of the staff shall be wholly devoted to strategy, simply the 

mental part of war, and be constantly accustomed to field service, with each 

individual fully and permanently under the well-graded authority of those whose 

province it is to command troops. In short, we need a higher general staff. ,,26 

More peculiar was Breckinridge's first call, in 1893, for the establishment 

of a homing pigeon service. After elaborating on the value of pigeons, which he 

said every modem army used, the Inspector General pointed out there were 

clubs of pigeon fanciers in all cities. He assured the Secretary that they would 

be willing to lend their help in the establishment of a national pigeon service. 

The War Department, Breckinridge suggested, should work to obtain favorable 

transportation rates for pigeon racers, or subsidize transportation with a small 

appropriation, out of which also would come prizes for the' 'best results obtained 

during the year as is now done in Europe. " Every pigeon club should in return 

make annual reports to the War Department. 27 

An Uncertain New Patron 

In March 1893, Secretary Elkins was succeeded by Daniel S. Lamont, 

whose progressive inclinations were as strong as those of Proctor. Lamont was 

cautious during his first year or two on the job, however, contenting himself 

only with a call for an increase of the enlisted force, echoing arguments that had 

been advanced many times in the past. Rather than condone Breckinridge's 

ambitions, Lamont made some effort to discourage him. The new Secretary did 

stop the excessive printing costs associated with the Inspector General's 

25. Sanger, "Inspector-General's Department"; Theo. F. Rodenbaugh and William L. Haskins, 

eds., The Army of the United States: Historical Sketches of Staff and Line with Portraits of 

Generals-in-Chief (New York: Maynard, Merrill, 1896). The complete text of Sanger's history 

sUivives in the manuscript, located in file 372, RIGa, Index to General Correspondence 1894-1916, 

WI~. . 

26. ARIG 1893, 31-32. 

27. Ibid ., 33-34. 
330 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

extremely long annual reports and, beginning in 1894, the Inspector General's 

report no longer was published in a separate volume. In his annual report of that 

year, Breckinridge told the Secretary and the Commanding General that, for the 

first time in several years, a complete inspection had been made of all garrisons 

and posts within a single fiscal year, for which he said the inspectors should be 

credited. Inspections that year included 928 disbursement accounts involving 

over $68 million and inspections of 90 posts; 50 staff facilities, prisons, and 

ungarrisoned posts; 82 military colleges; 51 national cemeteries; 27 recruiting 

stations; and 28 special investigations: a total of 1,256 inspections. Regretfully 

Breckinridge had to report that the annual inspection reports of post commanders, 

which had been required for about fifteen years, came to an end in 1894. He 

credited the post commanders' reports with much good, and obviously regretted the loss of that source of information and influence for his department. 28 

By 1894 it was clear that Breckinridge's ambitions continued to earn him 

enemies. But that resourceful inspector general was ready for any emergency. 

Asking the Secretary, "Is the Army inspected to death?" "This department," 

he said, "has not contended for frequent so much as for thorough and complete 

inspections, equally and fairly applied, or excluded alike from all." Retrenchments in mileage appropriations had curtailed inspections that year, but Breckinridge said that all in ,the Army realized that inspections were in the interest of 

discipline . He claimed, "Only a few officers" had objected to inspection, but 

the implication of his own words was that there had been many complaints 

about the Inspector General's Department. 29 

Breckinridge began 1895 with a rearrangement of personnel. Edward M. 

Heyl died on 2 January, making way for George H. Burton's rise to colonel and 

Peter D. Vroom's to lieutenarit colonel. The vacancy for one major was filled 

by promotion of Capt. Ernest A. Garlington of the 7th Cavalry. Garlington was 

a certified hero, winner of the Medal of Honor for "distinguished gallantry in 

action against hostile Sioux Indians on Wounded Knee Creek, South Dakota, 

29 December 1890, where he was severely wounded while serving as first 

lieutenant, 7th Cavalry." Garlington proved to be an effective and energetic 

addition to the Inspector General's Department. 30 

Independence Gained 

Secretary Lamont, his earlier hesitancy put aside, proved a strong supporter 

of the Inspector General after all. Breckinridge gained one of the greatest 

triumphs of his career: The Secretary granted nearly complete independence for 

the Inspector General's Department. Breckinridge had managed to persuade 

Lamont not only that inspection was in the Secretary's interests, but also that 

the many complaints from the Army were attempts by commanders to interfere 

28. ARIG 1894, H. Ex. Doc. I, 53d Cong., 3d sess., vol. I, pI. 2: 9{}-91 , 101 ,214. 

29. Ibid., 214-15. 

30. ARIG 1895, H. Doc. 2, 54th Cong., 1st sess., vol. I, pp. 107- 08; See Appendix B. 
BRECKINRIDGE'S WIDENING SCOPE 331 

with inspection, and therefore to hide something from the War Department. 

Schofield apparently voiced no strong objections to Breckinridge's scheme, 

and was in fact looking forward to retirement in the fall. The Commanding 

General had been thoroughly dismayed by the War Department's bureaucratic 

dogfighting since taking office, and chose not to spend his last months involved 

in another controversy. As a result, On 30 March 1895 the Secretary ordered 

that, effective 30 April, the United States be divided into six inspection districts 

" whose limits," reported Breckinridge, "were determined by the questions of 

economy of travel and equalization of work. The number of acting inspectorsgeneral was reduced from six to one .•• The new system put the entire inspectorate directly under the Secretary of War and (nominally) the Commanding 

General. What was really important about the new arrangement was that department commanders no longer controlled officers of the Inspector General's 

Department, who now covered territories that took in, with equal interest, 

military posts and secretarial concerns such as staff facilities and cemeteries. 3 1 

Breckinridge had evoked George Washington's inspectorate to justify this new 

structure. This was imaginative, but also inaccurate and self-serving, to say the 

least. If anything had characterized Washington's attitude toward inspection , it 

was its utter absorption into the military command. The army commander, not 

its Inspector General, answered to the civil authority for the Army's performance. 

In Breckinridge's scheme, the Inspector General served the civil authority 

represented by the Secretary of War, and only nominally served the Commanding General. That was a logical product both of the division of authority in the 

War Department and of Breckinridge's ambitions for bureaucratic independence, 

but it effectively separated inspection from command. 

Despite the predictable complaints from department commanders, the Army 

and Navy Journal observed the new inspection system with interest and a great 

deal of favor. The dual system of department commanders and inspectors 

general, each making annual inspections and reporting to the Secretary of War, 

said the editors, was very promising. The Journal emphasized Lamont's involvement in the new district inspection system on 20 April, and printed a list of the 

districts and the facilities they contained, along with inspection schedules. 

Finally, on 22 June, the editors reported, "The first inspections under the new 

method . . . were made during the past few weeks by the Inspection Corps, and 

the result has been all that its advocates have claimed for it. " Inspections, said 

the periodical, had been complete, thorough, in accord with the Secretary of 

War's desires, and reduced travel costS. 32 The system had begun so quickly 

because Breckinridge had arranged his officers as soon as possible once the 

district system took effect. Hughes held the North Atlantic District, with an 

office in New York City. Burton reported on the Pacific District from San 

31. GO No. 18, AGO, 30 Mar 95 , in GORI&IG; ARIG 1895, 106. 

32. Army and Navy Journal , 32 (2 March 1895): 434 (6 April 1895): 518 (13 April 1895): 541 

(20 April 1895): 555 , and (22 June 1895): 702; U.S·. War Department, Regulationsfor the Army of 

the United States 1895 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895), passim. 
332 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Francisco, Lawton the Southern District from Santa Fe, and Vroom the Middle 

District from Chicago. On 30 April, Sanger was detached as Military Secretary 

to Schofield, who embarked on his farewell tour of the Army. Garlington, 

based in Washington, D.C., served as Inspector General of the South Atlantic 

District, and was also assistant to "the Inspector General of the Army" 

(Breckinridge). Major Francis Moore, 5th Cavalry, the only line officer detailed 

to inspection, covered the Northern District from Denver. 33 

General Schofield was replaced by the new Commanding General, Nelson 

A. Miles, who took office on 5 October 1895. Miles was the most critical 

occupant the office had known since Winfield Scott. Schofield had acknowledged the powerlessness of the top office by trying to make himself a Chief of 

Staff to the Secretary of War. Miles, in contrast, was selfish of his prerogatives 

and wanted the Commanding General to command in fact as well as name. It 

was, therefore, only a matter of time before he came into conflict with 

Breckinridge, whose bureaucratic independence was neither as complete nor as 

traditional as that of other staff heads. But as Miles said in his memoirs, the 

Army as a whole suffered in 1895 because of its rigid size and hidebound 

ways.34 Trusting in support from Secretary Lamont, Breckinridge managed to 

get through Mile's first year without serious incident. His inspection system 

peaked in 1896 with its personnel unchanged and its work load continuing to 

increase. To assure Miles that he had the best interest of the Army at heart, 

Breckinridge reported that his inspectors had visited 82 garrisoned posts that 

year, thus demonstrating the thoroughness of his program. 35 He also told Miles 

that inspection under the new system was both more comprehensive and economical than that under previous systems. Fewer officers were doing more 

work. He may have believed that this positive assessment would calm Miles, for 

the department commanders were complaining frequently about the independent inspectors roaming their domains. Breckinridge's independence was derived 

from Secretary Lamont, whom he had convinced of the merits of the district 

inspection system. 36 

Independence Lost 

Secretary of War Lamont left office in March 1897 and was replaced 

immediately by Russell A. Alger, a genial, well-meaning man of average 

ability. He was interested in his position, but was unfortunately naive and no 

match for the unprincipled bureaucrats who were his nominal subordinates. 

When the war with Spain erupted, Alger proved a welcome scapegoat for 

everyone's complaints about the Army's problems. Before that, he had fallen 

into the most vicious feud between a Secretary of War and a Commanding 

33 . ARIG 1895, 106-07. 

34. Nelson A. Miles, Serving the Republic: Memoirs of the Civil and Military Life of Nels Oil A . 

Miles (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1911), 260--61. 

35. ARIG 1896, H. Doc. 2, 54th Cong., 2d sess., I: 100--103. 

36. Ibid ., 125,209. 
BRECKINRIDGE'S WIDENING SCOPE 333 

General since Sherman had departed for Saint Louis. At the start, however, 

Alger wanted only to please Miles, and his first annual report urged that the 

Commanding General be promoted to lieutenant general, as Schofield had been 

earlier. 37 Alger's approach to Miles had little effect at first on Breckinridge' s 

department. There were only minor changes in the inspectorate the year Alger 

took office. Lawton moved his headquarters from Santa Fe to Los Angeles, 

while Sanger and Garlington divided their time between the South Atlantic 

District and the Washington office. The total of inspections continued to climb, 

and Breckinridge was pleased to report that the work was all done by his regular 

complement, except for twenty-one military college inspections made by officers under detail. In troop inspections, he felt that practical exercises posed by 

inspectors were increasingly part of the routine, while follow-up, the correction 

of deficiencies reported by inspectors, had improved, except for unsolvable 

problems related to army buildings. 38 Breckinridge complained as usual that his 

officers were overworked, and that more were needed. Nevertheless, he thought 

that the dual system of inspections, as performed by Inspectors General and 

department commanders, was working well enough. 39 

However, by the end of 1897 Breckinridge must have known that his 

organization had serious problems. The department commanders were not satisfied with the district system and neither was Miles, who rightly perceived that 

he had no control over the inspectorate. Breckinridge requested a legislatively 

established department with mandated duties, but he failed to win the active 

support of Secretary Alger, who at the time respected and feared Miles. The 

Commanding General, meanwhile, was trying to assert his own authority, and 

his conflicts with Alger increased. The Secretary tried to placate Miles even as 

he battled to restrain him. Thus, the Inspector General's Department became a 

casualty of the growing controversy between the power-hungry Miles and the 

ineffective Alger. Alger had not the ambitions for the close relationship with 

the inspectorate that his predecessors had cherished. He would not grant Miles 

any control over the regular staff departments, but he decided that he could not 

refuse him the kind of connection to the Adjutant General and Inspector General that his predecessors had held . The first sign of Breckinridge's changing 

fortunes was his loss, on 12 March 1898, of authority to inspect the War 

Department Supply Division, a minor task filled by an inspector general since 

1889. That was a small event, but it marked only the second time since 

Breckinridge's advent that his department's service to the Secretary had 

decreased. 40 

37. ARSecWar 1897, H. Doc. 2, 55th Cong., 2d sess., 1: 9-10. Alger's background is 

addressed in Margaret Leech, III the Days of McKillley (New York: Harper, 1959). Alger was 

brevetted twice, to major general of volunteers, during the Civil War, but resigned under accusations 

of cowardice in 1864. He was politically well-connected as a governor of Michigan and a power in 

the Grand Army of the Republic. . 

38 . ARIG 1897, H. Doc . 2, 55th Cong. , 2d sess., 1: 117-18, 120, 146. 

39. Ibid. , 265-66. 

40. War Department Cir, 12 Mar 98 , cited in "History of the Inspector General's Department," 

31 Dec 04 , in file 372, Index to General Correspondence 1894-1916, RG 159. The first loss was 

purview over the Corps of Engineers, in 1892. 
334 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The great blow fell on 23 March 1898, when the Secretary abolished the 

inspection districts and assigned the inspectors general, and as many acting 

inspectors general as were necessary to be detailed, to the eight geographical 

departments. They were to serve under the orders of the department commanders. 

Only inspectors general not assigned to departments now served the Secretary 

of War or the Commanding General. Correspondence in the Inspector General's 

Department could be direct for purposes of instruction or information for 

inspectors but could not extend to matters of administration pertaining to military commanders.

41 Breckinridge' s cherished independence, unprotected by 

the legislative charter he had asked for and undefended by a disinterested 

Secretary, was crushed, as was Breckinridge. The change, Alger said later, was 

to put the inspectorate on a footing for a war that seemed imminent. The 

enraged Breckinridge, instead of staying in Washington while the army was 

engaged in war, left his department leaderless while he took to the field in 

pursuit of glory on the battlefield. His departure at such a critical time almost 

cost the Inspector General's Department its very existence. 

41. GO No. II, 23 Mar 98, in GOR1&IG. The officers were assigned to the departments by 

orders of 16 April 1898 . 
CHAPTER 19 

The Department in Service to the Secretary 

(1889-1898) 

During Breckinridge's leadership of the Inspector General's Department, 

the range of its ancillary inspection duties increased and the number of special 

investigations at the Secretary's behest decreased. That was mostly because 

Breckinridge was able to develop a comprehensive inspection system for activities that had formerly received only sporadic attention through special 

investigations. In the 1890s, rarely did the Secretary of War call one of the 

inspectors general off his regular tour to make a special review. An isolated 

instance occurred in April 1897, when Sanger, at the Secretary's request, ,was 

sent to Memphis, Tennessee, to inspect flood damage on the Mississippi and to 

report directly to the Secretary on what the War Department could do to relieve 

distress in the area. I 

Paragraph 955 

Breckinridge justified his department's independence and direct connection 

to the Secretary on inspections required by paragraph 955 of the regulation. That 

paragraph, in accordance with the law, directed the inspectors general to 

examine facilities not under the authority of department commanders and to 

report their findings to the Secretary of War. That introduced recurrent conflicts 

with department commanders, who resented the inspectors' freedom . The commanders triumphed momentarily in August 1890, when Breckinridge was ordered 

to keep departmental and divisional inspectors informed, through the commanders, of the paragraph 955 inspections desired by the Secretary. Each 

inspector was to submit his plan of inspection to his commander, who must 

approve it and give orders for the necessary travel. 2 At the other extreme was 

Breckinridge's triumph in freeing his officers of any control by departmental 

commanders through the institution in 1895 of inspection districts. The great 

number of paragraph 955 inspections, combined with the need to control travel 

time, justified the district system .... In 1891 Breckinridge explained that the 

attention of inspectors under paragraph 955 went only to business and adminisI. Correspondence on this assignment is located in file 2544, Index to General Correspondence 

(hereafter cited as Gen Corresp) 1894-1916, RG 159. 

2. GO No. 95, AGO, 26 Aug 90, in GORI&IG. 
336 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, l777-1903 

trative matters, not to technical or scientific concerns. He pointed out, for 

example, that his inspectors looked into business practices as well as into 

financial accounts to determine how the public's money was spent. Otherwise, 

he feared, "There is great danger which can not be too carefully guarGed 

against that our officers will degenerate into mere auditors, which evidently is 

not the intention of the law.' ,3 

Breckinridge ceased lamenting the 1892 loss of engineering inspections 

and concentrated on his otherwise expanding purview. His judgments on staff 

department facilities continued mostly favorable, although he did not hestitate 

to recommend improvements, from repair of dilapidated buildings to the institution of uniform pay scales for civilian employees. The Quartermaster Department's depots, he declared in 1896, were especially commendable for their 

adoption of a uniform business method. The Army and Navy General Hospital 

was usually described as in "excellent condition," while in 1897 he declared 

the Subsistence Department depots "well administered, as usual," although 

the Medical Department supply depots tended to be cluttered with too many 

objects. And although he steered clear of the Corps of Engineers' technical 

operations, the Inspector General still examined their books, and in 1897 advised 

that staff officers needed some accounting assistance so they could devote full 

time. to supervising their employees. 4 Although willing to render advice to 

another bureau, Breckinridge was quick to defend his department's prerogatives when he saw his own province threatened. A case in point was property 

condemnation and disposal procedures. With variations in practice, since 1825 

the law had required that each useless item, from riverboat to teacup, be taken 

before an inspector general for condemnation before it could be disposed of. 

That procedure was excessively cumbersome, with the kind of inventories the 

Army was accumulating by the late nineteenth century. But when some of the 

staff departments proposed to simplify matters, the Inspector General was 

quick to give them a reprint of the 1825 legislation and a dose of his own 

sentiments favoring no change. 5 

One of the Inspector General's paragraph 955 responsibilities continued to 

be the system of national cemeteries. By the mid-1890s the need for annual 

inspections was excessive, in terms both of burden upon the inspectors and of 

the real value derived . The places were usually found to be well run, and the 

occasional dilapidated building or missing fence was seldom news that an 

inspector brought to the superintendent or the Quartermaster General. Inspections ultimately were made biennial by 1895, and only ten were made the 

following year. The Inspector General successfully urged that Confederate 

dead in Federal cemeteries be treated and memorialized in the same manner as 

Federals. He also suggested that, because deceased honorably discharged soldiers were entitled to burial in national cemeteries, most of which were in the 

3. ARIG 1892, 20-26. 

4. ARIG 1894, 213- 14;ARIG 1895, 221-25;ARIG 1896, 218-21 ;ARIG 1897, 242-43, 253- 55. 

5. ARIG 1896, 211-20. 
THE DEPARTMENT IN SERVICE TO THE SECRETARY 337 

South, new cemeteries should be established near the regional homes for disabled volunteers and near selected northern cities. 6 

West Point 

The Military Academy at West Point returned to the Inspector General's 

purview in the early 1890s, · an annual duty owed to the Secretary of War. 

Typically, as in 1894, the inspection report spoke in "high terms of the excellent management of this institution." The inspector also listed the deficiencies 

corrected on the recommendations of previous inspections. Breckinridge proposed that year the coordination of all officer instruction in the Army, involving 

West Point and the officers' schools for application in infantry , artillery , and 

cavalry, as well as the lyceums beginning to appear at posts. In that, Breckinridge presaged the systematic educational program that would appear early in 

the twentieth century. He extended his attention to the West Point Special 

Contingent Fund in 1895, which was supported by rentals of the hotel on the 

academy grounds and other incidental sources, and used for minor expenses. It 

was, he said, "appropriately handled.,,7 

The Military Prison 

Inspection of the United States Military Prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

continued as a responsibility conveyed upon the Inspectors General by Congress in the 1870s. It was another duty they owed to the Secretary, not the 

Commanding General. Since 1881, the inspections had usually been made by 

divisional or departmental inspectors, and on 2 March 1889 the Secretary 

directed the inspector general of the Military Division of the Missouri to make 

quarterly inspections of the prison. In August Breckinridge complained that 

inspections by divisional or departmental inspectors had always caused friction, 

because the prison superintendent owed no allegiance to any geographical area 

commander. He asked Proctor to return the duty to the Inspector General's 

Department in Washington. The agreeable Secretary concurred early the next 

month, while Breckinridge was on tour in the West. 8 Advised by the Secretary 

of War, who learned what he knew from Breckinridge, that the quarterly 

inspection schedule was excessive, on 19 January 1891 Congress revised the 

law governing inspections of the prison, requiring a single annual inspection. 9 

On 1 November 1890, the United States Military Prison became an independent military post under the immediate authority of the Commanding General of 

6. ARIG 1893, 21-22; ARIG 1894, 214; ARIG 1896, 221-22; ARIG 1897, 255-56. The figure 

of ten cemeteries for 1896, a remarkable drop from recent years, is correct. 

7. ARlG 1894, 203-04; ARIG 1895, 214-15. 

8. Breckinridge to IG, Division of the Missouri, 8 Mar 89; Breckinridge to AG, 16 Aug 89; 

and Telg, Lawton to Breckinridge, 5 Sep 89, all in Letters Sent 1863-1889, RG 159. 

9. An Act to amend sections thirteen hundred and forty-six and thirteen hundred and fortyeight of the Revised Statutes of the United States. in reference to the visitation and inspection of the 

Military Prison and examination of its accounts and government, Statutes at Large 26, sec. 1348 , 

722 (1891). Thian , Legis/ative History, 115; GO No.8, AGO, 27 Jan 91, in GORI&IG. 
338 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

the Army, for the convicts and their keepers were the only troops he really 

commanded. The board of commissioners reformed the applicable governing 

rules in May 1891, permitting the prisoners holiday and letter-writing privileges. 

Those reforms did not entirely erase confusion at the prison. Both the commandant 

and the inspector were required by law to hear and investigate all prisoner 

complaints. Breckinridge maintained that that merely invited complaining, and 

claimed that at least a third of the time which boards and inspectors spent in 

looking at the place was devoted to reviews of nonsense generated by chronic 

malcontents. His answer to that problem was to change the procedure, to 

require that a complaining prisoner show how the prison rules had been 

violated. 10 The handling of complaints was not the only matter of concern: In 

the two decades of the prison's existence, there had been much grumbling in 

the higher officer corps about the coddling of criminals and the encouragement 

of crime by less than rigorous treatment; before Breckinridge's time, some of 

that complaining had Come from the Inspector General's Office. The government finally decided to end this experiment in modern penology, and in August 

1895 it terminated the United States Military Prison. Within the next few 

months, the prisoners were dispersed to guardhouses at the larger permanent 

posts, while the officers and men of the staff returned to their line positions. 

The inspectors general, of course, lost one of their special attachments to the 

Secretary of War when the prison shut down. II 

The Soldiers' Home 

The inspection of the Soldiers' Home was another secretarial attachment, 

begun in 1883, which Breckinridge took seriously. Besides meticulous reviews 

of the financial accounts, the Inspector General kept the place in the public eye. 

His inspection in 1892 reported some improvement, but suggested that the 

home's managers needed to do much more to provide comfort for the old 

soldiers. Better meal service, elevators, bathing facilities, warmer floors, and 

more fresh produce were all, in Breckinridge's opinion, wanted. He suggested 

forming a board of officers to work on improving the home's food . 12 The next 

year he said that the exterior had always looked good, but recently there had 

been improvements to the internal condition of the buildings, bedding, and' 

cleanliness, "and this at least extends to the facilities provided the inmates to 

enjoy the same virtue." Additional bathing facilities were still required, however, 

but the Inspector General was pleased to announce an increase in the water 

supply. He complained that there were still too few elevators for the feeble, and 

that some men slept in substandard conditions. The mess had improved, but the 

practice of buying from selected suppliers was expensive and unsatisfactory . 

10. ARIG 1891, 14- 15. 

II . ARSecWar 1896, H. Doc . 2, 54th Cong., 2d sess., I: 15; Foner, Soldier Between Wars, 

120. 

12. ARIG 1892, 43. For a general history of the Soldiers' Home, see Paul R. Goode, The 

United States Soldier's Home (Richmond, Virginia: William Byrd Press, 1957). 
THE DEPARTMENT IN SERVICE TO THE SECRETARY 339 

Breckinridge also asked that "means [be] provided for the innocent diversion and recreation of these old and disabled veterans," including a post exchange 

("dry if preferred") and amusement rooms like those at the military posts. He 

was not pleased to report the destruction of the home's dairy herd and the 

reduction of its garden. Finally, he suggested that the "funding basis" of the 

home' 'seems somewhat questionable ," although he did not say precisely what 

that meant. 13 Breckinridge's interest in the home's operations continued at a 

high level, and he agitated for further improvements continually. Although 

there was now a recreation room, it was dingy and inappropri:ilely located in a 

basement. In 1896 he reported a need for more improvements, and he listed 

them, including the construction of more walkways on the grounds. The home's 

books were "neatly and properly kept, but the habit of keeping cash balances 

on hand seems dangerous and undesirable, and where the depository is so easy 

of access it is also unnecessary . It is understood that two separate sets of 

accounts are kept, one as is usual with public accounts which are submitted for 

inspection, the other in some special manner not recognized elsewhere in the 

authorized system of accounting for public moneys. " 14 Inasmuch as double 

bookkeeping arouses suspicion in any auditor; the Soldier's Home had apparently ended the practice, whatever its original purpose, by 1897 and the Inspector General commended the staff and recommended that an additional officer be 

assigned to accounting. 15 

Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers 

Breckinridge was interested in the extension of his department's influence 

over the Army , but he was also a sincere humanitarian , a quality reflected in his 

concern for the nation's "old soldiers," and for the young soldiers he helped to 

relieve of Sunday inspections and exercises. Both facets of his personality were 

satisfied when Congress extended his purview over the National Home for 

Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, established to care for the growing numbers of 

indigent Civil War veterans. In 1893 Breckinridge reported that the appropriation acts and certain orders required his department to audit the accounts of the 

National Home quarterly. Transactions in the accounts that year amounted to 

about a million and a quarter dollars per quarter, and one appropriation for 

transportation had been overdrawn by $54.11. Breckinridge suggested that 

audits be made monthly to ensure better control. The Inspector General also 

stressed the need for routine close acountability of both property and money at 

all times. In the meantime, Breckinridge and the Treasury Department had 

developed an accounting system for the National Home . 16 

13. ARIG 1893, 26--27 . 

14. ARIG 1895, 220-21 ; ARIG 1896, 217- 18. 

15. ARIG 1897, 243-44. 

16 . ARIG 1893, 27- 30. The National Home was a predecessor of the Veterans Administration , 

established by Executive Order 5398,21 July 1930, in accordance with Ihe act of 3 July 1930 (46 

Stat. 1016), authorizing the President to consol idate and coordinate the United States Veterans 

. (Continued) 
340 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers was actually a collection of branch homes scattered across the country. Their administration was 

inevitably less professional than that of the Soldier's Home, which was a War 

Department operation housed in one place. In August 1894 Congress agreed 

that the National Home should receive closer supervision, but instead of monthly 

audits, it required regional annual inspections conducted by the Inspector 

General's Department. 17 The National Home, because of the political influence 

of Civil War veterans, was a politically sensitive subject that attracted close 

congressional attention. It was also a perennial headache for the inspectors. 

Breckinridge reported all branches generally in good condition in 1894, except 

for repairs needed to some buildings. Staff overhead duplicated excessive effort, 

he complained, and technical changes were needed in business procedures, 

along with some clarifications of the law. Most recommendations made by the 

inspectors general were adopted by the Board of Managers and the appropriations committee in Congress, and the adoption of new accounting forms and 

methods improved the records systems. 18 

Breckinridge himself inspected the branches of the National Home in 1896. 

He reported their newer barracks better than their antecedents, offering more air 

and light and improved comfort for the inmates. But the National Home's 

population was growing while its appropriations were decreasing. However, 

because of the administrative improvements he had encouraged, care of inmates 

continued adequate, economies had been instituted, and surpluses had been 

turned back to the Treasury. In Breckinridge's opinion, more savings were 

possible. The National Home's operators still did not conduct all of their 

affairs according to law, but defects in their vouchers were on the decline. As 

for the residents, the Inspector General had tried to visit every healthy inmate. 

"They seem to be generally contented," he said. 19 His personal interest meant 

that the scale of the inspectorate's involvement would be high. The size of the 

inspection responsibility may be seen in the fact that it took the Inspector 

General's Department fifteen man-weeks in 1897 to inspect the "whole plant, 

valued approximately at $7,500,000, and of the methods, more or less intricate, 

of its fiscal department and its great mass of accounts and vouchers, which 

aggregated more than $5,000,000." The National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers by then housed 18,000 men in hundreds of buildings and the 

number of eligible users was increasing. Breckinridge declared the branch 

homes generally in good condition, and although appropriations had been reduced 

again, increased efficiency had cut maintenance costS.20 

(Continued) 

Bureau, Bureau of Pensions, and National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. The Veterans 

Administration also eventually took over national cemeteries, except for those operated as historic 

sites. 

17 . An Act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal 

year ending June thirtieth , eighteen hundred and ninety-jive, and for other purposes, Statutes at 

Large 28 , sec. 1,372 (1894); Thian, Legislative History, 116. 

18. ARIG 208-11. 

19. ARIG 1896, 213-17. 

20. ARIG 1897, 244-50. The National Home by this time had its own supply service, with a 

central depot at Columbus, Ohio. 
THE DEPARTMENT IN SERVICE TO THE SECRETARY 

Disbursing Accounts 

341 

Breckinridge was obsessed with the National Home's bookkeeping because 

inspections of disbursing accounts had become his department's greatest area of 

concern. During his first year in Washington, inspectors general submitted 

1,204 reports of inspections of accounts covering transactions amounting to 

over $52 million. Only twenty-three, about 2 percent, had had to be returned 

for correction. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1889 the Secretary expressed his 

displeasure over two cases of gross carelessness in records of the Pay Department. 

He reminded disbursing officers to follow the rules on record-keeping. The 

Secretary also told the Inspector General's Department to give "special attention to these matters, and promptly report, for the action of the Secretary of 

War, all infractions of those rules and regulations. ,, 2 1 

Auditing the Army's financial transactions was the department's most seriously taken service to the Secretary of War. The activity provided a strong 

justification for the department's existence. No one approves the waste of 

public funds, and Breckinridge was quick to proclaim his department's role in 

monitoring disbursements. By 1892 Breckinridge's office was responsible for 

producing forms for inspection of money and property accounts, new versions 

of which appeared that year. The Secretary ordered earlier that any officer 

relieved from disbursing duty was to send "Form 3, Inspector General's 

Department," to the inspector who looked after his accounts. The inspector 

would make an examination if practical, and in any case was to forward the 

form to the Inspector General's Office in Washington.

22 This, too', was a huge 

task: The volume of accounts inspected increased to over $71 million in 1892. 

Officers of the Inspector General's Department made about a hundred account 

inspections per week, while other officers did the remaining quarter of the 

audits. Breckinridge concluded that it was absolutely vital that uniform methods of accounting and disbursing be adopted and enforced. Various staff departments made very broad interpretations of the law, accounting for 60 percent of 

the "exceptions" in inspectors' reports of audits. Inspectors had uncovered 

voucher frauds that had led to prosecutions. He suggested that the Treasury 

Department ought to compare every check and voucher it acted upon. 23 

Breckinridge also advised managing public works by contract, rather than 

having officers hire, subsist, and oversee gangs of construction laborers. Outstanding checks were a burden to disbursing officers, who must report them 

monthly until cashed. There was a slight decline in total disbursements in 1893, 

for which Breckinridge claimed credit for the inspectors general. He further 

claimed that since he had first started working on the problem in 1891, the 

percentage of final balances as part of the average of total monthly disburse21. ARIG 1889, 122; Cir, AGO, 20 Apr 89, in GORI&IG. 

22. ARIG 1890 , 281 - 84; Cir No. 15 , AGO, II Dec 90, and Cir, AGO, n.d. 1891. both in 

GORI&IG. 

23 . ARIG 1892 , 17-18. 
342 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

ments had fallen from 186 percent to 99 percent in 1892 and to 94 percent in 

1893. 24 Breckinridge also suggested that the congressional policy returning any 

savings to the Department of the Treasury was misguided, because it removed 

any incentives toward economy for officers in charge of projects. There were 

also other reasons that savings might be transferred from one account to another 

to support needed work, such as in barracks construction. In his view, all army 

appropriations should be transferrable among the many accounts, which would 

not affect the total appropriation. 25 

Property Inspections 

In its service to the Secretary of War's interest in economy, the department's 

attention to disbursing accounts was closely related to its inspection of property. 

The War Department meddled with property procedures endlessly. Inspection 

of ordnance property was transferred from the inspectors general to the Ordnance Department in 1890. Later that year, the regulations were revised to 

permit department and division commanders to give orders to dispose of condemned property, except in two instances. Only the Secretary of War could 

order the disposal of ordnance property, while the Surgeon General had first to 

give his opinion on the disposal of medical property. The Secretary was the 

arbiter of all disputes. 26 

Nothing revealed the administrative complexities of the War Department 

more than the subject of property management. Officers presenting property for 

inspection were told in January 1892 to inventory it in quadruplicate, on prescribed forms. Inspection reports on condemned property also were to be prepared in quadruplicate, on other specified forms. If valueless property was 

destroyed, one copy of the report went to Breckinridge's office; otherwise , all 

copies were to be held at department headquarters. Orders for the disposition of 

property were to be endorsed on inspection reports. One copy went to 

Breckinridge, one to the head of the staff department holding the property, and 

the other two to the accountable officer. In November, the War Department 

changed the inventory and inspection reports from quadruplicate to triplicate, 

with a copy to Breckinridge's office and two to the accountable officer. The 

staff department heads had to consult the Inspector General or their field officers if they wanted to know the fate of some discarded object. 27 

The reasons for those orders Breckinridge made clear later in 1892. Hitherto, there had been no record kept of property inspected and condemned. Breckinridge avowed that the level of information was improved, but the reports 

involved considerable speculation about the value of condemned property. The 

problem, he maintained, was that there was no uniform system in the War 

24. ARIG 1893, 12-13. 

25. Ibid ., 16. 

26. GO No. 90, AGO, 15 Aug 90, and GO No. 118, AGO, 7 Oct 90, in GORI&IG . 

27 . GO No.8, AGO, 29 Jan 92, and GO No. 76, AGO, 9 Nov 92, in GORI&IG. 
THE DEPARTMENT IN SERVICE TO THE SECRETARY 343 

Department, so that "on the one side an officer disposes of steamboats or 

vehicles without any outside inspection, and on another side extra officers are 

ordered to inspect property like pots and pans and bed linen before they can be 

disposed of. " Only the Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments then had to 

present property for review by an inspector general before it could be disposed 

of, and Breckinridge thought the procedure should be extended to the whole 

Army.28 Orders regarding property continued to multiply. In January 1893, the 

head of the Recruiting Service received the same authority as department commanders to appoint inspectors to examine property offered for condemnation by 

his officers. In August, the War Department made minor amendments to the 

regulations, emphasizing that inspections for condemnation must be wholly 

separate from boards of survey examining property from other perspectives. 29 

Finally, in 1894 the Secretary of War directed that inspections of unserviceable property be made by the Inspector General's Department. All inspections 

were to be made by inspectors general, acting inspectors general, or specially 

designated officers not connected with the organization possessing the property. 

Breckinridge applauded the development, and reported that he had received 

2,392 inspection and inventory (I. and I.) reports that year-84 percent of them 

made by officers of his department, who prepared 8 to 10 per working day. He 

said also that his officers still had some difficulty in fixing the costs of the 

property they inspected, and that they had met some resistance in performing 

their work.3o Although it was very heavy, the enormous burden of property 

inspections was a principal means in which the inspectorate's influence was felt 

throughout the Army. But it was also a self-inflicted wound, bogging inspectors down in tedious paper work and diverting them from larger issues. Breckinridge placed much importance on property inspections as the sort of economically oriented activity that justified his proposed increases in the Inspector 

General's Department. But, when the increases did not develop, the department 

was left with an almost unmanageable burden. 

Military Colleges 

Another activity of the Inspector General's Department that increased dramatically during the 1890s was the inspection of officers detailed to colleges 

and universities as professors of military arts and tactics. There were fifty such 

officers when Breckinridge became senior inspector general in 1889, only three 

of whom he said received inadequate support from their colleges. The collegiate programs were highly varied, but were generally improving. Breckinridge 

expressed high hopes that, with increased uniformity and support from the War 

Department, the nation would receive its future supply of wartime officers from 

28. ARIG 1892 , 40-41. By the whole Anny he meant especially the Corps of Engineers. 

29. Cir No. I, AGO, 10 Jan 93, conveying: Decision of the Secretary of War, 10 Dec 92, and 

GO No. 66, AGO, 7 Aug 93, in GORI&IG. The Recruiting Service was an arm of the Adjutant 

General's Office. 

30. ARIG 1894, 1~01. 
344 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

the civilian colleges. 31 His opinions show that Breckinridge was a strong supporter of collegiate military education, and as such was years ahead of most 

officers of the Regular Army. He found cause to complain during the summer 

of 1889 that there was strong opposition in the Army to the program, and some 

resistance from the colleges against more effective supervision by the War 

Department. He pointed out that there were discrepancies between the laws 

which authorized military studies at land grant colleges and those which allowed 

the detail of military faculty to the colleges. He urged strongly to the Secretary 

that regulations be developed clarifying the relationship and responsibilities of 

the army and colleges to each other. The regulations would also establish 

standards and performance criteria for the professors of military science. When 

a board of officers was formed to draft rules and regulations for college programs, 

and its report circulated, Breckinridge offered as comment seven legal-size 

pages of remarks, including his own proposed version of the regulations. 32 

Breckinridge ensured from the outset that his inspectorate would play a 

significant role in guiding the development of collegiate military education. 

The President imposed rules on 12 February 1890 for the detail of army officers 

to colleges and universities. The military department of any college accepting 

such a detail was then subject to an annual inspection near the end of the school 

year, and the college president, like a militia commander, would receive from 

the War Department a copy of the inspection report. Inspectors were told to 

report first to the college head, then to remain on campus long enough to 

understand the place of the military department within the entire institution. 33 

The college program and its accompanying inspections consumed a great deal 

of time and manpower. In fact, the detail of officers to college programs, 

Breckinridge said in 1893, was large enough to staff a regiment, but in his 

opinion fully worth the investment. Officers were present at every type and size 

of college, Breckinridge said, and "these schools des.erve the most favorable 

attention and zealous support of the national government. " But given Congress' 

failure to pass the law providing uniforms and equipment, the Inspector General 

said that the government was denying the colleges that support. In demonstration of the program's worth, he pointed to the "commendable character" of 

civilians commissioned in the Regular Army after graduation from civilian 

military programs. 34 His views persuaded the War Department to support the 

growth of the program. The number of institutions with active or retired army 

officers assigned to them rose to 106 in 1896, by which time Breckinridge had 

begun to add to his detailed surveys of the programs accounts of some difficul31. ARlG 1889, 122-23. He also reported that equipment furnished to the colleges was well 

cared for. 

32. Breckinridge to AG, 13 Jun 89, and scores of endorsements related to this subject, in 

Letters Sent 1863- 1889, RG 159. His comments on the board's recommendations in the same file 

are Breckinridge, Endorsement on report of Board ... , 16 August 1889. 

33. GO No . 15 , AGO, 12 Feb 90, and Cir B, AGO, 13 Feb 90, both in GORl&IG. 

34. ARlG 1893 ,8-9. 
THE DEPARTMENT IN SERVICE TO THE SECRETARY 345 

EIGHTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA INFANTRY REGIMENT AT THE ALLEGHENY 

CO. CENTENNIAL, 1888. The Inspector General's Department was one of 

the first War Department agencies to stress the importance of the revived 

National Guard. 

ties in inspecting them. Most colleges wanted their inspections near the end of 

the academic year, understandably enough, but that was a sore trial for inspectors. 

His officers, the Inspector General said, nevertheless performed commendably 

and got the job done. He urged more exchanges of information, by means of 

inspection reports, among colleges. 

The National Guard 

Breckinridge disagreed with those people, such as Emory Upton, who 

believed that the country must create a large military establishment founded on 

universal military training. Having himself entered the Army as a volunteer, he 

believed firmly that the nation could rely for its future defense upon the voluntary resources of citizens who would agree to a part-time commitment to 

military service. He counted upon them to come forward , in an emergency, 

better prepared than their predecessors in 1812 or 1861, provided they received 

proper encouragement and guidance from military professionals. He was for 

that reason quite at odds with those regular officers who wanted to ignore the 

college military programs. For the same reason, he disagreed with those who 

viewed the growing National Guard movement with disdain. Breckinridge 

perceived that both programs could satisfy his objectives: They accorded with 

his personal military philosophy and they provided opportunities for expansion 
346 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

of his department's purview. Even as the Inspector General's Department 

extended its reach over the college community, it became the War Department's 

ambassador to the reviving state militias. 

The growing numbers and political influence of the state militias (now most 

calling themselves the "National Guard" in etymological distinction from the 

discredited militia, of the old days) caused the Army in the 1880s to revive a 

duty it had never really performed fully. That was the annual inspection of the 

militia, which in November 1889 Breckinridge managed to have consolidated 

into his own hands. He was almost, but not quite, the only regular officer who 

wanted anything to do with it. At least one other, 1st Lt. John P. Wisser, also 

believed that the militia should be inspected annually by regular officers. 

Inspections, he said, could be used to improve the National Guard and to 

demonstrate that drill was not an end in itself but a means to military efficiency. 

Inspection, Wisser maintained, was the only way of making professional expertise available to the part-time soldiers of the Guard. Breckinridge could not 

have said it better himself.35 Despite his strong interest, Breckinridge entered 

the National Guard program cautiously. In 1890 he said that officers had been 

detailed from the Army to inspect and advise the militia, and from his vantage 

point over them all, he detected variations in all respects from state to state. 

Some states were very lax, or had no militia at all. In general, he thought the 

organizations had improved in recent years, but only a few states had decent 

camp and garrison equipment. Their officers were "zealous, " and Breckinridge thought that army officers should be assigned to advise governors full 

time, rather than just at summer camps, which he also believed could stand 

improvement. 36 

In 1891, fifty-seven officers had been detailed to forty-nine National 

Guard encampments in twenty-seven states and territories, while twenty-one 

states and territories either had no militia or held no encampments. That was the 

most complete inspection ever, because nearly every state that did hold an 

encampment had been visited by an army officer, who in many cases served as 

an instructor as well as an inspector. Federal-state relations were good, and the 

work continued to improve. Breckinridge had two major recommendations that 

year. One was that no officer ranked less than captain should be detailed to 

militia inspection, as the "worthiest men of wide experience" would have the 

most beneficial influence. The other was a grand, national encampment involving the militia of all states and territories, to be held in association with the 

planned Columbian Exposition in Chicago. 37 

The inspectorate temporarily lost its hold on the National Guard in 1892, 

when the Bureau of Information was established and inspection of militia went 

to the Adjutant General's Office. Breckinridge was outraged, and in June 

35. Sanger, " Inspector General's Department, " 247; John P. Wisser, "The Annual Inspection 

of the National Guard by Army Officers," United Service, n.s., 2 (December 1889): 607-14. 

36. ARIG 1890, 27 1-78. 

37. ARiG 1891 ,7-8,95,97. 
THE DEPARTMENT IN SERVICE TO THE SECRETARY 347 

INSPECTION OF ENGINEER TROOPS , Washington Barracks (now Ft. McNair) 

1892. 

complained that when officers were detailed to militia inspections the word 

"inspect" was deleted from their orders by the Adjutant General, and "no 

officer has been ordered to report to me, according to existing instructions and 

former practice." "In 1892," he wrote later, "this Department was for a time 

debarred from any participation in the work of instructing and inspecting the 

militia, and this work which had grown up and developed so considerably 

under its fostering care was somewhat retarded." But the function was returned 

by September 1892.38 At the same time, The National Guard Association was 

asked to help with systematic scheduling of state encampments. If the camps in 

each military department met consecutively and progressively, it would be 

possible to provide more complete instruction from basics to army-corps 

maneuvers. And although the Guard was organized by state, such coordination 

would encourage the "most reliable national feeling and effective comradery 

between the States" -the very purposes of the National Guard Association. 39 

Breckinridge had nothing but praise for the National Guard, saying that 

their encampments had overcome historical difficulties in militia training. He 

said that although criticisms of their inexperienced efforts were to be expected, 

the inspecting officers were always friendly and constructive. "With the en38. Breckinridge to Secy of War, II Jun 92, and Breckinridge to A.R. Kieffer, House of 

Representatives, 21 Dec 93, in Letters Sent 1891- 1894, RG 159; ARlG 1892,6; Sanger, " Inspector 

General's Department, " 247. 

39. Ibid ., 6-7 . 
348 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

thusiasm, superior intelligence, willingness and promptness displayed by the 

militia forces the task was not difficult, and the troops received many warm 

commendations. " Support for this assertion came from carefully selected quotations from inspection reports. Relations between the Guard and its inspectors 

were obviously not always smooth. Reports of unhappiness over inspectors' criticisms caused the War Department to consider ending the inspection duties 

of officers assigned to the militia. That issue was resolved, but later the 

Inspector General asked the Secretary to require officers detailed.to the National 

Guard to be "authorized to make a report to this office. ,,40 Criticisms were 

important, he said, and most Guard officers wanted them for use in improving 

their own organization. Breckinridge cited in his support a letter he had received in 1890 from the president of the National Guard Association, and 

quoted another letter from a colonel of the Illinois National Guard, who said, 

"To have the inspections and publications of your department cease would be 

a damage to the National Guard for which nothing else could possibly compensate. ,,41 This warm appreciation indicates that the reach of the Inspector 

General's Department extended during Breckinridge's years to cover every 

sphere of military activity . Breckinridge was perhaps first among the Army's 

hierarchy to recognize that the National Guard and the military programs of 

civilian colleges were worthy of serious official attention. But ultimately, 

there was only so much an inspector could do in the face of state-level independence, War Department indifference, congressional restraints, and the 

concomitant general disorganization of every part of the national defense except the Regular Army. When war erupted in 1898, most of the Regular Army 

distrusted the National Guard, and therefore denied it the kind of guidance 

that Breckinridge had long suggested. The result was a succession of disasters 

attributable in equal measure to the ineptitude of the guardsmen and the indifference of the regulars. 

Balancing Two Interests 

The inspection of the National Guard continued during Breckinridge's regime 

thanks to his own persistence in the face of opposition from within the Army 

and without. Because the Guard was politically a force to reckon with, the 

inspection system also provided a valuable service to the politicians who served 

as secretaries of war, providing them with a dependable source of information. 

It was in that sense part of a larger package of inspection activities catering to 

the interests of the Secretary, and only occasionally touching those of the 

Commanding General. Breckinridge quite obviously organized and increased 

his department's attention to paragraph 955 properties, staff departments, 

disbursements, and other such concerns with two purposes in mind. One was to 

strengthen his department's influence and growing independence by basing its 

40. Breckinridge to Secy of War, 4 Sep 93, in Letters Sent 1891-1894, RG 159. 

41. ARIG 1893, 7- 8, 34-35. 
THE DEPARTMENT IN SERVICE TO THE SECRETARY 349 

authority on an unfettered connection to the Secretary of War. But he lacked a 

formal charter for his organization, and in that context could be successful only 

so far as the changing secretaries permitted, as witnessed by the vacillating 

status of the district system of inspections. Breckinridge's other motive reflected 

the broader part of his interests. He simply wanted to get the job done better, 

more systematically, and with some demonstrable product. Before Breckinridge's 

tenure, except for purely military inspections, secretaries of war had been wont 

to scatter inspectors indiscriminantly on this or that errand, usually in response 

to some report of trouble. Breckinridge ended that waste of his manpower and 

thereby attained greater administrative control over his people. He did that by 

organizing all subjects of inspection into a set of systematic routines. It was no 

longer necessary to make so many special investigations as before, because a 

prearranged annual routine usually disclosed any trouble before the Secretary 

would sense a problem. That systematization was most apparent in the miscellany of ancillary, nonmilitary objects of inspection. 

Despite his difficulties and his frustration at not attaining complete departmental independence, Breckinridge came closer than any of his predecessors to 

serving equally his two masters. Inspectors general had looked mostly at purely 

military subjects for many years, serving the Commanding GeneraL When they 

answered to the Secretary, as had Wool before and others since the Civil War, 

their dispersal while satisfying secretarial requests had interrupted their attention to things military. Breckinridge had found a way to balance the two 

interests, although his solution made his inspectors' work load almost unbearable. 

Except for the period of the district inspections, most of his officers remained 

under department commanders, and therefore primarily conducted military 

inspections. Breckinridge had ensured that they looked after the Secretary's 

interests as they did so. Equally, his district system, which was constructed 

with secretarial interests in mind, also permitted systematic military inspections, 

its audience being the Commanding General directly rather than the department 

commanders. The achievement of this balance marks the department's entering 

maturity. The Inspector General's Department had been a linguistic convenience since the Revolution and the War of 1812. As a quasi-legal entity, it 

may have existed since the year Marcy became a brigadier general. But it was 

only due to Breckinridge's influences that it became a real "department," a 

carefully managed, smoothly working organization. If any person could hold 

the title of "father" of the Inspector General's Department, that man was 

Joseph C. Breckinridge. 
CHAPTER 20 

Reform During the Breckinridge Era 

(1889-1898 ) 

When Breckinridge assumed the mantle of senior inspector general in 1889, 

the Army's greatest single problem remained its staggering desertion rate . That 

had declined somewhat, but desertion continued to curtail seriously the available military force. The winds of reform were blowing strongly, however, and 

much of the Army's leadership had begun to recognize that conditions in the 

Army itself were partly to blame for the problem. Many senior officers began to 

see that changes would be necessary to solve the Army's problem. The last 

decades of the century saw a wave of reform movements developing throughout 

American society. In many ways the Army was in the vanguard of this 

movement, led by dynamic young officers intent on making it a modern force. 

Soldier Life and Discipline 

Most of the inspectors perceived that there were flaws in the system that 

required renovation. 'Their reports reflected a keen interest in sensible change 

and experimentation. As a result, the inspectorate kept a firm watch on developments within the Army that were intended to improve morale and discipline . 

Issues involving pay and the operations of soldier canteens and post exchanges 

were. evaluated and suggestions were made for further improvements. Breckinridge was for the most part enthusiastic over this positivism, adding his own 

recommendations for further advances. He pressed for reforms in military 

justice and promotion systems that would enhance the lot of the private soldier. 

Inspectors also noted an improvement in the quality of the individuals enlisting, 

and attributed this progress to the reforms and changes in recruiting and medical standards. The inspectors' observations were a valuable sounding board to 

the Commanding General and the Secretary as to the value and effect of the 

attempted changes. 

Breckinridge continued to speak glowingly about the Army's discipline in 

the year preceding the Spanish-American War. Training of recruits, he believed, 

continued successfully at the company level. He did pass on a suggestion from 

Inspector General Sanger that training detachments might be established at 

every post for efficiency's sake? although Breckinridge concurred only so far as 

the recruit's connection to his company continued unbroken. Discipline remained 

strong, and, not for the first time, Breckinridge proposed good-conduct badges 
REFORM DURING THE BRECKINRIDGE ERA 351 

as a reward for good behavior, and as a boost to morale. I That common soldiers 

might be entitled to privileges and consideration would have been unheard of a 

generation earlier. Some of the older officers, those few who remembered the 

old army before the Civil War, might not approve of the modem state of 

affairs, but the enlisted men did . The changes in enlisted life were justified by 

the lowest rate of desertion and the highest state of discipline, by 1898 , the U.S. 

Army had ever known. If old-timers objected, the Inspector General had proof 

in the form of facts and figures, and strong personal opinions, on matters of 

justice. 

Educating the Enlisted Men 

One of the modem measures that Breckinridge wanted imposed on the 

Army was a respectable system of education for enlisted men . He came into 

office determined to do something about the much-neglected post schools, just 

as he was determined to attack Sunday inspections. Shortly after his accession, 

on 31 January 1889, a general order raised education to the status of a military 

duty . All soldiers were required to receive some instruction during duty hours, 

and no discretion was allowed to line commanders on the subject. The Inspector General's Department was required to inspect the post schools, examine 

instruction, and advise commanders of defects. The inspectors were also to 

work with adjutants to improve the schools and induce uniformity. Their reports 

were to be forwarded through channels for the information of the Commanding 

General. 2 Not wholly the work of Breckinridge, the precept also reflected the 

views of Schofield and Proctor, both of whom believed strongly that education 

could elevate the character of enlisted men, make them more efficient, and 

prepare them for civil life after discharge . Also, both felt that something had to 

be done about the many illiterates in the ranks, and they were not alone in those 

sentiments. But some company officers believed that the general order was a 

denial of their responsibility as line commanders, unnecessarily increasing their 

work load. As a result, the schools were often perfunctory efforts to please the 

War Department bureaucrats, and a "disappointing and melancholy spectacle," 

according to one officer. 3 Breckinridge had to acknowledge by 1897 that the 

post school system was a failure, useful only to children. But he was never 

short of solutions, telling the Secretary, "The enlistment of the ignorant is now 

prohibited by law, so post schools should be made military schools intended 

more for the professional advancement of the enlisted men than for their education in merely the common English branches. " Moreover, the Army needed 

"a single system of schools" for noncommissioned officers, to make them as 

1. ARIG 1897, 122, 137- 38, 143-44, 240. 

2. GO No . 9, AGO, 31 Jan 89, in GORI&IG. 

3. ARComGen 1889, 62; William P. Burnham, " Military Training of the Regular Army of the 

United States," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 10 (1889): 613- 39; 

Miewald, "Army Post Schools," Military Affairs 39 (February 1975) 10-11. 
352 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

efficient and professional as possible. As for officers, their service schools 

were excellent but were underfunded. 4 

The development of a system of education in the Army was one of 

Breckinridge's greatest frustrations during the 1890s. He correctly stressed the 

importance of instruction, and offered a number of workable proposals. But 

neither he nor the other proponents of education had any success with an Army 

that was generally indifferent to official self-improvement. Part of the problem 

was bureaucratic. Breckinridge very correctly predicted an unsuccessful program unless someone was clearly responsible for it and charged with making it 

work . But the system also suffered from a lack of focus. Its original justification had been to cure the prevalent illiteracy in the ranks. But that purpose became dubious as illiteracy disappeared because of the changing character of 

recruits. Breckinridge had always wanted a system of enlisted education to 

parallel that accorded officers, but in an army whose officer corps partly 

believed that men were not entitled to even Sundays off, too few people shared 

his egalitarian views. And last, the overworked soldiery themselves had never 

shown enough interest in schooling to assure success. 

Military Training 

Greater success attended physical training and practical military instruction. 

That went hand in hand with the upgrading of general discipline, the two being 

the pillars of military efficiency. Breckinridge declared in 1889 that generations 

of contending with "savages" had done nothing to sharpen the Army's professional skills in modern warfare. Nor had its other circumstances: "The first 

duty of our Army to the country is perfected military instruction; but probably 

all professional soldiers recognize that perfect instruction is impossible with 

depleted skeletons." The reduction in manpower of the Army in pursuit of 

economy, he maintained, had come at the price of military efficiency. Units 

were often barely of cadre strength. Furthermore, the heavy burden of manual 

labor interfered with the training of the enlisted men, while their officers were a 

widely varied lot as leaders.5 Inspector General Breckinridge offered a laundrylist description of the Army's military readiness in 1890. The officers, he said, 

were improving, but their level of instruction varied. The cavalry needed to 

work on its horsemanship, while practice marches were to be encouraged for all 

troops. Although camps of instruction and field maneuvers, when held, had been a 

great success, drill was nothing but parade practice and did not prepare troops 

to meet an enemy. As for target practice, too much of it was on fixed ranges. 

When Inspector Robert P. Hughes took soldiers to rough and timbered ground, 

the best shots did poorly; only those who were hunters did well. Unless the men 

were trained to shoot at moving targets on uneven terrain, and rewarded with 

4. Breckinridge to Secy of War, 26 Oct 97, in ARSecWar 1897, 21; ARIG 1897, 133, 135- 37, 

240. 

5. ARIG 1889, 123-26. 
REFORM DURING THE BRECKINRIDGE ERA 353 

MAL GEN . JOSEPH C. BRECKINRIDGE. Inspector General of the 

Army, 30 January 1889-11 April 

1903. 

marksmanship badges, Breckinridge 

said that target practice would accomplish nothing. As for field artillery, 

none of the batteries had a practice 

range, while the heavy artillery's guns 

were so obsolete that Breckinridge declared practi~e a waste of time.

6 

Modem tactics placed a great deal 

of independent responsibility on private soldiers who worked the battlefield in squads, unlike their predecessors who had been tightly organized 

in larger formations. That was one of 

the motivations behind the reform of 

discipline and enlisted life generally. 

If the soldier must be trusted to act 

individually or as a member of a small 

group often indirectly supervised by 

an officer, he must be accorded respect and given responsibility for his 

own conduct in peace as well as on 

the battlefield. The days of volley fire 

and the massed bayonet charge had 

long since passed, and people like 

Breckinridge maintained that the hard discipline that had once supported those 

tactics should also be dispensed with. Something fundamental as weapons 

training had many flaws: Infantry and cavalry target practice, said Breckinridge, 

usually went forward systematically, although not often appropriately, while 

only part of the artillery had practice at all. Only at some of the posts were 

troops trained to estimate distances, and practice firing had not yet been added 

to practice marches or encampments on unfamiliar ground, nor was firing 

practiced with moving targets. And only part of the army engaged in field 

exercises: "Nothing can be more necessary to an army in time of peace than the 

experience of marches and encampments, " Breckinridge said, "and it is to be 

regretted that they do not form an unflexible part of the annual training of every 

soldier. It is especially desirable just now, when new equipments and drill 

regulations are under consideration."7 The Regular Army's unwillingness to 

embrace the need for a high level of practical training sorely frustrated the 

senior inspector general, which may have been one reason why he looked with 

such favor on the National Guard whose volunteer citizen-soldiers took to their 

summer encampments with such great enthusiasm. In any event, by 1893 

6. ARIG 1890, 1O~1O. 

7. ARIG 1893, 718- 19. Breckinridge also reported difficulties in giving infantry the extendedorder drill required by the new tactics. 
354 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

Breckinridge had adopted a very comprehensive view of the national defense 

establishment, embracing the Regular Army, the National Guard, and college 

cadet corps. 

8 

Even ordinary drill was beset with obstacles. The organization was defective, 

some reservations were too small, and there were no large assemblies of troops. 

Nevertheless, Breckinridge maintained that post commanders could do better 

than they had and should be required to report in advance what exercises they 

would have during the year. In the absence of scheduled exercises, at least one 

acting inspector general had started to teach minor unit tactics at every post he 

visited. He was really doing the job of a unit officer. But, as for the training of 

officers at posts, Breckinridge said the lyceums recently established provided 

good theoretical instruction when well conducted, but the topics presented for 

essays were usually too complex and arcane. Troops generally lacked training 

in estimating distances and tracking moving targets, while too few men were 

adequately trained in signaling. As for target practice, too little emphasis was 

placed on moving targets and unknown distances. 9 

A former gunner himself, Breckinridge felt the artillery especially needed 

tutelage, while the cavalry was showing slow improvement. Infantry drill in 

extended formations, he believed, did not appear adaptable to the battlefield. 

Practical problems had been tested during all inspections, and except for the 

coastal artillery, those exercises came off well. The men of the Medical Department earned special praise for their handling of "wounded" during exercises, 

but Sanger suggested that the troops generally needed more training as stretcher 

bearers. Despite training efforts, target practice had declined by 1897 with 

skirmish training remaining the weakest part of that program. The artillery was 

generally unprepared and its practice ammunition was in short supply, but 

moving targets were beginning to come into use, much to Breckinridge's 

satisfaction. Nevertheless he complained that no one had given much thought to 

having artillery posts coordinated to repel attack; hence the nation's coastal 

defense was piecemeal. Breckinridge listed the fundamental rules of infantry 

training, one of which was "The spade is raised almost to the rank of a 

weapon. " The new weaponry and new conditions of warfare, he maintained, 

meant, "For the infantry the proficiency required was never so great, and the 

time, if not the means, for instruction and preparation may seem severely 

limited; so the efforts of the officers have to be redoubled ." To prepare for a 

major war, he once again urged that, it being impossible to assemble the 

scattered Regular Army into a full corps, regulars and guardsmen of several 

states should assemble for maneuvers. 10 

When the American army first acquired its Inspector General, during the 

Revolution, his first job was to train the troops. Thereafter, the primary respon8. Ibid. , 6. 

9. ARIG 1894, 92- 94 , 96. 

10. ARAG 1897, H. Doc. 2, 55th Cong., 2d sess., I: 101 ;ARIG 1897,119, 122-23,124-27, 

133- 34, L 1-40, 151- 53,241 ; Breckinridge to Secy of War, 26 Oct 97 , in ARSecWar 1897,21. 
REFORM DURING THE BRECKINRIDGE ERA 355 

sibility of inspectors general remained 

the monitoring of the training and 

military proficiency of the soldiers. 

Breckinridge took that responsibility 

very seriously, and there is little doubt 

that the inspectors general played a 

significant part in revitalization of that 

army as a fighting force in the 1890s. 

They encountered resistance, from circumstances as much as from the officers and men, but by the mid-1890s 

their ceaseless criticism had caused 

line commanders to reenliven the 

training program, neglected for many 

years. By the time war erupted in 

1898, the Army was probably as well 

trained as it had been since 1865, and 

the line and mass of troops had made 

significant progress in overcoming the 

deadening effects of a long peace. 

INSPECTORGENERALINSIGNlA,1895-

1961. 

That the emphasis on training revived rather late was not as damaging as it 

might seem. The average soldier was far more intelligent than his predecessors, 

and his improved lot in life had made him more receptive to instruction. 

Reforms in his living conditions had helped diminish the amount of time taken 

from training by manual labor, while his shortened enlistment period meant that 

training had to be intensified. There was simply no time for the leisurely 

approach that had characterized professional armies a century earlier, something that Steuben had perceived at the American army's inception. The state of 

training was not all that Breckinridge would have preferred, but even he had to 

concede a high degree of improvement in a short span of years. However, no 

matter how thorough, training remained somewhat academic. Its real results 

were to be demonstrated on the battlefield, when .the next war started. The 

enlisted men at least were as ready as possible. It remained to be seen whether 

their officers, especially those in high command, were equally prepared to do 

their part. 

Supply Services 

Officers as a class called forth only selected proposals from the inspectors 

general, but in fact the inspectors spent most of their time observing officers-in 

their roles as troop leaders, staff administrators, disbursing officers, and so on. 

The Army's supplies and equipment were managed by officers, and as had 

always been true the inspectors general had much to say about such matters in 

the 1890s. Characteristically, Breckinridge was wont to offer recommendations 

on things other bureau chiefs might have said should not concern him. In 1890 

he averred that the rigid advertised contract system for procurement often 
356 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

forced the government to pay the highest price fixed by trusts, as anyone 

offering a lower price "will be discovered and made to suffer." Testifying to 

the trustworthiness of the Army's supply officers, he urged that they be allowed 

to depart from advertisement if they could find cheaper ways of procurement. 

The Quartermaster Department probably enjoyed that, but not the Inspector 

General's occasional barbs about horses, the baggage allowance, the "inferior 

quality of campaign shoes," fading dye on dress coats, and other details. 

Breckinridge did say in 1896, however, that the inspectors generally believed 

quartermasters to be overworked. 11 

One of the Quartermaster Department's major responsibilities was transportation. Thanks to the fact that the U.S. Army had spent decades scattered 

throughout a continental wilderness, by the end of the Indian wars it had 

perhaps the finest field transportation system and equipment in the world. But 

in a shortsighted economy measure, and as part of post closings and consolidations, in 1890 Congress ordered the department to sell off most of its equipment and draft animals. Breckinridge was quick to join the Quartermaster General in pointing out the error of that command, stressing that discarding the 

system would make it impossible to develop officers and men with experience 

in organizing transport, and that was one thing, he said, that necessitated 

experience. 12 He could not have been more prophetic, bec,ause the mobilization 

of 1898 turned into a transportation disaster; in fact, nearly all other shortfalls 

in supply and operations could be attributed to a combination of equipment 

shortages and general inexperience in organizing transport. It was apparent to 

Breckinridge by 1896 that some such disaster was in the winds, if an emergency arose, because the transportation inventory was by then insufficient even 

for peacetime needs. 13 

Besides the quartermasters, the Army's other principal supply service was 

the Subsistence Department. Breckinridge regarded that much as he had the 

Quartermaster Department, although it was excellently managed and its supplies were usually of good quality, there were a few complaints. Sometimes 

supplies were delayed, there was not enough soap issued, rations for field 

service hampered mobility, and an "emergency ration" was needed. Breckinridge was also opposed to the Subsistence Department's often repeated request 

that it be allowed to stop selling sundry items to the soldiers. This service was a 

convenience for the troops, the predecessor of an exchange system. Breckinridge rightly felt that the effect of ending such a program would be disastrous to 

morale. 14 

11. ARlG 1890,98, 102; ARIG 1894,96; AR1G 1895, 117-18; ARlG 1896, 119- 20; ARIG 

1897, 138-39. One or another item of clothing was the most common subject of complaint. See 

ARlG 1890,103; ARIG 1891 , 18; ARlG 1892 ,35; and ARIG 1893, 724-25. For persistent complaints about shortages of tentage, see ARIG 1892, 38, and ARIG 1895, 118. The issue of 

waterproof overcoats, incidentally, recommended by inspectors before Breckinridge's time, began 

in 1890. ARQMG 1890, 774-75, 

12. ARIG 1891,17, 

13 . ARlG 1896, 120, 

14. AR1G 1893, 723-24; ARIG 1894, 97; ARIG 1895, 11 9; ARIG 1896, 120; ARlG 1897, 

139-40. 
REFORM DURING THE BRECKINRIDGE ERA 357 

Important to the Anny's health as was its food, also was its medical service. 

Like inspectors general since the 1820s, those of the 1890s had nothing but 

praise for the Medical Department, which continued to modernize during the 

period. The enlisted Hospital Corps and detailed stretcher bearers also performed commendably during the period, and when the Anny Medical School 

was established in 1893 to give four months of instruction to new surgeons, 

Breckinridge found that an estimable development. He was also pleased with 

the Medical Department's educational and training programs for enlisted men. 

"The Medical Department seems to be generally in excellent condition," he 

said in 1897. "The Hospital Corps has frequently been specially mentioned for 

excellence in appearance and efficiency." 15 

Breckinridge addressed the Ordnance Department, as he did the other supply departments, in two tenns-according to its operations, and according to its 

products. The department's operations he usually commended, but occasionally he complained: The blanket bag was unpopUlar, he said; both heavy and 

light artillery equipment was a neglected subject; and a magazine explosion in 

1894 demonstrated occasional carelessness in handling stores. As for weaponry, 

Breckinridge complained for every year beginning in 1893 that the Anny with 

its .30-caliber rifle and the Navy with its rifle bore of . 236-caliber should find 

some common cartridge, as "a difference of 20 percent between the two 

services as to the theoretically perfect calibre seems excessive, and might be 

reconciled prior to the issue of a single weapon. " He was a strong proponent of 

"a small-caliber bullet and a large-caliber field cannon, and there is some 

gratification in seeing the tendency now generally established in this direction. " 

When a new .30-caliber cavalry carbine was adopted in 1896, Breckinridge 

was delighted, except for the absence of a windage gauge on the rear sight. But 

the difference between Anny and Navy calibers aside, in 1897 the Inspector 

General proclaimed the Army well-equipped, and even coastal armanent was 

improving at a slow pace. 16 

The Army, the Inspectors-Ready for War? 

Since the time of Steuben, the main purpose of the Inspector General was to 

detennine and report upon the Army's preparation for war. Under Breckinridge's 

guidance, the Inspector General's Department did that throughout the 1890s. 

Breckinridge had concluded by 1897 that the Regular Army was essentially 

ready, and when the test came the next year, at least as far as the fighting 

quality of the officers and men was concerned, he proved correct. But he and 

his inspectors had also continued to detect flaws in the system, and those flaws 

worked their own effects during the war with Spain. Breckinridge's complaints 

about the loss of transportation and the cumbersome procurement procedures 

IS. ARIG 1893, 721; ARSecWar 1893,9-10; ARIG 1894,94; ARIG 1896,113; ARIG 1897, 

140. 

16. ARIG 1890, 104-05; ARIG 1893,30-31 ,721-22; ARIG 1894, 95; ARIG 1896, 113; ARIG 

1897, 140-42, 241. 
358 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

proved especially well founded. Furthermore, the establishment had other shortcomings that were not so apparent to the inspectors. In finding the reactionary 

ways of the supply services, and their rigid defense of the fragmented staff 

system of the War Department, generally commendable the inspectors general 

did not ask whether the Army was prepared for the logistical demands of a real 

emergency. They had paid much attention to the National Guard, but they 

never really addressed the relationship between the Guard and the Regular 

Army in any possible war. Especially, in focusing on the need for defense, they 

did not consider how the Army might go on the offensive and carry a war 

overseas. 

Another thing that Breckinridge and his men failed to plan for was the 

proper role of the Inspector General's Department in the next major war. The 

inspectorate had fallen apart in the last two conflicts, although it had emerged 

from the Civil War with some semblance of order. Most of the Army's leaders, 

Breckinridge included, were veterans of Grant's Grand Army of 1865, and very 

conscious of that fact. Breckinridge was more forward-looking than most, and 

perhaps partly for that reason failed to consider how an inspectorate might be 

organized in the next grand army. But when the emergency erupted, it was not 

lack of foresight that hampered Breckinridge' s customary adaptability. Rather, 

it was his outrage over the disruption of the district system of the Inspector 

General's Department that made him look for a change of scene away from 

Washington and Nelson Miles. 

In one subject, however, Breckinridge proved more farsighted than any of 

his contemporaries: that was thinking about the next, unpredictable war. Beginning in 1892, he mounted a strong campaign to establish a fund for widows and 

orphans of military men, supported by interest-earning deducations from soldiers' 

pay and by fines levied by courts-martial. Compulsory life insurance, he 

maintained, was essential for soldiers, because the military was a hazardous 

occupation. The best soldiers were those most likely to put themselves in 

danger in the heat of battle, and also the least likely to plan for the future . When 

the war broke out in 1898, many new widows and orphans found cause to wish 

that the government had heeded the words of Inspector General Breckinridge. 17 

17. ARIG 1892 , 121-22; ARIG 1897, 144--45; Breckinridge to Secy of War, 26 Oct 97, in 

ARSecWar 1897, 21. 
Part Four 

The Inspector General's Department 

of the New Army 

(1898-1903) 

CHAPTER 21 

Inspection During the War with Spain 

(1898) 

In his postwar memoirs, Secretary of War Russell A. Alger commented on 

his department's preparedness for events that propelled it into war in April 

1898: "[The department] had, during thirty years, been called upon only to 

plan for and meet the requirements of the regular army in time of peace, and 

naturally enough had become quite fixed in the narrow grooves of peace. " I The 

Secretary's observation accurately summarizes the United States Army's situation at the time of the declaration of war with Spain in April 1898. Numbering a 

little more than 23,000 men, it was scattered in small garrisons throughout the 

country. The bureau structure at the War Department, adequate for peace, 

could not meet the demands of mobilization and deployment. Its mission had 

never been to plan and prepare for such contingencies and thus the predominantly older bureau chiefs had to improvise based on vague memories of the 

Civil War. The weakness inherent in the duality between the Secretary of War 

and the Commanding General became immediately apparent as policies and 

plans were hastily developed. 2 

The Situation in 1898 

The tremendous surge of enthusiastic but largely untrained and unequipped 

manpower accepted by the President proved to be the source of most of the War 

Department's problems during, and after, the war. Although conditioned by 

years of congressional parsimony, tight accountability procedures, and severe 

limits on any kind of stockpiling, the bureau chiefs unstintingly executed their 

responsibilities. Despite many critical problems, some of which should have 

been avoided, these leaders succeeded remarkably well under the circumstances. 

One minor and two major expeditions were equipped and transported to three 

completely different locations and successfully discharged. By the end of the 

war in August 1898, the Army numbered 274,714 men, far more than were 

I. Russell A. Alger, The Spanish American War (New York: Harper, 1901),7. 

2. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 289, 305; Ellen Maury Slayden, Washington 

Wife: Journal of Ellen Maury Slayden from 1897-1919 (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 17; 

Edward Ranson , "Nelson A. Miles as Commanding General, 1895- 1903," Military Affairs, 29 

(winter 1965- 1966): 179-200. 
362 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

needed. Most were concentrated in large training camps, the foremost of which 

was Camp Thomas in Georgia, on the old Chickamauga battlefield. The deficiencies exacerbated by the hasty mobilization of these untrained masses were 

most evident at such camps, as were the newspapermen eager for a story but 

ignorant of the overall problems experienced by the War Department. 3 

Most difficulties during the war came from shortfalls in transportation, just 

as Inspector General Breckinridge had feared. No one, apparently, consulted 

the Quartermaster on the selection of camp locations. Most had poor transportation facilities, and Tampa, the best embarkation point for Cuba, was a terminus 

served by fewer than adequate railroad tracks and inadequate roads. Volunteer 

quartermasters proved unable to execute the marshaling and unloading of railroad cars, and a system for the transshipment and loading of water transports 

was generally lacking. When the Army had sold off its wagon and pack train 

equipment during the years preceding the war, wagons flooded the market, 

leaving the wagon industry unable to supply new wagons on short order. Ocean 

.transportation at times nearly brought disaster. 

Even more serious was the defective medical service during the war, also 

attributable in part to the transportation shortfall. Not enough medical supplies 

reached the front, and transportation for the wounded was extremely primitive. 

But the greatest disasters occurred in the camps, stateside, where the Medical 

Department thought that circulating a pamphlet on hygiene satisfied the supervision of inexperienced volunteers. Epidemics, especially of typhoid fevers, 

swept the camps, taking more lives during the war than both the enemy and 

tropical diseases took in Cuba. To be sure, the volunteers had too few physicians, 

but the death toll in their camps could have been reduced had elementary 

precautions in siting, sanitation, and troop management been applied. The 

result of the Medical Department's failings paralleled that of the purchase of 

unpalatable canned beef by the Subsistence Department, which led to a major 

scandal and the overhaul of the department. 4 

The war itself was brief and surprisingly successful. General William' • Pecos 

Bill" Shafter led a force of 14,412 regulars and 2,465 volunteers to Cuba, 

followed eventually by about 5,000 additional volunteers. They landed on 20 

June 1898, established themselves ashore, and began ten days later to march 

from Siboney toward Santiago. The Americans cleared the heights around 

Santiago on 1 July , forcing the Spanish fleet to flee the safety of the city's 

harbor, whereupon the American fleet destroyed it. The campaign had involved 

three engagements; just two of them, El Caney and San Juan, had any real 

significance. Meanwhile, Miles led an expedition into Puerto Rico in late July, 

landing his forces at five separate places and quickly subduing the dispirited 

enemy on the island. An armistice concluded both campaigns on 12 August. 

3. General accounts of the war include David F. Trask, The War With Spain in 1898 (New 

York: Macmillan, 1981); Graham Cosmas, All Army for Empire: The Ullited States Army ill the 

Spanish-American War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971). 

4. Leech, Days of McKinLey, 3~4; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 304-05. 
INSPECTION DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 363 

Much of the U.S. Army's Cuban force, meanwhile, had been evacuated because 

of sickness. President McKinley directed the mustering out of all volunteers 

after the armistice, except for the regiments sent to the Philippines to capitalize 

on the Navy's victory there. The Spanish at Manila had given up swiftly, but 

the American volunteers continued mired in jungle warfare for another year 

fighti·ng Emilio Aguinaldo's revolutionaries who cared no more for American 

rule than they had for that of the Spanish. Things were more peaceful in the 

Caribbean, where the Army embarked upon the unfamiliar duties of military 

government without much strong guidance from the War Department. 5 

The Spanish-American War, in short, demonstrated that the War Department was seriously flawed. As a result of its organization it could not perform 

the fundamental duties of planning and supervising a mobilization or deployment. 

The supply and medical departments had done well in serving the Regular 

Army, but they were unable to extend their operations sufficiently to ensure 

that like service be given the larger force of volunteers. Volunteer supply and 

medical officers did their best in the circumstances, but were mostly unguided 

by their more experienced counterparts in the permanent establishments. The 

situation inevitably led to the creation of conditions that reflected adversely on 

the War Department's management of the war. 

Where Were the Inspectors? 

The War Department's failures were demonstrated to the public by the 

transportation calamities, the epidemics in the southern camps, and the tales of 

food that was either inedible or undelivered. These problems all reflected 

command and management inefficiencies that should have been detected early 

by the Inspector General's Department and righted, following its advice; but 

they were not. Breckinridge and his department could perhaps be excused for 

not predicting the waI,1ime disasters. But as the war faded , Breckinridge soon 

learned that he would not be excused for failing to report trouble when it 

developed. The other departments may have been less than perfect, but they at 

least tried to fulfill their obligations. The Inspector General's Department at 

War Department level, however, did little inspecting during the war. Its preoccupation with its structure and members' careers caused it to give little guidance to the many inspectors scattered throughout the Army, who had, they 

thought, nowhere to refer their findings. This drift began with Breckinridge 

making a fight for his department. He still chafed at the termination of his 

district system by Miles, who as the Commanding General was endeavoring to 

assert his authority over the Adjutant General and the Inspector General alike, 

clashing with both in the process. Breckinridge's response was an attempt to 

reassert the status of his own organization as a bureau of the War Department. 

5. Besides the general accounts of the war identified above, on Cuba see Joseph Wheeler, The 

Santiago Campaign (1898; reprinted Port Washington , New York: Kennikat, 1971), and Charles 

Johnson Post, The Litlle War of Private Post (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960). 
364 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Congressman John Handy of Kentucky, Breckinridge's nephew, introduced 

legislation on I April 1898 to "define and prescribe the duties of the officers of 

the Inspector-General' s Department of the Army. " The bill began by asserting 

that the department was a bureau of the War Department. It also would have 

established its complement at thirteen inspectors general and one accountant, 

with provisions for inspectors for brigades, divisions, and army corps in the 

event of mobilization. Furthermore, each inspector general would have been 

entitled to a clerk and messenger. Although Breckinridge generated a mountain 

of justifying paper work, the bill got nowhere against the strong opposition of 

the Adjutant General, whom the Inspector General believed in league with 

General Miles in an effort to suppress the Inspector General's Department. 6 

Breckinridge said later that the Handy bill would have been sufficient for the 

circumstances of the war, but that the legislation that actually did pass was 

insufficient, because it did not allow for enough officers. He was trying to shift 

to others the blame for any wartime failure, while nevertheless asserting that his 

department had performed as well as it could during the war. In any case, the 

first legislation, on 22 April, increasing the Army and mobilizing volunteers, 

permitted the assignment of inspectors general to the staffs of army corps and 

divisions. 7 

Meanwhile, on 16 April, the War Department reassigned the six junior 

inspectors general and one acting inspector general from the inspection districts 

to duty as inspectors of the eight military departments, which had been reorganized on II March 1898. This realignment required the detail of additional 

officers to act as inspectors. But before the change could be effected, the 

country was at war, and the Inspector General's Department began to 

disintegrate. 8 Even as its officers were leaving Washington for field duty, a 

development occurred on 3 May in response to a request from Breckinridge, 

which seemed to improve the department's status. The Judge Advocate General 

rendered an official opinion on the question "whether the Inspector-Genera1's 

Department is now legally a bureau of the War Department, similar to the 

Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and other bureaus therein, in its character and in 

the status and authority of its chief." The chief legal officer's finding was that, 

despite the absence of a specific law, precedent made the Inspector General's 

Department a department or corps of the Army, while the Office of the Inspector General was a bureau of the War Department. To Breckinridge's delight, he 

thus possessed status equal to the other bureau chiefs. "So, on the whole," said 

the Judge Advocate General, "it would seem that the offices usually called 

bureaus in the War Department are all bureaus in their character, and that all the 

6. ARIG 1898, H. Doc . 2, 55th Cong., 3d sess., I: 580, including a copy of the bill. 

Breckinridge's enormous file on the Handy bill, including his personal opinions about Miles, is in 

file 33 14 A-I, K-P, Index to General Correspondence, RG 159. 

7 . ARIG 1898, 580-81; An Act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment 

of the United States in time of war, andfor other pwposes, Statutes at Large 30, sec. 10,361 (1898); 

Thian, Legislative History, 116. 

8. ARIG 1898, 563, 564. 
INSPECTION DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 365 

chiefs of these bureaus are practically alike in the status and authority as chiefs 

of bureaus and heads of corps in the Army . ,,9 

The Judge Advocate General's opinion was so qualified that it accorded 

Breckinridge the status of bureau chief only by custom, not by law. But that did 

not disconcert the Inspector General, who asserted his equality with other 

bureau heads and used his organization's departmental status as justification to 

revive the issue of district inspectorates. He said again that the supervision of a 

bureau of the War Department should not be interrupted by departmental 

commanders. He implied later that these interruptions were the reason that his 

office had received few inspection reports during 1898.10 The day after receiving his declaration of departmental independence, Breckinridge responded to a 

request from the Secretary for an estimate of the extra manpower his department would need for the war. He assumed that four corps and twelve divisions 

would require permanent inspectors general, each with a clerk and a messenger. 

On 7 June, Sanger, acting for the absent Breckinridge, told the War Department's 

chief clerk that his office required eight more clerks and three more messengers, 

as well as additional office space. If the war lasted past December, Sanger said, 

eight additional clerks would be needed. Also that month, Warren H. Orcutt, 

Breckinridge's senior clerk, was temporarily promoted to chief clerk, whose 

duties he had been performing for years, and in August his promotion was 

made permanent. II 

Trying to assert his independence and enlarge his organization, which was 

suspended between the district inspection system and a return to departmental 

inspections, Breckinridge had not yet clarified how he intended to employ his 

department in the war effort. When Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler asked for Ernest 

A. Garlington to serve as inspector general of his volunteer division, Breckinridge said, "And to suggest now taking his inspector from the regular establishment and from this bureau must now be regarded as exceptional. " Breckinridge 

revealed that with his " inadequate force" he wanted junior officers to run the 

Washington office, while more senior officers were to join the field force. The 

best way "to provide for such exceptional requests as General Wheeler's and 

yet obviate the weakening or disintegration of this Department and bureau is by 

a proper increase of the permanent corps," he said. Complaining that Handy's 

bill had been killed by the Adjutant General's opposition in April, Breckinridge 

asked Adjutant General Corbin to prepare a new bill supporting his proposals 

for increases. That request, apparently, was answered when Corbin's comments and Alger's endorsement went to Congress. 12 Because no permanent 

increase was allowed, the work of inspecting the masses of troops for the most 

part fell to the inspectors general of volunteers, of whom at least thirty-six were 

9. Ibid., 589-90; another copy of the opinon is JAG to Asst Secy of War, 3 May 98, in file 

3314, Gen Corresp 1894-1914, RIGO, RG 159. 

10. ARIG 1898, 360-63. . 

11. Correspondence on this is in file 2912 , Index to Gen Corresp 1894-1916, RG 159. 

12. Breckinridge, memorandum for Henry C. Corbin, 13 May 98, in E.A. Garlington personal 

records, 5574-ACP-1877, box 493 , personnel records, RAGO, RG 94. 
366 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

assigned during the war. About two-thirds of them were assigned from the 

Regular Army; the others, from volunteers, with the approval of the War 

Department. It is clear from Breckinridge' s record of their assignments that not 

all spent the entire war as inspectors; they had various other staff or command 

duties. Moreover, Breckinridge did not assert control over the volunteer 

inspectorate, and as a consequence he heard very little from the volunteer 

inspectors. That was in striking contrast to his formerly incessant demands to 

have all inspection paper work flowing quickly to his office. 

Breckinridge's failure to direct the inspectorate and make it work was a 

primary factor in his department's ineffectiveness during the war with Spain. It 

was also a principal reason why the authorities in the War Department remained, 

until too late, uninformed about conditions in the southern camps. By the time 

the war was over, the Inspector General's Department was under considerable 

journalistic criticism for not doing its job. Breckinridge, predictably, would not 

concede that. The high rate of sickness in the volunteer camps, he said, was 

attributable to the absence of experienced officers and noncommissioned officers to teach camp discipline and sanitation. Clearly on the defensive, he 

claimed that the volunteer inspectors had done their job well. He said the 

inspectors were well selected and had done good work but sometimes had 

problems with "intercommunication. " 13 Breckinridge implied that, because of 

Miles' obtrusion, his communications with inspectors were interrupted by 

commanders; therefore his department was not culpable for any lack of information in the War Department on conditions in the camps. In fact, he made no 

attempt to assert his own control over information produced by the inspectorate. 

Besides being displeased over the abolishment of his district system, as 

senior inspector general, he had ambitions of his own. He wanted to go to the 

field, preferably as a line commander. He and other senior officers such as 

Miles still remembered the precedent of the Civil War. Overlooking the benefits of Hardie's and Schriver's work in consolidating the department, these 

senior officers seemed only to remember Marcy's role as McClellan's chief of 

staff. Every one of their memories seemed to call for the senior inspectors to 

betake themselves to the field, with the further emotional impulse of old warriors to advance toward the sound of the guns for one last time. Breckinridge 

went so far as to tell his nephew he felt it more honorable to be near danger with 

no particular job than to be safe at home on the staff. 14 As a "loyal Southerner" 

he was selected by President McKinley to be commissioned a major general of 

volunteers, junior only to Nelson Miles and John R. Brooke. Miles originally 

intended for Breckinridge to serve as his inspector general and chief of staff, 

assuming that he would accompany the main army into the field. 15 When other 

13 . ARlG 1898, 564--65. A list of volunteer inspectors and their assignments is in ARlG 1898, 

586-89. 

14. Joseph C. Breckinridge, Ltr to Desha Breckinridge, II Jul 98, in file 3409, Index to Gen 

Corresp 1894--1916, RG 159, entry 24. 

15. Orders dated 30 May 98 in ACP file B203 CB 1866, microfilm 1064, reel 240, National 

Archives. 
INSPECTION DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 367 

circumstances prevented this from happening, Breckinridge was somewhat 

disconcerted, although before that happened he had spent much of May and 

June inspecting volunteers at the largest gathering, Camp Thomas, at Chickamauga National Military Park in Georgia. Rather than any case study of an 

inspection by a volunteer inspector (he apparently had none in his office), 

Breckinridge selected that journey as the subject of his "summary outline of a 

single inspection" for his annual report. Miles had sent him out on 17 May to 

inspect camps at Chickamauga, Atlanta, New Orleans, Mobile, Tampa, Miami, 

and Key West. He took with him Garlington, Inspector General of Volunteers 

John J. Astor, and two lieutenants. The senior inspector general had to develop 

his procedures as he went along: "As the inspection of an improvised army 

preparing for the field was almost unprecedented and absolutely new to us, our 

progress in the earlier stages of the inspection was necessarily slow. " It should 

take three days for four inspectors to cover a division, he said, but he was soon 

behind schedule. 16 

To his credit, Breckinridge's telegrams revealed that serious problems existed in the organization, training, equipment, transportation, supplies, and 

medical services at Chickamauga. He was inclined to state things positively, 

however, and did not hint at any serious defects in sanitation there, although 

there was only a meager water supply. That he perceived problems was suggested by his request that Colonels Vroom and Burton be assigned to join him 

on the tour. It is also apparent that the troops he examined were far from 

prepared for action, and would require a long period of training. He was 

nevertheless able to drill them in some battle maneuvers. Breckinridge's last 

telegram from Chickamauga, on 4 June, asked the Secretary to give him a 

command commensurate with his new grade of major general of volunteers. 

Although Breckinridge should have been more informative and critical about 

what was going on in the camps before the worst epidemics erupted, the 

confusion over his status as a member of Miles' field staff is partial mitigation. 

His own tour covered only Chickamauga, one of several camps he was to 

observe, while his going to Cuba meant he received few reports from inspectors 

in the departments or in the camps and field. 

Despite Breckinridge's absence, his proposed expansion of the Inspector 

General's Department was progressing. Because he was not around to advance 

his own case, Congress followed the course laid out by the Adjutant General. A 

bill to add three officers to the department passed the House of Representatives 

on 28 June 1898. The approved bill became law on 7 July 1898, increasing the 

16. The "J. J. Astor" who accompanied Breckinridge to Chickamauga was John Jacob Astor 

of the New York family. Breckinridge was not impressed, as he wrote his nephew Desha from 

Santiago: "I recommend that the volunteer officers appointed for this war in the IGD should be 

subjected to a suitable examination, then volunteers would have been protected from the suffering 

which was shown along the sick-line at Chickamauga and Tampa .... And the country might have 

been spared the discredit of having to have such asses as Jack Astor .. . . pretend to direct & instruct 

soldiers for the absolute and fateful requirements of war." Breckinridge to Desha Breckinridge, 

II Jul 98, in file 3409, Index to Gen Corresp 1894-1916, RG 159. 
368 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

Inspector General's Department by a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, and a major. 

The law provided that these new slots were to be filled first by promotion 

within the department according to seniority, and that after the volunteers were 

mustered out and the Regular Army reduced, the department would decline by 

attrition to its former level of seven officers. 17 As a result of that legislation, 

Lawton became a colonel and Sanger and Garlington became lieutenant colonels. 

Major Charles H. Heyl became an inspector general on 8 July, joined on 25 July 

by Capt. Stephen C. Mills, promoted to major. "Following the honored precedent established early in its history," Breckinridge said, "the policy of this 

department was to secure service for as many of its officers as possible with the 

fighting line." 18 

This view meant that although the Inspector General's Department was 

significantly expanded, its members were dispersed almost immediately. Robert P. Hughes, assigned in late May to accompany troops bound for the 

Philippines, became a brigadier general of volunteers on 3 June; he ended the 

year as provost marshal in Manila. George H. Burton was ordered to the 

Washington office on 6 June, but he fell ill with typhoid later in the month and 

spent the rest of the year on sick leave. Henry W. Lawton, assigned as inspector general on Shafter's staff for the invasion of Cuba late in April, became a 

brigadier general of volunteers on 4 May, and then a major general of volunteers two months later; he never returned to inspection. Joseph P. Sanger, who 

began the war in the Washington office, was a brigadier general of volunteers 

by 27 May; he ended the war as division commander. Thus, besides Breckinridge, four Inspector General's Department senior officers were otherwise occupied during the war. Of those remaining on the permanent staff, Peter D. 

Vroom eventually became inspector on General Miles' staff during the invasion 

of Puerto Rico. Garlington started the war attached to Breckinridge, whom he 

accompanied to Chickamauga, but he was soon assigned as the inspector to 

Wheeler's cavalry division, which he accompanied to Cuba. He returned to 

duty in Washington at the end of August. Of the newcomers, Heyl found 

himself administering the Washington office after 14 JUly. He was joined there 

two weeks later by Mills, who left on 4 August to become the recorder for a 

commission investigating the conduct of the war. Another new inspector, Maj . 

Thomas T. Knox, was with his regiment in Cuba at the time of his 25 July 

appointment. There he was severely wounded. On 18 August he was ordered to 

report for duty, after convalescence, in the Washington office. 19 

The Inspector General's Department, as it had during the Civil War, existed 

mostly on paper. Two very junior officers in Washington could not begin to 

establish a systematic and responsible inspectorate over the whole Army, and in 

fact such an organization never evolved. The volunteer inspectors did their 

j 7. All Act to Provide for a Temporary Increase ill the Inspector·General's Department of the 

Army. approved 7 lui 98, 30 Stat. 720; Thian. Legis/ative History. 116. 

18. ARIG 1898. 564, 587. See Appendix B. Incidentally. Congress also provided in July for 

temporary increases in rank for four inspectors reporting to the Quartermaster General. Risch. 

Quartermaster Support. 518. 

19 . ARIG 1898. 585-86. 
INSPECTION DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 369 

best, interpreting the regulations as well as they were able. Inspection went 

forward, sometimes well, and sometimes not, in most divisions and corps, but 

it lacked the direction or overview of the Inspector General's Department. 

Meanwhile, at least seven officers served as acting inspectors general on the 

staffs of the geographical departments. As Breckinridge admitted, they sent him 

no reports. The only positive note, from his point of view, was an order on 30 

July that told the senior inspector general to report to the departmental inspectors, 

via their commanders, those inspections required of them by the Secretary of 

War. Inspections of staff facilities, cemeteries, and the like were explicitly 

excluded from supervision by the department commanders. 20 

The Whereabouts of General Breckinridge 

The Secretary's order should have pleased Breckinridge, who in earlier 

times would have used it as an initiative to reinstate his independence. But this 

time he was not present to notice. On 3 June, while Breckinridge was at 

Chickamauga, Miles ordered him to Tampa, where he arrived on 5 June. The 

Secretary of War later said that the Commanding General, Miles, had sent 

Breckinridge to observe operations in Cuba and to report on them. Actually, on 

6 June the Adjutant General telegraphed him, allowing him to accompany 

Shafter if he desired, which, of course, he did. 21 His purpose in going to Cuba 

has never been explained fully, but Breckinridge did perform as an inspector on 

occasion. When he arrived in Tampa he decided that the expedition's transports 

had not been examined by an inspector general as "suggested" in the regulations, 

and he observed that some of the ships were unsuitable. So he sent telegrams to 

Miles, Alger, and the "Acting Inspector General of the Army" (probably 

Burton, who had not yet arrived) after he had talked with Shafter and the chief 

surgeon. But all he suggested was that someone be assigned to perform the 

inspection; he did not do it himself.22 Breckinridge sent at least three telegrams 

to the War Department pointing out that the transports had not been properly 

inspected. He also reported that the troops at Tampa were in considerable 

"discomfort," aggravated by "the unsystematic and unsupervised methods, or 

lack of inspections of volunteers by capable inspectors hitherto prevailing." 

The best he could do was to ask the War Department to provide instructions on 

the duties of corps and division inspectors. Why, from his position on Shafter's 

staff, he did not work to straighten things out in the command by his own 

devices, he never explained satisfactorily. 23 

In his annual report for that year, Breckinridge tried to justify himself and 

avoid criticism: The volunteer inspectors were incompetent or undirected, or the 

20. Ibid ., 586; "History of the Inspector General's Department," 31 Dec 04, in file 372, Index 

to Gen Corresp 1894--1916, RG 159. The order was: GO No. 109, AGO, 30 Jul98 , which is not 

included in GORI&IG. 

21. ARlG 1898, 570-71 , 575; ARSecWar 1898, H. Doc. 2, 55th Cong., 3d sess., p.3. 

22 . ARIG 1898, 575 . 

23. Ibid., 575-76. 
370 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

BLOODY FORD, CUBA. Private Post met General Breckinridge at this site 

during the fighting for San Juan Hill, 1898. 

inspectorate had tried to do its job but was obstructed. Nowhere did he provide 

any evidence that he had tried to organize an effective inspectorate for Shafter's 

expedition; he seemed to have expected someone else to do that. Rather than 

immerse himself in the mechanics of inspection, Breckinridge regaled Miles 

and Alger with optimistic telegrams. Only rarely did the Inspector General find 

problems to report; these few were mainly related to supplies and were usually 

reported without details, as on 4 July when he complained of insufficiency of 

medical supplies. If anything positive came of Breckinridge's presence, it was 

his summary, "Report of a Tour of Duty with the Army of Invasion of Cuba," 

which offered a number of recommendations for changes in uniforms, equipment, 

supplies, maps, mail service, facilities for foreign observers, and so on. But 

mostly, his report, like his telegrams, was devoted to lavish praise of officers 

and men. 24 

Breckinridge had no clearly defined place in Shafter's army, and he evidently made no attempt to establish one . Lt. Col. John D. Miley served as 

Shafter's inspector general and was effectively his chief of staff, issuing orders 

to the generals. He also did investigative work, such as when he went out to 

learn why firing suddenly broke out during the night among troops investing 

Santiago. Breckinridge seemed content to accompany the investing force as an 

24. Ibid., 576-79, 590-601. 
INSPECTION DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 371 

observer, providing an occasional source of speculation to others with authentic 

jobs to do, including Pvt. Charles Johnson Post, who met him one night: 

Bloody Ford was our nearest watering place. I was in the ford filling our squad's 

canteens when a general and his staff rode through. A Mauser bullet from a sharpshooter 

smacked into the stream not six inches from my dipping hand. It had just missed the 

general. "Didn't miss by much, did he?" said the general mildly. . 

"Do you mind filling my canteen for me, my man?" He reached over his canteen. I 

filled it. I had never known a general, and I was curious. 

"General," I asked, "do you mind telling me what general you are?" 

"I am General Breckinridge, " he answered . 

And to this day, I do not know who General Breckinridge is, or was, or what he was 

doing at that Cuban ford. 25 

On 31 July 1898 , acceding at last to his appeals for a command in the line, 

the department assigned Breckinridge to command of "all the troops at Camp 

Thomas, Ga." He assumed charge at the camp in Chickamauga National 

Military Park on 2 August. 26 To some extent, Breckinridge redeemed his neglect 

of the inspectorate in his performance at Camp Thomas. The place, housing the 

largest gathering of green volunteers, was in a deplorable state, with diseases 

taking a ghastly toll, and a promise of worse to come. The new commander 

began his work with attention to the hospitals, which he told the War Department on 4 August were "inadequate and unsuitable. " A War Department board 

(one of its members, Maj. Walter Reed , was the future conqueror of yellow 

fever) was examining the conditions of sanitation at Chickamauga. According 

to Breckinridge, "All testimony and every appearance indicated that we were 

on the verge of an experience with a diseased camp that required prompt, 

decisive, and united effort to fully meet." The inspector-turned-commander 

went right to work rectifying camp discipline and moving camps out of unhealthy 

locations. 27 

Camp Thomas housed 40,000; these men were supervised by a commander 

unable to meet the special challenges of a large gathering of undisciplined 

volunteers and unable to enlist the support services that his situation required. 

The Army was then preparing for an advance on Havana, and Breckinridge was 

to lead his 40,000-man force in that campaign. In any case, too many of the 

men were ill or dying from patently preventable causes, and the place had 

become a national disgrace. Within 'a week, however, it was apparent that there 

would be no advance on Havana. The Spanish in Cuba had yielded to American 

pressure. This fact did not slow down Breckinridge. He took considerable 

satisfaction from his accomplishments in two months as a line commander. 

After correcting the sanitary defects at Chickamauga, he put into practice what 

he had long preached as an inspector general: He thoroughly formed and 

25 . William Henry Bisbee, Through Four American Wars: The Impressions and Expressions 

of Brigadier General William Henry Bisbee (Boston: Meador, 1931); Post, The Little War of 

Private Post, 219, 22fr.27 (quotation), 229. 

26. ARlG 1898, 582. 

27. Ibid., 582-83. 
372 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

organized the army, and trained it from top to bottom, to the point where it was 

proficient en masse in reviews and battle exercises. But as hard as he worked he 

said he was plagued by "constantly changing circumstances," his army was 

dissolving around him. He was compelled to begin mustering troops out in late 

August, finding himself the target of bad news reports which he attributed to 

complaints from men discontented because some regiments were mustered out 

ahead of their own. The last of the first-draft volunteers were gone on 14 

September. On the same day, Breckinridge began to march what was left of his 

command, now an army corps, to Knoxville, Tennessee, then to Lexington, 

Kentucky, drilling and training the troops all the way. Secretary Alger paid him 

the honor of reviewing the troops at Lexington on 20 September. Breckinridge 

turned over his corps to his replacement on 20 October and returned to 

Washington. He resumed his duties as senior inspector general on 24 October, 

and on 30 November his honorable discharge from the volunteer service took 

effect. 28 

The Aftermath 

The Inspector General's Department was at the time disorganized. In theory, 

Hughes was supposed to be at the Department of the East, Burton at the 

Department of the Lakes, Lawton at the Department of California, Vroom at 

the Department of the Gulf, and Sanger and Garlington on duty in Washington. 

The newest inspectors general had not received departmental assignments and 

few of the others were in their assigned places. Actually, Hughes was in the 

Philippines and Lawton was on his way there, both officers with line duties. 

Burton was home with typhoid fever, while Vroom was in the Caribbean, 

Sanger was commanding a division at Lexington, and Mills was on special 

assignment with the presidential commission. Only Garlington, Heyl, and Knox 

were accessible; all were in Washington. 29 When he returned to Washington, 

Breckinridge found himself and his department under heavy criticism in the 

press and among politicians. A few might acknowledge that he had worked 

manfully to ameliorate the miserable sanitation at Camp Thomas, but the general thinking was that the Inspector General's Department should have informed 

the authorities that such disasters were in the making. With his customary 

aplomb, Breckinridge tried to turn the situation to his own advantage, saying 

again that his department's ineffectiv~ness was attributable to the end of its 

independence in the spring and to its being too small . 

A renewed drive for an expanded Inspector General's Department depended 

upon a decision on the size of the permanent military establishment. Late in 

1898 Secretary Alger told Congress that the new island possessions made an 

increase in the army advisable. President William McKinley agreed, and in his 

annual message on 5 December l898 gave "unqualified approval" to Alger's 

28. Ibid., 584, 585, 601-11. 

29. Ibid ., 563-64, 585-86. 
INSPECTION DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 373 

request for a lOO,OOO-man Regular Army. Congressman John A.T. Hull, 

retired General Schofield, and even the National Guard Association supported 

such an expansion. But central to the issue was a reform of the staff department 

system, increasingly regarded as the cause of all the problems that had characterized the mobilization of 1898. Line officers seized the opportunity to argue 

strongly for an end to permanent staff departments, to be replaced by temporary 

rotations of line officers, along with other administrative changes. The staff 

departments, led by Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin, offered their own 

arguments in return, and the old issue of the relation between the Commanding 

General and the rest of the War Department arose once again.30 

Congressman George B. McClellan, the late Inspector General Marcy's 

grandson, introduced a bill on 12 December 1898 to reorganize the Army . His 

measure proposed merger of the Inspector General's and Adjutant General's 

Departments into a "general staff" headed by the most formidable of the staff 

chiefs, Adjutant General Corbin. General-staff officers would have permanent 

tenure, but would be required to have two years of service in the line every ten 

years. McClellan's bill would also have consolidated some other staff 

departments and put all of them under the direct control of the Commanding 

General, who would be graded lieutenant general, this an attempt to win 

Miles' support. Over the next two days, Miles, Schofield, Corbin, and others 

testified on various army expansion bills, with Schofield and Miles debating the 

proper status of the Commanding General. 31 

Breckinridge also testified, saying again that the Handy bill, introduced in 

the spring, would have provided all the organization necessary for his department. 

It would have extended his purview over all inspecting officers, "or others, 

under the control of the Secretary of War," excepting only the purely technical 

work of the Corps of Engineers and Ordnance Department. In a sense 

Breckinridge's ambitions paralleled Miles'. The Army and Navy Journal, a 

spokesman for much current military thinking, perceived what he was intriguing to do, and suspected that his emphasis on independence went too far. The 

periodical did not oppose reorganization of the Inspector General's Department, 

but avowed that the Handy bill circumscribed the authority of the President as 

Commander in Chief. Breckinridge wanted too much independence, and in 

reaching too far, as did Miles, he very nearly lost his department's identity 

altogether. 32 Breckinridge spent November and December 1898 building a 

great file of paper work justifying his designs for a large and thoroughly 

independent Inspector General's Department. He assailed congressmen and 

army officers with correspondence. When he had his opportunity to testify on 

Capitol Hill in December, however, he found himself faced with considerable 

skepticism among congressional committee members. They were not immediately interested in an expansion of the Inspector General's Department, they 

30. Graham A. Cosmas, "Military Reform After the Spanish-American War: The Army Reorganization Fight of 1898-1899," Milifaty Affairs, 35 (February 1971): 13. 

31. Ibid. , 14-15. 

32. Army alld Navy Journal, 35 (9 April 1898): 609 , and (16 April 1898): 626. 
374 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

questioned whether the organization had accomplished anything of value during the war, and they were definitely unsympathetic to Breckinridge's 

ambitions. 33 

The issue of expanding the Inspector General's Department was not resolved 

in 1898, partly because the larger issues arising from the War Department's 

conduct of the war, and the department's efficiency generally, had not all been 

thoroughly aired. But Breckinridge had by the end of the year acquired an 

important political ally in the person of the Secretary of War. The two now 

perceived that they had a common enemy in Miles. Alger was beginning to 

incline toward support of Breckinridge, as a way of curbing the troublesome 

Commanding General. In his report for 1898, Alger quoted Breckinridge's 

recommendations at length, strongly endorsing his proposal that the Inspector 

General's Department be extended in wartime to even the brigade level. But 

whether Alger's growing support of Breckinridge would prove beneficial would 

depend ultimately on the strength of Alger's own position. As scandal heaped 

upon scandal in the press at the end of 1898, Alger appeared less and less 

secure as Secretary of War. 34 

Breckinridge had to admit at the end of the year that the Inspector General's 

Department had not provided its usual services. Many of the regular inspections, 

he said, were deferred or omitted because of the war's pressing demands. Even 

the" customary third inspection of the accounts of most of the staff officers was 

not had. " About a quarter of the garrisoned posts and camps had been inspected 

(by acting inspectors), but none of the military colleges had. There had not 

been an inspection of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers in 

more than a year. As for property, Breckinridge detected a movement to end 

the cumbersome condemnation procedures that had been in effect since 1825, 

and he resisted vigorously any attempt to curtail the purview of his department. 35 

In other concerns, Breckinridge advised the establishment of an indemnity fund 

to compensate farmers for damages incurred during troop maneuvers; he also 

proposed a permanent maritime military transport service. Breckinridge renewed 

an earlier suggestion that a corps of "trained civilian teamsters and packers" be 

organized to prevent taking soldiers from the line for land transportation service; 

he recommended a renewed stockpile of transportation equipment, and an 

increase in the enlisted Hospital Corps. The ration, he said, should be "changed 

or made more elastic to meet the new conditions of service in the tropics; and 

articles required by convalescing patients, suffering from fever and disturbances of the alimentary tract, should be added to some branch of supply. " 

Breckinridge further suggested that the appointment of graduates from college 

cadet corps to volunteer commissions be made a matter of policy. 36 

33. Breckinridge's file on this issue at the time is in file 3314 ~U, W, Gen Corresp 1894-1914, 

RG 159. 

34. ARSecWar 1898, 154. 

35. ARIG 1898, 347-49, 352-53 , 356-58, 363-64, 611; GO No. 56, AGO, 27 May 98, in 

" History of the Inspector General's Department," 31 Dec 04, in file 372, Index to Gen Corresp 

1894-1916, RG 159. 

36. ARIG 1898, 154-55 . 
INSPECTION DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 375 

With ideas like that, Breckinridge had for several years shown himself 

ahead of the mass of the Regular Army in predicting the future shape of the 

military establishment, which in the next generation would be based on the 

permanent Regular Army, the National Guard, a system of reserves, and volunteer armies for large wars. Simultaneously, he was reactionary in his devotion 

to the idea that the staff departments should continue as independent satraps 

in a War Department organized as they had always known it. Breckinridge was 

not blind to the forces of change; he merely wanted his organization to be as 

little affected by their consequences as possible. 
CHAPTER 22 

Inspecting the New Army 

( 1898-1903) 

Commenting on a bill in the Senate that would have demolished the Inspector General's Department, on 22 February 1902 the editors of the Army and 

Navy Journal stated: "The most striking comment on the importance of a 

separate department of inspectors general is the action of the officers who 

abandoned the department during the Spanish war to seek more distinguished, 

or more congenial, services in command of troops, thus seriously crippling it at 

a critical time ." 1 With this as tbeir image among many of their colleagues, the 

inspectors seemed to be facing an insurmountable task to redeem themselves 

and their department's reputation . 

Breckinridge and the Dodge Commission 

Notwithstanding, on the question of whether the senior inspector general 

should have ordered more wartime inspections, Breckinridge, like the rest of 

the War Department, was somewhat hampered by circumstances in the highly 

charged political climate of 1898. The mobilization for the Spanish-American 

War had indeed had its unfortunate aspects, for it appeared to some people that 

much of the War Department had not done its job, or at least had not done it 

well: Moreover, this was the great age of "yellow" journalism, with newspapers competing viciously in circulation wars. Their weapons were sensational stories, preferably of scandals in high places. With reports of unpalatable food and sickness in the southern camps emerging even before the war 

was over, the papers initiated their accusations against the War Department. To 

quiet the controversy, President William McKinley appointed an investigating 

commission, chaired by Grenville M. Dodge, to investigate the War Department's conduct of the conflict with Spain . The members of the commission 

were upright and distinguished, none more so than the chairman, a Civil War 

hero , politician, and builder of the Union Pacific Railroad. Inspector Stephen 

Mills was its secretary. People looking for scandal recognized early that Dodge 

was a friend of Secretary Alger, and was so impeccably honest that he would 

not allow his panel to be a billboard for unsupported allegations. Nevertheless, 

1. Army alld Navy Journal , 39 (22 February 1902): 624, and (1 March 1902): 650. 
INSPECTING THE NEW ARMY 377 

Dodge gave everyone who so desired an opportunity to testify; nearly 500 

people did so, and not all were friendly to the War Department. 2 

The commission held its hearings during the fall and into the winter of 

1898, meanwhile conducting a large investigative correspondence with the War 

Department and others. Breckinridge testified before the panel in the middle of 

November. What he had to say was lost in a controversy that began a few 

weeks later between Miles and Charles P. Eagan, the Commissary General, and 

was remembered only after the testimony of Miles had become old news. The 

exchanges between Miles and Eagan dominated the public's attention for several 

months before becoming passe. Almost unnoticed in the uproar was the Dodge 

Commission's report, which cleared all War Department officials of any charges. 

The report, issued in February 1899, attributed the war's shortcomings to the 

understandable results of unpreparedness for hasty mobilization. The panel 

found the War Department's organization less than adequate for war, but it said 

that despite all obstacles the soldiers had all been sheltered, clothed, fed , and 

transported. All bureaus, save one, had done the best possible under the 

circumstances. That one exception was the Inspector General's Department. 3 

The members of the commission were especially interested that almost no 

reports ever reached the Inspector General's Office; those that Breckinridge had 

sent in comprised the bulk of the available information. Alger was sensitive to 

the charge that his department had not used its inspectorate to apprise itself 

adequately, and he repeatedly emphasized that all correspondence for the attention of the Inspector General went swiftly to that office. None, he said, had 

been held in the office of either the Adjutant General or the Secretary of War. 

As for the rule of the Inspector General's Department during the war, the 

Secretary acknowledged that four of its officers had been commissioned as 

volunteer generals for service as commanders. 4 When it issued its report, the 

Dodge Commission expressed concern that inspectors were required to inspect 

only when ordered to do so, and that orders to that effect were not always 

forthcoming. Furthermore, although some officers of the department had been 

assigned to field commands, others had remained in Washington, where they 

could have exercised a general oversight if directed to do so. The inspectorate's 

field organization was "ample," but reports often were not acted on or for2. The background to the appointment of the Dodge Commission is presented in Stanley P. 

Hirschson, Grenville M . Dodge: Soldier, Politician, Railroad Pioneer (Bloomington: Indiana 

University Press, 1967),234--35, and Weigley, History of the United States Army, 310-1 1. A more 

recent study of army reforms during the period is Barrie E. Zais, "The Struggle for a 20th Century 

Army: Investigation and Reform of the United States Army after the Spanish American War, 

1898- 1903" (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1981). 

3. Hirschson, Grenville M . Dodge, 236; Risch , Quartermaster Support, 555-56. The Dodge 

Commission's report was published as Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to 

Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain, S. Doc. I, 56th Cong., 1st 

sess. (8 vols. , 1900). The findings, but not the testimony, were released on 13 February 1899. 

4. Alger to Dodge, 29 Nov 98, and GO No. 81, AGO, 27 Jun 98, in Report of the Commission, 

1: 427-32. 
378 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

warded to Washington . The commission recommended a three part "better 

system" for the Inspector General's Department. First, inspectors general should 

be required to submit to the Secretary of War at stated intervals their plans for 

inspecting camps and troops. Second, the corps of inspectors general should be 

large enough to do the job. Third, inspection reports should be forwarded 

promptly by the Inspector General's Department to the Secretary of War. 5 

More important, however, was the fact that the commission dismissed 

Breckinridge's contention that his work was made impossible by the demise of 

the district system and by delays in reporting attributable to the necessity for 

routing correspondence through the Adjutant General. Most stinging was the 

implication in the commission's report that the inspectors general did not do 

their jobs during the war. Eventually, the commissioners were not too upset 

about the transfer of some inspectors to line commands, but they did point out 

that other inspectors remained in the department and implied that those officers 

by indirection, including Breckinridge, should not have awaited specific orders 

to do their work. The commissioners believed that Breckinridge and his people 

could have had the Army inspected adequately had they wished to, for no good 

reason existed why they could not have submitted plans and requested orders 

without higher authority speaking first. Characteristically, Breckinridge reacted 

sharply to the commission's remarks. His first action, when he heard of the 

criticisms, was to tell Maj. Thomas T. Knox to obtain a report from all inspectors general in the field, recounting their wartime activities. He also requested 

testimonials from commanders on the value of inspectors general's services to 

the Army. The senior inspector general anticipated a fight to save his department, 

and began collecting information in its defense. 6 

Increasing the Army Temporarily 

The fate of the Inspector General's Department quickly became entwined 

with the larger questions of the size and shape of the entire Army . With peace 

concluded, the military force was intended to decline to its prewar level, 

which was grossly insufficient for serving a colonial empire especially when 

rebellion raged in the Philippines. So the War Department submitted a plan to 

retain the necessary force . The measure called for an increase of the Regular 

Army, made the three-battalion infantry formation permanent, authorized the 

President to raise a force of volunteers for the Philippines, and had a number of 

reform provisions, including the authorization of company clerks. In basic 

form, this act of 2 March 1899 raised the Army to 65,000 enlisted men until 1 

July 1901 and allocated 35,000 volunteers. Both forces were nearly all recruited 

by the fall of 1899, and the infantry was permanently arrayed in the threebattalion formation. 7 The act of 2 March 1899 also affected the inspectorate. It 

5. Ibid., 1: 124. 

6. The file he built is file 412217, Index to Oen Corresp 1894-1916, RO 159. It also has some 

miscellaneous material on his tour of Cuba in 1899. 

7. Ibid ., 2371; Cosmas, "Military Reform, 1898- 99 ," 14-17; ARSecWar 1899,3-4, 45. 
INSPECTING THE NEW ARMY 379 

made permanent the slots of the three new inspectors general which were added 

during the war. It permitted the appointment of volunteers to be additional 

inspectors general, raising their number to eight lieutenant colonels and nineteen majors. The law also required that any captains who had' 'evinced marked 

aptitude in the command of troops" be reported by their colonels to the War 

Department, thereby becoming eligible to fill any vacancies in the Adjutant 

General's and Inspector General's Departments. 8 Despite the increase in his 

permanent force, Breckinridge pointed out that in addition to·the five officers 

who were on other duty, many of the volunteers were doing something else 

besides inspecting. 

Serving the Secretary's Interest in Economy 

The Inspector General's Department ended the Spanish-American War with 

its complement dispersed because of continued line service by some of its 

officers and a shifting corps of officers detailed to inspection. However, the 

organization soon functioned smoothly again. The department's mandate once 

more was diffused over a bewildering variety of secretarial duties, and across a 

uniformed army now spread around the world . As it had been for a quarter 

century, inspection of disbursement accounts remained a significant burden. 

The Inspector General's Department inspected accounts involving $325 million 

in fiscal year 1899, the largest amount inspected in anyone such year. That 

figure included accounts missed the previous year, which was the organization's 

auditing backlog, so the total declined to $280 million in 1900 while the 

number of inspections increased to 1,406. Breckinridge estimated that he needed 

thirty full-time inspectors to do the job properly, and also that he would require 

more clerical help. In 1901 inspectors made 2,197 reports, while in 1902 

(Breckinridge's last year on the job) the 3,040 inspection reports received in the 

Washington office represented $301 million worth of disbursements. 9 

Property inspections and condemnations were also a growing burden, albeit 

essential, while proposals for legislation to simplify the cumbersome procedures were resisted. Only 6 percent of property inspections were made by 

permanent inspectors in 1899; those remaining were made by special inspectors 

and officers detailed to inspection. This work load increased steadily through 

1902, with Breckinridge defending its necessity. The growing assignment of 

special inspectors, he said, justified an increase in the permanent complement 

8. An. Act for increasing the efficiency of the Army of the United States, and for other 

purposes, Statutes at Large 30, sec. 1,6, 14,977 (1899): Thian, Legislative History, 116-17; ARIG 

1899, 80. 

9. AR1G 1899, H. Doc. 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., I: 90; ARIG 1899 (to Secy War), H. Doc. 2, 

56th Cong., 1st sess., pI. 2, I: 122; AR1G 1901 (to Secy War), H. Doc . 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 

pI. 2, I: 134-38; ARIG 1902, H. Doc . 2, 57th Cong., 2d sess., I: 454-55. Breckinridge's separate 

reports to the Secretary and to the Commanding General fell into two separate parts of the War 

Department annual reports in 1900 and 190 I. (The report to the Secretary both years was in part 2, 

that to the Commanding General in part 3. Hereafter, the former will be cited as ARIG 1890, Secy, 

p. no.; the latter as ARIG 1890, CG, p. no. The practice of separate reports ended in 1902.) 
380 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

of the department. Nevertheless, he continued to gain better control of substantive and item-pricing information in the work. He also recommended regulation 

of auctioneers of discarded property and reforms in the management of subsistence stores in the tropics, an important loss of inventory. He was receiving 

over 7,500 condemnation reports a year by 1902, and said in justification of the 

program that it was comprehensive, including funds as well as property. 10 

The Inspector General 's Department also returned its attention to staff 

facilities such as the depots of the supply departments. As before the war, these 

were usually pronounced well managed, although there was comment on occasional overcrowding or defective buildings. The worst problems occurred in the 

tropical Philippines, where many stores of all types suffered from the climate 

and vermin. As for the national cemeteries, the Soldiers' Home, and the Army 

and Navy General Hospital, Breckinridge seldom found anything to criticize. 

By 1899, he had made himself a strong proponent of electric lighting in War 

Department facilities. II 

Inspections of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers resumed 

in late 1898, helped by a change permitted by orders on 27 May. Any officer of 

the Inspector General's Department, not just the senior inspector, now could 

perform this function . The home's greatest problems were serious overcrowding and an absence of outdoor recreational amenities. Furthermore, when its 

long-time manager retired in 1900, it came under a series of short-term managers who did not give it their full attention. Therefore, Breckinridge attributed 

any progress made to the inspections and noted a recently expanded population 

of 19,000 inmates in 1900. The next year, the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act 

of 3 March 1901 removed inspections of the National Home's accounts from 

the purview of the Inspector General's Department, transferring it to the Department of the Treasury's auditors. Inspectors, however, were still permitted to 

inspect the National Home's physical properties. This led to the discovery of a 

discrepancy in the accounts of deceased inmates, for which a treasurer was 

fired. The National Home had eight branches by 1902, with another about to 

open, and a sanitorium in South Dakota, with all facilities in "excellent condition generally" but badly overcrowded. 12 

Military Colleges and the National Guard 

The Inspector General's Department also returned its attention to the military programs at colleges in 1899 , finding that only some had continued to 

operate during the war. By 1900 the inspection program was fully operational 

again, including reviews of 101 of the colleges, only some of which were 

10. ARIG 1899, 97-102;ARIG 1900, Secy War, 140-46;ARiG 1901, Secy War, 138-42;AR1G 

1902 , 459- 66. 

11. AR1G 1899, 109- 12; ARiG 1901, Secy War, 163-90. 

12. GO No. 56, AGO, 27 May 98, in " History of the Inspector General's Department," 31 

Dec 04, in file 372, Index to Gen Corresp 1894-1916, RG 159; ARIG 1899, 92-94; ARiG 1900, 

Secy War, 127- 32; ARIG 1901, Secy War, 132, 147-51; ARiG 1902, 469-70 . 
INSPECTING THE NEW ARMY 381 

SECOND KANSAS NATIONAL GUARD, FIELD INSPECTION. FORT RILEY, 

KANSAS, 1898. 

staffed with regular officers. The number of officers assigned as instructors 

increased to fifty-eight in 1901 and to seventy-four in 1902. The programs 

continued to grow, and although they became so numerous that not all could be 

inspected each year, inspectors continued to examine as many as possible, 

whether or not Regular Army officers were present. Inspection support for the 

program was as great as ever by 1902: Recommendations included that another 

100 officers be assigned to colleges and the number of direct commissions of 

college graduates be increased in the Army. 13 

A more important long-term subject than the military colleges was the 

National Guard, whose record during the Spanish-American War had not earned 

it the favor of the regulars. When Elihu Root became Secretary of War in 1899, 

at first he shared the general disdain of professional soldiers for the National 

Guard. He did not want the Guard set up for wartime service, believing instead 

that volunteers should continue to be the basis of expansion of the national 

army, as had been the case when the force was increased in 1899 for service in the 

Philippines. 14 Both Root's attitude and the National Guard legislation had 

evolved considerably by 1902. The National Guard wanted not only federal 

money but also its independence from federal control. Root originally preferred 

the volunteer system as the basis for mobilization, since it would be federally 

13 . ARIG 1899, 94--95; ARIG 1900, Secy War, 135-40; ARIG 1901 , Secy War, 159-63; ARIG 

1902 , 384--89. 

14. Colby, " Root and the National Guard ," Military Affairs, 23 (spring 1959): 30. 
382 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

controlled, but he recognized the inevitability of the Guard's existence. 

Accordingly, he decided to seek its conversion into an effective national reserve. 

The legislation that eventually emerged, the Dick Act of 21 January 1903, 

repealed the Militia Act of l792 and made the Guard the nation's first source of 

wartime manpower. 15 The Dick Act imposed certain performance standards on 

the National Guard, specifying the number and frequency of drills and 

encampments. It also directed the Secretary of War to inspect the Guard annually, 

to monitor its efficiency. Root started the job immediately in 1903 and claimed 

many benefits, including some major reorganizations. But the inspection 

program, which really had evolved under Breckinridge's hands in the 1890s 

and had become one of his department's most cherished responsibilities, no 

longer was the exclusive province of the Inspector General's Department. Now 

the Adjutant General kept the Secretary informed on the state of the militia. 16 

Special Assignments for the Secretary 

The Inspector General's Department, even as it lost the Secretary's attention on matters affecting the National Guard, received from him a somewhat 

growing number of special assignments after the war with Spain. The first 

notable call was for Breckinridge himself, who conducted a detailed inspection 

of the U. S. forces in Cuba and Puerto Rico at the Secretary's personal request. 17 

Breckinridge said "Nothing was left undone," and, indeed, he was thorough. 

He returned with a large number of recommendations on the quality of housing 

in Cuba and Puerto Rico, on the disposal of garbage and sewage, and on civil 

affairs, which he said were well managed. He proposed a public works program 

to relieve native unemployment and also suitable summer clothing and rain gear 

for the soldiers. The "extraordinary infusion of new recruits," he also said, 

had disrupted the discipline of many units. 18 This was the first of many special 

reports from the new colonies. A year later, one of the volunteer inspectors 

general went to observe the transition from military to civilian rule in Puerto 

Rico, which he said went well. The indifference of the natives to the change in 

rule he attributed to their appreciation of the high quality of the military 

government. Breckjnridge also reported improvements in public health on the 

island, which he credited to the Army's surgeons. He further praised his 

department's accountant, William T. Kent, who had made a number of special 

investigations in the West Indies. Finally, in 1902, at Breckinridge's suggestion, 

15. ARSecWar 1902, 38-40; Louis Cantor, "Elihu Root and the National Guard: Friend or 

Foe?" Military Affairs, 33 (December 1969): 361-73; ARSecWar 1903 , H. Doc. 2, 58th Cong., 2d 

sess., 1:13; Colby, "Root and the National Guard,'"' 28 . The law was named for its sponsor, 

Congressman Charles Dick, a major general in the Ohio National Guard. 

16. ARSecWar 1903, 1&-18, ARAG 1903, H. Doc . 2, 58th Cong., 2d sess., 1:180-89. The 

subject of the National Guard is not mentioned in AR1G 1903 , H. Doc. 2, 58th Cong., 2d sess., 

vol. I. 

17. ARlG 1899, 437-38. 

18. Ibid ., 46&-96. Breckinridge's reports are in file 4122, Index to Gen Corresp 1894-1916, 

RG 159. They were also published in the Army-Navy Register during June and July 1899. 
INSPECTING THE NEW ARMY 383 

the Secretary recommended the disbandment of the Puerto Rico Regiment, with 

Puerto Ricans permitted to enlist in the Regular Army, and the withdrawal of 

all forces of occupation. 19 

The Secretary of War required sources of information as he tried to develop 

policies for the War Department's new colonial responsibilities. The Inspector 

General's Department, he quickly perceived, was a convenient source of such 

advice. By 1900, Breckinridge could report his department's' 'unusual activity," 

caused by a considerable expansion of inspection duties. These not only included 

more inspections of property, finances, and new units leaving the country, but 

also meant a return to inspection of West Point, and resumption of the prewar 

routine at its fullest. The most "notable development" that year was the work 

of Inspector General Burton, who exposed certain "Cuban postal frauds," the 

only malefaction detected that year not made good to the Treasury.2o Burton's 

skill in detecting these so-called Neely frauds demonstrated further the value of 

having qualified inspectors in the new territories. Experience, Breckinridge 

said in 1900, had proved the necessity of a highcranking inspector general in 

each of the overseas military divisions. Burton, he cited as an example, had 

thoroughly overhauled and organized the inspectorate in Cuba, and his disclosure of frauds had led to several trials and convictions. Garlington had provided 

such oversight in the Philippines before his return to America, and in 

Breckinridge's opinion, replacing him was essential. Meanwhile, Breckinridge 

himself resumed the inspection of the Military Academy, the first since 1897. 

"If general inspections are to continue in the Army," he said, "the cadet 

should be familiar with it [sic] as in times past. " The academy curriculum was 

not subject to the inspectors' purview. 21 

The special investigations performed by the members of the Inspector 

General's Department had increased by 1902 to 133, of which 31 related to the 

conduct of officers, 16 to insular and municipal government affairs, 10 to 

transport services, and 5 each to conduct of enlisted men, to accommodations 

for troops and garrisons, to sanitary conditions, and to financial claims. The 

growing volume of special inspections reflected a continued erosion of the 

independent control that Breckinridge had achieved of his department's affairs 

in the early 1890s. Once again, as they had been in the 1870s, the inspectors 

general seemed less a department than a group of individuals serving at the 

Secretary's behest. 22 

Old Business and New 

Some old responsibilities of the inspectors general returned early in the 

twentieth century. A system of military prisons was revived at the start of the 

19. ARIG 1900, Secy War 105 , 150-52; ARSecWar 1902, 4. One proposal was for the timebeing unsuccessful. The Puerto Rico Regiment continued until March 1915. Ganoe, History of the 

United States Army, 451. 

20. ARIG 1900, Secy War, 106. 

21. Ibid., 112-13 , 134-35 . 

22. ARIG 1902 , 389-90. 
384 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, l777-1903 

century, and inspectors were required to examine the United States Penitentiary 

at Fort Leavenworth, the prisons at A1catraz Island, and two prisons in the 

Philippines in 1901; and a total of seven institutions in 1902. Breckinridge also 

reasserted his control over the subsistence sales list in 1901, and was pleased to 

be able to talk the Secretary into an extensive revision. In addition, he recommended special lists for the Philippines and for Alaska.

23 His concern for the 

individual welfare of the soldiers was reflected in his interest and in the many 

reforms or improvements he recommended in each of these areas. 

Breckinridge proved himself exceedingly far-sighted in 1899 when he presumed to question the wisdom of separate governmental departments for the 

Army and the Navy . " Perhaps it was a wise provision of our institutions, " and 

worked well enough, he said, but some consolidation in the defense establishment might be advisable. As examples of difficulties caused by the separation 

of the armed services, he pointed out the Army's ineptitude in equipping itself 

with boats, the Navy's failure to cooperate in selecting troop-landing sites, and 

the difference in the bore of the small arms used by the two services. His 

solution to the confusion was to create a joint board whose decisions on 

interservice matters would be binding on both services.

24 Whether through 

Breckinridge's influence or not, the Joint Army and Navy Board, composed of 

four officers from each service, was established on 17 July 1903, just after he 

left the service. Only much later would there be a combined Department of 

Defense, this was nevertheless a tenative step in that direction. 25 

The State of the New Army 

As earnestly as the inspectors general applied themselves to things like 

disbursements, property, and other concerns of the Secretary, the first object of 

their attention remained the Army, which was considerably different from its 

previous form . No longer a desertion-prone, continental constabulary, it was 

becoming a disciplined, modem military force, now distributed around the 

world. The Army had not only global concerns, but it was also brought into 

contact with other nations' forces, increasing its awareness of the need to 

remain current in ideas and equipment. Inspector General Breckinridge urged 

greater thought be given to mobilization and the requirements implicit in defending new overseas possessions.

26 Predictably, he maintained that if the Army 

was to come through changing times successfully, it must rely on its inspectors. 

He told the Secretary that' 'It is an aphorism that a good army responds like a 

willing charger to inspections. ,,27 

23. ARIG1901, 180-82;ARIG I902,451- 54;ARIGI901, 182- 86. 

24. ARIG 1899, 102-03 . 

25. ARSecWar 1903 , 8--10. The Joint Army and Navy Board was another of Root's reforms of 

the defense establishment. Breckinridge 's influence on it is not clear, but he seems to have been the 

first War Department official to publicly propose such an idea. 

26. ARIG 1899, 81- 86. 

27. ARIG 1901 , CG, 174. 
INSPECTING THE NEW ARMY 385 

Inspecting a Worldwide Army 

The greatest hindrance to training in the "old" Army was the dispersion of 

its force across a continent. After 1898, its troops were scattered around the 

world, occupying the Caribbean Islands or trying to suppress the growing 

rebellion in the Philippines. As for the former, in 1899 Beckinridge declared 

Puerto Rico a healthy enough locale, but in Cuba the troops were facing 

typhoid fever, smallpox, and the constant threat of epidemics of yellow fever 

and malaria, all aggravated by crowded, substandard quarters. The story of the 

Cuban occupation, he believed, was mainly medical, and he devoted most of 

his attention to the admirable clinical and research work being performed by the 

Medical Department in that strange tropical land. 28 The inspectors general 

reported conditions generally fair in the Philippines, although they varied greatly 

from place to place. The troops there were mostly recruits, which impaired the 

efficiency and discipline of some of the regular and all of the volunteer units, 

and all their arms and equipment were becoming well-worn. The Army's heavy 

wool clothing, Breckinridge said, was unsuited to the climate, and American 

horses and mules appeared to founder under strange local rations. The mess's 

food was standard, but in that climate sometimes more was condemned than 

issued. In general, Breckinridge attributed most shortcomings to hasty preparation for the expedition to the Philippines.

29 

By 1900, the Inspector General's Department could inspect all regiments, 

before they left for the Philippines, thus correcting some of the effects of the 

former hastiness in preparation, and had instituted a systematic inspectorate in 

the islands. One of the acting inspectors general there was William Carey 

Brown, who received the assignment as light duty after a sickness. But inspecting the scattered forces of the Army in the Philippines was anything but light 

duty, and Brown's faithful diary records a schedule that would tax a healthy 

man in a temperate climate. As always, troop inspections were only part of a 

program that included military and civil disbursements. "In inspecting public 

civil funds, investigate the necessity, economy, and whether in strict conformity with the authority appropriating money," Brown recorded his instructions 

in his diary. 30 

Inspections were more routine in the Caribbean in 1900, where the Army 

was not fighting the natives, but was merely running their government for 

them. Not so routine was the United States' first joint interallied military 

campaign, the relief of the legations at Peking, China, during the Boxer 

Rebellion . No one from the Inspector General's Department was directly involved 

in that operation. Maj. John M. Lee, 15th Infantry, and Capt. Grote Hutcheson, 

6th Cavalry, were assigned as acting inspectors. Breckinridge said that reports 

28. ARlG 1899, 9~92 . 

29 . AR1G 1899, 438-46. 

30 . AR1G 1900, CG, 146-47, 154-57; Brown's diaries and other papers are in William Carey 

Brown Papers, United States Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 
386 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

he had seen showed that American soldiers compared favorably with their 

allies. A Japanese officer, to Breckinridge's positive delight, had said, "The 

American soldier is the best soldier in a fight and the poorest soldier out of a 

fight that I have seen in North China. ,,31 

Inspector General Sanger made a special inspection of the Signal Corps' 

operations in the Orient in 1901 and concluded, "Very little need be said of the 

Signal Corps except by way of commendation." The difficult transportation 

and poor mail service of the Philippines had literally made the Signal Corps the 

Army's lifeline, and the corps was profiting handsomely from its service charges 

for nonmilitary telegrams. In fact, the organization had given the Philippines 

their first communications system, which Breckinridge in 1902 declared marvelous and a testimony to the "admirable work and gallantry" of the signalmen. 

However, it should, in his opinion, be doubled, and a connection between the 

Philippines and Hawaii secured by undersea cable. The telegraphy of the 

Philippines led the Inspector General to predict that "wireless telegraphy" 

would be the norm in the future . 32 

Communications in the Philippines in the year of the Army's first radio set 

made BreckiQridge ponder the marvels of the future, but the distressing conditions of service in that territory also made him look to the old-fashioned issue of 

follow-up to inspection reports. Thanks to some creative but unnamed member 

of the inspectorate, in 1901 a means was developed to overcome the problems 

caused by the inadequate mail service, which had made this issue nearly unsolvable later. Before leaving a post, the inspector now would hand the commander a 

written statement of "irregularities, " and would receive in return the commander's statement of remedial actions taken for forwarding with the inspection report. The procedure , said Breckinridge, was developed "with the hearty 

cooperation of commanders and inspectors . . .. so expedition and efficiency 

are secured amidst unusually adverse surroundings. ,,33 

Supply Services 

Breckinridge's praise of the Quartermaster Department was positively lavish during the years after the war. He was almost equally positive about the 

Subsistence, Medical, Ordnance, and Pay Departments, all of which adapted 

well to greatly increased work loads, the peculiar demands of the Philippines 

service, and the heady winds of changing times and technologies. Some complaints remained to be sure , the most persistent being the loss of foodstuffs and 

drugs due to the climate and vermin of the Philippines. Breckinridge also 

reported in 1902 that staff departments frequently violated regulations by giving orders to their subordinates without the controlling line commanders' knowing 

anything about them. 

31. ARIG 1900, CG, 149, 157- 63 . 

32. ARIG 1901 , Secy War, 158; AR1G 1902, 448- 51. 

33. AR1G 1902, 376. 
INSPECTING THE NEW ARMY 387 

One logistical service of growing importance after the war was transportation, 

particularly over water. Breckinridge offered general praise of the Army's 

transport fleet in 1899, but he complained that the inspectorate was not allowed 

to inspect any of the transports. He warned that "perhaps the exclusion of 

disinterested general inspectors even from examining the disbursements as 

required by law may disarm all criticism of this Department." On 16 September 1899, by telegram and followed by instructions from the Adjutant General's 

Office, the Secretary told the appropriate department commanders to order their 

inspectors to begin looking at the transport fleet. 34 Inspections began immediately, and the results were often dismaying. The transport service was 

usually satisfactory, but many transports were old and defective, overcrowding 

and poor ventilation being common problems. Furthermore, the hiring of transports was unregulated, and the relative duties of contractors and army transportation officers were unclear: "As the law now star:.ds, the Government is at the 

mercy of owners of ships, brokers, and others." But, thanks in large measure to 

ceaseless inspections of both government and chartered vessels, the general 

condition of the Army's transports improved rapidly. Breckinridge was still 

calling for improvements in 1902, but by then reforms were comparatively 

minor, covering such things as the cost of meals on board and the transportation 

of unattached civilians, "especially women and children without male escort. ,,35 

Inspector General Breckinridge was in his sixties by the time the new 

century dawned , but he remained as ever a forward-looking man, delighted 

with each new development in the soldier's life and art. In 1900 he declared 

"road locomotives" obviously the transportation system of the future, because 

they were more efficient than animals. The next year he expanded on the 

virtues of "mechanical transportation" of men, supplies, and armaments. France 

and Germany , he said, were prepared to commandeer automobiles during 

mobilization, while the German Army had begun to mechanize: All staff officers 

were now supplied with autos, motorcycles, or bicycles. The English , 

meanwhile, had offered a prize for the best design of a "self-propelled lorrie or 

wagon for military purposes." The same year he urged that the U.S. Army take 

a serious interest in development of the new devices for its purposes. 36 

The Inspector General's Wide View 

Breckinridge sometimes could look both ways on the time line. In 1899 he 

complained that the Army "has neither trained dogs nor a pigeon service .... 

34. ARIG 1899, 454--55; Telg, AGO, 16 Sep 99, AG to CG, Department of the East, 13 Oct 

99, and AG to CG, Department of California, 3 Mar 1900, cited in "History of the Inspector 

General's Department," 31 Dec 04, in file 372, Index to Gen Corresp 1894--1916, RG 159. 

35. ARIG 1900, Secy War, 117-21 ;ARIG 1901 , Secy War, 15 1-57; ARIG 1902, 419-25. After 

his trip to the Orient in 1901, Breckinridge also recommended placing good libraries, especially for 

professional development, on board transports. See file 6355, Index to Gen Corresp 1894--1916, 

RG 159. 

36. ARIG 1900, Secy War, 121-22; ARIG 1901 , Secy War, 157-58; ARIG 1901, CG, 172- 73. 
388 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The Spanish war has taught us that we should be prepared beforehand at all 

times." The next year he offered a far-sighted proposal that a special body of 

rangers or guards be employed for the national parks. Troops were too expensive for park administration because of the associated costs of feeding and 

maintaining their animals. That was sixteen years before the establishment of 

the National Park Service. Finally, in 1902 Beckinridge urged the Army to 

adopt modem methods of copying and bookkeeping, and to expand its use of 

typewritten multiple copies to replace the old-fashioned letter-press books and 

pigeon-hole filing systems. The Army, he said, had buried itself in paper: 

When General [Adna R.] Chaffee was detailed on duty in the Inspector General's 

Department as a major the reduction of paper work in the Army was specially invited to 

his attention, but despite his forcefulness of character this incubus seems to have grown 

instead of diminished, and we find great tomes filled with longhand at almost every 

military center, while line officers in the fighting force feel hardly fairly treated when 

their clerks are taken ~o headquarters, and reports and returns are still demanded ad 

nauseam.

37 

Despite the paper work, Breckinridge had rescued his department from its 

disfavored status of 1898. He had revitalized it and shown it to be effective and 

necessary to the Army's operations. What is most remarkable about his success 

after the war was that it came during conditions that usually demoralize organizations and make them ineffective or merely self-serving. The Inspector General's 

Department continued to function even when the Secretary refused to clarify its 

authorities, compromising its independence. It kept its reports flowing even 

when events happened that would thoroughly undo most bureaucracies. First, 

the tenure of its officers was cancelled, albeit by attrition. Then, a seemingly 

irresistable movement took shape that would not only end the last traces of 

independence, but could altogether eradicate the Inspector General's Department. 

Breckinridge managed to bring his organization through that crisis, and at the 

last moment to preserve it intact. But it is to his great credit that, amid all that 

turmoil, he kept his people on the job and producing useful work for commanders at every level. 

37. ARIG 1899 , 455- 56; ARIG 1900 , Secy War, 148-50; ARIG 1902 , 474-75. 
CHAPTER 23 

Inspection and Reorganization of the 

War Department 

(1898-1903) 

The reaction to the findings of the· Dodge Commission combined with the 

evident failings of the War Department made it apparent that some kind of 

reorganization was required. Thus, the passing of Secretary Alger marked only 

a brief hiatus in the continuing examination of the Inspector General's 

Department, along with the entire bureau system that had been going on since 

1898. The changes in the National Guard, previously cited, were only the first 

of many that were even more far-reaching. The appointment of a new Secretary 

of War with an interest in reform presaged a fundamental restructuring of the 

War Department, a result which would affect many of the basics of inspection. 

Secretary Root Takes Charge 

"Really, you know, I do not need to know everything about armies and 

their organization, for the five reports of Elihu Root, made as Secretary of War 

in the United States, are the very last word concerning the organization and 

place of an army in a democracy ." 1 Thus spoke no less an authority than 

Britain's great reformist Secretary of State for War, Lord Haldane, upon taking 

office in 1905. Unlike his predecessors, Root did not owe his job to political 

favoritism, regardless of his long-standing association with Vice President 

Theodore Roosevelt. Instead, he was an accomplished lawyer, and President 

McKinley believed that a lawyer's skills were needed to oversee the Army's 

new and greatest task of governing the territories acquired from Spain. But 

Root soon realized that the Army had to become an effective fighting force, 

especially with a rebellion raging in the Philippines, and this led him to a larger 

perception that both the Army and the War Department required an overhaul. 

" [T]he American soldier today," he said in October 1899, "is part of a great 

machine which we call military organization . . . . The machine today is defective; 

it needs improvement; it ought to be improved. ,,2 Root, like most effIciency1. Root's tenure as Secretary of War is covered ' well in Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New 

York: Dodd, Mead, 1938), I: 215-410. See also Weigley, History of the United States Army, 313 

(Haldane quotation), and 313- 26; and Millis, Arms and Men, 157 (Root quotation). 

2. Ibid, 
390 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

minded Progressives of his generation, placed great faith in planning as the cure 

for all public evils. He appreciated especially that effective mobilization in war 

required planning in peacetime, but good planning was impossible under the present organization of the War Department and the Army. The Commanding 

General lacked any clear-cut authority in peacetime, and none at all over most 

of the staff bureaus. The division of responsibility between the Secretary of 

War and the Commanding General led to conflicts. The bureaus were responsible to the Secretary, if they were responsible to anyone, and most bureau heads 

had well-developed connections in Congress. In that context, Root did not want 

to fragment the War Department further until he had developed a sound understanding of what was wrong with it and how the defects might be repaired. 

Root began to educate himself on the workings of a proper national military 

establishment. He had not developed a coherent philosophy by the time of his 

first annual report, but he did see the need for specific changes. Proposing an 

increase and reorganization of the fighting force, he also offered a number of 

other innovations: First among them was the Army War College. He perceived 

that as the sort of central planning agency which his Progressive outlook thought 

proper; the War College became the seed of a general staff. "The real object of 

having an army is to provide for war," he said. But the college was also to be 

the pinnacle of a comprehensive system of officer education, which Root 

thought woefully deficient in the Army . To correct other glaring problems, the 

Secretary proposed that all staff appointments, except those in the Medical 

Department, be filled by rotations from the line on fixed terms; in other words, 

permanent tenure in the staff departments would be abolished. Root also proposed to modify the seniority system to allow promotions according to fitness 

as determined by boards of officers, a separate artillery corps, and improvements in the militia system. 3 

Before Root could make his organizational ideas more precise, Congress 

threatened to do some interfering of its own. Early in 1900 the lawmakers 

considered a bill to authorize transfers to the Adjutant General's and Inspector 

General's Departments of officers of the line then serving in those departments 

in the volunteer army. The measure had other restrictive provisions that would 

be inconsistent with previous legislation governing appointments and promotions in the two departments. Adjutant General Corbin objected on the grounds 

of fairness to the regular complement of the departments. Breckinridge joined 

him, and the Senate Committee on Military Affairs recommended against the 

bill. 4 The measure thus died in Congress, and Root turned his attention to a 

more fundamental review of the Army's organization. He convened a board of 

officers in the spring of 1900 to consider whether or not an army war college 

should be established. But its long report went far beyond its original charter 

and addressed the need for a general staff. The first idea proposed that the 

3. ARSecWar 1899, 44. 

4. Transfer afCertain Line Officers, S. Rpt. 605, 56th Cong., 1st sess. (1900). 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 391 

general staff could be created by a simple consolidation of the Adjutant General's 

and Inspector General's Departments (an old suggestion) but it soon became 

apparent that this would not produce the desired result. "I was opposed to 

forming a General Staff by a consolidation of the Adjutant General's and 

Inspector General's Departments," Root said later, "because that would carry 

over to the General Staff a great mass of such [administrative] duties.,,5 

While Root was trying to reorganize the Regular Army, Breckinridge continued to press for an increase in his own department and its clerical staff. He 

was still sensitive to his organization's bad wartime reputation. He pointed 

broadly to cases where inspection had been "hampered" or "trammeled," 

presumably by department commanders, and rightly complained that no orders 

had been issued to clarify the change in procedures with the shift from inspection districts to geographical departments, "So the work of the Department is 

occasionally questioned." But more fundamentally, he said that the Inspector 

General's Department needed "judicial independence and subordination to 

higher authority" in order to do its work properly. Furthermore, Breckinridge 

remained sensitive to complaints about delays in the transmission of inspection 

reports. The problem, he said in 1900, had been solved after hard work on his 

part. Describing the chain of communication from the inspector through various headquarters to the Adjutant General before it reached his office, he said 

that it took an average of 17.5 days for reports to reach him from posts in the 

United States. Reports on depots (under his juridiction, not the department 

commander'S) took only 12.5 days; on property, 22.4; and on disbursements, 

24.1. "Prompt remedial action is the soul of effective inspections," he said, so 

prompt reporting was essential. In other words, he still objected to the remaining delays imposed by the requirement that his paper work go through the 

n~rmal channel of the Adjutant General's Office .

6 

Secretary Root achieved his first legislative victories on 2 February 1901, 

when Congress fixed the size of the Regular Army between 59,131 and 100,000 

officers and men, according to the President's discretion. Because the war in 

the Philippines had abated, on 8 May the strength was fixed at 77,187 enlisted 

men . The actual strength, including native units, stood at 84,513 in the fall, 

with about two-thirds stationed overseas. The legislation increased the number 

of infantry and cavalry regiments and established the Corps of Artillery. The 

new organization was flexible, permitting fluctuations in enlisted manpower 

once the base number of officers or organizations had been decided. To reach 

the base desired, the law allowed the appointment of 298 staff officers and 873 

line lieutenants that year-mostly from the volunteer army, which was brought 

home and mustered out by 30 June. 7 

5. Vaulx 8, "The Evolution of a General Staff," Jourl/al of the Military Service Institution of 

the United States, 33 (1903); Elihu Root, I: 262 "Vaulx 8," it is apparent from his writing, was 

William H. Carter. 

6 . ARIG 1900, 106-08, 111-12, 126-27, 152-53; ARIG 1900, 111-12, 136 

7. ARSecWar 1901,7-9. 
392 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

One of Root's principal objectives was to expunge the isolation of the staff 

bureaus within the War Department. His first act in that direction was to end the 

old system of permanent tenure and promotion by seniority within the bureaus. 

The bureau chiefs, naturally , fought that idea as they always had, but despite 

their political connections, their credibility after the war was weak, while that 

of Root was on the rise. The Secretary triumphed. The end of permanence in 

staff assignments was the most important and enduring feature of the legislation 

of 2 February 1901. Under the new law, permanent appointments to any staff 

department were prohibited, except for technical professions as represented by 

the Medical, Engineer, and Ordnance Departments and the Signal Corps. Vacancies were to be filled by detail, without promotion, from the line, for a period of 

no more than four years. Furthermore, no officer below the grade of lieutenant 

colonel could return to a staff assignment until he had served at least two years 

in the line. The law also corrected an old problem when it specified that the 

army could fill by promotion any line position vacated by an officer detailed to 

a staff. The comfortable isolation of the staff bureaus was at long last ending. 

The process would be gradual, however, and no incumbent with a permanent 

appointment would be terminated. Vacancies in any permanent position, including that of bureau chief, were to be filled first by promotion from among the 

remaining permanent officers, according to seniority. When no permanent 

officer was available to fill a vacancy, it would be filled by four-year detail. 

When all permanent staff officers had retired, their positions would cease to 

exist. 

Another gesture to please the bureau chiefs was an increase in the size of 

their departments. The new positions would be filled first by promotions of 

permanent officers present, then by detail. That was the only gratifying part of 

the measure for Breckinridge. The law now gave the Inspector General's Department 1 brigadier general, 4 colonels, 4 lieutenant colonels, and 8 majors-a 

total of -17 officers. But exactly one month later, the annual appropriations act 

altered the department. After the present lieutenant colonels had been promoted 

or retired, no vacancy in the grade of colonel could be filled. Thereafter, the 

complement of the department would be 1 brigadier general, 3 colonels, 4 

lieutenant colonels, and 9 majors-still 17 officers, but on the average graded 

lower than before. 8 Of the 31 officers detailed to staff departments by November 1901, 12 went to the Adjutant General and 8 to the Inspector General, along 

with 5 to the Quartermaster, 2 to the Subsistence, and 4 to the Pay Department. 

Breckinridge still maintained that his department was understaffed. In 1900 he 

had complained that the assignment of inspectors to geographical departments 

had been inefficient, because the work loads varied widely. He repeated that 

8. An Actfor increasing the efficiency of the Army of the United States, andfor other purposes, 

Statutes at Large 31, sec . 17-37, 748 (1901); All Act to increase the efficiellcy of the permanent 

military establishment of the United States, Statutes at Large 31, sec . 14,26,895 (1901); Thian, 

Legislative History, 117-18. 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 393 

claim in 1901, saying that with fourteen departments and headquarters he had 

too few inspectors to permit assigning 2 to one place even if they were needed. 9 

Despite the increase in the complement of his department, and the concomitant growth of its work load, Breckinridge had received no expansion of his 

clerical staff, which he complained was unfairly graded lower than that of other 

departments. Moreover, inspectors at the departments had no civilian clerical 

help, and the department's ' 'contingent fund," first authorized in 1900 to cover 

office expenses, had disappeared from appropriations in 1901. So, along with 

the inevitable request for more officers, the Inspector General asked for more 

and higher ranked clerks. He did not get them, and in October the Secretary 

authorized him to require that those he did have work overtime, until they 

caught up with their work. More positively, Capt. John L. Chamberlain, 1st 

Artillery, had joined the department as a major on 10 November 1900, the last 

permanent officer assigned to the inspectorate. But Hughes was promoted to 

brigadier general on 5 February 1901, leaving a vacancy that could be filled 

only be detail. Despite these strength problems, Breckinridge boasted that 

during the year there were 10,333 inspections of different kinds made, or over 

28 per day for every day of the year, including Sundays. 10 

The General-Staff Idea and Inspection 

While Breckinridge was citing the inadequate size of his department and the 

great amount of work it still managed to accomplish, events that would 

threaten its very existence began to appear. The person responsible was an 

assistant adjutant general named William H. Carter, a formidable soldier and an 

even more formidable intellect. Carter became a major and assistant adjutant 

general in January 1897, six years after earning the Medal of Honor at Cibicu 

Creek, Arizona. Carter shared many of the views of his intellectual predecessor, 

Emory Upton , who had favored a strong defense establishment founded upon a 

general-staff system comparable to similar systems used in Europe. But Carter 

was more realistic than Upton, perceiving that the latter's more extreme proposals 

for an exceedingly large Army and universal military training were politically 

unacceptacle in the United States. Carter was to have considerable influence 

over the development of the new Secretary's views. Root encountered Carter, 

and through him Upton, early in his self-education on military subjects. Shortly 

after entering office, the Secretary began to read with great avidity everything 

he could get his hands on, beginning with the Dodge Commission report, then 

progressing to critical and academic studies of foreign armies and their staff 

systems. Carter brought him Upton's published study of the armies of Asia and 

9. ARSecWar1901 , 14; ARIG 1901, Secy of War, 131 . The Inspector General's Department 

had used detailed officers for so many years that in practical terms the new arrangement did not 

affect operations immediately. 

10. ARIG 1901 , Secy of War, 131-34, 186-87; receipt of letter from the Secretary ordering an 

extension of working hours of clerks in the Inspector General's Office "until the public business is 

caught up," 19 Oct 01, card 3236, in Index to Gen Corresp 1894-1916, RG 159. See Appendix B. 
394 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Europe, then Peter Smith Michie's biography of Upton, which included an 

analysis of the dead author's critique of American military policies, and finally 

Upton's unpublished manuscript on American policies. It was characteristic of 

Root's practical mind that he paid less attention to Upton's grand general 

themes than to his detailed proposals for reform. The latter included the threebattalion infantry regiment, a termination of the seniority system for promotion, 

and the establishment of a general staff for the United States Army. II 

When the receptive Secretary asked him for more information, Carter began 

to send him a series of memorandums that eventually led to a formal proposal 

for an American general staff. It was clear from the outset that there was no 

place in Carter's scheme for Breckinridge's notion of an independent inspection 

department. Carter had no specific complaint against the Inspector General's 

Department. Rather, he maintained that inspection was an essential process of 

information-gathering and self-education for a properly conceived general staff, 

and that a separate inspectorate would merely duplicate the procedures and 

confuse the command structure . In the fall of 1901 , in a more elaborate and 

much longer memorandum on the general staff, he once again reviewed his idea 

of its proper organization, and explained that the Adjutant General's Office 

should continue to exist as an administrative organization separate from the 

general staff. He reported, therefore, that the Inspector General's Department 

should be dissolved because it would merely duplicate the functions of the 

general staff. 12 In Carter's aU-encompassing vision, his general staff, headed 

by a chief, would eradicate the divided authorities and administrative confusion 

that had hampered the military establishment for nearly a century. In place of a 

titular Commanding General, this chief would be the principal adviser to the 

Secretary of War, whose supervision of all War Department operations and the 

line of the Army would be combined in one channel of authority through the 

general staff. As for inspection, Carter had grasped instinctively what 

Washington, Wayne, and Macomb had known: that inspection was essential to 

command and, if it was a separate power, it could threaten command. Consequently Carter's comprehensive vision of the military organization did not 

include space for a separate inspection bureau. So, Carter had almost, but not 

quite, won Root to his cause by September 1901 . The Secretary still placed his 

Progressive's faith in planning as the guarantee of successful public administration, and to that end he remained oriented toward a war college and its academically based war college board. The latter became the nucleus of Root's early 

general-staff ideas. But in one form or another, he had decided to seek legislation establishing a general staff and, on 27 September, summoned the bureau 

chiefs to his office to give them the news they dreaded to hear. 13 

11. Heitman, Historical Register, I: 288; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 315 ; 

William Harding Carter, Creation of the American General Staff: Personal Narrative of the 

General Staff System of the United States Army, S. Misc . Doc . 119, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1924). 

12. Carter, Creation of the American General Staff, 20 . 

13. Memo from the Secretary of War, 27 Sep 01, card 6652, in Index to Gen Corresp 

1894-1916, RG 159; ARSecWar 1901,25. Breckinridge was not present at the September meeting 

because he was in the Orient. 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 395 

Since 1872, possibly evoking the precedent of the old Adjutant and Inspector General, proposals had been advanced for consolidating the Adjutant 

General's and Inspector General's Departments. Upton, among others, had 

suggested forming a general staff in that way. But such a simple notion did not 

suit Carter and Root, who believed that the administrative responsibilities of the 

Adjutant General were best left separate, sparing the general staff the overwhelming paper work that could divert its attention from study and planning. 

But inspection was integral, they believed, to the proper functioning of a 

general staff, and it could not be divorced from the staff's mission. Breckinridge apparently misinterpreted Root's intentions, and in his annual report for 

1901 once again reproduced all the testimony and committee reports from 1872 

that argued against a consolidation of the functions of Adjutant General and 

Inspector General. He also complained about the end of permanence for his 

department's officers under the legislation enacted in February, pointing to the 

need for experience in the details of inspection work. In this regard Breckinridge offered an interesting point related to the planning and reform that the 

general staff was to provide. He did not compare his organization explicitly 

with the proposed general staff, but he said that the many changes in the Army 

since 1890 were attributable to his department's "agitation" for better men 

and horses and to such reforms as improved recruiting, better rations, and the 

end of Sunday duties. That was something more than a desperate bureaucrat's 

defense of his threatened empire; it was rather Breckinridge's imaginative way 

of trying, once again, to attain his goals of independence and clear authority 

under the Secretary of War. 14 

But Root was already moving ahead as far as his powers, and the support of 

the President, would permit. The establishment of a general staff required 

legislation, but the Army War College did not, so the college was established 

by executive order in November 1901. Explaining that the demands of field 

service since 1898 had nearly ended officer education, Root pointed out that 

two-thirds of new lieutenants in recent years had come into the Army from 

civilian life. Given that the lote of military science was changing swiftly, the 

Secretary averred that it was crucial for officers to remain professionally current. 

Accordingly, he directed the establishment of officers' schools of instruction at 

every post; the revitalization of the five special service schools; the establishment of a general service and staff college at Fort Leavenworth; and the formation of the Army War College, "for the most advanced instruction," at 

Washington, D.C. Moreover, officers of the National Guard, the volunteer 

army, and graduates of military colleges would be admitted to army schools. 

"This order, if loyally and persistently followed," said the Secretary, "will 

result in the building up of what is practically a university system of military 

education. " He said in the fall of 1902, a year later, that the development of the 

14. ARIG 1901 , 161-672. 
396 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

"general scheme of systematic instruction" adopted in November 1901 had 

made "satisfactory progress. ,,15 

The establishment of the Army War College, supervised by the war college 

board, was Root's essential first step on the way to achieving a general staff. 

His next endeavor was more cosmetically initiated, but it was perhaps equally 

significant in terms of symbolism, for Root understood that such was often very 

important: In 1902, he did as much as he could to create a single channel of 

authority within the War Department. The independent bureau chiefs historically had reported directly to the Secretary, but for many years the Adjutant 

General and Inspector General, the two officials nominally controlled by both 

the Secretary and the Commanding General, had issued separate annual reports 

to both of their putative masters. Now, in 1902, each official submitted only 

one report, to the Secretary. Root's actions thus foreshadowed the demise of 

the office of the Commanding General. Root hoped, before long, to have a 

chief of the general staff between him and all of the bureau chiefs. 

By the fall of 1902, Beckinridge was in the final throes of the fight to 'save 

his department. His permanent force continued to erode, as Sanger became a 

brigadier general of the line on 23 JUly. Heyl was promoted to colonel behind 

him, leaving one more vacancy to be filled for details. Vroom and Chamberlain 

departed for the Philippines to "take over the duties there recently vacated." 16 

The Inspector General's Department, large though it was with temporary inspectors on detail, was approaching the semblance of a relic .. . . So Breckinridge, 

knowing that direct action would be required to save the Inspector General's 

Department, began cultivating his connections on Capitol Hill. From the time 

that Root had revealed his notion of a general staff exclusive of a formal 

inspectorate, Breckinridge had become one of his strongest opponents. But 

Root, knowing how to avoid open confrontation sent Breckinridge on tour to 

Hawaii, China, and the Philippines from 10 August 1901 until 6 March 1902. 

The Inspector General returned to Washington only to find Root's reorganization well under way. 17 

The General Staff Bill 

Root decided to move ahead with the general staff measure in February 

1902, and William H. Carter drafted the legislation. The bill consolidated the 

Quartermaster, Subsistence, and Pay Departments but protected the careers of 

officers in the Inspector General's Department. Inspectors with permanent 

tenure were assigned to the general staff, while those on detail were returned to 

the line. Carter said later that he had been greatly influenced in his conception 

IS . ARSecWar 1901,20-25; ARSecWar 1902, 30. 

16 . An Act making appropriation jar the support oj the Army for the fiscal year ending June 

thirtieth, nineteen hundred and three, Statutes at Large 32, 509 (1902); AR1G 1902 , 375-76; 

477-79. 

17 . ARlG 1902 ,375. 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 397 

of a general staff by the findings of the Dodge Commission, particularly by its 

criticisms and recommendations regarding the Inspector General's Department. 18 

The bill was introduced in both the House and the Senate on 14 February 1902. 

Carter and Root then went to work to ensure its success. The chairman of the 

Senate Committee on Military Affairs asked Root about the elimination of the 

Inspector General's Department, the only part of the Army organization to 

disappear in the proposed new system. Root explained once again that the 

proposed general staff was expected to assume inspection functions, obviating 

the need for an Inspector General's Department, whose finance functions would 

be transferred to the Treasury Department. 19 

It was apparent by 20 March that Breckinridge was beginning to mount a 

campaign of resistance against the general staff proposal, at least so far as it 

affected his department. Carter sent Root a memorandum suggesting that the 

best solution for any threatened impasse would be "to gradually consolidate" 

the Inspector General's Department with the General Staff Corps. Carter still 

wanted to eliminate disbursement and property inspections immediately, but he 

would at least retain the identity of the Inspector General's Department for the 

length of Breckinridge's and the other permanent officers' tenures. On that same 

day, General Miles appeared on Capitol Hill to declare his absolute opposition 

to the entire proposal. 20 

On 7 April 1902, Root directed Breckinridge to see him at one o'clock on 

the first of Monday of each month. 21 Perhaps the Secretary wanted to keep up 

with the machinations of his most persistent opponent, who in any case now 

had a regular opportunity to spar verbally with his nemesis. Breckinridge's 

objection to the general staff proposal was understandable because, as presented, 

it called for the elimination of everything he had labored for over these many 

years. Breckinridge always made certain that his organization did its job, but he 

was equally interested in its continued well-being. He did not become Inspector 

General merely to preside over the destruction of his department, and in July 

1902 he prepared "Some Remarks on the Proposed Destruction of the Inspector 

General's Department." Using the Filipino water buffalo incident that had so 

interested him in a report a few years earlier, he asserted that the Treasury 

Department was incapable of adequately auditing the Army's accounts. Witness the fact that even War Department auditors were loath to pay for the hire of 

a "carabao and cart" in the Philippines when only the hire of a "bull cart" had 

been authorized. Inasmuch as it had taken months, apparently, to establish the 

equivalency of these terms Beckinridge used this case to illustrate the general 

inability of auditors to see the real purpose of inspection in the Army. "The 

18. Carter. Creation of an American General Staff. 22- 25. 30-35. This also includes the text of 

the bill. 

19. Root to Chainnan. Senate Committee on Military Affairs. 3 March 1902. in Elihu Root 

The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root. eds .• 

Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1916).405-06. 

20. Carter to Secy of War. 20 Mar 02. in Carter. Creation of an American General Staff. 34. 

21. Card 3236. in Index to Gen Corresp 1894-1916. RG 159. 
398 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

necessity, propriety, and economy of the expenditure in the first place was the 

real matter for inspection, " he said, "and no one but an officer familar with the 

work of troops is competent to make that inspection. ,>22 Breckinridge said that 

transferring his account inspection responsibilities to the Treasury would be 

equivalent to transferring the Army's water transportation to the Navy (he 

momentarily forgot that he had once proposed that very thing), the Judge 

Advocate General's duties to the Justice Department, and so on. The War 

Department, he alleged, could not rely on other departments to service its 

needs. As for property inspections, he delivered a long essay on the importance 

of preventing waste, which he said was the Inspector General's very purpose. 

His people, he claimed, saved the government a half-million dollars a year in 

property condemnation, by returning to service goods that should not have been 

presented for condemnation. Trained officers in a separate Inspector General's 

corps, he asserted, were as necessary to the Army as were specialists in the 

Medical Department, the Corps of Engineers, and the other technical services. 

The Inspector General must be a soldier first, not an accountant, because he 

was most essential during wartime. 23 

By the summer of 1902, Carter was in the midst of an equally vigorous 

propaganda campaign, designed to persuade the Army to accept the approaching order. Root's adviser was the single most prolific contributor to the professional military literature in the early twentieth century, producing article after 

article. By early 1903, the publication of "Training of Army Officers" had 

swelled the Army War College and promoted the idea of a general staff, while 

in the publication "Recent Army Reorganization" Carter said, "A number of 

minor changes which require legislative authority have been asked for, but the 

final step in the general movement and one which is far-reaching in its effects is 

the organization of a general staff corps, and incidentally, the abolition of the 

office of commanding general of the army and of the Inspector General's 

Department as a separate and distinct corps. " Carter told his colleagues that 

change was overdue: " The present administration and supply system is the 

result of a gradual growth." Carter continued, " Through a century of effort at 

meeting emergencies . .. it is now, and has always been, almost impossible to 

obtain legislation of a general character for the Army ." Legislative challenges 

aside, Carter acknciwledged that reorganization would be hard on the staff 

bureaus. But he reminded them that they were also soldiers, who had taken an 

oath of obedience to the government they served and to its appointed officials. 24 

Whatever Carter had to say, "soldierly loyalty to the Secretary of War" 

was a scarce commodity among the War Department's highest officers in 1902, 

22. Breckinridge, "Some Remarks on the Proposed Destruction of the Inspector General's 

Department," July 1902, in file 5066/A/I, Index to Gen Corresp 1894-1916, RG 159. 

23. Ibid. 

24. William H. Carter, " The Training of Army Officers, " United Service , 3d ser., 2 (October 

1902): 337--42; Carter, " Recent Anny Reorganizaiion ," United Service, 3d ser" 2 (August 1902): 

113-20; and Carter, "A General Staff Corps, " United Service, 3d ser., 3 (January 1903): 677-81 , 

quotations on 677- 78 , 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 399 

at least when it came to the subject of a general staff that would subsume their 

customary independence. The bureau chiefs mobilized their connections in 

Congress and did what they could to sabotage the Secretary's plans. General 

Miles proved especially obdurate. Miles had also participated in ruining Root's 

proposed consolidation of military posts early in the year, thus winning gratitude from congressmen who might have lost posts in their districts. When the 

Commanding General appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, 

he made much of his record during the Civil War, saying that a general staff 

was something characteristic of Old World despotisms, not the American Republic and its grand army that had performed so gloriously in 1865. 25 

Catering to the nostalgia of the Civil War veterans who dominated the 

military committees in Congress was used to advantage. As Carter observed in 

1903, "The Senate and House of Representatives soon [after the Civil War] 

became filled with ex-volunteers, and from that time to the present day, it has 

always been more or less difficult to convince committees composed of gentlemen who have seen service in the Civil War that the methods in vogue during 

that war can be improved upon." Indeed, as the military policy of the United 

States in 1812 was dominated by relics of the Revolution who wanted the Army 

to be as ~hey vaguely remembered Washington's to have been , in 1902 the 

aging congressional Civil War Veterans wanted to cast the Army forever in the 

imagined mold of Grant's victors of 1865.

26 

Root, however, had broken the opposition to the general-staff proposal by 

the fall of 1902, except for that of one man, Inspector General Breckinridge, 

who continued to fight against the eradication of his department, building a 

monumental file of correspondence with influential persons, keeping track of 

press notices, and finally taking his case directly to Congress. Far less disagreeable than Miles, Breckinridge nevertheless proved exasperating to Root. 27 

Breckinridge never directly challenged the general-staff idea; rather, he was 

concerned only that his own department would continue to exist. If the general 

staff transpired, he did not want any of his organization's activities curtailed or 

restricted. The proof of his argument, he claimed, lay in the visible positive 

effects of inspection as seen in increased efficiency and economy throughout 

the Army .28 

Breckinridge benefited from the fact that the criticisms of his department's 

wartime record had begun to abate under the press of current events. By 

December, Root and Carter feared that the Inspector General's relentless 

lobbying, together with that of Miles and the heads of the three main supply 

25 . Carter, Creation of the American General Staff, 31-36; Jessup, Elilru Root, I: 251-53; 

Weigley, History of tire United States Army, 319-20; William H. Carter, " The Evolution of Army 

Reforms," United Service, 3d ser., 3 (May 1903): 1192. 

26. Carter, " Evolution of Army Reforms," 1192. 

27. Jessup, Elihu Root, I: 261; Breckinridge's files on the last fight for his department, 

including documentation on the measures he personally had taken to improve the Army, are in file 

5066, Index to Gen Corresp 1894-1916, RG 159. 

28. ARIG 1902, 375, 485-88. 
400 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

departments, might destroy the whole scheme. So the Secretary decided to drop 

the side issues, such as the consolidation of the supply departments, and concentrate on the single issue of creating a general staff-still at the expense of the 

Inspector General's Department. Carter drafted a bill" of the simplest character" 

to authorize a General Staff Corps and " combine with it the military duties of 

the Inspector General's Department. ,,29 Root also elicited an opinion from 

Maj . Gen . Samuel B. M. Young. As the president of the Army War College, 

Young was destined to be the first Chief of Staff if the new organization came 

about, and he heartily approved of Carter and Root's notion that inspection 

should be integrated into the general staff's program. Young felt that remedial 

action on inspection findings would be more certain under the proposed system.

30 

Preparing for his last assault on the general-staff issue, Secretary Root decided 

to lay down the law to the bureau chiefs. 

Breckinridge had by that time earned the favor of Congressman James 

Slayden of Texas, a member of the Military Affairs Committee, who was 

sympathetic to his pleas to retain the Inspector General's Department in any 

new army organization. Slayden and his wife were on far more intimate terms 

with Brig. Gen. Fred Ainsworth, head of the Record and Pensions Office, who 

kept them informed of developments within the War Department, where 

Breckinridge's frantic efforts to save his own organization had become a source 

of some amusement. Ellen Slayden recorded in her diary what happened when 

Root tried to bring his bureaucrats to heel: 

December 14. The chiefs of bureaus were summoned by Secretary Root to hear the 

government's side of the new hoped for General Staff bill before the Military Affairs 

Committee, and General Ainsworth said it was Root's way of letting them know what 

his opinion was and serving notice on them to keep their mouths shut, so he just decided 

not to go so he could remain comfortably ignorant of the Secretary's opinion. General 

Breckinridge was there and talked all the time that was allowed him. General A. says it 

is true of Breckinridge as was said of Joe Blackburn in the House that he "would borrow 

time to talk from a man on the gallows. ,,3 1 

Breckinridge Saves His Department 

Unwilling to restrain himself, Breckinridge had his moment before the 

House Military Affairs Committee three days later, and all Washington listened 

in. He limited his testimony to those parts of the general-staff bill that would 

abolish the Inspector General's Department. According to a press report, he 

began by quoting "at length" generals from Washington to some still living, 

praising the work of his department, which he asserted was essential to the 

service .32 Certain members of the committee were sympathetic to his cause, 

providing him with leading questions. One was to describe the discovery of the 

29. Carter, Creation of an American General Staff, 42-43 . 

30. S.B.M. Young to Secy of War, 12 Dec 02 , in ibid ., 42. 

31. Slayden, Washingtoll Wife , 44-45. 

32. Breckinridge's testimony appears in Army and Navy Journal, 40 (20 December 1902): 

377. 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 401 

Cuban postal frauds by an inspector general (Burton). He answered, and added 

an account of commissary frauds in the Philippines. "Our method is not to have 

scandals," he said, "but to prevent them. Abolish the inspection and there will 

be no end of frauds. ,,33 As always, Breckinridge lavished praise on the Inspector General's Department, never exhausting his source of favorable examples to 

recount. The only general officer killed in the recent conflicts, he pointed out, 

was a member of the Inspector General's Department (Lawton). More 

pertinently, he asserted, "The military critics of the world have declared that 

our Army in the last war was the best the country ever raised, and its efficiency 

was the work of the Inspector General's Department. Whatever fault there may 

have been was in those who were above inspection. Those who were subject to 

inspection were found to be all right. ,,34 Whether his extravagant self-promotion 

impressed anyone or not, 17 December was one of Breckinridge's finest hours, 

because he saved his beloved Inspector General's Department. "During its 

progress through the committee of the House the Inspector General was given 

every opportunity to present his objections," William H. Carter recalled blandly, 

"and he succeeded in eliminating the proposed reorganization of the department. of which he was the head.' ,35 Indeed, by the next day, the committee had 

cut into pieces the original bill, eliminating the two sections that would have 

changed the system of inspections in the Army . 

How had Breckinridge done it? It is not likely that his ceaseless praise of his 

department persuaded many members of the committee. It is more probable 

that Breckinridge benefited from the organizational conservatism that characterized the old " Civil Warriors" who dominated the committee. As he reminded 

them, Washington had had an inspector generaf, and the victorious Scott and 

Grant had had inspectors general. Even Schofield, who favored the general 

staff, had in the past commended the inspectors general; Breckinridge had the 

quotations to prove it. In the minds of the committee, therefore, the Army had 

always had an inspector general, as it always should. Besides, even when the 

Congress wanted to reduce the War Department, it had shown a great deal of 

solicitude for incumbents whose jobs would be eliminated: they usually were 

allowed to remain until retirement. Beyond being able to take advantage of 

these factors, there is reason to believe that Breckinridge was able to capitalize 

on his personal connections. He had never been as assiduous a cultivator of 

political influence as some other bureau chiefs, but the general-staff crisis had 

33. Ibid . 

34. Ibid . 

35 . Carter, Creation of an American General Staff, 43, 45-47. Philip L. Semsch, "Elihu Root 

and The General Staff," Military Affairs, 27 (spring 1964): 26-7, offers a somewhat erroneous 

interpretation of what happened. As for Breckinridge's promotion, Semsch is evidently unaware 

that it immediately preceded his retirement, and was by no means the only graveyard promotion in 

1903, as Root tried to clear away as much of the War Department's dead wood as he could. 

Another interpretation is: Otto L. Nelson, National Security and the General Staff (Washington: 

Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 58--59, which attributes that event to Breckinridge's " political 

adeptness," and says that Root believed that the general staff needed eyes and ears for its studies and 

planning, while Congress thought an inspection service not necessary to a general staff. 
402 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

mobilized him into action . He was familiar to members of the Military Affairs 

Committees by virtue of his position, and by December 1902 he was even more 

familiar with some of them. 

Congressman James Slayden's wife reported three days after Breckinridge's 

testimony, "December 20. Met J. [James, her husband] down at Brentano's to 

buy Christmas cards and books. General ___ 's wife was there, and I was 

surprised to find how well we knew each other. 1's work to save her husband's 

place on the General Staff has advanced our acquaintance by ten years." 

"General ___ " could be no one but Breckinridge, for of the entire War 

Department bureaucracy, only he would have lacked a place in the new 

organization. 36 When Root learned of Breckinridge's feat, he was not as pleased. 

The informative and supervisory potential of inspection had been essential to 

his vision of how the general staff would keep the Army ready for war. The 

angry Secretary went directly to his predecessor, Redfield Proctor, who was 

now the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. "The House 

committee has also stricken out sections 5 and 6 of the bill relating to the 

Inspector General's Department," he told Proctor on 30 December. "I think 

that change is unfortunate and that those sections ought to be retained. ,,37 

Congressman George B. McClellan, grandson of Inspector General Marcy, 

agreed. On 6 January 1903 he told his colleagues that restoring the Inspector 

General's Department might weaken aspects of the general staff's operations. 38 

That lukewarm concurrence was as much support as Root was able to 

receive over the issue of the inspectorate. The House indulged in a long and 

tumultuous debate over the general staff bill, paying the greatest attention to the 

protection of the War Department's incumbent bureaucrats. Whether the Inspector General's Department should continue to exist was not a subject of great 

moment, and the sentiment was not strong to change the committee's bill. Fred 

Ainsworth's name, however, was mentioned often, and his position defended 

frequently, loudly, and gratuitously. So long as the guardianship of the pension 

records would remain unaffected by the reorganization, the lawmakers acquiesced to the measure. The bill passed through the House, then went to the 

Senate where its passage was quieter. Proctor was either unable or unwilling to 

challenge his Military Affairs Committee counterparts in the House, and on 

February 1903 sat quietly as the clerk read a message from the President. An 

Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Army had just become law. 39 

A Charter for the Future 

In the hands of Elihu Root, the War Department had just received the most 

thorough overhaul it had known since 1821. Although it would take time to 

36. Slayden, Washington Wife , 45. 

37. Root to Proctor, 30 Dec. 02, in Carter, Creatioll of an American General Staff, 47. 

38. Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 2d sess. (6 January 1903): 533 . 

39. Ibid . (6 January 1903): 533-40; (14 February 1903): 2240. The legislation and orders 

implementing it are in ARSecWar 1903,59-72. 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 403 

demonstrate just how valuable the general staff could be, of immediate benefit 

was the unification of authority within the department, which was achieved by 

eliminating the Commanding General and channeling all power through the 

Secretary and the Chief of Staff. Otherwise, the general staff would have had 

only potential, not immediate, use. Because too many old-time bureau chiefs, 

accustomed to their independence, were in place, and other permanent officers 

were scheduled to replace them as they retired, the legislation of 1901 had first 

to work its effects to curb bureaucratic independence by eliminating these 

permanent tenured bureaucrats through attrition. Still other problems confronted 

the new organization. Proposing that the general staff would merely coordinate 

the staff bureaus and not involve itself in current operations was unrealistic. 

Inevitably the staff would participate in operations, setting the stage for conflicts with the bureau heads. Moreover, American officers had no experience in 

working with a general staff in 1903, and although many of the strongest 

proponents of the new system had made a great study of the Prussian Army , 

they had concentrated on campaigns and maneuvers instead of the activities of 

the staff system that had made those campaigns so admirable. 40 

The general staff system was scheduled to become effective immediately 

after the mandatory retirement of the quarrelsome Nelson A. Miles. On 15 

August 1903, Samuel B. M. Young, president of the Army War College, 

became the first Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Root declared the 

establishment of the general staff' 'the important military event of the year," 

more than equal to the nearly simultaneous reform of the militia. As soon as the 

legislation passed, the Secretary appointed a board to work out the details of its 

implementation, and to select forty-two officers "for detail, upon their merits 

as exhibited by their military records," for service in the general staff. 4 1 The 

board also became an interim general staff to develop organizational and 

procedural guidelines. The Secretary, explaining that the new position of Chief 

of Staff would continue the civilian control of the American military, said that 

this arrangement would eliminate the problems caused by dual control. With 

the new organization in place, the National Guard beginning to come along, 

and the educational system showing early progress, the satisfied Secretary of 

War said, "Aside from such action as may be called for by a further study of 

coast defense problems, I do not think that any important legislation regarding 

the Army will be advisable for some time to come . ,,42 

The grounds for disagreement between the Secretary and the Inspector 

General lay in an honest difference of opinion. Root believed that the purposes 

served by inspection were essential to the operation of the general staff as he 

conceived it. In that view, things like property and disbursement account inspec40. Some of these issues are explored in James Hewes, " The United States Army General 

Staff, 1900-1917 ," Military Affa;rs, 38 (April 1974): 67- 71; and Edward M. Coffman , " Sidelights 

on the War Department General Staff in Its Early Years," Military Affairs, 38 (April 1974): 71- 72. 

41. ARSecWar 1903,3- 6, 10-13 , 36. 

42. Ibid. 
404 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

tions were minor administrative matters that could be handled by other means; 

they should not be allowed to divert the general staff from its fundamental 

supervision of the Army through inspection. Root's general staff would in that 

sense have presented the fullest integration of command and inspection since 

Anthony Wayne's Legion of the United States in the 1790s. All power of 

command would ultimately rest in the Secretary as the designated agent of the 

Commander in Chief. The general staff would be the agents of that power, and 

also its inspectors: The power to command and the power to inspect were one. 

That philosophy would have satisfied George Washington and Alexander 

Macomb, as well as Anthony Wayne, although all three had inhabited different 

political and bureaucratic climates. But it was not quite the philosophy that 

Breckinridge expressed, despite the frequency with which he raised old ghosts 

in his own support. . 

Breckinridge was interested in results, in a measurable and useful product. 

As in the case of post schools, he thought it impossible to achieve results unless 

some person or organization was put in charge of a program and told to make it 

work. So it was with inspection. Unless the inspectors held full-time appointments, he asserted, inspection would not be properly or efficiently conducted, 

and much important information would be lost. He did not consciously want to 

separate inspection from command, although that was the tendency of some of 

his actions. He believed that inspection should serve command, by providing it 

with a body of impartial information upon which decisions could be made. In 

Breckinridge's opinion, general staff officers would have too much on their 

minds to make them effective as inspectors, and he believed that a great many 

important matters should be inspected. His difference with Root over property 

and disbursement accounts, therefore, was more than a selfish attempt to shore 

up his organization by demonstrating that the work load required a separate 

organization; it also represented his conviction that if the responsibility for 

inspection was not discharged, many things could go wrong . Root was a 

politically adept administrator who believed fully in the Progressive era's notions of "scientific management" and the gospel of efficiency. He wanted 

those philosophies to govern the War Department. Breckinridge, on the other 

hand, was a production-oriented soldier, who saw his department's output as 

the measure of its intrinsic worth. Root had an unbounded faith in planning; 

Breckinridge's lay in doing. Both recognized that a competent and efficient 

Army served the public interest, but each had his own perspective on how that 

service might be provided. 

Inspection could remain in a separate department, thanks to Breckinridge, 

but Root ensured that it was restored so far as possible to its central place in the 

operations of the general staff. The Secretary's board of officers labored mightily to define the duties of the general staff, and on 3 August 1903, the President 

imposed them on the Army in the form of twenty new regulations. Inspection 

received special attention, with'1he-General Staff Corps "charged with the duty 

of investigating and reporting upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the 

Army and its state of preparations for military operations, and to this end, 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 405 

considers and reports upon all questions [and] exercises supervision over 

inspections," among a great many other things. The Chief of Staff "is charged 

with the duty of supervising, under the direction of the Secretary of War, all 

troops of the line, the Adjutant General's, Inspector-General's [and all other] 

departments. " His supervisory power encompassed duties pertaining to everything about the Army, including inspections of both regulars and the militia. He 

also had the sole power to keep the Secretary informed about all questions 

affecting the War Department, and "in the performance of the duties ... the 

Chief of Staff calls for information, makes investigations, issues instructions, 

and exercises all other functions necessary to proper harmony and efficiency of 

action upon the part of those placed under his supervision. ,,43 

In 1903 it was not clear just how the general staff and the Inspector General's 

Department would interact. If the senior inspector general, despite his supervision by the Chief of Staff, proved uncooperative, the Army could well find 

itself under the eyes of two inspectorates: that of the Inspector General's 

Department, along its customary lines, and another in the general staff serving 

that organization's interests. On the other hand , a cooperative Inspector General might willingly bend his organization'S programs to the interests of the 

supreme authority represented by the Chief of Staff. In that case, inspection 

would be completely integrated in command for the first time since the 

Revolution, when Washington supervised not only ·the Army but the staff 

services later embodied in the War Department. Root might regard the Inspector General's Department as unnecessary, but if it bent itself to the will of the 

General Staff, it could make his new organizational system work as he wanted 

it to. However, the actual definition of the general staff and its place in the 

Army and the War Department would depend upon the individuals involved. 

Those would not be the same people who had fought so earnestly over whether 

the general staff should exist at all. Root retired in January 1904, as did Chief 

of Staff Young. Carter became a major general in 1906. Quartermaster General 

Ludington left in 1903, and the days of a number of the other conservative 

bureaucrats were numbered by the mandatory retirement law. A few personalities involved in the struggles of 1902 remained for some time yet, among them 

Fred C. Ainsworth, who would follow Henry C. Corbin as Adjutant General in 

1904. But Ainsworth would no longer have Inspector General Breckinridge to 

amuse him as he pursued his own ambitions. Before the new regulations for the 

general staff were even promulgated, the man who had saved the Inspector 

General's Department had left the scene. He was honored in a farewell Army 

and Navy Journal article as an exceptionally inspiring leader and the officer 

most responsible for the improvements in the life of the enlisted men since the 

Civil War. 44 

43. Regulations for the general staff were published in ARSecWar 1903,63-68, 

44. "Army Promotions and Retirements," Army and Navy Journal, 18 (April 1903), 808-09. 
406 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

The Veterans Depart 

Breckinridge left the scene with his beloved department intact. Despite its 

survival and the apparent congressional indifference to consider its elimination, 

several members of the new general staff continued to be critical. Foremost 

amongst these was Carter. He considered the continued existence of the Inspector General's Department as one of only two defects in the War Department 

organization that still required correcting in 1903. Inspections of troops, he 

said, were the duty of commanders and the General Staff Corps. Worn-out 

property was not a big enough issue to require a separate bureaucracy, while 

money accounts could be "safely provided for." He then predicted that the 

Inspector General's Department would eventually vanish from lack of work and 

from the departure of its permanent members. 45 That prediction was as interesting as it was wrong. Did Carter mean to imply that the Secretary had struck a 

deal with one or another of Breckinridge's successors? That is not likely. More 

probably he believed that the workings of the law of 190 I, ending permanent 

tenure in the staff departments, would soon eliminate those who had a lifelong 

emotional investment in the Inspector General's Department. Rational officers 

on four-year assignment, free of personal attachment to the Inspector General's 

Department, he seemed to say, would recognize that the organization was 

superfluous beside the General Staff Corps. What he failed to recognize was 

that it is the nature of bureaucracies often to have lives of their own, outlasting 

the people who serve them. The Inspector General's Department did not vanish 

from the scene in Carter's professional lifetime, let alone Breckinridge's. Nevertheless he had grounds for hope in 1903, because the Inspector General's old, 

permanent cadre diminished significantly that year. Joseph C. Breckinridge 

was promoted to the rank of major general of the line and then retired on 11 

April. Peter D. Vroom became brigadier general and senior inspector general 

on the same day; he retired the next day. Also, on 11 April, Thomas T. Knox 

became a colonel; he retired on 13 April. The remaining officers were promoted behind them, leaving vacancies that could be filled only by successive 

four-year details. 46 

George H. Burton succeeded Breckinridge and Vroom as senior inspector 

general on 12 April 1903. He remained in the position until illness caused his 

retirement on 30 September 1906. By then, few officers remained who remembered the Inspector General's Department during the heady days of the 1890s, 

when under Breckinridge's strong leadership it aspired to bureaucratic 

independence. The department remained a part of the army, because it had 

accommodated itself to the new order of things. Breckinridge was not the only 

old soldier to receive a promotion as inducement to retire in 1903. Secretary 

45. Vaulx 8, "Evolution of a General Staff," 203-04. Why " Vaulx 8," William Carter, chose a pseudonym is unclear. 

46. ARIG 1903,443. Vroom was senior inspector in the Division of the Philippines at the time 

of his promotion and retirement. 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 407 

Root did his best to clear the War 

Department of those remaining from 

the old army. Among those who became one-day major generals was the 

redoubtable Marshall I. Ludington, 

Quartermaster General, who also left 

in April. The Congress might still 

have its share of aging Civil War 

veterans, but they were decidedly 

scarce in the AnDy by the end of 

1903. It was time for them, Breckinridge included, to go. They were artifacts of the most recent old army, and 

another new army was at hand. 

The new army of the early twentieth century was, like previous new 

armies, a product of a war and of new 

postwar realities. But something more 

had been at work, long before any 

purely high-level reorganization in 

1903. This new army was more careBRIG. GEN. PETER D . VROOM . Inspector General of the Army , 11 

April 1903. 

fully crafted than any of its predecessors had been, being slowly molded in the 

reforms and consolidation that had taken place during the 1880s and, especially, 

the 1890s. Inspector General Breckinridge had played an important, sometimes 

decisive, role in every one of those changes. The new army was not his work 

alone, of course, but he must be acknowledged as one of its creators. However, 

like many founding fathers, Breckinridge discovered that his creation had no 

place for him, nor for the other old army reformers who had helped to bring it 

about. Only the future could tell whether, in preserving the Inspector General's 

Department, Breckinridge had done the Army a service or had burdened it 

with a relic of the old days. If he had done one thing for the Inspector General's 

Department, Breckinridge had made it adaptable. In that regard , the future 

boded well for both the new army and its inspectors general . 

The War Department's dichotomy was theoretically resolved by the reorganization of 1903. The useless Commanding General was discarded , and soldiers, 

staff and line alike, had to acknowledge the real power over the military. It 

came from the President through the Secretary to all parts of the War Department. 

Instead of a rival for power, the Secretary had a loyal agent in the Chief of 

Staff, through whom he addressed the whole establishment. That unity of 

authority erased the division of power over the inspectorate. The people behind 

the reorganization understood as fully as Breckinridge that inspection was an 

essential function both of military command and of War Department administration. With command and administration unified in the general staff, they 

wanted inspection placed there also. Like General Washington, the Chief of 
408 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Staff was to be solely accountable for the performance of the Army according 

to the government's wishes. Like Washington, the reorganizers believed that 

the chief military officer must control his inspectorate absolutely. Breckinridge 

did not disagree with either the principle of inspection in service to the 

commander, or with the establishment of the general staff to unify authority 

within the War Department. But he had an emotional stake in the Inspector 

General's Department and labored successfully to preserve it, if not the permanence of its personnel. 

Root and Carter may have regarded the continued existence of a separate 

inspection department as an affront, but in fact they overreacted. The Chief of 

Staff, acting under the orders of the Secretary of War, had supervisory authority over the Inspector General's Department, as over all other bureaus. The 

danger that the inspectors general could gravitate toward the Secretary at the 

expense of the Chief of Staff threatened no longer, because the inspectors had 

to go through the Chief of Staff to reach the Secretary. In 1903 there was every 

reason to expect, therefore, that the Inspector General's Department would 

integrate its programs into the new system and become the eyes and ears of the 

Chief of Staff and his superior, the Secretary. 

Breckinridge made a career of claiming that he merely pursued the course 

that history had mapped out for the Inspector General, that he acted as Steuben 

would have in the same circumstances. Many of his historical allusions were 

overdrawn, but there was a fundamental correctness abut his basic position. He 

wanted inspection to serve "higher authority," and he tried to ensure that it 

did. But there was a similarity between Breckinridge and Steuben that the 

former did not detect. Steuben had struggled with Washington before he was 

able to work out his proper place in the Army. Breckinridge had his own 

struggle in 1902, and when he had finished this struggle, his position was 

firmly established in a workable system. 

As the new century brought with it increasingly complex challenges, it 

became apparent that, in their own ways, Root and Breckinridge each had made 

significant contributions to the Army's capabilities. While the general staff 

JUccessfully coped with steadily growing demands, the inspectorate became its 

handmaiden to judge, to evaluate, and to assist in the implementation of its 

plans and policies. Global conflict and commitment became the tragic norm, 

causing ever greater pressures on men, units, and resources. The Inspector 

General's Department in this context proved to be a vital extension of the War 

Department staff; without it, the many demands could not have been met. In the 

tradition of Steuben and his successors, the inspectorate continued to serve as 

the alter ego of the chain of command. Phoenix-like, it survived because of the 

consistent need for unbiased, concerned analyses and appraisals of every facet 

of the Army's activities. The old traditions continued into the twentieth century 

virtually intact. That Breckinridge was successful at the end was to be credited 

to his own ability and determination, but it also reflected an aggressive spirit 

that had infused the inspectors general since Steuben arrived at Valley Forge. 

That spirit was expressed by Breckinridge himself on the eve of his departure 
INSPECTION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 409 

for Cuba in 1898, when he sent Sanger a telegram that said simply, "Galatians 

Six Nine." The text he cited reads: " And in doing good, let us not fail; for in 

due time we shall reap , if we do not become faint-hearted." 

Appendix A 

Inspectors General of the United States Armyl 

(1777-1903) 

Inspector-General of Cavalry 

Col. Augustin Mottin de la Balme 08 July 1777-13 February 17782 

Inspector-General of Ordnance and Military Manufactories 

Maj. Gen. P.c. Jean-Baptiste Tronson 

du Coudray 

11 August 1777- 16 September 1777 

Inspector-General of the Continental Army 

Maj. Gen. Thomas Conway 

Vacant 

13 December 1777-28 April 17783 

13 December 1777-

Volunteer Inspector-General of the Main Army 

Friedrich W. A. von Steuben 28 March 1778-05 May 1778 

Inspector-General of the Main Army 

Maj. Gen. Friedrich W. A. von Steuben 05 May 1778-18 February 1779 

I From 1777 to 1903 the Inspectors General of the United States Anny encompassed the 

following military personnel: predecessors and equivalents to the position, persons holding the 

position or fulfilling the duties comparable to those of the senior inspector general of the Army , and 

persons entitled inspector general or the equivalent. 

2 Mottin de la Bahne sent Congress his resignation on 3 October 1777; it was noted by Congress 

on II October 1777 and accepted on 13 February 1778. 

3 Congress authorized two inspectors general on 13 December 1777, and immediately appointed 

Conway; the other position was never filled. Conway did not actually serve as an inspector general, 

making relinquishment of the title meaningless by the time he resigned on 28 April 1778 . 
412 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Inspector-General to the Armies of the United States 

Maj. Gen. Friedrich W. A. von Steuben 18 February 1779-15 April 1784 

Inspector of Troops4 

Maj. William North 15 April 1784-25 June 1788 

Vacant 

Adjutant and Inspector-General5 

05 March 1792-

Persons Acting as Inspectors of the Legion or Army 

Maj. Michael Rudulph 

Lt. Henry DeButts 

Maj. Michael Rudulph 

Capt. Edward Butler 

Maj. John Mills 

Maj. John Haskell 

Capt. Edward Butler 

Maj. Thomas H. Cushing 

1792-

10 March 1792-23 February 1793 

23 February 1793-17 July 1793 

18 July 1793- 13 May 1794 

13 May 1794-27 February 1796 

27 February 1796-01 August 1796 

01 August 1796-27 February 1797 

27 February 1797-18 July 1798 

Inspector-General6 

Maj. Gen. Alexander Hamilton 26 July 1798- 15 June 1800 

4 North served as acting adjutant and inspector general to 28 October 1787. Congress abolished 

the position of Inspector of Troops (originally called Inspector to the Troops Remaining in the 

Service of the United States) on 25 June 1788 . When required thereafter, the function of inspector 

genera l was served by War Department clerks. 

5 Although unclear, the act of 5 March 1792, Section 7, stated that the" Adjutant General shall 

do the duty of Inspector General. " Initially, it was offered to only one person , Winthrop Sargent, 

Adjutant General of the SI. Clair expedition . Even though he was a prominent territorial politician, 

Sargent declined the position. Until Anthony Wayne assumed command , inspection was mostly 

mustering to verify payrolls, a function routinely served by adjutants and brigade majors. Wayne's 

acting inspector for most of 1792 was Maj. Michael Rudulph. Thereafter the duty rotated among 

Wayne's aides: Michael Rudulph ,Henry DeButts, John Mills, and Edward Butler. Butler bore the 

title Deputy Adjutant and Inspector General pro tem from 28 September 1792. The list of acting 

inspectors that follows relies on Heitman's Historical Register. Wayne nominated Mills to be the 

Adjutant and Inspector General in 1794, but no action was taken on the nomination. In 1796, 

legislation gave the Inspector General the duties of an adjutant general , a provision not made in the 

law. The following year, the office was retitled Brigade Inspector. 

6 The Inspector General , as authorized 28 May 1798, was nominally the second highest office 

of the Army , and de facto commanding general. Hamilton devoted himself to general administration and planning for a provisional army that was never tested. The office was abolished 14 May 

1800, and Hamilton was honorably discharged a month later. 
ApPENDIX A 

Acting Adjutant and Inspector 

Maj. Thomas H. Cushing 15 June 1800--26 March 1802 

Adjutant and Inspector of the Army7 

Col. Thomas H. Cushing 

Maj. Abimael Y. Nicoll 

26 March 1802-09 May 1807 

02 April 1807- 14 July 1812 

Inspector-General8 

Brig. Gen. Alexander Smyth 06 July 1812-03 March 1813 

Adjutant and Inspector GeneraP 

Brig. Gen. Zebulon M. Pike 

Vacant 

12 March 1813-27 April 1813 

27 April 1813-09 May 1814 

09 May 1814-02 July 1814 

413 

Brig. Gen . William H. Winder 

Vacant 

Brig. Gen. Daniel Parker 

02 July 1814- 22 November 1814 

22 November 1814-01 June 1821 

Inspector General of the Arm/o 

Col. Arthur P. Hayne 

Col. James Gadsden 

03 May 1816-30 September 1820 

01 October 1820--13 August 1821 

7 The Office of Adjutant and Inspector General was authorized by the act of 16 March 1802. The 

act of 26 June 1812 also authorized an adjutant and inspector of the Army. The Secretary of War 

merged it with the Adjutant General 's Office 14 July 1812 , making the incumbent an assistant td 

the adjutant general. 

8 The position of inspector general was authorized 11 January 1812. Regulations adopted 4 May 

1812 prescribed duties similar to those of Steuben in the Continental Army. In practice, however, 

inspecting and mustering services were performed mostly by assistants. The Secretary of War 

attempted to manage the war without a commanding general of the whole Army giving the title of 

inspector general to the current favorite brigadier general. Smyth was dismissed when the Office of 

Inspector General was abolished by the act of 3 March 1813. He functioned in practice as commander in the most active theater while inspector general. 

9 The act of 3 March 1813 stated that the Inspector General 's Department would include an 

adjutant and inspector general appointed from among the brigadier generals commanding armies, 

with lesser officers including inspectors general, adjutants general, and assistants. Pike, as had 

Smyth , functioned mostly as a troop commander; the actual administration of the office rested with 

various staff members. Interpretation of the law kept the office vacant for a year after Pike's death 

allowing the duties to fall on various members of the staff. Winder served briefly before becoming 

a district commander at Washington, D.C. When Parker was appointed , the Secretary of War 

announced that the position was "not connected with the line of the AmlY." With the reduction of 

the Army in 1821, the office vanished and the functions were replaced by the Adjutant General and 

the Inspectors General. Persons bearing the title inspector general or assistant inspector general 

during this period are not listed . 

]0 The act of 24 April 1816 established that the general staff should include one adjutant and 

(Continued) 
414 

Col. Samuel B. Archer 

Col. John E. Wool I I 

Col. George Croghan 

Col. Sylvester Churchill 

Col. George A. McCall 

Col. Joseph K.F. Mansfield 

Col. Henry L. Scott 

Col. Randolph B. Marcy 

Col. Delos B. Sacket 

Col. Henry Van Rensselaer 

Col. Edmund Schriver 

Col. James A. Hardie 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

10 November 1821- 11 December 1825 

01 June 1821-25 June 1841 

21 December 1825-08 January 1849 

25 June 1841-25 September 1861 

10 June 1850-29 April 1853 

28 May 1853-14 May 1861 

14 May 1861-3 1 October 1861 

09 August 1861-02 January 1881 

01 October 1861-08 March 1885 

12 November 1861-23 March 1864 

13 March 1863-04 January 1881 

24 March 1864-14 December 1876 

Inspector General Stationed at the War Department 

(Supervising Inspector General at Army Headquarters) 

Col. Delos B. Sacket 

Col. James A. Hardie 

Col. Edmund Schriver 

Col. Randolph B. Marcy 

10 January 1863-01 April 1864 

01 April 1864-10 April 1866 

10 April 1866-15 March 1869 

15 March 1869- 12 December 1878 

Inspector General at Army Headquarters 

(Senior Inspector General, Inspector General of the Army)12 

Brig. Gen. Randolph B. Marcy 

Brig. Gen. Delos B. Sacket 

Brig. Gen. Nelson H. Davis 

Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird 

Brig. Gen. Roger Jones 

Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Breckinridge l3 

Brig. Gen. Peter D. Vroom 

Brig. Gen. George H. Burton 

(Continued) 

12 December 1878-02 January 1881 

02 January 1881-08 March 1885 

11 March 1885-20 September 1885 

20 September 1885-20 August 1888 

20 August 1888-26 January 1889 

30 January 1889-11 April 1903 

11 April 1903-12 April 1903 

12 April 1903-30 September 1906 

inspector general and one inspector general, with an assistant inspector general to every brigade. 

The act of2 March 1812 authorized two inspectors general, the other positions ceasing to exist. The 

act of 6 August 1861 added two more inspectors general. Until an inspector general was stationed 

permanently at the War Department in 1863 inspectors general were functiona lly coequal, relative 

seniority in grade notwithstanding. Assistant inspectors general are not listed here. 

II Because of division riva lries between north and south, the commander of the Northern 

Division , Jacob Brown, appointed Wool to be his inspector general on 29 April 1816. Wool held 

this position for five years before his status was authenticated. 

12 Officers junior to the senior inspector general and bearing the title of inspector general or 

assistant inspector general are not listed. 

13 Breckinridge was promoted to major general of the line and retired on i 1 April 1903. 
Appendix B 

Biographical Notes 

These biographical notes on men who served as inspectors contain information that may not bear directly on the story of the inspectorate but that fills out 

the records and provides further insight into the character of the personalities 

mentioned in the text. Often, other aspects of these men's careers have been of 

greater significance or interest, and any summary of their lives given in response 

to an inquiry about them would need their inclusion. These individuals appear 

alphabetically. Sufficient information on other inspectors whose names do not 

appear below is in the body of the text. 

ARCHER, SAMUEL B. (c. 1790-1825) entered the Army in 1812 as a 

captain of artillery . The next year he was brevetted major for his gallantry in 

operations against the British garrisoned at Fort George, Ontario. He was again 

cited for distinguished conduct at the battle of Stony Creek. He remained in the 

artillery after the War of 1812 until his promotion to colonel and inspector 

general on ION ovember 1821. His selection for the job over other candidates is 

most likely attributable to his reputation as an artilleryman, a skill given emphasis 

by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun. Archer's Virginia origins also balanced 

against those of the other inspector at the time, the New Yorker John E. Wool. 

[Heitman, Historical Register, 168; Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, 1: 87 .] 

BALME, MOTIIN DE LA (1736-1780), following the acceptance of his 

resignation as inspector of cavalry in February 1778, continued to serve as a 

colonel without pay. He became active in trying to stimulate rebellion in French 

Canada, serving first with Maj . Gen. Horatio Gates' command near Albany in 

1778. Later he shifted his activities to Maine where he conducted raids using 

the local Indians, again hoping to lure French Canadians to the American 

cause. He spent three months in the summer of 1780 recruiting amongst 

Frenchmen living in the Illinois country. On 5 November 1780, he was killed 

near the site of modern Fort Wayne, Indiana, while leading an ill-advised 

expedition of his recruits against Detroit. Somewhat unconventional, his actions 

and tragic death are proof of the sincerity of his support for the American cause. 

[Boatner, Encyclopedia of the Revolution, 749; Bodinier, Dictionnaire des 

Officiers, 355.] 

BURTON, GEORGE H. (1843-1917) was the first officer to become senior 

inspector general after the firing on Fort Sumter who was not a veteran of Civil 

War fighting . He was born in Millsboro, Delaware, on 12 January 1843, and 
416 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

graduated from the Military Academy in June of 1865, too late to see any 

action. He joined the 12th Infantry in Petersburg, Virginia, where he served on 

occuption duty. Later, he served with the 21st Infantry in Richmond (until 

1869). He then moved with his regiment to the West, where he was to serve for 

nearly ten years, except for two years' recruiting duty in Columbus, Ohio. He 

was cited for bravery in the fighting at the Lava Beds in January 1873, during 

the Modoc War. He later participated in the campaign against the Nez Perce 

during 1877 and 1878, and was brevetted for gallantry at the battle of Clearwater, 

11-12 July 1877, where he was cited "for coolness and gallantry ... in close 

combat with a superior number of enemy. " 

Despite his apparent success as a combat leader and the esteem of his 

superiors, Burton does not appear to have been content as an infantry officer. 

As early as 1877, he submitted a standing request for assignment to the Quartermaster or Commissary Department whenever a vacancy should open. At another 

time, he had an approved request for transfer to the 1 st Artillery, which he 

eventually refused. More and more influential individuals pressured the War 

Department to get Burton an appointment in the East during the late 1870s. In 

August 1879, Burton himself wrote the Secretary of War requesting appointment in either the Adjutant General's or Inspector General's Department. Despite 

the support of several of his former commanders and members of Congress, his 

request was denied. This agitation for a staff appointment was not uncommon. 

Officers who had served fifteen or twenty years with troops on hard service at 

the company level no doubt felt the physical burdens and could see no charms 

in continuing them. Furthermore, appointment to the staff must often have 

seemed to be the only way to achieve promotion to major, given the longevity 

of the regimental field-grade officers. Finally, coming from the Atlantic Coast 

states, as did Burton, and with the only prospect being more time in godforsaken 

western posts, a job on the staff may have been seen as the only way of 

returning to civilization. 

In September 1880, Burton rejoined his regiment at Fort Klamath, Oregon. 

There he was given the major additional duty of building the Fort Klamath and 

Ashland Military Telegraph Line. He became in the course of this project the de 

facto signal officer for the region. Later he requested that he take the examination for transfer to the Signal Corps and was favorably supported in this by 

Brig. Gen. Adolphus W. Greeley, its chief. For a while, his status in the 21st 

Infantry was unclear, as he responded to tasks sent to him direct by the chief 

signal officer. It took a three-way correspondence among General Sherman at 

army headquarters, General Miles at the Pacific Division, and General Greeley 

to settle the fact that Burton's company duties should always take priority. The 

restless Burton continued in his regimental duties for another five years with 

one six-month tour as an inspector of horses at Oakland, California. 

Finally, he returned on leave to Washington in early 1885 and personally 

submitted his application for an inspector's position that would be available. He 

cited his many previous good references and added more, including one from 
ApPENDIX B 417 

Governor A. G. Thurman of Ohio whom he had impressed while on recruiting 

duty. This time he was accepted, going on temporary duty to the Washington 

office of the Inspector General at the end of March 1885, before being assigned 

to the Department of the Missouri. He served throughout the West, enjoying 

two promotions and attaining colonelcy in 1895. (In 1892, he had worked 

directly for General Breckinridge inspecting colleges at the outset of this 

program.) 

When the war with Spain began, Burton tried to get an appointment as a 

brigadier general of volunteers. On 27 April 1898 he telegraphed the Adjutant 

General, asking that General Miles consider him for brigade command. He said 

he wanted to partici?'ate in the fighting . Miles forwarded the request to Secretary Alger with a st;rong favorable comment, but Alger turned down the request 

because all the vacancies of that grade had been filled. Burton was initially 

assigned as inspector of the 1st Corps at the request of its commander, John R. 

Brooke, but his orders were changed to report to the Office of the Inspector 

General for duty in Washington. There he was diagnosed as having typhoid 

fever and was placed on sick leave from October 1898 to August 1899. The 

surgeon's report shows that he was critically ill. 

After recovering, he was assigned to the Cuban Division as Gov. Gen. 

Leonard Wood's senior inspector. This was perhaps his finest hour. His work 

was described by General Wood as a "most valuable service in connection with 

postal frauds, inspection of public works, Department of Finance and much 

special work ... he was thorough and fearless." His duties in connection with 

the Neely postal frauds also brought him into close contact with Secretary Root. 

The esteem of these major figures as well as that of others such as Adna R. 

Chaffee unquestionably confirmed Burton's place as the senior inspector when 

Breckinridge retired. Unfortunately, he was not to have much time after his 12 

April 1903 appointment. For four months, from 12 November 1904 to 12 

February 1905, he was detained as a witness on the Neely postal fraud case and 

then, in December 1905, he went on extended leave for health reasons, never to 

return to duty. He retired on 30 September 1906 and died at his home in Los 

Angeles on 20 October 1917. The Army and Navy Journal credited him with 

restoring to the department ' 'much of the high regard it has held throughout so 

many years of its existence. " [George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the 

Officers and Graduates of the Military Academy (Boston and New York: 

Houghton Mifflin & Co.), vol. 3, nos. 1001 to 2000 and no. 2080) (hereafter 

cited as Cullum, Register); "Recent Deaths, " Army and Navy Journal, 27 Oct 

17 , 311 ; Fred H.E. Ebstein, "Twenty-first Regiment of Infantry ," Journal 

of the Military Service Institute of the U.S., no . 12, (1892): 844-850 (hereafter 

cited as JMSI); National Archives, RG 159, ROIG, files 3 and 518.] 

CHAMBERLAIN, JOHN L. (1858-1948), was the last living member of the 

Class of 1880, as well as the last permanent member of the Inspector General's 

Department. He was born in Livonia, New York, on 20 January 1858, the son 

of a Baptist minister and farmer. He left the New York State Normal School to 

enter the Military Academy , and was commissioned into the artillery. After 
418 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

three years' regimental duties in New York and California, he joined the 

Military Academy faculty in 1884 as an instructor in chemistry. One of his 

students was John J. Pershing with whom he was to form a lasting friendship . 

Following that, he returned for a short time to his regiment before being 

assigned in 1890, first to the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, and then to the 

Washington Navy Yard, to study heavy-gun construction. He took time off 

from his duties to rejoin his regiment, serving with it during the Wounded Knee 

campaign in January 1890. After completing his work at the Navy Yard, in 

which he was engaged in metals cheinistry, he returned to the 1st Artillery with 

the praise of the Navy Yard's commodore. 

In 1892, he considered applying for a position in the Subsistence Department but decided against it, l;lnd continued to spend a great deal of time on 

details away from his battery. He was fimilly directed by the War Department 

to rejoin (July 1893), after serving more than a year as Ordnance Officer in the 

Department of the Missouri. Previously, he had been aide to Brig. Gen. Nelson 

Miles at the 1892 Chicago Exposition. No sooner had he reported than he began 

to press for reassignment as professor of military science at the military academy in Peekskill, New York. The Adjutant General did not want to assign him 

because he had been away from his unit seven and a half years out of the 

previous fourteen. Pressure prevailed, however, and he joined the Peekskill 

faculty in January 1895. He continued to impress all those with whom he came 

into contact, and soon was teaching arithmetic and geology as well as military 

science. Inspector Capt. William P. Van Ness especially cited his energy and 

hard work, crediting him with improving the military program at the school 

considerably. He mentioned Chamberlain in his 1896 report for his complete 

dedication and "well known ability" as a disciplinarian . 

Chamberlain remained at Peekskill until September 1896 when he became 

commander of Battery E of the 1st Artillery at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, which 

was located later at Washington Barracks, Washington, D.C. Once again, his 

superiors expressed their high esteem for his professional knowledge and 

dedication. Then, in July 1897, he was sent to Vienna, Austria, as attache to 

the Austro-Hungarian Empire. His task was difficult and delicate because of 

Austria's sympathy for Spain in the growing tensions between that country and 

the United States. When it became apparent that the two nations would go to 

war, Chamberlain again began to agitate for a more active assignment. In 

March 1898 , he cabled the Adjutant General, asking for reassignment, and he 

left Europe on 21 May. 

Upon his return to the United States, Chamberlain was on recruiting duty 

for a short time in New York City; then he was assigned as adjutant of the Siege 

Artillery Train located at Tampa, Florida. He was appointed a major of volunteers and ordnance officer of the 1st Division, 7th Army Corps, after the train 

was disbanded in August. He became the division acting adjutant general in 

September. In that capacity, he mustered out most of the unit before collapsing 

with typhoid fever on 31 October. He resumed light duties in February 1899. 

Chamberlain returned to the 1st Artillery as regimental adjutant in April 
ApPENDIX B 419 

1899, joining it at its headquarters at Sullivan's Island at Moultrieville, South 

Carolina. Despite the praise of his commander, Maj. Gen. Arthur Murray, who 

characterized him as "one of the ablest and best officers I ever met," 

Chamberlain's request for a volunteer commission and duty in the Philippines 

was turned down. He then wrote General Miles asking for a volunteer 

appointment, saying he missed combat in Cuba and he wanted to prove himself 

in the Philippines. He asked further that if that was not possible, he would like 

to be considered for a position in the Adjutant General's or Inspector General's 

Department. 

Shortly thereafter he requested, formally , examination for entry into either 

of the two departments. He submitted eleven letters of recommendation with 

his request, signed by such officers as Generals Miles and Merritt, and former 

inspector Joseph P. Sanger, among others. He appeared before the examining 

board in New York City on 26 February 1900. The required examination took 

almost six hours and consisted of tactical, logistical, and administrative questions requiring fully developed, written answers. He was accepted and commissioned a major in the Inspector General's Department, the last man to undergo 

such an ordeal and the last to hold such a commission. 

He was first assigned to the Washington office of the Inspector General, 

from which he made a circuit through organizations in Pennsylvania and Maryland inspecting financial accounts. This was a tutorial period before he received 

his first independent assignment as inspector for the Department of California 

with headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco. While en route to California, 

he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. Once there, he soon became involved in 

a special investigation of the Army Transport Service on the West Coast, 

establishing for himself a reputation as an expert in the field. 

Chamberlain left California on 1 October 1902 for the Philippines, eventually going to Zamboanga where he served as inspector for the Department of 

Mindanao. While there, he frequently accompanied units on tactical operations 

as an observer. In June of the next year he went to Manila to assume the duties 

of inspector general for the Philippines Division. He later described his duties 

there as routine: inspecting various posts and making special investigations, 

making vast numbers of money and disbursing accounts inspections, as well. 

His commander, Maj. Gen. George W. Davis, specifically praised him for his 

skillful handling of an atrocity case. Later, Chamberlain accompanied his friend 

and former student, John J. Pershing, on the successful Lake Lanao expedition 

against the Moros. 

The detail law of 2 March 1901 precluded Chamberlain's automatic promotion to colonel to fill the vacancy created when Col. Thomas T. Knox retired in 

April 1903. A special bill was later passed by Congress to adjust his date of 

rank . But, before that, Chamberlain had received his promotion on a seniority 

basis to colonel in the Inspector General's Department on 30 November 1904. 

This was the last permanent commission granted in the department; thereafter, 

any vacancies were filled by detail in accordance with Secretary Root's reforms. 

Still the Philippines Division inspector, Chamberlain spent most of August 
420 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

and September 1904 in China inspecting the U.S . legation in Peking and troops 

at Tientsin Barracks. Shortly after his return to Manila, he was stricken with 

malaria and ordered to return to the United States for medical reasons. He was · 

authorized a circuitous boat trip by way of China and Japan as a form of 

convalescence. Chamberlain left Manila in January 1905 and finally arrived in 

Washington in April to assume the job of assistant to the Inspector General. For 

the next year and a half, he assisted in the management of the office and 

participated in several major inspections of depots, arsenals, the Leavenworth 

prison, and the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. He also conducted an extended special investigation of conditions in Puerto Rico. General 

Burton called Chamberlain' 'one of the most efficient all-around officers in the 

service. " 

Chamberlain's rise was marked by assignment for a year to the Pacific 

Division under Frederick Funston and then by transfer to the prestigious Department of the East at Governors Island, New York. There, he first worked under 

Maj. Gen. Frederick Dent Grant who characterized him as "one of the best 

officers I have had with me, a valuable officer for the General Staff, excellent. " 

Grant's successor, Maj . Gen. Leonard Wood , called Chamberlain painstaking 

and efficient. Throughout 1908 and early 1909, Chamberlain covered the vast 

department, inspecting posts and training activities as well as conducting numerous special investigations on topics ranging from race relations to officer conduct. 

He returned briefly to the Philippines and then to the West Coast before attending the Army School of the Line at Fort Leavenworth. Of special interest was 

his membership in the U.S . delegation to Hong Kong sent from Manila in June 

1911 as part of King George V's coronation observances. 

Chamberlain enjoyed the Leavenworth course (School of the Line), which 

he attended between his Philippine and Pacific Divisions assignments. He 

wrote General Garlington for permisssion to succeed it with attendance at the 

Army War College. He thought attendance would sharpen his inspecting skills. 

He also mentioned it was extremely likely that the Inspector General's 

Department, then under examination again, would be abolished. A War College diploma, would ensure his competitive skills if he was thrown back into 

the line. Garlington and General Murray, now ofthe Western Division, approved, 

and Chamberlain attended the War College from August 1912 to June 1913. 

The school commandant, Brig. Gen. William Crozier, cited Chamberlain as 

qualified for high command at the time of his graduation. 

Chamberlain stayed in the West only until September 1914, when he returned 

to Governors Island to serve under General Wood again. Wood said he was 

"delighted to have him, " calling him "a remarkably able and efficient officer. 

Far and away the best inspector I have ever had under my command and 

especially well fitted" to be the Inspector General of the Army . Wood continued to speak highly of Chamberlain until he was reassigned to replace Garlington 

in February 1914. His appointment was greeted with Army-wide approval. He 

served throughout World War I as the Inspector General of the Army , finally 

retiring in November 1921. He spent the remainder of his life in various 
ApPENDIX B 421 

business activities, dividing his time between Washington and Rhode Island. 

Chamberlain died in Washington on 14 December 1948. [National Archives, 

records of TAG, RG 94, 2566 ACP 1883; records of TIG, RG 159, entry 24, 

file 693-20; Obituaries, Washington Post, 15 Nov 48, New York World Telegram, 15 Nov 48, Assoc. of Grads., USMA, Assembly (JuI50): 53-54; Cullum, 

Register (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1891-1950) no. 

2831; USMA Archives, Cullum Files, Chamberlain .] 

CONWAY, THOMAS (1735-1795), the fractious Irishman, returned to France 

in 1779 where he reentered that country's army as a staff officer in Flanders. He 

was named a brigadier general on 1 March 1780 and assigned to duty in the 

French possessions in India. Promoted to marshal in 1784, he eventually became 

governor of all French colonies in the Indian Ocean area. He returned to Europe 

in July 1790 during the first stages of the French Revolution and there he took 

up the loyalist cause, first in a scheme to raise a force in the Midi. When that 

failed, he commanded an Irish regiment in British service until his death in June 

1795. [DAB, 4:366, Bodinier, Dictionnaire des Ojficiers, 105- 06. 

DEBUTTS, HENRY (birth and death dates unknown), born in Maryland, was 

a militia veteran of the Revolution who returned to military service in 1791 as a 

lieutenant during the activation of forces under Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair. He 

survived that officer's defeat to be commissioned in the 4th Sublegion, becoming a captain in December 1792. He served in various staff capacities until he 

returned to the infantry line in November 1796, where he resigned on 31 

December 1797. [Heitman, Historical Register, I :363-64; National Cyclopaedia 

of American Biography, 12:336.] 

FARNSWORTH, HENRY J. (birth date unknown), entered the army from 

civilian life in New York in early 1864. He became a captain and assistant 

quartermaster of volunteers in July 1864, earning two brevets for his service 

during the war. He moved to the 34th Infantry as a first lieutenant in June 1867 

and, when that unit was inactivated, joined the 8th Cavalry at the end of 1870. 

Having been promoted to captain in 1876, he transferred on 22 September 1885 

as a major to the Inspector General's Department. He died at Fort Monroe, 

Virginia, while still on active duty, on 19 November 1888. [Heitman, Historical 

Register, 1:4l3.] 

GARLINGTON, ERNEST A. (1853-1934), was the first young man from his 

Georgia congressional district to enter the U. S. Military Academy after the 

Civil War. Born in Newberry, South Carolina, on 20 February 1853, he was 

the son of a prominent lawyer and planter who became a Confederate general. 

He studied at the University of Georgia for three years before receiving an 

appointment to West Point from Congressman W.P. Price in 1872. He graduated 

from the academy in 1876 and was commissioned in the 7th Cavalry. His 

appointment in the cavalry was influenced by a request from former Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stevens to President Grant. There was some 

further pressure to have the young man assigned as a military professor to a 

Georgia school but that ended with news of the battle of the Little Big Hom. 

As soon as he heard of Custer's disaster, Garlington wrote the Adjutant 
422 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

General on 10 July 1876, requesting that he be allowed to tum in the remainder 

of his graduation leave and be given orders to join his depleted regiment. His 

request was granted and he went west to command G Troop of the 7th Cavalry 

in operations along the Powder River in Montana Territory. There were so 

many vacancies created by Custer's casualties that Garlington was promoted to 

first lieutenant in August 1876, almost as soon as he joined his unit. He spent 

the next several years in operations against the Indians and was cited for 

gallantry in action at Canyon Creek, 13 September 1877, during the Nez Perce 

campaign. 

He remained with his regiment until 1883, when in April he was placed 

under the control of the chief signal officer, Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen. 

Garlington had volunteered to lead an expedition for the relief of the Adolphus 

W. Greeley party stranded in the Canadian Arctic at Lady Franklin Bay. 

Unfortunately, his ship , the Proteus, was wrecked in Smith Sound , and 

Garlington was lucky to be able to extract his own crew in a 600-mile trip in 

open boats to safety aboard a second rescue vessel. 

After his Arctic adventure, Garlington resumed service with his regiment in 

Kansas and the Dakotas. In the spring of 1890, he assumed command of A 

Troop and served with it in the Wounded Knee battle at Pine Ridge Agency , 

South Dakota, in December 1890. He was severely wounded in the battle and 

later was awarded the Medal of Honor for " distinguished gallantry." He rallied 

his men at the critical moment and , despite pain and loss of blood, continued to 

direct them, thus determining the outcome of the fight. After a year's 

convalescence, Garlington returned to Fort Riley where he was an instructor in 

horsemanship and a member of the Cavalry Board. Within a year, he had 

published a small volume on cavalry tactics. His commander, Col. James W. 

Forsyth, considered him "one of the ablest young cavalry officers in the service 

with the ability to perform well in any position." He later called him "an 

unusually successful drillmaster. " 

Secretary of War Daniel Lamont noted Garlington's handiwork while on a 

visit to Fort Riley in 1894 and shortly thereafter appointed him a major in the 

Inspector General's Department. Also in 1894 Garlington wrote a history of his 

old regiment for the Military Service Institute. His selection as an inspector 

precluded his assignment to the military department at Clemson University , 

which the school had requested . He was assigned instead as the assistant to the 

inspector of the South Atlantic District, where he served until the war with 

Spain when he joined the Cavalry Division as its inspector. Garlington's assignment to the Cavalry Division in June 1898 was paralleled by an unsuccessful 

effort on the part of the South Carolina congressional delegation to have him 

appointed a brigadier general of volunteers. He remained instead with the 

Cavalry Division in Cuba where he participated in the operations against Santiago and was again cited for gallantry. He returned to the Washington office of 

the Inspector General in October 1898 and served for the next year as 

Breckinridge's senior assistant. Garlington was involved in many special 

investigations, including one looking into General Miles' allegations about the 
ApPENDIX B 423 

beef furnished the Army. He then served as the senior inspector in various 

departments including two tours in the Philippines, but both of his Philippine 

tours were curtailed because of illness. The last time this happened was in 1906 

when he was hospitalized at the San Francisco Army Hospital in time to witness 

the earthquake and great fire in which he lost most of his personal property, just 

arrived from Manila. 

Garlington's performance of duty between the war with Spain and his 1906 

return from the Philippines was praised by his superiors. Major General Arthur 

MacArthur considered him "fit for any duty. " Adjutant General Henry C. 

Corbin recommended him for duty on the new general staff, characterizing him 

as "exacting, yet generous and broad minded," fully capable of serving as a 

general officer. Later, Corbin recommended him to be superintendent of the 

Military Academy, saying that he was "an excellent soldier and a very fine 

gentleman. " 

In late May 1906, General Burton notified the Adjutant General that his 

health was not improving and that he intended to remain on sick leave over the 

summer of 1906 to try to recuperate. He was not optimistic and said the War 

Department should anticipate his retirement in September. He recommended 

that Garlington be designated his successor and be assigned as acting inspector 

general. Accordingly, Garlington was ordered off sick leave to go to the Secretary of War's summer home for consultation. He began running the Washington office on 8 June 1906. Burton's eyesight continued to deteriorate and 

Garlington was formally designated Inspector General on 1 October 1906. He 

was reappointed in 1910 and again in 1914, serving over ten years before 

retiring for reasons of age in February 1917. 

Shortly after his retirement, Garlington was recalled to active duty to serve 

as a special assistant to the Chief of Staff, his West Point classmate Tasker H. 

Bliss. He began that job on 30 April 1917 , but was reassigned at Secretary of 

War Newton B. Baker's request on 26 June to serve the remainder of the war as 

the Army representative on the Cantonment Adjustment Commission. This was 

a labor relations board agreed to by unions and management to assure fair 

conditions in the settlement of disputes while continuing to rush the building of 

barracks. At war's end, Garlington returned to retirement to live in San Diego, 

California. There he led a quiet, scholarly life until his death on 16 October 

1934. [National Archives, records ofTIG, RG 159, entry 24, files 693-720 and 

12179; entry 35, misc. office files; records of TAG, RG 94,5574 ACP 1877; 

USMA Archives, Cullum file, class of 1876; Assoc. of Grads., USMA, Annual 

Report, June 11, 1935, "Ernest Albert Garlington," 90-94; "Obituaries," 

Army and Navy Journal, 20 Oct 34, 173; Cullum, Register, no. 2622; Maj. 

E. A. Garlington, "The Seventh Regiment of Cavalry," Journal of the Military Service Institute of the United States, January 1895 , 16:649-65.] 

HASKELL, JONATHAN (birth date unknown) born in Massachusetts, enlisted 

in the Massachusetts Continental Line in December 1776 and served in various 

regiments throughout the Revolutionary War, about half the time as regimental 

adjutant. He was dischargeq on 20 June 1784 with the last infantry unit of the 
424 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, l777-1903 

Continental Army, Henry Jackson's Continentals. He was appointed an infantry captain in March 1794. He relieved John Mills as adjutant and inspector 

on 27 February 1796 but returned to his unit, the 4th Sublegion, on 1 August. 

When it was disbanded in November 1796, Haskell returned to Massachusetts, 

where he died on 13 December 1814. [Heitman, Historical Register, 1:509.] 

HEYL, CHARLES H. (1849-1926), entered the Army from civilian life in 

New Jersey as a second lieutenant of infantry in October 1873 , rising to first 

lieutenant in 1892. On 19 May 1898 he was appointed a major and an inspector 

general. He had been brevetted for gallantry during the Indian Wars and in 

1897 was awarded the Medal of Honor for his gallantry in action in 1876. He 

remained in the Inspector General's Department, becoming a colonel in 1902, 

and retired in 1904. Recalled to active duty during the First World War, he 

became chief of the Inspections Division where he effectively streamlined 

operations and guided them into the postwar era. He retired again in 1919 and 

died in Washington , D.C., on 12 October 1926. [Heitman, Historical Register, 

1:527.] 

HEYL, EDWARD M. (1834-1895), entered military service in August 1861 

as a quartermaster sergeant, later becoming a first sergeant in the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry. Promoted to second lieutenant in September 1862 and captain in 

May 1864, he served until his regiment was mustered out in August 1864. 

Among other locales, he had seen action at Brandy Station and Gettysburg. He 

returned to the Army as a lieutenant of the 9th Cavalry, a black regiment, in 

1866, and was promoted to captain within the next year. He transferred to the 

4th Cavalry in 1870, from which he was promoted to major and inspector 

general. Heyl had seen hard service before becoming an inspector and in 1890 

he was brevetted for gallantry in three actions against Indians in Texas in 

1869-in the inspectorate , he became lieutenant colonel in September 1885, 

and colonel in February 1889. Heyl died on 2 January 1895 in Chicago, 

Illinois. [Heitman, Historical Register, 1 :527.] 

HUGHES, ROBERT P. (1839-1909), a graduate of Jefferson College, 

Pennsylvania, joined a three-month Pennsylvania infantry regiment as a private 

at President Lincoln's first call for volunteers in April 1861. When that unit was 

mustered out, he became a lieutenant in the 85th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment. 

After that unit's service expired in 1864, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel 

in the 199th Pennsylvania Infantry. His extended service was rewarded with a 

brevet for gallantry and merit at the time he was mustered out in 1865. He 

rejoined the Army as a captain in 1866, remaining as such until his appointment 

in 1885 as a major and an inspector general. He rose to colonel in 1888 and was 

commissioned a brigadier general of volunteers during the war with Spain, after 

which he commanded troops during the insurrection in the Philippines. In 

1901, he became a Regular Army brigadier, then a major general in 1902. He 

retired in the wholesale retirements of April 1903 , and died in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, on 21 October 1909. [Heitman, Historical Register, 1:267.] 

KNOX, THOMAS T. (1849-1927), the son of Scottish immigrants living in 
ApPENDIX B 425 

Tennessee, graduated from West Point in 1871. Commissioned in the cavalry, 

he soon saw action in the Modoc War in 1872-73. After three years' staff duty, 

he returned to a line troop in time to take part in most of the battles of the Nez 

Perce campaign of 1876. He continued to see action with his regiment in the 

northwest until he was assigned to Washington, D. C., in 1881 to work in the 

Adjutant General's Office as part of the group producing the official record of 

the Civil War. During this period, he earned two law degrees from George 

Washington University and was admitted to the District of Columbia bar. In 

1891 he rejoined his regiment, the 1st Cavalry, and served with it on the frontier 

until it deployed to Cuba in June 1898 as part of Shafter's Corps. At the battle 

of Las Guasimas, he was critically wounded, but remained on the field directing his unit. His inspiring conduct led to the award of the Distinguished Service 

Cross for what Maj. Gen. S.B.M. Young called "conspicious gallantry, stoicism and devotion to duty ." A month later his appointment to the Inspector 

General's Department was approved. There, he became an expert on the National 

Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers and, when offered a position on its 

board, retired from the Army on 13 April 1903, becoming a board member. In 

1905 , he became governor of the Hampton branch of the home, and remained 

there until 1915. Following that, he retired to Washington, D.C., where he 

died on 16 May 1927. [Assoc. of Grads., USMA, Annual Report, June 9, 

1932 , "Thomas Taylor Knox," 87-92; Heitman, Historical Register, 1:607.] 

LAWTON, HENRY W. (1843- 1899), was born in Ohio and was reared in 

Indiana. He entered the Army as a sergeant of the 9th Indiana Infantry Regiment in 1861 and was soon raised to first lieutenant in the 30th Indiana Infantry. 

He became a captain within a year, and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 

November 1864. His gallant and meritorious service earned him a volunteer 

brevet during the war, and he was mustered out in November 1865. He returned 

in July 1866 as a second lieutenant of the 41st Infantry ((black regiment), spent 

two years as regimental quartermaster, and went to the 24th Infantry in the 

merger of the black regiments in 1869. The 6-foot, 3-inch, 21O-lb. giant transferred to the 4th Cavalry in 1871, continuing to distinguish himself as a combat 

leader. He participated in the Sioux War of 1876 and in operations against the 

Utes in 1879. His most famous campaign occurred in 1886 when he led a 

gruelling 1 ,300-mile successful chase after the Apache, Geronimo, in the mountains of Mexico. By then one of the Almy's foremost soldiers, he transferred to 

the Inspector General's Department on 17 September 1888, where he performed the usual duties until appointed a brigadier, and then major general of 

volunteers in 1898. In that year he was awarded a brevet for gallantry for his 

conduct at El Caney. Transferred to the Philippines in March 1899, he commanded a division in a series of spectacular successes against the insurrectos 

until he was killed at the battle of San Mateo on 19 December 1899. His death 

was cause for national mourning. His remains were returned to the United 

States, where he was buried at Arlington on 9 February 1900. [Heitman, 

Historical Register, 1:620; L. R. Hamersly, Biographical Sketches of Distinguished Officers of the Army and Navy (New York: Hamersly, 1905) 253; 
426 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Major General Henry W. Lawton of Ft. Wayne, Indiana, Ft. Wayne: Staff of 

Public Library of Ft. Wayne and Allen County, 1954; ARIG to the Com. Gen., 

1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), 85-91.] 

MILLS, JOHN (birth date unknown), entered the Massachusetts militia in 

May 1775, early in the Revolution. In January 1776 he transferred to the 

Massachusetts Continental Line where he served in various units until his 

discharge as a captain in June 1784. He returned to the army in 1791 as a 

captain of infantry, and rose to major by February 1793, acting as adjutant and 

inspector from 13 May 1794 to 27 February 1796. He was the only one of 

Wayne's acting inspectors to receive the general's formal nomination to be 

Adjutant and Inspector General, but no action was taken. He died on 8 July 

1796. [Heitman, Historical Register, 1:713; National Cyclopaedia, 12:336.] 

MILLS, STEPHEN C. (1854-1914), a native of Illinois, graduated from West 

Point in 1877, immediately joining the 12th Infantry Regiment in California. 

He saw action in the Bannock War the next year, then served four arduous 

years commanding Apache scouts in Arizona. He was twice brevetted for 

gallantry during this period. Following that, he was on college duty, was a 

general's aide, and was attache at Copenhagen, Denmark, for two years. When 

war with Spain erupted, he was made a major and inspector general of volunteers and given the duty on 12 May 1898 of mustering in state volunteer units. 

In July 1898, he was given a regular appointment to the Inspector General's 

Department. Following further mustering and demobilization duties, he was 

appointed recorder of the Dodge Commission investigating wartime problems. 

He served as Philippine Division Inspector from 1899 to 1902, during which 

period he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. After promotion to colonel in 

1903, he returned to the Philippines where he eventually served as division 

chief of staff from 1907 to 1909. Mills returned to the United States where he 

assumed the same duties first at the Department of the Lakes and then at the 

Department of the East. While at the latter, he was selected to serve as chief of 

staff of the temporary maneuver divisions formed annually as part ofthe army's 

tactical improvements. His ability and seniority marked him as General 

Garlington's successor, but for his death on 3 August 1914. He was one of the 

army's most admired officers, noted for his fair-mindedness and leadership. 

[Heitman, Historical Register, 1:714; Assoc. of Grads. , USMA, Annual Report, 

June 11th, 1915, "Stephen Crosby Mills," 94-98.] 

NORTH, WILLIAM (1755-1836), born in Maine, moved while young to 

Boston, where he was educated to become a merchant. He began his military 

career in 1776 as an artilleryman and then served in various Continental Massachusetts infantry regiments until assigned as Steuben's aide in May 1779. After 

the war, he served as the senior inspector in the army from 15 April 1784 t9 25 

June 1788. There is considerable controversy over his rank during this period, 

but most authorities give his rank as major. Through his marriage he had 

acquired an estate in the Hudson River Valley, to which he returned after army 

service, becoming active in state politics. He served several terms in the state 

legislature and then in 1798 was appointed by Governor John Jay to a vacant 
ApPENDIX B 427 

United States Senate seat. On 19 July 1798 he was appointed adjutant general 

of the provisional force in which Alexander Hamilton was inspector general. 

After his discharge, North returned to New York where he again was elected to 

the legislature. His colleagues appointed him to the Erie Canal Commission in 

1809, where he was active in assuring the adoption of that great commercial 

venture. Offered the adjutant general position again in 1812, he wisely turned it 

down in favor of his local activities. He died iIi New York City in 1836. Along 

with Benjamin Walker, North was named Steuben's son and heir in Steuben's 

will. [Doyle, Steuben, 35~0; Ryan, Salute fo Courage, 302-20; Heitman, 

Historical Register, 1:751; DAB, 7:563-64.] 

RUDULPH, MICHAEL (1758-1793), spelled "Rudulph" so consistently in 

Wayne's correspondence and in family papers that unquestionably this form 

was used by him instead of the suspect form "Rudolph," began his military 

service in 1778 as sergeant major of "Light Horse" Henry Lee's battalion of 

dragoons. He quickly rose through the ranks to captain in 1779. That year, he 

was cited by Congress for his bravery at the battle of Paulus Hook, New Jersey. 

Lee's unit, now designated a legion, was moved to the Southern Department in 

early 1781, where it remained for the rest of the war. Rudulph accepted his 

discharge there in May 1783 and settled in Sunbury, Georgia, where he became 

active in politics and led the local militia in skirmishes with the Indians. He 

reentered the army in June 1790 as a captain. Rudulph served in the northwest 

under Harmer and St. Clair and was commissioned major of dragoons in March 

1792. Then, he spent a frustrating year trying to organize the cavalry of Wayne's 

Legion. Wayne appointed him acting adjutant and inspector general on 23 

February 1793. At almost the same moment, he granted Rudulph' s request for a 

furlough. Rudulph apparently never returned to duty and his resignation was 

approved on 17 July 1793. He disappeared after sailing on board ship from 

Elkton, Maryland, shortly after his resignation. It seems likely that this colorful 

and magnetic character drowned at sea. [Rudulph, Marilou A., "Michael 

Ruduiph, Lion of the Legion," and "The Legend of Michael Rudulph," both 

in vol. 45 (1961), Georgia Historical Quarterly; Heitman, Historical Register, 

1:850; National Cyclopaedia, 12:335 .] 

SANGER, JOSEPH P. (1840--1926), born in Detroit, Michigan, on 4 May 

1840, was a student at the University of Michigan at the outbreak of the Civil 

War. In addition to service in Michigan infantry units, he served briefly as an 

aide-de-camp to President Lincoln. After the war he enjoyed a variety of 

assignments, to include duty against Fenians along the Canadian border, 

professorship of military science at Bowdoin College, Maine, and membership 

in General Emory Upton's 1875-76 worldwide military tour. Two years after 

coming to the inspectorate, he served as President Benjamin Harrison's secretary and aide in 1891. At the outbreak of the war with Spain, he held various 

commands in Cuba, then served as director of the census for Cuba and Puerto 

Rico. He returned to the inspectorate for duty in the Philippines, and there was 

promoted to brigadier general of the line and served as director of the Philippines census. He retired in the grade of major general in January 1904. During 
428 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

1908-09 he served on the court of inquiry that investigated the Brownsville 

incident in which black soldiers had allegedly rampaged in a Texas town. 

Later, from 1916 until his death, he served on the War Department Medal of 

Honor Board. Fluent in French and German, he also continued to write scholarly articles on military and literary topics. He died in Washington, D.C. , on 15 

March 1926. [Heitman, Historical Register, 12:859; National Cyclopaedia, 

27:311-12.] 

TOTTEN, JAMES (1818- 1871), a Pennsylvanian appointed to the Military 

Academy from Virginia, graduated in 184l. He was commissioned in the 

artillery and spent most of the next twenty years assigned to coastal defense 

activities. Totten saw action against the Seminoles in 1849-50 and frontier duty 

in Kansas in the late 1850s. Although among the first group of majors (assistant 

inspectors appointed in November 1861), he actually spent the next eighteen 

months in command of Missouri infantry and artillery units. This duty was 

followed by ten months' service as inspector general for the Department of 

Missouri in 1863-64. After that he commanded siege artillery units in operations in Arkansas and Alabama until the end of the war. He was brevetted four 

times for gallantry, rising to brevet brigadier general, U.S.A., in 1865. After 

the war, he served first as inspector for the Department of the East (until 1869), 

being promoted to lieutenant colonel, Inspector General's Department, in 1867. 

Transferred to the Department of the South as its inspector, he was relieved in 

April 1870 and dismissed in July after conviction on various charges of personal misconduct. He died on 2 October 1871 at Sedalia, Missouri. [Heitman, 

Historical Register, 1:966; Cullum, Register, 2:21-22,3:145 .] 

VROOM, PETER D. (1842-1926), was born in Trenton, N.J., on 18 April 

1842. His father's and mother's families had both been prominent in New 

Jersey affairs for generations. The elder Vroom had been governor of the state 

and was for many years a well-known jurist. Immediately after graduating from 

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1862, young Vroom entered the Army as an 

officer in the 1st New Jersey Cavalry. In 1863 , he was appointed major in the 

2d New Jersey Cavalry: He was severely wounded at the battle of South 

Mountain and later participated in the battles of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg. 

He ended the Civil War as the inspector of Maj. Gen. Benjamin Grierson's 

cavalry force on its devastating raid across Mississippi. Both Grierson and the 

famed cavalryman Joseph Karge praised Vroom as a brave and able officer. He 

was later awarded a brevet for gallant and meritorious service during the war. 

Vroom was given a regular commission as a second lieutenant in the 3d 

Cavalry in April 1866, based on recommendations from General Grierson and 

Senator Stockton of New Jersey, among others. For the next ten years he 

performed regimental duties at various posts in the West. He then participated 

in the Big Hom and Yellowstone expeditions. At the battle of the Rosebud in 

June 1876, he again distinguished himself for what George A. Forsyth described 

as "great coolness and management of his force in a tight situation." He spent 

the next several years in campaigns against the Sioux and the Ute Indians. 

By the early 1880s Vroom was beginning to feel the physical effects of his 
ApPENDIX B 429 

hard twenty years of service and asked his brother, George, a prominent New 

Jersey politician, to press discreetly to get him some kind of staff appointment 

in one of the bureaus or departments. As the decade proceeded, more and more 

prominent New Jersey politicians indicated their support for Vroom's appointment, citing his long service and professional reputation. Finally, in December 

1888, he was appointed and promoted to major in the Inspector General's 

Department. 

Vroom spent his first three years as an inspector assigned to the Department 

of the East, during which time he became somewhat an expert on financial 

accounts. When he was reassigned to the Department of Texas, Nelson Miles 

characterized him as "zealous" while Breckinridge praised him as a quiet, 

extremely able" gentleman of fine presence. " He recommended that Vroom be 

considered for attache duty. When the war with Spain commenced, Vroom's 

political friends urged that he be promoted to brigadier general. Instead, however, 

he was assigned as inspector for various corps before accompanying General 

Miles to Puerto Rico as his inspector general. He was there less than two 

months when he contracted malaria and had to return to the United States. 

After convalescing, he was again assigned to the Department of the East. 

During this tour, he was promoted to full colonel in January 1900. In July 

1902, he was reassigned as inspector general for the Philippine Division, but 

was soon overtaken by the events surrounding General Breckinridge's retirement. 

A delicate situation developed, in that, although second in rank to George 

Burton in the department, Vroom was senior to him in the Army line. A 

graceful solution was proposed by Senator John Kean, no doubt at George 

Vroom's suggestion. Vroom accepted promotion to brigadier general and Inspector General, with the agreement that he would retire as soon as he was promoted. 

He thus became the senior inspector of the Army for one day only, 11 April 

1903, but never served in that capacity as he was en route home from the 

Philippines at the time. He returned to New Jersey, where he was active in 

several veterans' organizations and also established a reputation as a scholar 

and collector of military literature. He died in Atlantic City on 19 March 1926. 

[Who Was Who in America, vol. 1 (1897- 1942); "Retired U.S. Army Officer is 

Dead," The State Gazette (Trenton, N.J .), 20 Mar 26; National Archives, RG 

94, records of AGO, 814 ACP 1883, 2762 ACP 1890; George A. Forsyth, The 

Story of the Soldier (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1900).319.] 

WALKER, BENJAMIN (1753-1818), migrating when young from England, 

became a merchant in New York City. He joined a New York infantry regiment 

at the start of the Revolution and served with it until appointed to Steuben's 

staff. In 1781 he transferred to Washington's staff until returning to civilian life 

in 1782. There, he served first as a private secretary for the governor of New 

York, and later as naval officer for the Port of New York. Then he spent a term 

as a congressman. In 1803 Walker moved to Utica, New York, where he spent 

the rest of his life as agent and manager for a group of land speculators in the 

central part of the state. He also became prominent in the development of the 

Utica area until his death in January 1818. Walker and Steuben remained close 
430 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

until Steuben's death, with Walker attending to Steuben's burial. Steuben made 

Walker and William North his adopted sons and heirs in his will. [Doyle, 

Steuben, 360--61; National Cyclopaedia, 5:239.] 

WILLIAMS, JONATHON (1750--1815), was a grandnephew of Benjamin 

Franklin, whom he served as secretary in Paris. Following this, he earned a 

master's degree from Harvard and then became secretary, and later counselor, 

of the American Philosophical Society. He developed such an interest in fortifications that in February 1801 he obtained appointment as a major in the 2d 

Regiment of Artillerists and Engineers with duty as inspector of fortifications in 

charge of the school at West Point. When the army was reduced in 1802, 

Williams became the first chief of the Corps of Engineers and the first superintendent of the Military Academy. He resigned in 1803 over issues of command, 

but was reinstated in 1805. Among other fortifications, he built castle Williams 

on Governors Island, New York. Williams resigned in 1812 and died in 1815. 

[Heitman, Historical Register; 1: 1041; Arthur P. Wade, "A Military Offspring 

of the American Philosophical Society," Military Affairs, Sep 44,38.] 
Selected Bibliography 

Archival Collections 

The basis for a study of the Inspector General's Department in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries must rest on the holdings of the National Archives 

in Washington, D.C., Record Group (RG) 159, Records of the Office of the 

Inspector General, naturally, should be the starting point. These are somewhat 

uneven before the Civil War. Most of the records that have survived between 

1814 and 1842 are on three microfilm rolls available for sale from the National 

Archives. The records become increasingly voluminous after 1862, and they 

are listed in a preliminary checklist prepared by the Archives, which indicates 

those entries in the group containing indexes. The nature of the work of the 

Inspector General's Department has involved it with many other bureaus and 

staff departments. Often, replies to correspondence or duplicate copies of Inspector General material may have survived in the records of these while 

perishing in those of RG 159. 

Particularly helpful in this study were the records of the Secretary of War 

(RG 107), the Adjutant General (RG 94), the Quartermaster General (RG 92), 

the Surgeon General (RG 112), and in those of various Continental Commands 

(RG 98). Each of these has a checklist and inventory available from the National Archives as well. The documentation in the Archives is for the most part 

highly impersonal and formal. The holdings of the Military History Institute, 

Carlisle Barracks, contain the personal papers of several officers who served as 

inspectors general in the late nineteenth century. Excellent biographical material on many inspectors may be found in the holdings of the U.S. Military 

Academy, West Point, particularly in its Cullum files. The Military History 

Institute and the Indiana University Library, Bloomington, Indiana, archives 

also contain large collections of published military documents. 

Printed Documents 

A large part of the research for this volume relied on printed official 

documents. One of the most important of these was the various Annual Reports 

of the Secretary of War, Commanding General (title varies), Adjutant General, 

Inspector General, Surgeon General, Quartermaster General, Commissary General of Subsistence, Judge Advocate General, Commissary General of Purchases, 

Ordnance Department (title varies), Corps of Engineers, and others, 1822-1920. 

All reports until 1920 were grouped together with the Annual Report of the 
432 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

Secretary of War, and began publication in 1822 or when the issuing official 

was established. The first Annual Report of the Inspector General appeared in 

1866. From 1822 to 1838, the War Department Annual Reports appear in 

American State Papers, Class V, Military Affairs; thereafter, they appear in the 

Congressional Documents Serial Set, usually as Document No . 1 for the year. 

From 1861 to 1920 the War Department Annual Reports were also published 

separately. The congressional publication, however, was used during the course 

of this research. Each report is given a complete citation the first time it appears 

in the footnotes. 

Also helpful were several published collections of congressional documents. 

These include Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774- 1789, 

(8 vols. , Washington, 1976-1981) and the Index: lournals of the Continental 

Congress, 1774- 1789 published by the National Archives in 1976. Thelournals 

themselves had been published by the Government Printing Office between 

1934 and 1937. William H. Carter's narrative of the creation of the general 

staff appears as Senate Misc. Doc. 119, 68th Cong. , 1st sess., 1924. Reports 

by various inspectors have also appeared as public documents: Edward P. 

Gaines' report on western posts is in American State Papers, 19: 103-41. 

Marcy and McClellan's Red River exploration was published as House Executive Document (n.n.), 33d Cong., 1st sess. (1854). The Dodge Commission's 

report may be found in Senate Document 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess. (1900). 

The second session of this Congress produced Joseph Sanger's IG History 

(House Document 2) and Raphael Thian's history of the general staff (Senate 

Document 229). 

Useful along this line were publications such as the Annals of Congress, the 

Congressional Globe, and the Congressional Record. All the issues of the 

Army Regulations need to be reviewed to see the various duties imposed on the 

inspectorate or expected of it. Many of these are cited in Virgil Ney's Evolution 

of the United States Army Field Manual prepared for the Army Combat Development Board in 1966. Especially valuable is the unique collection of General 

Orders compiled by A. C. Quisenberry for General Breckinridge. The original 

is in the National Archives and a copy is in the Office of the Inspector General. 

The Official Record of the War of the Rebellion, known to all Civil War 

students, can be useful if a particular name or incident is known. 

Books and Reports 

A great deal of information on inspectors and their activities during this era 

may be gotten from secondary sources through a careful gleaning. A few 

inspectors' reports have been published in full . Some men such as Steuben and 

Hamilton are the subjects of biographies. Numerous general or campaign histories mention inspectors' activities, often without realizing their significance. 

The titles listed below were helpful in providing background or in mentioning 

an inspector general in the performance of his duties. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 433 

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---. Halleck, Lincoln's Chief of Staff. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960. 

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Bandel, Eugene. Frontier Life in the Army, 1855-1861. Edited by Ralph P. 

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434 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

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Carter, William Harding. The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee. Chicago: 

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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 435 

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Fletcher, Marvin. The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 

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---. George Washington: Anguish and Farewell (1793-1799). Boston: Little, 

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---. George Washington in the American Revolution (1775- 1783). Boston: 

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436 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

---. George Washington: The Forge of Experience, 1732-1775. Boston: 

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Flipper, Henry O. The Colored Cadet at West Point. New York: Homer & Lee, 

1878. 

---. Negro Frontiersman: The Western Memoirs of Henry O. Flipper, 

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---. The United States Soldier Between Two Wars: Army Life and Reforms, 

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Foreman, Grant. Advancing the Frontier 1830-1860. Norman: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1933. 

---. Marcy and the Gold Seekers: The Journal of Captain R. B. Marcy, 

with an Account of the Gold Rush over the Southern Route. Norman: 

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Fowler, Arlen L. The Black Infantry in the West, 1869-1891. Westport, Conn.: 

Greenwood, 1971. 

Frazer, Robert W ., ed. Mansfield on the Condition of the Western Forts, 

1853-54. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963. 

---, ed. New Mexico in 1850: A Military View by Colonel George Archibald 

McCall. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968. 

Frederick II ("the Great") of Prussia. Frederick the Great on the Art of War. 

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Freeman, Douglas Southall. George Washington. 7 vols. New York: Scribner, 

1948- 1957. 

Freidel, Frank. The Splendid Little War. New York: Scribner, 1958. 

Funston, Frederick. Memories of Two Wars: Cuban and Philippine Experiences. New York: Scribner, 1914. 

Ganoe, William A. History of the United States Army . Rev. ed. New York: 

Appleton-Century, 1942. 

Garrison, Fielding H. John Shaw Billings: A Memoir. New York: Putnam, 1915. 

General Orders of George Washington, Commander in Chief of the Army of the 

Revolution, Issued at Newburgh on the Hudson, 1782-1783. Compiled and 

edited by Edward C. Boynton, 1909. Reprint, Harrison, N. Y.: Harbor Hill, 

1973 . 

Goetzmann, William H. Army Exploration in the American West, 1803-1863 . 

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Goff, John S. Robert Todd Lincoln.: A Man in His Own Right. Norman: 

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Goode, Paul R. The United States Soldiers' Home. Richmond, Va.: William 

Byrd Press, 1957. 

Greene, Francis Vinton. General Greene. 1893. Reprint. Port Washington, 

N. Y.: Kennikat, 1970. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 437 

Hamersly, L. R. Biographical Sketches of Distinguished Officers of the Army 

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Hamersly, Thomas H. S. Complete Army Register for 100 Years (1779 to 

1879). Washington: Hamersly, 188l. 

Hampton, H. Duane. How the U.S . Cavalry Saved Our National Parks. 

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1958. 

Hatch, Louis C. The Administration of the American Revolutiowry Army. New 

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Heitman, Francis B. Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army 

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---. Historical Register of the United States Army, From Its Organization, 

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Heyman, Max L., Jr. Prudent Soldier: A Biography of Major General E.R.S. 

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Higginbotham, Don. The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, 

Policies, and Practice, 1753-1789. New York: Macmillan, 1971. 

---, ed. Reconsideration of the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays. 

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Hill, Jim Dan. The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National 

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Hirschson, Stanley P. Grenville M. Dodge: Soldier, Politician, Railroad Pioneer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967. 

Hitchcock, Ethan Allen. Fifty Years in Camp and Field: Diwy of Ethan Allen 

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Hollon, W. Eugene. Beyond the Cross Timbers: The Travels of Randolph B. 

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Huston, James A. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953. Washington: 

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Ingersoll , L. D. A History of the War Department of the United States, with 

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Jackson, Donald, ed. The Journals of Zebulon Montgomery Pike, With Letters 

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Jacobs, James Ripley. The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783-1812. Princeton: 

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438 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Tarnished Warrior: Major-General James Wilkinson. New York: 

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Jessup, Philip C. Elihu Root. 2 vols, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938. 

Johnson, Virginia Weisel. The Unregimented General: A Biography of Nelson 

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Kurtz, Stephen G. The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism , 

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440 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

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442 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

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444 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

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446 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

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448 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

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450 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

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Armored Cavalry Journal 56 (March-April 1947): 38-41. 
Actg Asst IG 

AG 

AGO 

A&IG 

AMB 

ARAG 

ARComGen 

ARIG 

ARQMG 

ARSecWar 

ASP 

ASP- MA 

Asst QMG 

CDAB 

CG 

DAB 

DAE 

DAHP 

GenCorresp 

GO 

GORI&IG 

H. Doc. 

H. Rpt. 

JAG 

JCC 

JMSI 

LBD 

Ltr 

Ltr Bk 

MHI 

Mil Aff 

NCAB 

OED 

OIG 

OR 

QMG 

List of Abbreviations 

Acting Assistant Inspector General 

Adjutant General 

Adjutant General's Office 

Adjutant & Inspector General's Office 

Webster's American Military Biographies 

Annual Report of the Adjutant General 

Annual Report of the Commanding General 

Annual Report of the Inspector General 

Annual Report of the Quartermaster General 

Annual Report of the Secretary of War 

American State Papers 

American State Papers- Military Affairs 

Assistant Quartermaster General 

Concise Dictionary of American Biography 

Commanding General 

Dictionary of American Biography 

A Dictionary of American English on Historical Principles 

A Dictionary of Americanisms on Historical Principle 

General Correspondence 

General Order 

General Orders Relating to Inspection and the Inspector General's Department 

House Document 

House Report 

Judge Advocate General 

Journals of the Continental Congress 

Journal of the Military Service Institute of the U.S. 

Lamb's Biographical Dictionary of the United States 

letter 

letter book 

USA Military History Institute 

Military Affairs 

The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography 

The Oxford English Dictionary 

Office of the Inspector General 

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 

Records of the Union & Confederate Armies 

Quartermaster General 
452 

RAGO 

RG 

RIGO 

ROIG 

ROQMG 

S. Doc. 

SO 

USMA 

USV 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

Records of the Adjutant General's Office 

Record Group 

Records of the Inspector General's Office 

Records of the Inspector General 

Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General 

Senate Document 

Special Orders 

United States Military Academy 

United States Volunteers 
Index 

Adams, John: 75, 76, 77, 79, 8 1, 82 

Adjutant General: 24, 65 , 74, 82 , 126, 127, 

132, 272-73 . See also Inspector General; 

Secretary of War. 

as controller of Army's communications: 103 , 

143 , 158, 187- 88,217- 18,222, 287, 

377- 78, 382 

as inspector: 65 

Adjutant General's Office: 53, 226--27, 25 1- 52, 

254,256,3 12-13,390--9 1 

Adjutant and Inspector General: 65 , 67 , 92, 125 , 

126, 131, 132. See also Adjutant General. 

as assistant to Adjutant General: 93 

as chief administrative official: 107, 111 , 

11 2- 13, 115- 16 

as chief of staff: 99- 100, 103-04, 108 

as head of adjutants and inspectors: 108 

as Secretary of War's adjutant: 87- 90 

as troop commander: 105 

Aguinaldo, Emilio: 363 

Ainsworth, Brig. Gen. Fred C. 

as Adjutant General: 405 

as head of Record and Pensions Office: 400 , 

402 

Alexander, Bvt. Col. Andrew J.: 247 

Alexander, Brig. Gen. William . See Lord 

Stirling. 

Alger, Russell A. : 332- 34, 361, 365, 369, 

372-73, 374, 390 

Alien and Sedition Acts: 77 

American army. See Continental Army. 

American Revolution: 8, 12-14, 42-'43 

at Brandywine: 22 

at Germantown: 22 

at Morristown: 16 

at Philadelphia: 22, 31 

at Point of Fork, Virginia: 55 

at Saratoga , New York: 22 

at Schuylkill River: 42 

at Valley Forge: 28-29, 31, 35, 36 

at York: 22, 29,3 1,35,36 

Battle of Monmouth: 46 

campaigns of 1777: 21-22 

fina l battles: 56 

Anglo-American relations: 73- 74 

Appalachian Mountains: 62 

Archer, Col. Samuel B.: 12411, 136--40, 142, 

143-45 , 147, 15 1 

Apothecary-General: 9911 

Armstrong, John: 98, 99,103 , 105, 106, 107 , 

109, 111 , 11 5 

Anny. See United States Anny . 

Army alld Navy Journal: 270 , 298/l , 302, 331 , 

373 , 377, 405 

Army of the Potomac: 20711, 210, 217, 218 

Army War College: 390--9 1, 395- 96 

Arthur, Chester A.: 300 

Articles of War: 153 

Artillery: 138, 280 

Astor, John Jacob: 367 

Atkinson, General Henry: 123 

Auditing accounts: 287-89 , 303, 403- 04. See 

also Inspection reports; Inspections; 

Inspectors general; Inspectors general, 

special assignments. 

as strong justification for existence of 

inspectorate: 34 1-42, 348-49, 379, 397- 98 , 

404 

as Treasury Department function : 397-98 

of Corps of Engineers: 327 , 336 

of division and department commanders: 313 

of National Home for Disabled Volunteer 

Soldiers: 327, 339-4 1 

of Pay Department: 313 , 34 1 

of staff department officers: 313 

procedures: 287- 88, 313 

Bailey, Capt. William: 120 

Baird, Brig. Gen . Absalom: 209, 210--12, 222, 

292,300--30 1,306,310--12,3 14,316 

as a commander, Department of Louisiana: 

237 

as assistant commissioner, Freedmen's 

Bureau: 2 11- 12, 229, 237 

as assistant inspector general, Department of 

the Lakes: 237 , 23911 

as Commander of National Order of the 

Legion of Honor: 304 

as division commander, Am1y of Kentucky: 

2 11 

as inspector, Department of the Dakota: 248, 

259/l 

as inspector, Division of the Missouri: 276 

as inspector, Division of the South: 270 , 301 

as inspector, Washington office: 296--97, 

308-10 

as inspector and chief of staff, IV Corps, 

Army of the Potomac: 21 1 

as Inspector General: 302- 305 

Baird, Spencer F.: 200 

Bankhead, Maj. James: 120 

Banning, Henry B.: 279 

Barbour, James: 147, 150, 152 

Beall, Col. William: 90 
454 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Beaumarchais, Caron de: 34--35 

Belknap, William W.: 265- 66,275,276,283 

Bell, John: 171 

Bell , Maj. John R.: 108 

Benton, Thomas Hart: 157, 168- 69 

Biddle, Capt. John: 120" 

Bissell , William A.: 197 

. Black regiments: 248, 255- 56 

Blue book: 49- 50, 59-60, 64--65, 67, 196. See 

a/so Steuben, Maj. Gen. Friedrich W.A. 

von. 

Board of War: 17,25 , 47 

relationship to Inspector General: 26-27 

role in Conway affair: 28- 29 

Board of War and Ordnance: 16, 17 

Board to Organize the Invalid Corps: 2 19 

Board to Retire Disabled Officers: 2 19 

Boxer Rebellion: 385-86 

Breckinridge, Brig. ·Gen. Joseph C.: 298- 99, 

300,372- 75,39 1,392- 93 , 395,396,397 , 

398, 399- 402, 404--05 

as artillery commander, Washington Arsenal: 

285 

as assistant inspector general, Division of the 

Pacific: 295- 96 

as inspector, Division of the Missouri: 302 

as Inspector General and reformer: 3 18, 

320-58, 362, 363-65, 376-80, 382- 88 

as inspector running Washington office: 306 

as troop commander: 296 

roles in Spanish-American War: 365- 72 

British Army: 6-7 

at New York City: 56 

in campaigns of 1777: 2 1- 22 

British Articles of War: 12- 13 

Brock, General Isaac: 95 

Brooke, Maj. George M.: 120 

Brooke , John R.: 366 

Brown , Lt. Ethan Allen: 77n 

Brown , Maj. Gen . Jacob: 106, 109- 10 

as commander, Northern Division: 11 7, 120n , 

124--25 

as Commanding General: 128 , 13 1- 33, 136, 

137 , 139, 14 1-42, 151 

Brown , William Carey: 385 

Budget: 198 

Army: 123, 126-27, 13 1, 184--85 , 193-94 

Inspection: 144, 269, 279 

War Department: 123, 143, 183- 84 

Buford, John: 209, 222-23 

Bureau of Pensions: 339-40n 

Burgoyne, Maj. Gen. John: 22 

Burnside, Ambrose E.: 208 

BUIT, Aaron: 87 

Burton, Brig. Gen. George H.: 330, 367, 368 , 

369, 372 

as Davis' assistant in WaShington office: 30 I 

as inspector, Department of Arizona: 306 

as inspector, Department of the Missouri: 30 I 

as inspector, Pacific District: 33 1- 32 

as Inspector General: 406 

as organizer of inspectorate in Cuba: 383, 

400-401 

Butler, Capt. Edward: 66 , 67- 68 , 69 

Butler, Col. Robert: 136 

Cadwalader, Brig. Gen. John: 30 

Calhoun , John c.: 12 1-23, 125, 126-28, 

131-34, 135- 37, 186 

Cameron, Simon: 198- 99 

Camp Thomas, Chickamauga Nationa l Military 

Park, Georgia: 367, 371 - 72 

Canadian border problems: 168 

Canby, Bvt. Capt. Edward R. S.: 192-93 

Caroline: 168 

Carleton, James H.: 267 

Carter, William H.: 393- 95 , 396-97, 398-400, 

401, 405, 406, 408 

Cass, Lewis: 159- 60, 166 

Cavalry , 81, 2 15, 226-27, 279- 80. See a/so 

Inspection reports; Inspections; Inspectors 

general, special assignments. 

Cavalry Bureau: 2 19- 20 

Chaffee, General Adna R.: 388 

Chamberlain, Capt. John L.: 393, 396 

Champlain Department: 106n 

Chase , Salmon P.: 203 

Chief of Engineers: 243. See a/so Corps of 

Engineers. 

Chief of Staff: 403, 407- 08. See a/so General 

staff. 

Churchill , Brig. Gen. Sylvester: 106n , 148, 

172-73,175- 77 , 190,203 , 204 

as acting inspector general: 166 

as inspector, Department of the East: 194--95 

as inspector, Eastern Division: 187- 88, 192 

as inspector general , Army of the South: 

166-67 

as inspector general, Washington office: 186 

as inspector general and chief of staff: 177- 78 

as second in command: 178 

revision of drill manual and army regulations: 

195-200 

Civil War: 200 , 20 1- 02 , 207, 2 10 

assault on Missionary Ridge: 21 I 

Battl e of Antietam: 203, 221 

Battle of Bull Run: 2 11 

Battle of Chickamauga: 2 1 I 

Battle of Gettysburg: 2 10 

Battle of Jonesboro: 2 11 

capture of Cumberland Gap: 2 1 I 

firing on Fort Sumter: 198 

inspectors' role in: 202- 03 

Clarke, Bvt. Brig. Gen . Newman S.: 195 

Clay , Henry: 118- 19, 126 

Cleveland, Grover: 302 

Clothier General: 57 

Commander in Chief. See Commanding 

General. 
INDEX 

Commanders: 191 

company: 57- 58 

department: 134, 140-41 

division: 174-75 

fi eld: 167 

post: 305" 

regimental: 25-26 

Commanding General. See also General staff; 

Secretary of War; War Department; by 

name . 

as chief of staff of Secretary of War: 167 , 

306, 332 

as field commander: 178- 79 , 185- 86 

as nominal commander of line: 174-75 , 243 

as supervisor of U.S. Army , staff and line: 

133- 34, 252, 265- 66, 332, 363 

loss of control over anny and staff: 167- 69 , 

172, 179- 80, 205 , 243,250, 390 

relationship to Corps of Engineers: 161- 62, 

171 

relationship to Secretary of War: 66, 179 , 

181- 82,314, 330--31 

toward abolition: 398 

Commissary Department: 126, 252. See also 

Staff departments. 

Commissary Generals 

of Ordnance: 99" 

of Purchases: 9911, 126, 142 

of Subsistence: 126, 240 

Congress: 141 , ISO, 164, 166, 214. See also 

Continental Congress; House of 

Representatives; Senate. 

establishment of War Department: 56 

expansion of national defense: 73- 74 , 177, 

232, 238, 364, 372- 73 

legislation affecting inspectorate and its 

duties: 91 - 93, 142-43 , 144-45 , 150--51, 

168, 175 , 184,204-05,246, 248,278- 79 

postwar: 61 - 62, 356 

reduction of size of military force: 58- 59, 

11 2- 11 3, 131 , 175, 183 , 252,255- 56, 266, 

276, 279- 80 

reorganization of Army and staff departments: 

122, 159- 60, 216, 252-56 , 270--71,304-05 , 

373- 74 , 391 

wartime: 91- 93 , 177 

Conrad , Charles M.: I 84 

Construction: 145. See also Housing; Inspection 

reports; Inspections; Inspectors general, 

special assignments. 

of posts: 73 , 232- 33 

of schools and libraries: 234 

Continental Army: 3, 7, 12" , 21,61- 62. See 

also Steuben , Maj. Gen . Friedrich W.A. 

von; Washington, General George . 

against British at Barren Hill: 42-43 

as mixed force of regulars and militia: 11- 13, 

17 

at Charleston: 56 

at Hudson Highlands: 56 

at Middlebrook , New Jersey: 50--51 

at Morristown, New Jersey: 52 

becomes U.S . Army: 62 

campaigns of 1777: 21-22 

demobilization: 58- 59 

first inspector: 8 

455 

meeting British invasion of New York: 15- 16 

mounted force: 18- 19 

officers: 13- 14 

problems: 12- 15, 36--38 

successes: 16--17 

under authority of Continental Congress: 

12-13 

Continental Congress: 29, 48, 53- 54 

authority over American amly: 12, 14, 16, 17 

commissions to Europeans: 17- 21 , 22- 23 , 

33- 35 

concept of inspector general: 3, 5- 6, 27-28, 31 

development and support of effective fighting 

force: II , 12-13, 16--17 

establishment and use of Inspector General: 

24-28, 45-46, 47, 50, 53-54 

move to York: 22 

organization of line command: 12-13 

organization of staff departments: 12- 13 

Continental forces. See Continental Army; 

Militia; Volunteers. 

1st Continental Regiment: 1211 

Conway , Maj. Gen. Thomas: 22- 25, 26--27, 

28- 31,39,44, 250,271 

Cooper, Bv!. Maj. Samuel: 164, 188- 90, 195 , 

198 

Coppinger, Maj . John J.: 285 

Corbin, Henry C.: 365 , 373 , 390--91, 405 

Cornell , Col. Ezekial: 57 

Corps of Artillerists: 69 

Corps of Engineers: 69, 87,1 21, 127,141 , 

158-59, 161- 62,168 , 174, 190--91, 192, 

202 , 236, 23911 , 256, 272, 284, 304, 

308, 323, 327 , 373. See also Insp!;ctors 

general, special assignments; United States 

Military Academy. 

Corps of Topographical Engineers: 127, 168 

Crawford , George W.: 195 

Crawford, William H. : 113- 14, 115 

Croghan , Col. George: 145-48 , 150--51, 152, 

153- 54,156,157- 58,159, 160--62,163- 64, 

167 , 168,169,171,172, 173, 174, 

176--77,178,182, 191- 92,200 

Cromwell: 12 

Cushing, Col. Thomas H. 

as Acting Adjutant and Inspector: 67- 70, 82 

as Adjutant General: 93 

as Adjutant and Inspector of the Army: 87-88 

as brigade inspector: 73 

as line commander: 88 

D' Arendt, Baron: 29 

Davis, Jefferson: 186, 191 , 196--97 
456 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777- 1903 

Davis, Maj. John M. : 119- 20, 124, 125 

Davis, Brig. Gen. Nelson Davis: 216-17, 236, 

270-71,274,288 , 292 , 310-11 

as assistant inspector general , Army of the 

Potomac: 210, 218 

as inspector, Department of the Missouri: 259 

as inspector, Department of New Mexico: 

210 , 239n, 244, 247 

as inspector, Division of the Atlantic: 275, 

281 

as inspector, Division of the Missouri: 296 

as Inspector General: 212 , 300-302 

on special duty in New Mexico: 269- 70 

Deane, Silas: 17- 18 , 20-21,22- 23,34-35 

Dearborn, General Henry: 85-86, 87- 88, 95 , 96 , 

103-04, 105 , 106, 109 

DeButts, Lt. Henry: 65- 66, 68 

Departments. See also Districts; Divisions. 

Eastern: 128, 133 , 142, 151- 52 

9th Military: 190 

of California: 18411 

of New Mexico: 184n 

of Oregon: 18411 

of Texas: 18411, 229 

of the East: 238-39 , 246 

of the Lakes: 238- 39 

Southern: 55 

Western: 128, 133 , 151- 52 

Desertion: 15 , 96, 11 8,123,141 , 145, 149- 50, 

157,160, 182,194,254-55,261,351. 

See also Discipline; Enlisted men. 

Dexter, Samuel: 82 

Dick Act of 21 January 1903: 382 

Disbursements and receipts. See Auditing 

accounts. 

Du Coudray, Maj. Gen. Philippe Charles Jean 

Baptiste Tronson . See Tronson du 

Coudray, Maj. Gen. Philippe Charles Jean 

Baptiste . 

Duponceau , Pierre: 40-41, 48 

Eaton, Amos B.: 224 

Eaton , John H. : 157 

Education. See Military education. 

Elizabethtown, New Jersey: 167 

Elkins, Stephen B.: 327, 329 

Ellery , William: 28 

Enlisted men 

education of: 351- 52, 38711 

management of: 250-51 , 358 

Eustis, Col. Abram: 136 

Eustis, William: 89, 91, 93- 94 , 96-97 , 98 

Fallen Timbers, Ohio: 68 

Farnsworth , Maj. Henry 1.: 302, 318 

Federalists: 73- 74 , 75 , 82, 84. See also 

Republicans. 

Floyd, John B.: 198,201 

Forsyth , George A.: 234 

Fort Davis, Texas: 233 

Fort Jesup, Louisiana: 164 

Fort Leavenworth: 164 

Fort Pitt: 61 

Fort Shelby: 11911 

Fort Snelling, Minnesota: 164 

Fort Towson: 164 

Franklin , Benjamin: 17- 19,34-35 

Franklin , Brig. Gen. William B.: 199 

Frederick the Great of Prussia: 5 

Discipline: 80-81 , 82-83 , 88, 92, 96, 108- 09, French and Indian War: 6, II 

141, 149- 50 

Continental Army problems of: 15 , 37 

reform of: 156-57 , 204 , 350-5 1 

District of Columbia: 133 

Districts 

9th Military , in the North: 106 

of New Mexico: 238- 39 

of Tennessee: 224 

Divisions 

Eastern: 167, 188 

Northern: 116-17, 1201l, 125 

of the Atlantic: 251 

of the Missouri: 244, 250 , 298, 337 

of the Pacific : 238- 39, 250 

Pacific: 188 

Southern : 116-17 , 120, 122, 123- 24 

Western: 167 , 188 

Dodge Commission report: 376-78 , 389, 393, 

397 

Dodge, Grenville M.: 376 

Dodge, Col. Henry: 164 

Doughty, Capt. John: 61 

Draft: 80, 232 

Drillmaster. See Inspectors general. 

Gadsden , Col. James 

as Adjutant General: 132, 136 

as inspector general, Southern Division: 

124-25, 1261l, 127 

Gaines, Brig. Gen. Edmund P.: 108, 120, 124, 

125 , 132- 33 , 136, 137 

as commander, Western Division: 166, 

167- 68,171 - 72,173 

as department commander and own inspector: 

140-42, 151- 52, 156-57, 159 

Remarks Concernillg the Militia of the United 

States: 156 

Garfield , James A.: 252, 255 

Garlington , Lt. Col. Ernest A.: 330, 332, 333, 

365 , 367, 368, 372, 383 

Gates, Maj. Gen. Horatio: 14,22,24-25, 27 , 

29- 30 

General of the Armies of the United States. 

See Commanding General. 

General staff: 329 

of early staff departments: 69, 74 , 82, 87, 

98-99, 113 , 122 

as unity of authority: 394-406 
INDEX 

Gibson, Capt. James: 90 

Governors Island, New York: 133 

Grant, General Ulysses S. 

as· Commanding General: 205, 20711 , 223, 

230, 246, 247, 40 I 

as President: 252, 257, 265 

Greene , Maj. Gen. Nathanael: 20, 30, 36--37, 

4 1, 55- 56 

Hall , Nathaniel N.: 108- 09 

Halleck , Henry W.: 20711 

Hamilton, Maj. Gen. Alexander: 25, 28, 40, 41, 

46, 61, 74. See also Adams, John . 

as Treasury Secretary: 64 

as Inspector General: 75- 83, 88 

Hammond, Lt. Richard P.: 177 

Hancock, John: 18 

Hancock, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott: 279 

Handy , John: 364, 365- 66, 373-74 

Hardie, Col. James: 209- 10, 26 1, 267 , 27 1, 

274-75 , 276 , 283- 84, 366 

as inspector, Division of the Missouri: 259, 

269 

as inspector general at Washington office: 226--31 

237 , 240 , 253- 54 

as inspector on special duty at War 

Department: 238 , 244 , 245 , 246--47 , 248, 

256 

Harrison, Benjamin 

as Senator: 298 

as President: 32 1 

HalTison, Lt. William Henry: 68 

Harrison, General William Henry: 12 1, 145-46 , 

147 

Haskell , Maj. Jonathan: 68 

Hatch , Bvt. Maj. Gen. Edward: 285 

Hayne, Col. Arthur P. 

as adjutant general: 11 3 

as inspector general, Southern Division: 

11 6--17: 120, 123- 24, 136, 248 

Hazen, William B.: 237- 38 

Heyl, Col. Charles H.: 368 , 372, 396 

Heyl, Col. Edward M.: 330 

as assistant inspector general, Department of 

Texas: 300, 30 I, 302 

as assistant inspector general , Division of the 

Pacific: 306, 318 

Hicks, Maj . John: 120 

Hindman, Bvt. Lt. Col. Jacob: 139 

Hitchcock , Bvt. Maj. Gen. Ethan Allen: 17 1- 72, 

197 

as acting inspector general: 166 

as inspector general and chief of staff: 180 

Holt, Joseph: 198 

Hortalez and Company: 34 

House of Representatives: 159-60, 176,273- 74, 

280--8 1. See also Congress; Senate. 

Committee on Military Affairs: 166, 176, 

255-56, 272-73, 279-80 , 400-401 

H. R. 101 7: 299 

451 

Housing: 145 , 169, 193-94, 232-34, 285 . See 

also Construction; Inspection reports; 

Inspections; Inspectors general , special 

assignments. 

Howe, Maj . Gen . Sir William: 22 

Hughes, Maj . Daniel: 109 

Hughes, Brig. Gen. Robert P.: 393 

as brigadier general of volunteers , Philippines: 

368 , 372 

as inspector, Department of California: 301 

as inspector, Department of the Dakota: 300 

as inspector, Division of the Pacific: 301 

as inspector, North Atlantic District: 33 1- 32 

as inspector running Washington office: 306 

Hull , John A.T.: 373 

Hull, General William: 95 

Hutcheson , Capt. Grote: 385- 86 

Indians: 123- 24, 149, 188,210,229,232, 244, 

248,250--5 1, 259,267 , 269 , 294,295. See 

also Inspec tion reports; Inspectors general , 

special assignments. 

and British: 62- 64 , 67- 69 , 95- 96 

relocation: 164-66 , 168 

Inspecting and Mustering Department: 53, 57 

as general staff: 54-55 

relationship to Commander in Chief: 54-55 

Inspection reports: 27, 57- 58, 108-09, 113- 14, 

118-20, 137-40, 153, 155- 56, 157-58, 

161- 62, 166, 174 , 18 1, 19 1- 92, 193-94 , 

201 , 219- 2 1, 253- 54,312,321-23 ,366. 

See also Auditing; Cemeteries; 

Construction; Property condemnation and 

inspection ; Returns; United States Military 

Prisons. 

chain of communication for: 187- 88,217, 

275- 76 , 39 1 

confidential: 102, 108 , 125, 133, 14411, 155, 

162,235- 36, 239-40,247,253 

guidelines for: 220--2 1, 222 

on administration: 47-48, 137- 38 

on arms and equipment: 47-48, 151 , 163-64 , 

191- 93 

on conduct of officers: 119- 20, 124, 139, 

144, 162, 192,200 

on discipline: 47-48, 11 9- 20, 124, 137- 38, 

191 - 92 

on Eastern Department: 156 

on follow-up: 247-48, 269 , 275, 319- 20 , 386 

on Fort Stockton , Norfolk Harbor, Virginia: 

137 

on horses: 123- 24 

on Indians: 123-24, 152, 186--87, 193 

on police: 137-38 

on post gardens: 192, 319- 20 

on posts: 11 9- 20, 123-24, 192, 193- 94, 

144-45 

on property management: 139-40, 200-201, 

320 
458 

Inspection reports (cant.) 

on Quartermaster Department, Department of 

the Platte: 269 

on reform: 158- 59 

on Southern Division: 123- 24 

on supplies: 47-48 

on Western Department: 156 

Inspections: 57-58, 154-56, 158/1 ,223- 24, 

253-54, 258 , 28 1, 302- 03,365- 67. See 

also Inspectors general. 

as a fo rm of specialization: 136-37, 143- 44, 

299-300 

as a responsibility of commanders: 144, 2 13, 

228,230-3 1, 236 

as a source of information: 150-5 1, 153, 404 

as a tool ofcornrnand: 5-7,42,43-44,46,49, 

58,60,65, 100-102, 125,134,135, 141-42, 

156, 180,202,243 , 394, 404-05 

as civil oversight of military: 5- 6, 56-57, 58 

as management: 135 , 249 

concept of: 3-4 

divisions of: 83, 332, 334, 335- 36, 349 , 358 , 

363, 364-65 

encourage efficiency: 20 1 

essential to general staff operations: 403- 05 

follow-up: 258, 325- 26, 333 

frequency of: 144, 235 

guidelines for: 134-35,235- 36 

in absence of inspectorate: 61- 62 , 63 , 70 

of accounts of War Department Supply 

Division: 323 

of Camp Montgomery: 119 

of care of the sick: 51 

of Corps fortification construction projects: 

161 , 192 

of Cuban postal frauds: 383, 400-401 

of Department of California: 191, 192-93 

of Department of Oregon: 191 

of Department of Texas: 191 

of Department of the East: 194-95 

of Department of the Lakes: 159,269 

of Department of the Northwest: 2 I 7 

of Division of the Pacific: 19 I 

of Fort Claiborne: 109 

of Fort Columbus, New York: 195 

of Fort Delaware: 161 

of Fort Monroe, Virginia: 154, 195 

of Fort Saint Charles: 109 

of Fort Scott , Georgia: 124 

of Fort Shelby: 119 

of Fort Stockton: 137 

of Fort Sullivan: 140, 157 

of forts in Louisiana: 137 

of forts on East and Gulf coasts: 137 , 152, 

217 

of horses: 10 1- 02 

of 2d Infantry: 109, 159 

of 3d Infantry at Fort Trumbull, Connecticut: 

195-96 

of 5th Infantry: 159 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

of 7th Infantry: 15 1 

of 29th Infantry: 108 

of Jefferson Barracks, Missouri: 195 

of New Mexico Territory: 186-87, 19 1, 192 

of New Orleans: 109, 151 

of Niagara, New York: 137, 158 

of Ordnance Department facilities: 137, 

139- 40, 15 1, 154-55 , 158- 59, 323 

of posts on Missouri and Mississippi rivers: 

144, 150, 151 , 166 , 217 , 237- 38 

of Red River posts: 144, 193 

of 1st Regiment of Light Dragoons: 108 

of 2d Regiment of Light Dragoons: 108 

of 13th Regiment of Light Dragoons: 108 

of 1 st Rifle Regiment: 108- 09 

of target practice: 299 

of the West: 159, 160, 194,237- 38 

of United States Military Academy: 139-40, 

152, 158, 160-6 1, 32 1- 22 , 337 

of paragraph 955: 323 , 335- 37, 348-49 

on military and civil subjects: 349 

separated from command: 31 , 45-46 , 249- 50, 

330-3 1 

serving higher authority: 50, 134, 408 

serving mi litary more than civil purposes: 5- 6, 

236 

Steuben imprint on: 10 1 

systemati zed: 248- 49 

systems of, as mode ls: 4-8 

worldwide: 385- 86 

Inspector General: 50-5 1, 52- 53, 57, 9 1- 93 , 

13 1- 32, 228- 29 , 302, 328- 29, 335, 336. 

See also by /lame . 

as chief of staff: 52- 53 , 60, 74, 99- 100 

as commander: 79, 80, 83 , 94 

as Commander in Chi ef's principal inspector: 

55 

as drillmaster-general: 24, 38-42, 44 , 47 , 55 

as muster master-general: 55 

as second in command: 75- 76, 78- 79 

as staff officer: 47 

as standardizer of Army procedures: 43-44 , 

50-5 1, 53- 55,57- 58,228 

duties: 54, 93- 94, 2 17- 18, 224-26, 227 , 

335- 36 

Hamilton 's imprint on: 92 

relationship to Adjutant General: 46 , 52- 53, 

79 

relationshi p to Board of War: 27- 28 , 50, 

54-55 

re lationshi p to Commander in Chief: 30-3 1, 

43-44, 47-48, 50, 53- 55 

relationship to Continental Congress: 53- 55 

relationship to Secretary of War and 

Commanding General: 13 I, 132, 162 , 

227- 28 , 229- 30, 278 , 303- 04 , 324 

status with other department chiefs: 93 , 

277- 79 

Steuben's imprint on: 74 , 9 1- 92 

Inspector General's Depattment: 96, 102- 03, 
INDEX 

Inspector General's Department (cont.) 

256, 385, 390-91. See also Congress; 

Corps of Engineers; Adj utant General; Staff 

departments; United States Army. 

abolition of: 82, 9~97 

annual report of: 24 1, 249, 259, 30~ . 306 , 

315, 324, 329- 30, 369- 70, 395 

as arbiter of protocol: 247 

as arbiter of questions of relative rank : 260 

as duplication of general staff: 394--95, 39~98, 

400-401,404--05 

as group of individual agents: 275 , 277 

as staff of Commanding General: 65- 66 

as War Department chief auditor of accounts: 

3 16 

authority and work load of: 325- 26, 327, 

333- 34, 348-49, 383 

centrali zed authority of, over inspectors: 

153- 54, 178- 80,222, 236, 246-47 , 250-52 

c lerks as status of: 224 , 297 , 299 , 30 1, 303 , 

322, 325 , 365, 39 1, 393 

deterioration of, after Legion d issolves: 68 

during Civil War: 229- 31 

during Spanish-American War: 334, 357- 58, 

363 , 364, 365- 69 , 372, 374 

during War of 1812: 106 

fomla lization and status as separate 

department: 90, 20 1, 202 , 229- 3 1,242- 43, 

248 , 249-50 , 255,257,270-7 1, 273 , 275, 

276, 277- 79, 363, 364--65 

history of: 253- 54, 327- 29 

in low repute: 270 

independence of: 227, 242-43, 255 , 270-7 1, 

272- 73 , 275,277,28 1, 289- 90, 29~97 , 

30 1,320,328- 29,330-3 1, 334, 335- 36, 

348-49, 365- 66, 373- 74, 39 1 

lacking head of department: 274--75, 277- 78 

legislati on authori zing personnel and 

functions: 98- 101 , 11 5- 16,259- 60, 

273- 74,297- 98 , 299- 300,3 19- 20 , 365- 66 , 

367- 68 , 390-93, 406 

permanence of: 2 17-18, 241, 242-43,245-46, 

27 1,292-93 

post-American Revolution: 6 1- 62, 63 

post-Civil War: 243 

post-Spanish-American War: 372, 37~78 

post-War of 18 12: 11 3- 14 

rel ationship to Adjutant General 's Office: 

252-53, 30 III 

relationship to Secretary of War and 

Commanding General: 229- 30 , 254, 285, 

310,3 11 ,3 14, 320, 324--25 , 330-3 1, 

335- 36,348-49, 39 1, 394 

rules of inspection: 227,250 , 292- 93 , 335- 36 

Inspectors 

brigade: 39, 46, 50, 73, 89, 92 

divisional: 46 

of Artillery: 82 

of contracts and supplies: 57 

of Fortifications: 82, 86 

regular: 17 

sub: 38, 39, 45 , 53, 57, 74, 92 

volunteer: 366, 369- 70 

459 

Inspectors general: 4, 2 1, 2~27, 52- 53 , 5~58 , 

63,65- 66,9 1- 93,99- 101 , 102-03 , 142, 

162- 63,176,2 13- 15, 2 19- 21, 22~27, 

235- 36,245-46,259- 60 , 282,299,330-3 1, 

40 1- 02 

acting assistant: i39, 248, 296, 301 

administering oaths: 244--45, 257-58 

as a group of independently functioning 

individuals: 277 , 279, 383 

as adjutants: 50, 53 , 69, 79, 88, 168,2 15- 16 

as agents of civil oversight of military: 2~28, 

92 , 174--75 

as age nts of commanders served: 43- 44 , 46, 

50,60, 66, 102- 03 , 125 , 132-33, 134, 167, 

180, 227 , 235 , 246-47 , 302-03 , 30~08 , 

334 

as auditors: 25, 26, 92, 174, 175- 76,20 1, 

27 1- 72,287- 89 

as chiefs of staff: 103- 04 , 163, 167- 68 , 

177-78, 181 

as commanders: 46-47 , 179- 80,2 10- 11 , 

230-3 1, 376, 378 

as muster masters: 52-54, 57, 67-68, 92, 

100-101, 163, 16 ~67 , 170, 179 

as second in command: 65- 66, 177- 78 

as specialists: 242-43, 249 , 255 

as training officers: 24 , 25- 26, 3 1,45-46, 58, 

64--65, 106 

assistant: 3911 , 53, 58, 74 , 92- 93, 105-06, 

209- 13,222- 23 

chain of communi cations: 187-88, 195- 96 

charter: 50-5 I 

concept of: 4--5, 3711, 43- 44 

establishment of: 24 , 25 

granting discharges: 152- 53, 160 

independence: 125, 249 

inspection of United States Military 

Academy: 162 

legislation authori zing personnel and 

functions: 91- 92 , 105- 06, 127,204--05 , 269 

noting condition of buildings: 91 -92, 162 , 

232- 34 

observing conduct of officers: 25, 118- 19, 

152- 53 

promotion of discipline: 25, 2~27, 91-92, 

101 - 02 

property management: 65-66, 91-92, 142-43, 

163, 246n, 250 

re lationship to Commander in Chief: 3 1, 

5~58, 163 

re lationship to Congress: 5~58 

re lationship to Secretary of War and 

Commanding General: 5~58, 88- 89, 133, 

142-43 , 152, 167-69, 173- 75, 187-88,205 , 

2 13, 229-30,239, 249- 50,275-76,285 
460 

Inspectors general (cont.) 

relationship to War Department: 101, 181 

review of troops: 25-26, 27, 50, 64-66, 

170--7 1, 179-80,250--51 ,292 

supervision of camp selection and security: 

45-46, 100-103, 163 

Inspectors general, special assignments: 163- 64, 

218-19,225-26,256,274-75,283-85, 

309-11, 326, 335, 382-83 

auditing: 224-25, 229, 239-40, 257-58 

cavalry: 215, 216 

cemeteries: 284, 311 

conduct of officers: 250, 283-84, 285, 309 

construction: 245 

Corps of Engineers: 174, 284 

housing: 239-40, 284, 285 

Indians: 194-95,283,284,285 

ordnance: J 94 

Signal Corps: 308-09, 386 

Invalid Board: 218, 21911, 220. See also Board 

to Organize the Invalid Corps. 

Izard , Capt. George: 7711, 10611 

Jackson, Andrew: 112; 116--17,1 20, 121, 

122, 125, 132-33, 134, 136 

Jay Treaty of 1794: 73-74 

Jefferson Barracks, Missouri: 167 

Jefferson, Thomas: 84-86 

Jesup , General Thomas S. 

as field commander: 166--67 

as Quartermaster General: 142, 147 , 160, 

169, 193-94,202 

Johnston , Bvt. Col. Joseph E.: 198,202 

Joint Army and Navy Board: 384 

Jones, Col. Roger (father) 

as Adjutant General: 150, 158 

as adjutant general, Northern Division: 124, 

136, 187-88 , 195-96 

Jones, Brig. Gen. Roger (son): 212- 13, 244, 300 

as assistant inspector general, special 

assignments: 210 

as assistant inspector general, Army of 

Virginia: 212 

as assistant quartermaster general: 212 

as chief quartermaster, Army of the Potomac: 

212 

as inspector, Department of the East: 30 I 

as inspector, Division of the Atlantic: 275-76, 

296, 30 1 

as inspector, Division of the Mississippi: 229 

as inspector, Division of the Pacific: 23911, 

284, 285, 291, 302 

as inspector, Washington office: 305, 306, 

3 16--17,3 18 

as Inspector general: 305, 306, 3 16-- 17, 3 18 

Judge Advocate General: 364-65 

Kent, William T.: 382 

King, Capt. William: 9311 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Kirby, 1st Lt. Edmund: 132 

Knox, Brig. Gen. Henry: 37, 38 

as chief of artillery under Washington: 20 

as Secretary at War: 62 , 64-68, 76 

Knox, Kilburn: 229 

Knox, Col. Thomas T.: 368, 372, 378, 406 

Knoxville, Tennessee: 372 

Lafayette: 29-30, 41, 42-43 

Lamont, Daniel S.: 329-32 

Land Grant Act: 214 

Laurens, Henry: 29-30, 32, 34-35 

Laurens, Col. John: 30, 32, 40-41 

Lawton, Col. Henry W.: 306, 318, 332, 333, 

368,372 

Leadership: 95-96 

Continental Army: 13, 18 

reform of: 98-99, 106--07 

Lee, Francis Lightfoot: 28 

Lee, Maj. John M.: 385-86 

Legion of the United States: 404 

at Legionville: 64-67 

basis for the U. S. Army: 69, 70--71 

expedition in the Northwest: 67-68 

L'Enfant, Pierre Charles: 48 

Lewis, Capt. T.: 68 

Lexington, Kentucky: 372 

Lincoln, Abraham: 198 

Lincoln, Benjamin: 56--57 

Lincoln, Robert Todd: 297 

Logan , John: 273 

Lord Cornwallis: 55, 56 

Lord Haldane: 389 

Lord Stirling: 25 

Louis XIV: 4 

Louisville, Kentucky: 133 

Ludington, Capt. Elisha H.: 281 . 

as assistant inspector general: 225, 228-29, 

237 

as inspector, Department of the South: 248 

as inspector, Department of the Columbia: 

270 

as inspector, Division of the Pacific: 25911, 

276 

as inspector running Washington office: 239, 

240, 244, 245, 247 

Ludington , Maj. Gen. Marshall I.: 405, 407 

McCall , Col. George A. : 186--88, 190, 195- 96 

McClellan, Maj. Gen. George B. (father): 195, 

199, 206--08, 217, 291, 366 

McClell an , George B. (son): 373-74, 402 

McCrary , George W.: 276--77,278,282,303-04 

McDonald, Eleazer W.: 120 

McDowell , Maj . Gen . Irvin: 199 

McHenry, James: 74, 76, 78, 79-80, 81-82 

McKinley, William: 363, 366, 372-73, 389 

Macomb, Alexander: 10611 

as Chief of Engineers: 150, 152 
INDEX 

Macomb, Alexander (cont.) 

as Commanding General: 152, 153- 54, 

157- 59, 161, 162, 163- 64, 166, 167- 68, 

169 , 171- 72, 174 , 182, 187- 88,299,404 

Macon, Nathaniel: 157 

McRae , William: 120 

Madison, James: 89 , 90-91, 110, 11 2- 13, 

11 5- 16 

Mahan, Denis: 197 

Mansfi eld , Col. Joseph K.F.: 190-92, 193 , 197, 

203,204,22 1 

Marcy , Brig. Gen. Randolph B.: 199, 206,22 1, 

240 , 302, 316 

as brigadier general of volunteers: 207- 08 , 

217 

as chief of staff, Army of the Potomac: 207, 

366 

as inspector, Department of the Lakes: 269 

as inspector, Division of the Missouri: 238, 

244-45 , 248 , 250 , 252 

as Inspector Genera l: 212, 257- 6 1, 266-93 , 

294 , 295,3 11 - 12,315 

Outline Descriptiol1 of Military Posts: 283 

The Prairie Traveler: 206 

Marcy, William L.: 176 

Marigault, G. H.: 12011 

Marsh, George P. : 197 

Marsh, Lt. Col. J. F.: 225 

Medical Staff: 99n 

Medical Department: 127 , 256, 336, 386 

Army Medical School: 357 

Army and Navy General Hospital: 380 

Hospital Corps: 304, 357, 374 

as own inspector: 154, 214, 250n 

Meigs, Montgomery c.: 224 

Medal of Honor: 21 1 

Mentges, Col. Francis: 

as acting inspector of Southern Army: 57 

as inspector of contracts: 62 , 63 

Mexican War: 183 

at Battle of Buena Vista: 178 

at San Antonio: 177- 78 

inspectorate during: 177, 179- 80 

Mifflin , Thomas: 30 

Miles, General Nelson A.: 332- 33 , 358, 362- 63 , 

366-67, 368,369,373- 74 , 397,399-400 , 403 . 

Miley, Lt. Col. John D.: 370 

Military education. See also Arnly War College; 

Enlisted men. 

civilian , at colleges: 234 , 29 1, 311- 12, 333, 

343-45, 380-8 1 

university system of: 395-96 

Militia: 7- 8, 11- 13, 14-17 , 62- 64,67- 68,88- 89, 

97 , 150 , 157, 164 , 169, 198- 99. See also 

Continental Army; National Guard; 

Volunteers. 

Militia Act of 1792: 382. See also Dick Act of 

21 January 1903. 

Mills, Maj. John: 65- 66 , 67- 68 

Mills, Maj. Stephen c.: 368, 372 

Mingo River, Ohio: 6 1 

Monroe Doctrine: 232 

Monroe, James 

as Secretary of State: 110, III 

as President: 12 1, 127 , 136 

Moore , Maj . Francis: 332 

Morris, Gouverneur: 77 

Morris, Robert: 34, 56 

461 

Mottin de la Balme , Col. Augustin: 18- 19,20 

Mustering: 11- 12, 100-101, 215. See also 

Inspecting and Mustering Department; 

Inspectors general; Mustering Department. 

for pay: 52, 101 , 10211 , 107- 08, 1l2, 163, 170 

of militia and volunteers: 10211, 163, 168, 

170, 195 

with company muster rolls: 143 , 177- 78 

Mustering Department: 52- 53 

Muster master: 8 

Muster master-general: 8 

National conscription. See Draft. 

National Guard: 29 1, 345-46, 375 

Connecticut: 29 1 

encampments of: 346, 347-48 

inspection of: 346-48 

military training of: 353- 54, 381- 82 

National Guard Association: 29 1, 347 , 348,373 

National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers: 

339-41, 374, 380 

National military cemeteries: 184n, 214 , 234 , 

246 , 284,290, 3 11 , 336-37, 339-40n , 380. 

See also Inspection reports; Inspections; 

Inspectors general. 

National Park Service: 298, 388 

Nicoll, Maj. Abimae l Y. : 88- 89 , 93 , 106 

North, Maj. William 

as Adjutant General: 79, 9311 

as inspector: 59, 61 , 62 

as Steuben's aide: 48 , 49, 51 

North American Review: 149 

Office of the Inspector General. See Inspector 

General 's Department. 

Orcutt, Warren H. : 365 

Orderly books: 48 

Ordnance: 138, 142-43 , 151,154-56,158- 59. 

See also Inspection reports; Inspections; 

Inspectors general. 

Ordnance Department: 99 , 142-43, 151 , 154-56, 

158- 59, 168,202, 256 , 357 , 373- 74 , 386 

Orne, Maj. Azor: 106-07 

Ourand, C. H.: 324 

Parker, Brig. Gen. Daniel 

as Adjutant and Inspector General: 111-14, 

11 6-17, 124, 125, 133 
462 THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

Parker, Brig. Gen. Daniel (cont.) 

as Paymaster General: 127-28, 132 

Pay: 138, 149-50, 160, 254-55. See also 

Desertion. 

Pay Department: 127,252-53,256, 386 

Paymaster General: 69-70, 74, 101-02, 126, 

127-28,313 

Philadelphia: 47, 48 

Physician and Surgeon-General: 99n. See also 

Surgeon General. 

Physician General: 74 

Pickering, Col. Timothy: 15 

Pierce, Franklin: 186 

Pike, Brig. Gen . Zebulon Montgomery: 103-06, 

110 

Pinckney, Charles Cotes worth: 75, 76-77 

Poinsett, Joel R.: 167-69, 186 

Polk, James K.: 176-77 

Poore, Ben: Perley: 207 

Porter, Maj. Gen. Fitz-John: 199 

Porter, James M.: 175-76 

Porter, Peter B. : 152 

Portsmouth, New Hampshire: 35 

Post, Pvt. Charles Johnson: 371 

Post school system. See Enlisted men. 

Pratt, Capt. James: 118- 19 

Prisons. See United States Military Prisons. 

Proctor, Redfie ld 

as chairman, Senate Committee on Military 

Affairs: 402 

as Secretary of War: 320-23, 337, 351-52 

as senator: 326-27 

Property condemnation and inspection: 139, 

142-43 , 144,200-201,219,249,250, 

256-57, 258, 259-60, 336, 342-43, 374, 

379-80, 397, 398,403-04. See also 

Inspection reports; Inspections; Inspectors 

general. 

boards of survey for: 285-87 

of horses: 215, 219-20, 226-27, 287, 314-15 

of medical supplies: 286, 342 

of ordnance: 154-55, 170-71 

of signal ing gear: 314-15 

of subsistence stores: 314, 342-43 

procedures: 285-86, 342-43 

Provisional army: 74, 75-76, 77, 78-79, 82. See 

also Hamilton, Maj . Gen . Alexander. 

Pulaski, Casimir: 19 

Punishment. See Discipline. 

Purchasing Department: 122, 126 

Quarternlaster Department: 63, 9 1,99, 101-02, 

123, 127, 156, 174, 183-84,233-34, 

239-40, 255-56, 303- 04, 336. See also 

Inspectors general, special assignments; 

Staff departments. 

as own inspector: 153-54, 213-14, 223-24 

involvement in construction and repairs: 145, 

233-34 

management of cemeteries: 245-46, 290, 311 

management of transportation: 355-56, 362, 

374, 386-87 

supply problems: 14 

Quartermaster General: 57-58, 69, 74,9 1,9911, 

11 3, 122, 242-43, 283, 286-87, 290, 

302-03, 336-37 

Quisenberry, A. c.: 327-28 

Ramsay, Alexander: 282 

Rawlins, John A.: 265 

Reconstruction: 27 1, 276, 294 

Recruitment: 16, 103, 106 

Reed, Maj . Walter: 37 1 

Regular Army: 157, 169, 362-63, 365-66, 

372-73,375. See also United States Army. 

during peacetime: 90-91, 121-22, 233-34 

expansion: 73-74, 89 

problems: 80-8 1 

relationship with National Guard: 29 1,347-48 

Regulations: 102-03, 133,238,274-75,282. 

See also Inspector General's Department. 

defining authority of Commanding General: 

134, 179,201 

defining duties of general staff: 405 

defining inspectorate: 133, 20 I 

making inspection duty of company 

commanders: 42, 319-20 

establishing relationship of inspectors to 

Secretary of War: 20 1, 234-35, 367 

outlining inspectors' duties: 134-35, 144, 162, 

179,200-201 ,20211,234-36,266-67 , 

294-95, 3 19-20 

outlining inspection report fornlat: 63, 200 

outlining inspection procedures: 163,236, 

267, 294-95, 319-20 

Republicans: 75, 77, 82, 84-85 

Returns: 25-26, 56, 101- 02 . See also Inspection 

reports. 

Reserves: 375. See also National Guard . 

Revolutionary France: 73 

Revolutionary War. See American Revolution . 

Robinson; Fayette: 181 

Roosevelt, Theodore: 389 

Root, Elihu: 381-82,38411, 389-92, 393-400, 

401n, 402- 05, 407-09 

Rudulph, Maj. Michael: 65-66 

Rusling, James F.: 233 

Sacket, Brig. Gen. Delos B.: 240, 260-61, 

271-72,281-82,292, 302, 305, 310-11, 

313,316, 321 

as establisher of Inspector General's 

Department: 208-09 

as head of Inspector General's Department: 

217-19, 220-26, 227, 233, 237 
INDEX 

Sacket, Brig. Gen. Delos B. (conI.) 

as inspector, Department of the Cumberland: 

238 , 248 

as inspector, Division of the Atlantic: 250-52, 

259 , 267 

as inspector, Division of the Missouri: 275 

as inspector, Washington office: 295,296--301 

St. Clair, Maj. Gen . Arthur: 63-64 

St. Germain, Comte de: 34 

Sanger, Brig. Gen. Joseph P.: 292 , 324, 332, 

335 , 350-51 , 354, 386, 396 

as brigadier general of volunteers: 318- 19, 

368 

as division commander: 368 

as inspector, Division of the Missouri: 325 

as inspector, South Atlantic District: 333 

as inspector at Washington office: 325 , 333, 

365 , 368, 372 

The Army of the United States: Historical 

Sketches of Staff and Line with Portraits of 

Generals-in-Chief: 328- 29 

Sargent, Lt. Col. Winthrop: 63-64, 65 

Scammell , Col. Alexander: 40 

Schofield , General John M. : 373- 74 , 401- 02 

as Acting Secretary of War: 265 

as Commanding General: 305- 06, 319, 

321- 22 , 332, 351 

Schriver, Col. Edmund: 271, 282, 292n , 295, 

302, 366 

as agent of Secretary of War: 257- 6 1,266--69 

as head of Inspector General's Department: 

237 , 238- 57 

as inspector, Army of the Potomac: 22 1-22, 

227 

as inspector, Department of the Missouri: 

274-75 

as inspector, Department of the Pacific: 275 

as inspector, Division of the Pacific: 275 

as inspector of the U.S. Military Academy: 

281 

Schuylkill Arsenal: 245 

Scott, Genera l Winfield: 49n, 94 , 96 , 108, 150 

as Adjutant General: 109- 10, 113-14 

as commander and adjutant: 106--07 

as Commanding General: 172, 174, 176, 

179- 80, 185- 86, 187- 88, 198,203,205, 

401 

as department commander and own inspector: 

132- 33, 134-35 , 137, 139,151- 52, 167 , 

171 , 185- 86, 191 , 192- 94 

Scott's Exercise: 113 

Second Seminole War: 166--68 , 174, 175- 76 

Secretary at War: 56. See also Secretary of War. 

Secretary of War: 151 - 52, 157- 58, 167 , 239n , 

24 1,257 ,287- 88, 289- 90,304--05 , 3 14 , 

315, 322-23, 334, 377- 78, 383 , 394 

as all staff departments: 85 

as commander: 85 , 92, 96--97 , 98- 99 , 101 

as voice of government Army served: 173-75 

463 

relationship with Commanding General: 

87- 88 , 174--75, 201, 249- 50, 265- 66, 

389- 90, 402- 03 

responsibilities: 63n 

Seminole Wars: 164--65 

Dade massacre: 166 

role of inspection in: 166--67 , 168 

Senate. See also Congress; House of 

Representatives. 

Bill 321: 273- 74 

Committee on Military Affairs: 149-50, 

151- 52, 176, 198 , 278 , 299- 300,390-91 , 

398- 99 

Sevier, Ambrose H.: 159 

Shafter, General William " Pecos Bill " : 362- 63, 

369- 71 

Sheridan , Maj. Gen . Philip H.: 232, 298, 305 

Sherman , General William T.: 211- 12, 227- 28 

as commander, Division of the West.: 233, 252 

as Commanding General: 257, 258, 265- 66 , 

271 , 273- 74,275- 76 , 281 

Signal Corps: 238 , 308- 09, 323, 386 

Slayden , James: 400, 402 

Smith, Col. Persifor F.: 166--67 

Smyth , Brig. Gen. Alexander: 93- 97 , 103- 04 , 

150, 152 

Society of the Cincinnati: 59, 82n 

Soldier's Book: 169- 70 

Spanish-American War: 361- 63 , 366--67 

at EI Caney: 362 

at Havana: 371- 72 

at Manila: 363 

at San Juan: 362 

at Santiago: 362 

at Siboney: 362 

Cuban landing during: 362 

mobilization for: 376--78 

on the Philippines: 363 

on Puerto Rico: 362 

Spencer, John c.: 175- 76 

Sprague, William: 224 

Staff departments: 301n , 380. See also by nallle. 

in peacetime: 85 , 228, 280 

in wartime: 215- 16 

independence of: 173- 74 

of the Continental Army: 12- 13, 14,52,56--57 

personnel appointments: 390, 392- 94, 406 

relationship to Secretary of War and 

Commanding General: 158, 280, 306, 

389- 90 

Stagg, John: 62 

Stanton , Edwin M.: 208 , 217, 218- 19, 227- 28 , 

239, 245 

Steuben , Maj. Gen. Friedrich W.A. von: 33- 36, 

42-43 , 62, 64--65. See also Blue book; 

Continental Army; Continental Congress; 

Washington, General George . 

as drillmaster-general: 37-40, 44 

as Inspector-General: 39-44, 52-60 
464 

Steuben, Maj. Gen. (cont.) 

as line commander: 46-47, 55 

as muster master-general: 53-55 

as Washington's adviser: 36-37 

as de facto chief of staff: 52-53 

concept of an inspectorate: 43--44, 45--46 

development of American drill regulations: 

40--42 

establishment of inspection system: 47--48 

refonnation of the Continental Anny: 36-38, 

40--42 

Regulatiolls for the Order and Discipline of 

the Troops of the United States: 48-50 

Stewart, Pvt. Harris H.: 218, 224 

Strong, Lt. Col. James H.: 220---21 

Subalterns: 58, 92-93. See also Inspectors. 

Subsistence Department: 122,240,252- 53,256, 

356, 362. See also Staff departments. 

Subsistence sales list: 240, 248, 250, 260---61, 

289-90,315,384,386 

Sullivan, Maj. Gen . John: 20, 24 

Sunday inspections: 160, 171,299,320---22. See 

also Enlisted men. 

Sundry Civil Appropriations Act: 380 

Supply: 91, 95 

Continental Army problems of: 31-32, 36-37, 

56-57 

refonns: 98- 99, 169, 355- 56 

Taft, Alphonso: 266 

Taylor, General Zachary: 166-67, 177 

as commander, Western Division: 185-86 

as President: 185-86 

Temporary annies. See Legion of the United 

States. 

Thayer, Sylvanus: 158 

Thomas, Maj. Gen. George H.: 211 

Thomas, Brig. Gen . Lorenzo: 198-99,215- 16 

Thompson, Maj. lohn L.: 96 

Three-battalion infantry regiments: 203, 304-05, 

378-79, 394 

Totten, lames: 209-10 , 236, 23911, 259n, 267, 

270 

Training: 15, 16-17 ,68,95-96, 102-03,326, 

352-55 

Transportation: 183-85. See also Quartermaster 

Department. 

Treasury Department: 64, 179,339, 380, 397 

Treaty of Ghent: 112 

Tronson du Coudray, Maj . Gen. Philippe 

Charles Jean Baptiste: 20---21, 23, 39, 44 

Twiggs, Brig. Gen. David: 203 

Unifornls: 11511 , 195,272, 323-24 

United States Anny: 361, 385-86 

and the inspectorate: 87-88, 153-54, 181 ,228, 

230---31,257-58,366-67 

as modern military force: 384, 390---91 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1777-1903 

as peacetime continental constabulary: 70, 71, 

85, 118, 149-50, 153, 182, 183, 185-86, 

191,229,230---31,294,317 

comparison with the Legion and Continental 

Anny: 70---71 

expansion: 62-63, 73-74 , 91, 98-99, 160 

legalization by Congress: 62 

pennanence: 69 

reduction: 82,84,86-87,111-13, 123,183, 

232 

reformation: 159-60,294-95,316, 321-22 

reorganization: 64, 69, 390---91 

United States Military Academy: 61, 81, 82-83, 

84-85,86-87,157,17 1,179,238-39,244, 

321-22,337,383 

United States Military Prisons. See also 

Inspectors general, special assignments. 

at Alcatraz Island: 384 

at Fort Leavenworth , Kansas: 290, 337, 384 

at Memphis, Tennessee: 225-26 

in the Philippines: 384 

inspection of: 225-26, 290, 310---1 1, 337-38, 

383-84 

United States Soldiers' Home: 309-10, 338-39, 

380 

United States Veterans Bureau: 339--4011 

Upton, Emory 

general staff concept: 393-95 

infantry tactics: 246-47, 302-03 

universal military training: 345--46 

Van Ness, 1st Lt. William P.: 324 

Van Rensselaer, Col. Henry: 95 

Van Rensselaer, Maj. Gen . Stephen: 209, 226 

Varnum, Brig. Gen. lames Mitchell: 36 

Veterans Administration: 339--4011 

Volunteers: 63, 67-68, 177-78, 195,202-03 , 

211,212,215,232,361-63,365,375, 

378-79 

Vroom, Brig. Gen. Peter D.: 318, 330, 367, 396 

as inspector, Department of the Gulf: 372 

as inspector, Department of the Missouri: 325 

as inspector, Middle District: 332 

as inspector during invasion of Puerto Rico: 

368 

as Inspector General: 406 

as inspector in Caribbean: 372 

Walker, Capt. Benjamin: 40, 41, 48, 51 

War of 1812: 94-95 , 121-122 

at Albany: 95 

at Chippewa: 106-07, 109-10 

at Detroit: 95 

at Fort George: 95 

at Lake Champlain: 95 

at Lake Erie: 95 

at Lake Ontario: 104-05 

at Lundy's Lane: 106-07 
INDEX 

War of 181 2 (cont.) 

at Montreal: 95 

at Niagara River: 95- 96 

at Queenston Heights: 95-96 

at Sackets Harbor: 104-05 , 10~07, 109- 10 

at York, upper Canada: 104-05 

in Canada: 95 

War Department: 56, 61 , 63- 64, 88, 103- 04, 

121, 122-23, 128,142-43 , 151, 154, 

164-67 70-7 176,19~97 ,200 ,2 13 17, 

228,243,245,277, 344-46, 390, 396 

and the inspectorate: 131-32, 143-44, 178-80, 

205, 213-14, 215 , 220, 236 

as a collection of independent bureaucracies: 

157-58 

establishment: 62 

interest in economy: 227-28 

problems during the Spanish-American War: 

361-65, 36~67 

property management of: 142-43, 144, 

200-201, 314-15 

regulations: 164, 26~67 

Wars. See by lIame. 

Washington , General George: 65, 66, 81, 404, 

405 , 407-08 

and Conway affair: 22-31 

and Steuben: 36-40, 42-48, 50-57, 59- 60 

as Commander in Chief of Continental Army: 

11- 17 

as Commander in Chief of provisional army: 

75-77 

as own staff: 14, 23-24 

as President: 63 

attitude toward commissioned Europeans: 18, 

20-21 

465 

Washington Post: 314 

Wayne, Maj. Gen. Anthony: 64-68, 7 1, 85, 

109-10, 141-42, 404 

Webb, Capt. Nathaniel: 41 

West Point. See United States Military 

Academy. 

Wheeler, Maj . Gen. Joseph: 365-66 

Whipple, General William: 28 

Whiskey Rebellion: 77 

Whiting, Col. John: 89-90 

Wilkinson, Brig. Gen. James: 86, 87- 88, 106n 

as Army's brigadier general: 70-72, 73, 

78-79 

as Gates' aide: 25 

as own inspector: 70-72 , 87 

running the War Department: 82, 83 , 85 

Willetts Point, New York: 272 

Williams, John: 122 

Williams, Maj . Jonathan: 86 

Wilson , James H.: 223 

Winder, Brig. Gen. William H.: 107-08, 109-10 

Wool, Maj . Gen . John E.: 12611, 128, 131- 32, 

147, 148, 158-59, 166, 171- 72, 173, 

177-78, 199-200 

as division commander's chief of staff: 167 

as inspector, Northern Division: 117, 12011 

as inspector of infantry: 3~37, 140, 142, 

143-44 

as inspector of seaboard posts and ordnance: 

151 , 152,153-56,160-61,163-64,169-70 

working with Indians: 164-65 , 168 

Wright, Clinton: 120 

XYZ Affair: 74 

concept of an inspector general: 3, 24, 2~27, 

30-31,36,43-44,47 Ye llow journalism: 376 

Yellowstone National Park: 298 selection of inspectors general: 43-44, 50 

Young, Maj . Gen. Samuel B. M.: 400, 403, 405