## In the Court of Appeal s Se cond App ellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 24

- 00022

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 231st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 231

- 579672

- 15

Before S udderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opi nion by Justice Walker 

### I N THE 

### I NTEREST OF 

### J.G., J.G., J.G., AND 

### J.Z., C HIL DREN2 MEMO RAND UM OPINI ON Mother and Father both appeal ed the trial court ’ s termination s of their parental rights after a bench trial. The tr ial court terminated Mother ’ s par ental rights to her
four children

—

J.G ( Andrew ) , J.G. ( Benson ) , J .G. ( Charlotte ) , a nd J.Z. (Jane) 1

— based

on findings that she had endangered them under termination grounds (D) and (E) and
that termination was in the children ’ s best inter est
. See Tex. Fam. Code A n n. § 1 61.001( b)(1)( D), (E) , (2). The trial court termina ted Father ’ s pa ren t al rights to his
three children

—

Andrew , Benson , and Charlotte

— based on findings that he had endangered them under termination grounds (D) and (E) and that termina tion was in
the children ’ s best inter est
. 2 See id

. We will aff

irm.
I . MO T HER ’ S APPEAL
Mother ’ s appointed appellate counsel file d an Anders b rief stating t hat th ere are no arguable g rounds fo r appeal and a ls o filed a mot ion to withdraw as M o ther ’ s

attorne y of record

. See Anders v. California , 386 U .S. 738, 744 , 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967 ); see also In re K.M. , 98 S.W.3d 774, 776

– 77 (Tex. App.

— Fo rt W orth 2 003 , no pet. ) (ho lding that A nders pro cedures apply in cases t ermin at ing p arental rights ).

1 We use initials or aliases for t he name s of the child ren and their famil y members to protect the child ren ’ s priv acy. See Te x. Fam. Code A nn . § 1 09.002(d); Tex. R. Ap p. P. 9.8 (b)

.

2 Jane ’ s fath er

— E van

— al so had his parental rights terminated as to her, but he did not appeal

.3

The brief meets th e Anders requirements by presenting a profess ion al
evaluatio n of the record a nd demonstrating why th ere are no ar guable g rounds to be

a dvanced on appeal. Furt her, Mother ’ s c ounsel (1 ) pr ovided Mother wit h a cop y o f
the Anders brief

, (2) in formed M other of h er rig ht s to file a pro se respons e and to

see k discretion ary r eview from t he sup reme court , and ( 3 ) advise d Mother of h er right

to a c cess the appellate record from our cou rt and provide d her with instructions an d a
draft motion for obt aining the record

. See Kelly v. State , 43 6 S.W.3d 313 , 319

– 20 ( T ex. Crim. App

. 201 4). Mother did not file a response , and the Texas Departm ent of Family and Protective Services (Department) de clined to f ile a brie f.
W hen an Anders brief is filed, we must in d epe ndent ly examine the record to
det ermine if an y arguable gr ounds for appe al exist . In re C.J

. , 501 S.W.3d 254 , 255 (Tex. App.

— Fort W ort h 2 016 , pet s . denied )

. Our examination should consi der the record, the brie f

s, a nd any pr o se re sp onse. I n r e L. B

. , No. 02

- 1 9

- 00407

- CV, 2020 WL 1809505, at *1 (Te x. App.

— Fort Wo rth Apr. 9, 20 20 , no pet.) (mem. o p.).
After careful review , we agree wit h Mother ’ s counsel that the re a re no arguable grounds fo r appeal in Mother ’ s cas e. W e af firm the trial c ou rt ’ s jud gme nt t erm inat i ng Mother ’ s parental rights. However, w e de ny the m otion to withdraw filed by
Mother ’ s att orney because it d oes not show good cause for withdrawal. See In re P.M. , 52 0 S.W.3d 24, 27 (T ex. 2016 ) (order) ; C .J. , 501 S.W.3d at 255

. Th us, Mother ’ s

co u ns el re ma i ns ap pointed in this case through any proceedings in the suprem e c ourt unless otherw

ise relieved of these duties

. See P.M. , 52 0 S.W.3d at 27

.4 II . F ATHER ’ S APPE AL Father raises eight issues on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discr e tion in denying his motion to appe ar at t rial electro nically ; (2) he did not recei ve proper notice of th e date that the trial was set to reconvene on January 11, 202 4; (3) the trial
court abused its discretion by failin g to place his children in his care a fter the State of Michigan approved their placement w ith him; (4) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support t ermination on (D) grounds; (5) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to sup port termination on (E) grounds ; (6) the
evid ence was legally and factually in sufficient t o support termination on (N) grounds; (7) the evidence was legally and factua lly insufficient to support termination on (O) grounds; and (8) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to suppor t the tri al

court ’ s finding that terminati on of his pa rental rights was in his chil dren ’ s best
interest

. A. B ACKGROUND

1. Previous Conservatorship Cases In 2015, Mother filed a petit ion requesti ng that she and Father be named joint managi n g conser

vators of Andrew , Benson , and Cha rlotte with Mother having the right to designate their residence

. 3 On January 26, 2016, the trial court entered a default order in that case

. It appointed M other as sole managing con servator o f the

3 Mother and Father were never married

.5

chi ldren and Father as possessory co nservator. F a ther was ordered to have only
sup ervised vis itation with the children in the presence of a third party and to pay child
support
. By this tim e, Mother had started dating E van ; Ja ne was born in January 2017.
I n August 201 7, five

- year

- old Benson was taken to the h ospital with

une xplained , extensive injuries. Bens on , who is autistic and nonverbal, had a
f ractured left arm, a healing fracture to his r i ght arm, bleeding in his ear, bru ising
across his bo dy , and a ma rk on his left arm that looked like it had been tied down

. Mother had taken Benson to the hospital but provided no explanation for his injuries.
S he said that he might have been injure d after attempting to retrieve toy s that had
b een thrown behind his dress er. The hospital staff did not find this explanation plausible and diagnosed his injuries as having been caused by physical abus e. T he D epartment f

iled a petition for protection, conservators hip, and
termination on August 28, 2017 (the First Petition) , and t he children were removed
from Mother ’ s home. M oth e r initia lly told Depa rtment investigators t hat Evan did
not live in her home with th e children and had not been present when Benson was injur ed

. She admitted later that Ev an had been there when Benson was injured ; she
lied because she was worr ied tha t Ev a n would be judged by his criminal history a nd

tat too ed appear ance . Ev an also ini tially lied about having been in the house when
Benson was injured and also eventually admitted t o hav ing been th ere , though he6

denied ever hurting the chil d. T he D epartment ultimately concluded that Ev an had
been the one to abuse Be n son. A f ter the children ’s removal, the Department had some difficu lty locating
Father. A special investigator was able to locate him in N o rth Richland Hil ls , T e xa s , by fir st contacting his mother , but the childr en had already been plac ed in foster care . The Department had concerns about placing the children with Father due to his history of substance abus e and his mental

- health issues

. Mother told a De partment permanency specialist that, pri or to her fil ing her cons ervatorship petitio n in 2015, she
and Father ’ s children had moved out of the home with Father and into a domestic
violence shelter because of previous domestic violence betw een F ather and her

. On Oct o ber 30, 2019 , the tr ial court en tered its final order on the Department ’ s First Petition , naming the Department as the permanent managing

conservator (PMC) of all four children , but declining to terminate t he parental right s of Mother, Father, and E van . Ins tead, Mo ther was nam ed possessory conservator of
the children ; Father and E van were ordered to have no possession or unsupervi sed
access to the children.
2. Current Termination C ase On January 31, 2023, the Department filed its petition f o r p rote ction and

te rmination in the instant case (the Seco nd Petition)

. Attached to the Second Petition

was an Af fidavit for Termination of Parental Rights, in which a perman ency sp ec ialist for the Department re commended that Mother, Father, a n d E van all have the ir7

parental rights t erminated

. She attested that the parents had failed , in the approximately four years since the Department had been named P MC of the children ,

“ to make cha nges to their behaviors and circ u m stance s to provi de a safe and stable
envi ron ment ” for the children : M o ther acknowledged the need to leave E van for the

sa fety of the children but failed to; Father continued to test positive for alcohol and

mar ijuana and h ad not addressed his mental

- health issue s ; and E va n had had minimal contact with the Depar tment , had not visit ed his dau gh ter Jane , and did not take
respon sibili ty for Benson ’ s injuries.
The case proceeded to a bench trial, which occurred o ver two days on November 27, 2023 , and Janu ary 11, 20 24

. What follows is a summary of the t rial
evidence relevant to Father ’ s termination

. Father moved between Texas a nd Mich igan several times during the pendency
of the case s , though he l ived solel y in Mich i gan sta rting in at leas t August 202 2.
All thre e of F a ther ’s children have medical diagnoses that raise myriad issues
for their care . Andrew , who was six years o l d at initial removal, has been diagnosed
with autism, a tt ention d eficit h yp eractivity d isorder, dis ruptive m o od dysregu l a tion disorder, adjustment disorder, mi xed anxiety, and depressive mo od. He takes at least
four medications to deal with these d iagnos e s. Benson , who was five years old at

remova l, has been di agnosed with auti sm and is nonverbal. Charlotte , who w as four
year s old at removal, is nonverbal , quadriplegic , and has eighte en medica l diagnos e s , inclu ding cerebral pals y, spina bifida, and chro n ic lung disease

. She is f ed and receives8

her medication s through a tube, has mo tor, dev el op mental, and e motional delays, and requires round

- the

- clock care, which in clude s tw elve hours of daily care from a home

health nurse.
A s part of the previous cas e , a service p lan had been created for Father which was updated th roughou t t he life of both case s , and the Department continued to offer
him services (in Te xas and Michigan) related to that pla n through the pendency of the
instant case. F a ther ’ s service p l an recommended that he participate in a psychol ogi ca l

assessment , attend counseling , co mplete a parenting class, par ticipate in random drug screening, attend supervised visitation with his ch ildren , and find stable housing and
work

. Father c ompleted th e par enting cl ass and th ir ty days of inpatient substance

abus e therapy but did not complete any additional indiv idual counseling

. He reported

t hat he had com pleted his ps ych ological evaluation but pro vided the Department
caseworker only portions of the as s essmen t e ven after being asked for a complete

co py of the assessment

. 4 F ather sub mitted to d rug testing with some positive tests for
alcohol and marijuana 5 as late as March 2023. He also t ested positive for cocain e on

one occasion but claime d that hi s h a ir sample had been contaminated by t he testing

4 Father texted images of only a few pages of the ass essment to t he ca seworker , and she believed th at he did this in an attempt to hide the full picture of his me ntal

health issues.

5 Father lived in Michigan at the time , and marijuana use is legal there

.9

facility. Father struggled at times t o maintain stable employment but started working

at a Michigan tire factory in August 20 23

. H is caseworker characterized this job as

“ relat ively stab le ” co mpared to the i ns tability of his prior employment history

. Father admitted to using marijuana and to having issues with alcohol abuse

. He also told his Depar tment caseworker that he had sever e depression and a nxiety so

se ver e that he sometimes lost conscious ness an d had to seek treat ment at the hospital.
H e reported having lost a job due to panic attacks and th at he had ended up in the
ho spit al on one occasion due to acute alcohol withdrawal a fter not d ri n kin g for a
week. At one time Father had been prescribed med i cation s for his menta l

- health issues, but stopped taking them because he did not “ believe in prescription
medication for mental health. ” Initially, a home study via the I nte rstate Comp act on the Placement of Chi ldren (ICPC) w as conducted and approved b y Michi gan authorities for Father ’ s children to be placed in his home. The Department denied this placement, how ever, a fter a

cas eworker traveled to M i chigan and fo und the h ome to be inap propria te for the
children. Father lived in his m other ’ s home with h is two brothers and two nieces.
One of his brother s had sever e mental

- health issues but was not taking medication to
h elp with those issues. Further , F ather ’ s m o ther had prior history that inclu ded charges for child abandonment and endangerment.
T he h ous e was cluttered and not handicap accessible for a w heelchair

- bound
child. There w as marijuana paraphernalia and th e st rong odo r of marij uana in the10

house, and the case worker saw this as probl ematic for a child with sever e breathing
issues. Nor did it appear that there w as enough space for the children , as all of the
bedrooms were already occupied. T her e was cat fe ces o n the floor in the home , and
the furnace was inoperable making the home to o cold for the children

. Father live d at his mother ’ s hom e only on the weekends beca use it was too far
from his job at the tire factor y and liv ed at another residence during the wee k

. H e stated that his mother and a cousin could help him care for the children

. F a ther planned to move into his own apartment but n ever f ollowed through with this plan
and still lived in his m othe r ’ s home at the time of trial.
Most of F a ther ’ s visits with his children occurred remotely over Zoom, though
he did come to Texas on at least on e occasion for an in

- person visit

. Some of
F a ther ’ s behavior durin g these vis i ts w as co ncerning to the Department

. W hile he appeared to be engaged with his oldest son, Andrew, he struggled to engage with his two nonverbal children, Benson and Char lotte. Charlotte communicates by making
noises , a n d F a ther some times app ear ed to become ag itated with her because the
noises ma de it more difficult for him to engage with Andrew. Also, on one occasion , F a ther repeatedly ask ed Andrew if he wanted to live with F a ther , which made Andrew visibly upset. At t his , F ather bec am e very angry , and the vi sit had to be ended prematurely. Andrew was hesita nt to visit w ith Father following th is interaction. A Department ca seworker described F ather as eas ily angered and that , at several of the
Zoom vi sit s, Father h ad yelled at his m oth er in view of the children.11

At the in

- person visit, Father would only change Benson ’ s diaper when prompted by bot h a Department repre sentative and a C ASA represent ative , and he
d eclin ed to change Charlot te ’ s di ape r even wh en asked to d o so. When the Depa rtmen t attempted to sch edule the in

- person visit at 10: 00 a.m. due to Charlotte ’ s feeding schedule

—

which is v ery in tensive and requires the use of a fe eding tube

— Father complain ed that this time was to o early a nd that he would be too t i red due to
havin g a late flight into Texas the night bef ore . When it came time to feed Charlotte and to remove her from her wheel chair to perform walking exer cises , Father did not attempt to help and even left the roo m. These behavior s led Depa rtment o fficials to be concerned that Fat her would n ot adequately care for Charlotte ’ s dietary and mob ility needs. Further, F a ther ha d
declined to attend a n y treatment meetings for the children at which their c areg iv ers discuss ed their emotiona l and medical need s . He stated that he did not want to att end
the meetin gs because they involved dis cussions about the children ’ s medication needs , which would make h im angry. This concerned the Departm ent becaus e of Father ’ s known opposition t o prescription medication s a n d refusal to take his own
medications. There w ere fears that he would not ensure that his children took their required medications , which were nu merous given their extensive medical is sues. Andrew , Benson, and Ja ne were placed together in a foster hom e . Charlotte

was placed with another foster parent

— a nurse who ha d cared for Charlot te since the beginning of the cas e. These foster homes were adoption

- m otivated. A CASA12

rep r e sentati ve reported to the trial court that the children were happy and thriv i n g in their placements, receiving all of the medical care th at they needed, and were in safe,
stab le enviro nments.

3. Father ’ s Request to Appear R em otely Father appea red in

- person at the first day of trial on Nove mber 27, 2023 ; he did not appear at the second day , on January 11 , 2024

. At the beginning o f the second day of t rial , Father ’ s counsel announced that he had fi l ed that mor ni ng an unopposed motion for F ather to appear via Zoom or telephone because there had
been “ some confusion , ” and Father was in Michigan

. The fo llowing ex change
occurred between Father ’ s c ounsel and the trial court:
The Court: No. Den i ed. Should h ave been here. I f it ’ s

- - it ’ s real ly important for him to be here, [counsel]. [ Counsel ] : Yes, sir.
T he Court: Right? [ Coun s el ] : I agree.
T he Court: And you knew that b efore today. [ Co unsel ]: I actually didn ’ t know he was not goin g to be here u ntil yesterday and I was in medi ation when he called.
The C ourt: Okay. The answer is no.
T he issue was addressed again after t he Department closed its case and Fa ther ’ s

co unsel was a sked if he had any thing further to present :13

[Co u nsel]: My cl ient was available by phone, Your Honor. I think there was some confusion on his part , at least from what he relayed to me, as to when th i s was reset for. I ’ m not assigning any blame . I did re quest that he appear via Zoom or telephonically and the Cou rt denied that, so I have no further

– The Court: Well, you

– you a sked me today. You could have asked me another day or

– [C ounsel]: Y e s, sir.
The Court:

– he could h ave made arrangements an other day. But I would t hink that this is one of the most im portant things in his life

– [Co unsel] : I under stand.
The Court:

– that he would make every effort to be here. [C ounsel]: And I wasn ’ t made aware of it until yesterday.
The Court: I under s tand. [Counsel]: Yes, sir.
The Court: So

– all right. T han k you.
B. D ISCUSSION
1. D en ial of Zoom Appearance In his first issue, Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion b y denying him the opportunity to appear at trial remotely. We disagree.
A trial court ’ s ruli n g on a party ’ s request to parti cipate at trial by alternative
means is review ed for an abuse of discretion. Nikolenko v. Nikolenk o , No. 01

- 20

- 00284

- CV, 2022 WL 4 7998 8, at *9 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist

. ] Feb . 17, 2022 , pet. denied

) (mem. op.) ; I

n r e J.D. , No. 13

- 16

- 00 062

- CV, 2016 WL 3068260, at *314

(Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg May 26, 2016, no pet.) (me m. op.) . A trial
court abuses its discretion if it ac t s unreaso nably or arbitra rily or without referen ce to any guiding rules or principles. Beaumont B ank, N.A. v

. Bull er , 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (T e x. 1991).
G enerally , a party must appear at all court proceedings in person , unless the
trial court ’ s notice s t ates otherwise

. Tex. R. Civ. P. 21d (b)(1). Whi le Rule 21(d) provides that the t rial court “ may a llow ” a par t y to appear by vi de oconference,
telec onference, or other means , it in no way obligate s the court to do so. Id

. ; see Grant
v. Handal , No. 08

- 23

- 0 0 336

- CV, 2024 WL 1723948, at *2 (Tex. App.

— El Pas o Apr. 22, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Fu rther , Texas cour t s have held that a p arent does not hav e an absolute right to appear remotely in a termination case

. J. D. , 2016 WL 3068260, at *3 ; In re C.P.V.Y. , 315 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 2010, n o pet.)

. Father did not request to app e ar by Z oom or tele p honically unt il the morning of the second day of trial

. Given th at he made this request at the eleventh hour and had no absolute right to appear r emotely, we hold that the trial court did not a buse its discretion by denying this request . We o verrule Fat h er ’ s first is sue.

2. Notice of Tr ial ’ s Second Day In his second issue, Father contends that he did not receive proper notice that
trial was set t o reconvene on January 11, 20 24. F ather waived this issue due to inadequate bri efing

.15

Rule 38 .1 o f the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure contains specific requirements for an appellant ’ s brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. To comply with
Rule 38.1, an a p pellant ’ s brief must, among other things, contain a clear and concise argument f

or the contenti ons made, with appropriate citations to legal authority and
to the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); In re A.N.G. , 631 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2021, n o pet.). Merely uttering brief, c onclusory statements

un supported by citation t o legal authori ties does not satisfy briefing requirements.
A.N.G. , 631 S.W.3d at 476; Valadez v. Avitia , 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.

— El
Paso 2 007, no pet.). Indeed, “[f] a ilure to cite legal authority or p rovide substantive
anal ysis of the legal issue presen ted resu lts in waiver of the complaint.” Valadez , 238 S.W.3d at 845. In reviewing for briefing waiver, we are required to construe briefs liberally so
that the right t o appellate review is not lost by w aiver

. In re I.J.K. , No. 08

- 22

- 0 0055

- CV, 2023 WL 315364 5, a t * 4 (Tex. App.

— El Paso Apr. 28, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Lion Copolymer Holdings, LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC , 614 S.W.3d 729, 732 ( Tex. 2020)). Sim i larly, we should hesitate to resol ve cases on procedural defects and
instead work to resolv e ca ses on their me rits. See St. John Missionary Baptist Church v.
Flakes , 595 S.W.3d. 211, 213

– 14 (Tex. 2020). Even still, “[w]e are not responsibl e for identify i ng possible trial court error, sea rching the record for facts favora ble to a
party ’ s positi on, or conducting l egal research to support a party ’ s contentions.” In re J.O.A.M. , No. 01

- 23

- 00691

- CV, 2024 WL 1169432, at *23 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1s t16

Dist.] Mar. 19, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). “W ere we to engage in such activitie s, we would be abandoni ng o ur role as judg es and taking on the role of advocate for that party.” Id . (citing Valadez

, 238 S.W.3d at 845).
In the section of Father ’ s appellant ’ s brief ti t led “ Issues Presented , ” he lists a s his second issue that he did not receiv e proper notice of t he January 11, 2024 trial
date

. And in his S tatement of F acts section , he asserts that he was unaware of that
date. How ever, in his A r gument section, Father d o es not address or discuss this issue
what s oever. His brief does not pr esent a ny su bstantive analysis or citation to legal authority to support his contention that he lacked notice of the January 11, 2 024 trial setting. For these reasons, we hold that F a t h er wai ved his second issue due to inadequa te briefing

. 6 See J.O.A

. M. , 20 24 WL 116943 2, at *23.

3. Place me nt of Children With Father In Michigan
Father lists as his third i ssue in the “ Issues Presented ” section of hi s appellant ’ s brief that the trial c o urt abu sed its discretion by failing to place the children in his ca re aft er Michigan authoritie s approved an ICPC placement wit h him. His “ Statement of
Facts ” section bri efly mentions that Michigan approved the placement and th at Texas rejected it. T he rest of his appellant ’ s brief is devoid of any other mention of t his

6 Even if Father had properly brief ed the issue, hi s attorney ’ s knowledge of th e J anuary 11 , 202 4 date would have been imputed to him

. See In re S.H. , No. 2

- 05

- 174

- CV, 2006 WL 59354, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Jan. 12, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( “ An attorney ’ s knowledge of a trial setting is imputed to h is client. ” )

. His attorney app eared at the s econd day of trial and made no mention of or objection relate d to not having been adequately noti fied of the setting.17

issue . There is no substantive analysis or citation to legal authority to support his
contention that the trial court abused its disc retion by failing to place the children in
his car e . For th ese reasons, we hold that F ath er waived his third issue due t o inadequ ate b riefing

. 7 See id

. 4. Evidentia ry S ufficiency
In his fourth through eighth issues, Father contends that the evidence was lega lly and factually insufficient to support the t rial co urt ’ s findings as to termination grounds (D) , (E), (N), and ( O) , and i ts finding t hat termin ation was in the children ’ s best i nterest
. See Tex. Fam. Cod e Ann. § 161.001( b ) (1) (D), ( E) , (N), (O), ( 2 )

. We disagree.

a. Standard of review
For a tr i al cour t to terminate a parent

– chi ld relationship, the party seeking
terminat ion

— in this case the Department

— must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: 1) that the parent ’ s actions satisfy one termination ground listed
in Texas Family Code S ectio n 161.0 01(b)(1); and 2) that termi nation is in the child ’ s best inte rest. Te x. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); In re J.L. , 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is clear and convincing if it “ will prod uce in the min d of the trier of fact a fi rm belief or

7 Father also did not properly prese rve his third issue f o r appellate review. The re cord do es not show that Father ever ra ised this comp laint to the trial court with a timely request, objection , or m otion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).18

conviction as to the truth of the allegati ons sought to be established. ” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 802. To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental

- te rminati on

case s, we look at all the evide nce in the light most favorable to the chal lenged findi ng to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction
tha t the finding is true. In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We as sume th at the factfinder settled a ny evidentiary conflicts in favor of its fi nding if a r easonable
factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisput ed evidenc e even if it i s contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidenc e favorab le to the fi nding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable
factfinder could not. See i d

. The factfinder is the so le judge of the witness es ’ credibility and demeano r. In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
W e must perform “ an exacting review of the entire record ” in determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent

– child
rel ationsh ip. In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d 498, 5 00 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due
deference to the factfinder ’ s finding s and do not supplant them with our own. In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We review the whole record to decide
whether a factf

inder c ould reasonably form a firm conviction or belief t hat the Dep artment p roved the al leged termination ground and that termination of the
parent

– child relationship would be in the chil dren ’s best interest

. Tex. Fam. Code19

Ann. § 161.001(b); In r

e C.H. , 89 S.W .3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could f

orm such a firm convi ction or belief, then the evidence is fact ually
sufficient. C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 18

– 19. If the evidence is factually sufficient , then it is necessarily legally suffici ent as well. In re A. S. , No. 02

- 1 6

- 00076

- CV, 2016 WL 3364838, at *7 (Tex. Ap p.

— Fort
Wort h June 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op).
b. Applicable law
T he trial court terminated Father ’ s parent al rights under (D) and (E)
enda ngerment grounds. We may con duct a consolidated review of find ings rel ated to (D) and (E) ground s when th e evidence p ertaining to both is interrelate d, as it is here.
See In re A.B.

- G. , No. 02

- 19

- 00066

- CV, 2019 WL 3755770, at *8 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug. 8, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ; I n re M.R.J.M. , 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2009 , no pet. ) (op. on re h ’ g)

. Under (D), we examine evidence related to the child ren ’ s environment to determine if that environment endangered the ir physical or emotional well

- being. In

re J.T.G. , 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)

. A parent ’ s conduct in the home, including abusive or violent cond uct, can create an environment endangering the child ren ’ s physical and emotional well

- being. Id

. The relevant
timeframe un der (D) i s en dangerment to the child ren that occurred before they were

r emoved from the par ent ’ s care. In re I.D.G. , 579 S.W.3d 842, 851 (Tex. App.

— El
Paso 2019, pet. denied).20

Under (E), we ask whether evidence exists that the parent ’ s conduct

— including acts, omi ss ions, or failures to act

— endangered the child ren ’ s physical o r emoti onal well

- be ing. J.T.G. , 121 S.W.3d at 125

. Additionally, (E) requires not just a single act or omission but rather a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of
conduct. Id

. Th e co nduct may occur both bef ore or after the children have been
removed from the pa rent ’ s care. I.D.G. , 579 S.W.3d at 851

. Although “ ‘e ndanger’ means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less

- than

- ideal family environ men t,” it does not require that
there be conduct directed at th e child ren or that the child ren actually suffer injury. In

re J.W

. , 645 S.W.3d 726, 748 (Tex. 2022)

. Evidence that a person has engaged in abusive and violent conduct in the past perm its an i nfe rence that the person will

con tinue to engage in violent beh avior i n the future

. In re M.D.M. , 579 S.W.3d 744, 765 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no p et.)

. Use of drugs and alcohol and their effects on a parent ’ s life and his ability to parent m ay be endangering

. In re R.W. , 1 29 S.W.3d 732, 739 (T e x. App.

— Fort Wo rth 2004, pe t. denied)

. Likewise , a parent ’ s mental state and failure to seek mental

- health treatment may be considered in
d etermining whether a child is endangered if th e paren t ’ s ment al state demonstrates
an inabilit y to provide the child with a safe an d stable env i ronment
. Id

. ; see In re K.G. , 350 S.W.3d 338, 355 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). A parent might also endanger his children by subjecting the m to uncerta inty , in sta bility , or inappropriate
livin g conditions

. In re L.E.R. , 6 50 S.W. 3d 771, 783

– 84 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th21

Dist.] 2022, no pet.) ; T. D. v. Tex. Dep ’ t of Fam

. & Protective Serv

s. , 683 S.W.3d 901, 914 (Tex. App.

—

Austin 2024, no pet.)

. Finally, a p arent ’ s re f usal to participate in a Depa rtment

- requested service plan c an be considered i n the endangerment analysis.
T.D. , 683 S.W.3d at 915.
Althou gh we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the
child ’ s best interest, In re R.R. , 20 9 S.W.3d 11 2, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best

- interest analysis is child

- cent ered, focusing on the child ’ s well

- being, safety, and development,
In re A.C. , 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a best

- interest finding , w e review the entire record. In re E. C .R. , 402 S.W.3d 239, 2 50 (Te x. 2013). E vidence pro bative of a child ’ s best interest may be the same evidence that is probative of a S ubsection (b) (1) ground. Id. at 249; C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 28 ; see Tex. Fam . Code A nn. § 161.001(b)(1), (2) . We also consider the evidence in lig ht of n onexclusive factors th at the factfinder may apply in determining
the child ’ s best interest: (A) the [ child’s ] desires

. . . ; (B) the [ child’s ] emotional and physical needs [,]

. . . now and in the future; (C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the [ child’s ] best interes t
. . . ;22

( F) the plans for the child by these individuals or [ , if appl icable , ] by the ag ency seekin g custody; (G) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (H) the [

parent’s ] acts or omissions

. . . indicat [ ing ] that the existing parent

– child relat ionship is not a proper one; and (I) any excuse for the [ parent’s ] acts or om issions

. Hol ley v. Adam s , 544 S.W.2d 3 67, 371

– 72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted) ; see E.C.R. , 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best

- interest finding, “ we consider,

a mong oth er evidence, the Holley factors ” (footnote omitted)); E.N.C. , 3 84 S.W .3d

at 807. These fact ors are not exhaustive, and some listed factors may not apply to

some cases. C.H

. , 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just one
factor ma y be suf

fic ient to support a finding that termination is in the child ’ s best
interest. I

d. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id.

c. (D) and (E) grounds The following eviden ce est ablishes th at the trial court ’ s finding s as to (D) and (E) gro unds w ere suppo rted by fact ually (and, thus, legally) sufficient evidence :

• Mother reported to the Department that she had stopped living with Father and had taken the child ren to live in a domes tic viol enc e shelter because there
was ongoing do mestic violence in the home

.

• Fathe r admitted to the Department that he had issues with abusing alcohol and ma rijuana

.

• F a ther went to the hospital due to having alcohol withdrawals

.23

• Father tested positi ve for alco hol, mari juana, and cocai ne whi le the insta nt case was pending

.

• Father ’ s children had emotional and medical diagnoses that required substantial resources and accommodations

.

• T he Department had concerns that t he h ouse where Father lived a nd where he planned to place his children was not appropriate for children with such sever e e motional and medical needs . It smelled strongly of marijuana, had drug parapherna lia in open view, had ca t feces on the flo or, had an inopera ble furna ce, was clu t ter ed, was n ot handicap accessible , and did not have enough bedrooms.

• Father ’ s relative s who lived at the house raised concerns of their own: his brot her had severe mental

- health is sues for which he did not take m edicat ion and his mother and cousi n had pri or c rimina l hi story related t o child abandonment and endangerment.

• Father lived at a different residence during the week and stated that his Mother or other relatives would help him care for the ch ild ren .

• Father h ad severe depression and an a nxiety di sorder so severe that he sometimes lost consciousness and required medical attention

.

• Father did not ta ke medication or attend counseling to help with his mental

heal th iss ues. And he did not believe in using medication to help address these i ssues .

• Though Father seemed engaged with Andrew during visit ations , Department officials had concerns ab out his lack of engagement with Benson and Charlotte. He did n ot see m intereste d in changing the ir diapers , using the feeding tube to fee d Char lotte , or part icipating in her walking exercises

.

• The Depar tment described Father as easily angere d. He became visibly ang ry at his mother while on Zo om vi s it s wit h the children . He al so became a gitated with Charlotte due to the noises she makes and angry when An dr ew becam e upset at Father ’ s repeated inter rogation about whe ther Andrew wante d to live with Father

.24

• Father did not attend the ch ildren ’ s tre atment meetings because he became angry when discussing prescription medications. The Department had
con cerns tha t Father would not adequately care for the Children ’ s medical needs or ensure that they took their medications

.

• Though F ather completed a par enting class and an inpatient sub stance

- abuse program pursuant to his service plan , he never provided f ull docum entation of his psychi atric assessment, at tend ed individual counseling, or ma de ongoi ng efforts to contro l his substance de pendencies and mental

- health issues. He also struggled to maintain stable employment throughout the pendency of the case , t hough at the time of trial he seemed to have a stab le job.
Based on th e entire record, we hol d that the t rial court could have r easonably
form ed a firm conviction or belief that Father had engaged in conduct or had knowingly allowed Andrew, Benson, and Charlot t e to remain in cond itions or

surrou ndings that en dangered their physical or em otio nal we ll

- being. S ee Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E) ; C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 28 . We overrule Father ’ s fourth and fifth issues.
d. (N) and (O) grounds
In his sixth and seventh issues , Father contends that the evidence was legally and factually i nsuffi cient to sup port the trial court ’ s fi ndings terminating his parental rights under grounds (N) and ( O). Ho wever, the trial court did no t terminate F a ther ’ s
par ental righ ts on (N) or (O) grounds, only on (D) and (E) grounds. Acc ordingly, we
overrule Father ’ s sixth and seventh issues.25 e . Best interest In his eight h issue, Father argues that the evidence was legally and factually
i nsufficient to support the tria l court ’ s finding that termination of his parental rights
was i n Andr ew ’ s, Ben son ’ s, and Charlotte ’ s best inte rest
. Again, we disagree. We organi ze our discussion of this issue within the framework of the relevant Holley
factors. See 544 S .W.2d at 371

– 72

.

• Second and fourth H

o lley factor s ( the children ’ s curr ent and futu re emotional and physical needs and Father ’ s parenting abilities ): Andrew, Ben son, and Charlo t te had significant emotional and physical needs. The Department had concerns t hat Father di d not ha ve the resources , desi re, and parenting ab ility t o ensure tha t these needs w ould be met. F urthe r, Father had failed to complete his service plan even though the Department had made efforts to ma ke those services available to him in Mi chigan.

• Thir d and sixth Holley factors (current and future emo tional and physical danger to the children and Father ’ s acts or omissions suggesting parent

– child relationship improper): There was evidence that Father had engaged in domestic violence toward Mother while he lived w ith the children . Further, Father admi tted to having a pr oblem with alcohol abuse and had tested positive for cocaine and mari juana on random dr ug tests. H e also had signifi cant mental

- health issues that he refused to properly tre at with cou ns eling and
m edication

. His refu sal to treat his ow n medic al issues ra ised concerns with the Department that he would likewise refuse to see that the c hildren ’ s medical needs were met. Father a lso ex hibited concerning anger issues a round the
c h ildren

.

• Fi fth Holley factor ( Father ’ s and the Department ’ s p lans fo r the childr en, includin g the stability of the proposed home or placement) : F a ther ’ s plans were for the children to move into his mother ’ s home , e ven though he did not live there during the week. T he Departme nt presented evidence to show that his mother ’ s home wa s no t approp riate for the children: there was cat feces on the floor and drug paraphern alia in open v iew, it was not handicap accessible , the furnace was out and it w as cold, al l of the bedr ooms were o ccupie d by other family members, and ot her adults in th e home had u ntreated mental

-26

health issues and prior charges for child abandonment and en dangerment. Father told the Department that he planned to move into his own apartment, b ut he had not done so at the time of trial. On the other hand, the children
we re in stab le , adop tion

- motivated foster homes , and Charlotte ’ s f oster mother was a nurse who had the skills and resources to appropriately care for her.
Based on th e e ntire re cord in light of the Hol ley factors, we hold that the
evi den ce was sufficient f

or the trial cou rt to have r easonably form ed a firm conviction
or belief that termination of Father ’ s parental rig hts was in Andrew ’ s, Benson ’ s, and
Charlotte ’ s best interest

. See Tex. F am . Code. Ann. § 161.001(b)( 2 ) ; C

. H

. , 89 S.W.3d

at 2 8 . We overrule F ather ’ s eigh t h issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affi rm the trial court ’ s judgment terminati ng Mother ’ s parental rights but deny M o ther ’ s counsel ’ s moti on to with draw. Having overru led all of Fa ther ’ s issue s, we affirm the judgment of the trial court termin atin g his parent al rights. /s/ Br ian Walker
Brian Walker Justice
Delivered: June 13, 202 4