J-S07006-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EVAN C. SANTUCCI 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 509 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 29, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-07-CR-0002460-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MARCH 21, 2022

Appellant, Evan C. Santucci, appeals from the order entered on March 

29, 2021, which dismissed his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. In this appeal from the denial of 

PCRA relief, Appellant’s counsel filed a petition to withdraw and a no-merit 

brief pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).1 As 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Although counsel styled his brief as having been filed pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), we note that an Anders brief governs the 

withdrawal of counsel from direct appeal. Nevertheless, as Anders imposes 

stricter requirements for withdrawal than those set forth in Turner/Finley, 

this Court accepts Anders-compliant briefs in the context of collateral review. 

Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 866 A.2d 1109, 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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we conclude that counsel fulfilled the procedural requirements of 

Turner/Finley and that this appeal is without merit, we grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant 

post-conviction relief.

On April 4, 2019, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to criminal 

conspiracy, burglary, criminal trespass, possession of a firearm by a prohibited 

person, theft by unlawful taking, and receiving stolen property.

2

 On April 8, 

2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve the aggregate, negotiated 

term of two-and-one-half to 15 years in prison for his convictions. N.T. 

Sentencing, 4/8/19, at 1-7. Appellant did not file a direct appeal from his 

judgment of sentence.

On July 5, 2019, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant during the proceedings 

and counsel filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf. Within the 

amended petition, Appellant claimed that, on the day he entered his plea: 

[Appellant] was told by [his trial counsel (hereinafter “Trial 

Counsel”)] that jury selection was scheduled very soon and 

that [Trial Counsel] was not prepared to go to trial. [Trial 

Counsel] further informed [Appellant] that if he did not enter 

a plea of guilty he would surely be convicted and would face 

more time in prison than the amount of time offered in the 

plea. [Appellant] believed he had no [other] choice [but to] 

enter the guilty plea.

Amended PCRA Petition, 6/25/20, at 1 (paragraphing omitted).

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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 3502(a)(2), 3503(a)(1)(ii), 6105(a)(1), 3921(a), and 

3925(a), respectively.
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Appellant also claimed that Trial Counsel induced his plea by falsely

telling him that his sentence would “run concurrent to a sentence he had in 

Somerset County.” See id. at 2; Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

Appellant requested that the PCRA court allow him to withdraw his plea

and proceed to trial. Amended PCRA Petition, 6/25/20, at 2.

On March 15, 2021, the PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s 

petition, during which both Appellant and Trial Counsel testified. As the PCRA 

court explained:

During his testimony, [Appellant] acknowledged completing 

the written guilty plea colloquy (of which [the PCRA court]

took judicial notice and which [the court] incorporated into 

the record during [the] March 15, 2021 evidentiary hearing). 

Within such written colloquy, [Appellant] confirmed that he 

understood the charges to which he was pleading guilty and 

the potential maximum sentences for each. [Appellant] also 

confirmed that [Trial Counsel] explained the nature and 

elements of the criminal offenses to which he was pleading 

guilty. Throughout the written guilty plea colloquy, 

[Appellant] acknowledged that he understood that he had a 

right to a jury trial and all constitutional rights attached 

thereto, that he was giving up his right to a trial by judge or 

jury, i.e., the right to present or pursue any pretrial motions, 

etc., and that if his guilty plea was accepted, his rights to 

appeal to a higher court would be limited to four grounds. . 

. .

Within the colloquy, [Appellant] also confirmed that he was 

entering his guilty plea of his own free will, that no one could 

force him to do so, and that no force or threat had been used 

against him in entering his plea. [Appellant] additionally 

noted that he understood the plea agreement called for a 

sentence of [two-and-one-half] to 15 years. Finally, 

[Appellant] indicated that he was satisfied with [Trial 

Counsel’s] representation[,] that he had sufficient time to 

discuss his case with [Trial Counsel], and that he had 
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considered the advantages and disadvantages of entering a 

plea of guilty instead of going to trial. 

Of particular significance to this case, [Appellant] 

acknowledged that he was on probation and parole, that he 

understood that his guilty plea could mean a violation of his 

probation and parole, and that he may be sentenced to return 

to prison as a result of that violation. He also confirmed that 

he understood that the prison sentence for the charges 

before the court could be made to run consecutively to, or in 

addition to, any other jail or prison sentences on any other 

charges. The written guilty plea colloquy was signed by 

[Appellant] and [Trial Counsel].

At the time of entry of his guilty plea, [Appellant] also 

underwent an additional verbal colloquy by the [trial] court 

to further confirm that his guilty plea was entered knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily. [The PCRA court notes] that 

[Trial Counsel] entered the standard stipulation that the 

averments of the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable 

cause formed a factual basis for [Appellant’s] plea.

During the March 15, 2021 evidentiary hearing, [Appellant] 

verified that he received a sentence consistent with his plea 

agreement. He also acknowledged that he understood that 

his sentence would be consecutive to his subsequent parole 

hit. His only real claim of error [was] that he thought the 

sentence would be concurrent to a [one-to-three] year 

sentence previously imposed in Somerset County, PA.

In review of the transcript from the April 8, 2019 [sentencing] 

hearing, there was absolutely no representation made by the

[trial] court, [the assistant district attorney, or Trial Counsel]

that the sentence imposed on such date would run concurrent 

to the [one-to-three] year Somerset County sentence. In 

fact, quite the opposite is true. During the guilty plea 

sentencing hearing, [Trial Counsel] specifically stated the 

following:

[Appellant] is going to plead to all counts in the

information for a period of [two-and-a-half to 15] years. 

[Two-and-a-half to 15]. That would be consecutive to all 

other time he is serving in other jurisdictions.
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During [the] PCRA evidentiary hearing, the Commonwealth 

presented the testimony of [Trial Counsel]. [Trial Counsel] 

confirmed that he has been a licensed attorney within the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for approximately 25 years 

and has handled criminal defense cases. He confirmed that 

the original plea offer from the Commonwealth was [five] to 

15 years; however, in part due to the criminal matters in 

other jurisdictions (which would include Somerset County), 

as well as the fact that [Appellant] was facing a potential 

state parole hit, he was able to negotiate the plea offer from 

the Commonwealth downward to [two-and-one-half] to 15

years. [Trial Counsel] confirmed that he never told 

[Appellant] that he had to accept a plea offer; never told him 

that he could not exercise his constitutional right to a trial; 

and explained to him that his [two-and-one-half] to 15 year 

sentence would be consecutive to any and all other 

sentences. [Trial Counsel] merely told [Appellant] that this 

was the best plea offer the Commonwealth would offer under 

the circumstances. It is worth noting that the bottom of the 

standard range for [Appellant] was 60 months for possession 

of firearm prohibited and 27 months for burglary. In all 

respects, [the PCRA court found Trial Counsel’s] testimony to 

be credible.

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/29/21, at 6-10 (citations and some capitalization 

omitted).

Following the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant relief 

and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. In this appeal, Appellant’s 

counsel filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and a no-merit brief pursuant 

to Turner/Finley. Counsel presents the following issue in the Turner/Finley

brief:

[Appellant] maintain[s] that his guilty plea[] was unlawfully 

induced because [Trial Counsel] told him that he was not 

prepared for trial and that if [Appellant] did not enter a guilty 

plea he would be convicted and face more time in prison than 

if he entered a plea. [Appellant] also maintain[s] that [Trial 
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Counsel] told him his sentence . . . would be run concurrent 

to a sentence he had in Somerset County.

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Prior to addressing the merits of the issues raised in the Turner/Finley

brief, we must determine whether counsel met the procedural requirements 

necessary to withdraw. Counsel seeking to withdraw in PCRA proceedings 

must review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel 

must then submit a “no-merit” letter to the [PCRA] court, or 

brief on appeal to this Court, detailing the nature and extent 

of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing the issues 

which petitioner wants to have reviewed, explaining why and 

how those issues lack merit, and requesting permission to 

withdraw.

Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the 

“no-merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to 

withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right 

to proceed pro se or by new counsel.

Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that 

satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court —

[the PCRA] court or this Court — must then conduct its own 

review of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with 

counsel that the claims are without merit, the court will 

permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief.

Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 510–511 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citations and corrections omitted). 

Here, counsel fulfilled the procedural requirements necessary for 

withdrawing as PCRA counsel. We thus turn to the claims raised in the 

Turner/Finley brief. As our Supreme Court has explained:

In reviewing the grant or denial of PCRA relief, an appellate 

court considers whether the PCRA court's conclusions are 

supported by the record and free of legal error. Moreover, 
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the factual findings of a post-conviction court, which hears 

evidence and passes on the credibility of witnesses, should 

be given deference. A PCRA court passes on witness 

credibility at PCRA hearings, and its credibility determinations 

should be provided great deference by reviewing courts. 

Indeed, one of the primary reasons PCRA hearings are held 

in the first place is so that credibility determinations can be 

made.

. . .

We will not disturb the findings of the PCRA court if they are 

supported by the record, even where the record could 

support a contrary holding. [An appellate court’s] scope of 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence on the record of the PCRA court's hearing, viewed 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Commonwealth v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 910-911 (Pa. 2021) (quotation 

marks, citations, and corrections omitted).

On appeal, Appellant claims that: 1) “his guilty plea[] was unlawfully 

induced because [Trial Counsel] told him that he was not prepared for trial 

and that if [Appellant] did not enter a guilty plea he would be convicted and 

face more time in prison than if he entered a plea” and 2) “[Trial Counsel] told 

him his sentence . . . would be run concurrent to a sentence he had in 

Somerset County.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. However, in this case, the PCRA 

court held an evidentiary hearing where Trial Counsel testified that: 1) he 

never told Appellant that “[Appellant] had to plead guilty and could not go to 

trial” and, prior to the entry of the plea, he “discuss[ed Appellant’s] options 

with [Appellant] and “suggested that [the plea] was the best arrangement 

that could be made” and 2) he “explain[ed] to [Appellant] that his 
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[two-and-a-half] to 15 year sentence would be in addition or consecutive to 

other matters that he had pending.” N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/15/21, at 15-16. 

Further, the PCRA court expressly found that Trial Counsel’s testimony was 

credible. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/29/21, at 10.

The PCRA court’s credibility determinations render Appellant’s claims on 

appeal meritless. Therefore, since the issues Appellant wished to pursue on 

appeal have no merit and since counsel complied with the procedural 

requirements for withdrawing as counsel, we grant counsel's petition to 

withdraw and affirm the order denying Appellant post-conviction collateral 

relief.

Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. Order affirmed. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/21/2022