49410 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 168 / Thursday, September 2, 2021 / Notices 

1 49 CFR 236.1005. 

2 49 CFR part 218. 

3 49 CFR 236.1005. 

By the Board, Scott M. Zimmerman, Acting 

Director, Office of Proceedings. 

Raina White, 

Clearance Clerk. 

[FR Doc. 2021–18972 Filed 9–1–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4915–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

[Safety Advisory 2021–01] 

Positive Train Control Interface Design 

Issue With Locomotive and Cab Car 

Braking Systems 

AGENCY: Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory. 

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety 

Advisory 2021–01 to make the rail 

industry, including railroads and 

railroad employees, aware of a recently 

identified interface design issue relating 

to how positive train control (PTC) 

systems in use throughout the United 

States interface with locomotive and cab 

car braking systems. This recently 

identified interface design issue allows 

a train crewmember to circumvent a 

PTC enforcement by manually cutting 

out the pilot valve/brake stand, 

commonly known as the cut-out valve, 

prior to the PTC system initiating the 

brakes. This interface design issue poses 

a significant safety risk by allowing a 

PTC system to be disabled and unable 

to initiate the brakes to prevent a trainto-train collision, over-speed 

derailment, incursion into an 

established work zones, or the 

movement of a train through a switch 

left in the wrong position. This Safety 

Advisory recommends that all railroads 

operating with PTC systems 

immediately remind crewmembers that 

circumventing a PTC enforcement is 

subject to civil penalty or 

disqualification for the locomotive 

engineer or conductor responsible; audit 

the designs of PTC systems as 

implemented on all types of 

locomotives and cab cars; assess the 

extent to which the design of the system 

could allow a locomotive or cab car’s 

PTC system to be circumvented by a 

crewmember; develop and implement a 

plan to mitigate and/or correct this 

design issue; and provide FRA with a 

schedule for completion of the 

identified actions. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Gabe Neal, Staff Director, Signal, Train 

Control and Crossings Division, Office 

of Railroad Systems and Technology, at 

telephone: (816) 516–7168 or email: 

gabe.neal@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Positive train control (PTC) systems 

must be designed to prevent train-totrain collisions, over-speed derailments, 

incursions into established work zones, 

and the movement of a train through a 

switch left in the wrong position.1 PTC 

accomplishes this by using technology 

to monitor train speed and train 

locations, provide warnings for the 

traincrew to take action, and 

automatically initiate braking if the 

traincrew does not take action. 

FRA is aware of a recently identified 

design issue relating to how PTC 

systems in use throughout the United 

States interface with locomotive and cab 

car braking systems. This interface 

design issue allows a crewmember to 

circumvent a PTC enforcement by 

manually cutting out the pilot valve/ 

brake stand, commonly known as the 

cut-out valve, prior to the PTC system 

initiating the brakes. If a PTC system is 

allowed to be disabled by the actions of 

a crewmember, the PTC system can no 

longer prevent a train-to-train collision, 

over-speed derailment, incursion into 

an established work zone, or the 

movement of a train through a switch 

left in the wrong position. 

Although FRA has found that all PTC 

systems are potentially impacted by this 

interface design issue, FRA notes that 

only some interface designs between the 

PTC system and the locomotive or cab 

car braking system allow a PTC 

enforcement to be disabled. FRA 

believes that the interface designs of 

most concern are limited to a number of 

older locomotives equipped with 

mechanical braking systems, and the 

interface design is likely not an issue on 

most newer locomotives equipped with 

electronic braking systems. On PTCequipped locomotives and cab cars with 

interface designs with this issue, 

manually cutting out the pilot valve/ 

brake stand disables the PTC system 

enforcement capability. FRA recognizes 

that a locomotive or cab car PTC system 

is considered a ‘‘safety device’’ under 

FRA’s regulations 2 and that it is 

unlawful for a railroad employee to 

operate the equipment with such a 

safety device disabled without 

authorization. Accordingly, a system 

that allows such interference in its 

operation does not comply with the 

applicable statutory or regulatory 

requirements.3 In addition, a PTC 

system that allows such interference 

presents a significant safety risk in that 

it can no longer perform its required 

functions. 

FRA became aware of this issue 

through three recent events: 

• On May 27, 2021, during testing of 

the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement 

System II (ACSES II) PTC system aboard 

a freight train, an FRA PTC Specialist 

witnessed an engineer circumvent a 

penalty brake application while 

operating in an overspeed condition. 

The engineer placed the pilot valve/ 

brake stand in the cut-out position prior 

to PTC system enforcement of the 

overspeed condition. When the 

overspeed condition no longer existed, 

the pilot valve/brake stand was returned 

to the cut-in position, and the train 

continued without a PTC system 

penalty. 

• On July 13, 2021, during testing of 

the Interoperable Electronic Train 

Management System (I–ETMS) PTC 

system on a freight locomotive, FRA 

conducted a test in which a zero speed 

temporary speed restriction (TSR) was 

issued to the train and the pilot valve/ 

brake stand was placed into the cut-out 

position prior to PTC system 

enforcement of the TSR. This action 

allowed the train to circumvent PTC 

system enforcement. 

• On July 21, 2021, during testing of 

the ACSES II PTC system on a passenger 

train, FRA conducted a similar test in 

which a zero speed temporary speed 

restriction (TSR) was issued to the train 

and the pilot valve/brake stand was 

placed into the cut-out position prior to 

PTC system enforcement of the TSR. 

This action achieved similar results, 

allowing the train to circumvent the 

PTC system enforcement with one 

exception; after placing the pilot valve/ 

brake stand back into the cut-in 

position, the train encountered a PTC 

penalty brake application. 

Safety Advisory 2021–01 

As shown by the incidents described 

above, rail operations face a safety risk 

due to the interface design issue that 

allows PTC enforcement to be 

circumvented by cutting out the pilot 

valve/brake stand. Such risks must be 

addressed to provide for the safety of 

train operations, and thus FRA 

recommends that railroads do the 

following: 

(1) Immediately remind railroad 

crewmembers that, along with the 

unauthorized disabling of a PTC system, 

circumventing PTC enforcement by 

manually cutting out the pilot valve/ 

brake stand when not authorized is a 

revocable event for the locomotive 

engineer or conductor responsible, and 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 168 / Thursday, September 2, 2021 / Notices 49411 

subjects any other crewmember 

responsible to individual liability 

proceedings, including disqualification 

and/or civil penalties. See 49 CFR 

240.117(e)(5), 240.305(a)(5), and 

242.403(b) and (e)(5). 

(2) Immediately conduct a complete 

audit of the PTC onboard design of all 

locomotives and cab cars equipped with 

PTC to determine how the onboard PTC 

equipment is integrated into each 

railroad’s locomotive and cab car’s 

braking system, to ascertain what 

percentage of the locomotive and cab 

car fleet is subject to the interface design 

issue described above; 

(3) Within ten (10) days of the 

publication of this Safety Advisory, 

provide FRA, via the SIR site, with a 

report of the number and type of 

locomotives and cab cars that have this 

interface design issue; 

(4) Upon completion of item (2) 

above, determine the mitigating 

measures and/or corrective actions 

necessary to address the safety risk 

presented by the design issue, and 

provide FRA, via the SIR site, with a 

report documenting the planned 

measures and/or actions, including a 

schedule for completion; and 

(5) Immediately commence 

implementation of the planned 

measures and/or actions to address the 

safety risk presented by the design issue 

per the documented schedule, and 

provide FRA, via the SIR site, 

confirmation of completion. 

Issued in Washington, DC. 

John Karl Alexy, 

Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, 

Chief Safety Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2021–18997 Filed 9–1–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2019–0132; Notice 2] 

Hankook Tire America Corporation, 

Grant of Petition for Decision of 

Inconsequential Noncompliance 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Grant of petition. 

SUMMARY: Hankook Tire America 

Corporation (Hankook) has determined 

that certain Hankook Ventus V2 

Concept 2 tires manufactured by 

Hankook’s indirect subsidiary, Hankook 

Tire Manufacturing Tennessee, LP, do 

not fully comply with Federal Motor 

Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 

139, New Pneumatic Radial Tires for 

Light Vehicles. Hankook filed a 

noncompliance report dated November 

19, 2019, and subsequently petitioned 

NHTSA on December 5, 2019, for a 

decision that the subject noncompliance 

is inconsequential as it relates to motor 

vehicle safety. This notice announces 

and explains the grant of Hankook’s 

petition. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Abraham Diaz, Office of Vehicle Safety 

Compliance, the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

telephone (202) 366–5310, facsimile 

(202) 366–3081. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Overview: Hankook has determined 

that certain Hankook Ventus V2 

Concept 2 tires, do not fully comply 

with paragraph S5.5.1(b) of FMVSS No. 

139, New Pneumatic Radial Tires for 

Light Vehicles (49 CFR 571.139). 

Hankook filed a noncompliance 

report dated November 19, 2019, 

pursuant to 49 CFR part 573, Defect and 

Noncompliance Responsibility and 

Reports, and subsequently petitioned 

NHTSA on December 5, 2019, for an 

exemption from the notification and 

remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C. 

chapter 301 on the basis that this 

noncompliance is inconsequential as it 

relates to motor vehicle safety, pursuant 

to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h) and 

49 CFR part 556, Exemption for 

Inconsequential Defect or 

Noncompliance. 

Notice of receipt of Hankook’s 

petition was published with a 30-day 

public comment period, on April 17, 

2020, in the Federal Register (85 FR 

21504). No comments were received. To 

view the petition and all supporting 

documents log onto the Federal Docket 

Management System (FDMS) website at 

https://www.regulations.gov/, and then 

follow the online search instructions to 

locate docket number ‘‘NHTSA–2019– 

0132.’’ 

II. Tires Involved: Approximately 467 

Hankook Ventus V2 Concept 2 tires, size 

235/45R17V XL H457, manufactured 

between October 7, 2019, and October 

12, 2019, are potentially involved. 

III. Noncompliance: Hankook 

explains that the noncompliance is due 

to a mold error in which the subject 

tires, were marked with the date-code in 

the Tire Identification Number (TIN) 

inverted and; therefore, they do not 

meet the requirements of paragraph 

S5.5.1(b) of FMVSS No. 139. 

Specifically, the date code was printed 

upside down. 

IV. Rule Requirements: Paragraph 

S5.5.1(b) of FMVSS No. 139 includes 

the requirements relevant to the 

petition. Each tire must be labeled with 

the TIN required by 49 CFR part 574.5 

on the intended outboard sidewall of 

the tire. Except for retreaded tires, if a 

tire does not have an intended outboard 

sidewall, the tire must be labeled with 

the TIN required by 49 CFR part 574.5 

on one sidewall and with either the TIN 

or a partial TIN, containing all 

characters in the TIN except for the date 

code and, at the discretion of the 

manufacturer, any optional code, on the 

other sidewall. Each tire must be 

marked on each sidewall with the TIN 

required by 49 CFR part 574.5 as listed 

in the documents and publications 

specified in paragraph (b) TIN content 

requirement. 

V. Summary of Hankook’s Petition: 

Hankook describes the subject 

noncompliance and contends that the 

noncompliance is inconsequential as it 

relates to motor vehicle safety. In 

support of its petition, Hankook offers 

the following reasoning: 

1. The purpose of the labeling 

requirements in Part 574 is to ‘‘facilitate 

notification to purchasers of defective or 

nonconforming tires.’’ See Part 574.2. 

The date code portion of the TIN is 

required so that purchasers can identify 

the week and year of the tire’s 

manufacture in the event the tire is 

subject to a safety recall. 

2. The date-code characters reflect the 

correct week and year of the tires’ 

manufacture, but the date code is 

technically out of compliance because 

the characters are inverted. Despite the 

inversion, the date code meets the 

character height requirements of Part 

574 and is readily identifiable, 

permitting tire owners to easily 

determine the week and year of 

manufacture. 

3. NHTSA has previously granted a 

petition for inconsequential 

noncompliance for a similar issue. In 

granting a petition from Cooper Tire & 

Rubber Company, 81 FR 43708 (July 5, 

2016), the Agency explained: 

The Agency believes that in the case 

of a tire labeling noncompliance, one 

measure of its inconsequentiality to 

motor vehicle safety is whether the 

mislabeling would affect the 

manufacturer’s or consumer’s ability to 

identify the mislabeled tires properly, 

should the tires be recalled for 

performance-related noncompliance. In 

this case, the nature of the labeling error 

does not prevent the correct 

identification of the affected tires. 49 

CFR 574.5 requires the date code 

portion of the tire identification number 

to be placed in the last or correct 

position. In Cooper’s case, it is in the 

right-most position, however, the 

manufacture date code is upside down. 


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