NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-1569

___________

ANURADHA DHINGRA,

Appellant

v.

SAP AMERICA, INC.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2:22-cv-00765)

District Judge: Honorable Chad F. Kenney

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 3, 2024

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 16, 2024)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Anuradha Dhingra is a citizen of India residing in New Jersey. She obtained online 

certifications in certain software produced by SAP America, Inc. (SAP), after completing 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

training modules through SAP’s “Learning Hub.” Dhingra used the certifications to 

further her consulting career. 

In late 2021, SAP notified Dhingra about the expiration of her “Certification SUser ID,” an eleven-digit credential used to access the “Certification Hub” and its 

repository of information concerning certification history and status. That action 

allegedly made it more difficult for Dhingra to find work. 

Dhingra sued SAP, raising claims under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and state contract and 

privacy laws. The District Court granted SAP’s motion for summary judgment.

The District Court determined that Dhingra’s Fifth Amendment claim was legally 

defective because SAP is not a government actor and, regardless, Dhingra did not 

identify a protected liberty interest. As for Dhingra’s contract claim, the District Court 

determined: “There is no evidence there was a contract [ ], there is no evidence 

Defendant breached such a contract, and there is no evidence to support damages.” DC 

Op. 13. The District Court similarly determined that summary judgment was proper on 

Dhingra’s invasion-of-privacy claim because evidentiary support was wholly lacking. 

Rejecting the ATS claim as legally defective, the District Court determined that “[e]ven if 

Defendant deletes the Plaintiff’s certification records, this conduct does not rise to a level 

comparable to slavery, genocide, or nonconsensual medical experimentation to sustain a 

successful Alien Tort Statute claim.” DC Op. 17. Finally, the District Court determined 

that there was no basis for ordering injunctive relief, as all the claims were non-viable.
3

Dhingra filed a timely motion for reconsideration, then a notice of appeal. The 

District Court denied Dhingra’s motion without prejudice, on the ground that “the abovecaptioned case has been appealed.” DC ECF No. 49. The District Court was mistaken 

about its authority to act in that moment. See Mondrow v. Fountain House, 867 F.2d 798, 

800 (3d Cir. 1989). But because the motion is no longer pending, we need not remand.

Instead, we deem Dhingra’s notice of appeal timely as to the District Court’s 

summary judgment ruling, see Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 185 (3d 

Cir. 1983); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), and exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The 

District Court’s summary judgment ruling is reviewed de novo. Blunt v. Lower Merion 

Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).

We have considered Dhingra’s arguments on appeal; none reveals a reversible 

error by the District Court. Dhingra repeats throughout her briefs that this case presents 

issues of first impression, but whatever novelty her arguments might have does not 

change their disconnection from applicable precedent (or reasonable expansions thereof). 

Dhingra’s reliance on Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School 

Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), for example, to show an error in the District 

Court’s Fifth Amendment analysis, is unavailing. In Brentwood Academy, “the Supreme 

Court decided a private collective membership organization composed of public and 

private high schools in Tennessee was a state actor.” Matrix Distribs., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n

of Bds. of Pharmacy, 34 F.4th 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2022). The plaintiff there had “managed 

to show a tight connection between the association of schools and the state government,” 

such that policies of the former could be imputed to the latter. Id. Dhingra, by contrast, 
4

developed no evidence in the District Court even remotely suggesting a “close nexus” 

between a state government and the conduct challenged here, such that “seemingly 

private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Brentwood Acad., 531 

U.S. at 295 (citation and internal quotations omitted); cf. Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Co., 62 

F.4th 278, 283 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[F]ederal contracts by themselves do not create the 

requisite entwinement.”). The District Court was thus right to grant summary judgment to 

SAP on the Fifth Amendment claim.

Equally unpersuasive is Dhingra’s criticism of the District Court’s ATS analysis. 

Dhingra appears to contend that the District Court ignored SAP’s corporate activity in the 

United States, Dhingra’s personal financial troubles, and historical inequality experienced 

by women in India. Dhingra, however, misses a fundamental defect in her ATS claim: 

There was no evidence presented at the summary judgment phase indicating that SAP 

violated a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm of international law.” Sosa v. 

Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).

1 The District Court was thus right to grant 

summary judgment to SAP on the ATS claim.

Accordingly, for the reasons given above and set forth in the District Court’s 

memorandum opinion addressing SAP’s summary judgment motion, we will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court.

1

In so concluding, we have not taken a position on whether corporate liability is 

available under the ATS. Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 

145 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 569 U.S. 108 (2013), with Flomo v. Firestone

Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017-21 (7th Cir. 2011).