U.S. Department of Justice 

Project Safe Neighborhoods: Strategic Interventions
 

Lowell, District of Massachusetts: Case Study 6 

Written by: 

Jack McDevitt 


Northeastern University 


Anthony A. Braga
 

Harvard University 


Shea Cronin 


American University 


With: 

Edmund F. McGarrell 


Michigan State University 


Tim Bynum
 

Michigan State University 


School of Criminal Justice
 

Michigan State University
 

560 Baker Hall
 

East Lansing, MI 48824
 

February 2007
 
U.S. Department of Justice
 

Office of Justice Programs
 

810 Seventh Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20531 

Alberto R. Gonzales 

Attorney General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

This project was supported by Grant #2002-GP-CX-1003 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, 

Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of 

the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department 

of Justice. The Project Safe Neighborhoods series has benefited from the support, assistance, and 

comments of John Irving, Lois Felton Mock, Robyn Thiemann, and members of the Firearms 

Enforcement Assistance Team (FEAT) of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Overview
 

The last decade of the 20th century witnessed significant declines in the rate of crime in the United States. 

This was true for most types of crime, including 

homicide and serious violent crime.1 Despite these 

declines, the level of gun crime in the United States remains 

higher than that experienced in other western democracies 

and is a source of untold tragedy for families and communities.2 Given this context, in 2001 the Bush Administration 

made the reduction of gun crime one of the top priorities 

of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), along with combating terrorism and enhancing homeland security. 

The vehicle for translating this priority into action is Project Safe 

Neighborhoods (PSN). PSN represents a commitment to gun crime 

reduction through a network of local partnerships coordinated 

through the nation’s 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. These local partnerships are supported by a strategy to provide them with the resources 

that they need to be successful. 

The PSN initiative integrates five essential elements from successful 

gun crime reduction programs, such as Richmond’s Project Exile, the 

Boston Operation Ceasefire Program, and DOJ’s Strategic Approaches to 

Community Safety Initiative. Those elements are: partnerships, strategic 

planning, training, outreach, and accountability. The partnership element requires that the local U.S. Attorney create workable and sustainable partnerships with other federal, state, and local law enforcement; 

prosecutors; and the community. Strategic problem-solving involves the 

use of data and research to isolate the key factors driving gun crime at 

the local level, suggest intervention strategies, and provide feedback 

and evaluation to the task force. The outreach component incorporates 

communication strategies geared at both offenders (“focused deterrence”) and the community (“general deterrence”). The training element underscores the importance of ensuring that each person 

involved in the gun crime reduction effort—from the line police 

officer to the prosecutor to the community outreach worker—has the 

skills necessary to be most effective. Finally, the accountability element 

ensures that the task force regularly receives feedback about the impact 

of its interventions so that adjustments can be made if necessary. 

Partnerships 

The PSN program is intended to increase partnerships between 

federal, state, and local agencies through the formation of a local PSN 

task force. Coordinated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the PSN task 

force typically includes both federal and local prosecutors, federal law 

i 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

enforcement agencies, local and state law enforcement agencies, and 

probation and parole. Nearly all PSN task forces also include local government leaders, social service providers, neighborhood leaders, members of the faith community, business leaders, educators, and health 

care providers. 

Strategic Planning 

Recognizing that crime problems, including gun crime, vary from 

community to community across the United States, that state laws 

addressing gun crime vary considerably, and that local and state 

resources vary across the federal judicial districts covered by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, PSN also includes a commitment to strategic planning 

whereby the PSN program is tailored to local context. Specifically, PSN 

provides resources for the inclusion of a local research partner who 

works with the PSN task force to analyze the local gun crime problem 

and to share the findings with the task force for the development of a 

proactive plan for gun crime reduction. The research partners assist 

the task force through analysis of gun crime patterns and trends that 

can help the task force focus resources on the most serious people, 

places, and contexts of gun violence. The research partners can also 

bring evidence-based practice to the task force discussions of gun 

crime reduction strategies.3 The inclusion of the research partner was 

also intended to assist in ongoing assessment in order to provide feedback to the task force. 

Although each district creates strategic interventions that make 

sense in their local context, one strategy shared by all PSN task forces 

is increased federal prosecution of gun crime. PSN is built on the belief 

that the increased federal prosecution of gun offenders will reduce 

gun crime through the incapacitation of gun criminals and the deterrence of potential offenders. This working hypothesis is based on the 

notion that federal sanctions for gun crime are often more severe than 

those either available at the state level or likely to be imposed at the 

state level. Further, federal prosecution may include sanctions unavailable at the local level. The focus on prohibited persons possessing or 

using a firearm is built on the finding that a significant portion of gun 

crime involves offenders and victims with significant criminal histories. Thus, by increasing the certainty that a prohibited person in possession will face strong federal sanctions, the goal is to persuade 

potential offenders not to illegally possess and carry a gun. 

The commitment to increased federal prosecution appears to be 

borne out. Fiscal year 2005 witnessed over 13,000 individuals charged 

with federal gun crimes, the highest number ever recorded by DOJ. 

Since PSN’s inception, the number of federal firearms prosecutions has 

increased 73 percent.4 

ii 
Overview 

Training 

PSN has involved a significant commitment of resources to support 

training. This program has included training provided to law enforcement agencies on topics including gun crime investigations, gun crime 

identification and tracing, and related issues. Training on effective prosecution of gun cases has been provided to state and local prosecutors. 

Additional training has focused on strategic problem-solving and community outreach and engagement. By the end of 2005, DOJ estimates 

that nearly 18,000 individuals had attended a PSN-related training program sponsored by one of the many national PSN training and technical assistance partners.5 

Outreach 

The architects of PSN also recognized that increased sanctions 

would have the most impact if accompanied with a media campaign to 

communicate the message of the likelihood of federal prosecution for 

illegal possession and use of a gun. Consequently, resources were provided to all PSN task forces to work with a media partner to devise 

strategies for communicating this message to both potential offenders 

and to the community at large. This local outreach effort is also supported at the national level by the creation and distribution of Public 

Service Announcements and materials (ads, posters). These materials 

are direct mailed to media outlets and are also available to local PSN 

task forces.6 

The outreach component is also intended to support the development of prevention and intervention components. PSN provided grant 

funding in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to the local PSN partnerships 

that could be used to support a variety of initiatives including prevention and intervention. Many initiatives were built on existing programs 

such as school-based prevention, Weed and Seed, or juvenile court 

intervention programs. 

Accountability 

The leadership of the PSN initiative at DOJ has emphasized that 

PSN would focus on outcomes—i.e., reduced gun crime—as opposed 

to a focus on outputs such as arrests and cases prosecuted. That is, 

PSN’s success is measured by the reduction in gun crime. This 

accountability component was linked to strategic planning whereby 

PSN task forces, working with their local research partner, are asked 

to monitor levels of crime over time within targeted problems and/or 

targeted areas. 

Additional Information 

For more information on Project Safe Neighborhoods, visit 

www.psn.gov. If you are interested in supporting your local Project Safe 

Neighborhoods program, please contact your local U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

iii 
 

Contents
 

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
 

Lowell, District of Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 

Site Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 

U.S. District of Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 

Targeted Response to Asian Youth 


Interagency Working Group Implementation:
 

City of Lowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 

Lowell Police Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 

PSN Development and Implementation . . . . . . . . . 5
 

PSN Lowell: Early Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 

PSN Task Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 

PSN Lowell Working Group: Operations . . . . . 7
 

Problem Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 

Nature of Gun Violence in Lowell . . . . . . . . . . 9
 

Strategic Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 

General Gun Violence Strategic Intervention . . 11
 

Gang Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 

Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 

Intervention Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 

Pre-Post Intervention Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 

Comparison Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
 

Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
 

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
 

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
 

List of Figures 

Figure 1: Summary of Gun Crime 


Problem in Lowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 

Figure 2: Gun Crime Problem and PSN Strategies . . . 14
 

Figure 3: Pre-Post Comparison of Violent Crime 


Indicators, City of Lowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
 

Figure 4: Comparison of Pre- to Post-Intervention 


Change in Aggravated Assaults with a Firearm in 


Select Massachusetts Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
 

Figure 5: Summary of Key Components of PSN 


Lowell’s Successful PSN Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . 21
 

v 
Executive Summary
 

Context 

Massachusetts is covered by a single U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO). 

The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that Massachusetts has just over 6.4 

million residents (2003 estimate) and ranks 13th in U.S. state population (2000). The Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) task force in the 

District of Massachusetts focuses on Boston as well as 10 additional 

jurisdictions. This study focuses on the PSN task force operating in the 

City of Lowell. 

Task Force 

The PSN task force in Lowell benefited from and built upon the 

USAO’s experience with the Boston Operation Ceasefire Program as 

well as Lowell Police Department’s (LPD’s) longstanding commitment 

to community policing and problem solving. The police department is 

decentralized, with officers assigned to one of three geographic districts. The community-policing model emphasizes partnerships with 

community groups and other law enforcement agencies. These partnerships facilitated the implementation of PSN. The PSN working group 

consists of the PSN Coordinator and federal prosecutors from the 

USAO; local law enforcement including LPD detectives; federal law 

enforcement including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); county 

prosecutors; probation officers; and research partners from Harvard 

and Northeastern Universities. 

Problem Analysis 

In 2003, Lowell had a violent crime rate of 825 per 100,000 residents and a property crime rate of 2,933, based on the FBI’s Uniform 

Crime Reports’ (UCR) Crime in the United States (U.S. Department of 

Justice, 2003). Compared to all U.S. cities with populations greater 

than 75,000, Lowell placed above average in terms of violent crime 

and below average in terms of property crime. From 2000 to 2004, 

Lowell had a relatively stable average homicide rate of 4.5 per year. 

Gun crime in Lowell involved young males with prior criminal histories and gang involvement. 

Strategies 

The PSN strategy included an incapacitation strategy focused on a 

relatively small number of the most serious, chronic offenders of the 

federal criminal gun statute as well as a focused deterrence strategy 

geared toward youth gang members. The incapacitation strategy was 

facilitated by a joint prosecution gun case screening process whereby 

federal and local prosecutors reviewed cases to ensure that the most 

1 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

serious chronic offenders received the longest sentence in either federal or state court. The focused deterrence strategy was based on 

direct communication to at-risk youth gang members through offender 

notification meetings, increased supervision of probationers, and 

focused police patrol. A particularly innovative strategy targeted adults 

from the Asian community believed to be involved in gambling operations to exert informal social control over Asian youth gangs to desist 

in gun crime. 

Outcomes 

The impact assessment suggests a reduction in aggravated assaults 

with a firearm, the principal focus of the PSN Lowell task force. The 

reduction (-28 percent) was considerably larger than that observed in 

several comparison Massachusetts cities. There was no reduction in 

armed robberies with a gun or in gun-related calls-for-service. Homicides were too infrequent to assess impact. The assessment also indicated that a multi-agency partnership, employing a research-driven, 

strategic problem-solving approach, was effectively implemented in 

PSN Lowell. 

2 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

This case study describes and assesses the implementation of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) in the District of Massachusetts and particularly in the City of 

Lowell. It also describes the problem analysis process, the 

strategic intervention implemented by the interagency task 

force or working group, and its impact on gun crime in Lowell. The study presents a detailed description of a unique 

approach to reducing firearm violence undertaken in Lowell, 

which involved implementing strong, creative, and effective 

partnerships among local and federal law enforcement agencies, the strategic use of data to define the problem, and the 

development of an innovative strategy to reduce the city’s 

firearm violence problem. The experience of Lowell—a city 

whose size, demographics, and gun crime problems are similar to numerous mid-sized, urban communities throughout 

America—should benefit other agencies working within PSN 

networks or other interagency partnerships. 

Site Description 

U.S. District of Massachusetts 

The U.S. District of Massachusetts comprises the entire state. Massachusetts is a state of approximately 6.35 million people, with the City 

of Boston its political capital and economic center. 

Massachusetts has a modest amount of gun violence compared to 

other states. In 2003, there were 140 murders statewide, just over half 

(73) of which were committed with a firearm. These 73 reported firearm 

homicides place Massachusetts in the bottom quartile among states.7 

Based on data provided by 291 Massachusetts crime reporting agencies, 

29.2 percent of all reported robberies and 9.4 percent of all aggravated 

assaults were committed with a firearm. Virtually all of the state’s gun 

crimes occur in Boston and 10 other smaller cities within the state (e.g., 

Brockton, Fall River, Lawrence, Lowell, Springfield, and Worcester). The 

PSN Coordinator at the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) encouraged each 

of these cities to join PSN efforts and form local task forces to deal with 

the particular firearm violence problem in their communities. 

For several reasons, the PSN task force in Massachusetts gave 

greater initial emphasis to the smaller cities beyond Boston. First, the 

Boston Police Department—a department with a strategic orientation 

that is in part the model for PSN—appeared to have in place a greater 

3 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

degree of resources, interagency and community partnerships, and 

analytical capability at its disposal than smaller urban departments. 

Second, during the early stages of PSN, Boston’s gun violence problem 

seemed to be relatively under control: gun violence was near all-time 

lows, in part because of these strategic efforts. As such, it was believed 

that PSN resources were an opportunity to enhance the capacity of the 

smaller departments to understand their gun violence problem; participate in partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies; and craft 

strategic interventions that focused on their individual firearm violence 

problems. Among the agencies from these smaller cities that dealt regularly with gun crime problems is the Lowell Police Department 

(LPD). LPD, like other agencies, participated in the District of Massachusetts PSN task force, but also created a local interagency working 

group that focused attention on gun violence in Lowell. 

City of Lowell 

Lowell is located in northeastern Massachusetts, and has a population of 105,167 (2000 U.S. Census). While its population is primarily 

White (62.5 percent), Lowell has a substantial minority population 

comprised of Asian (17.3 percent) and Hispanic (14.0 percent) people. 

African-Americans (3.5 percent) and residents that report other or multiple races (3.4 percent) make up the remaining racial and ethnic 

groups in Lowell. Roughly one in seven residents (14 percent) live 

below the poverty line, which is above average for Massachusetts cities 

and towns. 

The racial composition of Lowell changed substantially between 

1990 and 2000. Most notable has been the steady increase in the number of residents of Asian descent. This community has grown from 10.9 

percent of Lowell’s population in 1990 to 16.5 percent in 2000. This 

group is largely composed of people from or having ancestry in the 

Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 

The language and cultural barriers associated with these growing 

immigrant populations have been a challenge to the LPD. While Lowell 

officers report that it has been difficult to engage the Southeast Asian 

community, progress has been made over the last several years, with 

renewed emphasis on community policing and direct outreach to 

these communities. 

Lowell had a violent crime rate of 825 per 100,000 residents, and 

property crime rate of 2,933 in 2003, based on the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s (FBI’s) Uniform Crime Reports’ (UCR) Crime in the 

United States (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). Compared to all U.S. 

cities with populations greater than 75,000, Lowell places above average in violent crime and below average in property crime. From 2000 

to 2004, Lowell had a relatively stable level of homicides averaging 4.5 

per year. 

4 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

Lowell Police Department 

LPD, consisting of 450 sworn police officers, has a national reputation for embracing community policing strategies. To facilitate ownership of neighborhoods and improve knowledge of localized crime 

issues, LPD patrol officers, supervisors, and detectives are assigned 

geographically to one of three sectors: East, West, or North. A captain 

is responsible for administering police services within each sector, and 

officers are allocated for long-term assignments. The department’s 

neighborhood enforcement approach emphasizes interacting with 

community residents, addressing quality of life crimes, and engaging in 

partnerships with community groups. 

The majority of the department’s investigations are handled by 

decentralized detectives operating out of the sector stations, as well as 

a centralized unit assigned to the Investigative Services Division (ISD). 

The detectives from ISD were most closely involved in PSN. Within the 

centralized ISD, major crimes are handled by detectives from the Criminal Investigation Section, while detectives from the Special Investigation Section are responsible for vice-related crimes such as drug 

trafficking and illegal gaming. Personnel from both units played an 

important role in crafting and implementing PSN interventions. 

PSN Development and Implementation 

Since the late 1980s, LPD has made a substantial change in its 

approach to policing, resulting in stronger relationships with external 

groups (Thatcher, 2000). Officers from each sector regularly attend 

neighborhood association meetings to discuss residents’ public safety 

concerns. Such efforts are promoted and rewarded by the chief of 

police and management. As the department’s community policing 

model grew, the department actively pursued partnerships with community-based organizations and law enforcement agencies. These partnerships would serve as a basis for the implementation of the city’s 

PSN strategy. 

A good example of the LPD’s willingness to engage in partnerships 

was the Safety First initiative in the late 1990s. Safety First, a community initiative sponsored by a non-profit foundation, was a partnership 

of criminal justice agencies and community organizations modeled 

after the Boston Operation Ceasefire Program (Hartmann, 2002). 

Through the initiative, the department partnered with probation officers and local youth workers to craft enforcement responses to youth 

violence, such as “impact player” lists, home visits, and offender notification meetings. 

The department also has built partnerships with federal law 

enforcement agencies. In some instances, this entails a daily working 

relationship and resource sharing. Through the High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Area (HIDTA) for example, the department designates a full5 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

time detective to work at the FBI office in Lowell. This partnership 

entails working on investigations together and developing street intelligence. Another interagency partnership in which the LPD is involved is 

the Cross Border Initiative, in which LPD detectives work closely with 

the Drug Enforcement Administration and local jurisdictions in Massachusetts and New Hampshire to investigate interstate drug trafficking. 

These existing partnerships with federal agencies helped to build 

mutual trust between LPD personnel and federal agencies and formed 

the foundation upon which PSN was established. 

In addition to developing partnerships, the department has built 

capacity to think strategically about crime problems—a core element 

of the PSN initiative. The department has made a commitment to 

research to help guide and assess policy and supports a crime analysis 

unit responsible for producing basic statistical reports, crime pattern 

and hot spot analysis, and special projects related to enforcement 

efforts. These analysts have developed a gang database that provides 

detailed information on gang members and associates. Detectives 

involved with violent crime have noted that the crime analysis unit is 

particularly helpful in providing information on patterns of crime as 

well as identifying likely suspects from databases. 

PSN Lowell: Early Stages 

The partnerships that developed in Lowell through PSN began 

informally, but strengthened significantly during the national PSN conference in Virginia in 2002. This conference offered the opportunity for 

a group of the partners to spend time together and discuss how they 

could work to implement PSN in Lowell. LPD personnel and the PSN 

Coordinator for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for Massachusetts met and 

began to lay the groundwork for PSN in Lowell. While there was 

already an interest in participating in this initiative by the leadership of 

the LPD, this conference provided an opportunity for a group of officers and the PSN Coordinator to meet and make more concrete plans 

for implementation. 

PSN Task Forces 

PSN is designed to foster partnerships between various law 

enforcement agencies tackling similar gun violence problems. The partnership—and the cooperative enforcement and prosecution that 

ensued—was implemented in Lowell via an interagency working group 

or task force. The PSN Lowell working group focused specifically on 

the city’s gun violence problems and interventions and consisted of 

local and federal law enforcement professionals and research partners 

from Harvard and Northeastern Universities. Local members of the 

task force included LPD detectives from the Criminal and Special 

Investigations sections, Middlesex County District Attorneys, and probation officers. The PSN Coordinator and other prosecutors from the 

6 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

USAO, FBI, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) agents represented federal enforcement agencies on the PSN 

Lowell task force. 

PSN Lowell Working Group: Operations 

The Lowell working group convened monthly. At each meeting, 

participants worked on several tasks related to gun crime: scanning 

and discussing recent incidents and gun crime problems, making decisions about the most appropriate prosecution venues, and crafting 

intervention strategies. The working group began each meeting with a 

review of all of the gun crime that had occurred in Lowell since the 

last meeting (Klofas et al., 2006). Before the meetings, LPD detectives 

and research staff retrieved every gun violence incident or arrest 

report—regardless of crime type or severity—for the working group to 

review. The review was important for participants to get a sense of the 

immediate gun crime problems taking place in Lowell, establish what 

cases were priorities, and determine what problems required the most 

immediate response. From the case reviews and discussion, the working group typically proceeded to examine prosecutorial options and 

enforcement strategies. 

A major element of PSN is the prosecution of gun crimes in the 

most appropriate venue, and the Lowell working group made this a 

major focus at each of its meetings (Decker et al., 2006). With both 

local and federal prosecutors attending, the group was able to decide 

how to prosecute each case in a manner that it felt would do the most 

to reduce firearm violence in the city. For many cases, this involved 

producing the longest sentence for the offender. On occasion the 

group decided that the offender involved may not be a real impact 

player and thus looked for a resolution that might provide the person a 

second chance. While the State of Massachusetts has relatively strict 

gun crime laws, the opportunity to prosecute an offender federally 

provided flexibility and special resources not available at the state 

level. For example, federal agencies had greater financial resources to 

devote to long-term investigations. The working group’s goal for prosecution, according to participants, was to get the most serious, chronic 

offenders off the street as quickly and for as long as possible. 

The working group chose prosecutorial avenues for offenders based 

on both formal and discretionary criteria. First, the offender had to 

meet the basic legal requirements to be eligible for prosecution by the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, including age and specific offense types. Next, 

from the pool of eligible offenders, the working group discussed which 

cases should be prosecuted locally or federally based primarily on the 

offender’s criminal background or the offense. Based on information 

from LPD personnel, the characteristics that shaped this decision were 

the offender’s depth of criminal history, perceived dangerousness to the 

community, and level of gang involvement. It was not always the case 

7 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

that the most severe cases or serious offenders were prosecuted 

through the federal court system. If evidence or the type of case might 

be most effectively prosecuted in district court, the group would 

choose that venue. If the federal court offered an opportunity to prosecute a particular serious, chronic offender—perhaps for another, less 

serious crime—the group would use this option to put an offender 

who was seen to be an impact player behind bars. 

One task force participant discussed an excellent example of the 

collaboration that developed between LPD detectives, federal agents, 

and federal prosecutors through PSN, based on an investigation of a 

homicide that occurred in Lowell. During the investigation, detectives 

uncovered a number of unlicensed firearms and silencers through a 

search warrant in a storage facility that a suspect was renting. LPD 

detectives expected, based on their experience, that this case would 

receive a possession of an illegal firearm charge and result in the defendant receiving bail and being released for trial at a much later date. To 

avoid this, an LPD detective and a working group member solicited the 

help of federal prosecutors to have the suspect charged with federal 

weapons violations. As a result, the suspect was arraigned in U.S. District Court and held without bail until trial. The working relationship 

that had developed through PSN provided an opportunity to keep a 

potentially serious offender off the street immediately until homicide 

charges could be brought. 

Finally, the working group used the meetings to discuss potential 

enforcement strategies. With information from the case review, local 

knowledge from working group members, and problem analysis conducted by research partners, the working group was able to discuss 

new ways to address gun violence problems. As one member 

described the process, the group discussed the “game plan” for each 

gun violence problem as it arose. It was in these meetings that enforcement alternatives were debated and later refined as they were implemented in the community. 

Problem Analysis 

A core element of PSN is to implement gun crime interventions 

based on a detailed understanding of the nature of gun violence problems within the local community. PSN facilitates this strategic or datadriven approach by including research partners on task forces and 

working groups. In Lowell, research partners from Harvard and Northeastern Universities worked directly with LPD personnel and other 

working group members to conduct problem analysis early in PSN 

implementation (for a detailed discussion of process, see Braga et al., 

2006). The goal of the problem analysis was to provide the working 

group and police policymakers with accurate information about gun 

violence in Lowell. In general, the problem analysis sought to consoli8 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

date various viewpoints of the gun violence problem as well as test 

and refine the department’s established understanding of gun violence. 

The methodology included both quantitative and qualitative 

sources of information. First, available official crime data sources were 

brought together and analyzed to develop a basic understanding of the 

city’s gun violence. Researchers analyzed data on homicides (2000 

through 2002) and aggravated assaults (2002) to answer questions 

about victim and offender demographics, temporal and spatial patterns, and the extent of firearm use. In addition, the Massachusetts 

Criminal History System Board’s Criminal Offender Record Information 

(CORI) was matched with the incident data to capture the known 

criminal histories and criminal justice system involvement of offenders 

and victims. This information was important, among other reasons, to 

determine the extent to which offenders were subject to existing criminal justice system options (i.e., probation or parole violations). 

To augment the basic information provided by the official sources 

of data, the research partners relied on qualitative sources of information. Over the course of the analysis, research partners from Harvard 

held focus groups with the LPD Investigative Services Division and the 

LPD Gang Unit, reviewed homicide and aggravated gun assault reports 

and case files with LPD detectives, and conducted informal interviews 

and participant observation. This research specifically addressed the 

extent of gang involvement in serious gun violence. Both the official 

data sources and the information produced through the qualitative 

sources presented a clearer picture of the nature of gun violence and 

the extent of gang involvement in Lowell. It is interesting to note that 

the analysis did not describe a situation drastically different from that 

perceived by the Lowell police, but rather validated the problem that 

the police had identified and provided a more systematic and broad 

ranging view of gun violence in Lowell. 

Nature of Gun Violence in Lowell 

The problem analysis provided the working group with a breakdown of the incident characteristics of the serious gun violence incidents in Lowell (see figure 1 below). Analysis of department incident 

data revealed that young, minority males were disproportionately 

offenders and victims of serious gun violence. In 34 aggravated assault 

incidents that occurred in 2002, the department records identified 51 

victims and 22 offenders. Males made up over 95 percent of identified 

offenders and 60 percent of all victims. Males committed and were victims of every homicide that occurred in the city from 2000 to 2002. A 

substantial percentage of aggravated gun assaults were committed by 

youth (13.6 percent by youth under 18, 31.9 percent by 18 to 24 year 

olds). Youth were even more likely to be the victims of aggravated gun 

assaults, with 31.4 percent of victims younger than 18 and another 

23.5 percent between the ages of 18 and 24. A majority of homicide 

9 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

Figure 1: Summary of Gun Crime Problem in Lowell 

•	 Young, minority males disproportionately offenders and victims 

of gun violence. 

•	 Gun crime offenders and victims had extensive prior criminal 

histories. 

•	 Gang members account for a substantial portion of gun violence. 

•	 Gangs tend to be small, loosely organized groups primarily 

located in the Hispanic and Asian communities. 

offenders (57.9 percent) and just under half (45.5 percent) of the 

aggravated gun assault offenders were Hispanic, while Whites made up 

15.8 percent of homicide offenders and roughly a third of aggravated 

assault offenders (31.8 percent) (Braga et al., 2006). 

Using CORI data, research partners examined the criminal histories 

and involvement of offenders and victims of serious gun violence. 

Fully 81.8 percent (18 of 22) of known aggravated gun assault offenders and 94.7 percent (18 of 19) of gun homicide offenders had some 

prior crime known to the criminal justice system. Of the known aggravated gun assault offenders with prior records, offense histories 

included a range of violent and property offenses. A substantial majority of offenders had a prior armed violent offense (66.7 percent) 

and/or a prior unarmed violent offense (72.2 percent). Victims of 

aggravated gun assaults were much less involved in prior gun violence 

(39.1 percent) than offenders, but had a similar rate of involvement in 

unarmed violent crime (69.6 percent) (Braga et al., 2006). 

Gang members accounted for a substantial portion of gun violence 

in Lowell. Based on information from LPD’s gang intelligence database 

and a focus group of detectives, 73.7 percent of gun homicide offenders (14 of 19) and 45.5 percent of aggravated gun assault offenders (10 

of 22) were active gang members. Looking at incidents, the working 

group classified 26.5 percent of aggravated gun assaults as “gangrelated” and an additional 8.8 percent as “gang- and drug-related,” 

which together are the most prevalent incident characteristic in Lowell. Other incident characteristics are personal dispute (20.6 percent), 

drug dealing that is not gang related (11.8 percent), domestic dispute 

(17.6 percent), and robbery/carjacking/home invasion (11.8 percent) 

(Braga et al., 2006). 

Gang membership, the organization of gangs, and the nature of 

gang conflict in Lowell were important issues for the working group 

and police. Information drawn from focus groups with detectives from 

the LPD Investigative Services Division was used to determine the picture of gangs in Lowell. At the time of this report, there are 19 active 

10 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

street gangs in the community, with an estimated 650 to 750 members. 

Most of these gangs are small, loosely organized groups and tended to 

be located in either the Hispanic or the Asian communities, with very 

little interracial membership. 

Strategic Interventions 

General Gun Violence Strategic Intervention 

With the PSN partnerships in place, the working group began to 

implement a gun violence intervention strategy in Lowell. The intervention was largely based on the targeted deterrence model, or 

“pulling levers,” used in nearby Boston in the mid-1990s. Popularized 

by the Boston Operation Ceasefire Program, the targeted deterrence 

approach seeks to prevent gun crime by clearly and dramatically 

increasing the likelihood and severity of criminal justice sanctions in 

the minds of serious, chronic, gang-involved offenders (Kennedy, 1997; 

Braga et al., 2006). Facilitated by interagency and community partners, 

which include police, probation, parole, social service providers, and 

community organizations, the approach calls for officials to send an 

unambiguous message that offender groups are under increased surveillance and that violence will not be tolerated and will be met with 

serious repercussions. Due to the cooperation of a network of criminal 

justice agencies in the approach, interagency partnerships have at 

their disposal a number of criminal justice levers, or possible sanctions, including probation revocation, increased community-based surveillance, and federal prosecution in addition to routine arrest and 

prosecution. As a targeted intervention, the approach immediately 

focuses on those individuals or gangs that engage in violence. 

In Lowell, the basic initial strategic intervention followed this 

model closely. The PSN working group and LPD set up a broader 

partnership that involved Department of Youth Services (DYS) caseworkers, Streetworkers (a coalition of social service workers), and 

other community-based organizations. When gangs engaged in violent 

behaviors, the department, together with these partners, sent a direct 

message that violence-involved gangs could expect greater scrutiny by 

the partner criminal justice agencies. This message was delivered in a 

wide variety of forums. The police participated in offender notification meetings (McDevitt et al., 2006), and the LPD provided additional names to local probation officers who were already conducting 

home visits. Police and probation officers and DYS case workers 

increased contacts with youth gang members, telling them explicitly 

that the attention they received was in response to violence. Streetworkers and other community-based organizations worked in coordination with law enforcement and were essential for supporting the 

communication of the targeted deterrence message. The message was 

also facilitated in Lowell through community forums and fliers that 

11 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

explained the reasons for targeted enforcement. With the support of a 

network of criminal justice agencies, the working group coordinated 

an array of enforcement options when dealing with specific groups 

engaged in violence. As the problem analysis revealed, individuals 

involved in serious gun violence in Lowell tended to be involved in a 

host of other violent and non-violent crimes. Moreover, the problem 

analysis confirmed that many gun crime offenders were under some 

level of criminal justice supervision and many more had some experience with the criminal justice system. The working group recognized 

that these characteristics of gun offenders, similar to those other cities 

where analysis has been conducted (e.g., Boston), made potential 

offenders amenable to community supervision, probation checks, outstanding warrants, and increased police contact (Bynum et al., 2006). 

Targeted Response to Asian Youth Gang Violence 

In 2001 and early 2002, Lowell began to see an increase in gun 

assaults by youth involved in Asian gangs. In one incident, two Asian 

gang members were shot to death in a single act of retaliation. In 

another incident a 7-year-old Asian girl was shot, but not killed, in an 

attack targeting an Asian gang member. The police and community felt 

that something had to be done quickly before the gun violence escalated even further. 

Very early in the implementation of PSN in Lowell, working group 

members were skeptical about the capacity of a basic targeted deterrence approach to prevent gun violence associated with Asian youth 

gangs. LPD was seeing an increase in Asian gang violence, but did not 

have strong intelligence about Asian gang structures. First, LPD detectives reported that information about specific offenders was often 

difficult to acquire because of the reluctance of witnesses in this community to cooperate with police. They relayed that even when 

responding to incidents of street violence, potential witnesses would 

say nothing or leave when police arrived. Lack of cooperation was 

attributed not only to a cultural distrust of the police, but also to what 

officials perceived as a real sense of fear of retaliation in the community. 

Second, because of this, the working group lacked good information 

about whom they should “pull levers” on in these gangs. Similar to previous gang research, Asian gangs in Lowell tended to be more secretive 

and less involved in street open drug markets, which made them less 

vulnerable to targeted deterrence than their Hispanic counterparts. 

The working group understood that a different approach was 

needed to deal with gun violence associated with Asian youth gangs 

and discussed various strategies. The strategic intervention that the 

working group and the department agreed to was based on a new 

understanding of crime and the structure of youth gangs within the 

Asian community. This new perspective was the result of several 

12 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

factors or events that changed the way the department understood the 

nature of crime within the community. 

First, detectives acknowledged that Southeast Asian residents and 

business owners attending a major community meeting appeared very 

reluctant to share information openly with the police. These residents 

reported to police that everything was fine in their neighborhoods, 

that they had no complaints about police, and were generally satisfied. 

Later, some residents told police that other residents and business 

owners would not speak to the police openly because they feared 

retaliation from organized crime groups. Some of the residents also 

indicated that those who came to the meeting had been told what to 

say beforehand. This meeting seemed to reinforce a growing perception that there was a very real fear of talking to the police. 

Faced with little information about gun crime learned through 

public forums, leadership began to aggressively recruit informants. 

Detectives from specialized gang and narcotics units reported they had 

very few, if any, useful informants in the Asian community. In follow-up 

interviews, these detectives pointed out that this initiative had drastically improved the informant base, but that more needed to be done. 

It was also reported that transfers into specialized detective units were 

based in part on whether or not the detective had successfully developed informants in the past. New information from informants suggested that illegal gambling in Lowell was more extensive and had 

closer ties to organized crime than previously believed. Important to 

the development of the intervention, they also helped provide some 

evidence about the relationship between “elders” and Asian youth 

gangs in Lowell that was highlighted in the problem analysis. Overall, 

the use of informants seemed a useful way for detectives to gain information about crime in a community they knew little about. 

Finally, the formal problem analysis helped to consolidate LPD’s 

knowledge about Southeast Asian youth gang crime. Using a variety of 

department personnel, the problem analysis was able to articulate an 

understanding about the structure of these gangs. Most importantly, 

the intelligence revealed a strong relationship between the Asian street 

gangs in Lowell and older members of the Asian community who were 

engaged in gambling. In fact, some recent gang violence seemed to 

have been associated with gambling involving older Asian individuals 

who operated businesses that served as fronts for gambling. Since the 

information fit with other patterns of Asian gangs, the researchers also 

helped place local knowledge of Asian youth gangs in the context of 

previous, albeit limited, research on Asian gangs elsewhere. Ultimately, 

the working group used the department’s understanding to construct a 

tailored intervention to the gun violence associated with Asian youth 

gangs. (For additional analysis in the development of the response to 

Asian gang violence, see Braga et al., 2006.) 

13 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

Problem 

Intervention 

The strategic intervention designed to combat gun violence associated with Asian youth gangs built upon Lowell’s targeted deterrence 

model. However, it did so by using a unique “lever” of organized gambling interests. The working group decided to turn their efforts to the 

gambling houses to see if this increased attention, and consequent loss 

of business, would lead those involved with gambling to put pressure 

on the younger gang members to reduce the violence. Initially, LPD 

detectives met with operators of storefronts thought to be involved in 

gambling to deliver a message to those who operated gambling business that gun violence would not be tolerated. During the initial interactions between the police and business owners, the police found 

additional evidence of a relationship between these businesses and 

Asian gangs—specifically, the police found clothes reflecting local 

gang “colors” and the presence of known gang members inside the 

businesses. In addition, it became clear that a number of gang members served as runners for certain gambling fronts. 

In a few instances, LPD parked police cars or stationed patrol 

officers in front of gambling houses, reducing business rather dramatically. In a few instances where the business owner ignored detectives, 

the LPD executed search warrants for the gambling houses where 

intelligence indicated that they were involved very closely with the 

Asian gangs. 

Figure 2 summarizes Lowell’s gun crime reduction strategies. 

Figure 2: Gun Crime Problem and PSN Strategies 

Overall Strategy Specific Components 

Small group 

of chronic 

violent gun 

offenders 

Prosecute and incapacitate most serious 

and chronic gun 

violence impact players 

Joint gun crime prosecution screening (federal and local); 

distinguish impact players from less serious offenders 

Gangs Pulling lever 

targeted deterrence 

Direct communication of deterrence-based message to 

violence-involved gangs (offender notification meetings, 

probation home visits, and police and Streetworker 

communication to gangmembers); increased surveillance 

and supervision of gang members under criminal justice 

authority 

Lack of 

leverage over 

Asian youth 

gangs 

Focus deterrence 

message on adults to 

exert influence over 

Asian youth gangs 

Direct communication to adults in the Asian community 

involved in gambling to exert social control over Asian 

youth gangs with respect to their involvement in gun 

crime; actual and threatened enforcement on gambling 

operations influences to adults to exert their influence 

14 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

Intervention Evaluation 

The implementation experience in Lowell illustrates core PSN elements. The interagency working group brought together federal, state, 

and local resources to combat gun crime, providing greater flexibility 

in the prosecution of gun crimes by adding federal avenues to more 

common local prosecutions. LPD, together with its PSN partners, 

enhanced its capacity to analyze the nature of gun violence and gang 

structure, allowing the working group and the department to develop 

information-driven strategies for addressing gun violence problems. As 

indicated above, Lowell focused on gun violence by Asian gang members, which primarily took the form of aggravated assaults by members 

of one Asian gang on members of rival Asian gangs. 

This section describes an assessment of the impact that the interventions may have had on indicators of gun violence, including homicides, aggravated assaults with a firearm, robberies with a firearm, and 

shots-fired calls-for-service. Data were drawn from quarterly progress 

reports from cities in Massachusetts, which were part of the PSN 

reporting requirements. All data were provided by law enforcement 

officials, and as such, reflect the limitations of official data sources, 

such as classification problems and underreporting. These indicators, 

on the other hand, offers the advantage of standard measures 

employed in the national PSN initiative, thus providing some objectivity to the following analysis. 

Recognizing the importance of local context, PSN allows a great 

deal of local discretion in selecting particular interventions. For example, local PSN working groups may design a successful strategy for 

reducing a specific outbreak of gun violence, but not focus on other 

forms of gun violence. The result may be a more limited success of a 

highly targeted intervention. 

Assessing real world enforcement initiatives like PSN is always a 

difficult task. Isolating treatment effect from confounding explanations 

(i.e., underlying historical trends and multiple treatments), accurately 

depicting the start and stop of interventions, ambiguity regarding the 

choice of outcome measures, and other methodological concerns 

inhibit this kind of analysis. With these caveats in mind, the following 

assessment uses a simple pre-post intervention analysis and then augments this by examining several comparison sites to determine the 

impact of the interventions. 

Pre-Post Intervention Analysis 

The gun violence intervention strategy targeting Asian youth gangs 

began in October 2002. This date represents the start of police executing search warrants on gambling houses and, as a result, an increase in 

arrests for related crimes. The goal of executing search warrants and 

arrests was to send a message to Asian youth gangs to stop all violence. 

15 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

Although, based on the problem analysis, most youth gangs were not 

directly affiliated with gambling, it was evident that organized gambling interests consisted of individuals who might be able to help control the activity of youth street gangs. Any impact of the targeted 

deterrence intervention in Lowell could be empirically observed by 

comparing the prevalence of gun crime indicators before the start of 

the intervention and after it was implemented. The specific focus of 

the PSN Lowell intervention was on gun assaults involving gang-related 

youth. Thus, the following analysis is focused on aggravated assaults 

with a gun. In addition, the task force sought an overall reduction in 

gun crime, and thus it is important to monitor the trends in other 

types of gun crime, such as armed robbery with a gun, gun-related 

calls-for-service, and homicides. 

Figure 3 presents the pre- and post-intervention totals and averages 

(per month) for these gun crime indicators. As the table shows, aggravated assaults with a gun declined from 4.94 per a month in the preintervention period to 3.56 for the post-intervention period.8 This 

represents a 28.02 percent decline in aggravated assaults with a gun— 

or one less gun assault per month. In contrast, robberies with a gun 

actually increased from 2.33 before the crackdown to 3.30 after (a 

41.27 percent increase). Since the intervention was targeted toward 

assaultive behavior, it is reasonable to expect an impact in assaults and 

not other forms of gun crime. 

According to these data, there appears to be little decline in shotsfired calls-for-service or homicide. Shots-fired calls declined slightly 

from 9.15 to 9.00 per month. Because homicides with a gun are a rare 

event in Lowell, detecting intervention effects is very problematic. 

There were nine in the 33 months before the intervention and eight 

gun homicides in the 27 months after the intervention. 

Figure 3: Pre-Post Comparison of Violent Gun 


Crime Indicators, City of Lowell
 

Pre-Intervention 

Period (33 Months) 

Post-Intervention 

Period (27 Months) 

Gun Violence 

Indicator 

Total Avg. Per 

Month 

Total Avg. Per 

Month 

Percent 

Change 

Gun Homicides 9 .27 8 0.30 8.64 

Gun Aggravated 

Assaults 

163 4.94 96 3.56 -28.02 

Gun Robberies 77 2.33 89 3.30 41.27 

Shots-Fired CFS 247 9.15 243 9 -1.62 

16 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

The results suggest some success in terms of reduction of gun violence outcomes in Lowell. Notably, there was a large decline in aggravated assaults with a gun, particularly important since this behavior 

was the primary focus of the PSN intervention in Lowell.9 

While the direct evidence of the relationship between the city’s 

Asian gangs and the gambling businesses is limited, in interviews with 

gang members after the initial crackdown on these businesses, it 

became clear that gang members were acutely aware of the pressure 

being placed on these businesses and that there was some level of 

ongoing communication between the two groups. 

When attempting this kind of simple pre- and post-intervention 

comparison, the evaluator must make assumptions about the expected 

lag and duration of the effect. The analysis assumes that the impact of 

the searches, beginning in October 2002, was immediate and lasted 

throughout the intervention. Absent any specific knowledge of how 

long it would take for the targeted deterrence message to reach potential offenders and change their behavior, an expectation of an immediate impact is reasonable. Changing the date of the post-intervention by 

allowing for some lag time, moreover, does not substantively change 

the results for any of these crime indicators. 

The issue of when the effect of deterrence intervention might end 

is trickier. To date, the department has never formally abandoned the 

use of the intervention (executing search warrants for gambling 

houses when Asian youth gangs engaged in violence), yet interviews 

suggest that the usage has tapered off. Moreover, it is unclear whether 

such a strategy would have a lasting or short-term effect. The observed 

trend in gun assaults after the introduction of the intervention is 

downward, meaning that selecting any post-intervention time period 

would decrease the observed effect of the intervention (on average). 

This is not necessarily a threat to the findings because the intervention 

may have caused a change in the trend of gun violence. 

Another limitation to the above analysis is that it does not rule out 

the influence of spurious explanations for the changes in the gun violence indicators. Factors that affect statewide trends in gun violence 

may have led to the decline in aggravated gun assaults or shots-fired 

calls-for-service reported in figure 3. One, albeit limited method, to isolate the intervention effect is to introduce one or more control cities 

and examine the change they experienced during the same time. Is the 

decline in gun assaults in Lowell the result of the intervention or of 

some underlying trend affecting other similar cities in Massachusetts? 

Comparison Analysis 

To test whether the findings hold, the decline in gun assaults 

within Lowell was compared to the change in gun assaults in six Massachusetts cities: Brockton, Boston, Fall River, Lawrence, Springfield, 

17 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

and Worcester. These cities were selected because they provided relatively reliable information on gun crime through PSN progress reports 

and, as such, were reasonable comparison cities. All cities for which 

data were available are included, rather than impose judgments about 

which cities are best matches. 

Figure 4 shows the monthly average number of gun assaults before 

and after the introduction of the targeted deterrence intervention in 

Lowell. It also compares the difference and percent change across all 

cities. A negative number refers to a decline in the average monthly 

number of gun assaults from pre- to post-intervention periods, while a 

positive number reflects an increase. As noted in the table, the series 

for each of the comparison sites does not match Lowell’s monthly 

series of gun assaults.10 

As the table shows, Lowell experienced the greatest decrease in 

aggravated gun assaults after the introduction of the intervention. Lowell’s aggravated gun assaults declined by an average of 1.38 per month, 

a 28 percent decline. Worcester, Brockton, and Boston also experienced declines in gun assaults during this same time period, ranging 

Figure 4: Comparison of Pre- to Post-Intervention 


Change in Aggravated Assaults with a Firearm 


in Select Massachusetts Cities
 

City 

Lowell 

Aggravated Assaults with a Firearm 

Difference 

-1.38 

Percent 

Change 

-28.02 

Pre-Intervention 

Monthly Average 

4.94 

Post-Intervention 

Monthly Average 

3.56 

Boston 37.61 36.50 -1.11 -2.94 

Brockton 8.76 8.04 -0.72 -8.27 

Fall River 2.52 4.75 2.23 88.86 

Lawrence 1.62 3.18 1.56 96.52 

Springfield 27.55 46.57 19.03 69.07 

Worcester 7.48 6.59 -0.89 -11.92 

Notes: 

Boston and Fall River data are missing the last 3 months of the series. 

Post-intervention monthly average computed by dividing total by 24 

months. 

Springfield data are missing the last 6 months from series. Post-intervention monthly average computed by dividing total by 21 months. 

Brockton and Lawrence data are missing the first year from series. 

Pre-intervention monthly average computed by dividing total by 21 

months. 

18 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

from 3 to 12 percent reductions. In contrast, Fall River, Lawrence, and 

Springfield experienced significant increases. Overall, the findings of 

this comparison analysis are consistent with the finding that PSN Lowell may have resulted in a reduction in aggravated assaults with a gun, 

consistent with the simple pre-post test analysis. 

Interagency Working Group Implementation: 

Lessons Learned 

Interagency networks are a growing part of public administration 

and law enforcement (O’Toole and Meier 2004). As this study illustrates, interagency partnerships provide resources, information sharing, and flexibility in choosing responses not available in more classic 

law enforcement agencies. The successful delivery of services through a 

network of enforcement practitioners requires the maintenance of effective partnerships and regular participation from member agencies. Several factors led to successful PSN partnerships in Lowell: 1) authority 

and organizational support, 2) leadership, 3) reciprocity, and 4) trust. 

First, the experience in Lowell suggests that it is necessary for personnel involved directly in interagency partnerships (e.g., task forces 

and working groups) to have the authority and support from their 

organizations to participate meaningfully. When the working group 

made decisions about how to prosecute a case, LPD detectives were 

not required to check with superiors. This was a function of their position within the department—they were all high- ranking detectives— 

and the support the department leadership gave them. Based on the 

policing model created within the department, the chief expected 

detectives to participate in partnerships, making decisions within the 

working group with little oversight. This occurred even though these 

decisions influenced enforcement practices, the use of resources, and 

changed the way the department processed specific cases. Had detectives with less authority or support been assigned to the working 

groups, participation might have been less meaningful. 

Similarly, the authority and resources that the USAO gave the PSN 

Coordinator provided wide latitude to implement the districtwide task 

force and participate directly in the working group, which was invaluable to maintaining the partnership. The USAO dedicated a full-time 

prosecutor to coordinate PSN throughout the district, which allowed 

the PSN Coordinator to take a strong leadership position, develop regular contacts at PSN agencies to maintain constant communication, 

and keep the task force focused on gun crime in multiple participating 

cities. Moreover, the PSN Coordinator was also able to participate 

directly in particular initiatives, such as the PSN Lowell working group, 

to facilitate sharing prosecutorial resources. 

Leadership from the PSN Coordinator was a critical factor in maintaining this partnership. While PSN is designed to be a partnership 

among equals, it is necessary to have leadership, particularly from a 

19 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

participant directly responsible for maintaining the group. In follow-up 

interviews, participants gave a great deal of credit to the PSN Coordinator for making the partnership work and making it worth their 

involvement. They reported that, as a leader, the PSN Coordinator kept 

the group focused on its goal of prosecuting serious gun crimes and 

helped to avoid interagency competition. In the District of Massachusetts and in Lowell, the working group was undoubtedly stronger 

because of the efforts from the PSN Coordinator. Such leadership 

might not have been possible, however, without the level of commitment from the USAO. 

Another important consideration is reciprocal relationships 

between the participants and their organizations. Interagency partnerships must provide some professional benefit for their participants’ 

time and effort. Detectives from Lowell, for example, reported that the 

resources federal agencies brought to bear on investigations and developing informants was extremely valuable to them. Similarly, federal 

agents were included in local investigations, where they typically 

would not be involved. This provided alternative perspective and 

enforcement options that helped the working group fit the punishment to the level of harm caused by the offender. 

The working group in Lowell worked well as an interagency partnership, meeting regularly and keeping the PSN initiative focused on 

gun crime problem solving and prosecution. The various viewpoints 

of enforcement agencies and academic partners broadened the 

group’s understanding of gun violence in Lowell. Prosecutions were 

directly coordinated through the working group meetings and 

the local-federal relationships, which allowed them to develop local 

knowledge that might lead them to develop a case where there had 

been a federal violation. 

Finally, it is important to recognize, especially for other local police 

agencies, that a successful partnership must be a long-term endeavor 

that requires establishing trust. In Lowell, the close working relationships that developed between the LPD, federal enforcement agencies, 

and the USAO built upon and extended existing partnerships. LPD 

detectives had a history of working with federal law enforcement agencies, particularly the ATF. Local police personnel expected to be equal 

partners based on this ongoing collaboration with federal agencies. 

Police agencies seeking to engage in PSN or other interagency partnership simply cannot expect the partnership to work overnight. Because 

PSN partnerships are designed to foster creative, interagency 

responses, they will likely challenge standard ways of doing business. 

Mutual trust allows the prospect of new responses and ideas to 

address gun violence to be seen as positive developments, rather than 

criticisms of existing agency efforts. 

Figure 5 provides a summary of the key components of the PSN 

Lowell task force. 

20 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

Figure 5: Summary of Key Components of PSN 


Lowell’s Successful PSN Task Force
 

Key Component Description 

USAO and police department USAO experience in Boston Operation Ceasefire 

commitment to and familiarity Program; LPD’s commitment to community 

with strategic problem model policing, problem solving, research, and crime 

analysis facilitate implementation of PSN 

Builds on prior initiatives 

and partnerships 

Safety First; High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area; 

Cross Border Initiative; DEA, FBI, and local law 

enforcement; DYS caseworkers, Streetworkers, 

and community-based organizations 

Regular task force meetings PSN Lowell working group meets regularly, 

reviews all gun crime incidents, case screening 

review (federal or local prosecution), targeted 

enforcement strategies 

Delegation of decisionmaking LPD detectives, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and 

authority to working group county prosecutors involved in PSN Lowell task 

members force were given authority to make decisions 

consistent with PSN mission 

Leadership of PSN Coordinator played a very active leadership 

PSN Coordinator role in PSN Lowell task force; maintained group 

focus on gun crime, strategic problem solving, 

and task force accountability 

Reciprocal benefits to Examples include LPD detectives noting benefit 

participating agencies of threat of federal prosecution in developing 

informants and furthering investigations; 

involvement of federal partners created focus on 

local gun crime problem 

Conclusion 

Project Safe Neighborhoods in Lowell presents an innovative 

approach to dealing with an emerging form of gun violence. The Lowell Police Department, in conjunction with the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

and its academic partners, performed an analysis of the problem and 

developed an innovative approach to addressing it. By focusing on 

gambling in Lowell, the working group was able to influence Asian 

gangs in the city to reduce gun assaults. While the results of this analysis are limited, it appears that the PSN initiative in Lowell reduced gun 

assaults, a reduction that has been sustained for more than 2 years. 

21 
Lowell, District of Massachusetts 

References
 

Braga, A.A., J. McDevitt, and G.L. Pierce. 2006. “Understanding and Preventing Gang Violence: Problem Analysis and Response Development in Lowell, Massachusetts.” Police Quarterly 9: 20-46. 

Belkin, D. 2004. “The Last Shot,” Boston Globe Magazine August 1:18. 

Bureau of Justice Assistance. 2004. Project Safe Neighborhoods:America’s Network Against Gun Violence. (Program Brief). Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 

Bynum, T., et al. 2006. Project Safe Neighborhoods: Strategic Interventions: Chronic Violent Offender Lists (Case Study 4). Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 

Decker, S., et al. 2006. Project Safe Neighborhoods: Strategic Interventions: Gun Prosecution Case Screening (Case Study 1). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 

Hartmann, F. 2002. “Safety First: Partnership, The Powerful Neutral 

Convener and Problem Solving.” Securing Our Children’s Future: 

New Approaches to Juvenile Justice and Youth Violence. Gary S. 

Katzman, Editor. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 

Kennedy, D. 1997. “Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention.” Valparaiso University Law 

Review 31: 449-484. 

Klofas, J., et al. 2006. Project Safe Neighborhoods: Strategic Interventions: Crime Incident Reviews (Case Study 3). Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Justice. 

McDevitt, J., et al. 2006. Project Safe Neighborhoods: Strategic Intervention: Offender Notification Meetings (Case Study 2). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 

McGarrell, E.F. 2005. Strategic Problem Solving and Project Safe 

Neighborhoods. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University. 

www.cj.msu.edu/%7Eoutreach/psn/Strategic_Problem_Solving_ 

PSN_wp1%5B1%5D.pdf (Accessed 01/16/07). 

O’Toole and L.K. Meier. 2004. “Public Management in Intergovermental Networks: Matching Structural Networks and Managerial Networking” Journal of Public Administration Research and 

Theory 4, 4: 469-494. 

Thatcher, D. 2000. National Cops Evaluation Organizational Change 

Case Study: Lowell Massachusetts. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. 

23 
Endnotes 

1. Bureau of Justice Statistics: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjc/cvict_c.htm 

(as of 12/28/04). 

2. Levels of property crime and violent crime not involving a gun 

are lower in the United States than many other western democracies, 

but gun crime remains exceptionally high in the United States. See 

Zimring and Hawkins, 1999; Bureau of Justice Statistics: 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ijs.htm (as of 12/28/04). 

3. Reviews of promising gun crime reduction strategies that can 

assist research partners and task forces include Braga, 2004; National 

Research Council, 2005; Ludwig and Cook, 2003; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999. See also Dalton, 2003; Decker, 

2003. 

4. These data were reported by the U.S. Department of Justice, 

Executive Office for United States Attorneys (10/05). 

5. Data compiled by Professor Joe Trotter and colleagues as part of 

American University’s PSN Technical Assistance Program. 

6. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2004. See also www.psn.gov. 

7. This is not including the District of Columbia and Florida, which 

have incomplete data according to Crime in the Unites States, 2003. 

8. This difference in mean is significant using a two-tailed test 

(p<.05). None of the indicators exhibit significant increases or 

decreases from pre- to post-intervention. 

9. The problem analysis and intervention components are further 

described in Braga, McDevitt, and Pierce, 2006; Braga is conducting a 

thorough outcome analysis of the PSN Lowell intervention and reports 

finding an intervention effort consistent with that reported herein. 

10. Since the series reported here do not reflect an identical time 

period, only common periods across the sites changing results were 

tested. For example, the analysis was restricted to a comparison 

between the changes 1 year (12 months) pre-intervention to 1 year 

(12 months) post-intervention. In this analysis and others, Lowell still 

demonstrated the greatest decline in aggravated assaults with a gun. 

25