U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

RECEIVED 

JUN 3 0 2014 

HEARING DOCKET 

In the Matter of: DMS No.: FAA 2014-0116 

JOSEPH R. MARIDON, SR., 

Respondent 

FAA Region: Western Pacific 

Judge: Richard C. Goodwin 

COMPLAINANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS 

AND REQUEST TO FIND OPPOSITION TIMELY FILED 

To: Administrative Law Judge Richard C. Goodwin and Respondent: 

The Federal Aviation Administration ("Agency") by and through counsel, pursuant to 

14 CFR § 13.218, files this Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss served by mail on 

May 28, 2014. Complainant further request~ this c~urt firid this opposition timely due, to its 

delay in the mail, and its actual receipt by Complainant on June 12,2014, or otherwise find 

good cause to consider this opposition: 

I. ARGUMENT 

1. Authoritv for Respondent's Motion and Time for Response: 

Respondent filed his motion citing to Rule 13.49 for authority, which prescribes a 5 

day response time. However, this is not a!} action brought under Subpart D ofthe Rules of 

Practice; rather, it is brought under Subpart G, part 13, of 14 C.F.R. Thus, the appropriate 

authority for the motion is Rule 13.218, which provides for an answer to a motion within 10 

days of service. In this case, the postmark and certificate of service indicate the motion was 

served by mail, properly addressed to Complainant, onMay 28,2014. Rule 13.212 [14 
C.P.R.§ 13.212] provides for an additional5 days for response for documents served by 

mail. This would have made Complainant's Response due on or before June 12, 2014, the 

date it was actually received by Complainant. However, Rule 13.2ll(h) [14 C.P.R. 

§ 13.21l(h)] indicates the service by mail, under circumstances applicable here, is a 

presumption. In this circumstance, the motion was not actually received by Complainant via 

mail until June 12, 2014. (See attached Declaration ofNaomi Tsuda.) 10 days from the date 

of actual receipt is June 22,2014, which was a Sunday. Thus, Complainant submits that 

service of her response on Monday, June 23, 2014, is timely, and asks the court to so fmd and 

consider it. 

Alternatively, should the court find the answer to the motion is untimely, 

Complainant requests the court exercise its discretion under Rule 13.205, and fmd the delay 

of actual receipt of the motion by Complainant to establish good cause to extend the time to 

answer the motion to Monday, June 23,2014, or otherwise consider its contents. 

2. Argument on Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent was charged with a violation of section 91.11 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14.C.F.R. § 91.11) which states, "No person may interfere with a crewmember 

in the performance of the crewmember's duties aboard an aircraft being operated." 

Respondent's motion to dismiss asserts that the violation may only be charged against a 

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person who is on board the aircraft, or if the person is outside the aircraft, he must touch the 

aircraft or otherwise enter the aircraft with part of his body or by, "controlling an object 

which touches or enters the aircraft." (Motion, page 2, 3'd full paragraph.) Respondent also 

argued there was no safety impact caused by his conduct. Respondent also contends that 

jurisdiction rests exclusively with the airport operator, and that equitable estoppel should 

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preclude Complainant from bringing this action because Respondent relied on publications 

from the airport operator that he believed reflected that Clark County alone, as the airport 

operator, would have sole jurisdiction over his conduct. 

Respondent acknowledges the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA'') published its 

interpretation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.11 in the Federal Register, but asserts that the interpretation 

is limited to whether an individual on the ground can interfere with a crewmember with a 

laser. (Motion, page 1, last paragraph.) In fact, the interpretation was first published by the 

FAA on June 1, 2011, and the interpretation is not so limited. The Respondent contends the 

complaint takes the interpretive language out of context in extending applicability of the 

regulation to persons outside of the aircraft; however, the full context shows this is not true. 

There is no improper application of the interpretation, which states: "Although the primary 

focus of the regulation [14 C.F.R. § 91.11], as explained in the 1999 amendments to the rule, 

was persons on board the aircraft, the plain language of the regulation does not specifY that 

the person interfering with a crewmember must be on board the aircraft." (Interpretation 

issued to Dennis E. Roberts, June 1, 2011) The interpretation was re-published in the Federal 

Register as part of a specific media effort to advise the public of the dangers specifically 

caused by directing laser beams towards aircraft operating on the ground and in the air. 76 

FR 76611 (Dec. 8, 2011). There is nothing in the interpretation itself, nor in the Federal 

Register publication, that refers to any limitation of the interpretation's plain language 

analysis of the regulation to applicability to persons outside the aircraft who are only engaged 

in directing laser beams towards aircraft. 

The application of this regulation to persons such as Respondent is also noted in the 

case cited in Respondent's motion, Administrator v. Siegel, NTSB Order EA-32804 (1993). 

Although Respondent Siegel was a pilot, at the time of his violation of§ 91.11, he was not 

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piloting an aircraft. In finding that the violation was properly charged against Mr. Siegel, the 

National Transportation Safety Board stated, "The Federal Aviation Regulations are not 

uniformly framed as applicable against certificate holders only. The instant rule is directed to 

all "persons," not all "certificate holders."' Siegel, p 4. 

Further, nowhere in the regulation, the interpretation, or the Federal Register 

publication is there a requirement that the interference be caused by any part of the violator's 

body or an object controlled by the violator's body touching or entering the aircraft, as 

Respondent contends. The regulation does not require an actual battery, but interference, 

which can be accomplished through less than physical contact with the pilots in the aircraft. 

Respondent cannot cite to any legal support for the contention that something must physically 

enter or touch the aircraft, and the plain reading of the regulation. 

To the extent the regulation contains any ambiguity, Chevron deference is owed to the 

FAA's interpretation of its own statutory authority, as Congress clearly assigned regulation of 

this subject matter to the FAA in 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103 and 44701. The jurisdictional issue is 

similarly, resolved with Chevron deference. See City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 133 S.Ct. 1863, 

1874-75 (2013). Complainant agrees that airport sponsors have the overall responsibility for 

the operation of vehicles on an airport. Whether Respondent's conduct may also run afoul of 

a rule or regulation of Clark County, Nevada, a matter on which Complainant does not opine, 

Complainant asserts there is at least concurrent jurisdiction and that the federal government is 

~ 

free to bring this regulatory violation against Respondent in this forum. The regulation at bar 

is designed to address the conduct of individuals that interferes with crewrnembers operating 

aircraft. The fact that Respondent chose a motor vehicle as the instrumentality does not 

1 Although Respondent holds a conunercial pilot certificate and a mechanic certificate, Complainant exercised 

prosecutorial discretion in bringing this case against him as an individual, rather than as an airman. 

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remove the action from this court's jurisdiction. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2) and 49 U.S.C. § 

44701 gives broad authority to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to 

prescribe safety rules and regulations such as 14 C.F.R. § 91.11, and Complainant has 

reasonably asserted jurisdiction here, where Respondent is alleged to have deliberately 

moved his motor vehicle into the path of a taxiing Vision Airlines aircraft with the intention 

of preventing the crew from operating the flight as they intended, and had been cleared by air 

traffic control to do. 

Respondent's reliance on equitable estoppel must also fail. As indicated in 

Respondent's motion at pg 5, equitable estoppel prevents a person from adopting a new 

position that contradicts a previous position when allowing the new position would unfairly 

harm another person who has relied on the previous position to his or her detriment. 

However, Respondent cannot cite to any contradictory previous position taken by the agency 

indicating it will not enforce 14 C.F.R. § 91.11 as it is in this case. At most, Respondent 

apparently assumed it would not act, since there is nothing in Respondent's moving papers 

showing the agency stated it would not take action against individuals who operated their 

motor vehicles in the way Respondent is alleged to have done in this case. Respondent's 

apparent assumption does not rise to the level of detrimental reliance under an equitable 

estoppel theory. Respondent's unsupported assertion on page 6 of his motion that it is in the 

public interest that vehicles on the airport be controlled by the airport operator does not 

> 

override the public's interest in preventing interference with flight crews as 14 C.F.R. § 91.11 

provides. 

Respondent's argument toward the end of his motion, that there was no safety risk 

caused by his actions because the Vision Airlines pilots saw him in time to stop ignores the 

fact that the regulation itself was promulgated by the agency as part of the exercise of its 

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authority under 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103 and 44701 to prescribe minimum safety regulations and 

standards. The fact that the flight crew saw the Respondent's truck in time to stop does not 

negate the danger posed when Respondent deliberately pulled a motor vehicle into the path of 

an oncoming taxiing aircraft. 

II. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Complainant requests the court find this opposition timely 

filed, or otherwise consider it for good cause shown, and deny Respondent's Motion to 

Dismiss. 

Respectfully submitted, 

/acrwwr/4dbNAoMJTsuDA 

Regional Counsel 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Office of the Regional Counsel 

Western-Pacific Region 

Dated: June 23, 2014 

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DECLARATION OF NAOMI TSUDA 

I, NAOMI TSUDA, declare as follows: 

I am over the age of eighteen years. All matters stated herein are within my own personal 

knowledge, and if called as a witness, I could, and would competently testify as follows: 

I. I am the Regional Counsel, FAA, Western-Pacific Region, and I am the Complainant 

in the matter captioned In Re Matter of: Joseph R. Maridon, Sr., FDMS No. FAA 2014-0116. 

2. ·On June 12, 2014, our office received an envelope with a partially obscured 

postmark, containing Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, dated May 28,2014. A true and correct copy 

of the envelope containing the Motion is attached as Exhibit "A". 

3. The envelope was properly addressed, and the postmark, although partially 

unprinted, appears to indicate May 28 or 29. 

4. We received the envelope in our office on June 12,2014, without any accompanying 

indication of why delivery was delayed by over two weeks. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the 

foregoing is true and correct. 

Signed this 23rd day of June, 2014, in Hawthorne, CA. 

NAOMI TSUDA 
-· ·;- 

Ayers 

rth Whitehouse Court 

WA 99208 

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Naomi Tsuda, Complainant's Counsel 

Office of the Regional Counsel, A WP-7 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Western-Pacific Region, 

P.O. Box 92007 

Los Angeles, CA 90009-2007 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certifY that on this date I have sent by facsimile where indicated and placed 

in the United States mail, postage prepaid, certified mail- return receipt requested 

Complainant's Motion to Deem Allegations Admitted, addressed as follows: 

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY 

ONE COPY 

Dated: June 23,2014 

Paralegal Specialist 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl000 

Ron. Richard C. Goodwin 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Ave., S.E. 

East Building Ground Floor, Room El2-230 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Facsimile: (202) 366-7536 

Joseph R. Maridon, Jr., Respondent's Counsel 

Attorney at Law 

6130 Elton Ave 

Las Vegas, Nv 89107 

Walter L. Ayers, Counsel for Respondent 

Attorney at Law 

13435 North Whitehouse Court 

Spokane, WA 99208 

Office of the Regional Counsel 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Western-Pacific Region 

Lawndale, California 

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