PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

RIORDAN ANTHONY MAYNARD, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 19-1304 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 1:18-CR-00395-CMA-1)

_________________________________ 

Grant R. Smith, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public 

Defender, with him on the briefs), Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District 

of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, appearing for Appellant. 

Aaron M. Teitelbaum, Assistant United States Attorney (Jason R. Dunn, United States 

Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney for the District of 

Colorado, Denver, Colorado, appearing for Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

 Defendant Riordan Maynard, the former chief executive officer of two related 

companies, was convicted by a jury of twenty-six criminal counts arising out of his 

gross mismanagement of those companies. Counts 1 and 2 related to Maynard’s 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 31, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

failure to pay corporate payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue Service and his related 

efforts to impede the government’s investigation into those unpaid taxes. Count 3 

arose out of Maynard’s conspiracy with an employee to steal or embezzle employee 

benefit plan and health care contributions that were made by company employees. 

Counts 4 through 13 related to Maynard’s theft or embezzlement of employee benefit 

plan contributions. Counts 14 through 26 related to Maynard’s theft or 

embezzlement of employee health care contributions. The district court sentenced 

Maynard to 78 months’ imprisonment. The district court also ordered Maynard to 

pay restitution to the Internal Revenue Service and to the employee-victims. 

 Maynard now appeals. Maynard argues that: (1) the district court misapplied 

the Sentencing Guidelines in calculating his offense level for Counts 1 and 2; (2) his 

convictions on Counts 14 through 26 were not supported by sufficient evidence; 

(3) the district court erred in calculating the restitution award for Counts 4 through 

13; and (4) the district court plainly erred in calculating the restitution award for 

Counts 14 through 26. 

 Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reject all of 

Maynard’s arguments and affirm his convictions and sentence. 

I 

Tax evasion

 Maynard founded Touchbase USA, Inc. (TBUSA) in approximately 2001, and 

served as its chief executive officer until approximately February 13, 2012. TBUSA 

provided telecommunications design and installation services for customers. 
3 

 From 2009 until 2012, TBUSA accrued unpaid federal tax liabilities of 

$2,595,039.00, which were comprised primarily of unpaid federal payroll taxes. The 

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contacted TBUSA regarding the delinquency and 

ultimately initiated collection actions against TBUSA, including levying on 

TBUSA’s bank accounts. 

 In early 2012, Maynard responded to the IRS’s collection efforts by shutting 

down TBUSA and starting a new company, Touchbase Global Services, Inc. 

(TBGSI), a few weeks later. TBGSI was essentially a continuation of TBUSA, 

operating with mostly the same employees and offering the same services to mostly 

the same customer base. Notably, TBGSI also continued TBUSA’s practice of 

failing to pay its payroll taxes. By the end of 2013, TBGSI owed over $1 million in 

unpaid federal payroll taxes. 

 At that point, the IRS assigned a revenue officer, Joanna Randall, to collect 

TBGSI’s unpaid taxes. Randall focused her efforts on determining who TBGSI’s 

officers were. Randall did so for two reasons: to obtain necessary information about 

TBGSI’s finances, and to determine who could be held personally liable for the 

payroll taxes that were deducted from the checks of TBGSI’s employees but never 

paid to the IRS. Maynard falsely denied being an officer of TBGSI and told Randall 

that his brother, Magnus Maynard, was in charge of TBGSI. In fact, however, 

Magnus had no involvement in running the company. 

 In late 2013, Randall began levying on TBGSI’s corporate bank account in an 

effort to recover some of the unpaid taxes. Unbeknownst at the time to Randall, 
4 

however, Maynard was engaging in efforts to transfer funds from TBGSI’s corporate 

bank account to his own personal bank account in order to avoid Randall’s levying 

attempts. 

 TBGSI made tax payments to the IRS in 2014 and 2015. Randall’s 

involvement with TBGSI ceased in March 2015, after TBGSI entered into an 

installment agreement with the IRS to pay its outstanding tax liability. 

 In the second quarter of 2016, however, TBGSI began to once again avoid 

making necessary tax payments to the IRS. TBGSI subsequently defaulted on its 

installment agreement with the IRS. Consequently, the IRS assigned a new revenue 

officer, Crystal Figueroa, to collect TBGSI’s unpaid taxes. 

 In early 2017, Figueroa began levying on TBGSI’s bank account in an attempt 

to recover the unpaid taxes. At that time, Maynard and Christina Elbers, an 

Australian citizen who served as TBGSI’s chief financial officer, began moving 

money out of TBGSI’s corporate bank account and into Maynard’s personal bank 

account to shield those monies from the levies. The IRS responded by expanding its 

collection activities in approximately April 2017. At that time, the IRS began 

sending letters to TBGSI’s customers instructing them to pay the IRS directly for 

services rendered by TBGSI. Maynard and Elbers in turn responded by contacting 

those TBGSI customers who received letters from the IRS and telling them, falsely, 

that the IRS letters were sent in error and that the IRS would soon be retracting them. 

Maynard and Elbers also told those TBGSI customers to hold their funds for eventual 

payment to TBGSI, rather than paying the IRS. 
5 

 Maynard and Elbers failed to respond honestly to the IRS’s requests for a list 

of TBGSI’s customers. The IRS sought this list in order to determine TBGSI’s cash 

flow and accounts receivable. Maynard and Elbers instead provided the IRS with a 

list of only those TBGSI customers who they thought the IRS was already aware of. 

In other words, Maynard and Elbers omitted some of TBGSI’s customers from the 

list in an attempt to continue receiving payments from those customers without 

interference from the IRS. Maynard and Elbers also deliberately delayed invoicing 

certain customers for services rendered on the theory that customers who had not 

received an invoice from TBGSI would not be obligated to pay any money to the IRS 

if the IRS sent them a levy notice. 

Embezzlement of health insurance premiums and 401(k) contributions

 TBGSI offered its employees optional health insurance coverage and a 401(k) 

savings plan. For those employees who chose to purchase health insurance coverage, 

premiums were to be deducted by TBGSI from their paychecks and forwarded to the 

contracted insurer. As for the 401(k) plan, TBGSI employees selected the amount, if 

any, they wanted withheld from each paycheck. TBGSI promised to match employee 

401(k) contributions at a rate set by formula. 

 In 2017, the last year of TBGSI’s operations, Maynard mishandled thousands 

of dollars of employee health insurance premiums and 401(k) contributions. 

Although TBGSI withheld the funds as directed by its employees, TBGSI, per 

Maynard’s directions, stopped forwarding the health insurance premiums to the 

contracted insurer, United Healthcare, and did not pay the withheld 401(k) 
6 

contributions funds into TBGSI’s retirement plan. TBGSI also, per Maynard’s 

directions, failed to make its promised “employer matching” contributions to the 

retirement plan during this period. 

 By June 2017, TBGSI owed United Healthcare approximately $119,000 in past 

due premiums. United Healthcare responded to this nonpayment by retroactively 

canceling TBGSI’s employees’ health insurance coverage back to March 4, 2017. As 

a result, TBGSI employees who obtained medical care between April and June of 

2017 received no insurance coverage for that care and instead were held personally 

responsible for the costs associated with that care. The total amount of denied claims 

from United Healthcare during this period for all TBGSI employees was 

approximately $40,204.32. 

 After United Healthcare cancelled TBGSI’s policy, TBGSI contracted for 

health insurance coverage from Anthem. Maynard falsely told his employees that he 

made the switch due to a rate dispute with United Healthcare. TBGSI continued, at 

Maynard’s direction, to deduct and retain premium payments from TBGSI 

employees’ paychecks, rather than forwarding them on to Anthem. In September 

2017, Anthem retroactively canceled TBGSI’s policy back to the beginning of 

coverage in early July 2017. As a result, TBGSI employees had no health insurance 

coverage from Anthem and were held personally responsible for all medical expenses 

they incurred from July 2017 through September 2017. Those unpaid medical 

expenses totaled $95,438.55. 
7 

 TBGSI ceased operations in September 2017. At approximately that same time, 

investigators from the United States Department of Labor and the IRS began a criminal 

investigation into Maynard’s management of TBUSA and TBGSI. 

II 

 On July 27, 2018, a criminal complaint was filed in the United States District 

Court for the District of Colorado charging Maynard with one count of corruptly 

impeding the administration of tax laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). 

 Less than a month later, a federal grand jury returned a twenty-six count 

indictment against Maynard and Elbers. Count 1 charged Maynard with corruptly 

impeding the administration of tax laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Count 2 

charged Maynard and Elbers with conspiracy to defraud the United States, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count 3 charged Maynard and Elbers with conspiracy 

to steal or embezzle payments made by employees into their 401(k) and health care 

plans, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Counts 4 through 13 charged Maynard and 

Elbers with theft or embezzlement from an employee benefit plan (i.e., the 401(k) 

plan), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 664 and 2. Counts 14 through 26 charged 

Maynard and Elbers with theft or embezzlement in connection with health care (i.e., 

Maynard’s theft of TBGSI employee premium payments for health care), in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 669 and 2. Lastly, the indictment included a forfeiture allegation 

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. 
8 

 The case against Maynard proceeded to trial in May 2019.1

 At the conclusion 

of the evidence, the jury found Maynard guilty on all twenty-six counts alleged in the 

indictment. 

 The district court sentenced Maynard to 78 months’ imprisonment. This 

included 36 months on the tax counts, 60 months on the counts related to 401(k) 

theft, and 78 months on the counts related to health insurance premium theft, with all 

sentences to run concurrently to each other. The district court’s sentence on the tax 

counts was based on a total tax loss of $4,970,694.91, which was the total amount of 

unpaid payroll taxes owed by TBUSA and TBGSI. The district court in turn ordered 

Maynard to pay restitution to the IRS in that same amount. 

 The district court calculated the loss amount on the 401(k)-related counts to be 

$111,974.04, which included the 401(k) contributions withheld from employees’ 

paychecks but never passed on to the retirement plan, and the employer matching 

amounts that Maynard promised but never paid on behalf of his employees. 

 The district court calculated the loss on the health insurance-related counts to 

be $185,921.91, which included premium payments withheld from employees’ 

paychecks but never passed on to the health plan, as well as the amounts of unpaid 

medical claims that employees incurred because of the retroactive cancellation of 

their insurance policies. 

1

 Elbers, who purportedly lived in Australia during much of the time frame 

covered by the indictment, has not yet made her initial appearance in district court. 

Aple. Br. at 4 n.2. 
9 

 As regards the loss calculated by the district court in both the 401(k)-related 

counts and the health care-related counts, the district court ordered Maynard to pay 

restitution to the affected employees in the amounts it had calculated. 

 Judgment in the case was entered on August 21, 2019. Maynard filed a timely 

notice of appeal. 

III 

 Maynard asserts four issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court 

procedurally erred at the time of sentencing by treating him as if he had been 

convicted of tax evasion. Second, Maynard argues that his convictions for theft in 

connection with healthcare (Counts 14-26) are not supported by sufficient evidence 

and therefore must be vacated. Third, Maynard argues that the district court 

procedurally erred at the time of sentencing by miscalculating the restitution award 

for Counts 4 through 13. Fourth, Maynard argues that the district court plainly erred 

in calculating the restitution award associated with Counts 14 through 26. 

Determination of loss amounts for Counts 1 and 2 

 In his first issue on appeal, Maynard argues that the district court, in 

calculating his offense level for Counts 1 and 2, “erred when it determined that the 

‘loss’ amount[] under U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 was the total amount of taxes owed by 

TBGSI and TBUSA.” Aplt. Br. at 12. In support, Maynard notes that under § 2T1.1, 

“the loss amount must reflect the loss caused by the object of the offense.” Id. 

Maynard in turn notes that he “impeded the administration of internal revenue law by 

engaging in several acts that prevented the IRS from obtaining a portion of the 
10 

outstanding tax debt.” Id. But, Maynard asserts, “[i]nstead of determining the loss 

caused by those acts, the district court erroneously ruled that the loss was the entire 

tax debt owed by TBGSI and TBUSA.” Id. Maynard also argues that “the district 

court’s loss determination is unmoored from the economic reality of the situation” 

because “[i]t is unrealistic to believe that the government would have ever obtained 

the full amount of the outstanding tax debt owed by TBUSA and TBGSI.” Id. at 18. 

Maynard argues that “[n]either company had the ability to pay the outstanding tax 

debt,” and thus “there is no evidence that the government would have collected 

nearly $5 million had [he] not violated 18 U.S.C. § 7212(a) or 18 U.S.C. § 371.” Id. 

 “We review challenges to the procedural reasonableness of sentences for an 

abuse of discretion.” United States v. Worku, 800 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015). 

“[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating 

the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). “As 

a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines 

should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.” Id. 

 Under the overarching abuse of discretion standard that applies to procedural 

reasonableness challenges, we review a district court’s loss calculation methodology 

de novo and its actual loss calculations for clear error. United States v. Snow, 663 

F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 2011). A district court commits procedural error, in 

pertinent part, by “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines 

range,” “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,” “or failing to adequately explain 

the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “An error of law is per se an abuse of 
11 

discretion.” United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248, 1262 (10th Cir. 2014) 

(quotations omitted). 

 Count 1 of the indictment charged Maynard with corruptly endeavoring, from 

early 2012 to approximately September 2017, to obstruct or impede the due 

administration of internal revenue laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). The jury 

convicted Maynard of this count and, in doing so, had to find that Maynard 

knowingly obstructed or impeded a “tax-related proceeding,” which the jury 

instructions defined to include “a particular investigation, audit, or other targeted 

administrative action.” ROA, Vol. 4 at 60. Although the jury was not required to 

make specific findings about how Maynard obstructed or impeded the IRS’s 

investigation, the indictment alleged several ways in which he did so: (a) closing 

TBUSA and opening TBGSI in order to avoid paying more than $2 million in federal 

payroll taxes owed by TBUSA; (b) in late 2013, falsely stating to an IRS employee 

that he was not an officer or employee of TBGSI; (c) in 2014 and 2017, transferring 

and causing to be transferred funds between TBGSI’s bank account and his own 

personal bank account in order to defeat IRS levies that sought taxes owed by 

TBGSI; (d) in 2017, omitting material information regarding TBGSI’s finances from 

submissions to the IRS in an effort to prevent the IRS from collecting funds from 

TBGSI’s customers; and (e) in 2017, falsely informing TBGSI customers that IRS 

levies they received were sent in error. 

 Count 2 of the indictment charged Maynard and Elbers with conspiring, from 

February 2017 to October 2017, to defraud the United States and the IRS for the 
12 

purpose of impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the IRS’s assessment and 

collection of federal taxes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count 2 alleged a number 

of overt acts in support of the conspiracy, all of which the jury unanimously found at 

trial. Those overt acts included repeatedly transferring money from TBGSI’s bank 

account to Maynard’s personal bank account, contacting TBGSI customers and 

telling them that IRS levies were “sent in error,” failing to disclose to the IRS any 

TBGSI customers that they believed had not received IRS levy notices, and 

submitting to the IRS a form that omitted Maynard’s personal bank account as an 

asset of TBGSI. 

 The presentence investigation report (PSR) grouped Counts 1 and 2 together 

for purposes of calculating an offense level.2

 ROA, Vol. 6 at 59. The PSR concluded 

that the controlling Guideline for Count 1 was U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, and that the 

controlling Guideline for Count 2 was U.S.S.G. § 2T1.9. Id. The PSR in turn noted 

that “[b]oth guidelines reference the use of the Tax Table at USSG §2T4.1.” Id. 

Applying that Tax Table, the PSR noted: 

According to the Government, it proved at trial that the defendant shut 

down TBUSA and restarted it as TBGSI in order to avoid paying more 

than $2.5 million TBUSA owed in [federal] payroll taxes. Then, TBGSI 

immediately incurred over $1 million in additional liabilities. By the 

time of its closure in 2017, TBGSI owed over $2.4 million in [federal 

payroll tax] liabilities. This results in a total tax liability of 

approximately $5 million. The tax loss is between $3,500,000, and 

$9,500,000; therefore, the base offense level is 24. USSG 

§§2T1.1(a)(1) and 2T4.1(J). 

2

 Maynard does not object to this grouping. 
13 

Id. 

 Maynard objected to the PSR’s calculation of his offense level for Counts 1 

and 2. ROA, Vol. 4 at 267-275. Maynard conceded that “[t]he Government’s 

calculation [of the loss] include[d] all payroll tax debt of both corporations at issue,” 

but he argued that he “was not tried, nor convicted of willful failure to pay taxes.” 

Id. at 270. Maynard noted that § 2T1.1(c) directs that “‘the tax loss is the total 

amount of loss that was the object of the offense (i.e., the loss that would have 

resulted had the offense been successfully completed),’” id. at 269 (quoting U.S.S.G. 

§ 2T1.1(c)), and he argued: 

The evidence presented at trial showed Mr. Maynard’s goal was to 

obstruct the IRS to buy time in hopes that TBGSI would become solvent 

and catch up on missed payroll tax. Mr. Maynard was not trying to get 

out of paying payroll tax, nor did he fraudulently file inaccurate payroll 

tax numbers. Over the years, TBGSI paid a total of $2,030,950.07 in 

payroll tax and TBUSA paid $1,318,602.83 in payroll tax. The IRS 

would not have been owed any tax had Mr. Maynard’s scheme been 

successful. 

Id. at 270. Maynard also argued that, in any event, “[t]he tax loss amount [wa]s not 

the entire tax liability of TBGSI and TBUSA combined, but rather the money that the 

Government was deprived of by the criminal conduct,” and he asserted that “this 

amount would be somewhere between $550,000 and $1,500,000.” Id. at 271. In 

support of this assertion, he noted that the government presented evidence that 

“TBGSI obstructed and prevented the IRS from levying $1.2 million which was in 

[his] personal bank account,” and that, “[h]ad this levy been successful TBGSI would 
14 

have ceased trading because it would not have had any money, and therefore it would 

[have] stopped incurring future tax debt.” Id. at 271-72. 

 At sentencing, the district court rejected Maynard’s objections. The district 

court instead “agree[d] with the Government that [Maynard’s] conduct [wa]s similar 

to tax evasion or willful failure to pay taxes.” ROA, Vol. 7 at 1453. The district 

court noted that “TBGSI did, in fact, file tax returns, but the defendant willfully 

evaded efforts to collect those taxes and willfully failed to pay those taxes.” Id. The 

district court in turn concluded that “[t]he methods [of calculation] described in 

Section 2T1.1(c)(1) and (3) [reasonably] fit the particular circumstances of this case,” 

even if they “d[id] not precisely match the facts.” Id. at 1454. The district court 

found that “[b]y shutting down TBUSA and obscuring the relationship between 

TBUSA and TBGSI, [Maynard] was able to willfully evade and failed to pay the 2.5 

million TBUSA owed the IRS.” Id. The district court further found that “[h]ad 

[Maynard] not engaged in the obstructive act of opening TBGSI and concealing its 

status as a successor entity, the entire tax debt of TBGSI, approximately 2.4 million, 

would not have accrued.” Id. Lastly, the district court found that “[e]ven after 

establishing TBGSI, [Maynard] engaged in a litany of acts to obstruct and impede tax 

collection.” Id. at 1454-55. 

 Section 2T1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which the district court applied to 

Count 1, is entitled “Tax Evasion; Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information, 

or Pay Tax; Fraudulent or False Returns, Statements, or Other Documents.” 

Subsection (a) thereof directs a district court to determine the base offense level by 
15 

applying the Tax Table found in § 2T4.1 to “the tax loss” associated with the offense 

or, “if there is no tax loss,” to apply a base offense level of 6. U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(a). 

Subsection (c), entitled “Special Instructions,” states, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the 

offense involved tax evasion . . . , the tax loss is the total amount of loss that was the 

object of the offense (i.e., the loss that would have resulted had the offense been 

successfully completed).” Id. § 2T1.1(c)(1). Subsection (c) also states, in pertinent 

part, that “[i]f the offense involved willful failure to pay tax, the tax loss is the 

amount of tax that the taxpayer owed and did not pay.” Id. § 2T1.1(c)(3). 

 The Application Notes to § 2T1.1 provide specific examples of tax loss, but 

none of those are similar to the offense conduct at issue in this case. The Application 

Notes do, however, also state: 

In determining the tax loss attributable to the offense, the court should 

use as many methods set forth in subsection (c) and this commentary as 

are necessary given the circumstances of the particular case. If none of 

the methods of determining the tax loss set forth fit the circumstances of 

the particular case, the court should use any method of determining the 

tax loss that appears appropriate to reasonably calculate the loss that 

would have resulted had the offense been successfully completed. 

Id. cmt. 1. In addition, the Application Notes state that “[i]n determining the total tax 

loss attributable to the offense . . . , all conduct violating the tax laws should be 

considered as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan unless 

the evidence demonstrates that the conduct is clearly unrelated.” Id. cmt. 2. This 

includes, according to the Application Notes, “a continuing pattern of violations of 

the tax laws by the defendant,” as well as when “the defendant uses a consistent 

method to evade or camouflage income.” Id. 
16 

 Section 2T1.9 of the Guidelines, which the district court applied to Count 2, is 

entitled “Conspiracy to Impede, Impair, Obstruct, or Defeat Tax.” It directs a district 

court, in determining a defendant’s base offense level, to “[a]pply the greater” of the 

“[o]ffense level determined from §2T1.1 or §2T1.4, as appropriate,” or “10.”3

 

U.S.S.G. § 2T1.9(a). The Application Notes to § 2T1.9 explain, in pertinent part, 

that “[t]he base offense level is the offense level . . . from §2T1.1 or §2T1.4 

(whichever guideline most closely addresses the harm that would have resulted had 

the conspirators succeeded in impeding, impairing, obstructing, or defeating the 

Internal Revenue Service) if that offense level is greater than 10. Otherwise, the base 

offense level is 10.” Id. cmt. 2. 

 Section 2T4.1 of the Guidelines, i.e., the Tax Table referenced in the foregoing 

Guidelines, provides, in pertinent part, that if the tax loss is “[m]ore than $550,000,” 

but less than $1,500,000, a base offense level of 20 applies. U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(H). It 

further provides that if the tax loss is “[m]ore than $3,500,000,” but less than 

$9,500,000, a base offense level of 24 applies. Id. § 2T4.1(J). 

 Applying these Guideline provisions to the facts presented in this case, we 

conclude that the district court did not err in calculating the loss associated with 

Counts 1 and 2 and, in turn, applying a base offense level of 26 to those counts. As 

3

 Section 2T1.4 of the Guidelines applies to “Aiding, Assisting, Procuring, 

Counseling, or Advising Tax Fraud.” Similar to § 2T1.1, it directs a district court, in 

determining a defendant’s base offense level, to apply the “[l]evel from §2T4.1 (Tax 

Table) corresponding to the tax loss,” or “6, if there is no tax loss.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 2T1.4(a). 
17 

the district court noted, Maynard’s offenses of conviction were similar in some 

respects to both tax evasion and willful failure to pay taxes, i.e., the first and third 

methodologies specified in § 2T1.1(c). Although the payroll taxes at issue were the 

legal obligation of TBUSA and TBGSI, the evidence established that Maynard 

exercised complete control over both corporations and routinely took actions to cause 

both corporations to pay as little accrued payroll tax as possible, and in turn to 

prevent the IRS from levying on corporate funds to recover those unpaid payroll 

taxes.4

 As anticipated by the Application Notes to § 2T1.1, Maynard exhibited a 

continuing and similar pattern of illegal conduct when he ran both corporations, and 

all with the goal of avoiding the payment of taxes owed. Maynard would have us 

limit the tax loss to what he defines as the object of the offense—his acts in impeding 

the IRS from obtaining from specific accounts a portion of the outstanding tax debt 

which he contends is somewhere between $550,000 and $1,500,000. We reject 

Maynard’s attempt to reduce his base offense level in this way. 

 The district court was correct, in our view, in determining that Maynard’s 

conduct at TBUSA caused the IRS a tax loss of approximately $2.5 million, and that 

his conduct at TBGSI caused the IRS an additional tax loss of approximately $2.4 

million. And, contrary to Maynard’s arguments on appeal, nothing in the Guidelines 

provides that a defendant’s inability to pay an accrued tax liability should be taken 

4

 With TBUSA, Maynard shut down the corporation and started a new 

corporation to avoid paying the accrued taxes. With TBGSI, Maynard took steps to 

prevent the IRS from levying on corporate accounts and customer payments that were 

owed to TBGSI. 
18 

into account in order to effectively reduce the tax loss at issue. See United States v. 

Brimberry, 961 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting defendant’s argument that 

tax loss should have been limited to what the government realistically could have 

expected to collect from her). Thus, for all of these reasons, we conclude that the 

district court’s calculation of the base offense level for Counts 1 and 2 was not 

erroneous. 

Sufficiency of evidence – Counts 14 through 26 

 In his second issue on appeal, Maynard argues that the government failed to 

present sufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions on Counts 14 through 26 

for theft or embezzlement in connection with health care, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 669. Section 669, Maynard asserts, requires proof that a defendant willfully 

embezzled, stole, or converted “assets of a health care benefit program.” Aplt. Br. at 

21. Maynard argues that “the government presented no evidence” in this case “that 

the funds withheld from [TBGSI] employee paychecks” for health insurance 

premiums “were ‘assets’ that belonged to that program.” Id. at 22. In other words, 

he argues, “[w]hile [he] undoubtedly owed money to both Anthem and [United 

Healthcare], the funds withheld from the [TBGSI] employee paychecks never 

belonged to either of these insurance providers.” Id. Maynard argues that because 

“he [merely] failed to pay his bill” and “did not defraud an insurance provider,” “this 

Court should vacate these convictions and remand to the district court for 

resentencing.” Id. at 23. 
19 

 Generally speaking, “we review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo to 

determine whether a rational jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Mobley, 971 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotations 

omitted). 

 The government argues in its response brief, however, that Maynard waived 

his challenge to the sufficiency of evidence on his § 669 convictions. Aple. Br. at 

27-28. In support, the government notes that “[a]fter the government rested” at trial, 

“Maynard moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 29, but he expressly limited his motion to count 1 of the indictment . . . 

and did not address the counts charging violations of . . . § 669.” Id. The 

government further notes that “Maynard did not renew the motion in any form at the 

close of all the evidence or after the jury returned its verdict.” Id. 

 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 addresses motions for judgment of 

acquittal and provides, in pertinent part: 

(a) Before Submission to the Jury. After the government closes its 

evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the 

defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for 

which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may 

on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a 

conviction. If the court denies a motion for a judgment of acquittal at 

the close of the government’s evidence, the defendant may offer 

evidence without having reserved the right to do so. 

* * * 

(c) After Jury Verdict or Discharge. 

(1) Time for a Motion. A defendant may move for a judgment of 

acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty 

verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later. 

(2) Ruling on the Motion. If the jury has returned a guilty verdict, 

the court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal. If the jury 
20 

has failed to return a verdict, the court may enter a judgment of 

acquittal. 

(3) No Prior Motion Required. A defendant is not required to move 

for a judgment of acquittal before the court submits the case to the 

jury as a prerequisite for making such a motion after jury discharge. 

* * * 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), (c). 

 “When a defendant challenges in district court the sufficiency of the evidence 

on specific grounds, ‘all grounds not specified in the motion are waived.’” United 

States v. Goode, 483 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Kimler, 

335 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2003)). “Although specificity of grounds is not 

required in a Rule 29 motion, where a Rule 29 motion is made on specific grounds, 

all grounds not specified are waived.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

 At the close of the government’s evidence in this case, Maynard’s counsel 

moved for judgment of acquittal. In doing so, Maynard’s counsel focused on the 

“acts listed in the first count.” Suppl. ROA, Vol. 3 at 7. Maynard’s counsel also 

stated, near the outset of his argument: “In regards [sic] to the other counts, we would 

rest on the record.” Id. at 9. Maynard’s counsel and the district court discussed in 

detail the elements of Count 1 and the evidence that was presented by the government 

in support of Count 1. After that discussion, the district court asked Maynard’s 

counsel, “Is that the entirety of your argument? So, only as to Count 1 is the only 

one you are moving for a MJOA?” Id. at 12. Maynard’s counsel responded, “Yes, 

Your Honor.” Id. After hearing from government counsel regarding Count 1, the 

district court “denie[d] . . . Maynard’s Rule 29 motion as to Count 1.” Id. at 15. The 
21 

district court then asked Maynard’s counsel, “Is there anything further?” Id. 

Maynard’s counsel responded “No, Your Honor.” Id. At no point thereafter did 

Maynard move for judgment of acquittal on any additional counts. 

 Maynard argues in his appellate reply brief that his counsel’s initial reference 

to “rest[ing] on the record” as “to the other counts” was intended as “a general 

motion [for judgment of acquittal] as to the remaining counts,” i.e., all counts other 

than Count 1. Aplt. Reply Br. at 8. That argument, however, is belied by the 

statements made thereafter by Maynard’s counsel. As outlined, the district court 

specifically asked Maynard’s counsel if he was moving for judgment of acquittal 

only as to Count 1 and Maynard’s counsel responded yes. Consequently, and 

understandably, the district court did not address or rule on any of the other counts at 

issue. Therefore, we conclude that Maynard’s current challenge to his § 669 

convictions (Counts 14 through 26) has been forfeited and, at best, is subject to 

review on appeal only for plain error. See Goode, 483 F.3d at 681 (explaining that a 

defendant’s failure to move for MJOA in district court “is more precisely termed a 

forfeiture”). 

 Maynard makes no plain error argument in his opening appellate brief and 

instead only briefly mentions the plain error standards in his appellate reply brief. 

For that reason, we could deem the issue waived and decline to review it entirely 

because Maynard has effectively deprived the government of the opportunity to 

respond to his plain error arguments. See United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 

1196 (10th Cir. 2019). We need not take that step, however, because even if we 
22 

review for plain error, it is apparent that Maynard cannot establish any error, let 

alone one that is plain. 

 Counts 14 through 26 of the indictment charged Maynard with violating 18 

U.S.C. § 669. That statute, entitled “Theft or embezzlement in connection with 

health care,” provides: 

(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully embezzles, steals, or otherwise 

without authority converts to the use of any person other than the 

rightful owner, or intentionally misapplies any of the moneys, funds, 

securities, premiums, credits, property, or other assets of a health care 

benefit program, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 

than 10 years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed 

the sum of $100 the defendant shall be fined under this title or 

imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 

(b) As used in this section, the term “health care benefit program” has the 

meaning given such term in section 24(b) of this title. 

18 U.S.C. § 669. Section 24(b) of Title 18, which is expressly referenced in § 669, 

provides: 

As used in this title, the term “health care benefit program” means any 

public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any 

medical benefit, item, or service is provided to any individual, and 

includes any individual or entity who is providing a medical benefit, 

item, or service for which payment may be made under the plan or 

contract. 

18 U.S.C. § 24(b). 

 Counts 14 through 26 of the indictment alleged that Maynard and Elbers 

“knowingly and willfully embezzle[d], st[ole], and otherwise without authority 

convert[ed] to their own use . . . and intentionally misapplied any of the moneys, 

funds, securities, premiums, credits, property and other assets of the TBGSI health 
23 

plan, a health care benefit program as defined in Title 18, United States Code, 

Section 24(b) . . . .” Supp. ROA, Vol. 1 at 16-17. The indictment further alleged 

thirteen specific dates (extending from June 15, 2017, through December 15, 2017) 

when Maynard and Elbers embezzled, stole, or otherwise converted payroll salary 

deferrals from their employees that were intended by those employees to pay their 

health insurance premiums. Id. at 17. 

 At trial, the government presented testimony from Paula Musil, an investigator 

employed by the United States Department of Labor, to support Counts 14 through 

26. Musil testified that TBGSI had “an existing health plan that eligible employees 

could elect to participate in.” ROA, Vol. 7 at 1061. Musil explained that TBGSI 

contributed a flat amount toward each employee’s health care premium payments, 

and that TBGSI employees would pay their remaining share of the health care 

premiums through a payroll deduction. Id. at 1061-62. Musil in turn testified that, 

based upon her review of corporate documents, Maynard and Elbers deducted the 

premium amounts from employees’ paychecks, but failed to pass those amounts on to 

Anthem and United Healthcare. Id. at 1068-69. According to Musil, Department of 

Labor regulations required Maynard and Elbers to forward the employee premium 

deductions on to the insurers within 90 days of deduction from the employees’ 

paychecks.5

 Id. 

5

 Musil did not identify the precise regulation she was referring. We assume, 

however, that she was referring to 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–102. That regulation defines 

the phrase “plan assets” to “include amounts (other than union dues) that a 

participant or beneficiary pays to an employer, or amounts that a participant has 
24 

 Maynard argues that Counts 14 through 26 concerned two “health care benefit 

programs,” i.e., the health insurance plan offered by United Healthcare and the health 

insurance plan offered by Anthem. Aplt. Br. at 21. That argument, however, ignores 

the broad definition of the statutory phrase “health care benefit program” that is 

outlined in § 24(b), as well as the language of the indictment in this case. As we 

have noted, the statutory definition includes “any public or private plan or contract, 

affecting commerce, under which any medical benefit, item, or service is provided to 

any individual, and includes any individual or entity who is providing a medical 

benefit, item, or service for which payment may be made under the plan or contract.” 

As we have also noted, the indictment in this case specifically alleged that Maynard 

and Elbers embezzled or stole assets belonging to “the TBGSI health plan.” Supp. 

ROA, Vol. 1 at 16. In turn, the evidence presented at trial, consistent with the 

language of the indictment, unquestionably established that TBGSI set up a health 

care plan for its employees, under which TBGSI contracted with a health insurance 

company (i.e., first United Healthcare and then Anthem) to provide insurance 

coverage for its employees, and under which TBGSI both contributed a flat amount 

for each employee’s coverage and also deducted from its employees’ paychecks the 

remaining premium amounts. Thus, under the broad statutory definition, the “health 

withheld from his wages by an employer, for contribution . . . , as of the earliest date 

on which such contributions . . . can reasonably be segregated from the employer’s 

general assets.” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–102(a)(1). The regulation in turn provides that 

“in no event shall the date determined pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section 

occur later than 90 days from the date on which the participant contribution amounts 

are received by the employer . . . .” Id. § 2510.3–102(c). 
25 

care benefit program” at issue was TBGSI’s “private plan . . . under which . . . 

medical benefit[s]” were “provided to” TBGSI’s employees, and it included the 

contracted insurance companies that provided medical insurance benefits to TBGSI’s 

employees.6

 Understood in that way, the government’s evidence clearly established 

that Maynard, together with Elbers, violated § 669 by effectively stealing the 

withheld employee premium payments. More specifically, those health care premium 

payments were “moneys,” “funds, and/or “premiums” that belonged to the plan. 

 For these reasons, we conclude that Maynard has failed to establish the 

existence of any error, let alone an error that was plain. We therefore reject his 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying Counts 14 through 26. 

Calculation of restitution award for Counts 4 through 13 

 In his third issue on appeal, Maynard argues that the district court erred at the 

time of sentencing by miscalculating the restitution award for Counts 4 through 13. 

Those counts pertained to Maynard’s embezzlement or theft of TBGSI employees’ 

401(k) contributions. The district court, Maynard notes, ordered him to “compensate 

the victims for not only the amount withheld from their paychecks but also for the 

amount that the employees expected to receive from the employer’s matching 

[401(k)] contribution.” Aplt. Br. at 23–24. Maynard asserts that he “objected to this 

award on the basis that the matching funds where [sic] not the subject of the 401(k) 

6

 Indeed, Maynard concedes in his opening brief that “the government 

presented sufficient evidence to prove that the ‘private contract between TBGSI and 

the health care providers’ qualified as a ‘health care benefit program’ as that term is 

defined by statute.” Aplt. Br. at 22. 
26 

counts.” Id. at 24 (citing ROA, Vol. 7 at 1469). Maynard argues that “[t]he district 

court’s restitution award represents an erroneous application of the [Mandatory 

Victims Restitution Act (MVRA)],” which “limits restitution to the actual loss caused 

by the defendant’s offense of conviction.” Id. 

 “When reviewing a challenge to a restitution determination, we review the 

district court’s application of the MRVA de novo, review its factual findings for clear 

error, and review the amount of restitution awarded for abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206, 1223 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotations and brackets 

omitted). 

 The MVRA requires a district court, “when sentencing a defendant convicted 

of [an offense against property under Title 18],” to “order . . . that the defendant 

make restitution to the victim of the offense . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1); see also 

id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring restitution in all cases involving “an offense 

against property under this title”). For purposes of the MVRA, “the term ‘victim’ 

means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an 

offense for which restitution may be ordered . . . .” Id. § 3663A(a)(2). The MVRA 

provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n each order of restitution, the court shall order 

restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by 

the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” 

Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A). 

 “Restitution is limited to losses caused by the conduct underlying the offense 

of conviction.” Camick, 796 F.3d at 1223 (brackets and quotations omitted). “The 
27 

Government carries the burden of proving causation by a preponderance of the 

evidence in the context of restitution.” Id. “The MVRA does not require absolute 

precision, but losses cannot be speculative.” United States v. Kalu, 791 F.3d 1194, 

1213 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). 

 In this case, the district court calculated the loss amount associated with 

Counts 4 through 13 to be $111,974.04, which included the 401(k) contribution 

amounts withheld from employees’ paychecks but never passed on to the retirement 

plan, interest on those withheld amounts, and the employer matching amounts 

(totaling $36,010.81) that Maynard and TBGSI promised but were never paid on 

behalf of TBGSI’s employees. ROA Vol. 4 at 340; ROA Vol. 7 at 1469–71. At 

sentencing, Maynard objected to including the employer matching amounts on the 

grounds that those funds were simply owed and not paid, but otherwise were never 

stolen or embezzled from TBGSI employees. ROA Vol. 7 at 1469 (“There is no 

doubt that, by contract, the employees should have received that money, but it 

certainly wasn’t deducted or stolen out of their paychecks, as the 401(k) payments, 

themselves, were.”). The district court overruled that objection, concluding “that the 

full amount of the victims’ 401(k) losses include[d] the employer matching 

contributions for each victim for 2017 because the employees were enticed to 

participate in the 401(k) program by the promise of a generous employer match.” Id. 

at 1470. 

 Maynard appeals the district court’s ruling, arguing that, for purposes of the 

MVRA, the only “loss caused by [his] violations of § 664” were “the assets that he 
28 

withheld from the employee paychecks and failed to deposit into a 401(k) plan.” 

Aplt. Br. at 25. We reject this argument. 

 The “Background” section of the indictment in this case alleged, in pertinent 

part, that TBGSI offered to its employees “a 401(k) savings plan” that “was subject 

to Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (‘ERISA’)” and 

in turn “the provisions of Title 18, United States Code 664.” Supp. ROA, Vol. 1 at 6. 

The indictment further alleged that “TBGSI employees selected the amount (if any) 

to be withheld from each paycheck for the 401(k) savings plan” and that “TBGSI 

promised to match employee contributions at a rate set by formula.” Id. Counts 4 

through 13 of the indictment expressly incorporated those allegations by reference. 

Id. at 15 ¶ 24. 

 At the trial in this case, the government, consistent with the allegations in the 

indictment, introduced an email written by Elbers and forwarded by Maynard to a 

prospective plan participant that explained in detail the employer matching 

component of the company’s 401(k) plan; that email was dated March 3, 2017, 

months after Maynard and Elbers stopped forwarding employees’ 401(k) 

contributions to the 401(k) plan.7

 ROA, Vol. 7 at 1095–96. Notably, Maynard does 

not dispute that he represented to plan participants that TBGSI would make employer 

matching contributions to the 401(k) plan. 

7

 Elbers stated in the email that the company’s “contribution [wa]s calculated 

as follows: 100% of the first 3% of deferred compensation plus 50% of the next 2% 

of deferred compensation (so effectively Touchbase contributions [sic] to a maximum 

of 4%).” ROA, Vol. 7 at 1095. 
29 

 In sum, the evidence presented at trial, consistent with the allegations in the 

indictment, established beyond a reasonable doubt that Maynard carried out the theft 

or embezzlement of the 401(k) funds by promising those employer-matching funds to 

TBGSI’s employees. Were it not for those promises, it is uncertain whether the 

employee-victims would have contributed to the 401(k) plan at all. In other words, it 

was those promises that placed Maynard in a position to be able to embezzle or steal 

the 401(k) contributions. We therefore conclude that the government carried its 

burden of showing that those promises were part of “the conduct underlying the 

offense of conviction,” Camick, 796 F.3d at 1223 (quotation marks omitted), and 

that, as a result, the loss to each employee-victim necessarily included the promised 

employer-matching contribution that was associated with each 401(k) contribution. 

See Kalu, 791 F.3d at 1213–14 (affirming district court’s restitution award under the 

MVRA that was based, in pertinent part, on misrepresentations made by the 

defendant to the victims regarding the salary they would receive if they accepted his 

offer of employment). 

 The dissent in this case suggests that restitution for Counts 4 through 13 

should have been limited strictly to the 401(k) contribution amounts withheld from 

the employee-victims’ paychecks. In support of its position, the dissent points to our 

decision in United States v. Mendenhall, 945 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2019). There, we 

held that the MVRA does not allow a district court to order restitution “for losses 

related to, but not arising directly from, [the] defendant’s offense of conviction.” Id. 

at 1266. We therefore rejected the district court’s inclusion of restitution amounts for 
30 

sixty-two stolen firearms because the defendant was only charged with and convicted 

of receiving, possessing, and concealing three of those firearms. Id. 

 In our view, Maynard’s case is distinguishable from, and therefore not 

controlled by, Mendenhall. As we have discussed, the allegations in the indictment, 

which were ultimately supported by the evidence at trial, established that Maynard’s 

promises of employee-matching funds were central to each of the theft/embezzlement 

offenses alleged in Counts 4 through 13 and proven at trial. More specifically, each 

stolen or embezzled employee 401(k) contribution was associated with a promised 

employer-matching amount that TBGSI, at Maynard’s direction, failed to make. 

Thus, in terms of actual loss to the employee-victims, each of the ten counts of 

conviction included a stolen or embezzled employee contribution and an associated 

employer-matching contribution that Maynard promised but failed to make. We 

therefore respectfully reject the dissent’s position.8

 

8

 Even assuming, for purposes of argument that the amount of restitution 

ordered by the district court for Counts 4 through 13 was erroneous, such error was 

harmless because the district court could have awarded the exact same amount of 

restitution under the MVRA for Count 3. Cf. United States v. Owens, 426 F.3d 800, 

808-09 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying harmless error review to restitution issue that 

involved the MVRA). Count 3 charged Maynard and Elbers with conspiracy to steal 

or embezzle payments made by employees into their 401(k) and health care plans, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and alleged in pertinent part that Maynard and Elbers 

carried out the conspiracy by promising the employee-victims that TBGSI would 

make employer-matching 401(k) contributions. Supp. ROA, Vol. 1 at 12-15. 

Notably, we have held that “[c]onspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 is covered 

by the MVRA when the underlying object of the conspiracy is an offense against 

property.” United States v. Butler, 694 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012). Therefore, 

the amount of restitution would not “change on remand.” Owens, 426 F.3d at 809. 
31 

Calculation of restitution award for Counts 14 through 26 

 In his fourth and final issue on appeal, Maynard argues that the district court 

plainly erred in calculating the restitution award for Counts 14 through 26 which, as 

we have noted, involved theft or embezzlement in connection with health care, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 669. 

 Where, as here, a defendant asserts a procedural reasonableness challenge on 

appeal but did not make that argument at the time of sentencing, we review the issue 

only for plain error. United States v. Wireman, 849 F.3d 956, 962 (10th Cir. 2017). 

“We will find plain error only when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) 

affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted). As the party 

alleging plain error, Maynard “has the burden of establishing the four elements of 

plain error.” United States v. Peña, 963 F.3d 1016, 1023 (10th Cir. 2020). 

 At sentencing, the district court adopted without objection the following 

factual findings relevant to Counts 14 through 26 that were set forth in the PSR. 

From around 2012 to June 2017, TBGSI offered health insurance through United 

Healthcare to TBGSI employees. TBGSI paid $600 per employee towards premiums, 

and employees paid the remainder. TBGSI automatically deducted the participant 

contribution from each participant’s paycheck. TBGSI was responsible for 

forwarding the full premium amounts to United Healthcare. Starting in March 2017, 

however, TBGSI stopped paying the premiums owed to United Healthcare. By June 

2017, TBGSI owed United Healthcare approximately $119,000. 
32 

 On July 5, 2017, United Healthcare retroactively terminated TBGSI’s health 

insurance coverage back to March 4, 2017, due to Maynard’s and Elbers’ failure to 

pay the outstanding premiums. Maynard and Elbers did not tell TBGSI’s employees 

that their health care coverage had been cancelled. Instead, Maynard and Elbers 

falsely informed TBGSI’s employees that United Healthcare had proposed to raise 

premiums by 20% to 30%, and that, as a result, Maynard and Elbers had decided to 

contract with Anthem to provide health insurance to TBGSI’s employees. 

 TBGSI’s coverage with Anthem was supposed to begin effective July 1, 2017. 

Although TBGSI continued to withhold employee contributions for health insurance 

premiums, it failed to make any premium payments to Anthem for the coverage. 

Consequently, in September 2017, Anthem terminated coverage retroactive to July 1, 

2017. 

 Maynard and Elbers kept for TBGSI’s benefit a total of $50,279.04 from 

employee paychecks that was intended for health insurance premiums. That included 

employee contributions towards premiums for United Healthcare from March 4, 

2017, to June 30, 2017, and employee contributions towards premiums for Anthem 

from July 1, 2017, to September 2017. Had TBGSI instead forwarded those 

premiums to United Healthcare and Anthem, its employees would have had health 

care coverage for the periods in question, including the payment of covered claims 

incurred. 

 At the time of sentencing, the government submitted without objection a chart 

listing the total amount of premiums withheld from eighteen TBGSI employees 
33 

between March 15, 2017, and September 15, 2017. ECF No. 117-3 at 1. The chart 

also listed, for each of those eighteen employees, the “Unpaid Claims” for United 

Healthcare and Anthem. Id. The district court relied on this evidence for purposes of 

calculating the restitution for Counts 14 through 26. More specifically, the district 

court determined, without objection from Maynard, that the appropriate restitution 

amount was “$185,921.91 for the health plan funds.” ROA, Vol. 7 at 1468. That 

total, the district court noted, was “comprised of $50,279.04 for the premium 

withholdings from the employees’ paychecks that were stolen,” “$40,204.32 in 

unpaid claims for UnitedHealthcare,” and “$95,438.55 in unpaid claims for 

Anthem.”9

 Id. 

 In his appeal, Maynard concedes that “the district court was authorized to 

order restitution for [these] offenses” under the MVRA. Aplt. Br. at 26. But, he 

argues, “the district court’s restitution order exceeds its statutory authority as the 

award amount exceeds the losses caused by [him] and puts the victims in a better 

position than they would have been had the crimes not occurred.” Id. In other 

words, Maynard argues, “[t]he court’s restitution award represents textbook doublecounting.” Id. at 27. He explains that “the loss caused by [his] conduct was either 

the amount of premiums withheld from each individual employee’s paycheck or the 

9

 Thirteen of the eighteen employees had claims denied by United Healthcare. 

ECF No. 117-3 at 1. Nine of the eighteen employees had claims denied by Anthem. 

Id. Only two of the eighteen employees had no claims denied by either insurer. Id. 

The claims denied by United Healthcare ranged in amounts from $20.00 to 

$9,591.90. Id. The claims denied by Anthem ranged in amounts from $800.00 to 

$80,645.55. Id. 
34 

amount that the insurance company would have paid on the claims, but not both.” Id. 

(emphasis in original). Maynard in turn argues that “[i]n order to put the victims 

back into the position that they would be in had the crimes not occurred, the court 

could choose between one of two options.” Id. “The court could,” he argues, “treat 

the victims as if they have never paid for health insurance—i.e., the victim would 

receive the amount of money withheld from their paychecks.” Id. Alternatively, he 

argues, “the court could have put the victim in the position they would have been had 

[he] secured health insurance—i.e., the victim would receive the amount the 

insurance plan would have covered minus the premiums that the victims would have 

paid to obtain such health insurance.” Id. Finally, Maynard argues that “the 

restitution award exceeds the actual loss suffered by the victims in that the district 

court failed to deduct from the denied claims any amount that the victim would have 

owed even if they had health insurance,” and that “[n]otably absent from the district 

court’s restitution award is consideration of the victim’s deductible.” Id. at 28. 

 We need not decide whether the district court erred for purposes of the first 

prong of the plain error test because, even assuming that it did, Maynard has failed to 

satisfy his burden under the second and third prongs of that test. “For an error to be 

plain, it must be an error that is clear or obvious under current, well-settled law.” 

United States v. Miller, 978 F.3d 746, 763 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks 

omitted). “Typically for an error to be contrary to well-settled law, either the 

Supreme Court or this court must have addressed the issue.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted). In this case, Maynard cites only to Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit cases 
35 

outlining general principles that are applicable to MVRA cases.10 For example, 

Maynard cites to Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) for the principle that 

“the MVRA only permits a restitution order that restores the victims to the position 

they occupied before the crime.” Aplt. Br. at 26. He also cites to United States v. 

Howard, 784 F.3d 745, 750 (10th Cir. 2015) for the principle that a “restitution 

award may not ‘unjustly enrich crime victims or provide them a windfall.’” Id. 

These general principles, however, do not address the specific and unique situation 

that is presented in this case regarding the restitution amounts associated with Counts 

14 through 26. And, as we shall discuss in more detail, it is far from “plain” that the 

district court erred by failing to calculate restitution in the manner suggested by 

Maynard. 

 Maynard argues that “the loss caused by [his] conduct was either the amount 

of premiums withheld from each individual employee’s paycheck or the amount that 

the insurance company would have paid on the claims, but not both.” Aplt. Br. at 27 

(italics in original). Because the limited evidence in the record establishes that each 

of the eighteen employee-victims was in a unique situation, it is not enough for 

Maynard to argue that the district court plainly erred by failing to choose between 

one category total or the other, i.e., awarding either the total of the withheld and 

10 The same holds true for the dissent. See Dissent at 9–10. Although the 

dissent suggests that these general principles are enough to conclude that the district 

court committed plain error, we disagree. Neither Maynard nor the dissent cite to a 

single case that involved offenses, and in turn restitution issues, remotely similar to 

those at issue here. And, although the dissent suggests that the alleged error here is 

“obvious,” we respectfully disagree. Id. at 9. 
36 

subsequently stolen premiums from all TBGSI employees or the total of the unpaid 

medical claims for all TBGSI employees.11 Indeed, our review of the evidence 

presented at the sentencing hearing indicates that, had the district court done so, it 

would have unnecessarily benefitted Maynard at the expense of at least some of the 

employee-victims. For example, if the district court had awarded only the amount of 

the unpaid medical claims, that would have left two of the employee-victims with no 

recovery at all because they had no unpaid medical claims during the period from 

March 15, 2017, to September 15, 2017. In contrast, if the district court had awarded 

only the amount of the withheld and stolen premium payments, that would have left 

many of the employee-victims without proper restitution because their unpaid 

medical claims exceeded the amounts of their withheld and stolen premium 

payments. 

 If, as Maynard suggests, the goal of the MVRA is to restore the victim to the 

position occupied before the crime, then the district court’s restitution award satisfies 

that goal and is not plainly erroneous. By deducting amounts from each employeevictim’s paycheck for health insurance premium payments and keeping those 

amounts for TBGSI’s benefit instead of forwarding them to United Healthcare and 

11 For example, TBGSI employee Victor Gutierrez had $3,076.65 withheld 

from his paychecks for premiums, but had no unpaid medical claims. ECF No. 117-3 

at 1. In contrast, TBGSI employee Alexis Nicholson had $2,554.11 withheld from 

her paychecks for premiums, and in turn had $91,637.35 in unpaid medical claims. 

Id. As a third example, TBGSI employee Clare Lamy had $6,826.69 withheld from 

her paychecks for premiums, and in turn had $5,608.96 in unpaid medical claims. Id. 
37 

Anthem, Maynard financially harmed the employee-victims in two ways: (1) he 

effectively stole from them the amounts that were deducted from their paychecks and 

intended to be used as health insurance premium payments; and (2) he also caused 

the employee-victims to incur medical expenses that would otherwise have been 

covered under their health care plans with United Healthcare and Anthem.12 In other 

words, Maynard’s criminal acts caused the employee-victims direct out-of-pocket 

losses when he kept the deducted insurance premiums deducted from their 

paychecks, and when they had to pay uncovered medical bills. Only by ordering 

restitution which covers both losses would the employee-victims be made whole. 

 To the extent Maynard is arguing that the district court should have separately 

analyzed each employee’s situation and attempted to determine what each 

employee’s actual loss was, he provides us with no additional evidence to support his 

arguments. To be sure, the limited evidence in the record, as we have noted, 

establishes for each employee-victim the premium amounts withheld from their 

paychecks and, in turn, the total amount of unpaid claims that would otherwise have 

12 Both Maynard and the dissent would essentially pretend, with respect to 

those employee-victims whose uncovered medical expenses exceeded their withheld 

and embezzled health insurance premiums, that those employee-victims had health 

insurance coverage. Not only does this ignore the realities of what actually occurred, 

it would effectively reward Maynard financially by allowing him to retain the 

embezzled health insurance premiums. Nothing in the text of the MVRA, nor in our 

case law interpreting the MVRA, supports such a result. To the contrary, the plain 

text of the MVRA indicates that the restitution award is intended as a “penalty” equal 

to “the full amount of each victim’s losses.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), 

3664(f)(1)(A). And those losses, as we have discussed, included both the stolen 

premium amounts and the uncovered medical expenses. 
38 

been covered by United Healthcare and Anthem. But this evidence does not establish 

(a) the time period that employee-victim was covered by the two healthcare plans,13

(b) when the unpaid medical claims were incurred,14 or (c) how the two insurance 

plans would have operated in terms of deductibles. Those details, which Maynard 

does not address or attempt to establish with evidence, would have been important 

and necessary to the district court had it been obligated to make the calculations now 

suggested by Maynard for the first time on appeal.15

 We also note that, to the extent Maynard suggests the district court should 

have engaged in a detailed analysis of each employee-victim’s situation, this ignores 

well-established precedent holding that the calculation of a restitution award under 

13 For example, the government’s chart indicates that TBGSI employee 

Gennaro Perrone had a total of $3,283.10 in premiums deducted from her paychecks 

and had $350.00 in unpaid medical claims that should have been covered by United 

Healthcare. Although we can infer from this evidence that Perrone intended to be 

covered by, and thus had premium payments deducted for, United Healthcare, it does 

not tell us whether Perrone intended to be covered by, and thus had premium 

payments deducted for, Anthem. 

14 If, for example, an employee incurred a medical claim on March 16, 2017, 

that should have been but was not covered by United Healthcare, and incurred no 

other medical claims thereafter, then, at least arguably, only the withheld premium 

amounts covering the March 16, 2017 occurrence should have been, under Maynard’s 

theory, taken into consideration in offsetting the amount of the unpaid medical claim. 

In other words, this employee, under Maynard’s theory, should have been awarded 

(a) the amount of the unpaid medical claim minus the withheld premium for the 

period covering the unpaid medical claim, and (b) the total amount of withheld 

premiums for the period following the occurrence of the unpaid medical claim. 

15 For these same reasons, we respectfully reject the dissent’s suggestion that 

the district court should have “examin[ed] each employee individually and utilize[ed] 

the greater of the embezzled premiums or the unpaid insurance claims.” Dissent at 

10. 
39 

the MVRA is not intended to be a full-blown trial of its own. Indeed, Congress itself 

made this very point when it enacted the MVRA. See S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 18 

(1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931 (cautioning that a district court’s 

calculation of restitution in a criminal case is not to “become fora for the 

determination of facts and issues better suited to civil proceedings”). As a result, we 

have held that a district court need not calculate restitution under the MVRA “with 

exact precision.” United States v. Anthony, 942 F.3d 955, 970 (10th Cir. 2020) 

(quotation marks omitted). We are therefore not convinced that the district court 

“plainly” erred by failing to precisely determine, including taking into account the 

workings of each insurance plan, the losses of each of the eighteen employee-victims. 

 We in turn conclude, for many of the same reasons, that Maynard has failed to 

establish, under the third prong of the plain error test, that the alleged error affected 

his substantial rights. “An error affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable 

probability that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Miller, 978 F.3d 

at 765 (quotation marks omitted). “In the sentencing context, we ask: Is there a 

reasonable probability that but for the court’s error, the defendant would have 

received a lesser sentence?” Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

 As we have discussed, Maynard provides us with no evidence that is 

supportive of his arguments. For example, he argues, but fails to substantiate, that 

each of the unpaid medical claims considered by the district court would have been 

subject, under the terms of the United Healthcare and Anthem plans, to deductible 

amounts that the employee-victims would have been obligated to pay. Ultimately, 
40 

given the very limited evidence before us, we are unable to say there is a “reasonable 

probability” that the restitution amount for Counts 14 through 26 would have been 

lower had the district court engaged in a detailed analysis of each employee-victim’s 

situation. 

IV 

 For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM Maynard’s convictions and 

sentence. 
19-1304, United States v. Maynard 

McHUGH, Circuit Judge, joining in part and dissenting in part: 

I agree with the majority that the district court did not err in calculating 

Mr. Maynard’s Guidelines range and that substantial evidence supports Mr. Maynard’s 

convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 669. Accordingly, I join those portions of the majority 

opinion.1

 However, for the reasons I now explain, I respectfully dissent from the 

majority’s affirmance of the restitution orders with respect to the retirement benefit and 

the healthcare embezzlement convictions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

As the majority opinion notes, at Mr. Maynard’s direction in 2017, Touchbase 

Global Services, Inc. (“TBGSI”) used money withheld from employees’ paychecks 

designated to retirement plans and health insurance plans to instead pay for operating 

expenses. TBGSI incentivized participation in the retirement plan by offering matching 

contributions, but later stopped paying the matching contributions without notifying its 

employees. In addition, TBGSI withheld money from employee paychecks ostensibly to 

pay for employee health insurance. Unbeknownst to the employees, TBGSI failed to pass 

along the employee withholdings to the appropriate health insurance company. As a 

1

 I also concur in the majority’s conclusion that an accurate calculation of 

employees’ deductibles would not have been possible based on the evidence presented. 

But because, as discussed in section II.B, I am convinced the restitution amount for the 

embezzlement of healthcare premiums is otherwise embedded with plain error, I dissent 

from the majority’s affirmance of that award. 
2 

result, two successive insurers retroactively cancelled health insurance coverage for 

TBGSI’s employees, resulting in unpaid claims the insurance would have covered. 

For his conduct in embezzling the employee withholdings, the grand jury charged 

Mr. Maynard with, and the petit jury convicted him of, one count of conspiracy to 

embezzle employees’ retirement contributions and health insurance payments, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3712

; ten counts of theft or embezzlement of employee benefit 

plan funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 664; and thirteen counts of theft or embezzlement 

in connection with health care, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 669.3

 

On the retirement benefit embezzlement counts, over Mr. Maynard’s objection, 

the district court ordered restitution, including “the employer matching contribution for 

each victim for 2017 because the employees were enticed to participate in the 401(k) 

program by the promise of a generous employer match” which was never paid. ROA, 

Vol. VII at 1470–71. The district court also included lost interest on the employees’ 

contributions. In total, the district court ordered Mr. Maynard to pay $111,974.04 in 

restitution for embezzlement of the retirement benefits. 

On the health insurance premium embezzlement counts, the district court ordered 

Mr. Maynard to pay $185,921.91 in restitution. This amount “is comprised of $50,279.04 

2

 The district court did not order restitution on this count. 

3

 Mr. Maynard was also charged with corruptly endeavoring to obstruct or impede 

due administration of the internal revenue laws in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) and 

conspiring to avoid paying taxes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Because I join in the 

majority’s analysis of Mr. Maynard’s arguments with regard to those claims, I do not 

discuss them here. 
3 

for the premium withholdings from the employees’ paychecks that were stolen[,] 

$40,204.32 in unpaid claims for UnitedHealthcare[, a]nd $95,438.55 in unpaid claims for 

Anthem.” Id. at 1468. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Restitution must be authorized by statute. United States v. Mendenhall, 945 F.3d 

1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2019). The restitution here is governed by the Mandatory Victims 

Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The MVRA directs courts to order “‘that 

the defendant make restitution to the victim’ of ‘an offense against property under this 

title.’” United States v. Howard, 887 F.3d 1072, 1076 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting 18 

U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii)). “The overarching principle of the MVRA is to 

make victims whole.” Id. at 1078. Thus, restitution under this section ordinarily 

constitutes the return of the victim’s property, but if that is impracticable, the value of the 

property. Id. at 1076. The government has the burden of proving the restitution amount. 

Id. “[T]he controlling metric for an award of restitution pursuant to the MVRA in every 

case is actual loss suffered; nothing more, nothing less, to ensure that the victim does not 

receive a windfall.” Id. at 1078 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A. Retirement Benefit Restitution 

On the 18 U.S.C. § 664 counts, the district court found that “the full amount of the 

victims’ 401(k) losses includes the employer matching contribution for each victim for 

2017 because the employees were enticed to participate in the 401(k) program by the 

promise of a generous employer match.” ROA, Vol. VII at 1470. The district court 

therefore included in the restitution amount the unpaid matching contributions in addition 
4 

to the embezzled withholdings and interest. Mr. Maynard argues this was improper 

because “the loss caused by the ‘offense of conviction’ was the funds stolen from the 

employees’ paychecks,” not the unpaid matching contributions. Appellant Br. at 24. The 

government argues the unpaid matching contributions are compensable because they 

were losses created by false representations and are necessary to make the victims whole. 

As the majority notes, there is no dispute that Mr. Maynard (and Ms. Elbers) 

fraudulently represented that employer matching contributions would be made to the 

401(k) program, thereby enticing employees to participate in the program and providing 

an opportunity to embezzle the employees’ contributions. The majority thus concludes 

“the government carried its burden of showing that . . . the loss to each employee-victim 

necessarily included the promised employer-matching contribution that was associated 

with each 401(k) contribution.” Majority Op. at 29. And like the government, the 

majority cites United States v. Kalu, 791 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2015), in support, reading 

that case to authorize restitution for misrepresentations. 

In my view, this court’s decision in Mendenhall precludes the government’s 

reasoning. The defendant in Mendenhall burglarized a pawn shop, stealing (among other 

things) sixty-two firearms. 945 F.3d at 1266. But he was charged with and convicted of 

only receipt, possession, and concealment of a stolen firearm based upon three specific 

firearms. Id. Without objection, the district court ordered restitution under the MVRA for 

other losses related to the burglary, including the other fifty-nine stolen firearms and 

repair costs the pawn shop incurred after the burglary. Id. at 1266–67. “Relying on 

controlling Supreme Court precedent, we conclude[d] that Congress has authorized 
5 

restitution only ‘for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense 

of conviction.’” Id. at 1266 (quoting Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990)). 

“In ordering restitution for losses related to, but not arising directly from, defendant’s 

offense of conviction,” this court in Mendenhall held, “the district court exceeded the 

range of restitution authorized by the [MVRA].” Id.

The majority’s view of Mendenhall, from my perspective, is not consistent with its 

facts. The majority characterizes Mendenhall as “reject[ing] the district court’s inclusion 

of restitution amounts for sixty-two stolen firearms because the defendant was only 

charged with and convicted of receiving, possessing, and concealing three of those 

firearms.” Majority Op. at 29–30. But the restitution order in that case was broader than 

just the other firearms; it included “wages for employees to conduct inventory, loss of 

revenue for closing of business (historical average of Saturdays and Mondays), and 

cleanup/repairs” caused by the burglary. Mendenhall, 945 F.3d at 1266–67. So 

understood, Mendenhall establishes it is not enough that these losses are related to the 

crime of conviction; to be eligible for restitution, the losses must be caused by the 

conduct underlying that crime. 

The majority attempts to distinguish Mendenhall because Mr. Maynard’s fraud 

was specified—although not separately charged—in the indictment and the evidence at 

trial “established that [Mr.] Maynard’s promises of employee-matching funds were 

central” to the retirement benefit embezzlement charges. Majority Op. at 30. The 

majority suggests the fraud was conduct underlying the offense because “it was those 
6 

[false] promises that placed [Mr.] Maynard in a position to be able to embezzle or steal 

the 401(k) contributions.” Id. at 29. 

I do not think these attempted distinctions distinguish Mendenhall. True, the 

indictment in Mendenhall listed only three firearms, and that matter did not proceed to 

trial. 945 F.3d at 1266, 1269. But we did note that there was substantial, undisputed 

evidence that Mr. Mendenhall had committed the burglary. Id. at 1266. Indeed, we stated, 

“everyone knows that [Mr.] Mendenhall stole the firearms and pocketed cash from the 

theft.” Id. at 1269. And there can be no doubt that the burglary was central to 

Mr. Mendenhall’s possessing stolen firearms—absent the burglary, the firearms would 

not have been stolen or in Mr. Mendenhall’s possession. In Mendenhall, we relied on a 

similar Fourth Circuit case; that court “explained that although the defendant’s ‘burglary 

and theft of the firearm represent necessary steps in the accomplishment’ of the convicted 

offense, they were ‘legally irrelevant for the purpose of restitution.’” Id. at 1268 (quoting 

United States v. Davis, 714 F.3d 809, 814 (4th Cir. 2013)). I see nothing materially 

different in the majority’s distinctions. 

Kalu is not contrary to Mendenhall, nor does it create an exception for 

misrepresentative conduct. In that case, a panel of this court upheld a restitution order 

that required the defendant to pay his victims as though his false statement had been true. 

791 F.3d at 1212–15. But there is a critical distinction between that case and Mendenhall: 

Mr. Kalu was convicted of fraud. Id. at 1199–1200 (explaining Mr. Kalu was charged 

with and convicted of mail fraud and visa fraud, inter alia, for recruiting nurses and 

obtaining visas for them with the false statement that they would earn $72,000 per year, 
7 

when in fact the nurses earned less than that amount). So, in my view, Kalu does not 

establish that all misrepresentations support an award of restitution. Rather, it holds that 

where misrepresentation is part of the offense of conviction, a district court may order 

restitution giving the victims of the misrepresentation the benefit of the promise. 

Here, the jury convicted Mr. Maynard of embezzlement of funds from a retirement 

benefit account. Unlike in Kalu, the government did not pursue a conviction for fraud. 

While promising (falsely) to provide matching contributions was among the means 

Mr. Maynard used to convince employees to request withholdings, it was not an element 

of any crime of which Mr. Maynard was convicted. Even if he had matched the 

contributions as promised, Mr. Maynard would have been just as guilty of violating § 664 

when he embezzled the employee contributions. As we explained in Mendenhall, district 

courts may order restitution only for losses caused by the conduct underlying the offense 

of conviction, not for losses caused by relevant conduct. 945 F.3d at 1269. Losses from 

conduct enabling, but not constituting, the crime may not be included. Id. at 1268. By 

choosing not to pursue a fraud case against Mr. Maynard, the government made recovery 

of the promised matching funds unavailable as restitution under the MVRA. See id. at 

1269. Accordingly, I would hold the district court erred in including the unpaid employer 

matching contributions as restitution for the convictions under § 664.4

4

 The majority notes the district court could have awarded this restitution for 

Count 3, and accordingly any error was harmless. Although the district court could have 

ordered this restitution on Count 3, it did not do so. It is true “that ordinarily we may 

affirm on any ground that finds support in the record.” United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 

1191, 1207 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But ordinarily, in 

exercising that discretion, we have been—as a matter of basic fairness—guided by 
8 

B. Healthcare Restitution 

Mr. Maynard next challenges the restitution award for his convictions of theft or 

embezzlement in connection with health care in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 669. In reaching 

its conclusion that Mr. Maynard could not prevail on this claim under plain error, the 

majority does not reach the question of whether the district court erred, instead 

concluding that any presumed error was not plain. In contrast, I begin my analysis of the 

healthcare restitution issue with that first prong—error—before turning to whether the 

error was plain. 

Error 

Mr. Maynard argues the district court erred in two ways: (1) by including both the 

embezzled premiums and the amount of unpaid claims in the restitution order and (2) by 

including the full amount of the unpaid claims in the restitution order rather than 

accounting for expenses such as deductibles which employees would have paid even if 

they had been covered by insurance as promised. I agree with the majority that 

Mr. Maynard has failed to come forth with evidence showing that, or how, deductibles 

whether the parties have fully briefed and argued the alternate ground, and whether they 

have had a fair opportunity to develop the factual record.” United States v. Chavez, 976 

F.3d 1178, 1203 n.17 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

government did not ask us to review for harmless error and, consequentially, 

Mr. Maynard did not discuss it. See United States v. Cristerna-Gonzalez, 962 F.3d 1253, 

1267 (10th Cir. 2020) (“The government ordinarily has the burden of proving that a nonconstitutional error was harmless.”) (quotation marks omitted). To my knowledge, this 

would be the first published opinion of this court to apply harmless error to an MVRA 

calculation. See Majority Op. at 30 n.8 (citing a Sixth Circuit case for the proposition that 

harmless error applies to an MVRA calculation). I would not do so for the first time on 

our own initiative. 
9 

would have applied; and on plain error review we cannot look beyond the record before 

the district court. However, I believe the district court erred in ordering restitution for 

both the embezzled premiums and the unpaid claims. 

Mr. Maynard argues that absent his criminal conduct, his employees’ withholdings 

would have been passed on to the health insurers, and the employees would have been 

covered. So, in his view, their loss is either the embezzled premiums or the unpaid 

medical claims, but not both. He argues that restitution for both the amount of premiums 

and the unpaid medical expenses puts the employees in a better position than they would 

have been in if, in fact, the withheld amounts were used to purchase health insurance. The 

government disagrees, arguing that the embezzled premiums represent the loss of 

protection against risk that health insurance provides, while the out-of-pocket payments 

compensate costs actually incurred. 

I agree with Mr. Maynard. Victims who receive both reimbursement of the 

premium amounts withheld from their paychecks and out-of-pocket expenses incurred 

when the insurers retroactively revoked coverage will recover more than they would have 

received if Mr. Maynard had not embezzled their premiums. That is an impermissible 

windfall under the MVRA.5

5

 The majority is concerned that this result “would effectively reward 

[Mr.] Maynard financially by allowing him to retain the embezzled health insurance 

premiums” and suggests such a “reward” is unsupported. Majority Op. at 37 n.12. But 

restitution is about restitution, not disgorgement. “The overarching principle of the 

MVRA is to make victims whole.” United States v. Howard, 887 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th 

Cir. 2018). 
10 

At oral argument, counsel for Mr. Maynard posited that the best way to calculate 

restitution would be by examining each employee individually and utilizing the greater of 

the embezzled premiums or the unpaid insurance claims. This would put each employee 

in a position as though Mr. Maynard’s crime had not been committed. For persons who 

incurred less in healthcare expenses than the stolen premiums, the restitution award 

would be the value of insurance coverage—that is, the total of the stolen premiums. For 

employees who incurred healthcare expenses that exceeded the cost of the stolen 

premiums, however, the proper amount of restitution would be the amount the insurance 

company would have paid in health care benefits if coverage were in effect. I agree with 

Mr. Maynard that awarding both the premium amounts and the amount of healthcare 

expenses puts the employees in a better position than if Mr. Maynard had not stolen the 

premiums. Under the district court’s award, the employees receive the benefit of health 

insurance, without the burden of an insurance premium.6

 Again, I think this exceeds the 

authority granted by the MVRA. 

6

 The majority suggests there are two categories of losses here—the embezzlement 

of premiums and the incurring of medical expenses that would have been covered by 

insurance—and that these losses must be remedied independently. I respectfully disagree. 

Insurance premiums represent the amount a person is willing to pay to have someone else 

cover her medical bills. By providing restitution for the amount of those bills, the court 

has given the employee the benefit of the bargain made. The employee is entitled to no 

less and no more. When a person incurs greater covered medical expenses than her 

premiums, the premiums are simply the cost of having those expenses covered. 
11 

Remaining Prongs of Plain Error Review 

The majority does not consider whether the district court erred, but rather holds 

any error was not plain or did not affect Mr. Maynard’s substantial rights. Generally, 

however, an error in fashioning the restitution order resulting in the restitution amount 

exceeding the losses caused by the conduct of conviction will meet the three remaining 

prongs of the plain error analysis. United States v. Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411, 1420 (10th 

Cir. 1992); United States v. Guthrie, 64 F.3d 1510, 1514 (10th Cir. 1995); United States 

v. Gordon, 480 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Zander, 794 F.3d 

1220, 1233 (10th Cir. 2015). But see United States v. Anthony, 942 F.3d 955, 974 (10th 

Cir. 2019) (holding a defendant failed to show plain error on the plainness prong despite 

agreeing there was error); United States v. Zhou, 717 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2013) 

(holding an alleged restitution error was not plain). As discussed below, I would hold that 

the error in including both insurance coverage and the insurance premiums was plain 

under our precedent and affected Mr. Maynard’s substantial rights. 

As to the plainness of the asserted errors, the majority faults Mr. Maynard for 

citing only general principles which “do not address the specific and unique situation that 

is presented in this case regarding the restitution amounts associated with” the charges 

here. Majority Op. at 35. It then reasons that forcing the district court to award an amount 

reflecting only premiums or only unpaid claims would undercount employees’ losses. 

Considering the employees separately and providing the greater of the unpaid claims or 

premiums, the majority believes, would require more evidentiary support and possibly 

mini-trials at sentencing. 
12 

As an initial matter, I am untroubled that the plainness of the district court’s error 

is evident from general principles governing restitution awards as opposed to a case 

factually identical to this one. Our precedent unambiguously demands that a restitution 

award make the victims whole, but not grant them a windfall. Howard, 887 F.3d at 1078; 

see also Zander, 794 F.3d at 1233. Here, it was obvious the restitution order put the 

employees in a better position than they would have been if Mr. Maynard had not stolen 

the premiums. The restitution award provides the employees all the benefits of health 

coverage, without the corresponding premium expense. In my view, that is a classic 

windfall. 

Like the majority, however, I agree the district court could not have equitably 

treated all the employees the same. By awarding restitution based solely on premium 

amounts, for example, some employees who had high healthcare expenses would not be 

made whole. And if instead restitution were based only on healthcare expenses, those 

employees who were lucky enough not to have incurred uninsured expenses would still 

have suffered the uncompensated loss of their premiums. But, unlike the majority, I am 

not convinced that calculating the restitution amount by taking the greater amount as 

between the unpaid premiums and the uncovered healthcare expenses of each employee 

would be too difficult. The schedules provided to the district court, without objection, 

included totals for each employee of the premiums stolen and the healthcare expenses 

incurred. A simple reference to that document to determine which amount is higher is all 

that would be required to award restitution sufficient to make the employees whole, 

without providing them with a windfall. Under these circumstances, I see little risk that a 
13 

full-blown trial would be required to calculate restitution. Instead, a restitution amount 

could have been easily calculated by including the higher of each amount—but not both 

amounts—for each employee. 

Regarding the substantial rights prong of plain error, the majority is “unable to say 

there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the restitution amount for Counts 14 through 26 

would have been lower had the district court engaged in a detailed analysis of each 

employee-victim’s situation.” Id. at 40. I respectfully disagree. 

According to Mr. Maynard, the district court should have ordered only the amount 

of each employees’ embezzled premiums or the amount of unpaid healthcare expenses, 

whichever is higher. The restitution award adopted by the district court includes both 

amounts. If we agree—as I do—with Mr. Maynard, the amount of the restitution order 

will necessarily be reduced by eliminating the lesser of those amounts for each employee. 

The error therefore affected Mr. Maynard’s substantial rights. See Mendenhall, 945 F.3d 

at 1269. 

Finally, this court’s precedent compels the conclusion that this error affected the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. “[W]e have already 

determined that where a court orders restitution in an amount that exceeds the loss caused 

by a defendant’s offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, such an order amounts to an 

illegal sentence.” Mendenhall, 945 F.3d at 1270. And an illegal sentence affects the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. (“[I]mproper 

restitution can thereby affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial 
14 

proceedings.”). Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s award of restitution on 

the healthcare benefit embezzlement and remand for a recalculation. 

III. CONCLUSION

I would hold the district court erred in its restitution calculations pertaining to the 

§§ 664 and 669 convictions, and that its error regarding the unpreserved challenge to the 

latter convictions was plain. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary 

conclusions as to those issues.