Unclassified Report to Congress 

on the Acquisition of Technology 

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction 

and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 

Covering 1 January to 31 December 2011 

The Director of National Intelligence hereby submits this report in response to a 

congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization 

Act, which states: 

"(a) Reports 

The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress an annual report on -

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use 

and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of 

mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and 

biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and 

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries." 

(b) Submittal dates 

(1) The report required by subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted each 

year to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 

leadership on an annual basis on the dates provided in section 415b of this 

title. 

(2) In this subsection: 

(A) The term "congressional intelligence committees has the meaning 

given that term in section 401 a of this title. 

(B) The term "congressional leadership" means the Speaker and the 

minority leader of the House of Representative and the majority leader 

and the minority leader of the Senate. 

(c) Form of reports 

Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted in 

unclassified form, but may include a classified annex." 

The National Intelligence Council coordinated this report within the Intelligence 

Community (IC). As directed by Section 721, subsection (c) of the Act, this report is 

unclassified. It does not present the details of the IC's assessments of weapons of 

mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are available in 

other classified reports and briefings for the Congress. 

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I. Acquisition by Country 

As required by Section 721 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the 

following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, 

contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced 

conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 31 December 2011 . 

This report focuses on key countries that we assess are developing capabilities 

applicable to WMD. 

Nuclear 

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure and 

continued uranium enrichment and activities related to its heavy water research reactor, 

despite multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions since late 2006 and most 

recently in June 2010 calling for the suspension of those activities. Although Iran made 

progress in expanding its nuclear infrastructure during 2011, some obstacles slowed 

progress during this period. 

• In 2011, Iran continued to make progress enriching uranium at the underground 

cascade halls at Natanz with first-generation centrifuges, and in testing and 

operating advanced centrifuges at the Natanz pilot plant. As of early November, Iran 

had produced about 4,900 kilograms of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) 

gas product at Natanz, compared to about 3,200 kilograms by November 2010 and 

1,800 kilograms of LEUF6 in November 2009. Iran's holdings as of November 2011 

include about 4,150 kg of 3.5 percent LEUF6 and about 80 kg of 20-percent enriched 

UF5. Between August 2010 and November 2011, Iran decreased the number of 

installed centrifuges from about 8,900 to about 8,000, but the number reported to be 

operating is around 6,200, up from about 3,800 in August 201 0. 

• Iran has installed centrifuges at the underground Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near 

Qom and initiated production of near-20 percent enriched uranium there. Iran has 

declared it plans to use Fordow for both production of enriched material as well as 

centrifuge research and development. 

• Iran in 2011 continued construction of the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor and 

it claims it will attempt to commence operations there by the end of 2013. 

• Iran in 2011 commenced low-level reactor operations at the Bushehr Nuclear Power 

Plant but has not yet operated it at full power. 

• Iran's Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan shut down for maintenance in 

August 2009 and Iran had postponed UF6 production as of early November 2011. 

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International Atomic Energy Agency Director General reports to the Board of 

Governors indicate Iran has almost exhausted its imported stockpile of yellowcake. 

Ballistic Missiles 

Iran has continued to develop its ballistic missile program, which it views as its primary 

deterrent. Iran is fielding increased numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic 

missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs) and we judge Tehran will continue to work on producing 

more capable MRBMs and developing space launch vehicles, which incorporate 

technology directly applicable to longer-range missile systems. Iran's ballistic missile 

inventory is one of the largest in the Middle East. 

• Iran as of 2011 continues to develop an anti-ship variant of its Fateh-110 SRBM 

called the Kalij Fars, which would represent an additional Iranian threat to military 

and commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. 

• An Aerospace Division commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in 

early 2011 announced Iran had launched two long-range ballistic missiles into 

the Indian Ocean. However, the official did not provide further detail on the types 

of missiles. 

• In late May 2011, Iran's defense minister claimed that the new Qiyam-1 SRBM 

cuts down on launch preparation timelines and reduces detection to anti-missile 

systems, according to press reports. 

• Iran in late June and early July launched a series of missiles and rockets as part 

of its Noble Prophet VI military exercise, including Shahab-1/2 SRBMs, a 

Shahab-3 MRBM, and Zelzal rockets. Iran also publicized its underground 

ballistic missile launch silos that it claims are less vulnerable to attack. 

As early as 2005, Iran stated its intentions to send its own satellites into orbit. As of 

January 2008, Tehran reportedly had allocated $250 million to build and purchase 

satellites. Iran announced it would launch four more satellites by 2010 to improve land 

and mobile telephone communications. 

• Iran in mid-June 2011 launched the Rasad satellite on board a Safir space 

launch vehicle (SL V), which was the same type SLV used to launch the Omid 

satellite in February 2009, according to press reports. 

• In October 2011 Iran announced it would launch the Fajr satellite into space by 

2012, along with other announcements related to advances in their space 

program. 

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• In mid-August 2008, Iran first launched the Safir, carrying the Omid satellite. Iran 

claimed the launch a success; however US officials believed the vehicle did not 

successfully complete its mission. 

• In February 2010, Iran displayed a much larger space launch vehicle dubbed the 

Simorgh, as well as its first stage clustered engines. Iran claims the Simorgh can 

launch a 1 OOkg satellite into a 500km orbit, according to press reports. 

Iran continued to move toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles, but 

almost certainly remains dependent on foreign suppliers for some key missile 

components. Entities in China and Russia along with North Korea are among likely 

suppliers. Iran has also marketed at least one ballistic missile system for export. 

Chemical and Biological 

We assess that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents 

and conducts research that may have offensive applications. Tehran continues to seek 

dual-use technologies that could advance its capability to produce CW agents. We 

judge that Iran is capable of weaponizing CW agents in a variety of delivery systems. 

Iran probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for 

offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. We assess that Iran has previously 

conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to expand its 

biotechnology infrastructure and seek dual-use technologies that could be used for BW. 

North Korea 

Nuclear 

In February 2007, North Korea agreed as part of the Six-Party Talks to "shut down and 

seal for the purposes of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear faci lity, including 

the reprocessing facility" as part of the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint 

Statement of September 2005. In mid-July 2007, North Korean officials shut down the 

Yongbyon 5-megawatt electric (MWe) nuclear reactor, and placed the Yongbyon spentfuel reprocessing facility, the Yongbyon nuclear fuel fabrication plant, and two 

unfinished nuclear reactors under IAEA monitoring. In return, the other five Parties 

agreed to cooperate in economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, 

including the provision of assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel 

oil during the period of Initial Actions and the next phase. 

In the Second-Phase Actions Agreement, signed October 3, 2007, Pyongyang 

committed to disable the 5MWe reactor, the reprocessing facility, and the fuel 

fabrication plant by December 31, 2007 in exchange for a US commitment to begin the 

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process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and to 

advance the processing of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy 

Act, in parallel with the DPRK's Second Phase actions. In November 2007, a team of 

US Department of Energy officials began overseeing disablement activities, including 

the unloading of reactor fuel rods at Yongbyon. In April 2009, North Korea informed the 

US and IAEA officials at Yongbyon that they were to depart at the earliest possible time 

and that North Korea planned to reactivate its nuclear facilities and reprocess the spent 

fuel removed from the reactor. In September 2009, North Korea announced that 

reprocessing of the spent fuel rods was in the final stages and that the recovered 

plutonium was being weaponized. 

North Korean nuclear test activity in 2006 and 2009 strengthens our assessment that 

the North has produced nuclear weapons. 

In June 2009, North Korea announced that It had begun uranium enrichment work at a 

test stage and was developing technology to produce fuel for a light-water reactor. In 

September 2009, North Korea reported that its uranium enrichment work had entered 

into the completion phase. In November 2010, North Korea revealed a claimed 2,000 

centrifuge uranium enrichment facility to an unofficial US delegation visiting the 

Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and stated it would produce low-enriched uranium 

to fuel a planned light-water reactor under construction at Yongbyon. In late 2011, 

North Korea stated the facility is producing uranium enriched up to 3.5 percent in 

uranium-235. 

Ballistic Missile 

North Korea continues to pursue the development, production, and deployment of 

ballistic missiles with increasing range and sophistication. It continues to procure 

needed raw materials and components from various foreign sources to support its 

missile industry. 

• North Korea has not launched its Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle or any 

other longer range space or missile system since July 2009. 

• North Korea continues to develop mobile short-range and longer-range ballistic 

missiles. 

Chemical and Biological 

We assess that North Korea has had a longstanding CW program. We judge 

Pyongyang possesses a stockpile of agents. 

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North Korea has a biotechnology infrastructure that could support the production of 

various BW agents. We judge that North Korea possesses a conventional munitions 

production infrastructure that could be used to weaponize BW agents. 

Nuclear 

Syria- despite being a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Party with full-scope IAEA 

safeguards- was engaged for more than a decade in a covert nuclear program 

with North Korean assistance. The program involved construction of a nuclear reactor 

at AI Kibar without informing the IAEA and while taking measures to preserve the site's 

secrecy. We assess the reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for 

nuclear weapons. The reactor was destroyed in September 2007, before it became 

operational, and Syria went to great lengths to try to eradicate evidence of its existence 

and remains generally uncooperative with the IAEA investigation. The covert nature of 

the program, the characteristics of the reactor, and Syria's extreme efforts to deny and 

destroy evidence of the reactor after its destruction are inconsistent with peaceful 

nuclear applications. 

IAEA inspectors in June 2008 took environmental samples at the AI Kibar site. The 

IAEA reported to the November 2008 Board of Governors that analysis of the AI Kibar 

environmental samples revealed a significant number of chemically processed natural 

uranium particles. The report also noted the Agency's assessment that the features of 

the AI Kibar building were similar to what may be found in connection with a reactor site, 

but stated that the IAEA could not exclude the possibility that the building was intended 

for non-nuclear use. 

The IAEA reported to the June 2011 Board of Governors that it is "very likely" that the 

building destroyed at the AI Kibar site was a nuclear reactor that should have been 

declared to the Agency. The Board of Governors found Syria in non-compliance with 

IAEA Safeguards Agreement and reported the finding to the UN Security Council and 

General Assembly. The IAEA is continuing its investigation of Syria's nuclear file. 

Ballistic Missile 

Syria possesses a large ballistic missile force that includes liquid-propellant Scud 

SRBMs and Scud-class variants such as Scud C and D. Syria also fields the SS-21 

solid-propellant SRBM. Syria remains dependent on foreign suppliers such as North 

Korea and Iran for some key ballistic missile technology; however, Syria has growing 

domestic capabilities and poses the risk of missile proliferation 

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Chemical and Biological 

Syria continued to seek dual-use technology from foreign sources during the reporting 

period. Syria has had a CW program for many years and has a stockpile of CW agents, 

which can be delivered by aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, and artillery rockets. We 

assess that Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW 

program, including precursor chemicals. 

Syria's biotechnical infrastructure is capable of supporting BW agent development. 

II. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism 

Several terrorist groups, particularly ai-Qa'ida and ai-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, 

probably remain interested in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 

capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. A number of the 33 US 

Department of State-designated foreign terrorist organizations worldwide have 

previously expressed interest in one or more of these capabilities, mostly focusing on 

low-level chemicals and toxins. Some terrorist groups see employing (CBRN) materials 

as a high-impact option for achieving their goals, as even if they do not produce many 

casualties they would have a psychological impact. We believe some of these 

terrorists aim to use these agents against Western targets, especially in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. We continue to be concerned about ai-Qa'ida's intent to conduct 

unconventional attacks against the United States. While counterterrorism actions have 

disrupted ai-Qa'ida's near-term efforts to develop a sophisticated CBRN attack 

capability, we judge the group is still intent on its acquisition. 

Ill. Key Suppliers 

North Korea and entities in Russia and China continue to sell technologies and 

components in the Middle East and South Asia that are dual use and could support 

WMD and missile programs. North Korea is among the world's leading suppliers of 

ballistic missiles and related technologies. Chinese companies have been associated 

with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and missile programs in Iran. 

The problem of secondary proliferation continues to expand, as more countries that 

previously imported weapons and technologies begin indigenous production and export 

of those systems. As their domestic capabilities grow, traditional recipients of WMD and 

missile technology also are capable of supplying technology and expertise. In addition, 

independent companies, scientists, and engineers may provide WMD- and missilerelated assistance. 

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China 

Chinese entities- including private and state-owned firms-continue to engage in 

WMD-related proliferation activities. The United States in recent years has imposed 

sanctions on several Chinese companies for sales of WMD- and ballistic missile-related 

technologies to states of concern. Although China has export control legislation that 

largely mirrors Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) controls, enforcement 

continues to fall short. Chinese entities- primarily private companies and individualscontinue to supply a variety of missile-related items to multiple customers, including Iran 

and Pakistan. 

China continues to offer for sale SRBMs that fall below the 300-kilometer range/500 

kilogram payload threshold for MTCR Category I systems. China's state-owned export 

firms remained a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan, 

which still represents China's most important partner in militar)i technology cooperation. 

North Korea 

North Korea remains committed to selling missiles and related technologies to foreign 

customers. Over the years, it has exported ballistic missile-related equipment, 

components, materials, technical expertise, and/or full missile systems to countries in 

the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. North Korea has demonstrated a 

willingness to sell complete ballistic missile systems and components that have enabled 

other states to acquire longer-range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been 

possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts. 

North Korea's relationships with Iran and Syria remain strong and we assess North 

Korea continues to seek new customers and reengage with previous customers. North 

Korea provided assistance to Syria's covert nuclear effort starting in the late 1990s and 

retains the potential for exporting nuclear materials or technology. 

Russia 

Russian entities remain key suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology to many 

civilian nuclear programs. Russia continues to provide assistance to Iran's civilian 

nuclear power program, by providing IAEA- safeguarded nuclear fuel and expertise to 

enable completion of Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. 

• Russia has been the primary provider of assistance to India's civilian nuclear 

programs. Russia has constructed two 1 ,000-megawatt light water nuclear 

reactors at Kudankulam. 

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China remains one of Russia's largest customers for nuclear-related equipment. Russia 

and China in 201 0 signed several contracts related to the planned construction of the 

third and fourth reactors at China's Russian-designed Tianwan nuclear power plant. 

Russian entities also remained a source of dual-use biotechnology equipment and 

related expertise. 

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