1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

OAKSTONE COMMUNITY SCHOOL, : 

 : Case No. 2:11-cv-1109 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 v. : 

 : 

CASSANDRA WILLIAMS, ET AL., : Magistrate Judge Abel 

 : 

 Defendants. :

 :

OPINION AND ORDER 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’, Cassandra Williams and Thomas Zraik, 

Joint Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) Plaintiff Oakstone Community School’s (“Oakstone”) 

Amended Complaint (Dkt. 9). Williams and Zraik move to dismiss Oakstone’s Amended 

Complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated 

below, Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

Plaintiff, Oakstone, is a public charter school located in Franklin County, Ohio. 

Defendant, Williams, is the parent of a former student at Oakstone. She lives in Franklin 

County, Ohio. Defendant, Zraik, is an attorney licensed by the Ohio Bar whose practice is based 

in Lucas County, Ohio. 

 In 2010, Williams served a complaint on Oakstone for due process pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415, a provision of “The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act” 

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 1 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>
2 

(“IDEA”), and the Ohio Rev. Code § 3323.05. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7). Williams, represented by 

Zraik as legal counsel, complained that Oakstone had denied her daughter a “free and 

appropriate public education” (“FAPE”). (Id. ¶¶ 5-7). Williams’s daughter, who is affected by 

autism, cerebellar cognitive affective disorder, and possibly other intellectual disabilities, 

attended Oakstone from August 2007 until June 2010. (Hearing Officer’s Decision (Dkt. 2-1) at 

6-7) Throughout her time at Oakstone, she continued to receive private speech and occupational 

therapies. (Hearing Officer’s Decision at 7). The State of Ohio’s Department of Education 

conducted a hearing on the matter which extended over six days in 2011: April 27 to 29, May 5, 

July 7, and August 22. (Id. at 1). 

 At the hearing, Williams sought the following relief: compensatory education including 

speech, occupational, and physical therapy, assistive technology, a multisensory reading 

program, a 1:1 tutor, and mandatory training for Oakstone personnel. (Id. at 3). At the hearing, 

Williams produced five witnesses who are professionals in the fields of education or mental 

health. (Id. at 5). Virginia Turi, a Speech-language Pathologist who had tested Williams’ 

daughter, testified that Williams’ daughter had moderate deficits in both expressive language 

skills and auditory processing skills. (Hearing Transcript Vol. 2 (Dkt. 17-1) at 154-55). Ann 

Ramsey, an Occupational Therapist who had tested Williams’s daughter, testified that 

Williams’s daughter had deficits in fine motor skills, bilateral coordination and balance, and 

whole-body coordination. (Id. at 201-202). Carolyn Patterson, a Ph.D. in psychology, also 

conducted a series of tests on Williams’s daughter. Dr. Patterson found her to be below average 

in multiple categories of intellectual ability, in some categories significantly below average. (Id.

at 113-114). Dr. Patterson also noted that her “academic achievement was below expectations.” 

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 2 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>
3 

(Id.) In 2009, Dr. Patterson conducted another round of tests on Williams’s daughter to 

determine her progress since 2007. The 2009 results showed Williams’s daughter had improved 

in a number of academic areas, but Dr. Patterson added that her scores had not improved as 

much as Dr. Patterson would expect. (Id. at 137). Based on those 2009 results, Dr. Patterson 

recommended, among other measures, “[e]xtensive speech and language evaluation with 

extensive therapy” as well as “occupational therapy.” (Id. at 132). 

 Ultimately, the Hearing Officer found that Williams’s daughter had made both academic 

and behavioral progress while enrolled in Oakstone. (Hearing Officer’s Decision at 8-10). 

Furthermore, the Hearing Officer found there was “no evidence” that Student required either 

occupational or physical therapy in order to benefit from her special education program at School 

District.” (Id. at 9). She found the speech therapy provided by Oakstone, though not of the type 

sought by Williams, complied with the IDEA. As a matter of law, the Hearing Officer concluded 

that the “individualized education plans” constructed by Oakstone met the IDEA requirements 

and that Williams’s daughter was not denied a FAPE during her enrollment at Oakstone. (Id. at 

17, 22). Oakstone also alleges that during the hearing Williams engaged in “improper” conduct, 

including “manipulating scheduling,” making “contradictory and incredible” statements, and 

interfering with the trial materials of Oakstone’s counsel. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 13) 

B. Procedural Background

 Following the decision by the Hearing Officer, Oakstone filed a Complaint against 

Williams and Zraik in this Court, under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3), seeking payment of fees it 

incurred during the administrative hearing process. In its subsequent Amended Complaint, 

which is the subject of Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss, Oakstone alleged the IDEA due 

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 3 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>
4 

process complaint brought by Williams and Zraik was “frivolous, unreasonable, and without 

foundation” and was brought for an “improper purpose.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-4). As a result, 

Oakstone sought $65,988.00 in attorney fees, $5691.93 in transcript fees, $20,238.02 in hearing 

officer fees, and $1,090.69 in litigation related expenses, for a total of $93,008.64. (Id. ¶17) 

 Williams and Zraik jointly moved to dismiss the entire action for failure to state a claim 

on which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, the Defendants 

contend, inter alia, that Oakstone’s allegations “do not amount to frivolousness or improper 

purpose.” The motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for decision. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A case may be dismissed if the complaint does not state a claim on which relief can be 

granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A “motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a test of the 

plaintiff’s cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff’s factual 

allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2005). Consequently, 

the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

accept all factual allegations as true, and make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 

party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 

434 (6th Cir. 2008); Murphy v. Sofamor Danek Gp.,Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997). 

The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by 

factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)). 

Although liberal, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires more than a bare assertion of legal 

conclusions to survive a motion to dismiss. Allard v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 4 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>
5 

1993) (citation omitted). The complaint must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the claim 

is, and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007)). While a complaint 

need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” its “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise 

a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 

(2007). A complaint that suggests “the mere possibility of misconduct” is insufficient; rather, 

the complaint must state “a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (citing Twombly, 

550 U.S at 556). 

While a court does not consider “matters outside of the pleadings” when testing the 

sufficiency of a claim, “‘[a] copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a 

part thereof for all purposes.’” Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c)). If this were not the case, “a plaintiff with a legally deficient 

claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by failing to attach a dispositive document upon 

which it relied.” Id. Furthermore, where extrinsic materials “add nothing new, but, in effect, 

reiterate the contents of the complaint itself,” they may be considered without converting a 

motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 

107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997). The chief concern when considering extrinsic materials on a 

motion to dismiss is that defendants seeking dismissal not suffer “any prejudicial surprise” as a 

result of the plaintiff including documents with its pleadings. Id. In the Sixth Circuit matters of 

public record may, at the court’s discretion, also be considered at the dismissal stage. Kostrzewa 

v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 644 (6th Cir. 2001). 

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 5 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>
6 

A. Plaintiff’s Attached Exhibits 

In deciding this motion to dismiss, Oakstone requested this Court consider both the Hearing 

Officer’s Decision (“Decision”) attached to the initial Complaint and the transcript of that 

hearing (“Transcript”) attached as an exhibit to its Response to Defendants’ Joint Motion to 

Dismiss. Oakstone relied on both the Decision and the Transcript in its Amended Complaint and 

referenced matters therein contained. Moreover, the Decision is a public record published by the 

Ohio Department of Education and the proceedings were made open to the public at the request 

of the Defendant, Williams. 

Here, there is no dispute as to the authenticity of the Decision or the Transcript. They merely 

lend specificity to the broad allegations made in the Amended Complaint. Furthermore, as 

explained below, the Defendants have not suffered “prejudicial surprise” as a result of the 

consideration of the Plaintiff’s exhibits. Therefore, the Court finds it proper to consider the 

Decision and the Transcript on the Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss. 

B. Attorney’s Fees Under IDEA 

Under “certain rare circumstances” the IDEA does allow a prevailing school district to 

collect fees. R.P. ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified School Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 

2011). The purpose of the IDEA is to “ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and 

parents of such children are protected.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B). Thus, the provisions 

granting attorney’s fees should not “improperly discourage[] [lawyers] from taking on 

potentially meritorious IDEA claims.” Id. at 1126. Nonetheless, a school district can recover 

attorney’s fees from an attorney who files a complaint that is “frivolous, unreasonable, or 

without foundation” or “continue[s] to litigate after the litigation clearly became frivolous, 

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 6 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>
7 

unreasonable, or without foundation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II). Additionally, a school 

district can recover from a parent, or her attorney, if suit was brought “for any improper purpose, 

such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). Oakstone seeks legal fees on both grounds. 

For a claim to have an “improper purpose” the claim must be both frivolous (without merit) 

and result from an improper motive. First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 

307 F.3d 501, 524 (6th Cir. 2002), R.P. ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified School Dist., 631 F.3d 

1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, if a claim is not frivolous, it necessarily does not have an 

improper purpose, even if resulting from an improper motive.1

 Clearly, a claim is not rendered 

frivolous merely because it is unsuccessful. R.P. ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified School Dist., 

631 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2011). When a parent has “a statutory remedy available that 

would arguably have provided additional educational benefit” to her child, “the fact that the 

arguments were not successful doesn’t make them frivolous.” Id. at 1126. To determine 

whether a claim is “frivolous” the Court must take into account the following factors, none of 

which alone is dispositive: whether the issue is one of first impression requiring judicial 

resolution, whether the controversy is sufficiently based upon a real threat of injury to the 

plaintiff, whether the trial court has made a finding that the suit was frivolous under the 

guidelines set forth in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) and whether 

 

1

 Contrary to Defendants’ contention in their Motion to Dismiss, the statement that “in [the 

Sixth] [C]ircuit attorneys’ fees may not be awarded to defendants where the plaintiff has asserted 

at least one non-frivolous claim,” is no longer the law of the Sixth Circuit following the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Fox v. Vice, 131 S.Ct. 2205 (2011). 

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 7 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>
8 

the record would support such a finding.2

 Garner v. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, 554 F.3d 

624, 636 (6th Cir. 2009), (quoting, Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 986 (6th Cir. 1984)). In 

Christianburg, the Supreme Court held a prevailing party could recover fees in a suit under Title 

VII only if the suit was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought 

in subjective bad faith.” Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. at 412, 421 (1978). 

When applying the Christianburg standard, the Sixth Circuit has found civil rights claims not 

“without foundation, frivolous, or unreasonable” when they are supported by “some evidence.” 

Smith v. Smythe-Cramer Co., 754 F.2d 180, 186 (6th Cir. 1985). 

While the claim Williams brought against Oakstone for the alleged denial of a FAPE to her 

daughter was unsuccessful, and perhaps not particularly strong, it was not frivolous. First, 

Williams sought relief that was available in the form of compensatory education. Moreover, 

Williams produced expert witnesses who testified her daughter would benefit from the relief 

sought. The Hearing Officer did not ultimately find Oakstone was obligated to provide 

Williams’ daughter with physical or occupational therapies, but a qualified Occupation Therapist 

testified Williams’ daughter greatly needed both those services. Similarly, the Hearing Officer 

found Williams’ daughter made progress in the area of speech during her time at Oakstone, but 

two experts, a Speech Therapist and psychologist, both testified she required more speech 

therapy than she received. The psychologist also testified that while Williams’ daughter had 

made progress in a number of academic areas from 2007 to 2009, her progress failed to meet the 

psychologist’s expectations based on the student’s potential. 

 

2

 The Ninth Circuit has observed that “the IDEA’s language granting attorney’s fees to 

prevailing defendants is nearly identical to the standard the Supreme Court developed in 

Christianburg.” R.P. ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified School Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 8 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>
9 

In summary, three expert witnesses who had personally tested Williams’ daughter testified 

she required forms of education Oakstone was not providing her. Thus, as did the plaintiff in 

R.P ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified School Dist., Williams made plausible arguments for an 

available remedy that would have provided educational benefit to her daughter. While this Court 

defers to the Hearing Officer’s decision that Oakstone provided Williams’ daughter with a 

FAPE, during the hearing Williams clearly surmounted the “some evidence” standard to 

demonstrate her claim was not frivolous. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer nowhere suggested 

the claim brought by Williams was frivolous or meritless. Since the claim was not frivolous, and 

was supported by evidence, it necessarily was not brought for an improper purpose. Williams 

believed her daughter required educational services that she was not receiving, experts supported 

those assertions, and Williams requested appropriate relief. 

Oakstone decided to incorporate the documents that demonstrated those facts into its 

pleadings and thus they have been properly considered by the Court. Oakstone’s allegations of 

the Defendants’ improper conduct during trial, accepted as true, do not alter the fact that 

Williams’ claim was not frivolous, nor does improper conduct at a hearing equate to an improper 

purpose in bringing that complaint in the first instance. The conduct of Williams and Zraik 

during the hearing may have been uncooperative, even obstructive, but it does not give rise to 

plausible claim on which relief can be granted to Oakstone under the IDEA. 

 

2011). 

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 9 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>
10 

V. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’, Cassandra Williams and Tom Zraik, Motion to 

Dismiss (Dkt. 10) Plaintiff’s, Oakstone, Amended Complaint (Dkt. 9) is GRANTED. This case 

is hereby DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/ Algenon L. Marbley 

 ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

DATED: September 13, 2012 

Case: 2:11-cv-01109-ALM-MRA Doc #: 55 Filed: 09/13/12 Page: 10 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>