IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES E. LUNDEEN, SR.,

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Action 2:11-cv-430

Judge Smith

Magistrate Judge King

JAMES S. RIDGE,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel,

brings this action for monetary damages against an Ohio Municipal

Court Judge in connection with the issuance of a search warrant. The

Complaint, Doc. No. 2, specifically alleges that defendant issued the

warrant under false pretenses and as a retaliatory measure, that

defendant thereafter “refused to hold a hearing” on plaintiff’s

“Motion to Quash” the search warrant and that defendant refused or

failed to order the return of items seized during the execution of

the warrant, thereby denying plaintiff his rights under the First,

Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. Plaintiff also appears to assert a claim of

obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. §1512(c). The Complaint names

defendant in both his official and personal capacities. Id. On

October 18, 2011, the United States Magistrate Judge issued a Report

and Recommendation recommending that defendant’s motion to dismiss,

Doc. Nos. 9, 11, be granted. Report and Recommendation, Doc. No. 16. 

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This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s objection to that

Report and Recommendation, Doc. No. 17, which the Court will consider

de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Plaintiff first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of jurisdiction

to review the legality of the decisions of a court of the State of

Ohio. Doc. No. 17, pp. 6-10. This doctrine takes its name from two

United States Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263

U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine applies to “cases brought

by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284

(2005). Although the doctrine bars federal litigation of claims

based on the state-court judgment itself, Rooker-Feldman does not

preclude actions based on “some other source of injury, such as a

third party’s actions.” Id. 

Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply

to the claims sought to be asserted in this action because plaintiff

asks this Court to review defendant’s alleged “willful neglect of

duty when there is not a legal option to do so” or alleged inaction

rather than defendant’s “judicial practices and decisions[.]” Doc.

No. 17, pp. 8-10. Specifically, plaintiff contends that defendant’s

“knowing and willful failure to take any action on the issue of

seized privileged materials,” which allegedly constituted an

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unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, forms the basis for plaintiff’s current

claims. Id. Under these circumstances, plaintiff argues, there “was

no state court judgment” and plaintiff had no opportunity to appeal. 

Id. at 9-10. This Court disagrees. Although plaintiff

characterizes defendant’s decisions as inaction, defendant’s

decisions to issue the search warrant and subsequent refusal to hold

a hearing and failure to order the return of seized, “privileged,”

documents is undeniably action by the state court. Accordingly, and

notwithstanding plaintiff’s characterization of these actions as

inaction or “willful neglect of duty,” the fact remains that

plaintiff is nevertheless asking this Court to review and reject

defendant’s decisions, which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids. 

See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.

Plaintiff’s insistence that defendant’s inaction or “neglect of

duty” was unlawful does not militate a different result. The source

of plaintiff’s alleged injury – the issuance of the search warrant

and subsequent refusal to hold a hearing and failure to order that

“privileged” documents be returned to plaintiff - remains the state

court judgment itself. The Court therefore agrees with the

Magistrate Judge that the Rooker-Feldman bars consideration by this

Court of plaintiff’s claims. 

Plaintiff next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that

defendant is absolutely immune from monetary liability by reason of

defendant’s judicial capacity. Doc. No. 17, pp. 10-20. Plaintiff

argues that defendant’s inaction – i.e., the decisions identified

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supra – is not a judicial act and therefore does not serve to

immunize defendant. Id. More specifically, plaintiff contends that

judicial immunity does not protect defendant where he lacked

authority to willfully neglect his duty and, therefore, aid and/or

abet the obstruction of justice. Id.

Once again, this Court disagrees. Absolute judicial immunity

protects judges from claims for monetary damages based on judicial

actions. DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 783 (6th Cir.

1999). As the Magistrate Judge previously explained, in determining

whether an act is “judicial,” a court must first consider whether the

act in question is a function that is “normally performed by a

judge.” Report and Recommendation, pp. 3-4 (citing Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). Under Ohio law, defendant has

the authority to issue search warrants. O.R.C. §2933.21(A); Ohio

Crim. R. 41(A); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991) (“The

issuance of a search warrant is unquestionably a judicial act”). 

Similarly, defendant’s decisions rendered in the underlying state

court proceeding and his resolution of pending motions are basic

judicial actions. The fact that plaintiff disagrees with those

decisions – including the refusal to order that allegedly privileged

documents be returned to plaintiff – and believes that defendant

acted unreasonably, does not mean that defendant’s decisions were not

judicial. Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial immunity protects

defendant from monetary liability - the only form of relief sought by

plaintiff in this action.

Finally, the Court notes that, to the extent that plaintiff

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asserts a claim of obstruction of justice based on 18 U.S.C.

§1512(c), such claim is without merit. See American Postal Worker’s

Union AFL-CIO, Detroit Local v. Independent Postal Sys. of America,

481 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1973) (noting that the general rule is that

a private right of action is not maintainable under a criminal

statute). 

Having carefully reviewed the record, the Report and

Recommendation, and plaintiff’s objections, the Court agrees with the

conclusions of the United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s

objections, Doc. No. 17, are DENIED. The Report and Recommendation,

Doc. No. 16, is ADOPTED and AFFIRMED. Defendant’s motion to dismiss,

Doc. Nos. 9, 11, is GRANTED. This action is hereby DISMISSED. 

The Clerk shall enter FINAL JUDGMENT. 

 s/George C. Smith George C. Smith, Judge

 United States District Court

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