Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Proposed Rules 17441 

a loophole that creates a security 

vulnerability that could potentially 

compromise public health and safety. 

The Proposed Amendments 

The petitioner requests that 10 CFR 

part 73 be amended to require that 

licensees implement procedures to 

ensure that: (1) When information 

becomes known to a licensee about an 

individual that would prevent that 

individual from gaining unescorted 

access to the protected area of a nuclear 

power plant, the licensee will 

implement measures to ensure the 

individual does not enter the protected 

area, whether escorted or not; and (2) 

when sufficient information is not 

available to a licensee about an 

individual to determine whether the 

criteria for unescorted access are 

satisfied, the licensee will implement 

measures to allow that individual to 

enter the protected area only when 

escorted at all times by an armed 

member of the security force who 

remains in periodic communication 

with security supervision. In the case of 

the first proposal, the petitioner believes 

that when it is known that a person’s 

trustworthiness and reliability do not 

meet the prescribed standards identified 

in § 73.56(b), access to protected areas, 

either escorted or unescorted, should be 

denied. In the case of the second 

proposal, the petitioner recognizes that 

it is impractical and burdensome to 

conduct background investigations of 

every person requiring access to a 

protected area, noting persons may need 

one-time access. With that in mind, the 

petitioner proposes granting these 

persons access to protected areas, but 

only when escorted by an armed 

member of the security force and only 

when this armed member is in periodic 

communication with security 

supervision. 

Conclusion 

The petitioner believes that current 

regulations create a security 

vulnerability that could potentially 

compromise public health and safety. 

The petitioner believes that its proposed 

amendments to 10 CFR part 73 will 

address this vulnerability in current 

regulations that enables persons who do 

not meet trustworthiness and reliability 

standards for unescorted access to 

protected areas of nuclear power plants 

permission to enter protected areas with 

an unarmed escort. Accordingly, the 

petitioner requests that the NRC amend 

its regulations related to the physical 

protection of nuclear power plants and 

materials as described previously in the 

section titled, ‘‘The Proposed 

Amendments.’’

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day 

of April 2007. 

Kenneth R. Hart, 

Acting Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E7–6644 Filed 4–6–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. NM366 Special Conditions No. 

25–07–03–SC] 

Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787–

8 Airplane; Composite Wing and Fuel 

Tank Structure—Fire Protection 

Requirements 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: This notice proposes special 

conditions for the Boeing Model 787–8 

airplane. This airplane will have novel 

or unusual design features when 

compared to the state of technology 

envisioned in the airworthiness 

standards for transport category 

airplanes. These novel or unusual 

design features are associated with 

composite materials chosen for the 

construction of the fuel tank skin and 

structure. For these design features, the 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for wing and fuel tank 

structure with respect to post-crash fire 

safety. These proposed special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

Additional special conditions will be 

issued for other novel or unusual design 

features of the Boeing Model 787–8 

airplanes. 

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before May 24, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposal 

may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal 

Aviation Administration, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, Attention: Rules 

Docket (ANM–113), Docket No. NM366, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; or delivered in 

duplicate to the Transport Airplane 

Directorate at the above address. All 

comments must be marked Docket No. 

NM366. Comments may be inspected in 

the Rules Docket weekdays, except 

Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mike Dostert, FAA, Propulsion/ 

Mechanical Systems, ANM–112, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2132; 

facsimile (425) 227–1320. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

special conditions, explain the reason 

for any recommended change, and 

include supporting data. We ask that 

you send us two copies of written 

comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive as well as a report 

summarizing each substantive public 

contact with FAA personnel concerning 

these proposed special conditions. The 

docket is available for public inspection 

before and after the comment closing 

date. If you wish to review the docket 

in person, go to the address in the 

ADDRESSES section of this notice 

between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change the proposed special 

conditions based on comments we 

receive. 

If you want the FAA to acknowledge 

receipt of your comments on this 

proposal, include with your comments 

a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on 

which the docket number appears. We 

will stamp the date on the postcard and 

mail it back to you. 

Background 

On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied 

for an FAA type certificate for its new 

Boeing Model 787–8 passenger airplane. 

The Boeing Model 787–8 airplane will 

be an all-new, two-engine jet transport 

airplane with a two-aisle cabin. The 

maximum takeoff weight will be 

476,000 pounds, with a maximum 

passenger count of 381 passengers. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, 

Boeing must show that Boeing Model 

787–8 airplanes (hereafter referred to as 

‘‘the 787’’) meet the applicable 

provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as 

amended by Amendments 25–1 through 

25–117, except §§ 25.809(a) and 25.812, 

which will remain at Amendment 25–


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSAL
17442 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

1The JAA is the Joint Aviation Authority of 

Europe and the JAR is its Joint Aviation 

Requirements, the equivalent of our Federal 

Aviation Regulations. In 2003, the European 

Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) was formed, and 

EASA is now the principal aviation regulatory 

agency in Europe. We intend to work with EASA 

to ensure that our rules are also harmonized with 

its Certification Specifications (CS). But since these 

efforts in developing harmonization of § 25.963 

occurred before EASA was formed, it was the JAA 

that was involved with them. 

115. If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for the 787 because of 

a novel or unusual design feature, 

special conditions are prescribed under 

provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the 787 must comply with 

the fuel vent and exhaust emission 

requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the 

noise certification requirements of part 

36. In addition, the FAA must issue a 

finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant 

to section 611 of Pub. L. 92–574, the 

‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’

Special conditions, as defined in 

§ 11.19, are issued in accordance with 

§ 11.38 and become part of the type 

certification basis in accordance with 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under the provisions of § 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The 787 will incorporate a number of 

novel or unusual design features. 

Because of rapid improvements in 

airplane technology, the applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. These 

proposed special conditions for the 787 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

The 787 will be the first large 

transport category airplane that will not 

be fabricated primarily with aluminum 

materials for the fuel tank structure. 

Instead it will use predominantly 

composite materials for the structural 

elements and skin of the wings and fuel 

tanks. Conventional airplanes with 

aluminum skin and structure provide a 

well understood level of safety during 

post-crash fire scenarios with respect to 

fuel tanks. This is based on service 

history and extensive full-scale fire 

testing. Composites may or may not 

have capabilities equivalent to 

aluminum, and current regulations do 

not provide objective performance 

requirements for wing and fuel tank 

structure with respect to post-crash fire 

safety. Because the use of composite 

structure is new and novel compared to 

the designs envisioned when the 

applicable regulations were written, 

additional substantiation by test and 

analysis will be required to show that 

the 787 provides an acceptable level of 

safety with respect to the performance 

of the wings and fuel tanks during an 

external fuel-fed fire. 

Although the FAA has previously 

approved fuel tanks made of composite 

materials that are located in the 

horizontal stabilizer of some airplanes, 

the composite wing structure of the 787 

will introduce a new fuel tank 

construction into service. Advisory 

Circular (AC) 20–107A, Composite 

Aircraft Structure, under the topic of 

flammability, states: ‘‘The existing 

requirements for flammability and fire 

protection of aircraft structure attempt 

to minimize the hazard to the occupants 

in the event ignition of flammable fluids 

or vapors occurs. The use of composite 

structure should not decrease this 

existing level of safety.’’ The relevance 

to the wing structure is that post-crash 

fire passenger survivability is dependent 

on the time available for passenger 

evacuation prior to fuel tank breach or 

structural failure. Structural failure can 

be a result of degradation in loadcarrying capability in the upper or lower 

wing surface caused by a fuel-fed 

ground fire. Structural failure can also 

be a result of over-pressurization caused 

by ignition of fuel vapors in the fuel 

tank. 

The FAA has historically developed 

rules with the assumption that the 

material of construction for wing and 

fuselage would be aluminum. As a 

representative case, § 25.963 was 

developed as a result of a large fuel-fed 

fire following the failures of fuel tank 

access doors caused by uncontained 

engine failures. During the subsequent 

Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 

Committee (ARAC) harmonization 

process with the JAA,1 the structures 

group attempted to harmonize the 

requirements of § 25.963 regarding the 

impact and fire resistance of fuel tank 

access panels. Both authorities 

recognized that existing aluminum wing 

structure provided an acceptable level 

of safety. Further rulemaking has not yet 

been pursued. 

As with previous Boeing airplane 

designs with under-wing mounted 

engines, the wing tanks and center tanks 

are located in proximity to the 

passengers and near the engines. Past 

experience indicates post crash 

survivability is greatly influenced by the 

size and intensity of any fire that occurs. 

The ability of aluminum wing surfaces 

wetted by fuel on their interior surface 

to withstand post-crash fire conditions 

has been demonstrated by tests 

conducted at the FAA Technical Center. 

These tests have verified adequate 

dissipation of heat across wetted 

aluminum fuel tank surfaces so that 

localized hot spots do not occur, thus 

minimizing the threat of explosion. This 

inherent capability of aluminum to 

dissipate heat also allows the wing 

lower surface to retain its load carrying 

characteristics during a fuel-fed ground 

fire. It significantly delays wing collapse 

or burn-through for a time interval that 

usually exceeds evacuation times. In 

addition, as an aluminum fuel tank is 

heated with significant quantities of fuel 

inside, fuel vapor accumulates in the 

ullage space, exceeding the upper 

flammability limit relatively quickly 

and thus reducing the threat of a fuel 

tank explosion prior to fuel tank burnthrough. Service history of conventional 

aluminum airplanes has shown that fuel 

tank explosions caused by ground fires 

have been rare on airplanes configured 

with flame arrestors in the fuel tank 

vent lines. Fuel tanks constructed with 

composite materials may or may not 

have equivalent capability. 

Current regulations were developed 

and have evolved under the assumption 

that wing construction would be of 

aluminum materials, which provide 

inherent properties. Current regulations 

may not be adequate when applied to 

airplanes constructed of different 

materials. Aluminum has the following 

properties with respect to fuel tanks and 

fuel-fed external fires. 

• Aluminum is highly thermally 

conductive. It readily transmits the heat 

of a fuel-fed external fire to fuel in the 

tank. This has the benefit of rapidly 

driving the fuel tank ullage to exceed 

the upper flammability limit prior to 

burn-through of the fuel tank skin or 

heating of the wing upper surface above 

the auto-ignition temperature. This 

greatly reduces the threat of fuel tank 

explosion. 

• Aluminum panels at thicknesses 

previously used in wing lower surfaces 

of large transport category airplanes 

have been fire resistant as defined in 

CFR 14 part 1 and AC 20–135. 

• The heat capacity of aluminum and 

fuel will prevent burn-through or wing 

collapse for a time interval that will 

generally exceed the passenger 

evacuation time. 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSAL
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Proposed Rules 17443 

The extensive use of composite 

materials in the design of the 787 wing 

and fuel tank structure is considered a 

major change from conventional and 

traditional methods of construction. 

This will be the first large transport 

category airplane to be certificated with 

this level of composite material for these 

purposes. The applicable airworthiness 

regulations do not contain specific 

standards for post-crash fire safety 

performance of wing and fuel tank skin 

or structure. 

Discussion of Proposed Special 

Conditions 

In order to provide the same level of 

safety as exists with conventional 

airplane construction, Boeing must 

demonstrate that the 787 has sufficient 

post-crash survivability, in the event 

that the wings are exposed to a large 

fuel-fed fire, to enable occupants to 

safely evacuate. Factors in fuel tank 

survivability are the structural integrity 

of the wing and tank, flammability of 

the tank, burnthrough resistance of the 

wing skin, and the presence of autoignition threats during exposure to a 

fire. The FAA assessed post crash 

survival time during the adoption of 

amendment 25–111 for fuselage 

burnthrough protection. Studies 

conducted by and on behalf of the FAA 

indicated that, following a survivable 

accident, prevention of fuselage burnthrough for approximately 5 minutes 

can significantly enhance survivability. 

( See report numbers DOT/FAA/AR–99/ 

57 and DOT/FAA/AR–02/49.) Beyond 

five minutes, there is little benefit, due 

to the effects of the fuel fire itself. That 

assessment was carried out based on 

accidents involving airplanes with 

conventional fuel tanks, and 

considering the ability of ground 

personnel to rescue occupants. In 

addition, AC20–135 indicates that, 

when aluminum is used for fuel tanks, 

the tank should withstand the effects of 

fire for 5 minutes without failure. 

Therefore, to be consistent with existing 

capability and related requirements, the 

787 fuel tanks must be capable of 

resisting a post crash fire for at least 5 

minutes. In demonstrating compliance, 

Boeing must address a range of fuel 

loads from minimum to maximum, as 

well as any other critical fuel load. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these proposed 

special conditions are applicable to the 

787. Should Boeing apply at a later date 

for a change to the type certificate to 

include another model incorporating the 

same novel or unusual design features, 

these proposed special conditions 

would apply to that model as well 

under the provisions of § 21.101. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features of the 787. It 

is not a rule of general applicability, and 

it affects only the applicant that applied 

to the FAA for approval of these features 

on the airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

Special Conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Proposed Special Conditions 

Accordingly, the Administrator of the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

proposes the following special 

conditions as part of the type 

certification basis for the Boeing Model 

787–8 airplane. 

In addition to complying with part 25 

regulations governing the fire-safety 

performance of the fuel tanks, wings, and 

nacelle, the Boeing Model 787–8 must 

demonstrate acceptable post-crash 

survivability in the event the wings are 

exposed to a large fuel-fed ground fire. 

Boeing must demonstrate that the wing and 

fuel tank design can endure an external fuelfed pool fire for at least 5 minutes. This shall 

be demonstrated for minimum fuel loads (not 

less than reserve fuel levels) and maximum 

fuel loads (maximum range fuel quantities), 

and other identified critical fuel loads. 

Considerations shall include fuel tank 

flammability, burn-through resistance, wing 

structural strength retention properties, and 

auto-ignition threats during a ground fire 

event for the required time duration. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

30, 2007. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–6542 Filed 4–6–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–27806; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NM–287–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Dassault 

Model Mystere-Falcon 50 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This proposed 

AD results from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

* * * discovery of interferences between 

the power wire supplying the galley’s coffeemaker and the surrounding structure. These 

interferences might, by chafing and 

degrading the wire insulation, generate short 

circuits between the wire and the aircraft 

ground through the composite cabinet 

structure, without activation of the Circuit 

Breaker (C/B). Several hot spots may then be 

created and generate a large amount of thick 

smokes just behind the cockpit. 

The proposed AD would require 

actions that are intended to address the 

unsafe condition described in the MCAI. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by May 9, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to 

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–

0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov; or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, 

any comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Office (telephone (800) 647–

5227) is in the ADDRESSES section. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom 

Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSAL