IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

 EASTERN DIVISION

James Mobley, :

 Plaintiff, :

 v. : Case No. 2:11-cv-186

Director Gary C. Mohr, : JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY

 Magistrate Judge Kemp

 Defendant. :

 OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court for the screening of the

civil complaint filed by plaintiff, James Mobley, a state

prisoner confined at the Madison Correctional Institution. 

Although Mr. Mobley has paid the filing fee in full, the Court is

required by statute (28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2), §1915A) to screen the

complaint before service of process occurs to determine if it is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, or states a claim against a person who is immune

from suit. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th

Cir. 1997) (“A district court is required to screen all civil

cases brought by prisoners, regardless of whether the inmate paid

the full filing fee, is a pauper, is pro se, or is represented by

counsel as the statute does not differentiate between various

civil actions brought by prisoners”). 

On March 16, 2011, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation (#4) which recommended that this action be

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) and 1915A for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On April 20,

2011, Mr. Mobley filed an objection to the Report and

Recommendation. Also, since the filing of the Report and

Recommendation, Mr. Mobley has filed thirteen “Motion[s] to Enter

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Additional Attachments.” On August 8, 2011, Mr. Mobley filed a

“Motion for Ruling by District Judge in 1983 Civil Complaint.” 

For the following reasons, the Court will overrule Mr. Mobley’s

objection (#8) and adopt the Report and Recommendation in its

entirety. Further, Mr. Mobley’s various motions will be denied.

I. Standard of Review

When objections are received to a report and recommendation

on a dispositive matter, the District Judge “must determine de

novo any part of the Magistrate Judge’s disposition that has been

properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After review,

the District Judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended

disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to

the Magistrate Judge with instructions.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1)(C). 

II. The Report and Recommendation

As explained by the Magistrate Judge in the Report and

Recommendation, Mr. Mobley filed a form complaint with

approximately fifty pages of attachments. Mr. Mobley

specifically named as a defendant only Gary Mohr, the Director of

the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and listed

other defendants as “Staff under the direct supervision of the

director Gary C. Mohr of the State of Ohio D.R. & C. (L.O.C.I.,

MaCI).” Mr. Mobley did not set forth any specific cause of

action in his form complaint but requested that the Court “view

all documents and determine if of [sic] the documents shows any

violation ....” The Magistrate Judge reviewed the documents

attached to the form complaint and described them as follows:

The documents consist mostly of grievances which Mr.

Mobley filed about his treatment while in isolation,

including a number of times when he was unable to turn

off the lights in his cell. They also include one

appeal of a Rules Infraction Board conviction to

Director Mohr, who affirmed the conviction. It appears

that the conviction was for violations of two prison

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rules, although the paperwork attached to the complaint

does not state the substance either of those rules or

what Mr. Mobley allegedly did to violate them. Mr.

Mobley’s exhibits show that the conviction was upheld

both by the warden of Mr. Mobley’s institution and by

Director Mohr. 

Construing Mr. Mobley’s pro se complaint liberally and

considering it under the standards set forth in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) and See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the Magistrate Judge concluded that

a claim upon which relief could be granted had not been stated

against Director Mohr. The Magistrate Judge found that the only

conduct attributable to Director Mohr was the affirmance of Mr.

Mobley’s RIB conviction. Although the Magistrate Judge

recognized that, under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), a

defendant can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violating

an inmate’s due process rights in connection with prison

discipline if that discipline imposes an “atypical and

significant hardship,” he noted that Mr. Mobley had failed to

identify any circumstances surrounding the RIB appeal which might

indicate a due process violation. For example, the Magistrate

Judge noted that Mr. Mobley failed to include any allegations

relating to the conduct leading to the conviction, the

constitutional rights violated, or the punishment he received. 

Absent any such allegations, the Magistrate Judge concluded that

Mr. Mobley had failed to provide enough facts to support a claim

for recovery from Mr. Mohr on a due process or other

constitutional theory relating to the RIB conviction. 

The Magistrate Judge also declined Mr. Mobley’s invitation

to examine his numerous documents in order to locate a

constitutional claim, relying on both Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and

Mays v. Sundquist, 103 F.3d 130 (6th Cir. 1996)

(unreported)(court properly dismissed complaint which “asked the

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federal courts to review all amendments to the state’s sentencing

laws which were passed between 1970 and 1995" because such a

complaint is too vague”). Moreover, the Magistrate Judge, citing

to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984), held

that, even if the attachments to Mr. Mobley’s complaint included

information suggesting a constitutional violation, Director Mohr

could not be held liable because it did not appear that he was

directly involved in the matters addressed by those grievances.

III. Mr. Mobley’ Objection and Other Filings

Mr. Mobley’s objection to the Report and Recommendation is a

one-page, hand-written document which states, in its entirety:

Plaintiff comes before this Honorable Court with

this motion to object to the Report and Recommendations

of Magistrate Judge Terrence P Kemp. Plaintiff request

this Honorable Court to review the case above. 

Plaintiff has been placed in segregation of violating

false institution rules on 17 Apr 11. Plaintiff will

forward additional attachments to this Honorable Court

when Plaintiff is released of segregation of this 3rd

time here a Madison Correction Institution and 9th time

overall since mid-April 2010.

Prior to filing his objection, Mr. Mobley filed two “motions

to enter additional attachments” (##6 and 7) and after filing his

objection he filed eleven more such motions. (##10-13, 15-19, and

21). Taken together, these “motions,” with attachments, total

188 pages. Nowhere in any of his “motions” nor in the

attachments does Mr. Mobley address any portion of the Report and

Recommendation. Instead, these motions appear to be an attempt

by Mr. Mobley to submit more information to the Court of the same

nature as the information attached to the complaint and reviewed

by the Magistrate Judge. 

The final motion filed by Mr. Mobley is a “motion for ruling

by a District Judge in 1983 Civil Complaint” (#22). As with his

other filings, nowhere in this motion does Mr. Mobley address any

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portion of the Report and Recommendation. Rather, through this

motion, Mr. Mobley seeks judgment in his favor because the

defendants have failed to respond to his complaint.

IV. Analyis

While objections to a report and recommendation are reviewed

de novo, “[o]verly general objections do not satisfy the

objection requirement.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725

(6th Cir. 2006); see also Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[a] general

objection to the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same

effects as would a failure to object.”) Rather, “[t]he

objections must be clear enough to enable the district court to

discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” 

Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). Objections

that merely dispute the magistrate judge’s recommendation but do

not set forth specific findings believed to have been made in

error are considered too general. Spencer, 449 F.3d at 725. 

Further, “the failure to file specific objections to a

magistrate’s report constitutes a waiver of those objections.” 

Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Here, at best, Mr. Mobley’s objection can be characterized

as a general objection to the entirety of the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation. The objection itself does not address

any specific portion of the Magistrate Judge’s decision and,

although, it suggests that Mr. Mobley may be intending to provide

additional information, the voluminous additional information 

provided also does not address any portion of that decision. As

such, it fails to meet the objection requirement and has the same

effect as a failure to object. See Spencer, supra; Howard,

supra; see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (failure

to specifically object to any portion of the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation constitutes a waiver of the right to

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object.) Consequently, the Court need not conduct a de novo

review of any portion of the Magistrate Judge’s decision and will

affirm the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. See Mira

v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986)(per curiam)(the

district court need not provide de novo review where objections

are too general because the burden is on the parties to identify

the portions of the report and recommendation for specific

consideration). 

With respect to Mr. Mobley’s thirteen motions to include 

additional attachments, he does not state specifically the relief

he is requesting by filing them. He does make the general

statement in many of them that he requests the Court to “view”

and “consider” the information in this case. To the extent that

Mr. Mobley may be attempting to amend his complaint, because he

is a prisoner whose complaint is subject to the initial screening

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, no amendments to the complaint are

permitted in order to cure pleading deficiencies which are

revealed by that screening. From its earliest interpretation of

the PLRA, the Court of Appeals has said as much. McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997). That rule

has been consistently followed. See, e.g., Reagan v. Hull, 99

Fed. Appx. 734, *1 (6th Cir. June 3, 2004) (“Since [the]

complaint failed to state a claim for relief at the moment of

filing, the dismissal of the complaint prior to amendment was

appropriate”); Napier v. Kerns, 2009 WL 464453, *3 (S.D. Ohio

February 23, 2009) (“the Court [does not] have discretion to

permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to avoid sua sponte

dismissal”). Consequently, the Court cannot consider the

information in the additional attachments as Mr. Mobley requests

and his thirteen motions will be denied. It is only the adequacy

of the initial complaint which is at issue here. The Court, like

the Magistrate Judge, finds that complaint inadequate. 

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Therefore, dismissal is appropriate. See Brown v. Mason, Case

No. 2:10-cv-783, 2011 WL 1703974 (S.D. Ohio May 4, 2011); Brown

v. Hurwood, Case No. 2:10-cv-880, 2011 WL 63591 (S.D. Ohio

January 6, 2011). 

Finally, in his motion for “a ruling by a district judge,” 

Mr. Mobley states that the defendants were served with the

complaint on March 18, 2011, and have not responded. Based on

these statements, Mr. Mobley appears to be requesting that a

default judgment be entered against the defendants for their

failure to respond to the complaint. A default judgment cannot

be entered prior to an entry of default. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a)

permits an entry of default “[w]hen a party against whom

affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise

defend.” Because in screening this case the Magistrate Judge

recommended that Mr. Mobley’s complaint be dismissed, defendants

have not been served with the complaint. Therefore, they have

not been required to plead or otherwise defend in response to Mr.

Mobley’s complaint. As a result, they are not in default. 

Consequently, the motion for a ruling by a district judge will be

denied. 

III.

For all of the reasons stated above, the Court overrules

plaintiff’s objection and ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation

(#4) in its entirety. This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) and 1915A for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s remaining motions (##

6,7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21 and 22) are

DENIED. The Clerk is directed to send a copy of the complaint

and this order to the defendant. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Algenon L. Marbley 

Algenon L. Marbley

 United States District Judge

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