abdomen (a shallow stab wound and a nick to her intestine) and a stab 

wound to her thumb were consistent with her claims of self-defense, and 

(4) her multiple statements to the police that the victim stabbed her and 

she acted in self-defense. 

To secure an indictment, the State must present sufficient 

evidence showing probable cause that the accused committed the alleged 

offense. Sheriff v. Burcham, 124 Nev. 1247, 1258, 198 P.3d 326, 333 

(2008). That probable cause determination "may be based on slight, even 

'marginal' evidence." Sheriff v. Hodes, 96 Nev. 184, 186, 606 P.2d 178, 180 

(1980). The grand jury is limited to receiving "none but legal evidence, 

and the best evidence in degree, to the exclusion of hearsay or secondary 

evidence." NRS 172.135(2). And, while "the State is not required to 

negate all inferences which might explain [an accused's] conduct," Kinsey 

v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 361, 363, 487 P.2d 340, 341 (1971), it is obligated to 

present to the grand jury any known evidence that "will explain away the 

charge." NRS 172.145(2). The phrase "explain away the charge" within 

the context of a grand jury proceeding means explain away the slight or 

marginal evidence supporting at least one element of the charge. See 

State v. Cameron, 113 P.3d 687. 690 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (ascribing a 

narrow definition to exculpatory evidence that strikes a balance between 

the grand jury's function to "authorize the trial of a defendant when the 

government has established a probability of the defendant's guilt" and to 

shield an accused from an unjust prosecution) rev'd on other grounds, 171 

P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2007); Cathey U. State, 60 P.3d 192, 195 (Alaska Ct. 

App. 2002) (explaining that the prosecution's obligation to apprise the 

grand jury of exculpatory evidence embraces only "evidence that tends, in 

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and of itself, to negate the defendant's guilt" (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); see also Sheriff v. Frank, 103 Nev. 160, 165, 734 P.2d 1241, 1244 

(1987) (recognizing that the grand jury's mission is "to clear the innocent, 

no less than to bring to trial those who may be guilty" (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

Petitioner argues that statements in her 911 call and to a 

neighbor that the victim stabbed her satisfy the excited-utterance 

exception to the hearsay rule, see NRS 51.095 (providing that "[a] 

statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the 

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 

condition is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule"), and therefore could 

be considered by the grand jury. Even accepting that premise, we 

conclude that those statements are not exculpatory under NRS 172.145(2), 

as they do not explain away the charges. Neither does medical evidence 

regarding petitioner's injuries. Moreover, the grand jury was presented 

with evidence that she sustained stab wounds to her abdomen and thumb. 

Petitioner's statements in a 911 call and to a neighbor do not in and of 

themselves explain away or negate the slight or marginal evidence 

supporting the elements of the charge. Evidence that the victim stabbed 

petitioner, alone, would not preclude a probable cause determination that 

petitioner committed first-degree murder. See NRS 200.030(1) (defining 

first-degree murder, in relevant part, as a "willful, deliberate and 

premeditated killing"). Further, petitioner's non-life-threatening stab 

wounds do not explain away the charge as those wounds could have been 

inflicted by means other than self-defense. Finally, self-exculpating 

statements are inherently suspect in their trustworthiness, see Williamson 

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v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600 (1994) (observing that "[s]elfexculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people are most likely 

to make even when they are false"). 

Regarding petitioner's statements to the police that the victim 

stabbed her and that she acted in self-defense, those statements are not 

exculpatory for the reasons explained above. See United States v. 

Camacho, 163 F. Supp. 2d 287, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Statements to police 

and prosecutors by criminal suspects or defendants are not considered to 

be reliable, because the declarant generally wants to obtain favorable 

treatment; [defendant's] statements to the police were especially 

unreliable because they were self-exculpatory."). In addition, they 

constitute hearsay and she has not demonstrated that they are admissible 

under any exception to the hearsay rule. See 51.035; United States v. 

Ferrell, No. 11 CR 595, 2013 WL 2636108, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2013) 

(concluding that "[a] party's self-serving, exculpatory, out-of-court 

statement generally constitutes inadmissible hearsay" and therefore 

"[d]efendant[ ] may only elicit testimony regarding any exculpatory 

statements if there is an applicable exception to the hearsay rule that 

would permit their admission"); People v. Mitchell, 583 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 

(App. Div. 1992) (concluding that defendant's self-serving exculpatory 

statements to the police were inadmissible hearsay and because the grand 

jury may only consider evidence admissible at trial, the prosecution was 

not required to present the statements to the grand jury), aff'd, 626 

N.E.2d 630 (N.Y. 1993). 

Because we conclude that petitioner has not demonstrated 

that the district court manifestly abused its discretion or exercised its 

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Parraguirre Saitta 

discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, see State v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. , 267 P.3d 777, 780 

(2011) (defining manifest abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious 

exercise of discretion), we 

ORDER the petition DENIED.' 

'Petitioner relies on our decision in Schuster Ti. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, 123 Nev. 187, 160 P.3d 873 (2007), to support her claim the 

prosecution was required to present evidence of self-defense to the grand 

jury. However, in that case, we were faced with the question of whether a 

prosecutor must explain the law of self-defense to the grand jury and 

concluded that NRS 172.145(2) imposed no such obligation. Our holding 

was premised on the fact that the prosecutor introduced the defendant's 

videotaped interview in which the defendant made inculpatory statements 

but also told the police that he fired a gun at the victim because the victim 

was "coming at him" and that he did not intend to shoot the victim. We 

have not expressly addressed whether a prosecutor's obligation under NRS 

172.145(2) to present exculpatory evidence encompasses evidence of selfdefense, and, because we conclude that the challenged evidence here is not 

exculpatory, we need not resolve that question. 

We deny petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief 

and an Additional Appendix in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 

The clerk shall reject the documents received via E flex on May 28, 2014. 

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J. 
cc: Hon. Stefany Miley, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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