UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL CHARLES PILOT, Petitioner,

v. COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, Personally and Individually; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, Officially; CHANNING D. PHILLIPS, Officially , Respondents. Case No. 17-cv-01337 (CRC)

OPINION AND ORDER Pro Se Plaintiff Michael Pilot has an unfortunate history of p ersonally suing District Court Judges whose rulings he dislik es. See, e.g., Pilot v. Goldsmit h, 17-cv-09929, (D.D.C. May 23, 2017) (CKK) (suit against U.S. Dis trict Judge Mark Goldsmith of the Eastern Distr ict of Michigan, among other officials). Earlier this year, Judge Kollar-Kotell y of this Court denied Pilot’s habeas petition because none of the respondents named in that case had custody over Pilot, and a proper habeas petition must be directe d at “the person with the abilit y to produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court[,]” R umsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242) (internal quotation marks omitted). See May 23, 2017 M emorandum Opinion and Transfer Order, 17-cv-09929, ECF No. 4. Judge K ollar-Kotelly then trans ferred the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern D istrict of Michi gan, where Pilo t’s original habea s petition was still pending. Id. Judge Kollar-Kotell y subsequently denied Pilot’s motion for leave to file a motion requesting reversal of the t ransfer order. Id., ECF Nos. 6–7.2 Less than two months later, Pilo t filed the present action in this Court against Judge KollarKotelly, in her personal and indi vidual capacity; United States Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, III, in his official cap acity; and the Acting United States Attorney Channing D. Phillips, in his official capacity. See July 6, 2017 Compl., 17-cv-01337, E CF No. 1. Pilot’s 94-page complaint raises a series of largely incom prehensible claims, but it appe ars at bottom to seek a declaratory judgment vacating the transfer or der and money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 85–86. Pilot has since moved to convene a three-judge panel under 28 U .S.C. § 2284 to review the transfer order. See Pl.’s Mot. Convene Three-Judge Court, ECF No. 3. The Court has the authority t o dismiss a case “at any time” if it determines that the complaint is (1) frivolous, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against an i mmune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 915(e)(2). All thre e grounds apply here and lead the Court to deny P ilot’s motion, dismiss the cas e in its entirety, and quash the summons that have been issued t o be served upon the defendants. First, the case is frivolous. When a judge issues an order aga inst him, Pilot’s proven patter n is to file a complaint with a new judge naming the prior judge as a defendant. Not only are thes e suits a backdoor attempt to relitigate his already decided cla ims, they are also a complete waste of judicial resources. Second, “[a]s a general principle, it is well se ttled that tran sfer orders are not appealable final orders.” Ukiah Adventist Hosp. v. F.T.C., 981 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). While Pilot ha s not styled his complaint a s an appeal from the transfer order, what he seeks is essentially tha t—a three-judge panel to review and reverse the order. Furthermore, Pilot has failed to specify any s tatute authorizing a three-jud ge court to be convened for this purpose. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (“A district court of three j udges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress ” (emphasis added)). Pilot likewise fails to state claims on3 which relief may be granted under § 1983. He asserts, for exam ple, that Judge Kollar-Kotelly acted in gross negligence by “[c]onti nuing to engage in improper abus ive tactics as to the Removal of action” and “[i]gnoring common sen se and federal common law[,]” Compl. 49–50; defamed him by publishing the transfer order , see id. at 54; and conspired wit h Judge Goldsmith to violate state and federal law, see id. Nowhere does Pilot offer facts to support these accusations or evidence that Judge Kollar-Kotelly a t any time acted outside of her official duties as a judge. Beca use “[Pilot’s] Complaint relies substantiall y, if not entirely, on naked asser tions devoid of further factual enhancement,” Ilaw v. Dep’t of Justice, 148 F. Supp. 3d 24, 37 (D.D.C. 2015) (CKK), he has failed to state a claim. Finally, the case must be dismissed on immunity grounds. As t o the claims against Judge Kollar-Kotelly, “[j]udges enjoy abs olute judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in [their] judici al capacity, unless [the] action s are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Sindr am v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (i nternal citation omitted). Such “immunity is an immunity from suit, not just fr om ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. W aco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Pilot name d Judge Kollar-Kotelly as a respondent and attached her trans fer order to his complaint. “ Absolute immunity applies here because Judge [Kollar-Kotelly] was acting in her judicial capac ity when she made the decisions challenged by [Pilot].” I law, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 34. And Pilo t does not put forward any evidence that jurisdiction was lacking i n the previous action. Therefor e, Judge Kollar-Kotelly enjoys absolute immunity and the Court will accordingly dismiss the cl aims against her. Additionally, the Court lacks jurisdiction over claims against Attorney General Sessions and U.S. Attorney Phillips and so must dismiss those claims under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) for lack of subject-ma tter jurisdiction. Insofar as P ilot sued them in their official capacity,4 the lawsuit is “effectively aga inst the United States, and the complaint does not cite any statutory grant of jurisdiction to overcome sovereign immunity[,]” which is a jurisdictional question. See Hunter v. Obama, 2014 WL 1759513, a t *1 (D.D.C. April 8, 2014) (citing FDCI v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)). 1 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that [3] Plaintiff’s Motion t o Convene Three-Judge Court is DENIED . It is further
ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE . It is further
ORDERED that any summons issued i n this case be quashed.
SO ORDERED.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge Date: July 18, 2017

1 Typically, once the Court finds that jurisdiction is lacking, it would have no need to reach the other grounds for dismissal , such as Pilot’s failure to sta te a claim or the fri volity of his suit. However, out of an abundance of c aution and given the perplexin g nature of the complaint and Pilot’s pattern of abusing the j udicial system, the Court finds it worthwhile to discuss the multiple justifications for di smissing the case.