IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

County of Northumberland :

:

v. :

:

Township of Coal, : No. 982 C.D. 2021

Appellant : Argued: September 15, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: October 19, 2022

The Township of Coal (Township) appeals from the Northumberland 

County (County) Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) August 23, 2021 order granting 

the County’s Summary Judgment Motion (Motion) and directing the Township to 

refund the County $267,320.98. There are two issues before this Court: (1) whether 

the County complied with Section 1 of the Act commonly referred to as the Refund

Act (Refund Act)1 by submitting a verified claim to the Township before filing its 

assumpsit action; and (2) whether the trial court properly concluded that the County 

had met its burden of establishing that the Township’s Permit Fee Ordinance was 

unreasonable. After review, this Court affirms.

On August 9, 2017, the County submitted building applications to the 

Township to convert an existing juvenile detention facility into a County prison after 

the County’s prison was destroyed by a fire (Project). On August 11, 2017, the 

Township sent the County an invoice (Invoice) demanding $161,724.00 for “State 

1 Act of May 21, 1943, P.L. 349, as amended, 72 P.S. § 5566b.
2

Inspections [and] Plan Review[.]” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 29a. The Invoice 

also sought an additional $220,801.00 for a “Coal Township Permit” (Coal 

Township Permit) pursuant to Township Ordinance 408 (Ordinance).

2

 Id.

On August 18, 2017, the County paid the Township $161,724.00. By 

September 6, 2017 correspondence, the Township acknowledged receipt of the 

County’s payment, but demanded the outstanding $220,801.00 balance by close of 

business on September 13, 2017, or the Township would issue a stop work notice on 

September 14, 2017. See R.R. at 32a. By September 12, 2017 letter (September 12, 

2017 Letter), County Chief Clerk Maryrose McCarthy (McCarthy) paid the 

Township $220,801.00 under protest and also demanded proof that the Township 

had incurred the costs purportedly represented by the previously submitted 

$161,724.00 fee. See R.R. at 35a-36a. 

The September 12, 2017 Letter provided, in pertinent part:

First, in regard to the payment previously made by 

the County [] to the Township [] in the amount of

$161,724[.00], I am hereby requesting proof that the 

Township actually incurred, or will be charged, the costs 

as set forth in the August 11, 2017 Invoice to the County 

for “State Inspections [and] Plan Review.”

Secondly, regardless of whether the charges related 

to the $161,724[.00] are legitimate, I am also hereby 

requesting proof that the $220,801.00 fee, nebulously 

referred to in the Township’s [I]nvoice as the Coal 

Township Permit fee, in any way relates to the costs to the 

Township in performing services related to the permitting 

of the prison.

2 Effective March 9, 2006, Township Ordinance 408 amended Township Ordinance Nos. 

A-282 and A-393 to provide: “All building fees for new structures or the renovation or 

rehabilitation of an existing structure shall be 1% of the total construction estimate but not less 

than $10[.00] for the first $1,000[.00]. There shall be no maximum fee.” Township of Coal, 

Northumberland Cnty., Pa. Ordinance § 408 (2006); R.R. at 266a. The $220,801.00 fee was 1% 

of the estimated $22,080,100.00 Project cost.
3

I would refer you to the following Pennsylvania 

Commonwealth Court cases on the subject: Raum v. Board 

of Sup[ervisors] of Tredyffrin [Township], 370 A.2d 777 

([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1976); Bucks Cove Rod & Gun Club, Inc.

v. Texas [Township] Zoning [Hearing Board (Pa. Cmwlth. 

No. 2666 C.D. 2010, filed Sept. 14, 2011)]; Martin Media 

v. Hempfield [Township] Zoning Hearing [Board], 671 

A.2d 1211 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1996); Skepton v. Borough of 

Wilson, [755 A.2d 1267] ([Pa.] 2000) . . . . These cases all 

clearly state that a municipality may not use its power to 

charge fees for issuing licenses or permits for the purpose 

of raising revenue and, further, that the fees charged must 

be directly related to the costs incurred by the municipality 

in issuing the permit. Any amounts collected in excess of

the Township’s costs will be considered an unauthorized 

tax and the County will be permitted to recoup these 

amounts, plus interest. I would point out that your 

[Township] Board [of Commissioners’] member’s 

comments in the local newspaper would seem to belie any 

argument that the fees the Township has charged are in 

any way related to the Township’s actual costs.

If I have not received the documentation requested 

herein, on or before the close of business on September 20, 

2017, please be advised that the County will commence 

action against the Township for reimbursement of all fees 

over and above the Township’s actual costs. In the event 

that the Township wishes to revise its permit fee, based 

upon the aforementioned, please feel free to send your 

revised fee to my attention.

R.R. at 35a-36a.

On January 15, 2018, the County filed an action in the trial court 

seeking declaratory judgment that the Township’s building fees were unreasonable 

and/or unenforceable and that the building permit fees charged were unconstitutional 

and/or legally invalid (Complaint). Further, the County sought relief in assumpsit, 

requesting a refund of building fees, permit fees, inspection fees or other fees in 

excess of the Township’s actual expense of administering the building permit 

process, plus interest.
4

On February 16, 2018, the Township filed preliminary objections to the 

County’s Complaint. Therein, the Township alleged, inter alia, that the Complaint 

should be dismissed because the County did not submit to the Township “a written 

and verified claim” before filing its action in assumpsit, as required by Section 1(a)

of the Refund Act. 72 P.S. § 5566b(a). The County filed its response to the 

preliminary objections. On April 25, 2018, the trial court overruled the Township’s 

preliminary objections, concluding, in pertinent part, that given the County’s 

September 12, 2017 Letter, the Township had failed to demonstrate that the County

did not satisfy Section 1(a) of the Refund Act’s “written and verified claim” 

requirement. 72 P.S. § 5566b(a); see R.R. at 73a-74a. 

On May 30, 2018, the Township filed its Answer, New Matter and a 

Contingent Counterclaim. On June 27, 2018, the County filed its Answer to the 

Township’s New Matter and Contingent Counterclaim. On August 30, 2018, the 

Township filed a Summary Judgment Motion, alleging that the County had failed to 

file a “written and verified claim for a refund of alleged overpayment for permits.” 

R.R. at 107a. On September 25, 2018, the County filed its response thereto. On 

December 17, 2018, the trial court denied the Township’s Summary Judgment 

Motion. See R.R. at 238a-239a.

On February 18, 2021, the County filed its Motion, alleging therein that 

no genuine issues of material fact remained with respect to the County’s right to a 

refund. On March 19, 2021, the Township filed its response. On August 23, 2021, 

the trial court granted the County’s Motion and directed the Township to refund the

County $267,320.98 plus statutory interest and costs. See R.R. at 383a. In its 

contemporaneous opinion, the trial court reasoned:

Building permit fees fall within the category of license 

fees and must be assessed commensurate with the expense 

of administering the permit. [See] 72 P.S. [§] 5566b; 
5

Skepton . . . , and Talley v. Commonwealth . . . , . . . 553 

A.2d 518 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1989). 

Presented at oral argument and attached to the [County’s] 

brief is evidence that Building Inspections Underwriters 

(B.I.U.), the entity the Township engaged to perform all 

inspections and reviews, actually discounted its charge to 

the Township, resulting in a total payment by the 

Township in the amount of $113,204.02. This appears to 

be unrefuted evidence. 

In a deposition with Robert M. Slaby, Jr. [(Slaby)], [] 

Township Manager, it is acknowledged that the Township 

performed no independent inspections, so the [trial] court 

is confronted with an assessed fee of $269,320.98 that 

cannot be justified by corresponding [T]ownship 

expenditures or expenses. The Township’s explanation is 

reduced to an argument that this amount was assessed to 

cover general administrative costs. In support of this 

assertion, they have provided no documentation; the [trial] 

court will concede, however, that they have the usual 

expenses attendant to running the office and will adjust the 

refund by $2[,]000.00, which the [trial] court considers

generous.

Trial Ct. Aug. 23, 2021 Op. at 2; R.R at 384a. On September 1, 2021, the Township 

appealed to this Court.3

The Township first contends that the County failed to satisfy the Refund 

Act’s mandatory requirement that it submit a “written and verified claim” before 

bringing suit, and argues that the trial court’s conclusion that the September 12, 2017 

Letter satisfied those requirements is erroneous. 72 P.S. § 5566b(a). The Township 

cites Stranahan v. County of Mercer, 697 A.2d 1049 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), to support 

its position that this Court must “narrowly construe [the Refund Act’s] statutory 

procedures and require the [County] to file for a refund before bringing an action in 

3

“An order of a trial court granting summary judgment may be disturbed by an appellate 

court only if the [trial] court committed an error of law . . . ; thus, our standard of review is de 

novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City of Pittsburgh, 

276 A.3d 878, 884 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (quoting Desher v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 212 A.3d 

1179, 1185 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)).
6

assumpsit.” Township Br. at 9 (quoting Stranahan, 697 A.2d at 1053) (emphasis 

omitted). The Township asserts that because the September 12, 2017 Letter did not 

explicitly request a refund, and was not verified, the trial court should have dismissed 

the action.

Section 1 of the Refund Act states in relevant part:

(a) Whenever any person or corporation of this 

Commonwealth has paid or caused to be paid, or hereafter 

pays or causes to be paid, into the treasury of any political 

subdivision, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or under 

protest, any taxes of any sort, license fees, penalties, fines 

or any other moneys to which the political subdivision is 

not legally entitled; then, in such cases, the proper 

authorities of the political subdivision, upon the filing with 

them of a written and verified claim for the refund of the 

payment, are hereby directed to make, out of budget 

appropriations of public funds, refund of such taxes, 

license fees, penalties, fines or other moneys to which the 

political subdivision is not legally entitled. Refunds of 

said moneys shall not be made, unless a written claim 

therefor is filed, with the political subdivision involved, 

within three years of payment thereof.

. . . .

(c)(1) Any taxpayer who has paid any tax money to which 

the political subdivision is not legally entitled shall receive 

interest on such sum of money. . . . 

72 P.S. § 5566b. Section 2 of the Refund Act provides:

In the event of refusal or failure on the part of authorities 

of the political subdivision involved to make any such 

refund of taxes, license fees, penalties, fines or other 

moneys to which the political subdivision is not legally 

entitled, or refusal or failure to pay interest as required by 

[S]ection 1 [of the Refund Act], then the aggrieved person 

or corporation shall have the right to bring suit for and 

recover any such taxes, interest, license fees, penalties, 

fines or other moneys to which the political subdivision is 

not legally entitled, subject to the limitation herein 

provided, by instituting an action in assumpsit in the court 
7

of common pleas of the county wherein such political 

subdivision is located.

72 P.S. § 5566c.

This Court addressed the Refund Act in FP Willow Ridge Associates, 

L.P. v. Allen Township, 166 A.3d 487 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Therein, an apartment 

complex owner (Willow Ridge) sought a sewer tapping fee refund from the 

township. Although Willow Ridge filed its complaint within three years of paying 

the fees, it did not file a claim for refund with the township within the three-year 

period following payment, as required by the Refund Act. The FP Willow Ridge

Court explained:

This Court has held that the Refund Act’s three-year 

provision is a statute of notification, not a statute of 

limitations. Borough of Malvern v. K.R.I. Corp., . . . 570 

A.2d 633, 636 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1990). “[A]bsent a 

showing of prejudice on the part of the municipality, a 

party’s failure to notify the municipality of a cause of 

action within a statutory time frame will not be a bar 

to such action.” Id.; see also City of Phila[.] v. Tax Rev[.]

Bd. of City of Phila[.], 901 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2006) (interpreting local counterpart of the Refund Act 

pertaining to taxes in the same manner).

Here, Willow Ridge did not technically file a claim for 

refund until May 14, 2014, which was over three years 

after Willow Ridge paid the [t]ownship [on March 31,

2011]. Although Willow Ridge filed a complaint on 

November 22, 2013, which was within the three-year 

period, a complaint does not constitute a “written and 

verified claim for the refund of the payment” for purposes 

of the Refund Act. By the plain language of the Refund 

Act, a claim must be filed as a prerequisite to filing suit.

[4]

See 72 P.S. § 5566c (“In the event of refusal or failure on 

the part of authorities of the political subdivision involved 

to make any such refund . . . , then the aggrieved person or 

corporation shall have the right to bring suit for and 

4 Notably, Willow Ridge’s written claim, submitted approximately six months after Willow 

Ridge filed its complaint, was itself unverified, but enclosed and referenced a copy of the verified 

complaint.
8

recover . . . .”). To conclude otherwise would invite 

unnecessary litigation in cases where a political 

subdivision may have every intention of issuing a refund 

upon proper presentation of a claim.

Notwithstanding, the [t]ownship was well aware that 

Willow Ridge disputed the assessment of tapping fees 

for its apartment complex within the three-year 

period. Willow Ridge expressed its intention to seek a 

reduction of tapping fees based on alternative capacity 

analysis for apartment dwellings when it sent its payment 

on March 30, 2011. . . . 

Although Willow Ridge’s efforts did not technically 

constitute a timely “written and verified claim for the 

refund of payment” for purposes of the Refund Act, 

[a]ppellees cannot profess surprise or prejudice. 

Appellees were well aware of Willow Ridge’s position 

and its desire to seek a reduction in tapping fees for its 

apartment complex. Under the circumstances here, 

Willow Ridge’s failure to file “a written and verified claim 

for the refund of the payment” within a three-year 

notification period does not operate as a bar to its Refund 

Act claim. 

FP Willow Ridge, 166 A.3d at 493-94 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

Based in part on FP Willow Ridge, the trial court rejected the 

Township’s arguments that the County had failed to adhere to the Refund Act’s 

procedures, reasoning:

On September 12, 2017, the County paid the [] Township 

Permit [f]ee but stated that [it] did so “under protest”. The 

County declared that the building fees, as assessed by the 

Township, were not permissible by law and demanded 

repayment of fees in excess of the actual amount of the 

costs incurred by the Township in issuance of the same. 

In its September 12, 2017 [L]etter, the County advised the 

Township that if it did not receive the requested 

documentation on fees and taxation, it would “commence 

action against the Township for reimbursement of all fees 

over and above the Township’s actual costs.” 

Furthermore, a [d]efendant cannot feign “surprise or 

prejudice” when the [d]efendant was well aware of the 
9

[p]laintiff’s position and desire to seek a reduction in fees. 

FP Willow Ridge . . . , 166 A.3d [at] 494 . . . .

Trial Ct. Apr. 25, 2018 Op. at 4-5; R.R. at 73a-74a. 

The Township argues that the trial court misconstrued FP Willow Ridge

by interpreting it to invalidate the statutorily-mandated written and verified claim 

requirement based on the Township’s awareness of the claim, rather than simply 

interpreting FP Willow Ridge to permit the submission of a written and verified 

claim beyond three years, while still requiring strict compliance with the 

requirements that a written and verified claim be submitted.

5

In particular, the 

Township claims the trial court ignored the FP Willow Ridge Court’s conclusion that 

“[b]y the plain language of the Refund Act, a claim must be filed as a prerequisite 

to filing suit,” id. at 493, and its declaration that “a complaint does not constitute a 

‘written and verified claim for the refund of the payment’ for purposes of the Refund 

Act.”6 Id. This Court disagrees.

The statutorily-mandated “written and verified claim” requirement’s 

purpose, 72 P.S. § 5566b(a), is “to notify a municipality that a claim may be pending 

against it[.]” Malvern, 570 A.2d at 636. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held 

that “the determination that an action should be barred for failure to comply with the 

notice statute must be coupled with a consideration of what if any prejudice resulted 

to the defendant.” Landis v. Phila., 369 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. Super. 1976); see also

5 This Court questions the practical consequences of accepting the Township’s argument. 

Even if this Court concluded that the September 12, 2017 Letter demanding justification for the 

fees imposed, and threatening legal action for reimbursement, did not constitute a claim, and/or 

the lack of verification invalidated the claim, this matter would not be put to rest. Here, the 

Township was aware of the County’s claim, within one month of the County’s initial payment. 

Thus, although it is now well beyond three years since the County’s initial payment, the Township 

would be hard pressed to establish prejudice, and, accordingly, the County would not be prohibited 

from filing its written and verified claim and again bringing an action in assumpsit. 

6 The Township disregards the fact that in FP Willow Ridge, Willow Ridge’s request for 

refund was not filed until after Willow Ridge instituted its legal action. Clearly, the FP Willow 

Ridge Court did not require strict compliance with the Refund Act’s notification provision.
10

Dubin v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 281 A.2d 711, 712 (Pa. Super. 1971) (with respect 

to notice filed one week beyond a statutory six-month notice requirement, the 

Superior Court, quoting the lower court, explained that the statute “is not a statute 

of limitations. It must be reasonably applied to effectuate its purpose and not to 

needlessly strike down just claims. . . . There is no question that the plaintiff has

substantially complied with the provisions . . . .”).

Here, within one month of the County’s initial August 18, 2017 

payment, the Township “was well aware” that the County disputed both fees. Trial 

Ct. Apr. 25, 2018 Op. at 5; R.R. at 74a. As noted by the trial court, the County’s 

September 12, 2017 Letter was unmistakably clear that the County believed the fees 

were unlawful, demanded justification therefor, and threatened legal action to 

recover fees in excess of the Township’s actual costs. In the September 17, 2017 

Letter, the County expressly claimed it was entitled to “recoup” the excess fees 

charged and threatened legal action seeking “reimbursement.”7 R.R. at 36a. Thus, 

the September 12, 2017 Letter unambiguously notified the Township “that a claim 

may be pending against it[.]”8 Malvern, 570 A.2d at 636. Approximately four

months after the deadline set for the Township’s response, the County filed the 

instant assumpsit action.

It is undisputed that the September 12, 2017 Letter was not verified.

9

 

However, in Donald B. Remmey, Inc. v. Centennial School District, 25 Pa. D. & C. 

7 The Refund Act does not set forth requirements for a “written . . . claim” and does not 

explicitly mandate that a written claim include the word refund. 72 P.S. § 5566b(a). 

8 The Township contends that the Refund Act’s language contemplates that payments may 

be made under protest, however, even in such cases, it requires an additional written and verified 

claim be submitted. Here, the County did far more than submit a payment under protest. It 

expressed that it was entitled to recoup the overpayments, sought documentation from the 

Township to justify its charges, and threatened litigation to obtain reimbursement.

9 The Refund Act does not define “verified claim[.]” 72 P.S. § 5566b(a). However, “[i]t 

is generally recognized . . . that for legal purposes verification means confirmation of the truth of 

a statement by oath or affirmation.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 369 A.2d 733, 734 (Pa. Super. 
11

3d 397 (1982), aff’d, Centennial School District v. Donald B. Remmey, Inc., 459 

A.2d 915 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (Remmey II), the trial court determined that such lack 

of verification did not preclude recovery. The plaintiff therein brought an action 

against Centennial School District (District) for a refund of a business privilege tax. 

The District argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s claim, in the form of a letter 

seeking a refund, was invalid because it was unverified. The trial court rejected the 

District’s argument, explaining:

We do not find, however, that a merely technical error of 

this sort precludes plaintiff from recovering in a suit in 

assumpsit. The mere fact that plaintiff has not attested to 

the accuracy of his claim by oath or affixed an affidavit 

has not impaired the purpose of the act or prejudiced [the 

District] in any way. The taxing authority has been 

appraised of plaintiff’s claim. It is difficult to see what 

difference it would make if plaintiff had a notary seal or 

an affidavit affixed to its letter.

Remmey, 25 Pa. D. & C. 3d at 403 (citation omitted). This Court affirmed based on

the trial court’s opinion, “agree[ing] with the trial court’s reasoning and disposition 

of the legal issues . . . .” Remmey II, 459 A.2d at 915.

As in Remmey, the County’s failure to affirm the truth of its statement 

contained in the September 12, 2017 Letter did not prejudice the Township or impair 

the Refund Act’s purpose. The Township “was well aware” of the County’s claims. 

Trial Ct. Apr. 25, 2018 Op. at 5; R.R. at 74a. Accordingly, this Court concludes that 

the trial court did not err when it held that the County complied with Section 1 of 

the Refund Act.

The Township next contends that the County failed to sustain its burden 

to prove both that the fees were unreasonable and that the Township did not 

reasonably anticipate the expense of enforcing the Ordinance.

1977). “The purpose of verification is to defend a party against spurious allegations.” Twp. of 

Chester v. Stapleton, 456 A.2d 673, 675 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983).
12

Initially,

“[o]rdinances are presumed to be valid and those who 

challenge their validity carry a heavy burden to establish 

their invalidity.” Fisher v. Viola, 789 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2001); accord Chrin Brothers, Inc. v. Williams 

T[wp.] Zoning Hearing B[d.], 815 A.2d 1179, 1184 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2003). A rebuttable presumption is not absolute 

or unassailable. Commonwealth v. McNeil, . . . 439 A.2d 

664, 667 ([Pa.] 1981); Kiskadden v. Dep[’t] of Env[’t]

Prot[.], 149 A.3d 380, 402 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) . . . . It is 

merely an assumption until it is disproved. 

Ziegler v. City of Reading, 216 A.3d 1192, 1201 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

Relative to whether the fee was reasonable, this Court explained:

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Mastrangelo v. 

Buckley, . . . 250 A.2d 447 ([Pa.] 1969), defined a license 

fee as follows:

A license fee is a sum assessed for the 

granting of a privilege. In most instances,

where a license is granted the [c]ity 

invariably incurs expense[s] such as the 

cost of registration and inspection; it is 

only proper that one who seeks and 

receives a license should bear this expense. 

To defray the cost of a license a fee is 

charged to the licensee; however, this fee 

must be commensurate with the expense 

incurred by the [c]ity in connection with the 

issuance and supervision of the license or 

privilege.

Mastrangelo, 250 A.2d at 464 (footnote omitted). “A 

license fee is distinguishable from a tax[,] which is a 

revenue producing measure characterized by the 

production of a high proportion of income relative to the 

costs of collection and supervision.” Thompson v. City of 

Altoona Code Appeals Bd., 934 A.2d 130, 133 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2007). A municipality cannot impose a tax upon 

a business under the guise of exercising its police power, 

and, therefore, a license fee will be struck down if its 

amount is “grossly disproportionate to the sum 
13

required to pay the cost of the due regulation of the 

business.” Flynn v. Horst, . . . 51 A.2d 54, 60 ([Pa.] 1947).

“The party challenging a license fee has the burden of 

proving that the fee is unreasonable.”[10] Thompson, 

934 A.2d at 133. “All doubt must be resolved in favor of 

the reasonableness of the fee, since the municipality must 

be given reasonable latitude in anticipating the expense 

of enforcing the ordinance.” Id.

Costa v. City of Allentown, 153 A.3d 1159, 1165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (emphasis 

added).

The Township’s Invoice stated in relevant part:

The permit fees for the Northumberland County Prison 

Project are as follow[s]:

State Inspections [and] Plan Review - $ 161,724.00[.00]

BREAKDOWN: Building $ 103,345.00

Bldg. Plan Review 9,887.00

State Fee 4.00

Electrical 9,340.00

Elec[.] Plan Review 2,471.75

Mechanical 15,120.00

Mech. Plan Review 2,471.75

Plumbing 11,000.00

Plumb[.] Plan Review 2,471.75

Fire Protection 3,141.00

F.P. Plan Review 2,471.75

 $ 161,724.00

Coal Township Permit - $ 220,801.00

R.R. at 29a.

According to the Invoice, the $161,724.00 fee represented the state

inspections and plan reviews attendant to the granting of necessary permits (State 

10 Importantly, “[t]he burden does not shift to a municipality to prove that a challenged fee 

is reasonable; it always remains the burden of the challenger to show that the fees are 

unreasonable.” Ziegler v. City of Reading, 216 A.3d 1192, 1201 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting M 

& D Props., Inc. v. Borough of Port Vue, 893 A.2d 858, 863 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)).
14

Inspections and Plan Reviews). However, the trial court found that unrefuted 

evidence showed that B.I.U., which performed all inspections and reviews on the 

Township’s behalf, charged the Township only $113,204.02 for the State

Inspections and Plan Reviews.

11

 Nonetheless, the Township assessed the full 

$161,724.00 fee to the County, charging the County an additional $48,519.98 over 

and above its costs for the inspections and reviews. 

In addition, the Township assessed the $220,801.00 Coal Township 

Permit fee pursuant to its Ordinance representing 1% of the estimated Project cost. 

See R.R. at 266a. However, in deposition testimony, Slaby confirmed that B.I.U. 

performs all inspections relating to the State Inspections and Plan Reviews, and 

acknowledged that with respect to the Coal Township Permit, there is no formal 

inspection process, and no additional inspections are performed beyond those 

performed for the State Inspections and Plan Reviews. See R.R. at 258a-259a.

As our Supreme Court described in Mastrangelo, license fees defray 

the cost of expenses such as “the cost of registration and inspection[,]” Mastrangelo, 

250 A.2d at 464. Here, B.I.U. charged the Township $113,204.02, and the Township 

in turn, charged the County $161,724.00 for the State Inspections and Plan 

Reviews.

12

 See R.R. at 29a. Even if a portion of the $48,519.98 difference between 

11 The charge represented a 30% discount that B.I.U. offered the Township which the 

Township accepted. See R.R. at 270a-271a.

12 In an affidavit attached to the Township’s response to the County’s Motion, Slaby 

clarified his deposition testimony, that $161,724.00 of the charges represented “separate costs 

related to permitting and the administration of the Uniform Construction Code ([]UCC[])[, Act of 

Nov. 10, 1999, P.L. 491, as amended, 35 P.S. § 7210.301-7210.305].” R.R. at 294a. He 

expounded:

6. First, there are permits which are administered by the Township 

which are not specifically controlled by the UCC.

7. Specifically, 70% of UCC (State) permit fee costs which have 

specific trade inspections are paid to the Township’s retained 

inspectors. The balance of the 30% of the UCC permit fees

[resulting from B.I.U.’s discount] are allocated to and used to defray 
15

the Township’s expense and the amount it invoiced the County could be attributed 

to administrative or supervisory costs as the Township contends, and part of the 

$161,724.00 fee was thereby justified as representing the costs of inspections, 

reviews and administrative fees, there is no record evidence justifying the additional 

cost between B.I.U.’s charge and the amount the Township invoiced, or the

additional 1% Ordinance fee, apart from the Township’s general claims that the 

charges cover administrative expenses. 

Indeed, the trial court emphasized: 

the Township’s administrative costs, which include the maintenance 

of our offices, telephone, fax and internet capabilities and allocable

Township staff time to administer the UCC.

8. In addition, the Township’s Code Officer patrols the Township to 

identify work that requires both Township and UCC permits. The 

Township administrative staff and Code Officer answers [sic] 

questions about the permitting requirements, processes, and plan 

requirement. Township administrative staff members record and 

track all plans and permits, with in[-]person visits, phone calls and 

emails back and forth with permittees on a routine basis. Properly

enforcing the UCC takes a considerable amount of Township 

administrative staff time.

9. The Township has reasonably allocated all administrative costs.

10. The County’s reference to the “30%” [discount by B.I.U.] which 

the County claims are “overcharges” are, in fact, allocated to offset 

the Township’s administrative costs.

11. The County has failed to understand, and therefore has 

misrepresented the Township’s costs which are defrayed by the 

permit fees. . . .

. . . .

14. The Township’s methodology of allocating administrative costs 

was established by the Township approximately 15 years ago and 

reflects the continued reasonable effort by the Township to establish 

a fee schedule reasonably reflective of the proper allocation of costs. 

The allocation of costs is based on historical data and reasonably 

anticipates the Township’s actual costs in the year to come.

R.R. at 294a-295a.
16

[Slaby acknowledged that] the Township performed no 

independent inspections, so the [trial] court is confronted 

with an assessed fee of $269,320.98 that cannot be 

justified by corresponding [T]ownship expenditures or 

expenses. The Township’s explanation is reduced to an 

argument that this amount was assessed to cover general 

administrative costs. In support of this assertion, [it has] 

provided no documentation; the [trial] court will concede, 

however, that [it has] the usual expenses attendant to 

running the office . . . .

Trial Ct. Aug. 23, 2021 Op. at 2; R.R. at 384a.

The Township contends:

The necessary predicate to the County’s entitlement to any

relief for Counts I and II of its complaint was [to] have 

undisputed facts which lead to the invariable and 

inevitable conclusion that the Township’s Ordinance was 

illegally conceived or disparately enforced. The County 

offered and had no such evidence.

[T]he uncontradicted facts set forth in . . . Slaby’s affidavit 

reflect that the Township’s permit fee structure considers 

the cost and expenses incurred by the Township in the 

inspection and administration of construction within the 

Township.

Township Br. at 19-20 (footnote and citation omitted). The Township also claims 

that “[t]he County offered no evidence supporting its claim that the Ordinance was, 

per se, ‘unreasonable’ or that the Township did not reasonably anticipate costs and 

the expense of enforcing the Ordinance when it was adopted.” Township Br. at 18-

19. In fact, the Township asserts that “the County took no steps to establish the 

Township’s total costs related to the administration of the prison 

construction[,]” and thus did not meet its burden. Township Br. at 20 (bold 

emphasis added). It further contends that “[t]he County did not acknowledge, and 

did not seek to identify, [the] Township’s costs associated with the prison 

project.” Id. (emphasis added).
17

Contrary to the Township’s assertions, the County demanded in its 

September 12, 2017 Letter, “proof that the Township actually incurred, or will be 

charged, the costs . . . for ‘State Inspections [and] Plan Review[,]’” and “proof that 

the $220,801.00 fee, nebulously referred to in the Township’s invoice as the Coal 

Township Permit fee, in any way relates to the costs to the Township in performing 

services related to the permitting of the prison.” R.R. at 35a. Further, at Slaby’s 

deposition, the County did seek such information, asking: “You do not charge a 

building fee based upon what the project is going to cost the [T]ownship;

correct?” R.R. at 265a (emphasis added). Slaby answered, “Correct.” Id.

(emphasis added). The County then asked Slaby: “Do you have any calculation 

that you have done regarding what the costs that the [T]ownship incurred as a 

result of the [Project] are?” R.R. at 265a (emphasis added). Slaby responded: 

“Not at this time. No.” Id. (emphasis added). 

The County also contends that it “requested in discovery that [the] 

Township produce any and all costs [the] Township incurred [ ] in excess of 

B[.]I[.]U[.]’s charges . . . [and the] Township failed to produce any evidence of any 

such costs.” County Br. at 20. Notably, the Township does not reference any such 

evidence in its briefs beyond the general assertions in Slaby’s affidavit. Although it 

is a challenger’s burden to show a license fee exceeds the costs of administration, 

where a challenger has specifically requested proof of costs and a defendant fails to 

disclose proper proof of its costs and where the evidence produced demonstrates that 

fees were improperly inflated, a court may find that the challenger has met its burden 

to invalidate the fee. See Martin Media.

The County filed its Complaint including counts seeking declaratory 

judgment that the Township’s fees were unreasonable, unenforceable and 

unconstitutional, and further, a count seeking relief in assumpsit, requesting a refund 

of its alleged overpayments. The County moved for summary judgment and the trial 
18

court granted the County’s Motion, ordering the Township to refund $267,320.98 to 

the County. Given the 30% differential between the costs of inspections charged to 

the Township and the costs the Township charged to the County, the evidence 

demonstrating the lack of a formal inspection process, the lack of any additional 

inspections conducted attendant to the Coal Township Permit, and the Township’s 

failure, upon demand, to document its related actual costs, the trial court did not err 

when it concluded that the County had met its burden. See Martin Media. For all 

of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision in this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

County of Northumberland :

:

v. :

:

Township of Coal, : No. 982 C.D. 2021

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2022, the Northumberland 

County Common Pleas Court’s August 23, 2021 order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge