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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JAMES E. LUNDEEN, Sr., M.D., 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. Civil Action 2:11-CV-484 

 Magistrate Judge King 

LANCE A. TALMADGE, M.D., et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 

This action originally arose out of plaintiff’s summary 

suspension from the practice of medicine and surgery by the State 

Medical Board of Ohio (“the Board”). Proceeding without the 

assistance of counsel, plaintiff filed this action on June 3, 2011 

against the twelve members of the Board in their official and 

individual capacities. The Complaint, ECF 2, asserted claims under 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, alleging violations of plaintiff’s 

First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as 

claims under Ohio law. Plaintiff sought a permanent injunction 

voiding his suspension and $36,000,000 in damages. On November 11, 

2011 the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that 

(1) abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), was 

appropriate with respect to plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief 

against defendants in their official capacity, (2) defendants were 

entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity in connection with 

plaintiff’s federal claims for monetary damages against them in their 

personal capacity and (3) defendants were immune under O.R.C. § 9.86 

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from liability for monetary damages under state law. Opinion and 

Order, Doc. No. 42. This Court’s judgment was affirmed by the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Lundeen v. Talmadge, 

Case No. 12-3250 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2012). 

This matter is now before the Court, with the consent of the 

parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for consideration of 

plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Re-open Proceedings 

Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) and Rule 60(b)(5) (“Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Relief from Judgment”), ECF 52, and on plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the 

Complaint, ECF 53. For the following reasons, the Court denies both 

motions. 

Plaintiff first asks that the final judgment previously entered 

in this action be set aside. Specifically, plaintiff clarifies that, 

should the final judgment be vacated, he intends 

(1) to seek an adjudication that the Defendants' orders 

in 11-CRF-055, the medical board's action against 

Lundeen's Ohio medical license 35-052257 (certificate 

to practice) are void and shall not be enforced, (2) an 

order which mandates the Defendants' [sic] to vacate 

their void orders in 11-CRF-055, and (3) a 

prospective permanent injunction which bars the 

Defendants' [sic] from taking any further action 

against Lundeen based on their allegations in 11-CRF055. Additionally, Lundeen seeks a judgment against the 

Defendants in their individual capacities for 

compensatory damages and punitive damages for their

official actions, taken under color of law, for which 

they are individually liable pursuant to the 

stripping doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See Ex Parte 

Young, 209 U.S. 28 S. Ct. 441; 52 L. Ed. 714; 1908 U.S. 

LEXIS 1726.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment, pp. 2-3. 

Rule 60 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides in 

pertinent part as follows: 

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On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 

relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a 

final judgment . . . for the following reasons: . . . (4) 

the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 

released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment 

that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it 

prospectively is no longer equitable[.] 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The decision to grant or deny a motion for 

relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) falls within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 207 F.3d 

305, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Universal Mgmt. 

Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 757 (6th Cir. 1999)). “The general 

purpose of Rule 60(b) . . . is to strike a proper balance between the 

conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and 

that justice must be done.” Charter Twp. of Muskegon v. City of 

Muskegon, 303 F.3d 755, 760 (6th Cir. 2002) (quotations and citations 

omitted). 

 In the case presently before the Court, plaintiff “seeks to reopen this action to make a collateral challenge to the alleged 

jurisdiction of the Ohio medical board action and of its related 

appeals.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment, p. 3. The 

Board’s summary suspension and revocation of plaintiff’s medical 

license is void, plaintiff argues, because the Board failed to provide 

notice of its administrative hearing by registered mail as required by 

O.R.C. § 119.07. Id. at pp. 5-6.1

 Plaintiff also argues that 

abstention is no longer appropriate because state administrative 

proceedings have now concluded (resulting in the permanent revocation 

 

1 Plaintiff does not allege that he was not provided notice of the hearing; he 

merely complains that the notice actually provided to him was not sent by 

registered mail and that the Board therefore lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings. 

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of plaintiff’s medical license), the Tenth District Court of Appeals 

has denied plaintiff’s request to vacate the administrative orders, 

and the Supreme Court of Ohio has declined to hear plaintiff’s appeal. 

Id. at pp. 2, 6. Plaintiff therefore “seeks an order from this Court 

invalidating the orders of the Defendants in action 11-CRF-055 for 

being void due to total lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” 

Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Set 

Aside Judgment and Re-Open Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) and 

Rule 60(b0(5), ECF 55, pp. 8-9. Plaintiff’s arguments are not well 

taken. 

Plaintiff seeks relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), (5), 

but he does not argue that this Court’s judgment is void or that this 

Court’s judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, that it 

is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated, or 

that applying this Court’s judgment prospectively is no longer 

equitable. Instead, plaintiff argues that the Board’s orders are void 

because the Board failed to provide notice of the administrative 

hearing by registered mail. Plaintiff raised this same issue in state 

court; the Tenth District Court of Appeals rejected the argument 

“because the board’s use of certified mail was not improper.” Lundeen 

v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, No. 12AP-629, 2013 WL 209136, at *3 (Ohio 

Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2013), attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Relief from Judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept 

jurisdiction of plaintiff’s subsequent appeal. Lundeen v. State Med. 

Bd. of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.3d 1405 (2013), attached as Exhibit C to 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment. 

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The grant of the relief requested by plaintiff would imply that 

the Ohio courts’ interpretation of Ohio law was wrong and that this 

Court may properly make that determination. However, this Court lacks 

appellate jurisdiction over final state court judgments. See Marks v. 

Tennessee, 554 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Under the RookerFeldman doctrine, ‘lower federal courts are precluded from exercising 

appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.’”) (quoting 

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006));2 Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 

411, 416-17 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[L]ower federal courts lack the power to 

decide claims in which the relief requested . . . requires determining 

that the state court’s decision is wrong or . . . void[ing] the state 

court’s ruling.”) (quotations and citations omitted)). 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from 

Judgment, ECF 52, is DENIED. 

Plaintiff has also filed a motion to amend the complaint, ECF 53, 

seeking to add new defendants and new claims. However, in light of 

the denial of Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment, leave to 

amend the complaint would be inappropriate. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

motion to amend, ECF 53, is likewise DENIED. 

February 7, 2014 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 

2 See Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); 

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). 

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