2022 IL App (4th) 200361-U 

NO. 4-20-0361 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

WILLIAM B. THOMPSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of

Douglas County 

No. 07CF92 

Honorable 

Gary A. Webber, 

Judge Presiding.

 JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Postconviction counsel’s certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) 

(eff. July 1, 2017) raises a presumption of reasonable assistance, which is 

unrebutted. 

¶ 2 The defendant, William B. Thompson, who is serving a sentence of natural life 

imprisonment for first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 2006); 730 ILCS 

5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(iii) (West 2006)), appeals from the second-stage dismissal of his petition for 

postconviction relief. See People v. Harris, 2013 IL App (1st) 111351, ¶¶ 46-47 (describing the 

three stages of a postconviction proceeding). In his view, the record fails to show that 

postconviction counsel substantially complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 

1, 2017), a rule designed to ensure that defendants receive a reasonable level of assistance from 

their postconviction counsel. In our de novo review, we conclude that (1) the Rule 651(c) 

FILED

January 14, 2022

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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certificate filed by postconviction counsel raises a presumption of reasonable assistance and 

(2) defendant fails to rebut that presumption. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On March 11, 2009, defendant appeared with this attorney and proposed that, in 

return for a sentence of natural-life imprisonment, he would plead guilty to count I of the amended 

information. Count I charged that on June 21, 2007, defendant committed first degree murder (720 

ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 2006)) in that he “or one [for] whose conduct he [was] accountable, 

fired gunshots in the direction of the driver’s side window of a police vehicle, at a time when 

Tommy Martin was driving said vehicle, thereby causing the death of Tommy Martin.” “[F]or 

sentencing purposes,” count I added that, at the time of the incident, Martin “was a peace officer 

in the course of performing his official duties” and that defendant “knew or should have known 

that the murdered individual was a peace officer.” See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(iii) (West 2006).

¶ 5 In response to questions from the circuit court, defendant said he understood count 

I, including the sentence-enhancing factor. He also said he understood that the sentencing range 

for first degree murder was imprisonment for not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years 

and that the extended range of imprisonment was not less than 60 years and not more than 100 

years. The court confirmed with defense counsel and the prosecutor that natural-life imprisonment 

would be mandatory if, in a trial, defendant were found to have known that Martin was a peace 

officer acting in the course of his official duties. Defendant said he understood that a unanimous 

verdict was required for the imposition of a natural-life sentence. He further said he understood 

that if he declined the plea agreement, proceeded to trial, and were found guilty, he could be 

sentenced to death. He said he understood that he would have a right to a jury in the

death-sentencing hearing and that a death verdict would have to be unanimous before the death 
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penalty could be imposed. He said he understood that the sentencing judge would be obligated to 

impose a natural-life sentence if the sentencing jury declined to impose the death penalty. Defense 

counsel stated, on the record, that he had explained to defendant that if he were found guilty of 

murdering a police officer “the only two possible sentences would be death or life imprisonment.” 

Defendant said he wanted to give up his right to trial and to plead guilty to first degree murder. 

¶ 6 The State presented the following factual basis for the proposed guilty plea:

“If this cause were to proceed to trial, Your Honor, the State would be able to prove 

the following facts which would support a conviction of the above—of this 

defendant, William B. Thompson, of the crime of first-degree murder, the mandated 

sentence for which is natural life imprisonment.

The evidence would show that at about 10:40 a.m. on June 21, 2007, 

Tommy Martin was the Chief Deputy Sheriff of Douglas County, a uniformed 

peace officer in the course of performing his official duties.

That earlier that morning at about 9:03 a.m., Trooper Brian Wood of the 

Illinois State Police effected a traffic stop on Interstate 57 in the southbound lanes 

in Douglas County, Illinois, of a tan or silver four-door Infinity motor vehicle for a

violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

That the driver of this Infinity was identified, and would be identified as the 

defendant, William B. Thompson, date of birth, August 2, 1980, this defendant. The 

passenger was subsequently identified as Yusef Kareem Brown. The Infinity was 

registered to Arnie L. Graves of Chicago, Illinois.

During the course of this traffic stop, a State Police canine performed a ‘free 

air’ sniff of the Infinity and indicated the odor of cannabis or controlled substances.
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That the defendant and Mr. Brown were instructed to exit the motor vehicle. 

The defendant and Brown refused to exit and fled the stop in the Infinity at about 

9:17 a.m., proceeding southbound on Interstate 57. It was later determined that at 

about 1:00 a.m. earlier that day, the owner of this vehicle, Arnie L. Graves, was 

murdered by gunshot and hammer blows to the head in his apartment in Chicago. 

It was later determined that the defendant, William Thompson, knew Arnie Graves 

and that he had been with Arnie Graves the evening before the murder.

That some time between 10 o’clock and 10:29 a.m. on the 21st at a residence 

located at 1540 East County Road 1250 North outside of Villa Grove in Douglas

County, Illinois, Betsy Orwick, Jeremy Shunk and Ryan Riddell were robbed and 

tied up by two armed gunmen, that Shunk and Orwick at trial would identify as the 

defendant and Yusef Brown. They would testify that the defendant and Brown left 

Shunk in the trunk of the Infinity parked in the rear of the property, at that time the 

home of Ryan Riddell.

The defendant and Brown stole Riddell’s black Chevrolet S-10 pickup and 

Orwick’s beige Mercury van and left the residence. That Orwick shortly thereafter

freed herself and called 911 at 10:29 a.m. to report the home invasion and robbery.

That Tommy Martin, among other law enforcement officers, proceeded 

towards that location in a police vehicle. Mr. Martin was travelling north on Prairie

Street out of Tuscola, turning east on County Road 1250 North, also known as the 

Hayes Road, towards the Riddell residence.

That at 10:40 a.m. Martin advised dispatch that he had sighted the Mercury 

van and the black S-10. 
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That at 10:41 a.m. Martin advised dispatch that he had been shot.

That shortly—that at a subsequent time from his hospital bed, Martin gave 

a recorded statement describing that he had been shot by a black male driving the 

black S-10 pickup.

That shortly thereafter, the beige Mercury was sighted by State Troopers 

headed northbound on Route 45 from the Hayes Road. Pursuit was then initiated 

until the van stopped at the intersection of Route 45 and Route 133 in Arcola, 

Illinois. The black S-10 was found abandoned at the intersection of the Hayes Road

and Route 45.

That during the pursuit of the Mercury van, the police car operated by 

Trooper Mike Sturgeon was hit by gunshots fired from the Mercury van. Trooper 

Sturgeon later recovered the projectiles from his back seat and they were turned 

into the State Crime Lab.

That the Mercury van came to a stop at the intersection of Route 133 and 

Route 45 in Arcola. This defendant ran from the passenger side of the van and

into the nearby First Mid Illinois Bank. Brown was apprehended from the driver 

seat of that van.

That the defendant, brandishing a Smith & Wesson 9-millimeter 

semiautomatic pistol, then held the bank employees hostage during the standoff 

with the police, eventually surrendering at the end of this day.

That Martin was taken to Carle Foundation Hospital where he was treated 

for the gunshot wounds to his face and chest. The gunshot projectile in his chest 

went through his lung and lodged in his spine. After surgery and intubation, Martin 
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regained consciousness only briefly during the next few weeks. In the beginning of 

July, Martin’s diverticulum perforated, sepsis set in, causing massive organ failure 

and Martin died on July 17, 2007.

Firearm projectiles recovered from Martin and the projectiles recovered 

from Trooper Sturgeon’s vehicle were analyzed by the State Police Crime Lab, who

determined to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that these projectiles were 

fired from the same 9-millimeter pistol possessed by the defendant during his 

standoff with the police at the bank in Arcola.

That the clothing the defendant was wearing on June 21, 2007, was seized 

following his arrest at the Arcola Bank. It was analyzed by the State Police Crime

Lab. The right cuff of the shirt the defendant was wearing was found to have 

gunshot residue particles indicating that a firearm had been discharged in close

proximity. 

That the black Chevy S-10 pickup, which [sic] it was taken from the Riddell 

residence, was examined by the Illinois State Police Forensic Lab. The defendant’s

fingerprint was found on the driver’s side door. The key to the Infinity that was 

registered to Arnie Graves was found on the center console of the black S-10. 

This key was found to have blood on it. DNA testing by the Illinois State Police 

show that the blood was Arnie Graves, the registered owner of the Infinity, who 

had been found murdered in his Chicago condominium on the 21st. The Infinity 

was being driven by William Thompson at the time he escaped from the Illinois 

State Police traffic stop on Interstate 57.
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That a sock seized from the defendant on the 21st was found to contain 

blood. The blood was DNA tested by the Illinois State Police and found that this 

was also the blood of Arnie Graves.” 

¶ 7 The circuit court then admonished and questioned defendant further. He waived his 

right to a jury on the sentence-enhancing issue of whether he knew or should have known that 

Martin was a peace officer. Defendant said nobody had forced him to plead guilty; that, outside 

the plea agreement, no promises had been made in exchange for his guilty plea; and that he was 

satisfied with the representation he had received. He said he wanted to plead guilty of his own free 

will. The court found his proposed guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary, and the court accepted 

the guilty plea and entered judgment on it.

¶ 8 The State then presented some victim impact statements. Pursuant to the plea 

agreement, the circuit court sentenced defendant to natural-life imprisonment. The State moved to 

dismiss the remaining counts against him as well as a pending charge in Douglas County case No. 

07-CF-125 that accused him of committing a crime while in jail. The court granted the motion.

The court admonished him of his right to appeal. He did not take a direct appeal.

¶ 9 On December 8, 2016, however, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction 

relief, in which he alleged as follows:

 “I was denied effective assistance of counsel when my attorney refused to 

interview my alleged co-defendant, Yusef b. [sic] Brown, regarding the fact that I 

did not intend; plan; agree; aid; abet, nor did I have any knowledge of the of the 

[sic] fact that Brown was going to shoot the Police Officer.

I was not in the truck with Brown when he shot the police, I was driving in 

front of Brown in a mini van, and after the officer was shot I stop[p]ed my vehicle 
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in shock (actually blocking Borow’s [sic] vehicle from escape). I then remember 

[B]rown opening my driver door and pushing me to the passenger side so he could 

make his escape. After coming out of shock I asked Brown ‘what did you shoot the 

police for?’

I kept telling my attorney that I was innocent, but he would not believe me, 

and he wouldn’t interview Mr. Brown to ver[i]fy my story. He just kept saying ‘if 

you don’t plea[d] guilty you will get the death penalty.’

However, I recently received newly discovered evidence in the form of an 

affidavit from Yusef K. Brown supporting my claim of actual innocences [sic].” 

¶ 10 In his affidavit, dated April 18, 2016, Yusef K. Brown averred as follows:

“On June 21 2007 I Yusef K. Brown shot a on duty police officer two times 

and aft[ ]er that William Thompson stop his car like he was in a state of illness or 

shock. 

So, I jump out the black truck ran to William Thompson assist because he 

was blocking the truck I was in then, I Yusef Brown open the driver door to the 

mini van William Thompson was driving and told him to move over the passenger 

seat and William Thompson move and let me Yusef Brown take over the mini van. 

So aft[ ]er making a right turn more police started to come and then I Yusef Brown 

ended up on the expressway then William Thompson ask me what did I shoot the 

police for and I Yusef Brown solely told William Thompson I work for GOD 

ALLAH.

So the police officer in the cars started to get closer to the mini van. So, I 

Yusef Brown got off the Expressway with a lead and that’s when I threw the gloves 
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I was wearing out the window and 100 more feet I crash the car and that[’]s when 

I Yusef Brown told William Thompson to run and get to safety because the police 

was going to shoot to kill.

I Yusef Brown stop that by surrend[er]ing to the down coming police cars.”

¶ 11 On May 5, 2017, the circuit court docketed the pro se petition for second-stage 

proceedings and appointed counsel.

¶ 12 On September 12, 2017, in a status hearing, postconviction counsel told the circuit 

court: 

“Judge, I would indicate that after we were here last time and Mr. Thompson was 

present I had a chance to speak to Mr. Thompson. He indicated to me at that time 

there wasn’t any additional claims that he wanted to make. The claim he has made, 

which he put in his pro se Petition, is very straightforward, and I think, easily 

understood. I don’t see a point in trying to amend that. [The prosecutor] has 

furnished me with—certainly not all the discovery in this lengthy case—but I think 

a sufficient amount of relevant discovery that I have had a chance to review that 

and kind of know what the circumstances were.

I don’t think there is a need to make an amendment to the petition or the 

other paperwork that Mr. Thompson filed.” 

¶ 13 On the grounds of untimeliness and a failure to make out a legally sufficient claim 

of actual innocence, the State moved to dismiss the pro se petition. On January 9, 2018, the circuit 

court held a hearing on the motion for dismissal. After the attorneys made their arguments, the 

court granted the State’s motion, for three reasons. First, the petition was not filed within three 

years after the conviction—the statutory period of limitation for claims other than those of actual 
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innocence, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 

2016). Second, the petition failed to show that defendant was actually innocent. The court 

explained, “I do not believe that this raises a cognizable claim of actual innocence. It may merely 

change who actually pulled the trigger and does not in and of itself raise a claim that he couldn’t 

be held accountable for that action regardless of who pulled the trigger.” Third, the court was 

unconvinced that Brown’s affidavit was new evidence that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 

would have been undiscoverable earlier—a requirement for claims of actual innocence. The court 

noted “sufficient evidence in the record that there were extensive amounts of interview time of this 

Co-Defendant, Yusef Brown, which [defendant] had access to.” “But even so,” the court added, 

“this statement in and of itself does not raise a cognizable claim of innocence such that I should 

excuse the late filing.” Therefore, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the pro se petition 

for postconviction relief.

¶ 14 Defendant appealed. On January 6, 2020, by summary order, we remanded the case 

for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), because the record, 

including the Rule 651(c) certificate, failed to show that postconviction counsel had examined the 

transcripts of the guilty plea proceedings. People v. Thompson, No. 4-18-0081 (2020) (unpublished 

summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). 

¶ 15 On remand, postconviction counsel filed a new Rule 651(c) certificate, which read 

as follows:

“1. I was appointed by the Court to represent Defendant on a pro se 

post-conviction petition.

 2. I met personally with Defendant and discussed his post-conviction 

petition.
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 3. I was provided by the Douglas County Circuit Clerk with the common 

law record of proceedings in the above cause which I examined to the extent I 

deemed necessary to understand Defendant’s post-conviction petition and earlier 

proceedings in this case. Further I was furnished with a transcript of proceedings 

which included a transcript of Defendant’s guilty plea.

 4. After the above review I determined that no amendment of Defendant’s

post-conviction petition was necessary to understand his claimed constitutional 

violations.” 

¶ 16 Defendant again appeals, maintaining that the record still fails to show substantial 

compliance with Rule 651(c).

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 A. The Capital Ineligibility of Defendants Who

Were Guilty Only on a Theory of Accountability

¶ 19 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), the record must 

“contain a showing, which may be made by the certificate of” the appointed postconviction 

attorney, that the attorney has discharged certain duties. One such duty is to “ma[k]e any 

amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of [the] 

petitioner’s contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). We decide de novo, that is, 

without any deference to the circuit court’s decision (People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 28), 

whether the record shows compliance with Rule 651(c). See People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 41-42 

(2007). 

¶ 20 “The filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate gives rise to a presumption that 

postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance during second-stage proceedings under the 
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Act.” People v. Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529, ¶ 23; see also Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 42 (holding 

that petitioners are entitled to a reasonable level of assistance from postconviction counsel). “It 

falls on the defendant to overcome that presumption by demonstrating counsel’s failure to 

substantially comply with the duties mandated by Rule 651(c).” Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529, 

¶ 23. 

¶ 21 With respect to amendments, the duty of postconviction counsel, again, is to 

“ma[k]e any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate 

presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

Rule 651(d) requires postconviction counsel to amend the pro se petition only to perfect the claims 

already set forth (imperfectly) in the pro se petition. See People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 

475-76 (2006). Postconviction counsel has to read the pro se petition, ascertain the claims that the 

defendant intended to assert therein, and make whatever nonfrivolous amendments are necessary 

for an adequate presentation of the defendant’s claims. Because a reasonable level of assistance is 

what postconviction counsel owes the defendant (see Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 42), postconviction 

counsel’s interpretation of the pro se petition must be reasonable. If, from the text of the pro se

petition, the defendant’s intention to assert a particular claim would be discernable to a reasonable 

reader, postconviction counsel is expected to discern that claim and to make whatever amendments 

to the petition are necessary to present that claim correctly and completely.

¶ 22 This was defendant’s pro se claim, to quote from his brief: “In his pro se petition, 

[defendant] alleged he was actually innocent based on an affidavit from his co-defendant, Yusef 

Brown, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Brown before trial.” 

Defendant admits that his “pro se claim of innocence ultimately fails because [he] could have been 

culpable for the murder even if Brown were the actual shooter, under a theory of accountability.”
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Nevertheless, defendant contends that “the allegations and affidavits of [his] pro se pleading also 

support a cognizable claim that his 2009 guilty plea was involuntary.” By failing to interview 

Brown, defendant argues, plea counsel failed to discover that he could be found guilty of Martin’s 

murder only on a theory of accountability. The severest penalty that defendant could have received 

on a theory of accountability was life imprisonment, not death. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(a)(i), 

(15) (West 2006); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 801 (1982). By falsely advising 

him that if he went to trial and were found guilty, he could be sentenced to death, plea counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance, defendant argues, making his guilty plea involuntary.

¶ 23 The trouble is, nowhere in his pro se petition for postconviction relief does 

defendant claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, let alone that it was involuntary because of 

plea counsel’s failure to advise him of the capital ineligibility of someone who was guilty merely 

by accountability. To be sure, defendant alleges in his pro se petition that plea counsel “kept on 

saying[,] ‘[I]f you don’t plea[d] guilty[,] you will get the death penalty.’ ” According to the pro se 

petition, however, what made that advice unreasonable was that defendant was actually innocent—

as, supposedly, plea counsel would have discovered by interviewing Brown—not that defendant 

was guilty by accountability. Defendant expects of his postconviction counsel a strained reading 

of the pro se petition that goes beyond reasonableness. Defendant “interprets” into existence a new 

claim that is not reasonably discernable from the text of his pro se petition.

¶ 24 In sum, a postconviction counsel’s duty of amendment under Rule 651(c) is limited 

to the claims the defendant already has made, incompletely or imperfectly, in the pro se petition.

See Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 475-76; People v. Richardson, 382 Ill. App. 3d 248, 258 (2008). In 

his pro se petition, defendant never claimed that his guilty plea was involuntary, let alone that it 

was involuntary because of plea counsel’s neglect to advise him that defendants guilty of murder
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only on a theory of accountability were ineligible for the death penalty. Instead, his pro se claim 

was that by failing to interview Brown, plea counsel failed to discover that defendant was actually

innocent of murder and that, because of his actual innocence of murder, he was ineligible for the 

death penalty (or any punishment at all). The pro se petition cannot be plausibly interpreted as 

intending to assert the claim that defendant asserts now. Consequently, he fails to rebut the 

presumption that postconviction counsel “made any amendments to the petition[ ] filed pro se that 

[were] necessary for an adequate presentation of [the] petitioner’s contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) 

(eff. July 1, 2017); see also Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529, ¶ 23.

¶ 25 B. Time Limitation

¶ 26 Defendant took no direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. Section 122-1(c) 

of the Act provides that “[i]f a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the post-conviction petition 

shall be filed no later than 3 years from the date of conviction, unless the petitioner alleges facts 

showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 

2016). But the statute adds, “This limitation does not apply to a petition advancing a claim of actual 

innocence.” Id. Thus, although defendant’s claim of actual innocence would not be subject to the 

three-year limitation, his claim of ineffective assistance would be subject to the limitation—unless 

his petition alleged facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence. See id.

Defendant criticizes his postconviction counsel for failing to amend the pro se petition so as to 

allege facts showing that defendant’s delay in bringing his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

was not due to his culpable negligence. See People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 44 (2007) (explaining 

that “[a]n adequate or proper presentation of a petitioner’s substantive claims necessarily includes 

attempting to overcome procedural bars, including timeliness, that will result in dismissal of a 

petition if not rebutted”).
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¶ 27 The claim of ineffective assistance, however, was premised on the claim of actual 

innocence. According to the pro se petition, plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 

to interview Brown and, as a consequence, failing to discover the evidence of defendant’s actual 

innocence of Martin’s murder. As defendant admits in his brief, however, his “pro se claim of 

innocence ultimately fails because defendant could have been culpable for the murder even if 

Brown were the actual shooter, under a theory of accountability.” If the premise of the ineffective 

assistance claim—the premise of actual innocence—fails on its merits, so does the ineffectiveness 

claim, regardless of whether it could be shown to be timely. Therefore, we need not reach the 

question of whether postconviction counsel should have amended the pro se petition so as to show 

an absence of culpable negligence in waiting more than three years to raise the ineffectiveness 

claim. In any event, the theory of ineffective assistance propounded by the pro se petition is 

substantively deficient, resting as it does on the misguided theory of actual innocence. 

¶ 28 C. Meeting With Defendant to Ascertain His Constitutional Claims

¶ 29 Another showing the record must make—a showing that likewise may be made by

a Rule 651(c) certificate—is that “the attorney has consulted with petitioner by phone, mail, 

electronic means or in person to ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of constitutional 

rights.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Defendant contends that although the new Rule 

651(c) certificate states that the attorney “met personally” with defendant and “discussed his 

post-conviction petition,” the certificate fails to specify that the attorney “attempted to ascertain 

the factual basis underlying defendant’s constitutional claims during this discussion.” But Rule 

651(c) says nothing about “factual bases.” Instead, Rule 651(c) requires the postconviction counsel 

to “consult[ ] with” the defendant “to ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of 

constitutional rights.” Such contentions are in the pro se petition, and according to the Rule 651(c) 
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certificate, postconviction counsel met with defendant and discussed the petition. Also, 

postconviction counsel told the circuit court, “I had a chance to speak to [defendant]. He indicated 

to me at that time there wasn’t any additional claims that he wanted to make.” Therefore, we find 

substantial compliance with Rule 651(c). See People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 18 

(noting that “[s]ubstantial compliance with Rule 651(c) is sufficient.”).

¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31 The presumption of reasonable assistance raised by the Rule 651(c) certificate is 

unrebutted. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 32 Affirmed.