Rel: May 3, 2024

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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

SC-2023-0945

_________________________

Raymond Shane Greene

v. 

Nicki E. Patterson

Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court

(CV-23-901385)

SELLERS, Justice.

Raymond Shane Greene appeals from an order of the Mobile Circuit 

Court granting Nicki E. Patterson's motion to dismiss an action that 
SC-2023-0945

2

Greene purportedly commenced pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. 

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In November 2015, Greene was convicted of rape in the first degree, 

a violation of § 13A-6-61(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975; sodomy in the first degree, 

a violation of § 13A-6-63, Ala. Code 1975; and sexual abuse of a child 

under 12 years of age, a violation of § 13A-6-69.1, Ala. Code 1975. The 

trial court sentenced Greene to life imprisonment for the rape conviction, 

99 years' imprisonment for the sodomy conviction, and 10 years' 

imprisonment for the sexual-abuse conviction; the sentences for rape and 

sodomy were ordered to run consecutively, and the sexual-abuse 

conviction was ordered to run concurrently with the other two. 

Greene was initially tried for the above-stated offenses in August 

2015, but that trial resulted in a mistrial based on the State's inadvertent 

failure to provide defense counsel with certain evidence, which prejudiced 

the trial. A transcript of the August 2015 trial proceedings indicates that, 

although defense counsel asked for the mistrial, counsel, nonetheless,

represented to the trial judge that there had been no bad faith on the part 

of the State in failing to provide the evidence and that double jeopardy 
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therefore would not bar a second trial. Based on those representations 

and the totality of the circumstances, the trial court declared a mistrial. 

Following the mistrial, Greene filed a motion to dismiss the charges 

against him on the ground of double jeopardy stemming from alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court presumably denied that 

motion, because Greene was retried in November 2015, convicted of the 

charged offenses, and sentenced as previously indicated. 

On July 7, 2023, Greene, acting pro se, purported to commence in 

the Mobile Circuit Court ("the circuit court") an action pursuant to Rule 

60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing, in relevant part, that his November 2015

criminal convictions were due to be set aside on double-jeopardy 

grounds.1 In that action, Greene accused Patterson, the assistant district 

attorney who had prosecuted him in the August 2015 trial, of 

prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, he claimed that, because

Patterson's misconduct had caused the mistrial, his second trial violated 

1Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that "[t]his rule does not limit 

the power of a court to entertain an independent action within a 

reasonable time and not to exceed three (3) years after the entry of the 

judgment (or such additional time as is given by § 6-2-3 and § 6-2-8, Code 

of Alabama 1975)."
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the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. The action was docketed as case no. CV-23-901385, and 

Patterson was served with the summons and complaint. The Mobile 

County District Attorney's Office, on behalf of Patterson, filed a motion 

to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., on the grounds that 

the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint, 

that the complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could 

be granted, that the claims asserted in the complaint were barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations, and that Patterson was entitled to 

State-agent and prosecutorial immunity. The circuit court, thereafter, 

entered an order granting Patterson's motion to dismiss. Greene filed a 

postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate, which the circuit court 

denied. This appeal followed.

Discussion

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the circuit court properly 

granted Patterson's motion to dismiss. We review the circuit court's 

ruling on the motion to dismiss without a presumption of correctness. 

Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). Greene seeks relief 

from his 2015 criminal convictions through an independent action 
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purportedly commenced pursuant to Rule 60(b).2 However, Rule 1, Ala. 

R. Civ. P., states that the rules of civil procedure govern "all actions of a 

civil nature." The Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 1 

further state that the rules of civil procedure "have no application in 

criminal proceedings." Rather, Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., exclusively 

governs postconviction-relief litigation under Alabama law. In fact, Rule 

32.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., states, in relevant part, that "any defendant who 

has been convicted of a criminal offense may institute a proceeding in the 

court of original conviction to secure appropriate relief ...." See also Rule 

32.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. ("A proceeding under [Rule 32] displaces all posttrial remedies except post-trial motions under Rule 24[, Ala. R. Crim. P.,]

and appeal. Any other post-conviction petition seeking relief from a 

conviction or sentence shall be treated as a proceeding under this rule."). 

In Citizenship Trust v. Keddie-Hill, 68 So. 3d 99, 106 (Ala. 2011), this 

2Greene cites Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), for the 

proposition that commencing an action pursuant to Rule 60(b) is a proper 

means by which to challenge his criminal convictions. Gonzalez, 

however, is inapplicable because it concerns the use of Rule 60(b), Fed. 

R. Civ. P., in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See also, e.g., Bandy v. 

State, 727 So. 2d 892, 893 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (noting that "a petition 

for the writ of habeas corpus filed in state court is not the appropriate 

method by which to seek relief from a conviction or sentence").
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Court specifically held that trial courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction 

over civil actions purporting to collaterally attack judgments in criminal 

cases. See also Tyson v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 43 So. 3d 

587, 589 (Ala. 2010) (holding that, with exceptions not applicable here, 

courts "may not interfere with the enforcement of criminal laws through 

a civil action"). That is essentially the same situation we have here; 

Greene has attempted to use a civil action to challenge the propriety of 

his convictions by suing the prosecuting attorney. In light of the plain 

language of Rule 1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the Committee Comments thereto, 

and this Court's existing caselaw, a state prisoner such as Greene may 

not use a rule of civil procedure to collaterally attack a criminal 

judgment; rather, Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides the exclusive 

remedy for challenging a final judgment of conviction. Because the circuit

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Greene's civil action,

it properly granted Patterson's motion to dismiss.3

3The circuit court did not indicate in its order a specific ground on 

which it granted Patterson's Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. However, it is 

well settled that "this Court will affirm the trial court on any valid legal 

ground presented by the record, regardless of whether that ground was 

considered, or even if it was rejected, by the trial court." Liberty Nat'l Life 

Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 

1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003). 
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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's order granting 

Patterson's motion to dismiss is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED.

Wise, Mendheim, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur.

Parker, C.J., and Shaw, J., concur in the result.

Mitchell, J., dissents, with opinion, which Bryan, J., joins.
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MITCHELL, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent because I believe that exclusive appellate 

jurisdiction of this matter lies with the Court of Criminal Appeals, not 

our Court. I would therefore transfer this appeal to the Court of Criminal 

Appeals and allow that court to decide it.

I agree with the majority opinion that Raymond Shane Greene has 

attempted to "use a rule of civil procedure to collaterally attack a criminal 

judgment." ___ So. 3d at ___. Greene purported to file his complaint 

under Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., a rule of civil procedure that can relieve 

a party from a "final judgment, order, or proceeding." But the only "final 

judgment[s], order[s], or proceeding[s]" here are Greene's criminal 

convictions. The substance of Greene's complaint is also telling: the only 

relief he sought was the vacatur of his convictions. Because this Court

"treat[s] a pleading and any other filing according to its substance, rather 

than its form or its style," Ex parte Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 

879 So. 2d 577, 584 (Ala. 2003), I agree with the majority opinion that we 

should treat Greene's complaint as a petition under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. 

P., which "provides the exclusive remedy for challenging a final judgment 

of conviction." ___ So. 3d at ___; see Rule 32.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. (stating 
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that, with few exceptions that do not apply here, "any ... post-conviction 

petition seeking relief from a conviction or sentence shall be treated as a 

proceeding under [Rule 32]").

The majority leaps from those observations to a discussion of the 

merits of the appeal, including a dispute over the trial court's subjectmatter jurisdiction. But before analyzing the trial court's jurisdiction, we 

must examine our own. And because this case -- despite its label as a 

civil action -- is actually criminal in nature, appellate jurisdiction lies 

only with the Court of Criminal Appeals, not our Court. That is because, 

under Alabama law, "[t]he Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive

appellate jurisdiction of all misdemeanors, including the violation of town 

and city ordinances, habeas corpus and all felonies, including all post 

conviction writs in criminal cases." § 12-3-9, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis 

added). 

Paradoxically, by reaching the merits of this appeal, the majority

opinion treats the case as a civil matter for purposes of determining our 

jurisdiction while simultaneously holding that this is a criminal matter 

for purposes of determining whether the trial court had jurisdiction. This 

contradictory approach cannot be squared with either the text of § 12-3-9 
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or our longstanding recognition that substance, not form, controls. See, 

e.g., Lockhart v. Phenix City Inv. Co., 488 So. 2d 1353 (Ala. 1986).

I would transfer this appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals and 

allow that court to decide it. I therefore respectfully dissent.

Bryan, J., concurs.