[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

State ex rel. Woodman v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3807.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-3807

THE STATE EX REL. WOODMAN, APPELLEE, v. OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM ET AL., APPELLANTS.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Woodman v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys.,

Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3807.] 

Court of appeals abused its discretion by independently reevaluating medical 

evidence and substituting its judgment regarding weight and credibility 

for that of the board of the Public Employees Retirement System. 

(No. 2014-0436—Submitted March 10, 2015—Decided September 22, 2015.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 13AP-406, 

2014-Ohio-710. 

________________ 

 Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Appellee, Raeanne Woodman, sought a writ of mandamus in the 

court of appeals to compel appellants, the Ohio Public Employees Retirement 

System (“OPERS”) and its board of trustees (collectively, “the board”), to grant 
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her application for disability benefits. The Tenth District Court of Appeals 

granted the writ. Because the court of appeals independently reevaluated the 

medical evidence and substituted its judgment regarding weight and credibility for 

that of the board, we hold that the court of appeals abused its discretion, and we 

reverse. 

Background 

{¶ 2} In 1989, Woodman suffered a hemorrhage in the pons, an area of the 

brainstem. In 1989 and 1991, she underwent surgery, and part of her pons and 

part of her cerebellum were removed. As a result of the surgery and the original 

hemorrhage, the muscles on the right side of Woodman’s face are weak, she has 

lost vision in her right eye and some of her hearing, and she is confined to a 

wheelchair. 

{¶ 3} In 1999, the Ohio State University English Department hired 

Woodman as an office assistant. Her position was eliminated in November 2011. 

{¶ 4} In October 2011, Woodman submitted a disability-retirement 

application to the board. In the application, Woodman indicated that her 

condition had progressively worsened over the years, and she identified three 

specific limitations. Her “biggest problem,” she wrote, was her eyesight. In 

addition, she stated that her handwriting has become illegible even to herself. 

And third, she spelled out in some detail her worsening hearing problems.

As I have been getting older, I’ve found that my hearing ability is 

decreasing and my vision has become much worse. I now have 

trouble hearing students and co-workers when they are in the 

office. Over the years, my condition has progressively worsened. * 

* * My hearing has also become jumbled. I find that if I’m in an 

office setting with various noise [sic] and sounds occurring, I am 

unable to hear and understand the individual student that I might 
January Term, 2015 

3

be speaking to at my front desk. I try to lean over my desk to hear 

the individual, but this has become too limiting.

{¶ 5} In support of her application, she submitted a report, dated October 

13, 2011, from Donald Mack, M.D., which noted the following disabling 

conditions: (1) Pontine hemorrhage with hemiparesis, (2) wheelchair bound, (3) 

carpal tunnel syndrome, and (4) decreased hearing. Dr. Mack described her 

prognosis for recovery as poor and described her deficits as permanent.

{¶ 6} The board required Woodman to submit to an independent medical 

examination with Dr. Robert Shadel. Dr. Shadel prepared a report in which he 

concluded that Woodman was not disabled. In response to the specific question 

whether Woodman’s hearing loss affected her ability to perform her job functions, 

Dr. Shadel wrote: 

In my medical opinion, Ms. Woodman has demonstrated adequate 

hearing in the examination room to allow her to perform the 

necessary job functions of office assistant. She is able to hear 

conversation well and accurately. As I have noted above, she is 

bright and articulate and has no trouble responding to spoken voice 

in appropriate verbal manner. Thus, in my medical opinion, her 

hearing deficit primarily in right ear does not disable her from the 

job of office assistant. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 7} Woodman’s file, which included Dr. Shadel’s report, was then sent 

to Managed Medical Review Organization (“MMro”) (the third-party 

administrator for the board) for review. Based on Dr. Shadel’s report, Dr. Jeffrey 
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4

Deitch recommended rejection of the claim. The board rejected the claim by 

letter dated February 16, 2012. 

{¶ 8} Woodman appealed. In support of the appeal, she submitted an 

examination report from Dr. Gerald Steiman. In his report, Dr. Steiman noted 

that testing on April 4, 2012, showed reduced hearing. Woodman displayed 

moderate-to-severe neurosensory hearing loss on her right side, with poor speech 

recognition. And otoacoustic-emission testing “revealed absent in all frequencies 

in the right ear.” Based on her test results and his own examination, Dr. Steiman 

concluded that her hearing dynamics had been altered such that her discrimination 

is “markedly reduced” on the right side. 

{¶ 9} Dr. Steiman opined that Woodman was unable to perform the 

functions of an office assistant. However, his report did not indicate whether 

Woodman’s disabling condition was her hearing loss, her vision loss, her 

paralysis, her memory problems, or some combination of these and other 

conditions. 

{¶ 10} MMro scheduled a second independent medical examination, this 

one to be conducted by Dr. Eric Schaub. However, there is no indication in the 

record that the exam ever occurred, or if it did, that the results were considered in 

subsequent reviews of the file. 

{¶ 11} On November 27, 2012, Dr. Elena Antonelli issued a report, which 

included a review of the supplemental information from Dr. Steiman. Dr. 

Antonelli concluded that Woodman’s subjective complaints “do appear to 

correlate with the objective clinical findings in the medical documentation,” but 

that Woodman was not disabled from performing her occupation. In support of 

her conclusion, she offered two rationales: 

There is no evidence that the claimant has significantly worsened 

since she was last able to do her job and she was terminated from 
January Term, 2015 

5

her job due to termination of the job itself and not due to disability. 

There is no evidence that she is unable to be accommodated 

sufficiently to be able to do her job as she has done in the past. 

Dr. Deitch submitted a second report, again recommending that OPERS deny the 

claim.1

{¶ 12} The board officially rejected Woodman’s appeal and again found 

that she was not permanently disabled, by letter dated December 20, 2012. 

Woodman then filed suit for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of 

Appeals. The magistrate recommended denial of the writ, stating: 

Although there is some evidence in the record which would 

indicate that [Woodman’s] disabling condition continues to slowly 

worsen, the magistrate finds that [the board] did not abuse its 

discretion when it determined that [Woodman] had not 

demonstrated that her disabling condition was preventing her from 

being able to perform her job duties as a part-time receptionist. 

However, the court of appeals did not follow the magistrate’s recommendation. 

{¶ 13} Instead, a majority of the court noted that Woodman had 

complained of worsening hearing that made it impossible to hear what students 

and coworkers were saying and that Dr. Steiman had confirmed that Woodman 

had trouble hearing if there was other noise in the room, including other people 

talking. The majority opinion criticized Dr. Shadel for evaluating Woodman’s 

 

1

In its brief to the Tenth District, the board represented that Dr. Andrew Smith also reviewed the 

file and recommended rejection of the claim. The magistrate’s report also refers to Dr. Smith. 

However, the record contains no medical records or reports from Dr. Smith. 
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hearing in an examination room only, not in a room where background noise was 

present. 

Woodman had informed OPERS and the [independentmedical-exam] doctors who examined her at OPERS’s request that 

she had major trouble hearing in her environment at the OSU 

Department of English. None of the [independent-medical-exam 

doctors] tested her in anything approximating a normal work 

environment with background noise. The doctors who evaluated 

her with a view to such a work environment all concluded that she 

could not do her work any more [sic]. 

Based upon this hole in the medical evidence, the decision 

by OPERS was arbitrary and unreasonable. There was simply no 

evidence to support a finding that her hearing allowed her to return 

to work as a receptionist. 

The court therefore granted the writ and ordered the board to award benefits. 

{¶ 14} Judge Sadler dissented, asserting that the court could not raise an 

issue regarding the testing environment sua sponte, when the parties had never 

challenged the adequacy of Dr. Shadel’s testing. The board timely appealed. 

Woodman has submitted an unopposed request for oral argument. We hold that 

the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve the appeal, and therefore, we deny the 

motion. 

Legal analysis

{¶ 15} In its first proposition of law, the board contends that it did not 

abuse its discretion in denying benefits, because the record contains “some 

evidence” to support its conclusion, namely, Dr. Shadel’s opinion that Woodman 

“demonstrated adequate hearing in the examination room to allow her to perform 
January Term, 2015 

7

the necessary job functions of office assistant.” By rejecting Dr. Shadel’s testing 

as inadequate, the board contends, the court of appeals abused its discretion and 

overstepped its bounds by independently reviewing the weight and credibility of 

the medical evidence. 

{¶ 16} Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when no statutory right of 

appeal is available to correct an abuse of discretion by an administrative body. 

State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-

Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 14. Because there is no right to appeal an adverse 

decision regarding disability-retirement benefits, mandamus is an appropriate 

remedy. State ex rel. Cydrus v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 127 Ohio St.3d 

257, 2010-Ohio-5770, 938 N.E.2d 1028, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 17} An abuse of discretion occurs when an administrative body issues a 

decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Shisler v. 

Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 122 Ohio St.3d 148, 2009-Ohio-2522, 909 

N.E.2d 610, ¶ 11. The board abuses its discretion—and a clear right to 

mandamus exists—if it enters an order that is not supported by some evidence. 

State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.3d 103, 

2013-Ohio-1777, 991 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 26; State ex rel. Schaengold v. Ohio Pub. 

Emps. Retirement Sys., 114 Ohio St.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-3760, 870 N.E.2d 719, 

¶ 19. Only if the board’s decision is not supported by any evidence will 

mandamus lie. State ex rel. Riddell v. State Teachers Retirement Bd., 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 13AP-660, 2014-Ohio-1646, ¶ 20. 

{¶ 18} The board is solely responsible for assessing evidentiary weight 

and credibility, and a reviewing court should not independently reweigh the 

medical evidence. State ex rel. Hart v. Indus. Comm., 66 Ohio St.3d 95, 96-97, 

609 N.E.2d 166 (1993); State ex rel. Guthrie v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-689, 2011-Ohio-6557, ¶ 13. But that is precisely 

what the court of appeals did: the majority held that Dr. Shadel’s medical opinion 
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was unworthy of consideration because (in the court’s view) his testing protocol 

was inadequate and less valid than the testing performed by the doctors 

supporting Woodman’s application. But a board does not abuse its discretion by 

accepting the opinion of its reviewing physician over that of the claimant’s 

treating physician. Cydrus, ¶ 30. 

{¶ 19} Woodman argues that Dr. Shadel’s report cannot constitute “some 

evidence” to support the decision because the report is internally inconsistent. A 

report that is internally inconsistent cannot be “some evidence” supporting an 

agency’s decision. State ex rel. Wyrick v. Indus. Comm., 138 Ohio St.3d 465, 

2014-Ohio-541, 8 N.E.3d 878, ¶ 14. In his report, Dr. Shadel noted Woodman’s 

facial paresis and right-eye impairments. But according to Woodman, Dr. Shadel 

then “concluded that poor hearing and poor vision were not reflected by objective 

findings,” thereby contradicting his own clinical findings. 

{¶ 20} Woodman’s argument is based on a misinterpretation of a poorly 

written sentence in the report: “Subjective complaints are primarily of poor 

hearing hemiplegia and poor vision are not reflected by objective findings of 

disabling hearing or vision dysfunction or by objective findings of extremity 

functioning that does not appear to be significant to a level of causing any 

disability.” The key word in that sentence is “disabling.” Dr. Shadel is not 

denying the existence of her problems, only their severity. 

{¶ 21} Wyrick, which Woodman cites in support of her argument, is 

distinguishable. In Wyrick, the examining physician found that the claimant was 

able to use his hand, wrist, and forearm only if his elbow remained at waist level, 

and yet somehow concluded that the claimant retained “significant remaining 
January Term, 2015 

9

function of his left upper extremity.” Id., ¶ 14. Those two statements are in 

complete contradiction, unlike the statements in Dr. Shadel’s report.2

{¶ 22} The fact that Woodman produced medical evidence to contradict 

Dr. Shadel’s opinion is immaterial. State ex rel. Am. Std., Inc. v. Boehler, 99 

Ohio St.3d 39, 2003-Ohio-2457, 788 N.E.2d 1053, ¶ 29. And in fact, it is not 

even clear that Woodman produced contradictory evidence. As noted above, Dr. 

Steiman never identified the disabling condition. Moreover, as noted in Dr. 

Antonelli’s report, Woodman’s employment ended for nonperformance reasons 

and there is no evidence that she was unable to perform her duties at the time her 

position was eliminated or that her condition had worsened since then. 

{¶ 23} The board’s appeal presents two additional propositions of law. In 

proposition No. 2, the board challenges the authority of the appellate court to raise 

the issue of the hearing-test protocol sua sponte. And in proposition No. 3, the 

board argues that even if there were legitimate questions concerning the testing of 

Woodman’s hearing, the proper remedy was to remand for further proceedings, 

not to issue a writ compelling the board to pay benefits. Given our disposition of 

the first proposition of law, it is unnecessary to address these issues. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

Judgment reversed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and

O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

PFEIFER, J., dissents. 

_________________ 

 

2

Woodman also takes issue with Dr. Shadel’s observation that her speech was “normal and clear,” 

alleging that he “completely ignor[ed] her slurred speech.” But here again, Woodman is attacking 

the quality of the examination, not identifying disqualifying internal contradictions. 
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PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 25} One paragraph from the majority opinion virtually answers the 

issue before us: 

Dr. Steiman opined that Woodman was unable to perform 

the functions of an office assistant. However, his report did not 

indicate whether Woodman’s disabling condition was her hearing 

loss, her vision loss, her paralysis, her memory problems, or some 

combination of these and other conditions. 

Majority opinion at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 26} There might be other conditions? Isn’t this sad laundry list of 

known impairments enough to warrant a declaration that Raeanne Woodman is 

disabled? Apparently not, because there is “some evidence” that Woodman might 

not be disabled. That that evidence is flawed because it is based on a test of 

Woodman’s hearing that was performed under ideal circumstances, not the 

circumstances attendant to fulfilling her job, is immaterial to the board and the 

majority. This is not a malingering malcontent. This is a profoundly disabled 

person who has established that she is no longer capable of performing her job. 

{¶ 27} Instead of siphoning money that it collects to pay pension and 

disability benefits into a fund to pay health-care costs for people who retire before 

they are eligible for Medicare, the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System 

should attend to people, like Woodman, who are disabled. I would affirm the just 

decision of the court of appeals. I dissent. 

_________________ 

Daniel H. Klos, for appellee. 

Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and Matthew T. Green, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. 
January Term, 2015 

11

_________________