PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-4065

No. 12-4500

___________

BEVERLY OHNTRUP, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 

ESTATE OF ROBERT OHNTRUP; ROBERT OHNTRUP

v.

MAKINA VE KIMYA ENDUSTRISI KURUMU; 

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY; 

FIREARMS CENTER INCORPORATED

*Alliant Techsystems, Inc,

Intervenor in No. 12-4065

*(Pursuant to the Court's Order dated 12/28/12)

Beverly Ohntrup, Administrator of the Estate of Robert 

Ohntrup, Deceased, and Beverly Ohntrup, in her own right,

 Appellants

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D. C. No. 2-76-cv-00742)

District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

___________
2

Argued September 25, 2013

Before: AMBRO, FISHER and 

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 25, 2014)

William F. Ford, Esq. [Argued]

Rachel E. Stephens, Esq.

Lathrop & Gage

2345 Grand Boulevard

Suite 2200

Kansas City, MO 64108

Will W. Sachse, Esq.

Dechert

2929 Arch Street

18th Floor, Cira Centre

Philadelphia, PA 19104

Attorneys for Intervenor Alliant Techsystems, Inc.

Casey B. Green, Esq. [Argued]

Wade D. Albert, Esq.

Sidkoff, Pincus & Green

1101 Market Street

Suite 2700

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Attorneys for Appellant Beverly Ohnthrup

Thomas J. Sullivan, Jr., Esq. [Argued]

Viola Vetter, Esq.

Brady L. Green, Esq.
3

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius

1701 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorneys for Appellee Morgan, Lewis & Bockius

____________

OPINION

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

These two appeals arise from the failure of a Turkish 

arms manufacturer to pay a thirty-year-old judgment. The 

first appeal (No. 12-4500) requires us to review the District 

Court’s order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

Perceiving no abuse of discretion, we will affirm that order. 

The second appeal (No. 12-4065) challenges the District 

Court’s conclusion that certain post-judgment discovery 

requests impose an “undue burden.” Because the District 

Court erred when it relied upon the uncertainty surrounding 

the judgment creditor’s ability to attach the targeted property, 

we will vacate that order and remand.

I

The historical facts underlying this dispute are 

incidental to the issues now before us, so we recount them 

only briefly. In 1975, a pistol manufactured by the judgment 

debtor malfunctioned, firing a bullet through Robert 

Ohntrup’s hand while he loaded the gun. Robert and his wife 

Beverly filed a products liability action in the District Court 

against the seller of the pistol, Firearms Center, Inc., and its 

owners. Defendants then impleaded the manufacturer of the 
4

pistol, Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK), which 

is wholly owned by the Republic of Turkey. After a bench 

trial, the District Court entered a final judgment holding 

Firearms Center and MKEK jointly liable for $847,173.97

and obliging MKEK to indemnify Firearms Center. MKEK 

appealed and we affirmed. See Appeal of Makina ve Kimya 

Endustrisi Kurumu (Ohntrup I), 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985).

The law firm of Morgan Lewis & Bockius (the Firm or 

Morgan Lewis) represented MKEK throughout the products 

liability litigation. MKEK terminated the Firm after learning 

that we dismissed its appeal in March 1985, and the Firm 

filed a motion to withdraw. Under the local rules of the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania, an attorney must receive permission from that

court to withdraw unless his client appoints replacement 

counsel. See E.D. Pa. Local R. 5.1(c). It permitted the 

individual Morgan Lewis lawyers to withdraw but required 

the Firm to remain as counsel of record until MKEK hired 

substitute counsel.

The Firm appealed the partial denial of its motion to 

withdraw, but we affirmed. Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., Inc.

(Ohntrup II), 802 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1986). In doing so, we 

noted that the Firm filed its motion only a few months after 

the Ohntrups initiated collection efforts, when it remained to 

be seen whether MKEK would ultimately comply with the 

District Court’s discovery orders. At that time, we viewed the 

Firm as an important conduit for communication between the 

Ohntrups and MKEK, which had already earned its reputation 

as an “intract[a]ble litigant.” Id. at 679. Without the Firm, we 

noted that the substantial communication gap between the 

Ohntrups and MKEK would hamper post-judgment 

proceedings. Id.
5

The Ohntrups tried in vain to collect their judgment, as 

MKEK disregarded the Ohntrups’ discovery requests. The 

Ohntrups sought assistance from the United States 

Department of State and they pursued MKEK in the Turkish 

courts, both to no avail. They also tried to add the Republic of 

Turkey as a defendant under an alter ego theory, but Turkey 

and MKEK ignored the District Court’s discovery orders in 

that regard.

In 2007, eight years after Robert died of cancer, 

Beverly, in her personal capacity and as administrator of 

Robert’s estate (collectively, Ohntrup), obtained a $16 million 

civil contempt judgment against MKEK that grows by 

$10,000 annually until MKEK complies with discovery.

Meanwhile, the original judgment continues to increase by 

ten percent each year to account for delay damages.

Ohntrup’s judgments against MKEK are now worth about 

$25 million.

Over twenty-five years have passed, and MKEK has 

yet to respond to a discovery request or participate in any way 

in post-judgment proceedings. Despite having been thwarted 

at seemingly every turn, Ohntrup’s lawyers continue their 

dogged pursuit of MKEK. In 2011, they learned of a $16.2 

million transaction in which a Minneapolis-based company 

called Alliant Techsystems, Inc. (Alliant), agreed to sell 

munitions manufacturing components to MKEK. Ohntrup 

obtained some initial discovery from Alliant, but the District 

Court entered an order denying Ohntrup’s subsequent 

discovery requests. When Ohntrup recently renewed her postjudgment discovery efforts, Morgan Lewis again sought leave 

to withdraw as counsel for MKEK. This time, the District 

Court granted the motion to withdraw. Ohntrup appeals both 

orders.
6

II

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction over both appeals 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In Morgan Lewis’s previous 

appeal of this dispute, we applied the doctrine of “practical 

finality” to exercise jurisdiction over its appeal of the District 

Court’s order denying its motion to withdraw from 

representing MKEK. Ohntrup II, 802 F.2d at 678. For the 

reasons stated in that opinion, we have jurisdiction over 

Ohntrup’s present appeal of the District Court’s order 

granting the Firm’s withdrawal from representing MKEK 

(No. 12-4500).

As for Ohntrup’s appeal of the District Court’s order 

denying post-judgment discovery in aid of execution (No. 12-

4065), the same rationale again leads us to conclude that we 

have jurisdiction. The District Court’s order in that appeal 

prevents Ohntrup from learning more about the munitions 

manufacturing components she claims belong to MKEK. 

Without that information, Ohntrup is unable to attach the 

property. The District Court’s order ends Ohntrup’s pursuit of 

that property, and to deny jurisdiction would render the 

District Court’s order effectively unreviewable. This would 

be inappropriate for the same reasons found by some of our 

sister courts, which have applied the doctrine of practical 

finality to exercise jurisdiction over orders denying postjudgment discovery. See Wilkinson v. F.B.I., 922 F.2d 555, 

558 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Kokkonen 

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994); United 

States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 104–06 (5th Cir. 1967); 

see also Saldana-Sanchez v. Lopez-Gerena, 256 F.3d 1, 7 

n.12 (1st Cir. 2001) (endorsing this proposition). We join 

those courts in holding that a judgment creditor may appeal 
7

from the denial of discovery in aid of execution. Accordingly, 

we have jurisdiction to hear both appeals.

III

Having established our jurisdiction, we turn to 

Ohntrup’s appeal of the District Court’s order granting 

Morgan Lewis’s motion to withdraw. After Ohntrup recently 

restarted efforts to collect on the judgment, the Firm renewed 

the request the District Court denied over twenty-five years 

ago and asked for permission to withdraw as counsel for 

MKEK. Finding that continued representation would serve no 

meaningful purpose, the District Court entered an order 

granting the motion. We review that decision for abuse of 

discretion. Ohntrup II, 802 F.2d at 679.

Our decision in Ohntrup II and this appeal both 

implicate the relevant local rule for attorney withdrawal, 

which provides: “An attorney’s appearance may not be 

withdrawn except by leave of court, unless another attorney

of this court shall at the same time enter an appearance for the 

same party.” E.D. Pa. Local R. Civ. P. 5.1(c).1 Although we 

affirmed the District Court’s order in Ohntrup II, we took 

issue with the notion that Morgan Lewis could not withdraw 

until MKEK hired substitute counsel. We said in that regard:

We do not believe that such a result 

automatically follows in all cases from the 

language of [Local Rule 5.1(c)]. Otherwise, a 

lawyer in the present situation might be unable 

to withdraw at any time. Such a result is neither 

 

1 Formerly E.D. Pa. Local R. Civ. P. 18(c).
8

mandated nor required for the effective 

administration of the judicial system. Rather, 

we conclude that a law firm is entitled to 

withdraw once the firm demonstrates to the 

satisfaction of the district court that its 

appearance serves no meaningful purpose, 

particularly insofar as an opposing interest is 

concerned.

Id. at 679–80. 

A panel of our Court and district courts within the 

Third Circuit have interpreted the quoted passage in Ohntrup 

II as enunciating a “meaningful purpose” test that guides the 

district court’s discretion on a motion for leave to withdraw. 

These courts have formulated three- and four-factor tests to 

decipher the import of “meaningful purpose.”2 We perceive 

two problems with that approach. First, there is no multifactor test that a district court must apply to decide a motion 

for attorney withdrawal. Rules regarding attorney withdrawal 

are necessarily general because of the context-laden nature of 

such determinations. The interests to be considered will vary 

widely from case to case. Second, contrary to the District 

 

2 See, e.g., Buschmeier v. G&G Investments, Inc., 222 

F. App’x 160 (3d Cir. 2007); Best Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Accuray, 

Inc., No. 2:10-CV-1043, 2014 WL 281676 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 

2014); Sharp v. Verizon Del., Inc., No. 11-1209, 2012 WL 

6212615 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2012); S.E.C. v. Asthma Disease 

Mgmt., Inc., No. 02-7436, 2012 WL 1658410 (E.D. Pa. May 

11, 2012); Select Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Asset Building 

Consultants, Ltd., No. 10-953, 2011 WL 283186 (W.D. Pa. 

Jan. 26, 2011); Worldspan, L.P. v. Ultimate Living Grp., LLC, 

No. 03-1081, 2006 WL 1046942 (D. Del. Apr. 20, 2006).
9

Court’s interpretation, its discretion to grant a motion to 

withdraw does not begin with whether the attorney serves a 

meaningful purpose. Rather, we stated that when the law firm 

serves no meaningful purpose, it “is entitled to withdraw.” 

Ohntrup II, 802 F.2d at 680 (emphasis added). That is, it 

would be an abuse of discretion to deny its motion to 

withdraw. “The very concept of discretion presupposes a zone 

of choice within which the trial courts may go either way.” 

Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 1984). 

The point at which the law firm no longer serves a 

meaningful purpose in the case marks the outer boundary of 

the District Court’s discretion because withdrawal would be 

required at that point. By requiring “leave of court” before an 

attorney may withdraw, the local rules commit the decision 

on attorney withdrawal to the discretion of the district court. 

And that discretion is not governed by any “meaningful 

purpose” test. 

Here, the District Court granted the Firm’s renewed 

motion for withdrawal and did not abuse its discretion in 

doing so. Ohntrup claims the District Court erred because, 

without the Firm as counsel to MKEK, she will suffer 

onerous service requirements under the Hague Convention, 

which governs service on foreign defendants in countries, like 

Turkey, that have ratified the treaty.3 Ohntrup argues that 

 

3 This question turns on the interpretation of Article 10 

of the Hague Convention, which governs service by mail. It is 

a question of first impression in our Court and one that 

divides the other courts of appeals. As an alternative to 

reversing the District Court’s dismissal of Morgan Lewis, 

Ohntrup asks us to hold that she may serve papers by mail 

without running afoul of the Hague Convention. This 
10

such a burden weighs far more heavily than the Firm’s light 

burden of forwarding papers to Turkey. We disagree. 

At the time the District Court denied the Firm’s first 

motion to withdraw, it remained uncertain how the Ohntrups’ 

post-judgment proceedings would unfold and whether MKEK 

would comply with discovery requests served on the Firm. 

We affirmed the District Court’s initial denial of the motion 

to withdraw because there was a chance that the Firm’s 

presence would facilitate communication between the parties, 

not to guarantee Ohntrup the most convenient method to 

comply with the service requirements in the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. By now, it is clear that the Firm is merely a 

captive, uncompensated process server and that Ohntrup’s 

efforts to communicate with MKEK through the Firm are 

futile. Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it 

granted the Firm’s motion to withdraw.4

IV

 

hypothetical question is not ripe for review. See Peachlum v. 

City of York, Pa., 333 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 2003).

4 Ohntrup asserts that our decision in Ohntrup II, 

which affirmed the District Court’s statement denying the 

Firm’s motion to withdraw until MKEK obtains substitute 

counsel, is law of the case. The penultimate sentence in our 

opinion in Ohntrup II explicitly negates this argument: “Our 

affirmance is without prejudice to renewal of the motion at a 

later appropriate time even if no substitute counsel replaces 

Morgan.” 802 F.2d at 680.
11

We next consider Ohntrup’s appeal of the District 

Court’s order denying additional discovery in aid of 

execution. We review the denial of discovery for an abuse of 

discretion. Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 

213 F.3d 124, 138 (3d Cir. 2000). 

Our review of this order begins with a summary of the 

relevant factual and procedural history. Two months after 

Alliant announced its contract with MKEK, Ohntrup filed a 

motion for supplementary relief in aid of execution pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) and Pa. R. Civ. P. 3118. Ohntrup 

asked the District Court to enjoin Alliant from transferring 

any property in its possession owned by MKEK and to 

compel Alliant to disclose information regarding its 

transactions with MKEK. At the recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge, the District Court denied Ohntrup’s request 

for an injunction, but granted discovery, subject to a 

confidentiality order to protect Alliant’s confidential business 

information.

Following the District Court’s order, Alliant produced

its current agreements with MKEK, along with information 

on MKEK’s finances and Alliant’s shipments to Turkey. 

Ohntrup’s lawyers alleged deficiencies in Alliant’s responses, 

but the Magistrate Judge disagreed, holding that Alliant was 

not required to supplement its responses with specifics on 

future shipments. Soon thereafter, Ohntrup served Alliant 

with three additional sets of discovery requests, mostly 

concerning the timing of the shipments. Alliant moved to 

quash those requests, and the Magistrate Judge issued an 

order reaffirming her decision that Alliant need not

supplement its responses. Upon review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s order, the District Court held that additional 

discovery would be an “undue burden” on Alliant under Pa. 
12

R. Civ. P. 4011(b) because: (1) discovery may jeopardize 

Alliant’s relationship with MKEK, (2) Alliant is an innocent 

third party, (3) it would incur expenses responding to 

discovery, and (4) discovery may be futile if the Foreign 

Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq.,

protects the components from attachment.

The District Court’s analysis improperly considered 

the possibility that discovery might be futile without 

determining whether that was in fact the case. Although the 

District Court is correct that “there is doubt as to whether 

Plaintiffs will likely be able to execute on their judgments,” 

Ohntrup’s potential inability to show that the subject property 

is not immune from attachment is immaterial to the question 

of unreasonable burden.5 See App. at 14. Ohntrup should not 

be penalized in the pursuit of discovery in aid of execution 

merely because a novel or difficult question of law is 

implicated. Accordingly, we will remand so the District Court

may analyze the question anew. 

This does not mean that Alliant must wait until 

Ohntrup files a writ of execution if it wishes to argue that the 

FSIA bars attachment. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s 

recent pronouncement regarding the FSIA, if MKEK’s 

munitions manufacturing components are immune from 

attachment, then the District Court should deny Ohntrup’s 

discovery request “because information that could not 

 

5 The District Court relied on the “unreasonable . . . 

burden” rule in Pa. R. Civ. P. 4011(b) for its ruling, but used 

the “undue burden” term of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. As the District 

Court applied the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, we 

will use the language of those rules.
13

possibly lead to executable assets is simply not ‘relevant’ to 

execution in the first place.” Republic of Argentina v. NML 

Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014) (quoting Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). Thus, if Alliant can persuade the District 

Court that Ohntrup cannot attach the targeted property, then 

Ohntrup’s discovery would be irrelevant under Rule 4011(c).6

Conversely, if the District Court concludes that the targeted 

property is not immune, that fact would obviously weigh in 

Ohntrup’s favor. Finally, if the District Court chooses not to 

decide whether the targeted property is subject to attachment

or lacks sufficient information to reach a definitive 

conclusion on the issue before discovery, any speculation in 

that regard should not be a factor in the Court’s unreasonable

burden analysis. See NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2257-58.

* * *

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 

Court’s order granting Morgan Lewis’s motion to withdraw 

as counsel for MKEK. We will vacate the order of the District 

Court precluding discovery and remand the case for 

additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

6 As the party objecting to the discovery, Alliant would 

bear the burden of persuasion on the FSIA issue. See Winck v. 

Daley Mack Sales Inc., 21 Pa. D. & C.3d 399, 404 (Pa. Com. 

Pl. 1980). We do not decide who bears the burden of 

persuasion when a party actually attempts to attach property 

that is arguably immune and the FSIA is directly at issue.