FINAL C OPY

294 Ga. 455

S13A174 5. DARLING INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. CARTER et al.

B ENHAM , Justice. This caseinvolves a dispute over title to a

7.63 ac re parcel of land lo cated in Bacon County. The pa rcel w as origin ally pa

rt of a 95.125 acre parcel owned byH.S. C arter, now dec ease d, that was ta ken by B acon C ounty via emine nt domain procee dings com

me nced in 1973. As a

result of the con demna

tion procee dings, Bacon

County acquired

a total of 2522.3 ac res for t

he purpose

of

crea ting a publicrecre ation proj ect know n as La ke Alm a and th e 95.125 acre Carterparce l was ju st one of t he parc e ls conde mned f

or this purpo se. Th e record s hows tha

t the propo sed Lake Alma was part of a larger u rban develop ment

project that received funds from the Federal Mod el Cities Progr am so that the City of Alm a and Bacon County could execute a development plan that include d, am ong other t hings, a n indu stri al park , a wa ste wa ter tre atment plant, and improvement of the local airport, in addition to construc tion of La ke Alma. The other projects were c omple ted but, due to prot racte d litiga

tion and other reasons, the Lake Alma pro ject was abandoned and never construc ted. In2

the meantim e, in 1985, the county granted an undivided one-half intere st in the Lake Alma tract to the City of Alma. After th e project was abando ned, at t he request of the city and cou nty, the General Assembly passed an amendm ent to OCGA § 36-9-3, effective July 1, 1992, that permitte d counties to sell back to the original

owners l and that

had been acquired for c reati on or deve lopme nt of

a lake, such as the La

ke Alm a proje ct, but

the le gislati on faile d t o provide fo r repurch ase of land by

the heirs of the o riginal owners. See Ga. L . 1992, p. 1348, § 1. By that time, H.S. Carter was deceased, and th e 95.125 ac r e parcel originallyowned by him was a pparently one of the only

parcels condemned for constructio n of Lake Alma that was not repurchased by th e original own er. The chain o f titleto t

he 7.63 ac res at

issue in this appe al ref

lects the f ollow ing conveyances: On December 31, 20 03, the count y and city each executed quitcla

im dee ds pu rpo rting to c onvey th e 7.63 a cres t o the Ba con County Development Authority , and on that same day the De velop me nt Author ity ex ecute d a war ranty d eed for the prope rty to Sout heastern Maintenance and Constru ction, Inc. In 2005, South eastern Maintenance gr anted

an ease ment o ve r a port ion of the property to appellant Da rling International, Inc. Also in 200 5, Southeast ern Mai ntenance executed a warranty deed3

purporting

to conve y 3.04 8 acres of the disputed property to D arling, and in 2007 it exe cuted a

warranty deed conveyin g the remainder of th e 7.63 acres to Darling. On July 1, 2010, OCGA § 36-9- 3 was a mende d to grant

the heirs of the original l andowners th e right to rep urchase land su ch as that which was condemned for

Lak e Alm a (OCG

A § 36-9-3 (g) (3) (B)). See Ga . L. 201 0, p. 7 4 6, § 1/HB 703. Shortly thereafter, certain heirs of H. S. Carter sought to repurch ase Mr. Carter’s orig inal 95.125 acre parcel. On December 21, 2010, t

he City of Alma

exec uted a q

uitclaim dee d to Bac on County convey ing it s undivid edinterest in th e 95.125 acres and , that same day, Baco n County executed a quitc laim

deed c onveying

all of i ts undivide d intere st in the property to the H.S. C arter heirs who are the appellees h erein. The quitclaim deed st ates that Bacon

County intends “to convey to Grantees only all properties which it obtained from

their fa ther Hoke Carter by cond emna

tion . . . Less & Exce

pt any portion of said pro perties which have be en previ ously le gitima tely c onveye d by the Grantor .” The

Carte r h eirs the n filed a petitio n to quiet

title a nd for ejec tment agains t Darling and Sout heaste rn Maint enanc e with r espec t to the 7.63 acr es. Th e parti es stipul ated to the undis puted m ateri al fac ts, and e ac h1 The convey ance from Bacon County

to the Bacon County D evelopment Authority

and the subsequent

conveya nce to Southeastern Maintenanceand Construction, Inc. occurr ed on the same da y. The Carter heirs assert, and Darling appears to concede, that Bacon County utilized the Ba con County Development Autho rity as a “straw man” to convey the property to Southeaster n Maintenance for purported economic deve lopment purposes. 4 party filed a motion for summary j udgment. Darling asserted it was entitled to summary judgment with res pect to the Carter heirs’ quiet title ac tion and their claim for eje ctment beca

use, a s a resu lt of thecounty’ s previous convey ance of the disputed property to the Developme nt Authority and the subsequent chain of conveyances by wh ich Darling ul timately obtained titl e, the Ca rter he irs do not have title to that p roperty. The C arter heirs asserte d they were e ntitled to

summ ary judgmen t, and t

hat Da rling’s m otion should be denie d, bec ause th e previous c onveya

nces a re not valid. The Carter heirs a rgued tha t the pre vious conveyance to the D evelopment Auth ority w as inva lid as a result of the cou nty’s failure to foll ow the requireme nts of OCGA § 36-9-2 to enter an order on its minutes authorizing disposal o f the real prop erty. They further argued t hat the conveyance of the previously c ondemne d property to Southeas tern M aintenance

was invalid

because it am

ounted to a legally impermissible sale of condemned propertyto private

develop ers for private u se and was not a tran sfer for a pro per alter nativepublic use. 1 Darlin g argued that the se previ ous conve yance s are2 Although the attorney representing theCarter heirs states in a supplemental brief that the issue of Darling’s status as a bona fide purchaser was first raised on appeal and was “never pr esented to the trial court for determination,” the re cord ref lects this issue was raised and supported by argument a nd citations to leg al author ity i n Darling ’s brief

respondi ng to the Carter h eirs’ cr

ossmotion for summary judgme nt. 5 legall y valid . Furthe r, Dar

ling asserted it was entitled to judgme nt in its f avor becau se it was a bona

fide purc haser of

the property wit

hout knowle dge of

the Carter heirs’ in terest in the pr operty. 2 Without add

ressing D arling’s bona fide purchas er argu

ment, the trial cour

t entered judgme nt in favo r of the Carter heirs along with a decree th at title t o the propertyvests in them and is superior to Da rling’s claim

of title . The c ourt found that the county’ s 2003 con veyance to the Developmen t Auth ority was invalid and did not

serve t o pass tit

le bec ause th e count

y fa iled to f

ollow the procedures required by OCGA § 36-9-2 to reco rd on its minutes th e authoriz ation

to convey

the property , whic h defic iency was ne ver correcte d by ratific ation. Further, the court foun d that the subseque nt atte mpt

to transf er the propertyto Southea stern Ma intena nce wa s invalid

be cause n either the county nor the city ever fo rmulated an economic development plan that encompassed an alternative pu blic use of th e property. 1. (a) The fir st issueraise d on appea l is whe ther, de spite B acon C ounty’s6

failure to com ply wit h the requirements of OCG A § 36-9-2 when it

conveyed its undivided one-half interest in the property to the Development Auth or ity, Darling is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of this irregularity

so that its title is superior to that of the Carter he irs. Pursuant to OCGA § 23-1- 20, “[a] bo na fidepurchas er for value wit hout notic e of an e quity wi ll not be interfered w ith by e qui ty.”At the t ime D arling pur

chase d the property for value, no other ou tstanding interest was reflected i n the recorded ch ain of title. At the ti me o f the 2003 c onveya nce of t he proper

ty to Sout

heastern Maintenance, the 2010 ame ndment to OCGA

§ 36-9-3 (g), permi tting dis position

to the heirs of th e original own er of proper ty that had been condemned for constr uct ion of a recreational lake but wh ich was no lon ger needed for such a pu rpose, had not yet been pas sed. See Ga. L. 2010, p. 74 6, § 1/HB 703. “[F]ailure to use the la nds for the purpose

for whic h they w ere condemned does not ca

use title to revert to th e original owners.” Galloway v. Bd. of Commrs. of Banks County , 246 G a. 472, 473 (271 SE2d 784) (1980), citing Sadtler v. Atlanta , 236 Ga. 396 (223 SE2d 819 ) (1976) . Accordingly, Darling assert s the Carter heirs’ intere sts did not a rise unti l 2010 and t

hus were nonexistentat

the tim es of

Darling’s p urchases in 20 05 and 200 7 and that it was7

an impossibility

for Darling to have notice of a n interest that did not yet e xist. Fir st, relyi ng upon Head v. Lee , 203 Ga . 191, 201 ( 4) (45 SE2d 66 6) (1947), the Carter heirs asser t that because Bacon County f ailed either

to reco rd authority for the sale to the Development Authority on its minutes as requir ed byOCGA § 36-9-2, or to ratify the sale a t any time be fore the 2010 con veyance to them, the purpor

ted 2003 convey ance to the Devel opment Authority

did not pass title and the Develo pment Authori ty’ s t itle is void. In West v. Fulton County , 267 Ga. 456, 457 (1) (479 SE2d 722) (1997), this Court note d “[t]he re

are no exceptions set forth in OCGA § 36-9-2 to the re quirement t ha t authoriz ation

for the conv eyance of county- owned property must be duly entered on the minutes of the proper county

authorit y.” B utin West , it was the countythat sought to voi d the m istake n convey ance of county-owned property in a tax sale because the prop erty, having been o wned by the county, was not subject to taxa

tion and shoul d not have been t he subject of levy and sal e by the tax comm

issioner . And in ne ither Head nor West was the

issue of th e purchas er’s status as a bona fide purc haser w ithout

notice raised or considered by this Court. In assert ing the title c onveye d to the D evelopment Auth ority w as void, the8

Carterheirs analogize th e conveyance to a forg ed deed which, this Court has held, is a null ity tha

t does no t p ass good ti tle eve n to a subse quent bona

fide purchaser without

notice. See Brock

v. Yale Mtg. Co rp. , 287 Ga . 849 (700 SE 2d 583) (2010) ( “[E]ven a bona fi de purcha ser for va lue wit hout notic e of

a forge ry cannot acquir e good title

from a grante e in a f

orged dee d, or those

holding under such a grant ee, be caus e the gr antee has no title to convey.”). But the Carter heirs cite no authori ty for the pro position that county-owned property conv eyed viaa properly executed deed, wherethe orde r direc ting disposa l of the property

was simply

not rec orded on the

minute s, con stitut es a void conv eyance that wouldnot pass title to a subseq uent bona

fide purch aser fo r valuewithout notice. As appli ed to the facts of this c ase, we dec line to adopt suc h a rule. Unlike t he circum stance s prese nt in the caseof a forged deed, here t he county possessed title t o its undivi ded one-h alf int erest in the pro perty, and no issu e

was raised regardin g the author ity of the ind ividual who executed the deed to act

on behalf of the c ounty. W e also rejec t the a ttem pted ana logy to c ases in

volving

a deed executed by a m entall y incom petent person. Those cases have held t hat such a dee d is not void but voidable by the incompe tent pe rson or his heirs even

as agains t a bona

fide purc haser f

or value without no tice of

such incompetence.9

See, e.g., Sewel

l v. A nderson , 197 Ga . 623, 624 h n. 8 (30 SE 2d 102) (1944); Thornton v. Carpenter , 222 Ga . App. 80 9, 813 (2) (d ) (476 SE2 d 92) (1996). In the case of a c onveyance of county-owe d property that was not properly recorded in the m

inutes a s require d by OCG A § 36-9-2, the de ed t o the immedia te grantee ma

y be voidable in that the c ounty or the immediate grantee may seek to invalida

te theconveyance (compare West v. F ulton County , supra) ; but as to a subsequent bona fide purchaser wi thout notice of the failure to comply with the statu te, the deed is not v oid. (b) Second, e ven if the previous c onveya

nce to t he Deve lopme nt Authority is not void, t

he Car ter heirs asse rt

Darlin g does not q

ualify as a bona fide purchas er with out notic e. The y argue the issue is not whether Darling had notice of their claim but w het her it had notice of any le gal impedime nt to its acquiri ng title a s again st the w orld. Ac cording to the Carter heirs, once Darlin g was placed on notice

that a governm ent entity wa s a pred eces sor in title it was under a duty to determine wheth er the requir eme nts of OC GA § 36-9-2 were met, and, ha

ving fail ed to do so, Darlin g was pla ced on c onstructive notic e of the defec t in the c hain of title. No legal authority, however, is cited for this proposition

. I nstead, the Carter heirs see k to draw an analogy to the duty10

incum bent upon a purchaser to confirm the validity of a guardi an’s app ointment when the chain o f titlecontains a

deed e xecute d by one who purports to act in the capacity of legal guard ian of another. See Chase Manha ttan Mtg. Cor p. v. Shelton , 290 Ga. 544, 547-548 (2) (722 SE2 d 743) (201 2 ). But guardianship presents a special situation in which the person executing the title has no int erest to convey and the exec ution is valid and pass es title only if th ere has been an appointm ent

bythe probate cou rt. See Dickey v. Sweeney , 16 Ga. App. 559 (8 5 SE 766) (1915). In such a case , it has long been held that the purchaser is “bound, at his peril” to ex amine the validity of t he appointment. S ee Dooley v. Bell , 87 Ga. 74, 77 (1 3 SE 284) ( 1891). As noted abov e, no issue has b een

r aised with respect to the auth ority of the in dividual wh o executed the deed convey ing the property to th e Deve lopme nt Authori ty to a ct on be half of a nd bind the cou nty. C ompare Deutsc he Bank Nat. Tru st Co. v. JP

Morgan Chas e Bank, N.A. , 307 Ga. App. 307, 309 (1) (704 SE2d 823 ) (2010) (a warranty deed

was valid on its face bec ause it appea red to be duly exe cuted by

an offic er of a corpora tion with authority to act, and thu s therewas no re ason to put a good faith purchaser on notice t o inquir e further int o its validi ty). Unlike a conveyance by a gua

rdian, Bacon

Count y owned the pr opert y in its own na me11

and did not purport to convey the property on beh alf of a

ny other person or entity. “Any circumstance which would place a man of ordinary prudence fully upon his gua

rd, and induce seriou s inquiry, is sufficient to constitute n otice of

a prior unre corded de ed.” (Citat ions and pun ctuati on omitt ed.) Montgomery v. Barrow , 286 Ga. 896, 897 (1) (692 SE2d 351) (2010) (an issue of fact was createdas to whether the

purchas er was a bona fi de purcha ser wit hout notic e of prior unrecorded d eeds where a repres entative of the corpo ration that p urchased the property

admit ted he h ad bee n told unre corde d deeds to the property existe d). See a lso OCGA § 23-1-17 (“Notice sufficient to excite attent ion and put a party on inquiry

shall be noticeof eve ryth ing to whic h it is af terwa rds found th at

such inqu iry might have led. Ig norance of a fact due to neglig ence shall be equival ent to know ledge in fixing the rights of parties.”). In this case, howeve r, it is not an unreco rded deed but a fact wholly outside the chain of title that the Ca

rter he irs claim shoul d have pl aced Darl in g on notice and cre ated a duty to conduct an i nquiry int o it. Ci rcumstance s that have been deemed sufficie ntto incite a duty to inquire into fac ts outside the rec orded dee d record s,

or at least raisean issue

with re spect t o the purc haser’s duty to i nquire, include3 Further, we reject the Carter heirs’ assertion that title did not pass on the second of the two conveya nc es of title to Darling because the gr antor does not appear in the chain of title. The titl e dated August 1, 2007 in Darling’s favor shows “Southeast Maintena nce and Construction, Inc.” as the grantor instead of Southeastern Maintenance and Construction, Inc., which was the true previous owner of th e p ro pe rt y. “[A] mere misnomer of a corporation in a written instrument is not material or vital inits consequences, if the identity of the corporation intended is clear or can be ascertained by proof.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. , supra, 307 Ga. App. at 310 (1) (a); see also Hawkins v. Turner , 166 Ga. App. 50, 51-52 (1) (303 SE2d 164) (1983). 12 facts showing the

purchas er had be en inform ed of the existe nce of pr

ior unrecorded deeds (see Montgomery, id.); evidence of open and notorious adverse possessi on of the prop erty that shoul d have pl aced the purc haser on noticeof another’s interest in the property (see, e.g., Dyal v . McLe an , 188 Ga. 229 (3 SE2d 571) (1939)); and evidence suf ficient to pu t a mortgagee on not ice of a fraudulent s cheme (see Collinsv. Fre eman , 226 Ga. 610, 611-612 (3) (176 SE2d 704) (1970)). B ut we de cline to hold that the existence, wit

hin the chain of title, of a conveyance by a count y is a circumstance that requi res a subse quent purchaser to inquire into whether the county compl ied wit

h the re quirem ents of OCGA§ 36-9-2 t o enter an order on it s minutes autho rizing disp osal of the real property, and tha

t failur e to inquir e defeats the subs equent purch aser’s status as

a bona fide

purchas er with o ut n otice. 3 Consequently, the trial court erred in concluding that the Carter heirs’ ti tle is superio r to that of Darl ing’s as a result of Bacon County’ s failur e to comply with the re quirements of OCGA § 36-9-24 Further, we note that even if the County ’s fa ilure to com ply with the requireme nts of OCGA § 36-9-2 was sufficien t to inva lidate its quitclaim deed to the Development Authority or defeat the subse quent pur

chaser ’s status a s a bona f ide purchase r wit

hout notice of a defect in the chain of title, t

his would not have se

rved to in

validate the City of Alma’ s c onveyan ce of its und ivided one-h alf inter

est in the p

roperty since this

statute a pplies onl y to disposal o f proper

ty ow ne d b y a c ou nt y. 13 with respect to its 2003 conveyance of its intere st in the property to th e Bac on County Develop ment Authority. 4 2. The tri al cour

t also e rred in finding the 2 00 3 convey anc e to Southeas tern

Maintenance w as invalid as a re sult of the

governing

authorities’ failure to formu late a

new ec onomic develop ment p lan. The 19 73 con demna tion petitio n reflects condemnatio n of the sub ject property was so ught to acqu ire fee simple title for the purpose of using it for a public lake, park, a nd recre ation

area. While t

he peti tion stat es only

that it was fil ed p ursuant

to what is now OCGA§ 22-2-100 et s eq., the Specia l Master provisions for eminent dom ain procee dings, the parties stip ulated to the fact th at the Lake A lma projec t was p art of a develop ment p lan form ulated by the C ity of A lma f

or the purp ose of utilizing funds awarded under the federal Model Cit ies Program to com bat the effects of blighte d neighborh oods in parti cipating citie s. Const ruction of Lake Alma was one

of four proje cts inc lu ded in the devel opment plan. The oth er projects were improvement of an in dustrial par k, upgrade of water and sewag e14

tre atme nt fa cilities, and impro vement of the airpo rt. Regardless of what condem nation law the proceedings were predicated upo n, no one dis putes that the 1973 condem

nation was for a prop er public pu rpose. Neverthel ess, the trial court found that

the 2003 transfer of title to Southeastern Maintenanc e, a private develop er, thirty y ears a fter the initial condem nation, was inva

lid bec ause neither Bacon

County no r the Ci ty of Alma ever form ula ted a new ec onomic develop ment

plan that encompass ed an alternat ive us e of the condemned property. We find no authority f or the prop osition tha

t, at t he tim e of the conveyance involved i n this case, a gover ning au thority was required to reformulate a new d evelopment plan for an alternative public use of condemned property on ce its original use was abandon ed. Pursuant to OCG A § 36-6 1-9 (c), with respect to property that a municipality

or c ounty s eeks to acquire in accordance with the Urb an Redeve lopme ntLaw, “[u]nle ss the propertyis to be acquired for the pu

rpose of devoting it to a public use,” it may be acquired throu gh the exercise of the power of emine nt domain only a fter the condem ning ent it y has adopted an u rban redeve lopme ntplan authorizing the exercise of eminent doma

in by the agency to acquire the property, t

he owne r of

the real propert y to be acquired has been15

notified of

the planned

rehabi litati on of the property as set forth in the plan, a nd the owner has been of fer ed the o pp ortunity to develop the property in accordance with the plan. In this case, the property wa s not expressly acquir ed pursuant to the Urban Redevelopm ent Law, OC GA § 36-61-1 et seq., but in any event the p arties do not disput e it wa s properly acquir ed through eminen t domain proceedings and that the La ke Alm a proje ct wa s part of a deve lopme nt plan. Even assuming the or iginal cond emnation proceed i ng was condu cted pursuant to the Urban Redevelopm ent Law and that O C GA § 36-61- 9 was applicable to it, the 2003 conveyance was not a

re-taking by a munic ipality or county, and thus the tra

nsacti on was not

governed by the requirements of OCG A § 36-61-9. B y its terms, t he statute applie s to the or iginal t aking of property by emine ntdomain. The 2003 c onveya nce wa s, inste ad, a re-purposing of the propertyfrom that involved in the original taking. “[W] here pr operty is not ultimately use d for the purpose for which it was originally condem ned, it may be devoted to another pr oper publ ic use.” Galloway, supra, 246 Ga. at 473. The deed to Southea stern Ma

intena nce inc orporate s an agr eem ent whereby it agreed to construct improveme

nts on the property that were de emed to be in the public5 In Kelo , the Supreme Court held that a governmental entity ’s dispo sition of p roperty

acquired by eminent domain to anothe r private entity did not violate the Fifth Amendment prohibition agains t t aking private property for public use without just compensation when the disposition was made in furtherance of an economic development plan that serves a public purpose.

6 At the time of the convey ance to Southeastern Mai ntena nce, Art. IX, Sec. I I, Par. VI I of the Georgia Constitution

of 1983 re ad, in per

tinent pa rt: “The General Assembly may authorize any 16 intere st and “to fos ter

and deve lop new industry and employment oppo rtunities for the ci tizens of

Alma and Ba con

County.” At the time of the conveyanc e to Southeas tern

Maintenance , such a

convey ance was co nstitut ionally permissible. See Talley v. Hous ing Auth. of Columb us , 279 Ga . App. 94 (2) (630 SE 2d 550) (2006) (affirming su mmary judgment to a housi ng author ity sued by the or iginal

owner of pr opert y that h ad been acquir ed by co ndemn ation but la ter sold to a private citizen without any requireme nt for public use after the original public purpose for the condemnation wa s abandoned). In 2003 the Georgia Constitut ionhad not yet been amended, in response to public concern over the holding of

the United S tates Suprem e Court i n Kelo v . City

of New London , 545 U. S. 469 (125 S Ct 2655, 1 62 LE2d 439) (2005), 5 to withdr aw theprevious constitutionally

grante d authorit

y for the sale or d ispositi on of pro perty, acquired by a government al enti ty by e minen t doma in, to p rivate ent ities fo r private use. 6 The amendment to OCGA § 36-61-9 (c) in 1971 (Ga . L. 197 1, p.co un ty, muni cipal ity, or ho usin g a ut ho ri ty to undert

ake and carry out commun

ity r edevelo pment, whichmay include the sale or other disposition

of prope rty acquire d by

eminent d

omain to private enterpr ise for private uses.” The amendment which e liminated th is provision and substituted the requirement

that “eminent domain shall not be used fo r r ed ev el op me nt pu rp os es by a ny e nt it y, except for public use, as defined by general law”

(see Ga. L. 2006, p. 1111, § 1), was approved by the voters at the general elec tion held on November 7, 2006.

17 445, §§ 1, 2), requiring the condemning governm ental entity to offer the owner of th e property to be acquired the opportunity to develop the property in accordance with an adopted urb an redeve lopme nt plan, was en acte d as a remedy to the previou s “evil” of the a bsolute po wer gra nted to c ounties a

nd municipalit ies t o take private property for a ny public or even non-public purpose so long as the ta

king was to effe ctuate

an adopt ed urban redeve lopme nt plan. See McCord v. Housing Auth. of City of Atlanta , 246 Ga . 547, 550 ( I) (272 SE2d

247) (1980). But by its terms, this re quirement applies to the initial acquisi tion. Likewi se, a t the ti me of t

he conveyance

to Southea stern Maintenance, the Gen er al Assembly had not yet enacte d certain am endments to OCGA § 22-1-1, known as the Landowner’s B ill of Rights and Private Property Protec tion

Act, w hich exempted , from

the definitio n of “pub lic use,” the public benefit of

eco nomic develop ment w ith respe ct to a uthority for

exerc ising the power of em inent domain. SeeOCGA § 22-1-1 (9) (B), e ffective April 4, 200 6 (Ga. L. 2006, p. 3 9, § 3/HB 131 3).7 Because the original conde mnation was for a proper public purpose, this case is not analogous to those c ases involv ing exercise of eminent domain for the purpose of one- to-one transfers of private property which the Supreme Court in Kelo stated are properly viewed “with a skeptical eye .” See Kelo , supra, 545 U. S. at 487, n17. 18 The 2003 disposit

ion of theproperty in d ispute in th is case is not go verned bythese 2006 ch anges to the law go verning eminent domain. We conc lude that at the time of the 200 3 convey ance to So utheast ern Maintenanc e, the City of Alma and Bacon Count y w ere not required to formulate a n economic develop ment

plan for a

n alter nativeuse of

the property

original ly ac quired by condem nation thirty years earlier. See Talley , supra. Furth er, the conveyance in this case was made for what appears to have been a proper pub lic purpos e at that time. We reject the Carter heirs’ assertion th at it was a one-to-o ne transfer of property interests for a private a nd not a publ ic purpose which vi olates the Fifth Amendme

nt. 7 Consequentl y, we rev erse t he trial court’s holding tha t the 2003 conv eyance to Southeaster n Maintenance was inv alid. For the se rea son s, the trial court’s order granting sum mary judgment to the Carter heirs is reversed, and th e decree establishing title is vacated. Judgme ntreversed in part a nd vacat ed in pa

rt. All the Justi ces c oncur, excep tHunsteinand Nahmias, JJ., who concur in judgment only as to Di vision19

2.

Decid ed Janua ry 27, 201 4. Title to land. Bacon S uperior Cou rt. Before Judg e DeVane. Hunter, Maclean , Exley & Dunn, Robert B . Lovett, Hea ther N. Hamm onds , for appellant. Smith, Ram ay & Bennett, Ken W. Smith , for app ellee s.