J-S39019-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

HASAN GOODEN-REID 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1650 MDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 22, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0000590-2016

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2018

Hasan Gooden-Reid (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order 

dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The facts presented at the guilty plea hearing established that Lycoming 

County Housing Authority received complaints of a foul odor and flies 

originating from Appellant’s apartment, and on July 27, 2015, the Housing 

Authority asked Appellant to vacate the apartment so that it could be 

fumigated. Once inside the apartment, Housing Authority workers noticed 

that the odor was worse and that there was a “sludge like” material in the sink 

and on the walls. The Housing Authority contacted the Williamsport Bureau 

of Police after one of the workers, Dennis Ulsamer, discovered a human jaw 

bone in the garbage outside of Appellant’s apartment. The police were also 

informed that Appellant’s girlfriend, Kristina Pope (Victim), frequented the 
J-S39019-18

- 2 -

apartment, but had not be in contact with her caseworker or any other 

individual in several weeks. 

The police contacted Appellant who, after being Mirandized, admitted 

that he was in a physical altercation with Victim. Appellant stated that Victim 

had grabbed a knife to protect herself, but he ended up with the knife, and

stabbed the Victim in the back at least four times. Appellant placed the 

Victim’s body in a closet in his apartment and disposed of all evidence of the 

killing in the housing complex’s garbage collection area. After being advised 

by the Housing Authority that the apartment would be fumigated, Appellant 

placed the Victim’s body in the trash where it was later found.

On June 9, 2016, Appellant entered negotiated guilty pleas to thirddegree murder and other crimes and was sentenced to 30 to 60 years in 

prison. He did not file a direct appeal. 

On February 2, 2017, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition and 

on February 14, 2017, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent 

Appellant. In his petition, Appellant asserted that plea counsel was ineffective 

for failing to (1) argue self-defense; (2) show that Appellant’s mental illness 

interfered with his ability to enter a guilty plea that was knowing, voluntary, 

or intelligent; and (3) file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal. After 

reviewing Appellant’s case file, the notes of testimony, and communicating 

with Appellant, PCRA counsel determined that no meritorious issues existed 

and filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to Turner/Finley. The PCRA court 

granted PCRA counsel’s petition on September 1, 2017, and simultaneously 
J-S39019-18

- 3 -

issued its Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition. Appellant 

filed a response to the Rule 907 notice on September 20, 2017. On September 

22, 2017, the PCRA issued a joint order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition

and memorandum addressing the merits of the claims raised. Appellant filed 

this appeal on October 24, 2017.1 

Appellant presents the following issues for review:

1. PLEA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHEN HIS 

REPRESENTATION FELL BELOW PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 

THAT RESULTED IN PREJUDICE. SPECIFICALLY WHERE 

COUNSEL:

A. FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE APPELLANT’S MENTAL 

ILLNESS INTERFERRED WITH THE APPELLANT’S ABILITY 

____________________________________________

1 Following the denial of his petition on September 22, 2017, Appellant filed a 

pro se notice of appeal docketed in the PCRA court on October 24, 2017 – one 

day outside the expiration of the 30-day appeal period, October 23, 2017. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). 

A pro se filing submitted by a prisoner incarcerated in a 

correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date it is delivered to 

the prison authorities for purposes of mailing or placed in the 

institutional mailbox, as evidenced by a properly executed 

prisoner cash slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence of the 

date that the prisoner deposited the pro se filing with the prison 

authorities.

Pa.R.A.P. 121(a). In this case, Appellant’s notice of appeal was stamped as 

received on October 23, 2017, within the 30-day appeal period, and docketed 

with the PCRA only one day outside the appeal period. Under these 

circumstances, we may infer that Appellant placed his notice of appeal into 

the hands of prison officials before the appeal period expired. See 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 931 A.2d 710 (Pa. Super. 2007) (panel may 

avoid quashal where the date of receipt indicates that appellant likely placed 

a notice of appeal into the hands of prison authorities before expiration of 

thirty days from the final order).
J-S39019-18

- 4 -

TO APPRECIATE HIS POSITION IN REGARDS TO HIS 

GUILTY PLEA.

B. PERMITTED THE APPELLANT TO UNINTELLIGENTLY 

PLEAD GUILTY WHEN A VIABLE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 

EXISTED.

C. FAILED TO FILE A POST-SENTENCE MOTION TO MODIFY 

SENTENCE/NOTICE OF APPEAL IN RELATION TO THE 

TRIAL COURT’S ABUSE OF DISCRETION PERMITTNG THE 

APPELLANT TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA BASED ON HIS 

COMPETENCY AS WELL AS THE COURT’S SEVERE 

SENTENCING UNDER THE EXTRAORDINARY 

CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. WAS PCRA COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE[NESS] DUE TO 

ABANDONMENT WHEN MERITORIOUS ISSUES EXISTED?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (PCRA court and suggested answers omitted). 

“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA 

court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quotations and 

citations omitted). “To be entitled to PCRA relief, [an] appellant must 

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, his conviction or sentence 

resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

9543(a)(2)[.]” Id.

Appellant challenges plea counsel’s effectiveness. In deciding 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we begin with the presumption that 

counsel rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 

1179, 1188 (Pa. 2014). To overcome that presumption, the petitioner must 

establish: “(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable 
J-S39019-18

- 5 -

basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice measured by 

whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. (citation omitted). To demonstrate prejudice 

in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the petitioner must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. 

King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012). If the petitioner fails to prove any of 

these prongs, the claim is subject to dismissal. Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1188.

“Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty 

plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the 

defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. 

Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quotations and citation 

omitted). “Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id.

(quotations and citations omitted). “Thus, to establish prejudice, the 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (quotations and citations omitted). “The reasonable probability test is 
J-S39019-18

- 6 -

not a stringent one; it merely refers to a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

With respect to valid guilty pleas, this Court has explained:

A valid guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 

entered. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate 

that pleas be taken in open court, and require the court to conduct 

an on-the-record colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is 

aware of his rights and the consequences of his plea. Specifically, 

the court must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant 

understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which he is pleading 

guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by 

jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges 

of sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the court is not 

bound by the terms of the agreement unless the court accepts the 

agreement. This Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea 

colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining 

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that 

plea.

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations 

omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that plea counsel was ineffective for 

failing to “show that Appellant’s mental illness interfered with the Appellant’s 

ability to appreciate his position in regards to his guilty plea.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 9. In essence, Appellant claims that his guilty plea was invalid because he 

was mentally ill. Appellant asserts that his “unnatural, robotic answers to the

judge’s colloquy” demonstrate his lack of competency to fully appreciate the 

consequences of his guilty plea. Id. at 11. 

With regard to the voluntariness of a plea, a guilty plea colloquy must 

“affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understood what the plea connoted 
J-S39019-18

- 7 -

and its consequences.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. 

Super. 1998). Once the defendant has entered a guilty plea, “it is presumed 

that he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of proving 

involuntariness is upon him.” Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 

1212 (Pa. Super. 2008). Competence to plead guilty requires a finding that 

the defendant comprehends the crime for which he stands accused, is able to 

cooperate with his counsel in forming a rational defense, and has a rational 

and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Commonwealth 

v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Here, during the lengthy guilty plea colloquy, the following relevant 

exchange occurred between the trial court and Appellant:

[Appellant]: I got mental problems. That’s what I got. I’m 

mentally ill. I’ve been like this since I was 16.

[The Court]: But you understand that your attorneys have had 

you tested to find out whether or not those mental problems would 

not enable you to commit a crime?

[Appellant]: Even if – there’s people that can commit crimes that 

have mental problems in today’s society.

[The Court]: I agree. I agree but –

[Appellant]: And they go to serve jail times, too.

[The Court]: But part of my accepting your guilty plea is – is partly 

a determination as to whether or not you understand what we’re 

talking about.

[Appellant]: I understand what you’re talking about.

[The Court]: And you do?
J-S39019-18

- 8 -

[Appellant]: Yes ma’am. Yes, ma’am.

. . .

[The Court]: Okay. Now, while you’re at – while you’ve been at 

the county prison have you been taking any medication?

[Appellant]: Yes. Yes, I have.

[The Court]: And then at some point you also – did you go to 

Torrance State Hospital?

[Appellant]: Yes, ma’am.

[The Court]: And they gave you some medicine out there?

[Appellant]: Yes.

[The Court]: Do you think that medicine, whether it’s the kind that 

you received at Torrance or the medicine that you receive at the 

county prison, do you think that’s interfering with – making it 

confusing for you to understand –

[Appellant]: No. It’s helping me out. It’s helping me. Calming 

me down, making me back to being an ordinary person.

[The Court]: Okay.

[Appellant]: And not a weirdo or a person that likes to stay to 

himself and doesn’t like to communicate with other people.

[The Court]: Okay. So you actually think that you can think more 

clearly with it?

[Appellant]: Yes, I can. Yes, ma’am.

[The Court]: All right. And over the past – I guess it’s been almost 

a year that you’ve been on that medication, have you felt pretty 

consistently able to understand?

[Appellant]: Yes. Yes, I have.

[The Court]: And to think clearly?
J-S39019-18

- 9 -

[Appellant]: Yes, ma’am.

[The Court]: Okay.

[Appellant]: Yes, I have.

N.T., 6/9/16, at 31, 37-38.

Based on the above testimony, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant 

was not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, 

and we find no error in this regard. See Kelley, 136 A.3d at 1013. 

Specifically, the PCRA court noted that the guilty plea hearing took more than 

an hour where all of the charges filed against Appellant were reviewed and 

Appellant had ample opportunity to consult with counsel. PCRA Court Opinion, 

9/22/17, at 5. Moreover, Appellant completed a comprehensive written guilty 

plea colloquy, indicating that he understood the charges against him. Id. at 

6. Appellant is bound by the statements he made in open court while under 

oath, and he may not now assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which 

contradict the statements. Turetsky, 925 A.2d at 876.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise a self-defense argument. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant 

asserts that trial counsel should have raised the affirmative defense of selfdefense to his third-degree murder charge because Victim was the initial 

aggressor. Appellant argues that “[w]hile it is true that the record states 

decedent was stabbed in the back, had counsel reviewed the circumstances 
J-S39019-18

- 10 -

of what occurred, there is a reasonable likelihood that rational triers-of-fact 

would have agreed it was self-defense . . . .” Id. No relief is due.

Appellant’s testimony at the guilty plea hearing refutes his claim. 

Appellant testified that the decision to plead guilty was his own, and agreed 

that by pleading guilty, he forfeited his right to raise a claim of self-defense: 

[Appellant’s plea counsel]: Do you understand that if you go 

through this guilty plea you’re giving up your right to claim self[-

]defense?

[Appellant]: Yes

[Appellant’s plea counsel]: And under Pennsylvania Law self[-

]defense would be a defense to the charges – some of the charges 

against you, do you understand you’re giving it up?

[Appellant]: Yes.

[Appellant’s plea counsel]: And what does that mean to you when 

I tell you you’re giving it up?

[Appellant]: It means I can’t pursue that no more.

[Appellant’s plea counsel]: You’re willing to plead guilty and you 

give up the right to claim self[-]defense?

[Appellant]: Yes.

N.T., 6/9/16, at 32. 

Likewise, our case law is clear that the entry of a guilty plea constitutes 

waiver of all defenses and defects except claims of lack of jurisdiction, invalid 

guilty plea, and illegal sentence. See Commonwealth v. Roden, 730 A.2d 

995, 997 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“Upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant 

generally waives all defects and defenses except those concerning the validity 
J-S39019-18

- 11 -

of the plea, the jurisdiction of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence 

imposed.”); see also Commonwealth v. Messmer, 863 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (“The entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all defenses 

and defects except claims of lack of jurisdiction, invalid guilty plea, and illegal 

sentence.”). Thus, there is no support for Appellant’s claim that plea counsel 

should have raised a self-defense claim. 

In his third claim, Appellant asserts that plea counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal. Although Appellant 

acknowledges that he did not advise plea counsel of his wish to file an appeal 

until after the appeal period had lapsed, Appellant asserts that due to his 

mental illness, plea counsel should have anticipated his desire and filed an 

appeal on his behalf. Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.

In rejecting his claim, the PCRA court opined:

Just prior to the end of the guilty plea colloquy, the Court advised 

the [Appellant] of his post sentence rights.

COURT: Do you have any questions for me?

[Appellant]: No, I don’t. I’m grateful. I’m grateful. Thank 

you so much. 

COURT: You’re welcome. Now you understand –

[Appellant]: Yes, I understand.

COURT: that you would still have the right to file a motion 

to modify this court’s sentence within 10 days or to take an 

appeal from what’s happened here today within 30?

[Appellant]: Yes, I understand.
J-S39019-18

- 12 -

COURT: [Your attorney] will continue to represent you 

throughout that time frame.

[Appellant]: Yes ma’am.

COURT: They’re your post sentencing rights.

[Appellant]: Yes ma’am.

COURT: Do you have any questions about those rights from 

me?

[Appellant]: No, I don’t.

COURT: Or from me?

[Appellant]: No I don’t.

[N.T., 6/9/16,] at 57.

PCRA Counsel also had the opportunity to review the file kept in 

[Appellant’s] case by trial counsel confirming the discussion that 

was held prior to [Appellant] being transported to state prison; 

trial counsel had written documentation that [Appellant] wished 

to waive his post sentence and appeal rights. However, when 

[Appellant] did wish to take an appeal, his letter was received by 

his attorney’s office past the deadline to file but that he was 

advised to file a PCRA petition. The court is satisfied that 

[Appellant] knew his post sentence rights and when he chose to 

exercise them outside the time set by rule, it was at no fault of 

his trial counsel.

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/22/17, at 8-9.

With respect to Appellant’s third issue, after careful review of the record, 

the briefs, and the decision of the Honorable Nancy L. Butts, we affirm based 

on the PCRA court’s decision. 
J-S39019-18

- 13 -

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s ineffective assistance claims 

with respect to his guilty plea counsel lack arguable merit, and the PCRA court 

did not err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

Finally, Appellant alleges that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise the issues we disposed of above. Appellant’s Brief at 19. Before 

discussing the merits of this claim, we must first determine if we may reach 

them. In Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009), our Supreme 

Court held:

[Petitioner’s] failure, prior to his PCRA appeal, to argue PCRA 

counsel’s ineffectiveness . . . results in waiver of the issue of PCRA 

counsel’s ineffectiveness. [Petitioner’s] attempt to obtain review, 

on collateral appeal, of an issue not raised in the proceedings 

below amounts to a serial PCRA petition on PCRA appeal. 

Although [petitioner] asserts his PCRA appeal was the first 

opportunity he had to challenge PCRA counsel’s stewardship 

because he was no longer represented by PCRA counsel, he could 

have challenged PCRA counsel’s stewardship after receiving 

counsel’s withdrawal letter and notice of the PCRA court’s intent 

to dismiss his petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, yet he failed 

to do so.

Id. at 880 n. 4; see also Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. 

Super. 2014 (en banc) (holding that “claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness 

may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

Here, Appellant failed to challenge PCRA counsel’s withdrawal after he 

received the no merit letter or after the PCRA court filed its notice of intent to 

dismiss. More importantly, Appellant failed to raise his issue concerning PCRA 

counsel in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors. As a result, the PCRA 

court did not have the opportunity to address Appellant’s claim, and it is 
J-S39019-18

- 14 -

waived where, consistent with Pitts and Henkel, Appellant has failed to 

preserve this issue for review. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/14/18