[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2015-Ohio-216.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

CASE NO. 2014-G-3230

 - vs - :

CINSEREE JOHNSON, :

 Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 12 C 

000142. 

Judgment: Appeal dismissed. 

James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Nicholas A. Burling, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 

44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Cinseree Johnson, pro se, 12450 Merritt Road, Chardon, OH 44024 (DefendantAppellant). 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Cinseree Johnson, brings this appeal from four judgments 

issued in a criminal action before the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas. In three 

of the judgments, the trial court overruled multiple motions for a new trial. In the fourth 

judgment, the trial court overruled multiple motions to set aside or vacate prior decisions 

in the case. Additionally, three of the judgments contain interlocutory rulings on various 
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non-dispositive motions appellant has filed over a six-month period. 

{¶2} Although not cited by the state in its submissions in this appeal, appellant 

has previously been designated a vexatious litigator under Ohio law. See Johnson v. 

Gallagher, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93009, 2009-Ohio-5385, ¶2, citing Johnson v. Pyle, 

Athens County Court of Common Pleas Nos. 08CI303 and 08CI305. As a result of this 

designation, institution of legal proceedings is governed by R.C. 2323.52. In relation to 

new appellate proceedings, the statute provides, in pertinent part: 

{¶3} “(D)(3) A person who is subject to an order entered pursuant to division 

(D)(1) of this section may not institute legal proceedings in a court of appeals, continue 

any legal proceedings that the vexatious litigator has instituted in a court of appeals 

prior to entry of the order, or make any application, other than the application for leave 

to proceed allowed by division (F)(2) of this section, in any legal proceedings instituted 

by the vexatious litigator * * * in a court of appeals without first obtaining leave of the 

court appeals to proceed pursuant to division (F)(2) of this section. 

{¶4} “* * * 

{¶5} “(F)(2) A person who is subject to an order entered pursuant to division 

(D)(1) of this section and who seeks to institute or continue any legal proceeding in a 

court of appeals or to make an application, other than an application for leave to 

proceed under division (F)(2) of this section, in any legal proceedings in a court of 

appeals shall file an application for leave to proceed in the court of appeals in which the 

legal proceedings would be instituted or are pending. The court of appeals shall not 

grant a person found to be a vexatious litigator leave for the institution or continuance 

of, or the making of an application in, legal proceedings in the court of appeals unless 
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the court of appeals is satisfied that the proceedings or application are not an abuse of 

process of the court and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings or 

application. 

{¶6} “* * * 

{¶7} “(I) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that a 

person found to be a vexatious litigator under this section has instituted, continued, or 

made an application in legal proceedings without obtaining to proceed from the 

appropriate court of common pleas or court of appeals to do so under division (F) of this 

section, the court in which the legal proceedings are pending shall dismiss the 

proceedings or application of the vexatious litigator.” 

{¶8} In light of the use of the “shall” in the foregoing provisions, an application 

for leave to proceed is mandatory before a vexatious litigator can go forward with any 

type of legal proceeding in a court of appeals. Marin v. Trumbull Cty. Probate Ct., 11th 

Dist. Trumbull No. 2012-T-0016, 2012-Ohio-2011, ¶19-20. If the required application for 

leave is not filed, dismissal is mandatory. The Huntington National Bank v. Lomaz, 11th 

Dist. Portage No. 2005-P-0075, 2006-Ohio-3880, ¶14. 

{¶9} Appellant has not filed an application for leave to proceed. On this basis 

alone, dismissal of this appeal is warranted. 

{¶10} When the appeal was filed, the trial court had not issued a sentencing 

judgment in the underlying criminal action. As a result, the four judgments appellant 

appealed were interlocutory orders not subject to an immediate appeal. However, while 

the appeal was pending, the trial court issued its sentencing judgment on December 8, 

2014. In some instances, the issuance of that judgment in the trial proceeding can have 
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the effect of rendering an existing appeal from an interlocutory order “premature” for 

purposes of determining whether it is properly before the appellate court. Under App.R. 

4(C), the existing appeal is deemed to have been filed immediately after the issuance of 

the sentencing judgment, and the appeal proceeds even though it was taken from a 

non-final order. But, given that appellant has not applied for leave to proceed under 

R.C. 2323.52(F)(2), it is not necessary to decide if App.R. 4(C) is applicable to this 

appeal. Even if appellant has otherwise satisfied all other requirements under the Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, she is not entitled to go forward unless she has been granted 

leave pursuant to a proper application. 

{¶11} As a designated vexatious litigator, appellant has not satisfied the 

statutory requirement for instituting a new appellate proceeding. Therefore, this appeal 

is hereby dismissed in its entirety. 

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J., concurs, 

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion. 

____________________ 

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion. 

{¶12} The following eight cases have been filed by Cinseree Johnson and are 

currently pending in this court: Johnson v. Geauga County Court of Common Pleas,

11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3206 (writ of prohibition); Johnson v. Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas, Psycho Diagnostic Clinic, et al., 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-
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G-3207 (writ of prohibition); State v. Johnson, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3215 

(delayed appeal and notice of voluntary dismissal); State v. Johnson, 11th Dist. Geauga 

No. 2014-G-3219 (appeal); State v. Johnson, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3223 

(appeal); State v. Johnson, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3229 (appeal); State v. 

Johnson, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3230 (appeal); and, State v. Johnson, 11th 

Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3231 (appeal). All relate to the same underlying criminal 

action, State v. Johnson, Geauga C.P. No. 12C000142. Ms. Johnson requests various, 

and often conflicting, relief from this court. All were filed before the trial court sentenced 

her. 

{¶13} The majority denies the petitions for writs finding Ms. Johnson cannot 

meet the standards for obtaining leave to file the petitions. It dismisses the appeals 

because appellant is a vexatious litigator, and has not sought leave of this court to 

appeal. R.C. 2323.52(D)(3). 

{¶14} I am aware that the courts of Ohio have held that once a person is 

designated a vexatious litigator, he or she must seek leave of court to pursue any action 

in a court of appeals, even in the criminal setting. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. Duffey, 

121 Ohio St.3d 356, 2009-Ohio-1218, ¶3. I respectfully question this position. The 

vexatious litigator statute, by its terms, is directed at people who “habitually, 

persistently, and without reasonable grounds [engage] in vexatious conduct in a civil

action or actions.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2323.52(A)(3). I agree the restrictions 

placed on vexatious litigators are not reserved simply for civil actions, by the plain 

language of the statute. See, e.g., R.C. 2323.52(D)(3). However, “[i]t is a cardinal rule 

of statutory construction that a statute should not be interpreted to yield an absurd 
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result.” Mishr v. Poland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 76 Ohio St.3d 238, 240 (1996). I do not 

see how applying the restrictions of the vexatious litigator statute to criminal 

proceedings, instituted by the state against an individual, forwards the obvious purpose 

of the statute, which is to prevent frivolous civil actions. 

{¶15} As the majority notes the trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence 

December 8, 2014. This is a final appealable order. Consequently, I would dismiss the 

petitions for writs as moot, accept the various appeals as prematurely filed under App.R. 

4, and consolidate them for disposition. I would further appoint appellant counsel for 

purposes of appeal. 

{¶16} I respectfully dissent.