Rel: 10/2 4/2014

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter
. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions , Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 3 6104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any ty p o g raphical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter
. 

# SUPREME COURT O F ALA BAMA

OCTOBER T ERM, 2014- 2015

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 11301 50

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Ameri ca's Home Place , Inc
.

v. Grego ry Rampey Appea l from Chambers Circuit C ourt

(CV-1 3-900 032) MAIN, Just ice.
The defen dant below , Ameri ca's Home Place , Inc. ("AHP "),
appea ls from an order of t h e Chamb ers Circu it Court ("the trial court ") denyi ng AHP's motio n to compe l arb itrat ion of11301 50

the claim s broug ht by the plain tiff below , Grego ry Rampe y. We

rever se an d rem and.

I. Fa cts a nd Pr ocedu ral H istor y
I n A u g ust 2012, Rampe y and AHP enter ed into a contr act , the t erms of wh ich p rovid ed th at AH P wou ld co nstru ct a house for Rampe y in Chamb ers Count y. AHP const ructe d the house for Rampe y; howev er, after he took posse ssion of the house , Rampe y began to notic e "sett lemen t and sinki ng of the found ation ," which , accor ding to Rampe y, resul ted in signi fican t struc tural and other damag e to the house
. AHP attempted to stabi lize the foun d a t i on and to repai r the damag e to the house that had

occur r e d a s a resul t of the unsta ble found ation ; those effor ts, howev er, were unsuc cessf ul. On March 3, 2013, Rampe y filed in the trial court a compl aint again st AHP. The compl aint alleg ed 10 coun ts ag ainst AHP, eachcoun t ste mming
from the const ructi on of the house that was the subje ct of the parti es' A ugust 2012 cont ract.
AHP moved to compe l arbit ratio n of Rampe y's claim s and to stay the proce eding s in the trial court pendi ng the outco me of arbit ratio n betwe en the parti es. In suppo rt of its motio n,
AHP attac hed the contr act betwe en AHP and R ampey . The

211301 50

contr act s tatedthat "Con tract or an d Own er ag ree a s fol lows" and then set forth 46 enu m e r a t ed provi sions
. Besid e each

enume rated provi sion in the contr act (exce pt nos. 4 and 27, which were inapp licab le) there wa s a l ine for the "owne r" (i.e. , Ramp e y ) to initi al. Rampe y admit tedly wrote his initi als i n t h e l ine next to every one of the 44 appli cable provi sions , inclu ding provi sion no. 37 ( "the arbit ratio n provi sion" ), wh ich s tates , in toto:
"BIND ING ARBITRATIONAGRE EMENT
"ALL CLAIM S, DISPU TES AND OTHER MATTE RS OR QUEST IONS ARISI NG OUT OF OR RELAT ING TO THIS AGREE MENT, OR THE BREAC H THERE OF, SHALL BE SETTL ED BY BI NDING ARBIT RATIO N IN ACCOR DANCE WITH THE RULES OF AMERI CAN ARBIT RATION ASSOC IATON [sic] (AAA) AND/O R DEMAR S & ASSOC IATES , LTD. (DMA) , AND JUDGE MENT UPON THE AWARD RENDE RED BY THE ARBIT RATOR O R ARBITRATORS MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVIN G JURIS DICTI ON THERE OF
. THE PARTI ES EXPRE SS LY AGREE THAT THE ARBIT RATOR OR ARBIT RATOR S SHALL HAVE THE POWER AN D AUTHO RITY TO GRANT REASO NABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IN RESOL UTION OF THE CLAIM S, DIFFE RENCE S AND/O R CONTR OVERS IES ARISI NG FROM THIS AGREE MENT WHICH THE P AR TIES HAVE AGREE D TO SUBMI T TO BINDI N G ARBIT RATIO N.
"THE DEMAN D FOR ARBIT RATIO N SHALL BE IN WRITI NG AND DELIVERED TO THE OTHER PARTY TO T H E AGREE MENT AND THE ARBIT RATOR
. THE DEMAN D FOR ARBIT RATIO N SHALL BE MADE WITHI N A REASO NABL E TIME AFTER THE CLAIM , DISPU TE OR OTHER MATTE R RELAT ING TO THIS AGREE MENT HAS ARISE N, AND IN NO EVENT SHALL BE MADE AFTER THE DATE WHEN INSTI TUTIO N OF LEGAL OR EQ UITAB LE PROCE EDING S BASED ON SUCH CLAIM , DISPU TE O R OTHER

311301 50

MAT T ER WILL BE BARRE D BY THE APPLI CABLE STATU TE OF LIMIT ATION S.
"THE COSTS OF THE ARBIT RATOR WILL BE PAID BY THE PARTY WHO IS AT FAULT ON THE POINT BEING ARBIT RATED
. IN THE EVENT OF MULTI PLE POINT S BEING ARBIT RATED THE ARB I T RATOR' S FEE WILL BE ALLOC ATED ON A PRO RATA BASIS BY THE ARBIT RA TOR. IF EITHE R PARTY FAILS TO ATTEN D THE ARBIT RATIO N, SUCH PARTY SHALL PAY FOR THE COSTS O F THE ARBIT RATOR , PLUS A $1,00 0.00 PENAL TY FOR LIQUI DATED DAMAG ES F O R LOST TIME OF THE PARTY THAT ATTEN DED THE ARBIT RATIO N. CONTRACTOR MAY SECURE ITS RIGHT S UNDER THE MECHAN IC'S LIEN LAW, AND, SUBSE QUENT TO THE ARBIT RATIO N AWARD , MAY ENFOR CE SAID RIGHT AND OBTAI N A LIEN FOREC LOSURE JUDGE MENT. " (Capi taliz ation in origi nal.) Immed iatel y benea th the arbit ratio n provi sion were signa ture lines for the parti es to the contr act, inclu ding one for "owne r," i.e., Rampe y. Rampe y also initi aled provi sio n no. 42, which state s: "[Rampey] ackno wledg es that each parag raph of this contr act has been expla ined and initi als accep tance of sa me. [Ramp ey] also ackno wledg es recei pt of this ag r eemen t." (Emph asis added .) Furth ermor e, Ra mpey admit tedlysign ed hi s nam e at the b ottom of ea ch of the last two p ages of th e con tract
. Rampe y f i l e d a respo nse to AHP's motio n to compe l arbit ratio n. Rampe y's sole argum ent in his respo nse was that his signa tu re on the signa ture line immed iatel y benea th the arbit ra tion provi sion was forge d, and, thus, he said, there

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exist s no proof of his inten t to arbit rate any dispu tes betwe en himse lf and AHP. Ramp e y d id not argue that the
contr act itsel f was inval id a n d /or unenf orcea ble; rathe r, Rampe y argue d o n l y that the arbit ratio n provi sion in the
contr act w as un enfor ceabl e bec ause, acco rdingto R ampey , his signa tur e i mmedia tely benea th the arbit ratio n provi sion was forge d. Rampe y suppo rted his respo nse to the motio n to compe l arbit ratio n wit h, am ong o ther evide ntiar y doc ument s, hi s own affid avit, whic h sta tes:

"My name is Grego ry Ra mp e y . I am a resid ent citiz en of the State of Alaba ma aged ninet een (19) years o r older and have perso nal knowl edge of the facts and matte rs set for t h herei n which are true and accur ate to the best of my belie f and knowl edge.
"I am the Plain tiff in the abo v e ident ified cau s e and have perso nal knowl edge of the facts set forthin t his a ffida vit.
"On Augus t 29 , 2012, I enter ed into a contr act with Ameri ca's Home Place , Inc.[ ,] for the const ructi on of a home locat ed at ___ Sp r i ngfie ld Avenu e, Chamb ers Count y, Alaba ma. This contr act conta ined a bindi ng arbit ratio n agree ment on page 5, parag raph 37. (See Contr act, attac hed to Plain tiff[ ']s O p posit ion as Exhib it 1). I did not sign the bindi ng arbit ratio n agree ment conta ined withi n the contr act. I do not know who signe d my name nor did they have m y permi ssion
. I had no inten tion of agree ing to bindi ng arbi trati on. The forge d signa ture appea ring withi n the bindi ng arbit ratio n claus e in no way bears any rese mblan ce

511301 50

to my actua l signa ture on pages 7-8 of the Contr act. (See Contr act). " After a heari ng on AHP's motio n to compe l arbit ratio n, the t rial court ente red t he fo llowi ng or der: "[AHP 's] M otion
to Compe l arbit ratio n is denie d at this time. [Ramp ey ] h as claim ed that the signa ture on the contr a c t i s forge d. The issue of wheth er an enfor ceabl e agree ment to arbit rate exist s shall be set for jury trial on the next avail able jury
docke t." AHP a ppeal ed.
II. S tanda rd of Revi ew "Our stand ard of r e view of a rulin g denyi ng a motio n to compe l arb itrat ion i s wel l set tled:

"'"Th is Court revie ws de novo the denia l of a mot i o n to compe l arbit ratio n. Parkw ay D o d g e, Inc. v. Yarbr ough, 779 So. 2d 1205 (Al a . 2000)
. A motio n to compe l arbit ratio n is analo gous to a motio n for a summa ry judgm ent. TranS outh Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Al a . 1999)
. The party seeki ng to compe l arbit ratio n has the burde n of provi ng t h e exist ence of a contr act calli ng for arbit ratio n and provi ng that the contr act evide nces a trans actio n affec ting inter state comme rce. Id. '[A]f ter a motio n to compe l arbit ratio n has been made and suppo rted, the burde n is on the non-m ovant to prese nt evide nce that the suppo sed arbit ratio n agree ment is not valid or does not apply to the di s p ute in quest ion.' Jim Burke Autom otive , Inc. v. Beave rs, 674 So. 2d 1 260, 1265 n. 1 (Ala.

611301 50 1995) (opin ion on appli c a t ion for rehea ring) ."'"
SSC Montg omery Cedar Crest Opera ting Co., LLC v. Boldi ng, 130
So. 3d 1194, 1196 (Ala. 2013) (quot ing Eliza beth Homes , L.L.C
.

v . G antt, 882 So. 2d 313, 315 (Ala. 2003) , quoti ng in t u r n Fleet wood E n t e rs., Inc. v. Bruno , 784 So. 2d 277, 280 (Ala. 2000) ).
III. Analy sis
T h e d ispos itive issue in this case is wheth er the tri a l

c ourt erred in denyi ng AHP's motio n to compe l arbit rati o n based on Rampe y's alleg ation that his signa ture i mmedia tely benea th the arbit ratio n provi sion in the contr act was forge d.
We concl ude that the trial c o u r t did err. As noted , the
contr act conta ins a bindi ng arbit ratio n provi sion (enum erate d provi sion no. 37 in the contr act); Rampe y admit tedly wrote his initi als in the line provi ded next to the ar b i t r a t ion provi sion. Als o, as note d, pr ovisi on no . 42 of th e con tract
state s: "[Rampey] ackno wledg es that each parag raph of t h is
contr act h as be en ex plain ed an d ini tials acce ptanc e of same. [Ramp ey] also ackno wledg es recei pt of this agree ment" ; Rampe y admit tedly wrote his initi als besid e that provi s i o n. Furth ermor e, provi sion no. 39 of the contr act state s: "This

711301 50

Agree ment const itute s the so l e and entir e Agree ment betwe en the parti es heret o and no m odifi catio ns of this Agree ment shall b e b indin g unles s signe d by all parti es to this Agree ment. No r e prese ntati on, promi se, or induc ement not inclu ded in this Agree ment shall be bindi ng upon any p a r ty heret o." Moreo ver, on page 7 of the contr act, direc tly above

one o f t he two place s in which Rampe y admit tedly signe d the
contr act, it state s, in perti nent part: "This agr e e m e n t[, i.e., the contr act,] shal l be bindi ng on the parti es th ereto
...." The contr act langu age quote d above shows tha t Rampe y and AHP enter ed into a bindi ng contr act, which Rampe y does not dispu te, that inclu des two signa tures Ra mp ey agree s are leg i t i mate and that the contr act inclu des a bindi ng arbit ratio n provi sion. The fact that R ampey 's signa ture immed iatel y benea th the arbit ratio n provi sion was (alle gedly ) forge d is of no conse que n c e b ecaus e his signa ture was not requi red immed iatel y be n e a t h the arbit ratio n provi sion and, furth ermor e, Rampe y assen ted to be bound by that prov i sion
when he admit tedly wrote his initi als on the line next to the arbit ratio n provi sion. Se e , e .g., Stile s v. Home Cable

811301 50

Conce pts, Inc., 994 F
. S u p p. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1998) , which aptlyexpl ains the f allac y of Rampe y's a rgume nt:

"Stil es'[s ] '[f]i rst and forem ost' objec tion is that he did not sign the arbit ratio n c l a u s e at issue
. It is, of cours e, a matte r of gener al contr act law th a t a party must agree to a contr act in order to be bound by it. See Old R e p u blic Ins. Co. v . L a n i er, 644 So. 2d 1258, 1260 (Ala. 1994) ; Rober son v. M o n e y Tree of Ala., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1519, 1528 (M.D. Ala. 1997) , citin g Resta temen t of Contr acts, 2d. § 17. T his provi sion of gener al contr act law appli es even if the arbit ratio n claus e is subje ct to the F e d e r al Arbit ratio n Act [('th e FAA') ]. See 9 U.S.C
. § 2 (arbi trati on c l a u se not enfor ced where inval id 'upon such groun ds as exist a t law or in equit y for the revoc ation o f a n y contr act')
. In addit ion, the FAA also requi res that an arbit ratio n claus e be writt en to be enfor ceabl e. 9 U.S.C
. § 2 (a 'writ ten provi sion' ); Conti nenta l Grain Co. v. Beasl ey, 628 So. 2d 319, 322 (Ala. 1993)
. "Whil e writt en agree ment is requi red for arb i trati on, howev er, there is no requi remen t that every singl e provi sion of a contr act, inclu ding the arbit ratio n claus e, must be signe d in order to form part of the agree ment. Indee d, it is axiom atic that 'part ie s may becom e bound by the terms of a con t r a ct, even thoug h they do not sign it, where their assen t is other wise indic ated. ' 17A Am. Jur
. 2d § 185.
... The FAA has no separ ate requi remen t of a s i g ned arbit ratio n claus e. As noted by th e North ern Distr ict of Alaba ma , '[i]t is well estab lishe d that a writt en agree ment to arbit rate need not be signe d by the parti es as a prerequi site to the enfor cemen t of the agree ment. ' Middl eb r ooks v. Merri ll Lynch , Pierc e, Fenne r & Smith , Inc., [No. CV 89- H M -5015 -NW, April 5, 1989] (N.D. Ala. 1989) [not repor ted i n F. Supp. ].

911301 50 "Stil es has cited this court to three cas e s

which al l e gedly stand for the propo sitio n that he must sign an a r b i t ratio n agree ment for it to be enfor ceabl e. His relia nce is mispl aced, howev er. The first that he cites , Old Republ ic Ins. Co., 644 So. 2d at 1260, only stand s for the p r o p o sitio n that a p a r t y must agree to a contr act to be bound by it. The secon d, Conti nenta l G r ain Co., 628 So. 2d at 322, merel y notes that the FAA requi res arbit ratio n claus es to be writt en. Final ly, the third, Ex parte Jones , 686 So. 2d 1166 (Ala. 1996) , only stand s for the propo sitio n that someo ne who is 'not a party to the contr act conta ining the arbit ratio n agree ment' may not compe l arbit ratio n. None state s the propo sitio n that the arbit ratio n claus e itsel f must be signe d. Indee d, these cases couldnot state that propo sitio n. Alaba ma law is not permi tted by the FAA to treat arbit ratio n claus es any diffe rentl y than other contr acts. See D o ctor' s Assoc ., Inc. v. Casar otto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–8 7, 116 S
. Ct. 1652, 1656, 1 3 4 L
. Ed. 2d 902 (1996 ) ('Cou rts may not, howev er, inval idate arbit ratio n agree ments under state laws appli cable only to arbit ratio n provi sions ') ( empha sis in origi nal); Allie d–Bru ce Termi nix Co. v. Dobso n, 513 U. S
. 2 6 5 , 281, 115 S. C t
. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995 ) (FAA m a k e s unl awful any state polic y that 'woul d place arbit ratio n claus es on an unequ al "foot ing"' ). Becau se Alaba ma law only requi res the contr act to be signe d (and only certa in contr a c t s at that) , and doe s n o t requi re every singl e provi sion of every contr act to be signe d, it could not requi r e t he arbit ratio n claus e at issue here to be si g ned. Docto r's Assoc ., 517 U.S. at 68 2

– 8 4 , 116 S. Ct. at 1654 (hold ing that Monta na law c a n not requi re speci al notic e provi sions in arbit ratio n contr acts)
.

" Stile s assen ted to the contr act as a whole i n this case. That fact is uncon teste d.
... Stile s has, there fore, assen ted to an a r bitra tion claus e, even abs e nt his signa ture.
... The provi sion is not inval id be cause not signe d."

1011301 50

Stile s, 99 4 F. Supp. at 1 416 ( initi al emphasi s add ed). Furth ermor e, it is w ell s ettle d tha t "[a] plain tiff canno t seek the benef its of a contr act but at the same time avoid the arbit ratio n provi sion in th e contr act. Wolff Motor Co. [v. White ], 869 So. 2d [1129 ,] 1136 [(Ala
. 2 003)]
. Inste ad, 'she mus t accep t or rejec t the entir e contr act.' Credi t Sales , Inc. v. Crimm , 815 So. 2d 540, 546 (Ala. 2001)
. Britt a's claim s, inclu ding her breac h-of- contr act claim , rely on the con tract to suppo rt he r claim s for damag es. There fore, she is bound by the arbit ratio n provi sion in the contr act. Infin iti of Mobil e, Inc. v. O f f ice, 727 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. 1999) [ ]; Delta Const r. Corp. v. Goode n, 714 1 So. 2 d 975 , 981 (Ala . 199 8)."
Bowen v. Secur ity Pest Contr ol, Inc., 879 So. 2d 11 3 9 , 1143 (Ala. 2003) (emph asis added ). See also South ern Energ y Homes , Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 113 1 , 1 134-3 5 (Ala. 2000) ("A plain tiff canno t simul taneo usly claim the benef its o f a
contr act and repud iate its burde ns a nd condi tions ." (citi ng Value Auto Credi t, Inc. v. Talle y, 727 So. 2d 61 (Ala. 1999) ; Infin iti of Mobil e, Inc. v. Offic e, 727 So. 2d 42 (Ala. 1999) ;

Notab ly, in Infin iti of Mobil e, Inc., a plura lity of this 1 C ourt concl uded that, "[b]e cause the undis puted evide nc e indic ates that the secon d retai l-buy er's- order form repre sents t h e final contr act betwe en Mr. Offic e and Infin iti, and becau se Mr. Off i c e clear ly initi aled the arbit ratio n provi sions appea ring on both the front side and t he rever se side of that contr act, we must concl ude that Mr. Offic e agree d to ar bitra te hi s cla ims a gains t Inf initi ." 7 27 So . 2d at 47 (emph asis added ). 1111301 50

Georg ia Po wer C o. v. Part in, 7 27 So . 2d 2 (Al a. 19 98); Delta
Const r. Corp. v. Goode n, 7 1 4 S o . 2d 975 (Ala. 1998) ; and Ex parte Dyes s, 70 9 So. 2d 4 47 (A la. 1 997)) ). Here, Rampe y, whose claim s are all predi cated on alleg ed breac hes and viola tions of the contr act, attempts to claim the benef its of t h e c o n tract while repud iatin g one of its condi tions , i.e., the bindi ng arbit ratio n provi sion. Howev er,

as noted , Rampe y must "'acc ept or rejec t the entir e
contr act.' " Bowen , 879 So. 2d at 1143 (quot ing Credi t Sales , Inc. v. Cr imm, 815 S o. 2d540, 546 (Ala. 2001 )). As wa s the

c ase in Bowen , Rampe y's claim s, inclu ding h i s breac h-of- contr act claim , rely on the contr a ct for suppo rt. Thus, Ramp ey is boun d by all t he pr ovisi ons o f the cont ract, inclu ding the arbit ratio n provi sion. Accor dingl y, we concl ude that the t rial court erre d in denyi ng AH P's m otion to c ompel arbit ratio n. 2

Rampe y offer s, as an alter nativ e basis for affir ming the 2 trial court 's denia l of the motio n to compe l arbit ratio n, the argum ent that A H P prese nted no evide nce "show ing that the arbit ratio n agree ment invol ved or affec ted inter state comme rc e . " R a mpey' s brief , at 13. See, e.g., Eliza beth Homes , L.L.C
. v. Gantt , 882 So. 2d 313, 315 (Ala. 2003) ("'Th e party seeki ng to compe l arbit ratio n has the burde n of provi ng the exist ence of a c o n tract calli ng for arbit ratio n and provi ng that the contr act evide nces a trans a c tion affec ting inter state comm erce. '" (q uotin g Fle etwoo d Ent ers., Inc. , 784 1211301 50 IV. C onclu sion

The trial court erred in denyi n g A H P 's motio n to compe l arbit ratio n. There f ore, we rever se the trial court 's order and reman d the cause to that court with instr uctio ns to vacat e its order denyi ng the motio n to compe l a r b itrat ion and to
enter an o rder grant ing A HP's motio n to compe l arb itrat ion.
REVER SED AND RE MANDE D WIT H DIRECTIO NS.
Stuar t, Bo lin, Parke r, Wi se, a nd Br yan, JJ., concu r. Murdo ck an d Sha w, JJ ., co ncur in th e res ult.

So. 2d at 280))
. Howev er, Rampe y did not raise that argum ent in the trial court ; there fore, t h e a r g ument is waive d on appel late revie w. See, e.g., Andre ws v. Merri tt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992) ("Thi s Cour t c a n n o t consi der argum ents raise d for the first ti m e on appea l; rathe r, our revie w is restr icted to the evide nce and argum ents consi dered by the trial court ."). Furth ermor e, even if it were not waive d, we cou l d concl ude that the argum ent is unava iling becau se the contr act shows that the house was built in Alaba ma by AH P, wh ich l istedits place of b usine ss as bein g in "Hall Count y, Gaine svill e, GA." See Hurst v. Tony Moore Impor ts, Inc., 699 So. 2 d 124 9, 12 57 (A la. 1 997) ("[I] f anyeffe ct on inter state comme rce can be found in a comme rcial trans actio n, then the trans actio n is consi d e r e d to be one invol ving inter state comm erce. "). 1311301 50

MURDO CK, J ustic e (co ncurr ing i n the resu lt). The main opini on cor rectl y concl udes that "Ramp ey

assen ted to be bound by [the arbit ratio n] provi sion when he admit tedly wrot e h i s i nitia ls on the line next to [that ] provi sion" and signe d his name in t he si gnatu re li nes a t the end of the contr act. ___ So. 3d at ___. I agree , and, based

on gener al princ iples of contr act law, I find this concl usion suffi cient to the end achie ved here. I there fore f i n d it

unne cessa ry to rely, as does the main opini on, upon the decis ion in Stile s v. Home Cable Conce pts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
. In f a ct, I find Stile s to be inapp osite to t he pr esent case . First , the state ments f r o m Stile s quote d in the main opini on, see ___ So. 3d at ___, were made in the conte xt of an arbit ratio n claus e that, on the one hand, was not accompanie d by a signa ture line dedic ated speci fical ly to that claus e and,

on the other hand, was n o t initi aled by the party resis ting arbit ratio n. In this conte xt, the key passa ge from the Stile s opini on quote d in the main opini on, i.e., "'the re is no requi remen t that every si n g l e provi sion of a contr act, inclu ding the a rbitr ation clau se, must b e sig ned i n ord er to

1411301 50

form part of the agre e m e n t,'" ___ So. 3d at ___ (emph asis omitt ed), lacks signi fican t proba tive value in a case, such as this one, where the a rbitr ation claus e is accompanie d by an unsig ned s ignat ure l ine d edica ted s olelyto t hat c lause
. In addit ion to its lack of signi fican t proba tive value as to th e pec uliar fact s pre sente d in this case, I amrelu ctant
to rely upon Stile s for anoth er reaso n. In Stile s the feder al distr ict court went so far as to impos e upon a co n s u m e r a requi remen t t o a rbitr ate pursu ant to a provi sion in an origi nal contr act that did not menti on arbit ratio n but inste ad
purpo rted to al low a cred it-ca rd is suer to ch ange any o f the
terms of the agree ment betw e e n it and the consu mer by unila teral notif icati on so long as the consu mer did not rejec t the propo sed chang es in writi ng withi n a presc ribed p e riod
follo wing such notif icati on. Regar dless of whate ver m e r it this holdi ng may have in regar d to a consu mer contr act such as the one at issue in Stile s, I see no reaso n to quote with
ap p r o v al from a decis ion that goes this far in order to achie ve th e res ult a chiev ed in the prese nt ca se.
I also find inapp osite to the prese nt case the princ iple invok ed in that port ion o f the main opin ion t hat f ollow s its

1511301 50

invoc ation of S tiles . Sp ecifi cally , the main opin ion s eizes
upon the propo sitio n that " '[a] plain tiff canno t seek the benef i t s o f a contr act but at the same time avoid the arbit ratio n prov i s i o n in the contr act.' " ___ So. 3d at

___ (quot ing Bowen v. Secur ity Pest Contr o l , I nc., 879 So. 2d 1139, 1143 (Ala. 2003) ). The only argum ent made by Rampe y in
the p r e s ent case, howev er, is that, becau se he did not sign
the signa ture line dedic ated to the arbit ratio n provi sion, the arbit ratio n pro visio n is not " in th e con tract ." H e doe s not
go furth er and argue that, even if that arbit ratio n provi sion is part of the contr act, he would not be bound by it for some

reaso n, even as he seeks to benef it from ot h e r p a r t s of the
contr act. The state d pri ncipl e is there fore inapp osite
.

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