INSPECTORS GENERAL

Oversight of Small Federal 

Agencies and the Role of 

the Inspectors General

Statement of Beryl H. Davis, Director

Financial Management and Assurance

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Financial 

and Contracting Oversight, Committee 

on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:30 a.m. ET

Thursday, April 10, 2014

GAO-14-503T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-503T,a testimony before 

the Subcommittee on Financial and 

Contracting Oversight, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate 

April 10, 2014 

INSPECTORS GENERAL

Oversight of Small Federal Agencies and the Role of 

the Inspectors General

Why GAO Did This Study

The IGs play a key role in federal 

agency oversight by enhancing 

government accountability and 

protecting the government’s resources. 

This includes a strong leadership role 

in making recommendations to 

improve the effectiveness and 

efficiency of government offices and 

programs at a time when they are 

needed most.

This testimony focuses on (1) the 

creation of independent IG offices, 

(2) IG oversight of small agencies, and 

(3) IG independence and budgetary 

resources. 

This testimony provides updates of 

current IG responsibilities; provisions 

of the IG Act, as amended; and draws 

on prior GAO reports and testimonies 

conducted in accordance with GAO’s 

Quality Assurance Framework. 

GAO has made numerous 

observations and provided matters for 

the Congress to consider in prior 

reports when addressing IG oversight 

at small federal agencies and IG 

independence. 

What GAO Found

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act), originally established 

inspectors general (IG) appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate 

in 12 major departments and agencies of the government to conduct and 

supervise independent audits and investigations; recommend policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and prevent and detect fraud and abuse 

in their departments’ and agencies’ programs and operations. Based in part on 

GAO’s findings that the internal audit offices of small federal agencies lacked 

independence and provided inadequate coverage of important programs, the 

Congress passed the IG Act Amendments of 1988 to establish IGs in designated 

federal entities (DFE), which are generally smaller agencies established in 

various statutes as commissions, boards, authorities, corporations, endowments, 

foundations, institutions, agencies, and administrations identified by the act. The 

DFE IGs are appointed by their respective entity heads with duties and 

responsibilities similar to those of IGs appointed by the President. The Congress 

used a budget threshold of $100 million to help determine which DFEs should 

have IGs. However, additional DFEs below this threshold were also included for

specific reasons. 

Significant federal programs and agencies should be subject to oversight by 

independent IGs; however, small IG offices with limited resources might not have 

the ability to obtain the technical skills and expertise needed to provide adequate, 

cost-effective oversight. GAO has previously found that alternative approaches 

exist to achieve IG oversight that may be appropriate for federal agencies with 

small budgets and few resources. For example, GAO has recommended on a 

case-by-case basis that specific small agencies could benefit by obtaining IG 

oversight from another agency’s IG office where the missions of the two agencies 

are somewhat similar.

Independence is one of the most important elements of an effective IG function. 

The IG Act, as amended, provides specific protections to IG independence. The 

IG Reform Act of 2008 further enhanced the IGs’ independence by providing 

specified pay levels, IG legal counsel, a process for handling allegations of IG 

wrong-doing, and required notification to the Congress before an IG is removed 

or transferred. The IG Reform Act also requires the IGs’ budget requests to be 

visible in the budget of the U.S. government submitted by the President to the 

Congress. Additional provisions to enhance the independence of IGs in DFEs 

with boards or commissions were included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 

and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Specifically, these IGs are to report 

organizationally to the entire board or commission rather than a single 

chairperson. In addition, the IG Act requires a two-thirds majority of the board or 

commission to remove the IG.

View GAO-14-503T. For more information, 

contact Beryl Davis, (202) 512-2623, 

davisbh@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-14-503T 

Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the oversight of federal agencies 

with relatively small budgets and resources and the role of the inspectors 

general (IG). IG offices play a key role in federal agency oversight by 

enhancing government accountability and protecting the government’s 

resources. This includes a strong leadership role in recommending 

improvements to the effectiveness and efficiency of government offices 

and programs at a time when they are needed most. The Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act), established IG offices at major 

departments and agencies to conduct and supervise audits and 

investigations; recommend policies to promote economy, efficiency, and 

effectiveness; and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in their 

departments’ and agencies’ programs and operations.1

My testimony today focuses on (1) an overview of the creation of 

independent IG offices, (2) IG oversight of small agencies, and (3) IG 

independence and budgetary resources. In preparing this testimony, we 

included updates of current IG responsibilities and provisions of the IG 

Act and relied on our prior work related to these issues. More detail on 

our scope and methodology is included in each issued product. The work 

on which this testimony is based was conducted in accordance with all 

sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that are relevant to our 

objectives. The framework requires that we plan and perform the 

engagement to meet our stated objectives and that we discuss any 

limitations in our work. We believe that the information and data obtained, 

and the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings 

and conclusions in this product. See the specific reports cited throughout 

this testimony for information on the standards applied.

 

1

Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (Oct. 12, 1978), codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. 

App.
 

Page 2 GAO-14-503T 

The IG Act originally established IGs appointed by the President and 

confirmed by the Senate in 12 major departments and agencies of the 

government in 1978.2 Since then, additional IGs have been added 

through a series of amendments to the IG Act. The Inspector General Act 

Amendments of 1988 established IGs appointed by their respective entity 

heads in designated federal entities (DFE) identified by the act with duties 

and responsibilities similar to those of IGs appointed by the President.3

DFEs are generally smaller agencies established in various statutes as 

commissions, boards, authorities, corporations, endowments, 

foundations, institutions, agencies, and administrations.4

Prior to the 1988 amendments, both GAO and the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency, which preceded the Council of Inspectors 

General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), had found that the internal 

audit offices of small federal agencies lacked independence and provided 

inadequate coverage of important programs that could benefit from 

independent oversight by an IG.5

 

2

In 1978, 12 IGs were established by the IG Act at the Departments of Agriculture, 

Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Labor, and Transportation; and 

at the Community Services Administration (which has since been abolished), 

Environmental Protection Agency, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration, Small Business Administration, and Veterans Administration 

(now the Department of Veterans Affairs).

Additional criteria used by the Congress 

to determine where to establish these new IG offices included a budget 

threshold of at least $100 million for the DFEs. Specifically, those 

3

Pub. L. No. 100-504, 102 Stat. 2515 (Oct. 18, 1988).

4

In addition to IGs established by amendments to the IG Act, we reported in 2011 that 

there were 10 IG offices established by various other statutes similar to the IG Act. They 

are the IG offices at the Architect of the Capitol, Central Intelligence Agency, Government 

Accountability Office, Government Printing Office, Library of Congress, Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Special Inspector 

General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and U.S. Capitol Police. (GAO, Inspectors 

General: Reporting on Independence, Effectiveness, and Expertise, GAO-11-770 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21. 2011). The Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction terminated its operations as of September 30, 2013.

5

CIGIE was established by the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-409, 

122 Stat. 4302 (Oct. 14, 2008), to replace the President’s Council on Integrity and 

Efficiency and the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency, which had been 

established by executive orders. CIGIE consists mainly of IGs, to address integrity, 

economy, and effectiveness issues that transcend individual government agencies, and to 

increase the professionalism and effectiveness of personnel in the IG offices.

Overview of the 

Creation of IG Offices
 

Page 3 GAO-14-503T 

agencies with an annual budget of $100 million or greater were 

considered for inclusion in the 1988 amendments. However, other 

agencies below this budget threshold were also included for specific 

reasons. While the IGs in DFEs generally have the same authorities and 

responsibilities as those established by the 1978 IG Act, there is a clear 

distinction—they are appointed and removed by their agency heads 

rather than by the President and are not subject to Senate confirmation.

The 1988 amendments established a new category of “federal entity,” 

which is defined to exclude departments and agencies and DFEs with 

statutory IGs under the IG Act, as well as judicial and legislative branch 

entities and others as specified. Further, the 1988 amendments require 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in consultation with GAO, 

to annually publish a list of (1) DFEs and, for DFEs that are not boards or 

commissions, their DFE heads and (2) the federal entities, as that term is 

defined by the IG Act. OMB’s list of DFEs and federal entities is to be 

published annually in the Federal Register.6

The IGs appointed by the President are generally located in the largest 

departments and agencies of the government; the DFEs generally have 

smaller budgets and their IGs have correspondingly smaller budgets and

fewer staff members. In our 2011 report of survey results of the IG 

community,

The 1988 amendments also 

require that federal entities, which are defined to exclude entities with a 

statutory IG under the IG Act, report annually by October 31 to each 

House of the Congress and to OMB on, among other things, the audit and 

investigative activities in their respective organizations.

7 we found 30 departments and agencies with IGs appointed 

by the President, 33 DFEs with IGs, and 10 IGs established by various 

statutes similar to the IG Act that were not included in our survey The 

presidentially appointed IGs and the DFE IGs reported to us total budget 

authority for fiscal year 2010 of about $2.2 billion with approximately 

13,000 authorized full-time equivalent staff (FTE). The presidentially 

appointed IGs’ budget authority constituted about 84 percent of the total 

IG budget authority and about 86 percent of the total IGs’ FTEs.

 

6

OMB published its most recent list on January 14, 2014. 79 Fed. Reg. 1896.

7

GAO-11-770. 
 

Page 4 GAO-14-503T 

GAO has long supported the creation of independent IG offices in 

appropriate federal departments, agencies, and entities, and we continue 

to believe that significant federal programs and entities should be subject 

to oversight by independent IGs. At the same time, we have reported 

some concerns about creating and maintaining small IG offices with 

limited resources, where an IG might not have the ability to obtain the 

technical skills and expertise needed to provide adequate and costeffective oversight. In the final analysis, the determination of whether to 

place IGs in specific agencies is a policy decision to be decided by the 

Congress.8

• Export-Import Bank. In 2001, we were asked to review the need for 

an IG at the Export-Import Bank, which was defined by OMB as a 

federal entity under the IG Act, and was not subject to IG oversight.

As a result, we believe there are alternative approaches that 

the Congress may wish to consider to achieve IG oversight that is 

appropriate for federal agencies with relatively small budgets and 

resources. For example, we have recommended, on a case-by-case 

basis, that specific small agencies could benefit by obtaining IG oversight 

from another agency’s IG office where the missions of the two agencies 

are somewhat similar. The following provides examples from our 

previously issued reports on alternatives suggested for IG oversight of 

small agencies.

9

 

8

GAO, U.S. Export-Import Bank: Views on Inspector General Oversight, 

We found that the Export-Import Bank obtained an annual financial 

audit from an independent public accountant and received additional 

audits of administrative operations from its internal audit group. We 

also found that the Export-Import Bank had the largest budget of all 

other federal entities on OMB’s list at the time, and that it was 

comparable in size to both departments and agencies with IGs 

appointed by the President and with DFEs with IGs appointed by the 

head of the DFE. The alternatives we provided for IG oversight of the 

Export-Import Bank included (1) establishing a new IG office through 

an amendment to the IG Act with an IG appointed by either the 

President or by the Export-Import Bank Chairman of the Board of 

Directors; (2) designating through legislation an existing IG office to 

provide oversight, such as the Agency for International Development 

IG; and (3) implementing a memorandum of understanding, which 

GAO-01-1038R 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2001).

9

GAO-01-1038R. 

IG Oversight of Small 

Agencies
 

Page 5 GAO-14-503T 

acts like a contract for outside IG services and would not require an 

amendment to the IG Act or other legislation. Subsequently, the 

Congress amended the IG Act in 2002 to establish a statutory IG for 

the Export-Import Bank, appointed by the President and confirmed by 

the Senate.10

• Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). In 2008, 

we reported on the responsiveness of CSB to past IG 

recommendations.11 We concluded that after 10 years of operations, 

CSB continued to operate in noncompliance with its statutory 

mandates by not investigating all accidental chemical releases that 

involved a fatality, serious injury, or substantial property damage. 

Since fiscal year 2004, CSB had been obtaining IG oversight services 

from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) IG through a 

temporary statutory mandate included in its annual appropriation.12

 

10Pub. L. No. 107-189, § 22(a)(c)(d), 116 Stat. 707,708 (June 14, 2002).

However, because of the significant issues uncovered by our review, 

we provided for congressional consideration alternative oversight 

mechanisms that could be achieved either by amending CSB’s 

authorizing statute or by amending the IG Act to permanently give the 

EPA IG the authority to serve as the oversight body for CSB and to 

provide appropriations and staff allocations specifically for the audit 

function of CSB through a direct line in the EPA appropriation. 

Alternatives such as allowing CSB to contract for its own oversight or 

create an internal audit and investigative unit were not considered as 

options because of the potential limitations of contracting in terms of 

both audit independence and the potentially limited duration of the 

contracting relationship and due to the limited staffing that could 

reasonably be allocated to an internal oversight function at an agency 

11GAO, Chemical Safety Board: Improvements in Management and Oversight Are 

Needed, GAO-08-864R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 2008).

12See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 399 

(Jan. 23, 2004): Regarding CSB oversight, “Provided, further, That notwithstanding any 

other provision of law, the individual appointed to the position of Inspector General of the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) shall, by virtue of such appointment, also hold the 

position of Inspector General of the Board: Provided further, That notwithstanding any 

other provision of law, the Inspector General of the Board shall utilize personnel of the 

Office of Inspector General of EPA in performing the duties of the Inspector General of the 

Board, and shall not appoint any individuals to positions within the Board.” 
 

Page 6 GAO-14-503T 

of its size. The EPA IG has reported continuing oversight efforts at 

CSB in recent semiannual reports to the Congress.13

• National Mediation Board (NMB). In a recent example, our 

mandated review of the programs and management practices at NMB 

concluded in a 2013 report that the board is a small agency, but with a 

vital role in facilitating labor relations in the nation’s railroads and 

airlines.14

There are a number of examples where IGs in federal departments and 

agencies with relatively large budgets currently provide oversight of 

federal entities with relatively small budgets. To illustrate, the Department 

of State IG has oversight authority for the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors.

We found that NMB’s strategic plan lacked assurance that 

its limited resources were effectively targeted toward the highest 

priorities. In addition, NMB lacked certain internal controls that could 

help achieve results and minimize operational problems. We also 

concluded that in addition to the periodic oversight by GAO and the 

annual audits of NMB’s financial statements by independent public 

accountants, an existing IG office assigned with the responsibility for 

providing ongoing audits and investigations of NMB and its operations 

would result in more effective oversight. We provided a matter for 

congressional consideration, which discussed the authorization of an 

appropriate federal agency’s IG office to provide independent audit 

and investigative oversight of NMB.

15 In another example, the Agency for International 

Development IG provides oversight to several small federal entities, 

specifically the Millennium Challenge Corporation,16 the U.S. African 

Development Foundation, the Inter-American Foundation,17

 

13Environmental Protection Agency Office of Inspector General, Semiannual Report to 

Congress April 1, 2013 – September 30, 2013, EPA-350-R-13-003 (Washington, D.C.: 

November 2013), and Semiannual Report to Congress October 1, 2012 – March 31, 2013, 

EPA-350-R-13-001 (Washington, D.C.: May 2013).

and the 

14GAO, National Mediation Board: Strengthening Planning and Controls Could Better 

Facilitate Rail and Air Labor Relations, GAO-14-5 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 2013).

15Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, § 

1314, 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-776-77 (Oct. 21, 1998), classified at 22 U.S.C § 6533.

16Millennium Challenge Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, title VI, § 614(f)(1), 118 

Stat. 211, 223 (Jan. 23, 2004), classified at 22 U.S.C. § 7713(f)(1).

17Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-133, div. B, § 1000(a)(7), 113 

Stat. 1501, 1536, Appendix G, § 205, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-422 (Nov. 29, 1999), codified 

at 5 U.S.C. appx. 8A(f)(a).
 

Page 7 GAO-14-503T 

Overseas Private Investment Corporation.18 Finally, the Department of 

Transportation IG is authorized to provide oversight of the National 

Transportation Safety Board.19

Independence is the cornerstone of professional auditing and one of the 

most important elements of an effective IG function. The IG Act provides 

specific protections to IG independence that are unprecedented for an 

audit and investigative function located within the organization being 

reviewed. These protections are necessary in large part because of the 

unusual reporting requirements of the IGs, who are subject to the general 

supervision of their agency heads and are also expected to provide 

independent reports of their work externally to the Congress.

The IG Act provides the IGs with independence by authorizing them to 

select and employ their own staffs, make such investigations and reports 

as they deem necessary, and report the results of their work directly to

the Congress. In addition, the IG Act provides the IGs with a right of 

access to information, and prohibits interference with IG audits or 

investigations by agency personnel. The act further provides the IGs with 

the duty to inform the Attorney General of suspected violations of federal 

criminal law.

With the growing complexity of the federal government, the severity of the 

problems it faces, and the fiscal constraints under which it operates, it is 

important that an independent, objective, and reliable IG structure be in 

place where appropriate in the federal government to ensure adequate 

audit and investigative coverage. The IG Act provides each IG with the 

ability to exercise judgment in the use of independence protections 

specified in the act; therefore, the ultimate success or failure of an IG 

office is largely determined by the individual IG placed in that office and 

 

18The Agency for International Development has provided IG oversight to the Overseas 

Private Investment Corporation pursuant to the interagency agreement that is in effect at 

the time the oversight services are rendered.

19National Transportation Safety Board Amendments Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-424, § 

12, 114 Stat. 1883, 1887 (Nov. 1, 2000), codified, as amended, at 49 U.S.C. §1137.

IG Independence and 

Budgetary Resources
 

Page 8 GAO-14-503T 

that person’s ability to maintain independence both in fact and 

appearance.20

The Congress passed the IG Reform Act of 2008 (Reform Act) to further 

enhance IG independence and accountability.21

The Reform Act also increased the visibility of the IGs’ budgetary 

resources through the annual budget process. Specifically, the act 

requires that IG budget requests include certain information and be 

separately identified in the President’s budget submission to the 

Congress. In addition, along with the separately identified IG budgets, an 

IG may include comments with respect to the budget if the amount of the 

IG budget submitted by the agency or the President would substantially 

inhibit the IG from performing the duties of the office. These budget 

provisions are intended to help ensure adequate funding and additional 

independence of IG budgets by providing the Congress with transparency 

into the funding of each agency’s IG while not interfering with the agency 

head’s or the President’s right to formulate and transmit their own budget 

amounts for the IG.

Among other provisions, 

the Reform Act requires the rate of basic pay of the IGs appointed by the 

President to be at a specified level, and for the DFE IGs, at or above that 

of a majority of other senior-level executives at their entities. The Reform 

Act also requires an IG to obtain legal advice from his or her own counsel 

or to obtain counsel from another IG office or from CIGIE. Additionally, 

the act provides a statutory process for handling allegations of 

wrongdoing by IGs so that such reviews are not done by the same 

management officials who are subject to IG oversight. The act also 

requires both the President and the DFE heads to give written reasons to

the Congress for removing or transferring an IG at least 30 days prior to 

the action.

In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 

Act (Dodd-Frank Act) amended the IG Act with provisions to enhance the 

independence of IGs in DFEs with boards or commissions.22

 

20GAO, Inspectors General: Opportunities to Enhance Independence and Accountability, 

Specifically, 

the Dodd-Frank Act changed who would be considered the head of 

GAO-07-1089T (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2007).

21Pub. L. No 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302 (Oct. 14, 2008).

22Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 989B-D,1081, 124 Stat. 1376, 1945-46, 2080 (July 21, 2010).
 

Page 9 GAO-14-503T 

certain DFEs for purposes of IG appointment, general supervision, and 

reporting under the IG Act. If the DFE has a board or commission, the IG 

Act now requires each of these IGs to report organizationally to the entire 

board or commission as the head of the DFE rather than an individual 

chairman. In addition, the IG Act requires the written concurrence of a 

two-thirds majority of the board or commission to remove an IG. Prior to 

this protection, most DFE IGs reported to, and were subject to removal 

by, the individual serving as head of the DFE.

In other past legislative reforms, the Congress has taken actions to 

convert IGs from appointment by the agency heads to appointment by the 

President with Senate confirmation as a way to enhance IG 

independence. For example, on the heels of the savings and loan and 

banking crisis over two decades ago, the role of the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) IG became increasingly important in 

providing oversight. Because of the perceived limitation of the FDIC IG’s 

independence resulting from agency appointment, the Congress 

converted the IG from agency appointment to appointment by the 

President with Senate confirmation.23 In another example, the Congress 

took action to convert the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) IG to 

appointment by the President with Senate confirmation because of 

concerns about interference by TVA management.24 In both cases, 

Congress recognized that the IG’s independence would be enhanced by 

the presidential appointment.

IGs play a critical role in federal oversight and we believe that all 

significant federal programs and entities should be subject to oversight by 

IGs. We have supported the creation of additional IG offices and the 

enhancements to their independence by past legislation. However, we 

continue to have some concerns about creating and maintaining IG 

offices in relatively small federal agencies where it may not be costeffective to obtain the skills and expertise needed to provide adequate 

 

23Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act, Pub. L. No.103-204, § 23, 107 Stat.2369, 

2407-08 (Dec. 17, 1993). To increase the independence of the entity’s IG, this act 

converted the FDIC IG from appointment by the head of FDIC to appointment by the 

President with Senate confirmation.

24Pub. L. No. 106-422, § 1, 114 Stat. 1872 (Nov. 1, 2000). To obtain increased IG 

independence, this act converted the TVA IG from appointment by the head of TVA to 

appointment by the President with Senate confirmation.

Concluding 

Observations
 

Page 10 GAO-14-503T 

oversight. We believe there are alternatives to creating additional IG 

offices that can be both effective and less costly. These alternatives for 

oversight should be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on the 

critical nature of the small agencies’ missions and the risks identified that 

require increased oversight. Because the Congress relies on the IGs to 

provide current information about their respective agencies’ programs and 

activities, the determination of where and how to provide IG oversight in 

specific agencies is a policy decision addressed best by the Congress.

This concludes my formal statement. Chairman McCaskill, Ranking 

Member Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittee, I would be 

pleased to answer any questions that you or the Subcommittee members 

may have at this time.

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please 

contact me at (202) 512-2623 or davisbh@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this testimony are Jackson Hufnagle (Assistant Director), 

Lauren S. Fassler, Gregory Marchand, Taya Tasse, and Clarence Whitt. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

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