IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

MSCI 2007-IQ16 GRANVILLE RETAIL, LLC, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 vs. Case No. 2:11-cv-487 

 Magistrate Judge King 

UHA CORPORATION, LLC, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This is a diversity action in which plaintiff MSCI 2007-IQ16 

Granville Retail, LLC (“plaintiff” or “MSCI”), as assignee, seeks a 

money judgment, declaratory relief and foreclosure of mortgaged 

premises in Delaware, Fairfield and Franklin Counties, and associated 

leases and personal property, following the alleged default of 

defendant UHA Corporation, LLC (“UHA”), on a commercial loan. First 

Amended Complaint, ECF 29. UHA asserts counterclaims for an 

accounting and an accord and satisfaction. Amended Answer of 

Defendant UHA Corporation, LLC to the Complaint, ECF 36. With the 

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(c), this matter is 

before the Court on the Motion of Plaintiff MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville 

Retail, LLC for Appointment of Receiver, ECF 41 (“Receivership 

Motion”), and Defendant UHA’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 

Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted, or in the Alternative for 

Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, 

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ECF 51 (“UHA’s Motion”). 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

 On June 6, 2011, Bank of America, National Association, as 

successor by merger to LaSalle Bank National Association (“LaSalle 

Bank”), as Trustee for the Holders of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., 

Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-IQ16 filed 

this action. Complaint, ECF 1. On August 17, 2011, the Court 

administratively closed the case pending resolution of the bankruptcy 

proceedings of defendant UHA, Order, ECF 11, but reactivated the case 

on October 23, 2013. Order, ECF 13. 

 Thereafter, MSCI filed a motion for an order designating it as 

the real party in interest and substituting it as plaintiff. ECF 15 

(“Motion for Substitution”). In support of that motion, MSCI attached 

copies of allonges purporting to reflect certain assignments and 

transfers. Exhibit 1, attached to ECF 15. On November 15, 2013, the 

Court, by agreed order, granted the Motion for Substitution: 

The Court finds as follows: 

 1. Plaintiff Bank of America, National Association, 

as successor by merger to LaSalle Bank National 

Association, as Trustee for the Holders of Morgan Stanley 

Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through 

Certificates, Series 2007-JQ16 (“BOA”), held all of the 

loan documents that are the basis of this action herein 

(collectively the “Loan Documents”). 

 2. Pursuant to the Assignments and Allonges as more 

fully described in the Motion, BOA assigned its interest in 

the Loan Documents to Assignee #2 (as that term is defined 

in the Motion), which in turn has assigned them to MSCI. 

 

1 The statements contained in this section are set forth for purposes of 

resolving only UHA’s Motion and the Receivership Motion. 

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 3. MSCI is the real party in interest with regard to 

the Loan Documents and is therefore entitled to prosecute 

this action as plaintiff. 

 Accordingly, the Court, being duly advised in the 

premises and for good cause shown, finds the Motion well 

taken and hereby grants the same. 

 

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED

that MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville Retail, LLC shall be, and 

hereby is, substituted as Plaintiff for all purposes 

herein, and that the caption of this case shall henceforth 

be, MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville Retail, LLC, Plaintiff, v. UHA 

Corporation, LLC, Defendant. 

Agreed Order Substituting MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville Retail, LLC as 

Plaintiff Herein, ECF 16, pp. 1-2 (“Agreed Order”) (emphasis in 

original). 

 MSCI later filed the First Amended Complaint, ECF 29 (“Amended 

Complaint”) alleging, inter alia, that it is “the assignee and the 

holder of the promissory note, mortgages, financing statements and 

assignments of leases and rents more fully described below, together 

with additional documents related to the loan transaction (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as “Loan Documents”) that is the subject of 

this action.” Id. at ¶ 1 (emphasis in original). MSCI also alleged 

that National City Bank (“the Original Lender”) extended a loan to UHA 

in the original principal amount of $9,600,000.00 pursuant to the 

terms and conditions of a certain promissory note dated August 14, 

2007 (“the Note”). Id. at ¶ 8; Exhibit A, attached thereto. 

According to MSCI, 

9. The Note was assigned and transferred as follows: 

 a. By a First Allonge to Promissory Note from 

original Lender to LaSalle Bank National Association, as 

Trustee for the Holders of Morgan Stanley Capital I, Inc., 

Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-

IQ16 (“Assignee #1”) dated October 24, 2007; 

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 b. By an Allonge from Bank of America, National 

Association, success by merger to Assignee #12

 to U.S. Bank 

National Association, as Trustee, as Successor-In Interest 

to Bank of America, National Association, successor by 

merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for 

the Holders of Morgan Stanley Capital I, Inc., Commercial 

Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-IQ16 

(“Assignee #2”); and 

 c. By an Allonge from Assignee #2 to MSCI. 

Amended Complaint, ¶ 9 (emphasis in original). 

 To secure obligations evidenced by the Note, UHA executed and 

delivered to the Original Lender three mortgages (collectively, “the 

Mortgages”), encumbering certain land and improvements located in 

Delaware, Fairfield and Franklin Counties (collectively, “the Real 

Estate”). Id. at ¶¶ 11-15. UHA also granted the holder of the 

Mortgages a security interest in any items as part of the Real Estate 

that may be subject to a security interest under the Uniform 

Commercial Code, including, but not limited to “all inventory, 

furniture, equipment and fixtures and other property of every kind and 

nature whatsoever located upon the Real Estate or the improvements 

thereon or appurtenant thereto or used in connection with the present 

or future operation of the Real Estate or the improvements thereon[.]” 

Id. at ¶ 17. In addition, UHA executed and delivered to the Original 

Lender certain assignments of leases and rents, assigning certain 

additional collateral in the Mortgages as security, including “leases, 

 

2

 “References herein to Assignee #1 are to LaSalle Bank National Association, 

as Trustee with respect to assignments from Original Lender, and are to Bank 

of America, National Association, as Trustee, as successor by merger to 

LaSalle Bank National Association with respect to assignments to Assignee #2, 

because LaSalle Bank, National Association merged into Bank of America, 

National Association after the assignments from Original Lender, but before 

the assignments to Assignee #2.” Amended Complaint, ¶ 9 n.1. 

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subleases, tenancies, subtenancies, licenses, contracts, contract 

rights and occupancy agreements affecting any portion of the mortgaged 

property, together with rents, revenues, payments, income, issues, 

profits deposits, accounts, cash, bankruptcy claims, lease guaranties, 

proceeds and other rights of UHA” (collectively, “the Assignments of 

Rents”). Id. at ¶ 26. 

 According to MSCI, UHA 

defaulted on its obligations to Plaintiff under the Loan 

Documents by virtue of various acts and failures to act, 

including without limitation its failure to make payments 

when due of amounts payable of the Note, as a result of 

which Assignee #1 accelerated the maturity of the Note and 

instituted this foreclosure action. 

Id. at ¶ 34. 

In response to the Amended Complaint, UHA admitted, inter alia, 

the allegations in paragraphs 9 (regarding transfers and assignments) 

and 34 (regarding UHA’s alleged default under the Loan Documents). 

Amended Answer of Defendant UHA Corporation, LLC to the Complaint, ECF 

36, ¶ 1 (“UHA’s Amended Answer”). UHA also raised two affirmative 

defenses. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. First, UHA stated that “since the 

commencement of this action in June 6, 2011, substantial payments in 

the form of adequate protection payments were made to substitute 

plaintiff’s predecessor in interest” and after the bankruptcy court 

dismissed UHA’s bankruptcy filing, “additional, voluntary payments 

continued for more than an additional 12 months[.]” Id. at ¶ 5. UHA 

also asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction or settlement as 

a bar to plaintiff’s claims for relief: 

As its Second Affirmative Defense Defendant states that 

during the period between May of 2012 and December 2012, 

Debtor and Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest, negotiated 

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a resolution of the controversy between the parties in the 

nature of a loan modification agreement. At the request of 

said predecessor, defendant consented and attempted to 

arrange a “soft block” Controlled Account with Fifth Third 

Bank, the designated financial institution of the lender. 

Creation of such an account was a prerequisite to 

completion of the agreed to loan modification documents. 

Through no fault of Defendant, and after expenditure of 

considerable time and effort, Fifth Third Bank suddenly and 

without reasonable explanation refused to proceed further 

with the Controlled Account agreement. Thereafter 

defendant was unable to obtain cooperation from the lender 

or its servicer in completing the arrangements described 

above. The course of dealing described represents an 

Accord and Satisfaction or Settlement barring relief to 

Plaintiff in this case. 

Id. at ¶ 6. 

II. UHA’S MOTION

 UHA urges the Court to dismiss the action because plaintiff is 

not real party in interest. UHA’s Motion. Plaintiff opposes UHA’s 

Motion. ECF 60 (“Plaintiff’s Memo. in Opp.”). No reply to UHA’s 

Motion has been filed. 

A. Applicable Standard 

 UHA moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), 

12(c) or 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the 

parties have had the opportunity to fully address the matters raised 

in UHA’s Motion and they rely on documents outside the pleadings, the 

Court will construe UHA’s Motion as a motion for summary judgment 

under Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 

12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and 

not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for 

summary judgment under Rule 56.”); Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 

F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2008) (“On a motion to dismiss, a court may 

accept ‘matters outside the pleadings,’ but in doing so it generally 

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must treat the motion ‘as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.’”) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). 

The standard for summary judgment is well established. This 

standard is found in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

which provides in pertinent part: 

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, the evidence 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Summary judgment 

will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, “that 

is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242 (1986). However, summary judgment is appropriate if the 

opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which 

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The mere existence of a scintilla 

of evidence in support of the opposing party’s position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. 

 The party moving for summary judgment always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 

323. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden 

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then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 250 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); Talley v. Bravo Pitino 

Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1995)(“nonmoving party 

must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact 

making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial”). “Once the 

burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary 

judgment cannot rest on the pleadings or merely reassert the previous 

allegations. It is not sufficient to ‘simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Glover v. Speedway 

Super Am. LLC, 284 F. Supp.2d 858, 862 (S.D. Ohio 2003)(citing 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 

(1986). Instead, the non-moving party must support the assertion that 

a fact is genuinely disputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment “[a] district court is 

not . . . obligated to wade through and search the entire record for 

some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.” 

Glover, 284 F. Supp.2d at 862 (citing InteRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 

889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989)). Instead, a “court is entitled to 

rely, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists 

on a particular issue, only upon those portions of the verified 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on 

file, together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called to 

its attention by the parties.” Id. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

B. Discussion 

 UHA argues that plaintiff is not the real party in interest 

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entitled to prosecute this foreclosure action. UHA’s Motion, pp. 2-5. 

However, UHA, through counsel, has previously expressly agreed to the 

characterization of plaintiff as the “real party in interest.” Agreed 

Order, ¶ 3. See Exhibits A and B, attached to Plaintiff’s Memo. in 

Opp. Accordingly, the Court has already concluded, with the agreement 

of the parties, that MSCI is the real party in interest and a proper 

plaintiff in this foreclosure action. As plaintiff points out, “[t]he 

law of the case doctrine generally discourages courts from 

reconsidering determinations that the court made in an earlier stage 

of the proceedings.” Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668, 676-77 (6th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Graham, 327 F.3d 460, 464 (6th 

Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). UHA has not addressed 

this argument nor has it offered any persuasive reason why this Court 

should reconsider its earlier holding that MSCI is the real party in 

interest entitled to pursue foreclosure in this action. Accordingly, 

UHA’s Motion is not well-taken.3

 

III. RECEIVERSHIP MOTION 

 Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint a receiver to oversee the 

operations of the following property located in Delaware, Fairfield 

and Franklin Counties: 

(1) A retail strip shopping center located at 4038 Morse Road, 

Columbus, Franklin County, Ohio commonly known as Diamond Plaza, and 

being UHA’s fee interest in Parcel Numbers 010-213780; 

(2) A stand-alone retail facility located at 3755 W. Dublin-Granville 

Road, Dublin, Franklin County, Ohio, being Parcel No. 273-008358; 

(3) A stand-alone retail facility located at 1141 Polaris Parkway, 

 

3 Having so concluded, the Court need not, and does not, address the parties’ 

remaining arguments relating to UHA’s Motion. 

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Columbus, Delaware County, Ohio, being Parcel No. 31843301004003; 

(4) A retail strip shopping center located at 2312 Taylor Park Drive, 

Reynoldsburg, Fairfield County, Ohio, being Parcel No. 0447379120; and 

(5) UHA’s interest in the associated Personal Property. 

Receivership Motion, p. 3 (referring to this real and personal 

property, collectively, as “the Project”). 

 Plaintiff explains that, as set forth above, it is the owner and 

holder of the Note, the Mortgages and Assignments of Rents. Id. at 4 

(citing Affidavit of Rachel Naylor, ¶ 3, attached thereto as Exhibit 

2) (“Naylor Affidavit”).4

 Plaintiff holds a mortgage lien on or a 

security interest in the Project pursuant to the terms of the 

Mortgages. Id. (citing the mortgage for the property located in 

Franklin County, attached to the Naylor Affidavit, as Exhibit B). 

According to plaintiff, UHA defaulted on the terms of the Loan 

Documents, causing plaintiff’s predecessor in interest to accelerate 

the maturity of the Note and to file this action. Id. (citing Naylor 

Affidavit, ¶ 4, and UHA’s Amended Answer, ¶ 1). 

Plaintiff represents that, during the administrative stay of this 

case pending resolution of UHA’s bankruptcy proceedings, UHA made 

adequate protection payments, but that, since this case was 

reactivated on October 23, 2013, UHA has ceased making payments. Id. 

at 5 (citing Order, ECF 11; Order, ECF 13; UHA’s Amended Answer, ¶ 5). 

Plaintiff contends that UHA has also failed to pay real estate taxes 

 

4 Ms. Naylor is an Asset Manager of LNR Partners, LLC, which is the Special 

Servicer of the Note and the non-member manager of MSCI. Id. at ¶ 1. She is 

familiar with the loan to UHA held by MSCI (“the Loan”) because she is 

responsible for, inter alia, overseeing and servicing the Loan and has 

personal knowledge of the books and records of LNR Partners, LLC, and of MSCI 

as the books and records relate to the Loan. Id. at ¶ 2. 

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in default of its obligations, thus requiring plaintiff and/or its 

predecessor in interest to advance $58,179.80 in real estate tax 

payments. Id. at 6 (citing Naylor Affidavit, ¶ 5). Plaintiff goes on 

to complain that UHA has failed to (1) remit any revenues generated by 

the Project since October 30, 2013, or (2) provide plaintiff with the 

financial information required by the Loan Documents, including 

operating statements, balance sheets and profit and loss statements, 

since the period ending June 30, 2013. Id. (citing Naylor Affidavit, 

¶ 6). All these failures, plaintiff contends, constitute defaults 

under the Mortgages. Id. at 6-7(citing Mortgages, page 39, § 10.1, 

attached as Exhibits B, C and D to the Naylor Affidavit). Plaintiff 

goes on to argue that UHA’s license to operate and manage the Project 

and to collect and receive the Projects’ rents was automatically 

revoked upon its default, thus entitling plaintiff and its predecessor 

in interest to immediate possession and to apply all such rents to the 

outstanding indebtedness of UHA under the Note. Id. at 7 (citing 

Assignments of Rents, § 2.1, attached as Exhibits E, F and G to the 

Naylor Affidavit). Although plaintiff has demanded that UHA remit the 

rents generated by the Project, UHA has failed and refused to do so. 

Id. (citing Naylor Affidavit, ¶ 6). Plaintiff calculates that UHA 

owes the principal sum of $9,511,064.08 as well as interest, a makewhole premium to be calculated at the time of any default prepayment, 

amounts that plaintiff has advanced or may advance in the future for 

the preservation and security of the Project and interest on such 

advances from the dates made, and fees and costs expended, including 

attorney’s fees. Id. at 6 (citing Naylor Affidavit, ¶ 7). According 

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to plaintiff, the Project’s value is less than this amount. Id. at 7 

(citing Naylor Affidavit, ¶ 9). Under these circumstances, plaintiff 

contends, it is entitled to the appointment of a receiver to protect 

its interests, to ensure that the Project is appropriately maintained 

and to collect revenues. Id. at 7-8.5

 

Plaintiff asks that Amy E. Blessard be appointed as receiver and 

that her employer, Finsilver/Friedman Management Corporation 

(“Friedman”) be designated as manager of the Project. Id. at 9, 15. 

Ms. Blessard has extensive experience serving as a receiver in Ohio 

foreclosure cases and Friedman is experienced in managing retail 

properties. Id. at 9 (citing résumé of Amy E. Blessard and list of 

distressed properties managed by her and/or Friedman, attached as 

Exhibit 3 to the Receivership Motion (“Blessard Résumé”)). Plaintiff 

also asks that, upon the appointment of a receiver, the Court direct 

UHA, its management company and its agents to turn over to the 

receiver all of the assets of and income generated by the operation of 

the Project and order the receiver to forward to plaintiff each month 

the net proceeds arising from the operation of the Project for the 

immediately preceding month or, alternatively, for the establishment 

of reasonable escrow accounts for the payment of real estate taxes and 

insurance premiums. Id. at 15-16. 

 In response, plaintiff does not appear to dispute plaintiff’s 

right to the appointment of a receiver. Defendant UHA’s Memorandum 

contra Appointment of Amy Blessard as Receiver Herein, ECF 49, (“UHA’s 

 

5 According to plaintiff, the terms of the Mortgages authorize the appointment 

of a receiver without notice. Id. at 8 (citing Mortgages, Section 11.1(g), 

p. 42, attached as Exhibits B, C and D, attached to Naylor Affidavit). 

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Opposition to Receivership Motion”). 

 Federal courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, enjoy 

broad discretion in the appointment of receivers to control and manage 

disputed assets. Liberte Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill, 462 F.3d 543, 

551 (6th Cir. 2006); Guy v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 429 

F.2d 828, 833-34 (6th Cir. 1970). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 66.6

 The 

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained 

that the goal of a receivership and the role of the receiver 

is to safeguard the disputed assets, administer the 

property as suitable, and to assist the district court in 

achieving a final, equitable distribution of the assets if 

necessary. See 13 Moore’s Federal Practice PP 66.02-.03 (3d 

ed. 1999). As an officer of the court, the receiver’s 

powers are coextensive with his order of appointment. 

Liberte Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill, 462 F.3d at 551. 

“A receiver is an indifferent person between parties, 

appointed by the court to receive the rents, issue, or 

profits of land, or other thing in question, pending the 

suit, where it does not seem reasonable to the court that 

either party should do it.” 

Id. at 551 n.2 (quoting 1 Clark on Receivers § 11(a) (3d ed. 1959)). 

 In determining whether or not to appoint a receiver, courts 

consider several factors. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. 

Fountain Circle Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 799 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Ohio 

1992). “Most important of these factors are the adequacy of the 

security and the financial position of the mortgagor.” Id. However, 

 6

These rules govern an action in which the appointment of a 

receiver is sought or a receiver sues or is sued. But the 

practice in administering an estate by a receiver or a similar 

court-appointed officer must accord with the historical practice 

in federal courts or with a local rule. An action in which a 

receiver has been appointed may be dismissed only by court order. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 66. 

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“[i]t would appear that something more than mere inadequacy of the 

security and insolvency of the debtor are required for a court to 

bestow upon the receiver the power to manage the property in addition 

to the collection of rent.” Id. at 51. “‘It may be any circumstance 

which commends itself to a court of equity as a reason for granting 

the relief sought.’” Id. (quoting View Crest Garden Apartments Inc. 

v. United States, 281 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1960)). For example, the 

danger that the property will diminish in value supports the 

appointment of a receiver. Id. at 52. See also Wells Fargo, N.A. v. 

CCC Atl., LLC, 905 F. Supp.2d 604, 614 (D. N.J. 2012) (listing various 

factors to consider when determining whether to appoint a receiver). 

 The record in this action establishes that the appointment of a 

receiver is appropriate. Plaintiff has submitted the following 

uncontroverted evidence: (1) UHA has not paid all real estate taxes 

on the Project, Naylor Affidavit, ¶ 5; (2) UHA has failed to remit to 

plaintiff any revenue from the operation of the Project since at least 

October 30, 2013, id. at ¶ 6; (3) UHA has failed to provide plaintiff 

any operating statements, balance sheets or profit and loss statements 

since the period ending June 30, 2013, or an operating budget for the 

years 2013 and 2014, id.; and (4) the Project’s value is less than the 

amount owed on the loan evidenced by the Note, id. at ¶ 9. It also 

appears that UHA has ceased making payments on its indebtedness since 

this case was reactivated on October 23, 2013. Cf. UHA’s Amended 

Answer, ¶ 5. The evidence also establishes that UHA’s financial 

position is unstable and perhaps insolvent. See Naylor Affidavit, ¶¶ 

5-6; UHA’s Amended Answer, ¶ 5. Accordingly, there is a strong 

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likelihood that the value of the Project will diminish, even assuming 

that it has not already diminished. All of these circumstances 

warrant the appointment of a receiver. 

 Although UHA does not appear to challenge the appointment of a 

receiver, UHA - noting that tenants of the Project include retail 

businesses such as Mattress Firm and Eye Mart - challenges the 

appointment of Ms. Blessard as receiver and alleges that Ms. Blessard 

lacks experience in managing such properties. UHA’s Opposition to 

Receivership Motion, p. 1-2 (arguing that Ms. Blessard’s experience 

“is limited almost exclusively to management of residential multifamily premises (apartments and condominiums).”) As plaintiff notes, 

however, Reply of Plaintiff MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville Retail, LLC for 

Appointment of Receiver, ECF 50, (“Reply to Receivership Motion”), Ms. 

Blessard has demonstrated experience in managing commercial real 

estate. Id. at 3 (citing Blessard Résumé). In any event, it is 

anticipated that Ms. Blessard will engage Friedman, which “currently 

manages over 12 million square feet of properties on behalf of both 

institutions and private investors[,]” including “a diverse mix of 

office, industrial retail, and multi-family properties” in various 

states, including Ohio, Receivership Proposal, PAGEID#:1165, to 

manage the retail properties in this case on a day-to-day basis. 

Reply to Receivership Motion, pp. 2-3 (citing proposed order 

appointing receiver, p. 4, paragraph j, attached as Exhibit 1 to 

Receivership Motion). Based on this record, the Court concludes that 

Ms. Blessard is qualified to act as receiver for the Project in this 

action. 

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WHEREUPON, Defendant UHA’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State 

a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted, or in the Alternative for 

Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, 

ECF 51, is DENIED, and the Motion of Plaintiff MSCI 2007-IQ16 

Granville Retail, LLC for Appointment of Receiver, ECF 41, is GRANTED. 

It is ORDERED that Amy E. Blessard of Finsilver/Friedman Management 

Corporation is APPOINTED as receiver to take charge of, preserve, 

manage, maintain, protect and collect the rents, profits and revenues 

from the Project as will be set forth in detail by separate order. 

 

September 29, 2014 s/Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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