History of Refusals by Executive Branch Officials to

Provide Information Demanded by Congress

PART II—Invocations of Executive Privilege by

Executive Officials

January 27, 1983 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

This memorandum sets forth examples of two separate but related categories of 

refusals by officials within the Executive Branch to disclose information or 

produce documents requested by Congress. The first category, addressed in 

Section I of this memorandum, comprises instances of refusals by Attorneys 

General, or other officials in the Department of Justice acting under the Attorney 

General’s authority. Included within this category are general statements by 

Attorneys General regarding the authority of Executive Branch agencies to 

withhold information from Congress, as well as instances in which other Executive Branch agencies have withheld information pursuant to the Attorney 

General’s express advice. Section II of this memorandum provides examples of a 

“ separate class” 1 of refusals to provide information, specifically, incidents in 

which officers of the Executive Branch and the independent agencies have 

declined to provide information to Congress relating to law enforcement, security, or personnel investigations.

The material contained in this and our December 14, 1982, memorandum,2 

when taken together, demonstrates convincingly that throughout this nation’s 

history, the Chief Executive and those who assist him in “ tak[ing] care that the 

laws be faithfully executed,” have on certain occasions exercised their constitutional obligation to refrain from sharing with the Legislative Branch information 

the confidentiality of which was vital to the proper constitutional functioning of 

the Executive Branch. As Attorney General, and later Supreme Court Justice, 

Robert Jackson stated in 1941:

1 Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U ft. L. Rev. 1383, 1402 (1974).

2 This memorandum is a supplement to Memorandum for the Attorney General, “ Presidential Invocations of 

Executive Privilege Vis-a-Vts Congress,” from Assistant Attorney General Theodore B. Olson, Office of Legal 

Counsel (Dec. 14, 1982), hereafter “December 14, 1982, Memorandum.” [See Part I, p. 751, supra.]

782
Since the beginning of the Government, the executive branch has 

from time to time been confronted with the unpleasant duty of 

declining to furnish to the Congress . . . information which it has 

acquired and which is necessary to it in the administration of 

statutes.131

This general principle is neither new nor novel, and represents no departure from 

past practice; to the contrary, the assertion of such responsibility has been a 

consistent theme throughout our constitutional existence. Moreover, while the 

Executive’s position at times has been resisted by Congress with varying levels of 

intensity, based partially on partisan political considerations, members of the 

Legislative Branch have often respected and supported the prerogatives of the 

Executive in this regard.4

Because this memorandum is intended to be tead as a supplement to our 

memorandum entitled “ Presidential Invocations of Executive Privilege Vis-aVis Congress,” supra, note 2, it does not include instances of presidential or 

presidentially authorized withholdings involving the Attorney General or the 

Department of Justice except when a significant statement by the Attorney 

General, independent of that made by the President, is involved. Nor does it 

discuss in detail instances in which law enforcement files were withheld by the 

President or pursuant to his express direction; such instances are noted, however, 

with a reference to our December 14, 1982, Memorandum.

While the fundamental principles and rationales underlying the incidents 

described here are identical to the principles and rationales underlying formal, 

presidential invocations of executive privilege to protect sensitive information 

within the Executive Branch, these examples do not represent, in and of them5 40 Op. Alt’y Gen. 45, 48 (1941)

4 Members of Congress in both Houses have on various occasions recognized the authority of Executive Branch 

officers to withhold from Congress sensitive investigative materials. For example, in 1906 the Senate was 

considering a resolution requesting information from the President concerning the dismissal of three companies of 

“ colored’* Army troops from military service Dunng the debate. Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin raised certain 

objections lo the form of the resolution In his remarks on the power of the Executive to withhold information, 

Senator Spooner gave the following examples of appropriate executive restrictions on disclosures to Congress: 

The Department of Justice would not be expected to transmit to either House the result of its 

investigations upon which someone had been indicted, and lay bare to the defendant the case of the 

Government The confidential investigations in various departments of the Government should be. 

and have always been, treated by both Houses as confidential, and the President is entirely at liberty 

to permit by the Cabinet officer to whom the inquiry is addressed as much or as little information 

regarding them as he might see fit.

3 Hinds’ Precedents § 1904, at 197 (1907).

Also, in 1948 six Members of the House, all Democrats and including then Minority Whip John W. McCormack 

of Massachusetts, stated as follows with regard to the Attorney General’s refusal to disclose Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) investigative files regarding paroles of four federal prisoners, see generally pp 790-91 infra

I think the Attorney General is entirely justified in his refusal to make the actual FBI reports available 

to the subcommittee Investigative reports almost inevitably contain much confidential information 

relative to the identity of informants They frequently contain material which must ip the interest of a 

successful criminal prosecution be kept confidential until the very moment it is required at the trial.

The effectiveness and efficiency of the FBI would be greatly impaired if its reports were to be made 

available to any congressional committee which asked for them. Nor do 1 believe that the consent of 

the Speaker or of the President of the Senate would obviate these difficulties. I may refer in this 

respect to the authoritative opinion of Attorney General Jackson . . [referring to the Opinion of 

Robert Jackson cited at n.3, supra]

H.R Rep No 1595, 80th Cong , 2d Sess. II (1948) (Minority Report).

783
selves, formal invocations of executive privilege.5 Rather, they exemplify efforts 

by executive officers to protect the integrity of their files by communicating their 

concerns to Congress before resorting to a formal, presidential assertion of 

privilege.

The following examples are not intended to be representative of the day-to-day 

relationship between the Executive Branch and Congress concerning disclosure 

of information. Many commentators have observed that, as a rule, Congress 

receives most of the information it seeks, largely because “ the several departments and agencies strive to be on good terms with the committees in charge of 

their appropriations and their legislative programs.” 6 Nor does this enumeration 

constitute a comprehensive listing of every refusal by an executive officer to 

disclose confidential material to Congress;7 the compilation of such a list would 

be an impossible8— and largely useless— task to undertake. This memorandum

5 As the doctrine is currently implemented, executive privilege may be formally invoked to prevent disclosures to 

Congress only by the President personally. Absent such formal invocation, executive officers are obliged lo comply 

with all congressional requests for information in a manner consistent with their duty to execute the law. See, e.g ,

President Reagan's Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies. Procedures Governing 

Responses to Congressional Requests for Information (Nov 4, 1982)

6 Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege: A Study c f the Period 1953-1960, 29 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 623, 627 

(1961) See also id. at 897-98; Bishop, The Executive's Right o f Privacy An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 

Yale L.J. 477, 486, 488 (1957); Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive Secrecy: A Study in the

Separation c f Powers, 20 U. Pitl. L Rev. 755, 770 (1959). For example, in response to a congressional inquiry, the 

Department of Defense revealed that between May 17, 1954 and May 27, 1957 approximately 300,000 requests for 

information had been received from Congress by the Department and the military services Of those inquiries, only

13 were known by the Department to have been formally denied Freedom c f Information and Secrecy in

Government: Hearings on S. 921 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights c f the Senate Comm, on the

Judiciary, 85th C ong., 2d Sess 385-87 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958Hearings] (noting, however, that because 

no records are maintained by the Department specifically recording denials of congressional requests for information, there may have been additional refusals).

7 In addition to the Dec 14, 1982, Memorandum, supra, there are a number of studies which catalogue both 

formal invocations of executive pnvilege by Presidents and refusals by other executive officers to disclose 

information to Congress. They vary widely in scope, accuracy, and completeness See, e.g.. Study Prepared by the 

Government and General Research Division, Library of Congress, The Present Limits of “ Executive Pnvilege,” 

reprintedm 119Cong Rec. 10079 (1973) (listing examples from the penod 1960-1972); American Law Division, 

Library of Congress, Selected Cases in Which Information Has Been Withheld from Congress by the Executive 

Department, reprinted in 1958 Hearings, supra, at 428-46 (covering the period 1789-1956); Memorandum on the 

Exercise of Executive Pnvilege, 1956-72, Response to Congressional Inquiry by Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General Mary C Lawton (Apr. 25, 1973), reprinted in Availability c f Information to Congress• Hearings on

H .R. 4938, H .R. 5983 and H R. 6438 Before a Subcomm. c f the House Comm, on Government Operations, 93d 

Cong , 1st Sess. 117-20 (1973); Kramer & Marcuse, supra, 29 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 629, 827, Memorandum 

Reviewing Inquines by the Legislative Branch During the Penod 1948-1953, Concerning the Decisionmaking 

Process and Documents of the Executive Branch (unpublished, anonymous Department of Justice document) 

(hereafter Department of Justice Study), Department of Justice study, submitted to the Committee by Deputy 

Attorney General Rogers, Is a Congressional Committee Entitled to Demand and Receive Information and fapers 

From the President and the Heads of Departments Which They Deem Confidential, in the Public Interest?, reprinted

in 1958 Hearings, supra, at 63-146 (hereafter Rogers Memorandum) (covering penod from Founders through 

1957)

8 There are countless examples among the boards, agencies, and departments of the Executive Branch wherein 

congressional staff, Members of Congress, or congressional committees have informally requested information or 

documents But, as one commentator has noted:

The actual extent and degree to which the Executive branch responds to [these] congressional 

requests for information and documents are buried in the files of the several departments, agencies, 

and congressional committees As a practical matter, it is impossible to sift those records in order to 

extract from them the portions relating to congressional demands for information and the answers of 

the Executive pertaining thereto. Only a small part of these inquiries finds its way into the mynad of 

pages of printed heanngs, committee documents and reports, and the Congressional Record. But 

even here it is virtually impossible to locate them owing to the absence of a proper indexing system.

Kramer & Marcuse, supra, at 627.

We know of only one occasion in which a survey has been conducted of the vanous executive departments’

C ontinued

784
instead is designed simply to provide examples of the well-established practice 

by which executive officers, in carrying out their duty to execute the laws, have 

declined to provide sensitive material generated within the Executive Branch to 

Congress.

I. Attorney General and Department of Justice Refusals9

1. 1886

In response to a Senate resolution requesting the Attorney General to transmit 

to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary copies of all documents and papers filed 

in the Department of Justice relative to the management and conduct of the Office 

of the District Attorney (now United States Attorney) for the Southern District of 

Alabama, Attorney General Garland wrote on January 28, 1886:

In response to the said resolution the President of the United 

States directs me to say that the papers which were in this 

Department relating to the fitness of John D. Burnett, recently 

nominated to said office, having been already sent to the Judiciary 

Committee of the Senate, and the papers and documents which 

are mentioned in the said resolution, and still remaining in the 

custody of this Department, having exclusive reference to the 

suspension by the President of George M. Duskin, the late incumcompliance with congressional requests for information. On April 2,1957, Chairman Hennings of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary sent letters to the heads of a selected list of 

executive departments and agencies asking the following questions:

1 How many times since May 17, 1954, has your agency refused information to Congressmen or 

congressional committees9

2. If there have been instances when information has been withheld, when did each occur, and what 

were the circumstances surrounding such occurrences?

3 On what basis was the information withheld in each instance?

1958 Hearings. supra, at 374. While the answers to Chairman Hennings' letter represent the most complete study 

concerning the degree to which the Executive Branch as a whole responds to congressional requests for information, 

the study was limited in scope not only with respect to time— May 1954 through April 1957—but also in terms of the 

number of agencies polled. In addition, the Hennings study also illustrates the almost insurmountable difficulties in 

obtaining comprehensive and accurate information on the subject, owing to the inadequacy of records. Typical was 

the response to Chairman Hennings’ letter by Acting Chairman Phillips of the Civil Service Commission:

The Commission has no way of ascertaining the number of times it has refused information to 

Congressmen or congressional committees. Our filing system does not lend itself to locating such 

information. The correspondence file is so voluminous, it would be an insurmountable task to search 

for such information Inquiries have been made of these [sic] persons in the Commission who would 

have occasion to entertain a question of refusal, consequently, our answers to your questions are 

based on memory of such incidents. Undoubtedly, since May 17, 1954, there have been refusals that 

have escaped the memory of those who were concerned at the time in the determination to furnish the 

requested information on the specific occasion.

Id. at 378. See also id. at 385 (response of the Secretary of Defense) (‘'no speciaJ records are maintained by the 

Department [of Defense] recording denials of congressional requests for information . . ”). See generally Kramer

& Marcuse, supra, at 637 (extensive analysis of Hennings study).

Notwithstanding these limitations, this memorandum has relied heavily upon the Hennings study and other

similar compilations in its effort to document typical instances of executive withholding. See generally note 7, 

supra These materials do not provide an adequate basis for obtaining comprehensive or statistically representative 

examples of executive withholding in the various Administrations

9 Although there may well have been instances of refusals by the Attorney General or Department of Justice 

officials earlier than 1886, such instances have not been well documented. The lack of records regarding incidents 

pnor to this period can be accounted for, in part, by the fact that earlier demands and refusals were handled directly 

by the President, see generally our Dec. 14, 1982, Memorandum, and the fact that the executive departments, 

including the Department of Justice, were not, for the most part, established until the 1870s

785
bent of the office of district attorney of the United States for the 

southern district of Alabama, it is not considered that the public 

interest will be promoted by a compliance with said resolution 

and the transmission of the papers and documents therein mentioned to the Senate in executive session.1101

On February 18, 1886, the Committee on the Judiciary reported a resolution 

condemning the refusal of the Attorney General to transmit the documents. On 

March 1, 1886, President Cleveland sent a message to the Senate stating that the 

requested papers were withheld at his direction because they contained information addressed to him and to the Attorney General by private citizens concerning 

the former District Attorney, and that the documents related to an act (the 

suspension and removal of an Executive Branch official) which was a function 

exclusively within the discretion of the Executive.11

2. 1904

On April 27, 1904, Attorney General Knox sent a letter to the Speaker of the 

House declining to comply with a resolution of the House requesting him, “ if not 

incompatible with the public interest,” to inform the House whether any criminal 

prosecutions had been instituted against individuals involved in the Northern 

Securities antitrust case, “and to send to the House all papers and documents and 

other information bearing upon any prosecutions inaugurated or about to be 

inaugurated in that behalf.” 12 The Attorney General responded that no prosecutions had been initiated and that “ further than this, I do not deem it compatible 

with the public interest to comply with the resolution.” 13

3. 1908

In response to a request to transmit, if not incompatible with the public 

interest, documents and information in the possession of the Department of 

Justice concerning the International Paper Co. and other corporations engaged in 

the manufacture of woodpulp or print paper, Attorney General Bonaparte replied 

on April 13, 1908, that no evidence had been obtained sufficient to justify the 

institution of legal proceedings, either civil or criminal, against any alleged 

combination of woodpulp or print paper manufacturers but that a further investigation was in progress. He added that “ [i]t would be inexpedient at the present 

stage of this investigation to disclose to the public specifically what steps have 

been taken, or what action is contemplated, by this Department with respect to 

matters mentioned in the said resolution.” 14

10 s. Misc. Doc. 68, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. 236 (1893).

11 Id. at 233, 262-63. See also 8 J Richardson, Messages and fapersof the Presidents 375 (1896); December 14, 

1982, Memorandum, supra, at 23.

12 38 Cong. Rec. 5636 (1904). The phrase, “ if not incompatible with the public interest,” and other, similar 

phrases have often been embodied in congressional requests for information from the Executive. For a discussion of 

Ihe origin and use of these congressional formulations, see generally Dec. 14,1982, Memorandum, supra, atn.15;

3 Hinds’ Precedents, supra, §§ 1856, 1896; Cox, supra. 122 U. f t L. Rev. at 1397 and n.55.

13 H. Doc. No. 704, 58th C ong., 2d Sess. (1904). TTiis refusal was cited by Attorney General Robert Jackson as 

historical precedent for his opinion at 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 45, 47 (1941), see infra, 788-89

14 H Doc. No. 860, 60th C ong., IstSess 1-2 (1908); 42 Cong. Rec. 4512 (1908) See also 40 Op. Att’y Gen., 

supra, at 47.

786
4. 1909

In response to a January 4, 1909, Senate resolution requesting Attorney 

General Bonaparte to inform it whether legal proceedings had been instituted 

against the United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel) by reason of its absorption of the Tennessee Coal & Iron Company, and, further, to provide any Attorney 

General opinions written on the subject. President Roosevelt replied on January 6 

that he, as the Chief Executive, was responsible for the matter, and that Attorney 

General Bonaparte had advised him that there were insufficient grounds for 

instituting legal action against U .S. Steel, and that he had instructed the Attorney 

General “ not to respond to that portion of the resolution which calls for a 

statement of his reasons for nonaction . . . because I do not conceive it to be 

within the authority of the Senate to give directions of this character to the head of 

an executive department, or to demand from him reasons for his action.” 15 

Thereafter, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary subpoenaed the Commissioner of Corporations to produce all papers and documents in his possession 

regarding U.S. Steel. The Attorney General advised the Commissioner that the 

discretion to make the documents public was vested in the President, and that he 

should therefore call the request to the attention of the President, submit to him 

the relevant documents and obtain his instructions as to what part of the data, if 

any, was “ suitable for publication by disclosure to the subcommittee of the 

Senate.” 16

5. 1912

On March 18,1912, Attorney General Wickersham sent a letter to the Speaker 

of the House declining to comply with a House resolution directing the Attorney 

General to furnish to the House information concerning the Department of 

Justice’s investigations of the Smelter Trust.17

6. 1912

On March 19, 1912, in response to a Senate resolution requesting the Attorney 

General to provide it with all correspondence, information, and reports of the 

Bureau of Corporations relative to the “ Harvester Trust,” Attorney General 

Wickersham responded that he was directed by the President to say that it was 

“ not compatible with the public interests” to provide the information at that time 

because the matters “pertain[ed] entirely to business which is now pending and 

uncompleted in this department.” 18

7. 1912

In response to a House resolution demanding that the Comptroller of the 

Currency provide the House Committee on Banking and Currency with data 

relative to the operation of national banks, Attorney General Wickersham sent an

15 43 Cong Rec. 528 (1909).

16 27 Op Att’y Gen. 150, 156 (1909). See also Dec. 14, 1982, Memorandum, supra.

17See 40 Op Att’y Gen., supra, at 47.

18 S Doc. No. 454, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1912)

787
opinion to the President on November 9, 1912, stating that the President, to 

whom the Comptroller had referred the request, could provide the Committee 

with the information if, in his opinion, it was proper to do so. The opinion further 

stated that:

Nowhere in the law is there any express provision that the 

information thus acquired by the Comptroller shall be confidential. While, if in your opinion, the interests of the Government require that this information shall be so treated, you have the 

right to refuse to divulge it, yet, I am clearly of the view that if, in 

your opinion, it is proper to give this information to the House 

committee you have the lawful power to do so.ll9)

8. 1914

On August 28, 1914, Attorney General McReynolds sent a letter to the 

Secretary to the President stating that it would be incompatible with the public 

interest to send to the Senate, in response to its resolution, reports made to the 

Attorney General by his associates regarding violations of law by the Standard 

Oil C o.20

9. 1915

On February 23, 1915, Attorney General Gregory sent a letter to the President 

of the Senate declining to comply with a Senate resolution requesting him to 

report to the Senate his findings and conclusions of the investigations conducted 

by the Department of Justice “ in the matter of illegal combinations in restraint of 

trade in the smelting industry, commonly called the Smelting Trust,” on the 

ground that to do so would be incompatible with the public interest.21

10. 1926

On June 8, 1926, Attorney General Sargent sent a letter to the Chairman of the 

House Committee on the Judiciary declining to comply with his request to turn 

over to the Committee all papers in the Department’s files relating to the merger 

of certain oil companies.22

11. 1941

In response to a request from the House Committee on Naval Affairs to furnish 

all Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports since June 1939, and all future 

reports, memoranda, and correspondence of the FBI or the Department of Justice 

in connection with investigations arising out of strikes, subversive activities in 

connection with labor disputes, or labor disturbances of any kind in industrial

19 29 Op. A tt’y Gen. 555, 560 (1912) (citations omitted).

x* See 40 Op. Att’y Gen , supra, at 47.

21 See 52 Cong. Rec. 4089, 4908-09 (1915); see also 40 Op Att’y Gen., supra, at 48.

22 See 40 Op A tt'y Gen., supra, at 48.

788
establishments which had naval contracts, Attorney General Robert Jackson 

declined, writing on April 30, 1941:

It is the position of this Department, restated now with the 

approval of and at the direction of the President, that all investigative reports are confidential documents of the executive department of the Government, to aid in the duty laid upon the 

President by the Constitution to “ take care that the laws be 

faithfully executed,” and that congressional or public access to 

them would not be in the public interest.1231

The Attorney General pointed to the following injurious results which would 

follow disclosure of the reports: (1) disclosure would seriously prejudice law 

enforcement; (2) disclosure at that particular time would have prejudiced the 

national defense; (3) disclosure would seriously prejudice the future usefulness 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in that the “ keeping of faith” with 

confidential informants was an indispensable condition of future efficiency; 

(4) disclosure might also result in the grossest kind of injustice to innocent 

individuals, because the reports included leads and suspicions, sometimes those 

of malicious or misinformed people, which had not been verified. In addition, he 

noted that the number of requests alone for FBI records by congressional 

committees would have made compliance impracticable, particularly since many 

of the requests were comprehensive in character.

The opinion of the Attorney General was in accord with the conclusions which 

had been reached by a long line of predecessors, and with the position taken by 

Presidents since Washington’s Administration. He concluded by stating that the 

exercise of this discretion in the Executive Branch had been upheld and respected 

by the judiciary.

12. 1944

The House Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications 

Commission subpoenaed the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 

testify concerning fingerprint records, activities at Pearl Harbor, and also to 

identify a certain document which he was alleged to have received in the course 

of his duties. The Select Committee had been empowered by a House resolution 

to investigate whether the Commission had been acting in accordance with law 

and the public interest.24 The Director refused to give testimony regarding the 

letter that he was alleged to have received, or to exhibit a copy of the President’s 

directive requiring him, in the interest of national security, to refrain from 

testifying or disclosing the contents of the Bureau’s files. Attorney General 

Biddle wrote a letter to the Committee, dated January 22, 1944, informing the 

Committee that communications between the President and the heads of depart23 Id. al 46. See also Dec. 14, 1982, Memorandum, supra.

24 See Rogers Memorandum, supra, at 97

789
ments were privileged and not subject to inquiry by congressional committees, 

stating:

I have carefully considered the request . . . that I produce 

before your committee a copy of the document that I received 

from the President directing Mr. Hoover not to testify before your 

committee about certain transactions between this Department 

and the Federal Communications Commission.

It is my view that as a matter of law and of long-established 

constitutional practice, communications between the President 

and the Attorney General are confidential and privileged and not 

subject to inquiry by a committee of one of the Houses of 

Congress. In this instance, it seems to me that the privilege should 

not be waived; to do so would be to establish an unfortunate 

p re ced e n t, inconsistent with the position taken by my 

predecessors.

It could, moreover, open the door to detailed inquiries into the 

confidential and privileged relationship that exists between the 

President and the Attorney General, heretofore generally recognized by the Congress. I must therefore respectfully decline to 

produce before your committee the President’s communication. 

Without waiving in any way the privilege, however, I believe that I 

can inform the committee that the President’s direction states that 

because the transactions relate to the internal security of the 

country, it would not be in the public interest, at the present time, 

for Mr. Hoover or any officer of the Department to testify about 

them or to disclose any correspondence concerning them.

Furthermore, I should like to point out that a number of . . . 

questions related to the methods and results of investigations 

carried on by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Department of Justice has consistently taken the position, long acquiesced in by the Congress, that it is not in the public interest to 

have these matters publicly disclosed. Even in the absence of 

instructions from the President, therefore, I should have directed 

Mr. Hoover to refuse to answer these questions.1251

13. 1947

During the course of an investigation by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments into the operation of the 

United States Board of Parole in 1947-48, the subcommittee, on September 30,

1947, requested Director Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to have a 

representative of the FBI bring to a hearing the investigative files of four parolees

25 See Study and Investigation c f the Federal Communications Commission: Hearings on H. Res 21 Before the

House Select Comm, to Investigate the Federal Communications Commission, 78th Cong , 1st Sess. 2338-39 

(1944) See also Dec. 14, 1982, Memorandum, supra

790
alleged to be members of the “ Capone Mob.” Hoover replied that he was 

forwarding the request to Attorney General Clark to whom the subcommittee 

reiterated the request.26 Assistant Attorney General Ford replied on the Attorney 

General’s behalf that the Department would contact the subcommittee after the 

completion of the FBI investigation. A further reply, by Acting Attorney General 

Perlman, dated October 15, 1947, stated:

The substance of your letter is a request that the reports of 

investigating agencies of the executive departments be made 

available to your committee. Such reports have long been held to 

be of a confidential nature.

. . . I feel certain that you can readily see the reasons why we 

cannot turn over to your committee [the] investigative reports or 

files you seek . . . ,l27]

The subcommittee then sought to reassure the Department that it did not intend at 

that time to seek “ any information as to the confidential sources from which the 

information was obtained,” to which the Department replied that the investigation was not yet complete and referred to the previous letters, again refusing the 

files. However, the Department did offer summaries of reports and information 

contained in the file for the subcommittee’s confidential use.28

14. 1948

The Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the 

Executive Departments requested Attorney General Clark, by letter of August 2,

1948, to furnish the Subcommittee with “ any letters, memoranda, or other 

written notice which the Department of Justice may have furnished to any other 

departments, agencies, bureaus, or individuals in Government concerning 

William W. Remington ...” The letter stated that the Subcommittee desired 

the information in order to determine the extent to which other departments 

within the Executive Branch had been notified of “ the possible espionage 

activities of Remington” so that the Subcommittee would then “ be in a position 

to inquire as to who was responsible for allowing Remington to hold three 

important jobs of a highly confidential nature, at the same time [that the 

Department was] conducting an investigation of him.” 29

26 The Seventeenth Intermediate Report of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments 

reported on August 6, 1948, that:

The FBI refused to give the committee any information, assigning as its reason that it was an 

agency of the Department of Justice and that, acting under instructions from the Department, it could 

not and would not comply with the request

A request to Tom Clark, head of the Department of Justice, and to the Department of Justice met 

with a refusal to furnish such information No reason was given other than that the information was 

confidential and that the refusal was in compliance with an Executive order issued by President 

Thiman, which was based on a long-established policy of the executive departments dating back to 

the administration of President Washington.

H.R. Rep. No. 2441. 80th Cong., 2d Sess 7 (1948)

27 Investigation as to the Manner in Which the United States Board c f Parole is Operating and as to Whether There

is a Necessityfor a Change m Either the Procedure or Basic Law: Hearings Before a Subcomm. c f the House Comm .

on Expenditures m the Executive Departments, 80th Cong., 2d Sess 595 (1948).

a id. at 594-96. See also H.R. Rep No 2441, 80th Cong , 2d Sess 7, 21-23 (1948)

29 Export Policy and Loyalty: Hearings on S Res. 189 Before the Investigations Subcomm. c f the Senate Comm,

on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 80th Cong , 2d Sess. 383 (1948).

791
In his reply of August 5, Attorney General Clark refused to supply the material 

on the ground that it fell within President Truman’s directive of March 13,1948,30 

and stated that the requestihad been referred to the Office of the President. A 

subsequent committee report states that, in addition to the Truman directive, the 

Attorney General’s refusal to supply the information was based on the need to 

protect . . . information relative to procedures employed by the Department of 

Justice in the handling of alleged espionage within the Government.” 31

15. 1949

On June I, 1949, Attorney General Clark failed to comply with a subpoena 

served upon him by the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the 

Senate Committee on the Judiciary that directed him to produce the files of the 

Department of Justice in the cases of 168 persons named in the subpoena. In 

refusing to comply, the Attorney General stated that the persons listed were, for 

the most part, officials or employees of the United Nations or of foreign 

governments; that the treatment of persons in that category implicated both 

sensitive foreign relations considerations and the maintenance of internal security; and that he had conferred with the Director of the FBI and had concluded 

‘“ that it is not in the public interest that [this information] be produced.’” The 

Attorney General further noted that it had been reported in the press that the 

Subcommittee Chairman intended to “ ‘release certain confidential information 

contained in [his] files relating to internal security matters.’” The Attorney 

General urged that before “ ‘such information is made public the matter be 

cleared with this Department.’ ” The letter closed by noting that the President had 

directed the Attorney General to decline to provide this information.32

16. 1950

On February 22,1950, the Senate adopted Resolution 231 directing a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator 

Tydings, to investigate allegations of disloyalty among Department of State 

employees, and “ ‘to procure, by subpoena, and examine the complete loyalty 

and employment files and records of all the Government employees in the 

Department of State and such other agencies against whom charges have been 

heard.’ ”33

On March 17, 1950, Attorney General McGrath prepared a memorandum 

prompted by the Department of State’s request for permission to reveal to the 

subcommittee the contents of the investigative files concerning those employees

30 id. at 384. The Mar. 13, 1948, directive issued by President Truman provided for the confidentiality of all 

loyalty files by requiring that all requests for such files from sources outside the Executive Branch be referred to the 

Office of the President for such responses as the President might determine to be appropriate. 13 Fed Reg. 1359 

(1948). See The Public ftpers of the Presidents, Harry S Truman, 1948, at 228; Dec. 14, 1982, Memorandum.

31 S Rep. No. 1775, 80th Cong , 2d Sess. 20 (1948).

32 Department of Justice Study, supra, at 12-13.

33 See Department of Justice Study, supra, at 16. Although this episode is covered in the December 14, 1982, 

Memorandum, portions of it are recounted in this memorandum to highlight the roles of the Attorney General and 

the Director of the FBI

792
against whom Senator McCarthy had made allegations of disloyalty, advising 

President Truman that, in light of the President’s unquestioned authority to 

withhold the files, the only question was whether, as a matter of policy, he 

deemed it advisable to make the files available. Referring to the President’s 

March 13, 1948, directive,34 Attorney General McGrath advised the President 

that unless there were special reasons which compelled a different course, the 

confidential nature of the loyalty files should be preserved, and that to do 

otherwise would create an unfortunate precedent. Attorney General McGrath did 

suggest, however, that the President could attempt to accommodate the subcommittee’s interests by transmitting the files to the Loyalty Review Board with a 

request that the Board review the files and report its findings with respect to each 

person against whom charges had been brought, in the light of the factual 

evidence which had been adduced, primarily by Senator McCarthy, before the 

subcommittee.35

On March 27,1950, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 

Attorney General appeared before the subcommittee to give their respective 

views. The Director’s statement dealt with practical objections, while the Attorney General’s statement dealt with the historic objections voiced by past 

Presidents to the disclosure of investigative files. The Attorney General pointed 

out that since the Department of State loyalty files chiefly involved investigations 

that had been conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the “loyalty files, 

therefore, are for all practical purposes FBI files.”36 The Director’s statement 

stressed the FBI’s obligation to protect not only the rights, lives, and property of 

American citizens, but also to protect the confidential relationship of citizens 

who serve their country by providing information essential to the national 

security:

FBI reports set forth all details secured from a witness. If those 

details were disclosed, they could become subject to misinterpretation, they could be quoted out of context, or they could be 

used to thwart truth, distort half truths, and misrepresent facts.

The raw material, the allegations, the details of associations and 

compilation of information in FBI files must be considered as a 

whole. They are of value to an investigator in the discharge of his 

duty. These files were never intended to be used in any other 

manner and the public interest would not be served by the disclosure of their contents.

In taking this stand, I want to reiterate— a principle is involved.

I would take this same stand before the Attorney General, as I 

already have, or before any other body. The fact that I have great 

respect, confidence, and a desire to be of assistance to a commit34 See n.30, supra.

35 Id. at 13-14.

36 Id. at 15, citing to the Attorney General’s statement before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 

Foreign Relations at 9 (Mar. 27, 1950).

793
tee of distinguished Senators, however, in no way detracts from a 

principle. I say this because I do not want any misinterpretation of 

my remarks, nor do 1 want it said that this and other committees of 

Congress do not have my respect and confidence. I would be 

derelict to my duty, untrue to my conscience, and unworthy of my 

trust to take any other position.1371

On March 28, 1950, the subcommittee served subpoenas on the Secretary of 

State, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission 

demanding production of the files. After reference of the subpoenas to the 

President pursuant to the March 13, 1948, directive, President Truman directed 

the officials not to comply.38

President Truman also wrote to Senator Tydings of the subcommittee on March 

28 and reiterated Director Hoover’s objections to public disclosure of the FBI 

reports, stating that the single most important factor in an effective and just 

loyalty program was the preservation of all files in the strictest confidence, from 

the points of view of informants as well as innocent individuals. The President 

closed his letter by stating that in order to give the most thorough and complete 

investigation of the charges that the subcommittee was considering, he had asked 

the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board to have the Board arrange for a 

detailed review of all cases with regard to which charges of disloyalty had been 

made. The President further stated that he had asked the Board, after such review, 

to give him a full and complete report on each case.39

Following these events, it appeared that the files had already been disclosed. In 

1947, prior to the March 13, 1948, Truman directive, the House Committee on 

Appropriations had conducted an investigation of the Department of State and 

had been furnished with the files that were presently sought by the Senate Foreign 

Relations Subcommittee. In light of this newly discovered fact, President 

Truman, on May 4, 1950, agreed to make the loyalty files available for review by 

the subcommittee “ on the theory that to do so would not establish a precedent for 

subsequent exceptions in violation of [the] March 13, 1948, directive.” 40 The 

conditions under which the subcommittee was permitted to see the files included 

the limitations that no individual cases by name would be discussed outside of the 

room in the White House where the files were to be viewed, no notes were to be 

taken from the White House, and no technical assistance by career FBI personnel 

would be provided to assist in the interpretation of notes found in the files.41

17. 1952

On March 4,1952, Assistant Attorney General Duggan wrote to the Chairman 

of the Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, in 

response to a letter dated February 22, 1952, requesting information from the

37 Department of Justice Study, supra, at 16.

38 The Public lepers of the Presidents, H arry S Truman, 1950, at 240

39 Department of Justice Study, supra, at 15.

40 S. Rep. No. 2108, 81st C ong., 2d Sess. 9(1950)

41 Department of Justice Study, supra, at 32.

794
Attorney General “ ‘for the purpose of conducting an inquiry into the administration of the Department of Justice.’ ” The Subcommittee sought a list of all cases 

that had been referred to the Department of Justice or United States Attorneys, 

for either criminal or civil action, by any governmental department or agency 

within the last six years. The information sought was:

(a) A list of all cases in which action had been declined by the Department 

of Justice, including the reasons for refusal to act;

(b) A statement showing all subsequent actions taken by the Department 

of Justice in cases in which the Department had returned a case to a 

government department or agency for further information; and

(c) A list of cases in which a referral to the Department of Justice had been 

pending for more than one year, other than the two categories 

mentioned.42

Mr. Duggan responded that the request was outside the scope of the resolution, 

since it did not seek information based upon specific complaints “ supported by 

credible evidence,” and that the request would impose an intolerable burden 

upon the Department, since it would require an examination of approximately 

500,000 cases and thus would effectively paralyze “ the Department’s efforts to 

discharge its current duties.” Mr. Duggan added that the Department was 

prepared to honor all reasonable requests with respect to cases in which specific 

allegations were supported by credible evidence, unless the public interest 

required otherwise.

On March 5, 1952, Mr. Duggan advised 54 executive agencies, boards, and 

commissions that he had advised the Subcommittee of his decision not to comply 

with its request, citing as his reason the fact that “ it constitutes what Mr. Justice 

Holmes has characterized as a ‘fishing expedition for the chance that something 

discreditable might turn up.’”43

18. 1952

On April 22, 1952, Acting Attorney General Perlman wrote the Chief Counsel 

of the House Subcommittee to Investigate the Department of Justice, in response 

to five letters sent by the Subcommittee in April 1952 for inspection of Department of Justice files, reiterating the agreement which he and the Subcommittee 

had reached regarding the production of additional Department of Justice files in 

aid of the Subcommittee’s investigation. That agreement provided for the 

following:

1. Requests involving open cases, either civil or criminal, would not be 

honored; however, a written or oral status report on the cases would be 

furnished.

42 See Department of Justice Study, supra, at 44-46, The Public F^pers of the Presidents, Harry S Truman, 

1952-53, at 199. President Truman’s response lo this request is reported in the December 14, 1982, Memorandum, 

supra

43 Department of Justice Study, supra, at 46

795
2. As to closed cases— cases in which the Department had completed 

prosecution or consideration without suit—the files would be made 

available.

3. As to all files made available, Mr. Perlman emphasized that the 

Department would “withhold from inspection all FBI reports and confidential information, reports of any other investigative agencies, and any 

other documents containing the names of informers or other data, the 

disclosure of which would be detrimental to the public interest.”

4. Personnel files would never be disclosed, except in cases where 

Senate committees were considering nominations made by the 

President.44

19. 1954

In response to a request by Republican members of the Special Subcommittee 

on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations during the 

Army-McCarthy hearings for more detailed information about a high-level 

meeting at the White House to which he had referred in his testimony before the 

full Subcommittee, the counsel to the Army stated that he had been instructed not 

to testify as to the interchange of views among the officials present at that 

meeting. In response to a request to submit written authorization for the position 

that he had taken, the counsel to the Army submitted the May 17, 1954, 

Eisenhower letter45 to which was attached a memorandum from Attorney General 

Brownell. Attorney General Brownell’s memorandum listed historical examples 

of instances in which Presidents had withheld information from Congress and 

concluded that:

Thus, you can see that the Presidents of the United States have 

withheld information of executive departments or agencies whenever it was found that the information sought was confidential or 

that its disclosure would be incompatible with the public interest 

or jeopardize the safety of the Nation. The courts, too, have held 

that the question whether the production of the papers was contrary to the public interest, was a matter for the Executive to 

determine.

By keeping the lines which separate and divide the three great 

branches of our Government clearly defined, no one branch has 

been able to encroach upon the powers of the other.1461

20. 1955-1956

In a letter from Chairman O’Mahoney to Chairman Hennings, whose subcommittee was separately conducting a study of Executive Branch refusals to provide 

information to Senate committees,47 Chairman O’Mahoney wrote:

44 Id. at 46-47

45 Reprinted in Dec 14, 1982, Memorandum.

46 Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges Involving: Secretary c f the Army Robert T.

Stevens, et al.: Hearings on S Res. 189 Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations c f the Senate Comm, on

Government Operations, 83d Cong , 2d Sess. 1269-75 (1954).

47 See generally 1958 Hearings, supra

796
The Department of Justice has declined to furnish to this 

[Subcommittee [on Antitrust and Monopoly] information in its 

files which was furnished by companies in connection with its 

voluntary merger clearance program on the ground that information so supplied is confidential.

The Department of Justice has consistently refused to permit 

the [Subcommittee to examine grand-jury transcripts] and documents obtained pursuant to grand-jury subpena[es] which have 

not become matters of public record. In accordance with longstanding policy, the Department has refused to permit examination of Federal Bureau of Investigation reports.1481

21. 1955

On June 15, 1955, Attorney General Brownell sent an opinion to the President 

advising him that the Federal Communications Commission could, in its discretion, provide the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce information that the Commission had received on a confidential basis from television 

stations and networks.49 However, the Attorney General advised, the authorization to disclose the information did not constitute a requirement that the Commission divulge to the Committee confidential information, and, that the Commission was free to withhold that information in its discretion.

22. 1955

Within the context of the July 1955 hearings on the Dixon-Yates Contract 

before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on 

the Judiciary,50 Attorney General Brownell advised the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that:

Any communication within the SEC among Commissioners or 

the Commissioners and employees is privileged and need not be 

disclosed outside of the Agency. Likewise, any communication 

from others of the executive branch to members of the Commission or its employees with respect to administrative matters comes 

within the purview of the President’s letter of May 17, 1954.

You inquired specifically whether when a proceeding is pending before the Commission a request to the Commission for an 

adjournment by someone in the executive branch outside the 

Commission is likewise covered. Because such a proceeding is 

quasi-judicial in nature, it is my opinion that such a request would 

not be covered by the President’s letter. . . . Once the proceeding 

is no longer pending before the Commission such information

48 Id. at 352.

49 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 221 (1955)

50 See generally Kramer & Marcuse, supra, 29 Geo. Wash. Rev. at 689, Dec. 14, 1982, Memorandum, supra.

797
should, upon request, be made available by the Commission to an 

appropriate congressional committee.1511

However, when subsequently questioned about a telephone conversation that he 

had had with Presidential Assistant Adams, the Chairman of the SEC testified as 

to the existence of the conversation but, on the advice of Attorney General 

Brownell and of Special Counsel to the President Morgan, he refused to divulge 

the matters discussed during the conversation on the ground that they involved 

privileged information.52

23. 1956

On May 29, 1956, during the course of its investigations into the Antitrust 

Consent Decree Program at the Department of Justice, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary requested the Department to furnish 

it with “ all files in the Department of Justice relating to the negotiations for, and 

signing of, a consent decree” in the A.T.&T. case.53 The Department of Justice 

replied on July 13, 1956:

The staff of the Antitrust Division has examined in detail this 

Department’s files relating to the negotiations and formulation of 

that decree. The bulk of these documents fall[s] in[to] two categories: first, material submitted by defendants regarding their operations; and, second, memoranda by various members of the Antitrust Division concerning negotiation conferences as well as 

decree provisions.

Documents relating to defendants’ operations . . . were produced, not pursuant to interrogatories or court order, but rather in 

the course of good-faith negotiation of a consent settlement.

Some touched on confidential aspects of the defendants’ operations. Were they made available to your subcommittee, this 

Department would violate the confidential nature of settlement 

negotiations and, in the process, discourage defendants, present 

and future, from entering into such negotiations.

In any event, . . . Department policy does not permit disclosure of staff memoranda or recommendations. As I indicated, 

the decision whether or not to settle, and if so on what terms, may 

involve difficult judgments. Reaching these judgments, I am sure 

you appreciate that men equally devoted to vigorous antitrust 

enforcement may well differ. To [ensure that] intelligent final 

decision[s are made] therefore, full and open discussion is re51 1958 Hearings, supra, at 445-46, citing The New York Times, July 15, 1955, at 1

52 See 1958 Hearings, supra, at 446

53 Kramer & Marcuse, supra, 29 Geo. Wash. L Rev. at 887. See Consent Decree Program c f the Department cf

Justice: Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. c f the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 85th Cong , 1st and 2d 

Sess., (Pts I & II) (1957-58); Report on H. R. Res 27 of the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm, on the 

Judiciary, 86th C ong., 1st Sess. (1959)

798
quired frequently, not only by all members of the staff but also by 

the staff with the Assistant Attorney General. This process of 

interchange may endure over some time. And, as a result of 

discussion, any participant must feel free to alter his views as the 

merits of argument dictate. This essential process of full and 

flexible exchange might be seriously endangered were staff members hampered by the knowledge they might at some later date be 

forced to explain before Congress intermediate positions taken.

The responsibility for explaining such decisions thus rests upon 

the Assistant Attorney General and ultimately upon the Attorney 

General.1541

However, the Subcommittee report indicates that the Subcommittee was able to 

get much of the information that it had requested voluntarily from A.T.&T., the 

Department of Defense, and the Federal Communications Commission.55

24. 1957

On April 18, 1957, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on 

the Judiciary, again investigating the Department’s enforcement efforts in the 

Consent Decree Program, sought correspondence between the Department and 

some of the oil pipelines, departmental drafts, and intradepartmental memoranda, including a factual summary of the results of an FBI investigation into 

compliance with the oil pipeline consent decree. On April 22, 1957, the Department responded that the documents would not be turned over to the Subcommittee because they

reflect almost completely either staff recommendations or differences in view. Should we decide some court action is called for, 

releasing those documents . . . could seriously prejudice any 

resulting litigation. Immediately clear is the disadvantage that 

would stem from revealing differences in staff views or investigative reports that could form the basis of any action in court.1561

On July 12, 1957, the Subcommittee requested copies of all written interpretations, and an explanatory statement of each official oral interpretation that had 

been made, of the various provisions of the judgment, as well as a statement that 

would summarize the factual results of the FBI investigations which had been 

instituted to determine compliance with the consent decree. The Department 

again declined, taking the position that:

The Department is currently considering possible enforcement 

steps which involve these interpretations. Many of these so-called 

interpretations were little more than expressions of opinions as to

54 Id at 887-88

55 Id at 891.

56 Id at 884.

799
the position that the Department might take if and when certain 

events were to occur. All were confined solely to specific individuals and at times unique problems. And the Department might 

well urge that these prior interpretations had no bearing on any 

particular enforcement move— contemplated now or in the future. Accordingly, to disclose such interpretations now, I believe, 

might complicate enforcement of the above judgment.1571

The FBI summaries were also refused, on the ground that even the summaries 

would divulge information given to agents in confidence.

During the subsequent hearings on the same subject, Assistant Attorney 

General Hansen further explained the Department’s refusal to provide the Subcommittee with the requested information, noting that because enforcement 

proceedings were pending, “ we should prejudice the possible interests of the 

Government by disclosing opinions that might be read out of context” and “ that 

such disclosure . . . would be exceedingly embarrassing.” 58 Congressman Keating, a member of the Subcommittee, supported the Assistant Attorney General, 

agreeing that opponents’ counsel would be most interested in learning which 

points of its case the government considered strong and of which aspects it was 

less confident.59

Chairman Celler then told the Assistant Attorney General that some of the 

information sought by the Subcommitee had already been made available to it 

from the files of various defendants. In response, the Assistant Attorney General 

explained that some letters had been sent to defendants containing staff recommendations but that such information was not intended to be shared among 

defendants, but rather to be used exclusively by the addressees themselves.60

25. 1960

On December 19, 1960, Attorney General William P. Rogers issued an 

opinion to the President advising him that a construction of a provision of the 

Mutual Security Act of 1954 that would require funds for the Office of the 

Inspector General and Comptroller to be cut off for failure to supply documents 

upon the request of appropriate congressional committees and subcommittees, 

notwithstanding a certification by the President that he had forbidden the production of the requested documents for certain specified reasons, would render the 

proviso unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers:

It is axiomatic that no democratic society can exist unless each 

of its branches makes every effort to disclose to the citizenry and 

the other branches of the Government those facts which are 

relevant to an understanding of the problems the society faces, the 

steps which have been taken to meet them, and the operations of

57 Id. at 885.

58 Id

59 Id.

“ Id. at 885-86.

800
the branch involved. Public policy therefore requires disclosure 

wherever possible. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances 

disclosure must be withheld in the public interest, and the principles expressed above may be summed up and applied as follows:

First, it is the constitutional duty and right of the President and 

those officials acting pursuant to his instructions, to withhold 

information of the executive branch from Congress whenever the 

President determines that it is not in the public interest to disclose 

such information.

Second, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of 

powers Congress may not directly encroach upon this authority 

confided to the President.

Third, the Constitution does not permit any indirect encroachment by Congress upon this authority of the President through 

resort to conditions attached to appropriations such as are contended to be contained in section 553A(d) of the act.

In my opinion, this condition on the use of appropriations . . .

[would] not only be plainly invalid, but if adopted in this case 

would also constitute a most dangerous precedent to the Office of 

the President, and would gravely impair the proper functioning 

and administration of the executive branch of the Government.16'1

26. 1969

During a House Committee investigation into the My Lai massacre, Congressman Rivers requested “ all reports, affidavits, photographs and all other 

pertinent documents, and material which may have any probitive value” concerning the Army’s ongoing investigation into the incident. Thomas Kauper, 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, gave the Department of Justice’s approval of a proposed letter to Congressman Rivers from 

Secretary of the Army Resor, which explained why this material could not be 

disclosed. Mr. Kauper stated as follows:

Over a number of years, a number of reasons have been 

advanced for the traditional refusal of the Executive to supply 

Congress with information from open investigational files. Most 

important, the Executive cannot effectively investigate if Congress is, in a sense, a partner in the investigation. If a congressional committee is fully apprised of all details of an investigation as the investigation proceeds, there is a substantial danger 

that congressional pressure will influence the course of the investigation. The My Lai investigations clearly represent such a 

danger.1621

61 41 Op. Att’y Gen 507, 529-30 (1960) (footnote omitted).

62 Memorandum for Honorable Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Counsel to the President, from Thomas E. Kauper, 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Dec 19, 1969), at 2.

801
27. 1970

On November 21,1970, Attorney General Mitchell, with the specific approval 

of the President, refused to release certain investigative files of the FBI to the 

Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee on 

Governmental Relations that contained information regarding certain scientists 

nominated by the President to serve on advisory boards of the Department of 

Health, Education and Welfare.63

28. 1975

On Januapf 31, 1976, Chairwoman Abzug of the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual kights of the House Committee on Government 

Operations requested interview statements and investigative reports concerning 

domestic intelligence matters from the open files of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. On February 26, 1976, Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, 

Jr., wrote Chairwoman Abzug, explaining why these documents could not be 

disclosed to the Subcommittee:

First, the Executive Branch must make a strong effort to protect 

innocent individuals. Disclosure of investigative files and reports, 

which often contain hearsay and inaccurate information, could do 

irreparable damage to the reputation of innocent individuals.

$ * Jfc Jfc *

Second, if the Department changes its policy and discloses 

investigative information, we could do serious damage to the 

Department’s ability to prosecute prospective defendants and to 

the FBI’s ability to detect and investigate violations of federal 

criminal laws.

$ ^ $

Third, the detection, and investigation of violations of federal 

criminal laws and the prosecution of individuals alleged to have 

committed such violations are Executive functions. The Attorney 

General, serving as the President’s chief law enforcement officer, 

is under the same constitutional duty as the President to “ take 

care [that] the laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. Art. II,

§ 3. That duty encompasses the responsibility to maintain the 

Separation of Powers so basic to our government.

29. 1979

In response to a request from Chairman Baucus of the Subcommittee on 

Limitations of Contracted and Delegated Authority of the Senate Committee on 

the Judiciary for a substantial number of documents from FBI files and other files

63 Memorandum for Chairman Moorhead, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information of 

the House Committee on Government Operations, from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Lawton, Office of Legal 

Counsel (Apr. 25, 1973) See also Dec. 14, 1982, Memorandum, supra.

802
located within the Department, to assist the Subcommittee in its oversight 

investigation into certain sales by the General Services Administration, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General Heckman stated:

The Department has agreed to give the Subcommittee staff 

limited access to these internal memoranda [2 closed files on 

titanium and lithium sales proposed by the General Services 

Administration]. Our policy with regard to providing Congressional Committees with analytical, strategy or deliberative 

portions of memorandum[s] related to these investigations is to 

make them available at the Department for review and analysis, 

including notetaking. The substantive information in these memoranda may be used for Subcommittee purposes. The memoranda 

themselves, however, will be retained in the Department and 

copies will not be provided.1641

The July 27, 1979, letter from Chairman Baucus to Attorney General Civiletti 

refining the Subcommittee’s request for documents indicated that its earlier 

requests for material from open investigative files on term contractors was denied 

“ because they are directly related to active investigations and prosecutions.” 65

30. 1980

On March 14, 1980, Chairman Edwards of the Subcommittee on Civil and 

Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary requested from 

Attorney General Civiletti a copy of the report prepared by the Rowe Task Force 

concerning the involvement of an FBI informant in the murder of Mrs. Viola 

Liuzzo in Alabama. On March 31, 1980, Michael Shaheen, Jr., Counsel, Office 

of Professional Responsibility, Department of Justice, wrote Chairman Edwards 

as follows:

The [Rowe] report is still being reviewed within the Department and several issues affecting its release outside the Department are still being studied. Certain promises of confidentiality 

were necessary before some individuals would cooperate with 

Task Force members and those promises must be honored. Moreover, the State of Alabama’s indictment of Mr. Rowe for the 

murder of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo is still pending and it is our opinion 

that any release of the report in its current form could seriously 

prejudice both Alabama’s and Mr. Rowe’s right to a fair trial.

For these and other related reasons, it is not possible for the 

Department to furnish to you a copy of the report in its present 

form at this time.1661

64 Aug 20, 1979, letter from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Heckman to Chairman Baucus

63 July 27, 1979, letter from Chairman Baucus to Attorney General Civiletti.

66 Cf. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v Dep't c f Justice, 677 F.2d 931 (D C Cir 1982) (upholding the Department’s 

claim ofprivilege pursuant toarequestunderthe Freedom of Information A ct,5 U S C § 552, for those parts of the 

Rowe Report which fell within the Act’s exemption for “ investigatory records compiled for law enforcement 

purposes,” § 552(b)(7), but rejecting the Department’s claim that the whole Report was protected from disclosure 

by Exemption 5 ’s “ deliberative process” privilege, § 552(b)(5)).

803
31. 1982

On November 5, 1982, Assistant Attorney General Olson advised the General 

Counsel to the Department of Transportation that a provision of the Tax Equity 

and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which requires the Administrator of the 

Federal Aviation Administration to transmit certain budget information and 

legislative recommendations to Congress at the same time that they are transmitted to the Secretary of Transportation, the President, or the Office of Management 

and Budget would, if interpreted literally, violate the constitutional principle of 

separation of powers.67

II.

Refusals by Independent Agencies and Executive Departments Other

Than the Department of Justice to Disclose Information to Congress

Concerning Law Enforcement, Security, and Personnel Investigations68

This Section II lists some of the many instances wherein independent agency 

heads and sub-presidential executive officers (outside the Department of Justice) 

have declined to provide sensitive investigative information requested by Congress. This Section does not describe those instances in which Presidents personally have ordered the withholding of investigative information;69 nor does it 

discuss those examples of Department of Justice withholdings of investigative 

information enumerated in Section I of this memorandum.70

It should be noted that, like Section I, this Section relies heavily upon 

published studies which discuss particular executive agencies’ responses to 

congressional requests for information during certain Administrations. Because 

these studies focus upon congressional-executive relationships at particular 

times in our history, they cannot be used to develop comprehensive statistics on, 

or statistically representative examples of, executive withholdings of information 

generally.71 It is possible, however, to infer from these studies that similar 

episodes of withholding of sensitive information have occurred throughout

67 On Feb 21, 1977, Assistant Attorney General Harmon, Office of Legal Counsel, advised the Attorney General 

that a bill that would require inspectors general in the executive departments to report directly lo Congress 

information regarding their investigations without prior clearance or approval by the head of the department 

involved would be unconstitutional. That memorandum stated. “ The constitutional principle of executive pnvilege 

must be preserved. The provision in the bill requiring reports to Congress of all 'flagrant abuses or deficiencies’ 

within 7 days after discovery would nsk jeopardizing ongoing investigations by the agency and the Justice 

Department, many of which would be subject to a claim of privilege.” 1 Op. O.L.C 16, 18-19 (1977).

68 Congressional requests for information from sub-presidential executive officers have a long history. A number 

of such requests occurring in the 19th century are discussed in 3 Hinds' Precedents, supra. §§ 1856-1910. See,

e.g., H.R Rep. No. 194, 24th Cong , 2d Sess. 4, 6-7 (1837), House Journal, 16th Cong , 2d Sess. 67, 70 (1820), 

House Journal, 14th C ong., IstSess. 92, 201, 206,262(1815); House Journal, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 533-36(1807); 

House Journal, 4th Cong , 2d Sess. 634(1796). See also Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat 65 (Secretary of 

Treasury must provide certain information to Congress upon request). It is unclear from these sources, however, how 

frequently such officers declined to comply with congressional requests.

69 See, e.g , Dec. 14, 1982, Memorandum, supra, at paras. 4 (President Monroe); 5 (President Jackson); 6 

(President Tyler); 9 (President Buchanan); 10 (President Lincoln); 11 (President Johnson); 13 (President Cleveland);

17 (President Theodore Roosevelt); 18 (President Coolidge); 20 (President Franklin Roosevelt); 21, C (President 

Truman), 25 (President Nixon).

70 See, e.g.. Section I, paras. 1 (also discussed in December 14, 1982, Memorandum, supra, at para 13); 2-6, 

&-16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26-30

71 See notes 6 -8 , supra.

804
American history. The following incidents have been selected only to provide 

some illustration of the well-established practice wherein Executive officers have 

protected their sensitive investigative files from disclosure to Congress.

1. 1846-47

On December 8, 1846, the House of Representatives by resolution directed the 

Secretary of the Treasury to supply it with information concerning secret inspectors who had been hired by the Department of the Treasury for customs enforcement. On February 8, 1847, the Secretary declined to reveal the names of the 

secret agents and inspectors, deeming it “ inexpedient” to do so.72 During a 

subsequent House debate on a further resolution to require the information from 

the Secretary, it was pointed out by Rep. Bayly that “ [t]he intention in employing 

[the agents] is to prevent smuggling; but if their names were made public, the 

very design of their employment would be frustrated.”73 The debate concluded 

with no further attempt to obtain the information.

2. 1861

On December 2, 1861, the House adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary of War, “ if not incompatible with the public interest,” to report to the House 

what measures were taken to investigate “ who is responsible for the disastrous 

movement of our troops at Balls Bluff.” 74 The Secretary of War declined to 

comply in a letter dated December 12, 1861.75 On January 6, 1862, the House 

responded with a resolution “ that the [Secretary’s] answer is not responsive nor 

satisfactory to the House, and that the Secretary be directed to return a further 

answer.”1761

On January 10, 1862, the Secretary responded to the second resolution of the 

House, stating, “ measures have been taken to ascertain who is responsible for 

the disastrous movement of our troops at Balls Bluff, but . . . it is not deemed 

compatible with the public interest to make known those measures at the present 

time.” 1771

3. 1932

In responding to a request from the House of Representatives for all documents 

pertaining to an investigation of the importation of ammonium sulfate, the 

Secretary of the Treasury stated:

72 17 Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 400 (1847); see id. at 355.

11 Id. at 401.

74 3 Hinds’ Precedents, supra, at § 1886. Although the Battle of Balls Bluff on Oct. 21, 1861, represented a 

militarily inconsequential defeat for Union troops early in the Civil War, it aroused Radical Republicans in Congress 

against General-in-Chief George B. McClellan, a Democrat. McClellan subsequently arrested General C.P. Stone 

for responsibility in the defeat, but no formal charges were filed against him. and General Stone was released within 

six months The Battle's chief military effect was to delay Union Army movements against Richmond, Virginia. See

generally 1 Dictionary c f American History 150 (J. Adams ed. 1940).

73 3 Hinds' Precedents, supra, at § 1891

76 Id. at § 1886.

77 Id

805
In passing the antidumping act the Congress decided to provide 

that the initial decisions as to the existence of dumping should be 

made by the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with administrative procedure. It has been the practice of the department in 

acting under this statute to treat all information furnished by 

interested persons as confidential and not to disclose it unless such 

persons consent to the disclosure. This practice is founded upon 

the necessity for the department to obtain complete information 

concerning manufacturers’ and importers’ business transactions 

which it would be practically impossible to obtain if those furnishing the information did not understand it would be treated as 

confidential and not divulged without their consent.

As consent has not been given to the disclosure of the information contained in the record before the Treasury Department, I am 

of the opinion that it would be incompatible with the public 

interest to comply with the request contained in the resolution.1781

4. 1948

A subpoena issued by the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of 

the Senate Committee on the Judiciary directed Assistant Secretary of State 

Peurifoy to provide investigative files of the Department of State concerning over 

160 persons named in the subpoena. In response, the Acting Secretary of State 

wrote the Committee that disclosure of the materials would be contrary to the 

public interest and detrimental to the conduct of the foreign relations of the 

United States. Disclosure of the material, the letter stated, would hamper future 

work of our diplomatic and consular missions abroad and place many sources “ in 

personal jeopardy.” The Acting Secretary referred, inter alia, to the April 1941 

Opinion of Attorney General Robert Jackson79 as authority for his refusal, and 

stated in closing that the President had given specific approval for the denial.80

5. 1955

On October 18, 1955, the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency requested the Securities and Exchange Commission to make available to the Subcommittee the investigative files on two separate 

matters. On November 10, Chairman Armstrong responded by stating, with 

regard to the first matter,

this investigation is still open and in progress. It has been the 

consistent policy of the Commission not to release its pending 

investigation files. It has been our belief that such release might 

impair the integrity of the Commission’s investigative process and

78 75 Cong. Rec. 11669 (1932). See generally Wolkinson, Demands c f Congressional Committees for Executive

Papers. 10 Fed. Bar J. 103, 133-34 (1949)

79 40 Op. A tt’y Gen. 45 (1941).

80 Department of Justice Study, supra, at 11—12

806
seriously interfere with the Commission’s responsibility of appropriate enforcement action, in case this becomes necessary ....

We do not at present know what information [the Committee staff] 

would desire on this subject but it may well be that we can provide 

. . . sufficient material in the form of summaries or otherwise to 

meet [their] needs. A similar procedure was followed this spring 

in connection with information about certain investigations which 

was desired by your Committee in connection with certain phases 

of the stock market study with mutually satisfactory results.18"

With respect to the second investigation, the Chairman wrote,

[s]ince this matter is still in litigation, it is the Commission’s view, 

with which I am sure you will agree, that it would be inappropriate to disclose those files or discuss this case outside the court. 

Immediately upon the termination of the litigation, we will, of 

course, welcome your Committee’s review of our files.1821

6. 1955

The General Services Administration (GSA) had turned over to the Department of Justice certain copies of insurance files of the Snare-Merritt Corporation, 

a government contractor, for investigation. The GSA subsequently declined to 

make these documents available to the Special Government Activities Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations on the ground that 

once copies of the documents had been transferred to the Department of Justice 

for investigation, those files became subject to the control of the latter Department.83 A similar demand for these documents was also made upon the Department of Justice, which refused to disclose them, apparently on the ground that 

they referred to a pending investigation.84 Subsequently, however, the material 

became available to the House through an undisclosed source, and this apparently mooted the controversy.85

7. 1955

Rep. Bennett, of the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House 

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, requested information from the 

current investigative files of the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding 

“ spectacular” examples of fraud, together with the names of companies and 

principals involved, which the Subcommittee could “expose” at its hearings. On 

November 4, 1955, SEC Chairman Armstrong advised Rep. Bennett as follows:

81 1958 Hearings, supra, at 297.

82 Id. at 298.

K See H R Rep. No 2390, 84th Cong , 2d Sess. 16 (1956).

84 Id. at 17 (the House Report states, “ [t]he Justice Department has furnished no reasonable explanation for 

denying the subcommittee access to [this information]” )

83 The New York Times, Oct 19, 1956, at 17, col. 3. See generally Kramer & Marcuse, supra, at 643—44

807
The requested information concerns material contained in the 

pending investigation files lof the Commission. These are not 

public at the present time. For the Commission to release such 

information in our pending investigation files for use in a public 

hearing of a congressional committee before our investigation has 

been completed might prejudice the prosecution of the matters in 

the event that the cases might later be referred to the Department 

of Justice for a criminal prosecution, and might destroy the value 

of any civil or administrative remedies that might be instituted by 

the Commission and the parties in the particular cases. Also, if 

testimony and statements elicted [sic] from witnesses on the 

understanding that the Commission would treat the information as 

confidential, were made public, the ability of the Commission to 

obtain the cooperation of the public in our investigations of 

violations of the Securities Acts would have the opposite effect 

which you so correctly say is the joint objective of your committee . . . and our Commission . . . .|861

8. 1955

During an investigation by the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil 

Service concerning the administration of the Federal Employees’ Security Program, a subpoena was issued to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission 

requesting him to produce, on July 28, 1955, “ all files, correspondence, documents, records, etc., in the possession of the Civil Service Commission” relating 

to three named individuals. The Chairman provided the Committee with certain 

material relating to the persons mentioned in the subpoena, but withheld portions 

of the files which concerned investigative matters, as well as internal advice and 

communications on official matters on the ground that such material was covered 

under President Eisenhower’s letter of May 17, 1954.87

9. 1955

On March 22, 1955, a Senator requested information in the files of the Civil 

Service Commission concerning certain named former federal employees. The 

Senator asked specifically “whether or not there is anything in the files of the 

following individuals which would be interpreted as of sufficient detrimental 

nature to prohibit their reemployment by the United States Government.” The 

Commission declined to make this information available, stating: “ The Commission cannot prejudice the material in a file of an individual who is not now before 

it for a determination as to eligibility for employment. If and when any of the 

persons mentioned in your letter again apply for Federal employment, the then 

existing applicable rules and determination as to eligibility will be adhered to and 

a determination made accordingly.”88

86 7955 Hearings, supra, at 416.

87 1958 Hearings, supra, at 378; Kramer & M arcuse, supra, at 652 The President’s instruction is discussed in the 

December 14, 1982, Memorandum.

88 J958 Hearings, supra, at 378.

808
10. 1955

On October 13, 1955, the Chief Clerk of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities requested that he, or an investigator of the Committee, be 

allowed to examine the Commission’s confidential files. The Commission denied 

the request “ because in many instances the files contain information of a 

confidential and investigative nature that can be made available only to those 

officials in the executive branch of the government who have need for the 

information in the performance of their official duties.” 89

11. through 18. 1955-1957

In response to Chairman Hennings’ request for an enumeration of refusals to 

supply Congress with information, see note 8, su pra, the Department of Defense 

listed, in ter alia , the following eight instances that concerned its investigative 

files:90

February 8, 1955: Upon the request of Senator McClellan, Chairman, Senate 

Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, for an inspector general’s report on 

Irving Peress, the Army submitted a detailed summary of all actions taken by the 

Army in the Peress case. The inspector general’s report itself was withheld, 

pursuant to the Department’s responsibility to safeguard (1) information revealing investigative techniques, (2) information as to the identity of confidential 

informants and information furnished by them in confidence, (3) incomplete 

information which might unjustly discredit an innocent person, and (4) intradepartmental communications of an advisory and preliminary nature.91

September 2-6, 1955: The Army denied the requests of the House Appropriations Committee for inspector general’s reports and auditor general’s reports 

pursuant to the Department’s responsibility to safeguard information in investigative reports for the reasons stated above. In lieu of the investigative reports, 

the Army furnished, as requested, detailed summaries of all actions taken in 

connection with the contracts under investigation.

September 16, 1955: The Air Force denied the request of Senator Johnson, 

Chairman, Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, for material derived from an inspector general’s report, pursuant to the Department’s responsibility to safeguard information in investigative reports.

January 17, 1956: The Air Force denied the request of Senator Magnuson, 

Chairman, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, for information concerning the discharge of a serviceman, pursuant to the Department’s 

responsibility not to release an individual’s personnel records without his consent 

so as not to unjustly or unnecessarily discredit him or disclose information 

received in confidence.

85 Id. at 379.

90Id. at 385-87.

91 Background concerning the congressional investigation of the promotion and discharge of Major Irving Peress 

may be found in Army Personnel Actions Relating to Irving Peress' Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on

Investigations of the Senate Comm, on Government Operations, 84th Cong., IstSess. (1955), Kramer & Marcuse, 

supra, at 687-89.

809
February 2, 1956: The Air Force denied the request of the House Appropria 

tions Committee for inspector general’s reports and auditor general’s reports 

pursuant to the Department’s responsibility to safeguard information contained 

in investigative reports.

sfc

January 12, 1957: The Army denied the request of Congressman Moss, 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Public Information, for an investigative file 

compiled in connection with charges of disloyalty and subversion at the Signal 

Corps Intelligence Agency, pursuant to the Department’s responsibility to safeguard investigative reports.

January 25, 1957: The Air Force denied the request of Congressman Murray, 

Chairman, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, for an inspector 

general report concerning employment conditions at Okinawa, pursuant to the 

Department’s responsibility to safeguard investigative reports. However, the 

Subcommittee was furnished a summary of the findings contained in the report.

4s Jjc sfc ♦

April 13, 1957: The Defense Department denied the request of Congressman 

Moss, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Public Information, for investigative 

memoranda and a report of conversations between the Department and newsmen, 

pursuant to the Department’s responsibility to safeguard investigative reports and 

information received in confidence.

19. 1956

An individual congressman (not a committee chairman) requested material 

from the files of the Housing and Home Finance Agency concerning certain 

housing project contracts which were related to a private bill he had introduced. 

On March 28, 1956, the Agency advised the congressman that it would not 

disclose the information because there was a pending lawsuit in the Court of 

Claims seeking judicially the same relief as that covered by the congressman’s 

bill. Since the litigation was being conducted by the Department of Justice, the 

Agency deemed it “ inappropriate” to provide the requested information.92

20. 1962

On May 2, 1962, Chairman Fountain of the House Government Operations 

Subcommittee requested access to the investigative files of the Food and Drug 

Administration concerning the drugs MER-29 and Flexin. Commissioner Larrich 

declined to make the files available, stating that his agency had “ uniformly 

declined to make files on new drugs available” to Congress, in order to encourage manufacturers to make as complete a disclosure as possible when they file 

new drug applications.93

21. 1971

During an investigation by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the 

Senate Judiciary Committee concerning information gathering by the military

91 1958 Hearings, supra, at 403-04.

93 The New York Times, June 21, 1962, at 17, col. 1.

810
with regard to possible civil disturbances, Chairman Ervin requested access to ai 

Army investigative report on the 113th Intelligence Group. In response, on April

19, 1971, Secretary of Defense Laird wrote the Chairman as follows:

it is the policy of the Executive Branch not to divulge the contents 

of investigations while an investigation is still open and prior to 

final action being taken. As the testimony taken . . . may possibly 

provide the basis for disciplinary action, it would be inappropriate 

to authorize the release of these documents. To do so might 

jeopardize the rights of the people involved and prevent them 

from being afforded a fair hearing.1941

22. 1972

On August 15, 1972, Senator Kennedy, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 

requested from the Securities and Exchange Commission “documents, statements, and other materials” relating to the Commission’s stock trading investigation of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT). On August 31, 1972, Chairman Casey of the Commission wrote Senator Kennedy as 

follows:

The Commission has, as your letter points out, initiated and 

settled civil actions involving some of the transactions under 

investigation. However, the staff informs me that it is still investigating other collateral matters which might lead to further appropriate proceedings.

In such investigations the Commission has been likened to a 

grand jury and like a grand jury it is the Commission’s policy to 

conduct its investigations on a confidential basis. Accordingly, in 

order to protect the contents of its investigatory files and the 

integrity of its investigative procedures, the Commission refrains 

from giving out material from its pending investigations. Pursuant to this established procedure, it is the Commission’s decision to respectfully refuse your request.1951

On September 21, 1972, Chairman Staggers of the Special Subcommittee on 

Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 

made a similar request for Commission documents concerning its investigation 

of ITT. On September 26, 1972, Chairman Casey responded:

It is the general policy of this Commission not to make public or 

deliver to any other party, materials, records and documents,

94 Executive Privilege. The Withholding c f Information by the Executive: Hearing on S 1125 Before the

Subcomm. on Separation c f Powers c f the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 403 (1971).

93 Legislative Oversight af SEC: Inquiry into Withholding and Transfer c f Agency Files Pertaining to ITT • Hearing

Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations c f the House Comm, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d 

Cong., 2d Sess 29-30 (1972).

811
during the course of this kind of an investigation and for a very 

good reason. Any investigation might lead to referral by the 

Commission of its investigative files to the Department of Justice 

with a recommendation for criminal prosecution. In such cases, 

the Commission has the same obligation as a grand jury to protect 

possible defendants from being unfairly injured by the possibility 

of a damaging but not fully substantiated charge. As you know, 

the Courts have strictly construed the right of a defendant to be 

free from pre-trial publicity. We do not want to take the chance 

that our release of any material obtained pursuant to our subpoena 

issued for the purpose of enforcing securities law would impair 

the rights of possible defendants or render ineffective any action 

taken to enforce the law. I am sure that you can understand our 

need to keep this file inviolate at this time.1961

Chairman Staggers reiterated his demand for access to the ITT investigative file 

in a letter to Chairman Casey on September 28, 1972, in which he stated, “ the 

Commission’s sudden refusal . . . is most strange and unprecedented.”97 On 

October 6, 1972, Chairman Casey wrote Chairman Staggers as follows:

I must . . . correct [your] statement that the Commission’s position on this matter is unprecedented. Our basic policy was clearly 

set forth in the December 17, 1969 letter which former [SEC] 

Chairman Budge sent to the [House] Committee on Government 

Operations. Chairman Budge expressed the Commission’s position on the availability of data from pending investigations in the 

following language:

“ The Commission has consistently taken the position, 

however, and has generally persuaded interested Congressional 

committees that, barring exceptional circumstances, it is inappropriate for Congressional committees to be furnished nonpublic 

information pertaining to a pending investigation or Commission 

adjudication. The Commission has adopted this position . . . to 

maintain the appearance as well as the fact of agency impartiality 

in its adjudicatory functions and to avoid any impediment to its 

investigatory and enforcement function.”

* jfc $ *

The considerations which Chairman Budge stressed are particularly vital in a matter [like this one] which can attract wide 

publicity and speculation. . . . I believe it to be a misuse of our 

subpoena power to permit access to documents except for the 

enforcement purposes for which it was authorized, a failure in our 

obligation to avoid anything which could jeopardize an enforce96 Id. at 6.

97 Id. at 7.

812
ment action, and an impropriety in disposing of documents, 

which may be used as evidence in a prosecution, in any matter 

which could cut off any rights a possible defendant might want to 

assert with respect to them in relation to any party other than the 

Commission.1981

23. 1973

On November 28, 1972, Chairman Magnuson of the Senate Committee on 

Commerce requested access to files of the Securities and Exchange Commission 

relating to certain unspecified investigations disclosed in a “ computer name and 

relation” printout previously supplied by the Commission to the Committee, 

which was investigating the effects of organized criminal activity on legitimate 

commerce. On January 10, 1973, Chairman Casey of the Commission responded 

to Senator Magnuson as follows:

[T]he Commission has directed the staff to make available to your 

Committee for inspection at our offices any Commission files you 

request as long as to do so would not violate the policies established to meet our law enforcement responsibilities. As you 

recognize in your letter, this would mean excluding all current 

investigative files. It would also exclude those files relating to 

cases referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. We must also exclude any reference to or information 

received from confidential sources.1991

The long and consistent history reflected in this and our December 14, 1982, 

Memorandum of actions by Executive Branch and independent agency officials 

to protect the integrity of confidential information from unwarranted disclosures 

to Congress, places in perspective similar necessary actions taken during this 

Administration. The separation of powers principle which underlies the structure 

of our government has brought virtually every Administration to the same 

conclusion: that some information at certain times not only may, but must, be 

withheld from the Legislative Branch in order that the laws may be faithfully 

executed.

T h e o d o r e B. O l s o n

Assistant Attorney General

Office cf Legal Counsel

98 Id. at 8.

99 Id. at 108

813