[Cite as State v. Hunter, 2015-Ohio-3498.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

-vs- : 

 : Case No. 15-CA-18 

 : 

ROBERT C. HUNTER : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 14 CR 00673 

JUDGMENT: REVERSED, SENTENCE VACATED, 

 AND REMANDED 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 26, 2015 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: 

 

KENNETH W. OSWALT ASHLEY E. LOYKE 

LICKING CO. PROSECUTOR REESE, PYLE, DRAKE, et al. 

CHRISTOPHER A. REAMER 36 N. Second St. 

20 S. Second St., Fourth Floor P.O. Box 919 

Newark, OH 43055 Newark, OH 43058-0919 

 
Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-18 2 

Delaney, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Robert C. Hunter appeals from the March 5, 2015 Judgment of 

Conviction of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state of Ohio. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶2} A statement of the facts underlying appellant's criminal convictions is not 

necessary to our resolution of this appeal. 

{¶3} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of aggravated drug 

possession (methamphetamine) pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(a), a felony of the 

fifth degree [Count I]. Appellant was also charged by bill of indictment with 

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle pursuant to R.C. 2913.03(B), a felony of the fifth 

degree [Count II]; aggravated drug possession (methamphetamine) pursuant to R.C. 

2925.11(A)(C)(1)(a), a felony of the fifth degree [Count III]; and one count of aggravated 

drug possession (methamphetamine) pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(a), a felony of 

the fifth degree [Count IV]. 

{¶4} Appellant entered negotiated pleas of guilty and first appeared before the 

trial court for sentencing on February 3, 2015. Sentencing was deferred because the 

trial court was not convinced appellant was fully apprised of the charges against him or 

the potential penalties thereof. 

{¶5} Appellant came before the trial court again on March 5, 2015. Appellee 

and appellant presented the trial court with a joint recommendation of an aggregate 

prison term of 18 months. The trial court declined to follow the joint recommendation 

and sentenced appellant to four consecutive terms of 9 months each, or an aggregate 

term of 36 months. 
Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-18 3 

{¶6} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entry of his conviction and 

sentence. 

{¶7} Appellant raises one assignment of error: 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶8} "I. IT WAS ERROR TO SENTENCE MR. HUNTER, A NONVIOLENT 

DRUG OFFENDER WHO WAS INITIALLY ELIGIBLE FOR EIGHTEEN MONTHS IN 

PRISON ON JOINT RECOMMENDATION OF BOTH THE STATE AND DEFENSE 

COUNSEL, TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WITHOUT PROVIDING THE 

STATUTORILY REQUIRED RATIONALE THEREFOR." 

ANALYSIS 

I.

{¶9} Appellant argues the trial court failed to make the requisite findings to 

impose consecutive prison terms and that the sentence imposed is disproportionate to 

the seriousness of the offenses. Appellee concedes the requisite findings were not 

made on the record at the sentencing hearing and were not incorporated into the court's 

sentencing entry. We agree and thus sustain appellant's assignment of error as to the 

absence of required findings in the record. 

{¶10} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) states: 

 If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for 

convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender 

to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the 

consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future 

crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are 
Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-18 4 

not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct 

and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court 

also finds any of the following: 

 (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple 

offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was 

under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 

2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for 

a prior offense. 

 (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as 

part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by 

two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or 

unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses 

committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately 

reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct. 

 (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates 

that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from 

future crime by the offender. 

{¶11} In State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014–Ohio–3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, 

syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "In order to impose consecutive terms of 

imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing 

entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings." The sentencing 

court is not required to recite “a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute.” 
Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-18 5 

Id. at ¶ 29. “[A]s long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in 

the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the 

findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Id. A failure to make the findings 

required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), however, renders a consecutive sentence contrary to 

law. Id. at ¶ 34. The findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) must be made at the 

sentencing hearing and included in the sentencing entry. Id. at the syllabus. 

{¶12} Here, appellant was sworn for the plea colloquy with the trial court and the 

court observed appellant had been through the court's intensive supervision program 

before but was here again after "running from the cops." The trial court also noted 

appellant wore a red jumpsuit because he was found in possession of 

methamphetamine at the jail. The trial court concluded it would not follow the parties' 

joint recommendation and imposed consecutive terms of 9 months each, stating the 

following: 

* * * *. 

 I find that the presumption in favor of prison--of concurrent 

terms in this case is overcome by the fact that consecutive terms 

are necessary to protect the public and to punish the offender. His 

prior record is terrible. He has been through virtually every 

potential program we have from probation to the community based 

correctional facility, and he just is not amenable. His supervision 

history is terrible, and so that's why I'm imposing consecutive terms 

on each of the four counts. 

* * * *. 
Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-18 6 

T. 25-26. 

{¶13} In the case at bar, the trial court found only that consecutive sentences 

are necessary to protect the public and to punish the offender; no findings were made 

that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of appellant's 

conduct and to the danger appellant poses to the public. We are thus unable to find the 

trial court made all of the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the time it imposed 

consecutive sentences; neither did it incorporate all of the necessary findings into its 

judgment entry. State v. Hatfield, 2015-Ohio-2846, ¶ 14 (5th Dist. Muskingum). 

{¶14} Of course this case is distinguishable from Hatfield because we can glean 

from the record the trial court found at least one of three additional findings, specifically, 

appellant's criminal history demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to 

protect the public from future crime by the offender. Id. at ¶ 14. Furthermore, we are 

reluctant to reverse and remand for mere recitation of the statutory factors, and Bonnell

explicitly rejects such rigid formalism. Bonnell, supra, at ¶ 29. In this case, however, in 

light of appellant's argument regarding sentence proportionality, combined with 

appellee's concession the record and entries are devoid of the requisite findings, we 

must sustain appellant's sole assignment of error and remand this matter to the trial 

court. 

{¶15} We are unable to uphold the consecutive sentences on this record 

because we cannot "discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and 

can[not] determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings." Hatfield, 

supra, 2015-Ohio-2846, ¶ 13 (5th Dist. Muskingum), citing Bonnell at ¶ 29. 

{¶16} Appellant's sole assignment of error is therefore sustained. 
Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-18 7 

CONCLUSION 

{¶17} Appellant's sole assignment of error is sustained, appellant's sentence is 

vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. 

By: Delaney, J. and 

Gwin, P.J. 

Hoffman, J., concur.