NUCLEAR SAFETY

Countries' Regulatory 

Bodies Have Made 

Changes in Response 

to the Fukushima 

Daiichi Accident

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Transportation and Infrastructure, 

Committee on Environment and Public 

Works, U.S. Senate

March 2014

GAO-14-109

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-109, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, Committee on Environment 

and Public Works, U.S. Senate

March 2014

NUCLEAR SAFETY

Countries' Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in 

Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

Why GAO Did This Study

The March 2011 accident at Japan’s 

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant 

led to a worldwide review of nuclear 

power programs. NRC licenses and 

oversees civilian nuclear reactors. The 

State Department coordinates policy 

matters with international organizations 

and treaties, including those dealing 

with nuclear safety.

GAO was asked to examine (1) the 

actions nuclear regulatory bodies from 

selected countries have taken to 

strengthen nuclear safety; (2) the 

extent to which these countries have 

established automated systems to

collect and transmit accident data; and 

(3) steps international organizations 

have taken to support nuclear 

regulatory bodies and promote nuclear 

safety worldwide since the accident.

The countries GAO selected represent 

a cross section of established and 

emerging nuclear power countries. 

GAO also reviewed relevant 

documents and interviewed or 

obtained information from U.S. federal 

agencies, 15 foreign nuclear regulatory 

bodies, and international organizations.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends (1) that State and 

NRC work with and encourage IAEA to 

systematically track the status of 

recommendations made by IAEA peer 

review missions and (2) NRC consider 

expediting its decision on whether or 

how to upgrade its automated system 

for transmitting key reactor data. NRC 

neither agreed nor disagreed with the 

recommendations. State partially 

concurred with the first 

recommendation and had no comment 

on the second. GAO believes that fully 

implementing these recommendations 

would enhance nuclear safety.

What GAO Found

All the nuclear regulatory bodies in the 16 selected countries in GAO’s review—

13 of which currently operate nuclear power reactors and 3 of which are 

developing or considering developing civilian nuclear power programs—have 

taken steps to strengthen nuclear safety in response to the Fukushima Daiichi 

accident in Japan. Japan in particular has fundamentally restructured its nuclear 

regulatory framework, and 3 other countries—China, Sweden, and Vietnam—are 

providing additional resources to their nuclear regulatory bodies. Countries are 

taking steps to improve safety with a focus on considering previously unimagined 

accident scenarios. Specifically, regulatory bodies in several countries (e.g., 

Belgium, Canada, Russia, and the United States) are now planning for accident 

scenarios that could involve multiple reactors at a single power plant. In addition, 

new requirements for emergency equipment, such as backup electric generators, 

in case of the loss of off-site power, as occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 

power plant, are an area of focus among the regulatory bodies in GAO’s review. 

Officials from 6 of the 13 countries with operating nuclear power reactors in 

GAO’s review said they have automated systems for collecting and transmitting 

critical nuclear power plant data to the nuclear regulatory body or designated 

technical experts who work with the regulatory body during an accident, and 

officials from a seventh country said that it has plans to build such a system. 

Officials from 3 of the countries with automated systems, including the United 

States, told GAO they are considering steps to ensure their systems can operate 

in certain emergency conditions, such as during the loss of off-site power, but 

none has a specific timetable for doing so. For example, the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) is first completing higher priority nuclear safety 

enhancements before deciding whether or how to upgrade its automated system

because how enhancements are done may affect how upgrades to an automated 

system would be implemented. By delaying its decision on upgrades to enable 

the system to function under emergency conditions, the system may not function 

when needed most—during a severe accident. 

Three key international organizations—the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA), the World Association of Nuclear Operators, and the European Union—

along with the Convention on Nuclear Safety, have taken steps to support 

nuclear regulatory bodies and help them identify the most important lessons of 

the Fukushima Daiichi accident and promote regulatory changes to enhance 

nuclear safety worldwide. For example, one key way IAEA helps countries 

improve nuclear safety and regulatory effectiveness is through peer review 

missions, which evaluate, among other things, a country’s nuclear safety 

regulatory framework based on IAEA Safety Standards and good regulatory 

practices. However, according to IAEA officials, the agency does not 

systematically track whether the recommendations of the peer review missions 

are implemented by the host countries. Without this information, IAEA cannot 

fully determine the impact and effectiveness of the peer review missions.

View GAO-14-109. For more information, 

contact David C.Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Letter 1 

Background 6

Nuclear Regulatory Bodies Have Taken Steps to Strengthen 

Safety 11

Nearly Half of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors in Our 

Review Have Automated Data Transmission Systems 22

International Efforts Taken to Support Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

and Promote Nuclear Safety 26

Conclusions 39

Recommendations for Executive Action 40

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 43

Appendix II Civilian Nuclear Profiles of Selected Countries 46

Appendix III Comments from the Department of State 49

Appendix IV Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 52

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 53

Tables

Table 1: Number of IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service 

(IRRS) Missions by Country, 1992 through June 30, 2013 29

Table 2: Number of IAEA Operational Safety Review Team 

(OSART) Missions by Country, 1983 through June 30, 

2013 31

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Figures

Figure 1: Unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 

Following the March 11, 2011, Earthquake and Tsunami 7

Figure 2: NRC’s Headquarters Operations Center 24

Abbreviations

Action Plan Action Plan on Nuclear Safety

ASN Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire

CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Convention Convention on Nuclear Safety

DOE Department of Energy

ENS Emergency Notification System

ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group

ERDS Emergency Response Data System

EU European Union

EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Service

IRRT International Regulatory Review Team

NEA Nuclear Energy Agency

NEPC Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission

NISA Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

NRA Nuclear Regulation Authority

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSSC Nuclear Safety and Security Commission

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development

ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation

OSART Operational Safety Review Team

SSM Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company

UN United Nations

VPN Virtual Private Network

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

WENRA West European Nuclear Regulators’ Association 

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Page 1 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 6, 2014 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

Committee on Environment and Public Works

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The March 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 

plant destroyed three nuclear reactors and resulted in the most extensive 

release of radioactive material at a nuclear power plant since the 1986 

Chernobyl disaster.1 The accident, which led to the evacuation of over 

one hundred thousand residents from the area around the plant and is 

expected to cost Japan tens of billions of dollars, has led to a review of 

civilian nuclear power programs worldwide. For example, Germany 

accelerated the shutdown of its nuclear power reactors, and Jordan 

reassessed plans to establish a civilian nuclear power program.2

 

1

On April 26, 1986, the worst accident in the history of civilian nuclear power occurred at 

the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine, where an explosion destroyed the core of a 

reactor containing approximately 200 tons of nuclear fuel. The explosion also destroyed 

much of the reactor building, severed the reactor’s cooling pipes, and spewed hot 

fragments of reactor fuel from the core. The explosion dispersed radioactive material over 

60,000 square miles of land primarily in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. A separate fund 

was established to help stabilize the damaged reactor at Chernobyl by constructing a new 

containment structure. We reported in 2007 that the estimated cost of this effort was $1.2 

billion, of which the United States pledged $203 million. See GAO, Nuclear Safety: 

Construction of the Protective Shelter for the Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor Faces Schedule 

Delays, Potential Cost Increases, and Technical Uncertainties, 

Nuclear 

regulators and industry officials question whether public acceptance of 

civilian nuclear power could survive another severe accident. The 

Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) noted at a September 2011 

UN high-level summit on nuclear safety and security that “the effects of 

nuclear accidents respect no borders.”

GAO-07-923 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 19, 2007).

2 In 2010, Germany amended its Atomic Energy Act to align with an “energy concept” 

where nuclear power would serve a “bridging function” until an infrastructure for renewable 

fuel sources was reliably in place, without setting a timeline for phasing out nuclear power. 

On June 30, 2011, after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the German parliament voted to 

fully shut down its nuclear power plants by the end of 2022. This vote followed the 

suspension of operations of 8 of Germany’s 17 nuclear power plants. 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Any event that compromises a nuclear power plant’s power supplies can 

create the conditions for a nuclear accident. The Fukushima Daiichi

accident resulted from a prolonged loss of electrical power when a

powerful earthquake triggered a tsunami wave that exceeded the plant’s 

seawall and flooded the site. The loss of power also largely disabled 

Japan’s automated system for collecting and transmitting data during 

emergencies. Various stakeholders, including Tokyo Electric Power 

Company (TEPCO), which operated the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, 

acknowledged that design and operational shortcomings contributed to 

the accident sequence. Furthermore, numerous studies have concluded 

that failures in regulation contributed to those shortcomings. For example, 

according to the Kurokawa Commission3

—an investigation commissioned 

by Japan’s parliament—Japan’s nuclear regulatory body at the time of the 

accident, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and TEPCO 

were aware of the risks of a station blackout and reactor core damage 

from the loss of seawater pumps from a tsunami. According to the 

investigation, NISA knew that TEPCO had not taken actions to mitigate 

those risks but did not require any corrective measures. The Kurokawa 

Commission attributed NISA’s reluctance to require greater preparedness 

of TEPCO to a flawed safety culture and to the fact that NISA was part of 

the government ministry responsible for promoting nuclear power, finding 

that NISA was not independent of the nuclear industry that it was charged 

with regulating or of the government agency responsible for promoting 

that industry.

4

 

3

The National Diet of Japan—the Japanese parliament—commissioned an investigation of 

the Fukushima Daiichi accident, chaired by Kiyoshi Kurokawa, known formally as The 

National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 

Commission. The commission issued its findings on June 9, 2012.

NISA’s lack of independence is believed by the Kurokawa 

Commission to have contributed to NISA’s lax oversight of the nuclear 

industry. Nuclear industry representatives have said that their industry 

needs effective nuclear safety regulation and that the regulatory body 

must be independent from both operators and politics. The international 

cooperative and assistance programs of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC)—the nuclear regulatory body of the United States—

4

Safety culture implies individual and organizational awareness of and commitment to the 

importance of safety. It also refers to the personal dedication and accountability of all 

individuals engaged in any activity that has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power 

plants. We reported in 2010 that development of a positive safety culture often involves a 

shift in how workers view and address safety-related events. See GAO, Biological 

Laboratories: Design and Implementation Considerations for Safety Reporting Systems, 

GAO-10-850 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2010).
 

Page 3 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

over the past 20 years have focused on promoting the independence and 

effectiveness of such bodies.

Nuclear power reactors generated about 11.3 percent of the world’s 

electricity in 2012. As of November 2013, there are 435 civilian nuclear 

power reactors operating in 30 countries and 71 more under construction,

primarily in China and Russia. In addition, as we reported in November 

2010, countries such as Vietnam and Jordan, which do not yet have 

operating civilian nuclear power reactors, are building the necessary 

regulatory infrastructure for nuclear programs.5 In April 2013, international 

regulators from 49 countries gathered in Ottawa, Canada, for a 

conference organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

devoted to improving nuclear regulatory systems following the Fukushima 

Daiichi accident.6

In light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, you asked us to examine

worldwide nuclear regulation and safety.

The conference concluded that nuclear regulatory 

bodies have learned many lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident 

and that implementing these lessons will take time and commitment. 

7

 

5

GAO, Nuclear Commerce: Governmentwide Strategy Could Help Increase Commercial 

Benefits from U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Other Countries, 

This report examines: (1) the

actions regulatory bodies from selected countries with existing or planned 

civilian nuclear power reactors have taken to strengthen nuclear safety; 

(2) the extent to which these countries have established automated 

systems for collecting and transmitting data to the nuclear regulatory body 

and taken steps to enable such systems to withstand emergency 

conditions; and (3) steps key international organizations have taken to 

support nuclear regulatory bodies and promote nuclear safety worldwide 

GAO-11-36

(Washington: D.C.: Nov. 4, 2010).

6

IAEA is an autonomous international organization affiliated with the United Nations, 

established in Vienna, Austria, in 1957. The agency has the dual role of promoting the 

peaceful uses of nuclear energy by transferring nuclear science and technology through 

its nuclear science and applications and technical cooperation programs, and verifying, 

through its safeguards program, that nuclear material subject to safeguards is not diverted 

to nuclear weapons or other proscribed purposes. The IAEA also develops (nonbinding) 

international standards for nuclear safety, as well as criteria for nuclear regulatory 

independence.

7

When we originally accepted this request, Senator Carper was Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, Committee on Environment and Public 

Works. In February 2014, Senator Carper became Chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure. As a result, we are addressing this report to him in his 

current capacity.
 

Page 4 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

since the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the impact of some of these 

steps.

To examine the actions that national regulatory bodies have taken to 

strengthen nuclear safety in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi

accident, we selected a nonprobability sample of 16 countries for case 

studies to represent a cross section of established and emerging civilian 

nuclear power countries in terms of program size,8 the country’s 

dependence on nuclear power, and the country’s nuclear regulatory 

framework.9 Of these 16 countries, the 13 countries with established 

nuclear power programs operate 78 percent of the world’s nuclear power 

reactors; the other 3 countries do not currently operate nuclear power 

reactors but have emerging civilian nuclear power programs or have 

stated an interest in developing such programs.10 Appendix II contains a 

complete list of these countries and information on their civilian nuclear 

power programs. For the 16 countries selected, we reviewed reports they 

prepared to document the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi

accident, including reports prepared for various international meetings on 

nuclear safety, and/or presentations in which they summarized those 

lessons.

11

 

8

The 16 countries we selected are Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Canada, China, France, 

Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United 

Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam.

We interviewed one or more officials from each selected 

regulatory body and/or technical support organization and/or received 

written responses to our questions. For some countries, we interviewed 

nuclear power plant operators and/or other nuclear energy industry 

officials. We also interviewed NRC and U.S. nuclear industry officials, as 

well as two former NRC chairmen. To examine the extent to which other 

countries have established or are considering establishing automated 

systems for collecting and transmitting data to the nuclear regulatory body 

during emergencies, we interviewed officials or received written answers 

9

Because this is a nonprobability sample, information from these countries is not 

representative of the entire population of established and emerging civilian nuclear power 

countries and cannot be generalized. However, this information can provide illustrative 

examples of these countries’ nuclear regulatory framework. 

10We included countries with emerging or potential nuclear programs in our sample 

because the implications of the Fukushima Daiichi accident extend to such countries. 

11These meetings include the April 2011 Convention on Nuclear Safety review meeting; 

the August 2012 Convention Second Extraordinary Meeting; and the International Atomic 

Energy Agency’s April 2013 International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory 

Systems.
 

Page 5 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

to our questions from the respective nuclear regulatory bodies and some 

power plant operators. Because some country officials were more 

responsive than others, the amount of corroborating evidence we were 

able to obtain varies by country. For more information, see appendix I. To 

examine the steps key international organizations have taken to support 

nuclear regulatory bodies and promote nuclear safety worldwide since the 

Fukushima Daiichi accident, we first identified such organizations through 

interviews with officials from the U.S. State Department, Department of 

Energy (DOE), and NRC officials. Based on these discussions, we 

identified IAEA, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development’s (OECD)12 Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA),13 the World 

Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO),14

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to March 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains more 

detailed information on our scope and methodology. 

and the European Union 

(EU). We then reviewed, as applicable, the reports or action plans of 

these organizations and interviewed or exchanged written questions with 

relevant officials from them. 

 

12The OECD is an organization of 34 countries that work together to address the 

economic, social, and environmental challenges of globalization. The organization 

provides a setting where governments can, among other things, compare policy 

experiences, seek answers to common problems, and seek to coordinate domestic and 

international policies.

13NEA is a specialized agency within OECD, an intergovernmental organization of 

industrialized countries based in Paris, France. In September 2013, OECD’s NEA issued 

a report on the actions taken and lessons learned by NEA member countries and standing 

technical committees in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

14After the Chernobyl disaster, nuclear power plant operators worldwide were determined 

to work together to ensure such a disaster could never happen again. From this, WANO 

emerged and formally came into being on May 15, 1989, during an inaugural meeting in 

Moscow. The WANO Charter is signed by 144 power companies, committing them to work 

in support of the WANO mission to maximize the safety and reliability of nuclear power 

plants worldwide by working together to assess, benchmark, and improve performance 

through mutual support, exchange of information, and emulation of best practice.
 

Page 6 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

This section describes (1) the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, (2) 

nuclear energy and its regulation, (3) automated data transmission 

systems used by some nuclear regulatory bodies, and (4) international 

organizations and a treaty involved in promoting nuclear safety. 

The March 11, 2011, tsunami wave that flooded the Fukushima Daiichi

nuclear station destroyed the station’s power supplies and emergency 

equipment, which, in turn prevented the plant’s operators from cooling the 

reactors. The tsunami wave, at 13.1 meters, or nearly 43 feet was beyond 

the Fukushima Daiichi plant’s “design basis”—that is, it exceeded the size 

of the tsunami that the site was designed and built to withstand, which 

was 3.1 meters, or slightly more than 10 feet above sea level. The 

station’s emergency power supplies, including diesel generators and 

batteries, were below ground and not in waterproof containers. The 

station’s three operating reactors had shut down during the earthquake 

that preceded the tsunami,

15 but the radioactive fuel continued to decay 

and produce heat. The tsunami destroyed the Fukushima Daiichi power 

station’s emergency power supplies, with the exception of one diesel 

generator for the sixth reactor.

16 The electric wiring system for the three 

operating reactors, as well as seawater pumps, which were used to 

remove heat from the plant and cool diesel generators, were also 

destroyed. Without power to cool the reactors, the water in the reactor 

vessels boiled away and exposed the fuel, which melted. The steam from 

the boiling water increased pressure inside the primary containment 

vessel, allowing steam and other gases to move into the reactor 

building.

17

 

15 Reactors 1, 2, and 3 were operating at the time of the accident. Reactors 4, 5, and 6 

were off-line for scheduled outages.

The steam reacted with melting fuel, generating hydrogen gas 

that built up in at least two of the reactor buildings before eventually 

exploding. In the wake of the accident, the Japanese government has 

directed that all but 2 of Japan’s 50 civilian nuclear power reactors be 

16The tsunami caused by the earthquake flooded and totally destroyed all but one of the 

emergency diesel generators, the seawater cooling pumps, the electric wiring system, and 

the direct current power supply for reactors 1, 2, and 4, resulting in loss of all power 

except for an external supply to reactor 6 from an air-cooled emergency diesel generator. 

In short, reactors 1, 2, 4, and 5 lost all power. Reactor 3 first partially lost power and later 

lost all power. 

17“Containment” refers to the structure and associated systems that enclose the nuclear 

reactor and are the final barrier to the radioactive materials that may otherwise be 

released into the environment in the case of an accident. Such enclosures are usually 

dome-shaped and made of steel-reinforced concrete.

Background

The Fukushima Daiichi

Nuclear Accident
 

Page 7 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

shut down pending a complete safety review and, as of this writing, all 

reactors have been shut down. It is uncertain when these reactors will be 

brought back online. Figure 1 shows Unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi

nuclear power station following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and 

tsunami.

Figure 1: Unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Following the March 11, 2011, Earthquake and Tsunami

Source: NRC
 

Page 8 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

The safe operation of nuclear power reactors worldwide has been a longstanding concern of the international community. According to IAEA, it is 

a fundamental safety principle that nuclear power plant operators have 

primary responsibility for nuclear safety during the life of the plant. 

However, nuclear regulatory bodies play a key role in ensuring nuclear 

safety. In the United States, NRC, an independent federal agency 

composed of five commissioners, licenses civilian nuclear power reactors 

and regulates and oversees their safe operation and security. 

According to IAEA documents, effective nuclear regulatory bodies are 

characterized by independence, as well as other key factors, such as 

transparency and commitment to safety culture. NRC, for example, 

defines regulatory independence as independence from 

• economic interests regarding the use of any nuclear materials or 

technology, 

• policy interests, and 

• political interests. 

To that end, according to NRC, it does not (1) make decisions based on

financial costs to nuclear plant operators when considering matters of 

safety significance or (2) consider the impact of its actions on the future of 

nuclear energy or any particular technology. Furthermore, NRC does not 

report to a cabinet agency or to the White House.

Automated systems for collecting and transmitting data enable operators 

to provide data on selected nuclear power plant parameters—such as the 

status of reactor coolant and containment systems, radiation monitoring 

and containment, and weather—directly to regulators. According to NRC 

officials, receiving automated, accurate, real-time data directly from 

automated sources at the site reduces the burden placed on operators to 

manually transmit information during an emergency and gives confidence 

to government authorities involved in responding to the event and the 

public that the plant operator is not withholding information. 

IAEA, WANO, and the EU play an important role in promoting nuclear 

safety worldwide. Specifically:

• IAEA develops (nonbinding) international standards for nuclear safety, 

as well as criteria for nuclear regulatory independence. IAEA also 

Nuclear Energy and Its 

Regulation

Automated Data 

Transmission Systems

International 

Organizations and Treaty 

Involved in Promoting 

Nuclear Safety
 

Page 9 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

offers technical cooperation and peer review missions to its member 

states. These peer review missions evaluate, among other things, a 

country’s nuclear safety regulatory framework based on the IAEA 

Safety Standards and conduct in-depth reviews of operational safety 

performance at nuclear power plants. A Secretariat, headed by the 

Director General, is responsible for implementing the agency’s 

policies and programs. The U.S. State Department is the lead agency 

on U.S. policy regarding the IAEA, including the promotion of effective 

functioning in the agency and management reform. In addition, the 

department coordinates U.S. policy matters with international 

organizations and treaties, including those dealing with nuclear safety. 

NRC participates regularly in a variety of IAEA activities related to, 

among other things, nuclear safety. For example, NRC serves as the 

U.S. government’s representative to the IAEA Commission on Safety 

Standards, as well as other technical committees.

• WANO, established in 1989, 3 years after the Chernobyl accident,

promotes the safe and reliable operations of all of the world’s civilian 

nuclear power plants. WANO works to achieve its goals through 

confidential peer reviews, shared access to members’ operating 

experience, technical support and exchange activities, and 

professional and technical development sessions. These peer reviews 

help members compare their operational performance against 

standards of excellence through an in-depth, objective, and 

confidential review of their operations conducted by nuclear experts 

drawn from other WANO members’ plants. To permit the free and 

open exchange of information among WANO members, plant specific 

information, such as that gathered in the course of a peer review, may 

not be released outside WANO without the approval of the originating 

member. Since 1992, WANO has conducted more than 500 peer 

reviews of operating nuclear power plants in 31 countries or regions—

including at least one at every WANO member plant. Membership is 

voluntary, but every nuclear operator in the world is currently a 

member, and participation in these activities is mandatory for 

members. WANO members are committed to take timely action to 

correct performance issues identified during peer reviews.

• The EU was active in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, 

exploring and implementing options for using its authorities to 

advance nuclear safety in Europe, particularly among the 14 EU 

member states with operating nuclear power plants. The requirements 

in the EU nuclear safety directive and nuclear waste directive are 

legally binding in all EU member states. 
 

Page 10 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

The Convention on Nuclear Safety (the Convention) is a multilateral 

treaty that, among other things, seeks to strengthen the safety of 

civilian nuclear power reactors. In the mid-1990s, representatives of 

over 50 nations, including the United States, participated in the 

development of the Convention in the aftermath of the Chernobyl 

accident. Today, 75 countries, including the United States, and one 

international organization, the European Atomic Energy Community 

(EURATOM), are contracting parties to the Convention.

18

 

18 EURATOM acts in several areas connected with atomic energy, including research, 

safety standards, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One of the fundamental 

objectives of the EURATOM Treaty that established EURATOM is to ensure that all users 

in the EU enjoy a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels.

The 

Convention calls on parties to establish and maintain a legislative and 

regulatory framework and a regulatory body with adequate authority, 

competence, and financial and human resources to govern the safety 

of nuclear installations, among other things. Specifically, parties to the 

Convention are obligated to take steps to ensure an effective 

separation between the regulatory body and any other body or 

organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear 

energy. Under the terms of the Convention, each contracting party—

regardless of whether it operates nuclear power plants—is obligated 

to submit a national report, months in advance of the review meeting, 

which identifies the measures taken to implement each of the relevant 

nuclear safety obligations contained in the Convention. Obligations 

cover such points as siting, design, construction, and operation of 

civilian nuclear power installations. Parties that do not operate nuclear 

power plants submit reports focusing on, among other things, the 

steps they have taken to prepare and test emergency plans to deal 

with an accident in a neighboring country that operates nuclear power 

plants. Countries considering establishing nuclear power programs 

are expected to provide information in their national reports about the 

steps they are taking to meet the Convention’s obligations including, 

for example, reactor design and siting requirements. The parties to 

the Convention have also established detailed guidance to help 

parties prepare their national reports. The purpose of the guidance is 

to encourage parties to describe the steps they are taking to meet the 

Convention’s obligations and to facilitate other parties’ review of the 

national reports of other countries. The countries meet every 3 years 

in Vienna, Austria, for review meetings to present their national report, 

address questions that may arise about the report, and assess and 

ask questions about the reports of other parties. This is considered a 
 

Page 11 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

peer review process. Parties may also submit written questions in 

advance of the review meeting on other parties’ national reports and 

receive written responses to these questions. 

The nuclear regulatory bodies in the selected 16 countries in our review 

have taken steps to strengthen nuclear safety. Countries are taking steps 

with an increased focus on considering previously unimagined accident 

scenarios, such as those affecting multiple reactors within a given power 

plant. In addition, most countries with operating reactors in our review are 

considering or have issued new requirements in common categories: 

emergency equipment, hydrogen control, and filtered venting. Japan has 

fundamentally restructured its regulatory framework, and 3 other 

countries—China, Sweden, and Vietnam—are providing their nuclear 

regulatory bodies with additional resources. Four countries—France, 

South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—have also reformed 

their regulatory framework but not specifically in response to the 

Fukushima Daiichi accident.

All 16 selected countries in our review have taken regulatory action in 

response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. For example, in the United 

States, NRC formed the Near-Term Task Force in March 2011 to conduct 

a comprehensive assessment of NRC’s processes and regulations in light 

of the accident to determine whether the agency should make additional 

improvements to its regulatory system or reactor safety in the United 

States. This task force issued a report in July 2011 with its findings and 

12 recommendations, which were prioritized in an October 2011 report 

into three tiers. The commission then approved the NRC staff’s three-tier 

prioritization in December 2011. Tier 1 recommendations were those that 

NRC staff determined should be started without unnecessary delay and 

for which resources are sufficient. Tier 2 comprises recommendations 

requiring further technical assessment or that depended on Tier 1 issues 

or availability of resources. Tier 3 recommendations require further study, 

depend on a shorter-term action to be completed to inform the longerterm action, or depend on the availability of resources or on the resolution 

of Task Force Recommendation 1, which deals with clarification of the 

regulatory framework. All of the items identified for long-term evaluation 

fall into Tier 3. 

Each of the other selected countries in our review, with the exception of 

Vietnam, which does not have operating power reactors—undertook 

Nuclear Regulatory 

Bodies Have Taken 

Steps to Strengthen 

Safety

Countries Are 

Strengthening Regulatory 

Effectiveness and 

Considering Previously 

Unimagined Events and 

Accident Scenarios
 

Page 12 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

safety inspections, including comprehensive risk safety assessments, 

more commonly known as stress tests.19 The findings from the stress 

tests were used to consider further action to improve nuclear safety. 

Stress tests examine what are known as “beyond design-basis events”—

those where conditions exceed what the facility or site was designed to 

withstand. For example, one of the beyond design-basis scenarios 

considered by the Belgian Doel nuclear power plant operator was a 

severe storm combined with an unfavorable wind direction—which 

together could breach the embankment protecting the plant from a 

flood.

20

The results of the stress tests served as a basis for corrective measures. 

For example, the proposed corrective measure for the scenario described 

at the Doel plant is to reinforce the top of the embankment with concrete 

tiles. In Sweden, regulators are considering a revision of the country’s 

emergency planning zones after stress tests revealed that the existing 

emergency planning zones were insufficient for a radioactive release 

similar to that of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

For this scenario, the plant’s operator analyzed the consequences 

of such a breach, estimating flooding levels and potential consequences, 

including weak points—such as buildings not designed to be watertight—

as well as ways in which the plant was adequately prepared, such as 

emergency equipment that remains protected. 

21

 

19These assessments examined how nuclear installations can withstand the 

consequences of various extreme external events and, in certain cases, security threats 

and incidents due to malevolent or terrorist acts. The topics of the tests included natural 

initiating events (earthquake, tsunami, and extreme climatic conditions), loss of the 

facility’s safety systems, and severe accident management.

In the United Arab 

Emirates, which does not have operating power reactors, the regulatory 

body commissioned a task force to study the implications of the 

Fukushima Daiichi accident from the standpoint of facilities with pending 

license applications, where operators were asked to supplement their 

license applications in consideration of external event contingencies, 

according to regulatory officials we interviewed. In the United States, 

NRC did not require plant operators to conduct stress tests. Instead, 

nuclear power plant operators were required to complete detailed 

inspections and engineering assessments of their plants, known as “walk20The Doel power plant is located along the Scheldt River and has four reactors with a 

combined output of 2,912 megawatts.

21NRC defines emergency planning zones as areas for which planning is recommended to 

assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of 

a radiological incident at a nuclear power plant.
 

Page 13 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

downs,” to check that all safety features were in operating condition and 

to submit reports to NRC for review. Any issues identified in the walkdowns were to be addressed by plants’ corrective action programs.22

According to a 2013 IAEA nuclear safety review, nuclear regulatory 

bodies are now focusing more on a wider range of possible events as a 

result of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. According to this review, nuclear 

regulatory bodies have not historically required nuclear operators to 

include multireactor accidents in their design basis. Canadian Nuclear 

Safety Commission (CNSC) officials also told us that a significant shift in 

regulatory focus in Canada pertains to the management of multiple 

reactors. They said that prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, which 

destroyed four reactors, CNSC’s guidelines did not consider the 

possibility of an event that could impact multiple reactors. These officials 

told us that certain safety features are more complicated for multireactor 

plants because some systems and equipment are shared among 

reactors, allowing for common-cause failures during an accident. CNSC 

officials told us that, in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, they 

are incorporating multireactor specifications into their regulations. 

Similarly, a Belgian nuclear regulatory official said that the Fukushima 

Daiichi accident has led regulatory bodies to “think outside the box” in 

considering scenarios that could threaten nuclear power plants. For 

example, one of the items in a national action plan that the Belgian 

nuclear regulatory body developed after the accident pertains to an 

internal emergency plan in case of an event that impacts multiple 

reactors. A Russian regulatory official also told us that regulators need to 

consider previously unimagined events, including the impact on nuclear 

power plants from a meteor, such as the one that struck Russia in 

February 2013.

For 

example, the flooding walk-down at the Vermont Yankee power plant 

identified a discrepancy in the procedure for sandbag barricades. The 

procedure has since been enhanced to provide specific, detailed 

guidance on the placement of sandbag barriers, and an exercise in 

accordance with the new procedure was successfully completed. 

23

 

22A corrective action program is an operator’s process for tracking, evaluating, and 

resolving deficiencies.

In March 2012, in keeping with the shift toward 

considering events that may impact multiple reactors, Russia’s nuclear 

regulatory body approved a corrective action plan that includes special 

23 On February 15, 2013, a meteor exploded over Chelyabinsk in Russia. The Mayak 

nuclear facility, which is near the explosion, was not affected.
 

Page 14 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

consideration for plants with multiple reactors.

24 In the United States, 

NRC is revisiting its beyond design-basis requirements to better integrate 

them into its overall regulatory procedures. For example, NRC’s NearTerm Task Force report contains a section that focuses on operators’ 

capabilities to respond to a prolonged station blackout—that is, a loss of 

power—and events that impact multiple reactors. This report explains that

the accident at Fukushima Daiichi has shown that such events are 

realities that must be addressed as part of emergency planning because, 

although they are of low probability, they have the potential for severe 

consequences.25

To improve nuclear safety based on the lessons learned from the 

Fukushima Daiichi accident, the regulatory bodies in our review are 

considering or have issued new requirements with regard to the following 

common categories: emergency equipment, hydrogen control, and filtered 

venting systems. In the course of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the 

loss of emergency equipment—including backup power supplies, such as 

batteries and diesel generators, as well as water supplies, such as 

pumps—prevented operators from cooling the reactors. Consequently, as 

the water in the reactors boiled and the fuel melted, hydrogen built up and 

exploded, destroying three reactor containment structures and releasing 

radioactivity into the environment. New regulatory requirements 

worldwide in response to these events include the following:

In that vein, an NRC commissioner said, in June 2013, 

that the accident has blurred the distinction between design-basis and 

beyond design-basis. 

• Emergency equipment. New requirements for emergency 

equipment—for example, the number of diesel generators on-site and 

their placement—are an area of focus among the regulatory bodies in 

our sample. Examples are as follows:

• South Korea’s regulatory body issued a list of 50 action items, 

which included securing the availability of a portable electric 

 

24“Updated Measures to Mitigate Consequences of Beyond-Design Basis Accidents at 

Nuclear Power Plants.” 

25In the United States, an August 23, 2011, magnitude-5.8 earthquake in Mineral, Virginia, 

which had its epicenter approximately 11 miles from the North Anna Power Station was a 

beyond design-basis event. The ground motion at the site during the earthquake 

exceeded levels for which the plant was originally designed and licensed. Nevertheless, 

the plant did not experience significant damage to its structures or safety systems.

Most Countries in Our 

Review Are Considering 

Common Categories of 

New Regulatory 

Requirements—

Emergency Equipment, 

Hydrogen Control, and 

Filtered Venting Systems
 

Page 15 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

power generator vehicle and batteries and installing paths for the 

injection of emergency cooling water. 

• The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has issued new 

requirements for emergency equipment and resources, such as 

requirements for backup power at emergency facilities; on-site 

storage of emergency equipment, such as portable generators; 

and the availability of portable backup power and emergency 

response equipment. 

• NRC has issued an order to address operators’ capabilities to 

move water to maintain or restore reactor core cooling, among 

other things. A senior NRC official said that, because the order 

requires these capabilities to be maintained even if power is lost, 

the order includes implicit requirements for emergency power 

supplies or suitable alternative methods to continue reactor core 

cooling indefinitely. 

• Hydrogen control. All but one of the 13 nuclear regulatory bodies in 

our review with operating nuclear power reactors in their countries 

have issued additional requirements for hydrogen control systems or 

are studying alternative options for hydrogen removal. In some cases, 

countries that already have some hydrogen control systems are 

looking to test existing systems and further strengthen hydrogen 

safety. For example, Russia’s regulatory body required complete 

implementation of hydrogen monitoring and removal systems in 

reactors where they were not part of the original design and also 

required an analysis of the adequacy of existing hydrogen monitoring 

and removal systems to prevent the formation of explosive gas 

mixtures in the most unfavorable scenarios in severe accidents. 

Similarly, France’s regulatory body has required that one type of 

hydrogen control system be qualified for external hazards beyond the 

level currently considered,26

• Filtered venting systems. Eleven of the 13 regulatory bodies in our 

review with operating reactors have issued new requirements or are 

studying options for filtered venting systems to minimize the release of 

radioactive materials into the environment in the event of an accident. 

and has issued requirements for the 

detection of hydrogen in places not planned for in the design. 

 

26This type of hydrogen control system refers to catalytic recombiners, which oxidize the 

hydrogen (or “recombine” it with oxygen to make water or steam). 
 

Page 16 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

For example, filtered venting systems are included in Japan’s new 

safety regulations under “measures for preventing core 

damage/containment failure.” Canada’s Action Plan in response to the 

Fukushima Daiichi accident includes requirements for “Emergency 

Filtered Containment Venting.” Countries that already have filtered 

venting systems, such as Sweden, are studying potential updates and 

improvements to their systems—for example, to ensure that they 

function in prolonged accident scenarios. France’s regulatory body 

has required the operator to submit a detailed study of possible 

improvements to its venting-filtration system, taking into account the 

possibility of needing filtration in two or more reactors simultaneously. 

In the United States, NRC announced that it is in the process of a 

technical evaluation to support rulemaking on filtering, with the 

deadline for the final rule set for 2017. NRC staff recommended that 

the commission order the installation of filtered venting systems at 

boiling water reactors with Mark I and II containments—those similar 

to the ones at Fukushima Daiichi.27

 

27There are three major types of containment designs for boiling water reactors: Mark I, 

Mark II, and Mark III. The Fukushima Daiichi reactor Units 1-5 had Mark I containments, 

and reactor Unit 6 had a Mark II containment. According to a commissioner vote, Mark I 

and II containment structures’ relatively small volume presents “long-recognized 

vulnerabilities” in their ability to contain radioactive materials during a severe accident. A 

1975 NRC study (NUREG-75/014) found that the risk of containment failure during severe 

accidents is higher at boiling water reactors with Mark I containments because the 

containment volume of Mark I containment designs was significantly less than that of the 

other containment designs, approximately one-sixth the volume of large dry pressurized 

water reactor containments. In boiling water reactors with a Mark II containment design, 

the containment volume could be approximately 25 percent larger than the volume of 

Mark I containments. According to NRC’s Near-Term Task Force, it can reasonably be 

concluded that under circumstances similar to those of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, a 

Mark II would have suffered similar consequences because its containment design is only 

slightly larger in volume than Mark I containment designs. 

However, the commission voted 

against issuing an immediate order to require installation of filtered 

venting systems and instead gave NRC staff a year to produce a 
 

Page 17 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

technical evaluation to support rulemaking on filtering,28

Japan was the only country in our review that fundamentally restructured 

its nuclear regulatory framework in response to the Fukushima Daiichi

accident. Specifically, in June 2012, Japan’s parliament passed the 

Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority Act, which, effective in 

September 2012, established the new Nuclear Regulation Authority 

(NRA) as an independent commission in charge of all of the nation’s 

nuclear regulatory functions. NRA replaced the organizations previously 

responsible for nuclear safety regulation, including NISA. This 

restructuring separated the government’s nuclear regulatory function from 

that of nuclear power promotion. The reform also established a Nuclear 

Emergency Preparedness Commission (NEPC) under Japan’s cabinet 

and required the new regulatory body to incorporate the latest scientific 

and technical knowledge into the nation’s nuclear regulatory basis, in 

keeping with the Kurokawa Commission finding that NISA had a negative 

attitude toward new advances in knowledge and technology from outside 

Japan. An NRA commissioner told us that Japan’s restructuring of its 

nuclear regulatory system is necessary to address the issue of “regulatory 

capture”—the collusion between NISA and the nuclear industry—that 

compromised the nation’s nuclear safety prior to the accident and to 

regain the public trust, which the commissioner told us was NRA’s biggest 

challenge. NRA’s mission statement lists among the agency’s core values 

thus deciding 

to address filtered venting through its regular process rather than as 

an emergency issue. The commission directed the staff to consider 

both the use of a filter to be placed on the vent, as well as a more 

performance-based approach using existing systems to achieve a 

similar reduction in radioactive release during an accident. 

 

28Generally, federal regulations, including those of NRC, can only be changed through the 

rulemaking process. An order—which is issued immediately—bypasses NRC’s rulemaking 

process, which could take years and seeks comments from stakeholders, such as industry 

and the public. NRC’s “backfit rule” requires, in order to impose new requirements on 

existing licensees, that NRC determine that the new requirements would result in a 

substantial increase in the overall protection of public health and safety or common 

defense and security and that this increased protection justifies the cost of 

implementation, unless the new requirement fits within one of the exceptions to the backfit 

rule in 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(4)(i)-(iii). Backfitting is defined by NRC as the modification of 

or addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the design 

approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the procedures or organization required 

to design, construct, or operate a facility; any of which may result from a new or amended 

provision in NRC’s regulations or the imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting 

NRC’s regulations that is either new or different from a previously applicable staff position, 

relative to specific dates, such as issuance of licenses.

Japan Restructured Its 

Nuclear Regulatory 

Framework, and China,

Sweden, and Vietnam 

Devoted Additional 

Resources to Nuclear 

Safety
 

Page 18 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

and principles the fostering of a genuine safety culture, where public

safety is the highest priority.

According to the commissioner, NRA’s structure is largely modeled on 

NRC’s, and, to a lesser extent, on that of France’s nuclear regulatory 

body. For example, NRA will have a five-commissioner voting system like 

the U.S. and French nuclear regulatory bodies. However, the Japanese 

government has not determined how to reconcile NRA’s independence 

from the Japanese bureaucracy with its status as a government agency 

within that bureaucracy. According to the commissioner, the

fragmentation under the previous system—with multiple agencies 

responsible for various aspects of nuclear safety— was problematic, and

the need for integration “obvious” and that integrating all nuclear oversight 

agencies into one is an international trend. He said, however, that 

merging the staff and budgets of previously separate agencies will take 

time, as NRA is an amalgam of these disparate agencies. The 

commissioner said that NRA currently has no budget autonomy, as its 

budget, as that of any other Japanese government agency, is allocated

by the government. However, the issue of NRA funding has not been 

finally settled, and fees from nuclear operators are still under 

consideration as a funding source. The commissioner said that funding 

the agency independently of the government will be difficult but that not 

having budgetary independence could limit organizational and personnel 

independence, which are essential. 

The NRA completed new regulations for civilian nuclear power plants in 

Japan in July 2013. All of Japan’s nuclear power plants with operators 

that wish to restart their reactors must meet criteria established by the 

new regulations. In addition, reactors built in the 1970s and 1980s will be 

reexamined in light of the latest science on earthquakes and geology. 

Once the safety of each reactor is assessed based on the new 

regulations—a process that is expected to take 2 to 3 years—the

Japanese government is to determine whether each reactor can restart. 

The operator of each reactor must also obtain the support of the public; 

the governor of the prefecture where the reactor is located and, in some 

cases, the governors of nearby prefectures; and the national government 

of Japan. NRA will only be involved in the technical deliberations and will 

not have a role in other aspects of the governmental decisions to restart

reactors. 

Three other countries in our review—China, Vietnam, and Sweden—did 

not change their regulatory structures in response to the Fukushima 

Daiichi accident, but senior nuclear regulatory officials we interviewed 

from those countries said that the accident reinforced to their 

governments the importance of a strong regulatory body. As a result, the 
 

Page 19 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

officials said that their governments provided additional human and 

financial resources to their nuclear regulatory bodies. According to the 

respective regulatory officials, the governments of China and Vietnam 

paused or slowed their nuclear programs after the Fukushima Daiichi 

accident to strengthen their regulatory authorities. The Chinese 

government suspended the licensing of new reactors in 2011—there were 

14 operating reactors and additional ones under construction at that 

time—until a National Nuclear Safety Plan was developed and safety 

inspections were completed, according to a senior regulatory official. The 

Chinese government also agreed to nearly double the regulatory body’s 

staff to 1,100 and increased its budget. In Vietnam, the government plans 

to begin construction on its first nuclear power plant in 2014 and to begin 

operation in 2020. However, since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the 

nuclear regulatory body sees this timeline as overly ambitious as the 

country needs time to develop a nuclear safety infrastructure that meets 

IAEA standards. To that end, Vietnam’s Atomic Energy Law will be 

reevaluated in the aftermath of Fukushima with regard to regulatory 

independence, among other things. According to the Department of 

Energy, Vietnam announced in January 2014 that the start of construction 

on its first nuclear power plant may be delayed until the 2017-2018

timeframe. In Sweden, senior regulatory officials told us that the 

government had previously hesitated to fund the regulatory body with the 

amount it had requested but, after the accident, it provided a larger 

budget allocation than requested, allowing the regulatory body to hire 

more staff.

29

Four countries in our sample—France, Sweden, South Korea, and the 

United Kingdom—have recently made changes to their regulatory 

structures that were not directly in response to the Fukushima Daiichi 

accident. Two of the countries, France and Sweden, made changes to 

their structures before the accident occurred. The other two countries 

(South Korea and the United Kingdom) made changes after the accident 

but, according to regulatory officials from those countries, these changes 

were planned prior to the accident. In all four countries, the regulatory 

changes were consistent with the lessons learned from the Fukushima 

Daiichi accident. 

 

 

29According to Swedish nuclear regulatory officials, Sweden’s nuclear regulatory body’s 

nuclear safety work is funded primarily by user fees. The increased allocation since the 

Fukushima Daiichi accident reflects an increase in the amount of the budget funded by the 

government. 

Four Countries’ Regulatory 

Changes Were Not Made 

in Response to the 

Fukushima Daiichi

Accident 
 

Page 20 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Specifically, France did not change its regulatory structure in response to 

Fukushima but overhauled its nuclear regulatory system in 2006 with a 

law on “Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field,” which 

established the Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) as an independent 

commission.30

Sweden also made changes to its nuclear regulatory structure 

independently of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The Swedish Radiation 

Safety Authority (SSM), established in July 2008 to consolidate various 

agencies previously involved in nuclear regulation, oversees nuclear 

safety and security, among other things. In 2010, the Swedish 

government assigned SSM to review the nation’s regulatory framework 

and strategy. Sweden, like France, had also already implemented many 

nuclear safety improvements in response to events prior to Fukushima. 

For example, the Swedish Parliament decided to require filtered venting 

equipment to protect against large-scale ground contamination following 

the Three-Mile Island accident in 1979 in the United States. Sweden also 

ASN has responsibility for nuclear safety, but not physical 

security, which is the responsibility of a separate authority. French 

regulatory officials told us that they would prefer that security also fall 

under the nuclear regulatory body—that integration of these functions 

would give the regulatory body more expertise and lead to more 

thoughtful and comprehensive regulation. According to French officials, 

regulatory and others, the Fukushima Daiichi accident did not drive more 

nuclear regulatory changes within France because France had already 

implemented many nuclear safety improvements in response to 

vulnerabilities exposed in 1999, when strong winds raised the tide, and 

water breached the seawalls of the Blayais nuclear power plant near 

Bordeaux and flooded it, including its safety-significant equipment. The 

plant shut down without incident but, in response, the regulatory body and 

the plant operator launched a 10-year program to create a more 

systematic approach to flooding hazards, including raising seawalls and 

making underground facilities watertight. Studies on flood preparedness 

at French nuclear power plants were commissioned, and new flood 

scenarios were considered and modifications made, such as raised 

seawalls.

 

30Even before the 2006 law that established ASN as an independent commission, the 

French agencies responsible for nuclear regulation became more independent over time. 

The first nuclear regulatory body was within the French Atomic Energy Commission, which 

also operated the reactors.
 

Page 21 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

established a Severe Accident Management Program in response to the 

Three-Mile Island accident.31

In 2011, the South Korean government established a new stand-alone 

regulatory body, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), 

which comprises a panel of commissioners that reports directly to the 

President of South Korea. The establishment of NSSC separated nuclear 

promotional functions from regulatory ones by removing regulatory 

decision making from South Korea’s Ministry of Education, Science and 

Technology, which previously oversaw nuclear regulation, as well as 

nuclear policy and research and development support. South Korean 

nuclear regulatory officials said that plans for this restructuring were in 

place before the Fukushima Daiichi accident. According to these officials, 

NSSC responded to recent nuclear safety incidents, such as the 

falsification of documents for reactor components at the Yeonggwang 

nuclear power plant in November 2012, with 20 measures to address 

such issues, including a program to improve safety culture.32

The United Kingdom also created a new regulatory body in April 2011—

the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)—to replace the Nuclear 

Installations Inspectorate, a quasi-autonomous nongovernmental 

organization.

33

 

31A Severe Accident Management Program is a program to prevent and mitigate the 

consequences of beyond design-basis accidents, including severe accidents. According to 

IAEA, accident management means taking actions during a beyond design-basis accident 

to prevent it from escalating into a severe accident, mitigate any consequences, and 

achieve a long-term safe stable state. 

According to the memorandum announcing the body’s

creation, this change was unrelated to the United Kingdom’s response to 

the Fukushima Daiichi accident. However, the memorandum stated that 

the events at Fukushima further confirmed the need for a modern, 

independent and flexible nuclear regulatory body. According to a senior 

ONR official, the change was prompted by recruitment and retention 

challenges the nuclear regulatory body was facing in competing with the 

32NSSC found 215 cases of quality-record falsification among 20 suppliers of reactor 

components for the Yeonggwang nuclear power plant. Another incident of concern to 

NSSC was a safety failure at the Kori nuclear power plant that was not reported to NSSC 

until a month after the incident. According to Korean nuclear regulatory officials, both 

incidents had an impact on public perceptions of nuclear safety.

33Under the quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organization construct, an agency can 

perform functions of the government and be entirely funded by the government but not 

controlled directly by the central government.
 

Page 22 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

nuclear industry. According to this official, recruiting from the nuclear 

industry was a challenge because the pay and conditions within the 

government, restrained by a public pay policy, were not competitive with 

those in the industry. An independent study recommended taking the 

nuclear regulatory body out of the civil service where it would not be 

subject to the same pay policy. The body remains under the umbrella of 

the Health and Safety Executive but is not subordinate to it; rather, it is a 

separate agency. The additional flexibility of this change has allowed 

ONR to retain staff and to better recruit staff from the industry, which 

helps meet the needs for new licensing applications. ONR manages the 

conflicts of interest that could arise from recruiting inspectors directly from 

industry by starting recruits out in its lower rungs, in technical assessment 

posts, where inspectors have no contact with operators, with particular 

care to avoid contact with the operators that had employed them. 

Six of the 13 countries that have operating nuclear power reactors in our 

review have established automated system for collecting and transmitting 

critical data to the nuclear regulatory body or designated technical experts

who work with the regulatory body during an accident, and a seventh 

country has plans to build such a system. However, officials from some of 

these countries, including the United States, told us that their automated 

data transmission systems are not currently designed to operate under 

severe emergency conditions, such as loss of off-site power and lines of 

communication as occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 

plant.34 Officials from 5 of the other countries with operating nuclear 

power reactors told us they either had no plans to establish such a 

system or they might consider establishing such a system in the future. 

We were unable to determine whether a sixth country has or plans to 

establish such a system.

 

34Normally, alternating current power, which is essential for safe operation and accident 

recovery at commercial (civilian) nuclear power plants, is supplied by off-site sources via 

the electrical grid. Loss of this off-site power can have a major negative impact on a power 

plant’s ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. 

Nearly Half of 

Countries with 

Nuclear Power 

Reactors in Our 

Review Have 

Automated Data 

Transmission 

Systems
 

Page 23 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Officials from 6 of the 13 countries in our review with operating nuclear 

power reactors—Japan, the United States, France, South Korea, China, 

and Argentina—told us that they have automated data transmission 

systems, and officials in a seventh country, Sweden, told us they are 

working to install such a system. However, none of these officials told us 

that their automated data transmission system is currently designed to 

operate under severe emergency conditions, such as loss of off-site 

power and lines of communication as occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi

nuclear power plant. Although nuclear regulatory officials from 3 countries 

(Japan, the United States, and France) told us they are considering 

upgrading their automated data transmission systems to operate under 

emergency conditions—to a satellite-based system, for example—only 

Japan, according to a senior Japanese official, has made a final decision

to upgrade its system to a more durable and reliable satellite-based 

communications system. None of these countries’ officials told us they 

have a specific timeline for upgrading their system. 

We obtained the most information regarding automated data systems 

from the United States and France. 

United States. NRC established an automated data transmission system

in the aftermath of the 1979 Three-Mile Island accident due to a high error 

rate from plant operators in data transmission during the accident. At that 

time, NRC relied on telephone calls with its resident inspectors and plant 

operators to verbally communicate technical data to NRC. In order to 

substantially improve access to key plant and reactor data, NRC began 

developing what became the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) 

in 1985, and the system became operational in 1993. At present, when 

activated, ERDS data flow directly to NRC’s Operations Center at its 

Maryland headquarters and are also available, as needed, at NRC 

regional offices in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Illinois, and Texas. According 

to NRC officials, approximately 39 of the 62 U.S. nuclear power plants 

have opted to transmit ERDS data continuously at all times; the 

remainder has the capability to do so in the event of an incident or 

emergency. Figure 2 shows NRC’s new Headquarters Operations Center.

Six Countries Have 

Automated Systems, and 

Some Are Considering 

Steps to Ensure They Can 

Operate in Emergency 

Conditions
 

Page 24 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Figure 2: NRC’s Headquarters Operations Center

However, according to NRC officials, ERDS’ capacity to collect and 

transmit information would be compromised under certain emergency 

conditions, such as the loss of off-site power and lines of communication, 

as occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Although NRC 

has not required that ERDS be upgraded to function under these 

conditions, NRC had taken steps before the Fukushima Daiichi accident 

to upgrade ERDS— to move the system from an analog based platform 

to a digital one and to address cybersecurity concerns. In particular, NRC 

officials told us that, prior to 2009, ERDS used a process requiring the 

use of a modem to transmit data. Over time, modems have become 

obsolete, making it difficult to maintain the system. Modems also 

inherently introduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities. ERDS has been 

upgraded to use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to create a secure pointto-point data pathway from each operator site to NRC headquarters.35

 

35A VPN is a private network that is maintained across a shared or public network, such 

as the Internet, by means of specialized security procedures. VPNs are intended to 

provide secure connections between remote clients, such as branch offices or traveling 

personnel and a central office. 

VPN technology, according to NRC, is the current, stable, and reliable 

information technology industry standard.
 

Page 25 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

NRC is considering additional upgrades to ERDS so that it would function 

more reliably during severe emergency conditions but has not yet acted 

because ERDS is not considered a “safety related” system, as it does not 

directly ensure the safety of a facility or play a direct or essential role in 

emergency response. These officials added that they thought ERDS was 

“a nice supplement” to voice communications but that it was not essential 

because NRC can communicate directly by telephone with its resident 

inspectors and the operator. They added that telephone communications 

have been upgraded since the 1979 Three-Mile Island accident. 

Specifically, NRC funded the establishment of the Emergency Notification 

System (ENS), which bypasses the local telephone switching network. 

Plant operators are now required to establish multiple, continuouslystaffed ENS telephone lines early in any accident scenario. NRC and 

licensees have also developed response plans using ENS and conduct 

frequent exercises to validate these plans. 

NRC officials acknowledge that data transmission via ERDS improves the 

efficiency of information sharing between the licensee and the NRC 

Headquarters Operations Center but said that the practices and 

procedures used to obtain the data using ENS would enable NRC to 

evaluate the severity of the reactor accident without ERDS if necessary. 

Accordingly, these officials told us that NRC is first completing higher 

priority post-Fukushima nuclear safety enhancements before deciding 

whether or how to upgrade ERDS because how these enhancements are 

resolved could affect how any ERDS upgrade might be implemented. 

They also noted that both the Three-Mile Island and Fukushima Daiichi 

accidents were managed without the benefit of functioning automated 

data transmission systems. However, an IAEA fact-finding mission to 

Japan in the aftermath of Fukushima stated that greater consideration 

should be given in the future to providing hardened systems, 

communications, and sources of monitoring equipment for providing 

essential information for on-site and off-site responses, especially for 

severe accidents. Moreover, without upgrades to enable ERDS to 

function under emergency conditions, it may not be available when the 

need for it is greatest, such as during a severe accident. 

France. French officials told us, during our tour of one of their national 

crisis centers—the French government’s emergency response center for 

dealing with events with possible radiological implications—that France 

also does not consider its automated data transmission system a “safety 

system.” These officials told us that there are accident scenarios under 

which emergency diesel generators would power their automated data 

transmission system, but whether the system would function would 

depend on the severity of the accident and level of damage to the plant’s 
 

Page 26 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

electrical system. In particular, if power were lost during a severe accident 

as it was during the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the automated system 

would not function. French officials also told us that they maintain close 

telephone contact with plant operators during an accident. Regardless of 

whether its automated data transmission system functions, France 

requires that “quarter-hour messages” be sent from the nuclear power 

plant control room to technical experts at its national crisis centers. 

According to French officials, these messages convey data on the most 

important nuclear power reactor parameters, a subset of data collected by 

the automated transmission system. These data are read by plant 

operator technicians from the control room instruments, copied by hand to 

a paper form, and then faxed to its national crisis centers every 15 

minutes. Nonetheless, France is also considering upgrading its

automated data transmission system to reliably function without off-site

power; according to French officials, studies are in progress, but no 

decisions have been made. 

Nuclear regulatory officials we spoke with from 5 of the 6 remaining

countries with operating reactors—Armenia, Belgium, Canada, Russia, 

and the United Kingdom—told us they do not currently have automated 

data transmission systems, and officials from 3 of these countries said 

their countries may consider establishing such systems in the future. We 

were unable to determine whether a sixth country, Pakistan, has or plans 

to establish such a system. 

For the 3 countries with emerging or potential nuclear power programs, 

regulatory officials in Vietnam told us that they plan to develop an 

automated data transmission system; officials in the United Arab Emirates 

told us they have not yet decided whether to do so and, in the case of 

Indonesia, which has not yet decided whether to pursue a civilian nuclear 

power program, we were unable to obtain information. 

Three key international organizations––IAEA, WANO, and the EU––along 

with the Convention on Nuclear Safety have taken steps to support 

nuclear regulatory bodies and promote nuclear safety worldwide since the 

Fukushima Daiichi accident—including playing a significant role in helping 

nuclear regulatory bodies identify the most important lessons from the 

accident and supporting the associated regulatory changes to enhance 

nuclear safety. 

International Efforts 

Taken to Support 

Nuclear Regulatory 

Bodies and Promote 

Nuclear Safety 
 

Page 27 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

IAEA adopted an Action Plan on Nuclear Safety (Action Plan) in 

September 2011, 6 months after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The 

plan’s purpose is to define a program of work to strengthen global nuclear 

safety by taking into account lessons learned from the accident. The 

Action Plan focuses on, among other things, safety assessments of 

nuclear power plants in light of their vulnerabilities to extreme natural 

hazards, peer reviews of nuclear regulatory bodies and nuclear power 

plants, provisions for emergency preparedness and response, and the 

adequacy of existing IAEA safety standards. The success of the Action 

Plan, according to IAEA, depends on its implementation through the full 

participation and cooperation of the member states, with the involvement 

of relevant stakeholders such as international organizations, nuclear 

industry associations, and research organizations. The plan is divided into 

12 actions, each of which is divided into subactions and activities. The 

status of each action is tracked at the activity level and posted on IAEA’s 

publicly available website. According to IAEA officials, the agency does 

not track the efforts of member states under the Action Plan but 

encourages member states to share information on progress in the 

implementation of the Action Plan through international conferences and 

international experts’ meetings on nuclear safety-related topics.

One of the key ways in which IAEA helps countries improve nuclear 

safety and regulatory effectiveness is through peer review missions. The 

most prominent peer review missions are the Integrated Regulatory 

Review Service (IRRS) and Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) 

missions. These missions evaluate the operations of a member state’s 

nuclear regulatory system and civilian nuclear power plant operational 

safety, respectively, and make recommendations and suggestions for 

improvement. According to IAEA officials, countries and plant operators

hosting peer review missions are also encouraged and expected by IAEA 

to host follow-up missions, typically 2 to 4 years after the initial review in 

the case of IRRS missions and 18 to 24 months in the case of OSART 

missions. According to these officials, follow-up missions have been a 

part of IRRS and OSART peer reviews since 2006 and 1989, 

respectively.

IRRS missions, which are voluntary to all but EU member states, assess 

the safety practices of the requesting country through an examination of 

its regulatory framework and organization and compare the country’s 

IAEA
 

Page 28 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

practices with IAEA Safety Standards and good regulatory practices.36

IAEA conducted 75 IRRS missions to 45 countries from 1992 through the 

end of June 2013.

IRRS mission teams include experts drawn largely from IAEA member 

countries’ nuclear regulatory bodies, including NRC. The requesting 

country is typically provided with recommendations and suggestions for 

improvement at the conclusion of the mission. According to IAEA officials, 

recommendations are proposed to host countries where aspects of their 

regulatory system relative to the IAEA Safety Requirements are missing, 

incomplete, or inadequately implemented. These recommendations, 

according to IAEA officials, should be specific, realistic, and designed to 

result in tangible improvements to regulatory effectiveness. When IAEA 

peer reviewers identify opportunities for improvement not directly related 

to inadequate conformance with IAEA Safety Requirements, but that may 

contribute to improvements in national regulatory arrangements, they 

make IRRS suggestions. According to IAEA, suggestions are primarily 

intended to make the regulatory body’s performance more effective or 

efficient, and to point out potential improvements to current regulatory 

activities. 

37 In addition, according to IAEA officials, a special 

module focused on the regulatory implications of the Fukushima Daiichi

accident was incorporated into the scope of IRRS missions immediately 

after the accident for countries having nuclear power plants. Table 1 lists 

the number of IRRS missions, including follow-up missions, which 

member states have hosted through June 30, 2013.

 

36 The Nuclear Safety Directive of the European Commission requires all EU member 

states to host an IRRS mission and a follow-up mission once every 10 years.

37 IAEA has conducted IRRS missions since 1992. The present form of IRRS mission 

dates to 2006. 
 

Page 29 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Table 1: Number of IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Missions by 

Country, 1992 through June 30, 2013

Country Number of IRRS missions

Armenia 2 

Australia 2 

Botswana 1 

Bulgaria 3 

Cameroon 1 

Canada 2 

China 3 

Côte d’Ivoire 1 

Czech Republic 2 

Finland 3 

France 2 

Gabon 1 

Germany 2 

Greece 1 

Hungary 2 

Indonesia 2 

Iran 1 

Japan 1 

Kenya 1 

Korea, Republic of 1 

Lebanon 1 

Lithuania 1 

Madagascar 1 

Mauritius 1 

Mexico 2 

Namibia 1 

Niger 1 

Pakistan 1 

Peru 1 

Poland 1 

Romania 5 

Russian Federation 1 

Sierra Leone 1 

Slovakia 3 
 

Page 30 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Country Number of IRRS missions

Slovenia 2 

Spain 2 

Sweden 1 

Switzerland 3 

Thailand 1 

Uganda 1 

Ukraine 4 

United Arab Emirates 1 

United Kingdom 2 

United States 1 

Vietnam 2 

Total 75

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

Note: IRRS missions were preceded by a similar program from 1992 to 2004 called International 

Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) missions. This table combines both types of missions. IAEA does 

not consider scoping or expert missions to be “full” IRRT or IRRS missions and are thus not included 

in this table. 

OSART missions also include experts drawn largely from IAEA member 

countries but are more narrowly targeted to review operational safety at 

specific nuclear power plants. OSART missions also typically make 

recommendations and suggestions to improve safety. According to IAEA, 

OSART recommendations provide operators ideas for improving 

operational safety and should: (1) be based on IAEA Safety Standards or 

proven, good international practices; (2) address the root causes rather 

than the symptoms of the identified concern; and (3) be specific, realistic, 

and designed to result in tangible improvements. An OSART suggestion 

is primarily intended to, among other things, make good performance 

more effective. In general, suggestions are designed to stimulate the 

plant management and supporting staff to continue to consider ways and 

means for enhancing performance. According to IAEA, the agency has 

conducted 284 OSART missions in 34 countries from 1983 through the 

end of June 2013. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, like 

most nuclear power plants, has not hosted an OSART mission. Table 2 

lists the number of OSART missions, including follow-up missions, that 

member countries have hosted through June 2013.
 

Page 31 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Table 2: Number of IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) Missions by 

Country, 1983 through June 30, 2013

Country Number of OSART missions

Argentina 2 

Armenia 2 

Belgium 4 

Brazil 11

Bulgaria 8 

Canada 4 

China 19

Czech Republic 15

Finland 4 

France 44

Germany 9 

Hungary 4 

India 1 

Italy 3 

Japan 9 

Kazakhstan 1 

Korea, Republic of 8 

Lithuania 4 

Mexico 6 

Netherlands 5 

Pakistan 6 

Philippines 2 

Poland 1 

Romania 6 

Russian Federation 12

Slovakia 10

Slovenia 6 

South Africa 6 

Spain 9 

Sweden 13

Switzerland 9 

Ukraine 23

United Kingdom 6 

United States 12
 

Page 32 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Country Number of OSART missions

Total 284

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

According to IAEA officials, the agency is not systematically tracking the 

status of the recommendations made by the IRRS or OSART peer review 

missions, and it does not know the extent to which the recommendations 

or suggestions have been implemented by the host countries and plant 

operators unless countries and operators have hosted a follow-up 

mission. Follow-up missions to IRRS and OSART missions are the 

means for informing IAEA of progress made in implementing the original 

missions’ recommendations and suggestions. IAEA posts on its publicly 

available website the names of countries and nuclear power plants that 

have hosted IRRS and OSART missions and follow-up missions and, in 

some cases, summary or full reports of the main conclusions of a given 

mission.38 According to IAEA officials, however, the agency is not 

authorized by member states to act as a nuclear safety oversight 

organization and so does not systematically track the status of such 

recommendations and suggestions. IAEA officials noted that member 

states are responsible for tracking the status of their mission findings.

However, without this information, IAEA cannot determine the impact and 

effectiveness of the peer review missions. Nuclear regulatory officials 

from France and Canada stated that greater transparency about the 

results and follow-up to peer review missions is needed. 

The importance of tracking recommendations and improving the impact 

and effectiveness of IRRS missions was noted at a recent IAEA 

conference. Specifically, the first action item at the April 2013 IAEA 

regulators conference in Ottawa, Canada, identified issues that needed to 

be addressed, implemented, and followed up on, including: (1) countries 

should develop national action plans to implement recommendations 

made by IRRS peer review missions, (2) the results of the IRRS missions 

should be made public, and (3) IRRS missions and follow-up missions 

should be reported to IAEA’s Board of Governors. Because not all of the 

recommendations and suggestions of IRRS peer review missions are 

made public, countries may have less incentive to follow up on them. 

 

38In the case of IRRS missions, and in accordance with IRRS guidelines, countries are 

encouraged to make their reports available to the public. IAEA will make a summary report 

publicly available 90 days after the letter transmitting the report to the host country unless 

the country specifically requests that it remain restricted.
 

Page 33 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

The experience of the 2011 IAEA-sponsored international expert mission 

to Japan highlights the current system’s limitations. This expert mission, 

which was established to find facts and identify initial lessons from the 

Fukushima Daiichi accident, noted, among other things, that despite the 

technical focus on nuclear safety and radiation protection, the mission 

also identified more general problems with: the regulatory framework for 

safety in Japan, the clarity of the roles and responsibilities among 

government entities and the operator, and the independence of the 

nuclear regulatory body. The expert mission noted that some of these 

issues had also been raised by the June 2007 IRRS mission to Japan, 

and that there had not been a follow-up mission. The IRRS report did not 

mention “regulatory capture”— a condition that was found by the 

Kurokawa Commission to have compromised Japan’s nuclear safety prior 

to the accident.39 

In the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, WANO is expanding the 

scope of its operations and activities to do more to help its members 

achieve its overriding goals to enhance nuclear safety and the operational 

performance of nuclear power plants. Specifically, according to WANO, 

the organization is 

• Increasing staff. WANO is more than doubling the size of its staff over 

3 years. It had about 170 employees in 2011 and plans to increase 

the number to 388 in 2014. 

• Requiring more frequent peer reviews focusing on issues highlighted 

by the accident. WANO is moving from 6-year to 4-year intervals for 

the peer reviews it requires of its members. WANO is also requiring its 

members to host a WANO peer review team for a follow-up 2 years 

after its peer reviews so the operator can explain what it has done to 

address the findings from the previous review. In addition, WANO has 

now expanded the scope of its peer reviews to include, among other 

things, issues highlighted by the accident, including emergency 

preparedness, severe accident prevention, and spent fuel pool 

management. 

 

39The Kurokawa Commission scrutinized the relationship between the plant operators and 

the regulators and found the relationship lacking in independence, transparency, and 

safety culture, calling the relationship a “typical example of regulatory capture in which the 

oversight of the industry by regulators effectively ceases.” 

WANO
 

Page 34 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

• Increasing coordination with IAEA. WANO also signed a 

Memorandum of Understanding with IAEA in September 2012 under 

which both organizations are to take a more coordinated approach to 

their activities. For example, under this memorandum, according to 

both organizations, WANO and IAEA staff are to meet regularly to 

discuss major safety related activities, share more nuclear power 

plant operating experience, and better coordinate the timing of their 

respective peer reviews so that, for example, operators will not have 

to host a WANO peer review in the same year they host an IAEA 

OSART mission. 

The EU, acting in concert with national nuclear regulatory bodies and the 

nuclear industry, among its member states, launched a process in March 

2011 to carry out EU-wide comprehensive risk and safety assessments of 

nuclear power plants. The EU nuclear safety directive and the EU nuclear 

waste directive grant it the authority to make these assessments legally 

binding on EU members. Within a few weeks of the Fukushima Daiichi

accident, all 14 EU member states that operate civilian nuclear power 

reactors—as well as two neighboring countries—had agreed, on a 

voluntary basis, to subject their power plants to targeted, comprehensive 

safety risk assessments of how well they could withstand the 

consequences of various extreme external conditions, including those 

that affected the Fukushima Daiichi plant.

40 These assessments were to

focus on the robustness of safety margins of nuclear power plants in 

three areas: (1) accident-initiating events such as earthquakes, floods, 

and extreme natural weather; (2) loss of safety systems, including power 

and ultimate heat sink;41

 

40In addition to the 14 EU member states with operating nuclear power plants (Belgium, 

Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, 

Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom), and two neighboring states 

(Switzerland and Ukraine), Lithuania also participated in the comprehensive safety risk

assessments even though the two reactors at its Ignalina nuclear power plant are 

currently being decommissioned.

and (3) severe accident management 

capabilities. The methodology of these assessments was determined by 

EU experts from the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 

(ENSREG) and the West European Nuclear Regulators’ Association 

41An ultimate heat sink is a source of water near the nuclear plant—a lake, river, or ocean, 

or a dedicated water source— to absorb decay heat. An ultimate heat sink is required to 

provide all of the nuclear power reactor’s cooling water needs for the first 30 days of an 

accident. Two or more pumps are used to take water from the heat sink to the plant.

European Union
 

Page 35 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

(WENRA).

42

1. Assessment of plants by operators (June to October 2011).

The comprehensive safety and risk assessments took place 

from June 2011 through April 2012 and were conducted with a three-step 

process as follows: 

2. Review of these assessments by national nuclear regulatory 

bodies (by the end of December 2011).

3. European peer reviews of assessments (January to April 2012). 

Following the completion of these safety assessments, according to EU 

officials, the ENSREG action plan was approved on August 1, 2012. The 

plan is to, among other things, (1) assist in ensuring that the conclusions 

from the comprehensive safety and risk assessments and their peer 

review result in improvements in safety across European nuclear power 

plants and (2) ensure, through further peer review, that the 

recommendations and suggestions from the peer reviews of 

comprehensive safety and risk assessments (also known as “stress 

tests”) are addressed by national regulators and ENSREG in a consistent 

manner. 

The EU also undertook a review of the existing legal and regulatory 

frameworks for the safety of nuclear installations to consider proposing 

any improvements that may be necessary. Having carried out EU-wide 

comprehensive risk and safety assessments of nuclear power plants, as 

well as a review of the existing legal and regulatory frameworks for the 

safety of nuclear installations, the European Commission concluded that 

improvements to European nuclear safety were necessary. The 

commission announced in June 2013 its proposal to update and 

strengthen its 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive. According to the 

commission announcement, the proposed new directive substantially 

strengthens the provisions of the existing directive by

• introducing EU-wide safety objectives; 

 

42ENSREG is an independent, authoritative expert body composed of senior officials from 

national regulatory or nuclear safety authorities from all member states in the EU. WENRA 

is an organization composed of the chief nuclear regulators of EU countries with nuclear 

power plants and other interested European countries. WENRA’s main objectives are to 

facilitate the exchange of nuclear safety information and experience among regulators, 

develop a common approach to nuclear safety, and provide an independent capability to 

examine nuclear safety in affiliated countries.
 

Page 36 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

• setting up a European system of peer reviews of nuclear 

installations;

• increasing transparency on nuclear safety matters;

• strengthening the role and independence of national regulatory 

authorities; 

• introducing a requirement of specific safety reviews for older 

nuclear power plants for which a lifetime extension is considered; 

and

• enhancing on-site emergency preparedness and response, for 

example by implementing strict accident management guidelines 

and by putting in place emergency response centers that must be 

protected against radioactivity and earthquakes or flooding.

If ultimately adopted by the European Council, this proposed new 

directive could enter into force as soon as 2014 and be written into 

binding national legislation by EU member states within the following 18 

months. 

The Convention has convened two meetings since the Fukushima Daiichi

accident—the regularly scheduled triennial review meeting in April 2011, 

which was held, coincidentally, about 3 weeks after the accident, and a 

special meeting approximately 18 months later, in August 2012, to focus 

specifically on the accident. For the special August 2012 meeting, parties 

to the Convention (1) prepared a Fukushima Daiichi-related national 

report describing the safety assessments of their nuclear programs 

undertaken after the accident and measures taken to address the lessons 

learned from the accident; (2) reviewed and shared their findings and 

measures taken with other parties through the peer review process and, 

to varying extents, the public; (3) reviewed the effectiveness and 

provisions of the Convention. 

One result of these meetings was to make and adopt revisions to the

Convention’s guidelines on the preparation of the triennial national 

Convention on Nuclear 

Safety
 

Page 37 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

reports.43

• refer to IAEA safety standards, such as IAEA Safety 

Fundamentals and Requirements, in discussing how they are 

meeting their obligations to the Convention;

The revised post-Fukushima guidelines provide more detailed 

suggestions for what information parties should include in their triennial 

national report and how it should be organized. Parties are encouraged to

• report in more detail about the steps they have taken to follow up 

on any issues and concerns that may have been raised in earlier 

review meetings and national reports; 

• discuss and address the results of international peer review 

missions, including IAEA IRRS missions, progress made in 

implementing recommendations, and suggestions and additional 

plans for further follow-up; and

• discuss lessons they have learned or actions taken in response to 

accidents and events, such as the issues highlighted by the 

Fukushima Daiichi accident. 

The parties also agreed to consider other measures to improve the 

effectiveness of the Convention at the next review meeting, scheduled for 

March 2014. In particular, part of the outcome of the August 2012 special 

meeting was the establishment of an effectiveness and transparency 

working group open to all interested parties to the Convention, to develop 

and propose various actions that could be taken to strengthen and 

amend, where necessary, the Convention. This working group is to

consider the various proposals raised during the special meeting to 

amend the Convention, including proposals already submitted by 

Switzerland and the Russian Federation. The working group is to present 

its findings to all parties at the 2014 review meeting. Among the Swiss 

proposals are several amendments to the Convention, including one that 

would require each contracting party to have periodic external review of 

its regulatory body to confirm its competence, independence, and that it is 

provided with adequate authority and resources. Another Swiss proposal 

would also require that the regulatory body’s findings and decisions on 

the safety of nuclear installations be made publicly available. The Russian 

 

43According to the Convention’s national report guidelines, their purpose is to suggest that 

material that may be useful for parties to include in their reports and to facilitate the most 

efficient review of implementation by the parties of their obligations under the Convention.
 

Page 38 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

proposals include (1) requiring periodic assessments of nuclear power 

plant safety and (2) affirming that new construction conforms with IAEA 

recommendations. NRC officials noted that the U.S. position is that 

changes to the Convention could be better addressed through guidance 

documents, rather than through reopening the Convention to 

amendments. 

As we reported in April 2010, IAEA officials told us it was important for 

parties to make as much information about their civilian nuclear power 

programs accessible as possible but that it was for each party to 

determine how much information should be made public and how much 

should remain confidential.44

Since April 2010, an additional 13 national reports prepared for the four 

review meetings held from 1999 to 2008 have been made available on 

IAEA’s publicly available website, including 8 additional national reports 

prepared for the 2008 review meeting. Notwithstanding this overall 

increase in the number of reports posted, the total number of reports 

posted on IAEA’s publicly available website for the 2011 review meeting 

We also recommended in 2010 that the 

Secretary of State, in coordination with the NRC Chairman, work with 

other parties to the Convention to, among other things, expand efforts to 

increase the number of parties’ national reports made available to the 

public by posting them to IAEA’s public website, even though there is no 

requirement to do so. In response to these recommendations, NRC 

stated that it (1) leads by example by always making the U.S. national 

report available on the NRC and IAEA publicly available websites and (2) 

uses its leadership positions in the Convention to work with and 

encourage leaders of other countries to encourage all contracting parties 

to make their national reports publicly available. In addition, under U.S. 

leadership, according to NRC, the Convention on Nuclear Safety 

Scientific Secretary in 2010 sent out a message to all contracting parties 

reminding them that “in the spirit of openness and transparency, 

Contracting Parties are encouraged to notify IAEA when they agree to 

have their National Reports posted on the IAEA public website.” Further, 

NRC and the State Department stated that they will also raise this issue 

during meetings of the Convention working group on effectiveness and 

transparency and continue to encourage contracting parties to make as 

much information publicly accessible as possible. 

 

44GAO, Nuclear Safety: Convention on Nuclear Safety Is Viewed by Most Member 

Countries as Strengthening Safety Worldwide, GAO-10-489 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 

2010).
 

Page 39 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

declined to 32 reports from 34 reports in 2008 despite the increase in the 

number of contracting parties to the Convention obligated to submit 

national reports increasing from 61 to 72 parties. Moreover, according to 

summary reports prepared by the parties at the end of the August 2012 

special meeting called to discuss the Fukushima Daiichi accident, 36 of 

61 parties (or 59 percent) that prepared national reports for the meeting

did not make them available on IAEA’s public website.

45

The Fukushima Daiichi accident underscored the importance of countries 

having a strong, competent, and independent regulatory body and the 

consequences of not having one. Nuclear regulatory bodies worldwide 

are taking this accident seriously and using it as an opportunity to 

strengthen regulatory procedures, requirements, and infrastructures, as 

appropriate. Nuclear regulatory bodies will continue to play key roles in 

minimizing the chances of a severe accident and ensuring the most 

effective emergency response possible should an accident occur––

factors considered to be fundamental to public safety and to the 

continued viability of the civilian nuclear power industry worldwide. For 

example, NRC participates regularly in a variety of IAEA activities related 

to, among other things, nuclear safety, and the State Department

coordinates U.S. policy matters with international organizations and 

treaties, including those dealing with nuclear safety. Supporting these 

efforts, IAEA peer review missions provide countries with unique 

opportunities to strengthen their nuclear regulatory organizations. 

However, IAEA does not systematically track the status of the 

recommendations made by the IRRS peer review missions and does not 

know the extent to which the recommendations have been implemented 

by the host countries. According to IAEA officials, the agency is not 

authorized by member states to act as a nuclear safety oversight 

organization, and member states are responsible for tracking the status of 

their mission findings. Without this information, IAEA cannot fully 

determine the impact and effectiveness of these peer review missions as 

important tools to improve nuclear safety. Furthermore, because not all of 

the recommendations and suggestions of the IRRS peer review missions 

are made public, countries may have less incentive to follow up on them.

 

45Of the 75 parties to the Convention, and that were obligated to submit a national report 

in 2012, 61 prepared such reports. 

Conclusions
 

Page 40 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Although NRC does not consider its automated data transmittal system—

ERDS—a safety system, the Fukushima Daiichi accident underscored the 

usefulness of having such a system fully functioning. NRC has taken 

steps to upgrade ERDS, but it is still not equipped to collect and transmit 

information when electrical power and lines of communication are 

compromised, as occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. 

NRC is delaying its consideration of additional upgrades to ERDS so that 

it would function more reliably because it is first completing higher priority 

post-Fukushima nuclear safety enhancements. By delaying its decision 

on whether or how to upgrade ERDS, a fully functioning system might not 

be available to regulators when the need is greatest—during a severe 

accident. Further, NRC may be missing an opportunity to lead by 

example as it does in other areas to promote nuclear safety worldwide, 

such as its efforts to encourage parties to the Convention on Nuclear 

Safety to make their national reports publicly available. 

We are making the following two recommendations in this report: 

• To further promote the safety of civilian nuclear power programs 

worldwide by enhancing the effectiveness of nuclear regulatory 

bodies, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in coordination 

with the Commission, work with and encourage officials from IAEA 

to systematically track the status of the recommendations made 

by the IRRS peer review missions and make this information 

publicly available to the extent feasible. 

• To increase the likelihood of NRC’s access to timely, accurate, 

and comprehensive information during nuclear accidents, we 

recommend that the NRC Chairman consider expediting NRC’s

decision on whether or how to upgrade ERDS so that it would 

remain functional during a severe accident.

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Energy, the 

Department of State, and NRC for review and comment. We also 

provided relevant sections of the draft report to IAEA. State and NRC 

provided written comments, which are presented in appendixes III and IV. 

NRC stated that it was in general agreement with the draft report but did 

not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our two recommendations, 

including the one recommending that NRC consider expediting its 

decision on whether or how to upgrade ERDS so that it would remain 

functional during a severe accident. The Department of Energy provided 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 41 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

technical comments, as did IAEA and NRC, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. 

In its written comments, the Department of State “partially concurred” with 

our recommendation that it, in coordination with the NRC Chairman, work 

with officials from IAEA to systematically track the status of the 

recommendations by the IRRS peer review missions and make this 

information publicly available to the extent feasible. In its comment letter, 

the department stated that it would work with NRC and raise the 

recommendation with appropriate safety officials at IAEA and seek their 

views to further discuss what possible steps could be taken. However, 

State raised a number of issues that it believed would need to be 

considered in discussions with IAEA officials, including: (1) maintaining 

member states’ confidentiality and willingness to participate in IRRS 

missions if IAEA systematically tracks the status of peer review 

recommendations and makes those results public, (2) member states’ 

acceptance of such tracking without extensive prior discussions, and (3) 

IAEA’s perspective on whether such tracking would improve the focus of 

the missions. State also raised questions about the costs associated with 

such systematic tracking and how they will be paid. We are encouraged 

that the department plans to work with NRC and raise the 

recommendation with IAEA and hope that these issues can be addressed 

in discussions with IAEA officials. NRC echoed issues similar to State’s in 

its technical comments and also noted that its more appropriate role 

should be to encourage—rather than work with—IAEA to systematically 

track the status of the recommendations by the IRRS peer review 

missions. In response to NRC’s comment, we have added the word 

“encourage” to the recommendation so that it now reads, in part, that “the 

Secretary of State, in coordination with the Commission, work with and 

encourage officials from IAEA to systematically track the status of the 

recommendations by the IRRS peer review missions . . .”

We recognize the significance of the issues State and NRC have raised

about maintaining confidentiality, member states’ acceptance of 

systematic tracking, how such tracking might affect member states’ 

willingness to participate in future IRRS missions, and the focus of such 

missions. We agree that these issues need to be factored into 

discussions with IAEA officials. For this reason, we recommended that 

the results of these missions be made publicly available to the extent 

feasible. If discussions among State, NRC, and IAEA officials can lead to 

greater transparency about the results of IRRS missions and improve 

prospects for analyzing the impact and effectiveness of these missions, 

they would be worthwhile. However, as we noted in our report, without 
 

Page 42 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

systematic tracking of the results of mission findings, including follow-up, 

IAEA cannot fully determine the impact and effectiveness of the peer 

review missions. In addition, our recommendation is consistent with 

another ongoing international effort—with U.S. participation—to 

encourage countries to be more open regarding nuclear safety. For 

example, as we noted in our report, the most recent version of the 

Convention on Nuclear Safety’s guidelines encouraged the contracting 

parties to discuss and address the results of international peer review 

missions in their national reports, including IRRS missions; discuss 

progress made in implementing recommendations; and discuss 

suggestions and additional plans for further follow-up. Regarding State 

and NRC’s mention of potential added costs associated with any tracking 

system, we note that neither agency provided any analysis or assessment 

of the potential added costs of systematic tracking in raising it as an 

issue.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 15 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Energy, 

the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, the appropriate congressional committees, and other 

interested parties. The report also will be available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 43 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

In light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, you asked us to examine

worldwide nuclear regulation and safety. This report examines: (1) the

actions regulatory agencies with existing or planned civilian nuclear 

power reactors have taken to strengthen nuclear safety; (2) the extent to

which these countries have established automated systems for collecting 

and transmitting data and taken steps to enable such systems to 

withstand emergency conditions; and (3) steps key international

organizations have taken to support nuclear regulatory bodies and 

promote nuclear safety worldwide since the Fukushima accident and the 

impact of some of these steps.

To examine the actions that national regulatory agencies have taken to 

strengthen nuclear safety in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, we 

selected a nonprobability sample of 16 countries to represent a cross 

section of “emerging” and established civilian nuclear power countries. 

For countries with emerging civilian nuclear power, we selected the three 

most often suggested by U.S. agency officials and nuclear experts as 

available. For established countries, we focused on those where nuclear 

power represented more than 15 percent of the country’s electricity 

production. From those, we asked agency officials and other interviewees 

to suggest countries that would provide good examples of actions taken 

to strengthen nuclear safety. We also considered program size and the 

nation’s nuclear regulatory framework to select 13 countries with 

established civilian nuclear power.1

The 16 countries are Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Canada, China, 

France, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, 

United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam. 

Thirteen of these 16 countries—those with established nuclear power 

programs—operated 78 percent of the world’s nuclear power reactors as 

From the sample, we prioritized 5 

countries to visit in person. We selected these 5 countries through a 

combination of suggestions from experts, size of nuclear program, and 

proximity to one another. We interviewed, at an international nuclear 

regulators’ conference in Ottawa, Canada, regulatory officials from all but 

1 of the 11 countries we did not visit in person; Armenia, the country with

regulatory officials we did not interview in person, provided written 

answers to our questions.

 

1

Regulatory frameworks may differ in that a nuclear regulatory agency could be a cabinet 

agency or ministry, or an independent commission. We also considered structural 

changes undertaken by nuclear regulatory agencies from one type to another (e.g., 

agency to commission). 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 44 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

of September 2013 (the other 3 countries—Indonesia, United Arab 

Emirates, and Vietnam—do not have operating nuclear power reactors).2

For the 16 countries selected, we reviewed reports these countries 

undertook to document the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, 

including reports prepared for various international meetings—including 

the Second Extraordinary Meeting for the Convention on Nuclear 

Safety—and reports relating to their comprehensive safety risk 

assessments, and/or presentations in which they summarized lessons 

learned.

3

We selected six illustrative categories of actions taken in response to 

Fukushima; our selection was neither an attempt to identify the full range 

of regulatory responses to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, nor to 

establish them as best practices or to catalog the extent to which each 

regulatory body within our sample undertook actions in each category.

We also interviewed officials from each selected regulatory 

body and/or technical support organization and/or received written 

responses to our questions. In countries where we conducted in-person 

site visits—Belgium, Canada, France, Sweden, and the United States—

we also visited nuclear power plants and interviewed nuclear power plant 

operators. In Canada, France, Sweden, and the United States, we 

interviewed other government officials in agencies or ministries related to 

civilian nuclear power. In the Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 

United States, we interviewed nuclear industry association officials. We 

also interviewed two former chairmen of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC). GAO did not independently verify statements of 

foreign law. 

To examine the extent to which the 15 selected non-U.S. countries have 

established automated systems for collecting and transmitting data to the 

nuclear regulatory body during emergencies, we interviewed officials from 

the respective nuclear regulatory agencies, technical support

organizations, and operators, as applicable, and possible and 

 

2

This figure includes reactors that are temporarily suspended and thus not “operating,” 

including the 50 reactors in Japan suspended in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi 

accident. The three “emerging” categories are in varying stages of considering, planning, 

or licensing their nuclear power programs; for example, the Indonesian government has 

not yet decided to pursue a nuclear program but had stated an interest in developing one.

3

These meetings include the April 2011 Convention on Nuclear Safety review meeting; the 

August 2012 Convention Second Extraordinary Meeting; and the International Atomic 

Energy Agency’s April 2013 International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory 

Systems.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 45 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

corroborated these statements with documents to the extent possible. 

GAO did not receive documentary or other substantial corroborating 

information to substantiate the statements of officials from China and 

Argentina that they have automated data transmission systems, and we 

have received only limited corroborating information that South Korea has 

such a system. There is no requirement that officials from these countries 

provide such information. 

To examine the steps key international organizations have taken to 

support nuclear regulatory bodies and promote nuclear safety worldwide 

since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, we first identified such 

organizations through interviews with officials from the State Department, 

Department of Energy (DOE), and nuclear regulatory officials. Based on 

these discussions, we identified the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 

(OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the World Association of Nuclear 

Operators (WANO), and the European Union (EU). We then reviewed, as 

applicable, the reports and action plans and other documents from these 

organizations and interviewed or exchanged responses to written 

questions with relevant officials from them. We also reviewed NRC 

documents and responses to written questions from NRC officials, and 

we reviewed State Department documents. In the case of IAEA, we 

reviewed IAEA information and details about IRRS and OSART missions,

as well as answers to written questions and conference documents. We 

also reviewed previous GAO work and statements from IAEA officials and 

other officials from the Ottawa conference.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to March 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Civilian Nuclear Profiles of 

Selected Countries

Page 46 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Country

Nuclear 

regulatory agency Established Structure a Scope of regulatory authority

Operational nuclear 

reactor and electricity 

generation data as of 

September 2013 b

Argentina Argentine Nuclear 

Regulatory 

Authority (ARN)

1997 Autonomous entity within 

the jurisdiction of the 

General Secretariat of 

the Presidency (reports 

to the President of 

Argentina). 

Nuclear safety; nuclear 

security; nuclear 

nonproliferation; 

environment and public 

health. 

2 power reactors (and 1 

under construction) 

generating 5% of the 

country’s electricity

Armenia Armenian Nuclear 

Regulatory 

Authority (ANRA)

1993 The ANRA Chairman is 

appointed and dismissed 

by the Prime Minister and 

reports to the President, 

government, and Prime 

Minister, but not to any

other ministry. 

Nuclear safety; 

nuclear security; nuclear 

nonproliferation; 

environment and public 

health; nuclear waste. 

1 power reactor generating 

27% of the country’s 

electricity 

Belgium Federal Agency for 

Nuclear Control 

(FANC)

1994 An autonomous public 

institution that reports to 

the Minister of Home 

Affairs. 

Nuclear safety; nuclear 

security; nuclear 

nonproliferation; 

environment and public 

health; nuclear waste. 

7 power reactors 

generating 51% of the 

country’s electricity 

Canada Canadian Nuclear 

Safety Commission 

(CNSC)

2000 The Commission 

Tribunal, CNSC’s central 

decision-making body, is 

a quasi-judicial 

administrative tribunal.

Nuclear safety; nuclear 

security; nuclear 

nonproliferation; 

environment and public 

health; nuclear waste.

19 power reactors 

generating 15% of the 

country’s electricity

China National Nuclear 

Safety 

Administration 

(NNSA) 

1984 Under the Ministry of 

Environmental 

Protection. 

Nuclear safety; 

environment and public 

health; nuclear waste.

18 power reactors (and 28 

under construction) 

generating 2% of the 

country’s electricity

France Autorité de Sûreté 

Nucléaire (ASN)

2006 ASN’s 5-person 

Commission serve for a 

6-year, full-time term. 

ASN reports to the 

French Parliament.

Nuclear safety; nuclear 

security; c 58 power reactors (and 1 

under construction) 

generating 75% of the 

country’s electricity 

environment 

and public health; nuclear 

waste. 

Indonesia BAPETEN 1997 BAPETEN has the power 

to establish regulations 

and to conduct licensing 

and inspections. 

BAPETEN is under and 

directly responsible to the 

President of Indonesia.

Nuclear safety; nuclear 

security; nuclear 

nonproliferation; 

environment and public 

health; nuclear waste.

No power reactors (3 

research reactors, 

regulated by BAPETEN)

Japan Nuclear Regulatory 

Authority (NRA)

2012 An independent 

commission (under the 

Ministry of the 

Environment). 

Nuclear safety; nuclear 

security; nuclear 

nonproliferation; 

environment and public 

health; nuclear waste.

50 power reactors (and 2 

under construction) 

generating 2% of the 

country’s electricity

Appendix II: Civilian Nuclear Profiles of 

Selected Countries

d
Appendix II: Civilian Nuclear Profiles of 

Selected Countries

Page 47 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Country

Nuclear 

regulatory agency Established Structure a Scope of regulatory authority

Operational nuclear 

reactor and electricity 

generation data as of 

September 2013 b

Korea, 

Republic of

Nuclear Safety & 

Security 

Commission 

(NSSC) 

2011 The 9-person 

commission an 

independent, standalone, ministry-level 

agency and supported by 

two technical support 

organizations. 

Nuclear safety; nuclear

security, nuclear 

nonproliferation; 

environment and public 

health; nuclear waste.

23 power reactors (and 5 

under construction) 

generating 30% of the 

country’s electricity 

Pakistan Pakistan Nuclear 

Regulatory 

Authority (PNRA)

2001 PNRA is an independent 

regulator reporting 

directly to the Prime 

Minister. PNRA 

comprises a chairman

and 2 full-time and 7 parttime members. The 

federal government 

appoints the chairman 

and the members.

Nuclear safety; nuclear 

security; environment and 

public health; nuclear 

waste.

3 power reactors (and 2 

under construction) 

generating 5% of the 

country’s electricity

Russian 

Federation

Rostechnadzor 

(the Federal 

Environmental, 

Industrial and 

Nuclear 

Supervision

Service) 

2004 Rostechnadzor is directly 

subordinate to the 

government and not to 

any ministry. 

Nuclear safety; nuclear 

security; environment and 

public health; nuclear 

waste. 

33 power reactors (and 10 

under construction) 

generating 18% of the 

country’s electricity 

Sweden The Swedish 

Radiation Safety 

Authority (SSM)

2008 SSM reports to the 

Ministry of the 

Environment but 

interprets and executes 

the law independently of 

the government.

Nuclear safety; nuclear

security; nuclear nonproliferation; environment 

and public health; nuclear 

waste. 

10 power reactors 

generating 38% of the 

country’s electricity

United Arab 

Emirates 

Federal Authority 

for Nuclear 

Regulation (FANR)

2009 FANR is an independent 

legal entity with “full legal 

competence and financial 

and administrative 

independence.” It is fully 

separate from the nuclear 

sector.

Nuclear safety; nuclear

security; nuclear

nonproliferation nuclear 

waste.

2 power reactors under 

construction

United 

Kingdom

Office for Nuclear 

Regulation (ONR)

2011 ONR is a stand-alone 

statutory body, formed as 

an agency of the Health 

and Safety Executive but 

working toward becoming 

an independent 

corporation. 

Nuclear safety; nuclear

security; nuclear

nonproliferation.

16 power reactors 

generating 18% of the 

country’s electricity
Appendix II: Civilian Nuclear Profiles of 

Selected Countries

Page 48 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Country

Nuclear 

regulatory agency Established Structure a Scope of regulatory authority

Operational nuclear 

reactor and electricity 

generation data as of 

September 2013 b

United 

States of 

America 

Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC)

1974 Independent federal 

agency headed by five 

commissioners

(commission is a quasijudicial body). 

Nuclear safety; nuclear

security; nuclear 

nonproliferation; nuclear 

waste. 

100 power reactors (with 3 

under construction) 

generating 19% of the 

country’s electricity

Vietnam Vietnam Agency 

for Radiation and 

Nuclear Safety

(VARANS) 

2003 VARANS is under the 

Ministry of Science and 

Technology. 

Nuclear safety; nuclear

security; nuclear

nonproliferation.

No power reactors (1 

research reactor, regulated 

by VARANS)

Source: GAO analysis of nuclear regulatory body documents; IAEA Power Reactor Information System as of September 4, 2013.

Note: Scope also implies only civilian and commercial nuclear matters; this table does not specify the 

regulatory agencies that also have oversight over military nuclear matters. 

a

This date represents the establishment of each country’s current nuclear regulatory body, 

which may have replaced an existing nuclear regulatory body.

 bThis column represents each regulatory body’s scope of responsibilities as reported by 

the country and does not convey any GAO analysis of the regulatory body’s performance 

of its responsibilities. Scope of regulatory authority comprises areas addressed by 

technical support organizations, such as Belgium’s Bel-V, France’s Institut de 

Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), and Korea’s KINS; areas not included may 

be performed by government agencies. For example, the U.S. NRC is not the primary 

U.S. agency responsible for oversight of environment and public health, but shares in

these responsibilities with regard to civilian nuclear power with other federal agencies and 

state and local governments.

c

France’s ASN is responsible for oversight of nuclear security (for example, security of 

radioactive materials, including transportation of such materials) but not for oversight of 

physical protection of nuclear power plants. However, its technical support organization, 

IRSN, has a role in monitoring physical protection.

d

Before all but two of Japan’s remaining 50 reactors were ordered to suspend operations 

after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, nuclear reactors generated 18% of Japan’s 

electricity. As of this writing all reactors have been shutdown.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 49 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of State
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 50 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 51 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission

Page 52 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 53 GAO-14-109 Nuclear Regulatory Bodies 

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Glen Levis, Assistant Director; 

Alisa Beyninson; Kevin Bray; Antoinette Capaccio; Scott Fletcher; Alison 

O’Neill; Steven R. Putansu; Kevin Tarmann; and Kiki Theodoropoulos 

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(361412)
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