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Unclassilied Report to Congress 

on th" Acquisition of Technology 

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction 

and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 

Covering '1 January to 31 December 2009 

The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis hereby submits this 

report in response to a congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 

Intelligence Authorization Act, which states: 

"(a) Reports 

The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress an annual report on -

(1) the acquisition by forei(ln countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use 

and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of 

mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and 

biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and 

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries." 

(b) Submittal dates 

(1) The report required by subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted each 

year to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 

leadership on an annual basis on the dates provided in section 415b of this 

title. 

(2) In this subsection: 

(A) The term "congressional intelligence committees has the meaning 

given that term in section 401 a of this title. 

(6) The term "congressional leadership" means the Speaker and the 

minority leader of the House of Representative and the majority leader 

and the minority leader of the Senate. 

(c) Form of reports 

Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted in 

unclassified form , but may includH a classified annex." 

CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) 

drafted this report. The National Intelligence Council reviewed and coordinated it within 

the Intelligence Community (IC). As directed by Section 721 , subsection (c) of the Act, 

this report is unclassified. It does not present the details of the IC's assessments of 

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weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are 

available in olher classified reports and briefings for the Congress. 

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I. Acquisition by Country 

As required by Section 721 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the 

following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, 

contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced 

conventional weapons (ACW) thatt occurred from 1 January through 31 December 2009. 

This report focuses on key countries that we assess are seeking WMD capabilities. 

Iran 

Nuclear 

We continue to assess Iran is keHping open the option to develop nuclear weapons 

though we do not know whether Tehran eventually will decide to produce nuclear 

weapons. Iran continues to develop a range of capabilities that could be applied to 

producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. 

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure and 

continued uranium enrichment and activities related to its heavy water research reactor, 

despite multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions since late 2006 calling for 

the suspension of those activities. Although Iran made progress in expanding its 

nuclear infrastructure during 200[1, some obstacles slowed progress during this period. 

• In 2009, Iran continued to make progress enriching uranium at the underground 

cascade halls at Natanz with first-generation centrifuges, and in testing and 

operating advanced centrifuges at the pilot plant there. As of mid-November, Iran 

had produced about 1,800 kilograms of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) 

gas product at Natanz, compared to 555 kilograms of LEUF6 in November 2008. 

Between January and November 2009, Iran increased the number of installed 

centrifuges from about 5,000 to about 8,700, but the number reported to be 

operating remains at about 3,~100. 

• In September, Iran disclosed that it was constructing a second gas-centrifuge 

uranium enrichment plant near the city of Oom that is designed to house 

approximately 3,000 centrifug'os. 

• Iran in 2009 continued construction of the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor. 

Iran during National Nuclear Day inaugurated its fuel manufacturing plant and 

claimed to have manufactured a fuel assembly for the IR-40. 

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• Iran in 2009 continued to make progress on completing its Bushehr Nuclear Power 

Plant but did not load fuel in U,e reactor. Iran currently plans to load fuel in the 

reactor in 2010. 

• Iran's Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan shut down for maintenance in 

August and had not resumed UF6 production as of late October. International 

Atomic Energy Agency reports indicate Iran has almost exhausted its imported 

stockpile of yellowcake which may have contributed to its decision to extend the 

shutdown of the UCF. 

Ballistic Missiles 

Iran has continued to develop its ballistic missile program, which it views as its primary 

deterrent. Iran is fielding increasEld numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic 

missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs) and we judge that producing more capable MRBMs remains 

one of its highest priorities. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is one of the largest in the 

Middle East. 

In late November 2007, Iran's defense minister claimed Iran had developed a new 2,000 

km-range missile called the Ashura. Iranian officials on 12 November 2008 claimed to 

have launched a two stage, solid propellant missile called the Sejil with a range of 2,000 

km. In 2009, Iran conducted three flight tests of this missile. 

As early as 2005, Iran stated its intentions to send its own satellites into orbit. As of 

January 2008, Tehran reportedly had allocated $250 million to build and purchase 

satellites. Iran announced it would launch four more satellites by 2010 to improve land 

and mobile telephone communications. 

Iran's President Ahmadi Nejad also announced Teh ran would launch a "homeproduced" satellite into orbit in 2008, and several Iranian news websites released 

photos of a new rocket called "Safic." 

In mid-August 2008, Iran first launched its Safir space launch vehicle, carrying the Omid 

satellite. Iran claimed the launch a success; however US officials believed the vehicle 

did not successfully complete its mission. Iran successfully launched the Omid satellite 

aboard the Safir 2 SLV in early FBbruary 2009 according to press reports. 

Assistance from entities in China and North Korea, as well as assistance from Russian 

entities at least in the past, has hBlped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in the 

production of ballistic missiles. Iran still remains dependent on foreign suppliers for 

some key missile components, however. Iran also has marketed for export at trade 

shows guidance components suitable for ballistic missiles. 

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Chemical and Biological 

We assess that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents 

and conducts research that may have offensive applications. Tehran continues to seek 

dual-use technologies that could advance its capability to produce CW agents. We 

judge that Iran is capable of weaponizing CW agents in a variety of delivery systems. 

Iran probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (8W) agents for 

offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. We assess that Iran has previously 

conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dualuse technologies that could be used for BW. 

North Korea 

Nuclear 

In February 2007, North Korea agreed as part of the Six-Party Talks to "shut down and 

seal for the purposes of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including 

the reprocessing facility" as part of the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint 

Statement of September 2005. In mid-July 2007, North Korean officials shut down the 

Yongbyon 5-megawatt electric (MWe) nuclear reactor, and placed the Yongbyon spentfuel reprocessing facility, the Yongbyon nuclear fuel fabrication plant, and two 

unfinished nuclear reactors under IAEA seals, monitoring, and verification. In retum, 

the other five Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy, and humanitarian 

assistance to the DPAK, including the provision of assistance up to the equivalent of 1 

million tons of heavy fuel oil during the period of Initial Actions and the next phase. 

In the Second-Phase Actions Agreement, signed October 3, 2007, Pyongyang 

committed to disable the 5MWe reactor, the reprocessing facility, and the luel 

fabrication plant by December 31, 2007 in exchange lor a US commitment to begin the 

process 01 removing the designation 01 the DPAK as a state sponsor of terrorism and to 

advance the processing 01 terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy 

Act, in parallel with the DPAK's Second Phase actions. In November 2007, a team 01 

US Department 01 Energy officials began overseeing disablement activities, including 

the unloading of reactor fuel rods at Yongbyon. In April 2009, North Korea informed the 

US and IAEA officials at Yongbyon that they were to depart at the earliest possible time 

and that North Korea planned to reactivate its nuclear lacilities and reprocess the spent 

luel removed from the reactor. In September 2009, North Korea announced that 

reprocessing of the spent fuel roels was in the final stages and that the recovered 

plutonium was being weaponized. 

The North's probable nuclear test in May 2009-apparently more successful than its 

2006 test-suggests the North has the capability to produce nuclear weapons with a 

yield of roughly a couple kilotons TNT equivalent. 

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In June 2009, North Korea announced that it had begun uranium enrichment work at a 

test stage and was developing technology to produce fuel for a light-water reactor. In 

September 2009, North Korea reported that its uranium enrichment work had entered 

the final stage. 

Ballistic Missile 

North Korea continues to pursue the development, production, and deployment of 

ballistic missiles with increasing range and sophistication. It continues to procure 

needed raw materials and components from various foreign sources to support its 

missile industry. 

• North Korea in April 2009 launched a Taepo Dong 2 which passed over Japan. It 

failed in its stated mission of orbiting a small communications satellite, but 

successfully tested several technologies associated with an ICBM. The UN Security 

Council subsequently issued a presidential statement condemning the launch as a 

contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1718. 

• North Korea's foreign ministry in April 2009 publicly threatened to conduct flight tests 

of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at an unspecified time. 

• In July it launched series of road-mobile Scud-based missiles. This launch activity 

was very similar to the series iQf launches it conducted in July 2006. North Korea 

also continues to develop a mobile IRBM as well as a mobile solid-propellant SRBM. 

Chemical and Biological 

We assess that North Korea has had a longstanding CW program. We judge 

Pyongyang possesses a stockpile of agents. 

North Korea has a biotechnology infrastructure that could support the production of 

various BW agents. We judge that North Korea possesses a conventional munitions 

production infrastructure that could be used to weaponize BW agents. 

Nuclear 

Syria-despite being a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Party with full-scope IAEA 

safeguards-was engaged for more than a decade in a covert nuclear program 

with North Korean assistance. T~le program involved construction of a nuclear reactor 

at AI Kibar without informing the fAEA and whife taking measures to preserve the site's 

secrecy. We assess the reactor woufd have been capabfe of producing plutonium for 

nucfear weapons. The reactor was destroyed in September 2007, before it became 

operational, and Syria went to g"lat lengths to try to eradicate evidence of its existence 

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and remains generally uncooperative with the IAEA investigation. The covert nature of 

the program, the characteristics of the reactor, and Syria's extreme efforts to deny and 

destroy evidence of the reactor after its destruction are inconsistent with peaceful 

nuclear applications. 

IAEA inspectors visited Syria between 22 and 24 June 2008 and took environmental 

samples at the AI Kibar site. The IAEA reported to the November 2008 Board of 

Governors that analysis of the AI Kibar environmental samples revealed a significant 

number of chemically processed natural uranium particles. The report also noted the 

Agency's assessment that the features of the AI Kibar building were similar to what may 

be found in connection with a reactor site, but stated that the IAEA could not exclude 

the possibility that the building was intended for non-nuclear use. The IAEA is 

continuing its investigation of Syria's nuclear file. 

Ballistic Missile 

Syria possesses one of the largest ballistic missile forces in the Middle East-including 

Scud-class liquid propellant SRBMs-and is developing longer-range missiles such as a 

Scud D and possibly other variants, with assistance from North Korea and Iran. Syria 

imports missile related technology and remains dependent on foreign suppliers for 

some key ballistic missile technology. 

Chemical and Biological 

Syria continued to seek dual-use technology from foreign sources during the reporting 

period. Syria has had a CW program for many years and already has a 

stockpile of CW agents, which can be delivered by aircraft, ballistic missile, and artillery 

rockets. We assess that Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements 

of its CW program, including precursor chemicals. 

Syria's biotechnical infrastructure is capable of supporting limited BW agent 

development, but the Syrians are not believed to have achieved a capability to put BW 

agents into effective weapons. 

II. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism 

Several terrorist groups, particularly al-Qa'ida, probably remain interested in chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of 

those capabilities. Many of the 3:l US Department of State designated foreign terrorist 

organizations worldwide have previously expressed interest in one or more of these 

capabilities. Some terrorist groups see employing (CBRN) materials as a high-impact 

option for achieving their goals. We believe these terrorists aim to use these agents 

against Western targets, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. We continue to be 

concerned about al-Qa'ida's stated intent to conduct unconventional attacks against the 

United States. While counterterrorism actions have dealt a significant blow to al7 

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Qa'ida's near-term efforts to devEdQP a sophisticated CBRN attack capability, we judge 

Ihe group is still intent on its acquisition. 

III. Key Suppliers 

North Korea and entities in Russia and China continue to sell technologies and 

components in the Middle East and South Asia that are dual use and could support 

WMD and missile programs. North Korea is among the world's leading suppliers of 

ballistic missiles and related technologies. Russian entities have provided assistance to 

missile and civil nuclear programs in Iran and India. Chinese companies have been 

associated with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and missile programs in Iran. 

We also see evidence of secondary proliferation, as countries that previously imported 

weapons and technologies begin indigenous production and export those systems. As 

their domestic capabilities grow, traditional recipients of WMD and missile technologyto include Iran and Pakistan-also are capable of supplying technology and expertise. In 

addition, independent companies , scientists. and engineers may provide WMD- and 

missile-related assistance. 

China 

Chinese entities-which include private and state-owned companies and individualscontinue to engage in WMD-relat!3d proliferation activities. The United States imposed 

sanctions in 2008 on several Chinese companies for sales of WMD- and ballistic 

missile-related technologies to states of concern. Over the past several years, China 

has implemented new export control legislation that approximates Missile Technology 

Control Regime (MTCR) controls, but enforcement continues to fall short. Chinese 

entities continue to supply a variety of missile-related items to multiple customers, 

including recent exports to Iran and Pakistan. 

In 2009, China continued to offer for sale SRBMs that fall below the 300-kilometer 

range/SOO kilogram payload threshold for MTCR Category I systems. China remained a 

primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan, which still represents 

China's most important partner in military technology cooperation. 

North Korea 

North Korea remains committed to selling missiles and related technologies to foreign 

customers. Over the years, it ha,; exported ballistic missile-related equipment, 

components, materials, technical expertise, and/or full missile systems to countries in 

the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. North Korea has demonstrated a 

willingness to sell complete ballistic missile systems and components that have enabled 

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other states to acquire longer-range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been 

possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts. 

North Korea's relationships with Imn and Syria remain strong. North Korea provided 

assistance to Syria's covert nuclear effort starting in the late 1990s and retains the 

potential for exporting nuclear materials or technology. 

Russia 

Russian entities remain key suppliers of civilian nuclear technology to a number of 

countries. Russia remains a key supplier for Iran's civilian nuclear program, primarily 

providing IAEA safeguarded equipment and expertise to enable completion of the 

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Russia has been the primary provider of safeguarded 

assistance to India's civilian nuclElar programs. Russia continues to construct two 

1 ,OOO-megawatt light water nuclear reactors at Kudankulam. China remains one of 

Russia's largest customers for nuclear-related equipment. Russia continues to assist 

with China's construction of an experimental fast reactor outside of Beijing. 

Russian entities also remained a source of dual-use biotechnology equipment and 

related expertise. For example, F~u ssian entities have been a source of dual-use 

biotechnology, chemicals, production technology, and equipment for Iran. 

IV. Proliferation of Advanced Ctonventional Weapons 

Iran continues to seek the advanced long-range S-300 air defense system from Russia. 

We judge likely deployment locations for this system include near Iran's nuclear 

facilities. 

Iran has a history of supplying arrns to Hizballah. Iran has reportedly supplied Hizballah 

with many types of rockets since 1992. It has been reported that since Israel's 

withdrawal from southem Lebanon in May 2000, there has been a dramatic increase in 

Iranian weapon and weapon systE3:m shipments through Syria, with transfers continuing 

even after the outbreak of hostiliti,es with Israel in July 2006. Hizballah's reported use of 

an anti-ship cruise missile during the 2006 war with Israel highlights the risk of 

proliferation of missiles to non-state actors. 

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