Filed 6 / 3 / 21 Popescu v. Cal. Highway Patrol CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

SORIN POPESCU et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

C ALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL et al.

,

Defendants and Res pondents. 2d Civil No. B306287 (Super. Ct. No. 56

- 2018

- 00520506

- CU

- CR

- VTA) (Ventura County)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on June 2, 2021, be modified as follows:

The c ounsel page of the opinion

, in the last paragraph starting with “Xavier Becerra” at the end of the counsel listing, delete the word “Plaintiff” and insert
“Defendant s , ” and add an “s” to the word “Respondent.” Should now read “ for Defendants and Responden ts.”

No change in judgment.

GILBERT, P.J. YEGAN, J. PERREN, J.Filed 6 / 2 / 21 Popescu v. Cal. Highway Patrol CA2/6 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

SORIN P OPESCU et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

C ALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL et al.

,
Defendants and Respondents. 2d Civil No. B306287 (Super. Ct. No. 56

- 2018

- 00520506

- CU

- CR

- VTA) (Ventura County)

A drunk and off

- duty California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer shot Sorin Popescu in the back while Popescu was standing in the entry way of his own home

. Popescu, his wife and
their children (appellants) conclusionally allege in their second
amended c omplaint that the officer, Treve r Dalton, was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time

. They further allege that the CHP is liable for Dalton’s unjustified use of force
and for its negligent failure to train, supervise and discipline
Dalton. The trial court sustaine d the CHP’s demurrer to their second amended complaint without leave to amend. Appellants2

contend the trial court erred w hen it concluded their complaint failed to state a cause of action against the CHP and when it
denied them leave to file a third amend ed complaint . We affirm.
FACTS In December 2017, the Thomas Fire destroyed or damaged numerous residences and caused widespread power outages in Vent ura. Appellants lived on a cul

- de

- sac in a neighborhood that lost power. As the family was trying to de cide
whether to evacuate, appellant Sor in Popescu heard a n oise from
the house next door. He went to investigate, worried someone might be looting his neighbor’s house. Once outside, appellant
encountered Dalton

, approaching the neighbor’s door

.

Dalton was employed as a California Highway Patrol (CHP) off

icer

. He is not alleged to have been in uniform , driving a marked black and white CHP car, or to have displayed a badge
or other identification. Popescu asked Dalton who he was

. Popescu decided Dalton was drunk and told him to leave.
Instead of leaving

, Dalton started questioning Popescu about his
i dentity and where he lived. He became increasingly aggressive with Popescu . He repeatedly told Popescu that he was a cop and was carrying a gun.

Dalton was riding a bicycle. As the two men exchanged words in the street, Dalton rode the bike in circle s around Popescu , eventually hitting him in the leg with the wheel. Popescu grabbed the handlebars and pushed the bicycle away

. This caused the intoxicated Dalton to fall off the bike. He began yelling that Popescu had assaulted him

.

Popescu retreated and called 911

. He told the operator about Dalton’s behavior including his claim that he was a police officer and that he said he had a gun. Dalton continued3

to make threatening state ments w hile Popescu was on the phone

. He said Popescu didn’t need to call the police because Dalton was the police. At one point during the interaction, Dalton used his phone to take a picture of the license plate on Popescu’s car.

Popescu returned to his house and talked with h is
wife about the conflict with Dalton. Meanwhile, Dalton had a confrontation with another neighborhood resident , Cason White

. Dalton asked White, who was standing outside with his son,
whether White was calling the police. He said White should call the police because, “ ‘ it’s about to go down ’ ” and then Dalton pulled a gun from an ankle holster

. White went into his house to
call 911. While White was calling 911, Popescu was standing inside his house, near the open front door, talking to his wife with his back to the street. Dalton walked up the driveway toward the
front door. Neighbors heard Dalton say, “ ‘ put your gun down. ’ ” Popescu was not armed and had not been at any point during his
confrontation with D alton. Dalton fired two shots , one of which hit Popescu in the back

.

Popescu suffered severe injuries and spent five days in the hospital. Dalton was taken into custody and charged with
firearms and assault offenses.

About three months before the s hooting, in September 2017 one of Dalton’s neighbors called the CHP office in Ventura to complain about his behavior in the neighborhood. The neighbor reported that , while intoxicated, Dalton walked around the neighborhood holding a live rooster and askin g people, “ ‘do you want to pet my cock. ’ ” Dalton would also stand in the street at night and stop passing motorists for no reason.
Dalton’s co

- workers reported that he “ ‘ drunk

- dialed ’ ” them and4

made inappropriate and unprofessional comments to them. The supervisors referred Dalton to the employee assistance program to address these issues and his admitted alcohol consumption practices.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellants’ first and seco nd amended complaint s attempted to allege causes of action for assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, negligent supervision, training and discipline,
violation of the Bane Act (Civ. Code , § 52.1 ) , and v iolation of civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both pleadings alleged the CHP was vicariously liable for Dalton’s misconduct because he was acting
within the course and scope of his employment when he shot Popescu. In support of this conclusion, appellants alleged that : Dalton carried a concealed, loaded firearm during the incident; he repeatedly invoked his status as a police officer ; he photographed the license plate on Popescu’s car and asked questions as if he

was investigating something ; and he gave com mands to Popescu
as if he was preparing to arrest Popescu

. Appellants furthe r alleged the shooting occurred during a state of emergency declared by the governor due to the Thomas Fire. During the state of emergency, all law enforcement officers were deem ed to
be on

- duty at all times. Appellants also alleged that officers are authorized at all times to carry out law enforcement functions such as making arrests. (See

, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 836, 25450, 25900; Veh. Code, § 2253.)

In addition to its respondea t superior vicarious liability theory , appellant s alleged the CHP is directly liable for its own negligent training, supervision and discipline of Dalton

. I n support of th is theory, appellants allege d that Dalton’s5

supervisors were aware, before the shooting occurred, that Dalton had a drinking problem. Supervisors were also aware that Dalton’s neighbors had complained to the CHP that he behaved
in intimidating and unprofessional ways in the neighborhood

. He also made inapprop riate comments to neighbors and to co

workers

. The CHP had referred Dalton to its Employee Assistance Program for counselling.

The CHP’s demurrers argued appellants could not allege a cause of action against it on a respondeat superior theory
because Da lton was off

- duty and not acting within the course and scope of his employment when the shooting occurred. The CHP contended it had no direct liability for failure to supervise Dalton because it had no special relationship with appellants.

In sustainin g the demurrer to appellants’ first amended complaint, the trial court noted , “ All of the factual allegations ple a d [ed] are of an off

- duty officer.” Dalton appeared to be drunk, was not in uniform and was not using a CHP vehicl e

. Although he referred to himself as a “cop,” Dalton did not identify the agency he worked for or display a badge. Popescu’s actions
reflected that he did not believe Dalton was acting as a peace
officer. For example, Popescu told Dalton to leave and did not

answer his questions. He p ushed the handlebars of Dalton’s bik e

. Popescu walked away from Dalton while Dalton was asking him questions

. Because the factual allegations did not establish Dalton was acting within the scope of his employment when he
sh ot Popescu, the trial court concluded the complaint failed to state a cause of action against the CHP.

Appellants amended their complaint to allege additional facts in support of their claim that Dalton was acting within the course and scope of his emplo yment. They also added6

causes of action all eging the CHP and Dalton’s supervisors were negligent in their supervision , trai ning and discipline of Dalton. Respondents again demurred on the grounds that Dalton was not acting within the course and scope of his employment

. They contended the CHP had no direct liability for negligence because it had no special relationship with appellants. The trial court agreed with respondents and sustained their demurrer without
leave to amend.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

We re view the second amended complaint “de novo to determine whether [it] alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory or to determine whether the trial court erroneously sustained the demurrer as a matter of law.” ( Aguilera v. Heiman (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 590, 595.) “In doing

so, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.” ( C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 866.) The complaint is to be given a
reasonable inter pretation and is read as a whole, with all its parts in context. ( Ibid

. )
DISCUSSION Vicarious Liability “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope o f his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, summarized in this statute, “ an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment.” ( Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 547

Cal.3d 202, 208 ( Mary M. ) .) Intentional torts and criminal acts may fall within the scope of the tortfeasor’s employment , even if the employer did not authorize the employee to commit those

acts . ( Id. at p. 209 ; Per ry v. County of Fresno (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 94, 101 ( Perry ) .) 1

The risk that an employee will commit an intentional
tort or crime “ ‘ arises out of employment ’ ” when “‘“ in the context of the particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business. [Citations.] In other words, where the question is one of vicarious liabilit y, the inqu i ry should be whether the risk was one ‘ that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental ’ to the enterprise undertaken by the employer

. [Citation.] ” [Citation.] Accordingly, the employer’s liability extends beyond his actual or possible control of the employee to include risks inherent in or created by the enterprise

. ’” ( Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1003 ( Farmers Ins. Group )

, quoting Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons

, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 968 ( Perez ) .)

By contrast, “vicarious liability is deemed inappropriate where the misconduct does not arise from the conduct of the employer’s enterprise but instead arises ou t of a personal dispute [citations]. In such cases, the risks are engendered by events unrelated to the employment, so the mere

1 Nothing in Inouye v. County of Los Angeles ( 1994 ) 30 Cal. App. 4 th 278, compels r eversal. There, the court held only that the County’s “policy of deeming its off

- duty safety police officers to not be engaged in the performance of their duties is ineffective to insulate the County from respondeat superior liability . .

. .” ( Id . at p. 280.) No written policy is here at issue.8

fact that an employee has an opportunity to abuse facilities or authority necessary to the performance of his or her duties doe s not render the employer vicariously liable.” ( Farmers Ins. Group,

supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1006.)

Mary M.

, supra , 54 Cal.3d 202 and Perry

, supra , 215 Cal.App.4th 94 illustrate this distinction. In Mary M., a police
officer who was on duty, in uniform and driving a patrol car, detained Mary M. using the red lights on his patrol car. He
ordered her into the car and drove her to her home, where he pushed her onto her couch . When Mary M. screamed, the officer
threatened to ta ke her to jail. Then the officer raped her. ( Mary
M. , supra, at p. 221.) Our Supreme Court held a jury could find the officer was acting in the course of his employment because he
used the authority given to him by his employer to commit the

rape. ( Id. at pp. 207, 221 .)

In P erry by contrast, a corrections officer at the county jail got into a car accident while he was off duty

, driving
his own car. Perry was injured in the accident and sued the
officer. The officer used jail computers to find the mailing
addresses of inmates. He then wrote threatening letters to the inmates, in Perry’s name, hoping to provoke inmates into retaliating against Perry and intimidating him into dropping the
lawsuit. The court of appeal found no causal nexus between the officer’s employer and his letter writing scheme because the officer’s dispute with Perry “had absolutely no connection to [the officer’s] employment. ” ( Perry

, supra , 215 Cal.App.4 th at p. 102.) The car accident and resulting lawsuit “were not work related.” ( Ibid

. ) Although the officer had access to inmates’ personal information through his work, “[t]he motivation behind [ his ] scheme was not generated by, or an outgrowth of, workplace9

responsibilities , conditions or events. Rather, [the officer’s] endeavor was purely personal. Accordingly, [the officer’s] wrongful tort was outside the scope of his employment.” ( Ibid

. )

In Mary M. , the rapist encountered, detain ed

, transport ed and subdue d his victim by (mis ) using the weapons, uniform, vehicle and other features of law enforcement authority provided to him by his employer. In Perry , the tortfeasor
obtained information through his e mployer that he then used to intimidate his opponent in a dispute that was unrelated to his employment

.

The question here is whether appellants have sufficiently alleged a causal nexus between Dalton’s criminal act
and his employment as a CHP officer

. Like the trial court, we conclude they have not. Dalton’s violence toward Popescu had nothing to do with his employment. Dalton was not driving a CHP car, was not being paid by the CHP at the time of the shooting, and was not enforcing the California Vehicle Code. He was riding his bicycle around a residential neighborhood while
drunk

. There is no allegation that Dalton cl aimed to be investigating a crime or performing a public safety function such as warning residents about the Thomas Fire or encouraging them

to evacuate. When Popescu asked Dalton what he was doing, Dalton started to argue with him. He said he was a cop and that he had a gun

, but never displayed a badge or identified his employer. He was not in uniform. There is no allegation that Dalton verbally threatened to arrest Popescu or told Popescu he
was under arrest

. When Popescu walked away from him, Dalton
did not immediately follow or order him to stop. Instead, he started arguing with another neighborhood resident. Even as he walked up the pathway to appellants’ front door with his weapon10

drawn , Dalton did not announce himself as a police off icer. He

s aid, “d rop your gun,” and then fired. There is no allegation that
Dalton used a CHP issued firearm.

A ppellants’ second amended complaint alleges facts
that describe a “personal dispute” Dalton created with a n innocent resident , not misconduct in the exercise of his law
enforcement responsibilities or authority. ( Farmers Ins. Group,

supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1 006 ; Perry

, supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p.
102 .) The risk that an officer would get drunk, start a n argument with a stranger and then shoot that perso n is not one “ ‘ “ that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental ” to the enterprise undertaken by [the CHP]. [Citation.] ’ ” ( Pe rez , supra , 41 Cal.3d at p. 968.) Because Dalton’s confrontation with Popescu was not generated by, or an outgrowth of, his workplace responsibili ties

, Dalton’s shooting of Popescu was outside the scope of his employment.

Appellants contend the trial court placed too much emphasis on the fact that Dalton was “off duty” when the shooting oc curred. They note Dalton was technically on duty
because of the fire

- induced state of emergency. We agree that
Dalton ’s on

- duty or off

- duty status is not dispositive. As we have explained, the dispositive question is whether there is “a causal

nexus bet ween the tort and the employee’s work, i.e., the tort (the [shooting]) must be engendered by or arise from the work.” ( Perry

, supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 101; s ee also Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291,
297

- 298.) That causal nexus is absent here, without regard to Dalton’s on or off

- duty status, because his confrontation with Popescu was not related to CHP work responsibilities

.11 Direct Liability Appellants allege the CHP and Dalton’s supervisors were aware of his abusive drinking and aggressive, unprofessional behavior toward civilians and toward his co

workers

. Respondents failed to protect the public from Dalton’s growing dangerousness by referring him to voluntary counseling rather than disciplining him , suspending him or requiring him to complete a mandatory counseling or substance abuse program

. Appellants allege respondents’ negligent failure to train, supervise or discipline Dalton were a proximate cause of the ir damages. They allege respondents are directly liable for their negligen ce in training, supervising and disciplining Dalton.

“Except a s otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury
arises ou t of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815.) The direct tort liability of a public entity “must be based on a specific statute declaring [the public entity] to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care , and not on the general tort provisions of
Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity
for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” ( Eastburn v. Regio nal Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 11 75, 1183 ( Eastburn ); s ee also de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238,
247 ( de Villers )

. )

No statute imposes direct liability on the CHP or its supervisory employees for negligen ce in the training, supervision or discipline of an officer . Similarly, no statute imposes on the
CHP a specific duty of care to the general public relating to the training, supe rvision or discipline of officers

. ( Munoz v. City of12

Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1112

- 111 3, disapproved on other grounds in Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 639. ) Finally, appellants allege no facts suggesting that responde nts “under [ took ] a special protective relationship toward” appellants . ( de Villers

, supra , 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 249.) Respondents are not alleged to have encouraged Dalton to harass his neighbors, acted to increase the risk that he would do

so, or increase d residents’ vulnerability to his violent outbursts. ( M.B. v. City of San Diego ( 1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 699, 706.) The second amended complaint thus fails to allege a cause of action for negligence against respondents. The trial court correctly

s ustained the demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action.

Appellants argue that respondents improperly withheld from the discovery process Dalton’s mental health records. These records are relevant, appellants contend, because they demonstrate resp ondents’ knowledge of , and negligent failure to protect appellants from Dalton’s mental health and
addi ction issues

. Because we have concluded appellants cannot, as a matter of law, allege causes of action for negligence against respondents, we need not a ddress these contentions

.

Violation of Civil Code § 52.1 Appellants’ sixth cause of action alleges Dalton
violated the Bane Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1) 2 because he shot

2 Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (b) provides, “If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intim idation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney13

Popescu while attempting to arrest him without probable cause

, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Appellants further allege the CHP is liable for damages associated with Dalton’s misconduct because he was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he shot Pope s cu

.

The Bane Act does not create direct liability on the part of a state agency for an employee’s conduct that violate s constitutional or statutory rights. As a result, appellants fail to allege a cause of action against the CHP for violation of the Bane
Act

. ( Gov. Code, § 815; Eastburn

, supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 118 3.) In addition, for the reasons we have already stated, appellants fail to allege facts showing respondents’ vicarious liability for
Dalton’s conduct. For these reasons, the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer with respect to appellants’ sixth cause of
action. Respondents further contend the demurrer was properly sustained because the complaint does not allege Popescu
believed Dalton was actually a police officer, or believed himself to be under arrest prior to the shooting. ( Brendlin v. California

General, or any distr ict attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of th e right or rights secured. ” Sub division (c) of the statute allows a person “whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interf ered with” to file an action for damages or equitable relief against the interfering person.14

(2007) 551 U.S. 249 [ seizure of a person for pur p oses of the
Fourth Amendment occurs when , in light of surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he or she was

not free to leave ]; Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [Bane Act requires allegation of threatening conduct independent of alleged interference with or violation of civil rights] .) We need not address these contentions because w e have concluded the demurrer was properly sustained on other grounds

. Leave to Amend

Appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion when it denied them leave to file their proposed Third Amended Complaint. The proposed amended complaint would have added factual allegations re lating to the CHP and the supervisors’ knowledge of Dalton’s substance abuse, mental
health challenges and prior misconduct. Appellants would also allege that Dalton was on duty at the time of the shooting,
because of the state of emergency and that , when he shot Popescu, Dalton was using police powers to effect an unlawful

arrest

. We review the trial court’s order denying leave to amend for abuse of discretion. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “ Failure to grant leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion only if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. ” ( Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470, 496 .) Leave to amend is properly denied where the proposed amendment fails to
state a cause of action

. ( Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618

- 619.) In addition, “ ‘ [a] plaintiff may not avoid demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended15

complaint that c ontradict the facts pleaded in the original complaint or by suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts
false. [Citation.] ’” ( McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1206

– 1207 , quoting Cantu v.
Resolution Trust Cor

p. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877 ; s ee also Astenius v. State of California (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 472, 476

– 477 ( Astenius )

. ) The trial court here properly denied leave to amend because appellants’ proposed amendment would not cure the
defects in their curr ent pleadings. Additional allegations regarding respondents’ knowledge of Dalton’s drinking problem or mental health concerns does not establish a special relationship between respondents and appellants. Without such a relationship, respondents had no duty to protect appellants and, therefore, no direct liability for negligence.

Similarly, the allegation that Dalton was on duty and attempting unlawfully to arrest Popescu when he fired his

weapon does no t cure the defect in the vicarious liability claims. The factual allegations describe a confrontation that was not work related and had no connection to Dalton’s employment. Concluding this was an attempt to make an unlawful arrest directly contradicts t hose factual allegations . Leave to amend may properly be denied when the proposed amendment
contradicts admission made in the original pleadings. ( Astenius

, supra , 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 477.)
CONCLUSION The picture that emerges, even at the pleading s tate, is clear . Dalton had a drinking problem and was drunk when he shot Pop escu. This was a private disp ute . T hat Dalton said he

was a cop with a gun does not make the CHP liable for the16

shooting. The CHP has no liability for a shooting having no
causal nexus to CHP duties. And, finally, what we said in People v. McNally (2015) 236 Cal.App.4 th 1419, 1423

- 1424, bears repetition: firearms a nd alcohol do not mix.

The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.Mark S. Borrell, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________ Andrew M. Wolf, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Xa vier Becerra and Rob Bonta , Attorney s General, Danielle F. O’Bannon , Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Pamela J. Holmes , Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Shirley R. Sullinger, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.