Applicability of the Antideficiency Act Upon a

Lapse in an Agency’s Appropriation

If, after the expiration of an agency’s appropriation, Congress has not enacted an appropriation for the immediately subsequent period, the agency may obligate no further 

funds except as necessary to bring about the orderly termination of its functions, and 

the obligation or expenditure o f funds for any purpose not otherw ise authorized by law 

would be a violation o f the Antideficiency Act.

The manifest purpose of the Antideficiency A ct is to insure that Congress will determine 

for what purpose the governm ent’s m oney is to be spent and how much for each 

purpose.

Because no statute generally permits federal agencies to incur obligations without appropriations for the pay o f employees, agencies are not, in general, authorized to employ 

the services o f their employees upon a lapse in appropriations.

April 25, 1980

T h e P r e s i d e n t

M y D e a r M r . P r e s i d e n t : Y o u have requested my opinion whether an 

agency can lawfully permit its employees to continue work after the 

expiration of the agency’s appropriation for the prior fiscal year and 

prior to any appropriation for the current fiscal year. The Comptroller 

General, in a March 3, 1980, opinion, concluded that, under the socalled Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665(a), any supervisory officer 

or employee, including the head of an agency, who directs or permits 

agency employees to work during any period for which Congress has 

not enacted an appropriation for the pay of those employees, violates 

the Antideficiency Act. Notwithstanding that conclusion, the Comptroller General also took the position that Congress, in enacting the 

Antideficiency Act, did not intend federal agencies to be closed during 

periods of lapsed appropriations. In my view, these conclusions are 

inconsistent. It is my opinion that, during periods of “lapsed appropriations,” no funds may be expended except as necessary to bring about 

the orderly termination of an agency’s functions, and that the obligation 

or expenditure of funds for any purpose not otherwise authorized by 

law would be a violation of the Antideficiency Act.

Section 665(a) of Title 31 forbids any officer or employee of the 

United States to:

Involve the Government in any contract or other obligation, for the payment of money for any purpose, in

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advance of appropriations made for such purpose, unless 

such contract or obligation is authorized by law.

Because no statute permits federal agencies to incur obligations to pay 

employees without an appropriation for that purpose, the “authorized 

by law” exception to the otherwise blanket prohibition of § 665(a) 

would not apply to such obligations.1 On its face, the plain and unambiguous language of the Antideficiency Act prohibits an agency from 

incurring pay obligations once its authority to expend appropriations 

lapses.

The legislative history of the Antideficiency Act is fully consistent 

with its language. Since Congress, in 1870, first enacted a statutory 

prohibition against agencies incurring obligations in excess of appropriations, it has amended the Antideficiency Act seven times.2 On each 

occasion, it has left the original prohibition untouched or reenacted the 

prohibition in substantially the same language. With each amendment, 

Congress has tried more effectively to prohibit deficiency spending by 

requiring, and then requiring more stringently, that agencies apportion 

their spending throughout the fiscal year. Significantly, although Congress, from 1905 to 1950, permitted agency heads to waive their agencies’ apportionments administratively, Congress never permitted an 

administrative waiver of the prohibition against incurring obligations in 

excess or advance of appropriations. Nothing in the debates concerning 

any of the amendments to or reenactments of the original prohibition 

has ever suggested an implicit exception to its terms.3

The apparent mandate of the Antideficiency Act notwithstanding, at 

least some federal agencies, on seven occasions during the last 30 years, 

have faced a period of lapsed appropriations. Three such lapses occurred in 1952, 1954, and 1956.4 On two of these occasions, Congress 

subsequently enacted provisions ratifying interim obligations incurred 

during the lapse.5 However, the legislative history of these provisions

’ A n exam ple o f a statu te th at w o u ld p erm it th e in cu rrin g o f o b ligations in excess o f a p p ro p riatio n s 

is 41 U .S.C . § 11, p erm ittin g such co n tra c ts for “clo th in g , subsistence, fo rag e, fuel, q u arters, tra n sp o rtation, o r m edical an d hospital supplies*’ for th e A rm ed F o rces. S ee 15 O p. A tt'y G en . 209. S ee also 25 

U .S.C § 9 9 and 31 U .S .C §6 6 8 .

2 A ct o f M arch 3, 1905, ch . 1484, § 4 , 33 S lat. 1257; A ct o f Feb. 27, 1906, ch . 510, § 3, 34 S tat. 48; 

A ct o f Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, § 1211, 64 S tat. 765; Pub. L. 85-170, § 1401, 71 S tat. 440 (1957); Pub. L. 

93-198, § 4 2 1 , 87 S tat. 789 (1973); Pub. L. 93-344, § 1002, 88 S tat. 332 (1974); Pub. L . 93-618, 

§ 175(a)(2), 88 Stat. 2011 (1975).

3 T h e proh ib itio n against in cu rrin g o b lig atio n s in excess o f a p p ro p riatio n s w as en a cted in 1870, 

am ended slig h tly in 1905 an d 1906, and reen acted in its m od ern version in 1950. T h e relev an t 

legislative debates o c c u r at C o n g . G lo b e, 41st C o n g ., 2d Sess. 1553, 3331 (1870); 39 C o ng. R ec. 3687- 

692, 3780-783 (1905); 40 C o ng. R ec. 1272-298, 1623-624 (1906); 96 C o ng. R ec. 6725-731, 6835-837, 

11369-370(1950).

4 In 1954 an d 1956, C o n g ress en acted tem p o rary ap p ro p riatio n s m easures later th an Ju ly 1, th e start 

o f fiscal years 1955 an d 1957. A ct o f Ju ly 6, 1954, ch . 460, 68 S tat. 448; A ct o f Ju ly 3. 1956, ch . 516, 

70 S tat. 496. In 1952, C o n g ress en acted , tw o w eek s late, supplem ental ap p ro p riatio n s for fiscal year 

1953 w ith o u t h av in g p rev io u sly en a cted a te m p o rary ap p ro p riatio n s m easure. A ct o f Ju ly 15, 1952, ch. 

758, 66 S tat. 637.

5 A ct o f Ju ly 15, 1952, ch . 758, § 1414, 66 S tat. 661; A ct o f A ug. 26, 1954, ch . 935, § 1313, 68 Stat. 

831.

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does not explain Congress’ understanding of the effect of the 

Antideficiency Act on the agencies that lacked timely appropriations.6 

Neither are we aware that the Executive Branch formally addressed the 

Antideficiency Act problem on any of these occasions.

The four more recent lapses include each of the last four fiscal years, 

from fiscal year 1977 to fiscal year 1980. Since Congress adopted a 

fiscal year calendar running from October 1 to September 30 of the 

following year, it has never enacted continuing appropriations for all 

agencies on or before October 1 of the new fiscal year.7 Various 

agencies of the Executive Branch and the General Accounting Office 

have internally considered the resulting problems within the context of 

their budgeting and accounting functions. Your request for my opinion, 

however, apparently represents the first instance in which this Department has been asked formally to address the problem as a matter of 

law.

I understand that, for the last several years, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) 

have adopted essentially similar approaches to the administrative problems posed by the Antideficiency Act. During lapses in appropriations 

during this Administration, OMB has advised affected agencies that 

they may not incur any “controllable obligations” or make expenditures 

against appropriations for the following fiscal year until such appropriations are enacted by Congress. Agencies have thus been advised to 

avoid hiring, grantmaking, nonemergency travel, and other nonessential 

obligations.

When the General Accounting Office suffered a lapse in its own 

appropriations last October, the Director of General Services and Controller issued a memorandum, referred to in the Comptroller General’s 

opinion,8 indicating that GAO would need “to restrain our FY 1980 

obligations to only those essential to maintain day-to-day operations.” 

Employees could continue to work, however, because of the Director’s 

determination that it was not “the intent of Congress that GAO close 

down.”

M n 1952, no te m p o ra ry ap p ro p riatio n s w ere en acted for fiscal y ear 1953. T h e supplem ental a p p ro ­

priatio n s m easure e n a cted on Ju ly 15, 1952 did, h o w ev er, include a p ro v isio n ratify in g obligations 

in c u rred on o r since Ju ly 1, 1952. A c t o f Ju ly 15, 1952, ch. 758, § 1414, 66 S tat. 661. T h e ratification 

w as in clu d ed , w ith o u t elab o ratio n , in th e H ouse C o m m ittee-rep o rted bill, H. R ep. N o. 2316, 82d 

C o n g ., 2d Sess. 69 (1952), an d w as not d eb ated on th e floor.

In 1954, a te m p o rary ap p ro p riatio n s m easure for fiscal y ear 1955 w as p resen ted to th e P resident on 

Ju ly 2 an d signed on Ju ly 6. A ct o f Ju ly 6, 1954, ch. 460, 68 S tat. 448. T h e S en ate C o m m ittee on 

A p p ro p riatio n s su b seq u en tly in tro d u ced a flo o r am en d m en t to th e ev en tu al supplem ental ap p ro p ria ­

tions m easure th a t ratified o b lig atio n s in c u rred on o r after Ju ly 1, 1954, and w as ac cep te d w ith o u t 

d eb ate. A ct o f A ug. 26, 1954, ch . 935, § 1313, 68 S tat. 831. 100 C o ng. R ec. 13065 (1954).

In 1956, C o n g ress’ te m p o rary a p p ro p riatio n s m easure w as passed on Ju ly 2 an d ap p ro v ed on Ju ly 3. 

A ct o f Ju ly 3, 1956, ch . 516, 70 S tat. 496. N o ratificatio n m easure fo r p o st-Ju ly 1 o b ligations w as 

en acted .

7 P ub. L. 94-473, 90 S tat. 2065 (O ct. I I , 1976); P ub. L. 95-130, 91 S tat. 1153 (O ct. 13, 1977); Pub. 

L. 95-482, 92 S tat. 1603 (O ct. 18, 1978); P ub. L. 9 6-86, 93 S tat. 656 (O ct. 12, 1979).

8T h e e n tire m em o ran d u m ap p e ars at 125 C o n g . R ec. S13784 (daily ed. O ct. 1, 1979) [rem arks o f 

Sen. M agnuson].

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In my view, these approaches are legally insupportable. My judgment is based chiefly on three considerations.

First, as a matter of logic, any “rule of thumb” excepting employee 

pay obligations from the Antideficiency Act would have to rest on a 

conclusion, like that of the Comptroller General, that such obligations 

are unlawful, but also authorized. I believe, however, that legal authority for continued operations either exists or it does not. If an agency 

may infer, as a matter of law, that Congress has authorized it to operate 

in the absence of appropriations, then in permitting the agency to 

operate, the agency’s supervisory personnel cannot be deemed to violate the Antideficiency Act. Conversely, if the Antideficiency Act 

makes it unlawful for federal agencies to permit their employees to 

work during periods of lapsed appropriations, then no legislative authority to keep agencies open in such cases can be inferred, at least 

from the Antideficiency Act.

Second, as I have already stated, there is nothing in the language of 

the Antideficiency Act or in its long history from which any exception 

to its terms during a period of lapsed appropriations may be inferred. 

Faithful execution of the laws cannot rest on mere speculation that 

Congress does not want the Executive Branch to carry out Congress’ 

unambiguous mandates.

It has been suggested, in this regard, that legislative intent may be 

inferred from Congress’ practice in each of the last four years of 

eventually ratifying obligations incurred during periods of lapsed appropriations if otherwise consistent with the eventual appropriations.9 Putting aside the obvious difficulty of inferring legal authority from expectations as to Congress’ future acts, it appears to me that Congress’ 

practice suggests an understanding of the Antideficiency Act consistent 

with the interpretation I have outlined. If legal authority exists for an 

agency to incur obligations during periods of lapsed appropriations, 

Congress would not need to confirm or ratify such obligations. Ratification is not necessary to protect private parties who deal with the 

government. So long as Congress has waived sovereign immunity with 

respect to damage claims in contract, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491, the 

apparent authority alone of government officers to incur agency obligations would likely be sufficient to create obligations that private parties 

could enforce in court. The effect of the ratifying provisions seems thus 

to be limited to providing legal authority where there was none before, 

implying Congress’ understanding that agencies are not otherwise empowered to incur obligations in advance of appropriations.

Third, and of equal importance, any implied exception to the plain 

mandate of the Antideficiency Act would have to rest on a rationale 

that would undermine the statute. The manifest purpose of the

9 Pub. L. 94-473, § 108, 90 S tat. 2066 (1976); Pub. L. 95-130, § 108, .91 S tat. 1154 (1977); Pub. L. 

95-482, § 108, 92 Stat. 1605 (1978); Pub. L. 96-86, § 117, 93 S tat. 662 (1979).

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Antideficiency Act is to insure that Congress will determine for what 

purposes the government’s money is to be spent and how much for 

each purpose. This goal is so elementary to a proper distribution of 

governmental powers that when the original statutory prohibition 

against obligations in excess of appropriations was introduced in 1870, 

the only responsive comment on the floor of the House was, “I believe 

that is the law of the land now.” Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 

1553 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Dawes).

Having interpreted the Antideficiency Act, I would like to outline 

briefly the legal ramifications of my interpretation. It follows first of all 

that, on a lapse in appropriations, federal agencies may incur no obligations that cannot lawfully be funded from prior appropriations unless 

such obligations are otherwise authorized by law. There are no exceptions to this rule under current law, even where obligations incurred 

earlier would avoid greater costs to the agencies should appropriations 

later be enacted.10

Second, the Department of Justice will take actions to enforce the 

criminal provisions of the Act in appropriate cases in the future when 

violations of the Antideficiency Act are alleged. This does not mean 

that departments and agencies, upon a lapse in appropriations, will be 

unable logistically to terminate functions in an orderly way. Because it 

would be impossible in fact for agency heads to terminate all agency 

functions without incurring any obligations whatsoever in advance of 

appropriations, and because statutes that impose duties on government 

officers implicitly authorize those steps necessary and proper for the 

performance of those duties, authority may be inferred from the 

Antideficiency Act itself for federal officers to incur those minimal 

obligations necessary to closing their agencies. Such limited obligations 

would fall within the “authorized by law” exception to the terms of 

§ 665(a).

This Department will not undertake investigations and prosecutions 

of officials who, in the past, may have kept their agencies open in 

advance of appropriations. Because of the uncertainty among budget 

and accounting officers as to the proper interpretation of the Act and 

Congress’ subsequent ratifications of past obligations incurred during 

periods of lapsed appropriations, criminal sanctions would be inappropriate for those actions.

Respectfully,

B e n j a m i n R. C i v i l e t t i

10See 21 O p. A tt’y G en . 288.

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