BALLISTIC MISSILE 

DEFENSE

Actions Needed to 

Address 

Implementation 

Issues and Estimate 

Long-Term Costs for 

European Capabilities

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2014

GAO-14-314

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-314, a report to 

congressional requesters

April 2014

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Actions Needed to Address Implementation Issues 

and Estimate Long-Term Costs for European 

Capabilities

Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2002, DOD has spent over $98 

billion developing a ballistic missile 

defense system to protect the United 

States, U.S. forces, and allies against 

inbound threat missiles. In December 

2011, DOD deployed the initial phase 

of a revised approach for Europe, with 

increased capabilities to be deployed 

in later phases. GAO has reported on 

potential risks to DOD’s

implementation caused by the lack of a 

coordinated management approach 

and an absence of life-cycle cost 

estimates. Given DOD’s BMD 

investment and revised approach, 

GAO was asked to review EPAA’s 

implementation. GAO evaluated the 

extent to which DOD (1) identified and 

planned to resolve implementation 

issues before deploying BMD 

capabilities to Europe; and (2) 

estimated the long-term costs to 

operate and support BMD elements in 

Europe. GAO reviewed DOD 

instructions, manuals, and other 

documents on the acceptance process

and the status of operating and support 

cost estimates that have been 

developed to-date, and interviewed 

cognizant officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD identify

and plan to resolve implementation 

issues prior to deploying and operating 

BMD elements and require and set a 

deadline for completing business-case 

analyses and joint cost estimates for all 

BMD elements in Europe. DOD agreed 

with three recommendations and 

partially agreed with one, expressing 

concern about the proper entities for 

resolving implementation issues. GAO 

believes that the recommendation can 

be implemented through collaboration

as discussed further in this report. 

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) met the presidentially announced time frame 

to deploy initial ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe under the 

European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) but did not fully identify and plan 

to resolve implementation issues before deployment. As a result, DOD 

experienced implementation issues, such as incomplete construction of housing 

facilities for soldiers arriving at the EPAA radar site in Turkey and incomplete 

implementing arrangements defining how to operate with allies when certain 

BMD elements arrived in the host country. U.S. Strategic Command, in 

coordination with other combatant commands, developed criteria to assess 

whether a BMD capability is ready for operational use to ensure that BMD 

capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered. However, the 

assessment criteria used during this process focused on effectiveness, suitability, 

and interoperability areas—such as whether BMD elements can work together to 

track ballistic missile threats—and did not explicitly require DOD to 

comprehensively identify and plan to resolve implementation issues prior to 

deploying these capabilities. DOD plans to continue to use its existing process to 

accept BMD capabilities planned for Europe in the future. Without identifying and 

planning to resolve implementation issues before deployment, DOD risks 

continuing to encounter implementation issues after it deploys additional BMD 

capabilities in Europe, which may lead to significant delays and inefficiencies. 

DOD has estimated the long-term operating and support cost estimates for some 

but not all BMD elements in Europe, and existing estimates could change. 

Specifically, initial estimates indicate these costs could total several billion dollars

over the elements’ lifetime, but key decisions that have not been made are likely 

to change these estimates. Also, DOD has not developed a comprehensive 

estimate for a key element—Aegis Ashore. In prior work developing costestimating best practices, GAO concluded that cost estimates can assist decision 

makers in budget development and are necessary for evaluating resource 

requirements at key decision points and effectively allocating resources. Office of 

Management and Budget guidance also emphasizes that agencies should plan 

for operations and maintenance of capital assets. In 2012, the Army and the 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) estimated the lifetime operating and support 

costs for two BMD elements, a forward-based radar and terminal high-altitude air 

defense batteries. However, DOD has not completed business-case analyses for 

them, which would underpin a decision on long-term support strategies, and has 

not decided where to station the terminal-defense battery. In addition, MDA and 

the Navy have separately begun to identify some costs but have not developed a 

comprehensive joint estimate of lifetime operating and support costs for the two 

planned Aegis Ashore sites. Although MDA and the services agreed to jointly 

develop estimates of lifetime operating and support costs, there is no explicit 

requirement to complete business-case analyses to support a decision on longterm product support, and jointly develop cost estimates, before deploying BMD 

elements in Europe. However, without completed business-case analyses and 

up-to-date operating and support cost estimates, DOD and decision makers are

limited in their ability to develop sound budgets and identify the resources 

needed over the long term to operate and support BMD elements in Europe. 

View GAO-14-314. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (404) 679-1816 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Letter 1 

Background 3

DOD Met EPAA Phase One Deployment Time Frame, but Its 

Warfighter Acceptance Process Does Not Fully Identify and 

Plan to Resolve Implementation Issues 10

DOD Lacks a Complete Understanding of the Long-Term 

Operating and Support Costs for BMD Elements in Europe 18

Conclusions 23

Recommendations for Executive Action 24

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 25

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29

Appendix II U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capabilities 

Available by European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA) Phase 32

Appendix III Key Department of Defense (DOD) Stakeholders 

Involved in Planning and Implementing the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach 35

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 36

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39

Related GAO Products 40

Figures

Figure 1: European Phased Adaptive Approach Time Frames and 

Elements 5

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Figure 2: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capabilities 

Available by European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA) Phase 6

Abbreviations

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

DOD Department of Defense

EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach

MDA Missile Defense Agency

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

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Page 1 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 11, 2014

The Honorable Mike Rogers

Chairman

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mike Turner

House of Representatives

Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent over $98 billion 

to develop a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system intended to defend 

the United States, U.S. forces, and allies around the world against 

inbound threat missiles. In 2009, the President announced a revised 

approach for BMD in Europe called the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach (EPAA). This approach is to include ships, land-based radars 

and interceptors, and a communications network, to be implemented in 

phases of increasing capabilities beginning in 2011. EPAA is intended to 

be a flexible and cost-effective way to address short-, medium-, and 

intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from Iran. EPAA replaced a 

prior plan to defend both Europe and the United States from longer-range 

ballistic missiles by deploying a radar in the Czech Republic and groundbased intercontinental missile interceptors in Poland.

We have issued numerous reports over the last 10 years on 

development, acquisition, and plans for operating ballistic missile defense 

capabilities. In 2010 and 2011, we reported that DOD’s efforts to establish 

EPAA lacked clear guidance and an integrated schedule, which could 

result in decreased performance and increased costs, and that DOD had 

not fully implemented a management process to synchronize EPAA 

acquisition activities and ensure transparency and accountability.1

 

1

GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation 

Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe, 

DOD 

generally agreed with our recommendations to provide guidance on 

EPAA that describes desired end states, develop an integrated EPAA 

GAO-11-220 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 

2011); and Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face 

Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges, GAO-11-179R 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2010). 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

schedule, and adopt BMD performance metrics for durability and 

effectiveness, but has not yet taken any actions. Given the resources 

dedicated to BMD and the revised approach, you asked us to review 

EPAA’s implementation. For this report, we assessed the extent to which 

DOD has (1) identified and planned to resolve implementation issues 

before deploying BMD capabilities to Europe; and (2) estimated the longterm costs to operate and support BMD elements in Europe.

To assess the extent to which DOD has identified and planned to resolve 

implementation issues before deploying BMD capabilities to Europe, we 

reviewed the U.S. Strategic Command document titled Ballistic Missile 

Defense System (BMDS) Warfighter Capability Acceptance.

2

To assess the extent to which DOD has estimated the long-term costs to 

operate and support BMD elements in Europe, we first reviewed 

agreements and their annexes between the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) and the Army and between MDA and the Navy regarding how 

these organizations would work together to manage the BMD elements, 

including information on how they would jointly develop cost estimates. 

To determine the general purpose for estimating long-term costs, we 

identified and reviewed documents containing best practices for 

This 

document described the goal of the warfighter acceptance process, which 

is, in essence, to ensure that capabilities can be used as intended when 

they are delivered, and culminates in formal acceptance of BMD 

capabilities by U.S. Strategic Command. We also reviewed key 

documents, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

titled Policy Guidance for Ballistic Missile Defense Operations and the 

Joint Staff Publication on Countering Air and Missile Threats, which 

describe DOD’s BMD guidance and responsibilities of various 

organizations. We also met with officials from the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. European Command and its military 

service components, and U.S. Strategic Command to understand how 

DOD’s acceptance process was implemented. In addition, we reviewed 

after action-reports and briefings from the Army and Air Force that 

described implementation challenges experienced during the deployment 

of BMD elements to Europe and other regions, and provided an 

assessment of lessons learned for future BMD element deployments.

 

2

The document is issued by U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component 

Command for Integrated Missile Defense. 
 

Page 3 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

determining high-quality cost estimates from the Office of Management 

and Budget and the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.

Specifically, we determined that cost estimates can assist decision 

makers in budget development and are necessary for evaluating resource 

requirements at key decision points and effectively allocating resources. 

In addition, we reviewed the Army’s regulation on Integrated Logistic 

Support, which includes guidance on business-case analysis, and is 

referenced in the agreement annexes between MDA and the Army, to 

identify DOD criteria for conducting business-case analyses to assess 

alternatives for providing long-term support. We then reviewed 

documentation of estimates developed by MDA and the services for BMD 

elements designated for EPAA, as well as elements that DOD could 

deploy to support EPAA. Finally, we met with DOD officials from MDA, 

and various Navy, Army, and Air Force offices, to identify key decisions 

that could affect the estimates.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to April 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details on our 

objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in appendix I.

In September 2009, the President announced a revised approach to 

missile defense in Europe called EPAA, which consists of phases of 

increasing capability to be deployed in the 2011, 2015, and 2018 time 

frames. EPAA serves as the U.S. contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization’s (NATO) mission to protect alliance populations, territory, 

and forces against ballistic missile threats. As originally announced, 

EPAA included a fourth phase that was expected to add U.S. homeland 

defense and expanded regional defense in the 2020 time frame. In March 

2013, the Secretary of Defense canceled Phase Four, due, in part, to 

development delays with a key element of this phase.

In 2011, DOD deployed BMD elements to meet the President’s 

announced time frame for the first phase of EPAA. This provided 

capability against short- and medium-range threats and included: Aegis 

Background

EPAA Capabilities and 

Time Frames
 

Page 4 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

BMD-capable ships with the Standard Missile-3 Block IA interceptor 

stationed in the Mediterranean; an Army Navy/Transportable Radar that 

is forward-based in Turkey; and a Command, Control, Battle 

Management and Communications system deployed to an Air Force base 

in Germany.3

 DOD is in the process of preparing for the second phase of 

EPAA scheduled for implementation in December 2015. The second 

phase will include Aegis Ashore based in Romania to provide additional 

capability against short- and medium-range threats with a more advanced 

interceptor.4 The third phase of EPAA is scheduled for late 2018 and will 

include Aegis Ashore based in Poland to provide capability against 

medium- and intermediate-range threats. Additionally, although Patriot 

and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries were not 

BMD elements originally announced as part of the revised approach to 

missile defense in Europe, DOD officials stated that both elements could 

deploy to support EPAA as needed, independent of the EPAA phases.5

 

3

The Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications system is a networked 

computer and communications element developed by MDA to integrate the BMD system 

by providing deliberate planning, situational awareness, sensor management, and battle 

management capabilities.

Figure 1 summarizes DOD’s proposed time frames and BMD elements 

for the three phases of EPAA. Figure 2 graphically displays increasing 

U.S. BMD capabilities introduced in each EPAA phase.

4

Aegis Ashore is a land-based element designed by MDA to provide capability to detect, 

track, and intercept threats by leveraging capabilities that exist on Aegis BMD ships. 

5

Patriot provides simultaneous air and missile defense capabilities in defense of U.S. 

deployed forces and allies against short-range ballistic missiles. THAAD employs the 

THAAD interceptor and the Army Navy/Transportable Radar (in THAAD mode) to engage 

ballistic missile targets in the late mid-course and terminal phases of their trajectory. 

THAAD can act as a surveillance sensor, providing sensor data to cue other elements of 

the BMD system.
 

Page 5 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Figure 1: European Phased Adaptive Approach Time Frames and Elements
Page 

Figure 2: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capabilities Available by European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.

Phase I

(December 2011)

Phase II

(December 2015)

Phase III

(Late 2018)

Interactivity instructions: Roll over a phase to see more information. See appendix II for the noninteractive, printer-friendly version. 
 

Page 7 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

A number of stakeholders within DOD have roles and responsibilities in 

developing, building, deploying, and managing resources for BMD, 

including MDA, combatant commands, the services, and other 

organizations. MDA is responsible for the development, acquisition, and 

testing of BMD system elements in close collaboration with the warfighter 

community and testing organizations.6 The combatant commands mainly 

involved in EPAA implementation are U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. 

European Command. U.S. Strategic Command’s responsibilities include 

synchronizing planning for global missile defense in coordination with 

other combatant commands, the services, MDA, and appropriate 

agencies, while U.S. European Command has operational control over 

BMD elements located within its area of responsibility and collaborates 

with the services that would employ the BMD elements during combat. 

See appendix III for a summary of key stakeholders across DOD that are 

involved in the implementation of EPAA.

In previous reports on BMD, we have identified challenges associated 

with MDA’s BMD efforts and DOD’s broader approach to BMD planning, 

implementation, and oversight. In an April 2013 report, we found that 

MDA’s cost baselines were not useful for decision makers to gauge 

progress because they did not include operating and support costs from 

the military services and thus were not sufficiently comprehensive.7

 

6

The warfighter community generally includes the combatant commands, service and joint 

functional component commands, units, military personnel, the military services, and their 

supporting components associated with the BMD mission. 

Although MDA reports some operating and support costs in its annual 

accountability report, we have found that this report does not include 

7

GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 

Management, GAO-13-432 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2013). 

BMD and EPAA Roles and 

Responsibilities

Our Prior Work on BMD
 

Page 8 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

services’ costs.8 DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to 

include in its resource baseline cost estimates all life-cycle costs including 

operating and support costs. Subsequently, as we found during this 

review, MDA is working with the services to jointly develop estimates of 

operating and support costs for two BMD elements. Further, we reported 

in 2011 that DOD had not developed a life-cycle cost estimate for BMD in 

Europe because the department considers EPAA an approach—not a 

program—that is flexible and would change over time.9 At that time, we 

recommended that DOD develop an EPAA life-cycle cost estimate which 

would allow the department to assess whether its plans were affordable. 

DOD responded that a more-effective approach would be to prepare 

element-specific cost estimates.10

In a January 2011 report, we reported that, though DOD initiated multiple 

simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA, it faced key management 

challenges that could result in inefficient planning and execution, limited 

oversight, and increased cost and performance risks. We also reported 

that DOD faced planning challenges because the BMD system’s desired 

performance was not defined using operationally relevant quantifiable 

 

8

GAO-13-432. MDA’s annual report is titled the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

Accountability Report. Section 225 of Title 10, U.S. Code, enacted in 2011, requires MDA 

to establish and maintain acquisition baselines for each program element of the ballistic 

missile defense system and each designated major subprogram, and to provide an 

accountability report regarding the baselines. See 10 U.S.C. § 225(a), (c) (enacted by the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 231(a)(1) 

(2011)). MDA must develop a life-cycle cost estimate as part of the baseline, including 

costs regarding operations and sustainment. See § 225(b)(3)(A). A provision in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 recently amended section 225, 

adding a requirement for the Director of MDA to ensure that each life-cycle cost estimate 

includes both the operations and sustainment costs for which MDA is responsible and a 

description of the operations and sustainment functions and costs for which a military 

department is responsible. See Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 231(b) (2013) (codified at § 225(e)). 

9

GAO-11-220. 

10We did not evaluate the quality of the estimates in this review. However we found in 

2011 that MDA lacked high quality cost estimates—estimates that are comprehensive, 

well-documented, accurate, and credible. We also found that cost progress cannot be 

independently evaluated until MDA reports baselines that are supported by reliable, high 

quality cost estimates. DOD concurred with our recommendation to take steps to ensure 

that cost estimates are high quality and reliable. See GAO, Missile Defense: Actions 

Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability, GAO-11-372 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 24, 2011). Subsequently, we found in a follow-on April 2013 report that MDA had 

made little progress improving the quality of its cost estimates that support its resource 

baseline. See GAO-13-432. 
 

Page 9 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

metrics—such as how long and how well it can defend—that would 

provide the combatant commands with needed visibility into the 

operational capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intended 

to employ.11 As noted earlier, DOD generally agreed with our 

recommendations to provide guidance on EPAA that describes desired 

end states, develop an integrated EPAA schedule, and adopt BMD 

performance metrics for durability and effectiveness but to date has not 

taken any action. In a September 2009 report, DOD generally agreed with 

our recommendations to perform a comprehensive analysis identifying its 

requirements for BMD elements and require the establishment of 

operational units before making elements available for use.12 In response, 

DOD completed an analysis of BMD requirements which, according to 

DOD officials, informed the Army’s process for fielding BMD elements 

with operational units. For additional GAO reports on BMD, see the 

Related GAO Products section at the end of this report.

 

11GAO-11-220. 

12GAO, Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and Establish 

Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities, GAO-09-856 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

16, 2009). 
 

Page 10 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

DOD met the presidentially announced time frame to deploy EPAA Phase 

One capabilities to Europe when DOD positioned EPAA elements in the 

region, and MDA declared EPAA Phase One architecture to be 

technically capable in December 2011.13 According to DOD officials, the 

BMD capabilities were in place and could have been used if needed. U.S. 

Strategic Command, through its warfighter operational readiness and 

acceptance process, used an established set of criteria to assess EPAA 

Phase One capabilities and formally accepted the EPAA Phase One 

architecture into the global BMD system in April 2012. However, DOD 

experienced implementation issues deploying BMD capabilities in 

Europe, such as incomplete construction of infrastructure, including 

housing and dining facilities, for soldiers arriving at the EPAA forwardbased radar site and incomplete implementing arrangements defining 

how DOD would operate with allies when certain BMD elements arrived in 

the host country.14 DOD’s existing warfighter acceptance process does 

not explicitly require the combatant commands, the services, and MDA to 

comprehensively identify and develop a plan to resolve such issues 

before deploying BMD capabilities. Without taking steps to resolve 

implementation issues prior to deployment, DOD risks encountering 

similar challenges as it deploys additional BMD capabilities to Europe.

DOD’s warfighter acceptance process and criteria were used to accept 

EPAA Phase One capabilities. The manual guiding the process for 

warfighter acceptance of BMD capabilities indicates that the end state of 

acceptance is crew knowledge and doctrine, tactics, techniques, and 

procedures that reflect the reality of the fielded system or ensure that the 

 

13The BMD system is an integrated, layered architecture that provides multiple 

opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they reach their targets The 

system’s architecture includes networked sensors and ground- and sea-based radars for 

target detection and tracking; ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles for destroying a 

ballistic missile; and a command, control, battle management, and communications 

network providing the warfighter with the needed links between the sensors and 

interceptor missiles. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations, Joint Pub. 3-14, at IV-13 

(May 29, 2013). 

14According to officials from the Department of State, agreements with allies would 

generally take the form of implementing arrangements to preexisting agreements. We 

reported in 2009 that, in the context of BMD, implementing arrangements were expected 

to serve as executing documents for broader agreements and address day-to-day working 

relationships between countries on a range of issues related to BMD, including security. 

DOD Met EPAA 

Phase One 

Deployment Time 

Frame, but Its 

Warfighter 

Acceptance Process 

Does Not Fully 

Identify and Plan to 

Resolve 

Implementation 

Issues

DOD Used Its Warfighter 

Acceptance Process and 

Criteria to Assess EPAA 

Phase One Capabilities
 

Page 11 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

warfighter can fight with and optimize MDA-delivered BMD capabilities.15

In essence, the goal of the warfighter acceptance process is to ensure 

that capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered. This 

process—separate from but a companion to MDA’s process for technical 

capability declaration16—informs MDA’s testing so that the warfighter 

understands the elements’ capabilities and limitations and can more 

effectively employ BMD capabilities. In addition, the U.S. Strategic 

Command, in coordination with other combatant commands, develops 

criteria to assist in the determination of whether to officially accept an 

element for operational use by the combatant commands.17 The criteria 

used during the warfighter acceptance process focuses primarily on areas 

such as effectiveness, suitability, and interoperability.18 For example, one 

of the acceptance criteria used to assess initial EPAA capabilities was the 

extent to which the forward-based radar19

In addition to using acceptance criteria, U.S. European Command 

conducted a separate BMD exercise in Europe with servicemembers 

operating actual BMD elements to demonstrate the performance of initial 

and Aegis BMD ship were 

capable of searching for and tracking ballistic missile threats. By 

comparing these acceptance criteria against BMD test results, U.S. 

European Command and the services were able to better understand the 

capabilities, limitations, and risks of initial EPAA BMD elements and 

developed their plans, tactics, and procedures accordingly.

 

15See Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS) Warfighter Capability Acceptance (Sept. 20, 2012). 

According to U.S. Strategic Command officials, the manual was in use prior to its issuance 

in September 2012 and was used for Phase One of EPAA. 

16MDA’s December 2011 technical capability declaration was used to announce the 

completion of EPAA Phase One. According to MDA guidance, a technical capability 

declaration requires sufficient testing of the system being fielded to support an 

understanding of overall capabilities and limitations of the system to support the 

combatant command missile defense mission. See Missile Defense Agency Directive 

5000.17, Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Capacity Baseline Procedures

(May 3, 2013). MDA may provide support to the acceptance process, but MDA technical 

capability declarations are independent from the warfighter acceptance process.

17These criteria are developed by U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component 

Command for Integrated Missile Defense.

18Throughout this report, we will refer to these criteria collectively as acceptance criteria.

19In this report, we refer to the Army Navy/Transportable Radar as the forward-based 

radar. 
 

Page 12 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

EPAA capabilities within the region. Using the results, U.S. European 

Command and U.S. Strategic Command coordinated to identify technical 

improvements that could be made, and U.S. Strategic Command 

accepted the EPAA Phase One architecture into the global BMD system 

in April 2012.20 After acceptance, U.S. European Command also 

conducted a subsequent BMD exercise in May 2013 with U.S. and NATO 

servicemembers to demonstrate interoperability of initial EPAA 

capabilities with NATO BMD capabilities.

As discussed above, DOD used its warfighter acceptance process to 

assess BMD elements dedicated to Phase One of EPAA. However, 

though the goal of the warfighter acceptance process is, in essence, to 

ensure that capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered, 

this process did not explicitly require the combatant commands, the 

services, and MDA to comprehensively identify and develop plans for 

resolving various implementation issues prior to deploying these and 

other supporting elements to Europe. As a result, DOD experienced three 

implementation issues related to deploying BMD capabilities to Europe. 

These included: (1) incomplete infrastructure, such as housing and dining 

facilities, for soldiers arriving at the forward-based radar site in Turkey; (2) 

lack of defined policies and procedures for sharing BMD radar data 

across geographic combatant commands; (3) and incomplete 

implementing arrangements and tactics, techniques, and procedures with 

allies.

• Incomplete facilities in Turkey: DOD deployed the forward-based 

radar to Turkey in December 2011 before completing construction of 

infrastructure, such as permanent housing, dining, and other facilities 

for soldiers arriving on the site. According to officials, construction 

could not be completed prior to deploying the forward-based radar 

due to compressed deadlines in order to meet the presidentially 

announced time frame. As a result, Army officials stated that soldiers 

arrived at the remote mountain-top radar site in winter conditions, and 

their tent-based expeditionary facilities—though climate controlled and 

equipped with latrines, showers, and other basic facilities—were 

initially unable to withstand the conditions. Also, at the time, roads 

leading to the nearest town were not well-maintained, which created 

safety challenges and made access to nearby services less efficient. 

 

20Details of these technical improvements are classified.

DOD’s Warfighter 

Acceptance Process Did 

Not Fully Identify and 

Resolve Warfighter 

Implementation Issues 

before Deploying BMD 

Elements
 

Page 13 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

The Army made some improvements after the 2011-2012 winter 

season, such as replacing the expeditionary facilities with those 

typically used in Alaska in order to better suit the wintery conditions, 

but construction of longer-term infrastructure will not begin until mid2014. Until the permanent facilities are completed, soldiers deployed 

to the site may continue to face difficult conditions. Further, without a 

process that accounts for implementation issues such as this, DOD 

may encounter similar challenges as it deploys additional capabilities 

to the region.

• Lack of defined policies and procedures for sharing BMD radar data 

across geographic combatant commands: Sharing BMD element 

data, such as radar data, can improve missile defense performance, 

but DOD accepted its most-recently deployed forward-based radar 

before finalizing policies and procedures that address potential 

overlapping operational priorities across geographic combatant 

commands. Subsequent to its deployment of a forward-based radar 

for EPAA in 2011, DOD deployed another forward-based radar in the 

operational area of U.S. Central Command in 2013. DOD had begun 

discussions on the benefits and drawbacks of sharing radar data, but 

the most-recent deployment proceeded without a decision for how to 

address these issues, even though both regions face a common 

threat. According to officials, the first priority for deploying each radar 

was to support separate missions in their respective areas of 

responsibility, and a decision to use one radar to support the other 

radar was a secondary priority and thus did not require resolution prior 

to deployment. However, officials also stated that sharing radar data 

between the recently deployed radar with the EPAA forward-based 

radar could benefit missile defense in Europe and potentially increase 

operational effectiveness across both geographic combatant 

commands. DOD guidance states that U.S. Strategic Command is 

responsible for synchronizing global missile defense planning in 

coordination with the combatant commands, services, MDA, and 

appropriate agencies.21 Guidance further indicates that U.S. Strategic 

Command, working with the geographic combatant commands, 

integrates and synchronizes various BMD elements, such as radars.22

 

21See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3295.01, enc. A, para. 2.b(2) (May 

24, 2013). 

22See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, app. E 

(Mar. 23, 2012).
 

Page 14 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

However, the warfighter acceptance process did not explicitly require 

a comprehensive assessment of whether policies and procedures for 

sharing BMD radar data are defined. The combatant commands, 

including U.S. European Command, have made progress on 

addressing this implementation issue. For example, since 

deployment, U.S. European Command, in coordination with U.S. 

Strategic Command, has requested technical analysis from MDA in 

order to determine the extent to which the radars can share 

information. In addition to the technical analysis, U.S. European 

Command officials stated that DOD has held several senior-level 

meetings to discuss policies and procedures for addressing potential 

overlapping operational priorities and to discuss possible 

consequences that might occur if the radars are integrated. As a 

result of not completing such policies and procedures prior to 

accepting BMD capabilities, DOD continues to operate these radars 

separately and may face difficulty in sharing the radar data across 

geographic combatant commands, thus affecting efficient BMD 

operations in Europe.

• Incomplete implementing arrangements and procedures for working 

with allies: DOD’s experience delivering Patriot batteries to Turkey in 

early 2013 demonstrates some of the difficulties the warfighter could 

encounter by not finalizing implementing arrangements and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures with allies prior to deployment. DOD 

deployed Patriot batteries to Turkey as part of a NATO mission to 

support the country’s air defense, but this action was not part of 

EPAA’s first phase. However, U.S. European Command officials 

indicated that it shaped this deployment to be similar to future U.S. 

deployments of Patriot batteries to Europe, and interoperability with 

NATO is a key aspect of EPAA. However, according to Army officials, 

host-nation implementing arrangements had not been finalized before 

the Patriot batteries arrived in Turkey, resulting in the equipment 

remaining at an airfield for several weeks before it could be deployed 

for operations. In addition, according to Army officials, foreign 

disclosure issues were not resolved by the time Patriot batteries 

arrived in Turkey, and initially there were limitations on what 

intelligence information could be shared with non-U.S. forces. Further, 

according to Army officials, soldiers had to receive supplemental 

training to perform the NATO mission, including using NATO tactics, 

techniques, and procedures, which can differ from those of the United 

States. According to officials, DOD was aware of these issues but 

could not address them prior to deploying Patriot batteries to Turkey 

due to the need to address threats there. Further, officials stated they 

must also adhere to certain political and host-nation decisions that 
 

Page 15 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

can affect their ability to address all implementation issues before 

deployment. Nonetheless, the warfighter acceptance process did not 

explicitly require a comprehensive assessment of whether these 

implementing arrangements and procedures were completed prior to 

deployment. By not completing implementing arrangements and 

procedures for how to work with allies before deployment, Army 

officials stated that they spent extensive time working with allies to 

resolve these implementation issues, which put a strain on Army’s 

limited existing resources.

DOD recognizes that it has encountered previous implementation 

challenges related to deploying BMD capabilities to Europe and is taking 

steps to address them, but these efforts may not prevent future problems. 

According to U.S. European Command officials, one step they have taken 

is to establish a synchronization board that tracks EPAA implementation, 

but this board has focused more on Aegis Ashore than on potential 

Patriot or THAAD battery deployments. Additionally, the Navy, in 

coordination with MDA and U.S. European Command, is tracking the 

development and deployment of the Aegis Ashore weapon systems and 

facilities. However, these efforts are not part of DOD’s warfighter 

acceptance process, which means that issues raised through these 

efforts would not necessarily be addressed prior to accepting or deploying 

additional EPAA capabilities. Also, the acceptance criteria used to assess 

BMD elements in areas such as effectiveness, suitability, and 

interoperability do not include a detailed identification of potential 

implementation issues that may affect operational performance. Further, 

DOD officials said that they plan to use the existing acceptance process 

to accept and deploy future EPAA capabilities, but may not for other BMD 

elements that could support BMD operations in Europe, such as THAAD. 

In using the existing process, which does not explicitly require a 

comprehensive assessment of various implementation issues prior to 

deployment, DOD may deploy future BMD capabilities without identifying 

or developing a plan to resolve implementation issues, such as 

incomplete host-nation implementing arrangements for Aegis Ashore 

radar operations.

One of the more-difficult challenges facing DOD is completing 

implementing arrangements for access to frequencies that Aegis Ashore 

is designed to use. We have previously reported on issues related to 

DOD’s Process for 

Accepting New BMD 

Capabilities Could Result 

in Future Implementation 

Challenges
 

Page 16 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

frequency access for Aegis Ashore.23 The two Aegis Ashore elements 

dedicated to EPAA Phases Two and Three—which are expected to 

operate in Romania and Poland by 2015 and 2018 respectively—have 

radars that DOD has designed to use a certain range of frequencies for 

full operations, including maintenance, periodic testing of equipment, and 

training of crews. However, according to U.S. European Command 

officials, some of the frequencies Aegis Ashore is designed to use are 

reserved for civil use, such as commercial and cell phone services.24

 

23We reported the potential for frequency access issues for Aegis Ashore as early as 

2010. In 2011 and 2012, we reported on two specific issues: the possibility that the radar 

might interfere with host-nation wireless usage; and that DOD and the relevant host nation 

authorities must work together to ensure that host nations approve use of the operating 

frequency needed for the radar. See 

Accordingly, U.S. European Command officials stated that resolving 

frequency access issues and completing the implementing arrangements 

for U.S. radars takes time and must be initiated early in the planning 

process to allow time for completion before DOD deploys Aegis Ashore in 

Romania. According to U.S. European Command officials, in 2013, DOD 

and Romanian officials worked together to agree on frequencies available 

for Aegis Ashore operations so that both the radar and the commercial 

and cell phone services can coexist, with restrictions, by early 2015. In 

Poland, however, resolving frequency range access issues is more 

complex, according to DOD officials. Specifically, the frequency range is 

more congested in central Europe, which increases the potential for 

cross-border interference with neighboring countries. In addition, 

according to U.S. European Command officials, Poland is in the process 

of issuing new commercial licenses for frequencies within its civil 

frequency range that overlap with those Aegis Ashore is designed to use. 

This process may affect the time frame for resolving Aegis Ashore’s 

access to these frequencies. DOD officials stated that they plan to work 

closely with their Polish counterparts to resolve these issues prior to the 

GAO-13-432. Although our reports noted that 

frequency access presented challenges, GAO made no recommendations on this issue. 

24The International Telecommunication Union has issued guidance on managing 

frequencies. The International Telecommunication Union is an international organization 

within the United Nations System where governments and the private sector coordinate 

global telecom networks and services. According to this guidance, frequencies are a 

shared resource that national governments monitor and manage to prevent and eliminate 

harmful interference and reduce potential for overlap and interference between uses. The 

guidance also notes that, in the European Union, national standards reflect European 

standards and national policy is to implement European Policy. For more information, see 

International Telecommunication Union, Guidance on the Regulatory Framework for 

National Spectrum Management, Report ITU-R SM.2093-1 (September 2010). 
 

Page 17 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

planned deployment of Aegis Ashore in 2018. According to DOD officials, 

construction of Aegis Ashore can proceed without these issues being 

resolved. However, the extent to which the radar could be used to train, 

maintain, and test the capabilities may be limited. As a result, the current 

warfighter acceptance process, with its focus on meeting operational 

needs based on criteria that do not comprehensively include potential 

implementation issues, may not ensure that radar capabilities can be fully 

used once deployed.

In addition, DOD may choose to forward station or deploy Patriot and 

THAAD batteries to supplement EPAA or NATO operations. U.S. 

Strategic Command officials stated that the warfighter acceptance 

process will not be applied to Patriot batteries, and they have not yet 

decided whether the process will be applied to THAAD batteries. 

Nonetheless, it is important that the warfighter be prepared to operate the 

batteries and that implementing arrangements be in place. As with the 

Aegis Ashore radar, if DOD forward-stationed a THAAD battery to

Europe, it may need to negotiate implementing arrangements for the 

THAAD radar to access frequency ranges for periodic testing, 

maintenance, and training to support BMD operations. Also, if Patriot 

batteries were sent to Europe, DOD may need to negotiate implementing 

arrangements and coordinate tactics, techniques, and procedures with 

allies as it did for the Patriot deployment to Turkey. Since DOD’s 

experience has shown that it may require considerable time in order to 

develop necessary implementing arrangements, it would be important for 

these types of issues to be identified as soon as possible. Unless DOD 

comprehensively identifies and develops a plan to resolve implementation 

issues for elements that may deploy to support BMD operations in 

Europe, DOD risks experiencing challenges that may affect the 

warfighter’s ability to fully utilize the systems as designed.

DOD has encountered various implementation issues when deploying 

BMD capabilities in Europe and risks encountering similar issues in the 

future, because there is no explicit requirement within the warfighter 

acceptance process to ensure that these types of issues are 

comprehensively identified before the capabilities are deployed. The 

current warfighter acceptance process does not produce an integrated, 

holistic identification of implementation issues and, as a result, DOD does 

not identify and develop a plan to resolve them before BMD capabilities 

are deployed. Instead, responsibilities are diffused across several 

organizations. For example, U.S. Strategic Command officials view their 

role as ensuring that EPAA capabilities function within the BMD system 

worldwide, which includes BMD elements that are not among those 
 

Page 18 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

dedicated to EPAA. U.S. European Command is responsible for 

conducting BMD operations in its area of responsibility. The services 

operate individual BMD elements and provide the manpower and training 

necessary to do so. Although U.S. Strategic Command considers input 

from U.S. European Command and the services when defining 

acceptance criteria, the criteria used to-date do not fully assess the extent 

to which implementation issues may affect operational performance, for 

instance by limiting the available frequencies for radar use in a particular 

country or region. As a result, DOD will likely continue to face 

implementation issues unless a more holistic, integrated view is taken to 

identify and plan to resolve these issues before BMD capabilities are 

deployed in Europe, which may result in less-efficient BMD operations.

DOD has estimated the long-term operating and support costs for some, 

but not all, BMD elements in Europe. Initial estimates indicate that these 

costs could total several billion dollars over the elements’ lifetime, but 

these estimates do not provide a complete picture of the likely costs. For 

example, key decisions that have not yet been made—such as what longterm support strategies to adopt and where to forward-station some BMD 

elements—are likely to change the estimates for THAAD and the forwardbased radar. In addition, DOD has not developed a comprehensive, joint 

estimate of operating and support costs for the two planned Aegis Ashore 

sites. The lack of complete, long-term operating and support cost 

estimates for the BMD elements could hinder DOD’s ability to develop 

budgets and allocate resources for BMD operations in Europe.

DOD developed initial estimates of operating and support costs for 

THAAD and the forward-based radar—both of which are ultimately to be 

managed by the Army—but these estimates are likely to change as these 

programs mature and DOD completes business-case analyses25

 

25A business-case analysis is conducted to assist decision makers by assessing the costs 

and benefits of alternative support strategies, which are compared to determine the mostefficient and effective means of support. Typically, a long-term or lifetime support strategy 

is selected based on the results of a business-case analysis. 

and 

makes key decisions, such as what their long-term support strategies will 

be and where to forward-station these elements. The Army and MDA 

have signed a memorandum of agreement and several annexes since 

2009 outlining how the two organizations are to manage responsibilities 

DOD Lacks a 

Complete 

Understanding of the 

Long-Term Operating 

and Support Costs for 

BMD Elements in 

Europe

Initial Operating and 

Support Cost Estimates 

for THAAD and the 

Forward-Based Radar Are 

Likely to Change
 

Page 19 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

for BMD elements, which includes jointly estimating operating and 

support costs.26 In addition, the element-specific annexes direct the 

development of business-case analyses as part of determining the longterm support strategy for these elements.27 Further, Army guidance, 

which is referenced in the annexes, similarly directs the use of businesscase analyses as part of selecting the product-support strategy.28

In January 2012, the Army and MDA estimated that the EPAA forwardbased radar would cost $61 million in fiscal year 2014 and $1.2 billion in 

then-year dollars over its 20-year life. However, this estimate assumes 

continued contractor support throughout the life of the forward-based 

radar. Even though forward-based radars have been deployed since 

2006, DOD has not yet completed a business-case analysis as part of 

determining the long-term support as described in an Army regulation and 

in the forward-based radar annex, which is to include an assessment of 

alternatives to contractor-provided support over the lifetime of this 

element. In addition, the Army has made changes to reduce operating 

and support costs for the forward-based radar, but these changes are not 

reflected in the $1.2 billion lifetime cost estimate previously cited. Army 

officials stated that the Army and MDA met in November 2013 to begin 

developing the business-case analysis for the radar, which they intend to 

complete in fiscal year 2015. However, the annex does not include an 

explicit requirement that this analysis be completed by a specific time. 

Also, MDA and Army officials said that completion of this analysis to 

inform a decision on a long-term support strategy will, in turn, provide 

information for updating the operating and support cost estimates for the 

forward-based radar.

In December 2012, the Army and MDA estimated operating and support 

costs for six THAAD batteries for 20 years, totaling $6.5 billion in then-

 

26The overarching Memorandum of Agreement, signed by the Director of MDA and the 

Secretary of the Army in 2009, is supplemented and implemented by annexes released in 

subsequent years and signed by various officials. 

27Specifically, the annexes require the development of an Army-approved business-case 

analysis prior to the transfer of the capability from MDA to the Army. 

28See Army Regulation 700-127, Integrated Logistics Support (Mar. 26, 2012). 
 

Page 20 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

year dollars.29

In addition, the estimate of operating and support costs for THAAD 

assumed that all six batteries would be located in the United States. 

However, DOD officials stated that they are examining options for 

forward-stationing some THAAD batteries overseas. Doing so would likely 

increase operating and support costs due to higher operational tempo, 

contractors that are deployed with the system, additional needed security, 

life-support facilities such as barracks and a mess hall, and site 

preparation for the equipment. For example, MDA recently estimated that 

operating and support costs for one THAAD battery in Guam could be 

$11 million higher annually than if the battery was located in the 

continental United States. However, this estimate does not include costs 

for military personnel, fuel, site activation, transportation, or some 

contractor costs. Further, costs could be even higher if an element is 

located at an austere location due to additional costs for site preparation, 

security, transportation, and some contractor costs.

This estimate also assumes continued contractor support 

throughout the life of THAAD. Even though the first two THAAD batteries 

have been available since early 2012, DOD has not yet completed a 

business-case analysis as part of determining the long-term support 

strategy, as provided for in the annex, which is to include an assessment 

of alternatives to contractor-provided support over the lifetime of THAAD. 

Specifically, MDA conducted an initial THAAD business-case analysis, 

which it provided to the Army for comment. The Army did not agree with 

the analysis because it was not done in accordance with Army 

regulations. As the Army and MDA work through these disagreements, 

the THAAD business-case analysis remains incomplete as of December 

2013, and there is no firm deadline to complete the analysis. Completion 

of this analysis to inform a decision on a long-term support strategy will, in 

turn, provide information for updating the operating and support cost 

estimates for the THAAD.

 

29DOD plans to buy a total of six THAAD batteries. As explained earlier in this report, 

DOD’s plans for EPAA include the possibility of forward-stationing a THAAD battery in 

Europe. However, the estimate did not provide a per battery cost for operating and 

supporting THAAD in Europe. 
 

Page 21 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

MDA and the Navy have not developed a comprehensive, joint estimate 

of the operating and support costs for the two European Aegis Ashore 

sites over their expected 25-year life span, and it is unclear when such an 

estimate will be completed. The Navy and MDA completed an annex to a 

memorandum of agreement in August 2012 describing how they are to 

jointly manage Aegis Ashore, which notes that the two organizations will 

collaborate on cost estimating and budget planning.30 Under the annex, 

MDA responsibilities include providing funding for construction of certain 

mission-essential facilities and the operations and support of aspects of 

the Aegis weapon system through fiscal year 2017. The Navy 

responsibilities include providing funding for construction and operations 

and sustainment of housing and quality-of-life facilities, as well as the 

training facility, which is located in the United States. The Navy will be 

responsible for all Aegis Ashore operating and support costs at the two 

planned sites beginning in fiscal year 2018. Although the Navy and MDA 

have agreed to jointly develop cost estimates, and officials from the Navy 

and MDA have stated these estimates will focus on operating and support 

costs, their August 2012 memorandum of agreement does not include a

clear deadline for first completing a joint cost estimate.31

Although MDA and the Navy have not developed a comprehensive joint 

estimate, they have individually begun to identify some costs. Specifically, 

the Navy has estimated $155 million will be required for manning, 

operating, and supporting the base facilities from fiscal year 2014 through 

fiscal year 2018. MDA has reported in its 2013 Ballistic Missile Defense 

System Accountability Report that operating and support costs for the 

Aegis Ashore test facility and the two European sites may total $82 million 

through fiscal year 2018, but this does not include operating and support 

costs for the entire expected 25-year life. In addition, MDA officials stated 

that their estimate does not include costs for base facilities, military 

personnel, or other Navy costs and, therefore, cautioned against 

combining both Navy and MDA’s individual estimates in order to 

approximate total Aegis Ashore operating and support costs. By fiscal 

This estimate 

would enable MDA and the Navy to more-accurately budget for their 

respective share of the costs.

 

30Similar to the Army, the Navy and MDA entered into an overarching Memorandum of 

Agreement in 2010, supplemented and implemented by specific annexes at later dates. 

31In June and July 2013, the Navy and MDA signed a Cost Analysis Requirements 

Description, which is a document that is used as the basis for developing a cost estimate.

DOD Has Not Developed 

a Comprehensive Joint 

Estimate of Operating and 

Support Costs for Aegis 

Ashore
 

Page 22 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

year 2018, the Navy will assume responsibility for all operating and 

support costs for the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland. 

However, without a comprehensive, joint estimate of the lifetime operating 

and support costs for the two Aegis Ashore sites that is updated as key 

program decisions are made, it will be difficult for the Navy to develop 

accurate budgets for operating and supporting this element of EPAA.

We and the Office of Management and Budget have reported that cost 

estimates are important to support budget development. Specifically, cost 

estimates can assist decision makers in budget development and are 

necessary for evaluating resource requirements at key decision points 

and effectively allocating resources.32 In addition, Office of Management 

and Budget guidance containing principles for capital asset acquisitions 

emphasizes that government agencies should understand all costs in 

advance of proposing acquisitions in the budget, and notes that agencies 

should plan for operations and maintenance of capital assets.33 Further, it 

is important to fully identify operating and support costs since these costs 

can be up to 70 percent of a weapon system’s lifetime costs. Major 

defense acquisition programs within DOD generally follow an acquisition 

process that includes steps in which cost estimates are developed, 

including operating and support costs. Due to the acquisition flexibilities 

MDA has been granted, application of this process has been deferred and 

MDA follows a separate process for development and acquisition.34

 

32GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, 

Nonetheless, DOD has not required completed operating and support 

cost estimates prior to introducing BMD capabilities in Europe. In addition, 

existing memorandums of agreement and related annexes between MDA 

and the services, while they require the completion of business-case 

analyses for the forward-based radar and THAAD, do not clearly require 

that these analyses be completed in a timely manner to support a 

decision on long-term support strategies before introducing capabilities. 

Similarly, these memorandums of agreement also do not clearly require 

developing estimates in a timely manner, such as before capabilities are 

GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

33See Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide: Supplement to 

OMB Circular A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition of Capital Assets, ver. 3.0 (July 

2013).

34BMD elements are expected to enter the defense acquisition system at a later stage. 

More-Comprehensive 

Cost Estimates Can Aid 

Budget Development
 

Page 23 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

introduced, or updating those estimates to support budget development 

after long-term support strategies or other key program decisions—such 

as whether to forward-station certain elements overseas—are made.35

The lack of an estimate and subsequent updates could limit decision 

makers’ ability to identify the resources that will be needed over the long 

term to support the planned investment in the system’s capabilities.

DOD has made a substantial investment in BMD, and its initial 

deployment of capabilities for EPAA proceeded in line with the 

President’s announced timelines. However, the rapid fielding of EPAA 

has resulted in challenges that, unless DOD takes action, are likely to 

continue as DOD implements additional capabilities. By not fully 

identifying and planning to resolve implementation issues in its 

acceptance process to-date, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. European 

Command, and the services have had to rush to secure and emplace the 

resources needed to support the capabilities it has already deployed. 

Without identifying the resources, implementing arrangements, 

infrastructure, and other items that need to be in place before deploying 

additional EPAA capabilities, DOD may continue to face challenges in 

operating BMD elements as it moves forward with the future phases of 

EPAA. In addition, if DOD does not also take action to identify and plan to 

resolve these types of implementation issues for all current and future 

BMD capabilities that could support BMD operations in Europe, DOD is 

likely to experience additional implementation challenges.

Similarly, the department’s commitment to EPAA implementation has 

proceeded without a full understanding of the related long-term operating 

and support costs, thereby lessening assurance of the approach’s 

sustainability through all phases. Although the services and MDA have 

begun to estimate operating and support costs, there are no firm 

deadlines for completing and revising estimates as the programs mature 

and key decisions are made, such as completing business-case analyses 

to support decisions on long-term support strategies or where the BMD 

capabilities may be forward-stationed. Making such decisions and 

updating the estimates accordingly would enable the services and MDA 

 

35According to DOD officials, the cost estimates may be updated to reflect some actual 

costs, such as fuel consumption, but will not be updated to reflect a change in the support 

strategy until a decision on the long-term strategy is made based on the business-case 

analysis. 

Conclusions
 

Page 24 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

to more-accurately develop budgets for their respective share of the 

costs. Further, the lack of a comprehensive, joint estimate of operating 

and support costs for Aegis Ashore can make it difficult for the Navy and 

MDA to develop budgets to cover these costs. Without completed and 

updated estimates for the long-term operating and support costs of BMD 

elements in Europe, the department and congressional decision makers 

may not be fully aware of the resources that will be needed over time to 

support DOD’s commitment of providing BMD capabilities to Europe.

To improve DOD’s ability to identify and resolve implementation issues 

and to improve budgeting for long-term operating and support costs of 

BMD elements in Europe, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

take the following four actions.

• To ensure that BMD capabilities can be used as intended when they 

are delivered, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, direct U.S. Strategic Command to identify and develop a plan to 

resolve implementation issues prior to deploying and operating future 

BMD capabilities in Europe. U.S. Strategic Command should work in 

consultation with U.S. European Command and the services to 

resolve implementation issues such as infrastructure, resolving 

policies and procedures to address potential overlapping operational 

priorities if radars are integrated across geographic combatant 

commands, completing host-nation implementing arrangements, and 

any other key implementation issues.

To identify resources needed to support its plans for providing BMD 

capabilities in Europe and to support budget development, direct the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to 

require and set a deadline for the following three actions:

• completing a business-case analysis for the forward-based radar to 

support a decision on the long-term support strategy, and updating 

the joint MDA and Army estimate for long-term operating and support 

costs after a decision on the support strategy is made; 

• completing a business-case analysis for THAAD to support a decision 

on the long-term support strategy, and updating the joint MDA and 

Army long-term operating and support cost estimate after this and 

other key program decisions, such as where the THAAD batteries are 

likely to be forward-stationed, are made; and

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 25 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

• completing a joint MDA and Navy estimate of the long-term operating 

and support costs for the Aegis Ashore two sites, and updating the 

estimates after key program decisions are made.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD and the Department of State for 

review and comment. DOD provided written comments, which are 

reproduced in appendix IV, and the Department of State did not provide 

written comments on the report. In its comments, DOD partially agreed 

with one recommendation and agreed with three other recommendations. 

Also, DOD completed a security review of this report and determined that 

its contents were unclassified and contained no sensitive information. 

DOD and the Department of State provided technical comments, which 

we incorporated as appropriate.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that U.S. Strategic 

Command, in consultation with U.S. European Command and the 

services, identify and develop a plan to resolve implementation issues 

prior to deploying and operating future BMD capabilities in Europe. In its 

comments, DOD stated that U.S. Strategic Command does not have the 

authority or mission to resolve implementation issues, but the services 

and MDA will work to identify and resolve implementation issues for future 

BMD capabilities in Europe. DOD further stated that U.S. Strategic 

Command will also work in consultation with U.S. European Command 

and the services to resolve integrated air and missile defense 

requirements and warfighter acceptance criteria, validate element 

performance and system integration, and advise cross global combatant 

command capability optimization/sharing as part of its global missile 

defense role. We understand that U.S. Strategic Command may not have 

the authority to directly resolve all implementation issues. However, it 

does have a role in integrating capabilities across combatant commands, 

as we discuss in this report. 

In addition, our recommendation does not state that U.S. Strategic 

Command should resolve all implementation issues prior to deploying 

capabilities, but rather that it identify and develop a plan to resolve 

implementation issues prior to deployment and to do so in consultation 

with U.S. European Command and the services. As we note in the report, 

the acceptance criteria used to-date focuses on effectiveness, suitability, 

and interoperability; however, the manual describing the acceptance 

process indicates that prerequisites for credibly assessing operational 

suitability include assessing whether such things as organization, training, 

or facilities are defined and in place for BMD elements. While it may be 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 26 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

appropriate for U.S. European Command and/or the services to take the 

lead in resolving some implementation issues, such as ensuring proper 

infrastructure is in place, U.S. Strategic Command, in its advocacy and 

integration roles, can help in identifying and planning to resolve some 

issues, such as advising cross-combatant command capability sharing. 

Further, U.S. Strategic Command’s warfighter acceptance process is the 

only existing high-level forum where all key BMD stakeholders come 

together to assess operational utility of BMD elements. Therefore, we 

believe that U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with U.S. European 

Command and the services, can use its position as the warfighter 

advocate to elevate implementation issues, such as cross-combatant 

command capability sharing and system integration, to ensure that such 

issues are identified and that a plan to resolve them is developed.

DOD agreed with our recommendation to require and set a deadline for 

completing a business-case analysis for the forward-based radar to 

support a decision on the long-term support strategy, and updating the 

joint MDA and Army estimate for long-term operating and support costs 

after a decision on the support strategy is made. DOD stated that the 

business-case analysis will be delivered in late fiscal year 2015 and that 

the joint cost estimate is updated biennially. The department further 

stated that if the business-case analysis results substantially change the 

underlying assumptions of the joint cost estimate, an out-of-cycle joint 

cost estimate would be conducted. Establishing a target date for 

completing the business-case analysis is a positive first step, and we 

believe that DOD needs to be vigilant to ensure that the late fiscal year 

2015 date is met in order to be fully responsive to the intent of our 

recommendation. Doing so will enable DOD to update operating and 

support cost estimates, which, in turn, can improve budget development.

DOD agreed with our recommendation to require and set a deadline for 

completing a business-case analysis for THAAD to support a decision on 

the long-term support strategy, and update the joint MDA and Army 

estimate for long-term operating and support costs after this and other 

key program decisions, such as where the THAAD batteries are likely to 

be forward-stationed, are made. DOD stated that THAAD is a “surge

support” asset for EPAA with no specifically assigned area of 

responsibility, battery quantities, or locations. DOD further stated that 

MDA and the Army will support the decision to deploy THAAD assets and 

any related business-case analysis for projected sites. According to an 

Army official, conducting a business-case analysis to assess a weapon 

system’s lifetime support strategy and making stationing decisions are 

two separate, independent decisions although both affect operating and 
 

Page 27 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

support costs. In other words, a business-case analysis can be completed 

and a support strategy decided upon without a decision on where the 

weapon system may be located. The purpose of a business-case analysis 

is to identify the optimum support concept at the lowest life-cycle cost, 

and DOD had previously planned to complete a business-case analysis 

for THAAD by late 2011. We recognized in this report that THAAD could 

deploy to support EPAA as needed and that options are being examined 

for forward-stationing some THAAD batteries overseas. We also noted 

that operating and support costs can account for up to 70 percent of a 

weapon system’s lifetime costs and that these costs are generally higher 

when a system is stationed overseas. Given that decision makers need to 

understand and therefore adequately budget for THAAD operating and 

support costs, we believe it is important for DOD to set a deadline for 

completing the business-case analysis to support a decision on the longterm support strategy and update the joint estimate of lifetime operating 

and support costs accordingly. DOD should also update the cost estimate 

after other key decisions are made, such as where THAAD may be 

located. Completing these actions would meet the intent of our 

recommendation.

DOD agreed with our recommendation to complete a joint estimate of the 

long-term operating and support costs for the two Aegis Ashore sites and 

update the estimates after key program decisions are made. However, 

DOD did not set a deadline for completing the estimate, such as before

introducing these capabilities in Europe—in late fiscal year 2015 and 

2018—as we also recommended. We noted in the report that the 

operating and support costs will likely be significant and that the Navy will 

be responsible for all Aegis Ashore operating and support costs at the two 

planned sites beginning in fiscal year 2018. The lack of a joint estimate of 

the long-term operating and support costs will make it difficult for the 

Navy to accurately budget for these costs and can limit decision makers’ 

ability to identify the resources that will be needed over the long term to 

support DOD’s planned investment in Aegis Ashore. Therefore, we 

believe that DOD should set a deadline for completing this estimate in 

order to meet the intent of our recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Commanders of the U.S. 

Strategic Command and U.S. European Command, the Secretaries of the 

Army and Navy, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, and the 

Secretary of State. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
 

Page 28 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix V.

John H. Pendleton

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 29 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

During our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) implementation 

of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), we examined 

relevant documentation and met with representatives from numerous 

agencies and offices. To assess the extent to which DOD has identified 

and planned to resolve implementation issues before deploying ballistic 

missile defense (BMD) capabilities to Europe, we reviewed the U.S. 

Strategic Command document titled Ballistic Missile Defense System 

(BMDS) Warfighter Capability Acceptance1

We also reviewed Navy instructions and documents from the Navy 

Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise and U.S. Naval Forces Europe to 

understand how the Navy monitors and addresses technical and 

implementation issues related to Aegis Ashore for EPAA Phases Two and 

Three. We reviewed 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command and 

32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command reports and briefings that 

described implementation challenges experienced during the deployment 

of BMD elements to Europe and other regions, and provided an 

assessment of lessons learned for future BMD element deployments. We 

also reviewed documents and briefings from the U.S. Air Forces Europe 

. This document describes the 

goal of the warfighter acceptance process, which is, in essence, to ensure 

that capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered, and 

culminates in formal acceptance of BMD capabilities by U.S. Strategic 

Command. We also reviewed key documents, such as the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3295.01, Policy Guidance for Ballistic 

Missile Defense Operations, and the Joint Staff Publication 3-01, 

Countering Air and Missile Threats, which describe DOD’s BMD guidance 

and responsibilities of various organizations, and U.S. Strategic 

Command’s June 2013 Instruction 538-03 on Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense (IAMD) Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). We also met with 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. 

European Command and its service components, and U.S. Strategic 

Command to understand how DOD’s process was implemented. In 

addition, we reviewed U.S. European Command planning documents, 

briefings on EPAA implementation and results of BMD exercises, and 

minutes from synchronization board meetings to identify implementation 

issues and assess the extent to which these issues are related to DOD’s 

acceptance process.

 

1

This document is issued by U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint functional Component 

Command for Integrated Missile Defense. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 30 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

603rd Air Operations Center to understand whether implementation 

issues—such as U.S.–NATO command and control relationships—are 

identified and channeled through U.S. European Command as a part of 

DOD’s capability acceptance process. We spoke to senior-level officials 

from the Army, Navy, Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. European 

Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Navy Europe, U.S. Air Forces 

Europe, Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) about their participation in the acceptance 

process, including the selection of acceptance criteria to assess EPAA 

Phase One BMD elements, identification and resolution of implementation 

issues prior to accepting EPAA BMD elements, and any planned 

adjustments to the existing process.

Finally, we spoke to senior-level State Department officials to understand 

their role leading up to the deployment of EPAA Phase One capabilities 

and overall involvement in subsequent EPAA implementation efforts. We 

also spoke to senior-level NATO officials to get their perspectives on 

possible implementation issues related to command and control 

relationships during NATO-led BMD operations and interoperability 

among U.S., NATO, and member-nation BMD systems.

To assess the extent to which DOD has estimated the long-term costs to 

operate and support BMD elements in Europe, we first reviewed 

agreements and their annexes between MDA and the Army and between 

MDA and the Navy regarding how these organizations are to work 

together to manage the BMD elements, including information on how they 

are to jointly develop cost estimates. We identified and reviewed 

documents containing best practices for determining high-quality cost 

estimates from the Office of Management and Budget and the GAO Cost 

Estimating and Assessment Guide, which indicate that estimating longterm operations and support costs assists in budget development and the 

allocation of resources. In addition, we reviewed the Army’s regulation on 

Integrated Logistic Support, which includes guidance on business-case 

analysis and is referenced in the agreement annexes between MDA and 

the Army to identify DOD criteria for conducting business-case analyses 

to assess alternatives for providing long-term support. We then reviewed 

documentation of estimates developed by MDA and the services for the 

BMD elements that are part of EPAA or could be deployed to support 

EPAA, which include Aegis Ashore, forward-based Army 

Navy/Transportable Radar, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

(THAAD), Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications, 

Patriot, and Aegis BMD-capable ships. We focused our assessment on 

the first three elements, because the services and MDA are sharing the 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

operating and support costs for these elements. We assessed the 

documentation of the Army and MDA December 2012 joint estimate of 

operating and support costs for THAAD and the January 2012 joint 

estimate of operating and support costs for the forward-based Army 

Navy/Transportable Radar. We interviewed Army and MDA officials to 

understand the key assumptions underpinning each estimate.

Further, we examined the key issues that could affect these estimates 

including DOD proposals for locating THAAD units overseas and the lack 

of business-case analyses for supporting a decision on the long-term 

support strategy for each element, which are called for by the BMD 

element agreements between the Army and MDA and by Army guidance 

referenced in those agreements. For Aegis Ashore, we confirmed with 

MDA and Navy officials that the two organizations had not yet jointly 

developed a comprehensive, long-term estimate. We did, however, 

assess Navy and MDA documentation of some Aegis Ashore costs that 

each organization expects to fund over the next 5 years. We did not 

evaluate the quality of the estimates in this review since we reported in 

2011 that six of MDA’s life-cycle cost estimates did not meet the 

characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate.2

We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to April 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Since our objective for the 

current review was to assess the extent to which DOD had identified the 

operating and support costs of BMD elements, documenting the 

existence or absence of estimates was sufficient for our purposes.

 

2

GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability, 

GAO-11-372 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2011). 
Appendix II: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Capabilities Available by European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase

Page 32 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Appendix II: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Capabilities Available by European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase
Appendix II: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Capabilities Available by European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase

Page 33 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Appendix II: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Capabilities Available by European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase

Page 34 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Appendix III: Key Department of Defense 

(DOD) Stakeholders Involved in Planning and 

Implementing the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach

Page 35 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Organization Primary Role in European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics

Provides acquisition policy direction, program guidance, and overall management 

oversight of the Missile Defense Agency. Chairs the Missile Defense Executive Board, 

provides program guidance, and makes recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense on missile defense issues.

Missile Defense Executive Board A senior-level body that reviews DOD’s ballistic missile defense efforts and provides the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics or Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, as necessary, with a recommended ballistic missile defense 

strategic program plan and feasible funding strategy for approval.

U.S. European Command The geographic combatant commanda whose area of responsibility includes all of 

Europe (including Russia and Turkey), Greenland, Israel, and surrounding waters. It is 

the primary geographic combatant command involved in planning for and implementing 

EPAA. It is assisted in this effort by its service components—principally U.S. Naval 

Forces Europe, U.S. Army Europe, and U.S. Air Forces Europe.

U.S. Central Command

b

The geographic combatant command whose area of responsibility includes parts of the 

Middle East. Coordinates with U.S. European Command to defend against ballistic 

missile threats originating from its area of responsibility.

U.S. Strategic Command Functional combatant commandc 

Military services

with responsibilities to integrate global missions and 

capabilities that cross the boundaries of the geographic combatant commands, such as 

synchronizing planning and coordinating operations support for global missile defense, 

as well as missile defense advocacy for the combatant commands.

Responsible for providing forces and resources to support fielding of the ballistic missile 

defense elements and assisting in planning for and managing the operations and 

maintenance and infrastructure needs of ballistic missile defense elements.

Missile Defense Agency Responsible for the research, development, testing, and acquisition of the integrated 

ballistic missile defense system, comprised of individual ballistic missile defense 

elements. In addition, the Missile Defense Agency is responsible for operating and 

support costs for some ballistic missile defense elements until this responsibility is 

undertaken by a military service.

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational test and 

evaluation in DOD. Responsibilities include issuing policy and procedures; reviewing and 

analyzing results of operational test and evaluation conducted for certain acquisition 

programs; and other related activities. In the context of the ballistic missile defense 

system, the director is responsible for conducting effective, independent oversight of 

operational testing and providing timely assessments to support programmatic decisions 

and reporting requirements.

Ballistic Missile Defense System 

Operational Test Agency

Plans and directs independent operational tests and evaluations and provides 

operational assessments of ballistic missile defense system capability to defend the 

United States, its deployed forces, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all 

ranges and in all phases of flight. The agency includes representation from service and 

joint operational test entities.

Source: GAO summary of Department of Defense (DOD) information.

a

The six geographic combatant commands are U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 

European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern 

Command.

b

A service component command is a command consisting of the service component commander and 

all those service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations 

under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command.

c

Appendix III: Key Department of Defense 

(DOD) Stakeholders Involved in Planning 

and Implementing the European Phased 

Adaptive Approach

The three functional combatant commands are U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic 

Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 36 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 37 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 38 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 39 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Patricia W. Lentini, Assistant 

Director; Marie A. Mak, Assistant Director; Brenda M. Waterfield; Jennifer 

S. Spence; Laurie Choi; Virginia A. Chanley; Michael Shaughnessy; Erik 

Wilkins-McKee; and Amie Steele made key contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 40 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 

Management. GAO-13-432. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2013.

Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by 

Reducing Concurrency. GAO-12-486. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012.

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Training Integration 

and Increase Transparency of Training Resources. GAO-11-625. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2011.

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and 

Accountability. GAO-11-372. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2011.

Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and 

Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe.

GAO-11-220. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2011.

Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face 

Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges.

GAO-11-179R. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects 

Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. GAO-10-676. Washington, 

D.C.: July 14, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to 

Strengthen Acquisition Approach. GAO-10-311. Washington, D.C.: 

February 25, 2010.

Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and 

Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities. 

GAO-09-856. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2009.

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 

Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European 

Sites. GAO-09-771. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.

Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When 

Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions. 

GAO-09-466T. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2009.

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Page 41 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense 

Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned. 

GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2009.

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost 

Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense.

GAO-08-1068. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for 

Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. GAO-08-740. 

Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.

Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but 

Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2008.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency’s Flexibility Reduces 

Transparency of Program Cost. GAO-07-799T. Washington, D.C.: April 

30, 2007.

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting 

Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements.

GAO-07-430. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between 

Flexibility and Accountability. GAO-07-727T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 

2007.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates 

Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO-07-387. Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2007.

Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning 

and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. GAO-06-473. 

Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but 

Falls Short of Original Goals. GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 

2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for 

Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 

GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
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Page 42 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify 

New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach. 

GAO-05-962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify 

New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach. 

GAO-05-540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.

Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 

2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.

Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve 

Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514. 

Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.

Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and 

Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.

Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing 

Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254. 

Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.

Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for 

Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.: 

August 21, 2003.

Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and 

Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington, 

D.C.: May 23, 2003.

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but 

Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce 

Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: July 

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Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National 

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Page 43 GAO-14-314 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New 

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Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be 

Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-121. Washington, D.C.: May 

31, 2000.

(351790)
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