1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KEITH BATTLE, Plaintiff,

v. MASTER SECURITY COMPANY, LLC, Defendant. Case No. 16-cv-01110 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Cour t on the defendant’s motion to d ismiss the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. For the reas ons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.
I. Background After being terminated from his position as a security guard in January 2015, pro se plaintiff Keith Battle filed suit against his former employer, Master Security Company, LLC. Finding that Battle’s initial complaint—which enumerated seven counts without description— did not give Master Security fai r notice of the content of his claims, the Court granted him leave to file an amended complaint. Battle’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 14) provides a parag raph-long explanation of each claim and att aches several exhibits. It al leges as follows: (1) Wrongful Termination (2) Retaliation (3) Equal Pay Act (4) Deceived and Willfully Obstructed from Competing [sic] E mployment (5) Took Personnel Action Because of Exercise of Complaint a nd Grievance2 2d Am. Compl. at 1. 1 Master Security has moved to dism iss this case under Federal R ule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the seco nd amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 2

II. Legal Standards The Court will grant a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the allegations in the compl aint do not “contain sufficient factual matter, acc epted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that i s plausible on its face.’” Ashc roft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 57 (2007)). A claim is facia lly plausible if the complaint provides “factual content that allows the court t o draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable fo r the misconduct alleged.” Id. While the court “must take all of the factual allegations in the compl aint as true,” legal conclusion s “couched as . . . factual allegation[s]” do not warrant the same deference. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Generally, the Court cannot consid er matters outs ide the pleadi ngs in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but it may consider “documents attached as exh ibits or incorporated by

1 The Court treats Bat tle’s “Memorandum of Points, Authorities in Support of Opposition AMENDED COMPLAINT,” w ith its attachments (ECF No. 14 ) as Battle’s second amended complaint. The Court decl ines Master Security’s sugges tion, see Def.’s Mem. at 4 n.1, to strike the second amended compl aint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) because Battle failed to sign it. The document’s first two pag es are identical to the amended complaint (ECF No. 10), which Bat tle did sign. The Court also construes the sixth and seventh of counts of Battle’s second amende d complaint, respectively, a s a demand for a jury trial and for damages.

2 Also before the Court is Battle’ s “Motions to Amended Pleadin gs” (ECF No. 17). The Court will deny the motion, and instead will construe it as Bat tle’s opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss.3 reference in the complaint.” W ard v. District of Columbia Dep’ t of Youth Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011). “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed . . . , and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent stan dards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Par dus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per c uriam). Further, a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings must be “considered in toto ” to determine whether th ey “set out allegations sufficient to survive dismissal. ” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Gr oup, Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
III. Analysis
A. Unlawful Retaliation Claims While Battle does not specify a source of law for his retaliat ion claim, Counts 2 and 5 of Battle’s second amended complaint are best understood as claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohib its employers from discrim inating against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employmen t practice by this subchapter,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (opposition clause), “or be cause he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or particip ated in any manner in an invest igation, proceed ing, or hearing under this subchapter,” id. (particip ation clause); see Crawford v. M etro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009) ( describing the two cla uses of Title VII’ s antiretaliation provision). A claim under either the opposition or participat ion clause is viable only if the plaintiff shows he “engaged in a statutorily protected activity , the employer treated [him] adversely, and a causal connection e xisted between the two.” W inston v. Clough, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010) (citations omitt ed). “[S]tatutorily pro tected activities in clude the filing of EEOC complaints and the initia tion of litigation to vindicate c laims of employment4 discrimination or retalia tion.” Baloch v. Norton, 517 F. Supp. 2d 345, 354 (D.D.C. 2007) (citations omitted). Internal complaints can also suffice, but they “must in some way allege unlawful discrimination, not jus t frustrated ambition.” Broder ick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006). While Battle identifies no specific instances of protected act ivity in his complaint, the exhibits attached to his original complaint include an Equal Em ployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) dismissal of his administrative employment charge. See Compl. at 9 (ECF No. 1). Such a charge clear ly would qualify as protected activity, but the mere fact that Battle filed an EEOC complaint does not support a retaliation c laim. “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to r etaliate was the but-for caus e of the challenged employment action.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. M ed. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 251 7, 2528 (2013) (citation omitted). And Battle has not plausibly all eged any link between the EEOC complaint and his termination. Indeed, because he makes no reference to the EEOC complaint in his pleadings, and because the complaint itself (as opposed to its dismissal) is nowhere in th e pleadings or attachments, it is not even clear that the complaint was filed before his termination on January 15, 2015. Thus, Battle’s EEOC complaint cannot serve as the basis for his retal iation claim. Battle also alleges that Master Security made retaliatory stat ements and caused him a “stressful working environment” because he expressed concerns i nternally about the company’s “wrongful procedures.” His exhibits contain a March 14, 2013 “ Statement of Record” sent to Kristine Nichols, a Senior Vice President at Master Security, r egarding his “interactions with Mr. Calvin Hersey, regarding [his] w ork, pay discrepancies[,] renew al of certifications,” and “many episodes of harassment, deterr ence and unfair labor practices” he had experienced. Id. Ex. B. A second memorandum, dated January 15, 2015, describes an inciden t that resulted in disciplinary5 action against Battle, but not aga inst other employees on that shift who also committed infractions. Id. Ex. B, at 16. To be sure, these statements a ired what may have been legitimate workplace grievances. But because neither statement references any discrimination that would be unlawful under Title VII, neith er amounts to protected activ ity. 3 See Broderick, 437 F.3d at
1232. Battle also includes as an exhibit an undated email chroniclin g events where he believed he was being harassed. 2d Am. C ompl. Ex. B, at 4. Even assumi ng the described incidents amounted to unlawful discriminatio n, however, it is clear that the email was sent after Battle’s termination, as he refers to the incidents retrospectively, “pr ior to [his] departure.” Id. Thus, because Battle has not pointed to any protected activity that may have served as the basis for his termination, he ha s not plausibly s tated a claim for unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII.
B. Equal Pay Act Claim Battle next claims that Master Security violated the Equal Pay Act by consistently paying him less than his counterparts at a given job site. He refers to a third set of exhibits which purportedly show a discrepancy be tween his pay and that of anot her employee. See id. Ex. B at
20–21. Battle has not stated a claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S. C. § 206(d). It is well established that the Act “app lies only to pay disparities stemm ing from sex

3 Given that Battle’s March 2013 statement mentions “unfair labo r practices” and “pay discrepancies,” it is theoretically possible that he coul d state a claim under a federal employmen t statute that protects against retaliation for complaints based on workplace conditions or pay—for example, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). But Battle invokes no such statute in his complaint or e xhibits, and his statement does no t refer to any incid ents that on their face give rise to a plausi ble retaliation claim.6 discrimination.” Kangethe v. D istrict of Columbia, 953 F. Sup p. 2d 194, 203 (D.D.C. 2013); see also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 190 (197 4) (explaining that the Act imposes “the principle of equal pay for equal work regardless o f sex”). None of Battle’s submissions mentions a discrepancy in pay because of his sex. The claim therefore must be dismissed.
C. Counts 4 and 5 In a count titled “Deceived and Willfully Obstructed From Comp eting . . . Employment,” Battle alleges that Master Security kept him from maintaining h is Lieutenant status and preventing him from obtaining p romotions. 2d Am. Compl. at 2. The legal basis for this claim is not clear from the complaint or the attached exhibits. Thus , as drafted, Count 4 simply is too vague to withstand a Rule 12(b )(6) motion. Similarly, to the e xtent that Count 5—titled “Took Personnel Action Because of Exercise of Complaint and Grievance ”—is a claim independent from Battle’s claims for reta liation and for equal pay, it does not state any legal theory under which the Court could grant relief.
D. Wrongful Termination Claim Finally, Battle alleges “wr ongful termination” based on his Ja nuary 2015 firing. He does not specify a source of law for t his claim, but it is evident f rom his attache d exhibits—and from the fact that he alleges no disc riminatory reason for the disch arge—that he views this as a claim arising under District of Columbi a employment law. See 2d Am. Compl. Ex. A (containing D.C. unemployment compensation decision ). Master Security in its mo tion to dismiss takes the same view.7 Because nothing in the pleadings or exhibits suggests diversit y of the parties, 4 the Court could decide Battle’s District- law claim only if it exercised s upplemental jurisdiction over it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; id. § 1366 (clarif ying that claims arisin g under District of Columbia law do not fall within federal origi nal jurisdiction). And with th e Court having dismissed Battle’s federal claims, the proper course is to dismiss his District-la w claim as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (allowing district cour t to decline supplemental jur isdiction if the Court “has dismissed all claims over which i t has original jurisdiction”); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the fede ral claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims s hould be dismissed as well.”).
IV. Conclusion The Court concludes that Battl e’s second amended complaint fai ls to state any federallaw claims upon which relief can be granted. And, having dismi ssed Battle’s federal claims, it declines to exercise supplement al jurisdiction over his claim f or wrongful termination, which arises under District of Columbi a law. The Court will therefor e dismiss this case. A separate Order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge
Date: February 9, 2018

4 The complaint and the attache d EEOC dismissal indicate that B attle and Master Security are both Maryland res idents. See Compl. at 1, 9 (ECF No. 1).