MILITARY AIRLIFT

DOD Needs to Take 

Steps to Manage 

Workload Distributed 

to the Civil Reserve 

Air Fleet

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2013

GAO-13-564

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-564, a report to 

congressional committees

June 2013

MILITARY AIRLIFT

DOD Needs to Take Steps to Manage Workload 

Distributed to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Why GAO Did This Study

To move passengers and cargo, DOD 

supplements its military aircraft with 

cargo and passenger aircraft from 

volunteer commercial carriers 

participating in the CRAF program. 

Participating carriers commit their 

aircraft to support a range of military 

operations in exchange for peacetime 

business. A House Armed Services 

Committee mandated GAO to report 

on matters related to the CRAF 

program. GAO assessed whether DOD 

(1) met its military airlift training 

requirements while also using CRAF 

participants to the maximum extent 

practicable, (2) provided justification for 

restricting commercial carriers from 

transporting partial plane loads of 

cargo over certain routes, and (3) has 

established future requirements for 

CRAF and how the planned size of 

CRAF compares to those 

requirements. GAO reviewed guidance 

and policies pertaining to the program, 

flying hour data, and DOD-sponsored

CRAF study reports. GAO also 

interviewed DOD and industry officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary 

of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Air Force and the Commander, U.S. 

Transportation Command—in 

conjunction with the Commander, Air 

Mobility Command—to use its existing 

processes for monitoring training to 

determine when it can shift its 

distribution of peacetime airlift 

workload from military to commercial 

sources. In comments on a draft of this 

report, DOD concurred with GAO’s 

recommendation and stated that it 

believes implementing the

recommendation will further improve 

the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program. 

What GAO Found

DOD exceeded the flying hours needed to meet military training requirements for 

fiscal years 2002 through 2010 because of increased operational requirements 

associated with Afghanistan and Iraq; however it does not know whether it used 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) participants to the maximum extent practicable. 

DOD guidance requires it to meet training requirements and to use commercial 

transportation to the “maximum extent practicable.” During fiscal years 2002 

through 2010, DOD flew its fleet more than needed to train its crews, although its 

flying has more closely matched its training needs in recent years. DOD has also 

used CRAF participants extensively to supplement military airlift. Although DOD 

has taken steps to make more airlift business available to CRAF participants, 

officials said that overseas operations have provided enough missions to support 

both training and CRAF business obligations. However, with the drawdown in 

Afghanistan, DOD officials expect the need for airlift to decline by at least 66 

percent—to pre-September 2001 levels—reducing both training hours available 

for DOD and business opportunities for CRAF. DOD does not use its process for 

monitoring flying hours to determine when it will exceed required training hours 

and allocate eligible airlift missions to CRAF participants. Therefore, it cannot 

determine whether it is using CRAF to the maximum extent practicable. As a 

result, DOD may be using its military fleet more than necessary—which officials 

say is less economical—while risking reduced CRAF participation.

DOD provided several reasons for restricting commercial carriers from 

transporting partial plane loads of cargo over channel routes, including the need 

to promote efficiency, meet its military airlift training requirements, and fulfill 

peacetime business obligations to CRAF participants. Channel route missions 

are regularly scheduled airlift missions used to transport cargo and provide 

aircrew training time. These missions also help DOD provide business to CRAF 

participants. According to U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) officials, 

DOD generally requires aircraft conducting channel route missions to be 

completely full of cargo before takeoff. The policy restricting carriers from flying 

partial loads over channel routes allows DOD to consolidate cargo previously 

flown by commercial carriers in less than full plane loads and redirect that cargo 

into the channel route system, where it will be transported by either commercial 

or military aircraft as part of a full plane load mission. According to DOD, 

consolidating cargo into full loads flown over the channel route system has 

increased both the efficiency of these missions and the availability of missions 

that DOD uses to train its crews and fulfill its business obligations to CRAF.

It is unclear whether the planned size of CRAF will be adequate to meet future 

airlift requirements. DOD last established its future requirements based on the 

wartime scenarios in the Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2016, issued in 

2010. However, due to changing military strategy and priorities, the 2010 study 

does not reflect current mission needs. The National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2013 requires DOD to conduct a new mobility capabilities and 

requirements study. DOD has not begun this study or finalized its ongoing 

reviews of the CRAF program’s ability to support future requirements. Once they 

are finalized, these studies should allow DOD to better understand future 

requirements for CRAF and whether the CRAF program will meet future airlift 

requirements.

View GAO-13-564. For more information, 

contact Zina Merritt at (202) 512-5257 or 

merrittz@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Letter 1 

Background 5

DOD’s Process for Monitoring Flying Hours Provides Information 

That Could Help It Determine When to Shift Eligible Missions to 

CRAF Participants 9

DOD Restricts Partial Plane Loads on Channel Routes to Promote 

Efficiency, Meet Training Requirements, and Fulfill Peacetime 

Business Obligations to CRAF 21

Adequacy of CRAF to Meet Future Mission Needs is Unclear until 

DOD Completes Several Assessments 30

Conclusions 35

Recommendation for Executive Action 35

Agency Comments 35

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 38

Appendix II U.S. Transportation Command Restricted Route Policy 42

Appendix III List of Civil Reserve Air Fleet Participants (As of April 2013) 43

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 44

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45

Table

Table 1: Level of Airlift Support Pledged by CRAF Participants for 

Stage 3 in Fiscal Years 2011–2013 16

Figures

Figure 1: Percentage by Which Actual AMC Flying Hours Exceeded 

Planned AMC Flying Hours in Fiscal Years 2001–2012 12

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Figure 2: AMC-Managed Sorties Flown in Fiscal Years 2004–2012, 

by Airlift Source 13

Figure 3: Passengers Flown on AMC-Managed Flights in Fiscal 

Years 2004–2012, by Airlift Source 14

Figure 4: Cargo Tons Flown on AMC-Managed Flights in Fiscal 

Years 2004–2012, by Airlift Source 15

Figure 5: DOD Payments Made to CRAF Participants and Foreign 

Carriers in Fiscal Years 2001–2012 18

Figure 6: Fiscal Years 2010–2012 Cargo Tons Flown by Airlift 

Mission Type (as Percentages of All Airlift) 24

Figure 7: Commercial versus Military Channel Route Movements 

for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2012 28

Abbreviations

AMC Air Mobility Command 

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

DOD Department of Defense

MCRS Mobility Capability Requirements Study

MRCS Mobility Requirements and Capability Study 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

REMIS Reliability and Maintainability Information 

System

TACC Tanker Airlift Control Center

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command

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Page 1 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 20, 2013

Congressional Committees

DOD augments its military cargo and passenger airlift capability with 

aircraft from commercial carriers participating in the Civil Reserve Air 

Fleet (CRAF) program. Participating carriers commit their aircraft to be 

called upon, or activated,1 for use to support a range of military 

operations. The U.S. government provides commercial carriers with 

economic incentives to encourage their participation in CRAF, by giving 

them the opportunity to transport DOD personnel and cargo in peacetime 

and by reserving a number of additional airlift contracts for CRAF carriers, 

such as the U.S. General Services Administration’s City Pairs program 

and the U.S. Transportation Command-managed World Wide Express 

program. Since 2001, CRAF participants have received nearly $30 billion 

in revenue for providing peacetime airlift services to DOD.2 In fiscal year 

2012, CRAF participants received approximately $2 billion in payments 

from DOD for their peacetime participation. However, DOD projects that 

by 2015, its peacetime business will decline by an estimated 66 percent 

as it returns to pre-September 11, 2001 levels, raising concerns within 

DOD and among CRAF participants about the effect this loss of business 

will have on the carriers and their ability to continue participating in the 

program. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Transportation Policy serves as the principal advisor for establishing 

policies and providing guidance to DOD components for efficient and 

effective use of government and commercial transportation resources. 

DOD’s U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), headquartered at 

Scott Air Force Base in Illinois, manages many aspects of the CRAF 

program and makes recommendations concerning the capability, 

capacity, and other requirements for mobility assets needed to execute 

TRANSCOM’s mission.

 

1

Aircraft committed to the CRAF program can be activated during a war-time or 

emergency scenario under a stage I, II, or III CRAF activation. In exchange for 

participation in the program, carriers are eligible to fly peacetime airlift missions under a 

non-activated status. 

2

DOD refers to any business performed by CRAF participants outside of an activation as 

commercial augmentation, otherwise referred to as “peacetime business” throughout this 

report. DOD’s last CRAF activation occurred from February to June 2003 at the start of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

According to TRANSCOM officials, CRAF benefits the nation by providing 

up to half of the nation’s long-range airlift capability, allowing the 

government to avoid having to buy additional aircraft, pay personnel 

costs, or maintain the aircraft during peacetime. The National Airlift Policy 

emphasizes the importance of CRAF to the nation by noting that military 

and commercial resources are equally important and interdependent in 

the fulfillment of the national defense airlift objective.3 Consistent with that 

policy, DOD Instruction 4500.57 requires that DOD operate its fleet to 

meet its training requirements while also using commercial sources of 

transportation to the “maximum extent practicable.”

4 According to Air 

Mobility Command (AMC) officials, airlift missions that are not conducted 

to satisfy training requirements should be performed by CRAF 

participants, except when there is some other feature of the mission that 

requires military airlift. Further, since DOD’s military fleet has limited 

capability to meet its passenger airlift requirements, it mostly relies on 

CRAF commercial carriers to fulfill these requirements. DOD’s military 

fleet has the capability to carry bulk, outsized, and oversized cargo; 

however, DOD relies on commercial cargo carriers to move a portion of 

its bulk cargo both in peacetime and in times of crisis or war.

Over the last several years, we and others have reported on the 

challenges faced by the CRAF program. In September 2009, we 

recommended that DOD assess the level of risk associated with the 

commercial carriers’ declining charter passenger capabilities and DOD’s 

increased need to move very large cargo. DOD did not agree with our 

recommendation because, it stated, an assessment of the declining 

charter passenger capabilities had already been done in 2008 by the 

Institute for Defense Analysis; however, as we stated in our report, the 

assessment conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis on DOD’s 

behalf did not include the most current and relevant data affecting the 

program; for that reason we believe our recommendation is still viable 

and important. Additionally, we recommended that, given the importance 

of the CRAF program in moving passengers and cargo to support 

 

3

See National Security Decision Directive 280, National Airlift Policy (June 24, 1987)

(hereinafter cited as National Airlift Policy (June 24, 1987)). As described by the policy, the 

national defense airlift objective is to ensure that military and civil airlift resources will be 

able to meet defense mobilization and deployment requirements in support of U.S. 

defense and foreign policies. See id.

4

See Department of Defense Instruction 4500.57, Transportation and Traffic Management 

(Mar. 18, 2008) (hereinafter cited as DODI 4500.57 (Mar. 18, 2008)). 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

peacetime, contingency, and major operations, DOD should develop 

appropriate policies and procedures for mitigating risks regarding the 

CRAF program in order to maintain its viability to meet DOD’s future 

needs.5 DOD agreed that there is a need for comprehensive policy 

governing all of the CRAF program elements identified in our report; 

however DOD did not identify what, if any, specific actions it would take in 

response to our recommendation. However, DOD updated some of its 

guidance regarding the CRAF program in 2011, and in fiscal year 2012, 

AMC began a series of studies that may begin to address this 

recommendation. Further, multiple DOD-sponsored studies have 

identified risks to the CRAF program resulting from a changed business 

environment and an expected decrease in CRAF participation—especially 

in the level of charter airline participation—as DOD’s airlift workload 

declines.6

House Report 112-479, accompanying a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, mandated us to report to the 

congressional defense committees on matters related to the long-term 

ability of CRAF to meet DOD’s needs. 7 Accordingly, we assessed the 

extent to which DOD has (1) met its military airlift training requirements 

while also using CRAF participants to the maximum extent practicable, 

(2) provided justification for restricting commercial carriers from 

transporting partial plane loads of cargo over certain routes, and (3) 

established future requirements for the CRAF program, and how the 

planned size of CRAF compares to those requirements.

To assess the extent to which DOD has met its military airlift training 

requirements while also using CRAF participants to the maximum extent 

practicable, we analyzed policies, regulations and guidance pertaining to 

the management of the CRAF program. We also analyzed DOD’s training 

requirements for its flying hour program to determine the number of hours 

DOD flew its strategic airlift fleet compared to the number of hours it was 

 

5

GAO, Military Airlift: DOD Should Take Steps to Strengthen Management of the Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet Program, GAO-09-625 (Washington D.C.: Sept.30, 2009). 

6

Institute for Defense Analysis: Civil Reserve Air Fleet: Economics and Strategy, IDA 

paper P-4373; August 22, 2008; Council for Logistics Research, Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

Study Report, July 31, 2008. 

7

See H.R. Rep. No. 112-479, at129-30 (2012).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

required to fly to meet training requirements over the last 10 years.8 In 

addition, we conducted interviews with officials from TRANSCOM, AMC, 

and The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics to understand how DOD decides whether to 

use the military fleet or commercial airlift. We also interviewed officials 

from 21 of the 30 CRAF carriers who were participating in the program as 

of October 2012, as well as representatives from the National Air Carrier 

Association—an industry association representing several CRAF 

participants—to understand the perspectives of commercial participants 

in the CRAF program. To assess the extent to which DOD provided 

justification for restricting commercial carriers from transporting partial 

plane loads of cargo over certain routes, we reviewed DOD policies that 

place restrictions on commercial carriers flying over certain routes. We 

also reviewed data from fiscal years 2000 and 2012, and interviewed 

TRANSCOM officials, to obtain information on the rationale and benefits 

of these restrictions. In addition, we conducted interviews and obtained 

written responses from CRAF participants to gain an understanding of 

how such restrictions were affecting their business. To assess whether 

DOD has established future requirements for the CRAF program and how 

the planned size of CRAF compares to those requirements, we reviewed 

studies assessing DOD’s strategic airlift capabilities, such as DOD’s 

Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study–2016, and the Air Mobility 

Command 2012 CRAF Phase 1 study. We also reviewed data on the 

number of commercial aircraft committed to DOD’s CRAF program and 

compared these data with DOD’s current airlift requirements. Lastly, we 

interviewed TRANSCOM and AMC officials to determine what steps are 

being taken to establish future requirements and to gain their perspective 

on the challenges, if any, they expect to face as they continue to manage 

the CRAF program.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to June 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence and data obtained was sufficiently reliable for our purposes, 

and provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

 

8

We obtained training requirement data on DOD’s flying hour program from the Air 

Mobility Command. 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

on our audit objectives. More detailed information on our scope and 

methodology is provided in appendix I.

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a voluntary, contract-based 

agreement between DOD and U.S. commercial air carriers that augments 

DOD’s military airlift capability during times of war and national 

emergency. It was created in 1951 to augment DOD airlift capability 

during a national defense-related crisis. The National Airlift Policy, signed 

by President Reagan in 1987 and still in effect, establishes policy that the 

military will rely on the commercial air carrier industry to provide the airlift 

capability required beyond that available in the military airlift fleet.9 The 

policy includes guidelines for meeting airlift requirements in both 

peacetime and wartime. These guidelines direct, among other things, that 

policies be designed to increase participation in CRAF and enhance the 

mobilization base10 of the U.S. commercial air carrier industry. In 

exchange for this participation, the government provides commercial 

carriers the opportunity to fly DOD peacetime missions moving 

passengers and cargo and also sets aside business for CRAF 

participants in the General Services Administration City Pairs passenger 

program and TRANSCOM’s Worldwide Express cargo program. CRAF is 

divided into three progressive stages that TRANSCOM can activate 

during times of crisis, in part or in whole, with the approval of the 

Secretary of Defense.

• Stage I covers a minor regional contingency or other situations where 

AMC cannot simultaneously meet both deployment and other airlift 

requirements.

• Stage II is tailored for a major theater war or a defense airlift 

emergency short of a full national emergency.

 

9

See National Airlift Policy (June 24, 1987).

10DOD defines the mobilization base as the total of all resources available, or that can be 

made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Such resources include the 

manpower and materiel resources and services required for the support of essential 

military, civilian, and survival activities, as well as the elements affecting their state of 

readiness. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, at 189 (Nov. 8, 2010) (as amended through Mar. 15, 

2013). 

Background 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

• Stage III would be required if the military had to fight more than one 

major theater war at the same time or operate in a larger crisis, 

including a national emergency declared by the President or 

Congress. A stage III CRAF activation has never occurred.

DOD has activated CRAF only twice in the history of the program. Stage I 

and part of stage II were activated in support of Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm in August 1990 and January 1991, respectively, 

through May 1991. The CRAF stage I passenger segment was activated 

in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in February through June 2003.

To enter the CRAF program, an air carrier must (1) be a U.S. flagged, 

Federal Aviation Administration approved Part 121 air carrier, (2) be 

approved by the Commercial Airlift Review Board, 11 (3) have one year 

prior equivalent uninterrupted service to the commercial sector, (4) meet 

a minimum fleet participation level (for international carriers), (5) meet a 

specified utilization rate (for international and aeromedical evacuation 

fleet participants), and (6) be able to meet manning and crew 

requirements. Once approved to participate, carriers commit the number 

of aircraft they will make available for each of the three stages of the 

CRAF program. AMC then decides the number of aircraft that will be 

accepted into the CRAF program, based on DOD’s wartime requirements. 

As of April 2013, a total of 64 aircraft were committed to stage I, 308 to 

stage II, and 554 to stage III.

Two segments of the commercial airlift industry—scheduled service 

carriers and charter carriers—comprise the CRAF wartime capability. The 

scheduled service carriers—which include large passenger airlines such 

as American Airlines and Delta Air Lines and cargo carriers such as 

FedEx and UPS—pledge the majority of the aircraft accepted into the 

CRAF program. DOD will use most of the pledged aircraft only during a 

CRAF activation. In peacetime, scheduled service carriers operate 

commercial flights on regular routes and cannot afford unplanned 

disruptions to their airline networks. Because many DOD missions are not 

routine in their locations or timing, charter carriers—which have the 

flexibility to provide airlift based on their customers’ schedules—transport 

the majority of DOD’s peacetime, contingency, and stage I business. For 

 

11The Commercial Airlift Review Board is comprised of DOD senior officials and makes 

decisions regarding the use or nonuse of air carriers participating or attempting to 

participate in the DOD air transportation program. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

some of the charter carriers, this peacetime business accounts for a 

significant portion of their total business revenue. However, because 

scheduled service carriers have large fleets, they are also a critical 

component of CRAF, and they provide the bulk of the CRAF strategic 

reserve in the event of a CRAF activation.

The primary incentive for commercial carriers to participate in the CRAF 

program is the opportunity to obtain DOD peacetime business. DOD 

distributes peacetime business to CRAF participants using an entitlement 

process. CRAF carriers are awarded points based on the number of 

aircraft they commit to the program, the stage to which these aircraft are 

assigned, and other considerations as applicable to the individual 

airline.12 The amount of peacetime business CRAF participants are 

entitled to is determined in advance of any missions awarded. DOD 

makes this business available to the CRAF carriers to fulfill its peacetime 

business obligation to them, and it does so by offering the carriers the 

opportunity to fly various missions (for a list of all CRAF carriers, see 

appendix III).

TRANSCOM and AMC share responsibility with respect to CRAF policy. 

TRANSCOM validates the requirements for the movement of personnel 

and cargo, determines which transportation mode will be used for these 

movements, and distributes the work to the appropriate component 

command. Once TRANSCOM determines that a movement will go by air, 

the mission requirement is handled by AMC. Within AMC, the Tanker 

Airlift Control Center (TACC) normally handles mission planning, 

assignment of airlift assets, mission control, and tracking. Mission 

planning includes determining whether military or commercial aircraft will 

fly a mission. CRAF carriers generally have priority over non-CRAF 

carriers for movements of passengers and cargo.

 

12To incentivize participation in the CRAF program, DOD awards CRAF carriers 

mobilization value points. Upon commitment and acceptance to the CRAF program, the 

CRAF carrier’s aircraft are assigned mobilization value points based on factors including 

range, payload, and productive utilization rate, essentially determining the value of each 

aircraft to the program. These points are used to determine the amount of peacetime 

business CRAF carriers will be awarded.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

The Fly CRAF Act generally requires DOD to use CRAF carriers when 

contracting for airlift services, whenever the carriers are available.13 If no 

CRAF participant is available to supply the airlift, DOD may use a nonCRAF carrier (either U.S. or foreign flagged) to fly the mission.14 For airlift 

services between two locations outside the United States, CRAF carriers 

must be used as long as they are “reasonably available.” Only foreign 

carriers operate larger aircraft, such as the AN-124 and IL-76, which are 

designed to carry outsized and oversized cargo that U.S. commercial 

carriers normally cannot accommodate.15 However, according to 

TRANSCOM officials, DOD uses foreign carriers through subcontracts 

with CRAF participants, and only rarely contracts directly with foreign 

carriers. DOD interprets the Fly CRAF Act as applying only to contracts 

that are specifically for airlift services, and not to contracts for services or 

supplies that may involve airlift or other transportation services. For 

example, according to TRANSCOM, DOD does not require “The Fly 

CRAF preference” to be applied to service or supply contracts such as 

the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program or the Defense Logistics 

Agency Prime Vendor Program. According to DOD officials, the current 

law and related contracting provisions provide the department with the 

 

13See 49 U.S.C. § 41106. The Fly CRAF Act applies to the transportation of passengers 

or property by CRAF-eligible aircraft obtained by DOD through a contract for airlift 

services. See § 41106(a)-(c). CRAF-eligible aircraft are aircraft of a type the Secretary of 

Defense has determined to be eligible to participate in the CRAF program. See § 

41106(e). Subject to carrier availability, such transportation may be provided only by 

carriers that hold a certificate issued under section 41102 and either have aircraft in CRAF 

or offer to place aircraft in CRAF. See § 41106(a)-(c). 

14Even where a CRAF carrier is unavailable, DOD may be required to use an available 

U.S. carrier pursuant to the Fly America Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 40118.

15Oversized cargo is air cargo that exceeds the dimensions of a standard (463L) pallet, 

but is air transportable on military and some civilian or foreign cargo carriers. Outsized 

cargo exceeds the dimensions of oversized cargo and requires the use of a military C-5 or 

C-17 aircraft, foreign owned capable aircraft, or surface transportation. 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

flexibility to acquire the best value for products and services when 

executing service or supply contracts.16

DOD has exceeded the flying hours needed to meet military training 

requirements for fiscal years 2002 through 2010 due to increased 

operational requirements associated with Afghanistan and Iraq; however 

it does not know whether it used CRAF participants to the maximum 

extent practicable during this period. In fiscal years 2010 through 2012, 

DOD’s flying hours have more closely matched its training plan. In 

keeping with its policy to both provide training within the military airlift 

system and use commercial sources of transportation to conduct eligible 

airlift missions, DOD has taken steps to provide CRAF participants with 

peacetime business. However, DOD does not use information from its 

process for monitoring flying hours to determine when it will use more 

hours than it has planned to meet training requirements and shift eligible 

airlift missions to CRAF participants to ensure that commercial sources 

are used to the maximum extent practicable, as required by DOD 

guidance. Unless DOD uses its information on flying hours to determine 

when it can shift eligible airlift missions to CRAF participants, it may be 

flying its military fleet unnecessarily. DOD officials say that using the 

military fleet to fly missions that are eligible to be shifted to CRAF 

participants is more expensive than using the CRAF carriers and could 

reduce these carriers’ level of participation in the CRAF program.

 

16For example, DOD officials pointed to Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 

Supplement section 247.301-71, which applies to supply contracts that will include a 

significant requirement for transportation of items outside the continental United States. In 

these circumstances, the source selection evaluation criteria for award of the supply 

contract should include an evaluation factor or subfactor that favors suppliers, third-party 

logistics providers, and integrated logistics managers that commit to using carriers that 

participate in certain readiness programs, including CRAF. See Memorandum from the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Transportation 

within Supply Contracts (July 28, 2011) (citing 48 C.F.R. (DFARS) § 247.301-71).

DOD’s Process for 

Monitoring Flying 

Hours Provides 

Information That 

Could Help It 

Determine When to 

Shift Eligible Missions 

to CRAF Participants
 

Page 10 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

The National Airlift Policy states that the “Department of Defense shall 

establish appropriate levels for peacetime cargo airlift augmentation in 

order to promote the effectiveness of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and 

provide training within the military airlift system.”

17 Consistent with that 

policy, DOD Instruction 4500.57 requires that DOD operate its fleet to 

meet its training requirements and also requires that it use commercial 

sources of transportation to the “maximum extent practicable.”

18 DOD 

officials stated that they have been using military airlift beyond what was 

planned, because the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq created 

additional airlift requirements, many of which could not be met using U.S. 

commercial sources. For example, some kinds of cargo—such as the 

mine resistant ambush protected vehicles—are too large to fit inside the 

aircraft operated by CRAF participants. Military aircraft, along with some 

foreign aircraft such as the AN-124 and the IL-76, are able to 

accommodate these kinds of cargo. Additionally, missions in Afghanistan

and Iraq often could not be flown by CRAF participants because of 

airspace restrictions on U.S. carriers operating in those countries. Finally, 

some missions have additional requirements that call for the use of 

military airlift, such as requirements that cargo be escorted by military 

personnel or that an aircraft land on an unpaved runway.

Every year, DOD develops requirements for its military aircrews that 

serve as the basis for its flying hour program. The flying hour program 

provides training and experience for the aircrews. These requirements 

consist mainly of two types of flying hours—”currency hours” and 

“experiencing hours.” Training flights conducted to log currency hours 

generally do not carry cargo or passengers and therefore do not compete 

with commercially-operated missions. On the other hand, experiencing, or 

“time in the air,” flights typically carry cargo or passengers and compete 

with commercially-operated missions. Officials told us that currency hour 

flights account for roughly 20 percent of the flying hour requirement and 

are funded through operations and maintenance funds, while 

experiencing hour flights account for approximately 80 percent of the 

requirement. We excluded currency hours from our analysis, since flights 

that provide these training hours generally do not compete for cargo or 

passengers with commercially-operated missions. However, flights that 

provide experiencing hour training are funded through the Transportation 

 

17See National Airlift Policy (June 24, 1987).

18DODI 4500.57, paras. 4.4, 4.4.4 (Mar. 18, 2008).

DOD Exceeded Its 

Required Military Training 

Hours for Fiscal Years 2002 

through 2010, but Has 

Reduced the Percentage of 

Excess Hours in Recent 

Years
 

Page 11 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Working Capital Fund, because these flights carry cargo or passengers. 

As a revolving fund account,19 the Transportation Working Capital Fund 

relies on customer reimbursements in exchange for transportation 

services provided. The customer that requests airlift reimburses the fund 

for the mission performed, although some costs associated with 

mobilization capability and readiness may be funded by the Air Force. For 

the purposes of this report, “military airlift training requirements” refers to 

experiencing hours, because those hours are the ones that DOD must 

decide how to allocate to meet military airlift training requirements while 

also using CRAF participants to the maximum extent practicable.

Figure 1 shows the percentage by which AMC has exceeded the flying 

hours that it planned for experiencing requirements in fiscal years 2001 

through 2012. DOD said that during these years it exceeded its flying 

hours for training because of the need to fly missions to support 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To develop this chart, we compared 

AMC’s requirements for experiencing flying hours to the actual hours 

AMC flew with the primary airlift platforms—the C-5, C-17, and C-130—

and expressed them as percentages of the planned flying hours. We 

excluded the tanker aircraft from this analysis, since there are no 

commercial aircraft in the CRAF program that are comparable to the KC10 or KC-135.

 

19A “revolving fund” is a fund established to finance a cycle of businesslike operations 

through amounts received by the fund. A revolving fund charges for the sale of products or 

services and uses the proceeds to finance its spending, usually on a self-sustaining basis. 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Figure 1: Percentage by Which Actual AMC Flying Hours Exceeded Planned AMC Flying Hours in Fiscal Years 2001–2012

Note: The flying hours in this chart include only Transportation Working Capital Fund hours that are 

used for experiencing training and airlift movements. DOD balances these airlift movements between 

commercial and military aircraft.

Recognizing the importance of the commercial carriers for meeting its 

future airlift requirements, DOD has taken steps to increase the amount of 

peacetime business it gives to CRAF participants. According to 

TRANSCOM’s Fiscal Year 2012 Annual Report,20 CRAF carriers remain 

essential in supplying transportation services and provide a critical part of 

DOD’s warfighting deployment capability. Further, TRANSCOM and AMC 

are using CRAF carriers to more directly support the forces in 

Afghanistan. CRAF participants have provided the majority of passenger 

movements and about a quarter or more of all cargo movements since 

fiscal year 2004. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the extent to which DOD has 

relied on CRAF participants to provide airlift services.

 

20TRANSCOM, United States Transportation Command 2012 Annual Report. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to 

Provide CRAF Participants 

with Peacetime Business
 

Page 13 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Figure 2: AMC-Managed Sorties Flown in Fiscal Years 2004–2012, by Airlift Source

Note: A sortie is defined as the takeoff and landing of one aircraft.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Figure 3: Passengers Flown on AMC-Managed Flights in Fiscal Years 2004–2012, by 

Airlift Source
 

Page 15 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Figure 4: Cargo Tons Flown on AMC-Managed Flights in Fiscal Years 2004–2012, by 

Airlift Source

Over the last few years, both the number of CRAF participants and the 

number of aircraft pledged to the CRAF program have fluctuated, and it is 

not clear what level of support CRAF participants will provide in the 

future. For example, as we noted in our 2009 report on CRAF,21 the 

number of charter aircraft enrolled in the CRAF program had declined 

from more than 60 aircraft in 2003 to as few as 19 in April 2008, before 

stabilizing at 29 charter aircraft in May 2008. Our analysis shows that 

CRAF participation as of fiscal year 2012 was still sufficient to allow DOD 

to meet its wartime requirements. However, according to some current 

CRAF participants, changes to the business environment, such as the 

ongoing economic down-turn, have resulted in five of the participating 

 

21GAO, Military Airlift: DOD Should Take Steps to Strengthen Management of the Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet Program, GAO-09-625 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2009). 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

carriers filing for bankruptcy over the last three years. Two of these 

carriers have already completely ceased providing airlift services. Table 1 

shows the level of airlift support provided by CRAF participants and 

military aircraft during the last three years.

Table 1: Level of Airlift Support Pledged by CRAF Participants for Stage 3 in Fiscal 

Years 2011–2013 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Support 2011 2012 2013b

Participating Carriers 35 31 28

Number and Type of 

Aircraft Pledged to 

CRAF

Passenger 686 823 392

Cargo 175 163 162

Aeromedicala 39 39 0 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Mobility Command data.

Note: Aircraft noted above are included in the International Segment (Long Range & Short Range), 

Aeromedical Segment, and National Segment (including Domestic and Alaskan sections). In fiscal 

year 2011, TRANSCOM implemented changes to the CRAF program limiting the number of aircraft 

that would be accepted into the program. 

a

The Aeromedical requirement was reduced in fiscal year 2013 and currently no carriers are pledged 

to this segment.

b

Aircraft enrolled in the CRAF program as of April 2013.

To support increasing the amount of business provided to CRAF 

participants, TRANSCOM has created a new organization called the 

Enterprise Readiness Center. According to an official with the Enterprise 

Readiness Center, one of the goals of the center is to explore ways to 

encourage DOD organizations, like the Defense Logistics Agency, to 

direct more air cargo business into the DOD-managed Defense 

Transportation System. Further, the center will also seek to preserve 

DOD’s airlift readiness capability, given the reduction in airlift volume, and 

to help DOD maintain efficiencies by ensuring that the Defense 

Transportation System is the primary source used by DOD entities to 

arrange transportation. To achieve this, the Enterprise Readiness Center 

proposes to improve the usage process of the Defense Transportation 

System, create flexible rates, minimize overhead as a way to reduce 

rates, develop customer-based transportation solutions, and create an 

active dialogue with CRAF participants. As a way to further strengthen 

communications and the strategic relationship between DOD, the 

Department of Transportation, and CRAF participants, TRANSCOM and 

AMC also established an Executive Working Group in 2010. The 

Executive Working Group is a discussion forum used to address general 

issues related to the CRAF program. The working group’s meetings are a 

forum for providing updates regarding efforts related to the CRAF 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

program, such as updates on various studies, the status of efforts related 

to CRAF, and carrier concerns.

DOD officials also told us that they have taken additional steps over the 

last few years to improve the distribution of business within the CRAF 

program. TRANSCOM has revised its process for awarding points over 

the last few years to award more bonus points to carriers that fly 

additional peacetime missions, assume a greater risk of activation, and 

operate more modern, fuel-efficient aircraft. TRANSCOM has also revised 

the practice of awarding commissions. Larger carriers allow the smaller 

carriers on their teams22 the benefit of using their points to obtain DOD 

business, in exchange for commissions consisting of a percentage of the 

revenue the smaller carriers earn from this business. These commissions 

are one of the ways in which larger carriers earn revenue from the CRAF 

program, since they do not conduct many of the actual airlift missions in 

peacetime. However, according to an official at one carrier, these 

commissions had risen to as high as 9 percent of the revenue earned 

from the mission. TRANSCOM officials told us that they have capped the 

value of these commissions at 5 percent of mission revenue, in an 

attempt to ensure that smaller carriers earn enough profit from performing 

peacetime airlift missions.

DOD intended for these efforts to strengthen the viability of the CRAF 

program. The opinions of CRAF participants varied on the extent to which 

these changes made the program more equitable, mostly depending on 

whether the carrier directly benefited from the changes. All of the carriers 

we spoke with indicated that they were planning to stay in the CRAF 

program for the immediate future. However, some added that if the 

revenue they were receiving decreased too much, they would reassess 

their participation and would consider not participating in future years. 

More than half of the CRAF participants we interviewed suggested that 

DOD could do more to increase the peacetime business it provides to 

them. Some of these carriers suggested that DOD’s use of foreign air 

carriers should be curtailed. According to DOD officials, foreign carriers 

 

22To maximize the value of entitlements, CRAF participants form teaming arrangements, 

which are created and managed by the participants themselves. The teams are comprised 

of a mix of passenger and cargo carriers that join together to pool their entitlements to 

DOD business; that is, the entitlement directly associated with a carrier’s individual 

commitment is combined with the entitlements earned by other carriers on its team. DOD 

assigns peacetime business to the team based on the team’s total entitlement and 

availability.
 

Page 18 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

primarily operate as sub-contractors to CRAF participants to move cargo 

that is too large for standard U.S. commercial aircraft, and only in rare 

cases would DOD contract directly with a foreign carrier. Furthermore, our 

analysis indicates that the use of foreign carriers has declined since its 

high point in fiscal year 2008. As shown in figure 5, payments made to 

foreign carriers have declined by more than 55 percent since fiscal year 

2008.

Figure 5: DOD Payments Made to CRAF Participants and Foreign Carriers in Fiscal Years 2001–2012

DOD does not use its process for monitoring flying hours to determine 

when it will exceed its planned training hours, and it does not use the 

information from this process to allocate eligible airlift missions to CRAF 

participants. As previously noted, DOD guidance requires TRANSCOM to 

meet its training needs while also using commercial sources of 

transportation to the “maximum extent practicable.” DOD officials told us 

that, consistent with this policy, meeting training needs was their priority. 

However, they also told us that flights provided by CRAF participants are 

less expensive than military flights, in part because commercial aircraft 

DOD Does Not Use Its 

Process For Monitoring 

Training Hours to Inform 

Its Allocation of Eligible 

Airlift Missions to CRAF 

Participants
 

Page 19 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

are designed to be more fuel-efficient, while military aircraft are designed 

to carry heavy cargo and land in austere locations. In addition, according 

to AMC data, once training requirements have been met, using 

commercial carriers for airlift missions can be less costly than using 

military aircraft. For example, according to an April 2013 analysis 

provided by AMC officials, the cost per pound to transport cargo using 

commercial carriers such as the 747 and MD-11 can be between 22 and 

35 percent lower than the cost of transporting the same cargo using 

military aircraft such as the C-5 and C-17. Currently, airlift requests are 

handled by different sections within the Tanker Airlift Command Center 

(TACC), depending on the type of airlift requested. Each of these sections 

has a different process for choosing whether to use commercial or military 

airlift to meet the request. Some airlift missions are conducted primarily 

by military airlift, while others are conducted by commercial sources.

However, while TRANSCOM performs periodic monitoring of the 

distribution of missions between military and commercial sources, officials 

acknowledged that this monitoring does not consider the extent to which 

training requirements have already been met or will be met with planned 

missions. According to DOD officials, airlift missions that are not 

conducted to satisfy training requirements should be performed by CRAF 

participants, except when there is some other feature of the mission that 

requires military airlift. Knowing when more flying hours are going to be 

used than are needed to meet training requirements—and using this 

information to shift eligible airlift missions to CRAF participants—would 

allow DOD to use commercial sources of transportation to the maximum 

extent practicable.

DOD officials told us that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan had ensured 

that there were enough airlift missions available both to support training 

requirements and to provide adequate peacetime business for CRAF 

participants. Further, they noted that there are a number of reasons that 

DOD might exceed its flying hours, such as the need to transport 

particularly large cargo, special conditions that require military aircraft 

(such as unpaved runways), and restrictions on U.S. carriers operating in 

Iraq and most of Afghanistan. Given such requirements, officials 

questioned the utility of developing a process to monitor the balance 

between satisfying flying hour training requirements and providing CRAF 

participants with additional peacetime business; they said that they were 

uncertain how many additional missions would be eligible to be flown by 

commercial carriers. However, TRANSCOM and AMC officials have 

acknowledged that they have not collected data that would allow them to 

determine how many of these missions could be shifted to CRAF 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

participants. Furthermore, while we acknowledge that there may be a 

number of legitimate reasons why military aircraft would have to be used 

for missions even after training requirements have already been met, it is 

not clear that such reasons are always present when military airlift is 

used. For example, AMC completed a study in December that was 

intended, in part, to address short-term concerns regarding the CRAF 

program and its participants. This study noted that some missions were 

flown on military aircraft only because the necessary load plans23 for 

commercial aircraft had not been developed in a timely manner—not 

because of any requirement that the cargo be flown on military aircraft. 

The study recommended that DOD airlift customers develop commercial 

load plans to facilitate scheduling of commercial aircraft in these 

situations. This study acknowledges that some missions currently flown 

by military airlift could instead be flown by CRAF participants without 

negatively affecting training hours.

After the drawdown in Afghanistan concludes, the need for airlift is 

expected to decline, which will reduce both training opportunities and the 

business available for CRAF participants. In addition, as airlift needs 

decrease, DOD may need to fly a higher percentage of its channel 

missions in order to provide its crews with sufficient training opportunities, 

which could further decrease its use of CRAF participants. DOD officials 

told us that they expect peacetime business to fall significantly after fiscal 

year 2015. This decrease has already begun; peacetime revenues of 

CRAF participants have already dropped by nearly one third, from their 

high point of approximately $3 billion in fiscal year 2010 to about $2 billion 

in fiscal year 2012, as shown in figure 5. Commercial carriers are 

projected to be used even less in fiscal year 2013 and beyond, until 

revenues return to pre-September 11, 2001 levels of $700 million or less. 

This represents a potential 66 percent decline in DOD business available 

to CRAF participants, which may further exacerbate the economic 

pressures under which CRAF participants are operating.

By not using the information it has on flying hours to help determine when 

it can allocate eligible airlift missions to CRAF participants, DOD loses the 

ability to determine whether it is using commercial sources—such as 

CRAF participants—to the maximum extent practicable, as required by 

 

23A “load plan” is the plan for how to pack a shipment of cargo so that it will fit safely onto 

a given aircraft. 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

DOD guidance. As a result, DOD may be using its military fleet more than 

necessary thereby risking reduced participation of commercial carriers in 

the CRAF program.

DOD provided several reasons for restricting commercial carriers from 

transporting partial plane loads of cargo over certain routes, based on its 

need to promote efficiency, meet its military airlift training requirements, 

and fulfill peacetime business obligations to CRAF participants. According 

to TRANSCOM officials, in 2001, DOD began restricting commercial air 

carriers from transporting partial plane loads of cargo over certain 

overseas channel routes in order to improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of the cargo missions flown over these routes and keep 

cargo flights in the channel route system that DOD relies on to satisfy its 

training requirements and business obligations to CRAF participants. In 

May 2012, TRANSCOM issued a memorandum reiterating its policy of 

restricting commercial aircraft—including CRAF participants—from 

transporting partial plane loads of cargo over these routes.24 According to 

TRANSCOM officials responsible for coordinating airlift for DOD, this 

policy—which has been in place for over a decade—is a tool to help DOD 

increase the efficiency of its cargo shipments airlifted over channel routes 

and minimize costs to DOD. DOD officials reported that in the late 1990’s 

and early 2000’s commercial air carriers began transporting an 

increasingly larger share of DOD cargo shipments, leaving a relatively 

small amount of cargo for military aircraft to transport over channel 

routes. DOD officials said that before the policy was implemented, military 

aircraft would often conduct channel route missions with partial loads of 

cargo, instead of completely filling the aircraft with cargo, which is more 

cost effective. In addition, in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, DOD was 

experiencing a shortage of flying hours for training. During this same 

period, commercial carriers were flying a large number of airlift missions, 

 

24See Memorandum For: International Carriers, Attachment 1, International Air Tender 

Restricted Routes (May 1, 2012). The memorandum provides that “[a]s a condition of 

USTC [TRANSCOM] approval of the International Heavyweight Air Tenders, 

Transportation Service Providers (Carriers/Agents/Forwarders) agree that they will not 

solicit or perform International Air Tender transportation services for Department of 

Defense consignors over validated OCONUS channel routes designated as ’Restricted 

Routes’ under USTC tenders.” However, the memorandum also provides that carriers are 

authorized to perform such movement on restricted routes through spot quotes or similar 

arrangements, once certain requirements have been met. For a copy of TRANSCOM’s 

restricted route policy memo see appendix II of this report. 

DOD Restricts Partial 

Plane Loads on 

Channel Routes to 

Promote Efficiency, 

Meet Training 

Requirements, and 

Fulfill Peacetime 

Business Obligations 

to CRAF
 

Page 22 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

which exacerbated DOD’s flying hour shortage, because many of the 

airlift missions that military aircrews could have conducted for training 

purposes were being lost to commercial air carriers. Lastly, according to 

TRANSCOM officials, because many of the partial planeload missions 

performed by commercial carriers were negotiated under tender 

contracting arrangements— which are not included in the annual amount 

of peacetime business DOD guarantees to the CRAF program—DOD’s 

ability to fulfill its peacetime business obligations to CRAF was being 

challenged.

The National Airlift Policy states that military and commercial resources 

are equally important— and interdependent—in fulfilling the national 

defense airlift objective.25 The policy also provides that the goal of the 

U.S. government is to maintain in peacetime military airlift resources that 

are manned, equipped, trained, and operated to ensure the capability to 

meet wartime requirements. DOD guidance also notes that TRANSCOM 

may be required to maintain a readiness posture that includes operating 

military airlift internationally during peacetime, and that it must conduct 

such operations at the level necessary to meet operational and training 

requirements.26 According to DOD officials who are responsible for 

managing DOD’s strategic airlift requirements, TRANSCOM takes steps 

to meet DOD’s flying hour training requirements while also providing 

commercial carriers with peacetime business; however the flying hour 

training requirement takes precedence. DOD performs a variety of types 

of airlift missions that allow military aircrews to meet their flying hour 

training requirements while also delivering the cargo needed to sustain 

military operations to military units located overseas. These mission types 

include:

• Channel airlift missions: regularly scheduled airlift for movement of 

sustainment cargo and/or personnel between designated aerial port of 

embarkation and aerial port of debarkation over validated contingency 

or distribution channel routes.

 

25See National Airlift Policy (June 24, 1987). As described by the policy, the national 

defense airlift objective is to ensure that military and civil airlift resources will be able to 

meet defense mobilization and deployment requirements in support of U.S. defense and 

foreign policies. See id.

26See DODI 4500.57, para. 4.4.4 (Mar. 18, 2008). 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

• Special assignment airlift missions: airlift missions requiring 

special pickup/delivery at locations other than those established within 

the approved channel structure or requiring special consideration 

because of the number of passengers, weight or size of the cargo, 

urgency or sensitivity of movement, or other special factors.

• Contingency missions: airlift for movement of cargo and/or 

personnel in support of military operations directed by appropriate 

authority to protect U.S. interests.

• Exercise missions: airlift for movement of cargo and/or personnel in 

support of a military maneuver or simulated wartime operation 

involving planning, preparation, and execution that are carried out for 

the purpose of training and evaluation.

• Theater direct delivery: a theater-based distribution system wherein 

delivery to destinations forward of major aerial ports of debarkation 

can be performed by any available aircraft, including those normally 

used for intertheater requirements.

Channel route missions are conducted by both military and CRAF 

participants and account for a large portion of DOD’s overall airlift activity. 

During the last three fiscal years, at least 30 percent of DOD’s total cargo 

movement was over channel routes. See figure 6 below.
 

Page 24 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Figure 6: Fiscal Years 2010–2012 Cargo Tons Flown by Airlift Mission Type (as 

Percentages of All Airlift)

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

TRANSCOM officials stated that to maximize efficiency, DOD requires 

aircraft conducting channel route missions—whether they are military or 

commercial—to be completely full of cargo before takeoff. According to 

TRANSCOM officials, the policy restricting commercial carriers from 

transporting partial loads over channel routes provides DOD with a tool to 

maximize the amount of cargo transported in a single mission over a 

channel route. Cargo previously transported by commercial carriers in 

partial loads is now consolidated at aerial ports of embarkation. 

TRANSCOM officials reported that historically, commercial carriers 

transporting partial loads had been conducting a large portion of DOD’s 

airlift business. These commercial airlift missions involved transporting 

cargo to and from locations that were also being serviced by military 

aircraft conducting channel missions. DOD was not maximizing the 

efficiency of its channel route missions and minimizing costs, because 

aircraft were not filled to capacity. To reduce the redundancy of 

transporting cargo using both modes of delivery, DOD began restricting 

commercial carriers from conducting partial plane load missions over 

channel routes, and it now generally requires commercial aircraft 

conducting channel missions to be full of cargo before takeoff. According 

to TRANSCOM officials, the policy ultimately played a role in increasing 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

the efficiency of DOD’s air cargo movements over channel routes. 

According to a RAND report issued in 2003 that analyzed the costs 

associated with transporting cargo over channel routes using commercial 

airlift versus military airlift, DOD would decrease airlift cost if it reduced 

the amount of cargo transported by commercial carriers conducing partial 

plane load missions, and shifted that cargo to be transported in a full 

plane load aircraft.27 Taking this step would be less expensive than 

allowing military aircraft to conduct partial plane load missions over 

channel routes.

In addition, DOD’s policy allows it to offer more training opportunities for 

its aircrews during periods of low demand for airlift. Rather than relying on 

other types of missions—such as contingency missions— to accomplish 

training, AMC prefers to schedule flying hours for training on channel 

route missions, which are regularly scheduled, planned in advance, 

consistent, and predictable. Channel route missions are used to maintain 

and upgrade pilots’ flying skills and, as part of the training, can include 

transporting cargo from specific military locations within the United 

States—such as McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey—to overseas 

military bases located in countries like Germany or Kuwait. These 

missions are conducted on a regularly scheduled basis and include DOD 

cargo, so they provide commanders with reassurance that they will 

receive planned amounts of sustainment cargo within a designated time 

frame.

TRANSCOM officials told us that in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s 

commercial aircraft had been conducting a large portion of DOD’s airlift 

business, but the overall demand for DOD airlift was relatively low; as a 

result the military began experiencing a shortage of flying hours to use for 

training. Many of the airlift missions flown by commercial carriers involved 

transporting cargo that could have been transported by military aircraft. 

DOD’s policy of restricting commercial carriers from transporting partial 

loads over channel routes has allowed DOD to shift cargo into the 

channel route system, increase the number of channel route missions 

available for aircrews to satisfy flying hour training requirements, and 

address DOD’s flying hour shortage. In 2003, the RAND Corporation 

 

27Brian G. Chow, The Peacetime Tempo of Air Mobility Operations: Meeting Demand and 

Maintaining Readiness (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2003).
 

Page 26 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

conducted a study28 of the peacetime tempo of DOD’s air mobility 

operations and asserted that DOD needed to take steps to address its 

shortage of flying hours. The report found that, during fiscal year 2000 

and 2001, aircrew personnel encountered a flying hour shortage because 

international military activity was relatively calm and there were fewer

U.S. missions that required airlift support. The report also pointed out that 

because commercial carriers had begun conducting a large portion of 

DOD’s airlift business, decreasing the amount of airlift business given to 

commercial carriers would help reverse this trend and help alleviate 

DOD’s flying hour shortage. The report’s conclusions supported 

measures taken by DOD to implement a policy to decrease peacetime 

business provided to commercial carriers when necessary, to support 

training requirements. With DOD’s policy in place, more cargo was being 

funneled into the channel route system, and DOD was able to increase 

the number of channel route missions offered to military aircrews, thereby 

helping to alleviate the shortage of flying hours.

Further, TRANSCOM officials said that DOD’s policy of restricting 

commercial carriers from transporting partial planeloads of cargo over 

certain channel routes was also implemented in part to help DOD fulfill its 

peacetime business obligations to CRAF. Through the CRAF peacetime 

airlift contract, DOD provides a certain level of airlift business to CRAF 

participants; DOD negotiates a designated amount of business that it is 

committed to provide to CRAF participants—as an incentive for 

commercial carriers to participate in the CRAF program—and distributes 

this business among the CRAF participants currently enrolled in the 

program. This business consists, in part, of missions flown across 

channel routes. TRANSCOM officials reported that many airlift missions 

conducted by commercial carriers carrying partial loads across channel 

routes were being arranged through tender-based contractual 

agreements. Tender-based agreements for airlift services are offers by an 

air carrier to provide transportation services at a specified rate. According 

to TRANSCOM officials, business associated with tender- based 

contracts falls outside of the CRAF peacetime business entitlement 

obligation. TRANSCOM officials said that this practice was diminishing 

the pool of peacetime business that DOD could provide to CRAF 

participants under the CRAF peacetime business entitlement process. 

 

28Brian G. Chow, The Peacetime Tempo of Air Mobility Operations: Meeting Demand and 

Maintaining Readiness (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2003) 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

According to TRANSCOM officials, the policy limiting the amount of 

tender-related airlift business provided to commercial carriers increases 

the efficiency of channel route missions, alleviates the shortage of flying 

hours for training, and allows DOD to provide CRAF participants with 

peacetime business to fulfill its CRAF peacetime business obligations. In 

addition, TRANSCOM officials said that in periods of high demand for 

airlift, such as the last several years, DOD can provide CRAF participants 

with more channel route business, because military aircrews can satisfy 

their training requirements for flying hours by conducting other airlift 

missions, such as contingency and special assignment airlift missions.

Some CRAF participants expressed concerns to us that the original 

rationale for DOD’s policy no longer exists and that the policy may 

prevent DOD from using the less costly commercial airlift option to 

transport partial loads of cargo over channel routes. First, according to 

TRANSCOM officials, the original rationale for the policy was to ensure 

that DOD could provide sufficient flying hours to train its aircrews. Two of 

the CRAF participants we interviewed stated that this policy was no 

longer necessary because DOD no longer faces flying hour shortages as 

it did in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. DOD officials stated that it is 

important to retain this policy as a management tool, especially since 

DOD’s need for airlift is projected to return to pre-September 2001 levels 

by 2015. According to DOD officials, data from fiscal year 2000 illustrate 

this point; in 2000, DOD needed to reserve about 57 percent of its 

channel route missions for training and provided about 28 percent of the 

channel route missions to CRAF participants. In contrast, during a period 

of high demand for airlift, such as fiscal year 2012, DOD reserved about 

31 percent of its channel route missions for training and was able to 

provide more than 60 percent of its channel route missions to CRAF 

participants. See figure 7 below.
 

Page 28 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Figure 7: Commercial versus Military Channel Route Movements for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2012

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

a

Opportune missions are specific training missions not already committed to a designated airlift 

mission, such as contingency or exercise airlift missions. Military aircraft conducting opportune 

missions transport cargo in the remaining space available aboard the aircraft.
 

Page 29 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Second, a CRAF participant we met with emphasized that using 

commercial aircraft to transport partial loads is less costly than using 

military aircraft to transport partial loads, because when using commercial 

airlift, DOD pays by the pound and only for the cargo airlifted, rather than 

incurring the entire cost of using a military aircraft to carry a partial load. 

DOD officials acknowledge that using commercial carriers to transport 

partial plane loads of cargo is less expensive than using military aircraft 

for this purpose and note that the policy restricting commercial carriers 

from transporting partial plane loads of cargo over certain overseas 

channel routes has a provision to allow commercial carriers to conduct 

such missions on a case-by-case basis, when needed to meet DOD’s 

requirements. For example, if a customer requires a critical, timesensitive item and cannot wait for it to be transported by a regularly 

scheduled channel mission, commanders still may have the option to use 

a commercial carrier to transport a partial load to a designated location 

using a channel route. In addition, commercial carriers can transport 

cargo outside the channel route system under a variety of other DOD 

airlift transportation contracts. For example, TRANSCOM’s World-Wide 

Express program, an airlift transportation program available only to CRAF 

participants, is used to provide international commercial express package 

transportation service for shipments up to and including 300 pounds. This 

program provides DOD with the ability to ensure that commanders can 

receive unique, time-sensitive cargo items when no channel mission is 

available within a specified time frame. Over the last five years, this 

program has consistently generated over $100 million dollars worth of 

airlift business annually for CRAF participants.

According to TRANSCOM and AMC analysis, as the drawdown efforts in 

Afghanistan proceed over the next few years, airlift demand is expected 

to decline to pre-September 11, 2001 levels. It will therefore be important 

for DOD to plan and ensure that military aircrews are provided with ample 

opportunity to fulfill training requirements and avoid a shortage of flying 

hours. In preparation for this decline in the demand for airlift, TRANSCOM 

officials emphasized that DOD’s policy to restrict commercial carriers from 

transporting partial loads over channel routes may continue to serve as 

an important management tool and allow DOD to balance the goals of 

operating its channel route system as efficiently as possible, providing 

enough training opportunities to military aircrews, and fulfilling its CRAF 

peacetime business obligations.
 

Page 30 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

DOD is conducting several interrelated studies to determine its future 

airlift requirements; however it is unclear whether the planned size of 

CRAF will be adequate to meet future airlift requirements. The National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires DOD to conduct 

a study that assesses its mobility needs—referred to as the Mobility 

Requirements and Capabilities Study 2018,29 which DOD had not begun 

at the time of our review. In addition, in response to the changing 

business environment, AMC is also conducting a two-phase study to 

assess the readiness of CRAF participants to augment DOD’s airlift 

capacity and the viability of the CRAF program. The CRAF Phase 1 study 

was completed in December 2012, and according to officials the Phase 2 

is scheduled to be completed in the fall of 2013. Meanwhile, DOD has 

been taking steps to continue to encourage commercial carriers to 

participate in the program. Until DOD finalizes these assessments, it will 

be unclear whether the planned size of CRAF will be adequate to meet 

future airlift requirements.

DOD reports that there are more aircraft committed to the CRAF program 

than are needed to fulfill the wartime requirements established by the 

Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16), which was 

issued in 2010. However, it is not clear whether the current level of CRAF 

participation will provide the right number and mix of aircraft to meet 

future requirements, since DOD has issued new strategic guidance that 

may affect DOD’s airlift requirements.

While the number of aircraft pledged to the program has fluctuated, 

DOD’s past analysis showed that the projected size and mix of the CRAF 

fleet was more than adequate to satisfy all war planning scenarios 

established by the MCRS–16. According to DOD data, as of March 2012, 

CRAF participants had enrolled 15 percent more aircraft in the program 

than would be needed to meet established airlift requirements. The 

MCRS–16 assessed components of the mobility capabilities that DOD 

would need for possible future strategic environments and was intended 

to help DOD make investment decisions regarding mobility systems, such 

as how much to invest in strategic airlift to meet wartime needs. Among 

other things, the study examined how changes in the mobility system 

affect the outcomes of major operations and assessed the associated 

 

29See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 141(c) (2013).

Adequacy of CRAF to 

Meet Future Mission 

Needs is Unclear until 

DOD Completes 

Several Assessments

DOD’s Mission Needs for 

CRAF Have Changed Since 

its Last Assessment of 

Future Requirements
 

Page 31 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

risks. The MCRS–16 determined that, with few exceptions, the mobility 

capabilities projected for 2016 would be sufficient to support the most

demanding projected requirements. The study assessed the major 

mobility systems required to move personnel and supplies from their point 

of origin to their destination: sealift, surface transportation, and airlift 

components, to include strategic airlift, aerial refueling, and CRAF 

passenger and cargo. To support decisions regarding future mobility force 

structure, the MCRS–16 developed three demanding cases consisting of 

conflicts and natural disasters with multiple scenarios occurring over a 7-

year period and requiring the use of mobility capabilities. The MCRS–16 

used approved DOD planning scenarios to develop the three cases. For 

example, in one case, U.S. forces might be required to conduct a large 

land campaign and a long-term irregular warfare campaign while also 

responding to homeland defense missions. In another case, U.S. forces 

might be conducting two nearly simultaneous large-scale campaigns, 

while also responding to three nearly simultaneous domestic events and 

conducting other operations.

Since its last assessment of its airlift requirements in 2010, DOD has 

issued new strategic guidance. Specifically, DOD’s strategic guidance 

issued in January 2012 calls for, among other things, an increased focus 

on the Asia-Pacific region and resizing U.S. forces,30 both of which may 

affect airlift needs. For example, an increased focus on the Asia-Pacific 

region could affect operational plans in that theater and require changes 

to the number and type of forces assigned to the region, as well as the 

associated airlift requirements. In addition, the resizing of DOD forces to 

achieve security objectives could have implications for the choice of 

commercial and military aircraft used to support future military operations. 

In March 2013, the Secretary of Defense tasked DOD senior leadership 

to examine the department’s strategic assumptions, following up on the 

January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance which, among other things, 

called for rebalancing military forces toward the Asia-Pacific region. This 

review examines the choices underlying the department’s strategy, force 

posture, investments, and institutional management, as well as past and 

future assumptions, systems, and practices. The results of the review will 

frame the secretary’s guidance for the fiscal 2015 budget and will be the 

 

30DOD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 2012). 
 

Page 32 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

foundation for the Quadrennial Defense Review expected to be issued in 

February 2014.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 

requires DOD to conduct a new mobility capabilities requirements study—

referred to as the Mobility Requirements and Capabilities Study 2018

(MRCS–18)—based in part on the new defense strategy mentioned 

above.31 This new assessment may provide decision makers with the 

analytical data needed to determine DOD’s airlift capability requirements 

and the number and type of aircraft CRAF participants would need to 

pledge to the program in order to support these requirements. Among 

other things, the NDAA requires DOD to

• describe and analyze the assumptions made by the Commander of 

the U.S. Transportation Command with respect to aircraft usage rates, 

aircraft mission availability rates, aircraft mission capability rates, 

aircrew ratios, aircrew production, and aircrew readiness rates;

• assess the requirements and capabilities for major combat operations, 

lesser contingency operations as specified in the Baseline Security 

Posture of the Department of Defense, homeland defense, defense 

support to civilian authorities, other strategic missions related to 

national missions, global strike, the strategic nuclear mission, and 

direct support and time-sensitive airlift missions of the military 

departments; and

• identify mobility capability gaps, shortfalls, overlaps, or excesses and 

assess the risks associated with the ability to conduct operations and 

recommended mitigation strategies where possible.32

Until DOD completes the MRCS–18, decision makers in DOD and 

Congress may not have all of the relevant information they need to 

ensure that DOD’s mobility capabilities and requirements are sized most 

effectively and efficiently to support the U.S. defense strategy. DOD 

acknowledges the requirements set forth in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 and fully intends to cooperate and 

 

31See § 141(c). Specifically, the provision requires DOD to conduct a study that assesses 

the end-to-end, full-spectrum mobility requirements for all aspects of the National Military 

Strategy derived from the National Defense Strategy that is a result of the 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance and other DOD planning documents. See § 141(c)(1).

32See § 141(c)(2)(B), (E), (G).

DOD Is Updating Its 

Future Airlift 

Requirements to Reflect 

Strategy Changes and 

Reassess the Incentives for 

CRAF Participants
 

Page 33 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

work to complete the assessment, but according to AMC and 

TRANSCOM officials, no time frame has been established for when this 

study will be completed.

Further, AMC has begun conducting additional studies to assess its airlift 

requirements and how the CRAF program will support near-term and 

long-term requirements. AMC’s CRAF study is being conducted in two 

phases and will help AMC to ensure that the commercial airlift forces 

associated with the CRAF program are prepared to support the 

drawdown of forces in Afghanistan by the end of calendar year 2014. 

Phase 1 of the CRAF study, completed in December 2012, focused on 

the international long-range segment of CRAF, which will be most 

affected by the decreasing demand for airlift resulting from the drawdown 

of forces in Afghanistan. It identifies a series of issues facing CRAF 

during the withdrawal and for the short term following the drawdown. A 

number of observations are directly related to the drawdown period and 

the period immediately following. These require near-term actions to 

ensure that commercial airlift support will be available when it is needed 

to support national interests. For example, the Phase 1 study noted that a 

future study should assess the risk and reward factors that may affect 

further CRAF participation due in part to the state of flux in the current 

charter air industry resulting from economic pressures brought on by a 

decline in commercial passenger charter opportunities.

In addition to discussing certain recommendations from the Phase 1 

study, Phase 2 of the CRAF study will focus on maintaining the future 

viability of the CRAF program and its readiness to augment military airlift 

capability and support surge requirements. This follow-on study will 

undertake an in-depth analysis of issues identified in Phase 1 that could 

affect the long-term viability and reliability of the CRAF program. The 

findings from the Phase 2 study will propose courses of action and 

mitigation strategies to ensure CRAF readiness now and in the future, 

balancing government interests and mandates with the dynamics of the 

changing industry. Furthermore, the CRAF Phase 2 study will evaluate 

the market, the carriers and their business base, and the existing 

business models within industry and government in order to provide 

insights and recommend actions to ensure that the CRAF program can 

continue to meet wartime requirements in the future. AMC and 

TRANSCOM expect this study to be completed by the fall of 2013. 

According to AMC officials, one of the issues that will be addressed in the 

Phase 2 study is the recommendation from the Phase 1 study that DOD 

continue the suspension of the 60/40 rule through fiscal year 2014. The 
 

Page 34 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

60/40 rule was created as a safeguard for DOD. Under the 60/40 rule, 

DOD business cannot provide more than 40 percent of a carrier’s 

revenue and the remaining 60 percent of the carrier’s revenue must be 

earned through sources other than DOD, generally referred to as 

commercial sources or commercial air transportation. Carriers that earn 

more than 40 percent of their revenue from DOD may be penalized by 

reductions in their entitlement to DOD business. Prior to fiscal year 2010, 

the rule was based on an air carrier’s revenue. However, in 2010 the rule 

was modified so that it calculated the percentage of business in block 

hours33 rather than amount of revenue. As of May 2010, the rule has 

been suspended. One of the original goals of the 60/40 rule was to 

ensure that CRAF carriers maintained a strong commercial business 

base, efficient operations, and modern fleets to help prevent them from 

going out of business when DOD demands were low. Limiting the 

proportion of DOD business carriers could have would also provide DOD 

with a surge capability to draw on if demand grew suddenly. According to 

TRANSCOM and AMC officials, the 60/40 rule was suspended so that 

commercial carriers would not be penalized for supporting increased 

DOD airlift demands. If carriers continued to increase support while still 

being required to observe the 60/40 rule, the rule would prove to be 

counterproductive. DOD would be asking for increased support while 

potentially issuing penalties to those carriers providing the increased 

support. Some of the carriers we spoke with stated that the 60/40 rule 

had not been strictly enforced and that the suspension of the rule had no 

effect on the amount of business they received as a result of participating 

in the CRAF program. However, according to DOD officials, five carriers 

have gone bankrupt in the last three years and two of them have stopped 

offering airlift services even though this rule has been suspended.

Based on data included in the MCRS–16, DOD counts on the CRAF 

program to provide most of the passenger airlift services as well as a 

significant amount of the cargo services to support wartime requirements. 

Therefore, CRAF must maintain the ability to respond in order to meet 

combatant commander requirements. DOD must develop accurate 

requirements if CRAF is to maintain the ability to respond to these 

requirements. For that reason, until DOD completes the MRCS–18 and 

 

33Block hours include not only actual flight time, but also taxi time before take-off and after 

a landing. 
 

Page 35 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

the CRAF Phase 2 study, it will be unable to determine the correct size 

and mix of the CRAF fleet to meet future airlift requirements.

The nature of U.S. military operations in today’s global environment 

requires DOD to be able to rapidly deploy personnel and cargo around 

the world and sustain forward deployed forces. DOD has taken a number 

of steps to strengthen the CRAF program while also ensuring that military 

aircrews receive required training. However, over the last few years, DOD 

has flown more hours than required to train its aircrews, thereby possibly 

reducing the level of peacetime business available to CRAF participants. 

The anticipated decline in DOD’s peacetime business over the next few 

years, combined with continuing business pressures in a highly 

competitive industry, highlight the need for a process to ensure that DOD 

maximizes the use of its commercial partners. However, DOD does not 

use the process it has for monitoring training hours to determine when it 

can allocate eligible airlift missions to CRAF participants. If DOD does not 

use the information provided by its existing process, it will be unable to 

determine whether it is using commercial carriers to the maximum extent 

practicable, as required by DOD guidance. Further, DOD may be using its 

military fleet—which officials say is more expensive to operate than 

commercial alternatives—more than necessary, while risking the CRAF 

participation needed to ensure wartime readiness.

To balance the use of military and civilian aircraft and ensure that 

commercial carriers participating in the CRAF program are used to the 

maximum extent practicable, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Commander, U.S. 

Transportation Command—in conjunction with the Commander, Air 

Mobility Command—to use the Air Mobility Command’s existing process 

for monitoring training hours to determine when it can shift eligible 

peacetime airlift workload from military to commercial sources.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written 

comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation and stated that it believes implementing the 

recommendation will further improve the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, the 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 
 

Page 36 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), and 

the Commander, Air Mobility Command. In addition, this report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Zina D. Merritt

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 37 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. “Bill” Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

To determine whether DOD has been meeting its training requirements 

we reviewed Air Force guidance on the development of flying hour 

requirements, as well as DOD guidance on flying hours for training.1 We 

also spoke with officials from U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) about how the training 

requirements are developed. We then analyzed flying hour data from the 

Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS) to determine 

the extent to which the airlift fleet—C-5, C-17, and C-130—was being 

flown in excess of training requirements. We assessed the reliability of 

these data by interviewing officials from the REMIS program office at the 

Air Force Life Cycle Management Center to understand the steps that 

have been taken to ensure the reliability of the database. In addition, we 

reviewed documentation relating to the system and compared the data 

with alternate sources. We concluded that the data from REMIS were 

reliable for the purposes of this engagement. We then compared the 

flying hour data from REMIS to the flying hour requirements developed by 

AMC. To determine whether DOD was providing Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

(CRAF) participants with peacetime business, we interviewed officials 

with TRANSCOM and AMC on the management of the CRAF program, 

recent changes that had been made to the program, and concerns about 

the future of the program. In addition, we conducted interviews with 

representatives from 21 of the 30 CRAF participants who responded to 

our request for an interview in October and November 2012, to obtain 

information on the CRAF program, their perspective on what elements of 

the program worked and which did not, and their willingness to participate 

in the program in the near future. Since that time, 2 CRAF participants—

one of which we interviewed—have gone out of business and are no 

longer members of the CRAF program. As of April 2013, there were 28 

CRAF participants included in the CRAF program. We also analyzed 

program-related documents from TRANSCOM, AMC, and CRAF 

participants, as well as guidance on the use of CRAF and commercial 

transportation. Furthermore, we analyzed data from fiscal years 2001 

through 2012 from two systems—the Commercial Operations Integrated 

System and an internal database managed by the Tanker Airlift 

Command Center (TACC) within AMC—to understand the extent to which 

CRAF participants are used compared with military airlift and foreign 

 

1

See, e.g., Air Force Instruction 11-102, Flying Hour Program Management (Aug. 30, 

2011); DODI 4500.57, para. 4.4.4 (Mar. 18, 2008); Air Force Instruction 11-101, 

Management Reports On The Flying Hour Program (Nov. 1, 2002) (certified current Dec. 

31, 2009).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

carriers. We assessed the reliability of these sources by reviewing 

documentation on to the systems, comparing these data with data from 

alternate sources and conducting interviews with knowledgeable officials. 

We concluded that the data from these systems were reliable for the 

purposes of this engagement.

To assess the extent to which DOD has justified restricting commercial 

carriers from transporting partial plane loads of cargo over channel 

routes, we reviewed DOD’s policy for restricting commercial carriers from 

flying over channel routes.2 The policy we reviewed helped us identify 

which channel routes were designated as restricted. We then conducted 

interviews with TRANSCOM and AMC officials to obtain information on 

the rationale for creating the policy and what operational and strategic 

benefits the policy provides for DOD. In addition, we reviewed fiscal year 

2000 and fiscal year 2012 channel route airlift transportation data to 

determine the extent to which DOD was using military aircraft rather than 

CRAF participants to conduct channel route missions, and we discussed 

the circumstances surrounding those decisions with TRANSCOM 

officials. We also conducted interviews and obtained written responses 

from CRAF participants to obtain additional perspectives on how the 

policy is affecting the CRAF program. We also reviewed previously 

written reports and studies conducted by the RAND Corporation and the 

Council for Logistics Research Inc. that addressed DOD’s use of channel 

routes, the impact of utilizing commercial carriers in lieu of military aircraft 

on DOD’s aircrew training program, and the impacts the policy has had 

on overall cargo management. Reviewing this historical information 

provided us with additional insight into DOD’s justification for 

implementing the policy.

To assess whether DOD has established future requirements for the 

CRAF program and how the planned size of CRAF compares with those 

requirements, we obtained and reviewed various studies conducted by 

DOD to assess its strategic airlift capabilities, such as DOD’s Mobility 

Requirements and Capabilities Study – 2016, and the AMC 2012 CRAF 

study. We also collected fiscal year 2011 through 2013 data documenting 

DOD’s current inventory of CRAF aircraft and compared these data with 

DOD’s current airlift requirements. In addition, we conducted interviews 

 

2

See, e.g., Memorandum For: International Carriers, Attachment 1, International Air 

Tender Restricted Routes (May 1, 2012). 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

with TRANSCOM and AMC officials to determine what steps are being 

taken to establish future requirements and to gain their perspective on the 

challenges they expect to face as they continue to manage the CRAF 

program. We also reviewed a provision in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 that requires DOD to conduct a 

new study of mobility capabilities and requirements. We discussed the 

status of the requirement with TRANSCOM and AMC officials to 

determine what time frames and milestones have been established to 

begin and complete this study. We also reviewed DOD’s defense 

strategic guidance issued in January 2012 to assess factors that may 

affect DOD’s future airlift needs.

To gather information for these objectives, we reviewed documentation 

and interviewed officials from the following organizations:

DOD

• The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Transportation Policy)

• U.S. Transportation Command

• J-3 Operations and Plans, Sustainment Division (TCJ3-G)

• Strategy, Policy, and Logistics (TCJ5/4)

• Acquisition (TCAQ)

• Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (TCJA)

• Enterprise Readiness Center (ERC)

• Air Mobility Command

• 618th Air and Space Operations Center (TACC)

• Commercial Airlift Division (A3B)

Private Sector CRAF Participants

• See appendix III for the CRAF participants we interviewed

• National Air Cargo Association (NACA)

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to June 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence and data obtained was sufficiently reliable for our purposes, 

and provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: U.S. Transportation Command 

Restricted Route Policy

Page 42 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Appendix II: U.S. Transportation Command 

Restricted Route Policy
Appendix III: List of Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

Participants (As of April 2013)

Page 43 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

CRAF Carrier Interviewed

1. ABX Air, Inc. √

2. Air Transport International LLC √

3. Alaska Airlines, Inc. √

4. Allegiant Air LLC

5. American Airlines, Inc.

6. Atlas Air, Inc. √

7. Delta Air Lines, Inc. √

8. Evergreen International Airlines, Inc. √

9. Federal Express Corp. √

10. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.

11. Jet Blue Airways Corp. √

12. Kalitta Air LLC

13. Lynden Air Cargo LLC √

14. Miami Air International, Inc. √

15. MN Airlines LLC (DBA Sun Country Airlines) √

16. National Air Cargo Group, Inc.(DBA Murray DBA National Airlines) √

17. North American Airlines, Inc.

18. Northern Air Cargo

19. Omni Air International, Inc. √

20. Polar Air Cargo Worldwide, Inc. √

21. Ryan International Airlines, Inc* √

22. Sky Lease 1, Inc. (DBA Trade Winds Airlines) √

23. Southern Air, Inc. √

24. Southwest Airlines Company √

25. Tatonduk Outfitters, Ltd. (DBA Everts Air Cargo) √

26. United Airlines, Inc. √

27. United Parcel Service Company √

28. US Airways, Inc.

29. World Airways, Inc.

Source: GAO. 

Note: Ryan International Airlines, Inc which previously declared bankruptcy has gone out of business 

since our meeting and was not a CRAF participant in April 2013.

Appendix III: List of Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

Participants (As of April 2013)
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 44 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 45 GAO-13-564 Military Airlift

Zina D. Merritt, (202) 512- 5257 or merrittz@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne Wren, Assistant 

Director; Jim Ashley; Namita Bhatia-Sabharwal; Jason Jackson; James 

Lackey; Joanne Landesman; Tamiya Lunsford; Michael Shanahan; Mike 

Shaughnessy; and Amie Steele made key contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(351765)
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