COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MARGARET JANE CRYOR GAYNOR 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record Nos. 1224-97-4, PER CURIAM 

 1841-97-4 and 1907-97-4 JUNE 9, 1998 

FREDERICK SYLVESTER HIRD, JR. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Paul F. Sheridan, Judge 

 Edward V. O'Connor, Jr. (Byrd, Mische, Bevis, 

Bowen, Joseph & O'Connor, P.C., on briefs), 

for appellant. 

 William B. Cummings for appellee. 

 The parties are familiar with the voluminous records 

relevant to this protracted litigation, together with the 

attendant facts and procedural history. Accordingly, this 

opinion omits needless archival references in resolving those 

issues subject of the most recent spate of appeals. 

 Our review is "guided by the principle that decisions 

concerning equitable distribution rest within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal 

unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence." McDavid v. 

McDavid, 19 Va. App. 406, 407-08, 451 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1994) 

(citing Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 

S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990)). 

 Unless it appears from the record that the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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chancellor has abused his discretion, that he 

has not considered or has misapplied one of 

the statutory mandates, or that the evidence 

fails to support the findings of fact 

underlying his resolution of the conflict in 

the equities, the chancellor's equitable 

distribution award will not be reversed on 

appeal. 

McClanahan v. McClanahan, 19 Va. App. 399, 401, 451 S.E.2d 691, 

692 (1994) (citing Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 443, 357 S.E.2d 

728, 732 (1987)). 

I. Equitable Distribution

 In fashioning the decree on appeal, our review of the 

instant and interrelated records discloses that the chancellor 

properly adjudicated the interests of the parties, including the 

bank accounts and marital debts in issue, consistent with statute 

and prior decisions of our Court in this cause. Thus, finding no 

error, we affirm the award. 

II. Rental Issues

 In record 1224-97-4, appellant assigns ten errors to the 

trial court's Order on Rental Claim on Remand. She complains 

that imputed rental income attributed to her ownership interests 

in the former marital residence was separate property, not 

properly subject to consideration in the monetary award. 

However, "legal title . . . has little or no bearing upon how 

[marital wealth] . . . is to be equitably distributed by a 

monetary award under Code § 20-107.3." Lightburn v. Lightburn, 

22 Va. App. 612, 616, 472 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1996). Here, the 

trial court valued appellant's rental claim and properly included 
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it in formulating a monetary award pursuant to the provisions of 

Code § 20-107.3. The court's determination of rental value is 

supported by credible evidence and its treatment and analysis in 

equitable distribution, carefully detailed in the disputed order, 

reflects no abuse of discretion. We, therefore, affirm the 

order. 

III. Suspension Bond

 Wife appeals the trial court's decision to allow appellee to 

pursue debtor's interrogatories and continue liens against the 

appellant's property, despite a Suspension Bond. Finding that 

the trial court's resolution of this issue evinces no abuse of 

discretion and is supported by the record, we affirm the 

challenged order. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court. 

 Affirmed.