Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1601-CR-18 | October 18, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jane H. Conley

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Richard Jones,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 18, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1601-CR-18

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Steven Rubick, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G01-1405-FC-25131

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1601-CR-18 | October 18, 2016 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Following a jury trial, Richard Jones was convicted of resisting law 

enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor. Jones appeals, raising a single issue for 

our review, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting evidence obtained by police during a warrantless entry and arrest in

his residence. Concluding Jones failed to preserve the issue for appeal with a 

contemporaneous objection to the admission of that evidence, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Jones resides with his eighty-six-year-old grandmother, Essie Ferrell, in her 

home, along with his six-year-old son, and his uncle. On the evening of May 

13, 2014, Jones’ girlfriend, Shamane Roach, arrived at the home and began 

arguing with Jones about her vehicle, which she accused him of stealing. The 

dispute caused so much noise that Jones’ uncle called the police and reported a 

disturbance. After the police were called, Roach left the home and went 

outside.

[3] Shortly thereafter, Officers Timothy Elliott and Nicholas Galico of the 

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) responded to the 

report and arrived at the home. When they arrived, Jones and Ferrell were 

inside the home with the door ajar, while Roach stood in the driveway. Roach

spoke with the officers and informed them Jones stole her vehicle. Officer 

Elliott then approached Jones at the doorway and asked him to step outside to 
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“get his side of the story.” Transcript at 182-83. However, Jones declined to 

come outside and stayed inside the home with Ferrell. A few moments later, 

Ferrell attempted to exit the house to speak with Officer Elliott, but Jones 

grabbed her and pushed her aside in an effort to close the door. Officer Elliott

then told Jones he was under arrest for committing battery on Ferrell and 

ordered him to leave the door open. Jones shut the door and locked it.

[4] Officer Elliott backed away from the door, instructed Officer Galico to watch 

the rear of the house, and radioed for backup. Three additional IMPD officers 

responded to the call, including Officer Elliott’s supervisor, Lieutenant Sandra 

Storkman. Five to ten minutes later, the door opened and Ferrell exited the 

home and spoke to Lieutenant Storkman and Officer Elliott. Both officers 

testified Ferrell permitted them to enter the home as long as they “didn’t hurt 

[Jones].” Id. at 36.

[5] After receiving Ferrell’s consent, Officer Elliott and the two additional IMPD 

officers entered the home, while Officer Galico watched the rear of the home. 

Once inside, the officers located Jones sitting on his bed holding his son. Jones 

initially refused to comply with the officers’ command to release his son; 

however, Jones eventually allowed his son to leave the home. Officer Elliott 

then ordered Jones to stand up and put his hands behind his back, but Jones 

ignored his command and rolled over on his stomach. Jones then put his hands 

beneath his abdomen, preventing the officers from placing handcuffs on him. 

The officers eventually forced his hands behind his back, placed him in 

handcuffs, and escorted him outside.
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[6] As Officer Elliott attempted to place Jones in his police car, Jones stiffened his 

body and used his legs to push off the door frame of the car. Jones continued to 

struggle, forcing the officers to deploy mace and bring Jones to the ground to 

subdue him. While on the ground, Jones began to twist his body and thrash 

around violently with his legs, causing the officers to place him in leg shackles. 

Eventually, the officers were able to gain Jones’ compliance and place him in a 

police vehicle.

[7] The State charged Jones with Count I, auto theft, a Class D felony; Count II, 

resisting law enforcement, a Class D felony; Count III, battery, a Class D 

felony; Count IV, battery by bodily waste, a Class D felony; and Count V, 

battery, a Class B misdemeanor. The State also sought to enhance Count I to a 

Class C felony based on Jones’ prior conviction for auto theft. On November 

19, 2014, the State dismissed Count I, Count V, and the auto theft 

enhancement. Jones’ first jury trial was held the same day and resulted in a 

mistrial. On May 20, 2015, Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging 

the State obtained its evidence as a result of an illegal entry and arrest in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion and the 

case proceeded to a second trial. At trial, Jones neither made a continuing 

objection nor did he object to the admission of any evidence on constitutional

grounds. The jury found Jones guilty of resisting law enforcement as a Class A 

misdemeanor and not guilty of the two remaining counts of battery. Jones now 

appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

[8] Jones contends the police officers’ warrantless entry and arrest in his residence

violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 

1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Using nearly identical language, both 

provisions guarantee a person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. Campbell v. State, 841 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 

[9] “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 

judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—

subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” 

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis 

added). Under the Fourth Amendment, if a search is conducted without a 

warrant, the State bears the burden of proving an exception to the warrant 

requirement. Swanson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. 

denied. Search and seizure violations under Article 1, Section 11 of the state 

constitution are analyzed differently. Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 

(Ind. 1999). The State must show that, in the totality of the circumstances, the 

police behavior was reasonable. Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1995). 

The provision is to receive liberal application to ensure that citizens of this state 

are free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.

[10] Although Jones filed a pretrial motion to suppress, we note that when a 

defendant challenges the constitutionality of a search following a completed 

trial, we consider the issue to be whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
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admitting the challenged evidence. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind.

2013). An abuse of discretion occurs “only when admission is clearly against 

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s 

substantial rights.” Id. at 260. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not 

reweigh the evidence and consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the 

ruling. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009). We defer to the trial 

court’s factual determinations unless clearly erroneous, id., but the 

constitutionality of the search is a question of law we consider de novo.

Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014).

[11] Jones contends the police violated his rights pursuant to the Fourth 

Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution by 

conducting a warrantless entry and arrest, and therefore his conviction should 

be reversed. The State argues Jones waived any objection to the admission of 

the evidence by failing to object to its admission at trial. Jones does not deny 

he failed to object on constitutional grounds at trial,1 and he does not contend 

the trial court committed fundamental error.

[12] We agree with the State that Jones failed to preserve his constitutional 

challenge to the admissibility of the evidence. A contemporaneous objection at 

the time the evidence is introduced at trial is required to preserve an issue for 

 

1

Jones objected on several occasions at trial, but his objections were based on evidentiary concerns, such as 

hearsay. However, generally a party “may not object to the admission of evidence on one basis at trial and 

for a different reason on appeal.” Hart v. State, 578 N.E.2d 336, 337 (Ind. 1991).
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appeal, regardless of whether the appellant has filed a pretrial motion to 

suppress. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010); see also Jackson v. 

State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2000) (holding the failure to make a 

contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence at trial results in

waiver of the error on appeal); Wagner v. State, 474 N.E.2d 476, 484 (Ind. 1985) 

(noting that when a motion to suppress has been overruled and the evidence 

sought to be suppressed is later offered at trial, no error will be preserved unless 

there is an objection at that time).

[13] Here, Jones did not object during trial to the admission of any of the State’s 

evidence against him on constitutional grounds. Accordingly, he has not 

preserved his arguments for appellate review. Moreover, the State relies on 

Jones’ lack of a trial objection in its brief on appeal, and Jones does not assert in 

his initial brief or in his reply brief that this court should nonetheless review the 

merits of his argument under the fundamental error doctrine or for another 

reason. See Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 207 (holding “an error in ruling on a motion 

to exclude improperly seized evidence is not per se fundamental error” and 

“[w]e do not consider that admission of unlawfully seized evidence ipso facto

requires reversal”). We conclude Jones has waived the issue of whether the 

trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence at trial.2 Thus, 

 

2 We note that not reviewing for fundamental error does not necessarily end the matter. Jones may seek 

relief, if he so desires, through a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Whiting v. State, 

969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012); see also Pemberton v. State, 560 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. 1990) (holding that 

defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to make a contemporaneous 

trial objection). 
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we do not address whether consent or exigent circumstances justified the 

warrantless entry of Jones’ home. Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ conviction.

Conclusion

[14] At trial, Jones failed to object to the admission of evidence on the grounds that 

it was obtained in violation of the federal and state constitutions, and has 

waived the issue on appeal. We therefore affirm his conviction.

[15] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.