IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

EVONNA MATHIS,

Plaintiff, Case Nos.: 2:10-cv-1090

2:10-cv-1103

2:10-cv-1145

2:11-cv-0252

2:11-cv-0270

JUDGE SMITH

v. Magistrate Judge Kemp

AT&T SBC COMMUNICATIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Ohio Bell Telephone Company (improperly

named in the Complaint as AT&T SBC Communications), Vivienne Howard, Ann Taylor, Mickey

Clements, Chad Hoerig, Timothy Moore, Deborah Hernandez Robert Kapps, Thomas Simone, Craig

Wyckoff, Bill Stiles, Kevin Bell, and Greg Boyle (collectively “Defendants”), Motions to Dismiss

and/or Renewed Motions to Dismiss1

 (Doc. 34 in 2:10-cv-1090; Doc. 23 in 2:10-cv-1103; Doc. 29

in 2:10-cv-1145; Doc. 5 in 2:11-cv-252; and Doc. 6 in 2:11-cv-270). Plaintiff has also filed a number

of motions in each of the aforementioned cases, including a motion for sanctions, motion for all

documents to be sent by certified mail, motion to stay discovery, motion for default, etc. The Court

1

 Defendants original Motions to Dismiss, document 25 in 2:10-cv-1090, document 16 in

2:10-cv-1103, and document 17 in 2:10-cv-1145, are now moot as Plaintiff filed an Amended

Complaint in response to each of the original Motions. Defendants then promptly filed a

Renewed Motion to Dismiss asserting that Plaintiff failed to cure any of the deficiencies alleged in

the original Motions to Dismiss. 

Case: 2:11-cv-00252-GCS-TPK Doc #: 27 Filed: 10/06/11 Page: 1 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
will first address Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and then if the cases remain pending, will address

Plaintiff’s motions. 

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2010, Plaintiff Evonna Mathis commenced this action against Defendants Ohio

Bell Telephone Company (improperly named in the Complaint as AT&T SBC Communications),

Vivienne Howard, Ann Taylor, Mickey Clements, Chad Hoerig, Timothy Moore, Deborah Hernandez

Robert Kapps, and Thomas Simone (collectively “Defendants”), alleging “1. Violation of Civil Right;

2. Violation of EED; 3. Violation of U.S. Constitution; 4. Violation of Privacy; 5. Bill of Rights.” 

(Am. Compl. in Case No. 2:10-cv-1090 at 3). Plaintiff also alleges in Case No. 2:10-cv-1145:

Violation of U.S. Constitution

Violation of EEO

Violating Civil Rights

Using image, voice for money/unauthorized

Monies owed by company in use of my image, voice (audio) and name

Discrimination in employment advancement, hiring and discipline

Withholding payment/wages, dividend, etc.

Discrimination in training

Wiretapping, bugging home/residence, car, mother’s home, etc.

Wiretapping (bugging)/tampering with residential cabling, phone, internet (my private

use)

Unjust work conditions

Healthcare fraud, did not apply for healthcare BCBS, enrolled without my knowledge

(signature/SSN fraud)

Removing, tampering with US mail at home residence – falsification of insurance,

court documents, etc.

Impersonating other companies ex. Insurance, doctors, etc.

Harassment, intimidation, bullying in workplace

Being fired unjustly

Followed by management, other entities of ATT/SBC outside work and inside of

work

Taping my image, voice, likeness without my knowledge

Stealing ideas/patterns “said by oneself” 

(Compl. at 3, Doc. 4). 

2

Case: 2:11-cv-00252-GCS-TPK Doc #: 27 Filed: 10/06/11 Page: 2 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Plaintiff Mathis asserts that her civil rights were violated by Defendants when they allegedly

falsified employee files and documents; harassed and monitored her; following her, asking/threatening

her to do things not required of the job; videotaping and recording her; and denied training, skill

upgrade and promotions due to race and gender. 

Defendants argues that Plaintiff has only made conclusory or incomprehensible allegations that

must be dismissed because she has failed to plead any facts to support the legal conclusions asserted. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a lawsuit for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is directed solely to

the complaint and any exhibits attached to it. Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134,

155 (6th Cir. 1983). The merits of the claims set forth in the complaint are not at issue on a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Consequently, a complaint will be dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) only if there is no law to support the claims made, or if the facts alleged are insufficient to

state a claim, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief. See Rauch

v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1978). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in

conjunction with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the complaint to

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]”

A court, in considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, must “construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff,” accepting as true all the plaintiff’s factual allegations. Gunasekera

v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). Although in this context all of the factual allegations in

the complaint are taken as true, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched

3

Case: 2:11-cv-00252-GCS-TPK Doc #: 27 Filed: 10/06/11 Page: 3 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
as a factual allegation.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Consequently,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

Furthermore, to survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a claim must contain sufficient

factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, at 570. “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, at 1950. While a complaint

need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are

true.” Twombly, at 555. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the

pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In the final analysis,

the task of determining plausibility is “context-specific [and] requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Mathis is proceeding pro se, and accordingly, this Court must construe Plaintiff’s

allegations liberally and apply a less stringent standard to those pleadings than to a complaint drafted

by counsel. Burrell v. Henderson, 483 F.Supp.2d 595, 599-600 (S.D. Ohio 2007). However, a court

does not need to accept as true “legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. at 600.

Plaintiff Mathis has made nearly identical statements in each of the five cases now before the

Court, alleging Defendants unlawfully harmed her, but she has not set forth factual allegations that

“plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. Even the Complaint form

4

Case: 2:11-cv-00252-GCS-TPK Doc #: 27 Filed: 10/06/11 Page: 4 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
provided by this Court instructs each plaintiff to write “the facts of your case. Describe how each

Defendant is involved. Include the name of all persons involved, give dates and places.” (See doc.

25 in 2:10-cv-1090, doc. 16 in 2:10-cv-1103, and doc. in 2:10-cv-1145). However, Plaintiff has

failed to meet these basic requirements. Plaintiff primarily names Ohio Bell in all five lawsuits, but

in case number 2:10-cv-1090, she also names eight individual Defendants, who were not named in

the other cases. Despite naming these eight individual Defendants, Plaintiff only mentions one in the

body of the Complaint, Vivienne Howard. Further, in case number 2:11-cv-270, Plaintiff names five

individual Defendants and while she does mention them in the Complaint in that case, she again has

not alleged sufficient facts to tie any of them to her possible claims. Therefore, the Complaints

contain insufficient facts to tie the individual Defendants to any of Plaintiff’s possible claims. See

Buster v. City of Cleveland, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4696 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (dismissing the

individual defendants as the amended Complaint “contains insufficient facts which reasonably

associate” them to any of the plaintiff’s claims).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that all pleadings contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In

Twombly, the Supreme Court held that while Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,”

it does “demand more than an unadorned the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. “Nor

does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”

Id.

 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court articulated a a two-stage process for determining whether a

5

Case: 2:11-cv-00252-GCS-TPK Doc #: 27 Filed: 10/06/11 Page: 5 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
complaint meets this pleading standard. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. First, a court must disregard

allegations that are no more than legal conclusions, as these are not entitled to the assumption of

truth. Id. at 1951. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (noting that the plaintiff’s allegation that government

officials adopted a challenged policy “because of” its adverse effects on a protected group was 

conclusory and not assumed to be true (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55)). Further, even though

the pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “marks a notable and generous

departure from the hyper-technical, code pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock the

doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 1950.

Second, the court must consider the factual allegations in the complaint “to determine if

they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. Where the wellpleaded

facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief,’” and therefore the complaint

should be dismissed. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure require a “showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This is so because “[w]ithout some

factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of

providing not only fair notice of the nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests.” 

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Althought courts generally hold the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff to less stringent standards

than pleadings filed by lawyers, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), “basic pleading essentials”

still apply. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1990). Where a pro se complaint does not

6

Case: 2:11-cv-00252-GCS-TPK Doc #: 27 Filed: 10/06/11 Page: 6 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
contain clear allegations, “district courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely

presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. To do so would

‘require . . . [the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff . . . [and]

would transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of advocate

seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Dixie v. Ohio, 2008

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41377 (N.D. Ohio 2008).

Applying the aforementioned two-part test to this case, Plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not

entitled to an assumption of truth, and her factual allegations, if any, are insufficient and do not

“plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. Accordingly, Plaintiff Mathis

has not stated a claim for which relief can be granted against Defendants. 

Further, Plaintiff appears to be alleging Title VII violations based on her race and gender. 

However, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, as she has failed to provide a

notice of the right to sue from the EEOC. The Sixth Circuit has held that “prior to . . . bringing suit

under Title VII in federal court, a plaintiff alleging discrimination must perform two administrative

prerequisites: (1) file timely charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC, and (2) receive

and act upon the EEOC’s statutory notice of the right to sue.” Brown v. City of Cleveland, 294 F.

App’x 226, 233 (6th Cir. 2008). 

Further, any claim under Title VII against the individually named Defendants must be

dismissed because Congress “did not intend individual employees to he held liable under the definition

of ‘employer’ under Title VII.” Burrell v. Henderson, 483 F.Supp.2d 595, 600 (S.D. Ohio 2007)

(Frost, J.) (citing Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 406 (6th Cir. 1997)).

Therefore, based on the aforementioned, the allegations in Plaintiff Mathis’ complaints are

7

Case: 2:11-cv-00252-GCS-TPK Doc #: 27 Filed: 10/06/11 Page: 7 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
conclusory allegations and are insufficient under the heightened pleading standards from

Twombly/Iqbal. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Ohio Bell and the individual

Defendants are hereby dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the individual

Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are GRANTED. All the additional pending motions filed by

Plaintiff are denied as moot, except for documents 45 and 47 in Case No. 2:10-cv-1090, documents

32 and 34 in Case No. 2:10-cv-1103, documents 41 and 45 in Case No. 2:10-cv-1145; documents 

15 and 17 in Case No. 2:11-cv-252; and documents 16 and 18 in Case No. 2:11-cv-270 relating to

her appeal. 

The Clerk of Courts is ordered to removed Documents 25, 34, 36, 41, 53, 55, and 62 in Case

No. 2:10-cv-1090; Documents 16, 23, 25, 28, 36, 41, 43, and 50 in Case No. 2:10-cv-1103; 

Documents 17, 20, 29, 32, 37, 47, 51, 53 and 60 in Case No. 2:10-cv-1145; Documents 5, 7, 11, 21,

and 23 in Case No. 2:11-cv-252; and Documents 6, 11, and 21 in Case No. 2:11-cv-270 from the

Court’s pending motions list.

The Clerk is further instructed to remove these cases from the Court’s pending cases list. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ George C. Smith 

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

Case: 2:11-cv-00252-GCS-TPK Doc #: 27 Filed: 10/06/11 Page: 8 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>