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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 EASTERN DIVISION 

JOHN RUGER, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. Civil Action 2:11-CV-969 

 Judge Watson 

 Magistrate Judge King 

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of a 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff’s 

application for supplemental security income benefits. On March 6, 

2013, the decision of the Commissioner was reversed and the matter was 

remanded pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further 

proceedings. Judgment, ECF 17. This matter is now before the Court 

on plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees under 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1525, 

416.1528, ECF 18. The Commissioner has filed no response to the 

motion. 

Plaintiff seeks an attorney fee of $5,740.00, that amount 

reflecting compensation at a rate of $350.00 per hour for 16.4 

itemized hours of work. Submitted in support of the motion is a copy 

of a fee agreement by which plaintiff agrees that his counsel should 

receive 25% of his retroactive benefits. Exhibit B attached to ECF 18. 

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The Notice of Award, Exhibit A attached to ECF 18, indicates that 

plaintiff’s retroactive benefits amount to $ 45,703.02. The requested 

fee is, of course, less than 25% of the retroactive benefits. 

By statute, a court must award "a reasonable fee not in excess of 

25 per cent of the total past-due benefit." 42 U.S.C. §406(b). A fee 

award should reflect the purpose of the social security program to 

provide a measure of economic security to the recipient, the extent 

and type of legal services provided, the complexity of the case, the 

level of skill and competence required of the attorney, the amount of 

time spent on the case, the results achieved, and the level at which 

the favorable decision was made. 20 C.F.R. §416.1525(b). A fee 

agreement between a recipient and his or her counsel “should be given 

the weight ordinarily accorded a rebuttable presumption.” Rodriguez 

v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746 (6th Cir. 1989). Deductions are permissible 

when there is improper conduct or ineffectiveness of counsel or when 

counsel would otherwise enjoy a windfall because of either an 

inordinately large benefit award or minimal effort expended in the 

matter. Hayes v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 923 F.2d 418, 

421 (6th Cir. 1990). “[A] hypothetical rate that is less than twice the 

standard rate is per se reasonable.” Id. at 422. In the final 

analysis, an award must be “reasonable for the services rendered.” 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 

 Upon consideration of all the appropriate factors, the Court 

concludes that the requested fee is reasonable. It is far less than 

25% of the past-due benefits, plaintiff has signed a contingency fee, 

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the requested fee does not reflect a rate of compensation more than 

twice the standard rate and it cannot be said that plaintiff’s counsel 

was ineffective or expended minimal effort in the case. 

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for attorney 

fees under 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1525, 416.1528, ECF 18, be GRANTED and 

that plaintiff’s attorney be AWARDED a fee of $5,740.00, or 25% of the 

past-due benefits, whichever is less.

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report 

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file 

and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, 

specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part 

thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 

U.S.C. §636(b)(1); F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be 

filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy 

thereof. F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to 

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to 

de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the 

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. 

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Federation of 

Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States 

v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 

 s/Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

Date April 1, 2014

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