1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, : 

LLC, : Case No. 2:11-CV-485 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : JUDGE ALGENON L. 

 : MARBLEY 

 v. : 

 : Magistrate Judge Mark R. Abel 

 : 

KANWAL N. SINGH, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION 

 This matter is before the Court on the following motions: Plaintiff Columbia Gas 

Transmission, LLC’s (“Columbia Gas” or “Plaintiff”) Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (Doc. 

2); Defendants Kanwal N. Singh and Lynn W. Singh’s (“Singhs” or “Defendants”) Request for 

Sanctions Against Plaintiff, (Doc. 6); Defendants’ “Motion for Court to Order US Attorney 

Investigation,” (Doc. 8); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. 17); 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement of Injunction-Related Claims, (“Motion to Enforce 

Settlement”), (Doc. 19); and “Motion of Defendants for Order Suspending Time for Filing 

Pleadings Pending Resolution of Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement,” (Doc. 24). 

 For the reasons stated herein, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce 

Settlement. The remaining motions listed above are now MOOT. Columbia Gas’s Complaint is 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, but this Court will retain jurisdiction over the agreed 

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upon matters set forth in the attached Order for purposes of enforcement. Defendants’ pro se

counterclaims are also DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Underlying Dispute 

 Columbia Gas filed a Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction simultaneously 

on June 6, 2011, seeking injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from interfering with Columbia 

Gas’s right-of-way on which two, separate, 20-inch diameter, high-pressure, natural gas, 

transmission pipelines, known as B-100 and B-115 (“Pipelines”), are located. Columbia Gas’s 

right-of-way runs through Defendants’ property, which Defendants acquired in August, 2004, 

with public notice of the right-of-way and notice that the Pipelines were in operation on the 

property. Columbia Gas’s predecessor, the Ohio Fuel Gas Company, acquired the right-of-way 

in 1949, and modification of deed of easement was recorded in the Franklin County Recorder’s 

Office in 1960, which identified the Pipelines as having been installed and in operation on the 

property. When the Ohio Fuel Gas Company and Columbia Gas merged in December 1970, 

Columbia Gas succeeded to the rights possessed in the right-of-way. Columbia Gas is entitled 

to, and has been, operating and maintaining the Pipelines in the right-of-way on Defendants’ 

property. 

 Columbia Gas alleges that Defendants have been conducting excavation and grading 

activities on the property that have only narrowly avoided the Pipelines. Columbia Gas alleges 

that on June 1, 2011, its personnel observed that dirt was piled over the right-of-way, and 

construction equipment was parked on top of the Pipelines. The Columbia Gas personnel met 

Mr. Singh on the property and advised Mr. Singh that due to the existence of the right-of-way 

and Pipelines, Defendants should not develop the property without first submitting plans to 

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Columbia Gas. Mr. Singh allegedly responded that “he does not need to ask for Columbia[’s] 

permission to do anything on the [p]roperty” and “it was Columbia that needed to seek 

permission to be on the [p]roperty.” (Compl. ¶ 15). Mr. Singh further informed the Columbia 

Gas personnel that the property was rented to a tenant who planned to construct an access road 

over the Pipelines and park trailers on the property. 

 The Columbia Gas personnel requested that the dirt piles and equipment sitting above the 

Pipeline be removed, but Mr. Singh allegedly declined to remove the obstructions. Mr. Singh 

indicated that he no longer wanted to respond to Columbia Gas personnel’s questions and drove 

away. After Mr. Singh departed from the property, the personnel discovered an unused post hole 

that “had been augured to within approximately one foot of one of the [P]ipelines.” Id. at ¶ 20. 

The personnel determined that the Pipeline needed to be exposed to determine if it had been 

breached or damaged. Id. While the personnel were in the process of exposing the Pipeline to 

check its integrity, Mr. Singh returned with Mrs. Singh, and an argument ensued with the 

personnel about whether they were allowed on the Defendants’ property. 

 Columbia Gas alleges that despite its warnings, Defendants have indicated that they 

would proceed with construction, and continue to develop their property without regard to 

Columbia Gas’s easement rights and safety concerns. Columbia Gas also alleges that as a result 

of the Defendants’ actions, it has been prevented from maintaining the Pipelines and complying 

with federal regulations, which could endanger human lives, cause property damages, and 

jeopardize gas services in the area. In its Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Columbia Gas asks 

this Court, among other things, to enjoin Defendants “from obstructing or in any way interfering 

with Columbia’s right-of-way and the operation and maintenance of Lines B-100 and B-115.” 

(Doc. 2-1). 

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 After Columbia Gas filed this lawsuit in June, 2011, Defendants made a number of pro se 

filings. Defendants filed a Response in “Opposition to Plaintiff Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction and . . . Request for Sanctions Against Plaintiff,” (Doc. 6), before Mr. Michael 

Braunstein filed his Notice of Appearance as counsel for Defendants, (Doc. 7), and then a 

“Motion for Court to Order US Attorney Investigation,” (Doc. 8), and Counterclaims, (Doc. 9, 

13), shortly after Mr. Braunstein’s Notice of Appearance was filed. 

B. Local Rule 65.1 Conference 

 This Court held a Local Rule 65.1 Conference on August 10, 2011. Mr. James Doerfler 

was on the phone as counsel for Columbia Gas, and Mr. Braunstein was present but explained at 

the beginning of the Conference that he was “no longer [present] for the defendant, since [he] 

was fired this morning.”1

 (Doc. 16 at 2). Mr. Singh explained that he would be preceding pro se

and that they would be looking for counsel for Mrs. Singh. This Court advised Defendants that 

they had the right to proceed pro se, but warned the Defendants as follows: 

I will urge you, on the strongest terms as I know how, for you not to go pro se. I 

have yet to have a pro se litigant who has demonstrated the capability of 

protecting his or her interests to the extent that a licensed practitioner can. One 

reason is that you aren’t learned in the nuances of the law. . . . 

 A second and equally compelling reason for you not to proceed pro se is 

that you have an emotional attachment to this case, and your emotions invariably, 

inevitably and, if that is not clear enough, always will cloud your judgment. . . . 

 And, so, you know, there is an old adage that a person that represents 

himself has a fool for a client. . . . 

 . . . Though I am duty-bound and I always do assure that justice is done, 

you know, I just can’t advocate on your behalf. And you need an advocate skilled 

in the law on your behalf in a case such as this. 

                                                           

1

 Because Mr. Braunstein acted as counsel for Defendants and negotiated a potential settlement with Mr. 

Doerfler prior to the Local Rule 65.1 Conference, this Court asked Mr. Braunstein to remain present at the 

Conference in case he was needed to clarify events that took place prior to his being terminated by the 

Singhs. (Doc. 16 at 14). 

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Id. at 3–5. 

 Mr. Doerfler then explained to the Court that an injunction hearing may no longer be 

necessary because a large portion of the dispute had become moot. Id. at 5. Columbia Gas filed 

its Motion for Preliminary Injunction, in part, to ensure that crossovers were engineered over the 

top of the Pipelines so that the construction could be completed on the Singhs’ property without 

compromising the integrity of the Pipelines. Mr. Doerfler explained further that this issue was 

now resolved as, “Mr. Braunstein helped broker an agreement where the Singhs’ engineer 

developed engineer drawings. Columbia field personnel supervised the construction, and it is 

my understanding that the construction is now substantially complete.” Id. at 7. The Court 

asked Defendants to confirm what Mr. Doerfler said: 

THE COURT: All right. So, that construction has been completed? 

MS LYNN SINGH: Yes. 

MR. SINGH: Yes. 

THE COURT: So, at least there is an agreement on that that [sic] the construction 

that necessitated the building of the access road is complete? 

MR. SINGH: Yes, sir. 

Id. at 10. 

 In addition to a solution ensuring that the construction on Defendants’ property would not 

compromise the integrity of the Pipelines, Columbia Gas sought a commitment from Defendants 

that they would not “impede or impair Columbia’s ability to perform its maintenance obligation 

in connection with those pipelines,” or allow their tenants to do so. Id. at 11. Mr. Doerfler 

explained that the relief requested by Columbia Gas was twofold. The first part was assurance 

“that the Singhs and any other tenants or successors or assigns would not store or place trailers, 

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equipment, or containers anywhere in the easements.” Id. at 12. The second part was “that the 

tenant would only cross the pipelines at those engineered crossover points, because he’s going to 

be bringing in heavy trailers.” Id. This Court asked Defendants if they had any objections to 

Columbia Gas’s first request:

THE COURT: . . . Let me be more specific. Do you have any objection to your 

tenant having none of its equipment in the easements? 

MR. SINGH: We wouldn’t say in writing, but we wouldn’t do it, because we like 

to leave the rights as they are. 

THE COURT: And, as they are, no equipment in the easements. 

MS. LYNN SINGH: The easements are already in place, and we will abide by 

the easements that are already in place. 

THE COURT: All right. And those are the same easements about which you 

speak; correct, Mr. Doerfler? 

MR. DOERFLER: That’s correct. These are the easements that have been in 

place since 1949. 

THE COURT: Right. And you just don’t—and you don’t want the easements 

obstructed? 

MR. DOERFLER: That is correct. 

THE COURT: And you have no objection to the easements not being obstructed; 

is that right? 

MR. SINGH: Right, but we would not sign anything. 

THE COURT: That’s not my question. 

MS. LYNN SINGH: We don’t have any objections. 

Id. at 16–17. The Court then addressed Columbia Gas’s second request: 

THE COURT: All right. The second thing is, the current tenant will not cross 

over except where crossovers have been constructed. Do you have any objection 

to that, Mr. Singh? 

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MR. SINGH: Again, without agreement, we will— 

THE COURT: Mr. Singh,— 

MS. LYNN SINGH: Answer “yes” or “no.” 

MR. SINGH: We have no objection. 

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Now, did that address the other outstanding 

issues. Mr. Doerfler, is that your understanding? 

MR. DOERFLER: That’s right, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: All right. So, both of the issues that are outstanding have been 

agreed to by the parties, because I have it on the record.

Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Mr. Doerfler then agreed to drop the lawsuit as long as Defendants 

would sign a written agreement memorializing the agreed-to terms. This Court explained to 

Defendants that “[w]hen there is a lawsuit and the parties reach an agreement settling that 

lawsuit as the two of you have, then our procedures are such that you sign a document. It’s a 

contract really, but a document just reflecting the terms of the agreement.” Id. at 18. Mr. Singh 

replied, “Ok.” Id. Deadlines were set for memorializing the agreement, and the parties were 

instructed to have an executed copy of the written agreement on the Court’s desk by August 31, 

2011. 

C. Post-Conference Discussions 

 As per this Court’s instructions, Columbia Gas sent a proposed written agreement to 

Defendants on August 17, 2011. (Doc. 20-4). Defendants responded on August 27, 2011, 

indicating that they were unwilling to settle the lawsuit despite their representations at the Local 

Rule 65.1 Conference that they would work with Mr. Doerfler in good faith. (Doc. 20-6). As a 

result, Columbia Gas filed its Motion to Enforce Settlement on August 31, 2011. (Doc. 19). 

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 Defendants’ new counsel, Mr. Michael Moore, filed a Notice of Appearance on 

September 11, 2011, (Doc. 21), and a “Motion of Defendants for Order Suspending Time for 

Filing Pleadings Pending Resolution of Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement,” (“Motion to 

Suspend Time”), (Doc. 24), shortly thereafter. While the Court is unsure how to construe this 

“Motion to Suspend Time,” Defendants ask the Court to decide the Motion to Enforce 

Settlement before deciding the other outstanding motions in this case, as it has the potential to be 

dispositive. Defendants also explain that “should this case go forward, it is the current defense 

counsel’s belief that the case will be served if additional pleadings are filed which will more 

clearly and precisely focus the issues inherent in the case.” Id. Mr. Moore appears to be 

referring to the pro se filings made by Defendants before he was retained as counsel. 

 This Court held a Telephonic Status Conference on October 4, 2011, with Mr. Doerfler 

and Mr. Moore to determine what, if any, progress had been made on memorializing an 

agreement. The parties were directed to report to the Court by October 17, 2011, as to whether 

they had memorialized an agreement or whether the Court would need to decide the Motion to 

Enforce Settlement. The parties filed a “Joint Report on Settlement on Conference” on October 

17, 2011, indicating that they had been unable to memorialize a settlement. 

 The Court will now address the Motion to Enforce Settlement, which is ripe for review. 

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

 Columbia Gas asks this Court to resolve and dismiss this lawsuit by enforcing the 

settlement reached by the parties during the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. Plaintiff argues that 

under Ohio law,2

 “a party cannot enter into a binding settlement agreement and then attempt to 

                                                           

2

 Both parties urge this Court to apply Ohio law when resolving the question of whether a valid settlement 

agreement exists. Ohio law should apply because a settlement agreement is a binding contract, and the 

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unilaterally repudiate that agreement at a later date.” (Doc. 20) (citing Spercel v. Sterline Indus., 

Inc., 285 N.E.2d 324, 326–27 (Ohio 1972)). The Singhs acknowledged a settlement was reached 

during the Conference, which is reflected in the transcript from the Conference. All that is left 

for this Court to do, Columbia Gas contends, is to memorialize the agreement in writing and to 

enter an order formally dismissing the case without prejudice. 

 Defendants counter that a valid settlement agreement does not exist because there was no 

meeting of the minds before, or during, the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. Defendants argue that 

the Conference was unfair and “went off the rails” because the Singhs were preceding pro se at 

the time.3

 They dispute the scope of Columbia Gas’s easement; the fact that Mr. Doerfler and 

Mr. Braunstein reached an agreement in principal prior to the Local Rule 65.1 Conference; what 

exactly was agreed upon during the Local Rule 65.1 Conference; and the terms in Columbia 

Gas’s proposed order memorializing the settlement. They argue that the City of Columbus is a 

necessary party in this lawsuit because it allegedly owns the land under which one of the 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

choice of law provisions of the forum state, Ohio, point to the law of the state in which the contract was 

formed, Ohio. Edwards v. Hocking Valley Cmty. Hosp., 87 F. App’x 542, 550 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2004) 

(citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Wells v. 10-X Mfg. Co., 609 F.2d 248, 

253 (6th Cir. 1979); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ferrin, 487 N.E.2d 568, 569 (Ohio 1986)); see also The 

Glidden Co. v. Kinsella, 386 F App’x 535 (6th Cir. 2010) (looking to Ohio law to determine whether an 

agreement was reached); Bameriliease Capital Corp. v. Nearburg, 958 F.2d 150, 152 (6th Cir. 1992) 

(explaining that settlement agreements are governed by contract law and Ohio law requires contracts be 

interpreted according to the law of the place of the contract’s making). 

3

 The Court will note that it finds this contention made by Defendants’ new counsel unpersuasive. The 

Court advised Defendants against proceeding pro se at the Local Rule 65.1 Conference, (Doc. 16 at 3–5), 

and despite the Court’s warnings, the Defendants decided to proceed without the assistance of counsel. 

The record in this case indicates that even while Mr. Braunstein was acting as counsel for the Defendants, 

they continued to file documents pro se and without knowledge of their counsel. Proceeding without the 

assistance of counsel does not give litigants the right to disregard the federal and local rules. See West v. 

Adecco Emp’t Agency, 124 F. App’x 991, 992 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Supreme Court has 

“never suggested procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse 

mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”). 

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pipelines runs. However, if the Court does find that the parties have reached a valid agreement, 

Defendants request that an evidentiary hearing be held to determine the precise terms of the 

settlement. 

 On reply Plaintiff argues that the issues raised by Defendants are not ripe or are nonessential to the terms of the settlement. Plaintiff explains that: 

Underlying the Singhs’ present argument is a more fundamental difference in the 

way the parties are approaching the dispute. Columbia has made clear throughout 

these proceedings that its narrow focus is to resolve the immediate pipeline safety 

issues that gave rise to the filing of its injunction request. By contrast, the Singhs 

have endeavored to expand the dispute more broadly to address their belief that 

the restrictions imposed by Columbia’s pre-existing 1949 easement on the Singhs’ 

proposed use of the property might constitute some sort of a “taking.” 

(Doc. 28). 

 Mindful of the parties’ positions, this Court will proceed with a two-part analysis. First, 

this Court must determine whether, under Ohio law, a valid settlement was reached between the 

parties during the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. If the parties did in fact reach a settlement, this 

Court must then decide whether, under this Circuit’s precedent, it should enforce that oral 

agreement. 

A. Existence of a Valid Settlement Agreement 

 Under Ohio law, “a valid settlement agreement is a contract between parties, requiring a 

meeting of the minds as well as an offer and an acceptance thereof.” Rulli v. Fan Co., 683 

N.E.2d 337, 33839 (Ohio 1997) (citing Noroski v. Fallet, 442 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (Ohio 1982)). 

Ohio law requires “that the terms of the agreement establish an objective meeting of the minds, 

which is to say that the contract was clear and unambiguous.” 216 Jamaica Ave., LLC v. S&R 

Playhouse Realty Co., 540 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2008). Ambiguity exists under Ohio law 

“where contract language is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,” Potti v. 

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Duramed Pharm., Inc., 938 F.2d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 1991), but a term is not ambiguous merely 

because two parties offer substantially different interpretations, 216 Jamaica Ave., LLC, 540 

F.3d at 440. Moreover, a party cannot enter into a binding settlement agreement and then 

attempt unilaterally to repudiate that agreement at a later date. Spercel v. Sterline Indus., Inc., 

284 N.E.2d 324, 32627 (Ohio 1972) (enforcing an oral settlement agreement in the presence of 

the court because such an agreement constitutes a binding contract); see Klever v. Stow, 468 

N.E.2d 58, 6162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (journalizing an agreement reached between attorneys 

and their client). 

 There was clearly a meeting of the minds at the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. Both 

parties agreed that the construction on the Singhs’ property that gave rise to the filing of this 

lawsuit in the first place has since been completed. (Doc. 16 at 10). The Singhs agreed to keep 

Columbia Gas’s easements unobstructed and to ensure that their tenant does not keep any of his 

equipment on the easement. Id. at 16–17. Defendants also agreed to make sure the crossovers 

would be used when the property was accessed. Id. at 17. In exchange, Columbia Gas agreed to 

drop the lawsuit. This Court observed that “both of the issues that are outstanding have been 

agreed to by the parties, because I have it on the record.” Id. 

 In their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement 

(“Memorandum in Oppositions”), (Doc. 27), Defendants argue that the term “obstruct” is 

ambiguous, and that there was no meeting of the minds with respect to this term. Defendants 

argue that “[w]hat the Singh’s meant by ‘obstruct’ was never defined in the Conference, but the 

only reasonable interpretation is found in the specific question the Court directed to them. That 

agreement was simply that on a temporary basis, the tenant would move its trailers over the pipes 

on the crossovers that were designed.” (Doc. 27). 

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 Defendants’ argument is unconvincing. As is evident from the Local Rule 65.1 

Conference transcript, when the Court was discussing “obstruction” of the easement with the 

Singhs, it was referring to placing large heavy objects on the easements, which may compromise 

the integrity of the Pipelines, such as the tenant’s equipment. The Court was not referring to the 

crossovers as Defendants seem to allude to in their Memorandum in Opposition. These were two 

different parts of the settlement agreement that were resolved separately. Furthermore, this 

Court disagrees that the use of the term obstruct was ambiguous. Columbia Gas repeated 

throughout the Local Rule 65.1 Conference and throughout its filings that its major concern is 

the Singhs and their tenant placing heaving vehicles and equipment above the Pipelines. At the 

time the Court was discussing the terms of the settlement, everyone present was well aware of 

which activities the Court was referring to when it referred to “obstruction” of the easements. 

 This Court finds that the Parties reached an oral settlement agreement on August 10, 

2011, at the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. 

B. Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement

 Because the parties reached an oral settlement agreement during the Local Rule 65.1 

Conference, this Court must now decide whether to enforce that agreement. In determining 

whether to enforce a settlement agreement, “the district court must conclude that agreement has 

been reached on all material terms.” Brock v. Scheuner Corp., 841 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 

1988). A federal court has the power to enforce a settlement agreement “even if that agreement 

has not been reduced to writing.” Brock, 841 F.2d at 152 (citing Bowater N. Am. Corp. v. 

Murray Mach., 773 F.2d 71, 77 (6th Cir. 1985)). “When parties have agreed on the essential 

terms of a settlement, and all that remains is to memorialize the agreement in writing, the parties 

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are bound by the terms of the oral agreement.” RE/MAX Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 271 F.3d 

633, 646 (6th Cir. 2001). 

 If facts material to the agreement are in dispute, an evidentiary hearing must ordinarily be 

held. Id. (citing Kulkla v. Nat’l Distillers Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 1973); Aro 

Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.3d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1976)). However, “no evidentiary 

hearing is required where an agreement is clear and unambiguous and no issue of fact is 

present.” Id. (citing Aro Corp., 531 F.3d at 1372). Therefore, “summary enforcement of a 

settlement agreement has been deemed appropriate where no substantial dispute exists regarding 

the entry into and the terms of an agreement.” Id. (citing Kulkla, 483 F.2d at 621; Therma-Scan, 

Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 217 F.3d 414, 418 (6th Cir. 2000)). 

 In RE/MAX International, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district 

court’s decision enforcing a verbal settlement agreement and finding that a party had breached 

the agreement by failing to negotiate in good faith and agree to final terms. 271 F.3d at 64548. 

RE/MAX filed suit against Realty One and another real estate brokerage company alleging that 

their practice of paying brokers associated with RE/MAX lower commissions on splitcommission transactions violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and analogous state laws. Id. at 

636. After a mistrial, the parties commenced settlement negotiations. Id. at 637. RE/MAX and 

the other real estate brokerage company were about to confirm an agreement reached on the 

record after negotiating for a number of hours, and Realty One unexpectedly stated that it desired 

to settle on similar terms. Id. at 63738. Realty One stated on the record that it would “adopt 

the same terms and [] draft the paper in the same time.” Id. at 638 n. 3. 

 Despite Realty One’s representations, it subsequently refused to memorialize the 

settlement reached, arguing that the draft proposed by RE/MAX contained additional terms and 

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provisions that were not included in the oral settlement. Id. at 639. The Court affirmed the 

district court’s decision that a valid settlement agreement had been reached by the parties, and 

explained that “[t]he existence of a valid agreement is not diminished by the fact that the parties 

have yet to memorialize the agreement.” Id. at 645–46. The parties had already agreed on the 

essential terms of the settlement and were, therefore, “bound by the terms of the oral agreement.” 

Id. at 646. The district court also correctly determined that Realty One breached the oral 

agreement by failing to negotiate in good faith and agree to the final terms of the settlement 

agreement. Id. at 646–47. 

 This Circuit reached a similar conclusion in The Glidden Company v. Kinsella, again 

affirming a district court’s decision to enforce an oral settlement agreement, and adopting and 

enforcing one party’s written memorialization as the final settlement agreement between the 

parties. 386 F. App’x 535, 536 (6th Cir. 2010). At a settlement conference before a magistrate 

judge over a trademark dispute, the parties reached an agreement, the essential terms of which 

were transcribed by the court reporter, and then the parties agreed to work together to finalize the 

written agreement. Id. at 537–39. The parties could not agree upon the final written 

memorialization of the oral settlement, in part because one party insisted that the proposed 

written agreement incorporated additional material terms not discussed at the conference. Id. at 

538. 

 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that an agreement was 

reached during the settlement conference because the parties assented to an outline of the 

settlement. Id. at 540. One party stated that “[t]he terms written down by your law clerk and 

expressed here are the terms that we understand are the essence of the settlement, and we accept 

those terms,” while the other party agreed that “the terms set forth by the Court are the terms 

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acceptable to [the party] for settlement in this matter.” Id. The Court affirmed the district 

court’s decision to enforce the written memorialization proposed by one party, with slight 

modifications. Id. at 547. 

 This Court finds that the parties reached a valid and enforceable oral settlement 

agreement at the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. The record indicates that there was agreement on 

three separate material terms of the settlement: (1) the Singhs agreed to ensure that Columbia 

Gas’s easements would not be obstructed, id. at 16–17; (2) the Singhs agreed to use the 

constructed crossovers when crossing the easements, id. at 17; and (3) Columbia Gas agreed to 

drop the lawsuit once the settlement agreement was memorialized, id. at 18. This Court 

explained to Defendants that “[w]hen there is a lawsuit and the parties reach an agreement 

settling that lawsuit as the two of you have, then our procedures are such that you sign a 

document. It’s a contract really, but a document just reflecting the terms of the agreement.” Id. 

Mr. Singh replied, “Ok,” acknowledging that he understood. Id. at 18. Similar to the parties in 

The Glidden Company, the parties here agreed to work together in good faith to memorialize the 

agreement. The record indicates that after the Local Rule 65.1 Conference, Defendants failed to 

work with Mr. Doerfler to finalize the agreement. 

 This Court finds that there was an enforceable oral settlement agreement reached at the 

Local Rule 65.1 Conference. This Court will next determine whether the proposed order 

submitted by Plaintiff as representative of the terms of the settlement reached during the 

Conference is, in fact, an accurate memorialization of the agreement reached. 

C. Memorialization of the Agreement 

 The order proposed by Plaintiff reads as follows: 

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(i) Neither Defendants Kanwal and Lynn Singh, nor any tenant, successor or 

assign of theirs, shall impair or impede the rights-of-way possessed by Columbia 

for pipelines B-100 and B-115 by placing trailers, equipment, containers or other 

objects in any portion of the rights-of-way that would impede Columbia’s use and 

maintenance of the right-of-way. Consistent with applicable precedent in similar 

pipeline cases, the Court finds the reasonable and necessary width of the gas 

pipeline easement/right-of-way for these pipelines to be 50 feet, or 25 feet in each 

direction from the centerline of each of the pipelines. 

(ii) Defendants, their tenants, successors and/or assigns shall restrict any vehicles 

which seek to cross over pipelines B-100 and B-115 on their Property to use only 

the engineered cross-over locations shown on Drive Plan Phase 1 Drawing, dated 

June 24, 2011 by P&L Systems, Inc. 

(iii) Based upon these agreed-upon promises by the Defendants to refrain from 

impairing or impeding the rights-of-way for lines B-100 and B115 in the future, 

Columbia has agreed to dismiss its Complaint against the Singhs. 

The Court hereby DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Complaint of 

Columbia Gas Transmission LLC. The Court will retain jurisdiction over the 

agreed upon matters set forth in this Order for purposes of enforcement. 

(Doc. 19-1). Defendants contest items (i) and (ii) of the proposed order in their Memorandum in 

Opposition. 

1. Item (i)

 As for item (i), Defendants argue that the Singhs’ only agreement during the Local Rule 

65.1 Conference was that their current tenant would not obstruct the easement; that obstruction 

was never defined during the Conference; that the agreement was simply on a temporary basis; 

and that the injunction proposed here is overbroad. 

 This Court cannot view the discussions that took place during the Local Rule 65.1 

Conference in a vacuum, as Defendants urge the Court to do. There was no need to define the 

term obstruct at the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. As discussed above, when the Singhs’ agreed 

not to obstruct Columbia Gas’s easements, they stated they would instruct their tenant to keep his 

heavy equipment off the easements. (Doc. 16 at 16). The Singhs acknowledged that the 

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easements had been in place since 1949, and that they would “abide by the easements already in 

place.” Id. This Court finds that the proposed language restricting the Singhs, their tenant, 

successor or assign from impairing or impeding the rights-of-way “by placing trailers, 

equipment, containers or other objects in any portion of the rights-of-way” is an accurate 

memorialization of what was agreed upon during the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. 

 Defendants next take issue with the language in item (i) that describes the rights-of-way 

as “50 feet, or 25 feet in each direction from the centerline of each of the pipelines.” (Doc. 19-

1). Defendants do not cite any law, but argue “[i]n that there are two separate pipelines, which 

eventually come together at the north end of the properties, by enjoining the Defendants from 

placing ‘other objects’ anywhere on the easement, the Court would create a 100 foot wide ‘no-go 

zone’ right through the heart of the properties.” (Doc. 27). 

 Neither party raised issues related to the width of the right-of-way during the Local Rule 

65.1 Conference. Furthermore, Columbia Gas did not assert any facts or law related to the width 

of the right-of-way in its Complaint, which it has now agreed to dismiss if this Court grants its 

Motion to Enforce Settlement. The Court will not incorporate terms regarding the precise width 

of the easement into the agreement that were never raised or agreed upon by the parties during 

the Conference. See Brock, 841 F.2d at 153 (“The court must enforce the settlement as agreed to 

by the parties and is not permitted to alter the terms of the agreement.”). 

 The parties have agreed, however, that Ohio law governs their settlement agreement, and 

relevant Ohio case law indicates that where the width of an easement is not specified in the 

document granting the easement, the grant should be construed to provide the grantee with “what 

is reasonably necessary and convenient to serve the purpose for which the easement was 

granted.” Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Adams, 646 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 

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1994); Roebuck v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. 386 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Ohio Ct. App. 

1977) (“if an easement is not specifically defined, the rule is that its extent is only such as is 

reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was created”); Columbia Gas 

Transmission Corp. v. Large, 619 N.E.2d 1215, 1216 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1992) (following 

Roebeck’s precedent and explaining that the width of an unspecified easement should be 

determined “by what is reasonably necessary and convenient for the purposes for which the 

easement was originally granted”). 

 Accordingly, this Court will remove the following language from item (i) of the proposed 

order: “Consistent with applicable precedent in similar pipeline cases, the Court finds the 

reasonable and necessary width of the gas pipeline easement/right-of-way for these pipelines to 

be 50 feet, or 25 feet in each direction from the centerline of each of the pipelines,” and replace it 

with the following language: “Consistent with applicable precedent in similar pipeline cases, the 

Court finds the easement extends only such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the 

purpose for which it was created.” 

2. Item (ii)

 Defendants argue that item (ii), as drafted, does not accurately reflect the terms 

settlement agreement reached during the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. Defendants argue that the 

language reflects “a permanent injunction against any vehicular traffic anywhere on the 

easement.” (Doc. 27). Defendants also contend that one of the crossovers is located on property 

owned by the City of Columbus and that Columbia Gas should have joined the City as a party in 

this lawsuit. Plaintiff counters that “[a]s the landowner and the party constructing any temporary 

roadway necessary to provide access for their tenant, it is the responsibility of the Singhs (and 

their retrained engineer) to determine whether or not a permit would be required from the City of 

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Columbus to construct a temporary roadway that would cross over the City’s paper street, and if 

one was required, then to obtain any such permit.” (Doc. 28). Moreover, Columbia Gas points 

out that the Singhs’ had already constructed a temporary roadway when the Local Rule 65.1 

Conference took place, and they “would seemingly be precluded under the unclean hands 

doctrine from using their own oversights as a basis to now scuttle the settlement.” Id. 

It is difficult for the Court to discern from Defendants’ pro se filings why they believe 

that the City of Columbus is a necessary party in this lawsuit. Nevertheless, the Court agrees 

with Columbia Gas that it was the responsibility of the Singhs, when they constructed temporary 

crossovers, to determine whether a permit would be required from the City of Columbus. The 

issues related to the City of Columbus and its “paper street” appears to be outside of the scope of 

the issues addressed in this Opinion and Order, namely, the injunctive relief requested by 

Columbia Gas. 

 The Court finds that the language in item (ii) accurately reflects the settlement agreement 

reached during the Local Rule 65.1 Conference. Defendants take no issue with item (iii), nor 

does this Court. Therefore, the Court finds the proposed order an accurate memorialization of 

the oral settlement agreement reached during the Local Rule 65.1 Conference, with the exception 

of the modification referenced above.4

                                                           

4

 The following language will be removed from item (i): “Consistent with applicable precedent in similar 

pipeline cases, the Court finds the reasonable and necessary width of the gas pipeline easement/right-ofway for these pipelines to be 50 feet, or 25 feet in each direction from the centerline of each of the 

pipelines,” and replaced as follows: “Consistent with applicable precedent in similar pipeline cases, the 

Court finds the easement extends only such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for 

which it was created.” 

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D. Outstanding Motions and Counterclaims Made by Defendants

 The following pending motions in this case are now moot in light of this Opinion and 

Order: Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (Doc. 2); Defendants’ Request for 

Sanctions Against Plaintiff, (Doc. 6); Defendants’ “Motion for Court to Order US Attorney 

Investigation,” (Doc. 8); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. 17); and 

“Motion of Defendants for Order Suspending Time for Filing Pleadings Pending Resolution of 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement,” (Doc. 24). 

 Defendants filed a pro se “Counter-Complaint” pleading and an amendment to that 

pleading, which this Court will construe as counterclaims. (Doc. 8, 9). In those filings 

Defendants appear to assert civil rights violations and attempt to add various parties to this 

litigation. Defendants’ new counsel has indicated “that should this case go forward, it is current 

defense counsel’s belief that the case will be served if additional pleadings are filed which will 

more clearly and precisely focus the issues [raised in the pro se filings] that are inherent in this 

case.” (Doc. 24). 

 It is unnecessary, however, for Defendants’ counsel to file additional pleadings. The 

Court need not construe Defendants’ factually and legally deficient counterclaims because 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement is granted and this lawsuit is dismissed. Therefore, 

Defendants’ counterclaims are also DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See Brown v. 

Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Particularly where deficiencies in a 

complaint are attributable to oversights likely the result of an untutored pro se litigant's 

ignorance of special pleading requirements, dismissal of the complaint without prejudice is 

preferable.”) (citing Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990)); Garrison v. 

Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 333 F. App’x 914, 915–16 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the 

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district court acted within its discretion when it dismissed pro se plaintiffs’ complaint alleging 

civil right violations without prejudice due to the improper nature of some of the filings). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement

and enters the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff, with the modification of deleting the 

following language in item (i): “Consistent with applicable precedent in similar pipeline cases, 

the Court finds the reasonable and necessary width of the gas pipeline easement/right-of-way for 

these pipelines to be 50 feet, or 25 feet in each direction from the centerline of each of the 

pipelines,” and replacing it as follows: “Consistent with applicable precedent in similar pipeline 

cases, the Court finds the easement extends only such as is reasonably necessary and convenient 

for the purpose for which it was created.” The following motions are now MOOT: Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (Doc. 2); Defendants’ Request for Sanctions Against 

Plaintiff, (Doc. 6); Defendants’ “Motion for Court to Order US Attorney Investigation,” (Doc. 

8); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. 17); and “Motion of Defendants 

for Order Suspending Time for Filing Pleadings Pending Resolution of Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Enforce Settlement,” (Doc. 24). Columbia Gas’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE, but this Court will retain jurisdiction over the agreed upon matters set forth in the 

entered order for purposes of enforcement, and Defendants’ pro se counterclaims are also 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/ Algenon L. Marbley 

 Algenon L. Marbley 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: March 26, 2012 

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