IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DJIBY MBAYE, 

Petitioner, CASE NO. 2:11-CV-1015

JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY

v. MAGISTRATE JUDGE E.A. PRESTON DEAVERS

COREY PRICE, 

District Director, I.C.E., 

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

On March 9, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be denied and Respondent be directed to file

a Return of Writ in response to Petitioner’s claims within twenty-one days. (Doc. 8). Respondent

has filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 90). For the

reasons that follow, Respondent’s objections are SUSTAINED. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 5), is GRANTED. This action is hereby DISMISSED. 

Although being advised of the right to object to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, and of the consequences of failing to do so, Petitioner has filed no objections. 

The record reflects that the Report and Recommendation was mailed to Petitioner at the address he

provided in the Petition. Petitioner, however, has an affirmative duty to notify the Court of any

change in address. See Barber v. Runyon, No. 93-6318, 1994 WL 163765, at *1 (6th Cir. May 2,

1994) (“If [pro se litigant’s] address changed, she had an affirmative duty to supply the court with

notice of any and all changes in her address.”); see also Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir.

1991) (“[W]hile pro se litigants may be entitled to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated

legal issues . . . there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural

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requirements that a layperson can comprehend.”); Walker v. Cognis Oleo Chem., LLC, No.

1:07cv289, 2010 WL 717275, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2010).

Petitioner, Djiby Mbaye, a citizen of Senegal, filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner Mbaye asserts he is being unreasonably and

unconstitutionally detained by ICE without significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable

future. He requests release from custody of ICE. 

Respondent objects solely to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Motion to

Dismiss this action be denied on the basis that Mbaye’s habeas corpus petition is moot. Respondent

argues that this action is moot, because on November 10, 2012, prior to the filing of his habeas

corpus petition, ICE released Mbaye from continued physical detention placing him under an Order

of Supervision. See Exhibits to Objections. Respondent thus argues that the relief Petitioner

requests, and the only relief to which he is entitled under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001),

i.e., his release from continued physical custody, thereby already has been effectuated, rendering this

action moot. 

Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition suggests that he remains in the physical custody of

Respondent and indicates that the relief he seeks is to be released from detention under an Order of

Supervision. Petition, at 4. The exhibits attached to Respondent’s objections indicate Petitioner

remains subject to a Final Removal Order and interim Order of Supervision. Exhibits to Objections. 

These document suffice to invoke habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Berry v.

Adducci, No. 10-10969, 2010 WL 2105130, at *2-3 (E.D. Mich. May 25, 2010)(citing RosalesGarcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2003)). That said, Respondent correctly notes, 

Petitioner already has obtained the relief he seeks. The record now reflects Petitioner likewise has

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obtained the relief authorized under Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (“we nowhere deny the right of

Congress to remove aliens, to subject them to supervision with conditions when released from

detention”):

[I]f removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold

continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by

statute. In that case, of course, the alien's release may and should be

conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are

appropriate in the circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be

returned to custody upon a violation of those conditions. 

Id. at 699-700.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), this Court has conducted a de novo review. For the

foregoing reasons, Respondent’s objections are SUSTAINED. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss,

Doc. 5, is GRANTED. This action is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Algenon L. Marbley 

ALGENON L. MARBLEY

United States District Judge

DATED: September 24, 2012

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