J-S61042-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN RE: A.O., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : : : APPEAL OF: J.R.O., Natural Mother : Nos. 424, 425 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order February 19, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County, Orphans' Court Division, No(s): CP-05-DP-0000021-20 14 5 for 2015 BEFORE: PANELLA, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2016 J.R.O. (“Mother”), the natural mother of A.O., a so n born in March 2014, appeals from the Order granting the Petition filed by Bedford County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) to involuntaril y terminate her parental rights to A.O. pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(5), (8) , and (b) of the Adoption
Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b). We affir m. On March 9, 2014, CYS received a report that Mother did not possess the knowledge or skills necessary to adequately car e for A.O. On April 11, 2014, Children’s Hospital in Pittsburgh admitted A. O., after he was referred by his primary care provider for being underweight. CYS received Emergency Protective Custody on April 16, 2014. A. O. entered foster care following his release from the hospital. On April 29, 2014, A.O. was adjudicated a dependent child and placed in the leg al and physical custody of CYS.J-S61042-16

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CYS established plans to begin the reunification pr ocess between Mother and A.O., including services with the Altern ative Community Resource Program (“ACRP”), which assists in family preservation, mental health services through Mental Health Mental Retard ation Services (“MHMR”), and alcohol and drug services. Mother wa s also afforded visiting opportunities with A.O. Between April 2014 and Jun e 2014, Mother visited A.O. 22 times. However, Mother discontinued her vi sits until December 2014, during which she visited A.O. twice. Mother then visited A.O. twice in January 2015, and once each month in March and Apri l 2015. 1 On April 17, 2015, CYS filed the Petition for Involuntary Termin ation of Parental Rights, seeking termination of Mother’s rights and a change in the goal of dependency proceedings to adoption. During the two termination hearings, the trial cour t heard testimony from a bonding expert, two agency workers, Mother’s current paramour, and Mother. Dennis Kashurba (“Kashurba”), a psychologi st and expert on bonding, testified to the lack of a meaningful bond between Mother and A.O. See N.T., 11/10/15, at 11-12, 20-23. Further, Kashurb a testified that he did see a meaningful bond between A.O. and foster m other. Id. at 12-13, 22-23. Amanda Kendall (“Kendall”), an ACRP family preserva tion worker, testified that Mother initially did not have any pa rental instinct, but that

1 After maternal grandmother passed away on April 13 , 2015, Mother did not visit A.O.J-S61042-16

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Mother was responsive to the program. Id. at 31-32, 38-40. However, Kendall also testified to Mother’s lack of contact with the agency at times, and the gaps in visitation with A.O. Id. at 26-29. Kendall testified that Mother did not appear to be interested in reunifica tion, and that she seemed more concerned with other things in life, despite t he potential consequence of losing her parental rights. Id. at 33-36. Moreover, Kendall testified to Mother’s lack of progress toward her Permanency Pla n goals, a regression in skills, and that Mother could not gain those skills in a reasonable period of
time. Id. at 37-38. Additionally, Kendall testified about h er concerns with Mother’s living situation, such as an overwhelming smell of cigarettes in one of her temporary residences. Id. at 41. Finally, Kendall stated that from her observations, there was a lack of a meaningful bond between Mother and A.O. See id. at 42-43 (noting that Mother would not initiate co ntact with A.O., A.O. did not recognize Mother, and A.O. was not distressed when separated from Mother). Tessa Miller (“Miller”), a CYS worker, testified ab out Mother’s lack of visitation with A.O. See N.T., 2/19/16, at 6-10, 12-13. Miller noted Mother’s housing instability, citing eighteen diffe rent residences in the time span of this case. Id. at 11, 19-20. Miller testified to the content of Mother’s Permanency Plan goals, her initial coopera tion, and to the overall lack of progress toward meeting those goals. Id. at 15-17, 20-22. Additionally, Miller stated that the elements of Se ction 2511(a)(5) and (8)J-S61042-16

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had been met in this case. Id. at 17-18. Miller then testified that she was aware Mother had a new baby during this process, bu t that the baby was not living with her and had also been the subject of a different county’s child services investigation. Id. at 23-24. Jeremy Dodson (“Dodson”), Mother’s current paramour , testified that Mother lived with him and his family for a period o f time. See id. at 27-28, 30-31. Dodson also testified that Mother cares wel l for the new baby and would be able to take care of A.O. Id. at 28-29. Dodson then testified that the new baby has always lived in his parents’ home, and that they have tried to take custody of the new baby. Id. at 31. Finally, Mother testified about the stability level of her living situation. See id. at 32-34, 36-40, 63-65. Mother acknowledged that while she is formally unemployed, she makes money babysitting. Id. at 35, 65. Mother noted the gaps in her visitation, but stated that o ne gap was the result of her “trying to better [herself].” Id. at 41; see also id. at 52-53, 59, 61-63 (wherein Mother testified that some of the lack in visitation was attributable to difficulties dealing with the agencies). Howeve r, Mother also testified that at one time, she filed a Petition for Increased Vis itation, but she failed to appear in court, and has not refiled since that occ asion. Id. at 60-61. Mother testified that a major problem was her mothe r’s death in April 2015, causing her to feel depressed and unable to handle working with the agencies. Id. at 37-38.J-S61042-16

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In regards to the visits that did take place, Mothe r testified that the visits were normal, she gave A.O. attention, and th at there was a connection between her and A.O. Id. at 42-44. Thereafter, Mother testified that she had been taking part in different services at vario us times that would help her progress toward her Permanency Plan goals, such as parenting classes during the new pregnancy, attending MHMR, attending psychological rehabilitation, and participating in ACRP and Indep endent Living for portions of the case. Id. at 44-51. Mother testified about her concerns wit h A.O.’s foster care. Id. at 53. Subsequently, Mother testified that she an d A.O. had a bond at one time, and that she desires custody. Id. at 56. Following the hearings, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b), and granted CYS’s request for goal change to adoption for A.O. Mother then filed the instant timely appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Conci se Statement. On appeal, Mother raises three questions for our re view:
A. Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion in determining [that CYS] had established a legal basi s through clear and convincing evidence for changing the goal to adoption/terminating [Mother’s] parental rights pur suant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)(8), as such a finding is not supported by the record?
B. Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion by determining that termination of [Mother’s] parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and e motional needs and welfare of [A.O.] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 25 11(b), as such a finding is not supported by the record?J-S61042-16

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C. Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion by failing to consider the impact of the death of [maternal grandmother] on [Mother’s] efforts to remedy the co nditions leading to the placement of [A.O.]? Brief for Appellant at 3 (issues renumbered). Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is as follows: When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the d ecision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. Ab sent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evi dentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must sta nd. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive rev iew of the record in order to determine whether the trial cour t’s decision is supported by competent evidence.
In re R.N.J. , 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations om itted). Termination of parental rights is controlled by Sec tion 2511 of the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. In termination cases, the bu rden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincin g evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the termination of par ental rights are valid. See In re R.N.J. , 985 A.2d at 276. “[C]lear and convincing evidenc e is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weig hty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear convict ion, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The trial court is free to believ e all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinationsJ-S61042-16

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and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G. , 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). If competent evid ence supports the trial court’s findings, “we will affirm even if the recor d could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B. , 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Satisfaction of any one subsection of Section 2511( a), along with consideration of Section 2511(b), is sufficient for the involuntary termination of parental rights. In re B.C.W. , 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) ( en banc ). In this case, we will review the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights based upon Section 2511(a) (8) and (b), which state the following: § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination (a) General rule. – The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: * * * (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. * * * (b) Other considerations. – The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and wel fare of theJ-S61042-16

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child. The rights of a parent shall not be termina ted solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequa te housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if f ound to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)...(8), the court sha ll not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s re moval by the court.” In
re A.R. , 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12 -month period has been established, courts must determine whether the conditions that led to the child’s removal continue to exist. Id. “[T]ermination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an evaluation of [a pa rent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to placem ent of her [child].” In re Adoption of C.J.P. , 114 A.3d 1046, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also In re K.M. , 53 A.3d 781, 789 (Pa. Super. 2012). The “relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the con ditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus whether reunification o f parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J. , 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). With respect to the “needs and welfare” ana lysis, this Court observed the following: [T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on th e parent, under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511( b) is on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requ ires an evaluation of the “needs and welfare of the child” prior to proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on theJ-S61042-16

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developmental, physical and emotional needs and wel fare of the child. Thus, the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent. Moreover, only if a court determines that the paren t’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to Section 2511(a), does a court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard o f best interests of the child. Accordingly, while both Se ction 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluat e the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resol ve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by Secti on 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address Sec tion 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G. , 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008) ( en banc ) (citations and some quotation marks omitted). In her first issue, Mother asserts that CYS did not present clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of her p arental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). See Brief for Appellant at 6, 9-10. Mother also claims that the progress she made toward her Perman ency Plan goals and her improvements in parenting skills weighed agains t a change in goal from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption. Id. at 8-9. Our review of the record discloses that CYS was gra nted Emergency Protective Custody on April 16, 2014, and filed the Petition for Involuntary Termination on April 17, 2015. See N.T., 2/19/16, at 17-18; In re A.R. , 837 A.2d at 564. Further, the conditions which led to A.O.’s removal
continue to exist. See N.T., 11/10/15, at 33-38, 41; N.T., 2/19/16, at 11 , 16-17, 19-20, 65. Indeed, despite initial particip ation in reunificationJ-S61042-16

- 10 - programs, there was no progress toward Mother’s Per manency Plan goals. See In re D.A.T. , 91 A.3d 197, 206 (Pa. Super. 2014) (finding termi nation proper where not all goals were completed, despite the mother completing some of the goals). Additionally, Mother’s parenti ng skills regressed, Mother inconsistently participated in the treatment progra ms, and there was no improvement in Mother’s residential or economic sta bility. See In re Adoption of R.K.Y. , 72 A.3d 669, 680 (Pa. Super. 2013) (using instabi lity of housing as support for termination). Moreover, the trial court considered the needs and welfare of A.O. See In re Adoption of C.L.G. , 956 A.2d at 1008-09. The trial court found no meaningful bond between Mother and A.O., evidenc ed by A.O.’s lack of distress when separated from Mother. See N.T., 11/10/15, at 11-12, 20-23, 42-43. Alternatively, the evidence showed a strong , beneficial bond between A.O. and his foster family. Id. at 12-13, 22-23. Analyzing Section 2511(a)(8), we conclude that the trial court’s determinations are supported by competent evidence. Thus, termination under Section 2511(a)(8) is appropriate. In her second issue, Mother avers that the trial co urt did not complete a full examination regarding the best interests of A.O., as required by Section 2511(b), and that it specifically omitted a discussion as to the natural bond between a biological parent and child. See Brief for Appellant
at 11-14.J-S61042-16

- 11 - Section 2511(b) “focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and e motional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M. , 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). “While a parent’s emotional bond wit h his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interes t analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be consider ed by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the chi ld.” In re Adoption of C.D.R. , 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation o mitted).

[I]n assessing the parental bond, the [trial] court is permitted to rely upon the observations and evaluat ions of social workers. Moreover, the mere existence of an emotio nal bond does not preclude the termination of parental right s.... [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial cour t can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child , and should also consider the intangibles, such as t he love, comfort, security, and stability the child mi ght have with the foster parent. Additionally, ... the t rial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re K.M. , 53 A.3d at 791 (citations omitted). Here, A.O. has spent all but one month of his life in foster care. See In re A.S. , 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010) (considering p lacement with a foster family for nearly the child’s whole life a nd concluding that there is no meaningful bond between child and natural parent , but rather a bond with the foster family that would be detrimental to sever). Kashurba, an expert on bonding, determined there was not a meani ngful bond betweenJ-S61042-16

- 12 - Mother and A.O. See N.T., 11/10/15, at 11-12, 20-23; see also In the Interest of B.C. , 36 A.3d 601, 611 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that “in cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.”). Indeed , Kendall testified that Mother would often times not acknowledge A.O. on he r own during visitation, A.O. did not react to Mother because he did not know her, and A.O. showed no distress when being separated from M other. See N.T., 11/10/15, at 42-43. Kashurba also noted a bond bet ween the foster family and A.O. See id. at 13 (stating that “[a]ll in all, there’s little question in this examiner’s mind that one would be quite hard presse d to find a better family arrangement for [A.O. than] that which is provided by his current foster parents.”); see also In re K.M. , 53 A.3d at 791 (stating that “whether a child’s primary emotional attachment is with a fost er parent rather than a birth parent is a significant factor in evaluating the child’s developmental and emotional needs and welfare.”). The trial court wa s free to rely on the observations of Kashurba and Kendall, see In re K.M. , 53 A.3d at 791, and we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law, as competent evidence supports the conclusions of the trial court. In her final issue, Mother alleges that the trial c ourt did not give enough weight to the effects of maternal grandmothe r’s death on Mother’s efforts at reunification, stating that the emotiona l trauma rendered herJ-S61042-16

- 13 - incapable of fully participating in the reunificati on process. Brief for Appellant at 10-11. “Our law is well established that once a child is r emoved from the care of the parent, the burden is on the parent to take action to regain parental rights.” In the Interest of B.C. , 36 A.3d at 609; see also In re Z.P. , 994 A.2d 1108, 1118-19 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding that parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative performanc e). Although Mother went through a tragedy, “[a] child’s life simply ca nnot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to han dle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re Adoption of M.E.P. , 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003). Here, maternal grandmother passed away a couple of days prior to the filing of the termination Petition. Miller testifi ed that although Mother was not cooperative with the bulk of services provided after maternal grandmother passed away, “[i]t was before that[,] t oo[.]” N.T., 2/19/16, at 22. Thus, Mother’s final claim does not entitle he r to relief. Based upon the foregoing, the Order to involuntaril y terminate Mother’s parental rights to A.O. was proper under S ection 2511(a)(8) and (b). Order affirmed.J-S61042-16

- 14 - Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 8/16/2016