Present: All the Justices 

CHRISTOPHER C. GOINS 

v. Record Nos. 951869, 951870 

OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 April 19, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Thomas N. Nance, Judge 

 In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction and 

the death sentence imposed on Christopher C. Goins, along with 

his convictions for first degree murder, malicious wounding, and 

use of a firearm in the commission of murder and malicious 

wounding. 

 I. Proceedings 

 Goins was indicted for capital murder for the killing of 

Robert Jones, based on the willful, deliberate, and premeditated 

killing of more than one person as part of the same act or 

transaction. Code § 18.2-31(7). He was also indicted on four 

charges of first degree murder for the killing of Daphne Jones, 

Nicole Jones, David Jones, and James Nathaniel Randolph, Jr. 

Code § 18.2-32. Finally, Goins was indicted for the malicious 

wounding of Tamika Jones and Kenya Jones, and for seven charges 

of use of a firearm during the commission of each of these 

felonies. Code §§ 18.2-51 and -53.1. 

 In the first stage of a bifurcated jury trial conducted 

pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.3, the jury convicted Goins of all 

offenses charged in the indictments. The jury fixed his 

punishment at four terms of life imprisonment for the first 

degree murder convictions, two terms of twenty years' 
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imprisonment for the malicious wounding convictions, and six 

terms of five years' imprisonment, as well as one term of three 

years' imprisonment, for the convictions of use of a firearm in 

the commission of a felony. 

 At the penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the jury 

heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the offense and 

fixed Goins' punishment for capital murder at death, based on 

findings of both "future dangerousness" and "vileness." After 

considering the probation officer's report and conducting a 

sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Goins in accordance 

with the jury verdicts. Under Code § 17-116.06, we have 

certified Goins' appeals of his non-capital convictions from the 

Court of Appeals, which we have consolidated with his appeal of 

the capital murder conviction and our review of the death 

sentence. 

II. The Evidence 

 We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the prevailing party below. Cheng v. Commonwealth, 

240 Va. 26, 42, 393 S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990). On the morning of 

October 14, 1994, Goins and his friend Barry Scott arrived at the 

home of Tamika Jones, where Tamika and the six other members of 

her family were present. Both Goins and Scott were friends of 

the Jones family. 

 Tamika, who was 14 years old, was seven months pregnant with 

Goins' child and recently had returned from the hospital after 
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receiving treatment for complications related to the pregnancy. 

When Scott attempted to show Goins an ultrasound photograph of 

the fetus, Goins refused to look and became angry. 

 Tamika saw Goins in the living room, but was in her bedroom 

when she later heard him participating in a conversation in the 

kitchen. The conversation was interrupted by the sound of 

gunfire. The shots were fired rapidly and were followed by 

screams, crying, and the sound of a single set of footsteps in 

the hall. Tamika stated that she then heard more shots and saw 

"flashes in the hall." 

 Goins appeared in the doorway of Tamika's bedroom and shot 

her nine times. He also shot her 21-month-old sister, Kenya, 

whom Tamika had attempted to shield with her body. 

 When Tamika believed that Goins had left the apartment, she 

telephoned "911" for emergency assistance. She told the operator 

that Goins had shot her. The operator asked if anyone was with 

her. Tamika responded, "Yes. He shot them too." 

 When the City of Richmond police arrived at the Jones' home, 

they determined that all the members of the Jones family had been 

shot. Only Tamika and Kenya survived. In the kitchen, the 

police found the body of Tamika's four-year-old brother, David, 

as well as the bodies of her parents, Daphne Jones and James 

Randolph, Jr. In one of the bedrooms, the police found the 

bodies of Nicole Jones, Tamika's nine-year-old sister, and Robert 

Jones, Tamika's three-year-old brother. 
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 Daphne Jones was shot four times, twice in the head, once in 

the left wrist, and once in the right leg. Both of the gunshot 

wounds to her head were lethal. One of these wounds showed 

evidence of "stippling," consisting of burned and unburned gun 

powder, which indicated that the gun was fired within a few feet 

of her head. 

 James Randolph, Jr. was shot nine times, twice in the head, 

three times in the left arm and chest, once in the abdomen, once 

in the right arm, once in the left leg, and once on the chin. 

Four of these wounds were lethal. The evidence showed that some 

of the shots were fired from less than "arm's length" and other 

shots were fired after Randolph had fallen to the ground. 

 David died as a result of a lethal gunshot wound to the 

head. This wound also showed evidence of stippling. Nicole 

suffered two lethal gunshot wounds. One bullet passed through 

her heart and a lung. The other bullet was fired into her head 

at close range. Robert sustained two lethal gunshot wounds to 

his head. Kenya sustained a wound, measuring between two and 

three inches long, through her left wrist. 

 Tamika was shot three times in the abdomen, three times in 

her thighs, once in her right hand, once in the neck, and once in 

her left shoulder. Her obstetrician performed a hysterectomy on 

her after the shootings, because multiple bullets had perforated 

her uterus and her right ovary and fallopian tube. When removed 

from the uterus, the fetus had sustained a gunshot wound to its 
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face and was dead. 

 The police retrieved from the kitchen seven .45 caliber 

cartridge casings, various bullets, and bullet jacket fragments. 

 In the bedroom where Nicole and Robert were shot, the police 

found two .45 caliber cartridge casings, as well as two bullets, 

a bullet jacket, and a lead fragment. In the bedroom where 

Tamika and Kenya had been shot, the police recovered six .45 

caliber cartridge casings and two bullets. No weapon was found. 

 James L. Pickelman, a firearms identification expert at the 

Commonwealth's Division of Forensic Science, explained that 

hollow point bullets, such as those used in the commission of 

these offenses, are designed by the manufacturer to explode on 

impact with the target. Frequently, at the point of impact, the 

bullet core separates from its jacket. Pickelman examined the 

weight and rifling characteristics of the bullets, bullet 

jackets, and jacket fragments recovered from the apartment and 

the victims' bodies. He testified that all these items were ".45 

auto caliber." 

 After examining the rifling marks on the bullet jackets and 

jacket fragments retrieved from Jones' apartment, Pickelman 

concluded that the bullet jackets were ejected from a firearm 

constructed by a manufacturer who uses polygonal rifling. 

Pickelman also stated that Glock, Inc. is the major manufacturer 

which uses this type rifling in the design of its firearms. 

 Ann D. Jones, also an expert in firearms identification at 
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the Division of Forensic Science, compared the various 

microscopic markings on each cartridge casing that was recovered. 

 Her examination of these markings established that all the 

cartridge casings were fired from the same .45 caliber Glock 

pistol. Jones stated that .45 caliber Glock pistols produce an 

elliptical shape firing pin impression, which is unique to that 

brand and type of pistol. She observed this impression on all 

the cartridge casings recovered from the crime scene. 

 Jones also testified that she compared the markings on one 

of the cartridge casings found at the crime scene with the 

markings on the unfired .45 caliber cartridge found in the home 

of Monique Littlejohn, Goins' girlfriend. Jones observed that 

these items exhibited the same extractor marks and concluded that 

both items had been in the same weapon. 

 On two occasions, the police searched Littlejohn's 

apartment. In addition to the unfired .45 caliber cartridge, 

they found an instruction manual for Glock pistols lying on the 

floor near some men's clothing. 

 In Littlejohn's automobile, the police found a Sam's Club 

identification card. Although Goins' photograph appeared on the 

card, the card was issued in the name of Derrick Reardon. Two 

other identification cards were also found in Littlejohn's car. 

Both cards were issued in the name of Derrick Reardon, but 

displayed Goins' picture. Investigators also found a high school 

equivalency diploma issued in the name of Derrick Lydell Reardon 
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in Littlejohn's vehicle, as well as the business card of a 

taxicab driver, Parrish Davis. 

 Approximately one month after the shootings, Goins was 

apprehended in New York with Monique Littlejohn. At the time of 

his arrest, Goins had shaved his head. 

 Parrish Davis, who had known Goins for several months prior 

to the shootings, testified that Goins had been a passenger in 

his taxicab approximately once or twice each week during those 

months. Davis stated that, during this time, Goins was living 

with Littlejohn at her apartment. 

 Davis also stated that about one week before the shootings, 

he had a conversation with Goins, in which Goins stated that he 

was upset because Tamika was pregnant by him. Goins told Davis 

that "he wanted to do away with her and her family." At that 

time, Davis did not believe that Goins intended to harm the Jones 

family. However, Davis stated that he and Goins occasionally 

discussed the subject of .45 caliber pistols. 

 Davis also testified that he spoke with Goins on the evening 

of October 14, 1994, after the shootings. During that 

conversation, Goins asked Davis to drive him out of town in the 

trunk of a friend's car. Davis refused to do so. 

 After the Commonwealth rested its case, Goins presented 

testimony from two witnesses. Mildred S. Plumber, an employee of 

the taxicab company for which Davis worked, testified that 

company records for October 1994 indicated Davis had reported no 
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fares for service to or from the address at which Littlejohn and 

Goins lived. However, Plumber conceded that Davis might have 

provided service to that location and not have reported the fares 

to the company. 

 Goins also offered the testimony of Jason Lamont Williams, 

who stated that, during the week before the killings, he "might 

have" ridden with Goins in a taxicab driven by Davis. Williams 

stated that Goins never said anything in his presence about guns 

or about "doing away" with Tamika Jones or her family. 

 On cross-examination, the Commonwealth's attorney asked 

Williams, "Do you or have you in the past sold drugs for Mr. 

Goins?" The trial court sustained Goins' objection to the 

question. The Commonwealth's attorney then asked, "Sir, have you 

ever told your probation officer, Ms. Bircham, that you sold 

drugs for this defendant?" Once again, the trial court sustained 

Goins' objection to the question. Finally, the trial court 

permitted the Commonwealth's attorney to ask Williams, "Did you 

ever tell your probation officer, Ms. Bircham, that you had a 

business relationship with Mr. Goins?" Williams responded, "No." 

 During the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth 

offered testimony from Detective John J. Riani of the Henrico 

County Police Department, who testified that, in February 1994, 

he had encountered Goins while working as a narcotics 

investigator at the Amtrack station on Staples Mill Road. Goins 

had alighted from a train arriving from New York when Riani 
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approached and asked him some questions. When Goins later 

consented to a search of his bags and clothing, Riani found 55.35 

grams of crack cocaine in a bag inside Goins' coat pocket. This 

amount of cocaine had a "street value" of approximately $5,500. 

 Riani then arrested Goins for possession of cocaine with 

intent to distribute. Goins told Riani that he was addicted to 

crack cocaine. 

 Goins never appeared for trial and a capias was issued for 

his arrest. Both the cocaine charge and the capias remained 

outstanding at the time of the present offenses. 

 The Commonwealth also presented evidence from Dr. Jack 

Daniel, Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the Commonwealth. 

Dr. Daniel testified that James Randolph, Jr., Nicole Jones, and 

Robert Jones all suffered multiple lethal gunshot wounds. He 

also testified that one of Nicole's lethal wounds occurred while 

she was lying face down. In addition, Dr. Daniel stated that the 

dried blood on Robert's face indicated that Robert had not moved 

after he was shot the first time. 

 In mitigation of the offenses, Goins presented the testimony 

of Paulette Goins Dickerson, his mother's sister. Dickerson 

testified that Goins' mother had used drugs frequently in front 

of Goins. Dickerson also testified that Goins has an aunt who 

abuses drugs, and that another of his aunts died of AIDS acquired 

from drug use. Dickerson further related that Goins has an uncle 

who is incarcerated in New York. Another uncle is mentally 
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handicapped, as a result of a head injury sustained at age two 

when Goins' mother pushed him out of a third-story window. 

 Dickerson also testified that, when Goins was 12 years old, 

he moved from Richmond to New York to live with his grandmother 

because his mother had abused him. Dickerson stated that Goins' 

mother never held, hugged, or nurtured any of her children. 

According to Dickerson, Goins was devastated when his grandmother 

died, because she was the only person who had shown him any love. 

 Goins' cousin, Leah Butler, testified that she had lived 

briefly in the same household with Goins and had observed his 

mother use drugs and neglect her children. Butler also testified 

that Goins is a caring, "giving" man. Butler's son, Phillip, age 

six, testified that he liked Goins, and that Goins would often 

play games with him and bring him candy. 

III. Issues Previously Decided 

 Goins has advanced a number of arguments that we have 

rejected in previous decisions. Finding no reason to modify our 

previously expressed views, we will reaffirm our earlier 

decisions and reject the following contentions: 

 A. The death penalty statutes do not give meaningful 

guidance to jurors that they may impose a death sentence only if 

they determine beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating 

circumstances outweigh mitigating ones. Rejected in Williams v. 

Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 535, 450 S.E.2d 365, 371 (1994), cert. 

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2616 (1995); Breard v. 
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Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74, 445 S.E.2d 670, 674-75, cert. 

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 442 (1994). 

 B. The death penalty statutes fail to instruct the jury 

properly on its consideration of mitigating evidence. Rejected 

in Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 79, 85, 459 S.E.2d 97, 100, 

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 535 (1995). 

 C. The aggravating factors of "vileness" and "future 

dangerousness" are unconstitutionally vague. Rejected in Breard, 

248 Va. at 74, 445 S.E.2d at 675. 

 D. Future dangerousness may not be proved by unadjudicated 

conduct unless the conduct is established beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Rejected in Williams, 248 Va. at 536, 450 S.E.2d at 371. 

 E. The death penalty as administered in Virginia 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is imposed in an 

arbitrary and a discriminatory manner. Rejected in Chandler v. 

Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 276, 455 S.E.2d 219, 223, cert. 

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 233 (1995); Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 476, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148 (1978), cert. 

denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). 

 F. The death penalty statutes are unconstitutional because 

they allow, but do not require, the trial court to set aside the 

death sentence upon a showing of good cause and permit the court 

to consider hearsay in the post-sentence report. Rejected in 

Chandler, 249 Va. at 276, 455 S.E.2d at 223. 

 G. The appellate review procedures for death sentences in 
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Virginia, including the expedited review process, are 

unconstitutional. Rejected in Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 

243, 253, 389 S.E.2d 871, 876, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990); 

Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 473-74, 357 S.E.2d 500, 508-

09, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933 (1987). 

 H. The denial of questions during voir dire, jury 

instructions, and other information about the fact that the 

defendant would be required to serve a minimum of 25 years before 

becoming eligible for parole. Rejected in Joseph v. 

Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 84, 452 S.E.2d 862, 866, cert. denied, 

___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 204 (1995). Under the principles 

expressed in Joseph, the trial court also properly rejected 

Goins' request to introduce evidence of parole eligibility at the 

sentencing phase. 

 I. The denial of an asserted right to exercise additional 

peremptory challenges. Rejected in Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 

Va. 268, 273, 427 S.E.2d 411, 416, cert. denied, 510 U.S. ___, 

114 S.Ct. 171 (1993). 

 J. The denial of individual voir dire of potential jurors. 

 Rejected in Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 319, 448 

S.E.2d 638, 644 (1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 

1134 (1995). 

 K. The denial of a request to mail a questionnaire to all 

potential jurors. Rejected in Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 

482, 489-90, 404 S.E.2d 227, 232, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 
- 13 - 

(1991). 

IV. Pretrial Matters 

A. Bill of Particulars 

 Goins filed a motion for a bill of particulars. During a 

hearing on the motion, he conceded that the Commonwealth already 

had provided him all information required by Virginia law. The 

trial court denied Goins' request for an additional statement of 

all evidence on which the Commonwealth intended to rely to prove 

the offense of capital murder and the death penalty predicates. 

 Goins argues that the trial court's denial of this request 

impeded his ability to make pretrial challenges to the 

application of the capital murder and death penalty statutes, and 

to file timely motions for suppression of the evidence on Fourth 

and Fifth Amendment grounds. Goins also asserts that, under 

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the Commonwealth was 

required to state in a bill of particulars its "narrowing 

constructions of the 'vileness' factor." We disagree. 

 A defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars as a 

matter of right. Code § 19.2-230 provides that a trial court 

"may direct the filing of a bill of particulars." Thus, the 

trial court's decision whether to require the Commonwealth to 

file a bill of particulars is a matter committed to its sound 

discretion. Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 372, 402 

S.E.2d 218, 223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). 

 A bill of particulars is not required if the indictment 
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provides a defendant sufficient "notice of the nature and 

character of the offense charged so he can make his defense." 

Wilder v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 145, 147, 225 S.E.2d 411, 413 

(1976). We conclude that the capital murder indictment, the only 

indictment challenged in this assignment of error, met that 

standard.1 

 In addition, contrary to Goins' assertion, Godfrey does not 

require the Commonwealth to state in a bill of particulars its 

construction of the "vileness" predicate or its evidence 

supporting a finding under that predicate. Godfrey addresses the 

issue of what instructions must be given to a jury considering 

the "vileness" predicate, in order to prevent "[t]he standardless 

and unchanneled imposition of death sentences in the uncontrolled 

discretion of a basically uninstructed jury." 446 U.S. at 429. 

Godfrey mandates that the jury and reviewing court be provided a 

"principled way to distinguish this case . . . from the many 

cases" in which the death penalty is not imposed. Id. at 433. 

Thus, Godfrey is inapposite to the present issue, which involves 

 

 1The capital murder indictment alleged that "[o]n or about 

October 14, 1994, in the City of Richmond, Christopher Cornelius 

Goins did feloniously and unlawfully commit capital murder in 

that he did kill and murder Robert Jones in a willful, deliberate 

and premeditated killing of more than one person as part of the 

same act or transaction." 
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only Goins' motion for a bill of particulars. 

 In addition, the record fails to show that the denial of 

Goins' request for a bill of particulars impaired his ability to 

challenge the application of the capital murder and death penalty 

statutes, or to file suppression motions based on Fourth and 

Fifth Amendment grounds. Therefore, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a 

bill of particulars. 

B. Discovery 

 Next, Goins contends that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for discovery of the results of a polygraph test 

administered to Barry Scott. Goins argues that the Commonwealth 

was required to produce the polygraph test results because they 

may have contained exculpatory evidence and impeachment material. 

 Goins also contends that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for production of all documents, diagrams, and 

sketches relating to the case that were shown to any of the 

Commonwealth's potential witnesses. Goins acknowledges that this 

request exceeded the requirements of Rule 3A:11. Nevertheless, 

he argues that, based on the number and nature of the charges 

against him, the trial court was required to order discovery of 

all exculpatory evidence and all other evidence that the 

Commonwealth intended to offer to establish his guilt. Goins 

asserts that the denial of these discovery requests violated his 

rights under the due process, compulsory process, and 
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confrontation clauses of the United States Constitution.2

 We 

disagree. 

 The Commonwealth is required to provide a defendant 

exculpatory evidence, including evidence which impeaches the 

credibility of a prosecution witness. Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 150, 

341 S.E.2d 159, 164 (1986). However, a defendant does not have a 

general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case. 

Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 679, 239 S.E.2d 112, 118 

(1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 930 (1978) (citing Weatherford v. 

Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)). 

 In order for a defendant to establish a Brady violation, he 

must demonstrate that the undisclosed evidence was exculpatory 

and material either to the issue of guilt or to the issue of 

punishment. Lowe, 218 Va. at 679, 239 S.E.2d at 118. The mere 

possibility that "undisclosed information might have helped the 

defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does 

not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." United 

 

 2Goins also argues that the denial of the discovery motions 

impeded his right to the effective assistance of counsel. This 

claim, however, is not reviewable on direct appeal. Walker v. 

Mitchell, 224 Va. 568, 570-71, 299 S.E.2d 698, 699 (1983); 

Browning v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 295, 297 n.2, 452 S.E.2d 

360, 362 n.2 (1994); see Acts 1990, ch.74. 
- 17 - 

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976). 

 The present record does not show that the Commonwealth 

withheld exculpatory information. In fact, the Commonwealth's 

attorney stated that he would disclose any prior statements of 

witnesses that were inconsistent with their anticipated trial 

testimony. Thus, since the record fails to show that the 

Commonwealth withheld from Goins exculpatory evidence, and since 

Goins concedes that the Commonwealth provided all other discovery 

required under Rule 3A:11, we conclude that the trial court did 

not violate Goins' right of due process in its discovery ruling. 

 We also hold that the trial court did not violate Goins' 

rights under the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of 

the Sixth Amendment. A defendant's rights under the 

confrontation clause are trial rights which are designed to 

prevent the improper restriction of cross-examination. These 

rights "[do] not include the power to require the pretrial 

disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in 

contradicting unfavorable testimony." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 

480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987). These rights are "satisfied if defense 

counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses." 

Id. Thus, Goins' rights of confrontation were not denied by the 

trial court's discovery ruling. 

 The compulsory process clause provides a defendant with 

government assistance in compelling the presence of favorable 

witnesses at trial. Id. at 56. This right has never been 
- 18 - 

extended to include the right to discover the identity of 

witnesses or to require the government to produce witnesses who 

might give exculpatory testimony. Instead, the Supreme Court has 

concluded that the right of compulsory process "provides no 

greater protections in this area than those afforded by due 

process." Id.; see also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 

U.S. 858, 872-73 (1982). 

 The denial of Goins' extended discovery request was 

unrelated to his right to obtain government assistance in 

compelling the attendance of witnesses. Thus, the trial court 

did not deny Goins' right of compulsory process when it denied 

his discovery request. 

C. Voir Dire 

 Goins requested the trial court to ask potential jurors 

questions from a prepared list. The trial court refused to ask 

certain questions.3 Goins contends that the trial court erred in 

 

 3The refused questions were: 

 What activities, if any, are you involved with at present 

for your church, temple, or other religious organization? 

 Have you ever been a member of an organization, religious or 

otherwise, that has taken a position opposed to legalized 

abortions? If so, what? 

 Have you personally taken a position in opposition to 

legalized abortions? 

 Are you a member of any organization, religious 

denomination, or other group that has taken a position in support 

of the death penalty? 

 Which political party do you usually support? 

 [H]ave you or a member of your family, or any close friend, 

ever had an opportunity to see the inside of a prison, jail, or 

other correctional facility? 

 What are your impressions of the ability of psychologists or 
- 19 - 

(..continued) 

refusing to ask these questions because they were relevant to 

establishing relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice. We 

disagree. 

 Code § 8.01-358 provides that 

 [t]he court and counsel for either party shall have the 

right to examine under oath any person who is called as 

a juror therein and shall have the right to ask such 

person or juror directly any relevant question to 

ascertain whether he is related to either party, or has 

an interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed 

any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice 

therein. 

This section provides a party the right to ask potential jurors 

psychiatrists to understand the human mind? 

 What are your views as to the major causes of crime in our 

society? 

 Have you ever experienced fear of a person of another race? 

 If so, what were the circumstances? 

 Do you think that African-Americans are more likely to 

commit crimes than whites? If so, why? 

 Tell us what your views are about the death penalty and why. 

 Why is the death penalty a good idea or not a good idea? 

 What is your opinion about the philosophy of "an eye for an 

eye" as it concerns the use of the death penalty as punishment 

for murder? 

 What types of situations do you think the death penalty 

might be appropriate for? In such situations, do you think the 

death penalty should always be imposed? 

 Do you think that imprisonment for life is a severe enough 

punishment for someone who has been convicted of any type of 

murder? Would the age of such a convicted person affect your 

thinking? 

 Where do your feelings about the death penalty come from? 

Have your feelings about it changed over the years? 

 Is your feeling about the death penalty strong enough to 

affect your vote in favor of or against a political candidate 

because of his or her position on the death penalty? 

 Occasionally one reads in the newspaper, or hears on T.V. 

news, about a person sentenced to death who was later found to be 

innocent. How does that fact affect your opinion about the death 

penalty? 

 Why do you think we are asking all these questions about the 

death penalty? 
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questions relevant to the statutory factors of relationship, 

interest, opinion, or bias. A party has no right, however, "to 

extend voir dire questioning ad infinitum." LeVasseur v. 

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983), cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984). A party must have a full and fair 

opportunity to determine whether the statutory factors are 

present, but the trial court retains discretion to determine when 

a defendant has had such an opportunity. Id.; Buchanan v. 

Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 401, 384 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1989), cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990). 

 Here, the trial court permitted extensive questioning of 

potential jurors relevant to all statutory factors outlined in 

Code § 8.01-358. Thus, since Goins had ample opportunity to ask 

relevant questions, and since the questions asked were sufficient 

to preserve Goins' right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, 

we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to ask additional questions. For these reasons, we also 

conclude that the refusal to ask these questions during voir dire 

did not violate Goins' rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 

V. Guilt Phase Issues 

 In a pretrial motion and again at trial, Goins asked that 

the Commonwealth be prohibited from introducing into evidence a 

videotape of the crime scene and photographs of the victims and a 
- 21 - 

gun. The trial court ordered that segments of the videotape be 

deleted, but denied Goins' motion with respect to the remaining 

portion of the tape and with respect to all the photographs. 

Goins argues that these items were calculated to arouse the 

jury's sympathies and were not needed to prove the Commonwealth's 

case. Since the identification of the victims was not disputed, 

Goins contends that the prejudicial impact of the videotape and 

photographs outweighed their probative value. 

 Photographs and videotapes of crime scenes are admissible to 

show motive, intent, method, malice, premeditation, and the 

atrociousness of the crime. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 

295, 312, 384 S.E.2d 785, 796 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 

(1990); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 270-71, 257 S.E.2d 

808, 816 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). If the 

photographs accurately depict the crime scene, they are not 

rendered inadmissible simply because they are gruesome or 

shocking. Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 343, 356 S.E.2d 

157, 173, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987). Further, the 

admissibility of photographs and videotapes rests within the 

sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 342, 356 S.E.2d at 

173; Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 235, 441 S.E.2d 195, 

204, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 234 (1994). 

 Here, the photographs and the videotape were relevant 

evidence. The photographs, coupled with the testimony of the 

medical examiners, demonstrated the nature of the wounds and the 
- 22 - 

position of the victims after they were shot. In addition, the 

videotape, which showed the positions of the victims relative to 

each other in the apartment, was relevant to the issue whether 

the shootings were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The 

videotape and the photographs also were relevant to the 

Commonwealth's theory of the sequence in which the shootings 

occurred. We conclude that the probative value of this evidence 

outweighed any potential prejudicial effect and, thus, that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these items 

into evidence. 

 Goins also objected to the trial court's admission of the 

tape-recorded conversation between the "911" emergency operator 

and Tamika Jones, in which Tamika stated that Goins had shot the 

other people in the apartment. Goins argues that Tamika's 

statement was not based on firsthand knowledge because she did 

not witness the shootings of five family members. Thus, Goins 

contends that the statement is inadmissible hearsay. The 

Commonwealth responds that the statement was properly admitted as 

an "excited utterance." We agree with the Commonwealth. 

 A statement comes within the excited utterance exception to 

the hearsay rule and is admissible to prove the truth of the 

matter stated, when the statement is spontaneous and impulsive, 

thus guaranteeing its reliability. Clark v. Commonwealth, 235 

Va. 287, 292, 367 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1988). "There is no fixed 

rule by which the question whether the statement is admissible as 
- 23 - 

an excited utterance can be decided. Resolution of the issue 

depends upon the circumstances of each case." Id., 367 S.E.2d at 

486. 

 The statement must be prompted by a startling event and be 

made at such time and under such circumstances as to preclude the 

presumption that it was made as the result of deliberation. 

Goins v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 285, 287, 237 S.E.2d 136, 138 

(1977). In addition, the declarant must have firsthand knowledge 

of the startling event. See John W. Strong, McCormick on 

Evidence § 272 (4th ed. 1992). The decision whether the 

statement qualifies as an excited utterance lies within the 

discretion of the trial court. Clark, 235 Va. at 292, 367 S.E.2d 

at 486. 

 The totality of the circumstances surrounding Tamika's 

statement satisfies these requirements. Tamika made the 

statement within minutes of the shootings, as soon as she 

believed that Goins had left the apartment. Her statement, "[h]e 

shot them too," was not responsive to the question posed by the 

operator, nor was it prompted or suggested by the operator. 

 The record contains sufficient evidence to establish that 

Tamika was still acting under the agitation of the startling 

event, and that she spoke based on her firsthand knowledge of the 

screaming, the single set of footsteps in the hall, the gunshots, 

and her observation of Goins both before and after the shooting 

began. These perceptions and observations were sufficient to 
- 24 - 

give her firsthand knowledge of all the events even though she 

did not see the killings take place. Based on these 

circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting the tape-recorded conversation. 

 Goins also argues that the trial court erred in admitting 

Parrish Davis' testimony that Goins stated he wanted to "do away" 

with Tamika and her family. Goins contends that this statement 

was inadmissible hearsay. The Commonwealth responds that the 

statement was properly admitted under the "party admission" 

exception to the hearsay rule. 

 A statement made by a party is admissible in evidence 

against him. "An admission deliberately made, precisely 

identified and clearly proved affords evidence of a most 

satisfactory nature and may furnish the strongest and most 

convincing evidence of truth." Tyree v. Lariew, 208 Va. 382, 

385, 158 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1967). The admission may relate to a 

past act or to a future event. 

 A prior statement of a threatening nature made by a criminal 

defendant is admissible to prove premeditation. For example, in 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 702, 261 S.E.2d 550, 554 

(1980), in which the defendant was tried for first degree murder, 

we held that the defendant's extrajudicial statement, "I've got 

it in for someone," was admissible as a party admission. 

 In the present case, the testimony of Davis precisely 

identified an admission that was deliberately made. Like the 
- 25 - 

defendant's statement in Smith, Goins' statement provided 

evidence of premeditation. Nevertheless, Goins asserts that, 

since Davis did not believe that Goins "was being serious" when 

he made the statement, it was thereby rendered false and 

inadmissible. We disagree. 

 In the case of a party admission, the credibility of the 

extrajudicial declarant is not an issue affecting the 

admissibility of the statement, because the party need not crossexamine his own statement in order to be in a position to deny, 

contradict, or explain the statement. See Charles E. Friend, 2 

The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 18-34 (4th ed. 1993). 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 

admitting this testimony into evidence. 

 Next, Goins contends that the trial court erred in admitting 

into evidence the business card of Parrish Davis. He argues that 

this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. We disagree. 

 Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency to prove 

an issue in a case. Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 

S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986). Relevant evidence may be excluded only 

if the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative 

value. The question whether the prejudicial effect of evidence 

exceeds its probative value lies within the trial court's 

discretion. Id. 

 Here, Davis' business card, which was found in Littlejohn's 

car, was relevant evidence that tended to corroborate Davis' 
- 26 - 

testimony about his acquaintance with Goins. The card was not 

cumulative evidence and there is no indication that its admission 

had an undue prejudicial effect. Therefore, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the card 

into evidence. 

 Goins also contends that the various identification cards 

bearing his photograph with the name of Derrick Reardon, and the 

high school diploma issued in the name of Derrick Reardon, were 

inadmissible evidence of "prior bad acts." He argues that this 

evidence was inadmissible because there was no direct link 

between that evidence and the elements of the crimes charged. He 

further contends that the evidence was highly prejudicial because 

it encouraged the jury to make an impermissible inference that 

Goins was predisposed to criminal activity. 

 Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is inadmissible if it 

is offered merely to show that the defendant is likely to have 

committed the crime charged. Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 

Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970). However, such evidence 

is admissible if it tends to prove any element of the offense 

charged, even though it also tends to show that the defendant is 

guilty of another crime. Woodfin v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 

95, 372 S.E.2d 377, 380-81 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1009 

(1989). Evidence of this nature will be permitted only when its 

probative value outweighs the incidental prejudice to the 

defendant. Id.
- 27 - 

 Evidence of other crimes or bad acts may be admitted to 

prove the perpetrator's identity. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 

Va. 78, 89, 393 S.E.2d 609, 617, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 

(1990). The trial court is vested with discretion in deciding 

whether the evidence of prior bad acts has probative value that 

outweighs the prejudice to the accused. Id. at 90, 393 S.E.2d at 

617. 

 Here, the identification cards and the diploma were relevant 

evidence tending to prove the identity of the perpetrator. This 

evidence linked Goins to Littlejohn and her apartment, where the 

Glock manual and the unfired .45 caliber cartridge were found. 

The potential prejudicial effect of this evidence was diminished 

by the fact that the Commonwealth did not link the identification 

cards and the diploma with the commission of another crime. 

Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting this evidence. 

 Goins next argues that the trial court erred in allowing 

Detective Woody to testify that he found gun publications in 

Littlejohn's apartment. At trial, Goins' counsel based his 

objection on the fact that "[t]he police evidently did not seize 

any of those things . . . and it puts us at a terrible 

disadvantage in that we don't have the ability to cross-examine 

in reference to that." On appeal, however, Goins raises a 

different argument, namely, that this testimony was irrelevant 

and highly prejudicial. 
- 28 - 

 We will not consider this new argument because it was not 

presented to the trial court. Rule 5:25. Likewise, we do not 

consider the objection Goins raised at trial because he has 

abandoned it on appeal. 

 Goins also argues that the trial judge erred in allowing 

Kenya Jones to be presented to the jury. Goins' counsel objected 

on the basis that "I don't know what purpose that serves." The 

trial court overruled the objection, stating that the 

presentation of Kenya was relevant evidence tending to identify 

her as the child who was shot. On appeal, Goins renews his 

argument that this evidence was irrelevant, but he also raises a 

new argument that the prejudicial effect of this evidence 

outweighed any probative value it might have had. 

 We will consider only the issue whether the evidence was 

relevant, because Goins did not raise in the trial court the 

issue of its prejudicial impact. Rule 5:25. We conclude that 

the presentation of Kenya to the jury was relevant to the issue 

whether Kenya was wounded by Goins, as well as to the nature and 

the location of her injury. 

 Goins next contends that the trial court erred in sustaining 

the Commonwealth's objection to the following question he 

attempted to ask the Commonwealth's firearms expert, Ann Jones: 

 If another expert were to testify in this matter that 

the results would be more conclusive if you had a 

weapon from the scene with which to fire test rounds in 

order to make a comparison, [would you agree that] 

. . . the results would be more conclusive? 
- 29 - 

Goins' counsel asked this question after Jones testified that her 

inability to test fire the murder weapon did not affect the 

weight of her conclusions concerning the cartridge casings she 

examined. 

 The Commonwealth objected to the question on the basis that 

the "defense could put on an expert if they wanted to prove their 

theory." In response, Goins' counsel asserted that "another 

expert who has already testified in this court . . . took a 

different approach." The trial court sustained the 

Commonwealth's objection, stating that the expert witnesses had 

not expressed any such differences in opinion. 

 Goins argues that the trial court's ruling resulted in the 

denial of his right to cross-examine Jones "fully and fairly." 

We disagree, because the record shows that Jones and the other 

firearms expert, Pickelman, did not give contradictory testimony. 

 Jones and Pickelman examined different categories of items. 

 Jones examined the markings on the cartridge casings found at 

the crime scene as well as the markings on the unfired cartridge 

found in Littlejohn's apartment. Based on this examination, she 

was able to conclude that all the cartridge casings had been 

ejected from the same .45 caliber Glock pistol. 

 Jones testified on cross-examination that her "results are 

very conclusive." She also stated that her results would not be 

different if she had fired test rounds from the actual weapon 

used at the crime scene. 
- 30 - 

 Pickelman did not state that test firing the actual murder 

weapon could have affected Jones' results. As Pickelman 

indicated in his testimony, Jones only performed tests on the 

unfired cartridge and the cartridge casings, which originally 

house the jacketed bullets in the weapon before they are fired. 

Pickelman's testimony did not evaluate these tests, but only 

dealt with his examination of the barrel markings found on the 

fired bullets, bullet jackets, and jacket fragments. Thus, when 

Pickelman agreed that, if he had been able to fire test rounds 

from the actual murder weapon, he might have been able to 

determine conclusively whether the various spent bullets and 

bullet jacket fragments came from the same weapon, his testimony 

was unrelated to the materials and methods involved in the tests 

that Jones performed. 

 Goins next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the 

Commonwealth's attorney to ask Lamont Williams whether he had 

told his probation officer that he had a prior business 

relationship with Goins. Goins contends that, since the 

Commonwealth's attorney earlier had attempted to ask Williams 

whether he had sold drugs for Goins, the later question raised an 

inference of unrelated criminal activity that did nothing more 

than impugn Williams' character and suggest that Goins was 

involved in selling drugs. We disagree. 

 The bias of a witness, based on a previous relationship with 

a party to the case, is always a relevant subject of cross-
- 31 - 

examination. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Sonney, 236 Va. 

482, 488, 374 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1988); see Brown v. Commonwealth, 

246 Va. 460, 464, 437 S.E.2d 563, 564-65 (1993). The issue 

whether a particular question may be asked about a witness' bias 

is a matter submitted to the trial court's discretion. Shanklin 

v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 862, 864, 284 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1981). 

 Here, the question allowed by the trial court was not 

improper, and Williams denied that he had told his probation 

officer he had a previous business relationship with Goins. 

Further, the objections to the earlier questions were properly 

sustained by the trial court. Therefore, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the question 

at issue. 

 Goins next contends that the trial court erred in refusing 

his request to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding 

the videotape of computer-generated graphics that the 

Commonwealth used during its closing argument in the guilt phase 

of the trial. Goins asked the trial court to instruct the jury 

that, when a presentation is made "in such a high-tech fashion," 

it is afforded "no more credibility." The trial court denied 

Goins' request and indicated that Goins' counsel was free to make 

this argument to the jury. 

 The decision whether to give a cautionary instruction is a 

matter lying within the trial court's discretion and will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless the record shows an abuse of 
- 32 - 

discretion. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 598, 605, 

347 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1986). Since Goins concedes that he did not 

object to the edited version of the tape that was shown to the 

jury, the trial court was not required to caution the jury 

concerning its form or its content. Thus, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying the requested instruction. 

 Goins next argues that the evidence is insufficient to 

support his convictions. Goins notes that Tamika did not see him 

shoot the murder victims, that Scott did not testify, that 

Scott's clothing was not tested for gunpowder residue, that the 

shootings of Tamika and Kenya were "radically different in 

character from the other shootings," and that no fingerprints 

were found on the bullet fragments recovered from the crime 

scene. 

 Goins also observes that drugs were found "on the person of 

one of the victims and in the system of another victim," and that 

no murder weapon was found. Finally, he contends that Parrish 

Davis' testimony was inherently incredible as a matter of law, 

and that the unfired cartridge found in the second search of 

Littlejohn's apartment may have been "planted" there after the 

first search conducted by the police. 

 The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

on appeal is well established. We must examine the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 

party at trial, and we will not disturb the trial court's 
- 33 - 

judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. Beavers, 245 Va. at 281-82, 427 S.E.2d at 421; Code 

§ 8.01-680. 

 In the present case, the evidence established that Goins 

told Davis that he wanted to kill Tamika and her family after she 

had told her parents that she was pregnant by Goins. Further, on 

the morning of the murders, Goins became angry when asked to look 

at an ultrasound photograph of the fetus. 

 Tamika saw Goins in the apartment that morning before she 

went to her bedroom, and she heard him speaking in the kitchen 

before the gunfire began. After hearing the first gunshots, 

screaming, and the sound of her brother crying, Tamika heard more 

gunshots, the sound of a single set of footsteps in the hall, and 

then an additional series of gunshots. Goins appeared at 

Tamika's bedroom door and Tamika saw him shoot her as she 

attempted to shield her sister, Kenya, from the shots. 

 After the murders, Goins asked Davis to drive him away from 

Richmond in the trunk of a car. Goins and Littlejohn ultimately 

fled to New York and, when Goins was arrested, his appearance was 

altered. 

 The evidence also established that all the fired cartridges, 

bullets, and bullet jacket fragments retrieved from the crime 

scene were fired from the same .45 caliber automatic pistol. The 

cartridge casings were identified conclusively as having been 

fired from the same .45 caliber automatic Glock pistol. 
- 34 - 

 In the apartment where Goins lived with Littlejohn, the 

police found a Glock instruction manual, as well as an unfired 

cartridge case. Scientific analysis performed on the unfired 

cartridge case showed conclusively that the case had been ejected 

from the same .45 caliber Glock pistol used to fire the spent 

cartridges. 

 Although Tamika and Kenya were the only victims who were not 

shot in the head, this fact fails to support Goins' argument that 

another person must have shot the victims who died. An 

hypothesis of innocence must arise from the evidence rather than 

from the imagination of defense counsel. Spencer v. 

Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 283-84, 384 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1989), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990). Moreover, there is no 

evidence indicating that anyone other than Goins shot the murder 

victims. Thus, we conclude that the jury's verdict is fully 

supported by the evidence. 

VI. Penalty Phase Issues 

 Goins also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the 

Commonwealth to introduce evidence of "future dangerousness." 

Goins asserts that, since he had not been convicted of any crimes 

when he was tried for the present offenses, the Commonwealth 

could not seek the death penalty based on this predicate. We 

disagree. 

 We specifically rejected this argument in Murphy v. 

Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 144, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53, cert. denied, 
- 35 - 

510 U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 336 (1993), in which the defendant argued 

that the absence of a felony record or any history of violence 

precluded a finding of "future dangerousness." Our holding was 

based on the language of Code § 19.2-264.4(C), which states in 

relevant part: 

 The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless 

the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that there is a probability based upon evidence of the 

prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances 

surrounding the commission of the offense of which he 

is accused that he would commit criminal acts of 

violence that would constitute a continuing serious 

threat to society. [Emphasis added.] 

 This language plainly states in the disjunctive the 

evidentiary standard for imposition of the death penalty based on 

"future dangerousness." Thus, it is not necessary that a 

defendant have a prior criminal record before the Commonwealth 

presents evidence of "future dangerousness" to the trier of fact. 

 Goins next contends that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the jury's findings of "vileness" and "future 

dangerousness." However, he offers no rationale in support of 

this argument. 

 We disagree with Goins' conclusory assertion. A finding of 

"vileness" must be based on conduct which is "outrageously or 

wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, 

depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." Code 

§ 19.2-264.2. Proof of any one of these three components will 

support a finding of vileness. Id.; Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 

Va. 386, 411, 422 S.E.2d 380, 395 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 
- 36 - 

1043 (1993). We hold that the evidence sufficiently established 

Goins' aggravated battery of Robert Jones, as well as Goins' 

depravity of mind. 

 First, the record establishes that Goins perpetrated an 

aggravated battery on Robert Jones within the meaning of Code 

§ 19.2-264.2. This Court has defined "aggravated battery" in 

this context to mean "a battery which, qualitatively and 

quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to 

accomplish an act of murder." Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. at 

478, 248 S.E.2d at 149. The evidence established that Goins shot 

Robert, a three-year-old boy, twice in the head. Both these 

gunshot wounds were lethal. 

 The record also contains sufficient evidence to establish 

Goins' depravity of mind. Robert Jones was a defenseless, 

innocent child. Nevertheless, Goins decided to kill him, 

conducting an execution-style slaying, merely because Robert was 

related to Tamika. 

 The record also contains sufficient evidence to support the 

jury's finding of "future dangerousness." The circumstances 

surrounding the commission of the capital murder of Robert Jones 

were sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Goins 

would commit future criminal acts of violence that would 

constitute a continuing threat to society. See Code 

§ 19.2-264.4(C). Goins planned and executed the murders of five 

innocent persons, three of whom were children. Four of the five 
- 37 - 

murder victims received multiple gunshot wounds. In addition, 

Goins maliciously wounded two other victims. These facts 

provided sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude 

that Goins placed no value on human life and would kill others 

whenever it suited him to do so. 

VII. Sentence Review 

 Code § 17-110.1(C) requires us to review the imposition of 

the death sentence on Goins to determine whether (1) it was 

imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other 

arbitrary factor; or (2) it is excessive or disproportionate to 

the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime 

and the defendant. 

 In support of his contention that the death sentence was 

imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other 

arbitrary factor, Goins incorporates by reference all his 

previous assignments of error. However, since we have found no 

error in the trial court's rulings on those matters, we reject 

this argument. See Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, ___, ___ 

S.E.2d ___, ___ (1996); Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 127, 

360 S.E.2d 352, 360 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988);

Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 335, 337 S.E.2d 715, 723 

(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112 (1986). Additionally, our 

independent review of the trial record fails to disclose that the 

sentence of death was imposed under the influence of any of these 

statutory factors. 
- 38 - 

 In conducting our proportionality review, we must determine 

"whether other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally 

impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 

considering both the crime and the defendant." Jenkins v. 

Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert. 

denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993); see also Code § 17-110.1(C)(2). We 

have examined the records of all capital murder cases reviewed by 

this Court, under Code § 17-110.1(E), including those cases in 

which a life sentence was imposed. We have given particular 

attention to those cases in which the death penalty was based on 

both the "future dangerousness" and the "vileness" predicates. 

 Based on this review, we conclude that Goins' death sentence 

is not excessive or disproportionate to penalties generally 

imposed by other sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth for 

comparable crimes. Such sentencing bodies generally impose the 

death sentence for a capital murder in which the defendant is 

also convicted of murdering another person or persons. See, 

e.g., Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 450 S.E.2d 124 (1994), 

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1433 (1995); Stewart v. 

Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 394, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 

___, 114 S.Ct. 143 (1993); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 

423 S.E.2d 360; Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 419 S.E.2d 

656, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 959 (1992); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 

244 Va. 1, 419 S.E.2d 606, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); 

Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d 757. 
- 39 - 

VIII. Conclusion 

 We find no reversible error in the judgments of the trial 

court. Having reviewed Goins' death sentence pursuant to Code 

§ 17-110.1, we decline to commute the sentence of death. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgments. 

Record No. 951869 - Affirmed. Record No. 951870 - Affirmed.