The State ex rel. Waldick, Law Dir., Appellee, v. Williams, Safety/Service Dir., 

Appellant. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Waldick v. Williams (1995), Ohio St.3d .] 

Mandamus to compel city of Delphos Safety Service Director to execute a 

waterline engineering contract authorized by an ordinance passed 

by city council -- Writ granted, when. 

 (No. 95-1551 -- Submitted December 5, 1995 -- Decided December 14, 

1995.) 

 Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Van Wert County, No. 15-95-6. 

 On March 27, 1995, the Delphos City Council passed Ordinance No. 1995-

15, which “authorized and directed” appellant, G. Roland Williams, the Delphos 

Safety/Service Director, “to enter into an agreement with the Poggemeyer Design 

Group, Inc. for the Lima Waterline Project.” The ordinance provided that the 

“engineering services shall include all the waterline design and corresponding 

improvements required by the City of Delphos to obtain potable water from the 

City of Lima; and other such conditions or requirements as deemed to be in the 

best interest of the City of Delphos,” with the cost of the agreement not to exceed 

$150,000. The ordinance was declared an emergency measure by the city council 

“for the purpose of the preservation of the public peace, safety and welfare and 
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because the City of Delphos must comply with the EPA imposed deadlines for the 

improvements to its water system.” 

 After Delphos Mayor John E. Sheeter vetoed the ordinance, council voted to 

override the veto by the statutorily required two-thirds majority on April 21, 1995. 

Shortly thereafter, although he received a copy of the engineering contract, 

appellant refused to sign it. While conceding that there were no procedural 

defects relating to the enactment of the ordinance, appellant, in part, based his 

refusal to comply with the ordinance on his belief that any action affecting the 

municipal water system was an administrative decision to be made by him rather 

than by council. 

 On June 8, appellee, Juergen A. Waldick, the Delphos Law Director, 

instituted this action in the Court of Appeals for Van Wert County for a writ of 

mandamus compelling Williams to execute the waterline engineering contract 

specified in the ordinance. Following the issuance of an alternative writ and the 

submission of evidence and briefs, the court of appeals granted the writ. 

 The cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. We granted a 

motion to expedite consideration of this appeal. 

____________________ 
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Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, C. Craig Woods and Loren L. Braverman, for 

appellee. 

Kagay, Albert & Diehl and David K. Lowe, for appellant. 

____________________ 

Per Curiam. Appellant asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting the 

writ of mandamus. In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Waldick had to 

establish a clear legal right to have appellant execute the waterline engineering 

agreement noted in the ordinance, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of 

appellant to do so, and the lack of a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary 

course of law. State ex rel. Ms. Parsons Constr., Inc. v. Moyer (1995), 72 Ohio 

St.3d 404, 405, 650 N.E.2d 472, 473. 

 Appellant does not contend that Waldick possesses an adequate legal 

remedy to enforce the ordinance. Instead, appellant claims that Waldick failed to 

establish either a clear legal right to execution of the contract or a corresponding 

clear legal duty on his part to sign the contract. More specifically, appellant 

contends that he has no duty to comply with an unlawful ordinance. 

 Appellant asserts in his first and second propositions of law that Ordinance 

No. 1995-15 illegally usurps his statutory authority and attempts to control his 
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administrative discretion. In general, enactments of a municipal legislative 

authority are presumed valid, and the presumption “continues until bad faith or 

abuse of legislative discretion *** is clearly proven, or it is manifest that the 

legislative authority has exceeded its powers, or if the legislation bears no 

reasonable relation to the public health, safety, welfare, or morals.” 1 Gotherman 

& Babbit, Ohio Municipal Law (2 Ed.1992) 108, Section T 7.17, citing Benjamin 

v. Columbus (1957), 104 Ohio App. 293, 4 O.O.2d 439, 148 N.E.2d 695, affirmed 

(1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 4 O.O.2d 113, 146 N.E.2d 854. 

 “All municipal corporations have the general powers mentioned in Sections 

715.01 to 715.67, inclusive, of the Revised Code, and the legislative authority of 

such municipal corporations may provide by ordinance or resolution for the 

exercise and enforcement of such powers.” R.C. 715.03. Among the general 

powers are that cities “may provide for a supply of water” and “prevent the 

unnecessary waste of water and the pollution thereof.” R.C. 715.08. 

 Appellant relies on R.C. 735.02, which provides that the director of public 

service of a municipal corporation shall manage and supervise public works of the 

city, including municipal water, “except as otherwise provided by law.” Similarly, 

R.C. 743.03 states that the “director of public service shall manage, conduct, and 
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control the water works of a municipal corporation, furnish supplies of water, 

collect water rents, and appoint any necessary officers and agents.” 

 Appellant claims that under R.C. 735.02 and 743.03, the issue of whether he 

should execute the waterline engineering contract is within his administrative 

discretion. However, R.C. 735.05 provides: 

 “The director of public service may make any contract, purchase supplies or 

material, or provide labor for any work under the supervision of the department of 

public service involving not more than ten thousand dollars. When an expenditure 

within the department, other than the compensation of persons, employed therein, 

exceeds ten thousand dollars, such expenditure shall first be authorized and 

directed by ordinance of the city legislative authority.” 

 Where it is necessary for the municipal legislative authority to authorize an 

expenditure by the safety-service director in an amount over that provided in R.C. 

735.05, “such legislative body has the power to incorporate in the authorizing 

ordinance specifications and conditions binding on the administrative agency.” 

State ex rel. Huddle v. Evans (1961), 172 Ohio St. 144, 145, 15 O.O.2d 282, 174 

N.E.2d 94, 95. In Huddle, we granted a writ of mandamus to compel the safetyservice director to advertise for bids and enter into a contract for the purchase of a 
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fire truck according to specifications adopted in an ordinance passed by council. 

In so holding, we rejected the safety-service director’s argument that the ordinance 

constituted “an encroachment on the executive powers given to [his] 

administrative office,” stating that “there is no statute giving to the safety-service 

director exclusive power to write the detailed specifications of contracts which 

must first be authorized by the legislative branch of the municipality.” Id. at 145, 

15 O.O.2d at 282, 174 N.E.2d at 95. 

 Similarly, in State ex rel. Leach v. Redick (1959), 168 Ohio St. 543, 7 

O.O.2d 422, 157 N.E.2d 106, we granted a writ of mandamus compelling a 

director of public service to execute a lease where the city council had enacted an 

ordinance authorizing and directing its execution. In rejecting the contention of 

the director of public service that the city could not compel him to sign the lease, 

the court stated: 

 “It seems to us that if council has the legislative authority to authorize the 

lease and to authorize the respondent to execute it, it must have the authority to 

direct the respondent so to do, and that such direction in no way constitutes an 

unlawful interference with an administrative function. 
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 “Respondent himself has no power to enter into the contract but is simply 

the party to complete the contract properly authorized by council.” Id. at 548-549, 

7 O.O.2d at 425, 157 N.E.2d at 110. 

 Appellant argues that Huddle and Leach are distinguishable because, unlike 

the respondents in those cases, he had acted on the waterline problems prior to 

council’s enactment of the ordinance. However, as Waldick aptly notes, nothing 

in the applicable statutes vests the authority to enter into contracts in the 

governmental branch that first exercises it. As in Leach, and pursuant to the 

manifest language of R.C. 735.05, appellant has no power to enter into any 

waterline engineering contract exceeding ten thousand dollars, and he is merely 

the party to complete the contract authorized by the Delphos City Council. 

 Appellant further contends in his second proposition of law that the 

ordinance does not require him to execute the contract since it gives him discretion 

as to “other such conditions or requirements as deemed to be in the best interest of 

the City of Delphos.” However, the ordinance clearly mandates him to “enter into 

an agreement with the Poggemeyer Design Group, Inc. for the Lima Waterline 

project” and that the agreement shall be for engineering services for the “waterline 

design” in order to obtain drinkable water from Lima. The discretion accorded 
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appellant by the ordinance was only as to other provisions of the contract, not the 

execution of the contract itself. 

 Therefore, based on the pertinent statutes and Huddle and Leach, Ordinance 

No. 1995-15 does not unlawfully usurp appellant’s administrative discretion to 

manage, conduct, and control the water system of Delphos pursuant to R.C. 735.02 

and 743.03. Appellant’s first and second propositions of law are meritless. 

 Appellant asserts in his third proposition of law that Ordinance No. 1995-15 

is invalid because it is not an emergency ordinance. However, as we have 

repeatedly held, “‘[w]here an ordinance, passed by the council of a municipality, is 

declared to be an emergency in accordance with the municipality’s laws and sets 

forth the reasons for the immediate necessity thereof, the legislative determination 

of the existence of an emergency is not reviewable by a court.’” State ex rel. 

Moore v. Abrams (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 130, 132, 580 N.E.2d 11, 12, quoting 

Jurcisin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 137, 519 N.E.2d 

347, paragraph three of the syllabus. Although purely conclusory, tautological, or 

illusory language in an emergency measure does not meet the requirements for a 

valid ordinance under R.C. 731.30, see Huebner v. Miles (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 

493, 497, 636 N.E.2d 348, 351, the language of the ordinance that the measure 
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was “for the purpose of the preservation of the public peace, safety and welfare 

and because the City of Delphos must comply with the EPA imposed deadlines for 

the improvements to its water system” is sufficiently specific. Cf. Youngstown v. 

Aiello (1951), 156 Ohio St. 32, 45 O.O. 45, 100 N.E.2d 62 (ordinance prevented 

from taking immediate effect where purported emergency clause stated that it was 

necessary to preserve the public peace, health, and safety, but gave no specific 

reasons for the necessity); see Walsh v. Cincinnati City Council (1977), 54 Ohio 

App.2d 107, 8 O.O.3d 208, 375 N.E.2d 811 (ordinance invalid since emergency 

clause merely stated that it was an emergency because it was an emergency). 

 In that the emergency clause of Ordinance No. 1995-15 sufficiently states 

and defines the emergency, the issues of whether an emergency actually existed or 

the accuracy of the reasons given by council are not subject to review by this 

court. Moore, supra, 62 Ohio St.3d at 133, 580 N.E.2d at 13. Appellant’s third 

proposition of law is also meritless. 

 Appellant has failed to overcome the presumed validity of the ordinance, 

and the court of appeals properly determined that Waldick had established his 

entitlement to the requested writ of mandamus. Accordingly, for the foregoing 

reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
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 Judgment affirmed. 

 MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 

COOK,JJ., concur.