United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-30809

____________

Jacques L. Soudelier, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Office of the Secretary of State, Louisiana; R. Kyle 

Ardoin, Secretary of State, Individually, 

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:22-CV-2436

______________________________

Before Jones, Barksdale, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Jacques L. Soudelier, proceeding pro se in the district court and on 

appeal, filed this lawsuit against the Office of the Louisiana Secretary of 

State and R. Kyle Ardoin, the Louisiana Secretary of State, claiming that 

they violated both federal and Louisiana law by using voting systems that 

were not properly certified and that were vulnerable to tampering. The 

district court dismissed Soudelier’s complaint, concluding that Soudelier 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 15, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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lacked standing. We agree with the district court that the complaint should 

be dismissed, and we AFFIRM.

I

Soudelier filed this lawsuit in August 2022 in the Eastern District of 

Louisiana against the Office of the Louisiana Secretary of State and the 

Secretary of State, R. Kyle Ardoin. Soudelier’s complaint contained two 

counts. Count I claimed that Appellees violated various provisions of the 

Louisiana Election Code and the Help America Vote Act by employing 

voting systems—specifically those leased from Dominion Voting 

Systems—that were not properly certified and that were vulnerable to 

hacking. Count II claimed that Appellees were required under 52 U.S.C. § 

20701 to preserve records from the November 3, 2020, election but were 

“running out the clock” until the mandatory two-year preservation period 

expired. The complaint further claimed that Soudelier had the right to 

access those records through discovery. The complaint also alluded to 

violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments resulting from 

Louisiana’s use of Dominion voting machines. Soudelier later clarified that 

these claimed constitutional violations formed the “core” of his lawsuit. 

The complaint requested various forms of relief, including an “emergency 

injunction” prohibiting the use of any of Louisiana’s voting machines in 

future elections and requiring Appellees to preserve records from the 2020 

election.

Several weeks after filing his complaint, Soudelier moved for a 

temporary restraining order. The district court denied his request, finding 

that Soudelier had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits 

because the statutes under which he sought relief did not confer a private 

right of action. The district court further found that Soudelier’s allusions to 

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constitutional violations failed to plausibly allege a non-conclusory and nonspeculative claim.

Shortly thereafter, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss Soudelier’s 

complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 

The district court granted the motion under Rule 12(b)(1) and dismissed 

Soudelier’s complaint in its entirety on the ground that Soudelier lacked 

Article III standing. This was because Soudelier’s constitutional claim was 

“neither concrete nor particularized,” but rather amounted to a 

“generalized grievance about the conduct of the government.” Soudelier v. 

Dep’t of State La., No. CV 22-2436, 2022 WL 17283008, at *4 (E.D. La. 

Nov. 29, 2022) (citation omitted) (alteration adopted). Likewise, because 

the statutes Soudelier cited in his complaint did not confer a private right of 

action, Congress had not “create[d] a statutory right or entitlement the 

alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Soudelier timely appealed.

II

We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(1) de novo, “just as we would a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” 

T. B. ex rel. Bell v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 980 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 

2020). Taking the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true, we 

“view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lane v. 

Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008). “[W]e may ‘affirm the 

district court’s judgment on any grounds supported by the record.’” T. B., 

980 F.3d at 1050 n.2 (quoting United States ex rel. Farmer v. City of Hous., 

523 F.3d 333, 338 n.8 (5th Cir. 2008)). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, “[a] 

plaintiff’s complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Stratta v. Roe, 

961 F.3d 340, 349 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation 

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omitted). “A claim is facially plausible if the pleaded factual content 

‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. at 349–50 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

III

Soudelier purported to bring claims under HAVA, the Louisiana 

Election Code, and federal law regarding retention of election records. And 

while he did not expressly state as much, he also alluded to claims arising

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. For the reasons explained

below, under none of these theories has he stated a claim upon which relief 

can be granted.1

First, as to the statutes Soudelier cites, none contain a private right 

of action under which his claims can be brought. The district court 

correctly determined as much in both its order denying Soudelier’s request 

for a temporary restraining order and in its order dismissing his complaint. 

Indeed, on appeal, Soudelier does not contest this point. 

The complaint references several provisions from the Louisiana 

Election Code that govern, inter alia, the Secretary’s approval of state 

voting systems. The thrust of Soudelier’s argument seems to be that 

_____________________

1 The district court ruled only on Appellees’ 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Here, 

however, “Rule 12(b)(6) provides a clearer basis for dismissal and we affirm on that 

ground.” Morales-Garza v. Lorenzo-Giguere, 277 F. App’x 444, 446 (5th Cir. 2008) 

(unpublished); see also Scott v. Fiesta Auto Ctr. of San Antonio, 273 F.3d 1095, 2001 WL 

1085192, at *1 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (“Generally, if it appears from the face of the 

complaint that a federal claim is without merit, the court should dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, and not on jurisdictional grounds.”).

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Appellees have failed to fulfil their statutory obligations by allegedly failing 

to oversee or control the use of Dominion voting machines. But “the 

Louisiana Election Code does not provide for a citizens suit, or ‘qui tam 

action’ for the enforcement of regulatory statutes against violators.” Treen 

v. Republican Party of La., 768 So. 2d 273, 279 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 

Soudelier “simply has no cause of action against” Appellees “if they violate 

the Louisiana Election Code.” Id.

Neither of the federal statutes contain an express private right of 

action either. And it is well-established that a statute confers no implied

private right of action absent congressional intent to provide both a private 

right and private remedy. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). 

Statutory text and structure form the touchstone of that inquiry, and 

“[s]tatutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals 

protected create no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular 

class of persons.” Id. at 289 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002). 

HAVA establishes standards for the administration of federal 

elections and provides two enforcement mechanisms, neither of which help 

Soudelier. First, the Attorney General can bring civil actions against states 

or jurisdictions to enforce HAVA’s “election technology and 

administration requirements.” 52 U.S.C. § 21111. Second, states receiving 

payment under HAVA must establish administrative complaint procedures 

that any person may use to report violations. Id. § 21112. However, 

nowhere does HAVA permit private plaintiffs to seek the relief Soudelier 

requests. Tex. Voters All. v. Dall. Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 3d 441, 459 (E.D. Tex. 

2020) (“Simply by its terms, HAVA does not create a private right of 

action.”); Morales-Garza v. Lorenzo-Giguere, 277 F. App’x 444, 446 (5th 

Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (same). And HAVA does not contain any implied 

right of action, because “[i]t is canonical that ‘Congress’s creation of 

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specific means of enforcing [a] statute indicates that it did not intend to 

allow an additional remedy—a private right of action—that it did not 

expressly mention at all.’” Tex. Voters All., 495 F. Supp. 3d at 460 (quoting 

Stokes v. Sw. Airlines, 887 F.3d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 2018)). 

Nor can Soudelier find a private right of action in federal election 

records provisions. His complaint cites 52 U.S.C. § 20701, which provides 

that “[e]very officer of election shall retain and preserve, for a period of 

twenty-two months from the date of any general, special, or primary 

election of which candidates for” various federal offices, including the 

President, “are voted for.” The complaint then cites 52 U.S.C. § 20705, 

which confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to compel the 

production of election records requested by the Attorney General. See also

52 U.S.C. § 20703. What these statutory provisions do not do is evince any 

intent by Congress to confer a private right of action on plaintiffs like 

Soudelier. The text makes no mention of any private right of action, and 

the provisions focus on “the person regulated” rather than “the individuals 

protected.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288; see also Fox v. Lee, No. 4:18CV529-

MW/CAS, 2019 WL 13141701, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2019) (“In a word, 

52 U.S.C. § 20701 does not confer a private right of action on Plaintiffs.”). 

To the extent that Soudelier relies on these provisions to support his claims 

under Count II of his complaint, his reliance is misplaced.

Second, to the extent Soudelier’s complaint claimed violations of his 

constitutional rights—a theory he continues to press on appeal—his claims

are both speculative and conclusory. The district court concluded as much 

in its order denying Soudelier’s temporary restraining order, and we agree. 

A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground 

Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[U]nadorned, the-defendantCase: 22-30809 Document: 00516969515 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/15/2023
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unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

677. Here, Soudelier’s argument that Louisiana’s continued use of 

“uncertified [voting] machines is a violation” of his constitutional rights, 

supported by his allegation that the voting systems may have been hacked, 

is a bare conclusion supported by nothing more than unadorned 

speculation. This is insufficient to state a claim upon which the district

court could grant relief. 

* * *

The district court correctly dismissed Soudelier’s complaint. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

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