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A CLOSER LOOK AT CUBA AND ITS RECENT

HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 26, 2013

Serial No. 113–79

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Hugh Griffiths, head, Countering Illicit Trafficking—Mechanism Assessment Projects, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (appering 

via videoconference) ............................................................................................. 6

Ms. Maria C. Werlau, executive director, Cuba Archive ...................................... 17

Ms. Mary Beth Nikitin, specialist in nonproliferation, Congressional Research 

Service ................................................................................................................... 25

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Hugh Griffiths: Prepared statement ............................................................... 10

Ms. Maria C. Werlau: Prepared statement ........................................................... 19

Ms. Mary Beth Nikitin: Prepared statement ........................................................ 27

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 38

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 39

The Honorable Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Material submitted for the record ............................................................................ 40

(1)

A CLOSER LOOK AT CUBA AND ITS RECENT 

HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will 

come to order. 

I’ll start by recognizing myself and ranking member to present 

our opening statements, and without objection the members of the 

subcommittee will be recognized to present their opening remarks. 

I ask that they do so in a timely manner to allocate time for all 

present members. 

Now I yield myself time to present my opening statement. Earlier this summer on July 16th the Panamanian Government discovered and detained the North Korean flagged Chong Chon Gang 

cargo vessel travelling from Cuba. 

Found on board were 25 cargo containers of Cuban weapons and 

other U.N.-sanctioned items bound for the rogue regime in North 

Korea. 

In anticipation of the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee, its impending report on the incident, I’ve convened this 

subcommittee today to investigate further Cuba’s recent history of 

military proliferation and noncompliance with U.N. sanctions, and 

to review the options available to the subcommittee to attempt to 

hold Cuba accountable for their violations. 

The facts in this case are not in dispute. At the time of their discovery, the Cuban foreign ministry said that the tanker was carrying 10,000 pounds of sugar—excuse me, 10,000 tons of sugar and 

240 metric tons of ‘‘obsolete defensive weapons’’ including disassembled missiles, two MiG–21 jet fighters and two disassembled 

anti-aircraft missile complexes ‘‘to be repaired and returned to 

Cuba.’’

But here is what the Panamanian officials actually found hidden 

among the bags of Cuban sugar: Night vision equipment, small 

arms and light weapons ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades 

and artillery ammunition for anti-tank guns. 

This cargo is a clear violation of the U.N. sanctions imposed on 

North Korea after its series of nuclear bomb tests. 

2

This is a potentially groundbreaking case where a country in the 

Western Hemisphere is likely to be found in violation of the U.N. 

Security Council sanctions on weapons proliferation. 

Many experts believe, and the Castro regime itself has actually 

admitted, to the violation of international sanctions in this case. I 

am convinced that this case should and would be getting a lot more 

international attention if not for the daily and deadly news coming 

out of Syria and now the heinous Al Shabaab acts of terrorism at 

the mall in Nairobi, Kenya. 

The narrative that defenders of the Castro regime would like us 

to believe is that much of the weaponry was to be repaired and/

or modernized and returned to Cuba, and that it is no longer involved in such illicit activities. 

But at least in this instance, it is undeniable that they got 

caught red handed in direct violation of the sanctions and they 

must be held accountable. 

This subcommittee has been told that knowing it is in violation 

of international sanctions the Castro regime has begun a full 

‘‘charm offensive’’ at the U.N. to convince the Sanctions Committee 

that it should in fact be applauded for its compliance and cooperation in this case rather than punished and sanctioned for its international and intentional breach of the sanctions regime. 

Failure to hold the Cuban Government fully responsible will also 

be a slap in the face to our allies. If Cuba is allowed to get away 

with this, this time, it would send a terrible message to Panama, 

which put its resources and its reputation on the line to intercept 

this vessel. 

Even worse, other countries in the future might decide it simply 

isn’t worth the cost and energy of pursuing similar violations to the 

benefit of rogue regimes in North Korea and Iran. 

Of further concern is that it appears that the Cuban military’s 

rogue business activities are growing increasingly dangerous, yet 

current U.S. travel policy continues to feed the Cuban military’s 

business interests. 

For example, U.S. travellers to Cuba stay almost exclusively at 

the Cuban military’s five-star hotels. I believe that this policy 

should be halted and that remittances from the U.S. should not be 

allowed to further fuel the moribund Castro regime. 

If Cuba is not properly reprimanded in the strongest terms available, then it could very well embolden Venezuela and other ALBA 

states to find ways to help other rogue regimes. 

We know Venezuela has already been helping Iran skirt U.S. financial sanctions. Allowing Cuba to get away with violating international weapons sanctions would send a very dangerous message 

to the international community at large. 

I very much look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses 

today as we delve further into these questions and how this subcommittee can most effectively work to ensure international sanctions are upheld with meaningful consequences for any violations. 

I yield time to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. 

The last time advanced weapons were shipped to and from Cuba 

3

the world had come close to the brink of nuclear war than in any 

other time. 

It was October 1962 at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis 

when the United States discovered that the Soviet Union was installing ballistic and tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba just 90 miles 

south of the United States’ coast. 

Today, we know that Cuba has the capability to launch without 

Russian codes or consent and have even pleaded Moscow to launch 

weapons already on the island even after the withdrawal was initiated. 

President Kennedy thwarted a dangerous game of nuclear chess 

played by the Soviet and Cuban regimes. Now, nearly 51 years 

later, we find Cuba has taken in a different partner in North Korea 

to partake in the illicit transfer of contraband, arms and weaponry. 

Staunch anti-Americanism, anti-democratic values and defiance 

of world order have isolated and strengthened a historically distant 

relationship between the two communist nations. 

On July 10th earlier this year Panamanian authorities seized a 

North Korean freighter declared to be carrying 10,000 tons of sugar 

from Cuba, only to discover a hidden cargo of Soviet-made anti-missile system components, fighter jet parts and engines. 

In doing so, inspectors encountered a defiant 35-member North 

Korean crew and a captain who even attempted to take his own life 

to prevent inspection. 

Days later, the Cuban Government acknowledged the contents of 

the cargo as mere obsolete defensive weapons to be repaired and 

returned to Cuba, adding that the sugar was a humanitarian gift 

to North Korea. 

This was not the first transshipment of its kind and neither 

Cuba nor North Korea had any intent of disclosing their transgressions or contents of the illicit cargo. 

Further inspection has in fact revealed the cargo to include over 

25 hidden containers, military vehicles and like-new ammunitions 

and hardware in original cases. 

However, North Korea’s involvement and the Cubans’ declaration 

has only raised more questions than it has answered. If only for 

repairs then why did Cuba not ask other nations instead of breaking various U.N. Security Council’s resolutions banning arms 

transfers especially to North Korea? With North Korea doing its 

best to refurbish its military hardware, it is more likely that the 

fighter jets were intended to stay in North Korea. 

At the same time a barter arrangement may have been reached 

to transfer some equipment to North Korea for repairs with sugar 

serving as payment. 

Without a doubt, the nature and contents of the seizure itself 

and the existence of a barter agreement reflect the dire economic 

conditions and level of desperation in both states. 

Nonetheless, irrespective of the purpose or intent, obsolete weaponry or not, the transfer of these items is a clear violation of the 

U.N. Council’s resolutions—Security Council resolutions. 

Meanwhile, Panamanian authorities have recently declared that 

the preliminary U.N. Security Council report has determined 

Cuba’s North Korea-bound arms cargo to be in violation of U.N. 

sanctions. 

4

However, that Cuba has by its own admission acknowledged its 

concealment and is presumably cooperating with the U.N. inspectors should be seen with great doubt. Cuba and North Korea starve 

their people of common dignity, freedom of speech and human 

rights. 

They have not abided by world norms and are unlikely to do so. 

The U.S., together with the U.N. Security Council, should enforce 

present sanctions against North Korea and be undeterred in punishing Cuba for violating them. 

Laws are not to be—that are not enforced and defended with lose 

value and respect. The U.S. and the U.N. should demonstrate that 

there are consequences to defying international laws. 

I look forward to hearing the panelists’ comments. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

The Chair yields to the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. RosLehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

This weapons proliferation violation in our own hemisphere poses 

a direct threat to our national security interest. 

Allowing the Castros to go unaccountable sends a terrible message to allies like Panama, who risked their time and resources to 

stop this vessel, and also to Venezuela and other rogue regimes 

who seek to cooperate further with North Korea or Iran. 

We must not allow U.S. People to People travellers to stay at 

Cuba luxury resorts which are owned by the Cuban military, as 

you pointed out. 

Additionally, this administration must reinforce the already existing ban on visas for regime officials and their family members. 

Allowing Castro family members and regime officials to be issued 

travel visas to come here sends a message of impunity. It eliminates the dissuasive effect for repressors. 

This is a time for the administration to hold the Castro regime 

accountable for its actions, not a time to engage in normalization 

efforts with the regime. 

A U.S. citizen languishes in a Cuban jail. This international violation now comes to light and yet the U.S. sits across the table 

from the Cuban regime on postal service issues. Incredible. 

Both North Korea and Cuba were in clear violation of U.N. sanctions yet neither nation has suffered any consequences from this 

act. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from American Samoa, Mr. 

Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you and our ranking member for calling this 

hearing. With Panama’s recent interdiction of North Korea’s ship, 

the Chong Chon Gang, many of the issues that have traditionally 

taken center stage in the Western Hemisphere suddenly become 

somewhat trivial. 

We are no longer just concerned with drug interdictions or trafficking, government corruption or democracy. We have now added, 

out of nowhere it seems, arms and proliferation the ongoing agenda. 

5

But did this exchange between Cuba and North Korea really 

come out of nowhere? Were there any warning signs? Was this an 

isolated incident? 

What about the intelligence that Panama received? The Panamanian authorities seized the vessel under suspicion of drugs aboard 

the ship. 

While the intelligence was wrong, it nonetheless led to the discovery of a very alarming situation here in the Western Hemisphere. I am concerned that there is much speculation and supposition surrounding this event. 

The truth is we just do not have the information we need to take 

a next step or even appreciate the implications that the situation 

will have on the United States, on our neighboring countries and 

on our government-to-government relationship within the region. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I want to personally offer my welcome to Ms. Nikitin and Ms. Werlau for their 

testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Does the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, choose to 

make an opening statement? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just to thank you, Mr. Chairman, on holding 

this hearing. I think it’s vitally important that the United States, 

while confronting serious challenges throughout the world, not lose 

sight of the fact that we have one of the world’s longest lasting tin 

pot dictatorships right along—right near our coast line. 

This regime is a disgrace and has held the people of Cuba back 

for so long. We need to again reaffirm that we are on the side of 

the people of Cuba and against their dictatorship. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Pursuant to committee rule seven the members of the subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements to be included in the official hearing record. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 7 days 

to allow statements, questions and extraneous materials for the 

record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

Now I’d like to introduce the panel. First of all, we have on 

Skype Mr. Hugh Griffiths. He’s the senior researcher and head of 

the Countering Illicit Drug Trafficking-Mechanism Assessment 

Projects at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 

He’s conducted a wide variety of investigation into arms trafficking via sea and air in Africa, the Middle East and Korean Peninsula working on behalf of a variety of United Nations, European 

Union and North American organizations, agencies and member 

states. 

He holds a Ph.D. research certificate and a Master’s of philosophy in international political economy as well as a post-graduate 

degree in international relations and law from the University of 

Amsterdam. 

We also have Ms. Werlau. She is the executive director of Cuba 

Archive. This initiative seeks to advance human rights through research and scholarship. 

6

For years she has tracked Cuba’s relationship with North Korea 

and other rogue states. Ms. Werlau holds a Bachelor’s degree of 

science in foreign service from Georgetown University and a Master’s degree in international affairs from Universidad de Chile. 

Ms. Nikitin—did I say that right? What is it, Nikitin? Nikitin. 

Is a specialist in nonproliferation in the Foreign Affairs Defense 

and Trade Division at the Congressional Research Service. 

Ms. Nikitin’s research covers nuclear, biological and chemical 

weapons nonproliferation issues including nuclear security, nonproliferation, threat reduction assistance and nuclear energy cooperation. 

She earned a B.A. with majors in government and French at 

Dartmouth College and a Master’s in international policy studies 

and a certificate in nonproliferation studies from Monterey Institute of International Studies. 

Let’s begin. Mr. Griffiths, you’re recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MR. HUGH GRIFFITHS, HEAD, COUNTERING 

ILLICIT TRAFFICKING—MECHANISM ASSESSMENT PROJECTS, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (APPERING VIA VIDEOCONFERENCE) 

Mr. GRIFFITHS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, ranking member and members of the committee, 

thanks for this invitation to testify today. 

I’ve been asked to present on SIPRI’s investigation and analysis 

of the attempted illicit transfer associated with the North Korean 

vessel, the Chong Chon Gang, that was interdicted by the Panamanian authorities transporting arms from Cuba in July 2013. 

Given your geographic focus on the Western Hemisphere, I will 

today mainly address Cuba’s role in this violation of United Nations sanctions as well as Cuba’s links with North Korea and in 

particular earlier voyages by North Korean vessels to Cuba in the 

period 2006 to 2013 that I believe merit further investigation. 

The focus here will thus be on maritime trafficking. Before addressing these matters, I would like to say a few words regarding 

the work of U.S. Government-related entities in the fields of 

counter proliferation, export control, as well as maritime and airborne-related trafficking. 

The SIPRI research publications for which I have been responsible acknowledge the cutting edge science, unique expertise and 

resources of a wide variety of U.S. Government departments, agencies and related entities charged with counter proliferation and export control as well as maritime trafficking of military equipment, 

dual use goods for weapons of mass destruction purposes and narcotics. 

Over the years, during the course of field investigations and research around the world, I’ve had the privilege of interacting with 

dedicated officials and experts from the U.S. Departments of State, 

Defense, Justice, Treasury as well as members of the U.S. intelligence community. 

The breadth and depth of their expertise and resources are unparalleled as are their abilities to build capacity amongst U.S. allies and partner states in the fields of counter proliferation, export 

control and counter trafficking. 

7

As Federal lawmakers and budget approvers, I’d like to say to 

you today that U.S. engagement at the international level on these 

issues is really critical in terms of mitigating the associated risks. 

Both the dedicated individuals and programs that I’ve had the 

opportunity to interact with over the past 10 years deserve your 

continuing support because they do a good job on these critical 

issues of national and international security concern. 

Put simply, no other country has the expertise and resources to 

undertake this work in the same way. I should make full disclosure 

and note that in 2013 the projects at SIPRI that I am responsible 

for received a grant from the Department of State’s Export Control 

and Related Border Security Program, EXBS, whose mandate covers some of the areas I’ve mentioned above. 

But to sum up and introduce the rest of this testimony, I believe 

the Chong Chon Gang case serves as the most recent open source 

example to highlight the critical role played in counter proliferation 

and export control by U.S. Government departments, agencies and 

programs funded from the Federal budget. 

As Members of Congress may be aware, following the Chong 

Chon Gang seizure in July of this year, open source media reports 

quoted unnamed U.S. officials as saying that the Panamanian authorities were tipped off by their U.S. counterparts as to the illicit 

nature of the vessel’s cargo. 

In other words, it was a U.S. tip off that prompted the interdiction by Panama. It should also be noted that Panama is a U.S. 

partner thanks to longstanding bilateral counter trafficking activities as well as through multilateral export control and customs initiatives such as the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 

(UNODC) Container Control Program (CCP) which is also supported by the U.S. Department of State. 

Set against this background of U.S. expertise, partnership and 

information sharing that you in Congress can be rightly proud of 

authorizing the budgets for, I’d now turn to some of the specifics 

of the Chong Chon Gang and the Cuban role. 

It’s already been covered by Members of Congress so I won’t go 

there again except to say that the evidence and testimony provided 

today make clear that contrary to both the North Korean shipping 

declaration, which I provided you a copy of, and Cuban Government statements, which were highlighted earlier by Members of 

Congress, the shipment was without doubt a violation of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. 

The statements issued by the Cuban authorities following the 

seizure are misleading to say the least because of the other cargo 

of miliary equipment that the ship was transporting which they 

failed to mention. 

Within the context of Cuba-related North Korean vessel movements, I think it is important to note that prior to the seizure of 

the Chong Chon Gang there were a number of other North Korean 

vessels calling at Cuban ports. 

Some of these voyages may be assessed as carrying a high risk 

of proliferation concern on the basis of the vessels’ flag, age, past 

registration, ownership patents, its safety record and, most importantly, various voyage routing anomalies. 

8

A number of these vessels were bulk carriers that may have contained the same hidden compartments or hold space that the SIPRI 

investigation highlighted were found aboard the Chong Chon Gang. 

A number of these other vessels also switch off their automatic—

their AIS radar transponders and this is a common risk indicator 

for various forms of maritime trafficking. 

A number of these vessels were ultimately owned by shell companies behind which stand the same company that owned the Chong 

Chon Gang. Given the illicit cargo and the concealed hold space 

found aboard the Chong Chon Gang, it is my opinion that these 

earlier North Korean voyages to Cuba would be worthy of investigation. 

But what Congress is asking is what has to happen now and 

what has to happen now is really full disclosure and access to Cuba 

for the United Nations Panel of Experts attached to the Sanctions 

Committee responsible for DPRK sanctions. 

As a first step, the Cuban authorities will need to invite the 

United Nations Panel of Experts charged with investigating violations of U.N. sanctions on North Korea to Cuba. The Cuban authorities would have to provide the U.N. Panel of Experts with full 

disclosure on all aspects of the agreements, contracts, background, 

loading and transfer of the illicit Cuban-origin military equipment 

that was seized aboard the Chong Chon Gang. 

Once the Panel of Experts were satisfied that the terms of full 

disclosure for this voyage had been met, they would have a clearer 

understanding of the Cuban personalities, ministries and agencies 

involved in that illicit transfer. 

Secondly, for the purposes of full disclosure relating to the other 

North Korean vessel voyages to Cuba, the Cuban authorities would 

have to grant the United Nations Panel of Experts access to all 

port authority documentation and all documentation relating to the 

voyages themselves, any port-state control safety inspections that 

may have been partially carried out but not filed with the respective port-state control memorandum of understanding, the MOU. 

The Cuban authorities would have to provide access to the relevant customs officials and dock workers for interview purposes as 

well. 

If the Cuban authorities are unwilling to make this kind of full 

disclosure and provide the invitation to visit Cuba and to interview 

officials, then the earlier misleading statements made on 16th July 

by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs will appear to be more 

than a one-off. 

It will appear as if they have something to hide on a systematic 

basis. In concluding this testimony, I should say that on the basis 

of our research we believe that the Chong Chon Gang incident is 

unusual not because the vessel was transporting concealed illicit 

commodities. 

The Chong Chon Gang incident was unusual because it involved 

an actual seizure and confiscation of illicit commodities. It may 

seem strange to Members of Congress that a North Korean vessel 

with a very large North Korean flag painted on the ship’s funnel 

could expect to sail in and out of the Caribbean Sea, which is effectively America’s back yard, the most intensely surveilled waters in 

9

terms of counter narcotics trafficking anywhere in the world and 

take delivery of an illicit arms shipment from Cuba. 

Such a gamble certainly appears foolhardy with the benefit of 

hindsight but it may not have been seen as a great risk if such 

shipments were undertaken in the past without problems. 

There were certainly less obtrusive options open to the North Koreans. They could have used a variety of other North Korean controlled ships that are registered under other flags of convenience 

formally owned by offshore entities registered in east or southeast 

Asia. 

And compared with the Chong Chon Gang these high-risk proliferation vessels are much more difficult to identify and the majority of them do not sail under the flags of states that have signed 

boarding agreements with the U.S. as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI. 

So to summarize, I believe that the Chong Chon Gang seizure 

highlights a number of points. The first is the need for full disclosure by the Cuban authorities to the U.N. Panel of Experts on 

North Korea on both this shipment and other North Korean-related 

voyages of concern to Cuba in recent years. 

The second point is that the Chong Chon Gang seizure demonstrates the continuing utility of building the capacities of choke 

point ports and nations such as Panama as well as other partner 

states and open registries that occupy strategic positions along potential proliferation supply chains. 

In these activities the United States is well placed to assist partners and allies around the world to counter such acts of proliferation. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Griffiths follows:]

10


82946a-1.eps

Written Statement 

Hugh S.W Griffiths 

Senior Researcher 

Head of the Countering Illicit Trafficking Mechanism Assessment Projects (CIT -MAP) 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 

Testimony 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 

14.00,26 September 2013 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee: Thank you for the 

invitation to testify today. I've been asked to present on SIPRI's investigation and 

analysis of the attempted illicit transfer associated with the North Korean vessel, the 

Chong Chon Gang that was interdicted by the Panamanian authorities transporting arms 

from Cuba in July of 2013. 1 

Given your geographic focus on the Western Hemisphere, I will today mainly address 

Cuba's role in this violation of United Nations sanctions, as well as Cuba's links with 

North Korea and in particular earlier voyages by North Korean vessels to Cuba for the 

period 2008 - 2013 that I believe merit further investigation. The focus here will thus be 

on maritime trafficking. 

Critical U.S. government information sharing, capacity-building and expertise 

Before addressing these matters, I would like to say a few words regarding the work of 

U.S. government-related entities in the fields of counter-proliferation, export control, as 

well as maritime and airborne-related trafficking. 

The SIPRI research publications - dating back to 2009 - for which I have been 

responsible acknowledge the cutting edge science, unique expertise and resources of a 

wide variety of U.S. government departments, agencies and related entities charged with 

counter-proliferation and export control as well as maritime trafficking as it relates to 

military equipment, dual use goods for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) purposes 

and narcotics. 

Over the years, during the course of field investigations and research around the world, 

I've had the privilege of interacting with dedicated officials and experts from the U.S. 

Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Justice, the 

1 Parts of this written testimony are reproduced hythe author from .om article published by 38 North, a website 

maintained by the U.S. Korea InstiUlte at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International SUldies (SAIS), 

http://38north.org/2 ° 13 108 I hgri ffiths082 7131 
11


82946a-2.eps

U.S. Department of the Treasury, the u.s. Department of Homeland Security as well as 

members of the u.S. intelligence community. 

The breadth and depth of their expertise and resources are unparalleled as are their 

abilities to build capacity amongst u.S. allies and partner States in the fields of counterproliferation, export control and counter-trafficking. 

As Federal law-makers and budget approvers, I'd like to say to you today that u.S. 

engagement at the international level on these issues is really critical in terms of 

mitigating the associated risks. 

Both the dedicated individuals and programs that I've had the opportunity to interact 

with over the past 10 years deserve your continuing support because they do a good job 

on these critical issues of national and international security concern. Put simply, no 

other country has the expertise and resources to undertake this work in the same way. 

I should make full disclosure and note that in 2013 the projects at SIPRI that I am 

responsible for received a grant from the Department of State's Export Control and 

related Border Security Program, EXBS who's mandate covers some of the areas I've 

mentioned above. 

To sum up, and to introduce the rest of this testimony, I believe that the Chong Chon 

Gang case serves as the most recent open source example to highlight the critical role 

played in counter proliferation, export control and related border security by u.S. 

government departments, agencies and programs funded from the Federal budget. 

As Members of Congress may be aware, following the Chong Chon Gang seizure in July 

2013, open source media reports quoted un-named U.S. officials as saying that the 

Panamanian authorities were tipped off by their U.S. counterparts as to the illicit nature 

of the vessel's cargo. 

In other words, it was this U.S. tip off that prompted the interdiction by Panama. 

It should also be noted that Panama is a U.S. partner thanks to long-standing bilateral 

counter-trafficking activities., as well as through multilateral export control and customs 

initiatives such as the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Container 

Control Program (CCP), which is also supported by the U.S. Department of State. 

Set against this background of U.S. expertise, partnership and information sharing that 

you in Congress can be rightly proud of authorizing the budgets for, I'd now like to turn 

to the specifics ofthe Chong Chon Gang, and the Cuban role. 

The Chong Chon Gang 

A total of 25 shipping containers have now been recovered from the hold of the Chong 

Chon Gang, as well as six military vehicles. 

All the military equipment aboard the vessel prior to shipment was Cuban in terms of 

ownership or origin. The shipping containers were camouflaged at the bottom of five of 
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the ship's holds beneath about 200,000 bags of sugar, weighing approximately one 

hundred pounds each. This amount of sugar together with "two thousand empty 

polyethylene bags" were the only declared items listed in the cargo manifest signed by 

North Korean Captain Ri Yong II. 

The evidence and testimony provided today make clear that contrary to both the North 

Korean shipping declaration and Cuban government statements the shipment was 

without a doubt a violation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea. 

Following the seizure, Cuban authorities released a statement claiming that the ship was 

transporting "two anti-aircraft missile complexes ... nine missiles in parts and spares, two 

Mig-21 jet aircraft and 15 motors for this type of airplane ... to be repaired and returned 

to Cuba."2 

The statement was misleading to say the least; the ship was also transporting a variety 

of small arms and light weapons (SALW) ammunition and conventional artillery 

ammunition for anti-tank guns and howitzer artillery as well as generators, batteries 

and night vision equipment, among other items. 

The various rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and conventional artillery ammunition, 

many in mint condition, were unused and much of it was in original packing cases. They 

clearly were not "to be repaired and returned to Cuba." Rather, these items were 

intended simply for delivery to North Korea for its own use. 

The most obvious discrepancy between the Cuban government statement and North 

Korea's illicit procurement practices has to do with the MiG-21 jet aircraft engines found 

on the ship. Here North Korea has a track record of attempted illicit or clandestine 

procurement of these engines as well as of the MiG-21 aircraft in general, having 

attempted to procure jet spare parts and engines on at least three separate occasions. 

The Associated Press reported recently that in 2011, North Korea attempted to buy 20 

MiG-21 aircraft from Mongolia for "engines and scrap.3 In a 2012 report, the United 

Nations Panel of Experts which monitors international sanctions noted that a Member 

State had stopped the sale of 32 retired fighter aircraft three years earlier because of 

suspicions that they would be transferred to North Korea. In 1999, Kazakhstan 

reportedly sold 40 MiG-21 aircraft to North Korea. In short, this documented history, 

suggests that the MiGs and the 15 jet engines were another item on the Chong Chon Gang 

that were not "to be repaired and returned to Cuba," as claimed by Havana. 

The historical record is supported by documentary evidence-photos included as part 

of this testimony which highlight the way the aircraft fuselages and engines were 

packed. 

They show that the MIG fuselages were rather carelessly packed with no protective 

padding covering the more sensitive extremities of the fuselage that could have been 

damaged should the ship have encountered rough seas on its voyage across the Pacific. 

In contrast, the engines were stored in shipping containers separate from the aircraft 

2 "Statement hy the MinistlY of Foreign Affairs: Statement ahollt the North Korean ship Chong Chon Gang seized in 

P,:mam8 Cem.oll," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuha, July 16, 2013. 

3 Ganbat Namjilsangarav, "Mongolian General Probed for North Korean Jet Deal," Associated Press, April 12, 2013 
13


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fuselages. More securely attached and adequately spaced, they were also covered in 

layers of protective plastic sheeting and brown packing paper. 

According to a former Finnish Air Force technician familiar with his country's old fleet of 

MiG-21s, the engines aboard the Chong Chon Gang appear to have been raised half a 

metre above the container floor in a manner that would be consistent with a dedicated 

or improvised transport frame to protect the underside of the engine while in transit. 

The more careful packing of the engines suggests their end use as replacement engines 

while the sloppy packing of the fuselages indicates their intended use as spare parts. In 

any event, the method of packing does not suggest that the aircraft themselves were to 

be "repaired" and "returned" to Cuba, but rather for end use in North Korea. 

Reinforcing this conclusion, North Korean Air Force Chief Yi Pyong Chol is frequently 

sighted boarding North Korean Air Koryo aircraft! for visits to foreign countries, such as 

Russia, that are the principal manufacturers or suppliers of spare parts for military 

aircraft found in Pyongyang's inventory. In 2011 he was photographed in Russia 

together with Kim Jong II and then Russian President Dimitri Medvedev on a visit that 

South Korean media reported likely involved an attempt to acquire aircraft. 

Interestingly, Yi was also a member of the North Korean delegation filmed in Havana in a 

2 July 2013 meeting with Raul Castro. 

You will note that the cargo manifest ofthe Chong Chon Gang is dated 4 July 2013 - such 

documents are generally signed after loading is complete. This means that the loading of 

the illicit military equipment aboard the North Korean vessel occurred when the North 

Korean military delegation were in Cuba. My personal assessment is that it is highly 

likely that members of the North Korean delegation witnessed the loading of the arms 

together with their Cuban hosts. 

North Korean Maritime Concealment Methods: Containers and Bulk Carriers 

The Chong Chon Gang episode combines two of North Korea's maritime smuggling 

modus operandi: the use of shipping containers and bulk carrier vessels owned by North 

Korean companies. The United Nations Panel of Experts has documented the use of 

shipping containers for North Korea-related consignments of embargoed dual use or 

military goods that may be used for missile production or weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) programs. In recent years such seizures have generally centered around cargoes 

destined for Syria, most likely related to the research facility in the Deir ez-Zor region 

that was bombed by Israel in 2007. These consignments, falsely declared and 

transported anonymously for much oftheir journey aboard container vessels owned by 

some of the world's biggest shipping lines, blend into the huge volumes of container 

traffic that depart East Asia for Middle Eastern, European and African markets on a daily 

basis. 

4 The aircraft generally llsed by North Korean military officials for such State flights are the Air Koryo Ilyushin 62 

aircraft. On 11 July 2012 a Cuban Ilyushin 62 \".'as flown to North Korea via West and Central Africa and South East 

Asia with a number of North Korean and Cuban technicians on board. This Cuban aircraft was subsequently broken up 

for spare parts for the North Korean fleet of Ilyushin 62 aircraft. The aircraft registration number was P-886. The 

constmction mltnher was 3749648. 
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Trying to identify consignments of trafficked goods from the vast majority of licit 

shipments is extremely difficult. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 

Container Control Program (CCP) is the only dedicated international initiative working 

at a practical level to tackle this problem.s This widely recognized UN flagship project 

established one of its first pilot programs in Panama, including the port of Manzanillo, 

which was the port the Chong Chon Gang was brought to for a detailed search. A forensic 

analysis and database search of the containers found aboard the Chong Chon Gang 

shows that they had not been registered as in use for cargo movements involving 

legitimate shipping companies for many years. It is believed that the containers were 

taken out of storage for the express purpose of transporting the sanctioned military 

goods to North Korea. 

In contrast to the normal modus operandi for shipping containers, the embargo-busting 

voyage did not involve a dedicated container ship but rather a bulk carrier. A bulk 

carrier is a ship designed to transport dry cargo-such as sugar, cement or coal-in 

large quantities. In the case of the Chong Chon Gang, the ship's holds, designed for 

transporting commodities such as sugar or grains, had been deliberately modified so 

that shipping containers could be moved into position underneath the legitimate sugar 

cargo to facilitate a clandestine transfer. 

One question that may confront the United Nations Panel of Experts who have 

investigated the case is whether this concealment device was created specifically for this 

voyage or is simply evidence of a long-standing practice employed by North Koreanowned vessels transporting illicit materials in a clandestine fashion. 

Pyongyang certainly has a track record of employing bulk carriers for clandestine 

missile movements in the past and documented cases, such as the So San shipment, 

another North Korean-owned vessels stopped while transporting 15 Scud missiles to 

Yemen in 2002 are likely an indication of much wider, undetected transfers. 

Other North Korean voyages to and from Cuba of possible concern 

Within the context of Cuba-related North Korean vessel movements I think it is 

important to note that prior to the seizure ofthe Chong Chon Gang, there were a number 

of other North Korean vessels calling at Cuban ports. 

Some of these voyages may be assessed as carrying a high risk of proliferation concern 

on the basis ofthe vessel's flag, age, past registration and ownership patterns, as well as 

its safety record and most importantly, various voyage routing anomalies. 

A number of these vessels were bulk carriers that may have contained hidden 

compartments or hold space similar to that found aboard the Chong Chon Gang. A 

number of these vessels switched off their AIS radar transponders - this is a common 

risk indicator for maritime trafficking. A number of these vessels were ultimately owned 

by the same company that owned the Chong Chon Gang. Given the illicit cargo and 

concealed hold space found aboard the Chong Chon Gang, it is my opinion that these 

earlier North Korean vessel voyages to Cuba would be worthy of investigation. 

5 The UNODC CCP is supported by the U.S. Department of State Export Control and related Border Security Program 

(EXBS) as well as other North American and ED member States. 
15


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Full disclosure and access to Cuba for the United Nations Panel of Experts is 

required 

In order to investigate these past cases of North Korean vessels calling at Cuban ports, 

the Cuban authorities will need to invite the United Nations Panel of Experts charged 

with investigating violations of the UN sanctions on North Korea to Cuba. 

As a first step, the Cuban authorities would have to provide the United Nations Panel of 

Experts with full disclosure on all aspects of the agreements, contracts, background, 

loading and transfer of the illicit Cuban military equipment seized aboard the Chong 

Chon Gang. 

Once the Panel of Experts were satisfied that the terms of full disclosure for that voyage 

had been met, they would have a clearer understanding of the Cuban personalities, 

ministries and agencies involved in that illicit transfer. 

Secondly, for the purposes of full disclosure relating to the other North Korean vessel 

voyages to Cuba, the Cuban authorities would have to grant the United Nations Panel of 

Experts access to all port authority documentation, all documentation relating to the 

voyages themselves, any port-state control safety inspections that may have been 

partially carried out but not filed with the respective Port-State Control Memoranda of 

Understanding (MoU). 

The Cuban authorities would have to provide access to the relevant dockworkers and 

customs officials for interview purposes. 

If the Cuban authorities are unwilling to make a full disclosure, given the earlier 

misleading statements made on 16 July, it may appear as if they may have something to 

hide. 

In concluding this testimony I should say that on the basis of our research, we believe 

that the Chong Chon Gang incident is unusual not because the vessel was transporting 

concealed illicit commodities. 

The Chong Chon Gang incident was unusual because it involved an actual seizure and 

confiscation of illicit commodities. 

It may seem strange to members of Congress that a North Korean vessel, with a very 

large North Korean flag painted on the ship's funnel could expect to sail into and out of 

the Caribbean Sea - which is effectively America's backyard - the most intensively 

surveilled waters in terms of counter-narcotics trafficking anywhere in the world - and 

take delivery of an illicit arms shipment from Cuba. Such a gamble certainly appears 

foolhardy with the benefit of hindsight, but it may not have been seen as a great risk if 

such shipments were undertaken in the past without problems. 

There were certainly less obtrusive options open to the North Koreans, they could have 

used a variety of other North Korean-controlled ships that are registered under other 

flags of convenience formally owned by offshore entities registered in East or South East 

Asia. Compared with the Chong Chon Gang, these high risk vessels are difficult to 
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identify and the majority of them do not sail under the flags of States that have signed 

boarding agreements with the U.S. as part of the Proliferation Security Intiatiive (PSI). 

To summarize, I believe that the Chong Chon Gang seizure highlights a number of points. 

The first is the need for full disclosure by the Cuban authorities to the UN Panel of 

Experts on North Korea on both this shipment and other North Korean-related voyages 

of concern to Cuba in recent years 

The second point is that the Chong Chon Gang seizure demonstrates the continuing 

utility to building the capacities of chokepoint ports and nations such as Panama, as well 

as other partner states and open registries that occupy strategic positions along 

potential proliferation supply chain. 

In these activities the United States is well-placed to assist partners and allies around 

the world to counter such acts of proliferation. 

Thank you very much. 
17

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Werlau. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MARIA C. WERLAU, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, CUBA ARCHIVE 

Ms. WERLAU. Good afternoon. Can you hear me? Good afternoon, 

Mr. Chairman, ranking member and members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to offer you this testimony. My 

written statement is much more extensive and I respectfully ask 

that it be considered for the record. 

As we have been discussing, on July 15th Panama discovered the 

North Korean flagship with concealed weapons from Cuba. To 

those familiar with the history and true nature of the Cuban regime, the only surprise is that it got caught and that it was widely 

reported by news organizations. 

In 2003, David Kay, special advisor on Iraqi WMD search, said 

on national TV that remarkable evidence had been found in Iraq 

of North Korean missiles going to Cuba. Nobody seemed to take notice, at least publicly. 

North Korea and Cuba, it turns out, have much in common. Both 

regimes have been ruled for decades by military dictatorships 

under the helm of respective families controlling a vast repressive 

apparatus. 

Both pay homage to orthodox communism, at least in theory and 

when convenient. Both have terrified their people into submission, 

flaunted basic rules and standards of civilized nations and committed crimes against humanity. 

Both work actively against our interest and threaten our security. Their command economies are both technically bankrupt, 

spreading misery amongst the people yet allowing privileges to the 

ruling elite. 

Both have perfected the art of milking the international community for concessions, massive aid and subsidies, favorable terms of 

trade and investment and loans they never pay. 

Their allies are fellow rogue regimes and together they have 

formed what in their own words is a joint front against the common enemy, the United States. 

My written testimony offers considerable detail of evident ties between the two. Since 2001, official visits, especially of a military 

nature, mutual praise and reiterations of the strong fraternal ties 

have visibly multiplied. Two visits stand out. 

In November 2004, several North Korean senior generals arrived 

in Cuba and met with then-President Fidel Castro and Defense 

Minister Raul Castro. 

They spent several days evaluating Cuba’s military infrastructure and touring manufacturing and assembly facilities of its defense industry conglomerate. Cuba confirmed a strengthening military cooperation and pledged to fight shoulder to shoulder with the 

Korean army and people. 

Another unusual visit concluded around 10 days—less actually—

than before the ship was seized by Panama. The general’s staff of 

North Korea’s army, who had already been to Cuba, led a highranking military delegation to, as he proclaimed, meet colleagues 

in the same trench. 

18

They stayed several days, met with top military brass including 

President General Raul Castro, toured military installations and 

inspected military equipment. 

According to Cuba’s state media, the highly fraternal exchange 

included detailed information on combat readiness, staff training 

and the use of the technology and weaponry. 

On August 25th, 38 days after the ship was stopped in Panama, 

the head of Cuba’s air force, a division general said to have been 

in charge of the shipment, was reported by state media killed in 

a car accident. It was a Sunday morning and details such as location, circumstances or witnesses were not provided. 

He was immediately cremated and buried 2 days later. Five days 

later, reports surfaced that the four-star North Korean general who 

had just returned from Cuba had been removed, his fate unknown. 

Two timely and convenient coincidences. 

What explains the arms trafficking? In my view, these visits and 

others in between point to deliberate and concerted efforts. 

As for North Korea, our Government confirmed last May that it 

defies sanctions through established channels to supply its missile 

and nuclear programs. Regarding Cuba, it is entirely feasible that 

the Castro regime would risk getting caught. 

First, it is in desperate need of hard currency to keep the dictatorship in power and rescuing its faltering economy. The Venezuelan economy is in dire straits, facing a huge liquidity crisis and 

its massive subsidies to Cuba are probably declining. 

Second, the Cuban regime is emboldened by the impunity the 

international system has afforded even its worse crimes. For Cuba 

and North Korea, nothing is too outrageous. 

There’s a saying in Spanish (foreign language spoken)—God creates them and they find each other. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Werlau follows:]

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HEARING BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

"A Closer Look at Cuba and its Recent History of Proliferation" 

September 26, 2013 

Maria C. Werlau 

President, Free Society Project 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the 

opportunity to otfer you this testimony. 

On July 15, 2013, the North Korean-t1agged ship Chong Chon Gang was seized by 

Panama for smuggling "undeclared military cargo" through the Panama Canal. Panama 

reported that the captain had attempted suicide and that the vessel's 35 crewmembers had 

been detained after violently resisting efforts to take the ship to port for inspection. 

Furthermore, it said that the ship's declaration indicated it was only carrying 10,000 tons 

of sugar plus two thousand empty polyethylene bags. However, hidden behind over 

200,000 bags of sugar were two containers full of weapons and military equipment. 

Because this presumably violates United Nations' sanctions on North Korea, the matter is 

under review by a U.N. panel of experts. 

Panamanian news sources reported that Cuban officials had initially said the ship was 

loaded with donated sugar "for the people of North Korea" and quickly requested it be 

released, pledging there were no drugs on board. Two days later, facing the inevitable, 

Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Mfairs issued a statement saying the ship had left Cuba with a 

cargo of primarily 10,000 tons of sugar and "240 metric tons of obsolete defensive 

weapons" bound for North Korea, "to be repaired and returned to Cuba." It said the 

containers held "two anti-aircraft missile complexes Volga and Pechora, nine missiles in 

parts and spares, two Mig-21 Bis, and 15 motors for this type of airplane," all 

manufactured midway through the past century. Further, it stated: "The agreements are 

subscribed by Cuba based on the need to maintain our defensive capacity to preserve 

national sovereignty. The Republic of Cuba reiterates its finn and unwavering commitment 

with peace, disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, and respect for international 

law." Soon North Korea's news agency quoted its Foreign Ministry: "This cargo is 

nothing but aging weapons to be sent back to Cuba after overhauling them according to a 

legitimate contract." A verbal note from North Korea's embassy in Havana said that the 

ship did not seek to endanger the security of the Panama Canal and that North Korea hoped 

for "amiable cooperation" to resolve the case "diplomatically." 

When the long and effortful process of unloading the ship had been completed, Panama's 

government issued a statement reporting the weaponry already acknowledged by Cuba as 

well as a variety of small anns and light weapons, different types of ammunition and 

1 
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artillery as well as generators, batteries, night vision equipment, and more. Analysts took 

special note of two reported missile radar systems and of photos posted online by 

Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli showing equipment that may be used to acquire 

or track targets for interception by surface to air missiles. 

Experts reported that the ship had crossed the Panama Canal on June 1,2013 and had again 

been spotted in Panamanian waters near the Canal on July 13, 2013, anchoring in Cuba 

during the interval. It was probably no coincidence that a delegation from North Korea led 

by the General Staff of its Army had left for Cuba on June 26th for a visit of several days 

to boost "the friendly relations between the two armies and peoples" and "stand together in 

the anti-imperialist joint front." 

To those of us familiar with the nature of the Cuban regime, the only surprise in finding 

Cuba secretly trading weapons with North Korea and probably flaunting UN sanctions is 

that it was caught. North Korea and Cuba, it turns out, have much in common. Both have 

been ruled for over half a century by ruthless family dynasties at the helm of military 

dictatorships. Both have imposed totalitarian rule that controls all aspects of the lives of 

their people -this thanks to the vast repressive apparatus they command. Both oftheir socalled "socialist" command economies allow profit-making capitalist networks exclusively 

for the enrichment of the ruler and select loyal associates. Both have managed to bring 

their countries to near economic collapse, yet maintain privileges for the ruling elite as 

misery is spread amongst the people. 

Until recently, both were the last two nations entrenched in orthodox communism, at least 

in theory. Cuba has, as ofiate, shed its usual Marxist-Leninist rhetoric to craft "an updated 

model," yet its Constitution still has the Communist Party as "the highest leading force of 

society and of the state" while its goal remains "the construction of socialism and the 

progress toward a communist society." Both preach Third World solidarity and are 

shrouded in small nation defiance against the United States. Importantly, they share what 

Cuba's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs explained in 2003 is a joint struggle against U.S. 

imperialism, the "common enemy." 

Cuba and North Korea have both perfected the art of milking the international community 

for massive aid and subsidies, favorable tenns of trade, enonnous loans they default on, 

and, at least in the case of Cuba, investment partnerships which they have mostly ended 

gobbling up. Both have repeatedly flaunted basic rules and standards of civilized nations, 

are guilty of multiple crimes against humanity, have longstanding relationship with fellow 

rogue states, have promoted subversion and terrorism, and have a very long history of 

actively working against U.S. interests worldwide. Also, they share the bad habit of taking 

hostages as bargaining chips to use against the U.S. government. The most recent victims 

are Alan Gross, held in Cuba since 2009, and Kenneth Bae, held in North Korea since 

2012. Both had traveled to help minority communities and were sentenced to 15 years of 

prison for violating the respective Stalinist laws. 

For all of the above, it is obvious why ties between North Korea and Cuba are 

longstanding and tight. In the 1960s, North Korea reportedly opposed Cuba's efforts to 

2 
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have the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) side with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, semiretired dictator-in-chief Fidel Castro, who now shares his "reflections" on world events in 

Cuban otlicial media, wrote that apparently in the early 1980s "Compafiero Kim n Sung, a 

veteran and impeccable combatant, sent us 100,000 AK rifles and their corresponding park 

without charging a cent" Not that what Fidel Castro says can be believed; he is a chronic 

prevaricator. Just this past July 28th he wrote about the Panama seizure: "In recent days 

there was an attempt to slander our Revolution, trying to portray (President Raul Castro) as 

tricking the United Nations and other heads of state." 

All indicates that North Korea-Cuba relations improved after the fall of the Soviet 

Communist empire and the end of its gigantic subsidies to Cuba. Subsequent news reports, 

especially from the otlicial media of both countries, provide plenty of evidence of a 

growing friendship. This is particularly evident since July 2001, when a Cuban military 

delegation led by the Chief of Statf of Cuba's Armed Forces traveled to Pyongyang to 

"strengthen relations between their armed forces." His host was the Chief of Staff of the 

Korean People's Army. The Cuban spoke of the "unbreakable friendship between the two 

countries" and the importance of his visit for "further consolidating and developing the 

friendship and solidarity ... advancing under the uplifted banner of socialism." The North 

Korean Vice-Marshal Kim Yong Chun stated that his country would always "stand by the 

people and army of Cuba," noting that "friendly relations have been put on a higher plane 

under the profound care of Kim J ong II and Fidel Castro Ruz." 

On February 7, 2002, North Korea's otlicial news agency reported that Fidel Castro had 

sent a congratulatory message for the "Beloved Leader" Kim Jong 11 on his 60th birthday 

praising his devoted efforts to foil "the hostile acts of the imperialist powers".. "that 

earned Cuba's admiration and respect" Castro reiterated the "strong will to steadily 

expand and strengthen fraternal ties and cooperation between the peoples, parties, and 

governments of the two countries." 

In the US, in February 2003, the directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the 

CIA told Congress that North Korea had a ballistic missile, apparently yet untested, 

capable of hitting the western United States and possibly targets farther inland. North 

Korea had expelled U.N. inspectors and was reportedly taking steps to restart plutoniumproduction plus pursuing a uranium-enrichment program. In Vienna, the 35-nation board 

of governors of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency issued a resolution reporting 

to the Security Council North Korea"s violations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty and other accords. Cuba and Russia refused to endorse it. 

A few months later, on October 5, 2003, David Kay, Special Advisor on Iraqi Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Search, appeared on ABC News with George Stephanopoulos ("This 

Week" program) and offered an example of the United States" "remarkable" findings in 

Iraq: evidence "of North Korean missiles going to Cuba." 

This didn"t stop the allies from moving forward, after all, nobody seemed to take much 

notice or care. North Korea's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Choi Su Hon, traveled to 

Havana in June 2004 "to strengthen" relations" with instructions from Kim Jong II to 

3 
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"develop mutual ties in various spheres." That November (2004), Vice-Marshal Kim Yong 

Chun, Chief of Stat!' of North Korea's Army, led a delegation of senior generals that spent 

tive days evaluating Cuba's military infrastructure -including an aerial defense unitand touring manufacturing and assembly facilities of the "Union de Industrias Militares," 

the island's defense industry conglomerate. They met with President Fidel Castro, Defense 

Minister Raul Castro, and the heads of all branches of Cuba's military establishment 

Cuba's state-run media described "the friendly atmosphere characteristic of relations 

between the armed forces of both countries" and reported "consensus on all issues" plus a 

"strengthening military cooperation." Cuba awarded medals to the North Koreans for the 

"Order of Solidarity" and "Fraternal Combat" and a statement was made that "the Cuban 

army and people will fight shoulder to shoulder with the Korean army and people in [an] 

anti-V. S. joint front" 

The visit to Cuba coincided with that of China's president Hu Jintao. Hu extended an 

economic lifeline to the Castro regime, committing as much as US$1.5 billion in Chinese 

government-backed investments reportedly to exploit Cuba's strategic nickel and cobalt 

ores. Any link to the North Koreans and their interest in the Cuban military infrastructure 

are unknown, but not unthinkable. 

In May 2009, North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui-Chun paid an official visit to Cuba 

and signed a bilateral agreement with his Cuban counterpart, Bruno Rodriguez, to increase 

cooperation and enhance ties. He declared that they shared "the same goals in the fight 

against the imperialist Yankees" and in the construction of socialism" The two ministers 

then met in Pyongyang on September 4, 2009 to discuss ways to enhance the bilateral 

relationship. 

The above sets the backdrop for the July 15, 2013 seizure of the North Korean vessel 

carrying concealed weapons from Cuba. Early that same month, a military delegation of 

the highest level had paid an official visit to Cuba. The visit lasted several days, it is 

unclear how many, and was led by North Korea's four-star general and Anny Chief of 

Staff Kim Kyok Sik. He highlighted the friendship between the two countries and said he 

was there "to find colleagues in the same trench." The visit included meetings with Cuban 

President General Raul Castro and the highest-ranking Cuban military officers plus 

armored vehicle inspections and tours of military facilities. Cuba's state media reported 

the military-to-military exchange as strongly fraternal and including "detailed information 

on combat readiness, staff training, and use of the technology and weaponry." 

Four weeks after the ship was seized, North Korea celebrated "Cuba solidarity" month, 

with Cuba's ambassador to Pyongyang reportedly announcing: "The friendly relations 

between the two countries have grown strong in the protracted and rigorous struggle 

against the U.S. imperialists, the common enemy, and become a model for the world 

people." 

But, behind the scenes, extreme damage control seems to have been put in place. Forty-one 

days after the seizure of the Chong Chon Gang, Division General Pedro Mendiondo 

Gomez, head of Aerial Defense and of the Air Force was reportedly killed in a car accident 

4 
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with his wife and parents-in-law on Sunday morning, August 25th. The General was 

apparently the man charged with the weapons seized in Panama. Cuban media reported the 

accident, but offered no details of the location, circumstances, or anything else. It is 

impossible to tell if this was just a convenient coincidence or something more sinister. But, 

in Cuba, these timely "accidents" are not rare; Brian Latell, university professor and Latin 

America specialist with 35 years of service in the CIA and the National Intelligence 

Council, describes several such killings in compelling detail in his book, Castru's Secrets: 

The CIA and Cuba's intelligence Machine (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). In July 2012 the 

Cuba Archive proj ect, which I head, published a report detailing many such cases among 

not just regime opponents, but also of high-ranking officials who've come under suspicion 

or fallen in disgrace. Meanwhile, in late August, Kim Kyok Sik, the North Korean General 

Stat!' of the Army who had just returned from Cuba, was quietly removed from his post, 

his fate unknown. 

What explains the arms trafficking? The military-to-military visits described above point to 

deliberate and concerted et!'orts. We know North Korea's motives. Rogue states such as 

Syria BUTIna, and Iran have helped it violate the sanctions regime. In May of this year, the 

U.S Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation said Iran 

and North Korea, with their missile and nuclear programs, were continuing to violate 

United Nations sanctions through established channels that allow them to both export 

weapons and import "items they need for their weapons industry." 

Regarding Cuba's motives, it is entirely feasible to imagine the Castro regime would risk 

getting caught. First, it is in desperate need of any hard currency it can get to feed its 

faltering economy and keep the Castro dictatorship in power; this would be true whether 

the shipment was for North Korea or ultimately for another such ally. The Venezuelan 

economy is in dire straits and its massive subsidies for Cuba probably in decline. Second, 

the regime is emboldened by the impunity the international system has afforded even its 

worst crimes against humanity. 

North Korea's bad behavior is widely known. Cuba's, however, is clouded by very 

effective propaganda and disinformation. But the facts are there for those who look, 

starting with Fidel Castro's request to Khrushchev to launch a missile strike against the 

United States during the October Missile Crisis of 1962 was well documented by the 

Soviets. Cuba's support of rogue states is also legendary and well documented. In May 

2000, Fidel Castro visited Iran, Libya, and Syria -who, like Cuba, are designated by the 

U.S. government as state sponsors of terrorism. In Iran, he gloated that the United States 

was weak and would soon be brought to its knees. Just last August 28th the Cuban Foreign 

Ministry issued a warning against an attack on Syria with a "vehement rejection of any 

attempt to undermine the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Syria and 

the self-deteTInination of its people." 

Cuba under the Castro brothers has trained thousands of guerillas and terrorists from all 

over the world and sponsored subversion and terrorism in most nations of this hemisphere, 

including the United States, as well as in the Middle East and Africa. It has ties to terrorist 

groups responsible for countless deaths worldwide. It harbors dozens of fugitives from 

5 
24


82946b-6.eps

u.s justice, including terrorists who killed Americans, and members of ETA (Basque 

Fatherland and Liberty) guilty of crimes in Spain. 

Cuba is successful in confusing people thanks to its powerful and etIective public 

relations' empire, designed to mold world opinion. It has dedicated huge resources and 

diligent efforts to building and maintaining a large and competent diplomatic corps, 

intelligence network, and gigantic state-run worldwide propaganda machine operating in 

many languages -radio stations, publications, web sites, blogs- and through many 

cultural, artistic, academic, and sports organizations, etc. This is all directed at the media, 

multilateral agencies, academia, governments, international organizations, agencies, 

community groups and influential individuals, especially in key countries. A 1984 CIA 

report declassified in 2003 provides ample detail of its reach by then. 

Required resources are available for the ruler's priorities. The Cuban economy is almost 

entirely controlled by the military, under Raul Castro. The GAESA and CIMEX corporate 

conglomerates operate through capitalist-style corporations and control all hard currency 

operations. Plus, the Castro brothers divert money to global safe havens and operate a 

worldwide corporate network that assures ready access to vast funds for priority proj ects. It 

also serves as a safety net in case they must leave. 1 described this in my paper published in 

2005, "Fidel Castro Inc.: A Global Conglomerate." Finally, all tactics are fair game -lies, 

manipulation, deception, disinformation, blackmail, espionage, coercion, even 

assassination, are used to further the regime's obj ectives. 

For Cuba and North Korea, partners in crime, nothing is too outrageous. There·s a saying 

in Spanish, "Dios los cria, ell os se juntan." ("God creates them, they find each other") 

6 
25

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Ms. Nikitin. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MARY BETH NIKITIN, SPECIALIST IN 

NONPROLIFERATION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Ms. NIKITIN. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I want to thank you for 

the opportunity to testify before you today on the recent incident 

of proliferation from Cuba and the U.N. Sanctions Committee’s possible response. 

Chairman Salmon, with your permission I’d like to submit my 

statement for the record and summarize it here in a few brief remarks. 

Interdiction of banned goods to and from North Korea is a binding obligation on all U.N. member states but implementation has 

been uneven. Overall, the risk of interdiction has likely raised the 

cost of illicit transfers for the North Korean regime and limited the 

number of its trading partners, most of them outlier states like 

Cuba. 

However, multiple reported cases of arms interdictions over the 

past 5 years show that North Korea continues to work to evade 

U.N. sanctions. 

Each time there is an interdiction of a banned shipment the 

international community learns more about North Korea’s evasion 

techniques. 

Panama’s seizure of the North Korean freighter, the Chong Chon 

Gang, and its cache of hidden weapons will provide insights into 

North Korean sanctions evasion. If the U.N. confirms the ship was 

carrying banned weapons, then the seizure would be the first case 

of a North Korean arms shipment to or from Cuba being reported 

to the U.N. Security Council and the first time such a case would 

be reported in the Western Hemisphere. 

There is not yet any official confirmation of the exact content or 

the reasons behind the shipment. But even if the shipment was 

sent to North Korea for repair, as the Cuban Government claims, 

it would still be an arms transfer and therefore prohibited. 

This shipment raises questions about whether there have been 

other undetected shipments of weapons between Cuba and North 

Korea, as my fellow witnesses have raised. 

All U.N. member states are authorized to interdict suspicious 

shipments to or from North Korea but these measures are not always followed. 

Panama did follow these procedures. They stopped a suspicious 

ship for inspection and when it discovered the weapons they seized 

them and promptly invited the U.N. Panel of Experts to go there 

to inspect. 

The Panel of Experts is a group of technical experts as part of 

the U.N. Secretariat that reports to the Security Council’s Sanctions Committee. 

The U.N. investigation of this case is still ongoing and the results of the inspection in Panama have not been made public. That 

visit would have focused on identifying the cargo and interviewing 

the crew. 

26

Most likely the experts will next seek to identify the specific actors that were involved in the transaction including seeking information from the Cuban Government, as Mr. Griffiths pointed out. 

One possible—excuse me, the Sanctions Committee, which is actually the same as the members of the Security Council, will then 

examine the information from the experts and determine whether 

there was a violation and decide what to do. 

One possible response would be to add the names of the parties 

involved to a designation list. This list identifies individuals, companies or government entities involved in illicit transfers. 

Member states are then expected to deny transactions with those 

on the list. In the past, adding names to this list has been highly 

political and has only been done as part of a new Security Council 

resolution after major breaches such as a North Korean nuclear 

missile test. 

However, the Security Council could decide to amend this list at 

any time. Separately, individual countries may choose to add these 

entities or individuals to their own watch lists. 

Outside the U.N. context, the U.S. has worked to improve other 

countries’ interdiction capabilities through the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. Panama is a strong PSI partner and U.S. 

and partner countries hold annual training exercises under 

Panamax to prepare for interdiction scenarios in the Panama 

Canal. 

The Government of Panama’s successful seizure of the Chong 

Chon Gang’s shipment may encourage additional states in Latin 

America and the Caribbean to take similar action. 

Congress may wish to consider whether adequate resources are 

being provided to support PSI and other programs that help countries strengthen their export controls, train custom officials and improve detection of illicit shipments. This may be particularly important for Latin American and Caribbean countries who may be 

transshipment points. 

Congress may also wish to examine whether the Security Council 

should revise the designations list on a more routine basis and 

could also show support for continuing to make publicly available 

the Panel of Experts’ findings on these illicit transfers. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you again for 

the opportunity to testify and I look forward to the subcommittee’s 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nikitin follows:]

27


82946c-1.eps

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 

STATEMENT OF 

MARY BETH NlKITIN 

SPECIALIST IN NONPROLIFERATION 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

HEARING ON 

"A CLOSER LOOK AT CUBAAND ITS RECENT HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION" 

SEPTEMBER 26,2013 

COl1grcssiomtf Research Serviu 7-570tJ 
28


82946c-2.eps

C011gressiona1 Researcl1 Service 

Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the recent incident of proliferation from Cuba and 

the U.N. Sanctions Committee's response 

The interdiction by Panama on July 10 of the North Korean freighter Chong Chon Gang revealed a 

hidden shipment of military goods, ranging from fighter planes to ammunition that was on its way to 

North Korea, according to press reports and the Cuban government. While we await official reports of 

what investigators fOll1ld on the ship, the Cuban government issued a statement on July 16 saying that the 

weapons being transported on the ship were 'two anti-aircraft missiles complexes Volga and Pechora, 

nine missiles in parts and spares, two MiG21 bis and 15 motors for this type of airplane." According to 

other reports, the ship was also carrying far more material, including artillery anlmunition, light weapons 

ammunition such as rocket-propelled grenades, and other military items. TI,e ship's two previous stops 

were Puerto Padre and Havana, Cuba. It is not yet clear whether Cuba had sent the latest weapons 

shipment to North Korea as a sale, for repair as it claims, or a combination of the two. TI,C sugar which 

hid the weapons on the Chong Chon Gang may have been part of a barter arrangement. but it is also 

possible that payment was made in some other way. 

Weapons trade with North Korea is restricted under United Nations Security Council resolutions. Ifthe 

UN confirms the ship was carrying banned weapons, the seimre of the (,hong (,hon Gang would be the 

first case of a shipment to or from Cuba being reported to the U.N. Security Council, and the first reported 

seizure of a banned North Korean shipment in the \Vestem Hemisphere. 

Since 2006. a series of increasingly stringent U.N. sanctions have been placed on North Korea following 

its successive nuclear and missile tests. U.N. Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) ban all anns 

transfers from North Korea and all anns transfers to North Korea except small anllS or light weapons. All 

ofthe goods the Cuban government identities as on the ship are considered advanced conventional 

weapons and therefore would be prohibited transfers lmder paragraph 8 ofUNSCR 1718 (2006) even if 

they were being sent to North Korea for repair, as the Cubans claim. 

All UN member states are authorized to stop and seize suspicious shipments to or from North Korea and 

report them to the U.N. Security Council for inspection. but these measures arc not always followed. The 

Panamanian gm emment, however, did follow these procedures and this case may be considered a model 

for other interdictions. First, it stopped a suspicious shipment for inspection. and 'when it discovered items 

in violation of the Security Council resolutions, it seized the goods and invited the U.N. Panel of Experts 

for North Korea to go to Panama to inspect the shipment immediately. 111e Panel of Experts is to report 

their findings on whether the shipment was a violation to the Security Council's North Korea Sanctions 

Committee. Once the parties to a prohibited shipment are identified, the U.N. Security Council Sanctions 

Committee may approve the addition of those entities or individuals to the "designation list" under 

Security Council resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 27. The designation list identifies individuals or 

companies, or government entities involved in illicit transfers. Member states are expected to prevent 

transfers involving those entities 

The United States has emphasized coordination and training exercises to improve interdiction capacity. 

especially through the Proliferation Security hlitiative (PSI). PSI was fomled in 2003 to increase 

international cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destmction (\VMD), their delivery 

systems, and related materials. It now has over 100 participants. PSI was originally launched by the 

United States partially in response to legal gaps revealed in an incomplete interdiction of the So San, a 

North Korean-flagged ship that was carrying Scud missile parts to Yemen in December 2002. 
29


82946c-3.eps

C011gressiona1 Researcl1 Service 

Panama is a strong PSI partner. In 2012. the United States and partner countries held a training exercise 

called PANAMAX to prepare for interdiction scenarios in the Panama Canal. With the Chong Chon Gang 

interdiction, the government of Panama's actions may encourage additional states in Latin America and 

elsewhere to take similar actions to implement Security Council resolutions. TI,e United States has also 

worked with countries around the world, including Latin America, to bolster export controls and train 

customs officials to recognize banned items. 

The Chong Chon Gang shipment raises questions about whether previous shipments of\veapons from 

Cuba to North Korea have gone undetected, and more broadly about the nature of Cuban-North Korean 

relations. According to press reports, North Korean ships have made several other trips to Cuba since 

2009. There is still not enough publicly available infol1nation to detennine motivations for the shipment. 

Cuba has reportedly been seeking upgrades to its Soviet-era military planes, but North Korea also has 

been seeking MIGs as noted in the U.N. Panel of Experts June 2013 report. ill addition, the recent visit of 

a higll-Ievel North Korean military delegation to Cuba in early July 2013, less than 10 days before the 

detention of the Chong Chon Gang, might provide some insight into the bilateral military relationship 

between the two comltries, but no details from the meeting have been publicized. TI,e North Korean 

delegation, led by General Kim Kyok Sik, Chief ofthe Korean People's Aml)' General Staff, met with 

Cuban President Raid Castro, who stressed the historic ties between the two countries and efforts to boost 

cooperative relations. 

Interdiction of banned goods to and from North Korea is a binding obligation on U.N. member states, but 

implementation has been uneven. Overall, the risk of interdiction has likely raised the cost of illicit 

transfers, and forced the Nordl Korean regime to engage in more illicit trade with its limited mnnber of 

trading partners_ most of them already outher states such as Cuba. Huwever. multiple reported cases of 

conventional arms interdictions over the past five years show that North Korea continues to work to evade 

the sanctions 

Congress has a variety of ways to strengthen implementation of sanctions on NOrdl Korea through 

interdictions, and bolster nonproliferation in the Western Hemisphere more broadly 

Congress could encourage the US. government and the international community to 

improve NOrdl Korea sanctions implementation in all cOmltries, through improved 

implementation of broader nonproliferation requirements under international law such as 

UNSCR 1540, which requires states to implement adequate export controls on WMDrelated materials in their cOLUltr}. Congress could fund nonproliferation programs and 

assistance to this end. 

Congress could encourage the administration to include the issue of UN. sanctions 

implementation in its engagement with countries of the Caribbean and Latin America, 

many of "vhich may be used as transshipment points 

Congress could choose to examine the role of the Proliferation Security hlitiative in 

interdictions and whether PSI has adequate resources and sufficient inter-agency and 

international coordination, It could encourage broader participation by states in Latin 

America and the Caribbean 

Congress could encourage the United States and other countries to revise UN. Security 

Council designations of sanctioned entities and individuals in a more routine manner. 

TI,is could help cOLmtries better prevent or interdict suspicious shipments, 
30

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

I’d really like to thank our three distinguished witnesses for 

sharing these very thoughtful and provocative ideas. 

The big reason that we convened this hearing is because this was 

a very, very significant incident here in the Western Hemisphere 

and because I don’t believe that there’s been adequate scrutiny 

with the international media on this subject, this issue. 

I’ve also had conversations with people that are close to the process of what’s happening with the Sanctions Committee at the 

United Nations and, quite frankly, I’m very sceptical that given the 

fact that the Cuban representatives have been putting on what I’d 

call a charm offensive and acting—I don’t know, kind of reminds 

me of ‘‘Leave it to Beaver,’’ you know, Eddie Haskell. Good morning, Mrs. Cleaver, you know, turning on all the—turning on all the 

charm looking like you’re actually cooperating when the effort is 

actually a public relations effort to try to deep six everything. 

And I’m really sceptical as to whether the Sanctions Committee 

is going to have the wool pulled over their eyes in this instance and 

the Cuban companies involved are going to get just a mere slap on 

the hands and try to sweep everything under the rug. That’s why 

we called this hearing. 

I think we need to call world attention to a very, very serious 

issue. And given that the sanctions contained in Iran—I’m going to 

ask my question of Mr. Griffiths—given that the sanctions contained in Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act already ostensibly apply to Cuba what beyond the current range of sanctions 

that we have in place against the Cuban regime could we do and 

what additional legislative measures do you think we should take? 

Please elaborate. 

Mr. GRIFFITHS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m not an expert on U.S. legislation but if your end goal is to 

find out more and you fear the wool may be pulled over people’s 

eyes, for me the first one very concrete thing would be to get full 

congressional support for making sure that the Cuban authorities 

really extend an invitation to the U.N. panel of experts to Cuba 

and provide the full disclosure I mentioned earlier. 

And if they don’t, that will prove that they have quite a lot to 

hide, especially regarding the command and control of this illicit 

transfer—who was responsible—because if they don’t provide full 

disclosure it will indicate that this perhaps went to the very top 

and, as I said before, to—for Congress to really push to make sure 

that the—that other—that the U.S. Government or other U.N. 

member states really ensure that the Cubans cooperate over these 

earlier voyages as well. 

Right now, the U.N. Panel of Experts has not been invited to 

Cuba and has not been offered full disclosure and this is the litmus 

test, if you will, and if they, you know, they don’t go down that 

road of cooperation and share information then I would suggest, 

you know, further investigation is merited to determine the extent 

of these shipments and this trade. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

I also—I believe it was you, Ms. Werlau, that mentioned that the 

two principal negotiators of this deal—one from Cuba and one from 

31

Korea—are both—well, one’s dead and one’s missing, and so it’s 

going to be very, very difficult to get at the truth. 

Given the fact that these two principals are gone, how confident 

are you that the Sanctions Committee is going to be able to get to 

the bottom of this? 

Ms. WERLAU. I’m very confident that Cuba’s going to manage it 

and they can. They own the economy. They own the country—the 

regime. 

They’re going to clean up their act, and I’ve worked in—at the 

U.N. I’ve had the opportunity to work in Geneva and New York to 

do advocacy activities. 

The power of the Cuban delegations there, the size, the influence 

is impressive and they have their allies. So I don’t think we’re 

going to get to the bottom of this, not through that channel. 

Mr. SALMON. You think they’re pretty good at public relations 

campaigns? 

Ms. WERLAU. Cuba has a vast propaganda apparatus that is supported not just by a huge public relations empire—media, radio 

stations, publications, news agencies, cultural centers—they have a 

very effective, well trained and large intelligence service. 

Most of their diplomats are trained intelligence officers. Yes, it’s 

very effective and they convince a lot of people who are not well 

informed, who are well meaning, who think that they’re changing, 

that don’t understand the criminal nature of this regime. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I yield back. 

I recognize the ranking member. 

Mr. SIRES. You know, I find it very difficult to think that the 

Cuban Government is going to cooperate on any kind of committee 

going to Cuba and trying to investigate whatever company because 

the company is the state, and so is North Korea. 

So I just find it very difficult to think that the Cuban Government is going to open its doors and say oh, here’s what happened 

and tell the world what happened. I just don’t see that happening. 

I worry about the U.N. because, quite frankly, in the past they 

have disappointed me many times when it comes to issues of 

human rights in Cuba. 

I mean, at one time they had the vice president of the Human 

Rights Commission being from Cuba. I mean, that is the—that is 

the most absurd situation you could have when human rights in 

Cuba they are nonexistent and yet at the U.N. you had somebody 

from Cuba being part of the Human Rights Commission. 

That just—you know, I guess the military apparatus of these two 

countries has to be pretty in dire condition to have this exchange. 

I just wonder what you think about that. Why at this time have 

such a shipment? I’m curious. If anybody can take a shot at that. 

I know that North Korea has been rattling the saber down on 

South Korea. 

So I was just wondering if it’s all related and I’m, quite frankly, 

concerned with the relationships between Cuba, Iran and the Western Hemisphere, you know, and the people travelling back and 

forth from Cuba to Iran. 

So can you—can you comment on that? We’ll start with you. 

Ms. NIKITIN. Thank you very much. 

32

I don’t have an independent source of information, you know, 

that confirms what the motivations were. But in doing a survey of 

the experts’ views on this shipment I think we can narrow it down 

to a few other options besides this idea of Cuba sending the equipment for repairs, that—you know, that was their story. 

They apparently said that they thought that would not contradict 

the U.N. Security Council resolutions. But the most recent versions 

of those resolutions have been strengthened to also prohibit that 

kind of activity. 

So North Korea is also strapped for hard currency and it’s possible that they—if they were not going to use those systems in 

their own military that they would have a capability to refurbish 

and sell to third parties. 

We just don’t know. So that’s another possibility that’s being discussed. 

Mr. SIRES. Ms. Werlau. 

Ms. WERLAU. Well, as I said in my testimony it doesn’t surprise 

me that they would attempt this. There certainly is a need in Cuba 

and they are using the most outrageous schemes to get hard currency. Exploiting their own people, sending people off to—as migrants to send money back to the regime, exporting doctors as temporary workers in schemes of modern slavery—anything can be expected of Cuba to make a buck. 

There’s a report in Uruguay I believe in late July that Uruguay 

imported $1 million in blood from Cuba. Now, I looked into this. 

We’re going to publish a report. Turns out Cuba massively collects 

blood from their citizens, telling citizens that it’s to save lives and 

they’re actually turning people into donors, regular donors, saying 

that they’re going to get sick if they don’t donate blood, and this 

is to sell it. 

This is a regime that drained the blood of political prisoners on 

their way to execution in the 1960s and sold it to Vietnam, for example, including, by the way, an American citizen, Robert Fuller. 

His blood was drained on the way to execution just for trying to 

form a resistant movement in Cuba very much like the Castro 

brothers had against the Batista dictatorship. Anything is possible 

from this regime to make a buck. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Mr. Griffiths, I was just wondering if you really think that Cuba 

is going to cooperate in any way, shape or form with this. 

Mr. GRIFFITHS. Well, on a point made by yourself and a colleague, I mean, I don’t think anyone would deny the fact that the 

U.N. has some limitations, given its membership and its mandate. 

But I have to say that the U.N. Panel of Experts on North Korea 

and those members of the Secretariat associated with the panel 

have done a very good job. They’re one of the best panels. 

You read the latest report by that panel published earlier this 

summer, 2013, and it’s really an outstanding piece of investigative 

research. 

They’ve dug up some very interesting shipments and they’ve 

identified suspected parties in places as far away as Kazakhstan 

relating to North Korean shipments to Iran. So if that team are invited into Cuba and are given access to the officials and the documents both on the Chong Chon Gang and these earlier ship voyVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:13 Nov 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\092613\82946 HFA PsN: SHIRL
33

ages—North Korean ship voyages, I’m quite confident that they 

would get to the bottom of it. 

The question is will they be invited, and you Members of Congress are sceptical that they will be invited. But that decision, I 

guess, hasn’t been made yet. 

So in some way maybe this hearing will contribute to an understanding at the U.N. and amongst Cubans who are open to listening that full access and full disclosure is absolutely necessary and 

if it’s not granted that’s going to confirm many people’s worst fears. 

So that’s what I can say on that subject. On the other issue, the 

nature of maritime trafficking is such that if the arms or drugs are 

not being shipped directly to a country like the United States or 

France or Spain or Britain but to two third countries such as Cuba 

and North Korea then, you know, there are very few open source 

reports on maritime trafficking and there are very few seizures. 

So much goes underneath the radar, so many vessel movements 

that are suspect that are never investigated because the International Law of the Sea gives sovereignty of the vessel to the flag 

state which in this case is either North Korea or some open registries, flags of convenience that can’t exercise their sovereignty or 

are unwilling to exercise their sovereignty, who don’t have the intelligence or the law enforcement capacities to do so. 

So the Chong Chon Gang is probably not an isolated case, in my 

opinion. When you say why now, given general patterns it’s quite 

possible there have been other earlier ones. But as we make clear 

in our investigation and has been documented by the U.N. Panel 

of Experts and others, the North Koreans are on the lookout for jet 

fighter spare parts to maintain their fleets. So they’re always on 

the lookout for those. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Mr. GRIFFITHS. So they’re in the market. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. We are probably going to be called for 

a vote on the floor for two amendments anytime now but we have 

about 10 minutes at least that we can go. I recognize——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

As we know, the Castro regime is and always has been a supporter, a facilitator of terrorism. It has a long history of proliferation activities, has actively sought to undermine the U.S. and our 

interests by any means possible. 

For decades the Castros have harbored fugitives from U.S. justice 

including convicted cop killer Joanne Chesimard, as Congressman 

Sires always reminds us, and he has a vast and sophisticated intelligence network operating against the United States. 

And the Castro brothers also have a well documented deep-rooted connection to rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea, united 

in a mutual hatred for the United States. As we have been talking 

about, days after the seizure of this North Korean flag ship the 

Cuban authorities released a statement claiming that they were obsolete defensive weapons sent to North Korea for repair, only to be 

returned to Cuba. 

But as you’ve pointed out, it’s obvious they were lying to the 

international community to hide the fact that the final destination 

was North Africa in violation of U.N. sanctions. 

34

The Castro regime is desperate to keep its propaganda machine 

running and its hold on power, and Kim Jong-un and the North 

Korean regime will stop at nothing to continue its illicit activities. 

So I ask you what should the U.S. Government be doing to support allies in the region like Panama for their security and their 

law enforcement efforts? Also, what penalties do you think the 

international community should impose on Cuba for these activities 

in addition to the bans we have in place? 

And despite these blatant violations of U.N. sanctions this administration continues efforts to normalize relations with Cuba, 

moving forward with talks regarding migration and direct mail 

services in the middle of what has been going on. 

What message do you think it sends to our commitment to regional security to move ahead with talks with the regime despite 

this blatant violation of international law like the one involving the 

North Korean ship? 

Anyone who’d like to take a stab. Thank you, Ms. Werlau. 

Ms. WERLAU. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. 

I’m really not prepared to answer such a big question. All I can 

say is that the people who understand the criminal nature of this 

regime should inform others and it’s the responsibility of our Government. 

There’s more than 50 years—55 years of history there including 

the murder of American citizens, citizens of other countries, subversion, terrorism—I think thousands of deaths worldwide caused 

by this regime. And it’s important that we don’t get confused by the 

message. The Cubans are extremely able——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I will interrupt you there because you 

bring out an important fact, and then I yield back. We let the Castro regime get away with the murder of four innocent pilots of 

Brothers to the Rescue in the shoot down of their two aircraft over 

international air space—three American citizens, one U.S. resident. 

And what price did the Castro brothers pay for their crime? They 

signed a bill into law—the administration at the time—that they 

have yet to put into action. That was it. That was the penalty that 

they paid. 

So we let that problem go unanswered and now we have another 

horrible example of a violation of international law and we’re about 

to let them off the hook yet again. No wonder they continue to do 

their espionage and dangerous activities against the U.S. We are 

willing to look the other way because it’s just—to act would be inconvenient. 

Ms. WERLAU. Yes. May I add, Mr. Chairman, to that? It’s very 

frustrating when you’re doing human rights documentation and 

getting the reports from Cuba, where they’re using surgical repression to exterminate the opposition, assaulting women, children. I 

mean, this is a regime that has massacred children and——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Tugboat—13th of March where they put 

high-pressure water cannons——

Ms. WERLAU. Exactly. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. Against people, killing dozens of 

them for the crime of trying to leave the hell hole that is the Castro 

regime’s Cuba. 

35

Ms. WERLAU. And that is just one, and what we’re getting in our 

news reports are reports about old cars, Mojitos——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Oh, yes. 

Ms. WERLAU [continuing]. And Raul Castro’s reforms. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It’s an interesting place. 

Ms. WERLAU. Yes. I mean, it’s very frustrating——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And if you’re a media outlet and you report 

on the human rights violations instead of reporting on the cute 

1950s cars then you get your license taken away. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

We have about 7 minutes left on the clock to get back for our 

vote on the floor. But Mr. Rohrabacher is the only one that’s expressed that he does have a question and so I’m going to go ahead 

and yield to Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. One minute. One minute. Thank you very 

much. 

Let me just note that Castro’s regime has been a disgraceful example of corruption and repression since day one. 

One of the first things he did was, of course, send off aid to insurgents in Venezuela to overthrow their elected government. He 

then made his country into a haven for Robert Vesco and other 

major drug dealers. 

He murdered his own people by the hundreds, and I will tell you 

it is a disgrace that the liberals in this country gave him such leeway over the years, never calling Castro to task for all of this violation of human rights on a mass scale in his own country. 

Let me just say that it’s a miracle—it’s a miracle to me that he 

has lived as long as he has with as number of people who have 

been praying that he was going to die soon over all these years. 

But I’m sure that he will be leaving this planet soon and there 

will be a warm place waiting for him right next to Che Guevara 

and none too soon. 

Again, the American people need to see that all along he’s been 

conducting himself and involved with illicit activities, drug dealing, 

arms dealing throughout the world and it shouldn’t surprise us 

now. 

One last thought, Mr. Chairman, and that is we should be insisting that all of the money that he has stored up in foreign banks 

be found out and be given to the people of Cuba once this dictator 

is dead. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I recognize the gentleman from American Samoa. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That’s all right, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

and as a follow up on my good friend from California’s line of question I just want to pose this to Dr. Griffiths and our two witnesses 

here. 

I said I’m very concerned of the fact that a noninspection, at 

least the way the Chong Chon Gang was being inspected. I believe, 

Dr. Griffiths, you mentioned that there have been three other occasions or three other Korean vessels that have gone between Cuba 

and North Korea. 

36

Here’s the—based on a hypothetical but the fact that the noninspection—that these vessels could well have contained nuclear 

weapons, missiles that are capable, they come in right in the back 

yard of the United States, putting an obvious risk on the security 

of this country is what concerns me. 

So we can talk about drugs. We can talk about—but in fact that 

if it was possible for North Korea to do this and three other occasions that we have no idea what was being transferred on those 

three earlier vessels, I am just curious. 

Is the threat serious or is it just another one of those bypass that 

we’re not really concerned or should be concerned about? Dr. Griffiths. 

Mr. GRIFFITHS. There have been at least 12 and possibly 13 instances of North Korean ships calling at Cuban ports since 2006 

that we are aware of. So the figure is actually considerably higher 

than reported in the media. 

It’s quite possible there could have been more because these 

ships are turning off their radar—the AIS, the signal that allows 

us to—our commercial databases to locate ships, and signals can 

also be faked. I mean, it’s between 12 and 13. We’re uncertain 

about the thirteenth 100 percent. 

We don’t know the content of what those ships were carrying but 

some of them really do have what we call voyage anomalies where 

the ship has sailed in a manner which makes no economic or commercial sense and it’s the typical risk indicator when it comes to 

arms trafficking or indeed narcotics trafficking. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Dr. Griffiths. 

I’ve got one more quick question to Ms. Werlau. You mentioned 

that you published a paper in 2005 giving some estimates of the 

corporate wealth of the Castro family. 

Can you just give us a one liner? How much is the Castro family 

worth right now in Cuba? 

Ms. WERLAU. I think nobody knows that, not even the people 

who manage it. It is so well done the way that it’s concealed 

through safe havens, using other people as they present as the 

owners of the bank accounts and corporations. It’s impossible to 

tell. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

All testimony concluded and questions concluded, I’d like to adjourn this meeting. But before I do, I just want to say that maybe 

it would be a good idea for the members of this subcommittee to 

pen a letter to Mr. Ban Ki-Moon—Secretary Ban Ki-Moon to voice 

our concerns over this process within the U.N. 

Would that be something we could entertain? All right. Well, 

thank you very much. This subcommittee hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(37)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

38

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82946n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Matt Salmon (R-AZ), Cbairman 

September 24, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

to be held by the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office 

Building (and available live on the Committee website at W","ON f'.xeignillIuirs.hotjj.MQY)· 

DATE: 

TiME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, September 26,2013 

2:00 p.m. 

A Closer Look at Cuba and its Recent History of Proliferation 

Mr. Hugh Griffiths 

Head 

Countering Illicit Trafficking - Mechanism Assessment Projects 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 

(Apperillg via videocollferellce) 

Ms. Maria C. Werlau 

Executi ve Director 

Cuba Archi ve 

Ms. Mary Beth Nikitin 

Specialist in Nonproliferation 

Congressional Research Service 

By Direction of the Chairman 
39

f


82946m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

M1NU rES OF SUHCOMMITTEE ON ______ -"-'hc-e-'''.c'esc.:''c.:rn'''H.''-e:.:: •.::lis'''p'''''''-re'---_____ ~ HEAR!)lG 

Day~1!lJ1~Dlllc __ -"O"-9--=2"'6'-'-2'-'OC!1-"3 __ Roorn _ ___'2'_'1'"_7"'2_'_R"H!.:O""'B'--_ 

Starting Time ')·(mam ~ndjngTimc }oI2p,m. 

Recesses L-to __ l L-m __ ) L-to __ ) L-to __ } L-to __ l L-to __ I 

Presiding Member(,) 

Cltairmm, ]lr/att Salmoll 

Check all of the followillg lilal apply: 

Open Session [2J 

Executive (ciosed) Session 0 Televhed [2J 

Tln.l!~ UF HEARING; 

Electronically Recorded (taped) 11] 

Stenographic Record [{] 

"A Closer Look at Cuha and il .. Recent History a/Proliferation" 

SImCOM~n'fn;E\llc\lBliHS l'RESENT: 

Chairman Matt Salmon. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lelrtinen, llep. Trey Radel. Rankin!: Mcmba Albio Sires lind Rep. 

Eni Faleomavaega. 

::iOI\'~SUBCOIVIl\ilTTEE MF..Ml1ERS PRF.SF.f'\T; (fi;fark'tvir}, an * ttt}!!?}' (11"13 flOl ifJeiJIbers ufflli! commilfee.; 

Rep. !Jalla lIohrabacher 

lJF:AIUNf; WITNW,SJ;,S; Same as meeting notice attached? Yes m No 0 

((f"no" please list belou· (liter include lil1e, ag..-n(.:-v, department, or or,r,z;wnzation.) 

STATJL\1ENTS t'OR TilE RECORD: (Li'lt an,V statements sl1hmitfNffor tile rf!cord) 

NIA 

TI"1E SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 3:12p.m. 
40

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE MATT SALMON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE


82946d-1.eps
41


82946d-2.eps

The Honorable Ball Ki-mooll 

October 28, 2013 

Page 2 

Many experts believe there has been - and the Castro regime itself has admitted to - a violation 

ofinternationai sanctions in this case. 

This Subcommittee has leamed that while admitting to blatantly violating the international 

sanctions on North Korea, the Castro regime has begun a fun ',(;harm olTensive" allhe U.N. [0 

convince the Sanctions Committee that it should ill fact be applauded fOf its compliance and 

cooperation in this case, mthel' than punished and sanctioned for its intentional breach of the 

sanctions tegilne. 

We strongly believe that if Cuba is not held accountable and instead is only given a slap on the 

wrist, the international ramifications would be substantial. Countries, I ike Panama, would he 

less likely to put their resources ami reputations on the line in order to intercept sllspiciolls 

vessels and activities. Even more concerning, other countries may be more inclined to violate 

intemational sanctions on behalf of rogue regimes like NOTth Korea or Iran fOT either profit or 

ideological reaSOllS if they perceive the consequences will be insignificant. 

Please give this impotiant matter your personal and immediate attention, and we look forward to 

a thorough report on this incident from your U,N. Panel of Experts. 

Sincerely, 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on tile Western Hemisphere 

Member of COl1grc~~ Member of Congress 

Member ofCongrc~~ 
42

Æ


82946d-3.eps

The Honorable Ban Ki·111oon 

Octoher 2&, 2013 

Page 3 

Member of Congress 

cc: The Honorable John L Keny, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, 

The Honorable Samantha Power, Ambassador, U.S. Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations,