IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

 EASTERN DIVISION

Kelley Craig-Wood, :

 Plaintiff, :

 v. : Case No. 2:10-cv-906

Time Warner NY Cable LLC, : JUDGE JAMES L. GRAHAM

 Magistrate Judge Kemp

 Defendant. :

 ORDER

 This employment discrimination case is before the Court to

consider the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint

filed by plaintiff Kelley Craig-Wood. Defendant Time Warner NY

Cable LLC has opposed the motion. Ms. Craig-Wood has not filed a

reply. For the following reasons, the motion (#18) will be

denied.

I. Background

Ms. Craig-Wood filed her original complaint on October 8,

2010, alleging claims for age and race discrimination under Title

VII and Ohio law. Ms. Craig-Wood attached as Exhibit 1 a copy of

her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC dated July 21, 2010. 

Further, at paragraph 11, Ms. Craig-Wood stated:

11. Plaintiff was terminated on March 4, 2010, after a

series of retaliatory acts by the Defendant TWC

and for which Plaintiff has 3 more outstanding

EEOC charges. Plaintiff will be requesting the

right to sue letter on these charges and to amend

the complaint as soon as practicable after their

receipt.

On February 2, 2011, Ms. Craig-Wood filed a first amended

complaint correcting the name of the defendant. On May 17, 2011,

the Court held the first pretrial conference pursuant to notice

and in accordance with Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Following this conference, the Court issued a

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scheduling order adopting June 10, 2011, the date proposed by the

parties, as the deadline for filing amendments. On August 6,

2011, Ms. Craig-Wood filed a motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint. This motion was denied without prejudice for

failure to comply with Local Civil Rule 7.3. On August 11, 2011,

Ms. Craig-Wood filed her current motion.

II. The Motion for Leave to Amend

Through her current motion, Ms. Craig-Wood seeks to add an 

additional cause of action for retaliation and has attached as an

exhibit a second right-to-sue letter from the EEOC dated May 10,

2011. Ms. Craig-Wood does not acknowledge that the deadline for

any amendments has passed. Rather, her entire argument in

support of her motion is framed in terms of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 and

lack of prejudice to Time Warner NY. According to Ms. CraigWood, Time Warner NY has always been in possession of the facts

and documents supporting her proposed claim, discovery is still

open, and the proposed amendment "[a]rises out of the same

nucleus of operative facts as her claims in the original

Complaint." Second Motion to File Second Amended Complaint

(#18), p. 3. Ms. Craig-Wood’s motion appears to indicate a

belief that the discovery deadline governs the time frame for the

filing of amendments.

Defendant Time Warner NY opposes the motion on grounds that

Ms. Craig-Wood has not demonstrated good cause to allow an

amendment to the complaint after the established deadline set

forth in the Court's scheduling order. Time Warner NY notes that

Ms. Craig-Wood does not even acknowledge the deadline for

amending let alone provide any explanation for her failure to

abide by it. Moreover, Time Warner NY contends that Ms. CraigWood would be unable to establish good cause because she was

aware of the alleged facts supporting her proposed claim at the

time she filed her original and first amended complaints. Time

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Warner NY cites Ms. Craig-Woods' allegations in both her original

and amended complaints that she would be filing an amended

complaint upon her receipt of three additional right-to-sue

letters from the EEOC. Time Warner NY asserts, however, that Ms.

Craig-Wood was in possession of two of the additional right-tosue letters at the time she filed her original complaint. They

have attached as exhibits to their response copies of these

letters - one dated September 15 without a year specified and one

dated September 29, 2010. Most significantly, however, Time

Warner NY contends that the final right-to-sue letter, which is

attached to the proposed second amended complaint, was issued by

the EEOC on May 10, 2011, well before the June 10 amendment

deadline. Time Warner NY argues that, not only did Ms. CraigWood fail to meet the deadline, she waited until 60 days after it

had passed before seeking leave to amend. For all of these

reasons, Time Warner NY asserts that Ms. Craig-Wood simply cannot

establish the good cause required to allow an amendment after the

deadline has passed. 

III. Analysis

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) states that when a party is required to

seek leave of court in order to file an amended pleading, "leave

shall be freely given when justice so requires." However, when,

as here, the deadline established by the Court's scheduling order

has passed, the Sixth Circuit has made clear that, "a plaintiff

must first show good cause under Rule 16(b) for failure earlier

to seek leave to amend" and the Court "must evaluate prejudice to

the nonmoving party ‘before a court will [even] consider whether

amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).'" Commerce Benefits Group,

Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 326 Fed. Appx. 369, 376 (6th Cir.

2009)(quoting Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th Cir.

2003)); see also Hill v. Banks, 85 Fed. Appx. 432, 433 (6th Cir. 

2003). Consequently, the Court is permitted to examine the

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standard factors governing amendments of the complaints under

Rule 15(a) only if it is satisfied that the date for the filing

of a motion for leave to amend is properly extended under the

good cause provisions of Rule 16(b). 

Further, although the Court has broad discretion to modify

its own pretrial orders, it must be remembered that "[a]dherence

to reasonable deadlines is ... critical to maintaining integrity

in court proceedings," Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866 F.Supp.

1191, 1199 (N.D. Iowa 1994), and that pretrial scheduling orders

are "the essential mechanism for cases becoming trial-ready in an

efficient, just, and certain manner." Id. at 1198. In

evaluating whether the party seeking modification of a pretrial

scheduling order has demonstrated good cause, the Court is

mindful that "[t]he party seeking an extension must show that

despite due diligence it could not have reasonably met the

scheduled deadlines." Deghand v. Wal-Mart Stores, 904 F.Supp.

1218, 1221 (D. Kan. 1995). The focus is primarily upon the

diligence of the movant; the absence of prejudice to the opposing

party is not equivalent to a showing of good cause. Tschantz v.

McCann, 160 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D. Ind. 1995). Of course,

"[c]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and

offers no reason for a grant of relief." Dilmar Oil Co. v.

Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 986 F.Supp. 959, 980 (D.S.C. 1997). 

Further, although the primary focus of the inquiry is upon the

moving party's diligence, the presence or absence of prejudice to

the other party or parties is a factor to be considered. Inge v.

Rock Financial Corp., 281 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2002).

Here, Ms. Craig-Wood has offered essentially no explanation

for her failure to seek a second amendment prior to the

established deadline. Rather, her only argument is that, because

Time Warner NY had knowledge of the facts and documents to

support this cause of action, amendment is proper. She does not

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in any way shed light on her failure to seek leave to amend

before the deadline of June 10, 2011, when the document she was

awaiting, according to her original and first amended complaints,

was in her possession nearly thirty days prior. Additionally,

she fails to address the 60-day lapse between that deadline and

the filing of her motion for leave to amend, or stated another

way, she does not address the nearly 90-day lapse between her

receipt of an anticipated document and her motion for leave to

amend. 

Ms. Craig-Wood's suggestion that lack of prejudice to Time

Warner NY somehow supports permitting her proposed amendment is

unavailing. While, as Ms. Craig-Wood contends, Time Warner NY

may have been aware of the information supporting her proposed

amendment, the fact of the matter is that she was, too. 

Moreover, as discussed above, lack of prejudice to the opposing

party is not the standard here. Rather, the focus of the Court's

inquiry is on the diligence of the moving party. Ms. CraigWood’s proposed amendment consists of a fourth claim set forth in

four paragraphs and a total of five sentences as well as a

revision to paragraph 3 and the inclusion of an additional onepage exhibit. As such, the additional proposed allegations

cannot be characterized as complex or time-consuming to prepare. 

Under this circumstance, the Court believes that Ms. Craig-Wood,

in the exercise of any diligence, was able to pursue her proposed

claim within the scheduled time frame for amending. 

Based on the record before it, the Court cannot conclude

that Ms. Craig-Wood exercised due diligence in moving for leave

to amend after the deadline. Accordingly, she has not

established the good cause required for a modification of the

case schedule under Rule 16(b) and the Court need not undertake

any analysis under Rule 15(a). Consequently, the motion for

leave to file a second amended complaint will be denied.

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IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, plaintiff's motion for leave to file

a second amended complaint (Doc. #18) is denied. 

V. Procedure for Reconsideration

 Any party may, within fourteen days after this Order is

filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for

reconsideration by a District Judge. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A),

Rule 72(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt.

I., F., 5. The motion must specifically designate the order or

part in question and the basis for any objection. Responses to

objections are due fourteen days after objections are filed and

replies by the objecting party are due seven days thereafter. 

The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set

aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.

This order is in full force and effect, notwithstanding the

filing of any objections, unless stayed by the Magistrate Judge

or District Judge. S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.4. 

 /s/ Terence P. Kemp 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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