NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DARREN L. DEFLANDERS,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

SLOAN D. GIBSON, 

Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-7037

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 12-1182, Judge Mary J. Schoelen.

______________________ 

Decided: June 9, 2014 

______________________ 

DARREN L. DEFLANDERS, of Pascagoula, Mississippi, 

pro se. 

JOSHUA A. MANDLEBAUM, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondentappellee. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Assistant Attorney General, BRYANT G. SNEE, Acting 

Director, KIRK T. MANHARDT, Assistant Director. Of 

counsel on the brief were Y. KEN LEE, Deputy Assistant 
2 DEFLANDERS v. GIBSON

General Counsel, and LARA K. EILHARDT, Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, 

DC. 

______________________ 

PER CURIAM. 

Darren L. DeFlanders (“DeFlanders”) appeals from 

the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming the decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“the Board”): 

(i) finding that DeFlanders had not submitted new and 

material evidence sufficient to reopen claims for serviceconnected disability compensation for a left knee disability and spots on the lungs; (ii) denying compensation for 

spots on the brain; and (iii) denying a disability rating in 

excess of 10% for non-cardiac chest pain. See DeFlanders 

v. Shinseki, No. 12-1182, 2013 WL 5614273 (Vet. App. 

Oct. 15, 2013), reconsideration denied, 2013 WL 6184935 

(Vet. App. Nov. 22, 2013). Because DeFlanders’s arguments challenge only factual findings and an application 

of law to fact, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

DeFlanders served on active duty in the U.S. Army 

from 1989 to 1996. Following his separation from service, 

DeFlanders sought disability compensation for at least 28 

conditions, including a bilateral knee disability, lung 

spots, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and substance abuse. Resp’t’s App. 83–85. In 2006, following 

various challenges to the Board resulting in numerous 

remands to the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) 

Regional Office (“RO”) and subsequent determinations, 

the Board denied service-connected disability compensation for most of those claims, including the claims for a 

knee disability, lung spots, PTSD, and substance abuse. 

DeFlanders, 2013 WL 5614273, at *1. DeFlanders did not 

appeal the Board’s 2006 decision and it became final. Id. 
DEFLANDERS v. GIBSON 3

 DeFlanders then sought to reopen his claims for the 

knee disability, lung spots, and PTSD, and raised new 

claims requesting compensation for, inter alia, spots on 

the brain, bipolar disorder, an evaluation in excess of 10% 

disability rating for non-cardiac chest pain, and alcohol 

dependence and cannabis and cocaine abuse, the latter 

claimed together as substance abuse or “drug addiction.” 

Id. The RO notified DeFlanders that his old claims could 

not be reopened without new and material evidence and 

advised him regarding the information that would be 

required to substantiate his new claims. See Resp’t’s App. 

28–29. DeFlanders submitted medical records documenting treatment for his knees and for a lung condition, in 

addition to personal testimony. See id. at 32. The RO 

subsequently determined that DeFlanders had failed to 

submit new and material evidence sufficient to warrant 

reopening his claims relating to the knee disability and 

lung spots and also denied his claims relating to brain 

spots, substance abuse or drug addiction, PTSD, bipolar 

disorder, and the higher rating for non-cardiac chest pain. 

DeFlanders, 2013 WL 5614273, at *1–2. 

DeFlanders again appealed to the Board. In 2011, the 

Board characterized his claims for PTSD and bipolar 

disorder as a single claim for an acquired psychiatric 

disability and remanded that claim and several others for 

further examination. Resp’t’s App. 24–25, 41–50. The 

Board denied DeFlanders’s other claims, including service 

connection for brain spots, the request to reopen his

claims for lung spots and knee disability, and the request 

to increase his rating for non-cardiac chest pain above 

10%. Id. at 40–41; DeFlanders, 2013 WL 5614273, at *2. 

The Board explained that DeFlanders’s proffered evidence 

was not material because it did not provide a link to his 

military service and was redundant and cumulative of 

evidence already of record. Resp’t’s App. 32–33. The 

Board’s decision did not address the claim for substance 

abuse or drug addiction because DeFlanders did not 
4 DEFLANDERS v. GIBSON

specifically mention that claim on his appeal form, which 

indicated that it had been withdrawn. Resp’t’s App. 21–

22, 51–53, 56; DeFlanders, 2013 WL 5614273, at *2. 

DeFlanders then appealed to the Veterans Court, specifically identifying only four issues for the court’s review: 

brain spots, lung spots, knee disability, and substance 

abuse or drug addiction. DeFlanders, 2013 WL 5614273, 

at *2. First, the Veterans Court held that DeFlanders 

had abandoned his claim for an increased disability rating 

for non-cardiac chest pain because it was not identified in 

his informal brief as an issue for appeal and he did not 

make any specific argument challenging the Board’s 

determination in that regard. Id. at *3. Secondly, the 

court vacated what it characterized as the Board’s “implicit finding” that DeFlanders had not filed a substantive 

appeal on his claim for substance abuse or drug addiction, 

concluding that it was unable to review the Board’s reasoning for that decision, and remanded that matter for 

readjudication consistent with VA regulations. Id. at *5. 

Third, the court held that the Board’s denials of DeFlanders’ requests to reopen his claims for a knee disability 

and lung spots were not clearly erroneous and were 

supported by adequate reasons and bases. Id. at *6–9. 

Finally, the court affirmed the Board’s denial of serviceconnected disability compensation for brain spots, concluding that the Board had considered the relevant evidence and had adequately explained its determination. 

Id. at *9. 

In a subsequent order, the Veterans Court denied 

DeFlanders’s motion for reconsideration on the bases that 

the court’s initial decision (i) did not overlook or misunderstand a fact or point of law prejudicial to the outcome, 

(ii) did not conflict with a precedential decision of the 

court, and (iii) did not raise an issue warranting a precedential decision. DeFlanders, 2013 WL 6184935, at *1. 

The Veterans Court thus ordered that its initial decision 

would remain the decision of the court. Id.
DEFLANDERS v. GIBSON 5

DeFlanders then appealed to this court seeking to invoke our jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292.

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a Veterans 

Court decision is limited. We may review a Veterans 

Court decision with respect to the validity of a decision on 

a rule of law or the validity or interpretation of any statute or regulation that was relied upon by the Veterans 

Court in making the decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). Except with respect to constitutional issues, we “may not 

review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a 

challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a 

particular case.” Id. at § 7292(d)(2).

DeFlanders argues here that the Veterans Court did 

not correctly consider new evidence of knee surgery and 

an error relating to that evidence. Appellant’s Br. 1. He 

also asserts that he did not abandon his claim for a higher 

rating for non-cardiac chest pain, that the court’s decision 

to remand the substance abuse or drug addiction claim 

was “not fairly done,” and that the RO and the Board did 

not provide him with adequate assistance. Id. at 1–2. 

However, DeFlanders’s arguments challenge only the 

Veterans Court’s application of law to the facts of his case, 

which are matters outside of our jurisdiction. See Bastien 

v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The 

evaluation and weighing of evidence . . . are factual determinations committed to the discretion of the factfinder. We lack jurisdiction to review those determinations.”). The Veterans Court decision did not involve any 

questions regarding the validity or interpretation of a 

statute or regulation, nor did the court decide a constitutional issue. Rather, the Veterans Court merely applied 

the governing law to the facts of DeFlanders’s case. The 

court applied established law to the facts to determine 

that the Board’s decision that DeFlanders had not presented new and material evidence to warrant reopening of 
6 DEFLANDERS v. GIBSON

his claims for a knee disability and lung spots was not 

clearly erroneous. DeFlanders, 2013 WL 5614273, at *6–9 

(citing 38 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 7104(b), 7105(c); 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.156(a); United States vs. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 

364, 395 (1948); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 

1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Likewise, the court applied established law to the facts in affirming the Board’s denial of 

service-connection for brain spots. Id. at *9 (citing Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 

The court applied its own procedural rules to conclude 

that DeFlanders had abandoned the issue of non-cardiac 

chest pain. Id. at *3. But because the Veterans Court did 

not interpret a statute or regulation in the application of 

its procedural rules, we also cannot review that decision. 

See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (d)(2); Newhouse v. Nicholson, 

497 F.3d 1298, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ferguson v. Principi, 

273 F.3d 1072, 1074–75 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We also generally do not review the Veterans Court’s remand orders 

because they are not final decisions and the court here did 

not make any legal decisions regarding DeFlanders’

substance abuse or drug addiction claim other than to 

remand it. See Ebel v. Shinseki, 673 F.3d 1337, 1340 

(Fed. Cir. 2012); Williams v. Principi, 275 F.3d 1361, 1364 

(Fed. Cir. 2002). 

We likewise do not possess jurisdiction to entertain 

arguments that the VA did not fulfill its duty to assist 

under the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. 

L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000) (“VCAA”). Although 

DeFlanders does not explain what either the RO or the 

Board failed to do in assisting him, whether the VA has 

fulfilled its duty to assist under the VCAA is typically a 

question of fact. See Garrison v. Nicholson, 494 F.3d 

1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (regarding notice requirements under 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a)); DeLaRosa v. Peake, 515 

F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (regarding duty to assist 

under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A). 
DEFLANDERS v. GIBSON 7

We have considered the additional arguments presented in DeFlanders’ informal appeal brief but do not 

find them persuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the 

appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the arguments raised by DeFlanders.

DISMISSED

COSTS

No costs. 

 FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole 

 Daniel E. O’Toole 

 Clerk of Court