Filed 12/8/20 P. v. Blake CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KENYATA BLAKE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B298188

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA433216)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed as Modified.

Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney 

General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Douglas L. Wilson, Deputy Attorneys

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendant Kenyata Blake appeals from a judgment of conviction 

after a jury convicted him of one count of first degree felony murder 

(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 two counts of robbery (§ 211), and found 

true that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon 

during the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), the commission of which 

occurred during a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The trial court 

sentenced defendant to an overall term of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole (LWOP) plus four years, and imposed a $300 

restitution fine, three $40 court operations assessments, and three $30 

court facilities assessments. 

On appeal, defendant contends insufficient evidence supports a 

finding that he participated in the robbery as alleged in count 3. He 

also challenges the constitutionality of the eyewitness identification 

instruction (CALCRIM No. 315) given at trial, the robbery-murder 

special circumstance found true in count 1, and the mandatory LWOP 

sentence he received for the special circumstance murder that he 

committed while he was 18 years 7 months old. Finally, defendant 

contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by 

failing to object to the imposition of the restitution fine and assessments 

before conducting an ability to pay hearing. 

The Attorney General disputes these contentions, and notes that 

the indeterminate and determinate abstracts of judgment should be 

1 Unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal Code. 
3

corrected to accurately reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of 

judgment. 

We agree, and modify the abstracts of judgment to reflect the 

court’s verbal pronouncement. In all other respects, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By information, defendant and his identical twin brother Keishon 

Blake were charged with the first degree felony murder and robbery of 

Maria Rivas (§§ 187, subd. (a), 211; counts 1 & 2), and the robbery of 

Yoshie Washington (§ 211; count 3).2 The information also alleged that 

the murder of Rivas was committed during the commission of a robbery 

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and that defendant personally used a deadly and 

dangerous weapon, a knife, during the commission of the murder 

(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). 

Following court ordered treatment to restore his competency to 

stand trial (§ 1368), in April 2019, when defendant was 22 years old, he 

was tried alone before a jury. 

1. Prosecution Evidence

A. Robbery and Murder of Maria Rivas

According to Detective Robert Lait, the investigating officer 

assigned to this case, around 6:30 p.m. on December 22, 2014, 

paramedics were called to a sidewalk area outside of a Ralph’s grocery 

2 For ease of reading, we refer to Keishon Blake by his first name. 

Keishon is not a party to this appeal.
4

store to assist a woman who had been stabbed. Maria Rivas, a 62 yearold woman, was transported to a hospital where she subsequently died. 

When Lait arrived at the scene, he saw a bag of groceries on the 

sidewalk. Lait did not locate a purse, wallet, or other identifying 

information of Rivas. 

A deputy medical examiner testified that Rivas died from a single 

stab wound to the left side of her upper back that penetrated her left 

lung and heart. No defensive marks were found on her body. 

Lait obtained security video from the Ralph’s grocery store. As 

the prosecutor played clips of surveillance footage, Lait testified that 

the woman depicted on the video was Rivas. The surveillance footage 

showed Rivas carrying a large black purse inside the store. Prior to 

exiting the store around 6:10 p.m., Rivas purchased the groceries that 

Lait had found at the scene of the stabbing. 

Defendant’s adopted sister, Gail Turner,3 testified that on the 

evening Rivas was stabbed, defendant and Keishon ran home to where 

they and Turner lived to watch the news. When Turner confronted 

defendant the following day about the stabbing, he became angry and 

responded that “the lady wasn’t nothing but a Mexican and—a Mexican 

and they [sic] always killing us, so fuck her.” Defendant then told 

Turner he had stabbed Rivas with a knife. 

3 Turner’s mother adopted defendant and Keishon when they were four 

years old. 
5

B. Robbery of Yoshie Washington

Around 6:30 p.m. on January 23, 2015 (one month after the 

robbery and murder of Rivas), Yoshie Washington was walking alone on 

a sidewalk in front of an apartment building. She testified that while 

she was walking and talking on her cell phone, she was forcefully 

pushed from behind, causing her to drop her phone and fall to the 

ground, scraping her knee.

Washington watched as a “Black . . . but light-skinned” man ran 

from behind her and picked up her cell phone before running across the 

street. Washington did not see the man’s face. Suddenly, another lightskinned Black man walked in front of Washington, who was still on the 

ground, and said, “Give me your shit.” Washington looked at the man’s 

face and threw away her purse. The man picked up the purse, which 

contained her wallet, house and car keys, and walked across the street 

toward the other suspect “as if nothing had happened.” Washington 

watched as both men, who “looked very similar to each other,” walked 

away together. Washington recalled her white Nissan Rogue was 

parked nearby and could be located by pressing the car key. 

Washington ran to her friend’s apartment and called the police. 

Around 6:40 p.m., Officer Joshua McDonald responded and met 

with Washington at the apartment. Though Washington told McDonald 

that she could only identify one of the suspects, she told McDonald that 

both suspects were light-skinned Black men between the ages of 18 and 

20. 

Around 8:00 a.m. the next morning, Washington walked to where 

her car had been parked and discovered that it had been stolen. 
6

Washington’s child car seat and toys, which had been inside the car 

when Washington last locked it, were on the ground. The same day, 

Washington went to the police station to report that her car had been 

stolen. 

C. Defendant’s Arrest and Subsequent Investigation

Turner testified that sometime around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. in 

January 2015, she saw a white car “[f]acing the wrong way in front of 

the house, and then a young lady drove it up into the driveway.”4 

Turner watched as Keishon and his female companion removed license 

plates from the car. When Turner talked to Keishon, he did not 

mention defendant, and stated that that his female companion was with 

him during the robbery of Washington. 

A patrol officer testified that around 5:00 p.m. on January 25, 

2015, she and her partner noticed an abandoned, white Nissan Rogue 

parked on the wrong side of the street. When the officers ran the 

license plates affixed to the car, they determined that the plates did not 

match. After running the vehicle identification number, the officers 

realized the car had been reported stolen. When the car was 

impounded, a forensic print specialist pulled a fingerprint from the 

outside passenger side, rear body panel of the car near the gas tank. 

The fingerprint conclusively matched defendant’s fingerprint. 

4 Turner subsequently testified that she did not “know who drove up in 

the car, I just know when they got out of it. When they were at the door, in 

the house, the car was sitting out in front.” 
7

On January 26, 2015, Turner called the police and spoke with Lait 

about the murder and robberies. Turner’s description of the stabbing 

was consistent with autopsy findings. According to Lait, both robberies 

took place in the same part of Los Angeles. 

Following Turner’s discussions with Lait, defendant and Keishon 

were arrested, after which defendant admitted to stabbing Rivas. 

Defendant told Lait he had stabbed Rivas because she struggled with 

defendant over her purse. 

Lait met with Washington and showed her two photographic sixpack lineups. In the first lineup that included a photograph of 

Keishon,5 Washington identified Keishon as the person who had 

demanded her belongings. When Washington was shown the second 

lineup that included a photograph of defendant, she looked puzzled, 

pointed to defendant’s picture, and told Lait, “Well, it’s the same 

person.” When Lait told Washington that defendant and Keishon were 

identical twins, Washington said she saw only one of the assailant’s 

faces, and that the assailant could have been either defendant or 

Keishon. Lait testified that “although [Washington] circled the first one 

[identifying Keishon] . . . she couldn’t say with any more certainty that 

it wasn’t the second one that I showed her as well.” 

During her testimony, Washington recalled telling Lait that she 

“could not I.D. the other person” who had taken her cell phone. The 

person she was “attempting to I.D., was . . . the person who said ‘give 

5 Lait decided to use Keishon’s picture in the first photographic lineup 

after Turner told him that Keishon had admitted to participating in the 

robbery. 
8

me your shit.’” Despite her inability to identify the suspect who had 

taken her cell phone, Washington reiterated at trial that both suspects 

were similar in size, age, race, and skin tone. 

2. Defense Evidence

Defendant did not present any witnesses in his defense. 

3. Verdict and Sentencing

The jury found defendant guilty as charged, and found the special 

allegations to be true. The court sentenced defendant to an overall term 

of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole in count 1, plus 

a consecutive determinate term of four years, comprised one year for 

the deadly weapon enhancement in count 1, plus the middle term of 

three years in count 3. The court then ordered defendant to pay a $300 

restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), three $40 court operations 

assessments (§ 1465.8), and three $30 court facilities assessments (Gov. 

Code, § 70373). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

1. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Robbery Verdict in Count 3

Defendant contends that insufficient evidence supports a finding 

that he participated in the robbery of Washington in count 3. We 

disagree.
9

A. Governing Law and the Standard of Review

“When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for a 

jury finding, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to 

the judgment of the trial court. We evaluate whether substantial 

evidence, defined as reasonable and credible evidence of solid value, has 

been disclosed, permitting the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820 

(Vargas).) “‘“The standard of review is the same in cases in which the 

prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.”’ [Citation.]” 

(Ibid.)

During our review, we presume every fact the jury could have 

reasonably deduced from the evidence, and accept logical inferences 

that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence, even 

if the evidence can be reconciled with a contrary finding. (Vargas,

supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 820; People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411; 

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 639 [“the possibility that 

the trier of fact might reasonably have reached a different conclusion 

does not warrant reversal”].) 

B. Analysis

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that he was 

one of the two men who participated in the robbery of Washington. He 

asserts Washington’s description of the assailants was too generic and 

did not amount to substantial evidence because “[a] mere racial match, 
10

without more, is not of evidentiary value.” (In re Christopher B. (2007) 

156 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1560, fn. 2.) 

Defendant’s claim ignores the full range of circumstantial 

evidence that the jury actually considered. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 

10 Cal.4th 764, 792–793 [circumstantial evidence may connect a 

defendant with the crime].) That evidence included Washington’s 

identification of Keishon as one assailant—an identification defendant 

does not dispute—and her full description of the other assailant. 

Washington told Lait and testified at trial that both assailants were 

skinny, light-skinned Black men between the ages of 18 and 20 years. 

She also stated that both assailants looked “very similar to each other,” 

which is compelling given that Keishon and defendant are identical 

twins. 

Defendant’s argument also ignores the jury’s consideration of the 

similarities with which the Rivas and Washington robberies were 

committed. (See Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 824 [evidence of the 

offense “was similar to the evidence adduced concerning each of the 

robberies with which defendant was charged”]; People v. Sullivan (2007) 

151 Cal.App.4th 524, 564 [same].) In each robbery, an unaccompanied 

woman carrying a purse was suddenly attacked by Keishon and another 

young man (who was indisputably identified in the first robbery as 

defendant). Both women were robbed in the same part of the city, 

around the same time, and were in vulnerable positions.

The physical evidence also connects defendant to the scene of the 

robbery. On January 24, the morning after the robbery, Washington 

found her child’s seat and toys strewn on the street where her locked 
11

car had been parked. The car was reported stolen the same day, and 

was recovered by police on January 25, after which investigators located 

defendant’s fingerprint on the outside rear passenger side of the car. 

From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant and 

Keishon obtained Washington’s car key from her purse, and used it to 

locate and ransack the car before driving away. Thus, we cannot say

that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to find that defendant took 

Washington’s belongings from her person and against her will by means 

of force or fear (§ 211).

2. The Eyewitness Identification Instruction (CALCRIM No. 315) Is

Not Unconstitutional

Defendant contends that the trial court violated his federal 

constitutional rights by instructing the jury, as part of CALCRIM No. 

315, that in evaluating the accuracy of an identification, it could 

consider the level of certainty with which an eyewitness (i.e. 

Washington) made the identification. Defendant contends that the jury 

should not be permitted to consider this as a factor, because scientific 

studies and case law recognize there is, “at best, a weak correlation 

between witness certainty and the accuracy of an identification.” 

As delivered to the jury in this case, CALCRIM No. 315 provides:

“You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant. 

As with any other witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave 

truthful and accurate testimony. [¶] In evaluating identification 

testimony, consider the following questions: [¶] Did the witness know 

or have contact with the defendant before the event? [¶] How well 
12

could the witness see the perpetrator? [¶] What were the 

circumstances affecting the witness’s ability to observe . . . ? [¶] How 

closely was the witness paying attention? [¶] Was the witness under 

stress when he or she made the observation? [¶] Did the witness give a 

description and how does that description compare to the defendant? 

[¶] How much time passed between the event and the time when the 

witness identified the defendant? [¶] Was the witness asked to pick 

the perpetrator out of a group? [¶] Did the witness ever fail to identify 

the defendant? [¶] Did the witness ever change his or her mind about 

the identification? [¶] How certain was the witness when he or she 

made an identification? [¶] Are the witness and the defendant of 

different races? [¶] Was the witness able to identify the defendant in a 

photographic or physical lineup? [¶] Were there any other 

circumstances affecting the witness’s ability to make an accurate 

identification? [¶] The People have the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who committed the crime. 

If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not 

guilty.” (Italics added.) 

Defendant acknowledges that he did not object to this instruction 

at trial; however, he contends that his claim was not forfeited because 

the instruction affected his substantial rights. (See People v. Anderson

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927 (Anderson) [“[f]ailure to object to 

instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects 

defendant’s substantial rights”].) 

Defendant has not established how consideration of a witness’s 

certainty affected his substantial rights. (Anderson, supra, 152 
13

Cal.App.4th at p. 927 [determination depends on whether the error 

resulted in a miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 

Cal.2d 818 (Watson)].) On the contrary, given the facts of this case, 

defendant would surely want the jury to consider how uncertain

Washington’s identifications were, as CALCRIM No. 315 permits the 

jury to do. (People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461 (Sánchez).) 

Indeed, during closing argument, defense counsel drew the jury’s 

attention to Washington’s inability to identify defendant, and the 

uncertainty with which she described the second assailant.6 Thus, “it is 

unclear that defendant would want the court to delete the certainty or 

uncertainty factor from the instructions.” (Id. at p. 462.) 

The contention is meritless in any event. In Sánchez, our

Supreme Court “specifically approved” CALCRIM No. 315’s predecessor, 

CALJIC No. 2.92, “including its certainty factor,” which had previously 

been approved in People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, and 

“reiterated the propriety of including this factor” in the jury instruction. 

(Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 462.) After acknowledging the very 

same premise on which defendant relies here (i.e., that out-of-state 

cases had found “scientific studies that conclude there is, at best, a 

weak correlation between [eye]witness certainty and accuracy”), the 

6 Counsel told the jury that Washington “couldn’t tell what race my 

client was, if he was there. She couldn’t tell what race the other assailant 

was, or whether it was female or male, because she didn’t see them.” Counsel 

also stated that “[Washington] told the police officer she had no idea, could 

not tell who the other person was. Do you remember both of them? No, only 

one. Was that person tall? Fat? Black? White? Skinny? No, I have no 

idea.” 
14

Court declined to reexamine its previous cases, explaining that because 

some certain and uncertain identifications had been made at trial, it 

was “not clear that even those [out-of-state] cases would prohibit telling 

the jury it may consider this factor” in a case where the defendant 

“would surely want the jury to consider how uncertain some of the 

identifications were.” (Id. at pp. 461–462; see id. at p. 462 [“[a]ny 

reexamination of our previous holdings in light of developments in other 

jurisdictions should await a case involving only certain 

identifications”].)

Like Sánchez, this case does not involve certain identifications. 

Regardless, we are bound by our high court’s decisions on this issue,

and conclude that the instruction is not unconstitutional. (Auto Equity

Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 (Auto Equity

Sales).

7

3. The Felony-Murder Special Circumstance Is Not Unconstitutional

Defendant’s conviction for first degree felony murder in count 1 

included a true finding that he killed Rivas during the commission of a 

robbery. “Once the jury finds the defendant has committed first degree 

murder, the felony-murder special circumstance applies if the murder 

was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a 

7 We are also bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme 

Court, which have approved consideration of a witness’s certainty when 

evaluating the witness’s “‘ability to make an accurate identification.’” (See 

Perry v. New Hampshire (2012) 565 U.S. 228, 725, fn. 5, quoting Manson v. 

Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 114.)
15

statutorily enumerated felony, and subjects the defendant to a sentence 

of death or of life without the possibility of parole.” (People v.

Andreasen (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 70, 80; see § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) 

[robbery is an enumerated felony].) 

Defendant contends that the robbery-murder special circumstance 

is unconstitutional because it allows a defendant who is the actual 

killer to be eligible for the death penalty even if the jury does not find 

the defendant had a culpable mental state. He also contends that the 

special circumstance does not narrow the class of offenders eligible for 

capital punishment, as a direct perpetrator would be subject to both a 

felony murder conviction and special circumstance finding. 

These arguments have been rejected by our Supreme Court. “We

have repeatedly held that when the defendant is the actual killer,

neither intent to kill nor reckless indifference to life is a constitutionally

required element of the felony-murder special circumstance. 

[Citations.] ‘[W]e have also rejected the related claim that the 

imposition of the death penalty under these circumstances fails to 

adequately narrow the class of death-eligible offenders.’ [Citations.] 

We decline to revisit these precedents here.” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 

Cal.5th 269, 347; accord, People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 583 

[Court again “decline[d] to revisit” the issues identified in Jackson].) As 

a court exercising inferior jurisdiction, we must follow these decisions. 

(Auto Equity Sales, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455.)
16

4. Defendant’s Life Without the Possibility of Parole Sentence Is Not

Unconstitutional

Defendant contends that his mandatory LWOP sentence for 

committing a special circumstance first degree murder (§ 190.2, subd. 

(a)), violates the state and federal constitutions’ bans on cruel and 

unusual punishment, because he was 18 years 7 months old when he 

committed the murder. He asserts that the characteristics of juveniles 

that motivated the decision in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 

(Miller), compel a requirement that trial courts exercise discretion to 

impose a sentence other than LWOP after consideration of these 

characteristics and any mitigating circumstances. 

Defense counsel raised this issue during the sentencing hearing, 

and the court denied the claim, stating that “defendant’s youth, to me, 

is no excuse.” Following a brief outburst from defendant, the court 

stated that “[i]f I had the authority to choose a different sentence . . . I 

wouldn’t. He deserves the maximum sentence because of what he has 

done.” 

In Miller, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that 

“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 

sentencing,” because juveniles have diminished capacity and greater 

prospects for reform than adults. (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471.) 

“[T]he distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological 

justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, 

even when they commit terrible crimes.” (Id. at p. 472.) In light of 

those characteristics, “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing 
17

scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for

juvenile offenders.” (Id. at p. 479.) 

As relevant here, however, the United States Supreme Court has 

consistently toed the line between the age of minority and the age of 

majority when determining the constitutionality of capital punishment: 

“While drawing the line at 18 is subject to the objections always raised 

against categorical rules, that is the point where society draws the line 

for many purposes between childhood and adulthood and the age at 

which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.” (Roper v. Simmons

(2005) 543 U.S. 551, 554 (Roper); accord, People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 

Cal.4th 1354, 1380 (Gutierrez).)

We are bound by Miller, Roper, and Gutierrez, and decline the 

invitation to conclude that “new insights and societal understandings 

about the juvenile brain require us to conclude the bright line of 18 

years old in the criminal sentencing context is unconstitutional.” 

(People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 617; People v. Argeta (2012) 

210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482; People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 

1211, 1220–1221.) 

5. Restitution Fine and Assessments

As discussed above, the trial court imposed a $300 restitution fee 

(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), three $40 court operations assessments (§ 1465.8), 

and three $30 court facilities assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373). 

Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), 
18

defendant now challenges the assessments and fine on due process 

grounds.8

Defendant concedes he did not object to the imposition of the 

assessments or restitution fine despite being sentenced five months 

after Dueñas was decided. To avoid forfeiting the claim (see People v.

Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 

Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153–1155), defendant contends that his counsel’s 

failure to object to the imposition of the fine and assessments 

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant was 

required to demonstrate prejudice, or a reasonable probability that but 

for the challenged act or omission of counsel, he would have obtained a 

more favorable result. (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674–

676; see also In re Crew (2011) 52 Cal.4th 126, 150 [“[i]f a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel can be determined on the ground of 

lack of prejudice, a court need not decide whether counsel’s performance 

was deficient”].)

Defendant has not established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

failure to object. Without any citation in the record, he simply 

concludes that he was then and is now indigent. In our review of the 

record, we find no indication that defendant was indigent or otherwise 

8 Our Supreme Court has granted review in People v. Kopp (2019) 38 

Cal.App.5th 47, review granted November 13, 2019, S257844, on the 

following issues: “Must a court consider a defendant’s ability to pay before 

imposing or executing fines, fees, and assessments? If so, which party bears 

the burden of proof regarding defendant’s inability to pay?”
19

unable to pay the restitution fine and assessments. The minute orders 

and abstract of judgment reflect that defendant was represented by 

private counsel at trial. The pre-conviction probation report lists as 

“unknown” defendant’s employment, residency, mental health, 

parenthood, and finances. Moreover, the court could have found that 

defendant was able to pay the total sum of $510 from prison wages over 

the length of his lifetime sentence. (See People v. Aviles (2019) 39 

Cal.App.5th 1055, 1075–1077 [any Dueñas error was harmless due to 

defendant’s ability to earn prison wages equaling amount of fine and 

assessments]; People v. Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1035 [same]; 

People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 139–140 [same].) Having 

failed to satisfy his burden to establish prejudice, defendant’s Dueñas

claim fails.

6. Correction to the Abstracts of Judgment 

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed three 

consecutive sentences: an LWOP sentence for first degree felony 

murder (count 1); a one-year sentence for the deadly weapon 

enhancement (count 1); and a three-year sentence for the Washington 

robbery (count 3). 

The Attorney General correctly notes that the consecutive threeyear sentence in count 3 is listed in the indeterminate abstract of 

judgment as a consecutive LWOP sentence, and is omitted from the 

determinate abstract of judgment. The Attorney General is also correct 

that the consecutive one-year sentence for the deadly weapon 
20

enhancement on count is omitted from the indeterminate abstract of 

judgment. 

We direct preparation of amended abstracts of judgment to correct 

these errors. (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89.)

DISPOSITION

The trial court is directed to prepare and forward to the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation amended abstracts of 

judgment that reflect: (1) the three-year determinate sentence in count 

3 is to run consecutively to the LWOP sentence in count 1; and (2) the 

one-year sentence for the deadly weapon enhancement in count 1 is to 

run consecutively to the LWOP sentence. As modified, the judgment is 

affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

COLLINS, J.

CURREY J.