Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Strauss v. City of Chicago, 2021 IL App (1st) 191977

Appellate Court 

Caption

BRIAN J. STRAUSS, Individually and d/b/a 1572 North Milwaukee 

Avenue Building Corporation, an Illinois Corporation, PlaintiffAppellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. First District, Sixth Division 

No. 1-19-1977

Filed March 5, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-CH-00256; the 

Hon. David B. Atkins, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Robert Robertson and Marko Duric, of Robertson Duric, and James 

Patrick McKay Jr., of Law Offices of James P. McKay Jr., both of 

Chicago, for appellant.

Mark A. Flessner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth 

Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Suzanne M. Loose, Assistant 

Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.
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Panel JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Harris and Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment and 

opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Brian J. Strauss, individually and d/b/a 1572 North Milwaukee Avenue Building 

Corporation, owned and operated a building located at 1572 North Milwaukee Avenue in 

Chicago in which Double Door Liquors (Double Door), a music venue, had been a tenant. 

After Double Door was evicted, a zoning ordinance was enacted that changed the kinds of 

establishments that were allowed in the building. In his second amended complaint, plaintiff 

raised claims that challenged the ordinance and certain acts done by the local alderman and 

defendant, the City of Chicago, before the ordinance was enacted. The circuit court dismissed 

those claims under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 

(West 2016)). On appeal, plaintiff contends that (1) the complaint sufficiently stated claims 

that the zoning ordinance violated substantive due process and equal protection under the 

Illinois Constitution, (2) the complaint sufficiently stated a claim for inverse condemnation, 

and (3) his tort claims are not barred by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees 

Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2016)).

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

¶ 4 Plaintiff alleges that the alderman for the ward where the building was located, Proco Joe 

Moreno, engaged in a course of conduct designed to punish plaintiff for evicting Double Door. 

In July 2017, plaintiff filed a federal civil rights complaint in the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois. The federal district court later dismissed the case, and 

plaintiff’s state law claims were remanded to the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 5 On February 9, 2019, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, which states in part as 

follows. When the complaint was filed, the Strauss family had owned the 1572 North 

Milwaukee Avenue building for almost 40 years. At one time, the family ownership of the 

building was incorporated and Brian Strauss became president of the 1572 North Milwaukee 

Avenue Building Corporation, which owned and operated the building. Located in the 

Milwaukee-North-Damen corridor, the building has four stories, consists of nearly 20,000 

square feet, and has 11 apartments. Before the dispute at issue, the estimated market value of 

the building was $10 million. The building had long been zoned as B3-2, which allows 

apartments above the ground floor and street-level commercial property, such as shopping 

centers, large stores, and retail storefronts. At all relevant times, all other buildings along the 

corridor were also zoned at B3-2 or greater. 

¶ 6 Alderman Moreno was a member of the city’s zoning committee, which had 18 aldermen. 

Alderman Moreno also had a personal and financial relationship with Double Door’s owners. 

In 2012, Alderman Moreno told defendant that only Double Door would be allowed in the 

building. However, “numerous problems” arose with Double Door, including “constantly high 

noise levels that were problematic for residential tenants and commercial neighbors,” illicit 
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drug use and alcohol abuse by Double Door’s customers, and damage done to the property by 

Double Door and its patrons. Double Door’s lease relationship ended due to these problems 

and other lease violations. Plaintiff initiated a forcible entry and detainer lawsuit against 

Double Door in 2015. 

¶ 7 On April 13, 2016, while the lawsuit against Double Door was pending, Alderman Moreno 

introduced a downzoning amendment to the zoning committee for just plaintiff’s building. The 

amendment would have changed the building’s zoning to B1-1, which prohibited over 30 types 

of businesses from occupying the building, including general restaurants, medium and large 

entertainment venues, and hotels or motels. Also, the apartments on the upper floors of the 

building would not be allowed to take new leases. On June 20, 2016, the zoning committee 

held the B1-1 proposal in committee, making it available to be called for a vote at any time in 

the future. At a meeting with Alderman Moreno on July 20, 2016, plaintiff was again told that 

only Double Door was allowed in the building. 

¶ 8 On August 15, 2016, plaintiff won the lawsuit against Double Door, which was evicted in 

February 2017. Two days later, plaintiff attended a meeting at city hall with the commissioner 

for the Department of Planning and Development, Alderman Moreno, the chairman of the 

zoning committee, the zoning administrator, and the owners of Double Door, among others. 

The commissioner tried to broker a sale of the building to Double Door, as well as negotiate a 

new month-to-month lease. Alderman Moreno also warned plaintiff that if Double Door was 

not allowed back in the building, the alderman would make the zoning process very lengthy 

and expensive and that the building could be vacant for two to five years. Alderman Moreno 

asserted that he decides what kind of tenant goes into the building and all of these issues could 

be avoided if Double Door was allowed back into the building at a rent far less than what the 

market would bear. Alderman Moreno also confronted plaintiff inside the building and later 

on the front sidewalk on February 25, 2017. Alderman Moreno told plaintiff that he would not 

have a tenant for three years, there would be inspectors in the building on a daily basis, and 

plaintiff “can come back to [Alderman Moreno] on [plaintiff’s] knees.” Alderman Moreno 

threatened that the building would be empty with no income for plaintiff or his family. 

¶ 9 The commercial space in plaintiff’s building ordinarily garnered rents of $35,000 per 

month, “conservatively speaking.” However, plaintiff’s building had been vacant since Double 

Door was evicted in February 2017. Plaintiff received several written letters of intent to rent 

the space at market rates, but these potential tenants refused to sign leases unless the zoning 

classification remained at B3-2. Alderman Moreno’s downzoning proposal loomed over the 

property and prevented plaintiff from leasing the commercial space to potential but reluctant 

tenants. 

¶ 10 Plaintiff tried to sell the building. Around May 10, 2017, plaintiff entered into a written 

contract with an entity known as Buyer A for $9.6 million. On June 8, 2017, Buyer A cancelled 

the contract after learning about the pending downzoning amendment from Alderman Moreno. 

¶ 11 Two days before Buyer A cancelled its contract, Alderman Moreno had proposed a second 

amendment that would zone the building to RS-3, which is intended to accommodate the 

development of single-unit detached houses on individual lots. Plaintiff’s building had never 

been used as a single unit and shared a common wall with another building that was also a 

commercial/business establishment with upper-level apartments. On June 22, 2017, the zoning 

committee deferred the RS-3 zoning proposal, making it available to be called for a vote at any 

time in the future. 
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¶ 12 Around July 21, 2017, plaintiff entered into a written contract to sell the building to an 

entity known as Buyer B for $9.1 million. Buyer B knew of the pending downzoning 

amendments, and the contract was contingent on the property keeping a B3-2 zoning 

designation. Buyer B met with Alderman Moreno and cancelled the contract on August 7, 

2017, due to Alderman Moreno’s downzoning scheme looming over the property. 

¶ 13 Meanwhile, city officials worked with Alderman Moreno to devise a third downzoning 

proposal. In August 2017, Alderman Moreno proposed downzoning just plaintiff’s building to 

B2-2, which is intended to spur development in commercial corridors with low demand for 

retail. B2-2 zoning prohibited over 30 categories of businesses and building uses and allowed 

fewer options for the types of commercial or retail tenants that would be permitted to occupy 

the building. The zoning change would dramatically decrease the value of the building. Prior 

to a zoning committee meeting on September 11, 2017, a conversation about the B2-2 proposal 

was recorded between Alderman Moreno and his chief of staff. Alderman Moreno said he was 

going to “F*** with them, it makes their lawsuit weaker ***.” 

¶ 14 The complaint appended a transcript of a September 11, 2017, zoning committee hearing 

where the B2-2 amendment was on the agenda. There, Alderman Moreno stated in part:

“I humbly ask the committee for support. Planning supports and the law department 

both support this as a planning tool. And I know many other aldermen *** have done 

this in other circumstances to get the best for our community and the best for the owner 

of the building. So this is not something that it’s [sic] outside the purview of this 

committee, nor the local alderman, which is me in this case.” 

Defendant’s zoning administrator, Patti Scudiero, stated that the matter was not recommended 

when it was first introduced. However, Alderman Moreno had since worked with the 

Department of Law and the Department of Planning and Development to amend the zoning 

application to a B2-2 designation, which “has a floor area ratio that is identical to the current 

zoning on the property of a B3-2, which is no loss of floor area.” Scudiero’s department 

supported the application. 

¶ 15 The zoning committee passed the B2-2 amendment. Ten days later, Buyer B made a new 

offer to buy the building for $6.5 million, representing a loss of $3.1 million due to the 

downzoning amendment. On October 11, 2017, the Chicago City Council officially 

downzoned the property from B3-2 to B2-2. 

¶ 16 Plaintiff further alleged that defendant’s actions were motivated by Alderman Moreno’s 

spiteful effort to get even with plaintiff and defendant assisted the alderman in his vindictive 

and irresponsible attack. Due to the first two downzoning amendments that were proposed and 

the third amendment that was approved, plaintiff was unable to lease the commercial space 

vacated by Double Door at the market rate for B3-2 properties. In June 2018, plaintiff sold the 

building for $9.1 million, losing $500,000 in purchase price alone. 

¶ 17 We next summarize the causes of action alleged in the complaint that plaintiff pursues on 

appeal: violation of substantive due process, violation of equal protection, inverse 

condemnation (all under the Illinois Constitution), and three tort claims. 

¶ 18 In his substantive due process claim, plaintiff asserted in part that the B2-2 zoning 

ordinance was passed to satisfy the desire of one person: Alderman Moreno. No other person 

or business in the community participated in or supported the proposal, and every building in 

the immediate area was still zoned at B3 or higher. 
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¶ 19 In his equal protection claim, plaintiff asserted in part that the downzoning was illegal spot 

zoning that was motivated by Alderman Moreno’s personal agenda. No other building was 

downzoned. Defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable, intentional, willful and 

wanton, and were undertaken with malice. Alderman Moreno’s intent to keep Double Door as 

the commercial tenant belied any theory that defendant may have acted to mitigate high noise 

levels or drug or alcohol abuse that accompanied Double Door’s use of the property. 

¶ 20 In his inverse condemnation claim, plaintiff stated in part that defendant’s actions were a 

de facto taking of plaintiff’s property without just compensation. Due to defendant’s actions, 

plaintiff was not free to sell his building to buyers or lease space to new tenants at the market 

prices that a B3-2 zoning classification would demand. The B2-2 zoning amendment ended 

the freedom of choice that the Strauss family had enjoyed for over 40 years. Plaintiff suffered 

economic harm in the form of a decrease in the building’s market value, a decrease in the 

purchase price of the building, and a loss of rental income. 

¶ 21 Plaintiff’s tort claims alleged tortious interference with contracts, tortious interference with

prospective economic advantage, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff 

stated that Alderman Moreno intentionally and unjustly interfered with plaintiff’s business 

relationships with prospective buyers and tenants. Alderman Moreno knew about the sales 

contracts with Buyer A and Buyer B, and his actions induced the buyers to cancel their 

contracts. Plaintiff also stated that Alderman Moreno’s conduct was extreme and outrageous 

and he exerted intentional pressure to force plaintiff to let Alderman Moreno’s friends back 

into the building.

¶ 22 B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

¶ 23 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint under section 2-619.1 of the 

Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016)). Under section 2-615 of the Code (id. § 2-615), 

defendant stated in part that plaintiff did not have a constitutionally recognized property 

interest because the entity known as 1572 North Milwaukee Avenue Building Corporation, 

and not plaintiff, owned the property. Further, the facts as pled in the complaint supplied 

rational bases for the B2-2 zoning ordinance. Under section 2-619 of the Code (id. § 2-619), 

defendant contended in part that plaintiff did not have standing because a shareholder has no 

right to seek damages for injury to a corporation, even if he is the only shareholder. Defendant 

also asserted that it was immune from plaintiff’s claims under the Tort Immunity Act (745 

ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2016)). 

¶ 24 In response, plaintiff asserted in part that he was suing as Brian Strauss, individually, and 

doing business as 1572 North Milwaukee Avenue Building Corporation and was not suing 

alone as a shareholder. Plaintiff also stated that “[p]laintiff consists of Brian Strauss, the 

individual, and Brian Strauss, the president of the corporation. The corporation speaks through 

Brian Strauss. The injuries that occurred to the corporation, occurred to its president as well.” 

¶ 25 In a written order dated August 30, 2019, the circuit court granted defendant’s motion to 

dismiss. The court found that the substantive due process and equal protection claims failed. 

After noting that the parties agreed that Double Door was a well-known music venue, the court 

stated that plaintiff himself alleged rational bases for the zoning change, including constantly 

high noise levels, illicit drug use and alcohol abuse, and damage done to the property over the 

course of many years. Also, plaintiff did not allege that defendant as a whole—that is, the City 

of Chicago—had some other basis for its decision. Plaintiff only alleged that Alderman 
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Moreno, who was not a party to the case, was motivated solely by personal animus. The court 

took judicial notice that at any given time, there were 50 aldermen on the city council, plus the 

mayor. Allegations that one of them had an improper motive for seeking a zoning change were 

insufficient to sustain a claim against defendant based on that change. The court further found 

that the inverse condemnation claim also failed. The B1-1 and RS-3 zoning proposals were not 

a taking because they were never actually passed. Further, the B2-2 zoning ordinance did not 

deprive plaintiff of all economically beneficial use, where plaintiff admitted he later sold the 

building for a similar amount that he asserted it was worth before the zoning change. The court 

also found that defendant was immune from plaintiff’s tort claims under the Tort Immunity 

Act. All of plaintiff’s tort claims arose out of the adoption or efforts to adopt a zoning 

ordinance, which is a core legislative function of local governments. Alderman Moreno’s 

alleged individual conduct—threatening to seek zoning changes out of personal animus—

related squarely to his discretion to do so as an alderman. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint 

was dismissed with prejudice.

¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27 A. Plaintiff’s Name

¶ 28 As a preliminary matter, defendant asserts that plaintiff does not have a constitutionally 

protected property interest because the corporation, and not plaintiff, owned the property. 

Thus, any cause of action about the rights of the property belonged to the corporation itself and 

not its president. Defendant further states that even if plaintiff had alleged that he was the sole 

shareholder of the corporation, he would not have standing because an action to enforce 

corporate rights or redress injuries to a corporation must be brought in the corporation’s name. 

¶ 29 To review, plaintiff’s name on the complaint is “Brian J. Strauss, individually, and d/b/a 

1572 North Milwaukee Avenue Building Corporation.” Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that 

the family ownership of the building was incorporated and Strauss eventually became president 

of the corporation. 

¶ 30 Plaintiff appears to have taken different positions on who or what holds the protected 

interest at stake. In his response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff stated that plaintiff 

consisted of Brian Strauss, the individual, and Brian Strauss, the president of the corporation. 

Plaintiff also stated that the corporation spoke through Brian Strauss and that the injuries that 

occurred to the corporation also occurred to its president. Plaintiff asserted that he was not 

suing as a shareholder. Now on appeal, plaintiff contends that the complaint makes clear that 

1572 North Milwaukee Avenue Building Corporation owned the property. Still, in the brief, 

plaintiff uses the pronoun “his” when referring to plaintiff.

¶ 31 It matters whether plaintiff is suing as a corporation or a person. The styling of plaintiff’s 

name in the complaint and plaintiff’s position on the matter in the circuit court overlooks the 

distinction between a corporation and its president. A corporation is separate from its 

shareholders, directors, and officers, who are not ordinarily liable for the corporation’s 

obligations. Capital One Bank, N.A. v. Czekala, 379 Ill. App. 3d 737, 743 (2008). No person, 

individually—not even the president of a corporation—“does business as” a corporation. Id.

¶ 32 Plaintiff suggests that the issue is a mere misnomer, which is “nothing more than a party is 

styled in other than [its] own name.” Todd W. Musburger, Ltd. v. Meier, 394 Ill. App. 3d 781, 

806 (2009). Misnomers most frequently occur when plaintiffs misname defendants, but 

sometimes plaintiffs misname themselves. U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Luckett, 2013 IL App 
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(1st) 113678, ¶ 23. A misnomer may be corrected at any time (735 ILCS 5/2-401(b) (West 

2016)). However, another possibility is that plaintiff made a mistake, which occurs when the 

wrong person (or entity in this case) was joined and served. Protein Partners, LLP v. Lincoln 

Provision, Inc., 407 Ill. App. 3d 709, 719 (2010). An amendment to address a mistaken identity 

must meet certain requirements (735 ILCS 5/2-616 (West 2016)). “Courts are much more 

reluctant to allow parties to easily correct parties’ names if they are incorrect because of a 

mistaken identity than because of a misnomer.” Luckett, 2013 IL App (1st) 113678, ¶ 21. The 

intent of the plaintiff is a pivotal inquiry in determining whether a case involves misnomer or 

mistaken identity. Czekala, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 743. Based on the record, we cannot determine 

at this time whether misnomer or mistaken identity is at work. However, we need not resolve 

this issue because we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for other reasons, as 

discussed below.

¶ 33 B. Claims Under the Illinois Constitution Dismissed Under Section 2-615

¶ 34 We next address plaintiff’s claims under the Illinois Constitution that were dismissed under 

section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016)). A section 2-615 motion to dismiss 

challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint based on defects apparent on its face. PoohBah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 473 (2009). The motion 

“presents the question of whether the facts alleged in the complaint, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, and taking all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable 

inferences that may be drawn from those facts as true, are sufficient to state a cause of 

action upon which relief may be granted.” Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 

2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 25. 

The court determines whether the pleadings present the possibility of recovery. Carter v. New 

Trier East High School, 272 Ill. App. 3d 551, 555 (1995). The complaint must sufficiently set 

forth every essential fact to be proved. Id. The court only considers (1) facts apparent from the 

face of the pleadings, (2) matters subject to judicial notice, and (3) judicial admissions in the 

record. Reynolds, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 25. Exhibits attached to the complaint may also 

be considered. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 321 (2008). We review de novo

an order granting a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d at 

473.

¶ 35 1. Substantive Due Process 

¶ 36 Plaintiff contends that the complaint stated a claim that the B2-2 zoning ordinance violated 

substantive due process under the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiff argues that in dismissing the 

claim, the circuit court relied on a lone allegation about Double Door’s management of its 

operation and ignored the allegations that defendant used its coercive power to protect Double 

Door. Plaintiff also asserts that the circuit court did not consider any of the factors in Sinclair 

Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370 (1960), and La Salle National Bank of 

Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40 (1957), which favor plaintiff. 

¶ 37 Article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of 

life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the 

laws.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. “The Illinois Constitution’s guarantees of due process and 

equal protection [citation] stand separate and independent from the federal guarantees of those 

rights.” Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 2013 IL 112673, ¶ 79. We may look to federal 
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interpretations for “guidance and inspiration,” but the final decision on how to construct the 

Illinois guarantees of due process and equal protection is for Illinois courts to draw. Id.

¶ 38 Substantive due process limits the state’s ability to act. In re Marriage of Miller, 227 Ill. 

2d 185, 197 (2007). “The constitutional declaration that private property shall not be taken *** 

without due process of law is subordinated always to the interests of the public welfare as 

expressed through the exercise of the police power of the State,” which includes zoning laws. 

Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 97 (1951). We note that municipal 

ordinances are construed using the same rules that apply to statutes. Napleton, 229 Ill. 2d at 

306. A court first identifies the nature of the right that was allegedly infringed, a necessary first 

step because the nature of the right dictates the level of scrutiny that applies to determine 

whether a statute is constitutional. Id. at 307. 

¶ 39 Plaintiff did not have a right to a particular zoning classification. A property owner cannot 

reasonably rely on the indefinite continuation of a zoning classification and acquires a property 

knowing that amendments can be made to a zoning ordinance within the limits of the law. 

Furniture LLC v. City of Chicago, 353 Ill. App. 3d 433, 438 (2004); see River Park, Inc. v. 

City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1994) (zoning classifications are not the 

measure of a property interest, but are legal restrictions on the use of property). The right that 

was allegedly affected by the zoning ordinance is the ability to use one’s property in his own 

way and for his own purposes. Napleton, 229 Ill. 2d at 308-09. An infringement of that right 

is subject to the rational basis test, which provides that a zoning ordinance will be upheld if it 

bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor 

unreasonable. Id. at 307, 309. At this point, plaintiff does not need to meet the heavy burden 

of proving that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and only needs to allege sufficient 

facts to proceed further. Whipple v. Village of North Utica, 2017 IL App (3d) 150547, ¶ 22. 

¶ 40 The parties disagree about the applicability of a list of factors that courts have at times 

applied to determine whether an ordinance violates substantive due process. These factors are 

from two cases—Sinclair Pipe Line Co., 19 Ill. 2d at 378, and La Salle National Bank of 

Chicago, 12 Ill. 2d at 46-47—and are as follows: (1) the existing uses and zoning of nearby 

property; (2) the extent to which property values are diminished by the particular zoning 

restrictions; (3) the extent to which the destruction of property values of the plaintiff promotes 

the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the public; (4) the relative gain to the public as 

compared to the hardship imposed on the individual property owner; (5) the suitability of the 

subject property for the zoned purposes; (6) the length of time the property has been vacant as 

zoned in the context of land development in the vicinity; (7) whether a comprehensive zoning 

plan for land use and development exists; and (8) whether the community needs the proposed 

use. Plaintiff contends that the factors apply and reveal the arbitrariness of defendant’s decision 

to strip plaintiff of the uses permitted by the former B3-2 zoning. Defendant asserts that the 

factors are not useful in this context.

¶ 41 There has been some debate about the contexts in which the La Salle/Sinclair factors are 

useful, including for as-applied and facial challenges to zoning ordinances. Compare Napleton, 

229 Ill. 2d at 319 (factors do not lend themselves to facial challenges), with Paul v. County of 

Ogle, 2018 IL App (2d) 170696, ¶¶ 28, 30 (rejecting assigning “talismanic significance” to the 

distinction between facial and as-applied challenges and noting that the La Salle/Sinclair

factors can apply even where an ordinance concerns one piece of property). Still, not every 

case involving a challenge to a zoning ordinance on substantive due process grounds has 
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applied the La Salle/Sinclair factors. See Drury v. Village of Barrington Hills, 2018 IL App 

(1st) 173042. Further, the list itself is not exclusive, and no single factor is controlling. 

Whipple, 2017 IL App (3d) 150547, ¶ 26; see La Salle National Bank of Chicago, 12 Ill. 2d at 

46 (stating that the listed factors are “among the facts which may be taken into consideration 

in determining validity of an ordinance”).

¶ 42 The purpose of the La Salle/Sinclair factors is to determine whether the zoning action was 

reasonably related to a legitimate government interest and was a reasonable method to achieve 

that purpose. Whipple, 2017 IL App (3d) 150547, ¶ 26. Plaintiff’s complaint itself answers that 

inquiry. The allegations describe problems associated with the former tenant, Double Door: 

high noise levels that were problematic for other tenants and neighbors, illicit drug use and 

alcohol use by Double Door’s customers, and damage done to the property by Double Door 

and its patrons. A more restrictive zoning classification could be an attempt to prevent those 

problems from recurring. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Alderman Moreno was the driving 

force behind the zoning ordinance. Yet, a zoning restriction “could be good for the public at 

large even if only one person asked for it.” Drury, 2018 IL App (1st) 173042, ¶ 98. Although

“our supreme court has typically invalidated” an ordinance where the record shows that the 

“only justification for the ordinance is that a chosen few individuals wanted it” (emphasis 

omitted) (id. ¶ 99), Alderman Moreno’s agenda was not the only justification. Under the 

rational basis test, the court may hypothesize reasons for legislation, even if the reasoning 

advanced did not motivate the legislative action. People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 

117, 124 (1998). A law will be upheld if there is “any conceivable basis for finding a rational 

relationship.” Id. As stated in plaintiff’s complaint, the secondary effects of having a concert 

venue at the building’s location provided a reason to downzone the property. The complaint 

itself alleged a rational basis for the zoning ordinance, and so plaintiff’s substantive due 

process claim was properly dismissed.

¶ 43 2. Equal Protection

¶ 44 We turn to plaintiff’s equal protection claim under the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiff 

contends that defendant targeted a single property owner in a dense corridor of similarly 

situated properties with an irrational ordinance that applied only to him. Plaintiff states that his 

property and all the other buildings along the Milwaukee-North-Damen corridor had been 

zoned at B3-2 or greater, none of the other properties were downzoned, and the downzoning 

was out of harmony and completely inconsistent with the existing zoning and uses of other 

buildings in the community. Plaintiff also contends that he can state an equal protection claim 

without identifying similarly situated individuals. According to plaintiff, defendant’s 

discriminatory intent is apparent from the pattern of retaliation against plaintiff for evicting 

Double Door. 

¶ 45 In one type of equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege that there are other similarly 

situated people who are being treated differently than him and that there is no rational basis for 

the difference. Whipple, 2017 IL App (3d) 150547, ¶ 38. Where there is no fundamental right 

or suspect class involved, the legislature—or city council in this case—may differentiate 

between people who are similarly situated if there is a rational basis for doing so. Jenkins v. 

Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 477 (1984). In another type of claim, an equal protection claim can be 

brought by a “class of one.” See Frederickson v. Landeros, 943 F.3d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 

2019) (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). The only form of 
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such a claim that is clearly established within the Seventh Circuit involves governmental actors 

who single out a citizen for differential treatment with no objective rational basis for that 

difference and because of a vindictive or harassing purpose. Id. at 1062. 

¶ 46 Regardless of its type, plaintiff’s equal protection claim fails for a similar reason as the due 

process claim: the complaint itself provides a rational basis for downzoning plaintiff’s 

building. Economic regulation passes the rational basis test “if there is any reasonably 

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the legislation.” Vigilante v. 

Village of Wilmette, 88 F. Supp. 2d 888, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2000). If the classification has some 

reasonable basis, it passes constitutional muster even though in practice it results in some 

inequality. Id. As noted above, plaintiff’s complaint listed some of the problems that were 

associated with Double Door. Plaintiff asserts in his brief that the concerns about noise, drugs, 

alcohol, and property damage would apply equally to other establishments along the 

Milwaukee-North-Damen corridor, but the complaint only describes the problems that were 

associated with Double Door. It is conceivable that defendant enacted the B2-2 zoning 

ordinance to prevent those problems from happening again in the same location. Further, that 

Alderman Moreno allegedly advocated for the zoning change out of revenge does not mean 

that the zoning committee and city council endorsed those motives. See Civil Liberties for 

Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir. 2003). The defendant in this 

case is the City of Chicago and not Alderman Moreno. Defendant had a rational basis for only 

changing the zoning classification of plaintiff’s building. The equal protection claim was 

properly dismissed.

¶ 47 3. Inverse Condemnation

¶ 48 Plaintiff next contends that the complaint stated an inverse condemnation claim under the 

Illinois Constitution. Plaintiff argues that the government may effect a taking or damaging of 

property when it deprives the owner of rental income needed to sustain himself and, moreover, 

the taking or damaging can occur through a formal ordinance or through preliminary activities. 

Plaintiff also asserts that he can recover without a total deprivation, noting that the B1-1 and 

RS-3 proposals dramatically decreased his property value and robbed him of all commercial 

rental income because tenants repeatedly refused to sign leases. Plaintiff further states that 

Alderman Moreno destroyed purchase agreements worth $9.6 million and $9.1 million 

respectively. According to plaintiff, the injuries were made permanent when the B2-2 zoning 

ordinance was passed because the ordinance assured that plaintiff would continue to lose 

$35,000 every month with a vacant commercial space that was zoned out of harmony with the 

surrounding community. Plaintiff states that eight months after the ordinance passed, he sold 

the building for nearly $1 million less than its previous fair market value.

¶ 49 Article I, section 15, of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property shall not 

be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided by law.” Ill. Const. 

1970, art. I, § 15. Inverse condemnation is a way for a property owner to recover just 

compensation for private property that was taken or damaged without a condemnation action 

having been instituted. City of Chicago v. ProLogis, 383 Ill. App. 3d 160, 165 (2008). 

¶ 50 The Illinois Constitution’s takings clause is broader than its federal counterpart because 

the Illinois Constitution provides a remedy for property that is damaged, in addition to property 

that is taken. Hampton v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, 2016 IL 119861, ¶ 31. 

“Damage” under the Illinois Constitution’s takings clause is:
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“ ‘[S]ome direct physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which [the 

plaintiff] enjoys in connection with his property, and which gives to it an additional 

value, and *** by reason of [which] he has sustained a special damage with respect to 

his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally.’ ” Equity Associates, 

Inc. v. Village of Northbrook, 171 Ill. App. 3d 115, 121-22 (1988) (quoting Rigney v. 

City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64, 81 (1881)).

If a plaintiff cannot show that the property was damaged, then the claim is analyzed under the 

same standard used under the federal constitution. Hampton, 2016 IL 119861, ¶ 16. Here, 

plaintiff has not explained how defendant’s actions caused a physical disturbance to his 

property. So, we will address plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim using the same standard 

used in federal cases.

¶ 51 Inverse condemnation claims, such as the one here, generally involve regulatory takings. 

Kaskaskia Land Co. v. Vandalia Levee & Drainage District, 2019 IL App (5th) 180403, ¶ 22. 

In some instances, government regulation of private property may be so onerous so as to 

constitute a direct appropriation or ouster that would be compensable. Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 

2d 435, 443 (2006) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005)). 

¶ 52 We first address plaintiff’s assertion that defendant’s activities before the B2-2 zoning 

ordinance was enacted were a taking. To review, as alleged in the complaint, these activities 

included Alderman Moreno’s proposals for B1-1 and RS-3 zoning. The B1-1 zoning 

amendment was introduced in April 2016 and later held in committee. The commercial space 

became vacant in February 2017, after Double Door was evicted. In May 2017, plaintiff 

entered into a contract with Buyer A to sell the building for $9.6 million. In June 2017, 

Alderman Moreno proposed the RS-3 zoning amendment. Two days later, Buyer A cancelled 

the contract after learning about the pending zoning amendment. The zoning committee later 

deferred the RS-3 proposal. In July 2017, plaintiff entered into a contract with Buyer B to sell 

the building for $9.1 million. Buyer B cancelled the contract in August 2017 due to the looming 

“downzoning scheme.” Plaintiff also stated that he was unable to secure a tenant because 

tenants refused to sign a lease unless the zoning classification remained at B3-2. In August 

2017, the B2-2 zoning ordinance was introduced, and the city council downzoned the property 

about two months later. 

¶ 53 The United States Supreme Court has found that good-faith planning activities are not a 

taking. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980); see Davis, 221 Ill. 2d at 444 

(mere plotting or planning in anticipation of a public improvement is not a taking). Plaintiff 

asserts that defendant and Alderman Moreno’s activities were done in bad faith, focusing on 

the B1-1 and RS-3 zoning proposals. However, plaintiff has failed to plead facts that show bad 

faith on behalf of the defendant in this case—the City of Chicago—in regards to the B1-1 and 

RS-3 zoning proposals. We decline to find that deferring the proposals, without more, 

constituted bad baith. 

¶ 54 Further, plaintiff’s back-and-forth with buyers and the fluctuations in the selling price do 

not indicate that a taking occurred. “Mere fluctuations in value during the process of 

governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership” and do 

not so burden an owner’s property so as to amount to a taking. (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9. Also, plaintiff asserts that Alderman Moreno and 

defendant targeted plaintiff over the course of two years, but the complaint indicates that their 

actions did not begin to affect plaintiff until the building became vacant in February 2017, after 
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which plaintiff was unable to find a tenant to lease the space at market rates for B3-2 zoning. 

Plaintiff does not allege that he could not lease the space to a tenant who did not require B3-2 

zoning or that he could not lease the space if he charged less than the $35,000 per month that 

he sought. Plaintiff alleged mere fluctuations in value that did not so burden his property as to 

constitute a taking.

¶ 55 In reaching this conclusion, we are not persuaded by plaintiff’s reliance on River Park, Inc. 

v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill. App. 3d 154 (1996). There, the defendant alleged that the 

municipality, while processing the plaintiffs’ zoning petition, “decided to acquire [the] 

property, directed its employees to stall [the] plaintiffs’ petitions, drove [the] plaintiffs into 

bankruptcy causing [the bank] to eventually foreclose, and then purchased the property at 

below-market value.” Id. at 170. The municipality in River Park, Inc. carried out a scheme to 

actually acquire the subject property. That is a far cry from what happened here, where plaintiff 

maintained control over the building.

¶ 56 We next consider whether the enacted B2-2 zoning ordinance was a taking. A regulatory 

taking will be found when a regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of 

land. Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017). Even where a 

regulation does not deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use, the regulation can 

still be a taking based on a complex set of factors, including (1) the economic impact of the 

regulation, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 

expectations, and (3) the character of the government action, such as whether it amounts to a 

physical invasion or just affects property interests through some public program adjusting the 

benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 

1943; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39 (citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 

438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). In large part, the inquiry turns upon “the magnitude of a regulation’s 

economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.” 

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.

¶ 57 Applying the factors here, plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the economic impact 

of the ordinance was sufficiently severe so as to be a taking. Plaintiff ultimately sold the 

building for $9.1 million. That figure is less than the $10 million that plaintiff estimated was 

the previous market value for the building and less than the $9.6 million that was agreed to 

with Buyer A. But a decrease in market value is not enough to state a claim. “ ‘Mere diminution 

in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.’ ” Home 

Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago, 213 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1029 (N.D. Ill. 

2016) (quoting Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension 

Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993)). Many regulations are not takings 

even when they prohibit the owner from making the most value-producing use of the property. 

Id. After the zoning change, plaintiff could have leased the vacant space to a tenant for whom 

B2-2 zoning was acceptable. See Tim Thompson, Inc. v. Village of Hinsdale, 247 Ill. App. 3d 

863, 887 (1993) (claim properly dismissed where the plaintiff failed to allege any substantial 

deprivation of an economically viable use, in that the plaintiff “remained free to develop the 

entire parcel subject only to the newly enacted ordinance”). Moreover, as discussed above, the 

B2-2 zoning ordinance was an attempt to mitigate the negative effects of having a concert 

venue in that location. “[A]s a matter of public policy, [g]overnment hardly could go on if to 

some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 

change in the general law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 889 (citing Lucas v. South 
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Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)). Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation 

claim was properly dismissed.

¶ 58 C. Claims Dismissed Under Section 2-619—Tort Immunity

¶ 59 Next, we turn to plaintiff’s tort claims, which were dismissed under section 2-619 of the 

Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016)): tortious interference with contracts, tortious 

interference with prospective economic advantage, and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. The circuit court found that defendant was immune from these claims under sections 

2-103 and 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-103, 2-201 (West 2016)). Here, 

plaintiff contends that those sections do not immunize conduct that occurred before the B2-2 

zoning ordinance was enacted.

¶ 60 A section 2-619 motion to dismiss disposes of issues of law and easily proved issues of 

fact at the outset of the litigation. Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367 

(2003). Section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code permits involuntary dismissal where “the claim 

asserted against [the] defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect 

of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016). “Affirmative matter” includes 

any defense other than a negation of the essential allegations of the plaintiff’s cause of action 

(Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115 (1993)) and can 

include immunity under the Tort Immunity Act (Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 367). In ruling on a 

section 2-619 motion to dismiss, a court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 367-68. We review a section 2-619 

dismissal de novo (American Service Insurance Co. v. City of Chicago, 404 Ill. App. 3d 769, 

776 (2010)) and may affirm on any basis supported by the record (BDO Seidman, LLP v. 

Harris, 379 Ill. App. 3d 918, 923 (2008)).

¶ 61 “The purpose of the Tort Immunity Act is to protect local public entities and public 

employees from liability arising from the operation of government.” Village of Bloomingdale 

v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (2001). Because immunity operates as an 

affirmative defense, the governmental entity has the burden of raising and proving its immunity 

under the Tort Immunity Act. Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 370. If no immunity provision applies, 

then the governmental entity is liable in tort to the same extent as private parties. Id. at 368-

69.

¶ 62 Three sections of the Tort Immunity Act are at issue: enactment immunity under section 2-

103, discretionary immunity under section 2-201, and the employer liability provision under 

section 2-109. Section 2-103 states, “A local public entity is not liable for an injury caused by 

adopting or failing to adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law.” 745 ILCS 10/2-

103 (West 2016). Section 2-201 states, “Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public 

employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of 

discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy 

when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.” Id. § 2-201. And, section 

2-109 states, “A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission 

of its employee where the employee is not liable.” Id. § 2-109.

¶ 63 Plaintiff contends that section 2-103 does not immunize defendant from the allegations 

related to the B1-1 and RS-3 zoning proposals because section 2-103 immunity only extends 

to the actual adoption of an ordinance, and those two proposals were not adopted. Plaintiff 

further argues that section 2-201 immunity does not apply to Alderman Moreno’s conduct 
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before the B2-2 zoning ordinance was enacted. Plaintiff states that defendant made no showing 

that Alderman Moreno either made a policy determination or exercised discretion when he 

arranged private meetings to convince buyers to back out of purchase contracts and when he 

physically confronted plaintiff to make a series of threats. Plaintiff also contends that the B1-

1 and RS-3 proposals were not policy determinations or judgment calls and served no objective 

purpose other than to injure a single person.

¶ 64 Defendant met its burden to prove that the conduct that occurred before the B2-2 zoning 

ordinance was enacted is immunized by section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act. Section 2-

103 would immunize defendant for the B2-2 zoning ordinance itself (id. § 2-103), but that 

ordinance is not the subject of plaintiff’s argument. Plaintiff’s tort claims focus on Alderman 

Moreno’s conduct, which is immunized under section 2-201. 

¶ 65 “Section 2-201 extends the most significant protection afforded to public employees under 

the [Tort Immunity] Act.” Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 370. To claim section 2-201 immunity, a 

defendant must prove that the employee held either a position involving the determination of 

policy or the exercise of discretion. Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL 122486, ¶ 29. The 

defendant must also establish that the act or omission giving rise to the injuries was both a 

determination of policy and an exercise of discretion. Id. Policy determinations are “decisions 

that require a governmental employee to balance competing interests and *** make a judgment 

call as to what solution will best serve each of those interests.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Brooks v. Daley, 2015 IL App (1st) 140392, ¶ 17. Discretionary acts “involve the 

exercise of personal deliberation and judgment in deciding whether to perform a particular act, 

or how and in what manner that act should be performed.” Id. Whether an act or omission is 

discretionary “escapes precise formulation and should be made on a case-by-case basis in light 

of the particular facts and circumstances.” Monson, 2018 IL 122486, ¶ 29. Immunity under 

section 2-201 is absolute and covers both negligent and willful and wanton conduct. Id. There 

is no exception for corrupt or malicious motives. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d at 495.

¶ 66 Plaintiff does not dispute that Alderman Moreno held a position involving the 

determination of policy or the exercise of discretion. Our analysis thus focuses on whether 

Alderman Moreno’s conduct leading up to the B2-2 zoning ordinance was both a determination 

of policy and an exercise of discretion. We must look primarily at Alderman Moreno’s conduct 

itself, rather than the intent behind it. Kevin’s Towing, Inc. v. Thomas, 351 Ill. App. 3d 540, 

548 (2004). And, Alderman Moreno’s actions were entirely consistent with the requirements 

for section 2-201 immunity. Alderman Moreno decided he wanted a certain tenant in a specific 

location in his ward, which required him to balance the interests of the community and the 

interests of a property owner. He further decided that mounting a pressure campaign would 

best serve those interests. Alderman Moreno chose particular tactics for achieving his desired 

goal, which included confronting plaintiff, meeting with prospective buyers, and introducing 

zoning proposals.

¶ 67 Plaintiff suggests that Alderman Moreno’s motives and the way he acted on his policy 

choices preclude immunity. But that Alderman Moreno may have acted corruptly or 

maliciously does not change the result. See id. at 549 (mayor’s conduct was immunized under 

section 2-201 even if the mayor acted out of retaliation and intent to harm). Section 2-201’s 

plain language provides that immunity is available even if the employee abuses his discretion. 

745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2016). That Alderman Moreno may have acted corruptly or 

maliciously does not preclude section 2-201 immunity here. 
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¶ 68 Plaintiff also contends that section 2-201 cannot apply to Alderman Moreno’s actions 

because defendant denies that his actions reflect the zoning policy of the City of Chicago. 

According to plaintiff, it is consistent for Alderman Moreno to be a policymaker for the 

purpose of tort immunity but not for other claims. In support, plaintiff cites Valentino v. Village 

of South Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009), where an issue was whether a mayor 

was a policymaker for holding a village liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services 

of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The court criticized the defendants for denying 

that the mayor was a policymaker for Monell liability but arguing that he made a policy 

decision for the purposes of the Tort Immunity Act. Valentino, 575 F.3d at 679. Here, there is 

no such logical inconsistency. Defendant has nowhere denied that Alderman Moreno held a 

position involving the determination of policy. Alderman Moreno’s position was not disputed 

in plaintiff’s constitutional claims. But for both plaintiff’s constitutional claims and tort 

immunity, Alderman Moreno’s personal motives as someone who determines policy are not 

part of the analysis. See Drury, 2018 IL App (1st) 173042, ¶ 99 (“[t]he only question, at 

bottom, is whether the ordinance is rationally related to the public welfare, regardless of who 

or how many people wanted it”); CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d at 495 (no exception to 

section 2-201 immunity for corrupt or malicious motives). Alderman Moreno’s personal 

motives, malicious though they may have been, do not preclude immunity under section 2-

201. Under section 2-109, because Alderman Moreno is not liable for injuries resulting from 

his conduct, defendant is also not liable. 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 2016).

¶ 69 We need not reach defendant’s argument that tort immunity also applies to plaintiff’s 

constitutional claims because we have affirmed the dismissal of those claims on other grounds, 

as discussed above. Defendant met its burden of proving that it is immune under sections 2-

201 and 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act. Plaintiff’s tort claims were properly dismissed.

¶ 70 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 71 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 72 Affirmed.