MILITARY HOUSING

Information on the 

Privatization of 

Unaccompanied 

Personnel Housing

Report to the Subcommittee on 

Readiness, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

March 2014

GAO-14-313

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-313, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of Representatives 

March 2014 

MILITARY HOUSING

Information on the Privatization of Unaccompanied 

Personnel Housing 

Why GAO Did This Study

Partly in response to concerns that 

inadequate housing might be 

contributing to servicemembers’ 

decisions to leave the military, 

Congress enacted the MHPI in 1996. 

The initiative gave the Department of 

Defense (DOD) legal authorities to 

replace or renovate inadequate 

housing for unaccompanied military 

personnel (those without dependents)

and military families using privatesector financing, ownership, operation, 

and maintenance. Certain military 

personnel receive the BAH, which can 

be used to pay rent to live in privatized 

housing. Since 1996, DOD has built 

and modernized on-installation 

unaccompanied personnel housing

using military construction funds. 

According to a February 2013 DOD 

report to Congress, from fiscal years 

1996 through 2012, DOD spent over 

$20 billion of military construction 

funds to build and modernize oninstallation housing for unaccompanied 

military personnel. 

GAO was asked to review DOD’s 

efforts to privatize unaccompanied 

housing. GAO discusses the (1) 

analyses the military services 

conducted to make decisions about 

privatizing housing for unaccompanied 

personnel and (2) status of housing 

projects the military services have 

privatized for unaccompanied 

personnel. GAO obtained and 

reviewed fiscal years 1996-2013 

housing plans and analyses the 

services conducted, reviewed 

information on privatization projects, 

and interviewed DOD and service

officials.

GAO is not making recommendations 

in this report.

What GAO Found

Since Congress enacted the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) in 

1996, the military services conducted several analyses and considered other 

factors to determine whether to privatize housing for unaccompanied personnel. 

These analyses were conducted between 1997 and 2011. The Army’s and the 

Navy’s analyses compared different scenarios—such as whether to rely on 

privatization or use traditional military construction funding to improve housing 

quality—and considered information from multiple installations in these analyses. 

In contrast, the Air Force and Marine Corps analyzed the feasibility of privatizing 

unaccompanied housing at a few selected installations. For example, the Air 

Force based its initial analysis on information for two locations, while the Marine 

Corps based its 2008 analysis on information specific to one installation. The 

Navy and Army concluded that privatization could be used under a narrow set of 

circumstances at specific installations, such as where unaccompanied 

servicemembers were already receiving the basic allowance for housing (BAH). 

The Air Force and Marine Corps concluded that privatization was not suitable for 

meeting any of their housing needs. For example, an April 2000 Air Force 

memorandum indicated that privatization could have a negative effect on building 

unit cohesion. Other factors also played a role in the four services’ decisions 

about whether to privatize housing, including (1) the limited availability of the 

BAH for junior unaccompanied personnel, which may result in not having a 

dedicated stream of income to pay rent for privatized housing; (2) the frequency 

or duration of unit deployments, which could affect the occupancy rates of 

unaccompanied housing; and (3) uncertainty about the future size of the military, 

and whether there would be sufficient demand for privatized housing. 

Between 1996 and 2013, the Army and Navy implemented seven privatized 

unaccompanied personnel housing projects. The Air Force and Marine Corps 

have not used the privatization authorities, and are instead using military 

construction funds to improve the quality of their unaccompanied personnel 

housing. Air Force housing officials told us that Air Force unaccompanied 

personnel housing inventory generally meets current housing needs. According 

to Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps intends to eliminate existing housing 

deficiencies by demolishing inadequate unaccompanied personnel housing and 

using military construction funds to replace or renovate housing by the end of 

fiscal year 2014. According to Office of the Secretary of Defense and military 

service housing officials, none of the services have plans to pursue any future 

privatized housing projects for unaccompanied personnel.

View GAO-14-313. For more information, 

contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or 

curriec@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Letter 1 

Background 3

Each of the Services Conducted Analyses and Considered Other 

Factors in Determining Whether to Privatize Housing for 

Unaccompanied Personnel 7

Status of Military Services’ Projects to Privatize Housing for 

Unaccompanied Personnel 13

Agency Comments 21

Appendix I GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 22

Related GAO Products 23

Tables

Table 1: Junior Unaccompanied Personnel Required to Live in 

Government-Owned Housing in the United States, as of 

February 2013 4

Table 2: Status of the Army’s Five Projects to Privatize Housing 

for Unaccompanied Personnel 15

Table 3: Status of the Navy’s Two Projects to Privatize Housing 

for Junior and Mid-Level Unaccompanied Personnel 18

Figure

Figure 1: Bedroom in New Unaccompanied Housing Project at 

San Diego 20

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Abbreviations

BAH basic allowance for housing

DOD Department of Defense

MHPI Military Housing Privatization Initiative

OMB Office of Management and Budget

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Page 1 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 18, 2014

The Honorable Rob Wittman

Chairman

The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

In the mid-1990s, the Department of Defense (DOD) became concerned 

that inadequate housing was contributing to servicemembers’ decisions to 

leave the military. As part of its efforts to improve the quality of military 

housing, DOD requested certain authorities from Congress that would 

allow the department to use the private sector’s investment capital and 

housing construction and operations expertise so that the department 

could replace or renovate inadequate housing. According to DOD 

officials, privatization could be a faster method to improve the condition of 

military-owned housing compared with constructing government-owned 

housing using traditional military construction funding. In 1996, Congress 

enacted the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI), which gave 

the military services the authorities to privatize housing for 

unaccompanied military personnel (those without dependents) and 

military families in the United States.1

Certain military personnel receive a basic allowance for housing (BAH), 

which, when the servicemembers choose to live in privatized housing, is 

typically used to pay rent to privatized housing project companies, which 

are operated and managed by developers. The BAH is a cash allowance 

paid from DOD’s military personnel appropriation account to cover the 

typical monthly costs of rent, utilities, and renter’s insurance. Personnel 

These authorities allow for privatesector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military 

housing. Under the initiative, DOD can invest in the privatization efforts 

and provide direct loans, loan guarantees, and other incentives to 

encourage private-sector developers to construct and operate housing 

either on or off military installations.

 

1

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §§ 2801-

2841 (1996) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2871, et seq.).
 

Page 2 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

eligible for the housing allowance typically are not required to live in any 

particular location; they can elect to live at their military service’s 

privatized housing project (if one exists on or off the installation) or to live 

elsewhere.

You requested that we review DOD’s efforts to privatize housing for 

unaccompanied personnel. Specifically, we discuss the (1) analyses that

the military services conducted to make decisions about privatizing 

housing for unaccompanied personnel and (2) status of housing projects 

that the military services have privatized for unaccompanied personnel.

To address these objectives, we focused on privatized unaccompanied 

housing projects that were constructed, renovated, and operated entirely 

or partially with private capital between fiscal years 1996 (when Congress 

enacted the MHPI) and 2013. We reviewed the statutory authority for the 

MHPI and reviewed DOD- and service-level guidance implementing the 

initiative. Specifically, we reviewed the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense’s program evaluation plans and, for the military services with 

privatized housing projects, information about their unaccompanied 

housing master plans. We also reviewed but did not evaluate analyses 

that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps documented to support 

their respective housing privatization decisions. We did not evaluate 

these analyses because DOD and service officials told us that they had 

no plans to pursue any additional unaccompanied privatized housing 

projects. Further, in cases where they did privatize, all projects are 

complete except for two. To corroborate our understanding of these 

analyses, we interviewed officials in the Facilities Investment and 

Management Directorate and Facility Energy and Privatization Directorate 

of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 

Environment) responsible for overseeing housing privatization, as well as 

officials in associated offices in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps.

For each of the seven existing privatized housing projects for 

unaccompanied personnel, we reviewed information such as the location, 

target population, number of beds, occupancy rates, and financial 

information such as projected revenues, expenses, and net operating 

income. To assess the reliability of these data, we discussed with the 

military services and officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

the process for collecting the data, and the steps they took to ensure that 

the data were accurate. We determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this audit. We conducted site visits to four of 

the seven Army and Navy unaccompanied privatized housing projects. 
 

Page 3 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Specifically, we visited projects in high- and low-population density areas. 

During these visits, we interviewed installation housing officials to 

determine the status of privatized housing projects for unaccompanied 

personnel and to identify any issues related to specific projects. In 

addition, we interviewed commanding officers as well as junior and senior 

enlisted unaccompanied personnel to obtain their perspectives on 

privatized unaccompanied housing. At each location we visited, we toured 

both privatized and government-owned housing for unaccompanied 

personnel. We also interviewed the private-sector developers responsible 

for the privatized projects we visited to get their views on the financial 

status of existing and any future projects. The information gathered from 

our site visits is not generalizable to all privatized unaccompanied 

personnel housing projects.

We conducted this work from April 2013 to March 2014 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.

Unaccompanied personnel who are not assigned to government-owned 

housing, or are above certain pay grades, are authorized to receive the 

BAH, and the amount of the allowance is based on factors that include a 

servicemember’s pay grade, dependency status, and geographic location. 

Additionally, each service determines pay grades at which personnel are 

no longer assigned to government-owned housing. Junior 

unaccompanied personnel are generally required to live in governmentowned unaccompanied housing on their installation, commonly referred to 

as barracks (Army and Navy), dormitories (Air Force), or bachelor 

enlisted quarters (Marine Corps), and may be eligible for the housing 

allowance only if on-installation, government-owned housing is not 

available.

In table 1, we list the pay-grade thresholds each military service has 

established for junior unaccompanied personnel permanently assigned to 

installations in the United States and required to live in governmentowned housing.

Background

Basic Allowance for 

Housing (BAH)
 

Page 4 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Table 1: Junior Unaccompanied Personnel Required to Live in Government-Owned 

Housing in the United States, as of February 2013

Service Pay grade

Army E-1 (Private) to E-5 (Sergeant)

Navy E-1 (Seaman Recruit) to E-3 (Seaman), and E-4 (Petty Officer Third 

Class) with fewer than 4 years of service. However, depending on 

availability of unaccompanied housing on an installation, E-4s with more 

than 4 years of service may also be required to live in unaccompanied 

housing. 

Air Force E-1 (Airman Basic) to E-3 (Airman First Class), and E-4 (Senior Airman) 

with fewer than 3 years of service

Marine Corps E-1 (Private) to E-5 (Sergeant)

Source: Department of Defense (DOD).

In 1995, DOD adopted a new construction standard that called for more 

space and increased privacy in new government-owned housing for 

servicemembers permanently assigned to an installation. The new 

standard, which was modified in 2007, provided each junior 

unaccompanied servicemember with a private sleeping room and a 

kitchenette and bath shared by one other member. DOD justified the 

adoption of the new standard primarily as an investment in quality of life 

aimed at improving military readiness and retention. All the military 

services except the Marine Corps accepted the new standard, and 

developed various initiatives to implement it, as discussed below. The 

Marine Corps believed that the new standard did not allow for the unit 

cohesion and team building needed to reinforce Marine Corps values and 

develop a stronger bond among junior Marines. Therefore, the Marine 

Corps obtained a permanent waiver from the Secretary of the Navy to use 

a different design standard—one sleeping room and bath shared by two 

junior Marines. According to a February 2013 DOD report to Congress on 

government-owned housing for unaccompanied personnel, from fiscal 

years 1996 through 2012, DOD spent over $20 billion of military 

construction funds to build and modernize on-installation housing for 

unaccompanied personnel.2

 

2

Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics, Report to Congress on Government-Owned Unaccompanied 

Housing (Washington, D.C.: February 2013).

DOD Efforts to Improve 

Quality of Housing for 

Unaccompanied 

Personnel
 

Page 5 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

• Army: Between fiscal years 1996 and 2012, the Army spent over $12 

billion of military construction funds on its barracks modernization

program to modernize housing for all Army unaccompanied personnel 

permanently assigned to an installation. The renovated facilities meet 

the current DOD standard configuration, and each module includes 

two bedrooms, one bathroom, a cooking area, and appliances. The 

housing complex also includes laundry facilities. 

• Navy: The Navy spent about $2.5 billion of military construction funds 

between fiscal years 1996 and 2012 on improving the condition of its 

housing for unaccompanied personnel. A key component of the 

Navy’s modernization program for unaccompanied housing is the 

Homeport Ashore program, which was created to improve the quality 

of life among ship-based junior sailors by moving them off ships and 

into unaccompanied housing on shore while their ships were docked 

in their homeport. The Navy expects to complete this initiative by 

fiscal year 2016 utilizing both privatization and military construction 

authorities. However, the BAH statute (37 U.S.C. § 403(f)) prohibits E1 to E-3’s without dependents on sea duty from receiving the BAH, 

and privatized housing projects are not generally feasible unless 

military members are receiving a housing allowance. Congress, in the 

Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 

amended the housing privatization authorities by adding a new 

section (10 U.S.C. § 2881a) that authorized the Navy to carry out up 

to three pilot unaccompanied housing privatization projects in which 

junior enlisted members without dependents could be authorized 

higher rates of partial BAH to pay their rent.3

• Air Force: The Air Force spent almost $3 billion of military construction 

funds from fiscal years 1996 to 2012 on modernizing its dormitories 

for unaccompanied personnel. Air Force housing officials told us that 

the service has adequate housing for all its airmen. The Air Force also 

implemented a policy in 1996 whereby each unaccompanied airman 

Per 37 U.S.C § 403(n), 

partial BAH is a payment at a rate determined by the Secretary of 

Defense based on a specified historical rate (typically around $8 per 

month, as of 2011) paid to members not authorized to receive BAH, 

such as those assigned to live aboard ships or in government 

quarters. The 10 U.S.C. §2881a authority expired on September 30, 

2009, and the Navy executed two of the three authorized projects 

prior to the expiration of the authority.

 

3

Section 2881a of Title 10 of the United States Code authorizes the payment of higher 

rates of partial BAH for members occupying housing acquired under this pilot authority, 

subject to Secretary of Defense approval. 
 

Page 6 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

permanently assigned to an installation is assigned to a private 

bedroom. In 2006, the Air Force started requiring that its dorms be 

built or renovated according to a four-bedroom module design, called 

Dorms-4-Airmen, specifically for unaccompanied personnel in the pay 

grades from E-1 to E-3 and E-4 with less than 3 years of service. The 

design was based on Air Force criteria, detailed analysis of squarefootage requirements and constraints, and prototype development. It 

was designed to achieve the goal of providing privacy while boosting 

social interaction.

• Marine Corps: The Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the 

Bachelor Enlisted Quarters campaign plan in 2006. The goals of the 

plan were to eliminate existing space deficiencies, demolish 

inadequate housing, and achieve the new standard of one sleeping 

room and bath shared by two junior Marines by fiscal year 2014. From 

fiscal years 1996 to 2012, the Marine Corps spent about $3.5 billion of 

military construction funds to replace and renovate its housing for 

unaccompanied personnel.

In June 1997, DOD and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

agreed to a set of guidelines4 that would be used as a frame of reference 

for scoring privatization projects.5

 

4

These guidelines were updated in 2005. Office of Management and Budget, Guidance on 

Use of Limited Liability Partnerships in Military Housing, Memorandum (Aug. 2, 2005).

The implications of scoring depend on 

which MHPI authority will be used. For example, the guidelines state that 

if a project provides an occupancy guarantee, then funds for the project 

must be available and obligated “up front” at the time the government 

makes the commitment of resources. In other words, if a project provides 

an occupancy guarantee, then the net present value of the guarantee—

the cumulative value of the rents to be paid for the housing over the entire 

contract term—must be obligated at the beginning of the project.

According to Army and Navy officials, none of the privatized projects for 

housing unaccompanied personnel discussed in this report include an 

occupancy guarantee. 

5

Each privatization project that DOD enters into must be scored for budget purposes. 

Scoring seeks to determine the cost that should be recognized and recorded as a DOD 

obligation at the time the project agreements are finalized. OMB Circular A-11 provides 

guidelines on how future obligations should be treated for budget purposes. The 

guidelines are designed to ensure that the budget records the full amount of the 

government’s commitments when a commitment is made.

Budget Treatment of 

Privatization Projects
 

Page 7 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

From 1997 to 2011, the services conducted several analyses of the costs 

and suitability of privatization as a financing method for their housing 

needs for unaccompanied personnel. Using different methods, such as 

business-case and life-cycle cost analyses, and using different 

assumptions about how repairs and upkeep for housing would be funded, 

the services reached different conclusions about the potential for cost 

savings from using either privatization or the traditional governmentfunded military construction approach. The Army concluded that 

privatization is feasible but more costly in most cases, while the Navy 

found that privatization is feasible in certain locations. The Air Force and 

Marine Corps concluded that privatization was not desirable for housing 

their unaccompanied personnel.

The Army conducted three sets of analyses to determine whether to 

privatize housing for unaccompanied personnel. These analyses used 

different scenarios and data gathered from multiple locations. The Army 

documented the analytical processes used, and communicated its 

conclusions to service leadership. In 2004, the Army formed a task force 

to assess the feasibility and desirability of privatization of unaccompanied 

personnel housing. Task-force members conducted the study over 6 

months, visiting six sites, including Fort Detrick, Maryland; Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri; Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Stewart, Georgia; Fort 

Hood, Texas; and the Presidio of Monterey, California. There appeared to 

be no consistent criteria applied for site selection in the task-force study in 

that the reasons for selection differed in each case. For example, Fort 

Lewis was selected in part because of command interest, and Fort 

Leonard Wood was selected because it is a training installation that 

represents the consolidation of training missions at a larger site. Study 

authors also considered 18 scenarios, 5 of which were Army-wide. These 

scenarios involved different assumptions about the number and pay 

grades of unaccompanied personnel housed on and off installations, as 

well as the amount of money spent by the Army to construct and sustain 

new facilities. The study concluded that privatization of housing for 

unaccompanied personnel was financially feasible at selected 

installations, such as Fort Stewart and Fort Hood, in part because a 

majority of senior enlisted personnel there were already receiving the 

BAH and living off the installation; however, all members of the leadership 

task force responsible for the study could not reach consensus on the 

study’s findings. For example, the study authors suggested that soldiers 

should not be mandatorily assigned to privatized housing. OMB scoring 

rules require that mandatory assignment be treated as an occupancy 

guarantee, which would have the effect of committing the government to 

Each of the Services 

Conducted Analyses 

and Considered 

Other Factors in 

Determining Whether 

to Privatize Housing 

for Unaccompanied 

Personnel

The Army and Navy 

Compared Different 

Scenarios from

Installations Service-Wide
 

Page 8 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

a large long-term expenditure. However, other members of the task force 

questioned whether mandatory assignment might be necessary to 

support the building of cohesive units, which is fostered by working and 

living together as a team.

The Army completed an additional analysis of privatization in response to 

a 2009 congressional inquiry. The Army prepared a report that focused 

on the privatization of housing for junior unaccompanied personnel. The 

analysis included a review of privatization’s effect on costs, soldiers’ 

quality of life, and the Army’s traditions and culture. The study was 

conducted over a 3-month period and included modeling scenarios at Fort 

Polk, Louisiana; Fort Irwin, California; and Fort Meade, Maryland, and 

one U.S.-wide extrapolation. The three locations were chosen because 

their barracks needed renovations and local commanders and privatesector developers supported privatization. The analysis concluded that 

privatization was feasible, but the cost to privatize barracks would be 

higher than what the Army was currently spending on barracks 

construction and sustainment.6

The Army also conducted a series of due diligence studies at Fort 

Benning, Georgia; Fort Irwin, California; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri; Fort Meade, Maryland; and Fort Polk, 

Louisiana, in April and May 2010.7

 

6

“Sustainment” is the term used to refer to actions that are recurring and scheduled over 

the life of a facility so that it maintains function. 

The purpose of these studies was, 

among other things, to assist the Army in determining the feasibility of 

implementing barracks privatization pilot projects. In July and August 

2010, the results of the studies were condensed into business-case 

analyses to show the potential costs or savings the Army would 

experience at each of the six sites if barracks privatization projects were 

executed. According to the Army report, the bottom-line finding of the 

analyses was that such projects would result in a significant net cost to 

the Army if executed, because the Army was not funding all barracks 

requirements at 100 percent. The report further stated that the Army’s 

expected BAH payments would be greater than the actual barracks 

funding that was currently taking place. Fort Meade was the only 

7

Department of the Army, Unaccompanied Personnel Housing (UPH) Barracks 

Privatization Initiative (BPI): Due Diligences & Summary Business Case Analyses at Forts 

Benning, Irwin, Knox, Leonard Wood, Meade & Polk (August 2010). 
 

Page 9 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

exception of the six sites because less than 50 percent of the junior 

servicemembers were Army, but the Army was funding all barracks for all 

the services. The report concluded that the Army’s expected BAH 

payments at Fort Meade would be less than the current Army Military 

Construction, Operation and Maintenance, and Sustainment, Restoration 

and Modernization funding.

Like the Army, the Navy developed analyses that considered multiple 

scenarios. In 2009, the Navy conducted a business-case analysis using 

three scenarios and data collected from site visits at San Diego, 

California; and Norfolk, Virginia; which were the only Navy locations with 

privatized projects for unaccompanied housing. The service used both 

quantitative and qualitative data, drawing on the pro forma financial 

statements8

In 2011, 2 years after the initial analysis, the Navy reviewed the issue of 

the privatization of housing for unaccompanied personnel again and 

reached similar conclusions. The Navy study found that privatization 

requires lower operating costs than housing funded through annual 

appropriations requested through the military construction budgeting 

process and sustained at the required levels of operation and 

maintenance. However, the study noted that privatization of housing for 

and requests for proposals from the San Diego and Norfolk 

privatization projects, military construction budget, and BAH data from 

multiple years, as well as interviews with personnel across the Navy. The 

study compared three alternative scenarios with a baseline scenario. One 

of the scenarios involved privatization, another featured construction with 

military construction funds, and the third assumed the community 

provided the majority of the housing needs. Under the baseline scenario, 

the assumptions were that the Navy would own and operate all housing 

for unaccompanied personnel, and would underfund building 

maintenance and support. Briefings to leadership documented the 

analytical process and summarized the results of the study. The Navy 

analysis concluded that privatization of housing for unaccompanied 

personnel would be more cost-effective for housing junior sailors based 

on their receiving a higher partial rate of BAH (versus the full BAH rate), 

rather than building new quarters using traditional military construction 

funding.

 

8

Pro formas are hypothetical financial statements or balance sheets based on financial 

assumptions or projections about a business’s expected performance. 
 

Page 10 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

unaccompanied personnel is only viable at select locations, such as 

where there is a stable population and a need to provide sailors with 

housing ashore when their ship is in its homeport. In such areas, enough 

population might exist to sustain the necessary level of occupancy in 

unaccompanied housing while sailors are at sea.

The Air Force and Marine Corps analyses of whether to privatize 

unaccompanied personnel housing reviewed privatization at a few 

selected locations. The Air Force developed three analyses reviewing 

privatization over a 5-year period beginning in 1997. Air Force officials 

documented the analytical processes used through reports and 

memorandums and communicated the conclusions to service leadership 

in briefings. The first effort, the Dormitory Privatization Feasibility Study, 

lasted for 5 months and included site visits to two bases where data were 

collected for a feasibility analysis. The Air Force selected the two 

locations—Dover Air Force Base, Delaware; and Tinker Air Force Base, 

Oklahoma—from eight candidate bases nominated by the major 

commands, in part because both bases had housing shortages. Tinker 

had the largest housing shortage of the eight candidate bases with 59 

percent of the total demand for unaccompanied housing unmet, 

compared with 12 percent at Dover, and both had rooms that would 

require future renovation or replacement. Based on post-site-visit financial 

analyses, the study authors found that privatization would be less 

expensive than traditional military construction at Tinker but not at Dover. 

A 51-year life-cycle cost comparison conducted in 1997, provided to us by 

Air Force officials, showed the cost of privatization at Tinker to be $163.7 

million, compared with the military construction cost of $205.7 million. For 

Dover, the analysis showed a cost of $110.5 million for a traditional 

military construction approach compared with $132.5 million for 

privatization. The study authors concluded that privatization was more 

suitable for installations with a slow local economy, high installation and 

local support for privatization, degraded existing facilities, and a large 

unaccompanied housing shortage—conditions that existed at Tinker. 

Further, the study concluded that since privatization of housing for 

unaccompanied personnel was suitable only for certain locations, it could 

be used only to augment traditional military construction funding, not to 

replace it.

Later, in 1997, the Air Force organized an exercise to discuss whether to 

use privatization as a tool to construct dormitories. The team conducting 

the exercise was composed of more than a dozen Air Force headquarters 

housing and installation officials. The team discussed the results of the 

The Air Force and Marine 

Corps Analyzed the 

Feasibility of Privatizing 

Housing for 

Unaccompanied 

Personnel at Selected 

Installations
 

Page 11 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Dormitory Privatization Feasibility Study, as well as other factors such as 

the effects of utilities, leasing, and mandatory assignment of personnel to 

privatized housing on OMB scoring, and leadership control over housing 

residents’ activities. The team recommended that the Air Force not 

pursue privatization to construct dormitories, primarily because the team 

found that privatization was not a cost effective alternative to using 

military construction funding for building dormitories. In 2002, 5 years 

later, another team composed of new members from all levels of the Air 

Force met to establish a baseline for an Air Force dormitory privatization 

program. This team also identified a number of issues, such as unit 

integrity, the scale of necessary government commitment of funds, 

enforcing discipline among tenants, and conducting inspections in a 

building that was not solely government-owned, that would make 

privatization projects unfeasible unless they were resolved. In an April 

2000 memorandum, the Air Force Chief of Staff argued against privatizing 

unaccompanied personnel housing. The official indicated that residing in 

on-base dormitories ensures that junior enlisted personnel acclimate to 

the Air Force, build esprit de corps with members of their unit, and have 

access to base services such as medical, fitness, recreation, commissary, 

and exchange facilities. Ultimately, according to Air Force officials, the Air 

Force decided that military construction would meet their needs for 

housing and decided against using privatization.

In 2008, the Marine Corps completed a feasibility analysis to decide 

whether to privatize housing for unaccompanied personnel at a single 

location—Camp Pendleton, California—as it lacked sufficient high-quality 

housing for unaccompanied personnel. The service documented this 

analysis in a briefing submitted to Marine Corps leadership and a 

memorandum prepared the following year. The feasibility analysis 

included an examination of the cash contributions required from the Navy, 

a participation test for the 336-bed project, and a life-cycle cost analysis. 

The feasibility analysis concluded that privatization of housing for 

unaccompanied personnel would be 55 percent more expensive than 

building new quarters using military construction funds. A 2009 Marine 

Corps summary on the subject of bachelor housing privatization noted 

that Marines are assigned to barracks with others from their unit, which 

promotes unit integrity and unit cohesion. However, the direct or 

mandatory assignment of servicemembers to privatized housing could be 

viewed as providing an occupancy guarantee to the developer, which 

under the OMB guidelines would require that the full value of the 

guarantee must be available and obligated “up front” at the time the 

government makes the commitment of resources. In interviews, Marine 

Corps officials stated that privatized housing is incompatible with Marine 
 

Page 12 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Corps culture because Marines do not deploy as individuals; they deploy 

as units. Moreover, E-1 to E-3 Marines, like E-1 to E-3 sailors on sea 

duty, are assigned to shared rooms. This configuration is an important 

element of the Marine Corps’ philosophy and goal of fostering team 

building, companionship, camaraderie, and unit cohesion, according to 

the 2010 report by the LMI company on unaccompanied personnel 

housing for junior enlisted members, which was commissioned by DOD to 

provide a comprehensive view of housing programs for unaccompanied 

personnel across the services.9 The Marine Corps conducted no 

additional analyses of privatization for unaccompanied personnel. Starting 

in 2008, the Marine Corps undertook a $2.8 billion military construction 

initiative to build new barracks over a 6-year period from fiscal year 2008 

through fiscal year 2014. According to Marine Corps officials, the Marine 

Corps decided that military construction would meet its needs for housing 

and decided against using privatization.

In addition to the three issues of OMB scoring, the life-cycle cost of 

government construction and operation of housing versus that of 

privatized construction and operation of housing, and unit integrity, the 

services’ analyses and our interviews with service officials identified three 

other factors that influenced the services’ decisions about whether to 

privatize housing for unaccompanied personnel:

• BAH: Most junior unaccompanied personnel without dependents are 

not eligible to receive a housing allowance (and, in the case of junior 

shipboard sailors, are not entitled by law to receive a BAH). Without 

the assurance of a steady stream of income from the BAH, which 

junior unaccompanied personnel could use to pay rent for privatized 

housing, private-sector developers would likely be unwilling to 

participate in privatized housing projects, the Army’s 2005 

Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Privatization Task Force Study 

concluded. In interviews and in some analyses, such as the Army’s 

task-force study report, the services expressed reluctance to assume 

any additional costs, particularly a cost relating to personnel since 

such obligations to pay costs in the future must typically be funded at 

the time the obligation is made. In the Army’s privatization task-force 

report, the Army’s resource-management officials noted that even just 

 

9

LMI, Unaccompanied Personnel Housing for Junior Enlisted Members, HCS80T1 (May 

2010).

Other Factors Influenced 

the Services’ Decisions 

Regarding Privatizing 

Housing for 

Unaccompanied 

Personnel
 

Page 13 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

a few pilot privatization projects could lock the Army into a 50-year 

BAH bill that must be funded, because the leases for privatization 

projects generally run for 50 years.

• The frequency or duration of unit deployments: With privatized family 

housing, the frequency of deployments of the servicemember 

generally does not affect the rent received because the 

servicemember’s family remains behind and maintains the leased 

property. However, unaccompanied personnel living in privatized 

housing do not receive the BAH when they are deployed, if they do 

not have a lease. Therefore, frequent or prolonged deployments can 

reduce the occupancy rates of privatized housing. Occupancy rates 

are a key indicator of a housing project’s financial viability.

• The uncertainty about the future size of the force: According to a 2012 

DOD budget-priorities document, the department plans to reduce the 

size of the active Army from a post-9/11 peak of about 570,000 in 

fiscal year 2010 to 490,000 by fiscal year 2017, and the active Marine 

Corps from a peak of about 202,000 in fiscal year 2010 to 182,000 by 

fiscal year 2017.10 None of the services’ analyses discussed the 

current uncertainty about the future size of the force, partly because 

most of them were written before the current force-structure 

reductions were announced. These reductions may eliminate current 

housing deficits and create a disincentive for private-sector 

developers to participate in privatization projects.

Between 1996 and 2013, the Army and the Navy implemented seven 

privatized unaccompanied personnel housing projects. As stated 

previously in this report, both the Army and Navy have also used military 

construction funding to upgrade and renovate their housing for 

unaccompanied personnel The Air Force and the Marine Corps have not 

used the privatization authorities, and are instead using military 

construction funds to improve the quality of their unaccompanied 

personnel housing. Air Force housing officials told us that the Air Force 

unaccompanied personnel housing inventory generally meets current 

housing needs. According to Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps 

intends to eliminate existing housing deficiencies by demolishing 

inadequate unaccompanied personnel housing, and using military 

construction funds to replace or renovate such housing by the end of 

fiscal year 2014. According to Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

 

10Department of Defense, Defense Budget and Priorities (Washington, D.C.: January 

2012).

Status of Military 

Services’ Projects to 

Privatize Housing for 

Unaccompanied 

Personnel
 

Page 14 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

military-service housing officials, none of the services have plans to 

pursue any future privatized housing projects for unaccompanied 

personnel.

The Army has projects to privatize housing for unaccompanied personnel 

at five locations. Four of these projects are at Fort Irwin, California; Fort 

Drum, New York; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Fort Stewart, Georgia. 

At each of these locations, sufficient adequate and affordable housing 

was not available off the installation. These projects were intended to 

house unaccompanied personnel at pay grades E-6/Staff Sergeant and 

above, who are eligible to receive the BAH. In 2012, the Army made a 

decision to implement a fifth privatization project at Fort Meade, 

Maryland, for unaccompanied personnel E-5/Sergeant and below.11

These junior unaccompanied personnel currently receive the BAH and 

are living off the installation because Fort Meade does not have enough 

housing for unaccompanied personnel on-site. The initial development 

cost for the Army projects was about $219 million, all of which was 

incurred by the privatized housing project companies.12 The development 

costs generally included the costs of construction and project financing. 

The Army’s investment in the projects was in the form of land leased to 

the privatized housing project companies to serve as the sites for the 

projects. Table 2 summarizes the status of the Army’s five projects to 

privatize housing for unaccompanied personnel.

 

11The Fort Meade project is not specific to Army junior enlisted unaccompanied personnel 

(E-1 /Private to E-5/Sergeant). It includes all DOD junior enlisted personnel permanently 

assigned to Fort Meade.

12The privatized housing project companies are entities that include both the privatesector developers and the Army. 

The Army Has Five 

Projects to Privatize 

Housing for 

Unaccompanied 

Personnel
 

Page 15 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Table 2: Status of the Army’s Five Projects to Privatize Housing for Unaccompanied Personnel

Status 

Average occupancy rate, calendar years 

2009-2013 (%)b

Installation

Date first 

apartment 

opened

Number of 

apartments

Number of 

bedroomsa Targeted residents 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Fort Irwin, CA September 2008 200 200 E-5/ Sergeant 

and above

96 98 86 97 99

Fort Drum, 

NY

February 2009 192 320 E-6/Staff 

Sergeant and 

above

66 93 99 99 88

Fort Bragg, 

NCc February 2009 312 504 E-6/Staff Sergeant and 

above

73 77 96 96 95

Fort Stewart,

GA

November 2008 334 370 E-6/Staff 

Sergeant and 

above 

64 77 97 95 86

Fort Meade, 

MD 

Projected 

completion is in 

2014

432 816 E-5/Sergeant and 

below

Total 1,470 2,210

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

Each apartment may have one or two bedrooms, so the number of apartments and the number of 

bedrooms may not be the same. 

b

The average occupancy is the mean and is based on the number of apartments occupied. 

c

The information for Fort Bragg does not include data for the second phase of the project. 

Details about each project follow.

Fort Irwin, California, was the Army’s first project to privatize housing for 

unaccompanied personnel—specifically, for senior unaccompanied 

personnel at the rank E-5/Sergeant and above. In March 2004, DOD 

included 200 apartments for these senior unaccompanied personnel to 

existing privatized housing for military families because of a shortage of 

affordable housing off the installation. However, these apartments did not 

open until September 2008, and construction on all apartments was 

completed by 2011. These apartments each have one bedroom. The 

privatized housing project company’s cost was about $29.1 million.

In 2005, the Army approved the expansion of the existing Fort Drum, New 

York, project to privatize housing for families to add 192 apartments for 

senior unaccompanied personnel of the rank E-6/Staff Sergeant and 

above. At this time, the Army changed its housing allowance policy and 

Fort Irwin, California

Fort Drum, New York
 

Page 16 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

allowed E-6/Staff Sergeants to live off the installation and receive the 

BAH. Prior to 2005, only unaccompanied personnel at pay grade E7/Sergeant First Class and above were eligible to receive the BAH. In 

February 2009, the Army opened its first apartments for these senior 

unaccompanied personnel, and in May 2009 completed construction on 

all apartments. There are 64 apartments with one bedroom and 128 

apartments with two bedrooms, for a total of 320 bedrooms. The 

privatized housing project company’s cost was about $31.1 million.

In 2006, the Army approved a limited expansion of the existing Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, project to privatize housing for families to add 312 

apartments for senior unaccompanied personnel of the rank E-6/Staff 

Sergeant and above. In February 2009, the Army opened its first 

apartments for these senior unaccompanied personnel, and completed 

construction of all the apartments by January 2010. There are 120 

apartments with one bedroom, and 192 with two bedrooms, for a total of 

504 bedrooms. The privatized housing project company’s cost was about 

$37.8 million. In May 2012, the Army approved the second phase of the 

Fort Bragg project, which added 120 apartments with a total of 198 beds. 

Construction began in 2012, and is scheduled for completion in 2014. The 

cost for the second phase was about $14 million.

In 2006, the Army approved a limited expansion of the existing Fort 

Stewart, Georgia, project to privatize housing for families to add 334 

apartments for unaccompanied personnel of the rank E-6/Staff Sergeant 

and above. In November 2008, the Army opened its first apartments for 

these senior unaccompanied personnel, and completed construction on 

all the apartments by October 2009. There are 298 apartments with one 

bedroom, and 36 apartments with two bedrooms, for a total of 370 

bedrooms. The privatized housing project company’s cost was about 

$37.2 million.

While junior unaccompanied personnel (E-5/Sergeant and below) 

typically are not authorized to receive the BAH, Fort Meade does not 

have enough government-owned housing on the installation, so more 

than 50 percent of the junior unaccompanied personnel there are 

currently receiving the BAH and are living off the installation. In an effort 

to bring these junior unaccompanied personnel back onto the installation, 

in 2012 the Army reached an agreement with a private-sector developer 

to provide privatized housing for junior unaccompanied personnel at Fort 

Meade. The project is scheduled to open this year (April 2014), and with 

this project the Army will provide 432 apartments to junior 

unaccompanied personnel, with 40 apartments having one bedroom and 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Fort Stewart, Georgia

Fort Meade, Maryland
 

Page 17 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

388 having two bedrooms, for a total of 816 bedrooms. The privatized 

housing project company’s cost is about $70 million.

In 2002, Congress amended the MHPI to provide the Navy with the 

authority to carry out not more than three pilot projects using the private 

sector for the acquisition or construction of unaccompanied personnel 

housing.13 The amendment to the MHPI also authorized the payment of 

higher rates of partial BAH to personnel occupying housing acquired 

using the pilot authority.14 The Navy implemented two such projects—at 

San Diego, California, and at Hampton Roads, Virginia—before its pilot 

authority expired on September 30, 2009.15 According to Navy officials, 

these locations were selected because both are fleet concentration areas, 

and the privatization projects also support the Navy’s Homeport Ashore 

Program.16 The Navy’s projects include 8 existing buildings (1 at San 

Diego and 7 at Hampton Roads) that the Navy conveyed to the privatesector developer and 91 new buildings (3 at San Diego; 1 mid-rise 

building and 87 “manor homes,” each consisting of five two-bedroom 

apartments, at Hampton Roads). San Diego has 2,398 bedrooms, while 

Hampton Roads has 3,682 bedrooms, for a total of 6,080 bedrooms. The

development costs for both projects totaled around $1.1 billion, of which 

the Navy provided cash equity investments of about $80 million, with the 

developers providing about $1 billion. The developers’ costs generally 

included the costs of construction, project financing, and operating 

expenses. Table 3 summarizes the status of the Navy’s two projects to 

privatize housing for junior and mid-level unaccompanied personnel.

 

13Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-

314 § 2803 (2002).

14Section 2881a(c) of Title 10 of the United States Code authorizes the Secretary of 

Defense to prescribe and pay higher rates of partial BAH for members occupying housing 

acquired under this pilot authority. 

15The Hampton Roads project is located at Naval Station Norfolk, which is geographically 

located in the Commonwealth of Virginia, in an area commonly referred to as Hampton 

Roads.

16The Navy’s Homeport Ashore Program was initiated to minimize the number of sailors 

living aboard ship while docked in the ship’s home port.

The Navy Has Two 

Projects to Privatize 

Housing for Junior and 

Mid-Level Unaccompanied 

Personnel
 

Page 18 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Table 3: Status of the Navy’s Two Projects to Privatize Housing for Junior and Mid-Level Unaccompanied Personnel 

Status 

Average occupancy rate, calendar 

years 2009-2013 (%)b

Installation Date awarded

Number of 

apartments 

Number of 

bedroomsa Targeted residents 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Naval Station 

San Diego, CA

December 

2006

1,199 2,398 E-4/Petty Officer Third 

Class with less than 4 

years of service and 

below (existing 

building); E-4/Petty 

Officer Third Class with 

more than 4 years of 

service to E-6/Petty 

Officer First Class 

(new building)

77 94 95 96 98

Naval Station 

Norfolk, VA

December 

2007

1,913 3,682 E-4/Petty Officer Third 

Class with less than 4 

years of service and 

below

95 90 95 94 94

Total 3,112 6,080

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

Each apartment may have one or two bedrooms, so the number of apartments and the number of 

bedrooms may not be the same. 

b

The average occupancy is the mean and is based on the number of bedrooms occupied. 

Details about each project follow.

In December 2006, the Navy awarded its first pilot project to privatize 

housing for junior unaccompanied personnel at Naval Station San Diego, 

California. The project included the privatization of one existing building 

and the construction of three new buildings. According to Navy officials, 

the existing building includes 258 “modules” built to the 1995 DOD 

standards for housing for unaccompanied personnel, each featuring two 

sleeping rooms and a small common area. The new buildings include 941 

“market-style” two-bedroom apartments, and, in total, the San Diego 

project provides 2,398 bedrooms. The existing building, which was 

conveyed to the developer, was intended to house junior unaccompanied 

personnel (E-4/ Petty Officer Third Class and below), and the new 

buildings were intended to house mid-level unaccompanied personnel (E4/ Petty Officer Third Class with more than 4 years of service to E-6/Petty 

Officer First Class). The three new buildings became available to rent 

within a 4-month period, beginning in December 2008. Navy officials told 

us that delivering 1,882 new beds within 4 months caused significant 

occupancy challenges, and that the target population of E-4 to E-6 has 

San Diego, California
 

Page 19 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

never been realized because of the on-base location of the project. In 

addition, they stated that while the sailors recognize the superior facilities 

and amenities, they are reluctant to return to quarters inside the 

installation’s fence line with restricted access for their friends and family. 

Therefore, the private-sector developer and the Navy decided to 

temporarily expand the target demographic from E-4 with more than 4 

years of service through E-6 to now include Homeport Ashore sailors and 

junior shore-based sailors (E-4 and below).

According to Navy officials, this shift has largely solved the occupancy 

challenges, yet it has strained revenues for the private developer, as 

Homeport Ashore sailors receive only a partial BAH rate based on the 

market rent for the existing building, but the private-sector developer’s 

financial projections were based on the market rent for the new buildings. 

The new buildings were constructed to higher standards compared with 

the existing one, and have a higher rent structure that is equivalent to 

current market rents for comparable housing in the San Diego area. The 

Navy’s evaluation of the developer’s proposed budget for 2013 noted that 

although the overall occupancy rate for the San Diego project at the end 

of 2012 was about 96 percent, the revenues being received were 

insufficient to sustain the project over the long term. Therefore, in June 

2013, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, 

Installations and Environment) requested the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Personnel and Readiness) to authorize a higher partial rate of the BAH 

for junior unaccompanied sailors residing in the new buildings. The higher 

partial rate of BAH requested would be equivalent to the market rents for 

the new buildings. In September 2013, the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense approved the Navy’s request for an increase in the 

partial rate for the BAH. The private-sector developer’s cost for the project 

was about $321 million, with the Navy providing a cash equity investment 

of about $43 million for a total of about $364 million. Figure 1 shows a 

bedroom in one of the new buildings at San Diego, California.
 

Page 20 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Figure 1: Bedroom in New Unaccompanied Housing Project at San Diego

The Navy’s Hampton Roads, Virginia, project, awarded in December 

2007, was built to house junior unaccompanied personnel (E-4/Petty 

Officer Third Class with fewer than 4 years of service and below). The 

project included 7 existing buildings on two installations (Naval Station 

Norfolk, Virginia, and Naval Support Activity, Norfolk, Virginia) that were 

conveyed to the developer and 88 newly constructed buildings on three 

separate locations off the installation. Although the new buildings are off 

the installation, two locations are on Navy property leased to the 

developer, and one location (Newport News) is on land donated by the 

city. In total, the Hampton Roads project includes 1,913 apartments and 

3,682 bedrooms. Specifically, the 7 existing buildings include 723 

apartments and 1,315 bedrooms, and the 88 new buildings include 1,190 

apartments and 2,367 bedrooms. According to Navy officials, the 

Hampton Roads project initially struggled to meet lease expectations 

because of the reluctance of commanding officers to allow sailors off their 

ships. As a result, the Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic, directed 

commanding officers to comply with the Navy’s Homeport Ashore 

Hampton Roads, Virginia
 

Page 21 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

initiative by allowing sailors to move off the ship. The private-sector 

developer’s cost for the project was about $713 million, with the Navy 

providing a cash equity investment of $37 million for a total of about $750 

million. According to data provided by the Navy, the project’s average 

occupancy rate is about 94 percent.

We are not making any recommendations in this report. DOD opted not to 

provide formal comments on a draft of this report, but provided technical 

comments, which were incorporated into this report as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 

and Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, this 

report will be available at no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix I.

Chris P. Currie

Acting Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Agency Comments
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 22 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Chris P. Currie, (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Kimberly Seay, Assistant 

Director; Vijay J. Barnabas; Julie Corwin; Mae Jones; Barbara Joyce; 

Carol Petersen; Michael Silver; and Michael Willems made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 23 GAO-14-313 Military Housing 

Defense Infrastructure: Improved Guidance Needed for Estimating 

Alternatively Financed Project Liabilities. GAO-13-337. Washington, D.C.: 

April 18, 2013.

Military Housing: Enhancements Needed to Housing Allowance Process 

and Information Sharing Among Services. GAO-11-462. Washington, 

D.C.: May 16, 2011.

Military Housing Privatization: DOD Faces New Challenges Due to 

Significant Growth at Some Installations and Recent Turmoil in the 

Financial Markets. GAO-09-352. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2009.

Military Housing: Management Issues Require Attention as the 

Privatization Program Matures. GAO-06-438. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 

2006.

Military Housing: Further Improvements Needed in Requirements 

Determination and Program Review. GAO-04-556. Washington, D.C.: 

May 19, 2004. 

Military Housing: Better Reporting Needed on the Status of the 

Privatization Program and the Costs of Its Consultants. GAO-04-111. 

Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2003.

Military Housing: Opportunities That Should Be Explored to Improve to 

Housing and Reduce Costs for Unmarried Junior Servicemembers. 

GAO-03-602. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2003.

Military Housing: Management Improvements Needed as the Pace of 

Privatization Quickens. GAO-02-624. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2002. 

Military Housing: DOD Needs to Address Long-Standing Requirements 

Determination Problems. GAO-01-889. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 

2001.

Military Housing: Continued Concerns in Implementing the Privatization 

Initiative. GAO/NSIAD-00-71. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2000.

Military Housing: Privatization Off to a Slow Start and Continued 

Management Attention Needed. GAO/NSIAD-98-178. Washington, D.C.: 

July 17, 1998.

Related GAO Products

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