MILITARY 

CAPABILITIES

Navy Should 

Reevaluate Its Plan to 

Decommission the 

USS Port Royal

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2014

GAO-14-336

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-336, a report to 

congressional committees

April 2014

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Navy Should Reevaluate Its Plan to Decommission 

the USS Port Royal 

Why GAO Did This Study

The USS Port Royal, one of the Navy’s 

newest cruisers, ran aground in 2009. 

Although it was repaired by the Navy, it 

was slated for decommissioning in 

fiscal year 2015. Two separate 

mandates directed the Navy to 

comprehensively assess the condition 

of the ship before its decommissioning. 

This report evaluates the extent to 

which (1) the Navy’s 2013 assessment 

and report to Congress addressed

congressional direction; and (2) Navy’s 

decision to decommission the Port 

Royal aligns with current information 

and Navy decommissioning 

requirements.

GAO reviewed the Navy’s assessment 

and supporting documentation. In 

addition, GAO interviewed Navy

personnel who performed the 

assessment or evaluated the results. 

GAO also interviewed officials from the 

independent organizations that 

reviewed the Navy’s assessment and 

discussed the findings of their reviews.

Finally, GAO interviewed Navy officials 

responsible for maintaining the Port 

Royal and officials involved with the

decommissioning decision.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Navy to reevaluate the decision to 

decommission the Port Royal in light of 

the Navy’s 2013 assessment and 

internal and external experts’ 

assessments subsequently provided to 

the Navy. The Department of Defense

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendation, and the Navy has 

subsequently decided to retain the Port 

Royal and place it in a phased 

modernization program along with 

several other ships.

What GAO Found

The Navy’s 2013 report to Congress on the Port Royal’s material condition 

partially addressed congressional reporting requirements but has likely 

overstated modernization costs should the ship be retained in service. While the 

Navy acknowledges that it did not obtain an independent structural assessment

as required by one of the mandates, the Navy found the condition of the ship to 

be comparable to other cruisers when its own technical experts assessed the 

ship. For example, in addressing the congressional requirements, the Navy 

assessed the Port Royal’s structure and found the condition of the superstructure 

and interior hull to be typical of other cruisers in the class, indicating its suitability 

for continued use. The mandate also required that the Navy’s assessments be 

reviewed by experts. GAO found that the Navy’s assessment was reviewed by 

the Naval Sea Systems Command Engineering Directorate, the Navy’s technical 

authority, and by independent boards of subject-matter experts from the 

Department of Defense and industry—the Board of Inspection and Survey and 

the American Bureau of Shipping, respectively. All three reviewers generally 

concurred with the assessment. Finally, the Navy’s report to Congress included 

some combat-system modernization upgrades that are not consistent with plans 

for similar cruisers. Removal of these costs would reduce the total cost to repair 

and modernize the Port Royal from $712 million to $406 million.

On the basis of current information, the Navy’s plan to decommission the Port 

Royal is not aligned with decommissioning requirements. Navy officials told GAO 

that, in 2011, they decided to decommission the Port Royal based on certain 

factors included in the Navy’s decommissioning policy; however, the 2013 

assessment revealed that the Navy’s original assumptions about those factors 

were inaccurate. Specifically, the Navy made negative assumptions about the 

ship’s material condition, repair and modernization costs, and the effect of the 

2009 grounding. The Navy’s policy on the retirement of naval vessels identifies 

not only material condition and life-cycle costs as key factors to be considered 

when determining which ships to retire, but also estimated service life and 

operational effectiveness. According to officials, the Navy assumed in 2011 that 

the Port Royal was in poor material condition, that the grounding had created 

hidden maintenance problems, and that midlife costs would be very expensive; 

therefore, they planned to decommission the Port Royal in part to avoid these 

modernization and other operating and maintenance costs. However, the Navy’s 

2013 assessment showed that the Port Royal’s material condition is similar to 

other cruisers and that the grounding should have no significant effect on the 

ship’s future maintenance needs or costs relative to other cruisers. GAO found 

that, in terms of its estimated service life and capabilities, the Port Royal has 

some advantages. The ship is the youngest cruiser in its class and has more 

service life remaining than any other cruiser. The Port Royal also has some key 

capabilities that many of the Navy’s other cruisers lack, including a ballistic 

missile defense capability that is highly sought after by combatant commanders. 

Navy officials are aware of the findings of subsequent assessments, but, at the 

time of GAO’s review, did not have plans to reevaluate their decision. Unless the 

Navy reevaluates its decision, it risks prematurely decommissioning a ship that 

could provide many additional years of service, as well as needed ballistic missile 

defense capability.

View GAO-14-336. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (404) 679-1816 or 

PendletonJ@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

Letter 1

Background 3

Navy’s Assessment of the USS Port Royal Partially Addressed 

Congressional Direction 5

Current Assessments Run Counter to the Assumptions the Navy 

Used When It Decided to Decommission the Port Royal 9

Conclusions 16

Recommendation for Executive Action 16

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 16

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 19

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 22

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 24

Tables

Table 1: GAO’s Evaluation of the Extent That the Navy Addressed 

Congressional Direction 6

Table 2: Port Royal Costs That Are Not Consistent with Other 

Ticonderoga-Class Cruisers 9

Figures

Figure 1: Key Events in the Recent History of the Port Royal 4

Figure 2: Service Lives and Ballistic Missile Defense Capability for

Active Cruisers (Newest to Oldest) 15

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

Abbreviations

ABS American Bureau of Shipping

Appropriations Act Consolidated and Further Continuing

Appropriations Act of 2013

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense 

DOD Department of Defense

INSURV Board of Inspection and Survey

NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command

NAVSEA 05 Naval Sea Systems Command, Engineering

Directorate

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

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Page 1 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 8, 2014

Congressional Committees

In an effort to achieve budgetary savings following the enactment of the 

Budget Control Act of 2011, the Navy decided to decommission seven 

cruisers, including the USS Port Royal (CG-73),1

In January and March 2013,

and two amphibious 

ships. According to Navy officials, the decommissioning of these nine 

ships was projected to save the Navy approximately $6 billion from fiscal 

years 2013 through 2017. This decision was controversial because the 

Port Royal, a $1 billion Ticonderoga-class (CG-47) cruiser, is one of the 

newest ships in its class and is capable of ballistic missile defense 

operations. On February 5, 2009, the Port Royal had run aground on a 

reef off the coast of Hawaii, which caused significant damage to a number 

of the ship’s components, including the sonar dome, propellers, 

superstructure, and underwater hull. While the Navy completed repairs to 

these components in January 2010, Navy officials reported that concerns 

the ship had sustained additional damage persisted within the Navy 

leading up to the decommissioning recommendation.

2

 1

Hereafter in this document referred to as the Port Royal.

two separate congressional reports directed 

the Navy to reexamine the condition of the Port Royal, noting that the 

Navy had not provided adequate analysis and cost data on the structural 

condition of the ship. The conference report accompanying the National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the Secretary of the Navy to 

conduct a material condition assessment of the Port Royal, to be 

reviewed by the appropriate Navy technical authority and independent 

boards from the Department of Defense (DOD) and industry. The report 

directed the Navy to submit the results of its assessment, along with the 

2

The congressional reports referenced in this paragraph are found in the conference 

report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 

2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, which was enacted in January 2013, and in the conference 

committee explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act (Appropriations Act) of 2013, which was enacted in March 2013, Pub. 

L. No. 113-6. Section 4 of the Appropriations Act provides that the explanatory statement 

shall have the same effect with respect to the allocation of funds and implementation of 

this legislation as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference. For 

ease of reference, we will refer to the two conference reports as the NDAA conference 

report and the Appropriations Act conference report throughout our report.
Page 2 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

results of independent reviews, to the congressional defense committees. 

In a separate mandate, the Consolidated and Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act of 2013 (Appropriations Act) conference report 

directed the Navy to carry out an independent structural assessment of 

the Port Royal. In response to these congressional reports, the Secretary 

of the Navy directed the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to 

provide a comprehensive assessment of the Port Royal’s current material 

condition, and NAVSEA’s Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare led 

this effort.3 The Navy’s assessment was conducted from February to 

March 2013. On August 1, 2013, the Navy issued a report, USS Port 

Royal (CG 73) Material Condition Assessment, to the congressional 

defense committees to address both mandates.4

The NDAA conference report mandated that GAO review the Navy’s 

report directed by the NDAA conference report, and the Appropriations 

Act conference report mandated GAO to review the independent 

structural assessment that the Navy was required to carry out. This report 

evaluates the extent to which (1) the Navy’s 2013 assessment and report 

to Congress addressed congressional direction, and (2) the Navy’s 

decision to decommission the Port Royal aligns with current information 

and Navy decommissioning requirements.

To address our objectives, two GAO analysts independently reviewed the 

Navy’s assessment and determined whether the assessment met the 

requirements listed in the conference report and explanatory statement. 

The analysts agreed on all requirements decisions. We also interviewed 

nine of the technical experts who inspected the ship during the 2013 

assessment concerning what guidance they were given before 

conducting the assessment, how they conducted the assessment, and 

what criteria they employed.5

 3

This directorate (NAVSEA 21) is responsible for the maintenance and modernization of 

nonnuclear surface ships currently operating in the fleet. Additionally, this directorate 

oversees the ship inactivation process, including ship transfers or sales to friendly foreign 

navies, inactivation, and disposal.

We also interviewed six of the Technical 

4

All of the documentation supporting the material condition assessment and the Navy’s 

report to Congress will be referred to as the Navy’s 2013 assessment of the Port Royal. 

5

The structural inspector we interviewed not only performed the inspection for the Navy’s 

2013 report to Congress, but he also inspected the Port Royal’s hull from February to 

March 2011 and in October and December 2011 during the ship’s last deployment.
Page 3 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

Warrant Holders6 and discussed their evaluation of the assessment and 

their understanding of the material condition of the Port Royal. We also 

obtained these technical experts’ conclusions about the Port Royal

compared to other ships in its class, based on their latest assessments. In 

addition, we interviewed representatives from the independent 

organizations that reviewed the Navy’s assessment and discussed the 

findings of their reviews. We also interviewed officials who are directly 

responsible for the maintenance of the ship at its homeport in Hawaii. We 

reviewed the Navy’s list of needed repairs for the Port Royal and 

compared the Navy’s approach for estimating repair costs against general 

principles of cost-estimating. We also reviewed information concerning 

the age of the Port Royal and its capabilities relative to other cruisers. We 

compared the information available to the Navy following its 2013 

assessment to the requirements contained in the Navy’s 

decommissioning instruction.7

We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to April 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Port Royal, commissioned in 1994, is one of 22 active Ticonderogaclass cruisers8

 6

The Technical Warrant Holders are subject-matter experts that serve as the Navy’s 

technical authority for specific ship systems.

capable of performing multiple missions including air, 

undersea, and strike warfare. Each cruiser costs about $1 billion to 

7

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, General Policy for the Inactivation, Retirement, 

and Disposition of U.S. Naval Vessels, OPNAV Instruction 4770.5G (Washington, D.C.:

February 2009).

8

Hereafter referred to as cruisers. Note: The Ticonderoga class originally consisted of 27 

ships, CG-47 (USS Ticonderoga) through CG-73 (USS Port Royal). As CG-47 through 

CG-51 did not have the vertical launch system—a significant combat upgrade—these 5 

ships were decommissioned between 2004 and 2005. 

Background

USS Port Royal (CG-73)
Page 4 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

procure and has an estimated service life of 35 years. The ships can 

operate independently or in support of carrier battle groups and are 

equipped with a range of armaments, including a vertical launching 

system for various types of missiles, torpedoes, lightweight guns, and 

close-in weapon systems. The Port Royal is one of five cruisers with 

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities. Figure 1 lists some key 

events in the Port Royal’s recent history.

Figure 1: Key Events in the Recent History of the Port Royal

A number of organizations oversee ship maintenance. For example, 

NAVSEA is responsible for repairs and alterations on all Navy ships from 

a technical standpoint. As the lead technical authority, it develops and 

manages maintenance programs for each ship class. Specifically, it 

Organizations Overseeing 

Ship Maintenance and 

Conducting Inspections
Page 5 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

establishes hull, mechanical, electrical, and combat systems technical 

requirements, provides technical support to maintain the material 

condition of all ships, sets maintenance intervals and durations, and 

establishes preventive maintenance requirements. Another organization 

that assists the Navy with overseeing ship maintenance is the American 

Bureau of Shipping (ABS), an industry group. ABS provides marine 

classification services, which involve conducting periodic ship surveys, 

examining repairs and modifications, and verifying that marine vessels 

comply with their standards. NAVSEA had previously contracted with 

ABS to assess surface combatant ships’ abilities to achieve their 

expected service lives through corrosion assessments, engineering 

analysis, and maintenance recommendations, and ABS assists NAVSEA 

in maintaining a database of the structural condition of Navy ships.

For its part, the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) 

conducts a number of inspections over the life of a ship. INSURV is an 

independent activity that reports to the Chief of Naval Operations and the 

Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command. Its primary missions include 

conducting acceptance trials of newly constructed ships, performing 

material inspections of all naval ships periodically to determine a ship’s 

fitness for further service, and accomplishing surveys for the purpose of 

determining and documenting the material condition of ships at the time 

of their inactivation.9

The Navy’s assessment of the Port Royal’s material condition partially 

addressed congressional reporting requirements, but has likely 

overstated the modernization costs for the Port Royal should it be 

retained in service. The two reporting requirements were similar in that 

they both focused on the material condition of the Port Royal. The 

broader mandate in the NDAA conference report directed the Secretary of 

the Navy “to conduct a detailed material condition assessment of the 

U.S.S. Port Royal that will: include a comprehensive inspection of the 

ship’s major structural, machinery, electrical, combat and weapons 

systems elements.” The Navy was to “identify the necessary repairs and 

modernization, including detailed costs to make those repairs and 

upgrades, that would be required for the ship to meet its expected service 

 9

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Mission, Organization, and Functions of the 

Board of Inspection and Survey, OPNAV Instruction 5420.70F (Washington, D.C.: August 

2006).

Navy’s Assessment of 

the USS Port Royal

Partially Addressed 

Congressional 

Direction
Page 6 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

life, consistent with other ships in the Ticonderoga class.” Also, the 

assessment was to be evaluated by the “appropriate Navy technical 

authority” and reviewed by “an independent board of subject matter 

experts from both industry and the Department of Defense (DOD).” The 

narrower mandate in the Appropriations Act conference report focused on 

the structural condition of the Port Royal. In it, the Conferees directed the 

Secretary of the Navy to “carry out an independent structural 

assessment” of the Port Royal that was to include a comparative 

structural assessment to other cruisers of the same class. The 

independent assessment was to provide a detailed cost estimate to repair 

the ship and indicate how that estimate differs from the cost to repair 

other cruisers of the same class. It was also to identify the issues that 

would be corrected during planned maintenance availabilities. Under 

relatively short time frames and having already begun its assessment to 

address the first and broader mandate before the second mandate was 

issued, in August 2013 the Navy issued one report to Congress to 

address both mandates. We found the Navy had addressed several 

requirements in the congressional mandates as part of its assessment 

and report to Congress, but had not done an independent structural 

assessment and had included some modernization costs that were not 

consistent with other cruisers. Table 1 describes the results of the Navy 

efforts to address each element of the two congressional mandates, and 

our evaluation.

Table 1: GAO’s Evaluation of the Extent That the Navy Addressed Congressional Direction

Congressional requirements

Port Royal material condition assessment, 

reviews, and report to Congress 

GAO’s evaluation of the assessment, 

reviews, and report to Congress

The NDAA conference report directed 

the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a 

detailed material condition assessment 

of the Port Royal to include a 

comprehensive inspection of the ship’s 

major structural, machinery, electrical, 

combat, and weapon systems 

elements.

The Navy conducted a detailed material 

condition assessment of the Port Royal and 

found the condition of the ship to be comparable 

to other Ticonderoga class cruisers.

The Navy utilized qualified personnel and 

appropriate criteria to conduct the 

assessment.

• The assessment should identify 

the necessary repairs and 

modernization, including detailed 

costs to make those repairs and 

the upgrades that would be 

required for the ship to meet its 

expected service life, consistent 

with other ships in the 

Ticonderoga class.

The Navy’s report states it would cost $712 

million to repair and modernize the Port Royal to 

meet its expected service life—$92 million for 

repairs, $250 million for the development of 

modernization upgrades, and $370 million for 

the procurement and installation of 

modernization upgrades.

The Navy’s report included modernization 

upgrades that are not consistent with other 

ships in its class. Removal of these 

upgrades and their development costs 

would significantly reduce the cost to repair 

and modernize the Port Royal.
Page 7 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

Congressional requirements

Port Royal material condition assessment, 

reviews, and report to Congress 

GAO’s evaluation of the assessment, 

reviews, and report to Congress

• The results of the Port Royal

material condition assessment will 

be evaluated by the appropriate 

Navy technical authority.

Naval Sea Systems Command’s (NAVSEA) 

Engineering Directorate (NAVSEA 05), the 

Navy’s technical authority for ships and ship 

systems, reviewed and commented on all

findings from the material condition assessment. 

They concurred with most of the findings 

identified in the material condition assessment.

NAVSEA 05 is the appropriate technical 

authority to review the assessment.

• The results of the Port Royal

material condition assessment will 

be reviewed by an independent 

board of subject-matter experts 

from industry and the Department 

of Defense (DOD).

ABS and INSURV reviewed the Port Royal’s 

material condition assessment and both boards 

generally agreed with the Navy’s findings 

concerning the ship’s material condition. ABS 

and INSURV also reviewed the Navy’s repair 

cost estimates and respectively found them to 

be “realistic and accurate” and “reasonable.”

However, ABS did not review the Navy’s $250 

million estimate for the development of 

modernization upgrades because it did not 

receive the detailed information needed to 

evaluate the estimate. INSURV disagreed with 

some of the items included in the modification 

cost.

It was appropriate for the ABS and 

INSURV to review the assessment. ABS is 

a commercial organization that conducts 

periodic ship surveys and verifies that 

marine vessels comply with their 

standards. INSURV is an independent 

Navy organization that conducts material 

inspections of all naval ships to determine 

their fitness for continued service. Our 

analysis also found repair costs to be well 

documented, but found modernization 

costs to be questionable since some of 

these costs were not consistent with other 

ships in the class.

The Appropriations Act conference 

report directed the Secretary of the 

Navy to carry out an independent 

structural assessment of the Port 

Royal that includes comparisons to 

structural assessments of other 

cruisers of the same class.

The Navy assessed the Port Royal’s structure

and found the condition of the superstructure 

and interior hull to be typical of the Ticonderoga 

class cruisers.

The assessment was not independent in 

that the data and information presented in 

the Navy’s report to Congress came from 

Navy sources. During our review, Navy 

officials acknowledged that the structural 

assessment was not independent and 

stated that to best utilize the resources at 

the time and to meet the tight time frame 

they did not contract for an independent 

assessment.a

• The review shall include a detailed 

cost estimate to repair the ship.

The Navy compiled detailed cost estimates 

during its assessment, but in its report to 

Congress, the Navy reported only total costs.

Our review of the Navy’s detailed cost 

estimates found that structural repair costs 

accounted for approximately $17 million of 

the $92 million in total repair costs.b

• The review shall show how the 

detailed cost estimate differs from 

the cost to repair other cruisers of 

the same class, including what 

issues would be corrected during 

planned maintenance 

availabilities.

The Navy planned on two maintenance 

availabilities for the Port Royal—one in fiscal 

year 2014 and the other in fiscal year 2016. For 

2014, the Navy compared the Port Royal’s total 

repair cost to two other cruisers; for 2016, the 

Navy compared the Port Royal’s total repair 

cost to five other cruisers. The Navy did not 

make any conclusions about these 

comparisons. However, INSURV concluded that 

the cost of maintaining and modernizing the 

Port Royal was comparable to other CG-47 

Class ships.

The Navy identified the structural issues it 

would correct but did not compare Port 

Royal’s structural repair costs to the 

structural repair costs of other cruisers.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

a

According to Navy officials, the Navy had already started its assessment of the Port Royal with Navy 

personnel based on the NDAA conference report mandate, which did not require independence, 

before the Appropriations Act conference report mandate was issued. To conserve resources and 
Page 8 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

meet the deadlines for both mandates, the Navy utilized the same Navy personnel to meet the 

mandate requirements of the Appropriations Act conference report.

b

To determine the cost to complete Port Royal’s structural repairs, we reviewed the results of the 

assessment, identified structural repairs documented in the assessment, and totaled the Navy’s cost 

estimates for these repairs. We confirmed our list of structural repairs with Navy officials.

On the basis of our analysis of the Navy’s report to Congress, the most 

significant issue is the inclusion of modernization costs that would not 

need to be performed if the Port Royal were to remain in service; as a 

result, the Navy’s estimate to repair and modernize the Port Royal is likely 

overstated by at least $306 million. Specifically, the Navy included costs 

associated with the combat system Baseline 9B and Ballistic Missile 

Defense (BMD) 5.0 upgrades for Ticonderoga-class cruisers. These 

upgrades would enhance the ability of Ticonderoga class cruisers to 

conduct both Anti-Air Warfare and BMD missions. However, Navy officials 

reported that there are currently no plans to finish the development of 

Baseline 9B and BMD 5.0 for cruisers.10 They explained that they 

included these items for the Port Royal because the congressional 

mandate language directed them to include modernization costs, and the 

Navy had intended to make these modernizations to the Port Royal prior 

to the decision to decommission the ship.11 However, the mandate 

language also directed the Navy to include modernization costs 

“consistent with other ships in the Ticonderoga class,” and, at the time of 

the Navy’s 2013 assessment of the Port Royal, the Navy was not 

planning on implementing these modernization upgrades for other 

cruisers. Further, a senior INSURV official stated that the cost of two 

modernization upgrades (BMD 5.0, combat system Baseline 9B) is not 

consistent with other Ticonderoga class cruisers and that it is speculative 

to say that the Navy might choose to implement these upgrades in the 

future on the Port Royal. Table 2 shows these questionable costs.

 10In comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the modernization package for 

BMD-capable cruisers is under review.

11According to Navy officials, when the Baseline 9B and BMD 5.0 were planned the Navy 

would have spread the development cost across all five BMD-capable cruisers that would 

have received the upgrades. However, since there are no current plans to upgrade the 

other BMD-capable cruisers and the congressional mandate only concerned the Port 

Royal, the Navy attributed the entire $250 million in developmental costs to the Port 

Royal.
Page 9 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

Table 2: Port Royal Costs That Are Not Consistent with Other Ticonderoga-Class 

Cruisers

Dollars in millions

Cost description Cost

Developmental costs—for combat system Baseline 9B and Ballistic Missile 

Defense (BMD) 5.0 for cruisers

$250

System upgrades for BMD 5.0 56.1

Total $306.1

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

If the Navy did not include the costs in table 2, which are unique to the 

Port Royal and not consistent with planned costs for other cruisers, the 

Navy’s total cost to repair and modernize the Port Royal would decrease 

by $306 million, from $712 million to $406 million.12

On the basis of current information, the Navy’s plan to decommission the 

Port Royal is not aligned with decommissioning requirements. The Navy 

decided to decommission the Port Royal in 2011 based on certain factors 

in its decommissioning policy, including material condition and life-cycle 

costs; however, the 2013 assessment, which provided additional 

information on the ship’s condition, future costs, and the effect of the 

grounding, revealed that the Navy’s original assumptions about those 

factors were inaccurate. Although aware of the additional assessment 

information, the Navy, at the time of our review, did not have any specific 

plans to reconsider its decision to decommission the Port Royal. Apart 

from these expert assessments, the Port Royal also has some 

advantages relative to other cruisers in terms of service life and special 

capabilities—other factors considered in the decommissioning of ships.

 12Depending on how the Navy would use the Port Royal, if it remains in service, the 

modernization costs may be overstated by an additional $167 million. In its report to 

Congress, the Navy included $167 million of combat systems upgrades to get the ship to 

the 9B configuration. The Navy’s four other BMD cruisers are not scheduled to receive this 

upgrade. However, the Navy’s 17 non-BMD cruisers have received, or are scheduled to 

receive, combat systems upgrades, which bring the non-BMD ships to a 9A configuration. 

Port Royal could receive these 9A upgrades, which would enhance its anti-air warfare 

capabilities consistent with the Navy’s non-BMD cruisers. However, if the Port Royal’s 

combat systems were upgraded to the 9A configuration, the ship would no longer be 

capable of executing the BMD mission.

Current Assessments 

Run Counter to the 

Assumptions the 

Navy Used When It 

Decided to 

Decommission the 

Port Royal
Page 10 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

The Navy’s policy on the retirement of naval vessels13 identifies material 

condition, life-cycle costs, operational effectiveness, and service life as 

key factors to be considered when determining which ships to retire. The 

policy contains additional requirements for ships that are going to be 

decommissioned early, which is prior to the end of their estimated service 

lives. Specifically, the policy requires that the Navy describe, in the form 

of a decision memorandum, why it is in the best interest of the Navy to 

retire the ship early, identify any resulting capability gaps and their 

duration, and recommend strategies to mitigate those capability gaps.

Although the Navy did not prepare a decision memorandum, officials told 

us that in 2011 the Navy decided to decommission the Port Royal in the 

context of a broader decommissioning proposal that included other 

cruisers and amphibious ships. Navy officials identified a number of 

assumptions that led the Navy to including the Port Royal as one of the 

nine ships planned for decommissioning. Officials specifically noted that 

the condition of the Port Royal’s hull and superstructure were key reasons 

why they recommended decommissioning the ship.14 They also explained 

that the 2009 grounding of the Port Royal created uncertainty regarding 

future maintenance requirements. According to Navy officials, another 

primary reason the Port Royal was selected for decommissioning was the 

avoidance of upcoming maintenance and modernization costs, 

particularly midlife modernization costs. Many of the Navy’s other active 

cruisers had already received their midlife modernizations. According to 

Navy officials, the Navy also discussed Port Royal’s BMD capability as a 

key factor, in terms of the potential benefits this capability provides, while 

developing its decommissioning proposal. However, the Navy ultimately 

decided to decommission the Port Royal based on its assumptions 

concerning material condition, the effects from the grounding, and costs.

 13Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, General Policy for the Inactivation, Retirement, 

and Disposition of U.S. Naval Vessels.

14Officials repeatedly referenced an incident in 2011 when the ship’s supporting structural 

beams separated from the hull of the ship.

Navy Policy Identifies 

Factors to Be Considered 

before Decommissioning 

Ships

Navy Officials Planned to 

Decommission Port Royal

Based in Part on 

Assumptions Relating to 

Material Condition, 

Grounding, and 

Maintenance and 

Modernization Costs
Page 11 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

The Navy’s 2013 assessment of the Port Royal provided additional 

information on the ship’s material condition, the residual effects of the 

2009 grounding, and life-cycle costs; much of this information runs 

counter to the assumptions the Navy relied on in 2011 when it decided to 

decommission the ship. The 2013 assessment showed that the Port 

Royal’s material condition was similar to other cruisers and that the 2009 

grounding should have no significant effect on the ship’s future 

maintenance needs. The assessment also showed that the repair cost 

projections for the ship were similar to other cruisers. On the basis of 

current information, the Navy’s plan to decommission the Port Royal is 

not aligned with decommissioning requirements.

As shown in table 1, the Navy’s 2013 assessment of the Port Royal

concluded that the Port Royal’s material condition was similar to other 

cruisers. For example, the Navy’s 2013 assessment of the Port Royal

found that the ship’s superstructure and its interior steel hull were in 

similar or better condition than the comparable components of several 

other cruisers—CG-70, CG-71, and CG-72—that were not being 

decommissioned. Reviewers of the assessment and technical experts we 

interviewed confirmed this conclusion. In its review of the Navy’s 

assessment, INSURV stated that the Port Royal’s material condition is 

comparable to other ships in the class, and in some cases superior. 

According to INSURV, the Navy’s 2013 assessment of the Port Royal

does not present material evidence to support the recommendation to 

decommission the Port Royal rather than other cruisers in the class.

Navy technical experts we interviewed also characterized the ship’s 

material condition as being similar to other cruisers. In interviews, some 

of these experts provided the following comments about the Port Royal’s 

ship systems:

• Hull: Port Royal’s hull has no unique or ship-specific structural 

discrepancies.

• Superstructure: Port Royal’s superstructure is in line with the rest of 

the ships in its class.

• Engines: Port Royal’s engines are generally on par with other ships.15

 15Technical experts clarified further that some engines need to be replaced because of 

total operational hours since the last major overhaul, not because their material condition 

was not well maintained.

Experts’ Assessments of 

Material Condition, Effect 

of the Grounding, and 

Repair Costs Run Counter 

to the Navy’s Original 

Assumptions

Material Condition and Effect 

of the Grounding
Page 12 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

• Electrical system: Port Royal’s system is in comparable or better 

condition compared to other cruisers.

• Weapons Handling system: Port Royal’s system is in average 

condition compared to other cruisers.

• Aegis Weapon System Fire Control System: Port Royal’s system is 

the same or better than the Fire Control System on other cruisers.

• Aegis Weapon System Radar Components: Port Royal’s 

components—signal processor and antenna—are in above-average 

condition compared to other cruisers.

In one exception, the Navy’s technical expert on the ship’s sewage 

system characterized the Port Royal’s sewage system as significantly 

worse than other ships. However, according to this same official, much of 

the system’s deterioration was likely due to maintenance being deferred 

after the ship was identified for decommissioning. In addition, cruisers are 

supposed to have their sewage systems modified as part of the normal 

cruiser modernization programs.

In contrast to the Navy’s earlier assumption that the 2009 grounding 

would lead to ongoing maintenance issues, the Navy’s 2013 assessment 

of the Port Royal found no lingering effects from the 2009 grounding. The 

Navy’s 2013 assessment identified plans for maintenance for the Port 

Royal in fiscal years 2014 and 2016 if the ship were not decommissioned 

and noted that hundreds of repair items would be completed during these 

availabilities. The Navy’s assessment listed four possible causes that 

could have necessitated these repairs. While “residual result of the ship’s 

grounding” was one of the possible causes,16

 16The other three causes were: (1) result of deferred maintenance in anticipation of 

decommissioning, (2) normal problem / maintenance issue for Ticonderoga class, and (3) 

issue specific to USS Port Royal (CG-73). The cause attributed to most repair items was 

cause (2), but a number of repair items were also attributed to causes (3) and (1).

none of the listed repair 

items was attributed to the ship’s 2009 grounding. Navy officials stated 

that one repair item, which is not included in the 2014 and 2016 

maintenance availabilities, can be directly attributable to the 2009 

grounding—a repair to adjust the magnetic signature of the ship, which 

costs $100,000. According to Navy officials, they deferred this repair 

related to the 2009 grounding, in part, because it cannot be done in 

Hawaii; moreover, many ships that have not run aground require this 

same maintenance action as they age.
Page 13 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

The 2013 assessment of the Port Royal provided additional information 

on the costs to repair the Port Royal compared to similar ships. During 

fiscal year 2014, the Navy would address most of the repair items 

identified during the 2013 assessment, and in fiscal year 2016 the Navy 

would conduct a second depot period to accomplish all modernizations 

and upgrades, as well as complete additional maintenance.17

Although the Navy assumed the Port Royal was in need of costly repairs 

that other cruisers would not require, the Navy’s 2013 assessment 

showed that the estimated repair costs for the proposed 2014 and 2016 

maintenance periods would be similar to repair costs for other cruisers. 

For example, the projected cost of the Port Royal’s 2016 maintenance is 

similar to the maintenance costs that four other cruisers incurred during 

their modernizations. According to Navy officials involved in the 2013 

assessment of the Port Royal, there is no significant difference in the cost 

estimate to repair and modernize the Port Royal compared to other ships 

in the class; there is also no significant difference in the cost estimate to 

do the structural work on Port Royal compared to other ships in its class. 

Furthermore, INSURV stated that the Navy’s report does not present 

financial evidence to support the recommendation to decommission the 

Port Royal rather than another cruiser.

After reviewing the recent 2013 Port Royal assessment, senior Navy 

officials acknowledged that the ship was in “good shape” and “consistent 

with” other cruisers. They also stated that, if they had the opportunity to 

revisit the 2011 decision, they likely would select a different cruiser for 

decommissioning. The officials also noted that the Navy is considering 

some different options for keeping the ships, including the Port Royal, 

after decommissioning them. However, they did not outline, at the time of 

our review, any specific plans to reverse the decision to decommission 

the Port Royal.

 17The 2016 depot period would be the ship’s midlife availability. In a midlife availability, the 

Navy accomplishes major modernization to the hull, mechanical, electrical, and combat 

systems throughout the ship. The goal is to restore and modernize the material condition 

of a ship so it can reach its estimated service life.

Costs to Repair and Modernize 

the Port Royal
Page 14 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

In terms of its estimated service life and capabilities, the Port Royal has 

some advantages when compared to the Navy’s other cruisers. 

Commissioned in 1994, the Port Royal is the youngest cruiser in its class 

and has 15 years of service life remaining—more than any other cruiser 

in the Navy. The Port Royal also has some key capabilities that many of 

the Navy’s other cruisers lack. One of these capabilities is the Port 

Royal’s BMD capability. Aegis BMD is the naval component of the Missile 

Defense Agency’s Ballistic Missile Defense System. In May 2013, the 

Director of the Missile Defense Agency testified that the Aegis BMD is a 

prominent part of DOD’s regional defense posture in Europe and in 

Japan. He also stated that the demand for missile defense from the

combatant commanders is increasing in terms of capacity required. As a 

result, the Navy is currently trying to increase the number of ships with 

BMD capabilities due to this high level of demand for this capability. Such 

efforts consist of upgrading Aegis destroyers to the BMD capability, 

incorporating Aegis BMD into the Aegis Modernization Program, and new 

construction of Aegis BMD destroyers. Figure 2 shows the Navy’s 22 

active cruisers and lists their remaining service lives and whether or not 

they have BMD capabilities. It also shows which cruisers the Navy plans 

to decommission.

Navy Policy Requires that 

Estimated Service Life and 

Capabilities Are 

Considered before 

Decommissioning Ships
Page 15 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

Figure 2: Service Lives and Ballistic Missile Defense Capability for Active Cruisers (Newest to Oldest)
Page 16 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

While the Port Royal has BMD capabilities that other cruisers do not

possess, there are some capability upgrades that the Port Royal has not 

received. These include upgrades for weapon systems such as the 

Vertical Launch System, the MK 34 Gun Weapon System, and the Aegis 

Weapon System. However, Port Royal is not the only ship that lacks 

these upgrades. Several other cruisers that are not scheduled for 

decommissioning, including CG-70, CG-71, and CG-72, also have not 

received these weapon-systems upgrades.

Navy officials have cited the Port Royal’s 2009 grounding, as well as the 

avoidance of midlife modernization and maintenance costs, as 

determining factors in the ship’s decommissioning. However, the Navy’s 

report to Congress shows that the ship has recovered from the grounding 

and that the ship’s material condition and repair costs are similar to other 

cruisers. Navy officials are aware of the findings of the 2013 assessment, 

but, at the time of our review, did not have specific plans to reevaluate 

their decision. The Navy could capitalize on its additional information it 

has gathered by reevaluating the extent to which its decision to 

decommission the Port Royal met its criteria for early ship 

decommissioning. By reevaluating its original assumptions on the Port 

Royal in light of its additional information, the Navy can better ensure that 

it is making the best decision with regard to its current budget and its 

requirements to support the needs of the combatant commanders.

To optimize capabilities within its current budget constraints, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Navy to reevaluate the Navy’s decision to decommission the Port Royal in 

light of the current information available to the Navy—including internal 

and external experts’ assessments of the Port Royal.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Navy to reevaluate the Navy’s decision to decommission the Port Royal in 

light of the current information available to the Navy. Subsequent to 

conducting the material condition assessment, the Navy has decided to 

retain the Port Royal. The Navy’s reevaluation of the decision to 

decommission the Port Royal—given the additional information available 

about its material condition and other factors discussed in this report—

meets the intent of our recommendation. Instead of decommissioning the 

Port Royal, the Navy will place its 11 newest cruisers, including the Port 

Conclusions

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 17 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

Royal, into a long-term phased modernization plan starting in fiscal year 

2015. After undergoing modernization, the service lives of these cruisers 

will be extended by 5 years, and the Navy will reactivate these ships on a 

one-for-one basis as its 11 oldest cruisers (CG 52-62) reach their 

expected service life. Under this plan, the Navy would bring the Port 

Royal back into active service in 2026, when it retires USS 

Chancellorsville (CG-62), and Port Royal would remain in an active status 

through 2044—15 years later than its original expected service life. 

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. 

DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where 

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to congressional defense 

committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you 

or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at 

(404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

John H. Pendleton

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 18 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 19 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

The objectives of this report were to evaluate the extent to which (1) the 

Navy’s 2013 assessment and report to Congress addressed 

congressional direction, and (2) the Navy’s decision to decommission the 

Port Royal aligns with current information and Navy decommissioning 

requirements.

To evaluate whether the Navy’s 2013 assessment and report addressed 

the requirements contained in the conference report to the National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2013, and the conference report to 

the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013, two 

analysts independently reviewed the Navy’s report and determined 

whether the report met the specific requirements listed in the conference 

report and explanatory statement. The analysts agreed on all 

requirements decisions. Additionally, we interviewed nine of the InService Engineering Agents from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Carderock Division-Ship Systems Engineering Station, and Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, who assessed the Port Royal, to 

learn what guidance they were given to conduct the assessment, how 

they conducted the assessment, and what criteria they employed. We 

also interviewed six of the Technical Warrant Holders in the Naval Sea 

Systems Command (NAVSEA) Engineering Directorate, who evaluated 

the Port Royal report as the Navy’s technical authority, and discussed 

their evaluation of the assessment and their understanding of the material 

condition of the Port Royal.

In addition, we interviewed representatives from the Navy’s Board of 

Inspection and Survey (INSURV) and the American Bureau of Shipping 

(ABS) and discussed their review of the Navy’s Port Royal report and 

their review findings. We interviewed officials from the Surface Warfare 

Directorate of NAVSEA to learn how they planned, conducted, and 

managed the material assessment of the Port Royal, developed cost 

estimates of repairs and modernizations, and prepared their report. We 

met with the analyst from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation, to discuss his review of the cost 

estimate contained in the Port Royal report. We also discussed the 

material assessment of the Port Royal with the Commanding Officer of 

the Port Royal, the Pearl Harbor Port Engineer for the Port Royal, and 

officials from the Navy’s Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning 

Program.

Finally, we discussed with officials from Program Executive Office, 

Integrated Weapons Systems, the cost estimate of combat systems 

modifications for the Port Royal. We reviewed the list of repairs and 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 20 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

upgrades and compared the Navy’s approach estimating the repair and 

upgrade costs against principles in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide.1

To evaluate the extent to which Navy’s decision to decommission the Port 

Royal aligns with current information and Navy decommissioning 

requirements, we examined the report and interviewed officials involved 

in preparing or reviewing the assessment. We interviewed officials from 

the staff of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Pacific Fleet, and 

Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific to learn the rationale for 

placing the Port Royal on the decommissioning list. We obtained 

technical-expert assessments of how the Port Royal compares to other 

ships in its class to determine whether a clear rationale among Navy 

stakeholders exists to decommission the Port Royal early. For example, 

we interviewed technical experts who had inspected Port Royal’s engines 

and other systems associated with weapons handling, oil pollution 

abatement, and components of the Aegis weapon system and asked 

them how these systems’ material condition compared with other cruisers 

and how they were affected by the 2009 grounding. We compared this 

information with Navy’s General Policy for the Inactivation, Retirement, 

and Disposition of U.S. Naval Vessels,

To determine the cost to 

complete Port Royal’s structural repairs, we reviewed the results of the 

Navy’s assessment, identified structural repairs documented in the 

assessment and confirmed, with Navy technical experts, that the items 

we selected were structural repairs, and then totaled the Navy’s cost 

estimates for these repairs.

2

To address our reporting objectives, we reviewed relevant documents 

and interviewed knowledgeable officials from the following DOD and Navy 

offices, as well as the independent industry board:

which lists relevant factors for 

ship retirements, and with the mandate language itself. We also analyzed 

information concerning the age of the Port Royal and its capabilities (e.g., 

ballistic-missile-capable versus not ballistic-missile-capable) relative to 

other cruisers.

 1

Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group, Operating and 

Support Cost-Estimating Guide (Washington, D.C.: October 2007).

2

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, General Policy for the Inactivation, Retirement, 

and Disposition of U.S. Naval Vessels, OPNAV Instruction 4770.5G (Washington, D.C.:

Feb. 6, 2009)
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 21 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation;

• Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV):

• OPNAV N43, N80, N9I;

• Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA):

• NAVSEA Engineering Directorate and Surface Warfare 

Directorate;

• In-Service Engineering Agents who inspected the Port Royal from 

NAVSEA Ship Systems Engineering Station and from Naval 

Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division;

• Program Executive Office, Integrated Weapons System;

• Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program;

• Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific:

• CG-73 Pearl Harbor Port Engineer;

• N43;

• Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command;

• U.S. Pacific Fleet:

• Force Structure;

• N43;

• Commanding Officer of the Port Royal;

• Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV); and

• American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).

We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to April 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 22 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 23 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 24 GAO-14-336 USS Port Royal

John H. Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Michael Ferren, Assistant Director; Robert Breitbeil; Kevin Keith; 

Amie Steele; and Richard Powelson.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(351825)
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