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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2272

K R Y S TA S UTT E R

F I E L D, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

C I T Y OF M I L W

AUKE E, et al., Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Eastern Distri ct o f Wi sconsi n. No. 11 -C- 04 86

— J. P. Sta dtm uel le r , Judg e.

A RGUE D O C T OB E R 25, 2012

— D E C I D E D M A Y 9, 2014

Before F L AUM

, M AN I O N

, and R OVN E R

, Circ uit Judges.

R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge. Kr ysta Sutt erfield sued the Ci ty of Milw aukee and sev eral of i ts poli ce of ficers after the offi cers forcibly enter ed h e r h om e to e ffe c tu a te a n e m e rgency detention for purposes of a mental healt h ev aluati on, opened a locked
co nt ai ner

, and seized for safekeeping the gun and concealed

carry li cens e s t hey found insi de. She contends that offi cers violated her r i ghts under the S econd, Fourt h, and F ourt eenth2 No. 12-2272
Amendments i n doin g so

. W e conclu de that the w arr antless entry i nto Sutt erfield ’s home w as justifi ed under the exigent ci rcums tances exception to the Fourth Amendm ent’s w arr ant req uir e ment, as the defendant o ffi cers had a reasonable basi s to beli ev e that Sutter fi eld posed an i mminent danger o f harm to herself. W

e shall assu me, as the di stric t court di d, t ha t t he search of a closed contai ner for a gun, and the ensuing sei zure of that gun, violated Sutt erfield ’s Four th Amendme nt rights. But w e agr ee wi th the di stric t court that ev en i f the offi cers di d exceed co nsti tutional boundari es, they are prot ected by quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. See Sutt erfiel d v
. City of Milwaukee, 870 F

. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. W i s. 2012). W e there fore affi rm the di stric t court’s deci si on to gr ant sum mary judgment in fav or of the defendants. I. At aro und noon on Mar ch 22, 2011, Dr

. Miche lle Bentle, a psychi atr i st at Columbi a/St

. Mar y’s Hospi tal in Milwaukee, placed a 911 call to repo rt that Sutt erfield had just left an outpatient appoi ntment in her offi ce after ex pressing sui ci dal t ho ug hts. Milwaukee poli ce offi cers Cli fton St ephens and

1 Ti mothy P ow ers w ere tasked to respond to the repo rt

. They contacted D r
. Bentle, who advis ed them that S utter fi eld, after i ndi cati ng that she had receiv ed some ba d ne ws, had remarked, “I guess I’ll go home and blo w my brai ns out.” Dr

. Bentle i ndi cated she w as concerned for Sutt erfield ’s safety and that poli ce i nterventi on w as w arr anted. She also informed the

Sutterf i el d di sputes the accuracy of the repo rt, b ut accepts tha t this i s 1 wha t the de fendant of fi cers wer e to l d.No. 12-2272 3
offi cers that Sutt erfield had w or n an empty gun holster to her appoi ntment, from whi ch she had surmi sed that Sut t e r field owned a gun. Ov er the next few hours, St ephens and P ow ers were unabl e t o locate Sutt erfield

. They vis i ted her home, knocked on t he front door

, but receiv ed no response. A nei ghbor advis ed them that Sutter fi eld had left her home that mornin g in her c ar and had not ret urned. The offi cers chec ked her gar age and the street i n front of Sutt erfield ’s resi dence but di d not see the type of car that her nei ghbor had described. At 2:45 p

. m. , Dr

. Bentle telephoned the offi cers to advis e them that Sutt erfield had called her some minutes earlier statin g that she w as not in need of assi stance and t hat the doctor should “call off” the poli ce search for her

. Accordi ng to the offi cers, Dr

. Bentle di d not indi cate that Sutt e r fie ld no longer posed a danger t o herself.
Wi th th e end of their shi ft approachi ng, St ephens and P ow ers prepar ed a St atement of Emergency Detention by Law Enforcement Offi cer (“statement of detention”) pursuant to Wi scons i n St atutes secti on 51.15. In relev ant part, secti on 51.15 prov i des that a law enforcement offi cer may take a person into
cus to d y wh e n he has caus e to beli ev e that the person i s mentally ill and evidenc es “[a] sub stanti al probabi li ty of physi cal harm to hi mself or herself as mani fested by evidenc e of recent threat s of or atte mpts at suicide o r seri ous bodi ly harm.” § 51.15(1)( a)(1)

. The statute speci fi es a set of procedures that mus t be follow ed in effectuating such a detention. In Milw aukee County

, the law enforceme nt offi cer mus t si gn a statement of detention whi ch, inter alia, “shall prov i de detailed4 No. 12-2272 speci fi c i nformation concerning the recent ov er t a ct , atte mpt,
or threat to act or omi ssi on on whi ch the beli ef under sub [sec

tio]n (1) [here, that the person poses a danger to hi mself ] i s based and the names of the persons observing or repo rt ing the

r e cent ov ert act, atte mpt, or threat to act or omi ssio n. ” § 51.15(4)( a). Signing such a statement knowi ng the information contai ned there i n to be false i s deemed a felony offense. § 51.15(12). Upon presentin g the indi vidu al—along wi th the st a tement of detention— to an appropr i ate tr eatment faci li ty , the tr eatment di recto r of that faci li ty (or hi s desi gnee) mus t deter mine wi thi n 24 hours whether the indi vidu a l sh o uld be detain ed for a period of up to 72 ho urs. § 51.15(4)(b). If the faci li ty deter mines that the person d oes not meet the cri ter i a set fort h in secti on 51.20(1)( a) o f the W i scons in S tatut es to det ain an i ndi vidu al for purpos e s o f an in-pati ent mental health
ev aluati on (the fi rst step in the inv oluntary commi tment process), the person must be released i mmedi ately

. Id. If the 2 faci li ty di recto r deci des to detain the indi vidu al, the di recto r may supp lement i n wri tin g the statement of detent i on prepared by the law enforcement offi cer and inclu de other pert i nent i nformation indi cating that the indi vidu al meets the cri ter i a for commi tment; the di recto r also mus t desig na t e whether the i n d i vidu al i s, inter alia , mentally i ll. Id. The di recto r mus t promptly fi le the or ig ina l statement, inclu ding any

In relevan t pa rt, sectio n 52 .20 (1 )(a) requir es tha t a peti tio n seeki ng such 2

an eva l uatio n all ege tha t the perso n i s menta l l y i l l , d r u g d e p e ndent, or develo pmentall y di sab l ed, and tha t there i s a sub stan tial pro b ab i l i ty tha t he may harm himsel f, as evidenced b y rece nt threats of or attempts at suici de
or seri ous bodi l y harm.No. 12-2272 5
supp lement, a long wi th a notic e of detention, wi th the local probat e court. Id. The statem e nt of detention prepar ed by St ephens and P ow ers documented the perti nent information that Dr

. Bentle ha d shared wi th them about Sutt erfield and noted their i nabi li ty to locate her

. Both office r s si gned the statement. At 4:00 p.m., Stephens and Pow ers w ent off duty

. Offi cer Jami e Hewi tt of t he Sensi tiv e Crimes Divis i on
s ub s e qu e n tly wa s assi gned to locate Sutt erfie l d

. Af te r s p e n d in g sev eral ho urs rev i ewing the paperw or k, tr acking down in for m a ti on re ga rd in g Su tt e rf i e l d ’s a u to m ob i le and havin g that i nformation i ssu ed to Milw aukee patro l offi cers, and chec kin g wi th local hospi tals to see whether Sutt erfield had been admi tte d, Hewi tt and sev eral other offi cers ret urned to Sutt er
fi eld’s resi dence. Hewi tt’ s intent w as to execute the statement of detention i f and when sh e located S utter fi eld. A r r iv i ng on Sutt erfield ’s door step at approx i mately 8:30 p.m., Hewi tt and the other offi cers found her at home. Sutt er
fi eld answered Hewi tt’ s knock at the front door but w ould not engage wi th her

, except to state repeat edly that she had “called off” the poli ce and to keep shu tting the door on He wit t. Sutt erfield w ould no t admi t Hewi tt to the resi dence, and duri ng the exchange kept the outer stor m d oor closed and l o ck ed. Unable to gain admi ttance to the house, Hewi t t conclu ded that the poli ce w ould hav e to enter it forcibly

. Consi stent wi th poli ce department procedure, Hewitt requested that a supervis or y offi cer b e di spatched to the house. Ser geant Aaro n Berk en arr i v ed at approx i mately 9:00 p.m. After Hewi tt brought hi m up to speed on the si tuation, Berk en6 No. 12-2272
knocked at t he front door and i denti fi ed hi mself as a poli ce offi cer

. As she had wi th Hewi tt, Sutt erfield opened the inner door of the house but not the locked st o rm door ; she refused to admi t Berk en or any other o ff ice r into the resi dence. Sutt erfield called 911 in an effor t to hav e the offi cers leave; as
a result of that call, the ensuing e vents w ere recor ded by the emerge ncy call center . Sutt erfield can b e heard on the recor ding t elling the offi cers that she w as fine and that she di d no t

w ant any one to enter her r esi dence. After i nforming Sutt erfield of hi s intention to open the stor m door forcibly if sh e d id not unlock i t herself, Berk en y anked the doo r open and enter ed the house wi th the other offi cers to take cu stody of Sutt erfield pursuant to the statement of detention. A bri ef strugg le ensued. Sutt erfield can be heard
on the 911 recor ding demanding both that the offi cers let go of her and that they leav e her home. (Sutter fi eld w ould later say that the offi cers tackled her .) Sutt erfield w as handcuffed and placed in the offi cers’ cus tody

. At that poin t the offi cers conduc te d a prot ecti v e sweep of the home. In the kitch en, offi cer James Flor i a ni o bser v ed a comp a ct di sc carry i ng case in plain view

. He pi cked up the 3 soft-si ded case, whi ch w as locked, and surmi sed from the feel and wei ght of i ts contents that there mi ght be a fi rear m insi de. He then forced the case open and di scov ered a semi -automatic

Sutterf i el d av ers tha t the case was not actua l l y i n pl ain v i ew b ut i nstead 3

was wi thin an opaque ba g. The d i stric t court de termi ned that she ha d no t preser v ed a d i spute of fact on this poi nt i n respo nding to the def e ndant s’ statem ent of mat eri al facts be l o w. 8 70 F. Supp. 2d at 63 6 n.1. Sutterf i el d
conce des the p oi nt fo r purp oses o f thi s appeal.No. 12-2272 7 handgun i nsi de; a y ellow smi ley-face sti cker w as affi xed to the barrel of the gun, cov erin g t he muzzle. Also insi de the case
w ere concealed- carry fi rear m li cens es from multi ple j ur i sdi ctions other than Wi scons in. E l sewhere in the kitch en the offi cers di scov er e d a B B gun made to realis tic ally resemble a Glock 29 handgun. The contents of the case w ere sei zed along wi th the BB gun a nd placed i nto poli ce inv entor y for safekeeping. Berk en
w ould later state that he authorized the sei zure of the handgun i n o rder to k eep them out o f the hands of a juv eni le, should a juv eni le en t e r t he house unac compani ed by an adult whi le Sutt erfield remain ed in the hospi tal. (The police k new that Sutt e r fie l d had a son, whom they beli ev ed to be a juv eni le, although hi s sp eci fi c age w as unknown.) F loriani w ould later testif y that he beli ev ed i t appropr i ate to take both the handgun and BB gun i nto cus tody so that Sutt erfield, when released from the hospi tal, w ould not be a bl e t o use the handgun to commi t sui ci de or the BB g un t o p ro v oke a poli ce offi cer to shoot her

. Flor i ani and another offi cer sub sequently t r ansported Sutt erfield to the Milwaukee County Mental Health Complex,
a p sychi atr i c hospi tal whi ch, among other thi ngs, prov i de s short-te rm i n-pati ent and cri si s man agement care for persons i n mental di stress. What occurred there i s not part of the recor d and, in any ev ent, i s not relev ant to the clai ms made in thi s li tigati on. Sutt erfield fi led sui t pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 again st the ci ty and the i ndi vidu al offi cers inv olv ed in the inci dent, challen gin g the w arr antless entry into her home, the sei zure of8 No. 12-2272
her person, the search o f the case c ontaining the g un, and the sei zure of the gun i tself along wi th the concealed- carry li cens es. She contends that these acts violated her rights under the Four th Amendment (as made a p pli cable to the St ates thro ugh the Four teenth Amendment), and that the sei zure of the rev olv er addi tionally violated her rights under the Second Amendment. The di stric t court gr anted sum mary judg me nt to the offi cers on these clai ms in a thought ful opin i on. 870 F

. Supp. 2d 633. Beli eving that Sutt erfield w as not contestin g the sei zure of her person, see id. at 643, the c ourt focus ed i ts atte nti on on the

w arr antless entry i nto her home, the search of the locked case, and the ensuing sei zure of S utter fi eld’s handgun

. Id. at 637. The co ur t tr eated the entry into Sutt erfield ’s home as presumpti v ely i nv ali d, as the poli ce had no w arr ant. Id. at 637- 38. It proceeded to consi der whether the entry w as nonetheless justifi ed under ei ther the co mm unity caretak ing or exigent ci rcums tances exceptions to the Four th Amendment w a r r ant requirement. The court deter min ed that the commu ni ty caretak er exception, on whi ch the defendants prim arily relied, di d not justif y the entr y

. Id

. at 640. The court reasoned that although the Wi scons in courts had deemed that exception appli cable in a “broad sw ath of si tuations,” id. , the Sev enth Ci rcui t had not done so. Indeed, i n United States v
. Pichany, 687 F .2d 204, 208-09 (7th Ci r
. 1982), w e had exp r e ss ly rej ected the government’s
e ff o rt to apply the exception bey ond the automobil e conte x t

. 870 F . Supp. 2d at 640.No. 12-2272 9
The court thought that the exigent ci rcums tances exception mi ght justif

y the w arr ant l e ss entry into Sutt erfield ’s home, although i t ulti mately abstained from a deci si on on that poin t. The court noted at the outset that thi s exception required the authoriti es to make “a fai rly stro ng s h owing that the surroundi ng ci rcums tances w ere so sev ere as to justif y a departur e from the w arr ant requirement.” Id. at 638 (ci t ing United States v
. Patino , 830 F .2d 1413, 1415 (7th Ci r
. 1987)). In Patino , thi s court had ci ted a 3 0 -m i nute w ai t for backup before effectuating a
w arr antless entry int o a resi dence as evidenc e that there w as no exigency

, as the w ai tin g offi cers could hav e sought a search and/or arr est w arr ant duri ng that tim e period. Id. at 1415-16. In thi s case, more than nine hours had tr anspi red after the poli ce
w ere fir st no t i fi ed of the sui ci de threat before the offi cers enter ed Sutt erfield ’s home. 870 F

. Supp. 2d at 638. On the other hand, they w ere also executin g a secti on 51.15 statement authorizing Sutt erfield ’s detention for a mental health ev aluation, and the courtunderstood that s tate ment to fun cti on as a quasi -arrest w arr ant. Id. at 639. Ev en i f a statement of detention cannot fulfi ll the ro le of a w arr ant giv en the lack of judi ci al i nv olv ement, the co urt reasoned, the offi cers could hav e thought that the statement a ut ho rized them to take such acti ons as w ere necess ary to detain Sut t e rfi eld, inclu ding enter i ng her home. Id. Mor eov er , the offi cer s w ere acting to prot ect li fe or to forestal l seri ous injury , an intere st that the court recog ni zed can justif y poli ce acti on whi ch w ould other wi se be i llegal absent an exigency or emerg e nc y

. Id. (ci tin g Brigham City

, Utah v
. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006))

. The di stric t court ulti mately conclu ded that i t w as unnec essary to deci de whether the w arr antless en tr y10 No. 12-2272

i nto Sutt erfield ’s home w as consti tutionally permi ssi ble, giv en i ts sub sequent conclu si on t ha t the offi cers w ere entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty on the u nlawf ul entry clai m. Id. at 639- 40.
T urning to the sear ch of Sutt erfield ’s home, the court reasoned that a cursory sweep of the premi ses, whi ch brought the compact di sc case to the offi cers’ atte nti on, w as legally permi ssi ble notwi thstanding the lack of a search w arr ant. The court relied on Maryla nd v
. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S

. C t

. 1093 (1990), whi ch authorizes offi cers making an in-home arrest t o conduct a prot ecti v e sweep of the premi ses to deter mine whether other persons are present. Here, th e offi cers w ere present i n Sutt erfield ’ s home as the result of her doctor ’s 911 call. Sutt erfield had not answered the offi cers when sh e w as asked whether any one else w as present in the ho me

. (T he i nqui ry , and Sutt erfield ’s lack of response, can be heard on the 911 recor ding of t he e nc o unt er .) Mor eov er , as a result of the i nformation prov i ded by her physi ci an, the offi cers beli ev ed that she had a gun. And the ov erall encounter w as, in the court’s w or d, “ t e ns e.” 870 F

. Supp. 2d at 640. Under these ci rcums tances, the court deemed i t appropr i ate for the offi cers to make a cursory i nspec tion of the premi ses t o d eter mine i f
someone else mi ght be present. Id. at 640-41. That permi ssi ble
sear ch led to the di scov ery of the compact di sc cas e in t he kitch en, whi ch w as in plain si ght. Id. at 641. The search of that case, and the ens uing s ei zure of the gun i nsi de, w as “ [o]f much gr eater concern” to the court. Id. The li mi ted search authorized by Bui e d id not ext end to the contents o f a locked case. Although Flor i ani indi cated that when he pi cked up the case, i t felt as i f i t mi ght contai n a gun,No. 12-2272 11
the court poin ted out that the case could hav e held “practic ally anythin g.” Id. As the search of the case w as unauthorized, the court acknowledged that both the opening of the case and the sei zure of the gun found insi de li kely consti tuted violati ons of Sutt erfield ’s Fourt h Amendmen t r i ghts. Id. The court r ejecte d Sutt erfield ’s contention that the sei zure of the gun and concealed- carr y li cens es also consti tuted a violati on of her Second Amendment rights on the facts of thi s case. In the court’s view , nei ther McDonald v
. City of Chicago , 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2 0 1 0 ), nor Dist. of Columbia v
. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2 7 8 3 (2008), forecloses the possi bi li ty that an i ndi vidu al’s fi rear m may be sei zed by the p o li ce for certain purposes. 870 F

. Supp. 2d at 642. Other wi se, the court reasoned, any sei zure of a gun by the authorit ie s— if take n as e vi d e n c e, for example—mi ght c on s titu te a Se c on d Am e n d m e n t violati on. Id. Although t he court had found i t “likely” that S utter fi eld’s Four th Amendment rights had been violated, the co ur t di scerned no basi s t o hold Milw aukee li able for the violati on. Id. at 642-43. Sutt erfield had i denti fi ed no muni ci pal poli cy , cus tom, or practic e as necess ary to supp or t a clai m again st the ci ty under Monell v
. Dep’t o f Soc. Servs. of N.Y

. , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). The court theor i zed that Sutt erfield perhaps could arg ue that i t w as an unc onsti tutional practic e for the ci ty to follow secti on 51.15 by requiring that the subject of a secti on 51.15 statement be take n into cus tody no matter the ci rcum-12 No. 12-2272

stances, but S utter fi eld had not made such an arg ument. 870

4 F

. Supp. 2d at 643. Consequently , only the indi vidu al offic e r s had a ny prospectiv e li abi li ty

. (Sutter fi eld has not challen ged thi s asp ect of the dis tr i ct court’s deci si on.) The court conclu ded that th e offi cers, assu ming they had violated Sutt erfield ’s Four th Amendment rights, w ere entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. Id. a t 6 4 3 -44. The only aspect of the encounter ov er whi ch they may hav e lacked di screti on w as the deci si on to detain Sutt erfield, whi ch the court beli ev ed she had not contested. Id. at 643. The court noted that the ci rcums tances of the encounter

, i f they di d not quali fy as exigent, w ere nearly so; a nd the boundari es separating exigent from non-exi gent ci rcums tances w ere not so clear as t o hav e placed the offi cers on notic e that their conduc t exceeded the bounds of the exigent ci rcums tances exception. Id. at 644. At the same tim e, giv en the breadth that the W i scons in courts had attr ibu t e d to the
commu ni ty caretak er exception, the offi cers could hav e thought that thi s exception allow ed them to enter Sutt erfield ’s home, to perfor m a w arr antless search of th e premi ses, i nclu ding the compact di sc case, and to sei ze the gun they found insi de of that case. Id. Whi le the Sev enth Ci rcui t has refused t o read the C o mmu ni ty Care[tak er] exemption nearly as expansiv e l y as Wi scons in, and w ould thus seem to bind thi s

Bo th Hewitt and Berke n i ndic ated i n thei r d epo siti ons tha t they 4 understoo d department pol i cy to essential l y requir e them to execute the 51 .15 statem e nt b y taking Sutterf i el d i nto custody regardl ess of wha t trans pi red at her home, suggesting tha t the deci sio n to sei ze her perso n was not a di screti onary call o n their part.No. 12-2272 13
Court to find that such an exemption clearly d o e s no t apply , the Court cann o t expect that poli ce offi cers are sch ooled in t he nuanc es of the law as i t di ffers by jurisdi cti on. The poli ce mus t be able to act deci si v ely to prev ent inj ur y to ci tizens, especi ally when they are acti ng upon i nformatio n fr om a thi rd party whom i t
seems reasonable to beli ev e i s tellin g the truth, such as Dr

. Bentle i n t hi s case. By enter ing Ms. Sutt erfield ’s ho me, searching i t, and sei zing the i tems that t he y beli ev ed to pose a danger to bot h M s. Sutt erfield and member s o f the commu ni ty who may (though i t w as unli kely) happen upon those i tems, the offi cers acted in that deci si v e, though di screti onary w ay; and, under the laws of W i scons i n, doi ng so w as not clearly unlawfu l. Id. (internal quot ation marks and c i tations omi tte d). II. Sutt erfield challen ges each aspect of the di stric t co ur t ’ s sum mary judgment deci si on, sav e for t he court’s deter mination that the recor d lacked evidenc e suffi ci ent to hold Milw aukee li able under Monell for any of the consti tutional violati ons asserted i n thi s case. So only the li abi li ty of the indi vidu al ofi cers i s at i ssu e. Sutt erfield contends, in su m, that the poli ce offi cers’ w arr antless e ntry into her home, the sei zure of her person, the search of the locked compact di sc ca se , and the sei zure of the rev olv er and th e concealed carry li cens es di scov ered there i n all violated her rights under the Four th and Four teenth Amendm ents, and that the sei zure of the gun and li cens es also viola te d h e r ri ghts under the Second Amendment. She furth e r co ntends that becau se these rights w ere clearly14 No. 12-2272
establi shed (in her view ), the offi cers do not e nj oy quali fi ed i mmu ni ty from sui t. Before w e turn to the merits of Sutt er
fi eld’s clai ms, w e feel compelled to say a few w or ds about the i mport ance of the competing i ntere sts at stake in thi s cas e. The i ntrusi ons upon Sutt erfield ’s priv acy w ere profo und. At the core of the priv acy prot ected by the Four th Amendment i s the right to be let alone in one’s home. See, e.g. , Kyllo v
. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041-42 (2001) (cit ing Silve rman v
. Unit e d S ta te s , 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S. Ct. 679, 683 (1961)) ; P ay ton v
. N.Y

. , 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381-82 (1980). I n t his case, poli ce enter ed Sutt erfield ’s home forcibly and wi thout a w arr ant, again st her expr ess wis he s. O nc e i nsi de of her home, they sei zed her person, ag a in employin g f or ce becau se she resi sted. They then searched the premi ses of the house, disc o ver ed the locked compact di sc ca se , br oke i t open, and sei zed her gun and concealed carr y li cens es, all wi thout a search w arr ant. Fin ally , pursu a nt t o secti on 51.15, they too k Sutt erfield to the Milw aukee Mental Health Complex for an (inv oluntary ) ev aluati on. Although the offi cers too k each of these acti ons for benev olent reasons, from Sutt erfield ’s perspecti v e—and from the perspecti v e of any one i n a si mi lar si tuation who di d not wi sh assi stance—these w ere se r ious i ntrusi ons upon the sanc tity of her home and her person. On the other hand, courts from the Uni ted St ates Supreme Court on down hav e long recog ni zed the i mport ant ro le that poli ce play i n safeguarding indi vidu als from dangers posed to themse lv es and other s—a ro le that wi ll, in appropr i ate ci rcums tances, permi t searches and sei zures made wi thout the judi ci al sanc tion of a w arr ant. See, e.g. , Brigham City , U ta h v
.No. 12-2272 15
Stuart, supra , 547 U.S. at 403-04, 126 S. Ct. at 1947 (collecting cases ); Mincey v
. Ariz. , 437 U.S. 385, 392 & nn.6-7, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 & nn.6-7 (1978) (sam e). Her e, the Milwaukee poli ce had been co nt a ct ed by Sutt erfield ’s physi ci an wi th a concern that Sutt e rfi eld mi ght harm herself. Wi scons in law sets fort h an emerge ncy detention procedure to deal wi th preci sely thi s sort of si tuation. Pursu ant to secti on 51.15, a statement authorizing Sutt erfield ’s emerge ncy detention w as prepar ed, and pol ice executed that statement when they enter ed Sutt erfield ’s home and too k her i nto t he ir cus tody

. They look ed for

, di scov ered, and sei zed her fi rear m out o f concern for Sutt erfield ’s safety
a nd that of any minor who mi ght enter her home in he r absenc e. There i s no suggesti on that they acted for any reason other than to pr ote ct Sutt erfield from harm. Thi s case there fore requires us to balanc e Sutt erfield ’s priv acy i nt e r e st s, as prot ected by the Four th Amendment, again st a commu ni ty intere st—and fr a nkly Sutt erfield ’s own i ntere st—i n prot ecting her from harm, inclu ding self- infli cted harm. Asi de from the i mport ance of these competing intere sts,
sev er a l ci rcums tances make our jo b more di ffi cult. First, the parties ha ve g i v en us virtually no information as to the alter nati v es other than emerge ncy detention pursuant to secti on 51.15 t ha t w ere av ai lable to the Milwaukee poli ce in thi s s i tu a ti on. Sutt erfield , for example, frequently speaks about the lack of a w arr ant but has not addresse d what type of

w arr ant, i f any

, w ould hav e been appropr i ate and av ai lable in the ci rcum st a nc es confronting the poli ce. Her bri efs seem to

v iew the case thro ugh the lens of cri minal law enforcement when the case plainly does not fi t that model. Mor eov er , as w e shall di scu ss, ther e a l so persi sts a lack of clari ty in Four th16 No. 12-2272
Amendment case law as to the appropr i ate legal framew or k that should be appli ed to w arr antless intrusi ons motiv ated by purposes other than law enforcement and evidenc e-gather ing. It will no doubt be frustrating to Sutt erfield and to the reader that w e do not reach fi rm conclu si ons as to the merits of all of the clai ms she has asserted and instead, li ke the di stric t court, resolv e the case in part based on the doctrine of quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. W e recog ni ze the si gni fi cant ro le that resolv ing the merits of each clai m plays in the dev elopment of precedent and clari fyi ng the boundari es of consti tutional rights. See Pearson v
. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). But giv en the i mport ance of the intere sts at stake, the lack of clari ty in the
case law , and the s hallownes s of the b riefing as to the alter nativ es av ai lable to the poli ce on the facts presented here, w e beli ev e that the tent a tiv e nature of some of our analysi s i s appropr i ate. W e now turn to the merits of Sutter fi eld’s clai ms. A. Detention of Sutter fi eld Our di scu ssi on of the fi rst clai m may be bri ef. Although Sutt erfield i nsi sts that, contrar y to the di stric t court’s beli ef, she has challen ged the defendants’ sei zure of her per son as being contrar y to t he Four th Amendment, she has not adequately devel o ped any such arg ument. She does not contest that her physi ci an repo rt ed that she had threat ened to do herself harm. Furt her , there i s no di spute that, in li ght of the doctor ’s repo rt, there w as a v ali d basi s to pursue an emerge ncy detention of Sutt erfield under secti on 51.15, that the poli ce compli ed wi th the requirements of that st a t ut e , or that the statute (and the sta t e ment completed by offi cers St ephens and P ow ers)No. 12-2272 17
authorized the s ei zure of Sutt erfield

. Sutt erfield suggests that the statute i s un consti tutional to the ext ent that i t permi ts the sei zure of a person wi thout t he a ut horizati on of a judi ci al offi cer

. But she fai ls to supp or t her contention wi th any ci tation of author i ty o r leg al analysi s. W e no t e that Sutt erfield ’s posi tion presumes that prior judi ci al approv al i s required when a person i s detain ed not becau se she i s sus pected of a cri me but r a t he r be caus e she i s beli ev ed to pose a danger to herself. In that respect, she makes
no di sti ncti on betw een the law enforcement a nd commu ni ty caretak i ng func tions of the poli ce. Her arg ument, moreo v er , calls i nto questi on the consti tutionali ty not only of Wi scons in’s
sec t io n 51.15, but a host of comparable prov i si ons found in other state codes. Many i f not most st a t e s hav e prov i si ons authorizing the emerg ency detention of indi vidu als based o n i nformation indi cating that the y p o se a danger to themselv es
or other s. See T

reat ment Adv ocacy Center , Emer gency Hospitalizat ion f or Evaluation—Assisted Psychiatric T reatment Standards by State ( June 2011), av ai lable at http://t re a t mentadv ocacy ce nt e r
. o r g / st o r a g e / d o cu me nt s / E m e r g e n c y

_ H o s p it a l iz a t io n_ for_Ev aluati on.pdf (last vis i ted May 9, 2014). Although the speci fi cs of such stat utes v ary , they commonly do not require prior judi ci al approv al of the emerge ncy detention. See, e.g. , 405 Ill. Comp. St at. 5/3-601 - 5/3- 603 (authorizing inv oluntary admi ssi on of person to mental health faci li ty wh e n adult presents petiti on to faci li ty indi cating admi ssi on i s n e c e ssary to prot ect self or other s from harm, detailing s i gns or symptoms of mental i llness, and describing relev ant ac ts, threat s, behavi or , and so fort h; petiti on mus t be accomp a nied by statement of qualif i ed exper t and if none i mmedi ately av ai lable, per son18 No. 12-2272
may be detain ed for purposes of exami nati on by such exper t); Indi ana Code § 12-26-5- 1 (authorizing detention of person for no more than 72 hou r s o n wr i tte n appli cati on of indi vidu al

s e ttin g for th beli ef admi tte d person i s mentally i ll or dangerou s and i n need of i mmedi ate restr aint, tog ether wi th statement of at least one physi ci an indi cating person may be mentally i ll or dangero us)

. Our poin t is no t to suggest that the sort of emerge ncy detention authorized by secti on 51.15 and si mi lar st a tutes in other states necess arily i s consti tutional. Our poin t, instead, i s that giv en the ubi qui ty o f su ch s tatut es, and the legi tim acy of the i ntere sts in both personal and publi c safe t y un derlying
such statutes, a contention that an emerge ncy detention i s per se unc onsti tutional wi thout prior judi ci al authorizati on demands much more th a n a c on c l u s ory arg ument to that effect. Sutt erfield has w ai v ed any clai m tha t he r detention w as unlaw ful absent the prior appro v al of a judge. See, e.g. , Flu ker

v
. Cnty. of Kankakee, 741 F .3d 787, 795 (7th C ir

. 2013) (per func

tor y and undev eloped arg uments w ai v ed). See al s o In re Commitmen t of Louise M. , 555 N.W .2d 807, 810 (W is. 1996) (finding that procedures for inv oluntary detention set fort h in secti on 51.15 sati sfy the requirements of du e pro cess ).
B. Entry i nto S utter fi eld’s Home The di stric t court, as noted, found that the w arr antless entry i nto Sutt erfield ’s home mi ght be justifi ed on the basi s of the exigent ci rcu m s tan c es doctrine. Sutt erfield focus es the bulk of her arg ument on thi s possi bi li ty , contending that in view of the pass age of nine hours betw een her physi ci an’s ini tial phone call to the poli ce and the poin t a t wh ich poli ce sought entryNo. 12-2272 19

i nto h e r h om e, the c i rcums tances cannot be desribed as exigent,
as there w as ample oppor tuni ty for the poli ce to o bt a in a
w arr ant. She adds that her own conduc t in refusing to open the door to her home and admi t the poli ce cannot be sai d to hav e created an ex i gency where none o therwis e exis ted. There are t hr e e doctrines or exceptions to the w arr ant requirement that hav e bee n r a ise d at one poin t or another in thi s case as possi

ble justifi cati ons for the w arr antless entry into Sut ter fi eld’s home: the commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine, the emerge ncy ai d doctrine, and the exigent cir cum stances doctrine. For the reasons that follow , w e beli ev e that the entry i nto Sutt erfield ’s home w as justifi ed by the emerge ncy aid doctrine, whi ch the Supreme Court has deemed a sub set of the exigent ci rcums tances doctrine. But as there i s some degr ee of
ov erlap b etw een the doctr ines, the di stincti ons betw een them
are not alw ays clear

, and all three doctrines are, to some degr ee, imp l icated i n thi s case, w e begin wi th a short di scu ssi on of each. 5

Scho l ars hav e frequentl y remarked on the l ack of cl arity i n j u d i ci al 5 articul atio n and appli catio n of the three do ctri nes. See, e.g. , Megan Pauli ne Mari nos, Co mment, Breaking and Entering or Community Caretaking? A Solution to th e Ov erb road Exp ansion of th e Inventory Search , 22 G EO

. M ASO N U. C IVI L R IG HT S L. J. 24 9, 26 1 (20 12 ) (“Over the years, state an d f eder al co urts hav e muddl ed the di stincti on b etween the emergency aid exceptio n to the warrant requir ement and the community caretaking exceptio n to the pro b ab l e cause and warrant requir ements.”); Mi chael R. Dimi no, Sr. , Police Pat ernalis m: Community Caretaking, Assis tance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonab lenes s , 6 6 W ASH

. & L EE L. R EV

. 14 85 , 14 94 (2 00 9) (“ The

v agueness surro unding the def i ni tio n of the community- caretaking category an d the di ffe rent stan dards governing the consti tutio nali ty of (co ntinued. ..)20 No. 12-2272
The commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine recog ni zes that poli ce someti mes ta k e a cti ons no t for any cri minal law enforcement purpose but rat her to prot ect members of the publi c; searches (inclu ding home entr i es) c onducted for the latter purpose are d e e m ed exempt from the Four th Amendment w arr ant requ i re
ment. The doctrine w a s fi rst recog ni zed by the Uni ted St ates Supreme Court i n Cady v
. Dombrowsk i, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2 5 23 (1973), whi ch sus tain ed the w arr antless search of an automobil e i n poli ce cus tody that w as conduc ted as a matter of
ro uti ne for a purpose “tot ally di v or ced from the detection, i nv esti gation, or acqui siti on of evidenc e relat ing to the violation of a cri minal statute,” id. a t 4 41, 93 S. Ct. at 2528. As w e shall see, state and federal courts hav e di vided ov er the scope of the commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine recog ni zed in Cady

. Thi s court, taking the narro w view , has confined the d o ct rine to automobil e searches. United Stat e v. Pichany, supra , 687 F .2d at 207-09. Pichany rules out the commu ni ty caretak er doctrine as a basi s whi ch mi ght justify the w arr antless entry into

( ...c onti nued) 5 di ff e r e nt types of community- caretaking searches i ndic ate tha t more preci sio n is needed . There i s not a singl e community- caretaking do ctri ne. Ra ther, there are sev eral di ffe rent community- caretaking do ctri nes, b ut
cour ts hav e not cl arif i ed the consti tutio nal i nterests affected b y those di ffe rent kinds ofs earches.”) ; Deb or ah Tuerkheimer, Exig ency, 49 A RIZ

. L. R EV

. 80 1, 81 2 n. 60 (2 00 7) (“ the state ofthe case l aw in this area is re markab l y confused”) ; Mary El i zab eth Naumann , Note , The Community Caretaker Doct rine: Yet Anoth er Fourth Amendm ent Exc eption , 26 A M

. J. C RIM

. L. 32 5, 36 5 (1 99 9) (“ A review of b oth fed eral and state case l aw reveals a l ack of consi stency i n the def i niti on and b ounda r i es of the community caretaker do ctri ne tha t contro l the judgment exerci sed b y the of f i c e rs i n these situati ons.” ).No. 12-2272 21
Su tt erfield ’s home, as the di stric t court recog ni ze d

. B u t b e c a u s e the Wi scons i n courts—whi ch, li ke th e co urt, possess the authority and i ndeed the obli gation to interpr et and apply the Four th Amendment, see Bur gess v
. Lowery, 201 F .3d 942, 945-46 (7 t h Ci r
. 2000)

— hav e accorded a much broader sweep to th e commu ni ty caretak er doctrine, and thi s w ould hav e giv en the defendants reason to beli ev e that the e nt r y w as justifi ed, a
more detailed di scu ssi on of Cady and i ts prog eny i s called for

. In Cady, Wi scons i n poli ce offi cers searched t he t r unk of a rente d au to m ob i le that had been di sabled in a one-car acci dent. The obviousl y i ntox i cated driv er of the car , Dombrowski, had i nformed the offi cers tha t he w as a Chi cago poli ceman. Beli eving that Chi cago poli ce offi cers w ere required to carry their service rev olv ers wi th them at all tim es, the W i sconsin poli ce look ed for a gun o n Dombrowski ’s person and in the glove compartment and front seat o f the car , but they did not find one. The ca r w as tow ed to a local (pri v ate) gar age and Dombrowski w as take n into cus tody for drunken driving. Later that night, an offi cer visi ted the gar age to s earch the c ar again for Dombrowski ’s rev olv er; the search w as described as a matter of ro uti ne practic e wi thi n the local poli ce department. When the offi cer opened t he l o ck ed tr unk of the car , he di scov ered clothin g a n d other i tems wi th blood on them. When Dombrowski w as co nf r o nted wi th those i tems, he di rected poli ce to a body on hi s brot her’s farm. Do mbrowski w as ulti mately charged wi th murder , and t he it e ms di scov ered in the tr unk of the car w ere admi tte d at tr i al as evidenc e. Dombrowski w as convic ted. On habeas rev i ew , thi s court agr eed wi th Dombrowski tha t t he sear ch of the car tr unk violated hi s Four th Ame nd me nt rights, as there w as no22 No. 12-2272 exigency that mi ght hav e justifi ed a w arr antless search. Dombrowsk i v
. Cady, 471 F .2d 280, 283-84 (7t h Ci r
. 1972) (2-1 deci si on). The Supreme Courtrev ersed. The Court in C ad y sus tain ed the search of car tr unk as a legiti mate exer ci se of the poli ce force’s commu ni ty caretak ing func tion. After fi rst noting that the touchstone of the Four th Amendment i s “reasonableness,” id. a t 439, 93 S. Ct. at 2527, the Court poin ted out that i t had long di stingui shed auto mobi le searches from searches of the home, both becau se cars are i nherently mobi le, lending greater justifi cati on to w arr antless searches, and becau se the hi ghly-reg ulated st a t us of moto r
v ehi cles bri ngs the poli ce into fr e q ue nt contact wi th automobi les—and any contents, inc l uding contraband, whi ch are in plain view —for reasons unrelated to the inv e s ti ga ti on of cri me. Id. at 440-42, 93 S. Ct. at 2527-28. In thi s case, the poli ce had been compelled to assu me cus tody of Dombrowski ’s rental car becau se Dombrowski hi mself w as unabl e to drive and becau se the w recked v ehi cle other wi se presented a nui sanc e upon the
ro adw ay

. Id. at 442 -4 3 , 93 S. Ct. at 2529. After they too k
cus tody of the car

, poli ce had f ollow ed what t he low er court s had deter mined to be standard oper atin g procedure in se arching the car for Dombrowski ’s service rev olv er

. Th a t search w as conduc ted n ot for evidenc e-gather ing purposes but rat her for safety reasons: the car had been tow ed to a gar age lot whi ch w as not secu red, leav ing a ny gun insi de acces si ble to

v andals. Id. at 443, 448, 93 S. Ct. at 2529, 2531. Thus, the search, al t ho ug h uns upporte d by a w arr ant, consti tuted a legiti mate
exer ci se of the poli ce force’s commu ni ty caretak ing functi on. Id. at 447-48, 93 S. Ct . at 2531.No. 12-2272 23 Cady ’s ho lding has sinc e ev olv ed into a rule authorizing a ro uti ne, w arr antless inv entor y sea r ch of an automobil e lawfu lly i m p oun d e d by the poli ce. In South Dako ta v
. Opperman , 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976), for example , t he C ourt
su st a i ned the search of a car whi ch had been i mpounded by poli ce after i t w as left parke d i llegally in a restr i cted zone; the search had unearthed mari juana in the veh i cle’s glove compartment. Af

te r re i te ra tin g Ca dy ’s rat i onale and adding that the i ndi vidu al has a lesser expectat i on of priv acy in the automobil e than i n the home, id. at 367-69, 96 S. Ct. at 3096, the Court noted that a ro uti ne i nv entor y search of an i mpounded v ehi cle
serv es multi ple ne e ds: prot ecti on of the owner’s proper ty , prot ecti on of the poli ce again st allegations of los t or stolen proper ty , a nd prot ecti on of the poli ce from potent i al danger , id. at 369, 96 S. Ct. at 3097. The search, conduc ted for legiti mate caretak i ng reasons and not as a pret ext for evidenc e-gather ing, there fore me t the Four th Amendment’s reasonableness standard. Id. at 375-76, 96 S. Ct. at 3100; see also , e.g

. , United States v
. Jackso n , 189 F .3d 502, 508-09 (7th Ci r
. 1999). Opperman , as i t tur ned out, mark ed the last time that the Supreme Co urt relied to any meaningful degr ee on the commu ni ty caretak ing func tion of the poli ce in e v a l uati ng the reasonableness of searching automobil es and other i tems i mpounded by the p ol i ce; sub sequent cases hav e rested on Opperm a n ’s d e s c rip ti on of the search as a ro uti ne “inv entor y” search. See, e.g. , Colorado

v
. Bertine, 479 U

. S

. 367, 371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741 (1987) (“i nv entor y searches are now a w ell-defined exception to the w arr ant requirement of the F o ur th Amendment”); see also Mar inos, supra n.5, 22 G E O

. M A S O N U. C I VI L R T S

. L. J. at 251 n.11, 259.24 No. 12-2272
Thi s court, as w e hav e menti oned, has li mi ted the commu
ni ty caretak er doctrine to a ut o mo bi le searches. Pichany, 687 F .2d at 207-09. Our deci si on in Pichany addressed the w arr antless search of a commerci al w arehouse. P o l i ce offi cers had
arr i v ed early for a meetin g at an indus tr i al park wi th a bus i ness owner who had rep or ted a burglary of hi s w arehouse. Whi le look i ng for the owner , the officers w andered into the defendant’s nearby w arehouse, whi ch w as both unlocked and unmark ed—but whi ch w as not the w arehouse repo rt ed burglarized. There they disc o vered sev eral stolen tr actor s, whi ch resulted i n the defe n d a n t b e ing charged wi th theft. After the di stric t court supp ressed the evidenc e di scov e r e d in the

w arehouse, the government appe aled, seeki ng to justif y the

w arr antless entry i nto the defendant’s w arehouse on the basi s of the commu ni ty caretak er doctrine. The government arg ued that when the offi cers enter ed the defendant’s w arehouse, they

w ere not i nv esti gating the defendant’s possi ble inv olv ement in a cri me but si mply look ing for the indi vidu al who had report ed a burglary

. W e rej ected the invitati on to ext end Cady ’s
commu ni ty caretak i ng rat i onale bey ond the automobil e context

. “None of the factors whi ch the Court found character

i zed the commu ni ty caretak ing func tion are present here.” 687 F .2d at 207. W

e poin ted out that, in contrast to the si tuation in Cady, the poli ce had not exer ci sed contro l or domini on ov er the defendant’s w arehouse, nor w as there any threat of damage or theft that mi ght hav e tr ig g e r e d a duty on the part of the offi cers to secu re hi s w arehouse. Id. at 207-08. Mor e fund amentally , the Court i n Cady, by stressing the ci rcums tances th a t di fferentiated cars from houses and other thi ngs that mi ght be searched, had indi cated that i ts holding “ext ended on ly toNo. 12-2272 25
automobil es tempor arily in poli ce cus tody .” id. at 208. “Consequently , the plain i mport from the lang uage of the Cady d eci si on i s that the Supreme Court di d not intend to cre a t e a broad exception to the Four th Ame nd ment w arr ant requirement to apply whenev er the poli ce are acting in an ‘i nv esti gativ e,’ [ i.e. , commu ni ty car e t a k ing] rat her than a ‘crim inal’ func tion.” Id. at 208-09 (quoti ng Cady, 413 U.S. at 453, 93 S. Ct. at 2534) (Brennan, J., di ssen tin g)). Th e o t her ci rcui ts are di vided on the questi on of whethe r the commu ni ty caretak er exception appli es outsi de o f the automobil e context, and in particu lar to w arr antless searches of the home. In addi tion t o t his ci rcui t, the Thi rd, Ninth, and T enth ci rcui ts hav e confined the commu ni ty caretak ing exception to the automobil e context

. See Ray v
. Tp. of W arren , 626 F .3d 170, 177 (3d Ci r
. 2010); United States v
. Bute, 43 F .3d 531, 535 (10th Ci r
. 1994) (2-1 deci si on); United States v
. Erickson , 991 F .2d 529, 531-33 (9th Ci r
. 1993). In contrast, the Fifth, Sixth, 6 and Ei ghth ci rcui ts hav e relied on th e co mmu ni ty caretak ing exception to justif

y w arr a nt l e ss searches of the home. See United Stat es v

. Quezada, 448 F .3d 1005, 1007-08 (8th Ci r
. 2006); United States v
. Rohrig

, 98 F .3d 1506, 1521-25 (6th Ci r
. 1996) (2-1 deci si on); United S tat es v. Y ork , 895 F .2d 1026, 1029-30 (5th Ci r
.

Mo re rece ntly, the Ni nth C i rcui t fo und tha t a warrantle ss entry i nto a 6 home was justi fi ed when pol i ce ent e r e d t he home i n a community caretaking ro l e whil e respo nding to a perce i ve d emergency; the cour t emphas i zed tha t the ci rcumstan ces must present a genuine emergency i n or der fo r such

an entry to b e justi fi ed. See United States v. Stafford, 41 6 F.3d 10 68 , 10 73 -7 5 (9 th Ci r. 20 05 )

. Despite the refe rences to community caretaking, the deci sio n i s pro b ab l y b est ch ar acteri zed as rel ying on the emergency aid do ctri ne rather than the co mmun i ty caretaking do ctri ne.26 No. 12-2272 1990) (frame d a s an exigent ci rcums tances deci si on, but stressing commu ni ty caretak ing ro le of poli ce in abati ng noi se di sturbance)

. How ever , the Sixth Ci rcui t more recently has expr essed doubt that the commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine

w ould generally authorize the w arr antless entry into a home,
see Unit e d S tat es v
. W

illiams , 354 F .3d 497, 508 (6th Ci r
. 2003), although its dec i si on i n that case ulti mately rested on the fact that poli ce w ere motiv ated by a sus pi ci on of cri mina l wr ongdoin g i n addi tion to commu ni ty caretak ing purposes, id. Fin ally , the Four th C ir cui t has indi cated that the commu ni ty caretak i ng exception may justif y a w arr antless resid ential search when, as i n Cady, the search i s conduc ted pur su a nt to
ro uti ne procedure and not for p urposes of cri minal evid encegather i ng. Hun sber

ger v
. W ood, 570 F .3d 546, 554 (4th Ci r
. 2009) (Wi lkin son, J.). See also MacDonald v
. T own of Eastha m , 2014 WL 944707, at *4-*6 (1st Ci r
. Mar

. 12, 2014) (notin g di sarray in cases and leaving questi on open); United States v
. McGough, 412 F .3d 1232, 1238-3 9 (1 1th Ci r
. 2005) (notin g that “w e hav e nev er explic i tly held that the commu ni ty ca r e t akin g func tions of a poli ce offi cer permi t the w arr antless entry into a home”; court goe s on to find that i n any ev ent facts di d not w arr ant appli cation of the excep t io n in that case)

. A si mi lar di vis i on exis ts at the stat e l e vel. See Grego ry T

. Helding, Comment, Stop Hammerin g Fourth Amendmen t Right s : Reshaping the Commun ity Caretak ing Exception W ith the Physicial Intrusion Standard, 97 M AR QU E TT E L. R E V

. 123, 143-48 (2013) (collecting cases ext endi ng commu ni ty caretak ing exception bey ond the aut o mobi le context ); Naumann, supra n.5, 26 A M

. J. C RI M

. L. at 352-57 (su rv eying di fferent appro aches employ ed by state court s).No. 12-2272 27
As the di stric t court noted, the W i scons in courts in particu

lar hav e ext ended the commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine to searches of homes. W

e reserve our di scu ssi on of the W i scons in precedents for our quali fi ed i mmu nity analysi s below

. For
now , i t i s su ffi ci ent to expr ess our agr eement wi th the di stric t court that, giv en our deci si on in Pichany, the w arr antless entry i nto Sutt erfield ’s home cannot be sus tain ed on the basi s of the
commu ni ty car etak er do ctrine. The exigent ci rcums tances e xception to the w arr ant requiremen t consti tutes a second gr ound on whi ch the

w arr antless entry i nto Sutter fi eld’s home potent i ally could be justifi ed. Pursu ant to thi s exception, a w arr antless entry into a dw elling may be lawf

ul wh en there is a press ing need for the p o l ice to enter but no tim e for them to secu re a w arr ant

. Michigan v . T

yler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S

. Ct. 1942, 1949 (1978);
see also , e.g. , Fitzgerald v
. S an to ro , 7 07 F .3d 725, 730 (7th Ci r
. 2013). Recognized exigenci es inclu de si tuations in wh ich the occupan t of a resi dence i s injured o r is in danger o f i mminent i njury , Michigan v
. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47-48, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548- 49 (2009); Brigham City

, Utah v
. Stuart, supra , 547 U.S. at 403-04, 126 S. Ct. at 1947; see, e.g. , Fitzgerald, 707 F .3d at 731-32) (danger of sui ci de); when t he re i s a danger posed to other s by the occupan t of a dw el l ing , as when the occupan t i s armed and mi ght shoot at the poli ce or other persons, e.g. , United States v
. Kempf , 400 F .3d 501, 503 (7th Ci r
. 2005); when poli ce are in “hot pursui t” of a fleein g suspec t, United S tates v. Santana , 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 9 6 S

. Ct. 2406, 2409-10 (1976) (ci tin g W arden v
. Hayde n , 3 8 7 U

. S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967)) , or there i s a ris k that the sus pect may escape, see Minnesota v
. Olson , 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1990); and to prev ent the i mminent28 No. 12-2272
destructi on of evidenc e, Kentu cky v
. Kin g, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856- 5 7 (2011). Whether the exigent ci rcu m s tan c e s e xc e p ti on ju s ti f i e s
w arr antless action is judged by an o bjectiv e standard: w e ask whether i t w as reasonable for the poli ce offi cers on the scen e to beli ev e, i n li ght of the ci rcums tances they faced, that there w as
a compelling need to act and no t ime to obtain a w arr ant. See T yler , 436 U.S. at 509, 98 S. Ct . at 1949; e.g. , Fitzgerald, 707 F .3d at 730. There mus t be a genuine need to foreg o the w arr ant process; and in asses sing that need, we mus t focus not only on the moment that poli ce made the deci si on to make the w arr antless entry

, but rat her “apprais e the agents' conduc t duri ng the entire period after they had a right to obtain a w arr ant and not merely from the moment when they knocked at the front door .” United States v
. Patino , supra , 830 F .2d a t 1416 (quoti ng United States v
. Rosselli, 506 F .2d 627, 630 (7th C ir

. 1 9 7 4) (footnote o mi tte d) (Stev ens, J.) ). Related to b oth o f the foreg oin g ex cepti ons to t he w arr ant requirement i s the emerge ncy or emerge nc y ai d doctrine, whi ch recogni zes t hat a w arr antless entr y into the home may be appropr i ate when poli ce enter for an urgent purpose other than to arr est a sus pect or to look for evidenc e of a cri me. See Mincey v
. Ar i z. , s upra , 437 U.S. at 392-93, 98 S. Ct. at 2413; Hanson v
. Dane Cnty., W is. , 608 F .3d 335, 337-38 (7th Ci r
. 2010); United States v
. Richardson , 208 F .3d 626, 630 (7th Ci r
. 2000); United States v
. Salava, 978 F .2d 320, 324-25 (7th Ci r
. 1992). Li ke the commu ni ty caretak er excep t io n to the w arr ant requirement, thi s doctrine recog ni zes that poli ce p l a y a service and prot ecti v e ro le i n addi tion to a law enforcement ro le. See SheikAbdi v
. McClell an , 37 F .3d 1240, 1244 (7th Ci r
. 1994) (ci tin g United States v
. Moss , 963 F .2d 673, 678 (4th Ci r
. 1992)). In theNo. 12-2272 29
former capac i ties, poli ce offi cers may someti mes need to enter
a d w e l l ing i n or der to render ai d to an occupan t whom they beli ev e t o be in di stress and in i mmedi ate need of their assi stance. Id. The test for thi s exception i s also objectiv e: the ques t io n i s whether the poli ce, giv en the facts confronting them, reasonably be l ie v ed that i t w as necess ary to enter a ho me i n or der to “render assi stance or prev ent harm to p e rsons or proper ty wi thi n.” Id. (quoti ng Moss , 963 F

. 2 d a t 678); see also United States v
. Je n ki n s , 329 F .3d 579, 581-82 (7th Ci r . 2003). Although we had und ersto od the emerge ncy aid do ctrine to be separate from ( a lbei t relat ed to) the exigent ci rcums tances exception, see Sheik-Abdi, 37 F .3 d a t 1 2 44, see also Hopkins v
. B on v icin o , 573 F .3d 752, 763 (9th Ci r
. 2009); John F

. Decker , Emer gency Cir cum stances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment R e strictions , 89 J. C RI M

. L. & C RI MI N OL O GY 433, 441-45 (1999), the Supreme Court in Brigham City effecti v ely made the former a sub set of t he l atte r
. 547 U.S. at 403-4, 126 S. Ct. at 1947; see T

uerkheimer, supra n.5, 49 A RI Z

. L. R EV

. a t 8 1 2-13 & n.60. The poli ce i n Brigham City had responded to a 3:00 a.m. call complaining of a loud party at a r e sid e nc e

. On arr i v al at the resi dence, the offi cers heard shouting from insi de of the house,

w alked down the drivew ay , saw tw o juv en ile s drinkin g beer i n the bac ky ard, and from there notic ed an alter cati on taking place in the kitchen

of the h ome. Through a screen doo r , they
saw four adults atte mpting to restr ain a juv eni le, who w as able to break free and strike one of the adults, d r a win g blood. As the strug gle continu ed, one of the offi cers opened the doo r t o30 No. 12-2272
the kitch en, announc ed hi mself, and then enter ed. At that poin t, the alter cati on ceased. The poli ce ulti mately arr ested the adults for

, inter alia , contribu tin g to the delinquency of a minor and di sorder ly conduc t. At i ssu e be fo r e the Supreme Court

w as the lawfu lness of the poli ce offi cer s’ entry into the resi

dence. The Court deter mined that the intere st in prev entin g injury to an occupan t of the home justifi ed a w arr antless entry by the poli ce. The Court recog ni zed that the need to assi st a person who i s seri ously i njure d or who i s threat ened wi th such an i njury i s one type of exigency that obvi ates the n eed to obtain
a w arr ant: “The ne ed to prot ect or preserve li fe or av oid serio us injury i s justifi cati on for what w ould be other wi se i llegal absent an exigency o r emerge ncy .” 5 4 7 U.S. at 403, 126 S. Ct. at 1947 (internal quotat i on marks and ci tations omi tte d). “Accordi ngly

, law enforcement offi cers may enter a home wi thout a wa rr a n t to render emerge ncy assi stance to an injured occupan t or to prot ect an occupant from i mminent injury .” Ibid. The offi cers’ subj ecti v e motiv e for the entry —be i t to quell violence or to make an arr est, for example—i s i rr elev ant; what matter s i s whether the facts, v ie w e d objectiv ely , justifi ed the acti on take n by the poli ce. Id. at 404-05, 126 S. Ct. at 1948

. In thi s case, the offi cers wi tnessed a fracas o ng o ing wi thi n the home that had already resulte d in inj ury to one of the occupants. The offi cers cons e q uent ly had reason to beli ev e both that the person who had been struck mi ght need help and that the fi ght mi ght conti nue wi tho ut intervention. The entry into the home w as there fore reasonable. Id. at 406, 126 S. Ct. at 1949.
W e relied on Brigham City ’s exigency rat i onale in Fitzgerald, 707 F .3d 725, to sus tain a w arr antless entry into a home whereNo. 12-2272 31 poli ce had reason to beli ev e t ha t t he occupan t mi ght harm herself. The poli ce i n Fitzgerald w ere summo ne d to the plaintiff’s home after she had a telephone conv ersation wi th a poli ce offi cer that caused that offi cer to be concerned that she mi ght be sui ci dal. At the conclu si on of a str e ssf ul, aggr av atin g day

, the plainti ff, who had be en drinkin g, atte mpted to contact a local help line but instead found herself speaking to the desk
se r geant at a local poli ce station. Although she deni ed e nt e rtain i ng sui ci dal thought s, the sergeant, whi le remain ing on the line wi th her

, d isp a t ched offi cers to her home, repo rt ing that she w as hi ghly depressed, int o x icat ed, and possi bly sui ci dal. As the offi cers w ere approachi ng the plainti ff’s condomini um, they learned that the plainti ff had just abruptly hung up on the desk se r g e a nt

. At that poin t, the offi cers made a forced,

w arr antless entry i nto the plainti ff’s home. After s p e a king wi th her for a period of 30 minutes, the offi cers ulti mately too k the plainti ff i nto cust o d y again st her wi ll for ev aluati on at a hospi tal. She later fi led sui t, contending among ot he r thi ngs that the w arr antless intrusi on into her home viola t e d the Four th Amendment.
W e conclu ded that the ent r y w as justifi ed based on the exigent ci rcums tances exception. Gi v en the information
av ai lable to the offi cers, i t w as objectiv ely reasonable for them to beli ev e at the tim e they enter ed the home that the occupan t

w as i n need of i mmediat e assi stance. See id. at 731(quoti ng United States v
. Arch , 7 F .3d 1300, 1304 (7th Ci r
. 1993)). The fact that the offi cers who arr i v ed on the plainti ff’s door step had not personally observ ed any sui ci dal behavi or w as not di sposi tiv e. Th e y w ere reasonably rely ing on informa ti on p ro vi d e d to the m by the desk sergeant, who had conv ey ed to them t ha t t he32 No. 12-2272 plainti ff had called the poli ce station, that sh e sounded both i ntox i cated and sui ci dal, and had abruptly hung up as offi cers approached her home. Thi s case fi ts snu gly within our precedents holding that poli ce offi cers and other emerge ncy personnel
mus t be “able to assi st pe r sons in danger or otherwi se i n need of assi stance.” Richardson , 2 0 8 F .3d at 630. “[W]hen poli ce are acting in a swi ftly dev elopi ng si tuation

... a court mus t not indulge in unreali stic second- guessing.” Leaf v

. Sheln utt, 400 F .3d 1070, 1092 (7th Ci r
. 2005) (internal quotation marks omi tted). W e apply that max i m agai n today

. 707 F .3d at 732. Fitzgerald, w e beli ev e, gui des us to a particu lar result in thi s case; but before w e turn back to the parti cular facts before us, sever a l p o i nts deserv e maki ng as to the three doctrines w e hav e just di scu ssed. All three d o ct r ines, to the ext ent they authorize the polic e to make a w arr antless entry into a dw elling i n or der to render ai d to a member of th e publi c—someti mes described as an “assi stance search,” see Di mino, supra n.5, 66 W A S H

. & L E E L. R E V

. at 1488—are speaki ng to the commu ni ty caretak ing func tion of poli ce offi cers, see id. at 1494. There are, nonet heless, i mport ant di fferences in both the doctrines and how co urts apply them that present challen ges i n deci ding whi ch of them go v erns a particu lar set of facts. Exigency , for example, i s defined by a tim e-urgent need to act that makes resor t to the w arr ant process i mpracti cal. See id. at 1508; see also , e.g. , T

yler, 439 U.S. at 509, 98 S. C t

. at 1949;No. 12-2272 33
United States v
. F oxworth , 8 F .3d 540, 544-45 (7th Ci r
. 1993). If,
on the other hand, there i s tim e for the poli ce to seek a w arr ant, then one mus t be soug ht: see, for example, our deci si on in Patino , 830 F .2d at 1416-17, whi ch the di stric t court di scu ssed. 8 7 0 F

. Supp. 2d at 638; see also , e.g. , United States v
. T alkingto n , 843 F .2d 1041, 1046 (7th Ci r
. 198 8 ) (r emanding for deter mination of whether agents had tim e to procure w arr ant). But the focus on the standard w arr ant process pr esum es t hat the r e i s reason to be l ie v e that something cri minal i s afoot

. Exigenc y cases thus typical ly speak ei ther of there being probable caus e to beli ev e a cri me i s being or has been committ ed or of the need to act i n o rder to fulfi ll t he p r o bable cause r equi rement,
as by prev entin g a sus pect from fleeing or preserv ing evidenc e t hat mi ght other wi se be destro y ed. See Mar inos, 22 G E O

. M A S O N U. C I VI L R T S

. L. J. at 262; Debra Li vingston, Police, Commun ity Caretak ing, and the Fourth Amendmen t, 1998 U. C H I

. L E G AL F OR

UM 261, 274-77 (1998); Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402, 126 S. Ct. at 1946 (di scu ssing and quoting fro m deci si on of court below

, Brig h am C i ty v
. Stuart, 122 P .3d 506, 5014 (Utah 2005)); Sheehan v
. City & Cnty

. of San Franci sco , 743 F .3d 1211, 1221 (9th Ci r
. 2014); Hogan v
. Cun nin gham , 722 F .3d 725, 731-32 (5th Ci r
. 2013); Feli ciano v
. C ity of Miami Beach , 707 F .3d 1244, 1251 (11th Ci r
. 2013); Storey v
. T aylor , 696 F .3d 987, 9 9 2 (10th Ci r
. 2012); United States v
. W atso n , 489 F

. App’x 922, 925 (6th Ci r
. 2 0 1 2 ) (unp ubli shed) ; Cisn eros v
. Gutierrez , 598 F .3d 997, 1004 (8th Ci r
. 2010); United States v. Coles , 437 F .3d 361, 365-66 (3d Ci r
. 2006); United Stat es v

. Cephas , 254 F .3d 488, 494-95 (4th Ci r
. 2001); United States v
. T ibolt, 72 F .3d 965, 969 (1st Ci r
. 1995); United States v
. Dawkins , 17 F .3d 399, 403 (D.C. Ci r
. 1994). In thi s respect, the exigent cir cum stances doctrine, as i t has34 No. 12-2272

tr adi tionally been understood, i s i ll-s uit e d to assi stance searches li ke the one in thi s case, where there w as no reason to
sus pect any one of comm itting a cri me. See Di mino, 66 W AS H

. & L E E L. R E V

. at 1512 (“All commu ni ty-c a ret akin g cases are i ncompatible wi th Four th Amendment requ ir ements of

w arr ants and probable caus e.”); see als o i d. at 1494, 1508-09, 1512-13; Li vingston, 1998 U. C H I

. L E G AL F O RU M at 277 (“For
commu ni ty caretak i ng intrusi ons,

... the exigency concept i s consi derably less straigh tf or w ard.”); Sheik-Abdi, 37 F .3d at 1244 (ci tin g Moss , 963 F .2d at 678) (notin g that whether w arr antless
e nt r y e ff e ct ua t e d f o r l a w e n f o r c e m e n t p ur p o se o r service/protect ive purpose may di stingui sh exigent ci rcumstances doctrine from emergency aid doctri ne). The emerge ncy ai d doctrine logical ly i s a be t t e r fi t in thi s reg ard, i ts defining characteris tic being urgency , see Di mino, 66 W A S H

. & L E E L. R E V

. at 1505-06, and there being no logical need to addi tionally consi der probable caus e and the av ai labi li ty of
a standard cri minal w arr ant. See De ck e r , 89 J. C RI M

. L. & C R I MI NAL I T

Y at 439, 455; Li vingston, 1998 U. C H I

. L E G AL F OR UM at 277. And that appears to be tr ue no t wit hstanding the Supreme Court ’s deci si on in B r igham City to place the emer
gency ai d doctrine wit hin the exigent ci rcums tances framew or k. See United States v
. Gordo n , 741 F .3d 64, 70 (10th Ci r
. 2014) (“Offi cers do not need probable caus e i f they face exigent ci rcums tances i n an emerge ncy.”) (internal quotat i on marks and ci tation omi tte d); United S tates v

. T immann , 741 F .3d 1170, 1178 & n .4 (11th Ci r
. 2013); Hun sber ger v
. W ood , supra , 570 F .3d
a t 5 5 5 ; United States v
. Huff man , 461 F .3d 777, 783 (6th Ci r
. 2006); United States v

. Stafford, supra n.6, 41 6 F .3d at 1075. But,
a s w e di scu ss below

, the real di ffi culty wi th applyi ng theNo. 12-2272 35
emerge ncy ai d doctrine to a ca se li ke thi s one may be the pass age of a sub stanti al a mo un t of tim e betw een the poin t at whi ch the poli ce are on notic e that someone requires their ai d and the poin t at whi ch they make a w arr antless entry into that p e r so n’s home. The doctrine may not require that acti on be take n i mmedi ately in o r der for i t to be characterized as “emerge ncy” ai d, see Di mino, 66 W A SH

. & L E E L. R E V

. at 1507 (delays may be toler able i f they ar e explain ed) (c i tin g D ecker , 89 J. C RI M

. L. & C RI MI NOL O GY at 508), but at some poin t, the pass age of tim e wi ll undermine the notion that emerge ncy ai d

w as requi red, id. at 1506-07. The comm uni ty car etak ing d octr ine has a more ex pansi v e tempor al reach, i n that i ts prim ary focus i s on the purpose of poli ce acti on rat her than on i ts urgency

. See Li vingston, 1998 U. C HI

. L E G AL F OR

UM at 277 (“the r elev ance o f t i me as a li mi tin g prin ci ple i n the exigency equati on seems less apparent in these
commu ni ty caretak i ng intrusi ons—since poli ce could not hav e obtained a tr adi tional w arr ant in any ev ent”); see also Mar inos, 22 G E O

. M A S O N U. C I VIL R T S

. L. J. at 280; Di mino, 66 W AS H

. & L E E L

. R E V

. at 1506. Mor eov er , as w e hav e already menti oned and as w e shall di scu ss further , becau se thi s doctrine presumes that the poli ce are not acting for any law enforcement purpose, whether or not there i s tim e to seek a tr adi tional cr iminal

w arr ant i s i mmaterial (although, as w e also di scu ss, a di fferent type o f w arr ant could be envi si oned). As a matter of doctrine, then, the commu ni ty caretak ing doc t r ine w o uld potent i ally be t he best fit fo r thi s case, in t hat i t cap tures the benefi cent purpose for whi ch poli ce enter ed Sutt erfield ’s ho me and leav es more ro om for the delay that preceded i t than the emerge ncy ai d doctrine other wi se mi ght.36 No. 12-2272
And becau se there i s no suggesti on that p o l ice had any law enforcement motiv e in enter ing the home, there w ould be a ready basi s on whi ch to d i stingui sh cri minal cases li ke Patino , whi ch demand a search w arr ant when there i s, in fact, tim e in whi ch to seek one. Y et, our deci si on i n Pichany obviousl y forecloses relianc e on the commu ni ty caretak ing d o ct rine here. Although the defendants inv oke d the commu ni ty caretak ing d oc tr in e below , they hav e not pursued i t on appeal, let alone asked us to reconsi d e r P icha ny

. And the di vis i on among the federal ci rcui ts
as to the appropr i ate scope of the commu ni ty caretak ing doctr ine makes clear that there i s no obvious answer as to wh e ther i t i s appropr i ate to ext end that doctrine bey on d t he automobil e setting that the Supreme Court dealt wi th in Cady

. The defendants hav e chosen instead to rely on the exigent ci rcums tances exceptio n to the w arr ant requirement and, in particu lar

, the emerge ncy ai d exception that Brigham City places wi thi n the exigency fr a mew or k, as the justifi cati on for their entry i nto t hei r home. And ultim ately , giv en the Cour t’s deci si on i n Brigham City and our own deci si on in Fitzgerald, w e beli ev e they ar e right on thatscore. As i n F itzgerald, the offi cers in thi s case had objectiv ely reasonable gr ounds on whi ch to beli ev e that Sutt erfield mi ght harm herself. The poli ce had been advis ed by Su t ter fi eld’s phy sic ia n t hat she had threat ened to take her own life. Based on that r epor t, they had completed a statement of emerg ency detention that authorized offi cers to take S ut tefi eld into
cus tody for a mental health ev aluati on. Wh en offi cers arr i v ed at S utter fi eld’s home that ev ening an d tr i ed to talk to h er , sheNo. 12-2272 37

w ould not allow them into her home. Sutt erfield contends that she w as not acting “err atic ally ,” as the di stric t court put i t, but si mply wi shed to be left alone. Perhaps so

. B ut the relev ant poin t, f or our purposes, i s that nothin g tr anspi red at the fro nt door of her home that mi ght hav e put the poli ce on notic e that the emerge ncy t hat had be e n r epor ted by Sutt erfield ’s phy si

ci an, and whi ch w as the basi s for the secti on 51.15 statement of emerge ncy dete nt ion, had di ssi pated. It w as objectiv ely reasonable for poli ce on the scen e to beli ev e that the danger to Sutt erfield ’s w e l l -b ei ng w as ongo ing and that, in the absenc e of Sutt erfield ’s cooper ation, they nee d e d t o enter the home forcibly , as they di d.
T o say , as Sutt erfield does, that g iven t he pass age of tim e and her own assu rances to the offi cers th a t sh e w as fine, that there w as no longer any emerge ncy , and th at the offi cers should hav e heeded her demands that they leav e, i s to engage i n the v ery sort of second- guessing that w e esch ew ed in Fitzgerald

. How w ere the offi cers to know that Sutter fi eld w as competent to asses s the state of her own mental health or that, reg ardless of what she hersel f sa id, there w as no longer any ris k that she mi ght harm herself ? Only a medi cal professi onal could make that judgment, and the offi cers had prepar ed and

w ere executin g a secti on 51.15 statement for the v ery purpose of havin g her e v aluated by such a professi onal. There are, as w e hav e ack nowledged, outstanding questions about the ext ent to whi ch the exigent ci rcums tances exception to the w arr ant requi rement, and the em erg ency ai d sub set of exigency precedent, apply to a si tuation li ke thi s one. The di stric t court i tself had doubts about whether the w arr antless entry i nto Sutt erfield ’s home could be justifi ed on the basi s38 No. 12-2272
of exigency; and the ov erlappin g and unc ert ain boundari es of the three do ct rines w e hav e been di scu ssing certainly leav e ro om for Sutt erfield’s contention that nei ther the exigent

c i rcums tances doctrine nor any other justifi es the entry into he r home giv en the facts presented. Clearly , one concern i s the nine hours that pass ed betw een the i ni tial repo rt from Sutt erfield ’s physi ci an and the entry into Sutt erfield ’s home. Again, the exigency doctrine ge nerally , and the emerge ncy ai d doctrine in particu lar , presume that there i s an emerge ncy that requires expe d it i ous, i f not i mmedi ate, acti on on the p a r t of the poli ce. See Fitzgerald, 707 F .3d at 731 (quoti ng Arch , 7 F

. 3 d at 1304); cf. Hun sber ger v
. W ood, 570 F .3d at 554 (wh ereas “[t]he commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine requires
a court to look at the fun ction perfor med by a poli ce offi cer , ... the emerge ncy exception requires an analysis of the cir cum

stances to deter mine whether an emerge ncy requiring i mmedi

ate acti on exis ted”) (emphas i s in or i gin al). Sutt erfield suggests that, by the tim e poli ce chose to force open her stor m door , the facts known to the offi cers di spelled any notion that there w as an urg e nt need for them to enter her home: she had told her physi ci an to call off t he p o l ice, many hours had pass ed since the d o ct o r ’s ini tial communi cati on wi th the poli ce, and when the poli ce arr i v ed on her door step they could see that she w as a li v e, coherent, and di d not w ant their assi stance. W e shoul d note that on the current recor d, w e see no indi cati on that the poli ce acted i n anythin g but a consc i entious and expediti ous manner; they si mply had tr ouble locatin g Sutt erfield

. St i ll, i t i s a reasonable and i mport ant questi on how long the poli ce may clai m that a putative emerge ncy justifi es w arr antless actio n. Section 51.15 i tself speci fi es no li mi t on th e t i me that poli ceNo. 12-2272 39
hav e to execute a statement of emerge ncy detention. At or al
a r g ument, the defendants’ atto rney suggested that 24 hours mi ght i n practic e be the outer li mi t in a ca se such as thi s one. But although w e a gr e e w i th Sutterfield that emerge nci es do not last forever

, i t w ould be folly for us to tr y to decla r e e x an te
some arbi tr ary cut-off t ha t w ould apply to all emerge ncy ai d
cases . Ev en in thi s cas e, i t is not at all clear to us, n or w ould i t hav e been to the poli ce, that the mere pass age of tim e wi thout appar e nt i nci dent w as suffi ci ent to alleviate any concern that Sutt erfield mi ght y et ha r m he rself. Cf. United States v
. Salava, supra , 978 F .2d at 324-25 (peri od of 90 minutes that poli ce too k to i denti fy lessee of mobi le home and t o tak e v arious precautionary measu res be fore enter ing home to chec k for presence of murder vic tim di d not viti ate emerge ncy). And the parties hav e giv en us no i nform a t io n about how long a threat of sui ci de could be th o ug ht to i mpose an i mminent danger of harm to the p e r so n who made i t; certainly nothin g in thi s recor d suggests that such a threat necess arily di mini shes wi th the pass age of a few hours or wit h t he sui ci dal indi vidu al’s
assu rances that she i s fine. A relat ed concern inv olv e s t he oppor tuni ty to seek a
w arr ant. As w e hav e sai d, the exigent ci rcums tances exception tr adi tionally ha s bee n understood to excuse the lack of a
w arr ant when, although a w arr ant i s av ai lable, the need for i mmedi ate ac tion depriv es law enf or cement of adequate tim e to seek one. E.g. , Michigan v
. T yler, supra , 436 U.S. at509, 98 S. Ct. at 1949-50; United States v
. Schm idt, 700 F .3d 9 3 4 , 9 3 7 (7th Ci r
. 2012); Li vin g ston, 1998 U. C H I

. L E G AL F OR UM at 274-77. Proceedi ng fro m the premi se that a w arr ant theoret i cally w as av ai lable to the poli ce offi cers inv olv ed in thi s case, Sutt erfield40 No. 12-2272
has arg ued t ha t t he re w as ample tim e for them to seek a
w arr ant. The di stric t court, havin g our de cisi on in Patino in mind, saw some merit in that arg ument. P oin tin g out that ev en i f one confines the analysi s to the ro ughly 30-minute period betw een the i ni tial arr i v al of poli ce at Sutt erfield ’s door step and the entry i nto her home, the di stric t court noted that Patino had deemed that amount of tim e suffi ci ent for the poli ce to tr y and obtain a w arr ant. 870 F

. Supp. 2d at 638 (ci tin g Patino , 830 F .2d at 1415-16). Mor eov er , as Sutt erfield suggests, i t mi ght not be appropr i ate for us to confine our consi derat i on to that 30- minute period. After all, i t too k nine hours to tr ack Sutt erfield down after he r p hy sic i an fi rst rais ed the alarm. There w as more than suffi ci ent tim e duri ng that longer period to consu lt
a judge. And ev en i f w e view the completi on of th e se ct i on 51.15 statement as the ev ent that st a rt ed the clock running, there sti ll w ere betw een four and fi v e hours in whi ch to seek a
w arr ant. Assu ming that there w a s so me type of w arr ant
av ai lable to the poli ce in thi s si tuation, there w as, as the di stric t court po i nted out, ample time in whi ch to seek one.
But a more fund amental questi on rais ed by thi s case i s the relev ance of the w arr ant requi rement. Cert ainly i t i s logical to consi der the av ai labi li ty of a w ar r a nt when the poli ce hav e reason to sus pect that cri minal acti vity may be afoot, but what about cases in whi ch the poli ce are not acting in a law enforcement capac i ty? S ome em erg ency ai d cases repeatthe customary language about the lack of tim e to seek a w arr ant, e.g. , Fitzgerald, 707 F .3d at 730, but one w onders whether , in the emerge ncy ai d context, i t i s more accu rat e to say that a w arr ant i s unav ai lable, period. See Li vingston, 1998 U. C H I

. L E GAL F OR UM at 277, 281. The typical w arr ant, after all, r e q uiresNo. 12-2272 41 probable caus e to beli ev e that someone i s engaged in cri minal mi sch i ef and/o r that evidenc e of a cri me wi ll be found in a particu lar plac e, see T

erry v . Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); W

ong Sun v
. United States , 371 U.S. 4 7 1 , 479, 83 S. Ct. 407, 413 (1963); Brin egar v

. United States , 338 U.S. 160, 175- 76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11 (1949), and giv en that the point of the exigent ci rcums tances doctrine i s to excus e the lack of a
w arr ant, i t comes as no surpri se that our exigency cases (a nd those of other courts, see supra at 36) frequently refer ence probable caus e, e.g. , United States v. V enters , 539 F .3d 801, 806- 07 (7th Ci r
. 2008); Leaf v
. Sheln utt, 400 F .3d 1070, 1081-82 & n.10 (7th Ci r
. 2005); United States v
. Rivera , 248 F .3d 677, 680-81 (7th Ci r
. 2001); Cannaday v
. Sandoval , 458 F

. App’x 563, 567 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (per curi am) (nonprecedenti al deci si o n). But in emer
gency ai d cases, where the poli ce are acting to prot ect someone fr o m i mminent harm, there frequently i s no sus pi ci on of wrongdo i ng at the moment that the poli ce take acti on. Ev en in a case li ke Brigham City, for example, where there actually w ere si gns of cri minal acti vity (juv eni l e s drinkin g beer in the backy ard, and people fig hting insi de of the house), and the occupan ts of the house ulti mately w ere arr ested and charg ed wi th cri minal offenses, the relev ant poin t vis -à-vi s the w arr antless en tr y w as that i mmedi ate action w as required in or der t o prot ect someone from harm. Brigham City thus art i culated the justifi cati on for the entry not in ter ms of reason to beli ev e that any cri me w as taking p l a ce, or that evidenc e w as about to be destro y ed, but r ather as r eason to beli ev e that an o ccu pant of the home needed their assi stance. 547 U.S. at 403, 406, 126 S. Ct. at 1947, 1949. It may be, then, that probab l e caus e in the
eme r g e ncy ai d context i s not reason to beli ev e a cri me i s42 No. 12-2272

o cc urring or has been commi tte d, but reason to beli ev e t ha t
someone i s in need of ai d and there i s a compelling need to act. See Hanson v
. Dane Cnty., W is. , supra , 608 F .3d at 338 (“probable
caus e just means a goo d reason to act”); United States v
. Jenkins , 329 F .3d 57 9 , 581-82 (7th Ci r
. 2003) (reason to beli ev e that occupan t of home, who di d not respond to 911 call-back, w as i ll, i njured, or under threat of violence) ; see also United States v
. T immann , supra , 741 F .3d at 1178 n.4; United States v
. W olfe, 452 F

. App’x 18 0 , 183 (3d Ci r
. 2011) (nonprecedenti al deci si on); United States v
. Mart ins , 4 13 F .3d 139, 147 (1st Ci r
. 2005); Li vingston, 1998 U. C H I

. L E G AL F OR UM at 275. Thi s framing of the i nqui ry sugge st s t hat whether there w as tim e to seek a
w arr ant loses i ts relev ance in the e me r g ency ai d sub set of exigency cas es. The passage of tim e may remain relev ant as a
measu re of whether there w as a tr ue emerge ncy justif yin g the i ntrusi on into someone’ s home, bu t notin terms of whether a

w arr ant could hav e been sought.
Rein forci ng that poin t in thi s case i s the unans w er ed questi on as to what type of w arr ant w ould hav e been av ai lable to the poli ce, given that Sutt erfield w as not suspected of any cri me. W

e posed that questi on at or al arg ument and nei ther 7

We set aside the possi b i l i ty, not di scussed b y the partie s, tha t attempted 7 suici de might consti tute a cri me and tha t the pol i ce woul d hav e had reason to take warrantle ss actio n i n or der to prevent Sutterf i el d fro m commi tting tha t cr i me. Co nsistent with most states, Wi sconsi n pro hibits ass i sting another perso n to take her own l i fe, see Wi s. Stat. § 94 0.1 2, b ut d o e s no t appear to mak e attempted suici de i tsel f a cri me. See generally 2 Wayn e R. LaFa v e, S UB STA NT IVE C RIM

. L. § 15 .6 (aid i ng and attempting suici de) (2 d ed. updated through October 20 13 ) (“ In some states attempted suici de, which (co ntinued. ..)No. 12-2272 43

c ounsel could i denti fy such an alter nati v e. Sutt erfi e l d ’s c oun s e l suggested that perhaps the poli ce could hav e sought a wri t of capi as or bench w arr ant authorizing Sutt erfield ’s d e tention,

8 but the legal basi s for such a course of acti on in W i scons in remain s unc lear

. Sutt erfield ’s couns el may be corr e ct in arg uing that the lack o f a n av ai lable w arr ant procedure does not foreclose her Four th Amendment challen ge to the w arr antless entry ; the judi ci ary could, in theor y , require the creation of
an appropr ia t e p r ocedure. That i s essenti ally what the Supreme Court di d i n Camara v
. Muni. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Franci sco , 387 U.S. 523, 87 S

. Ct. 1727 (1967). In Camara, the Court dealt wi th an i nspec tion sch eme pursuant to whi ch ci ty housing i nspec t o r s had the right to enter any bui lding at a reasonable tim e si mply upon presentation of their credentials

. The plainti ff had been charg e d wit h a mi sdemeanor offense after he had repeat edly refuse d to allow an inspec tion of hi s apartment pursuan t to thi s sch eme. He contended that su ch a
w arr antless i nspec ti on vi ol a ted hi s rights under the Four th and Four tee nt h A mendments. The Supreme Court agr eed. In the absenc e of the resi dent’s consent, the Court held, auth o r i ties

( ...c onti nued) 7

was a commo n l aw misde me an o r , was at one time a cri me, b ut the prevail i ng v i ew has l ong b een otherwi se.”) (fo otno tes omi tted); see also State

v. Genova , 25 2 N.W.2 d 38 0, 38 3 (Wi s. 19 77 ) (“ Co mmon l aw c r i me s were ab ol i shed i n Wisco nsin i n the 19 55 Cri minal Co de.” ) ( ci ting Wi s. Stat. § 9 39 .10 ).

A wri t of capias i s essent i al l y a wri t commanding an of fi cer to take a 8

nam ed i ndivid ual i nto c u stody, typic all y when he has fail ed to appear or fail ed to compl y with a judgment. See B LA CK ’ S L AW D ICT ION AR Y 23 6 (9 th ed. 20 09 ).44 No. 12-2272

w ere required to ob t a in an admini strat i v e w arr ant for an i nspec tion supp or ted by probable caus e to beli ev e that the bui ldin g for whi ch the w arr ant i s sought quali fi es for inspec
tion pursuant to reasonable legis l a t i v e or admini strat i v e standards (bas e d o n such factors as the type of bui lding, the condi tion of the surroundi ng area, and the pass age of tim e) for conduc tin g an i nspec tion. Id. at 538, 87 S. Ct. at 1735-36. Camara
a t l east take s us out of the cri me-detecting context, but obviously i t i s not a close fi t wi th thi s case, whi ch does not inv olv e anythin g like a uni form in specti on schem e. What Sutt erfield w ould envis i on, p re s u m ab l y , i s something more li ke a standard cri minal w arr ant -a p p l i cati on process in the sens e that i t i s i ndi vidu ali zed, but pursuant t o wh ich a neutral deci si onmaker deter mines whether there i s reason to beli ev e that the occupan t of a dwelling i s in danger such that entry i nto (and search of ) the dw elling i s necess ary to address th a t d a ng e r
. At least one wri ter has arg ued in fav or of a commu ni ty-caret akin g w arra n t as a means of guarding again st
unnec essary i ntrusi ons into the sanc tity of the home and again st poli ce abuses. Mar inos, C omment, 22 G E O

. M A S O N U. C IVI L R T S

. L. J. at 284-89; see also Di mino, 66 W A S H

. & L EE L. R E V

. at 1520-21. But the parties hav e ci ted no exis tin g process by whi ch such a w arr ant could be ob t a ine d , whether in Wi scons i n or any other jurisdi ct io n. And w e hav e found no Wi scons i n case ci tin g secti on 51.15 whi ch i denti fi es an alter nativ e procedure that w as av ai lable to the poli ce in the s i tuation confronting them.
T o be clear then, what Sutt erfield i s arg uing for i s the creation of a particu lar type of w arr ant that does not currently exis t. In maki ng that arg ument, how ev er , she does not di scu ssNo. 12-2272 45
who w ould i ssu e a co mm uni ty caretak ing w arr ant, what the cri ter i a for i ssu ance of such a w arr ant w ould be, wh at ty pe of evidenc e w ould be required to meet those cri ter i a (in a case li ke thi s one, for example, w ould the statement of a physi ci an or other quali fi ed me nt al health professi onal be necess ary ?), or how such a w arr ant mi ght interact wi th an emerge ncy commi tment sch eme li ke that establi shed b y secti on 51.15. Much like Sutt erfield ’s cursory con te n ti on th a t s e c ti on 5 1

. 1 5 i s u n c onsti tutional, her su gge sti on that a w arr ant i s requi red in a s i tuation li ke thi s one am ounts to no more than a premi se that i s stated wi thout any elaborat i on or sub stance. W e w ould also poin t out that the advis abi li ty of, and precedential supp or t for , a w arr ant requirement for assi stance searches are open to debate. Compare Mar i nos, 22 G E O

. M AS O N U. C I VI L R T S

. L. J. at 285, 288 (“B y re qu i rin g a c om muni ty caretak ing w arr ant, a neutral thi rd p a rty w ou l d d e ter mine [in adv ance] whether the c i rcu m s tan c e s ris e to the lev el that r e qui res entry into a home by balanc ing t he ne ed to search again st the resi dent’s Four th Amendment rights.

... Relying solely on an ex post reasonableness deter mi

nati on ha s co nt rib uted to a muddl ing of the exigent ci rcumstances exception and [the commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine] in
v arious courts that hav e ext ended the [comm uni ty caretak ing doctrine] to the home.”), with Di mino, 66 W A S H

. & L E E L. R E V

. at 1521 (“Requi ring admini strat i v e w a rr a n ts for n one m e rgency commu ni ty-caret akin g searches as a matter of Four th Amendment doctrine carries sub stanti al di sadv antages

... . [It] w ould be a sub stanti al shi ft from the Supreme Court ’s practic e in the
comm uni ty-caret akin g area, whi ch has shown no inclinati on whatev er to require any k ind of w arr ant, and i t w ould be contrar y to the tr end of the Court ’s other Four th Amendment46 No. 12-2272

cases, whi ch hav e tended of late to stress the Reasonableness Clause much more than the W arr ant Clause. ... Addi t io nally , commu nit y -c aret akin g si tuations aris e on the spur of the
mome nt , and i t i s di ffi cult to i magi ne offi cers being able to expend the tim e necess ary to obtain a w arr ant whi le their cri me-detecti on and cr i me-prev ention duti es go neglected.”). A deci si on akin to Camara requiring such a w arr ant, whatev er i ts mer i ts mi ght be, w ould require a much more dev eloped arg ument than thi s. Retur ning to fi rst prin ci ples: What the Four th Amendment requires in all cas es i s reasonableness, Kentu cky v. Kin g, supra , 131 S. Ct. at 1856; B r ig h am City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S. Ct. at 1947, and wit ho ut knowi ng what, i f any , alter nati v e process
w as av ai lable to the poli ce, w e are not prepar ed to say that the

w arr antless entry i nto Sutt erfield ’s home w as unlaw ful under the ci rcums tances presented to them. Th e p o li ce acted out of legiti mate conce rn for Sutt erfield ’s safety and w ell-being (in other w o r d s, t here i s no hint that they w ere using the emer
gency as a prete xt t o loo k for evidenc e of a cri me), they acted consi s te n tly w i th s e c ti on 5 1

. 1 5 , a n d the c i rcums tances gener ally meet the cri ter i a for a w arr antless entry art i culated in Brigham City and appli ed i n Fitzgerald, in that i t w as objectiv ely reasonable for the offi cer s to beli ev e that their interventi on w as required i n or der to prev ent Sutt erfield from harming herself, notwi thstanding her own prot estations to the contrar y

. Her
own physi ci an, a psychi atr i st, had expr essed concern for Su tt e rf i eld’s w ell-being and declared a need for in te rve n ti on on her be ha l f, and despi te the pass age of tim e betw een the physi ci an’s i ni tial telephone call to t he poli ce and the forced entry i nto Sutt erfield ’s home, the recor d contains no evidenc e,No. 12-2272 47
other than Sutt erfield ’s own prot estations at the tim e, that the cri si s had passed and that she no longe r pr esented a threat to herself. W

e are not i n any posi tion, in fact, to second- guess the poli ce, who w ere following th e procedure prescribed by W isconsin law (the consti tutionali ty of whi ch has not be e n preserved as an i ssu e in t his appeal). The forced entry into Sutt erfield ’s home w as reasonable und er t he ci rcums tances. C. Prot ecti v e Sw eep of Sutt erfield ’s Home Sutt erfield has conce d ed that i f the poli ce offi cers’ entry i nto her home w as legal, a prot ecti v e sweep of the premi ses of the ty p e a ut horized by Buie w as also appropr i ate. Sutt erfield Br

. 17. Gi v en our conc lusi on that the forced entry w as reasonable, the sweep that resulted in the di sco ver y of the locked compact di sc case contai ning S ut ter fi eld’s gun and v arious concealed- carry li cens es w as also reasonable, and w e need not di scu ss the s w eep further

. D. Sear ch of the Locked Case Openi ng the locked compact di sc case w as a si gni fi cant step bey ond the search authorized by Buie

. The case w as obviousl y too small to be hi ding a person, the case i tself w as innocuous, and although Flor i ani av err ed that he thought the wei ght and feel of the case w as consi stent wi th a gun being insi de, that w as at most a v ery goo d guess—as the di stric t co ur t p oin ted out, the case could hav e contain ed almost anythin g. 9

Even i f the gun had b een i n pl ain v i e w, t he re woul d b e a separate 9 questio n whether the Fourth Amendment permi tted the sei zure of the gun, which Sutterf i el d l awfull y possessed. But we address the l egi timacy of the (co ntinued. ..)48 No. 12-2272
The defendants’ bri ef i s conspi cuous ly dev oid of ci tation to any authority that justifi ed the search of the locked case. Ev en 1 0

( ...c onti nued) 9 sei zure separately b el ow. At this juncture, we are conce rned sol el y with the deci sio n to search the compact di sc case, which was b oth cl osed and l ocke d.

The def endants ci te State v. Gocken , 85 7 P.2d 10 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 19 93 ), 1 0

as auth or i ty suppor ting a community- caretaking search of the compact di sc case. Defendants’ Br. 23

. As Gocken do es not a ddre ss the search of a cl osed b ag or c o nta i ner, the def endants pro b ab l y mean to ci te State v. Gray, No. 38 40 6– 6- 1, 19 97 WL 53 78 61 , at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Sep. 2, 19 97 ) (unpubl i shed, nonprece denti al deci si on), a case i n which the cour t susta i ned the search of the def endant’s tote b ag (where b oth drugs and mo ne y were di scovered) as a l egi timate exerci se of the community caretaking functi on. The pol i ce encounter wi th Gray had b egun as a safety and wel fare check tri ggered b y her errati c b ehav i or

. She held the of fi cers at b ay fo r 30 minutes, hol di ng a knife to her th ro at and threatening to kil l hersel f; she also made
a numb er o f d e l usio nal statem ents. When i nfor med tha t she was b ei ng taken to the hospi tal, Gray ask ed i f she coul d take her tote b ag with her. At tha t poi nt an of fi cer i nfor med her tha t he woul d hav e to search the b ag fi rst. The cour t concl uded tha t the search was justi fi ed on safe ty grounds, to ensure th at there wa s no wea pon or other i tem i n the ba g that G ray might
use to harm hersel f. Gray i s quite simi l ar i n tha t respect to State v. Tilley, No. 00 -2 54 0- CR, 20 01 WL 9 4 2 6 0 8 , at *3-*4 (Wi s. Ct. App. Aug. 21 , 20 01 ) (unpubli shed, nonprece d ential deci sio n), which uphel d a search of the def endant’s purse and b ag (i n which marij uan a and drug paraph ernali a were fo und). A pol i ce of fi cer had take n an i ntoxicated and despo ndent Ti l l ey to the hospi tal, where she b egan to say tha t she was thi nking ab out kil l i ng hersel f and had attempted to do so i n the past. Those remarks l ed the of fi cer to take Ti l l ey i nto pro tecti v e custody pursuant to secti on 51 .15 fo r an emergency menta l health eva l uatio n and to search her b ags fo r any thing she might use to harm he r se l f or others. The cour t held tha t the community caretaker exceptio n justi fi ed the search. Bo th cases are di stinct fro m this
case i n the sense tha t they i nv ol v ed an acute need to e ns u r e t hat the (co ntinued. ..)No. 12-2272 49
the Wi scons i n cases that ext end the commu ni ty caretak ing d octr i ne to dw ellings do not go so far as to endo r se fu l l searches of those dw ellings and their contents. As our di scu ssi on below wi ll rev eal, those cases authorize safety- relat ed

sweeps akin to that here, and the sei zure of contraband that i s i n plain view

, but no more. It may be po ssi ble t o construct an arg ument that when poli ce lawfu lly enter a home to address the possi

bi li ty that the o cc up ant may harm herself—and par t icu l a rly where, as here, they hav e reason to beli ev e the person i n quest io n owns a fi rear m (as the gun holster Sutt er
fi eld’s physi ci an notic ed suggested she di d)—the poli ce hav e the authority to search the premi ses, inclu ding closed containers, for fi rear ms. Cf. Cady v
. Dombrowsk i, supra , 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct . 2523 (su stai ning w arr antless inv entor y search of locked automobil e tr unk for defendant ’ s ser vic e rev olv er for safety reasons); Stricker v
. Tp. of Cambridge, 710 F .3d 350, 362 (6th Ci r
. 2013) (in case of repo rt ed drug o v erdo se, sustaining w arr antless search of house, i nclu ding closed draw ers and cabinets, for clues as to what drug(s) occupan t may hav e ingested); Mora v
. City of Gaithersbur

g, Md. , 519 F .3d 216, 225-26 (4th Ci r
. 2008) (Wi lkin son, J.) (in case of repo rt ed comments by plainti ff to hotline oper ator that he w as sui ci dal, that he could understand shooting people at w or k, that he had w e a pons in hi s apart-

( ...c onti nued) 1 0 detained i ndivid ual di d not hav e access to a weapon or other i mple ment of harm i n her b el o ng i ngs. By contrast, Sutterf i el d nev er ask ed to take the compact di sc case with her to the hospi tal, so there was no i mmediate need to search the case i n or der to pro tect bo t h he r an d the i ndivid uals who woul d b e trans por ting and then exa mini ng her duri ng the p e r i o d of her emergency de tentio n.50 No. 12-2272
ment, and that he “mi ght as w e l l di e at w or k,” sus tain ing
w a rr antless search of plainti ff’s luggage , v an, and apartment—i nc l ud ing locked ro oms, gun safes, and fi ling cabi

nets—ev en after plainti ff had been seized and handcuff e d , in o r der to deter mine scope of threat potent i ally posed by plainti ff ). It bears noting, how ev er , that thi s w ould be an arg ument for li cens e to conduc t vir t ually a top-to -botto m search of the h ome, as almost any c loset, draw er , or contai ner theor etic ally could contai n a handgun (or other potent i al i mplements of self- harm). In any case, the defendants hav e not dev eloped suchan argument here

. W e there fore proceed on the assu mpti on that the search of the locked compact di sc case w as unlaw ful. Sutt er fie l d had a priv acy i ntere st i n the contents of the case reg ardless of whe t he r the poli ce w ere searching the case for a law enfor cement purpose o r solely for purposes o f pr ote cting Sutt erfield from harm. See Camara, 387 U.S. at530, 87 S. Ct . at 1732 (“It is surely anomalous to say t ha t the indi vidu al and hi s priv ate proper ty are fully prot ected by the Four th A me nd ment only when the i ndi vidu al i s s u s p e c te d of cri minal behavi or .”); Dubbs

v
. Head Start, Inc. , 336 F .3d 1 1 9 4, 1206 (10th Ci r
. 2003) (McConnell, J.) (“The focus of th e Amendment i s
... on the
secu rity of the person, not the i denti ty of the se archer or the purpose of the search.”); Doe v
. Heck , 327 F .3d 492, 509 (7th Ci r
. 2003) (Fourt h Amendment appli es to intrusi ons duri ng ci vil as
w ell as cri minal i nv esti gat ions). Ev en i f the poli ce had a legiti mate i ntere st i n secu ring any w eapons that w ere in plain viewor that were in a place obviousl y m eant for gun storag e, such as a gun safe (a poin t we a d dress below), nothin g more than a hunch supp or ted the notion that a gun mi ght be insi deNo. 12-2272 51
the compact di sc case. Mor eov er , Sutt erfield w as already in poli ce cus tody at the tim e the case w as opened and w as about to be tr ansported fr o m he r home for ev aluati on by a mental health professi on. At that poin t in tim e, she posed no i mmedi

ate danger to herself. St i ll, for the reasons we di scu ss below in the quali fi ed i mmu nit y p or tion of our analysi s, ev en i f the search of the case w as unlaw ful, w e beli ev e that the poli ce offi cers had ample reason to beli ev e that i t w as permi ssi ble as a legiti mate safety measu re under the ci rcums tances confronti ng them. E. Seizure of the Gun and Concealed-Carry Li cens es 1. Four th Amendment Our assu mpti on that the search of the locked case containi ng the gun violated the Four th Amendment requires a si mi lar
assu mpti on as to the sei zure of the gun. Cf. W ong Sun v
. United States , supra , 371 U.S. at 484-86, 83 S. Ct. at 416 (evid ence sei zed
as a result of an unlaw ful search i s frui t of the pois onous tr ee); Uni te d S ta te s v
. Jeffers , 342 U.S. 48, 52, 72 S. Ct. 93, 95 (1951) (“ Th e sear ch and sei zure are

... incapab le of being unti ed.”), overruled on other ground s by R ak as v
. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128, 98 S. C t

. 4 2 1 (1978). Nonetheless, becau se the reasons for the sei zure have a bearin g on our quali fi ed i mmu ni ty analysi s, i t i s w or th spending a few moments di scu ssing the competi ng i ntere sts i mpli cated by the sei zure. Offi cer F l o r i ani ’s instinct to sei ze the gun in or der to
remove from the house a w eapon that Sutt erfield mi ght use to harm herself w as natural and un derstandable. (Sutter fi eld’s empty gun holster and her remark to her d o ct o r , after all, suggested that i f she di d do herself harm, she w ould do so wi th52 No. 12-2272

a gun.) Nonetheless, Sutt erfield had a legal right to possess the gun. And, again

, once she w as in poli ce cus tody , there w as no possi bi li ty that she w as going to harm herself wi th the gun ei ther at that moment or duri ng her ensuing commi tment for
a mental health ev aluati on. Mor eov er , Flor i ani ’s concern as to what mi ght happen if d octor s deci ded to release Sutt erfield after ev aluating her poses a conun drum: Cert ainly there w as a possi bi li ty that Sutt erfield mi ght again (or st ill ) harbor sui ci dal thought s; y et, she presumabl y w ould be released only i f medi cal exper ts deci ded that she di d not pose an i mmedi ate danger to herse l f. So although remov ing the gun from the house seems li ke a logical step t o take to prot ect Sutt erfield from self- harm, the possi bi li ty of her rele a se tends to negate the notion that she needed such prot ecti on. Mor eov er , i f the prospect of Sutt erfield ’s commi tment for a mental health
ev aluati on justifi ed the seizure of a gun, w ould i t also hav e justifi ed the re mov al of other i tems that Sutt erfield mi ght use to har m herself, s uchas kni v es and potent i ally lethal medi cations ? Th ese are noteasy questi ons to answer

. The Fou rt h Ci rcui t, when confronted wi th somewhat

s i m i l a r c i rcums tances, cauti oned again st “sli c[ing] the s i tu a ti on too finely and employ[i ng] hin d sight too readily to acti ons ai med

... at heading off a hu ma n tr agedy that, once vis i ted, could not be redeemed or take n back.” Mora v
. City of Gaithersbur g, Md. , supra , 519 F .3d at 228. Recall that the plainti ff in Mora

w as seize d o n an emerge ncy basi s after he indi cated to a healthcare hotline oper ator that he w a s sui ci dal and made remark s suggesti ng that he mi ght kill hi mself at w or k and take the li v es of hi s co-w or ker s in the process. After he w a s d ispatched to a hospi tal for an emergency mental health ev alua-No. 12-2272 53
tion, the poli ce, wi thout a w arr ant, sei zed the many (lawfullypossess ed) g un s they had found in his home for safekeeping. The p l a inti ff arg ued that thi s step w as logical ly unjusti fi ed, giv en that the s tate ’s inv oluntary commi tment statute di d not authorize hi s r e l e ase i f, as w as feared, he posed a danger to hi mself or other s. Th e Fo urth Circui t r ejecte d thi s contenti on:

Thi s arg ument i mpli es that once poli ce tr ansferr ed Mor a to a psychi atr i st, the responsi bi li ty for ensuring publi c safety pass ed to th e p sy chiatri st as well; the offi cers could w ash their hands of the si tuation, their jo b done. But prot ecti ng publi c saf e t y is why poli ce exis t, and nothin g i n Mar yland’s inv oluntary admi ssi on st a tute supp or ts the remark able suggesti on that, by handing Mor a ov er to doctor s, the offi cers relinqu i shed authority ov er the thi ng for whi ch t he y are under law chi efly re sp o nsi

ble. A psychologic al ev aluati on w ould not change what the offi cers al r e a dy knew: that Mor a
w as uns table a nd heavily armed, and a ris k to hi mself and other s. ... Id. For si mi lar r e a so ns the court rej ected the notion that once Mor a w as on hi s w ay to th e ho spi tal, the poli ce should hav e sought a w arr ant before sei zing hi s guns, as there w as no longer an emergency j usti fying w arr antless ac tion. [W]e are unw i lling to say the emerge ncy that br ought
on the sei zure di sappeared as qui ckly as M o r a w ould hav e us thi nk. The o ffic ers w ere entitled to take into
accoun t the nature of the t hr e a t t hat led to their presence at the scen e, and the corr obor atin g fact of a v erita-54 No. 12-2272
ble fort r e ss of w eapons and ammu ni tion they found when they arr i v ed. Mor eov er , in the rapi dly unfolding seri es of ev ents, the offi cers could not be sure of exactly what i t w as they confronted. They had no w ay of knowi ng whether confederates mi ght possess acces s to Mor a’s consi derable stor e of fi rear ms, or whether Mor a hi msel f might ret urn to the apartment more qui ckly than expected and carry out some desperate plan. ... Id.
T o be sure , there are si gni fi cant di fferences betw een the facts pr esented i n Mora and those presented here: Sutt erfield
nev er threat ened any one’s li fe but her own, and so far as the
recor d rev eals, she possess ed just one (real) gun rat her than the “v eritable fort ress of w eapons an d a m mu ni ti on” that the poli ce di scov ered i n Mora

. But the esse nt ia l point that the Four th Ci rcui t made i n Mora i s nonetheless relev ant here: The poli ce offi cer s who too k Sutt erfield into cus tody had a legiti mate p ublic safety intere st in her health, and although they kne w that she w o uld be ev aluated by mental health professi onals pursuant t o secti on 51.15, they could not be sure what w ould happen next. I t w a s natural, logical, and prudent for them to beli ev e that her fi rear m should be sei zed for safekeeping unti l
such tim e as she w as ev aluated and i t w as clea r t ha t she no longer posed a danger t o herself. 1 1

In the ev en t p ro fe ssio nal s de ter m ine d tha t Su tte rf ie ld ind ee d di d p ose a 1 1 dange r t o he rs el f (o r othe rs ), one c onse qu en c e of tha t fin di ng m ight hav e b ee n a ju di c ial or de r p ro hib iting he r fr om p osse ssin g a fir ea rm and di re c ting the sei zu reof any fir ea rm owne d b y he r. SeeWi s. Stat . § 51.2 0( 13 )( c v )( 1)

.No. 12-2272 55
An equally persuas ive j usti fi cati on for the sei zure of the gun i s the one art i culated by Ser geant Berk en, that the gun mi ght other wi se be acces si ble to Sutt erfield ’s son d uri ng her absenc e from the house. Th e polic e knew that S utter fi eld had
a so n, but they di d not know where he w as or whether he mi ght hav e uns uper v ise d acces s to Sutt erfield ’s home in her absenc e. Nei ther di d they know , no r could t hey hav e known, ho w long Sutt erfield mi ght be detain ed nor who mi ght have
acces s to the house duri ng that tim e. It w as arguably prudent to remove the gun from the home as a p r o p hy lacti c measu re duri ng Sutt erfield ’s abse nce. Cf. United States v
. Harris , 2014 WL 135682 2 , a t *3 & n.4 (8th Ci r
. Apr

. 4, 2014) (comm uni ty caretak i ng do ct rine justifi ed tempor ary sei zure of gun seen falling out of p o ck et of man sleeping in bus ter minal, giv en danger exposed and unguar d e d fi rear m posed to publi c, i nclu ding ris k that a chi ld or devious adult mi ght take the gun). There may hav e been alter nati v e s, but remov ing and
secu ring the fi rear m w as an obvious and reasonable measu re. One ne e d only i magi ne the publi c outcry that w ould hav e take n place had the poli ce left the gun where i t w as and had Sutt erfield ret urned ho me a nd then used the gun to take her
own li fe, or had her son take n the gun in her absenc e and used i t to harm hi mself or other s, to see the wi sdom in what the poli ce di d. Milw aukee does hav e in p lace a procedure, whi ch Sutt er
fi eld ulti mately used, to reg ain possess i on of the gun. No i ssu e i s rai sed here as to t he adequacy o f t hat procedure. So w e are presented solely with a di spute as to the sei zure of the g un at the tim e Sutt erfield w as take n into cus tody and tr ansported for
ev aluati on, rat her than questi ons a s t o the tim eliness and56 No. 12-2272
effi cacy of the process that Sutt erfield ulti mately employ ed to obtain the return o f her gun.
Fin ally , Sutt erfield has arg ued that ev en i f the sei zure of the gun w as lawfu l, the sei zure of her concealed- carry li cens es w as not. But on the facts presented to us, the sei zure of the li cens es does not present a separate i ssu e. W e can i magi ne that Sutterfi eld mi ght hav e been able to obtain another fi rear m whi le she

w as aw ai tin g the ret urn of the s ei zed gun; she may ev en hav e owned other guns not sei zed by the polic e. The sei zure of the li cens es di d not preclude her fr o m possess ing those guns, how ev er

. They si mply prev ented her from carry ing t hose

w eapons i n a concealed fash i on in v arious sta t e s o t her than Wisconsin. Sutt erfield has not dev eloped any arg ument as to the w ays i n whi ch her tempor ary inabi li ty to carry a concealed

w eapon i n other states, as di stinct from the sei zure of her fi rear m, harmed her

. On thi s recor d, any injury infli cted by the sei zur e of the li cens es w as de mini mi s, and w e need not explor e thisi ssu e further

. W e began thi s di scu ssi on wi th an assu mpti on that, if t he search of the case contai ning the gun w as conduc ted in violati on the Four th Am endment, the sei zure of the gun i tself

w as also contrar y to the Four th Amendment. But there are, as
w e hav e gone on to note, pow erful a r g um e nt s in fav or of the tempor ary sei zure of the gun as a prudential measu r e ; these arg uments fi gure prominen tl y in our quali fi ed i mmu ni ty analysi s bel o w

. F o r now i t bears emphas i s that our assu mptions that the search for and sei zure of the gun w ere inconsi stent wi th the Fourt h Amendmen t ar e just that—ass umpti ons. W e reserve a fi rm ruli ng on the merits of these i ssu es for a case i n whi ch the arg uments are better dev eloped and supp or ted.No. 12-2272 57

2. Second Amendment Sutt erfield has separ a t e ly arg ued that the sei zure of her fi rea rm violated her Second Amendment rights. She reasons that apar t fro m her pro pert y in ter est in the gun, the Supr eme Court ’s deci si ons i n District of Columbia v
. Heller, supra , 554 U.S. 128 S. Ct

. 2783, and McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill. , supra , 130 S. Ct. 3020, recog ni ze her right to possess a gun in the home for purposes of self- defense. See also Moo re v
. Madiga n , 702 F .3d 933 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (2-1 deci si on) (holding that Second Amendment right to bear arms for self- defense ext ends bey ond home), reh’g
en banc denied over d i s s ent, 708 F .3d 901 (7th Ci r
. 2013). The sei zure deprived her of that right in addi tion t o her Four th Amendment right not to hav e the gun take n from her wi thout probable caus e, she reasons. Whether and to what ext ent the Second Am e ndment prot ects an indi vidu al’s right to posses s a particu lar gun (and li mi ts the pow er of the poli ce to sei ze i t absent probable caus e t o be li ev e i t w as i nv olv ed in a cri me) i s an i ssu e that i s jus t begi nning to receive judi ci al atte nti on. Helleri tself recognizes that the r ight to possess a fi rear m secu red by the Second Amendment “i s not unli mi ted.” 554 U.S. at 6 2 6 , 1 2 8 S. Ct. at 2816. The Ei ghth Ci rcui t, havin g conclu ded that the plainti ff’s Four teenth Amendment r i ght t o due pro cess w as v i olated by the authoriti es’ refusal to ret urn hi s gun once the legal basi s for sei zi ng i t had ev aporat ed, found no inde p e nd ent violati on of the plainti ff’s Second Amendment right to possess the gun. W alters v
. W

olf , 660 F .3d 307, 317-18 (8th Ci r
. 2011). Although the court confined it s ruli ng to the facts and di d not rule out the possi bi li ty that, under di fferent ci rcums tances, the sei zure58 No. 12-2272

o f a gun mi ght consti tute a Second Amendment v i olation, i d

. at 318, i t reasoned that where the plaintiff had been able to vind i cate hi s i ntere st in “a meaningful procedural mechan i sm for r e t ur n of hi s lawfu lly sei zed fi rear m,” by w ay of the due process claus e, id. at 317, the sei zure of one par ticular fi rear m di d not other wi se i nterfer e wi th hi s Se co nd Amendment i ntere sts: “The defendants’ poli cy and acti on affec ted one of W alter ’s fi rear ms, whi ch w as lawfu lly s ei zed. The defendants di d not prohibi t W

a l ter s from ret aining or acqui ring other fi rear ms.” Id. at 318 (emphas is in or i gin al). Cf. Houston v
. City of New Orleans , 682 F .3d 361, 363-64 (5th Ci r
. 2012) (per curi am) (remanding to di stric t court for deter minati on whether st a te law permi tte d state o ff icials to ret ain plainti ff’s handgun following entry of nolle p ros e qu i on charges again st hi m, as deter minati on t hat state law compelled ret urn of gun w ould render i t unn e cess ary to deci de whether defendants violated plainti ff’s Second Amendment rights by refusing to ret urn gun to hi m); s ee generally John L. Schw ab & Thomas G. Spr ankli ng, Houston, W

e Have a Problem: Does the Second Amendmen t Create
a Property Right to a S p e c i f ic Firearm? , 112 C OL UM

. L. R E V

. S I D E B AR 158 (2012) (agreeing that Second Am e n d m ent does not encompas s right to possess a speci fi c fi rear m, cri tic i zing lack of analytic rigor i n j udi ci al d e ci si ons t o date on thi s subject, and p ro p os i ng cauti ous, mini mali st approach to deter minin g s c op e of Second Amendment). Thi s i s not an i ssu e that w e hav e addressed and i t i s not one that we wi ll address here. Bey ond a bare-boned contention that the sei zure violated her Second Amendment rights, Sutt erfield has not dev eloped a cogent arg ument a s to the reach and appli cati on of the Second Amendment in the law enforcementNo. 12-2272 59
and commu ni ty caretak ing context

. The i ssu e i s a sens i tiv e one, as i t i mpli cates not only the indi vidu al’s right to possess a fi rear m, but the abi li ty of the poli ce to take appropr i ate acti on when they are confronted wi th a fi rear m that may or may not be lawf ully posses sed, and whi ch, irrespecti v e of the o wner’s right to possess the fi rear m, may pose a danger to the owner or other s. W e do rei ter ate that Milw aukee h as a procedure by whi ch
a cit iz en whose lawfu lly-posses sed gun has been sei zed may seek i ts ret u rn
. Su tterfi eld av ai led herself of that procedure and has not contested i ts adequacy in thi s appeal. Thi s too couns els again st addressing the meri ts of Sutt erfield ’s Second Amen dment clai m. Cf. Houston , 682 F .3d at 364.
F

. Quali fi ed Immuni ty Quali fi ed i mmu ni ty shi elds a government offi ci al from sui t when the offi ci al i s perfor ming a di screti onary func tion and hi s conduc t does not violate clearly establi shed r i gh t s of whi ch a reasonable person w ould hav e known. Harlow v
. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982); see a lso , e.g. , V olkman

v. R yker , 736 F .3d 1084, 1089-90 (7th Ci r . 2013). Sutt erfield concedes that all but one of the poli ce acti ons at i ssue i n thi s case w ere di screti onary acts that are potent i ally subject to q ua l i fi ed i mmu ni ty

. The one acti on she asserts w as not di screti onary w as the sei zure of her person pursuant to section 51.15. Thi s asserti on i s based large ly on Hewi tt’ s and B e r k e n’ s testim ony that they w ere going to execute th e statement of emerge ncy detentio n by taking Sutt erfield into
cus tody reg ardless o f what tr anspi red when the y l o cated her and gain ed acces s to her home. Sutt erfield reads thi s testim ony60 No. 12-2272

as proo f that the deci si on to sei ze her w as not d i screti onary

. She contradic ts herself on thi s poin t, ho w e ver , when she arg ues that the poli ce offi cers who sei zed her should hav e realized that secti on 51.15 i tself i s flawed—the i mplic a t ion being that they could and should hav e declined to i mplement the statement of emerge ncy detention. No matter

. As w e di scu ssed earlier

, Sutt erfield has notpreserved a challenge t o the legality of her sei zure. Wh ether or not t hat act w as potentia l l y subject to a quali fi ed i mmu ni ty defense i s there fore a questi on w e need not addr ess. The defense clearly does apply t o t he other acts to whi ch Sutt erfield has preserved a challen ge—t he w arr antless entry i nto her home, the search of the locked compact di sc case, and the sei zure of the gun and li cens es. For the reasons that follow , giv en the broad sweep that W i scons in courts hav e giv en to the
commu ni ty caretak i ng doctrine, w e agr e e wit h the di stric t court t hat the police c ould hav e thoughteach of these acti ons
w as permi ssi

ble in order to pr ote ct Sutt erfield ’s well-being. One poin t as to the relev ance of Wi scons in cases mus t be di sposed of at the start

. Sutt erfield contends that becau se Wi sc o ns in precedent w ould not bind thi s court on the merits of her clai ms, and bec a us e in particu lar w e, in contrast to the Wi scons i n courts, hav e refused t o ext end the commu ni ty caretak i ng do ct r i ne to anythin g but automobil e searches, the Wi scons i n cases ar e i rr elev ant in t erms of whether t he d e fendants hav e quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. Not so. Although i t i s tr ue that i n thi s court, the Wi scons in cases hav e persuasi v e v alue only
on the merits of Sutt erfield ’s federal clai ms, t he y r emain relev ant as to what the defendants mi ght hav e thought the law , i nclu ding the federal consti t ut i on, permi tte d them to do inNo. 12-2272 61

e xe cu tin g the e m e rg e ncy statement of detention. Fe d e ra l c ou rt s d o not possess exclusi v e authority to deci de Four th Amendment i ssu es; state courts resolv e such i ssues ev ery day

. See Pompey v
. Browa rd Cnty. , 95 F .3d 1543, 1550 (11th Ci r
. 19 96) (“The state courts are courts o f e q ual di gni ty wi th all of the federal ‘i nferi or courts’—to use the Fra m e rs ’ p hra s e

— a n d state courts hav e the same duty to interpr e t and apply the Uni ted St ates Constituti on as w e do.”). In the absenc e of a contro lling deci si on by the Uni ted St ates Supreme Court, the W i scons in cases are thus as relev ant as our own precedents in ev aluating what a Milw aukee poli ce offi cer mi ght hav e thought t he l a w permi tte d i n respondi ng to a repo rt that the occupant of a priv ate dw elling w as in danger of harming herself. See Bur gess
v
. Lowery, supra , 201 F .3d at 945- 46; see a lso Stanton v
. Sims , 134 S. Ct. 3, 5, 7 (2013) (per curi am) (cons i dering deci si ons of both federal and state courts in conclu ding i t w as not cle arly establi shed that w arr antless entry into home in hot pursu i t of person beli ev ed to hav e commi tte d mi sdemeanor offense w as contrar y to Four th Amendment); Barnes v
. Zaccari, 669 F .3d 1295, 1307 (11th Ci r
. 2012); Starlight Sugar , Inc. v
. Soto , 253 F .3d 137, 144-45 (1st Ci r
. 2001); Edwards v
. City of Goldsbo ro , 178 F .3d 231, 251 (4th Ci r . 1999). 1 2

It i s worth noti ng tha t even i f we were reviewi ng the Wi sconsi n 1 2 deci sio ns we are ab out to di scuss—b oth of whic h are cri minal cases—pu r su ant to peti tio ns fo r a wri t of hab eas cor pus, see 28 U.S .C. § 22 54 , the conf l i ct b etween those deci sio ns and our own deci sio n i n Pich any as to the appropr i at e scope of the community caretaker exceptio n woul d not b y i tsel f suppor t hab eas rel i ef. Pursuan t to the Anti ter r o ri sm and Eff ecti v e Death Penalty Act of 19 96 , the state deci sio ns woul d hav e to b e (co ntinued. ..)62 No. 12-2272 Although our deci si on in Pichany refused to ext en d the
commu ni ty caretak i ng exception recog ni zed by t he Supreme Court in Cady bey ond the automobil e context, W i scons in courts hav e giv en the exception a much br o a d e r reach. They hav e r e l ie d on the commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine to justif y
w arr antless entries i nto the home when the poli ce hav e reason to beli ev e that the occupan t may be inj ured or other wi se in danger o f harm. The appellate court’s deci si on in State v
. Horngren , 617 N.W .2d 508 (W is. Ct. App. 2000), appli ed the doctrine in the contextof a repo rt ed sui ci de threat to hold that a w arr antless entry i nto and search of a home under ci rcums tances much li ke t ho se presented here w as lawfu l. The poli ce in that case ha d receiv ed a call repo rt ing that Horng ren had threat ened to k i ll hi mself

. Whi le en ro ute to Horng ren’s apartment, the respondi ng offi cers w ere further advis ed he had a hi stor y of pr i or sui ci de threat s (and had once been commi tte d to a mental health faci li ty for such a t hr e a t), and that he had (lawf ully) possess ed multi ple fir e a rms. When they arr i v ed at the apartment, the offi cers knocked on hi s door and di scov ered i t w as unlocked. When one of the offi cers leaned on the door , caus ing i t to open sli ghtly

, a naked Horng ren rushed to the door and tr i ed to push i t shu t wi thout suc cess

. The offi cers forced the

( ...c onti nued) 1 2 “co ntrary to, or i nv ol v e[ ] an u nr e aso nab l e appli catio n of, cl early estab

l i shed Feder al l aw, as deter mined b y the Supreme Court of th e United States ,” i n or der to suppor t the i ssuance of a wri t. § 22 54 (d) (1 ) (emphasis our s). See Marshall v. Rodgers , 13 3 S. Ct. 14 46 , 14 50 -5 1 (2 01 3) (per curi am); Williams v. Tay lo r, 5 2 9 U.S

. 36 2, 41 2- 13 , 12 0 S. Ct. 14 95 , 15 23 (2 00 0) ; Morales v. Boat

wright , 5 80 F.3 d 6 53 , 6 62 -6 3 ( 7th Ci r. 2 00 9)

.No. 12-2272 63
door open, placed Horng ren in handcuff s, and then conduc ted
a sweep of the apartment in or der to deter mine whether there

w as someone else pr e sent, as Horng ren told them there w as. During that sweep, they came acr oss mari juana that w as in plain view

. That di scov ery (along wi th drug parapher na l i a found pursuant to a su bsequent consens ual search of the premi ses) led to cri minal charges again st Horng ren. He sought to supp ress th e mar i

juana and drug paraphernalia on the gr ound that the w arr antless entry into and sweep of hi s home, whi ch resulted in the di scov ery of the m arijuana, violated the Four th Amendment. The W i scons in appellate court, how ev er , he l d that the entry and sweep w ere consi stent wi th bot h t he Four th Amendment and the co rr esponding prov i si on of Wi scons i n’s consti tution, as the poli ce w ere not engaged in tr adi tional law enforcement when they enter ed Horng ren’s ho me but rather commu ni ty caretak ing. Id. at 511. The court appli ed a tw o-part test to deter mine whether the commu ni ty caretak er exception to the w arr ant requirement appli ed, fi rst confi rmi ng that the poli ce w ere engaged in bona fi de commu
ni ty caretak i ng acti vity

, that i s, acti vity “tot ally di v or ced from the detection, i nv esti gation, or acqui si tion of evidenc e relat ing to the violati on of a cri minal st a t ute,” id. (internal quotat i on marks and ci tations omi tte d), and second, w ei ghi ng the publi c goo d serv ed by the acti ons of the poli ce again st the lev el of i ntrusi on on the i ndi vidu al’s priv acy , and deter mining in li ght of that balanc e whether the poli ce acti on w as reasonable on the facts an d ci rcums tances of the indi vidu al cas e, id. Ci tin g secti on 51.15, the court observ ed that the poli ce had
a legiti mate i nter e st in Horng ren’s w ell-being, giv en the repo rt ed sui ci de threat, that permi tte d them to enter the home64 No. 12-2272 again st Horng ren’s consent. “T ruly , the motiv ation in inv esti

gating the c omplaint w as to render ai d, not to inv esti gate any
cr i minal acti vity

.” Id. at 511. Gi v en the potent i al da ng e r t o Horng ren’s w ell-being, the publi c interest also supp or ted the degr ee of i ntrusi on upon Horng ren’s priv acy

. Id. at 512. Prev entin g an i ndi vidu al from taking hi s own li fe w as of the “utmost publi c concern.” Id. The ci rcums tance s w ere also g enuinely exigent: the poli ce w ere acting in response t o a n emerge ncy call and to the ci rcums tances presented to them; and no less i ntrusi v e means of respondi ng to the exigency w ere feasi ble und er t he ci rcums tances. The sweep of the premi ses w as li kewi se pe r miss ible: the court noted that a prot ecti v e sweep i s authorized to ensure the safety of the poli ce and other s present o n the premi ses. Id. at 513. Horng ren had i ndi cated to the offi cer s t ha t a girl w as p r e sent but she had not shown herself despi te the offi cers’ strugg le wi th hi m; i t w ould hav e been unr easonable, in the court’s v i ew

, for the poli ce not to chec k on her status. And becau se they di sco vered the mari juana in plain view duri ng the chec k for the girl, the court conclu ded tha t t he mari juana should n ot be suppressed. Id. at 513-14. In State v
. Pinkard, 785 N.W .2d 592 (Wi s. 2010), the W i sconsin Supreme Court —applyi ng both the Four th Amendment and i ts Wi scons i n count erpar t—likewi se sus tain ed the

w arr antless entry i nto, and sweep of, a dw elling, thi s tim e in response t o a repo rt suggesti ng that the occupan ts w ere unc onsci ous, possi

bly as the result of drug abus e. Th e r e, a poli ce of fic e r had receiv ed a tip that tw o people w ere seen sleeping i n a resi dence next to cocaine, money , a nd a di gitalNo. 12-2272 65
scal e; the back do or to the resi dence w as r epor tedly standing open. P olic e responded to the ti p, sawthat t he back door (t he main entrance to th e resi dence) w as indeed standing three

quarter s of the w ay aj ar , knocked and announced themselv es t o no response, and enter ed the dw elling. Upon look ing aro und, they saw an open bedroo m door and tw o p e o ple sleeping i nsi de of that bedroom. They announced themselv es loudly a second tim e to t he occup ants, and after again receivi ng no r e spo nse, enter ed the bedroo m. There, in plain view , they observ ed both powder and crack cocaine, mari juana, and
a di gital scal e. Ultim ately , they had to physi cally shake one of t he occupan ts—Pinkard, the defendant—aw ake, after whi ch they ar rested himfor po sses si on of the dr ugs. 1 3
The court held that the w arr antle ss entry into the defend a n t’s home consti tuted a legiti mate exer ci se of the c om mu ni ty caretak i ng func tion of the poli ce. Consequently , the drugs and drug paraphernalia di scov ered in the home were admi ssi ble again st Pinkard attr i al. At the outset, t he court expr essly rej ected Pinkard’s contention that the commu ni ty caretak ing exception fi rst recog ni zed by the U ni ted St ates Supreme Court in Cady w as li mi ted to searches of automobil es. The court instead declared that the commu ni ty caretak ing func tion may also justif y the

w arr antless entry i nto a home, depending on the tot ali ty of the

They sub sequently fo und a gun underneath the mat tress. However, the 1 3 tri al cour t granted the def endant’s moti on to suppress the gun, fi nding tha t searching b eneath the mattress exceeded the b ounds of the pol i ce of fi cers’ community caretaking functi on. That rul i ng was not appealed b y the State. 78 5 N. W.2d at 59 6.66 No. 12-2272

ci rcums tances confronting the p o li ce. Id. at 598-601. Whether the poli ce w ere serving a bona fi de commu nit y caretak ing func tion when they enter ed Pinkard’s home presented a “close” questi on, i n the sens e that the information repo rt ed to the poli ce not on l y rais ed a legiti mate concern for the occupants’ safety but a l so i mpli cated the occupan ts in cri minal acti vity

. Id. at 603. But the court declined to take a narro w view of the commu ni ty caretak ing exception and li mi t the exception only to cas e s in which the sole motiv ation for poli ce acti on i s the safety and w ell-being of a dw elling’s occupan t; commu ni ty caretak i ng and law enforcement objectiv es are not mutually exclusi v e, the courtreasoned. Id. at 604-05. 1 4
Wi th that point set t l ed, the court consi dered whether the
commu ni ty caretak er exception justifi ed the w arr antless entry i nto and sweep of Pinkard’s home. After a sc e rt aining that a Four th Amendment search or sei zure had occurred, id. at 602, the court eng a g e d in the same tw o-part inqui ry that the appellate court had i n Horngren : (1) w ere the poli ce exer ci sing

By contrast, some schol ars hav e adv o c ated fo r a rul e condi tio ning 1 4 appli catio n of the com mu ni ty caretaking do ctri ne on evidence tha t the pol i ce were animated pri maril y or sol el y b y a community caretaking purpo se, as opp osed to a cri minal l aw enfo rcement pu r p o se, when they too k warrantle ss actio n. See Dimi no, 66 W ASH

. & L EE L

. R EV

. at 15 28 -4 0; Decker, 89 J. C RIM

. L AW & C RIM INO LO GY at 51 0- 12 ; cf. People v. Mitchell , 34 7 N.E.2 d 60 7, 60 9 (N.Y. 19 76 ) (fi nding warrantle ss entry i nto de f e nd ant ’s hotel ro om to b e justi fi ed under emergency aid do ctri ne, i n part b ecause pol i ce had no moti v e to apprehend and arrest def e nd an t or to sei ze evidence) , abrogated by Brigh am City, 54 7 U.S

. at 40 4- 05 , 12 6 S. Ct. at 19 48 (i n emergency aid situati on, “[ t] he of fi cer’s sub jec tive moti v atio n i s i rrel ev ant .”)

.No. 12-2272 67

a bona fi de commu ni ty caretak ing func tion, a nd , i f so, (2) whether the publi c i ntere st outw ei ghed the intrusi on upon the priv a cy o f t he i ndi vidu al, such that the offi cers’ exer ci se of their commu ni ty caretak ing func tion w as reasonable. See id. at 601. The court answered these questi ons in the affirm a tiv e. In thi s case, the poli ce had a legiti mate concern for the w ell-being of the unc onsci ous, unresponsi v e occupan ts of the house. Id. at 603-04. Balancing the publi c intere st serv ed by poli ce a ct ion again st the intrusi on on Pinkard’s pri v acy intere sts, id. at 605, the court conclu ded t ha t the former outw ei ghed the latter : i t

w as possi

ble that the occupan ts may hav e ov erdo sed on drugs and thus required urgent medi cal assi stance, and the fact that the door to the resi dence w as left ajar su g g e st e d that the
o ccupants w ere unabl e to look out for their own intere sts, i d

. at 606-08. In short, giv en the to tality of the ci rcums tances, the entry i nto the house and then the open bedroo m consti tuted a reasonable exer ci se of the poli ce offi cers’ commu ni ty caretaki ng func tion. Id. at 608. And as the drugs w ere o bs e r ved in plain v ie w in the bedroo m, they w ere admi ssi ble again st the defendant at tr i al. Id. 1 5

See also , e.g. , State v. Ziedonis , 70 7 N.W.2 d 56 5 (Wi s. Ct. A p p

. 2 0 0 5 ) 1 5 (sustaining warrantle ss entry i nto def endant’s home

— wh erei n b oth unlawful l y possessed fi rearms and marij uan a we r e o bserved i n pl ain

v i ew—on b asis of community caretaker do ctri ne, where pol i ce, i n attempt to sol i ci t def endant’s help i n cor rall i ng his do gs, which were running l oo se outsi de his resi dence and causing a di sturb ance i n the mid dl e of the night,
saw tha t b ack do or of def endant’s home was ope n b y sev eral i nc he s, and def endant di d not respo nd to repeated and pro l onged eff or ts to ann ounce (co ntinued. ..)68 No. 12-2272
Based on these deci si ons, the offi cers who forcibly enter ed Sutt erfield ’ s ho me could hav e beli ev ed that their entry w as justifi ed by the commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine as understood and appli ed by the Wi scons in courts. They had a secti on 51.15 st atement of emerge ncy detention to execute based o n t he sui ci dal r emark Sutt erfield ha d made t o her physi ci an e arlier that day

. Sutt erfield w ould not v oluntarily admi t the offi cers to her home; and her behavi or , i f not err atic, di d no thi ng to allay the concerns rais ed by the physi ci an’s repo rt to the poli ce. The entry w as made i n a bona fi de effort to assu re Sutt erfield ’s

w ell-being; there has nev er been any suggesti on that the poli ce
w ere acti ng for a law enforcement motiv e. In relev ant respects, the ci rcums tances of thi s case, as w e hav e noted, were sub stantiall y si mi lar to the ci rcums tances that the a p p e l late court in Horngren found suffi ci ent to justif y a forcible entry

. B a se d on both that precedent and Pinkard, the poli ce r e asonably could hav e thought that the publi c intere st in sa feguardin g Sutt er
fi eld’s li fe outw ei ghed the intrusi on into the priv acy of her home.

( ...c onti nued) 1 5 their presence and hav e him come to d o o r ); State v. Ferguson , 62 9 N.W.2 d 78 8 (Wi s. Ct. A p p

. 20 01 ) (sustaining warrantle ss entry i nto def endant’s b edro om and cl oset—where i n marij uan a pl ant s wer e d i scovered—as l egi timate exerci se of c o mmuni ty caretaker functi on, where occ upants of b edro om di d not respo nd to of fi cers’ repeated knocks and yel l s, there were multi pl e i ndic i a el sewhere i n the apa rtment t ha t juvenil es had b een dri nking sub stan tial amounts of alco hol , and def endant had not b een seen at wor k i n sev eral days; of fi cers were justi fi ed i n b oth enteri ng b edro om and checki ng cl oset to mak e sure there was no one i nside who needed
ass i stan ce).No. 12-2272 69
Th e deci si on to forcibly open and search the lo ck e d compact di sc case di scov e r e d in the course of the prot ecti v e
sweep presents a clo se r questi on in ter ms of the offi cers’ quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

, just as i t does on the merits of Sutt erfield ’s Four th Amendment clai m. No W i scons in case that has be en ci ted to us or that w e hav e found has relied on the commu ni ty caretak i ng doctrine to justif y any search of the premi ses more i ntrusi v e than the sort of li mi ted, prot ecti v e sweep envis i oned by Buie —that i s, a search of p l aces wi thi n the home that another person mi ght be found. 494 U.S. at 335-36, 110 S. Ct. at 1099. The gun, havin g been secu red wi thi n a locke d , opaque case, obvi ously w as not in plain view , in contrast to the drugs found in both Horngren and Pi n ka r d

. O pening the case w as a sub stanti al step bey ond the standard prot ecti v e sw eep, and consti tuted a more sub stantia l intrusi on on Sutt erfield ’s priv acy i ntere sts in her personal effects. 1 6 Ev en so, a p o l ice offi cer mi ght hav e thought the search of the case justifi ed by the ci rcums tances presented to hi m and the broader art i culati on of the commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine

Compa re St ate v. Toliver, No. 20 10 AP48 4- CR, 20 11 WL 22 88 89 (Wi s. Ct. 1 6 App. Jan. 26 , 20 11 ) (nonpre cede ntial deci sio n) (co mmun i ty caretaker do ctri ne justi fi ed of fi cer’s deci sio n to ope n purse and l oo k fo r i denti fi catio n, where of fi cer was respo nding to repo rt of possi b l e suici de attempt and arrived to di scover purse l eft una ttended i n c o mm o n area outsi de of dupl ex), with Stat e v. Kuczor , No . 200 9A P10 77 -CR, 200 9 WL 3103 74 9 ( Wi s. Ct. App. Sep. 30 , 20 09 ) (nonpre cede ntial deci sio n) (co mmun i ty c ar e t aker do ctri ne di d not justi fy warrantle ss search of def endant’s duff el b ag b y deputy who respo nded to def endant’s one- c ar accid ent, notwi thstanding bo t h accid ent and def endant’s stran ge b ehav i or , where there were no particul ar facts tha t warranted i ntrusio n i nto b ag and deputy wa s simpl y on a fi shing expedi tio n.70 No. 12-2272 by the Wi scons in Supreme Court in Pinkard

. The tw o-part i nqui ry set fort h in Pinkardasks fi rst whether t he poli ce acted for a communi ty-caret akin g purpose and second whether , on the to tality of the ci rcums tances, the publi c intere st serv ed by the poli ce acti on outw ei gh the intrusi on upon the indi vidu al’s priv acy

. Although w e hav e not found any W i scons in case that i nv oke d the commu ni ty caretak ing doctrine to sus tain a search akinto t hat here, neither hav e w e found anything that w ould preclude thi s result when the search i s conduc ted for purposes of prot ecti ng someone’s safety or w ell-being. W e can i magi ne, for example, that i n the cas e of a repo rt ed sui ci de atte mpt by drug ov erdo se, a Wi scons in cour t mi ght sus tain the search o f someone’s medi cine cabinet, ni ghtstand, or purse in an effort to locate drugs that the indi vidu al has take n or mi ght take

. See Stricker v
. Tp. of Cambridge, supra , 710 F .3d at 362 (su staining the

w arr antl e ss search of home, inclu ding draw ers and cabinets, where drug ov erdo se of occupan t had been repo rt ed and such search mi ght yield clues as to what occup a nt had ingested). I nd e e d, the U.S. Supreme Court ’s analysi s in Brigham City theor etic ally mi ght recog ni ze such a si tuation as an emerge ncy that j usti fi es a w arr antless s earch of thiskin d. 1 7

See Sta te v. Ho o per

, N o. 20 09 AP5 75 -C R, 20 09 WL480 68 89 (W is. Ct. App

. 1 7 D ec

. 10, 20 09 ) (n onp re c ed ential de c ision ) (f ind ing se arc h of de fe nd ant ’s dr es se r ju stifie d b y c om mu nit y car eta ke r ex c ep tion , whe re de fe nd ant had
su m m one d em er ge ncy ass istanc e w ith re p or t tha t she had take n c oc ain e and

w a s h a vin g d i ff

icu lty b re ath ing, em er ge ncy m ed ic al p er sonn el a rr i v e d t o f in d he r inc ohe rent an d un r e s p o n s i v e, m e d i c a l p er sonn el instru c ted p olic e to look
ar ound d efen dant’s ap ar tm en t forany har m fu l sub stan c e de fe nd ant m ight hav e inge ste d, offic er saw a m ir ro r on top of d re sse r w ith p ow de ryr es id u e on it, an d of

fic er looke d in

dr es se r d raw er

anddisc ov er edco c ain e)

.No. 12-2272 71

Here, there i s no questi on that the poli ce searched the compact di sc case not for law enforcement purposes but rat her out of a safety concern. And the poli ce mi ght reasonably hav e conclu ded that although for c in g open the case w as a si gni fi cant i ntrusi on upon Sutt erfield ’s priv acy , i t w as ampl y j usti fi ed by the publi c intere st in prot ecti ng both her safety and w ell-being as w ell as that of any one else who ei ther li v ed wi th her or had
acces s to her home, i nclu ding in particu lar a minor

. Gi v en the nat ur e of Sutt erfield ’s threat to harm herself and her physi

ci an’s repo rt that she li kely possess ed a gun, poli ce had reason to look for any fi rear m that Sutt erfield mi ght use to har m herself. And although there w as nothin g b ut Flor i ani ’s hunch that suggested the r e might be a gun insi de of the case, the locked case w as a logic al place to loo k for a gun. For essenti ally the s ame reasons, we beli ev e that a reasonable po li ce o ffi cer mi ght hav e thought, upon di scov ery of the gun, that he w as authoriz ed by hi s commu ni ty caretak ing funct io n to sei ze the gun for safekeeping. Gi v en the breadth that the Wi scons i n courts hav e giv en to the commu nit y caretak i ng doctrine, and the fact-s pe ci fi c balanc ing of publi c
v ersus priv ate intere sts in whi ch they engage when the poli ce take acti on as they di d here to safeguard an indi vidu al’s wellbeing, a poli ce offi cer mi ght think he w ould be authorized to sei ze an o bvi ous impl ement of harm from a n individu al who has threat ened to kill he rself and i s being take n into cus tody pursuant to secti on 5 1 .15 for an emerge ncy mental health
ev aluati on. Regar dless of Sutt erfi eld’s legal right to possess the gun, there i s an obvious and pow erful logic and prudence supp or tin g the deci si on to take the gun into poli ce cus tody

. See72 No. 12-2272
Florida v
. J. L. , 529 U.S. 266, 272, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1 3 7 9 (2000) (“Fi rear ms are dangero us, and ext rao rdin ary dangers so metim es justif

y unus ual precauti ons.”). Th e p o li ce knew that 1 8 Sutt erfield had threat ened to harm herself and w as potent i ally i n a v olatile state of mind, that her p sy ch ia t r i st beli ev ed she

w as i n need of an interventi o n, a nd that, pursuant to secti on 51.15, Sutt erfield w as facing a short -t erm commi tment for
ev aluati on and potent i ally a l o nger ter m commi tment i f professi onals confi rmed she indeed posed a danger to herself. They had no i dea whether she w ould be released wi thi n a day , a w eek, or a month. And they had no i dea wh o , in t he meanti me—inclu ding her son—mi ght hav e acces s to her home and to the unattended gun. Seizing the gun mi ght not hav e been the only step they could ha ve t a ken to prev ent the gun from being mi sus ed or falling into the wrong hands, but i t w as a rat i onal and defens ible step. See Mo ra v. City of Gaithersbur g, supra , 519 F .3d at 227-28 (su staining sei zur e of indi vidu al’s guns and ammu ni tion for publi c safety , after indi vidu al had been sei z e d for i nv oluntary mental health admi ssi on for maki ng remark s indi cating he mi ght kill hi mself and possi bly hi s co-w or ker s); United States v
. Harris , supra , 2014 WL 1356822,

See also State v. Kucik

, No. 20 09 AP93 3- CR, 20 10 WL 46 33 08 2, at *11 (Wi s. 1 8 Ct. App. Nov. 16 , 20 10 ) (nonpre cede ntial deci sio n) (Fi ne, J., concur ri ng) (where def endant had b een detained pursuant to se cti on 51 .15 after
ass aulti ng cousi n and threatening l i fe ofb oth cousi n and aun t—incl udi ng threat to put a b ull et i n aun t’s head—an d guns were se en i n pl ain view i n glass-fro nted gun cab i net, i t was reasonab l e for of fi cers to ta ke custo dy o f d efe ndant ’s guns as safety measure i n exerci se of their comm u ni t y caretaking fu nc t i o n, given tha t they di d not know how l ong def endant woul d o therwise b e separated f ro m his guns).No. 12-2272 73

at * 3 & n.4 (su stai ning tempor ary sei zure of gun falling out of sleeping man’s pocket).
For all of these reasons, the defendants a r e entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty for the w arr antless entry into Sutt erfield ’s home, the search of the locked compact di sc ca se , a nd the tempor a r y se iz ure of the gun found insi de of the case. The poli ce w ere faced wi th a di ffi cult situati on in whi ch they had
reason to beli ev e, based on her physi ci an’s repo rt, that Sutt er
fi eld mi ght po se a danger to herself, they w ere impl ementi ng an emerge ncy detention of her person for ev aluati on pursuant to secti on 51.15, and they w ere logical ly atte mpting to find the fi rear m they had reason to beli ev e Sutt erfield possess ed and to
secu re that fi rear m whi le Sutt erfield w as undergoing a mental h e a l th e v a luati on. Notwiths tandi ng the un c e rt a inty a s to whi ch legal framew or k best appli es to the w arr antless ac tions of the poli ce in these ci rcums tances, the poli ce could hav e beli ev ed that Wi scons i n precedents, i f not the federal cases, authorized them to take these acti ons in or der to prot ect Sutt erfield ’s wellbeing as w ell as the w ell-being of any one else, inc l ud ing her son, who mi ght hav e acces s to her ho me in her absenc e. III. Based on the Supreme Court ’s deci si on in Brigham City and thi s court’s d e c i s i on i n Fitzgerald, w e conclu de that the w arr antless entry i nto Sutt erfield ’s home w as justifi e d

. U nd er the ci rcums tances confronting the defendant police offi cers, they had an objectiv ely reasonable basi s for beli eving that Sutt er
fi eld posed an i mminent da ng e r o f harm to herself; the

c i rcu mstanc es thus consti tuted an emerge ncy whi ch di s p e n s e d wi th the ne e d for a w arr ant under the exigent ci rcums tances74 No. 12-2272 exception to the Four th Amendment’s w arr ant requirement. Alter nati v ely

, ev en i f th e e nt ry into Sutt erfield ’s home w as i nconsi stent wi th the Four th Amendment, a reasonable person
w ould not hav e known that the entry v io l a t ed Sutt erfield ’s cl e arly establi shed rights; the offi cers w ould there fore be entitled to qualifi ed i mmu ni ty on the unlaw ful entry clai m. Sim i larly , although w e hav e assu med ar guen do that both the
sear ch of the compact di sc case in Sutt erfield ’s home a nd t he sei zur e of the (lawf

ully-poss essed) gun found insi de of that
case were contrar y to the Four th Amendment, w e conclu de that the defendant offi cer s are entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty
on the unlaw ful search and sei zure clai ms. W e do not address Sutt erfield ’s sum mary contention that the offic e r s’ sei zure of her person for purposes of an emerge ncy mental he a l t h
ev aluati on pursuant to Wi scons in St atutes sect ion 51.15 w as contrar y to the Four th Amendment, as she has not adequately preserved that arg ument. Nei ther do w e address Sutt erfield ’s contention that the sei zure of her lawfu lly-posses sed handgun violated her Second Amendment right to possess a fi rear m for the purpose of self- defense, as Sutt erfield has not a d e qua t ely dev eloped an d supp or ted that contention, nor has she shown any defect i n the av ai lable means of reg aining possess i on of her gun from the author i ties

. The judgment of the dis tr i ct court isAFF IRM ED.No. 12-2272 75

M AN I O N , Circ uit Judge, concu rr ing
. I am pleased to jo in the court’s t ho r o ug h and sch olarly opin io n. After examining many of the problems, the court

r eaches the corr ect conclu si on that the acti ons of the p o l ice offi cers were well wi thi n the shelter of quali fi ed i mm un i ty prov i ded by st a t e and federal judi ci al opin i ons interpr eting and applyi ng the Four th Amendment. I wri te s eparat ely only wi th the hope of encouraging legis latures to p r o v ide for a judi ci ally-i ssu ed ci vil warrant process that would authorize law enforcement to enter someone’s home wh e n there i s probable caus e to beli eve that she poses a ris k to herself or other s bec ause of men tal il lness

. In thi s case we a r e able to deter mine that exigent ci rcumstances justifi ed the poli ce forci ng their wa y into a private dwelling i n or der to prot ect the owner. But there was no other legal author i ty t o enter her home agains t her will

. I recog ni ze that allegations of mental health ris ks can have dramatic i mpli cati ons on privacy, liberty , and proper ty rights. After r e ceivi ng some due process, those deter mined to be mentally i ll may lose certain fund amental r i ghts, the same as
a cri minal. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d); Jana R. McCrear y, “Mentally Defec tive" Language in the Gun Control Act,” 45 C ONN

. L. R EV

. 813 (2013). What we do not seem to have i s a law that strikes a balanc e that prot ects those rights at least as much as i t does the rights o f t he cri minally accu sed, whi le sti ll allowing for swi ft and effecti ve respons e s by the poli ce. Here, exigent ci rcums tances enabled the poli ce to bypass some legal barriers. But i n ver y li mi ted ci rcums tances, as here, when the poli ce are posi tioned to enter a private h ome against the own er’s wi ll, i t76 No. 12-2272
would be ver y helpfu l, for example, i f the state legis lature of Wi scons in were to amend Wi s. St at. § 51.15 to allow the option of havin g what i n thi s case i s called the “St atement o f E me r gency Detention” approv ed by a judge. Then, the document could be a s or t of ci vil w arr ant on par w i th an arr est warrant

. It would allow the poli ce to rely on the document to enter the home when the owner-occupan t i s be l i eved to pose a ris k to herself or other s. By prov i ding the poli ce wi th the abilit y to obtain a ci vil warrant prior to enter ing the home of such a person, they wi ll have a more clearly establi shed method that i s safely wi thi n the confines of the l a w a nd whi ch prot ects personal pro pert y and privacy.
Becaus e the court resolv ed the i ssu es before i t consi stent wi th contr olli ng precedent, I fully concur.