IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., et al.,

 

 Plaintiffs, 

 vs. Civil Action 2:11-CV-705 

 Magistrate Judge King 

NOLAN ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This is an action for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 

101 et seq., in which plaintiffs allege that defendants willfully 

performed or caused to be performed copyrighted compositions at 

Centerfold Club in Columbus, Ohio, without license or authority. This 

matter is now before the Court, with the consent of the parties 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for consideration of Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’ Motion”), Doc. No. 19. 

Plaintiffs’ Motion seeks injunctive relief, $20,000 in statutory 

damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Defendants oppose 

Plaintiffs’ Motion on the basis that they did not willfully infringe 

plaintiffs’ copyrights. Reply of Defendants to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Response”), Doc. No. 20. Plaintiffs 

have filed a reply. Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Support of Motion for 

Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’ Reply”), Doc. No. 21. For the reasons 

that follow, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED. 

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I. Background 

 Plaintiff Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) possesses the right to 

license the public performances of numerous copyrighted musical 

compositions owned by each of the nine other plaintiffs in this 

action. Declaration of John Coletta (“Coletta Declaration”), Doc. No. 

19-1, ¶ 2. BMI alleges that defendants willfully performed or caused 

to be performed four copyrighted compositions at Centerfold Club, a 

“strip club” in Columbus, Ohio, on October 2, 2010, without license or 

authority. Defendant Nolan Enterprises, Inc. (“Nolan Enterprises”) is 

the legal entity that owns or controls Centerfold Club. Defendants’ 

Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories Propounded to 

Defendants, Doc. No. 19-9, pp. 4-5; Defendants’ Responses to 

Plaintiffs’ First Request for Admissions to Defendants, Doc. No. 19-9, 

p. 15. Defendant Frederick Tegtmeier is the sole owner of Nolan 

Enterprises. Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of 

Interrogatories Propounded to Defendants, Doc. No. 19-9, pp. 4-5 

On October 2, 2010, Nolan Enterprises and Tegtmeier operated, 

maintained, and had a direct financial interest in Centerfold Club and 

had the right and ability to direct and control its activities. 

Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Request for Admissions to 

Defendants, Doc. No. 19-9, pp. 16-17. Tegtmeier also had the ability 

to supervise the persons employed by Centerfold Club. Id. at p. 17. 

 Sometime prior to August 2008, BMI learned that defendants were 

offering musical entertainment at Centerfold Club without a BMI 

license. Stevens Declaration, Doc. No. 19-3, ¶ 3. On August 15, 

2008, BMI sent a letter to Tegtmeier at Centerfold Club and advised 

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that a license was required to publically perform BMI affiliated 

music. Letter Dated August 15, 2008, Doc. No. 19-5, p. 2. From 

September 22, 2008 through October 6, 2010, BMI sent approximately 23 

letters to defendants informing them that a license was required to 

publicly perform BMI copyrighted musical works. Stevens Declaration, 

¶¶ 5-6; Letters, Doc. No. 19-5, pp. 3-29. In much of the 

correspondence, plaintiffs offered terms of a license that would 

authorize the public performance of BMI’s music at Centerfold Club. 

See id. at pp. 3-29. Letters sent on April 30 and October 6, 2010 

directed defendants to cease and desist all use of BMI licensed music 

at Centerfold Club. Id. at pp. 25, 29; Stevens Declaration, ¶ 6. In 

addition to the letters sent to defendants, BMI’s licensing personnel 

telephoned Centerfold Club on seventy-nine occasions and visited the 

club on four occasions. Stevens Declaration, ¶¶ 8-9. Defendants did 

not respond to plaintiffs’ letters, see id. at ¶ 5; Letter Dated 

February 11, 2011, Doc. No. 19-5, p. 34, and at no time have 

defendants entered into a licensing agreement with BMI. Defendants’ 

Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Request for Admissions to Defendants, 

Doc. No. 19-9, p. 22; Defendants’ Response, pp. 1-2. 

 On October 2, 2010, plaintiffs sent an investigator, Scott 

Farkas, to Centerfold Club to make an audio recording and written 

report of the music being publicly performed at that establishment. 

Stevens Declaration, ¶ 11. According to plaintiffs, that 

investigation revealed that defendants publicly performed four BMI 

copyrighted music works on that date. Id.; Certified Infringement 

Report, Doc. No. 19-4. Plaintiffs advised defendants of their 

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investigation by a letter dated February 2, 2011 and offered to 

resolve the matter by entering into a license agreement in exchange 

for payment of outstanding licensing fees and costs of investigation 

in the amount of $5,208.16. Letter Dated February 2, 2011, Doc. No. 

19-5, p. 30; Stevens Declaration, ¶ 12. 

 According to Lawrence E. Stevens, Assistant Vice President of 

General Licensing for BMI, “[h]ad the [d]efendants entered into an 

agreement at the time BMI first contacted them in August 2008, the 

blanket license fees from August 1, 2008 through September 30, 2012 

would have been approximately $6,951.88; and the blanket license fees 

for the year commencing October 1, 2012 will be approximately 

$2,012.50.” Stevens Declaration, ¶ 16. 

II. Standard 

The standard for summary judgment is well established. This 

standard is found in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

which provides in pertinent part: 

The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. 

 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Pursuant to Rule 56(c), summary judgment is 

appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” 

Id. In making this determination, the evidence “must be viewed in the 

light most favorable” to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress 

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Summary judgment will not lie if the 

dispute about a material fact is genuine, “that is, if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving 

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party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

However, summary judgment is appropriate if the opposing party “fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322 (1986). The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support 

of the [opposing party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be 

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [opposing 

party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 

 The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions” of the record which 

demonstrate “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “Once the moving party has proved that no 

material facts exist, the non-moving party must do more than raise a 

metaphysical or conjectural doubt about issues requiring resolution at 

trial.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th 

Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). 

III. Discussion 

 A. Infringement 

To establish a claim for copyright infringement of a 

musical work by means of public performance, a claimant 

must prove: (1) the originality and authorship of a 

composition; (2) a valid copyright under the formalities of 

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the Copyright Act; (3) claimant's ownership of the 

copyright at issue; (4) defendant's public performance of 

the composition; and (5) defendant's failure to obtain 

permission from the claimant for such performance. 

Jobete Music Co., Inc. v. Johnson Communc’ns, Inc., 285 F.Supp.2d 

1077, 1082 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (citing Varry White Music. V. Banana Joe’s 

of Akron, Inc., No. 5:01CV1074, 2002 WL 32026609 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 

2002)). See also Superhype Pub., Inc. v. Vasiliou, 838 F.Supp. 1220, 

1224 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 

 Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of John Coletta, BMI’s 

Vice President of Legal Affairs, to establish the first three elements 

of their claim. Coletta Declaration, Doc. No. 19-1. Attached to Mr. 

Coletta’s declaration is a list of the musical works allegedly 

infringed, registration certificates issued by the United States 

Copyright Office for the musical works, and documentation relating to 

the chain of ownership of each copyrighted work. See id., pp. 19-2. 

Defendants have not disputed this evidence, nor have they otherwise 

created a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiffs' 

ownership of valid copyrights in the songs at issue in this 

litigation. Plaintiffs have therefore established their ownership of 

valid copyrights in the four songs allegedly infringed. See 17 U.S.C. 

§ 410(c). 

 As to the fourth element, plaintiffs have submitted a “Certified 

Infringement Report” as evidence that defendants publicly performed 

plaintiff’s copyrighted works. Certified Infringement Report, Doc. 

No. 19-4. The Certified Infringement Report was prepared by Scott 

Farkas, who visited Centerfold Club on October 2, 2010 and who 

documents that BMI works were publicly performed at that 

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establishment. Id.; Stevens Declaration, ¶ 11. Again, defendants 

have presented no contradictory evidence in their response to 

Plaintiffs’ Motion. Therefore, the Court finds that the “public 

performance” element of plaintiffs’ claims has been satisfied. 

 Finally, plaintiffs allege, and defendants concede, that they did 

not have a BMI license to publicly perform the copyrighted music on 

October 2, 2010. See Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ First 

Request for Admissions to Defendants, Doc. p. 22; Defendants’ 

Response, pp. 1-2. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material 

fact regarding the fifth element of plaintiffs’ claims. 

 Defendants offer no evidence, nor do they make any argument, 

contesting the alleged infringements. See Defendants’ Response, pp. 

1-6. Instead, defendants appear to argue that the alleged 

infringement was not done “willfully” or with knowledge. See id. at 

pp. 1, 3, 4 (“The alleged infringement has not been willful . . . .”). 

The only evidence offered by defendants is the affidavit of Tegtmeier, 

who avers that, “[a]t no time has [Nolan Enterprises or Tegtmeier] 

willfully disregarded or infringed on copyrights. . . . [Nolan 

Enterprises] is willing to pay [a] commercially reasonable licensing 

fee.” Tegtmeier Affidavit, attached to Defendants’ Response, at ¶ 3. 

This evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 

fact regarding plaintiffs’ copyright infringement claims. 

 B. Liability 

 Having concluded that plaintiffs established unlawful 

infringement, the Court now turns to the issue of defendants’ 

liability. Plaintiffs argue that Nolan Enterprises and Tegtmeier are 

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jointly and severally liable for infringement at Centerfold Club. 

Plaintiffs’ Motion, p. 15-17. Defendants appear to argue that they 

are not liable for the infringement because they had no knowledge of 

the particular music played on October 2, 2012. See Defendants’ 

Response, p. 3. 

In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 

417 (1984), the United States Supreme Court observed that 

[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable 

for infringement committed by another. . . . [However,] 

vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of 

the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is 

merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the 

circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual 

accountable for the actions of another. 

Id. at 434–435. Accordingly, Nolan Enterprises, as the entity that 

operated, maintained, had a direct financial interest in, and had the 

right and ability to direct and control the activities of Centerfold 

Club on October 2, 2010, see Doc. No. 19-9, pp. 15-17, is liable for 

the infringement, regardless of whether it had knowledge of the music 

actually played on that date. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Branham, 

No. C-1-80-124, 1982 WL 1271, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1982) (citing 

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975) (“The 

entrepreneur who sponsors such a public performance for profit is also 

an infringer . . . .”). 

As to Tegtmeier, “[c]ourts within virtually every circuit, 

including the Sixth Circuit, have adopted a two-prong test to 

determine whether a corporate officer is jointly and severally liable 

with the corporation for copyright infringement.” Broadcast Music, 

Inc. v. Rooster’s Inc., No. 04-140-DLB, 2006 WL 335583, at *3 (E.D. 

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Ky. Feb. 14, 2006) (citing Jobete Music Co., 285 F.Supp.2d at 1083). 

See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. H.S.I., Inc., No. C2-06-482, 2007 WL 

4207901, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2007) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 

Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)). On 

October 2, 2010, Tegtmeier operated, maintained, had a direct 

financial interest in, had the ability to direct and control the 

activities of, and had the ability to supervise the persons employed 

by Centerfold Club on that date. See Doc. No. 19-9, pp. 15-17. 

Tegtmeier is therefore also vicariously liable for the infringement of 

plaintiffs’ copyrights that occurred at Centerfold Club on that date. 

 C. Injunctive Relief 

 Plaintiffs request that the Court enjoin defendants from further 

unauthorized public performances of BMI’s copyrighted music, pursuant 

to 17 U.S.C. § 502. Plaintiffs’ Motion, pp. 1, 9-10. Defendants 

argue that plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction because money 

damages are adequate and because “music is an integral part” of the 

operation of a “strip club;” to grant the injunctive relief requested 

by plaintiffs, defendants argue, will force Centerfold Club to close. 

Defendants’ Response, pp. 3-4. 

 The Copyright Act authorizes a court to order temporary or final 

injunctive relief as a remedy for infringement “on such terms as it 

may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a 

copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). It is well established “that a 

showing of past infringement and a substantial likelihood of future 

infringement justifies issuance of a permanent injunction.” 

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub., 507 F.3d 470, 492 (6th 

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Cir. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted). “Not only is the 

issuance of a permanent injunction justified ‘when a copyright 

plaintiff has established a threat of continuing infringement, he is 

entitled to an injunction.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Walt 

Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Otherwise, 

awarding damages without injunctive relief would amount to a “̔forced 

license to use the creative work of another.’” Id. (quoting 

Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2004)). 

 In the case presently before the Court, plaintiffs have 

established past infringement on the part of defendants. Further, 

defendants have persistently disregarded plaintiffs’ invocation of 

their rights and of plaintiffs’ offer to license their works. See 

also Defendants’ Response, pp. 2-3 (“First, almost all of the 

telephone calls and correspondence occurred before the October 2, 2010 

on-site inspection by BMI.”). Under these circumstances, the Court 

concludes that there is a substantial likelihood of future 

infringement. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Pub Dayton, LLC, No. 3:11-

cv-58, 2011 WL 2118228, at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio May 27, 2011). 

 Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction enjoining 

defendants from publicly performing BMI’s copyrighted music without a 

license. 

 D. Statutory Damages 

 Plaintiffs also seek statutory damages of $5,000 for each of the 

four claimed infringements. Plaintiffs’ Motion, p. 16. The Copyright 

Act permits plaintiffs to seek statutory damages in lieu of actual 

damages attributable to the infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(c). 

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Statutory damages for each individual act of infringement can be no 

less than $750 and no more than $30,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). 

Where the copyright owner establishes willful infringement, the Court 

may increase the award of statutory damages to $150,000. 17 U.S.C. § 

504(c)(2). “The Court has substantial discretion to set statutory 

damages within the permitted range, but it is not without guidance.” 

H.S.I., Inc., 2007 WL 4207901 at *4 (citing Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 

U.S. 207, 210 (1935)). When determining the proper amount of 

statutory damages, “̔courts have looked to: (1) whether [d]efendants' 

infringement was willful, knowing, or innocent; (2) [d]efendants' 

profit from infringement; (3) [p]laintiffs' loss from infringement; 

and (4) deterring future violations by [d]efendants and similarly 

situated entities.’” Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 4737 Dixie Highway, 

LLC, No. 1:12-cv-506, 2012 WL 4794052, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2012) 

(quoting H.S.I., Inc., 2007 WL 4207901 at *6). 

 The parties first dispute whether defendants willfully infringed 

plaintiffs’ copyrights. In an action for copyright infringement, 

“willfully” means with knowledge that the defendant’s 

conduct constitutes copyright infringement. Otherwise, 

there would be no point in providing specially for the 

reduction of minimum awards in the case of innocent 

infringement, because any infringement that was nonwillful 

would necessarily be innocent. This seems to mean, then, 

that one who has been notified that his conduct constitutes 

copyright infringement, but who reasonably and in good 

faith believes the contrary, is not “willful” for these 

purposes. 

Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 

1392 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

 This is a case of willful infringement. Beginning in August 

2008, BMI sent defendants more than twenty letters, called Centerfold 

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Club 79 times, and sent representatives to the club on four occasions, 

demanding that defendants secure a license in order to lawfully 

perform BMI’s copyrighted music. Stevens Declaration, ¶¶ 5-9. BMI 

also directed defendants on April 30 and October 6, 2010 to cease and 

desist all use of BMI licensed music at Centerfold Club. Doc. No. 19-

5, pp. 25, 29; Stevens Declaration, ¶ 6. Defendants assert that the 

Centerfold Club’s day shift manager was responsible for collecting the 

mail, that the club has a high rate of employee turnover, and that 

Tegtmeier does not start work until late in the evening. Defendants’ 

Response, p. 12. Defendants do not, however, deny that they received 

these communications. Instead, defendants argue that BMI’s 

communications sent before October 2, 2010, i.e., the date of the 

infringements at issue in this case, are a “mitigating” factor in 

calculating statutory damages. Defendants’ Response, p. 5. To the 

contrary, defendants’ receipt of these communications before the date 

of the claimed infringements demonstrates that the infringement was in 

fact willful. See 4737 Dixie Highway, LLC, 2012 WL 4794052 at *3; 

H.S.I., Inc., 2007 WL 4207901 at *5; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Leyland 

Co., LLC, No. 5:11CV2264, 2012 WL 5879838, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 

2012); Pub Dayton, LLC, 2011 WL 2118228 at *3. 

 With regard to profits and losses associated with the 

infringements, plaintiffs have established $6,951.88 in lost licensing 

fees from August 1, 2008 through September 30, 2012. Stevens 

Declaration, ¶ 16. Although defendants argue that plaintiffs lost no 

licensing fees prior to October 2, 2010, see Defendants’ Response, p. 

4, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have sufficiently established 

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defendants’ costs savings as well as plaintiffs’ loss. See 4737 Dixie 

Highway, LLC, 2012 WL 4794052 at *3; Pub Dayton, LLC, 2011 WL 2118228 

at *3-4. 

 As to the amount of the award, “̔in the narrow class of cases 

dealing with willful, unauthorized, musical performances in public 

establishments, the damages awards range from two times the licensing 

fee to five times the licensing fee.’” 4737 Dixie Highway, LLC, 2012 

WL 4794052 at *4 (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DeGallo, Inc., 872 

F.Supp. 167, 169 (D.N.J. 1995)). “In fact, cases within this Circuit 

have recognized that the method of awarding statutory damages 

based ̔on some multiple of unpaid fees is more appropriate than 

measuring damages by the number of infringements.’” Id. (quoting 

H.S.I., Inc., 2007 WL 4207901 at *6 (awarding “statutory damages of 

three times the unpaid fees”). 

Plaintiffs’ request for statutory damages of $5,000 per 

infringement, for a total award of $20,000, is less than three times 

the amount of plaintiffs’ lost licensing fees. Defendants suggest, 

however, that the Court should award an amount equal to the unpaid 

licensing fees or $750 - $1,000 per infringement. Defendants’ 

Response, p. 4. The Court rejects this suggestion as insufficient. 

“If the Copyright Act is ̔to have any effect, judgment against 

defendant must be appreciably more than the amount he would have had 

to expend to obtain appropriate permission.’” H.S.I., Inc., 2007 WL 

4207901 at *6 (quoting Music City Music v. Alfa Foods, Ltd., 616 

F.Supp. 1001, 1003 (E.D. Va. 1985)). “Defendants ̔should be put on 

notice that it costs less to obey the copyright laws than to violate 

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them.’” Id. (quoting Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 623 F.Supp. 

889, 892 (W.D. Pa. 1985)). Defendants were on notice for two years 

that the public performance of BMI-licensed music without license or 

permission constituted copyright infringement. Defendants 

nevertheless refused to secure a license. 

Accordingly, the Court AWARDS plaintiffs statutory damages in the 

amount of $20,000, which constitutes an award of $5,000 for each of 

the four claimed infringements. This amount properly accounts for 

defendants' gain, plaintiffs' loss, and the interest of the Copyright 

Act in deterring future violations. 

E. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 

 Finally, plaintiffs seek an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees 

and costs. Plaintiffs’ Motion, p. 16. The Court is vested with the 

discretion to award fees to the prevailing party in a copyright 

infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 505. The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has set forth a series of factors to 

consider in determining whether to award attorney fees, including such 

factors as “̔frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness 

(both in the factual and in the legal components of the case) and the 

need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of 

compensation and deterrence.’” Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama 

Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 589 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fogerty v. 

Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)). “The grant of fees and 

costs ̔is the rule rather than the exception and they should be 

awarded routinely.’” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 520 

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F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Positive Black Talk Inc. v. 

Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 380 (5th Cir. 2004)). 

 In the case presently before the Court, defendants willfully 

infringed plaintiffs’ statutory rights despite numerous warnings that 

a license was required in order to publicly perform BMI works. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs. 

 “It is well settled law that the ‘lodestar’ approach is the 

proper method for determining the amount of reasonable attorneys’ 

fees.” Bldg. Serv. Local 47 Cleaning Contractors Pension Plan v. 

Grandview Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing 

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 

U.S. 546, 563 (1986)). The lodestar approach multiplies the number of 

hours reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. (quoting 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). There is a “strong 

presumption” that this figure is a reasonable fee. Id. (quoting 

Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 565). 

 The Declaration of Ronald H. Isroff (“Isroff Declaration”), Doc. 

No. 19-6, itemizes attorneys’ fees in the amount of $14,905.501

 and 

expenses in the amount of $465.41, for a total of $15,370.91. Isroff 

Declaration, pp. 11-12. According to the Isroff Declaration, 

attorneys Ronald Isroff and Christie Watchorn charged an hourly rate 

in 2011 of $455 and $280, respectively. Id. at ¶ 16. In 2012, 

 

1

 $14,905.50 represents the total amount billed by attorneys Isroff, Watchorn, 

and Thrush. Isroff Declaration, pp. 11-12. Attorney Isroff billed $8,845.50 

for 11.90 hours in 2011 and 7.30 hours in 2012. Id. Attorney Watchorn 

billed $5,576.00 for 5.10 hours in 2011 and 13.60 hours in 2012. Id. 

Attorney Corey billed $484.00 for 2.20 hours in 2012. Id. 

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attorneys Isroff, Watchorn, and Corey Thrush charged at hourly rates 

of $470, $305, and $220, respectively. Id. The Isroff Declaration 

avers that these fees and costs were 

reasonable and necessary to advance [p]laintiffs’ 

interest in this matter given the level of experience 

of the lawyers, the time and labor required in light 

of the fees customarily charged in this locality for 

similar legal services. 

 

Id. at ¶ 17. Although defendants characterize Mr. Isroff’s rate as 

unreasonable, Defendants’ Response, p. 6, defendants offer no evidence 

in support of this characterization or controverting plaintiff’s 

evidence in this regard. Therefore, the Court concludes that 

plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 17 

U.S.C. § 505, in the amount of $15,370.91. 

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Doc. No. 19, is GRANTED. 

 Defendants are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from publicly performing 

BMI’s copyrighted music without a license. 

 Plaintiffs are AWARDED statutory damages in the amount of 

$20,000. 

 Plaintiffs are AWARDED attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of 

$15,370.91. 

The Clerk shall enter FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of plaintiffs. 

January 11, 2013 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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