U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

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19–011 2003

108th Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 108–50

A REPORT IN CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENTIAL 

DETERMINATION UNDER PUBLIC LAW 107–243

COMMUNICATION

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 3(b) OF THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION 

OF 2002 (PUBLIC LAW 107–243)

MARCH 19, 2003.—Referred to the Committee on International Relations 

and ordered to be printed 


E:\Seals\Congress.#13
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THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, March 18, 2003. 

Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Consistent with section 3(b) of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 

(Public Law 107–243), and based on information available to me, 

including that in the enclosed document, I determine that: 

(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic and 

other peaceful means alone will neither (A) adequately protect 

the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq nor (B) likely lead to enforcement 

of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and 

(2) acting pursuant to the Constitution and Public Law 107–

243 is consistent with the United States and other countries 

continuing to take the necessary actions against international 

terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, 

organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, 

or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 

2001. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE W. BUSH. 

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REPORT IN CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION

UNDER PUBLIC LAW 107–243

This report summarizes diplomatic and other peaceful means 

pursued by the United States, working for more than a dozen years 

with cooperating foreign countries and international organizations 

such as the United Nations, in an intensive effort (1) to protect the 

national security of the United States, as well as the security of 

other countries, against the continuing threat posed by Iraqi development and use of weapons of mass destruction, and (2) to obtain 

Iraqi compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council 

(UNSC) resolutions regarding Iraq. Because of the intransigence 

and defiance of the Iraqi regime, further continuation of these efforts will neither adequately protect the national security of the 

United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq nor likely lead to enforcement of all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding 

Iraq. 

This report also explains that a determination to use force 

against Iraq is fully consistent with the United States and other 

countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 

11, 2001. Indeed, as Congress found when it passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243), Iraq continues to harbor and aid international 

terrorists and terrorist organizations, including organizations that 

threaten the safety of United States citizens. The use of military 

force to remove the Iraqi regime is therefore not only consistent 

with, but is a vital part of, the international war on terrorism. 

This document is summary in form rather than a comprehensive 

and definitive rendition of actions taken and related factual data 

that would constitute a complete historical record. This document 

should be considered in light of the information that has been, and 

will be, furnished to Congress, including the period reports consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 

Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102–1) and the Authorization for Use 

of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–

243). 

1. THE GULF WAR AND CONDITIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

On August 2, 1990, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq initiated 

the brutal and unprovoked invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The 

United States and many foreign governments, working together 

and through the UN, sought by diplomatic and other peaceful 

means to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and to establish 

international peace and security in the region. 

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President George H.W. Bush’s letter transmitted to Congress on 

January 16, 1991, was accompanied by a report that catalogued the 

extensive diplomatic, economic, and other peaceful means pursued 

by the United States to achieve U.S. and UNSC objectives. It details adoption by the UNSC of a dozen resolutions, from Resolution 

660 of August 2, 1990, demanding that Iraw withdraw from Kuwait, to Resolution 678 on November 29, 1990, authorizing member 

states to use all necessary means to ‘‘implement Resolution 660,’’ to implement ‘‘all subsequent relevant resolutions,’’ and ‘‘to restore 

international peace and security in the area.’’ Despite extraordinary and concerted efforts by the United States, 

other countries, and international organizations through diplomacy, 

multilateral economic sanctions, and other peaceful means to bring 

about Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions, and even after the 

UN and the United States explicitly informed Iraq that its failure 

to comply with UNSC resolutions would result in the use of armed 

force to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s regime 

remained intransigent. The President ordered the U.S. armed 

forces, working in a coalition with the armed forces of other cooperating countries, to liberate Kuwait. The coalition forces promptly 

drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, set Kuwait free, and moved into 

southern Iraq. 

On April 3, 1991, the UNSC adopted Resolution 687, which established conditions for a cease-fire to suspend hostilities. Among 

other requirements, UNSCR 687 required Iraq to (1) destroy its 

chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with ranges 

greater than 150 km; (2) not use, develop, construct, or acquire biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; 

(3) submit to international inspections to verify compliance; and (4) 

not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow 

others who commit such acts to operate in Iraqi territory. On April 

6, 1991, Iraq communicated to the UNSC its acceptance of the conditions for the cease-fire. 

2. IRAQ’S BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE CONDITIONS: THREATS TO

PEACE AND SECURITY

Since almost the moment it agreed to the conditions of the ceasefire, Iraq has committed repeated and escalating breaches of those 

conditions. Throughout the first seven years that Iraq accepted inspections, it repeatedly obstructed access to sites designated by the 

United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On two occasions, in 1993 

and 1998, Iraq’s refusal to comply with its international obligations 

under the cease-fire led to military action by coalition forces. In 

1998, under threat of ‘‘severest consequences,’’ Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding pledging full cooperation with UNSCOM 

and IAEA and ‘‘immediate, unconditional and unrestricted’’ access 

for their inspections. In a matter of months, however, the Iraqi regime suspended cooperation, in part an effort to condition compliance on the lifting of oil sanctions; it ultimately ceased all cooperation, causing the inspectors to leave the country. 

On December 17, 1999, after a year with no inspections in Iraq, 

the UNSC established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification 

and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor to 

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UNSCOM, to address unresolved disarmament issues and verify 

Iraqi compliance with the disarmament required by UNSCR 687 

and related resolutions. Iraq refused to allow inspectors to return 

for yet another three years. 

3. RECENT DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER PEACEFUL MEANS REJECTED BY

IRAQ

On September 12, 2002, the President addressed the United Nations General Assembly on Iraq. He challenged the United Nations 

to act decisively to deal with Iraq’s systematic twelve-year defiance 

and to compel Iraq’s disarmament of the weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems that continue to threaten international 

peace and security. The White House background paper, ‘‘A Decade 

of Deception and Defiance: Saddam Hussein’s Defiance of the 

United Nations’’ (September 12, 2002), summarized Iraq’s actions 

as of the time the President initiated intensified efforts to enforce 

all relevant UN Resolutions and demonstrates the failure of diplomacy to affect Iraq’s conduct:

For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has deceived 

and defied the will and resolutions of the United Nations 

Security Council by, among other things: continuing to 

seek and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and prohibited long-range missiles; brutalizing the 

Iraqi people, including committing gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity; supporting international terrorism; refusing to release or account for prisoners of war and other missing individuals from the Gulf 

War era; refusing to return stolen Kuwaiti property; and 

working to circumvent the UN’s economic sanctions.

The President also summarized Iraq’s response to a decade of 

diplomatic efforts and its breach of the cease-fire conditions on October 7, 2002, in an address in Cincinnati, Ohio:

Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian 

Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its 

weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of 

such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. 

The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It 

possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It 

is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith.

In response to the President’s challenge of September 12, 2002, 

and after intensive negotiation and diplomacy, the UNSC unanimously adopted UNSCR 1441 on November 8, 2002. The UNSC declared that Iraq ‘‘has been and remains in material breach’’ of its 

disarmament obligations, but chose to afford Iraq one ‘‘final opportunity’’ to comply. The UNSC again placed the burden on Iraq to 

comply and disarm and not on the inspectors to try to find what 

Iraq is concealing. The UNSC made clear that any false statements 

or omissions in declarations and any failure by Iraq to comply with 

UNSCR 1441 would constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s 

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obligations. Rather than seizing this final opportunity for a peaceful solution by giving full and immediate cooperation, the Hussein 

regime responded with renewed defiance and deception. 

For example, while UNSCR 1441 required that Iraq provide a ‘‘currently accurate, full and complete’’ declaration of all aspects of 

its weapons of mass destruction (‘‘WMD’’) and delivery programs, 

Iraq’s Declaration of December 7, 2002, failed to comply with that 

requirement. The 12,000-page document that Iraq provided was little more than a restatement of old and discredited material. It was 

incomplete, inaccurate, and composed mostly of recycled information that failed to address any of the outstanding disarmament 

questions inspectors had previously identified. 

In addition, since the passage of UNSCR 1441, Iraq has failed to 

cooperate fully with inspectors. It delayed until two-and-a-half 

months after the resumption of inspections UNMOVIC’s use of aerial surveillance flights; failed to provide private access to officials 

for interview by inspectors; intimidated witnesses with threats; undertook massive efforts to deceive and defeat inspectors, including 

cleanup and transshipment activities at nearly 30 sites; failed to 

provide numerous documents requested by UNMOVIC; repeatedly 

provided incomplete or outdated listings of its WMD personnel; and 

hid documents in homes, including over 2000 pages of Iraqi documents regarding past uranium enrichment programs. In a report 

dated March 6, 2003, UNMOVIC described over 600 instances in 

which Iraq had failed to declare fully activities related to its chemical, biological, or missile procurement.

Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, reported to 

the UNSC on January 27, 2003 that ‘‘Iraq appears not to have 

come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament 

which was demanded of it.’’ Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, Director 

General of the IAEA, reported that Iraq’s declaration of December 

7 ‘‘did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998.’’ Both demonstrated 

that there was no evidence that Iraq had decided to comply with 

disarmament obligations. Diplomatic efforts have not affected 

Iraq’s conduct positively. Any temporary changes in Iraq’s approach that have occurred over the years have been in response to 

the threat of use of force. 

On February 5, 2003, the Secretary of State delivered a comprehensive presentation to the UNSC using declassified information, including human intelligence reports, communications intercepts and overhead imagery, which demonstrated Iraq’s ongoing efforts to pursue WMD programs and conceal them from UN inspectors. The Secretary of State updated that presentation one month 

later by detailing intelligence reports on continuing efforts by Iraq 

to maintain and conceal proscribed materials. 

Despite the continued resistance by Iraq, the United States has 

continued to use diplomatic and other peaceful means to achieve 

complete and total disarmament that would adequately protect the 

national security of the United States from the threat posed by 

Iraq and which is required by all relevant UNSC resolutions. On 

March 7, 2003, the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain presented a draft resolution that would have established for Iraq a 

March 17 deadline to cooperate fully with disarmament demands. 

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Since the adoption of UNSCR 1441 in November 2002, there have 

been numerous calls and meetings by President Bush and the Secretary of State with other world leaders to try to find a diplomatic 

or other peaceful way to disarm Iraq. On March 13, 2003, the U.S. 

Ambassador to the UN asked for members of the UNSC to consider 

seriously a British proposal to establish six benchmarks that would 

be used to measure whether or not the regime in Iraq is coming 

into full, immediate, and unconditional compliance with the pertinent UN resolutions. On March 16, 2003, the President traveled to 

the Azores to meet with Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel 

Durao Barroso, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Spanish 

Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar to assess the situation and confirm that diplomatic and other peaceful means have been attempted to achieve Iraqi compliance with all relevant UNSC resolutions. Despite these diplomatic and peaceful efforts, Iraq remains 

in breach of relevant UNSC resolutions and a threat to the United 

States and other countries. Further diplomatic efforts were suspended reluctantly after, as the President observed on March 17, 

‘‘some permanent members of the Security Council ha[d] publicly 

announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq.’’ The lesson learned after twelve years of Iraqi defiance is that the 

appearance of progress on process is meaningless—what is necessary is immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation in the 

complete disarmament of Iraq’s prohibited weapons. As a result of 

its repeated failure to cooperate with efforts aimed at actual disarmament, Iraq has retained weapons of mass destruction that it 

agreed, as an essential condition of the cease-fire in 1991, not to 

develop or possess. The Secretary of State’s February 5, 2003, presentation cited examples, such as Iraq’s biological weapons based on 

anthrax and botulinum toxin, chemical weapons based on mustard 

and nerve agents, proscribed missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and mobile biological 

weapons factories. The Secretary of State also discussed with the 

Security Council Saddam Hussein’s efforts to reconstitute Iraq’s 

nuclear weapons program.

The dangers posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and 

long-range missiles are clear. Saddam Hussein has already used 

such weapons, repeatedly. He used them against Iranian troops in 

the 1980s. He used ballistic missiles against civilians during the 

Gulf War, firing Scud missiles into Israel and Saudi Arabia. He 

used chemical weapons against the Iraqi people in Northern Iraq. 

As Congress stated in 1998 in Public Law 105–235, ‘‘Iraq’s continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threaten vital 

United States interests and international peace and security.’’ Congress concluded in Public Law 105–388 that ‘‘[i]t should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime 

headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the 

emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.’’ In addition, Congress states in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243), 

that:

Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and secuVerDate Dec 13 2002 03:38 Mar 21, 2003 Jkt 019011 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HD050.XXX HD050
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rity in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material 

and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, 

among other things, continuing to possess and develop a 

significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations.

Nothing that has occurred in the past twelve years, the past 

twelve months, the past twelve weeks, or the past twelve days provides any basis for concluding that further diplomatic or other 

peaceful means will adequately protect the national security of the 

United States from the continuing threat posed by Iraq or are likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding Iraq and the restoration of peace and security in the area. 

As the President stated on March 17, ‘‘[t]he Iraqi regime has 

used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage.’’ Further 

delay in taking action against Iraq will only serve to give Saddam 

Hussein’s regime additional time to further develop WMD to use 

against the United States, its citizens, and its allies. The United 

States and the UN have long demanded immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation by Iraq in the disarmament of its weapons 

of mass destruction. There is no reason to believe that Iraq will disarm, and cooperate with inspections to verify such disarmament, if 

the U.S. and the UN employ only diplomacy and other peaceful 

means. 

4. USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WAR ON

TERROR

In Public Law 107–243, Congress made a number of findings concerning Iraq’s support for international terrorism. Among other 

things, Congress determined that: 

• Members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for 

attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including 

the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be 

in Iraq. 

• Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist 

organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and 

safety of United States citizens. 

• It is in the national security interests of the United States and 

in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through 

the use of force if necessary.

In addition, the Secretary of State’s address to the UN on February 5, 2003 revealed a terrorist training area in northeastern 

Iraq with ties to Iraqi intelligence and activities of al Qaida affiliates in Baghdad. Public reports indicate that Iraq is currently harboring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab alZarqawi, a close al Qaida associate. In addition, Iraq has provided 

training in document forgery and explosives to al Qaida. Other terrorist groups have been supported by Iraq over past years. 

Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism and continues to 

be a safe haven, transit point, and operational node for groups and 

individuals who direct violence against the United States and our 

allies. These actions violate Iraq’s obligations under the UNSCR 

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687 cease-fire not to commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow others who commit such acts to operate in Iraqi 

territory. Iraq has also failed to comply with its cease-fire obligations to disarm and submit to international inspections to verify 

compliance. In light of these Iraqi activities, the use of force by the 

United States and other countries against the current Iraqi regime 

is fully consistent with—indeed, it is an integral part of—the war 

against international terrorists and terrorist organizations. 

Both because Iraq harbors terrorists and because Iraq could 

share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists who seek them 

for use against the United States, the use of force to bring Iraq into 

compliance with its obligations under UNSC resolutions would be 

a significant contribution to the war on terrorists of global reach. 

A change in the current Iraqi regime would eliminate an important 

source of support for international terrorist activities. It would likely also assist efforts to disrupt terrorist networks and capture terrorists around the globe. United States Government personnel operating in Iraq may discover information through Iraqi government 

documents and interviews with detained Iraqi officials that would 

identify individuals currently in the United States and abroad who 

are linked to terrorist organizations. 

The use of force against Iraq will directly advance the war on 

terror, and will be consistent with continuing efforts against international terrorists residing and operating elsewhere in the world. 

The U.S. armed forces remain engaged in key areas around the 

world in the prosecution of the war on terrorism. The necessary 

preparations for and conduct of military operations in Iraq have 

not diminished the resolve, capability, or activities of the United 

States to pursue international terrorists to protect our homeland. 

Nor will the use of military force against Iraq distract civilian departments and agencies of the United States Government from continuing aggressive efforts in combating terrorism, or divert resources from the overall world-wide counter-terrorism effort. Current counter-terrorism investigations and activities will continue 

during any military conflict, and winning the war on terrorism will 

remain the top priority for our Government. 

Indeed, the United States has made significant progress on other 

fronts in the war on terror even while Iraq and its threat to the 

United States and other countries have been a focus of concern. 

Since November 2002, when deployments of forces to the Gulf were 

substantially increased, the United States, in cooperation with our 

allies, has arrested or captured several terrorists and frustrated 

several terrorist plots. For example, on March 1, 2003, Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan by Pakistani authorities, with U.S. cooperation. The capture of Sheikh Mohammed, the al Qaida ‘‘mastermind’’ of the September 11th attacks 

and Usama Bin Laden’s senior terrorist attack planner, is a severe 

blow to al Qaida that will destabilize the terrorist network worldwide. This and other successes make clear that the United. States 

Government remains focused on the war on terror, and that use of 

force in Iraq is fully consistent with continuing to take necessary 

actions against terrorists and terrorist organizations. 

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5. CONCLUSION

In the circumstances described above, the President of the 

United States has the authority—indeed, given the dangers involved, the duty—to use force against Iraq to protect the security 

of the American people and to compel compliance with UNSC resolutions. 

The President has full authority to use the armed forces in Iraq 

under the U.S. Constitution, including his authority as Commander 

in Chief of the U.S. armed forces. This authority is supported by 

explicit statutory authorizations contained in the Authorization for 

Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102–1) 

and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243). 

In addition, U.S. action is consistent with the UN Charter. The 

UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, provided that 

member states, including the United States, have the right to use 

force in Iraq to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Council authorized the use of force in UNSCR 678 with 

respect to Iraq in 1990. This resolution—on which the United 

States has relied continuously and with the full knowledge of the 

UNSC to use force in 1993, 1996, and 1998 and to enforce the nofly zones—remains in effect today. In UNSCR 1441, the UNSC 

unanimously decided again that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions and 

would face serious consequences if it failed immediately to disarm. 

And, of course, based on existing facts, including the nature and 

type of the threats posed by Iraq, the United States may always 

proceed in the exercise of its inherent right of self defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. 

Accordingly, the United States has clear authority to use military 

force against Iraq to assure its national security and to compel 

Iraq’s compliance with applicable UNSC resolutions.

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