IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES E. LUNDEEN, Sr.,

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Action 2:11-CV-1128

Judge Smith

Magistrate Judge King

THE STATE MEDICAL BOARD OF OHIO,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action challenges the permanent revocation of plaintiff

James E. Lundeen’s medical license by the defendant, the State Medical

Board of Ohio (“the Board”). This matter is closely related to a prior

case, Lundeen v. Talmadge, Case No. 2:11-cv-00484, in which plaintiff

challenged the summary suspension of his medical license.1

 This matter

is now before the Court for consideration of several motions filed by

plaintiff, who is proceedings without the assistance of counsel:

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 6; Motion for Declaratory

Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Constitutional Challenge of State

Statute R.C. 119.12, Doc. No. 13; and Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings Pursuant to Rule 12(c), Doc. No. 16. For the reasons that

follow, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motions be DENIED and that

this action be DISMISSED.

I.

Plaintiff filed this action on December 19, 2011. In his Complaint

1

 The Court entered final judgment granting defendants’ motion to

dismiss the earlier action, Lundeen v. Talmadge, Case No. 2:11-cv-00484, 2011

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134019 (Nov. 21, 2011), and that judgment is the subject of

plaintiff’s pending appeal. Plaintiff has also filed numerous other lawsuits

in both state and federal courts related to the suspension of his medical

license and the surrounding events. See 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134019, at *4

n.1. The Court does not construe the claims asserted in this action to include

new or renewed challenges to the summary suspension of plaintiff’s medical

license. 

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for Declaratory Judgment, Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, Doc. No.

2, plaintiff alleges that, on December 14, 2011, the Board wrongfully

ordered that plaintiff’s medical license be permanently revoked. Id. at

p.4; see also Entry of Order, attached as Exhibit B-3 to Complaint, Doc.

No. 2-1. The Board based its decision upon the report and recommendation

of a hearing examiner, Patricia A. Davidson. Id. Hearing Examiner

Davidson had concluded that plaintiff’s “acts, conduct, and/or omissions”

constituted violations of Ohio Revised Code §4731.22(B). See Report and

Recommendation, attached as Exhibit B to Opposition to Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 11-2, pp. 356-57. The Board informed

plaintiff of his right, under O.R.C. §119.12, to appeal the revocation

decision to the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County, Ohio. See

December 14, 2011 Ltr. to Lundeen, attached as Exhibit B-1 to Complaint,

Doc. No. 2-1. On December 29, 2011, plaintiff in fact filed an

administrative appeal in the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County,

Ohio. See Notice of Appeal, attached as Exhibit A to Opposition to Motion

for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 11-1. That appeal apparently

remains pending.

Plaintiff asks this Court to enjoin the Board from enforcing the

permanent revocation of his medical license. Complaint, p. 4. Plaintiff

further seeks to enjoin the Board from enforcing O.R.C. §4731.22(B),

which governs disciplinary actions by the Board, alleging that certain

subsections “violate his due process and equal protection rights under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,

his free speech and redress rights under the 1st Amendment, as well as

his rights articulated under Article I, Sections 1 and 2 of the Ohio

Constitution.” Id. at p.4.2

 Plaintiff also challenges the “absence of

2

 Plaintiff also refers to §4731.22(G), which relates to license

suspensions. See fn. 1, supra. 

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mens rea and scienter language and application of strict liability”

within the statute. Id.3 

Plaintiff also challenges the constitutionality of Ohio’s

administrative appeals statute, O.R.C. §119.12. See Doc. No. 13.4 In

particular, plaintiff challenges the statutory provision that permits

affirmance of the agency’s order upon a finding that the order is

supported by “reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in

accordance with law.” See Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent

Injunction, Doc. No. 13, p. 3. According to plaintiff, this standard of

appellate review “violates his due process and equal protection rights

. . . . [by not including] a weighing or burden of evidence other than

non-zero.” Id. Instead, plaintiff argues, “a higher proof of evidence,

either preponderance or clear and convincing,” should be required for

review of agency decisions that “affect constitutionally-protected rights

of property and/or liberty.” Id. at pp. 5, 28.

II.

Plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(c), which provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed . . . a

party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The Board has not yet

filed an answer. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings Pursuant to Rule 12(c) is not properly before the Court. See

Nationwide Children’s Hosp., Inc. v. D.W. Dickey & Son, Inc., No. 2:08-

cv-1140, 2009 WL 5247486, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (holding Rule 12(c)

3

 Plaintiff also appears to assert a due process violation relating to

his summary suspension. See fn. 1, supra. 

4 The Complaint expressly challenges only the constitutionality of

§4731.22. However, the Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent

Injunction, Constitutional Challenge of State Statute R.C. 119.12 , Doc. No.

13, also requests injunctive relief relating to §119.12. Because the pro se

plaintiff’s pleadings must be liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519 (1972), and because this Court’s disposition of plaintiff’s challenge

to §119.12 is the same as that relating to his challenge to §4731.22, the

Court will overlook this procedural defect.

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motion premature because pleadings not “closed” when all defendants had

not yet filed an answer). It is RECOMMENDED that this motion, Doc. No.

16, be DENIED. 

III.

 A.

Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. 

Interim injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that should be

granted only after the Court has carefully considered the following four

factors: 

(1) whether the movant has a “strong” likelihood of success on

the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer

irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary

injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4)

whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a

preliminary injunction.

Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing McPherson

v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997)

(en banc), quoting Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d

1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995)). When considering these factors, a district

court should balance each factor against the others to arrive at its

ultimate determination. Id. These factors are not prerequisites to

injunctive relief; rather, they are factors that a court must balance. 

In re Delorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985); Michigan

Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2001) (no single

factor is determinative); Monongahela Power Co. v. Schriber, 322 F.

Supp.2d 902, 918 (S.D. Ohio 2004)(same). However, a preliminary

injunction should not issue where there is simply no likelihood of

success on the merits. Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240,

1249 (6th Cir. 1997).

The standard governing a request for permanent injunctive relief is

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essentially the same as that governing a request for a preliminary

injunction, except that plaintiff must show actual, as opposed to a

likelihood of, success on the merits. See ACLU of Kentucky v. McCreary

Cty., 607 F.3d 439, 445 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v.

Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987)). 

The Court concludes that plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood of

success on the merits.

B. 

As an initial matter, the Court concludes that the Eleventh

Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of subject

matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in this action. The

Eleventh Amendment prohibits “any suit in law or equity, commenced or

prosecuted against one of the United States.” The only named defendant

in this action is the Board, which is an agency of the State of Ohio

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Begun v. Ohio State Medical

Bd., 1989 WL 34047, *1 (6th Cir. March 29, 2989)(unpublished)(affirming

dismissal of claim against the Board based on Eleventh Amendment

immunity).

The Board argues that the Court also lacks personal jurisdiction

over it because plaintiff has neither requested a waiver of service nor

effected service of summons. See Doc. Nos. 15, 17. Indeed, the record

does not reflect either the waiver or the completion of service of

process. Plaintiff responds that, on December 19, 2011, he filed a

praecipe with the Clerk of Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(b), 28

U.S.C. §2403 and S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 10.1, intended to inform the Ohio

Attorney General of plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to a state

statute. See Praecipe, Doc. No. 3; Plaintiff’s Reply, Doc. No. 18.

According to plaintiff, this praecipe “acts as a service of summons.” 

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Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the

Record, Doc. No. 18, p. 1. Moreover, because counsel for the Board

immediately thereafter entered an appearance in the action and

“materially participated” in this matter, plaintiff argues that the Board

has constructively waived the service of process requirement. Id. p. 2.

Plaintiff is mistaken.

Service of process on a defendant is a fundamental requirement in

litigation. As stated by the United States Supreme Court:

In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service by

the defendant), a court ordinarily may not exercise power over

a party the complaint names as defendant. See Omni Capital

Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987)

(“Before a ... court may exercise personal jurisdiction over

a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons

must be satisfied.”); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.

Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946) (“[S]ervice of summons

is the procedure by which a court ... asserts jurisdiction

over the person of the party served.”). Accordingly, one

becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in

that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other

authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the

party served must appear and defend. . . . Unless a named

defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to

function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity

to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or

substantive rights. 

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350

(1999)(some internal citations omitted).

Proper service of process in litigation instituted in the Southern

District of Ohio must conform to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and S.D. Ohio Civ. R.

4.2. The fact that a defendant may have received actual notice of the

filing of the action cannot substitute for proper service of process. See

LSJ Investment Co., Inc. v. O.L.D., Inc., 167 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir.

1999); Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1155 (6th Cir.

1991). Similarly, a defendant’s mere entry of appearance after receiving

actual notice of the lawsuit does not automatically waive the requirement

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of proper service of process. Cf. Reed v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:04-cv0546, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2006) (finding that individual defendant

had implicitly waived his argument of improper service by its extensive

participation in the case, including the filing of an answer, conducting

discovery, testifying on deposition and affirmatively filing a motion for

summary judgment). 

Here, there is no dispute that plaintiff has not effected service

of process in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 or S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 4.2.

Although he is proceeding pro se, plaintiff has demonstrated his ability

to effect service of process in other cases filed by him. See, e.g.,

Lundeen v. Talmadge, Case No. 2:11-cv-1148, Doc. Nos. 4, 5. Moreover,

the Board has noted the failure to effect service of process in nearly

every filing made by it and plaintiff has nevertheless not attempted to

either secure a waiver of service or actual service of process. Under

these circumstances, the claims asserted in this action are subject to

dismissal without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

Wholly apart from these jurisdictional issues, the Board argues that

this Court’s consideration of plaintiff’s claims for relief is prohibited

by the federal abstention principles articulated in Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Doc. Nos. 11, 15. Plaintiff responds that Younger

does not apply here because: (1) this case is related to a separate

habeas case, in which Younger would not apply; (2) the three-prong test

for abstention has not been satisfied; and (3) the statutory scheme at

issue in this action is so “flagrantly and patently violative of express

constitutional prohibitions” that abstention is inappropriate. See

Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Preliminary Injunction,

Doc. No. 14. 

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The Younger abstention doctrine, as established and extended by the

United States Supreme Court, prohibits federal courts from issuing

injunctions that serve to interfere with state criminal and civil

proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, 46 (addressing interference

with state criminal proceedings); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592

(1975) (extending Younger to state civil proceedings). The doctrine also

prohibits federal courts from interfering with certain state

administrative proceedings. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton

Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986); see also Middlesex County

Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433 n.12 (1982).

A federal court must consider three factors in determining whether

Younger abstention is appropriate: 

(1) whether the underlying proceedings constitute

an ongoing judicial proceeding, (2) whether the

proceedings implicate an important state interest,

and (3) whether there is an adequate opportunity in

the state proceedings to raise a constitutional

challenge. 

Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2008). Even when a federal

court determines that each of the Younger factors has been satisfied, the

court must then determine whether any exceptions to the Younger doctrine

apply so as to counsel against abstention. See BB&T Ins. Servs., Inc. v.

Ohio Dept. of Ins., No. 2:06-cv-09, 2006 WL 314495, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb.

9, 2006). Specifically, Younger abstention does not apply when a federal

court finds that 

the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to

harass or is conducted in bad faith, or where the

challenged statute is “flagrantly and patently

violative of express constitutional prohibitions in

every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in

whatever manner and against whomever an effort

might be made to apply it.” 

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 611. 

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Plaintiff first contends that, because this Court has characterized

this case as “related” to a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. §2254 5

– one of four (4) other related cases filed by plaintiff in this Court,

see Doc. No. 8 – Younger abstention is inapplicable. This argument is

entirely frivolous. This case is not a habeas case and application of the

Court’s internal administrative process by which related cases are

assigned to the same judicial officers does not make it so. In any

event, the habeas case filed by plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. §2254, Lundeen

v. State Medical Board of Ohio, 2:11-cv-1054, was dismissed by the Court

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts without requiring response by the Board. The Court

will therefore consider the Younger three-prong test.

This Court has previously held that the administrative proceedings

initiated before the Board qualify as “an ongoing judicial proceeding”

for purposes of Younger abstention. Lundeen v. Talmadge, 2:11-cv-11-484,

Doc. No. 42, pp. 6-7. See also Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 846 (6th

Cir. 1988) (finding proceedings initiated by the Tennessee Division of

Health Related Boards to summarily suspend a doctor’s license to be

“judicial proceedings” subject to Younger abstention principles). See

also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S.

at 627 (finding that administrative proceedings that are judicial in

nature from the outset remain judicial in nature even though they have

“progressed to state-court review” by the time the federal injunction

case is heard). Plaintiff’s claim that the Board’s proceeding is not

5

In Lundeen v. State Medical Board of Ohio, 2:11-cv-1054, plaintiff

claimed that the summary suspension of his medical license denied him his

right to liberty and procedural due process and defamed him. That action was

dismissed because plaintiff did not meet the “custody” requirement of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Order, Doc. No. 9. Plaintiff’s appeal from the judgment

entered in that action remains pending.

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“judicial” because the voting members are allegedly biased (because they

were named as defendants in plaintiff’s other lawsuit(s)) is not welltaken. 

The administrative proceedings are also clearly “ongoing.” 

Plaintiff has chosen to continue the administrative matter by filing an

appeal in the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County from the

administrative revocation of his medical license. See Lundeen v. Ohio

State Med. Bd., Case No. 11-CV-016295. That case apparently remains

pending. See Fed. Express Corp. v . Tenn. Public Serv. Comm’n, 925 F.2d

962, 969 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding state court proceedings “ongoing” for

purposes of Younger analysis where plaintiff had initiated state judicial

review of state agency’s order).6

The second Younger question is whether the proceedings implicate an

important state interest. Again, this Court has previously held that the

state proceedings do. Lundeen v. Talmadge, 2:11-cv-11-484, Doc. No. 42,

p. 7. It is clear that the regulation of the practice of medicine is an

important interest to the State of Ohio. See, e.g., Watts, 854 F.2d at

846-47 (“It is readily apparent that the State of Tennessee has an

important interest in protecting its citizens from the illegal and

6

 In Fed. Express Corp. v. Tenn. Public Serv. Comm’n, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit utilized the “day-of-filing” rule to

conclude that the underlying state proceedings were ongoing. 925 F.2d at 969.

Specifically, the court found the first prong of the Younger analysis to be

satisfied because a state proceeding was pending at the time the federal court

action was filed. Id. Even though, in the instant case, plaintiff filed this

action after the administrative hearing process had ended but before he had

filed his administrative appeal in state court, the undersigned finds that

this analysis does not change. At the time plaintiff filed this action, the

15-day window provided by state law for appealing the Board’s administrative

decisions had not yet passed. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §119.12; December 14,

2011 Ltr. to Lundeen, attached as Exhibit B-1 to Complaint, Doc. No. 2-1. Just

ten days after filing this action, plaintiff filed his appeal in state court.

See Notice of Appeal, Doc. No. 11-1. No proceedings on the merits of this case

had taken place in the interim and the Court therefore concludes that the

principles of comity and federalism underlying the Younger abstention doctrine

are fully applicable here. See Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State

Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 436-37 (1982); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349

(1975). 

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improper distribution of controlled substances and from the negligence

of licensed physicians.”); Korn v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 61 Ohio App.3d

677, 685-86 (Franklin Cty. 1988) (“There is a strong public interest in

the removal of a doctor from the profession to protect innocent

patients.”). Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary (including his

inapplicable detour into the criminal principle of entrapment) is without

merit. 

The third element of the Younger inquiry is whether plaintiff has

an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the pending

state proceedings. Under Ohio law, a party adversely affected by an order

of the Board may argue on appeal, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §119.12,

that the order is not “in accordance with law,” a term that has been

construed to include federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g.,

Reading v. Pub. Util. Comm., 109 Ohio St.3d 193, 195-96 (2006)

(permitting facial constitutional challenge); Leon v. Ohio Bd. Of

Psychology, 63 Ohio St.3d 683, 686-87 (1992) (permitting argument that

the regulation relied upon to revoke appellant’s license was

unconstitutionally vague). This Court has specifically held that an

appeal to Ohio courts under §119.12 provides an adequate forum to raise

constitutional issues. See BB&T Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Ins.,

No. 2:06-cv-09, 2006 WL 314495, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2006); Walter

v. Cincione, No. 2:00-cv-1070, 2000 WL 1505945, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 6,

2000). Thus, plaintiff’s pending appeal before the Franklin County Court

of Common Pleas provides ample opportunity for plaintiff to raise his

constitutional challenges; indeed, plaintiff has done just that. See

Notice of Appeal, attached as Exhibit A to Opposition to Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 11-1, p. 3. Plaintiff’s argument that

he cannot receive an adequate review of his current constitutional

concerns in a state forum, based on the fact that his prior cases have

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failed and his belief that the State of Ohio “has affected a stranglehold on the State Court system,” is without merit. 

This Court therefore concludes that the Younger analysis militates

in favor of abstention.

Plaintiff argues that a lack of mens rea language in §4731.22 makes

it so “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional

prohibitions” that equitable relief is warranted notwithstanding the

Younger analysis. See Reply, Doc. No. 14, p. 18. This Court disagrees. 

Section 4731.22 addresses disciplinary actions against physicians

and, inter alia, authorizes the revocation of a certificate to practice

for certain specified reasons. § 4731.22(B). Although certain of the

specified bases include a mental element, e.g., §

4731.22(B)(4)(“Willfully betraying a professions confidence”); §

4731.22(B)(5)(“Making . . . a statement . . . intended . . . to create

false or unjustified expectations . . . .”), other specified bases do

not, e.g., § 4731.22(B)(2)(“Failure to maintain minimal standards

applicable to the selection or administrative of drugs . . .”); §

4731.22(B)(4)(3)(“[A]dministering drugs for other than legal and

legitimate therapeutic purposes . . .”). 

However, not every statute must contain an express mens rea element

in order to pass constitutional muster. This is true, moreover, even

where a statute – unlike the statutes challenged by plaintiff – imposes

criminal liability. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Anderson, 106 F.3d 402, *5

(Table), 1997 WL 35577 (6 th Cir. January 29, 1997). In particular,

statutes that deal with the public welfare or regulatory offenses need

not require proof of any mens rea. See Staples v. United States , 511

U.S. 600, 606 (1994). It is notable in this regard that § 4731.22(B) was

enacted under the state’s power to protect the public’s safety and

welfare. Bouquett v. Ohio State Med. Bd. , 123 Ohio App.3d 466, 473

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(Franklin Cty. 1997). In any event, courts may, under some

circumstances, impute a mental element required by either legislative

intent or constitutional mandate. See, e.g., Morissette v. United

States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). 

This Court expresses no opinion as to the merits of plaintiff’s

claims in this regard; the Court does conclude, however, that the mere

fact that §4731.22 may not expressly require a particular mental element

does not render the statute so flagrantly and patently violative of

express constitutional prohibitions that equitable relief is warranted

notwithstanding the Younger analysis.7

 

WHEREUPON, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 6), Motion for Declaratory Judgment

and Permanent Injunction, Constitutional Challenge of State Statute

R.C. 119.12 (Doc. No. 13), and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Pursuant to Rule 12(c) (Doc. No. 16) be DENIED. It is FURTHER

RECOMMENDED that this case be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter and

personal jurisdiction, and because the Court should abstain from

consideration of plaintiff’s claims.

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file

and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,

specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part

thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28

U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must

be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy

7

 The same can be said for §119.12, even though plaintiff does not

specifically address this statute. 

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thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to

de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of

Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v.

Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

 s/Norah McCann King Norah McCann King

 United States Magistrate Judge

May 7, 2012

(Date)

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