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S. HRG. 113–117 

STOPPING FRAUDULENT ROBOCALL SCAMS: 

CAN MORE BE DONE? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, 

PRODUCT SAFETY, AND INSURANCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 10, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

WILLIAM COWAN, Massachusetts 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

DAN COATS, Indiana 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF CHIESA, New Jersey 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

JOHN WILLIAMS, General Counsel 

DAVID SCHWIETERT, Republican Staff Director 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, PRODUCT SAFETY, 

AND INSURANCE 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

WILLIAM COWAN, Massachusetts 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada, Ranking Member 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DAN COATS, Indiana 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 10, 2013 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator McCaskill ............................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Heller ................................................................................... 3 

Statement of Senator Pryor .................................................................................... 38 

WITNESSES

Lois Greisman, Associate Director, Division of Marketing Practices, Bureau 

of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission ........................................ 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Eric J. Bash, Associate Chief, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications 

Commission ........................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20 

Kevin Rupy, Senior Director, Law and Policy, United States Telecom Association ........................................................................................................................ 32

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Michael F. Altschul, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, CTIA— 

The Wireless Association® ................................................................................... 38 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

Matthew Stein, Chief Technology Officer, Primus Telecommunications Inc. ..... 43 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Aaron Foss, Freelance Software Developer, Nomorobo ........................................ 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted to Lois Greisman by: 

Hon. Claire McCaskill ...................................................................................... 61 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 63 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 64 

Hon. Dan Coats ................................................................................................ 66 

Response to written questions submitted to Eric J. Bash by: 

Hon. Claire McCaskill ...................................................................................... 66 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 68 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 68 

Hon. Dan Coats ................................................................................................ 70 

Response to written questions submitted to Kevin G. Rupy by: 

Hon. Claire McCaskill ...................................................................................... 70 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 75 

Hon. Dan Coats ................................................................................................ 77 

Response to written questions submitted to Michael F. Altschul by: 

Hon. Claire McCaskill ...................................................................................... 77 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 77 

Hon. Dan Coats ................................................................................................ 79 

Response to written questions submitted to Matthew Stein by: 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 79 

Hon. Dan Coats ................................................................................................ 82 

Response to written questions submitted to Aaron Foss by: 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 82 

Hon. Dan Coats ................................................................................................ 84 

(1) 

STOPPING FRAUDULENT ROBOCALL SCAMS: 

CAN MORE BE DONE? 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 10, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, PRODUCT

SAFETY, AND INSURANCE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire McCaskill, 

presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. Welcome, everyone. This hearing will come 

to order. We appreciate you being here. 

We have all been subject to the frustrations and annoyances of 

receiving unwanted telemarketing calls, also known as robocalls. It 

seems these calls always intrude at a very inconvenient time. 

Ten years ago, the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal 

Communications Commission, at the direction of Congress, established a National Do Not Call Registry so that consumers could get 

some peace and quiet in their homes and stop the torrent of unsolicited telemarketing calls. The idea was simple: voluntarily register your phone number on a centralized list, and telemarketers 

would be prohibited by law from calling you. The registry has been 

celebrated across party lines as a successful government program 

that provides real benefits to consumers. 

While the National Do Not Call Registry has been effective at 

limiting intrusions by legitimate telemarketers, fraudulent 

robocalls have since filled the void and have become the source of 

understandable anger and frustration among the public. These 

automated, prerecorded telemarketing calls that often seek personal information from unsuspecting consumers are an annoyance 

at best, but they can be devastating for those that are defrauded 

by them. 

It is easy to see how consumers can easily be confused by these 

calls. One common scam involves a call from Rachel from ‘‘Cardholder Services’’ offering an easy way to reduce consumers’ credit 

card interest rates. 

[Audio played.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. Another common scam involves robocalls 

warning consumers that their auto warranty is about to expire. 

[Audio played.] 

2 

Senator MCCASKILL. In both examples, with the press of a button, the consumer is directed to an individual whose job is to collect 

financial information in an effort to defraud them. Even pressing 

the button they claim removes a caller from their list does nothing 

more than identify a phone number as valid, likely increasing the 

frequency of unwanted calls in the future. 

Law enforcement officials have estimated that telemarketing fraud costs Americans over $40 billion annually. So it is no wonder 

that robocalls consistently remain a top consumer complaint at the 

FTC as well as the FCC. The FTC alone receives more than 

200,000 complaints about robocalls every month. Complaints received from consumers in the state of Missouri alone have roughly 

doubled every year since 2009. 

The FTC and FCC have taken important steps to try and stop 

fraudulent robocalls. Both commissions have issued rules restricting robocalls, and they have taken enforcement actions to protect 

consumers. 

Since the National Do Not Call Registry started, the FTC has won more than $250 million in civil penalties and equitable relief 

for consumers against robocalls. But because these shady companies and individuals are often based overseas and very difficult to 

locate, the FTC has only been able to collect $15 million out of the 

$250 million that they have in fact gotten authorization to collect. 

Today we will hear from the FTC and the FCC about their efforts to implement the National Do Not Call Registry and other 

telemarketing rules. We will hear about their successes and their 

challenges in pursuing fraudulent robocalls, as well as their suggestions for how we can stem the tide of the alarming number of 

robocalls being placed to Americans every day. 

Advances in technology have made it cheap and easy for an individual anywhere in the world with a computer and a broadband 

connection to make thousands and even millions of robocalls at the 

push of a button. 

Last year, recognizing the limits of regulation and law enforcement in stopping these kinds of calls, the FTC launched a public 

competition asking American innovators to put forth their best 

ideas for a technological solution that would weed out fraudulent 

robocalls. In April, the FTC announced its winners. 

Among the three winners of the FTC challenge was Nomorobo, 

a technology that would screen out fraudulent callers in much the 

same way that a spam filter screens out unwanted e-mails. We will 

hear from that product’s developer about his innovative idea and 

what it would take to make it or something like it a viable tool for 

every American consumer. 

It would seem the technological and legal barriers to a technological solution are not insurmountable. Primus, a Canadian telecommunications provider, offers its customers a free ‘‘Telemarketing Guard’’ that similarly screens out fraudulent callers. We 

will hear from its inventor and chief technology officer about its 

service. 

We will also hear from our domestic wireline and wireless telephone service industries, represented here by the United States 

Telecom Association and CTIA—The Wireless Association, about 

the steps the industry has taken, is taking, and could take in the 

3 

future to help address the consumer harm from fraudulent 

robocalls. 

Ten years of the National Do Not Call Registry, by all accounts, 

has accomplished precisely what Congress and the FTC intended. 

However, fraudulent robocalls and advancing technology has allowed scammers looking to make a quick buck with no regard for 

the law—they remain a serious annoyance and abuse that faces 

consumers. 

Similarly, the exceptions to the Do Not Call Registry for charities, political calls, and businesses with which consumers have an 

existing relationship also remain a nuisance for consumers. In exploring regulatory, statutory, or technological changes to address 

the problem of robocalls, giving the consumers the choice to stop 

all unwanted calls—charities, political, and businesses with existing relationships to the consumer—stopping all of those calls, regardless of who places them, should be our ultimate goal. The 

choice here should rest firmly in the hands of the phone that rings. 

And I will turn it over now to Senator Heller. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN HELLER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA 

Senator HELLER. Thank you. And good morning. Chairman 

McCaskill, thanks for holding this hearing. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for being here and those in 

the audience also that are interested in what I think is a very important hearing. And having your participation is important in 

moving this forward. 

Congress has been looking for ways to limit unsolicited telephone 

calls since 1991 when the Telephone Consumer Protection Act was 

passed. In 1994, Congress acted again when the Telemarketing 

Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act was signed into law. 

These laws gave the FCC and the FTC commissions the authority 

to enact regulations on telephone solicitations and the use of automated telephone equipment to make these solicitations. 

These laws clearly prohibited any telemarketer from initiating or 

any seller from causing a telemarketer to initiate an outbound telephone call to a person when that person previously had stated that 

he or she does not wish to receive a call. So there shouldn’t be any 

confusion as to the intent of Congress when these bills were 

passed. People have a right to free themselves from telephone solicitations. 

As we come up on the 10th year anniversary of the National Do 

Not Call Registry, I think it is important to note this has been, to 

a degree, a successful government program. The FTC and the FCC 

deserve credit for promoting this program and ensuring that it 

functions correctly. 

Solicitors for the most part have honored the wishes of consumers, and when a solicitor has broken the rules, the FTC and/ 

or the FCC have acted appropriately. In fact, on June 27, 2013, the 

FTC announced a $7.5 million civil penalty for violations by a 

refinancer of veterans’ home loans, which, according to the FTC, is 

the largest fine that has ever been collected. 

Despite the popularity of the Do Not Call Registry and the actions of the FTC and the FCC, there has been a noticeable rise in 

4 

the number of illegal robocalls over the last several years. Between 

October 2008 and September 2009, the FTC received over 700,000 

complaints involving calls using a recorded message. Between October 2011 and September 2012, these complaints increased over 2 

million. 

The FTC and the FCC are actively engaged in stopping these illegal robocalls, but they have admitted to the significant challenges 

they face against new and emerging technologies, including sophisticated Voice-over-Internet-Protocol enabled auto-dialers and the 

use of fake caller ID systems. 

Companies using auto-dialers can send out thousands of phone 

calls every minute at almost no cost. Some of these companies do 

not screen against the Do Not Call Registry and use this solicitation to scam an individual. 

I have here with me a recent article in USA Today that outlined 

an example of this type of scam. In fact, it came out this month, 

on July 4, and it is called ‘‘Your Money: Seniors Fight Back Against 

Robocalls.’’ And it gave a specific example of what is happening out 

there, and I would like to take a couple of paragraphs, if I may. 

‘‘The automated voice implies that a doctor or a relative signed 

the consumer up for a medical alert system, and it is all free. 

Authorities said that, in some cases, after consumers press a 

button to accept the offer, they quickly receive another call 

asking for personal information, including credit card numbers. 

This might be con artists trying to get bank or credit card information or a Social Security number to use in ID theft, or it 

is a way to pressure seniors into paying for equipment or services that they don’t need. The medical alert system scam is in 

full swing in Michigan, according to the state attorney general’s office, as well as in other states, including Pennsylvania, 

New York, Texas, Wisconsin, and Kentucky.’’ 

Today’s hearing is an opportunity for the Senate to hear more 

about the actions of the FCC and the FTC, what they are taking, 

as well as from the private sector on what technologies are available to help consumers free themselves from unwanted telephone 

solicitations. 

I am looking forward to the testimonies of our panelists and 

again thank the Chairman for calling this important hearing. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

We will now hear from our witnesses. And we have two witnesses on our first panel. The first panel is Lois Greisman—we are 

happy to have you here—and Eric Bash, from the FCC and the 

FTC. 

And we are happy to have both of you, and we look forward to 

your testimony. 

Ms. Greisman? 

STATEMENT OF LOIS GREISMAN, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

DIVISION OF MARKETING PRACTICES, BUREAU OF 

CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

Ms. GREISMAN. Thank you. And good morning, Chairman 

McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller. I am delighted to appear before you this morning to discuss the FTC’s work to fight illegal 

5 

robocalls. And we are very much appreciative of your leadership in 

the consumer protection area. 

I am also pleased to be sitting next to my friend and former colleague, Eric Bash. Both he and the FCC have been outstanding 

partners in our fight against telemarketing fraud. 

As you noted, by establishing the Do Not Call Registry 10 years 

ago, the Federal Trade Commission gave consumers an easy-to-use 

tool to protect their privacy against unwanted calls. I believe, as 

you indicated, that the do-not-call program has been highly effective in reducing unwanted calls from legitimate telemarketers. Enforcing the do-not-call provisions is a top priority for the agency, 

and the more than 100 cases filed by the FTC reflect that priority. 

But several years ago, we observed a troubling shift in the landscape: robocalls. And I want to talk briefly about what gave rise 

to the new problem and how we are marshalling all of our resources to tackle illegal robocalls and to protect consumers. 

Technological changes in communication services have brought 

enormous benefits to consumers by way of lower costs and improved services. At the same time, however, fraudsters have also 

taken advantage of these lower costs, which brought faster and 

cheaper automated-dialing platforms. Fraudsters have also further 

exploited caller ID spoofing, which induces the consumer to pick up 

the phone, while at the same time enabling the scammer to hide 

its identity and location. And, of course, with phone calls bouncing 

from country to country all over the world, it is now easier than 

ever for the robocaller to hide. 

With such a cheap and scalable business model, bad actors can 

blast literally tens of millions of illegal robocalls over the course of 

a single day at less than 1 cent per minute. These robocalls not 

only invade consumers’ privacy, quite often they pitch goods and 

services riddled with fraud. 

To meet this challenge, we stepped up our law enforcement initiatives. Looking just at the cases we have completed involving 

robocalls, we have shut down entities that placed billions of such 

calls and we have obtained court orders totaling more than $200 

million in redress or disgorgement and also more than $51 million 

in civil penalties. 

And we have strategically targeted entities that we believe facilitate the illegal robocallers. Specifically, we have sued entities that 

afford access to massive dialer or voice-blasting platforms that initiate the calls. We have also sued entities known as payment processors that afford access to the financial system and enable the 

robocallers to process payments from consumers. 

And, of course, our coordination with state, Federal, and international partners is as strong as ever. And I am happy to report 

that some of the individuals sued by the Federal Trade Commission for placing illegal calls have also been prosecuted criminally 

by the Department of Justice. 

We knew, though, that law enforcement was not enough and that 

more was needed. Toward those ends, we hosted a robocall summit 

last October, bringing together key players, engineers, academics, 

industry members, and of course law enforcers. We analyzed the 

technological changes that had given rise to the robocall tidal wave 

6 

1The views expressed in this statement represent the views of the Commission. My oral presentation and responses to questions are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Commission or any individual Commissioner. 2 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29, 2003); 16 C.F.R. Part 310. The FTC issued the TSR pursuant 

to the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6108. 3See Appendix A, National Do Not Call Registry Active Registrations and Complaint Figures. 4For example, in Fiscal Year 2012, more than 28,000 telemarketers accessed the Do Not Call 

Registry. National Do Not Call Registry Data Book FY 2012 at 8 (Oct. 2012), available at 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/10/1210dnc-databook.pdf. 5 Humorist Dave Barry called the Do Not Call Registry ‘‘the most popular Federal concept 

since the Elvis stamp.’’ See Dave Barry, Idea for telemarketers: Hang up and go away, DESERET

NEWS, Aug. 31, 2003, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/1006979/Idea-for-telemarketers-Hang-up-and-go-away.html. 6See Section II(A), infra. 7 73 Fed. Reg. 51164 (Aug. 29, 2008); 16 C.F.R. Part 310.4(b)(1)(v). The FTC had already 

brought robocall-related enforcement actions prior to 2008, alleging that defendants made illegal 

‘‘abandoned calls,’’ because their robocalls did not ‘‘connect the call to a sales representative 

within two seconds of the completed greeting of the person who answer[ed].’’ 16 C.F.R. Part 

310.4(b)(1)(iv). Any telemarketing campaign consisting solely of prerecorded messages would always violate that provision, and would not meet the abandoned call safe harbor requirements 

under the TSR. See 16 C.F.R. Part 310.4(b)(4). Nonetheless, the Commission amended the TSR 

to explicitly prohibit unsolicited robocalls, considering it beneficial to make the prohibition more 

prominent. 

and existing structural impediments that served as obstacles to enhanced consumer protection. 

Recognizing consumers’ frustration with robocalls, which we all 

share, we wanted solutions now. So we used the summit to launch 

the FTC’s first public contest, which you discussed. It was a huge 

success in stimulating the marketplace to innovate and develop 

technological solutions that would help consumers block illegal 

robocalls. 

Mr. Foss’s participation in the next panel illustrates the impact 

of the FTC’s challenge to spur competition. He was 1 of 3 winners, 

but nearly 800 eligible solutions were submitted, many of which 

presented well-thought-out technical proposals. 

And, as always, consumer education and outreach remain indispensable tools that complement our law enforcement and policy 

work. 

Finally, I want to assure you of our ongoing and sustained commitment to protect consumer privacy and halt illegal telemarketing 

fraud by enforcing the Do Not Call Registry and by tackling illegal 

robocalls. And I look forward to any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Greisman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, and members of the Subcommittee, I am Lois Greisman, Associate Director of the Division of Marketing 

Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission (‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘FTC’’).1 I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Commission’s initiatives to fight illegal robocalls. 

In 2003, the FTC responded to enormous public frustration with unsolicited sales 

calls and amended the Telemarketing Sales Rule (‘‘TSR’’) to create a national Do 

Not Call Registry.2 The Registry, which currently includes more than 221 million 

telephone numbers,3 has been tremendously successful in protecting consumers’ privacy from the unwanted calls of tens of thousands 4 of legitimate telemarketers who 

participate in the Registry each year.5 More recently, changes in technology led to 

a new source of immense frustration—the blasting of prerecorded messages using 

Voice over Internet Protocol (‘‘VoIP’’) technology.6 In 2008, the Commission responded by amending the TSR to address this problem, prohibiting the vast majority of prerecorded sales calls unless the recipient has provided express written consent to receive them.7

7 

8See FTC Robocall Action Plan, http://www.ftc.gov/robocalls. 9 In 2003, two different district courts issued rulings enjoining the Do Not Call Registry. See 

Press Release, FTC Files Motion to Stay Pending Appeal in Oklahoma DNC Ruling (Mar. 24, 

2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/dncok.shtm; Press Release, Statement of 

FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris (Sept. 26, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/ 

09/dnc030926.shtm. Congress addressed the first decision in summary fashion by enacting HR 

3161 in one day. See ‘‘HR 3161 (108th) Do-Not-Call-Registry bill,’’ http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr3161; Press Release, Statement of FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris (Sept. 25, 

2003), available at ttp://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/dnc030926.shtm. The 10th Circuit reversed 

the second district court decision on February 17, 2004. See Press Release, Appeals Court Upholds Constitutionality of National Do Not Call Registry (Feb. 17, 2004), available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/dncappeal.shtm. 10See Press Release, Mortgage Broker Targeting U.S. Servicemembers Will Pay Record $7.5 

Million to Settle Alleged Telemarketing Violations (June 27, 2013), available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/06/donotcall.shtm. 11The 105 Do Not Call actions include cases that involve the rule provisions prohibiting unauthorized robocalls, which also invade consumers’ privacy and may be deceptive as well. 12 As is true of for all TSR violations, telemarketers who violate the Do Not Call provisions 

are subject to civil penalties of up to $16,000 per violation. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A); 16 C.F.R. 

1.98(d). 13For example, in October 2007, an independent study by Harris Interactive® found that of 

the 72 percent of Americans who had registered their telephone numbers for the Do Not Call 

Registry, 18 percent reported that they currently received no telemarketing calls, 59 percent reported that they still received some, but far fewer than before they signed onto the Registry, 

and 14 percent said they received some, but a little less than before they registered. Previous 

surveys had similar results. See Annual Report to Congress for FY 2007 Pursuant to the DoNot-Call Implementation Act on Implementation of the National Do Not Call Registry, at 4–5, 

n.10 (July 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/07/P034305FY0dncreport.pdf. 14Like the other provisions of the TSR, the robocall provisions do not apply to non-sales calls, 

such as calls placed by charities or those that are pure political, informational, or survey calls. 

See generally ‘‘Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule’’ (Feb. 2011), available at http:// 

business.ftc.gov/documents/bus27-complying-telemarketing-sales-rule. 15 16 C.F.R. Part 310.4(b)(1)(v). Limited exceptions exist for calls that deliver a healthcare 

message made by an entity covered by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 

16 C.F.R. Part 310.4(b)(1)(v)(D), and for certain calls placed by telemarketers who solicit charitable contributions, 16 C.F.R. Part 310.4(b)(1)(v)(B). 16The FTC filed 12 of the 34 cases before the rule change went into effect on September 1, 

2009. 

Illegal robocalls are still a significant consumer protection problem today, because 

they repeatedly disturb consumers’ privacy and many of them peddle fraudulent 

goods and services that cause significant economic harm. Therefore, the FTC is 

using every tool at its disposal to fight them.8 This testimony describes the Commission’s efforts to stop telemarketer violations, including our aggressive law enforcement, initiatives to spur technological solutions, and broad consumer and business 

outreach. 

I. Do Not Call and Robocall Law Enforcement 

Since the Do Not Call Registry was established in 2003,9 the Commission has 

fought vigorously to protect consumers’ privacy from unwanted calls. Indeed, two 

weeks ago on the 10th anniversary of the Do Not Call Program, the Commission 

announced that Mortgage Investors Corporation, one of the Nation’s leading 

refinancers of veterans’ home loans, will pay $7.5 million, the largest Do Not Call 

fine the FTC has ever collected.10 This case is the 105th enforcement action since 

the Commission began enforcing the Do Not Call provisions of the TSR in 2004.11

Through these enforcement actions, the Commission has sought civil penalties,12

restitution for victims of telemarketing scams, and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains 

from the 298 companies and 234 individuals involved. Although a number of cases 

remain in litigation, the 81 cases that have concluded thus far have resulted in orders totaling more than $126 million in civil penalties and $741 million in redress 

or disgorgement. In the first several years of the Registry’s existence, consumers reported that the Do Not Call program was highly effective in reducing the number 

of unwanted telemarketing calls they received.13

On September 1, 2009, new TSR provisions went into effect prohibiting the vast 

majority of sales robocalls,14 unless the telemarketer has the consumer’s prior written authorization to transmit such calls.15 The robocall provisions cover prerecorded 

calls to all consumers, including those who have not registered their phone number 

on the Do Not Call Registry. The Commission has been aggressive in enforcing prohibitions on robocalls, bringing 34 cases involving illegal prerecorded calls against 

97 companies and 77 individuals.16 These actions have shut down entities responsible for billions of illegal robocalls, and the 22 cases that have concluded thus far 

have resulted in orders totaling more than $51 million in civil penalties and $202 

8 

17See U.S. v. The Talbots, Inc., No. 10–cv–10698 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 2010), available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/04/talbots.shtm; U.S. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. 3:09–cv–03073 (C.D. 

Ill. Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/03/echostar.shtm; U.S. v. 

DIRECTV, Inc., No. 09–02605 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 

2009/04/directv.shtm. 18FTC v. Navestad, No. 09–CV–6329 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2012), available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/04/cashgrant.shtm. 19The following describe some of the telemarketing and robocall sweeps that the FTC and its 

law enforcement partners have conducted over the past several years: Press Release, FTC Leads 

Joint Law Enforcement Effort Against Companies that Allegedly Made Deceptive ‘‘Cardholder 

Services’’ Robocalls (Nov. 1, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/11/ 

robocalls.shtm; Press Release, FTC Settlements Put Debt Relief Operations Out of Business 

(May 26, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/05/amsdynamic.shtm; Press Release, FTC Sues to Stop Robocalls with Deceptive Credit Card Interest-Rate Reduction Claims 

(Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/12/robocall.shtm; Press Release, FTC 

Cracks Down on Scammers Trying to Take Advantage of the Economic Downturn (July 1, 2009), 

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/shortchange.shtm; Press Release, FTC Announces 

‘‘Operation Tele-PHONEY,’’ Agency’s Largest Telemarketing Sweep (May 20, 2008), available at 

http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/05/telephoney.shtm. 20See Press Release, FTC Leads Joint Law Enforcement Effort Against Companies that Allegedly Made Deceptive ‘‘Cardholder Services’’ Robocalls (Nov. 1, 2012), available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/11/robocalls.shtm. 

million in redress or disgorgement. Some of the Commission’s early robocall cases 

were against companies with household names such as Dish Network, DIRECTV, 

and Talbots.17

Yet increasingly, robocalls that plague consumers are initiated by fraudsters, who 

often hide out in other countries in an attempt to escape detection and punishment. 

One example is the defendants in FTC v. Navestad, who the Commission successfully traced and sued even after they attempted to hide their identities through fake 

caller IDs, shifting foreign operations, and name changes. The court found that the 

defendants made in excess of eight million robocalls, and ordered them to pay $30 

million in civil penalties and give up more than $1.1 million in ill-gotten gains.18

Unfortunately, the two defendants are currently in hiding overseas. 

A. Coordination with Law Enforcement Partners 

1. State, Federal, and International Coordination 

As the law enforcement challenges associated with illegal telemarketing have increased, the FTC’s relationships with other agencies have become ever more important. The Commission has robust collaborative relationships with state law enforcers, including through the National Association of Attorneys General Do Not Call 

working group. In addition, the FTC regularly works with the Federal Communications Commission (‘‘FCC’’), the Department of Justice, the U.S. Postal Inspection 

Service, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices across the country. The Commission also coordinates with its counterparts in other countries on particular cases and broader strategic matters such as caller ID ‘‘spoofing’’—the practice of faking a call’s identifying 

information. 

The FTC’s collaboration with its partners takes many different forms, including 

sharing information and targets, assisting with investigations, and working together 

on long-term policy initiatives. The agency also coordinates with various partners 

to bring law enforcement ‘‘sweeps’’—multiple simultaneous law enforcement actions—that focus on specific types of telemarketing fraud.19 One recent example is 

a concerted attack on illegal robocalls purporting to be from ‘‘Rachel’’ or others from 

‘‘Cardholder Services,’’ which pitch a supposedly easy way to save money by reducing consumers’ credit card interest rates. The FTC brought five cases against companies that were allegedly responsible for millions of these illegal calls. The Commission simultaneously announced that state law enforcement partners in Arizona, 

Arkansas, and Florida had filed separate law enforcement actions as part of the 

same sweep.20

2. Referrals for Criminal Prosecution 

Although the Commission does not have criminal law enforcement authority, it 

recognizes the importance of criminal prosecution in deterrence. Accordingly, the 

Commission routinely works with Federal and state criminal law enforcers through 

its Criminal Liaison Unit (‘‘CLU’’). Since CLU’s launch in 2003, hundreds of fraudulent telemarketers have found themselves facing criminal charges and prison time. 

One example is the Voice Touch case, which involved the use of robocalls to advertise an auto warranty scam. The FTC case shut down the scam and resulted in alVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:17 Dec 06, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\85765.TXT JACKIE
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21Press Release, FTC Returns Almost $3.2 Million to Auto Warranty Robocall Victims (Aug. 

31, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/08/voicetouch.shtm; FTC v. Voice Touch, 

Inc., No. 09CV2929 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/ 

0823263. 22Department of Justice (‘‘DOJ’’) Press Release, ‘‘Auto Warranty’’ Telemarketer Pleads Guilty 

(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ils/News/2012/Jun/ 

06152012lDolan%20Press%20Release.html; DOJ Press Release, Update on Transcontinental 

Warranty Case (Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ils/Programs/VWA/ 

transcontinental.html. 23FTC v. Econ. Relief Techs., LLC, No. 09–CV–3347 (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2010), available at 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923118. 24DOJ Press Release, Adams Sentenced to Over 17 Years in Prison for Multi-Million Dollar 

Telemarketing Fraud Scheme (Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/ 

press/2012/02-09-12.html. 25 As an example, the FTC recently created a robocall ‘‘honeypot,’’ which is a group of phone 

numbers from around the country that the Commission controls, permitting it to receive 

robocalls directly. This allows the Staff to quickly amass information about who is making the 

calls and to have recordings in-house, thus facilitating a more rapid law enforcement response. 26The PSTN is the ‘‘Public Switched Telephone Network.’’ It consists of transmission facilities 

(e.g., phone lines, fiber optic cables, microwave transmission links, cellular radios, communication satellites, etc.) and switching facilities (central office switches, databases for 800 number 

translation, gear for cellular handoffs, multiplexors, etc.). 

most $3.2 million in redress to consumers,21 and the Office of the U.S. Attorney for 

the Southern District of Illinois subsequently brought criminal charges. Three of the 

fraud’s principals have pleaded guilty and gone to prison, with the two leaders of 

the scheme each sentenced to five years.22

Another example is Kara Singleton Adams, the leader of a scam that used 

robocalls to sell worthless credit card interest rate reduction services. Not only did 

the Commission act to shut down the operation,23 a Federal jury in Atlanta subsequently convicted Adams on charges of wire fraud and conspiracy, among other 

things. In 2012, the court sentenced her to more than 17 years’ imprisonment. Three 

of her associates in the scheme also went to prison.24

B. Strategic Targeting for Maximum Impact 

The Commission constantly seeks innovative ways to maximize its resources and 

its impact on those responsible for illegal robocalls.25 Often, telemarketers’ deceptive 

and abusive practices are facilitated by third parties, such as auto-dialers, which 

provide the software needed to blast out millions of calls, and payment processors, 

which enable fraudulent telemarketers to reach into consumers’ bank accounts. The 

FTC has increasingly targeted gatekeepers that have tended to service large numbers of rogue telemarketers and therefore offer a way to strike a blow to many lawbreakers with only one case. 

Money flows in many directions within a robocall operation. 26


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27 U.S. v. Skyy Consulting, Inc., also d/b/a CallFire, No. 13–CV–2136 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 

2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1223011; FTC v. Asia Pac. Telecom, Inc., No. 

1:10–3168 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023060; U.S. 

v. Brian Ebersole, No. 3:12-cv-00105 (D. Nev. Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/ 

caselist/0923174; U.S. v. Sonkei Commc’ns, No. SACV11–1777 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1123060; U.S. v. Voice-Mail Broad. Corp., No. cv-08–00521 

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523182; U.S. v. The 

Broadcast Team, Inc., No. 6:05–cv–01920 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2007), available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523025/0523025.shtm. 28FTC v. Asia Pac. Telecom, Inc., No. 1:10–3168 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2012), available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023060. The full judgment will become due immediately if the defendants are found to have misrepresented their financial condition. 29See, e.g., FTC v. Automated Elec. Checking, Inc., No. 3:13–cv–00056 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2013), 

available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1223102; FTC v. Landmark Clearing, Inc., No. 4:11–cv– 

00826 (E.D. Tex. June 27, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1123117. 30 16 C.F.R. Part 310.3(b). 31FTC v. Innovative Wealth Builders, Inc., No. 13–cv–00123 (M.D. Fla. June 5, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1223127; FTC v. WV Universal Mgmt., LLC, No. 6:12– 

CV–1618 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1223190. 32 National Do Not Call Registry Data Book FY 2010 at 5 (Nov. 2010), available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101206dncdatabook.pdf. Since that time, the FTC began separately 

tracking Do Not Call complaints and robocall complaints based on information provided by the 

consumer. 33 National Do Not Call Registry Data Book FY 2012 at 5 (Oct. 2012), available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/os/2012/10/1210dnc-databook.pdf. 

First, the Commission aggressively pursues companies that provide the equipment 

and software necessary to send out millions of calls, sometimes referred to as ‘‘voice 

broadcasters’’ or ‘‘autodialers.’’ 27 One example is FTC v. Asia Pacific Telecom, Inc., 

in which the FTC alleged that defendants were responsible for violating the TSR 

by placing billions of prerecorded phone calls on behalf of unscrupulous telemarketers. These robocalls pitched worthless extended auto warranties and credit 

card interest rate reduction programs while using spoofed Caller ID names—such 

as ‘‘SALES DEPT’’—and phone numbers registered to companies with overseas offices in the Northern Mariana Islands, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands. In 2012, 

the Commission reached a settlement under which the defendants are banned from 

all telemarketing, from misrepresenting any good or service, and from selling or otherwise benefitting from customers’ personal information. The order imposed a $5.3 

million judgment that was suspended, based on the defendants’ inability to pay, 

after they had surrendered assets valued at approximately $3 million.28

Second, the FTC has increasingly taken action against payment processors when 

they assist and facilitate telemarketers engaged in deceptive practices, providing access to the financial system and, in turn, consumers’ money.29 Two amended complaints the FTC filed in June provide examples of the agency’s enforcement in this 

area. In both cases, the Commission sued telemarketing operations allegedly peddling bogus credit card interest rate reduction services. After obtaining temporary 

restraining orders against the defendants and beginning discovery, the FTC moved 

to amend both complaints to include the defendants’ payment processors. The Commission alleges that the payment processors knew, or consciously avoided knowing, 

key facts about the illegal telemarketing,30 and chose to continue profiting from the 

illegal activity by processing consumers’ payments to the original defendants.31

In sum, the Commission seeks to identify and attack chokepoints for illegal telemarketing. 

II. Policy and Market Stimulation Initiatives 

Despite the 2008 prohibition of unauthorized robocalls and the Commission’s vigorous enforcement efforts, technological advances have permitted law-breakers to 

continue to profit from illegal robocall campaigns. In the fourth quarter of 2009, the 

FTC received about 63,000 complaints about illegal robocalls each month.32 That 

number ballooned in three years, to an average of approximately 200,000 complaints 

per month in the fourth quarter of 2012.33

11 

34While this chart suggests recent positive trending of self-reported complaints, it has in no 

way diminished the Commission’s law enforcement efforts. 35See generally FTC Workshop, Robocalls: All the Rage (Oct. 18, 2012). A webcast of the workshop, a transcript of the event, PowerPoint presentations, and other related materials are available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/robocalls. References to the workshop transcript 

(‘‘Tr.’’) identify the speaker and the transcript page. See, e.g., Zoeller, Tr. at 86–87; Bash, Tr. 

at 88–89; Maxson, Tr. at 89–90. 36This estimate is based on the FTC’s equitable monetary relief awards, and excludes civil 

penalties ordered in the same cases. In addition, it only includes cases that involved robocalls. 

The estimated consumer harm associated with the FTC’s 81 concluded Do Not Call actions 

amounts to more than $741 million. 37See, e.g., Maxson, Tr. at 90–92; Zoeller, Tr. at 86–88; see also FTC, Robocall Challenge Comments [hereinafter Public Comment], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ 

robocallchallenge; Michelle Block, Public Comment, cmt. #565017–00015, at 1 (explaining how 

robocalls can cause her to lose desired assignments as a substitute teacher). 38See generally FTC Workshop, Robocalls: All the Rage (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/ 

bcp/workshops/robocalls. 39 Bellovin, Tr. at 12. 40Schulzrinne, Tr. at 22; Rupy, Tr. at 46–47; Diggs, Tr. at 55. 41 Bellovin, Tr. at 12–17. 

Number of robocall complaints filed with the FTC each month34

The public’s anger has increased with the number of illegal robocalls.35 Robocalls 

propagate harmful frauds; indeed, the estimated consumer harm associated with the 

22 FTC lawsuits against robocallers that have concluded thus far amounts to more 

than $202 million.36 Illegal robocalls also have a significant impact on quality of life 

by repeatedly invading the privacy and peace of consumers’ homes.37

A. Coordinating with Technical Experts, Industry, and Other Stakeholders 

Convinced that law enforcement alone is not enough to solve the problem, FTC 

Staff has aggressively sought new strategies in ongoing discussions with academic 

experts, telecommunications carriers, industry coordinating bodies, technology and 

security companies, consumers, and counterparts at federal, state, and international 

government bodies. To that end, on October 18, 2012, the Commission hosted a public summit on robocalls to explore these issues (the ‘‘Robocall Summit’’).38

The Robocall Summit made clear that convergence between the legacy telephone 

system and the Internet has given rise to massive, unlawful robocall campaigns. 

The telephone network has its origins in a manual switchboard that allowed a 

human operator to make connections between two known entities.39 A small group 

of well-known carriers were in control and were highly regulated.40 Placing calls 

took significant time and money, and callers could not easily conceal their identities.41

Now, communications technology is universal and standardized such that entrepreneurs can build up a viable telephone services business wherever they find an 


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42 Herrman, Tr. at 60–61; Maxson, Tr. at 96. 43Schulzrinne, Tr. at 22. 44See, e.g., Bellovin, Tr. at 16–17. 45 Id. at 17. 46 Herrmann, Tr. at 58–59; Schulzrinne, Tr. at 24. 47Schulzrinne, Tr. at 24. 48 Herrmann, Tr. at 59–61. 49See Dan Weber, Alan Basinger, Dean Willis, and David Schwartz, Public Comment, cmt 

#565017–00014, at 3. 50Schulzrinne, Tr. at 20–21; Maxson, Tr. at 95–98. 51Schulzrinne, Tr. at 21; Bellovin, Tr. at 16–17. 52Panagia, Tr. at 130–32; Bellovin, Tr. at 17. 53Panagia, Tr. at. 132; Maxson, Tr. at 100. 54Schulzrinne, Tr. at 24–25; Maxson, Tr. at 100; Bash, Tr. at 104. 55Panagia, Tr. at 160–61; see also id. at 132–133; Schulzrinne, Tr. at 21. 

Internet connection.42 As a result, the number of service providers has grown exponentially and now includes thousands of small companies all over the world.43 In 

addition, VoIP technology allows consumers to enjoy high-quality phone calls with 

people on the other side of the planet for an affordable price.44 With this efficiency 

came other changes: instead of a voice path between one wire pair, the call travels 

as data; identifying information can be spoofed; many different players are involved 

in the path of a single call; and the distance between the endpoints is not particularly important.45 As a result, it is not only much cheaper to blast out robocalls; 

it is also easier to hide one’s identity when doing so. 

1. New Technologies Have Made Robocalls Extremely Inexpensive 

Until recently, telemarketing required significant capital investment in specialized hardware and labor.46 Now, robocallers benefit from automated dialing technology, inexpensive long distance calling rates, and the ability to move internationally and employ cheap labor.47 The only necessary equipment is a computer connected to the Internet.48 The result is that law-breaking telemarketers can place 

robocalls for less than one cent per minute.49 In addition, the cheap, widely available technology has resulted in a proliferation of entities available to perform any 

portion of the telemarketing process, including generating leads, placing automated 

calls, gathering consumers’ personal information, selling the products, or doing all 

of the above.50 Because of the dramatic decrease in upfront capital investment and 

overall cost, robocallers—like e-mail spammers—can make a profit even if their success rate is very low.51

Technology enables a cheap and scalable model for robocalls. 

2. New Technologies Have Made It Easier for Robocallers to Hide 

Technological changes have also affected the marketplace by enabling telemarketers to conceal their identities when they place calls. First, direct connections 

do not exist between every pair of carriers, so intermediate carriers are necessary 

to connect the majority of calls. Thus, the typical call now takes a complex path, 

traversing the networks of multiple different VoIP and legacy carriers before reaching the end user.52 Each of these carriers knows which carrier passed a particular 

phone call onto its network, but likely knows little else about the origin of the call.53

Such a path makes it cumbersome to trace back to a call’s inception.54 All too often, 

this process to trace the call fails completely because one of the carriers in the chain 

has not retained the records that would further an investigation.55


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56Schulzrinne, Tr. at 24–26. 57See, e.g., Panagia, Tr. at 129. 58Schulzrinne, Tr. at 21–22. 59 Id. at 24–26; Maxson, Tr. at 97; Bash, Tr. at 103. 60See Truth in Caller ID Act, 47 U.S.C.§ 227(e); cf. 16 C.F.R. Part 310.4(a)(8) (the Telemarketing Sales Rule requires that sellers and telemarketers transmit or cause to be transmitted the telephone number and, when made available by the telemarketer’s carrier, the name 

of the telemarketer, to any caller identification service in use by a recipient of a telemarketing 

call, or transmit the customer service number of the seller on whose behalf the call is made 

and, when made available by the telemarketer’s seller, the name of the seller. Under this provision, it is not necessary to prove intent to defraud.). 61Schulzrinne, Tr. at 21; Bellovin, Tr. at 16–17. 62The judges for the Challenge were FTC Chief Technologist Steve Bellovin, FCC Chief Technology Officer Henning Schulzrinne, and co-Executive Editor of All Things Digital Kara Swisher. The basic judging criteria were: Does it work? (50 percent); Is it easy to use? (25 percent); 

Continued 

Second, new technologies allow callers to manipulate the caller ID information 

that appears with an incoming phone call.56 This ‘‘caller ID spoofing’’ has beneficial 

uses; legitimate companies adjust their caller ID information regularly so that customers will see the most useful corporate number or name, rather than the phone 

number from which an agent actually placed the call.57 However, the same 

functionality allows robocallers to deceive consumers by pretending to be an entity 

with a local phone number or a trusted institution such as a bank or government 

agency.58 In addition, robocallers can change their phone numbers frequently in an 

attempt to avoid detection.59 It is generally illegal to transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or 

wrongfully obtain anything of value, but many robocallers flagrantly violate this 

law.60

Finally, new technologies help robocallers operate outside the jurisdiction where 

they are most likely to face prosecution.61 Indeed, all of the many different entities 

involved in the path of a robocall can be located in different countries, making investigations even more challenging. 

The path of a robocall can span the entire globe. 

B. Need to Stimulate Technological Solutions 

The Commission recognized the need to spur the marketplace into developing 

technical solutions that could help American consumers block illegal robocalls. Thus, 

at the conclusion of the Robocall Summit, the FTC announced its first public contest, a ‘‘Robocall Challenge’’ hosted on the challenge.gov platform, with a $50,000 

prize for the individual or small team that could propose a technological solution 

to help consumers block robocalls on their landlines and mobile phones. The Commission also offered a separate award for the best solution by an organization with 

ten or more employees, which did not have a cash prize.62


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and Can it be rolled out? (25 percent). For details, see FTC Robocall Challenge Criteria Details, 

http://www.robocall.challenge.gov/details/criteria. 63See Press Release, FTC Announces Robocall Challenge Winners; Proposals Would Use Call 

Filter Software to Reduce Illegal Calls (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 

2013/04/robocall.shtm; Appendix B, Summary of Winning Robocall Challenge Submissions. 64See, e.g., FTC Robocall Microsite, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0025- 

robocalls. 65See, e.g., FTC Consumer Information Blog, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog. 66See, e.g., FTC Robocalls Facebook Q&A Transcript (July 17, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 

socialmedia/facebookchats/1207ftcrobocallsfb.pdf. 67See, e.g., FTC Robocalls Infographic, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/robocalls/ 

infographic.shtm. 68See, e.g., FTC Video and Media, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/media. 69See, e.g., FTC Consumer Information Audio, ‘‘Hang Up on Robocalls,’’ http:// 

www.consumer.ftc.gov/media/audio-0045-hang-robocalls. 70See FTC Consumer Information, ‘‘Travel Tips’’ (May 2013), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0046-travel-tips; FTC Consumer Information, ‘‘Auto Service Contracts and Warranties’’ 

(Aug. 2012), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0054-auto-service-contracts-and-warranties; 

FTC Consumer Information, ‘‘Credit Card Interest Rate Reduction Scams’’ (Feb. 2011), http:// 

www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0131-credit-card-interest-rate-reduction-scams; see generally FTC 

Robocall Microsite, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0025-robocalls; FTC Robocall 

Microsite in Spanish, ‘‘Llamadas automa ́ticas pregrabadas o robocalls,’’ http:// 

www.consumidor.ftc.gov/destacado/destacado-s0025-llamadas-automaticas-pre-grabadas-orobocalls. 71 Robocall Challenge: Consumer Tips & Tricks (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/ 

media/video-0086-robocall-challenge-consumer-tips-tricks. 

The FTC received an astounding 798 eligible submissions, many of which were 

extremely well-considered technical proposals that moved the ball forward. As a result of the Robocall Challenge, a wide array of people with the necessary technical 

expertise spent countless hours thinking about these issues. All of the winning proposals were submitted by people who had never previously worked on the specific 

problem of illegal robocalls. In addition, the Robocall Challenge received an overwhelming amount of public attention and interest, helping the FTC spread the word 

about illegal robocalls and what consumers can do to fight them. 

The primary goal of the Robocall Challenge was encouraging development of realistic ideas for decreasing the prevalence of telemarketing robocalls in a way that the 

FTC’s traditional law enforcement efforts could not achieve alone. On April 2, 2013, 

the agency announced three winning solutions, which all contained promising ideas 

about how to address difficult realities such as the limitations of the telecommunications infrastructure and the prevalence of caller ID spoofing.63 As the winning 

contestants and others further develop their ideas for introduction into the marketplace, we expect positive results for American consumers. 

III. Consumer Education 

Public education is an equally essential tool in the FTC’s consumer protection and 

fraud prevention work. The Commission’s education and outreach program reaches 

tens of millions of people a year through our website, the media, and partner organizations that disseminate consumer information on the agency’s behalf. 

The FTC delivers actionable, practical, plain language information on dozens of 

issues. Indeed, the Commission uses law enforcement announcements as opportunities to remind consumers how to recognize a similar situation and report it to the 

FTC. In the case of robocalls, whether the offer involves fraudulent credit card services, so-called auto warranty protection plans, or bogus vacation travel packages, the 

FTC’s message to consumers is simple: If you answer a call and hear a recorded 

sales message—and you haven’t given your written permission to get calls from the 

company on the other end—hang up. Period. Other key self-help messages to consumers include how to place a phone number on the Do Not Call Registry, what 

to consider before asking a phone carrier to block calls, and how and where to report 

illegal robocalls. The FTC’s education materials also explain how robocallers use 

technology to make thousands of calls at minimal cost, send fake caller ID information, and conceal their locations. The FTC disseminates these tips through articles,64 blog posts,65 social media,66 infographics,67 videos 68 and audio.69

The FTC updates its consumer education whenever it has new information to 

share. The Commission’s library of articles on robocall scams in English and Spanish also includes pieces specifically describing credit card interest rate reduction 

scams, auto service contract and warranty fraud, and travel-related schemes.70

When Robocall Challenge participants submitted to the Commission techniques they 

were using to successfully reduce illegal robocalls, the GSA and FTC used these tips 

in a video that relays some of the best consumer suggestions about what works 

today to fight robocalls.71

15 

72See, e.g., Craig Timberg, Find a way to block ‘‘robo-calls’’ and win $50K from the FTC, 

WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ 

find-a-way-to-block-robocalls-and-win-50k-from-the-ftc/2012/10/18/a2d648c6-1943-11e2-aa6f3b636fecb829lstory.html; Trevor Mogg, Wanna be a national hero? FTC contest offers $50,000 

prize for solution to end annoying robocalls, DIGITAL TRENDS, Aug. 18, 2012, available at http:// 

www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/ftc-contest-offers-50000-prize-for-solution-to-end-annoyingrobocalls; NBC Bay Area, FTC Holding Anti-Robo Call Contest, Oct. 20, 2012, available at 

http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/FTC-Holding-Anti-Robo-Call-Contest-175078991.html. 73See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, 2 Deterrents to Robocalls Win Contest by FTC, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 

2, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/technology/two-deterrents-torobocalls-win-ftc-contest.html; Jon Brodkin, No more robocalls: New tech automatically hangs up 

on robots, ARS TECHNICA, Apr. 2, 2013, available at http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/04/no-more-robocalls-new-tech-automatically-hangs-up-on-robots; Cristin Dorgelo, 

‘‘Innovative Solutions to Fight Illegal Robocalls,’’ Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 

blog/2013/04/17/innovative-solutions-fight-illegal-robocalls. 74This process will require active planning and cooperation in the coming months and years, 

as we move away from the legacy telecommunications infrastructure and toward a VoIP-based 

system. Experts around the world, including those involved in the Internet Engineering Task 

Force (‘‘IETF’’), have already begun to explore the technical changes necessary to permit authentication of VoIP calls. In fact, the IETF is in the process of creating a working group about this 

very topic called ‘‘STIR’’—Secure Telephone Identity Revisited. Participants in the FTC Robocall 

Summit also mentioned the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions as the type of 

standard-setting group that might assist in organizing the necessary collaboration. Schulzrinne, 

Tr. at 167; see also Rupy, Tr. at 51, 67; Diggs, Tr. at 68–69; Whitt, Tr. at 208–09; see generally 

Paula Bailey-Stine, Public Comment, cmt #565017–00022, at 3–5. 

The Robocall Challenge expanded the reach of the Commission’s consumer education messages about robocalls by spurring tremendous media interest. The announcement of the Challenge in October 2012 prompted a nationwide flurry of articles and television stories.72 When the agency announced the winners in April 2013, 

it again made headlines in national news outlets and technology publications, also 

reaching a television audience of an estimated 2.2 million viewers in the first 24 

hours following the announcement.73 Stories explained the problem of illegal 

robocalls and the FTC’s determination to block them from landlines and mobile 

phones nationwide. 

IV. Next Steps and Conclusion 

The 10-year old Do Not Call Registry remains enormously successful in protecting 

consumers against unsolicited calls from legitimate telemarketers. But as technology changes and fraudsters exploit those changes, we must remain agile and creative. The Commission will continue its multifaceted efforts to fight illegal robocalls, 

including but not limited to the following actions: 

• Continue Aggressive Law Enforcement 

» We will maintain our enforcement efforts, in coordination with state, federal, 

and international partners, to target high-volume offenders and pursue 

robocall gatekeepers in order to stop the largest number of illegal calls. 

» We will work with the telecommunications industry, encouraging carriers to 

be proactive in monitoring for illegal robocalls and securing the information 

necessary for prosecutions. 

• Spur Innovation 

» We will work with industry leaders and other experts to further stimulate the 

development of technological solutions to block illegal robocalls. 

» We will continue to encourage industry-wide coordination to create and deploy 

VoIP standards that incorporate robust authentication capabilities.74 Such coordination is the only way to ensure a future phone system with accurate and 

truthful calling information. 

• Engage in Ongoing Consumer Education 

» We will continue our broad outreach to consumers regarding the Do Not Call 

Registry as well as illegal robocalls and how best to fight them. 

• Work with Congress 

» We stand ready to assist in your efforts to protect consumers. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share some of the highlights regarding the 

FTC’s battle against illegal robocalls. We look forward to working with you on this 

important issue. 

16 

APPENDIX A 

National Do Not Call Registry Active Registrations and Complaint Figures 


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18 

APPENDIX B (Con’t) 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Ms. Greisman. Sorry 

I mispronounced your name at the beginning. 

Mr. Bash? 

STATEMENT OF ERIC J. BASH, ASSOCIATE CHIEF, ENFORCEMENT BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 

Mr. BASH. Good morning, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking 

Member Heller. I am Eric Bash, Associate Chief of the Federal 

Communications Commission’s Enforcement Bureau. Thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Almost every American has personal experience with robocalls, 

and almost everyone is fed up with them. With our own six-figure 

volume of complaints last year, we hear you. 

So what exactly is a robocall at the FCC? What makes one illegal 

under our rules? What are we doing about them? And how could 

enforcement be enhanced? 

At the FCC, we use the term ‘‘robocalls’’ to refer not to just 

prerecorded calls but also autodialed calls, regardless of whether 

the call is live or prerecorded. Under FCC rules, these calls cannot 

be made to a number assigned to emergency telephone lines, lines 

in guest rooms in health-care facilities, or wireless devices except 

in two cases: one, for an emergency purpose; or, two, with the prior 

express consent of the called party. That means that robocalls generally cannot be made to wireless devices or the other restricted 

lines I mentioned, even for a noncommercial purpose. 

Prerecorded calls to residential landlines are subject to fewer 

limitations, but only a few less. Prerecorded calls to residential 

lines can be made for non-emergency purposes without the called 

party’s consent, but only if the call is made, one, for a noncommercial purpose or, two, for a commercial but not telemarketing purpose or, three, by certain defined persons to deliver a health-care 

message or, four, by or for a nonprofit organization. Any otherwise 


710FTC7.eps
19 

permissible robocall must also include certain identifying disclosures to be legal. 

The FCC also recently adopted rules to create a special do-notcall list for lines answered by public safety answering points and 

is prohibiting all autodialed calls to numbers registered on that 

list. 

As you know, the FCC shares responsibility at the Federal level 

with the Federal Trade Commission for enforcement against telemarketing calls, including telemarketing robocalls. The agencies 

maintain consistency between their rules pursuant to statute and 

a memorandum of understanding. Both agencies’ rules prohibit 

making prerecorded telemarketing calls to any telephone number, 

mobile or residential, except with the express prior written consent 

of the called party. 

Congress has empowered the FCC to enforce the Communications Act in several ways. The tool the agency uses most is assessment of a monetary forfeiture. Under the Communications Act, the 

FCC may not impose such a forfeiture on a non-licensee, meaning 

someone other than broadcasters or carriers, for example, until it 

first issues a citation to the wrongdoer for an illegal act and the 

wrongdoer thereafter repeats the same kind of misconduct. The 

maximum penalty for non-licensees is generally $16,000 or about 

one-tenth the amount of that for carrier licensees. 

Over the last decade, the FCC has issued more than 500 citations and taken approximately 10 forfeiture-related actions involving millions of dollars of penalties for robocall rule violations. 

Our two most recent robocall actions cited operators of platforms 

that, according to our investigations, made almost 6 million impermissible robocalls to mobile phones in just several months. The operators offered a service to call the phone numbers provided by 

their clients, to deliver the prerecorded message provided by their 

clients, and to display on consumers’ caller ID the telephone numbers provided by their clients. 

By focusing on these operators, rather than their individual clients, we hope to maximize the impact of our existing enforcement 

resources. Numerous other platform providers remain under investigation. 

Significant law enforcement challenges remain, however. A fundamental problem is identifying the wrongdoer. Robocallers often 

spoof the number from which they are calling, so inquiries to carriers that control the numbers displayed to the consumers may not 

yield useful identifying information. Investigators must therefore 

work backward, subpoenaing the called parties’ carrier and, in 

turn, all intermediate carriers to find out where the call originated. 

Time is of the essence because some providers do not appear to 

keep relevant records for much time and because the FCC must 

initiate any forfeiture proceeding within 1 year of a violation. 

There are several ways in which the FCC’s enforcement tools 

might be enhanced. Congress might, for example, consider changing the FCC’s authority by, one, allowing the FCC to impose a forfeiture on non-licensee robocaller violators without first issuing a 

citation; two, expanding the current statute of limitations from 1 

year to 2; and, three, increasing the maximum forfeiture that the 

FCC can impose on non-licensee robocallers. 

20 

To address the spoofing that complicates law enforcement, Congress might also consider extending the scope of the prohibition in 

the Truth in Caller ID Act against changing caller ID for harmful 

purposes to apply to offshore callers and more VOIP providers than 

just those who originate and terminate traffic on the public 

switched telephone network. Congress might also consider giving 

the FCC regulatory authority over third-party spoofing providers. 

There are also technological ideas on the table that may afford 

additional consumer protections from illegal robocalls. The FTCsponsored contest helped to identify some of these ideas, and an industry standards organization is working with FCC technical staff 

on still more ideas. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

I welcome any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bash follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC J. BASH, ASSOCIATE CHIEF, ENFORCEMENT BUREAU, 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Good morning Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. My name is Eric Bash, and I am an Associate Chief in the Enforcement Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC.) My responsibilities 

include oversight of the agency’s enforcement of provisions in the Communications 

Act and the FCC’s rules that are designed to protect consumers of telecommunications services. These provisions and rules include restrictions against ‘‘robocalls,’’ 

which is a popular shorthand way for to calls made using a prerecorded message 

or using an autodialer, whether the message is live or recorded. Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear today to address the FCC’s role in combatting these calls. 

Almost every American is familiar with robocalls from their own personal experience. Who, for example, hasn’t answered a phone call at one time or another, only 

to hear a recorded message encouraging the called party to ‘‘press 1’’ to claim a free 

vacation? Or to redeem a ‘‘last chance’’ to lower mortgage rates? Or to extend an 

auto warranty? There are certainly legitimate robocalls—such as those consumers 

want, for example, to alert them to changes in school schedules—but most of these 

calls, at best, annoy consumers, and at worst, trick them into fraudulent transactions. 

At the FCC, we are also aware of, and take very seriously, the problem of 

robocallers making huge volumes of calls, either simultaneously or in rapid succession, to multiple lines at the same place of business, in order to overwhelm it. When 

these robocalls target first responders or hospitals telephone lines, they can threaten to interfere with legitimate calls that, if left unanswered, may literally mean the 

difference between life and death. 

The prevalence of these types of robocalls is on the rise. This is because of the 

ready availability and low cost of phone service and the software needed to make 

the calls, as well as the ability of callers to ‘‘spoof’’ the number from which they are 

calling in an attempt to disguise who they are and avoid detection. It is no surprise, 

then, that robocalls are an increasing source of consumer complaints in recent years 

at the FCC, with the number of complaints about the topic doubling in the past two 

years to over 100,000 filed in 2012. While this is only a fraction of the total number 

of robocall complaints filed each year at various agencies, the volume at the FCC 

alone still speaks volumes, so to speak, about the extent of the problem. The FCC 

is also hearing more and more from first responders who are victims of sporadic 

autodialing. 

I have been asked to address you this morning to explain the FCC’s role in combatting illegal robocalls. In doing so, I think it would be helpful first to describe the 

applicable law that Congress has charged the FCC with enforcing. I will then turn 

to the enforcement powers and process that Congress has given the FCC to discharge its responsibilities, and highlight some recent actions the agency has taken. 

I will close my prepared remarks by identifying some enforcement challenges we 

face in combatting illegal robocalls, and how we might begin to overcome them. I 

will also explain how the Federal Trade Commission’s authority in this area complements the FCC’s. 

21 

FCC-Enforced Legal Standards 

So what makes a robocall illegal under FCC-enforced standards? It depends upon 

the kind of number called, and the purpose of the call. The FCC’s rules in this area 

flow directly from the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, or TCPA. 

Restricted Lines. Under the FCC’s rules, no telephone call can be made using an 

autodialer or an artificial or prerecorded voice to certain ‘‘restricted lines’’ for nonemergency purposes without the called party’s prior express consent. These ‘‘restricted lines’’ are emergency telephone lines (such as 911 lines), lines in guest/patient rooms in health care facilities, and all numbers assigned to mobile devices. 

Note that this restriction applies not just to calls with an artificial or prerecorded 

voice, but also to live calls made with an autodialer. For telemarketing calls, the 

prior express consent will have to be in writing after October 16, 2013. 

In this day and age of heavy mobile phone use, it may be worth repeating that 

the FCC’s rules flatly prohibit all autodialed or prerecorded calls to mobile phones 

made for a non-emergency purpose without the called party’s permission. It does not 

matter whether the call is to persuade the called party to buy some thing or to support some cause. And, despite common mischaracterizations of the law, it does not 

matter whether the called party is charged for the call, or whether the content of 

a message is blasted by text or voice. (The FCC has been clear that ‘‘autodialed’’ 

text messages fit within the restriction.) What matters is that a robocall was placed 

to a mobile phone, for a non-emergency purpose without the called party’s consent. 

Robocallers can ensure that they are complying with this restriction by scrubbing 

their call lists against the telephone numbers that several commercial services offer 

to identify those assigned to mobile telephones. 

Residential Lines. Like calls made to restricted lines, calls using an artificial or 

prerecorded voice can be lawfully initiated to a residential line for an emergency 

purpose or with the called party’s prior express consent, and, for telemarketing 

calls, the prior express consent will have to be in writing after October 16, 2013. 

But calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice can also be lawfully initiated to 

residential lines under several other circumstances. Such calls may be made if they 

contain certain disclosures and: (1) the call is made for a non-commercial purpose; 

or (2) the call is made for a commercial purpose but does not constitute telemarketing; or (3) the call delivers a health care message and is made by certain 

defined persons; or (4) the call is made by or for a tax-exempt non-profit organization. The disclosures must identify, at the beginning of the call, the person or entity 

responsible for initiating the call, and, during or after the message, provide a telephone number where that person or entity can be reached. And it is important to 

note that the restrictions for residential lines apply only to calls using prerecorded 

messages, not those using an autodialer. 

PSAP Lines. Pursuant to legislation passed last year, the FCC has also adopted 

rules that will create a special do-not-call registry for lines answered by public safety answering points (PSAPs), and has prohibited autodialed calls to numbers registered on that list. The legislation was designed to address the situation of 

autodialers placing calls to telephone numbers associated with emergency lines, and 

thereby precluding legitimate emergency-related calls from coming through. Note 

that this restriction applies to all autodialed calls, whether live or prerecorded. 

FCC Enforcement Process 

Congress has empowered the FCC to enforce the Communications Act, including 

the TCPA, and the agency’s implementing rules and orders, in several ways. In designating the FCC as the Federal agency that licenses and regulates those involved 

in electronic communication by wire or radio, Congress created different enforcement mechanisms that vary in terms of availability and severity according to 

whether the wrongdoer holds (or should hold) a license from the FCC. 

For licensees, such as broadcasters and carriers, the FCC’s most powerful tool to 

enforce compliance with the law is to revoke a license for non-compliance, or deny 

issuance or renewal of the license. Because obtaining or retaining an FCC license 

may literally mean the difference between economic life and death for a licensee, 

the FCC does not resort to this remedy except in the most egregious cases of noncompliance. 

The FCC more commonly enforces the Communications Act, including the TCPA, 

and its implementing rules and orders by imposing monetary penalties. To do so, 

the FCC must either conduct a hearing, or issue a notice of apparent liability for 

forfeiture, or NAL. For administrative efficiency and other reasons, the agency most 

frequently follows the latter approach. A party subject to an NAL has an opportunity to submit factual and legal arguments in response explaining why the forfeiture proposed should be canceled or reduced. The FCC evaluates the response, 

and assuming it concludes that a forfeiture of some amount should be assessed, 

22 

issues a final order imposing the penalty. If further legal action is necessary to collect the penalty, the FCC must refer the matter to the U.S. Department of Justice. 

While the FCC may impose a forfeiture either through a hearing or an NAL against 

both licensees and non-licensees, the Communications Act distinguishes between 

these groups, both in terms of process required and the severity of the penalty permitted. For non-licensees, under current law, generally speaking the FCC may impose a maximum penalty of $16,000 per violation, but may do so only after first 

issuing a citation to the wrongdoer finding that it has engaged in an illegal act, and, 

subsequent to the citation, the wrongdoer again engages in violations of the same 

type. By contrast, for carriers, which operate under express authorization from the 

FCC, the agency may impose a forfeiture of up to $150,000 per violation, without 

first citing the carrier. Likewise, broadcasters, which operate pursuant to an FCC 

license, generally speaking are directly subject to forfeitures of $37,500 per violation, without a prior citation. (These forfeiture amounts are those generally applicable for violations of the Communications Act, including violations of TCPA. Note 

that Congress has adopted other penalty structures in certain other circumstances.) 

The Communications Act also authorizes the FCC to issue an order to cease and 

desist against anyone violating a law it enforces; the Act envisions a trial-type administrative hearing in order to invoke this remedy. The Communications Act also 

authorizes the Department of Justice to obtain an injunction on behalf of the FCC. 

FCC Enforcement Actions 

Using these enforcement powers, in the last decade, the FCC has issued more 

than 500 citations, and taken approximately 10 penalty-related actions involving 

around $3.5 million, for violations of its robocall rules. (These are in addition to 

more than 500 citations and approximately 20 penalty-related actions for do-not-call 

telemarketing violations.) The FCC also issued an Enforcement Advisory last fall, 

as the election season was in full swing, to remind campaigns and those making 

calls on their behalf of the rules of the road for making robocalls. It is worth reiterating, as this advisory suggests, that the sweep of our rules is broad; they address 

not just telemarketing robocalls, but all robocalls, including political robocalls and 

robocalls to ‘‘restricted lines’’ without the called party’s permission. 

I want to highlight the FCC Enforcement Bureau’s two most recent robocall enforcement actions, taken just a few months ago. These reflect a change in approach 

designed to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of agency enforcement in this 

area. Instead of targeting a single enterprise or individual behind a single type of 

robocall, the Bureau cited operators of platforms that make prerecorded calls in violation of the robocall rules. These operators offered a service whereby third-party 

clients could transmit or upload to the operator for delivery to specified called parties, along with the telephone numbers to which the operator was to place the calls. 

They could also choose the phone number that they wished the platform to display 

to the called party. The investigations leading to these citations found that the operators had made nearly six million impermissible robocalls in just several months. 

By addressing the platforms that make the illegal calls, as opposed to focusing on 

end-users behind such calls, we expect to cast a wider net and more efficiently use 

our limited resources to multiply the impact of our enforcement efforts. While I cannot comment on pending law enforcement matters where we have not yet taken a 

public action, I can say that these platforms remain an area of emphasis. I also 

want to add that, while the express language of the TCPA disallows ‘‘making’’ 

prerecorded calls under the circumstances that were the subject of our platform citations, and unambiguously outlaws platforms from ‘‘making’’ calls like those I have 

described, the FCC recently issued a ruling to re-emphasize that anyone who makes 

a call on behalf of a third party is liable for violations of FCC rules implementing 

the TCPA. The third party on whose behalf an illegal call is made may also be vicariously liable for the violation. 

Law Enforcement Challenges 

Notwithstanding the actions the FCC and others have taken over the last decade, 

significant challenges remain to stopping illegal robocalls, especially from those attempting to entice the called party to engage in a fraudulent transaction. 

Identification of Perpetrator. A fundamental problem for law enforcement in dealing with fraudulent as well as other robocallers remains identifying the parties responsible for them. Consumer complaints filed with the FCC about robocalls ordinarily provide little more information than the names used by callers, and the telephone numbers displayed on the called parties’ caller ID, because this is normally 

all the data available to the complainant. But these pieces of information are not 

sufficient to enable prompt enforcement action if the robocaller has used a fake and 

nondescript name, and ‘‘spoofs’’ the number from which it is calling—that is, preVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:17 Dec 06, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\85765.TXT JACKIE
23 

sents on the called party’s caller ID a number other than the one from which the 

robocaller is actually calling. In these circumstances, subpoenas issued to the carrier 

that controls the apparent originating number may not yield identifying information. As a result, investigators must work backward and subpoena the called party’s 

carrier for information about where that carrier obtained the call. Because multiple 

carriers may be involved in handling a single call, investigators may need to repeat 

this process a number of times before they can identify the true originator of a given 

call. Time is of the essence, as carriers maintain this kind of call detail record only 

for limited periods of time, and because the FCC is required by law to act within 

a year of a violation if it intends to impose a forfeiture penalty. As a result, the 

FCC is exploring ways to streamline the subpoena process with carriers. 

FCC Enforcement Options. Entities that or individuals who do not hold a Commission authorization and are not required to have one pose particular enforcement 

challenges. As I have noted, while we may cite a wrongdoer, finding that its conduct 

violates the law, we may not impose a monetary penalty directly. And while citations may work reasonably well for those who are unknowingly or negligently violating the regulatory and statutory provisions on robocalls, we believe a more immediate and tangible penalty may be needed to cause those who are intentionally violating the law to bring their conduct into compliance. Swift, stern enforcement powers are especially needed against fraudulent robocallers who use different names, 

change addresses frequently, and appear to open and close businesses on a regular 

basis. Law enforcement is also complicated, of course, when the robocaller appears 

to be physically located outside of the United States. 

Federal Trade Commission 

As Members of this Subcommittee know, the FCC shares enforcement responsibility at the Federal level with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for combatting 

telemarketing calls, including telemarketing robocalls. The agencies maintain consistency between their telemarketing rules pursuant to the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003. Thus, with respect to robocall rules in particular, both agencies’ 

rules will, as of October 16, 2013, prohibit making prerecorded telemarketing calls, 

except with the prior express written consent of the called party. This consent is 

in addition to, and distinct from, registering a phone number on the national donot-call list. 

To coordinate the exercise of their joint responsibilities in the telemarketing area, 

the FCC and the FTC also entered into a longstanding Memorandum of Understanding. Under the MOU, the agencies have agreed to, among other things, meet 

at regular intervals to discuss matters of mutual interest, to share complaints regarding potential violations of Federal telemarketing rules, and to work together to 

implement consistent and non-redundant enforcement of such rules. In fact, Ms. 

Greisman and I met with our agencies’ respective staff just last week for law enforcement coordination purposes. 

One particular way the agencies have coordinated enforcement in the telemarketing area is by each agency focusing on the areas where its enforcement tools 

are best suited to the misconduct at issue. For example, the FCC’s authorization 

over carriers provides a very powerful means of pursuing and remedying violations 

involving them. (While the FCC has not yet taken any action against a carrier for 

robocall violations, it has for do-not-call violations.) Moreover, our regulatory expertise with carriers gives us a familiarity with their processes that is uniquely helpful 

to us in obtaining the information we need to pursue robocall violations. The FTC, 

on the other hand, possesses particular advantages in discouraging robocall activity 

in connection with its efforts to thwart the fraudulent activity that often underlies 

robocalls. The FTC’s ability to bring suit against non-licensee miscreants, freeze assets and obtain restraining orders based on fraudulent activity can be quite effective 

in discouraging robocall behavior, although it is also quite resource intensive. 

Overcoming Enforcement Challenges and Further Protecting Consumers 

To maximize the FCC’s enforcement impact, Congress might consider making certain changes to the FCC’s powers. For example, Congress might consider: 

• allowing the FCC to impose a forfeiture on non-licensee robocall violators without first having to issue a citation; 

• expanding the current statute of limitation from one year to at least two years, 

given the frequent need to engage in the time-consuming process of identifying 

callers by working backwards through a chain of carriers; and 

• increasing the maximum forfeiture that the FCC can impose on non-licensee 

robocallers. 

24 

Congress might also consider revising the Truth-in-Caller-ID Act of 2010. This 

statute prohibits spoofing when done by persons in the United States with the intent to defraud or cause harm or wrongfully obtain anything of value. When the 

FCC adopted implementing rules approximately two years ago, the agency’s Chairman sent a report to Congress with proposed additional changes to the statute, including: 

• expanding the scope of the prohibition to apply to persons outside of the United 

States when their spoofing is directed at people inside the United States; 

• clarifying whether the existing restrictions should apply to Voice over Internet 

Protocol providers that enable only outbound calls; and 

• giving the FCC appropriate authority to regulate third-party spoofing services. 

As the report explained, the Department of Justice has advocated that third-party 

spoofing providers should be required to verify that a user has authority to use the 

telephone number it is seeking to have substituted for its own, in order to make 

it easier to identify actors who use these services for fraudulent or other harmful 

purposes. 

Technological solutions that empower consumers to block illegal robocalls so that 

they do not receive them in the first instance may also be helpful in thwarting illegal robocalls. An industry standards organization is currently working with FCC 

technology staff to design a system whereby originating carriers would cryptographically sign calls, so that receiving carriers can validate that callers in fact have the 

right to use the number they are using; as more carriers implement such solutions, 

methods could be developed to protect consumers from calls where the number cannot be validated. The staff involved hope that the joint effort may lead to 

implementable specifications in about a year. Other ideas about technical solutions 

were presented at the FTC’s robocall summit last fall, as well as in the FTC’s contest that closed just a few months ago. 

As legal changes and technological solutions are being considered, the FCC, along 

with the FTC and others, must continue to educate consumers about how to protect 

themselves from illegal robocalls, and when they receive them, how to file the most 

useful complaint with law enforcement. Such education includes discouraging consumers from interacting with any of the prompts in a robocall, and making sure 

that their complaints include as much information as possible, including the exact 

time and date of the call they received, and the carrier to whose service they subscribe. The FCC’s website has its own consumer education materials, complaint 

forms, and cross-references useful material provided by the FTC. 

Conclusion 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today to explain the 

FCC’s role in addressing illegal robocalls. I welcome any questions you have for me. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you both. 

Well, let me start with you, Mr. Bash. Do the statutes that guide 

your enforcement in this area, do they provide for the possibility 

of prison? 

Mr. BASH. They do not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

And how about anything that you can do on your end at the 

FTC? 

Ms. GREISMAN. We do not have criminal law enforcement authority, but we work regularly with the Department of Justice and 

criminal authorities at the state level. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is there an applicable statute that you can 

utilize at the Federal level that provides prison for people who do 

this? 

Ms. GREISMAN. Not on the part of the Federal Trade Commission. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. Well, so nobody has gone to jail, right? 

Ms. GREISMAN. There have been criminal prosecutions of individuals who have been sued by the Federal Trade Commission for enVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:17 Dec 06, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\85765.TXT JACKIE
25 

gaging in illegal robocalling in civil cases. The criminal prosecutions, I believe, have focused on allegations of wire fraud. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And so the wire fraud prosecutions that 

have taken place in the area dealing with robocalls, has anybody 

gone to prison? Do you know? 

Ms. GREISMAN. Yes, I believe there have been significant sentences. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Well, we need to get that word out. It 

seems to me that, you know, these guys aren’t really afraid of you. 

I don’t think that they are very nervous at all. Because it seems 

to me that they are just all in at this point. 

They have the technology to do massive amounts of calls for literally scraps off the table, with great potential of payoff. I mean, 

this is a criminal sandbox, and I can’t imagine a more fun place 

to hang out if you are somebody who is a criminal. And I think we 

need to look at that also. 

Would some additional criminal statutes help you, Mr. Bash? 

Mr. BASH. I think additional legislation like that could be useful. 

The FCC, like the FTC, is not a criminal law enforcement agency, 

so I don’t think we would be taking the actions ourselves there. But 

certainly—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I guarantee you that criminal prosecutions 

in this area would be way more popular than just about anything 

else the Department of Justice does. 

Mr. BASH. I am sure they would be. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What about the folks that are processing 

the payments on this? Do you feel like you have adequate statutes 

to go after them and put them in prison? 

Because somebody is moving this money through electronically, 

and they are making money off of it. And they have to know that 

this is not mom and apple pie that is being sold here, that they 

are making money off of. 

I know that we have had some actions against the payment processors. Are these companies that we would recognize that are processing these payments? 

Ms. GREISMAN. The Federal Trade Commission has taken action 

against payment processors for well over 10 years. The most recent 

ones were brought under the Telemarketing Sales Rule. They are 

alleged to have assisted and facilitated the illegal robocaller. And 

we have a burden of proof of showing that there is some level of 

knowledge there. 

I think, you know, there are two scenarios. There are those who 

facilitate fraud who are completely in cahoots with the fraudster; 

they know exactly what is going on. And then there are those who 

either do know or consciously avoid knowing. And, you know, it is 

just going to turn on the facts. 

But it is not necessarily the case that those who facilitate fraud, 

gatekeepers or chokepoints, are completely in bed with the 

fraudsters. They maybe avoid knowing what is going on. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, yes, but they are not hard to catch. 

Because if you set them up, if they are trying to avoid knowing, 

9 times out of 10 if you send somebody in under cover to say the 

appropriate things, they are going to say something in reply that 

makes it clear that they are trying to—it is a little bit like the guy 

26 

driving the getaway car: ‘‘Well, I had no idea he was in there robbing the bank. You can’t hold me liable.’’ Well, under criminal law, 

we can. 

Ms. GREISMAN. You are right. And you are absolutely—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And this is, they are driving the getaway 

car. 

Ms. GREISMAN. Yes, they are facilitating the illegal—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Are these companies that we would recognize that are processing these payments? Are these, you know, the 

mainstream payment processors that process my payments to 

iTunes or my payments to Amazon? Are they the same people? 

Ms. GREISMAN. I am not sure that any of the ones that the FTC 

has sued of late are necessarily recognizable names. But we certainly will be looking across the industry to see whether there are 

any entities who facilitate—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is reassuring that you are looking. 

And I certainly wasn’t trying to make any allegation against those 

companies, that they are involved in this. I am just, you know— 

obviously, we are processing a lot of payments electronically these 

days. And there are recognized, reputable companies, and then 

there are others. And I am just assuming that this is all in the others’’ space. 

Ms. GREISMAN. We look at each case as we see it—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Ms. GREISMAN.—and we see who is involved. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me finish up, and then I will give it to 

Senator Heller. 

On the caller ID spoof, I have been asking my family to keep 

track of calls. And, in fact, I have gotten a few. I have learned 

something very important. If you ask for a phone number, they 

hang up. They are all trained that if you ask them for a phone 

number, they immediately hang up, because they know there is not 

a good ending there. So they just move on to the next call—if you 

have somebody live on the other end. 

I also have learned from my family members that they are using 

fraudulent caller ID numbers, that if you are getting a call in Saint 

Louis or if you are getting a call in Kansas City, the area code that 

they are using is, in fact, a state area code even though the call 

is being generated from far away, many times not even in this 

country. 

Can we go after the companies that are providing these numbers 

that clearly are not the numbers they are calling from? 

Mr. BASH. The folks who are providing the false number? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. 

Mr. BASH. So let me get at that a couple of different ways. 

Under the robocall rules, it is really the legal standard is the 

person who is making the call, who is initiating the call. That is 

who is responsible under our law for a violation. 

There is, as I mentioned, the Truth in Caller ID Act that prohibits spoofing caller information with an intent to defraud or 

cause harm or wrongfully obtain anything of value. And if the folks 

that you are referring to would satisfy that standard, those are 

people that we could pursue. 

27 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, why would you give a false—why 

would you provide a number that is not really the number they are 

using for—what kind of good could there be? 

I mean, I am trying to figure out, I am trying to think about arguing a case to a jury in a criminal courtroom. Under what possible 

scenario would somebody be providing a phony caller ID number 

that wasn’t up to something nefarious? 

Mr. BASH. Examples that are mentioned in the context of the 

rulemaking that the FCC did to implement these rules involved 

calls coming from a battered women’s shelter. A call might need to 

be made out by someone who is living there to check on her children, and she is needing to protect the actual number from which 

she is calling. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And the blocked number is not sufficient in 

those instances? You can’t just block the number so people can’t see 

what it is? 

Mr. BASH. The example I gave you is what we have pointed to 

and what folks refer to as legitimate uses of spoofing caller ID. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In the grand scheme of things, I can’t imagine that that is not just a tiny, infinitesimal number of these that 

are being given out. 

And I would certainly like—we are going to ask you to do some 

follow-up on this. But one of the follow-ups I would ask you to look 

at is, what do we need to do to strengthen the laws to go after the 

people that are providing these phony numbers? Because that is a 

huge part of the problem. 

Mr. BASH. And just to add to that, one of the suggestions that 

our former chairman made in submitting a report to Congress on 

potential changes to the Truth in Caller ID Act was to give the 

FCC direct regulatory authority over so-called third-party spoofing 

providers. These are people who are providing a service to people 

to spoof numbers. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

Senator Heller? 

Senator HELLER. Thank you. And thanks again, Madam Chairman, for holding this hearing, and for our witnesses, for your testimony. Appreciate that. 

I would be surprised if there is anybody here in this room that 

hasn’t at one time or another been subject to a telemarketing call. 

And I would submit that I have. That second recording that you 

did on extended warranties on vehicles, every time my vehicle gets 

to be about 4 or 5 years old, I get that phone call. And when you 

ask follow-up questions, they usually hang up on you when they 

find out that they can’t deceive you. 

And in most cases, the deception practice is that you are thinking that you are talking to the original maker of that vehicle, 

whether that is a GM product, Ford product, or Nissan product. 

You think you are talking to that company. You know, at least they 

give off that perception. Then you find out that they are not associated with that organization. 

So I thought that was a great example of the type of deception 

that we hear and see all the time. 

28 

Mr. Bash, you did a great job in your testimony of coming up 

with overcoming some of the enforcement challenges that you guys 

face. 

And I was wondering, Ms. Greisman, if you have other ways. 

What can we do here in Congress to help allow you to have more 

authority? Do you need more authority? I am going to ask the next 

panel, of course, the same question. But what do you need? What 

kind of enforcement challenges do you face that you need to overcome that Congress could help you with? 

Ms. GREISMAN. Well, I dare mention the common carrier exemption. We do think it is more than a relic. The commission is on 

record for the past several years in support of its elimination, and 

I certainly share that view. 

Senator HELLER. OK. OK. 

I want to clarify the numbers. You know, you have testified a little bit, both of you, a little bit on the numbers, the challenges that 

you are faced with. 

Can you quantify the cost of this problem, both in the numbers 

of calls that people are receiving today and the cost? I know the 

chairman mentioned some costs. Just so that everybody here and 

those that are viewing this have an idea how big this problem is. 

Ms. GREISMAN. Sure. First, with respect to the numbers, we 

know that through our law enforcement action we have halted literally billions of illegal robocalls. And we know that from the cases 

we have brought. 

We also know that from the cases that have concluded in the 

robocall and do-not-call area that courts have ordered, I think it is, 

$740 million in redress or disgorgement. That, of course, is courtordered. So that is at least a baseline for the scope of the magnitude of the economic injury being caused by this. 

Senator HELLER. Do you agree with those numbers, Mr. Bash? 

Mr. BASH. Yes. And I just want to reiterate what I said in my 

testimony, that the two most recent actions that we took, just the 

particular months that we were looking at, for our enforcement actions, these two operators had placed approximately 6 million calls 

in just several months. 

Senator HELLER. How many individuals in your office do you 

dedicate to enforcement of no calls, telemarketing scams like this? 

Mr. BASH. In the Enforcement Bureau, we have a handful of lawyers that are dedicated to dealing with this particular problem. On 

the policy side, our Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau 

works to implement the rules and change the rules as needed per 

any action you may take on Capitol Hill or to harmonize our rules 

with those of the Federal Trade Commission. 

Senator HELLER. Is there a bureau within the FCC specifically 

dedicated to telemarketing fraud? 

Mr. BASH. There is not one that is specifically dedicated to that. 

Senator HELLER. How about the FTC? 

Ms. GREISMAN. At the Federal Trade Commission, telemarketing 

rule enforcement, combating telemarketing fraud is something that 

is engaged in throughout the bureau. It is, as I mentioned before, 

a top priority. 

Senator HELLER. Right. 

29 

Ms. GREISMAN. And it is not just the bureau at headquarters. 

Every regional office is involved in the fight against illegal telemarketing. The shop that I head is the manager/coordinator, if you 

will, of the telemarketing fraud enforcement program. 

Senator HELLER. Thank you. I will preserve questions for later. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Let me ask just a couple more things. 

I want to make sure that it is clear how technology is changing 

this landscape. I think everyone has figured out that Congress is 

not nimble and we do not move quickly, and clearly we are behind 

the eight ball in many areas as it relates to technology. 

And both of the agencies you work for have a very difficult job, 

because you are trying to get everyone to hold hands and sing 

‘‘Kumbaya’’ when there are competing commercial interests and 

just competing interests because of advancing technology. 

This is an area where most average Missourians don’t understand why there is a different set of rules for the phone that rings 

in their house and the phone that rings in their purse. They don’t 

understand why you can take action against a political campaign 

that calls the phone in the purse but you can’t take action against 

the political campaign that calls in the family room when you are 

eating dinner. 

And so would you explain why there would be these different 

rules? And try, if you can—I have a hard time with figuring out— 

I know it all boils down to wired versus wireless, and in the old 

days when everyone was paying by the minute as opposed to the 

vast majority of plans now that are not—well, there are still plans 

that pay by the minute. 

But, you know, I don’t think people—and then you have VoIP, 

which is, of course, the new method of phone calls that is not the 

common carriers but it is a wire nonetheless at some point. And 

where do they fall in this? And why should these rules all be different? 

Ms. GREISMAN. I will take a stab and then turn it over to Mr. 

Bash. 

From the FTC’s perspective, it doesn’t matter where the call 

rings. It doesn’t matter whether it is at your home landline or in 

a device in your car, on your cell, wherever you are. It makes no 

difference; the telemarketing sales rule applies equally. And it 

doesn’t matter whether it is coming over a copper wire or through 

the Internet. 

With respect to the charitable calls that you mentioned, the FTC 

does not have jurisdiction over those bone fide charitable fundraising calls. We are able to reach for-profit telemarketers who 

place calls on behalf of bona fide charities, however. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. So the people that call me that pretend that they are really helping the sheriffs and they are really 

taking 90 cents on the dollar and giving the sheriffs 10 cents, can 

you go after them? 

Ms. GREISMAN. We can, and we have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Mr. BASH. So, as you heard me testify this morning, our rules do 

make a distinction between wireless phones and residential 

30 

landlines. And the distinctions that our rules make flow directly 

from the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is obviously up-to-date. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BASH. Maybe you will revisit that. But that is why our rules 

make the distinction that they do. The statutory language is really 

quite prescriptive, so our rules just track what the legislative distinctions in the law are. 

And, as Lois was saying, with respect to VoIP, that is not really 

germane to the issue, because what matters is who is calling. It 

doesn’t matter whether they are calling over VoIP or they are calling over a traditional telephone line. If you are making a call under 

the circumstances that are not legal, then it is impermissible. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think we have to really take a look at updating all of this so that, you know—there is a whole generation 

that is going to be very blessed by the fact that they can’t get political robocalls, because none of my kids have landlines. And, you 

know, they were really glad last October in Missouri, because it 

was ugly out there. 

But the elderly that are still answering that landline every day— 

I had a hard time. I felt like I needed this when I would go out 

in public, because everybody was so mad about these stupid political robocalls. 

Let me just finally ask your thoughts—it seems to me that you 

are playing Whac-A-Mole. And you are playing Whac-A-Mole with 

people that many times are in foreign countries, and the long arm 

of the law is really, really difficult in these circumstances, especially since they can make a lot of money and shut down fairly 

quickly and move on. And your limited tools in law enforcement do 

not allow you to be as quick as they are, in terms of being able to 

get to them before they have shut down and moved on to another 

location or another IP address. 

Talk a little bit about the technological solution. And what are 

the barriers that are in this country for—I mean, I know, I look 

at the technology that is available. I marvel at what I can do on 

this little, bitty box. I can run my life, literally, with this little, 

bitty box. 

It is so hard for me to believe that there is not the technology 

available yet in America that we can control this without the government having a great deal of involvement, just through a technological answer. 

And if you could speak to that briefly before we hear from our 

second panel, unless Senator Heller has more questions. 

Ms. GREISMAN. I would be happy to start. 

It is precisely because we felt there would be a technological solution that we launched the challenge. And the goal was to spur 

innovation, to tap into the genius of American consumers to develop ideas. 

And I think it was enormously successful. There were three winners. But it is not just those three winners who submitted proposals that might go to market; there are others out there. And I 

think you will be very encouraged when you hear from Mr. Foss 

on the second panel. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Great. 

31 

Senator Heller? 

Senator HELLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Bash, you talked a little bit about where these calls originate 

from. And I was wondering if you have any quantitative numbers 

of whether most of these robocalls are coming domestically or they 

are coming from foreign sources. 

Mr. BASH. I don’t think I have data to give you on that. I think 

that—— 

Senator HELLER. Do you have a feel for it? 

Mr. BASH. I don’t want to go out on a limb for that. 

Senator HELLER. OK. 

Mr. BASH. But I think it is fair to say that they are coming from 

both places. 

Senator HELLER. OK. 

Mr. BASH. They are coming from both places. 

Senator HELLER. All right. 

Ms. Greisman, you talked about enforcement challenges. And one 

of the things, of course, that you asked for is to abolish the common 

carrier exemption. And, of course, that would protect carriers from 

dual regulations by both the FCC and the FTC. 

I guess my question to you is, is there any evidence or allegations that these common carriers are the source of these calls? 

Ms. GREISMAN. Let me address that this way. From where we sit, 

we think common carriers can do two things. One is they can be 

more proactive in looking at what is going across their transom and 

flagging what probably are red flags. 

We have some concerns that there may be some carriers out 

there—and remember, there is a real blurred distinction, given convergence in technology, of what is a telemarketer and what is actually a carrier. But we think there is some conduct that may be engaged in by some entities that purport to be carriers that would do 

more than raise an eyebrow. 

Senator HELLER. OK. OK. I will probably ask the next panel the 

same question. 

Mr. BASH. If I could add—— 

Senator HELLER. Please. 

Mr. BASH.—on that subject, as I have mentioned in my written 

testimony, we obviously work with the Federal Trade Commission 

in coordinating law enforcement. And Lois and I, actually, just last 

week met on various coordination issues and issues with respect to 

carriers that she is aware of. She has made us aware of them, and 

we are certainly going to be looking at some of the information that 

was shared with us. 

Senator HELLER. Terrific. 

Thank you for your time. I want to thank both witnesses for 

being here. 

And, Chairman, thank you very much. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

I am just curious, what is the conduct that raises the eyebrow? 

If you can tell us. 

Ms. GREISMAN. It is too soon at this point to get into. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Ms. GREISMAN. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I will be waiting. 

32 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you both. 

And if the next panel would come forward. 

I want to thank this panel. We have Mr. Kevin Rupy, Senior Director of Law and Policy, United States Telecom Association; Mr. 

Michael Altschul—am I saying that correctly? 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. Yes, you are. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL.—Altschul, Senior Vice President and General Counsel at CTIA—The Wireless Association; Mr. Matthew 

Stein, Chief Technology Officer from Primus Telecommunications— 

welcome; thank you for being here—and Mr. Aaron Foss, Freelance 

Software Developer, Nomorobo. 

Thank you, Mr. Foss. We are glad you are here. 

And we will begin with your testimony, Mr. Rupy. 

STATEMENT OF KEVIN RUPY, SENIOR DIRECTOR, LAW AND 

POLICY, UNITED STATES TELECOM ASSOCIATION 

Mr. RUPY. Chairwoman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, 

thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you 

today. My name is Kevin Rupy, and I serve as Senior Director of 

Law and Policy at the United States Telecom Association. 

U.S. Telecom and our member companies share the Subcommittee’s concern about the problems associated with illegal robocalls. 

We understand the consumer frustration they cause, and we have 

long worked and coordinated with relevant private and government 

stakeholders to address this issue. 

In addition to the harm they cause consumers, robocalls impact 

U.S. Telecom’s own member companies. Our companies’ customer 

service representatives represent the first line of defense on this 

issue. They must be well-versed in explaining to customers the difference between legal and illegal robocalls, providing them with information on how to file a complaint with the FTC, and pointing 

them to tools to help them mitigate these calls. 

Robocalls can also adversely impact our companies’ networks. 

Mass-calling events are typically highly localized, high-volume, extremely brief, lasting only a matter of minutes. And carriers receive no advance warning of these calls. A severe mass-calling 

event can result in service degradation and disruptions to phone 

services in a provider’s impacted area. Moreover, illegal robocalls 

exacerbate an already troubling problem in our industry known as 

phantom traffic: calls that evade the established intercarrier compensation regime. 

Given these impacts on both our customers and our networks, we 

can sympathize with the frustration you must feel at the apparent 

growth of this problem over the last 2 decades in spite of repeated 

legislative efforts to put an end to it. Those efforts illustrate the 

difficulty of keeping the law ahead of the lawbreakers and ahead 

of technology. 

This is not to say that network operators are passive observers. 

As mentioned earlier, we serve on the front lines of defense and 

work in many other ways to monitor, mitigate, and respond to this 

problem. Many U.S. Telecom member companies maintain network 

operations centers that monitor network traffic, conduct traffic data 

forensics, and initiate mass-calling investigations. 

33 

Our members provide and will continue to develop various services, such as anonymous-call blocking, and other functionalities 

that help mitigate the problem. Network operators also work within standards-setting groups to address issues related to robocalls. 

Carriers initiate legal actions against robocallers when they can 

be found and coordinate with state and Federal law enforcement 

agencies during ongoing investigations and enforcement actions. 

Looked at through the lens of history, the explanation for this is 

regrettably fairly simple. The original phone network was a closed 

system, meaning that voice service was generally provided by local 

exchange carriers and long-distance companies through only the 

public switched telephone network, or PSTN, providing plain old 

telephone service. 

Today’s communications services are provided not by the historical closed PSTN but by a network of networks. The interdependent, interconnected, and global nature of the Internet means 

that areas of vulnerability exist throughout the network and, therefore, cannot be realistically addressed by any single stakeholder. 

U.S. Telecom supports the development of possible technological 

solutions to the robocall problem by stakeholders throughout the 

Internet ecosystem, most of whom do not face the significant legal 

limitations outlined in my written statement that currently constrain our member companies. 

But it is unlikely that any single technological silver bullet can 

permanently address the robocall problem. Today’s solution could 

very well turn into tomorrow’s Maginot Line and could have unintended adverse consequences, some examples of which I also outline in my written testimony. 

The same increasingly appears to be the case for legislative and 

regulatory solutions, which regrettably do not seem capable of 

keeping pace with the evil genius of scammers, who continually invent new ways of evading discovery and capture, much less prosecution and punishment. 

In closing, let me again thank the Subcommittee for holding this 

timely hearing. We share both the Subcommittee’s and consumers’ 

frustration, and we look forward to our continued work together in 

a manner that provides flexibility in addressing this constantly 

evolving challenge. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rupy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEVIN RUPY, SENIOR DIRECTOR, LAW AND POLICY, 

UNITED STATES TELECOM ASSOCIATION

Chairwoman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to present the 

views of our industry on the burgeoning problem of robocalling. It is both timely and 

appropriate that the Subcommittee take time to review this important consumer 

protection issue. The United States Telecom Association (USTelecom) and our member companies are aware of the growing problem associated with illegal robocalls. 

We understand the consumer frustration they cause, and as a result we have long 

worked collectively and coordinated with relevant private and government stakeholders to address this issue. 

My name is Kevin Rupy, and I serve as Senior Director of Law and Policy at 

USTelecom. Our association represents innovative broadband companies ranging 

from some of the largest companies in the U.S. economy to some of the smallest cooperatives and family-owned telecom providers in rural America. Our members offer 

a wide range of communications services on both a fixed and mobile basis, and the 

overwhelming majority of them offer advanced broadband services including voice, 

34 

video, and data. The customers that rely on our networks include consumers, businesses large and small, and government entities at the local, state, and Federal levels. 

Robocalls are a Problem for Consumers and Providers of Voice Services 

USTelecom’s member companies are all too aware of the increasing consumer 

frustration attributable to robocalls. Probably all of us in this room have experienced such calls. They are intrusive and disruptive. That’s bad enough. But through 

some calls’ deceptive pitching of phony products and services such as debt reduction 

programs and mortgage modification scams, the criminals behind these calls are 

stealing money from unsuspecting consumers. Just last month, the FTC filed a complaint against one robocaller targeting current and former U.S. military members. 

In addition to the harm they cause to consumers, robocalls impact USTelecom’s 

own member companies. Often, the first call a consumer will make following a 

robocall incident is to the phone company. Our member companies’ customer service 

representatives represent the first line of defense on this issue, and must be well 

versed in explaining to customers the difference between legal and illegal robocalls, 

pointing them to tools available to help them mitigate these calls and providing 

them with information on how to file a complaint with the FTC. 

Robocalls can also adversely impact our companies’ networks. Mass-calling events 

are typically highly localized, tremendously high volume, and extremely brief—lasting only a matter of minutes. And providers receive no advance warning of these 

calls. A severe mass-calling event can result in service degradation and disruptions 

to phone services in a provider’s impacted area. Moreover, illegal robocalls exacerbate an already troubling economic problem in our industry because they can often 

be associated with ‘‘phantom traffic’’—calls largely originating outside our companies’ local calling areas for which a terminating access charge will never be paid 

by the long-distance carrier because the necessary call identification information has 

been stripped. 

What Are Robocalls and Why Have They Proliferated? 

The proliferation of robocalls has resulted from three major changes in the communications marketplace. The global reach of the Internet, combined with the widespread availability of mass-calling technology and a dramatic reduction in the costs 

of long-distance service, have radically changed the capabilities and economics of 

robocalling. As former FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz stated at last October’s FTCsponsored robocall workshop, the Internet has allowed ‘‘voice blasting technology to 

flourish at bargain basement prices.’’ 

Looked at through the lens of history, we can sympathize with the frustration you 

must feel at the apparent growth of this problem over the last two decades in spite 

of repeated legislative efforts to put an end to it. Those efforts illustrate the difficulty of keeping the law ahead of the law-breakers—and ahead of technology. The 

Federal Trade Commission (FTC), over which this Subcommittee has jurisdiction, 

was specifically directed under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse 

Prevention Act of 1994 to adopt rules prohibiting deceptive and abusive telemarketing acts or practices, including ‘‘unsolicited telephone calls which the reasonable consumer would consider coercive or abusive of such consumer’s right to privacy.’’ The body of regulations adopted by the FTC to implement this 1994 Act is 

known as the Telemarketing Sales Rule. The FTC is also empowered generally to 

address unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, which the 

Federal Trade Commission Act declares unlawful. But the FTC’s jurisdiction does 

not extend to common carriers, which are subject to the regulatory authority of the 

Federal Communications Commission (FCC). And for reasons described below pertaining to both our common carrier and privacy obligations, our member companies 

must complete phone calls. 

Viewed from the perspective of communications law, when Congress adopted the 

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) to address telemarketing 

robocalls, its major purposes were to protect the privacy and public safety interests 

of telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on automatic dialers, fax machines, 

and unsolicited automated calls. The TCPA amended Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 to add a new section 227, entitled ‘‘Restrictions on the Use of Telephone Equipment.’’ The nature of the technology being used in 1991 is well-illustrated by a consumer complaint listed among several examples in this Committee’s 

report accompanying the bill (S. Rept. 102–178): ‘‘the automated calls filled the entire tape of an answering machine, preventing other callers from leaving messages.’’ 

Except for amendments to expand the reach of section 227 to offshore callers and 

to prohibit caller-ID spoofing, the robocall provisions of the law remain largely as 

35 

*To put this in further perspective, the first website was created in 1991—the year of the 

TCPA’s enactment. Today, there are more than 30 trillion individual web pages. 

they were enacted in 1991—and, as we all know, they have become increasingly ineffective. 

The explanation for this is, regrettably, fairly simple. The original phone network 

was a ‘‘closed’’ system, meaning that voice services were generally provided by local 

exchange carriers and long distance companies through only the public switched 

telephone network (PSTN). These companies were providing what is called ‘‘plain 

old telephone service,’’ or POTS. When Congress passed the TCPA in 1991 to address robocalls, autodialing systems, and certain fax machine problems, and even 

when it acted again three years later to deal with unsolicited telemarketing calls, 

wireless communication was only beginning to emerge and even dial-up Internet access was not yet a reality for mass consumer use. In contrast to the situation that 

confronted Congress in the early 1990s, today’s communications services are provided not by the historical closed PSTN but by a ‘‘network of networks.’’ *

As a result, voice service is now available from a myriad of companies with a diverse technical heritage. We still have the PSTN, but we also have Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers, Internet service providers, and cable companies offering ‘‘phone’’ service, right alongside competitive local exchange carriers and wireless 

carriers. Approximately 40 percent of U.S. households have ‘‘cut the cord’’ and rely 

entirely on wireless for their voice service. And by the end of 2013, USTelecom estimates that more than 52 percent of wireline households will subscribe to interconnected VoIP, oftentimes provided by the local cable company. Finally, ‘‘over-thetop’’ VoIP services—which use existing broadband networks—are widely available to 

American consumers and are offered by some of the country’s most prominent companies, including Vonage, Google Voice, and Microsoft’s Skype service. Skype, for example, disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commission in August 2010 that 

the company had 20 million connected users in the United States, 1.9 million of 

whom were paying customers. 

Regardless of their delivery platform, each of these voice providers must ultimately connect to the PSTN because the reliability of their service to their own customers depends on their ability to deliver any call to anywhere. As a result, ‘‘phone’’ 

calls can connect to anyone, anywhere, regardless of whether a consumer’s phone 

is connected to the PSTN, or their wireline or wireless phone or computer is connected to a broadband network. But this same remarkable connectivity—a 

connectivity we celebrate and want to expand to those Americans who don’t yet 

enjoy it—also makes it possible for robocalling con artists and fraudsters to set up 

shop virtually anywhere in the country or even the world and, with the right equipment and a few clicks of the mouse, begin auto-dialing unsuspecting and vulnerable 

consumers across the United States. 

The Contextual Nature of Robocalls—What the Consumer Sees 

Now that we understand the network framework under which robocalls operate, 

it is important to understand the various types of robocalls. It can be helpful to consider all mass calling and robocall events as a traffic signal, comprised of green, yellow, and red lights. Robocalls that are important and legal would fall into the 

‘‘green’’ category; robocalls that are legal, but whose usefulness are a matter of subjective personal opinion, would fall into the ‘‘yellow’’ category; and malicious and illegal robocalls would fall into the ‘‘red’’ category. 

So, for example, a consumer may receive a ‘‘green’’ robocall from his or her child’s 

school, stating that the school’s opening will be delayed due to bad weather. Similarly, public safety agencies will often use robocalls to provide critical public safety 

messages. For example, Los Angeles County has implemented an emergency mass 

notification system used by the County’s Emergency Operations Center to notify 

residents and businesses of emergencies or critical situations and provide information regarding necessary actions, such as evacuations due to wildfires. Because the 

system uses geomapping, emergency notifications can be directed to very specific geographic areas. Clearly, robocalls of this type would fall into the ‘‘green’’ category. 

Robocalls falling on the ‘‘yellow’’ spectrum are also legal, although some recipients 

might be indifferent to their messages or might prefer not to receive them. A doctor’s office may use a robocall to remind a patient of an upcoming appointment. 

Similarly, political candidates and political groups will often use robocalls to solicit 

votes in an upcoming election, or to deliver an advocacy message. 

Finally, there are the instances of illegal calls falling into the ‘‘red’’ category of 

calling events. These calls include the infamous ‘‘Rachel from Card Services,’’ as 

well as other bogus schemes selling everything from cruises to insurance. 

36 

Robocallers are becoming increasingly creative in perpetrating their scams, many of 

which originate from beyond our Nation’s borders. 

The traffic from a robocaller directed toward a consumer on the PSTN can transit 

the network either over the Internet, or through the PSTN itself. In fact, it is usually the case that a typical mass-calling event will transit multiple networks—encompassing both the PSTN and the Internet—before finally reaching the consumer. 

The Contextual Nature of Robocalls—What the Service Provider Sees 

Consumers are the only ones who can ultimately determine the nature of any specific robocall. Service providers, conversely, have no visibility into the specific nature 

or type of robocall transiting their network. They have no way of determining 

whether the call is illegal or legal. The service provider may only see that a mass 

calling event is taking place at a specific point on their network. 

From the service provider’s perspective, these mass calling events are defined by 

four characteristics. First, they are highly localized in nature. Second, they are represented by a high volume of calls. Third, once the calls arrive at their intended 

local target, they are extremely brief—potentially only lasting a matter of seconds 

or minutes. Finally, there is no advance warning for these calls. 

Adding further complexity to the robocall issue is the problem of caller-ID spoofing—misrepresenting one’s identity using a deceptive caller-ID. Although, after the 

fact, providers have investigative techniques that can positively identify whether a 

call has been spoofed or not, there is no way for a carrier to make that determination in real time, as the call is transiting the network. 

Significant Legal Constraints Limit Potential Robocall Deterrents 

Two primary legal issues face USTelecom’s member companies with respect to 

remedying the robocall problem. First, under existing laws to which USTelecom’s 

members are subject for their provision of legacy voice service, phone companies 

have a legal obligation to complete phone calls. These companies may not block or 

otherwise prevent phone calls from transiting their networks or completing such 

calls. The current legal framework simply does not allow our companies to decide 

for the consumer which calls should be allowed to go through and which should be 

blocked. 

Second, there are substantial privacy issues that arise in any discussion relating 

to proposed robocall solutions. Robocalls are extremely contextual in nature. Depending on the nature of the call, certain robocalls are permitted under the law, 

while others are prohibited. Proposed solutions to the robocall dilemma that seek 

to make phone service providers the arbiter of whether a call should—or should 

not—be permitted to proceed skirt dangerously close to violating the privacy obligations imposed on us by law. For example, the Wiretap Act (also known as Title I 

of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) or Title III of the Omnibus 

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968) expressly protects wire, oral, and electronic communications while in transit and establishes that service providers are 

permitted to intercept those communications only as a necessary incident to the rendition of service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider. Similarly, except as authorized by ECPA, section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934 

makes it a crime for any person ‘‘to intercept and divulge or publish the contents 

of wire and radio communications’’—a provision not limited solely to common carriers. 

The Practical Realities of Technological and Legislative Solutions 

The interdependent, interconnected, and global nature of the Internet means that 

areas of vulnerability exist throughout the network, and therefore cannot be realistically addressed by any single stakeholder. Given the rapid and ever-changing nature of the robocall problem, it is highly unlikely that a technological ‘‘silver bullet’’ 

can be developed as a permanent solution. Much in the same way that remediation 

efforts in areas such as spam or cybersecurity must continually evolve, the same can 

be expected for robocalls. 

Robocalls, like their brethren in the area of spam, phishing, and cybersecurity is 

a constantly evolving problem. USTelecom supports the development of possible 

technological solutions to the robocall problem by stakeholders throughout the Internet ecosystem, most of whom are not constrained by the significant legal limitations 

currently facing our members. But members of this Subcommittee need to be aware 

that no single solution will permanently address the robocall problem. Today’s solution could very well turn into tomorrow’s Maginot Line, and could have unintended 

adverse consequences. 

For example, solutions that rely extensively on blocking calls populated by a 

blacklist could very well result in the blocking of legitimate calls from callers whose 

own phone numbers have been illegally spoofed. Conversely, solutions implementing 

37 

call blocking features based upon a whitelist could potentially block an important— 

albeit unexpected—message from a legitimate caller. Even more perversely, the 

availability of spoofing technology can easily fool consumers into taking calls they 

should avoid. For example, spoofing the number of the local municipal hospital could 

dupe a senior citizen into believing that a fraudulent effort to sell phony medical 

products is actually a legitimate call from a whitelisted number. Given the open nature of the broadband network, technological solutions can be—and often are—superseded by technological countermeasures. 

The same increasingly appears to be the case for legislative and regulatory solutions, which regrettably do not seem capable of keeping pace with the evil genius 

of scammers who continually invent new ways of evading discovery and capture, 

much less prosecution and punishment. As noted earlier, we have been trying to legislate out of existence the problems of robocalling, spam, autodialing, and caller-ID 

spoofing for as long as two decades, but new technologies only seem to make the 

problems grow worse. 

Addressing Robocalling Requires A Multi-Pronged Approach 

This is not to say that carriers are passive observers to the robocall problem. 

USTelecom’s member companies work on multiple fronts in order to monitor, mitigate, and respond to mass-calling events. For example, many USTelecom member 

companies maintain network operations centers (NOCs), which include 24-hour security desks that monitor network traffic, respond to consumer complaints, conduct 

traffic data forensics, and initiate mass calling investigations. 

In addition, carriers are providing—and will continue to develop—various services 

consumers can use to help mitigate the robocall problem. These services include 

basic caller-ID functionality, as well as conditional call-forwarding and anonymous 

call-blocking. Because the offerings and capabilities of companies are different, consumers are always encouraged to contact their respective service provider in order 

to identify available resources. 

Network operators also work within the framework of various standards setting 

groups, the best example of which is the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry 

Solutions (ATIS). ATIS is a standards organization that develops technical and operational standards for the communications industry, including standards related to 

the handling of mass-calling events. In addition, several USTelecom member companies are members of the Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA). 

CFCA’s membership consists of approximately 200 different carriers, private network owners, end users, law enforcement officers, and others from around the 

world. Through these public-private partnerships, industry stakeholders work together to identify best practices and solutions to a broad range of telecommunications-related issues, including robocalls. 

Carriers will initiate legal actions against robocallers when they can be found and 

coordinate with law enforcement agencies at the state and Federal level during ongoing investigations and enforcement actions. For example, in a 2010 FTC action 

against a robocaller that allegedly made more than 370 million calls to consumers 

nationwide in a single year, the agency specifically acknowledged the assistance 

that both AT&T and Verizon provided in the investigation of the case. 

Finally, the competition between our companies and other communications platforms for consumer and enterprise business provides incentives for all communications providers to innovate and to develop new and more effective solutions to challenges such as robocalling. This competition requires us to offer consumers the best 

possible experience subject to what the law allows us to do, including taking action 

to mitigate robocalling. If we do not offer effective solutions, consumers will simply 

migrate to alternate technologies that offer better ones. 

In closing, let me again thank the Subcommittee for holding this timely hearing. 

We share both the consumer’s and Subcommittee’s frustration with the issue, and 

we look forward to our continued work together in a manner that provides flexibility 

in addressing this constantly evolving challenge. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Rupy. 

And I am going to interrupt here for a moment. We have been 

joined by Senator Pryor. And this is a subcommittee that really has 

overlapping jurisdiction with Senator Pryor’s subcommittee on telecommunications. And so I would like to defer to him for a moment. 

If you would like to make any comments at this point, Senator 

Pryor, before we continue with this panel, that would be terrific. 

38 

Thank you for joining us today. Between Consumer Protection 

and your committee—and I know you were the former chairman of 

this subcommittee, so I really appreciate you cooperating with us 

and allowing us to have this hearing even though we could argue 

about the jurisdiction, which we do around here sometimes, I have 

noticed. 

[Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator PRYOR. That is OK. No, I am thrilled that you are 

chairing this subcommittee now. It is a great subcommittee, as you 

know, great staff and a great team of people here. But thank you. 

Let me just say, we have a great leader in Chairwoman 

McCaskill. She is going to do great things with this subcommittee. 

And these are very important issues that you are talking about 

today. And we may have had some overlapping jurisdiction, but I 

don’t care, because I think that you are going to handle this hearing just great. And I just want to say thank you for your hard 

work, and I want to say thank you to all the Subcommittee members. 

You know, I look at the numbers; it is clear that the Do Not Call 

Registry has been a success. And I am pleased that the FTC is 

working with states to crack down on the individuals with robocalls 

and other illegal activities. 

So everybody is working together; we can solve this. So all I want 

to say is thank you. And I didn’t want to interrupt, but thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Pryor. 

Mr. Altschul? 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL F. ALTSCHUL, 

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL, 

CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION®

Mr. ALTSCHUL. Good morning, Chairman McCaskill, Ranking 

Member Heller, and Senator Pryor. On behalf of CTIA, thank you 

for the opportunity to participate in this morning’s hearing to explore ways to protect consumers against unlawful robocalls and 

SMS text messages. 

CTIA was proud to support initial adoption of the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act back in 1991. In fact, I had just joined 

the association; it was one of the first legislative issues I worked 

on. 

Like our customers, wireless carriers are also victims of illegal 

text message phishing scams and robocall campaigns by unscrupulous boiler-room operators seeking to sell extended car warranties 

and the like that violate the protections in the TCPA and other 

laws. 

That is why CTIA has called on the FCC to change the way it 

reports TCPA complaints, which, as you may know, are divided 

into wireless complaints and wireline complaints. These consumer 

complaints are about calls and messages that originate outside of 

a carrier’s network and control. And the way the FCC reports them 

actually tends to hide the magnitude of the problem in their reports. 

39 

CTIA and our member companies understand consumer annoyance over these calls and repeatedly have pledged our full cooperation to efforts by the FCC and the FTC to bring enforcement actions against robocallers and fraudsters who violate the TCPA. 

In cases where they can locate and identify the source of the 

messages, our carrier members have brought lawsuits against the 

perpetrators. And the industry has cooperated with the FTC and 

state attorneys generals in their investigation and prosecution of 

these cases. 

However, as you have heard from other witnesses, it is virtually 

impossible to trace an interconnected VoIP call or an over-the-top 

text message delivered to a wireless carrier from the Internet, especially when the sender wants to disguise his or her identity 

through the use of proxy servers and spoofed caller ID. 

I would like to use a screenshot of a text message that I received 

on Monday to illustrate the difficulties we face in trying to solve 

this problem. 

And, by the way, wireless carriers do screen text messages and 

successfully block millions of them, I believe, every day. Voice calls 

have to be found at the source to be cut off. 

As you can see, this text message appears to be an informational 

text message about my account at a local financial institution. In 

fact, I have provided my express prior consent to the financial institutions where I have accounts, authorizing them to send me informational text message alerts about fraudulent activity, data 

breaches, and other time-sensitive account information. 

But since I do not have an account at this institution, I knew immediately it was a phishing scam that violates both the TCPA and 

the Truth in Caller ID Act, which prohibits the spoofing of caller 

IDs. Scammers, especially those outside of the United States, are 

not deterred from violating the TCPA or the Caller ID Act. 

For this phishing scam, the fraudster spoofed the caller ID of a 

local Washington, D.C., phone number. As it turns out, this number is not in service. It happens to be assigned and arranged so 

that it is assigned to a CLEC. But I called it and got a recording 

that the number is not service. So this is not a real phone number 

assigned to a user. 

But the fraudster could just as easily spoof the financial institution’s actual phone number or tumbled phone numbers randomly to 

defeat the use of blacklists and whitelists. And this is why this is 

such a difficult problem to solve. Carriers do not know the businesses and public agencies the customer has given express prior 

consent to send informational calls and messages. And even if a 

carrier did know this information, fraudsters can spoof whitelisted 

numbers and appear to be a legitimate business sending informational calls and messages to its customers. 

We appreciate the efforts of the FTC and others who are exploring technologies that may minimize the transmission of illegal 

robocalls and text messages to our customers. However, as H.L. 

Mencken famously observed, there is always a well-known solution 

to every human problem neat, plausible, and wrong. This wise 

counsel cautions us that any technical solutions must be subject to 

careful and complete consideration. 

40 

So, on behalf of CTIA, thank you for your consideration of these 

suggestions. We look forward to working with you to address these 

and related matters as the Subcommittee moves forward. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Altschul follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL ALTSCHUL, GENERAL COUNSEL, CTIA—THE

WIRELESS ASSOCIATION®

Good morning Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, and members of the 

Subcommittee. On behalf of CTIA—The Wireless Association®, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this morning’s hearing to explore ways to protect consumers against unlawful robocalls. 

Like our customers, wireless carriers are also victims of robocall campaigns by unscrupulous ‘‘boiler-room’’ operators seeking to sell extended car warranties and the 

like that violate the protections in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). 

At CTIA, we and our members understand consumer annoyance over these calls and 

repeatedly have pledged our full cooperation to efforts by the FCC and the FTC to 

bring enforcement action against these serial violators of the TCPA. In cases where 

they can locate and identify the source of these messages, our carrier members have 

vigorously brought suit against the perpetrators, and the industry has cooperated 

with the FTC in its investigation and prosecution of TCPA cases. 

CTIA was proud to support initial adoption of the Telephone Consumer Protection 

Act in 1991. At that time, there were roughly seven million wireless subscribers in 

America, and nearly every wireless subscriber also had a landline phone. Today, 

there are more than 326 million wireless subscriber connections in the United 

States, including connections for advanced communications devices like 

smartphones and tablets that access increasingly ubiquitous wireless broadband 

services. The U.S. wireless industry now leads the world in delivering next generation wireless services. Wireless has evolved from a niche voice service to the primary 

source of broadband communications for millions of Americans. Consumers’ mass 

migration to wireless-only service also is a testament to the attractiveness of wireless prices. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Wireless Price Index, the 

effective monthly cost of wireless service to consumers has fallen more than 40 percent since December 1997. 

At the same time, because of the real reduction in the price of a wireless call, 

the popularity of rates plans that offer ‘‘buckets’’ of minutes and unlimited calling 

on nights and weekends, innovative devices and applications, and the added convenience that wireless offers to consumers who value personal and untethered communications, a substantial portion of the population has moved or is moving to ‘‘cut 

the cord’’ and rely completely on their wireless phones as their only means of communication. Currently more than 35 percent of U.S. households are ‘‘wireless only’’ 

for their voice service, and the percentage is significantly higher in some regions 

and among certain segments of the population. 

Of particular significance for today’s hearing, the continuing trend to adoption of 

wireless service as the primary source of communications for millions of Americans, 

and the changes that have flowed from innovative rate plans and the greater affordability of wireless service, justify a fresh look at the TCPA’s treatment of pre-recorded calls to mobile devices. 

For instance, given the shift in the way consumers use their mobile devices the 

TCPA’s disparate treatment of informational calls that depends upon whether a 

company is calling a wireline or wireless phone number—or, increasingly, a number 

associated with an interconnected VOIP provider that simultaneously forwards the 

call to a customer’s wireline and wireless numbers—is increasingly out of date. As 

currently enacted, the TCPA requires the ‘‘prior express consent’’ of the called party 

for even informational calls to wireless phones if the calls are prerecorded or use 

an autodialer; non-commercial informational calls to residential phones are not similarly restricted. This disparity creates challenges for companies and government 

agencies that want to provide legitimate informational calls to individuals who are 

not reachable in any other way and who may value such calls to receive timely information such as notification about a data breach, fraud alert, change in flight 

time, or other time-sensitive account information. 

Even where a consumer has given prior express consent to one entity to receive 

autodialed calls on her mobile device, that consent would not apply to informational 

calls from other entities about that purchase. For example, I may have given LL 

Bean consent to call me on my cell phone when I ordered a new shirt, but that 

would not permit UPS to notify me about scheduled delivery times. Similarly, I may 

have given the auto dealership consent to call my cell phone when I purchased my 

41 

car, but that consent may not extend to the auto manufacturer that wants to later 

call me about a safety recall. 

A key adjustment to the TCPA that would help resolve this issue would be clarification of the statutory definition of an ‘‘automatic telephone dialing system’’ 

(ATDS), at least as it applies to delivery of informational calls. The TCPA defines 

an ATDS as ‘‘equipment which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator’’ and the ability 

‘‘to dial such numbers.’’ The Federal Communications Commission and some courts 

have interpreted this definition to include equipment that dials numbers from a list 

of customer phone numbers that are neither random nor sequential. The equipment 

simply aids the calling party by automating the process of dialing these intentionally selected numbers. This expansive interpretation potentially leaves wireless 

customers unable to receive desirable informational messages, like a fraud alert 

from their bank, while there remain no restrictions on sending the same alert message to the dwindling number of consumers that maintain a landline phone. A welcome clarification to the TCPA would allow use of ATDS to send informational messages to wireless phones, so long as they are not used to dial numbers sequentially 

or randomly. 

Another outmoded aspect of TCPA implementation is the fact that the Federal 

Communications Commission continues to catalog consumers’ TCPA reports as 

‘‘wireless complaints,’’ suggesting they are complaints about wireless service, when 

the complaints are in fact about violations of the TCPA and FCC rules by telemarketers calling consumers on their wireless phones. As I noted at the outset, 

wireless carriers have taken numerous steps—including bringing lawsuits against 

robocallers—to protect their customers against unlawful calling campaigns. At 

CTIA, we understand consumer annoyance over these calls and repeatedly have 

pledged our full cooperation to efforts by the FCC and the FTC to bring enforcement 

action against these serial violators of the TCPA. 

Yet while wireless carriers are doing what they can to identify and shut down 

TCPA violations, the FCC continues to misleadingly catalog consumers’ TCPA reports as ‘‘wireless complaints.’’ We believe it is unfair for the FCC to continue to 

count TCPA complaints, which are about calls that originate outside of the wireless 

network and have nothing to do with wireless carriers’ behavior, as ‘‘wireless complaints.’’ The FCC’s refusal to properly characterize these consumer complaints significantly and misleadingly expands the apparent rate of consumer complaints 

about wireless services. This is important since absent inclusion of TCPA-related 

complaints, the total number of complaints about wireless service received by the 

FCC has been declining significantly, dropping from 12/1000ths of one percent of industry subscribership in 2005 to slightly more than 7/1000ths of one percent today. 

To ensure accurate reporting, we believe the FCC should disaggregate TCPA data 

from its quarterly and annual wireless complaint data and report it separately. 

Let me turn now to the question of whether technical solutions can help address 

the problem of unlawful robocalls. While the recent effort by the FTC to use a contest to identify a technical solution that would allow consumers to automatically 

screen and reject unwanted robocalls produced some interesting proposals, the limited information available to CTIA and the public about these proposals suggests 

the FTC and others should approach implementation cautiously. 

Each of the three winning entries in the contest, including one submitted by two 

engineers at Google, relies on creation of a ‘‘blacklist’’ database of numbers identified as associated with robocall spammers. All incoming calls to a consumer would 

be compared with this database, with calls from blacklisted numbers blocked. The 

database would also include a ‘‘whitelist’’ of numbers associated with entities that 

have been identified as associated with ‘‘legitimate’’ callers. While there may be 

value to these solutions, they raise a number of issues that would need to be resolved before any such system can even be considered for implementation. 

• Identification of Blacklist Numbers. Each of the proposed systems includes a 

method for identifying numbers to be included on the blacklist—some using consumer input and at least one using a mathematical algorithm. But there are 

significant issues with either method. Given the ease with which robocallers 

using modern equipment can mimic the caller ID of any other phone user, a 

consumer or an algorithm may think it is identifying an illegal robocaller for 

the blacklist, when it is actually listing the number of an innocent party. Illegal 

robocallers can also change the numbers they use (or the numbers they mimic) 

frequently—even ‘‘tumbling’’ a new legitimate number for each individual 

robocall—limiting the usefulness of the blacklist. This suggests a need to contact the person or business associated with the number in order to provide an 

opportunity to object to being placed on the blacklist. Would there be an appeal 

42 

process? Would there be criteria for moving an innocent customer from the 

blacklist to the whitelist? In addition, one person’s unwanted annoying robocall 

may be another person’s important informational message. One consumer may 

suggest adding a political candidate’s number to the blacklist because he or she 

is annoyed with the candidate’s message, while others may welcome such messages. It is unclear how an algorithm could even distinguish between wanted 

and unwanted robocalls. 

• Identification of Whitelist Numbers. Before implementation, rules would need to 

be worked out and a system administrator appointed to determine how, and on 

what basis, a robocaller could get its number added to the whitelist. Would 

there be an appeal process? What would be the criteria for moving a bad actor 

from the whitelist to the blacklist? 

• Caller ID Spoofing. Even assuming an accurate database of blacklisted and 

whitelisted numbers can be compiled and maintained, the ease with which modern equipment and software can allow a caller to hide its identity by spoofing 

a caller ID would present significant challenges. It would, for example, be relatively simple for an illegal robocall spammer to spoof one or more of the numbers on the whitelist to get its calls through the protection system. While the 

Truth in Caller ID Act prohibits spoofing of caller IDs for fraudulent or harmful 

purposes, unlawful robocallers—especially those that are calling from outside 

the United States—that aren’t deterred from violating the TCPA would likely 

have little concern about also violating the caller ID law. Identifying illegal 

robocallers that are spoofing caller ID is made significantly more difficult if the 

robocaller uses modern Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) technology, which 

if routed through a proxy server becomes virtually impossible to trace. 

• Scaling. Because unlawful robocallers typically use a large number of telephone 

numbers and change telephone numbers frequently, the database for the blacklist would be very large and continually growing, requiring a significant investment for both acquisition and maintenance of computer resources. Perhaps 

more significantly, the capacity in both telecommunications and computer resources needed to route to the database for comparison all of the calls 

robocallers may make to the tens or even hundreds of millions of persons who 

may sign up for the service would be massive. 

• Administration and Operation of the System. Any robocall blocking system of 

the type proposed in the FTC contest would involve a fairly massive administrative and operational effort. It should not be expected that carriers can be the 

implementing entities. The significant costs of the system aside, a single carrier 

could reasonably compile and maintain a robocall blacklist that would be associated only with the illegal robocall identification and calling preferences of its 

own customers. Thus no system operated by a single carrier could be as comprehensive as it would need to be to be effective. In addition, wireless carriers, 

as legal common carriers, must deliver calls that are placed on their networks. 

While a subscriber that opted in to the proposed robocall blocking system may 

be considered to have authorized the blocking, the carrier may not block calls 

from a legal robocaller on its network, absent specific statutory or regulatory 

authority to do so. 

• Privacy Issues. At least one reported robocall solution would require the carrier 

to allow the solution administrator to screen subscribers’ incoming calls to determine whether they are from an illegal robocaller or a legal robocaller or live 

individual. Even if this kind of snooping is authorized by the recipient of the 

call, such a potentially invasive technology raises serious questions about consistency with the law and rules governing the privacy of customer proprietary 

network information and a carrier’s traditional responsibility to avoid intercepting or divulging the content of communications other than in narrowly circumscribed instances. 

We appreciate the efforts of the FTC and others who are exploring technologies 

that may minimize the transmission of illegal robocalls to our customers. As the 

foregoing suggests, however, any technical solutions must be subject to careful and 

complete consideration. Particularly at this early stage of development, it would be 

premature to impose any technical solution as a mandate. 

Finally, whether as part of a technical solution to robocalls or as part of any 

amendment to the TCPA, nothing should be done to upset the FCC’s longstanding 

conclusion under the TCPA that wireless carriers need not obtain additional consent 

from subscribers prior to initiating autodialed calls at no cost to their subscribers. 

These important and beneficial customer service calls may be used to notify customers of billing alerts, low balance alerts on prepaid phones, and usage alerts inVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:17 Dec 06, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\85765.TXT JACKIE
43 

forming customers of approaching limits for voice, data, or messaging plans. In encouraging wireless carriers to provide this information to their customers, the FCC 

has consistently recognized the benefits of such calls between wireless carriers and 

their customers and recognized that Congress had no intention of hindering these 

communications. Any new solution to illegal robocalling, whether technical or 

through increased enforcement, should not upset this key communication between 

wireless providers and their customers. 

On behalf of CTIA, thank you for your consideration of these suggestions. We look 

forward to working with you to address these and related matters as the Subcommittee moves forward with its work. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Stein? 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW STEIN, CHIEF TECHNOLOGY 

OFFICER, PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC. 

Mr. STEIN. Thank you, Chair, Ranking Member Heller, and Senator Pryor. My name is Matthew Stein, and I am the Chief Technology Officer of Primus Telecommunications. While my responsibilities at Primus cover all of our technology assets globally, my 

comments today are specific to our Canadian business, known as 

Primus Canada. 

As in the United States, robocalls are a concern in Canada, and 

I thank you for the opportunity to speak to a technological solution 

invented, developed, and deployed by Primus. 

Primus provides a service called Telemarketing Guard to all of 

our telephone customers in Canada. This patented service was developed and deployed in 2007 in response to our customers’ discontent with their inability to control unlimited, unsolicited calling. 

The concerns expressed by our customers are familiar: unwanted 

calls interrupting dinner, interrupting quiet evenings, interrupting 

family time, and, in many cases, the inability to make these calls 

stop, no matter how many times the customer asked to be taken 

off one kind of list or to be put on another. 

Before I proceed, it is important to make clear that we view 

robocalls and automated telemarketing calls as a subset of mass 

unsolicited calling, which, for convenience, I will refer to as ‘‘telemarketing.’’ Our customers have made clear that their view of telemarketing does not change if they are greeted by a live person or 

a recorded message when they pick up the phone. 

Telemarketing Guard addresses this issue by providing customers with control over how they wish to deal with telemarketing 

calls. When a call is placed to a customer protected by it, our system evaluates the call even before the phone has rung. If the system believes, based on feedback provided through our customers, 

that the caller is likely a telemarketer, the call does not go directly 

to our customer. Instead, a message is played telling the caller that 

the customer does not accept telemarketing calls and invites them 

to press ‘‘1’’ to record their name so that their call can be announced. The customer then has the choice to accept the call, 

refuse the call, or send it to voice-mail, all without actually speaking to a telemarketer. 

Telemarketing Guard uses the actions of our customers to identify these telemarketing calls. The system is completely neutral to 

all phone numbers until a report from a customer is received. As 

a result, all calls, telemarketing or not, are unimpeded to our cusVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:17 Dec 06, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\85765.TXT JACKIE
44 

tomers initially. But if a customer receives an unscreened telemarketing call, it is up to them to decide whether or not they will 

choose to report that number, which they can do by picking up 

their phone and dialing a special code. 

If they choose to report the call and if a threshold of other customers also reports that call, the system begins to monitor the 

phone number and scans for a number of behavioral characteristics. For example, these could be frequency of calling, time-of-day 

concentration, sequential calling, and so on. There are many, many 

other elements that are scanned for. All of this is done to determine if the call should be identified as a telemarketer on a go-forward basis. 

In essence, the system promotes and relies on customer engagement to identify telemarketing calls. But the reverse is also true. 

If enough customers accept a call from an identified telemarketer, 

the number will cease to be considered a telemarketer by the system. 

This is accomplished by a system that requires no arduous maintenance of lists or complicated judgment calls to be made, whether 

by network providers, by third parties, or government bodies. Instead, the system just tallies customer votes to determine who is 

and who is not an unwanted telemarketer. In other words, it becomes a living, breathing, crowdsourced list of undesirable telemarketers and robocallers. 

Further, customers that don’t even bother to participate in reporting still benefit from the actions of those that do. This is the 

defining element of Telemarketing Guard and what we believe 

makes it unique. In fact, this is what led us to patent this system. 

Customer engagement and response have been exceptional. 

Based on our internal surveys, the service has increased customer 

satisfaction and become one of the leading reasons customers 

choose to keep their phone service with Primus. 

In regards to costs and implementation, the system is not complicated or expensive to establish and maintain. Indeed, we currently provide Telemarketing Guard to all of our customers at no 

extra charge. The system can also be grafted easily into existing 

phone networks, as we did into ours. It can work for traditional 

landline phones, Voice-over-IP phones, or mobile phones. The service doesn’t require customers to buy anything or install anything 

or configure their phone in certain ways. And, finally, the service 

itself can be adapted and configured to address needs of consumers, 

telephone service providers, or legislative and regulatory bodies. 

In conclusion, besides being a powerful consumer tool, we believe 

that Telemarketing Guard is consistent with the competitive interests of telecommunications carriers to provide valuable new services to customers. Primus therefore welcomes the efforts of this 

committee to identify ways that consumers can be given more tools 

to address mass unsolicited calls and to encourage carriers to provide such services. 

Thank you, and I look forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stein follows:] 

45 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATTHEW STEIN, CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, 

PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC. 

Thank you Chair and distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Matthew Stein, and I am the Chief Technology Officer of Primus Telecommunications 

Inc. While my responsibilities at Primus cover all of our technology assets globally, 

my comments today are specific to our Canadian business, known as Primus Canada. As in the United States, robocalls are a similar concern in Canada and I thank 

you for the opportunity to speak to a technological solution invented, developed, and 

deployed by Primus to assist our customers with this issue. 

Primus provides a service called Telemarketing Guard to all of our telephone customers in Canada. This patented service was invented in 2006, and deployed in 

2007 in direct response to our customers’ discontent with their inability to control 

and limit unsolicited calls. The concerns expressed by our customers are familiar— 

unwanted calls interrupting dinner, interrupting quiet evenings, interrupting family 

time and, in many cases, the inability to make the calls stop no matter how many 

times the customer asks to be taken off one kind of list or put on another. 

Before I proceed, it is important to make clear that we view robocalls and automated telemarketing calls as a subset of mass unsolicited calling, which for convenience I will generally refer to as telemarketing calls throughout my presentation. 

Our customers have made clear that their view of telemarketing calls does not 

change if they are greeted by a live person or a recorded message when they pick 

up the phone. 

Telemarketing Guard addresses this issue by providing customers with control 

over how they wish to deal with telemarketing calls. When a call is placed to a customer protected by Telemarketing Guard, our system evaluates the call even before 

the customer’s phone is rung. If the system believes, based on feedback provided by 

our customers, that the caller is likely a telemarketer, the call does not go directly 

to our customer. Instead, a message is played advising the caller that the customer 

does not accept telemarketing calls and invites them to press 1 to record their name, 

so that their call can be announced to the party they are calling. After the caller 

records their name, similar to leaving a voice-mail, the system calls our customer 

and advises them that they have received a potential telemarketing call and plays 

the recording provided by the caller. The customer then has the choice to accept the 

call, refuse the call, or send the call to voice-mail if available. In fact, customers 

often decide to ignore the call altogether without even having to answer the phone 

as the caller ID will display the name ‘‘Telemarketing Guard’’ along with the original caller’s phone number. 

Telemarketing Guard uses the actions of our customers to identify potential telemarketing calls. The system is completely neutral to all calling telephone numbers 

until a report from a customer is received. As a result, all calls—telemarketing and 

non—will initially proceed completely unimpeded to our customers. If a customer receives an unscreened telemarketing call, it is up to them to decide whether or not 

to report the number, which they can do through their phone. If they choose to report the call and if a threshold of customers reporting the same number is reached, 

the system then begins to monitor the calling phone number and applies a number 

of behavioural characteristics (e.g., frequency of calling, time of day concentration, 

sequential calling, etc.) to determine whether the call should be identified as a telemarketing call on a going forward basis. 

In essence, the system promotes and relies on customer engagement to identify 

potential telemarketing calls. The reverse is also true. If enough customers accept 

a call from an identified telemarketer, the number will cease to be considered a telemarketer by the system. Several other safeguards are employed by the system to 

ensure that calling numbers are not erroneously identified. 

Customer engagement and response has been exceptional. Based on our internal 

surveys, the service has increased customer satisfaction and become one of the leading reasons that customers choose to keep their phone service with Primus. In fact, 

few customers have selected to disable the service. 

In regards to costs and implementation, the system is not overly complicated or 

expensive to establish and maintain. For its part, Primus currently provides Telemarketing Guard to all of its telephone customers at no extra charge. The system 

can also be easily grafted into an existing network and deployed, such as we did. 

It can work for traditional land line phones, voice-over-IP phones, or mobile phones, 

if the Service Provider so configures it. The service does not require customers to 

purchase or install any equipment or software whatsoever, nor does it require customers to actively participate in reporting in order to benefit from the reports of 

other customers. Additionally, the service itself can be adapted and configured to 

46 

address specific needs of customers, telephone service providers or legislative and 

regulatory bodies. 

In addition to being a powerful consumer tool, we believe that Telemarketing 

Guard is consistent with the competitive interest of telecommunications carriers to 

provide valuable services to customers. Primus therefore welcomes the effort of the 

Subcommittee to identify for consumers a way that they can be equipped with the 

means to address unsolicited calls and to encourage carriers to offer services that 

provide such tools to customers. 

Thank you and I look forward to any questions that you may have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. We appreciate you 

being here. 

Mr. Foss? 

STATEMENT OF AARON FOSS, FREELANCE SOFTWARE 

DEVELOPER, NOMOROBO 

Mr. FOSS. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member 

Heller, and Senator Pryor. I appreciate this opportunity to testify. 

And I am here today to illustrate that the technology exists right 

now to block these illegal robocalls. And while there are some challenges, such as caller ID spoofing and privacy concerns, there are 

also effective solutions. 

And to that end, there are three main points that I want to discuss. First, I am going to talk about my winning FTC Robocall 

Challenge entry. Then I will discuss some issues and concerns that 

are involved with blocking robocalls. And, finally, I am going to discuss the commercial viability of robocall-blocking services. 

So, currently, the Do Not Call Registry is almost completely ineffective against these illegal mass-dialed robocallers. So to fight 

back, the FTC launched a competition to find new and creative solutions to this problem. They chose my proposal, which I call 

Nomorobo, as one of the co-winners. And that is a little play on ‘‘no 

mo’ ’’ robocalls. 

So in real-time—well, here is how—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Even we got that. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. FOSS. Great. Just making sure. Just making sure. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. Just to reassure you. I know the rest of the 

country thinks we are idiots, but we got that. [Laughter.] 

Mr. FOSS. Just making sure. 

So here is how it works. In real-time, Nomorobo analyzes the incoming caller ID and the call frequency across multiple phone 

lines, and if it detects a robocaller, the call is automatically disconnected. And all of this happens before the consumer’s phone rings. 

So as each call is analyzed, a blacklist of robocallers is continually updated. And the more calls that come into the system for 

analysis, the better that the algorithm works. 

I actually built this system using the same technology that these 

robocallers are using, so it scales inexpensively to handle millions 

of calls. And Nomorobo works on landlines, voice-over-IP, and cell 

phones on all of the major carriers and does not require any additional hardware or software. All that is required by the consumer 

is a simple, one-time setup to enable a free feature that is already 

built into the switches called ‘‘simultaneous ring.’’ 

47 

But, as with all new ideas, there is always some skepticism. Industry players have expressed three major concerns about robocall 

blocking: spoofing caller ID; violating consumer privacy; and allowing legal robocalls. 

So it is incredibly easy to spoof caller ID to show any phone number, and almost all of the robocallers do that. But while you can 

falsify the calling number, you can’t falsify the calling patterns. So 

it is a red flag, for example, when the same number, whether it is 

spoofed or not, has made 5,000 calls to different numbers in the 

past hour. And it is also a red flag when the same number is sequentially calling large blocks of phone numbers. Both of these scenarios indicate robocalling patterns. 

And so a static blacklist of known robocallers would only work 

in a very limited amount of situations. But by combining the caller 

ID, whether it is real or faked, with real-time calling pattern analysis, robocalls can effectively be detected. 

And, also, with solutions like these that only look at the 

metadata of a call, there is no need to monitor or listen in to the 

phone calls, thus assuring customer privacy. The caller ID data, 

along with the date and time, across many phone lines, gives 

enough of a fingerprint to detect robocallers without having to analyze the actual content of the call. 

And the final concern that has been raised is how to allow legal 

robocalls, such as schools and emergency notifications, to bypass 

robocall blocking. And this can be accomplished by building a trusted, real-time whitelist. I have already had the opportunity to speak 

with some of the legal robocallers, and they are very open to working on a solution that allows them to successfully deliver their 

calls. They want these illegal robocallers put out of business as 

much as the consumer does. 

As my final point, I would like to show that there is proof of consumer demand for this type of service, as well as commercial viability. After I won the competition, I commissioned a nationwide survey that indicated that 57 percent of respondents would use a 

robocall-blocking service. And, further, 17 percent said that they 

would pay a monthly fee for such a service. 

Since the beginning of April, when the FTC announced the winner of the competition, over 3,600 people have signed up on the 

Nomorobo mailing list. I have received over 400 e-mails asking, or, 

rather, begging, for me to release this service. 

And based on the feedback that I have received, robocalls are a 

serious quality-of-life issue, as many people on this panel have 

said. I have to agree; I hear time and time again how consumers 

feel helpless to stop robocalls. And I think it hits at a certain core 

level, and we have mentioned this, but they are in their homes, 

with their family, enjoying their time, and they are being interrupted by a fraudster who is trying to sell them something that 

they don’t want or they don’t need. 

So, members of this committee, I hope I have effectively demonstrated that the technology to defeat these robocalls exists today. 

It can be implemented quickly and easily with no changes to the 

current infrastructure. And while there are some concerns, such as 

spoofing and privacy, there are also solutions. The market is large 

48 

and the problem is so irritating that consumers have shown a willingness to pay for a solution. 

So I thank you for your time, and I am committed to supporting 

your efforts in any way that I can. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Foss follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AARON FOSS, FREELANCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPER, 

NOMOROBO

Thank you, Senator McCaskill, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the 

Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to testify. 

I am here today to illustrate that the technology exists, right now, to block illegal 

robocalls. And, while there are some challenges, such as Caller ID spoofing and privacy concerns, there also are effective solutions. 

To that end, there are three main points that I will discuss. 

First, I am going to talk about my winning FTC Robocall Challenge entry. Then 

I will discuss some issues and concerns involved with blocking robocalls. And finally, 

I will discuss the commercial viability of robocall blocking services. 

Currently, the Do-Not-Call registry is almost completely ineffective against illegal, 

mass dialed, robocallers. To fight back, the FTC launched a competition to find new 

and creative solutions to this problem. They chose my proposal, which I call 

‘‘Nomorobo,’’ as the co-winner. 

In real-time, Nomorobo analyzes the incoming Caller ID and call frequency, across 

multiple phone lines. If it detects a robocaller, the call is automatically disconnected. 

All of this happens before the consumer’s phone rings. 

As each call is analyzed, a blacklist of robocallers is continually updated. The system is actually built using the same technology that the robocallers are using, allowing it to scale, inexpensively, to handle millions of calls. The more calls that come 

into the system for analysis, the better the algorithm works. 

Nomorobo works on land lines, voice-over-IP and cell phones on all of the major 

carriers and does not require any additional hardware or software. All that is required by the consumer is a simple, one-time setup, enabling a free feature called 

simultaneous ring. 

But, as with all new ideas, there’s always some skepticism. Industry players have 

expressed three major concerns about robocall blocking: (1) spoofing Caller ID; (2) 

violating consumer privacy; and (3) allowing legal robocalls. 

It is incredibly easy to spoof the Caller ID to show any phone number—and almost all of the robocallers do this. But, while you can falsify the calling number, 

you cannot falsify calling patterns. It is a red flag, for example, when the same 

phone number, spoofed or not, has made 5,000 calls to different numbers in the past 

hour. It is also a red flag when the same phone number is sequentially calling large 

blocks of phone numbers. Both of these scenarios indicate robocalling patterns. 

A static blacklist of known robocallers only works in very limited situations. But, 

by combining the Caller ID, whether real or faked, with real-time calling pattern 

analysis, robocalls can be effectively detected. 

Also, with solutions that only look at the metadata of a call, there is no need to 

monitor or listen to the phone call, assuring consumer privacy. The Caller ID data, 

along with the date and time, across many phone lines, gives enough of a fingerprint to detect robocallers without having to analyze the actual content of the call. 

The final concern that has been raised is how to allow legal robocalls, such as 

schools and emergency notifications, to bypass robocall blocking. This can be accomplished by building a trusted, real-time whitelist. I have had the opportunity to 

speak with some of the legal robocalling companies and they are very open to working on a solution that allows them to successfully deliver their calls. They want the 

illegal robocallers put out of business as much as the average consumer does. 

As my final point, I will show proof of consumer demand for this type of service 

as well as commercial viability. I commissioned a nationwide survey that indicated 

that 57 percent of respondents would use a robocall blocking service. Further, 17 

percent said they would pay a monthly fee for such a service. 

Since the beginning of April, when the FTC announced the winner of the competition, over 3,600 people have signed up on the Nomorobo mailing list. I have received 

over 400 hundred e-mails asking, or rather, begging for this service to be released. 

Based on the feedback that I have received, robocalls are a serious quality-of-life 

issue. I hear time and time again how consumers feel helpless to stop robocalls. It 

hits at a certain core level. Here they are, in their homes, with their family, and 

49 

they are being interrupted by a fraudster trying to sell them something they do not 

want or need. 

Members of this Committee, I hope that I have effectively demonstrated that the 

technology to defeat robocalls exists today. It can be implemented quickly and easily 

with no changes to the current telephone infrastructure. And, while there are some 

concerns, such as spoofing and privacy, there are also solutions. Stopping robocalls 

would be a huge win for the consumer. The market is large and the problem is so 

irritating that consumers have even shown a willingness to pay for a solution. 

I thank you for your time and I am committed to supporting your efforts in any 

way that I can. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I appreciate you being here very much. 

And let me just say, Mr. Stein, I was fascinated with—because 

you have now had experience doing this for years, and it has 

worked commercially for your carrier. 

Mr. STEIN. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And so let me just say for the record that 

the first company that is smart enough to do this in the United 

States, I am switching carriers to that one. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. STEIN. Fair enough. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I think that the American—and I 

would like, Mr. Altschul, for you to address this, and Mr. Rupy. 


710FOSS1.eps
50 

I don’t understand. We have heard from two good witnesses that 

the technology is available. And I understand fear of the consequences and Mencken’s quote and that for every action we have 

in Congress, there is a reaction. On the other hand, if you look at 

the fears, to me, they are much less than what the reality is now 

that people are dealing with. 

So why is it that Mr. Foss’s technology is not quickly being 

adapted in these commercial markets? And why is it that Mr. 

Stein’s patented product has not been licensed to an American carrier? 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. I don’t know about the license issues, but we do 

have concerns about overreaching and blocking legitimate calls. 

As senators, I am sure you are more familiar than you would like 

to be with the kind of informational robocalls and text messages 

you receive from airlines when flights are delayed because of 

weather or other events. The volume of these calls are unpredictable, and they will flood carrier networks with identical recorded 

messages and text messages. 

And they will carry a caller ID. That caller ID, if it is put on a 

whitelist, can then be spoofed, as I think we all agree how easy it 

is to spoof a number, and have the same fingerprint or pattern as 

other messages. 

One of the things—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, how does Mr. Stein’s licensed product—I hate to interrupt you, but if I could get a conversation between the two of you. 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. Sure. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Stein, address the airlines calling with 

information that a flight has been delayed. 

Mr. STEIN. Well, first—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. In reality, how does that work—— 

Mr. STEIN. Sure. 

Senator MCCASKILL.—with your technology? 

Mr. STEIN. Sure. Remember that the technology has been deployed for a number of years, so I will speak specifically to the Canadian calling patterns, which, for the record, I don’t have any reason to believe are any different than American. 

The reality is that the system, the Telemarketing Guard system 

itself, will only begin to monitor and, therefore, take action once 

there are reports by enough people that say, this is an unwanted 

telemarketer. 

Further, once that call comes in, the system will not block that 

call. Being a carrier ourselves, we have always viewed it as our responsibility to put the two people on the phone, not impede that. 

But it is to give a moment of pause and to get the other party, the 

calling party, to press ‘‘1,’’ record their name, and so forth. 

In the event of delayed flights and things like that, these things 

tend to go right through. There hasn’t been any effect. We have 

never seen a complaint like that because—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. So no consumer is going—— 

Mr. STEIN.—people have never—— 

Senator MCCASKILL.—to call—— 

Mr. STEIN. That is right. No consumer—— 

51 

Senator MCCASKILL. Nobody is going to call and say, the airline 

let me know my flight was late. And that is what the initial—— 

Mr. STEIN. That is right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is the initial beginning of the block, is 

a critical mass of people calling and saying, hey, these guys are—— 

Mr. STEIN. That is right, because they—— 

Senator MCCASKILL.—rip-off people or they are trying to sell me 

siding. 

Mr. STEIN.—they are not objecting. The consumer is not objecting. And I talk about this benefit, in that nobody other than the 

consumers themselves decide what is and what is not an unwanted 

telemarketer or robocall. And so that—— 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. But my point is that that number, which is welcome and legitimate and properly described on caller ID, is basically the identifier that the carrier and the customer and Mr. 

Stein’s system has to track wanted and unwanted calls. 

Right now, there is no need for scammers to actually pick numbers that consumers would recognize as the source of messages, informational messages, they would like to receive. But there is no 

limitation on a fraudster’s ability to use an airline’s number to fill 

out the caller ID field in the robocalls and messages that they send. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, let me just address that. So let’s assume in Canada, since 2007, that a fraudster got a hold of United 

Airlines’ number and started using that. 

How would it work with your system, Mr. Stein, if that happened, if they spoofed a legitimate number that no consumer would 

complain about, but they started using it and—— 

Mr. STEIN. Right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What would happen? How would that work? 

Mr. STEIN. Two quick comments. 

First, the system is quite smart. And over the years that we have 

tuned it and built and enhanced it, we have built in a great many 

safeguards to prevent this exact thing from happening. And I won’t 

elaborate in full detail on all those, but such is to say that if such 

a thing were to happen and reports were to start to come in, one 

would assume that at the same time the airline is using that phone 

number, too, and therefore a lot of those calls are getting accepted 

by our customers. 

So we would be seeing votes going in both directions, and the 

system becomes increasingly skeptical and looks for what distinguishes the two types of calls, and then is able to break them down 

based on many of the other criteria that are no longer using just, 

say, the caller ID, which is the thing that is easy to spoof. There 

are a lot of other characteristics in a phone network that are available that we use. 

Senator MCCASKILL. He wins. 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. Well, give me another chance. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. STEIN. I would be happy to—— 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. As Mr. Foss testified, his technology is the same 

technology or built on the same roots as the technology these 

scammers are using. And what we have found, particularly in the 

area of policing text messages that come across carriers’ gateways 

from the Internet is, as the carriers become more sophisticated in 

52 

looking at the fingerprints, looking at the volume of calls, the number, the speed, the number of identical messages, the fraudsters become increasingly better educated and sophisticated at the same 

time. 

So this is a cat-and-mouse game. You set a threshold, say, originally of 10,000 messages a minute or an hour, and any message 

volume for identical messages above that would get caught. Before 

long, the fraudsters set their threshold at 9,000 messages. You 

lower the threshold again, the fraudsters find out their messages 

aren’t going through, they change their threshold to still stay 

under the limit. The costs of doing this really are almost zero. 

And so, for every action and every, you know, time you raise the 

wall, the bad guys come back at you with a taller ladder. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I think the point that is being made, 

and for Mr. Rupy and Mr. Altschul, the point that is being made 

is we have the capability of being as sophisticated in terms of technology as the bad guys. And there are a number of different algorithms that could be used to identify the bad guys that currently 

our American carriers just aren’t bothering to use. 

And that is hard for me—I mean, Mr. Foss is on the precipice 

of hopefully rolling out a product that will show that Canada won’t 

be a decade ahead of us, as opposed to merely—what are we up to 

now? Six, 7 years? You know, if the sky was going to fall, I think 

Mr. Stein probably wouldn’t be here. 

And, Mr. Rupy, I will wait for Mr. Heller to ask questions to 

come back and ask your take on this. 

Because it worries me that we are going to say, well, you know, 

if we do this to try to catch the bad guys, they are just going to 

do something else. Can you imagine the amount of money we could 

have saved if we just would have just given up on trying to interdict drugs? 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. Well, and to be clear—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. ‘‘Well, if we do that, if we go after their airplanes, they are going to do boats. Let’s not do the airplanes. Or 

if we do boats, they are going to go over, you know, the Mexican 

border. Let’s don’t do that, because then they will just go over the 

Mexican border.’’ 

We just keep trying. And I think this is one of these issues that 

we really haven’t teed up yet to really try hard. 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. Well, to be clear, wireless carriers, with respect 

to SMS text messages, are doing exactly what you have described, 

and it has been an iterative learning experience. And some of the 

lessons learned—it is just basically a spam filter, but a spam filter 

for text messages—are instructional as to how smart the bad guys 

are. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We are smart. 

Senator Heller? 

Senator HELLER. Madam Chairwoman, thank you. 

Mr. Stein, I want to talk a little bit about Telemarketing Guard. 

Is that a unique system in Canada? 

Mr. STEIN. Yes. 

Senator HELLER. Are there any other carriers that have anything 

that is similar to what you have? 

Mr. STEIN. No. We—no. 

53 

Senator HELLER. You talked about years. How long has it taken 

you to develop this particular system? 

Mr. STEIN. We came up with the idea in early 2006. We had it 

commercially deployed, built, tested, et cetera, commercially deployed by, I believe, early 2007. 

Senator HELLER. Any initial weaknesses to the system, things 

that—— 

Mr. STEIN. No, I wouldn’t say there were weaknesses. I would 

say we learned lots in the initial days, but nothing concerning, no. 

Senator HELLER. OK. 

Mr. STEIN. No complaints from customers, et cetera, nothing like 

that. 

Senator HELLER. Have you been approached by any other carriers, whether in Canada or the U.S., to borrow or buy the technology? 

Mr. STEIN. A little bit. We participated in the FTC’s robocall 

summit in the fall last year. After that, we had a couple of calls, 

some light inquiries, but nothing pursued too greatly. 

Senator HELLER. So you got beaten out by Nomorobo? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. STEIN. Well, in fairness, we didn’t submit Telemarketing 

Guard to the challenge, as we were not eligible for it. We had presented at the summit that preceded the challenge. 

Senator HELLER. OK. Are you aware of any barriers that may 

prohibit bringing this kind of technology from Canada to the 

United States? 

Mr. STEIN. No, I am not. 

Senator HELLER. OK. OK. 

Mr. Foss, congratulations. 

Mr. FOSS. Thank you. 

Senator HELLER. And you said you had about 3,600 people now 

that have—do they buy your product, they download your product? 

What do they do? How does someone know to get involved in what 

the FTC has produced in this case? 

Mr. FOSS. Sure. And that is the funny part, is that it is not even 

available yet. It was just the announcement. I set up a website, I 

put in my e-mail and said, it is coming soon. Thirty-six hundred 

people said, give this to me, whatever it is. They don’t know how 

much it is going to be, how it is going to work. They just know that 

there is a problem. So this is just basically the press that has been 

generated by this and directed them to the website. 

Senator HELLER. When do you think it will be readily available? 

Mr. FOSS. By the end of the summer, actually. 

Senator HELLER. So you will have some kind of a program to 

make sure that the American public are aware of what your product is? 

Mr. FOSS. Exactly, exactly. After the competition, I wound up 

talking to a bunch of investors. I got enough seed money to go and 

build this into a beta to actually go and launch it and to address 

some of these exact concerns to see—you know, the best way is just 

to prove that it will work. 

And one of the things, I think, that Mr. Stein’s product is actually better at than mine, because he is a carrier, is the worst-case 

scenario, I think, in Mr. Stein’s case is that the call gets diverted 

54 

to voice-mail. You know, a lot of these things—the thinking that 

went into it before everybody had voice-mail was that, and especially on mine, is that the call is going to be disconnected, you are 

going to lose the call forever. But now if we can just divert it to 

voice-mail, much like spam does into your spam filter, I think everybody would rather have a voice-mail box with five or six 

robocalls than five or six robocalls. 

Senator HELLER. OK. 

You mentioned during your testimony that there were some industry players that were concerned with this technology. What are 

those concerns, and what have you done to address those concerns? 

Mr. FOSS. Yes. So the main concern is the caller ID spoofing. A 

lot of players feel and what they say is that, well, the caller ID is 

always going to be wrong, so therefore we can’t stop this problem. 

But, again, I see it a little bit differently. And by using the caller 

ID, whether it is real or not, with these calling patterns, real-time 

calling patterns, that we can actually start—again, even if it is 

faked, it doesn’t really matter. 

The second is the consumer privacy. A lot of people have said 

that this isn’t like e-mail, because in an e-mail you can go and analyze the content, and that in order to do this, you would have to 

listen in on everybody’s phone calls. 

And I don’t believe that is correct. I think that using this caller 

ID, with the calling patterns—and, again, much like the other solutions that are here—some other reported data, the FTC data, you 

actually have a stab at making this—it is not going to be perfect. 

It is absolutely not going to be 100 percent. But even with spam 

filters today, certain spam gets through, sometimes real e-mails get 

into your spam folder. And I think that we need to try it, and I 

think that we need to start somewhere. 

Senator HELLER. Mr. Rupy, you said in your testimony that technology is constantly changing. Do you believe a solution like this, 

Nomorobo, is a solution that can work? 

Mr. RUPY. Senator, that is a fantastic question, and I have to say 

I think it is absolutely fantastic that there are innovators like Mr. 

Foss out there who are working to develop these various solutions. 

And as Mr. Foss acknowledges, there are challenges to some of 

these technological solutions. 

And my point on the technological issue is that, like so many 

issues that arise in this Internet space, it is a constantly evolving 

and moving target. So I think in terms of designing a single technological silver bullet that can fully address the robocall issue, that 

will be an ongoing challenge. 

Senator HELLER. One more question, if you don’t mind. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Sure. Take all the time you would like. 

Senator HELLER. Mr. Altschul, government agencies cited their 

number of complaints. Do you find those numbers to be accurate? 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. Carriers receive complaints. The government 

agencies at all levels, Federal and state, receive these complaints. 

So they are accurate, but our gripe is the way they are actually displayed and recorded by the Federal Communications Commission. 

They are divided across services, and it really doesn’t provide a 

clear picture of what is going on or the magnitude of the problem. 

55 

Senator HELLER. Has the industry had an opportunity to verify 

the number of cites and complaints that—— 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. I am not in any way challenging the numbers. It 

is how they are reported. 

Senator HELLER. OK. 

Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Rupy, when the common carriers see 

mass amounts of calling and short calls in a massive quantity come 

over the transom, what do you do? 

Mr. RUPY. Senator, that is where, during my oral testimony and 

the written testimony, several of our member companies have these 

network operations centers. And there are measures that these 

companies can take to address these mass-calling events. And that 

is where some of these working groups that I mentioned come in. 

Our experience—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. What do they do now, though? You said 

they take different measures. Can you give me an example of one 

of the—you know, you don’t have to name the carrier, but give me 

an example of—let’s assume one of my carriers, which is AT&T, 

let’s assume a massive amount comes over in a short period of time 

in a geographically concentric area. Do you know what they actually do when that happens, if anything? 

Mr. RUPY. Senator, I know they take actions. I don’t know what 

those specific actions are. And we would be happy to provide that 

information. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think that would be important for us to 

know. 

Mr. RUPY. Absolutely. Sure. And—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Go ahead. 

Mr. RUPY. And just to keep in mind, oftentimes these mass-calling events, I mean, they are not all directly attributable to 

robocalling events. So, you know, for example, on September 11th, 

we had mass-calling events in New York City and Washington, 

D.C. So—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I think that is pretty obvious, though. 

I mean, obviously everyone understands that. 

I am talking about, all of a sudden it is Kansas City—and, you 

know, it is interesting. I was on a radio program this morning talking about this. And they had gone out and done a man-on-thestreet interviewing people. And every single person they talked to 

said they had gotten a call about siding. So, clearly, there had been 

a massive amount of calling in the Kansas City area about siding. 

And that is what I am talking about. I mean, there is nothing 

going on, there is no extraordinary weather event. You know, if a 

plane is late, we are talking about maybe 100, 200 people; we are 

not talking about thousands. 

I need to know what, if anything, these carriers are doing. And 

do they feel an obligation to do something? 

Mr. RUPY. Well, and they are certainly taking action on those 

issues, Senator. But I think one of the points that was raised earlier by various folks on the panel here is that, under our current 

legal framework, regardless of whether it is a mass-calling event 

or sort of a standard calling volume, we are under a legal obligation to complete those phone calls and—— 

56 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, so you are saying that you legally 

couldn’t adopt Mr. Stein’s technology? 

Mr. RUPY. As I understand—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. It connects; it just decides whether it goes 

to voice-mail. 

Mr. RUPY. As I understand Mr. Stein’s and Mr. Foss’s technology, to a certain degree you have these—the decision is removed, to a certain degree, from the consumer and is made by the 

carrier with—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. No, that is not true. That is not true. I don’t 

think that is true. 

Mr. Stein, the carrier is not making the decision, is it? 

Mr. STEIN. No, the carrier does not make that decision. I can 

only speak, of course, to our system. 

The system doesn’t block a call under any circumstance, other 

than if the customer were to say, here is one given number that 

I don’t want, a blacklist, available on many services. 

In the case of Telemarketing Guard, it impedes the call and asks 

the caller to press a digit to record their name. But in all of those 

cases, those recorded names, the phone call is made, et cetera. 

And I am not a lawyer, so I can’t speak to the legality of it. I 

am sure we have a lot of them in the room, though. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would really appreciate, Mr. Rupy, if you 

would take back to the legal staff at your organization the specifics 

of both Mr. Stein’s and Mr. Foss’s technology and get back to us 

with what specific problems, from a legal framework, you believe 

that there are. 

I think if this were offered by a carrier, you know, I am just 

shaking my head that an American carrier has not tried to adopt 

one of these technologies because I think it is such a winner in an 

open, capitalistic, competitive market. And by my television ads 

that I watch, all the carriers are pretty darn competitive right now. 

I mean, they are desperately not just trying to get new customers; 

they are trying to hold on to customers. Because, you know, now 

that we can take our phone numbers, there is this incredible desire 

to see if you can’t get somebody to walk from someone else to you. 

And for the life of me, I can’t figure out why you all are not more 

aggressively going after this very desirable technology on behalf of 

consumers. 

Mr. RUPY. Senator, we can absolutely provide that information. 

And just to be clear, I mean, our member companies do offer— 

and I always encourage consumers to reach out to their respective 

carriers to see the services that they are offering. And they do 

range from things like, whether it is caller identification, to conditional call forwarding, to anonymous-call blocking. There are tools 

that the carriers are providing and continuing to develop. 

And, again, we operate under that very stringent obligation to 

complete those calls. And it is very clear to us that that is something we need to comply with. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I don’t want anybody to break the law. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. But I have a feeling we can do this with the 

technology that is out there without breaking any law and maybe 

57 

even without us having to write any laws. And wouldn’t that be 

special? Because it is always nice when we can reach a marketplace solution in the private sector. 

And I know that I am getting a nodding head from Senator Heller right now. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is always better to do it in the marketplace with a competitive solution as it relates to capitalism than it 

is for the government to come in with a heavy hand and try to impose a solution. 

So I think it is pretty important that we hear from you about 

what you see the legal missteps would be, since we have an example of technology that has been used in a country that also embraces capitalism—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL.—and it seems to be working and working 

well for their company. So I would really appreciate you all with 

that follow-up. 

Do you have any other questions? 

Senator HELLER. Yes, I do. And thank you, Madam Chairwoman, 

and thanks for your comments and to follow up. 

And this is for the panel. I guess the bottom line with this particular hearing is, should the FTC and the FCC be given enforcement powers or additional enforcement powers, or can this be 

solved through the private industry itself? 

Mr. Rupy? 

Mr. RUPY. Senator, I think as Senator McCaskill mentioned earlier this morning, the existing legal framework dealing with 

robocalls appropriately targets the bad actors who are engaging in 

this fraudulent activity. 

And I think to the extent that we continue to target that enforcement and make that enforcement aggressive against those actors, 

that is the ideal solution here. Because, as I have said in my written testimony, our member companies work with agencies like the 

FTC to prosecute these actors. We want to catch them as much as 

everyone here in this room. 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. I would agree. I think it requires a holistic solution. Everybody has to play a role. And, certainly, the enforcement 

agencies have a critical role, as do consumers, as does the industry. 

One of the things that our industry has begun looking at, which 

is far from yielding any results, is how to better map and trace 

these calls and messages when they cross through the Internet to 

traditional carrier networks. 

As you may know, carrier networks, when they were closed, used 

a signaling system called Signaling System 7—there never was a 

System 8—as a way of setting up and identifying calls for billing, 

tracing, all kinds of things. The Internet uses a system call SIP, 

Session Initiation Protocol. And mapping or being able to marry 

these two very, very different kinds of protocols is part of the problem right now the enforcement agencies and everyone is having in 

trying to trace this back to the source of these messages. 

And if the technical experts who have begun to work on this 

marrying of SIP to SS7 messaging protocols are able to solve that 

58 

problem, we will enable, you know, great progress in identifying 

and stopping these messages at the source. 

Senator HELLER. I am going to guess Mr. Stein and Mr. Foss believe that there is a private-sector solution to these problems, and 

I will leave it at that. 

I just want to ask one more question for you, Mr. Rupy and Mr. 

Altschul: if you have any response to the FTC raising the issue of 

abolishing the common carrier exemption. Do you have any feel on 

that? 

Mr. RUPY. In terms of the common carrier exemption, Senator, 

I think, as Senator McCaskill raised in her testimony this morning, 

we have these issues where we have sort of conflicting regulations, 

one for wireline, one for wireless. And I think to the extent you 

start expanding the scope of, you know, numerous agencies regulating similar players in the field, that gets to be problematic. 

Second, we fully support—and what I thought I heard in the earlier testimony from the FTC is that, to the extent there is an entity 

out there engaging in illegal activity, they are going to go after that 

entity, as well they should. And we fully support that, whether 

they are a common carrier or whomever. 

Mr. ALTSCHUL. As the FCC’s Mr. Bash testified, there is an existing working relationship between the two agencies. They are both 

enforcing the same laws. And I think that there are some institutional advantages that each institution has developed in their respective areas. I am not aware that it is a problem that has actually deterred any kind of investigation or enforcement activity. 

Senator HELLER. OK. 

I want to thank the witnesses for your time and energy. 

And, Madam Chairwoman, thank you for holding this hearing. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I appreciate everyone being here. 

I will tell you that I know that there are concerns, and all of the 

concerns about what can be done are based in wanting to follow the 

law and stay true to what your mission is as carriers, whether it 

be wireless or wired. 

I do want you to know that I am going to follow up in 3 months 

and ask to find out what your members are doing in this regard 

and what they feel like they can do. And whatever information that 

you can give us in the next 3 months that would spell out the problems you would have with adopting either the technology that Mr. 

Foss is ready to roll out by the end of the summer—do you know 

what it is going to cost, Mr. Foss? 

Mr. FOSS. I am actually hoping to offer it for free. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So am I going to have to look at ads? 

Mr. FOSS. No, actually, because I figure that on the—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. How are you going to do that? We know we 

have to look at ads if it is free. 

Mr. FOSS. I didn’t put this in my testimony, but this problem 

doesn’t only affect the consumer; it affects businesses. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. FOSS. And as the other panel talked about it, the PSAPs, the 

emergency call centers. The FCC put me in touch with the organization that manages a lot of these 911 centers. I think there are 

over 5,000 of them. You know, this do-not-call list is being implemented. 

59 

And, you know, I said to them, I said, if there was a blacklist, 

a real-time blacklist, an up-to-date list of the numbers that you 

shouldn’t be answering, would that be helpful? And they said that 

they had never even thought about that, and if that existed, it 

would be amazing. 

So I think that there is an actual, you know, this data set of the 

real-time robocallers and the calls that you shouldn’t pick up on, 

even I think on the consumer side—or, I am sorry, on the business 

side or anybody who has large call centers, you know, thousands 

of phone lines. 

And I spoke to some that are in financial services, you know, the 

Citibanks and the Chases of the world. Every call that comes in, 

they have to go and screen for fraudsters. So if they know before 

they even send it for screening that they should immediately dump 

it, I think that there is a real valuable asset there. 

So I think that by doing it with the consumers and offering them, 

you know, a really good service of blocking the robocalls, my thesis 

is that I can make money on the business side. 

Senator MCCASKILL. On the business side. 

Mr. FOSS. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Well, you don’t need to worry; when 

you roll out, I will give it a try. 

Mr. FOSS. Sounds good. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And thank you, Mr. Stein, for coming from 

Canada. And we will look forward to following up with our carriers 

here in America to see if we can’t reach a solution. 

Because I do know this: With the technology that is available, if 

it is just about chasing these guys, law-enforcement-wise, around 

the country, we are never going to get the results that consumers 

deserve on this. 

So I thank you all very much for being here. We appreciate it. 

[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(61) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL TO

LOIS GREISMAN

Question 1. Ms. Greisman, the FTC has essentially placed a call for help with 

robocalls. Then-FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz noted last year at a summit on the 

issue, ‘‘Law enforcement alone can’t stop the robocalls.’’ No matter how many cases 

the FTC brings, the agency says there is not much more it can do from an enforcement perspective to abolish illegal robocalls. As a result, the Commission held a 

public competition to find a viable technological solution that could provide some 

level of defense against robocalls. Why do you think a technological solution is the 

best answer to this problem? 

Answer. I do not believe there is one best answer to this problem; rather, the FTC 

must simultaneously pursue multiple strategies to fight illegal robocalls. We 

launched the Robocall Challenge because technological advances caused the explosion in illegal robocalls, and we believe it is important to encourage technological 

solutions that can counteract the proliferation of illegal robocalls. But the agency’s 

other efforts—including law enforcement, coordination with experts, and consumer 

education—continue. 

As one example, we continue our aggressive and strategic law enforcement, and 

the actions we have brought in Federal court have shut down entities responsible 

for billions of illegal robocalls. For instance, the FTC put a robocall operation out 

of the telemarketing business and recovered approximately $3 million under a settlement resolving FTC charges that the defendants bombarded consumers with 

more than two billion robocalls, including the ubiquitous ‘‘Rachel from cardholder 

services’’ calls, sometimes using false Caller ID names, such as ‘‘SALES DEPT.’’ See 

FTC v. Asia Pacific Telecom, Inc., available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/03/ 

asiapacific.shtm. 

Question 2. The FTC selected three winners in its robocall challenge. Why were 

those three entrants chosen as winners? What about their submissions, compared 

to the rest, does the FTC believe will best limit fraudulent robocalls for America’s 

consumers? 

Answer. The Robocall Challenge submissions were judged by Steve Bellovin (Chief 

Technologist from the FTC), Henning Schulzrinne (Chief Technology Officer at the 

Federal Communications Commission), and Kara Swisher (co-Executive Editor of All 

Things Digital). The judges reviewed hundreds of entries to find submissions that 

best met all three of the judging criteria: (1) Does it work?; (2) Is it easy to use?; 

and (3) Can it be rolled out? What follows is a more detailed explanation of the criteria, which was publicly posted at http://robocall.challenge.gov/details/criteria: 

Does it work? (weighted at 50 percent) 

• How successful is the proposed solution likely to be in blocking illegal robocalls? 

Will it block wanted calls? An ideal solution blocks all illegal robocalls and no 

calls that are legally permitted. (For example, automated calls by political parties, charities, and health care providers, as well as reverse 911 calls, are not 

illegal robocalls.) 

• How many consumer phones can be protected? What types of phones? Mobile 

phones? Traditional wired lines? Voice over Internet Protocol (‘‘VoIP’’) land 

lines? Proposals that will work for all phones will be more heavily weighted. 

• What evidence do you already have to support your idea? Running code? Experiments? Peer-reviewed publications? 

• How easy might it be for robocallers to adapt and counter your scheme? How 

flexible is your scheme to adapt to new calling techniques? How have you validated these points? Remember that the real test of a security system is not 

whether or not you can break it; it’s whether or not other people can. 

Is it easy to use? (weighted at 25 percent) 

62 

• How difficult would it be for a consumer to learn to use your solution? 

• How efficient would it be to use your solution, from a consumer’s perspective? 

• Are there mistakes consumers might make in using your solution, and how severe would they be? 

• How satisfying would it be to use your solution? 

• Would your solution be accessible to people with disabilities? 

Can it be rolled out? (weighted at 25 percent) 

• What has to be changed for your idea to work? Can it function in today’s marketplace? (E.g., Does it require changes to all phone switches world-wide, and 

require active cooperation by all of the world’s phone companies and VoIP gateways, or can it work with limited adoption?) Solutions that are deployable at 

once will be more heavily weighted, as will solutions that give immediate benefits with even small-scale deployment. 

• Is deployment economically realistic? 

• How rapidly can your idea be put into production? 

The judges selected the winners from among the contestants’ many informed, creative, and intelligent submissions, based on the criteria laid out above. 

While I cannot speak for the judges, I believe the winning solutions contain promising ideas about how to address difficult realities such as the limitations of the telecommunications infrastructure and the prevalence of caller ID spoofing. For example, one of the winners, Aaron Foss, proposed an innovative method of deploying a 

filter, via a cloud-based service that consumers could access using a simultaneous 

ring feature on their current telephones. The other two winners tackled the problem 

of caller ID spoofing in novel ways; they each designed their own mechanisms that 

can help determine whether an incoming call’s caller ID information is authentic or 

not. I believe the three winning solutions represent real breakthroughs compared 

with what is currently available in the marketplace. 

Question 3. The United States Telecom Association, at the hearing, said its member companies work with various law enforcement agencies, including the FTC, to 

prosecute individuals and entities responsible for fraudulent robocalls. Would this 

be an accurate assessment of the industry from the FTC’s point of view? 

Answer. Many of the members of the United States Telecom Association do assist 

us with investigations of those responsible for illegal robocalls, and we greatly appreciate this assistance. As I stated in my testimony, I do believe that carriers could 

be more proactive in identifying suspicious activities on their networks that could 

be indicative of illegal robocalling. 

Question 4. What percent of the FTC’s investigations into potential violations of 

your telemarketing and robocall rules are initiated by information voluntarily submitted by industry to your agency? Since the establishment of the National Do Not 

Call Registry, how many times have telecommunications providers alerted the FTC 

to potential violations of either your telemarketing rules or robocall rules? 

Answer. Generally speaking, industry players have not proactively alerted the 

FTC to potential violations of our rules. The more common scenario is that our attorneys or investigators contact a carrier about a potential rule violation, and the 

carrier then assists us in obtaining available information about that particular call 

campaign. 

Question 5. The FTC and the FCC have clear rules establishing what is, and what 

is not, allowable when it comes to robocalls, and both agencies have taken enforcement actions to stop illegal robocalls. Yet despite all of these efforts, intrusive and 

fraudulent robocalls have proliferated. Technological solutions may very well provide the American public with relief, but I also think that there is no substitute for 

strong law enforcement. As such, I am interested in learning further about the 

FTC’s and the FCC’s efforts and what more can be done to stop illegal robocalls. 

What are the limitations your agency faces in bringing more enforcement cases? Is 

there a need for legislation to assist your efforts? 

Answer. We do face challenges related to law enforcement against illegal 

robocallers. Given automated dialing technology, inexpensive long distance calling 

rates, and the ability to move internationally and employ cheap labor, robocalling 

has become an attractive marketing channel to fraudsters. And new technologies 

make it easy for robocallers to hide their identities by spoofing and regularly changing caller ID information, as well as by allowing them to generate calls from any 

location in the world where they have access to an Internet connection. In addition, 

a single call now traverses the networks of many different service providers and no 

single entity knows the entire path of a call; the result is that every entity must 

63 

timely provide data in order for law enforcers to successfully trace a call. These factors, among others, make investigation and enforcement increasingly difficult and 

time-consuming. 

Separate from these challenges, and as I stated in my testimony, I believe the 

common carrier exemption is outdated and unnecessary. The telecommunications industry has become much more complex and diversified, and the line between what 

is and is not a carrier has blurred significantly. Currently, numerous entities participate in delivering the robocall, including the associated caller ID information, 

and not all of their functions fit squarely into the categories of carrier or non-carrier. It would be far more efficient if the FTC could address illegal telemarketers 

and those who facilitate their activities without having to determine which of the 

entities that participated in a single call campaign might be considered common carriers. In other words, the exemption creates an obstacle to effective law enforcement 

efforts against robocallers. For these reasons and in this context, I support elimination of the common carrier exemption. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

LOIS GREISMAN

Question 1. I want to applaud the FTC for undertaking the ‘‘Robocall challenge’’ 

as an innovative way for government to work with the private sector and software 

engineers to find solutions. Ms. Greisman, can you discuss the process for the challenge and how you chose the awardees? What is the next step for the FTC in encouraging getting these products to market and helping to fight fraud? 

Answer. The Robocall Challenge was the FTC’s first public contest under the 

America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. One of our first steps involved 

choosing three experts to judge the challenge. Two of our judges were the Chief 

Technologists from the FTC and the Federal Communications Commission—Steve 

Bellovin and Henning Schulzrinne—who both have extensive technical backgrounds 

in telecommunications, Voice over Internet Protocol (‘‘VoIP’’) technology, and security. The third judge was Kara Swisher, one of the co-founders of All Things Digital 

and someone who has broad expertise regarding consumer technology products and 

the consumer experience. The judges helped determine the judging criteria, which 

were: 1) Does it work? (50 percent); 2) Is it easy to use? (25 percent); and 3) Can 

it be rolled out? (25 percent). For more information regarding these criteria, please 

visit this website: http://robocall.challenge.gov/details/criteria. 

We publicly announced the Robocall Challenge on October 18, 2012, and submissions were due by January 17, 2013. We received 798 eligible submissions. Pursuant 

to the official rules, an internal panel screened these submissions to determine, in 

accordance with the judging criteria, which submissions warranted further review 

by the judges. The internal panel identified 266 submissions that were then reviewed by the expert judging panel. Following numerous meetings and discussions, 

the judges chose seven finalists and assigned numerical scores to each. Two engineers from Google won the nonmonetary award in the large organization category. 

The judges found a tie within the category of individuals and small organizations; 

thus, the two winners split the $50,000 prize. 

The goal of the challenge was to stimulate the marketplace and encourage the development of new ideas. The FTC does not take an active role in bringing the winning solutions to the market and does not endorse particular consumer products. To 

identify and reward the challenge winners and promote the challenge as a tool to 

spur innovation in the marketplace, we held a press conference and produced videos 

about the challenge. Through these means and related efforts, we think we have 

helped to encourage innovators to focus their talents on developing a technical solution to the problem of illegal robocalls. 

Question 2. Ms. Greisman and Mr. Bash, we know that technology will continue 

to evolve. How are the FTC and the FCC working to keep up with these evolutions 

in communications to protect consumers from future scamming operations? 

Answer. We issued the Robocall Challenge to spur technological innovations that 

would complement our law enforcement efforts to protect consumers from scammers. 

As we looked at the marketplace in the context of e-mail spam, we saw numerous 

experts deploying technological solutions to protect consumers against spammers 

and fraudsters, but relatively little focus on robocalls. Through the challenge, we 

sought to bring more attention to illegal robocalls and prompt rich and vital initiatives to address the problem. I believe that the challenge accomplished this goal and 

that the winners’ sophisticated filters and other similar products can significantly 

enhance consumer protection. Notably, none of the four technology experts who created the winning solutions had ever worked on the robocall problem before. I will 

64 

*Selected Constituent Robocall Concerns 

‘‘It is an invasion of our privacy, and it ties up our phones and disrupts our lives to get as 

many as 15 calls every single day when we have been on the donotcall list since day 1. Anything 

you can do about this issue will be greatly appreciated.’’ 

—Constituent from Arlington, VA 5/26/2012 

‘‘I am registered on the ‘‘Do Not Call’’ list for my home phone (not cellphone) and I am still 

getting many solicitation ‘‘robo calls’’ for lower credit card rates, car warranties, and other commercial products. Some callers block caller ID. I systematically report these callers via the ‘‘report a violator’’ process on the Registry website. I have been on the do-not-call registry since 

its inception, and I have verified this on the Registry site. I also put my elderly mother’s home 

phone number on the DNC Registry several years ago. She also gets many solicitation calls. I 

am well versed on the types of calls that the DNC system is supposed to address, and the kinds 

of calls that are excepted. I am astonished at the number of calls I am getting even as I am 

on the DNC list.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 05/04/2012 

‘‘xxx-xxx-xxxx [redacted]. This number continues to call with impunity, even though they are 

on my FTC Do Not Call Registry, and several other residents I’m friends with. They are scam 

artists, trying to mine personal information, and the FTC hasn’t responded to my concerns. Are 

you game for going after this group of obvious scammers, because a lot of vulnerable citizens, 

could be prey for their scam which involves lowering debt. They call themselves [redacted], and 

they are a company I and others have never done business with. Thank you kindly.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 06/06/2012 

‘‘I have been getting calls on my home phone from a ’Credit Card Services’ for over a year 

now. I have submitted at least five complaints on the FTC website and at least two complaints’ 

on the ’Do Not Call’ website. I have asked to speak to a supervisor numerous times, only to 

be hung up on. I have told them over and over and over again to not call me. I have threatened 

them with FTC complaints. I have received over 30 calls from this company and have turned 

in many complaints to the Federal Trade Commission and nothing seems to work. If you look 

on the internet, you will see tens of thousands of complaints. Therefore, I would like to request 

that you (my congressmen) get the Federal Trade Commission to do their job and shut these 

people down.’’ 

—Constituent from Alexandria, VA 07/23/2012 

‘‘Over the last couple of months, I’ve been getting an increasing number of robo-dialer/recorded commercial calls in violation of the Do-Not-Call registry. Many have been from the same 

’crook’, often ‘‘Credit Card Services.’’ I’ve reported most of them on the FTC’s Do Not Call registry. (That is not counting the growing number of political calls, which unfortunately are not 

violations of Do Not Call).’’ 

—Constituent from Reston, VA 08/20/2012 

‘‘Senator—Please have someone on your staff Google (xxx)xxx-xxxx [redacted] and you will see 

several websites dedicated to complaints about harassing phone calls from this number asking 

add that while the challenge spurred nearly 800 innovators to submit proposals, it 

also prompted others to go to the drawing table. We have heard that the FTC’s recent robocall initiatives gave other entrepreneurs new connections and ideas to fight 

illegal robocalls, which is an important ripple effect. We hope this will help stimulate the market to develop technology that will combat telephone spam, similar to 

efforts to develop technology to reduce e-mail spam. 

In addition, we work to ensure that our internal team at the FTC keeps up with 

the ongoing evolution of communications technology. For example, we regularly 

speak to and work with technical experts who can help us understand evolving technology, including academics, industry insiders, and entrepreneurs. We partner with 

internationally renowned technological associations—such as the Messaging, 

Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group and the Internet Engineering Task 

Force—to work toward a longer-term goal of changing the telephone network protocols to allow for authenticated telephone calls. We also use our evolving knowledge 

to innovate with respect to our own law enforcement investigations and targeting. 

As one public example, last October we announced our new robocall honeypot, which 

is a group of phone numbers that allows the FTC to receive robocalls directly and 

helps the agency gather evidence and take quick action. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

LOIS GREISMAN

Question 1. Over the past year or so, my office has seen a marked increase in calls 

and letters regarding possible abuses by some telemarketers. Since January 2013, 

my office has heard from more than 300 people requesting assistance with the Do 

Not Call List, and since taking office in 2009, my office has heard from over 1200 

people on this issue. A small sampling of some of the concerns we have received 

are also included in this document for the record.*

65 

if we want to refinance our VA loan. We have been on the Do Not Call list since 2006 and have 

asked them to stop calling us 6–8 times a day. They pointedly refuse to stop. This is not about 

freedom of speech, it is invasion of privacy. I, on behalf of many, many people request my Federal Government figure a way to make these people stop calling over and over again.’’ 

—Constituent from Yorktown, VA 08/27/2012 

‘‘My name is [redacted] and I reside in Charlottesville, VA. I am in the fourth grade. I am 

writing to ask that you help by intervening in the issue of unsolicited phone calls. Our number 

is on the Do Not Call list. In the last two days we’ve received three such calls.’’ 

—Constituent from Charlottesville, VA 05/23/2012 

As a supporter of the Do Not Call Act, I sympathize with the frustration of my 

constituents. I recognize that the same technology that is allowing telephone service 

providers to more efficiently manage networks is also enabling disreputable callers 

to abuse the system. 

Still, it seems to me that if we can’t find a technical solution to abusive telemarketing calls, that raises many serious questions as well. I encourage you to 

think more creatively about possible solutions, and about any legislative authorities 

that would better enable the FTC to keep pace with technology. For instance, have 

similar problems occurred in other countries? If so, are there any solutions adopted 

in other markets that might be applicable in the U.S.? 

Answer. Yes, the same problems are occurring in other countries. We have undertaken a global search for solutions, and we did identify the ‘‘Telemarketing Guard’’ 

by Primus Telecommunications Canada, whose Chief Technology Officer Matthew 

Stein testified on July 10 after also appearing at our Robocall Summit the previous 

fall. We have actively encouraged carriers and others to bring Telemarketing Guard 

or a similar solution to consumers in the United States. Telemarketing Guard is 

currently only available to approximately one million Canadian consumers. 

Unfortunately, we are unaware of successful solutions that have been more broadly adopted in other countries. Instead, the FTC is actively participating in a joint 

search for such solutions. Our Office of International Affairs (‘‘OIA’’) coordinates 

with our international counterparts on related issues. For example, our OIA participates in several multinational networks that coordinate on broad strategic matters 

related to illegal telemarketing, including through the London Action Plan (‘‘LAP’’) 

on international spam enforcement cooperation and the Centre of Operations Linked 

to Telemarketing. Through our involvement in the LAP’s Do Not Call Working 

Group, we are actively engaged with the multinational organization’s initiatives to 

develop an international strategy related to caller ID spoofing. One example is the 

LAP’s upcoming October meeting, which is being held in coordination with the Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group. The FTC, with the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission and the Australian Communications and Media Authority, will lead a discussion of proposed solutions— 

technological, policy and enforcement—that can be considered for global telecommunications systems. Also at that meeting, we are leading a panel on telephony 

abuse, which includes caller ID spoofing. 

We are also fully engaged with international communities of technical experts 

that are working to address this problem, such as the Internet Engineering Task 

Force. In addition, we have collaborated with foreign law enforcement authorities 

on particular cases, for example working closely with Canadian law enforcement on 

FTC v. Direct Financial Management, Inc., No. 10 C 7194 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2012), 

and FTC v. Economic Relief Technologies, LLC, No. 1:09–cv–03347 (N.D. Ga. Jul. 

22, 2010). 

Question 2. In 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged innovators 

to come up with a solution that would block illegal commercial robocalls on 

landlines and mobile phones. One of the proposed solutions creates a filtering system, similar to an e-mail spam filter, that intercepts and filters out illegal robocalls 

using a technology that ‘‘blacklists’’ and ‘‘whitelists’’ phone numbers. The proposal 

envisions a consumer-facing system, however, others have suggested that a network-based system might be more efficient and less burdensome for consumers. 

Do you believe that a filtering system would be effective? If so, do you believe it 

should be implemented by networks or by consumers? If not, do you have ideas for 

a better solution? 

Answer. I believe effective solutions for blocking illegal robocalls could be based 

on any number of possible technical approaches. An effective solution might, for example, be based on filtering, and could be designed to be implemented by networks, 

consumers, or otherwise. However, it is important to consider not only whether the 

proposed solutions would be effective to block illegal robocalls, but also whether they 

would be easy to use, and whether they could be rolled out in a timely manner. For 

example, a network-based solution could require extensive investment and active 

66 

participation by carriers, which might make such a solution more difficult to roll out 

than a solution that consumers could implement on their own, with little or no reliance on carriers. In any event, the FTC actively encourages carriers to pursue all 

efforts to curb illegal robocalls, regardless of the specific technical approach or approaches adopted. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DAN COATS TO

LOIS GREISMAN

Question 1. I commend the work the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 

and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have done in establishing a national DoNot-Call Registry pursuant to their authorities under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The registry is nationwide in scope, applies to all telemarketers 

(with the exception of certain non-profit organizations), and covers both interstate 

and intrastate telemarketing calls. Recently, I have heard a number of concerns 

from my state regarding the regulation of high volume auto-dialer initiated voice 

over Internet protocol (VOIP) ‘‘broadcasted’’ calls. My understanding is that these 

calls can put 10,000 calls per minute onto Indiana’s landline telephone network, by 

using VOIP technology, in an attempt to get around Indiana’s Do Not Call List. 

Does the technology exist to identify these high volume, auto-dialer initiated calls 

in real time? 

Answer. I am not currently aware of any such identification technology that is 

broadly available to U.S. consumers. There are certain call-blocking ‘‘apps’’ that 

work only on wireless smartphones. The FTC launched the Robocall Challenge to 

encourage parties to create solutions that would identify and block illegal, high-volume, autodialed calls, which are generally made using voice over Internet protocol 

technology. The Challenge was designed to stimulate the marketplace to put such 

technological solutions into the hands of U.S. consumers, and we believe it was 

enormously fruitful. The winning solutions, including that of Aaron Foss, who testified at the hearing on July 10th, contained promising ideas about how to address 

illegal robocalls using a combination of call pattern analytics and crowd-sourced 

data. 

Question 1a. My understanding is that when phone calls are made, there are usually two user-facing identifiable pieces of information: a phone number and a Caller 

ID Name (CNAM). I understand that the CNAM can be used to display the calling 

party’s name alongside the phone number, to help users easily identify a caller. I 

have also been told that there are numerous CNAM lookup services which allow you 

to pay a small fee to lookup the CNAM of a specified caller (by phone number). Do 

any mechanisms exist to prevent telemarketers from blocking CNAM lookups by individuals? 

Answer. I am unaware of any technological mechanisms that would prevent telemarketers from blocking CNAM lookups by individuals. However, with certain limited exceptions, a telemarketer violates the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) 

if it fails to transmit an accurate telephone number and, when made available by 

the telemarketer’s carrier, its CNAM, to any caller identification service used by the 

call recipient. 16 C.F.R. 310.4(a)(8). Thus, telemarketers violate the TSR if they 

block their telephone numbers, causing a consumer’s caller ID or telephone to show 

‘‘blocked’’ or ‘‘unavailable.’’ In addition, it is illegal to assist and facilitate a practice 

prohibited by the TSR; such liability attaches if the entity knows or consciously 

avoids knowing of the prohibited activity. 16 C.F.R. 310.3(b). As a result, carriers 

or CNAM lookup services that help telemarketers hide their identities by providing 

false caller ID information or blocking the telemarketers’ phone numbers, or that 

otherwise facilitate illegal activity, may be liable under the TSR. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL TO

ERIC J. BASH

Question 1. The FTC focuses on deceptive telemarketing through the lens of consumer protection. The FCC, as regulator of the telecommunications industry, brings 

its expertise on the wireline and wireless telephone networks themselves. Does the 

FCC have any concerns about or see any barriers to the winning technological solutions chosen by the FTC? 

Answer. Henning Schulzrinne, the FCC’s Chief Technology Officer, was one of 

three judges who determined the winners of the FTC-sponsored competition. Other 

FCC staff members have also spoken informally with the winners of the FTC 

Robocall Challenge to gain a better understanding of their winning ideas. We underVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:17 Dec 06, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\85765.TXT JACKIE
67 

stand that the winning ideas are currently in the development or implementation 

phases. While there are questions about some details, including whether caller ID 

spoofing may affect their use of caller ID information to identify robocallers, we believe the ideas are promising. The competition explicitly focused on ideas that could 

be implemented quickly, even if they could not suppress all illegal robocalls. Longer 

term approaches that increase the trustworthiness of caller ID information may 

make solutions such as those identified in the FTC-sponsored competition work even 

better. 

Question 2. At the hearing, you said that additional legislation could be useful to 

better enforce against individuals or entities that provide or facilitate phony numbers used to spoof caller IDs. You also mentioned that the FCC has previously suggested revising the Truth in Caller ID Act to give the FCC direct regulatory authority over so-called third-party spoofing providers. From your agency’s perspective, 

would changing the Truth in Caller ID Act be the most effective way for the FCC 

to help stop caller ID spoofing? Are there any other legislative solutions the FCC 

believes would better equip it to take enforcement actions against such entities or 

individuals? 

Answer. In addition to recommending that Congress give the FCC authority to 

regulate third-party spoofing providers, the FCC has also suggested that Congress 

expand the Truth in Caller ID Act in several other ways, by: 

• broadening the scope of the statute to prohibit spoofing by persons outside of 

the United States when directed at people inside the United States; 

• clarifying whether the existing restrictions should apply to Voice over Internet 

Protocol providers that enable only outbound calls; and 

• stating explicitly that text messaging is covered by the statute. 

The FCC recommended that Congress take these additional steps to secure the 

integrity of telephone numbers as a reliable identifier of a call’s origin, particularly 

as VoIP technology increasingly replaces the traditional technologies upon which 

telecommunication service is widely based, and as text messaging increasingly supplements voice communications. 

Technological solutions that empower consumers to block illegal robocalls so that 

they do not receive them in the first instance may also be helpful in thwarting illegal robocalls. An industry standards organization is currently working with FCC 

technology staff to design a system whereby originating carriers and certain VoIP 

callers would cryptographically sign calls so that receiving carriers can validate that 

callers in fact have the right to use the telephone number they are using. The Commission staff hopes that the joint effort may lead to implementable specifications in 

about a year. 

Question 3. The FCC’s distinction in its rules for wireline and wireless phones 

stems from the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. Needless to say, the 

wireless industry has changed dramatically since then. Would revisiting that statute 

to eliminate the anachronistic distinction be something that would allow the FCC 

to be more aggressive in taking on fraudulent robocalls? 

Answer. The restrictions on robocalls in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

(TCPA) and the FCC’s implementing rules are generally stricter for calls to wireless 

numbers than to wireline/residential ones. Section 227(b)(1)(A) of the TCPA and 

FCC rules prohibit non-emergency autodialed or prerecorded calls to wireless numbers, regardless of content, without prior express consent. Section 227(b)(1)(B) and 

FCC rules prohibit prerecorded telemarketing calls to residential/wireline numbers 

without prior express consent. Neither autodialed calls nor purely informational 

calls are covered by the latter provision concerning calls to residential lines. (Note 

that the TCPA does not distinguish between fraudulent robocalls and other 

robocalls, for either residential/landline or wireless numbers; as such, while the 

Commission is certainly very concerned about fraudulent robocalls, whether a call 

is fraudulent is not an element of legal analysis under the TCPA.) 

In light of increasing consumer reliance on wireless services since the TCPA was 

enacted more than twenty years ago, the distinctions in the statute between wireless and residential/wireline numbers may well be outdated. These distinctions can 

be a source of confusion to consumers, complicate compliance efforts for law-abiding 

callers and marketers, and introduce additional steps for law enforcement, in terms 

of both the factual discovery and legal analysis needed to investigate and pursue 

those who violate the law. As a result, harmonizing the legal standards that apply 

to robocalls to residential/wireline and wireless numbers may well benefit consumers, callers and telemarketers, as well as law enforcement. 

Question 4. What are the limitations your agency faces in bringing more enforcement cases? Is there a need for legislation to assist your efforts? 

68 

*Selected Constituent Robocall Concerns 

‘‘It is an invasion of our privacy, and it ties up our phones and disrupts our lives to get as 

many as 15 calls every single day when we have been on the donotcall list since day 1. Anything 

you can do about this issue will be greatly appreciated.’’ 

—Constituent from Arlington, VA 5/26/2012 

‘‘I am registered on the ‘‘Do Not Call’’ list for my home phone (not cellphone) and I am still 

getting many solicitation ‘‘robo calls’’ for lower credit card rates, car warranties, and other commercial products. Some callers block caller ID. I systematically report these callers via the ‘‘report a violator’’ process on the Registry website. I have been on the do-not-call registry since 

its inception, and I have verified this on the Registry site. I also put my elderly mother’s home 

phone number on the DNC Registry several years ago. She also gets many solicitation calls. I 

am well versed on the types of calls that the DNC system is supposed to address, and the kinds 

of calls that are excepted. I am astonished at the number of calls I am getting even as I am 

on the DNC list.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 05/04/2012 

‘‘xxx-xxx-xxxx [redacted]. This number continues to call with impunity, even though they are 

on my FTC Do Not Call Registry, and several other residents I’m friends with. They are scam 

artists, trying to mine personal information, and the FTC hasn’t responded to my concerns. Are 

you game for going after this group of obvious scammers, because a lot of vulnerable citizens, 

could be prey for their scam which involves lowering debt. They call themselves [redacted], and 

they are a company I and others have never done business with. Thank you kindly.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 06/06/2012 

Answer. As discussed at the hearing, two major impediments to the FCC taking 

stronger enforcement action against illegal robocallers are the difficulty of identifying wrongdoers, and limitations on the FCC’s power. Amendments to the Truth 

in Caller ID Act such as those the FCC has proposed (see above), coupled with development and implementation of technological means to improve caller ID authentication (also discussed above), would help to address the first of the FCC’s enforcement challenges. Congress could enhance the FCC’s enforcement powers against illegal robocallers by making it easier for the agency to impose significant forfeitures, 

in at least three ways: (1) allow the FCC to impose a forfeiture on a non-licensee 

robocaller without first issuing a citation; (2) extend the current statute of limitations from one year to at least two; (3) increase the maximum forfeiture that the 

agency can impose on non-licensee robocallers. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

ERIC J. BASH

Question. Ms. Greisman and Mr. Bash, we know that technology will continue to 

evolve. How are the FTC and the FCC working to keep up with these evolutions 

in communications to protect consumers from future scamming operations? 

Answer. The Commission recognized in 2003 and 2008 orders that ‘‘[i]t is clear 

from the statutory language and the legislative history that Congress anticipated 

that the FCC, under its TCPA rulemaking authority, might need to consider 

changes in technologies.’’ In those orders, the Commission made it clear that as 

automated calling moved away from random or sequential dialing, the TCPA could 

still be applied to newer or different calling technologies, including predictive dialers 

that relied more primarily on defined lists of telephone numbers rather than random or sequential dialing. We will continue to monitor and address new technologies in this area as warranted, and Commission staff is actively fostering industry standards that, in the long term, should help to reduce the number of illegal 

robocalls and the malicious caller ID spoofing often associated with them. In the 

short term, we also plan to work with key telecommunication providers to address 

the problem of consumers being inundated with calls if their numbers happen to be 

used as caller ID by illegal robocallers. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

ERIC J. BASH

Question 1. Over the past year or so, my office has seen a marked increase in calls 

and letters regarding possible abuses by some telemarketers. Since January 2013, 

my office has heard from more than 300 people requesting assistance with the Do 

Not Call List, and since taking office in 2009, my office has heard from over 1200 

people on this issue. A small sampling of some of the concerns we have received 

are also included in this document for the record.*

69 

‘‘I have been getting calls on my home phone from a ’Credit Card Services’ for over a year 

now. I have submitted at least five complaints on the FTC website and at least two complaints’ 

on the ’Do Not Call’ website. I have asked to speak to a supervisor numerous times, only to 

be hung up on. I have told them over and over and over again to not call me. I have threatened 

them with FTC complaints. I have received over 30 calls from this company and have turned 

in many complaints to the Federal Trade Commission and nothing seems to work. If you look 

on the internet, you will see tens of thousands of complaints. Therefore, I would like to request 

that you (my congressmen) get the Federal Trade Commission to do their job and shut these 

people down.’’ 

—Constituent from Alexandria, VA 07/23/2012 

‘‘Over the last couple of months, I’ve been getting an increasing number of robo-dialer/recorded commercial calls in violation of the Do-Not-Call registry. Many have been from the same 

’crook’, often ‘‘Credit Card Services.’’ I’ve reported most of them on the FTC’s Do Not Call registry. (That is not counting the growing number of political calls, which unfortunately are not 

violations of Do Not Call).’’ 

—Constituent from Reston, VA 08/20/2012 

‘‘Senator—Please have someone on your staff Google (xxx)xxx-xxxx [redacted] and you will see 

several websites dedicated to complaints about harassing phone calls from this number asking 

if we want to refinance our VA loan. We have been on the Do Not Call list since 2006 and have 

asked them to stop calling us 6–8 times a day. They pointedly refuse to stop. This is not about 

freedom of speech, it is invasion of privacy. I, on behalf of many, many people request my Federal Government figure a way to make these people stop calling over and over again.’’ 

—Constituent from Yorktown, VA 08/27/2012 

‘‘My name is [redacted] and I reside in Charlottesville, VA. I am in the fourth grade. I am 

writing to ask that you help by intervening in the issue of unsolicited phone calls. Our number 

is on the Do Not Call list. In the last two days we’ve received three such calls.’’ 

—Constituent from Charlottesville, VA 05/23/2012 

As a supporter of the Do Not Call Act, I sympathize with the frustration of my 

constituents. I recognize that the same technology that is allowing telephone service 

providers to more efficiently manage networks is also enabling disreputable callers 

to abuse the system. 

Still, it seems to me that if we can’t find a technical solution to abusive telemarketing calls, that raises many serious questions as well. I encourage you to 

think more creatively about possible solutions, and about any legislative authorities 

that would better enable the FTC to keep pace with technology. For instance, have 

similar problems occurred in other countries? If so, are there any solutions adopted 

in other markets that might be applicable in the U.S.? 

Answer. The Commission staff has previously discussed telemarketing and related 

consumer issues with its Canadian counterparts, to the mutual benefit of both 

groups. Our recent research shows that, in addition to Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and India have all addressed problems with unwanted telemarketing calls to consumers. For example, the UK has a ‘‘Telephone Preference 

Service,’’ which appears to be similar to our National Do-Not-Call Registry. Similarly, India and Australia also have do-not-call lists. In the UK, a technology is 

available that blocks all calls until the caller enters an identifying phone number, 

thereby establishing that the call is a human-originated call rather than a robocall. 

In Canada, a blocking service has been implemented that is aimed at stopping unwanted calls from known robocall or telemarketer numbers, based, in part, on filtering technology that relies on telemarketers identified by consumers (i.e., crowdsourced). While we must, of course, focus on the specific statutory requirements of 

the TCPA, we will also continue to monitor the situations in other countries to ensure that we are aware of solutions that they may develop to problems that we have 

in common. 

Question 2. In 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged innovators 

to come up with a solution that would block illegal commercial robocalls on 

landlines and mobile phones. One of the proposed solutions creates a filtering system, similar to an e-mail spam filter, that intercepts and filters out illegal robocalls 

using a technology that ‘‘blacklists’’ and ‘‘whitelists’’ phone numbers. The proposal 

envisions a consumer-facing system, however, others have suggested that a network-based system might be more efficient and less burdensome for consumers. Do 

you believe that a filtering system would be effective? If so, do you believe it should 

be implemented by networks or by consumers? If not, do you have ideas for a better 

solution? 

Answer. The FCC staff spoke informally with the winners of the FTC Robocall 

Challenge, and we understand that the winning ideas are currently in the development or implementation phases. There are questions about some details, including 

whether caller ID spoofing may affect their use of caller ID information to identify 

robocallers, and they may work better if the integrity of caller ID can be improved. 

70 

We will continue to monitor the progress of these proposed solutions, including 

whether they should be implemented on telecommunications networks or by consumers, or through a combination of the two approaches. We will also work with 

telecommunication service providers to encourage the development of open interfaces that allow third-party services to offer innovative ways for consumers to manage their incoming phone calls. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DAN COATS TO

ERIC J. BASH

Question 1. I commend the work the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 

and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have done in establishing a national DoNot-Call Registry pursuant to their authorities under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The registry is nationwide in scope, applies to all telemarketers 

(with the exception of certain non-profit organizations), and covers both interstate 

and intrastate telemarketing calls. Recently, I have heard a number of concerns 

from my state regarding the regulation of high volume auto-dialer initiated voice 

over Internet protocol (VOIP) ‘‘broadcasted’’ calls. My understanding is that these 

calls can put 10,000 calls per minute onto Indiana’s landline telephone network, by 

using VOIP technology, in an attempt to get around Indiana’s Do Not Call List. 

Does the technology exist to identify these high volume, auto-dialer initiated calls 

in real time? 

Answer. Technology exists that can identify—and block—a high-volume of calls in 

certain instances, such as calls originating from a single number, or sharing the 

same electronic signature, such as call length, call source and destination numbers, 

or certain VoIP call attributes. Large businesses often purchase this type of technology to protect their corporate networks from voice SPAM, VoIP Denial of Service 

attacks, and other activities the business seeks to prevent. 

Question 1a. My understanding is that when phone calls are made, there are usually two user-facing identifiable pieces of information: a phone number and a Caller 

ID Name (CNAM). I understand that the CNAM can be used to display the calling 

party’s name alongside the phone number, to help users easily identify a caller. I 

have also been told that there are numerous CNAM lookup services which allow you 

to pay a small fee to lookup the CNAM of a specified caller (by phone number). Do 

any prohibitions exist to prevent this practice by telemarketers? 

Answer. CNAM databases link Calling Party Numbers (CPNs) to the individuals 

and entities to whom the numbers have been assigned. Some terminating providers 

maintain their own CNAM database and others purchase CNAM database services 

from third-party providers that aggregate the listing information from a variety of 

sources. Typically this aggregation is done with real-time information feeds and may 

involve a chain of feeds through several layers of providers and resellers. When a 

phone call is made, Caller ID services often dip into the CNAM database to look 

up the name or other identifying information of the caller. We are not aware of any 

specific legal restrictions prohibiting access to CNAM databases. Commission staff 

would be happy to discuss these issues in further detail with your staff. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL TO

KEVIN G. RUPY

Question 1. Your member companies are by no means the problem, but I believe 

your industry should be more proactive in being part of the solution if we are going 

to seriously address the proliferation of fraudulent robocalls. In your testimony, you 

described past and present actions of providers to help combat the problem. Do you 

believe your industry has done as much as it could or should to assist law enforcement and consumers? Why or why not? 

Answer. Yes, we believe our industry does as much as it can to assist both law 

enforcement and consumers in this regard. The telecommunications industry is, 

along with the consumer, a victim of unwanted calls that annoy consumers and diminish the value and stability of telecommunications services. Unfortunately, a 

large number of criminals, now able to use cybercrime techniques and international 

boundaries to evade national jurisdiction, present challenges to law enforcement, 

consumers and industry alike. The telecommunications industry is highly motivated 

to control abuse, and is responding to the growth of abuse by creating the right 

technologies, systems and processes to mitigate it. Industry is not only assisting, but 

in most cases leading enforcement, technology development and collaborative actions 

needed to address this issue. 

71 

USTelecom members have long worked collectively and coordinated with private 

and government stakeholders to address issues relating to illegal robocalls. For example, in a 2010 FTC action against a robocaller that in one year made more than 

370 million calls to consumers nationwide, the agency specifically acknowledged the 

help that USTelecom member companies AT&T and Verizon provided in the investigation and resolution of the case. 

In terms of assistance to our customers, no area is more challenging to address 

than mass calling events originating outside of our networks over multiple IP-based 

platforms using spoofed caller ID, many of which involved auto-dialers or pre-recorded human voices, often referred to as robocalls. Since no technology currently 

exists that enables carriers to identify in real time whether any single call traversing their network is legitimate or illegitimate, it is not currently practical to deploy services that can identify the illegal robocall needle in the high-volume call 

traffic haystack. As reflected in Attachment One, carriers have no way of distinguishing between legal or illegal robocalls that may be terminating on their network—only the consumer is in a position to make that determination. 

Nevertheless, carriers do their best to protect their customers in the context of 

suspicious mass calling events, as outlined in greater detail in our answer to your 

next question. Our members have long been providing—and will continue to develop—various services consumers can use to help mitigate the robocall problem. 

The scope and availability of these services differ by carrier, but may include basic 

caller-ID functionality, conditional call-forwarding, anonymous call-blocking, block 

lists and other related services. Unfortunately, these services are susceptible to evasion by caller-ID spoofing, which can be accomplished at relatively low cost from 

anywhere in the world using readily available technologies such as a personal computer and free software. 

Question 2. Mr. Rupy, you explained at the hearing that your member companies’ 

network operations centers monitor call traffic over their networks and initiate investigations into suspicious mass-calling events. You also added that your member 

companies address such suspicious mass-calling events through different measures. 

Could you provide specific details on what measures your member companies take 

when they notice a suspicious mass-calling event? 

Answer. As discussed in our testimony, many USTelecom member companies 

maintain network operations centers that monitor network traffic, conduct traffic 

data forensics and initiate mass-calling investigations. During suspected mass-calling events, providers can undertake various measures to mitigate their effect, including routing traffic to an alternate tandem, and coordinating with the providers 

sending the incoming traffic. For example, when a carrier realizes that a connecting 

provider is sending an unusually large amount of traffic onto its network, it may 

contact the connecting provider to request that its customer cease generating the 

traffic. Of course, given the interconnected nature of the Internet and the public 

switched telephone network, the company delivering the large call-traffic volume 

may be only one of several intermediaries simply passing along traffic received from 

yet another provider. 

Finally, many companies maintain call fraud bureaus that will initiate investigations after a suspected mass calling event. Using traffic data forensics and other investigative tools, providers will try to identify the parties behind a particular mass 

calling event. When they can identify the entities behind these calls, USTelecom’s 

members have sued the perpetrators, and often engage law enforcement agencies 

and the Federal Trade Commission to investigate and prosecute illegal robocall incidents. 

Question 3. What issues, specifically, with regards to robocalls are the standardssetting groups you cited in your testimony addressing that would better protect 

American consumers from fraudulent robocalls? What kinds of solutions and best 

practices have been and will be adopted by industry members to address the 

robocall problem? 

Answer. USTelecom’s member companies have an extensive record of working 

with standards-setting groups and other industry associations to address robocalls. 

In particular, they have worked with and continue to work with the Alliance for 

Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) to develop standards and best practices to address the robocall problem, with the Internet Engineering Task Force 

(IETF) to develop standards for secure call authentication and with the Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA) to combat communications fraud. 

ATIS has developed various guidelines and best practices that help network management personnel address traffic management issues that may arise during mass 

calling events. For example, ATIS helped public safety agencies optimize their deployment of Emergency Notification Systems to better ensure call completion withVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:17 Dec 06, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\85765.TXT JACKIE
72 

out overwhelming affected networks. ATIS has also published reference information 

for responsible companies on the use of auto-dialers, and will publish an updated 

section related to network security later this year. ATIS is also planning to update 

existing documents as they relate to the deployment of next generation networks in 

order to address various network management issues, including mass calling events. 

The IETF is the standards organization responsible for most Voice over Internet 

Protocol (VoIP) standards. The IETF has formed an active Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) Working Group, whose priority will be to develop standards 

for use in IP-based communications networks for authenticating callers. 

Through public-private partnerships like the CFCA, industry stakeholders work 

alongside law enforcement to identify best practices and solutions to a broad range 

of telecommunications-related issues, including robocalls. Given its collaborative 

public-private nature, the CFCA fosters critical relationships between individual industry stakeholders and law enforcement. These professional relationships are crucial to investigating and prosecuting individuals that engage in fraudulent activities 

occurring over communications networks, including illegal robocalls. 

The CFCA also provides a forum for industry stakeholders and law enforcement 

to coordinate on issues relating to the latest scams, evolving investigations and 

cases, and other related fraud matters. This invaluable coordination increases the 

abilities of public and private stakeholders to stay ahead of the constantly evolving 

robocall environment, and thereby more effectively combat the bad actors operating 

in this area. 

Question 4. In their written and oral testimony, witnesses from the FTC and the 

FCC proposed a number of statutory changes that would better equip their agencies 

to combat fraudulent robocalls. For inclusion in the hearing record, I ask that you 

provide your comments on the following proposed statutory changes by September 

9, 2013: Elimination of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s common carrier exemption. 

Answer. As Chairwoman McCaskill noted in her August 16, 2013 letter to 

USTelecom, in the area of fraudulent robocalls ‘‘America’s telecommunications providers are not the problem.’’ We agree, and believe that this makes the elimination 

of the common carrier exception somewhat beside the point. Because the FCC already has full authority to pursue appropriate remedies against carriers, USTelecom 

is concerned that elimination of the common carrier exception could lead to regulation of the communications industry by two separate agencies, thereby creating the 

potential for duplicative or conflicting regulatory requirements, resulting in additional consumer confusion and frustration. More broadly, robocalls are among the 

many issues that USTelecom maintains requires Congress to create a new framework that reflects today’s converged technological world. 

Question 4a. Changes to the FCC’s enforcement authorities including: 

• Allowing the FCC to impose a forfeiture on non-licensee robocalls violators without first issuing citation; 

Answer. USTelecom supports full enforcement of relevant laws by agencies 

against entities engaging in illegal robocall activities. The FTC already has authority to enforce existing Do-Not-Call provisions, including the authority to seek civil 

penalties, restitution for victims of telemarketing scams and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. As discussed below, USTelecom believes that in lieu of incremental approaches, Congress should instead focus on a new framework that better reflects the 

realities of today’s converged marketplace. 

(b) Expanding the statute of limitations from one year to at least two years; and 

Answer. Given the immediacy of illegal robocalling incidents, the current one year 

time-frame on the statute of limitations is sufficient for ensuring that ample time 

is available to investigate and prosecute such incidents. 

(c) Increasing the maximum forfeiture that the FCC can impose on non-licensee 

robocallers. 

Answer. It is unlikely that increasing the maximum forfeiture available to the 

FCC will favorably impact the proliferation of these calls. In instances where such 

calls are originating from overseas, the threat of increased forfeitures will likely 

have no effect on the decision to engage in such activities. The better alternative 

is for the FCC to more aggressively pursue and prosecute bad actors operating in 

this area. 

Question 4b. Revisions to the Truth-In-Caller ID Act [of 2009] including: 

Answer. In light of the evolving, interconnected and interdependent global Internet network of networks, USTelecom cannot vouch for the efficacy of any of these 

proposals. However, USTelecom supports targeted and enhanced enforcement efforts 

that specifically target the entities engaged in illegal robocall activity. USTelecom 

73 

pledges to continue to work with policymakers to address the problem and to cooperate in government enforcement actions against firms and individuals that abuse our 

open communications networks in order to perpetrate fraud on consumers, enterprise, and carriers alike. 

• Expanding the scope of the prohibition to apply to persons outside of the United 

States when spoofing is directed at people inside the United States; 

Answer. USTelecom does not support expanding the Truth in Caller-ID Act of 

2009 prohibitions to persons outside of the United States when spoofing is directed 

at people inside the United States. Significant jurisdictional issues would arise from 

the application of domestic law to international operators, and it is therefore highly 

questionable whether efforts to enforce such prohibitions would be effective. In addition, it is possible that such an expansion of domestic law could encourage other 

countries to pass extra-territorial laws to the detriment of both consumers and U.S.- 

based companies providing communications or other consumer services abroad. 

(b) Clarifying whether the existing restrictions should apply to VoIP providers 

that enable only outbound calls; and 

Answer. USTelecom does not oppose the FCC clarifying that the regulations relating to the Truth in Caller-ID Act of 2009 apply to VoIP providers that enable only 

outbound calls, to the extent such an ambiguity currently exists. 

(c) Giving the FCC authority to regulate third-party spoofing services. 

Answer. The FCC already has the authority to regulate third-party spoofing services. In its 2010 order addressing caller-ID spoofing, the FCC declined to impose additional obligations on such third-party caller ID services. It stated, however, that 

its decision to do so ‘‘in no way immunizes them from the obligation to comply with 

the Act.’’ The FCC further stated that where a third-party caller ID spoofing service 

causes the transmission or display of false or misleading caller ID information with 

the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value, ‘‘such 

service will be in violation of the Truth in Caller ID Act and our rules.’’ 

The solutions proposed in each of these questions are at best incremental approaches that reflect increasingly obsolete statutes in the context of today’s rapidly 

evolving technological world. Robocalls are among the many issues that USTelecom 

maintains require Congress to create a new framework reflecting today’s converged 

technologies. It is doubtful that the drafters of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 

the Communications Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, or other similar 

statutes ever envisioned circumstances under which functionally equivalent services 

would be regulated by separate Federal agencies, sometimes applying different 

standards and consumer protections, even though those services could be delivered 

through technologies that often cannot be constrained by state or national boundaries. USTelecom hopes the Committee will begin the process of developing legislation that would remedy these types of circumstances with the goal of developing a 

pro-consumer, pro-competitive framework for the Information Age. 

74 

ATTACHMENT ONE

ATTACHMENT ONE (CON’T) 


710RUPYQ1.eps 710RUPYQ2.eps
75 

*Selected Constituent Robocall Concerns 

‘‘It is an invasion of our privacy, and it ties up our phones and disrupts our lives to get as 

many as 15 calls every single day when we have been on the donotcall list since day 1. Anything 

you can do about this issue will be greatly appreciated.’’ 

—Constituent from Arlington, VA 5/26/2012 

‘‘I am registered on the ‘‘Do Not Call’’ list for my home phone (not cellphone) and I am still 

getting many solicitation ‘‘robo calls’’ for lower credit card rates, car warranties, and other commercial products. Some callers block caller ID. I systematically report these callers via the ‘‘report a violator’’ process on the Registry website. I have been on the do-not-call registry since 

its inception, and I have verified this on the Registry site. I also put my elderly mother’s home 

phone number on the DNC Registry several years ago. She also gets many solicitation calls. I 

am well versed on the types of calls that the DNC system is supposed to address, and the kinds 

of calls that are excepted. I am astonished at the number of calls I am getting even as I am 

on the DNC list.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 05/04/2012 

‘‘xxx-xxx-xxxx [redacted]. This number continues to call with impunity, even though they are 

on my FTC Do Not Call Registry, and several other residents I’m friends with. They are scam 

artists, trying to mine personal information, and the FTC hasn’t responded to my concerns. Are 

you game for going after this group of obvious scammers, because a lot of vulnerable citizens, 

could be prey for their scam which involves lowering debt. They call themselves [redacted], and 

they are a company I and others have never done business with. Thank you kindly.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 06/06/2012 

‘‘I have been getting calls on my home phone from a ’Credit Card Services’ for over a year 

now. I have submitted at least five complaints on the FTC website and at least two complaints’ 

on the ’Do Not Call’ website. I have asked to speak to a supervisor numerous times, only to 

be hung up on. I have told them over and over and over again to not call me. I have threatened 

them with FTC complaints. I have received over 30 calls from this company and have turned 

in many complaints to the Federal Trade Commission and nothing seems to work. If you look 

on the internet, you will see tens of thousands of complaints. Therefore, I would like to request 

that you (my congressmen) get the Federal Trade Commission to do their job and shut these 

people down.’’ 

—Constituent from Alexandria, VA 07/23/2012 

‘‘Over the last couple of months, I’ve been getting an increasing number of robo-dialer/recorded commercial calls in violation of the Do-Not-Call registry. Many have been from the same 

’crook’, often ‘‘Credit Card Services.’’ I’ve reported most of them on the FTC’s Do Not Call registry. (That is not counting the growing number of political calls, which unfortunately are not 

violations of Do Not Call).’’ 

—Constituent from Reston, VA 08/20/2012 

‘‘Senator—Please have someone on your staff Google (xxx)xxx-xxxx [redacted] and you will see 

several websites dedicated to complaints about harassing phone calls from this number asking 

if we want to refinance our VA loan. We have been on the Do Not Call list since 2006 and have 

asked them to stop calling us 6–8 times a day. They pointedly refuse to stop. This is not about 

freedom of speech, it is invasion of privacy. I, on behalf of many, many people request my Federal Government figure a way to make these people stop calling over and over again.’’ 

—Constituent from Yorktown, VA 08/27/2012 

‘‘My name is [redacted] and I reside in Charlottesville, VA. I am in the fourth grade. I am 

writing to ask that you help by intervening in the issue of unsolicited phone calls. Our number 

is on the Do Not Call list. In the last two days we’ve received three such calls.’’ 

—Constituent from Charlottesville, VA 05/23/2012 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

KEVIN G. RUPY

Question 1. Over the past year or so, my office has seen a marked increase in calls 

and letters regarding possible abuses by some telemarketers. Since January 2013, 

my office has heard from more than 300 people requesting assistance with the Do 

Not Call List, and since taking office in 2009, my office has heard from over 1200 

people on this issue. A small sampling of some of the concerns we have received 

are also included in this document for the record.*

As a supporter of the Do Not Call Act, I sympathize with the frustration of my 

constituents. I recognize that the same technology that is allowing telephone service 

providers to more efficiently manage networks is also enabling disreputable callers 

to abuse the system. 

Still, it seems to me that if we can’t find a technical solution to abusive telemarketing calls, that raises many serious questions as well. I encourage you to 

think more creatively about possible solutions, and about any legislative authorities 

that would better enable the FTC to keep pace with technology. For instance, have 

similar problems occurred in other countries? If so, are there any solutions adopted 

in other markets that might be applicable in the U.S.? 

76 

Answer. Given the interdependent, interconnected, and global nature of the Internet, we would suspect that unwanted robocalls are an international issue. While 

USTelecom is not familiar with the availability, effectiveness, or nature of solutions 

adopted in other countries, the association and its member companies were interested in the testimony that a Canadian company provided to the Subcommittee regarding the deployment of a patented technology to address unwanted robocalls. 

Our member companies are seeking more information about this technology. However, as noted in our testimony and below, American law governing common carrier 

and privacy obligations with regard to voice telephone calls, together with consumers’ historical needs and expectations with regard to call completion, may not 

make every international comparison useful, even if a particular solution can be implemented under another nation’s laws or traditions. 

Question 2. In 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged innovators 

to come up with a solution that would block illegal commercial robocalls on 

landlines and mobile phones. One of the proposed solutions creates a filtering system, similar to an e-mail spam filter, that intercepts and filters out illegal robocalls 

using a technology that ‘‘blacklists’’ and ‘‘whitelists’’ phone numbers. The proposal 

envisions a consumer-facing system, however, others have suggested that a network-based system might be more efficient and less burdensome for consumers. Do 

you believe that a filtering system would be effective? If so, do you believe it should 

be implemented by networks or by consumers? If not, do you have ideas for a better 

solution? 

Answer. Our member companies are providing—and will continue to develop— 

various technologies and services to help mitigate the robocall problem. These include basic caller-ID functionality, enhanced caller authentication and authorization, conditional call-forwarding, anonymous call-blocking, and other services that 

may vary by provider. 

The rapid and ever-changing nature of the robocall problem, however, makes the 

potential for a technological ‘‘silver bullet,’’ such as a filtering system, highly problematic. An open communications network is inherently vulnerable to abuse. This 

abuse can be managed, but (as explained below) only at the expense of some legitimate calls being delayed or blocked. The existing legal framework for phone calls 

under which USTelecom members operate generally does not permit such delaying 

or blocking. For example, USTelecom member companies in recent months have 

been working with Federal and state authorities on ways to mitigate the effects of 

criminal Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) attacks directed towards public safety 

answering points (PSAPs). During such events, telephone providers may implement 

corrective measures to alleviate overwhelming call volumes. However, such corrective measures cannot be applied more broadly. For example, in the event a carrier 

inadvertently blocks a legitimate and critical robocall (e.g., one originating from a 

public safety entity), the positive public service aspects of such legitimate calls 

would be negated. 

Therefore, policymakers should proceed cautiously when contemplating the creation or facilitation of regimes using yet-to-be developed technologies that could prevent critical—possibly life-saving—information from reaching the public. This is particularly challenging due to the relative ease with which illegal robocallers can 

‘‘spoof’’ legitimate phone numbers. Spoofing technology can easily fool consumers 

into taking calls they should avoid. For example, spoofing the number of the local 

municipal hospital can dupe a senior citizen into believing that a fraudulent effort 

to sell phony medical products or services is actually a legitimate call from a 

whitelisted number. In addition, solutions implementing call blocking features based 

upon a whitelist could potentially block an important—albeit unexpected—message 

from a legitimate caller. Conversely, solutions that rely extensively on blocking calls 

populated by a blacklist could very well result in the blocking of legitimate calls 

from callers whose own phone numbers have been illegally spoofed. 

The blocking of select phone calls based on CNAM data is fraught with risk since 

it is impossible to identify legitimate robocalls from illegitimate robocalls as they are 

occurring. In particular, public safety agencies are increasingly using automated 

phone calls for ‘‘push-911’’ services. Such systems send a recorded message to phone 

numbers en masse, listed and unlisted, in a geographical calling area. They have 

been used by public safety entities to great effect, most recently when residents of 

Watertown, Massachusetts, were advised by public safety agencies to shelter in 

place when their neighborhood became the epicenter of the manhunt for one of the 

Boston Marathon bombing suspects. 

Even non-public safety entities utilize robocalls for public safety purposes. For example, KFOR–TV, the NBC affiliate for Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, instituted the 

‘‘4Warn’’ storm alert system, a free public service that allows Oklahoma residents 

to opt in to receive a voice message on their home, office or cell phone any time 

77 

there is a tornado warning issued in their county. More than 34,000 people have 

signed up for the 4Warn service. During a 2010 tornado event, the service was used 

to send more than 28,000 warnings in less than 24 hours. 

A better solution to filtering, which appeared to be the consensus of the regulatory 

participants in last fall’s FTC robocall workshop, would be the development of 

strong caller authentication and authorization mechanisms within the industry that 

will enable better management of the problem. The development of standards in 

this area for use in IP-based communications networks is the priority of the STIR 

Working Group recently activated within the IETF. However, such solutions are dependent upon a full transition to IP-based communications networks, a process that 

is currently in the early stages. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DAN COATS TO

KEVIN G. RUPY

Question 1. Does the technology exist to identify high volume, auto-dialer initiated 

calls in real time? 

Answer. While high-volume and random or sequential calling patterns can be 

identified, there are no currently available technologies that can reliably identify in 

real time whether calls are being initiated by auto-dialers, or what types of software 

and/or hardware are being used to initiate such calls. Moreover, given a mix of 

human-dialed calls from individual consumers, call centers and similar mass-calling 

locations (e.g., political campaign headquarters) and auto-dialer initiated calls spoofing legitimate numbers, current technologies cannot reliably distinguish between 

the two, nor between legal and illegal mass calling events. 

Question 2. Do any prohibitions exist to prevent a telemarketer from purchasing 

CNAM data? 

Answer. USTelecom is not aware of any existing statutory or regulatory prohibitions preventing a telemarketer from purchasing CNAM data. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL TO

MICHAEL F. ALTSCHUL

Question. Your member companies are by no means the problem, but I believe 

your industry should be more proactive in being part of the solution if we are going 

to seriously address the proliferation of fraudulent robocalls. In your testimony, you 

described past and present actions of providers to help combat the problem. Do you 

believe your industry has done as much as it could or should to assist law enforcement and consumers? Why or why not? 

Answer. The wireless industry is proud of its ongoing record of providing assistance to law enforcement. In particular, the FTC has noted the industry’s assistance 

and cooperation (‘‘The Commission would like to acknowledge the extraordinary cooperation that telecommunications carriers AT&T Mobility and Verizon Wireless 

provided in the investigation of the case.’’ See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/05/ 

robocalls.shtm. Also, ‘‘The FTC acknowledges the invaluable assistance it received 

from Verizon Wireless, AT&T, and CTIA—The Wireless Association in this matter.’’ 

See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/02/loan.shtm.) 

As I noted in my testimony, the wireless industry also has conducted its own investigations and brought lawsuits under the TCPA when they have been able to find 

the violators in the United States. Unfortunately, carriers experience the same difficulties law enforcement encounters in trying to trace calls to their source—these 

robocallers ‘‘spoof’’ caller ID, use proxy servers, and route calls through multiple networks, which, together, make it time consuming and often impossible to trace the 

source of these calls back to their origin. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

MICHAEL F. ALTSCHUL

Question 1. Over the past year or so, my office has seen a marked increase in calls 

and letters regarding possible abuses by some telemarketers. Since January 2013, 

my office has heard from more than 300 people requesting assistance with the Do 

Not Call List, and since taking office in 2009, my office has heard from over 1200 

78 

*Selected Constituent Robocall Concerns 

‘‘It is an invasion of our privacy, and it ties up our phones and disrupts our lives to get as 

many as 15 calls every single day when we have been on the donotcall list since day 1. Anything 

you can do about this issue will be greatly appreciated.’’ 

—Constituent from Arlington, VA 5/26/2012 

‘‘I am registered on the ‘‘Do Not Call’’ list for my home phone (not cellphone) and I am still 

getting many solicitation ‘‘robo calls’’ for lower credit card rates, car warranties, and other commercial products. Some callers block caller ID. I systematically report these callers via the ‘‘report a violator’’ process on the Registry website. I have been on the do-not-call registry since 

its inception, and I have verified this on the Registry site. I also put my elderly mother’s home 

phone number on the DNC Registry several years ago. She also gets many solicitation calls. I 

am well versed on the types of calls that the DNC system is supposed to address, and the kinds 

of calls that are excepted. I am astonished at the number of calls I am getting even as I am 

on the DNC list.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 05/04/2012 

‘‘xxx-xxx-xxxx [redacted]. This number continues to call with impunity, even though they are 

on my FTC Do Not Call Registry, and several other residents I’m friends with. They are scam 

artists, trying to mine personal information, and the FTC hasn’t responded to my concerns. Are 

you game for going after this group of obvious scammers, because a lot of vulnerable citizens, 

could be prey for their scam which involves lowering debt. They call themselves [redacted], and 

they are a company I and others have never done business with. Thank you kindly.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 06/06/2012 

‘‘I have been getting calls on my home phone from a ’Credit Card Services’ for over a year 

now. I have submitted at least five complaints on the FTC website and at least two complaints’ 

on the ’Do Not Call’ website. I have asked to speak to a supervisor numerous times, only to 

be hung up on. I have told them over and over and over again to not call me. I have threatened 

them with FTC complaints. I have received over 30 calls from this company and have turned 

in many complaints to the Federal Trade Commission and nothing seems to work. If you look 

on the internet, you will see tens of thousands of complaints. Therefore, I would like to request 

that you (my congressmen) get the Federal Trade Commission to do their job and shut these 

people down.’’ 

—Constituent from Alexandria, VA 07/23/2012 

‘‘Over the last couple of months, I’ve been getting an increasing number of robo-dialer/recorded commercial calls in violation of the Do-Not-Call registry. Many have been from the same 

’crook’, often ‘‘Credit Card Services.’’ I’ve reported most of them on the FTC’s Do Not Call registry. (That is not counting the growing number of political calls, which unfortunately are not 

violations of Do Not Call).’’ 

—Constituent from Reston, VA 08/20/2012 

‘‘Senator—Please have someone on your staff Google (xxx)xxx-xxxx [redacted] and you will see 

several websites dedicated to complaints about harassing phone calls from this number asking 

if we want to refinance our VA loan. We have been on the Do Not Call list since 2006 and have 

asked them to stop calling us 6–8 times a day. They pointedly refuse to stop. This is not about 

freedom of speech, it is invasion of privacy. I, on behalf of many, many people request my Federal Government figure a way to make these people stop calling over and over again.’’ 

—Constituent from Yorktown, VA 08/27/2012 

‘‘My name is [redacted] and I reside in Charlottesville, VA. I am in the fourth grade. I am 

writing to ask that you help by intervening in the issue of unsolicited phone calls. Our number 

is on the Do Not Call list. In the last two days we’ve received three such calls.’’ 

—Constituent from Charlottesville, VA 05/23/2012 

people on this issue. A small sampling of some of the concerns we have received 

are also included in this document for the record.*

As a supporter of the Do Not Call Act, I sympathize with the frustration of my 

constituents. I recognize that the same technology that is allowing telephone service 

providers to more efficiently manage networks is also enabling disreputable callers 

to abuse the system. 

Still, it seems to me that if we can’t find a technical solution to abusive telemarketing calls, that raises many serious questions as well. I encourage you to 

think more creatively about possible solutions, and about any legislative authorities 

that would better enable the FTC to keep pace with technology. For instance, have 

similar problems occurred in other countries? If so, are there any solutions adopted 

in other markets that might be applicable in the U.S.? 

Answer. Both in light of Primus’ testimony at July’s hearing and the fact that 

many robocalling operations, when ultimately identified, are located off-shore, it is 

likely that this phenomena has an international dimension to it. However, because 

CTIA’s focus is domestic in nature, we do not have great familiarity with what solutions or attempted solutions may have been used in other markets. Additionally, 

even if technology solutions are deployed successfully in other markets, they would 

need to be evaluated to determine whether they could be deployed here in a manner 

that would be consistent with wireless carriers’ regulatory and legal obligations. 

79 

Question 2. In 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged innovators 

to come up with a solution that would block illegal commercial robocalls on 

landlines and mobile phones. One of the proposed solutions creates a filtering system, similar to an e-mail spam filter, that intercepts and filters out illegal robocalls 

using a technology that ‘‘blacklists’’ and ‘‘whitelists’’ phone numbers. The proposal 

envisions a consumer-facing system, however, others have suggested that a network-based system might be more efficient and less burdensome for consumers. Do 

you believe that a filtering system would be effective? If so, do you believe it should 

be implemented by networks or by consumers? If not, do you have ideas for a better 

solution? 

Answer. Many of the filtering systems submitted for evaluation in the FTC’s 

‘‘Robocall Challenge’’ contest were based on Caller ID, which is easily spoofed, notwithstanding the fact that such spoofing is illegal. Given this vulnerability, I am 

skeptical that they will work. Additionally, to the extent that filtering systems were 

deployed at the network level, they would require carriers to screen the content of 

traffic addressed to their customers, something very likely to raise privacy concerns. 

And finally, even if carriers screened traffic, it could still be difficult to identify and 

separate ‘‘bad’’ robomessages from ‘‘good’’ auto-dialed messages such as a high volume of identical messages announcing airline flight delays or a school system letting 

families know of a weather delay or cancellation. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DAN COATS TO

MICHAEL F. ALTSCHUL

Question 1. I commend the work the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 

and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have done in establishing a national DoNot-Call Registry pursuant to their authorities under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The registry is nationwide in scope, applies to all telemarketers 

(with the exception of certain non-profit organizations), and covers both interstate 

and intrastate telemarketing calls. Recently, I have heard a number of concerns 

from my state regarding the regulation of high volume auto-dialer initiated voice 

over Internet protocol (VOIP) ‘‘broadcasted’’ calls. My understanding is that these 

calls can put 10,000 calls per minute onto Indiana’s landline telephone network, by 

using VOIP technology, in an attempt to get around Indiana’s Do Not Call List. 

Does the technology exist to identify these high volume, auto-dialer initiated calls 

in real time? 

Answer. Network traffic management technologies exist that can identify a high 

volume of calls delivered to a carrier at an interconnection point. However, robo-callers can thwart these technologies by routing calls over different paths, limiting the 

volume of calls presented at any one point, using a mix of messages and a mix of 

spoofed Caller ID addresses to disguise the common origin of these calls. Moreover, 

there are lawful high volume auto-dialer calls sent with the recipient’s express consent (airline flight delays, school closings, etc.) and there is no technology that provides real-time identification of lawful versus unlawful high volume calls. 

Question 1a. My understanding is that when phone calls are made, there are usually two user-facing identifiable pieces of information: a phone number and a Caller 

ID Name (CNAM). I understand that the CNAM can be used to display the calling 

party’s name alongside the phone number, to help users easily identify a caller. I 

have also been told that there are numerous CNAM lookup services which allow you 

to pay a small fee to lookup the CNAM of a specified caller (by phone number). Do 

any prohibitions exist to prevent this practice by telemarketers? 

Answer. I am not aware of any such prohibitions, but question whether such lookups will be useful in changing the behavior of serial robocallers, as those entities 

are most likely spoofing their numbers to defeat Caller ID or routing traffic to make 

identification of its origin difficult. See, for example, http://800notes.com/forum/ta19b1ccea03917e7/scammers-now-spoofing-good-phone-numbers and http://www.cou 

rthousenews.com/2011/08/16/39024.htm. Additionally, the blocking of calls based 

on CNAM data could result in the blocking of legitimate calls. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

MATTHEW STEIN

Question 1. Over the past year or so, my office has seen a marked increase in calls 

and letters regarding possible abuses by some telemarketers. Since January 2013, 

my office has heard from more than 300 people requesting assistance with the Do 

Not Call List, and since taking office in 2009, my office has heard from over 1200 

80 

*Selected Constituent Robocall Concerns 

‘‘It is an invasion of our privacy, and it ties up our phones and disrupts our lives to get as 

many as 15 calls every single day when we have been on the donotcall list since day 1. Anything 

you can do about this issue will be greatly appreciated.’’ 

—Constituent from Arlington, VA 5/26/2012 

‘‘I am registered on the ‘‘Do Not Call’’ list for my home phone (not cellphone) and I am still 

getting many solicitation ‘‘robo calls’’ for lower credit card rates, car warranties, and other commercial products. Some callers block caller ID. I systematically report these callers via the ‘‘report a violator’’ process on the Registry website. I have been on the do-not-call registry since 

its inception, and I have verified this on the Registry site. I also put my elderly mother’s home 

phone number on the DNC Registry several years ago. She also gets many solicitation calls. I 

am well versed on the types of calls that the DNC system is supposed to address, and the kinds 

of calls that are excepted. I am astonished at the number of calls I am getting even as I am 

on the DNC list.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 05/04/2012 

‘‘xxx-xxx-xxxx [redacted]. This number continues to call with impunity, even though they are 

on my FTC Do Not Call Registry, and several other residents I’m friends with. They are scam 

artists, trying to mine personal information, and the FTC hasn’t responded to my concerns. Are 

you game for going after this group of obvious scammers, because a lot of vulnerable citizens, 

could be prey for their scam which involves lowering debt. They call themselves [redacted], and 

they are a company I and others have never done business with. Thank you kindly.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 06/06/2012 

‘‘I have been getting calls on my home phone from a ’Credit Card Services’ for over a year 

now. I have submitted at least five complaints on the FTC website and at least two complaints’ 

on the ’Do Not Call’ website. I have asked to speak to a supervisor numerous times, only to 

be hung up on. I have told them over and over and over again to not call me. I have threatened 

them with FTC complaints. I have received over 30 calls from this company and have turned 

in many complaints to the Federal Trade Commission and nothing seems to work. If you look 

on the internet, you will see tens of thousands of complaints. Therefore, I would like to request 

that you (my congressmen) get the Federal Trade Commission to do their job and shut these 

people down.’’ 

—Constituent from Alexandria, VA 07/23/2012 

‘‘Over the last couple of months, I’ve been getting an increasing number of robo-dialer/recorded commercial calls in violation of the Do-Not-Call registry. Many have been from the same 

’crook’, often ‘‘Credit Card Services.’’ I’ve reported most of them on the FTC’s Do Not Call registry. (That is not counting the growing number of political calls, which unfortunately are not 

violations of Do Not Call).’’ 

—Constituent from Reston, VA 08/20/2012 

‘‘Senator—Please have someone on your staff Google (xxx)xxx-xxxx [redacted] and you will see 

several websites dedicated to complaints about harassing phone calls from this number asking 

if we want to refinance our VA loan. We have been on the Do Not Call list since 2006 and have 

asked them to stop calling us 6–8 times a day. They pointedly refuse to stop. This is not about 

freedom of speech, it is invasion of privacy. I, on behalf of many, many people request my Federal Government figure a way to make these people stop calling over and over again.’’ 

—Constituent from Yorktown, VA 08/27/2012 

‘‘My name is [redacted] and I reside in Charlottesville, VA. I am in the fourth grade. I am 

writing to ask that you help by intervening in the issue of unsolicited phone calls. Our number 

is on the Do Not Call list. In the last two days we’ve received three such calls.’’ 

—Constituent from Charlottesville, VA 05/23/2012 

people on this issue. A small sampling of some of the concerns we have received 

are also included in this document for the record.*

As a supporter of the Do Not Call Act, I sympathize with the frustration of my 

constituents. I recognize that the same technology that is allowing telephone service 

providers to more efficiently manage networks is also enabling disreputable callers 

to abuse the system. 

Still, it seems to me that if we can’t find a technical solution to abusive telemarketing calls, that raises many serious questions as well. I encourage you to 

think more creatively about possible solutions, and about any legislative authorities 

that would better enable the FTC to keep pace with technology. For instance, have 

similar problems occurred in other countries? If so, are there any solutions adopted 

in other markets that might be applicable in the U.S.? 

Answer. Primus Canada confirms that issues related to mass unsolicited calling, 

including abusive telemarketing calls (together, ‘‘telemarketing’’), are not unique to 

the U.S. and are of a similar significant concern to its customers in Canada. In response to these concerns, Primus Canada invented, developed and deployed a patented technological solution called Telemarketing Guard to assist its customers with 

this issue. 

Telemarketing Guard provides customers with control over how they wish to deal 

with telemarketing calls. When a Primus Canada customer receives a call identified 

81 

as a telemarketing call by the Telemarketing Guard system, the call is impeded and 

does not go directly to the customer. Instead, a message is played advising that the 

customer does not accept telemarketing calls and invites the caller to announce 

themselves. The customer then has the choice to accept the call, refuse the call or 

send the call to voice-mail. 

Importantly, Telemarketing Guard uses the actions of customers to identify potential unsolicited telemarketing calls. When a customer receives an unscreened telemarketing call, the customer is able to report the call to the Telemarketing Guard 

system. When a threshold of customers reporting the same number is reached, the 

system begins to monitor the calling phone number and applies a number of behavioral characteristics (e.g., frequency of calling, time of day concentration, sequential 

calling, etc.) to determine whether the call should be identified as a telemarketing 

call on a going forward basis. In essence, the system promotes and relies on customer engagement to identify potential telemarketing calls. 

Notably, the response by Primus Canada’s customers has been exceptional. Based 

on internal surveys, the service has increased customer satisfaction and become one 

of the leading reasons that customers choose to keep their phone service with Primus Canada. 

Accordingly, Primus Canada is of the view that Telemarketing Guard represents 

the very type of creative solution contemplated in this Question for the Record. 

Question 2. In 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged innovators 

to come up with a solution that would block illegal commercial robocalls on 

landlines and mobile phones. One of the proposed solutions creates a filtering system, similar to an e-mail spam filter, that intercepts and filters out illegal robocalls 

using a technology that ‘‘blacklists’’ and ‘‘whitelists’’ phone numbers. The proposal 

envisions a consumer-facing system, however, others have suggested that a network-based system might be more efficient and less burdensome for consumers. Do 

you believe that a filtering system would be effective? If so, do you believe it should 

be implemented by networks or by consumers? If not, do you have ideas for a better 

solution? 

Answer. As noted in response to the first Question for the Record, Primus Canada 

provides a service called Telemarketing Guard that enables its customers to control 

how they wish to address mass unsolicited calling (‘‘telemarketing’’). 

Telemarketing Guard service is distinct from technologies that rely on the use of 

blacklist and whitelists solutions (‘‘list solutions’’) to intercept and filter out telemarketing calls, including illegal robocalls, as it relies on dynamic information to 

identify potential telemarketing calls. Specifically and as described in response to 

the first Question for the Record, Telemarketing Guard uses the actions of customers and the application of behavioural characteristics to determine whether a 

call should be identified as a telemarketing call. 

Primus Canada is of the view that the use of dynamic information has a number 

of significant advantages relative to the reliance on the type of static information 

that is generally associated with administered list solutions. For example, the use 

of static information requires significant manual administration, oversight and 

intervention. This is necessitated by the fact that being placed on a blacklist has 

a number of significant ramifications to the calling party. As a result, a process is 

required to validate that a number should be blacklisted to protect against the erroneous or mischievous reporting of telephone numbers. A dispute process is also required to address claims that a number should not have been, or should no longer 

be, placed on the blacklist. 

In comparison, the use of dynamic information by the Telemarketing Guard system alleviates these concerns. For example, concerns of erroneous or mischievous reporting are addressed as a call is identified as a potential unsolicited call only after 

a threshold of reports by customers is reached and behavioral characteristics are applied. Similarly, dispute processes are not required as a number will cease being 

identified as a potential unsolicited caller if customers stop reporting calls from that 

number. 

As for implementation, Primus Canada views Telemarketing Guard as both a network-based and customer-facing solution. Indeed, Telemarketing Guard relies on 

customer provided information and engagement to identify telemarketing calls. Customers may also enable and disable the service at will, though few select the latter 

option. On the other hand, implementation in the network ensures that customers 

can benefit from the service without, for example, having to purchase equipment or 

software, actively participate in reporting or continually update individual lists. 

For these reasons, Primus Canada has selected to implement Telemarketing 

Guard in its network and in a manner that relies on dynamic information to identify potential telemarketing calls. 

82 

*Selected Constituent Robocall Concerns 

‘‘It is an invasion of our privacy, and it ties up our phones and disrupts our lives to get as 

many as 15 calls every single day when we have been on the donotcall list since day 1. Anything 

you can do about this issue will be greatly appreciated.’’ 

—Constituent from Arlington, VA 5/26/2012 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DAN COATS TO

MATTHEW STEIN

I commend the work the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the 

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have done in establishing a national Do-Not-Call 

Registry pursuant to their authorities under the Telephone Consumer Protection 

Act (TCPA). The registry is nationwide in scope, applies to all telemarketers (with 

the exception of certain non-profit organizations), and covers both interstate and 

intrastate telemarketing calls. Recently, I have heard a number of concerns from my 

state regarding the regulation of high volume auto-dialer initiated voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) ‘‘broadcasted’’ calls. My understanding is that these calls can 

put 10,000 calls per minute onto Indiana’s landline telephone network, by using 

VOIP technology, in an attempt to get around Indiana’s Do Not Call List. 

Question 1. Does the technology exist to identify these high volume, auto-dialer 

initiated calls in real time? 

Answer. Yes, the technology to identify and address high volume auto-dialer initiated calls exists. In fact, Primus Canada has invented and deployed a service since 

2007 that enables its customers in Canada to address such examples of mass unsolicited calling. 

Primus Canada provides a service called Telemarketing Guard to all of its telephone customers in Canada. This service enables its customers to report a received 

telemarketing call (including auto-dialer initiated calls) to the Telemarketing Guard 

system. 

When a threshold of customers reporting the same number is reached, the system 

begins to monitor the calling phone number and applies a number of behavioral 

characteristics (e.g., frequency of calling, time of day concentration, sequential calling, etc.) to determine whether the call should be identified as a telemarketing call 

on a going forward basis. 

When a Primus Canada customer receives a call identified as a telemarketing call 

by the system, the call is impeded and does not go directly to the customer. Instead, 

a message is played advising that the customer does not accept telemarketing calls 

and invites the caller to announce themselves. The customer then has the choice to 

accept the call, refuse the call or send the call to voice-mail. 

Accordingly, in the example put forward in the question, the auto-dialer initiated 

VoIP calls would be identified and impeded by the Telemarketing Guard system 

when the threshold of customers reporting the number is reached. 

In essence, Telemarketing Guard promotes and relies on the choices and actions 

of Primus Canada’s customers to identify unwanted telemarketing calls. If enough 

customers accept a call from an identified telemarketer, the number will similarly 

cease to be considered a telemarketing call by the Telemarketing Guard system. 

Accordingly, Primus confirms that the technology exists to identify high volume, 

auto-dialer initiated calls. 

Question 2. My understanding is that when phone calls are made, there are usually two user-facing identifiable pieces of information: a phone number and a Caller 

ID Name (CNAM). I understand that the CNAM can be used to display the calling 

party’s name alongside the phone number, to help users easily identify a caller. I 

have also been told that there are numerous CNAM lookup services which allow you 

to pay a small fee to lookup the CNAM of a specified caller (by phone number). Do 

any prohibitions exist to prevent this practice by telemarketers? 

Answer. Primus is not aware of any prohibitions that exist that prevent this practice by telemarketers. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

AARON FOSS

Question 1. Over the past year or so, my office has seen a marked increase in calls 

and letters regarding possible abuses by some telemarketers. Since January 2013, 

my office has heard from more than 300 people requesting assistance with the Do 

Not Call List, and since taking office in 2009, my office has heard from over 1200 

people on this issue. A small sampling of some of the concerns we have received 

are also included in this document for the record.*

83 

‘‘I am registered on the ‘‘Do Not Call’’ list for my home phone (not cellphone) and I am still 

getting many solicitation ‘‘robo calls’’ for lower credit card rates, car warranties, and other commercial products. Some callers block caller ID. I systematically report these callers via the ‘‘report a violator’’ process on the Registry website. I have been on the do-not-call registry since 

its inception, and I have verified this on the Registry site. I also put my elderly mother’s home 

phone number on the DNC Registry several years ago. She also gets many solicitation calls. I 

am well versed on the types of calls that the DNC system is supposed to address, and the kinds 

of calls that are excepted. I am astonished at the number of calls I am getting even as I am 

on the DNC list.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 05/04/2012 

‘‘xxx-xxx-xxxx [redacted]. This number continues to call with impunity, even though they are 

on my FTC Do Not Call Registry, and several other residents I’m friends with. They are scam 

artists, trying to mine personal information, and the FTC hasn’t responded to my concerns. Are 

you game for going after this group of obvious scammers, because a lot of vulnerable citizens, 

could be prey for their scam which involves lowering debt. They call themselves [redacted], and 

they are a company I and others have never done business with. Thank you kindly.’’ 

—Constituent from Fairfax, VA 06/06/2012 

‘‘I have been getting calls on my home phone from a ’Credit Card Services’ for over a year 

now. I have submitted at least five complaints on the FTC website and at least two complaints’ 

on the ’Do Not Call’ website. I have asked to speak to a supervisor numerous times, only to 

be hung up on. I have told them over and over and over again to not call me. I have threatened 

them with FTC complaints. I have received over 30 calls from this company and have turned 

in many complaints to the Federal Trade Commission and nothing seems to work. If you look 

on the internet, you will see tens of thousands of complaints. Therefore, I would like to request 

that you (my congressmen) get the Federal Trade Commission to do their job and shut these 

people down.’’ 

—Constituent from Alexandria, VA 07/23/2012 

‘‘Over the last couple of months, I’ve been getting an increasing number of robo-dialer/recorded commercial calls in violation of the Do-Not-Call registry. Many have been from the same 

’crook’, often ‘‘Credit Card Services.’’ I’ve reported most of them on the FTC’s Do Not Call registry. (That is not counting the growing number of political calls, which unfortunately are not 

violations of Do Not Call).’’ 

—Constituent from Reston, VA 08/20/2012 

‘‘Senator—Please have someone on your staff Google (xxx)xxx-xxxx [redacted] and you will see 

several websites dedicated to complaints about harassing phone calls from this number asking 

if we want to refinance our VA loan. We have been on the Do Not Call list since 2006 and have 

asked them to stop calling us 6–8 times a day. They pointedly refuse to stop. This is not about 

freedom of speech, it is invasion of privacy. I, on behalf of many, many people request my Federal Government figure a way to make these people stop calling over and over again.’’ 

—Constituent from Yorktown, VA 08/27/2012 

‘‘My name is [redacted] and I reside in Charlottesville, VA. I am in the fourth grade. I am 

writing to ask that you help by intervening in the issue of unsolicited phone calls. Our number 

is on the Do Not Call list. In the last two days we’ve received three such calls.’’ 

—Constituent from Charlottesville, VA 05/23/2012 

As a supporter of the Do Not Call Act, I sympathize with the frustration of my 

constituents. I recognize that the same technology that is allowing telephone service 

providers to more efficiently manage networks is also enabling disreputable callers 

to abuse the system. 

Still, it seems to me that if we can’t find a technical solution to abusive telemarketing calls, that raises many serious questions as well. I encourage you to 

think more creatively about possible solutions, and about any legislative authorities 

that would better enable the FTC to keep pace with technology. For instance, have 

similar problems occurred in other countries? If so, are there any solutions adopted 

in other markets that might be applicable in the U.S.? 

Answer. I am the co-winners of the FTC Robocall Challenge and I think that 

there most definitely are technological solutions to this problem. Many of the entries 

to the FTC Robocall Challenge had very creative uses of inexpensive technology. 

Computer processing power is getting faster and cheaper by the day. Building a system to fingerprint robocaller calling patterns is definitely within reach. 

Question 2. In 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged innovators 

to come up with a solution that would block illegal commercial robocalls on 

landlines and mobile phones. One of the proposed solutions creates a filtering system, similar to an e-mail spam filter, that intercepts and filters out illegal robocalls 

using a technology that ‘‘blacklists’’ and ‘‘whitelists’’ phone numbers. The proposal 

envisions a consumer-facing system, however, others have suggested that a network-based system might be more efficient and less burdensome for consumers. 

Do you believe that a filtering system would be effective? If so, do you believe it 

should be implemented by networks or by consumers? If not, do you have ideas for 

a better solution? 

84 

Answer. I do believe that a filtering system would be effective in reducing the 

amount of robocalls that get to consumers’ phones. Even simple blocking techniques 

would dramatically reduce the number of calls that interrupt and annoy consumers. 

I believe that the solution should be jointly implemented by the networks and consumers. The carriers should offer it as an additional service, but it would have to 

be enabled (opt-in) by the consumer. Most enhanced services such as call waiting 

and call forwarding are offered this way today. Consumers should ultimately have 

the tools available to them to block the calls that they don’t want to receive. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DAN COATS TO

AARON FOSS

I commend the work the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the 

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have done in establishing a national Do-Not-Call 

Registry pursuant to their authorities under the Telephone Consumer Protection 

Act (TCPA). The registry is nationwide in scope, applies to all telemarketers (with 

the exception of certain non-profit organizations), and covers both interstate and 

intrastate telemarketing calls. Recently, I have heard a number of concerns from my 

state regarding the regulation of high volume auto-dialer initiated voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) ‘‘broadcasted’’ calls. My understanding is that these calls can 

put 10,000 calls per minute onto Indiana’s landline telephone network, by using 

VOIP technology, in an attempt to get around Indiana’s Do Not Call List. 

Question 1. Does the technology exist to identify these high volume, auto-dialer 

initiated calls in real time? 

Answer. I think that there most definitely are technological solutions to this problem. Many of the entries to the FTC Robocall Challenge had very creative uses of 

inexpensive technology. Computer processing power is getting faster and cheaper by 

the day. Building a system to fingerprint robocaller calling patterns is definitely 

within reach. 

Question 2. My understanding is that when phone calls are made, there are usually two user-facing identifiable pieces of information: a phone number and a Caller 

ID Name (CNAM). I understand that the CNAM can be used to display the calling 

party’s name alongside the phone number, to help users easily identify a caller. I 

have also been told that there are numerous CNAM lookup services which allow you 

to pay a small fee to lookup the CNAM of a specified caller (by phone number). Do 

any prohibitions exist to prevent this practice by telemarketers? 

Answer. I am aware of some companies that allow high-volume callers to display 

customized CNAM data however I don’t know about the legality around this practice. 

Æ