IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

GABRIELLE RENOIR-LARGE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs. Civil Action 2:11-CV-0023

Judge Marbley

Magistrate Judge King

NORMA DARWIN LANE,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiffs, residents of Ohio proceeding without the assistance

of counsel, allege that defendant, a North Carolina resident who is

proceeding without the assistance of counsel, harassed and threatened

plaintiffs through various internet message boards. This matter is

now before the Court on plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary

restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction, Doc. Nos. 14 and 151

(collectively, “plaintiffs’ motions”). For the reasons that follow,

the Court RECOMMENDS that plaintiffs’ motions be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs allege that, since March 2010, defendant has stalked,

threatened and harassed plaintiffs through various internet message

1After reviewing both motions, the Court concludes that the only

difference between the two is that the later filed motion contains additional

factual allegations. See, Doc. No. 15, p. 2. For ease of reference, the

Court will refer to page numbers in the later filed motion, Doc. No. 15. 

2In addressing the motions for interim injunctive relief, any findings

of fact and conclusions of law made by this Court are not binding at a trial

on the merits. See, e.g., United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258,

261 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395

(1981)).

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boards, including the “JonBenet Ramsey Forum” hosted by Topix.com

(“Topix”) and the “Jeffrey MacDonald” message board hosted by Yuku.com

(“Yuku”). See Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 67, ¶¶ 8-20.3 Plaintiffs

specifically allege that defendant’s published comments constitute

libel. Id. at ¶¶ 99-136. The Amended Complaint seeks recovery of

compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. Id. at ¶

137. 

Plaintiffs filed two motions for temporary restraining orders

and/or injunctive relief, which were referred to the undersigned for

consideration and a Report and Recommendation. Doc. Nos. 14 and 15;

Order, Doc. No. 25. In their requests for interim injunctive relief,

plaintiffs allege that, since January 7, 2011, defendant has, through

postings on Topix, attempted to intimidate plaintiffs into dropping

this lawsuit. Doc. No. 15, pp. 1-2. Plaintiffs contend that, without

interim injunctive relief, they “will suffer further permanent and

irreparable damage to their private lives, reputations, physical,

emotional, and mental health and ability to secure work” and that

plaintiffs “could suffer severe economic loss.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs

further argue that “[i]mmediate action is also required to secure the

safety and security of both Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ families.” Id.

On March 7, 2011, the undersigned held a conference addressing

Plaintiffs’ Motions, pursuant to S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 65.1. All parties

participated in the conference and had the opportunity to address

3On June 15, 2011, after plaintiffs had filed their motions for interim

injunctive relief, the Court granted plaintiffs leave to file an amended

complaint. Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 66. 

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these motions and to summarize their respective positions.4 In

accordance with the briefing schedule established at that conference,

Order, Doc. No. 36, defendant filed a response to plaintiffs’ motions,

Doc. No. 39 (“Defendant’s Memo. in Opp.”). With the filing of

plaintiffs’ reply memorandum, Doc. No. 47 (“Plaintiffs’ Reply”), this

matter is now ripe for resolution.5

II. STANDARD

Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party

to seek injunctive relief if the party believes that he or she will

suffer irreparable harm or injury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) and (b). A

temporary restraining order relates only to restraints sought without

written or oral notice to the adverse party, whereas the application

is properly treated as one for a preliminary injunction where the

adverse party has been given notice. First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v.

Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Reed v. Cleveland

Bd. of Educ., 581 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1978)); Fed. R. Civ. P.

65(a) and (b).

“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent

irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a

meaningful decision on the merits.” United Food & Commer. Workers

Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341,

4On the same day, plaintiffs also filed a memorandum in support of their

motions. Doc. No. 34.

5As this motion may be resolved on the parties’ filings, there is no

need for an evidentiary hearing. See Potter v. Havlicek, No. 3:06-cv-211,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10677, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2007) (“A hearing is

not always necessary on a motion for a preliminary injunction.”) (citing,

inter alia, 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure, § 2949).

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348 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921,

925 (6th Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The decision

whether or not to grant a request for interim injunctive relief falls

within the sound discretion of the district court. Friendship

Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir.

1982). An injunction, however, is an extraordinary remedy that should

be granted after the Court has considered the following four factors:

(1) whether the movant has a “strong” likelihood of success

on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer

irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary

injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4)

whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a

preliminary injunction.

Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing

McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th

Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (quoting Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic

Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995)). These four considerations

need not all be met but are rather factors to be balanced. In re

DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d at 1229; Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v.

Engler, 257 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2001). “Moreover, a district

court is not required to make specific findings concerning each of the

four factors used in determining a motion for preliminary injunction

if fewer factors are dispositive of the issue.” Jones v. City of

Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 2003). The movant bears the

burden of establishing that “the circumstances clearly demand” this

extraordinary remedy. Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County

Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). 

III. DISCUSSION

4

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 In the case sub judice, plaintiffs assert claims for libel, which

is defamation in written form. Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 67, ¶¶ 99-

137; Mawaldi v. St. Elizabeth Health Ctr., 381 F. Supp. 2d 675, 688

(N.D. Ohio 2005);6 McCartney v. Oblates of St. Francis deSales, 80 Ohio

App.3d 345, 353 (1992) (“Defamation is the unprivileged publication of

a false and defamatory matter about another.”).7 Plaintiffs seek

interim injunctive relief “to stop Defendant’s stalking, harassment,

and attempted intimidation of all three Plaintiffs[.]” Doc. No. 15,

p. 1. Plaintiffs initially sought an order prohibiting defendant

from, inter alia, posting “personal information and threats about the

Plaintiffs and about certain members of the Plaintiffs’ families” on

certain internet message boards. Doc. No. 15, p. 1. However,

plaintiffs have since broadened their request, asking that defendant

be restrained from posting anything at all on certain internet

websites, restricting defendant’s ability to conduct online research

and asking that some of defendant’s filings be stricken. Doc. No. 47,

pp. 22-23. Plaintiffs now also ask the Court to order non-parties to

take certain action in order to limit defendant’s alleged activities. 

6“A court sitting in diversity applies the law of the forum state and,

in the absence of direct state court precedent, must make its best prediction

as to how the highest state court would resolve the issues presented.” 

Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 598 F.3d 257, 264

(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890, 893-94 (6th Cir.

2000)). The substantive law of Ohio applies to this matter as plaintiffs

filed this action in federal court in Ohio on the basis of diversity

jurisdiction. The parties have offered no case authority on this particular

issue and therefore do not appear to dispute this conclusion. 

7To establish a claim of defamation, whether based upon libel or

slander, a plaintiff must show: (1) a false statement; (2) about the

plaintiff; (3) that was published without privilege to a third party; (4) with

fault or at least negligence on the part of the defendant; and (5) that the

statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to plaintiff. 

Gosden v. Louis, 116 Ohio App.3d 195, 206, 687 N.E.2d 481 (1996) (citations

omitted). 

5

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Id. at 23 (asking that defendant’s work supervisor be ordered “to

closely monitor Defendant’s activities and not permit her to abuse her

workplace to stalk Plaintiffs and seek to discover private information

about them” and asking that “relevant Ohio counties” be ordered “to

immediately seal the marriage licenses and certificates of the

Plaintiffs” or be ordered to redact certain information from these

documents).

However, plaintiffs’ requested injunction amounts to a prior

restraint on defendant’s speech. See Alexander v. United States, 509

U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (“Temporary restraining orders and permanent

injunctions – i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech

activities – are classic examples of prior restraints.”). “‘[I]n the

case of a prior restraint on pure speech [when First Amendment rights

are implicated], the hurdle [imposed on a party seeking such

injunctive relief] is substantially higher [than in a case involving

an injunction that does not seek a prior restraint]: publication must

threaten an interest more fundamental than the First Amendment

itself.’” County Sec. Agency v. The Ohio Dep’t of Commerce, 296 F.3d

477, 485 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers

Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 226-27 (6th Cir. 1996)). In light of the

“heavy presumption” against prior restraints, see New York Times Co.

v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted), the party seeking to impose a prior restraint

“‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the

imposition of such a restraint.’” County Sec. Agency, 296 F.3d at 485

(quoting New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714). 

Therefore, to the extent that defendant’s speech at issue might

6

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be defamatory and plaintiffs now seek to impose a prior restraint on

such speech, “the usual rule is that ‘equity does not enjoin a libel

or slander and that the only remedy for defamation is an action for

damages.’” See Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206 (6th

Cir. 1990) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814

F.2d 663, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). While the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has authorized a limited injunction

prohibiting an individual “from continuing and reiterating the same

libelous and defamatory” statements in accordance with a more modern

rule, that Court specifically “limit[ed] the application of such

injunction to the statements which have been found in. . . proceedings

to be false and libelous.” Id. at 1206 (Guy, J., majority opinion

except as to injunctive relief), 1209 (Wellford, J., majority opinion

as to injunctive relief, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

See also Lassiter v. Lassiter, 456 F. Supp.2d 876, 884 (E.D. Ky. 2006)

(concluding that Kentucky courts would permit injunctive relief

against defamation8 where, inter alia, the injunction be “clearly and

narrowly drawn” and that there be an adjudication of falsity or

illegality, established “by at least clear and convincing evidence,”

prior to the issuance of the injunction) (emphasis added), abrogated

by Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Ky. 2010)

(“[D]efamatory speech may be enjoined only after the trial court’s

final determination by a preponderance of the evidence that the speech

at issue is, in fact, false, and only then upon the condition that the

8A defamation claim under Kentucky law requires: “1. defamatory

language[,] 2. about the plaintiff[,] 3. which is published and[,] 4. which

causes injury to reputation.” Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d

781, 793 (Ky. 2004). 

7

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injunction be narrowly tailored to limit the prohibited speech to that

which has been judicially determined to be false.”) (emphasis added). 

Here, although the usual rule provides that defamation may be

remedied only by an action for damages, even application of the modern

rule bars plaintiffs’ requested injunction. First, there has been no

final determination that defendant’s statements are false and

libelous. Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d at 1206. Second, even if this Court

later determines after such adjudication that an injunction is

appropriate, plaintiffs’ requested relief extends well beyond the

allegedly defamatory statements posted by defendant. As noted supra,

plaintiffs ask this Court to, inter alia, (1) completely ban defendant

from posting on certain internet websites and prohibit defendant from

talking with anyone about plaintiffs except to the extent the such

discussion “is irrelevant to this case,” that is, impose restrictions

that capture activity that is not defamatory, and (2) order outside

third parties, an individual and unidentified “Ohio counties,” to take

certain action. Instead, such an injunction must be narrow and

limited in scope to the statements found to be defamatory. Id. at

1208-09. See also Lassiter, 456 F. Supp.2d at 884. Cf. County Sec.

Agency, 296 F.3d at 485 (imposing a heavy burden on the party seeking

to impose a prior restraint). Stated differently, plaintiffs’

requests for injunctive relief is improper because they seek to enjoin

conduct that is not in and of itself actionable. Therefore, at this

stage in the proceedings, plaintiffs’ requests cannot be met.

Moreover, even if this Court went on to consider the preliminary

injunction factors in connection with plaintiffs’ request, plaintiffs

nevertheless fail to establish that “the circumstances clearly demand”

8

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the extraordinary remedy that they seek. See Overstreet, 305 F.3d at

573. For example, the Court is not persuaded that plaintiffs have

established a strong likelihood that defendant will intimidate or

injure plaintiffs, thereby causing irreparable harm. To establish

irreparable harm, plaintiffs must show that, unless their motion is

granted, “they will suffer ‘actual and imminent’ harm rather than harm

that is speculative or unsubstantiated.” Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443

F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2006). Here, plaintiffs initially asserted an

assault claim, alleging that they feared that defendant would inflict

on them “a violent physical injury[.]” Complaint, Doc. No. 7, ¶¶ 141-

50.9 See also Affidavit of Gabrielle Renoir-Large in Support of

Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction / Temporary

Restraining Order, ¶ 5, attached to Doc. No. 34 (“I am actually

frightened of coming to the Courthouse. I feel Defendant or one of

her friends would not hesitate to commit a violent act.”). However,

plaintiffs later abandoned their assault claim when they filed the

Amended Complaint, which suggests that plaintiffs no longer fear

injury from defendant. The timely filings and recent motions filed by

plaintiffs in this litigation further establish that defendant’s

actions have not intimidated plaintiffs. Indeed, plaintiffs

specifically assert that they “have no fear regarding this lawsuit or

they would not have initiated it.” Doc. No. 47, ¶ 9.10 Therefore, any

9To the extent that plaintiffs fear injury to their family members, the

Court will not address such claims. Plaintiffs have no standing to assert

claims on behalf of these unidentified non-parties.

10As this Court previously observed, Report and Recommendation, Doc. No.

59, witness intimidation or tampering is a federal felony offense, punishable

by a term of imprisonment of up to twenty (20) years. See 18 U.S.C. §

1512(b). 

9

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professed harm is simply too speculative at this time to support

plaintiff’s requested relief. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 552.

Similarly, to the extent that plaintiffs complain that defendant

has posted “personal and private information” about them on the

internet, the Court is not persuaded at this time that such harm rises

above the speculative level. For example, although plaintiffs allege

that defendant “boasted” about posting plaintiff Renoir-Large’s Social

Security number online, Amended Complaint, ¶ 53, plaintiffs concede

that Topix has already removed such posts. Doc. No. 34, ¶ 7; Doc. No.

47, ¶ 8. Likewise, other information identified by plaintiffs – such

as names, addresses and information about marriage licenses – is

frequently available to the public through probate courts and

government websites. Under these circumstances, there is no threat of

imminent, irreparable harm where the information identified by

plaintiffs has been removed or is already lawfully available to the

public.11 Therefore, because plaintiffs have not established

irreparable harm, their request for injunctive relief is unwarranted. 

Cf. United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir.

2004) (stating that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to

preserve the status quo).

Moreover, as noted supra, defendant would suffer constitutional

harm from a prior restraint on speech if this Court granted

plaintiffs’ request for interim injunctive relief. This is

11Plaintiffs also allege that they “could suffer severe economic loss”

absent the requested injunction. Doc. No. 15, ¶ 4 (emphasis added). However,

as plaintiffs’ own language establishes, such loss is wholly speculative. See

Abney, 443 F.3d at 552 (stating that harm must be “actual and imminent,” not

speculative or unsubstantiated).

10

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particularly true on the present record where plaintiffs’ requested

relief extends beyond allegedly defamatory statements and seeks to

curtail defendant’s lawful exercise of her First Amendment rights via

the internet. 

Finally, “the public interest is served by preventing the

violation of constitutional rights.” Chabad of S. Ohio & Congregation

Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427, 436 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Here, granting plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief would not

serve this interest but would, rather, impair it, as defendant’s

rights would be harmed by issuing the requested injunction. This

factor thus also weighs against issuing the requested injunction.12

Accordingly, this Court concludes that, based on the present

record, plaintiffs have not met the high standard necessary for

extraordinary injunctive relief. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that

plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary restraining order and/or a

preliminary injunction, Doc. Nos. 14 and 15, be DENIED.

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file

and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,

specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part

thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28

12Finally, the Court need not address plaintiffs’ multiple requests to

strike information “from the record” that plaintiffs believe “is so

inflammatory as to unfairly prejudice a jury against Plaintiffs[.]” See,

e.g., Doc. No. 47, ¶¶ 8, 13-16, 20, 27, 29-30, 32-33, 35-36, 38. Such overly

broad requests are defective for the reasons previously discussed supra. 

Moreover, assuming that this case proceeds to trial, a jury will not have

access to information simply because the parties filed such information with

the Court prior to trial.

11

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U.S.C. §636(b)(1); F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be

filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy

thereof. F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to

de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Federation

of Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United

States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

July 20, 2011 s/Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King

 United States Magistrate Judge

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