1

Filed 4/29/22 R.M. v. J.J. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Siskiyou)

----

R.M.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

C090018

(Super. Ct. No. 

SCCVCVSP19144)

J.J. (Mother) appeals from an order finding her ex-husband, R.M., is a presumed 

father of E.S., pursuant to Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d),

1 and also finding 

he is a third parent pursuant to section 7612, subdivision (c). 

On appeal, Mother asserts: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected 

her request to include R.M.’s trial court “outbursts” and the court’s admonitions in the 

settled statement; (2) the presumed paternity finding was not supported by substantial 

1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
2

evidence; (3) this case is not an appropriate action to grant third parent status because it 

would lead to “warring parents fighting for custody”; (4) granting third parent status 

would impermissibly circumvent the purpose of stepparent adoption statutes; (5) there is 

no existing relationship between R.M. and E.S. to support a third parent finding; and (6)

section 7612, subdivision (c), is unconstitutional as applied. We disagree with Mother’s 

contentions and affirm the trial court’s ruling with respect to R.M.’s parental relationship 

to E.S.

I. BACKGROUND

R.M. and Mother first met in elementary school. They met again when she was 

seven months pregnant with E.S. E.S. was born in January 2013 in Southern California. 

R.M. started dating Mother when E.S. was between three and seventh months old. This 

is when he first met E.S. E.S.’s first birthday party was at R.M.’s mother’s house. R.M. 

was also present for E.S.’s second, third, and fourth birthday parties. 

R.M. and Mother married in September 2014. They had two other children

together during their marriage. They held themselves out as a family and did not identify 

E.S. as a stepchild. 

During the relationship and marriage, R.M. lived and primarily worked in 

Southern California, and Mother lived primarily in Northern California. R.M. would 

come to Northern California regularly and stay with Mother and the children. Mother 

and the children stayed with R.M. in Southern California on a few occasions. 

Mother and R.M. separated in 2017. 

In January 2019, R.M. filed a petition pursuant to section 7630 to establish a 

parental relationship with E.S. 

In February 2019, J.S. signed a declaration of paternity with respect to E.S. and 

first met her in person. No paternity testing was performed. J.S. and E.S. share a last

name, but his name was not on E.S.’s birth certificate. 
3

In April 2019, the court held a contested evidentiary hearing on R.M.’s petition at 

which R.M., Mother, J.S., and other witnesses testified. 

On May 14, 2019, the trial court issued a ruling explaining that “[t]he evidence 

from the hearing is very clear and overwhelming—at the time of the hearing, [R.M.] was 

the only father figure with a[] ‘well-established parental relationship’ with [E.S.]” The 

court found R.M.’s exhibits “very telling: ‘if a picture is worth a thousand words, [R.M.] 

has, in effect, written a novel in acknowledging [E.S.] as his child.’ [Citation.] [¶] 

There was no rebuttal that [R.M.] is anything but a presumed parent of [E.S.] [Citation.] 

[Mother]’s attorney . . . agreed. Here, it is clear, that [Mother] allowed and encouraged 

[R.M.] to function as [E.S.]’s second parent from sometime after the relationship began 

until they separated some four years later.” The court found the case appropriate to 

recognize third parent status based on all the relevant factors, including the relationship 

between R.M. and E.S. and that it “is one where he has fulfilled the child’s needs for care 

and affection for a considerable amount of time.” 

The court found that, to E.S., R.M. “was her father” and he “provided love and 

support for [E.S.] as he did for his other two children. . . . Even though much of the 

relationship can be described as a long distance relationship, it appears from the 

evidence, that [R.M.] and [E.S.]’s relationship was significant and strong, and extended 

for most of [E.S.]’s life.” The court “consider[ed] relevant the other siblings in the bigger 

picture of [R.M.] and [E.S]. She is the big sister of the group, and this relationship is a 

factor as [R.M.] is the father, biological of his two children, and psychological father of 

[E.S]. Considering the totality of all relevant factors, this court finds that [R.M.] has an

existing parental relationship with [E.S.] such that it should be maintained and 

maintaining that relationship is in her best interest, for it would be detrimental to [E.S.] to 

sever this relationship. [R.M.] has met his burden of proof to establish a parental 

relationship pursuant to” section 7612, subdivision (c). The court ordered that judgment 

enter in R.M.’s favor. The court also ordered R.M. and Mother to share joint legal and 
4

physical custody of E.S. The court ordered E.S.’s primary residence will be with Mother, 

and R.M. will have visitation with E.S. at the same time, frequency, and duration as with 

his other two children. 

Mother filed a timely appeal.2 No respondent’s brief was filed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Settled Statement

An appellant may elect to use a settled statement as the record of the oral 

proceedings in the trial court when designated oral proceedings in the trial court were not 

reported by a court reporter. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(a), (b)(1).)3 Mother elected 

to use a settled statement and contends the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting 

her request to include R.M.’s trial court “outbursts” and the court’s admonitions in the 

settled statement. 

2

 Mother asserts the ruling is appealable as an order after judgment, but cites no 

applicable judgment. Instead, she cites Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, 

subdivision (a)(10), which allows the appeal of an order made appealable by the Family 

Code, and Family Code section 3554 which allows for the appeal of a judgment or order 

made under Division 9 of the Family Code (§ 3500, et seq.), entitled “Support.” The 

May 12, 2019 ruling is not a support order. It states “Judgment shall enter in [R.M.’s]

favor.” The ruling further states, “This Order shall take effect immediately. [R.M.] is 

directed to prepare a judgment consistent with this ruling and attach a custody and 

visitation order consistent with this ruling.” Mother’s opening brief indicates no 

judgment was prepared. Nonetheless, because the only further action for the court to take 

on the issue of parenthood is the ministerial act of filing the judgment, we can treat the 

appeal as from that judgment. (Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th

824, 829, fn. 8.) A party may also take an appeal from “a final order or judgment in a 

bifurcated proceeding regarding child custody or visitation rights.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 904.1, subd. (a)(14).) The order is final with respect to R.M.’s status as a parent of E.S. 

We conclude this finding is appealable, and the issues Mother raises related to this 

finding are cognizable.

3

 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
5

“A settled statement is a summary of the superior court proceedings approved by 

the superior court.” (Rule 8.137(a).) 

An appellant’s proposed statement must “[c]ontain a statement of the points the 

appellant is raising on appeal” and “[c]ontain a condensed narrative of the oral 

proceedings.” (Rule 8.137(d)(1) & (2).) The latter must include “a concise factual 

summary of the evidence and the testimony of each witness relevant to the points that the 

appellant states . . . are being raised on appeal.” (Rule 8.137(d)(2)(A).) The respondent 

may file proposed amendments in response to appellant’s proposed statement. (Rule 

8.137(e)(1).) As apparently occurred here, the trial court may “[m]ake any corrections or 

modifications to the statement necessary to ensure that it is an accurate summary of the 

evidence and the testimony of each witness relevant to the points that the appellant states 

. . . are being raised on appeal.” (Rule 8.137(f)(3)(B)(i).) “ ‘As long as the trial judge 

does not act in an arbitrary fashion he has full and complete power over such a record.’ ” 

(Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 195.) “Nevertheless, ‘under the rules it 

is the duty of the trial court to settle a proposed statement, not to make one.’ ” (Ibid.)

In issuing a corrected condensed narrative of the oral proceedings, the court 

explained that R.M.’s “outbursts in relation to statements made by [Mother], her attorney, 

or any other witness, is not considered by this court to be relevant evidence or testimony. 

Furthermore, this court did not consider the fact that [R.M.] made such outbursts as 

evidence or testimony, and the outbursts, including the content of the outbursts, was not a 

factor considered by the court for purposes of rendering its decision and ruling which is 

the subject of the appeal.” None of the authorities cited by Mother indicate outbursts or

admonitions relating to outbursts must appear in a settled statement. For instance, in A.G. 

v. C.S. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1269, we stated, “In the settled statement, the court noted, 

‘Throughout this trial, Mother acted in a very abnormal manner and may be depressed at 

this time.’ ” (Id. at p. 1287.) This part of the settled statement was a quote from the trial 

court’s order. (Id. at p. 1279.) The case does not address whether outbursts or 
6

admonitions must be included as part of the summary of the evidence and testimony. 

(See Rule 8.137(d)(2)(A).) Moreover, Mother does not cite her proposed condensed 

narrative of oral proceedings such that we can discern what outbursts or admonitions, if 

any, she proposed that were refused by the trial court. Rather, to the extent Mother 

suggests what outbursts she had in mind, she relies on the declaration she submitted in 

support of her objections to the corrected condensed narrative of the oral proceedings and 

not any actual proposals. In ruling on those objections, the court explained, Mother

“attempts to interject editorial comment and facts not presented during the evidentiary 

hearing in her condensed narrative of oral proceedings.” Mother has failed to 

demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in settling the statement.

B. Presumed Parent Finding

“The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (§ 7600 et seq.) ‘provides the framework by 

which California courts make paternity determinations. (§ 7610, subd. (b).)’ [Citation.] 

Section 7611 sets forth various rebuttable presumptions for determining a child’s natural 

parent. [Citation.] A presumption under section 7611 generally ‘is a rebuttable 

presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action 

only by clear and convincing evidence.’ (§ 7612, subd. (a).)” (In re L.L. (2017) 13 

Cal.App.5th 1302, 1309-1310.) “A person who claims entitlement to presumed parent 

status has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the facts 

supporting the entitlement.” (R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 774.) 

Mother argues no substantial evidence supports the presumed parent finding. The 

trial court’s ruling indicated it found R.M. to be a presumed parent based on section 

7611, subdivision (d): “The presumed parent receives the child into their home and 

openly holds out the child as their natural child.” The court stated Mother’s own counsel 

agreed with that conclusion at the end of the evidentiary hearing. 

“We review the trial court’s factual findings, including its findings that [R.M.] 

received the child[] into [his] home and openly held [her] out as [his] natural child[], 
7

under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.] ‘ “Under that standard, we must 

consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it 

the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the 

judgment. [Citations.] [¶] It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the 

evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a 

determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, 

contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment.” ’ [Citation.] To the extent 

we are called upon to review the trial court’s legal interpretation of the ‘receiving’ and 

‘holding out’ requirements set forth in section 7611[, subdivision ](d), we shall exercise 

our independent legal judgment.” (S.Y. v. S.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1031, 

italics added.)

“When determining whether the person has met the statutory requirements of 

receiving the child into his or her home and openly holding the child out as his or her 

own, the court may consider a wide variety of factors, including the person’s provision of 

physical and/or financial support for the child, efforts to place the person’s name on the 

birth certificate, efforts to seek legal custody, and the breadth and unequivocal nature of 

the person’s acknowledgement of the child as his or her own. [Citation.] No single 

factor is determinative; rather, the court may consider all the circumstances when 

deciding whether the person demonstrated a parental relationship by holding out the child 

as his or her own and assuming responsibility for the child by receiving the child into his 

or her home.” (R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) 

According to the settled statement, R.M. testified that after he married Mother, she 

lived with E.S. in his home in Southern California for a month. Mother eventually 

moved to Northern California and bought a home; R.M. would come north every other 

month for 10 days or so. When R.M. was in Northern California, he, Mother, E.S., and 

eventually their other two children all lived together. From around December 19, 2015,

to around January 22, 2016, the family lived in R.M.’s house in Southern California. In 
8

both 2016 and 2017, Mother made two trips to Southern California. R.M. testified that 

he treated E.S. as if she was his child and not his stepchild and held her out as his child

and not his stepchild. Mother also testified that they introduced themselves as a family 

and E.S. was not identified as a stepchild. Mother testified she did not want E.S. singled 

out. 

According to the settled statement, R.M. testified that he went to a number of 

doctor appointments for E.S. and was present for three or four of the times she got shots. 

He made several cash payments toward E.S.’s unpaid medical bills. His mother invested 

in a college fund for E.S. According to R.M., Mother lives off her deceased stepfather’s

inheritance, “but she didn’t budget the money very well.” R.M. testified that he sent 

money to Mother to support the entire family, including E.S. Before they were married, 

he would deposit $800-1,000 per month in her bank account. Later, they opened a joint 

account, and he deposited the same amount each month. When he was in Northern 

California, the family would go to Walmart, and he would tell Mother to get whatever 

she wanted or needed for all of the children. They usually spent between $200 and $300. 

At the time of the hearing, R.M. was behind on child support payments. The record 

suggests these payments are based on the separate proceedings relating to R.M. and 

Mother’s other two children. 

R.M. submitted as evidence family photographs and a picture of his tattoo of an 

“E” for E.S. 

Mother argues evidence of certain activities on the part of R.M. were missing, 

such as evidence he “provided actual caretaking such as diaper changes, feeding, 

dressing, playing, participating in parenting decisions, or potty training.” She also alleges 

R.M. submitted no evidence of specific child-related purchases pertaining solely to E.S.

or that he listed her as his daughter on any insurance policies. Mother complains R.M. 

did not assert custody rights promptly. None of these allegations are dispositive because 

no particular items of evidence are required; indeed, no factor is determinative. (R.M. v. 
9

T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) Further, we cannot reweigh the evidence. 

Mother argues that because the evidence demonstrates E.S. only spent Father’s Days with 

R.M. until the dissolution of their marriage, his doing so was only incidental to his 

relationship with Mother. The court was not required to make this inference. “ ‘ “Our 

authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there 

is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the 

judgment.” ’ ” (S.Y. v. S.B., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1031, italics added.) Because 

there was, we must affirm the court’s finding that R.M. was a presumed parent under 

section 7611, subdivision (d).

C. Third Parent Status 

As set forth above, the trial court found R.M. established he was E.S.’s father

under section 7612, subdivision (c). This provision provides: “In an appropriate action, 

a court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division 

are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to 

the child. In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider all relevant 

factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child from a stable 

placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child’s physical needs and the child’s 

psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a 

substantial period of time. A finding of detriment to the child does not require a finding 

of unfitness of any of the parents or persons with a claim to parentage.” (§ 7612, subd. 

(c).) “This statutory provision ‘allows a court to recognize three parents only in “rare 

cases” where a child truly has more than two parents.’ [Citation.] Specifically, ‘ “an 

appropriate action” for application of section 7612, subdivision (c) requires a court to 

find an existing, rather than potential, relationship between a putative third parent and the 

child, such that “recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child.” ’ ” 

(M.M. v. D.V. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 733, 742.)
10

“We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment within the meaning of . . . 

section 7612, subdivision (c) for substantial evidence.” (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 

886, 899.)

1. Non-Statutory Criteria

Mother argues this is “not an appropriate action to grant third parent status” 

because to do so would: (1) lead to “warring parents fighting for custody,” and (2) 

circumvent the purpose of stepparent adoption. Neither argument is based on the 

language of the statute. The argument that finding a stepfather to be a presumed parent 

“ ‘circumvents the purpose of stepparent adoption statutes’ ” was rejected in In re

Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, which also affirmed a third parent finding: “In 

considering this argument, it must be remembered that adoption and presumed parent 

status serve different purposes. Adoption is available generally to stepparents, while 

designation of a presumed parent normally occurs in the context of a dependency 

proceeding. Given the potentially critical importance of a presumed parent in the life of a 

child who is subject to a dependency proceeding, we see no reason to place roadblocks to 

the achievement of that status by otherwise qualified persons, including stepparents, by 

imposing requirements not found in the Family Code provisions bearing on presumed 

parent status. In the absence of an indication by the Legislature that adoption is intended 

to be the exclusive means by which a stepparent is to be granted custodial status, we find 

no basis for denying presumed parent status to otherwise qualified stepparents.” (Id. at 

pp. 498-499.) We see no reason the answer is different outside of the dependency 

context. In any context, “in construing this, or any statute, we may not broaden or narrow 

the scope of the provision by reading into it language that does not appear in it or reading 

out of it language that does.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 545.) 

Likewise, we cannot read into section 7612, subdivision (c), a requirement that it 

not apply to parents who are “warring.” (See C.A. v. C.P. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 27, 36

[“If the Legislature wanted to limit the bill’s application to cases where no stable 
11

marriage existed, it easily could have said so”].) Nor does the Legislative history cited 

by Mother suggest such a requirement should be read in. Rather, it explains: “While 

more than two parents may be highly desirable in a dependency case, where more loving 

parents may help keep a child out of a group home or other foster care placement, 

multiple parents in a family law proceeding, where warring parents are fighting for 

custody, could be more troublesome. This bill addresses that concern in two ways. First, 

as discussed above, it allows a court to recognize more than two parents only when it 

would be detrimental to the child not to do so. The bill provides courts with guidance on 

finding such detriment, by requiring the court to consider all relevant factors, including 

the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled 

the child’s physical and psychological needs for a substantial period of time.” (Assem. 

Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended 

May 14, 2013, p. 7.) Mother’s assertion that the Legislature “rejected” the notion that 

third party parent status can apply when warring parents are involved is incorrect. 

Rather, the Legislature recognized many proceedings would involve warring parents 

fighting for custody and attempted to address the “trouble” this can present through the 

requirement that the court find detriment. The Legislature did not suggest parents who 

are fighting over custody may never satisfy the requirements for third parent status under 

section 7612, subdivision (c). Again, we cannot insert requirements where they do not 

exist. We thus turn to the arguments raised by Mother that relate to the actual statutory 

requirements for recognizing a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c).

2. Statutory Criteria

Mother argues there was no existing relationship between R.M. and E.S. such that 

it would cause her “devastating psychological and emotional impact” to have only two 

parents. The quoted language comes from the legislative history of section 7612, 

subdivision (c), which explains that “ ‘[s]eparating a child from a parent has a devastating 

psychological and emotional impact on the child.’ ” (In re Donovan L. (2016) 244 
12

Cal.App.4th 1075, 1090.) The statute itself does not require a specific finding of 

“devastating psychological and emotional impact on the child.” In In re Donovan L., the 

juvenile court found the child “ ‘does not have a strong relationship’ ” with his biological 

father and ordered visits to be supervised because the biological father “ ‘has to develop a 

relationship,’ ” but nonetheless found the biological father to be a third parent under 

section 7612, subdivision (c). (In re Donovan L., supra, at p. 1092.) The appellate court 

held this was error. (Ibid.) No such error occurred here. The court found R.M. had an 

existing parental relationship with E.S. Mother attacks this finding by again asking us to 

reweigh the evidence as she did with respect to the presumed parent finding. This 

approach remains unavailing. 

Additionally, Mother argues R.M. took no steps to maintain his relationship with 

E.S. after separation. The settled statement indicates R.M. continued to see E.S. at least 

periodically. The court’s ruling states, “after the separation of the parties, [Mother] made 

every effort to exclude [R.M.] from [E.S.]’s life. He only saw her infrequently. He 

testified that he was told by a number of people, including his attorney at the time, that he 

did not have any legal means to assert being a father to [E.S.]” Mother argues the court’s 

statement that she made every effort to exclude R.M. from E.S.’s life is not supported by 

substantial evidence. We are not persuaded. In discussing the settled statement, the court 

explained, “I recall some of the reasons why we ended up in court with this particular 

case was [R.M.] had wanted to see [E.S.] and that [Mother] was prohibiting that postseparation and limiting him to only their two biological children.” R.M.’s petition 

supports the court’s recollection. The trial court also explained that it recalled testimony 

to that effect and that this was the conclusion it came to based on the testimony. At a 

minimum, it is reasonable to infer from what is in the settled statement that after the 

dissolution of their marriage, Mother limited contact between R.M. and all of their 

children to what was necessary or required. For example, the settled statement

summarizes Mother’s position that she did not want the children at R.M.’s home, but 
13

states they stayed there when she went to urgent care. Further, Mother would sometimes 

not bring E.S. when she met R.M. for court ordered visitation of their other children. 

Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that R.M. did take steps to maintain his 

relationship with E.S.

But regardless of the steps R.M. took after separation or any diminished contact, a 

presumed father does not lose his status merely because of a temporal gap in visitation,

and “[w]hether the bond remains intact . . . is a fact-bound decision for the trial court to 

make.” (C.A. v. C.P., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 38.) Here, the court found that despite 

more limited contact, there was still an existing parental relationship between R.M. and 

E.S. Further, the court found that “[c]onsidering the totality of all relevant factors, this 

court finds that [R.M.] has an existing parental relationship with [E.S.] such that it should 

be maintained and maintaining that relationship is in her best interest, for it would be 

detrimental to [E.S.] to sever this relationship.” This ultimate finding was supported by 

substantial evidence: “As discussed above, the minor has an established, parental 

relationship with [R.M]. Preserving such a relationship is precisely the purpose of the 

amendment to section 7612 to permit multiple presumed parents.” (In re Alexander P., 

supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 498.) 

With respect to the court’s detriment finding, Mother also argues E.S.’s 

relationship with her biological father was irrelevant to her relationship with R.M. It was 

not. (Martinez v. Vaziri (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 373, 387-388.) Additionally, Mother 

contends “the court’s concern regarding E.S.’s sibling relationship is misplaced” because 

children in blended families often visit their respective fathers separately from halfsiblings. This does not mean that it is error to consider the third party’s relationship with 

siblings. Mother has failed to demonstrate any basis to disturb the court’s detriment 

finding. As such, we must affirm the courts finding that it would be detrimental not to 

recognize R.M. as a parent under section 7612, subdivision (c).
14

3. Constitutional Challenge

Mother argues section 7612, subdivision (c) is unconstitutional as applied because 

“[a]dding a former stepfather as a third parent over the objection of custodial parents 

violates their rights to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their 

children and eviscerates the presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best 

interests.” “But what [Mother] overlook[s] is that [R.M.], too, is a parent.” (C.A. v. C.P., 

supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 43.) Mother argues C.A.’s rejection of this constitutional 

argument was not dispositive of her claim because in that opinion this court did not 

consider her assertion that a person is not a parent entitled to constitutional rights until 

after the third parent finding, and that to allow such a finding by less than clear and 

convincing proof infringes on parental rights. The authorities Mother cites do not support 

these alleged distinctions. None of these authorities suggest the standard used to declare 

someone a parent, rather than the distinction between parents and nonparents, is relevant. 

Indeed, other courts have rejected similar claims. (See, e.g., R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 776-778 [rejecting argument that standard for establishing presumed 

parent status should be clear and convincing evidence to protect mother’s right to form 

single parent family].) We reject Mother’s constitutional claim and affirm the trial 

court’s third parent status ruling.
15

III. DISPOSITION

The court’s May 14, 2019 ruling is affirmed with respect to R.M.’s parental 

relationship to E.S. 

/S/

 

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

 

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

/S/

 

HULL, J.