UNCLASSIFIED 

Unclassified Report to Congress 

on the Acquisition of Technology 

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction 

and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 

Covering 1 January to 31 December 2010 

The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis hereby submits this 

report in response to a congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 

Intelligence Authorization Act, which states: 

"(a) Reports 

The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress an annual report on -

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use 

and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of 

mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and 

biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and 

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries." 

(b) Submittal dates 

(1) The report required by subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted each 

year to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 

leadership on an annual basis on the dates provided in section 415b of this 

title. 

(2) In this subsection: 

(A) The term "congressional intelligence committees has the meaning 

given that term in section 401 a of this title. 

(8) The term "congressional leadership" means the Speaker and the 

minority leader of the House of Representative and the majority leader 

and the minority leader of the Senate. 

(c) Form of reports 

Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted in 

unclassified form, but may include a classified annex." 

The National Intelligence Council coordinated this report within the Intelligence 

Community (IC). As directed by Section 721, subsection (c) of the Act, this report is 

unclassified. It does not present the details of the IC's assessments of weapons of 

mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are available in 

other classified reports and briefings for the Congress. 

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I. Acquisition by Country 

As required by Section 721 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the 

following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, 

contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced 

conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 31 December 2010. 

This report focuses on key countries that we assess are seeking WMD capabilities. 

Nuclear 

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure and 

continued uranium enrichment and activities related to its heavy water research reactor, 

despite multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions since late 2006 and most 

recently in June 2010 calling for the suspension of those activities. Although Iran made 

progress in expanding its nuclear infrastructure during 2010, some obstacles slowed 

progress during this period. 

• In 2010, Iran continued to make progress enriching uranium at the underground 

cascade halls at Natanz with first-generation centrifuges, and in testing and 

operating advanced centrifuges at the pilot plant there. As of mid-November, Iran 

had produced about 3,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) 

gas product at Natanz, compared to about 1 ,800 ki lograms in November 2009 and 

555 kilograms of LEUF6 in November 2008. Between January and November 2010, 

Iran decreased the number of installed centrifuges from about 8,700 to about 8,400, 

but the number reported to be operating is around 4,800, up from about 3,900 in 

November 2009. 

• Iran still has not installed centrifuges at the Oom Enrichment Facility, revealed in late 

2009, that is designed to house approximately 3,000 centrifuges. Iran plans to use 

Oom for both production of enriched material as well centrifuge research and 

development. 

• Iran in 2010 continued construction of the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor and 

plans to commence operations there in 2013. 

• Iran in 2010 continued to make progress on completing its Bushehr Nuclear Power 

Plant including finishing fuel loading in late November 2010. 

• Iran's Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan shut down for maintenance in 

August 2009 and had not resumed UF6 production as of early November 2010. 

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International Atomic Energy Agency Director General reports to the Board of 

Governors indicate Iran has almost exhausted its imported stockpile of yellowcake. 

Ballistic Missiles 

Iran has continued to develop its ballistic missile program, which it views as its primary 

deterrent. Iran is fielding increased numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic 

missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs) and we judge Tehran will continue to work on producing 

more capable MRBMs and developing space launch vehicles, which incorporate 

technology directly applicable to longer-range missile systems. Iran's ballistic missile 

inventory is one of the largest in the Middle East. 

• In late November 2007, Iran's defense minister claimed Iran had developed a 

new 2,000 km-range missile called the Ashura. Iranian officials on 12 November 

2008 claimed to have launched a two stage, solid propellant missile called the 

Sejil - possibly another name for the Ashura - with a range of 2,000 km. In 

2009, Iran conducted three flight tests of this missile. 

• In late August 2010, Iran's defense minister also announced the test of a new 

SRBM called the Q'iam. The defense minister claimed that the Q'iam was a "new 

class" of missile system, which was more accurate and less vulnerable to 

interception. 

As early as 2005, Iran stated its intentions to send its own satellites into orbit. As of 

January 2008, Tehran reportedly had allocated $250 million to build and purchase 

satellites. Iran announced it would launch four more satellites by 2010 to improve land 

and mobile telephone communications. 

• Iran's President Ahmadi Nejad also announced Tehran would launch a "homeproduced" satellite into orbit in 2008, and several Iranian news websites released 

photos of a new rocket called "Safir." 

• In mid-August 2008, Iran first launched its Safir space launch vehicle, carrying 

the Omid satellite. Iran claimed the launch a success; however US officials 

believed the vehicle did not successfully complete its mission. Iran successfully 

launched the Omid satellite aboard the Safir 2 SL V in early February 2009 

according to press reports. 

• In February 2010, Iran displayed a much larger space launch vehicle dubbed the 

Simorgh, as well as its first stage clustered engines. 

• In December 2010, Iran's defense minister announced that Iran plans to launch 

at least two satellites, both more capable than the Omid, sometime in early 2011 . 

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Iran continued to move toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles, but 

almost certainly remains dependent on foreign suppliers for some key missile 

components. Entities in China and Russia along with North Korea are among likely 

suppliers. Iran has also marketed at least one ballistic missile system for export. 

Chemical and Biological 

We assess that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents 

and conducts research that may have offensive applications. Tehran continues to seek 

dual-use technologies that could advance its capability to produce CW agents. We 

judge that Iran is capable of weaponizing CW agents in a variety of delivery systems. 

Iran probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for 

offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. We assess that Iran has previously 

conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dualuse technologies that could be used for BW. 

North Korea 

Nuclear 

In February 2007, North Korea agreed as part of the Six-Party Talks to "shut down and 

seal for the purposes of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including 

the reprocessing facility" as part of the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint 

Statement of September 2005. In mid-July 2007, North Korean officials shut down the 

Yongbyon 5-megawatt electric (MWe) nuclear reactor, and placed the Yongbyon spentfuel reprocessing facility, the Yongbyon nuclear fuel fabrication plant, and two 

unfinished nuclear reactors under IAEA monitoring. In return, the other five Parties 

agreed to cooperate in economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, 

including the provision of assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel 

oil during the period of Initial Actions and the next phase. 

In the Second-Phase Actions Agreement, signed October 3,2007, Pyongyang 

committed to disable the 5MWe reactor, the reprocessing facility, and the fuel 

fabrication plant by December 31,2007 in exchange for a US commitment to begin the 

process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and to 

advance the processing of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy 

Act, in parallel with the DPRK's Second Phase actions. In November 2007, a team of 

US Department of Energy officials began overseeing disablement activities, including 

the unloading of reactor fuel rods at Yongbyon. In April 2009, North Korea informed the 

US and IAEA officials at Yongbyon that they were to depart at the earliest possible time 

and that North Korea planned to reactivate its nuclear facilities and reprocess the spent 

fuel removed from the reactor. In September 2009, North Korea announced that 

reprocessing of the spent fuel rods was in the final stages and that the recovered 

plutonium was being weaponized. 

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The North's probable nuclear test in May 2009-apparently more successful than its 

2006 test- suggests the North has the capability to produce nuclear weapons with a 

yield of roughly a couple kilotons TNT equivalent. 

In June 2009, North Korea announced that it had begun uranium enrichment work at a 

test stage and was developing technology to produce fuel for a light-water reactor. In 

September 2009, North Korea reported that its uranium enrichment work had entered 

into the completion phase. In November 2010, North Korea revealed a claimed 2,000 

centrifuge uranium enrichment facility to an unofficial US delegation visiting the 

Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and stated it would produce low-enriched uranium 

to fuel a planned light-water reactor under construction at Yongbyon. 

Ballistic Missile 

North Korea continues to pursue the development, production, and deployment of 

ballistic missiles with increasing range and sophistication. It continues to procure 

needed raw materials and components from various foreign sources to support its 

missile industry. 

• North Korea did not conduct any ballistic missile or space launches in 2010, 

following a Taepo Dong 2 launch in April 2009 that failed to orbit a small 

communications satellite and several road-mobile Scud-based missile launches in 

July 2009. 

• North Korea's foreign ministry in April 2009 publicly threatened to conduct flight tests 

of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at an unspecified time. 

• North Korea also continues to develop a mobile IRBM as well as a mobile solidpropellant SRBM. 

Chemical and Biological 

We assess that North Korea has had a longstanding CW program. We judge 

Pyongyang possesses a stockpile of agents. 

North Korea has a biotechnology infrastructure that could support the production of 

various BW agents. We judge that North Korea possesses a conventional munitions 

production infrastructure that could be used to weaponize BW agents. 

Nuclear 

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Syria- despite being a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Party with full-scope IAEA 

safeguards-was engaged for more than a decade in a covert nuclear program 

with North Korean assistance. The program involved construction of a nuclear reactor 

at AI Kibar without informing the IAEA and while taking measures to preserve the site's 

secrecy. We assess the reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for 

nuclear weapons. The reactor was destroyed in September 2007, before it became 

operational, and Syria went to great lengths to try to eradicate evidence of its existence 

and remains generally uncooperative with the IAEA investigation. The covert nature of 

the program, the characteristics of the reactor, and Syria's extreme efforts to deny and 

destroy evidence of the reactor after its destruction are inconsistent with peaceful 

nuclear applications. 

IAEA inspectors visited Syria between 22 and 24 June 2008 and took environmental 

samples at the AI Kibar site. The IAEA reported to the November 2008 Board of 

Governors that analysis of the AI Kibar environmental samples revealed a significant 

number of chemically processed natural uranium particles. The report also noted the 

Agency's assessment that the features of the AI Kibar building were similar to what may 

be found in connection with a reactor site, but stated that the IAEA could not exclude 

the possibility that the building was intended for non-nuclear use. The IAEA is 

continuing its investigation of Syria's nuclear file. 

Ballistic Missile 

Syria possesses one of the largest ballistic missile forces in the Middle East, including 

liquid-propellant Scud SRBMs and Scud-class variants such as Scud C and D. Syria 

also fields the SS-21 solid-propellant SRBM. Syria remains dependent on foreign 

suppliers such as North Korea and Iran for some key ballistic missile technology; 

however, Syria has growing domestic capabilities and poses the risk of missile 

proliferation. 

Chemical and Biological 

Syria continued to seek dual-use technology from foreign sources during the reporting 

period. Syria has had a CW program for many years and has a stockpile of CW agents, 

which can be delivered by aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, and artillery rockets. We 

assess that Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW 

program, including precursor chemicals. 

Syria's biotechnical infrastructure is capable of supporting BW agent development. 

II. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism 

Several terrorist groups, particularly al-Qa'ida, probably remain interested in chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of 

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those capabilities. A number of the 33 US Department of State designated foreign 

terrorist organizations worldwide have previously expressed interest in one or more of 

these capabilities, mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and toxins. Some terrorist 

groups see employing (CBRN) materials as a high-impact option for achieving their 

goals, as even if they do not produce many casualties they would have a psychological 

impact. We believe some of these terrorists aim to use these agents against Western 

targets, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. We continue to be concerned about alQa'ida's stated intent to conduct unconventional attacks against the United States. 

While counterterrorism actions have disrupted al-Qa'ida's near-term efforts to develop a 

sophisticated CBRN attack capability, we judge the group is still intent on its acquisition. 

III. Key Suppliers 

North Korea and entities in Russia and China continue to sell technologies and 

components in the Middle East and South Asia that are dual use and could support 

WMD and missile programs. North Korea is among the world's leading suppliers of 

ballistic missiles and related technologies. Chinese companies have been associated 

with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and missile programs in Iran. 

The problem of secondary proliferation continues to expand, as more countries that 

previously imported weapons and technologies begin indigenous production and export 

those systems. As their domestic capabilities grow, traditional recipients of WMD and 

missile technology also are capable of supplying technology and expertise. In addition, 

independent companies, scientists, and engineers may provide WMD- and missilerelated assistance. 

China 

Chinese entities- including private and state-owned firms- continue to engage in 

WMD-related proliferation activities. The United States in recent years has imposed 

sanctions on several Chinese companies for sales of WMD- and ballistic missile-related 

technologies to states of concern. Although, China has export control legislation that 

approximates Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) controls, enforcement 

continues to fall short. Chinese entities continue to supply a variety of missile-related 

items to multiple customers, including Iran, Syria, and Pakistan. 

China continues to offer for sale SRBMs, that fall below the 300-kilometer range/SOO 

kilogram payload threshold for MTCR Category I systems. China remained a primary 

supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan, which still represents China's 

most important partner in military technology cooperation. 

North Korea 

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North Korea remains committed to selling missiles and related technologies to foreign 

customers. Over the years, it has exported ballistic missile-related equipment, 

components, materials, technical expertise, and/or full missile systems to countries in 

the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. North Korea has demonstrated a 

willingness to sell complete ballistic missile systems and components that have enabled 

other states to acquire longer-range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been 

possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts. 

North Korea's relationships with Iran and Syria remain strong and we assess North 

Korea continues to seek new customers and reengage with previous customers. North 

Korea provided assistance to Syria's covert nuclear effort starting in the late 1990s and 

retains the potential for exporting nuclear materials or technology. 

Russia 

Russian entities remain key suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology to many of 

the world's most active civilian nuclear programs. Russia continues to provide 

assistance to Iran's declared nuclear program, by providing IAEA-safeguarded nuclear 

fuel and expertise to enable completion of Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. 

• Russia has been the primary provider of assistance to India's civilian nuclear 

programs. Russia continues to construct two 1 ,ODD-megawatt light water nuclear 

reactors at Kudankulam. 

• China remains one of Russia's largest customers for nuclear-related equipment. 

Russia and China in 2010 signed several contracts related to the planned 

construction of the third and fourth reactors at China's Russian-designed 

Tianwan nuclear power plant. 

Russian entities also remained a source of dual-use biotechnology equipment and 

related expertise. 

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