NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RUTH MERI ACOSTA, AKA Ruth Mery

Acosta Mejia, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-72052 

Agency No. A094-190-510 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted July 14, 2022

Pasadena, California

Before: BENNETT and KOH, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,**Judge.

Ruth Meri Acosta Mejia, a citizen of Honduras, challenges the decision of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal of the

Immigration Judge (“IJ”)’s denial of her claims for withholding of removal and 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court 

of International Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

AUG 9 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Exercising our 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny the petition. 

“We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s decision that an applicant has 

not established eligibility for . . . withholding of removal[] and CAT protection.” 

Zhiqiang Hu v. Holder, 652 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other 

grounds by Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669 (2021). We will uphold the 

agency’s findings of fact unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled 

to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of 

removal because Acosta failed to establish a clear probability of future persecution. 

Because Acosta did not allege that she experienced past persecution in 

Honduras, she must show a “clear probability of future persecution” to establish 

eligibility for withholding of removal. Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 

(9th Cir. 2010). The agency found that Acosta failed to do so because she did not 

demonstrate: (1) a nexus between her proffered Particular Social Group (“PSG”)—

that being the “Acosta family,” the “Arguellas Mejia family,” and the “Acosta 

Mejia family”—and the harm feared; or that (2) her claimed fear is objectively 

reasonable. Acosta contests both findings, but her arguments are unavailing. 

To the first point, although the agency accepted Acosta’s proposed familybased PSG as cognizable, the agency found that any past harms endured by 
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Acosta—in the form of murders and/or disappearances of eight family members—

did not come about because of membership in the family. On appeal, Acosta has 

not identified a specific commonality among her family members to explain why 

they as a family are targets. Acosta’s own explanations—that various family 

members were murdered or disappeared for witnessing crimes, resisting extortion,

and/or serving as a judge—support the IJ’s assessment that her “family were 

victims of criminal actors” who sought out various opportunistic moments to harm 

and/or extort money from Acosta’s family members unconnected to a protected 

ground. 

To the second point, although the agency articulated multiples issues

undermining the objective reasonability of Acosta’s fear of future persecution, on 

appeal, Acosta only responds to one of them. Namely, Acosta contends that the 

continued presence and safety of various family members in Honduras does not 

undercut her objective fear of future persecution on family-based grounds because 

the agency failed to make a finding that the identified remaining family members

are “similarly situated” to her. However, the agency did make such a finding and 

the record does not compel a contrary determination where several of Acosta’s 

remaining family members share her last name and continue to reside in Honduras. 

Indeed, as the IJ observed, Acosta herself resided in Honduras without incident for 

four years after her brother disappeared after witnessing a bank robbery.
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Because Acosta has not raised any arguments sufficient to disturb the 

agency’s determination that she failed to establish a clear probability of future 

persecution, the BIA properly upheld the IJ’s order denying withholding of 

removal.

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Acosta is 

ineligible for CAT relief because she failed to show she is more likely than not to 

be tortured in Honduras by or with the acquiescence of the government. 

On appeal, Acosta’s argument seems to be that because the Honduran

government would not be able to protect her, the court should find acquiescence 

rising to the level of torture. We have rejected such arguments. Andrade-Garcia v. 

Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the 

government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show 

acquiescence.”). Moreover, record evidence—such as human rights reports by the 

State Department—shows that the Honduran government is trying to combat the 

kind of gang violence Acosta fears, and that the authorities were responsive to the 

Acosta family following each gang-related fatality that befell her relatives.

Because Acosta has not shown that the record compels a finding of

government acquiescence in torture, the BIA properly upheld the IJ’s order 

denying her claim for protection under the CAT. 

PETITION DENIED.