```
                                                                 
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued 
Management Challenges (23-SEP-02, GAO-02-1122T).		 
                                                                 
To protect the nation from terrorist attacks, homeland security  
stakeholders must more effectively work together to strengthen	 
the process by which critical information can be shared,	 
analyzed, integrated and disseminated to help prevent or minimize
terrorist activities. The success of a homeland security strategy
relies on the ability of all levels of government and the private
sector to communicate and cooperate effectively with one another.
Activities that are hampered by organizational fragmentation,	 
technological impediments, or ineffective collaboration blunt the
nation's collective efforts to prevent or minimize terrorist	 
acts. The challenges facing the homeland security community	 
require a commitment to focus on transformational strategies,	 
including strengthening the risk management framework, refining  
the strategic and policy guidance structure to emphasize	 
collaboration and integration among all relevant stakeholders,	 
and bolstering the fundamental management foundation integral to 
effective public sector performance and accountability. 	 
Implementation of these strategies along with effective oversight
will be necessary to institutionalize and integrate a long-term  
approach to sustainable and affordable homeland security.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-1122T					        
    ACCNO:   A05205						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face   
Continued Management Challenges 				 
     DATE:   09/23/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Government information dissemination		 
	     Information resources management			 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Performance measures				 

                                                                 
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued 
Management Challenges (01-OCT-02, GAO-02-1122T).		 
                                                                 
To protect the nation from terrorist attacks, homeland security  
stakeholders must more effectively work together to strengthen	 
the process by which critical information can be shared,	 
analyzed, integrated and disseminated to help prevent or minimize
terrorist activities. The success of a homeland security strategy
relies on the ability of all levels of government and the private
sector to communicate and cooperate effectively with one one	 
another. Activities that are hampered by organizational 	 
fragmentation, technological impediments, or ineffective	 
collaboration blunt the nation's collective efforts to prevent or
minimize terrorist acts. The challenges facing the homeland	 
security community require a commitment to focus on		 
transformational strategies, including strengthening the risk	 
management framework, refining the strategic and policy guidance 
structure to emphasize collaboration and integration among all	 
relevant stakeholders, and bolstering the fundamental management 
foundation integral to effective public sector performance and	 
accountability. Implementation of these strategies along with	 
effective oversight will be necessary to institutionalize and	 
integrate a long-term approach to sustainable and affordable	 
homeland security.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-1122T					        
    ACCNO:   A05205						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face   
Continued Management Challenges 				 
     DATE:   10/01/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Government information dissemination		 
	     Information resources management			 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Performance measures				 

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GAO-02-1122T

GAO United States General Accounting Office

a

Test i mony Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U. S. Congress Statement
for the Record

September 23, 2002 For Release on October 1, 2002

HOMELAND SECURITY Information Sharing Activities Face Continued Management
Challenges

Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States

GAO- 02- 1122T

Page 1 GAO- 02- 1122T Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Committees:
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, both the Administration

and Congress have focused on the performance of the intelligence community
and whether intelligence and other information is effectively shared *
between federal agencies, with state and local law enforcement and other
officials, and with private entities * to prevent or respond to terrorist
attacks. Both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have, in their joint inquiry,
helped to illuminate many issues from which lessons can be drawn

to improve how our intelligence community and other homeland security
stakeholders share, analyze, integrate and disseminate important
information, both at home and overseas.

Today, governments at all levels, as well as private sector entities,
recognize that they have a greater role to play in protecting the nation
from terrorist attacks. To achieve this collective goal, homeland security
stakeholders must more effectively work together to strengthen the

process by which critical information can be shared, analyzed, integrated
and disseminated to help prevent or minimize terrorist activities. The
work of these committees and of others in Congress and the Administration
in crafting solutions to leverage agencies* abilities and willingness to
share timely, useful information is critical to the fundamental
transformation

required in our homeland security community to ensure an affordable,
sustainable and broad- based response to new and emerging threats to our
country. In your request that GAO provide a statement for the record, you
asked us to focus on the information sharing activities of the
intelligence, law enforcement, and other agencies involved in homeland
security, as well as the role of state and local governments and the
private sector. You also requested that we provide a description and
status of the principal recommendations we have made related to combating
terrorism.

We have developed an extensive body of work on combating terrorism over
the years and more recently we have issued a number of reports on homeland
security. Based on GAO*s Strategic Plan issued in January 2000, which
included a new emphasis on addressing key emerging threats to national
security in a post- Cold War environment, GAO issued many

reports prior to September 11 th on combating terrorism and related
matters. At the request of Congress, or on our own initiative, we
currently have more than 80 engagements under way to examine a variety of

Page 2 GAO- 02- 1122T homeland security issues. Our ongoing work includes
evaluations of information sharing activities in homeland security,
including reviews of airport and transportation security, seaport security
and law enforcement agencies. However, as the committees are aware, GAO*s
work in evaluating the activities of the intelligence community
historically has been limited,

due in part to limitations imposed by the intelligence agencies and the
small number of requests made by Congress. My statement today reflects
this limitation on evaluations of the intelligence community and focuses
more broadly on information sharing among various homeland security
stakeholders.

In my testimony today, I will discuss (1) some of the challenges to
effective information sharing, including the fragmentation of information
analysis responsibilities, and technology and collaboration challenges,
and (2) GAO*s views on addressing these challenges through
transformational strategies, including strengthening the risk management
framework; refining the national strategy, policy, and guidance structures
to emphasize

collaboration and integration among homeland security stakeholders to
achieve common goals; and bolstering the fundamental management foundation
integral to effective public sector performance and accountability. The
statement also includes an appendix that lists GAO*s recommendations on
combating terrorism and the status of their implementation, as well as a
list of related products. Challenges to Effective Information Sharing

The success of a homeland security strategy relies on the ability of all
levels of government and the private sector to communicate and cooperate
effectively with one another. Activities that are hampered by

organizational fragmentation, technological impediments, or ineffective
collaboration blunt the nation*s collective efforts to prevent or minimize
terrorist acts.

Page 3 GAO- 02- 1122T Information Sharing Fragmentation

GAO and other observers of the federal government*s organization,
performance, and accountability for combating terrorism and homeland
security functions have long recognized the prevalence of gaps,
duplication, and overlaps driven in large part by the absence of a central
policy focal point, fragmented missions, ineffective information sharing,
human capital needs, institutional rivalries, and cultural challenges. In
recent years, GAO has made numerous recommendations related to

changes necessary for improving the government*s response to combating
terrorism. 1 Prior to the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security
(OHS), GAO found that the federal government lacked overall homeland
security leadership and management accountable to both the President and
Congress. GAO has also stated that fragmentation exists in both
coordination of domestic preparedness programs and in efforts to develop a
national strategy. 2 GAO believes that the consolidation of some homeland
security functions

makes sense and will, if properly organized and implemented, over time
lead to more efficient, effective, and coordinated programs, better
information sharing, and a more robust protection of our people, borders,

and critical infrastructure. 3 At the same time, even the proposed
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), will still be just one of many
players with important roles and responsibilities for ensuring homeland
security. In addition, the creation of DHS will not be a panacea. It will
create certain new costs and risks, which must be addressed.

As it is with so many other homeland security areas, it is also the case
for intelligence and information sharing that there are many stakeholders
who must work together to achieve common goals. Effective analysis,
integration, and dissemination of intelligence and other information
critical to homeland security requires the involvement of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
National Security

Council (NSC), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of
Defense (DOD), and a myriad of other agencies, and will also include the 1
U. S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges
and Related Recommendations, GAO- 01- 822 (Washington, D. C.: September
2001). 2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Comments on
Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy, GAO- 01- 556T
(Washington, D. C.: March 27, 2001). 3 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues, GAO- 02-
957T (Washington, D. C.: July 17, 2002).

Page 4 GAO- 02- 1122T proposed DHS. State and local governments and the
private sector also have critical roles to play * as do significant
portions of the international

community. Information is already being shared between and among numerous
government and private sector organizations and more can be done to
facilitate even greater sharing, analyzing, integrating, and disseminating
of information.

We have observed fragmentation of information analysis and sharing
functions potentially requiring better coordination in many homeland
security areas. For example, in a recent report on critical infrastructure
protection (CIP), we indicated that some 14 different agencies or
components had responsibility for analysis and warning activities for
cyber

CIP. 4 Our recent testimony on aviation security indicated that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), FBI and the Department of
State all need the capacity to identify aliens in the United States who
are in violation of their visa status, have broken U. S. laws, or are
under

investigation for criminal activity, including terrorism. 5 GAO has also
noted that information sharing coordination difficulties can occur within
single departments, such as those addressed in our July 2001 review of FBI
intelligence investigations and coordination within the Department of
Justice. 6 Procedures established by the Attorney General in 1995
required, in part, that the FBI notify the Criminal Division and the
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review whenever a foreign
counterintelligence investigation utilizing authorized surveillance and
searches develops

** facts or circumstances* that reasonably indicate that a significant
federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed*.* However,
according to Criminal Division officials, required notifications did not
always occur and often, when they did, were not timely. The Attorney

General and the FBI issued additional procedures to address the
coordination concerns and ensure compliance, but these efforts have not
been institutionalized.

4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Federal Efforts Require a More Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for
Protecting Information Systems, GAO- 02- 474 (Washington, D. C.: July 15,
2002). 5 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security:
Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long- Term
Challenges, GAO- 02- 971T (Washington, D. C.: July 25, 2002). 6 U. S.
General Accounting Office, FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination
Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited, GAO-
01- 780 (Washington, D. C.: July 2001).

Page 5 GAO- 02- 1122T Technological Impediments This country has
tremendous resources at its disposal, including leading edge technologies,
a superior research and development base, extensive expertise, and
significant human capital resources. 7 However, there are substantial
challenges in leveraging these tools and using them effectively

to ensure that timely, useful information is appropriately disseminated to
prevent or minimize terrorist attacks. One challenge is determining and
implementing the right format and standards for collecting data so that
disparate agencies can aggregate and integrate data sets. For example,
Extensible Markup Language (XML) standards are one option for exchanging
information among disparate systems. 8 Further, guidelines and procedures
need to be specified to establish effective data collection processes, and
mechanisms need to be put in place to make sure that this happens * again,
a difficult task, given the large number of government,

private, and other organizations that will be involved in data collection.
Mechanisms will be needed to disseminate data, making sure that it gets
into the hands of the right people at the right time. It will be equally
important to disaggregate information in order to build baselines
(normative models) of activity for detecting anomalies that would indicate
the nature and seriousness of particular vulnerabilities. Additionally,
there

is a lack of connectivity between databases and technologies important to
the homeland security effort. Databases belonging to federal law
enforcements agencies, for example, are frequently not connected, nor are

the databases of the federal, state, and local governments. In fact, we
have reported for years on federal information systems that are
duplicative and not well integrated. 9 7 U. S. General Accounting Office,
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy, GAO02-
811T (Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002). 8 XML is the universal format for
structured documents and data on the Web that makes it easy for a computer
to generate data, read data, and ensure that the data structure is

unambiguous. XML avoids common pitfalls in language design: It is
extensible, platformindependent, and supports internationalization and
localization. XML is a flexible, nonproprietary set of standards for
annotating or *tagging* information so that it can be transmitted over a
network and readily interpreted by disparate systems. For more information
on its potential use for electronic government initiatives, see U. S.
General Accounting Office, Electronic Government: Challenges to Effective
Adoption of the Extensible Markup Language, GAO- 02- 327 (Washington, D.
C.: April 2002).

9 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Enterprise
Architecture Use Across the Federal Government Can Be Improved, GAO- 02- 6
(Washington, D. C.: February 2002).

Page 6 GAO- 02- 1122T Ineffective Collaboration Ineffective collaboration
among homeland security stakeholders remains one of the principal
impediments to integrating and sharing information in order to prevent and
minimize terrorist attacks. The committees* joint

inquiry staff*s initial report detailing numerous examples of strategic
information known by the intelligence community prior to September 11th
highlights the need to better ensure effective integration, collaboration,
and dissemination of critical material. 10 The joint inquiry staff*s
report focuses on the national intelligence community, but its
implications are clearly

evident for all homeland security stakeholders * government at all levels,
as well as the private sector, must work closely together to analyze,
integrate, and appropriately disseminate all useful information to the

relevant stakeholders in order to combat terrorism and make the nation
more secure.

GAO recognizes that this goal is easier to articulate than achieve and
that some long- standing obstacles to improving information sharing
between and among stakeholders at all levels will require significant
changes in organizational cultures, shifts in patterns of access to and
limitations on information, and improved processes to facilitate
communication and interaction.

GAO*s ongoing work illuminates some of the issues. For instance, officials
from the Department of Justice, FBI, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense indicated that the vast majority of information* about 90 percent*
is already publicly available, and that only about 10 percent of the
information is classified, sensitive, or otherwise restricted. The
officials said that the expectation for all homeland security participants
to obtain actionable information (actionable intelligence is information
that is specific enough to tell who, what, where, and when an attack will
take

place) is unrealistic because, in most cases, the data do not exist or
cannot be recognized as actionable. These officials also said that they do
share actionable information with appropriate entities, but must also
balance the release of the information against the possibility of
disclosures that may

reveal the sources and methods used to collect the information. Non
federal officials tend to echo these concerns. Since September 11 th , GAO
has met with representatives of various state and local organizations 10
U. S. Congress, House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees, Joint
Inquiry Staff

Statement, Part I, (Washington, D. C.: September 18, 2002).

Page 7 GAO- 02- 1122T and conducted dozens of case studies of transit
authorities, port authorities, and pipeline safety commissions and others
entities, as well as

testified before and heard testimonies from federal, state, and local
officials at 11 congressional field hearings around the country. State and
local officials continue to be frustrated by difficulties in the
communication and sharing of threat information among all levels of
government. Some of the problems they cited include: limited access to
information because of

security clearance issues, the absence of a systematic top- down and
bottom- up information exchange, and uncertainties regarding the
appropriate response to a heightened alert from the new homeland security

advisory system. It is clear that sharing, analyzing, integrating, and
disseminating information needs to occur both in and between all levels of
government -- and throughout organizations both vertically and
horizontally. A number of steps have been taken to address these issues,
but clearly more needs to be done. Following the terrorist attacks of
September 11 th , a review by the Department of Justice found that
America*s ability to detect and prevent terrorism has been undermined
significantly by restrictions that limit the intelligence and law
enforcement communities* access to, and

sharing of, information. The USA Patriot Act, enacted shortly after the
terrorist attacks, was designed to address this problem through enhanced
information sharing and updating information- gathering tools. The Patriot

Act gives federal law enforcement agencies greater freedom to share
information and to coordinate their efforts in the war on terrorism.
Methods to use this authority are now being established and implemented,
but the effectiveness of these changes will need to be evaluated.

Moreover, the private sector has a critical role in reducing our
vulnerability from terrorists. The national strategy for homeland security
states:

*Government at the federal, state, and local level must actively
collaborate and partner with the private sector, which controls 85 percent
of America*s infrastructure.* 11 The strategy further states that the
government at all levels must enable the private sector*s ability to carry
out its protection

responsibilities through effective partnerships and designates the
proposed DHS as the primary contact for coordination at the federal level.

11 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security
(Washington, DC, July 16, 2002).

Page 8 GAO- 02- 1122T Recently, the President*s Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board issued a strategy recognizing that all Americans have a
role to play in cyber security,

and identifies the market mechanisms for stimulating sustained actions to
secure cyberspace. 12 The strategy recommends that the federal government
identify and remove barriers to public- private information

sharing and promote the timely two- way exchange of data to promote
increased cyberspace security. Although industry groups already exchange
security data, confidentiality concerns over the release of information
may limit private sector participation. For example, the technology
industry has

said that any security information shared with the government should be
exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, which
provides that any person has the right to request access to federal agency
records or information. GAO has also reported on how public- private
information sharing practices can benefit CIP. In a report issued last
October, GAO cited a number of important practices, including:

 establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of federal and
nonfederal entities that may be in a position to provide potentially
useful information and advice on vulnerabilities and incidents;

 developing standards and agreements on how information will be used and
protected;

 establishing effective and appropriately secure communications
mechanisms; and

 taking steps to ensure that sensitive information is not inappropriately
disseminated, which may require statutory change. 13 Clearly, these
practices are applicable to intelligence and information

sharing in the broadest sense* and for stakeholders. Effectively
implementing these practices will require using the full range of
management and policy tools.

12 The President*s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, The National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Draft (Washington, D. C.: September 2002).
13 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Sharing: Practices That
Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection GAO- 02- 24 (Washington, D.
C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

Page 9 GAO- 02- 1122T Addressing the Challenges

GAO believes that the challenges facing the homeland security community
require a commitment to focus on transformational strategies, including
strengthening the risk management framework, refining the strategic and
policy guidance structure to emphasize collaboration and integration among
all relevant stakeholders, and bolstering the fundamental management
foundation integral to effective public sector performance and
accountability. Implementation of these strategies along with effective
oversight will be necessary to institutionalize and integrate a long- term
approach to sustainable and affordable homeland security.

Comprehensive Risk and Threat Assessment Needed

The events of September 11 th have clearly shown the need for a
comprehensive risk and threat assessment. Such an assessment, which needs
to be integrated at all levels within the homeland security community, is
necessary to better protect the nation*s people, borders, and property. As
your committees* work indicates, threats are many, and

sources are numerous. A comprehensive assessment can help the nation to
better understand and manage the risks associated with terrorism.
Moreover, a comprehensive risk and threat assessment is critical to
setting priorities and allocating resources. There is no such thing as
zero risk and, therefore, hard choices must be made given our limited
resources over the coming years.

Previously, GAO observed that the federal government has not effectively
planned and implemented risk assessment and management efforts. We noted
in testimony before Congress last October that individual federal agencies
have efforts under way, but the results to date have been inconclusive. 14
In the past, we have recommended that the FBI and the DOD enhance their
efforts to complete threat and vulnerability assessments and to work with
state and local governments in order to provide comprehensive approaches.
Although some of this work was

accomplished, delays resulting from the September 11th attacks have
prevented their completion. Nevertheless, assessments can help in efforts
to pinpoint risks and reallocate resources: For example, after September
11th the Coast Guard conducted initial risk assessments of the nation*s

ports. The Coast Guard identified high- risk infrastructure and facilities
14 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management
Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO- 02- 208T (Washington, D. C.:
October 31, 2001).

Page 10 GAO- 02- 1122T within specific areas of operation, which helped it
to determine how to deploy resources to better ensure harbor security.

The Administration clearly recognizes the importance of such assessments.
The national homeland security strategy points out that vulnerability
assessments must be an integral part of the intelligence cycle for
homeland security activities. They would allow planners to project the
consequences of possible terrorist attacks against specific facilities or
different sectors of the economy or government. The strategy also states
the U. S. government does not now perform comprehensive vulnerability
assessments of all the

nation*s critical infrastructure and key assets. Integration of Strategic
and Policy Framework Needed

GAO has long advocated the development and implementation of a national
strategy to integrate and manage homeland security functions. The national
strategy for homeland security released by the Administration last summer
recognizes information sharing and systems as key factors cutting across
all mission areas in linking and more effectively using the nation*s
information systems to better support homeland security. The issuance of
this strategy is a very important step. Moreover, information systems and
processes will need to be better integrated to support the goals
established by the strategy.

In our current world, we can no longer think of information sharing,
analysis, integration, and dissemination in terms of just the traditional
intelligence community. Today, a broader network for information sharing
includes the traditional intelligence community, U. S. allies, other
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. To
optimize such a network, it is important to have a strong, strategic
planning framework and a supporting policy structure.

In addition, the national strategy identified one key homeland security
mission area as intelligence and warning to detect and prevent terrorist
actions. The intent is to provide timely and useful actionable information
based on the review and analysis of homeland security information. The
national strategy describes a number of initiatives to better develop
opportunities for leveraging information sharing among homeland security
stakeholders, including:

 Integrate information sharing across the federal government. This
initiative addresses coordinating the sharing of essential homeland
security information, including the design and implementation of an

Page 11 GAO- 02- 1122T interagency information architecture to support
efforts to find, track, and respond to terrorist threats. This effort is
among the

Administration*s budget priorities for fiscal year 2004.

 Integrate information sharing across state and local governments,
private industry, and citizens. This initiative describes efforts to
disseminate information from the federal government to state and local
homeland security officials. One effort, to allow the exchange of
information on federal and state government Web sites, has been completed.

 Adopt common *meta- data* standards for electronic information relevant
to homeland security. This initiative is intended to integrate terrorist-
related information from government databases and allow the use of *data
mining* tools for homeland security. This effort is under

way.

 Improve public safety emergency communications. This initiative is
intended to develop comprehensive emergency communications systems that
can disseminate information about vulnerabilities and protective measures
and help manage incidents. State and local governments often report that
there are deficiencies in their communications capabilities, including the
lack of interoperable systems. Such systems are necessary between and
among all levels of government. This effort is planned, but no timeline is
indicated.

 Ensure reliable public health information. The last initiative is
intended to address reliable communication between medical, veterinary,
and public health organizations. It is under way.

Page 12 GAO- 02- 1122T While these initiatives provide a starting point
for improved information sharing, their effective and timely
implementation is not assured. A

commitment to achieve these objectives must be emphasized. Implementation
will require integration, coordination, and collaboration between
organizations both within and outside the federal government. Further, the
initiatives tend to rely on the creation of DHS for their

complete implementation, a department that will require a considerable
transition period to reach full potential. Improvements in efficiency and
effectiveness are expected in the long term, but there will be additional
costs and challenges, as the new department faces tremendous
communications, human capital, information technology, and other

integration, challenges. 15 Moreover, it is also important to note that
the national strategy for homeland security is one of several national
strategies that address general and specific security and terrorism
related issues. In addition to the homeland security strategy, the
Administration recently released a national security strategy. The
Administration has stated that the national security strategy could, in
conjunction with the homeland security strategy, be

viewed as an overarching framework. There are also requirements for
several other strategies that cover specific aspects of national and
homeland security. These include the National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, National Money Laundering
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Drug Control Strategy.
These strategies reflect important elements supporting national and
homeland security.

In is important that clear linkages be established among the various
strategies to ensure common purpose within an overarching framework in
order to clearly define specific roles, responsibilities, and resource
priorities. An overarching, integrated framework can help to sort out
issues of potential duplication, overlap, and conflict * not only for the
federal government, but for all key stakeholders. While the individual
plans will articulate roles and responsibilities, as well as set goals,
objectives and priorities for their areas, effective integration is
necessary to ensure that initiatives are undertaken that complement, not
conflict with, each other. 15 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland
Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has

Merit, But Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success, GAO- 02- 886T
(Washington, D. C.: June 25, 2002).

Page 13 GAO- 02- 1122T Further, integration would allow for the better
utilization of resources. Given the many challenges we face, we do not
have the resources do everything and must make some hard choices.

Finally, a comprehensive, integrated strategic framework requires a review
of the policies and processes that currently guide sharing, analysis,
integration, and dissemination of intelligence and other critical
information to homeland security stakeholders. Indeed, the policy
structure currently in place is principally the product of a Cold War
environment, in which

threats to the United States occurred mainly on foreign soil. New and
emerging threats clearly demonstrate that terrorist acts can * and will *
impact America at home. The changing nature of the threats present an
opportunity for the homeland security community to revisit the legal and
policy structure to ensure that it effectively creates an environment for
the type of broad- based information sharing needed to protect America at
home. It is not just the intelligence community, or the federal
government, that have roles, as well as needs, in this evolving
environment. Information

can be collected by many sources and analyzed to identify potential
threats. This information must be disseminated to all relevant parties *
whether it is to a federal agency or another level of government. The
volume and sources of threats, as your committees have reported, present
new and serious challenges to our ability to analyze and integrate
information into meaningful threat assessments. Not least, this will
require attention to government*s capacity to handle the increased volume
of information.

Our policy structures need to adapt to these challenges. In fact, the
government has recently implemented several measures that promote the
sharing of information between all levels of government. For example, the
USA Patriot Act provides for greater sharing of intelligence information
among federal agencies. The FBI has also implemented several initiatives

that would increase information sharing between all levels of government,
including increasing the number of its Joint Terrorism Task Forces, to be
located at each of its 56 field offices; and establishing the Terrorism
Watch List to serve as its single, integrated list of individuals of
investigative

interest. The FBI plans to make the list accessible throughout the law
enforcement and intelligence communities. All of these are recent changes,
of course, and will take time to fully

implement. It will be important to assess how effective these and other
changes are in promoting needed and appropriate information sharing. GAO
stands ready to assist the Congress in these efforts.

Page 14 GAO- 02- 1122T Management Success Factors As the recent proposals
to create DHS indicate, the terrorist events of last

fall have provided an impetus for the government to look at the larger
picture of how it provides homeland security and how it can best
accomplish associated missions * both now and over the long term. This
imperative is particularly clear for the homeland security community,

where information sharing and collaboration issues remain a challenge. In
this environment, there exists a very real need and possibly a unique
opportunity to rethink approaches and priorities to enable the homeland
security community to better target its resources to address the most
urgent needs. In some cases, the new emphasis on homeland security has
prompted attention to long- standing problems that have suddenly become

more pressing. In other cases, it will be equally important for
organizations to focus on the fundamental building blocks necessary for
effective public sector performance and accountability * foundations that
readily apply to the homeland security community. In recent months, we
have testified about the long- term implementation challenges that the
homeland security community faces * not only in ensuring an effective
transition to a consolidated DHS, but in strengthening the relationships
among and between all stakeholders to facilitate transformational change
that can be sustained in years to come. There are many tools that
organizations involved in homeland security might consider to drive
necessary changes for better collaboration and integration of information
sharing activities. One such tool is the Chief Operating Officer (COO)
concept. Strategic positioning of COOs can provide a central point to
elevate attention on management issues and transformational change, to
integrate various key management functions and responsibilities, and to
institutionalize accountability for management issues and leading change.

Page 15 GAO- 02- 1122T Despite some assertions to the contrary, there is
no meaningful distinction between the intelligence community, other
homeland security organizations, or even other public sector agencies when
it comes to creating an environment where strong leadership and
accountability for results drives a transformational culture. Over the
years, GAO has made observations and recommendations about many success
factors required for public sector effectiveness, based on effective
management of people,

technology, financial, and other issues, especially in its biannual
Performance and Accountability Series on major government departments. 16
These factors include the following:

 Strategic Planning: Leading results- oriented organizations focus on the
process of strategic planning that includes involvement of stakeholders,
assessment of internal and external environments, and an alignment of
activities, core processes and resources to support mission- related
outcomes.

 Organizational Alignment: Operations should be aligned in a way that
provides for effective sharing of information, consistent with the goals
and objectives established in the national homeland security strategy.

 Communication: Effective communication strategies are key to any major
transformation effort and help to instill an organizational culture that
lends itself to effective sharing of information.  Building Partnerships:
A key challenge is the development and

maintenance of homeland security partners at all levels of the government
and the private sector, both in the United States and overseas.

 Performance Management: An effective performance management system
fosters institutional, unit, and individual accountability.

 Human Capital Strategy: As with other parts of the government, homeland
security agencies must ensure that their homeland security missions are
not adversely impacted by the government*s pending

human capital crisis, and that they can recruit, retain, and reward a 16
U. S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO- 01- 241 (Washington, D. C.:
January 2001).

Page 16 GAO- 02- 1122T talented and motivated workforce, which has
required core competencies, to achieve their mission and objectives.

 Information Management and Technology: State- of- the art enabling
technology is critical to enhance the ability to transform capabilities
and capacities to share and act upon timely, quality information about
terrorist threats.

 Knowledge Management: The homeland security community must foster
policies and activities that make maximum use of the collective body of
knowledge that will be brought together to determine and deter terrorist
threats.  Financial Management: All public sector entities have a
stewardship obligation to prevent fraud, waste and abuse, to use tax
dollars appropriately, and to ensure financial accountability to the
President, Congress and the American people.

 Acquisition Management: The homeland security community, along with the
proposed DHS, in the coming years will potentially have one of the most
extensive acquisition requirements in government. High- level attention to
strong systems and controls for acquisition and related business processes
will be critical both to ensuring success and maintaining integrity and
accountability.

 Risk Management: Homeland security agencies must be able to maintain and
enhance current states of readiness while transitioning and transforming
themselves into more effective and efficient collaborative cultures.

Creating and sustaining effective homeland security organizations will
require strong commitment to these public sector foundations to foster our
nation*s safety. Building Effective Systems Of all the management success
factors applicable to the homeland security community, one of the most
important is the establishment of effective

communications and information systems. Such systems will likely be
critical to our efforts to build an integrated approach to information
sharing. Meaningful understanding of inter- and intra- agency information
sharing (intelligence or otherwise) necessitates the development of models
depicting both how this occurs today and how this should occur tomorrow

Page 17 GAO- 02- 1122T to optimize mission performance. Such modeling is
referred to as developing and implementing enterprise architectures, which
in the simplest of terms can be described as blueprints (both business and
technology) for transforming how an organization operates. Included in

these architectures are information models defining, among other things,
what information is needed and used by whom, where, when, and in what
form. Without having such an architectural context within which to view

the entity in question, a meaningful understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of information sharing is virtually impossible.

Currently, such an understanding within the homeland security arena does
not exist. At OHS steps are being taken to develop enterprise
architectures for each of the proposed department*s four primary mission
areas. According to the chief architect for this effort, working groups
have been established for three of the four homeland security mission
areas and they are in the process of developing business models (to
include information

exchange matrixes), that are based on the national strategy and that
define how agencies currently perform these mission areas. For the fourth,
which is information analysis and infrastructure protection (i. e.,
intelligence information sharing), the office is in the process of forming
the working group. The goal of the groups is to follow OMB*s enterprise
architecture framework, 17 and deliver an initial set of architecture
models describing

how homeland security agencies operate by December 31, 2002. Human Capital
Emphasis Human capital is another critical ingredient required for
homeland security success. The government- wide increase in homeland
security activities has

created a demand for personnel with skills in areas such as information
technology, foreign language proficiencies, and law enforcement * without
whom, critical information has less chance of being shared, analyzed,
integrated, and disseminated in a timely, effective manner. A GAO report
issued in January 2002 stresses that foreign language translator
shortages,

combined in part with advances in technology, at some federal agencies
have exacerbated translation backlogs in intelligence and other
information. These shortfalls have adversely affected agency operations

17 This framework provides for the following set of reference models:
business, performance measures, data and information, application
capabilities, and technology and standards.

Page 18 GAO- 02- 1122T and hindered U. S. military, law enforcement,
intelligence, counter terrorism and diplomatic efforts. 18 GAO believes it
is reasonable for certain human capital and management

flexibilities to be granted, provided that they are accompanied by
adequate transparency and appropriate safeguards designed to prevent abuse
and to provide for Congressional oversight. Such flexibilities might prove
useful to other entities involved in critical information sharing
activities. Moreover, the proposed department, similar to other federal
agencies,

would benefit from integrating a human capital strategy within its
strategic planning framework. Naturally, this framework would apply to the
intelligence community at large, as well as other homeland security
stakeholders.

While recent events certainly underscore the need to address the federal
government*s human capital challenges, the underlying problem emanates
from the longstanding lack of a consistent strategic approach to
marshaling, managing, and maintaining the human capital needed to maximize
government performance and assure government*s accountability. Serious
human capital shortfalls are eroding the capacity of many agencies, and
threatening the ability of others to economically,

efficiently, and effectively perform their missions. The federal
government*s human capital weaknesses did not emerge overnight and will
not be quickly or easily addressed. Committed, sustained, and inspired
leadership and persistent attention from all interested parties will be
essential if lasting changes are to be made and the challenges we face
successfully addressed.

GAO*s model of strategic human capital management embodies an approach
that is fact- based, focused on strategic results, and incorporates merit
principles and other national goals. As such, the model reflects two
principles central to the human capital idea:

 People are assets whose value can be enhanced through investment. As
with any investment, the goal is to maximize value while managing risk.

 An organization*s human capital approaches should be designed,
implemented, and assessed by the standard of how well they help the 18 U.
S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach
Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO- 02- 375
(Washington, D. C.: January 2002).

Page 19 GAO- 02- 1122T organization pursue its mission and achieve desired
results or outcomes. The cornerstones to effective human capital planning
include leadership; strategic human capital planning; acquiring,
developing and retaining

talent; and building results- oriented organizational cultures. The
homeland security and intelligence communities must include these factors
in their management approach in order to leverage high performance
organizations in this critical time.

Institutional Oversight Finally, it is important to note that the success
of our nation*s efforts to defend and protect our homeland against
terrorism depends on effective oversight by the appropriate parts of our
government. The oversight entities of the executive branch * including the
Inspectors General, the OMB and OHS -- have a vital role to play in
ensuring expected performance and accountability. Likewise, the committees
of the Congress and the GAO, as the investigative arm of the legislative
branch, have long term and broad institutional roles to play in supporting
the nation*s efforts to strengthen homeland security and prevent and
mitigate terrorism. GAO

recognizes the sensitive issues surrounding oversight of the intelligence
and law enforcement communities, and we work collaboratively to find a
balance between facilitating the needs of legitimate legislative oversight
and preventing disclosure of national security and law enforcement
sensitive information. Yet, as GAO has testified previously, our ability
to be

fully effective in our oversight role of homeland security, including the
intelligence community, is at times limited. Historically, the FBI, CIA,
NSA, and others have limited our access to information, and Congress*s
request for evaluations of the CIA have been minimal. 19 Given both the
increasing importance of information sharing in preventing terrorism and
the increased investment of resources to strengthen homeland security, it
seems prudent that constructive oversight of critical intelligence and

information sharing operations by the legislative branch be focused on the
implementation of a long term transformation program and to foster
information sharing in the homeland security community.

19 U. S. General Accounting Office, Central Intelligence Agency:
Observations on GAO Access to Information on CIA Programs and Activities,
GAO- 01- 975T (Washington, D. C.: July 18, 2001).

Page 20 GAO- 02- 1122T In summary, I have discussed the challenges and
approaches to improving information sharing among homeland security
organizations, as well as the overall management issues that they face
along with other public sector organizations. However, the single most
important element of any

successful transformation is the commitment of top leaders. Top leadership
involvement and clear lines of accountability for making management
improvements are critical to overcoming an organization*s natural
resistance to change, marshaling the resources needed to improve
management, and building and maintaining organization- wide commitment to
new ways of doing business. Organizational cultures will not be
transformed, and new visions and ways of doing business will not take root
without strong and sustained leadership. Strong and visionary leadership
will be vital to creating a unified, focused homeland security community
whose participants can act together to help protect our homeland.

This concludes my written testimony. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you or members of the committees may have.

Page 21 GAO- 02- 1122T Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating

Terrorism and Homeland Security Appendi x I

This appendix provides a compendium of selected GAO recommendations for
combating terrorism and homeland security and their status. GAO has
conducted a body of work on combating terrorism since 1996 and, more
recently, on homeland security. Many of our recommendations have been
either completely or partially implemented, with particular success in the

areas of (1) defining homeland security, (2) developing a national
strategy for homeland security, (3) creating a central focal point for
coordinating efforts across agencies, (4) tracking funds to combat
terrorism, (5) improving command and control structures, (6) developing
interagency guidance, (7) improving the interagency exercise program to
maintain readiness, (8) tracking lessons learned to improve operations,

(9) protecting critical infrastructure, (10) protecting military forces,
(11) consolidating first responder training programs, (12) managing
materials used for weapons of mass destruction, and (13) improving
coordination of research and development. Overall, federal agencies have
made realistic progress in many areas given the complexity of the

environment confronting them. Many additional challenges remain, however,
and some of GAO*s previous recommendations remain either partially
implemented or have not been implemented at all.

The information below details many of our key recommendations and the
status of their implementation. The implementation of many of these
recommendations may be affected by current proposals to transfer certain
functions from a variety of federal agencies to the proposed Department of
Homeland Security. Some of the recommendations have been modified slightly
to fit into this format.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 22 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to
Protect Its Forces Overseas (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 207, July 21, 1997).
Recommendations, p. 20.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop common standards and procedures to
include (1) standardized vulnerability assessments to ensure a consistent
level of quality and to provide a capability to compare the results from
different sites, (2) Department of Defense (DOD)- wide physical security
standards that are measurable yet provide a means for deviations when
required by local circumstances, and (3) procedures to maintain greater
consistency among commands in their implementation of threat condition
security measures.

Implemented. (1) The Joint Staff has sponsored hundreds of vulnerability
assessments* known as Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments*
based on a defined set of criteria. (2) The Joint Staff has issued one
volume of DOD- wide construction standards in December 1999, and plans to
complete two additional volumes by December 2002. (3) DOD has provided
more guidance and outreach programs to share lessons learned among
commands.

To ensure that security responsibility for DOD personnel overseas is
clear, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the necessary steps
to ensure that the memorandum of understanding now under discussion with
the Department of State is signed expeditiously. Further, the Secretary
should provide the geographic

combatant commanders with the guidance to successfully negotiate
implementation agreements with chiefs of mission. Implemented. The
Departments of Defense and State have signed

a memorandum of understanding, and scores of country- level memorandums of
agreement have been signed between the geographic combatant commanders and
their local U. S. ambassadors or chiefs of mission. These agreements
clarify who is responsible for providing antiterrorism and force
protection to DOD personnel not under the direct command of the geographic
combatant commanders.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 23 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide
Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39,
Dec. 1, 1997). Recommendations, p. 13.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that consistent with the responsibility for coordinating
efforts to combat terrorism, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs of the National Security Council (NSC), in consultation
with the Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the heads of
other executive

branch agencies, take steps to ensure that (1) governmentwide priorities
to implement the national counterterrorism policy and strategy are
established, (2) agencies* programs, projects, activities, and
requirements for combating terrorism are analyzed in relation to
established governmentwide priorities, and (3) resources are allocated
based on the established priorities and assessments of the threat and risk
of terrorist attack.

Partially implemented. (1) The Attorney General*s Five- Year Counter-
Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan, issued in December 1998, included
priority actions for combating terrorism.

According to NSC and OMB, the Five- Year Plan, in combination with
Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 39 and 62, represented
governmentwide priorities that they used in developing budgets to combat
terrorism. (2) According to NSC and OMB, they analyzed

agencies* programs, projects, activities, and requirements using the Five-
Year Plan and related presidential decision directives. (3) According to
NSC and OMB, they allocated agency resources based upon the priorities
established above. More recently, the

Office of Homeland Security issued a National Strategy for Homeland
Security, which also established priorities for combating terrorism
domestically. However, there is no clear link between resources and
threats because no national- level risk management approach has been
completed to use for resource decisions.

To ensure that federal expenditures for terrorism- related activities are
well- coordinated and focused on efficiently meeting the goals of U. S.
policy under PDD 39, we recommend that the Director, OMB, use data on
funds budgeted and spent by executive departments and agencies to evaluate
and coordinate projects and recommend

resource allocation annually on a crosscutting basis to ensure that
governmentwide priorities for combating terrorism are met and programs are
based on analytically sound threat and risk assessments and avoid
unnecessary duplication.

Partially implemented. OMB now is tracking agency budgets and spending to
combat terrorism. According to NSC and OMB, they have a process in place
to analyze these budgets and allocate

resources based upon established priorities. More recently, OMB also
started tracking spending on homeland security* the domestic component of
combating terrorism. However, there is no clear link between resources and
threats. No national- level risk management

approach has been completed to use for resource decisions.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 24 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve
Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 3,
Nov. 12, 1998). Recommendations, p. 22.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense* or the head of any subsequent
lead agency* in consultation with the other five cooperating agencies in
the Domestic Preparedness Program,

refocus the program to more efficiently and economically deliver training
to local communities.

Implemented. DOD transferred the Domestic Preparedness Program to the
Department of Justice on October 1, 2000. The Department of Justice
implemented this recommendation by emphasizing the program*s train- the-
trainer approach and concentrating resources on training metropolitan
trainers in recipient jurisdictions. In June 2002, the President proposed
that a new Department of Homeland Security take the lead for federal

programs to assist state and local governments. We recommend that the
Secretary of Defense, or the head of any subsequent lead agency, use
existing state and local emergency management response systems or
arrangements to select locations and training structures to deliver
courses and consider the geographical proximity of program cities.
Implemented. DOD transferred the Domestic Preparedness Program to the
Department of Justice on October 1, 2000. The Department of Justice
implemented this recommendation by modifying the programs in metropolitan
areas and requiring cities to include their mutual aid partners in all
training and exercise activities. In June 2002, the President proposed
that a new Department of Homeland Security take the lead for federal
programs to assist state and local governments.

We recommend that the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection and Counterterrorism actively review and guide the growing
number of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management
training and equipment programs and response elements to ensure that
agencies* separate efforts

leverage existing state and local emergency management systems and are
coordinated, unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a clearly defined
end state.

Partially implemented. NSC established an interagency working group called
the Interagency Working Group on Assistance to State and Local
Authorities. One function of this working group was to review and guide
the growing number of WMD consequence management training and equipment
programs. In a September

2002 report, we reported that more needs to be done to ensure that federal
efforts are coordinated, unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a
clearly defined end state* a results- oriented outcome as intended for
government programs by the Results Act. In June 2002, the President
proposed that a new Department of Homeland Security take the lead for
federal programs to assist state and local governments.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 25 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to
Improve Counterterrorism Operations (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135, May 13, 1999).

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that the Attorney General direct the Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), to coordinate the Domestic Guidelines and concepts
of operation plan (CONPLAN) with federal

agencies with counterterrorism roles and finalize them. Further, the
Domestic Guidelines and/ or CONPLAN should seek to clarify federal, state,
and local roles, missions, and responsibilities at the incident site.

Implemented. The Domestic Guidelines were issued in November 2000. The
CONPLAN was coordinated with key federal agencies and was issued in
January 2001.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense review command and control
structures, and make changes, as appropriate, to ensure there is unity of
command to DOD units participating in domestic counterterrorist operations
to include both crisis response and consequence management and cases in
which they might be

concurrent. Implemented. In May 2001, the Secretary of Defense assigned
responsibility for providing civilian oversight of all DOD activities to

combat terrorism and domestic WMD (including both crisis and consequence
management) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low- Intensity Conflict. Further, in October 2002, DOD will establish
a new military command* the Northern Command* to manage command and
control in domestic military operations to combat terrorism in support of
other federal agencies. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require
the services to produce after- action reports or similar evaluations for
all

counterterrorism field exercises that they participate in. When
appropriate, these after- action reports or evaluations should include a
discussion of interagency issues and be disseminated to relevant internal
and external organizations.

Partially implemented. DOD has used its Joint Uniform Lessons Learned
System to document observations and lessons learned during exercises,
including interagency counterterrorist exercises. Many DOD units produce
after- action reports and many of them address interagency issues.
However, DOD officials acknowledged

that service units or commands do not always produce after- action reports
and/ or disseminate them internally and externally as appropriate.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 26 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response
Teams Is Unclear

(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 110, May 21, 1999). Recommendations, p. 20.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163, Sept. 7, 1999).
Recommendations, p. 22.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection and Counterterrorism, in consultation with the Attorney
General, the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the
Secretary of Defense, reassess the need for the Rapid Assessment and
Initial Detection teams in light of the numerous local, state, and federal
organizations that can provide similar functions and submit the

results of the reassessment to Congress. If the teams are needed, we
recommend that the National Coordinator direct a test of the Rapid
Assessment and Initial Deployment team concept in the

initial 10 states to determine how the teams can best fit into coordinated
state and federal response plans and whether the teams can effectively
perform their functions. If the teams are not needed, we further recommend
that they be inactivated. Partially implemented. With authorization from
Congress, DOD established additional National Guard teams and changed
their

names from Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams to WMD Civil
Support Teams. However, subsequent to our report and a report by the DOD
Inspector General, which found some similar problems, DOD agreed to review
the National Guard teams and work with other agencies to clarify their
roles in responding to terrorist incidents. In September 2001, DOD
restricted the number of teams to 32.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that the Attorney General direct the FBI Director to prepare
a formal, authoritative intelligence threat assessment that specifically
assesses the chemical and biological agents that would more likely be used
by a domestic- origin terrorist* nonstate actors working outside a state-
run laboratory infrastructure.

Partially implemented. The FBI agreed with our recommendation. The FBI,
working with the National Institute of Justice and the Technical Support
Working Group, produced a draft threat assessment of the chemical and
biological agents that would more likely be used by terrorists. FBI
officials originally estimated it would be published in 2001. However, the
terrorist attacks in the fall of 2001 delayed these efforts. The FBI and
the Technical Support Working Group are now conducting an updated
assessment of chemical and biological terrorist threats. According to the
FBI, the assessment is being done by experts in WMD and terrorist training
manuals and will include the latest information available. The

assessment, once completed, will be disseminated to appropriate agencies.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 27 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological
Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed (GAO/ HEHS/ AIMD- 00- 36, Oct. 29,
1999). Recommendations, p. 10.

We recommend that the Attorney General direct the FBI Director to sponsor
a national- level risk assessment that uses national intelligence
estimates and inputs from the intelligence community and others to help
form the basis for and prioritize programs developed to combat terrorism.
Because threats are dynamic, the Director should determine when the
completed national- level risk assessment should be updated. Partially
implemented. The Department of Justice and the FBI

agreed to our recommendation. According to the FBI, it is currently
working on a comprehensive national- level assessment of the terrorist
threat to the U. S. homeland. The FBI said that this will include an
evaluation of the chemical and biological weapons most likely to be used
by terrorists and a comprehensive analysis of the

risks that terrorist would use WMD. The FBI estimates the assessment will
be completed in November 2002.

(Continued From Previous Page)

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations GAO recommendations Status
of recommendations

We recommend that the Department of Health and Human Services* (HHS)
Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and U. S.
Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) establish
sufficient systems of internal control over chemical and biological
pharmaceutical and medical supplies by (1) conducting risk assessments,
(2) arranging for periodic, independent inventories of stockpiles, (3)
implementing a tracking system that retains

complete documentation for all supplies ordered, received, and destroyed,
and (4) rotating stock properly. Partially implemented. Three of the
recommendations have been implemented. However, only VA has implemented a
tracking system to manage the OEP inventory. CDC is using an interim
inventory tracking system. CBIRF has upgraded its database

program to track medical supplies, and is working toward placing its
medical supply operations under a prime vendor contract.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 28 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate
Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 64, Mar. 21,
2000). Recommendations, p. 25.

Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces
Overseas (NSIAD- 00- 181, July 19, 2000). Recommendations, p. 26.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General
eliminate duplicate training to the same metropolitan areas. If the
Department of Justice extends the Domestic Preparedness Program to more
than the currently planned 120 cities, it should integrate the program
with the Metropolitan Firefighters Program to capitalize on the strengths
of each program and eliminate duplication and overlap.

Partially implemented. DOD transferred the Domestic Preparedness Program
to the Department of Justice on October 1, 2000. The Department of
Justice, while attempting to better integrate the assistance programs
under its management, continued to run the Domestic Preparedness Program
as a separate program. In June 2002, the President proposed that a new
Department of Homeland Security take the lead for federal programs to
assist state and local governments.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

To improve the effectiveness and increase the impact of the vulnerability
assessments and the vulnerability assessment reports, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to improve the vulnerability assessment reports provided to installations.
Although the Joint Staff is planning to take some action to improve the
value of these reports, we believe the vulnerability assessment reports
should recommend specific actions to overcome identified vulnerabilities.
Not implemented. DOD believes that the changes in process at the

time of our report addressed our recommendations. DOD is still in the
process of implementing these actions.

To ensure that antiterrorism/ force protection managers have the knowledge
and skills needed to develop and implement effective antiterrorism/ force
protection programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity
Conflict to expeditiously

implement the Joint Staff*s draft antiterrorism/ force protection manager
training standard and formulate a timetable for the services to develop
and implement a new course that meets the revised standards. Additionally,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict should review the course content to ensure that the
course has consistency of emphasis across the services. Partially
implemented. DOD revised its training standards for

antiterrorism/ force protection managers, but the Army has not implemented
the new training standards.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 29 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide
Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination

(GAO- 01- 14, Nov. 30, 2000). Recommendations, p. 27.

We recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should develop an
antiterrorism/ force protection best practices or lessons learned program
that would share recommendations for both physical and process- oriented
improvements. The program would assist installations in addressing common
problems* particularly those

installations that do not receive Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability
Assessment reports or others who have found vulnerabilities through their
own assessments.

Partially implemented. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have undertaken a number
of lessons learned programs, but not all of the programs that would
address this recommendation are operational.

To provide Congress with the most complete information on the risks that
U. S. Forces overseas are facing from terrorism, we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense direct the services to include in their next
consolidated combating terrorism budget

submission information on the number and types of antiterrorism/ force
protection projects that have not been addressed by the budget request and
the estimated costs to complete these projects. Information on the backlog
of projects should be presented by geographic command.

Not implemented. DOD did not concur with this recommendation. DOD believes
that there is no need to provide the additional information to Congress.

(Continued From Previous Page)

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations GAO recommendations Status
of recommendations

To guide resource investments for combating terrorism, we recommend that
the Attorney General modify the Attorney General*s Five- Year Interagency
Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan to cite desired outcomes that
could be used to develop budget requirements for agencies and their
respective response teams. This process should be coordinated as an
interagency effort.

Partially implemented. The Department of Justice asserted that the Five-
Year Plan included desired outcomes. We disagreed with the department and
believed what it cited as outcomes are outputs* agency activities rather
than results the federal government is trying to achieve. The National
Strategy for Homeland Security, issued in July 2002, supercedes the
Attorney General*s Five- Year Plan as the

interagency plan for combating terrorism domestically. This strategy does
not include measurable outcomes, but calls for their development. We
recommend that the Director, FEMA, take steps to require that the WMD
Interagency Steering Group develop realistic scenarios involving chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear agents and weapons with experts in
the scientific and intelligence communities.

FEMA agreed with the recommendation. GAO is working with FEMA to determine
the status of implementation. In June 2002, the President proposed that a
new Department of Homeland Security take the lead for developing and
conducting federal exercises to

combat terrorism. We recommend that the Director, FEMA, sponsor periodic
nationallevel consequence management field exercises involving federal,
state, and local governments. Such exercises should be conducted

together with national- level crisis management field exercises. FEMA
agreed with the recommendation. GAO is working with

FEMA to determine the status of implementation. In June 2002, the
President proposed that a new Department of Homeland Security take the
lead for developing and conducting federal exercises to

combat terrorism.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 30 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical
Supplies Needs Further Improvement (GAO- 01- 463, Mar. 30, 2001).
Recommendations, pp. 25 and 26.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommended that the Secretary of HHS require the Director of CDC to

 execute written agreements as soon as possible with all CDC*s partners
covering the storage, management, stock rotation, and transporting of
medical supplies designated for treatment of biological or chemical
terrorism victims;

 issue written guidance on security to private warehouses that store
stockpiles; and

 to the extent practical, install proper fencing prior to placing
inventories at storage locations.

Partially implemented. CDC has implemented two of our recommendations and
partially implemented one. Specifically, CDC has not finalized agreements
with private transport companies to transport stockpiles in the event of a

terrorist attack. It is currently using contracts between the federal
government and the transport companies. We recommend that the Secretary of
HHS require the Director of OEP to

 finalize, approve, and issue an inventory requirements list;

 improve physical security at its central location to comply with Drug
Enforcement Agency regulations, or move the supplies as soon as possible
to a location that meets these requirements;

 issue a written policy on the frequency of inventory counts and
acceptable discrepancy rates;

 finalize and implement approved national and local operating plans
addressing VA*s responsibilities for the procurement, storage, management,
and deployment of OEP*s stockpiles;

 train VA personnel and conduct periodic quality reviews to ensure that
national and local operating plans are followed; and

 immediately contact Food and Drug Administration or the pharmaceutical
and medical supply manufacturers of items stored at its central location
to determine the impact of items exposed to extreme temperatures, replace
those items deemed no longer usable, and either add environmental controls
to the current location or move the supplies as soon as possible to a
climate- controlled space.

Implemented. OEP has implemented all eight of our recommendations. To
ensure that medical supplies on hand reflect those identified as being
needed to respond to a chemical or biological terrorism incident, we
recommend that the Marine Corps Systems Command program funding and
complete the fielding plan for the CBIRF specific authorized medical

allowance list and that the Commandant of the Marine Corps require the
Commanding Officer of CBIRF to adjust its stock levels to conform with the
authorized medical allowance list and remove expired items from its stock
and replace them with current pharmaceutical and medical supplies.

Implemented. CBIRF has implemented all of our recommendations.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 31 GAO- 02- 1122T Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant
Challenges in Developing National Capabilities (GAO- 01- 323, Apr. 25,
2001). Recommendations, pp.

57, 68, and 85.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, in coordination with pertinent executive agencies,

 establish a capability for strategic analysis of computer- based
threats, including developing a related methodology, acquiring staff
expertise, and obtaining infrastructure data;

 develop a comprehensive governmentwide data- collection and analysis
framework and ensure that national watch and warning operations for
computer- based attacks are supported by sufficient staff and resources;
and

 clearly define the role of the National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC) in relation to other government and private- sector entities,
including lines of authority among NIPC and NSC, Justice, the FBI, and
other entities; NIPC*s integration into the national warning system; and
protocols that articulate how and under what circumstances NIPC would be
placed in a support function to either DOD or the intelligence community.
Partially implemented. According to the NIPC director, NIPC has received
sustained leadership commitment from key entities, such as the Central
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, and it continues to
increase its staff primarily through

reservists and contractors. The Director added that the NIPC (1) created
an NIPC Senior Partners Group similar to a board of directors, which holds
quarterly meetings with the senior leadership of each agency that details
personnel to the NIPC in order to ensure that their interests are
addressed with respect to future NIPC initiatives and program plans and to
share with them the status of ongoing initiatives; (2) has developed close
working relationships with other Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
entities involved in analysis and warning activities, such as the Federal
Computer

Incident Response Center (FedCIRC), DOD*s Joint Task Force for Computer
Network Operations, the Carnegie Mellon CERT(R) Coordination Center, and
the intelligence and antivirus communities, and (3) had developed and
implemented procedures to more quickly share relevant CIP information,
while separately continuing any related law enforcement Investigation. In
addition, the Director stated that two additional teams were created to
bolster its analytical capabilities: (1) the critical infrastructure
assessment

team to focus efforts on learning about particular infrastructures and
coordinating with respective infrastructure efforts and (2) the collection
operations intelligence liaison team to coordinate with various entities
within the intelligence community.

We recommend that the Attorney General task the FBI Director to require
the NIPC Director to develop a comprehensive written plan for establishing
analysis and warning capabilities that integrates existing planning
elements and includes

 milestones and performance measures;

 approaches (or strategies) and the various resources needed to achieve
the goals and objectives;

 a description of the relationship between the long- term goals and
objectives and the annual performance goals; and

 a description of how program evaluations could be used to establish or
revise strategic goals, along with a schedule for future program
evaluations.

Partially implemented. The NIPC Director recently stated that NIPC has
developed a plan with goals and objectives to improve its analysis and
warning capabilities and that NIPC has made considerable progress in this
area. The plan establishes and describes performance measures for both its
Analysis and Warning Section and issues relating to staffing, training,
investigations, outreach, and warning. In addition, the plan describes the
resources needed to reach the specific goals and objectives for the
Analysis and Warning Section. However, according According to NIPC
officials, the NIPC continues to work on making its goals more measurable,
better reflect performance, and better linked to future

revisions to strategic goals.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 32 GAO- 02- 1122T We recommend that the Attorney General direct the
FBI Director to task the NIPC Director to

 ensure that the Special Technologies and Applications Unit has access to
the computer and communications resources necessary to analyze data
associated with the increasing number of complex investigations;

 monitor implementation of new performance measures to ensure that they
result in field offices* fully reporting information on potential computer
crimes to the NIPC; and

 complete development of the emergency law enforcement plan, after
comments are received from law enforcement sector members. As the national
strategy for critical infrastructure protection is reviewed and possible
changes considered, we recommend that the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs define

NIPC*s responsibilities for monitoring reconstitution. Partially
implemented. According to NIPC officials, the Special

Technologies and Applications Unit has continued to increase its computer
resources. In addition, the director stated that the NIPC had developed
and implemented procedures to more quickly share

relevant CIP information, while separately continuing any related law
enforcement investigation. However, because of the NIPC*s reorganization
in August 2002, when the Computer Investigation and Operations Section was
moved from NIPC to the FBI*s Cyber Crime Division, it is important that
NIPC establish procedures to

continue this information sharing. In addition, an emergency law
enforcement services sector plan has been issued. The President*s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board released a draft strategy on September 18,
2002, for comment. The draft states that a strategic goal is to provide
for a national plan for continuity of operations, recovery, and
reconstitution of services during a widespread outage of information
technology in multiple sectors. However, NIPC*s responsibilities regarding
monitoring reconstitution

are not discussed. We recommend that the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (1) direct federal agencies and encourage the

private sector to better define the types of information that are
necessary and appropriate to exchange in order to combat computer- based
attacks and procedures for performing such exchanges, (2) initiate
development of a strategy for identifying

assets of national significance that includes coordinating efforts already
under way, such as those at DOD and Commerce, and (3) resolve
discrepancies between PDD 63 requirements and

guidance provided by the federal Chief Information Officers Council
regarding computer incident reporting by federal agencies. Partially
implemented. NIPC officials told us that a new ISAC development and
support unit had been created, whose mission is to enhance private- sector
cooperation and trust, resulting in a twoway

sharing of information. Officials informed us that NIPC has signed
information sharing agreements with most of the ISACs formed, including
those representing telecommunications, information technology, water
supply, food, emergency fire services, banking and finance, and chemical
sectors. NIPC officials added that most of these agreements contained
industry- specific cyber and physical incident reporting thresholds. NIPC
has created the Interagency Coordination Cell to foster cooperation across
government agencies in investigative matters and on matters of

common interest. We recommend that the Attorney General direct the FBI
Director to direct the NIPC Director to (1) formalize relationships
between

NIPC and other federal entities, including DOD and the Secret Service, and
private- sector Informantion Sharing Analysis Centers (ISACs) so that a
clear understanding of what is expected from the respective organizations
exists, (2) develop a plan to foster the twoway exchange of information
between the NIPC and the ISACs, and (3) ensure that the Key Asset
Initiative is integrated with other

similar federal activities. Partially implemented. According to NIPC*s
Director, the

relationship between NIPC and other government entities has significantly
improved since our review, and the quarterly meetings with senior
government leaders have been instrumental in improving information
sharing. In addition, in testimony, officials

from the FedCIRC and the U. S. Secret Service have discussed the
collaborative and cooperative relationships that now exist between their
agencies and NIPC. However, further work is needed to

identify assets of national significance and coordinate with other similar
federal activities.

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GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 33 GAO- 02- 1122T FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination
Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited

(GAO- 01- 780, July 16, 2001). Recommendations, p. 32.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

To facilitate better coordination of FBI foreign counterintelligence
investigations meeting the Attorney General*s coordination criteria, we
recommend that the Attorney General establish a policy and guidance
clarifying his expectations regarding the FBI*s notification of the
Criminal Division and types of advice that the division should be allowed
to provide the FBI in foreign counterintelligence investigations in which
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) tools are being used or
their use is anticipated.

Partially implemented. In an August 6, 2001, memorandum, the Deputy
Attorney General outlined the responsibilities of the FBI, Criminal
Division, and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR)
regarding intelligence sharing in FISA cases and issued clarifications to
the Attorney General*s 1995 coordination procedures. Specifically, these
clarifications included defining

*significant federal crime* to mean any federal felony and defining the
term *reasonable indication* to be substantially lower than *probable
cause.* The memorandum also requires notification to take place without
delay. The only remaining open point, albeit a significant issue, is the
type of advice that the Criminal Division is permitted to provide the FBI
after it has been notified of a possible criminal violation. In this
regard, in March 2002, the Attorney General signed revised proposed
procedures for sharing and coordinating FISA investigations, including
changes resulting from the USA Patriot Act of 2001. However, the
procedures must be approved by the FISA Court, which recently rejected
some of the them as going too far in terms of loosening the barriers
between

criminal investigations and intelligence gathering. To improve
coordination between the FBI and the Criminal Division by ensuring that
investigations that indicate criminal violations are

clearly identified and by institutionalizing mechanisms to ensure greater
coordination, we recommend that the Attorney General direct that all FBI
memorandums sent to OIPR, summarizing investigations or seeking FISA
renewals contain a section devoted

explicitly to identifying any possible federal criminal violation meeting
the Attorney General*s coordination criteria, and that those memorandums
of investigation meeting the criteria for Criminal Division notification
be timely coordinated with the division. Implemented. In an August 6,
2001, memorandum, the Deputy Attorney General directed the FBI to
explicitly devote a section in its

foreign counterintelligence case summary memorandums, which it sends to
OIPR in connection with an initial FISA request or renewal, for
identification of any possible federal criminal violations associated with
the cases. OIPR is to make those memorandums available to the Criminal
Division. The Deptuy Attorney General*s

memorandum also required that, when the notification standard is met,
notification should be accomplished without delay. To improve coordination
between the FBI and the Criminal Division by ensuring that investigations
that indicate a criminal violation are clearly identified and by
institutionalizing mechanisms to ensure greater coordination, we recommend
that the Attorney General direct the FBI Inspection Division, during its
periodic inspections of foreign counterintelligence investigations at
field offices, to review compliance with the requirement for case summary
memorandums sent OIPR to specifically address the identification of
possible criminal violations. Moreover, where field office case summary
memorandums identified reportable instances of possible federal crimes,
the Inspection Division should assess whether the appropriate headquarters
unit properly coordinated those foreign counterintelligence investigations
with the Criminal Division.

Implemented. In a July 18, 2001, memorandum to the Deputy Attorney
General, the Assistant Director of the FBI*s Inspection Division stated
that the division has established a Foreign Intelligence/
Counterintelligence Audit that is to be completed during its on- site
inspections at applicable FBI field offices. The audit, according to the
Assistant Director, will determine whether significant criminal activity
was indicated during intelligence investigations and, where such activity
was identified, determine whether it was properly coordinated with FBI
headquarters and Justice*s Criminal Division.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 34 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed To Improve DOD
Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management (GAO- 01- 909, Sept.
19, 2001). Recommendations pp. 26 and 27.

To improve coordination between the FBI and the Criminal Division by
ensuring that investigations that indicate criminal violations are clearly
identified and by institutionalizing mechanisms to ensure greater
coordination, we recommend that the Attorney General issue written
policies and procedures establishing the roles and responsibilities of
OIPR and the core group as mechanisms for

ensuring compliance with the Attorney General*s coordination procedures.
Implemented. On June 12, 2001, OIPR issued policy guidance to its

staff on compliance with the Attorney General*s 1995 coordination
procedures. The issuance of this policy partially implements the GAO
recommendation. Later on August 6, 2001, the Deputy Attorney General
issued a memorandum to the Criminal Division, the FBI and OIPR
establishing the roles and responsibilities of the

Core Group to resolve disputes arising from the Attorney General*s 1995
guidelines.

(Continued From Previous Page)

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations GAO recommendations Status
of recommendations

To improve the implementation of the DOD antiterrorism program, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict to identify
those installations that serve a critical role in support of our national
military strategy, and to ensure that they receive a higher headquarters
vulnerability assessment regardless of the number of personnel assigned at
the installations.

Partially implemented. DOD is in the process of changing its antiterrorism
standards. To improve the implementation of the DOD antiterrorism program,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict to develop a
strategy to complete higher headquarters vulnerability assessments at
National Guard installations.

Partially implemented. DOD *s primary action officer is working with Army
and Air National Guard to provide vulnerability assessments. To improve
the implementation of the DOD antiterrorism program, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict to clarify the force protection
standard requiring a criticality assessment at each installation to
specifically describe the factors

to be used in the assessment and how these evaluations should support
antiterrorism resource priority decisions.

Partially implemented. DOD is in the process of updating its antiterrorism
handbook.

To improve the implementation of the DOD antiterrorism program, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict to expand the
threat assessment methodology to increase awareness of the consequences of
changing business practices at

installations that may create workplace violence situations or new
opportunities for individuals not affiliated with DOD to gain access to
installations. Implemented. DOD has reviewed its threat methodology to
ensure

that no threat indicators are ignored or overlooked.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 35 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and
Related Recommendations (GAO- 01- 822, Sept. 20, 2001). Recommendations
pp. 41,

42, 57, 86, 87, 104, and 128.

To improve the implementation of the DOD antiterrorism program, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict to require each
installation commander to form a threat working group and personally and
actively engage state, local, and federal law enforcement officials. These
working groups should hold periodic meetings, prepare records of their
discussions, and provide threat information to installation commanders
regularly.

Partially implemented. DOD is in the process of updating its antiterrorism
handbook.

To strengthen management of the antiterrorism program, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict to establish a management
framework for the antiterrorism program that would provide the department
with a vehicle to guide resource allocations and measure the results of
improvement

efforts. This framework should include A strategic plan that defines

 long- term antiterrorism goals,

 approaches to achieve the goals, and

 key factors that might significantly affect achieving the goals, and An
implementation plan that describes

 performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and
resources to achieve the goals;

 performance indicators to measure outputs;

 an evaluation plan to compare program results to established goals; and

 actions needed to address any unmet goals. Partially implemented. DOD is
planning to issue a management

plan to include the elements of GAO*s recommendation.

(Continued From Previous Page)

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations GAO recommendations Status
of recommendations

We recommend that the President, in conjunction with the Vice President*s
efforts, appoint a single focal point that has the responsibility and
authority for all critical leadership and coordination functions to combat
terrorism. Implemented. Through Executive Order (EO) 13228, the President

established an Office of Homeland Security (OHS) to develop and coordinate
the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the
United States from terrorist threats or attacks.

 The focal point should be in the Executive Office of the President,
outside individual agencies, and encompass activities to include
prevention, crisis management, and consequence management.

Implemented. EO 13228 establishes OHS within the Executive Office of the
President. OHS functions include efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the
United States.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 36 GAO- 02- 1122T  The focal point should oversee a national- level
authoritative threat and risk assessment on the potential use of WMD by
terrorists on U. S. soil. Such assessments should be updated regularly.
Partially implemented. EO 13228 states that OHS shall identify priorities
and coordinate efforts for collection and analysis of information within
the United States regarding threats of terrorism against the United States
and activities of terrorists or terrorist groups within the United States.
OHS shall identify, in coordination

with NSC, priorities for collection of intelligence outside the United
States regarding threats of terrorism within the United States. EO 13228
does not address risk assessments.

 The focal point also should lead the development of a national strategy
for combating terrorism. Implemented. EO 13228 states that OHS will
develop a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from
terrorist threats or attacks. The National Strategy for Homeland Security
was issued in July 2002.

 The national strategy should include (1) desired outcomes that can be
measured and are consistent with the Results Act, (2) state and local
government input to better define their roles in combating terrorism, and
(3) research and development priorities and needs in order to facilitate
interagency coordination, decrease

duplication, and leverage monetary resources. Partially implemented. (1)
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, while not including
measurable outcomes, calls for their

development. (2) OHS worked with state and local governments to develop
the national strategy. (3) The National Strategy for Homeland Security
includes a discussion of research and development.

 The focal point should coordinate implementation of the national
strategy among the various federal agencies. This would entail reviewing
agency and interagency programs to ensure that they are being implemented
in accordance with the national strategy and do not constitute duplication
of effort.

Partially implemented. EO 13228 directs OHS to coordinate the
implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United
States from terrorist threats or attacks. OHS shall work with,

among others, federal agencies to ensure the adequacy of the national
strategy for detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against,
responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks within the United
States and shall periodically review and coordinate revisions to that
strategy as necessary. The National Strategy for

Homeland Security was issued in July 2002. Given the recent publication of
the plan, it is too early to determine the OHS role in coordinating its
implementation.

 The focal point should analyze and prioritize governmentwide budgets and
spending to combat terrorism to eliminate gaps and duplication of effort.
The focal point*s role will be to provide advice or to certify that the
budgets are consistent with the national strategy, not to make final
budget decisions.

Implemented. EO 13228 states OHS shall work with OMB and agencies to
identify homeland security programs, and shall review and provide advice
to OMB and departments and agencies for such programs. Per EO 13228, OHS
shall certify that the funding levels are necessary and appropriate for
the homeland security- related activities of the executive branch.

 The focal point should coordinate the nation*s strategy for combating
terrorism with efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to computer- based
attacks on critical infrastructures. We do not see the focal point for
combating terrorism also having responsibility for protecting computer-
based infrastructures because the threats are broader than terrorism and
such programs are more closely associated with traditional information
security activities.

Nonetheless, there should be close coordination between the two areas.

Implemented. Per EO 13228, OHS shall coordinate efforts to protect the
United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of
terrorist attacks. In performing this function, the office shall work with
federal, state, and local agencies, and private entities as appropriate
to, among other things, coordinate efforts to protect critical public and
privately owned information systems within the United States from
terrorist attacks. In addition, the

President created a Special Advisor for Cyberspace Security and appointed
him as Chair of the President*s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board.
This Chair reports to both OHS and NSC.

(Continued From Previous Page)

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 37 GAO- 02- 1122T  The focal point should be established by
legislation to provide it with legitimacy and authority, and its head
should be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the U.
S. Senate. This

would provide accountability to both the President and Congress. Also, it
would provide continuity across administrations. Not implemented. However,
there have been bills before Congress that would legislatively create a
central focal point (e. g., OHS),

making its director subject to appointment with the advice and consent of
the U. S. Senate.

 The focal point should be adequately staffed to carry out its duties for
planning and oversight across the federal government. Partially
implemented. EO 13228 has provisions for OHS to hire staff, and for other
federal departments to detail their staff to OHS. Given the relative
newness of OHS, it is too early to determine whether staff levels are
adequate.

 The focal point should develop a formal process to capture and evaluate
interagency lessons learned from major interagency and intergovernmental
federal exercises to combat terrorism. The focal point should analyze
interagency lessons learned and task individual agencies to take
corrective actions as appropriate.

Partially implemented. Per EO 13228, OHS shall coordinate domestic
exercises and simulations designed to assess and practice systems that
would be called upon to respond to a terrorist

threat or attack within the United States and coordinate programs and
activities for training. OHS shall also ensure that such programs and
activities are regularly evaluated under appropriate standards and that
resources are allocated to improving and sustaining preparedness based on
such evaluations. Given the relative newness of OHS, it is too early to
determine how it has implemented this responsibility. To help support a
national strategy, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the
Director of the FBI to work with appropriate agencies across government to
complete ongoing national- level threat assessments regarding terrorist
use of WMD.

Partially implemented. The Department of Justice and the FBI agreed to
this recommendation. According to the FBI, it is currently working on a
comprehensive national- level assessment of the

terrorist threat to the U. S. homeland. The FBI said that this will
include an evaluation of the chemical and biological weapons most likely
to be used by terrorists and a comprehensive analysis of the risks of
terrorists using other WMD. The FBI estimates the assessment will be
completed in November 2002.

To guide federal efforts in combating domestic terrorism, we recommend
that the Attorney General use the Five- Year Interagency Counterterrorism
and Technology Crime Plan and similar plans of other agencies as a basis
for developing a national strategy by including (1) desired outcomes that
can be measured and that are consistent with the Results Act and (2) state
and local

government input to better define their roles in combating terrorism.
Partially implemented. The Department of Justice asserted that the

Five- Year Plan included desired outcomes. We disagreed with the
department and believed what it cited as outcomes are outputs* agency
activities rather than results the federal government is trying to
achieve. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued in July 2002,
supercedes the Attorney General*s Five- Year Plan as the

interagency plan for combating terrorism domestically. This strategy does
not include measurable outcomes, but calls for their development. To
improve readiness in consequence management, we recommend that the
Director of FEMA play a larger role in managing federal exercises to
combat terrorism. As part of this, FEMA should seek a formal role as a
cochair of the Interagency Working Group on Exercises and help to plan and
conduct major

interagency counterterrorist exercises to ensure that consequence
management is adequately addressed. FEMA agreed with the recommendation.
GAO is working with

FEMA to determine the status of implementation. In June 2002, the
President proposed that a new Department of Homeland Security take the
lead for developing and conducting federal exercises to

combat terrorism.

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GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 38 GAO- 02- 1122T To ensure that agencies benefit fully from
exercises in which they participate, we recommend that the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Veterans
Affairs; the Directors of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,
FEMA, FBI, and the U. S. Secret Service; the

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and the Commandant
of the U. S. Coast Guard require their agencies to prepare after- action
reports or similar evaluations for all exercises

they lead and for all field exercises in which they participate. Partially
implemented. Several of the agencies agreed with this recommendation and
cited steps they were taking to ensure that

after- action reports or similar evaluations are completed as appropriate
for exercises to combat terrorism. For example, DOD has used its Joint
Uniform Lessons Learned System to document observations and lessons
learned during exercises, including interagency exercises to combat
terrorism. Other agencies taking steps to improve their evaluations of
exercises include the Department of Energy and the FBI.

To reduce duplication and leverage resources, we recommend that the
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology complete efforts to
develop a strategic plan for research and development to

combat terrorism, coordinating this with federal agencies and state and
local authorities.

Partially implemented. The National Strategy for Homeland Security
includes a chapter on science and technology, which includes an initiative
to coordinate research and development of the homeland

security apparatus. The proposed Department of Homeland Security, working
with the White House and other federal departments, would set the overall
direction for homeland security research and development. The proposed
department would also establish a network of national laboratories for
homeland security.

Given that the department is only a proposal at this time, it is too early
to determine how it might implement our recommendation. To eliminate
overlapping assistance programs and to provide a single liaison for state
and local officials, we recommend that the President, working closely with
Congress, consolidate the activities of the FBI*s National Domestic
Preparedness Office and the Department of Justice*s Office for State and
Local Domestic Preparedness Support under FEMA.

Partially implemented. In June 2002, the President proposed that a new
Department of Homeland Security take the lead for federal programs to
assist state and local governments. Given that the department is only a
proposal at this time, it is too early to determine whether these offices
and their functions have been successfully consolidated.

To clarify the roles and missions of specialized National Guard response
teams in a terrorist incident involving WMD, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense suspend the

establishment of any additional National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction
Civil Support Teams until DOD has completed its coordination of the teams*
roles and missions with the FBI. We also recommend that the Secretary of
Defense reach a written agreement with the Director of the FBI that
clarifies the roles of the teams in relation to the FBI.

Partially implemented. Subsequent to our earlier report on these teams,
and a report by the DOD Inspector General, which found some similar
problems, DOD agreed to review the National Guard

teams and work with other agencies to clarify their roles in responding to
terrorist incidents. In September 2001, DOD restricted the number of teams
to 32.

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GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 39 GAO- 02- 1122T Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts
Are Underway but Uncertainty Remains (GAO- 02- 610, June 7, 2002).
Recommendations, p. 20.

To strengthen the federal government*s critical infrastructure strategy,
we recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs define

 specific roles and responsibilities of organizations involved in
critical infrastructure protection and related information security
activities;

 interim objectives and milestones for achieving CIP goals and a specific
action plan for achieving these objectives, including implementation of
vulnerability assessments and related remedial plans; and

 performance measures for which entities can be held accountable.

We believe the federal government*s cyber- security strategy should be
linked to the national strategy to combat terrorism. However, the two
areas are different in that the threats to computer- based infrastructures
are broader than terrorism and programs to protect them are more closely
associated with traditional information security activities.

Not implemented: The President*s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
released a draft strategy on September 18, 2002, for comment. The draft
does not specify roles and responsibilities, or performance measures.
However, the President*s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board plans to
periodically update the

strategy as it evolves. The draft also states that other groups have
developed strategies related to their portion of cyberspace they own or
operate. Further, the President*s national strategy for homeland security,
issued in July 2002, states that a comprehensive national infrastructures
plan will be issued in the future.

Regarding the link with efforts to combat terrorism, the draft strategy
states that it supports both the National Strategy for Homeland Security
and the National Security Strategy of the United States.

(Continued From Previous Page)

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations GAO recommendations Status
of recommendations

We recommend that the President direct OHS to (1) develop a comprehensive,
governmentwide definition of homeland security, and (2) include the
definition in the forthcoming national strategy.

Implemented. In July 2002, OHS published the National Strategy for
Homeland Security. In this document, there is a detailed definition of
homeland security.

Appendix I GAO Recommendations on Combating Terrorism and Homeland
Security

Page 40 GAO- 02- 1122T Nonproliferation R& D: NNSA*s Program Develops
Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened (GAO-
02- 904, Aug. 23, 2002). Recommendations, pp. 20- 21.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) work with OHS (or the Department of Homeland
Security, if established) to clarify the Nonproliferation

and Verification Research and Development Program*s role in relation to
other agencies conducting counterterrorism research and development and to
achieve an appropriate balance between short- term and long- term
research. In addition, to improve the program*s ability to successfully
transfer new technologies to users, the program should, in cooperation
with OHS, allow users

opportunities to provide input through all phases of research and
development projects Partially implemented. NNSA agreed to the
recommendation and stated that it will improve coordination with other
agencies

conducting research and development. In addition, coordination may be
improved if two of the program*s divisions are moved to a new Department
of Homeland Security, as proposed by the President.

Page 41 GAO- 02- 1122T Related GAO Products Homeland Security September
11: Interim Report on the Response of Charities. GAO- 02- 1037.

Washington, D. C.: September 3, 2002.

National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges. GAO-
02- 1048R. Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1013T. Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1012T. Washington, D. C.: August 22, 2002. Homeland
Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to Success. GAO-
02- 1011T. Washington, D. C.: August 20, 2002.

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO- 02- 993T. Washington, D. C.: August 5, 2002.

Chemical Safety: Emergency Response Community Views on the Adequacy of
Federally Required Chemical Information. GAO- 02- 799. Washington, D. C.:
July 31, 2002.

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
and Long- Term Challenges. GAO- 02- 971T. Washington, D. C.: July 25,
2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be
Addressed, GAO- 02- 961T. Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002.

Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO- 02-
957T. Washington, D. C.: July 17, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but
Transferring Control of Certain Public Health Programs Raises Concerns.
GAO- 02- 954T. Washington, D. C.: July 16, 2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More
Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Information Systems.
GAO- 02- 474. Washington, D. C.: July 15, 2002.

Related GAO Products Page 42 GAO- 02- 1122T Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Significant Homeland Security Challenges Need to Be Addressed.
GAO- 02- 918T. Washington, D. C.: July 9,

2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical R& D
Coordination but May Disrupt Dual- Purpose Efforts. GAO- 02- 924T.
Washington, D. C.: July 9, 2002.

Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO02-
927T. Washington, D. C.: July 9, 2002.

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be
Critical to Success. GAO- 02- 901T. Washington, D. C.: July 3, 2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting. GAO- 02- 893T. Washington, D. C.: June 28,
2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO- 02- 883T. Washington, D.
C.: June 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But
Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO- 02- 886T. Washington, D.
C.: June 25, 2002.

FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad Transformation
Needed. GAO- 02- 865T. Washington, D. C.: June 21, 2002.

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO- 02- 610. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy. GAO- 02-
811T. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.

Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001,
Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center. GAO- 02- 700R. Washington, D.
C.: May 29, 2002.

Related GAO Products Page 43 GAO- 02- 1122T Homeland Security: Integration
of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an
Effective National Strategy for Homeland

Security. GAO- 02- 621T. Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO- 02- 549T. Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2002.

Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership Sought.
GAO- 02- 490T. Washington, D. C.: March 12, 2002.

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long- Term National Needs. GAO- 02- 160T. Washington, D. C.: November 7,
2001.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO- 02- 208T. Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001. Homeland
Security: Need to Consider VA*s Role in Strengthening Federal

Preparedness. GAO- 02- 145T. Washington, D. C.: October 15, 2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO- 02-
150T. Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation*s Issues.

GAO- 01- 1158T. Washington, D. C.: September 21, 2001. Combating Terrorism
Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but

Could Be Improved and Expanded. GAO- 02- 890. Washington, D. C.: September
10, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism
Abroad. GAO- 02- 1021. Washington, D. C.: September 6, 2002.

Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls over Transfers of
Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement. GAO- 02- 972.
Washington, D. C.: September 6, 2002.

Nonproliferation R& D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful Technologies,
but Project Management Can Be Strengthened. GAO- 02- 904. Washington, D.
C.: August 23, 2002.

Related GAO Products Page 44 GAO- 02- 1122T Diffuse Security Threats: USPS
Air Filtration Systems Need More Testing and Cost Benefit Analysis Before
Implementation. GAO- 02- 838.

Washington, D. C.: August 22, 2002. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U. S.
Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. GAO- 02- 989T. Washington, D. C.:
July 30, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO- 02- 955TNI.
Washington, D. C.: July 23, 2002.

Diffuse Security Threats: Technologies for Mail Sanitization Exist, but
Challenges Remain. GAO- 02- 365. Washington, D. C.: April 23, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a
National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 550T.
Washington, D. C.: April 2, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO- 02- 549T. Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 548T. Washington, D. C.: March 25,
2002. Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 547T.

Washington, D. C.: March 22, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State
and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 473T. Washington, D. C.: March 1, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO- 01- 162T. Washington, D. C.: October 17,
2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO-
01- 822. Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001.

Related GAO Products Page 45 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Actions
Needed to Improve DOD*s Antiterrorism Program Implementation and
Management. GAO- 01- 909. Washington,

D. C.: September 19, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H. R. 525 to Create a President*s Council
on Domestic Preparedness. GAO- 01- 555T. Washington, D. C.: May 9, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO- 01- 660T. Washington, D. C.: April 24, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy. GAO- 01- 556T. Washington, D. C.: March 27, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating
Preparedness and Response. GAO- 01- 15. Washington, D. C.: March 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO- 0114.
Washington, D. C.: November 30, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass
Destruction Training. GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 64. Washington, D. C.: March 21,
2000.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological
Terrorism. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 50. Washington, D. C.: October 20, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attack. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163. Washington, D. C.:
September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs. GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 99- 181. Washington, D. C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment
and Sustainment Costs. GAO- NSIAD- 99- 151. Washington, D. C.: June 9,
1999.

Related GAO Products Page 46 GAO- 02- 1122T Combating Terrorism: Use of
National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 110. Washington,
D. C.: May 21, 1999. Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending
to Combat Terrorism. GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107. Washington, D. C.: March
11, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO- NSIAD- 99- 3. Washington, D. C.:
November 12, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic
Preparedness Program. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 16. Washington, D. C.: October 2,
1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74. Washington, D. C.: April
9, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39. Washington, D. C.:
December 1, 1997. Public Health Public Health: Maintaining an Adequate
Blood Supply Is Key to Emergency Preparedness. GAO- 02- 1095T. Washington,
D. C.: September 10,

2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination But May
Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO- 02- 883T. Washington, D.
C.: June 25, 2002.

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*s Role in
Public Health Protection. GAO- 02- 235T. Washington, D. C.: November 15,
2001.

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO02-
149T. Washington, D. C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO- 02- 141T.
Washington, D. C.: October 10, 2001.

Related GAO Products Page 47 GAO- 02- 1122T Bioterrorism: Coordination and
Preparedness. GAO- 02- 129T. Washington, D. C.: October 5, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO- 01- 915.
Washington, D. C.: September 28, 2001.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and Inventory
Management Are Needed. GAO- 01- 667. Washington, D. C.: September 28,
2001.

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.

GAO/ HEHS- 00- 180. Washington, D. C.: September 11, 2000.

Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and
Biological Attacks. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163. Washington, D. C.: September 7,
1999.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 159. Washington, D. C.:
August 16, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public
Health Initiatives. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 112. Washington, D. C.: March 16,
1999.

Disaster Assistance Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster
Declaration Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO- 01- 837.
Washington,

D. C.: August 31, 2001.

FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies.

GAO- 01- 850. Washington, D. C.: August 13, 2001.

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and
Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO- 01- 832. Washington, D. C.:
July 9, 2001.

Budget and Management

Performance Budgeting: Opportunities and Challenges. GAO- 02- 1106T.
Washington, D. C.: September 19, 2002.

Related GAO Products Page 48 GAO- 02- 1122T Electronic Government:
Proposal Addresses Critical Challenges. GAO- 02- 1083T. Washington, D. C.:
September 18, 2002.

Results- Oriented Cultures: Insights for U. S. Agencies from Other
Countries' Performance Management Initiatives. GAO- 02- 862. Washington,
D. C.: August 2, 2002.

Acquisition Workforce: Agencies Need to Better Define and Track the
Training of Their Employees. GAO- 02- 737. Washington, D. C.: July 29,
2002.

Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive
Transformational Change. GAO- 02- 940T. Washington, D. C.: July 15, 2002.

Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond. GAO-
02- 538T. Washington, D. C.: March 19, 2002.

A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO- 02- 373SP. Washington,
D. C.: March 15, 2002.

Budget Issues: Long- Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO- 02- 467T. Washington, D.
C.: February 27, 2002.

Managing for Results: Progress in Linking Performance Plans with Budget
and Financial Statements. GAO- 02- 236. Washington, D. C.: January 4,
2002.

Results- Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO- 01- 1084SP.
Washington, D. C.: August 2001.

Managing for Results: Federal Managers* Views on Key Management Issues
Vary Widely across Agencies. GAO- 01- 0592. Washington, D. C.: May 2001.

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks. GAO-
01- 159SP. Washington, D. C.: November 2000.

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission
Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO/ AIMD- 97- 156. Washington, D. C.:
August 29, 1997.

Related GAO Products Page 49 GAO- 02- 1122T Government Restructuring:
Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal Missions and Approaches. GAO/
T- AIMD- 95- 161. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 1995.

Grant Design Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility,
Accountability, and Performance Information. GAO/ GGD- 98- 137.
Washington, D. C.: June 22,

1998.

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go
Further. GAO/ AIMD- 97- 7. Washington, D. C.: December 18, 1996.

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. GAO/ AIMD-
95- 226. Washington, D. C.: September 1, 1995.

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