FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARMEN BAGHDASARYAN, 

Petitioner, No. 05-72416

v. Agency No.  A077-993-598 ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

September 30, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed January 13, 2010

Before: Harry Pregerson, Stephen Reinhardt and

Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

935
COUNSEL

Shawn Sedaghat, Law Offices of Shawn Sedaghat, Encino,

California, for the petitioner.

Brigid Martin, United States Department of Justice, San Francisco, California; Michael L. Scott, for the respondent.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Armen Baghdasaryan (“Baghdasaryan”) is a native and citizen of Armenia. Baghdasaryan petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision affirming

the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 Baghdasaryan was

threatened, harassed, fined, detained, and beaten because he

opposed the systemic government corruption, including the

extortion of bribes, perpetrated by General H. Hakopian, a

powerful politician and government official. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition in

part and remand. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The BIA found Baghdasaryan to be credible. Accordingly,

we must accept Baghdasaryan’s testimony as true. See Kalubi

v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Testimony

must be accepted as true in the absence of an explicit adverse

credibility finding.”).

1We do not reach the CAT claim, which the parties did not fully brief

and the BIA summarily dismissed. 

938 BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER
In Armenia, Baghdasaryan operated a small business making and distributing audio tapes from his home. In September

1995, Baghdasaryan moved his business to a store in a local

market owned by General Hakopian, a well-known general at

the Ministry of Defense, who later became a deputy of the

National Assembly. The market was similar to a swap meet,

with hundreds of vendors selling items in a large area. Baghdasaryan obtained the proper permit to sell his goods, paid tax

on his sales, and remitted rent to General Hakopian for use of

his space in the market. The record does not show whether

General Hakopian was entitled to keep the entire amount of

rent payments for himself.

One month later, Samvel Hakopian (“Samvel”), General

Hakopian’s nephew, and several other men came to Baghdasaryan’s store and demanded $100 per month on behalf of the

General, in addition to rent. Baghdasaryan refused to pay and

filed a written complaint against General Hakopian with a

local judge. When Baghdasaryan received a second visit from

Samvel demanding money on General Hakopian’s behalf, he

followed up on his judicial complaint. Shortly thereafter,

Baghdasaryan was arrested and fined $100 by the tax authority for working without a license that no other vendor was

required to have. Baghdasaryan could only operate his business if he paid a monthly $100 “surcharge” to the tax authority. Baghdasaryan eventually received the license after paying

a $500 bribe. 

After he was arrested and fined, Baghdasaryan began organizing the other business owners in the market to fight against

General Hakopian’s corruption. In February 1996, Baghdasaryan and one hundred other business owners organized a

rally to publicize the bribes exacted by General Hakopian,

which they believed the government sanctioned. A few days

later, four individuals representing themselves as criminal

investigators entered Baghdasaryan’s store and conducted a

search without a warrant. Allegedly, the criminal investigators

received a complaint that Baghdasaryan was selling illegal

BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER 939
items, but they failed to find any contraband in the store.

Around the same time, Baghdasaryan began receiving phone

calls threatening “dire consequences” if he did not withdraw

his complaint against General Hakopian.

During this time, the business owners also went on strike

for two days. After the strike, General Hakopian became very

angry and told Baghdasaryan that he knew Baghdasaryan had

organized the strike. General Hakopian demanded that Baghdasaryan either stop his organizing activities or face further

problems. Fearing harm to his family and himself, Baghdasaryan started paying the monthly $100 bribe and did so for

several years.

Baghdasaryan’s wife, Hamsik Aznavuryan, and their two

children were eligible under the Lautenberg Amendment to

seek asylum in the United States.2 Baghdasaryan sent his wife

and children to safety in the United States in February 2001,

and then resumed his organizing activities. Baghdasaryan

scheduled another rally for February 13, 2001. Several days

before this rally took place, militia men forcibly took Baghdasaryan from his home in the early hours of the morning without a warrant. The militia detained Baghdasaryan for twenty

days without charge. During his detention, Baghdasaryan was

beaten. During the beating, the Chief of the Criminal Section

told him that he must behave “normally” and that he was “defaming” and “raising his head” against the deputy of the

National Assembly, General Hakopian. The beating only

stopped when Baghdasaryan agreed to stop opposing General

Hakopian and exposing his corruption. 

When Baghdasaryan returned home from jail, his mother

informed him that she had received phone calls from people

2The Lautenberg Amendment permits Jewish and evangelical Christian

refugees from the former Soviet Union and Indochina to seek asylum in

the United States. Aznavuryan and the children have resided legally in the

United States since 2001. 

940 BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER
associated with General Hakopian. The callers knew the

address of Baghdasaryan’s family’s in the United States and

threatened to harm his family if Baghdasaryan did not “behave . . . calmly.” Soon thereafter, Baghdasaryan had an emotional breakdown, which required him to stay in the hospital

for two months.

In May 2001, Baghdasaryan left Armenia and attempted to

join his family in the United States by traveling through South

America. This attempt failed, and he returned to Armenia

three months later, in August 2001. When Baghdasaryan

returned, two individuals from the Armenian National Security Service met him and told him that “it would be much better if [you] went back from where [you] just came from . . . .”

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Baghdasaryan entered the United States using a fraudulent

visa on October 22, 2001. On October 30, 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)3

 served Baghdasaryan

with a Notice to Appear. On January 21, 2002, Baghdasaryan

appeared before the IJ and did not concede removability.

Baghdasaryan submitted an application for asylum and withholding of removal based on political opinion. He also

requested relief under CAT. After the merits hearing, the IJ

issued an oral decision finding Baghdasaryan not credible and

alternatively held that he had not established a nexus to a protected ground. The IJ denied all forms of relief. 

Baghdasaryan appealed to the BIA. The BIA reversed the

IJ’s adverse credibility determination, but nevertheless dismissed the appeal for failure to establish a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA found “very little indication” that the

3On March 1, 2003, the INS was abolished and its functions were transferred to the newly created Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

See Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 471, 6 U.S.C. § 291. We refer simply to the immigration agency simply as the “Government” in this opinion.

BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER 941
Armenian government was imputing any political opinion to

Baghdasaryan and that Baghdasaryan was merely the “victim

[of] criminal misconduct.” The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s

denial of relief under CAT. Baghdasaryan timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the BIA conducted a de novo review of the IJ’s

decision, our review is “limited to the BIA’s decision except

to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted [by the

BIA].” Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.

2006). We typically review the BIA’s asylum and withholding of removal determinations under the substantial evidence

standard.4See Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.

2009). Under the substantial evidence standard, the BIA’s

determinations will be upheld “if the decision is ‘supported by

reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record

considered as a whole.’ ” Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027,

1029 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d

1037, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Reversal, however,

is appropriate when “the evidence in the record compels a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the [BIA’s] decision is

incorrect.” Id.

4Baghdasaryan argues that the BIA’s asylum and withholding of

removal determinations are reviewed de novo. Although we typically

review the BIA’s asylum and withholding of removal determinations for

substantial evidence, there is support for Baghadasaryan’s position that de

novo review applies here. When an applicant is deemed credible, we have

considered nexus issues to be questions of law entitled to de novo review.

See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995) (reviewing de

novo the BIA’s decision that the applicant was not persecuted on account

of imputed political opinion when the IJ made a favorable credibility finding) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated by Parussimova v.

Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739-40 (9th Cir. 2009). Because Baghadasaryan

is eligible for relief under either standard, it is unnecessary to reach this

issue. 

942 BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER
DISCUSSION

I. THE BIA’S CONCLUSION THAT BAGHDASARYAN

WAS INELIGIBLE FOR ASYLUM IS NOT

SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

[1] To be statutorily eligible for asylum, Baghdasaryan

must show that he is a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A refugee is one who is “unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of [his or her native] country because of

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account

of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “Either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution provides eligibility for a discretionary grant of asylum.”

Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1998). 

[2] An applicant alleging past persecution has the burden of

establishing that (1) his treatment rises to the level of persecution; (2) the persecution was on account of one or more protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was committed by the

government, or by forces that the government was unable or

unwilling to control. Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th

Cir. 2000).

The BIA concluded that Baghdasaryan was not eligible for

asylum because he failed to establish a nexus between his

mistreatment and a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(A). This conclusion is contrary to the record

and our case law, which establishes that opposition to government corruption is an expression of political opinion. See

Fedunyak v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 2007).

We hold that Baghdasaryan was harmed on account of political opinion and, accordingly, we remand his petition to the

BIA to determine whether the harm that Baghdasaryan experienced rose to the level of persecution.

BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER 943
A. Nexus to a Protected Ground

[3] A nexus is established when the past persecution is “on

account of” one or more of the grounds enumerated in 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), which include race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.5

See Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir.

2008). To demonstrate a nexus between the harm Baghdasaryan suffered and his political opinion, Baghdasaryan must

show (1) that he held, or his persecutors believed that he held,

a political opinion; and (2) that he was harmed because of that

political opinion. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir.

2000). Although “[p]urely personal retribution is . . . not persecution on account of political opinion,” Grava v. INS, 205

F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000), it is well established that

mixed motives do not negate a legitimate nexus to political

opinion, see, e.g., Fedunyak, 477 F.3d at 1130 (nexus established where persecution is motivated by both personal greed

and applicant’s complaints about government extortion); Zhu

v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008) (nexus

established where Chinese woman harmed because of a personal dispute with a government official and the political act

of whistleblowing).

The BIA concluded that Baghdasaryan was not eligible for

asylum because Baghdasaryan failed to demonstrate that his

mistreatment was motivated by an imputed political opinion6

and that “there is no evidence of any basis for his mistreat5Baghdasaryan filed his application for relief prior to May 11, 2005, the

effective date of the REAL ID Act. Accordingly, nexus is evaluated

according to the “on account of” standard, rather than the “central reason”

standard codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). See Sinha, 564 F.3d at

1021 n.3 (applying pre-REAL ID Act standards because petitioner’s asylum application was filed before May 11, 2005). 

6An imputed political opinion arises when “[a] persecutor falsely attributes an opinion to the victim, and then persecutes the victim because of

that mistaken belief about the victim’s views.” Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970

F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1992). 

944 BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER
ment other than his failure to pay the money requested.” The

BIA also noted that “it does not appear . . . that [Baghdasaryan] was a victim of anything other than criminal misconduct.” Substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s

conclusion that General Hakopian mistreated Baghdasaryan

merely because of a personal dispute. To the contrary, the evidence in the record would compel a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that Baghdasaryan was mistreated because of his

political opinion. 

1. Political Opinion

[4] Whistle-blowing against government corruption is an

expression of political opinion. See, e.g., Zhu, 537 F.3d at

1044-45 (finding political opinion where a Chinese factory

worker wrote a letter of complaint to the town government

after her supervisor, who was also a government official,

raped her); Fedunyak, 477 F.3d at 1129 (finding political

opinion where Ukrainian business owner filed complaints

opposing government extortion scheme); Hasan v. Ashcroft,

380 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding political opinion

where a journalist wrote a newspaper article criticizing a corrupt government official); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 724,

728-29 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding political opinion where a Haitian fisherman refused to accede to extortion by government

security forces). 

[5] Here, Baghdasaryan opposed and publicly criticized

General Hakopian’s extortion scheme. He filed a complaint

with a judge, organized his fellow business owners at the market into an informal union to fight the extortion, and held several successful rallies and strikes to publicize the corruption.

Accordingly, Baghdasaryan is a whistle-blower whose opposition to General Hakopian’s corruption qualifies as a political

opinion. 

[6] The Government attempts to distinguish our whistleblower line of cases on the ground that this case does not

BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER 945
involve systemic government corruption. We disagree.

Where, as here, a government official uses the resources of

his office to extort bribes from many people, he is engaged in

more than aberrational conduct. See, e.g., Hasan, 380 F.3d at

1117, 1120 (holding that a journalist exposed systemic government corruption by writing an article about a corrupt government official who acted like a “godfather” with the

implicit permission of law enforcement and other government

officials); Zhu v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir.

2008) (holding that filing a complaint against a factory manager, who was also a government official, for raping an

employee is a political act when interpreted as an act of opposition to the government).

[7] Here, General Hakopian, like the corrupt government

official in Hasan, is a powerful figure who extorted bribes

from Baghdasaryan and hundreds of other business owners at

the market with the permission, and sometimes the assistance,

of law enforcement and other government officials. A review

of the evidence demonstrates that General Hakopian was

engaged in systemic government corruption. When Baghdasaryan refused to pay the bribe and filed a complaint, the tax

authority arrested and fined him for working without a license

that no other market vendor needed. The “fine” was the same

amount as the bribe and Baghdasaryan could not obtain the

license until he paid the “fine” for several months. When

Baghdasaryan publicized General Hakopian’s extortion

scheme, the militia arrested him, detained him without a warrant for twenty days, and beat him while a top law enforcement officer told him that he was “defaming” and “raising his

head” against General Hakopian. The National Security Service also threatened Baghdasaryan. The participation of these

various government actors demonstrates that General Hakopian’s corruption was systemic. Accordingly, a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to conclude that Baghdasaryan’s

whistleblowing activity against extortion and corruption was

an expression of his political opinion.

946 BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER
2. Nexus

[8] Moreover, a reasonable factfinder would be compelled

to conclude that Baghdasaryan was mistreated, at least in part,

because of his whistleblowing activity. Baghdasaryan was

threatened, harassed, arrested, and beaten after filing a complaint and publicly protesting the government sanctioned

extortion practiced by General Hakopian. While Baghdasaryan was beaten in detention, a top law enforcement official

told him that he was “defaming” and “raising his head”

against General Hakopian. This is direct and concrete evidence that Baghdasaryan was beaten because of his opposition to the government corruption perpetrated by General

Hakopian. Because the BIA ignored this compelling evidence

of nexus, its conclusion that Baghdasaryan failed to establish

nexus is not supported by substantial evidence. 

Despite the compelling evidence of nexus in the record, the

Government urges us to find that Baghdasaryan was merely

“on the wrong side of a personal dispute with the powerful

owner of the market who was also a government official.” To

support its position, the government cites two cases, MolinaMorales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2001) and ZayasMarini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1986). Neither of these

cases are controlling.

In Molina-Morales, the petitioner was persecuted after filing a rape complaint against the leader of a political party, but

we declined to find a nexus based on political opinion because

the petitioner did not have a political opinion and no evidence

suggested that any political opinion was imputed to him. 237

F.3d at 1051. Here, unlike in Molina-Morales, Baghdasaryan

demonstrated that he held a political opinion—opposition to

the systemic government corruption perpetrated by General

Hakopian. Moreover, unlike in Molina, the record suggests

that a political opinion was imputed to Baghdasaryan. A top

law enforcement official indicated that Baghdasaryan was

detained and beaten because he was “defaming” and “raising

BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER 947
his head” against General Hakopian. This comment indicates

that the Armenian government viewed Baghdasaryan as a

protestor and punished him for his resistance to government

corruption. Thus, Molina-Morales does not govern this case.

Zayas-Marini is also inapposite. In that case, we declined

to find persecution on account of political opinion where the

petitioner was a member of the Paraguayan elite who had personal disputes with several individuals in the ruling political

party. 785 F.2d at 806. Subsequent cases have limited ZayasMarini to situations in which the persecuted and persecutor

are social and political equals, and where the persecutors act

solely out of their individual capacities.7 Here, there is a substantial disparity between the social and political power of

General Hakopian, a powerful regional official, and Baghdasaryan, a struggling small business owner. Moreover, Baghadasaryan experienced mistreatment by officials acting under

color of law, including the milita, National Security forces,

and the tax authority, rather than private individuals acting in

their individual capacities. Accordingly, Zayas-Marini is not

controlling.

While some of the harm that Baghdasaryan experienced

may have been motivated by the personal greed of General

Hakopian, substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s

determination that Baghdasaryan was harmed for personal

reasons alone. Baghdasaryan’s testimony that he was

harassed, threatened, arrested, and beaten by the government

compels the conclusion that he was harmed, at least in part,

7

See Zhu, 537 F.3d at 1044 (distinguishing Zayas-Marini because police

acting under the color of law threatened the petitioner, rather than private

individuals acting in their individual capacities); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d

723, 728 (9th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing Zayas-Marini because the petitioner was not the social and political equal of his persecutor); LazoMajano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986) (same), overruled on

other grounds by Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1996) (en

banc). 

948 BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER
due to his political opinion expressed through his opposition

to government corruption. 

B. Committed by the Government

The BIA concluded that Baghdasaryan was only a “victim

. . . of criminal misconduct.” Therefore, the BIA did not view

the Armenian government to be the source of Baghdasaryan’s

persecution. This conclusion is not supported by substantial

evidence.

[9] “[W]hen the government is responsible for the persecution, the third prong of our asylum inquiry is satisfied without

further analysis.” Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1078

(9th Cir. 2004). Here, the evidence shows that Baghdasaryan

was mistreated by the militia, National Security Service, the

tax authority, and criminal investigators. Accordingly, any

reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find that the

Armenian government mistreated Baghdasaryan on account of

his political opinion, as expressed through his opposition to

government corruption. We therefore remand to the BIA to

consider whether the threats, harassment, fines, detention, and

beating that Baghdasaryan experienced rose to the level of persecution.8

8Neither the IJ nor the BIA explicitly considered whether the mistreatment that Baghdasaryan experienced rose to the level of persecution.

Accordingly, we are compelled to remand this question to the BIA. See,

e.g., Deloso v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 858, 865 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005). In doing

so, however, we note the credible evidence that Baghdasaryan was

detained, beaten, and threatened on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Ahmed

v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that detentions,

beatings, and threats rose to the level of persecution where they were disproportionate to applicant’s civil disobedience); Ndom v. Ashcroft, 384

F.3d 743, 756 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that threats and detentions for a

total of twenty-five days constitutes persecution), superseded by statute on

other grounds as stated by Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739-

40 (9th Cir. 2009). 

BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER 949
II. BAGHDASARYAN’S APPLICATION FOR

WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL SHOULD BE

RECONSIDERED

[10] The BIA dismissed Baghdasaryan’s appeal from the

IJ’s denial of his application for withholding of removal without any explanation. This lack of explanation is understandable because the BIA concluded that Baghdasaryan failed to

establish nexus, which is required to establish eligibility for

withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Because

we conclude that Baghdasaryan has established nexus, we

remand for a determination of whether he is eligible for withholding of removal, in addition to asylum. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we conclude that the BIA’s denial of

asylum is not supported by substantial evidence. We remand

with instructions for the BIA to determine whether the mistreatment that Baghdasaryan experienced on account of his

political opinion rose to the level of persecution. We also

remand for the BIA to consider whether Baghdasaryan is eligible for withholding of removal. 

GRANTED AND REMANDED.

950 BAGHDASARYAN v. HOLDER