In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-22-00454-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 324th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 324-613430-17

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

IN THE INTEREST OF K.B., Z.B., G.C., K.C., J.C., AND P.B., CHILDREN
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant A.B. (Mother)1appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parent–

child relationship with her children: K.B., Z.B., G.C., K.C., J.C., and P.B.2 The trial 

court found that the Department of Family and Protective Services had proved three 

conduct-based grounds for termination and that termination was in the children’s best 

interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). The trial court 

awarded permanent managing conservatorship of the children to the Department. 

Mother timely appealed.

II. BACKGROUND

Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that he “has 

been unable to identify any legally non-frivolous grounds for appeal” and that 

Mother’s appeal is therefore frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 

87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights

termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Counsel’s brief 

1We use initials to refer to Mother and her children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

2The children’s parent–child relationships with their fathers were also 

terminated, but no appeals were filed on behalf of the fathers.
3

meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record 

and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. 

We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record 

and to file a pro se response, but she did not do so.

3

 The Department has agreed that 

no meritorious grounds for appeal exist and thus has declined to file a responsive 

brief.

III. DISCUSSION

When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate 

record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-

00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.) 

(mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also 

consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-

18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. 

denied) (mem. op.); see Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09.

3We mailed Mother written notice informing her that her court-appointed 

counsel had filed an Anders brief and that she could obtain a copy of the appellate 

record and file a pro se response. However, this notice was returned to the court as 

undeliverable. Counsel informed us that he was having difficulty locating Mother and 

that his brief, which had been served on Mother by certified mail at her last known 

address, had been returned to him as well. Counsel reached out to Mother’s trial 

court attorney to see if she had a better address for Mother, but these efforts were not 

fruitful. Given that a party who fails to keep her attorney informed of her current 

address forfeits the right to receive a copy of the Anders brief and the right to file a 

pro se response, In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408 n.21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

(orig. proceeding), we hold that counsel complied with his Anders duties in this case.
4

We have carefully reviewed appointed appellate counsel’s Anders brief and the 

appellate record. Having found no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this 

appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). 

Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parent–child relationship 

between Mother and the children.

Mother’s counsel remains appointed in this appeal through proceedings in the 

supreme court unless otherwise relieved from his duties for good cause in accordance 

with Family Code Section 107.016. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016; In re P.M., 

520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order).

IV. CONCLUSION

We agree with counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we affirm the 

trial court’s termination order.

/S/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Delivered: March 9, 2023