United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Procurement,

Committee on National Security, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Monday,

September 30, 1996

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Russia’s Request for the

Export of U.S. Computers

for Stockpile Maintenance

Statement for the Record by Mr. Harold J. Johnson,

Associate Director, International Relations and Trade

Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/T-NSIAD-96-245

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

This statement responds to your request that we obtain information on

proposed exports of U.S. high performance computers to Russian nuclear

weapons laboratories. Specifically, you requested information on the

policies affecting cooperation between the United States and Russia on

nuclear warhead safety and security under a Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT) and Russian officials’ requests for access to U.S. high

performance computer exports to conduct work under a CTBT.

The executive branch, pursuant to U.S. policy on cooperation with Russia,

has held discussions with Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM)

and other officials on the possibility of undertaking cooperative projects

under a CTBT. Although no specific project plans have been developed or

approved, Department of Energy (DOE) officials said that the boundaries

for potential cooperative projects are that (1) they would be unclassified,

and (2) they would not enhance performance of Russian nuclear weapons

or contribute to Russian nuclear weapons design. These officials stated

that any access to computers provided to Russian scientists will be

consistent with current export control laws. The regulations implementing

the law provide the executive branch the authority to deny a license for

any item intended for research, development, design, manufacture,

construction, testing, or maintenance of any nuclear explosive device or

other sensitive nuclear activities. The United States is now seriously

considering Russia’s request for the export of U.S. high performance

computers that are more powerful than those previously exported to

Russia. The proposed export raises issues about safeguards to ensure that

U.S. policy is adhered to and that the computers are not being used for

proscribed nuclear activities. In considering these issues, the United States

must also consider whether or not Russia could develop or acquire high

performance computers from other non-U.S. sources in the near future.

Policies Affecting

U.S.-Russian Stockpile

Safety and Security

Cooperation

On September 24, 1996, the United States, Russia, and several other

countries signed a CTBT that prohibits any nuclear explosions. The United

States supports a CTBT to prevent the improvement of existing nuclear

arsenals and to constrain nuclear weapons proliferation. Since nuclear

explosions are not permitted under a CTBT, the United States has embarked

on a science-based stockpile stewardship program that uses past nuclear

weapons test data, nonnuclear laboratory tests, and computer simulations

to maintain confidence in the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile. It is U.S.

policy to continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent against other countries

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-245
with access to nuclear forces; the United States considers such a nuclear

deterrent to be a supreme national interest.

While negotiating the CTBT, representatives from the United States and

Russia discussed the possibility of scientific and technical collaboration

on topics related to the safety and security of each country’s stockpile

under a CTBT. However, according to DOE officials, the United States set

boundaries for cooperation with Russia to ensure that the information

exchange does not contribute to nuclear weapons design or enhance the

military performance of Russian nuclear weapons. The United States

restricted collaboration to unclassified subjects and materials and projects

that would not enhance the performance of Russian nuclear weapons.

Access to computers will be consistent with U.S. export control laws. In

this context, it should be noted that the actual export of high performance

computers is not required to conduct the collaborative efforts currently

being discussed, according to a national laboratory official.

The executive branch announced a new export control policy on

October 6, 1995, for high performance computers that is intended to focus

controls on computers that have a significant impact on U.S. and allied

security interests and eliminate controls that became unnecessary or

ineffective due to rapid advances in computer technology. The policy

allows the executive branch to deny export licenses for high performance

computers to certain nuclear weapons states and other countries of

proliferation concern, such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel,

when the computers (1) are intended for a military end user or an end user

involved in proliferation activity and have a composite theoretical

performance (CTP)1

 of over 2,000 million theoretical operations per second

(MTOPS) or (2) are intended for a civilian end user and have a CTP of over

7,000 MTOPS. The policy retained the authority to deny export licenses for

any item intended for the research, development, design, manufacture,

construction, testing, or maintenance of any nuclear explosive device or

other sensitive nuclear technologies.

The policy was announced after the executive branch concluded that

computers capable of a composite theoretical performance of up to 7,000

MTOPS would become widely available in international markets within the

next 2 years. The executive branch set a lower export control limit of 2,000

MTOPS for military end users and end users of proliferation concern

because, while these computers may be less controllable, the United

1

Composite theoretical performance is used to estimate the maximum possible performance of a

computer as measured in millions of theoretical operations per second.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-245
States does not want to support proliferation or certain military efforts in

these countries.

The policy also outlines a number of steps that the U.S. government may

require of the exporter or the end user to safeguard computer exports.

Among other things, the exporter or end user may be required to limit

access to the computer or inspect computer logs and output. In addition,

the end user may also be required to agree to on-site inspections by U.S.

government or exporting company officials, who would review programs

and software used on the computer, or to remote electronic monitoring of

the computer.

Russian Requests for

High Performance

Computer Exports

In the early summer of 1996, a MINATOM official expressed concern about

U.S. export restrictions on high performance computers and requested

that Russian and U.S. officials discuss the possible export of a Convex SPP

2000 computer. This computer is more capable than any computer known

to be in use in Russia. This request is currently being considered by the

United States, although the Commerce Department has not yet received an

export license application for the computer. In considering this request,

the United States asked MINATOM for additional information on how Russia

planned to use the SPP 2000 computer and several other computers for

which the executive branch was reviewing export license applications.

The MINATOM official indicated that the SPP 2000 would be used to help

maintain Russia’s nuclear stockpile but that the other computers

requested would be used for civilian purposes at Russian nuclear weapons

laboratories. According to the manufacturer, the SPP 2000, now known as

the Exemplar X-Class, can be configured with a maximum of 64

processors and has a maximum performance rating of 46,100 million

floating point operations per second (or approximately 34,500 MTOPS).2

Our review of computer export data indicates that it is unlikely that

Russian military and nuclear weapon laboratories have acquired

computers capable of more than approximately 3,500 MTOPS, due to a lack

of known sales of computers above that capability from the United States

or Japan, the only countries currently producing computers above that

level. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory officials told us that, the Russians

currently have the capability to connect less powerful computers into a

system with a capability greater than 3,500 MTOPS, but they did not know

whether the Russians had done this. Figure 1 shows a comparison of

2

The computer industry measures computer performance in floating point operations per second.

According to national laboratory officials, an MFLOP is roughly equal to .75 MTOP for multiprocessor

computers.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-245
Russia’s computing capabilities with the Convex Exemplar X-Class

computer.

Figure 1: Comparison of Russian

Computing Capabilities With the

Convex Exemplar X-Class Computer. 40,000

35,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

U.S. high performance computer export control limits

military end users civilian end users

Milion of theoretical operations per second. 1

MTOPs1

Estimated computing capability of Russian nuclear weapons labs.

30,000

25,000

Convex Exemplar

X-Class

estimated peak

performance

Issues Regarding the

Export of High

Performance

Computers to Russia

Under current export control regulations, the United States could choose

to approve the export of high performance computers to Russia with a

computer safeguard security plan. According to some national laboratory

officials, implementing a rigorous safeguard plan would require personnel

experienced in nuclear weapons work to identify the types of programs

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-245
being run on the computer. These officials said that some civilian

computer programs are similar to nuclear weapons programs.

Within this context, the proposed export of high performance computers

to Russian nuclear weapons laboratories raises several questions the

Congress and the executive branch may wish to consider.

• How will the executive branch determine whether the export of high

performance computers to Russian nuclear weapons laboratories is in the

U.S national security interest, taking into account (1) U.S. support for the

CTBT and (2) the executive branch’s boundaries on nuclear weapons safety

and security collaborations with Russia to ensure that such efforts do not

enhance the military performance or contribute to the design of Russian

nuclear weapons?

• If the United States were to approve the export of any computers to

Russian nuclear weapons laboratories for civilian end uses, how would the

United States devise a computer safeguard plan that could detect the

possible diversion of the computers from civilian end uses to proscribed

nuclear weapons activities?

• Could Russia develop or acquire computers with similar capability to

those they are requesting from non-U.S. sources in the near future?

This concludes our statement for the record.

(711192) Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-245
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