1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-14-00357-CV

____________________

ANGELLA D. SOILEAU, Appellant

V.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 136th District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. D-194,954 

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Angella D. Soileau (Soileau) appeals the trial court’s order dismissing 

Soileau’s claims against Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) and the order 

awarding Nationstar attorneys’ fees as a sanction.1See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13, 91a. We 

reverse and remand.

 

1 We note that Rule 13 does not specifically reference the award of “attorney 

fees” as a sanction, but it provides that the court upon motion or upon its own 

initiative, after notice and a hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction available 

under Rule 215.2(b), which expressly allows for “attorney fees” as a sanction. See
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UNDERLYING FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Soileau’s 2009 Lawsuit

On February 3, 2009, Soileau filed an Original Petition and Application for 

Temporary Restraining Order (the “2009 Lawsuit”) against First Horizon Home 

Loans (First Horizon) and Met Life Home Loans (Met Life) alleging errors relating 

to her home mortgage loan. The 2009 Lawsuit was styled, Cause No. E-183,194, 

Angella Soileau v. First Horizon Home Loans, Met Life Home Loans, in the 172nd 

Judicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas. After the 2009 Lawsuit was 

filed, the parties entered into an agreed temporary injunction that provided that 

First Horizon and Met Life would not foreclose on the loan during the pendency of 

the litigation.

After Soileau’s trial counsel withdrew, Soileau filed a motion for 

continuance. Another attorney filed a notice of appearance as Soileau’s counsel of 

record. On March 24, 2011, Soileau filed an “Amended Original Petition, 

Application for Temporary Restraining Order, and Action in Trespass to Try Title”

against First Horizon and Met Life. Therein, Soileau alleged libel of her credit 

 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 13, 215.2(b). Additionally, Rule 91a provides that if a claim is 

dismissed as baseless, the trial court shall award the prevailing party “reasonable 

and necessary attorney fees incurred with respect to the challenged cause of 

action.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.7. For purposes of this appeal, we will continue to 

reference “attorney fees” as “attorneys’ fees” because the trial court and defendants 

referred to them as “attorneys’ fees.” 
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history, violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), violations 

of the Texas Debt Collection Act, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act, and an action in trespass to try title in which Soileau alleged that 

Met Life was not a holder in due course with rights to foreclosure. The case was 

then continued by agreement and reset on the try or dismiss docket for August 

2011. Soileau failed to announce ready for trial and on October 6, 2011, the trial 

court entered an order of dismissal, dismissing the 2009 Lawsuit for want of 

prosecution. On or about October 12, 2011, Soileau served a Motion to Retain,

asking that the trial court retain the case on its docket and asserting that Soileau’s 

counsel made a mistake in failing to mark the date for the announcement on the 

calendar. The 172nd District Court granted the motion to retain. The trial of the 

matter was then reset and placed on the March 2012 try or dismiss docket. The 

March 2012 try or dismiss docket expressly required Soileau to make an 

announcement by February 17, 2012, and notified the parties that failure to 

announce ready would result in a dismissal. 

On February 22, 2012, the 172nd District Court issued a Notice of Intent to 

Dismiss the 2009 Lawsuit for want of prosecution stating that the suit was “more 

than eighteen (18) months old without final disposition[]” and “Counsel of Record 

and/or Pro Se Party” had failed to announce ready for trial, and giving notice that 
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the court would hold a hearing on the notice of intent to dismiss the case on March 

7, 2012. On February 29, 2012, Soileau filed a Motion to Retain, and the 

defendants filed a response and objection. On March 7, 2012, the trial court held a 

hearing and denied Soileau’s Motion to Retain. On March 24, 2012, Soileau filed a 

Second Amended Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining 

Order in which she claimed First Horizon and Met Life mishandled her loan, and 

she alleged libel to her credit history and violations of what she referenced as the 

Federal Debt Collections Practices Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Texas 

Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Texas Debt Collection Act. 

On April 20, 2012, the trial court denied Soileau’s Motion for 

Reconsideration of Second Motion to Retain or Alternatively Motion to Reinstate. 

On July 2, 2012, Soileau appealed the dismissal of the 2009 Lawsuit. On 

September 17, 2012, the trial court signed an order granting First Horizon’s and 

Met Life’s “Motion to Release Funds from [the] Registry of the Court[.]”

This Court dismissed Soileau’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and also 

overruled her motion for rehearing. Soileau sought review of this Court’s decision 

and the Texas Supreme Court denied the petition for review. On February 21, 

2013, this Court issued a mandate in the 2009 Lawsuit stating that the appeal was 

dismissed. 
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Soileau’s 2013 Lawsuit

In 2013, Soileau filed a Verified Original Petition, Application for 

Temporary Restraining Order, Application for Injunctive Relief, and Request for 

Disclosure (the “2013 Lawsuit”) against Nationstar. The 2013 Lawsuit was styled, 

Cause No. D194954, Angella D. Soileau v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, in the 136th

Judicial District Court in Jefferson County, Texas. In the 2013 Lawsuit, Soileau 

alleged that prior foreclosure proceedings were initiated against her after she 

“began having several problems” with her mortgagee, First Horizon, and the 

servicer of the loan, Met Life. According to Soileau’s petition in the 2013 Lawsuit, 

despite a “legitimate dispute” with First Horizon about the “accounting of her

escrow and mortgage,” Soileau alleged she attempted to make “good-faith 

payments through October 2008, which were rejected by First Horizon.” Soileau 

alleged that she previously filed the 2009 Lawsuit against First Horizon and Met

Life under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the FDCPA. According to Soileau,

Nationstar sent Soileau a letter in 2011 notifying her that it would be servicing the 

2002 note on behalf of Fannie Mae “despite Plaintiff never receiving notice from 

First Horizon or MET Life that ownership of the 2002 Note had allegedly 

transferred to Fannie Mae.” Soileau claims that in March 2012, the 172nd Judicial 

District Court dismissed the 2009 Lawsuit against First Horizon and Met Life for 
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want of prosecution “due to the acknowledged error of Plaintiff’s former counsel, 

who announced ready for trial one week too late under the Jefferson County Local 

Rules.” Soileau further asserted in the 2013 Lawsuit that Nationstar sent her a 

Notice of Acceleration and a Notice of Substitute Trustee Sale, notifying her of the 

upcoming foreclosure and sale of her home. According to Soileau, Nationstar 

mishandled the accounting for the note and has incorrectly accounted for 

payments, credits, and offsets related to the note. 

In the 2013 Lawsuit, Soileau seeks Declaratory Relief, asking the trial court 

to declare the rightful mortgagee of the note and deed of trust, the current servicer 

of the note, and the current amount due on the note. Soileau also seeks relief under 

the FDCPA, a temporary restraining order prohibiting Nationstar from selling the 

home pursuant to the Notice of Substitute Trustee Sale, and a temporary injunction 

against Nationstar preventing Nationstar from foreclosing against Soileau’s home 

during the pendency of the case. 

On April 25, 2014, Nationstar filed a Motion to Dismiss the 2013 Lawsuit 

“based on res judicata[.]” In the Motion to Dismiss, Nationstar argued that the 

2009 Lawsuit was “fully litigated” to a final judgment on the merits, “the evidence 

clearly illustrates that the defendants in the [2009] lawsuit are in privity with the 

defendant in the [2013] lawsuit[,]” Soileau “could have simply added Nationstar as 
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a defendant as she had already this same cause of action pending against First 

Horizon and MetLife for the same issues raised in the present lawsuit.” Nationstar 

argued that the doctrine of res judicata bars the 2013 Lawsuit because “the present 

suit is based on the same claims that were raised or that could have been raised in 

the first lawsuit.” Nationstar attached forty-two exhibits to its Motion to Dismiss, 

including, among other items, copies of pleadings and orders from the 2009 

Lawsuit and from the 2013 Lawsuit, as well as copies of the Memorandum 

Opinion from the appeal of the dismissal of the 2009 Lawsuit. Nationstar also filed 

a Motion for Rule 13 Attorneys’ Fees alleging that the 2013 Lawsuit is “clearly 

groundless and brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.” 

On May 14, 2014, the trial court signed an order granting Nationstar’s 

motion to dismiss and dismissing Soileau’s case, but the order did not state the 

dismissal was “with prejudice[.]” On the same day, the trial court signed an order 

granting Nationstar’s motion for attorney’s fees under Rule 13 and awarding

Nationstar attorney’s fees in the amount of $9,300. On June 13, 2014, Soileau filed

“Plaintiff’s Verified Motion to Reinstate, or alternatively, Motion for New 

Trial[.]”Nationstar filed its response on June 27, 2014. According to the trial 

court’s Order dated August 22, 2014, the “Plaintiff’s Verified Motion to Reinstate, 

or alternatively, Motion for New Trial” was originally set for a hearing on July 3, 
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2014, and then re-noticed for July 25, 2014, by the plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff’s 

counsel did not appear at the July 25th hearing. The trial court denied Soileau’s 

motion on July 25, 2014. On August 20, 2014, Soileau filed “Plaintiff’s Verified 

Motion to Reconsider Motion to Reinstate, or alternatively, Motion for New Trial” 

and “Plaintiff’s Supplement to Verified Motion to Reconsider Motion to Reinstate, 

or alternatively, Motion for New Trial[.]” On August 22, 2014, the trial court 

signed an order denying Soileau’s Motion to Reconsider Motion to Reinstate or, 

alternatively, Motion for New Trial. Soileau appeals from the trial court’s orders 

granting Nationstar’s motion to dismiss and granting Nationstar’s motion for 

attorney’s fees under Rule 13.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

In her first appellate issue, Soileau argues the trial court committed 

reversible error by dismissing Soileau’s case based on res judicata (1) when her 

first case was dismissed for want of prosecution and res judicata does not apply to 

a prior dismissal for want of prosecution and (2) Nationstar’s motion to dismiss 

was defective because it was untimely and fails to state why Soileau’s causes of 

action are baseless or do not entitle her to the relief she seeks, and (3) the trial 

court considered evidence and not just the pleadings in ruling on the motion to 

dismiss in violation of Rule 91a.6 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. In her 
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second appellate issue, Soileau contends that the trial court committed reversible 

error by granting Nationstar’s Motion for Rule 13 Sanctions against Soileau based 

on Nationstar’s motion to dismiss. 

Nationstar responds by arguing that Soileau presented these issues for the 

first time on appeal and, therefore, Soileau has failed to preserve error in the trial 

court. In the alternative, Nationstar contends that, even if Soileau’s issues were 

preserved for appellate review, the trial court did not err in granting the motion to 

dismiss and awarding attorney’s fees. In her reply brief, Soileau argues that she 

was not required to preserve error because she was challenging the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the ruling and she contends she could raise this issue for 

the first time on appeal pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(d). She 

also cites to Alvarado v. Magic Valley Electric Co-op, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied), and argues that she was not required to 

preserve error because the trial court’s dismissal of Soileau’s claims constituted 

fundamental error.

RULE 91a

Rule 91a authorizes a party to move for a dismissal of a cause of action that 

has no basis in law or fact. Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. We review a dismissal under 

Rule 91a de novo. Dailey v. Thorpe, 445 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex. App.—Houston 
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[1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). In ruling on the motion, a court looks only to “the 

pleading of the cause of action, together with any pleading exhibits.” Tex. R. Civ. 

P. 91a.6 (“[T]he court may not consider evidence in ruling on the motion and must 

decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together with 

any pleading exhibits permitted by Rule 59.”). 

EFFECT OF PRIOR DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

Soileau argues that the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss because the prior dismissal in the 2009 Lawsuit was not an adjudication 

on the merits and could not, as a matter of law, serve as res judicata to preclude her 

2013 Lawsuit. Ordinarily, when an order dismissing an action for want of 

prosecution does not state whether the suit was dismissed with or without 

prejudice, we presume that the dismissal was without prejudice. See Barnes v. 

Deadrick, 464 S.W.3d 48, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). A

dismissal for want of prosecution is generally without prejudice. Christensen v. 

Chase Bank USA, N.A., 304 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. 

denied). However, if a trial court erroneously dismisses a case for want of 

prosecution with prejudice, and no appeal is taken, then the dismissal will support 

the application of res judicata in the event the suit is refiled. Id. (emphasis added).

Otherwise, a dismissal without prejudice is not an adjudication on the merits and 
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does not serve as res judicata to preclude a later-filed action. Barnes, 464 S.W.3d 

at 54.

According to the record before us, the 2009 Lawsuit was dismissed by the 

172nd District Court’s order of March 7, 2012, wherein the trial court stated that 

the suit is dismissed “for want of prosecution.” The trial court did not specify that 

the dismissal was with or without prejudice, and the appeal of the dismissal did not 

consider whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Therefore, we 

presume that the trial court’s dismissal of the 2009 Lawsuit was without prejudice.

Id.; Christensen, 304 S.W.3d at 553. Because the dismissal of the 2009 Lawsuit 

was without prejudice, it would not be an adjudication on the merits and would not 

preclude Soileau’s 2013 Lawsuit.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR

Nationstar argues on appeal that Soileau failed to preserve this argument for 

appeal because she failed to make the argument in the trial court. Tex. R. App. 

33.1(a). Soileau argues that the argument she made in her Motion to Reinstate and 

Motion for New Trial was sufficient, that she was not required to make the 

argument below under Rule 33.1(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

and the error was “fundamental error” and therefore she can make the argument for 

the first time on appeal.
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As a general rule, in order to preserve error for appellate review, it is 

incumbent upon the complaining party to (1) make a timely objection to the trial 

court that “state[s] the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party [seeks] 

from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the 

complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context[,]” and (2) 

obtain a ruling. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Nevertheless, under Rule 33.1(d), in 

nonjury cases certain arguments can be made for the first time on appeal. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 33.1(d).

“In a nonjury case, a complaint regarding the legal or factual insufficiency of 

the evidence—including a complaint that the damages found by the court are 

excessive or inadequate, as distinguished from a complaint that the trial court erred 

in refusing to amend a fact finding or to make an additional finding of fact—may 

be made for the first time on appeal in the complaining party’s brief.” Id.; see also

Office of Attorney Gen. of Texas v. Burton, 369 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tex. 2012) (“As 

a general rule, an appellant must first complain to the trial court by a timely 

request, objection, or motion and obtain a ruling as a prerequisite for appellate 

review of that complaint, but the general rule does not apply to complaints about 

the sufficiency of the evidence in a trial to the court.”) Because the motion to 

dismiss was decided by the trial court and Soileau challenges the legal sufficiency 
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of the evidence for the trial court to conclude that the dismissal of the 2009 

Lawsuit should act as res judicata and preclude her from filing the 2013 Lawsuit, 

we sustain Soileau’s first issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d). We conclude that the 

trial court erred in granting Nationstar’s motion to dismiss based upon res judicata, 

and we reverse the trial court’s order awarding Nationstar attorneys’ fees and 

sustain issue two. We reverse the trial court’s order dismissing Soileau’s claims 

against Nationstar and the order awarding Nationstar attorneys’ fees as a sanction 

and remand this matter to the trial court.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

_________________________

 LEANNE JOHNSON

 Justice

Submitted on January 26, 2015

Opinion Delivered November 12, 2015

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.