AIR FORCE

Actions Needed to 

Strengthen 

Management of 

Unmanned Aerial 

System Pilots

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2014

GAO-14-316

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-316, a report to 

congressional requesters

April 2014

AIR FORCE

Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of 

Unmanned Aerial System Pilots

Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2008, the Air Force has more 

than tripled the number of its activeduty pilots flying RPAs, which is the 

term the Air Force uses to refer to 

unmanned aerial systems such as the 

MQ-1 Predator. Due to increases in 

demand, RPA pilots have had a 

significant increase in workload since 

2007. GAO was asked to evaluate the 

Air Force’s approach to managing its 

RPA pilots as well as their quality of life

and promotion rates. For this review,

GAO evaluated the extent to which the 

Air Force (1) has used a strategic 

human-capital approach to manage 

RPA pilots; (2) has addressed 

concerns, if any, about the working 

conditions of RPA pilots that may affect 

their quality of life; and (3) analyzes the 

promotion rates of RPA pilots. 

GAO analyzed personnel planning 

documents, Air Force studies, and 

officer promotion data. GAO also 

interviewed unit commanders at 

selected Air Force bases and

Headquarters Air Force officials and 

conducted focus groups with RPA 

pilots. While the results of these focus 

groups are not generalizable, they 

provide valuable insights. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Air Force 

update optimum crew ratios; establish 

a minimum crew ratio; develop a 

recruiting and retention strategy; 

evaluate using alternative personnel 

populations to be pilots; use feedback 

from RPA pilots; analyze the effects of 

being deployed-on-station; and 

analyze the effect that being an RPA 

pilot has on promotions. The Air Force 

concurred with four recommendations

and partially concurred with the 

remaining three recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Air Force has managed its remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots using some 

strategic human-capital approaches, such as planning for the different levels of 

experience that it needs in these pilots. However, it continues to face challenges. 

High-performing organizations manage human capital to identify the right number 

of personnel and to target the right sources to fill personnel needs. In 2008, the 

Air Force determined the optimum number of RPA pilots—the crew ratio—for 

some units, but it did not account for all tasks these units complete. Air Force 

officials stated that, as a result, the crew ratio is too low, but the Air Force has not 

updated it. Air Force guidance states that low crew ratios diminish combat 

capability and cause flight safety to suffer, but the Air Force has operated below 

its optimum crew ratio and it has not established a minimum crew ratio. Further, 

high work demands on RPA pilots limit the time they have available for training 

and development and negatively affects their work-life balance. In addition, the 

Air Force faces challenges recruiting officers into the RPA pilot career and may 

face challenges retaining them in the future. High-performing organizations tailor 

their recruiting and retention strategies to meet their specific mission needs, but 

the Air Force has not tailored its approach to recruiting and retaining RPA pilots 

nor considered the viability of using alternative personnel such as enlisted 

personnel or civilians. Without developing an approach to recruiting and retaining 

RPA pilots and evaluating the viability of using alternative personnel populations 

for the RPA pilot career, the Air Force may continue to face challenges, further 

exacerbating existing shortfalls of RPA pilots. Moreover, the Air Force has not 

used direct feedback from RPA pilots via existing mechanisms, or otherwise, to 

develop its approach to managing challenges related to recruiting, retention, 

training, and development of RPA pilots. 

The Air Force has taken some actions to address potentially difficult working 

conditions RPA pilots face, but it has not fully analyzed the challenge pilots face 

to balance their warfighting roles with their personal lives. RPA pilots operate 

RPAs from bases in the United States and live at home; thus they experience 

combat alongside their personal lives—known as being deployed-on-station—

which RPA pilots stated negatively affects their morale. While the Department of 

Defense has committed to maintaining high morale for servicemembers, the Air 

Force has not fully analyzed the effects on morale related to being deployed-onstation, and thus it does not know whether it needs to take actions in response. 

The Air Force monitors RPA pilot promotion rates, but has not analyzed factors 

that may relate to their low promotion rates. Statistical principles call for 

researchers to account for potential key factors in analysis because when they 

omit key factors, the relationships between other factors may not be accurately 

estimated. The Air Force analyzed promotions across a group of officers, 

including RPA pilots, and found factors that related to promotions in general. 

However, the Air Force has not analyzed the factors related to RPA pilots’ 

promotions specifically and, as a result, it does not have the information to 

determine what factors may affect their promotions. Consequently, the Air Force 

may not be targeting actions it is taking to raise RPA pilot promotion rates at the 

appropriate factors, and information it has reported to Congress may not be 

accurate.

View GAO-14-316. For more information, 

contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or 

farrellb@gao.gov.
Letter 1

Background 5

The Air Force Has Made Efforts to Manage RPA Pilots but Faces 

Challenges to Recruit, Develop, and Retain Pilots and Build 

Their Morale 10

Air Force Has Taken Some Actions to Address the Potentially 

Challenging Working Conditions RPA Pilots Face but Has Not 

Fully Analyzed Being Deployed-on-Station 22

The Air Force Monitors RPA Pilot Promotion Rates but Has Not 

Analyzed Factors Related to Those Rates 27

Conclusions 34

Recommendations for Executive Action 35

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 39

Appendix II Focus-Group Methodology and Results 45

Appendix III Comments from the Department of the Air Force 49

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 53

Table

Table 1: Questions GAO Moderator Asked Air Force Remotely 

Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Pilots during Focus Group Meetings 

at Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases 46

Figures

Figure 1: Current and Planned Operational and Training Locations 

for Air Force Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 6

Figure 2: Remote-Split Operations of Air Force Remotely Piloted 

Aircraft (RPA) 8

Contents
Figure 3: Air Force Steps to React to Growth in Demand for 

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 13

Figure 4: Distribution of Permanent and Temporary Air Force 

Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 18

Figure 5: The Rates of Promotion to Major for Pilots of Remotely 

Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air Force 

Officer Careers, 2006 to 2012 29

Figure 6: The Rates of Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel for Pilots 

of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air 

Force Officer Careers, 2006 to 2013 30

Figure 7: The Rates of Promotion Rates to Colonel for Pilots of 

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air 

Force Officer Careers, 2006 to 2012 31

Figure 8: Results of GAO Analysis of Focus Groups Meetings of 

RPA Pilots 48

Abbreviations

AFPC Air Force Personnel Center

CAP combat air patrol

DOD Department of Defense

DOPMA Defense Officer Personnel Management Act

RPA remotely piloted aircraft 
Page 1 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 10, 2014

The Honorable Harry Reid

Majority Leader

United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) are one of the most in-demand 

capabilities the Air Force provides to battlefield commanders.1 Beyond 

replacing human beings in aircraft that perform dangerous roles, RPAs 

are highly valuable because they possess characteristics that many 

manned aircraft do not. For example, they can fly long-duration missions, 

thereby providing a sustained presence over the battlefield. In response 

to the increased demand, the Air Force has significantly increased the 

number of RPAs it uses for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

and precision strike capabilities, according to Air Force documentation. 

Consequently, the Air Force has increased the number of its pilots flying 

RPAs from approximately 400 in 2008 to about 1,350 in 2013. Due to the 

increased demand for their capabilities, these pilots have served at a high 

pace of operations since 2007.2 Most of these pilots are located on Air 

Force bases within the United States and fly the RPAs overseas in 

operational environments. The Air Force uses the term RPA to refer to 

large unmanned aircraft systems, such as the MQ-1 Predator. The 

Department of Defense (DOD) defines an unmanned aerial system as a 

system whose components include the necessary equipment, networks, 

and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft—that is, an aircraft that 

does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight under remote 

control or autonomous programming.

 1

Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 (May, 18 2009).

2

Pace of operations refers to the number of aircraft flying hours and it increases with the 

intensity and number of operations. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force flew its Predator and 

Reaper systems for over 300,000 hours, combined.
Page 2 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Our prior work has found that DOD has faced challenges in the 

development and acquisition of unmanned aircraft systems and in the 

integration of these systems into combat operations.3 Regarding 

personnel, we have found that the Air Force and the Army identified 

limitations in their approaches to provide personnel to meet unmanned 

aircraft systems force levels, and they had not fully developed plans to 

supply needed personnel.4 More recently, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20135 required the Air Force to report on 

the education, training, and promotion rates of RPA pilots.

You requested that we evaluate the Air Force’s approach to managing its 

RPA pilot workforce as well as the pilots’ quality of life and their promotion 

rates. For this review we evaluated the extent to which the Air Force (1) 

has used a strategic human-capital approach to manage RPA pilots; (2) 

has addressed concerns, if any, about the working conditions of RPA 

pilots that may affect their quality of life; and (3) has analyzed the 

promotion rates of RPA pilots.

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force uses a strategic humancapital approach to manage RPA pilots, we applied criteria from our 

model of strategic human-capital management that we previously 

reported. The model includes leading practices used by high-performing 

organizations and is intended to help federal organizations use their 

human capital effectively and integrate human-capital considerations into 

daily decision making and planning for the program results they wish to 

 3

See, for example, GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems, GAO-07-578 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2007); Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased 

Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, GAO-07-836 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2007); 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management and 

Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs, GAO-09-175 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 14, 2008); and Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater 

Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems, GAO-09-520

(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2009).

4

GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a Results-Oriented 

Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories, GAO-10-331 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010).

5

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 527 

(2013).
Page 3 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

accomplish.6 We adapted these criteria by analyzing the practices in the 

model to determine which were relevant to RPA pilots and a military 

career in general. We reviewed our adaptation with Air Force officials who 

agreed that our criteria were relevant to the Air Force’s management of 

RPA pilots. To identify the extent to which the Air Force used these 

practices, we interviewed officials from offices including the Deputy Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services and the 

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Operations, Plans, and 

Requirements, as well as RPA pilots and their commanders. In addition, 

we analyzed DOD and Air Force guidance and data on personnel levels, 

incentive pays, and attrition rates for RPA pilots. Furthermore, we 

discussed instances of Air Force personnel-management actions that we 

found to be inconsistent with the leading practices we reported on 

previously with the appropriate Air Force officials.

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force has addressed concerns, if 

any, about the working conditions of RPA pilots that may affect their 

quality of life, we identified and analyzed criteria included in DOD’s 2009 

and 2004 Quadrennial Quality of Life Reviews. These reviews include 

statements that express DOD’s commitment to provide servicemembers 

with the best quality of life possible. DOD has broadly defined quality of 

life to include such factors as morale, health and wellness, and work-life 

balance. To understand the working conditions of RPA pilots that may 

affect their quality of life, we analyzed Air Force studies that evaluated the 

stress and mental-health conditions of RPA personnel, which included 

pilots. We also interviewed the researchers who conducted these studies 

to clarify our understanding of their methods, findings, and 

recommendations to alleviate the stress of RPA personnel. We analyzed 

the recommendations included in the Air Force studies as well as 

documentation provided by officials from various Air Force offices 

describing actions the Air Force has taken in response to these 

recommendations. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Air Force 

Medical Support Agency, Headquarters Air Force officials, as well as RPA 

pilots, their commanders, and mental-health professionals during site 

 6

GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). See also applications of this model in evaluations of DOD personnel 

management in GAO, Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to 

Better Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel, GAO-06-908 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006) and Defense Management: Actions Needed to Ensure National 

Guard and Reserve Headquarters Are Sized to be Efficient, GAO-14-71 (Washington 

D.C.: Nov. 12, 2013).
Page 4 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

visits to Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. In these interviews 

we obtained perspectives on the working conditions of RPA pilots that 

may affect their quality of life and actions taken in response.

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force analyzes the promotion 

rates of RPA pilots, we applied criteria from our model of strategic 

human-capital management7 regarding using complete data in humancapital decisions. We analyzed data from the Air Force Personnel Center 

(AFPC) for active-duty officers promoted to the ranks of major, lieutenant 

colonel, and colonel. We analyzed data from 2006 to the most-recently 

available data, which for promotion to major and colonel was 2012 and for 

promotion to lieutenant colonel was 2013.8 In addition, we interviewed 

officials from AFPC, reviewed documentation they provided, and found 

the data to be reliable for our purposes. Furthermore, we analyzed 

documentation that officials from Headquarters Air Force and AFPC 

provided, including Air Force policy that governs the officer promotion 

process, AFPC’s analysis of officer promotion rates, and the Air Force’s 

August 2013 report to Congress on the promotion rates of RPA pilots.9

Moreover, we evaluated documentation of steps the Air Force has taken 

to raise the promotion rates of RPA pilots including instructions the 

Secretary of the Air Force provided to promotion board members and 

briefings that Headquarters Air Force and AFPC prepared for the 

Secretary of the Air Force.

For all our objectives, we also conducted 10 focus groups during site 

visits to Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. Each group 

generally consisted of six to nine active-duty RPA pilots at ranks ranging 

from second lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. The information that we 

obtained during these focus groups accurately captures the opinions 

provided by the RPA pilots who attended the focus groups at the three Air 

Force Bases we visited. However, these opinions cannot be generalized 

to all RPA pilots at these bases or to all RPA pilots in the Air Force. We 

 7

GAO-02-373SP.

8

We evaluated promotion rates of officers in the Line of the Air Force competitive 

category, which includes RPA pilots. In addition, we focused our analysis on officers who 

were promoted in the zone. We discuss competitive categories and officer promotion 

timing in more detail in the background section of this report.

9

Air Force, Report on Education and Training and Promotion Rates for Air Force Pilots of 

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (August 2013).
Page 5 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

discuss our scope and methodology in more detail in appendix I and our 

approach to conducting our focus groups in appendix II.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to April 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Air Force has rapidly expanded its use of RPAs in the last decade to 

support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Air Force flies 

three types of RPAs—the MQ-1 (Predator), the MQ-9 (Reaper) and the 

larger RQ-4 (Global Hawk). Beyond the traditional intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to analyze evolving battlefield 

conditions, the MQ-1 and the MQ-9 have been outfitted with missiles to 

strike targets, with equipment to designate targets for manned aircraft by 

laser, and with sensors to locate the positions of improvised explosive 

devices and moving insurgents, among other missions.

All the military services operate RPAs, and each uses different 

approaches to assign personnel to pilot them and operate their sensors. 

For example, the Air Force (the focus of this review) assigns officers to fly 

RPAs and enlisted personnel to operate the RPAs’ sensors, which 

provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. In 

addition, the Air Force relied solely on manned-aircraft pilots to fly RPAs 

until 2010, when it established an RPA pilot career field for officers who 

specialize in flying RPAs and are not qualified to fly manned aircraft. 

Similarly, the Navy assigns officers to pilot RPAs, and enlisted personnel 

to operate RPA sensors. However, the Navy has not established a 

separate career field for pilots who specialize in flying RPAs and instead 

assigns pilots of manned aircraft to operate them. By contrast, the Army 

and Marine Corps have opted to assign enlisted personnel to fly RPAs 

and operate their sensors. Further, in both the Army and Marine Corps, 

there is no distinction between the pilot and sensor operator.

Background

Growth in Use of RPAs 

and Expanded Missions

The Military Services’

Various Approaches to 

Assigning RPA Personnel
Page 6 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Air Force RPA pilots carry out their missions and pilot RPAs from eight 

active-duty bases in the continental United States including Creech, 

Cannon, and Beale Air Force Bases and from Air National Guard bases in 

six states including North Dakota, New York, and Ohio. In addition, RPA 

pilots are trained at some of the bases where RPAs are operated, such 

as at Beale Air Force Base, as well as at other bases where RPAs are not 

operated, such as at Holloman Air Force Base. The Air Force plans to 

add an Air Force Reserve unit at Hurlburt Field as well as Air National 

Guard RPA bases in Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, New York, and 

Pennsylvania (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Current and Planned Operational and Training Locations for Air Force 

Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)

The initial training that the Air Force provides to its RPA pilots is designed 

specifically for flying RPAs and consists of two major components that 

take about 10 months to complete. The first major component is 

Undergraduate RPA Training and it consists of a basic flying skills course 

in which RPA pilots learn to fly a small manned aircraft in Pueblo, 

Colorado; instrument training in a manned-aircraft flight simulator at 

Randolph Air Force Base in Texas, and an RPA fundamentals course that 

is also at Randolph. In the second major component of their initial 

training, RPA pilots get their first opportunity to fly an RPA at a Formal 

Training Unit, which for most active-duty pilots takes place at Holloman 

Air Force Base in New Mexico. During this training, RPA pilots learn basic 

RPA Pilots’ Current and 

Future Basing

Training and Training 

Costs
Page 7 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

RPA operations in all mission areas including intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance as well as close air support. Following their time in 

Formal Training Units, RPA pilots finish their training by attending a 2-

week joint weapons course in which they learn how to operate with the 

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in a joint operational environment.

The Air Force spends considerably less to train RPA pilots than it does to 

train manned-aircraft pilots. Specifically, Air Education and Training 

Command officials estimate that the Air Force spends about $65,000 to 

train each RPA pilot to complete Undergraduate RPA Training. 

Conversely, these officials estimate that the Air Force spends an average 

of $557,00010 for each manned-aircraft pilot to complete the 

corresponding portion of manned-aircraft pilot training, which is called 

Undergraduate Pilot Training.

The Air Force currently flies the bulk of its RPAs using a concept known 

as remote-split operations. With remote-split operations, a small number 

of RPA pilots deploy to operational theaters located overseas to launch 

and recover RPAs from various locations around the world while other 

RPA pilots remotely control the RPA for its mission from Air Force bases 

in the United States (see fig. 2). According to Air Force officials, remotesplit operations help the Air Force reduce the personnel and equipment it 

deploys overseas because the units that launch and recover RPAs are 

staffed with a relatively small number of pilots, sensor operators, support 

personnel, and equipment. In addition, remote-split operations provide the 

Air Force flexibility to change the geographic region of the world where an 

RPA pilot conducts a mission without moving the pilot, support personnel, 

or equipment needed to control the RPA. If the Air Force is not able to 

use one of its launch and recovery sites for various reasons such as poor 

weather, the Air Force can continue its RPA operations by launching 

RPAs from a different launch and recovery site.

 10This cost is an average of the $679,552 that the Air Force spends to train fighter or 

bomber pilots during Undergraduate Pilot Training and the $434,418 that it spends for 

cargo or tanker pilots during the same training. Air Education and Training Command 

officials stated that fuel costs were the primary reason for the differences between the cost 

to train fighter and bomber pilots versus cargo and tanker pilots.

Remote-Split Operations
Page 8 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Figure 2: Remote-Split Operations of Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)11 created a 

system for managing the promotions for the officer corps of each of the 

military services. DOPMA specifies that the secretaries of the military 

departments must establish the maximum number of officers in each 

competitive category that may be recommended for promotion by 

competitive promotion boards. Career categories, also known as 

competitive categories, cluster officers with similar education, training, or 

experience, and these officers compete among themselves for promotion 

opportunities. Under this system, as currently implemented in the Air 

Force, there are several competitive categories including one that 

contains the bulk of Air Force officers called the Line of the Air Force, 

which includes RPA pilots, as well as pilots of manned aircraft and other 

operations-oriented careers.12

 11See 10 U.S.C. § 611, et seq.

12Additional competitive categories in the Air Force include the judge advocate and 

chaplain competitive categories as well as several competitive categories for a variety of 

medical career fields.

Promotion Process
Page 9 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

To consider officers for promotion from among those who are eligible, the 

Air Force assigns groups of senior officers to serve as members of a 

promotion selection board for each competitive category of officer in the 

Air Force. Promotion boards consist of at least five active-duty officers

who are senior in grade to the eligible officers, but no officer on the board 

is below the rank of major. In addition, Air Force guidance states that the 

Air Force attempts to provide a balanced perspective on promotion 

boards, and hence it selects officers who mirror, as much as possible, the 

officers they are considering with respect to race, sex, aeronautical rating, 

career field, and command.13 Promotion boards typically convene 

annually at AFPC headquarters to review a variety of records for each 

eligible officer, including performance and training reports as well as 

recommendations from supervisors. Board members assess these 

records using a best-qualified approach and use a variety of methods to 

score the records and resolve differences among the scoring of the board 

members, if necessary. An Air Force officer cannot serve as a member of 

two successive promotion boards considering officers of the same 

competitive category and rank.

A key feature of DOPMA is its “up-or-out” promotion system. Under this 

system, as currently implemented in the Air Force, promotion to the first 

two ranks in an officer’s career is not competitive. Specifically, 100 

percent of fully qualified Air Force second lieutenants and first lieutenants 

are promoted after serving for 2 years in their respective ranks and do not 

meet with a competitive promotion board. However, as officers advance 

through the ranks in cohorts that are determined by the year they were 

commissioned, they compete for promotion against other members of 

their cohort at set years or zones of consideration for each rank. For 

example, Air Force officers are generally considered for promotion to 

major, or the grade of O-4, after 10 years.

Under the DOPMA system, a select group of officers can also be 

considered for promotion 1 or 2 years early, or “below the zone.”

However, because only a limited number of officers below the zone may 

be promoted, officers have their greatest potential for promotion “in the 

zone.” If officers in a cohort are not promoted while they are in the zone, 

they can compete for promotion in the following one or in some instances 

 13Air Force Pamphlet 36-2506, You and Your Promotions—The Air Force Officer 

Promotion Program (Sept. 1, 1997).
Page 10 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

two years later, which is known as competing “above the zone.” However, 

if these officers are not selected for promotion above the zone, they could 

be involuntarily separated from the Air Force.

The Air Force has taken some steps toward managing RPA pilots using a 

strategic human-capital approach but faces several challenges including 

accurately identifying personnel requirements, limited training time for 

pilots, recruiting and retention difficulties, and incorporating feedback from 

RPA pilots into its operations.

The Air Force’s effort to meet combatant command RPA requirements 

has included some elements of strategic human-capital planning, but 

increasing demand and past experience indicate the Air Force has not 

accurately identified RPA personnel requirements. High-performing 

organizations use strategic human-capital planning to help them evaluate 

the extent to which their human-capital approaches support the 

accomplishment of programmatic goals. Strategic human-capital planning 

involves identifying human-capital needs like the necessary “shape,”

which involves ensuring that agencies have the right numbers of staff at 

the right levels of experience, as well as the necessary size of the 

workforce for accomplishing agency missions while also enabling the 

workforce to accomplish career-development tasks, which furthers 

agency goals and objectives.

The Air Force has taken steps to plan for the shape and size of the RPA 

pilot workforce and react to requirements from the Secretary of Defense, 

including adding a cadre of experienced officers to mentor officers 

recruited into a new career the Air Force established for RPA pilots. In 

order to develop a long-term, sustainable career path for pilots flying 

RPAs and demonstrate its commitment to RPA pilots, in 2010 the Air 

Force established an RPA pilot career field with a separate set of training 

requirements. These officers are qualified only to fly RPAs and are not 

qualified on Air Force manned aircraft.

The Air Force Has 

Made Efforts to 

Manage RPA Pilots 

but Faces Challenges 

to Recruit, Develop, 

and Retain Pilots and 

Build Their Morale

The Air Force Has 

Undertaken Some 

Workforce Planning Efforts 

but It May Not Have 

Identified Its Personnel 

Requirements Accurately

Air Force Steps to Plan for the 

Shape and Size of the RPA 

Pilot Workforce and React to 

Increased Combat Air Patrol 

(CAP) Requirements
Page 11 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

In addition, the Air Force recognized that as new officers were recruited 

into the RPA pilot career field, they would need a group of more-senior 

officers to serve as mentors and leaders. Therefore, in 2011, the Air 

Force permanently recategorized around 475 manned-aircraft pilots who 

were generally serving at the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel to 

serve as permanent RPA pilots, according to Air Force documentation.

Air Force officials stated that these more-senior pilots would help provide 

a leadership and experience base for the new RPA pilot career field. The 

officials also stated that additional manned-aircraft pilots have been 

permanently recategorized as RPA pilots since 2011, and Air Force 

documentation shows a total of 545 recategorized manned-aircraft pilots.

Furthermore, the Air Force has taken steps to plan for the size of its RPA 

pilot workforce. According to Headquarters Air Force officials, the number 

of RPA combat air patrols (CAP),14 directed by the Secretary of Defense 

and based on the mission needs of the combatant commands, is a 

primary factor in determining RPA pilot personnel levels. In 2010, the 

Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to fund personnel to reach 65 

CAPs by fiscal year 2013 and be prepared to grow beyond that 

requirement in future years. To determine the number of RPA pilots, the 

Air Force Manpower Agency conducted a personnel requirements study 

for MQ-1 Predator squadrons in 2008 and established the number of RPA 

crews required to fly one CAP for 24 hours, referred to as the crew ratio.

Based on the study, the Air Force concluded that the crew ratio for MQ-1 

Predator squadrons would be 10:1, which calls for 10 RPA pilots to 

sustain a Predator for 24 hours.15 Air Force officials stated that although 

the 2008 study did not address the personnel requirements for MQ-9 

Reaper squadrons, the Air Force used the study as the basis for 

establishing a 10:1 crew ratio for MQ-9 units also because MQ-1 and MQ-

 14The term CAP refers to a near-continuous 24-hour flight presence of an RPA. This 

includes time en route to and from the target area. Based on the distance to the target, 

more than one CAP may be required for 24-hour continuous coverage of a geographic 

point. A CAP requires around four RPAs—three in-theater and one at a U.S. Air Force 

base for training purposes.

15The Air Force conducted the personnel requirements study in response to concerns that 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense expressed that a preliminary crew ratio the Air 

Force established in Air Force policy of 10:1 was too high. The Air Force based the 

preliminary crew ratio on commanders’ experiences operating RPA squadrons, and 

although the study recommended a crew ratio of 9:1, the Air Force decided to retain the 

10:1 crew ratio in guidance.
Page 12 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

9 units have similar requirements. In addition to this crew ratio, the Air 

Force used Air Force Instruction 38-20116 to calculate the required 

number of additional pilots it needs for support positions such as 

commanders, and staff positions at various organizational levels including 

headquarters.17 Using the crew ratio and the Air Force instruction, the Air 

Force determined that the total number of RPA pilots required to sustain 

the 65 CAPs currently required by the Secretary of Defense is between 

1,600 and 1,650 pilots, according to a Headquarters Air Force official.

Furthermore, the Air Force has taken steps to react to increased CAP 

requirements. Until 2009, the Air Force relied solely on manned-aircraft 

pilots serving assignments as RPA pilots to fill personnel requirements. In 

fiscal year 2006, manned-aircraft pilots were sustaining 12 CAPs, and the 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that the Predator system alone 

would grow to 21 CAPs by 2010. However, according to Headquarters Air 

Force officials, by 2007 the demand from the combatant commands had 

already exceeded that benchmark. Air Force leadership committed the 

service to meeting the increased requirements, and the Air Force took 

actions to provide sufficient personnel. These actions included 

lengthening the assignments of manned-aircraft pilots in RPA squadrons 

and then extending those assignments indefinitely, mobilizing pilots from 

the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, delaying the establishment 

of the RPA weapons school after designating RPA as a formal weapon 

system, and extending the length of deployments to augment staffing 

levels of RPA squadrons. In 2009, the Air Force also began assigning 

manned-aircraft training graduates to RPA assignments as their first 

assignment after completing Undergraduate Pilot Training. In 2010, the 

Air Force established the RPA pilot career field. Figure 3 summarizes the 

steps that the Air Force took to react to increased CAP requirements 

since 2007.

 16Air Force Instruction 38-201, Management of Manpower Requirements and 

Authorizations (May 14, 2013).

17As of December 2013, the Air Force had 175 RPA training-position billets and 111 RPA 

staff billets across the Air Force major commands, including Air Combat Command, Air 

Force Special Operations Command, and Headquarters Air Force, among others.
Page 13 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Figure 3: Air Force Steps to React to Growth in Demand for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 

Using these steps, the Air Force has made progress towards meeting the 

CAP requirements, but at personnel levels that were below requirements. 

In addition, the Air Force reduced the capacity of its RPA training unit 

because instructors were pulled to fly in RPA units. In fiscal year 2012, 

the Air Force began a reconstitution period intended to staff the training 

units, restart the weapons school, and increase the overall number of 

RPA pilots to increase the crew ratios of RPA units. As of December 
Page 14 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

2013, there were 1,366 RPA pilots, or around 85 percent of the total of 

1,600 pilots determined by the Air Force as necessary to sustain RPA 

operations and training for 65 CAPs. In addition, the Air Force anticipates 

increasing the number of RPA pilot staff positions across the Air Force 

from 111 as of December 2013 to 300 by fiscal year 2023 to serve at 

various Air Force commands, including at Headquarters Air Force and Air 

Combat Command.

The Air Force has not accurately identified optimum personnel 

requirements, or crew ratio, for the number of RPA pilots it requires. We 

have reported that high-performing organizations use complete and 

current data to inform their strategic human-capital planning and remain 

open to reevaluating workforce planning efforts.18 In the 2008 study that 

the Air Force Manpower Agency conducted to determine the appropriate 

crew ratios for MQ-1 Predator squadrons, the Air Force did not account 

for all of the flying and administrative tasks that are required in these 

squadrons. While the study accounted for some important tasks that RPA 

pilots perform in MQ-1 squadrons such as performing operational 

missions, it did not account for other important tasks such as those 

required to launch and recover RPAs. In addition, the study did not 

account for some important administrative tasks such as conducting 

flight-safety evaluations and providing a commander’s support staff. The 

study acknowledged that due to its reporting time frames, it did not 

capture the personnel requirements of a variety of tasks.

Headquarters Air Force personnel acknowledged the study’s limitations 

and said that because the study omitted critical and important tasks from 

its analysis, the resulting crew ratio that it recommended probably did not 

provide enough pilots to perform the work in an MQ-1 squadron. These 

officials stated that, because of the study’s omissions, the 10:1 crew ratio 

for MQ-1 squadrons established in an Air Force instruction that was 

based on this study should probably be increased.19 Similarly, some RPA 

unit commanders and RPA pilots in some of our focus groups also said 

that the crew ratio is too low.20 However, to-date the Air Force has not 

 18GAO-02-373SP.

19Air Force Instruction 65-503, Authorized Aircrew Composition-Active Forces, table A36-

1 (Feb. 1, 2012).

20We use the term “some,” as in “pilots in some focus groups,” to report topics that were 

discussed by RPA pilots in two to four of our focus groups.

Air Force Has Not Accurately 

Identified Optimum Personnel 

Requirements and Has Not 

Established a Minimum 

Personnel Requirement
Page 15 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

updated the crew ratio for RPA squadrons. Headquarters Air Force 

officials stated that updating the crew ratio has not been a top priority. At 

the same time, these officials noted that more recently they have 

discussed the need to update the crew ratio and expressed optimism that 

it would become a priority in the future, though no concrete plans exist to 

initiate an update to the requirement.21

Furthermore, an Air Force instruction states that a crew ratio establishes 

the number of personnel required to support a unit mission and that if a 

ratio is too low, combat capability is diminished and flight safety suffers.

22

Such risks can arise when crew-ratio requirements are set too low, as 

well as when units operate at crew ratios that are too far below optimum 

crew ratios. However, Air Force documentation shows that crew ratios in 

RPA units have fluctuated between 7:1 and 8.5:1, and at times have 

dropped to 6:1, according to Air Force officials. This indicates that the 

RPA pilot workload is performed by fewer pilots working more hours to 

accomplish the mission than if the Air Force ensured that its RPA units 

operated at the required crew ratios. The Air Force has operated at these 

levels to provide a higher number of CAPs.

According to Headquarters Air Force officials, in the past the Air Force 

has attempted to deny requests made by combatant commanders for Air 

Force RPA capabilities because they push crew ratios too low. These 

officials stated that when the Air Force denies a request it provides 

justification, which include concerns about crew ratios, to the Joint Staff, 

which is responsible for resolving differences between combatant 

commanders’ requests for capabilities and the services that provide them. 

However, Air Force officials stated that the Joint Staff has overridden 

some of the Air Force denials in order to accomplish missions, despite the 

possibility that crew ratios would decrease. Without establishing a 

minimum crew ratio for RPA units, the Air Force does not have the 

information it needs to determine when those units are operating at crew 

ratio levels that expose the Air Force to unacceptable levels of risk to 

accomplishing its mission and ensuring safety.

 21The crew ratio for units that operate the RQ-4 Global Hawk RPA is set at 15:1 in Air 

Force policy. However, it is not clear that this crew ratio is appropriate because the Air 

Force’s manpower study focused on the personnel requirements for MQ-1 squadrons and 

did not evaluate RQ-4 squadrons.

22Air Force Instruction 65-503, table A36-1 (Feb. 1, 2012).
Page 16 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

As a result of inaccurate crew ratios for Air Force RPA squadrons and a 

lack of a minimum crew ratio, the RPA pilot workforce has sustained a 

high pace of operations, which limits its time for training and 

development. The Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 

2009-2047 states that it is imperative to provide the necessary training 

and opportunities for advancement that will create a cadre of future Air 

Force leaders.23 However, unit commanders in each of the three locations 

we visited and some RPA pilots stated that the high pace of operations 

and demand for RPA capabilities limited their units’ time to train for the 

various mission sets that RPA units are required to perform.24 One unit 

commander stated that battlefield commanders that his unit supports 

have pointed out that his RPA pilots need training, and pilots in some 

focus groups noted that limited training opportunities prevent RPA units 

from excelling at their missions and becoming experts in their field. In 

addition, pilots in all 10 focus groups indicated that they are limited in their 

ability to pursue developmental opportunities.25

Furthermore, DOD has noted that the prevalence and use of unmanned 

systems, including RPAs, will continue to grow at a dramatic pace. As 

discussed above, the Secretary of Defense has stated specifically that the 

requirement for 65 CAPs represents a temporary plateau in progress 

toward an increased enduring requirement. Also, as the national security 

environment changes, RPA pilots will be expected to conduct a broader 

range of missions across different conditions and environments, including 

antiaccess and area-denial environments where the freedom to operate 

RPAs is contested.26 By not creating an environment where RPA pilots 

 23Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 (May 18, 2009).

24For example, one RPA unit had to spend about 95 percent of its work hours in fiscal 

year 2013 flying combat-operations missions and the remaining 5 percent flying training 

missions, logging around 19,600 hours flying combat missions, compared to about 940 

hours of training missions.

25Development opportunities can include changes in base assignments or assignments 

within the squadron, wing, or staff levels, as well as completing professional military 

education in-residence or via correspondence, which is a primary component of an 

officer’s professional development.

26DOD defines operational access as the ability to project military force into an operational 

area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Antiaccess refers to 

those actions and capabilities designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an 

operational area. Area denial refers to those actions and capabilities designed not to keep 

an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area.

A High Pace of Operations 

and Work Demands Limit 

Time for Training and 

Development
Page 17 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

can receive the training and development opportunities they need to 

perform their functions effectively, the Air Force may be hindering its 

ability to perform its mission even if it is able to operate at the optimum 

crew ratio that is set in the Air Force instruction.

The Air Force has used a dual strategy to meet its increasing need for 

RPA pilots: using manned-aircraft pilots and recruiting RPA pilots, the 

career field established in 2010 for officers trained to only fly RPAs. 

However, the Air Force has faced challenges in recruiting RPA pilots 

since it began this career field. High-performing organizations tailor their 

recruitment and retention strategies to meet their specific mission 

needs.27 The Air Force intends to build a cadre of dedicated RPA pilots, 

and projects that RPA pilots will make up 90 percent of the RPA pilot 

workforce by fiscal year 2022. However, the Air Force has not been able 

to achieve its recruiting goals for RPA pilots in fiscal years 2012 and 

2013. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force recruited 110 new RPA pilots, 

missing its goal of 179 pilots by around 39 percent. Consequently, while 

the Air Force has made progress in increasing the total number of RPA 

pilots and staffed its RPA units at about 85 percent of current 

requirements as of December 2013, around 42 percent of those pilots are 

manned-aircraft pilots and manned-aircraft pilot training graduates. Both 

of these groups are temporary RPA pilots who serve only one assignment 

in an RPA squadron. While the length of these assignments can be 

extended, these pilots will likely not stay in the RPA squadrons 

permanently (see fig. 4).

 27GAO-02-373SP.

The Air Force Faces 

Challenges Recruiting 

RPA Pilots and May Face 

Challenges Retaining 

Them in the Future
Page 18 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Figure 4: Distribution of Permanent and Temporary Air Force Pilots of Remotely 

Piloted Aircraft (RPA)

Headquarters Air Force officials believe the Air Force has missed its 

recruiting goals in 2012 and 2013 for RPA pilots because potential 

recruits have a limited understanding of the RPA mission and there is a 

lack of recruiting officials with RPA experience to advise potential recruits. 

The Air Force may face challenges recruiting officers to serve as RPA 

pilots because of a negative perception that some in the Air Force 

associate with flying RPAs. Headquarters Air Force officials, RPA pilots in 

some of our focus groups, and one unit commander stated that some in 

the Air Force view flying RPAs negatively, resulting in a stigma. According 

to these officials one reason some view flying an RPA negatively is 

because flying an RPA does not require pilots to operate an aircraft while 

on board an aircraft in-flight. In addition, officials stated that overcoming 

this stigma may be difficult because publicizing the work that RPA pilots 

do is often not feasible due to the classified nature of RPA missions. 

Nonetheless, Headquarters Air Force officials stated that the Air Force 

projects it will meet its recruiting goals for the RPA pilot career field for 

fiscal year 2014 on the basis of commitments made by cadets 

participating in the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps.
Page 19 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

We have reported that high-performing organizations make use of 

targeted investments such as recruiting bonuses as part of their 

strategies to recruit high-quality personnel with the critical skills. However, 

Headquarters Air Force officials reported that the Air Force is not 

currently exercising its option to offer a recruiting bonus as an incentive to

volunteer for the RPA pilot career field. Officials from the Headquarters 

Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense stated that such pay 

incentives are rarely used to recruit officers in the Air Force. 

Headquarters Air Force officials also stated that due to the current 

constrained budget environment in which DOD and the federal 

government are operating, the Air Force would first prefer to exhaust the 

use of all nonmonetary options for improving recruiting before offering 

bonuses. As a result, the Air Force may have to continue to rely on 

manned-aircraft pilots to meet RPA pilot personnel needs. This approach 

may not be cost-effective because the Air Force spends an average of 

$557,000 per pilot on traditional Undergraduate Pilot Training, compared 

to an average of $65,000 for Undergraduate RPA Training, according to 

Air Education and Training Command officials. Without a more-tailored 

approach to recruiting RPA pilots that increases the appeal of the new 

career to potential recruits, the Air Force risks perpetuating personnel 

shortages and may need to continue relying on manned-aircraft pilots to 

fill its personnel requirements.

Moreover, the Air Force uses officers as RPA pilots, but it has not 

evaluated whether using alternative personnel populations such as 

enlisted or civilian personnel as RPA pilots is a viable option. A report by 

the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence urged the Air 

Force to study the other military services’ experiences with using enlisted 

personnel as RPA operators and evaluate whether this approach would 

degrade mission performance.28 Headquarters Air Force officials stated 

that prior to 2010, they decided to assign officers to serve as RPA pilots 

because they thought officers were more appropriate since RPAs fly in 

complex airspace, and, in some cases, fire missiles at adversaries. 

Headquarters Air Force officials also stated that they have, at times, 

considered the use of enlisted or civilian personnel but have not initiated 

formal efforts to evaluate whether using such populations would 

negatively affect the ability of the Air Force to carry out its missions. 

 28House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Performance Audit of Department 

of Defense Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (April 2012).
Page 20 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

However, without an evaluation of the viability of using other sources of 

personnel, the Air Force may lack valuable information on whether 

additional options exist for meeting personnel requirements.

With regard to pilot retention, the Air Force has taken some steps but 

does not have a retention strategy for RPA pilots, though indications 

suggest that it could face challenges retaining them in the future. 

Specifically, according to Headquarters Air Force officials, the Air Force 

has offered assignment incentive payments to RPA pilots since the career 

field was established in 2010. In addition, the officials stated that mannedaircraft pilots serving assignments in RPA squadrons receive skill-based 

aviator career incentive pay and can receive aviator retention pay by 

extending their service commitment in the Air Force. Despite these 

incentive payments, pilots in 7 of 10 focus groups we conducted indicated 

that retention of RPA pilots is or will be a challenge. In addition, pilots in 

some focus groups stated that they are considering their options for 

leaving active-duty service in the Air Force to go to the Air National 

Guard, or Air Force Reserve, or the private sector. Unit commanders in 

one location we visited, pilots in some of our focus groups, and other Air 

Force officials stated that they were concerned about the future retention 

rates of RPA pilots.

Headquarters Air Force officials stated that the Air Force’s strategy for 

meeting personnel requirements has focused on recruiting and that they 

have not observed indications of a concern with the retention of RPA 

pilots. However, the Air Force has not evaluated the potential effect of the 

difficult working conditions, such as long working hours and frequently 

rotating shifts that we discuss in more detail later in this report, that RPA 

pilots face and how those conditions may affect the Air Force’s ability to 

retain RPA pilots, despite the situation that many of these pilots will begin 

to reach the end of their service commitments in fiscal year 2017. In a 

2011 memorandum to the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense directed 

the Air Force to provide sufficient incentives to retain high-quality RPA 

personnel. Although the Air Force has made retention payments available 

to RPA pilots, these efforts may not be enough or appropriate to 

overcome the challenges the Air Force may face to retain RPA pilots.
Page 21 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

While the Air Force has mechanisms in place to collect feedback from 

RPA pilots, it has not used this feedback to develop its strategic humancapital approach to managing RPA pilots, such as by incorporating their 

feedback into tailoring a recruiting and retention strategy or by taking 

actions related to training and development. High-performing 

organizations involve their employees in their strategic human-capital 

approaches and planning in order to improve motivation and morale by 

seeking employee feedback on a periodic basis, and using that input to 

adjust their human-capital approaches.

The Air Force has mechanisms in place that it has used to collect 

feedback from RPA pilots. For example, the Air Force solicits feedback 

from RPA units as well as all other Air Force units during an annual Unit 

Climate Assessment that gauges discrimination, harassment, and morale 

issues at the unit level. While this effort is not specific to the RPA units, it 

does include assessments of RPA units. Unit commanders can use the 

results of their Unit Climate Assessments to address challenges at the 

local unit level. However, Headquarters Air Force officials responsible for 

managing RPA pilots have not obtained information from these 

assessments to identify whether they include potentially valuable 

information about any concerns related to establishing the RPA pilot 

career field. Headquarters Air Force officials stated that the Air Force 

created this career field more quickly and under greater operational 

demand than any career field in recent Air Force history. However, these 

officials also stated that using feedback from the Unit Climate 

Assessments to address issues at a headquarters level that would affect 

RPA pilots could undermine unit commanders. They also noted that 

officials at the headquarters level might lack the proper context for 

understanding the assessment results.

The Air Force also collected feedback from RPA pilots in studies the Air 

Force School of Aerospace Medicine published in 2011 and 2013 to 

assess the level of and reasons for stress in personnel assigned to RPA 

units, which included surveys and interviews of RPA pilots. In response to 

these studies, the Air Force took actions designed to address stress in 

personnel assigned to RPA units. For instance, the studies recommended 

that the Air Force assign an operational psychologist to each RPA unit, 

and, in response, local flight surgeons, clinical providers, and aerospace 

physiologists have created teams to help address stress concerns at the 

base level. While researchers from the Air Force’s medical research 

community conducted these studies, they included findings related to 

personnel shortages that are germane to the Air Force personnel and 

operations communities. However, Headquarters Air Force officials from 

The Air Force Has 

Mechanisms to Collect 

Feedback from RPA Pilots 

but Has Not Used That 

Feedback to Manage Its 

Human-Capital Strategy 

for RPA Pilots
Page 22 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

the personnel and operations communities stated that, prior to our review, 

they were unaware of the studies and their findings.

RPA pilots in our focus groups also noted information that suggests that 

incorporating pilot feedback from existing mechanisms could help 

improve communication and address issues pilots are facing. For 

example, pilots in some of our focus groups stated that they did not know 

what the career path for an RPA pilot is or what steps they should take to 

advance. Further, in some of our focus groups, manned-aircraft pilots 

who are serving assignments as RPA pilots expressed uncertainty 

regarding whether they will be able to return to their manned platforms 

and what effect, if any, their RPA assignment will have on their careers. 

Pilots in some focus groups also reported that senior leadership had not 

communicated to them about this uncertainty, and one pilot specifically 

noted that the lack of communication negatively affects morale. Without 

using existing mechanisms to obtain feedback from RPA pilots directly, 

Headquarters Air Force may be missing an opportunity to obtain 

information that can help it address recruiting, retention, training, and 

development challenges related to RPA pilots.

Air Force Has Taken 

Some Actions to 

Address the 

Potentially 

Challenging Working 

Conditions RPA Pilots 

Face but Has Not 

Fully Analyzed Being 

Deployed-on-Station
Page 23 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

RPA pilots find their mission rewarding, but they reported that they face 

multiple, challenging working conditions. RPA pilots in 8 of the 10 focus 

groups we conducted reported that they found it rewarding to be able to 

contribute to combat operations every day through the RPA mission. For 

instance, one pilot stated that the mission is the reason that he had 

decided to become a permanent RPA pilot and that it was rewarding to 

contribute to overseas contingency operations, which he would not be 

able to do in any other job. Similarly, the Air Force School of Aerospace 

Medicine published studies in 2011 and 2013 that evaluated the 

psychological condition of RPA personnel and found that RPA pilots held 

positive perceptions of the effect and contributions of their work.

However, RPA pilots also stated that they face multiple challenging 

working conditions including: long hours, working shifts that frequently

rotate, and remaining in assignments beyond typical lengths.29 RPA pilots 

in all of our focus groups reported that these challenging conditions 

negatively affected their morale and caused them stress. Similarly, the Air 

Force School of Aerospace Medicine studies found that RPA personnel 

reported sources of stress that were consistent with the challenges we 

identified. These challenges include the following:

• RPA pilots in 8 of our 10 focus groups stated, and Air Force studies 

we reviewed show, that RPA pilots work long hours. RPA pilots in 7 of 

our focus groups described factors that contribute to their long hours 

including performing administrative duties and attending briefings, in 

addition to flying shifts. The Air Force studies also found that working 

long hours was one of the top five reasons for stress among 

personnel in RPA squadrons. In the studies, over 57 percent of 

respondents reported that they worked more than 50 hours per week. 

In addition, the studies found that over 40 percent of respondents 

reported that performing administrative duties added hours to their 

work week and was the third-highest reason for stress among activeduty RPA personnel.

• RPA pilots also reported that it was challenging to work on shifts that 

rotate. RPA pilots in 7 of the 10 focus groups we conducted stated 

 29Often during our focus groups when a participant described a challenging working 

condition associated with being an RPA pilot, another participant raised a counterpoint to 

that challenge. For example, during one focus group, one participant described the 

challenge of working long hours in an RPA squadron, and another participant stated that 

all squadrons in the Air Force require pilots to work long hours. One or more participants 

raised counterpoints to most of the challenging working conditions that RPA pilots 

described.

Air Force RPA Pilots Find 

Their Work Rewarding but 

Report Multiple 

Challenging Working

Conditions, Some of 

Which the Air Force Has 

Taken Actions to Address
Page 24 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

that constantly rotating shifts caused sleep problems for them 

because they must continuously adjust their sleep schedule to 

accommodate new shifts.30 In addition, pilots noted that continuously 

rotating to new shifts disrupted their ability to spend time with their 

family and friends. Officials told us that it was ideal for pilots working 

evening or night shifts to maintain a consistent sleep pattern on their 

off-duty days even though those sleep patterns would require that 

pilots sleep while their family and friends were awake. However, some 

RPA pilots reported that they typically adjusted their sleep schedules 

dramatically on their off-duty days so they could spend time with their 

families and that these changes to their sleep schedules resulted in 

significant fatigue both at home and when they returned to work. 

Similarly, over half of the respondents to the surveys included in the 

Air Force studies we reviewed reported that shift work caused a 

moderate to large amount of their stress.

• RPA pilots in 5 of our focus groups reported that being assigned to 

continue flying RPAs for periods extending beyond the typical Air 

Force assignment was difficult. In all of the focus groups we 

conducted with RPA pilots, those who plan to return to flying manned 

aircraft stated that they have been required to stay in their 

assignments for periods that are longer than a typical Air Force 

assignment. Air Force officials stated that there is no requirement for 

officers to move to a new assignment after a specified period. 

However, pilots in our focus groups and Air Force headquarters 

officials said that officer assignments typically last 3 to 4 years. Air 

Force documentation shows that some of these pilots have been in 

their RPA assignments for over 6 years. Moreover, the Air Force 

studies also found that one of the most common stressors that RPA 

personnel cited was the lack of clarity regarding when they would 

return to their careers in manned aircraft. Specifically, the 2011 study 

states that the Air Force informed RPA pilots who previously flew 

manned aircraft that their RPA assignments were temporary and after 

 30RPA pilots fly CAPs 24 hours a day and thus RPA pilots may be needed to fly on day, 

evening, and night shifts. Whereas civilian workers typically work the same, fixed shift for 

extended periods, military servicemembers, such as RPA pilots, tend to work on shifts that 

rotate. RPA pilots fly shifts that rotate from days, to evenings, to nights. Some squadrons 

rotate their pilots’ shifts quickly, such as weekly, and other squadrons rotate shifts slowly, 

up to several months. Research has shown that shift work negatively affects employee 

sleep as well as family and social lives, which can adversely influence performance, 

physical health, and safety. See, for example, J. Barton et al., “The Standard Shiftwork 

Index: a battery of questionnaires for assessing shiftwork-related problems,” Work Stress,

vol. 9, no. 1 (1995): 4–30.
Page 25 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

3 to 4 years they could return to their manned-aircraft career.31 The 

study goes on to state that due to the increasing demand for RPAs

and the long-standing surge in RPA operations, many pilots have 

been unable to return to their manned-aircraft careers and, until 

recently, the Air Force kept them in these assignments indefinitely.

The Air Force has taken some actions to address some of the challenging 

working conditions that RPA pilots face. The Air Force studies included 

over 10 recommendations to address the sources of stress that RPA 

personnel reported. For example, the studies recommended that the Air 

Force assign an operational psychologist to each RPA unit to help 

commanders optimize work-rest schedules and shift cycles, and identify 

pilots who are reaching elevated levels of fatigue or stress. In response, 

the Air Force has assigned mental-health providers that are dedicated to 

RPA squadrons at Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. 

However, the studies also recommended that the Air Force increase 

staffing in RPA squadrons to reduce the number of hours that RPA 

personnel work and to help establish better shift schedules. Air Force 

researchers stated that increasing staffing levels, or crew ratios, in RPA 

squadrons would be the most-effective means to reduce RPA pilot stress, 

but as discussed above, the Air Force has operated its RPA squadrons 

below the optimum crew ratios.

RPA pilots also face challenges related to being deployed-on-station as 

they balance their warfighting responsibilities with their personal lives. 

Because pilots are able to operate RPAs from Air Force bases in the 

United States and are thus able to live at home—what is known as being 

deployed-on-station—their dual role juxtaposes stress related to 

supporting combat operations with the strains that can occur in their 

personal lives. While these pilots face this challenging working condition 

that may affect their quality of life, DOD’s Quadrennial Quality of Life 

Reviews have emphasized DOD’s continued commitment to provide 

servicemembers with the best quality of life possible.32

 31Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Psychological Health Screening of Remotely 

Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Operators and Supporting Units (April 2011).

32For example, see Department of Defense, Report of the 2nd Quadrennial Quality of Life 

Review (January 2009).

Air Force Has Not Fully 

Analyzed Challenges That 

RPA Pilots Face Related 

to Being Deployed-onStation
Page 26 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Being deployed-on-station is a new concept in warfighting, and a 2011 

report33 prepared for the Air Force Medical Support Agency describes five 

conditions that personnel who are deployed-on-station can experience.

The report notes that these personnel (1) experience a justifiable risk of 

being the target of hostile adversary attacks because they are 

combatants and their bank accounts, reputations, or physical safety could 

be targeted; (2) operate in contact with and sometimes kill adversaries, 

although operations they conduct are out of direct risk from combat; (3) 

must act with urgency to sometimes kill adversaries and take other timepressured actions to help ensure combatants they support do not lose 

their lives; (4) work on a wartime rhythm that includes 24/7 operations 

365 days a year; and (5) are required to conceal information from friends 

and family about their work because their missions are often classified. A 

Headquarters Air Force official described being deployed-on-station as a 

status between deployed-in-theater and not deployed and emphasized 

that personnel who are deployed-on-station are not directly engaged in 

combat, which is a significant component of being deployed. The official 

also acknowledged that being deployed-on-station can be more 

challenging than assignments with more-limited connections to the 

battlefield.

RPA pilots in each of the 10 focus groups we conducted reported that 

being deployed-on-station negatively affected their quality of life, as it was 

challenging for them to balance their warfighting responsibilities with their 

personal lives for extended periods of time. RPA pilots in some of our 

focus groups, as well as commanders of RPA squadrons, noted that they 

would prefer to deploy-in-theater for 6 months with a clear end point and 

be separated from their family and friends rather than be deployed-onstation for 3 or more years. One commander stated that he preferred 

being deployed-in-theater and knowing when his deployment would end. 

In contrast, he stated that in an RPA squadron, it was difficult to juggle his 

warfighting role with the typical challenges of home life for multiple years. 

Likewise, the Air Force studies found that being deployed-on-station was 

one of the most commonly cited stressors that RPA personnel reported.34

 33Air Force Medical Support Agency, On Telewarfare and Military Medicine: A White 

Paper/State of the Art Report On AFMS Support to the Emerging Paradigm of Employedin-Place Operations (September 2011).

34Conversely, some pilots in our focus groups did not identify being deployed-on-station 

as a challenging working condition and some stated that they preferred it.
Page 27 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

In addition, RPA pilots in 6 of our 10 focus groups reported that they are 

expected to do more work than their counterparts who are deployed-intheater. For example, RPA pilots in some of our focus groups who had 

previously deployed-in-theater stated that they are expected to complete 

administrative tasks that are not required of them when they are 

deployed-in-theater.

Headquarters Air Force officials as well as pilots in some of our focus 

groups stated that the Air Force provides support to personnel who are 

deployed-in-theater that it does not provide for personnel who are 

deployed-on-station. Moreover, the Air Force has surveyed RPA 

personnel and other deployed-on-station personnel to study their stress 

and mental health, but it has not fully analyzed the effects of being 

deployed-on-station. Specifically, it has not fully analyzed whether being 

deployed-on-station has negative effects on quality of life that are not 

attributable to the stressors that are related to low unit-staffing levels that 

we discussed above such as rotating shifts and long assignments. As a 

result, the Air Force does not have the information it needs to determine 

whether being deployed-on-station has a negative effect on the quality of 

life of RPA pilots that is not attributed to the other factors and what steps 

might be needed to reduce those effects.

The Air Force 

Monitors RPA Pilot 

Promotion Rates but 

Has Not Analyzed 

Factors Related to 

Those Rates
Page 28 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

AFPC monitors the promotion rates of RPA pilots and has found that they 

were promoted below the average rate for active-duty line officers on 20 

of 24 officer promotion boards since 2006. We reached the same 

conclusion based on our review of data for these promotion boards. We 

also found that RPA pilots were promoted below the average rate of 

manned-aircraft pilots35 on 21 of 24 boards. Furthermore, we compared 

the promotion rates of RPA pilots to those of other career fields and found 

that RPA pilots were promoted at the lowest rate of any career field on 9 

of the 24 boards and were promoted in the lowest 5 percent of the career 

fields that competed on 5 additional boards.36 Conversely, RPA pilots 

were promoted in the top 50 percent of the career fields that competed on 

only 3 boards of the 24 boards. More specifically, RPA pilots competing 

for promotion to each rank that we analyzed faced challenges. RPA pilots 

competing for promotion to major were promoted in the top 50 percent on 

just one of the seven promotion boards since 2006. RPA pilots competing 

for promotion to lieutenant colonel were promoted at the lowest or nextto-lowest rate compared to the other career fields that competed on 7 of 

the 9 boards since 2006. Likewise, RPA pilots competing for promotion to 

the rank of colonel had the lowest promotion rate of any career field that 

competed on 4 of the 8 colonel boards since 2006. Figures 5, 6, and 7 

display the results of our analyses.

 35We compared the average promotion rate of RPA pilots to the average promotion rates 

of fighter, bomber, and mobility pilots combined.

36To identify the percentile of RPA pilot promotion rates compared to other Line of the Air 

Force officer career fields that competed on the promotion boards in the scope of our 

review, we analyzed the promotion rates of the active-duty officers from all of the careers 

from the Line of the Air Force competitive category who competed on each promotion 

board since 2006. For this analysis, the number of careers that competed on these 

promotion boards ranged from 22 to 33. We excluded career fields if fewer than 10

officers competed for promotion from a given year, because the rate of promotion in these 

cases is highly sensitive to the outcomes of single officers. However, we included the 

results from 8 promotion boards in which fewer than 10 RPA pilots competed for 

promotion to provide a more-comprehensive account of RPA pilot promotions. The 

promotion rate that we calculate for instances when fewer than 10 RPA pilots competed 

for promotion should be considered cautiously since the outcome of one or two officers 

could have a large effect on the overall rate for RPA pilots for those instances. The boards 

that included fewer than 10 RPA pilots who competed for promotion are indicated in the 

notes to figures 5, 6, and 7.

The Air Force Monitors 

RPA Pilot Promotion Rates 

and Has Found That They 

Are Lower Than in Other 

Career Fields
Page 29 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Figure 5: The Rates of Promotion to Major for Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft 

(RPA) Compared to Other Air Force Officer Careers, 2006 to 2012

Note: The Air Force did not hold a promotion board for Line of the Air Force majors in 2013. At least 

10 eligible officers from between 29 and 33 careers competed, in the zone, for promotion to the rank 

of major in the Line of the Air Force competitive category between 2006 and 2012.
Page 30 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Figure 6: The Rates of Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel for Pilots of Remotely 

Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air Force Officer Careers, 2006 to 2013

Note: The Air Force held two promotion boards in 2006 for Line of the Air Force lieutenant colonels. 

Fewer than 10 RPA pilots were eligible for the 2006a, 2007, and 2008 promotion boards. At least 10 

eligible officers from between 26 and 30 careers competed, in-the-zone, for promotion to the rank of 

lieutenant colonel in the Line of the Air Force competitive category between 2006 and 2013.
Page 31 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Figure 7: The Rates of Promotion Rates to Colonel for Pilots of Remotely Piloted 

Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air Force Officer Careers, 2006 to 2012

Note: The Air Force held two promotion boards for Line of the Air Force colonels in 2009. Also, the Air 

Force held a promotion board for Line of the Air Force colonels in November 2013, but the results 

were not available as of February 2014. Fewer than 10 RPA pilots were eligible for the 2006, 2007, 

2008, 2009a, and 2009b promotion boards. At least 10 eligible officers from between 22 and 26 

careers competed, in-the-zone, for promotion to the rank of colonel in the Line of the Air Force 

competitive category between 2006 and 2012.

While AFPC has monitored the promotion rates of RPA pilots, it has not 

analyzed the factors related to lower promotion rates for these pilots. It is 

a common statistical practice when analyzing how selected factors are 

related to a given outcome to account for other key factors that could also 

be related to the outcome. Although AFPC analyzed the promotions of 

officers in the Line of the Air Force competitive category, which includes 

RPA pilots, and identified factors related to promotion outcomes for 

officers in this category, it has not incorporated a key factor—the career 

field effect of being an RPA pilot—into its analysis.

AFPC analyzed promotion data of officers in the competitive category that 

includes RPA pilots called Line of the Air Force and found multiple factors 

related to promotion outcomes. Specifically, AFPC analyzed these data 

using logistic regression, which is a statistical method that enables AFPC 

to analyze the relationships among multiple factors. Using this method, 

AFPC identified a number of factors that are positively and negatively 

Air Force Has Not 

Analyzed Factors Related 

to Lower RPA Pilot 

Promotion Rates
Page 32 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

related to promotions. For example, AFPC found that one of the two 

factors with the most-substantial positive relationship to promotions was 

for an officer to have completed a professional military education program 

by attending an Air Force school in-residence, rather than completing the 

same professional military education program by correspondence. The 

other factor with the most-substantial positive relationship was for an 

officer to have completed an advanced academic degree. By contrast, 

AFPC found that officers who have unfavorable information, such as 

performance-related reprimands, in their personnel files are promoted at 

lower rates, in general, than officers who do not.

AFPC did not include the career field effect of being an RPA pilot as a 

factor in its analysis. As a result, AFPC does not know whether or how 

being an RPA pilot is related to promotions for these pilots. AFPC has 

analyzed other careers and found that most careers are not related to 

promotion rates. AFPC officials stated that they had not analyzed this 

effect because most of the officers currently serving as RPA pilots are 

temporary RPA pilots and AFPC does not typically analyze a career field 

effect of temporary assignments.

In addition, AFPC assumed that the factors that were substantially related 

to promotions for the Line of the Air Force category were also 

substantially related to promotions for the RPA pilot subgroup, but did not 

confirm that its assumption was warranted. AFPC officials stated that 

when they analyzed the records of RPA pilots, they focused on the 

factors identified in the analysis of Line of the Air Force officers, including 

completing professional military education in-residence and advanced 

degrees. They found that RPA pilots generally completed professional 

military education in-residence and advanced degrees at lower rates 

compared to the average rates for officers who had been promoted since 

2006. However, by not including the career field effect of being an RPA 

pilot into its analysis, the Air Force cannot determine whether these 

factors have the same relationship with RPA pilot promotions as they do 

on officer promotions in the broader Line of the Air Force category.
Page 33 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

The Air Force reported reasons for low RPA pilot promotions rates to 

Congress and took actions to raise those rates without a comprehensive 

understanding of the factors related to the promotion rates of these pilots. 

Specifically, the Air Force attributed low RPA pilot promotion rates to 

three factors: (1) RPA pilots completed professional military education at 

lower rates than average; (2) RPA pilots completed advanced degrees at 

lower rates than average; and (3) the process the Air Force used to select 

RPA pilots. As discussed above, the AFPC’s approach to identify the first 

two factors assumed that their relationships with promotion rates for RPA 

pilots as a subgroup would be the same as those with the Line of the Air 

Force as a whole, but this assumption was not confirmed through 

analysis. Regarding the third factor, Air Force documentation states 

“lower quality pilots are generally sent to RPA squadrons.”

37

Headquarters Air Force officials and two commanders of manned-aircraft 

squadrons explained that commanders select pilots from their squadrons 

to assign to RPA squadrons and in general most commanders assign 

less-skilled pilots and less-competent officers to these squadrons. 

Headquarters officials also stated that less-skilled and less-competent 

officers generally had fewer of the factors AFPC identified that positively 

influence promotions in their records than their peers. Air Force officials 

also explained that because the bulk of RPA pilots who have competed 

for promotion since 2006 were assigned using this process, they believe 

these are the reasons that RPA pilots have been promoted at lower rates 

than their peers. However, the Air Force has not incorporated variables 

into its analysis to account for RPA pilots or the process to assign them to 

determine whether they are related to promotions of RPA pilots. 

Consequently, the Air Force report to Congress may not be accurate 

because the Air Force does not have comprehensive analysis to 

demonstrate that these factors are actually related to RPA pilot 

promotions.

Recently, the Air Force has taken actions to raise promotion rates of RPA 

pilots. First, to communicate to promotion boards that promoting RPA 

pilots was important, the Secretary of the Air Force has issued 

instructions since 2008 to each officer promotion board, directing them to 

consider the strategic effect made by RPA pilots when evaluating their 

 37Air Force documentation notes that one indicator of the trend to assign “lower quality 

pilots” to RPA squadrons is that pilots selected for RPA assignments tended to perform at 

lower levels on flight-safety evaluations than pilots retained in manned-aircraft squadrons.

Air Force Reported 

Reasons for Low RPA Pilot 

Promotions Rates to 

Congress and Took 

Actions in Response 

without a Comprehensive 

Understanding
Page 34 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

records for promotion. In the instructions, the Secretary directs board 

members to consider that RPA pilots’ records may not show the same 

career progression as their peers because of operational requirements 

they have had to meet to satisfy the needs of the Air Force. Second, the 

Air Force intervened on behalf of RPA pilots to enhance their 

opportunities to achieve one of the two most important factors that AFPC 

identified in its analysis of all Line of the Air Force officers by reserving 46 

in-residence seats in Air Force professional military education schools in 

2012 for RPA pilots who were competing to be promoted to major. 

Moreover, the Air Force stated in its August 2013 report to Congress that 

its long-term plan to raise promotion rates is to attract “quality” recruits to 

the RPA pilot career field and to establish a sustainable pace of 

operations that will enable these pilots time to complete in-residence 

professional military education and advanced academic degrees. 

However, because it has not fully analyzed the career field effects of 

being an RPA pilot, it is unclear whether the Air Force is targeting these 

corrective actions at the right factors. Consequently, the Air Force’s 

actions may have limited effect on improving the promotion rates for RPA 

pilots.

The Air Force has demonstrated a commitment in recent years to the use 

of RPAs, believing that the capabilities they provide are worth the 

service’s investment in both platforms and personnel. As the RPA pilot 

career field evolves, it will be important that Air Force senior leadership 

demonstrates a commitment to a human-capital management approach 

that addresses a number of outstanding challenges. For instance, without 

updating its optimum crew ratio for RPA units, the Air Force may have 

RPA pilot shortfalls even after its current requirement is met, which could 

exacerbate existing strains on this workforce. In addition, by not 

establishing a minimum crew ratio below which RPA units cannot 

operate, the Air Force does not know when it is operating at unacceptable 

levels of risk to mission and safety. Further, without developing a strategy 

tailored to address specific challenges of recruiting and retaining RPA 

pilots, current pilot shortfalls may persist even longer than expected. 

Finally, without evaluating the viability of using alternative personnel 

populations, such as enlisted or civilian personnel, the Air Force may not 

meet and sustain required RPA pilot staffing levels.

Moreover, without incorporating feedback from RPA pilots using existing 

feedback mechanisms, the Air Force may be missing opportunities to 

manage its human-capital strategies effectively for these pilots. Also, RPA 

pilots face a number of challenging working conditions that can affect 

Conclusions
Page 35 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

their quality of life including those associated with being deployed-onstation. However, without analyzing whether being deployed-on-station 

has long-term negative effects, the Air Force does not have the 

information it needs to determine whether it should take any action in 

response. Finally, while the Air Force has taken action to improve the 

chances for RPA pilots to be promoted, senior Air Force leaders cannot 

be assured that the actions are the appropriate ones because the Air 

Force has not analyzed the effect that being an RPA pilot itself may have 

on those chances.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Air Force to take the following seven actions:

• update crew ratios for RPA units to help ensure that the Air Force 

establishes a more-accurate understanding of the required number of 

RPA pilots needed in its units,

• establish a minimum crew ratio in Air Force policy below which RPA 

units cannot operate without running unacceptable levels of risk to 

accomplishing the mission and ensuring safety,

• develop a recruiting and retention strategy that is a tailored to the 

specific needs and challenges of RPA pilots to help ensure that the 

Air Force can meet and retain required staffing levels to meet its 

mission,

• evaluate the viability of using alternative personnel populations 

including enlisted or civilian personnel as RPA pilots to identify 

whether such populations could help the Air Force meet and sustain 

required RPA pilot staffing levels,

• incorporate feedback from RPA pilots by using existing mechanisms 

or by collecting direct feedback from RPA pilots,

• analyze the effects of being deployed-on-station to determine whether 

there are resulting negative effects on the quality of life of RPA pilots 

and take responsive actions as appropriate, and

• include the career field effect of being an RPA pilot into AFPC’s 

analysis to determine whether and how being an RPA pilot is related 

to promotions and determine whether the factors AFPC identified in its 

analysis of Line of the Air Force officers are also related to RPA pilot 

promotions.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. The 

Deputy Director of Force Management Policy, Headquarters Air Force 

provided written comments in response to our report. In its written 

comments, the Air Force concurred with four of our seven 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 36 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

recommendations and partially concurred with the remaining three 

recommendations. The Air Force’s written comments are reprinted in their 

entirety in appendix III. The Air Force also provided technical comments 

that we have incorporated into this report where applicable.

In concurring with our first three recommendations, the Air Force stated 

that it:

• has an effort underway to update crew ratios for RPA units and 

expects to have this effort completed by February 2015;

• a minimum crew ratio would indicate when the Air Force receives a 

request for forces that would pose risks to the mission and safety and 

it expects to respond to our recommendation by February 2015; and

• will develop a recruiting and retention strategy that is tailored to the 

specific needs and challenges of RPA pilots and expects to have this 

done by October 2015.

In concurring with our fifth recommendation, to incorporate feedback from 

RPA pilots by using existing mechanisms or by collecting direct feedback 

from RPA pilots, the Air Force stated that if it determines that it is 

appropriate to collect such feedback, it will do so using a survey. We 

continue to believe that collecting this feedback could be a useful tool for 

the Air Force to develop a tailored recruiting and retention strategy and to 

inform actions it may take related to training and developing RPA pilots.

The Air Force partially concurred with our fourth recommendation that it 

evaluate the viability of using alternative personnel populations as RPA 

pilots and determine if such populations could help the Air Force meet 

and sustain required RPA pilot staffing levels. The Air Force stated that it 

considered assigning enlisted personnel as RPA pilots, but it decided that 

the responsibilities of piloting an RPA were commensurate with the rank 

of officers instead. At the same time, the Air Force stated that it has 

initiated a review of some of its missions and the ranks needed to execute 

those missions and that it may consider using enlisted airmen in this 

review.

In our report, we acknowledge that the Air Force had previously 

considered using enlisted personnel as RPA pilots and that the Air Force 

decided instead to use officers. However, it is not clear what steps the Air 

Force took in its previous considerations. We think it is a positive step that 

the Air Force has initiated a review of Air Force missions and rank 

requirements to execute those missions. Considering the significant role 

that RPAs play in the Air Force mission, we believe the Air Force should 
Page 37 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

include RPA pilots in its review to evaluate whether enlisted personnel as 

well as civilians may provide a means for the Air Force to address 

shortfalls in the staffing levels of RPA pilots.

In addition, the Air Force partially concurred with our sixth 

recommendation that it analyze the effects of being deployed-on-station 

to determine if there are resulting negative effects on RPA pilots’ quality 

of life and take responsive actions as appropriate. In response to our 

recommendation, the Air Force stated that it had studied the effects that 

being deployed-on-station has on RPA pilots and that many of the 

stressors it identified in these studies were related to low unit staffing 

levels. In addition, the Air Force asked us to focus our recommendation 

on an evaluation of these studies.

We acknowledge in our report that the Air Force evaluated the 

psychological condition of RPA personnel who are deployed-on-station in 

studies it published in 2011 and 2013. We also acknowledge that the 

primary recommendation these studies make is to increase staffing levels 

in RPA units to alleviate the stress of RPA personnel. As we discussed in 

our report, RPA units have been understaffed and thus increasing staffing 

levels may be appropriate. However, our finding is focused on whether 

being deployed-on-station has negative effects on quality of life that are 

not attributable to the stressors that are related to low unit-staffing levels. 

We think that a more complete understanding of the effects of being 

deployed-on-station that are not attributable to low staffing levels will help 

the Air Force determine if responsive actions are needed that go beyond 

increasing staffing levels. Further, the 2011 report prepared for the Air 

Force Medical Support Agency that focuses more directly on the concept 

of being deployed-on-station is a constructive source of input for the Air 

Force to understand any negative effects of being deployed-on-station. 

However, it is not clear that an evaluation of this report and the 2011 and 

2013 studies will provide the Air Force with a complete understanding of 

this new deployment concept’s consequences for its personnel.

Finally, the Air Force partially concurred with our seventh 

recommendation that it include the career field effect of being an RPA 

pilot into AFPC’s promotion analysis to determine if being an RPA pilot is 

related to promotions and determine if other factors that AFPC identified 

in its analysis of Line of the Air Force officers are also related to RPA pilot 

promotions. The Air Force stated that the RPA career field is a subsection 

of the Line of the Air Force and therefore factors related to promotions 

identified in analysis of the Line of the Air Force are directly related to 

RPA pilot promotions. In our report, we acknowledge that the Air Force 
Page 38 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

identified factors related to promotion outcomes for officers in the Line of 

the Air Force competitive category. However, as we discussed in the 

report, not including the career field effect of being an RPA pilot as a 

factor in its analysis has several consequences. First, AFPC does not 

know whether or how being an RPA pilot is related to promotions for 

these pilots. Second, the Air Force cannot determine whether the factors 

that it found that are related to promotions for the Line of the Air Force 

competitive category have the same relationship with RPA pilot 

promotions. Third, the information the Air Force included in a report to 

Congress in August 2013 on education, training, and promotion rates of 

RPA pilots may not be accurate. Finally, it is unclear whether the Air 

Force is targeting actions to increase RPA promotion rates at the right 

factors and thus its actions may have limited effect.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air Force. 

In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3604 or FarrellB@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix IV.

Brenda S. Farrell 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

To understand the context of each of the issues in our review, we 

analyzed various Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force 

documents. This documentation included a report1 to Congress by the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics on the future of unmanned aerial systems and a report2 by the 

Air Force Audit Agency on the Air Force’s personnel management of 

pilots flying RPAs. We also reviewed reports that we previously issued 

that address topics related to our review including a 2010 report on DOD 

planning, training, and doctrine for unmanned aircraft systems.3

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force uses a strategic humancapital approach to manage remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots, we 

used a model of human-capital management GAO had previously 

developed4 that specifies leading practices that high-performing 

organizations exhibit in their strategic human-capital management. The 

Model for Strategic Human Capital Management is intended to help 

federal organizations use their human capital effectively and integrate 

human-capital considerations into daily decision making and planning for 

the program results they wish to accomplish. It identifies concepts and 

leading practices that are organized into strategic human-capital 

management cornerstones including strategic human-capital planning; 

acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; and creating results-oriented 

cultures.

To adapt the criteria to the context of this review, we reviewed the model 

to identify specific practices that organizations can use to make progress 

 1

Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics, Department of Defense Report to Congress on Future 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training, Operations, and Sustainability (April 2012). 

2

Air Force, Air Force Audit Agency, Unmanned Aerial System Pilot Force Management

(Dec. 17, 2008).

3

GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a Results-Oriented 

Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories, GAO-10-331 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010).

4

GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002); Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to 

Better Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel, GAO-06-908 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006); and Defense Management: Actions Needed to Ensure National 

Guard and Reserve Headquarters Are Sized to be Efficient, GAO-14-71 (Washington 

D.C.: Nov. 12, 2013).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

associated with each of the four strategic human-capital management 

cornerstones. We then analyzed each practice to determine whether it 

was appropriate and relevant to both the RPA pilot workforce and the 

military context overall. After identifying the list of practices, we discussed 

our adaptation with Air Force officials, who agreed they were appropriate 

and relevant and provided points of contact for obtaining information on 

each practice.

We interviewed officials from Headquarters Air Force offices including the 

Officer of Manpower, Personnel, and Services Policy and the Office of 

Operations, Plans, and Requirements Policy to gather their perspectives 

and information on practices across all four cornerstones. From these 

offices, we obtained and analyzed documentation, including strategic 

DOD and Air Force guidance and data on personnel levels, recruiting, 

incentive pays, and attrition rates for remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots. 

In addition, we interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy on the Air 

Force’s use of incentives to recruit and retain RPA pilots. We collected 

perspectives from RPA pilots and RPA unit commanders on the Air 

Force’s strategic human-capital planning practices, including the effects 

of those practices on their training, professional development, quality of 

life, and retention, as well as any efforts the Air Force has made to solicit 

feedback from and communicate about key issues with RPA pilots. We 

also interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Air Force Personnel 

Center on practices related to results-oriented cultures.

Furthermore, we compared the perspectives and documentation we 

collected to the GAO criteria and held discussions with Air Force officials 

to discuss instances in which the Air Force’s management actions were 

not consistent with these criteria. We discussed challenges raised by the 

RPA pilots and unit commanders with whom we spoke, including any 

efforts in place to address the challenges.

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force has addressed concerns, if 

any, about the working conditions of RPA pilots that may affect their 

quality of life, we identified and analyzed criteria included in DOD’s 2009 

and 2004 Quadrennial Quality of Life Reviews in which DOD expresses 

its commitment to provide servicemembers with the best quality of life 

possible through support and development of responses to emerging 

servicemember needs. DOD has broadly defined quality of life to include 

such factors as morale, health and wellness, and work-life balance. To 

understand these reviews and the commitments, we obtained information 

from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Community & Family Policy, which is responsible for conducting the 

department’s Quadrennial Quality of Life Reviews. To understand 

challenges in the working conditions that RPA pilots may face we 

analyzed studies that the Air Force conducted to assess the stress and 

mental-health condition of RPA personnel, including RPA pilots.

In particular, we reviewed and analyzed two studies conducted by the Air 

Force School of Aerospace Medicine published in 2011 and 2013, which 

identified the sources of stress of RPA personnel.5 The studies’ results 

were based on self-administered surveys of Air Force RPA personnel, 

including pilots, from squadrons in Air Combat Command, Air Force 

Special Operations Command, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force 

Reserve. The surveys were administered in 2011 and 2012 with response 

rates from RPA squadrons that ranged from 24 to 98 percent. The 

surveys included questions related to exhaustion, distress, and posttraumatic stress disorder.

We also interviewed the researchers who conducted these studies to 

clarify our understanding of their methods, findings, and 

recommendations to alleviate the stress of RPA personnel. In addition, 

we analyzed a report prepared for the Air Force Medical Support Agency 

that describes the defining characteristics of being deployed-on-station 

and examines the challenges that personnel who are deployed-on-station 

face.6 To obtain a firsthand account of the challenging working conditions 

that RPA pilots face, we conducted focus groups with pilots at Beale, 

Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. We also interviewed leadership 

officials at these bases to obtain their perspective on the challenges that 

RPA pilots in their units face. Moreover, we interviewed mental-health 

professionals at each of the bases we visited to obtain their perspectives 

on the working conditions of RPA pilots and any effects on their quality of 

life.

 5

Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Facets of Occupational Burnout Among U.S. 

Air Force Active Duty and National Guard/Reserve MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper 

Operators (June 2011) and 2012 Occupational Health Stress Screenings within USAF 

RPA Predator/Reaper Units (Feb. 26, 2013).

6

Air Force Medical Support Agency, Telewarfare and Military Medicine: White Paper/State 

of the Art Report on AFMS Support to the Emerging Paradigm of Employed-in-Place 

Operations (Sept. 30, 2011).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 42 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

To evaluate actions the Air Force has taken to address the challenging 

working conditions RPA pilots face, we analyzed the recommendations 

that were included in the studies conducted by the Air Force School of 

Aerospace Medicine and the report prepared for the Air Force Medical 

Support Agency. We also obtained and analyzed documentation provided 

by the Air Force Medical Support Agency that describes actions the Air 

Force has taken in response to these recommendations and we 

interviewed officials from this agency to further understand these actions. 

Furthermore, we interviewed and obtained information from officials in the 

Air Force Office of Manpower, Personnel and Services Policy and the 

Office of Operations, Plans and Requirements Policy to determine any 

actions the Air Force has taken to alleviate the challenging working 

conditions that RPA pilots face. We also obtained information from 

commanders and mental-health professionals at each of the bases we 

visited to understand actions they have taken to address the challenging 

working conditions that RPA pilots face and that affect their quality of life.

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force analyzes the promotion 

rates of RPA pilots, we applied criteria from common statistical practices, 

which indicate that when analyzing relationships between selected factors 

and a given outcome researchers should account for other key factors 

that could also explain that relationship. To understand the context of Air 

Force officer promotions, we reviewed relevant laws and Air Force 

guidance including the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act7 and 

Air Force Instruction 36-2501.8 To identify the promotion rates of Air 

Force RPA pilots and how their promotion rates compared to officers in 

other careers in the Air Force, we analyzed promotion-rate data for 

officers in the Line of the Air Force competitive category who were 

promoted “in-the-zone” to the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and 

colonel. We analyzed data from 2006 to the most-recently available data, 

which for promotion to major and colonel was 2012 and for promotion to 

lieutenant colonel was 2013.

We focused on Line of the Air Force officers, because RPA pilots are 

included in this category. We focused on officers promoted in-the-zone 

because this zone is the point in an officer’s career when his or her 

 7

See 10 U.S.C. § 611, et seq.

8

Air Force Instruction 36-2501, Officer Promotions and Selective Continuation (Aug. 17, 

2009).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 43 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

opportunity for promotion is the highest. We focused on rates of 

promotion to the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel because 

the promotion rates from second lieutenant to first lieutenant and from 

first lieutenant to captain are nearly 100 percent, and hence the first 

competitive promotion opportunity for an Air Force officer occurs as he or 

she becomes eligible for promotion to the rank of major. In addition, we 

did not evaluate promotion rates above colonel because no RPA pilots 

have been promoted to the general officer ranks in the Air Force yet.

To identify the percentile of RPA pilot promotion rates compared to other 

line officer career fields, we analyzed data on the range of promotion 

rates of active-duty officers from the careers that competed in the 

promotion zone on each promotion board to the ranks of major, lieutenant 

colonel, and colonel from 2006 to 2013. For this analysis, the promotion 

rate of RPA pilots includes the rate for permanent RPA pilots (i.e., RPA 

pilots and recategorized RPA pilots) as well as temporary RPA pilots (i.e., 

manned-aircraft pilots serving assignments in RPA squadrons and 

manned-aircraft pilot training graduates). For this analysis all of the listed 

career fields are mutually exclusive. That is, if a temporary RPA pilot was 

identified as an RPA pilot in this analysis, the pilot was not included in the 

data to calculate promotion rates for other careers such as the mannedaircraft career fields. For each promotion board, officers from between 22 

and 33 careers competed for promotion. This analysis excludes career 

fields where fewer than 10 officers were eligible for promotion, because 

the rate of promotion in these cases is highly sensitive to the outcomes of 

single individuals. However, we included the results from 8 boards in 

which fewer than 10 RPA pilots competed for promotion to provide a 

more-comprehensive account of RPA pilot promotions. The promotion 

rate that we calculate for these instances should be considered cautiously 

since the outcome of one or two individuals could have a large effect on 

the overall rate. Fewer than 10 RPA pilots were eligible for promotion to 

the rank of lieutenant colonel for the first 2006 board as well as the 2007 

and 2008 boards. In addition, fewer than 10 RPA pilots were eligible for 

promotion to the rank of colonel for the 2006, 2007, 2008, and both of the 

2009 promotion boards. We obtained these data from the Air Force 

Personnel Center (AFPC), and to understand the methods AFPC used to 

collect, store, and maintain these data, we interviewed officials from 

AFPC and reviewed documentation they provided, and we found the data 

to be reliable for our purposes.

To evaluate steps the Air Force took to analyze the promotion rates of 

RPA pilots and the reasons that these rates have been lower than 

average, we interviewed Air Force officials in headquarters personnel 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 44 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

offices as well as AFPC offices. In addition, we evaluated documentation 

of AFPC’s analysis of officer promotions rates including the results of 

AFPC’s logistic regression identifying the factors that are related to officer 

promotion. We also reviewed the August 2013 report9 that the Air Force 

provided to Congress on the promotion rates of RPA pilots in which the 

Air Force identifies reasons for lower promotion rates of RPA pilots. To 

identify actions the Air Force took to respond to low RPA pilot promotion 

rates, we evaluated relevant documentation including instructions the 

Secretary of the Air Force has provided to promotion board members 

since 2008 in which the Secretary communicates the importance of 

promoting RPA pilots. We also reviewed briefings that Air Force 

headquarters offices as well as AFPC prepared for the Secretary of the 

Air Force on additional steps the Air Force took to address low RPA pilot 

promotion rates. We also analyzed the Air Force’s August 2013 report to 

Congress and additional documentation that the Air Force provided about 

its plans to raise promotion rates of RPA pilots.

As we noted earlier, to obtain the perspectives of RPA pilots related to 

each of our three objectives we conducted 10 focus groups that each 

consisted of between six and nine active-duty RPA pilots during site visits 

to Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. To conduct these focus 

groups we randomly selected RPA pilots to participate, asked them a 

structured set of questions during meetings that lasted about 90 minutes, 

and took detailed notes. We then evaluated these notes using content 

analysis to develop our findings. We discuss the methods we used to 

select our participants, develop questions, conduct the focus-group 

meetings, and analyze the information we obtained in the focus groups, 

and the results of our analysis, in more detail in appendix II.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to April 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 9

Air Force, Report on Education and Training and Promotion Rates for Air Force Pilots of 

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (August 2013). 
Appendix II: Focus-Group Methodology and 

Results

Page 45 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

To obtain the perspectives of pilots of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) 

related to each of our three objectives, we conducted 10 focus group 

meetings with active-duty RPA pilots during site visits to Beale, Cannon, 

and Creech Air Force Bases. We decided to visit the three bases we 

selected because more RPA pilots are stationed at these bases than 

other Air Force bases. We specifically included Beale Air Force base 

because we wanted to obtain the perspectives of the RPA pilots who fly 

the RQ-4 (Global Hawk) who are stationed there. In addition, we selected 

Cannon Air Force Base because we wanted to obtain the perspectives of 

RPA pilots assigned to the Air Force Special Operations Command.

To select specific RPA pilots to participate in our focus groups, we 

obtained documentation that included lists of the RPA pilots stationed at 

each base as well as the amount of time each had served flying RPAs, 

and their ranks. To obtain a variety of perspectives, we randomly selected 

pilots with various amounts of experience flying RPAs and we included 

pilots of various ranks in our groups. These groups typically consisted of 

six to nine participants.

To conduct the focus groups, a GAO moderator followed a protocol that 

included prompts, instructions to the participants, and a set of three 

questions, each with several follow-up questions. We pretested this

protocol at Beale Air Force base and used it at the remaining two bases. 

We used the same set of questions from this protocol for each of the 10 

focus groups we conducted. These questions are reprinted below. During 

each focus group, the GAO moderator asked questions related to the 

topics of our review to participants who, in turn, provided their 

perspectives on the topics. During the focus-group meetings, three GAO 

team members took separate sets of detailed notes to document the 

participants’ comments. See table 2 for the complete list of questions and 

follow-up questions that we asked during our focus groups.

Appendix II: Focus-Group Methodology and 

Results
Appendix II: Focus-Group Methodology and 

Results

Page 46 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Table 1: Questions GAO Moderator Asked Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Pilots during Focus Group Meetings at 

Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases

Promotion

1. As an RPA pilot, what has been your perception of your chances of promotion?

a. What factors do you think contribute to different promotions rates of RPA pilots? Has it been possible to attend professional military 

education in residence?

b. As an RPA pilot, have you experienced challenges pursuing any other career-development activities, like completing an advanced 

academic degree?

c. For pilots who previously flew manned aircraft, how does your ability to pursue career-development activities compare with the 

ability to do so as a pilot of the manned aircraft?

d. What effects do perceptions of differences in promotion rates have on squadron morale?

Quality of Life

2. How would you say being an RPA pilot has impacted your quality of life?

a. For pilots who previously flew manned aircraft, how does the level of stress as an RPA pilot compare to your level of stress as a 

pilot of the manned aircraft?

b. What aspects of being an RPA pilot do you think increase or decrease stress levels?

c. What about manning shortages in your squadron? 

d. (If YES) What effects do manning shortages have on your level of stress?

e. (If YES) What effects do manning shortages have on squadron morale?

f. If being an RPA pilot has increased or decreased your levels of stress, what has the impact been?

g. As an RPA pilot, are you aware of any options that the leadership has made available to reduce stress?

h. What are the positive and negative aspects of conducting warfare operations away from the kinetic battlefield?

Other Personnel Challenges

3. Do you face any other challenges in your work, such as training issues, that we have not addressed today?

a. What about training exercises and the tempo of operations?

Source: GAO.

Following our focus-group meetings, we consolidated our separate sets of 

detailed notes for each focus group to create a compiled final record of 

the participant comments from each focus group. To do this, a GAO 

analyst reviewed the set of detailed notes and compiled them in a final 

record for each focus group. A key rule of this compilation was that if one 

analyst recorded a comment, but another did not, we included the 

material in the final record. To ensure that our compiled final record of 

each focus group was accurate, a second analyst then reviewed at least 

25 percent of each of the final records. In instances where an analyst 

identified some discrepancies between the detailed notes and the final 

record, the reviewing analyst corrected the discrepancy and reviewed a 

higher percentage of the notes for that focus group.
Appendix II: Focus-Group Methodology and 

Results

Page 47 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Next, we used content analysis to analyze the final records of each focus 

group to identify themes that participants expressed across all or most of 

the groups. To do this, three GAO analysts first met to discuss and agree 

on a preliminary set of themes. We then analyzed an initial set of the 

records and counted instances that we observed these initial themes. We 

then reconvened as a group to discuss and agree on additional themes to 

add to our analysis and to consolidate and delete others. We then 

analyzed our records and made coding decisions. Following the initial 

analysis by one analyst, a second analyst independently reviewed all of 

the coding decisions that the first analyst made for each of the records. 

Where there were discrepancies, the analysts reviewed one another’s 

coding and rationale for their coding decisions and reached a consensus 

on which codes should be used. See figure 8 for the complete results of 

our analysis.

When describing the results of our analysis of our focus groups in this 

report, we use the term “some,” as in “pilots in some focus groups,” to 

report topics that were discussed by RPA pilots in two to four of our focus 

groups. The information we present from our focus groups accurately 

captures the opinions provided by the RPA pilots who attended the 10 

focus groups at the three Air Force Bases we visited. However these 

opinions cannot be generalized to all of the RPA pilots at the three Air 

Force Bases we visited or to all RPA pilots in the Air Force. The results of 

our analyses of the opinions of RPA pilots we obtained during our focus 

groups are not generalizable because the Air Force Bases we selected 

are not necessarily representative of all of the Air Force Bases that 

contain RPA squadrons and the RPA pilots included in our focus groups 

are not necessarily representative of all of the RPA pilots in the Air Force.
Appendix II: Focus-Group Methodology and 

Results

Page 48 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Figure 8: Results of GAO Analysis of Focus Groups Meetings of RPA Pilots
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of the Air Force

Page 49 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of the Air Force
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of the Air Force

Page 50 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of the Air Force

Page 51 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of the Air Force

Page 52 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 53 GAO-14-316 Air Force RPA Pilots

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or FarrellB@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Lori Atkinson (Assistant Director),

Steve Boyles, Ron La Due Lake, Kelly Liptan, James P. Klein, Steven R. 

Putansu, Michael Willems, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Amie Steele made 

key contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(351792)
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