Department of Defense 

Biological Threat Responses to the 2009-2010 

H1N1 Influenza Outbreak:

A Real World Exercise

By

Laura E. Peitersen, Calli S. Levin and Allison G. Jones

The Counterproliferation Papers

Future Warfare Series No. 51

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
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Department of Defense 

Biological Threat Responses to the 2009-2010

H1N1 Influenza Outbreak

A Real World Exercise

Laura E. Peitersen, Calli S. Levin

and Allison G. Jones

April 2011

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the 

USAF Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to 

assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and 

USAF officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from 

weapons of mass destruction. Copies of No.51 and previous papers in 

this series are available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 

Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is 

(334) 953-7530: phone (334) 953-7538.

Counterproliferation Paper No. 51

USAF Counterproliferation

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36116-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:

http://cpc.au.af.mil/
ii

Table of Contents

Disclaimer...........................................................................iii

About the Authors...................................................................iv

Introduction..................................................................................................1

Natural vs. Deliberate Disease Spread.........................................................3

Background: Public Health and National Security Considerations ............4

The Start of a Global Pandemic...................................................................8

A Novel Influenza Strain ...........................................................................11

Fighting Back: Vaccine Development Begins...........................................13

Putting Disease Containment Plans to the Test .........................................16

DoD Plans for Fall Flu Season ..................................................................19

First Vaccines Shipped ..............................................................................20

Immunization Campaigns Begin ...............................................................22

Declining Pandemic: A Snapshot .............................................................23

Notes................................................................................28
iii

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and 

do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center.
iv

About the Authors

Dr. Laura E. Peitersen supported the US Air Force Strategic Plans and 

Policy Division (USAF A5XP), Counter-Biological Warfare (C-BW), 

during the writing of the case study. She has over 20 years of experience 

as a research scientist, analyst and lecturer, and has led and supported 

CBRN programs for a number of government agencies. Dr. Peitersen 

supported policy review, training and planning for pandemic influenza 

preparations for the USAF and US HHS.

Calli S. Levin is an SAIC contractor supporting the US Air Force 

Strategic Plans and Policy Division (USAF A5XP). She serves as the 

contractor lead for the Air Force Counter-Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological and Nuclear Education, Training and Exercise program. 

Previously, she worked as the manager for grassroots advocacy at the 

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Ms. Levin holds a 

Master’s degree in Security Studies from Georgetown University. She 

graduated magna cum laude with a B.A. in Journalism from Indiana 

University.

Allison G. Jones was a C-CBRN Policy Analyst when she contributed to 

writing this case study. Through SAIC, Ms. Jones supported the US Air 

Force Strategic Plans and Policy Division (USAF A5XP). In this capacity, 

she supported Counter-Biological Warfare (C-BW) and aided in 

coordinating the counterproliferation team's efforts regarding CBRN 

Policy and Doctrine review for A5XPC. Ms. Jones also supported 

continuity of operations program development at the National Cancer 

Institute at Frederick, Maryland (NCI-Frederick). Throughout the 2009-

2010 H1N1 outbreak, Ms. Jones contributed to developing guidance and 

training to prepare NCI-Frederick personnel for emergency operations 

should the pandemic influenza outbreak escalate or a future crisis emerge.
1

Department of Defense Biological Threat Responses to 

the 2009-2010 H1N1 Influenza Outbreak:

A Real World Exercise

In June 1993 a doomsday cult known as Aum Shinrikyo sprayed 

an aerosolized form of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) from the roof of its 

suburban-Tokyo headquarters. Health officials became aware of this 

event following “numerous public complaints concerning odors emanating 

from the building.” 1

 Several animals in the vicinity fell ill, but no people

were seriously harmed. This incident was largely ignored until two years 

later when the same group conducted a sarin nerve gas attack on the 

Tokyo subway system, killing 13 people and injuring hundreds. In 

retrospect, Aum Shinrikyo’s intentional dispersal of anthrax marked a 

turning point in bioterrorism. Though the strain of anthrax used in the 

failed attack “had little possibility for endangering human life,”2 this event 

highlighted the threat of biological agents used as weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD).3

“One of our greatest concerns continues to be that a terrorist group or some 

other dangerous group might acquire and employ biological agents... to 

create casualties greater than September 11.”

Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell, Commission on the 

Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, World at Risk, Dec. 2008 
2

In 2001 in the United States, the threat of bioterrorism once again 

emerged as letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to two U.S. 

Senate offices and several news agencies. In what became the most lethal

biological attack in U.S. history, five people were killed, and dozens more 

were injured.4 Though these incidents may seem isolated, national security 

experts agree that it is merely a matter of time before a terrorist group or 

rogue state conducts biological warfare against the United States. 

Numerous congressional and academic studies have predicted that 

terrorists will use a biological WMD within the next several years. 5 In 

fact, World at Risk, a 2008 publication by the bi-partisan U.S. 

Congressional Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 

Terrorism, concluded, “Unless the world community acts decisively and 

with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass 

destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the 

end of 2013.”6 The Commission’s report specifically focused on nuclear 

and biological weapons, labeling these threats as the ones posing the 

“greatest peril.”7 This case study examines the biological threat that 

H1N1 posed to the U.S. and highlights DoD’s WMD-related preparations, 

including force health protection and medical countermeasures, in the 
3

midst of a pandemic disease outbreak. The 2009-2010 worldwide H1N1 

influenza outbreak provided the DoD an opportunity to exercise disease 

containment planning measures and address BW response mechanisms 

while responding to a real-world biological event.

Natural vs. Deliberate Disease Spread

Beginning in April 2009 with the outbreak and rapid spread of the 

H1N1 “swine flu,” the world witnessed the potential effects of a 

bioterrorist attack. While the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic was a naturallyoccurring disease outbreak and not a deliberate attack, the symptoms, 

infection rates and response mechanisms associated with the virus could 

be similar to the impacts of a deliberate attack employing a contagious 

biological agent. Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons that have clearly 

identifiable signatures, biological agents may be disseminated covertly, 

and therefore they may not be identified immediately. The first indication 

of a biological event could be more numerous-than-expected hospital 

visits in a particular location, or in a group of people who were in the same 

location at the same time. Whether natural or deliberate, biological 

outbreaks will have similar impacts on employee absenteeism, school and 

work closures, the availability and distribution of medical and non-
4

medical countermeasures, and mortality rates. While influenza is not a 

viable biological warfare (BW) agent,

8

Background – Public Health and National Security Considerations

the H1N1 outbreak provided the 

U.S. Government and the Military Services an opportunity to identify and 

assess valuable lessons learned that can be applied in the event of a 

deliberate BW attack. It also can provide insight into how to improve 

DoD responses to future WMD attacks. 

Since at least 2004, several U.S. Government agencies including 

the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS), and the FBI have initiated efforts to prevent and mitigate 

the risks associated with biological WMD. In order to sustain operations 

and protect national security, the DoD has a significant role in 

bioterrorism prevention and mitigation. The DoD must be aware of and 

prepare for terrorist use of BW, including both non-contagious pathogens 

such as anthrax and contagious pathogens such as smallpox. During the 

2009-2010 worldwide H1N1 influenza outbreak, the DoD was able to 

practice bioterrorism response mechanisms in a high-stakes, real-world 

exercise.
5

Though the particular strain of influenza is novel, the H1N1 

outbreak did not represent a new biological threat to the U.S. On the 

contrary, the world periodically experiences severe influenza pandemics 

that threaten significant illness and mortality rates. There were three such 

pandemics during the 20th century, with each one producing varying 

degrees of infection and mortality rates.9 The 1918-1919 “Spanish flu” 

was by far the most lethal, killing between 20 and 50 million people and 

infecting more than 25 percent of the U.S. population.

10 The Spanish flu 

primarily affected adults rather than the young or the elderly.11 

Figure 1. The impact of the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic was greater in 

young adults than in the more typical age extremes seen in seasonal 

flu.12
6

The Spanish flu, which coincided with the final years of World 

War I, swiftly became the real enemy as it killed more U.S. servicemen in 

Europe than did combat action in the Great War.

13 For the young men 

who lived in close quarters and faced extreme pressure, the Spanish flu 

had a tremendous impact on military operations. Military hospitals were 

quickly overwhelmed with flu patients and treatment options were 

extremely limited, consisting mainly of quarantines. 14

Josie Brown, a nurse stationed at a Naval Hospital in Great Lakes, 

Ill., in 1918, described the scene at her hospital:

The morgues were packed almost to the 

ceiling with bodies stacked one on top of 

another. The morticians worked day and 

night. You could never turn around 

without seeing a big red truck loaded 

with caskets for the train station so

bodies could be sent home. 

We didn’t have the time to treat them. 

We didn’t take temperatures; we didn’t 

even have time to take blood pressure.

We would give them a little hot whisky 

toddy; that’s about all we had time to 

do.15

The Spanish flu demonstrated how disastrous a biological 

epidemic can be for military forces—a fact just as true today as it was in 
7

1918. Throughout the planning and operations in response to a biological 

event, “force health protection remains a primary focus...regardless of 

whether the virus was natural, accidental or of deliberate origin.”16 If an 

outbreak were determined to be a deliberate act of war, it will be 

particularly important for U.S. military forces to maintain operational

capability and accomplish their assigned missions. As noted in the 2006 

Government Accountability Office report on DoD infectious disease 

planning: “An influenza pandemic would be of global and national 

significance and could affect large numbers of Department of Defense 

(DoD) personnel, seriously challenging DoD's readiness.”17

Prior to the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, the DoD recognized the need to 

conduct deliberate planning and implemented a variety of strategies to 

mitigate and protect military personnel against infectious diseases. On 

Aug. 15, 2006, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld designated the United 

States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) the “global synchronizer” 

for pandemic influenza (PI) planning.

18 By October 2007, 

USNORTHCOM drafted and implemented CONPLAN 3551, Concept 

Plan to Synchronize DoD PI Planning. CONPLAN 3551 addresses DoDlevel planning and operating considerations and directs the Services to 
8

create PI mitigation plans. The DoD relied heavily on the CONPLAN 

3551 PI planning infrastructure both in the years leading up to and during 

the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. Using lessons learned from the H1N1 

pandemic, the DoD continues to improve its BW and infectious disease 

response policies, plans and procedures.

The Start of a Global Pandemic

On April 26, 2009, the United States and Mexico both reported an 

unusual number of influenza cases (20 cases in the U.S., 18 in Mexico) 

outside of the normal flu season (October to March in the Northern 

hemisphere). Laboratory test showed that the influenza strain responsible 

for these illnesses had not been previously observed in humans. The virus

spread rapidly, largely due to high volumes of global air travel (illustrated 

in Figure 2). By April 27, 2009—only one day after the first cases were 

identified—73 cases of H1N1 influenza in four countries, along with 

seven deaths had been reported. 
9

Figure 2. Spread of the 2009 H1N1 influenza strain was expedited 

by air travel.19

The virus quickly gained the attention of world leaders and

international health organizations. On April 27, speaking at the National 

Academy of Sciences’ annual meeting, U.S. President Barack Obama 

declared, “We are closely monitoring the emerging cases of swine flu in 

the United States. And this is obviously a cause for concern and requires a 

heightened state of alert.”20 On the same day, the DoD announced that it 

was “monitoring the H1N1 flu situation closely, with its primary focus on 

protecting the military population.”21 A Pentagon official said, “We 

certainly have a number of contingency plans for dealing with health 

incidences like this, because our primary goal is preservation of the 

fighting force.”22 As part of previous infectious disease outbreak 

planning, military treatment facilities already stocked prescription 
10

anti-viral drugs Relenza and Tamiflu, with larger stockpiles spread across 

the U.S. and overseas.23

By April 29, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the 

H1N1 outbreak a level five (out of six) pandemic, meaning the virus had 

spread between humans in at least two countries.24 Accordingly, WHO 

Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan recommended,“All countries should 

immediately activate their pandemic preparedness plans. Countries should 

remain on high alert for unusual outbreaks of influenza-like illness and 

severe pneumonia.”25 Though the DoD remained at Phase 0, the Services 

and Combatant Commands began implementing many of their CONPLAN 

3551-directed preparedness plans (see WHO vs. DoD Phases, below). At 

that time, Dr. Michael Kilpatrick, the Military Health System’s director of 

strategic communications, said, “We have been preparing for a situation 

like this for more than five years and have plans, processes and procedures 

to respond to a pandemic incident.”26 Lt Col (Dr.) Wayne Hachey, 

director of preventative medicine for defense department health affairs, 

added, “We have been preparing for pandemic flu because of its potential 

impact on the mission.”27

 

 
11

A Novel Influenza Strain

On April 30, only four days after the start of the outbreak, the 

United States experienced its first H1N1-related death, and by the 

beginning of May the disease had spread to 21 states.28 As influenza 

continued to spread across the country and around the globe, health 

experts were concerned by the fact that H1N1 was a novel strain to which 

people had no immunity. Even in the worst flu seasons, pandemics rarely 

occur because a large percentage of the population already has some 

WHO vs. DoD Phases

“The main difference between the WHO Phase levels and DoD Phase 

levels is that the DoD Phase levels are driven by 3 factors: Operational, 

Efficiency of Virus Transmission, and Geographic distribution. All 

three are taken into consideration by the Secretary of Defense before 

any phase is raised or lowered. The WHO Phase levels are driven 

primarily by Efficiency of Viral Transmission.”

“Pandemic Influenza Phases.” Pandemic Influenza Watchboard. 3 Jun. 

2010. http://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/pandemicflu.jsp

The Department of Defense, though geographically deployed, is 

primarily organized with respect to mission. The DoD phases do not 

necessarily correspond to those of the WHO. USNORTHCOM, as 

global synchronizer of PI planning, enacted its own phases to coincide 

with CONPLAN 3551 actions. USNORTHCOM initiated Phase 1 in 

August 2009, and remained at a Phase 1 throughout the crisis.
12

immunity to the influenza strain in circulation.29 H1N1, however, 

developed as a combination of the swine and avian influenzas and had not 

previously infected humans.30

In addition to the natural protection many people have against the 

seasonal flu, vaccines can guard against infection and can mitigate the 

spread of the disease. As the human-to-human H1N1 infections spread, 

scientists looked to an H1N1 vaccine as a possible mitigation measure. 

Experts from the WHO convened in May 2009 to determine the necessity 

and feasibility of developing a vaccine separate from the seasonal flu 

variety. On May 14, however, the organization was unable to decide on 

vaccine production recommendations, calling the issue “enormously 

complicated.”31 One of the complicating factors in producing an H1N1 

vaccine was the timing of the outbreak. The time between when a new 

virus is first identified and when a vaccine is released to the military or the 

public is generally at least five or six months.32 The question was whether 

the pandemic would already be over by the time manufacturers could 

produce a vaccine.
13

Fighting Back: Vaccine Development Begins

For the DoD, preventing proliferation of the disease and 

maintaining force health protection were guiding principles in dictating 

the department’s response. Anti-viral medications Tamiflu and Relenza

were proving somewhat effective in lessening the duration and severity of 

the symptoms associated with H1N1, but the medicines were not intended 

to prevent infection like a vaccine. Additionally, the DoD’s anti-viral 

supplies were far too limited to cover the entire force, which by its very 

nature is “more vulnerable than most to the spread of disease... [because 

they] live together, eat together in mess halls, sleep together in barracks 

and bunk together by the thousands aboard ships.”33

 With the WHO unable to reach a conclusion about whether to 

recommend H1N1 vaccine development, the DoD and other U.S. 

government agencies developed a strategy to respond to this biological 

threat. On May 22, in order to support health protection measures, HHS 

allocated $1 billion to vaccine research and development.

 Furthermore, if the 

anti-viral supply was too limited to protect the force, what was to be done 

to protect DoD civilian employees, contractors and military dependents? 

34 Bruce Gellin, 

director of the National Vaccine Program Office within HHS explained,
14

“HHS is committed to protecting the health and safety of American 

citizens from CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] 

threats. Along with our colleagues at DoD, HHS is committed to a full 

examination and discussion of all viable options for the manufacture of 

vaccines and other medical countermeasures against identified threats.”35

On June 11, just seven weeks after the first H1N1 cases were 

reported, with more than 17,400 people in 62 countries infected with the 

virus, the WHO declared the outbreak a Phase 6 pandemic. 36 Vaccine 

research moved quickly after the WHO’s decision to elevate the pandemic 

alert to Phase 6. Over the next two days, the CDC released vaccine 

guidance and HHS pledged an additional $1 billion for vaccine research. 

Yet, with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) following the rigorous 

seasonal flu research and development timeline, an H1N1 vaccine would 

not be available to the public or the military until the fall of 2009. 
15

The H1N1 Disease Profile

As the number of confirmed cases rose, the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC) reported unusual trends involving young patients, with higher 

H1N1-related hospitalizations occurring among the 5-24 year-old-age group. I

 

During the typical flu season, the elderly and the very young II are usually the most 

affected, in terms of both hospitalization and mortality rates. H1N1, however, 

targeted a different age group. The median age for H1N1 cases in the U.S. was 20 

years old, II and 75 percent of H1N1 infections worldwide involved those under 30 

years of age. IV 

The significance of the H1N1 disease profile extends to the DoD, as more than 66 

percent of active duty military personnel are under the age of 30.V

I

Schuchat, Dr. Anne, “CDC Telebriefing on Investigation of Human Cases of H1N1 

Flu,” Press Briefing

Transcripts., May 18,2009. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(CDC), June 3,2010,

http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090518.htm. II The CDC characterizes elderly as over 65 and very young as those under 5 years 

old. See http://www.cdc.gov/flu/keyfacts.htm. III Kelly, Heath, et al, “H1N1 Swine Origin Influenza Infection in the United States 

and Europe in 2009 May be Similar to H1N1 Seasonal Influenza Infection 

in Two Australian States in 2007 and 2008,” Influenza and Other 

Respiratory Viruses 3.4, (Jul 2009), pp. 183–188. IV Butler, Declan, “Portrait of a Year-Old Pandemic,” Nature, (April 22, 2010), vol. 

464. V “

Active Duty Demographic Profile: Assigned Strength, Gender, Race, Marital, 

Education and Age Profile of Active Duty Force,” Sept. 2008, Online 

PowerPoint, Defense Manpower Data 

Center.,http://www.slideshare.net/pastinson/us-military-active-dutydemographic-profile-presentation.
16

Putting Disease Containment Plans to the Test

DoD also responded to the H1N1 pandemic through by enacting

the social distancing measures called for in USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 

3551 with the goal of mitigating the spread of the disease. As early as 

April 2009, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) issued a message to U.S. 

forces within its area of responsibility stressing the importance of 

preventative measures against the virus.37 The message included simple 

social distancing precautions, such as “staying at home when sick; 

covering your mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing; washing your 

hands regularly; avoiding touching your nose, mouth or eyes; and seeking 

medical care if you are ill.”38

Social distancing measures were particularly necessary at the U.S. 

Army’s Fort Jackson, through which more than 50,000 Initial Entry 

Training Soldiers pass each year and where H1N1 cases were “steadily 

climbing.”

 

39 According to Lt Col Marilyn Lazarz, chief of Army Public 

Health Nursing at Fort Jackson, “the virus is more active among BCT 

[Basic Combat Training] Soldiers because they live within close 

quarters—in barracks—and tend to share personal items.”40 
17

Force health protection measures continued throughout the 

summer of 2009 while the H1N1 vaccine was under development. The 

Services updated and tested the USNORTHCOM-directed disease 

containment plans and mitigation measures, including social distancing, 

working from alternate locations and other non-medical countermeasures. 

At Fort Jackson, for example, the Army instituted social distancing 

through “sick-in-quarters,” an isolated area on-post for confirmed H1N1 

cases, and took additional prevention measures, asking all soldiers to 

re-arrange their bunks to sleep head-to-toe “so that if one coughs or 

sneezes during the night, the other soldier is on the opposite end of the 

dispersion droplets.”41

These social distancing measures were essential to protecting the 

health of the force. According to Department of the Navy (DON) 

Work/Life Program Manager Karen Meyer, “40 percent of flu cases could 

be prevented by stopping the spread of germs.”

 

42 She further noted that 

“avoiding human contact by ‘social distancing’ was and remains the most 

effective method of minimizing the effects of the pandemic flu 

emergency.”43 To that end, the DON practiced teleworking (working 

from an alternate location) and appointed telework coordinators at each of 
18

the Navy’s Major Commands. While not everyone in DON was eligible 

to telework—either because of the sensitive nature of the work or because 

of mission requirements—allowing even a portion of the Department to 

work remotely limited the spread of the disease. 

Similarly, the Air Force used the summer months to test its disease 

containment plan for the National Capital Region. In August 2009, 

Bolling Air Force Base in Southeast Washington, DC, conducted a weeklong full-scale PI exercise. The purpose of the exercise was to ensure that 

the base and other Air Force installations within the National Capital 

Region would be prepared when H1N1 returned as expected during the 

fall flu season. According to Col Steven Shepro, 316th Wing Commander

at Andrews AFB in Landover, Md., ‘‘If you’ve been listening to the news, 

you’ve heard how the H1N1 can come back with a real vengeance for 

which we may not have the perfect remedy. This can be serious. That’s 

why we’re here today – come flu season, we may be at a point where we 

have to make tough decisions and have thresholds for those decisions. We 

have to be active and foresee the ‘what ifs’ in this situation.”44

Advance preparation is the key to successfully mitigating the 

effects of a pandemic, whether H1N1 or some other future bio-event. 
19

“Operations and the mission will still go on” during an outbreak, said Col 

Shepro, the goal is to practice disease containment plans in advance so 

that during a true emergency, the military will “be able to react as a team 

[and not] get bogged down in checklists.”45

DoD Plans for Fall Flu Season

The Northern hemisphere received a much-needed respite from the 

H1N1 pandemic during the off-peak flu season.46 However, with the fall 

approaching, a vaccine was needed more than ever. Worldwide, H1N1 

cases jumped to more than 200,000 by August 23, and WHO Chief Dr. 

Margaret Chan said the speed at which the virus was spreading was 

“almost unheard-of.” She also noted that 40 percent of H1N1-related 

deaths had been in otherwise healthy young adults.47 These statistics did 

not go unnoticed by the DoD. On August 26, “to mitigate the flu's effect 

on military operations,”48 the Department purchased 2.7 million doses of 

the novel H1N1 vaccine for active military members and planned to 

conduct an immunization campaign beginning in October.49 On August 

28, in a long awaited move, USNORTHCOM raised its Pandemic Phase 

level from 0 to 1.
20

First Vaccines Shipped

Vaccine distribution was still at least a month away when President 

Obama allocated an additional $2.7 billion toward H1N1 prophylaxis and 

immunization campaigns.50 Unfortunately, this did little to help Army 

Spc. Christopher Hogg, a 23-year-old soldier stationed at Fort Jackson. 

The Army base had not received doses of the vaccine when, on September 

10, Spc. Hogg died of H1N1-related pneumonia. Spc. Hogg’s death was 

the first H1N1 military death.51 Manufacturers began shipping the 

vaccine to distribution centers less than three weeks later,

52

When research and development began on the H1N1 vaccine, it 

was clear that because the H1N1 strain was novel the vaccine would need 

to be distinct from the seasonal one. The first 1.4 million H1N1 doses (of 

the 2.7 million the Pentagon ordered) were scheduled to arrive in early 

October for dispersal to active duty military.

and military 

bases were scheduled to receive the vaccine in the first weeks of October.

53 The Pentagon announced 

that the vaccine would be mandatory for all uniformed personnel, and 

“highly encouraged for all others.”54 Active duty personnel preparing for 

deployment were given top priority, with troops slated for domestic 

disasters next on the list. 55 Some DoD personnel claimed that the process 
21

for administering the H1N1 vaccine would be no more difficult than 

distributing the seasonal flu vaccine.56 “We’ve been doing this for 

decades,” said Lt. Col. (Dr.) Wayne Hachey. “The system is tried and 

true.”57

Whether routine or not, to the DoD, protecting troops against the 

H1N1 virus was as important as providing protection against any other 

threat. Ellen Embrey, the acting assistant secretary of defense for health 

affairs, said, “[the DoD uses] other treatment modalities [such as vaccines] 

to protect people in the same way we use body armor to protect against 

other threats...The H1N1 vaccine was purchased specifically for our 

uniformed servicememebers so they could continue to perform their 

mission anywhere on the globe. And during a pandemic, that’s a real 

threat.”

 Yet others within the department were concerned about how 

National Guard/Reserve personnel, civilians, mission-essential contractors 

and dependents would receive their vaccines. Lack of DoD 

standardization for vaccine distribution made it potentially more difficult 

than the seasonal flu distribution. 

58 
22

Immunization Campaigns Begin

Initially, scientists were unsure whether the H1N1 vaccine would 

be administered in one dose or two. On the October 1, vaccine-production 

company Sanofi announced that a single dose could prevent H1N1 

infection.59 A study by the National Institutes for Health corroborated this 

conclusion.60 With this new dosing guidance, the DoD’s 2.7 million doses 

could be distributed to a larger population than originally planned. Active 

duty military personnel were still given top priority, but the DoD hinted

the vaccine would also be available to Guard and Reserve personnel, 

civilians, contractors and dependents. On October 29, the DoD ordered 

one million additional doses of the Sanofi-produced H1N1 vaccine and 

announced the “vaccine is intended for DoD’s non-beneficiary workforce 

and OCONUS DoD beneficiaries.”61 By the end of October, the 

Department further extended the vaccination umbrella by announcing that 

“more than enough [H1N1 vaccine] will be available for all military 

personnel and their beneficiaries,”62 and that the DoD purchased enough 

to “immunize all 460,000 members of the National Guard.”63

With the H1N1 vaccine beginning to arrive through distribution 

chains, the Services started immunizing their personnel. Some DoD 
23

personnel received their vaccination through immunization campaigns, 

such as at Fort Gordon, Ga., where thousands of military members were 

vaccinated in one day. “Units [at Fort Gordon] were scheduled in 20- to30-minute increments, with 60 medics administering the vaccine while 

more than 80 additional personnel recorded data in the [Medical 

Protection] computer record system or helped with other tasks.”64 Others 

were vaccinated through Joint efforts. The National Capital Region 

Medical Joint Task Force (JTF CAPMED) formed three 10-person Joint 

vaccination teams “with a mission to go to pre-designated offsite locations 

to vaccinate DoD active duty and civilian DoD employees against 

seasonal influenza and 2009 H1N1.”65 The JTF CAPMED teams visited 

21 locations in the Washington, D.C. area. Air Force Pandemic Influenza 

policy expert Lt Col Anthony Ricci explained the JTF CAPMED teams 

vaccinated many DoD employees, contractors and dependents who, 

because of their geographic location, would not otherwise have had access 

to a military medical treatment facility.66

Declining Pandemic: A Snapshot

On Nov. 20, 2009 the CDC reported that despite greater influenza 

activity than normal for that time of year, H1N1 activity in the United 
24

States fell.67 On December 8, the DoD announced, “The overall trend for 

influenza-like illness has decreased across the military health system 

(MHS),” though H1N1 “remains the predominant strain among [U.S.] 

Armed Forces beneficiaries across MHS.” 68 Though progressing more 

slowly than the seasonal flu vaccination process, DoD active duty 

personnel were being immunized (illustrated in Figure 3). The Army led 

the Services in percent of soldiers immunized with 31 percent by 

December 8; the DoD overall percentage of active duty personnel was 16 

percent.69

Figure 3. Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza Active Component

Vaccine Coverage as of Dec. 8, 200970
25

By the end of December 2009, researchers analyzing flu test 

results confirmed the swine flu pandemic reached its first peak in April of 

that year with a second peak in October 2009. 71 Vaccination campaigns 

continued into 2010 with the annual “National Influenza Vaccination 

Week” sponsored by HHS and CDC.72 CDC Director Thomas R. Frieden, 

emphasized,“[t]he window of opportunity to get the H1N1 vaccine is still 

open...[as] we do know that the H1N1 vaccine is the best way to protect 

yourself.”73

By March 2010 the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center 

reported only two active duty servicemen died from H1N1—a number that 

remained unchanged since January 2010.74 Despite a decline in H1N1 

activity, each Service maintained monthly influenza activity reporting and 

moved forward with H1N1 immunization efforts. 75 The DoD sought to 

achieve 99 percent vaccination compliance for all active duty military 

members, after which the Joint Staff would allow reporting activities to 

cease.76 By the end of March, H1N1 immunization coverage for each 

Service was above 80 percent.77 The Army and the Air Force were in the 

lead with 94 percent H1N1 immunization, followed by the Coast Guard 

(93 percent) and the Navy and Marines (each 82 percent).78 
26

In late April the WHO’s weekly pandemic updates reported an 

overall decline in H1N1 activity across the globe.79 As the one-year 

anniversary of the first H1N1 cases approached, outreach for 

immunization continued for the Services.80

 In April 2010, the Army’s efforts to complete mass immunization 

resulted in “95 percent complian[ce] with the vice chief of staff’s directive 

that all units be immunized.”81 An April AFHSC Influenza Surveillance 

Summary reported that the Army, Air Force and Coast Guard had 

achieved 95 percent H1N1 immunization coverage. The Navy had reached 

84 percent H1N1 vaccination compliance, followed by the Marines at 83 

percent.82

While the H1N1 pandemic was not the result of a deliberate 

biological attack, the threat the virus presented prompted the DoD to 

implement a range of force health protection measures, focusing efforts on 

social distancing and vaccination campaigns. The pandemic provided the 

DoD an opportunity to exercise disease containment planning measures 

and address BW response mechanisms.

From experience gained during the H1N1 pandemic, the Air 

Force’s Lt Col Ricci said the DoD is “absolutely” in a better position if 
27

another pandemic or biological threat occurs.83 Referring to the review of 

disease containment plans and procedures, he said, “Changes are 

improvements. Procedures we wrote for the [Headquarters Air Force] 

didn’t exist before. We’re definitely in a better position than we were 

[before the H1N1 Pandemic].”84

The Pandemic Today:

“Worldwide, pandemic influenza activity has remained low over the past 

few months, and there has been little evidence of outbreaks outside the 

normal influenza ..”

As of August 2010, the WHO maintains a Phase 6 pandemic alert level 

and will apply information from the Southern hemisphere’s winter flu 

season to reassess this decision.

World Health Organization Pandemic Influenza Briefing Note 22. 

July 21 2010. 
28

 

1 Keim, Paul, et al. “Molecular Investigation of the Aum Shinrikyo Anthrax Release in 

Kameido, Japan.” Journal of Clinical Microbiology 39.12 (2001). 2 Ibid

3 Takahashi Hiroshi, et al. “Bacillus Anthracis Incident, Kameido, Tokyo, 1993.” 

Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal 10.1 (2004). 4 Amerithrax Investigation. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 19 May 2010 

<http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm>. Though the infamous 

Rajneeshee salmonella attack in Oregon in 1984 sickened more than 750 people, 

it did not cause any deaths. For more information on the Ranjansee attack, see 

Miller, Judith, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad. Germs: Biological 

Weapons and America’s Secret War. New York: Touchstone, 2002. 5 United States. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation and Terrorism. Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism 

Report Card, By Bob Graham, and Jim Talent. Jan. 2010. 26 May 10 

<http://www.preventwmd.gov/static/docs/report-card.pdf>. 6 The December 2008 Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation 

and Terrorism (World at Risk) details the findings of a bipartisan expert 

committee on nuclear and biological WMD threats. See Graham, Allison, et al. 

World At Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD 

Proliferation and Terrorism. New York: Vintage Books, 2008. 7 Ibid

8 Influenza is not a viable BW agent, for a number of reasons. In terms of virulence, most 

strains of influenza are not as highly lethal or incapacitating as other BW 

pathogen candidates. Its genetic structure is unstable—this is why influenza 

strains change seasonally, requiring the development of new vaccines. This 

instability can also have unintended consequences—a weaponized strain might 

recombine with other influenza viruses, or adapt in other ways that make it a 

risk to the perpetrator. 9 The three pandemics are: 1918-1919; 1957; and 1968-1969 influenzas. Flu Pandemics. 

U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services. 25 May 2010 

<http://pandemicflu.gov/individualfamily/about/pandemic/>. 10 The Deadly Virus: Influenza Epidemic of 1918. National Archives and Records 

Administration. 9 Jun. 2010 < http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/influenzaepidemic/>. 11Influenza of 1918 (Spanish Flu) and the US Navy. Navy Dept. Library. 8 Jun. 2010 

<http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/influenza_main.htm>. 12 Oxford, JS, et al. “World War I May Have Allowed the Emergence of “Spanish” 

Influenza.” Lancet Infectious Diseases 2:2 (2002): 111-114. 13 Billings, Molly. The Influenza Pandemic of 1918. Feb. 2005. Stanford University. 25 

May 10 <http://virus.stanford.edu/uda/>
29

 

14 Influenza of 1918 (Spanish Flu) and the US Navy. 17 Feb. 2006. Navy Department 

Library. 8 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/influenza_main.htm>. 15 Ibid 16 United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-41, Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological or Nuclear Consequence Management (Draft). Washington D.C., 

2010. 17 United States. Government Accountability Office. Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has 

Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but Accountability, Funding, and 

Communications Need to be Clearer and Focused Departmentwide. Washington 

D.C., 2006. 18 United States. U.S. Northern Command. NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs. 

USNORTHCOM Contributes Pandemic Flu Contingency Planning Expertise to 

Trilateral Workshop. By Sgt. 1st Class Gail Braymen. 14 Apr. 2004. 25 May 10 

<http://www.northcom.mil/news/2008/041408.html>. 

See also, United States. U.S. Northern Command. US NORTHERN 

COMMAND Protecting and Defending America 2002-2008. 8 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.northcom.mil/about/history_education/usnc%20key%20event%20c

hron%202002-2008.pdf>.

19 Colizzi, Vittoria. “People Interact. They travel. And Diseases Might Travel with 

Them.” Airneth Column Sep. 2009. 15 Apr. 2010. 

<http://www.airneth.com/index.php/columns/people-interact-they-travel-anddiseases-might-travel-with-them.html>. 20 Obama, U.S. President Barrack. “The Necessity of Science.” Speaking at the National 

Academy of Sciences. 27 Apr. 2009. 22 Jul. 2010 <

http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/04/27/The-Necessity-of-Science/>. 21 Miles, Donna. “Military Monitors H1N1 Flu With Focus on Protecting Force.” 

American Forces Press Service on the Web 27 Apr. 2009. 2 Jun. 2010 

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54088>. 22 Ibid 23 Miles, Donna. “Military Monitors H1N1 Flu With Focus on Protecting Force.” 

American Forces Press Service on the Web 27 Apr. 2009. 2 Jun. 2010 

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54088>. 24 WHO pandemic influenza phases are as follows: Phase 1: no viruses circulating 

among animals have been reported to cause infections in humans. Phase 2: an 

influenza virus in domesticated or wild animals emerges as a human-infection 

threat. Phase 3: limited incidents of animal-to-human disease spread due to 

combination (reassortant) of the new virus with another viral strain. Phase 4:

larger numbers of human-to-human disease transmission are confirmed within a 

community. Phase 5: human-to-human spread of the virus into at least two 

countries in one WHO region has occurred. Phase 6: global pandemic; 
30

 

community-level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO 

region. For more information see 

<http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/index.html>. 25 Chen, Dr. Margaret. “Influenza A(H1N1).” World Health Organization. 29 Apr. 2009. 

8 Jun. 2010 

<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090429/en/pri

nt.html>. 26 Gilmore, Gerry J. “Military Continues to Monitor H1N1 Flu Virus’s Path.” American 

Forces Press Service on the Web 6 May 2009. 2 Jun. 2010 

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54228>. 27 Garamone, Jim. “Defense Department to Start H1N1 Flu Vaccinations.” American 

Forces Press Service 1 Sep. 2009. 2 Jun. 2010 

<http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123165987>. 28 “Cautious Optimism on Flu but U.S. ’Not Out of Woods’”. Associated Press 3 May 

2009. 9 Jun. 2010.

<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=464022&publicationSubCateg

oryId=200>.

29 Although the virus mutates from year to year, it typically remains in the same general 

family of strains (such as influenza B viruses). 30 Port, Tami. “Difference Between the New H1N1 and Seasonal Flu.” Associated 

Content from Yahoo! 6 Aug. 2009. 8 Jun. 2010 

<“http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2029750/difference_between_the_n

ew_h1n1_and.html> 31 “WHO: No Decision Yet on H1N1 Vaccine Production.” Center for Infectious Disease 

Research & Policy. (May 14, 2009), University of Minnesota,

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/news_scan/index.

html, (June 8, 2010). 32 Once a new strain is identified, WHO collaborating centers like the U.S. Federal Drug 

Administration (FDA) prepare reagents to test the vaccine. Manufacturers then 

begin producing the vaccine and performing quality control tests. For some 

vaccines clinical trials are required before being released to the public. Once the 

vaccine is determined safe and effective, regulatory agencies review the research 

and release the product. For a graphical depiction of the vaccine process, see 

“Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing Process and Timeline,” Global 

Alert and Response, (Aug. 6, 2009), World Health Organization,

http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_vaccine_20090806/en/inde

x.html, (June 8, 2010). 33 Baldor, Lolita C. “H1N1 Outbreak Reveals Military Pandemic Plans, Gaps.” The 

Associated Press 20 May 2009. 8 Jun. 2010. < http://www.ems1.com/emsnews/498003-h1n1-outbreak-reveals-military-pandemic-plans-gaps/>.
31

 

34 “HHS Funnels $1 Billion Toward Vaccine for Novel H1N1 Flu”. Center for Infectious 

Disease Research & Policy. May 22, 2009. University of Minnesota. 9 Jun. 

2010. 

<http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/news_scan/inde

x.html>. 35 Gellin, Bruce M.D., M.P.H. United States. Cong. Senate. Committee on 

Appropriations, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies 

Subcommittee on Labor. Manufacturing Medical Countermeasures for 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats: The Role of HHS 21 

Aug. 2009. 36 “Influenza A(H1N1) - Update 42.” World Health Organization. 1 Jun. 2009. 9 Jun. 

2010. <http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_06_01a/en/index.html>. and “World 

Now at the Start of 2009 Influenza Pandemic.” World Health Organization. 11 

Jun. 2009. 9 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase

6_20090611/en/index.html>. 37 “PACOM Encourages Preventive Measures Against H1N1 Influenza Virus.” United 

States Pacific Command. 28 Apr. 2009. 10 Jun. 2010.

<http://www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/media/pr007-09.shtml>. 38 “Preventive Measures Encouraged in Response to H1N1 Outbreak.” United States 

Pacific Command. 28 Apr. 2009. 10 Jun. 2010. <http://us-pacificcommand.blogspot.com/2009/04/preventive-measures-encouraged-in.html>. 

39 Fulton, Delawese. “Flu Cases Rise: H1N1 Cases Concentrated Among BCT Soldiers.” 

Fort Jackson Leader 23 Jul. 2009. 3 Jun. 2010. <http://www.army.mil/-

news/2009/07/23/24768-flu-cases-rise-h1n1-cases-concentrated-among-bctsoldiers/>. 40 Ibid 41 Fulton, Delawese. “Flu Cases Rise: H1N1 Cases Concentrated Among BCT Soldiers.” 

Fort Jackson Leader 23 Jul. 2009. 3 Jun. 2010. <http://www.army.mil/-

news/2009/07/23/24768-flu-cases-rise-h1n1-cases-concentrated-among-bctsoldiers/>. 42 Markfelder, George. “Telework: DON Keeps Working Through Flu Season.” Navy.mil

21 Dec. 2009. 2 Jun 2010. 

<http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=50288>. 43 Ibid 44 Chehy, Pacifica. “Exercise Discusses Disease Containment.” Capital Flyer 23 Jul. 

2009. 11 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.capflyer.com/stories/072309/news_28201.shtml>. 45 Ibid
32

 

46 The peak flu season in the United States fall between late November through March. 

Seasonal Influenza. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 23 Jun. 

2010. <http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/disease.htm>. 47 As of the end of July 2009, WHO no longer required countries to test and report H1N1 

cases. Therefore, cumulative case totals are most likely understated. See

http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/updates/en/index.html. 48 McIntire Peters, Katherine. “Defense Officials Prepare for H1N1 Flu.” Government 

Executive 26 Aug. 2009. 14 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0809/082609kp1.htm>.

49 “Defense Department Secures its Own Vaccine Supply.” Center for Infectious Disease 

Research & Policy. 27 Aug. 2009. University of Minnesota. 11 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/news_scan/inde

x.html>. 50 “Obama to Spend Another $2.7 Bln to Fight H1N1.” Reuters 2 Sep. 2009. 15 Jun. 

2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5816TC20090902>. 51 Carden, Army Sgt. 1st Class Michael J. “Army Confirms Suspected H1N1-Related 

Death.” American Forces Press Service 1 Oct. 2009. 2 Jun. 2010. < 

http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/10/02/28217-army-confirms-suspected-h1n1-

related-death/>. 52 “Shipments of H1N1 Flu Vaccine Leave Factories.” CNN Health. 29 Sept. 2009. 14 

Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/29/first.h1n1.vaccine/index.html>. 53 “Military to Get Mandatory Swine Flu Shots Soon.” The Associated Press. 30 Sept. 

2009. 23 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090930/NEWS

/909300349>. 54 Krenke, Lt. Col. Ellen. “H1N1 Vaccine Order Includes Enough for National Guard.” 

American Forces Press Service 29 Oct. 2009. 2 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=56447> 55 Ibid 56 Garamone, Jim. “Defense Department to Start H1N1 Flu Vaccinations.” American 

Forces Press Service 1 Sep. 2009. 2 Jun. 2010 < 

http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123165987>. 57 Ibid 58 Kruzel, John J. “Like Body Armor, Flu Vaccine Aims to Protect Troops.” American 

Forces Press Service 4 Nov. 2009. 14 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123176025>.

59 Sanofi Pasteur Announces Results of U.S. Clinical Trials in Adults Following One 

Dose of Influenza A (H1N1) Vaccine.” Sanofi Pasteur. 1 Oct. 2009. 14 Jun. 

2010. < http://www.avpi.org/sanofipasteur2/ImageServlet?imageCode=26483&siteCode=SP_US>. See also, 
33

 

Synderman, Judith. “Military Will Have Enough H1N1 Vaccine, Officials Say.” 

American Forces Press Service 30 Oct. 2009. 2 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=56467>. 60 United States. Department of Defense Statistical Information Analysis Division. 

Military Personnel Statistics. 30 Apr. 2010. 16 Jun. 2010. 

<http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm>. 61 Garman, Lt. Col. Patrick, PhD. “DoD H1N1 Vaccine Supply - Federal Government 

Employees and OCONUS Beneficiaries.” MILVAX H1N1 Update. 26 Oct. 

2009. 15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.vaccines.mil/default.aspx?cnt=disease/minidv&dID=60>. 62 Garamone, Jim. “Defense Department to Start H1N1 Flu Vaccinations.” American 

Forces Press Service. 1 Sep. 2009. 2 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55698>. 63 Krenke, Lt. Col. Ellen. “H1N1 Vaccine Order Includes Enough for National Guard.” 

American Forces Press Service. 29 Oct. 2009. Web. 2 Jun. 2010. <H1N1 

Vaccine Order Includes Enough for National Guard>. 64 Harben, Jerry. “Still Time to Get H1N1 Vaccine.” Army News Service. 15 Apr. 2010. 

3 Jun. 2010. <http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/04/15/37432-still-time-to-geth1n1-vaccine/>. 65 “JTF CAPMED Joint Vaccination Teams Provide Influenza Prevention Support.” The 

JTF CAPMED Voice. Issue 4. Oct. 2009. 15 Jun. 2010. < http://www.ncaintegration.amedd.army.mil/newsletters/JTF%20CAPMED%20Voice%20Octob

er%202009.pdf>. 66 Ricci III, Lt Col Anthony. Telephone interview. 15 Jun. 2010. 67 Roos, Robert. “CDC: H1N1 declining but still widespread.” Center for Infectious 

Disease Research & Policy.

University of Minnesota. 20 Nov. 2009. 15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://cidrapbusiness.biz/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/news/nov2009cdc.h

tml>. 68 United States. Department of Defense Pandemic Influenza Watchboard. Department of 

Defense Weekly Global Influenza Surveillance Summary. 08 December 2009. 

15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/pdf/AFHSC%20Weekly%20Influenza%20Sur

veillance%20Summary-08%20December.pdf>. 69 United States. Department of Defense Pandemic Influenza Watchboard. Department of 

Defense Weekly Global Influenza Surveillance Summary. 08 December 2009. 

Web. 15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/pdf/AFHSC%20Weekly%20Influenza%20Sur

veillance%20Summary-08%20December.pdf>. 70 United States. Department of Defense Pandemic Influenza Watchboard. Department of 

Defense Weekly Global Influenza Surveillance Summary. 08 Dec. 2009. Web. 
34

 

15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/pdf/AFHSC%20Weekly%20Influenza%20Sur

veillance%20Summary-08%20December.pdf>. 71 Fox, Maggie. “Testing Group Data Shows Swine Flu Waning in US.” Reuters. 18 Dec. 

2009. 15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AO3Z420091218>. 72 United States. Department of Health and Human Services. “HHS Announces 

Nationwide Effort to Encourage H1N1 Vaccination During National Influenza 

Vaccination Week January 10 – 16, 2010.” HHS News Release. 8 Jan. 2010. 14 

Jun. 2010. <http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/01/20100108a.html>. 73 Ibid 74 United States. Department of Defense Pandemic Influenza Watchboard. Department of 

Defense Weekly Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC) Influenza 

Surveillance Summary. 30 Mar. 2010. Web. 15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/pdf/AFHSC%20Weekly%20Influenza%20Sur

veillance%20Summary-30%20March.pdf>. 75 World Health Organization. “Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 update 89-90.” Situation updates 

– Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 26 Feb-5 Mar. 2010. 15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/updates/en/index.html>. 76 Ricci III, Lt Col Anthony. Telephone interview. 15 Jun. 2010. 77 United States. Department of Defense Pandemic Influenza Watchboard. Department of 

Defense Weekly Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC) Influenza 

Surveillance Summary. 30 Mar. 2010. Web. 15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/pdf/AFHSC%20Weekly%20Influenza%20Sur

veillance%20Summary-30%20March.pdf>. 78 Ibid 79 World Health Organization. “Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 updates 96-98.” Situation 

updates - Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 16-30 Apr. 2010. 15 Jun. 2010. 

<http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/updates/en/index.html>. 80 Harben, Jerry. “Still time to get H1n1 vaccine.” Army News Service. 15 Apr. 2010. 3 

Jun. 2010. <http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/04/15/37432-still-time-to-geth1n1-vaccine/>. 81 Ibid 82 United States. Department of Defense Pandemic Influenza Watchboard. Department of 

Defense Weekly Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC) Influenza 

Surveillance Summary. 6 Apr. 2010. 16 Jun. 2010. 

<http://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/pdf/AFHSC%20Weekly%20Influenza%20Sur

veillance%20Summary-%206%20April%202010.pdf> 83 Ricci III, Lt Col Anthony. Telephone interview. 15 Jun. 2010. 84 Ibid