COURT OF A PPEAL S EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEX AS ELPASO, TEXAS
BRAND ON WEL L S, Appellant,

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

. § § § § § § No. 08-09-00110- CR

Appea l from the 399th District Court of B exar County , Texas (TC# 2007CR3253)

O P I N I O N Appellant, Br andon Wells, was convicted of murder and sent en ced to fifty y ear s’ imprisonment a

nd a $10,000 fine. I n four issues on appea l, A ppellant complains of the a dmission of cer tain evidenc e and the trial court’s denial of his motions for direc ted verdic t and mistrial. We aff irm.
BACK GR OUND Sandra Bush and at times, her son, L arr y Drummer I I I , the victim, wer e living with Appellant
at his g randmother ’s home. On J anuar y 12, 2007, Appellant and the victim went to eat lunch with Sandra at 12:30 p.m. The victim was very talkative during lunch and acte d normal. Sandra returne d
to work betwee n 1 and 1:15 p.m. When Appellant and the victim left, Sandra saw their car stop for five minutes and then dr ive off. She c ould not see inside the ca r bec ause of

the tinted windows. Appellant and the victim wer e alone in the car from 1:30 p.m. until 2 p.m., when Appellant picked up Samuel Cordier. Cordier thought the victim was aslee p in the backse at as he never made
any nois es . Ap p el lant then picked up Cordier’s uncle, Anthony Sy lve. All three arr ived at Appellant’s g randmother ’s house around 3:45 p.m. to 4 p.m. There , Appellant asked a neig hbor towatch the victim, but wh en the neig hbor found the victim limp and something wrong with him,

Appellant ref

used to g ive him to the neig hbor and told her to leave

. Appellant then took the victim inside his gr andmother’ s house. When Appellant left, the neig hbor told Appellant’s g randmother that something was wrong with the victim, a

nd they both r an back to w here Appellant place d him a nd discovere d that he was foaming at t he mout h and had uri nated on himself. They took him outside and called 911 around 4 p.m. The paramedic s dispatched to the s cene found t he victim clenc hing his jaw and posturing, that is, his arms were flexed inward with his hands in fists, and his leg s wer e st raig ht out with his fee t turned inward. His condition indicated a head i n j u ry . On the Glasg ow Coma Scale, the
para medic believed the victim was a five out of fiftee n, and any thing less than an eig ht is considere d criti cal. Although the victim was unconscious, he was brea thing on his own, and the para med i cs assisted with his breathing to reduc e the r isk of car diac a rre st. A CT scan showed a sever e closed head injury , “a horrible, horrible brain injury .” Dr. Dent, the trea ting phy sician, believed that the injury occur red approximately one to two hours befor e the
para medics arr ived. Blood filled the space s on both sides of the victim’s head, and the brain was so swollen that it lost its no rm al s t ru ct ure. A CAT scan showed cellular death on both sides of the victim’s head, which was non-survivable

. And indeed, the victim died less than twenty -four hours afte r ar riving at the hospital. The medical examiner found fre sh bruising to the left side of the victim’s fac e and chee k, and
to the left ey e. She also found fre sh bruising to the head, which she opined was cause d by the victim being struck b y s o m et h i ng blunt or being struck ag ainst something three to four times. Dr. Dent testified t hat t he amount of force require d to cause t h e i n j u ry would be a car wre ck occurring at aspeed faster than normal highw ay speed. The only way the victim could have rec eived the injury was

from massive, sever e forc e, that a two-y ear -old child could not do on his o wn . T h e m edica l examiner deter

mined that the sever e blow to the victim’s head cause d his death. Ba sed on witnesses’ statements, the police believe d t h e i n j ury occur

red betwee n 1:30 p.m., when Sandra returne d to work, a nd 4 p.m., when the a

mbulance w as summoned. Wells g ave two oral statements to the police. I n the first, he initially claimed that his fivey ear -old cou s i n h i t t h e v i cti m in the ey e and scra tched his fac e, causing the bruising to the fac e. Wells later alleg ed that when he returned Sandra to work, the victim was jumping around in the backse at and he either

hit his head on some jumper c ables or a g ainst the door. He also contende d that the victim could hav e h i t h i s h ead on the dresse r by the bed. Appellant denied that he ever struck the victim.
I n the second oral st at ement, Appellant claimed that the injury was cause d when Sandra “whoope d” the victim at lunch or when Sy lve opened the car door and the victim fell partially out, striking his head on the door panel. He insisted t h at h e n ever touched the victim in any way , nor would he eve r har

m him. Whil e in jail, Appellant met an inmate named Jose Ramirez. Although Appellant initially told him that he was there on drug char g es, he later admitted that he was there for injury to a child. Appellant told Ramirez that if “wor se had come to worse, y ou know what I mean, that he would act

cra zy , y ou know, like – like Andre a Hay s [si c] or something like that for what he did or something.” Ramirez believed that statement was a confe ssion that he committed the crime and intended to blame it on Sandra.
DISCUSSIO N Appellant raises four issu es o n ap p ea l

. The first contends that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by admitting two video rec ording s of his oral statements to the detec tives, the second

alleg es t hat t he t ri al court erre d by deny ing his motion for directed verdict, the third complains of the trial court’s failure to g rant a mistrial, and the fourth alleg es that extraneous o ffe nses wer e admitted without first having been pr oven bey ond a re asonable doubt. After r eviewing the brief s, law, and the rec ord, we find Appellant’s second and third issues not prese rved f or our revie w, and no merit in his first and fourth issues. Unpreserv ed Error
We addre ss Appellant’s second and third issues first. I n his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court err ed by “deny ing [hi s] motion for an instructed verdic t b eca use the medical evidenc e did not comport with the State’s alleg ations, making the evidenc e fac tually insufficient.”
Howeve r, appellate challeng es t o d i rected verdic ts are revie wed for leg al sufficie ncy , not fac tual sufficie ncy . W

illiams v. Stat e , 937 S.W .2d 479, 48 2 (T ex . Crim. App. 1996); Noyola v. Stat e , 25
S.W .3d 18, 19 (Tex. App. – El Paso 1999, no pet.). Appe llant, seeming ly rec og nizi ng his fallacy , q u o t es the leg al-suff

iciency standard; howeve r, he also quotes the fac tual-suffic iency standard. Appellant then eng ag es in a fac tual-suffic iency discussion. He never provides any discussion from

a leg al-suff

iciency standpoint. Given the wording of Appellant’s second issue, his citations to both leg al and f

actua l suf ficienc y standards of revie w, and his sole discussion of the fa ctual suff

iciency of the evidenc e, we cannot deter mine if Appellant is c halleng ing the direc ted verdic t or the fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to support his conviction. I n s h o rt , Ap pellant’s second issue is multifarious, and we decline to addre ss it. See Russell v. Stat e , 598 S.W .2d 238, 245 (Tex. Crim. Ap p . ), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1003, 101 S.Ct

. 544, 66 L .Ed.2d 300 (1980); Taylor v. State , 19 0
S.W .3d 758, 764 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2006), rev’ d on other grounds , 233 S.W .3d 356 (Tex.
C ri m . App. 2007); Parra v. Stat e , 935 S.W .2d 862, 875 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1996, pet. ref’d)(ca ses dec lining to addr ess multifarious points of err or).

I n his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial cour t erre d by overr uling his motion for mistrial, claiming that the mistrial was war rante d when Detec tive Damiani informed the jury that he confe ssed to a

n inmate. Specifica lly , Appellant claims that Detec tive Damiani wa s ly ing w hen he made the co mplained-of statement. Howeve r, at trial, Appellant’s sole objection t o the s tatement

was that the inmate had not y et testified. Appellant never raised his appellate complaint to the trial court, that is, that Detec tive Damiani committed perjury

. Be cause Appellant’s complaint on appea l does not comport with his objection at trial, we find his third issue not prese rved for our revie w. See Gallo v. State , 239 S.W .3d 757, 767-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Sarringar v. State , Nos. 2-02-288- CR, 2-02-289- CR, 2003 WL 21404819, at *1 (Tex. App.

– Fo rt W o rt h J un. 19, 2003, pet. ref ’d) (mem. op., not desi gn ated for publication) (ca ses declining to addre ss trial court’s failure to g rant a mistrial when a

ppellant’s complaint on appe al diffe red f rom his trial objection).
Moreove r, we find Appellant’s second and third issues inadequa tely briefe d. I n his second issue, Appellant mere ly sets out the leg al-suff iciency standard for revie wing direc ted verdic ts but then fails to provide any supporting arg ument explaining why the evidenc e was leg ally insufficient and the direc ted verdic t should have been g rante d; rathe r, he solely discusses whether the evidenc e

was fac tually sufficie nt to support his conviction. But as noted above, appella t e challenge s to direc ted verdic ts a

re revie wed for leg al sufficie ncy , not f actua l suf ficienc y . W

illiams , 937 S.W .2d
at 482; Noyola , 25 S.W .3d at 19. Be cause Appellant has failed to provide any supporting arg ument

or analy sis discussing the leg al sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, we find Appellant’s second issue to be inadequa tely briefe d. See Nar va i z v. State , 840 S.W .2d 415, 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Foster

v. State , 101 S.W .3d 490, 499 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (c as es co n cludi ng issue inadequa tely

briefe d when a

ppellant offe red no a

rg ument for the issue r aised).Simi larly , in his third issue, Appellant sets out the applicable standard of revie w for mistrials

and cites to case law addre ssing perjure d testimony

. Howeve r, Appellant never eng ag es in any analy sis, discussion, or arg ument in suppor t of the case s he cites, explaining how they apply to the facts in his case . Mere ly setting out a g ener al leg al principle with supporting cas e l aw i s n o t sufficie nt to adequately brief a point of err or. Rather, Appe l l ant bear s the burden of providing a supporting arg ument, analy zing the case s cited and apply ing those case s to the fac ts at hand. See
T E X
. R. A P P
. P. 38.1(i); Rocha v. State , 16 S.W .3d 1, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We will not make his arg uments for him. W

yatt v. State , 23 S.W .3d 18, 23 n.5 (Tex

. C ri m. App. 2000). Be cause Ap p el l an t has not g rac ed us with any arg ument, we conclude his second issue is inadequa tel y briefe d, as well. See W

ood v. Stat e , 1 8 S

. W .3d 642, 650-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); McD uff v. State , 939 S.W .2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied , 522 U.S

. 8 4 4, 118 S.Ct

. 125, 139
L .Ed.2d 75 (1997); Turner v. State , 4 S

. W.3d 74, 80-81 (Tex. App. – Waco 1999, no pet.) (ca ses concluding appellant wa ived issue by failing to adequa tely

develop his ar g ument). Having deter

mined Appellant’s second and third issues are not prese rved for our revie w, we

overr ule the same

. Videotape Re cordings of Statements
We now turn to Appellant’s first issue, which contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to suppress his videotaped statements. Acc ording to Appellant, the statements lacke d the re quisite statutory war nings. We disag ree . Article 38.22 proscr ibes the admissibili ty of oral s t at ements made during custodial interrog ation unless (1) those state ments were rec orded a nd (2) prior to making the statements but d u ri n g the rec ording , the acc used was war ned of his rig hts and knowing ly , intelligently , an d voluntarily waived those rig hts. See T E X
. C O D E C R I M
. P R O C
. AN N
. art. 38.22, § 3 (Ve rnon 2005).Those wa

rning s include that: (1) [t he acc used] has the rig ht to rema in silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement he ma kes may be used a g ainst him at his trial; (2) a ny statement he ma kes may be used a s evidenc e ag ainst him in court; (3) he has the ri gh t t o h av e a lawy er prese nt to advise him prior to and during any questioning; (4) if he is unable to employ a lawy er, he has the rig ht to have a lawy er appointed to advise him prior to and dur ing a ny questioning; a

nd (5) he has the rig ht to terminate the intervie w at any time[ .] Id . at 38.22, § 2 (Ve rnon 2005).
We have revie wed both videotaped statements, and both tapes ref lect that the detec tives duly

war ned Appellant of hi s ri gh t to rema in silent, that any statement made may be used as evidenc e
ag ainst him in court, of his rig ht to have a la wy er pr esent, to employ a lawy er, or to have a lawy er appointed, and of his rig ht to terminate the intervie w at any time. Be cause all requisite warning s 1
appea r on the videotape, Appellant has not shown that the statements fail to me et the admissibili ty require ments of Article 38.22.
Neve rtheless, Appe llant asserts that the statute imposes a n additional duty

on the police to expli citly ask the acc used whether he knowing ly , voluntarily , and intelligently waived those rig hts.
Howeve r, afte r Appellant filed his brief, t he Court of Criminal Appea ls reiter ated “‘tha t neither a written nor an oral express waiver is require d”’ befor e a statement is admissible under the mandates of article 38.22. See J

oseph v. State , 309 S.W .3d 20, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting W atson

W e p a u s e t o n o t e t h a t A p p e l l a n t w a s n o t a r r e s t e d u n t i l a f t e r h e g a v e t h e f

i r s t o r a l s t a t e m e n t

. T h u s , a r t i c l e 1 3 8

. 2 2 w o u l d n o t a p p l y t o t h e f i r s t s t a t e m e n t a s i t w a s n o t t h e r e s u l t o f c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n . S e e T E X
. C O D E C R IM
. P R O C
. A N N
. a r t

. 3 8

. 2 2 , § 3 ; H e r r e r a v
. S t a t e , 2 4 1 S

. W

. 3 d 5 2 0 , 5 2 6 ( T e x . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 7 )

. H o w e v e r , t h e S t a t e d i d n o t a r g u e t h a t A p p e l l a n t w a s n o t i n c u s t o d y d u r i n g t h e f i r s t s t a t e m e n t a t t r i a l , n o r d o e s i t a r g u e t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n o n a p p e a l ; r a t h e r , t h e S t a t e a s s u m e s t h a t i f h e w a s i n c u s t o d y , t h e r e w a s n o v i o l a t i o n . W e a g r e e .v. Stat e , 762 S.W .2d 591, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)); Barefi eld v. Stat e , 784 S.W .2d 38, 40-41

(Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (noting that the oral confe ssion statute does not require an “express verba l
statement from an accus ed t h at he waives his rig hts prior to g iving the statement”) , overruled on other grounds, Zimmerman v. State , 860 S.W .2d. 89, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Oliver , 29
S.W .3d 190, 192 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2000, pet. ref ’d ) (n o ting that there is no “additional lang uag e . . . re quired be fore a trial c ourt could i nfer the def endant ha d waived his rig hts pursuant
to art. 38.22”). Rather , t h at waiver may simply be “‘infe rre d from the actions and words of the
person interrog ated.’ ” Joseph , 309 S.W .3d at 24-25 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct

. 1755, 60 L .Ed.2d 286 (1979))

. But that waiver must still be knowing ly , intelligently , and voluntarily

made. Joseph , 309 S.W .3d at 24.
I n evalua ting whether a waiver is knowing ly , intelligently , and voluntarily made, we employ a two-part t est, asking : (1) whether the relinquishment of t he right wa s v o l u ntary by deter mining whether it the product of a fre e and delibera te choice rathe r than intimi dation, coer cion, or dece ption; and (2) whether the waiver was made with full awa rene ss of the nature of the rig hts being abandone d

an d t h e conseque nces of the decision to abandon it. Joseph , 309 S.W .3d at 25 (citing Mo r a n v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct . 1135, 89 L .Ed.2d 410 (1986))

. “Only if the ‘tot ality of t he circ umstances surrounding the interrog ation’ reve al both an uncoer ced choice and the requisite level

o f co mprehe nsion may a court proper ly conclude that the Miranda rig hts have been waived. ”
Moran , 475 U.S. at 421. I n revie wing the totality of the circ umstance, we may consi d er the defe ndant’s backg round, experience , and conduct. Joseph , 309 S.W .3d at 25 (citing Fare v. Michae l
C. , 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.C t. 2560, 61 L .Ed.2d 197 (1979))

. The totality of the circ umstances surrounding the interrog ations show Appellant’s waiver , in both inst ance s, was voluntary . I mmediately afte r being warned by the detective t hat he had therig ht to rema in silent and that he did not have to make any statement to any one, Appellant willingly

participa ted in two interrog ations, the first lasted one hour, and the second lasted twenty -five minutes. Neither rec ording ref lects that Appellant ever asked that the interrog ations cea se. Fur ther, the rec ord does not show any evidenc e of intimi dation or coer cion, that is, that the detec tives resor ted
to phy sical or psy cholog ical pre s s u re to elicit statements, or make any promises that could have possibly jeopar diz ed t h e v o luntariness of Appellant’s statement. The parties rema ined calm throug hout the entire interrog ation proce ss, and Appellant did not budg e from his story that he never
to u ch ed the victim. See Joseph , 309 S.W .3d at 25-26 (finding voluntary statement under simil ar circ umstances)

. Turning to the awa

re n es s prong , we also find that the totality of the circ umstances surrounding the interrog ations show Appellant’s waiver was made with f ull a war eness of both the
nature of the rig hts being abandone d and the conseque nces of the decision to abandon them. I n the first interview, the detec tives g ave all the required warning s mandat ed b y ar t icle 38.22, including that Appellant did not have to say any thing, an d as k ed Appellant if he understood those rig hts. Appellant answe red aff

irmatively and signe d a document, stating that he understood those rig hts. Appellant then fre ely answe red the questions posed by the detec tives. Simi larly , in t h e second interview, the detec tive g ave the require d war nings and asked if Appellant understood those rig hts. Ag ain, A p p e ll a n t a n s w e r e d a ffirma

tively and fre ely answe red the detec tive’s questions. As the Court of Criminal Appea ls noted in J oseph, “[t] he war nings rea d to Appellant made him fully awa re of the rig hts set forth in Miranda and Article 38.22 , as well as the conseque nces of abandoning those rig hts.” Joseph , 309 S.W .3d at 27. By i n d icating his understanding of the rig hts and then fre ely

answe ring the detec tives questions without ever asking the interviews to cea se, Appellant’s conduct undoubtedly demonstrated his awa rene ss of his rig hts and knowing waiver of those rig hts. SeeGately v. State , No.11-08-00157 -CR, — S.W .3d —, 2010 WL 1999684, at *3 (Tex. App. – Eastland

May 20, 2010, no pet. h.) (not y et repor ted) (“A lthough appellant never expressly waived his rig hts, appellant willingly participa ted in the interview. Ba sed on the totality of the circ umstances, a waiver

can clea rly be inferr ed from appellant’ s words and actions. The rec orded interview establishes that appellant knowing ly , intelligently , and voluntarily waived his rig hts.”).
Be cause the rec orded statements contained the requisite war nings, and beca

use Appellant knowing ly , intelligently , an d voluntarily waived those rig hts, his rec orded oral statements wer e admissible. I ssue One is ove rruled. Unadjudicated Ex traneous Offenses Appellant’s fourth and final issue contests the admissibili ty of two unadjudicate d extraneous

o ff en s es at t he punis hment phase of the t rial. The first occur red on J uly 3, 2006, when an o ff i ce r lear ned from a confide ntial informant and another arr estee that Appellant was using a .45 handg un and SKS rifl e to rob drug deale rs in the are a. The office r then drove to a specifie d location and observe d a vehicle descr ibed by the informant. A sear ch of the vehicle reve aled no wea pons; howeve r, a consente d-to sear ch of the apar tment resulted in the seizure of marijuana , b aggi es of

coca ine and heroin packa g ed for sal e, the .45 handg un, and the SKS rifle, all of which Appellant claimed we re his. The second extraneous offe nse occur red on J uly 21, 2007. There , the offic ers obse rved a n unlit license plate on a vehicle, and afte r activating the patrol car ’s emer g ency lights, t h e v eh i cle
enter ed a parking lot and acc eler ated, jumped curbs, and ran over cones to evade the police. When
t h e v eh i cl e s topped, its six occupa nts, including Appellant, fled on foot. The office rs observe d Appellant throw a .223 caliber assault rifl e u n d er n eath the vehicle before running awa y , althoug h he quickly surre ndere d soon there afte r. The judge of t h e 2 2 6 t h District Court later order ed thewea

pon rele ased to Da

vid Dilley , Appellant’s de fense attorney in the case

. Acc ording to Appell an t , both extraneous offe nses wer e inadmissible as the State failed to establish his guilt to either be y ond a rea sonable doubt. For support, Appellant notes that the State only char g ed him with possession of marijuana for the first offe nse, not unlawfully car ry ing of a

wea pon, nor could the State pr ove the se cond off ense w ithout the weapon. We disag ree . Section 3 of article 37.07 g overns the admissibili ty of evidenc e at puni s h m en t

. Ha l ey v. State , 173 S.W .3d 510, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Under that section, evidenc e may be offe red

as to any matters the court deems rele vant including evidenc e of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown bey ond a rea sonable doubt to have been committed by the defe ndant or for which he could be held cr iminally

responsible. T E X
. C O D E C R I M
. P R O C
. AN N . art. 37.07, § 3(a )(1) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). Whether an acc used has actua lly been char g ed with or finally convicted of a crime does not
matter. Id . Nor doe s it matter that the ac t w as not ac tually a cr iminal offense or that the e lements of a crime nece ssary for a finding of g uilt cannot be est ablished. Haley , 173 S.W .3d at 514-15. Rather, it simply must be shown bey ond a rea sonable doubt that the acc used was involved in the act itself. Id

. As the Court of Criminal Appea ls noted, the question at punishment is “not whether the defe ndant has c ommitt ed a c rime, but instead wha t sentence should be assesse d.” Id . at 515.
Her e, Appe llant does not dispute that he was involved in the complained- of unadjudica ted
acts or t h at ev i d en ce of those acts was not rele vant. I nstead, he asser ts the State failed to prove bey ond a rea sonable doubt the elements of the potential criminal offe nses. Howeve r, the State was
not require d to make that proof. Id

. at 514-15. Throug h its witnesses, t he S tate met its burden of proving Appellant was involved in the two unadjudicate d acts. This was all the State was require d 2

A p p e l l a n t n o t e s t h a t i n t h e f i r s t a c t , t h e o f

f i c e r s d i d n o t a r r e s t h i m f o r u n l a w f

u l l y c a r r y i n g a w e a p o n . 2 H o w e v e r , t h e w e a p o n s w e r e c e r t a i n l y s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n , c o n t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e o f w h e t h e r A p p e l l a n t c o u l d b e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e b a d a c t s o f a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y , p o s s e s s i o n o f m a r i j u a n a , o r p o s s e s s i o n w i t h i n t e n t t o d e l i v e r c o c a i n e o r h e r o i n .to do. Id .; Coy v. Stat e , No. 2-09-113-CR, 2010 WL 522649, at *3 (Tex. App. – For t Worth Fe b. 11, 2010, pet. re f’d) (mem. op., not de signa ted for publication); Mey er v. State , No. 05-05-00900- CR, 2007 WL 2052125, at *8 (Tex. App. – Dallas J uly 19, 2007, pet. ref ’d) (op., not desig nated for publication). Thus, we find Appellant’s complaint that the evidenc e of the unadjudicate d acts was inadmissible is wit hout merit and over rule his fourth issue.
CONCLUSION Having overr

uled Appellant’ s issues, we af firm the trial c ourt’s judg ment.

GUADA L UPE RI VERA, J ustice
J uly 30, 2010
Be fore Chew, C.J ., McClure, a nd Rivera, JJ

. (Do Not Publish)

S e e T E X
. P E N A L C O D E A N N
. § 2 9

. 0 3 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( V e r n o n 2 0 0 3 ) ( a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y ) ; T E X
. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E A N N
. § 4 8 1

. 1 2 1 ( V e r n o n 2 0 1 0 ) ( p o s s e s s i o n o f m a r i j u a n a ) ; T E X
. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E A N N
. § 4 8 1

. 1 1 2 ( V e r n o n 2 0 1 0 ) ( p o s s e s s i o n w i t h i n t e n t t o d e l i v e r ) ; W i l s o n v
. S t a t e , 1 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 5 , 6 9 8 ( T e x . A p p . – A m a r i l l o 2 0 0 4 , p e t

. r e f ’ d

. ) ( d e e m i n g a s “ r a t h e r s e t t l e d ” t h e n e x u s b e t w e e n t h e d r u g t r a d e a n d w e a p o n s ) ; s e e a l s o R o g e r s v
. S t a t e , 8 5 3 S

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. 2 d 2 9 , 3 3 ( T e x . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n , c o n t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e i s a d m i s s i b l e )

. I n t h e s e c o n d a c t , A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e S t a t e c a n n o t p r o v e t h e o f f e n s e w i t h o u t t h e w e a p o n . B u t t h e S t a t e i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o p r o d u c e a w e a p o n u s e d i n a n o f f e n s e t o c o n v i c t a n a c c u s e d , a n d i n a n y c a s e , w h e t h e r t h e S t a t e c o u l d p r o d u c e t h e w e a p o n d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t b a d a c t w a s n o t a t t r i b u t a b l e t o A p p e l l a n t

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. S t a t e , 6 8 5 S

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. 2 d 3 3 3 , 3 3 6 ( T e x . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 5 ) ( S t a t e n o t r e q u i r e d t o p r o d u c e t h e w e a p o n t o s u s t a i n c o n v i c t i o n )

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