* The appeal is stayed as to Stage Stores pending bankruptcy

proceedings.

** Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 00-20230

JOHN C. WELD, JR., On Behalf of Himself and all

others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

STAGE STORES INC. * , CARL TOOKER, TYLER INTERNATIONAL, TYLER

MASSACHUSETTS L P; TYLER CAPITAL FUND L P, BCIP ASSOCIATES,

BAIN CAPITAL INC., BAIN VENTURE CAPITAL, ACADIA PARTNERS L P,

ACADIA FW PARTNERS L P, AC ADIA MGP INC., OAK HILL PARTNERS INC.,

SANDRA BORNSTEIN, ERNEST R. CRUSE, RIGO HERNANDEZ, JERRY C. IVIE,

JOANNE SWARTZ, MARK SHULMAN, MEL WARD, DONALD R. WESTBROOK, JAMES

MARCUM, STEPHEN LOVELL, CHARLE S SLEDGE, ADAM KIRSCH, JOSHUA

BEKENSTEIN, PETER G. MULVIHILL, CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON, BEAR

STEARNS & CO., INC., BCIP TRUST ASSOCIATES L P,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

H-99-CV-957

May 16, 2001

Before DAVIS, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM: **the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

2 The only significant issues presented in this appeal are: (1)

w hether the district court erred in dismissing the appellants’

petition because it failed to comply with Rule 9(b) F.R.C.P. and

allege with sufficient particularity facts which would support an

inference of fraud; and (2) whether the district court abused its

discretion in refusing to permit appellant to file an amended

complaint.

As to issue 1, our review of the record persuades us that the

plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations are insufficient to give rise to

a “strong inference” that each defendant acted with the requisite

fraudulent intent. S ee 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). We need not reach

the issue of whether allegations of motive and opportunity are

sufficient to establish scienter under the Reform Act because even

under this standard the plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to

raise a strong inference of fraud.

As to issue 2, we agree with the appellants th at Rule 15(a)

gave them the absolute right to file an amended petition in this

case at any time before judgment was entered. Although more than

five months elapsed between the time the defendants moved to

dismiss the petition and the court’s ruling on that motion,

plaintiff did not file an amended petition. After the district

court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, the plaintiff did seek

permission to amend which the court denied. In denying that3

motion, the court explained that plaintiff had failed to provide it

with a proposed amending complaint or provide, in some other form,

an explanation of how it proposed to improve its earlier

allegations. Although there is certainly no universal requirement

that a party seekin g to amend provide a copy of a proposed

amendment, we con clude that under the facts and circumstances of

this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to allow the amendment without some explanation of how the

plaintiff proposed to improve his com plaint so as to avoid

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff, with full knowledge of

the defendant’s arguments as to the defects in the original

petition, allowed over five months to elapse without amending his

petition to correct these deficiencies. The plaintiff made a

strategic decision to stand on his co mplaint as filed, which

required th e district court to analyze the defendant’s motion in

light of the existing complaint. Under these circumstances, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to allow

an amendment to that petition aft er it entered judgment,

particularly where the plai ntiff declined to provide a proposed

amended complaint or give the court any information about how it

proposed to improve his original complaint so as to avoid a

12(b)(6) motion.

AFFIRMED.