Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MICHAEL R. FISHER GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

MICHAEL GENE WORDEN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ERICA BATTLE, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1211-CR-924

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIO COURT

The Honorable Robert R. Altice, Jr., Judge

The Honorable Amy J. Barbar, Magistrate

Cause No. 49G02-1203-FC-20453

June 19, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

Erica Battle (“Battle”) was convicted of three counts of Forgery, as Class C felonies.1 

She now appeals, raising one issue for our review: whether there was sufficient evidence to 

support her convictions.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

Battle applied for employment with the Indiana Department of Insurance (“IDOI”) as 

an administrative assistant in the Medical Malpractice Division. On December 22, 2011, 

Battle was interviewed for the position and was considered a strong candidate for the job; she 

was therefore asked to consent to a background check to be performed by the State Personnel 

Department (“SPD”). Battle represented on her application form that she did not have a 

criminal history, and during the interview Battle was informed that a background check 

would be required. Battle mentioned that she had been the victim of identity theft and that 

criminal convictions had been incorrectly entered against her as a result, and that she had 

paperwork that would establish the veracity of her claims.

The SPD background check ultimately revealed prior criminal convictions, as a result 

of which Battle was disqualified from the administrative assistant position.

On January 9, 2012, Battle appeared at the IDOI’s reception area and told the 

receptionist that she had been hired and was appearing for her first day of work. The 

receptionist contacted Barbara Lohman (“Lohman”), Chief Financial Officer for the IDOI, 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(b).
3

who received paperwork from Battle that, Battle claimed, showed that the convictions 

identified by the background check were entered in error. The papers Battle presented were 

styled as motions filed by Marion County deputy prosecutors to dismiss criminal charges 

against her, with signatures from Marion County Superior Court judges purporting to dismiss 

the charges. On accompanying documents, the reason provided for the motions to dismiss 

was listed as “identity theft.” 

Lohman provided the papers to Nancy Tunget (“Tunget”), a human resources director 

for the IDOI, who in turn provided them to the Commissioner of Insurance, Stephen 

Robertson (“Robertson”). Robertson in turn provided the documents to an attorney with the 

IDOI with instructions to give the documents to the IDOI’s investigator, Michael Herndon 

(“Herndon”). Seeking to verify the authenticity of the motions, Herndon provided copies of 

the documents to the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office. After an investigation, it was 

determined that the documents Battle presented to Lohman were not authentic.

On March 27, 2012, Battle was charged with three counts of Forgery. A bench trial 

was conducted on August 8, 2012, at the conclusion of which the trial court found Battle 

guilty of each charged offense. On October 24, 2012, a sentencing hearing was conducted, at 

the conclusion of which Battle was sentenced to three concurrent terms of five years 

imprisonment, with all three sentences suspended to probation.

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Battle’s sole argument on appeal contends that the State did not introduce sufficient 
4

evidence to sustain her conviction. Our standard of review in such cases is well-settled:

This court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.

Cox v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Only the evidence 

most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences that 

can be drawn therefrom will be considered. Id. If a reasonable trier of fact 

could have found the defendant guilty based on the probative evidence and 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, then a conviction will be affirmed. Id.

at 1028-29.

Sargent v. State, 875 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Here, Battle was convicted of three counts of Forgery, as Class C felonies. To convict 

Battle of each count of Forgery, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Battle, with intent to defraud, knowingly made or uttered written instruments—each 

captioned “State’s Motion to Dismiss”—in such a manner that the instruments purported to 

have been made by another person, with different provisions, or by authority of individuals 

who did not give that authority. I.C. § 35-43-5-2(b); App. at 21-28.

Battle contends that the State failed to prove that she uttered the false motions to 

dismiss with the intent to defraud required by the statute. “A person engages in conduct 

‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. 

§ 35-41-2-2(a). Intent is a mental function, and absent an admission by the defendant intent 

“must be determined from a consideration of the defendant’s conduct and the natural and 

usual consequences thereof.” Spann v. State, 632 N.E.2d 741, 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) 

(citing Metzler v. State, 540 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Ind. 1989)). “The trier of fact usually must 

resort to ‘reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances 

to determine whether, from the person’s conduct and the natural consequences that might be 
5

expected from that conduct, a showing or inference [of] the intent to commit that conduct 

exists.’” Id. (quoting Metzler, 540 N.E.2d at 609.)

As this Court has previously observed, “‘[t]here must be a potential benefit to the 

maker or potential injury to the defrauded party.’” Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Jacobs v. State, 640 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). 

Interpreting the requirement of intent to defraud, in Eifler v. State, 570 N.E.2d 70 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1991), we looked to our supreme court’s interpretation of the theft statute and observed, 

“‘[w]hen the natural and usual consequences of the conduct charged and proved are not such 

as would effect the wrong which the statute seeks to prevent, the intent to effect that wrong is 

not inferable.’” Id. at 77 (quoting State v. McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind. 1985)). Thus, 

we held that even if an instrument is fraudulently made, there was insufficient evidence of 

intent to defraud requisite for a conviction for forgery where the allegedly forged instrument 

would not cause reliance resulting in the granting of a benefit for which the defendant was 

not entitled (in Eifler, municipal sewer tap-in rates specified by a local ordinance). Id. at 77-

78. 

In support of her argument that she lacked the requisite intent for conviction for 

Forgery, Battle directs our attention to a decision by another panel of this Court, Bocanegra 

v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. In Bocanegra, the defendant 

was in the United States illegally and used another person’s identity to obtain employment. 

Id. at 1027. Addressing the requirements for proving intent to defraud as required by the 

Forgery statute at issue here, the Bocanegra Court held that intent to defraud requires intent 
6

to deceive resulting in reliance and a resultant injury. Id. at 1029-30. The Court went on to 

conclude that the resultant injury need not be actual, but may instead be potential. Id. at 1030 

(citing, inter alia, In re Sniadecki, 924 N.E.2d 109, 118 (Ind. 2010); Jacobs, 640 N.E.2d at 

65).

In the Bocanegra case, the potential injury arose from Bocanegra’s immigration status 

subjecting his employer to potential penalties associated with “hiring a person who was not 

legally permitted to work.” Id. at 1029. Here, Battle contends that her circumstances fall 

outside the scope of even the potential injury this Court concluded in Bocanegra wasrequired 

to convict a defendant of Forgery. Specifically, Battle contends that there was no evidence 

that she had any intent other than to obtain employment, and that her submission of the 

falsified documents to the IDOI posed no potential injury.

We disagree. Here, Battle submitted falsified court documents in order to obtain 

employment in a position with the IDOI. As early as her December 22, 2011 job interview, 

Battle was aware that a background check could be conducted by the IDOI or another State 

agency on IDOI’s behalf, and offered to provide documentation that would establish the 

erroneous nature of the criminal record results of a background check. That is, Battle 

submitted the fictitious motions to dismiss in order to cause the State to rely upon those 

documents, and not the results of the background check, in making a hiring decision. Among 

the natural and probable results of this would be the hiring of Battle into a position for which 

she was not qualified—that is, the fraudulent motions would cause Battle to accrue a benefit 

to which she was not entitled. See Eifler, 570 N.E.2d at 77.
7

Moreover, if Battle were hired on the basis of falsified records, among the natural 

consequences of Battle’s uttering of the forged motions was that those records could remain 

in the State’s personnel systems and form the basis for retention and promotion decisions. 

Looking to the rulings of our sister states with respect to the intent to defraud element of the 

offense of forgery, we think this result sufficient to support the trial court’s guilty finding in 

Battle’s case. See, e.g., Arizona v. Thompson, 981 P.2d 595, 598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) 

(finding sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for forgery and holding that where the 

defendant’s forging of vehicle registrations “intentionally undermined the authenticity and 

accuracy” of motor vehicle records, the element of intent was met even without evidence of 

pecuniary harm).

Thus, we agree with the State that there was sufficient evidence upon which the State 

could obtain a conviction against Battles for Forgery, as charged.

This does not end our analysis, however. For while we conclude there was sufficient 

evidence to sustain Battle’s convictions, we are also required to raise sua sponte the question 

of double jeopardy “because a double jeopardy violation, if shown, implicates fundamental 

rights.” Smith v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

The double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o person 

shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Ind. Const. art. I, § 14. In Richardson 

v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held that “two or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ 

... if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual 

evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the 
8

essential elements of another challenged offense.” 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999) (emphasis 

in original). In prior cases, both this Court and the Indiana Supreme Court have found 

double jeopardy violations “where there had been an ‘imposition of two sentences for the 

same injurious consequences sustained by the same victim during a single confrontation 

violated both Federal and State double jeopardy prohibitions.’” Kocielko v. State, 938 

N.E.2d 243, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Bowling v. State, 560 N.E.2d 658, 659 (Ind. 

1990)), trans. denied.

Here, Battle was convicted of three counts of forgery, each naming a different 

document, but all sharing the common intent to defraud the IDOI in order to obtain a single 

benefit—a job. The three offenses thus share a single victim—the Indiana Department of 

Insurance—and a single fraudulent intent. The offenses occurred at the same time, in a 

single transaction, when Battle submitted the three falsified motions to dismiss in order to 

deceive the IDOI. That is, submission of the three documents for a single purpose at a single 

time amounted to one act of forgery, and thus it is a violation of double jeopardy principles 

for Battle to be convicted of three separate offenses of forgery.

We therefore remand with instructions that the trial court vacate two of the three 

counts of forgery. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

NAJAM, J., and BARNES, J., concur.