THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Gena Cain Davis, Claimant, Respondent, 

v. 

S.C. Department of Corrections, Employer, and State 

Accident Fund, Carrier, Petitioners. 

Appellate Case No. 2022-000519 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission 

Opinion No. 28224 

Heard January 10, 2024 – Filed July 31, 2024 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

Kirsten Leslie Barr, of Trask & Howell, L.L.C. of Mt. 

Pleasant, for Petitioners. 

Stephen Benjamin Samuels, of Samuels Reynolds Law 

Firm, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondent. 

CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: In this workers' compensation case, the 

employer challenged the single commissioner's order that allowed the claimant to 

withdraw her Form 50 request for a hearing without prejudice and dismissed the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

employer's Form 21 request to stop the payment of temporary compensation. A 

three-member panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission 

("Appellate Panel") upheld the ruling as to the Form 21, but reversed the ruling on 

the Form 50 as to prejudice after finding the single commissioner lacked jurisdiction 

to rule on prejudice, and it returned the case to the Commission's files. The claimant 

appealed, and the court of appeals vacated the Appellate Panel's decision in part, 

holding the single commissioner's ruling on the Form 50 was interlocutory and not 

immediately reviewable by the Appellate Panel, and it remanded the case to the 

Commission. Davis v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., Op. No. 2022-UP-081, 2022 WL 551972 

(S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 23, 2022). We granted the employer's petition for a writ of 

certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals and to clarify the statutory 

review process for workers' compensation claims.

1 We affirm as modified. 

I. FACTS 

The claimant, Gena Cain Davis ("Davis"), filed a Form 50 notice of a claim 

in July 2016, alleging she sustained injuries to her legs and back in a slip-and-fall 

accident that occurred on July 14, 2016 during the course and scope of her 

employment as a correctional officer with the South Carolina Department of 

Corrections ("SCDC"). In October 2016, Davis submitted a Form 50 request for a 

hearing on her claim, in which she additionally alleged she sustained the aggravation 

of a pre-existing condition of deep vein thrombosis as a result of her accident.2 

A hearing date was set for February 2017, but the hearing was cancelled after 

Davis withdrew her Form 50 request. In April 2017, SCDC suspended the payment 

of temporary disability compensation and filed a Form 21 requesting a hearing on 

its accompanying request to stop compensation. Also, in April 2017, Davis filed a 

second Form 50 request for a hearing on her claim. A hearing was initially scheduled 

for the parties in July 2017, but it was postponed at the request of SCDC and its 

carrier3 for additional time to depose a witness. 

1 This case involves questions of jurisdiction at multiple stages of review. See 

generally S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-50 (2015) (review of a single commissioner's 

ruling by the Appellate Panel); id. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2023) (judicial review of a 

final agency decision by the court of appeals). 

2 A Form 50 is used to report a claim and also to request a hearing on a claim. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The parties obtained a new hearing date of October 24, 2017 to consider 

Davis's claim and SCDC's Form 21 stop-payment request. A formal hearing never 

occurred, however, because the single commissioner allowed Davis to withdraw her 

Form 50 hearing request and dismissed SCDC's Form 21 request at an off-therecord, prehearing conference with the parties that occurred on the date of the 

scheduled hearing, October 24. 

This appeal concerns SCDC's dispute over the written order subsequently 

signed by the single commissioner on November 14, 2017 memorializing his rulings. 

The order of the single commissioner indicated that, after a prehearing conference: 

(1) Davis "was allowed to withdraw the Form 50 without prejudice"; (2) SCDC's 

Form 21 hearing request for a stop-payment was dismissed on the ground it was not 

properly before the single commissioner, as SCDC had already suspended temporary 

compensation and was not current in its payments; (3) the scheduled hearing was 

cancelled; and (4) Davis's "claim [was] returned to the Commission's general files." 

SCDC's dispute centered on its objection to the characterization of the Form 

50 withdrawal as being "without prejudice." Notably, before the single 

commissioner filed the order, the parties discussed the details of the order, including 

the issue of prejudice, in a series of email exchanges. Davis had initially been asked 

to prepare a proposed order regarding the Form 21 and, in a follow-up email, Davis 

had sought clarification from the single commissioner about the status of her Form 

50 after becoming aware that SCDC was planning to seek the dismissal of Davis's 

entire claim, as opposed to just the Form 50 hearing request. SCDC argues that the 

claim is procedurally viable but legally dead as a result of the second withdrawal of 

the Form 50. 

SCDC vehemently objected to the withdrawal of the Form 50 being 

characterized as "without prejudice" and argued the Form 50 withdrawal should, 

instead, be deemed a "voluntary" dismissal by Davis of her claim because it was the 

second time she had withdrawn her Form 50, and the withdrawal was being done 

solely for purposes of delay. SCDC relied on an agency regulation for its assertion 

in this regard. See S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-609(C) (2012) ("Withdrawing a Form 

50 or Form 52 the second time without good cause may operate as a voluntary 

dismissal of the claim when the form is withdrawn by a claimant who has once 

3 For convenience, "SCDC" will be used to refer to the employer, but it will also be 

deemed to include the carrier, when appropriate. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

withdrawn a Form 50 or Form 52 based on the same set of facts, and, in the opinion 

of the Commissioner, the form is withdrawn merely for the purpose of delay." 

(emphasis added)). 

Davis, in turn, stated in the email exchanges that, after SCDC indicated during 

the prehearing conference that it planned to contest her additional medical treatment, 

she had sought to withdraw her hearing request solely to obtain additional proof to 

address SCDC's concerns about her treatment that arose based on SCDC's 

interpretation of certain case law regarding the burden of proof. Davis maintained 

she was not dismissing her claim, all parties were aware of this point, and her 

withdrawal of the Form 50 was not for the improper purpose of causing a delay. 

The single commissioner responded, through his staff, that it was his 

understanding Davis had asked to withdraw the Form 50 without prejudice during 

the prehearing conference, "and with it being within his discretion to do so, [he] 

allowed [Davis] to do that." The single commissioner rejected SCDC's arguments 

for removing the "without prejudice" designation and issued the order memorializing 

his decision to allow Davis to withdraw her Form 50 without prejudice and to 

dismiss SCDC's Form 21. 

SCDC sought review by the Commission, and the matter was heard by the 

Appellate Panel. At the hearing on the matter SCDC argued, in relevant part, that 

the Form 50 withdrawal should not be designated "without prejudice" because the 

question was not discussed at the prehearing conference, so the single commissioner 

lacked the "authority" or "jurisdiction" to issue the challenged order, and the order 

was impermissibly vague because it did not specifically reference whether there was 

"good cause" to allow the Form 50 withdrawal to be made without prejudice. SCDC 

also summarily asserted Davis's explanation that she was seeking additional medical 

proof was not good cause for the withdrawal of her hearing request. 

Davis, in contrast, maintained she expressly provided an explanation of her 

necessity for withdrawing her Form 50 at the prehearing conference, it was clear to 

everyone present that she was withdrawing her hearing request, not her claim, and 

she understood it to be without prejudice. Davis asserted SCDC did not argue during 

the prehearing conference that the harsher penalty of prejudice should apply or that 

the second withdrawal of her Form 50 should be treated, instead, as a voluntary 

dismissal. Davis contended that, if SCDC wanted the single commissioner to treat 

the withdrawal as a voluntary dismissal, it was incumbent upon SCDC to assert to 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the single commissioner that her reason for the withdrawal was not good cause and 

move for a dismissal. Davis argued that, under the applicable regulation, whether a 

withdrawal is being made merely for purposes of delay is to be determined within 

the discretion of the single commissioner, but SCDC remained silent on this point 

until the proposed order was prepared, and when the issue was finally raised by 

SCDC, the single commissioner rejected SCDC's contention. Davis maintained the 

single commissioner did not lose his authority to issue a written order memorializing 

his rulings, as the single commissioner would not lose his authority until there was 

an order issued returning the case to the Commission's general files or the order was 

appealed after fourteen days, pursuant to the statutory review process. 

The Appellate Panel affirmed the single commissioner's ruling as to the Form 

21 and reversed the ruling as to the Form 50. The Appellate Panel found the single 

commissioner correctly ruled the Form 21 request was not properly before the 

Commission. As to the Form 50, the Appellate Panel noted SCDC was arguing that 

the second Form 50 withdrawal operated as an adjudication on the merits and was 

tantamount to a voluntary dismissal. The Appellate Panel found the single 

commissioner erred as a matter of law in concluding Davis was allowed to withdraw 

her Form 50 without prejudice. The Appellate Panel found the issues of whether 

there was "good cause" to withdraw the Form 50 for a second time or whether it was 

made solely for purposes of delay were not raised to the single commissioner during 

the prehearing conference, and the single commissioner lost "jurisdiction" over 

Davis's claim after what it called Davis's "voluntary" withdrawal of her Form 50, the 

dismissal of the Form 21, and the cancellation of the hearing. The Appellate Panel 

further concluded the issue of prejudice also was not properly before it (the Appellate 

Panel). The Appellate Panel additionally noted the single commissioner's order was 

vague because "it lack[ed] detailed findings of fact and rulings of law." 

Davis appealed. The court of appeals vacated in part and remanded. Davis v. 

S.C. Dep't of Corr., Op. No. 2022-UP-081, 2022 WL 551972 (S.C. Ct. App. filed 

Feb. 23, 2022). The court of appeals observed the Appellate Panel's review is 

governed by section 42-17-50 of the South Carolina Code, which allows the 

Commission (or Appellate Panel) to review a single commissioner's "award." Id. at 

*2 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-50 (2015)). The court of appeals reasoned "[t]he 

single commissioner's order allowing Davis to withdraw the Form 50 [hearing 

request] without prejudice and returning the claim to the [C]ommission's general 

files is analogous to an order granting a continuance or denying a motion to dismiss," 

which are intermediate orders that are not immediately appealable. Id. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Consequently, the court of appeals vacated the portion of the Appellate Panel's 

decision addressing the Form 50 (the only portion of the Appellate Panel's order that 

SCDC challenged) on the basis the ruling was not immediately reviewable, and it 

remanded the case to the Commission for proceedings consistent with its opinion. 

Id. at *3. 

This Court granted SCDC's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the 

decision of the court of appeals. Among its contentions, SCDC questions the 

appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals to rule on the appeal and argues the 

court of appeals erred in holding the Appellate Panel did not have jurisdiction to 

review the single commissioner's ruling. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), an 

appellate court may reverse or modify the decision of the agency if substantial rights 

of the appealing party have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, 

inferences, conclusions, or decisions are affected by an error of law or are not 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) 

(Supp. 2023) (listing various categories of error). 

In workers' compensation cases, the full Commission is the ultimate factfinder. Shealy v. Aiken Cnty., 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000). "The 

court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight 

of the evidence on questions of fact." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5). 

The appeal before this Court turns on the meaning of statutory provisions 

governing the review process in workers' compensation matters. Namely, the 

provisions regarding administrative review of a single commissioner's order by the 

Appellate Panel, and judicial review of an Appellate Panel's order by the court of 

appeals. "Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and 

this Court reviews questions of law de novo." Town of Summerville v. City of N. 

Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008). 

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to 

the intent of the legislature." Brown v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 354 S.C. 436, 439, 581 S.E.2d 

836, 838 (2003). We must give the words in a statute their plain and ordinary 

meaning, without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

statute's operation, and when the words are unambiguous, we must apply their literal 

meaning. CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cnty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 

877, 881 (2011). 

Statutes should be read in harmony with their purpose and with other 

provisions that are part of the same general statutory law in order to determine their 

effect. Id. While this Court will generally give deference to an agency's 

interpretation of an applicable statute or its own regulation, where the plain language 

of a statute is contrary to the agency's interpretation, this Court will reject the 

agency's interpretation. Brown, 354 S.C. at 440, 581 S.E.2d at 838. Deference to 

an agency's interpretation is not mandatory. 

III. DISCUSSION 

SCDC asserts the court of appeals erred in exercising its appellate jurisdiction 

to review and vacate in part an interlocutory decision of the Appellate Panel that did 

not determine the merits of the case, in concluding the Appellate Panel lacked 

authority to review the single commissioner's decision, and in ordering a remand to 

the Commission when no issues germane to the appeal are pending. 

SCDC further asserts several subsidiary points regarding the content of the 

Appellate Panel's order. SCDC argues the Appellate Panel properly reversed the 

single commissioner's order, as the latter was rendered upon unlawful procedure and 

was prejudicial to SCDC's right of due process; and it maintains the Appellate Panel 

properly found Davis unilaterally and unconditionally withdrew her claim by notice. 

A. Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals 

SCDC argues, as an initial matter, that the court of appeals lacked appellate 

jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the Appellate Panel's order because it was 

not a final agency decision. As a result, SCDC contends the opinion of the court of 

appeals should be reversed or vacated, and the order of the Appellate Panel should 

be reinstated. We disagree. 

This case involves questions regarding the jurisdiction of both the court of 

appeals and the Appellate Panel. We find the court of appeals properly exercised its 

appellate jurisdiction. Because the opinion of the court of appeals focused only on 
 

 

 

 

 

the Appellate Panel's jurisdiction, however, we find it helpful to clarify the statutory 

review process to provide additional guidance in this and future cases. 

"The APA establishes the standard for judicial review of decisions of the 

Commission." Bone v. U.S. Food Serv., 404 S.C. 67, 73, 744 S.E.2d 552, 556 (2013) 

(holding the APA, not the general appealability statute of section 14-3-330, 

establishes the applicable standard for review); see also Lark v. Bi–Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 

130, 132, 276 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1981) (stating the APA "purports to provide uniform 

procedures before State Boards and Commissions for judicial review after the 

exhaustion of administrative remedies"). 

Section 1-23-380 of the APA governs judicial review of the Appellate Panel's 

decision by the court of appeals: 

A party who has exhausted all administrative remedies 

available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a 

final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial 

review . . . . Except as otherwise provided by law, an 

appeal is to the court of appeals. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (emphasis added). 

The statute includes an exception, however, that allows immediate judicial 

review of an interlocutory order "if review after a final agency decision" is found to 

be inadequate: 

A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action 

or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final 

agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

SCDC asserts the disingenuous argument that the Appellate Panel's order is 

not a "final agency decision" as contemplated in section 1-23-380 because the order 

did not concern and resolve the merits of Davis's claim. SCDC contends this is 

readily apparent from the fact that no evidentiary hearing has ever been held. SCDC 

further argues Davis can obtain an adequate review of her issues at a later date— 

upon appeal from the final agency decision—so the exception allowing immediate 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

judicial review of an interlocutory ruling is not applicable. SCDC would have us 

overlook the Appellate Panel's order portending the dismissal of Davis's claim by 

the application of the doctrine of retraxit. SCDC further contends the Appellate 

Panel did not err in vacating the order of the single commissioner after finding the 

commissioner lacked jurisdiction to rule on the issue of prejudice. 

In contrast, Davis points out that SCDC argued in its brief to the court of 

appeals, as it does here, that Davis's withdrawal of her second Form 50 was 

tantamount to a voluntary dismissal with prejudice, and the mere fact that Davis did 

not intend the preclusive effect of the law to apply to her is irrelevant. Davis 

contends this implies there has been a final agency decision that has terminated her 

claim. Davis states it is clear that, if the Appellate Panel's order is not a final agency 

decision, SCDC intends to pursue the argument on remand that the Appellate Panel's 

decision effectively ended her claim, even if it did not do so directly, or that the 

Appellate Panel's findings (including the point that she "voluntarily" withdrew her 

Form 50) are now the law of the case, and SCDC will move for a dismissal with 

prejudice based on those findings. Davis asserts this would leave her without an 

adequate remedy on appeal, so the Appellate Panel's order should be immediately 

reviewable. Davis asserts the court of appeals correctly vacated all of the Appellate 

Panel's findings related to the withdrawal of the Form 50 because, as found by the 

court of appeals, the single commissioner's decision to allow Davis to withdraw her 

Form 50 hearing request without prejudice was not subject to interlocutory review 

by the Appellate Panel. She also contends the Appellate Panel erred in finding the 

single commissioner lacked jurisdiction to issue his order regarding the Form 50 and 

the issue of prejudice. 

South Carolina's appellate courts have long wrestled with the review process 

to be utilized in workers' compensation cases. An overarching concern has been to 

avoid repeated, piecemeal appeals in order to foster expeditious review. However, 

the individualized nature of work injuries and the need, in some cases, for lengthy 

medical treatment have resulted in protracted litigation disputing nearly every aspect 

of the administrative process prior to a final determination on the merits of a claim. 

See, e.g., Russell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 426 S.C. 281, 286, 826 S.E.2d 863, 865 

(2019) ("The [APA] limits the role of the judicial branch of government in meeting 

the goal of quick decisions in limited litigation by restricting appeals to final 

decisions in most cases. Nevertheless, this Court has struggled to foster quick and 

efficient resolution of work-related injury claims by discouraging the commission 

from making repeated, unnecessary remands." (citations omitted)); id. (noting the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"lingering confusion" concerning immediate appealability arising in workers' 

compensation matters following the passage of the APA (citation omitted)). 

A plain reading of the statutory language in section 1-23-380, particularly the 

requirement that a party must have first "exhausted all administrative remedies 

available within the agency," and the existing case law interpreting the statute 

indicate that a party must first complete the review process within the agency and 

have obtained a "final decision" (or "final agency decision")4 regarding the claim 

from the Commission before seeking judicial review by the court of appeals. 

The reference to a "final decision" in this context does not include a final 

decision on a procedural or other intermediate point that does not resolve the merits 

of the claim. Otherwise, there would be no need for the explicit exception in section 

1-23-380 allowing immediate review by the court of appeals of "[a] preliminary, 

procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling" when the claimant would be left 

with an inadequate remedy on appeal. 

Our appellate courts have previously explained that an agency decision, 

including one by the Commission, is generally not a "final decision" unless it 

resolves the merits of the action. See, e.g., Bone, 404 S.C. at 73–74, 744 S.E.2d at 

556 (stating "[a]n agency decision which does not decide the merits of a contested 

case . . . is not a final agency decision subject to judicial review" (second alteration 

in original) (quoting S.C. Baptist Hosp. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envt'l Control, 291 

S.C. 267, 270, 353 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1987))); Price v. Peachtree Elec. Servs., Inc., 

405 S.C. 455, 457, 748 S.E.2d 229, 230 (2013) ("An agency decision that does not 

decide the merits of a contested case is not a final agency decision subject to judicial 

review."); Rose v. JJS Trucking, LLC, 411 S.C. 366, 368, 768 S.E.2d 412, 413 (Ct. 

App. 2015) ("An order of the commission is not a final decision unless it resolves 

the entire action."). 

A "final decision" as used in section 1-23-380, concerning review by the court 

of appeals, has been treated similarly to the term "final judgment" that appears in 

section 1-23-390 (entitled, "Supreme Court review") and governs review by this 

Court of a lower court's decision. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-390 (Supp. 2023) ("An 

aggrieved party may obtain a review of a final judgment of the circuit court or the 

4 Section 1-23-380 refers interchangeably to a "final decision" or "final agency 

decision." 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

court of appeals pursuant to this article by taking an appeal in the manner provided 

by the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules as in other civil cases."). While we 

recognize the similarity of sections 1-23-380 and 1-23-390 because they both govern 

judicial review, we note they concern two distinct stages in the review process, so 

they are not interchangeable. However, the essential requirement of finality remains 

constant. 

This reading harmonizes the statutory language in section 1-23-380 with its 

plain meaning and with the purpose of the workers' compensation statutory scheme, 

which is to facilitate a streamlined review of the merits of a claim. In our view, the 

intent of the South Carolina General Assembly is to allow the Appellate Panel to 

administratively review a final "award" (grant or denial of a claim) by the single 

commissioner (under section 42-17-50), and then to permit, in turn, judicial review 

of the "final agency decision" of the Appellate Panel in a direct appeal to the court 

of appeals (under section 1-23-380). Routinely allowing multiple, intervening 

appeals prior to a final agency decision on a claim would only lengthen the laborious 

review process, which in Davis's case has already extended over eight years without 

a determination of the merits of the claim. See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 74, 716 

S.E.2d at 881 (stating courts should give words in a statute their plain and literal 

meaning without resorting to a construction that expands or limits the statute's 

operation); Brown, 354 S.C. at 439, 581 S.E.2d at 838 (stating the intent of the 

legislature should be ascertained and given effect). This extraordinary delay in 

establishing whether compensation is due to a South Carolina worker could not have 

been intended by the General Assembly. 

We hold the order of the Appellate Panel was not a final decision because it 

did not resolve the merits of Davis's claim.

5 However, the court of appeals had 

appellate jurisdiction to evaluate, in the first instance, whether there was a final 

decision from the Appellate Panel. Additionally, even if the agency decision is 

deemed interlocutory, an appellate court may consider whether immediate review is, 

nevertheless, appropriate because a later appeal following a final decision would not 

5 The Appellate Panel expressly stated the issue of whether Davis's Form 50 was 

withdrawn without prejudice—and implicitly, whether there was good cause for the 

withdrawal or whether it was done for the purpose of delay—was not properly before 

it at that time, so it did not issue a final ruling on this question or address the merits 

of Davis's claim. However, the Appellate Panel’s discussion of the antiquated 

common law doctrine of retraxit is noteworthy and concerning. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

provide an adequate remedy. Cf., e.g., Hilton v. Flakeboard Am. Ltd., 418 S.C. 245, 

247, 791 S.E.2d 719, 720 (2016) (explaining "[w]e granted certiorari to review an 

order of the Court of Appeals dismissing [the claimant's] appeal of an admittedly 

interlocutory order of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's 

Appellate Panel" because we concluded that an appeal from a final decision would 

not provide an adequate remedy to the claimant). 

"This Court has held that whether an intermediate action or ruling is 

immediately reviewable is to be decided on a case-by-case basis, i.e., whether a 

review of the final decision would not provide an adequate remedy." Id. at 249, 791 

S.E.2d at 721. We have also held that an examination of the underlying merits of 

the ruling may be necessary to determine the adequacy of the remedy after a later 

appeal and whether immediate review should be afforded. See id. at 247, 791 S.E.2d 

at 720 ("Determining whether review of the final agency decision would give Hilton 

an adequate remedy requires us to reach the underlying merits of the Commission's 

order, and since we conclude that the order cannot stand, we vacate the Court of 

Appeals' order and remand the matter to the Commission."). 

As previously noted, it has now been eight years since Davis's workers' 

compensation claim was filed in 2016. Although some delay may be expected, the 

protracted appeals that stemmed from SCDC's challenge of the single 

commissioner's interlocutory order in 2017 have resulted in a complete shut-down 

of the claims process. This defeats the ostensible purpose of the workers' 

compensation statutory scheme—to provide a streamlined process for considering 

employee injury claims and rendering timely compensation in exchange for 

employees giving up the right to sue their employers for damages in a court of law. 

Due to the inordinate length of time that Davis's claim has been stalled and, 

as we shall examine in the next section, the fundamental flaw in the decision by the 

Appellate Panel, which contained errors as to the scope of its own, as well as the 

single commissioner's, jurisdiction, we find any additional delay before reviewing 

the Appellate Panel's decision would not provide Davis an adequate remedy, as these 

errors could continue to impact the Commission's view of the status of Davis's claim 

upon remand. As a result, we hold the court of appeals correctly exercised its 

appellate jurisdiction to consider this appeal of the Appellate Panel's decision. See 

id. at 247, 791 S.E.2d at 720 (finding it necessary to reach the ruling of the 

underlying order when review of the final agency decision would not provide an 

adequate remedy to the claimant); see also Russell, 426 S.C. at 290–91, 826 S.E.2d 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

at 867 (considering the Commission's remand on a change of condition claim for the 

third time, after two single commissioners had issued rulings, and "find[ing] the 

commission's unreasonable delay in making a final decision leaves Russell without 

an adequate remedy on appeal from a final decision under section 1-23-380" and 

holding "the appellate panel's remand order is immediately appealable"). 

B. Appellate Panel's Decision 

We turn now to the specific issue addressed by the court of appeals—whether 

the Appellate Panel had jurisdiction to review the single commissioner's ruling 

regarding the Form 50. We hold the court of appeals correctly found the single 

commissioner issued an interlocutory ruling, not an "award" subject to immediate 

review. Consequently, the Appellate Panel did not have jurisdiction to vacate the 

single commissioner's ruling, so the Appellate Panel's order should be vacated and 

the single commissioner's ruling should be reinstated. 

The propriety of the Appellate Panel's review of the single commissioner's 

order is controlled by section 42-17-50, which provides for the administrative review 

of a single commissioner's "award" of "compensation benefits" by the full 

Commission (or an Appellate Panel thereof).

6 Section 42-17-50 states, in relevant 

part, as follows: 

SECTION 42-17-50. Review and rehearing by 

commission. 

If an application for review is made to the commission 

within fourteen days from the date when notice of the 

award shall have been given, the commission shall review 

the award and, if good grounds be shown therefor, 

reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence, rehear 

the parties or their representatives and, if proper, amend 

the award. 

A three-member Appellate Panel may conduct the review of the single 

commissioner's order and has the same effect as review by the full Commission. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 42-3-20(C). 

6 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-50 (2015) (emphasis added). 

The term "award" is not explicitly defined in section 42-17-50, perhaps 

because it was deemed to be self-evident from the context of its extensive use 

throughout the statutory scheme. See generally id. § 42-9-5 ("Any award made 

pursuant to this title must be based upon specific and written detailed findings of 

fact substantiating the award." (emphasis added)); id. § 42-9-35(B) ("The 

commission may award compensation benefits to an employee who has a 

permanent physical impairment or preexisting condition and who incurs a 

subsequent disability from an injury arising out of and in the course of his 

employment for the resulting disability of the permanent physical impairment or 

preexisting condition and the subsequent injury." (emphasis added)). 

Although "award" is not statutorily defined, the term "compensation" is 

statutorily defined to mean monetary benefits. See id. § 42-1-100 ("The term 

'compensation' means the money allowance payable to an employee or to his 

dependents as provided for in this title and includes funeral benefits provided in this 

title."). 

Section 42-17-40 provides a single commissioner may conduct a hearing and 

issue an "award," which must be supported by findings of fact and rulings of law. 

Id. § 42-17-40 ("Conduct of hearing; award."). As previously noted, the Appellate 

Panel may then review the award made by the single commissioner. Id. § 42-17-50 

("Review and rehearing by commission."). Either party may seek review of the 

Appellate Panel's decision in a direct appeal to the court of appeals, although the 

Appellate Panel's factual findings are generally conclusive. Id. § 42-17-60 

("Conclusiveness of award; appeals; payment of compensation during appeal; 

accrual of interest."). An award of the Commission may then be filed with the circuit 

court and enforced as a judgment. Id. § 42-17-70. 

From the context of the statutes such as those recited above, it is apparent that 

an "award" is implicitly defined in workers' compensation matters to mean an award 

of monetary compensation or other benefits (such as medical treatment) that are 

available under South Carolina's workers' compensation laws for the injury or 

condition that is the subject of a claim. 

The court of appeals focused on section 42-17-50's reference to the review of 

a single commissioner's "award" as establishing the eligibility for review and 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

acknowledged that the term has to date remained undefined in our statutory law: 

"While the statute's language indicates an appeal from a single commissioner to the 

appellate panel must be from an award, this court has noted that '[t]he Code does not 

define award.'" Davis v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., Op. No. 2022-UP-081, 2022 WL 

551972, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 23, 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Levi v. N. Anderson Cnty. EMS, 409 S.C. 374, 380, 762 S.E.2d 44, 48 (Ct. App. 

2014)). 

The court of appeals did not attempt to define the term, but reasoned that the 

single commissioner's order in this case, which allowed Davis to withdraw her Form 

50 without prejudice and returned the matter to the Commission's files, was 

analogous to an order granting a continuance or denying a motion to dismiss, which 

it stated generally was not immediately appealable. Id. In doing so, the court of 

appeals observed that it had "previously held a single commissioner's decision to 

deny a motion to dismiss was not immediately appealable." See id. (citing its 

decision in Levi, 409 S.C. at 385, 762 S.E.2d at 50). The court of appeals also cited 

other instances where these principles had been applied to find an order returning a 

matter to the Commission's files was an interlocutory decision, not an "award," so 

such decisions were not immediately reviewable: 

This court has applied these sorts of general principles in 

workers' compensation cases before. See Walker v. 

Springs Indus., Inc., 298 S.C. 249, 379 S.E.2d 729 (Ct. 

App. 1989) (single commissioner's order allowing a 

claimant to withdraw her hearing request without 

dismissing her underlying claim and returning the claim to 

the commission's files was interlocutory because it 

constituted an indefinite continuance of the case)7

; Levi, 

409 S.C. at 385, 762 S.E.2d at 50 (single commissioner's 

7 SCDC correctly observes that Walker, cited above, focuses on the appellate court's 

jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order returning a claim to the Commission's 

files, instead of the Appellate Panel's jurisdiction. However, the court of appeals 

broadly cited Walker as an example of a case involving "these sorts of general 

principles," i.e., the treatment of interlocutory orders. The premise that an 

interlocutory order returning a case to the Commission's files is not normally subject 

to immediate review is equally valid when considering either administrative or 

judicial review. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

order denying an employer's motion to dismiss not 

immediately appealable); see also Martinez v. 

Spartanburg County, 406 S.C. 532, 534, 753 S.E.2d 436, 

437 (2014) (opinion of this court vacated and case 

remanded to the commission because the underlying order 

was not immediately appealable). 

Id. (emphasis added). 

SCDC argues, however, that agency regulations permit an Appellate Panel to 

review a "decision" by a single commissioner, so the Appellate Panel is not limited 

by section 42-17-50 to review of an "award." See S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-701(A) 

(2012) ("Either party or both may request Commission review of the Hearing 

Commissioner's decision by filing the original and three copies of a Form 30, 

Request for Commission Review, with the Commission's Judicial Department 

within fourteen days of the day the Commissioner's order is received." (emphasis 

added)). We disagree with SCDC's reasoning and find it has no merit. 

This Court has held section 42-17-50 sets forth the jurisdiction of the 

Commission (or Appellate Panel) for review and that, although regulations have the 

force of law, an agency's regulations may not alter or add to a statute. Goodman v. 

City of Columbia, 318 S.C. 488, 490, 458 S.E.2d 531, 532 (1995). To the extent 

Regulation 67-701(A) may be read to expand the scope of review beyond that which 

has been legislatively delegated to the Commission, it conflicts with the terms of 

section 42-17-50. Accordingly, the terms of the statute, which requires an "award," 

must prevail. See id. at 490–91, 458 S.E.2d at 532 ("Reg. 67–701 adds the 

requirement of applying for [Commission] review with a particular form, thereby 

adding to the statute. Insofar as Reg. 67-701 increases the threshold requirements 

of § 42-17-50, the specifications set forth in the statute must prevail."). 

Further, this specific argument—for an unlimited expansion of the Appellate 

Panel's jurisdiction to include review of a "decision" rather than an "award" by the 

single commissioner—has already been rejected by our courts. In Levi, the court of 

appeals expressly held Regulation 67-701(A) cannot broaden section 42-17-50 to 

allow the review of just "any decision." See Levi, 409 S.C. at 384, 762 S.E.2d at 50 

("Although the applicable regulation [67-701(A)] uses the term decision instead of 

award, a regulation cannot add to the statute. Therefore, an appeal must be from an 

award, not simply any decision."), cert. denied (S.C. 2015). Thus, the argument that 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

a "decision" from a single commissioner meets the statutory threshold for the 

Appellate Panel to commence its review under section 42-17-50 is contrary to not 

only the terms of the statute, but also existing precedent.8 

SCDC's decision to challenge the single commissioner's interlocutory ruling 

for over eight years is an example of the excessive litigation that has ensnared 

workers' compensation cases despite the General Assembly's statutory framework 

calling for the review of (1) a single commissioner's award (or denial of a claim), 

(2) the Appellate Panel's final agency decision regarding any such award or denial, 

and (3) judicial review by the court of appeals of the final agency decision rendered 

on the merits of the claim. Davis's claim has been trapped in what should be the last 

stage in the process, judicial review, despite the fact that it never advanced beyond 

the filing of a claim and discovery. 

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the court of appeals that the single 

commissioner's order, which ultimately returned Davis's claim to the Commission's 

files, was an interlocutory order, not an "award" as contemplated in section 42-17-

50, so it was not subject to immediate review by the Appellate Panel. Accordingly, 

we hold the court of appeals did not err in vacating the order of the Appellate Panel 

and remanding the matter to the Commission.

9 See generally Allison v. W.L. Gore 

& Assocs., 394 S.C. 185, 189, 714 S.E.2d 547, 550 (2011) ("Since the Full 

Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear respondent's appeal, the decision of that 

Commission as well as the master's order are [VACATED.]"). As a result, the order 

of the single commissioner is reinstated. 

Although the Appellate Panel's order is vacated, so its findings are no longer 

efficacious, we find it necessary to also briefly address the Appellate Panel's finding 

8 Although the court of appeals did not cite Regulation 67-701(A), we dismiss as 

dicta its suggestion that there might be exceptions to section 42-17-50 for some 

unspecified interlocutory issues on the basis it is contrary to the General Assembly's 

requirements in section 42-17-50. See, e.g., Davis, 2022 WL 551972, at *2 (opining 

"[t]he appellate panel commonly reviews intermediate orders that decide important 

issues in a contested workers' compensation case," but stating the order in Davis's 

case "is not one of those orders"). 

9 SCDC also argues the court of appeals erred in remanding the case to the 

Commission. We reject this argument as specious. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

that the single commissioner lacked jurisdiction to rule on the issue of prejudice. 

Jurisdiction is a fundamental issue that could impact the proceedings on remand, so 

we address this point in order to complete our clarification of the review process and 

to prevent the misapprehension of the status of Davis's claim on remand. See Hilton, 

418 S.C. at 247, 791 S.E.2d at 720 (finding it necessary to reach the underlying 

merits of the Appellate Panel's "admittedly interlocutory order" and concluding the 

nature of the error was such "that the order cannot stand"). 

In this case, the Appellate Panel concluded that, "[a]fter the second Form 50 

was withdrawn and the Form 21 hearing was cancelled, the [single commissioner] 

was divested of jurisdiction and authority to entertain or adjudicate further 

arguments regarding this claim." This mischaracterizes the single commissioner's 

jurisdiction. The parties held an informal, unrecorded, prehearing conference to 

discuss several aspects of the claim, including Davis's Form 50 and SCDC's 

Form 21. Proposed orders were prepared by both sides as a dispute arose over 

whether Davis's Form 50 should be designated as withdrawn without prejudice. 

After further discussion in a series of emails, the single commissioner sided with 

Davis and confirmed that it was his intent to approve the withdrawal of the Form 50 

without prejudice—a matter that he correctly recognized to be within his 

discretion—and he memorialized his rulings as to the Form 50 and the Form 21 in a 

written order. Contrary to SCDC's arguments, the single commissioner was not 

instantaneously "divested" of jurisdiction during the informal conference, and he 

acted within his authority in issuing an order formalizing the results of the 

conference for the record. 

As part of its jurisdictional argument, SCDC also asserts Davis failed to timely 

raise the issue of prejudice to the single commissioner because it was not discussed 

at the prehearing conference, so the single commissioner did not have "jurisdiction" 

to address this unpreserved issue. We disagree. This case does not arise from a 

hearing on the record with the attendant formalities. Rather, there was an off-therecord discussion of the case status, and those informal discussions continued during 

the submission of proposed orders, until the single commissioner issued his written 

order. SCDC did, in fact, vigorously argue the withdrawal of the Form 50 was for 

the improper purpose of delay and should result in a dismissal with prejudice, but 

the single commissioner chose not to impose the harsher outcome of a dismissal, 

which was within his discretion. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SCDC did have an opportunity to make its objection known, and it could have 

contemporaneously argued at the prehearing conference that any withdrawal of the 

Form 50 should be deemed with prejudice. At the hearing before the Appellate 

Panel, SCDC specifically conceded that it did not contemporaneously assert to the 

single commissioner at the prehearing conference that Davis's second withdrawal of 

a Form 50 was not being made for "good cause" because it was for purposes of delay 

and that it should, therefore, be treated by the single commissioner as a voluntary 

dismissal of the claim. SCDC stated it did not make this argument because it 

believed a voluntary dismissal "is the default position under the Regulations" (i.e., 

S.C. Ann. Regs. 67-609(C) (2012))10 and it was "perfectly happy" with Davis's 

action if she "wanted to take it." However, a dismissal normally operates without 

prejudice in the absence of an affirmative finding to this effect in the discretion of 

the single commissioner, and SCDC, not Davis, is the party advancing the argument 

as to prejudice. Therefore, it is reasonable that SCDC should have borne the burden 

of affirmatively seeking the withdrawal of the hearing request to be designated as a 

dismissal of the claim with prejudice.

11 In any event, SCDC did make its objection 

known prior to issuance of the order, and the single commissioner properly exercised 

his jurisdiction to rule on the issue of prejudice, so we find no error in this regard. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

10 We note dismissal is not the default position under the Regulation 67-609(C). It 

is a matter left to the sound discretion of the single commissioner. 

11 Although SCDC refers, by analogy, to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and Rule 41(a)(1), 

SCRCP regarding the prejudicial effect of multiple dismissals in another context, 

those rules do not contain the proviso contained in Regulation 67-609(C), which 

makes a dismissal with prejudice a matter within the single commissioner's 

discretion and warranted only when the single commissioner specifically finds the 

second withdrawal of a Form 50 was made merely for the purpose of delay. A plain 

reading of Regulation 67-609(C) reveals that good cause is not necessary in every 

instance to avoid dismissal of a claim upon a second withdrawal of the Form 50. 

Regulation 67-609(C) uses the permissive term "may." SCDC's misapprehension of 

the default position under Regulation 67-609(C) does not constitute error by the 

single commissioner. Cf. Erickson v. Jones St. Publishers, LLC, 368 S.C. 444, 476, 

629 S.E.2d 653, 670 (2006) (stating "a party may not complain on appeal of error or 

object to a trial procedure which his own conduct has induced"). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

We conclude the court of appeals did not err in exercising its appellate 

jurisdiction to consider this appeal and in holding the Appellate Panel lacked 

jurisdiction to consider SCDC's challenge to the single commissioner's interlocutory 

ruling. The single commissioner's ruling was not an "award" as required by section 

42-17-50, and the requirements of a statute prevail when they conflict with an 

agency's regulations. Consequently, we affirm the determination of the court of 

appeals, which vacated the decision of the Appellate Panel and remanded the matter 

to the Commission. The ruling of the single commissioner is hereby reinstated. We 

further conclude, as a point of clarification, that the Appellate Panel erred in 

determining the single commissioner did not have jurisdiction to rule on the question 

of prejudice. 

Because Davis's claim has remained pending with the Commission, Davis will 

need to file a new Form 50 to request a hearing on her claim. Once that is filed, we 

urge the Commission and the parties to work together to expeditiously pursue a 

resolution of the merits of this claim. 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 

KITTREDGE, J., Acting Justices Stephanie P. McDonald and James Edward 

Lockemy, concur. FEW, J., concurring in a separate opinion. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUSTICE FEW: I concur in the result reached by the majority—to reinstate the 

single commissioner's order. I write separately to address three points. First, I agree 

with the majority the appellate panel's order was immediately appealable to the court 

of appeals under the "adequate remedy" language of section 1-23-380 of the South 

Carolina Code (Supp. 2023). See Russell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 426 S.C. 281, 

290-91, 826 S.E.2d 863, 867 (2019) (holding an intermediate order of the workers' 

compensation commission was immediately appealable under section 1-23-380 

because "the commission's unreasonable delay" left the claimant without an 

adequate remedy on appeal from a final decision). 

Second, I agree the single commissioner retained the authority to enter the order on 

appeal even after the claimant withdrew the Form 50. However, I want to make 

clear the question is not one of jurisdiction. Rather, it is a question of power and 

authority. See Rish v. Rish, Op. No. 28223 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 31, 2024) 

(Howard Adv. Sh. No. 29 at 114) ("This Court has recently corrected our prior cases 

that imprecisely and inaccurately referred to different procedural and substantive 

rules as limitations on a court's 'subject matter jurisdiction.'"). 

Third, I would hold the single commissioner's order was immediately appealable to 

the appellate panel. On that point I disagree with the majority. Even if the majority 

were correct that section 42-17-50 somehow restricts the appellate panel's authority, 

the majority reads the term "award" too narrowly. That term is not defined in the 

Workers' Compensation Act, and there is nothing in the Act to suggest it means only 

what the majority suggests. Regardless of the interpretation of the term, however, 

the effect of section 42-17-50 is only to impose a fourteen-day deadline for the 

appeal of a single commissioner's order, not to restrict the authority of appellate 

panel to hear appeals. Whether an appellate panel has the authority to hear 

interlocutory appeals is simply not addressed in the Act. 

It is not up to the judicial branch to impose on the commission a requirement that is 

not specifically stated in its enabling legislation. "Section 42-3-180 of the South 

Carolina Code confers a general grant of authority on the Commission to address all 

issues arising under the Workers' Compensation Act that are not otherwise provided 

for under South Carolina law." James v. Anne's Inc., 390 S.C. 188, 200-01, 701 

S.E.2d 730, 736 (2010) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 42-3-180 (1985)). "All questions 

arising under this title . . . shall be determined by the commission, except as 

otherwise provided in this title." S.C. Code Ann. § 42-3-180 (2015). As the court 

of appeals stated, "The appellate panel commonly reviews intermediate orders that 

decide important issues in a contested workers' compensation case." Davis v. S.C. 
 

 

 

 

Dep't of Corr., Op. No. 2022-UP-081, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 23, 2022). If 

the commission believes it is necessary to hear interlocutory appeals on certain 

issues to effectuate the purpose of the Act, it is not this Court's role to prevent it from 

doing so unless there is a specific statutory restriction of that authority. See James, 

390 S.C. at 201, 701 S.E.2d at 737 (stating the "workers' compensation commission 

. . . is, in the first instance, responsible for effectuating the purposes of the workers' 

compensation act by administering, enforcing, and construing its provisions in order 

to secure its humane objectives." (quoting 100 C.J.S. Workers' Compensation § 706 

(2000))). Thus, I would hold the single commissioner's order was immediately 

appealable to the appellate panel.