United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 20-1251 

VERONICA LUZ MALAVER AVENDANO, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

LEONARDO ALFONZO BLANCO BALZA, 

Defendant, Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Allison D. Burroughs, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Barron, Circuit Judge, 

and Katzmann, Judge. 

Matthew P. Barach, with whom Barach Law Group LLC was on 

brief, for appellant. 

Shamis N. Beckley, with whom Dana M. McSherry, Annabel 

Rodriguez, and McDermott Will & Emery LLP were on brief, for 

appellees. 

January 11, 2021 

 Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting 

by designation. 
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KATZMANN, Judge. This wrenching case involves the 

application of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 

International Child Abduction (Hague Convention) and its 

implementing statute to a father's wrongful retention of a child, 

herein "G*" to protect his privacy. See Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 

No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494-01 

(Mar. 26, 1986); International Child Abduction Remedies Act 

(ICARA), 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. G*'s mother, plaintiff-appellant 

Veronica Luz Malaver Avendano (Avendano), sought G*'s return to 

Venezuela, alleging that G*'s father, defendant-appellee Leonardo 

Alfonzo Blanco Balza (Balza), abducted G* in contravention of a 

Venezuelan child custody order and the Hague Convention. The 

district court determined that Balza admitted to unlawfully 

retaining G* in contravention of the Hague Convention and the 

implementing statute. However, after determining that Balza had 

established that G* is a mature child such that the court should 

consider G*'s stated desire to remain with his father in the United 

States, the district court denied Avendano's petition for return 

of her son to Venezuela. Avendano appeals that decision. We 

affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Hague Convention Framework 

The Hague Convention "aims to deter parents from 

abducting their children to a country whose courts might side with 
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them in a custody battle." Díaz-Alarcón v. Flández-Marcel, 944 

F.3d 303, 305 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Darín v. Olivero-Huffman, 

746 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014)). Relevant here, the United States 

and Venezuela are contracting parties to the Hague Convention. 

See Status Table, Hague Conf. on Priv. Int'l L., 

https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/statustable/?cid=24 (last visited Dec. 21, 2020). In the United States, 

ICARA implements the Hague Convention and permits a parent to 

petition a federal or state court to return an abducted child under 

the age of sixteen to the country of the child's habitual 

residence. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001, 9003(b). The Hague Convention 

applies only to determine whether a child should be returned, see 

Hague Convention, art. 1, and does not empower the court to make 

any determinations regarding child custody. The court simply asks 

whether a custody decision should be made in the United States or 

in the country of the child's habitual residence. Díaz-Alarcón, 

944 F.3d at 305–06; Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218 (1st Cir. 

2000). 

"The removal or retention of a child is to be considered 

wrongful where a) it is in breach of rights of custody . . . under 

the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident 

immediately before the removal or retention; and b) . . . those 

rights were actually exercised . . . ." Hague Convention, art. 3. 

The Hague Convention favors custody decisions be made by the courts 
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of the country of habitual residence, Mendez v. May, 778 F.3d 337, 

343 (1st Cir. 2015), and the "re-establishment of the status quo 

disturbed by the actions of the abductor," see Elisa Pérez-Vera, 

Explanatory Report: 1980 Hague Conference on Private International 

Law, in 3 Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session 426, 430 

(1982) (Pérez-Vera Report).1 The Convention carves out few 

exceptions to this strong presumption of return of the child to 

his or her country of habitual residence. See Hague Convention, 

art. 13. Furthermore, "courts construe these exceptions 

narrowly." Díaz-Alarcón, 944 F.3d at 306 (citing Nicolson v. 

Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2010)). The exception 

relevant here permits the court to decline to order the child 

returned "if [the court] finds that the child objects to being 

returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which 

it is appropriate to take account of [the child's] views" (herein 

"the mature child exception"). Hague Convention, art. 13. The 

wrongful abductor must prove that the child is mature enough for 

the court to consider his or her stated desire by a preponderance 

of the evidence. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(B). 

1 The Pérez–Vera Report refers to the travaux préparatoires 

of the Hague Convention, which provides the official history and 

commentary of the text of the treaty as prepared by "the official 

Hague Conference reporter" for the Hague Convention. Hague 

International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 

51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,503–06 (Mar. 26, 1986); see also Abbott v. 

Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 19 (2010). 
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B. History of G*'s Presence in the United States 

Unlike many cases involving child custody that implicate 

the Hague Convention, the parties agree on many of the facts and 

threshold issues. We summarize their account below. 

Prior to the events leading to this litigation, G* lived 

with his mother in Venezuela, the country where he was born and is 

a citizen. Balza, a joint citizen of the United States and 

Venezuela with residence in Massachusetts, had joint custody over 

G* pursuant to a custody order by a Venezuelan court. As the 

district court found, Balza visited G* in Venezuela often while he 

resided there and provided financial support to G*. However, as 

the relationship between Avendano and Balza deteriorated, the 

parties sought a custody arrangement through the Venezuelan 

courts. That order provided for G* to visit Balza in the United 

States every August and every other December. Because of the poor 

relationship between Avendano and Balza, the Venezuelan courts had 

to intervene to enforce the order so that G* could travel to the 

United States in both 2016 and 2018. 

While G* was visiting Balza in the United States for his 

second yearly visit that began in August 2018, Balza secured U.S. 

citizenship on behalf of G* that resulted in the forfeiture of 

G*'s green card. Subsequently, Avendano refused to grant the 

necessary permission for issuance of G*'s U.S. passport, and a 

Venezuelan court refused to extend the period of visitation. 
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Therefore, Balza declined to return G* to Venezuela at the end of 

his court-mandated visit, claiming that he would not return G* to 

Venezuela without the proper documents through which he could 

return to the United States. G* thus continues to live with Balza 

and has begun attending school in Massachusetts. The district 

court noted that G* speaks with his mother weekly and stays in 

contact with his friends in Venezuela.

The political, social, and economic conditions in 

Venezuela provide the backdrop to G*'s childhood there. As the 

district court noted, "Venezuela is currently experiencing a 

period of economic instability and political unrest." The district 

court made related findings on food insecurity, lack of access to 

medical care, high levels of violent crime, and human rights 

violations in Venezuela. However, the district court also noted 

that Avendano's evidence indicated that the island of G*'s habitual 

residence in Venezuela "is largely insulated from the larger issues 

in Venezuela." 

C. District Court's decision to allow G* to remain in the 

United States 

After Balza's retention of G* in the United States beyond 

the date of the Venezuelan court order, Avendano sought G*'s return 

by filing suit in federal district court. The parties agreed that 

Avendano had lawful custody of G* pursuant to a valid Venezuelan 

court order, that G*'s country of habitual residence was Venezuela, 
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and that Balza wrongfully retained G* in the United States. Having 

conceded that he wrongfully retained G*, Balza argued that G* 

should nevertheless remain in the United States because G* is a 

mature child who objects to being returned to Venezuela and because 

G* would face grave conditions if returned to Venezuela.2

After hearing evidence from Avendano, Balza, G*'s 

Guardian Ad Litem, three expert witnesses, and witnesses from G*'s 

community in Venezuela, as well as conducting an in-person 

interview with G*, the district court issued Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law. The district court determined that G* was a 

child of sufficient age and maturity to have his wishes taken into 

consideration. While finding that "[t]here is no question in the 

mind of the [c]ourt that Avendano is a loving and committed 

parent," the district court then determined that G* genuinely 

objected to being returned to Venezuela because of ongoing 

political and societal tumult. Finally, the district court found 

that G*'s desire to remain in the United States was reached 

independently, free of undue influence by Balza. The district 

court, however, ruled that it did not need to determine whether G* 

would face a grave risk of harm if returned to Venezuela. In light 

2 Not at issue in this appeal, the Hague Convention also 

provides an exception for return where "there is a grave risk that 

. . . return would expose the child to physical or psychological 

harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation." 

Hague Convention, art. 13(b). 
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of these conclusions, the district court "exercise[d] its 

discretion granted by Article 13 of the [Hague] Convention and 

refuse[d] Avendano's petition for return of the child to 

Venezuela." Avendano appeals that decision. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Questions of fact, such as whether a child is of 

sufficient age and maturity to have his views considered and 

whether the child is subject to undue influence, are reviewed for 

clear error. Mendez, 778 F.3d at 344; Díaz-Alarcón, 944 F.3d at 

311. "Clear-error review is demanding: this standard will be 

satisfied only if, 'upon whole-record-review, an inquiring court 

"form[s] a strong, unyielding belief that a mistake has been 

made."'" United States v. Nuñez, 852 F.3d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 2017) 

(alteration in original)(quoting United States v. CintrónEchautegui, 604 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010)). "It is not enough 

that a finding strikes us as possibly or even probably wrong." 

Díaz-Alarcón, 944 F.3d at 312 (emphasis omitted). To the extent 

that the district court interpreted and applied the Hague 

Convention, we review de novo. Id. 

III. ANALYSIS 

Avendano challenges two aspects of the district court's 

decision: (1) the district court's conclusion that G* met the 

mature child exception to the Hague Convention's return mandate 
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and (2) the district court's finding that Balza did not unduly 

influence G*'s viewpoint. 

A. The Mature Child Exception to the Hague Convention 

Avendano claims that the district court erred in 

determining that G* was of sufficient age and maturity for the 

court to consider his wishes regarding his return to Venezuela. 

She points to various pieces of evidence in the record that she 

argues support a conclusion that G* was not sufficiently mature to 

have his views considered. Further, Avendano contends that the 

district court improperly considered G*'s age at the time of the 

court proceedings rather than "at the time he was wrongfully 

retained in the United States." 

The Hague Convention applies only to children under the 

age of sixteen. Hague Convention, art. 4. However, it does not 

set an age at which a child is considered to be sufficiently 

mature; rather, the determination is to be made on a case by case 

basis. See Pérez–Vera Report at 433 ("[A]ll efforts to agree on 

a minimum age at which the views of the child could be taken into 

account failed, since all the ages suggested seemed artificial, 

even arbitrary."). The Hague Convention purposefully leaves these 

determinations "to the discretion of the competent authorities." 

Id.; see also id. at 460 ("[T]he very nature of [Article 13] 

exceptions gives judges a discretion – and does not impose upon 

them a duty – to refuse to return a child in certain 
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circumstances."). Other Circuits have upheld analyses by district 

courts requiring both that the child wishes to stay in the United 

States and objects to being returned. See, e.g., Tann v. Bennett, 

648 F. App'x 146, 149 n.3 (2d Cir. 2016); Tsai-Yi Yang v. FuChiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 279 (3d Cir. 2007). 

The district court examined "whether G*, who will be 

twelve years old in March 2020, is sufficiently mature to have his 

views taken into account and if so, whether his views should carry 

the day." The district court heard testimony from experts and 

witnesses familiar with G* and both his current and former living 

conditions. On appeal, Avendano argues that the district court 

ignored testimony of G*'s Guardian Ad Litem and Avendano's 

witnesses. Contrary to Avendano's claims, however, the district 

court considered the testimony of the Guardian Ad Litem at length,

and weighed the credibility of the various experts based on the 

amount of time they spent with G*. Finally, the district court 

personally interviewed G* in the offices of G*'s Guardian Ad Litem. 

Upon examination of this evidence, the district court determined 

that Balza "established by a preponderance of the evidence that G* 

is a mature child, whose desire to stay with his father in the 

United States should at least be considered." The district court 

further concluded that "G* not only prefers to live in the United 

States, but also objects to being returned to Venezuela." The 

district court noted that, while G* had positive and negative 
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things to say about living in Venezuela and now living in the 

United States, G*'s desire to remain was "very clear, consistent, 

and rational." 

There is no support in the Hague Convention or our 

caselaw to support Avendano's claim that the district court should 

have considered G*'s age retrospectively to the time he was 

retained in the United States. On the contrary, the Hague 

Convention ceases to apply once the child reaches the age of 

sixteen regardless of whether the child was wrongfully removed or 

retained prior to that date. Hague Convention, art. 4. We agree 

with Balza that "[i]t defies logic that a court would be required 

to return a child it currently viewed as sufficiently mature over 

their earnest objections simply because the child may have been 

less mature a few months earlier." 

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err 

in declining to return G* to Venezuela. As we have noted, the 

Hague Convention leaves the mature child determination to the 

discretion of courts.3 See Hague Convention, art. 13; Pérez–Vera 

Report at 433. The district court thoughtfully considered the age 

and maturity of G* and concluded that G* was of the age and maturity 

to have his views regarding his return to Venezuela considered. 

3 For this reason, we also reject Avendano's proposal that we 

adopt objective criteria by which a court should evaluate a child's 

maturity. 
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We afford deference to the district court's decision, in part based 

on its personal interview with G*, that G* was of sufficient age 

and maturity to have his views considered. See Díaz-Alarcón, 944 

F.3d at 315 (affirming lower court decision pursuant to the Hague 

Convention primarily on the basis of the deference to district 

court's discretion and expertise as the finder of fact); see also 

United States v. Young, 105 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Deference 

to the district court's findings of fact reflects our awareness 

that the trial judge, who hears the testimony, observes the 

witnesses' demeanor and evaluates the facts first hand, sits in 

the best position to determine what actually happened."). Thus, 

based on the record before us, we will not disturb the district 

court's finding that G* was sufficiently mature. 

B. Undue Influence 

Avendano also claims that the district court erred in 

considering G*'s wishes prior to analyzing whether Balza exerted 

undue influence over G*. Specifically, Avendano contends that the 

district court "failed to weigh all of the available evidence 

regarding [Balza's] influence and brainwashing of the child prior 

to considering his wishes." Avendano discusses in detail eight 

pieces of evidence that ostensibly indicate that Balza had undue 
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influence over G*, including Balza's testimony, allegations of 

conversations between Balza and G*, and Avendano's testimony. 

The Hague Convention is silent on undue influence and 

instead emphasizes the discretion of the deciding authority in 

applying the mature child exception. See Pérez–Vera Report at 

433. The State Department's analysis of the Hague Convention notes 

that the court's discretion in applying the age and maturity 

exception is important in light of the "potential for brainwashing 

of the child by the alleged abductor." Hague International Child 

Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 

10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986) (Legal Analysis). Specifically, "[a] 

child's objection to being returned may be accorded little if any 

weight if the court believes that the child's preference is the 

product of the abductor parent's undue influence over the child." 

Id. In short, the possibility of undue influence over the child 

is one consideration in the competent authority's assessment of 

whether a child is of the age and maturity to have their views 

considered. 

The district court noted that it was undisputed that G* 

wanted to stay with Balza in the United States and that "he has 

seemingly not waivered [sic] in his decision." The district court 

then concluded that "G*'s desire to stay in the United States does 

not appear to be the result of undue influence or coaching by 

Balza." In so determining, it pointed to testimony from the 
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Guardian Ad Litem, testimony from Balza, and the court's own 

interview with G*. The district court rejected Avendano's claims 

that Balza unduly influenced G* both by questioning the truth of 

Avendano's testimony and by concluding that, even if Avendano's 

allegations were true, they would not rise to the level of undue 

influence. In determining that there was no undue influence, the 

district court noted that "G* feels like he is free to choose for 

himself whether he wants to stay in the United States or return to 

Venezuela," regardless of the truth of that belief in light of 

conditions in Venezuela and the strained relationship between 

Avendano and Balza. Finally, in concluding that G* wished to 

remain in the United States, the court noted "that current living 

conditions in Venezuela" were relevant to G*'s desire to remain in 

the United States even though the district court ultimately did 

not find it necessary to decide Balza's claim that G* would face 

grave conditions if returned to Venezuela. 

The district court did not clearly err in determining 

that Balza did not unduly influence G*'s desire to remain in the 

United States and his objection to returning to Venezuela. The 

analysis provided by the district court shows that it considered 

all the relevant evidence.4 The district court did in fact consider 

4 We note that, for purposes of appellate review, it is useful 

for a district court to separately analyze any claims of undue 

influence apart from analyzing the child's age and maturity. For 

example, identifying the specific allegations of undue influence, 
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the evidence cited by Avendano on this issue. The district court 

acknowledged Balza's wrongful conduct and concluded that Avendano 

made out a prima facie case of wrongful retention. A fundamental 

purpose of the Hague Convention is to protect children from 

wrongful international removals or retentions by persons 

determined to obtain their physical or legal custody. Pérez–Vera 

Report at 430. However, the Pérez–Vera Report also makes clear 

that a child's objection outweighs this general objective. Id. at 

433. Thus, the court's conclusion that G* met the mature child 

exception after the court met with G* and rejected Avendano's 

allegations of Balza's undue influence should be afforded 

deference. See Díaz-Alarcón, 944 F.3d at 315; Young, 105 F.3d at 

5. 

Furthermore, the district court did not rely solely upon 

G*'s expressed desire to remain in the United States and objection 

to being returned to Venezuela. The district court's ruling was 

also supported by socio-political conditions in Venezuela and G*'s 

continued access to and communication with Avendano in deciding to 

retain G* in the United States. In sum, the district court's age 

and maturity decision properly considered Balza's influence over 

what level of influence may be present, and what influence, if 

any, was proven would clarify findings relevant to influence over 

the child. Because the district court analyzed all relevant 

evidence of undue influence and rejected such a conclusion, we 

discern no error in the district court's decision. 
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G* and, based on the totality of the circumstances, the court did 

not clearly err or abuse its discretion in declining to order G*'s 

return to Venezuela. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

As the district court observed, "G* loves both of his 

parents" and both parents "love him very much."5 We conclude that 

in its analysis of a wrenching set of circumstances, the district 

court did not clearly err in rejecting a claim that Balza unduly 

influenced G* and in determining that G* was of the age and 

maturity to state his viewpoint that he should remain in the United 

States and not return to Venezuela. The district court properly 

exercised its discretion in refusing Avendano's petition for 

return of G* to Venezuela. Therefore, the district court's 

decision is Affirmed.

5 As the district court elaborated: 

Nothing in the [c]ourt's decision should be taken as 

commentary about which parent has a better relationship 

with their son, loves him more, or would be the better 

parent. G* is lucky enough to have two caring and 

devoted parents. The [c]ourt's decision is limited to 

the determination that G* is a mature child, who has 

decided that he wants to stay in the United States. 

Although he loves Venezuela and his mother, G* 

recognizes the unrest in his home country and does not 

want to live there. This is not an irrational decision. 

It is therefore up to the courts of this country to 

determine how best to navigate any custody decisions.