DRUG CONTROL

DEA’s Strategies and

Operations in the 1990s

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin

Director, Administration of Justice Issues

General Government Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Crime

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

9:30 a.m. EDT

on Thursday

July 29, 1999

GAO/T-GGD-99-149

Statement 

Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and

Operations in the 1990s

Page 1 GAO/T-GGD-99-149

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our recently

completed comprehensive review of the Drug Enforcement

Administration’s (DEA) strategies and operations in the 1990s. We

undertook this work at the request of this Subcommittee and the Senate

Caucus on International Narcotics Control. As agreed with the

Subcommittee and the Caucus, we focused our work primarily on

determining (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives,

and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its

mission; and (2) whether DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, programs

and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the Office of

National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) National Drug Control Strategy.

Also, as requested, we reviewed how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998

staffing needs and allocated the additional staff.

My statement is based on and will outline the detailed results of our July

21, 1999 report1

 (which I would now like to submit for the record). Overall,

we determined that, consistent with its mission, DEA enhanced or changed

important aspects of its operations during the 1990s, including expanding

its focus to target local drug dealers in addition to major drug trafficking

organizations. In this regard:

• DEA expanded its domestic enforcement operations to work more with

state and local law enforcement agencies and help combat drug-related

violence in local communities.

• DEA implemented an investigative approach focusing on intercepting the

communications of major drug traffickers.

• DEA enhanced its foreign operations by (1) participating in two

interagency programs to target major drug trafficking organizations in

Latin America and Asia and (2) screening and training special foreign

police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign countries.

We also determined that DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, and

enhanced programs and initiatives, in the 1990s were consistent with the

National Drug Control Strategy. However, DEA has not developed

measurable performance targets for its programs and initiatives that are

consistent with those adopted for the National Strategy.

I will now briefly outline the results of our work.

 

1

 Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s (GAO/GGD-99-108, July 21, 1999).
Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s

Page 2 GAO/T-GGD-99-149

As you know, DEA has significant responsibilities for the drug supply

reduction portion of ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy. DEA’s

overall mission is to enforce the nation’s drug laws and regulations and to

bring drug traffickers to justice. DEA is the lead agency responsible for

enforcing the federal drug control laws and for coordinating and pursuing

U.S. drug investigations in foreign countries. DEA’s primary

responsibilities include (1) investigating major drug traffickers operating

at interstate and international levels and criminals and drug gangs who

perpetrate violence in local communities; (2) managing a national drug

intelligence system; (3) seizing and forfeiting traffickers’ assets; (4)

coordinating and cooperating with federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies on mutual drug enforcement efforts; and (5)

carrying out, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and U.S.

Ambassadors, programs associated with drug law enforcement

counterparts in foreign countries.

Funding for all federal drug control efforts has increased by about 49

percent, in constant 1999 dollars, in the 1990s to the fiscal year 1999 level

of about $18 billion. Funding for DEA almost doubled, in constant dollars,

from about $806 million in fiscal year 1990 to about $1.5 billion in fiscal

year 1999. The number of DEA staff increased from about 6,000 in fiscal

year 1990 to about 8,400 in fiscal year 1998.

Nevertheless, during the 1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs

have persisted at very high levels and have continued to adversely affect

American society. For example, on the basis of the National Household

Survey on Drug Abuse, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services

Administration estimated that in 1997 there were 13.9 million current

users2

 of illegal drugs in the United States aged 12 and older, representing

6.4 percent of the total population. This number has fluctuated somewhat

but has remained fairly constant overall since 1990, as have the numbers of

current users of cocaine and marijuana, with 1.5 million cocaine users and

11.1 million marijuana users in 1997.

Also, a report prepared for ONDCP showed that drug users in the United

States spent an estimated $57 billion for illegal drugs in 1995.3

 ONDCP, in

its 1999 National Drug Control Strategy, noted that illegal drugs cost our

 

2

 A current user is an individual who consumed an illegal drug in the month prior to being interviewed.

3

 What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988-1995; prepared for the Office of National Drug

Control Policy by William Rhodes, Stacia Langenbahn, Ryan Kling, and Paul Scheiman; September 29,

1997.

Background
Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s

Page 3 GAO/T-GGD-99-149

society approximately $110 billion annually. The societal costs include lost

jobs and productivity, health problems, and economic hardships to

families. In addition, many violent crimes are drug related, according to

ONDCP.

Drug trafficking organizations have continued to supply drug users in the

United States despite short-term achievements by DEA and other law

enforcement agencies in apprehending drug traffickers and disrupting the

flow of drugs. In the 1990s, DEA pointed to many drug enforcement

accomplishments. But, despite these accomplishments, national and

international drug trafficking organizations continued to smuggle large

amounts of illegal drugs, including cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and

methamphetamine, into the United States. In addition, methamphetamine,

a powerful stimulant that has had a devastating impact in many cities

across the nation during the 1990s, is clandestinely produced in this

country; and marijuana is grown here. Local gangs and individuals deal in

these and other drugs in local communities and have caused violence in

doing so.

Since it was established in 1973, DEA’s top priority has been to disrupt and

dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. During the 1990s, DEA

broadened the focus of its enforcement operations. DEA now focuses on

what it calls the “seamless continuum” of drug trafficking, with programs

and initiatives directed at major regional, national, and international

trafficking organizations; violent, street-level drug gangs and other local

community problems; and domestically cultivated and manufactured

illegal drugs.

During the 1990s, DEA, primarily through its Kingpin Strategy and then its

Special Operations Division, increased its emphasis on intercepting

communications between top-level drug traffickers and their subordinates

to identify and target the leaders and dismantle their operations. This

resulted in a 183-percent increase, from fiscal years 1990 through 1998, in

the number of electronic surveillance court orders requested and

conducted by DEA.

DEA also started working with other federal agencies on two programs—

the Linear Approach and Linkage Approach Programs—to target and

investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia,

respectively. In 1996, to improve its effectiveness in several key foreign

countries, DEA began to screen and train special foreign police units. The

intent of this effort is to improve the capabilities of foreign police and to

DEA’s Enforcement

Operations Reach From the

International Level to the

Local Level
Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s

Page 4 GAO/T-GGD-99-149

build trustworthy and reliable foreign antidrug units with which DEA

works.

At the same time, DEA attempted to improve its effectiveness in

addressing the “seamless continuum” of drug trafficking by giving

domestic drug trafficking a higher priority, including focusing resources on

regional and “local impact” drug problems. In this regard, during the 1990s,

DEA devoted more resources to its State and Local Task Force Program.

Also, in 1995, DEA established the Mobile Enforcement Team Program to

assist local police with violent drug gangs and other local drug problems.

DEA’s strategic goals and objectives and its enhanced programs and

initiatives in the 1990s have been consistent with the National Drug

Control Strategy. Both the National Strategy and DEA hope to reduce the

illegal drug supply and drug-related crime and violence by disrupting and

dismantling domestic and international drug trafficking organizations.

The principal objectives in the National Drug Control Strategy relating to

DEA are:

• combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal organizations, and arrest

the leaders of illegal drug syndicates; and

• disrupt and dismantle major international drug trafficking organizations

and arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their leaders.

For domestic drug trafficking organizations, the National Strategy calls for

increasing by 5 points the percentage of drug trafficking organizations

disrupted or dismantled by 2002 as measured against the percentage

recorded in the base year using a prioritized list of designated targets. It

calls for at least a 10 percentage point increase above the base year by

2007.

For international drug trafficking organizations, the National Strategy calls

for achieving by 2002 a 50 percent success rate in the number of

organizations disrupted or dismantled as measured against a designated

target list established in the base year. The Strategy also calls for

increasing the success rate to 100 percent by 2007 as measured against the

base year list. According to ONDCP and DEA, neither the domestic nor

international designated target lists referred to above have been

developed.

Unlike the National Strategy, DEA’s performance plans for fiscal years

1999 and 2000 do not contain performance targets for assessing its

DEA Has Not Yet

Developed Performance

Targets Consistent With the

National Strategy
Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s

Page 5 GAO/T-GGD-99-149

progress in disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. DEA

has no annual, mid-, or long-range measurable performance targets for

disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. In commenting

on a draft of our report, DEA indicated that (1) it had developed

preliminary performance targets for inclusion in its fiscal year 2001 budget

submission to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and (2) it could not finalize

its targets and measures until the responsible federal agencies complete a

designated targeted list of international drug trafficking organizations, as

called for in the National Strategy. Nevertheless, in the absence of finalized

performance targets, it is difficult to quantitatively assess DEA’s overall

effectiveness in achieving its strategic goals.

In order to carry out its mission and operations during the 1990s, including

the programs and initiatives I have mentioned, DEA received funds to staff

its operations through various sources, including its annual appropriations

salaries and expenses budget, as well as DOJ’s Violent Crime Reduction

Program4

 and other reimbursable programs, such as the Organized Crime

Drug Enforcement Task Force Program. Our report discusses in detail the

process used in fiscal year 1998 to determine and allocate additional DEA

positions provided through its salaries and expenses budget. DEA and DOJ

officials considered this process to be generally typical of the process DEA

has used in other years.

The fiscal year 1998 DEA staffing needs determination process was

systematically linked to its budget formulation process. It was typical of

and consistent with the processes and procedures that federal agencies are

expected to follow, according to federal laws and regulations and

procedures promulgated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Moreover, the process considered factors related to DEA’s ability to carry

out its mission, including emerging drug abuse and trafficking trends,

staffing requests from the field, the DEA Administrator’s vision statement,

and the Special Agent in Charge’s vision statement from each field office.

DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission to DOJ estimated the need for a

total of 989 new positions, including 399 special agent positions. As a

result of reviews by DOJ, OMB, and ONDCP and consideration of the

resources provided in DEA’s fiscal year 1997 appropriation,5 the President’s

fiscal year 1998 budget, which was submitted to Congress in February

 

4

 The Violent Crime Reduction Program was established by the Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322, as amended).

5

 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation

Act, 1997, P.L. 104-208 and H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863 (1996).

DEA’s Fiscal Year 1998

Staffing Needs

Determination Process Was

Consistent with Federal

Processes and Procedures
Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s

Page 6 GAO/T-GGD-99-149

1997, requested a total of 345 new positions for DEA, including 168 special

agent positions. In its fiscal year 1998 DEA appropriation, Congress

provided 531 additional positions, of which 240 were special agent

positions, with guidance as to how the positions were to be allocated.

Then, DEA senior management systematically determined the allocation of

the additional staff to headquarters and field offices, taking into

consideration congressional guidance and such factors as field office

requests.

Mr. Chairman, let me close by emphasizing that although DEA’s strategic

goals and objectives, as well as its enhanced programs and initiatives, are

consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy, DEA has not

developed measurable performance targets for disrupting and dismantling

drug trafficking organizations. Without such performance targets, it is

difficult for DEA, the Department of Justice, Congress, and the public to

quantitatively assess (1) how effective DEA has been in using resources

provided by Congress to achieve its strategic goals and (2) the extent to

which DEA’s programs and initiatives in the 1990s have contributed to

reducing the illegal drug supply. Measurable performance targets would

also help in determining what DEA resources, including staff, are needed

and how resources should be allocated and used to produce the expected

results of DEA’s strategies, goals, programs, and initiatives.

In this regard, our report recommended that the Attorney General direct

the DEA Administrator to work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop

measurable DEA performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug

trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets in the

National Drug Control Strategy.

This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased

to answer any questions.

Contact and Acknowledgment

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Norman J.

Rabkin at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this

testimony included Daniel C. Harris, Ronald G. Viereck, Samuel A.

Caldrone, Lemuel N. Jackson, and Barbara A. Stolz.

Conclusions and

Recommendation
Page 7 GAO/T-GGD-99-149
Page 8 GAO/T-GGD-99-149
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