alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RESILIENT FLOOR COVERING

PENSION TRUST FUND BOARD OF

TRUSTEES; RESILIENT FLOOR

COVERING PENSION TRUST FUND, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 v.

MICHAEL’S FLOOR COVERING,

INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16749

D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05200-JSC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jacqueline Scott Corley, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 5, 2017

San Francisco, California

Before: KOZINSKI and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and KEELEY,

**

District Judge.

 

FILED

DEC 18 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Irene M. Keeley, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
page 2

1. The district court didn’t err in holding appellants must show that

Michael’s Floor Covering, Inc. (“MFC”) had notice of Studer’s Floor Covering

Inc.’s (“SFC”) withdrawal liability prior to becoming SFC’s successor to impose

withdrawal liability on MFC. See Resilient Floor Covering Pension Tr. Fund

Bd. of Trs. v. Michael’s Floor Covering, Inc., 801 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 2015). 

2. In employment cases, “[t]he principle [sic] reason for the notice

requirement is to ensure fairness by guaranteeing that a successor had an

opportunity to protect against liability by negotiating a lower price or indemnity

clause.” Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1995). Appellants

argue that MFC had sufficient notice because it knew that some of SFC’s

employees were unionized and SFC contributed to a pension fund. Appellants also

claim that MFC had notice because a Resilient Floor Covering Pension Trust Fund

trustee told MFC’s owner that “if the pension was fully funded as of today, I would

go non-union the next day.” But this trustee was the owner of an entirely separate

business in a different city and there’s no evidence that he had any ownership stake

in MFC or SFC. These facts fail to show that MFC had notice of SFC’s

withdrawal liability or “had an opportunity to protect against [it.]” Id.

AFFIRMED.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DONALD L. McCORMICK, 

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Action 2:10-CV-1115

Judge Frost

Magistrate Judge King 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

ORDER

On February 1, 2012, the United States Magistrate Judge

recommended that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

be reversed and the action be remanded for further consideration of

plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain. Report and Recommendation,

Doc. No. 18. Although the parties were advised of their right to file

objections, and of the consequences of their failure to do so, there

has been no objection.

The Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. The

decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to

the Commissioner of Social Security for further consideration of

plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain.

The Clerk shall enter FINAL JUDGMENT pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

 /s/ Gregory L. Frost 

 Gregory L. Frost

 United States District Judge 

Case: 2:10-cv-01115-GLF-NMK Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/22/12 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of PinstripesNY, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Clifford Teller, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Clifford Teller

Clifford Teller

Principal Financial Officer

June 28, 2011
JEROME GEE,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

___________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-2294

Opinion filed October 16, 2014.

Petition for Belated Appeal -- Original Jurisdiction.

Jerome Gee, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking a belated appeal of the order denying motion for 

postconviction relief rendered November 22, 2013, in Leon County Circuit Court case 

number 2005-CF-1524 is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion 

shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal. 

THOMAS, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., CONCUR.
an evidentiary hearing, wherein Castillo's former counsel testified that 

she advised Castillo to waive the hearing because certification as an adult 

was a virtual certainty due to his use of a firearm and therefore 

negotiating an agreement with the State was the best option available. 

During argument, post-conviction counsel conceded that it was a "big 

stretch" to suggest that Castillo would not have been certified as an adult 

and stated she raised the claim to demonstrate his "unsophisticated view 

of the criminal justice system" and bolster her argument regarding 

mitigation. Because of this, and because Castillo admitted that he was 

satisfied with the negotiations, the district court denied this claim as 

moot. The district court also concluded that Castillo failed to demonstrate 

deficiency or prejudice. The record supports the district court's 

determinations, and we conclude that it did not err by denying this claim. 

See NRS 62B.390(2)(a)(2) (in most cases, the juvenile court shall certify a 

child as an adult if he is charged with an offense involving the use of a 

firearm), see also Doleman v. State, 112 Nev. 843, 848, 921 P.2d 278, 280- 

81 (1996) (counsel's tactical decisions are virtually unchallengeable). 

Second, Castillo contends that the district court erred by 

denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present 

witnesses at sentencing to testify about Castillo's low intelligence, 

cognitive immaturity, and troubled upbringing. After hearing testimony 

from the newly offered witnesses, the district court concluded that Castillo 

failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice because trial counsel had 

presented mitigation evidence and the sentence would not have been 

different had he presented the new witnesses. The record supports the 

district court's determinations, and we conclude that it did not err by 

denying this claim. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A 
J. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.' 

, J. 

Hardesty 

)%143 J. 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge 

Mary Lou Wilson 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

'The fast track statement submitted by Castillo fails to comply with 

NRAP 3C(h)(1) because the footnotes are not "in the same size and 

typeface as the body of the brief," NRAP 32(a)(5). Counsel is cautioned 

that future failure to comply with this court's briefing requirements may 

result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A
Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 , th e court has determined that this o pinion should not * be publishe d an d is not precede nt except under the limit ed circu mstance s set forth in 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 .4. 

### INTHE UNI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FORTHE FIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 08- 41019 Su m m ar y Cal endar
UN I TE D S TA TE S OF AM ERI CA P l ai n t i f f

- A pp el l ee
v. GUADALUPE REYNA- M EDI NA D e fe nda nt
- Appe l l ant

A pp ealf

rom t h e U n i t ed S t ates D i st ri ctC ou rt f or t h e S ou t h ern D i st ri ctof T exas U SD C N o. 2: 05- C R

- 540- 1
B ef ore K IN G , ST E W A R T , an d H AY N E S , C i rcui tJu dg es. P E R C U R I A M: * T h e att orney app oi n t ed to represent G uad al upe R eyn a- M edi n a ha s m oved f o rl e av e t o w i t h draw a n d has f i l e d a b r i e f

i n a c c o r da nc e w i t h A nder s v. C a lif o rn ia , 3 86 U
. S. 7 38 ( 19 67 )
. Rey n a- M edi na ha s no tf i l e d a r e s po ns e . Our i nde pe nde ntr e vi e w o f t he r e c o r d a nd c o uns e l ’ s b r i e f di s c l o s e s no no nf

r i vo l o us is s u e fo ra p p e a l. A c c o r d i n g ly , co u n s e l’ s m o tio n fo rle a v e to w ith d r a w is GRANTED, c o u n s e l i s e x c u s e d f r o m f u r t h e r r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s h e r e i n , a nd t he A P P E A L IS D IS M IS S E D
. S ee5 T H C IR . R. 42. 2. United States Court of App eals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D Jul y 21, 2009 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I Clerk
No. 56520.

protest 162910-K (Ogdensburg).

#### E. Dillingham, Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Lawrence, J.

It was stipulated that the goods in controversy at the time of entry were articles of which metal was the component material of chief value and were not ores or concentrates or crude metal; that said articles were imported to be used in remanufacture by melting; and that since entry, said articles were melted and remanufactured by melting. An examination of the papers disclosed that affidavits have been filed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Public Law 869, *supra.*Upon the record presented, it was held that the merchandise comes within the provisions of Public Law 869, *supra,*and is properly entitled to free entry.
# C_2007199EN.01002301.xml

| 25.8.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 199/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.8.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 199/23

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) (United Kingdom) made on 14 June 2007 — The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs v Isle of Wight Council, Mid-Suffolk District Council, South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council, West Berkshire District Council

(Case C-288/07)

(2007/C 199/35)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

High Court of Justice (Chancery Division)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs

Applicant:

Defendants: Isle of Wight Council, Mid-Suffolk District Council, South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council, West Berkshire District Council

Defendants:

Questions referred

| 1. | Is the expression ‘distortions of competition’ to be ascertained on a public body by public body basis such that, in the context of the present case, it should be determined by reference to the area or areas where the particular body in question provides off-street parking or by reference to the totality of the national territory of the Member States? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is the expression ‘distortions of competition’ to be ascertained on a public body by public body basis such that, in the context of the present case, it should be determined by reference to the area or areas where the particular body in question provides off-street parking or by reference to the totality of the national territory of the Member States?

| 2. | What is meant by the expression ‘would lead to’? In particular, what degree of probability or level of certainty is required for that condition to be satisfied? |
| --- | --- |

2.

What is meant by the expression ‘would lead to’? In particular, what degree of probability or level of certainty is required for that condition to be satisfied?

| 3. | What is meant by the word ‘significant’? In particular, does ‘significant’ mean an effect on competition that is more than trivial or de minimis, a ‘material’ effect or an ‘exceptional’ effect? |
| --- | --- |

3.

What is meant by the word ‘significant’? In particular, does ‘significant’ mean an effect on competition that is more than trivial or de minimis, a ‘material’ effect or an ‘exceptional’ effect?

de minimis

---
# C_2007155EN.01001202.xml

| 7.7.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 155/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.7.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 155/12

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 24 April 2007 — Verlag Schawe GmbH v Sächsisches Druck- und Verlagshaus AG

(Case C-215/07)

(2007/C 155/23)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Verlag Schawe GmbH

Applicant:

Defendant: Sächsisches Druck- und Verlagshaus AG

Defendant:

Questions referred

| 1. | Do Article 7(1) and (5) and Article 9 of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases (1) prohibit a legal provision of a Member State, according to which an official database which is published as a matter of general information for official purposes (in this instance: a systematic and complete collection of all calls for tender documents emanating from a German Land) does not benefit from sui generis protection under the directive? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Do Article 7(1) and (5) and Article 9 of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases (1) prohibit a legal provision of a Member State, according to which an official database which is published as a matter of general information for official purposes (in this instance: a systematic and complete collection of all calls for tender documents emanating from a German Land) does not benefit from sui generis protection under the directive?

1

Land

sui generis

| 2. | If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative: is this also the case where the database is constructed not by a public body but by a private undertaking on its behalf, to which all bodies of this Land issuing calls for tender must directly submit their calls for tender documents for publication? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative: is this also the case where the database is constructed not by a public body but by a private undertaking on its behalf, to which all bodies of this Land issuing calls for tender must directly submit their calls for tender documents for publication?

Land

---

(1)  OJ 1996 L 77, p. 20.

1

---
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 60343 Summary Calendar

NAKIA RESHEA SUTTON , Plaintiff

- Appellant

v. DALE CASKEY; SANDRA ATWOOD; UNKNOWN CARMICHAEL; BART GRIMES , Defendant s
- Appellee s

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 4:10

- CV

- 39

Before REAVLEY, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Nakia Reshea Sutton, Mississippi prisoner # R4655, appeals from the summary judgment dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint in
which he alleged that the defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his
medical needs . He also moves f or the appointment of counsel and to correct
the record

.

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED April 9, 2014 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-60343 Document: 00512590023 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/09/2014No. 13

- 60343

This court must examine the basis for its jurisdiction on its own motion. Mosley v. Cozby , 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). In a civil case, a timely notice of appeal is “mandatory and jurisdicti onal.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Sutton’s notice of appeal, filed more than 30 days after the denial of his timely motion to alter and amend judgme nt under Federal Rule of Civi l Procedure 59(e), is untimely. See F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 4(a)( 1 )(A) , (a)(4)(A). Thus, this court lacks jurisdiction over the instant appeal, and the appeal is DISMISSED. See Bowles , 551 U.S. at 214. Sutton’s motion s for the appointment of counsel and to correct the record are DENIED.

2 Case: 13-60343 Document: 00512590023 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/09/2014
Exhibit 31.1

RULE 13a-14(d) Certification

 

I, In-Young Chase, certify that:

 

1.	     I have reviewed this report on Form 10–K and all reportson Form 10–D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10–K of SATURNS Trust No.2010-01 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

 

2.      	Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports,taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3.	     Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicingand other information required to be provided under Form 10–D for the period covered by this report is included in the ExchangeAct periodic reports;

 

4.      	Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement(s)required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer,The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee of SATURNS Trust No. 2010-01, has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement,which is the Trust Agreement relating to SATURNS Trust No. 2010-01; and

 

5. 	     All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicingcriteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteriafor asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange ActRules 13a–18 and 15d–18 have been included as an exhibit to this report. Any material instances of noncompliance describedin such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10–K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied oninformation provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: The Bank of New York Mellon and its officers and agents.

 

 

 

By:	/s/In-YoungChase	

Name:	In-YoungChase
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the
Quarterly Report of First National Banc, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the Report), the
undersigned, Roscoe H. Mullis, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and David G. Moffat, President and Chief Operating Officer, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of our knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|    |  |                                                                   
|--- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------
|By: |  | /s/    Roscoe H. Mullis                                           
|    |  |                                                                   
|    |  | Roscoe H. Mullis Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer May 24, 2004



|                                                                                                               
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/    David G. Moffat                                                                                         
|                                                                                                               
|David G. Moffat President and Chief Operating
Officer (principal financial and accounting officer) May 24,
2004
June 25, 1940

No. 44080.

#### Protests 759320-G, etc., of Atlas Marine Co. et al.

C. D. 216. Plaintiffs’ application for rehearing granted.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v PATRICK F. MAWHINNEY, Seaman, U. S. Navy, Appellant

11 USCMA 350, 29 CMR 166

*351No. 13,715

Decided March 25, 1960

*Lieutenant Colonel R. G. Coyne,*USMC, was on the brief for Appellant,. Accused.

*Captain Warren C. Kiracofe,*USN, States. was on the brief for Appellee, United

Opinion of the Court

PER Curiam:

The accused was charged with a number of offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Two of the specifications allege that he wrongfully communicated a threat, in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 934. The words purporting to constitute the threat in the first specification are to the effect that the accused would “get” Seaman Apprentice K. D. Swanson upon his release from the brig. The allegation in the second specification is that the accused told L. A. Goodman “you done crossed me up, buddy; that could cost you your life. Yeah, you could die for that. You better not go to sleep at night without a knife under your pillow.”

At trial, one of the issues developed in the final arguments of counsel was whether each of the communications constituted an avowed determination or intent to injure. However, neither the arguments nor the instructions of the president of the special court-martial clearly indicated that the communication must show a purpose to injure, not merely a purpose to commit any kind of a wrongful act. United States v Jenkins, 9 USCMA 381, 26 CMR 161. As a result, the threat offenses were “submitted to the court members under insufficient instructions.” United States v DeMaris, 8 USCMA 750, 752, 25 CMR 254. The inadequacy, however, does not affect both specifications. As-we pointed out in the *Jenkins*case, supra, an overly-broad definition of the-kind of declaration that constitutes a. threat is not prejudicial, if the declaration charged shows a promise of injury to a person and the circumstances indicate that the court members could not have been misled as to what they had to find in order to convict the accused. On the other hand, if the words used are equivocal in meaning and can be' reasonably construed as indicating a purpose to commit any kind of a wrongful act, reversal is required. In the-*Jenkins*case we noted that a declaration to “get” someone is equivocal in meaning, while a statement that the declarant is going to kill another manifestly shows a purpose to injure. Applying the rule of the *Jenkins*case to' the instant situation, it is clear that the specification alleging the communication to Goodman must be affirmed, whereas that relating to Swanson must be reversed.

The findings of guilty of specification 1, Charge II, are set aside and the specification is ordered dismissed. The sentence is set aside and the record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General for reference to the board of review for reassessment of the sentence upon the basis of the remaining findings of guilty.
yearID sourceTypeID sourceTypePopulation

2024 11 42327 2024 21 480603 2024 31 259551 2024 32 86712 2024 41 453 2024 42 225 2024 43 3005 2024 51 142 2024 52 20468 2024 53 3274 2024 54 4895 2024 61 2531 2024 62 3698