No. 13-14-200-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT CORPUS CHRISTI

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLANT

v.

RHONDA ROMBS, 

APPELLEE.

ON APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2

NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

(STATE’S APPEAL)

Christopher L. Morrell

State Bar No. 24077383

Assistant District Attorney

105th Judicial District of Texas

901 Leopard, Room 206

Corpus Christi, Texas 78401

(361) 888-0410

(361) 888-0700 (fax) 

christopher.morrell@co.nueces.tx.us

Attorney for Appellant 

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

ACCEPTED

13-14-00200-CR

THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEAL

CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

2/10/2015 12:15:13 PM

DORIAN RAMIREZ

CLERK

 FILED IN 13th COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS 2/10/2015 12:15:13 PM DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Clerk
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS

State’s Trial Attorney:

Matthew S. Manning

State Bar No. 24075847

Assistant District Attorney

105th Judicial District of Texas

901 Leopard, Room 206

Corpus Christi, Texas 78401

(361) 888-0410

(361) 888-0399 (fax)

matthew.manning@co.nueces.tx.us

State’s Appellate Attorney:

Christopher L. Morrell

State Bar No. 24077383

Assistant District Attorney

901 Leopard, Room 206

Corpus Christi, Texas 78401

(361) 888-0410

(361) 888-0700 (fax)

christopher.morrell@co.nueces.tx.us

Appellee:

Rhonda Rombs

7613 Baykal, Corpus Christi, TX 78411

361-290-9456

Appellee’s Trial Attorney:

Constance A. Luedicke

State Bar No. 12673300

5262 S. Staples St., Ste. 250, Corpus Christi, TX 78411

(361) 883-0838

cluedicke@sbcglobal.net

i
Appellee’s Appellate Attorney:

Stephen W. Byrne

State Bar No. 24050365

302 Rosebud Ave, Corpus Christi, TX 78404

(361) 877-2099

byrne.attorney@gmail.com

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS............................................. i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................1

ISSUES PRESENTED ....................................................................................1

Ground of Error

The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress, and

specifically, in concluding that Officer Durbin lacked consent to search 

the wallet.........................................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................................2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT..............................................................3

ARGUMENT...................................................................................................3

I. Appellate Jurisdiction......................................................................3

II. Appellate Standard of Review.......................................................3

III. Officer Durbin Had Consent to Search Rhonda Rombs’

Wallet....................................................................................................3

PRAYER..........................................................................................................6

RULE 9.4(i) CERTIFICATION......................................................................7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE........................................................................7

iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Amador v. State, 221 S. W.3d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). ..........................3

United States v. Battista, 876 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1989)..................................5

United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 1994).........................................4

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (1991)........................... 3, 4

Heald v. State, 492 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. 1986). ...................................................5

Lemons v. State, 298 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2009, pet. ref’d). ...........4

United States v. Mendoza—Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2003)...............4

United States v. Stapleton, 10 F.3d 582 (8th Cir. 1993)...................................4

Statutes & Rules

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 44.01(a)(5).........................................................3

iv
NO. 13-14-200-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, § COURT OF APPEALS

Appellant, §

§

V. § FOR THE THIRTEENTH 

§

RHONDA ROMBS, §

Appellee. § DISTRICT OF TEXAS

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

(STATE’S APPEAL)

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Rhonda Rombs was charged with possession of a dangerous drug by 

information on July 7, 2012 (CR p. 4). She filed a motion to suppress challenging 

the search which revealed the drug in question (CR p. 27), which the court granted 

(CR p. 28). The State filed a timely notice of appeal from this order (CR p. 29), 

and a timely request for findings of fact and conclusions of law (CR p. 32). 

Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the trial court (Supp. CR p. 

6-9).

ISSUES PRESENTED

Ground of Error

The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress, and 

specifically, in concluding that Officer Durbin lacked consent to search the 

wallet.

1
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On July 7, 2012, Officer Chance Durbin with the Corpus Christi Police 

Department was patrolling the area of Yorktown and Everhart streets when he 

observed two subjects, a female and a male, sitting outside a Stripes store (Supp. 

CR p. 4). The officer noticed that the female was crying and he wanted to 

investigate further to see if she was involved in a disturbance and to check the 

welfare of both of them (Supp. CR p. 4). As the officer approached appellee, he 

observed that she was actively crying, that her eyes were red, bloodshot, and that 

she was slurring her words (Supp. CR p. 4). 

Officer Durbin asked appellee what was going on and she advised that she 

was having a disturbance with her mother and that she and her roommate left that 

location and walked to the Stripes store (Supp. CR p. 5). The officer observed a 

purse sitting next to appellee and asked her, “If she minded if I took a look in her 

purse” (Supp. CR p. 5). The officer stated that in response to his request, she said, 

“Go ahead. I don’t mind” (Supp. CR p. 5). The officer picked up the purse and 

started looking through it and searching it (Supp. CR p. 5). Inside the purse, the 

officer found a closed woman’s wallet (Supp. CR p. 5). The officer opened the 

closed pocket of the wallet and found two and a half white pills (Supp. CR p. 5). 

At no point when officer Durbin was searching in the purse did Ms. Rombs rescind 

her consent (RR p. 9). 

2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress because the 

officer expressly had consent to search the contents of the purse, which included 

the wallet within that purse.

ARGUMENT

I. Appellate Jurisdiction.

The State is permitted to appeal the trial court’s order in this case under the 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 44.01(a)(5).

II. Appellate Standard of Review.

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed on appeal 

under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S. W.3d 666, 673 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Almost total deference is accorded to a trial court’s 

determination of the facts that the record supports. Id. When applying the law to 

the facts, appellate courts review the trial court’s ruling on those questions de 

novo. Id.

III. Officer Durbin Had Consent to Search Rhonda Rombs’ Wallet.

“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the 

Fourth Amendment is that of “objective” reasonableness-what would the typical 

reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 

suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991).

3
With regard to vehicle searches, if an officer makes a general request to 

search and the individual consents, knowing that there are unlocked containers in 

the car, the individual should expressly limit his consent to the vehicle but not the 

containers or, at the very least, object when the officer begins to open the 

container. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 484

(5th Cir. 1994); see also Lemons v. State, 298 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex. App.-Tyler 

2009, pet. ref’d). Of course, a person is free to limit the scope of the consent that 

he gives, Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252, but a person’s silence in the face of an officer’s 

further actions may imply consent to that further action. United States v. 

Stapleton, 10 F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, “[i]f the consent to 

search is entirely open-ended, a reasonable person would have no cause to believe 

that the search will be limited in some way.” United States v. Mendoza—

Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 670 (5th Cir. 2003). 

In the present case, at no time was Rhonda Rombs’s consent limited, and she 

freely gave the officer consent to search her purse. There is no tangible difference 

between allowing consent to search a purse and to search a wallet located inside 

that purse. Common expectations of privacy indicate that a person has the same 

general privacy interest in the things she puts in both her purse as in her wallet.

The wallet is simply a more convenient way to organize and carry money, driver’s 

license, credit cards and like objects, generally financial or for identification, 

4
whereas the open space in the purse is more suited to bulky items that would not fit 

in the wallet. Because both have the same general degree of expectation of 

privacy, permission to go into the purse would include permission to enter the 

wallet as well, absent some protestation at the time by the person giving 

permission or some lock on the wallet that would prevent easy access.

In other jurisdictions, similar searches have been upheld. See United States v. 

Battista, 876 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1989); Heald v. State, 492 N.E.2d 671, 680 (Ind. 

1986) (consent to search a container operates as a consent to search items found 

within the container which are pertinent to the investigation being conducted). In 

the present case, Officer Durbin was searching for possible drugs which could be 

the cause for the appearance of Rhonda’s intoxicated state. The drugs could and 

were found inside the wallet.

Also, the analysis applicable to luggage search cases is very helpful to 

determine the appropriateness of the search. Similar to the present case, luggage 

cases usually have health and hygiene products which are closed containers found 

inside luggage. A reasonable person who consents to a search of one of his bags 

would not expect the officer to repeat his request for consent before examining 

each new item encountered in the bag. See United States v. Battista, 876 F.2d 201 

(D.C.Cir.1989) (holding that consent to search luggage included consent to search 

several plastic bags contained therein and stating that the court refuses to turn such 

5
searches into games of “Mother-may-I”). That approach would be unduly 

burdensome, and inconsistent with the objective reasonableness standard 

established by the Supreme Court in Jimeno. 

Officer Durbin searched a closed wallet located inside Rhonda Rombs’s purse. 

He should not have to ask again if he can search Ms. Rombs’ wallet because she 

had already given consent to search her purse.

PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court of 

Appeals order of the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to suppress, 

and for all other relief to which the State shows itself justly entitled. 

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Christopher L. Morrell

Christopher L. Morrell

State Bar No. 24077383

Assistant District Attorney

901 Leopard, Room 206

Corpus Christi, Texas 78401

(361) 888-0410

(361) 888-0700 (fax)

christopher.morrell@co.nueces.tx.us

6
RULE 9.4 (i) CERTIFICATION

In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify 

that the number of words in this brief, excluding those matters listed in Rule 

9.4(i)(1), is 1,076.

/s/ Christopher L. Morrell

Christopher L. Morrell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a copy of this brief was emailed this 10th day of 

February, 2015, to Appellee’s attorney, Stephen W. Byrne, at his email of 

byrne.attorney@gmail.com.

/s/ Christopher L. Morrell

Christopher L. Morrell

7