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REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION: AN

EXAMINATION OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN

REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE (CARSI)

AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY

INITIATIVE (CBSI)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 19, 2013

Serial No. 113–74

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State 10

Ms. Liliana Ayalde, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................... 19

Mr. Mark Lopes, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin America 

and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development ..................... 30

Mr. Eric L. Olson, associate director, Latin America Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ................................................................ 47

Mr. Michael Shifter, president, Inter-American Dialogue ................................... 56

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Prepared statement ................................................................................................... 4

The Honorable William R. Brownfield: Prepared statement ............................... 12

Ms. Liliana Ayalde: Prepared statement ............................................................... 21

Mr. Mark Lopes: Prepared statement .................................................................... 32

Mr. Eric L. Olson: Prepared statement ................................................................. 50

Mr. Michael Shifter: Prepared statement .............................................................. 58

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

The Honorable Albio Sires, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New Jersey: Prepared statement .................................................................... 72

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 73

Written responses from the Honorable William R. Brownfield, Ms. Liliana 

Ayalde, and Mr. Mark Lopes to questions submitted for the record by 

the Honorable Matt Salmon ................................................................................ 75

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REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION: AN 

EXAMINATION OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN 

REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE (CARSI) 

AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY 

INITIATIVE (CBSI) 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:52 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. I would like to call this committee meeting to order. 

I would like to start by recognizing myself for a brief opening statement. I know we have kept everybody waiting for a long, long time. 

So I apologize. Work here at the House from time to time is that 

they call votes on the floor. And that is audacious, isn’t it, that 

they would expect that we would have to vote? But anyway, I believe some of the other committee members were planning on being 

here and will be here soon. 

I would like to welcome everybody here today to the second of 

our two-part series of hearings on regional security. As you may recall, a few weeks ago, we focused on the Merida Initiative and the 

direction in which our security cooperation with the world’s highest 

homicide rates, replacing Ciudad Juarez last year as the world’s 

most violent city. Poverty, crime, public corruption and a legacy of 

violence in the region have created a perfect storm that critically 

hampers economic growth and opportunity, luring youth into a 

seemingly endless cycle of crime and drug trafficking. 

This week we are going to delve into the security situation in 

Central America and the Caribbean Basin and examine programs 

we have undertaken in the region to deal with combating drug trafficking organizations to help the nations of both regions combat violence and criminality. The security situation in most countries of 

Central America and the Caribbean remains critical. Gangs and organized criminals continue to operate with impunity. Prisons are 

substandard, overcrowded. Corruption remains endemic. And the 

justice and law enforcement sector simply lack capacity. 

Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, known as the northern 

triangle, suffer from excessive violence. San Pedro Sula in Honduras has the world’s highest homicide rates. And interdiction 

2

alone has proven insufficient in dealing with serious problems that 

plague the region. Through CARSI and CBSI, the United States 

has led the effort in assisting the region to address the underlying 

causes of what seems like a regional point of no return. 

State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, 

INL, and USAID have put together a set of programs designed to 

help the region’s law enforcement agencies contend with the creeping presence of the Zetas and Sinaloa cartels, while enabling municipal and Federal police forces to acquire the appropriate tools 

necessary to minimize corruption and human rights violations. In 

addition, U.S. personnel have worked diligently with regional partners in an effort to bring effective and sustainable justice sector reforms to the region, while USAID has worked with local and regional nongovernmental organizations to enable communities to 

partner with the private sector, to take the citizen security and 

prevention bull by the horns, so to speak. 

I don’t doubt that our efforts are earnest, but I am looking forward to hearing from both panelists today whether those efforts 

have yielded measurable success and if the political will exists 

within Central American and Caribbean governments to press with 

real results. The horrifying statistics from the region underscore 

that our efforts are needed, but we are only making a dent in the 

problem at this point. We need dedicated and strong willed partners if we are to make progress. And progress cannot be made 

without a series of unwavering commitments to transparency, 

human rights, and grit from the governments of the region. 

As chairman of the subcommittee, I maintain that working with 

and assisting our neighbors in Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean to build the necessary capacity to deal with these challenges 

is in our national interest. Our region is interconnected not only 

geographically but culturally and economically. At the risk of 

sounding like a broken record, economic growth and prosperity in 

Central and South America will lead to more growth in prosperity 

in the United States. 

Regional security matters. Without security, the countries of 

Central America and the Caribbean will lack the ability to grow 

their economies, give their youth the opportunity and incentive to 

move to the next generation of peace and prosperity. 

And as you may know, I did serve in Congress previously from 

1995 to 2001. And I served on the Foreign Relations Committee 

then. So I have seen my fair share of summits and regional meetings where there is plenty of talk, good intentions, lofty goals, but 

often too little in terms of execution and follow-through. The people 

of the United States have always been generous and dedicated to 

helping our friends and neighbors through tough times. Even in 

this time of tight budgets Americans are kind enough and practical 

enough to remain engaged and help the region. That said, Americans rarely enjoy throwing good money after bad, and we have got 

to make sure that what we do works. 

I see our efforts in Central America and the Caribbean as important and they need to continue. I want the people of those nations 

to have a society that is free of corruption where law enforcement 

works for its people to ensure their security, where the justice system is transparent and fair, and most importantly, where young 

3

people no longer have to turn to a life of violence gangs and drug 

trafficking. 

I am extremely happy Ambassador Bill Brownfield is back before 

the committee again to tell us about INL’s efforts in Central America and the Caribbean. And after our hearing on Mexico and the 

Merida Initiative, my subcommittee staff led a delegation to Mexico 

City and cities in northern Mexico where INL is working diligently 

to help the Mexican Government build capacity, train law enforcement, and strengthen and reform the justice sector to effectively 

deal with all of the problems associated with transnational criminal and drug trafficking organizations. What we learned is that 

there is still a lot of work ahead for us and our partners in Mexico, 

that this is a long-term and vital undertaking. 

Ambassador Brownfield, your staff throughout Mexico is professional, dedicated and up to the task. I was happy to learn that your 

office in Mexico has developed a program called SAME PAGE that 

provides an efficient and clear way to track projects and expenditures. The taxpayer appreciates and deserves that level of accountability. I am pleased that the law enforcement trainers and other 

staff you have placed in the field are dedicated and hardworking 

Americans. Thank you. And thank them for their service. 

I am grateful to both Deputy Assistant Secretary Ayalde and 

Mark Lopes from USAID for being here to testify. Working in tandem with INL, I am hopeful that your respective agencies can build 

on work already done to more efficiently and effectively tackle the 

worsening situation in the region. I am also looking forward to 

hearing from our private panel: Mr. Eric Olson from the Woodrow 

Wilson Center, who just returned this week from Central America 

and will hopefully give us a clear picture of just how dire the security situation is in the region. We also have Mr. Michael Shifter 

who is the president of the Inter-American Dialogue who has written extensively on this topic. 

Thank you all for being here today for taking the time to discuss 

regional security issues and the growing threat of violence and 

criminality in Central America and the Caribbean. I look forward 

to a productive and informative hearing. And I will now recognize 

the ranking member for his remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Salmon follows:]

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Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. And 

thank you to our witnesses who have been here today and thank 

you for your patience. 

Today’s discussion on the security situation in Central America 

and the Caribbean is both timely and long overdue. While merited 

efforts to combat criminal threats and reduce drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has diverted our attention from the public 

security crisis that has emerged in Central America, the deteriorated state of security in the region is a byproduct of gangs, organized crime groups, drug traffickers that have spilled over from 

Mexico in attempts to control the drug trade, coopting local crime 

organizations into their network who smuggle drugs, people, illicit 

goods, and weapons. And while the Caribbean is not the dominant 

transit point of choice for the illicit drugs into the U.S., it would 

be naive for us to ignore the possibility that a pressure on drug 

traffickers in Mexico and Central America increases. The Caribbean will become a viable and attractive alternative for illicit activity. 

The most basic functions for any government is to protect its citizens. With some of the highest homicide rates in the world 

amongst the northern triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, citizen security remains an issue. For some 

countries, false conflict institutional reform in the 1990s have left 

already weak governments with a broken justice system, corrupt 

police forces, and poverty stricken unequal societies. With the persistent unemployment and the lack of social mobility, many Central American youth have either emigrated to the United States or 

been recruited by criminal groups. As a result, a bigger Central 

American population now live in the United States. And for some 

Central American countries, remittances represent between 10–20 

percent of the GDP. It is unfortunate when the choice of a young 

adult is to either leave one’s homeland or face a life of poverty 

alongside constant threats to join gangs or other criminal organizations. 

I have been concerned with the rise of Central American gangs 

into the criminal activities and the constant threat they pose to 

susceptible youth and weak governments, particularly El Salvador 

and Honduras. Homicides and drug related violence remain serious 

obstacles to the peace and security of Central America. According 

to the U.N., Mexico, a country with 112 million people, had in 2011 

a homicide rate of 23.7 percent per 100,000 people. El Salvador 

with a population of 6 million had a rate of 69.2 and Honduras, 

with a population of almost 8.5 million had a homicide rate of a 

staggering 91.6. These facts reinforce our need to ensure that the 

Central American Security Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, one, broad enough to dismantle a transitional 

crime organization and curb illicit drug flows with crime prevention 

and institutional building efforts to spread to the rule of law and, 

two, are implemented in the coordinated manner within the U.S. 

agencies and partner countries. While remaining dynamic enough 

to address both current and potential threats as seen in the Caribbean, it will be in our best interests not to overlook security concerns in the Caribbean. 

9

Today nearly $500 million have been appropriated for CARSI and about $200 million have been appropriated for CBSI. However, 

recent Government Accounting Office reports suggest that less 

than 28 percent of CARSI’s funds and roughly 90 percent for CBSI 

funds have been distributed. This committee needs to understand 

why such funding has not been carried out in an efficient manner. 

I look forward to hearing from our panelists regarding the assessment of these security initiatives as well as their determination of 

the current state of security in Central America and the Caribbean. 

Transforming a generation of corrupt behavior, strengthening the 

rule of law, implementing long due institutional reform, and creating a more inclusive society for youth prone to illicit activities 

will take time and determination. However, the United States must 

approach these initiatives with a goal of transferring ownership to 

Central American leadership. Ultimately, it is the people of Central 

America that are responsible to get the public and the political will 

to take this difficult task on. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I recognize the gentlewoman from Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And 

when talking about security in this hemisphere, we must not forget 

about Cuba, the State sponsor of terrorism 90 miles from my district. In the last 2 months, the Obama administration has granted 

a U.S. visa to Raul Castro’s daughter and returned to Cuba a convicted spy without having him finish his sentence here in the U.S. 

This week, we find that the State Department is engaging the Castro regime in direct mail and migration talks. The Castro regime 

will not, has not, never has complied with any international agreement. In fact, just a few years ago, the regime signed two international human rights accords. Yet the tensions on the island have 

risen. Valiant defenders of democracy, like Las Damas de Blanco, 

the Ladies in White, face weekly beatings. In addition, it is the 

Castro regime that does not comply with the mail accords that we 

signed with him from years ago. Meanwhile, a U.S. citizen languishes unjustly in a Cuban prison. Cuban activists, as we speak, 

are risking their lives on hunger strikes. And over 70 refugees, 70 

fugitives have gone to Cuba for safe haven. There are fugitives 

from U.S. law, including, as you know, Mr. Sires, a cop killer from 

New Jersey. 

What is next with this administration? Enough is enough. Basta 

ya! The Cuban people deserve freedom and democracy just as all 

oppressed people do. And these talks will not help them achieve 

those goals. 

And Mr. Chairman, during the question and answer period, I 

look forward to asking our witnesses about the capacity and the 

willingness and the capability of the Caribbean nations to fight 

drug trafficking and whether the Mexican drug cartels are penetrating any of these countries. We have heard a lot about the Dominican Republic having been infiltrated by them. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Pursuant to committee rule VII, the members of the subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements to be inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Nov 06, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\061913\81568 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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cluded in the official hearing record. And without objection, the 

hearing record will remain open for 7 days to allow statements, 

questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the 

length limitation in the rules. 

I would like to introduce the first panel. Ambassador Brownfield 

is the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs. Prior to his appointment, Mr. 

Brownfield served as U.N. Ambassador to Colombia, the Bolivarian 

Republic of Venezuela, and Republic of Chile. Pretty easy career 

there. Ambassador Brownfield is a graduate of Cornell University 

and the National War College. He also attended the University of 

Texas School of Law. 

Mark Lopes is the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean. He was formerly the 

senior policy adviser/staff director for the chairman of the International Development and Foreign Assistance Committee of the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Prior to that, he served on 

the State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Subcommittee 

of the House Appropriations Committee. Mr. Lopes holds a BM 

from Berklee College of Music and an MPP from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. 

Ms. Ayalde is a career minister serving as a Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, covering Cuba, 

Central America, and the Caribbean. She previously served as the 

USAID Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for 

Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition Ms. Ayalde served 

as the United States Ambassador to Paraguay from 2008 to 2011. 

She holds a BA from American University in international studies 

and a master’s degree in international public health from Tulane 

University. And also I understand that you have been nominated 

to be Ambassador to Brazil which is fantastic. We were just there. 

And they need a great person like you. So best of luck. 

And without further ado—I keep calling him Ambassador 

Brownfield but we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. You may call me whatever you wish, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires, members of 

the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today to discuss CARSI and CBSI initiatives. 

Our strategic assessment is very simple. We believe the region 

suffers from a surge in drug trafficking and violence and all nations are affected. As efforts succeed in Colombia and Mexico, traffickers push into Central America and the Caribbean; therefore, we 

must pursue a coordinated strategy throughout the region. As the 

American people look to Central America, they see drug flows into 

the United States. But the peoples of Central America see violence, 

crime, and homicide. Our strategy must address both drugs and violence. 

11

Between 2008 and 2012, Congress provided more than $300 million in funding to my bureau to support law enforcement and rule 

of law in Central America. Most Central American governments 

have increased their own tax and revenue base to provide more 

support for security and rule of law as well. What are we doing? 

We support police training and internal affairs units to identify 

and root out corruption. But reforming an institution takes a generation, and the people have a right to improved performance now. 

So we support special vetted units who can work high priority 

cases today. We link up with USAID’s community development programs to support model police precincts in the poorest and most 

violent communities. We provide specialized training on drugs, 

criminal investigation, gangs, and special victims. And we provide 

training to prosecutors, judges, border guards, and corrections officials. 

Mr. Chairman, over the past year, homicide and violence rates 

have gone down throughout Central America, and I will not claim 

full credit for CARSI but clearly it is one factor. If Central America 

is today’s crisis, then the Caribbean is tomorrow’s challenge. I have 

said it before and I repeat it today, as our efforts in Central America begin to bite, trafficking organizations will search for alternative routes and networks and the Caribbean will look attractive. 

Drug flows through the Caribbean are tiny compared to Central 

America, but they are growing. In 1 year, they increased from 5–

9 percent of total cocaine flow to the United States. 

CBSI is designed to work with Caribbean governments to reduce 

drug trafficking, strengthen citizen security, and improve justice. 

We are investing today to pay dividends tomorrow. We are building 

cooperation. Each country is different but our programs are regional. We train police in basic and specialized law enforcement. 

We train prosecutors, judges, and corrections officers. We support 

special units to combat drug trafficking and gangs. And the Coast 

Guard leads maritime exercises. 

In Trinidad and Tobago, we work to expand the national police 

academy into a regional training hub. Law enforcement throughout 

the Caribbean benefits from access to the Automated Fingerprint 

Information System, or AFIS, in working their caseloads. 

Mr. Chairman, this subcommittee has been generous in supporting our efforts in Central America and the Caribbean. There 

are some who call this mission impossible, insisting that we will 

never solve the problem. I am not one of them. I agree that it took 

us years to get into this situation and it will take years to get out 

of it. But the hemisphere is focused as never before. The OAS dedicated its general assembly 2 weeks ago to the drug issue. We are 

engaged. We are cooperating. And we are exploring new approaches and strategies. I believe we will have a good narrative to 

tell about Mexico and Central America. I look forward to telling it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brownfield follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Ms. Ayalde, I would like to recognize you. Thank 

you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LILIANA AYALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. AYALDE. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, members of the committee, it is truly a privilege to join you here today. 

I appreciate the invitation and the subcommittee’s continuous support for the administration’s efforts to partner with our neighbors 

in the Western Hemisphere to increase citizen security particularly 

through the Central American regional security initiative, CARSI 

and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. I wish to focus my 

comments today on the administration’s efforts to meet pressing 

challenges in this region and to galvanize the international community to work effectively to ensure that our combined efforts are 

impactful. The security needs, rule of law capacity deficits, and requirements for improved quality and quantity of basic government 

services for citizens of Central America and the Caribbean are beyond the capability of any single nation or donor. Therefore, an 

international approach to coordinating and leveraging our efforts is 

essential. The administration has highlighted this message at the 

highest levels at various international forums in recent months. 

President Obama visited Costa Rica in May where he met with the 

seven heads of state of the Central American Integration System, 

SICA, and the Dominican Republic. He emphasized to them the importance of shared partnership and our commitment to continue 

working with the region on issues related to security. He also emphasized the critical link between security and economic opportunity and prosperity. The President stressed that our aim is to reinforce security and opportunity in every sense, not only combating 

crime but ensuring that human rights are respected and communities are secure in their access to food, energy, education, health 

care, social services, and financial and economic opportunity. 

Vice President Biden also championed this message when he met 

with the Caribbean leaders in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago 

last month. Just last week, Secretary Kerry traveled to Guatemala 

where he participated in the annual general assembly of the Organization of American States, the OAS. Secretary Kerry countered 

the misperception that U.S. counternarcotics policy is primarily focused on law enforcement by highlighting our comprehensive plan 

that addresses demand, prevention, and treatment. 

In April, as part of our effort to strengthen multilateral approaches to supporting Central America, the Department held the 

first North America-SICA Security Dialogue in Washington. Canada, Mexico, the United States and the seven SICA countries participated. The dialogue provided an opportunity to discuss enhancing regional coordination on security programming and it specifically focused on the themes of precursor chemicals and violence 

prevention. It provided a forum where we were able to discuss 

these issues and begin a process of bringing additional resources 

and commitments to specific problems faced in both Central and 

North America. 

20

We have reinforced our message with much needed support 

through the CARSI and CBSI initiatives that have been generously 

funded by Congress, and we are seeing the fruits of these efforts 

as partner nations demonstrate increased political will and the 

prioritization of their most pressing citizen security, rule of law, 

human rights, and prevention challenges. 

The Guatemalan Government, for example, achieved a 20 percent increase in the number of murder cases brought to trial in 

Guatemala City over the last 2 years. In Salvador, the government’s commitment to reducing urban violence has exposed over 

6,000 students to the gang resistance education and training program. In the Caribbean, Dominica recently passed a comprehensive 

civil asset forfeiture law with a dedicated forfeiture fund to ensure 

that seized illicit proceeds are used to strengthen law enforcement, 

prosecution, and drug abuse treatment and prevention. This is the 

first such law passed anywhere in the eastern Caribbean. 

The Government of Jamaica has embraced a comprehensive police anticorruption program that includes an anticorruption branch 

of the Jamaican Constabulary Force. We are watchful that success 

against the criminal enterprises in Mexico, Colombia, and Central 

America could drive them increasingly to the Caribbean for new opportunities and trafficking routes. 

With CBSI assistance, we have an opportunity to address 

vulnerabilities in the infrastructure, build government and law enforcement capacity, and engage at-risk youth before transnational 

and other criminal elements can take hold. It is only through our 

continued support, the support and expertise of other donor nations, and the commitments of our partners in the region that we 

can prevent an increase in crime in the Caribbean. 

As a partner of Central America and the Caribbean, it is the goal 

of the United States to continue to support these regional and national efforts and to utilize our diplomatic and political resources 

as well as foreign assistance to foster enhanced levels of sustained 

dialogue and collaboration to turn today’s citizen security challenges into a catalyst for building a more secure and prosperous future for the hemisphere. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss these issues with 

you, and I look forward to the questions. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ayalde follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Mr. Lopes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK LOPES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. LOPES. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member 

Sires and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

USAID’s work in security is focused on addressing the root 

causes of crime and violence not only because of the implications 

for U.S. national security but because high levels of crime and violence threaten to stall economic and democratic progress as well. 

The heart of our work in this area is through prevention programs 

designed to complement and reinforce government efforts to improve the rule of law, strengthen the capacity of municipalities to 

prevent crime, and create additional educational and employment 

opportunities for youth most susceptible to joining gangs. 

To ensure that we have the greatest impact on the most people, 

our efforts are largely focused in high crime urban areas of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Governments in the region are 

largely abandoning the previous decade’s failed mano dura or ‘‘iron 

fist’’ crime fighting tactics in favor of more prevention-based approaches. We welcome this change. 

For example, the Government of Honduras declared 2013 the 

year of prevention. The Government of El Salvador recently 

launched a new municipal crime prevention policy that we think is 

a healthy framework within which to operate. USAID is employing 

several novel approaches, a couple of which I will mention here. 

First, because no single actor involved has all the answers, we are 

aggressively working as a broker to share lessons from places that 

have had success. Countries like Brazil and Colombia have much 

to offer in this respect. Also, through an agreement that we signed 

with the City of Los Angeles, USAID is adapting L.A.’s proven 

gang reduction message in identifying youth susceptible to joining 

gangs and organized crime. We are also connecting city officials in 

the region with our counterparts in places like Arlington, Texas; 

Santa Ana, California; Pinellas County, Florida and tailoring successful models accordingly. 

Second, given the size and scope of these challenges, donor investments are not enough. Countries must generate and invest 

their own resources. For this reason, we are testing models that 

allow them to bring in more money, particularly at the municipal 

level. And in El Salvador and Honduras we launched a revenue 

challenge competition to increase the collection of unpaid fees. Cities that do this well will get a modest subsidy to reinvest in crime 

reduction programs. The idea behind this is to invigorate local government ownership, increase resources for prevention and thereby 

build their capacity to play a greater role in the solution. 

Third, governments and donors are not the only stakeholders, 

and therefore USAID is increasingly engaging with the private sector. Through partnerships with Chevron, Hanes brands and 

Starbucks we are working to physically transform more than 150 

schools in the region. We also work with telecom operators and mobile phone companies who provide free Internet access in our outVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Nov 06, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\061913\81568 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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reach centers and who develop the mobile crime system that enables law enforcement in five municipalities to track, report, and 

analyze real crime data. The innovations brought by these companies are as valuable if not more valuable as their financial contributions. 

And lastly, our programs under CARSI would have little impact 

if they were not embraced by youth in the region. Most of them 

have a mother, a brother, a sister, a cousin who they can help galvanize around violence prevention. USAID is proud to support the 

Central American Youth Movement Against Violence, which now 

has chapters in all seven Central American countries, and in February 40 of these youth presented their ideas to the Presidents of 

Central America at a gathering in Costa Rica. In the Caribbean our 

programs are similar in spirit to those in Central America but 

focus more on crime rate prevention, including education and government capacity building, working in close partnership with national and regional governments. 

Mr. Chairman, we also work across a range of other sectors 

under the premise that it takes more than prevention and law enforcement to advance durable security and prosperity. By keeping 

children in school, training young people for jobs, connecting farmers to markets, lifting rural poor out of poverty, preserving natural 

resources, and reaching out to historically marginalized groups, we 

contribute to a broader effort to make the region more peaceful and 

more prosperous. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to share our programs with 

you, and I look forward to sharing your guidance. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lopes follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. I would like to yield myself 5 minutes to ask a 

question. And then I will go to the ranking member and the other 

members on the panel here today. This question is for both Ambassador Brownfield and Deputy Assistant Secretary Ayalde. 

There have been concerns about the Honduran Government’s efforts to confront corruption and criminality in its police force and 

about State Department’s Fiscal Year 2012 certification of Honduras. In your estimation, has the Honduran Government met the 

conditions for certification? And can you explain State’s rationale 

in reaching that decision to certify? Second, what is the impact on 

your programs and progress from the Senate holding up the funding? 

Ambassador Brownfield. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Do you want to start on certification? 

I will follow up. 

Mr. SALMON. Yes, that is fine. 

Ms. AYALDE. We have not issued the report yet. We are following 

the situation very carefully. Obviously we are, like others, concerned with some of the issues of impunity and human rights. But 

we believe that our commitment is to the Honduran people, and we 

are looking for ways that we could continue to do so while adhering 

very closely to the legal restrictions. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, from a programmatic 

perspective, the impact on our ability to conduct our programs is 

this: First, we try to have programs that directly attack the problem, the problem being evidence of corruption and call it misbehavior or abuse of authority in law enforcement and security elements. We attempt to address the problem by training at base level 

or basic level for those in the police and security forces and, second, 

by supporting the establishment of internal affairs divisions that 

are able to identify the corrupt or abusive individuals and eventually remove them from service. 

Second, we are applying the strictest possible vetting standards 

to those units and individuals with whom we work, by which I 

mean we use the community that assesses these matters, the 

human rights community, the legal community, the policy community both here in Washington and in the field in Honduras to determine which individuals and which units are reasonably believed to 

have committed these abuses in the past or are continuing to commit them in the future. And those individuals and units, we will 

not work with. We will find, in some cases we apply a lesson by 

which we have two degrees of separation. For example, if a particularly senior official is found to have committed these abuses, we not 

only will not work with that official, we will not work with anyone 

that reports to that official. We will be at least two steps below 

that individual before we would work with anyone in that institution. 

What has been the impact of the Senate hold? Mr. Chairman, 

there is currently $10.3 million on hold. This funding would be 

used to support the ability of the Honduran national police to conduct interdiction, drug interdiction operations, particularly in the 

isolated northern region of the country. The impact of the hold at 

this point is our inability to deploy or support the deployment of 

Honduran national police in that area. That in and of itself is not 

38

a disaster. The problem of course is just as you and I realize this, 

so do the drug traffickers. And as they realize that this is a zone 

where the police cannot reach, it obviously for them becomes a very 

inviting area through which to traffic their product. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I am going to yield back the balance of 

my time and recognize the ranking member. 

Mr. SIRES. You know, I read before where nearly $500 million had been appropriated for CARSI and about $200 million had been 

appropriated for CBSI. Recently, the Government Accounting Office 

reports suggest that less than 28 percent of CARSI and roughly 90 

percent of CBSI funds have been distributed. Can you expand upon 

that why? It just seems that we could have done a better job of appropriating more money. 

Ms. AYALDE. Yes, sir. It did take a while to get started. In the 

Caribbean, we are working with 13 different governments with different levels of capacity. And we have to ensure that there were institutions that were going to be good partners in working that. I 

think it took a while to get started but we are at the right pace 

right now where we are cranking up a number of activities. So only 

to say that we recognize the slow start but we had to be comfortable and assured that there would be transparency in the use 

of funds and that the partners would be able to carry out their 

commitments. So we are at that place. In fact, it is unique to see 

that the governments of the region have taken the framework of 

CBSI as theirs. We believe that this is very positive. Other donors, 

including the Canadians who are helping us coordinate among all 

the donors that are participating in the Caribbean, are coordinating under the leadership of Canada, and they are also using the 

framework of CBSI. 

So it took a while to get started but I think that we are at the 

right moment right now. So we recognize that slowness. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Congressman, if I could add a little bit 

of gloss from my side. And I will run the specific figures by you. 

The GAO report was assessing a period of time that concluded with 

Fiscal Year 2011. Since then, we have gone through another whatever number of months we have since then, another 18 months. 

Things have happened in that period of time. Between 2008 and 

2012, the INL account, which I am responsible for for CARSI Central America was $305 million. Of that $305 million, $294 million 

is now obligated. The remaining $11 million that is unobligated is 

the $10.3 million that I just described to Chairman Salmon and another couple of hundred thousand on another program. Of that 

sum, more than half has actually been spent. In other words, the 

obligation is us reaching agreement with the governments on how 

it will be spent. And the spending, which is a separate process, has 

actually moved forward to well over 50 percent as opposed to the 

20 percent number that you had. 

In the Caribbean, the figure is between 2010 and 2012 for our 

INL funds. Ninety-five million dollars total of which eighty-three 

million dollars has been obligated, a figure of just under 90 percent. I expect that remaining $12 million to be obligated before the 

end of this fiscal year. Our liquidation rate has been a bit slower 

in the Caribbean than in Central America for the reasons that 

Liliana just indicated, which is to say we are starting up. We are 

39

coordinating with many different governments. This is not the Plan 

Colombia or Merida where we are coordinating with just one government. We are coordinating with 13 in the Caribbean or seven 

in Central America. The coordination takes time. And finally to be 

absolutely honest with you we were starting at very close to .0 in 

terms of the personnel and staff that we had in the field. And I had 

to beef them up. I had to add additional staff to our sections in 

three of our six working Central American Embassies. And we are 

adding additional personnel in the Caribbean. I think the story 

from this point on will be much better for you. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

I recognize Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And the timeliness of 

this hearing is ironic. It was almost a year ago today that the Committee on Homeland Security Oversight Subcommittee that I now 

chair had a hearing on a very, very similar topic, on June 21 had 

a committee hearing titled U.S.-Caribbean Border: An Open Road 

for Drug Traffickers and Terrorists. The witnesses were the Honorable Luis Fortun ̄ o of Puerto Rico and Rear Admiral William Lee, 

Director of Operations Policy and Capability of the United States 

Coast Guard. So during that hearing, we talked about the Caribbean region being possibly a potential to become an unlocked back 

door to the continental United States not only for drug traffickers 

but terrorists as well. And given the confluence of actors in the region, namely drug cartels, terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, 

antagonistic Latin American leaders like the former Hugo Chavez, 

the Caribbean has a potential to become a region hostile to the 

United States. What is more, given the Caribbean’s geographical 

proximity to the United States mainland, this threat is even more 

unsettling. And during that hearing, we talked about the Caribbean being astride to major shipping lanes from South America, 

North America and even Europe, how appealing that is to drug 

traffickers moving cocaine from South America and Mexico. 

So I say all that saying that this hearing is great as a followup so to what we learned there. And then shortly thereafter, I traveled to Bogota and met with the Colombians and really learned 

about what we were doing with the Colombian Government and 

helicopter training and a lot of other training to the tune of about 

$10 billion I think over a decade. And so the question I have is, 

do you see a segue to build on that Colombian experience? And 

then how do you see Colombia working in this? And I will ask Ambassador Brownfield there because I certainly enjoy his testimony 

in Congress. He has come several times. And I think he is very 

knowledgeable. How do we see Colombia as possibly being an ally 

in the region to train maybe the Hondurans or the Guatemalans, 

Salvadorians and they may not go to U.S. for training, but they 

may go to an ally within Latin America for training. So are they 

a willing partner? Do you see the benefit of that? And how may 

that help in the Caribbean nations as well? 

Ambassador. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure. Let me start, Congressman, and 

then yield to the good Dr. Ayalde or good Dr. Lopes if they wish 

to add on. I think it is an excellent question and even better, it is 

40

an opportunity for me to make a couple of points about Colombia, 

a country with whom I have had some considerable experience, including I would like to think 3 years during which we were trying 

to lay the groundwork for exactly what you have just described. 

I believe Colombia plays a very useful role in two senses. One, 

lessons that we have learned there, frequently, the hard way between January 2000 when Congress first appropriated funds to 

support Plan Colombia and today. Lessons in terms of how you do 

these sorts of programs, how you cooperate and collaborate. How 

you engage other partners. How you try to bring together the security side of a program with the developmental side of the program. 

How you sequence it. How you figure what your end game is so 

that we are not asking Congress to support a program forever. 

There are a lot of lessons that we have learned in Colombia that 

we can apply in Central America or the country to the immediate 

north of Central America or among the 14 countries of the Caribbean. 

The second important fact—and I use the word ‘‘fact’’ to talk 

about in the Colombia sense—is how Colombia itself plays as a 

service provider and supporter in these programs because let me be 

absolutely frank and blunt. Right now the Colombian national police is training more police and law enforcement in Central America than all of U.S. law enforcement put together. Now, some of it 

is supported by us. So it in essence it is CARSI funding, Plan Colombia funding, or some cases, even Merida funding that does this. 

And it does it because it is cheaper for us to have the Colombian 

national police provide this training than us doing it ourselves. 

Sometimes it is the Colombians themselves providing that training. 

They are at this point training in four of the seven countries in 

Central America. They are providing training and support in the 

Dominican Republic in the Caribbean. They are open to further engagement. I actually believe we get excellent value either by Colombians training in third countries or by us bringing law enforcement personnel from those third countries to train in many of the 

Colombian training institutions that we helped support and set up 

during Plan Colombia from the year 2000 to 2010. I think we actually should be looking forward and looking for ways to engage Colombia more and more effectively in this effort. From my perspective, it is a dividend that we get for our more than $9 billion of 

investment in support for Plan Colombia over the last 13 years. 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is exactly the points I wanted to be brought 

out. I appreciate your service there. And my time is about out. But 

ma’am, you act like you want to chime in, if the chairman will 

allow it. 

Ms. AYALDE. Just very quickly to complement what the Ambassador has mentioned. Colombia is also very eager to be engaged. 

We have included Colombia as a member of this North AmericaSICA Dialogue because of their interest at not only at the operational levels such as training and technical assistance but also in 

providing some strategic guidance. For instance, whether there is 

a reform of the police—and to give an example, in Honduras, 

whether there would be some value added in providing some guidance because of the experience. And we see that as a big plus. They 

have also expressed an interest and are engaged in the forums that 

41

we hold to coordinate strategic directions in the Caribbean. So just 

as a complement to what has been said. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much. Those are the points I wanted 

to make. I appreciate it. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

I recognize Mr. Radel. 

Mr. RADEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have a question for Mr. 

Lopes. Can you tell me if the programs in Central America have 

any kind of a list of individuals that we trained with our CARSI 

funds? So what I am getting at here, I am curious with our taxpayer dollars being spent, do we have a quantitative measure on 

who, how many people we are training and maybe more importantly how many we retain? 

Mr. LOPES. Certainly. Thank you. I will touch on our outreach 

centers which I am not sure is where your question is going. But 

then maybe I can ask a follow-up. I think we have got a range of 

programs in Central America focused on at-risk youth and municipal capacity building. Some of that has a training element. Some 

of that has an outreach element. We have got 100 centers throughout the northern triangle countries as well as in Panama. Combined, those efforts in 2012 have reached about 90,000 people. As 

I mentioned in my opening statement, there is a lot of secondary 

benefits to individuals who are involved in these outreach centers. 

Sometimes these are youth at risk. We have also got more structured training programs in terms of employment opportunities and 

job generation work that we use to target in particular areas where 

people are vulnerable to engaging in either illicit activities or gang 

activities. In terms of impact, we have seen encouraging results. 

We have also looked in a scientific way—and I know that this committee is concerned with impact rather than just output. And we 

as well are concerned not just in the region but around the world 

that as USAID we have got a treatment and control group of communities whereby we look scientifically according to a series of factors with a baseline and a mid term. That study is not over yet but 

that mid term evaluation has shown statistically significant impact 

in terms of the treatment communities doing better than those control communities. 

Mr. RADEL. So those are kind of qualitative measures. Do we 

have lists—correct me if I am wrong here. But we pay people, 

right, that have roles that play within this. Do we have knowledge 

lists of who these people are and whether we retain them over a 

certain amount of time that continue to do the work? 

Mr. LOPES. Certainly. I mean, we would be happy to follow up 

in terms of whether it is individuals or profiles and whatever information that would be helpful. 

Mr. RADEL. Okay. So it would be clerks, judges, police. 

Mr. LOPES. In terms of the justice reform programs and the work 

in terms of training for judicial officials, we can certainly provide 

you with details on exactly who these individuals are. 

Mr. RADEL. And police officers. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. If it is police, Congressman, the reason Mark is ducking that question, if it is police, I do it. And yes, 

we do do it and we can provide those sorts of numbers for you. 

Mr. RADEL. Okay. Great. We will get that then in writing. 

42

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE TREY RADEL

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) maintains a record of International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) student alumni, 

including those who received training funded under the Caribbean Basin Security 

Initiative (CBSI) and Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Each 

ILEA management staff is tasked with maintaining ILEA alumni training information. 

Law enforcement professionals from Central America and the Caribbean receive 

training funded under CBSI and CARSI at ILEA San Salvador. Since 2005, approximately 4,400 alumni from Central America and the Caribbean received training at 

ILEA San Salvador. This total includes 203 alumni from Belize, 371 from Costa 

Rica, 1759 from El Salvador, 617 from Guatemala, 514 from Honduras, 180 from 

Nicaragua, 365 from Panama, 23 from Antigua and Barbuda, 70 from the Bahamas, 

51 from Barbados, 15 from Dominica, 15 from Grenada, 7 from Guyana, 67 from 

Jamaica, 12 from St. Kitts and Nevis, 14 from St. Vincent, 21 from St. Lucia, 45 

from Suriname, and 42 from Trinidad and Tobago. 

In addition to providing high-quality training for ILEA participants from Central 

America and the Caribbean, the ILEA Program conducts six-month post course evaluations as part of the six-week Law Enforcement and Leadership Development 

(LELD), or Core Program. This is the first year we have conducted six-month evaluations for the LELD Program, and we will utilize this data to gauge alumni knowledge retention and make necessary adjustments to improve course delivery. The 

LELD six-month evaluation does not track whether or not ILEA-trained officials remain in their positions. 

INL works closely with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to 

ensure all candidates who attend ILEA courses are vetted in compliance with Department and Leahy vetting requirements, and this includes alumni who return for 

additional coursework. ILEA does not continue to vet alumni after graduation, but 

we have no information indicating that any officials trained at the ILEA have later 

been implicated in human rights abuses or have been prosecuted for corruption.

Mr. RADEL. Thank you. I appreciate your time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. We would like to get to the next panel. 

But before I do, I have a question I would like to just ask and have 

you submit in writing. I know you have already been detained way 

too long. But my question would be, Ambassador Brownfield, 

CARSI aid is divided among seven countries. Actually all three of 

you, if you could submit any relevant answers to this. The CARSI 

aid is divided among seven countries as well as regional programs. 

How much funding has been allocated to each country? And how 

are those allocation decisions being made? Are any of the countries 

not receiving any or certain types of CARSI aid at this time? And 

if so, why not? And finally, to what extent is CARSI aid tied to 

demonstrations of political will by partner governments? And do we 

have an idea of how much the region spends on their own security 

for every dollar the United States contributes? And I want to thank 

you very much. And I will have staff provide those questions to you 

as well. But if you could respond back, I would really appreciate 

it. And thank you so much for your patience today. And thank you 

so much for your wonderful testimony. And it is always a pleasure. 

[The information referred to follows:]

43

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, MS. 

LILIANA AYALDE, AND MR. MARK LOPES TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE MATT SALMON

The Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) is a whole-of-government multi-year program that responds to security threats in Central America and 

supplements strategies and programs the nations of Central America are implementing on their own and in cooperation with other countries. The $496.5 million 

in U.S. CARSI assistance committed to date (FY2008–2012) supports: law enforcement and counternarcotics efforts; rule of law and capacity building, including police 

and judicial reform and anti-corruption; and community-based violence and drug 

prevention to address the root causes of crime and violence and build more resilient 

communities. CARSI funds are allocated across all seven countries in the region. 

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, the three northernmost countries, receive 

the majority of CARSI funding given their particularly high levels of crime and 

weak rule of law institutions, and the remaining funds support regional and national programs in the rest of the region. 

We prioritize our citizen security assistance, including the allocation of resources 

and programming, in the nations that are most severely affected by transnational 

organized crime, including narcotics trafficking and gangs. We work with our international partners through the Group of Friends of Central America donor coordination process, our embassies, interagency partners, host nations, and the Central 

American Integration System (SICA) to determine the scope of the threat to citizen 

safety in each nation and the needs and deficiencies of host nation law enforcement, 

rule of law, and prevention capacity and institutions. Then, based upon limited U.S. 

resources, the actions of other donors, and host nation capacity to absorb U.S. assistance, we determine the assistance for each nation. In Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, we are focusing on replicating programs that have proved successful in other countries and that can make short-to-medium-term impact, including municipal crime prevention planning, critical youth-at-risk services, model precincts and community policing in crime-ridden municipalities, and border interdiction programs. In Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama, we are supporting host-nation efforts to reduce growing levels of insecurity and to rebuild the capabilities of 

their rule of law institutions. 

Governments in the region have come a long way over the years in acknowledging 

the scope of the security threats, taking responsibility for addressing them, and undertaking serious institutional and policy reforms to improve citizen security. Governments are passing new laws to generate taxes and revenue supporting investment in citizen security programs, extradition, judicially authorized wiretapping, 

and asset forfeiture. They are also developing community-based approaches to reduce violence and taking steps to address difficult issues, including internal affairs 

and police reform. This growing political will is evident at the regional level. 

Through SICA, the nations of Central America are showing an unprecedented 

level of transnational cooperation on security. This is essential, because drug traffickers and criminal networks do not respect national boundaries, and no single 

country can defeat these criminals alone. We must work together to address this 

shared regional threat. We have much more work ahead of us, and we have encouraged the region’s leaders to devote more resources to these challenges and to continue to combat corruption and impunity. 

Fiscal year 2012 CARSI allocations, through both Economic Support Funds (ESF) 

and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Funds (INCLE), were as 

follows:

44

Mr. SALMON. We will have one more question. I am sorry. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry about sneaking in there. In my Financial Services Committee we had some 

votes going on. But I did not want to miss the opportunity to ask 

a few questions of this distinguished panel that we have before us 

on topics that are most important to me. 

And I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, also though for 

your focus on regional security concerns you know as a top priority 

for this subcommittee. I think it is exactly the right place. But let 

me not dilly-dally. Let me just go straight to a couple of questions 

that I don’t believe were asked. My staff was listening and they 

told me which questions were and which were not. Mr. Sires may 

have asked everything but I didn’t ask at all. 

So in regards to the—overall, dealing with the Caribbean drug 

transshipment, overall the use of the Caribbean as a transshipment point for illicit drugs from South America to the United 

States I am told has diminished over the past 10–15 years as drug 

traffickers have shifted primarily to using Mexico and Central 

America corridor. What is your assessment of the current status of 

drug transshipment through the Caribbean and have you seen any 

increase recently due to law enforcement efforts in Mexico and 

Central America? Let me add on to that, to what extent is the Caribbean equipped to contend with an increase in the use of the region for drug transshipments and to what extent has the CBSI 

helped increase the interdiction and law enforcement capacity of 

the Caribbean nations to contend with the increase in illicit drug 

trafficking? 

Just a few questions. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I am sure I speak for 

the entire panel when I say we would be deeply disappointed were 

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81568i.eps
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tleman from Queens. I will be delighted to offer at least the start 

of an answer on these and let my friends Drs. Ayalde and Lopes 

follow up as they think appropriate. 

What have we seen by way of trends of drug shipments moving 

through the Caribbean? Here is my simple answer to that question, 

Congressman: We see drug transshipments through the Caribbean 

as still a tiny percentage of that which moves through Central 

America and Mexico but it is growing. In between 2011 and 2012, 

the last year for which we put together reasonably good statistics 

so far since traffickers do not report their business to official government institutions, we calculate that the amount that has been 

transshipping through the region has jumped from 5 percent to 9 

percent of the total that is coming to the United States of America. 

Nearly doubling. The overwhelming majority of that flows through 

the island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic and Haiti and 

probably the majority of that that flows through Hispaniola flows 

through the Dominican Republic. The trend therefore is obviously 

moving in an upward direction. 

And I would add a second point. It is perfectly logical that that 

happen. The logic is as follows: In the early 2000s, we squeezed 

them in Colombia and a lot of them moved their operations to Mexico. Beginning in 2007–2008 we started to squeeze them in Mexico 

and they moved into the Central American region. Starting around 

2009, we began to squeeze them in Central America. What are they 

going to do? One option is that they all go out of business, open 

beach cabanas, and live happily ever after as entrepreneurs. The 

other is they will look for an alternative and cheaper place to do 

business. And when they start that search, the Caribbean and 

those old networks that we took down in the 1980s and the 1990s 

are going to look very attractive. 

And that, Congressman, is what CBSI from my perspective is all 

about. We are investing in the future. We are trying to build both 

the capabilities and the cooperation among the 13 cooperating governments of the region so that they will be prepared to address this 

reality that I see coming down the road. We are talking about 

many States that are very small, vulnerable because they do not 

have the resources and the personnel to perform this mission who 

require this degree of cooperation and support from us in order to 

be able to do it. If we do our job right today, this is not a story 

in 2 years time. We will know in 2 years whether we have done 

our job right. 

Ms. AYALDE. If I may, sir, just to add to that, everything that is 

being done is done through the optics of institution building. To 

give an example, we have two advisers from ATF that are posted 

in the Caribbean to provide technical assistance on trafficking of 

small arms. It is a big issue in the Caribbean, and they are overwhelmed with how to deal with it. The adviser has been placed in 

a regional institution. They are being encouraged to share information which is not very natural to them. But the idea is that they 

will get the procedures, the way things are done to try to track 

these small arms. They are being trained and they will have the 

know-how of where to go with this information and what to do with 

it. 

46

So again, it is about institution building, making sure that what 

we do is not just for today but for tomorrow. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me just ask this if the chairman wouldn’t mind, 

also, let me just ask about—we did Plan Colombia. We also had a 

part of dealing with economic development in the area so that the 

locals would not have to resort to selling drugs, et cetera, when 

that happens. So are we still doing the same thing here? Are we 

doing enough to encourage the economic and as you talk about institutional development while we work on security also? 

Ms. AYALDE. I have to admit that that is an ongoing challenge 

because these are small states. In many cases they are struggling 

with their fiscal health. You may be very familiar, for instance, 

with Jamaica and how much we worked with them to try to get 

them to sign the IMF agreement and some of the very hard choices 

they have to make. So we have to look at it. And this is what President Obama has been saying, the investment in the economy and 

that prosperity is essential to the sustainability of anything we do 

in security. 

It is a challenge in the case of the Caribbean because they are 

small states, they depend a lot on tourism. And we have limited 

resources. AID is present in a very limited way and so we don’t 

have as many tools. But what we do have is more creative ways 

of working with the business sector. For instance, I am traveling 

to Barbados in about a week to launch the American Chamber of 

Commerce there to be working in the eastern Caribbean, and we 

are encouraged to be able to attract more business and investment. 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chairman, I was a little late, but could I ask 

unanimous consent to submit my opening statement for the record? 

Mr. SALMON. Absolutely. Without objection. 

Thank you very much for your testimony. We really appreciate 

it. Thanks again for your patience. 

Mr. RADEL [presiding]. We would like to go ahead and welcome 

our second panel. Thank you so much for being here. Let’s go 

ahead and run through the bios real quick here. 

Eric Olson, a member of our second panel here, is the associate 

director of the Latin American program at the Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars. His research and writing is focused primarily on security issues and the impacts of crime, organized crime and violence on democracies. He has also written about 

reform of police and judicial institutions as a vehicle for addressing 

the problem of rapidly expanding crime in the Americas, which is 

what we are dealing with here today. Prior to joining the Wilson 

Center he was a senior specialist in the Department for Promotion 

of Good Governance at The Organization of American States from 

2006 to 2007. 

Mr. Olson also holds a BA from Trinity College in history and 

secondary education and a Master’s Degree in International Affairs 

from American University. Again, thank you for being here. 

Over to Mr. Michael Shifter. Mr. Shifter is the President of the 

Inter-American Dialogue. Since 1993, Mr. Shifter has been an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, where he teaches Latin American politics, which is a little complicated from time to time. Prior to joining the Inter-American DiaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Nov 06, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\_WH\061913\81568 HFA PsN: SHIRL
47

logue, Mr. Shifter directed the Latin American and Caribbean Program at the National Endowment for Democracy. 

Mr. Shifter holds a BA from Oberlin College in Sociology and political science and a Master’s Degree in sociology from Harvard 

University. 

We will go ahead and go along with the testimony and I will 

start with Mr. Olson. You are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC L. OLSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

LATIN AMERICA PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you so much, and I appreciate your staying 

on and overseeing this hearing, and thank you also, Mr. Meeks. I 

know he spent a lot of time looking at issues of democracy and security in Latin America, particularly in the Andes region, so thank 

you for being here as well. 

I have submitted some written testimony to the committee already so I would like to, with your permission, just make some 

summary remarks on that. 

I just came back from 10 days in Central America in the northern triangle of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, so much of 

what I say reflects that 10-day travel to the region. But I also lived 

in Honduras for 2 years in the 1980s and have repeatedly traveled 

to the region over the last 20–25 years. 

And while I consider myself an optimist at heart, hopeful by nature, I have to admit that I feet a bit of sense of dj vu listening 

to our panel before us, all wonderful people that I have enormous 

respect for. But some of what we have been talking about here 

today is the same things we were talking about 20 years ago, building institutions, strengthening capacity, so on and so forth. So 

there is a time at which one has to ask oneself, are we really being 

successful, are we really doing the right things? And I don’t question the goal. The problem is not the goal, it is the method to getting there, and I do have to say that I have some serious questions 

about how we are going about it simply because it is not producing 

the results we would like to see, and, to be honest, what the people 

of Central America want to see and deserve to see. So that I just 

offer as a preface. 

I would just say in a word that the security situation in the 

northern triangle in particular, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, 

is dire. I don’t want to call it a crisis, but it is dire. Organized 

crime and trafficking is rampant. And we are no longer talking just 

about drug trafficking, we are talking about human trafficking, 

trafficking in minerals, gold increasingly, other minerals, petroleum products. I mean, you name it, there is trafficking going on. 

And what that means is that the income from those businesses is 

phenomenal and the coercive effects of that kind of trafficking is 

tremendous. 

Gains, especially in El Salvador and Honduras, are a daily reality for people in big urban areas. And although there has been 

a truce declared in El Salvador and the homicide rates have gone 

down, extortion is still rampant. People are afraid of taking buses 

because they get held up consistently and regularly. So that is an 

issue. 

48

One of my missions on this trip was to begin an assessment of 

the borders in Central America. You can only imagine the number 

of problems. To say it is porous and open borders is to say the obvious. There are eight official crossings between Guatemala and Mexico and 122 estimated informal crossings. And I am not talking 

about foot paths. These are areas where trucks drive across rivers 

and where boats traverse rivers without any kind of control. 

Conversely and ironically, at the official ports of entry there is 

enormous inefficiency for commerce, legitimate commerce, where 

there is high levels of corruption and trucks and people bringing 

products in are stuck for days on end. 

So the situation again is dire. There are areas of the countries 

where there is no effective state presence—I am sorry, areas of the 

region where there is no effective state presence, and even in areas 

where there are authorities who are elected, many times, and I 

don’t want to overstate it, but many times those authorities are on 

the payroll or themselves engaged in trafficking. And this is particularly troublesome along Honduras and the Guatemalan border 

where there is really very little state presence. 

I wanted to just go ahead and say a couple more things. I see 

two problems in Central America that need to be addressed. First 

of all, success in Central America depends essentially on the Central Americans themselves and their capacity and willingness to 

make the tough decisions, and, unfortunately, in many cases that 

has not been done. Oftentimes there is a promise of reform, initiatives to reform, there is purging and vetting, but the fundamental 

kinds of reforms that create greater transparency and greater accountability, and I think you were actually getting at this issue as 

well, we are training people, training people, but we don’t have a 

clear sense of what that outcome is, how is that really turning 

things around. I think it is an indicator of how we need to adjust 

our strategy in Central America to make it more effective, have 

better outcomes, not just better inputs. 

I also think that one of the problems is that since we focus so 

much on drugs, we tend to reduce every problem in Central America as primarily a drug problem, and I think frankly while obviously drugs and drug trafficking are a big problem, we need to 

have a broader approach to the region. Let’s not just focus on drugs 

and getting the drug cartels, but to also do, as some of you have 

implied, look at the economic situation, look at the health care system, look at the education system, because if you don’t start from 

a broader perspective and start to reestablish the capacity of the 

state at many levels, I think the likelihood and hope for change in 

that region goes down quite a bit. 

I would focus anything we were to do going forward on building 

or defining basic benchmarks for transparency and accountability. 

Again, simply training people is not going to solve their problem. 

We have been investing in rule of law and justice reform in Central 

America for probably 20 years, at least, and we are still with the 

situation of a justice system in Honduras that basically doesn’t 

work. 

We have police forces in Central America and particularly in 

Honduras where last Monday while I was there the Minister of Security said that he found over 400 people on the police rolls who 

49

didn’t exist, he called them ghosts, people who were collecting salaries and doing no police work. So without greater transparency on 

all of these fronts, I think we can continue to train people, we can 

continue to send equipment, we can continue to provide information, but that is the kind of fundamental building blocks that we 

need to start with in the region. 

Obviously in 5 minutes I can’t cover it at all. I will leave it there. 

I am happy to answer any of your questions and I think there is 

a lot more information in my written testimony. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. RADEL. Mr. Olson, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:]

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Mr. RADEL. We now go to Mr. Shifter. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SHIFTER, PRESIDENT, INTER–

AMERICAN DIALOGUE 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you very much, Congressman Radel, and 

thank you, Congressman Meeks. It is good to see you. 

The security situation in Central America and the Caribbean is 

very serious. It varies from country to country, it has different explanations in each country, but over all the trend is worsening and 

very worrying. Criminal violence poses a great challenge to the rule 

of law and to fragile democracies. The situation can and should be 

addressed by countries in both regions and by the regional organizations such as SICA and CARICOM. But the United States has 

enormous responsibility and also the capacity to assist. 

The economic and demographic ties to both regions are profound 

and are growing. The U.S.’s own strategic interests are at stake. 

Skepticism about whether the U.S. can help is understandable but 

should be put in perspective. I recall testifying before Congress 13 

years ago about Plan Colombia and everyone asked the question, 

is there any precedent for the U.S. providing sustained support to 

another country in the world that has helped strengthen the capacity of the state and led to reduced violence? Back then there were 

no good answers to that question. Today it is possible to cite the 

example of Plan Colombia itself. U.S. cooperation did not solve Colombia’s problems, but it did contribute to reducing the security 

problem in an important and positive way. 

Two thousand thirteen is not two thousand and there are so 

many differences between Colombia and Central America and the 

Caribbean today. But the core problem of governance and lawlessness applies to both situations. Both CARSI and CBSI are useful 

and important steps, but the programs are not enough. Despite the 

cooperation, crime and violence in a number of countries are worsening, not improving. In Honduras, murder rates increased by 

some 50 percent between 2008 and 2012, precisely the time period 

in which these programs were implemented. And even where violence has dropped, U.S. support has been too modest and could be 

more effectively targeted. 

CARSI and CBSI are comprehensive and wide ranging cooperation programs. They combine traditional counternarcotics activities 

with institution building and crime prevention measures. There 

has been a welcome shift in resources toward the latter, but the 

counternarcotics control and law enforcement still account for a significant share of the assistance. 

Over the long term the best investment, the wisest investment, 

is in institution building. Drug trafficking is a key element in 

spreading violence and weakening institutions. It needs to be addressed. But levels of cocaine seizures, the main metric used to 

measure success in U.S. security aid, are not directly correlated 

with homicide rates. Even when the share of cocaine trafficked to 

the Caribbean has been reduced, the murder rates have more than 

doubled over the last decade. 

It is critical that resources be delivered in a timely manner and 

that they be commensurate with the huge challenges. According to 

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57

layed. It is commendable that in this difficult fiscal environment 

there will be more resources are for CARSI in next year’s budget. 

Resources are not everything, but they are important, and the U.S. 

should see this region as a high priority and be prepared to even 

increase funding should circumstances warrant. 

The U.S. should not limit its policy to Central America and the 

Caribbean to security cooperation programs. Diplomatic instruments and political pressures should also be brought to bear to engage other governments in the region to be more helpful. The role 

of Mexico and Colombia, and Colombia was referred to in the last 

panel, are especially critical, but other governments as well in the 

region need to be helpful and supportive. 

Central America is also sensitive to U.S. domestic policy issues. 

The U.S. should seriously engage in a review of drug policy, should 

manage deportations to the countries in the region with greater 

sensitivity to how they affect security, and it should do more to 

stop illegal arms from entering the region. The U.S. should recognize that there is a great opportunity for collaboration in the region. President Obama and Vice President Biden’s recent visits illustrate the goodwill in both Central America and the Caribbean, 

and Colombia shows that sustained U.S. support can make a difference. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity. I look forward to any 

questions you might have. 

Mr. RADEL. Thank you, Mr. Shifter. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]

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Mr. RADEL. I now yield myself 5 minutes to ask some questions. 

In committee hearing after committee hearing, Colombia always 

is this bright shining example of what we can do when we work 

together, fostering an economy, work on security, national security 

issues, et cetera, where we go from what was almost a failed state 

to what we now have in Colombia, the GDP booming, growing. But, 

Mr. Shifter, you pointed out how you cannot have one-size-fits-all 

approach when it comes to these types of issue and you noted some 

of the differences between Colombia and present day Central 

America. 

I would ask you, could you expand on that a little more? What 

are the differences and how can we better direct resources based 

on that? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Well, thank you. I think Colombia has an internal 

armed conflict, is a major difference. The political conflict is now 

a peace process in Colombia. Colombia clearly is one country as opposed to small countries, as Ambassador Brownfield underscored. 

It is a major coca producer. Plan Colombia was directed at eradicating the coca production in southern Colombia. So I think there 

are enormous differences. And this is mainly a problem of trafficking. Really this is the transit routes that go through. So I think 

there are some real, real differences. 

But the problem in Colombia, Colombia was called on the brink 

of a failed state and now some of these countries are called failed 

states. So there are similarities in terms of basic structures of governance, and questions of accountability, transparency, corruption. 

These issues were brought up in the context of Plan Colombia always well. 

So I do think that you tackle a very, very similar kind of problem. What I think is needed is a much more engaged approach 

even than we had in Colombia. Colombia is a country with a strong 

democratic tradition, stronger than many of the Central American 

countries. So they were a partner that you can work with, and I 

think in Central America I think really ultimately the responsibility is with the Central Americans themselves. But I do think beyond just security assistance programs, there needs to be a much 

more engaged and focused and targeted approach by the United 

states. 

Mr. RADEL. And that is where we get back to institutional support, versus just, gee, how many kilos of cocaine have we seized 

today. 

Mr. Olson, if you would want to expand on that, that is kind of 

what you were getting at as well, right, that institutional support, 

whether we are talking the justice system, education, things like 

that? 

Mr. OLSON. I totally agree with what everyone has said, that institutional support is essential. What I am trying to get at is in 

some ways we have been trying to do that for a long time and not 

terribly successfully. So what I am suggesting is maybe we need to 

take a little bit different approach to it; that the focus not be so 

much on training, not that I am against training, but that not be 

the main focus of what we do and we instead try to start with 

issues of transparency and accountability. 

64

Let me give you a couple examples. Again, Minister Corrales in 

Honduras discovered that there were 400-plus police officers that 

didn’t exist receiving salaries; 162 missing vehicles; expensive communication, brand new, never taken out of the package. That kind 

of problem you don’t solve by training more people because they 

are coming into a system of corruption, of penetration, of capture 

of the state. 

So what I am trying to say is that maybe the first building block 

here is to push them to have more transparent procedures. Nobody 

in Honduras can tell you how many cases have been opened, how 

many have been investigated, how many have been prosecuted and 

how many have been sentenced, basic information so that you 

could judge whether there is any progress. We keep training and 

training and training, but the system stays basically the same. 

And, no, it is not a question of institution strengthening or not. 

It is how you are going to do the institution strengthening that 

makes a difference. And I think that is the key to me. 

Mr. RADEL. Mr. Olson, I thank you for your time. I am the eternal optimist like you. I hope we can have a brighter future in this 

in implementing. Again, I go back to those kind of qualitative and 

quantitative measures to address what you have discussed. I think 

it is important that this committee too recognize if there are issues 

like that, if our funds are being directed or mismanaged in any 

way, tied into some of these issues that you have brought up, I 

hope that we can address that. 

At this point I will go ahead, and my time has expired, Mr. 

Meeks, you are recognized. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. I was going to call you Mr. Chairman 

but I see the chairman is back, so I don’t want him to think there 

is anything funny going on here. 

Mr. RADEL. You can still call me Mr. Chair. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me again thank you for your dedication and your 

focus on issues of concern, especially in Latin America and Central 

and South America. I am wondering, going back to the conversation that we were just having and oftentimes Colombia is a subject 

matter which we bring up, now, it seems to me maybe one of the 

fundamental differences has been, and you tell me, is leadership, 

from the top going down getting the word out that I want transparency. Because if the leadership doesn’t say I want transparency, 

then wherever the money goes it is going to be gone without having 

transparency. 

So talk to me about leadership in some of the key areas where 

we are investing money or where we should not invest money and 

how do we do that so we can make sure that there is accountability, eventually transparency and get on a pathway, as we did 

in Colombia. 

Mr. OLSON. I was going to defer to the chairman over here. I 

mean, I think that is a very valid point and a good point. And, 

again, like Michael said, each country is different. I think the Millennium Challenge Account has made transparency in governance 

a central part of its program and there has been progress in that 

in El Salvador, for instance. I think there has been progress in 

Guatemala because Guatemala has had the good fortune of having 

65

an attorney general who herself is courageous and has held people 

accountable. 

But I frankly am pessimistic about what I have heard and seen 

in Honduras, and part of it is there has been a revolving door. 

They have had three public security ministers in just over 3 years, 

and each one of them comes in with a new agenda and a new reform plan and is really going to shake things up. And more power 

to them, but it never takes hold and we never quite make it beyond 

that. 

So that is why looking at sort of the systemic part of this, the 

transparency part is really important. And, you know, if there were 

that kind of leadership committed in the long term, then I would 

say there is even more hope. 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Shifter? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you. I think you make a great point, Congressman. In Colombia what happened was they basically said this 

country is no longer viable if the situation continues the way it has 

been going, so in that context leadership emerged that kind of 

tapped into something that was out there. And we haven’t quite 

seen that yet in Central America. 

Part of the problem is that there is a very difficult challenge in 

coordinating efforts. Each one is a different situation. There is 

some mistrust frankly among the governments and you really have 

to have somebody that really plays—no one has really stepped forward yet to really assume that role of coordinating the region because everything is on the line. And that is really what happened 

in Colombia. It is easier to do it in one country than it is in many, 

especially when there are such different circumstances. 

But I think in terms of U.S. policy there are reformers in each 

of the countries. I think Honduras, as Eric said, is the most problematic, the most troubling. If you had to single out the most difficult one, I think it would be Honduras. But in Guatemala you 

have an Attorney General and in other countries you have people 

in leadership positions that I think you can be supporting, you can 

work with, and I think effort should just be to focus and to 

strengthen those individuals in leadership position, if not the President then at least in the judicial branch or Congress or in other 

institutions that are key. 

Mr. MEEKS. Well, let me ask, I have always been curious, those 

individuals that we may have in various institutions in various 

countries that seem to be moving in the right direction, where do 

they come from? How do we find them? Is it civil society if it 

doesn’t come from the top? What do we do to make sure that there 

more of them, that we are creating more of them, that we are educating or teaching more of them so we will have more of them coming from the groundswell up as opposed to leaving a vacuum? 

Mr. OLSON. I think that is a great point, and that is why I say 

we can’t have just such a narrow focus on fighting drugs. We have 

to look more broadly, because we have to identify leaders with possibility that can move this forward. And they may come from unexpected places. 

Again, trying to be optimistic even about Honduras, the one 

bright light I see in Honduras is actually the university. A university that traditionally has been abandoned, underfunded, corrupt, 

66

you name it, now has a rector who is viewed as an honest person, 

who is doing new and innovative things at the university. She has 

created an observatory on violence that is actually creating documentation schemes of who is getting murdered where. The government is not doing that. She is doing it. 

So there is somebody that is not in government and that is on 

the outside and maybe the periphery, but I think she is beginning 

to create a space in Honduras that is legitimate and maybe we can 

build something there. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. RADEL. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. I now recognize the chair. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Either of you can answer this question. 

Actually, it is a couple of questions. How has DOD supplemented 

the assistance provided through CARSI and what have been the 

principal accomplishments for DOD support for Central America 

thus far; how will the budget cuts affect the interdiction and training efforts moving forward; and what are the major challenges for 

interagency cooperation; and how would you respond to concerns 

that U.S. assistance is being provided to militaries that still experience widespread impunity for human rights violations and criminal 

activity? 

Thank you. 

Mr. OLSON. I am not sure I have an exact answer for you. I 

would like to be able to respond in writing. I mean, I take it by 

DOD you mean their counternarcotics assistance, because there is 

a DOD presence or a State Department presence in Honduras at 

the Soto Cano base, but that is not a counternarcotics function. 

SOUTHCOM has numerous programs in the area that are counternarcotics-focused. I am beginning to look at this issue of border 

and border security, and I know SOUTHCOM is doing quite a bit 

in Belize, in Guatemala, to try to increase the capacity of the militaries in those countries to patrol the borders. I don’t have numbers around that and I don’t know much more than that, but I do 

know they have a presence. 

What the sequester impact will be on all these programs, I just 

couldn’t tell you in honesty. 

Mr. SALMON. This is my last question, and either one of you, I 

will be happy to have you answer. How would you respond to than 

concerns that U.S. assistance is being provided to militaries that 

still experience widespread impunity for human rights violations 

and criminal activity? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Well, I think this is a concern. I mean, Central 

America as you know has a very troubling history and one of the 

achievements in Central America is precisely the reduction of the 

military over the recent period. And the worst thing the United 

States could do would be to strengthening those military forces for 

non-military purposes for what should just be law enforcement purposes. But the problem is the police are not adequate to the task 

and there is a lot of public pressure for order. And if the military 

is the only institution that can do that, that is a real dilemma, that 

is a real problem. So I think that is a very, very strong concern. 

I guess I would respond with a question that if the United States 

doesn’t provide support to those militaries, those countries, those 

militaries are going to do it anyway, and this at least gives the 

67

United States some leverage and ability to try to constrain those 

abuses. Because these situations are out of control, no other institution can provide order, and I don’t think the U.S. wants to sit 

by and say well, we are not part of this, but look what they are 

doing down there. 

I think this was the Colombian case. Again if you go back to Colombia, human rights has been a central part of that program and 

there has been a reduction in human rights abuses in parts thanks 

to the pressure applied from Washington. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Prisons throughout Central America 

are overcrowded and in substandard conditions. Moreover, they 

have become recruitment centers for criminal gangs, further complicating the security situation in the region. What are the governments of these countries doing to address these serious problems? 

Mr. OLSON. I know that in the case of Honduras the U.S. had 

I believe it was about a $10 million program to help reform and 

strengthen the prison system there because not only was it grossly 

overcrowded, but the prisons were actually platforms for organized 

crime and we had these horrific examples of prison fires and riots 

where hundreds of people were being killed. So there was a real 

interest in dealing with this problem here. And the U.S. said before 

we give you this money, we have a few conditions: No more cell 

phones in the prison, segregate the prisoners, keep minors out of 

the adult population, some basic, basic criteria. 

And the government was unable to meet those basic criterias so 

the U.S. said we are not giving you $10 million. As much as it is 

needed, as important as it is, if you can’t make some basic standards, you don’t have the will to do some basic things, we are not 

giving you the money. So it is a real dilemma because the problem 

as you say is extreme. 

Now there are better prisons, they have improved prison conditions in El Salvador, they have improved prison conditions in other 

countries. But when a country doesn’t have the basic fundamental 

commitment to make some minimal changes, one has to ask oneself 

is this the right way to invest our money? I think they did but the 

situation has not improved. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. RADEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you both gentlemen. It has been very productive. I think 

it gives us a little clarity moving forward on the realities of this, 

the cultural realities to this, which is a theme that just keeps coming up. You can only do so much. People want to have to want to 

help themselves. And as stewards of taxpayer dollars, it is imperative that we look at this very critically, especially given our own 

economy and our own budget here in the United States. 

Gentleman, thank you both. There being no further business, 

this subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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