NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS

Technology 

Development Efforts 

for the Uranium 

Processing Facility 

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2014

GAO-14-295

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-295, a report to 

congressional committees

April 2014

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Technology Development Efforts for the Uranium 

Processing Facility 

Why GAO Did This Study

NNSA conducts enriched uranium 

activities—including producing 

components for nuclear warheads 

and processing nuclear fuel for the 

U.S. Navy—at the Y-12 National 

Security Complex in Tennessee.

NNSA has identified key 

shortcomings in the Y-12 plant’s

current uranium operations, including 

rising costs due to the facility’s age. 

In 2004, NNSA decided to build a 

more modern facility—the UPF—

which will use nine new technologies 

that may make enriched uranium 

activities safer and more efficient.

In November 2010, GAO reported on 

the UPF and identified risks 

associated with the use of new 

technologies (GAO-11-103). The 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act mandated that

GAO assess the UPF quarterly. This 

is the third report, and it assesses (1) 

additional technology risks, if any,

since GAO’s November 2010 report

and (2) NNSA’s actions to address 

any risks. GAO reviewed NNSA and 

contractor documents and 

interviewed NNSA officials and 

contractor personnel. 

GAO is not making any new 

recommendations. However, NNSA 

should continue actions to address 

the two recommendations—which 

NNSA generally agreed with—in 

GAO’s November 2010 report 

related to ensuring that technologies 

reach optimal levels of maturity prior 

to critical project decisions. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, 

NNSA said its current technology 

maturation guidance is adequate.

What GAO Found

GAO has identified five additional risks since its November 2010 report (GAO-11-

103) associated with using new technologies in the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s (NNSA) Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which is to be built

in three interrelated phases. These risks and the steps that NNSA is taking to 

address them include the following: 

• Technology integration risks. An August 2013 UPF independent peer 

review team concluded that the microwave casting technology—a process 

that uses microwave energy to melt and form uranium into various shapes—

has not been demonstrated in a relevant environment, which is a 

requirement to reach a key technology maturity milestone. To address this 

risk, NNSA officials said they plan to accelerate the procurement and 

environmental testing of a microwave casting prototype. 

• Technology development risks. A key insulation material planned as a 

nuclear safety control during uranium casting failed a series of performance 

tests in fiscal year 2013. According to UPF contractor representatives, this 

risk is now the project’s most significant technological risk. To address this 

risk, these representatives said they are trying to identify a replacement 

insulation material and exploring the use of a different safety control.

• Technology transition risks. NNSA is currently evaluating an alternative 

technology to the UPF’s baseline uranium purification technology, which has 

been under development since 2005. The alternative technology may 

generate less radioactive waste and may be more efficient to operate than 

the baseline technology. If NNSA switches technologies, NNSA officials said 

that the UPF contractor (1) will have to redesign the processing area and 

equipment; (2) may have to add utilities; and (3) will have to revise the UPF’s 

nuclear safety analysis, creating the potential for further project risks.

• Performance assurance risks. NNSA stopped development efforts on a 

key machining technology, which is part of the UPF’s second phase. As a 

result, NNSA may not have optimal assurance that the technology will work 

as intended before starting construction. However, in January 2014, NNSA 

began (1) reevaluating alternatives to the UPF that may not include 

machining operations and (2) developing a uranium infrastructure strategy, 

which is a framework for how NNSA will maintain all uranium capabilities into 

the future. It is too soon to determine if the draft uranium strategy, scheduled 

to be issued in April 2014, will outline actions to address this risk. 

• Funding risk. Instead of using UPF project funds, NNSA has primarily 

funded UPF technology development activities from a limited research and 

development program. As a result of budget constraints in this program, for 

fiscal year 2014, 7 of the 19 technology projects the UPF contractor 

considered priority were not funded. Per a corrective action plan recently 

developed, the UPF Assistant Project Manager for Technology is responsible 

for determining which technology development activities should be funded 

directly with UPF project funds and is to prepare a cost estimate for those 

activities. This official said he expects to complete these estimates in March

2014. 

View GAO-14-295. For more information, 

contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

Letter 1

Background 3

New Technologies Planned for the UPF Face Five Additional 

Risks 10

NNSA Is Taking Some Actions to Address Identified Risks 13

Conclusions 16

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17

Appendix I Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration 20

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 22

Tables

Table 1: Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Phases, Scope of 

Work, Cost Estimate, as of June 2012, and Proposed 

Start of Operations 5

Table 2: Definitions of Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 7

Table 3: Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) New Technologies 

and Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) Assessed by the 

UPF Contractor and UPF Independent Peer Review 9

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

Abbreviations 

B&W Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Y-12, LLC 

CD critical decision 

CNS Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC

DER/ER direct electrolytic reduction and electrolytic refining 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

PDRD plant-directed research and development 

TRL Technology Readiness Level 

UNH uranyl nitrate hexahydrate 

UPF Uranium Processing Facility

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 18, 2014

Congressional Committees

The Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is the 

National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) site for conducting 

enriched uranium activities, producing uranium-related components for 

nuclear warheads and bombs, and processing nuclear fuel for the U.S. 

Navy.1

To address these shortcomings, in 2004, NNSA decided to construct a 

new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF).

NNSA is a separately organized agency within the Department of 

Energy (DOE). According to NNSA documents, the Y-12 plant’s current 

enriched uranium operations, which are conducted in four separate 

facilities, have key shortcomings including: (1) an inefficient work flow; (2) 

continually rising operations and maintenance costs due to facility age; 

and (3) hazardous processes that could expose workers to radiological 

contamination, among other things.

2

 1

NNSA owns the buildings, equipment, and the components produced at the Y-12 plant, 

but the site is operated under contract to NNSA by Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services 

Y-12, LLC (B&W), a partnership of the Babcock & Wilcox Company and Bechtel National, 

Inc. Beginning in July 2014, the Y-12 plant will be operated under contract to NNSA by 

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC, (CNS) which is comprised of member companies 

Bechtel National, Inc., Lockheed Martin Services, Inc., ATK Launch Systems Inc., and 

SOC LLC, with Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., as a teaming subcontractor.

According to NNSA documents, 

the UPF will consist of a single, consolidated facility less than half the size 

of existing facilities. As NNSA consolidates its facilities, the agency plans 

to develop several advanced technologies to make uranium processing 

and component production safer, more effective, and more efficient. 

Uranium processing uses chemicals and other means to recover enriched 

uranium from multiple sources in NNSA’s inventory. Component 

production includes enriched uranium metalworking and other processes 

to assemble new or refurbished nuclear weapons components. In 

November 2010, we reported on the extent to which the UPF is to use 

2

B&W is the contractor managing the UPF design and has subcontracted portions of the 

design work to four other contractors. In July 2014, CNS will become the contractor 

managing the UPF design. 
Page 2 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

new, experimental technologies, and resultant risks.3

• NNSA is using a systematic approach to assess the maturity of its 

new technologies; and

Specifically, we 

found that

• NNSA may not have assurance that all technologies will work as 

intended, and the UPF could have to revert to existing or alternative 

technologies, which could result in design changes, higher costs, and 

schedule delays.

At the request of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on 

Energy and Water Development and, in accordance with the Fiscal Year 

2013 National Defense Authorization Act, GAO is mandated to submit 

quarterly reports on the UPF.4 We issued our first report in July 2013, 

which found that key assumptions contained in multiple cost estimates 

proved to be inaccurate and were the primary factors that contributed to 

the UPF’s cost increase from $1.1 billion in 2004 to $6.5 billion in 2012.5

We issued our second report in October 2013, which found that the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board—an independent executive 

branch agency created by Congress in 1988 to assess safety conditions 

at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities—had identified safety concerns with 

the UPF’s design, and that NNSA had taken actions to address most of 

these concerns.6

To do this work, we reviewed DOE’s key project management order that 

establishes project management requirements, including those for 

technology development, as well as the order’s accompanying technology 

The objectives for this third quarterly report are to 

identify (1) additional risks, if any, since our November 2010 report of 

using new technologies associated with the UPF and (2) NNSA’s actions, 

if any, to address those risks.

 3

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its Uranium 

Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and Technology Readiness, 

GAO-11-103 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2010).

4

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 renamed UPF as the 

Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project. NNSA uses the new nomenclature in its fiscal 

year 2014 budget request.

5

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Factors Leading to Cost Increases with the Uranium Processing 

Facility, GAO-13-686R (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2013).

6

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Information on Safety Concerns with the Uranium Processing 

Facility, GAO-14-79R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2013).
Page 3 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

development guidance. In addition, we reviewed UPF technology 

maturation plans, UPF technology risk assessments, and UPF technology 

risk reduction plans. We also reviewed an August 2013 report by an 

NNSA independent peer review team that examined various aspects of 

the UPF project, including technology development. The peer review 

report contained multiple technology development related findings and 

recommendations, and we also reviewed NNSA’s corrective action plan 

for addressing these findings and recommendations. We interviewed UPF

contractor representatives responsible for managing technology 

development efforts, as well as NNSA officials who oversee this process. 

We visited the Y-12 plant and received technology development related 

briefings from NNSA officials and UPF contractor representatives and 

visited the UPF’s technology research and development facilities.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to April 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In 1990, we first designated DOE program and contract management as 

an area at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.7 In 

January 2009, to recognize the progress made at DOE’s Office of 

Science, we narrowed the focus of the high-risk designation to two DOE 

program elements, NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management.8

In February 2013, our most recent high-risk update, we narrowed this 

focus to major projects (i.e., projects over $750 million) at NNSA and the 

Office of Environmental Management.9

 7

GAO, Government Financial Vulnerability: 14 Areas Needing Special Review, 

DOE has taken some steps to 

address our concerns, including developing an order in 2010 (Order 

413.3B) that defines DOE’s project management principles and process 

for executing a capital asset construction project, which can include 

GAO/OCG-90-1 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 23, 1990). We update our high-risk list every 2 

years.

8

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington, D.C.: January 2009).

9

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: February 2013).

Background
Page 4 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

building or demolishing facilities or constructing remediation systems.10

• CD 0: Approve a mission-related need.

NNSA is required by DOE to manage the UPF construction project in 

accordance with this order. The project management process defined in 

Order 413.3B requires DOE projects to go through five management 

reviews and approvals, called “critical decisions” (CD), as they move 

forward from project planning and design to construction to operation. 

The CDs are as follows:

• CD 1: Approve an approach to meet a mission need and a preliminary 

cost estimate.

• CD 2: Approve the project’s cost, schedule and scope targets.

• CD 3: Approve the start of construction.

• CD 4: Approve the start of operations.

In August 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Energy originally approved CD 1 

for the UPF with a cost range of $1.4 to $3.5 billion. In June 2012, the 

Deputy Secretary of Energy reaffirmed CD 1 for the UPF with a cost 

range of $4.2 to $6.5 billion and approved a phased approach to the 

project, which deferred significant portions of the facility’s original scope.11

According to NNSA documents, this deferral was due, in part, to the 

project’s multibillion dollar increased cost estimate and to accelerate the 

completion of the highest priority scope. In July 2013, NNSA decided to 

combine CD 2 and CD 3 for the first phase of UPF.12 Table 1 shows the 

UPF’s phases, scope of work, cost estimate, as of June 2012, and 

proposed start of operations.

 10U.S. Department of Energy, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of 

Capital Assets, DOE O 413.3B (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2010).

11Order 413.3B requires reaffirmation if the original CD 1 cost range increases by more 

than 50 percent.

12According to the UPF Federal Project Director, there were two reasons for this decision: 

(1) NNSA’s delay in awarding the combined management and operating contract for the 

Y-12 plant and the Pantex plant in Texas and (2) NNSA needed to conduct further 

analysis to help ensure an optimized UPF project execution strategy.
Page 5 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

Table 1: Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Phases, Scope of Work, Cost Estimate, as of June 2012, and Proposed Start of 

Operations 

Phase Scope of work Cost estimate as of June 2012 

Proposed start 

of operations

Phase I UPF building exterior, all support systems, and Building 

9212 capabilities (uranium purification and casting)

$4.2 to $6.5 billion 2025

Phase II Building 9215 capabilities (machining) and Building 9998 

capabilities (product certification) 

NNSA has not established a cost 

estimate.

from 2030 to 2036

Phase III Building 9204-2E capabilities (assembly and 

dismantlement) 

NNSA has not established a cost 

estimate. 

from 2030 to 2036

Source: NNSA.

However, the future status of the UPF project and the process by which 

enriched uranium operations at the Y-12 plant will be modernized are 

unclear. NNSA has recently decided to: (1) delay later UPF phases, (2) 

assess options other than the UPF for enriched uranium operations at the 

Y-12 plant, (3) change a key technological requirement for the UPF, and 

(4) develop a strategy for how NNSA will maintain the Y-12 plant’s 

uranium capabilities into the future. Specifically:

• NNSA is delaying UPF Phase II and Phase III a minimum of 2 

years. In a December 2013 testimony before the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board, the NNSA Acting Administrator said that the 

agency does not expect to move out the facilities that house 

machining operations (Building 9215) as well as assembly and 

dismantlement operations (Building 9204-2E) until 2038 due primarily 

to budget constraints. NNSA previously estimated that these 

capabilities would be operational in the UPF no later than 2036.

• NNSA is currently evaluating alternatives to the UPF. In early 

January 2014, NNSA began to consider options other than the UPF 

for enriched uranium operations at the Y-12 plant because, according 

to the UPF Federal Project Director, the project is facing budget 

constraints, rising costs, and competition from other high-priority 

projects within NNSA—such as the planned B61 bomb and W78/88 

warhead nuclear weapon life extension projects. NNSA has initiated a 

formal analysis of UPF alternatives—an analytical comparison of the 

operational effectiveness, costs, and suitability of proposed solutions 

to address a mission need. According to the UPF Federal Project 

Director, the analysis of alternatives, which is scheduled to be 

completed by April 15, 2014, will include a potential solution for 
Page 6 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

replacing only uranium purification and casting capabilities (Building 

9212) by July 2025 at a cost that does not exceed $6.5 billion.13

• NNSA is currently evaluating alternatives for a key uranium 

purification technology originally planned for UPF Phase I, which 

now may be part of UPF Phase II. In late January 2014, NNSA 

decided to consider alternatives from its baseline uranium purification 

technology—which was to be part of UPF Phase I scope and had 

been under development since 2005—to a new technology, according 

to the UPF Federal Project Director. NNSA believes the new 

technology will require less space in the UPF and be more efficient to 

operate. In early February 2014, NNSA directed the UPF contractor to 

suspend design efforts in two UPF processing areas impacted by the 

potential technology change. Furthermore, NNSA is now considering 

installing this new technology as part of UPF Phase II scope, pending 

the results of further analysis.

According to the NNSA Acting Administrator, NNSA does not plan to 

continue full operations in Building 9212, which has been operational 

for over 60 years, past 2025 because the building does not meet 

modern safety standards, and increasing equipment failure rates 

present challenges to meeting required production targets. While 

NNSA is undertaking the analysis of alternatives, the UPF project 

team is currently (1) delaying the start of approximately $300 million in 

site preparation and long lead procurement activities and (2) will no 

longer complete engineering work to have the UPF’s design reach the 

90 percent complete milestone by August 2014, as previously 

planned.

• NNSA is currently developing a Uranium Infrastructure Strategy 

for the Y-12 plant. In early February 2014, the NNSA Deputy 

Administrator for Defense Programs directed his staff to develop a 

Uranium Infrastructure Strategy, which establishes the framework of 

how NNSA will maintain the Y-12 plant’s uranium mission capabilities 

into the future. Key aspects that are to be considered during the 

strategy’s development include, among other things: (1) an evaluation 

of the uranium purification capabilities and the throughput needed to 

support requirements for life extension programs and nuclear fuel for 

the U.S. Navy; (2) an evaluation of the alternatives to the UPF that 

prioritizes replacement capabilities by risk to nuclear safety, security, 

and mission continuity; (3) an identification of existing infrastructure as 

 13During the June 2012 CD 1 reaffirmation process, NNSA analyzed six alternatives to 

meet its enriched uranium processing mission need. NNSA ranked the alternative of a 

smaller building containing only Building 9212 capabilities fifth out of the six alternatives. 
Page 7 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

a bridging strategy until replacement capability is available in new 

infrastructure. A draft of the strategy is due to the Deputy 

Administrator by early April 2014.

To assess the maturity of new technologies, DOE and NNSA adopted the 

use of Technology Readiness Levels (TRL). DOE took this action in 

response to our March 2007 report14 that recommended that DOE 

develop a consistent approach to assess the extent to which new 

technologies have been demonstrated to work as intended in a project 

before starting construction.15

Table 2: Definitions of Technology Readiness Levels (TRL)

As shown in table 2, TRLs start with TRL 1, 

which is the least mature; through TRL 4, in which the technology is 

validated in a laboratory environment; to TRL 9—the highest maturity 

level, where the technology as a total system is fully developed, 

integrated, and functioning successfully in project operations.

TRL Definition 

TRL 1 Basic principles observed 

TRL 2 Concept/applications formulated 

TRL 3 Proof of concept 

TRL 4 Validated in a laboratory environment 

TRL 5 Validated in a relevant environment 

TRL 6 Subsystem demonstrated in a relevant environment 

TRL 7 Subsystem demonstrated in an operational environment 

TRL 8 Total system tested and demonstrated 

TRL 9 Total system used successfully in project operations 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD, NASA, and DOE data.

In 2009, DOE first issued guidance on the use of TRLs.16 In our 

November 2010 report,17

 14GAO, Department of Energy: Major Construction Projects Need a Consistent Approach 

for Assessing Technology Readiness to Help Avoid Cost Increases and Delays, 

we found that DOE’s TRL guidance was not 

GAO-07-336 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2007).

15 TRLs were pioneered by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

and have been used by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies in their 

research and development efforts for several years.

16DOE, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide, DOE G 413.3—4A (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 12, 2009).
Page 8 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

always consistent with best practices followed by other federal agencies, 

as well as with our prior recommendations. Specifically, DOE’s TRL 

guidance recommended that new technologies reach TRL 6—the level 

where a prototype is demonstrated in a relevant or simulated environment 

and partially integrated into the system—at the start of construction (CD 

3). However, best practices followed by other federal agencies and our 

prior recommendations state that new technologies should reach TRL 7—

the level where a prototype is demonstrated in an operational 

environment, has been integrated with other key supporting subsystems,

and is expected to have only minor design changes—at the start of 

construction. In our November 2010 report, we recommended that the 

Secretary of Energy evaluate where DOE’s guidance for gauging the 

maturity of new technologies is inconsistent with best practices and, as 

appropriate, revise the guidance to be consistent with federal agency best 

practices.18 In September 2011, DOE issued its revised TRL guidance, 

but the guidance does not incorporate federal agency best practices and 

is not fully responsive to our recommendation.19

In November 2010, we reported that NNSA was developing 10 advanced 

uranium processing and nuclear weapon components production 

technologies for the UPF. 

Specifically, DOE’s 

revised TRL guidance continues to recommend that new technologies 

reach TRL 6 at the start of construction, while stating that reaching TRL 7 

at the start of construction is a recognized best practice.

20

 17

Since that time, NNSA eliminated 1 

technology as the agency removed certain operations from the UPF. In 

April 2013, NNSA chartered an independent peer review team to examine 

various aspects of the UPF project, including assessing the current TRLs 

for new technologies. In an August 2013 report, the independent peer 

review team found that 6 of the 9 new technologies were not as mature 

as previously reported in the UPF contractor’s May 2013 TRL 

assessment; the independent peer review report also stated that no 

fundamental technology show stoppers were identified. In addition, the 

independent peer review report contained multiple technology 

development related findings and recommendations, and NNSA and the 

GAO-11-103. 

18GAO-11-103.

19DOE, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide, DOE G 413.3—4A (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 15, 2011). 

20 GAO-11-103. 
Page 9 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

UPF contractor developed a corrective action plan to address them. Table 

3 provides a description of the new technologies, the phase in which each 

technology will be deployed, and the TRL assessment concluded by the 

UPF contractor in May 2013 and the UPF independent peer review in 

August 2013.

Table 3: Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) New Technologies and Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) Assessed by the UPF 

Contractor and UPF Independent Peer Review

New technology Description 

May 2013 TRL 

assigned by UPF 

contractor 

August 2013 TRL 

assigned by UPF 

independent peer 

review report

Phase I

Microwave casting A process that uses microwave energy to melt and cast 

uranium metal into various shapes 

6 Less than 6

Special casting 

a

A custom process for casting uranium into various 

shapes 

3 3

Bulk metal oxidation A process that converts bulk uranium metal to oxide 7 7

Uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) 

calcination 

A process that converts impure solutions into a stable, 

storable condition 

5 5

Saltless direct oxide reduction

b

A process that converts uranium dioxide into metal c 6 4 or 5

Recovery extraction centrifugal 

contactors 

A process that uses solvent to extract uranium for 

purposes of purification 

7 Not above 6

Phase II 

d

Agile machining A system that combines multiple machining operations—

for fabricating metal into various shapes—into a single 

process 

5 4

Chip management An automated process that reduces operator interactions 

with machining process and improves worker safety by 

minimizing exposure to radioactive metal chips. It is one 

of the multiple operations to be performed through agile 

machining 

6 5

Alternate processing of pins A process to form uranium metal into custom shapes 7 6

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

Note: A TRL is assigned to each critical technology on a scale from a TRL 1, which is the least 

mature, through TRL 9—the highest maturity level where the technology as a total system is fully 

developed, integrated, and functioning successfully in project operations.

a

According to the August 2013 independent peer review team’s report, the microwave casting 

technology is assessed to be “less than TRL 6” because certain testing and planning activities were 

incomplete.

b

The August 2013 independent peer review team concluded that pending the completion of a nuclear 

safety study for UNH calcination, this technology would be at TRL 6 as all other requirements were 

met. According to UPF contractor officials, the required study is complete, and the contractor has 

reassessed the TRL.

c Although saltless direct oxide reduction is the UPF’s current baseline uranium purification 

technology, NNSA notified the UPF contractor in early February 2014 of its plans to update the 
Page 10 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

document that establishes UPF requirements to incorporate a new uranium purification technology 

called direct electrolytic reduction and electrolytic refining (DER/ER). According to NNSA officials, the 

agency currently (1) has not directed the UPF contractor to pursue the DER/ER technology as part of 

UPF Phase I and (2) is considering installing the DER/ER technology into UPF Phase II pending the 

results of further analysis. According to the August 2013 UPF independent peer review report, the 

DER/ER technology is less mature than the saltless direct oxide reduction technology. Specifically, 

the direct electrolytic reduction technology is at TRL 3 and the electrolytic refining technology is at 

TRL 4.

d

According to the August 2013 peer review team’s report, the recovery extraction centrifugal 

contactors technology is assessed to be “not above TRL 6” because the entire system has not been 

tested.

Since our November 2010 report, we identified five additional risks 

associated with using new technologies in the UPF. Specifically:

• Integration risks for microwave casting technology. The August 

2013 independent peer review team report raised concerns with 

microwave casting—a process that uses microwave energy to melt 

and cast uranium metal into various shapes—as it is planned to be 

integrated in the UPF’s casting system.21

• Technology development risk for special casting technology. In

2012, the UPF project team determined that a different nuclear safety 

control was needed for special casting—a custom process for casting 

uranium metal into various shapes—as this process uses more 

uranium than the regular casting process.

According to an NNSA 

official, the casting system planned for the UPF will employ uranium 

processing technology, equipment, and steps that are substantially 

different than the casting system currently used at the Y-12 plant. For 

example, microwave casting in the UPF will use glovebox 

enclosures—a containment system of secured gloves attached to a 

box that allows workers to process nuclear material inside the box 

without risk of contamination. The independent review team found that 

the UPF’s planned casting glovebox enclosures are: (1) large and 

somewhat complex, (2) have not had their functionality tested, and (3) 

have not been demonstrated with microwave casting. As such, the 

independent review team concluded that microwave casting has not 

been demonstrated in a relevant environment—a key requirement to 

reach TRL 6.

22

 21A casting system includes multiple processing steps and related equipment to handle, 

transfer, melt, cast, and cool uranium, as well as conduct quality assurance inspections. 

For special casting, the 

22A nuclear criticality accident occurs when enough fissile material, such as uranium, is 

brought together to cause a sustained nuclear chain reaction. The immediate result of a 

nuclear criticality accident is the production of an uncontrolled and unpredictable radiation 

source that can be lethal to people who are nearby. 

New Technologies 

Planned for the UPF 

Face Five Additional 

Risks
Page 11 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

UPF contractor is developing a nuclear safety control called 

“entombment.” 23

• Transition risks if NNSA switches to a new uranium purification 

technology. In 2005, NNSA decided to deploy the saltless direct 

oxide reduction technology—a process that converts uranium dioxide 

into a useable metal form—into the UPF. The August 2013 UPF 

independent peer review report concluded that an alternate 

technology called direct electrolytic reduction and electrolytic refining 

(DER/ER; currently assessed to be at TRL 3 and 4, respectively) 

could potentially reduce the UPF’s operating costs and produce less 

radioactive waste compared with the saltless direct oxide reduction 

technology. In a December 2013 testimony before the Defense 

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Acting NNSA Administrator stated 

that early research and development investments in the DER/ER 

technology are promising and NNSA is actively seeking to mature and 

deploy the technology into UPF to minimize future waste streams.

NNSA is now considering installing this new technology as part of 

UPF Phase II scope, pending the results of further analysis, and 

directed the UPF contractor in February 2014 to suspend design 

efforts in two UPF processing areas impacted by this potential 

technology change.

The entombment control—which uses multiple parts, 

such as cylinders and an insulation material—would occupy void 

volume where molten uranium metal could otherwise collect in the 

event of an improper casting (i.e., mis-pour). However, a key 

insulation material planned for use in the entombment control failed 

an important series of performance tests in fiscal year 2013. 

According to UPF contractor representatives, this failure and the need 

to identify and test an alternative insulation material is now the 

project’s most significant technology development risk and the primary 

reason why the special casting technology is currently assessed to be 

at TRL 3.

UPF contractor representatives told us that incorporating DER/ER into the 

UPF would require significant changes to the facility’s design. For 

example, NNSA officials said that changing to DER/ER would require a 

complete redesign of the processing areas and their equipment and may 

require adding new support utilities and that the UPF facility would have 

 23According to the UPF Federal Project Director, special casting will account for 20 

percent of UPF’s casting operations while regular casting will account for the remaining 80 

percent. He also said that currently the Y-12 plant is not able to conduct special casting 

operations due to nuclear safety concerns. 
Page 12 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

to revise its nuclear safety analysis. In addition, the August 2013 UPF 

independent peer review report found that the UPF project team has not 

conducted any nuclear criticality studies or developed any nuclear safety 

controls for the DER/ER technology because the technology was not 

planned for use in UPF at the time.

• Assurance risks that the agile machining technology will work as 

intended before making key project decisions. As stated earlier, 

NNSA plans to approve a combined CD 2 (approved cost, schedule, 

and scope targets) and CD 3 (approve start of construction) milestone 

in for UPF Phase I, which includes the building exterior, all UPF 

processing areas, and all UPF support systems. In short, UPF Phase I 

will create key parameters that subsequent UPF phases must work 

within. Agile machining—a system combining multiple machining 

operations into a single process that fabricates metal into various 

shapes—is the key technology planned for UPF Phase II. The August 

2013 independent UPF peer review assessed agile machining to be at 

TRL 4. In December 2013, NNSA decided to no longer fund agile 

machining technology development efforts because (1) agile 

machining is not considered a baseline technology for UPF Phase I as 

it is part of the deferred scope and (2) NNSA is considering combining 

agile machining development efforts with other machining 

development efforts used in at the Y-12 plant. According to NNSA 

officials, the UPF contractor has completed the design for the agile 

machining prototype, but it will be the responsibility of the UPF Phase 

II project to mature this technology.24

According to best practices we identified in our 2007 report, a new 

technology should achieve at least TRL 6 by CD 2 and at least TRL 7 by 

CD 3.25

 24According to the UPF Federal Project Director, there are examples of other DOE 

construction projects that have provided space for future technologies, such as the 

Spallation Neutron Source constructed by DOE’s Office of Science.

Since NNSA cancelled agile machining development efforts, the 

technology will remain at TRL 4 when NNSA plans to approve the 

combined CD 2 and CD 3 milestone for UPF Phase I. As a result, NNSA 

will not have optimal assurance that agile machining will work as intended 

before making a key project decision, which could result in costly design 

changes and construction delays. In addition, NNSA plans to operate the 

UPF as an integrated system that incorporates all uranium capabilities, 

25GAO-07-336.
Page 13 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

which requires the successful deployment of all new technologies 

planned for the UPF, including those scheduled for UPF Phase II.

• Risk that funding mechanism for UPF technology development 

activities may not be adequate to develop all new technologies.

According to NNSA officials and UPF contractor representatives, 

NNSA has primarily funded UPF technology development activities 

from the Y-12 plant-directed research and development (PDRD) 

program, which requires projects from every part of the Y-12 plant to 

compete for funding.26 From fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2013, the 

$73 million in UPF technology development costs have been funded 

by non-UPF project sources, such as the PDRD program, instead of 

from the $1 billion specifically allotted to the UPF project, according to 

the UPF contractor Project Manager. UPF contractor representatives 

told us that NNSA made the decision to fund technology development 

activities from non-UPF project sources because some UPF 

technologies could be used for other operations at the Y-12 plant or at 

other nuclear weapon stockpile programs. However, NNSA did not 

select some UPF technology development projects identified as being 

priority by the UPF project team for PDRD funding. For example, in 

fiscal year 2013, 19 projects were considered priority by the UPF 

project team, but NNSA did not fund 3 of these projects. For fiscal 

year 2014, 19 projects were considered priority by the UPF project 

team, but NNSA did not fund 7 of these projects. In addition, one of 

the five UPF technology development risk reduction plans developed 

by the UPF contractor is to “obtain additional PDRD funding,” but the 

effectiveness of this plan is unclear given that existing UPF 

technology development projects considered priority have not 

received funding.

NNSA is currently taking some actions to address three of the five UPF 

technology risks we have identified. NNSA is currently developing plans 

and making programmatic decisions about the UPF that could address 

the other two risks but, it is still too soon to determine if these actions will 

sufficiently address these two risks. Specifically:

 26Similar to DOE’s Laboratory Directed Research and Development program, the PDRD 

program funds conceptual or preliminary designs of innovative technologies. PDRD 

funding may not exceed 4 percent of a plant’s budget. At the Y-12 plant in fiscal year 

2012, for example, PDRD program funding was $23.9 million, or 3.1 percent of the plant’s 

budget. 

NNSA Is Taking Some 

Actions to Address 

Identified Risks
Page 14 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

• Microwave casting technology. To address the risks with integrating 

microwave casting—a process that uses microwave energy to melt 

and cast uranium metal into various shapes—into the UPF’s casting 

system, the UPF contractor plans to issue a request for proposal in 

March 2014 for the development of a prototype microwave casting 

furnace. UPF contractor representatives said that they have had 

preliminary discussions with two vendors about building the prototype. 

According to NNSA officials, the UPF contractor will be required to 

test the prototype in an integrated UPF configuration that includes 

glovebox enclosures. If completed, we believe these planned actions 

will help NNSA reduce this risk and identify further mitigation 

measures that may need to be taken.

• Special casting technology. For the entombment nuclear criticality 

safety control planned for special casting—a custom process for 

casting uranium metal into various shapes—UPF contractor 

representatives told us that they would like to have a replacement 

insulation material identified and successfully tested by June 2014. 

However, NNSA officials said that this June 2014 date is optimistic 

and may not be met. In addition, UPF contractor officials said they are 

currently conducting a formal analysis of alternatives for the 

entombment control. The UPF contractor expects to finish its analysis 

by the end of January 2014 and brief the results and potential impacts 

to senior NNSA management. If NNSA completes these planned 

actions, we believe that the agency may have taken appropriate 

actions to address this risk.

• DER/ER technology. According to the UPF Federal Project Director, 

in February 2014, the NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense 

Programs directed NNSA’s Production Office—the field office 

responsible for contractor oversight and management of the Y-12 

plant—to: (1) create a technology development plan for DER/ER, (2) 

develop a preliminary cost estimate for DER/ER technology 

development, (3) identify existing facilities at the Y-12 plant where 

DER/ER could be deployed, and (4) use DER/ER in actual uranium 

operations no later than 2021. 

However, as noted above, the design of the two UPF processing 

areas impacted by the potential switch to DER/ER has been 

suspended. According to the UPF Federal Project Director, these 

areas are considered part of UPF’s deferred scope which means that 

(1) the UPF will reserve space for DER/ER capabilities and ensure 

that all needed support utilities are available in the two processing 

areas and (2) it will be the responsibility for the UPF Phase II project 

team to install the DER/ER equipment into the UPF. Given the early 
Page 15 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

stages of NNSA’s planning, we believe that it is too soon to determine 

if these actions will address this technology transition risk.

• Agile machining technology. The UPF is to modernize and 

consolidate all enriched uranium operations at the Y-12 plant in three 

phases. Agile machining—a system that combines multiple machining 

operations for fabricating metal into various shapes into a single 

process—is the key technology planned for UPF Phase II. As stated 

above, NNSA decided in December 2013 to no longer fund agile 

machining technology development efforts (currently assessed at TRL 

4) for multiple reasons. UPF contractor representatives told us that (1) 

they have completed the design of an agile machining prototype; (2) 

by the end of 2014, they will outline the actions needed to mature the 

technology to TRL 6; and (3) the UPF Phase II project team will have 

the responsibility to mature the technology.

NNSA is currently evaluating alternatives to the UPF, and the 

outcome of this evaluation may require different agency actions to 

address this risk. If NNSA decides to continue with a UPF that 

includes machining operations, the agency will need to take action to 

address a recommendation from the August 2013 UPF independent 

peer review team. Specifically, the peer review team recommended 

that the UPF project fabricate and test an agile machining prototype 

before starting construction on the UPF. According to the peer review 

team, implementing this recommendation is a high-priority action and 

will help ensure the confident integration of the agile machining 

technology into UPF at a later date. However, if NNSA decides to 

construct a facility with only uranium purification and casting

capabilities—which do not include machining capabilities—the agency 

will have to develop alternate plans that detail how machining 

capabilities will be modernized and how the agile machining 

technology will be matured. It is too soon to determine if the Uranium 

Infrastructure Strategy that NNSA is currently developing and 

scheduled to issue in draft form in early April 2014 will address this 

issue. Given that NNSA is: (1) currently evaluating potential UPF 

alternatives; (2) currently developing its Uranium Infrastructure 

Strategy; and (3) planning to conduct machining operations in its 

current facility, until at least 2038, we believe it is too early to tell if 

NNSA is taking appropriate action to address this risk.

• Technology development funding. The August 2013 UPF 

independent peer review report recommended that the UPF project 

fund more technology development activities from project funds 

instead of PDRD funds. In October 2013, the UPF contractor issued a 

corrective action plan to address the recommendations from the 
Page 16 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

August 2013 UPF independent peer review. This corrective action 

plan: (1) lists planned and ongoing actions that the contractor and 

NNSA will take to address each recommendation, (2) provides an 

estimated date by which planned actions are to be completed, and (3) 

identifies which UPF contractor representative or NNSA official is 

responsible for completing the planned action. As part of this 

corrective action plan, the UPF Assistant Project Manager for 

Technology is responsible for determining which technology 

development activities should be funded directly with UPF project 

funds and is to prepare a cost estimate for those activities. The UPF 

Assistant Project Manager for Technology told us that he expects to 

complete the planned corrective action by the end of March 2014. 

Adding required technology development activities to the UPF’s cost 

estimate may increase the project’s cost estimate, but it may also 

improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the estimate. If 

NNSA completes these planned actions, we believe that the agency 

may have taken appropriate actions to address this risk.

Enriched uranium operations at the Y-12 plant play a vital role in the 

national security of the United States by producing critical components for 

the nuclear weapons stockpile and by supplying fuel for the Navy. There 

is a clear need for NNSA to replace the old, deteriorating, and highmaintenance facilities at the Y-12 plant. NNSA is currently reevaluating 

the UPF project and may decide to construct a facility that is smaller and 

contains only select enriched uranium processing capabilities. Whether 

NNSA continues with the UPF project or chooses to undertake a smaller 

project, the facility will likely cost billions of dollars, and its ability to meet 

critical national security needs will depend on the successful development 

and deployment of new technologies. It is encouraging that NNSA has 

taken some steps to manage the development of these technologies. 

However, as we have detailed in this and other reports, we are concerned 

that, nearly a decade after the project started, the UPF project continues 

to face key technology-related risks, including the potential transition risks 

associated with NNSA’s recent decision to consider alternatives to a new 

uranium purification technology. NNSA is in the process of making key 

programmatic decisions with the UPF and has some ongoing efforts that 

may address identified risks if fully and successfully implemented. We will 

continue to monitor NNSA’s progress in addressing these risks as part of 

our UPF critical decisions reviews as directed by the Fiscal Year 2013 

National Defense Authorization Act.

In addition, NNSA has not taken action to address the two 

recommendations related to UPF technology development we made in 

Conclusions
Page 17 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

our November 2010 report: (1) that NNSA ensure that new technologies 

reach the level of maturity called for by best practices prior to CDs being 

made on the UPF project and (2) that the agency report to Congress any 

decisions to approve cost and schedule performance baselines or to 

begin construction of UPF without first having ensured that project 

technologies are sufficiently mature. NNSA generally agreed with those 

recommendations, and we continue to believe that best practices followed 

by other federal agencies for managing technology development, 

particularly reaching TRL 7 at the start of construction, are important. By 

not fully incorporating these practices, NNSA may not be able to ensure 

that the UPF and its other projects can be completed on time and within 

budgets.

We are not making any new recommendations in this report. We provided 

a draft of this report to NNSA for comment. In written comments (see 

Appendix I), the acting NNSA Administrator stated that NNSA’s existing 

TRL guidance, which encourages the achievement of TRL 7 prior to the 

start of construction (CD 3), provides adequate protection against the 

premature commitment of resources while giving projects flexibility to 

make decisions between seeking TRL 6 and TRL 7. In addition, the acting 

NNSA Administrator stated the agency is closely overseeing and 

managing UPF’s ongoing technology development efforts using on-site 

personnel and independent reviews to confirm reported progress while 

also keeping senior management informed of development efforts. 

We continue to believe that DOE should fully adhere to best practices in 

its technology development activities. DOE’s guidance recognizes that 

achieving a TRL 7 at the start of construction is a best practice and DOE 

encourages—but does not require—projects to achieve this level of 

readiness. Achieving TRL 7—the level where a prototype is 

demonstrated in an operational environment, has been integrated with 

other key supporting subsystems, and is expected to only have minor 

design changes—does require more time, effort, and money than 

achieving TRL 6. However, TRL 7 is seen as a best practice because it 

provides greater assurance the new technologies will work as intended 

before making very significant resource investments in construction 

activities, which for the UPF will total billions of dollars. Notably, DOD 

follows best practices in this area and recommends projects reach TRL 7 

before production and deployment, or the equivalent of beginning 

construction on a DOE project.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 18 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

Regarding NNSA’s oversight of technology development efforts, it is clear 

that certain NNSA actions, such as the August 2013 UPF independent 

peer review, helped identify and respond to some technology 

development issues. However, since NNSA is currently considering 

alternatives to UPF and developing the Uranium Infrastructure Strategy 

for the Y-12 plant, it is too early to determine if the oversight and 

management actions cited by NNSA will be sufficient to fully address all 

the risks we identified. 

NNSA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, and 

other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions on matters discussed in 

this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Page 19 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Chairwoman

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mike Simpson

Chairman

The Honorable Marcy Kaptur

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 20 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 21 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

NNSA’s attachment 

provided technical 

comments which we 

incorporated as 

appropriate in the final 

report.
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 22 GAO-14-295 Nuclear Weapons

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov.

In addition to the individual named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant 

Director; Patrick Bernard; Antoinette Capaccio; Will Horton; Katrina 

Pekar-Carpenter; Dr. Timothy Persons, and Ron Schwenn made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(361529)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov.

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.