Acquisition of Technology 

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 

1 January to 31 December 2005 

Acquisition by Country 

As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are 

country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and 

deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons 

(ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 31 December 2005. This report focuses on key 

countries of concern that we assess are seeking WMD capabilities. 

Iran 

We assess that in 2005, Iran continued its indigenous nuclear, chemical and probable biological 

warfare, long-range ballistic missile, and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) programs. 

Iran sought foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how during 2005 focused 

particularly on entities in China, North Korea, Russia, and Europe. 

Nuclear. We remain concerned that Tehran may have a clandestine nuclear weapons program, 

contrary to its obligations as a Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). During 

2005, Iran continued to pursue an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, which it asserts is necessary 

for its civilian nuclear program, but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued 

to have many outstanding questions and has been unable to conclude that there are no 

undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. International scrutiny and IAEA inspections 

and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from using facilities declared to the IAEA 

directly for weapons purposes as long as Iran remains a Party to the NPT. However, Iran could 

use the same technology at other, covert locations for military applications. 

 

Iran continued in 2005 to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to either 

indigenously establish or otherwise acquire the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Iran claims that this 

fuel cycle would be used to produce fuel for its nuclear power program, which currently is 

limited to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, a 1000-MW light-water reactor that is not yet 

operational. Although Russia has pledged to provide the fuel throughout the operating lifetime 

of the Bushehr reactor and has negotiated with Iran to take back the irradiated spent fuel, Iran 

argues that it needs to produce its own fuel to ensure a future supply for its nuclear power 

program. Iran continued construction of a Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) in Esfahan that it 

declared to the IAEA would provide fuel for Bushehr as well as for the 40-megawatt heavywater research reactor under construction at Arak. The Arak reactor, once operational, would 

provide spent fuel from which Iran might reprocess weapons-grade plutonium. During August 

2005, Iran removed IAEA seals and resumed uranium conversion activities at the Uranium 

Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan. 
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Ballistic Missile. Ballistic missile-related assistance from entities in China, North Korea, and 

Russia over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the 

production of ballistic missiles. We believe that such assistance continued during 2005 to 

include equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran's ballistic missile inventory in 2005 was 

among the largest in the Middle East and included some Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic 

missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)—including the 

Shahab-1 (Scud B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and Tondar 69 (CSS-8)--as well as a variety of large 

unguided rockets. Already producing the 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 MRBMs, Iran announced 

that it has developed a 2,000-km-range variant of this missile. Iranian public statements also 

indicate that its solid-propellant technology is maturing. Solid-propellant ballistic missiles have 

operational advantages over Iran’s existing liquid-propellant systems because they are already 

fueled and can be readied for launch in a shorter time. Iran in May 2005 publicly claimed it 

was testing a solid rocket motor, possibly for a missile with a longer range. Iran also has stated 

that it plans to use its ballistic missiles to develop space launch vehicles to place domestically 

produced satellites into space. We assess Iran genuinely aspires to access space; however, 

technologies related to space launch vehicles have direct application to long-range ballistic 

missiles that we also assess Iran seeks. 

Chemical. Iran is a Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during 

the reporting period Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise 

from foreign entities that could advance its assessed chemical warfare (CW) program.

Biological. Iran also is a Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). As of 2005, the 

status of its biotechnology infrastructure indicated that at a minimum, Iran probably had the 

capability to produce at least small quantities of biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive 

purposes. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnology materials, equipment, and expertise 

that are consistent with its growing legitimate biotechnology industry but could benefit 

Tehran’s assessed probable BW program. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. In 2005, Iran continued to seek and acquire conventional 

weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia and China. Tehran also sought 

high-quality products, particularly weapons components and dual-use items, or products that 

proved difficult to acquire through normal governmental channels. 

Libya 

On 19 December 2003, the Libyan Government announced its intention to eliminate its nuclear 

and chemical weapons programs and long-range missiles. In 2005, Libya continued to 

cooperate with experts from the US and UK, who were investigating Tripoli’s past WMDrelated activities. No efforts to acquire technology for WMD purposes were identified. Libya 

still maintains a program for developing missiles that fall below the Missile Technology 

Control Regime (MTCR) Category I limit of being able to deliver a 500-kg payload to a range 

of 300 km. During 2005, Libya submitted plans for the destruction of its CW agent stockpile 

and destroyed the precursors and the specialized chemical production equipment that had been 

removed from the Pharma 150 chemical weapons production facility. 
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North Korea 

Nuclear. During 2005, North Korea continued its nuclear weapons program and its 

participation in the Six-Party Talks. In February 2005, North Korea announced that it had 

manufactured nuclear weapons. In May, Pyongyang announced the unloading of the 5 MWe 

reactor as a measure to bolster its nuclear arsenal. The North informed US visitors in October 

that the reprocessing of this spent fuel had been completed. 

• In the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the forth round of the Six-Party 

Talks, North Korea committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing 

nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA 

safeguards. 

Ballistic Missile. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic 

missiles, and continues to procure needed raw materials and components from various foreign 

sources. In 2005, North Korea continued to abide by its voluntary moratorium on long-range 

missile flight tests adopted in 1998 and reaffirmed in May 2004, although Pyongyang in March 

2005 announced in a Foreign Ministry statement that it was no longer bound by the moratorium. 

Chemical. Pyongyang has not signed the CWC, and North Korean firms during the reporting 

period sought dual-use materials that could be applicable to the production of CW agents. In 

2005, the United States and its allies intercepted two deliveries bound for North Korea 

containing materials that could be used to make CW agents. 

Biological. North Korea is a Party to the BWC. Pyongyang’s resources presently include a 

rudimentary biotechnology infrastructure. North Korea has the scientists and facilities for 

producing biological products and microorganisms, and has the ability to produce traditional 

infectious BW agents or toxins. North Korea produces conventional munitions that could be 

used to deliver BW agents. In 2005, North Korea requested, but was subsequently denied, a 

preventive vaccine manufacturing facility from South Korea. 

Syria 

Nuclear. Syria—an NPT Party with full-scope IAEA safeguards—has nuclear research 

facilities at Dayr Al Hajar and Dubaya. In 2005, Syria continued to develop its civilian nuclear 

infrastructure and research capabilities. We continue to monitor Syrian nuclear intentions with 

concern. 

Ballistic Missile. During 2005, Damascus continued to seek help from abroad to establish a 

solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria’s liquid-propellant 

missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance—primarily 

from North Korean entities. Damascus also continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud 
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missiles. In addition, Syria was developing longer-range Scuds, such as the Scud D and 

possibly other variants, with assistance from North Korea and Iran. 

Chemical and Biological. Syria continued to seek dual-use technology from foreign sources 

during the reporting period. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but 

apparently has tried to develop a more toxic and persistent nerve agent. We assess that Syria 

remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor 

chemicals. During 2005, Syria probably also continued to develop a BW capability. Syria has 

signed but not ratified the BWC and has not acceded to the CWC. 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism 

A wide array of reporting in 2005 indicated continued interest by al-Qa’ida and other terrorist 

groups in developing chemical and biological capabilities for use in attacks against Western 

targets, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rhetoric from these groups continued to focus on 

the need for spectacular attacks, but actual attempts were few during this time period and 

consisted of small-scale attacks using commercially available toxic industrial chemicals. In 

addition, Al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups maintained a steady interest in acquiring 

radiological or nuclear material. 

Chemical. During 2005, al-Qa’ida in Iraq attempted to improve its chemical capabilities in 

cooperation with other Iraq-based terrorist groups, and anti-Coalition insurgents were blamed 

for one poisoning. Other international terrorist groups showed active interest in developing a 

crude chemical attack capability focused on commercially available chemicals, and jihadist 

websites continued to espouse the use of chemicals in attacks against the West. Historically, alQa’ida has maintained a steady effort to develop a capability to use chemicals in attacks, but in 

2005 there was no reporting associated with such pursuits beyond some possible chemicalrelated training in Pakistan. 

• In May 2005, Iraqi insurgents reportedly injected watermelons with common 

chemicals and distributed them to Iraqi soldiers south of Mosul. Some soldiers 

became ill but there were no reported fatalities. 

Biological. The Intelligence Community received no reliable reporting that suggests al-Qa’ida 

maintained an active biological weapons effort in 2005. The IC judges, however, that based on 

the group’s longstanding interest in acquiring WMD for mass casualty attacks against the West 

and previous biological production efforts, it is unlikely that the current leadership will 

permanently abandon this option. Reports of various credibility indicated that other terrorist 

groups had a continued interest through 2005 in the use of “poisons”—predominantly plant 

toxins such as ricin. 

Nuclear and Radiological. In 2005, al-Qa’ida continued to demonstrate an interest in the 

acquisition of radiological material for use in the development of improvised weapons. The 

group has also shown interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear expertise. 

There were no indications of acquisition or development efforts by other terrorist groups. 
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Nuclear attack scenarios remained a topic of jihadist rhetoric on Internet websites in 2005 and 

the Intelligence Community continued to receive a steady stream of nuclear and radiological 

threat reporting. 

 

Key Suppliers 

China 

Nuclear. China’s record is strongest with respect to nuclear nonproliferation, as Beijing has 

largely curtailed government-sanctioned assistance to most countries. China in late 2003 

applied for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and became a member at the 

NSG Plenary in 2004. As an NSG member, China is committed to implementing the NSG’s 

policy of full scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states. 

However, China has told the NSG that Beijing intends to "grandfather" certain contracts with 

safeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan, which does not have full-scope safeguards. 

Ballistic Missile. In October 1994, China pledged not to sell MTCR Category I ground-toground missiles, and in November 2000 pledged not to assist any country in any way in the 

development of MTCR Category I ballistic missiles. China’s ballistic missile-related export 

control record in 2005, however, remained uneven. 

The Chinese Government continued in 2005 to take steps to improve its export control record, 

including seeking foreign assistance with its nonproliferation efforts. Despite these efforts, in 

2005, Chinese entities continued to support ballistic missile programs in Pakistan, Iran, and 

North Korea. Earlier Chinese-entity assistance helped Pakistan achieve domestic serial 

production of solid-propellant SRBMs and supported Pakistan's development of solidpropellant MRBMs. It also helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the 

production of ballistic missiles. 

Chemical. Reporting during 2005 showed that Chinese firms continued to provide dual-use 

chemical production equipment and technology to Iran. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. During 2005, China remained a primary supplier of 

advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan and Iran. Although Pakistan still represents 

China’s most important regional partner in military technology cooperation, Iran was gaining 

ground in this area and was producing the Chinese-origin C802 antiship missiles. China in 

2005 continued assisting Pakistan in joint development of a new state-of-the-art fighter aircraft, 

the JF-17. 

North Korea 

Nuclear. We remain concerned about North Korea’s potential for exporting nuclear materials 

or technology. At the April 2003 trilateral talks in Beijing, North Korea privately threatened to 
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export nuclear weapons. During the third round of Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear 

issue in June 2004, Pyongyang included a ban on nuclear transfers in its nuclear freeze 

proposal. In April 2005, North Korea told a US academic that it could transfer nuclear weapons 

to terrorists if driven into a corner. IAEA inspectors in May 2004 recovered two tons of 

uranium hexafluoride from Libya that is believed to have originated in North Korea. 

Ballistic Missile. North Korea has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete ballistic missile 

systems, missile components, and missile production capabilities that have enabled other states 

to acquire longer-range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been possible and to 

acquire the basis for domestic development efforts. Pyongyang has attached high priority to the 

development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology as a major source 

of hard currency, which supported ongoing missile development and production. 

Russia 

Nuclear. Russia is the key supplier of nuclear technology to a number of countries, much of 

which is for civilian nuclear programs. Most recipients pose little proliferation threat, but some 

pose greater concern because the Russian assistance could be used in the recipient’s nuclear 

weapons program directly—as in the case of China—or could be diverted to nuclear weapons 

programs.

Russia continued work on the Bushehr nuclear reactor in Iran, and in February 2005 signed an 

agreement for the return of spent fuel from Bushehr to Russia. 

China remains Russia’s largest purchaser of nuclear-related equipment. The Russian nuclear 

industry is currently constructing two nuclear power reactors worth over $3 billion at China’s 

Tianwan nuclear power plant, as well as an experimental fast reactor outside of Beijing, 

according to press reporting. 

Russia was India’s greatest foreign provider of nuclear assistance in 2005. Russia continued 

work on a nuclear power station in Kudankulam pursuant to a Russian-Indian contract signed 

on 6 October 2001. This contract called for Russia to install two nuclear power reactors at the 

Kudankulam station, which reportedly will be under IAEA safeguards. In late 2005, Russia 

worked out details of a contract with India to supply low-enriched uranium fuel for the two 

safeguarded nuclear power reactors at Tarapur. In addition, Russia continued to be the main 

supplier of technology and equipment to India’s naval nuclear propulsion programs. 

Ballistic Missile. Russian entities have supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and 

technical know-how to China, Iran, India, and North Korea. Russia continued to market the 

Iskander-E short-range ballistic missile in 2005. 
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Chemical and Biological. In 2005, countries of concern continued to contact Russian entities 

for dual-use chemical precursors and equipment. Such entities also remained a source of dualuse biotechnology equipment and related expertise. Russia’s well-known biological and 

chemical expertise may make it an attractive target for countries seeking assistance that could 

be applied to chemical or biological warfare programs. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Russia continued to be a major supplier of ACW to India in 

2005. Russian-Indian joint venture projects included advanced multi-role combat aircraft, the 

BrahMos family of cruise missiles, upgrading Kilo-class submarines to fire advanced cruise 

missiles, leasing an Akula-class submarine, and development of a new ultra-long-range air-toair missile. 

In 2005, Russia was also a major supplier of ACW to China. In December, Russia signed a 

contract to supply China 150 AL-31F jet engines, which will be installed on Su-27SKM fighters 

assembled in China under license. Under another contract, signed in May, Russia will supply 

spare parts for Su-27SK and Su-30MK2 fighter engines. Also in December, Russia delivered 

the first Project 956EM destroyer to the Chinese Navy.

During 2005, Russia was negotiating the sale of the Strelets vehicle-mounted surface-to-air 

missile to Syria.