Report to the Secretary of Defense

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

October 2002 DEFENSE

MANAGEMENT

Munitions

Requirements and

Combatant

Commanders’ Needs

Require Linkage

GAO-03-17
Page i GAO-03-17 Defense Management

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Improvements Made, but Gap Remains between the Combatant

Commanders’ Needs and the Services’ Purchasing Decisions 5

Munitions Requirements Process Provides Varying Answers for

Acquisition Decisions 10

Conclusion 11

Recommendation for Executive Action 11

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 11

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 13

Appendix II Related DOD Inspector General and

General Accounting Office Reports 14

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 16

Contents
Page 1 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

October 15, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Department of Defense planned to spend about $7.9 billion on

acquiring munitions1

 in fiscal year 2002. Ongoing military operations

associated with the global war on terrorism have heightened concerns

about the unified combatant commands2

 having sufficient quantities of

munitions. In September and October of 2001, Congress provided

emergency funding of $1.3 billion for munitions, with a supplemental

increase in the fiscal year 2002 munitions budget of $397 million.

Significant funding increases are also planned, which would bring the

fiscal year 2003 munitions budget to over $10 billion.

Since 1994, the Department of Defense Inspector General and GAO have

issued numerous reports identifying weaknesses and expressing concerns

about the accuracy of the process used by the department to determine

munitions requirements. Our April 2001 report discussed steps being taken

by the department to improve the process and additional actions still

needed.3

 In response to that report, the department outlined actions

underway that address all aspects of the report’s recommendations.

The department expected that its efforts to improve the munitions

requirements process should correct over- or understated requirements

and provide the combatant commands with needed munitions.

 1

 Munitions include a wide variety of ammunition for small arms, mortars, cannons,

artillery, and guns, as well as bombs, rockets, missiles, mines, demolition material,

grenades, flares, and torpedoes. The Department of Defense also considers chemicals,

nuclear weapons, and pyrotechnics to be munitions. However, we are not referring to these

categories of munitions in this letter.

2

 Each unified combatant command is composed of forces from two or more military

services, has broad and continuing missions, and is organized either on a geographical or

functional basis. There are currently nine unified combatant commands.

3

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit

Reliability of the Munition Requirements Determination Process, GAO-01-18

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

Notwithstanding the improvements the department said it would make to

the munitions requirements determination process, combatant commands

have continued to report munitions shortages. Accordingly, this review

was undertaken, pursuant to GAO’s legislative authority, to determine the

extent to which (1) improvements have been made to the Department of

Defense’s munitions requirements determination process and (2) the

process is being used to guide current munitions acquisitions.

The Department of Defense has improved its munitions requirements

process by eliminating most of the systemic problems—for example,

correcting questionable and inconsistently applied data, completing target

templates, and resolving issues involving the level of detail that should be

included in planning guidance. However, a fundamental problem remains

unaddressed—inadequate linkage between the near-term munitions needs

of the combatant commands and the purchases made by the military

services based on computations derived from the department’s munitions

requirements determination process. This disjunction—sometimes

referred to as a difference between the combatant commanders’ near-term

focus (generally 2 years) and the services’ longer-term planning horizon

(generally 6 years)—has resulted in the combatant commands and the

services identifying different munitions needs and, ultimately, in the

combatant commanders reporting shortages. However, we believe there

is a more fundamental reason for the disconnect; it occurs because the

department’s munitions requirements determination process does not fully

consider the combatant commanders’ preferences for munitions and

weapon systems that will be used against targets identified in projected

scenarios. The department recognizes that a disjunction exists between

needs identified by the combatant commanders and the services’

purchasing decisions. On June 18, 2002, the department contracted for

an assessment of its munitions requirements process with the goal of

developing a process that will include determinations of the near-year and

out-year munitions requirements.

The department’s munitions requirements process provides varied

answers for current munitions acquisitions questions because of the

aforementioned disjunction. As a result, the services, in the short term, are

purchasing some critically needed munitions based on available funding

and contractors’ production capacity. In one such case—involving a

munition preferred by each of the combatant commanders—the quantities

of munitions shortages identified by both the services and the combatant

commanders differed, exceeding previously planned acquisition quantities.

As a result, the department entered into an agreement to purchase the

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

maximum quantities that it could fund the contractor to manufacture at

this time. In such cases, the department could purchase too much or too

little, depending upon the quantities of munitions ultimately needed.

While this approach may be necessary in the short term, it raises questions

as to whether over the long term it would position the services to make

the most efficient use of appropriated funds and whether the needs of

combatant commands to carry out their missions will be met.

Our report recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish a direct

link between the munitions needs of the combatant commands and the

munitions requirements determinations and purchasing decisions made by

the military services. In written comments on a draft of this report, the

department concurred with our recommendation.

The Department of Defense’s budget is the product of a complex

process designed to develop an effective defense strategy that supports

U.S. national security objectives. For munitions, the department generally

does not have the combatant commands submit separate budgets, but

relies on the military services’ budget submissions.4

 Thus, the military

services are largely responsible for determining requirements for the types

and quantities of munitions that are bought. The Department of Defense

Inspector General and GAO have issued numerous reports dating back

to 1994 identifying systemic problems—such as questionable and

inconsistently applied data, inconsistent processes among and between

services, and unclear guidance—that have inflated the services’

requirements for certain categories of munitions and understated

requirements for other categories. (For a listing of these reports, see

app. II.)

In 1997, as one step toward addressing these concerns, the Department of

Defense issued Instruction 3000.4, which sets forth policies, roles and

responsibilities, time frames, and procedures to guide the services as they

develop their munitions requirements. This instruction is referred to as the

capabilities-based munitions requirements process and is the

responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics. The instruction describes a multi-phased

 4

 The U.S. Special Operations Command has a separate budget for a portion of its

munitions needs. Its munitions budget for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 was about $60 million

and $42 million, respectively.

Background
Page 4 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

analytical process that begins when the Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy develops—in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the military services, and the combatant commands—policy for the

Defense Planning Guidance.

5

 The Defense Intelligence Agency uses

the Defense Planning Guidance and its accompanying scenarios, as well

as other intelligence information, to develop a threat assessment. This

assessment contains estimates and facts about the potential threats that

the United States and allied forces could expect to meet in war scenarios.

The combatant commanders (who are responsible for the theaters of

war scenarios), in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, use the

threat assessment to allocate each service a share of the identified targets

by phases of the war. The services then develop their combat

requirements6

 using battle simulation models and scenarios to determine

the number and mix of munitions needed to meet the combatant

commanders’ specific objectives.

Despite the department’s efforts to standardize the process and generate

consistent requirements, many questions have continued to be raised

about the accuracy or reliability of the munitions requirements

determination process. In April 2001, we reported continuing problems

with the capabilities-based munitions requirements determination process

because the department (1) had yet to complete a database providing

detailed descriptions of the types of targets on large enemy installations

that would likely be encountered, based on warfighting scenarios; (2) had

not set a time frame for completing its munitions effectiveness database;

and (3) was debating whether to include greater specificity in its

warfighting scenarios and to rate the warfighting scenarios by the

probability of their occurrence. These process components significantly

affect the numbers and types of munitions needed to meet the warfighting

combatant command’s objectives. The department acknowledged these

weaknesses and recognized that inaccurate requirements can negatively

affect munitions planning, programming, and budget decisions, as well as

assessments of the size and composition of the industrial production base.

 5

 The Secretary of Defense and his staff prepare the Defense Planning Guidance, issue

policy, and articulate strategic objectives that reflect the national military strategy. The

Defense Planning Guidance includes the Secretary’s force and resource guidance to the

military departments, other combat support agencies, and the unified combatant

commands.

6

 These quantities include weapons-based load expenditures (a fighting load of munitions

appropriate for engaging the enemy), resupply, and logistics add-ons due to environmental

factors in the theater of operations (i.e., terrain and weather).
Page 5 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

In responding to our report’s recommendations, the department has taken

a number of actions to correct the problems we identified.

Our review of the requirements process and related documentation

showed that the Department of Defense corrected the previously

identified systemic problems in its process for determining munitions

requirements, but the reliability of the process continues to be uncertain

because of the department’s failure to link the near-term munitions needs

of the combatant commands and the purchases made by the military

services based on computations derived from the department’s munitions

requirements determination process. Because of differences in how

requirements are determined, asking a question about the quantities of

munitions that are needed can result in one answer from the combatant

commanders and differing answers from the military services. For this

reason, the combatant commands may report shortages of munitions they

need to carry out warfighting scenarios. We believe—and the department’s

assessment of its munitions requirements process recognizes—that

munitions requirements and purchase decisions made by the military

services should be more closely linked to the needs of the combatant

commanders. The main issue that the department still needs to address is

engaging the combatant commands in the requirements determination

process, budgeting processes, and related purchasing decisions to

minimize the occurrence of reported shortages. Because of the present

gap between the combatant commands’ munitions needs and department’s

requirements determination process, which helps shape the services’

purchasing decisions, munitions requirements are not consistently stated,

and thus the amount of funding needed to alleviate possible shortages is

not always fully understood.

In April 2001, we reported that key components of the requirements

determination process either had not been completed or had not been

decided upon.7

 At that time, the department had not completed a database

listing detailed target characteristics for large enemy installations based

on warfighting scenarios and had not developed new munitions

effectiveness data to address deficiencies identified by the services and

the combatant commanders. Additionally, the department had not

 7

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability

of the Munition Requirements Determination Process, GAO-01-18 (Washington, D.C.:

Apr. 5, 2001).

Improvements Made,

but Gap Remains

between the

Combatant

Commanders’ Needs

and the Services’

Purchasing Decisions

Steps Taken to Improve

the Requirements

Determination Process
Page 6 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

determined whether to create more detailed warfighting scenarios in

the Defense Planning Guidance or to rate scenarios in terms of their

probability. We concluded that until these tasks were completed and

incorporated into the process, questions would likely remain regarding

the accuracy of the munitions requirements process as well as the

department’s ability to identify the munitions most appropriate to defeat

potential threats.

In response to our report, the department took actions during fiscal

years 2001 and 2002 to resolve the following three key issues affecting

the reliability of the munitions requirements process:

• List of targets—The department lacked a common picture of the

number and types of targets on large enemy installations as identified

in the warfighting scenarios, and, as a result, each of the services had

been identifying targets on enemy installations differently. To resolve

this issue, the Joint Chiefs instructed the Defense Intelligence Agency,

in coordination with the combatant commanders, to develop target

templates that would provide a common picture of the types of

potential targets on enemy installations. In August 2001, the

department revised its capabilities-based requirements instruction to

incorporate the target templates developed by the Defense Intelligence

Agency as the authoritative threat estimate for developing munitions

requirements.

• Munitions effectiveness data—The department was using outdated

information to determine the effectiveness of a munition against a

target and to predict the number of munitions necessary to defeat it.

The department recognized that munitions effectiveness data is a

critical component for requirements planning and that outdated

information could over- or understate munitions requirements. To

address this shortfall, the department updated its joint munitions

effectiveness manual with up-to-date munitions effectiveness data for

use by the services in their battle simulation models.

• Warfighting scenarios—The Defense Planning Guidance contains

warfighting scenarios that detail conditions that may exist during the

conduct of war; these scenarios are developed with input from several

sources, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, and the services. This guidance should provide a common

baseline from which the combatant commands and the services

determine their munitions requirements. However, when the

department adopted the capabilities-based munitions requirements
Page 7 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

instruction, details were eliminated in favor of broader guidance. To

ensure that the combatant commanders and the services plan for the

most likely warfighting scenario and do not use unlikely events to

support certain munitions, the department revised the Defense

Planning Guidance to provide fewer warfighting scenarios and more

detail on each.

The department expected that these actions to improve the munitions

requirements process would correct over- or understated requirements

and provide the combatant commands with needed munitions.

However, despite the department’s efforts to enhance the requirements

determination process, one problem area remains—inadequate linkage

between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands and

the purchases made by the military services based on computations

derived from the department’s munitions requirements determination

process. Various actions taken to address this issue have not been

successful.

The disjunction between the department’s requirements determination

processes and combatant commanders’ needs is rooted in separate

assessments done at different times. The services, as part of their

budgeting processes, develop the department’s munitions requirements

using targets provided by the combatant commands (based on the Defense

Intelligence Agency’s threat report), battle simulation models, and

scenarios to determine the number and mix of munitions needed to meet

the combatant commanders’ objectives in each war scenario. To develop

these requirements, the services draw upon and integrate data and

assumptions from the Defense Planning Guidance, warfighting scenarios,

and target allocations, as well as estimates of repair and return rates for

enemy targets and projected assessments of damage to enemy targets and

installations. Other munitions requirements are also determined, and

include munitions needed (1) for forces not committed to support combat

operations, (2) for forward presence and current operations, (3) to provide

a post-theater of war combat capability, and (4) to train the forces, support

service programs, and support peacetime operations. These requirements,

in addition to the combat requirement, comprise the services’ total

munitions requirement. The total munitions requirement is then compared

to available inventory and appropriated funds to determine how many of

each munition the services will procure within their specified funding

limits and is used to develop the services’ Program Objectives

Memorandum and their budget submissions to the President.

Continuing Limitations in

Requirements

Determination Process
Page 8 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

Periodically the combatant commanders prepare reports of their readiness

status, including the availability of sufficient types and quantities of

munitions needed to meet the combatant commanders’ warfighting

objectives, but these munitions needs are not tied to the services’

munitions requirements or to the budgeting process. In determining

readiness, the combatant commanders develop their munitions needs

using their own battle simulation models, scenarios, and targets and give

emphasis to the munitions they prefer to use or need for unique war

scenarios to determine the number and mix of munitions they require to

meet their warfighting objectives. The combatant commanders calculate

their needs in various ways—unconstrained and constrained and over

various time periods (e.g., 30 days and 180 days). Unconstrained

calculations are based on the combatant commanders’ assessment of

munitions needs, assuming that all needed munitions are available.

Constrained calculations represent the combatant commanders’

assessment of munitions needs to fight wars under certain rules of

engagement that limit collateral damage and civilian and U.S. military

casualties. Because the combatant commanders’ battle simulation models

and scenarios differ from those used by the military services, their

munitions needs are different, which can result in reports of munitions

shortages. In contrast, the U.S. Special Operations Command develops its

combat requirements for the number and mix of munitions needed to meet

its warfighting objectives using the same battle simulation models and

scenarios that the services used and provides these requirements to the

services, rather than providing only potential targets to the services as

other commands do. This permits the U.S. Special Operations Command

to more directly influence the assumptions about specific weapons

systems and munitions to be used. As a result of working together, the

Command’s and the services’ requirements are the same.8

In an effort to close the gap between the combatant commanders’ needs

and the department’s munitions requirements determination process, a

1999 pilot project was initiated by the department to bridge this gap by

better aligning the combatant commanders’ near-term objectives (which

generally cover a 2-year period) and the services’ long-term planning

horizon (which is generally 6 years). Another benefit of the pilot was that

 8

 In addition, the U.S. Special Operations Command had a separate munitions budget to

offset shortages resulting from the difference between the quantities of munitions that the

Command had determined were required and the quantities the services had purchased.

Title II of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

(P.L. 99-433) permitted the combatant commands to have their own operations budgets.
Page 9 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

the Joint Chiefs of Staff could validate the department’s munitions

requirements by matching requirements to target allocations. However, the

Army, the Navy, and a warfighting combatant commander objected to the

pilot’s results because it allocated significantly more targets to the Air

Force and fewer targets to the Army. Army officials objected that the

pilot’s methodology did not adequately address land warfare, which is

significantly different from air warfare.9

 The Navy did not concur with the

results, citing the lack of recognition for the advanced capabilities of

future munitions. U.S. Central Command officials disagreed with the

results, stating that a change in methodology should not in and of itself

cause the allocation to shift. In July 2000, citing substantial concerns about

the pilot, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and

Logistics suspended the target allocation for fiscal year 2000 and directed

the services to use the same allocations applied to the fiscal year 2002 to

the 2007 Program Objectives Memorandum.

In August 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made another attempt to address

the need for better linkage between the department’s munitions

requirements process and the combatant commanders’ munitions needs.

The combatant commanders were to prepare a near-term target allocation

using a methodology developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each

warfighting combatant commander developed two allocations—one for

strike (air services) forces and one for engagement (land troops) forces

for his area of responsibility. The first allocated specific targets to strike

forces under the assumption that the air services can eliminate the

majority of enemy targets. The second allocation assumed that less than

perfect conditions exist (such as bad weather), which would limit the

air services’ ability to destroy their assigned targets and require that the

engagement force complete the mission. The combatant commanders did

not assign specific targets to the engagement forces, but they estimated

the size of the expected remaining enemy land force. The Army and the

Marines then were expected to arm themselves to defeat those enemy

forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff used the combatant commanders’ nearyear threat distribution and extrapolated that information to the last year

of the Program Objectives Memorandum for the purpose of the services’

munitions requirements planning. The department expected that these

 9

 The Army’s position was that unlike the air services that plan munitions requirements to

destroy assigned targets, assigning specific targets to a land battle is meaningless, because

the number of targets destroyed may not be an accurate measure of a successful operation.

Specifically, in a land battle, circumventing enemy forces or surrounding them and cutting

off their supply lines may meet the combatant commander’s operational plan.
Page 10 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

modifications would correct over- or understated requirements and bridge

the gap between the warfighting combatant commanders’ near-term

interests and objectives and the services’ longer planning horizon.

However, inadequate linkage remains between the near-term munitions

needs of the combatant commands and the department’s munitions

requirements determinations and purchases made by the military services.

This is sometimes referred to as a difference between the combatant

commanders’ near-term focus (generally 2 years) and the services longerterm planning horizon (generally 6 years). However, we believe that there

is a more fundamental reason for the disconnect; it occurs because the

department’s munitions requirements determination process does not fully

consider the combatant commanders’ preferences for munitions and

weapon systems to be used against targets identified in projected

scenarios.

On June 18, 2002, the department contracted with TRW Inc. to assess its

munitions requirements process and develop a process that will include a

determination of the near-year and out-year munitions requirements.

The assessment, which will build upon the capabilities-based munitions

requirements process, is also expected to quantify risk associated with any

quantity differential associated between requirements and inventory and

achieve a balance between inventory, production, and consumption.

A final report on this assessment is due in March 2003.

The department’s munitions requirements process provides varying

answers for current munitions acquisitions because of the inadequate

linkage between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant

commands and the munitions requirements computed by the military

services. As a result, the services are purchasing some critically needed

munitions based on available funding and the contractors’ production

capacity. For example, in December 2001, both the services and the

combatant commanders identified shortages for joint direct attack

munitions (a munition preferred by each of the combatant commanders).

According to various Department of Defense officials, these amounts

differed and exceeded previously planned acquisition quantities.

Therefore, the department entered into an agreement to purchase the

maximum quantities that it could fund the contractor to manufacture and

paid the contractor to increase its production capacity. In such cases, the

department could purchase too much or too little, depending upon the

quantities of munitions ultimately needed. While this approach may be

needed in the short term, it raises questions whether over the long term it

Munitions

Requirements Process

Provides Varying

Answers for

Acquisition Decisions
Page 11 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

would position the services to make the most efficient use of appropriated

funds and whether the needs of combatant commands to carry out their

missions will be met.

Until the department establishes a more direct link between the

combatant commanders’ needs, the department’s requirements

determinations, and the services’ purchasing decisions, the department

will be unable to determine with certainty the quantities and types of

munitions the combatant commanders need to accomplish their

missions. As a result, the amount of munitions funds needed will remain

uncertain, and assessments of the size and composition of the industrial

production base will be negatively affected. Unless this issue is resolved,

the severity of the situation will again be apparent when munitions funding

returns to normal levels and shortages of munitions are identified by the

combatant commands.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a direct link

between the munitions needs of the combatant commands—recognizing

the impact of weapons systems and munitions preferred or expected to

be employed—and the munitions requirements determinations and

purchasing decisions made by the military services.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit

a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the

Senate Committee on Government Affairs and the House Committee on

Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A

written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees

on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made

more than 60 days after the date of this report.

The Director of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense’s Strategic

and Tactical Systems provided written comments on a draft of this report.

They are included in appendix III. The Department of Defense concurred

with the recommended linkage of munitions requirements and combatant

commanders’ needs. The Director stated that the department, through a

munitions requirements study directed by the fiscal year 2004 Defense

Planning Guidance, has identified this link as a problem and has

established a solution that will be documented in the next update of

Instruction 3000.4 in fiscal year 2003. The department also provided

technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.

Conclusion

Recommendation for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 12 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional

committees and to the Director, Office of Management and Budget. The

report is also available on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. The

scope and methodology of our work is presented in appendix I. If you or

your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this letter,

please contact me at (202) 512-4300. Key contributors to this letter were

Ron Berteotti, Roger Tomlinson, Tommy Baril, and Nelsie Alcoser.

Sincerely yours,

Barry W. Holman

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 13 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

To determine the extent to which improvements had been made to the

Department of Defense’s requirements determination process, we

reviewed the Department’s Instruction 3000.4, Capabilities-Based

Munitions Requirements (to ascertain roles and oversight responsibilities

and to identify required inputs into the process); 17 Department of

Defense Inspector General reports and 4 General Accounting Office

reports relating to the department’s munitions requirements determination

process (to identify reported weaknesses in the requirements

determination process); and reviewed requirements determinations and

related documentation and interviewed officials (to identify actions taken

to correct weaknesses in the requirements determination process) from

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics, Washington, D.C.; Joint Chiefs of Staff (Operations,

Logistics, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment), Washington, D.C.;

and Army, Navy, and Air Force officials responsible for budgeting, buying,

and allocating munitions.

To determine whether the munitions requirements determination process

was being used to guide current munitions acquisitions, we met with the

services’ headquarters officials (to determine how each service develops

its munitions requirements, to obtain data on the assumptions and inputs

that go into its simulation models, to see how each service reviews the

outcome of its munitions requirement process, and to determine the basis

for recent munitions purchases) and interviewed officials at U.S. Central

Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base,

Florida; U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida; U.S. Pacific Command;

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Army Pacific; Marine Forces Pacific;

U.S. Pacific Fleet, Oahu, Hawaii; U.S. Forces Korea; Eighth U.S. Army,

Seoul, Korea; and 7th Air Force, Osan, Korea (to determine whether the

munitions needed by the warfighters are available).

We performed our review from March 2002 through July 2002 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General

and General Accounting Office Reports

Page 14 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability of the Munition

Requirements Determination Process. GAO-01-18. Washington, D.C.:

April 2001.

Summary of the DOD Process for Developing Quantitative

Munitions Requirements. Department of Defense Inspector General.

Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2000.

Air Force Munitions Requirements. Department of Defense Inspector

General. Washington, D.C.: September 3, 1999.

Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor

Weapon Acquisitions. GAO/NSIAD-99-105. Washington, D.C.:

July 22, 1999.

U.S. Special Operations Command Munitions Requirements.

Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1999.

Marine Corps Quantitative Munitions Requirements Process.

Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.:

December 10, 1998.

Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to be Reassessed.

GAO/NSIAD-99-32. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1998.

Navy Quantitative Requirements for Munitions. Department of Defense

Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 1998.

Army Quantitative Requirements for Munitions. Department of Defense

Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 1998.

Management Oversight of the Capabilities-Based Munitions

Requirements Process. Department of Defense Inspector General.

Washington, D.C.: June 22, 1998.

Threat Distributions for Requirements Planning at U.S. Central

Command and U.S. Forces Korea. Department of Defense Inspector

General. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 1998.

Army’s and Marine Corps’ Quantitative Requirements for Blocks I

and II Stinger Missiles. Department of Defense Inspector General.

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 1996.

Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General

and General Accounting Office Reports
Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General

and General Accounting Office Reports

Page 15 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

U.S. Combat Air Power–Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction

Capabilities Could Save Billions. Department of Defense Inspector

General. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1996.

Summary Report on the Audits of the Anti-Armor Weapon System and

Associated Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General.

Washington, D.C.: June 29, 1995.

Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory,

Production, and Development. GAO/NSIAD-95-95. Washington, D.C.:

June 23, 1995.

Acquisition Objectives for Antisubmarine Munitions and Requirements

for Shallow Water Oceanography. Department of Defense Inspector

General. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 1995.

Army’s Processes for Determining Quantitative Requirements for

Anti-Armor Systems and Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector

General. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 1995.

The Marine Corps’ Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements

for Anti-Armor Munitions for Ground Forces. Department of Defense

Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 1994.

The Navy’s Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for

Anti-Armor Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General.

Washington, D.C.: October 11, 1994.

The Air Force’s Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for

Anti-Armor Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General.

Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1994.

Coordination of Quantitative Requirements for Anti-Armor

Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.:

June 14, 1994.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 16 GAO-03-17 Defense Management

Appendix III: Comments from the

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 17 GAO-03-17 Defense Management (350150)
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