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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

WILLIAM HINES, 

Appellant No. 1245 WDA 2017 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 18, 2017 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013322-1970 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 03, 2019 

William Hines ("Hines") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

after he was resentenced pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 

(2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).1,2 We affirm. 

In 1970, Hines brutally assaulted, raped, and murdered seventeen-year 

old Eileen Taylor ("Taylor"). Taylor's nude body was discovered behind a Giant 

Eagle store, covered in lacerations and bruises. There were superficial lesions 

on her throat, bruises on her breasts, and approximately 100 puncture wounds 

1 The Supreme Court in Miller held that sentencing schemes mandating life 

in prison without parole ("LWOP") for defendants who committed their crimes 

while under the age of eighteen violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 

on "cruel and unusual punishments." Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. 

2 The Supreme Court in Montgomery held that the Miller decision announced 

a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively. 

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
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on the left side of her body. A piece of wood found at the scene, tapered at 

one end, splintered and sharp, had been forcefully inserted into Taylor, 

causing severe vaginal mutilation. Police also discovered a stone lodged in 

the back of Taylor's head, which had fractured her skull and caused it to 

become concave. An investigation led to Hines's arrest. 

On September 29, 1970, Hines, who was 15 years old at the time, pled 

guilty to criminal homicide. Following a degree of guilt hearing, held on 

October 2, 1970, the trial court found Hines guilty of murder in the first 

degree.3 The trial court sentenced Hines to a mandatory prison term of LWOP. 

Hines appealed, and our Supreme Court ultimately reversed his conviction, 

vacated his guilty plea, and remanded for a jury trial. See Commonwealth 

v. Hines, 437 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 1981). In 1982, a jury convicted Hines of 

murder in the first degree, and the trial court sentenced him to a mandatory 

prison term of LWOP. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our 

Supreme Court denied Hines's Petition for allowance of appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Hines, 491 A.2d 907 (Pa. Super. 1985). 

Hines subsequently filed several unsuccessful Petitions for relief 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").4 Nonetheless, Hine's 

most recent PCRA Petition, filed on February 23, 2016, resulted in a 

resentencing hearing pursuant to Miller. After stating on the record its 

3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). 

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

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considerations in fashioning the new sentence, the trial court resentenced 

Hines, on July 18, 2017, to 50 years to life in prison, with credit for time 

served. Hines filed a timely post -sentence Motion, which the trial court 

denied. Thereafter, Hines filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court -ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement. 

On appeal, Hines raises the following question for our review: 

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in imposing a manifestly 

excessive and unreasonable sentence of 50 years to life 

[in prison], which far exceeds the minimum term of 35 years 

under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1102.1[(a)(1)], which the court is not 

bound by, but should give due consideration to in this case, and 

which did not take into account all of the sentencing factors under 

the [S]entencing [C]ode? 

Brief for Appellant at 5. 

Hines asserts that the trial court failed to consider all relevant, 

mitigating factors when it resentenced him in excess of the statutory 

minimum. Brief for Appellant at 24-25. Specifically, Hines claims that the 

trial court did not adequately consider, among other things, that 

"he was able to mature, recover mentally and emotionally from 

the physical abuse he suffered as a child, learn to manage his 

anger, and understand the impact, risks and consequences of his 

actions" while he was in prison; 

he began abusing alcohol and illegal substances at age 11, and, 

until recently, continued to abuse such substances; 

he achieved a degree from Villanova, attended therapy, learned 

janitorial skills, and became an artist while incarcerated; and 

he had been fully rehabilitated. 

Id. at 25-26, 30. Additionally, Hines contends that the trial court failed to 

consider whether his sentence was the "least stringent necessary to protect 

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the community and to serve [his] rehabilitative needs...." Id. at 30. Further, 

Hines claims that the trial court "failed to give any reasons [to support the 

sentence,] having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and 

[his] history, character, and condition..." or any other factors "statutorily 

required under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) or 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725." Brief for 

Appellant at 30-31. 

Hines's claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Pennington, 751 A.2d 212, 215 

(Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that "[an appellant who] claims his sentence is 

excessive [] does not challenge its legality; rather, he challenges its 

discretionary aspects."). "Challenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right." Commonwealth 

v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. super. 2010). 

Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing 

issue, it must be determined: (1) whether [Hines] filed a timely 

notice of appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether 

[Hines] properly preserved [the issue] at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence, pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [Hines's] brief has a fatal defect, 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(b). 

Commonwealth v. Schrader, 141 A.3d 558, 563 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citations omitted). 

The record reveals that Hines filed a timely Notice of Appeal, properly 

preserved the substance of his appeal in a post -sentence Motion, satisfied his 

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obligation under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), and raised a substantial question. See 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 826 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating 

that "[t]his Court has held that an excessive sentence claim-in conjunction 

with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors-raises a 

substantial question." (citation omitted)). Thus, we will address the merits of 

Hines's appeal. 

Our standard of review in an appeal from the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing is well settled: 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is 

more than just an error in judgment, and, on appeal, the trial 

court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the 

record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill -will. 

Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Section 9721(b) requires a court to "follow the general principle that the 

sentence imposed should [be] consistent with the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and 

on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Section 9721(b) also directs the court to consider 

relevant sentencing guidelines when fashioning a sentence. Id. 

Section 1102.1(a)(1) requires the imposition of a 35 -year minimum 

sentence for a minor who commits murder in the first degree. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

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§ 1102.1(a)(1). Additionally, Section 1102.1(a)(1) permits the imposition of 

a life sentence. 

Section 9725 provides that a court "shall impose a sentence of total 

confinement if, having regard to the nature and circumstances of crime[,] and 

the history, character, and condition of defendant," confinement is necessary 

because there is an undue risk that the defendant will commit another crime; 

the defendant needs correctional treatment that would most effectively be 

offered by commitment to institution; or a lesser sentence would depreciate 

the seriousness of the crime. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725. 

In challenging his sentence, Hines emphasizes that his minimum 

sentence is greater than 35 years. Brief for Appellant at 25. The 35 -year 

sentence mandated by Section 1102.1(a)(1) is a minimum sentence. Section 

1102.1(a)(1) authorizes not only a life sentence, but also LWOP, for the crime 

Hines committed. Section 1102.1 is inapplicable in this case, as Hines's 

conviction predates the statute insofar as Section 1102.1 pertains to 

convictions occurring after June 24, 2012. Nonetheless, courts should be 

guided by the relevant sentencing statutes in fashioning a sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 458 (Pa. 2017); see also 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). 

Hines's sentence of 50 years to life in prison fits squarely within the 

guidelines provided by Section 1102.1(a)(1). Accordingly, Hines's argument 

that his sentence is excessive is without merit. See Commonwealth v. 

Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 154 (Pa. Super. 2004)(providing that a sentence that 

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falls below the maximum sentence for a crime cannot be excessive). Thus, 

we cannot afford Hines relief on this basis. 

Hines also asserts that the trial court did not give due consideration to 

his alleged rehabilitation, or other mitigating factors. At the resentencing 

hearing, Hines presented the testimony of Alice Applegate, Ph.D. 

("Dr. Applegate"), a forensic psychologist, who testified that, after completing 

a psychological evaluation of Hines, she could say that he "has used his many 

years [in prison] to rehabilitate himself. He is an artist. He has done murals 

... is a past athlete ... and he's become a student. [H]e has used the past 47 

years to mature, to change, to grow and to come to this point. He is 

rehabilitated." N.T., 7/18/17, 34. Additionally, Hines relies on his own 

testimony that he "grew up," is "sorry for killing the person [he's] in prison 

for," and doesn't "see [the victim] as an enemy" in order to bolster his position 

that incarceration is no longer necessary.5 Brief for Appellant at 30. Hines 

further contends that the trial court failed to consider the nature and 

circumstances of the crime, as well as Hines's history, character and condition. 

Brief for Appellant at 30-31. 

The record belies Hines's argument. To the contrary, the trial court 

considered both the nature of the crime and the impact it had on the victim's 

5 We note that although Hines highlights Dr. Applegate's favorable testimony, 

the trial court also heard testimony from Dr. Applegate as to Hines's recent 

and continuous "misconducts" at the prison, including raping other inmates, 

disobeying orders, fighting, possessing a shiv and metal pipe, and using 

solvents. See N.T., 7/18/17, 38. 

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family. See N.T., 7/18/17, 80, 81-82 (wherein the trial court stated that it 

"considered again the nature of the offense," as well as the testimony from 

the victim's family as to the "long-lasting effect that this case has had [] on 

them," and the detailed testimony from the police officer who was at the scene 

of crime); see also id. at 7-15 (wherein the victim's family members testified 

as to the deep depression of the victim's parents, their undergoing mental 

health procedures and therapy, the family's eventual relocation outside of the 

community, and the premature death and job loss of the victim's father 

following the victim's rape and murder). 

The court also considered testimony from Hines's friends and family 

regarding his changed character, articulable achievements while incarcerated, 

socio-economic background, and familial upbringing. See id. at 80 (wherein 

the trial court stated that it "has considered [Hines's] age at the time that this 

offense was committed, [his] culpability for the offense ... [and] his ability to 

change. In evidence [], he's changed. Some of it very positive. Some of it 

not so positive. It appears that he's made effective use of the time that he 

spent in prison."); see also id. at 81-82 (wherein the trial court stated that 

it considered Hines's background and achievements outlined in the 

Memorandum in aid of sentencing, as well as testimony regarding the impact 

of the case on Hines's family); id. at 51 (discussing Hines's personality 

development); id. at 54 (discussing the "racial strife and conflict in 

Homewood," where Hines was raised); id. at 57 (discussing Hines's academic 

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and artistic advancements); id. at 62 (discussing Hines's upbringing and 

family troubles). 

Additionally, the trial court considered both the expert testimony and 

evaluations of Dr. Applegate. See id. at 80-81. Lastly, the trial court 

reviewed a Memorandum in aid of sentencing, prepared by Hines, and relied 

on its substance in resentencing Hines. See id. at 78 (wherein the court 

temporarily recessed from the resentencing hearing in order to "go over the 

Memorandum[,] ... [as it was] fairly lengthy with some exhibits"); see also 

id. at 82 (wherein the trial court specifically mentions its consideration of the 

information contained in Hines's Memorandum). 

A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court referenced the 

appropriate sentencing guidelines, made the requisite inquiries and 

considerations, including evidence favorable to Hines, and imposed a sentence 

that not only is appropriate given the seriousness of the crime, but also is 

clearly permissible under the law. As such, we cannot find that the trial court 

abused its discretion, and affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

7.,,ezetr,r1PJ seph D. Seletyn, Es 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/3/2019 

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