SECOND DIVISION

								DECEMBER 29.,, 2000

1-99-2583

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE 		)

COUNTY COLLECTOR FOR JUDGMENT		)

AND ORDER OF SALE AGAINST		)			

LAND AND LOTS RETURNED DELINQUENT	)

FOR NONPAYMENT OF GENERAL TAXES 	)

FOR THE YEAR 1996 AND PRIOR YEARS	)

							)

							)	Appeal from the

AJAX FINANCIAL, L.P.,			)	Circuit Court

							)	of Cook County

	Plaintiff-Appellee			)

							)	

		v.					)	No. 98 CoTD 2381	

							)	

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS CMS, ABN-AMRO)	

INCORPORATED LEASING AND FINANCIAL	)

SERVICES,						)	The Honorable

							)	Marjan P. Staniec,

	Defendants-Appellants.		)	Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the court:

	Tax purchaser Ajax Financial, L.P. (Ajax) brought a petition to expunge redemption against property owner ABN-AMRO

Incorporated Leasing and Financial Services (ABN).  Specifically,

Ajax argued that ABN paid delinquent property taxes after the

extended period of redemption had expired.  On June 23, 1999, the

trial court granted Ajax's motion for summary judgment on its

petition to expunge redemption.  On June 29, 1999, the trial

court further entered an order directing the county clerk to

issue a tax deed for the contested property in favor of the tax

purchaser, Ajax.

	ABN now appeals, arguing that:  (1) Ajax waived its right to

contest ABN's redemption of the taxes because an Ajax agent

authorized late redemption after the period of redemption had already expired; and (2) ABN is entitled to an equitable redemption because it attempted to redeem its property in good

faith and was frustrated through no fault of its own.

BACKGROUND

	On February 27, 1998, Ajax purchased delinquent real

property taxes for parcel No. 16-35-403-043-0000 located in Cook

County for the 1996 tax year.  The property owner was ABN.  The

parcel consists of a portion of a commercial warehouse leased to

the State of Illinois.  A certificate of purchase dated March 11,

1998, issued by the county clerk for Cook County, states that

Ajax’s tax purchase also included $3,352.03 of unpaid taxes for

1992.  Since ABN owed two years of back taxes for the years 1992

and 1996, the original period of redemption expired six months

from the date of sale, on August 27, 1998.  However, ABN now

alleges that Cook County records indicate that the 1992 taxes

were overpaid by ABN, such that it appears that only one year’s

taxes had been in arrears.  According to ABN, the original period

of redemption should have expired two years from the date of sale

on February 28, 2000.

	In any event, Ajax extended the period of redemption on two

occasions, the last extension expiring on January 27, 1999.  On

September 16, 1998, Ajax filed its petition for tax deed with the

clerk of Cook County.  On October 27, 1998, ABN obtained an

estimate of redemption from the Cook County clerk (County).  

	On January 13, 1999, ABN paid $34,216.70 to the County based

upon the County’s October estimate of redemption.  On January 14, 1999, the County recomputed the cost of redemption and determined

that the funds tendered by ABN were insufficient.  The County

attempted to inform ABN of the shortfall by sending a letter

properly addressed to:

	"State of Illinois CMS c/o ABN AMRO Inc. Leasing and

Financial Services

	208 S. LaSalle St. 208-400

	Chicago, IL 60604."

However, on February 2, 1999, six days after the expiration of

the period of redemption, the United States Postal Service

returned the letter to the County, stating that the addressee was

"unknown."

	The County then contacted ABN by telephone, informing ABN

that it would be unable to accept the outstanding balance without

the tax buyer’s consent, because the period of redemption had

already expired.  ABN contacted an Ajax agent in California and

obtained the agent’s consent to the late redemption.  The Ajax

agent wrote the following letter, dated February 4, 1999, to

Fredda Berman of the Cook County collector’s office:

	"We authorize the Cook County Collector’s Office to accept

payment after January 27 for the redemption of parcel # 16-

35-403-043-0000.  Please call me if you have any further

questions at 310-576-3500 extension 263.

							Sincerely,

							Leone Vukelj

							Agent, Ajax Financial."	

Upon receiving the letter, ABN remitted $24.30, and the County

issued a certificate of redemption to ABN on February 17, 1999.

	In its brief, ABN alleges that an outstanding balance of $24.30 resulted from additional interest.  The record reveals

that the shortfall was actually $23.40 and was itemized as

advertising costs.  Specifically, the October estimate indicates

$122 was due for advertising; whereas, the January estimate

increased the amount to $155.40.             

	Ajax’s counsel in Chicago represented to the trial court

that he had no actual knowledge of ABN’s redemption.  However,

Ajax does not contest the agent’s authority for purposes of

summary judgment.  Ajax continued with the petition for tax deed

and proved Ajax’s compliance with Article 22 of the Property Tax

Code before Judge Marjan Staniec on February 24, 1999.  35 ILCS

200/22-5 et seq. (West 1998).  Ajax's counsel represented to the trial court that, on March 9, 1999, he learned of the redemption

while checking records of the county clerk on an unrelated

matter.  On March 10, 1999, Ajax filed its petition to expunge

redemption and later filed a motion for summary judgment on the

matter.  The trial court granted Ajax’s motion and entered an

order directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed on June 29,

1999.  

	ABN appeals.  We reverse in part and vacate in part.

ANALYSIS

I.  WAIVER

	First, ABN argues that Ajax waived the statutory requirement

that provides "the court shall allow the purchaser *** to extend

the period of redemption after expiration."  35 ILCS 200/21-385 (West 1998).  Ajax responds that Section 21-385 is not waivable.

	Statutory construction is a question of law, and a reviewing

court will interpret a statute pursuant to its own judgment,

without deference to the trial court’s determination.  Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996).  Section 21-385 of the Property Tax Code provides in

pertinent part:

	"Extension of the period of redemption.  The purchaser or

his or her assignee of property sold for nonpayment of

general taxes or special assessments may extend the period

of redemption at any time before the expiration of the

original period of redemption, or thereafter prior to the

expiration of any extended period of redemption, for a

period which will expire not later than 3 years from the

date of sale, by filing with the county clerk of the county

in which the property is located a written notice to that

effect describing the property, stating the date of sale and

specifying the extended period of redemption.  If prior to the expiration of the period of redemption or extended period of redemption a petition for tax deed has been filed under Section 22-30, upon application of the petitioner, the court shall allow the purchaser or his or her assignee to

extend the period of redemption after expiration of the

original period or any extended period of redemption, provided that any extension allowed will expire not later

than 3 years from the date of sale."  (Emphasis added.)  35

ILCS 200/21-385 (West 1998). 

The parties agree that the purchaser may extend the period of

redemption any time before expiration of the period of redemption without leave of court.  However, after the period of redemption expires, where a petition for tax deed has been filed, the

statute provides that, upon application of the petitioner, the

court shall allow the purchaser to extend the period of

redemption.

	ABN argues that Ajax could waive a statutory provision intended for Ajax’s benefit.  In support of its view, ABN cites

three cases stating the general rule that a party may waive a

statutory provision designed for its personal benefit.  United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-01, 130 L. Ed. 2d 697, 704, 115 S. Ct. 797, 801 (1995); Dever v. Simmons, 292 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74, 684 N.E.2d 997 (1997); Raimondo v. Kiley, 172 Ill. App. 3d 217, 224-25, 526 N.E.2d 457 (1988).  In Mezzanatto and Dever, it was clearly ascertainable whom the statutes were intended to benefit and the courts found the provisions waivable. 

Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201, 210-11, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 704, 710, 115 S. Ct. at 801, 806 (plea-statement rules, giving defendant

the right not to be impeached by statements made during plea

discussions, were clearly designed to benefit criminal defendant

and were waivable); Dever, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 74 (statute of limitations, intended to benefit defendant, was waivable if

defendant waited too long in raising this affirmative defense).  

	However, the court in Raimondo found that the ex post facto prohibition was not waivable by a criminal defendant because it

served purposes other than securing the personal rights of

criminal defendants.  Raimondo, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 225.  In Raimondo, the court wrote:

	"Through the [ex post facto] prohibition, the Framers sought to assure that statutes give fair warning of what conduct

the State deems criminal and the punishment that the State

may impose.  Further, the prohibition permits individuals to

rely on the meaning of statutes until explicitly changed.

[Citations.]  The ex post facto prohibition also upholds the doctrine of separation of powers.  The prohibition confines

the legislature to enacting penal statutes with only prospective effect and confines the executive and judiciary

to applying existing penal law."  Raimondo, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 225.

Thus, Raimondo held that certain constitutional rights are so fundamental they are not subject to waiver.  In contrast, Section

21-385 does not involve fundamental constitutional rights.   

	ABN also argues that this case is similar to In re Application of County Collector, 131 Ill. App. 2d 509, 266 N.E.2d 383 (1970) (First Lien).  We agree.  In First Lien, the tax purchaser voluntarily extended the time for redemption to January

16, 1969.  The mortgagee testified at trial that, about a month

before the 16th, he had a phone conversation with the tax purchaser in which the purchaser agreed to waive strict adherence

to the redemption period.  However, the tax purchaser testified

that he had no recollection of this conversation.  Based upon

this alleged conversation, the mortgagee tendered the redemption

money on January 21, but the county clerk refused to accept it

because the redemption period had ended on the 16th.  First Lien, 131 Ill. App. 2d at 511-13.

	The court held that the mortgagee's clear and unequivocal

testimony concerning the purchaser's oral waiver, in contrast to

the purchaser's vague recollection, was sufficient to establish

waiver of strict adherence to the redemption period.  The court

also emphasized that the mortgagee prepared to redeem months

before the expiration of the redemption period.  First Lien, 131 Ill. App. 2d at 512-13.  

	Ajax contends that First Lien is distinguishable because the tax purchaser extended the deadline before the period of redemption expired.  However, the statute in effect at that time

allowed tax purchasers to extend the time of redemption either

"before or after" expiration of the period of redemption.  Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 120, par. 744.  Thus, the First Lien court was not concerned with whether the purchaser extended the

deadline before or after the expiration of the period of

redemption because the statute made no such distinction at that

time.

	On June 25, 1970, Public Act 76-2329 amended section 263 and

introduced the court intervention procedure that is contained in

the present version of the statute.  Pub. Act 76-2329, eff. June

25, 1970.  Certainly the statute was amended in 1970 to include

court intervention procedure.  However, nothing in the

legislative history suggests that this provision cannot be waived

by agreement between the parties whom it was intended to benefit. 

In our view, the provision of Section 21-385 (35 ILCS 200/21-385

(West 1998)) that provides that "the court shall allow the

purchaser *** to extend the period of redemption after

expiration" does not preempt the voluntary extension by the

purchaser, property owner and County of the period of redemption

after expiration in the instant case.

II.  EQUITABLE REDEMPTION

	Next, ABN argues that it is entitled to an equitable redemption because it attempted to redeem in good faith and was

frustrated by the mistake of the United States Postal Service. 

ABN relies on In re Application of the County Treasurer & Ex Officio County Collector, 171 Ill. App. 3d 644, 525 N.E.2d 852 (1987) (Sadacca).  In Sadacca, the property owner requested an estimate for general taxes outstanding.  However, the clerk erred

by sending an estimate that included taxes owed for 1982-84, but

not for 1980-81.  Since the property owner believed he had

redeemed the taxes based on the erroneous estimate, he failed to

attend the hearing on the tax buyer’s petition for tax deed. 

Sadacca, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 648.  

	Sadacca held that, when the clerk’s office had committed an error, it was enough that the property owner "attempted in good

faith to redeem his property."  Sadacca, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 648.  Sadacca was based on a provision of the Property Tax Code which allowed an owner of property that it occupied to vacate the

issuance of a tax deed due to negligent or willful error by the

clerk.  Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 120, par. 747.  The holding in

Sadacca was superseded when the legislature amended the statute to include "reasonable reliance" as a prerequisite for obtaining

relief from an error by the clerk.  See In re Application of the County Treasurer & County Collector, 267 Ill. App. 3d 993, 1001, 642 N.E.2d 741 (1994); 35 ILCS 205/266 (West 1992) (repealed and

reenacted as 35 ILCS 200/22-45 (West 1994)).

	Sadacca involved a property owner’s petition to vacate a tax deed.  Here, the property owner is appealing an order granting

the purchaser’s petition to expunge redemption.  Also, there are

no allegations that the clerk erred in the instant case and no

provision of the Property Tax Code specifically grants relief due

to mistakes by the United States Postal Service.  We also note

that the estimate was file-stamped October 27, 1998, and that ABN

did not redeem the property until January 13, 1999. 

Additionally, the October estimate contained the following

message written in large print beneath the grand total amount:

"NOTE: THE GRAND TOTAL IS SUBJECT TO INCREASE."  In our view,

Sadacca is inapposite.

	Lastly, ABN contends that there exists a genuine issue of

fact as to whether its 1992 taxes were in arrears.  In light of

our holding that the purchaser, property owner and County

voluntarily extended the period of redemption after expiration in

the instant case, we do not reach this contention by ABN.

	For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's June 23, 1999, order granting Ajax's motion for summary judgment expunging ABN's

redemption is reversed and the trial court's June 29, 1999, order

directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed is vacated.

	Reversed in part and vacated in part.

	CAHILL, P.J. and McBRIDE, J., CNCUoncuconcur.