### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Marc h 23 , 200 4 S es sio n M EL A N IE S U E G IB SO N v. ER N ES TI N E W . F R A N C IS Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Sevier County No. 99-905-II Ric hard R. Vance, Judge

No. E2003-02226-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JUNE 30, 2004

Th is t ort a c tio n a

ri se s o ut o f a

tw o- ve hic le a c c ide nt. At tr ial , th e de fe nd a nt E rn e sti ne W. Fra nc is admitted liability . The jury returne d a ver dict in favor of the plaintif

f M el an i e Sue Gibson for property damag e in the amount of $6,900; howeve r, t he jury declined to awa rd her any damag es on he r c la im f

or pe rs on a l inj ur ie s. On app e a l, the plaint if f arg ue s that the tr ia l c ou rt didno t pr op e rl y perf orm its role a s thirteenth juror; that the ve rdict is contra ry to the weig ht of the evide nce; a nd that th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d wh e n it r e - in s tr u c te d th e ju r y

in r e s p o n s e to a

q u e s ti o n f

r o m th a t b o d y . We aff irm. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed; Case R em anded C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J , delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and W I L L I AM H. INMAN , S R
. J ., joined. H. Doug las Nichol and H arold C. Wimberly , Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Melanie Sue Gibson.
Jo h n T

. Jo h n s o n , Jr

. a n d D e b o r a h E

. Jo h n s o n , K n o xv il le , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll e e , E r n e s ti n e W. F ranc is.

OP IN ION
I. On Octobe r 7, 1999, the plaintiff f iled a complaint for

damag es re sul t i n g fr o m the subject a uto mob ile a c c ident

. As no te d a bo ve , th e de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d li abil ity , a ndthe c a se pr oc e e de d to trial solely

on the issue of the da mag es to which the pla intiff was entitled. The primary focus of the plaintiff’s cla im for per sonal injuries was with re spect to pain in her low and mid back.-2-

At trial, th e p la in ti f

f te s ti f ie d o n h e r o w n b e h a lf

. Sh e a ls o p r e s e n te d th e te s ti mo n yof the fo llo wi ng pe rs on s: h e r t

re a tin g ph y sic ia n, he r ph y sic a l the ra pis t, a vo c a tio na l r e ha

bil itatio n e xpe rt , and a pe rsonal friend. The defe ndant rested at t he conclusion of the plaintiff’s pr oof without putting o n an y proof. Af

ter the jury

was c harg ed, it retire d to delibera te. I t later re turned into open c ourt with the following written question: “Doe s the l aw require or state wit h any specific ity

with respec t to medical evide nce in pe rsonal inj ury case s, i.e., does the burde n of proof require medical e vidence , or ca n injury

be found o n t h e b as i s of subjective e vidence only ? ” I n response , the trial court reinstructed the jury

on the plaintiff’s bur den of pr oving eac h element of her claim by a pre pondera nce of the e vidence

. As previously noted, the jury returne d a $6,900 verdic t f or the damag e t o t h e p l ai n tiff’s automobile, but declined to aw ard he r any damag es on her claim for pe rsonal injuries. The trial court app ro ve d th e jury

ve rd ic t. T he plaint if

f a pp e a ls, raisi ng the foll owin g tw o is su e s w hic h w e qu ote from her brief: 1. Whether t h e t ri al [ court] erre d in [ its] role a s thirteenth juror by determining that the j ury ’s verdict was not contra ry to the weig ht of the evidenc e. 2. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in re char g ing the ju ryonly on the pr e po nd e ra nc e of

the e vid e nc e c ha

rg e a nd faile d to e ith e r c omp le te ly rec harg e the jury o r to answe r spec ifically that subjective medic al evidenc e wa s sufficient to satisfy the Plaintiff’s burde n of proof

. II. Our standa

rd of r eview of a jury verdic t is well-settled. The S upreme Court has addre ssed it a s f oll ow s: Rule 13(d) of the Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure provides that “ [f]in din g s of f

a c t by a jury in c ivi l a c tio ns sh a ll b e se t a sid e on ly if there is no material evide nce to support the verdic t.” As this Court stated in the re cent c ase of Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co. , “ I t is we ll e sta bli sh e d th a t w he n r e vie wi ng a jud g me nt b a se d o n a

jury ve rd ic t, appellate courts are limited to determining whether there is material evidenc e to support the ver dict.” 833 S.W.2d at 898.
I t is the tim e ho no re d r ule i n th is St a te that in revie wing a judg ment based upo n a juryverdic t the appellate courts ar e not at li berty to weig h the e vid e nc e or

to d e c ide wh e re the pr e po nd e ranc e lie s, bu t are lim ite d to de te rm ini ng wh e the r the re is ma te ri a l e vid e nc e to s up po rt the ve rd ic t; a ndin-3- de te rm ini ng wh e the r the re is m a te ri a l evide nc e to su pp ort the ve rd ic t, the app e llate c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to take the strong est leg itimate view of a ll the evidence in favor of

the ver dict, to as s ume the truth of all that tends to support it, allowing all rea sonable infe renc es to sustain the verdict, a nd to d i s car d all to the contra ry . Having thus examined the record, if there be a ny ma te ri a l e vid e nc e to s up po rt the ve rd ic t, i t mu st be af firmed; if it wer e other wise, the pa rties would be deprive d of their c onstitut ional rig ht to trial by jury

. For re ste r v . St

oc ks til l , 869 S.W .2d 328, 329-330 (Te nn. 1994) ( q u o t i n g Crabtree Masonry Co. v. C. & R. C

onstr., I nc. , 575 S.W .2d 4, 5 (Tenn. 1978) ).
I n p e rf or min g its ro le a s th e thi rt e e nthjuro r, a tr ial co urt mu st w e ig h th e e vid e nc e to determine if the court is independently satisfied with the jury ’s ver dict. Rid ing s v . N or fo lk S out he rn Ry. Co. , 894 S.W .2d 281, 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). Wher e the tria l court simply approve s the jury ’s ver dict without further comment, we presume the court adequate ly perf ormed it s function as thirteenth juror. Id. a t 28 9; se e als o Davidson v. Lindsey , 104 S.W .3d 483, 488 (Tenn. 2003). When a trial c ourt approve s a jury verdic t, the issue for the a ppellate c ourt bec omes that as stated in the Forresterand Crabtree c a se s. III

. Apply ing our standard of revie w as noted above, we find no merit in the plaintiff’s conte ntion that the tr ia l c ou rt

imp ro pe rl y

pe rf or me d it s d uty

to i nd e pe nd e ntl y

we ig h th e e vid e nc e a s th irte e nth juror. The trial court’s sole comment i n this reg ard was as follows: “[i] n acc ordanc e with the ver dict of this jury , I ’ll ap p ro v e t h at verdic t and enter judgme nt in behalf of the Plaintiff ag ainst the De fe nd a nt i n th e a mou nt o f $ 6, 90 0, tog e the r with th e c os ts o f the c a us e .” Ac c or din g ly , w e pr e su me that the trial court proper ly discharg ed it s duty as thirteenth juror

. See Ridin gs , 894 S.W .2d at 289. This is a complete a nswer to this particula r issue. Although the plaintiff re cog nizes and cites the material evidenc e standa rd, the substanc e of he r ar g u m e n t i s e n c ap s u l a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g q u o t e f

r o m h e r b r i e f : “ t h e m a t e r i a l e v i d e n c e i n th is case clea rly preponde rate s ag ainst a zero ver dict for bodily injury .” We must decline the pla intiff’s invitation to re -we igh the evidenc e. I nstead, we must review the r ecor d to determine if the re is any materia l evidence to support the jury ’s ver dict. The plaint if

f a ll e g e d a n d c o mp lain e d o f p a in in h e r

lo w a n d mi d b a c k

. H e r s u b je c ti ve complaints were at the cr

ux of her alleg ation that she sustained pe rsonal inj uries in the ac cident. At trial, the plaintiff introduce d the deposition testimonyof her treating phy s i ci an, Dr. Christopher Sawy er. A fter the acc ident, the plaintiff did not g o to the emer g ency room but visited Dr. Sawy er la te r that day . D r. Sa wy e r t e sti fi e d th a t hi s d ia g no sis su bs e qu e nt to the a c c ide nt w a s a “ mil d th or a c ic-4-

ba c k s tr a in. ” Dr . Sa wy e r t e sti fi e d a s f oll ow s o n c ro ss- e xami natio n r e g ard ing his dia g no sis a ndhis decision to ref

er the plaintiff to an orthope dic doctor: Q: A s tr a in, is tha t – A: Well, bef

ore we g et into semantics here , she wa s having back pain. A lot of people, using the term spra in and strain and all that kind of stuff is kind of nonspecif

ic anymore. She wa s having back pain. Q : O k a y. A: We call it back pa in. Q: Can y ou sprain y our nec k and bac k like y ou do an ankle ? A: Sure. But it’ s n ot a ll that si mpl e e ith e r. Th e re c a n b e mul tip le c a us e s o f b a c k– a t th a t pe ri odof tim e , th a t’ s k indof

a g e ne ri c te rm

is wh a t I ’m g e tti ng a t. Q: You used – I

mean ba sically

speaking , she had ba ck pain?
A: Ye s, that’ s c or

re c t. Q : S o f ar a s n o w , h a s a n y

p h y s i c i a n o r d e r e d a n M R I? A: Not that I ’m awa

re o f. Bu t , ag ain, that’s why I sent her to a n orthopedist to ge t an opinion. She had see n somebody that knew he r back, that had X-r ay s on her ba ck up to that poin t i n t i m e, and that wo uldbe – th a t w ou ld b e the ir c a ll. Q: And y o u s e n t h e r

to K n o xv il le O r th o p e d ic Cl in ic b e c a u s e y ou va lue d th e ir

jud g me nt? A: Absolutely

. * * * Q: An d d id y ou re c e ive Dr . Joh ns on ’s re po rt ? A: Yes, I did.
* * *-5- Q: The phy sical examination, is that the section of the re port wher e the do c tor

ta lks abo ut the a ctu al phy sic a l e xami natio n a ndhis fi nd ing s u po n th e e xam? A: Ye s. Q: And in the phy sical examination of Ms. G ibson did he n o t e t hat she did not appea

r to be in any

distress when he examined her?
A: Th a t’ s c or

re c t. Q: Did he note that she moved on and off the exam table with ease ? A: Sure. Q: Of c ou rs e , h e no te d th a t sh e ha d s c oli os is, c or re c t? A: Uh-huh. Q: That wa s before the ac cident. Did he say that she had normal c or on a l a ndsa g itt a l pl a ne ba lan c e ? An d th e n my ne xt que sti on is g oing to be what does tha t mean. A: That means that in this plane and this plane (indicating ) she had normal bala nce. T hat’s an anterior a nd po s t er i o r and from side-toside. Q: Did Dr. Johnson not e that M s . Gi b son could flex and extend normally without pain?
A: Th a t’ s w ha t hi s n ote sa y s. Q: Did he indicate that he could not dete ct any dy srhythmia? A: That’s what it say s. Q: Did he say

that she had no te nderne ss to palpat i o n or per cussion of her lumbar spine?
A: Th a t’ s c or

re c t. Q: Th a t’ s h e r l ow ba c k, ri g ht?-6- A: That’s he r bac k. Q: He sa id s he wa s n ot e ve n te nd e r t o to uc hin g a ndfe e lin g , c or re c t? A: Cor re c t. * * * Q: And from what y ou see in re ading Dr. Johnson’s report in here , do y ou se e wh e re Dr . Joh ns on fo un d a nythi ng objec ti ve ly abn orma l, oth e r tha n th e sc oli os is?
A: No . Bu t at the sa me tim e , an d I un de rs ta ndy ou r p oin t on a ll this , his impression sti ll was per s i s tent intermittent low back pa in, intermittent being the key word there. I t may not have hurt that very se c on d s he wa s in the of fi ce andsh e did n’ t ha ve te nd e r p la c e s to palpate. A t the same time, she was having intermittent low ba ck pain, y es. Q: B a se d o n w ha t sh e tol d h im?
A: Th a t’ s c or

re c t. Q: Now, he did ha ve her

do or it appea

rs that he h ad h er do a , y ou know, bending type mane uver to see if she had f ull rang e of motion, c or re c t? A: Cor re c t. Q: And she ha d a full ra ng e of motion? A: At that time.
As ca n be see n, the plaintiff’s c laim that she suffe red persona l injurie s in the acc ident was fo un de d o n h e r s ub

je c tiv e com pl aints o f p a in i n h e r b a c k. Th e e xpe rt te sti mon y

in the c a se wi th respe ct to her persona l injury claim was based upon her complaints. I t w as her obligation to prove by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e that she suf fer ed per s o n al i n

j uries in the ac cident. While the defe ndant di d not put on any proof, her counsel did vigor ously dispute, by way of cr oss examination of the plaint if

f a nd he r w itn e sse s, that th e plaint if f h a d s uf fe re d a ny pe rs on a l in

jurie s a s a pr oximate result of the a ccide nt. I t was the theory of the de fenda nt that the plaintiff was not injured in the ac ci d ent and that he r complaints, if true, w ere rela ted to a prior a utomobile accide nt some eig ht months before the subject a ccide nt or a subseque nt acc ident in Febr uary , 2000.-7-

I t was the duty and prer og ative of the jury to a ssess the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s, and the jury was at l i b er t y t o ei ther be lieve or disbelieve the plaintiff’s subjec tive complaints. The jury app are ntl y

c ho se no t to be lie ve t he plai nti ff ’s te sti mon y re g ard ing he r p a in, its orig in, a nd /or its eff ect on he r. I f the jury

disbelieved the pla intiff – and appar ently it did – then the pla intiff failed to es ta bli sh he r pe rs on a l inju ry c la im by a pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e . As a c on se qu e nc e of thi s, the re is m a te ri a l e vid e nc e to s up po rt the jury ’s ve rd ic t.

I V. After t h e t ri al court had cha

rg ed the jury

and af ter that body

retire d to delibera te, the jury submitt ed the f

ollowing written question to the t rial court: “Doe s the law re quire or state with any specific ity

with respec t to medical evidenc e in per sonal injury case s, i.e., does the burde n of proof require medical e vidence , or can injury be found on the basis of subjective e vidence only ? ” The trial court c alled the jury

back to the courtroom and, afte r a brief discussion with the jury fore person, r einstructed the jury

reg arding the plaintiff’s bur den of proof and the definition of “pr eponder ance of the ev i d ence .” On a

ppeal, the pla intiff asserts that the trial court e rre d by not repe ating the entire char g e to the ju ry

and in fa iling to instruct the jury specific ally

that subjective e vidence was sufficie nt to satisfy

the plaintiff’s bur den of pr oof. Th is c ou rt

ha s st a te d th e fo llo wi ng re g ard ing app e llate re vie w o f j ury ins truc tio ns : We review t h e j u ry charg e in its entirety to determine w hether

the trial judg e committed re versible e rror . Ot is v. Cambr

idg e Mut. Fire Ins. C o. , 85 0 S. W.2 d 4 39 , 4 46 (T e nn .1 99 2) ; In re Estat e of Elam , 738 S.W .2d 169, 174 (Tenn.1987) ; and Grissom v. M et ropolitan Go v ’t of Na shv ill e , 817 S.W .2d 679, 685 (Tenn.A pp.1991). Jury instructions are not meas u red a g ainst the standar d of per fec tion. Grissom , 81 7 S. W.2 d at 68 5. Th e c ha rg e wi ll n ot b e inv a lid a te d if it “fa irly define s the leg al issues involved in the cas e an d does not mislead the jury .” Ot

is , 85 0 S. W.2 d a t 44 6; Grissom , 817 S.W .2d at 685. Furthermore , a particula r instruction must be considere d in the context of the entire c harg e. Elam , 738 S.W .2d at 174.
City of J o h n s o n City v. Outdoor West, In c. , 947 S.W .2d 855, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App.1996). Atrial court is permitted to give a limit ed r e-instruc tion to a jury in response to a

question from the jury afte r it ha s retire d. Elc an v . Aug ustine , C/A No. W1999-01621-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 13234, at *6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . W. S., fi le d Jan . 4 , 2 00 1) ; se e als o Miller v. B a p t ist Hospi tal, In c. , 1 9 8 7 WL 79 67 a t *3 (T e nn . Ct. Ap p. M. S., fi le d M arc h 1 8, 19 87 ); Pre sle y v . Ambur

n , 461 S.W .2d 956, 958 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).
The Supreme Court has stated the f ollowing r eg arding jury

re- instruction:-8- Of c ourse, the only proper response by a trial judg e to a que stion from the jury or an individual juror is to rec all the j ury , counsel, and parties in t o o p en court, he ar the question, reinstruct the jury on the portion of the c harge that responds to the que stion, if necessa ry , and make clea r that the re p ea ted instruction should not be considere d as emphasis of that portion of the char g e. Spe nc e r v . A- 1 Cr

ane Se rv ic e

, I nc . 880 S.W .2d 938, 941 (Tenn. 1994) . We note that t h i s i s the exact proce dure f

ollowed by the t rial court in the i nstant case . After re- instructing the jury , the trial court inquired: “ Now, for

the question that y ou’ve a sked, does that c over it for every one? Do I need to go f urther?” The jury

fore person responde d by say ing twice, “ that clea rs it up.” The tria l court noted that the other

jury members nodde d their hea ds in the aff irmative.

I n the cour se of r e-instruc ting the jury , the t rial court stated, on three separ ate occasions, a variation of this admonishm ent to the jury : “ just be cause I ’m not r epeating the whole char g e doesn’ t mean that this is a ny more important than any other char g e.” We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its response to the jury ’s question.

V.
The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed. This case is remande d for e nforc ement of the trial c ou rt ’s jud g me nt a ndfo r c oll e c tio n o f co sts a sse sse d be low , a ll p ur su a nt t o a pp lic able la w. Cos ts of appe al ar e taxed to the appellant, Me lanie Sue Gibson.

_________________________ C har l es D

. Susa no, J r . , J udge