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Unclassified Report to Congress, January ­ June 2000

Unclassified Report to Congress

on the Acquisition of Technology

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction

and Advanced Conventional Munitions,

1 January Through 30 June 2000

Scope Note

Acquisition by Country:

Iran

Iraq

North Korea

Libya

Syria

Sudan

India

Pakistan

Egypt

Key Suppliers:
Russia

North Korea

China

Western Nations

Trends

Scope Note

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of

the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:

"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence

shall submit to Congress a report on

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual­use and other technology useful for the

development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and

biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."

At the DCI's request, the DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence

Community. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of

the Intelligence Community's assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are

available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.

Acquisition by Country:

As required by Section 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are summaries by country of acquisition activities

(solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional

weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 1999. We excluded countries that already have substantial WMD

programs, such as China and Russia, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern.

[Top of page]

Iran

Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD and ACW technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is

attempting to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of weapons—chemical, biological, and nuclear—and their

delivery systems. During the reporting period, the evidence indicates reflections of determined Iranian efforts to acquire WMD­ and

ACW­related equipment, materials, and technology focused primarily on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Western Europe.

Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) party, already has manufactured and stockpiled several thousand tons of chemical

weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents, and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. During the first half of

2000, Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals that could be used as precursor

agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from entities in Russia and China.

Tehran expanded its efforts to seek considerable dual­use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily

from entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses. We judge that this equipment and know­how could be applied

to Iran's biological warfare (BW) program. Iran probably began its offensive BW program during the Iran­Iraq war, and it may have some

limited capability for BW deployment. Outside assistance is both important and difficult to prevent, given the dual­use nature of the

materials, the equipment being sought, and the many legitimate end uses for these items.

Iran sought nuclear­related equipment, material, and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia. Work continues

on the construction of a 1,000­megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) safeguards. In addition, Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian research centers on various activities. These projects
will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and

development. The expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts established—even from

cooperation that appears strictly civilian in nature—could be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons research and development

program.

Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a number of steps to increase its oversight of entities involved in dealings

with Iran and other states of proliferation concern. In 1999, it pushed a new export control law through the Duma. Russian firms,

however, faced economic pressures to circumvent these controls and did so in some cases. The Russian Government, moreover, failed

to enforce its export controls in some cases regarding Iran.

China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two

nuclear projects: a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use to produce cladding for

reactor fuel. As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but

safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or its products.

Iran claims that it is attempting to establish fuel­cycle capabilities to support its civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain

turnkey facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility that, in fact, could be used in any number of ways to support fissile material

production needed for a nuclear weapon. We suspect that Tehran most likely is interested in acquiring foreign fissile material and

technology for weapons development as part of its overall nuclear weapons program.

During the first half of 2000, entities in Russia, North Korea, and China continued to supply the largest amount of ballistic missilerelated goods, technology, and expertise to Iran. Tehran is using this assistance to support current production programs and to achieve

its goal of becoming self­sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran already is producing Scud short­range ballistic missiles

(SRBMs) and has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the Shahab­3 medium­range ballistic missile (MRBM). In addition, Iran's

Defense Minister in 1999 publicly acknowledged the development of a Shahab­4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile

than the Shahab­3 but later categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran's Defense Minister also

has publicly mentioned a "Shahab 5," although he said that development had not yet begun. Such statements, made against the

backdrop of sustained cooperation with Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities, strongly suggest that Tehran intends to develop a

longer range ballistic missile capability.

Iran continues to acquire conventional weapons and production technologies from Russia and China. During the first half of 2000, Iran

received five Mi­171 utility helicopters from Russia under a 1999 contract, and it began licensed production of Russian Konkurs (AT­5)

antitank guided missiles. Iran also claims to be producing a new manportable surface­to­air missile known as Misagh­1, which

resembles China's QW­1 MANPAD system. Tehran also has been able to keep operational at least part of its existing fleet of Westernorigin aircraft and helicopters supplied before the 1979 Iranian Revolution and continues to develop limited capabilities to produce

armor, artillery, tactical missiles, munitions, and aircraft with foreign assistance.

[Top of page]

Iraq

Since Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations' inspectors into Iraq as required by

Security Council Resolution 687. In spite of ongoing UN efforts to establish a follow­on inspection regime comprising the UN

Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA's Iraq Action Team, no UN inspections occurred during

this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring system installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq

is no longer operating. Having lost this on­the­ground access, it is more difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current

state of Iraq's WMD programs.

We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its

past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. We assess that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of

1998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months. Without an inspection

monitoring program, however, it is more difficult to determine if Iraq has done so.

Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its

missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual­use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use.

This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN

inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased. Following Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction

effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, including several critical missile production complexes and former dual­use CW

production facilities. In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual­use equipment at CW­related facilities. Some of these

facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.

UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW

program. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that

Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran­Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This
discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions.

In 1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted the first in a series of Full, Final, and Complete Disclosures

(FFCDs) that were supposed to reveal the full scope of its BW program. According to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete and

filled with inaccuracies. Since the full scope and nature of Iraq's BW program was not verified, UNSCOM assessed that Iraq continues

to maintain a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any

time, if needed.

Iraq has continued working on its L­29 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L­29 jet trainer aircraft

originally acquired from Eastern Europe. It is believed that Iraq may have been conducting flights of the L­29, possibly to test system

improvements or to train new pilots. These refurbished trainer aircraft are believed to have been modified for delivery of chemical or,

more likely, biological warfare agents.

We believe that Iraq has probably continued low­level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile

material remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon.

Iraq continues to pursue development of SRBM systems that are not prohibited by the United Nations and may be expanding to longer

range systems. Authorized pursuit of UN­permitted missiles continues to allow Baghdad to develop technological improvements and

infrastructure that could be applied to a longer­range missile program. We believe that development of the liquid propellant Al­Samoud

SRBM probably is maturing and that a low­level operational capability could be achieved in the near term. The solid­propellant missile

development program may now be receiving a higher priority, and development of the Ababil­100 SRBM and possibly longer range

systems may be moving ahead rapidly. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would increase its attempts to

acquire missile­related items from foreign sources, regardless of any future UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on long­range

ballistic missile programs. Iraq probably retains a small, covert force of Scud­type missiles.

[Top of page]

North Korea

P'yongyang continues to acquire raw materials from out­of­country entities needed for its WMD and ballistic missile programs. During

this time frame, North Korea continued procurement of raw materials and components for its ballistic missile programs from various

foreign sources, especially through firms in China. We assess that North Korea is capable of producing and delivering via munitions a

wide variety of chemical and biological agents.

During the first half of 2000, P'yongyang sought to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program,

but we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the nuclear weapons program. We assess that North Korea has produced

enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. The United States and North Korea are nearing completion on

the joint project of canning spent fuel from the Yongbyon complex for long­term storage and ultimate shipment out of the North in

accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework. That reactor fuel contains enough plutonium for several more weapons.

North Korea continues to seek conventional arms. It signed a contract with Russia during this reporting period.

[Top of page]

Libya

Libya has continued its efforts to obtain ballistic missile­related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources.

Outside assistance is critical to its ballistic missile development programs, and the suspension of UN sanctions last year has allowed

Tripoli to expand its procurement effort. Libya's current capability remains limited to its aging Scud B missiles, but with continued foreign

assistance it may achieve an MRBM capability—a long­desired goal.

Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW­related equipment. Following the

suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Tripoli reestablished contacts with sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals

abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Libya still appears to have a goal of establishing an offensive CW capability and an indigenous

production capability for weapons. Evidence suggests Libya also is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW

agents.

Libya continues to develop its nascent nuclear research and development program but still requires significant foreign assistance to

advance to a nuclear weapons option. The suspension of sanctions has accelerated the pace of procurement efforts in Libya's drive to

rejuvenate its ostensibly civilian nuclear program. In early 2000, for example, Tripoli and Moscow renewed talks on cooperation at the

Tajura Nuclear Research Center and discussed a potential power reactor deal. Should such civil­sector work come to fruition, Libya

could gain opportunities to conduct weapons­related R&D.
Following the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya has negotiated deals—reported to be worth up to $100 million, according to Russian

press—with Russian firms for conventional weapons, munitions, and upgrades and refurbishment for its existing inventory of Soviet­era

weapons.

[Top of page]

Syria

Syria sought CW­related precursors and expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile

of the nerve agent sarin, and it would appear that Syria is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains

dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is

highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability.

We will continue to monitor the potential for Syria's embryonic nuclear research and development program to expand.

During the first half of 2000, Damascus continued work on establishing a solid­propellant rocket motor development and production

capability with help from outside countries. Foreign equipment and assistance to its liquid­propellant missile program, primarily from

North Korean entities, but also from firms in Russia, have been and will continue to be essential for Syria's effort. Damascus also

continued its efforts to assemble—probably with considerable North Korean assistance—liquid­fueled Scud C missiles.

Syria continues to acquire ACW—mainly from Russia and other FSU suppliers—although at a reduced level from the early 1990s.

During the past few years, Syria has received Kornet­E (AT­14), Metis­M (AT­13), Konkurs (AT­5), and Bastion­M (AT­10B) antitank

guided missiles, RPG­29 rocket launchers, and small arms, according to Russian press reports. Damascus has expressed interest in

acquiring Russian Su­27 and MiG­29 fighters and air defense systems, but its outstanding debt to Moscow and inability to fund large

purchases have hampered negotiations, according to press reports.

[Top of page]

Sudan

During the reporting period, Sudan sought to acquire a variety of military equipment from various sources. Khartoum is seeking older,

less expensive weapons that nonetheless are advanced compared with the capabilities of the weapons possessed by its opponents

and their supporters in neighboring countries in the long­running civil war.

In the WMD arena, Sudan has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, it has

obtained help from entities in other countries, principally Iraq. Given its history in developing chemical weapons and its close

relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well.

[Top of page]

India

India continues its nuclear weapons development program, for which its underground nuclear tests in May 1998 were a significant

milestone. The acquisition of foreign equipment could benefit New Delhi in its efforts to develop and produce more sophisticated

nuclear weapons. India obtained some foreign assistance for its civilian nuclear power program during the first half of 2000, primarily

from Russia.

India continues to rely on foreign assistance for key missile and dual­use technologies, where it still lacks engineering or production

expertise in ballistic missile development. Entities in Russia and Western Europe remained the primary conduits of missile­related

technology transfers during the first half of 2000. New Delhi flight­tested three short­range ballistic missiles between January and June

2000—the Prithvi­II in February and June, and the Dhanush in April.

India continues an across­the­board modernization of its armed forces through ACW, mostly from Russia, although many of its key

programs have been plagued by delays. During the reporting period, New Delhi continued negotiations with Moscow for 310 T­90S

main battle tanks, Su­30 fighter aircraft production, A­50 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, Tu­22M Backfire

maritime strike bombers, and an aircraft carrier, according to press reports. India also continues to explore options for leasing or

purchasing several AWACS systems from other entities. India has also received its first delivery of Russian Krasnopol laser­guided

artillery rounds to be used in its Swedish­built FH­77 155­mm howitzers, negotiated the purchase of unmanned aerial vehicles from

Israel, and considered offers for jet trainer aircraft from France and the United Kingdom.

[Top of page]
Pakistan

Chinese entities continued to provide significant assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program during the first half of 2000. With

Chinese assistance, Pakistan is rapidly moving toward serial production of solid­propellant SRBMs. Pakistan's development of the twostage Shaheen­II MRBM also requires continued Chinese assistance. The impact of North Korea's assistance throughout the reporting

period is less clear.

Pakistan continued to acquire nuclear­related and dual­use equipment and materials from various sources—principally in Western

Europe. Islamabad has a well­developed nuclear weapons program, as evidenced by its first nuclear weapons tests in late May 1998.

Acquisition of nuclear­related goods from foreign sources will remain important if Pakistan chooses to develop more advanced nuclear

weapons. China, which has provided extensive support in the past to Islamabad's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, in

May 1996 pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any state, including Pakistan. We cannot

rule out, however, some continued contacts between Chinese entities and entities involved in Pakistan's nuclear weapons

development.

Pakistan continues to rely on China and France for its ACW requirements. Pakistan received eight upgraded Mirage III/V fighters from

France and continued negotiations to purchase an additional 50 F­7 fighters from China.

[Top of page]

Egypt

Egypt continues its effort to develop and produce ballistic missiles with the assistance of North Korea. This activity is part of a longrunning program of ballistic missile cooperation between these two countries.

[Top of page]

Key Suppliers:

Russia

Despite overall improvements in Russia's economy, the state­run defense and nuclear industries remain strapped for funds, even as

Moscow looks to them for badly needed foreign exchange through exports. We remain very concerned about the nonproliferation

implications of such sales in several areas. Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior, therefore, will remain a very high priority.

Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile­related goods and technical know­how to

countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya. Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities

accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab­3 MRBM, which was first flight­tested in July 1998. Russian entities during the first six

months of 2000 have provided substantial missile­related technology, training, and expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue

to accelerate Iranian efforts to develop new ballistic missile systems.

Russia also remained a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily focused on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

project. With respect to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance enhances Iran's ability to support a nuclear weapons

development effort. By its very nature, even the transfer of civilian technology may be of use in Iran's nuclear weapons program. We

remain concerned that Tehran is seeking more than a buildup of its civilian infrastructure, and the Intelligence Community will be

closely monitoring the relationship with Moscow for any direct assistance in support of a military program.

In January, Russia's cabinet approved a draft cooperative program with Syria that included civil use of nuclear power. Broader access

to Russian scientists could provide opportunities to solicit fissile material production expertise if Syria decided to pursue a nuclear

weapons option. In addition, Russia supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear program during this reporting period. President

Putin in May amended the presidential decree on nuclear exports to allow the export in exceptional cases of nuclear materials,

technology, and equipment to countries that do not have full­scope IAEA safeguards, according to press reports. The move could clear

the way for expanding nuclear exports to certain countries that do not have full­scope safeguards, such as India.

During the first half of 2000, Russian entities remained a significant source of dual­use biotechnology, chemicals, production

technology, and equipment for Iran. Russia's biological and chemical expertise make it an attractive target for Iranians seeking

technical information and training on BW­and CW­agent production processes.

Russia continues to be a major supplier of conventional arms. It is the primary source of ACW for China and India, it continues to supply

ACW to Iran and Syria, and it has negotiated new contracts with Libya and North Korea, according to press reports.
The Russian Government's commitment, willingness, and ability to curb proliferation­related transfers remain uncertain. The export

control bureaucracy was reorganized again as part of President Putin's broader government reorganization in May. The Federal

Service for Currency and Export Controls (VEK) was abolished and its functions assumed by a new department in the Ministry of

Economic Development and Trade. VEK had been tasked with drafting the implementing decrees for Russia's July 1999 export control

law; the status of these decrees is not known. Export enforcement continues to need improvement. In February 2000, Sergey Ivanov,

Secretary of Russia's Security Council, said that during 1998­99 the government had obtained convictions for unauthorized technology

transfers in only three cases. The Russian press has reported on cases where advanced equipment is simply described as something

else in the export documentation and is exported. Enterprises sometimes falsely declare goods just to avoid government taxes.

[Top of page]

North Korea

Throughout the first half of 2000, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile­related equipment and missile

components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. P'yongyang attaches a

high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and

related technology are one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development

[Top of page]

China

During this reporting period, the Chinese have continued to take a very narrow interpretation of their bilateral nonproliferation

commitments with the United States. In the case of missile­related transfers, Beijing has repeatedly pledged not to sell Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I systems but has not recognized the regime's key technology annex. China is not a

member of the MTCR.

Chinese missile­related technical assistance to Pakistan continued to be substantial during this reporting period. With Chinese

assistance, Pakistan is rapidly moving toward serial production of solid­propellant SRBMs. Pakistan's development of the two­stage

Shaheen­II MRBM also requires continued Chinese assistance. In addition, firms in China provided missile­related items, raw

materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya.

Chinese entities have provided extensive support in the past to Pakistan's safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear programs. In May

1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. We cannot rule out some continued

contacts between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. China's involvement with

Pakistan will continue to be monitored closely.

With regard to Iran, China confirmed that work associated with two remaining nuclear projects—a small research reactor and a

zirconium production facility—would continue until the projects were completed. The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor

carefully Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Prior to the reporting period, Chinese firms had supplied CW­related production equipment and technology to Iran. The US sanctions

imposed in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW program remain in effect.

Evidence during the current reporting period shows Iran continues to seek such assistance from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to

what extent these efforts have succeeded. In June 1998, China announced that it had expanded its CWC­based chemical export

controls to include 10 of the 20 Australia Group chemicals not listed on the CWC schedules.

[Top of page]

Western Countries

As was the case in 1998 and 1999, entities in Western countries in 2000 were not as important as sources for WMD­related goods and

materials as in past years. However, Iran and Libya continue to recruit entities in Western Europe to provide needed acquisitions for

their WMD programs. Increasingly rigorous and effective export controls and cooperation among supplier countries have led the other

foreign WMD programs to look elsewhere for many controlled dual­use goods. Machine tools, spare parts for dual­use equipment, and

widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals were the most common items sought. In addition, several Western

countries announced their willingness to negotiate ACW sales to Libya.

[Top of page]
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Trends

As in previous reports, countries determined to maintain WMD and missile programs over the long term have been placing significant

emphasis on insulating their programs against interdiction and disruption, as well as trying to reduce their dependence on imports by

developing indigenous production capabilities. Although these capabilities may not always be a good substitute for foreign imports—

particularly for more advanced technologies—in many cases they may prove to be adequate. In addition, as their domestic capabilities

grow, traditional recipients of WMD and missile technology could emerge as new suppliers of technology and expertise. Many of these

countries—such as India, Iran and Pakistan—do not adhere to the export restraints embodied in such supplier groups as the Nuclear

Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Some countries of proliferation concern are continuing efforts to develop indigenous designs for advanced conventional weapons and

expand production capabilities, although most of these programs usually rely heavily on foreign technical assistance. Many of these

countries—unable to obtain newer or more advanced arms—are pursuing upgrade programs for existing inventories.

[Top of page]

Posted: May 02, 2007 07:52 AM

Last Updated: Jan 03, 2012 12:51 PM

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