Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid

Metal Reactor

May 1994

OTA-BP-ENV-126

NTIS order #PB94-173994

GPO stock #052-003-01370-3
Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technical

Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor---Background Paper, OTA-BP-ENV-126

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994).
—.—— --

Foreword

1

n this post-Cold War era, scientists and engineers have focused

much research on the development of technologies to address the

legacy of the nuclear arms race. One of the more intractable problems currently is how to dispose of excess plutonium from retired

nuclear weapons and how to manage radioactive plutonium waste. The

Office of Technology Assessment covered this issue in its 1993 assessment Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials. The

House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy

and Power, asked OTA to expand the technical analysis of the advanced

liquid metal reactor (ALMR).

This background paper discusses the history and status of the ALMR

research program. It presents applications of this technology to the plutonium disposition problem and the possible advantages and disadvantages of its future development and deployment. It also discusses related

issues such as waste management and concerns about proliferation of

plutonium material.

With regard to its application to the plutonium disposition problem,

ALMR technology will require a decade or more of research and testing

before the performance of a complete system could be ensured. Even

though complete elimination of the plutonium isotope within the reactor

is theoretically achievable with this technology, other aspects of fullscale deployment must be considered in setting goals and objectives for a

development program.

OTA appreciates the assistance and support it received for this effort

from many contributors and reviewers, including the Argonne National

Laboratory, the General Electric Company, the Department of Energy,

other independent research organizations and public interest groups, and

many individuals. They provided OTA with valuable information critical to the completion of this paper and important insights about its techn ical evaluations and projections. OTA, however, remains solel y responsible for the contents of this report.

&Q@=----

ROGER C. HERDMAN

Director

. . .

Ill
Reviewers

John F. Ahearne

Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research

Society

Anna Aurilio

U.S. PIRG

Matthew Bunn

National Academy of Sciences

Tom Clements

Greenpeace Plutonium Campaign

Tom Cochran

Natural Resources Defense

Council

Paul Cunningham

Los Alamos National Laboratory

William H. Hannum

Argonne National Laboratory

Mark Holt

Congressional Research Service

James J. Laidler

Argonne National Laboratory

Terry Lash

U.S. Department of Energy

William W.-L. Lee

Environmental Evaluation Group

Paul Leventhal

Nuclear Control Institute

Arjun Makhijani

Institute for Energy and

Environmental Research

Jon Medalia

Congressional Research Service

Marvin Miller

Department of Nuclear

Engineering

Robert H. Neill

Environmental Evaluation Group

Ronald Omberg

Westinghouse Hanford Co.

Thomas Pigford

University of California, Berkeley

Larry Ramspott

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory

William G. Sutcliffe

Lawrence Liverrnore National

Laboratory

Marion L. Thompson

GE Nuclear Energy Corp.

Raymond G. Wymer

Consultant

Joe Youngblood

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Note: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. The reviewers

do not. however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this background paper. OTA assumes full responsibility for the background paper and the accuracy of its contents.

iv
Clyde Behney PETER A. JOHNSON

Assistant Director Project Director

Health, Education, and the

Environment Mark Brown

Principal Analyst

Robert Niblock

Environment Program Director

CONTRIBUTORS

Paul Carroll

Kathryn Cox

Lois Joellenbeck

——

Preject Staff

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Kathleen Beil

Office Administrator

Nellie Hammond

Administrative Secretary

Kimberly Holmlund

Administrative Secretary

Sharon Knarvik

Secretary

Jene Lewis

Administrative Secretary
contents

1

2

3

4

Introduction and Summary 1

Focus of OTA’s Analysis 2

Summary of ALMR Evaluation 3

= Disposing of Weapons Plutonium 3

● Processing Spent Rcactor Fuel 4

■ Processing Other Radioactive Wastes 4

= Risks and Benefits in Terms of Plutonium

Proliferation 4

Conclusion 5

History of Liquid Metal Reactors in the

United States 7

The Present ALMR/IFR Concept 8

■ Goals of the ALMR/IFR Program 9

= Previous Analyses of the ALMR/IFR Concept 11

Description of the ALMR/lFR Program 13

Future Full-Scale Commercial Development 15

■ The ALMR/IFR Fuel Reprocessing System 17

■ LWR Spent Fuel Reprocessing System 24

Evaluation of the ALMR/lFR Technology 27

Disposing of Weapons Plutonium 28

Nuclear Waste Management 30

■ Processing Spent Reactor Fuel 30

■ Processing Other Radioactive Wastes 32

Proliferation Risks and Benefits 32

= Concerns About Plutonium Breeding 32

■ Concerns About Weapons-Usable Plutonium 33

Role of Nuclear Safeguards 36

Political Barriers 37

Beyond the Spent Fuel Standard for Proliferation

Resistance 39

APPENDIX

A Abbreviations and Glossary 41

References 45
I

Introduction

and

Summary 1

n September 1993, the Office of Technology Assessment

(OTA) published Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the

Nuclear Materials, a report on the technical and policy issues involved in dismantling nuclear warheads in the United

States and Russia as well as the long-term care of the materials

extracted from these warheads. OTA concluded, and several other

recent reports have confirmed (48, 27, 37), that disposing of plutonium from warheads is one of the more intractable problems

that remain as a legacy of the Cold War nuclear arms race. In addi -

t ion, the OTA report stressed the need to formulate national polic y

goals on plutonium control and disposition prior to adopting major technical paths. ’

Although few readily available methods, other than long-term

storage, currently exist for plutonium disposal, many proposals

have been put forward to develop. adapt, or apply new advanced

technologies for this purpose. One such technology that has been

proposed is the so-called advanced liquid metal reactor/integral

fast reactor (ALMR/IFR, or ALMR system). OTA reviewed the

merits of this system briefly in its dismantlement report. The Department of Energy (DOE) has been supporting a research program to develop this system for many years. Basic research on liquid metal reactor systems began more than four decades ago. The

work supported by DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy in the 1970s

and 1980s was part of a major effort to develop breeder reactors

that would produce plutonium and power at the same time. More

| 1
2 | Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

recently, the developers of this technology have

claimed that essentially the same concept could be

used to consume plutonium and meet such goals

as disposing of surplus plutonium from nuclear

warheads.

This paper evaluates the ALMR program, its

current status and potential for plutonium disposal, and certain key questions that have been raised

about what benefits or risks this technology may

offer if it is fully developed and deployed in the future. The program itself has a long and complicated history. The technology for plutonium disposal would include a nuclear reactor, a fuel

manufacturing and reprocessing system, and

many ancillary components. Some of these components are already developed, while others are in

the early testing phase or have not yet been designed. In general, the overall technology is still in

the research stage, and many claims about its potential are based on assumptions about the successful outcome of future development and testing work.

Since the ALMR system has been promoted for

a variety of purposes, the features and subsystems

of the total project have necessarily changed to fit

each purpose. Therefore, any analysis of the advantages or disadvantages of this technology

should be made separately for each purpose proposed. OTA has attempted to conduct this evaluation in such a way as to limit its analyses primarily

to the newly proposed objectives, without making

judgments about the future of nuclear power in

general.

During FY 1992 and 1993, DOE supported the

ALMR research program at a level of approximately $40 million to $43 million annually. These

funds were allocated to the Argonne National

Laboratory, which received almost 80 percent of

the budget, and to the General Electric Company

(GE), which received about 20 percent. Argonne

has conducted this work at its laboratory and research offices in Chicago, as well as at its test facility known as "Argonne West,” which is located

in the Idaho National Energy Laboratory. Recently, Argonne’s work focused on the development of

the reactor fuel reprocessing portion of the total

system, which is one of the important and necessary components for the plutonium disposal application. GE efforts, however, have focused on a

total commercial power generating system that is

not closely related to the key development needs

for plutonium disposition applications.

In 1993, Congress debated whether continued

funding for this program could be justified. Issues

were raised about the most appropriate goals for

the program and whether there was sufficient justification for funding the program at various levels. The final FY 1994 appropriation for the program was about $30 million. In the President’s FY

1995 budget as submitted to Congress in January

1994, the Administration proposed to cut almost

$100 million from Nuclear Energy research and

development (R&D) programs in general and to

terminate the ALMR project.

FOCUS OF OTA’S ANALYSIS

This paper, which presents OTA’s evaluation of

the ALMR project, first reviews the history of

government programs and recent program goals

for developing 1 liquid metal fast reactors, and then

focuses on four key questions that have been

posed about the technology’s potential for specific

purposes:

1.

2.

3.

4.

What is the potential for this technology in disposing of surplus weapons plutonium?

What is its potential for processing spent fuel

from light-water reactors and for destroying

plutonium and other actinides?

What is its potential for processing other radioactive wastes that are currently stored under

marginal conditions?

What risks and benefits, in terms of plutonium

proliferation, might be associated with largescale deployment of this technology in the future?

Throughout the history of this program, the development of an advanced reactor system for

large-scale nuclear power generation has consistently been an overriding goal. However, that goal

has not been put forth as primary in recent program justifications. As such, this OTA paper does

not address the role of advanced reactors in future

energy supply scenarios, the risks and benefits of
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 3

nuclear power in general, or the advantages or disadvantages of this particular technology in terms

of the future of nuclear power.2

SUMMARY OF ALMR EVALUATION

OTA’s analysis shows that the DOE ALMR project is clearly in the research phase and, as such,

cannot provide conclusive results regarding its

potential for newly identified uses other than power production. The following summarizes OTA’s

analysis.

I Disposing of Weapons Plutonium

ALMR technology is one of several advanced

reactor or converter systems that theoretically

could convert substantial portions of a given

amount of plutonium to other fission products by

processing the materials through the system repeatedly over a long period. In one hypothetical

system, for example, after fissioning, fuel would

be removed from each reactor and reprocessed

approximate] y every 2 years for a total of 50 years

in order to destroy about two-thirds of the total

plutonium material fed into the system. To deploy

a working system that will perform effective y and

efficiently would require a great deal more research and testing of several key components, as

well as of the total system. Therefore, it is important to make sure that there is a clear and pressing

need for such a capability and that the cost and

time required to implement it are justified.

Plutonium isotopes can potentially be eliminated completely within the reactor of a future

ALMR systems Thus, according to ALMR supporters, it should be favored over options that

would simply produce a material with difficult-toextract plutonium still in it. This distinction, however, becomes less important when one considers

the fact that plutonium exists in all spent reactor

fuel currently stored worldwide. Also, even

though its percentage is small, the total quantity of

plutonium now contained in all spent reactor fuel

is much larger than the current stockpile of plutonium extracted from weapons. This fact has led

some researchers to take the position that it is

more important to put weapons plutonium into a

form that is as proliferation-resistant as spent fuel

as soon as possible, than it is to wait (perhaps

many decades) to prove the effectiveness of a system such as the ALMR, which may be able to

eliminate it.

The Department of Energy and other responsible agencies are currently developing policies and

strategies with regard to the disposition of weapons plutonium. These policies will probably put a

high priority on methods that can be implemented

quickly to control weapons-usable material and

make it more resistant to proliferation. Most policymakers recognize the urgency of dealing with

materials that are now in the former Soviet Union

and would also put a high priority on methods that

could be implemented quickly there.

Given the above priorities, the ALMR technology would be less appropriate for plutonium disposition than more near-term technologies that

would not require as long a development time

(such as mixing with high-level waste and vitrification or fissioning in existing light-water reactors). However, if a policy is adopted at some future date that favors complete elimination of

plutonium in all forms, ALMR technology has the

potential to be one of several options that could be

evaluated after more development work has been

done. 4

2 Ftw an fwerall assessment of the relative rmmts of this and other nuclear rcact(~r technt)l(~gics for future cnergj supply, see U.S. Congess,

Office of Tcchmdogy Assessment, fi.’nerg~ Te[hno/o,q.y L“hoIce.$: Shq~Irrg Our Fufurc, OTA-E-493 (Wash lngt(m, DC” U.S. Government Printing

Office, July 1991 ).

3 It sh(mld he noted, however, that current ALMR reacli)r designs must always maintain some amount of plut(m]unl w]lhln [he reactor core In

order to function and that this material w III remain even after many decades of (~perati(m.

4 The other elirninatmn options, advanced reactors and converters, arc discussed tn rcfcrcnccs 27 :ind 48.
Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

Processing Spent Reactor Fuel

Current difficulties with progress toward an underground repository for spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors have led proponents of the

ALMR to suggest that this technology could be

used to process spent fuel and thus make it more

suitable for repository disposal. With technical

additions for handling spent fuel, ALMR technology could potential y reprocess the spent fuel rods

and, over many cycles, transform the actinides

(uranium plus elements with higher atomic

weights) to other materials. If all actinides were

removed, proponents claim that the remaining

waste would have to be isolated and contained for

no more than a few centuries because the actinides

are elements with very long half-lives that require

repository integrity for tens of thousands of years

or longer.

The above claims of complete actinide removal

and transformation, however, are somewhat uncertain at the current stage of ALMR development. Less work has been accomplished on this

aspect of the technology than on most other aspects. Also, although actinide removal is theoretically feasible, in practice it would add many more

fission products to the waste stream. Some of

these products also have long half-lives (equivalent to or greater than plutonium). Until more

complete design analysis and testing work is

done, it is not clear whether ALMR technology

can offer much of an advantage, if any, to the commercial nuclear waste management dilemma. In

addition, problems in establishing a nuclear waste

repository may not be solved with purely technical approaches. A long history of public policy

and regulatory issues related to repository planning and siting has dominated technical issues in

the past and will probably continue to do so in the

future.

Another proposed advantage of actinide (particularly plutonium) removal from spent fuel is

that material suitable for weapons would thus be

destroyed. Since the plutonium present in small

quantities in all reactor spent fuel does present

some level of proliferation risk, removing it could

alter that risk. Recent studies have discussed the

risk and approaches to managing it (26, 27).

Whether ALMR technology has a place in nonproliferation strategies with regard to the processing of spent fuel will depend on comparisons with

other approaches and will need to be evaluated in

an international context because all countries with

nuclear reactors have some spent fuel that requires

management.

| Processing Other Radioactive Wastes

The ALMR has also been proposed for processing

certain radioactive wastes that cannot be stored or

treated safely with any existing technologies. In

particular, DOE has a large inventory of special

spent fuel assemblies, some of which are stored

under marginal conditions and require treatment

or packaging to ensure adequate protection for the

future. Parts of the ALMR technology may be

suitable for processing such wastes, but more

analysis will be needed to match the existing problems with the capabilities of the system. Very little

research on this application has been conducted to

date.

Another issue that requires further exploration

and development is the question of what additional types and volumes of wastes from a total

ALMR system may be generated that will need

treatment, storage, and disposal, On the one hand,

it may be possible with careful and efficient design to minimize waste. On the other hand, each

step of a complex process can create its own waste

stream. While an overall goal of the ALMR system is to eliminate long-lived radioactive actin ides from the waste stream, new fission-products

and wastes will be generated. A more complete

determination of the wastes streams produced by

this technology must await the results of prototype testing.

| Risks and Benefits in Terms of

Plutonium Proliferation

Developers of the ALMR technology have

worked to create technical barriers to prevent the

diversion of weapons material that would be present within the reactor and the fuel reprocessing

systems. However, critics of the program continue
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 5

to stress that any technology that concentrates and

separates plutonium would be a proliferation concern because it could be modified, once developed, for weapons purposes. Although technical

barriers incorporated in the ALMR design may

prevent material diversion when adequate inspection systems and controls are in place, they may

not suffice to deter a state or a group that did not

honor safeguard agreements, Most experts agree

that any separated plutonium from reactors could

be used to produce weapons. Whether or not the

ALMR technology is proliferation-resistant thus

depends more on its deployment, control and success of outside inspection, than on the technology

itself.

If the ALMR technology were developed and

then exported to a number of other countries, the

United States should be concerned about adequate

control of plutonium to prevent its diversion for

weapons. Even if the system were designed to be a

plutonium consumer, it would not be mechanical1 y difficult for an owner with technical expertise to

convert it to a “breeder” (plutonium producer).

The difficulty of converting the ALMR system

from a ‘“burner” to a “breeder” is related to the

stage of its development and whether the conversion possibility was a factor in the initial design of

a reactor. Since the technology is currently in the

R&D stage, one could easily complete a specific

design to fit requirements for either an easy or a

difficult conversion. Nevertheless it would be difficult or impossible to design a reactor core that

could be guaranteed to not work as a plutonium

breeder. In addition, the ALMR technology has

certain components such as a hot cell that could be

used to support other equipment to concentrate,

separate, and purify plutonium. Technical systems could be built, and inspection procedures

adopted, to monitor operations and protect against

proliferators, but the technology itself could not

be a guarantee against misuse.

Compared with other older technologies that

have been used to reprocess spent reactor fuel and

to separate plutonium,s the ALMR system may

offer more proliferation advantages because of

technical barriers that could be designed into the

system. However, these possible advantages must

be weighed against the risks of widely deploying

systems that could be later modified if the owners

had the proper technical capability and weaponsbuilding motives.

CONCLUSION

In summary, ALMR technology will not be available for application to plutonium disposition for

many years. Substantial research, development.

and testing work is needed to demonstrate the performance of specific portions of the total system

necessary for fuel reprocessing and waste handling. Even though ALMR technology has potentially beneficial features such as the elimination of

plutonium isotopes, concerns about possible proliferation problems still have to be resolved.

Whether the development of this technology

should be pursued also needs to be considered in

the context of plutonium disposition policy objectives as well as overall energy policy. Any subsequent development work on ALMR technology

would benefit from clearly stated policy goals and

specific objectives by which to measure future accomplishments.

$ Such as the PURE.X sy stem, w hlch IS a chemical scparat]on prtxxss conlnl{)nl) used in prcducing w cap(~ns materials and m strew conm]crc ial t)pcrall[ ms I n France and the Un]td K lngd(m~.
History of

Liquid Metal

Reactors

in the

United States 2

T

oday, U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors are based

on a design known as the light-water reactor (LWR). In

this design, uranium oxide-based nuclear fuel is used once

and then prepared for disposal. Although not commercialized in this country, other reactor designs continue to be explored

and developed. One such design is a liquid metal reactor (LMR).

This design uses metal fuel that is reprocessed after each use cycle

and then fed back into the reactor as new fuel. Reprocessing is a

chemical and physical process whereby new fuel is separated

from the waste products. The LMR reactor was origin all y developed as a “breeder reactor” to produce excess plutonium during

its operation. Breeder operation implies that the reactor and fuel

reprocessing system can produce more nuclear fuel than the reactor consumes.

The liquid metal reactor concept has been under development

in the United States since the 1950s. The first nuclear reactor ever

to produce electricity y, the experimental breeder reactor (EBR-I) at

Argonne West in Idaho that began operation in 1951, was such a

system (3, 15). The Clinch River Breeder Demonstration reactor

was an LMR breeder design intended to demonstrate the concept

on a large scale. It was designed to use a nuclear fuel reprocessing

technology known as PUREX1 for converting its spent fuel into

new nuclear fuel. The Clinch River project was terminated by

Congress in 1983 because of concerns about its risks in terms of

I me pUREX process ~,as orlglnal]Y, deve]oped in the 1940s to separate plul(mlum for

w capons prtxluctitm, The process in which spent fuel IS diss(~lvcxi, and plut(~n]um and (~thcr materials arc separa[d from wastes, can also h> used [() produce plutimlunl ft~r nuclear

fuel.
8 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

Argonne National Laboratory West. A number of nuclear test

facilities are located at this site, including the EBR II nuclear

reactor (the domed structure in the center), and its fuel

recycling facility (in front and to the right of the EBR //)

nuclear weapons proliferation, its effects on the

environment, and its economics compared with

competing reactor designs.

The current advanced liquid metal reactor/integral fast reactor (ALMR/IFR) concept, begun in

1984, grew out of these earlier programs. In the

last decade, this development program worked

with an experimental LMR breeder reactor EBR11 at Argonne West to conduct safety tests, including simulated accidents involving loss of coolant

flow; to test experimental ALMR/IFR nuclear

fuels; and to develop a new type of nuclear fuel reprocessing known as pyroprocessing.

Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to recover

plutonium and other nuclear materials for making

new fuel is inherent to breeder reactors. Breeder

reactor operation uses some form of spent fuel reprocessing to separate new nuclear fuel from

waste nuclear fission products. Various nuclear

fuel reprocessing technologies have been developed. PUREX reprocessing was pursued in the

first decades of breeder power reactor development. PUREX reprocessing of commercial nuclear reactor spent fuel produces a “civilian” grade

of plutonium that can nevertheless be used to

make nuclear bombs.2 During the 1970s the

United States abandoned commercial PUREX

plutonium reprocessing plans after a long debate

over the merits and risks of developing a commercial plutonium-based nuclear power industry. The

debate centered on several issues, including the

environmental risks associated with the proposed

nuclear fuel reprocessing cycles and expansion of

the industry; the economics of plutonium reprocessing and fuel recycle; and the potential impacts

of an expanded plutonium economy on international security with respect to nuclear weapons

proliferation. The debate became part of the 1976

presidential campaign agenda, and in April 1977

the Carter Administration called for an indefinite

deferral of U.S. programs aimed at commercialization of the plutonium fuel cycle, including

spent fuel reprocessing (8, 9).

THE PRESENT ALMR/lFR CONCEPT

Researchers at Argonne National Laboratory and

General Electric (GE), who together are developing the present ALMR/IFR concept, have attempted to address the earlier objections to LMR

breeder reactor reprocessing systems. Some potential advantages claimed for the present ALMR/

IFR concept include the ability to:

■

■

■

supply a significant portion of future worldwide energy needs, through wide deployment

eventually as a plutonium breeder reactor fuel

reprocessing system;

eliminate U.S. and Russian surplus military

plutonium while producing electricity;

provide superior nuclear proliferation resistance and acceptable nuclear material safeguards, compared with the standard plutonium

fuel reprocessing and separation technology

(PUREX), thereby allowing export (with safeguards) to other nations:

2CiviImn and military ft~m]s t~f plutonium differ merel y in the cxmctmtrati(m t)f the plultmium isotope plut(miun-239. Military-grade nlatcrial h:is n]t)rc than 90 percent pluttmlum-239 and civilian grade less than 90 percent. Many cxmsider this diffcmmce to have little slgnitkance in

terms of mahmg a nuclear btm]b.
Chapter 2 History of Liquid Metal Reactors in the United States | 9

m

■

reprocess its own spent nuclear fuel. and that

from other types of nuclear reactors, into new

fuel, possibly extending the cupacity or acceptability of geologic repositories and easing relevant repository licensing and safety concerns

by eliminat ing some of the long-l ived radionucli des: and

operate more safely than existing LWR systems

due to fundamental physical and design differences.

These claims have not been fully demonstrated

or proven at the current stage of development of

this technology. However, they are used to justify

continuing development because, if they were

demonstratrated, they would offer considerable

benefits.

| Goals of the ALMR/lFR Program

The emphasis of the ALM R/IFR and its predecessor research and developmen( programs has been

adjusted in response to certain domestic and international political developments. As originally

conceived of four decades ago. LMR technology

meant a plutonium breeder nuclear reactor (producing more plutonium fuel than it consumed) using PUREX nuclear fuel reprocessing for the production of electricity. After the United States

abandoned the commercial izat ion of breeder reactors and PUREX reprocessing in the 1970s because of concerns about plutonium proliferation,

environmental impacts, and costs, ALMR/IFR

developers conceived of a new fuel reprocessing

technology claimed to involve less proliferation

risk than the earlier PUREX technology. Nevertheless, electricity production remained the primary goal for justifying the program. During the

last 5 years, however. the ALMR/IFR concept begann to be promoted more as a method to reprocess

and transform spent nuclear fuel from commercial

LWRs so as to make it more acceptable for disposal in geologic repositories, such as the still incomplete Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada.3 After 1991, when arms reduction agreements

between the United States and the former Soviet

Union appeared likely to produce significant

quantities of surplus military plutonium, developers of the ALMR/IFR concept emphasized its potential to eliminate this plutonium by consuming

it as a nuclear fuel to make electricity.

Most recently, ALMR/IFR developers have

again refocused on the potential of the technology

to eliminate plutonium (and other actinides) in

spent nuclear fuel by reprocessing it into new

ALMR/IFR fuel (and waste fission products).

However, this time the rationale is not so much

that it would help the geologic repository program, but rather that as long as plutonium exists

even in spent nuclear fuel, it remains a potential

nuclear weapons proliferation risk. The ALMW/

IFR concept, developers argue, might eliminate

that risk. The technology was renamed the

“ALMR actinide recycle system” to reflect this

change of emphasis.

One proposal for the ALMR/IFR specifically

examined in the recent Office of Technology Assessment (OTA ) report Dismantling the Bomb and

Managing the Nuclear Materials was its use for

the disposition of surplus military plutonium. Its

designers have promoted it as a means to transform surplus weapons plutonium into fission

products that could never be turned back into a nuclear bomb. The OTA report concluded that although the ALMR/IFR system was designed as a

plutonium producing breeder reactor it could be

operated as a net plutonium consumer. However,

some limitations of the ALMR/IFR concept for
10 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

Electricity was first generated with the EBR 1 (Experimental

Breeder Reactor 1) in 1951 Research with this system was in

part the basis of the EBR II and the current ALMR/IFR design.

plutonium disposal noted in the OTA report include the following:4

●

●

■

It would require many cycles of plutonium reprocessing over many decades to completely

fission and destroy a significant portion of surplus military plutonium, compared with other

possibly more rapid disposal methods such as

vitrification.5

The plutonium reprocessing required for complete destruction of surplus military plutonium

is a transformation and not a disposal method.

It would change one type of waste (plutonium)

into another type of waste (highly radioactive

fission products) that would still require treatment and disposal in facilities that are not yet

available in the United States (a problem in fact

with any radioactive waste disposal concept).

The licensing and change in national policy involved in the act of deploying plutonium9

m

fueled nuclear power reactors with plutonium

reprocessing could be expected to be difficult

in the United States, which abandoned this

technology in the mid-1970s because of economic and proliferation concerns.

It would not be economical to develop such a

reactor system solely for disposal of surplus

military plutonium. Selection of this option

could make sense only as part of a larger national decision to turn to a plutonium breeding/reprocessing nuclear energy program.

Developers of the ALMR/IFR concept envision

many facilities operating as breeder reactors

deployed in the21 st century as the next generation of U.S. nuclear power reactors. In this scenario, the amount of plutonium available from

dismantled nuclear warheads would be relatively minor compared with the amount of plutonium that would be cycled through these

reactors.

Selective emphasis on a single capability or

function of the ALMR/IFR concept, while ignoring its other features, has made it difficult for

those not intimately involved to evaluate, criticize, or even understand the program. Therefore,

for the purpose of the present study, the ALMR/

IFR system is looked at from the broadest perspective. It is evaluated as a system containing a

nuclear reactor capable of operating as a plutonium breeder, a nuclear fuel reprocessing and fabrication (pyroprocessing) system, a nuclear waste

handling system, and a system for reprocessing

existing spent fuel from conventional U.S. commercial LWR into new ALMR/IFR nuclear fuel.

In addition, the present study looks at the timeliness of the ALMR/IFR technology. That is, given the early development status of the program,

~For a nlorc ~onlp]e(e ~xp]ana(ion of” these Findings, see U.S. C(mgrcss, office of Technt)logy Assessment, [)lsnum!/I’nx lk ~on~~ fJn~~an-

(JgIn,q Ihe NII(lcar MaferIa/s (Washingttm, DC. U .S. Gtnw-nment Print]ng Ofik, 1993). Some of the advantages claimed by the (ievclt)pers are

listed (m the following” p:~gm.

5ALM~] ~ Pronloters” ~)ln[ OUI tha( the [echn~)logy c(dd provide more rapid disposition by using the fueI made fron~ wea~)ns PIu(onium

for a very short period and removing it for storage and subsequent c(m~ple[e burning in the future. The sh(mt fuel use W(NJM “spike’” the material

by making it radioactive, alth(wgh less radioactive than the fully used up fuel. This strategy w(mld also be appl icable to wreactor-based disp)siti(m; for example, after c(mversi(m I(J MOX (mixed uranium and plut(mium oxide) the fuel could be used briefly in already available c(mvtmti(mal reactors to achieve Ihc ““splhed” fuel effect.
Chapter | 2 History of Liquid Metal Reactors in the United States | 11

what long-range problems in energy production or

waste handling might it be appropriate for the

ALMR/IFR technology to address?

| Previous Analyses of the

ALMR/lFR Concept

A number of studies have examined the use of nuclear reactors, including the ALMR/IFR, to dispose of plutonium from dismantled U.S. and former Soviet Union nuclear weapons or from spent

nuclear fuel. These studies were carried out by the

Office of Technology Assessment, the National

Research Council Committee on International Security and Arms Control, the General Accounting

Office, the RAND Corporation, and the Department of Energy (27, 37, 46, 48, 50), Although

each study approached the issue from a unique

perspective, they reached many similar conclusions.

All concluded that long-term plutonium disposition will be lengthy, complex, and costly. In

addition, short-term plutonium storage will be required regardless of the ultimate disposition option selected. The most available long-term options are either conversion to mixed-oxide fuel for

use in existing, proven, light-water reactor designs without nuclear fuel reprocessing, or disposal as waste, for example through vitrification. Any

disposition option will stretch over decades and is

likely to involve costs rather than net economic

benefits. Although all options involve some unresolved issues and risks of uncertain magnitude,

these studies concluded that the development of

advanced reactors for plutonium disposition

would involve the highest costs and greatest uncertainties.
I

Description

of the

ALMR/IFR

Program 3

T

he Department of Energy (DOE) has been funding the development of an advanced liquid metal reactor under a

program within the Office of Nuclear Energy. Recent

budgets for this program were between $40 million and

$43 million per year for FY 1992 and 1993, and $30 million for

FY 1994. Most of the budget has been directed toward research

work at the Argonne National Laboratory. During FY 1992 and

1993. some $10 million per year was directed toward research at

the General Electric Company (GE).

The current DOE concept of the advanced liquid metal reactor/

integral fast reactor (A LMR/IFR) system includes a liquid metalcooled nuclear reactor and associated nuclear fuel reprocessing,

manufacturing. and waste processing facilities. The system combines many discrete components operating together at a single

site. The complete system can be divided into three major parts:

1.

2.

. . 3

an advanced li quid metal reactor.

a fuel reprocessing system for transforming ALMR spent fuel

into new fuel and processing its radioactive waste fox- disposal,

and

alight-water reactor (LWR) spent fuel reprocessing system for —

the recovery of plutonium, uranium, and related act in ides from

the spent fuel from conventional U.S. nuclear reactors to make

new ALMR/IFR nuclear fuel.

Figure 3-1 illustrates these major components and shows the

stage of development for each. For example, the current reactor

part of the test system is a prototype that has been operating in various tests for more than 30 years. Many of the fuel reprocessing

components. such as the electrorefiner, have been tested but have

yet to be tested as a prototype system. Many of the waste and

spent fuel processing components are still in the design stage. I 13
14 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

m r “---- ” -------- ”

s Nuclear safeguards system ‘m

.,,,:, ,,, , ,,,.., ,.,, ,,, ,:,: ,:.,.., . .s., . . .

Plutonium, uranium, and

: other materials transformed

to metal forms

. ,..,,....:. .,,,:, .., .

Radioactive

wastes

I

Plutonium,

uranium,

other

actinides,

and some

radioactive

fission

products

Spent reactor fuel

/

r

-m--mm,w ~

, Fuel pin chopper r

- =------- -

f

Chopped up

fuel pins

v

Waste fission

products in

cadmium

Waste fission

products m

molten salt \ l

I ““““

TEBR41

J

Experimental

breeder

reactor

w - - - DPlutonium, uranium, other

actinides, and some

residual radioactive fission

products in cadmium

.,,,.,,,:,,,. .,..:.

1

Pyrocontactors treat ~

waste molten salt for ‘~

:

recycle

.:.

l \

.: Fission

‘~. Fission products

,,,.,., .., ..:. . . . . . . . . . .

products

,:: metal alloy ‘ (CS-135 and

encapsulation ~ 1-129) in !.. ,. ,, .., .,,.,., ..: ..,.:,. ,..., ..:.,:.

b Primary ALMR/lFR me/ten sa/t

3

metal matrix

Solidified pr&iucts

,,:,,.,. . . . . . . . . . . . . .,.,, .,, ,,.,.,., ,,,:., .,.,.

fission

. . . . . . . . . . . ..,, ,,,,,. W.,, ,+, .+:bx..’>+,:+:<.<. . . . . . . .

.:.: : product sa/ts

/

Fission products in

Geologic repository \ inc/uding solid matrix

::. required for fission ‘~ CS-135 and

:::. Droducts /-129. . . . ,. .: : . : ::....... . . . .

—

Recycled reactor

fuel as new pins

\

F ------ ”-- Q

~ Fuel pin processor t

1

uranium, other

actinides, some

re.wdual highly

radioactive fission

products, as a

meta/ ingot

--- m-- -

B Cathode s

8

s processor ‘

------t

Prototype status

G

Prototyp

= fully tested

and installed

r-.-~

= Under develop

I 8 ment, desi n

8 B laboratory ested, Y

---wa if tested in hot

cell then not

with actual fuel

material

Still in design/ :x.,. .,.. :.,. ,., ,. +.:. concept stage,

.:, = laboratory

.::

;:: .> demonstration .::

,., ,.,.,,.: but no prototype

NOTE The system would involve many interlinked components, including a nuclear reactor and facilities for fuel reprocessing and fabrication, for

reprocessing conventional reactor spent fuel into new ALMR/IFR fuel, and for handling the resulting nuclear wastes

SOURCE Argonne National [Laboratory
Chapter 3 Description of the ALMR/lFR Program | 15

Argonne National Laboratory and GE are partners in research and development for the ALMR/

IFR program. Argonne has taken the lead in developing the ALMR metal fuel reprocessing

technology, while GE is focusing on developing

the full-scale nuclear reactor. At present, the

30-year-old Experimental Breeder Reactor II

(EBR-II) at Argonne West is serving as a prototype reactor for testing ALMR/IFR nuclear fuels

(43). However, since the EBR-II is scheduled to

be decommissioned at the end of 1994, its role in

ALMR/IFR prototype development will be ending. DOE partly funds the GE reactor design project—at about $10 million per year over the last

few years (43). GE also takes an active role in the

ALMR/IFR fuel reprocessing development, via

regular-meetings and consultation with Argonne

National Laboratory researchers.

Figure 3-2 shows the 5-year schedule announced by DOE in 1991 for the development of a

prototype ALMR/IFR at Argonne West(51 ). The

total costs (shown by year and including nongovernmental contributions) over 5 years were projected at the time as $976.4 million.

Although the exact dates will change as work

proceeds, the status of development of each component shown in figure 3-1 and the schedule

shown in figure 3-2 illustrate that substantial developmental work remains to be done, and many

of the individual components are in only the concept or early prototype_stage. Some components

have been demonstrated in the laboratory, but prototypes have not yet been constructed or tested.

Thus any description of the ALMR/IFR system

must be based partially on plans, rather than on actual hardware. This description also will have to

be revised as the system is designed and developed. The schedule shown in figure 3-2 is for a

prototype facility only (which was planned to be

constructed at Argonne West), not for full commercialization of the technology. Although this

schedule is already out of date, it serves as a general indication of the amount of development work

ahead. It will require revision, for example, after

the recent decision to suspend development of the

nuclear reactor portion of the program and conThe EBR-II and fuel processing facility at Argonne West are

prototype scale facilities. The reactor portion (left) has been in

operation for several decades.

centrate only on development of the prototype

fuel reprocessing system (3).

FUTURE FULL-SCALE COMMERCIAL

DEVELOPMENT

If the planned research and development work,

followed by completion of a prototype, is completed by Argonne and GE, full-scale commercial

development using part or all of this fuel cycle

may be carried out by a private sector multiorganization team. Using this assumption, GE has projected the full-scale ALMR system as a 1.866-gigawatt electric ALMR/IFR modular design plant

that could include an ALMR/IFR metal fuel reprocessing facility with a capacity of 22 metric

tons per year. Alternative] y, a centrally located facility with a capacity of 180 metric tons per year

might support eight separate ALMR plants (44).

The complete facility could also include a

2,800-metric-ton-per-year LWR spent fuel processing and conversion facility (12, 34, 42). Highlevel and low-level waste processing facilities

would be colocated with the reactor and fuel reprocessing facility. One reactor design proposed

by GE would use a nuclear fuel breeding ratio of

1.05 (i.e., for every pound of plutonium consumed

during a fuel cycle, 1.05 pounds of new plutonium

would be produced) and would also have the ability to operate at a range of ratios from 0.6 (thus
Project year

Project component

Advanced liquid

metei reactor

(ALMR) design

and development

Metal fuel cycle

design and

development

LWR spent fuel

recycle design

and development

Yearly cost ($ million)

ALMR

Metal fuel

LWR reprocessing

Nongovernment contribution

Total

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996

I I I I I I 1

Complete NRC Solicit detail Complete key

Start fuel test Safety Evaluation design proposals component testing

program (8/93) Report (12/93) (9/95) (9/97)

v v v

I Base technology development phase

Comlete R&D and obtain

Initiate

fuel

irradiation

(2/93)

RFP for preliminary Start preliminary Submit preliminaty Complete preliminary preliminary design

Initiate PEIS engineering design engineering design engineering certification design, initiate detailed approval from the NRC

(10/93) (4/94) (12/94) application to NRC (9/96) design (12/96) (12/98)

v v v v

Demonstate the reactor powerplant

Initiate

recycle Complete ALMR

testing pyroprocess Evaluate fuel licensing data

(4/93) development (8/96) cycle (9/97) base (9/98)

v v v v

Metal fuel cycle demonstration phasa Prototype facility

A A A A

Complete fuel Complete fuel Initiate prototype Preliminary waste

safety overpower specifications facility design qualification

tests (6/96) (9/96) (1/98) report (9/98)

Select process

testing flow Initiate pilot-scale Initiate pilot-scale construction

sheet (3/93) design activity (10/93) (12/95)

Begin pilot-scale

operation (1/98)

v v v v

|I Simulated fuel development phase Scale=up

A A

Initiate 20-kg Evaluate technical and

processing test (7/93) economical feasibility (12/95)

Initiate prototype

Begin design Modify facility for a Initiate facility facility design

activities (1 1/94) 1&kg test (12/95) operation (1/98) (12/98)

v v

LWR spent fuel reprocessing demonstration (10-to 20-kg soate)

I I [ I I I 1

8.8 31.5 47.7 101.0 151.0

26.4 32.6

137.0

53.7 56.9 60.1

6.5 18.5

62.2

19.5 30.0 30.0

9.5 12.0

30.0

13.5 10.0 15.0 13.0

51.2 94.6 134.4 197.9 256.1 242.2

NOTE Although it IS out of date the schedule shows the amount of developmental work that remains undone Any analysis of the ALMR/IFR system WiII require revision as the system IS designed

developed, and deployed

KEY NRC = Nuclear Regulatory Commmission PEIS = programmatic environmental impact statement RFP - request for proposals

SOURCE U S Department of Energy, 5-Year Plan, 1993
Chapter 3 Description of the ALMR/lFR Program I 17

consuming plutonium) to 1.23 (thus breeding plutonium) (34).

As of the end of 1993, GE projected schedule

was as follows” (34):

■

■

●

■

by 1996, complete technical feasibility and economic potential studies, as well as key features

test and qualification phases;

by 1999, complete both a concept demonstration and metal fuel qualification, and a components and subsystems test phase;

by 2010, complete design certification; and

after 2010, begin commercial deployment.

GE also projected that reprocessing LWR spent

fuel could provide a source of startup plutonium

fuel necessary for commercial-scale deployment

(34, 42). The low-enriched uranium that will be simultaneously recovered from the reprocessed

LWR fuel might either be put back into existing

LWRs or into recycled AL MR/IFR fuel as a fertile

material for breeder operation, or be disposed of as

actinide waste in a repository. As an alternative

approach, GE projected the full-scale AL MR/IFR

system also to be capable of using a more conventional mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel

(MOX) without electrorefiner reprocessing (42,

45).1

The commercial full-scale ALMR as conceived of by GE is a breeder-capable nuclear reactor that uses liquid sodium as a coolant, and a metal nuclear fuel containing plutonium and uranium.

The full-scale GE ALMR design is projected to be

a bank of up to six modular reactors, each generating 311 megawatts of electricity (each approximately 16 times larger than the EBR-II prototype)

(34). With nuclear fuel reprocessing the system

would be capable of operating as a breeder reactor

(making more plutonium than consumed). This

design has not yet been built. By comparison, conventional LWRs used for commercial power generation today in the United States are water

cooled, use uranium oxide nuclear fuel, and do not

reprocess their spent fuel.

The ALMR/IFR system has generally been

presented as easily convertible between plutonium breeding and burning. The full-scale ALMR

system envisioned by GE is designed specifically

to be converted easily between breeding and nonbreeding operation (42). According to its designers, “[b]y straightforward adjustments in fuel

composition and arrangement, the system can be

readily adjusted to meet any overall fissile demand scenario, from being a rapid consumer of

fissile material (conversion ratio as low as about

0.6) to a net producer (breeding ratio as high as

about 1.3)”2 (14). Figure 3-3 shows across section

of the arrangement of fuel elements in a full-scale

ALMR reactor in the breeding and nonbreeding

configurate ion. As can be seen, both configurate ions

use the same total number of elements in the reactor core. Only the arrangement of fuel, the fuel

type, and the presence or absence of fertile material (for breeding) are different (21).

| The ALMR/lFR Fuel Reprocessing

System

The ALMR/IFR fuel reprocessing system as currently envisioned by Argonne researchers will be

a complex of equipment for handling spent fuel,

chopping up the fuel elements, reprocessing to

separate actinides from fission products, converting into new reactor fuel elements, inspecting and

quality control, and handling and processing radioactive waste for disposal. Because of the intense radiation of spent fuel, reprocessed fuel, and

‘ Cfmvcnt]tmal LWRS fueled with uranium ox ide w ill transfoml some of the uraniun]-238 (the bulk (}f the fuel material) c(mtained in the fuel

Int{) plut(~nlun~ as the fuel IS irrachated in the reactor. This is the source of the appr(~~ irna[cly 1 percent plumnium cfmtained in LWR spent fuel.

The dlffcrcncc IS that In LL?’R reachws the plutonlun] is ~In the spent fuel for ciisp)sal. Breeder reactor operati~m requires that the spent fuel be

repr(k-essed to rcc~ ~v~r [he plutonlunl.

2 At the end of each cycle of fuel fi~sl(mul in [hc reactor (appr(~ximatcly 18 months to 2 years), a c(mversi(m ratio of 0.6 means that about 60

percent of the tmglnal am(wnt of pluttmlum In the fuel would rcmain. whllc a conversion” ratio of 1.3 means that about 130 percent of the original

amount ot plut(mlunl w(mld be present.
18 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

Breeder-configured core

c).“ .”.

“.” .”.”

“.”.

Breeder blankets (radial and

internal material for breeding new

plutonium)

Nuclear fuel (driver for breeder

configuration, low and high enriched

for nonbreeder configuration)

—

Nonbreeder-configured core

Core shielding

o Reflector

●

Other (control, shutdown,

and gas expansion modules)

SOURCE Magee (GE), 1993

waste from the reprocessing of spent fuel, all of

these operations would have to be carried out in a

remotely operated hot cell.

Remotely Operated Hot Cell

The hot cell is an enclosed area surrounded by

heavy shielding to protect workers against the intense radioactivity present from the fission products in spent and new reprocessed ALMR/IFR nuclear fuel. In addition, because of the extreme

chemical reactivity with air or water of ALMW/

IFR fuel materials and processing chemicals,

processing is done in an inert atmosphere (the current prototype uses dry argon gas). Even new recycled ALMR/IFR fuel after reprocessing will

contain sufficient amounts of highly radioactive

fission products to require heavy shielding and remote manipulation by robotics or remotely operated manipulators. For radiation protection, a hot

cell has walls made of several feet of concrete and

4-foot-thick special radiation-shielding glass windows for viewing. All operations would be done

with remote manipulators or by automation. After

startup with radioactive materials, no human

would enter the hot cell.

Argonne researchers are in the process of transforming an existing hot cell facility at Argonne

West for this purpose. The hot cell was originally

built as part of the demonstration of an earlier version of the current design, with the EBR-II as part

of a breeder reactor system integrated with onsite

molten salt metallic fuel reprocessing from 1964

to 1969 (12, 31). It consists of two hot cells, one

with an air and the other with an argon atmosphere, and a passageway connecting them to the

EBR-II reactor building for transfer of spent fuel
Chapter 3 Description of the ALMR/lFR Program | 19

-._—_————

FUEL

EBR -II REACTOR VESSEL

SUBASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY DISMANTLING

AND REMANUFACTURE [ AIR CELL

.

.

‘t

TRANSFER CORRIDOR

‘

=

--’ =~. ~ -

~ v ’

—— —

FUEL ELEMENT REPROCESSING 

AND FABRICATION ( ARGON CELL)

Diagram showing plans for converting the existing EBR II and Fuel Cycle Facility to an ALMRIIFR prototype system The system

would contain the nuclear reactor (EBR II on the Ieft) and the fuel reprocessing facility (rfght).

containers. Argonne researchers expect that the

ALMR/IFR demonstration equipment to be

constructed and installed in the hot cell will be of a

scale appropriate for a full commercial-size

ALMR/IFR installation.

Electrorefiner Fuel Reprocessor

The electrorefiner, now under development at Argonne West, would be used to dissolve, reprocess,

and divide spent fuel from the reactor into new

fuel material and spent fuel fission products (see

box 3-1 ). With some process modifications, the

electrorefiner might also be used to reprocess

spent fuel from existing commercial U.S. lightwater reactors, Irradiated fertile (breeding) elements from an ALMR breeder configuration

would be similarly processed using this equipment ( 14). Because of the intense radioactivity of

the fission products, the electrorefiner must also

be operated remotely in the hot cell.

The electrorefiner is a key part of the ALMR/

IFR nuclear fuel reprocessing cycle, but it is still

in the early stages of development. A full-scale

prototype electrorefiner is being readied for testing with remote operation, before installation in

the hot cell at Argonne West. This installation is

expected to be completed in 1994(31). This prototype has yet to be tested with actual spent fuel material, although a similar unit has been tested with

unirradiated fuel (17). The fuel element chopper

for chopping the spent fuel pins has been installed

in the hot cell for testing. The first test will be a

qualification step that involves chopping metallic

sodium-filled dummy fuel elements.
20 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

The electrorefiner will be at the heart of both the ALMR/IFR fuel reprocessing technology and the possible

reprocessing of spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel into new ALMR/lFR fuel. It WIII be a vat heated to 500°C

(about 930°F), filled with molten mixture of lithium and potassium chloride electrolyte that contains both cathode and anode electrodes, resting above a liquid cadmium phase (see ftgure 3-4). The fuel IS mechanically

chopped up, placed in the anode basket, and then broken up through electrochemical action to allow the plutonium, uranium, and other actinides, along with some fission products, to be dissolved in the molten salt. The

chopped stainless -steel fuel cladding is not dissolved but IS left behind in the anode basket (16). Other materials from the chopped spent fuel that are less soluble in molten salt simply fall into the molten cadmium phase

located below the molten salt phase. Selective distribution to the molten salt, rather than the liquid cadmium,

results in the upper phase containing most of the highly electropositive fission products, including alkali metals

such as cesium, alkaline earths such asstrontium, and some rare earths (Ianthanides) (figure 3-4) Noble metal

fission products, including ruthenium, rhodium, molybdenum, palladium, technetium, and zirconium, and more

rare earth (Ianthanide) fission products along with zirconium from the fuel alloy move to the lower cadmium pool

(14).

After the spent fuel is electrochemically dissolved, passage of an electric current through the iron electrode

causes the bulk of the uranium dissolved in the molten salt electrolyte from the spent fuel to become deposited

as a metal on the iron cathode. ALMR/IFR designers hope to recycle this uranium to make new reactor core or

fertile material (breeding) elements, Next, the plutonium, remainder of the uranium, and other actinides such as

neptunium, americium, and curium from the dissolved chopped fuel are transported electrochemically to asecond, smaller liquid cadmium pool cathode contained in a ceramic crucible immersed in the electrorefiner molten salt (14). Some rare earth (Ianthanide) fission products also inevitably end up codeposited with the actinides in this cadmium cathode, Both the salt and the cadmium phases would accumulate highly radioactive

fission products and would require periodic processing to remove these waste products for disposal.

An electrorefiner large enough to support fuel reprocessing for a commercial-scale reactor such as the fullscale ALMR concept would be about 1 meter in diameter and would contain 1,000 kg of cadmium and 500 kg of

salt (14). Argonne researchers expect that fuel reprocessing wiII be done in batches containing about 10 kg of

uranium and 3 to 5 kg of fissile materials (mostly plutonium) (13).

To adapt the electrorefiner processor LWR spent fuel reprocessing, the LWR spent fuel, which IS composed

of the oxides rather than the metallic forms of uranium, plutonium, other actinides, and fission products, must

first be chemically reduced to the metal (16), This reduction can be accomplished by treating the chopped LWR

spent fuel with Iithium metal m the molten salt solution (28). After conversion to the metal form, the material

would be collected from the bottom of the molten salt bath and transferred to the anode basket of the electrorefiner, where spent ALMR/lFR fuel IS Introduced as described above, There it too could be processed into new

fuel

The Cathode Processor

One of the key steps in the electrorefiner involves

concentrating actinides collected at the liquid cadmium cathode (see figure 3-4). After processing,

most of the actinides, including plutonium and

uranium, along with some fission products, will

be deposited in a molten cadmium pool contained

in the liquid cadmium cathode. This cadmium

pool will then be transferred to another piece of

equipment called the cathode processor. After

evaporation of the cadmium (which will be recycled), the plutonium, uranium, other actinides,

and remaining rare earth (lanthanide) fission products will be recovered as a metal ingot at the bottom of the cathode processor.

This ingot will contain up to 70 percent plutonium and 30 percent uranium and other actinides,

as well as a minor amount of rare earth (lantha-
Chapter 3 Description of the ALMR/IFR Program

Solid iron Liquid cadmium

Anode basket cathode cathode

\

I

\ / Molten salt

I I 500 oC (930 o

F)

\

NOTE The electrorefiner would reprocess spent ALMR/IFR metal fuel

into new fuel and highly radioactive waste fission products in a hot cell

The operations described here have not yet been conducted with actual spent nuclear fuel A similar but physically separate system IS envisioned for reprocessing LWR spent fuel Into new ALMR/IFR fuel

SOURCE Argonne National Laboratory

nide) fission products. Although the lanthanides

contribute less than 1 percent of the mass, along

with certain more radioactive actinide isotopes,

they generate the hazardous radioactivity responsible for what the developers consider the "selfNotes on figure 3-4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Spent metal fuel from an ALMR containing plutonium, uranium,

21

and

other actinides, and highly radioactive fission products, IS mechanically chopped up and placed in the anode basket Chopped fuel

IS broken up electrochemically and its nuclear components are dissolved in the molten salt, Ieaving behind the old fuel cladding

The plutonium, uranium, and other actinides, and most of the highly

electropositive fission products, are dissolved electrochemically in

the molten salt This includes alkali metals such as cesium, alkaline

earths including strontium, and some rare earths (Ianthanides)

Noble metal fission products including ruthenium, rhodium, molybdenum, palladium, technetium, and zirconium are not transported

electrochemically but settle as metal particulates m the molten cadmium pool at the bottom of the electrorefiner The cadmium pool accumulates radioactive waste fission products

Passing an electric current through the electrodes causes the bulk

of the dissolved uranium to become deposited as metal on the iron

cathode

The plutonium, remaining uranium, and other actinides, and some

rare earth fission on products, are transported electrochemically from

the molten salt to a cadmium cathode, made of a smaller cadmium

pool in a ceramic crucible The material in the cadmium cathode IS

as high as 70 percent plutonium and 30 percent uranium and other

actinides, and less than 1 percent rare earth fission products Other

highly radioactive waste fission products accumulate in the molten

salt

After reprocessing and separation are complete, the molten cadmium from the cadmium cathode IS transferred to the cathode processor where cadmium IS removed, Ieaving a metallicing got that will

be made into new ALMR fuel

Fission products from reprocessed fuel accumulate in the molten

salt and cadmium Periodically these must be removed, and the

waste materials processed, producing a highly radioactive waste

form for disposal

protecting” proliferation resistance of the final recycled fuel product.3 A significant amount of the

total radioactivity of the final product from the

cathode processor and of the radioactive decay

heat comes from the minor transuranic isotopes

that are retained through the separation process

( 17). One estimate is that without further purification this material would be about 10,000 times

more radioactive than a similar product from conventional PUREX reprocessing (56). This radioactivity also means that the cathode processor

must be placed in the remotely operated hot cell.

The device is currently undergoing tests for re3 Se/ f-pro [ectlng Pro/if era(fon” r~$ls(ance or;glna]]y referred to the intense radioactivity due to the fission pr(tiucts in spent nuclear fuel that

makes II lethal to handle with[wt extensive prt)tecti(m. This radi(mciivity “pn~tects” the material from theft or diversi(m. The amount of fission

products In ALMR IFR reprocessed fuel is significantly lt)wer than In LWR spent fuel and provides less self-protecting radiati(m. For this reas(m, radioactivlt y from the residual ac(inides bcc(mm more in~~)rtant for the self-protecting aspect of ALMR/IFR reprocessed fuel c(mlpared

with LWR spent fuel ( 17).
22 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

A prototype device for casting new fuel elements IS currently Installed in the Argonne West hot cell, It consists of a series of units for converting the metal ingot from the cathode processor into new fuel pros. The fuel pin

injection casting machine IS similar to existing equipment used with the experimental breeder reactor (EBR - II),

except that it IS designed to be operated remotely in the hot cell. After the metal ingot has been melted in a

furnace, its composition IS Intended to be adjusted by adding zirconium and uranium in proportions appropriate for new ALMR/IFR fuel. Next, the metal IS cast into new fuel pins in precision quartz molds that resemble long

drinking straws (54) After inspection, the newly cast fuel IS loaded into stainless-steel cladding along with

sodium metal and an inert atmosphere to make anew fuel pin. Volatilization of the radioactive actinide element

americium during casting may be a problem, In one experiment casting fuel pins with minor actinides, approximately 40 percent of the americium charge was lost during casting due in part to evaporation (54). CurrentIy, the

quartz molds are broken off after casting and create a waste material. Argonne West researchers have done

some experiments on replacing the quartz with direct casting into azirconium sheath that could be inserted into

conventional stainless-steel cladding.

Argonne researchers have not yet tested actual recycled ALMR/lFR fuel in this system. The pin casting furnace has been installed in the Argonne West hot cell, and some experiments in casting depleted uranium have

been completed. Experiments are planned for 1994 to fabricate experimental uranium-plutonlum-zlrconwm

(ternary) fuel elements (31). As part of the research on fuel design, a full-scale ALMR prototype fuel containing

uranium, plutonium, and zirconium has been Irradiated to high degrees of fuel burn up (fissioning of total fissionable materials) in the EBR-II (54). ALMR/IFR fuel from recycled light water reactor spent fuel will contain about

20 percent plutonium and 10 percent zirconium, along with 70 percent uranium (mostly U-238) (54).

As part of the equipment required for fabricating new fuel pins for the EBR - I I, a “welder/settler” IS also being

tested Argonne expects to transfer it to the hot cell so it will be available in 1994. A “vertical assembler/disassembler’” for fuel pin fabrication IS being tested as well and will be installed in the hot cell when available. A “fuel

element inspection x-ray system” IS also under development.

mote operation and is expected to be installed in

the Argonne West hot cell in 1994 (31).

After the metal ingot material is removed from

the cathode processor, it is transferred to a fuel pin

casting furnace and then to a fuel pin processor.

The function of these parts is to produce new fuel

rods from the processed material that will then be

recycled to the reactor, to complete the entire fuel

reprocessing step. Box 3-2 describes the specific

operations envisaged for the casting furnace and

the status of its development.

ALMR/lFR High-Level Nuclear Waste

Treatment Processes

During the electrorefining reprocessing of spent

fuel, fission products and other materials will accumulate in the molten salt and the bottom liquid

cadmium pool (figure 3-4). Eventually, these

waste products will generate excessive heat and

cause unacceptable contamination (by the accumulating rare earth fission products) of the reprocessed nuclear fuel deposited in the liquid cadmium cathode (16). Argonne researchers expect

that a salt load might be used for several dozen fuel

reprocessing cycles before requiring treatment.

The intense radioactivity from the fission products means that all waste treatment will have to be

performed in the remotely operated hot cell. Waste

recovered from the molten salt and cadmium

would have to be disposed as high-level radioactive waste in some suitable repository. Box 3-3 describes the steps involved in waste treatment and

the development status of this subsystem.

It will also be necessary for the ALMR/IFR

waste processing technology to meet current and

proposed high-level waste packaging and storage
.

Chapter 3 Description of the ALMR/lFR Program | 23

Reprocessing ALMR/IFR spent fuel will separate highly radioactive fission products that must be processed

for eventual disposal The molten salt containing waste fission products and small amounts of actinides from

the electrorefiner would be transferred into a processing device called a pyrocontactor There it will be treated

with a uranium-cadmium alloy to reduce the residual transuranic chlorides to their metal forms (1 6) This would

recover residual plutonium, uranium, and other actinides (which are returned to the electrorefiner) from the molten salt Next, the molten salt would be treated with Iithilum in molten cadmium to remove the rare earth fission

products in a Iiquid cadmium phase that would be combined with the Iiquid cadmium waste stream coming

from the electrorefiner (figure 3-4)

fission products still remaining in the molten salt will require further treatment to remove them Argonne

researchers have performed preliminary experiments with nonradioactive fission product analogues, 1 showing how fission products remaining in the salt—lncluding cesium, strontium, rare earths, and Iodine 129—might be recovered by passing the molten salt through a zeolite (mineral)-based ion exchange column Two possible final waste forms (for placement in a geological repository) are under development one IS a

bonded zeolite” in which zeolite IS permeated with a Iow-melting glass for mechnical strength and leach/d lf -

fusion resistance the second is a sodalite mineral structure formed by pyrolysis of a blended zeolite material If

the development of this technology IS successful, the purified molten salt could be recycled back to the electroreflner

Flsslon products in the molten cadmium pool from the electrorefiner, including the transition metal fission

products technetium, ruthenium, rhodium, and zirconium, after reduction to their metal forms, are expected to

be placed in a stainless-steel matrix and cast into a metal ingot waste form, by using the remaining nuclear fuel

cladding hulls as a source of stainless steel If the development of this technology IS successful, cadmium

would also be recycled to the electrorefiner

None of these processes has been tested with actual ALMR/lFR recycled fuel A single-stage pyrocontactor

has been tested in a glove box, and initial flow tests with salt and cadmium have been conducted (16) A multistage pyrocontactor test apparatus (seven or eight stages will be required to meet target actinide recovery) IS

under design Some experiments reducing rare earth salts to their metallic forms with Iithium in Iiquid cadmium

have been completed, as well as the demonstration of the use of centrifugal pumps for the transfer of salt and

cadmium between process vessels Argonne researchers are currently investigating the use of pumped filtration units for the removal of insoluble such as U02 (uranium oxide) from the process, the filters will then be sent

to the metal waste stream (16)

I For example the Iodine Isotope I- 129 IS a tox[c radioactive flsslon product whereas another Isotope I -127 IS a naturally occurring

nonradloact[ve form of lodlne As an analog of the more toxic I-129, 1-127 has physical properties that are very slmllar to I- 129 and

can be used more safely 10 test chemical process development

methods. Although experience with actual reprocessed spent fuel is lacking, salt waste generated

from recycling spent ALMR/IFR fuel by these

processes can be expected to be quite different

from PUREX aqueous waste and will require the

development of special treatment processes (56).

Argonne researchers have experimented with various salt waste forms ( 17). However, if current

plans for developing salt waste treatment are not

successful, recovery and recycling of some types

of waste materials may conceivably require processes that would generate aqueous waste forms

(56). Experience suggests that several kinds of

water-based separation processes could be used to

recover some wastes that do not lend themselves

to nonaqueous treatment (56). As another option,

Argonne researchers are also considering the pos--

sibility of vitrifying ALMR/IFR waste ( 17).
24 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

| LWR Spent Fuel Reprocessing System

Argonne researchers are beginning to design

equipment for reprocessing existing and future

spent LWR fuel from U.S. commercial nuclear

reactors to recover the actinides, including plutonium and uranium, for making new ALMR/IFR

fuel. Recently, this feature has become a central

goal of their research program and has been renamed the "ALMR actinide recycle system” to reflect this shift (35). The overall plan is that

ALMR/IFR technology might be used to remove

the plutonium, uranium, and other actinides in existing commercial reactor spent nuclear fuel by

transforming them into radioactive fission products. Promoters of this idea think that this maybe a

more acceptable waste form for repository disposal. In principle, over a period of centuries—with

repeated reprocessing in many ALMR/IFR systems deployed around the world—much of the existing world’s inventory of plutonium and other

actinides in spent fuel could be transformed. Of

course, in the process, quantities of plutonium

would be contained in ALMR/IFR reactors or fuel

reprocessing plants.

Argonne researchers hope to make the LWR

process compatible with the electrorefiner designed for reprocessing spent ALMR fuel by using the same temperatures, reagents (salts), and

waste forms and treatments. Plutonium and other

transuranic actinides will be recovered for ALMR

fuel, while uranium may be recycled for ALMR or

LWR use, or disposed of (16). As with spent

ALMR/IFR fuel, the reprocessing of spent LWR

fuel inventories will require shielded hot cell facilities for handling the spent fuel, recovering actinide elements, and processing the resulting radioactive wastes, which will include highly

radioactive fission products.

Officials at DOE and Argonne indicate that the

research and development of the LWR spent fuel

reprocessing system lags significantly behind that

of other components of the ALMR/IFR fuel cycle

system ( 11, 28) (figure 3-2). Others add that the

use of electrorefiner technology for the conversion of spent LWR oxide fuel into new metal fuel

may be very difficult. “The fact that LWR fuel is

oxide and the [Argonne] conceptual process is a

nonaqueous process requiring conversion of all of

the oxide fuel material to metal poses process development problems that may not be easily

solved” (56). According to Argonne researchers

the process chemistry has been selected. The next

step would be the design of a prototype system.

During 1993, an experiment was conducted by

Argonne using materials that resemble LWR fuel

(without fission products), and a small quantity

(20 kilograms) was transformed from the oxide to

the metal (16). According to current plans, building a prototype of this system for demonstration

purposes with actual irradiated fuel may be completed by FY 1997 (see figure 3-2).

Uranium is the most abundant material in LWR

spent fuel. If it is to be eliminated by this process

(i.e., completely converted to fission products), it

would first have to be transmuted into plutonium,

then reprocessed into new fuel, and finally fissioned in the nuclear reactor. This would require

breeder operation and the production of plutonium over many decades before actinide elimination might be completed. It would also result in

the wide deployment of ALMR/IFR nuclear reactor systems that would both require additional

plutonium for continued operation, if for example

they were to continue to generate electricity, and

be capable of breeding more plutonium. Thus, the

net effect may not be to decrease the world plutonium inventory, because plutonium would be contained in recycled nuclear fuel in ALMR/IFR systems spread around the world. These systems

would also provide facilities and equipment that

could be modified for small-scale plutonium purification, described later. Thus, from a long-term

standpoint it is not clear whether large-scale

ALMR deployment would be preferable to a plan

that would place existing spent fuel in geologic repositories, should they become available (30).

Waste Management Issues

The potential impact of actinide removal on the

long-term management of spent nuclear fuel has

been the subject of a number of analyses. Some ar-
Chapter 3 Description of the ALMR/lFR Program | 25

gue that the difficulty of developing geologic repositories cannot be reduced by merely making

technical modifications to the waste because issues of siting, fairness, scientific uncertainty, and

public trust override technical barriers ( 18). In any

event, use of the AL MR/IFR technology for “actinide recycling’* of LWR spent fuel would in effect

transform actinides into highly radioactive fission

products that would have to be treated and disposed of in some suitable repository.

Argonne researchers expect that the most problematic waste fission products, such as iodine and

cesium isotopes (because of their very long halflives and water leaching potential), would be encapsulated in a mineralized form similar to a vitrified glass log for disposal in a geologic repository.

Other fission products including technetium,

strontium, zirconium, and carbon isotopes might

be encapsulated in a metal ingot form. The researchers hope that these waste forms might prove

to have equal or even greater groundwater-leaching resistance than the original LWR fuel rods ( 17,

28). It has been difficult for repository designers

to prove the engineering reliability of safe spent

fuel storage over man y centuries, and it is not clear

that the new waste forms proposed by Argonne researchers will be any easier to evaluate.

Argonne researchers also think that by removing actinides from the LWR spent fuel, the wastes

will be made more readily acceptable to the U.S.

public for repository disposal. In part this is because the greatest amount of long-term radioact ivity is due to the actinides in the spent fuel, although some fission products are also long-lived.

Others conclude that the impact on public acceptance will be minimal because although actinides

contribute the majority of the total long-term radioactivity in spent fuel, they are much less water

soluble than the fission products. Thus long-term

leakage risks from a geologic repository come

more from long-l ived, water-soluble fission products such as technetium-99 (half-life 210,000

years) and iodine- 129 (half-life 17 million years)

than from actinides (5, 19, 46).

DOE officials are also quick to point out that

they consider all such exposure risks from repositories, including leakage, to be extremely low

(46). Some environmentalists argue that a lower

environmental impact would result if all materials

contained in spent fuel remained in the spent fuel

rods they are presently in, and that any reprocessing will inevitably increase the risks of environmental releases due to increased handling and

transportation during reprocessing (28).
Evaluation of

the ALMR/IFR

Technology 4

T

he advanced liquid metal reactor/integral fast reactor

(ALMR/IFR) project within the Department of Energy

(DOE) is currently a research project, and the key components necessary for proposed future applications which

are reviewed in this chapter, require considerable development

and testing. As described in chapter 3, many of these key components are still under development, at the concept stage, or still being tested. For example, studies are just beginning on the behavior of reprocessed ALMR/IFR nuclear fuel over its lifetime and

may require as long as 5 years for completion. ] In addition, the

existing experimental breeder reactor (EBR-II), which is part of

the test complex, is now scheduled to be shut down at the end of

1994. Fuel behavior studies are needed for each of the variety of

fuel types proposed for the ALMR/IFR system, including those

based on reprocessed spent light-water reactor (LWR) fuel, recycled ALMR/IFR fuel, and surplus weapons-grade plutonium.

It is not clear how these studies will proceed without the EBR-II.

Many components of the ALMR/IFR fuel reprocessing and recycling system have been demonstrated on a bench scale. However, most have yet to be tested as prototypes or at a full production scale, or to be integrated into a complete operating system. In

addition, the waste disposal technology for the system is still in an

early research stage. Only after such research, development, and

prototype work is complete could a commercial-scale ALMR/

IFR system be deployed. Because of the nature of any research

project in which both problems and opportunities have yet to be

| 27
28 | Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

discovered, it is difficult to evaluate the suitability

and potential of the proposed system for any specific goal. Such a research project will change and

adapt in response to data gathered during its development. Thus, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) analysis therefore reflects that uncertainty. It also reflects the fact that all recent

technical data available on this project have been

developed by DOE contractors-Argonne National Laboratory and the General Electric Company (GE).

DISPOSING OF WEAPONS PLUTONIUM

ALMR/IFR technology has been proposed as an

option for eliminating surplus military plutonium

in both the United States and the former Soviet

Union by converting and using it as nuclear fuel.

Theoretically, with enough multiple fuel reprocessing cycles through an ALMR/IFR system,

virtually all plutonium isotopes in the original

weapons material and in reprocessed fuel could be

converted into fission products. However, as discussed in chapter 3 and supported by previous

studies, this technology would take more than a

decade of research to build, require several

hundred million dollars in research expenditures,

and face uncertain outcomes (27, 37, 46, 48). To

speed up the process, promoters of the technology

have proposed that the surplus plutonium could

initially be "deweaponized” by blending it with

fission products (to make it too radioactive to handle outside a hot cell) and later returned to an

ALMR (when one is developed) for complete fissioning (53). Such an approach may be feasible,

but it is not unique to ALMR technology.

A consideration pointed out by the National

Academy of Sciences (NAS) and others is that it

may be inappropriate to wait for the possible development of the ALMR/IFR system before dealing with the problem of Russian plutonium now

coming from warhead dismantlement. Many experts agree that the existence and status of that plutonium represent a “clear and present danger,” and

that advanced reactor concepts such as the

ALMR/IFR are too far from realization to be considered useful disposition options for this material

(27, 48). Given the status of development of the

ALMR/IFR system, it will not be operational for

decades. If current plans and budgets are followed, a prototype system scheduled by Argonne

and GE researchers could begin operation about

2005. When the time necessary for technical, environmental, safety, and siting evaluations is considered, substantial ALMR/IFR capacity is unlikely to be available until about 2015 at the

earliest.

If disposition of plutonium is urgent, other

more immediately available and technically mature options, such as conversion into mixed-oxide

(MOX) fuel and burning in existing nuclear reactors or vitrification, should be viewed as near-term

preferred choices. Even if it were completed and

performed as specified, the ALMR/IFR system

requires substantial time for the elimination of

large amounts of plutonium. In a maximized burner configuration (operating to burn the most plutonium possible), a full-sized commercial-scale

1 -gigawatt ALMR/IFR installation could destroy

(by fissioning) only about 0.4 metric ton of plutonium per year (42, 45).

The use of ALMR technology for the complete

destruction of surplus weapons plutonium would

probably not be feasible as a stand-alone mission

for this technology. It would have to be coupled

with some other plutonium fuel source in addition

to surplus weapons plutonium (e.g., material recovered from LWR spent fuel), because a minimum amount of plutonium must always be present in the ALMR for the reactor to function. For

example, a hypothetical full-scale ALMR would

require an initial plutonium fuel load on the order

of 15 tons to begin operation. In the burner mode,

after a fuel load was used up in approximately 2

years, it would be removed, and the remaining

plutonium would be recovered during reprocessing to make new ALMR fuel. Only about 0.4 tons

of new plutonium would have to be added per year

to make up the reactor core load.

In other words, about 15 tons of weapons plutonium would be needed to initially load the reactor,

but only about 0.4 tons would be transformed to

fission products each year, and this would have to
Chapter 4 Evaluation of the ALMR/lFR Technology | 29

be replaced for continued reactor operation. When

no more weapons plutonium was available as

makeup fuel, slightly less than 15 tons of plutonium would remain in the reactor core. Thus, if the

above-mentioned 1 -gigawatt reactor operated to

consume plutonium for as many as 50 years it

could destroy about 20 tons of plutonium, but

would require about 35 tons to operate, leaving

about 15 tons of plutonium in the system at the end

of the 50 years. Under these conditions, only

about 60 percent of the 35 tons of plutonium required for reactor operation would be destroyed.

Further reactor operation to fission the remaining

15 tons would require a new source of plutonium

other than dismantled weapons.

Another issue related to estimating the time to

deployment is licensing and siting. If the ALMR

were licensed in the manner of other civilian nuclear facilities, the process must be expected to require several years. Argonne and GE expect that

licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) would be possible, and they have submitted a preapplication review to NRC that is now

complete (44). The NRC review concluded that

the concept is licensable, specifically including

seismic isolation, fuel integrity, and emergency

shutdown aspects ( 12, 44). This was a preapplication review, and further licensing could be subject

to future questions and debate. If the ALMR were

deployed by the private sector, licensing could

elicit public concerns about plutonium reactors in

general. An alternative licensing process would be

to carry out operations at government sites in Russia and the United States to avoid the debate about

proliferation issues that the use of multiple

ALMR/IFRs would entail (53). Some believe that

a very lengthy public debate about licensing and

siting can be avoided if the only intention is to license several reactors at government sites operating with surplus weapons plutonium (27).

Plutonium storage could also bean issue if a decision is made to wait until the ALMR/IFR

technology is developed before surplus weapons

plutonium is processed. In that case, today’s surplus plutonium may have to be stored for decades

while ALMR technology is designed, tested,

scaled up, deployed, and licensed. Some believe

that the use of breeder reactors such as the ALMW

IFR will make economic sense as a means of

meeting future U.S. energy needs, and therefore

the United States should store its military plutonium for this eventuality. Others point out that

plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactors will not be

economically competitive with current reactors

for probably a century (37, 46). Plutonium could

become an economic energy source only if uranium becomes much more expensive or the

world’s uranium resources become scarce. Most

experts agree that, at present, the cost of fabricating and safeguarding plutonium fuels makes it uncompetitive with cheap and widely available lowenriched uranium fuels (27).

In a recent report, the National Academy of

Sciences concludes that advanced reactor designs

will not be available for plutonium disposition for

many decades, and thus it makes little economic

sense to store existing plutonium against this

eventuality, especially when there are much more

near-term disposition methods available (27).

NAS also concludes that current decisions about

disposition options for surplus weapons plutonium should not be used to drive decisions about

future options for nuclear power in the United

States. The amount of weapons plutonium likely

to be surplus is small on the scale of global nuclear

power use and is not a large factor in the future of

civilian nuclear power (27). Another issue is that

whatever economic value plutonium might have

in the future must be considered in light of the security risks it may present. There is also a danger

that long-term storage of military weapons plutonium awaiting a disposition technology may send

the wrong political signal to the rest of the world

about U.S. plutonium management goals.

Finally, the selection of any disposition option

must await formulation of an overall national

policy for managing plutonium and other nuclear

materials from dismantled weapons that states the

key, relevant criteria (48). Meanwhile, certain features of the ALMR/IFR concept-its potential capacity to protect plutonium from proliferation and

its development status-can be used by policymakers to compare and evaluate it against other

plutonium management options. A careful assess-
30 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

ALMR researchers claim that the removal of actinides from spent fuel (for recycling into ALMR

fuel) would reduce the duration of radiological

Spent fuel nuclide Half-life (years) toxicity of such waste from millions of years to

hundreds of years because a large portion of the

Technetium-99 (fission product) 210,000 long-lived radioactive isotopes would be removed

lodine-129 (fission product) 17,200,000 (12).

Cesium-135 (fission product) 2,000,000 Others have disputed some of these claims,

Uranium-234 (actinide) 248,000 based on calculations of the impact of actinide rePlutonium-239 (actinide) 24,360 moval on key geologic repository parameters.

Americium-241 (actinide) 458 Also, its developers claim that the ALMR/IFR

might be able to eliminate a variety of problematic

SOURCE Handbook o/ Chemistry and Physics, 48th Ed (Cleveland, -

. .

OH The Chemical Rubber Company, 1967)

nuclear wastes, converting the actinides they contain into fission products. Others counter that actiment, independent of all reactor vendors and proponents of certain technologies, would be beneficial. Such an assessment might consider which

criteria are most important in both the United

States and the former Soviet Union, and evaluate

the technology options against those criteria. Recent studies cited above could be used as a starting

point for such an assessment.

NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT

Waste volume and characteristics are important

factors in assessing potential applications of the

ALMR/IFR concept. Because this concept is still

in research and development stages, and has not

been tested with actual spent ALMR/IFR fuel, its

potential impact on waste reduction must be projected from available data. Nevertheless, developers of the ALMR/IFR cite some anticipated advantages of the system based on its minimization

of waste.

I Processing Spent Reactor Fuel

Developers of the ALMR/IFR claim it may be

possible to remove (by repeated reprocessing over

time) the actinides from LWR spent fuel, includnide removal would offer few if any significant

advantages for disposal in a geologic repository

because some of the fission product nuclides of

greatest concern in scenarios such as groundwater

leaching actually have longer half-lives than the

radioactive actinides. The concern about a waste

cannot end after hundreds of years even if all the

actinides are removed when the remaining waste

contains radioactive fission products such as technetium-99, iodine-1 29, and cesium-135 with the

half-lives between 213,000 and 15.7 million years

(table 4-1) (5, 18, 19).

A final advantage of actinides removal (including plutonium) from spent fuel is to eliminate concerns about leaving plutonium in a repository that

might be mined sometime in the future for the purpose of making weapons. This is a legitimate

point that should be considered more broadly in

the context of future proliferation potential.

In the proposed operation of the ALMR/IFR

actinide recycle concept, the actinides separated

from spent fuel would be converted into new fission products, that require disposal. Thus, this

system does not eliminate the need for a nuclear

waste repository, nor can it be considered a shortterm solution to the U.S. spent fuel disposal probing plutonium and uranium, leaving only the gen- lem. Also, unless the deployed ALMR/IFRs were

erally shorter-lived (but initially very radioactive) permanently shut down and decommissioned at

fission products, which would then be packaged the end of this mission, they might continue to be

for geologic repository disposal. However, the po- used as breeder reactors for electricity production.

tential impact of ALMR processing on geologic In that case they would continue to produce radiorepositories for spent nuclear fuel is far from clear. active fission products that would require dispos-
Chapter 4 Evaluation of the ALMR/lFR Technology | 31

al. Numerous other technical ques

proposals to eliminate plutonium

ions relating to

n spent fuel by

using various technologies are currently being

evaluated by the National Academy of Sciences

Panel on Separations Technology and Transmutation Systems (STATS panel).2

Processing all U.S. spent reactor fuel to remove

actinides is likely to be very slow and require decades to significantly reduce the actinide content

of existing LWR spent fuel (26, 27, 46). With a national deployment schedule. ALMR/IFR technology might permanently destroy a significant portion of U.S. spent fuel after 60 to 90 years (3).

Another estimate is that it would take 20 ALMR/

IFR facilities 100 years or more to destroy 90 percent of the LWR actinide waste inventory projected to exist in 2010 (26,). Each reprocessing

cycle of LWR spent fuel in the ALMR/IFR system

would transform and remove only a small proportion of the total actinides originally contained in

LWR spent fuel, so that a great number of reprocessing steps would be required to transform all of

the actinides. LWR spent fuel contains only about

1 percent plutonium, with the remainder being

mostly uranium, much smaller amounts of other

actinides, and fission products. Separating the

plutonium would leave the vast majority of the

LWR spent fuel material, mostly uranium-238,

which would still require disposition. One proposal is to convert this surplus uranium-238 by

breeding it into new plutonium fuel in the ALMR/

IFR. During the course of this operation, much

more plutonium would be generated than was

present in the original LWR spent fuel.

In terms of the potential regulatory impact of an

actinide recycling program. one study concluded

that because of Environmental Protection Agency

and NRC rules, acinide recycling would not make

licensing of a repository significantly easier. A

study on the potential of ALMR actinide recycling

(and several other reprocessing/disposal technologies) for handling spent nuclear fuel concluded

that the concept was flawed on both technical and

poitical grounds. and that ALMR actinide recycling was neither an alternative to the current geologic disposal program nor essential to its success

(36). In fact, the conclusion reached was that pursuit of such a program would require a major restructuring of the U.S. geologic repository effort

because the waste forms generated would be so

different (36). The study pointed out that even if

the efficiency of spent fuel actinide recovery

claimed by proponents were feasible on an industrial scale. it would solve the wrong problem.

Many of the risks of a long-term geologic repository come not from the actinides contained in

spent fuel but rather from long-lived soluble fission products that might leach from a repository

into groundwater, which would not be eliminated

by the ALMR/IFR system. In addition. the absolute radioactivity risk from a repository is already

very low, and actinides do not contribute significantly to that risk.

Further, some argue that actinide recycling

would aggravate rather than reduce public concerns by requiring the siting and operation of numerous reactors, as well as reprocessing and fuel

fabrication facilities; by reviving the concerns

over nuclear proliferation; by generating new and

different waste streams: and by requiring centuries of reliable institutional control over powerproducing, reprocessing, and storage facilities.

Removing the actinides from radioactive waste is

unlikely to have a significant impact on public antipathy to geologic disposal (23. 46).

It appears that actinide recycling is unlikely to

reduce the difficulty of managing the overall

waste stream from nuclear power reactor operations. In fact, the opposite is possible. New licensing. the operation of reprocessing facilities, transportation between the present locations of LWR

spent fuel and reprocessing facilities, and management of ancillary waste streams would all be

required. Finally. if the ALMR/IFR becomes a

widely deployed technology for electricity generation, as envisioned by its developers, the net

2ThIS rcpmt IS schccluld for rcleiiw In July 1994.
32 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

impact in the long term would be to increase the

repository capacity required for the disposal of fission product wastes created by the technology.

I Processing Other Radioactive Wastes

According to Argonne researchers, the same

technology that might convert LWR spent fuel

into ALMR/IFR fuel would in principle be applicable to the processing of other types of nuclear

waste materials. These would include DOEowned spent fuel, surplus weapons plutonium,

and scrap from plutonium processing operations

( 16). According to a recent DOE report, the problem of dealing with a large number of old and disintegrating fuel elements from its past operations

is reaching critical proportions (52).

Since the ALMR/IFR technology will not be

available soon, it may not be appropriate to consider its application for the most pressing and immediate waste disposal needs outlined by the

DOE Spent Fuel Working Group. Nevertheless,

some method for improved safe storage of this

waste is urgently needed. And if parts of the

ALMR technology could be developed for treating and packaging this material or similar waste

further, investigation might be useful.

In summary, the ability of ALMR/IFR technology to reprocess LWR spent fuel into ALMR fuel

has yet to be demonstrated, and significant technical problems remain, one possible application is

for long-term management of radioactive wastes

that do not require immediate attention. Because

of the preliminary nature of research on the

ALMR/IFR concept, characterizing its potential

impact on a geologic repository for nuclear waste

in terms of waste volume, longevity in a repository, or long-term risk factors, is difficult. Thus, it is

also difficult to make comparisons with much

more developed processes, such as direct disposal

of spent fuel in geologic repositories or high-level

waste vitrification.3 Furthermore, any spent fuel

reprocessing option must be evaluated in the larger context of establishing a U.S. plutonium reprocessing policy or of reviewing international

policies regarding nonproliferation.

PROLIFERATION RISKS AND BENEFITS

I Concerns About Plutonium Breeding

Although some recent proposals for the future of

the ALMR/IFR concept have focused more on its

ability to transform and irreversibly use up plutonium, even its developers acknowledge that it is

“uncontested that the IFR can be configured as a

net producer of plutonium” ( 13). In principle, any

nuclear reactor could be operated as a breeder

(producing new plutonium). However, as mentioned earlier, the ALMR/IFR system originated

as a reactor capable of reprocessing its own spent

fuel and breeding more plutonium (42). In fact,

liquid metal reactor (LMR) technology has always been associated with breeder reprocessing

technology. The first reactor ever to produce electricity, which began operation in 1951, was a liquid metal cooled-breeder reactor design. In September 1993, ALMR/IFR developers emphasized

the possible long-term energy advantages of the

concept as a breeder reactor design (4). GE representatives described the flexibility of converting

their full-scale reactor design from burner to

breeder operation in a November 1993 status report to DOE (21, 34).

Thus, for the purpose of evaluating the potential impact of the ALMR/IFR on nuclear proliferation risks, it must be considered a breeder-capable

reactor system. Even though this system might be

capable of operating in a way that uses up plutonium from sources such as dismantled weapons, if

properly modified it could also be used to breed

more plutonium. Most proponents of the technology believe that its long-term mission will probably always be as part of an integrated system in

which plutonium fuel and reprocessing make significant contribution to U.S. and world energy

needs.
Chapter 4 Evaluation of the ALMR/lFR Technology | 33

If reactor design allowed sufficient room, a

“breeder blanket" of fertile uranium-238 could be

retrofitted around the reactor core that, when irradiated, could produce plutonium with a relatively

low buildup of undesirable (from a weapo n s

manufacturing standpoint) plutonium isotopes .

4

Breeder blankets have also been used to produce

weapons-grtidc plutonium in LWRs. Some argue

that the ALMR could be designed to allow no

room for such a blanket of breeding material

around the retie’ t o r core. I n this case, however, although less efficient it would still be possible to

breed plutonium by placing fertile material at either end of the fuel rods.

However, the designs recent] y described by GE

do not require any extra room in the reactor core.

They are designed to be flexibly convertible from

breeding to consuming by simply altering the arrangement of a fixed number of reactor elements

(for example, see figure 3-3). Thus, operatirrg an

ALMR/IFR system to breed plutonium would

probab]y not be difficult. It would, however, be

difficult to design an ALMR reactor core that

could not be converted to breeder operation given

sufficient motivation and ability on the part of the

reactor’s owner. Any reactor could theoretically

be converted to breeder operation. so the important proliferation concerns may be the access to a

heavily shielded hot cell and fuel reprocessing

equipment. along with access to a spent fuel

source (e.g, the ALMR/IFR ).

Although acknowledging that the ALMR/IFR

is a breeder reactor system. its developers nevertheless claim that it has distinct proliferation advantages compared with curlier breeder/reprocessing systems such as the Clinch River Breeder

Demonstration project that ended in 1983. The

major difference between the two programs is the

substitution of pyroprocessing for PUREX nuclear fuel reprocessing. The promoters of this concept believe that a switch to pyroprocessing by nations currently using PUREX reprocessing,

including Japan, France, England. and North Korea, would represent a major step in nonproliferation. Others point out that it is difficult to justify

the U.S. funding development of possible

PUREX reprocessing substitutes for nations that

clearly have not agreed to adopt them should they

ever become available (27 ).

I Concerns About Weapons-Usable

Plutonium

How does pyroprocessing differ from PUREX reprocessing in terms of inherent nuclear proliferation risks? One of the larger proliferation barriers

claimed for ALMR/IFR reprocessed fuel is the

presence of residual fission products and actinides

that are highly radioactive. The irradiated fuel

from an ALMR/IFR recycling facility could consist of up to 70 percent plutonium and 30 percent

uranium and other actinides, along with small

amounts of highly radioactive fission products.

This radioactivity would make the material difficult to work with and require that all operations be

carried out by using a heavily shielded remotely

operated hot cell. Presumably it would be difficult

to fabricate weapons components under such

conditions with this material. Plutonium from

PUREX reprocessing does not contain these fission products and thus can be used directly to fabricate weapons components. On the other hand,

fuel from the ALMR/IFR cycle would be a preferable starting material for converting to weapons

material compared with ordinary spent nuclear

fuel from a conventional LWR because it contains

a much higher concentration of plutonium (70

percent versus 1 percent) and significantly lower

quantities of radioactive fission products. A large

fraction (but not all) of the fission products would

be removed by the pyroprocess. Thus, to obtain

enough plutonium for a bomb it would be much
34 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

easier to handle and process some tens of pounds

of reprocessed ALMR fuel than almost a ton of

spent LWR fuel.

The developers of this technology point to several factors as obstacles to the use of ALMR/IFR

reprocessed material for fabricating weapons.

These are the reduction of the plutonium concentration by the presence of uranium and other

compounds, the presence of plutonium isotopes

other than plutonium-239, and the high radioactivity of contaminating compounds that makes

handling more difficult. None of these, however,

is a particularly impenetrable proliferation barrier.

Reducing the plutonium concentration, (e.g., because of the presence of 30 percent uranium in the

reprocessed material) does not itself make the plutonium unusable in terms of weapons. For example, diluting plutonium-239 with 50 percent nonfissile uranium-238 would increase the amount of

material required to make a weapon by only about

a factor of four (40).

The isotopic composition of reprocessed

ALMR/IFR is also not an insurmountable

barrier to proliferation. Plutonium is produced by

the same process in both military plutonium production reactors and civilian nuclear power reactors. However, military reactors were operated

differently to produce a plutonium containing

mostly the single plutonium-239 isotope, which is

considered the most desirable isotope for bomb

production. Nevertheless, plutonium obtained

from any spent nuclear fuel source can be used to

make a nuclear bomb; therefore, no distinction

should be made between weapons and civilian

reactor-grade plutonium from the standpoint of

nuclear proliferation (27, 37, 40).

The plutonium from ALMR recycled fuel

would have an isotopic composition similar to

that obtained from other spent nuclear fuel

sources. Whereas this might make it less than

ideal for weapons production, it would still be adequate for unsophisticated nuclear bomb designs.

In fact, the U.S. government detonated a nuclear

device in 1962 using low-grade plutonium typical

of that produced by civilian powerplants (10, 37).

The bomb design used in the 1945 Trinity test

could in principle contain civilian reactor-grade

plutonium of any degree of burnup and isotope

composition, and still provide nuclear yields in

the multikiloton range (22). Using civilian power

reactor-grade plutonium in the 1945 design would

increase the probability that the yield would be reduced. However, it would not greatly change the

value of the “fizzle” (lowest expected) yield,

which although smaller than the nominal yield

would nevertheless create quite damaging nuclear

explosion (22, 40). Thus, although civilian power

reactor-grade plutonium would be harder to work

with for making bombs, the drawbacks are not serious and nuclear proliferators might not be deterred simply because the only accessible bomb

material was less than perfect.

The plutonium recovered from spent ALMR

fuel would also be contaminated by heat-generating plutonium-238, but this too would not present

an insurmountable proliferation barrier. 5 In any

case, the plutonium recovered from the ALMR by

operating it as a breeder would be relatively free of

plutonium-238.

On the other hand, some processing would

probably be required to remove these residual fission products from ALMR/IFR reprocessed nuclear fuel. Currently available methods for removing the residual fission products in ALMR/IFR

spent fuel could be performed in the hot cell (although they might interrupt normal operation and

be detectable with any inspection regime); these

Sme dc[al]s ,)f how, heat ~)tltput frorrl P]utoniunl UStXI in warheads would affect its design and (Jperati(m are not available publicly. me ‘AS

repwt ctmcluded that the heat generated by plut(miunl-238 and plutonium-240 would require careful management for weapons design, including [he use of ~hanne]s t. c(}nduct it frt)nl the plu[on]um through [k surrounding explosive, (jr delaying assembly of the device until a few

mmutes bef~~re use (27). Similarly, [he radiatitm from an~erictun}-241 in ALMR/l FR reprocessed fuel would require that rmwe shielding be used

but is not an msurn](wntable obstacle (27). Only plutonium composed of more than 80 percent plutoniun~-238 is exempted from International

At(mlic Energy Agency safeguards; any t)thcr isot(~pe conlp)sition must be considered usable for making a bomb (37).
Chapter 4 Evaluation of the ALMR/lFR Technology | 35

would provide usable, if not optimal material. for

weapons purposes. Thus, access to the hot cell

associated with ALMR/IFR technology, and with

its ability to handle highly radioactive materials

safely (which is not a feature of conventional

LWR systems), may be a key proliferation issue.

Proponents claim that the purification of ALMR/

IFR reprocessed material would require either

construction of or access to a PUREX reprocessing facility. others point out that there are significantly simpler methods for removing fission

products, such as a commonly used industrial

process known as aqueous ion exchange (6, 56).

Los Alamos National Laboratory has routinely

used aqueous ion exchange to separate radioactive

fission products from plutonium. The equipment

and materials used in this process are commonly

available for other types of industrial separation

and purification (49). Such an operation would require the type of heavy shielding offered by the

hot cell of an ALMR/IFR system. 6

Other processes available within the ALMR/

IFR system might also be modified to produce

material suitable for making a nuclear weapon.

ALMR/IFR designers expect to be able to remove

the fission product wastes that would accumulate

in the molten salt bath of an operating electrorefin -

er by using zeolite ion exchange, with the molten

salt as a solvent. Analogous aqueous ion exchange

processes have been used routinely to separate

plutonium from other actinides and fission products, Since the same physical processes would be

involved in molten salt-zeolite ion exchange, given sufficient motivation, one might be able to

modify the process in order to remove fission

products, and generate a material that could be

converted into bomb components, with only a

~glove box for shielding. Similarly, although the

conditions are substantially different, pyroprocessing (electrorefining)-type procedures have

been developed by Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory for separating the actinide americium

from recycled weapons plutonium ( 1). However,

while the ALMR/IFR process and equipment

might be modified to achieve such a separation

with recycled fuel, any such modifications would

probably be very difficult to conceal from a credible outside inspection regime.

Thus, in providing both the necessary starting

material (ALMR/IFR recycled fuel) and the necessary facilities (hot cell and related reprocessing

equipment), the ALMR/IFR system could be considered a source of weapons-usable nuclear material. Whereas it would probably be easier to generate weapons plutonium from a PUREX facility if

one were available, but for a determined and capable proliferator, access to an ALMR/IFR facility is

likely to serve such purposes.

An independent assessment of the proliferation

potential and international implications of the integral fast breeder reactor, prepared by Martin Marietta for DOE and the Department of State in

1992 (the Wymer report), concluded that the diversion and further purification of plutonium by

using the facilities available in the ALMR/IFR

processing and recycle facility would be possible

(56). The report also noted that the modifications

required for these scenarios would be readily detectable with any reasonable inspection regime

and that therefore proliferation scenarios involving treaty abrogation were the greater concern. In

other words, any diversion of nuclear materials

from the ALMR/IFR would be difficult to carry

out clandestinely if an inspection regime were in

place (24).

The Wymer report outlined several possible

proliferation scenarios in which ALMR/IFR

equipment could be modified to produce weapons

material, including the following (56):

■ The normal recycled ALNR/IFR fuel product

could be reprocessed through multiple elcctro-
36 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

refiner cycles to remove the rare earth fission

products and reduce the radioativity of the material, thereby making it easier to manipulate.

- Multiple batches of fuel might be processed by

using only the iron cathode electrode to remove

uranium and allow the plutonium to accumulate in the molten salt phase (see figure 3-4).

This could generate a material with a plutonium-to-uranium ratio as high as nine, after

electrochemical transport to the liquid cadmium cathode, although other actinides and

rare earths would also be present.

■ The reactor could be run in the breeder configuration with reprocessing of the irradiated fertile

(breeding) material. For a more preferable

grade (containing a higher proportion of the

plutonium-239 isotope) of plutonium, it would

be desirable to schedule blanket assemblies for

reprocessing when the electrorefiner salt had

just been replaced and was free of contaminants. Such plutonium would still be contaminated with fission products but, under certain

conditions. could deposit a material having a

plutonium-to-uranium ratio of one. Multiple

batches of blanket fuel might have to be processed before the better grade of plutonium

could be removed from the liquid cadmium

( 1 7).

According to this analysis, the proliferation resistance of ALMR/IFR technology is more a function of the adequacy of nuclear materials safeguards than of the technology itself. If a nation

possessing an ALMR/IFR system chose to abandoned safeguards (e.g., by reneging on previous

safeguards agreements ), the technology alone

would probably offer few proliferation barriers.

The Wymer study also considered the question:

If it was willing to renounce international inspection, would a nation that had access to an ALMR/

IFR system have an advantage in proliferation.

compared with a nation that did not have access to

such a facility’? The study determined that having

an ALMR/IFR facility would clearly provide a

potential proliferating: nation several advantages.

including a spent fuel receiving area and facilities

for preparing the fuel for dissolution (56). Having

an ALMR/IFR facility would be much more valuable to a potential proliferator that had no other existing reprocessing facilities. A nation that abandoned nonproliferation regimes and had existing

PUREX facilities might see less proliferation advantage in having an ALMR/IFR facility.

If, instead of processing spent fuel, the ALMR

system were used to reprocess irradiated fertile

(breeding) material in the electrorefiner, the resulting plutonium would be a superior material,

with an nearly ideal isotope composition for nuclear weapons manufacture (56). It would be superior even to plutonium obtained by PUREX reprocessing of conventional LWR spent fuel

because of its higher plutonium-239 content.

When it operates as a breeder, the plutonium available from the ALMR/IFR under normal operation

will be weapons grade, whereas commercial

LWRS always produce a much lower-grade plutonium unless they are shut down and refueled much

more frequently than required for economical operation (49).

Developers of the ALMR/IFR technology indicate that it is an "uncontested fact that it would be

technically possible to make nuclear explosives

from material extracted in some (unspecified)

fashion from an IFR process stream” ( 13). Other

reports have come to similar conclusions. Even

though the ALMR reduces certain proliferation

risks when operated with proper safeguards, possess ion of such a facilitywould bring with it some

of the technology needed to produce weapons plutonium as well (27).

ROLE OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

Part of the ALMR/IFR research program is a project to develop suitable nuclear material safeguards

and monitoring and control systems. One study

suggests that ALMR/IFR fuel recycling would

have some features that require the development

of unique safeguards and inspection systems (56).

Others feel that the notion that plutonium in nonnuclear weapons countries can be made safe by the

use of safeguards is misleading. That is, full-scale

reprocessing and breeder development would involve such a large amount of separated plutonium
Chapter 4 Evaluation of the ALMR/lFR Technology | 37

instns[ version would political and other pressures to prevent a proli ferbe difficult or impossible (37).

According to the Wymer report, a safeguards

regime for the ALMR/IFR system would have to

be very different from that for a PUREX facility.

(In fact, even safeguards for large-scale PUREXtype reprocessing plants remain to be proven in

actual operation.) Conventional safeguards systems for PUREX rely heavily on materials control

and accounting techniques in which representative samples of key, homogeneous solutions are

taken during plant operation. Chemical analyses

of these samples give an accurate and precise picture of the movement of materials through the

PUREX reprocessing system. Such an approach

may be less applicable to the ALMR/IFR system

because of the lack of homogeneity of molten salt

solutions used in pyroprocessing and at other key

points during operation. In the clectrorefining

process. for example, plutonium (along with other

actinides) may actually precipitate from solution.

leading to misleadingly low measurements (24).

Safeguarding the ALMR/IFR system would

therefore have to rely more on containment and

surveillance methods. Similar methods have been

developed as proliferation control techniques at

sites such us Sandia National Laboratories (24).

The development of adequate safeguards for the

ALMR/IFR system may be an essential requirement to allow its future development and deployment (24). However, International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA ) inspection would always require

actual hands-on monitoring of a facility.

According to one analysis, if nonnuclear countries obtain full-scale reprocessing plants and

breeder reactors, even full safeguards may not

provide timely warning if a country should decide

to abrogate its safeguards agreements (37). Thus,

no safeguards scheme. including any IAEA program, could be effective if such sensitive materials and facilities became widely available in nations that are current I y nonnuclear weapons states.

This is because the possession of such facilities

would allow a nation to build nuclear weapons too

quickly for adequate international response. A

year hasbeen estimateded as the time necessary for

the United States and others to amass sufficient

ating country from making a bomb. The only acceptable approach, therefore, may be for nonnuclear countries to completely forego nuclear

reprocessing. Then, if a country seized spent fuel.

it would still need 1 1/2 to 2 years to build the necessary reprocessing facility to extract the plutonium—time enough in them-y for the rest of the

world to take heed and respond.

Supporters suggest that a key difference between ALMR/IFR technology and PUREX plutonium separation is that. in principle, the former

would keep the entire cycle (fuel reactor burning,

spent fuel reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and

waste processing) at a single site. If adopted. this

would elminate proliferation concerns stemming

from the shipment of separated plutonium and

spent fuel. Thus the configuration of the complete

system. rather than the technology itself. may offer a proliferation resistance advantage compared

with PUREX reprocessing. In countries currently

de~cloping PUREX reprocessing for plutonium

fuel recycling, such as France and Japan, spent

fuel is transported to central facilities and reprocessed fuel must be transported back to the reactors. On the other hand. the United States prescntIy curries out no reprocessing. If the United States

begins reprocessing. there may be no technical

reason why reprocessing facilities including

PUREX could not be colocated with a nuclear

reactor, if this were determined to be an important

feature. In addition, GE acknowledges that it may

be politicall y difficult to colocate reprocessing facilities at new nuclear reactors, and it is considering the possibility of a central reprocessing facility that could serve many reactors at different

locutions (43). Therefore the collocation advantage may be an equally infeasible option for either

IFR or PUREX reprocessing.

POLITICAL BARRIERS

Separate from the issue of whether the ALMR/

IFR system could provide sufficient tcchni(w[

barriers to proliferation is the question of the program's impact on political barriers to prlifera- 5

tion. In particular. how much might a United
38 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

States decision to reprocess and bum plutonium

influence the plutonium management policies of

other countries? Since the late 1970s the United

States has chosen not to carry out plutonium reprocessing for both economic and political reasons. In a September 27, 1993, policy statement

the Clinton Administration reaffirmed this by announcing a nonproliferation initiative, which includes a proposal for a global convention banning

production of fissile material (e.g., plutonium) for

weapons, a voluntary offer to put U.S. excess fissile materials under IAEA safeguards, and a recognition that plutonium disposition is an important nonproliferation problem requiring

international attention (55). Subsequently, President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris

Yeltsin, during their meeting in Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed to cooperate with each other

and other states in measures designed to prevent

the accumulation of excessive stocks of fissile

materials and to reduce such stocks overtime (3 3).

They agreed to establish a joint working group to

consider steps to ensure that these materials would

not be used again for nuclear weapons.

Many are concerned that a U.S. emphasis on

ALMR/IFR development, with its inherent reliance on nuclear fuel reprocessing, could undermine this policy and stimulate other nations to undertake plutonium reprocessing programs. In his

September 1993 statement, President Clinton said

that although the United States will not interfere

with reprocessing in Japan or Europe, “the United

States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself engage in

plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power

or nuclear explosive purposes” (55). If the United

States breaks this long-standing norm by proceeding with the development of plutonium reprocessing technologies, other nations might be encouraged to consider LWR fuel without necessarily

limiting the types of technologies used.

The example set by the United States in any decision about reprocessing for commercial reactors

is likely to prove an important influence on the behavior of other countries and should be carefully

considered. Setting an example for other nations

has long been a primary argument for not supporting U.S. breeder reactor development. The NAS

and others have warned that U.S. policy on plutonium disposition must take into account the signals sent by the choice of a particular disposition

method (27). For example, if the United States

treated its weapons plutonium as a waste to be disposed of, this could set an important example in its

desire to discourage the use of plutonium reprocessing.

In summary, any nuclear technology carries

with it some proliferation risks. These risks might

be minimized by using inspection and safeguards

regimes. However, the effectiveness of these measures is based more on political and international

norms than on purely technical barriers. If the

ALMR/IFR reprocessing technology were exported, the United States could not guarantee its

ability to impose and enforce enduring and reliable technical barriers on other nations.

If the proliferation resistance of ALMR/IFR

technology is judged from a purely technical

viewpoint, its reprocessing facilities and nuclear

reactor could clearly be adapted to breeder operation for producing plutonium. In addition, the

technology carries with it several issues of general

proliferation concern beyond whether it is designed as a breeder or a burner of plutonium. In itself, the use of reprocessing and its collocation

with hot cell facilities provide some opportunity

for plutonium concentration and the acquisition of

plutonium for weapons. Although the ALMR/

IFR system might prove more difficult to misuse

for weapons production than a PUREX facilit y, its

operation would produce a much more concentrated form of plutonium compared with spent

LWR fuel, and would provide a facility (hot cell)

and a technology for handling and reprocessing

spent fuel into a weapons-usable form. Thus, from

a purely technical viewpoint, if ALMR/IFR replaced or were developed as an alternative to

PUREX-based reprocessing, it might be an incremental improvement nonproliferation. If it replaced the conventional LWR reactor with a oncethrough fuel cycle followed by direct disposal,

then it could increase the risk of proliferation.
Chapter 4 Evaluation of the ALMR/lFR Technology | 39

BEYOND THE SPENT FUEL STANDARD

FOR PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE

ALMR/IFR promoters have focused attention on

the fact that any plutonium contained in LWR

spent fuel is a legitimate nuclear weapons proliferation concern. They and many others, including

the recent NAS study on plutonium disposition,

point out that there are large quantities of plutonium in low concentrations tied up in spent nuclear fuel in various nations around the world.7 Although pure plutonium from dismantled nuclear

weapons in the former Soviet Union is recognized

as the immediate "clear and present danger” (27),

the plutonium contained in spent fuel, as well as

plutonium already separated from spent fuel, also

represents a significant nuclear proliferation risk

(30).8 Since the plutonium obtainable from spent

fuel can be used for making a nuclear bomb, the

issue of the fate of this material must be addressed

by all nations. The proposal to eliminate plutonium in spent nuclear fuel by using various

technologies is currently being evaluated by the

so-called STATS panel of the National Academy

of Sciences, discussed earlier.9

In the past spent nuclear fuel was considered

the benchmark for proliferation resistance because of its lethal “self-protecting” radioactivity.

Although it contains weapons-usable plutonium,

the spent fuel from a reactor is normally so highl y

radioactive due to the presence of fission products

that it cannot be handled or processed by a potential proliferator without complex specitil equipment and heavy shielding such as available in the

nuclear weapons complexes of the United States

or former Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, over the long term, mtiny experts

agree that the unseparated plutonium in spent fuel

must be considered a proliferation risk (27, 37,

46). The chemistry for separating plutonium from

spent fuel is described in the open literature, and

the essential technologies are available on the

open market (49). Although commercial-scale

separation is difficult and costly, a potential proliferator could use a much simpler and less costly

facility to extract enough material for a few weapons. The plutonium contained in a truckload of

spent fuel rods from a typical power reactor is

enough for one or more bombs (27). Moreover,

the intense radioactivity that initially makes nuclear spent fuel self-protecting declines after some

decades. For example, after 100 years, spent nuclear fuel of typical burnup would decay to less

than 100 rads per hour at 1 meter, which is the

minimum radioactivity level considered sufficiently self-protecting by the NRC and IAEA to

require less safeguarding (27). The unavoidable

conclusion is that any plutonium, whether military or civilian, of any form and isotopic composition could be considered a proliferation risk over

the long term.

Some solutions for plutonium safeguarding

(including use of the ALMR/IFR) are directed at

the idea of totally eliminating all the world’s plutonium. Promoters of this solution argue that the

best action for nuclear nonproliferation would be

if all nations agreed to eliminate all plutonium and

plutonium manufacture. However, this would require that all nations of the world agree to dispose

of plutonium in all its forms, including surplus

military as well as spent fuel and civilian sepa-
40 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

rated plutonium (30). Some countries such as the

United Kingdom, Japan, and France have made ia

substantial financial commitment to the commercial use of plutonium and might not be willing to

accept this (37). The NAS concluded that this option could not be available for at least the next 50

years, although it may nevertheless be worthwhile

to continue its development for future needs (30).

The NAS also made the point that it would be

futile to develop a plutonium disposition process

that made surplus military plutonium more proliferation-resistant than the much larger and growing

quantity of civilian plutonium contained in spent

fuel from commercial reactors. The spent fuel

standard for proliferation resistance should be

considered adequate for the nonproliferation

benchmark unless methods are developed that

also address the plutonium contained in LWR

spent fuel (27). The corollary is that if a disposition method cannot achieve the spent fuel standard for military plutonium in a few decades, with

low to moderate security risks along the way, it

should not be considered (30).

The NAS also warned that it is far from clear

that the best long-term nonproliferation solution

for all the world’s plutonium is total elimination

by fissioning. Some type of geologic disposal

method may be superior (27). The enormous costs

of eliminating the entire global inventory of plutonium cannot be justified if options such as geologic disposal can provide acceptable nonproliferation risks. 10 Some elimination options involving

repeated plutonium reprocessing and reuse may

even have greater proliferation risks than to disposal in geologic repositories (27). Nevertheless,

the major stumbling block will be that the elimination of plutonium would require a world consensus, which is clearly lacking today. It is important that this issue not be confused with the more

clear and present danger of surplus military pluto -

nium. A clear distinction must be made between

the issue of dealing with the plutonium supply

worldwide (by elimination or repository storage)

and the issue of securing weapons plutonium.

However, dealing with the current weapons plutonium disposition issue may serve to focus attention on long-term plutonium disposition and provide new options to that objective.

Finally, any international decision to eliminate

the world’s plutonium supply, including that in

spent fuel, must be made against the background

of international policy regarding the future of nuclear energy. In other words, it might be futile to

adopt policies to eliminate all plutonium if the

world continues to maintain or even increase the

number of nuclear power facilities that produce

more plutonium (in spent fuel). In this light, the

deployment of a large number of ALMR systems

for the purpose of eliminating plutonium in spent

fuel might actually increase the total amount of

plutonium in the form of recycling ALMR/IFR

fuel inventories.

I ~cNAS~eP)ti ~onc]ucje~ [ha[ an! ~w.nl fuc] rcpr(K.e$51ng (Jptlfjn w (WId C(MI in the tens to hundreds of bill ion d(dlars ~d require kades

to cxmturics to develop fully.
ABBREVIATIONS

ALMR advanced 1iquid metal reactor

DOE Department of Energy

EBR-I, EBR-II experimental breeder reactors

I and II

GAO General Accounting Office

GE General Electric Company

HEU highly enriched uranium

IAEA International Atomic Energy

Agency

IFR integral fast reactor

LMR liquid metal reactor

LWR light-water reactor

MOX mixed oxide

NAS National Academy of

Sciences

NRC Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

PEIS programmatic environmental

impact statement

RFP request for proposal

STATS NAS Panel on Separations

Technology and Transmutation Systems

Appendix A:

Abbreviations

and

Glossary A

GLOSSARY

Actinides

A group of the heaviest elements, beginning with

actinium (atomic number 89), and including uranium and plutonium.

ALMR system

As used in this report, “ALMR system” refers to,

and is interchangeable with, the integral fast reactor with its associated reprocessing, hot cell, and

waste treatment facilities.

Bench scale

An experimental process (or experimental equipment), generally used in a laboratory. Bench-scale

activities represent the earliest stages of developing a new process and the smallest scale of equipment that is useful in examining a process.

Breeder

A nuclear reactor designed or operated in such a

manner that the net amount of plutonium remaining in the reactor core and associated components

after irradiation is greater than that contained in

the original fuel elements.

I 41
42 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

Burner

A nuclear reactor designed or operated in such a

manner that the net amount of plutonium remaining in the reactor core and associated components

after irradiation is less than that contained in the

original fuel elements.

Cladding

A metal (usually stainless steel or zirconium) layer that surrounds nuclear fuel elements. This protective covering serves to contain the fuel elements and acts as a first-level container for fuel

rods when stored as waste.

Electrorefiner

As used in this report, electorefiner refers to the

apparatus comprised of a cathode, anode, liquid

cadmium, and other components operated in a hot

cell to reprocess ALMR/IFR spent fuel. It is possible that the components could be modified to allow for the reprocessing of spent LWR fuel as

well.

Fission products

Atoms created when a heavier element, such as

uranium, decays into lighter elements such as iodine or strontium. Some of the uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactor fuel undergoes fissioning

after combining with neutrons in the reactor core,

with the corresponding release of energy and more

neutrons. Most fission products created in a reactor are radioactive.

Fuel cycle

A generic term used to describe the series of steps

that nuclear reactor fuel systems may take, from

mining and milling of uranium, through enrichment, fuel element fabrication, and irradiation.

Fuel cycles are generally considered either “open”

or “closed.” An example of an open cycle would

be conventional light-water reactors in the United

States that use uranium fuel, irradiate it in a reactor, and then dispose of spent fuel as waste. A

closed cycle might be a plutonium-based fuel

cycle that separates and reuses the plutonium contained in the initial spent fuel for additional cycles

of irradiation.

Glove box

An enclosed unit equipped with gloves through

which a technician can manipulate and process radioactive materials. Glove boxes provide protection from the least penetrating form of radiation,

alpha radiation, as well as prevent unintended or

accidental inhalation of dust and/or particulate

material. They do not offer protection against

highly radioactive materials, such as spent fuel,

that emit more penetrating gamma and beta radiation.

Hot cell

An enclosed structure designed to allow safe operations with the most intensely radioactive nuclear materials. Hot cells are characterized by

heavy concrete or metal shielding and specially

designed radiation-shielding windows. Operations of highly radioactive materials inside the hot

cell are done by remote robotic manipulation.

Once radioactive materials are used in a hot cell no

human can enter the enclosure.

Integral fast reactor

As used in this report, integral fast reactor refers to

the entire advanced liquid metal reactor system,

with its associated reprocessing and waste treatment facilities. IFR is synonymous with “ALMR

system.”

MOX fuel

Mixed-oxide fuel, a nuclear reactor fuel consisting of a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides.

Plutonium

A human-made element produced when uranium

is irradiated in a reactor.

Prototype scale

The step in the development of a new process that

follows bench scale, used to conduct tests and obtain information that may be extrapolated to fullscale deployment.

PUREX reprocessing

A water-based chemical process used to separate

plutonium, uranium, and other elements and fis-
Appendix A Abbreviations and Glossary | i43

sion products, from spent reactor fuel. It was original l y developed to separate plutonium for nuclear

weapons.

Pyroprocessing

A nonaqueous process used to separate plutonium, and other elements, from spent nuclear fuel.

Pyroprocessing is an alternative to, and distinctly

different from, the PUREX process. It is a hightemperature, electrochemical procedure.

Reprocessing

A general term to describe the treatment used to

separate plutonium and uranium from the fission

and other byproducts contained in spent fuel.

PUREX and pyroprocessing represent two different reprocessing technologies.

Spent fuel

Fuel elements that are removed from a reactor after their nuclear composition has been changed by

irradiation to the extent that the fuel can no longer

sustain reactor operation through fission reactions.

Transmutation

The transformation of one atom into another by

any one of a variety of means-fissioning, neutron

bombardment in an accelerator, and so forth.

Transuranics

Elements, including plutonium, with an atomic

number higher than that of uranium (92). Virtually

all transuranic elements are human-made and radioactive.

Uranium

A naturally occurring radioactive element. Natural uranium is comprised of approximately 99.3

percent uranium-238. and about 0.7 percent uranium-235, a fissionable isotope. Different

“grades” of uranium exist, based on the relative

content of uranium-235.

Vitrification

A waste management process that immobilizes radioactive material by encapsulating it under high

temperature into a glasslike solid, sometimes with

other waste forms.
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