NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS

Actions Needed by 

NNSA to Clarify 

Dismantlement 

Performance Goal

Report to the Subcommittee on Energy 

and Water Development, Committee 

on Appropriations, U.S. Senate

April 2014

GAO-14-449

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-449, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water 

Development, Committee on Appropriations, 

U.S. Senate

April 2014

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Actions Needed by NNSA to Clarify Dismantlement 

Performance Goal

Why GAO Did This Study

NNSA is responsible for the nation’s 

nuclear weapons programs. As part of 

this mission, it oversees dismantlement 

of retired nuclear weapons and 

disposition of their components. 

Dismantlement occurs at NNSA’s 

Pantex Plant, and disassembly of 

CSAs from dismantled weapons 

occurs at the Y-12 site. GAO was 

asked to assess NNSA’s weapons 

dismantlement and component 

disposition efforts.

This report examines, among other 

things, (1) how NNSA measures 

progress toward its fiscal year 2022 

dismantlement performance goal, as 

well as any challenges it might face in 

achieving the goal; (2) the schedule for 

and any challenges in dismantling 

weapons to be retired as a result of the 

New START treaty; (3) physical 

capacity available at Pantex to meet or 

accelerate planned dismantlement 

workload; and (4) any challenges in 

disassembling and disposing of 

weapon components. GAO analyzed 

NNSA’s future dismantlement 

schedule, observed weapons

dismantlement and component 

disposition activities at Pantex and Y12, and interviewed NNSA officials. 

This report summarizes the findings of 

GAO’s classified report on nuclear 

weapons dismantlement.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that NNSA (1) 

clarify the dismantlement performance 

goal and (2) consider extending the 

goal to avoid a dismantlement 

workload gap. NNSA generally agreed 

with these recommendations.

What GAO Found

How the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) measures progress 

toward its performance goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 

2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022 is unclear for two reasons. First, NNSA does 

not track the actual date that dismantled weapons were retired and may be 

counting some dismantled weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 as equivalent to 

weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. Second, NNSA will not dismantle some 

weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 but will reinstate them to the stockpile to 

save on rebuilding other weapons and count the reinstated weapons as 

equivalent dismantlements. Having clear goals and measures is a key element of 

program management. Because the dismantlement performance goal does not 

make these practices clear, NNSA risks providing misleading information about 

progress related to its goal. 

NNSA has a schedule for future weapon dismantlements but has not scheduled 

for dismantlement any weapons to be removed from the stockpile resulting from 

implementation of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). 

These weapons are not expected to be retired until the late 2020s or early 2030s. 

The deferred retirement of these weapons could result in a significant 

dismantlement workload gap during the mid-2020s. Such a gap could result in 

the loss of certified dismantlement personnel because dismantlement technicians 

at Pantex lose their certifications if they have not worked on a weapon type in the 

past year. By extending the fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal, 

NNSA could allow the current dismantlement workload to be leveled and 

extended through the mid-2020s to sustain its dismantlement workforce. 

The physical capacity at the Pantex Plant in Texas should be sufficient to meet 

NNSA’s planned dismantlement workload and other stockpile commitments 

through fiscal year 2022. According to NNSA officials and Pantex site 

contractors, the site’s ability to significantly accelerate its dismantlement rates 

and complete planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022 could be costly, and 

it is unclear whether the site would have sufficient capacity to do so.

GAO identified policy and technical challenges complicating NNSA’s disassembly 

and disposition of nuclear and nonnuclear components from dismantled nuclear 

weapons. For instance, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee 

disassembles canned subassemblies (CSA)—a major nuclear component that 

can contain highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is uranium enriched in the 

isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or greater. NNSA is retaining many CSAs, 

leaving far fewer of them for disassembly, and creating challenges for Y-12’s

ability to plan its disassembly workload. However, NNSA bases its retention 

decisions on national security considerations and not Y-12 workload. Moreover, 

NNSA’s ability to effectively manage a contingency inventory of millions of 

nonnuclear components at Pantex is complicated by decisions to retain many 

components for potential reuse in weapons, including old parts for weapons no 

longer in the stockpile, and by limitations in Pantex’s previous component 

inventory management system. GAO is not making a recommendation on these 

matters because of efforts already under way at Pantex to address the need to 

retain older parts and to upgrade its component inventory management system.

View GAO-14-449. For more information, 

contact David C.Trimble at (202) 512-3841or 

trimbled@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Letter 1 

Background 9

Weapons Inventory to Be Dismantled Shrank Then Increased, 

While NNSA’s Annual Dismantlement Rates Generally Declined 20

How NNSA Measures Progress Toward Its Dismantlement 

Performance Goal May Be Misleading, and NNSA Is Unlikely to 

Achieve This Goal 23

Deferred Retirement of Weapons under New START Will Pose 

Challenges to NNSA’s Management of Future Dismantlement 

Workload and Workforce 29

Pantex Capacity Sufficient to Meet NNSA’s Planned 

Dismantlement Workload but Accelerating Dismantlement 

Could Be Costly 30

Disassembly and Disposition of Some Nuclear and Nonnuclear 

Components from Dismantled Weapons Is Complicated by 

Policy and Technical Challenges 37

Conclusions 50

Recommendations for Executive Action 51

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 51

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 54

Appendix II Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration 59

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 61

Tables

Table 1: Nuclear Weapon Systems in the U.S. Stockpile, as of 

September 2012 10

Table 2: NNSA Estimated Additional Funding to Achieve Fiscal 

Year 2022 Dismantlement Performance Goal by Fiscal 

Year 2018 or Fiscal Year 2020 34

Table 3: Pantex Nonnuclear Component Inventory as of May 2013 44

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Figures

Figure 1: B61 Nonnuclear Components 4

Figure 2: NNSA Sites Involved in the Nuclear Weapons 

Dismantlement Process 6

Figure 3: Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Process Workflow 19

Figure 4: SS-21 Improvements—Old and New B83 Bomb Work 

Stands 21

Figure 5: Pantex Zone 4 Magazines for Pit and Weapon Storage 40

Figure 6: Pantex Nonnuclear Component Warehouse Storage 45
Page iii GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Abbreviations

ALCM air-launched cruise missile

CSA canned subassembly

DEQ dismantlement equivalent unit

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DQ difficulty quotient

HEU highly enriched uranium

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

KCP Kansas City Plant

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LRPPM Long Range Production Planning Model

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NNSS Nevada National Security Site

RTBF Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

SS-21 Seamless Safety for the 21st Century

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

WDD Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

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Page 1 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 30, 2014

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Chairman

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

Nuclear weapons remain an essential element of U.S. national security.

However, the number of nuclear weapons needed by the United States to 

maintain deterrence has shifted dramatically since the end of the cold war 

and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Since the early 

1990s, the United States has greatly reduced its nuclear forces through 

arms control treaties with the Soviet Union and Russia—including the 

1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and the 2002 Strategic 

Offensive Reductions Treaty.1

As a result of these force reductions and other initiatives reducing the size 

of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile,2 thousands of weapons have been 

retired from service and made available for dismantlement.3

 

1

The formal titles of these treaties are, respectively: The Treaty Between the United 

States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and 

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the Treaty Between the United States of 

America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

By 

overseeing the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, the Department of 

Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) helps 

ensure that the United States is not maintaining more nuclear weapons 

2

For instance, in September 1991, the President announced several unilateral initiatives to 

reduce the U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons arsenal. The following month, the Soviet 

President responded that the Soviet Union would reduce its nonstrategic nuclear 

weapons. In addition, as part of the annual presidential stockpile review process, in 2004, 

the President directed that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile be reduced by more than 

40 percent by 2012 and, in 2007, he directed an additional reduction of the stockpile, 

making it roughly one-quarter the size of cold war-era levels.

3

The United States had 19,008 nuclear weapons in the stockpile at the end of fiscal year 

1991 and approximately 5,000 weapons at the end of fiscal year 2012.
 

Page 2 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

than necessary and is meeting international treaty commitments.4 From 

fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2012, NNSA and DOE dismantled 

more than 12,000 retired nuclear weapons. However, there are several 

thousand retired weapons awaiting dismantlement, and additional 

weapons will enter the dismantlement queue as a result of ongoing 

weapon retirement decisions. Moreover, further stockpile reductions are 

expected as a result of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known 

as New START, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010.5

The dismantlement of nuclear weapons also supports U.S. 

nonproliferation objectives. NNSA and Department of State officials have 

noted the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons dismantlement in 

demonstrating the nation’s commitment to disarmament under the 1970 

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and NNSA officials 

and documents have stated that dismantlement represents a concrete 

step toward the President’s long-term goal of a world without nuclear 

weapons.6 Other organizations—including the Secretary of Energy 

Advisory Board—have recommended that NNSA accelerate its 

dismantlement of retired nuclear weapons to further demonstrate the 

United States’ commitment to nuclear weapons reductions.7

 

4

NNSA is a semiautonomous agency within DOE created in 1999 with responsibility for 

the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.

The 2010 

Nuclear Posture Review—which provides a road map for implementing 

the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States—

also highlights nuclear weapons dismantlement and the administration’s 

intention to consider accelerating the pace of dismantlement.

5

The formal title of this treaty is the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 

Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 

Offensive Arms.

6

Among other things, parties to the treaty, including the United States, agree to undertake 

to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear 

disarmament, and nonnuclear weapon state parties agree not to manufacture or otherwise 

acquire nuclear weapons or seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

7

The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board provides advice and recommendations to the 

Secretary of Energy on the department’s basic and applied research and development 

activities, economic and national security policy, educational issues, operational issues, 

and any other activities and operations of DOE as the Secretary may direct.
 

Page 3 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs oversees the maintenance, 

refurbishment,8 surveillance,9

The physical work of dismantling weapons and disassembling and 

disposing of weapon components is performed by contractors operating 

facilities in NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise.

and dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

Within this office, the Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD) 

program oversees, among other things, nuclear weapons dismantlement 

and the further disassembly of major weapon components, 

“characterization” of components to identify hazards and security 

concerns, and disposal of most weapon-system components. The WDD 

program’s performance goal is to dismantle all nuclear weapons that were 

retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022.

10 In general, 

dismantlement of a nuclear weapon involves reducing it to its component 

parts and takes place at the Pantex Plant in Texas. NNSA defines a 

weapon as dismantled when the high explosive surrounding the weapon’s 

fissile core, known as the “pit,” is removed.11

 

8

Since the end of the cold war, in lieu of designing, testing, and producing new nuclear 

weapons, NNSA has sought to extend the lifetimes that existing nuclear weapons can 

safely and reliably remain in the stockpile through a refurbishment process known as a life 

extension program.

The dismantlement of a 

weapon results in nuclear components, such as the pit, and numerous 

nonnuclear components of various types and sizes, from screws to 

parachutes. Figure 1 depicts some of the components from a B61 bomb.

9

NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program includes two elements: the stockpile evaluation 

program, which conducts surveillance evaluations of the active and inactive stockpile and 

new production units, and an enhanced surveillance program, which provides diagnostics, 

methodologies, and other tools to enable prediction and detection of weapon defects. 

Surveillance is performed at various levels, including testing and evaluation of full 

weapons, major assemblies and components, and the materials that compose the 

components. Under this program, samples of weapons from each system in the stockpile 

are chosen annually and sent to the Pantex Plant for disassembly, inspection, 

reconfiguration, and testing by the national laboratories. The surveillance process can 

include destructive testing of components, resulting in the dismantlement of some 

weapons.

10NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise—formerly known as the nuclear weapons complex—

consists of the laboratories, production plants, and a test site that carry out missions to 

support NNSA’s programs.

11Nuclear weapons dismantlement generally takes place in “campaigns,” in which a type 

of weapon is sent to Pantex for dismantlement over a period of months.
 

Page 4 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Figure 1: B61 Nonnuclear Components

Some components from the dismantled weapon require further 

disassembly. For instance, after Pantex has dismantled a weapon, a 

major nuclear component called the canned subassembly (CSA), which 

can contain highly enriched uranium (HEU) and other materials, is 

packaged and sent to the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee 

for additional disassembly and disposition.12

Nuclear components from dismantled weapons may be retained for 

eventual reuse, disposed of, or retained as a “strategic reserve” to ensure 

an adequate supply of material for the weapons program in the future. For 

example, pits from dismantled weapons are stored at Pantex pending 

decisions regarding their potential reuse in refurbished weapons or 

decisions regarding further disassembly and disposition, or to compose 

part of the U.S. strategic reserve of plutonium. In addition, some CSAs 

are retained at Y-12 for potential reuse in refurbished weapons, 

disassembled to recover HEU that may be recycled into fuel to supply the 

 

12HEU is uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or greater. Lowenriched uranium contains uranium-235 in a concentration of less than 20 percent and 

greater than 0.7 percent.
 

Page 5 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

U.S. Naval Reactors Program,13

Nonnuclear components may also be disposed of or saved for reuse.

However, some nonnuclear components may be classified or 

radioactively contaminated and therefore require extra precautions to 

securely and safely dispose of them. Nonnuclear components from types 

of weapons still in the stockpile may be retained at Pantex for potential 

reuse in refurbished weapons. In addition to managing retained 

components for weapons still in the stockpile, Pantex has a backlog of 

components from the dismantlement of types of weapons that are no 

longer in the stockpile—referred to as “legacy” components—which it is 

working to characterize and dispose of.

among others, or as part of the U.S. 

strategic reserve of HEU.

The Kansas City Plant (KCP) in Missouri stores some nonnuclear 

components, and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) disposes of 

other classified or radiologically contaminated components. Technical 

support for the dismantlement process—including responding to any 

problems Pantex encounters while dismantling a weapon—is provided by 

the national laboratories involved in nuclear weapons design: the 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California, the Los 

Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico, and Sandia National 

Laboratories (SNL) in California and New Mexico. Figure 2 shows the 

locations of NNSA facilities involved in the dismantlement process and 

briefly describes their roles.

 

13The U.S. Naval Reactors Program, run jointly by the U.S. Navy and DOE, ensures an 

adequate supply of HEU as fuel for U.S. nuclear-powered naval vessels, among other 

things.
 

Page 6 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Figure 2: NNSA Sites Involved in the Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement Process

You asked us to report on issues associated with NNSA’s nuclear 

weapons dismantlement and component disposition efforts. Our 

objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the annual inventories of 
 

Page 7 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

weapons awaiting dismantlement and NNSA’s annual dismantlement 

rates have changed over time, and, if so, the reasons why; (2) how NNSA 

measures progress toward achieving its performance goal of dismantling 

all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022, 

and any challenges it might face in meeting the goal; (3) NNSA’s 

schedule for dismantlement of weapons retired as a result of the New 

START treaty and the challenges, if any, NNSA faces in dismantling 

those weapons; (4) the physical capacity available at Pantex to meet 

NNSA’s planned future dismantlement workload and to potentially 

accelerate dismantlement; and (5) the challenges, if any, affecting 

disassembly and disposition of components from dismantled weapons. In 

February 2014, we reported to you on the results of our work in a 

classified report. This report summarizes certain aspects of our classified 

work.

In general, we addressed these objectives by reviewing relevant nuclear 

weapons stockpile guidance and planning documents; interviewing NNSA 

officials on issues related to dismantlement and component management; 

interviewing officials from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 

military services on nuclear weapons retirement and dismantlement 

interactions with NNSA; and conducting site visits to the two sites that 

carry out the two major steps of weapons dismantlement and disposition, 

the Pantex and Y-12 sites. On our site visits, we observed weapons 

dismantlement and CSA disassembly operations for several weapon 

systems; viewed component processing and storage facilities; and 

interviewed Pantex and Y-12 site operating contractors on issues relating 

to dismantlement operations and component management processes, as 

well as site weapon engineers on issues affecting dismantlement and 

CSA disassembly of seven different weapon systems.

To assess the extent to which and the reasons why the annual 

inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and NNSA’s annual 

dismantlement rates have changed over time, we analyzed data from 

NNSA on the annual inventories of retired weapons available for 

dismantlement and on annual numbers of weapons dismantled for fiscal 

year 1992 through fiscal year 2012. We selected this period for several 

reasons, including that it allowed us to assess weapon retirements and 

dismantlements since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 

1991 and resulting from stockpile reductions through strategic arms 

control treaties and presidential initiatives. We also interviewed NNSA 

and DOD officials and Pantex site contractors on issues affecting retired 

inventories of weapons and annual dismantlement rates. To assess how 

NNSA is measuring progress toward achieving its performance goal, and 
 

Page 8 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

the challenges it faces in doing so, we analyzed a March 2013 draft 

schedule for the dismantlement or other disposition of all retired weapons 

from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2022—including the 

dismantlement schedule for the remaining weapons retired prior to fiscal 

year 2009—and interviewed NNSA and DOD officials on issues that could 

affect this dismantlement schedule. To assess NNSA’s schedule for 

dismantlement of weapons retired as a result of the New START treaty 

and the challenges, if any, NNSA faces in dismantling those weapons, we 

interviewed DOD officials on the numbers of weapons expected to be 

retired and when they would be retired as a result of the treaty and 

interviewed NNSA officials on challenges related to management of this 

future dismantlement workload. To assess the physical capacity available 

at Pantex to meet NNSA’s planned future dismantlement workload, and to 

potentially accelerate dismantlement, we analyzed data on the physical 

capacity at Pantex available to meet the future dismantlement schedule 

and all other future stockpile production commitments and analyzed data 

and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors on the site’s 

ability to accelerate dismantlement work. To assess the challenges 

affecting disassembly and disposition of components from dismantled 

weapons, we reviewed NNSA data and interviewed NNSA officials and 

Pantex site contractors on the management of plutonium pit inventories, 

and we reviewed NNSA data and interviewed NNSA officials and Y-12 

site contractors on CSA inventory management, disassembly schedules, 

and the potential effect on HEU supply commitments. We also analyzed 

data from Pantex and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site 

contractors on the nonnuclear component inventory and the issues 

affecting the management, retention, and disposition of these 

components. We assessed the reliability of data on the inventories of 

retired weapons available for dismantlement and the annual numbers of 

weapons dismantled for fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2012, future 

capacity requirements at Pantex, and nonnuclear component inventories.

We analyzed the data for accuracy by, among other things, manually 

testing the data for errors and missing data, and interviewed 

knowledgeable officials about the data. We determined that the data were 

of sufficient reliability for our purposes. Additional details on our 

objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to April 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
 

Page 9 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

This section discusses the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; the stockpile 

planning and retirement process; nuclear weapons design and 

components; nuclear weapons dismantlement planning, facilities, 

supporting programs, and budget; and the nuclear weapons 

dismantlement process.

Since 1945, the United States has fielded more than 70 different nuclear 

weapon systems; currently, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile consists 

of 8 such systems. These systems can be strategic or nonstrategic, and 

can include gravity bombs deliverable by long-range bombers and dualcapable aircraft, as well as warheads deliverable by submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles (SLBM), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and 

air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM).

14

For some systems in the stockpile—such as the B61 bomb—there may 

be multiple versions as a result of modifications, or “mods,” that change 

weapon components related to their operational characteristics, safety, or 

control features.15 Life extension programs have been initiated for some 

weapons to address aging and enhance the safety, security, and 

reliability of the weapons in the stockpile.16

 

14DOD identifies strategic weapons as those delivered by ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy 

bombers. All other weapons are nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear bombs delivered by 

nonstrategic aircraft—usually dual-capable aircraft that can be used for nuclear and 

conventional missions. In the past, nonstrategic U.S. nuclear weapons were available for 

delivery through other means, including as warheads on cruise missiles delivered by 

nonstrategic aircraft; warheads delivered on sea- or ground-launched cruise missiles; 

warheads on ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges less than 5,500 kilometers; 

warheads fired from cannon artillery; atomic demolition munitions; and antisubmarine 

nuclear depth bombs.

Table 1 shows the weapon 

15In addition to “mods,” other alterations, or “alts” to weapons may be made that do not 

affect their military characteristics. For example, an alt was completed on B61-3, -4, -7, 

and -11 bombs to replace spin rocket motors, which accelerate the rotation of a weapon 

after it is released from a delivery aircraft and produce thrust to arm the weapon.

Background

U.S. Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile
 

Page 10 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

systems in the U.S. stockpile, including information on their delivery 

systems and missions, responsible military services, and dates of entry 

into the stockpile.

Table 1: Nuclear Weapon Systems in the U.S. Stockpile, as of September 2012

Weapon 

system Description

Delivery 

system Mission

Military 

service

Entry into 

service

W76-0/1 Submarine-launched ballistic 

missile (SLBM) warhead

D5 missile, Trident 

submarine

Underwater to 

surface

Navy 1978 (mod 0)

2009 (mod 1)

W78-0 Intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) warhead

Minuteman III ICBM Surface to surface Air Force 1979

W87-0 ICBM warhead Minuteman III ICBM Surface to surface Air Force 1986

W88-0 SLBM warhead D5 missile, Trident 

submarine

Underwater to 

surface

Navy 1989

B61-3/4/10 Nonstrategic bomb F-15, F-16, and certified 

NATO aircraft

Air to surface Air Force 1979 (mod 3)

1979 (mod 4)

1990 (mod 10)

B61-7/11 Strategic bomb B-52, B-2 Air to surface Air Force 1985 (mod 7)

1997 (mod 11)

B83-1 Strategic bomb B-52, B-2 Air to surface Air Force 1993

W80-1 Air-launched cruise missile 

(ALCM) warhead

B-52 Air to surface Air Force 1982

Source: National Nuclear Security Administration.

Note: The suffix associated with each warhead or bomb (e.g., the -0/1 for the W76) represents the 

mod associated with the respective weapon.

The nuclear weapons stockpile is configured into “active” and “inactive” 

categories, and individual nuclear weapons are identified as being in 1 of 

10 states of readiness across both categories.17

 

16For instance, some W76-0 warheads are currently going through a life extension 

program, resulting in refurbished W76-1 units. For more information on life extension 

programs, see GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA and DOD Need to More Effectively 

Manage the Stockpile Life Extension Program, 

Active weapons 

maintained at the top readiness state are operationally deployed 

weapons; the numbers of these weapons have been limited under 

strategic arms control treaties, such as New START. Inactive weapons 

GAO-09-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 

2009).

17DOD officials told us in June 2013 that the readiness states for the stockpile were 

changing, but that the new categories had not yet been released.
 

Page 11 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

are normally maintained at a depot in a nonoperational status.18

Retired nuclear weapons have been removed from their delivery 

platforms and are no longer part of the stockpile. Retired weapons fall into 

one of the following two categories:

Some 

nondeployed weapons are “hedge” weapons, maintained in both the 

active and inactive categories and retained both for technical hedge 

purposes (i.e., to hedge against an unforeseen catastrophic failure in a 

weapon type or family) and for geopolitical hedge purposes (i.e., to hedge 

against a reversal in the geopolitical situation that would require more 

weapons to be available for use).

• Weapons released for dismantlement. These weapons have been 

released for dismantlement, consistent with the capacity available at 

NNSA facilities and DOD requirements. Some of these weapons may 

be “reinstated” to the stockpile in lieu of being dismantled. Specifically, 

the Nuclear Weapons Council has approved a practice that allows 

NNSA to reinstate some retired weapons awaiting dismantlement to 

the stockpile to replace weapons that have been disassembled and 

inspected under the stockpile surveillance program.19

• Weapons in managed retirement. These weapons have been 

removed from the stockpile but have not been approved for 

dismantlement. These weapons are maintained in such a way that 

they could be reactivated should there be a catastrophic failure in the 

stockpile necessitating such action. The Nuclear Weapons Council 

Standing and Safety Committee must approve dismantlement of these 

weapons.

 

18Inactive stockpile weapons are not available to be uploaded on a delivery vehicle. They 

have certain components removed and other limited-life components of inactive stockpile 

weapons are not replaced unless the weapons are reactivated and moved to the active 

stockpile.

19The Nuclear Weapons Council, established by Congress in 1986, is a joint DOD/DOE 

organization that facilitates high-level coordination to secure, maintain, and sustain the 

nuclear stockpile. See Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 3137 (1986). The council consists of five 

members: the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the 

Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command; and the NNSA Administrator. The Nuclear 

Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee is a subordinate body to the Nuclear 

Weapons Council, which advises and assists it, and provides preliminary approval for 

many of the council’s activities. It is a joint DOD-DOE senior executive or flag-level 

committee that conducts transactions between DOD and DOE on behalf of the council.
 

Page 12 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

In addition, NNSA also characterizes retired nuclear weapons as either 

“war reserve” weapons or “quality assurance” weapons. Retired war 

reserve weapons are those withdrawn from the active or inactive stockpile 

categories that are surplus to defense needs and that could be reinstated 

to the stockpile if not dismantled. Retired quality assurance weapons are 

those that have been retired from the active or inactive stockpile 

categories for surveillance purposes—specifically, some of their 

components are destructively tested as part of the surveillance process, 

and these weapons are subsequently dismantled rather than being 

rebuilt. In discussing its future dismantlement schedule, NNSA tends to 

focus on the inventory of war reserve weapons because this inventory 

includes a large number of weapons that have been retired and 

accumulated in inventory over time and are weapons to be counted 

toward NNSA’s dismantlement performance goal. The number of retired 

quality assurance weapons is generally small and consistent from year to 

year, and the dismantlement of all quality assurance weapons is generally 

completed within the year they are retired.

The decision to retire and subsequently dismantle nuclear weapons is 

tied to a high-level policy-making process establishing the U.S. nuclear 

stockpile’s size and composition. This process begins with nuclear 

weapons policy and strategy guidance provided by the President in the 

form of a Presidential Policy Directive. Based on this presidential directive 

and other inputs—including guidance from the Secretary of Defense in 

the form of DOD directives and planning guidance—the military services, 

combatant commanders, and Joint Chiefs of Staff develop nuclear 

weapons requirements.

These requirements are submitted to the Nuclear Weapons Council staff 

and, combined with other inputs, inform the development of a nuclear 

weapons Requirements and Planning Document, which specifies nuclear 

weapon policies, military requirements, joint DOD and DOE planning 

factors, long-term planning considerations that affect the future of the 

stockpile, and supporting programmatic details. The Requirements and 

Planning Document provides detailed technical information and analyses 

that support the development of a Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 

Memorandum and a proposed presidential directive containing a 

proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. The Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile Memorandum is an annual memorandum from the Secretary of 

Defense and Secretary of Energy that transmits the proposed directive, 

which, if approved, becomes the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. The 

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan specifies the size and composition of 

Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile Planning and 

Retirement Process
 

Page 13 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

the stockpile for a projected multiyear period. The coordination process 

for these documents serves as the key forum in which DOD and DOE 

resolve issues concerning DOD nuclear weapon requirements and DOE 

capacity and capability to support those requirements. Once the 

President signs the directive, the Nuclear Weapons Council is authorized 

to approve changes in the stockpile within certain percentage limits 

specified by the President.

Nuclear weapons are retired from the stockpile by the Nuclear Weapons 

Council in accordance with the presidential guidance in the Nuclear 

Weapons Stockpile Plan. Project Officers Groups—which are joint DODDOE committees established for each weapon type to coordinate on 

technical matters relating to the weapon—develop prioritized retirement 

plans for the weapon systems identified for retirement in the 

Requirements and Planning Document.

20

NNSA uses the information from each Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan

and the Requirements and Planning Document to develop a Nuclear 

Weapons Production and Planning Directive, which includes long-term 

schedules for weapons dismantlement at Pantex and CSA disassembly at 

Y-12, as well as plans for nuclear weapon life extension programs, 

surveillance, and other stockpile-related activities executed by the 

agency.21 Dismantlement scheduling details are elaborated by NNSA in 

specific weapon Program Control Documents used to manage the 

workload outlined in the Production and Planning Directives. NNSA 

coordinates with the Navy and the Air Force to arrange delivery of specific 

weapons to the Pantex Plant for dismantlement, consistent with the 

Production and Planning Directive and the Program Control Documents. 

 

20The Nuclear Weapons Council charters a Project Officers Group for each weapon 

system to provide a technical forum for weapon development and management activities. 

Each Project Officers Group is led by a project officer from either the Navy or Air Force—

the two military services that maintain and operate nuclear weapons.

21NNSA issued a 2012 Production and Planning Directive that amended or updated 

certain information in the 2011 directive. According to NNSA officials, the 2012 version 

was not considered a full Production and Planning Directive and, among other things, did 

not include an updated dismantlement schedule. The 2013 Production and Planning 

Directive was not available at the time of our review.
 

Page 14 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

All weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile are two-stage nuclear weapons, 

sometimes referred to as thermonuclear weapons, involving fission and 

fusion reactions to achieve the explosive yield.22

Outside of the nuclear explosive package, a nuclear weapon contains 

other nonnuclear components that control the use, arming, and firing of 

the weapon, including arming, fuzing, and firing systems; reservoirs of 

tritium and deuterium gas that are injected into the pit through gas 

transfer systems to boost the nuclear reaction during detonation; neutron 

generators that produce neutrons for primary detonation; and other 

nonnuclear components such as radars, batteries, and parachutes (for 

gravity bombs dropped from aircraft).

The first stage, known as 

the primary, consists of a hollow pit—containing a central shell of fissile 

material typically made of plutonium or of plutonium and uranium inside a 

tamper shell—surrounded by high explosives. The second stage, or 

secondary, is encased inside a CSA that can contain HEU and other 

materials. The primary and the CSA are referred to as the weapon’s 

nuclear explosive package.

Nuclear weapons dismantlement is a multistage process that requires 

extensive planning, utilizes a mix of facilities at Pantex, and relies on a 

number of supporting NNSA programs. For fiscal years 2008 through 

2012, the WDD program budget generally ranged from approximately $50 

million to $60 million per year.

Before a weapon system can be dismantled, Pantex must conduct 

planning to identify and analyze potential hazards, locate or create 

appropriate tools, train its workforce, identify disposition pathways for 

nuclear and nonnuclear components, allocate time and facilities for 

dismantlement activities, ensure space is available to receive and store, 

or “stage,” the weapons, identify on-site storage for pits, and coordinate 

transport of CSAs recovered from the weapons to Y-12 for further 

disassembly.

 

22Fission occurs when the nucleus of a heavy unstable atom (such as uranium-235 or 

plutonium-239) is split into two lighter parts, releasing neutrons and producing large 

amounts of energy. Fusion occurs when the nuclei of two light atoms (such as deuterium 

and tritium) are joined, or fused, to form a heavier atom, with an accompanying release of 

a neutron and large amounts of energy.

Nuclear Weapons Design 

and Components

Nuclear Weapons 

Dismantlement Planning, 

Facilities, Supporting 

Programs, and Budget

Planning for Dismantlement
 

Page 15 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Since 1999, Pantex has managed the planning for dismantlement of 

weapons through an integrated safety management process known as 

Seamless Safety for the 21st Century (SS-21). Among other things, this 

process ensures that appropriate safety authorizations have been 

developed, reviewed, and approved for each weapon system before it is 

dismantled. The SS-21 process is unique to Pantex and comprises 

several steps, including: (1) hazard analysis to review all possible 

hazards at each step, such as the risk of electrostatic discharge within a 

dismantlement facility and the number of times a warhead must be lifted 

and moved; and (2) tooling preparation to ensure that workers have the 

necessary specialized tooling designed to mitigate the hazards; and (3) 

reviews, safety analyses, and readiness assessments, which must be 

completed before dismantlement authorization is given.

Dismantlement operations at Pantex occur at a secure area of the site—

referred to as Zone 12—inside specialized bays and cells authorized for 

nuclear explosive operations.23 Intact nuclear weapons on-site awaiting 

dismantlement are stored inside magazines, located in a separate secure 

area of the plant—known as Zone 4. Zone 12 contains 37 bays where 

mechanical dismantlement of weapons and dismantlement of nuclear 

explosive packages utilizing insensitive high explosives may be 

conducted, as well as 10 cells that are reserved for nuclear explosive 

operations involving conventional high explosives.24

Physical capacity available at any given time at Pantex is influenced by 

several factors, including the physical size of the weapons, whether they 

use conventional or insensitive high explosives, weight limitations within 

facilities, and the time requirements to perform dismantlement operations, 

which vary from weapon system to weapon system. Furthermore, 

physical capacity at the site to dismantle weapons is limited, and it must 

be balanced against other stockpile-related operations at Pantex that 

require use of bays and cells. Other stockpile-related operations that use 

Pantex refers to 

these 47 facilities as nuclear explosive production facilities.

 

23Nuclear explosive operations are activities involving a nuclear explosive, including 

activities in which the main charge high-explosive parts and pit are collocated.

24Compared with conventional high explosives, insensitive high explosives are highly 

insensitive to shock, heat, and impact and are highly resistant to accidental detonation. 

Cells have a higher level of explosive containment than bays, to reduce the potential for 

release of radioactive material in the event of the accidental explosion of conventional 

high explosives.

Pantex Facilities for 

Dismantlement
 

Page 16 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

the site’s bays and cells include temporarily staging weapons brought into 

Zone 12 from Zone 4 prior to being worked on, life extension program 

work, and weapon surveillance work. In addition, nuclear explosive 

operations at the site halt during thunderstorms that occur nearby—to 

minimize electrostatic detonation risks inside bays and cells during 

weapons assembly and disassembly. According to Pantex site 

contractors, the site plans for a small loss of capacity each year in the 

form of facility downtime due to lightning risks.

The WDD program relies on several other NNSA programs to support the 

dismantlement mission. For instance, funding from NNSA’s Readiness in 

Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program provides the facilities, 

infrastructure, and base capabilities that indirectly support the WDD 

program. RTBF funds also provide storage and material recycle and 

recovery support to WDD efforts.25

In general, for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, the WDD program budget 

has ranged from approximately $50 million to $60 million per year.

NNSA’s Office of Secure 

Transportation pays for transportation of weapons to Pantex for 

dismantlement and transportation of resulting components to other sites 

for further disassembly or processing, utilizing specialized vehicles called 

Safeguards Transporters. NNSA’s Stockpile Services Production Support 

program supports shipping, receiving, equipment maintenance and 

calibration services, and other activities that facilitate dismantlement and 

other weapons-related work.

26

 

25Through a range of subprograms, the RTBF program provides the facilities and 

infrastructure needed to support NNSA’s national security and operational mission 

requirements. In its fiscal year 2014 budget request, NNSA proposed eliminating the 

RTBF program and splitting its activities between an existing Site Stewardship program 

and a new Nuclear Programs unit that will continue to support the nuclear material recycle 

and recovery activities that were supported by RTBF. For further information on the RTBF 

program, see GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed to Identify Total Costs of 

Weapons Complex Infrastructure and Research and Production Capabilities, 

The 

WDD budget supports weapons dismantlement, characterization of 

components to identify hazards and classification issues, disposition of 

components, and other activities. According to an NNSA official, 

GAO-10-582 

(Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2010).

26For weapons going through life extension programs, the process involves replacing 

multiple components and includes dismantling and reassembling the weapons. The WDD 

program does not fund dismantlement of weapons associated with life extension 

programs, but it does fund dismantlement of weapons subjected to destructive component 

testing under the stockpile surveillance program.

NNSA Programs Supporting 

Dismantlement

Dismantlement Budget
 

Page 17 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

approximately 80 percent of the current and anticipated future program 

budget is allocated to weapons dismantlement and disassembly, with the 

remaining funding allocated to component characterization, disposition, 

and other activities.

NNSA does not track the indirect dismantlement costs incurred by other 

NNSA supporting programs because these programs do not separately 

account for or apportion their costs between support for WDD and other 

stockpile support activities. For instance, the Office of Secure 

Transportation provides transportation support for programs across the 

NNSA nuclear security enterprise but does not collect or maintain 

accounting data based on weapon type or functional workload for 

weapons.

The dismantlement process begins when a weapon is transferred from a 

storage magazine in Zone 4 to a dismantlement bay in Zone 12. In the 

bay, the nuclear explosive package containing the primary and CSA; the 

arming, fuzing and firing system; and other nonnuclear components are 

removed from the weapon. Nuclear explosive packages that contain 

conventional high explosives are transferred to a cell for further 

dismantlement, while those with insensitive high explosives may be 

dismantled in a bay. Within the bay or cell, the high explosive is 

separated from the pit, and the weapon is considered officially 

dismantled.

From this stage forward, nuclear and nonnuclear components are 

accounted for individually, and each component has an established 

disposition path—it may be stored, recycled, or disposed of. The pit is 

packaged and returned to Zone 4 at Pantex and is stored pending either 

reuse in refurbished weapons or eventual disposal as part of NNSA’s 

plutonium disposition program. The high explosives are disposed of at 

Pantex through open-air burning. Other components recovered are 

returned to their original manufacturer—such as nonnuclear components 

sent to KCP for further disposition. Some classified or radiologically 

contaminated components may be disposed of through burial at the 

Nuclear Weapon 

Dismantlement Process
 

Page 18 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

NNSS. Nonnuclear components may be returned to KCP; demilitarized, 

sanitized, and disposed of at Pantex;27

The CSAs from dismantled weapons are sent to Y-12 for disassembly to 

recover HEU and other materials they contain. Because Y-12 is the sole 

national supplier of HEU, disassembly of CSAs is critical in supplying 

HEU for refurbished weapons and meeting HEU supply commitments for 

fuel for naval reactors and research reactors. The HEU retrieved from the 

CSAs is stored at Y-12 in the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility,

and other recovered materials are stored elsewhere on site. Materials that 

are not suitable for recycling or reuse are sent for burial at NNSS. See 

figure 3 for a general illustration of the nuclear weapons dismantlement 

process workflow.

or stored at Pantex for reuse.

 

27Demilitarization refers to the process whereby a component is rendered unusable for 

weapons purposes. Sanitization refers to removing or destroying any classified 

characteristics of a component, such as by crushing or shredding.
 

Page 19 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Figure 3: Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Process Workflow
 

Page 20 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

After generally declining from fiscal year 1992 through the early 2000s, 

the inventory of retired nuclear weapons awaiting dismantlement 

increased following nuclear stockpile reductions and significant additional 

weapon retirements in 2004 and 2007. At the same time, the number of 

weapons dismantled annually—NNSA’s annual dismantlement rate—

generally declined over the past 20 years because of a greater emphasis 

on dismantlement safety and increased weapon complexity.

In the early 1990s, following the end of the cold war, the United States 

had a large inventory of retired nuclear weapons awaiting 

dismantlement.28 This inventory shrank through the mid-1990s and early 

2000s. However, according to NNSA and DOD officials, significant 

stockpile reductions stemming from presidential direction in 2004 and 

2007 resulted in large numbers of additional weapons being declared 

surplus to defense needs and retired. For instance, in 2004, the President 

directed that the stockpile be reduced by nearly one-half by fiscal year 

2012. In 2007, the President directed substantial additional reductions in 

the stockpile. These decisions resulted in substantial growth in the 

inventory of retired weapons awaiting dismantlement. NNSA has reduced 

this inventory since that time. However, at the end of fiscal year 2012, the 

inventory of retired weapons that were awaiting dismantlement was 

similar in size to the inventory of weapons awaiting dismantlement in the 

mid-1990s.

 

28We agreed with NNSA officials to use the annual retired inventory of weapons as an

approximate measure of the number of weapons awaiting dismantlement from year to 

year, from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2012. For more information, see 

appendix I.

Weapons Inventory to 

Be Dismantled 

Shrank Then 

Increased, While 

NNSA’s Annual 

Dismantlement Rates 

Generally Declined

Inventory of Weapons 

Awaiting Dismantlement 

Declined Until the Early 

2000s but Then Increased 

Following Substantial 

Additional Weapon 

Retirements
 

Page 21 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

According to our analysis of dismantlement data, since the early 1990s, 

NNSA’s dismantlement rates have generally decreased, with NNSA 

dismantling about 1,000 fewer weapons annually in recent years than it 

was dismantling in the mid-1990s. In addition, in some years, only one or 

two types of retired war reserve weapons were dismantled.

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors attributed the overall decline in 

dismantlement rates in part to an increased emphasis on safety in nuclear 

explosive operations performed at the Pantex site. The initiation of the 

SS-21 process at Pantex in 1999 provided a more comprehensive 

framework for evaluating and mitigating the hazards associated with 

nuclear weapon activities, including dismantlement.29

Figure 4: SS-21 Improvements—Old and New B83 Bomb Work Stands

According to NNSA 

officials and Pantex site contractors, the SS-21 process also led to 

greater efficiency in dismantling individual weapons. For example, the 

SS-21 redesign of the B83 dismantlement process included development 

of a new work stand that holds the bomb throughout the dismantlement 

process, allowing Pantex to mitigate both the safety risks and time losses 

previously experienced in moving the weapon from one work stand to 

another. Figure 4 shows the old and new B83 work stands.

 

29In an October 1993 report on nuclear weapons dismantlement, we found that Pantex 

had completed fewer than half of the required safety analysis reports for its facilities and 

operations; see GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Safety, Technical, and Manpower Issues Slow 

DOE’s Disassembly Efforts, GAO/RCED-94-9 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 1993). 

According to NNSA and Pantex officials, the SS-21 process was instituted to correct these 

deficiencies and improve the overall safety of operations at Pantex, and Pantex is certified 

to work on all weapon types in the U.S. stockpile under this process.

NNSA’s Annual 

Dismantlement Rate Has 

Generally Decreased over 

the Past 20 Years as a 

Result of Increased Safety 

Emphasis and Weapon 

Complexity
 

Page 22 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

However, according to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, the 

new emphasis on safety stemming from SS-21 led Pantex to suspend the 

practice of dismantling multiple weapons within one bay or cell—a 

practice referred to as multiunit dismantlement. Some weapon systems 

are currently authorized for different types of multiunit dismantlement but, 

as a matter of practice, Pantex is not dismantling multiple weapons within 

individual bays and cells.30

• W48 warheads: dismantled two per cell, three per bay;

According to Pantex site contractors, this 

move away from multiunit processing offset other processing efficiencies, 

resulting in a significant decline in the number of weapons dismantled by 

the site annually. For instance, Pantex site contractors told us that 

throughout the 1990s, the site was processing multiple weapons in a bay 

or cell at a time, which enabled the site to typically dismantle 1,000 to 

2,000 weapons per year. With suspension of multiunit dismantlement, 

Pantex site contractors told us that it was unlikely the site could achieve a 

comparable rate of dismantlement today. Pantex site contractors provided 

us with data showing that, in the 1990s, some weapon systems were 

dismantled three- or four-at-a-time within a bay or cell, including the 

following systems:

• B57 bombs: dismantled two per cell, four per bay;

• W68 warheads: dismantled three per cell, four per bay;

• W70 warheads: dismantled three per cell, four per bay; and

• W79 warheads: dismantled two per cell, four per bay.

According to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, as a result of the 

reevaluation of safety at Pantex, NNSA concluded that the potential 

additional risk during multiunit dismantlement processing outweighed the 

benefits of dismantling multiple weapons within one bay or cell at a time.

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors also told us that 

dismantlement rates have generally decreased over time because 

weapons dismantled recently have tended to be more difficult and timeconsuming to dismantle than weapons dismantled in the 1990s. More 

specifically, an NNSA official told us that many of the weapons 

 

30For example, the B61 is authorized for dismantlement of two weapons simultaneously 

by two separate work crews within one bay or cell, though operations are currently 

conducted on a single-unit basis. Other weapons are authorized for multiunit processing, 

including the W87—which is authorized for one work crew to work on two weapons in a 

bay simultaneously—and the W80—which is authorized for dismantlement of one unit 

while another is staged in a transport canister within the bay.
 

Page 23 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

dismantled in the 1990s were smaller, less complex tactical nuclear 

weapons, such as nuclear artillery shells that were retired as a result of 

the 1991 presidential nuclear initiatives, and that more recently 

dismantled weapons—such as the B53 and B83 strategic bombs—have 

tended to be larger, more complex weapon systems.

Pantex site contractors told us that each weapon system comes apart 

differently and poses different dismantlement challenges. These 

variations affect the length of dismantlement time. Pantex has developed 

data to measure the time requirements in dismantling different weapon 

systems, referred to as dismantlement “difficulty quotients” (DQ).

According to Pantex officials, dismantlement DQs are not measures of 

technical difficulty per se in dismantling a weapon, but they are measures 

of the amount of time involved in the dismantlement operation. These 

DQs are developed by Pantex planning staff who work with individual 

weapon program engineers to determine the number of hours required for 

each dismantlement activity associated with the weapon in question.

These hours are rolled up for each weapon type and then divided by the 

number of hours required for a “standard” life extension program involving 

disassembly, inspection, refurbishment, and rebuilding of the weapon.

NNSA has used the DQ data to establish “dismantlement equivalent 

units” (DEQ) for each weapon type, in order to measure the relative 

dismantlement time requirements among different weapon systems. The 

DEQs are derived by dividing a weapon’s DQ against the DQ of a 

dismantlement base case. According to NNSA officials and Pantex site 

contractors, and based on our review of DQ and DEQ data, some 

weapon systems that have recently been dismantled in large numbers 

were more time-consuming to dismantle than other weapons due to their 

complexity and size, and these have high DEQs.

How NNSA measures progress toward its performance goal of 

dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of 

fiscal year 2022 is unclear and may make its reported progress 

misleading, including its practice of not tracking the actual date of 

retirement of individual dismantled weapons and its plans to reinstate to 

the stockpile—rather than dismantle—certain weapons retired prior to 

fiscal year 2009. In addition, NNSA faces challenges in managing 

planned dismantlement workload and is unlikely to achieve its 

dismantlement performance goal because a large number of weapons 

retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are in managed retirement status, and it is 

uncertain whether these weapons will be released for dismantlement in 

time for NNSA to meet its dismantlement goal.

How NNSA Measures 

Progress Toward Its 

Dismantlement 

Performance Goal 

May Be Misleading, 

and NNSA Is Unlikely 

to Achieve This Goal
 

Page 24 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

In 2006, NNSA established a performance goal for the WDD program to 

dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal 

year 2022. This goal was established to demonstrate to Congress that 

NNSA had a plan for timely, safe, and secure dismantlement of nuclear 

weapons. In March 2013, we obtained a draft of NNSA’s future 

dismantlement schedule for all retired war reserve weapons, which 

included the schedule for the dismantlement, or other disposition, of the 

subset of weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. Our analysis of 

NNSA’s dismantlement schedule for weapons retired prior to fiscal year 

2009 and interviews with NNSA officials indicate that how NNSA 

measures progress toward this performance goal is unclear and may be 

misleading for two reasons.

First, the way in which NNSA measures progress toward its 

dismantlement performance goal is unclear and may be misleading 

because NNSA as a matter of practice does not identify and track the 

actual retirement date of individual weapons that are dismantled.

According to an NNSA official, NNSA knows how many weapons of each 

system type were retired prior to fiscal year 2009. However, NNSA and 

Pantex do not track the date of retirement of individual weapons when 

they are dismantled at the Pantex Plant. Instead, whenever Pantex 

dismantles an individual retired weapon of a system type represented in 

the pre-fiscal year 2009 inventory—regardless of that weapon’s actual 

date of retirement—NNSA counts that dismantlement as being equivalent 

to a weapon retired prior to fiscal year 2009 and counts it toward the fiscal 

year 2022 goal. Because of this approach, it is possible, according to an 

NNSA official, that NNSA is counting weapons toward the achievement of 

its performance goal that were retired after fiscal year 2009. This official 

told us that while individual retired weapons in storage at military facilities 

can be tracked by retirement date, weapons retired prior to fiscal year 

2009 are not marked or designated for priority dismantlement. However, 

this official stated that, in general, it is unlikely that a more recently retired 

weapon would be selected for dismantlement if older retired weapons of 

the same type are available.

An NNSA official also commented that there may be technical reasons 

why an individual weapon retired after fiscal year 2009 may be 

transferred to NNSA for dismantlement before a weapon retired prior to 

fiscal year 2009. For instance, an NNSA official told us that NNSA’s 

stockpile surveillance program might identify potential problems with a 

specific component, such as a capacitor, that might apply only to 

individual weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 and not to those retired 

How NNSA Measures 

Dismantlement Progress 

May Be Misleading
 

Page 25 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

before, making dismantlement of the weapons retired after fiscal year 

2009 a higher priority.

Second, how NNSA measures progress toward its dismantlement 

performance goal is also unclear and may be misleading because some 

weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are reinstated to the stockpile 

rather than dismantled. Specifically, in our analysis of NNSA’s 

dismantlement schedule as of March 2013 for weapons retired prior to 

fiscal year 2009, we found that approximately 9 percent of the weapons 

retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are scheduled to be reinstated during 

fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2022 or later.

According to NNSA officials, NNSA plans to reinstate these weapons, in 

part, to offset the costs of rebuilding weapons disassembled under the 

stockpile surveillance program. Through this program, in a given year, a 

random sample of weapons from each weapon system is selected and 

withdrawn from the stockpile, disassembled, and inspected, and usually 

one weapon in each weapon system sample is subjected to nonnuclear, 

destructive testing of its nuclear components and cannot be rebuilt. The 

destructively tested units are replaced by weapons kept in readiness 

states in the inactive category of the stockpile, known as quality 

assurance and reliability testing replacement weapons. The remaining 

weapons from the sample set could be rebuilt following inspection and 

returned to the stockpile. However, in lieu of rebuilding all of the 

disassembled weapons, NNSA replaces some of them by reinstating 

retired war reserve weapons to the stockpile. According to NNSA officials, 

this is a cost-effective practice that avoids the costly rebuilding of 

weapons evaluated under the surveillance program and also reduces the 

number of weapons in the dismantlement queue.

An NNSA official told us that it is technically correct that under this 

practice some weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are not expected 

to be dismantled but reinstated to the stockpile instead. However, this 

official noted that, under the reinstatement practice, NNSA is still 

dismantling a weapon for each weapon that is reinstated to the 

stockpile—that is, the weapon in the stockpile that is disassembled and 

inspected under the surveillance program. Thus, the reinstatement 
 

Page 26 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

practice represents an equivalent dismantlement that has a neutral 

impact on the size of the stockpile.31

We have found in our prior work that having clear performance goals and 

measures is a key element of effective program management.32

Performance goals or measures that are not clearly stated may be 

confusing or misleading. Neither NNSA’s dismantlement performance 

goal as currently written, nor the way that progress toward the goal is 

measured, makes it clear that NNSA is counting equivalent numbers of 

weapons dismantled. Without such clarity, Congress and other users of 

this performance information may not understand the age or types of 

weapons that NNSA is counting toward achievement of the performance 

goal.

The uncertainties surrounding when weapons in managed retirement—

retired weapons that have not been approved by the Nuclear Weapons 

Council for dismantlement—may be released for dismantlement present 

challenges for NNSA in scheduling future dismantlement workload and 

make it unlikely that NNSA will achieve its goal of dismantling all weapons 

retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022. During our 

review, weapons from three different weapon systems were in managed 

retirement. These include some

• W84-0s retired in fiscal year 2006,

• W80-1s retired in fiscal year 2007, and

 

31During our review, DOD and military service officials raised concerns about the practice 

of reinstating retired weapons to the stockpile and its potential implications for stockpile 

reliability. NNSA officials provided us with additional information about the reinstatement 

practice and how NNSA addresses potential reliability concerns associated with weapons 

that could be reinstated, and they noted that reinstatements are conducted with the full 

cognizance of the joint DOD-DOE Project Officers Group responsible for weapon systems 

that are reinstated.

32For additional information on developing performance goals and measures, see GAO, 

Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act Implementation Provides Important 

Opportunities to Address Government Challenges, GAO-11-617T (Washington, D.C.: May 

10, 2011); Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can Improve 

Usefulness to Decisionmakers, GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69 (Washington, D.C.: February

1999); The Results Act: An Evaluator’s Guide to Assessing Agency Annual Performance 

Plans, GAO/GGD-10.1.20 (Washington, D.C.: April 1998); and Executive Guide: 

Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, 

GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).

Uncertainties Related to 

Weapons in Managed 

Retirement Make It 

Unlikely That NNSA Will 

Achieve Its Dismantlement 

Goal
 

Page 27 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

• W76-0s retired from fiscal years 2004 through 2012.

The W84-0s and W80-1s currently in managed retirement may not be 

available to NNSA for dismantlement prior to fiscal year 2022 because 

both of these systems are being held in managed retirement as 

candidates for potential reuse as the warhead on a future long-range 

standoff missile to replace the Air Force’s current ALCM.33

According to an NNSA official, if the W80-1 is selected for reuse on the 

future missile, NNSA could move the W84-0s back into its dismantlement 

schedule in the future. Depending on the timing, such a decision could 

present challenges to NNSA and Pantex in meeting the fiscal year 2022 

dismantlement goal, as the W84-0 is considered a relatively difficult, or 

time-consuming, weapon to dismantle based on our review of DQ and 

DEQ data. However, this official told us that the W84-0 has many modern 

features. For this reason, there is a possibility that, even if this weapon 

system is not selected for reuse as the long-range standoff missile 

warhead, NNSA and the national labs may seek to retain the W84-0s 

indefinitely for other potential future warhead reuse options. Because of 

these uncertainties, NNSA had not scheduled dismantlement of any W84-

0s—including those in managed retirement—in the dismantlement 

schedule we reviewed, as of March 2013, and NNSA officials told us that 

these weapons will be addressed in one way or another after fiscal year 

2022. Given this time frame, and since all W84-0s in managed retirement 

were retired in fiscal year 2006, NNSA is unlikely to achieve its goal of 

dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of 

fiscal year 2022 unless these weapons are released from managed 

retirement, and a decision is made to dismantle them.

NNSA and 

DOD officials told us that release of the W84-0s and W80-1s in managed 

retirement for dismantlement is contingent on a future Nuclear Weapons 

Council selection of a warhead for potential reuse on the future missile.

However, the timing of the future Nuclear Weapons Council’s decision, 

whether it will select the W84-0 or W80-1 for the long-range standoff 

missile, and when weapons will be released for dismantlement remains 

uncertain, according to NNSA and DOD officials.

Alternatively, if the W84-0 is selected for reuse on the future missile, the 

time frame for dismantlement of the W80-1s in managed retirement 

 

33In addition, B61 bombs are also being evaluated for reuse as the warhead for the longrange standoff missile, though no B61s are currently in managed retirement.
 

Page 28 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

remains uncertain. NNSA has tentatively scheduled the W80-1s for 

dismantlement before fiscal year 2020. However, DOD officials told us 

that, given the need to sustain the ALCM through the mid-2020s, it is 

unlikely that the W80-1s in managed retirement would be released for 

dismantlement before the first warhead is produced for the new missile 

and before the missile achieves initial operating capability, projected for 

later in the 2020s. 

Uncertainties also surround the W76-0s in managed retirement and when 

they might be released for dismantlement, which could pose challenges 

for NNSA in meeting its dismantlement performance goal. NNSA is 

currently conducting a W76 life extension program under which W76-0 

warheads in the stockpile are replaced with refurbished W76-1 warheads.

NNSA expects to complete this life extension program by fiscal year 

2019. As a hedge against technical problems in the life extension 

program process and in the refurbished warheads, however, the W76-0s 

are to remain in managed retirement and be unavailable for 

dismantlement until the life extension program processes and W76-1 unit 

reliability are “satisfactorily established,” according to the fiscal year 2011 

nuclear weapons Requirements and Planning Document. However, the 

criteria for “satisfactory establishment” of the W76 life extension program 

process and W76-1 unit reliability are unclear, creating uncertainty as to 

whether the W76-0s in managed retirement will be released to NNSA in 

time for dismantlement by the end of fiscal year 2022.

This uncertainty is driven by concerns about the life extension program 

that have been raised by DOE and DOD officials. For instance, in 2006 

and 2012, the DOE Inspector General reported on delays in the W76-1 

life extension program that put program startup and production goals at 

risk. In March 2013, DOD officials expressed concerns to us about the 

W76-1 life extension program, including that NNSA has been unable to 

produce consistent quantities of W76-1 warheads, and they told us that 

there are no formal criteria for the Nuclear Weapons Council’s decision to 

release the W76-0s in managed retirement. These officials stated that it 

would be difficult to predict the completion of the W76-1 life extension 

program given inconsistent production, and that it was impossible to say 

whether the W76-0s in managed retirement could be released for 

dismantlement prior to fiscal year 2019 without additional confidence in 

NNSA’s production capability.
 

Page 29 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

According to DOD officials we interviewed, the 2010 New START treaty 

may eventually result in the retirement of additional weapons from the 

U.S. stockpile. However, DOD officials told us it is unlikely that entry into 

force of New START will lead immediately to additional warhead 

retirements and increased dismantlement workload for NNSA. Instead, 

DOD officials said that the United States will meet the New START 

ceiling—1,550 operationally deployed nuclear weapons—to be in force by 

2018 by transitioning currently deployed nuclear weapons to nondeployed 

“hedge” status without any significant change in the total stockpile size.

DOD officials told us that the retirement of additional weapons from the 

stockpile stemming from New START will be predicated on the successful 

restoration of the NNSA weapons production infrastructure, including the 

construction and operation of new NNSA facilities supporting nuclear 

weapons production—the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Replacement Nuclear Facility at LANL, and the Uranium Production 

Facility at Y-12—which they did not believe could be achieved until the 

late 2020s or early 2030s.34

The deferred retirement of weapons following entry into force of the New 

START treaty until the late 2020s or early 2030s could present challenges 

to NNSA in managing its future dismantlement schedule and workforce.

Specifically, there could be a significant gap in dismantlement work during 

the mid- to late-2020s, between the end of fiscal year 2022, when NNSA 

expects to complete most of its planned dismantlement workload, and the 

time when a large number of additional weapons would be available for 

dismantlement resulting from New START. This gap could affect NNSA’s 

ability to manage the dismantlement workforce, posing challenges for 

NNSA in dismantling weapons retired as a result of the treaty. In 

particular, an NNSA official expressed concern that this gap in 

Because of these conditions, it remains 

unclear when the weapons associated with the New START reductions 

will be retired. Due to the uncertainty on the timing of these retirements 

NNSA has not yet scheduled for dismantlement any weapons that may be 

removed from the stockpile under New START.

 

34The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility is intended to 

provide LANL with a modernized capability to analyze and store plutonium. However, 

NNSA has deferred construction of this facility until at least fiscal year 2019. The Uranium 

Production Facility is intended to provide Y-12 with a single consolidated uranium 

processing and component production facility. This facility was renamed the Uranium 

Capabilities Replacement Project and is scheduled to be completed in three phases 

through the mid-2030s.

Deferred Retirement 

of Weapons under 

New START Will 

Pose Challenges to 

NNSA’s Management 

of Future 

Dismantlement 

Workload and 

Workforce
 

Page 30 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

dismantlement workload in the mid-2020s could result in the loss of 

certified dismantlement personnel because dismantlement technicians at 

Pantex lose their certifications if they have not worked on a weapon type 

within the past year. As a result, Pantex may need to retrain and recertify 

sufficient numbers of new dismantlement personnel in the late 2020s to 

resume dismantlement efforts to address retired weapons stemming from 

New START.

According to an NNSA official we interviewed, relaxing the fiscal year 

2022 dismantlement performance goal could allow the dismantlement 

workload to be leveled, and a steady dismantlement workforce to be 

maintained at Pantex through the mid-2020s. Pantex site contractors 

agreed with this view and stated that they were working with the WDD 

program manager to avoid a potential dismantlement workload gap. An 

NNSA official also told us that stretching out the dismantlement workload 

beyond fiscal year 2022 could free up program resources—assuming 

future WDD program budgets are comparable in size to the current 

budget of approximately $50 million per year—to allow the program to 

focus greater attention on disposing of a large inventory of legacy 

components from weapons dismantled long ago that are no longer in the 

current stockpile.

Our analysis of Pantex data indicates that the physical capacity at Pantex 

should be sufficient to allow the site to meet NNSA’s planned 

dismantlement workload through fiscal year 2022 and to meet all other 

stockpile commitments, including surveillance and life extension program 

activities. NNSA’s ability to significantly accelerate dismantlement and 

complete planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022 could be costly, 

and it is unclear whether Pantex would have sufficient capacity to do so.

Pantex Capacity 

Sufficient to Meet 

NNSA’s Planned 

Dismantlement 

Workload but 

Accelerating 

Dismantlement Could 

Be Costly
 

Page 31 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

In April 2013, we obtained and analyzed data on the physical capacity at 

Pantex to address NNSA’s long-term dismantlement schedule and other 

stockpile plans as of March 2013 and found that sufficient bay and cell 

capacity should be available to meet these commitments. Specifically, we 

analyzed data from a computer-based system, known as the Long Range 

Production Planning Model (LRPPM), that Pantex uses to forecast the 

numbers of bays and cells needed to address future planned workload at 

the site—including dismantlement, surveillance, maintenance, staging, 

and life extension program activities.

The LRPPM also provides a tool to NNSA to evaluate the capacity 

available at Pantex to support different potential stockpile plans and 

scenarios—such as the effect of a delay in completing or initiating a life 

extension program for a certain weapon system, or the impact of 

accelerating the dismantlement of certain weapons. On the basis of the 

workload schedules at any given time, Pantex site contractors can use 

the LRPPM to calculate the amount of time and the numbers of bays and 

cells needed to complete annual workload from year to year.35 We used 

data generated by the LRPPM to assess the future bay and cell 

requirements for dismantlement and other stockpile related activities at 

Pantex on the basis of NNSA’s dismantlement schedule and other longterm stockpile plans as of March 2013.36

 

35The LRPPM converts workload by year—i.e., the numbers of weapons to be processed 

under one activity or another in a given fiscal year—into annual bay and cell requirements 

through a series of calculations. First, the system calculates the total number of hours 

needed to complete a discrete workload activity, such as dismantlement of B61-3 bombs, 

in a given fiscal year by multiplying the number of weapons to be processed that year by 

the estimated amount of time needed to complete that activity for a single weapon. The 

system then divides this total time to complete the planned activity by 2,080—the number 

of hours available in a single facility (bay or cell) at one work shift, during the course of a 

year. This results in the total numbers of bays or cells needed to complete that activity in 

that year. For example, if 100 weapons of a given type are to be dismantled in a given 

fiscal year, and it takes an estimated 30 hours to complete dismantlement of a single unit, 

the bay requirements for this activity over the course of the year would be 1.44 (or 3,000 

divided by 2,080). The LRPPM adds bay and cell requirements for all planned workload 

activities (e.g., dismantlement, surveillance, and life extension programs) to determine the 

total bay and cell requirements.

We did not validate the LRPPM 

system itself.

36NNSA and Pantex officials told us in April 2013 that the capacity projections generated 

by the LRPPM are subject to change and are often updated because stockpile 

requirements and resources can frequently change after a Production and Planning 

Directive is issued—such as a decision to accelerate dismantlement of one system and 

defer another.

Physical Capacity at 

Pantex Should Be 

Sufficient to Meet NNSA’s 

Planned Dismantlement 

Workload and Other 

Stockpile Commitments
 

Page 32 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Based on the LRPPM data, sufficient bay and cell capacity should be 

available to meet NNSA’s planned weapon dismantlement, life extension 

program, and surveillance workload from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal 

year 2022.37

Notwithstanding these projections of sufficient capacity, as of April 2013, 

NNSA officials cautioned that there are dozens of issues that could 

significantly change stockpile workload schedules and capacity 

requirements at Pantex in the future. These factors include reduced longterm funding levels for all NNSA stockpile-related work stemming from 

sequestration; potential new nuclear weapon requirements generated by 

the U.S. Strategic Command;

In many years, the total number of bays and cells needed to 

complete total planned workload at the site exceeds the capacity limit at 

one work shift but does not require a second work shift. Pantex site 

contractors told us in those cases that they could address excess 

workload through overtime pay or a partial second shift, which they 

believed would be less expensive than maintaining a larger workforce to 

sustain the use of two work shifts.

38 potential loss of military interest in a future 

planned common, or interoperable, warhead to replace the W78 and 

W88; new presidential guidance that could call for significantly reduced 

stockpile levels; and delays in startup of new NNSA facilities supporting 

nuclear weapons refurbishment.

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors said that they believe that 

significantly accelerating future dismantlement workload—to complete 

total planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022—could be costly and 

that it is unclear whether the site would have sufficient capacity to do so.

However, NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us that Pantex 

can and has accelerated some planned dismantlement work in response 

to changing military needs and to annual financial performance incentives 

provided by NNSA to the Pantex site operating contractor.

 

37After fiscal year 2022, the only dismantlement workload that NNSA and Pantex had 

scheduled in the LRPPM data we reviewed were W76-0 dismantlements.

38The U.S. Strategic Command, part of the Department of Defense, has primary 

responsibility for targeting nuclear weapons, preparing the U.S. strategic nuclear war plan, 

and, if ordered by the President, executing the war plan.

NNSA’s Ability to 

Significantly Accelerate 

Dismantlement and 

Complete Planned 

Workload Earlier Than 

Planned Could Be Costly
 

Page 33 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

NNSA has assessed the capacity at the Pantex site and the costs to 

significantly accelerate the dismantlement schedule in order to dismantle 

all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 earlier than the end of fiscal 

year 2022. Specifically, in March 2011, the Office of the Vice President 

asked NNSA to assess the possibility of accelerating its dismantlement 

schedule, to dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by 

fiscal year 2018, or 4 years earlier than the performance goal date. In 

December 2011, the Office of the Secretary of Defense also asked NNSA 

to evaluate this scenario and a second scenario for completing 

dismantlement of all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal 

year 2020, or 2 years earlier than the performance goal date. In response 

to these inquiries, in fiscal year 2011, NNSA identified the requirements 

and estimated the costs of increasing annual dismantlement rates.

To achieve the rate of dismantlement associated with either scenario, 

NNSA identified the need for certain technical improvements at Pantex, 

including bringing one bay and one cell that were unavailable for 

dismantlement operations back online, among other things. In addition, 

NNSA estimated at the time that approximately $212 million in additional 

funding on top of the projected baseline budgets for WDD and other 

NNSA programs supporting WDD for fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 

2018 would be needed to achieve the fiscal year 2018 dismantlement 

scenario. Alternatively, NNSA estimated that $265 million in additional 

funding on top of the projected baseline budgets for WDD and other 

NNSA programs supporting WDD for fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 

2020 would be needed to achieve the fiscal year 2020 scenario. We did 

not verify the accuracy of these funding estimates. See table 2 for more 

information on NNSA’s estimated annual funding needs associated with 

these dismantlement acceleration scenarios.

Capacity to Significantly 

Accelerate Future 

Dismantlement Workload Is 

Uncertain and Would Likely 

Entail Significant Costs
 

Page 34 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Table 2: NNSA Estimated Additional Funding to Achieve Fiscal Year 2022 

Dismantlement Performance Goal by Fiscal Year 2018 or Fiscal Year 2020

(Dollars in millions)

Program Total

Increased funding to achieve fiscal year 2018 dismantlement scenario goal

WDD program $119.8

Other NNSA programs supporting WDD $91.6

Total $211.5

Increased funding to achieve fiscal year 2020 dismantlement scenario goal

WDD program $142.7

Other NNSA programs supporting WDD $122.4

Total $265.0

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

Note: Amounts may not total due to rounding.

Under NNSA’s 2011 estimate, achieving either of these acceleration 

scenarios was predicated on additional funding being made available to 

the WDD program and the other supporting NNSA programs beginning in 

fiscal year 2012. According to an NNSA official, no additional funding was 

provided by Congress to NNSA in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 to support 

either the 2018 or 2020 dismantlement acceleration scenario. NNSA 

officials and Pantex site contractors told us that, since the 2011 estimate, 

they have not reassessed the costs of accelerating its dismantlement 

schedule and have not reevaluated the constraints—including bay and 

cell capacity, and the numbers of certified workers available—or the 

impact on the site’s other scheduled stockpile life extension program and 

surveillance work that would be associated with accelerating 

dismantlement rates to meet the fiscal year 2018 or 2020 dismantlement 

scenario. NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us they were 

reluctant to undertake such a reevaluation without a clear signal of new 

congressional interest in accelerated dismantlement. As a result, we 

could not determine whether it would be possible for NNSA to accelerate 

dismantlement workload to complete dismantlement of all weapons 

retired prior to fiscal year 2009 earlier than fiscal year 2022.

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us that they believed it 

would not be possible to complete dismantlement of the remaining 

weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2018 without 

compromising the site’s planned stockpile life extension program and 

surveillance workload. However, an NNSA official told us that completing 
 

Page 35 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

dismantlement work 2 years early, or by the end of fiscal year 2020, might 

be possible if (1) Congress provided additional funding to the WDD 

program and supporting NNSA programs beginning in fiscal year 2014 

and (2) other conditions were met, including timely Nuclear Weapons 

Council decisions on the release of weapons in managed retirement and 

rehabilitation of the additional bay and cell at Pantex. To accelerate 

dismantlement to meet a fiscal year 2020 goal, an NNSA official 

estimated that additional funding of approximately $212 million, as a 

rough order of magnitude, would likely be required on top of current 

projected baseline budgets for WDD and supporting NNSA programs—

that is, the amount of additional funding NNSA estimated in 2011 that 

would be needed to achieve the dismantlement rates for the fiscal year 

2018 acceleration scenario described above.

Even though NNSA and Pantex have not formally reassessed the costs 

and capacity constraints of accelerating dismantlement to complete 

planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022, according to NNSA 

officials and Pantex site contractors, the Pantex site is generally able to 

accelerate dismantlement work. Specifically, Pantex has regularly 

exceeded annual dismantlement targets established in the Production 

and Planning Directives and Program Control Documents by running 

extra dismantlement shifts and allowing overtime pay. Based on our 

analysis of NNSA data for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012, the 

Pantex site exceeded the annual planned dismantlement rates every year 

by approximately 14 percent on average.39

Pantex has accelerated some dismantlement work in response to 

changing military needs that have required some weapons to be 

dismantled more quickly. For instance, in 2011, NNSA agreed to a Navy 

request to accelerate dismantlement of retired W76-0 warheads at the 

rate of 100 units per year, with the goal of dismantling 500 warheads by 

the end of fiscal year 2016. At the time, NNSA had not planned for 

significant and consistent dismantlement of W76-0 warheads until fiscal 

year 2015. According to Navy officials we interviewed, accelerating 

dismantlement of retired W76-0 warheads allowed the Navy to avoid 

 

39NNSA officials stated that the high annual rates of dismantlement would not necessarily 

lead NNSA to complete planned dismantlement workload earlier than fiscal year 2022, as 

dismantlement workload is dynamic and adjusted for increases or decreases in the 

planned quantities of weapons available for dismantlement, and because dismantlement 

workload must be balanced with component disposition work.

Pantex Has Accelerated 

Dismantlement of Some 

Weapons in Response to 

Military Needs and Financial 

Performance Incentives
 

Page 36 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

constructing new weapon storage facilities, saving the Navy 

approximately $190 million in estimated construction costs.

NNSA has also provided financial performance incentives to the Pantex 

site operating contractor to encourage the site to pursue accelerated 

rates of dismantlement. NNSA has included dismantlement-related 

financial incentives in the annual performance evaluation plans that set 

forth the criteria used by NNSA to evaluate the Pantex site operating 

contractor’s performance and determine the total fee the contractor 

earned. For example, the fiscal year 2012 performance evaluation plan 

included five dismantlement-related performance incentives, as follows:

• exceed planned dismantlements of B53s,

• complete scheduled W76-0 dismantlement quantities,

• exceed scheduled W76-0 dismantlement quantities,

• complete dismantlement of at least 14 W31 trainer units from Y-12, 

and

• exceed scheduled W80-0 dismantlement quantities.

NNSA determined, in its fiscal year 2012 performance evaluation report, 

that the Pantex site operating contractor substantially exceeded each of 

these goals. On the basis of this performance, along with the site’s 

performance in meeting other objectives not related to dismantlement, the 

site contractor earned over $16.5 million in award fees for defense 

program-related work that year.40

In addition to accelerating dismantlement activities at Pantex, NNSA 

officials told us that consideration had been given in the past to 

augmenting dismantlement capacity by using a similar weapons 

assembly/disassembly facility, known as the Device Assembly Facility, 

located at the NNSS. Using this facility in such a way would be similar to 

an approach to increase dismantlement capacity recommended by the 

 

40According to NNSA officials, because of the way the incentives are structured in the 

performance evaluation plans, it is not possible to determine the total earned fee in a fiscal 

year resulting directly from dismantlement performance. Specifically, while there are 

some dismantlement-specific performance incentives, in other cases, the dismantlement 

performance targets can be one component of a composite, Pantex-wide performance 

goal. In those cases, the amount of the fee attributable to the dismantlement portion 

cannot be determined, according to NNSA officials, because fee amounts are not 

generally allocated to specific targets in the composite performance goal.
 

Page 37 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Secretary of Energy Advisory Board in 2005.41 However, NNSA officials 

told us that using the Device Assembly Facility for nuclear weapons 

dismantlement operations could carry significant costs. According to 

NNSA officials, the facility currently does not have the necessary safety 

authorizations, sufficient numbers of certified technicians and security 

personnel, and other required tooling and resources to perform 

dismantlement operations there. For example, because the SS-21 

process is a Pantex-specific plan for dismantlement that takes into 

account the unique features of the site, Pantex site contractors told us the 

SS-21 process would need to be recreated at the Device Assembly 

Facility to adjust for features specific to that facility and the weapons to be 

dismantled there. NNSA officials said that they believed meeting these 

requirements could take a significant amount of time, so that the 

augmented dismantlement capacity at the facility might be operational for 

only a few years before the planned dismantlement workload is expected 

to be completed.

We identified several policy and technical challenges affecting NNSA’s 

disassembly and disposition of nuclear and nonnuclear components from 

dismantled nuclear weapons. First, NNSA has not established a capability 

for the disassembly and disposition of pits from dismantled nuclear 

weapons, creating uncertainty about when they will be removed from 

Pantex. Second, NNSA is retaining much of its inventory of CSAs, which

is not expected to have a near-term effect on NNSA’s ability to meet its 

external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. Naval Reactors Program 

and others, but poses challenges to Y-12’s ability to plan its workload.

Third, NNSA is storing millions of nonnuclear components from 

dismantled weapons at Pantex in a contingency inventory that may 

exceed future weapons needs, and the agency’s ability to effectively 

manage this inventory is complicated by decisions to retain many 

components for potential reuse in weapons and by limitations in Pantex’s 

previous component inventory management system. Finally, there is a 

large backlog of legacy components and unknown legacy material that, at 

 

41In 2005, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Nuclear Weapons Complex 

Infrastructure Task Force recommended that NNSA utilize the Device Assembly Facility 

for assembly of nuclear weapons utilizing insensitive high explosives, thereby freeing up 

capacity at Pantex for expedited weapons dismantlement. Secretary of Energy Advisory 

Board Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force, Recommendations for the 

Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future (Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2005).

Disassembly and 

Disposition of Some 

Nuclear and 

Nonnuclear 

Components from 

Dismantled Weapons 

Is Complicated by 

Policy and Technical 

Challenges
 

Page 38 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

current funding levels, could take up to a decade or longer to dispose of 

because of technical and classification security challenges associated 

with the characterization of components. However, efforts to address the 

need to retain older parts and upgrade Pantex’s component inventory 

management system are already under way.

NNSA has not established a capability for the disassembly and 

disposition of pits from dismantled nuclear weapons, creating uncertainty 

about when they will be removed from Pantex and potentially posing 

challenges to site operations. In 1994, the United States declared 38.2 

metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium as surplus to national security 

needs, and in 1997 NNSA announced a plan to dispose of this plutonium 

through conversion into mixed oxide fuel by building a dedicated pit 

disassembly and conversion capability and a mixed oxide fuel fabrication 

facility, among other means.42

However, after 15 years of consideration, NNSA has decided not to 

establish a dedicated plutonium disposition capability and is studying 

other options for disassembly of surplus pits. As a result, the future of the 

overall plutonium disposition program remains unclear.

Much of the plutonium slated for 

disposition is contained in nuclear weapon pits, which must be 

disassembled and converted to plutonium oxide before it can be 

fabricated into mixed oxide fuel.

43 Since 1997, 

NNSA has proposed a number of planned alternatives for establishing a 

plutonium disposition capability; however, in 2007 and 2010, we identified 

persistent problems with cost overruns and schedule delays in many of 

these plans.44

 

42The United States declared an additional 9 tons of plutonium as excess in 2007.

In its fiscal year 2014 budget, NNSA stated that it remains 

committed to plutonium disposition but that, in consideration of 

preliminary cost increases and the current budget environment, it is 

43The plutonium disposition program is managed by NNSA’s Fissile Materials Disposition 

Program.

44GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Address Uncertainties with and 

Strengthen Independent Safety Oversight of Its Plutonium Disposition Program, 

GAO-10-378 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010); and Department of Energy: Major 

Construction Projects Need a Consistent Approach for Assessing Technology Readiness 

to Help Avoid Cost Increases and Delays, GAO-07-336 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 

2007).

NNSA Has Not 

Established a Capability 

for Disassembly and 

Disposition of Pits Stored 

at Pantex
 

Page 39 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

assessing alternative strategies for a plutonium disposition capability, 

which may further delay the timelines for pit removal from Pantex.45

Because NNSA has not established a capability for pit disassembly and 

conversion, Pantex has accrued a large inventory of pits that are surplus 

to defense needs. These pits are being stored on-site until a pit 

disassembly capability is operational. Many of the surplus pits are 

available for disassembly. The remaining pits on site comprise the U.S. 

strategic reserve of plutonium, or serve as candidates for potential reuse 

in refurbished stockpile weapons.

Pantex is authorized by federal authorities to store up to 20,000 pits onsite. Pantex site contractors told us that the pits from all weapons to be 

dismantled by fiscal year 2022 could be accommodated at the site without 

surpassing the 20,000 pit limit. According to our analysis of NNSA’s future 

dismantlement schedule, additional weapons, each with one pit, are to be 

dismantled from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2022, but the site will 

remain within the overall storage limit.

However, as future weapons are retired and dismantled and, in the 

absence of a plutonium disposition capability, storing an increasing 

number of pits will require a reconfiguration of some of the nonnuclear 

bays at Pantex. Pantex site contractors told us that while Zone 4 

magazine storage is reaching capacity under its current configuration, if a 

dedicated pit disassembly and conversion capability is not built, additional 

nonnuclear bays within Zone 12 would need to be converted to permit the 

storage of the remaining pits up to the 20,000 pit limit. An NNSA official 

told us that these bays have recently been authorized for nuclear 

explosive operations and could be used for pit storage without any 

adverse impact on the site’s ability to perform its anticipated workload.

See figure 5 for photos of the weapon and pit storage magazines in 

Pantex Zone 4.

 

45NNSA is disposing of a small amount of plutonium using a pit disassembly development 

and demonstration project located at LANL.
 

Page 40 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Figure 5: Pantex Zone 4 Magazines for Pit and Weapon Storage

NNSA has made a policy decision to retain many CSAs for potential 

reuse in refurbished weapons and as part of the U.S. strategic reserve.

Retention of these CSAs is not currently expected to have a near-term 

impact on NNSA’s external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. Naval 

Reactors Program and other programs, but retention poses challenges to 

Y-12’s ability to plan its future workload.

At the end of fiscal year 2012, NNSA identified a large number of CSAs 

from dismantled weapons or in retired weapons awaiting 

dismantlement.46

 

46CSAs within active stockpile weapons, managed retirement weapons, and a small 

quantity held as test objects and for enhanced surveillance activities were not included in 

this inventory. 

Some of these CSAs were identified as excess by 

NNSA and were available for disassembly at Y-12. The HEU from the 

excess CSAs may be used to meet NNSA’s external HEU supply 

commitments to the U.S. Naval Reactors Program and other programs.

However, there were many remaining CSAs being retained by NNSA that 

were not available for disassembly. According to NNSA documents and 

officials, as well as Y-12 site contractors, NNSA is retaining many CSAs 

for several reasons, including the following:

NNSA’s Decision to Retain 

Many CSAs Poses 

Challenges to Y-12’s 

Workload Planning

NNSA Is Retaining Many CSAs
 

Page 41 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

• To provide NNSA with multiple options in selecting which CSAs to 

reuse in refurbished weapons. According to data provided by NNSA 

officials and Y-12 site contractors in March 2013, NNSA is retaining 

two types of CSAs as options for reuse in a potential future W78 

warhead refurbishment.47

• To provide a technical hedge for aging CSAs. Additional CSAs are 

being retained because of uncertainty about the effects of aging on 

the retained CSAs. Some of the retained CSA types have not been 

disassembled and inspected in many years, and the national 

laboratories have expressed the concern that the age and 

degradation of components may affect the number of useable CSAs 

and CSA parts. The laboratories recommend that the condition of 

many of the systems be reassessed and that those systems found 

unacceptable be removed from the list, but NNSA officials told us they 

had no plans to do so. NNSA officials told us they could not estimate 

the number of CSAs that the laboratories have requested as a hedge 

due to concerns about their age.

An NNSA official told us that NNSA 

anticipated a decision on the CSAs for W78 reuse by 2016, which 

would lead to the release for disassembly of the retained CSAs not 

selected shortly thereafter. In addition, NNSA is also retaining four 

types of CSAs as options for reuse in a warhead on the Air Force’s 

planned long-range standoff missile. An NNSA official told us that the 

work to select CSAs for a long-range standoff missile warhead was in 

a very preliminary stage and that it was not possible to estimate a 

date for the release of the CSAs currently being held as reuse 

candidates.

• For potential use in planetary defense against earthbound asteroids.

NNSA officials told us that CSAs associated with a certain warhead 

indicated as excess in the 2012 Production and Planning Directive are 

being retained in an indeterminate state pending a senior-level 

government evaluation of their use in planetary defense against 

earthbound asteroids. While NNSA has declared these CSAs to be 

excess and, until March 2013, had scheduled them for disassembly 

beginning in fiscal year 2015, the national labs’ retention letter has 

also characterized the CSA associated with this warhead as an 

“irreplaceable national asset.” The WDD program is coordinating 

NNSA’s evaluation of their use in planetary defense with the support 

of LLNL, LANL, and Y-12.

 

47Refurbishment of the W78 is intended to modify the weapon such that it may be used on 

multiple platforms.
 

Page 42 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

• To provide a strategic reserve of HEU. Because the United States no 

longer produces HEU, since 1994, the United States has retained a 

strategic reserve of HEU—in the form of CSAs and HEU metal—to 

ensure an adequate HEU supply is available for the weapons program 

in the future. Some of the HEU from retained CSAs is expected to 

remain in the strategic reserve even after disassembly. For example, 

once a decision is reached regarding which of the two retained CSA 

types will be used in the refurbished W78, the remaining CSA types 

not selected will be released for disassembly, but their HEU metal will 

continue to make up part of the U.S. strategic reserve.

NNSA’s decision to retain many CSAs is not expected to have a nearterm impact on NNSA’s external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. 

Naval Reactors Program, space and research reactors, and nuclear 

nonproliferation programs. Based on our review of a March 2013 Y-12 

analysis of the site’s ability to supply HEU over the next 20 years and 

interviews with an NNSA official and an NNSA contractor, CSA 

disassembly through the end of fiscal year 2020 is projected to provide Y12 with enough HEU to meet its external supply commitments through 

2032. However, the Y-12 analysis noted that, unless additional CSAs are 

made available for disassembly, after fiscal year 2020 Y-12 will need to 

draw HEU from its on-hand inventory to meet its commitments.

Furthermore, an NNSA official confirmed that a significant delay in the 

release of managed retirement weapons would impact NNSA’s ability to 

meet external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. Naval Reactors 

Program after 2032. According to the Y-12 analysis, additional supplies of 

HEU to support the U.S. Naval Reactors Program after 2032 are required, 

and NNSA is currently reviewing weapon life extension program 

requirements that will ensure additional supply.

However, NNSA’s decision to retain many CSAs has reduced the number 

of CSAs available for disassembly at Y-12, which poses significant 

challenges to Y-12’s ability to plan its disassembly workload. We 

analyzed Y-12 CSA disassembly data from the 2009 Production and 

Planning Directive—published before the number of CSAs retained was 

increased—and from the March 2013 draft CSA disassembly schedule 

and found that, from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2032, Y-12 is 

projected to disassemble far fewer CSAs than in NNSA’s 2009 Production 

and Planning Directive. 

NNSA’s decision to retain many CSAs, and uncertain policy decisions 

regarding when some will be released for disassembly, pose challenges 

to Y-12’s ability to plan future work. Under NNSA’s September 2012 

CSA Retention Is Not 

Expected to Have an Impact 

on NNSA’s External Supply 

Commitments but Poses 

Challenges to Y-12’s Ability to 

Plan Its Disassembly Workload
 

Page 43 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

retention plan, the March 2013 draft disassembly schedule shows a 

significant drop-off in workload in fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 

2020, and after fiscal year 2022. Y-12 site contractors told us that they 

need approximately 2 to 3 years to plan for the disassembly of CSAs, 

including training personnel and ensuring that adequate equipment is in 

place. Y-12 site contractors raised serious concerns about how this 

potential drop-off in workload could affect both their near-term planning 

and their long-term workload, resulting in the need to lay off workers, and 

that the effects could be felt at the site earlier than the first year of the 

drop-off.

An NNSA official also told us that upcoming decisions regarding which 

CSAs would be used for certain refurbished weapons would result in the 

release of additional CSAs for disassembly by late 2016. However, based 

on our discussions with Y-12 site contractors, a decision in late 2016 

could already affect Y-12’s ability to prepare for upcoming disassembly 

work. When we raised these concerns with an NNSA official, the official 

told us that CSA retention decisions are driven by national security 

considerations and not by Y-12 workload considerations.

NNSA is storing millions of nonnuclear components from dismantled 

weapons at Pantex—including millions of parts for potential reuse in 

repairing, maintaining, or refurbishing weapons in the current and future 

stockpiles—as a contingency inventory that may exceed future weapon 

needs. However, NNSA’s ability to effectively manage and evaluate the 

retention of some parts in this inventory is complicated by decisions to 

retain many components for potential reuse in weapons, including old 

parts from weapons no longer in the stockpile, and by limitations in 

Pantex’s previous component inventory management system.

The inventory of nonnuclear components at Pantex includes several 

categories of components that are managed in different ways.

Nonnuclear components from weapons still active in the stockpile are 

categorized within Pantex’s “active” component inventory, and nonnuclear 

components from weapons no longer in the stockpile are considered 

“legacy” components. “Mark quality” components are those that have 

been retained for reuse—Pantex retains those in the active category but 

is authorized to dispose of those in the legacy category. The “nonnetable” category comprises components that will not be retained at 

Pantex and that will be disposed of. Table 3 illustrates Pantex’s 

nonnuclear component inventory as of May 2013.

NNSA Is Retaining a 

Contingency Inventory of 

Nonnuclear Components 

That May Exceed Future 

Weapon Needs
 

Page 44 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Table 3: Pantex Nonnuclear Component Inventory as of May 2013

Mark qualitya Non-netableb Total

Legacyc 7,250 75,425 82,675

Actived 3,029,300 239,902 3,269,202

Total 3,036,550 315,327 3,351,877

Source: Pantex.

a

Mark quality refers to nonnuclear components retained for possible reuse.

b

Non-netable refers to nonnuclear components that will not be retained.

c

Legacy refers to nonnuclear components from weapons no longer in the stockpile.

d

Active refers to nonnuclear components from weapons still in the stockpile.

In arranging for the disposition of nonnuclear components from 

dismantled weapons, Pantex’s first priority is disposing of components 

from ongoing weapon dismantlement to avoid adding unnecessarily to 

Pantex’s preexisting inventory. However, because remanufacturing 

certain nonnuclear components and parts could be time-consuming and 

expensive—or, in some cases, is impossible—NNSA officials and the 

national laboratories ask Pantex to store components for potential reuse 

in current weapons, future modernized weapons, or for other weaponsrelated contingencies. These component retention instructions are 

outlined in a weapon type’s Program Control Document, which targets the 

numbers of components to retain, and detailed in each weapon type’s 

Retirement Disposition Instruction, developed by the national laboratories 

and weapon program managers, which specifies the method of 

disposition for each component—saved for reuse, disposed of, or sent to 

KCP or NNSS. According to a 2011 Pantex chart, Pantex will add an 

estimated 53,000 components to the mark quality inventory per year from 

fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015. Figure 6 shows nonnuclear 

component storage within Pantex’s warehouses and nonnuclear 

components packaged and ready for shipment from Pantex.
 

Page 45 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Figure 6: Pantex Nonnuclear Component Warehouse Storage

Our review of nonnuclear component inventory data and Pantex 

documents, as well as our interviews with NNSA officials and Pantex site 

contractors, suggest that Pantex may be retaining more nonnuclear 

components as “mark quality” for potential reuse than necessary and that 

the age and condition of some mark quality components raises questions 

about their suitability for reuse. As of May 2013, Pantex was storing 3 

million mark quality nonnuclear components as a contingency inventory 

for potential reuse in maintaining active stockpile or refurbished weapons.

In January 2013, Pantex site contractors estimated that 1.4 million of 

these components were commercially available hardware, such as 

screws, nuts, and bolts. According to Pantex documentation, “a large 

number” of the components retained in the mark quality inventory are 

believed to be excess based on the current stockpile. Pantex site 

contractors also told us that some retention requests from the laboratories 

for nonnuclear components may be overly conservative. For instance, 

Pantex site contractors told us that, in 2012, NNSA—at the request of the 

national laboratories—directed Pantex to retain approximately 650 spin 

rocket motors, but that after questioning from Pantex, they revised the 

request to 50 motors. In addition, some mark quality components in 

storage are very old. For example, our review found that 1.7 million 

components—or more than half of the mark quality inventory at Pantex, 

as of August 2012—were placed in storage in 1989 or before.48

 

48We were limited to using August 2012 data because Pantex officials told us this 

information was not easily extracted directly from their records.

During 

our site visit to Pantex, we observed several components covered in dust 
 

Page 46 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

that appeared not to have been touched or moved in years, if not 

decades.

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, however, told us that they 

believed that it made sense to retain more components in mark quality 

inventory than may be necessary because of uncertain future stockpile 

maintenance, repair, or refurbishment needs, and because it could be 

costly to remanufacture or replace components that had been disposed 

of. An NNSA official told us that, in the past, NNSA had disposed of 

components that the agency later needed. For instance, an NNSA official 

told us that NNSA had disposed of the center cases—a section of the 

case that contains the CSA—from dismantled B61 bombs through burial 

at NNSS but later found the agency would need them for the B61 life 

extension program. NNSA officials told us that the components’ 

importance was such that NNSA had decided to dig up the cases 

because doing so cost less than remanufacturing them. In addition, 

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us that, since some parts 

will always need to be retained to sustain the current stockpile, and since 

the cost to sustain the warehouses varies little by the number of parts 

stored, they believed that any marginal costs associated with storing 

excess components were justified by the potential cost of any future 

scenario requiring their remanufacture or reacquisition.

However, we found that some active mark quality nonnuclear 

components in the Pantex inventory are associated with weapon systems 

no longer in the stockpile, raising questions about whether these 

components will ever be reused. For example, as of August 2012, we 

found that Pantex was storing in its mark quality inventory for reuse 

493,305 components from weapons that were no longer in the active 

stockpile, including approximately 6,135 components from the B43—a 

weapon produced in the early 1960s and retired from the stockpile in 

1991—and 5,092 components from the Mk-11—a weapon produced in 

the 1950s and retired in 1960. Both of these weapons were dismantled 

before 1992, but some of their components remain in Pantex’s 

contingency inventory. In addition, Pantex continues to store 58,854 

components from dismantled B57s, a weapon that was last dismantled in 

1995. Pantex site contractors told us that NNSA retains some 

components from weapons no longer in the stockpile because they can 

be reused in active stockpile weapons, but Pantex site contractors said it 

was unlikely that many of the components from some of these very old 

weapons would be reused. An NNSA official told us that NNSA is working 

with the national laboratories to reassess the need to retain these 

components, but that efforts were hampered under current funding levels.
 

Page 47 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

In recognition of these inventory issues, in September 2012, NNSA 

created a capability to track “slow moving” inventory and reevaluate the 

continuing need to retain it. However, in January 2013, NNSA officials 

told us that the capability was too new to judge its usefulness to weapons 

program managers and the national laboratories. NNSA officials told us 

that they would use this capability to evaluate the ongoing necessity to 

retain some of these slow moving components during their next annual 

review of retained weapons components to be held in the fall of 2013.

Management of the large nonnuclear component inventory at Pantex has 

been further complicated by limitations in the site’s previous inventory 

management system. For example, the inventory system, which dated to 

1989, did not have the fields to collect financial and other information to 

establish storage component costs, the value of the components in 

storage, or forecast future storage capacity needs. In January 2013, we 

requested data on the cost of storage for nonnuclear components at 

Pantex. NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors said they did not have 

an estimate of those costs. NNSA officials also did not have an estimate 

of the value of the components in storage that could enable NNSA to 

make economic decisions about retaining or disposing of certain 

components, particularly those weapons no longer in the stockpile.

In addition, according to an NNSA official and Pantex site contractors, the 

system could not be used to forecast future component inflows or 

outflows based on anticipated capacity and workload at Pantex. Pantex 

site contractors estimated that Pantex’s inventory was at 86 percent of 

the site’s storage capacity, which was a decrease from the 1990s, when 

inventory was at nearly 95 percent capacity. In January 2013, the DOE 

Inspector General found that the warehouses that Pantex uses to store 

weapons components are nearing capacity levels.49

 

49DOE, Audit Report: The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Weapons 

Dismantlement and Disposition Program, OAS-L-13-06 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 

2013).

Pantex site 

contractors were able to show us pictures demonstrating reductions in 

stored components that had freed up space, but the inventory system 

could not project if current storage capacity will be sufficient to contain the 

estimated 53,000 components that will be added to the mark quality 

inventory on average through fiscal year 2015. Pantex site contractors 

told us that, if they ran out of storage space, they could store components 

in special containers outside in Zone 12, or create additional storage by 
 

Page 48 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

opening up an unused warehouse on-site, but that doing so may add to 

operating costs. Furthermore, when we requested basic information such 

as how long components had been in storage and their associated 

weapon system, Pantex site contractors told us they would have to write 

special queries to extract this information from the system.

In May 2013, Pantex site contractors informed us that they would be 

addressing some of these limitations through a $38 million upgrade to the 

site’s computer systems in July 2013 that would include improvements to 

the component inventory management system. However, this system was 

still being implemented in August 2013, and we were not able to assess 

the extent to which the upgrades may address the issues we identified.

According to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, the upgraded 

system will include fields to collect cost information and the physical size 

of a component. However, it will not contain fields to track the age of a 

part, though a Pantex site contractor said that the upgraded system will 

make it easier to research that data.

In addition, there is a large backlog of legacy components and unknown 

legacy material that could take up to a decade or longer to dispose of 

because of technical and classification security challenges associated 

with the characterization of components. Nonnuclear components must 

be characterized before Pantex can safely and securely dispose of them.

Characterization is the process of understanding, documenting, 

classifying according to security level, and establishing a waste disposal 

pathway. To characterize a component, Pantex relies heavily on 

engineers at SNL, as well as weapons component information contained 

in a database maintained by SNL called the Stockpile Dismantlement 

Database.

• Legacy components: As previously mentioned, these are components 

from dismantled weapons that are no longer in the active stockpile 

and that Pantex is authorized to dispose of. These components may 

be partially characterized—in that they have been identified and 

recorded in the inventory system—but do not yet have an appropriate 

disposal pathway established by Pantex.

• Legacy material: There is an unknown quantity of components in 

boxes left over from previous decades’ dismantlement. These 

components have not been characterized, and, once identified and 

recorded, may or may not have an established disposal pathway.

Disposing of a Large 

Nonnuclear Legacy 

Component Inventory 

Could Take a Decade or 

Longer
 

Page 49 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

In 2011, after several years of review, NNSA authorized Pantex to 

dispose of all of the site’s legacy components, but approximately 1,300 

components need characterization before they can be disposed of.

According to an NNSA official, in November 2012, characterization and 

disposal of legacy components and material in legacy boxes is the lowest 

priority for the WDD program and would be the first activity to be reduced 

under program budget cuts. In September 2013, an NNSA official told us 

that the net impact of sequestration had been a delay to legacy 

component disposition work in fiscal year 2013. According to Pantex data, 

by May 2013, Pantex had successfully disposed of more than 75 percent 

of the legacy component inventory it had in September 2011—from 

350,249 to 82,675 components. However, 1,300 of these legacy 

components had not been fully characterized, as of April 2013, and could 

not be disposed of. Pantex site contractors told us that they could 

characterize 730 of these components on-site but that information on the 

remaining 570 had been sent to SNL for additional research. In April 

2013, Pantex site contractors told us this additional research could take 

over a year to complete.

Additionally, Pantex currently has an unknown quantity of legacy material 

in boxes left over from previous decades’ dismantlement operations that it 

is attempting to eliminate over time. Pantex site contractors and an NNSA 

official told us that, in previous decades, less emphasis was placed on 

properly disposing of nonnuclear weapons components. During our site 

visit, we observed a number of cardboard and wooden boxes containing 

unknown weapons parts from previous decades’ dismantlements. Pantex 

site contractors told us that some of these boxes may contain parts that 

are up to 60 years old and that may be radiologically contaminated, which 

makes them difficult to handle and identify.

An NNSA official told us that they have an informal goal of disposing of 

the entire backlog of legacy components and legacy material by fiscal 

year 2022. However, Pantex site contractors told us that their efforts are 

hampered when weapons component information in the Stockpile 

Dismantlement Database does not exist or is incomplete. Pantex site 

contractors told us they rely heavily on information in the database to 

identify these legacy components, but some very old weapons 

information—which may contain highly classified additional details about 

the design of early nuclear weapons—is incomplete or has not been 

added to the database out of “need to know” security concerns. NNSA 

officials told us that because the database can be accessed by a variety 

of individuals across the weapons complex, LLNL and LANL site 

contractors are often reluctant to share drawings with SNL for inclusion in 
 

Page 50 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

the database, hampering SNL and Pantex’s efforts to identify and dispose 

of legacy components. Pantex site contractors told us that they could 

request the drawings directly from the weapons design laboratories, but a 

Pantex document states that the time required to characterize a 

component is significantly lengthened when it is not in the database.

NNSA officials told us that they are working to identify a solution, in 

concert with site contractors at Pantex, SNL, LLNL, and LANL.

NNSA’s WDD program is instrumental in enabling the United States to 

eliminate nuclear weapons excess to defense needs and to meet 

international treaty commitments. To these ends, DOE and NNSA have 

dismantled more than 12,000 weapons since the dissolution of the Soviet 

Union, and the WDD program will play a critical role in dismantling 

weapons through fiscal year 2022 and beyond as the nuclear weapons 

stockpile continues to shrink, and more weapons are retired. While we 

recognize the progress NNSA has made, we identified concerns related 

to its dismantlement performance goal.

NNSA is unlikely to achieve its goal of dismantling all weapons retired 

prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022 because of 

uncertainties surrounding when large numbers of retired weapons that 

are currently in managed retirement might be released for dismantlement.

In addition, because of the possible delay in the retirement of additional 

weapons resulting from New START treaty implementation, there could 

be a significant gap in dismantlement workload during the mid- to late2020s that could affect NNSA’s ability to sustain sufficient numbers of 

certified dismantlement personnel. By relaxing and extending the fiscal 

year 2022 dismantlement performance goal deadline, NNSA could give 

itself flexibility to account for the uncertainties associated with weapons in 

managed retirement and could allow the dismantlement workload to be 

leveled and extended through the mid-2020s to sustain the 

dismantlement workforce.

In addition, NNSA’s level of progress toward its dismantlement 

performance goal is unclear because it does not track the actual date of 

retirement of individual weapons as they are dismantled. As a result, 

some weapons retired after 2009 may be dismantled and counted toward 

meeting this performance goal. In addition, some weapons retired prior to 

fiscal year 2009 will be reinstated to the stockpile, but counted as 

dismantled, because they are replacing weapons disassembled and not 

rebuilt under the stockpile surveillance program. As a result, NNSA 

counts equivalent numbers of weapons as dismantled toward its 

Conclusions
 

Page 51 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

performance goal. Because the dismantlement performance goal as 

written does not make these practices clear, NNSA risks providing 

misleading or confusing information about the age or types of weapons 

being dismantled.

We recommend that the NNSA Administrator take the following two 

actions:

• Reevaluate and consider extending the fiscal year 2022 

dismantlement performance goal, to account for the uncertainties 

about when weapons currently in managed retirement will be released 

for dismantlement, and to avoid a potential dismantlement workload 

gap due to the deferred retirement of large numbers of additional 

weapons following entry into force of the New START treaty.

• Revise the dismantlement performance goal to clarify that NNSA 

intends to dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009, or an 

equivalent number of weapons, by the end of fiscal year 2022 or an 

updated deadline, to reflect that NNSA may be counting some 

dismantled weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 as equivalent to 

weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009, and is counting some 

reinstated weapons as being equivalent dismantlements.

We provided a draft of this report to NNSA and DOD for comment. NNSA 

provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix II. DOD 

did not provide written comments.

In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with our two recommendations 

that it (1) reevaluate and consider extending the fiscal year 2022 

dismantlement performance goal, to account for the uncertainties when 

weapons currently in managed retirement will be released for 

dismantlement, and to avoid a potential dismantlement workload gap due 

to the deferred retirement of large numbers of additional weapons 

following entry into force of the New START treaty and (2) revise the 

dismantlement performance goal to clarify that NNSA intends to 

dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009, or an equivalent 

number of weapons, by the end of fiscal year 2022 or an updated 

deadline.

Regarding the first recommendation, in its written comments, NNSA 

stated that it is committed to the development of a comprehensive, longterm strategy to address not only weapons retired before fiscal year 2009, 

but also weapons retired in fiscal year 2009 and thereafter. NNSA stated 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 52 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

that such a strategy would allow the agency to manage dismantlement 

and production activities at Pantex and Y-12 in order to balance the 

workload at those facilities and to allow NNSA to manage critical skills 

and technologies to maintain its dismantlement commitments. NNSA 

also stated that it is fully committed to dismantling all weapons retired 

prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2022. NNSA’s proposed action to 

develop a long-term dismantlement strategy to balance workload is 

responsive to our recommendation and our concerns about the impacts of 

a potential gap in dismantlement workload from fiscal year 2022 to the 

late 2020s or early 2030s. However, as discussed in this report, NNSA is 

likely to face challenges in achieving its goal of dismantling all weapons 

retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2022 due to the 

uncertainties surrounding when weapons in managed retirement—

including some weapons retired before fiscal year 2009—may be 

released for dismantlement.

Regarding the second recommendation, in its written comments, NNSA 

responded that the dismantlement performance goal of dismantling by 

fiscal year 2022 all weapons retired before fiscal year 2009 should focus 

on the equivalent numbers of weapons that are being dismantled. NNSA 

agreed with the recommendation and noted that changing how the 

agency calculates a performance goal requires approval from the Office 

of Management and Budget. NNSA agreed to work with the Office of 

Management and Budget during fiscal year 2014 to identify appropriate 

changes to the dismantlement performance goal in response to our 

recommendation. In addition, NNSA commented that it was incorrect of 

us to characterize the way in which NNSA tracks progress toward its 

dismantlement performance goal as being misleading. Our 

characterization is accurate. As stated in the report, in tracking progress 

under its dismantlement performance goal, NNSA counts weapons retired 

prior to fiscal year 2009 that are reinstated to the stockpile rather than 

being dismantled. We also found that NNSA does not track the actual 

retirement date of individual weapons that are dismantled and may be 

counting weapons toward its dismantlement performance goal that were 

retired from service after fiscal year 2009. NNSA’s performance goal, as 

written, does not make these practices clear. As we have previously 

reported, having clear performance goals and measures is a key element 

of effective program management, and performance goals and measures 

that are not clearly stated may be confusing or misleading.
 

Page 53 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the NNSA Administrator, and the Secretary of Defense. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix III.

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 54 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the annual 

inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and the National Nuclear 

Security Administration’s (NNSA) annual dismantlement rates have 

changed over time, and, if so, the reasons why; (2) how NNSA measures 

progress toward achieving its performance goal of dismantling all 

weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022, 

and any challenges it might face in meeting the goal; (3) NNSA’s 

schedule for dismantlement of weapons retired as a result of the New 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and the challenges, if 

any, NNSA faces in dismantling those weapons; (4) the physical capacity 

available at Pantex to meet NNSA’s planned future dismantlement 

workload and to potentially accelerate dismantlement; and (5) the 

challenges, if any, affecting disassembly and disposition of components 

from dismantled weapons.

In general, we addressed these objectives by reviewing relevant nuclear 

weapons stockpile guidance and planning documents and interviewing 

NNSA officials. These documents include Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 

Plans, the nuclear weapons stockpile Requirements and Planning 

Documents, and NNSA’s Nuclear Weapons Production and Planning 

Directives. We interviewed NNSA officials responsible for overseeing the 

Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD) program and obtained 

technical information and data from them on the stockpile, past and future 

dismantlement workload, component management, and on other issues 

pertaining to the program. To understand stockpile planning, weapons 

retirement, and how the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military 

services interact with NNSA on dismantlement issues, we obtained 

information and interviewed officials from the Office of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, U.S. Air Force, U.S. 

Navy, and U.S. Strategic Command. We also visited the Pantex and Y-12 

sites where we observed weapon dismantlement and canned 

subassembly (CSA) disassembly operations for several weapon systems, 

viewed component storage facilities, and interviewed representatives of 

the site operating contractors at each location on issues relating to 

dismantlement operations and component management processes.1

 

1

The terms dismantlement and disassembly are sometimes used interchangeably. 

However, in our report, we use the term nuclear weapons dismantlement to refer to the 

process at Pantex of reducing a weapon to its component parts and removing the high 

explosives surrounding the pit. We use the term disassembly to refer to weapons 

disassembled and inspected for surveillance purposes at Pantex, and to refer to further 

disassembly of weapon components, such as CSAs disassembled at Y-12.

We 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 55 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

identified a nonprobability sample of seven weapons systems—B53, B61, 

W62, W70, W71, W76, and B83—based on several factors, including the 

branch of the military associated with the weapons, the weapon delivery 

platform (i.e. bomber or missile), and whether the weapon is strategic or 

nonstrategic. We used a list of standardized questions to conduct 

interviews with nuclear weapon engineers at Pantex on the time, 

requirements, challenges, and other issues associated with the 

dismantlement of those systems.2

To assess the extent to which and the reasons why the annual 

inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and NNSA’s annual 

dismantlement rates have changed over time, we obtained and analyzed 

data from NNSA’s Weapons Information System on the annual 

inventories of retired weapons awaiting dismantlement and on annual 

numbers of weapons dismantled for fiscal years 1992 through 2012. We 

selected this time frame for several reasons, including that it allowed us to 

assess weapon retirements and dismantlements since the dissolution of 

the Soviet Union in December 1991 and resulting from stockpile 

reductions through strategic arms control treaties and presidential 

initiatives. The Weapons Information System does not include a specific 

field or category of nuclear weapons that are awaiting dismantlement.

According to NNSA officials, the annual inventory of retired nuclear 

weapons—which is tracked—approximates, but is not a precise figure for, 

the number of weapons awaiting dismantlement. According to NNSA 

officials, during the time frame of our review, each year some number of 

retired weapons were reinstated, or held for future reinstatement, to the 

stockpile and were not available for dismantlement.

We also received presentations from 

Y-12 weapon engineers on issues related to the disassembly of the CSAs 

of these seven weapon systems.

3

 

2

Because this was a nonprobability sample, information derived about these weapon 

systems cannot be generalized to all weapon systems, but it can provide illustrative 

examples of the time, requirements, challenges, and other issues associated with the 

dismantlement of the systems and the disassembly of the associated CSAs.

In addition, some 

retired weapons were not immediately available for dismantlement 

because they were in managed retirement status and had not been 

released by the Nuclear Weapons Council. Because NNSA officials told 

3

According to NNSA officials, in general, the number of weapons in the annual retired 

inventory to be reinstated to the stockpile was relatively small, perhaps 1 or 2 percent of 

the total, while weapons in managed retirement status generally represented a larger 

percentage of the annual retired inventory.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 56 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

us that it would be difficult and time-consuming to locate older stockpile 

records and reconcile the data to develop accurate figures on the actual 

inventory of weapons that were awaiting dismantlement by year over the 

past 20 years, we agreed with NNSA officials to use the annual retired 

inventory of weapons as an approximate measure of the number of 

weapons awaiting dismantlement from year to year, for fiscal year 1992 

through fiscal year 2012. We also interviewed NNSA and DOD officials on 

reasons why the inventories of retired weapons have changed over time, 

and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors on issues that 

have affected dismantlement processes and rates. We obtained and 

analyzed data that Pantex has developed to measure the difficulty, or 

time requirements, in dismantling different weapon types, referred to as 

dismantlement “difficulty quotients” (DQ). NNSA has used the DQ data to 

establish “dismantlement equivalent units” (DEQ) for each weapon type to 

measure the relative dismantlement time requirements of different 

weapon types. Pantex had DQ data available only for weapons 

dismantled since fiscal year 1998. As a result, we were unable to analyze 

dismantlement DQ and DEQ data for all weapon types dismantled since 

fiscal year 1992 and determine whether weapon systems have become 

more time-consuming to dismantle over the past 20 years based on this 

data. However, we did interview weapon engineers at Pantex regarding 

the challenges in dismantling weapons, including two recently dismantled 

weapon systems that both had relatively large DEQs.

To assess how NNSA measures progress toward achieving its 

performance goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 

2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022, and any challenges it might face in 

meeting the goal, we obtained and analyzed NNSA data on the inventory 

of retired weapons potentially available for dismantlement over fiscal year 

2013 through fiscal year 2022. Specifically, we analyzed a March 2013 

draft schedule for the dismantlement or other disposition of all retired 

weapons over this time, which included the schedule for dismantling the 

subset of remaining weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. We 

interviewed NNSA and DOD officials on issues related to or that could 

affect the dismantlement schedule, including reinstatement of retired 

weapons and release of retired weapons in managed retirement status for 

dismantlement.

To assess NNSA’s schedule and the challenges, if any, in the 

dismantlement of weapons to be retired as a result of the New START 

treaty, we interviewed NNSA officials to determine whether those 

weapons had been scheduled for dismantlement. We interviewed DOD 

officials to understand how many and when those weapons are expected 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 57 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

to be retired and other conditions affecting the timing and release of those 

weapons to NNSA for dismantlement. We interviewed NNSA officials and 

Pantex site contractors on issues related to how this additional future 

dismantlement workload will be managed.

To assess the physical capacity available at Pantex to meet NNSA’s 

dismantlement goal and to potentially accelerate achievement of this 

goal, we obtained and analyzed data from Pantex’s Long Range 

Production Planning Model and interviewed Pantex site contractors on 

the physical capacity at Pantex available to meet the future 

dismantlement schedule and all other future stockpile production 

commitments such as weapon life extension and surveillance efforts. We 

also analyzed data and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site 

contractors on Pantex’s ability to accelerate dismantlement work, 

including data on the extent to which Pantex has exceeded annual 

dismantlement goals in response to contract performance incentives and 

information from NNSA on previously developed scenarios for 

accelerating dismantlement workload to meet the fiscal year 2022 

dismantlement goal by fiscal year 2018 or fiscal year 2020.

To assess the challenges affecting disassembly and disposition of 

components from dismantled weapons, we reviewed NNSA program and 

planning documents and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex and Y-12 

site contractors on the full scope of the weapons dismantlement and 

disposition process. We reviewed NNSA data and interviewed NNSA 

officials and Pantex site contractors on the number and location of pits 

from dismantled weapons and future plans for reuse or disposition, as 

well as effects of storage on Pantex operations. We reviewed NNSA 

documents, analyzed data, and interviewed NNSA officials and Y-12 site 

contractors on current and future CSA inventories, draft CSA disassembly 

schedules, and related policy issues affecting CSA management to 

assess the effects of CSA disassembly and retention on Y-12’s workload 

and ability to supply highly enriched uranium to the U.S. Naval Reactors 

Program and other programs. We reviewed data from Pantex’s 

nonnuclear weapons component inventory management system and 

interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors on the size of the 

overall inventory, age and weapon system associated with these 

components, impact of requests from the national labs to retain some 

components, and limitations of the inventory management system.

We conducted reliability assessments of the data on: (1) the inventories 

of retired weapons available for dismantlement and on annual numbers of 

weapons dismantled for fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2012 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 58 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

(NNSA’s Weapons Information System); (2) future capacity requirements 

at Pantex (Pantex’s Long Range Production Planning Model); and (3) 

nonnuclear component inventories (Pantex’s nonnuclear weapons 

component inventory management system). We analyzed the data from 

each system for accuracy by, among other things, manually testing the 

data for errors and missing data, and interviewed knowledgeable officials 

on the reliability of the data. We found discrepancies in the data provided 

to us on the retired and dismantled weapon inventories and on the Pantex 

capacity projections, but we were able to correct or reconcile the 

differences through interviews with NNSA officials and Pantex site 

contractors. We did not identify any material weaknesses in the three 

data sources that would significantly alter our findings. We determined 

that, overall, the data provided to us were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this review.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to April 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 59 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 60 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 61 GAO-14-449 Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant Director), 

Julia Coulter, and William Hoehn made key contributions to this report.

Other technical assistance was provided by Antoinette Capaccio, Penney 

Harwell Caramia, Karen Keegan, Cynthia Norris, Kevin L. O’Neill, Dr. 

Timothy M. Persons, Dan Royer, Justin Schnare, Rebecca Shea, Amie 

Steele, and Kiki Theodoropoulos.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(361555)
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