2003 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
10-22-2003 

# L undy v . H o chb e rg P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 02-1343

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2003 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du
. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" Lundy v . H ochbe rg " (2003). 2003 D e cisio n s . P ape r 193. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/193NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No s. 02-1343 , 02-2041; 02-3678; 02- 2053; 02-3732; 02-3845

MARVIN L

UNDY

v. ROBERT HOCHBERG; JOHN HAYMOND; JOHN HAYMO

ND, P.C. t/a HAYMOND & LU

NDY; SCOTT E. DIAMOND; HAYMOND , NAPOL

I, DI AMOND, P. C. Marvin Lundy, Appellant in Nos. 02-2053, 02-3732 & 02-3845 Robert Hochberg, Appellant in Nos. 02-1343, 02-2041 & 02-3678

App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. No. 99-cv- 05048) Distric t Judg e: The H onorab le Norm a L. Sha piro

Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

September 16, 2003 Before: M CK EE , SM ITH , and CO W EN , Circuit Judges (Fil ed: October

22, 2003)1 All of the appeals s et fort h in the c aption r elat e to the unauthori zed pract ice of l aw clai m. The second and third i ssues appea led in c ase number 02-3845, togethe r with t he appeals in case numbers 00- 1969 and 02-3781, ar e unrelated to t he unauthori zed pract ice of law clai m and are dispos ed of in a se parate decisi on file d this same date. 2 OPINI ON OF THE COURT

SM ITH , Circuit

Judge

. Be for e us are ju st so me of th e bitt er fr uits o f a le gal p artn ersh ip g one aw ry. Appellee/ cross- appell ant Marvin Lundy file d in the Dis tri ct Court s tate law clai ms for prospect ive inj unctive reli ef agains t his former law partners Robert Hochberg, John Ha ymon d, and Sco tt Diam ond for the unau thorize d pra ctice o f law and “ cons piracy” to “aid and abet” the unaut horized pr acti ce of law. Hochberg a ppeals fr om the grant

of a judgment and per

manent inj unction a gainst him, whil e Lundy cr oss-appea ls fr om the Distri ct Court’ s dismi ssal of his “cons piracy” and “aid and a betting” clai ms relating to t he same against Haymond and D iamond. Because L undy is without st anding to pursue these stat e law clai ms in an Arti cle II I court , we will vacate t he orders of the Dist

rict Court and remand w ith inst

ructions to dis miss these claims. 1 I. In October 1997, appell ant Robert Hochberg and his t

hen-part ner John Haymond, personalinjur

y at torney s both then lic ensed and prac ticing in Connecti cut, formed a new legal partnership in P ennsylvania w ith appellee/cross-ap pellant M arvin Lu ndy. Mr.2 The rec ord belies L undy’s present asse rtions of ignora nce regard ing Ho chberg’s

crimina l convic tion and l icensur e stat us. The Dist

rict Court expres sly

found, based on test imony gi ven by Lundy at trial, that Lundy

was informed of Hochberg’s indict ment when Lundy, Haymond, and Hochberg were negoti ating to form H&L in April1997, and that Lundy

and his at

torney , negot iating the merger through an ar

ms-lengt h trans acti on, knew or should h ave kn own about the su bseque nt plea, sentencing , and licensure proceedi ngs. Hochberg’ s August 4, 1997 gui lty plea wellpreceded t

he finalformati on of H& L that O ctober.

3 When the parti es ini tial ly brought t

heir as sorte d clai ms below, Hochberg and Haymond had conti nued as part ners and were al lied a gainst Lundy. Hochber g and Haymond have sinc e also gone t heir s eparat e ways and have, not surprisi ngly , al so chosen to re solv e the differen ces exis ting betw een them thro ugh litiga tion

. 3 Lundy, t hen alre ady pos sessi ng a personalinjur y pr acti ce of his own in Phi ladelphia, joined with M essrs. H ochb erg an d H aymon d bec ause of the ir expe rience and e xper tise in generat ing lega l busi ness through tele visi on and other a dverti sing t echniques. The

resu lting par tner ship , Ha ymo nd & Lu ndy (“ H& L” ), laste d tw o yea rs. Aro und Oc tober 1 999 , Lun dy claim s to ha ve lea rned that H ochb erg h ad pr eviou sly pled g uilty to a fed eral co unt o f con spirac y to com mit ba nk f raud , had b een d isbarre d in Massachusett s and suspended in Connecticut as a res ult, and was therefor e pract icing l aw in Pennsylvania without a l icense. Lundy Second Stage Br. at 3. Lundy asserts that, as a resul t, he declar ed his par tners hip with Haymond and Hochberg dissol ved on October 9. 2 The former part

ners fi led cros sing complaints i n the East ern District of Pennsy lvania , alleging assorted federal and state law claims against the othe r. 3 Lu ndy a llege d, inter alia , that H aymon d, H ochb erg, an d D iamo nd – wh o w as pre viou sly associa ted w ith Lundy, but

left to practice with Haymond and Hochberg when H& L was dissolve d –4 The Co nnec ticut B ar reins tated H ochb erg’s lice nse to practic e law in that sta te in

November of 2001. Nonethele ss, unde r the t erms of the Dis tri ct Court’ s inj unction, Ho chbe rg ap pears to be p rohib ited fro m u nder taking any actio ns at a la w f irm in Pen nsylvan ia that m ay be co nstrue d as “ practic ing law ” until h e is also license d in Pennsylvania. 4 committed acivilRICO violati on by cons piri ng to defraud Lundy of hi s law fir m and clie nts, and there fore sought various damages and compensati on. Lundy a lso brought stat e law clai ms pursuant to a Pennsy lvania stat ute authorizi ng civilacti ons for prospective injuncti ve relief to prevent t he unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers. Although allthe feder al question cla ims dropped out of the l iti gation ove r ti me, both Hochbe rg and Haymond’s supplem ental stat e law breach of contract claim against Lundy and Lundy ’s unauthorized pr acti ce of law claim against Hochber g eventual ly went to trial. The Distri ct Court t ried t he breach of cont

ract c laim fi rst, resul ting in a verdic t of liabi lit y i n favor of Haymond agai nst Lundy for breach of

the part nershi p agreement on January 26, 200 1. On F ebruary 21, 200 1, the bench trial comme nced o n Lun dy’s unauthorized practice of law claim against Hochberg. This resulted i n a judgment against Hochberg on August 31, 2001, and a permanent injuncti on prohibi ting hi m from practic ing law in Pe nnsylva nia un less an d un til he ob tained adm ission to the P enns ylvania Bar either in fu ll or pro hac vice

. 4 No nethe less, ou t of de feren ce to th e Pen nsylvan ia courts , the Distri ct Court ha d earli er abst ained fr om involvi ng its elf i n the question of wh ether H aymon d, a licen sed p ractition er, cou ld be h eld liab le for “ cons piracy” to “aid and abet” Hochberg’ s unauthor ized pra ctic e of law and dis missed t hat novel clai m. The5 In the even t that the District Cou rt’s suppleme ntal jurisdiction were u pheld, H ochbe rg

also as sert ed that

the Dist rict Court abused i ts di scret ion in continuing t o maintai n that juris dicti on o nce all th e fe der al cla ims we re d ism issed

. See , e.g. , Annulliv. Panikkar , 200 F.3 d 18 9 (3 d C ir. 19 99) , abrogati on on other grounds recogniz ed by Forbes v. Eagleson , 228 F .3d 471 (3 d Cir. 200 0). 5 parties appea led these respe ctive judgm ents and, con sistent with w hat the D istrict Court found to be the “consistently overliti gated”and “vexatious” nature of this dispute, also dispu te the a mo unt o f attorn eys’ fees subs eque ntly awa rded by the D istrict Co urt. Th e D i st r i ct Co urt pr em i se d i t s j ur i sd i cti onon28 U. S. C. § 1 33 1 and§ 1 36 7. We have jurisdiction o ver these ap peals pursu ant to 28 U .S.C. § 129 1. On a ppeal, H ochbe rg

asse rts, inter alia , that pursuant to our decisi on in Lyon v. Whisman , 45 F.3d 7 58 (3d C ir. 199 5) , and t

he p ri ncipl es re lati ng t o suppl ementa l j ur is di ct io n st at ed b yth e Supr eme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715 ( 1966), t he Distr ict Court

never properl y poss essed subj ect-matter j urisdi ction ove r the s tate unauthori zed pract ice of l aw clai ms because the y di d not suffi cient ly “derive from a common nucleus of oper ative fact” as the feder al questions so as to permit the Dist rict Court to exe rcis e supplement al juri sdict ion over t

hose claims in the first instance. 5 Lundy res ponds that supplementa l juri sdict ion was appropr iate , and that the Distri ct Court inappropri atel y abs taine d from

cons idering wh ether “ the P enns ylvania C onstitu tion w ould be vio lated w ere the [D istrict] Co urt to ente rtain juris dicti on o ver Pen nsylv ania Ba r me mb ers.” II. Before addressing the merits of the parti es’ allegat ions in this appeal, we mu st6

sati sfyoursel ves that

it was appr opriat e for an Arti cle II I court to consi der the s tate law clai ms brought by

Lundy. Whil e neither part y r aised t he issue of whether Lundy possessed Article IIIstanding to bring his cl aims, “every federalappellate court has a specialobligation to s atis fy i tsel f not only of its own jurisdi ction, but als o that of the lower courts, in every

appeal presented to it, regardless of whether the parties cont est juri sdict ion.” Lewis v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters , 826 F.2d 1310 ( 3d Cir. 1987) (citing Ben der v . William spor t Area Sch. D ist. , 475 U.S. 534 ( 1986) (i nternalquotati ons

om itted )). See also Lyon , 45 F.3d at 760 (vacat ing a dis tri ct court judgment for

lack of jurisdiction even a fter a trial on the me rits); Tre nt R ealty Ass oc. v . Fir st F ed. S av. & Loans Assoc. , 657 F.2d 29, 36-37 (3d Cir . 1981) ( vacati ng a dist rict court or der, t

hough “cognizant

that s ome frustr ation i s inevi table by a hol ding on appealthat a matter which has proceede d to judgment for one of the parti es must be r emanded” for la ck of federal jurisdiction). The Supreme Court succi nctly summarized t

he now familiar

elements a plai ntiff must demonstr ate t o establ ish Arti cle II I standing in Luja n v. D efend ers of W ildlife , 504 U.S. 55 5 (1992 ): First , the plaintiff must have suffered an “injur y i n fact”- -an invas ion of a legal ly protect ed inte rest

which is ( a) concre te and particul arize d and (b) “actual or imm inent, not ‘conjectura l’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second , there must be a causa l connect ion between t he injur y and t he conduct compla ined of-- t he injur y has to be “fai rly

... trace [able] to the c halle nged acti on of the defend ant, and no t ... t

h[e] result [of] the indepen dent action o f some third party not b efore the co urt.” T hird, it m ust be “likely,” as o ppo sed to mere ly “speculative,” that the injury will be ‘redressed by a fav orable dec ision.’”7

Id. at 560-61 ( citations omitt ed). At al l ti mes, “[t ]he part y i nvoking feder al jurisdi ction bears t he burden of est ablis hing thes e elements .” Id. at 561. “[A]t the final st age, those facts ( if controvert ed) must be ‘ supporte d adequately by the evi dence adduced at tri al. ’” Id. (quoti ng Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood , 441 U.S . 91, 1 15 n .31 ( 197 9)). Because the par

ties did not brief the issue of whether Lundyhad success fully proven thes e ele me nts, w e req ues ted s upp lem enta l brie fing fro m th e pa rties o n th is issu e. See Lun dersta dt v. C olafella , 885 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir. 1989 ). Hochberg argues t

hat Lundylacks Art icle III s tanding be cause Lundy : [1] s eeks redres s for past

wrongs that

are not “ accompanied by present adverse eff

ects”; [2] did not demonstrat e his al leged i njury is caus ally

relat ed to the clai m of unauthori zed pract ice of law; and [3] a favorabl e decisi on enjoining Hochberg from pract icing l aw could not alle viate any pr esent t

hreat of injur y t o Lundy. Lundy

responds t

hat he sus taine d the following injuri es that

he contends would be redres sed thr ough his unaut horized pr acti ce of law claim: [1] “that H ochbe rg’s acts and o missions ‘place d the clients of the law firm at ri sk, and cr eated bot

h ethic al and fi nancialrisks to alllawyer s and other s at [H&L]”; [2] that H ochbe rg and h is present firm still retain cases belo nging to L undy and a re denyi ng him the fees associ ated with those cas es; and [3] because seve ral ca ses ret ained by Ho chbe rg stem from a time wh en L und y was p artners with Ho chbe rg, Lu ndy “is thereb y respon sible fo r each and e very claim wh ich m ay be m ade a gains t him in connecti on with Hochberg prac ticing law without a lice nse, and whil e disbar red and6 “Injunction.– I n additi on to cri minal pros ecuti on, unauthorized pr acti ce of law may be

enjoine d in any

county court of c ommon pleas having per sonal j urisdi ction ove r the defendant. The party

obtaining such an inj unction may be awarded cost s and expenses incu rred , inclu din g re aso nab le atto rne y fees , aga inst th e enjoin ed p arty.” 4 2 P a. C .S.A . § 2524(c ). 8 suspended. ” Thus, Lundyassert s he “has been damaged and remains at risk a s a result of H aym on d’ s f

oi sti ng off H oc hb er g o n L un dy a s M an ag in g P ar tn er of H aym on d & Lu nd y, LL P” f rom Oc tob er 1 997 to O ctob er 1 999

. III. The questi on of a plai ntiff ’s Arti cle II I standing to bring a cl aim must be consider ed in li ght of the specifi c all egati ons that a plai ntiff

has brought

and the re lief

sou ght

. See , e.g. , City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U .S. 95, 1 02 (1 983 ); Simon v. Eastern Kentuc ky WelfareRights Organi zati on , 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). Lundy brou ght h is una utho rized p ractice o f law claim s purs uant to a Pen nsylvan ia statute crimina lizing the unauthorized pr acti ce of law byany per son who “convey[s ] the impressi on that he is a pr acti tioner of the l aw of any jurisdi ction” in Pennsy lvania . 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 2524(a). This statute al so permits an individual t o bring a civil cl aim against such an “unauthorized pr acti [tione r], ” but sol ely for the be nefit

of prospect ive inj unctive relie f. See § 2524 (c). 6 Lundy ass erts that he is a “per son contemplated by the framers of [§ 2524] who would vindicate the public pol icy because of hi s personalinjur y. ” Had Lundy brought these cl aims in Penns yl vania’s courts , which are not bound by the constitutional7 Because Lundy’ s purport ed clai ms for inj unctive reli ef agains t Haymond and

Diamond for “conspi racy ” to “ai d and abet” t he unauthori zed pract ice of l aw derive from and are pre mised upon Lundy’ s dire ct cl aim agains t Hochberg, we see no need to analyze them separately

and we decline t o do so. I f Lundy l acks Arti cle II I standing to bring the und erlying claim aga inst H och ber g, a fortiori , he i s without standi ng to bri ng the derivative cl aims. Fur

thermore, as Haymond has now separ ated fr om and is in l iti gation with Diamond and Hochberg regar ding the s ubsequent br eakup of their pract ice, any claim that Lu ndy had ag ainst Haymo nd to enjoin his “aiding an d abetting” o f Ho chberg’s una uth oriz ed p racti ce o f law app ears mo ot. 9 requ ireme nts of

Article III, perh aps th at wo uld b e eno ugh . No nethe less, hav ing ele cted to litigate this c laim in the fe deral c ourts, L und y must p rove he ha s prese nted a suff iciently concrete ca se or controv ersy to meet the jurisdictional requ irements of Article III before he c an p roc eed

. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 7 Ge nerally, a “p laintiff m ust sho w th at he ‘h as sus tained or is im med iately in dan ger of s usta inin g so me dire ct inj ury’” t o de mo nstra te sta ndi ng. Lyons , 461 U.S. at 101 -02. B ut w here th e claim at issue is one for inju nctive relief, “p ast w rong s do n ot in them selves amo unt to th at real an d imm ediate threat o f injury ne cessa ry to mak e out a case or cont

roversy .” Id. at 103. Thus, Lundy’ s “standing to s eek the i njuncti on requested” in federal co urt “depen ded on whe ther he w as likely to suffer future injury fro m” Ho chb erg ’s co ntin ued una uth oriz ed p racti ce o f law

. Id. at 10 5. Lun dy ’s as se rti on s t

ha t Hoc hb er g’ s unautho ri ze d p ra ct i ce whi l e apa rt ne r at H&L “placed” him at risk and caused o ther past injuries obv iously fail to amoun t to an injury that c an be redre ssed by an injunc tion aga inst

Hochberg’s pre sent and fut ure unauthorized pra ctice of la w. Lyons , 461 U.S. at 105 (“i njuncti on request ed depended on whether he10

was likely t o suffer fut

ure inj ury ”). Lundy

is no l onger in par

tners hip with Hochberg and, we fe el we ca n safely conclud e from the record, w ill not be again. N onetheless, L undy’s assertions that he i s both bei ng denied attorney fees as a r esult

of Hochberg’s cont inued

unau thorize d pra ctice o f law and th at Lu ndy is “re spon sible fo r each and e very claim wh ich m ay be m ade a gains t him in conn ection with Ho chbe rg’s pr acticing law w ithout a lice nse” att empt to al lege pre sent and fut ure harm. We consider these argument s in t urn. First , Lundy a ssert s that Hochberg’s cont inued prac ticing of law presently and prospect ively

denies hi m of revenues and fees that mi ght other wise go to hi m. Of course, the same coul d be said by just about any

other l awyer who does not present ly

have Ho chbe rg’s firm ’s clients as his o wn . Thu s, we dou bt that th is allega tion of harm is anyt hing more than a “general ized gri evance” that Lundy s hares wit h every other l awyer pra cticin g in Pen nsylv ania

. See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 575. Lundy seems “no more ent itl ed to an injunctio n than any othe r citizen” or attorn ey and w ithout a suff iciently par ticul arize d in

jury. Lyons , 461 U.S . at 11 1. N on eth ele ss , ev en if w e a ss um e “ th at t he in ju ry . . . affe ct[ s] t he pl ain tif f [ Lu nd y] in a pers onal and i ndividualway,” Lujan , 50 4 U .S . at 56 0 n .1. , “t he ‘c as e o r c on tro ve rsy’ limitation of A rt. III still require s that a federa l court a ct only to re dress injury that fa irly can be tr aced to t

he chall enged acti on of the defendant , and not injur y t hat res ults from the inde pendent act ion of some third part y not before the court. ” Eastern Kentuc ky Welfare Ri

ghts Organization , 426 U.S. at 41-42. Neither Lundy ’s complaint, t he tri al11

record, nor the Distri ct Court’s ulti mate findings of fact and conclusions of law suggest that, bu t for H ochb erg’s u nauth orized practic ing o f law , Lun dy’s form er clien ts wo uld leave Hochberg’ s present law firm and r eturn t o Lundy. Thus, Hochberg’s cont inuing practice is not cau sing Lu ndy’s “injury.” Rather, the record ind icates that Lun dy’s “inju ry” res ulted fro m “ the in dep end ent a ction of s om e thir d pa rty not b efo re th e co urt,” id. , sp ec ifi ca lly h is for m er cli en ts’ de cis io ns to tak e th eir bu sin es s e lse w he re . C er tai nl y, the record suggests that Hochberg engaged in the unauthorized practice of law because his “decisions on behalf of [the] law firm” could “require legaljudgment.” Nonetheless, it al so shows that

Hochberg was not pri marily a pract iti oner, but

mostly a firm manager and administ

rator . There i s only

sparse e vidence of cl ient c ontact by Hochberg, and none of it suggests that

Hochberg w as the primary poi nt of contact or “draw” for any of those clie nts. Thus, nothing suggests that any “par ticul arize d” injuries Lundy contends he was sufferi ng could be “r edresse d by a favor able deci sion” banni ng Hochberg from legal pra ctice

. Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560-61. This is not to s uggest t

hat nei ther Hochberg nor Haymond committe d no wrongs that could be actionable i n initi ally inducing Lundy’s clients to abandon him. W e express no opinion on t

hat question here; before us i s whether Lundy was sufferi ng a conti nuing injur y t hat was “fai rly

trace able” spe cifi call y t o Hochberg’s conduct of pract icing l aw withou t a license and, therefore, “likely, as opposed to m erely speculative, that the injury [w oul d] b e red ress ed b y a fav ora ble d ecis ion ” an d pr osp ectiv e inju nctio n. Lujan , 50412

U.S. 560-61 ( quotati ons and alt erati ons omitt ed). Whether Lundy had st anding to bring an acti on for damages st emming from past fr auds or misr epresent ations purport edly made by Hochberg or

Haymond to Lundy ’s former clie nts i s a separ ate i ssue. Because, however, the record bel ow does not refl ect that Lundy ’s purpor ted los s of cli ents and fe es was caused by , was li kely to be redr essed by , or ( with the be nefit of the hi ndsight

now possesse d) in any

way even was redr essed by an injunc tion aga inst

Hochberg from the Distri ct Court pur suant t o § 2524(c), that a llegation of injury cannot form the basis for the Ar ticle I II sta ndi ng w hich Lu ndy m ust s how to b ring his c laim s. Lundy’s lett er bri ef now also ass erts that he will be “ responsible for e ach and every clai m which may be made against him in connection with Hochberg pr acti cing law without a l icense. ” Lundy Lett er Br. at 5 (emphasis added). Unlike Lundy’s previous alle gation, this alle ged injur y se ems suffici ent to “ demonstrat e a ‘pers onal st ake in the out com e’” to justif

y Artic le III s tand ing

. Lyons , 461 U.S. at 101 (quot ing Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S . 186, 2 04 (1 962 )). No nethe less, an “ injury in fa ct” m ust no t only be “ conc rete and parti culari zed,” but also “ac tual or

imminent, not ‘conj ectura l’ or ‘hypotheti cal. ’” Id. at 560. Stated another way , the plaintiff must be “immediat ely in danger of

sustaining some direct

injur y. ” Lyons , 461 U.S . at 10 2. De spite his prese nt repr esen tations to this C ourt, L und y neither a lleged in his

com plaint n or pro ved a t trial that an y malpra ctice liab ility was like ly to result fro m h is past par tners hip with Hochberg or Haymond. Nonethel ess, assuming t hose all egati ons13

had been “support ed adequately by the evi dence adduced at tri al, ” Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561, they stillwou ld not presen t adequate g rounds for invoking an A rticle III court’s jurisdictio n. Lu ndy adm its in his lette r brief th at som e ma lpractice liability “ma y” result from his pastassoc iation w ith H ochb erg, bu t he do es no t conte nd su ch liab ility is “im min ent,” or e ven likel y. Id. at 560 ; Whitmore v. Ark ansas , 495 U .S. 149, 155 (1990); see als o Lyons , 461 U .S. at 10 2. Lu ndy alleg es that if a malpractice sui t is brought against him, and if that s uit s tems from a matt er upon which Hochberg cont ribut ed during his partners hip with Lundy from October 1997 t o October 1999, and if it i s found that Hochberg actual ly

committed malpracti ce, and if Lundy is found derivatively l iable for Hochberg’s malpr acti ce because Hochberg’ s Connectic ut law li cense was suspende d at that t ime , then Lundy willsuffer an i njury . We dismiss this “hypot hetic al” and “conjectura l” injury as n othing mo re than an ele venth hou r effo rt by Lun dy to justify his litiga tion of th ese gen erali zed , non -div erse , state law claim s in a n A rticle III co urt. Lundy’s “malpractice” t heory of injur y al so encounter s causat ion and red ress abili ty prob lem s sim ilar to tho se u pon wh ich h is “d enia l of fees ” the ory fo und ered

. Again, t o the ext ent that Lundy mi ght have any liabi lit y for Hochberg’s conduct

on cases stemming from t

he partne rship at H&L, any negl igent a cts which coul d fairly be as cribed to Lundy have already occurred. Lundy has not been in partnership with, or other wise associated with and responsible for, the practice of Hochberg and his present partners, despit e Lundy’s clai ms of part “owners hip” over s ome pending contingent fees , si nce8 We also note t hat Pennsylvania ’s st atute of limi tati ons for bringing attorney malp ractice c laims is tw o years. 42 Pa.C .S. §55 24(7 ); Garcia v. Community Legal Services Corp. , 524 A .2d 98 0 (Pa . Sup er. 198 7). Be caus e Lu ndy disso lved h is partner ship with Hochberg and Haymond on October 8, 1999, the stat ute of l imit ations for an y claims a gains t Lun dy regard ing H ochb erg’s c ond uct ha s prob ably exp ired. T his further miti gates t

he possibi lit

y t hat the “hypot

hetic al” and “conj ectura l” malpr acti ce inju ry to L und y wo uld eve r oc cur . See Lyons , 461 U .S. at 10 2; Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560. 14 October 1999. Ther efore, there i s no prospect of any l iabil ity

to Lundy r esult ing from Hoc hberg’s co ntinued pra ctice; an injunction ag ainst Hoc hberg’s pre sent and f uture practice can do nothing to redress Lundy’s past injuri es. 8 Despite our holding, we in no way countenance H ochberg’s apparent past violations of Pennsylvania law and the r isks and harms to which he evi dently exposed both his fo rmer partne rs and clients. N oneth eless, it is no t the pla ce of the fe deral c ourts to involve themsel ves in abs tract disput es and provi de advisor y opi nions on matt ers of state law, particularly where issu es of state con stitutional law are in dispu te. Hoch berg not es , and Lundy

doe s no t d eny , t

hat Lundyhas al re ady

takenth es e ve ry

sa me unauthori zed pract ice of l aw and relat ed stat e law clai ms against Hochberg, Haymond, and Dia mo nd t o th e Pe nns ylvan ia C our t of C om mo n P leas for Ph ilade lph ia C oun ty. Hochberg Br. at

9. We trust

that Penns yl vania’s courts are capabl e of conside ring Lundy’s stat e law clai ms and, unhampered by the jurisdi ctiona l strict

ures of Art icle III, of affording what ever rel ief i s proven t o be appropri ate. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Lundy is without standing to contest15

in the f ederal courts Hochberg’s unaut horized pr acti ce of law and Haymond and Diamond’s “conspi racy ” to “ai d and abet. Therefore, the Dist rict Court lac ked jurisdiction to grant a pe rmanen t injunction against H ochbe rg. The A rticle III courts are for addres sing the clai ms of indivi duals poss essing parti culari zed inj uries that c an actual ly be redres sed bya favorabl e judgment. Concluding that Lundyis not such a person, we will vacat e the orde rs of the Distr ict Court and remand for i t to ent er an order of d ismissa l.

TO THE C LERK: Please fi le the foregoing opinion. By Th e Co urt, /s/ D. Brooks Smith Circuit Judge DAT ED: October 22, 2003