### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ja nuary6, 200 5 S es sio n


### RO KE TA M AS ON , A M I NO R B Y Y OL AN DA M AS ON , A S NE XT FR IEN D A ND NAT URA L MO TH ER , A ND YOL AND A MA SON, INDIV IDUA LL Y v. MET ROP OL ITA N G OVE RNME NT OF NAS HVILLE AND DAVID SO N COUNTY, TENNES SEE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 03C-234 Ham ilton V. Gayden, Jr., Judge

No. M2003- 03108-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Septem ber 30, 2005

Plaintiff, a tenth g rade hi gh school student, was attacked w hile riding the school bus. She was

s er i o u s l y i n

j u re d b y an o t h er s t u d en t u s i n g a ra z o r pr o v i d ed b y t h e sc h o o l as p ar to f t h e c o s m et o l o gy
c ur ri c ulu m. P la int if

f f ile d th is a c tio n a g a ins t th e sc ho ol s y ste m a lle g ing ne g lig e nc e for failu reto properly supervise students using dang erous instructional instruments and fo r v i o lation of the school’s zero tolera n ce p o licy by permitting students to take razors to and fr om school, thereby p er m i t t i n g t h e a t t ac k ert o h av e t h e ra z o r o n t h e s ch o o l b u s wh er e t h e at t ac k o cc u rr ed

. Fo l l o wi n g a bench trial , plaintiff was a war ded a judg ment of $80,000 fr om which def endant a ppeals. F inding the school sy stem is not li able for t he inj uries suffere d by the pl aintiff, we vacate the judg ment and

rema nd with instructions to enter an or der dismissing the a ction.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Vacate d

F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the c ourt, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined.

J ohn L . Kenne dy

and L ora B arke nbus Fox, Na s h v i l l e, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Metropolitan Government of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee.

Jose phP. B e dn arz, Sr ., a ndJose phP. B e dn arz, Jr., Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e lle e s, Rok e ta Mason and Yolanda Mason.

OP IN ION

Rok e ta Ma so n (Plaint if

f) su ff e re d sev e re c uts to the fa c e du ri ng a fi g ht w itha no the r s tud e nt, Brittany Moore ( Moore) , while riding the scho o l b us home at the e nd of the school day at WhitesAn i n i t i al c on f l i ct be t we en t h e g i r l s oc cu r r ed ea r l i er i n t h e day on t h e bu s r i de t o s ch ool

. H os t i l e wor ds 1

w e re e x c h a n g e d o v e r a n o the r stu d e n t’s b o o ts b u t no p h ysic a l co n ta c t wa s thr e a te n e d o r e n g a g e d in a t t h a t t im e

. R e fer e n c e to this m o rn ing inc id e n t o n the b u s rid e ho m e p re c ip itate d the fi g h t at issu e

.

T e stim o n y b y o the r stu d e n ts re v e a le d the gir ls d id no t kn o w e a c h o the r p rio r to the d a y o f t h e a ssa u lt. 2

D efend ant has a “ zero t o l erance” wea p o ns p o l i cy i n t he st ud ent hand b o o k ba nni ng weap o ns, i ncl ud i ng 3

ra z o r b la d e s, fro m the sc h o o l ca m p u s. V io la tio n o f t h e p o licy c o u ld re su lt in e x p u lsio n fro m the sc h o o l f o r a ye a r.
2 Creek H igh School. T h e assault occ urre d on J anuary 25, 2002. Both g irls were tenth g rade 1 students, but they

did not know eac h other prior to the day

of the a ssault. Whil e neither Plaintiff 2 or Moore wer e exemplary students, neither ha d a his tory of assault or violent behavior prior to the event at issue.

At t h e e n d o f t h e s c h o o l d ay , M o o re an d P l ai n t i ff s ep ar at el y

en t er ed t h e s ch o o l b u s t o go home. Plaintiff was alre ady seate d when Mooreenter ed the bus. An a rg ument beg an while Plaintiff was sitting by

one window and Ms. Moore sit ting by another window. B oth students had someone sitti ng next t o them on the bus . The two a rg ued brie fly , then Moore r eac hed over the students sitti ng be tw e e n th e m a nd g ra

bb e d Plai nti ff

wi th P la int if

f h itt ing Mo or e in r e sp on se . M oo repr oc e e de d to pu ll a ra zor bla de fr om h e r p oc ke t a nd , u sin g it a s a we apo n, c ut P la int if

f. P la int if

f w a s ta ke n to Vande rbilt Univer s it

y M e d ic al C e n ter

E me rg ency

Room byambulancewher e she unde rwe nt surg ery
rec eiving over one hundred stitches. Aperma nent sca r fr om the lace ration re mains.

T h e r az o r M o o re u s ed t o as s au l t P l ai n t i ff wa s o n e o f m an y

i n s tru m en t s i n t h e c o s m et o l o gy k i tp ro v i d ed b y

t h e c o s m et o l o gy

s ch o o l t ea ch eratW h i t es C re ekHi gh S ch o o l t o co s m et o l o gy studen ts

. T h e c o s me to lo g y k it –w h ic h in c lu d e d r a zo r b la d e s ( Sh ap e r

B la d e s ) , s c is s o r s ( I ce Temper ed Shear ), cuticle pusher, among othe r i n s t ru m en t s – was a n integ ral pa rt of the cosmetolog y

curriculum at the school. The c osmetolo g y students were permitted to ca rry the cosmetolog y

kits to an d fr o m s chool s o the students could do homewor k. Prior to permitting the students to take the kits to and from school, the cosmetolog y teac her pr ovided safe ty

instructions on theva ri ou s c os me tol og y

ins trume nts in the kit a nd te ste d the ir kn ow le dg e of thesa fe ty ins truc tio ns

. Th e te a c he r s pe c if

ic a lly e xpla ine d th a t if

a stu de nt us e d the c os me tol og y ins trume nts , thera zor in particula r, other than as instructed in c lass, the student would be subjec t to the school’s “zero toleranc e” policy

which expressly

prohibited students from possessing razors and other objec ts used for the pur

pose of g oing a

rmed. One of

the spec ific mandat es t h e t ea cher imposed upon the 3

co s m et o l o gy

s t u d en t s wa s t o k ee p t h e s af et y s h i el d o n t h e r az o rs an d t h e ra z o rs i n t h e c o s m et o l o gy kit wh ile tr a ns po rt ing thekit . A s th e te a c he r e xpla ine d, sh e tol d th e m:

Re me mbe r, zer o to le ranc e do n’ t [sic ] exe mpt y ou be c aus e y ou ha ve theimp le me nts in y our kit – or y ou have the m o u t

. Yo u m u s t h ave them in y our kit. I f they are
c au g h to u t , t h e n y o u ar e n o w m a y b e [ s i c ] s u s p e n d e d f

o r h a v i n g i to u to f

t h e k i t

. It must stay in the kit at all times unless for instructional purposes in the c lass.D ef en dan t r ai s es t wo i s s u es on a ppea l

. T h e f i r s t i s s u e, w h i ch w e fou n d t o be di s pos i t i v e, i s t h e s u bj ec t of 4

t hi s o p i ni o n and i s f

ul l y ad d res sed i n our anal y si s. T he second i ss ue p ert ai ned t o co m p arat i ve f aul t

. O ur d e te rm ina tio n tha t D e fen d a n t i s n o t l ia b le re n d e rs the c o m p a ra tive fau lt issu e m o o t.
3 Only afte r the tea cher instructed and tested t he st udents on the s afe and proper use and ca re of the c osmetology

kit did the teache r per m i t t he students to take their cosmetolog y

kits from the

c la ssr oo m.

Pla i n t i ff sued the Metr opolitan Governme nt of Nashville Da vidson Countyof Tenne ssee (De fendant) based on T enn. C ode Ann. § 29-20-205, the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleg ing liabilitybased on the neg lige nt acts and omissions of an e mploy ee, the cosmetolog y school teac her

a t Whit e s Cr e e k Hi g h Sc ho ol. F oll ow ing a be nc h tria l, the tria l c ou rt fo und De fend ant lia ble be c aus e , a s it

state d, “ the a c tio ns of [the te a c he r], in al low ing stu de nts to ca rry str a ig ht r a zor s h ome with them on the bus, was an ope rational a ct of ne g lige nce an d contrary to the school’s Z ero To l e r a n c e P o l i c y ” a n d a w ar d e d P l a i n t i f f d a m a g e s i n t h e a m o u n t o f $ 8 0 , 0 0 0

. D e f e n d a nt app e a ls contending the attac k was not for esee able. 4

S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW

The tr ial court he ard this ca se without a jury . The standa rd of r eview of

a trial c ourt’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t is de novo a n d w e p r e s u meth a t th e f in d in g s o f

f a c t a r e c o rr e c t u n le s s the pr e po nd e ranc e of

thee vid e nc e is oth e rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Ra wlin gs v . J oh n H an c oc k Mu t. Life Ins. Co. , 78 S.W. 3d29 1, 29 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) . F or thee vid e nc e to p re po nd e rate a g a ins t
a tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing of fa c t, it mus t su pp ort a no the r fi nd ing of fa c t w ithg re a te r c on vin c ing e ff e c t. W alke r v . S idn ey Gi lre ath & As so c s. , 40 S.W. 3d 66 , 71 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; The Realty Shop, Inc.

v. R.R. W estminster Holding, Inc ., 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Where the trial court does not ma

k e f in d in g s o f f

a c t, th e r e is n o p r e s u mp ti o n o f c o rr e c tn e s s a n d w e “ mu s t c o n d u c t our own independe nt review of the rec ord to de termine wher e the preponde ranc e of the e vidence lies.” Brooks v. Brook

s , 992 S.W .2d 403, 405 (Tenn. 1999). We a lso give g reat weig ht to a trial court’ s determinations of cre dibilit y of witnesses. Estate of W alton v. Y oung , 950 S.W .2d 956, 959 (Tenn. 19 97 ); B & G Con str

., In c . v . P olk , 37 S.W

. 3 d 4 6 2, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I ssues of law a re revie wed de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Nelson v. Wal -M a rt Stores, Inc. , 8 S.W .3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999)

.
A N A L Y SIS

Def endant contends the t rial court err ed by finding it neg lige nt beca use Moore’s attac k on Plaintiff was not fore seea ble. The tria l court found De fend an t l i ab l e, re asoning the eve nt was fore seea ble “in this day

and time” be cause “the students and atmosphere ha ve chang ed.” We ha ve determined the trial court applied an err oneous “for esee ability ” standard that produce d an er roneous
c o n c l u s i o n o f

l i ab i l i t y.4

Society place s a sig nificant re sponsibili ty upon school offi c ia

ls to p r o v idea saf

e envir onment fo r o ur c hil dr e n, thestu de nts . H ow e ve r, s uch a res po ns ibi lit y do e s n ot m ake ou r s c ho ol o ff ic ia ls insurers of

the safe ty

of its students. To the contrary , teac hers and school districts are not expected to be insurer s of the saf

ety of students. King by King v. Kartans on, 72 0 S.W.2 d 6 5, 68 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 86 ); Roberts v. Robe rtson Count y Board of Education, 692 S.W .2d 863, 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 85 ); Cadorett e v. Sumner County Board of Education , N o

. 0 1 A 0 1

- 9 5 1 0

- CV

- 0 0 4 4 1 , 1 9 9 6 WL 187586, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. April 19, 1996 ). Moreove r, Tenne ssee doe s not impose upon teac hers the duty

to anticipate or fore see the hundreds of unexpected student ac ts that occur in our public schools. Ro be rts , 692 S

. W

. 2 d at 8 7 2

. This is particularly true whe n injury

results from conduct that c onstitut es a r adica l departure fr om rea sonable c onduct. See D oe v. Linder , 845 S.W .2d 17 3, 17 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) ; Ro e v . Ca tho lic Di oc e se , 950 S.W .2d 27, 31-32 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1996).

A claim of ne g lige nce r equire s proof of the following elements: (1) a duty of ca re ow ed by the def endant to the plaintiff; ( 2) conduc t below the appl i ca b l e s t an d ard of car e that amounts to a brea ch of that duty ; ( 3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fac t; and (5) pr ox imate, or leg al, cause. Mc Cal l v. W ilder , 913 S.W .2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995) ( citing Kilpat rick v . Bryant , 8 6 8 S. W. 2 d 5 9 4 , 598 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ; Bradshaw v. Daniel , 85 4 S.W. 2d 86 5, 86 9 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ; McClenahan v . Cooley , 806 S.W .2d 767, 774 (Tenn. 1991)). Duty is the leg al obligation owed by the def endant to the plaintiff to conform to a r easona

ble per son standard of

car e for the protec tion ag ainst unrea sonable risks of harm. Mc Cal l , 9 1 3 S. W. 2 d at 153 ( citing Pittman v. Upjohn Co. , 890 S.W .2d 425, 428 (Tenn. 19 94 ); Nic ho ls v . A tni

p , 844 S.W .2d 655, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), pe rm. to appea l denied, (Te nn. 1 9 9 2 ) ; W

. KEE TON , P R OS S ER AND KEETON ON THE LA W O F T OR TS , § 53 (5th ed. 1984))

.
I f it is d et er m ined that a plaintiff' s injury would not have oc curr ed but for the defe ndant’s brea ch of a

duty , the question then is whether the def endant’ s brea ch wa s a proxi mate cause of the plaintiff' s injury , which, as our Supreme Court noted in Hale v. O strow , is dif fe re nt f ro m a c aus e in fac t of the injury . 166 S.W .3d 713, 718-719 (Te nn. 2005).

P ro x i m at e c au s e p u t s a l i m i to n t h e cau s al ch ai n , s u ch t h at , ev en t h o u gh t h e p l ai n t i ff 's injury would not ha ve happene d but for the de fendants' br eac h, defe ndants will not be held liable f

or injuries that we re not substantially cause d by their conduc t or wer e not rea sonably

fore seea ble re sults of t h ei r conduc t. Hayne s , 883 S.W .2d at 612. "T hus, proxi mate ca

use, or leg al cause, conc erns a determination of whether leg al li abi li tysh ou ld be i mp os ed w here caus e in facthas been est abl is hed ." Kilpat rick , 868 S.W .2d at 598.

Hale, 16 6 S.W.3 d at 719

. Whil e a de fe nd a nt in a ne g lig e nc e a c tio n ca nn ot be fo un d li ableun le ss the def endant’ s conduct wa s the proxim ate cause of the plaintiff' s injuries, the defe ndant’s conduc t need not be the only

conduct c ausing the injury . As long as the de fendant's c onduct is a substantial f a c t o r c a u s i n g t h e i n

j u r y , t h a tc o n d u c tn e e d n o tb e t h e s o l e c au s e n o r t h e l a s tc au s e o f

t h e i n j u r y. Lan c as te r v . M

on te si , 39 0 S. W.2 d 2 17 , 2 21 (T e nn . 1 96 5) ; Kroger Co. v. Giem , 387 S.W .2d 620, 626 (Tenn. 1964)

.5

The fo c u s o f th is ap p e a l is th e is s u e o f f o r e s e e ab il ity

. F o r e s e e ab il ity is a n e le me n t of the proof of proxi mate ca

use. Ford Motor Co. v. Eads , 457 S

. W

. 2d 28, 32 (Tenn. 1970) . The fore seea bilityrequire ment is one prong of a thre e-pr ong ed test to determine proxi mate ca use. The thr e e -p ro ng e d te st t o d e te rm inepr oximate c aus a tio n is a s f oll ow s:
(1) the tortfea sor' s conduct must have b een a "substantial f

actor " in bringing about the harm being complained of ; and (2) the re is no rule or policy that should relieve the wr o n gd o er from liabilitybeca use of the manner in whic h the neg lige nce ha s
re su lte d intheha

rm ; a nd (3 ) the ha

rm g ivi ng ri se to the a c tio n c ou ld h a ve re a so na bly been forese en or anticipated by a per son of ordinary

intelligenc e and pr

udence

. See Sm ith v . G ore , 72 8 S.W. 2d 73 8, 74 9- 50 (T e nn . 1 98 7) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Eads , 224 Tenn. 473, 457 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tenn. 1970); Ray Carter, Inc . v. Edwards , 222 Tenn. 46 5, 43 6 S. W.2 d 8 64 , 8 67 (T e nn . 1 96 9) ; Lan c as ter v . M on te si , 216 Tenn. 50, 390 S.W. 2d21 7, 22 1 ( Te nn . 1 96 5) ; Roberts v. Robertson County Bd. of Ed. , 692 S.W .2d 86 3, 87 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 5) ; Caldwell v. Ford Motor Co. , 619 S.W .2d 534, 541- 43 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 19 81 ); W yatt v. W innebago Industries, Inc ., 566 S.W .2d 276, 280-81 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1977).

McClenahan v . Cooley , 806 S.W .2d 767, 775 (Tenn. 1991) . I f t h e injury g iving rise to the ac tion could not have be en re asonably fore seen or

anticipated, then there is no pr ox imate cause and thus no liabilityfor ne g lige nce. Ray Carter, Inc . v. Edwards , 436 S.W .2d 864, 867 (Tenn. 1969)

. Howeve r, the for esee ability require ment is not so st rict as to re quire the t o rt fe as o r t o fore see the

e xac t mann er in w hic h th e inj ury take s p la c e , p ro vid e d it

is d e te rm ine d th a t th e tortf e a so r c ou ld fore see, or

throug h the exercise o f reasonable diligenc e should have fore seen, the g ener al manner in which the injury

or loss occur

red. McClenahan , 806 S.W .2d at 775 ( citing Ro be rts , 692 S.W .2d

a t 87 1; W yatt, 566 S.W .2d at 281.)

Th e tria l cou rt ’s a sse ssm e nt that th e a ssa ult on Pla int if

f b y Mo or e wa s f

or e se e able“ in this day and time” be cause “the students and atmosphere have chang ed” is c onsistent with jurisdi ctions holding that misconduc t is to be ex pecte d whene ver a g roup of students is broug ht toge ther. Se e Ho ff v. Vac aville, 968 P.2d, 522, 5 3 4 (C al

. 1 988) (obse rving the “c ommonlyknown tendenc y ” of stu de nts to e ng a g e in imm a tur e be ha vio r that c ou ld be da ng e ro us to the mse lve s o r p e e rs ); Moore by and Through Kni ght v. W ood County Board of Education , 489 S.E.2d 1, 6 (W. V a. 1997) ( stating that the immature be havior of c hildren must be taken into a ccount in the supervision of childre n); Da ile y v . Lo s A ng e le s U

nif ie d S c ho ol D ist

. , 4 6 0 P

. 2 d 3 6 0 (C al

. 1 9 7 0 ) ( fi n d i n g t h at“r o u gh h o u s i n g” and “hor seplay ” ar e norma l activities for hig h school boy s and thus it is a function of prope r supervision to control such be havior).
Other jurisdictions, such a s New Y ork, hold that misconduct is not to be anticipated in the absenc e of pr oof of prior misconduct. See Sm ith v. East Ramapo Central School District, 741 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252 (N.Y. A pp. Div. 2002) (finding that even though school had noti ce of two other

a ft e r s c ho ol e ve nt a ssa

ult s, thesc ho ol c ou ld n ot h a ve foreseen th at the se tw o p art ic ula r s tud e nts
wo ulda ssa

ult theplaint if

f) ; Br own v . B oa rd

of E du c ati on of G le n Co v e Pu bli c Sc ho ols , 7006

N.Y.S.2d 58, 60 ( N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding unfore seea ble wher e there was no pre vious history of attac k betwee n the two sports teams, or betwee n the victim and the two g irls who attacke d her) ; Busby v. Ticonde roga Cent. School District , 684 N.Y.S.2d 70 9 , (N.Y. A pp. Div. 1999) (f inding isolated statement by attacking student, just prior to incident unforesee able as relations betwe en the attacke r and vic tim were g ood).

Tenne ssee f

ollows the latter, more conservative for esee ability approa ch t hat student misconduct is not to be anticipated abse nt proof of prior misconduct. Kindred v. Board of Education of M e mp his CitySc ho ols , 946 S.W .2d 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that attack on plaintiff by fellow student wa s not forese eable wher e similar threa t s we re made by students but never c arried out, and the attac ker ha d not been known to ha v e a we ap o n or cause trouble at the school); Chudasama v. Me tro

p o li ta n G o v e r

n ment of Nashville and Davidson County, 914 S.W .2d 922 (Tenn. Ct. App., 1995 (holding locke r room fig ht was not rea sonably fore seea ble bec ause t h e coa ch wa s
unawa re of any neg ative history

betwee n the students and ther e wa s no re co rd of disciplinary pr ob le ms b e tw e e n th e stu de nts inv olv e d inthefi g ht) . T e nn e sse e , als o, ha s a do pte d th e re a so na ble person standa

rd in ca ses involving the sa fety of students. Ro be rts , 692 S.W .2d at 870-71.

Kin dre d v . B oa rd

of E du c at io n of

Me mp his CitySc ho ols , 946 S.W .2d 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), Chudasamav

. M

e tr o p olitan Governme nt of Nashvill e and Dav idson County, 914 S.W .2d 922 (Tenn. Ct. App., 1995) and Ro be rts v

. Ro be rts on Cou ntyBo ar d o f E du c ati on , s up ra , are three of the l eading c ases in Te nnessee that we f ind particularly

rele vant in analy zing this case. In Kindred a student was collec ting a dmission t o a fa culty -student baske tball game at the door

. A forme r student ref used to pay

the adm i ssion and exchang ed wor ds with the student collecting the admission threatening , “I ’ll be bac k.” Id. at 48. The f ormer stude nt returne d with a wea pon and shot the student collecting admission to the s chool event. A coach and the s chool principal testified t hat the former student, Oliver, wa s not known to carry wea pons or cause any

trouble at school. This court found t h e e v en twa s n o tfo re s ee ab l e, ex p l ai n i n g:

The e vidence at trial supports t hese findings. S pecif ically , Coach Ande rson
an d P ri n ci p al Ha wk i n s b o t h t es t i fi ed t h ati n ci d en t s i n v o l v i n g s t u d en t s grab b i n g, pushing, and threatening other st u d ents occur red quite of

ten at the sc hool. Coach Ander son testified that he c onstantly hear d students make thre ats simil ar to the threat made by Oliver in this c ase, but, in the coac h' s experience , this was the first time a

s t u d ent ac tually

had ca rried out suc h a thre at. S e e , e

. g

. , R a w l s v

. B u l l o c h Cou nty School District , 223 Ga.App. 234, 477 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1996) (holding that attack on plaintiff by

fellow student wa s not forese eable where pl aintiff testified that student' s threat to " kill" plaintiff wa s not unusual among students in plaintiff's sc hool and p lain ti f

f d id n o t ta

k e s tu d e n t' s th r e a t s e r io u s ly )

. F u rth e r , Co a c h A n d e r s o n had

ne ve r kno wnOl ive r to ha ve a we apo n o r t o c aus e a ny

pr ob le ms a

ro un d th e sc ho ol. Principal Haw kins corrobor ated Coach Ander son' s testimony , stating that, based on his knowledg e of O liver as a former student, the principal would not have e x pecte d Oliver to ca

rry out his threat. Se e , e .g ., Cox v . S tate , 84 4 S.W. 2d 17 3, 17 8 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1992) (holding that, g iven complete lack of evidenc e of inmate' s propensity for7

violent acts, evide n ce d id not preponder ate a g ainst finding that inmate' s attack on claimant wa s not forese eable ). Ac cording ly , we r ejec t Plaintiff' s arg ument that the trial court e rre d in declining to impose liability ag ainst Def endants unde r principles of common-law neg lige nce.
Id., 946 S.W .2d at 49-50.

I n Chudasama , a fig ht broke out in an unsupervised loc ker r oom after a tea cher dismiss ed the students from his class be fore the end of the period. The injured stude nt sued the school sy stem conten d i n g t h e fight and r esulting injuries w ere fore seea ble and the pr ox imate re sult of neg lige nt supervision by

the principa l and a tea cher , who also served as a coac h. Sp ec i fi ca l l y , the plaintiff contende d the coa ch failed to adequately supervise the g irls’ locker room and that he violated school po lic y by a llo wi ng his stu de nts to l e a ve c la ss f if te e n mi nu te s e arl y

to g o to theloc ke r r oo m. T his court found the coac h’s neg lige nce in letting his students go to the locke r room ea rly in violation of

a sc ho ol r ule ins uf fi c ie nt to impo se lia

bil ity on thesc ho ol s y ste m, e xpla ini ng theplaint if f mus t a lso show “that it was f

orese eable that injury to a student would occur as a result of the coa ch' s actions in order f or liabilityto attach.” Id. , 9 14 S.W. 2da t 92 5. As thec ou rt mor e fu lly

e xpla ine d:

Wit h the bene fit of hindsight, we can n o w s ee that if Mr. Summral had

re str a ine d th e g ir ls i n h is c la ss f ro m g oin g to t

heloc ke r r oo m f

or a s lo ng a s p os sib le on the day in que stion, Jennifer' s ordea l w ould ha ve been shortened, though it might not have be en pre vented.

Howeve r, eve n conce ding, a rg uendo, that the c oach w as neglig ent in letting his s tu den ts g o to theloc ke r r oo m e arl ie r tha n h e wa s o bli g e d to , a ndthat hi s neg lige nce w as one of

the causes of Jennifer' s injuries, the plaintiff must also show t h ati twa s fo re s ee ab l e t h ati n j u ryt o a st u d en t wo u l d o cc u r as a re s u l t o f t h e c o ac h 's actions in order

for liability

to attach. Se e Lan c as te r, 390 S.W .2d at 221.

But ther e is no evidenc e in the re cord that Mr. Summ ral wa s awa re of the

a nta g on ism

be tw e e n Jen nif

e r andSta rr , o r that hekn e w a fi g ht b e tw e e n th e tw o g ir ls

wa s w ide ly ant ici pate d b y his stu de nts . T he rewa s a lso no re c or d o f p ro ble ms betwee n J ennife r and the g irls who actua lly attacke d her, and the locker room had pr e vio us ly be e n thesit e of on ly tw o f ig hts in n iney e ars . It w ou ld p la c e a n u nr e a lis tic burden of fore sight upon the teac her to c onclude that he should have anticipated the events that oc curr ed.

Id. , 914 S.W .2d at 925.

As state d e arl ie r, Te nn e sse e do e s no t imp os e up on te a c he rs a nd sc ho ol s y ste ms the du ty to
a nti c ipate or

fo re se e thehu nd re ds of

un e xpe c te d s tud e nt a c ts that oc c ur da ily in our pu bli c sc ho ols

. Ro be rts , 692 S.W .2d at 872 (c itation omit ted); howe ver, w e haveno hesitation in holding a te ache r or loca l school sy stem to the duty of safeg uarding students from re asonably fore seea ble dang erous“In this c a se fo r e x a m p le , R o b e rts' inj u ry w o u ld ha v e b e e n p re v e n te d ha d [th e tea c h e r] tak e n the sim p le 5
pr ec au t i on of

n ot g i v i n g Y ou n t a dr i l l bi t h e di d n ot k n ow h ow t o u s e or h ad [ t h e t ea ch er ] a dopt ed an d e n for ce d a

r ul e pr ohi bi t i ng s t udent s f r om bei ng i n t he s hop when he was not pre s ent

. T he i nj ur y woul d al s o hav e been av oi ded had [t he t eacher] bee n pro vi d ed wi t h t he cent ral ab i l i t y t o render al l m achi nes i no p erab l e whi l e he was not i n t he shop area. ” (f

o o t no t e i n R o b e rts op i ni o n)
8 conditions including the dang erous a cts of fe llow students. Id . I n Ro be rts , we c oncluded that the

e v i d e n c e s u p p o rt e d a f

i n d i n g t h e s h o p t e a c h e r w a s n e g l i g e n t a n d h i s f a i l u r e t o f u r nis h a de qu a te i n s t r u c ti o nan d s up e rv isi on to h is v oc a tio na l a g ri c ultur e stu de nts wa s th e pr oximate c aus e of Rob e rt s' injuries. We identified four a spects of the teac her’ s conduct that supporte d this conclusion.

F ir st, [the te a c he r] h a d a p ra c tic e of pe rm itt ing ine xpe ri e nc e d f re sh ma n s tud e nts to
rema in in th e s h o p are a unsupervised in the prese nce of fully operational power driven e quipment which, if used imprope rly , could ca u s e s erious inj ury . Second, there is no p ro o f t h at [the teache r] ever instruc ted his students in the proper techniques f

or assisting others i n operating shop mac hinery . Third, there is no proof that [th e te a c he r] e ve r g a ve his stu de nts a ny ins truc tio n c on c e rn ing theway s a drill press c ould cause injury

if it was not u s ed prope rly . Whil e ther e is proof that [ the teac her] demonstrated two of the many way s that a drill pr ess could be use d, neither [t he tea ch er ] nor any

of his students testified that any instruction was g iven

c o n c e r n i n g t h e o t h e r

w a ys t h a ta

d r i l l p r e s s , i f

i m p r o p e r l y u s e d , c o u l d c au s e i n j u r y. Fourth, [ the teac her] g ave Y ount a drill bit knowing that [Yount] had neve r used the drill bit before and that he wa s eag er to use it during that class period.

The e vidence in Ro be rts fur t h er s u p p orted the c onclusion the teac her w as aw are Yount, a fourtee n y ear

old, did not know how t o use t he longer drill bit properly when he g ave it to him and the drill bit could be dang erous if used improperly

. The e vidence also established the te ache r had dir e c t kn ow le dg e Yo un t in te nd e d to us e the drill bit a t that ti me . Rathe r t ha n k e e pin g thedrill bit and telling Yount he would come into the shop are a momentarily to supe rvise his w ork, the tea cher g ave Y ount the instrument and left the classroom lea ving Y ount unsupervised. With the foreg oing evidentiary

backdr op, we c oncluded:
Providing the drill bit to Yount, knowing at the time that the shop equ i p m en t was fully opera ble, that other students we re w orking in the shop are a without supervision,

a ndthat Y ou nt w a s e a g e r t o u se thedrill bit c on sti tut es a bre a c h o f [the te a c he r' s] duty to supervise his students properly and provides a sufficient basis for a judgme nt in Roberts' favor

. 5

Ro be rts , 692 S.W .2d at 872.9

Her e, Plaintiff’s for esee ability arg ument primarily hinge s on the contention that the tea cher kn owi ng ly

a ndne g lig e ntl y

pe rm itt e d M oo reto v iol a te thezer o to le ranc e po lic y wh ic h e xpre ssl y prohibited razors. We find Plaintiff’s re liance on the zero toleranc e policy to be misplaced.

As Pla int if

f c on te nd s, thezer o to le ranc e po lic y e xpre ssl y pr oh ibi ts r a zor s; h ow e ve r, it a lso pr oh ibi ts “ a ny

ob je c t” po sse sse d b y a stu de nt “f or the pu rp os e of g oin g arm e d. ” Th e po lic y pr ov ide s: A student shall not knowingly possess, handle, transmit, or use a wea pon . . . knives with blades 2 1⁄2 inche s or mo re in leng th, switchblade, box cutter, ra zor blade or other knife -like instrument utiliz ing a razor blade. Furthermore , a student shall not knowing ly

possess any

object for

the purpose or

intent of g oing a

rmed.

No te a c he r s ho uldkn ow ing ly pe rm it a stu de nt t o pos se ss an ob

je c t at sc ho ol f

or thepu rp os e of g oing a rmed, y et some educ ational instruments – objects – that ar e permitted, if not required, f or
us e in the c la ssr oo m may be mis us e d by stu de nts a s we apo ns

. Th ou g h it is ina rt fu lly e xpre sse d in thepo lic y , th e zer o to le ranc e po lic y c on te mpl a te s a

du a l pu rpos e of

so me ob je c ts: on e that is pe rm itt e d, the ot her proh ibi te d. Th is i s e vid e nt f ro m th e mod if

ic a tio n o f the te rm

“ a ny ob je c t” to
exc l u d e o b

j ec ts used “for

the purpose or

intent of g oing a

rmed.” The modification indicates that

so me ob je c ts, a lth ou g h po te nti a l we apo ns , are no t pr oh ibi te d by thepo lic y

if po sse sse d b y

stu de nts for a ppropriate purposes, such a s part of the curriculum. Thus, the policy does not prohibit a student from possessing any

and all objec ts which may be misused as wea

pons. Neve rtheless, the judg ment of the c osmetology

teac her in a llowing he r students t o possess straig ht razors outside of the

c la ssr oo m, e ve n if

c on ta ine d inc os me tol og y kit s, is q ue sti on able , if

no t ne g lig e nt.

There are , howeve r, at least two fallac ies with Plaintiff’ s relianc e on the z er o t o l er ance po lic y . O ne fa lla c y

is that the po li c y

app lie s to a

nu mbe r o f “ ob

je c ts” stu de nts arepe rm itt e d to po sse ss at sc ho ol u nd e r c e rt a in c ir c ums ta nc e s. A ba se ba ll bat is on e su c h ob je c t. Aba se ba ll b a t is pr oh ibi te d b y

thesa me po lic y

if it i s p os se sse d f

or thepu rp os e of

g oin g arm e d, y e t it i s p e rm itt e d if

u s e d i n c o n

j u n c t i o n w i t h s c h o o l i n tr a m u r a l a c t i v i t i e s o r t h e b a s e b a l l t e a m

. S t u d e n t s m a y c arr y a
nu mbe r o f o bje c ts t o a ndfr om s c ho ol that c ou ld b e us e d a s a we apo n. Th us , an ob

je c t th a t is permissible for the student to possess, because it is part of the student’s c urriculum or e x trac urricula r activities, can become a prohibi ted obj ect the moment the stude nt chooses to use it as a w eapon, f or the purpose of

“g oing a rmed.” Thoug h the baseba ll bat is not expresslyprohibited by the policy , the same ba seball bat is prohibited if possessed a s a we apon, just as the policy prohibits razors.

Another f

allacy with Plainti ff’ s relianc e on the zero tole ra nce policy is if we conc ede, arg uendo, that the c osmetology teac her w as neg lige nt in letting her students transport the cosmetolog y

kit to and from school, Plaintiff must show it was foresee able that injuryto a student

wo u ld occur

as a r esult of the cosme tology teac her' s actions in order for liability

to attach. See Lancaster , 390 S.W .2d at 221.

I s it f o r e s e e ab l e , i n t h i s d a y a n d t i m e , t h a t s o m e s t u d e n t s o m e w h e r e m i g h t u s e a ba t a s a
wea pon to assault another

student at school? The an s wer to the question is y es. I s it foresee able,10

in this day and time, that some student somewher e might use a razor from their c osmetology kit as

a we apon to assault anothe r studen t at s ch o o l? The a nswer to this question is also y es. The fore seea bility standard stated in the two questions above a ppear s to be the standar d applied by the trial court; howeve r, it is notthe fore seea bilitystandard to be applied in Tenne ssee. The Tenne ssee standard is w hether it wa s fore seea ble that a student like Ms. Moor e – who ha d re ce i v ed p roper ins truc tio n a s to thesa feus e a ndtr a ns po rt a tio n o f the c os me tol og y kit , w ho ha d b e e n te ste d o n th os e instructions, who had been warned that an improper use of the kit or its contents could violate the zero toleranc e policy , and who ha d no history of violence – would take the ra z o r fr om the cosmetolog y

kit and use it as a we apon to criminallyassault another student at school.

As in the Kindred

ca s e, b o t h t h e c o s m et o l o gy t ea ch eran d t h e p ri n ci p al at W h i t es C re ekHi gh School were surprised by Moore’ s conduct a nd d i d not expect this t ype of be havior fr om her. Kindred, 946 S.W .2d at 49. The pr incipal testified to his surprise, upon arrival at the scene , to see Moore de tained as the ag g ressor. B ased o n Moore’ s disciplinary rec ord and the principal’s

ex p er i en ce wi t h h er , t h e pr i n ci p al wa s s h o ck ed b y h eri n v o l v em en ti n a v i o l en t ac t

. T h e c o s m et o l o gy te a c he r h a d n o in dic a tio n o f v iol e nt o r a g g re ssi ve c on du c t th rou gh th e c ou rs e of he r d e a lin g wi th Moore in her

classroom nor w as she a war e of any dang erou s or violent beha vior by Moore. The te a c he r s po ke wi th M oo reon on e oc c a sio n a bo ut t a lki ng too muc h inc la ss b ut M oo rewa s r e sp e c tf ul, obedient and worke d well with othe rs in the course of the cosmetolog y class. Ba sed on her c onduct i n t h e c l a s s r o o m , t h e t e a c h e r o b s e r v e d n o b e h a v i o r

i n d i c a t i v e o f a n a g g r e s s i v e o r v i o l e n tt e n d e n c y.

F a ctors this court found sig nificant in Chudasama are prese nt here . The c osmetology teac her had no knowledge of antag onism betwee n the two g irls and neither student had a disciplinary rec ord indicative of violent be havior. Chudasama , 914 S.W .2d at 925. There is no evidence to indicate the teac her kne w or should have rea sonably fore seen a

violent attack by

Moore on Plaintiff or another stu de nt. Th e te a c he r’ s la c k o f kno wl e dg e of a nta g on ism or c on fl ic t wa s supp orte d by oth e r s tud e nts who test i fi ed the girls did not know ea ch other prior to the day

of the a ssault. Moreover , neither Moore nor

Plaintiff had a history

of violence and only

Moore had re ce i v ed disciplinary action, though noneof it pertaine d to violent behavior.
We also find signific ant, as we did in Chudasama , t h at d u ri ng the cosmetolog y teac her’ s thirty -four

y ear car eer , she never experience d a student removing a razor from the c lassroom for an unauthorize d p u rpose and no student used a c osmetology razor as a

wea pon even thoug h she had

a lw a y s p e rm itt e d h e r s tud e nts to t rans po rt e sse nti a lly

thesa me c os me tol og y

kit , in c lud ing ra zor s, to and fr om school. 914 S.W .2d at 925 (de eming it significant that only two fig hts had occ urre d in the locker room in the nine y ear s prior to the incident).

Th e c os me tol og y

te a c he r i ns truc te d M oo re , a lon g wi th a ll c os me tol og y stu de nts , o n s a fe ty fo r a ll i ns trum ent s in the c os me tol og y kit a ndte ste d th e m onthe ir kn ow le dg e of

tho se sa fe ty instructions. The teac her a dditionallyexplained that u s e o f the c osmetology tools for any

rea son other than a s i n s t ru ct ed in class could subjec t the student to the zero toleranc e policy prohibiting razors at school. It was only afte r the tea cher

had provide d safe ty

instructions and tested Moore on the se ins truc tio ns , d id the c os me tol og y te a c he r a llo w M oo reto t ake thekit fro m the c la ssr oo m.11

These f acts a re sig ni fi cantly

differ ent from the f

acts in Ro be rts wher e the shop tea cher was found to be neg lige nt and the injury was found to be for esee able. 692 S.W.2d at 872. I n Ro be rts the shop teac her did not instruct the student on safe ty proce dures and he g ave the fourtee n y ear old student thelarg e drill bit

kn ow ing thestu de nt i nte nd e d to pr omp tly us e it i n th e drill pr e ss. As signif icant and tr ag ic as t h e i n

j u ries to Plaintiff are , it was not fore seea ble that Moore would use the ra zor from the cosmetolog y ki t t o as s au lt Pl aintiff; thus, the cosmetolog y teac her’ s neg lige nce in pe rmitting st udents to transport the cosmetology kits was not the proxi mate ca use of Pla int if f’ s in jurie s. To thec on tr ary , th e int e nti on a l, c ri min a l a ssa ult by Mo or e wa s th e pr oximate
c aus e of Pla int if f’ s in jurie s.

I N C ONCL US I ON

There fore , we va cate the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re mand with instructions to enter an order dismiss ing the action. Costs of this a ppeal are assessed ag ainst appellee s, Roketa Mason and Yolanda Ma son.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR ., J UDGE