IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

OHIO CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS,

AFFILIATED WITH THE 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD

OF TEAMSTERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

KOKOSING CONSTRUCTION

COMPANY, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:11-CV-0214

Judge Peter C. Economus

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendant Kokosing Construction 

Company, Inc.’s Motion for Attorney Fees. (Doc. # 27.) Plaintiff Ohio Conference of 

Teamsters, Affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“OCT”) filed a response 

(doc. # 31) to which Kokosing filed a reply (doc. # 32). Kokosing moves this Court for an order 

for reasonable attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

I. BACKGROUND

On behalf of its constituent Teamsters Local 436, OCT brought a complaint to compel 

arbitration against Kokosing. OCT argued that Kokosing was obligated to Local 436 under the 

2010-2013 Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) which required arbitration of grievances.

1

 

 

1 The specific details of the agreement, the signatories to the agreement, and the efforts Kokosing undertook to limit 

the scope of its obligation under the CBA to exclude OCT is set forth in this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and 

Order. (Doc. # 25.) The nature of the grievance is also described in that Order. 

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Kokosing denied any obligation to Local 436. The parties filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment on the legal issue of whether Kokosing, as a signatory to the CBA, had consented to 

arbitration with Local 436. Ultimately, this Court found in favor of Kokosing. 

Kokosing now argues that OCT maintained this lawsuit in bad faith because it knew, 

after the close of discovery, that it had no basis for its claim. In support, Kokosing offers a letter 

from its counsel to OCT’s counsel to convince OCT to dismiss the lawsuit. Kokosing’s counsel 

had made it “abundantly clear” that Kokosing was not bound under a contract with Local 436 

and, therefore, was not required to arbitrate the grievance. (Motion, page 3, Exh. A.) However, 

OCT’s counsel responded with an equally detailed letter, explaining that its position to maintain 

its lawsuit was buffered the “presumption of arbitrability” that “strongly supported” its claims. 

(Id. at Exh. B.) Kokosing also cites to this Court’s grant of summary judgment in its favor as 

support for its assertion that OCT acted in bad faith: “This Court granted summary judgment to 

Kokosing and denied OCT the requested relief with an express finding that OCT has [sic] no 

factual or legal basis for its claim.”2

 (Id., page 2.) 

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

In the United States, the general rule is that a prevailing party may not recover attorney’s 

fees absent statutory authority or an enforceable contract provision. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. 

International Union, et al., 981 F.2d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Shimman v. International 

Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 1229 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. 

 

2 This Court notes that this “express finding” is no more than the application of the summary-judgment standard. 

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denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985)). There is no statutory or contract provision applicable here. 

However, a court may award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party if it determines that the 

losing party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, or for oppressive reasons.” Alyeska Pipeline

Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975). Kokosing asserts that the bad-faith 

exception applies. 

According to Kokosing, at the close of discovery, it was “evident” that there were “no 

facts presented” that Kokosing had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Local 

436. (Motion, Ex. A, page 1.) Nonetheless, despite Kokosing’s “demand” for dismissal, OCT

continued to pursue its “meritless claims” in bad faith. (Motion, page 6.) However, OCT had set 

forth specific reasoning for its belief that the case was worthy of continued litigation (id., Ex. B), 

and that reasoning was based on relevant case law. That OCT did not prevail does not undercut 

what appears to be a good-faith estimate of its success at the time. Kokosing offers nothing more 

to support its conclusion that OCT’s evaluation of its case was without merit. Nor does 

Kokosing offer any evidence that OCT did anything else during the remainder of the litigation 

that would constitute bad faith. Kokosing’s conclusory statement that OCT acted in bad faith is 

not sufficient. 

In addition, Kokosing offers no case law to support its contention that defeat on a motion 

for summary judgment is equivalent to bad faith. A lack of genuine issue of material fact does 

not equate to bad faith; if it were so, attorney’s fees awarded under the bad-faith exception would 

not be “an extreme sanction, and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct.” 

Monroe, 981 F.2d at 270 (quoting Ray A. Scharer and Co. v. Plabell Rubber Products, 858 F.2d 

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317, 320 (6th Cir. 1988)). Absent any evidence to show that OCT acted egregiously, this Court 

declines to find that such an “extreme sanction” is appropriate. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant Kokosing 

Construction Company’s Motion Attorney Fees. (Doc. # 27.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Peter C. Economus _____________

PETER C. ECONOMUS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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