Filed 8/24/21 In re D.C. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re D.C., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 B309256

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 20CCJP01940B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

E.C.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Sabina A. Helton, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Maryann M. Goode, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

_________________________

E.C. (father) molested his then 12-year-old daughter, G.C. 

(daughter), while in the same room with his then six-year-old 

son, D.C. (son). The juvenile court dismissed a petition filed 

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivisions (b), (d) and (j)1 on behalf of son after concluding that 

he was differently situated than daughter and not at risk of 

sexual abuse or serious physical harm. The Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (Department) 

appeals the dismissal.

We find no error and affirm.

FACTS

Father and S.B. (mother) operated a daycare center at their 

home and the family used their living room as a shared bedroom. 

While mother and son slept in a queen size bed together, father 

and daughter had their own beds. The children’s adult half1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

brother, I.G., lived in a bedroom on the second floor. Mother had 

security cameras set up throughout the entire house because of 

her daycare business.

Son has cerebral palsy and is developmentally delayed and 

somewhat verbal. He has a shunt from his brain to his stomach. 

He received occupational therapy, speech therapy, and physical 

education through his local school, and he received other services 

from a variety of agencies and entities. Father took the children 

to school and medical and dental appointments, and he took son 

to his therapy sessions. The children were generally well 

behaved.

In late 2019, mother and father “separated” because they 

were no longer in love but they nonetheless continued living 

together. Father’s demeanor changed toward daughter; he would 

not let her go places and hang out with her friends, and insisted 

that she be picked up from school rather than walk home. 

Periodically, father would touch daughter’s thigh. She thought it 

was a joke.

Mother was told there would be a scheduled power outage 

the night of February 15, 2020. That night, daughter woke up 

around 3:00 a.m. to see her father leaning over her looking out a 

window. Mother and son were asleep in their bed. Father

covered daughter’s head with a blanket and then put his hand 

inside her underwear. He rubbed her vagina for several minutes. 

Also, he pulled down her pants and underwear and put his mouth

on her vagina. He used his tongue on the outside area for “a 

while.” She pretended to be asleep. After he went back to bed, 

she went to the bathroom where she stayed for 30 minutes and 

cried. He texted, “Hey are you ok? What’s wrong?” She replied 

that she was sick and taking medicine.
4

The next morning, daughter disclosed the touching but not 

the oral copulation to mother.2 Mother told father to leave the 

home. She checked for a recording on the security cameras but 

did not find one. She suspected that father planned the 

molestation for the night that the security cameras were not 

operating.

A week after the incident, father called daughter and said 

“he was sorry for what he did and for not being able to see” son. 

But when father was questioned by a social worker, he denied the 

incident.

The Department removed son and daughter from father’s 

physical custody and then filed a section 300 petition pursuant to 

subdivisions (b), (d) and (j) alleging: Father sexually abused 

daughter. “On or about 2/15/2020, the father fondled the child’s 

vagina and orally copulated the child’s vagina. Such sexual 

abuse of the child by father endangers the child’s physical and 

emotional health and safety and places the child, and the child’s 

sibling, [son], at risk of serious physical and emotional harm 

. . . and sexual abuse.”

Son was interviewed and stated that his parents never hit 

or spank him. I.G. said he never observed anything in the home 

that caused him concern. A maternal uncle said he considered 

father a good person and that mother and father took good care of 

the children. Mother said father was a good parent who was very 

involved with the children’s school, medical appointments and 

son’s therapy. She was shocked and surprised by the sexual 

abuse.

2 At times, daughter denied the oral copulation. She did, 

though, reveal it to nurses at a hospital. At some point, she 

revealed it to mother.
5

Prior to the detention hearing, Department recommended 

that father participate in individual/family counseling, sexual 

abuse awareness counseling, and parenting classes. In April 

2020, the juvenile court ordered the children detained from father 

and released to mother under Department’s supervision.3 In 

September and November 2020, Department reported that father 

had not enrolled in any court-ordered programs. He had fourhour monitored visits with son on Sundays.

Father’s adult daughter stated that she did not think 

father was capable of sexual abuse and believed the children 

were safe with him. She added that she has a good relationship 

with father, and she did not suffer sexual abuse when she was 

growing up. She monitored father’s visits with son and reported 

no concerns. The visits were consistent and son was happy to see 

father.

In a November 2020 addendum report, the Department 

notified the juvenile court that father had not enrolled in any 

court-ordered programs.

In the jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department 

reported that son has a strong attachment to and bond with 

father. Father continued to deny the sexual abuse but said he 

was willing to participate in programs. He told a social worker: 

“I would like everything to be normal. I would like to see my 

children without restrictions. I need my kids. I miss them.” He 

said that he wanted to visit daughter when she was ready.

3 A September 2020 Interim Review Report refers to courtordered programs for father. Presumably, those programs are 

consistent with Department’s recommendations. The record, 

however, offers no confirmation. 
6

On December 1, 2020, the juvenile court held a combined 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Father’s attorney argued 

that son should be dismissed because he is a different sex from 

daughter and is therefore differently situated. The attorney 

representing son and daughter argued that son was differently 

situated and not at risk of harm from father. The juvenile court 

ruled that Department met its burden of proving that father 

sexually abused daughter but then ruled that son was 

“differently situated from his sister.” It dismissed the petition as 

to son and sustained the remaining counts as to daughter. 

Daughter was removed from father’s custody and placed with 

mother under Department’s supervision. It ordered family 

preservation services for mother. As for father, the juvenile court 

ordered sex abuse counseling for perpetrators, programs for 

parenting and fatherhood, and individual counseling.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Department contends that the juvenile court erred when it 

dismissed son from the section 300 petition at the jurisdiction 

hearing. “[W]e review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings

for substantial evidence. [Citations.]” (In re R.C. (2011) 196 

Cal.App.4th 741, 748.) Typically, we review the record in the 

light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations while 

drawing all reasonable inferences that the evidence offers. The 

ultimate question is whether there is substantial evidence that 

would permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the order 

and findings are appropriate. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 

Cal.App.4th 183, 193; In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 

315, 321.) Conceptually, this can be difficult when we are asked 

to review whether a party successfully proved a claim that a 
7

juvenile court rejected. To rephrase the law in more palatable 

terms, one court explained that the question is “whether the 

evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of 

law. [Citations.]” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, 

disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 

Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.)

I. The Relevant Statutory Provisions.

A child can be adjudged a dependent child of the court 

under, inter alia, section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) if there 

is a substantial risk that he will suffer serious physical harm as a 

result of a parent’s failure or inability to adequately supervise or 

protect the child; there is a substantial risk that the child will be 

sexually abused as defined by Penal Code section 11165.1;

4 and if 

his sibling has been abused or neglected as defined in section 300,

subdivisions (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i) and there is a substantial risk 

the child will suffer the same abuse or neglect.

II. Section 300, Subdivision (j).

The primary focus of Department’s briefs is on whether the 

juvenile court erred when it dismissed the count in the petition 

based on section 300, subdivision (j).

Under section 300, subdivision (j), the sibling abuse 

provision, a juvenile court “shall consider the circumstances 

surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and 

gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the 

sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any 

4 The definition of sexual abuse means sexual assault or 

sexual exploitation by various acts including oral copulation, 

sexual contact between the genitals of one person and the mouth 

or tongue of another person, and intentional touching for sexual 

arousal. (Pen. Code, § 11165.1.)
8

other factors the court considers probative in determining 

whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (§ 300, subd. (j).) 

Subdivision (j) “implies that the more egregious the abuse, the 

more appropriate [it is] for the juvenile court to assume 

jurisdiction over the siblings. [Citation.]” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 

Cal.4th 766, 778 (I.J.).) 

By including a list of factors that the other subdivisions of 

section 300 lack, subdivision (j) indicates that a juvenile court 

must consider the totality of the circumstances. It authorizes a 

juvenile court to consider factors that might not be determinative 

if it were adjudicating a petition directly under one of the other 

subdivisions. As a result, subdivision (j) “‘accords the [juvenile 

court] greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose 

sibling has been found to have been abused than [it] would have 

in the absence of that circumstance.’ [Citation.]” (I.J., supra, 56 

Cal.4th at p. 774.)

In the context of a section 300, subdivision (j) case in which 

the petition alleges sexual abuse of a sibling, we note the 

following: “‘Although the danger of sexual abuse of a female 

sibling . . . may be greater than the danger of sexual abuse of a 

male sibling, the danger of sexual abuse to the male sibling is 

nonetheless still substantial.’ [Citation.] The juvenile court need 

not compare relative risks to assume jurisdiction over all the 

children of a sexual abuser, especially when the abuse was as

severe and prolonged[.]” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 780.) Thus, 

“when a father severely sexually abuses his own child, the 

[juvenile court] may assume jurisdiction over, and take steps to 

protect, the child’s siblings.” (Ibid.) As explained by I.J., “If the 

sibling abuse is relatively minor, the [juvenile court] might 

reasonably find insubstantial a risk the child will be similarly 
9

abused; but as the abuse becomes more serious, it become more 

necessary to protect the child from even a relatively low 

probability of that abuse.” (Id. at p. 778.)

The takeaway from I.J. is that the sexual abuse of a child 

can pose a risk of sexual abuse to a sibling but it depends on the

circumstances. This is a case-by-case analysis. As I.J. explained, 

“the juvenile court is supposed to use its best judgment to 

determine whether . . . the particular substantial risk exists.” 

(I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 779.) 

Here, there was a single, short incident of sexual abuse

perpetrated on daughter. Father’s adult daughter had a good 

relationship with him and had not suffered any sexual abuse. No 

evidence suggested that he has sexual interest in males. Mother 

is protective of her children and promptly forced father to leave 

the family home upon learning of his crime. The juvenile court 

exercised jurisdiction over son for the better part of a year and all 

his visits with father went well. Moreover, son was happy to visit 

with father. Also, the evidence suggests that son is differently 

situated from daughter due to his gender, cerebral palsy, 

developmental delays, and his continued good relationship with 

father. These facts support a reasonable inference that despite 

father’s lone aberrant crime against daughter, son is not at 

substantial risk of being sexually abused by father. Thus, this is 

not a case in which the evidence compels a finding of jurisdiction 

over son as a matter of law.

III. Section 300, Subdivisions (b) and (d).

Department asserts the same arguments regarding the 

counts alleged under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d) as it did 

for the count alleged under section 300, subdivision (j), i.e., the 

sexual abuse of daughter placed son at risk of sexual abuse and 
10

therefore the dismissal was not supported by sufficient evidence. 

Those arguments fail for the same reasons we explained in 

part II of the discussion.

Separately, Department contends that father’s sexual 

abuse of daughter established that he abandoned his role as a 

protective parent and placed son at substantial risk of suffering 

serious physical harm within the meaning of section 300, 

subdivision (b). This argument fails, too, because Department 

does not explain how the lone incident of sexual abuse necessarily

created a risk of serious physical harm to son, i.e., why the 

evidence compels a finding of jurisdiction over son under section 

300, subdivision (b) as a matter law.

DISPOSITION

The order dismissing son from the section 300 petition is 

affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

__________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

_______________________, P. J.

LUI

_______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT