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*********************************************** 
MICHAEL ROBINSON ET AL. v. V. D.*

(SC 20731)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Ecker,

Alexander and Prescott, Js.

The plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the defendant’s

appeal from the trial court’s denial of his special motion

to dismiss, filed pursuant to General Statutes §

52-196a, having been presented to this court, it is hereby

ordered that the plaintiffs’ motion is denied, and the

case is transferred to the Appellate Court for further

proceed-ings according to law.

May 2, 2023

ROBINSON, C. J., with whom McDonald, Mullins and

Prescott, Js., join. The defendant, V. D., appealed from

the order of the trial court denying his special motion

to dismiss, pursuant to the anti-SLAPP1statute, General

Statutes § 52-196a,2the action brought by the plaintiffs,

Michael Robinson and Mary Robinson. The plaintiffs

now move to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and, specifically, for lack of an

appealable final judgment.3In response to the plaintiffs’

motion, the defendant contends that the legislature’s

inclusion of ‘‘interlocutory appeal’’ language in subsection (d) of § 52-196a, the statute’s legislative history, and

public policy all favor an implicit right to an immediate

appeal, and the defendant further asserts that the denial

of a special motion to dismiss is an appealable final

judgment underthe standard set forth in State v. Curcio,

191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the reasons

set forth in the companion case that we also decide

today, Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. , A.3d

(2023), we conclude that a trial court’s denial of a colorable special motion to dismiss under § 52-196a is an

immediately appealable final judgment under the second prong of Curcio. We further conclude that the

record demonstrates that the defendant has presented

a colorable claim that he is entitled to a right to avoid

litigation under our anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly,

we deny the plaintiffs’ pending motion to dismiss this

appeal for lack of a final judgment and transfer the

case to the Appellate Court for further proceedings

according to law.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history, which are undisputed for purposes

of the present appeal. The parties are civilian employees

of the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard).

Michael Robinson works as a locksmith at the United

States Coast Guard Academy in New London (academy)

and previously served as an assistant coach for the

academy’s skeet shooting team. Mary Robinson works

as a human resources specialist at the Coast Guard

headquarters. The defendant is employed as a carpenter/mason at the academy and, in 2019, was temporarily

promoted to the new position of construction control

inspector.

In late 2019 or early 2020, after applying for the fulltime, permanent construction control inspector position, the defendant was informed that he had not been

selected for the position. The defendant then resumed

his job as a carpenter/mason. Thereafter, the defendant

filed a formal, written grievance through his union representative and alleged that the plaintiffs were involved

in ‘‘a ‘quid pro quo’ arrangement’’ with the candidate

selected for the position and the official who had

selected the candidate. The defendant also alleged that

he was denied the position, in part, ‘‘because of his

known affiliation with the union . . . .’’4 A hearing took

place, at which, the plaintiffs contend, the defendant

made certain statements consistent with the allegations

in the written grievance. Administrative officials with

the Coast Guard subsequently investigated both of the

plaintiffs and cleared them of any wrongdoing.

Thereafter, in June, 2020, the parties attended a competitive shooting event at a gun club in Burrillville,

Rhode Island. After the event was over, Michael Robinson and the defendant had a verbal altercation in

the parking lot, during which they exchanged certain

insults. Thereafter, the defendant served an application

for a protective order on Michael Robinson. A hearing

took place in the Superior Court, which dismissed the

application.

In December, 2020, the plaintiffs filed the present

action against the defendant, alleging in their complaint

that the defendant made false accusations against them

on numerous occasions, namely, in the union grievance,

during the proceedings which resulted from it, in the

application for the protective order, and during the

hearing that took place in the Superior Court on the

protective order application. The plaintiffs alleged defamation, invasion of privacy by false light, common-law

vexatious litigation, vexatious litigation under General

Statutes § 52-568, and intentional and negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress.

In January, 2021, the defendant filed a special motion

to dismiss, pursuant to § 52-196a, arguing that the plaintiffs’ allegations in this action arose from the exercise

of his rights of free speech, to petition the government,

and to associate as a member of a labor union under

the Connecticut constitution and the first amendment

to the United States constitution. The defendant also

alleged, among other defenses, that the plaintiffs’ action

violated public policy and that his statements were

immune from the defamation claims, as they arose during judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, and, following a

hearing, the trial court denied the special motion to

dismiss. The court found that the defendant’s conduct

as alleged in the complaint was not protected under

§ 52-196a because it addressed private concerns, rather

than a ‘‘matter of public concern,’’ as defined in subsection (a) (1) of the statute.5 The court further concluded

that the defendant’s conduct during the work related

grievance process was personal in nature because it

related to his employer’s denial of the defendant’s promotion and did not address the general practices of

the employer. As such, the court determined that the

defendant’s conduct during that process was not related

to a matter of public concern under ‘‘the government,

zoning and other regulatory matters’’ category of the

definition. General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (1) (C). In

addition, the trial court found that the defendant’s

actions did not relate to a matter of public concern

under the ‘‘public official or public figure’’ category;

General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (1) (D); because the

defendant had failed to establish that the plaintiffs’ positions gave them ‘‘substantial control or responsibility

over governmental affairs or that there was a significant

public interest in either position that went beyond the

general interest in all public sector employees.’’6

Accordingly, the court concluded that the defendant

had failed to meet his burden of showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that the complaint was based on

the exercise of his right of free speech, to petition the

government, or of association.

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s decision to the Appellate Court in April, 2021, where the

plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack

of a final judgment. Thereafter, the defendant filed a

motion to stay the proceedings until this court decided

Pryor v. Brignole, 346 Conn. , A.3d (2023).

The Appellate Court granted the motion for a stay on
September 29, 2021, without ruling on the plaintiffs’

motion to dismiss. In July, 2022, this court transferred

this appeal to itself pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1

and ordered the parties to address in their appellate

briefs ‘‘only the threshold jurisdictional issue of

whether the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed

pursuant to . . . § 52-196a is an appealable final judgment . . . .’’7

The primary issue raised by the plaintiffs’ motion to

dismiss this appeal—namely, whether a trial court’s

denial of a special motion to dismiss under the antiSLAPP statute can constitute an appealable final judgment—is controlled by Smith v. Supple, supra, 346

Conn. . In that case, we examined relevant statutory

text, legislative history, and analogous laws from our

sister states and concluded that our ‘‘anti-SLAPP statute

affords a defendant a substantive right to avoid litigation on the merits . . . .’’ Id., ; see id., . We then

continued to conclude that, in cases in which a defendant can assert a colorable claim that a trial court’s

denial of a special motion to dismiss under that statute

has placed that particular right at risk, an immediate

appeal may be taken pursuant to the second prong of

State v. Curcio, supra, 191 Conn. 31. See Smith v. Supple, supra, ; see also Sena v. American Medical

Response of Connecticut, Inc., 333 Conn. 30, 41, 213

A.3d 1110 (2019) (‘‘[a defendant] must make at least

a colorable claim that some recognized statutory or

constitutional right is at risk’’ (emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Application of that standard to the present case

requires us to consider whether the defendant has

asserted a colorable claim to the protections afforded

by the anti-SLAPP statute. In particular, we must determine whether the defendant has asserted a colorable

claim that his actions, as alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint, are based on his right of free speech, to petition

the government, or of association.

We conclude that the defendant has asserted a colorable claim that at least some of the statements forming

the basis of the plaintiffs’ complaint were based on

the defendant’s exercise of his right to petition the

government, as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP statute. ‘‘Right to petition the government’’ is defined in

relevant part as ‘‘communication in connection with an

issue under consideration or review by a legislative,

executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body . . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (3) (A).

A party seeking protection under the statute must show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the exercise

of that right is in connection with a ‘‘matter of public

concern,’’ as defined in § 52-196a (a) (1). See footnote

5 of this opinion. Courts have found that ‘‘mixed questions of private and public concerns’’ may be protected

under the first amendment and that ‘‘the fact that a

statement evolves from a personal dispute does not

preclude some aspect of it from touching [on] matters

of public concern.’’ Morgan v. Milford, 914 F. Supp. 21,

23 (D. Conn. 1996).

The defendant presented evidence before the trial

court that his actions related to a matter of public concern because they (1) arose from a collective bargaining

agreement between the Coast Guard and the American

Federation of Government Employees, Council 120, to

which the defendant belongs, and (2) related to improprieties in the hiring process at the academy that went

beyond his own personal position, specifically, that

Coast Guard hiring officials disfavor persons with a

union affiliation when hiring.

On the basis of our review of the record and the

plain meaning of the definition of ‘‘right to petition the

government,’’ we conclude that the defendant has at

least a superficially well founded claim that some of his

statements, particularly those relating to the grievance

process, qualify as communications relating to an issue

under consideration by a governmental body, namely,

the Coast Guard. See Stellmaker v. DePetrillo, 710 F.

Supp. 891, 893 (D. Conn. 1989) (public school teacher’s

grievance was protected under first amendment from

retaliation by public officials because ‘‘[the] grievance

was filed pursuant to a procedure established through

collective bargaining’’ and thereby invoked his ‘‘right

to . . . petition a government[al] body, the [b]oard of

[e]ducation’’); see also Noble v. Hennessey, Superior

Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. KNLCV-20-6045166-S (January 12, 2021) (allegedly defamatory grievance filed with quasi-judicial body, Statewide

Grievance Committee, fell under purview of petitioning

government for purposes of anti-SLAPP statute).

In addition, the defendant has asserted a colorable

claim that his statements during the grievance process

relate to a ‘‘matter of public concern.’’ Although these

statements evolved from a personal dispute between

the parties, the statements could conceivably be of concern to the general public because the allegations

related to hiring practices within a governmental entity.

In particular, the defendant’s speech touches on the

possible existence of anti-union sentiment within the
academy and quid pro quo arrangements between management officials as it relates to hiring. Therefore, the

defendant has at least a superficially well founded claim

that his conduct concerns not only him, but others at

the academy and the general community at large.8

Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has

asserted a colorable claim to a right to avoid litigation

under our anti-SLAPP statute. On the basis of the record

before us, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of

the defendant’s special motion to dismiss filed pursuant

to § 52-196a constitutes an appealable final judgment

under Curcio.

The plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss this appeal for lack

of a final judgment is denied, and, pursuant to Practice

Book § 65-1, the case is transferred to the Appellate

Court for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion McDONALD, MULLINS and PRESCOTT, Js., concurred.

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as

amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,

Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person

protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective

order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through

whom that person’s identity may be ascertained. 1 ‘‘SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public participation

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332,

337 n.4, 246 A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 2467, 209

L. Ed. 2d 529 (2021). 2 General Statutes § 52-196a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) In any civil

action in which a party files a complaint, counterclaim or cross claim against

an opposing party that is based on the opposing party’s exercise of its right

of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under

the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in

connection with a matter of public concern, such opposing party may file

a special motion to dismiss the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim.

***

‘‘(d) The court shall stay all discovery upon the filing

of a special motion to dismiss. The stay of discovery

shall remain in effect until the court grants or denies

the special motion to dismiss and any interlocutory

appeal thereof. Notwithstanding the entry of an order

to stay discovery, the court, upon motion of a party

and a showing of good cause, or upon its own motion,

may order specified and limited discovery relevant to

the special motion to dismiss.

***

‘‘[e] (3) The court shall grant a special motion to

dismiss if the moving party makes an initial showing,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the opposing

party’s complaint, counterclaim or cross claim is based

on the moving party’s exercise of its right of free speech,
right to petition the government, or right of association

under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of

public concern, unless the party that brought the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim sets forth with particularity the circumstances giving rise to the complaint,

counterclaim or cross claim and demonstrates to the

court that there is probable cause, considering all valid

defenses, that the party will prevail on the merits of

the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim. . . .’’

3 The defendant appealed from the decision of the

trial court to the Appellate Court, and we subsequently

transferred the appeal and the pending motion to dismiss to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-

199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

4 In their complaint in this action, the plaintiffs specifically contended that the defendant falsely alleged in

the grievance that he was ‘‘unfairly treated because of

his known affiliation with the union’’ and that ‘‘[m]anagement favors persons who do not affiliate with the

union . . . .’’

5 ‘‘Matter of public concern’’ is defined as ‘‘an issue

related to (A) health or safety, (B) environmental, economic or community well-being, (C) the government,

zoning and other regulatory matters, (D) a public official or public figure, or (E) an audiovisual work . . . .’’

General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (1).

6 As to the defendant’s statements in the application

for a protective order and his conduct during the proceedings that resulted therefrom, the trial court concluded that the application and the proceedings were

inherently personal in nature.

7 We subsequently granted the application of the

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Connecticut (ACLU) to file an amicus curiae brief in support of

the defendant’s contention that a denial of a special

motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute is an

appealable final judgment.

8 Because we conclude that the defendant has

asserted a colorable claim under the right to petition

the government for his statements during the grievance

proceedings, we need not decide whether the statements alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint also fall within

the statutory definitions of ‘‘right of free speech’’ and

‘‘right of association.’’ See General Statutes § 52-196a

(a) (2) and (4). Ultimately, we leave it to the appellate

court reviewing the merits of the defendant’s appeal to

determine whether the trial court, in fact, incorrectly
concluded that the defendant had not met his initial

burden under § 52-196a (e) (3).