BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

21st Century Warfare Issues

Barry R. Schneider

Lawrence E. Grinter

Revised Edition

September 1998

The Air War College Studies in National Security was

established as a forum for research on topics that influence

the national security of the United States . Copies of No . 3 in

this series are available from the Air War College, 325

Chennault Circle, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

36112-6427 . The fax number is (334) 953-7934; the

telephone number is (334) 953-2103/DSN 493-2103/7074.

Air War College

Studies in National Security No. 3

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6428
Battlefield ofthe future : 21 st century warfare issues / [edited] by Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence

E. Grinter-Rev. ed.

p. cm. -(Air War College studies in national security : no. 3)

I . Military art and science-Forecasting . 2. Twenty-first century . I. Schneider, Barry R.

II . Grinter, Lawrence E. III. Series .

U104.1338 1998

355.02'01'12-dc21 98-38913

CIP

ISBN 1-58566-061-2

First Printing September 1995

Second Printing (Revised Edition) September 1998

Third Printing July 2001

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not the offical policies

or positions of the United States Department of Defense or the United States Government.

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents

US Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402
To Keegie (eSchneider)

who so fully supported one of the editors in

the preparation of Llm book, and to Gertrude E .

and George H. (Schneider and ConsLance L . and

Linton E. Grlnter who lovingly and unselfishly

gave us a twentieth-century vantage point

to peer into the twenty-first century

Chapter

1 Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future . . . . . . 5

Barry R. Schneider

2 New-EraWarfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Gen Charles A. Homer, USAF, (Ret.)

3 The Revolution in Military Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage,

George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill

4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Col John A. Warden III, USAF

21st Century Warfare Issues

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ff

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ufi

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Overview: New Era Warfare? ARevolution in Military

Affairs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Overview: Future Airpower and Strategy Issues . . . . . . . 99

Parallel War and Hyperwan Is EveryWant aWeakness? . . . 125

Col Richard Szafranski, USAF

Overview: Information Warfare Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

6 Information War - Cyberwar - Netwar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

George Stein

7 Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns . . . . . . . . . . 171

Col James W. McLendon, USAF

Overview: Biological Warfare Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

8 The Biological Weapon: APoor Nation's Weapon of

Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Lt ColTerry N. Mayer, USAF
9 Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF

10 Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare . . . . . 251

Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF

11 On Twenty-First Century Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Lawrence E. Grinter and Dr. Barry R. Schneider

Figures

Tables

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

IIlustrations

1 Elements of the Present RMA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

2 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

3 China and Iraq-Comparative Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

1 System Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

2 US Offensive Biological Weapons Agents

Produced Between 1954-1969. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

3 Estimated Cumulative Losses to the US from

Selected NonIndigenous Species, 1906-1991 . . . . . . . 257
We, the editors, wish to thank the authors for their timely

responses to our requests for quality work and for meeting

deadlines. At the Air War College, we wish to thank Dean

Ronald Kurth and Col Theodore Hailes, associate dean for

their championing of the Air War College Studies in National

Security series. Thanks also are due to Col Robert Hinds, our

department chairman, who gave us his support and

encouragement when we began work on this project. We also

appreciate Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, Dr Alexander S .

Cochran, Dr Robert Wendzel, Dr David Sorenson, Dr Dan

Hughes, Dr Bill Martel, Col Joseph Englebrecht, and

Dr George Stein, all Air War College faculty, who have taken

their time to review chapters written by others . Outside

reviewers who also contributed valuable suggestions include:

Mr David Kay (SAIC), Col John Ellen, USAF, retired

(SAIC), Col Phillip Gardiner, USAF, retired (SAIC), Dr Robert

Joseph, director of the NDU Counterproliferation Center; and

Phillip E . Lacombe, managing director of the Aerospace

Education Foundation . Help was also provided by the Institute

for National Security Studies, USAFA, that supported part of

Dr Schneider's research on this project. We are also grateful to

MSgt Milton Turner for running interference on the budgetary

paperwork, and to Modeyither Jones and Linda Jenkins for

their administrative assistance that helped us turn this book

out in a timely fashion. At the Air University Press, we wish to

thank Dr Elizabeth Bradley, director; Tom Mackin; Thomas

Lobenstein; Rebecca McLeod ; Steven Garst; and other AU

Press editors that gave us valuable suggestions for improving

the manuscript in a timely fashion.

Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E . Grinter

This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst

of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the

twenty-first century. Its 11 essays examine topics such as

military operations against a well-armed rogue state or NASTI

(NBC-arming sponsor of terrorism and intervention) state; the

potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of

states ; the revolutionary potential of information warfare; the

lethal possibilities of biological warfare; and the elements of

an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) .

The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational

problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US

national security decision makers in the twenty-first century.

The participating authors are either professional military

officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national

security issues. Two of the architects of the US air campaign

in the 1991 Gulf War have contributed essays that discuss the

evolving utility of airpower to achieve decisive results and the

lessons that might portend for the future of warfare .

In "Principles of War on the Battlefield of the Future," which

sets the tone for the book, Dr. Barry Schneider examines how

traditional principles of war may have to be reassessed in light

of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among

third world states. Regarding the principle of "mass," traditional

theory dictated that forces be massed for an offensive

breakthrough . But Schneider argues that, against an enemy

armed with WMD, dispersal of one's forces may, in fact, be

more prudent, and fighting by means of "disengaged combat"

prior to a decisive strike may be necessary. This requires high

coordination and "superior targeting and damage assessment

intelligence, combined with superior high-tech weapons."

Still, the United States and its allies would not likely be able

to dominate a future battlefield even with advanced

conventional arms if they did not have close-in air bases to

operate from and thereby to achieve air dominance over the

battle space . Therefore, while it sounds good, striking from

outside the enemy's range is not a real option for long if the

enemy is mounting a ground campaign that is closing in on

vital areas. Local air, sea, and ground power will be needed to
local air bases and seaports must be available and protected .

Yet, the US and allied armed forces, in confronting a

Saddam Hussein with nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)

warfare capabilities might be well advised to forego massing

forces (which present lucrative targets to the enemy's WMD) in

favor of maneuver, dispersion, speed, mobility, range, and

deception. How to protect fixed installations such as ports and

airfields is a dilemma. Furthermore, Schneider tells us, the

principle of maintaining the "offensive" may have to be

supplemented "with a combination of potent defenses to avoid

lethal enemy "DI counterstrikes ."

In twenty-first-century warfare, theater missile defenses

(TMD) are likely to be essential, especially against future rogue

regimes possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads

and ballistic missile delivery systems. These could pose a

threat against US and allied forces, ports, airfields, naval

convoys, and cities within range that only effective multilayered

TMD may be able to handle .

When facing a WMD-armed adversary, it will be even more

important than in the past to preserve "unity of command" via

effective command, control, and communications during a

conflict. Moreover, it is highly likely that, in an era of "information warfare," both sides will attempt and may be able to

disrupt and destroy each other's command and control systems.

Regarding the principle of clear, obtainable "objectives,"

Schneider argues that war with a nuclear-armed terrorist

state "must either be a short victorious war that starts with

the neutralization or destruction of the enemy's WMD, or one

fought for limited objectives and prosecuted with deep respect

for the power of the adversary's mass destruction capabilities ."

This would require a revolution in the way US regional

"war-fighting" commanders in chief prepare for major regional

conflicts (MRC) . It might be difficult for US decision makers to

"sell" such a strategy to an American public, given our

penchant for quick, decisive victories.

Finally, "security" as a principle of war demands exceptionally

good intelligence . In the future, it will be especially important

to identify those states acquiring WMD and missile

capabilities and to gauge their locations and numbers from
proliferator states greatly complicate accurate intelligence on

their paths to acquiring WMD by pursuing multiple

clandestine paths to such capabilities . These paths include

the use of underground secret facilities, camouflage,

disinformation, dispersal, cheating on Non-Proliferation Treaty

requirements, purchasing "dual use" technologies, and other

means to disguise their programs and hide their facilities . The

discovery after the Gulf War of how far Iraq had progressed in

acquiring nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile

capabilities was a wake-up call to the world community.

In summary, the dangers of confronting an adversary with

weapons of mass destruction or the capacity for strategic

information warfare may prompt a very different thinking

about the traditional "principles of war." Preparing for such an

eventuality will require some major changes in C3I (command,

control, communications, and intelligence), military doctrine,

operational strategy, acquisition, equipment, logistics,

coalition building, coalition warfare, and war termination .

Some changes may even be necessary in foreign policy

regarding the kinds of commitments that US vulnerabilities,

capabilities, and interests will permit in a more proliferated

world or one where the enemy has utilized the technologies

and methods of information warfare.

Principles of War for the

Battlefield of the Future

Barry R. Schneider

The United States would have fought its wars of the past

half century far differently had Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, Kim Il

Sung, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, Manuel Noriega, and

Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons at the time.

A world of nuclear-armed states will require the United

States and its allies to revise force structures, strategy and

doctrine, intelligence capabilities, command and control

procedures, and logistics for major regional conflict

scenarios . A proliferated world of potential adversaries

equipped with weapons of mass destruction and the means

of delivering them will require the US military to implement

a "revolution in military affairs," one that may require

significant departures from current US strategy, operational

policies, and military capabilities .)

Clearly, US force planning and conflict preparation have

not yet taken into account a "Saddam Hussein with nukes"

to use Les Aspin's phrase when he announced the US

Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. The Bottom Up

Review, conducted by the Clinton Administration under

then-Secretary of Defense Aspin, did not assume the United

States would confront an adversary armed with weapons of

mass destruction in either of the two nearly simultaneous

major regional conflicts (MRCs) that US forces are supposed

to be able to fight and win. Yet, it is clear that radical and

hostile states such as Iraq and Iran are probably just a few

short years away from having a nuclear weapons capability

and North Korea may already possess one . All three are

presently credited with biological and chemical weapons

capabilities .
py gy

So how do you fight a NBC-armed sponsor of terrorism and

intervention (NASTI) on the battlefield, if war breaks out? Do

the old principles of war work in this kind of conflict? And just

what are those principles which have guided US and allied

forces in past wars? In the United States, even young ROTC

students are taught the elements of war, summed up by the

acronym MOSSCOMES:

M - Mass

O - Offensive

S - Surprise

S - Security

C - Command Unity

O - Objective

M- Maneuver

E - Economy of Force

S - Simplicity

Seven of these principles were extracted from the works of

British major general J. F. C. Fuller, who provided them for

the instruction of the British Army in World War 1 .2 They were

then republished in a 1921 US Army training regulation and

have been passed on in Air Force, Army, and Joint doctrine

and professional military education publications since . 3

Some of General Fuller's ideas may be applied without

modification to future war against hostile radical adversaries

armed with weapons of mass destruction. Other principles of

war have to be modified to reflect changes in technology or

situation. For example, WMD in enemy hands suggests that

future commanders modify the way they apply the warfighting principles of mass, maneuver, command unity, and

taking the offensive initiative in combat . New technology

provides new _stealthy means of achieving surprise, and

end-of-war residual enemy WMD capability may very well alter

allied approaches to security and war termination ends and

means .

Further, there are some additional principles of war that

Fuller did not address that deserve attention in an era marked
include the advantages to be gained by simultaneity and depth

of attack, effective force-projection logistics, information

dominance, and precision targeting.

What is new and what is constant in this brave new

proliferated world? Let us look first at the principle of "mass"

in warfare.

The Principle of Mass in Warfare

The principle of mass suggests the wisdom of concentrating

superior combat power at the decisive place and time in

military operations in order to achieve decisive results . 4 This

massing of resources directed at key enemy vulnerabilities

helps one's own forces to retain the initiative and makes it

possible, together with the proper application of other

principles of war, for outnumbered forces to achieve breakthroughs and decisive war, campaign, and battle results.

For example, Mao Tse-tung in his guerrilla war strategy

emphasized the importance of achieving local superiority in

battle even though one's own forces were greatly outnumbered

overall in the conflict across all major theaters. His tactics

when engaging the enemy called for ten against one, even if

outnumbered ten to one at the strategic level . In Mao's

strategy, proper choice of the time, place, and ratio of engaged

forces could shift victory from the hands of larger-but-more

diffused enemy forces, to those of less numerous-but-more

highly concentrated forces that achieved greater mass at the

points of contact. 5

When J. F. C . Fuller wrote his treatise on the principles of

war in World War I, mass was strongly correlated with

numbers of ground troops concentrated in a given location

against enemy ground forces in close proximity. Today, such

massed units would be vulnerable to a different type of mass

derived from weapons of mass destruction and precision

guided munitions delivered by missiles, aircraft, or superguns. 6

This gives a new meaning to "local superiority."

Ideally, US forces can catch regional opponents in a

paradigm shift, where the adversaries may adhere to the older
can substitute the application of massed firepower for massed

troops. In such a competition, massed allied firepower could

put to flight or destroy massed enemy units .

The increased lethality of conventional weapons has led to

progressively greater dispersion of forces in the field with each

passing era. For example, the density of troops deployed in the

battle zone has decreased from an average of 4,790 troops per

square kilometer in the Napoleonic Wars to just 2.34 troops

per square kilometer in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. WMD

threats will accelerate a historical trend toward a progressively

emptier battlefield .

As military technology has improved over time, firepower

has increased and the size of units directing it and trying to

avoid it has decreased.

As one analyst observes:

The logical end point of such developments (advanced

conventional arms and WMD) is the replacement of the notion of

concentration of mass with one emphasizing concentration of

fire . Increasingly, modern armies of the future should achieve

breakthroughs and victory without resorting to large masses of

troops directed at vulnerable points . Instead, the combination of

rapidly firing systems, precision weapons of long range, and

advanced command and control systems will allow widely

dispersed forces to focus their fire on specific points .$

Indeed, in combat with an adversary armed with WMD, one

corollary to Fuller's dictum on "mass" is that dispersing one's

own forces can make enemy WMD less cost-effective . A second

corollary is that massed allied firepower needs to be directed

first to destroying or degrading enemy WMD at the inception of

combat to permit the later massing of one's own general

purpose forces for combat in the war-termination phase of the

conflict.

Just as in the American Civil War and World War I, when

massed offenses were slaughtered by heavily concentrated

defensive firepower, the future possession of WMD in enemy

hands should discourage the use massing of allied troops until

after the opponents WMD are silenced or neutralized. 9 If it

looks like disabling early strikes cannot neutralize enemy

WMD in a projected conflict, perhaps such an adversary
option (i .e ., if the war has not yet begun and if one's homeland

and forces are not already engaged) .

Unfortunately, in some inherently unstable situations, if the

adversary were to strike first with weapons of mass

destruction, he might achieve victory, at least temporarily, in a

regional conflict. If the adversary is vulnerable to an allied

preemptive strike, he would have an incentive to use his WMD

first. Such a perceived "use or lose", situation is inherently

unstable and unpredictable, especially in a crisis or escalating

conflict.

Some analysts even suggest that the development of very

advanced conventional armaments, combined with new

strategy and organization of forces, can be a "revolution in

military affairs," making the massing of troops impractical and

dangerous. Thus, one of three courses of action may be

adopted by the allied commander when faced with a NASTI

armed force:

" Desert Storm II : Proceed as if the threat did not exist,

except to rely upon escalation dominance to deter the

adversary from escalating to WMD use in the conflict.

" Dispersed Storm: Adopt many measures to protect the

allied force, such as disinformation, extended dispersal

of units, downsizing of units, constant mobility, passive

defenses, and active defenses while still engaging in

traditional forms of warfare, relying also on escalation

dominance to preserve intrawar deterrence of enemy

WMD use.

" Remote Engagement: Adopt a mode of "disengaged

combat," where allied forces conduct their military operations at a substantial remove from their enemies. t o

The first approach is the same approach that the United

States and its coalition took with regard to possible Iraqi use of

its biological warfare (BM, chemical warfare (CW), and Scud

assets in the 1991 Gulf War. In this conflict, despite the

vulnerability of allied forces and capitals, the allies used

counterforce strikes and active and passive defenses to protect

against Iraqi air and Scud attacks and used escalation
CW assets . This combination might work again in the future if

the adversary is similarly outclassed in the air, and where the

preponderance of high-tech weapons is held by the allies .

Nevertheless, it is a risky strategy that might backfire with

huge downside results.

The second approach is where forces similar to those sent to

the Gulf War are given far more protection, by much improved

air defenses, missile defenses, and passive defenses. The

regional CINC would also reduce the number of lucrative

theater targets available to the enemy by an extensive

dispersal of his own forces and logistical units and by very

pronounced use of mobility to increase enemy uncertainty

concerning the location of key allied forces.

The third approach is where the main allied force stays

outside of enemy range and attempts to pick off his WMD and

destroy his massed forces by air, missile, and special forces

attacks before sending the bulk of the expeditionary force to

engage him in the endgame. In remote engagements, the allied

force would attempt to outrange the adversary and degrade his

capability before closing and attempting to finish the conflict

on allied terms.

In the future, friendly forces may be well advised to avoid,

where possible, close massed engagements with heavily armed

enemy forces . Instead, they likely should adopt the Dispersed

Storm or Remote Engagement postures as a mode of

operations out of respect for the possible consequences of an

enemy WMD strike, particularly if the adversary develops a

capability well beyond that achieved by Iraq in 1991 .

There are trade-offs in adopting the Dispersed Storm mode

of operations . On the one hand, failure to mass one's own

troops can make them more vulnerable to enemy conventional

attacks . Moreover, it would be difficult to conduct normal

conventional operations in a dispersed mode. On the other

hand, one would run less risk of having main force units

obliterated by enemy WMD strikes in this mode. The tradeoffs

of adopting the Remote Engagement mode of operations, when

facing an enemy with WMD, has received less discussion, and

deserves to be considered first.

1 0
such a formidable opponent, the allies probably should first

attempt to outrange them, dealing punishment from a

distance while staying out of harm's way. In the words of

former heavyweight boxing champion, Muhammed Ali, US and

allied forces should "float like a butterfly, sting like a bee." On

the other hand, getting bogged down in massed armor and

artillery duels, providing mass targets to enemy advanced

weapons, is a route to heavy casualties and possible defeat.

If military forces follow the strategy of disengaged combat,

the battle front may be hard to find. Indeed, in such remote

engagement warfare, it may not exist. The initial stages of

combat might find two heavily armed rival forces, both

dispersed, striking at each other from a distance, each

attempting to secure an advantage by locating and striking the

other's key units and assets, while simultaneously trying

to stay out of harm's way from the massive and precise

capabilities of the other.

If remote engagement were adopted as a strategy, then only

after sufficient damage has been inflicted on the adversary via

disengaged combat, would an attempt be made to close and

force a capitulation . If the adversary's weapons of mass

destruction have been eliminated with high confidence, this

war-termination phase of conflict might resemble more traditional forms of combat. The opening scenarios of remote combat

would require great standoff capabilities, the spreading and

hiding of forces, intensive intelligence, attrition of enemy

advanced capabilities, effective active and passive defensive

measures, and extensive coordination of fire from many

diverse points to the highest priority targets on the other side.

In such conflicts, each of the armed services would need to

be tightly coordinated with the others. Regional CINCs would

need complete connectivity to theater forces under their

command while likely having to operate from highly mobile

l and hard-to-target command posts.

This suggests the need for superior generalship, superior

targeting and battle damage assessment intelligence, combined

with superior high-tech weapons. "Using the accuracy of

advanced sensors and precision weapons, US forces may be:
and battlefield missiles, picking them off in turn ."' i

This kind of remote engagement conflict would require

changes in US strategy, doctrine, training, and organization.

Regional CINCs, in charge of fighting major regional conflicts,

would have to be schooled in a different kind of war fighting

from that pursued in the 1991 Gulf War, the 1964-74 Vietnam

War, the 1950-53 Korean War, or World War 11 . Preliminary

extensive war gaming, in-the-field exercises, and operational

planning for the new type of warfare would be mandatory for

later success in the region of combat.

An enemy with WMD or very advanced conventional

capabilities obviously poses severe dangers to choke points,

ports of entry, regional air bases, and naval convoys . For

example, aircraft carriers and their surrounding task forces

might be very vulnerable to an adversary armed with nuclear

or biological weapons. These floating airfields, capable of

carrying up to 100 aircraft and holding a military population of

5,000 to 6,000, represent highly lucrative targets and may be

inappropriate in the future for confronting such a very heavily

armed regional foe capable of obliterating or sinking them.

The US Navy in future combat against a "Saddam Hussein

with nukes" may be forced to operate from more numerous,

smaller, less expensive and more dispersed platforms,

emphasizing ballistic and cruise missiles rather than naval

aircraft as theater strike weapons. These might be augmented

by longer-range, air-refueled, naval fighter-bombers launched

from carriers outside the range of enemy aircraft or missiles

that carried the threat of WMD bombardment and obliteration.

How far the US Navy needs to go in these directions will be

determined partly by how successful it is in developing fleet

defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles.

The US Army, likewise, may be forced to move away from

strong reliance on heavy tanks and armored personnel carriers

that fight close to enemy forces. Rather, Army units may be

required to hit and locate the enemy at much greater ranges,

at least in the earlier phases of battle, rather than close and

attempt to destroy the NASTI enemy with heavy mechanized

forces before his WMD capabilities have been neutralized. As

one defense analyst observes, "such armored forces are

1 2
avoid, not bring about." 12

US Air Force officials have become convinced that massed

bomber attacks are less productive than a few stealthy bombers

firing or dropping precision munitions at targets from a standoff mode. A few low-observable aircraft are now able to penetrate

enemy defenses with very few losses and inflict, via increased

accuracy, greater damage than whole air armadas previously

could inflict using less accurate bombs and missiles.

As one Air Force analyst notes, with the revolution in

accuracy, "it no longer took hundreds of bombers dropping

thousands of bombs or even tens of bombers dropping scores

of bombs to destroy a single target. Now, one aircraft often

delivering only one weapon, could destroy one target." 13

A third element of "mass" to be considered in combat with

very heavily armed opponents is the need for whole-unit

reinforcements. Armies, divisions, naval task forces, or air

bases brought under NBC missile attack may suffer such

wholesale losses in such short time periods that they may

entirely cease to function as cohesive military units. In such

horrific circumstances, front-line units may need to be replaced

by entire units of similar capability and numbers, perhaps

under new commanders due to the massive and traumatic

nature of the losses suffered from WMD bombardment.

Nuclear detonations, lethal nerve gas attacks, or clouds of

deadly biological agents could annihilate entire defense sectors

and open large gaps in friendly forces that could be filled only

with fresh units that retained their cohesion and command,

control, and communications linkages .

Thus, when confronting a NASTI, or even a hostile state

possessing very advanced conventional arms, it appears wise

to rethink the advisability of massing one's own troops .

Consider, for example, how different the outcomes of warfare

might have been in the past half century if US forces and

those of the Allies had to consider German nuclear strikes

against the Normandy beachhead, Italian biological weapons

at Anzio, or Japanese nerve gas blanketing US invasion forces

at Iwo Jima.

Faced with WMD bombardment, would the allies have been

able to hold the Pusan beachhead or successfully mount the

13
nuclear threat communicated to Beijing via the Indian government have been credible if the People's Republic of China also

had possessed nuclear warheads and long-range aircraft in

1953? In the 1990-91 Gulf War, how would things have been

different if Iraq had possessed even a few nuclear weapons and

had been prepared to use them prior to the allied ground

offensive while coalition troops were massing in Saudi Arabia?

The Principle of Maneuver in Warfare

Perhaps far greater emphasis will have to be placed on

maneuver, the second "M" in J.F.C. Fuller's principles of war,

rather than on the first "M," mass. Inherent in maneuver is the

idea that mobility enhances both offensive and defensive

capabilities as well as one's ability to achieve a viable deterrent

and escalation superiority in both peace and war.

Coupled with the need for maneuver is the concept of

dispersion. Armies in modern times are increasingly mobile

and dispersed due to increases in battlefield lethality and

other technical changes. Moving and spreading out gives the

adversary less probability of targeting success and less of a

target to hit. Prudence would advise spreading friendly forces

even more in the future to expose fewer of them to any single

WMD attack.

On the other hand, this need to disperse forces can greatly

hinder conventional combat capability. An army dispersed will

have less capability for achieving local superiority and

breakthroughs against its opponents armed forces and less

opportunity for battle and war termination until the main

weapons of the enemy are silenced.

The need to simultaneously guard against vulnerability to

WMD attack and to conduct a conventional campaign will

impose contradictory pressures on regional CINCs planning

future campaigns . Such dual concerns might prevent quick,

decisive engagements in the future that are based on the 1991

Gulf War model . Instead, future armies may be forced to fight

more at the low-intensity warfare level or to engage in

prolonged conventional wars of attrition while avoiding

1 4
blow delivered by their WMD.

Victorious armies facing NASTIs may be more preoccupied

with active defense, passive defenses, mobility, dispersion, and

concealment than with conventional offensive actions that

could get them annihilated . Indeed, the lethality of the future

battle area may be so great that a new vision of defensive deployment is required while simultaneously adding new urgency to

the locating, targeting, and destroying of enemy launchers and

storage compounds for enemy weapons of mass destruction

and the adversary's very advanced conventional weapons .

The Principle of Offensive Initiative in Warfare

One of the principles of war found in US military doctrine is

the necessity to "seize, retain, and exploit the initiative" in

combat.

14 Maintaining the offensive initiative in warfare is

important to victory, and also helps avoid defeat. An enemy on

his heels is seldom an enemy at your throat . There is still

some truth to the old adage that the best defense is a good

offense. A good offense that keeps the adversary busy

defending his own forces and homeland robs him of some of

the potential to carry the fight to yours.

Unfortunately, offensive operations under attack by enemy

WMD, or the threat of such an attack, can be difficult to

execute. US Army operations during its Combined Arms in a

Nuclear/Chemical Environment (CANE) exercises have shown

that enemy WMD very much hindered "Blue" forces' offensive

success . As one report summarized, "during offensive

operations, it was noted that:

" attacks and engagements lasted longer;

" fewer enemy forces were killed;

" friendly forces suffered more casualties;

" friendly forces fired fewer rounds at the enemy;

" fratricide increased ;

" terrain was used less effectively for cover and

concealment." 15

1 5
introduction of NBC weapons on the battlefield by an

opponent gives him the initiative." 16 Such actions, or even the

threat of WMD strikes, place allied forces somewhat on the

defensive and give the initiative to the opponent, since allied

commanders and units are forced to take fewer risks in

exposing themselves to such lethality.

Enemy use of WMD can create residual radioactive, chemical,

or biological contamination of the battle area, hindering allied

ability to act for hours, days, or even weeks after their use.

Protective clothing, exhaustive decontamination procedures,

extensive vaccination programs, administration of antidotes,

and the caution borne of fear in an anthrax, highly toxic

chemical, or radioactive environment can easily degrade the

offensive performance and mind-set of allied forces subject to

WMD bombardment. Maneuver may also be limited in battle

space so contaminated.

US Army war games suggest that enemy WMD can negatively

impact allied efforts to maintain the initiative, maneuver

through the battlefield, synchronize forces, and project power

into certain highly dangerous and contaminated areas . 17

Moreover, while conducting offensive operations, allied forces

faced with WMD threats will need to operate under a defensive

shield to survive and succeed. Thus, in future wars against

enemies armed with weapons of mass destruction, in contrast

to General Fuller's day, it will be important to supplement

offensive strikes to disarm the adversary's WMD with a

combination of potent defenses to avoid lethal enemy

preemptions or counterstrikes to degrade the threat.

In the classic case, when dealing with a Saddam Hussein

with WMD, the US military commander is faced with a dual

need . First, he would like to neutralize both the enemy

leadership and his WMD potential . This means the

prosecution of counter-leader targeting coupled with an all-out

bombardment of likely enemy WMD capabilities and

production facilities. If this opening phase of the conflict is not

totally successful, the allied operations should be prepared to

shift dramatically from the offensive to the defensive mode, or

take enormous risks that whole sectors of the allied forces

might be destroyed if not dispersed into a defensive mode .

1 6
victory in the 1991 Gulf War, postulates that future war will

feature parallel strikes aimed at all the key facets of an

adversary's state and force, that, if struck nearly simultaneously,

will inflict strategic paralysis and quick defeat on the

adversary. Airpower, he argues, is the instrument of choice for

such "parallel war."

Such simultaneous, parallel strikes are a fine example of the

value of retaining the offensive initiative in warfare, and the

paralysis such strikes inflicted on Iraq in 1991 shows their

value in keeping an adversary from taking the offensive

himself. Simultaneous, parallel, in-depth attacks throughout

the battle space is likely to remain as part of US military

doctrine into the foreseeable future . For example, the US

Army's "Force XXI Operations" study states :

Future American operations will induce massive systemic shock

to an enemy. These operations will be meant to force the loss or

deny the enemy any opportunity to take the initiative. 18

Similarly, US air doctrine emphasizes the use of new

technologies such as stealth aircraft, stealthy cruise missiles,

and precision guidance to give the advantages of surprise and

offensive initiative to their possessor since these weapons are

difficult to detect and allow airpower to go where it wishes

without major losses in pursuit of strategic or tactical

targets . 19 Indeed, "aerospace power can quickly concentrate

on or above any point on the earth's surface . Aerospace

power can exploit the principles of mass and maneuver

simultaneously to a far greater extent than surface forces. 20

However, unless the initial offensive in such hyperwar and

parallel war renders inoperable the enemy's ability to strike

back with weapons of mass destruction or with his most

capable advanced conventional weaponry, then the conflict

may feature a parallel war air blitzkrieg coupled with the

pullback and dispersal of allied ground and naval forces to

provide less inviting targets to possible massive enemy

counterattacks spearheaded by WMD targeted on US and

allied power projection forces in the region.

If total allied dominance of weapons of mass destruction is

not achieved, the endgame of a conflict will be extremely risky.

1 7
launching NBC fusillades as his regime goes under? Will he

use some WMD and threaten more use still in an attempt to

achieve a better end-war settlement?

Or should allied forces keep out of range until such enemy

WMD can be destroyed or until the enemy leadership is killed

or replaced? If this is not possible, what then? It is possible

that the better part of valor might be to accept a compromise

peace that leaves the adversary regime and his military in

place rather than demanding total surrender as required of

Nazi Germany or Tojo's Japan in 1945 . If this option is

rejected, the allied side risks massive casualties, perhaps

numbering in the millions, before victory could be achieved

against a regional foe so heavily armed.

As in the 1991 Gulf War, the location of the enemy

leadership and his weapons of mass destruction may be

unknown. There will be a temptation at the inception of any

such conflict to target the enemy leader or leaders to create

disorganization and a regime change . However, the closes- such

counter-leader strike attempts come to success without

accomplishing the task, the greater the possibility that the

enemy regime will counter with desperate measures that might

include launching a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons

attack, even if they face a clearly superior allied nuclear force

that enjoys escalation dominance.

How do you achieve victory or a measure of victory in

regional combat with such an enemy, and how do you, at the

same time, limit the damage inflicted on allied forces and allies

in the region of operations? Further, how do you limit damage

to the continental United States and allied countries during

such regional conflicts?

Until effective US and allied theater or strategic defenses are

developed and deployed in the regions where foes developing

or deploying WMD are located, efforts to counter such threats

will have to rely upon deterrence of the adversary or on allied

conventional offensive capabilities .

While it would be the very rare contingency when the United

States or allied states could successfully identify, locate,

target, and destroy the force of a hostile radical state on the

verge of using WMD against the American homeland, US and

1 8
few opportunities where allied intelligence can pinpoint such

preparations and strike a blow to disarm such an adversary

with high confidence .

Nor is it wise to use all the military potential the United

States possesses, since the use of US nuclear arms to strike

the enemy WMD targets would likely entail too many political,

economic, diplomatic, legal, and moral negatives . 21

In some cases, this imperative to use conventional weapons

only, would make it impossible to disarm an adversary arming

itself with WMD since conventional weapons may not be

capable of.

" destroying deeply buried and hardened bunkers

containing WMD assets;

" area targeting of widely dispersed but "soft" mobile

enemy WMD assets;

" burning enemy biological weapons ingredients that

were otherwise likely to be spread across the region if

impacted by conventional bombing.

For these and a number of other reasons, reliance on

conventional offenses alone to end the WMD threat would be

unwise, because the penetration of allied defense by even a

single enemy nuclear, biological, or chemical warhead might

be lethal across a wide area. Theater missile defenses are also

needed.

Only the combination of offensive suppression strikes

coupled with defensive interception capabilities could provide

any possibility of the regional "astrodome" protection needed

against such unforgiving weapons, where even a single enemy

warhead "leaker" through the defenses could devastate a port,

base, airfield, naval convoy, massed army, or population

center.

What makes the damage limitation enterprise even thinkable,

once war has begun, is that the enemy may possess only a

half dozen or so of such weapons at the time of a conflict, few,

enough so that it is possible for an allied offense-defense

combination to neutralize the threat.

1 9
Another principle of war laid out by Gen J. F. C . Fuller is

that of the requirement for unity of command. Maintaining

good command, control, communications, and intelligence

(C31) could become much easier in future MRCs as a result of

the ongoing revolution in information technology available to

allied commanders. This information revolution will provide

more information earlier, and in far greater detail about the

opponent's capabilities, locations, and activities than known

in previous wars.

Moreover, such a communications revolution will lead to

flatter organization structures and to greater force-wide

awareness of allied and enemy dispositions in real time . This

will enhance the control of central commanders while, at the

same time, permitting wider dispersal of friendly forces . The

US Army's "Force =Operations" report states that

advances in information management and distribution will

facilitate the horizontal integration of the battlefield functions

and aid commanders in tailoring forces and arranging them on

land . . . . Units, key nodes, and leaders will be more widely

dispersed leading to the continuation of the empty battlefield

phenomenon. 22

The challenge to effective command, control, and communications in a major regional conflict could be immense . If the

adversary has the capability of decapitating the US or allied

military commands, of decapitating regional allied governments, of targeting the US National Command Authority, or of

"leveling the playing field" by knocking out most allied

communications with a high-altitude nuclear explosion

emitting a destructive electromagnetic pulse (EMP), it could

destroy the unity of command of the allied forces in the region.

If the regional adversary was at a severe disadvantage in

NBC weapons, he might still make effective use of his limited

capability by atmospheric nuclear bursts of EMP that could

play havoc with allied telecommunications, navigation, radar,

aircraft, missiles, automated guns, APCs, tanks, trucks, and

any microchips or electrical circuits that are not protected

against EMP.

20
theater of war to the capitals of allied countries, including even

Washington, D.C. It may be possible that the adversary has

aircraft or missiles capable of reaching such capitals. Even if

this was not technically possible, it is conceivable that

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons could be delivered

against such cities by unconventional means via saboteurs

smuggling them in the allied countries and detonating them or

threatening to do so to achieve favorable diplomatic

concessions at the end of the conflict.

Unfortunately, most allied capitals are highly vulnerable to

WMD threats. For example, Washington, D.C ., has long been a

vulnerable target and will remain so in the foreseeable

future. 23 A clandestine nuclear detonation in the city would

likely doom the US president, the vice president, Cabinet

members, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and members of Congress

who were there at the time . The chaos that such an attack

would cause would be difficult to overstate. One of the more

difficult questions to answer in the hours after such a NASTI

decapitation attack would be "who is in charge here?"

This chaos would be compounded if the headquarters housing

the US regional CINC and his staff also were to suffer a similar

decapitation strike at the same time. It is possible that the

national leadership and the regional military forces of the

United States would be plunged into chaos for sometime .

The threat of communication disruption and command disablement in conflicts with NASTIs leads to several conclusions

regarding the preservation of unity of command in such conflicts :

" Command unity may have to give way to subcommand

dispersal under a preset unified contingency plan;

" Military units may need to be more autonomous and

dependent on prewar planning of operations;

" Unit commanders will need simpler, less frequent

updates from central headquarters;

" Alternative commanders in mobile and hardened command posts will be needed for all regional and supporting

CINCs, with trained backups in reserve several layers

deep, ready to assume command if and when the CINCs

are targeted, killed, or isolated from their forces;

2 1
similarly to distributed computer networks, with greater

autonomy, independence of action, and ability to

operate independent of central command while still

following command guidelines.

The Principle of Clear

Obtainable Objectives in Warfare

Wars, like chess matches, are generally characterized by

opening moves, both offensive and defensive, by a middle

game exchange, and by a decisive endgame. 24 Central and

theater commanders should begin each phase of the conflict

with the desired end in mind, with each phase designed to

move the situation forward toward the goal. The United States

Army Field Manual FM 100-5 states that commanders ought

to "direct every military operation towards a clearly defined,

decisive, and attainable objective."

In the Persian Gulf, President Bush defined the US and

allied objective simply as the freeing of Kuwait from Iraqi

occupation and the establishment of agreed borders between

Iraq and Kuwait. Once beaten in the field of battle, the regime

of Saddam Hussein was allowed to remain in power, although

restrictions were placed upon Iraqi military units, UN

inspectors were sent into Iraq to locate its nuclear, biological,

and chemical weapons as well as its ballistic missiles for the

purpose of destroying them . Iraq was prohibited from most

international trade or exports, and was especially limited from

profiting from oil exports until it was deemed to be in full compliance with peace terms negotiated at the end of the Gulf War.

President Bush's decision to stop the fighting when he did

was controversial . Many thought he should have directed US

and allied forces to proceed on to Baghdad when he had the

Iraqi military on the run and in chaos, continuing the conflict

so long as Saddam Hussein and his cabinet controlled the

Iraqi government and military forces.

It has been argued that President Bush's decision was made

in line with the principle of war that says to direct every

22
attainable objective . First, the decision to end the conflict once

Iraqi troops were expelled from Kuwait was a clearly defined

objective. The war aim, as agreed at the United Nations when

the allied coalition was formed, was not to occupy Iraq, replace

the present Iraqi government, or govern Iraq during a

transition period to another regime.

President Bush complied with the United Nations resolutions

authorizing the collective security action and the limited goals

embraced by the whole US-led coalition. To go further might

have led to a split in the coalition and would have been on

uncertain legal grounds.

Second, despite the US decision to halt Desert Storm

operations short of a ground occupation of Iraq, the campaign

was, nevertheless, decisive in securing the liberation of Kuwait

and in inflicting a decisive defeat and surrender of all Iraqi

forces stationed outside of Iraq's borders.

Third, President Bush's objective in the Gulf conflict was

quite attainable. Not only was Kuwait liberated, but, after

three years, the Iraqi parliament has finally agreed to drop

claims to Kuwaiti territory and recognize the borders of Kuwait

as legitimate.

President Bush's decision to keep to such clearly defined,

decisive, and attainable objectives was determined by the

calculation that to go further and invade Iraq would have gone

beyond the UN resolutions authorizing the collective action.

Such action, it was thought, would endanger the support of

coalition partners needed to legitimize the subsequent peace

arrangements and whose support the United States would

need to guard its interests in future dealings in the Middle

East and the Persian Gulf. Further, President Bush and his

advisers understood the difficulties of conquering Iraq,

locating and capturing Saddam Hussein and his subordinate,

leaders, subduing the remnants of the Iraqi military

throughout a country larger than Germany, and governing a

hostile population of almost 20 million while seeking to set up

a friendly regime.

The Bush administration was also eager to avoid further

bloodshed, having just won the victory in Kuwait at a human

cost well below what had been predicted for the ground

23
up to 15,000). President Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick

Cheney saw entry into Iraq as a quagmire to be avoided and

ended the fighting while the allies were well ahead and had

attained their immediate stated goals.

Realpolitik may also have been a factor in the United States's

decision to stop when it did. Prior to the 1990 invasion of

Kuwait, the United States had been more concerned with

containing Iranian power rather than Iraqi power in the region.

After all, it was Iran under the ayatollahs who seized American

hostages at the US embassy in Tehran in 1979, and who was

seen as the chief exporter of anti-American sentiments, and

who was seen as the chief exporters of terror worldwide. The

fact that Iraq, if totally disarmed by the allied coalition, could

not offset the expansionist ambitions of Iran was still another

argument for not entering Iraq and totally dismantling its

military power in 1991 .

Finally, it is likely that President Bush and his political

advisors also wished to reap the political fruits of an almost

total victory in Kuwait as opposed to entering the political

minefield of an invasion, extended military campaign, and

occupation of Iraq. By stopping when he did, President Bush

received an unprecedented 93 percent approval rating in polls

of the American public in the aftermath of the war.

The decisive victory, stopped at its apex, also sent an

unchallenged message around the world about US military

prowess and American willingness to act decisively against

aggression when it felt its vital interests were at stake . This

enhanced US reputation in the world could be used to deter

other would-be aggressors in places like North Korea, the

Persian Gulf, and elsewhere . US credibility had never been

higher since the end of World War II, a recovery from the years

following the Vietnam War.

Given these arguments in support of President Bush's

decision to follow limited war aims in 1991, there is still

controversy over whether stopping short of Baghdad was an

act of wisdom or short-sightedness . Some believe that the

allies should have finished the regime of Saddam Hussein

when they had the opportunity to act decisively against him.

Time has shown that he has a remarkable ability to survive

24
of its conventional military capability even under the terms of

the truce. Moreover, Iraq retains the scientific base, foreign

supplier contacts, potential wealth from its oil reserves, and

ambitions for future great-power status .

Once UN sanctions are lifted on Iraq, many believe that

country will be back in the WMD business full-scale. Indeed,

resurrection of its biological weapons stockpile should be

simple since the allies never found it and therefore did not

destroy it. Iraq is given two years of full scale effort before it

could be at 1991 levels again in its nuclear weapons research,

and less than a decade after that before it could join the

nuclear weapons club.

Indeed, not to have deposed Saddam Hussein, when the

chance presented itself, may be to have defined the US and UN

objective too narrowly at the onset of the Gulf conflict since it

is arguable whether the US and allied limited actions achieved

a lasting end to the Iraqi threat or merely postponed the

confrontation with an Iraq armed with NBC weapons and the

missiles to deliver them on target.

The symptoms were treated and their effects mitigated, but

the disease persists that could be lethal next time to US

interests and allies in the Gulf region. One evidence of

Saddam's persistent malevolence was the Iraqi-sponsored

attempt to kill former President Bush on his visit to Kuwait in

1993 . Leaving such an opponent alive and in power is like

allowing a rattlesnake to continue to live in your house after it

has attempted to kill you once, because you have temporarily

milked it of its venom, even though you know it will inevitably

produce more in time.

Permitting Saddam Hussein to remain in power to continue

to threaten his neighbors and US interests in the region, by

stopping at the Iraq-Kuwait border, is analogous to having

allowed Adolph Hitler to remain in control of Germany in 1945

because the Allies decided to stop at Germany's borders once

German armies had been expelled from the lands that they

occupied from 1939-1945.

Given the track record of Iraq, a state that has been at war

with its neighbors since its inception, and of Saddam Hussein,

whose regime has constantly used murderous violence against

25
neighbors since he took power, there is a high likelihood that

the Gulf War will have to be repeated in the future, perhaps

against an even more dangerous enemy.

To conclude, as former Secretary of Defense Caspar

Weinberger once advised, "if we do decide to commit forces to

combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and

military objectives. And we should know precisely how our

forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives." 25 This

is a useful guideline, even if it does not precisely tell you what

to do and where to draw the line on your prewar and postwar

aspirations.

The Principle of Security in Warfare

Good security means the enemy cannot achieve strategic

surprise. Such good security increasingly depends on accurate

and timely intelligence information to assess the threat and give

timely warning of it in an era when hostile and radical opponents

are about to acquire the most destructive ofweapons.

It has become increasingly difficult to predict the progress of

nonnuclear states as they approach obtaining an operational

WMD capability. Most of these regimes find it neither in their

political, economic, nor military interests to advertise their

progress or capabilities.

The international legal norm established by the NPT carries

pledges by the nuclear weapon states that they will not attack

nonnuclear signatories of the pact and that they will be

subject to sanctions if they violate that pledge. Aspiring

proliferators might hide behind their signatures on the NPT to

gain legal protection against intervention, particularly if the

evidence of their developing WMD is ambiguous.

Declared proliferators may also suffer unilateral cutoffs and

sanctions by triggering national legislation on the books in the

United States and among other states. These laws enforcing

international norms prohibiting proliferation also prescribe

various penalties for states that break from the ranks . Witness

the Pressler Amendment and the trade penalties inflicted on

Pakistan as a result of its nuclear weapons program.

26
his Osirak reactor was destroyed by Israeli warplanes, it does

not pay to develop WMD in high-profile, easily targeted

facilities . Instead, armed with great wealth from his oil

revenues, Saddam from 1981-1991 was able to move very

close to a nuclear weapons capability following a clandestine

approach. This model is the more likely one for aspirant states

to follow, namely:

" Pursuing multiple technical paths to NBC weapons ;

" Disguising and hiding WMD facilities, some underground;

" Providing disinformation about WMD activities/locations ;

" Joining the NPT as a ruse while clandestinely cheating;

" Using third parties to purchase WMD production

technology;

" Purchasing dual-use technologies allegedly for another

purpose ;

" Producing indigenously as many components of WMD as

possible;

" Getting prospective contractors to fill gaps in WMD

knowledge through the bid and proposal process,

sometimes not letting the contract afterwards;

" Buying as much WMD technology and resources on the

open market as possible from contractors all too ready

to help in return for substantial profits ;

" Hiring foreign NBC/missile expertise where local

expertise is lacking; and

" Purchasing WMD technology subcomponents, rather

than components, and assembling them inside their

country to reduce the audit trail.

Like the proverbial iceberg, just the tips of the North Korean

and Iranian nuclear weapons programs are visible, and they

probably indicate a much larger clandestine program operating

out of sight.

The rate of progress may be accelerated by the possibility of

transfers of scientific knowledge, highly enriched uranium (HEU)

or plutonium (PL), weapons designs, missiles, and nuclear

27
Soviet Union, which have a surplus of underpaid nuclear

scientists and technicians, hundreds of tons of HEU and PL,

tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, a need for hard currency,

and an expanding criminal element with some access to the

widespread nuclear facilities of the former superpower.

According to US military doctrine, the United States should

never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage .

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly

vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise . . . . Thorough

knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and

doctrine and detailed staff planning can improve security and

reduce vulnerability to surprise. 26

Vulnerability to surprise and attack can be reduced by a

combination of offensive and defensive measures. Security can

be maintained by a mix that includes :

Keeping allied escalation dominance to deter enemy

escalation to first use of WMD;

" Allied counterforce strikes to destroy or reduce enemy

WMD assets ;

" Allied active defenses to intercept enemy missile or

aircraft attacks ;

" Use of passive defenses to protect friendly forces from the

effects of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon attacks;

Any other measures designed to present less lucrative

targets to enemy WMD such as dispersion, mobility,

maintaining forces outside of enemy missile or aircraft

ranges, and introducing supply and reinforcement

means that are less vulnerable to NBC strikes.

No single approach may neutralize the WMD threat, but taken in

combination, these measures may greatly reduce the

vulnerability of friendly forces to NASTI surprises.

Improved allied capabilities to remotely detect adversary

nuclear, biological, chemical and missile assets on the ground

or en route to target, would also enhance security and help

avoid rude and devastating surprises by the enemy.

28
py 

Another principle of war set out in US military doctrine is to

"allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary

efforts."27 In other words, it is recommended that the US

commander should concentrate the majority of his military

power toward a clearly defined primary threat rather than

compromise the effort against secondary priorities . This

principle of war is based on the premise that the CINC will not

have unlimited resources and must accept some calculated

risks in secondary areas of importance in order to achieve

superiority in the priority area where the battle or conflict may

be decided.

On the grand strategic level, the United States has adopted

a strategy of preparing to fight two nearly simultaneous major

regional conflicts at the same time. Clearly, utilizing the principle of economy of force, the United States would need to hold in

reserve enough force for a second MRC once the first one begins.

The principle of "economy of force" also would serve as a

guide to cutting back on secondary US military participation

such as in on-going UN peace operations in other regions-so

long as US forces are engaged in one or more major regional

conflicts, or lack the military power to predominate in both.

The principle of economy of force must be applied with a

caveat when an enemy is equipped with WMD. The allied

commander must avoid having his main thrust trumped by the

employment of enemy mass destruction weapons. Therefore,

while resources must be focused on the decisive weak points in

adversary forces and plans, they must simultaneously be

adequately protected by maintaining intrawar escalation

dominance, and their employment prefaced by an air campaign

designed to substantially eliminate an enemy WDM capability.

The main ground thrust against enemy forces must be

adequately protected by concentrating active and passive

defense assets on behalf of the main effort. Dispersion and

continued mobility of key force elements, combined with rapid

supply and reinforcements from diverse logistics pathways, all

done with dispatch, air cover, and secure and clandestine

movements of troops, equipment, and supplies, will help

29
the main effort will be made.

As US Army and Air Force doctrine states, "economy of force

missions may require the forces employed to attack, to defend,

to delay, or to conduct deception operations ." 28

The Principle of Surprise in Warfare

US military doctrine teaches that commanders must

attempt to "strike the enemy in a time or place, or in a

manner, for which he is unprepared." 29 Surprise can affect the

outcome of battles, campaigns, or even entire wars . Surprise

can be achieved by speed of attack and maneuver, taking

unanticipated actions, using deception, varying the tactics

used from those previously employed, maintaining operations

security, gaining good intelligence and insights into enemy

thinking and doctrine, and applying new technologies in ways

that reduce enemy warning time, provide capabilities he does

not anticipate, or contribute to his confusion.

In the realm of new technologies to achieve surprise, note

the importance of stealth F-117 fighter-bombers in striking

key targets in the 1991 Gulf War and the use of precisionguided cruise missiles with very small radar cross-sections.

One of the architects of the US air campaign in the 1991

Persian Gulf War has written that

for the first time in the history of warfare, a single entity can

produce its own mass and surprise . . . . Surprise has always

been one of the most important factors in war-perhaps even the

single most important because it could make up for the

deficiencies in numbers. Surprise was always difficult to achieve

because it conflicted with the concepts of mass and

concentration. In order to have enough forces available to hurl

enough projectiles to win the probability contest, the commander

had to assemble and move large numbers. Of course. assembling

and moving large forces in secret was quite difficult, even in the

days before aerial reconnaissance, so the odds of surprising the

enemy were small indeed. Stealth and precision have solved both

sides of the problem; by definition, stealth achieves surprise, and

precision means that a single weapon accomplishes what

thousands were unlikely to accomplish in the past. 3o

30
capable of detecting and targeting incoming stealth aircraft and

cruise missiles, the United States and its allies have a means

of achieving tactical surprise in any air strike or any cruise

missile launch. The ability to strike "out of the blue" without

warning, provided by the B-2, F-117s, future F-22s, and

stealthy cruise missiles is limited only by how successfully US

and allied intelligence can identify and locate significant

enemy targets, and by the availability of stealth aircraft or

cruise missiles.

Technological surprise can also decide battles when one side

first employs a decisive new military technology which puts

the adversary at an unanticipated disadvantage. One of the

most dramatic illustrations of this was the decisive role of

British radars in helping the Royal Air Force win the Battle of

Britain against the German Luffwaffe . Although greatly

outnumbered in aircraft, the British were able to pinpoint the

directions and numbers of German aircraft as they took off in

France and flew across the English Channel toward Britain.

Armed with this knowledge, British Spitfires waited high in the

clouds in ambush and concentrated superior forces in the air

battles they chose to fight. The result was a British victory

where bean counters would have predicted defeat. Radar was

the biggest difference in the two sides. 31

The Principle of Simplicity in Warfare

US Army commanders are taught to prepare "clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough

understanding. " 32 Simplicity of operational concepts and goals

should reduce misunderstandings of orders, reduce confusion,

and enhance the understanding of key audiences whose

support is necessary to conduct the war.

This simplicity of operation should be applied to all phases

of combat; during the opening phase of operations, in the

main campaign, and in the war-termination phase. The war

plan should be a continuation of politics by other means,

keeping in mind the national ends for which the conflict was

begun, constantly relating national ends to ongoing military

3 1
imposed by the stark fact that the adversary possesses weapons

whose destructive magnitude exceeds anything previously

faced by other US commanders in previous conflicts .

Of course, simplicity and clarity of goals, plans, and orders

alone do not guarantee a correct strategy or successful operation

against a heavily armed regional enemy. A CINC could choose a

clear, simple plan based on tried-and-true principles, but find

that it would not work in a future MRC where the adversary

was equipped with radically different capabilities well beyond

those possessed by enemies in the past.

Armed with WMD, such adversaries might follow an

escalatory strategy that could shatter the cohesiveness of an

allied coalition, could scare off potential allies, might inflict a

political defeat on the coalition by dissolving allied domestic

support for the war, or even cripple an allied expeditionary

force by turning NBC and missile assets against allied

forces, ports, air bases, logistical tail, or allied capitals in the

region. In such a campaign, a NASTI attack might conceivably

inflict in a single day allied war deaths in excess of what the

United States suffered in Korea, Vietnam, or even in World

War 11 .33

The right operational plan will be essential against NASTIs

on the field of battle . Clarity and simplicity added to a sound

approach contribute to success . Of course, if added to a

flawed concept of operations, clarity and simplicity cannot

avert defeat.

Additional Principles of War

against Enemies with W1VID

Military experience and recent technical innovations have

spawned some additional principles of warfare to add to the

list supplied by General Fuller in World War I . These new

operating principles, when combined with the original

MOSSCOMES principles of war may supply the decisive edge

against radical hostile regimes armed with WMD.

These new principles can be summarized by the acronym SLIP:

32
L - Logistics

I - Information Dominance

P - Precision Targeting

Simultaneity and Depth of Attack

When battling a NAST[, it is best to strike fast and simultaneously at all key enemy assets to stun and paralyze his forces

to defeat them in the shortest time possible. Simultaneous

strikes throughout the entire battlespace may be enough to rob

him of much or all of his WMD capability, and reduce his

offensive potential.

As the US Army Training and Doctrine Command states in

its concept of operations for the early twenty-first century,

"The relationship between fire and maneuver may undergo a

transformation as armies with high technology place increasing

emphasis on simultaneous strikes throughout the battle space.

Maneuver forces may be massed for shorter periods of time. "34

Army doctrine also notes that "depth and simultaneous

attack may be a key characteristic of future American military

operations. These operations will redefine the current ideas of

deep, close, and rear."35 Indeed, such parallel war or hyperwar

strikes blur the distinction between the strategic, operational,

and tactical levels of operations and tend to blend them into one.

Recent effectiveness of simultaneous operations conducted

across the full length, breadth, and height of the battle space

have led to quick victories in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf.

Desert Storm, for example, showed that "deep battle has

advanced beyond the concept of attacking the enemy's follow-on

forces in a sequential approach to shape the close battle to one

of simultaneous attack to stun, then rapidly defeat the enemy. "3s

Colonel John Warden III, one of the architects of the air

campaign that defeated Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, suggests

that near-simultaneous parallel warfare strikes against key

enemy leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population

centers, and fielded military forces may impose strategic or

operational paralysis on him, leading to his rapid defeat- 37

Warden notes the impact of the fast-paced US parallel air strikes

on the 1991 defeat of Iraq:

33
many key facilities suffered so much damage so quickly that it

was simply not possible to make strategically meaningful

repair . Nor was it possible or very useful to concentrate

defenses ; successful defense of one target merely meant that

one out of over a hundred didn't get hit at that particular time.

Like the thousand cuts analogy, it just doesn't matter very

much if some of the cuts are deflected. It is important to note

that Iraq was a very tough country strategically . Iraq had spent

an enormous amount of money and energy on giving itself lots

of protection and redundancy and its efforts would have paid

off well if it had been attacked serially as it had every right to

anticipate it would. In other words, the parallel attack against

Iraq was against what may well have been the country best

prepared in all the world for attack. If it worked there, it will

probably work elsewhere. 38

Thus, the experience of the 1991 Gulf War is that parallel

warfare can be decisive since regional adversaries are likely to

have a relatively small number of vital strategic targets,

estimated by Colonel Warden at "in the neighborhood of a few

hundred with the average of perhaps 10 aimpoints per vital

target." 39 These enemy assets "tend to be small (in number), very

expensive, have few backups, and are hard to repair. If a

significant percentage of them are struck in parallel, the damage

becomes insuperable. "40

Of course, there may be countermeasures that an adversary

might take to offset the possibilities of simultaneous allied air

strikes across the battlespace of a major regional conflict. 41

Efforts might be taken to (1) disguise, diversify and

"demassify" the key political-military-economic assets to make

them less lucrative targets, (2) hide, harden, or put on mobile

launchers, WMD assets to reduce their vulnerability, (3)

employ AND against allied bases from which parallel attacks

are being launched, (4) attack allied C4I and employ various

forms of "info war" to confuse, disorganize, and mislead allied

commanders and "psychological warfare" to reduce allied

morale and influence the publics of the United States and its

allies to undermine political support for the war.

Logistics

When drafting the original list of principles of war, General

Fuller failed to identify the overwhelming importance of

34
mobilize, deploy, maneuver, reconstitute, withdraw, and

demobilize. Without proper logistics it would be impossible to

man, arm, fuel, fix, move, or sustain the soldier, sailor, or

airman and their equipment as they enter and fight major

regional conflicts. As one US Army general has put it, "Forget

logistics and you lose."42 On more than 230 occasions, US forces

have been sent to other countries and regions of the world in the

twentieth century alone . Logistics gets them there, sustains

them, and gets them home again.

Increasingly, logistics will play an important part in whether

US and allied forces get to the battle in time and whether they

will predominate when they arrive. This is especially true now

that fewer US troops are stationed abroad while still responsible

for standing ready to win two near-simultaneous major regional

conflicts (MRCs) and participating in a number of military

operations other than war (MOOTW as well.

MRCs and MOOTWs both require a force-projection logistical

system that has "the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert,

mobilize, deploy and operate anywhere in the world. "43 As a

recent analysis of the US Army in the Gulf War notes, logistics

units do more than sustain forces in the field. Indeed, "the

strength of the logistics engine determines the pace at which an

intervening force makes itself secure." 44

One student of that conflict has observed :

The Iraqi Army stood by and watched on television as the

American Army assembled a sophisticated combat force in front

of them with efficiency and dispatch. The act of building the

logistics infrastructure during Desert Shield created an

atmosphere of domination and a sense of inevitable defeat among

the Iraqis long before the shooting war began. In the new style of

war, superior logistics becomes the engine that allows American

military forces to reach an enemy from all points of the globe and

arrive ready to fight. Speed of closure and buildup naturally

increases the psychological stature of the deploying force and

reduces the risk of destruction to those forces that deploy first. In

contrast, dribbling forces into a theater by air or sea raises the

risk of defeat in detail. 45

A successful buildup of US and allied forces and supplies at

the inception of a major regional conflict could, in turn,

depend upon the early deployment of an effective multilayered

35
As Col Warden has warned, surface forces and logistical

support units are fragile at the operational level of war,

especially against highly armed challengers.

Supporting significant numbers of surface forces (air, land, or

sea) is a tough administrative problem even in peacetime.

Success depends upon efficient distribution of information, fuel,

food, and ammunition. By necessity, efficient distribution

depends on an inverted pyramid of distribution . Supplies of all

operational commodities must be accumulated in one or two

locations, then parsed out to two or four locations, and so on

until they eventually reach the user. The nodes in the system are

exceptionally vulnerable to precision attack. 4s

In short, while the United States and its allies may be able

to handle a NASTI regime such as Iraq in 1991, in the future it

may be dealing with adversaries that have mastered the

building of accurate ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads,

chemically armed reentry vehicles, and relatively cheap,

hard-to-detect cruise missiles. At that point, MRC forces and

their logistics tails had better reduce their vulnerabilities by

application of deterrence, preemptive strikes, defenses,

deployment outside of enemy range, dispersion of units,

constant mobility, or diversity of supply paths in order to avoid

defeat.

Information Dominance

The importance of winning the information war should be a

guiding principle of wars of the future. A US Army study predicts

that "effective information operations will make battlespace

transparent to us and opaque to our opponents.

47 Such, at

least, is the goal.

One of the air commanders of the Gulf War also emphasizes

the importance of information at the strategic and operational

levels. He notes that

In the Gulf War, the coalition deprived Iraq of most of its ability to

gather and use information. At the same time, the coalition

managed its own information requirements acceptably, even

though it was organized in the same way Frederick the Great had

organized himself. Clear for the future is the requirement to

redesign our organizations so they are built to exploit modern

information-handling equipment. This also means flattening

36
decision making to very low levels, and forming worldwide neural

networks to capitalize on the ability of units in and out of the

direct conflict area. 48

The information lesson from the Gulf was negative; the coalition

succeeded in breaking Iraq's ability to process information, but

the coalition failed to fill the void by providing Iraqis with an

alternative source of information. Failure to do so made

Saddam's job much easier and greatly reduced the chance of his

overthrow. Capturing and exploiting the datasphere may well be

the most important effort in many future wars. 49

Precision Targeting

Another principle of war flowing from technical innovations

is the dominance imparted by using precision guided weapons.

Suddenly, with great precision, nearly all important fixed

targets can be destroyed in a campaign. Instead of having to

fire thousands of bombs and missiles at targets, just a few will

do the job today with much greater certainty than the

imprecise massed attacks of yesterday.

Now "one bomb, one target destroyed" is more the norm

instead of "hundreds of bombs, perhaps few or no targets

destroyed." This helps in planning a successful campaign

and in executing it. MRC logistics are simplified since a

finite number of precision weapons can now be used to

destroy a set of targets rather than the massive quantities of

"dumb" weapons that would otherwise be needed to

accomplish the same mission.

The combined advantages of stealth technology and

precision guided missiles can be seen by comparing a

conventional bombing attack in the 1991 Gulf War, against the

same target, the Baghdad Nuclear Research Center, with a

stealthy precision attack two days later. The conventional air

attack failed to destroy the target even though it used 32

bomb-dropping aircraft, 16 fighter escorts, 12 aircraft for

suppression of Iraqi air defenses, and 15 tanker aircraft. Two

days later, this target was successfully destroyed using just

eight F-117 stealth fighter-bombers supported by just two

tankers. 5o

37
There are many other principles of war that might be

formulated to apply to different kinds of engagements. For

example, war against a NASTI is far different from

participating in military operations other than war such as UN

peace operations . Further, low-intensity counterguerrilla

warfare is prosecuted differently than more conventional

battle, as fought in the 1991 Gulf War, and both might be

fought differently in future wars.

One scholar has listed over one hundred principles of war

that have been advocated by military thinkers since the time of

Sun Tzu. 5 I Indeed, in 1984 US Air Force doctrine recommended

four guidelines (timing, tempo, logistics, and cohesion) in

addition to Fuller's original list of nine principles of war. Some

in the recent past have argued for the inclusion of the concept

of deterrence as a separate principle of conflict management. 52

A review of the principles of war that pertain to a future

conflict with an enemy equipped with advanced conventional

arms and mass destruction weapons can provide a better

understanding of how to operate on the future battlefield.

However, such a set of principles are not infallible guides to

action. They cannot substitute for judgment, improvisation,

insights into the enemy, or initiative . Nor can they be applied

by rote or as part of a checklist.

Understanding of these principles can add to the commander's

understanding of how to conduct warfare, and a review of

them can remind him of fundamentals to observe, but such

application of these principles by themselves is not sufficient

for victory. For one thing they are somewhat abstract and

require judgment in application to specific cases.

In the end, the commander and his subordinates still must

bring a depth of experience, concrete mastery of details, and

an understanding of military affairs that reaches well beyond

such general principles. Nevertheless,- these principles of war

can be useful ways to think about how to solve the problem

facing a commander whose force is opposed by a NASTI.

38
1 . Rogue states whose military forces are equipped with WMD and

means of delivering them on targets may interfere with highly sophisticated

new strategies and technologies developed by the United States and its

allies . WMD may level the playing field. For example, a high-altitude nuclear

EMP burst may destroy allied communications, interfere with space-based

reconnaissance, impede the digitalization of the battlefield, blind allied

precision strike forces to new targets, and serve as a form of information

warfare in its crudest form. The RMA brought about by the introduction of

NBC and missile systems into a theater of war may predominate over the

effects of other strategies and technologies . For a different view see the

chapter on "The Revolution in Military Affairs" by Jeffrey McKittrick, James

Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield, and Dale Hill

in this volume.

2 . J. F. C. Fuller, "The Principles of War, with Reference to the

Campaigns of 1914-1915," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,

vol. 61, February 1916. Fuller cited seven principles of war: Objective,

Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Surprise, Security, Cooperation . Later,

the US military dropped Cooperation as a principle of war and substituted

Simplicity and Command Unity.

3. See Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the

United States Air Force, March 1992, vol. 1, 1 and 2, Essay B, "Principles of

War," 9-15 . See also, Appendix A, "Principles of War," Army Field Manual

(FM) 100-5, Operations, 1990 edition, 173-77.

4. Ibid., 174. The principle of mass can also be applied at the grand

strategic level. "In the strategic context, this principle suggests that the

nation should commit, or be prepared to commit, a preponderance of

national power to those regions or areas of the world where the threat to

national security interests is greatest." See also AFM 1-1, 1 .

5 . The advantages of achieving local superiority, even if outnumbered

overall, is not a new idea. The same point was made several thousand years

ago by Sun Tzu. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith

(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 98.

6. The Manhattan Project provided a fission weapon in 1945 that was

over a thousand times more powerful per unit weight than a TNT warhead of

equivalent weight. The H-bomb fusion weapons that followed carried an

explosive yield a thousand times more powerful than the earlier A-bombs.

This millionfold increase in explosive capability between 1945 and 1950 was

augmented by the first-time capability to deliver such weapons across

intercontinental distances by aircraft and missiles. Massed local forces were

now targetable by WMD delivered across intercontinental ranges.

7. Gen Gordon R. Sullivan and Col James M. Dubik, USA, "Land

Warfare in the 21st Century," Military Review, September 1993, 22. Their

chart on "The Expanded Battlefield" traces the density of troop deployment,

width of the battlefront, and depth of the battle space in wars from antiquity

to the 1991 Gulf War. The earlier work done on wars of antiquity,

Napoleonic wars, the American civil war, World War I, World War II, and the

39
Warfare (Fairfax, Virginia: Hero Books, 1980).

8. Michael Mazaar, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for

Defense Planning," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College,

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, June 10, 1994, 20.

9. Lt Col Edward Mann, USAF, "One Target, One Bomb: Is the Principle

of Mass Dead?" Military Review, September 1993, 33-41 .

10. Ibid., 16.

11 . Ibid., 18 .

12 . Ibid., 21 . Indeed, Mazaar notes, more broadly, that "developments in

warfare are reducing the role of major platforms-heavy ground vehicles, large

capital ships, and advanced aircraft." See also Adm David E. Jeremiah, "What's

Ahead for the Armed Forces," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 1 (Summer 1993); 32.

13 . Mann, 37.

14. Army, FM 100-5, Appendix A, 1990, 173.

15 . Army Chemical School, "Summary Evaluation: Report for Combined

Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment (CANE) Force Development Test

and Experimentation, Phase 1, March 1986. This source was cited in an

article by Maj Gen Robert D. Orton, USA, and Maj Robert C. Neumann, USA,

"The Impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction on Battlefield Operations,"

Military Review, December 1993, 66.

16. Ibid ., 68 .

17. Ibid., 68-71 .

18. US Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), "Force XXI

Operations : A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimension Operations for

the Strategic Army of the Early 'twenty-First Century," TRADOC Pamphlet

525-5, August 1994, 3-21 .

19 . AFM 1-1, vol. 1 .

20. Ibid., 5.

21 . It would be inadvisable in almost all contingencies to use US nuclear

weapons in counterforce strikes against enemy weapons of mass

destruction . For a number of reasons, the preferred instrument for

disarming the adversary very likely should be advanced conventional

weapons. The worldwide reaction to the United States using nuclear

weapons on a regional enemy, particularly if used first, would be negative in

the extreme and could unhinge all other US diplomatic and multilateral

efforts to counter the spread of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons in

other regions of the world. For one thing, nuclear strikes against a state that

had signed the NPT are illegal under the treaty, so such an action would be

a flagrant violation of international law. Indeed, any state that violates this

code would be taking a course diametrically opposed to UN Security Council

pledges to punish such violators. Indeed this has historically been a US

position at the United Nations to punish nuclear first use against NPT

members. Further, US nuclear first use in a regional war, even against a

NASTI, would undoubtedly arouse world opinion against US policy, making

the United States a pariah state in many more quarters. It would not be

unexpected to see Americans and US property assaulted all around the

globe in retaliation . Moreover, US nuclear first use, even against a NASTI,

would shatter the nonnuclear international taboo that the United States has

40
policy of nuclear first use could also cause a collapse of US domestic

support for the regional war effort that would probably rival or exceed the

antiwar activities inside the United States during the Vietnam War period.

22. "Force XXI Operations," 2-8.

23. During the cold war, one fear of US strategists was the nuclear

decapitation strike from the Soviet Union, perhaps by an off-shore

sea-launched ballistic or cruise missile . See Barry R Schneider, "Invitation to a

Nuclear Beheading," Across The Board, 20, no. 7 (July/August 1983): 9-16.

24. If the first engagement is decisive enough, the conflict may be over

almost before it has begun. This was true, for example, of the United

States's intervention against the Noriega regime in Panama.

25. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," text of remarks

by the secretary of defense to the National Press Club, November 28, 1984.

This is included in the appendix to Weinberger's book, Fighting for Peace:

Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990) 441 .

26. FM 100-5, "Appendix A: Principles of War," 176. For a similar

commentary, see the June 1993 edition of FM 100-5, 2-4 to 2-6.

27. Ibid., 174-75.

28. Ibid., 175.

29. Ibid., 176.

30. John A. Warden III, "Air Power for the Twenty-First Century," in Karl

P. Magyar, Editor in Chief, Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military

Security Concerns (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, August

1994) 328-29.

31 . See Chester Wilmot, "David and Goliath," chapter 2, The Strugglefor

Europe (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1952,) 33-55. Not realizing the

potency and importance of British radar stations, the German high

command mistakenly abandoned their early bombardment of them in the

Battle of Britain because they believed that the British would be able to

repair them and put them back into operation very quickly. Had the

Germans persisted, they may have won the air battle over England.

32 . FM 100-5, 177.

33 . In Korea, the United States was reported to have lost 35,000 troops

killed in combat; in Vietnam the number was 53,000 ; and in World War II,

330,000.

34. "Force XXI Operations," 2-9.

35. Ibid., 3-11 .

36. Ibid., 2-9.

37. Warden, 311-32 .

38. Ibid ., 325.

39. Ibid., 327.

40. Ibid.

41 . Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, "Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every

Want a Weakness?" See elsewhere in this volume.

42. Gen Frederick M. Franks, Jr., as quoted in Col Michael S. Williams

and Lt Col Herman T. Palmer, USA, "Force-Projection Logistics," Military

Review, June 1994, 29.

43. FM 100-5, June 1993, 3-6.

4 1
War (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff

College Press, 1994), 378 .

45. Ibid., 376.

46. Warden, 328.

47. "Force XXI Operations," 3-21 .

48. Warden, 329-30.

49. Ibid.

50. Mann, 38.

51 . John I . Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of

War (Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1982) . Alger drew on the military

writings of thinkers such as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Jomini, Mahan,

Rocquancourt, Steele, MacDougall, Liddell Hart, Mao Tse-tung,

Montgomery, as well as the British army, French army, German army, and

US Army and Air Force in compiling his list of principles of war. These

guidelines included, for example, diverse maxims on the need for

cooperation, shock, favorable ground cover, vitality, fire superiority,

flexibility, an indirect approach, simultaneity, reconnaissance, local

superiority, air superiority, a will to win, readiness, pursuit, God's blessing,

and the moral high ground.

52. For a summary discussion see AFM 1-1, vol. 2, Essay B : "Principles

of War." 14. The original sources are Col Robert H. Reed et al., "On

Deterrence: A Broadened Perspective," Air University Review, May--June

1975, 2-17, and John M. Collins, "Principles of Deterrence," Air University

Review, November-December 1979, 17-26.
Revolution in Military Affairs?

Are we currently living through a "revolution in military

affairs?" Several of our authors in this book argue that this is

the case. What is a revolution in military affairs (RMA)? For

our purposes, an RMA is defined as a fundamental change, or

discontinuity, in the way military strategy and operations have

been planned and conducted.

Sometimes an RMA is driven by technological innovation, such

as the introduction of nuclear weapons at the end of World War

II . Sometimes operational innovations change warfare-for

example, the German blitzkrieg. Societal changes such as

Napoleon's Levee en Masse also can contribute to RMAs. At

other times, an RMA may be created by a combination of developments-indeed, the reinforcement and integration of military

operational, technical, and even socio-economic developments.

The essay by Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred

Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill,

analysts at the Science Applications International Corporation

(SAIC), argues that we have been in the midst of an integrated

RMA since the start of the Gulf War and that it is accelerating.

The SAIC analysts contend that the current RMA is

characterized by an integration of operational, organization,

and technical capabilities across all operating mediums-air,

land, and sea. Furthermore, they argue that "new warfare areas,"

such as long-range precision strikes, information warfare,

dominating maneuver, and space warfare, are also emerging.

Regarding deep precision strike, there have been dramatic

increases in the ability to strike strategic targets. "In 1943,"

writes the SAIC team, "the US 8th Air Force prosecuted only 50

strategic targets during the course of the entire year. In the first

24 hours of Desert Storm, the combined [coalition] air forces

prosecuted 150 strategic targets-a thousand-fold increase over

1943 capabilities ." In 25 more years, it may be possible to strike

as many as 500 to 1000 targets in the first few minutes of a

campaign, inflicting strategic paralysis on the enemy.

Information warfare constitutes another revolutionary

aspect of the new era warfare-quickly disrupting or destroying

43
information propaganda abilities, and general situational

awareness.

"Dominating maneuver" refers to the positioning and

employment of forces anywhere in a theater so that, in

combination with precision strike and information warfare, an

adversary's center of gravity can be destroyed .

Space warfare involves dominating the "high ground" of

space to deny its advantages to the adversary and to use it to

implement one's own command, control, communications,

navigation, reconnaissance, air defense, missile defense,

warning, and weather forecasting. Space assets can become a

key to the future digitalization of the battlefield where some of

the fog and friction of war is removed for the side dominating

space . Space warfare includes aspects of the other three

emerging warfare areas, but has the potential to become a

distinct warfare area of its own. The SAIC analysts conclude

that truly revolutionary effects in warfare will occur when two

or more of the new warfare areas combine. The effect may be

to so dominate an adversary before conflict starts as to make

the conflict unnecessary, something Sun Tzu advocated nearly

2,500 years ago.

Gen Charles Homer also believes we have entered a period

where new technologies can change the manner in which we

fight wars and can downgrade the value of possession of

nuclear arms. This officer, who led the US and allied air

operations in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, writes that

Desert Storm represents a revolution in warfare. Specifically, we will need

to conduct operations in ways that inflict the minimum number of

casualties on both sides. Additionally, we must prepare for wars in which

ballistic missiles are used against our own troops and as terror

weapons. . . . In the end, we should aim to reduce our nuclear arsenals to

zero as we substitute missile defenses for nuclear weapons.

Homer's essay concentrates on the need for effective theater

missile defenses (TMD) and strong strategic ballistic missile

defenses (BMD) . The author notes how ballistic missiles and

their technology are proliferating across the third world, and

have fallen into the hands of rogue states .

Homer argues that multilayered ballistic missile defenses

will work better than single terminal-phase systems such as

44
War. Multilayered defenses are designed to intercept ballistic

missile attacks all along their flight trajectories. For example,

such defenses will interdict the attack at several key points:

" Boost phase and post-boost phase intercepts-the best

time to hit a missile because "it's signature is high, it's at

its slowest speed, it's vulnerable, and if you get it then, it

falls on the enemy." Furthermore, a single intercept of a

MIRVed system kills all the weapons with a single shot,

before the reentry vehicles carrying the warheads can

separate and are en route to individual targets.

" Midcourse interceptalso desirable because one can

shoot at the missile in a space environment that interferes

less with high-energy defensive weapons, and can target

the reentry vehicles that escaped the boost-phase defenses.

" Terminal-phase intercept-more dangerous, because

the debris can fall on the defender. This last line of

defense has less time to react to the incoming reentry

vehicles and is presently restricted to kinetic kill or

explosive techniques for intercepts since the earth's

atmosphere interferes with laser and particle beam

projection. However, if the first two layers of defense do

their job well, the attack will be greatly diluted and will

present fewer targets for ground-based BMD interceptors .

A two-layered theater missile defense system is currently

planned by the United States for future major regional

conflicts (MRCs), perhaps the Theater High-Altitude Area

Defense (THAAD) system in combination with an improved

Patriot terminal defensive system, to help protect US and

allied forces in future MRCs.

General Homer advocates a strong, fielded ballistic missile

defense system for the United States, our allies, and Russia,

which is surrounded by would-be proliferators . However

contends that the United States could begin more extensive

cooperation with the Russians by sharing information on

warning systems, and, as we build trust, might cooperate in

constructing shared missile defenses. This controversial view of

one of the nation's foremost military leaders has attracted much

debate .

45

New-Era Warfare

Gen Charles A. Homer, USAF (Ret.)

In the twenty-first century we are going to confront

increasingly the threat of ballistic missiles and the need for

ballistic-missile defenses .

The threats posed by ballistic missiles are obvious . Many

nations now have them, and not all those nations are hightech. There is also no doubt about the fact that the capabilities

of ballistic missiles are increasing. Former CIA Director

Woolsey, for example, noted that North Korea has developed

three new ballistic missiles.

But our real problem is not so much the threat itself, but a

lack of understanding about what is the threat. The military

missed the whole point in Desert Storm. We used to look upon

ballistic missiles in terms of warhead size and accuracycircular error probability and the like-and calculate the

warhead's impact on the enemy, but we missed the real

impact of the ballistic missile.

Part of the reason for this misunderstanding is simply our

heritage. All of us here today have lived the majority of our

adult lives during the cold war, which caused us to look at

things in strategic terms ; that is, in the context of US/Soviet

relations . We still argue, for example, about the futility of

having ballistic missile defenses because it's bad to defend

against mutual assured destruction. But many of our views on

ballistic missiles, couched in the obsolete terms of the cold

war bipolar world, are not appreciated by much of the world

today. That is particularly true of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and

Israel.

Edited remarks originally delivered by Gen Charles A. Homer on 19 July 1994 at the

Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, sponsored by The Marshall

Institute. His speech is reprinted here with the permission of the George C. Marshall

Institute, Washington, D.C .

47
ballistic missiles, and I was puzzled during Desert Storm that

we didn't seem to be aware of that history. Ballistic missiles

were used against Rotterdam and London in World War II .

After the Gulf War, I was watching a story about our stealth

fighter, the F-117. The person largely responsible for the

stealth technology on the F-117 is an Englishman who had

grown up in London during WWII . He said, "I recall the

terrorizing impact of the V-2 attacks. They were far more

fearsome than bomber attacks." So the lesson was there that

ballistic missiles can have a large psychological impact as well

as a military impact on a war, but we had failed to learn that

lesson .

The ballistic missile had a profound impact on the coalition

nations in Desert Storm, on our forces, and on our

understanding of the ballistic missile's own utility. The

ballistic missile was the only advantage that Saddam Hussein

had in that war. That's the lesson that Saddam taught us, that

ballistic missiles may have little military value but do have

great terror potential.

Ballistic missiles and ballistic-missile defense carry heavy

political implications . For example, if we have no money to

spend on conventional defense, we tell our people that it

doesn't matter, because we have ballistic missiles, and that

since defenses against missiles are destabilizing, it is not even

in our best interests to spend money on a defense against them.

But in reality ballistic missiles are with us, and the

capability for launching them is growing . Technology

transfers, a technology revolution occurring every 18 months

to two years, as well as legitimate space launches, are things

we need to be concerned about in this regard. In today's world

there is no reason why any nation can't put a communications

satellite into space . That same capability for launching

satellites can be transformed, with proper guidance, into a

ballistic missile of intercontinental range. Other technologies

enhance this delivery capability, such as our Global

Positioning System (GPS), which gives nations the ability to

target with some degree of accuracy without having to go

through the same costly and intense development that we had

to go through to get that system operational . There are also

48
Yemen, and Afghanistan are all examples . We've seen testing

on the part of Vietnam, Korea, and Syria, and they are seen as

necessary for defense by countries such as Saudi Arabia and

Israel. Certainly, there are opportunities we can foresee for

countries such as Libya and North Korea to use ballistic

missiles; and they are the cornerstone of defense for the

United States and Russia, and also for countries such as India

and Pakistan.

The world has changed, and the capability exists for many

countries to use ballistic missiles . If you put these facts

together with other big shifts, such as the decline in nationstate status, and new stresses such as international migration

and environmental degradation, we must understand that the

world is changing. Certainly there are new strategies being

pursued . There is no doubt, for example, that many states are

pursuing a strategy of acquiring weapons of mass destruction

and the means to deliver them. This is the war that is

replacing the cold war.

Lessons of Desert Storm

So let me turn to Desert Storm because it illustrated this

revolution in warfare. First, look at this example. At a Camp

David meeting in September 1990, before the Gulf War began,

President Bush asked : "How do we avoid casualties?" At first, I

thought he was referring to US casualties, and then I thought

he meant casualties of all the possible allies, but as he

continued to speak I realized he was talking about the Iraqis.

He was asking how we could conduct this military operation

with minimum casualties on both sides . That is part of

new-era warfare .

There's no doubt that casualties in modern warfare-at least

from our point of view-are quite unacceptable . If the casualty

count is too high, you can win the war on the battlefield yet

lose it at home because you inflicted large numbers of

casualties on the enemy or if they inflicted large numbers of

casualties on you. Both are unpopular with the US public.

49
Desert Storm? The answer is, we were ill-prepared, though

we did prepare to some extent. In 1988 in an exercise under

Gen George Crist (commander-in-chief of Central Command),

Army Brig Gen Jim Ellis was given free play as a Red Force

commander. He was supposed to challenge us . The scenario

was that the Russians attacked through Iran and we had to

defend . What Jim Ellis did was to keep firing ballistic

missiles into my area . Every time I'd mass my force, he

would send a couple of ballistic missiles at us . It's a war

game, but I'll tell you, pretty soon you get a little tired

because you want to be a hero in front of your boss, and this

brigadier general was not cooperating at all . But he did us a

great service by making us aware of the military utility of

these weapons .

In another exercise in July, 1990, the scenario was that

Country Orange was going to attack Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

from the north, and we knew Country Orange probably had

ballistic missiles. I said, "We're not going to be unprepared

again." So I went down to see Lt Gen John Yeosock, commander,

Third US Army, who was the ground force commander, and I

told him that I wanted to use the Patriots to defend against

ballistic missiles.

At that time, Patriot was believed to have the capability to

intercept ballistic missiles, so I took the Patriot air defense

circle and put it on my maps . When we plotted those circles,

they just about covered the map. Of course, we learned in

Saudi Arabia that the Patriot ballistic missile defense circle

looks more like the head of a pin .

We have all heard a lot of very smart people talk about

whether the Patriot missiles were or were not a success in Desert

Storm. I can only tell you that I had to make a decision about

whether or not to move the E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and

Control System) aircraft out of Scud range. They were positioned

at Riyadh Air Base and Saddam was shooting Scuds at them. I

had to decide whether to leave them there or move them to

Thumrait, which would have put another hour or

hour-and-a-half between them and their operational area. I

decided to leave them at Riyadh and, because of the Patriot

missiles, we didn't lose a single AWACS. That was either a

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know that from where I stood, the Patriots worked .

After the initial Scud launchings, we saw the value of the

Patriots and of defense against ballistic missiles in general.

There can be no doubt about the value of these antiweapon

interceptors. Consider that the greatest number of casualties

came from one Scud attack on the Dhahran barracks.

This could prove to be a lesson not lost on other nations in

terms of the terror caused by ballistic missiles and the political

leverage they provide. Suppose Iran, for example, had nuclear

weapons and ballistic missiles, and suppose they decided that

they wanted to raise the price of oil, and they tell their

neighbors that they are going to deny them and every other

nation access to the Red Sea. They say to the Saudis, "You

know we have these weapons, but we're not interested in

occupying your country, nor are we interested in crossing into

it ; we just want to get the price of oil back to where we can

make some money." What would be the reaction of the Saudis?

And finally, it's reasonable to believe that the development

and proliferation of ballistic missiles in the hands of potential

adversaries has reached a stage where they can affect such

things as the building and maintaining of coalitions. For

example, what if we were involved in a situation like Desert

Storm, where an ally like Italy, for example, was threatened

with such a missile attack? Would other neighboring

countries, also within range, dare to ally themselves with Italy

or the United States? How difficult would it be to hold together

a coalition as diverse as the one we had in Desert Storm if the

member nations were threatened with direct missile attack?

Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Programs

Where are we today with respect to ballistic missile defense?

We have the defense guidance on theater, national, and

technology demonstrations, and we have the ABM Treaty,

which is the most significant element at the policy level. The

ABM Treaty made sense in a cold war context, but you wonder

if it has merit in the new world . So far as our current

capability is concerned, warning of long-range missiles is

5 1
should keep in mind that our radars are configured for the

cold war. Although we can change that fact, as of now our

infrared systems for theater defense have limited detection

capability . They have difficulty with land masses far away from

the equator, with weather, and with the smaller infrared

signature of missiles like the Scud. The biggest problem with

our current radars and space-based sensors, however, is that

they do not allow us to target and attack mobile launchers.

That was one lesson I brought back from Desert Storm, and it

is the one I keep hitting over and over and over.

We have made some progress since then. We have modified

the software associated with the Defense Support Program

(DSP) signal . We can take two or more satellites and

interweave their coverage to improve accuracy and the

likelihood of detection. But they still do not offer the degree of

certainty that I think is needed and wanted. Other countries

have offered us the use of their some of their warning assets .

For example, the head of the Ukrainian Air Forces asked me,

"How would you like to have some of our ballistic-missile radar

gear, left over from the cold war?" But we looked at its location

and decided we were not interested because it really had no

potential military benefit. Of course, the Ukrainians are trying

to get close to the United States to preclude being overpowered

by the Russians.

Among those most interested in our ballistic missile warning

capabilities, and how they can be shared, are our allies. The

long-term program that I think would be most effective in this

respect is called ALARM. It gives us the ability to see lower

signature missiles and it gives us the ability to see missiles

that are coasting, for example. Finally, ALARM gives us

responsiveness, in that it will be on a smaller launch vehicle

and maybe on other satellites .

We need to be concerned about keeping our warning

capabilities effective . For example, a DSP satellite went bad

last year, so I said launch the spares. I thought it might take

90 days to do this. It turns out that it takes considerably longer.

In some cases, it can take up to two years to replace a warning

satellite .

52
we have to think in depth. Too often the nature of our acquisition

system forces us into being too programming oriented. We

must think not in terms of the single solution but in a variety

of solutions. For instance, we wanted to attack Iraq's missiles

where they were built, before they were on the launch pads.

That would have been the most productive approach. We have

the capability to do that, but we did not do a very good job at

finding and destroying Iraq's missiles in Desert Storm because

we really had not thought sufficiently about the problems

beforehand.

After the war, I asked several questions about the command

and control of Iraq's systems, and we found out that we could

have done some things to improve our missile defense

efficiency. For example, launch orders in Iraq tended to come

from a very high level, so there were vulnerabilities that could

have been exploited.

In general, we need to consider the three areas of missile

defense: boost-phase, midcourse and terminal. We have other

capabilities, such as JOINT STARS, GPS, and multitarget

detection, but I think most of us want to talk about what

happens after missiles are launched.

Boost-Phase Intercept

During the Gulf War, we had the potential for an intercept of

a Scud just after launch. An F-16 was over Iraq suppressing

Scuds, and the pilot saw a missile coming off the pad. He

thought it was a SAM being shot at him, so he made a move

away from it . He then realized that there was no radar warning

and that the missile was very bright and large for a SAM.

When he realized it was a Scud, not a SAM, he attempted to

shoot it down with an AIM-9 heat-seeking missile. But the

high rate of acceleration of the Scud was too much for the

F-16 .

Boost-phase is a good time to intercept a missile because its

signature is high, it's at its slowest speed, it's vulnerable, and

if you get it then, it falls on the enemy-a beautiful thing. The

problem is having the time to detect and launch on it. The

timeline on a boost-phase intercept is very, very tight.

53
can get airplanes to cap an attack, as we did during the Gulf

War. You can have protection from large airplanes if you want

to use an airborne laser, for example. There are also options

for putting unmanned airplanes up for long periods of time .

We need to work on the boost-phase intercept issue, but

right now it has been hampered . We have three boost-phase

programs that I know of, all on airplanes: HARM, AMRAAM,

and the airborne laser. But I think that the current budget

crisis will probably keep these programs from being acquired

and deployed. That we have been taking funds from these

programs tells us more about our own lack of perception of the

seriousness of the threat than it does about the threat itself.

Midcourse Intercept

The advantage of a midcourse intercept is that during this

period the missile has a good signature because it's out there in

a sterile, space environment and you have multiple opportunities

to shoot at it . Also, if you go to space-based systems for intercept

in mid-course, you get wide-area protection ; you can cover larger

portions of the landmass depending on how many of these

interceptor platforms and sensor satellites you want to put in

orbit. Of course, the big down-draw on anything in space is the

ABM Treaty, and the widely held attitude that we should not

have weapons in space.

My answer to that is that the weapon in space is the

warhead on a missile . The interceptor is an antiweapon .

Therefore I don't have the same philosophical problems .

Parenthetically, I'm not in favor of weapons in space.

There are still other options for midcourse defense against

ballistic missiles. The Navy Upper Tier is one, because it gives

you a great deal of flexibility. You can park these ships

anywhere. If we deployed this system you could have a

national missile defense by stationing them as far away as

Hudson Bay. But again, midcourse intercept requires

midcourse guidance, and that involves sensors in space which

track cold bodies and relay that data to the intercept missile,

and that is prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

54
Finally, we have terminal defense, where most of our work is

now done . The most logical elements would be development of

an improved Patriot; Theater High Altitude Area Defense

(THAAD), a ground-based system by the Army; and/or Navy

Lower Tier.

However, I worry about this. Will these ground-based

systems address the future threat? Too often, when people

approve building a theater missile defense, they are talking

about building a missile defense against a benign nonthreat, a

Scud-like threat. Remember, the Scud wasn't even good

enough for Saddam. Even if we deploy one of these systemssuch as THAADwe still need a cold-body tracker in space. If

I'm sitting here with my THAAD missile and somebody

launches a ballistic missile at me, I still need very definite data

as to where that missile is so that I can launch my THAAD

before knowing where it's aimed . So warning is not enoughwe need to have accurate information about where the missile

is . A cold-body tracker doubles the range of your groundbased or ship-based systems. But again, to deploy that tracker

requires ABM Treaty changes.

Need for a Robust TMD

The technology for building effective ballistic missile

defenses is available today. The dollars have been spent, and

countries are clamoring for ballistic missile defenses. I believe

that we must be concerned about what kind of ballistic-missile

defenses we're allowed to build . Those concerns have to be

voiced, or else we will wind up with a noneffective system

against fair-to-reasonable threats. If space systems can give us

the capability we need to defend our men and women when

they are overseas, let alone defend the United States, then we

need to seek that. If that means we need to work with the

Russians to change the ABM Treaty, that's what we need to

do .

Let's talk about the ABM Treaty. I believe the ABM Treaty is

a cold war hang-over. is the cold war over? If you look at the

55
visits from the head of the KGB, and Col General Ivanov, head

of Russia's rocket forces. We're talking with them about

shared exercises ; I've been invited to Moscow. Given all this, I

think it's reasonable to assume that the cold war is overand, therefore, I think the ABM Treaty has outlived its

usefulness.

That does not mean that we and the Russians are not going

to have tensions, conflict, disagreements, and competition .

But, I think that things have fundamentally changed between

our two countries. Yet we still have ballistic missiles pointed at

each other. To what end? We are not going to fight each other.

So, it's now a question of how we walk away from the cold war,

not do we walk away from the cold war.

In walking away from the cold war, one area we must

investigate is shared ballistic missile defenses with the

Russians . That requires building trust with the Russians. Nor

is it an easy thing to do since they are still coming from a

bipolar world view, and I think that they are genuinely

concerned about our ability to outstrip them in technology.

They want to be in the driver's seat in determining how we

march forward on ballistic missile defenses, and the ABM

Treaty gives them the leverage to do that. I ran into this

problem with Ivanov. We were at the national test facility,

which is an impressive operation, and we were briefed by

people from our Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. You

could see that General Ivanov, who is a very thoughtful,

intelligent, and tough guy, was threatened . He looked as if he

were thinking, "My God, I didn't know they were this good ."

I knew we were going to reach this point, so I had spoken

with him all morning about how could we cooperate with him.

"What we need to do," I said, "is work together on this. We

need to share these technologies . You have things that we

can't match, like heavy-lift access to space. There's a marriage

right there-our technology in ballistic missiles and your

access to space to put things in orbit. There's no reason our

two countries can't work together, other than the fact that

there are those in both of our capitals who are still very close

to the cold war." And he said, "What is your problem in

achieving this technology?" I said, "Well, it's the budget. We

56
he went to get on the airplane to leave, he turned and said,

"Good luck with your Congress."

In both Washington and Moscow there are people who are

still operating in a cold war context. I think the Russians are

terrified that we are going to get ahead of them in ballistic

missile defenses. So, it is very important that we do things,

such as share ballistic-missile warning as an entree, and then

become involved in shared ballistic-missile defenses. At that

point, the ABMTreaty is moot.

How you build trust with the Russians is a matter of a lot of

effort, discussion, and dialogue. But I think to approach it

from the cold war standpoint is the wrong tack. I think we

must approach it looking at things through their eyes as they

look to the south, not over the pole. I have no doubts that the

Russians are quite willing to do that, given time.

The biggest problem we have is our own lack of

understanding of the threat. I'm amazed by that. Many people

come to Cheyenne Mountain where we show them the ballistic

missile warning systems. Then we ask them, "What do you

think of our ballistic missile defenses?" I would estimate that

60 percent of the people say, "They have got to be the finest in

the world, and we can't thank you enough." But the truth is

we have none.

That is a scary thing-they don't know. The danger here is

that if we are threatened by ballistic missiles someday, the

American people are going to feel betrayed. So, I think that,

while we have no threat for now, we must communicate to the

American people that they do not in fact have ballistic missile

defenses, and that there is a potential for them at some point

in the future to be attacked.

Shared Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

What do we need to do? First, recognize that the world has

changed; second, recognize that the cold war is over; and,

finally, recognize that we and the Russians have much to gain

from getting rid of our nuclear arsenals . Think about this : the

nation most threatened by the proliferation of missiles and

57
by North Korea, China, Pakistan, India, Syria, Iraq, Iran,

Afghanistan, and Ukraine, and all these states have nuclear

weapons or nuclear-weapons programs, and all have ballistic

missiles or ballistic-missile programs. Russia needs ballistic

missile defenses more than does the United States. Why do we

not start the process by sharing warning, and as we build

trust, then sharing defenses?

What's the cost of sharing warning, for example? It means

we give up the opportunity to attack them on a surprise basis.

We have people who are fighting shared warning, but I think

their arguments are based on cold war fears, not on the world

we find today. I think that we have to recognize this world is a

dangerous place in many areas, and that proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them

are the true threat that we need to be addressing. Diplomacy

is best, and we have nonproliferation regimes, which we need

to pursue. But there are determined adversaries out there who

are not deterrable by counterforce because, if they are smart

at all, they know that we are not going to use nuclear

weapons.

What are nuclear weapons good against? They are good

against cities . Are we going to bomb the capital of some

country in order to deter them from using nuclear weapons?

They know we are not going to do that. Now, we do have

sufficient conventional military strength, and particularly with

a coalition as in the Gulf War, we can be effective on the

battlefield . But if there is a question about our national will,

then it's in some nation's interest to build these weapons of

mass destruction and threaten people .

We must be credible on the basis of conventional defense . In

Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein had more chemical weapons

than I could bomb. We had to make a decision to go after the

production areas and those storage areas that were in the

immediate area of the battlefield . I could not have even begun

to take out all of his chemical storage-there are just not

enough sorties in the day.

Although Iraqi had abundant chemical weapons, they did

not use them in Desert Storm. We interrogated their people as

to why this was so. I thought perhaps it was a concern that we

58
things ambiguous in that regard . But the Iraqi generals

reported the reason they didn't use chemical weapons was

because if they used them, they knew our troops were better

protected than their troops . They felt that if they used

chemical weapons, they would suffer many more casualties

than we would .

I think that they were right in their assessment, and I think

that it highlights the importance of defenses being a key

element in deterrence. If you have ballistic missile defenses,

then that makes another country's acquiring ballistic missiles

less important, and in fact, may deter them from spending

large amounts of money to build them.

Our allies and neutral nations would benefit greatly if we

had wide-area ballistic-missile defenses. For example, suppose

we had the capability to share ballistic missile defenses on a

global basis, say a space-based system. You could go to a

country such as Israel-which I believe has nuclear weaponsand say, "If you get rid of your nuclear weapons, we'll share

ballistic missile defenses with you." Or suppose we went to

India and Pakistan and said, "Look, we understand that you

don't like each other, we understand that you are both relying

on ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons to deter one

another, and that if you have a war, there is liable to be a

nonrational decision which causes one or the other or both to

use these weapons . The problem is, we live downwind, and we

don't like it . So, while you may want to use these systems,

we're not going to let you. We are going to preclude you from

doing that, at least to the extent we can, by using our ballistic

missile defenses to interfere with any missile attack that takes

place ." I think that use of active defenses can be as important

as using ballistic missile defenses in the direct defense of our

own nation.

Consider this: The former head of the Japanese Air Force,

General Ishizuka, and I have talked for hours about the

challenges in defending against possible missile attacks,

because it is a subject of very high concern in Japan. The

military leadership in Japan is very concerned about

ballistic-missile defense. One of their concerns is that their

people, or elements of their population, will lose confidence in

59
are apprehensive about what effect that might have . If the

Japanese decide they must go their own way, and renounce

their constitution and develop a very aggressive outreach in

military capability, what would that do to the whole Pacific

Rim, or to the countries that well remember WWII? So, it's

important that we have the ability to share ballistic missile

defenses with a country like Japan.

Working with the Russians, the Japanese, and others will

also affect the Chinese. The number of warheads the Chinese

have is significant in terms of inflicting pain, but in terms of

attacking Russia or the United States, they are probably not

decisive. The Chinese are pragmatic, so you can work with

them if you understand what their internal concerns are, such

as control of the Chinese border. So I think that over the long

term, if you ignore them in this regard and work with the

Russians, the Japanese and countries like that, you can then

say to the Chinese, "By the way, we're going to neutralize your

ballistic missiles."

Does it mean we'll have peace? No, I don't think so. I think

you have to ask yourself this one question: "Would it be a

better world if we had ballistic missile defenses and no nuclear

weapons, or nuclear weapons and no ballistic-missile

defenses?" I think that this is the choice, and I think that is

where we need to have the vision and the courage to take on

this mission of ballistic missile defense in new-era warfare .

Reducing Nuclear Arsenals

One of the greatest potential benefits of ballistic missile

defense specially shared warning and wide-area defensesis in reducing the value of nuclear ballistic missiles. There is a

significant domestic value here as well, but the costs of

developing, deploying, and operating such defenses are not

trivial . In fact, in the current budget environment, you can't

expect the military to take the lead. But I think ballistic

missile defenses would compete very well, particularly if you

trade them off against the cost of maintaining nuclearweapons forces.

60
The Air Force has got to come to grips with relinquishing the

ICBMs . We just put three black boxes on each one of the

Minutemen, at a million dollars a box. The cost to the Navy

operating the Trident submarines is certainly not trivial.

What are we going to have to do when we have to replace the

tritium? Are we going to restart the Savannah River Project?

So, I think if you worked a trade-off one against the other you

could probably free up a great deal of money.

There is another argument made by those who cling to cold

war ideas, and that is that we need to maintain our nuclear

weapons to deter other nations . These people point to the

proliferation of the technologies for weapons of mass

destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and worry that

without our own nuclear arsenals we will be ripe for attack.

But does our nuclear deterrent force really limit the threat

posed by the proliferation of such weapons? Such weapons

might be delivered by a variety of means. Aircraft and missiles

carrying such weapons might not be the only threat. Those

attempting to smuggle nuclear weapons into the United States

might do so in a manner that is not traceable. But even if we

identified the culprits, we would probably not be able to use a

nuclear weapon against them. Nonetheless, we ought to have

the conventional military power to be able to influence them

on a deterrable basis.

In other words, the question is, are we being well-served if,

as we cut our military forces down, we reserve large amounts

of money to preserve weapons we probably cannot employ, as

opposed to acquring more very capable conventionalforces?If a

nation uses a nuclear weapon or poison gas against us, then

we must have military options to take-and strong conventional forces provide those options .

So, you have two problems : deterrence, and what do you do

if deterrence fails . Anybody who would poison Chicago is

nondeterrable, because they are not operating on our same

logic train. Therefore, I think that some potential aggressors

that are indifferent to whether we have nuclear weapons or

not. I believe Saddam Hussein, in many ways, was indifferent

to nuclear weapons. In fact, sometimes I wonder if he really

was not looking for Israel to throw a nuclear weapon at him.

6 1
So, 

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adversary is probably only useful with reference to the

Russians. That's what I believe.

However, let me be clear on this . We cannotwe must notunilaterally disarm. You must do it in concert with the

Russians, and you must have a vision. But we seem to lack

vision, and to be in a reactive mode, which precludes

long-term planning. What we mean by long-term is really a

function of perception of threat, of building trust with Russia. I

would not suggest that we can walk away from nuclear

deterrence other than arm-in-arm with the Russians . There is

an opportunity to let other nations have nuclear arsenals and

yet work with them on a business-like basis. I personally am

not threatened by England and France having nuclear

weapons, or even Israel. I think China also tends to fall in that

category. Nuclear disarmament has to be worked in terms of

the Russia/US relationship.

Maintaining Conventional Strength

It is absolutely essential that we maintain US conventional

military strength-the type of conventional strength that we

exhibited in Desert Storm. I think that we are approaching

what I call the dominance of defense . The thing that scares

me, of course, is the French reached that conclusion in 1930. I

see so little value in warfare.

For example, in Saddam Hussein's case, I am not sure that

we missed the boat in not dethroning him. If I were somebody

living in Baghdad, what threatens me most are the Kurds and

the Shiites. So, while I might hate Saddam Hussein for what

he does to my family, my economy, and my nation, an Iraqi

might believe that he is the one person who was keeping me

alive. If I were a Kuwaiti, I would hate the Iraqis for what they

did to my children and my country, but on the other hand, I'm

not sure I would want Iran on my northern border either.

Probably the mistake we made was in our publicity during

the Gulf War, which demonized Saddam Hussein. He is a

gangster and an evil person. But in the Vietnam War, we

became very involved in the internal affairs of South Vietnam

62
concerned about was getting involved in solving the problems

of Iraq, when Iraq's problems are not solvable. So, in my

opinion, if the Iraqis want Saddam, they can elect him, let him

try to run Iraq, but Saddam and Iraq would be very wise not to

step over the boundary lines again.

Of course that's fine, if Saddam Hussein is just a modest

risk taker. But if you are faced with a dictator who in fact runs

risks, a defense-only capability may not be an adequate US

military posture. We also should have a very credible

conventional military capability.

I think we also have to remember that each war is different.

We are ill-prepared for things like Bosnia or Somalia, and

there are those who want to build forces for that. We fight a

Desert Storm only every 10 or 15 years. But, I think the point

is that you've got to be able to fight the Desert Storms

successfully, and obviously counterforce is necessary. I'm not

sure what the campaign against Iraq's economy achieved. But

basically, our goal was to eject Iraq from Kuwait and cripple

Iraq's nuclear/biological/chemical capabilities, and I do

believe we did have an impact. We went after leadership, and

we went after it in a military context, not in a political context.

Since Saddam was the top Iraqi military leader, it would have

been nice if we had gotten him, but only because he was their

top military figure, not because he was their president.

Conclusions

The fundamental point is clear: the United States and its

allies must pursue ballistic missile defenses. Ballistic missile

defenses are the key to new era warfare-to opportunities for

reducing nuclear arsenals and to ensuring the type of

conventional strength that enables the United States to secure

its interests in the future. As far as I am concerned, it is

simply time to get on with it.

63

The Revolution in Military Affairs

Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage,

George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill*

According to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net

Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "a

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a major change in the

nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application

of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes

in military doctrine and operational and organizational

concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of

military operations." Such an RMA is now occurring, and

those who understand it and take advantage of it will enjoy a

decisive advantage on future battlefields .

Military theorists around the world have long noted the

historical discontinuities in the conduct of warfare caused by

the advent of new technologies and weapon systems. The

Soviets called these discontinuities "military-technical

revolutions ." Recently, analysts in the United States have

started calling them RMAs . This change in terminology was

meant to capture the nontechnical dimensions of military,

organizations and operations, the sum of which provide a large

part of overall military capabilities .

The nature of these discontinuities is such that warfare after

the "revolution" is unlike what went on before in profound and

significant ways . Throughout history, there have been a

number of such revolutions. Gunpowder produced an early

military revolution in the Western World, transforming both

land and naval warfare. During the mid-nineteenth century,

industrialization revolutionized warfare through railroads, the

telegraph, the steam engine, rifled guns, and ironclad ships .

More recently, the mechanization of warfare during the

*Robert Kim, Mark Jacobson, John Moyle, and Steven Kenney also assisted in the

preparation of this chapter.

65
aviation, amphibious warfare, and strategic bombing.

In some cases, the changes in technology associated with

these revolutions changed not only transportation,

communication, and warfare but also entire societies as well.

During the transportation revolution, for example, railroads

altered the economies of nations and allowed them to move

military forces farther and faster and sustained them longer.

Moreover, these societal changes created new sets of

operational and strategic targets. We currently characterize

these kinds of revolutions as "social-military revolutions."

To date, the bulk of the intellectual and physical development

associated with the current RMA has focused on new systems

and technologies. What is needed now is a more careful

analysis of the new operational concepts and new

organizations that might best help us realize the full potential

of these new systems and technologies. To reach that level of

analysis, we need to start with an appreciation of the historical

and geostrategic contexts in which the RMA may unfold.

What motivated past changes in the conduct of warfare?

Who might our future competitors be? What will be their

political and military objectives? How might they choose to

organize and equip militarily to achieve those objectives? How

might the conduct of warfare change? The answers to these

questions will assist us in identifying new RMA warfare areas

and, in turn, help identify what new military capabilities the

United States will need.

Before proceeding, however, we must issue a word of

caution. Although we think that we now stand at the start of a

long period in which we may face a RMA, we cannot be certain

about when the transition period might start, how long it

might last, what new competitors might arise, when they will

arise, or what new warfare areas might be developed, not to

mention a host of other key questions. In short, we do not

have an absolute grasp of the scope, pace, and implications of

this possible RMA.

We can make useful observations even at this early stage.

During and immediately after the First World War,

forward-thinking military officers such as Col J.F.C. Fuller of

the British army and Maj Earl Ellis of the US Marine Corps

66
warfare . They defined these concepts decades before the

necessary systems existed and at a time when the political

circumstances of the next war were uncertain.

More recently, science fiction writers have been exploring

future war-fighting capabilities . The novels Starship Troopers

by Robert Heinlein (1957) and Ender's Game by Orson Scott

Card (1977) alluded to military systems that today equate to

artificial intelligence and virtual reality. These future systems

appeared to be pure fantasy at the time, but yesterday's fiction

has, in many instances, become today's reality. It should be

instructive to those of us engaged in looking to the twenty-first

century that military officers and authors were able to look

into the future and picture types of warfare that became real

or today are becoming real.

Achieving analytic progress requires discussion of these

issues with as much definition and certainty as possible in

order to give analysts something concrete to critique and,

thereby, improve . It is our hope that such discussion will

facilitate identifying new ideas and animate a discovery

process that includes war games and simulations over the

course of the next three to five years . It is in this spirit of

discovery that we offer the following portrayal of the unfolding

revolution in military affairs .

Lessons of Past RMAs

RMAs have risen from various sources, with many-but not

all-of them technological. Societal change contributed to a

military revolution during the wars of the French Revolution

and the Napoleonic era, in which the levee en masse allowed

for the creation of larger, national armies.

In the technologically based military revolutions of this

century, different scientific fields have provided the enabling

factor. For example, chemistry and early physics drove many

of the critical advances during World War I . In this war of

gunpowder, the rate at which weapons fired and the ranges

that the projectiles traveled decided the fate of many battles.

67
the mastery of flight to improved radios and the introduction

of radar through the creation of nuclear weapons at the end of

World War II .

The current RMA has as its source what has been called new

physical principles . These principles focus on technologies

such as lasers and particle beams . Current trends indicate

that the next revolution in military affairs may have a

biological source. Some manifestations of these biological

advances may include biosensors, bioelectronics,

nanotechnologies, distributed systems, neural networks, and

performance-enhancing drugs.

New technologies and systems significantly influence the

RMA, although the resulting RMA could take one of a number

of forms. The interwar innovations of armored warfare by the

German army, amphibious warfare by the US Marine Corps,

carrier warfare by the US Navy, and strategic bombing by the

US Army Air Forces have been characterized as "combinedsystem RMAs ." Their revolutionary nature derived from a

collection of military systems put together in new ways to

achieve a revolutionary effect.

A different type of RMA is the "single-system RMA." An

example is the nuclear revolution of the 1940s and 1950s, in

which a single technology, nuclear fission/ fusion, drove the

revolution . Another example of a single-system RMA is the

gunpowder revolution, in which gunpowder transformed land

and naval warfare through the use of siege guns, field artillery,

infantry firearms, and naval artillery.

Evidence suggests that the revolution unfolding today is

neither a combined-system nor a single-system RMA but an

integrated-system RMA. The outlook is for the rapid evolution

of new technologies eventually leading to the development of

several advanced military systems.

These systems, when joined with their accompanying

operational and organizational concepts, will become

integrated systems. In contrast to developments during the

interwar period, this system-of-systems approach will aim to

take advantage of the cumulative effect of employing each of

the new capabilities at the same time.

68
own operating medium-armored warfare on land battlefields,

strategic bombing in the air over homelands, carrier warfare at

sea, and amphibious warfare at the intersection of land and

sea-and only occasionally interacted with the others. In the

current RMA, the integrated employment of all the new

systems will be essential to take advantage of their true value.

Nevertheless, this forecast does not exclude the possibility of

a single-system RMA. To avoid strategic surprise, we must

continue to think about breakthroughs in critical areas such

as information technology, biogenetics, and others .

Unforeseen advances in these areas could bring about a

sudden, significant, and solely owned military advantage to

the country that achieves a breakthrough.

The same holds true for a combined system RMA.

Furthermore, there is also the possibility that the information

revolution may result in far-reaching societal changes, putting

us on the path of a social-military revolution . Such a

revolution holds profound, but somewhat different, implications

for the changing nature of warfare .

It is important to remember that technologies and systems

enable but do not cause military revolutions. Past military

revolutions have been driven by requirements that have

motivated military organizations to innovate in order to

overcome the limitations of existing practice. Such strategic,

operational, and tactical requirements determined whether

technologies were adopted and how they were employed .

Without them, stagnation can prevail, even in states

possessing technologies with revolutionary implications .

An example of this principle is the gunpowder revolution of

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries . In Europe,

gunpowder weapons fundamentally changed the conduct of all

areas of warfare-maneuver warfare, siege warfare, and naval

warfare-on account of the constant competition between rival

states of roughly equal military power. Imperial China

developed gunpowder and firearms a century before Europe

possessed them, but stagnated in all areas . China fell behind

in the gunpowder revolution largely because of its vast

population, which allowed it to overcome any land or sea

threats through sheer weight of numbers.

69
innovations in response to pressing military requirements. In

sixteenth century Japan, where rival warlords strove for

dominance, the rise of firearm-equipped infantry and the use

of volley fire mirrored developments in Europe. Korea in the

1590s responded to the threat from reunified Japan by

developing its "turtle ships," ironclad, cannon-armed galleys

that provided a technological advantage that proved essential

to defeating three successive Japanese invasions .

Another example is the interwar period, in which all of the

major powers possessed the same technologies but only a few

countries created new operations concepts and organizations.

For example, the development of carrier aviation took place in

the United States and Japan for the purpose of fighting major

naval engagements in the Pacific. Carrier aviation withered in

Britain's Royal Navy, whose main tasks were fighting in

confined waters such as the Mediterranean Sea and combating

German commerce raiders on the high seas.

In the case of armored warfare, only the Germans employed

tanks, radio, and airplanes in new ways in 1940 even though all

of the essential technologies had been available since World War

I . This situation was due in part to Germany's unique strategic

problem of being surrounded by enemies. This problem led to an

operational requirement for rapid offensives to defeat enemy

states quickly, and the emphasis on offense dictated tactical

requirements for mobility, firepower, and protection.

Germany thus integrated tanks, infantry, and artillery in the

Panzer division and supplemented them with close air

support . France and Britain, constrained by defensive

strategic and operational concepts on land, did not innovate

and paid the price in May of 1940.

Past RMAs hold another significant lesson for the current

RMA. In past RMAs many of the key systems were already

used in combat or in civilian applications decades before

significant changes occurred in military organizations. For

example, railroads began carrying commerce in the 1830s, but

in the 1860s only the Prussian army under Helmuth von

Moltke, the elder, used them to facilitate intricate mobilization

plans that conferred a significant operational advantage at the

start of a campaign.

70
used in quantity in World War I, but they did not realize their

true potential until the Germans devised new organizational

and operational concepts for them in the 1930s . Likewise, the

implementation of revolutionary operational and organizational concepts in this RMA may require a long time even

though most of the key systems probably are already in

development or have even been used in combat. We need to

start thinking immediately about the shape of warfare in 2020

in order to capitalize on the RMA in a timely fashion.

Future Competitors

If we hope to understand the scope and potential impact of

the RMA, we first must understand our potential future

competitors. The threats and the vulnerabilities of these

competitors will clearly influence how the United States should

exploit the RMA.

We must stress that we are talking about potential military

competitors-not political and economic competitors-although

politics and economics are related factors. Developing and

assessing alternative futures--projecting the nature of future

competitors, their force structures, and modes of operation-is

far from an exact science. Indeed, if the events of the last five

years are any indicator, current approaches at predicting the

future will continue to meet with only marginal success.

While it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess accurately

which nations will become peer competitors in 25 years, it is

possible to imagine one nation, or a combination of nations,

rising to challenge US national security interests . History

provides many examples of potential competitors rapidly

elevating themselves first to regional and then to peer

competitor status. Japan and Germany prior to World War II

are examples of the ability of nations to evolve rapidly up the

competitor scale through willpower and sacrifice . To assume

that we are unlikely to see a peer competitor in the next 25

years is to ignore history.

Given that a peer competitor is likely to emerge, the most

important question is not who the competitor is but the likely

7 1
of assessing the nature of future competition have provided

significant insights into how we view and think about potential

competitors.

Dr Paul Bracken of Yale University, in his article on "The

Military After Next," 1 , characterizes nations as Type A, B, and

C competitors . Type A competitors are peer competitors, able

to compete with the United States on a global basis across a

full range of military capabilities . Type B competitors are

regional competitors, able to compete regionally, and only

across a limited set of military capabilities . Bracken's Type C

competitors are terrorists, low-intensity conflict countries,

drug lords, and the like. We feel this type of competitor is not

really a national security competitor but a political competitor.

It is more useful to think of Type C competitors as being niche

competitors. A niche competitor would be a country that has

chosen to specialize in a specific military capability that

appears to have high leverage against US forces. This type of

characterization seems useful in bounding the range of

possible competitiveness in a military sense.

Dr Stephen Rosen of Harvard University has framed the

debate on future competitors by dividing the world into "zones

of peace" and "zones of turmoil."2 His fundamental division of

the great powers places the industrialized democracies in the

zone of peace with all other countries in the zone of turmoil .

Conflicts will most likely arise among nations in the zone of

turmoil, or between them and countries in the zone of peace. It

is difficult to develop scenarios that lead to wars among

nations in the zone of peace.

So long as the countries remain democratic, Dr Rosen cannot

envision a war between the United States and, for example, a

democratic Japan or Germany. Dr Rosen's analysis reminds

us that it is important to consider political traditions, cultural

norms, economic strength, alliances, and many other factors

as we think about the evolution of competition between states.

Furthermore, states may swing between peace and turmoil,

dramatically change goals and directions, or gain or lose military

capabilities, making our strategic planning even more difficult.

To understand the nature of future competitors and, more

importantly, plan for their potential emergence requires an

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the countries under consideration. By "national character" we

mean what makes them tick-what factors (current and future)

would push them along the path from niche, to regional, to peer

competitor.

Such considerations might include, but are not limited to,

the following:

" Historical context

" Cultural and social beliefs (mores, etc.)

" Demographics (rate of change, age of population)

" Geography (landlocked, access to ports, agriculture)

" Economic development (trade, industrial baseindigenous/other)

" Political system (democratic, autocratic, stability)

" Access to foreign markets and technologies (sunrise/

sunset systems, information technologies and capability)

" Military force structure (disposition, training)

" Nature of alliances (cooperative agreements, traditional/

nontraditional adversaries)

In other words, it is essential that we understand what a nation

or region is to more accurately reflect what it maybecome.

Understanding the national character and proclivities of a

nation is only part of the equation. Equally important is an

appreciation of national, regional, and/or global trends that may

act in synergy with national character to propel a nation to

competitive status. Trends associated with economics, the pace

of technological innovation, the development of military weapon

systems, the growth of new operational and organizational

approaches, and the proliferation and diffusion of military

systems and technologies will all interact with the national

character and daily events of virtually every nation in the world.

While some analysts may view the birth of competitor states

(China or Japan for instance), as being quite predictable, we

should be cautious in ascribing too much certainty to such

predictions . Trends may cause nations to transform in

unanticipated ways, thereby giving rise to a number of surprise

competitors. Nevertheless, evaluating trends in the context of

national character may help to narrow the field of who these

competitor states may be.

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character of potential competitor states/regions, our subsequent

analysis should focus on the three dimensions of the RMA

required for a nation to achieve competitor status. First is the

conscious decision on the part of a state to acquire all or

portions of what might be termed an RMA complex. Second is

the ability to acquire or develop the systems that constitute

RMA-type technologies. Last, and perhaps most important, is

the ability, organizationally and operationally, to adapt

technologies in ways that bring into being the full military

potential of an RMA.

In the analysis of the current RMA, which may take decades

to emerge, analysis of likely competitors will be a long,

arduous, and ongoing process. Today, we could identify a

number of potential candidates as peer competitors (Russia,

Japan, China, Germany, a unified Korea, an Asian coalition,

etc.), but whether they achieve that status remains in question.

An even more interesting result of the analysis may be the

surprises-new candidates, not unlike Japan in 1940, which

have the potential to rise from niche to regional or peer competitor status in the early decades of the twenty-first century.

In either of these eventualities, it is likely that for a period of

time in the future, the United States will be faced with a number

of regional competitors while not being forced to deal with a

true peer competitor. However, historical precedent leads us to

believe in the inevitability that a large peer competitor will

emerge over time. It will be critical for the United States to

understand the nature of the challenges posed by such a peer

long before the competitor achieves rough parity across

important military areas.

Understanding the natures of competitors is especially

important because of their influence on emerging forms of

warfare . Judging from the example of past RMAs, distinct

approaches to harnessing new technologies will surface in

those states seeking to exploit them . During the interwar

period, the Germans, British, and French followed different

directions in the usage of tanks; similarly, the US and British

navies differed in their development of carrier aviation .

The most successful approaches will not necessarily come

from the countries most experienced with the relevant

74
development of tanks and carrier aviation despite having

invented them . Success will most likely come through

favorable matchups between competing doctrines. Obtaining

an advantage over a peer competitor through the RMA will

require understanding likely opponents' tendencies in order to

determine the optimum approach.

New Warfare Areas

We think the current RMA, like the interwar period, will

involve the emergence of multiple new warfare areas . A warfare

area is a form of warfare with unique military objectives and is

characterized by association with particular forces or systems.

Examples of warfare areas that emerged in the interwar period

are armored warfare, carrier warfare, amphibious warfare, and

strategic bombing. We have currently identified four potential

new warfare areas-long-range precision strike, information

warfare, dominating maneuver, and space warfare. Other areas

that we have yet to identify could also develop.

Of the four potential new warfare areas, precision strike is

the most developed conceptually, although even here much

analytic work remains to be done. Much work has been done

in the area of information warfare, yet it remains a poorly

understood concept. Analysis of dominating maneuver and

space warfare has just begun.

The warfare areas that we have identified are likely to

emerge in the long run but will not necessarily be developed

fully in the near future. Doctrinal development is a long and

uncertain process, and military history offers numerous

examples of unexploited warfare areas-concepts intended to

revolutionize warfare that did not come to fruition. Technological limitations, conflicts with prevailing doctrine, or lack

of strategic purpose derailed these developments.

In the late nineteenth century, the Jeune Ecole in France

sought to exploit an emerging weapon, the torpedo, to contest

British sea control with small, cheap torpedo boats for

commerce raiding and coastal defense. Their attempt to create

a new warfare area led to a decade of doctrinal uncertainty in

75
ineffectiveness of the primitive torpedoes and torpedo boats,

the rising influence of Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the

emergence of the Anglo-French entente.

After the Korean War, Gen James Gavin and others in the

US Army sought to create a new form of land warfare using the

helicopter. Seeking greater strategic mobility between theaters

and a "mobility differential" over the battlefield, they envisioned

helicopter-equipped units that could rapidly deploy in a crisis

and would use their superior mobility to their advantage in the

cavalry roles of scouting, pursuit, and delaying actions. They

succeeded in making helicopter aviation a significant part of

the Army, but the Army developed the helicopter as part of a

combined-arms team rather than as the basis for autonomous

units, fielding only one air assault division during and since

the Vietnam War. The vulnerability of helicopters to air

defenses and the predominance of armor and infantry in

existing doctrine each contributed to this result.

Short-term technological and doctrinal barriers will not

diminish the ultimate importance of a new warfare area. There

are past examples of warfare-area concepts that were abortive

in one context but resurfaced in other settings with the

emergence of the right enabling technologies or doctrinal

pressures. The ideas of the Jeune Ecole appeared again in

Germany during the First World War, when practical

submarines were the enabling technology and the need to

strangle British commerce provided the doctrinal pressure.

Similarly, the nascent armored warfare concepts of J .F.C .

Fuller and the Salisbury maneuvers went undeveloped in

Britain but reemerged in the German army. The fact that

concepts discarded by Britain and France provided the basis

for U-boat warfare and the Panzer divisions illustrates that

fundamentally sound concepts will eventually be exploited- if

not by the United States, then by its competitors.

Precision Strike

Precision strike may well be the most thoroughly understood

new warfare area of the next revolution in military affairs . This

is true because the United States has been a leader in the

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1970s. The creation of precision strike capabilities during the

latter stages of the Cold War in fact cast a long technology

shadow and deeply affected Soviet military thought.

The Red Army gave us far more credit than we deserved for

developing the reconnaissance strike complex. It probably saw

tests of parts of systems, such as the Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) "assault breaker" missiles

in the mid-1970s, as indicative of imminent deployment.

Somewhat ironically, the Soviet military may have more fully

comprehended the revolutionary impact that such systems would

have on future battle than did the US military establishment.

Precision strike in the context of the coming RMA is well

beyond its predecessors of follow-on forces attack (FOFA) and

joint precision interdiction, which are its conceptual forebears.

At the time of the development of such precision strike systems

as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)

and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), the idea was

to create a maneuver differential for NATO ground forces.

NATO planned to delay and disrupt the arrival of secondechelon and third-echelon Warsaw Pact armored forces before

they could overwhelm the outnumbered and outgunned NATO

defenders . Such deep strikes would extend the battlefield ; they

would delay in time the advance of the conflict to the nuclear

threshold; that would permit reinforcing forces to arrive from

the continental United States (CONUS). This was planned to

allow for the creation of a conventional counteroffensive force

to turn back the attacking Warsaw Pact armored advance.

The Gulf War demonstrated the potential for such deep

strike systems not only to create a maneuver differential, but

at least potentially to be decisive in themselves. Precision

strike, in the context of the unfolding RMA, is the ability to

locate high-value, time-sensitive fixed and mobile targets; to

destroy them with a high degree of confidence ; and to

accomplish this within operationally and strategically

significant time lines while minimizing collateral damage,

friendly fire casualties, and enemy counterstrikes . In 2020,

precision strike technologies will create the potential to

achieve strategic effects at intercontinental distances.

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dramatic increase of capabilities to strike strategic targets. In

1943 the US Eighth Air Force prosecuted only 50 strategic

targets during the course of the entire year. In the first 24

hours of Desert Storm, the combined air forces prosecuted 150

strategic targets-a thousand-fold increase over 1943 capabilities .

By the year 2020, it is not out of the realm of possibility that

as many as 500 strategically important targets could be struck

in the first minute of the campaign-representing a five

thousand-fold increase over Desert Storm capabilities .

It is envisioned that precision strike will be able to achieve

effects similar to those of nuclear weapons but without the

attendant risk of escalation to intolerable levels of destruction .

When directed against targets comprising the enemy center of

gravity, precision strike might itself prove decisive . For it to do

so, however, requires a much clearer understanding than we

have had in past wars about what constitutes the enemy's

center of gravity and what it takes to affect it .

The precision strike area of warfare presents a significant

challenge to the organizational adaptation of the US military.

These systems achieve decisive impact only if they are

integrated at the operational or strategic level of war. This

means that a single theater or global commander must have

control over the employment of precision strike systems, as

was done during Desert Storm.

A potential problem does arise however in the development

of current precision strike systems, which are jealously

guarded by the individual military services and even by some

DOD-wide agencies . This arrangement tends to lead to the

acquisition of systems that are duplicative rather than

complementary. Notwithstanding the potential benefits to be

derived from having the services compete for the precision

strike mission area, there is a potential danger that in the

current budgetary climate such competition may prove to be

counterproductive .

There is a further potential problem in that even should we

manage to orchestrate a successful joint program management scheme, the architecture that frames the development of

disparate precision strike technologies and systems may not

be structurally coherent. This could result in several separate

78
which have much military utility by themselves. There is a

growing need for a system-of-systems framework to define

precision strike requirements, as well as a need for an

architecture which would drive the development of advanced

technologies and systems applicable to precision strike.

We must begin now to move beyond the service-specific

approach to the employment of precision strike and

experiment with new organizational approaches to employing

these systems on the battlefields of 2020. These systems will

likely be theater-wide or even global, and there will be no

single service able to provide a service-specific core organizational unit to serve as the basis for the commander-in-chiefs

joint task force for precision strike operations. Therefore, new

organizational units may have to be cut out of whole cloth .

This does not imply that massive new commands or new

organizations must be created. In fact, we may need to

consider just the opposite approach. We may need to consider

the power inherent in the new information technologies that

could greatly expand a commander's span of control, allowing

us to eliminate one or more levels of command and to

consequently accelerate the decision-making and command

and control cycle.

The essence of precision strike is the ability to sense the

enemy at operational and strategic depth, recognize his

operational concept and strategic plan, and select and

prioritize attacks on enemy targets of value. All of this is

intended to achieve decisive impact on the outcome of the

campaign . To be most effective those attacks probably should

be synchronized in time and space.

The revolutionary potential of precision strike derives from

the technologies that provided a glimpse of their own potential

during Operation Desert Storm. These and related technologies

enable commanders to have continuous wide-area surveillance

and target acquisition, near-real-time responsiveness, and

highly accurate, long-range weapons at their disposal.

Such technologies by themselves have the potential to change

dramatically the way wars are waged. Integrating precision

strike capabilities with dominating maneuver and information

war may create an especially potent RMA.

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systems must become a reality. For the first time in history,

this responsiveness will allow the striking force to maneuver

fires rather than forces over long ranges, and allow direct and

simultaneous attack on many of the enemy's centers of gravity.

This warfare area is currently being driven by advances in

technology. The key improvements that are now occurring are

in broadening the environmental conditions for wide area

surveillance and precision targeting; security and countermeasures ; data processing and communications ; delivery

platforms ; precision munitions; and positioning/locating

devices. The advances needed to exploit our lead in this warfare

area include continuous situation awareness and improvements in data fusion, mission planning, and battle damage

assessment (BDA) .

At the same time, we need an equal effort in developing new

operational concepts and organizations for the application of

precision strike. As in other new warfare areas, it may be that

the greatest military payoff will come from operational

approaches and organizational adaptation-not from systems.

Information Warfare

Another revolution under way in warfare is that associated

with information systems, their associated capabilities, and

their effects on military organizations and operations . We call

this new warfare area information warfare, which we define as

the struggle between two or more opponents for control of the

information battlespace.

At the national level, information warfare could be viewed as

a new form of strategic warfare, one of the key issues being the

vulnerability of socio-economic systems, and the question is

how to attack the enemy's system while protecting yours. At

the military operational level, information warfare may contribute to major changes in the conduct of warfare; therefore,

one of the key issues is the vulnerability of command, control,

communications, and intelligence systems, and the question is

how to attack the enemy's system while protecting yours.

As we increasingly assimilate information capabilities into

our military structure and focus more and more on

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war-winning strategy, we also change the vulnerabilities of US

forces, and, ultimately of the United States itself. The force

structure that will implement information warfare 25 years

from now may well be different from today's military in more

ways than just its equipment. Moreover, the character of

warfare may change in ways that affect our thinking regarding

intelligence and crisis and wartime decision making.

Some of the changes might include the whole issue of

deciding that a war has begun. It is not clear at this time

whether information warfare measures taken by a potential

adversary at the outset of a war would be readily detectable.

The question of how you know you are at war may be difficult

to resolve in view of the potential ambiguity associated with

information warfare .

Ambiguity and plausible denial are not new phenomena.

But the rapid growth of interconnections manifested already in

communications, banking, and other areas creates vulnerabilities and presents opportunities to do grievous harmquickly, with no warning, and with a minimal "signature ."

Accordingly, the analysis of indications and warning that mark

the outset of warfare must change . To date, insufficient

thought has been applied to this aspect of the character of

future war.

In addition to its inherent ambiguity, information warfare in

2020 also portends a very different set of potential responses

by the United States to an adversary detected acting in a

hostile or potentially hostile fashion. The information warfare

measures that the United States could take might require

quite different policies with regard to rules of engagement than

have previously been contemplated .

This is both good news and bad news . The good news is that

there may be new tools, short of lethal attacks available to

signal an adversary that warfare with the United States would

be a bad idea. The bad news is the inherent ambiguity noted

above . In other words, it might be hard to signal our

intentions . In any case, the point is that much thought must

be given to the examination of threats, requirements for

intelligence, and rules of engagement.

8 1
has always been a feature of warfare, the continental United

States has been somewhat invulnerable to such measures.

One clear implication of warfare in 2020 is that almost any

enemy will try to degrade our information system. The United

States must be prepared for that eventuality. Paradoxically,

although the technology of information systems is becoming

more capable and sophisticated, it is actually harder to secure

the US information infrastructure from attacks .

One potential vulnerability is the fact that information

warfare generates problems at the national level rather than

just for the Department of Defense. Therefore, such problems

will not be solved by creating new military organizations. The

problem goes beyond the armed forces to the entire national

security infrastructure . As the international information

infrastructure grows and elaborates, its reach expands beyond

the control of any single entity or any single nation.

Thus, the infrastructure is beyond the control of those who

use it, and has access points at a myriad of places for others

to enter the system. It is not at all clear, as a result, that

today's military organizational structure (e .g., the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, regional and supporting commanders-in-chief, and

military service departments) is the best way to manage the

complexities of information warfare as it might unfold in 2020 .

Another key organizational deficiency is the lack of a

coherent strategic approach to offensive and defensive

considerations for information warfare . Nowhere in our system

do we bring together and integrate the offensive and defensive

nature of information warfare . Nor is there a single locus for

requirements generation and staking claims in the acquisition

process for information warfare.

The Defense Information Security Agency (DISA) has been

actively pursuing "information assurance" as a part of the

charter to take responsibility for all DOD information systems.

However, DISA is not an operational command.

The question is, will we be able to plan for war in 2020 with

the view that communications channels will be available, with

little concern for the overall architecture or the nature and

characteristics of those channels? It seems clear that

information warfare in 2020 may require operators to have

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these operators to execute effectively strategy and operations.

There are examples of the problems we can anticipate if

such "information awareness" is not part of the force. The first

example concerns the logistics information systems, which are

both elaborate and critical to successful military operations.

Despite their criticality, these systems are generally subject to

less stringent security measures than other military systems.

The shortcoming does not involve just cryptologic security,

although that is an area that lags operational channels. We

could make the system cryptologically secure but still be quite

vulnerable. A potential enemy could significantly disrupt our

operations merely by denying us information-by simply

interfering with logistics transmission links.

A second example is the anticipated problems associated

with the presence of automated systems on the battlefield of

the future. These systems are likely to be considerably more

widespread in 2020 than they are today. The commander who

knows his "human" systems but who does not understand his

"automated" systems will be vulnerable to surprise-possibly

to defeat. Knowing the automated systems entails an

understanding of the software programming "rules."

There are already many autonomous systems available to the

commander to include unmanned air vehicles (UAVs),

unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), smart mines, and

Tomahawk cruise missiles, among others. The commander who

does not understand the details of his logistics information

system, or the programming of his autonomous systems, may

face a significant information warfare vulnerability in 2020.

In dealing with the information revolution that is affecting

the military today, the US military services seem to be engaged

in improving their current communication channels . That is,

they are striving to improve performance elements within the

current organizational structure. They have yet to address the

implications of systems and capabilities that do not fit within

the current structure. This is a fundamental issue . The

military traditionally has viewed information services, including

intelligence and communications, as supporting inputs to the

actual warfare functions of fire, maneuver, strike, and the like.

83
supporting function; it might take a leading role in future

campaigns . This makes it both more important and more

challenging to get the organizational issue right. By 2020, at

least in some militaries, the requirements of the battlefield will

be such that traditional hierarchical command and control

arrangements will be obsolete . In most organizations today,

the decentralization trend is already well established.

Information technology is making distributed systems

commonplace, and "virtual organizations" are growing like

cultures on a petri dish . The rapid rate of growth of these

types of new organizational entities would seem to suggest

strengths that the military would be wise to examine.

Dominating Maneuver

One of the more recently identified potential new warfare

areas is dominating maneuver. Maneuver has always been an

essential element in warfare, but the RMA potentially offers

the ability to conduct maneuver on a global scale, on a

much-compressed time scale, and with greatly reduced forces.

We define dominating maneuver as the positioning of forcesintegrated with precision strike, space warfare, and information

war operations-to attack decisive points, defeat the enemy

center of gravity, and accomplish campaign or war objectives .

While precision strike and information warfare are destroying

enemy assets and disrupting his situational awareness,

dominating maneuver will strike at the enemy center of gravity

to put him in an untenable position, leaving him with no choice

but to accept defeat or accede to the demands placed on him.

War is typically nonlinear, meaning that the smallest effects

can have unpredicted, disproportionate consequences. In

meteorology, nonlinearity is illustrated through the "butterfly

effect"-a butterfly flapping its wings in the southern hemisphere can set off a string of reactions that eventually result in

a violent storm in the northern hemisphere .

In the early nineteenth century, Clausewitz made similar

observations when discussing the formulation of successful

strategy. He wrote that victory comes not through winning

battles or inflicting attrition but through attacking the enemy

84
his army, his capital, his leaders, or his principal ally. In the

course of the twentieth century, it appears that the complexity

of warfare has increased as military forces and their logistical

and political underpinnings have become more complicated.

With increasing complexity, the nonlinear nature of war is

likely to increase. Dominating maneuver seeks to exploit the

increasing complexity and nonlinearity in warfare by striking

directly at the enemy center of gravity in order to disrupt his

cohesion and cause his swift collapse.

Dominating maneuver is distinct from maneuver in several

ways . Maneuver refers to the "employment of forces on the

battlefield through movement in combination with fires, to

achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy in

order to accomplish the mission." 3

Dominating maneuver refers to the positioning of forces, not

necessarily their employment ; they can be positioned

anywhere in a theater, not necessarily on the battlefield . It

goes beyond "combination with fires" by integrating its effects

with the effects from precision strike, space warfare, and

information warfare. Its ultimate purpose is directly to achieve

campaign and war objectives, transcending the role of

ordinary maneuver.

Dominating maneuver does not require superiority at all

points in the battlespace or imply domination of the entire

maneuver. By 2020 our competitors could well challenge our

national interests in regions where they enjoy the advantage of

close proximity, and we may have neither a lengthy buildup

period to marshal our forces nor access to a continental

infrastructure to support our forces in the theater.

Under these circumstances, we will have to fight using the

continental United States as our principal base of operations,

making the maneuver battlespace orders of magnitude larger

than it was in Desert Storm . Dominating maneuver could

allow ground forces to operate successfully in situations where

they cannot dominate the entire battlespace . The concept has

a number of other implications for operations, organization,

and technologies as well.

First of all, dominating maneuver will require new operational

concepts that take into account the decisive importance of

85
sequential . It will be essential to attain operational and

strategic objectives through simultaneous information warfare,

space warfare, precision strike, and maneuvers against the

enemy's critical points rather than through a series of pitched

battles against enemy forces.

Further evolution of the Army's airland operations or the

Marine Corps's operational maneuver from the sea could lead

to such a concept. On the other hand, entirely new concepts

may be required.

The German invasion of Norway in April 1940 was a campaign

waged successfully in a way analogous to dominating

maneuver, although on a smaller scale . A single airborne

maneuver into Oslo on April 9, 1940, induced the surrender of

the city's garrison by creating the perception that their cause

was hopeless. Fighting continued on the fringes of Norway for

six weeks, but the airborne maneuver led directly to decisive

results . The maneuver gave the German commander a time

advantage during which he could reinforce faster than the

Norwegians could mobilize or the Allies could deploy .

Moreover, the surrender of the Oslo garrison precipitated the

capitulation of the Norwegian monarchy and forced the Allied

decision not to become heavily engaged on the Scandinavian

peninsula.

The Inchon landing during the Korean War was another

operation that illustrates the principles underlying dominating

maneuver. Gen Douglas MacArthur's plan to capture Seoul

through an amphibious landing at Inchon struck at one of the

critical vulnerabilities of the North Korean forces-their

dependence on the transportation bottleneck at Seoul . Instead

of gradually rolling the North Koreans back from Pusan,

MacArthur planned to cut them off and put them into an

extremely vulnerable position . The landing paralyzed the

already overstretched North Korean forces, and they broke into

disorganized fragments that retreated in disarray, incapable of

serious resistance.

To execute dominating maneuver in 2020, the United States

will have to develop new means for the movement of ground

forces . The development of forms of mobility not possessed by

the enemy could help generate maneuver dominance. More

86
give a decisive advantage, as the Germans demonstrated in

May 1940. The Germans generated maneuver dominance on

the ground by employing combined-arms units that could

mass combat power quickly, supporting them with fastmoving "aerial artillery" in the form of close air support,

stressing aggressiveness, developing a faster command and

control system to establish C2 dominance, and employing air

interdiction to degrade Allied mobility.

The revolutionary period that we are currently entering will

have its own forms of maneuver that will require new

technologies, new operational concepts, and new organizations .

Along with new forms of mobility, the United States will require

advances in logistical support to maintain the effectiveness of

forces engaged in dominating maneuver. The need to operate

far from existing bases, with little time for logistical buildups

and with insecure lines of communications, will compel

changes in the supply and support of ground forces.

The dangers of failure in this area are exemplified by the

German campaign in the Soviet Union in 1941 . In this

campaign, the Germans quickly established complete

maneuver dominance over the Soviets, whose decimated air

force and poorly organized ground forces could not stop the

Germans' fast-moving armored columns.

The Germans intended to use their maneuver dominance

first to attrit the Red Army and then to seize Moscow, whose

capture would sever the Soviets' transportation network and

paralyze their political apparatus. Despite their maneuver

dominance, the Germans failed-largely because of their

logistics, which were inadequate to the needs of supporting

far-flung advances over the vast distances of the Soviet Union.

Future attempts at dominating maneuver may similarly come

to grief as a result of shortcomings in logistics .

The dual imperatives of mobility and logistics may create the

need for smaller forces and new transportation technologies.

The current Strategic Mobility Study has as its objective the

intercontinental deployment of a heavy brigade in 15 days and

a heavy corps in 75 days. In the future, the United States may

require the ability to move a corps-equivalent force across the

oceans in seven days or less.

87
new transportation technology such as fast sea transports

capable of 100 knots or more, the national aerospace plane,

and supersonic transports ; through organizational changes

creating smaller units with useful combat power that could

deploy faster or be forward-deployed on naval platforms; or

through ways not yet conceived.

The organization and tactics of such ground forces are

difficult to visualize today. Some have suggested that twentyfirst century variants of the so-called Hutier tactic developed

by the Germans in World War I-Stingray or infestation tacticswould be useful. Such tactics would combine deception and

bombardment with infiltration and attacks against strong

points . The ground forces may be a small number of Army

infantrymen, marines, or special operations forces, delivered

deep in enemy territory by air and equipped with

high-technology linkages to space-based or atmospheric strike

systems, in effect acting as part of a sensor-shooter network.

The United States may need new technologies if it employs

such tactics and seeks to maintain the lead that its forces

possess in close combat . As advanced sensors and

conventional weapons technologies proliferate and provide

greater stand-off ranges for enemy forces, the United States

should concentrate on achieving capabilities that will allow it

to leap ahead of these developments . We should begin now to

apply low-observability techniques to maneuver systems. We

need to develop advanced propulsion technologies to give our

maneuver systems greater speed, range, and agility. We also

need new means to enhance the lethality of our munitions and

the protective characteristics of our materials and systems.

Progress in these conceptual and technological areas will

enable maneuver to play a significant role in the RMA. It is

possible that precision strike and information warfare will

make maneuver unnecessary in certain situations or that

enemy progress in these areas will make maneuver difficult.

Nevertheless, maneuver will be essential against an enemy

unwilling to concede defeat unless the United States defeats

centers of gravity that cannot be attacked without maneuver

forces. Dominating maneuver may provide the coup de grace

in future wars, and in other situations may serve as the

88
precision strike operations.

Space Warfare

We define space warfare, the fourth future warfare area of

importance, as the exploitation of the space environment to

conduct full-spectrum, near-real-time, global military

operations. It includes facets of the other three warfare areas

but has the potential to become a qualitatively distinct warfare

area in its own right.

The US military's increasing reliance on support from

space-based systems for its everyday operations and especially

during times of conflict has highlighted the importance of

space operations. However, space assets could provide more

than support for the terrestrial war fighter in the future. The

space environment offers the possibility of conducting

worldwide military operations in a greatly reduced time frame.

The evolution of space operations is comparable to the

development of air warfare, which similarly exploited inherent

advantages in altitude and speed . Aircraft filled an essential

role in supporting the ground and naval forces in the First

World War through observation, antiobservation, ground

attack, and communications . Between the wars, larger aircraft

came into service in the form of civil and military transport, a

capability that was greatly expanded during World War II .

Moreover, between the world wars the United States and

Great Britain developed airpower as a means of leapfrogging

conventional ground and naval battles to enable direct strikes

on the enemy's ability to wage war. Although this theory of

strategic bombing met with limited success in the Second

World War, the concept culminated in the development of the

intercontinental nuclear deterrent after the Second World War.

Space operations, like air operations in the First World War,

currently provide support essential for the successful operations

of terrestrial forces. Satellites enable near-real-time, world

wide communications, sensing, timing, and navigation . These

capabilities, analogous to the roles of the observation balloons

and aircraft of the First World War, may make possible

89
g

precision strike architecture .

An effective antisatellite (ASAT) capability could lead to the

ability to achieve aerospace control or superiority in order to

deny an opponent the ability to operate in or from space . An

ASAT system would follow in the footsteps of the first fighter

aircraft that dueled for control of the air over the trenches of

the First World War and is a logical extension of the current

role of air superiority fighters and developing theater air

defense systems .

However, space operations will also greatly differ from air

operations. First, the "geography" of space is fundamentally

different from that of the earth's atmosphere. Orbital mechanics

require operating speeds (17,000 miles per hour) that far

surpass those currently achievable in the atmosphere.

Thus, if properly placed and employed, space assets could

perform missions in much less time than state-of-the-art

aircraft. One possible mission is to use space forces to project

power to directly achieve national objectives (operational or

strategic) in a particular theater. Space strike systems based

on satellites or on transatmospheric vehicles could enable

precision strikes whose quantitative advantage in speed would

result in a qualitative difference in capability.

Although currently limited, future capabilities in space

transport may also make possible the movement of critical

forces and equipment from CONUS to a theater in time frames

an order of magnitude faster than with current sea and air

transport . Thus, space operations may provide important

advantages in time-critical situations.

Further, the altitude advantages provided by space greatly

improve surveillance and reconnaissance coverage of the earth

and, as a result, could offer the means to command and

control operations in theaters where distance and terrain

complicate or confound terrestrially based systems .

Space, however, does have limiting factors that could

constrain its military use . First, space is not amenable to

human life, thus limiting the manned presence in future space

operations . As a result, most of the improvements in future

space operations will most likely come through unmanned

technologies. In addition, the speeds associated with space

90
using current technologies and energy sources greatly limit

the flexibility of spacecraft in orbit.

Therefore, sizable technical hurdles have to be overcome

before space-based strike, antisatellite systems, spacelift, and

space transport become militarily usable capabilities . Systems

that could enable future space operations might include

trans-atmospheric vehicles (TAVs), single-stage-to-orbit

(SSTO) launch vehicles, space-based directed-energy weapons

(DEW) or kinetic energy weapons (KEW), space-based ballistic

missile defense (BAD), satellite defense systems, small satellites,

and both space-based and ground-based distributed networks to

reduce the vulnerability of space capabilities .

However, new technologies such as new materials to reduce

weight, more heat-resistant and stress-resistant materials, and

sources of energy more powerful and efficient than chemical

reactions may be needed to make these systems truly effective .

Space warfare will likely become its own warfare area only

when there is need to conduct military operations in space to

obtain solely space-related goals (not missions that are

conducted to support earth-based operations). For example, if

the United States becomes dependent on resources unique to

space (such as He3 on the moon), it may be forced to develop

technologies and operational concepts to support/defend

space-based industries, command and control nodes, or

colonies that are entirely non-earth dependent . In such

situations, space operations would be altogether removed from

any congruence with traditional air operations and would

undoubtedly become a distinct warfare area.

Implications: Dominant Battlespace Awareness

Though our understanding of the unfolding RMA and its

potentially new warfare areas is still evolving, several possible

implications have begun to come into focus. One of our

working hypotheses is that the truly revolutionary effects will

come from the combination of two or more new warfare areas .

For example, some combination of space and information

warfare may provide certain advantages heretofore impossible

to generate . As a result, the United States may be able to

9 1
gy y

both significantly degrading his information flow and

enhancing ours, thereby gaining a potential step-function

increase in our information capabilities.

The application of such a system of systems may generate

significantly greater capabilities in times of conflict . One

potential result may be the ability to generate dominant

battlespace awareness (DBA) over a particular enemy, in a

particular conflict. This awareness would not magically

provide perfect intelligence, but would allow the United States

to detect all observable phenomenology while limiting the

enemy's knowledge .

This information would translate into the ability to know

force locations and characteristics (including distinguishing

between targets and decoys and among target types) at all

times . Furthermore, the DBA architecture could include

mechanisms for disseminating this data directly to the

appropriate strike systems and conducting constant battle

damage assessments (BDA).

An advantage such as DBA would probably require a large

percentage of the total US sensing, analysis, and data transmission assets. As a result, to generate dominant battlespace

awareness for a given conflict would require borrowing from both

national assets and those assets dedicated to other theaters.

In the collection arena, the constant monitoring required may

increasingly emphasize airborne and terrestrial sensors rather

than space-based platforms . We may well see stealthy

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), flying at very high altitudes,

conducting a greater share of the collection duties than do

manned aircraft.

Advancements in information processing should enable

faster analysis of the data, while dissemination can be directly

linked to the shooters. Efficiency in military strike operations

should be enhanced by such an across-the-board

improvement in our reconnaissance-strike architecture.

Having established the possibility of generating DBA, what

might its implications be in a future conflict with a regional

competitor? The enemy's goal might be to achieve a breakthrough quickly and push the US forces out of the country

before they could be reinforced. This would be especially true if

92
consequences. The United States would presumably desire to

stop the attack as soon as possible, with as few losses as

possible. Roughly 24 hours of warning before the launch of a

standing-start attack would improve the prospect of the United

States generating battlespace awareness.

A capability such as DBA could affect both the systems the

United States fields and the operational concepts designed to

employ them in such a conflict. One likely implication may be

that a force with a greater number of long-range strike

systems, tied to DBA, would be far more lethal in attriting

enemy forces than would traditional forces. If the value of DBA

can be shared throughout the force, then the entire time line

of the conflict from locating targets, determining the best time

to strike them (e.g., when they are on the move), striking them,

and then assessing the success of the attack could eventually

become seamless . Thus, the efficiency of US precision strike

campaigns could increase substantially as current problems

such as prompt targeting, selection of the proper munitions,

reallocation of assets, and near-real-time BDAbegin to dissipate.

On the other hand, a force designed to maximize the impact

of DBA might exacerbate some difficulties faced by today's

forces. First, the volume of targets made available through

DBA could simply overwhelm US strike capabilities . A force

heavily weighted toward long-range precision-strike weapons

may not completely overcome this problem but may still

provide an order-of-magnitude increase in the force's lethality .

Second, such a fire-intensive force will require a very large

inventory of munitions. Both of these problems, last seen in

the Gulf War, may not go away.

As noted above, dominant battlespace awareness may also

provide benefits that extend beyond simply increasing the

effectiveness of long-range strikes. For example, another force

structure implication of DBA may be the ability to truly do

more with less . If DBA can tell us where the main axis of

attack is coming, we may be able to use smaller forces to blunt

the attack because they will be covered more effectively by fire

support, and the commander will have the ability to commit

reserves precisely where and when they are needed. This could

lead to much improved loss/exchange ratios and the opportunity

93
earlier in a conflict.

Similarly, far lighter forces could also be used for dominating

maneuvers, either airmobile or amphibious, with the goal of

dislodging the enemy and allowing DBA-cued strikes to target

them more easily on the move . These maneuvers can also be

far less risky because the planners can select landing

objectives they know to be free of enemy forces . Finally, a

smaller force may be capable of exploiting a successful defense

with a counteroffensive far sooner than today because we

could identify the path of least resistance and focus our fire

support and commit our reserves more precisely and in a more

timely manner.

At the same time, we would have to recognize that there

would be several categories of targets where DBA would not

have a large impact. One example may be a country with large

inventories of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons .

Use of these weapons may take the form of limited chemical

attacks on ports and airbases or could even include nuclear

attacks against US forces. Almost certainly, DBA will not help

the United States gauge the enemy's intentions vis-a-vis NBC

use. Furthermore, the deep underground targets that typically

house NBC systems and infrastructure would be impossible

for DBA to penetrate .

Another potential area in which DBA's impact may be limited

is close battle. Even after a highly successful attrition campaign,

US forces may inevitably run into residual enemy forces on the

ground and the resulting battle may be too confined for

DBA-cued fires to be of much utility. Nevertheless, if the above

implications are borne out, DBA could allow the United States

to defeat an enemy quicker and with fewer losses than is

currently possible .

Conclusions

This description of the revolution in military affairs is

neither definitive nor conclusive. The discussion is intended

primarily to stimulate thinking-thinking in unique and more

meaningful ways about how warfare in the twenty-first

94
equal importance, evaluating what we should be doing now to

prepare ourselves for that eventuality.

We expect that the true revolutionary impact of future changes

in the conduct of warfare will come from the intersection of

precision strike, information warfare, dominating maneuver,

and space warfare. Military operations in all four warfare areas

will be integrated into an overall operational plan that will be

decisive in terms of the course-if not the outcome-of the war.

Precision strike will hold an enemy at a distance and blind

and immobilize him by destroying operationally and

strategically crucial, time-urgent targets. Information warfare

will deny an enemy critical knowledge of his own-as well as

our-forces and turn his "fog of war" into a wall of ignorance.

Dominating maneuver will deploy the right forces at the right

time and place to cause the enemy's psychological collapse

and complete capitulation. Space warfare will enable the

United States to project force at dramatically increased speeds in

response to contingencies while denying the enemy the ability to

do the same. At least that is the overall concept. What we need to

do now is develop the details of how we can conduct such warfare

against various categories of competitors.

Figure 1 . Elements of the Present RMA

95
military is going to compete successfully on the battlefields of

2020 . First, there must be a change in outlook-a change in

the way we think about preparing for the future. The military

must nurture an attitude that supports free thinking, that

accepts honest mistakes, that encourages experimentation, that

rewards risk takers, and that makes provisions for starting over.

As an organization, the military must break out of the box, must

consider alternative futures, must think the unthinkable, and

must let go of the conventional modes of operation.

Why are these changes so important? What may be the

consequences if we fail to change? First, failure to change will

ensure that we will not gain the most that we possibly could

from the unfolding RMA. Failure to change will make it

difficult for our military to make the best possible use of the

new emerging technologies.

Failure to think imaginatively about the future may result in

a failure to maintain the military advantages our forces so

clearly demonstrated during the Gulf War. Approaches that

are not innovative may prove adequate in the short term, but

in the long run they may squander potential advantages

needed against future competitors. We must alter our thinking

and our approaches to planning if we are to be prepared for

either the emergence of a large peer RMA competitor or the

surprise of a true niche competitor.

To be successful and lasting, the change must come from

the top-from leadership. The impetus for change must flow

through the entire organization, especially through the

education system. The required changes cannot occur without

the support and encouragement of leadership and the

enthusiasm and cooperation of the entire organization.

To be successful, we need to develop a broad strategy-a

strategy robust enough to encompass and cope with the

massive uncertainty we face. We need to be clear (if not always

explicit) about our goals, vis-a-vis our allies as well as our

competitors . We need to think through what we would like the

future to look like and develop a strategy for shaping it to that end.

None of this will be easy. But a concerted, sustained, and

focused effort by the Defense Department could pay dividends

in the decades to come in ways as yet unforeseen .

96
1 . Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," Washington Quarterly, 16, no.

4 (Autumn 1993) 157-174.

2. Stephen Peter Rosen, Briefing on Future Competitors, US Army

Roundtable Conference on the Revolution in Military Affairs, HQ US Army

TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 27 September 1993 .

3 . Department of Defense Directory of Military and Associated Terms,

1 December 1989, 218. See also, JCS Pub 1-02.

p

and Strategy Issues

Strategy is the art and science of translating national security

objectives into practical military plans and operations. Strategy

formulation in an age of revolution in affairs is especially

challenging. Our two strategy essays by two premier military

thinkers, Col John Warden and Col Richard Szafranski, debate

the issue of just how innovative strategy formulation must be in

the midst of a military revolution. Col Warden argues that "war

in the twenty-first century will be significantly different for the

United States from anything encountered before the Gulf War."

However, Col Szafranski contends that "there may not be really

much that is revolutionary in contemporary notions of parallel

war and hyperwar."

Col Warden believes that twenty-first century strategy will

have to ensure great precision : high casualties will not be

politically tolerable; collateral damage must be minimized;

nonlethal weapons will have wide application; and manipulation

of information will be critical. Strategy will have to concentrate

on an enemy's entire system of organization and activity, not

simply its armed forces .

Using the five-ring analogy, Col Warden proposes that strategy

should target an adversary's leadership, energy or resources,

infrastructure, population, and armed forces. This would make

airpower the dominant instrument of such new era warfare.

Simultaneously attacking these essential components rather

than concentrating solely on enemy armed forces is the essence

of Warden's strategy. Warden believes that the five-ring analysis

gives us a good picture of what to strike, and that we must view

"the enemy as a system, not an independent mass of tanks,

aircraft, or dope pushers." Warden's goal is "to make the cost

political, economic, and military-to the enemy higher than he is

willing to pay, or to impose strategic or operational paralysis on

him so that he would become incapable of acting."

Col Szafranski, however, questions whether proposals like

Col Warden's aiming at the "simultaneous reduction of the

enemy systems overall energy level, so that the organic system

goes into shock" are really new. Is attacking the various centers

99
theory of war? Szafranski argues that "simultaneous and

integrated attacks have long been the goal of combined arms.

Attacks on the leader and leadership are not new goals of

warfare, whether the enemy was viewed as a system, or not, in

the past." Col Szafranski adds that the nuclear attack single

integrated operations plan (SIOP), long used by the US Air Force

Strategic Air Command, "promoted and planned for parallel war

and hyperwar long before 'the five rings' came into vogue ."

While Col Warden's essay implies that the five-rings strategy

can work against very large states like China, or versus almost

any adversary, Col Szafranski limits its utility to smaller

industrialized states and is dubious regarding utility against

terrorist or insurgent organizations. "Worse," writes Szafranski,

"airpower cannot make the decisive and dominant contribution

to [counterterrorism and counter-insurgency] much to the

chagrin ofairpower advocates."

Col Warden was a key planner and organizer of the allied air

campaign that gave the Coalition air superiority over Saddam

Hussein's air force in the 1991 Gulf War. Parallel war and

hyperwar did shock and paralyze the Iraqi state and its

military forces . Warden's essay suggests that this same

parallel war and hyperwar approach, emphasizing airpower as

the key to rapid and complete victory, can and should be

applied in future conflicts in the twenty-first century.

However, Col Szafranski argues that this theory of fighting

wars, and the central role assigned to airpower in it, does not

apply to all kinds of conflicts. Szafranski contends that we still

have not found a theory of airpower and air strategy that

applies universally. Indeed, this leads to the question of

whether or not one air doctrine and military strategy for all

contingencies can be effective across the entire spectrum of

types of conflicts and types of adversaries that the United

States and its allies may confront in the future . Perhaps,

instead, there should be a search for multiple air doctrines for

various alternative types of conflicts and enemies .

The reader can decide for himself or herself what is new or

different in Col Warden's "air theory for the twenty-first century,"

and whether the same strategy will work across the spectrum

of conflicts. What both Col Warden and Col Szafranski do

100
warfighting assets-whether military or civilian, whether

physical or psychological-is important for strategy success in

twenty-first century warfare.

Air Theory for the

Twenty-first Century

Col John A. Warden III, USAF

War in the twenty-first century will be significantly different

for the United States from anything encountered before the

Gulf War. American wars will be increasingly precise ;

imprecision will be too expensive physically and politically to

condone. Our political leaders and our citizenry will insist that

we hit only what we are shooting at and that we shoot the

right thing. Increased use of precision weapons will mean far

less dependence on the multitudes of people or machines

needed in the past to make up for inaccuracy in weapons.

Precision will come to suggest not only that a weapon strike

exactly where it is aimed, but also that the weapons be precise

in destroying or affecting only what is supposed to be affected.

Standoff and indirect-fire precision weapons will become

available to many others, which will make massing of large

numbers in the open suicidal and the safety of deploying

sea-based or land-based aircraft close to a combat arca

problematic.

We might hope that more accurate weapons would drive

potential enemy leaders to be less enamored of achieving their

political objectives with force; if we are very lucky, perhaps the

world will move in this direction. Of at least equal likelihood,

however, states and other entities will turn to other forms of

warfare---such as attacks on enemy strategic centers of gravity.

These attacks may be via missiles, space, or unconventional

means, but all will recognize that they must achieve their

objective before the United States chooses to involve itself.

This, in turn, will increase the premium on American ability to

move within hours to any point on the globe without reliance

on en route bases.

The advent of nonlethal weapons technology will expand our

options over the full spectrum of war. These new weapons will

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and internal combustion engines, to name but a few potential

targets . And of greatest interest, they will accomplish their

ends without dependence on big explosions that destroy more

property than necessary and that cause unplanned human

casualties. Can these weapons replace traditional lethal tools? In

theory they can, as long as we accept the idea that war is fought

to make the enemy do your will. What we will surely find,

however, is that these weapons give us operational concepts and

opportunities well beyond what would be possible if we merely

substitute them for conventional weapons.

The United States can achieve virtually all military objectives

without recourse to weapons of mass destruction. Conversely,

other states, unable to afford the hyperwar arsenal now the

exclusive property of the United States, will at least

experiment with them. The challenge for America is to decide if

it wants to negate these weapons without replying or

preempting in kind . Accompanying this question is the

question of nuclear deterrence in a significantly changed

world. Although deterrence will certainly be greatly different

from our cold war conception of it, does it lose its utility in all

situations? How should US nuclear forces be maintained? This

entire matter deserves serious thought, soon.

Information will become a prominent, if not predominant,

part of war to the extent that whole wars may well revolve

around seizing or manipulating the enemy's datasphere . 1

Furthermore, it may be important in some instances to furnish

the enemy with accurate information . This concept is

discussed later in this chapter.

The world is currently experiencing what may be the most

revolutionary period in all of human existence with major

revolutions taking place simultaneously in geopolitics,

production, technology, and military affairs . The pace of

change is accelerating and shows no sign of letting up. If we

are to succeed in protecting our interests in this environment,

we must spend more time than ever in our past thinking about

war and developing new employment concepts . Attrition

warfare belongs to another age, and the days when wars could

be won by sheer bravery and perseverance are gone. Victory

will go to those who think through the problem and capitalize

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laying the intellectual framework for future air operations.

All military operations, including air operations, should be

consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment. In World War II the United States and her Allies imposed

widespread destruction and civilian casualties on Japan and

Germany; prior to the Gulf War, a new political climate meant

that a proposal to impose similar damage on Iraq would have

met overwhelming opposition from American and coalition

political leaders. As late as the Vietnam War the general

inaccuracy of weapons required large numbers of men to

expose themselves to hostile fire in order to launch enough

weapons to have some effect on the enemy; now, the new

physical reality of accurate weapons means that few men need

be or should be exposed.

Military operations must be conducted so as to give

reasonable probability of accomplishing desired political goals

at an acceptable price. Indeed, before one can develop or adopt

a concept of operations, an understanding of war and political

objectives is imperative.

For war to make any sense, it must be conducted for some

reason. The reason may not be very good or seem to make much

sense, but with remarkably few exceptions, most rulers who

have gone to war have done so with the objective of achieving

something-perhaps additional territory, a halt to offensive

enemy operations, avenging an insult, or forcing a religious

conversion. Very few have gone to war to amuse themselves with

no concern for the outcome or desire for anything other than the

opportunity to have a good donnybrook.

This is not to say, however, that all those who have gone to

war have done so with a clear idea of their objective and what

it would take to achieve it. Indeed, failure to define ends and

means clearly has led to innumerable disasters for attacker

and attacked alike. First rule : if you are going to war, know

why you are going. Corollary to the first rule: have some

understanding of what your enemy wants out of the war and

the price each of you is willing to pay. Remember: war is not

quintessentially about fighting and killing; rather, it is about

getting something that the opponent is not inclined to hand

over. Still another way to express this idea is this: war is all

105
when he doesn't want to do it-and then preventing him from

taking an alternative approach which you would also find

unacceptable .

There are a variety of ways to make an enemy do what you

want him to do. In simple terms, however, there are but three:

make it too expensive for the enemy to resist, with "expensive"

understood in political, economic, and military terms; physically

prevent an enemy from doing something by imposing strategic or

operational paralysis on him; or destroy him absolutely.

The last of these options is rare in history, difficult to execute,

fraught with moral concerns, and normally not very useful

because of all the unintended consequences it engenders. We

will pass over it and concentrate on the first two.

When we talk about making something so costly for an

enemy that he decides to accept our position, we are talking

about something very difficult to define or predict precisely.

After all, human organizations typically react in an infinite

number of ways to similar stimuli. The difficulty of defining or

predicting, however, does not suggest that it is a hopeless

task. Imprecise, yes; hopeless, no.

We all know from our experience that we regularly make

decisions whether or not to do something. We don't go on a

trip if it costs more money than we are ready to pay; we don't

go mountain climbing if we fear the cost of falling; and we

don't drive above the speed limit if the probability of a ticket

seems high, and so on. Enemies, whether they be states,

criminal organizations, or individuals, all do the same thing;

they almost always act or don't act based on some kind of

cost-benefit ratio. The enemy may not assess a situation the

way we do, and we may disagree with his assessment, but

assessments are part and parcel of every decision. From an

airpower standpoint, it is our job to determine what price

(negative or positive) it will take to induce an enemy to accept

our conditions. To do so, however, we need to understand how

our enemies are organized. One might object that understanding

how our enemies are organized is an impossible task, especially

if we don't know in advance who they are. Fortunately, this is

not the case ; as we shall see, every life-based system is

organized about the same way. Only the details vary.

106
cartel, or an electric company, every organization follows the

same organizational scheme. This is very important to us as

military planners because it allows us to develop general

concepts not dependent on a specific enemy. Likewise, as we

understand how our enemies are organized, we can easily

move on to the concept of centers of gravity. Understanding

centers of gravity then allows us to make reasonable guesses

as to how to create costs which may lead the enemy to accept

our demands . If the enemy does not respond to imposed costs,

then this same understanding of organization and centers of

gravity shows us how to impose operational or strategic

paralysis on our enemy so, he becomes incapable of opposing

us. Let's start with the basics of organization (table 1) .

Table 1

SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES

As can be seen from the preceding table, a wide variety of

systems ranging from an individual to an electric company are

organized with remarkable similarity. This organizing scheme

is sufficiently widespread to make it an acceptable starting

place for working out most military or business problems. It

helps us put into effect injunctions from ancient Greek and

107

Electric

Body State Drug Cartel Company

Leader Brain Government Leader Central Control

-eyes -communication -communication

-nerves -security -security

Organic Food/oxygen Energy Coca source Input (heat,

Essential -conversion via (electricity, oil, plus conversion hydro)

vital organs food), money Output

(electricity)

Infrastructure Vessels, bones, Roads, airfields, Roads, airways, Transmission

muscles factories sea lanes lines

Population Cells People Growers, Workers

distributors,

processors

Fighting Leukocytes Military, police, Street soldiers Repairmen

Mechanism firemen
to simplifying the "knowing" process, this organizational

scheme gives us an easy way to categorize information, which we

must do if we are to make real decisions. For practical purposes,

the world contains an infinite amount of information which by

definition cannot be totally correlated. Filters of some sort are a

necessity; this systems approach provides an easy way to

categorize information and to understand the relative importance

of any particular bit.

Our primary interest is not in building a theory of organizaion; rather, it is to derive an understanding of what we might

need to impose an intolerable cost or strategic or operational

paralysis on an enemy. To grasp the essence of this problem, it

helps to rearrange our table in the form of five rings (fig. 2) .

Rearranging the tabular information into the five rings

diagram gives us several key insights. First, it shows us that

we are dealing with an interdependent system. That is, each ring

has a relationship with all of the others and all play some role.

Seeing the enemy as a system gives us enormous advantages

over those who see him merely as an army or air force, or worse

yet, as some quantity of tanks or airplanes or ships or drug

pushers without ever understanding what it is that allows these

tanks or ships to operate and for what purpose .

Figure 2. System Model.

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each entity contained within a given ring. For example, the head

of a drug cartel (the leadership ring) has the power to change the

cartel considerably whereas the street soldier (in the fielded

military forces ring) assigned the job of protecting a pusher in a

back alley can have virtually no effect on the cartel as a whole.

Third, it portrays rather graphically an ancient truth about

war: our objective is always to convince the enemy to do what

we want him to do. The person or entity with the power to

agree to change is the leader in the middle. Thus, directly or

indirectly, all of our energies in war should be focused on

changing the mind of the leadership.

Fourth, our rings clearly show that the military is a shield or

spear for the whole system, not the essence of the system.

Given a choice, even in something so simple as personal

combat, we certainly wouldn't make destruction of our enemy's

shield our end game. Contrary to Clausewitz, destruction of the

enemy military is not the essence of war, the essence of war is

convincing the enemy to accept your position, and fighting his

military forces is at best a means to an end and at worst a total

waste of time and energy.

Fifth, and last, the rings give us the concept of working from

the inside to the outside as opposed to the converse .

Understanding this concept is essential to taking a strategic

rather than a tactical approach to winning wars.

In using the rings to develop war ideas, it is imperative to

start with the largest identifiable system. That is, if the

immediate problem is reversing the effects of an invasion, one

would start the analysis with the largest possible look at the

system description of the invading country. An example : when

the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, Gen Norman Schwarzkopf quickly

grasped the idea that his problem was first with Iraq as a state

and only secondarily with Iraq's military forces within Kuwait

itself. At some point, however, we wanted to understand

details about Iraq's army in Kuwait. Not surprisingly, we found

that it was organized on the five-ring principle and insofar as

our objective with respect to that army was something other

than pure destruction, five-ring analysis gave us a good

picture of what to strike. Had we so desired, we could have

continued our analysis down to the level of an individual

109
country. From a diagraming standpoint, then, we start out

with the big picture of the strategic entity. 2

When we want more information, we pull out subsystems

like electrical power under system essentials and show it as a

five-ring system . We may have to make several more five-ring

models to show successively lower electrical subsystems. We

continue the process until we have sufficient understanding

and information to act. Note that with this approach, we have

little need for the infinite amount of information theoretically

available on a strategic entity like a state . Instead, we can

identify very quickly what we don't know and concentrate our

information search on relevant data.

For the mathematically inclined, it will be clear that we are

describing a process of differentiation as opposed to integration. In a complex world, a top-down, differentiation approach

is a necessity. Important to note, however, is that virtually all

our military training (and business training) starts us at the

lowest possible level and asks us to work our way up. Thus,

we learn a tactical approach to the world. However, when we

want to think not about fighting wars but about winning them,

we must take a strategic and operational-or top-downapproach if we are to succeed.

So far, we have not talked explicitly about centers of gravity,

but we have derived them by showing how we and our enemies

are organized. Centers of gravity are primarily organizational

concepts. Which ones are most important becomes clear when

we decide what effect we want to produce on the enemy in

order to induce him to accept our position. Which ones to

attack becomes a matter of our capability.

Let us review key concepts discussed to this point. First, the

object of war is to induce the enemy to do your bidding.

Second, it is the leadership of the enemy that decides to accommodate you. Third, engagement of the enemy military may

be a means to an end, but the engagement is never an end in

itself and should be avoided under most circumstances .

Fourth, every life-form-based system is organized similarly: a

leadership function to direct it, a system-essential function to

convert energy from one form to another, an infrastructure to

tie it all together, a population to make it function, and a
system, not an independent mass of tanks, aircraft, or dope

pushers. And sixth, the five rings provide a good method for

categorizing information and identifying centers of gravity.

We said earlier that our goal in war would generally be to

make the cost-political, economic, and military-to the

enemy higher than he was willing to pay or to impose strategic

or operational paralysis on him so that he would become

incapable of acting. Now, with an understanding of how enemies

are organized, we can begin the process of determining how to

accomplish either or both with airpower tools .

The object of war is to convince the enemy leadership to do

what you want it to do . The enemy leadership acts on some

cost/risk basis, but we can't know precisely what it might be .

We can, however, make some reasonable guesses based on

system and organization theory. To do this, put yourself in the

center of the five rings as the leader of a strategic entity like a

drug cartel or state. You have certain rather basic goals that

normally will take precedence over others. First, you want to

survive personally (this is not to say you won't die for your

system, but you probably see yourself and the system as being

closely tied together) . For you to survive personally (in most

instances) the system you lead must survive in something

reasonably close to its present form.

Let us say that you are the leader of a drug cartel and an

enemy threatens you credibly with the following (to which you

cannot respond) : your bank accounts will be zeroed, your

communications with the world outside your mountain retreat

will be severed, your cocaine processing facility will be

destroyed, and your house will be converted to rubble. To

avoid these nasty things, all you have to do is agree to stop

selling cocaine in one country. What do you do? If you are

remotely rational, you agree immediately. Failure to do so

means your system effectively ceases to exist, which leaves

you personally in a precarious position and unable even to

retire in splendor because you can't get at the billions you had

socked away in a country with strict privacy in banking laws .

Suppose that only some of these dire events were threatened

or deemed likely. In this case, you might choose to negotiate.

Perhaps you would agree to sell less cocaine in the target
Your enemy might or might not accept these counterproposals;

it would depend largely on how much he was willing to spend

to create a cost for you . In our ideal world we like to think we

don't negotiate with drug dealers or tyrants like Saddam

Hussein. In the real world we do so all the time. Very rarely

are we willing to invest the time and effort required to achieve

maximal results.

Our discussion of costs has so far been oriented at a

strategic level. Does it also apply at an operational level-the

level at which military forces are actually employed? The

answer is an absolute yes . Military commanders, with the

exception of a few really stupid ones, have always weighed

costs as they were planning or conducting an operation. Let's

take a hypothetical look at George Patton and the Third Army

in World War II .

George Patton was an aggressive commander who believed

that speed of advance was key to success. Obviously, then, the

Third Army needed to move quickly as a system-not just the

tanks, but the whole system that supported them at the front.

From the German side, if moving fast was good from George

Patton's perspective, it was bad from theirs . Now, let us do a

quick five-ring analysis of the Third Army from just the cost

standpoint. (We will return to it later when we discuss

operational paralysis.)

Let us suppose that something catastrophic happened to

Third Army's fuel supply in mid-September of 1944 . Let us

assume that someone tells General Patton at a staff meeting

that all fuel deliveries to his Army will cease in two days. His

choices are basically two: slow down or stop the movement of

his army so that it can assume a reasonable defensive

position, or tell everyone to plunge ahead as far as possible

until they run out of gas. Since the latter is likely to leave the

majority of the army in an untenable and unplanned position

and is unlikely to achieve anything final, Patton opts for the

former because he has assessed the cost of continuing as too

high for the possible results.

Realize also that unbeknownst to the commanding general,

every subordinate commander and soldier will start acting on

information about an impending fuel shortage as soon as he
order to halt comes down, forward movement already would

have ceased and hoarding of remaining fuel supplies would

have become widespread. The principle is simple: at all levels,

leaders make decisions based on a cost/benefit analysis .

Before moving on to discuss imposition of strategic and

operational paralysis, we need to make two more points on the

subject of cost. The first is that the enemy leader may not

recognize how much attacks on him are costing at the time of

attack and in the future. This almost certainly was the case with

Saddam Hussein, who simply failed to comprehend for several

weeks what the strategic air attacks against him were doing to

his future. Had he understood, he might have sued for peace the

first morning of the war. His lack of understanding flowed from

ignorance of the effect of modern air attack3 and from lack of

information. The coalition attack in the first minutes had so

disrupted communications at strategic levels that it was very

difficult to receive and process damage reports. 4

A similar event may have taken place in Japan in late 1944

and into 1945. Japanese army leaders persisted in their desire

to continue the war even though their homeland was

collapsing around them as a result of strategic air and sea

attacks. They apparently lacked the in-depth understanding of

war and their country to appreciate what was really

happening. Like Saddam a half-century later, the Japanese

were stuck in a paradigm that said that the only important

operations in war were the clashes of armies . In the Japanese

case part of the problem may have stemmed from the Bushido

code of personal bravery that tended to assume that success

in war would be a function of agglomerating many tactical

successes. The concepts of strategic and operational war were

simply not there.

Two lessons flow from these examples: you may have to

educate the enemy on the effect your operations are likely to

have. You may also have to give him accurate information on the

extent of his losses-and the long-term and short-term effects

likely toflow from them

As we have seen, we cannot depend on the his making the

concessions we ask because of a realistic cost/benefit analysis.

In the event we cannot educate and inform him properly, we
paralysis . Fortunately, the effort we put into understanding

how enemies are organized and how to impose costs leads us

directly into the concepts and mechanisms of paralysis.

The idea of paralysis is quite simple . If the enemy is seen as

a system, we need to identify those parts of the system which

we can affect in such a way as to prevent the system from

doing something we don't want it to do. The best place to start

is normally at the center for if we can prevent the system's

leadership from gathering, processing, and using information

we don't want him to have, we have effectively paralyzed the

system at a strategic level.

Let us go back to the drug cartel example we earlier discussed . Suppose that the suppliers and pushers hear nothing

from headquarters for some period of time. Their finances

begin to dry up, nobody protects them from competitors, and

their stocks dwindle quickly. What do they do? They begin to

look for other cartels to deal with or for other lines of work. In

a short period of time, but not instantly, the paralysis imposed

at the strategic level of the cartel destroys the organization's

ability to sell the drugs its opposition didn't want it to sell-all

while the overwhelming majority of the individuals in the

organization are unharmed and not even directly threatened .

The obvious place to induce strategic system paralysis is at the

leadership, or brain, level. What happens, however, if the brain

cannot be located or attacked? Although the leadership function

always provides the most lucrative place to induce paralysis, it is

not the only possibility. Suppose that we can't reach the drug lord,

but we can reach and destroy one of his system essentials, such

as his financial net? We are likely to have created a different level

of paralysis. The organization may still be able to function, and it

will certainly search furiously to repair or replace its financial net.

If it doesn't succeed, however, this paralysis in one part of the

strategic system is likely to cause much of the rest to atrophy and

become ineffective. After all, the majority of the organization's

suppliers and workers must eat and must pay for services

rendered. If they are not getting regular pay, they are going to be

forced again to find alternatives outside the organization that can

no longer provide them with a system essential.
state loses a system essential like electricity . Imagine the effect

on the United States if all of its electricity stops functioning.

Let us return to our George Patton and Third Army example

to look at operational paralysis. Patton depended on speed for

success, but not unfocused speed . He needed to know where

he was going, what his troops were going to encounter, where

to send the fuel and ammunition, and where to shift land and

air forces as required. Suppose the Germans had succeeded in

blinding Patton by depriving him of his ability to gather and

disseminate information. Under these conditions, Third Army

would have been effectively paralyzed insofar as its ability to

conduct rapid offensives simply because offensives on the

ground at any speed are extraordinarily complex and require

huge amounts of good information.

If the Germans were unable to blind Patton, what else could

they have done to induce operational paralysis? Again, going

from the center of the rings toward the outside suggests we

should look next in the system-essential (or supply) ring for an

answer. Most assuredly, Patton's speed depended on fuel for

his tanks and trucks-no fuel, no speed. Thus, elimination of

fuel, perhaps by interdicting the Red Ball Express, induces the

desired form of operational paralysis and converts Third Army

into something different. Before its fuel was cut off, Third

Army was a fast moving, dangerous threat to the Germans;

after the fuel stops, it becomes a slow, slogging beast significantly different in nature and threat.

So far we have discussed effects we might want to produce

on the enemy: untenable costs or paralysis at one or more

levels. Next, we must look at how we go about doing it . Before

proceeding, however, it is useful to note that we have used

quite a few pages talking about air theory and have yet to

discuss bombs, missiles, or bullets. The reason is simple; well

before it makes any sense to talk about mechanics, it is

imperative to decide what effect you want to produce on the

enemy. Making this decision is the toughest intellectual

challenge; once the desired effect is decided, figuring out how

to attain it is much easier if for no other reason than we

practice the necessary tactical events every day, whereas we

rarely (far too rarely) think about strategic and operational
about producing the effect: do it very fast.

It may seem facetious to reduce the "how" to such a simple

rule, and, indeed, we will now make it a little more complex by

talking about parallel attack. Nevertheless, the essence of

success in future war will certainly be to make everything

happen you want to happen in a very short period of

time-instantly if possible . Why? And what is parallel war?

Parallel war brings so many parts of the enemy system

under near-simultaneous attack that the system simply

cannot react to defend or to repair itself. It is like the death of

a thousand cuts ; any individual cut is unlikely to be serious. A

hundred, however, start to slow a body considerably, and a

thousand are fatal because the body cannot deal with that

many assaults on it . Our best example of parallel war to date

is the strategic attack on Iraq in the Gulf War. Within a matter

of minutes the coalition, attacked over a hundred key targets

across Iraq's entire strategic depth . In an instant, important

functions in all of Iraq stopped working very well . Phone

service fell precipitously, lights went out, air defense centers

stopped controlling subordinate units, and key leadership

offices and personnel were destroyed. To put Iraq's dilemma in

perspective, the coalition struck three times as many targets

in Iraq in the first 24 hours as Eighth Air Force hit in Germany

in all of 19431

The bombing offensive against Germany (until the very end)

was a serial operation, as virtually all military operations have

been since the dawn of history. Operations have been serial

because communications made concentration of men

imperative, the inaccuracy of weapons meant that a great

number had to be employed to have an effect, and the

difficulty of movement essentially restricted operations to one

or two locations. In addition, military operations have mostly

been conducted against the enemy's military, not against his

entire strategic or operational system. All this meant that war

was a matter of action and reaction, of culminating points, of

regrouping, of reforming. Essentially, war was an effort by one

side to break through a defensive line with serial attacks or it

was an attempt to prevent breakthrough .
safety through most of a conflict with the fighting and damage

confined largely to the front itself. Even when aerial bombardment

began to reach strategic depths, the bombardment tended to be

serial (again because of inaccurate weapons and the need to

concentrate attacking forces so they could penetrate an aerial

defensive line). This meant that the enemy could gather his

defenders in one or two places and that he could concentrate the

entire system's repair assets on the one or two places which may

have suffered some damage. Not so in Iraq.

In Iraq, a country about the same size as prewar Germany,

so many key facilities suffered so much damage so quickly

that it was simply not possible to make strategically

meaningful repair. Nor was it possible or very useful to

concentrate defenses; successful defense of one target merely

meant that one out of over a hundred didn't get hit at that

particular time . As in the thousand cuts analogy, it just

doesn't matter very much if some of the cuts are deflected. It is

important to note that Iraq was a very tough country

strategically. Iraq had spent an enormous amount of money

and energy on giving itself lots of protection and redundancy

and its efforts would have paid off well if it had been attacked

serially as it had every right to anticipate it would. In other

words, the parallel attack against Iraq was against what may

well have been the country best prepared in all the world for

attack. If it worked there, it will probably work elsewhere.

Executing parallel attack is a subject for another essay or even

a book. Suffice it to say here that those things brought under

attack must be carefully selected to achieve the desired effect.

We have now provided the groundwork for a theory of air

power to use into the twenty-first century. To summarize :

understand the political and technological environment; identify

political objectives; determine how you want to induce the enemy

to do your will (imposed cost, paralysis, or destruction); use the

five-ring systems analysis to get sufficient information on the

enemy to make possible identification of appropriate centers of

gravity; and attack the right targets in parallel as quickly as

possible . To make all this a little more understandable, it is

useful to finish by mentioning the Gulf War's key strategic and
for the next quarter-century or more .

We can identify 10 concepts that summarize the revolution

of the Gulf War and that must be taken into account as we

develop new force levels and strategy:

1 . The importance of strategic attack and the fragility of

states at the strategic level of war

2 . Fatal consequences of losing strategic air superiority

3 . The overwhelming effects of parallel warfare

4. The value of precision weapons

5 . The fragility of surface forces at the operational level of war

6 . Fatal consequence of losing operational air superiority

7 . The redefinition of mass and surprise by stealth and

precision

8 . The viability of "air occupation"

9 . The dominance of airpower

10 . The importance of information at the strategic and

operational levels

Let us look at each of these briefly.

1 . The importance of strategic attack and the fragility of

states at the strategic level of war. Countries are inverted

pyramids that rest precariously on their strategic innards-their

leadership, communications, key production, infrastructure,

and population. If a country is paralyzed strategically, it is

defeated and cannot sustain its fielded forces though they be

fully intact.

2 . Fatal consequences of losing strategic air superiority.

When a state loses its ability to protect itself from air attack, it

is at the mercy of its enemy, and only the enemy's compassion

or exhaustion can save it. The first reason for government is to

protect the citizenry and its property. When a state can no

longer do so, it has lost its reason for being. When a state loses

strategic air superiority and has no reasonable hope of

regaining it quickly, it should sue for peace as quickly as

possible. From an offensive standpoint, winning strategic air

superiority is the number one priority of the commander; once

that is accomplished, everything else is a just a matter of time.
organizations, including states, have a small number of vital

targets at the strategic level-in the neighborhood of a few

hundred with an average of perhaps 10 aimpoints per vital

target. These targets tend to be small, very expensive, have few

backups, and are hard to repair. If a significant percentage of

them are struck in parallel, the damage becomes insuperable .

Contrast parallel attack with serial attack where only one or

two targets come under attack in a given day (or longer) . The

enemy can alleviate the effects of serial attack by dispersal

over time, increasing the defenses of targets that are likely to

be attacked, concentrating his resources to repair damage to

single targets, and conducting counteroffensives . Parallel

attack deprives him of the ability to respond effectively, and

the greater the percentage of targets hit in a single blow, the

more nearly impossible is response .

4. The value of precision weapons. Precision weapons allow

the economical destruction of virtually all targets-especially

strategic and operational targets that are difficult to move or

conceal. They change the nature of war from one of probability to

one of certainty. Wars for millennia have been probability events

in which each side launched huge quantities of projectiles (and

men) at one another in the hope that enough of the projectiles

(and men) would kill enough of the other side to induce retreat or

surrender. Probability warfare was chancy at best. It was

unpredictable, full of surprises, hard to quantify, and governed

by accident. Precision weapons have changed all that. In the

Gulf War, we knew with near certainty that a single weapon

would destroy its target. War moved into the predictable.

With precision weapons, even logistics become simple ;

destruction of the Iraqis at the strategic, operational, and

tactical levels required that about 12,000 aimpoints be hit.

Thus, no longer is it necessary to move a near-infinite quantity

of munitions so that some tiny percentage might hit something

important. Since the Iraqi army was the largest fielded since

the Chinese in the Korean War and since we know that all

countries look about the same at the strategic and operational

levels, we can forecast in advance how many precision weapons

will be needed to defeat an enemy-assuming of course that

we are confident about getting the weapons to their targets.
war. Supporting significant numbers of surface forces (air, land,

or sea) is a tough administrative problem even in peacetime.

Success depends upon efficient distribution of information, fuel,

food, and ammunition. By necessity, efficient distribution

depends on an inverted pyramid of distribution . Supplies of all

operational commodities must be accumulated in one or two

locations, then parceled out to two or four locations, and so on

until they eventually reach the user. The nodes in the system are

exceptionally vulnerable to precision attack. As an example,

consider what the effect would have been of a single air raid a

day-even with nonprecision weapons-on the WWII Red Ball

Express or on the buildup behind VII and XVIII Corps in the Gulf

War. The Red Ball Express became internally unsustainable,

and the VII and XVIII Corps buildups severely strained the

resources of the entire US Army-even in the absence of any

enemy attacks.

Logistics and administration dominate surface warfare, and

neither is easy to defend . In the past these activities took place

so far behind the lines that they were reasonably secure. Such

is no longer the case-which brings into serious question any

form of warfare that requires huge logistics and administrative

buildup . 6. Fatal consequence of losing operational air superiority.

Functioning at the operational level is difficult even without enemy

interference. If the enemy attains operational air superiority (and

exploits it) 5 and can roam at will above indispensable operational

functions like supply, communications, and movement, success is

not possible. As with the loss of strategic air superiority, loss of

operational air superiority spells doom and should prompt quick

measures to retreatwhich is likely to be very costly-or to

arrange for surrender terms.

7. The redefinition of mass and surprise by stealth and

precision. For the first time in the history of warfare, a single

entity can produce its own mass and surprise. It is this single

entity that makes parallel warfare possible. Surprise has always

been one of the most important factors in war-perhaps even the

single most important, because it could make up for large

deficiencies in numbers. Surprise was always difficult to

achieve because it conflicted with the concepts of mass and

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enough projectiles to win the probability contest, a commander

had to assemble and move large numbers. Of course,

assembling and moving large forces in secret was quite difficult,

even in the days before aerial reconnaissance, so the odds on

surprising the enemy were small indeed. Stealth and precision

have solved both sides of the problem; by definition, stealth

achieves surprise, and precision means that a single weapon

accomplishes what thousands were unlikely to accomplish in

the past.

8. The viability of "air occupation." Countries conform to the

will of their enemies when the penalty for not conforming

exceeds the cost of conforming. Cost can be imposed on a state

by paralyzing or destroying its strategic and operational base or

by actual occupation of enemy territory. In the past, occupation

(in the rare instances when it was needed or possible) was

accomplished by ground forces-because there was no good

substitute. Today, the concept of "air occupation" is a reality and

in many cases it will suffice. The Iraqis conformed with UN

demands as much as or more than the French did with German

demands when occupied by millions of Germans . Ground

occupation, however, is indicated when the intent is to colonize

or otherwise appropriate the enemy's homeland . 9. The dominance of airpower. Airpower (fixed wing,

helicopter, cruise missile, satellite), if not checked, will destroy

an enemy's strategic and operational target bases-which are

very vulnerable and very difficult to make less vulnerable . It

can also destroy most tactical targets if necessary.

10. The importance of information at the strategic and

operational levels. In the Gulf War, the coalition deprived Iraq of

most of its ability to gather and use information. At the same

time, the coalition managed its own information requirements

acceptably, even though it was organized in the same way

Frederick the Great had organized himself. Clear for the future is

the requirement to redesign our organizations so they are built

to exploit modern information-handling equipment. This also

means flattening organizations, eliminating most middle

management, pushing decision making to very low levels, and

forming worldwide neural networks to capitalize on the ability of

units in and out of the direct conflict area.
coalition succeeded in breaking Iraq's ability to process

information but failed to fill the void by providing Iraqis an

alternate source of information. 6 This failure made Saddam's job

much easier and greatly reduced the chance of his overthrow.

Capturing and exploiting the datasphere may well be the most

important effort in many future wars.

Beyond these Gulf War lessons, which have applicability

well into the future, it behooves the air planner to think of one

other area: what can be done with airpower that in the past we

knew could only be done with ground or sea power or couldn't

be done at all? The question must be addressed for several

reasons: airpower has the ability to reach a conflict area faster

and cheaper than other forms of power; employment of air power

typically puts far fewer people at risk than any other form (in the

Gulf War, there were rarely more than a few hundred airmen in

the air as opposed to the tens of thousands of soldiers and

sailors in the direct combat areas) ; and it may provide the only

way for the United States to participate at acceptable political

risk (use of airpower does not require physical presence on the

ground) . Let us look at just one example.

Suppose a large city is under the control of roving gangs of

soldiers, and it is American policy to restore some degree of order

to the city. Normally, we would think that could only be done by

putting our own soldiers on the ground. But what if policyrnakers

are unwilling to accept the political and physical risks attendant

to doing so? Do we do nothing, or do we look for innovative

solutions?

If we define the problem as one of preventing groups of soldiers

from wandering around a city, we may be able to solve it from the

air. Can we not put a combination of AC-130s and helicopters in

the air equipped with searchlights, loudspeakers, rubber bullets,

entangling chemical nets, and other paraphernalia? When groups

are spotted, they first receive a warning to disperse. If they don't

they find themselves under attack by nonlethal, but unpleasant,

weapons. If these don't work, lethal force is at hand. It may be very

difficult to prevent an individual from skulking around a city or

even robbing an occasional bank. Single individuals, however,

constitute a relatively small tactical problem since they are

unlikely to be able to cause wide-scale disruption as can multiple

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is a police matter.

By the same token, we know that we will be called on to

conduct humanitarian and peacemaking operations . If we

think about food delivery as the same as bomb delivery and

understand that with food, as with bombs, our responsibility

is to distribute it to the right people, we should be able to do

as well with food as we do with bombs. To do so, however, will

require putting as much effort into developing precision

food-delivery techniques as we put into developing precision

bomb or cluster-bomb capabilities . The problem is the same and

is theoretically susceptible to an airpower solution if we are

willing to think outside the lines. And indeed, thinking outside

the lines will be a necessity if airpower is to prosper and to play a

key role in defending American interests well into the next

century.

Indeed, there is a new world building around us and the

revolutions in politics, business, and war have happened and we

must deal with them, not ignore them. Of course, it is human

nature to stay with the old ways of doing business even when the

external world has made the old ways obsolete or even

dangerous. So many examples come so easily to mind: the heavy

knights at Agincourt refusing to believe that they were being

destroyed by peasants with bows; the French in World War I

exulting the doctrine of "cold steel" against the machine gun and

barbed wire as the flower of a generation perished; and the steel

and auto makers of the United States convinced that their

foreign competitors were inept even as their market positions

plummeted. Accepting the changes made manifest in the Gulf

War will be equally difficult for the United States but by no

means impossible, ifwe all resolve to think.

Notes

1 . A term introduced by Don Simmons in Hyperton (New York: Bantam

Books, 1990).

2. A strategic entity is any self-contained system that has the general

ability to set its own goals and the wherewithal to carry them out. A state is

normally a strategic entity as is a drug cartel or a guerrilla organization.

3. Saddam made the following statement shortly after his successful

invasion of Kuwait. "The United States depends on its Air Force and

everyone knows that no one ever won a war from the air ." Thus, his

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made it difficult for him to analyze what was happening to him.

4. As an aside, the planners had recognized that Saddam would not be

able to gather information, so they had intended to provide him accurate

reports of all attacks by using psychological warfare assets. For a number of

reasons, the planners were unable to make this happen; as a result,

Saddam lacked information that the coalition really wanted him to have .

5 . Some would argue that the mujahideen in Afghanistan lost

operational air superiority and yet still prevailed. The latter is true ; the

former is not, because the Stinger antiaircraft missiles forced the Soviets to

operate at an altitude that deprived them of the ability to hit anything. The

Soviets simply did not have the precision weaponry and detection capability

the United States had in the Gulf War.

6. The coalition provided Iraqi soldiers at the front great quantities of

information and did so effectively; the same thing did not happen at the

strategic level inside Iraq for a variety of not very good reasons.
Parallel War and Hyperwar:

Is Every Want a Weakness?

Col Richard Szafranski, USAF

Something happened in Desert Storm never witnessed

before . Air power-in thousands and thousands of Coalition

sorties-appeared to have defeated an enemy. Advocates of air

power earnestly want others to accept what they believe Desert

Storm proved. Desert Storm proved, they assert, that air power

can be or is dominant and decisive,' fulfilling the vision of

Gulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, Jimmy Doolittle,2 and others3-or

so advocates believe and want us to believe.

That want may be a weakness. This essay examines the

notions of parallel war and hyperwar, principally as they apply

to air campaigns, revealing minor flaws in the ideas and their

application. First, it examines parallel war to determine what

is new in the idea. Second, it examines this "new" kind of air

warfare to illuminate the strengths and shortcomings parallel

war evidences in theory and practice. Third, it argues that the

theory is useful if applied against weak industrial states. Next,

it postulates theoretical ways to defeat an adversary intending

to employ parallel war. Defeating parallel war is possible

whether the United States is the nation intending to employ it,

or whether some post-Gulf War aficionado embraces the

theory. None of this intends to do any more than add greater

discernment to the theory of parallel war and hyperwar .

Theories of parallel warfare are not "bad" or "wrong." Rather,

their shortcoming is that they have only limited utility in the

emerging world.

Copyright 1995, Us Naval Institute. Reprinted with permission . An edited version

appears in the August 1995 issue of Proceedings (vol . 121, no. 8) . "Is every want a

weakness?" is a Zen Buddist reflection .

125
Even so, one caveat remains: if parallel war is the new air

warfare form, it would be a valuable one indeed. If authentic

parallel war were possible, it would, as its advocates argue,

render much of Clausewitz irrelevant. Clausewitz himself

noted that

if war consisted of one decisive act, or a set of simultaneous

decisions, preparations would tend toward totality, for no

omission could ever be rectified. . . .

But, of course, if all the means available were, or could be,

simultaneously employed, all wars would automatically be

confined to a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous

ones-the reason being that any adverse decision must reduce

the sum of the means available, and if aU had been committed in

the first act there could really be no question of a second. Any

subsequent military operation would virtually be part of the

first-in other words, merely an extension of it . 4

Three "ifs," with three "coulds" and two "woulds" in tandem,

suggest skepticism. Since everything pivots on "if," the ideas

bear close examination.

What Is Parallel War?

The idea of parallel war arises from understanding the

enemy as a "system" or "organism," simultaneously more

complicated and less complicated than the people-state-armed

forces system described by Clausewitz. 5 The enemy state

theoretically has five key organic components : (1) fielded

military forces at the periphery; (2) the masses of the people

who are not direct combatants ; (3) a transportation

infrastructure providing organic essentials ; (4) the organic

essentials themselves ; and, (5) residing at the center,

leadership or a controlling mechanism for the entire system.

Advocates refer to these orbits or concentric "rings" as "the five

rings." 6 Like a fractal, each of the rings also has within it the

five components . Thus, the fielded forces at the periphery,

from the army to the individual soldier, have within them

leadership or some internal controlling mechanism.

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within it key nodes or "centers of gravity." 7 Leadership, the

controlling mechanism, is the key node in each ring and

throughout. The theory is that simultaneous and coordinated

operations against all the key nodes in the system and in each

of the rings are the essence of the a new kind of offensive

military air campaign. Air, the theory holds, is the superior

medium for prosecuting these operations. It is air power, the

theorists argue, that allows attacks against the internal rings

and all the other rings without first collapsing the outer rings

that surround the inner ones.$

In contrast, serial warfare is, or was, warfare that engaged

each ring and its categories of targets in turn, ad seriatim,

moving from the periphery toward the center. 9 In the past it

was not possible to attack the sovereign in the castle until the

opposing army had defeated the enemy monarchs fielded

forces and moved through the population toward the center. In

World War II, air attempted to engage its targets in parallel,

but more often engaged its air targets and target sets serially

within the organic whole of Germany, giving ball-bearing

factories, submarine pens, petroleum, airfields, rail and road

networks, and cities some priority for air attack at any given

time. Parallel war, on the other hand, theoretically employs air

power to attack all the decisive points in each ring and the

decisive point of the entire system simultaneously. The object

is not just the destruction of targets. Destruction is the means

to an end. The object is to destroy or damage (or to render

dysfunctional) those targets that produce a strategic effect by

causing loss of the enemy system's organic capabilities .lo

When these parallel warfare attacks occur with simultaneity or

great speed, hyperwar results.

In a later iteration of the theory, and as information wars i

becomes an intriguing notion within the services and the

Department of Defense, information becomes the "bolt"

running through all the rings and holding the rings together.

12

John Warden, the leading theorist, also asserts that whatever

else "weapons" may be or do, they are essentially "information"

because they communicate "messages," or "meaning." Thus,

air power delivers "information" to the enemy leadership . The

most important information delivered in this ethereal sense is

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and you are paralyzed," or, in the extreme case, "you are dying."

Death or paralysis of the systems military or warfighting

capability is the objective and intended effect of the air

campaign. The goal is to visit the cumulative "death of a

thousand cuts" on the enemy system.

13 Because the object

sought is paralysis, parallel war and hyperwar aim at the

sudden and simultaneous reduction of the enemy systems

overall "energy level," so that the organic system goes into

"shock." The simultaneous engagement of centers of gravity

prevents recovery from this shock because the energy

available to the system is inadequate to restore the system to

full functioning. Thus, attacks against the centers of gravity

must occur not only in parallel, but also with "hyper" speed.

Since ground forces cannot do this, since forces afloat cannot

do this (except through their air power), then air forces are the

forces best suited for employing parallel war at hyperwar

tempo. Or so the theory goes .

What is New Here?

According to Jeffrey R. Cooper, what might be new is a way

of fighting, enabled by technology, that could evidence both

coherence and simultaneity. Cooper writes:

At the operational level, the impact of these coherent operations

is to overwhelm the opponent's ability to command and control

his forces, denying him the ability to respond to our campaign

plan and operations, and forcing him at the limit to execute only

uncoordinated preplanned actions .

The attacks themselves are

a (massively) parallel series of synchronized integrated operations

conducted at high-tempo, with high lethality and high mobility,

throughout the depth and extent of the theater, intended to force

the rapid collapse of both the enemy's military power and the

enemy's will.

The consequence of the attacks is rapid defeat of the enemy

force

128
the high lethality, and the capability for sustained high tempos of

operations, so many enemy units can be defeated in detail

simultaneously that the operation may resemble a more classic

coup de main executed in a single main-force engagement. 14

But is this a new theory? Military forces since Clausewitz

have been enjoined to identify and engage the "center of

gravity" of an enemy's military capability. Simultaneous and

integrated attacks have long been the goal of combined arms.

Attacks on the leader and leadership are not new goals of

warfare, whether the enemy was viewed as a system or not in

the past. Even in chess, not a new game, it is possible to

impose checkmate without the serial destruction of all the

adversary's knights, rooks, and pawns. Nor is it novel that

such a campaign theory would be advanced by airpower

advocates. What the air aspects of the theory promise seem to

differ little from what Douhet, Mitchell, and the faculty of the

Air Corps Tactical School promised . Air power, we have always

been told-even promised-by air power advocates, will be

decisive . That the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and

The Gulf War Airpower Survey both used empirical data to

show that some of the undertakings of airpower fell short of

the vision of airpower cannot be ignored.

15

Nor should anyone ignore that the idea that parallel warfare,

as distinguishable from serial warfare, is not a new strategic

conception. As early as 1951, a naval officer, Capt. (later Rear

Adm) J. C. Wylie, asserted that there were two types of strategy:

"sequential" and "cumulative." He described the cumulative

approach in an article that appeared in Proceedings in 1952 .

Wylie later wrote that

there are actually two very different kinds of strategies that may

be used in war. One is the sequential, the series of visible,

discrete steps, each dependent on the one that preceded it. The

other is the cumulative, the less perceptible minute

accumulation of little items piling one on top of the other until at

some unknown point the mass of accumulated actions may be

large enough to be critical . They are not incompatible strategies,

they are not mutually exclusive. Quite the opposite. In practice

they are usually interdependent in their strategic result . 16

Moreover, the architects of the nuclear single integrated

operations plan (SIOP), like Wylie, promoted and planned for

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before current theorists articulated "the five rings ." As

Desmond Ball has shown, SIOP nuclear weapons were

allocated against target sets in the former Soviet system

characterized as "leadership" (leadership), "nuclear force"

(nuclear forces), "economic and industrial" (organic essentials

and logistics infrastructure), and "other military" (other fielded

forces).

17 The, SIOP also evidenced coherence and simultaneity,

using Cooper's terms. Thus, there is scant difference between

the targeting logic of the SIOP approach and the targeting logic

of the five-rings approach, save for the important distinction

that one employed nuclear weapons effects and the other did

not, but might have . 18 While the difference between the

nuclear SIOP and parallel war waged with conventional

weapons is critically important, there are more similarities

between the theories than differences . Both approaches

sought to strike decisive points, both sought to checkmate

enemy leadership, both were executed simultaneously and

with hyper speed, 19 both aimed at driving down enemy "energy

levels" dramatically, both sought to impose shock and

paralysis on the enemy system, and both sought to eliminate

rapid (or almost "any," in the case of the SIOP) enemy

post-attack recovery capability. 2° Nuclear weapons use does

make a difference. The SIOP intended to be so threatening that

it also may have been self-deterring. Parallel warfare using

nonnuclear appears no less threatening in terms of its

immediate consequences, but has fewer constraints on its

employment. Even so, the difference in weapons is not a

difference in the theory qua. theory nor in the proximate effects

the SIOP and nonnuclear parallel war sought. 21

Strengths and Shortcomings

The strength of cumulative strategies, both the SIOP and

parallel war, even though they are the same theory, is that

they promise to reduce more rapidly the war-making capacity

of an industrialized enemy state . 22 It is indisputable that

industrial states may be organized as the kind of system

represented. The logic of a cumulative model appears sound,

130
there are lucrative targets for air attack throughout the enemy

system. The air campaign in Desert Storm demonstrated that

the combat power of Iraq or a state like Iraq can be reduced by

apparently simultaneous and coherent attacks against

important targets . The SIOP, had it been executed, would

likely also have proven the point against a more robust

belligerent and war-fighting system. 23 Conventional weapons

have the additional advantage of being easier to employ and

having fewer constraints on their employment than nuclear

weapons. Unconventional weapons have the added advantage,

in some cases, of producing effects that can be reversed . Thus,

the ability to prosecute these kinds of nonnuclear attacks,

using SIOP targeting logic under a new name, is a valuable

adjunct to warfare in the latter years of the "second wave." 24

While a cumulative strategy promises to be effective against

any enemy, one difficulty with the five-rings model is that it is ill

equipped for coping with organisms that are not industrialized or

industrializing state systems . Certainly a terrorist organization is

a "system" that has separate component parts. Of course an

insurgent organization is a "system" that has differentiated

component parts. While theoretically possible to differentiate the

component parts of both terrorist systems and insurgent

organizations, it is not always easy actually to identify or to

isolate these parts. As physical entities, the component parts, or

five rings of terrorist and insurgent organization are exceedingly

difficult for the air campaign planner to target. Thus, the model

holds, but becomes exquisitely irrelevant for these types of

organizations and counterterrorism warfare and counterinsurgency warfare. Worse, airpower cannot make the decisive

and dominant contribution to these kinds of fights, much to the

chagrin of airpower advocates . Fighting in the former Yugoslavia,

the ill-starred intervention in Somalia, and our impotence in

stopping the genocide in Rwanda are only the more recent

examples of the limits of airpower. Airpower, it would seem,

works best in massive doses applied as an antidote against the

strength of industrial or industrializing states, uniformed armed

forces, and identifiable leaders and other targets .

The five-rings model thus becomes illogical or at least

impractical for nontrinitarian warfare, or what Gen John Boyd
by Martin van Creveld, is warfare wherein the warring sides do

not manifest the organization of Clausewitz's remarkable

"trinity" of state, people, and armed forces. If, as John Keegan,

Carl Builder, Martin van Creveld and others suggest,

conventional war between industrial states is the less likely

warfare form for the future,25 this need not invalidate the

theory entirely. The model remains extremely useful for its

heuristic value to novitiate students of warfare and as a thesis

to stimulate antithesis and debate.

Nontrinitarian warfare is only one of the challenges with

which the theory cannot contend. Some of the characteristics

of warfare on the eve of the "third wave" also confound the

theory: demassification, diversity, and ninjitsu. Demassification

is the fractionating of large conventional targets into much

smaller ones. For example, mainframe computers are an

attractive and easy-to-target set of nodes. Distributed laptops

are less attractive targets because they are simultaneously

more numerous, less easy to locate, mobile, and less easy to

target. "Third-wave" information technology liberates leadership and leadership command centers from the requirement to

reside in fixed locations. Just as telecommuting is possible for

nonwarfare "knowledge workers" today, it is not inconceivable

that the leaders of warfare operations in the future can

command these operations from their domiciles, from

nonbelligerent states, or from offshore . As hierarchies yield to

networks, leadership will also become demassified. "Virtual"

presence makes distance command and control possible.

Thus, even among warring states, the leaders need not reside

in the states to direct the fighting.

Miniaturization combines with demassification to complicate

the challenge. Asatellite dish receiver that measures three to five

meters in diameter is an easy target for precision-guided or even

area weapons. A satellite receiver or transmitter that measures

one-half meter in diameter is a more difficult target to strike,

especially if thousands are employed in a distributed network.

While the model may be valid, the targeting challenge is such

that the model might as well be invalid since it has little utility.

Dual-use technologies and facilities also confound the fiverings campaign planner. Fermentation chambers, for example,

132
same fermenters are also essential for the production of

biological weapons . Beer is good. Biological weapons are not

good. Dual-use systems do not fit easily into the targeting

template. Information technology is ubiquitous and much of it

serves multiple constituencies. The Global Positioning System

(GPS) would be a lucrative target, but the constellation of

these satellites is demassified and distributed . Moreover, GPS

users are military and civilian. Thus, the consequences of

attacking GPS must be borne by friendly forces, enemy forces,

and neutrals. Most communications satellites pose the same

type of problem for campaign planners . Demassification,

miniaturization, and dual-use also make ninjitsu-the "art of

invisibility"-possible . By distributing important elements of a

system, reducing them dramatically in size, embedding them

in other things (religious facilities, civilian hospitals, university

research centers), these elements effectively become invisible

to the campaign planner. 26

There are at least seven additional minor problems. First, the

attacks may not actually occur simultaneously, except when

compared to warfare of the distant past. Next, like the SIOP, the

current model strives for the "decisive battle" in new form. Third,

it neglects evolution in the attacked organism or system. Fourth,

it pays insufficient attention to war-termination issues. Fifth, the

current model neglects the reality of the challenges posed by the

post-attack damage assessment architecture, the Air Tasking

Order (ATO) system, and the reality of combined arms

operations. Sixth, the assertion that "information is the bolt that

holds the rings together" seems to give the lie to the entire

theory. And last, in the world that is emerging, there may be

little room for this type of air campaign. Each of these lesser

challenges deserves a few words.

The simultaneous attacks celebrated by the five-rings

theorists in the Gulf War did not occur simultaneously . They

occurred sequentially and over time . For airpower to be

effective, air superiority, or control of the air, is necessary. To

achieve air superiority, enemy air defenses must be defeated,

circumvented, or suppressed . Thus, and even though the

initial onslaught may have attacked other targets in other

categories, elimination or reduction of the capabilities of the

133
campaign. 27 If the theorists and air campaigners assert that

suppression of enemy air defenses was not their first priority

in time and in space, that assertion appears to contradict

current air doctrine . If they accept that coping with enemy air

defense capability was the first priority, but reply that the first

wave of attacks included other targets, then the attacks were

not simultaneous, but merely very close in time . (Zeno

probably would argue that any separation in time, however,

constitutes serial warfare.) In truth, the opening salvos of the

Desert Storm air campaign were directed-as they must be for

air power to be effective-against the enemy air defense

system, the "crucial first step" in the air campaign . 28

Sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and Army Apache

helicopters were part of this first wave of atrpower attacks for

airpower's benefit. How quickly other targets in the series

followed, becomes less relevant to the theory. A compressed

serial attack is still serial warfare, even though time

compression may create the appearance and, more important,

the effect of sirrlultaneity . 29

Because the five-rings model for air campaign planning

asserts that the consequence of its attacks will be paralysis of

the enemy system, it in effect asserts that the Napoleonic and

Clausewitzian "decisive battle" is its aim. Moreover, it seeks to

annihilate enemy capability. 3o (It does this, by the way, even

while some of its advocates suggest that their theories now

might have rendered much or most of Clausewitz irrelevant.) If

the aim of the air campaign is not achieved-that is, if the

consequent is not affirmed-then the fault must reside not in

the air campaign, but somewhere else. 31 Dogmatic adherence

to the air campaign plan list of priority targets is necessary to

"prove" the theory. Close air support, the theory holds, is less

important than strategic attack . If sorties have to be

reapportioned because of some "ground emergency," then the

dogma has been violated and, of course, the opportunity to

win a decisive battle may have then been lost. Where the

targeting list is followed religiously, failure to achieve a

decisive battle can also be attributed to inadequate

intelligence. Or it could be bad weather, the bane of aviation.

Or it could be caused by an adaptive enemy.

134
struggle to preserve themselves . 32 Any attacked organism can be

expected to struggle for survival by responding and adapting to

stimuli, to internal changes, and to its new environment. Rigid

adherence to an air campaign plan specifying a series of parallel

attacks in advance is rigid adherence to a set of attacks designed

against the initial organism, not the evolved one. The danger

with a wonderfully deterministic air campaign plan is that it may

adapt poorly to an organism that evolves in unexpected ways.

When flying weather impedes mechanical execution of the air

campaign plan, allowing the enemy respite and the opportunity

to recover, it is the fault of chaos. When mobile missiles are

introduced in unexpected ways, it is the fault of intelligence.

When operations against mobile missiles deplete sorties

intended to achieve the decisive victory of the air campaign, it is

the fault of the politicians . Airpower advocates did in fact argue

that the Iraqi Scuds were not militarily significant. 33 That the

missiles might have rent the Gulf War Coalition asunder had

they not been actively pursued and engaged shows an immature

understanding of what constitutes "military" significance in state

warfare . Mobile missiles ought to have been priority targets in

the air campaign: as political weapons they might have altered

the course and outcome of the war.

War termination issues, not neglected in the SIOP, also

appear to be neglected in the five-rings approach. The posited

aim of the air campaign is strategic paralysis-the expectation

being that "paralysis" must somehow equate to "surrender."

The reality is somewhat different. Wars may end because the

losers sense that there is something they value more than the

object of the war and that continuing the war imperils

preservation of this more important value or preference set. 34

The five-rings model attacks everything but population

centers, perhaps encouraging the enemy to fight to the death.

Even simple attacks can then have unintended consequences.

Attacks against communications designed to separate

leadership from fielded forces, for example, may also deprive

leadership of feedback regarding damage to the organism.

Thus, the organism may neither realize its paralysis nor

behave as a paralytic . Certainly, if attacks annihilate a large

part of the enemy's capability, defeat in detail is then possible,

135
on the winning side supports the bloodletting required to

defeat an enemy in detail . None should, of course,

underestimate the ruthlessness of a United States forced to

fight for its vital interests. It would be equally foolhardy to

underestimate the power of public opinion in fights not

perceived by our citizens as involving their vital interests.

The five-rings approach may work well against a weak

enemy and a transparent target set. If the enemy-the

resistant element described by Clausewitz-is not weak or

stupid, or if the target set is characterized by attention to

ninjitsu, problems arise for the air campaign planner. Prewar

intelligence, very effective damage assessment, and close

coordination are all required to make the ATO system function

effectively . (Where the ATO is less effective and the fault

cannot be attributed to "intelligence," it is, we are told by

some, the fault of the Army and the Marines . 35) The ATO takes

a long time to produce. 36 This fact alone ensures that it directs

attacks against an organism that no longer exists. If damage

assessment is imperfect-normally imperfection is the status

quo unless the weather is perfect, intelligence is precise and

abundant, and the enemy is perfectly inept or stupid-the

problems are compounded . That Saddam was not stupid,

albeit an excessively bold risk-taker (and even though Gen H.

Norman Schwarzkopf reviled him as a strategist), is shown by

his pawns gambit on the border of Kuwait in 1994. Perhaps

the Gulf War educated him.

If the Gulf War educated us, we should now appreciate that

warfare is a poor laboratory for validating air-only, or

naval-only, or ground-only theories . 37 Warfare against a small

and inferior state is an even poorer laboratory. We fight with

combined arms and depend on their interaction, their

combined effects, to defeat the enemy's strategy. An enemy

facing a 400,000 or a one-half million person allied army on its

border will invariably behave differently than one only facing

air attacks, no matter how wonderful the pounding to which

air subjects that enemy. It may be as divisive as it is

short-sighted to resign forces in other media to the null set

when attempting to use an actual fight with a third-, fourth-,

or tenth-rate opponent to illustrate or prove a theory.

136
nation airpower-was powerful in Desert Storm. Of that there

can be no doubt. But was it powerful because Iraq was so

inferior? Was airpower powerful alone, or was it powerful

because of the force-the well-armed, well-trained, belligerent

and hot-blooded human beings-poised to take the fight to

Baghdad on land and from the sea? Would not have true

parallel war, horizontal and vertical parallel war, brought the

interactive power of land warfare and amphibious assault to

bear on Iraq even as the air campaign unfolded? Has our

desire for few casualties become yet another weakness; a

weakness leading us away from sound strategy?38

This last question is an important one when examining

the air campaign's quest for parallel war. Wars occur and

warfare occurs within a much broader context than the

battlespace. Will the strategic context of the future-the

entire social, political, economic, and military gamut of goals,

interests, and behaviors-tolerate the kind of Desert Storm air

campaign advocated? Parallel war is and has been a

wonderful theory. Yet, the move from theory to practice is both

a torturous and tortuous one. Preparedness to execute the

SIOP, for example, cost the United States trillions of dollars

over decades. Preparedness to execute a Desert Storm-type air

campaign against any but small and weaker states might

require an equivalent investment. Would such warfare work

against a large country? Against a peer? Will the United States

ever again have the surplus resources it had in Desert Storm?

Not likely, seems to be the answer.

Iraq was and is a small country . When proportional

silhouettes of Iraq are superimposed over a larger nation, as

they are in Figure 3, the aerial achievements of Desert Storm

appear in a different light. This is not to suggest any

adversarial relationship with or hostile designs against China.

Rather, this perspective merely illuminates the fact that Iraq is

a very small country.

Finally, if information is "the bolt that holds the five rings

together," then information is the decisive center of gravity.

Accordingly, should we not aim all attacks at information?

Even though our understanding of information operations or

information warfare is imperfect and immature, the evolving

137
DR ARMIN LUDWIG, AIR WAR COLLEGE, 1995

CHINA & IRAQ

COMPARATIVE

SIZES

MILES 1,000

Figure 3. China and Iraq-Comparative Sizes

theory demands that the connectivity between and within the

rings becomes the object of attack. Electrical power production

facilities, roads and rails, airfields, missile production installations, and government buildings are not difficult for the air

campaigner to target. Information is, or would be, difficult to

target. Inclusion of information as a lucrative target may be a

trendy afterthought on the part of airpower advocates on the one

hand . On the other hand, it may be creation of another

precondition for success of the air campaign. The precondition, if

not met, then becomes the fault not of the theory, but of

prehostility target intelligence or the clumsy execution of a

brilliant air campaign plan.

138
g 

Perhaps the more valuable contribution the five-rings model

makes to the study of warfare is that it elucidates how one can

falsify or defeat the theory. The first priority, the best way to

defeat an adversary, Sun Tzu tells us, is to defeat an adversary's

strategy. Air campaigners do not appear to be strategists . More

likely they are air tacticians-their protestations to the contrary

notwithstanding . If the five rings support the overall strategy or

constitute the strategy of the air campaign, how can one defeat

the strategy? There are at least five ways, with each one examined

in turn. (Recall, please, that this discourse aims at theory and

antithesis. In practice, some of these countervailing means are

as risky as they are illegal . Even so, we would do well to keep in

mind that our conceptions of risk and legality may be ours alone.

There are antithetical notions out there in the real world.)

" Disguise, diversify, and demassify the system. Force the air

campaign planner and the air campaigner to strike what

appear to be widely distributed and primarily civilian

targets. The center of gravity of United States armed

forces may be public opinion. If public opinion is the

Clausewitzian hub upon which all movement depends in

most democratic states, attacking this hub is both a

prewar and wartime priority. To defeat parallel war even

before it commences, a wise adversary will strive to

disguise, diversify, and "demassify" key elements of the

system so that total war is necessary. Such a cunning

adversary will have mobile systems wherever possible.

Where mobility is not possible, the adversary will embed

military activities in civilian ones. Weapons production will

occur in facilities producing civilian goods. Weapons

research activities will be collocated in hospitals,

universities, and religious centers. Command and control

transmitters and receivers will be placed on schools, hotels,

temples, and recreational facilities . Airfields will be joint

commercial-military facilities, routinely used by

commercial and military entities . Dual-use systemstelecommunications media, fiber optics, direct broadcast

and very small aperture satellites-will be used for

administrative military communications. An adversary

139
missiles in refrigerator factories, might commingle

military and civilian transport, and could build its

military garrisons in populous areas. The adversary

would also be wise to move from military leadership

hierarchies to military leadership networks. Where

possible, the enemy will put foreign contractors in all

militarily significant facilities . The adversary will

encourage engagement, enlargement, tourism, and

foreign investment. The adversary's objective is to up

the ante for the attacker by forcing him to war on the

innocents and against the investors . The wise adversary

will attack and defeat its opponent's strategy even

before declaration of a state of hostilities .

" Acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on mobile

systems. WMD so raise the risks and consequences of an

attack that mere possession of WMD and mobile delivery

systems may impose prewar paralysis on the attacker. To

defeat parallel war, the adversary will distribute WMD

among the innocents with the same impunity that other

military capability is commingled. Nuclear weapons

production facilities may have bold, bright signatures .

Chemical and biological weapons production facilities do

not. Since those may be the WMD of choice in the third

wave, an adversary intending to defeat parallel war will

acquire them. Acquisition of any deliverable WMD

changes the political and military calculus dramatically .

" Where immobile, be invisible. One of the best ways to

create invisibility is to go underground; the deeper, the

better. Lateral is better than merely vertical. A cunning

adversary will realize that whatever is the key node in

the underground facility should also reside beneath a

civilian facility. Schools, orphanages, and "baby milk"

factories may have high utility for concealing these kinds

of basements . Distinctive painting or marking,

source-identifiable military communications, and even

uniforms do not contribute to invisibility . The obvious

and key point is that whatever cannot be identified cannot

be targeted. An astute adversary will also capitalize on the

attackers cultural myopia and mirror-imaging.

140
requires planning how the organism will adapt, transform

itself, and recover, if attacked. The adversary intent on

defeating parallel war will anticipate a reduction in energy

levels after an attack. Even so, the adversary also will

realize that a planned mutation at the bifurcation point is

superior to a random one. Especially cunning adversaries

will choose an asymmetrical and unpredictable response

to attacks, not a symmetrical or predictable one. If, for

example, electrical power production comes under

intense attack, the adversary might respond by

intentionally shutting down all visible electrical power.

(One cannot be especially cunning without having

considered and prepared for this in advance .) This

unexpected mutation makes damage assessment difficult.

The air campaign planner may cope with this difficulty by

forcing an extensive search for corroboration that attacks

have achieved required damage expectancies, may fall

into the trap of wishful thinking and reallocate sorties

to other roles, or-and this is the likely case-may

mindlessly continue to adhere to the installation-driven

or target-driven air campaign plan. Another useful

mutation might be to withdraw uniformed fielded

forces and employ terrorists or special operations forces

in the attacker's homeland.

" Attack information. The five rings exist in peacetime as

well as in wartime. If information is indeed the bolt that

holds them together, an adversary will realize that attacks

should begin in the prehostility phase. The object of

preliminary attacks in the prehostility phase will be to

paralyze or destroy a target set called "any public opinion

that does not support my aims." Combining propaganda

with more active measures, such as assassination and

other kinds of terrorism, may prevent a weak-willed

attacker from taking the offensive. (On the other hand,

active measures might stimulate uncharacteristically

ferocious responses.) Failing the success of propaganda

and anticipating an attack, an adversary may turn to

"worms" and "viruses" as its swords. As one communications analyst has noted:
programs called "worms" and "viruses." A worm is used to delete

a portion of a target computer's memory, and the aptly named

virus calls forth a machine's files and copies itself onto them,

creating an unfixable mess. Database records can be (and have

been) altered by outside interference, just as broadcasting

airwaves have been intercepted and preempted. Even on a small

budget, it seems, where there is a will there is a way. 39

As Brigadier V. K. Nair, VSM (Retired), wrote in his book War

In The Gulf. Lessons for the Third World:

Active measures to degrade attacking electronic systems should

be cost effective and simple. For example, the most sophisticated

system such as that of the United States, could be totally

disrupted by the projection of a suitable virus that would

automatically find their [sic] way back into the computers on

which the systems are dependent. Cheap, simple and effective

avenues must be exploited on a priority. 4o

Thus, it is only a matter of technique and time before these

countermeasures to parallel war are employed. What are the

counter-countermeasures? There may be none, although

information technology may provide the homeopathy of future

warfare. 41 In the quest for primacy in warfare, the pendulum

will continue to swing between measures and countermeasures.

The elusive search for the technologies, the weapons, and the

concepts of operations and organization that allow

Vemichtungschlacht likely will continue.

Conclusions

There may not really be much that is revolutionary in

contemporary notions of parallel war and hyperwar. It is the

logical evolution of a nonnuclear SIOP accelerated in serial

applications. The ability to execute a nonnuclear SIOP against

a large state or peer would require SIOP-level investments.

After acquiring the capability, an adversary could checkmate it

by simple tactical adjustments modulating the strategic

environment. Dispersing and disguising targets and making

the public opinion consequences of striking them unacceptable

cause the more obvious of these modulations. Absent the

powerful real or imagined survival motives that impelled the

142
will acquire the kind of airpower required to satisfy the needs

of the parallel war and hyperwar air campaign. Absent the

acquisition of the required technologies, the theory remains a

rather large and important footnote to the Gulf War.

A problem with contemporary air campaign theories may be

the progressive detachment of these presumptive airpower

theories-presumptive from the realities of warfare. 42 The new

theories seem to be less about warfare than they are about the

ways in which some believe the battlespace ought to be

apportioned and the resources that ought to be acquired once

the roles of force elements are determined. Warfare is about

human beings, human aspirations, and human passions . No

one should thoughtfully relegate the study of warfare to the

investigation of sterile technology and the targets that reside

in precisely defined systems or rings . Warfare between

humans is a hot thing, not a cold thing. It is more about blood,

fear, surprise, and friction than it is about technology .

Precision targeting depends on speed and certainty, including

the assurance that humans can know and understand causal

relationships . Parallel war theorists require the ready

availability of the technologies that allow speed, precision, and

the chimera of accurate knowledge and authentic

understanding. Parallel war requires massive resource

investments. 43

Thus, airpower in this current formulation seems to have

become no more nor less than the power of detached, dispassionate technology. 44 Technology is applied science. The science

of the parallel war theorists is cold, deterministic, and-from the

perspective of those who value jointness or integrationmisapplied. "If this, then that" is a supposition that warfare

rarely substantiates . The hubris of contemporary airpower

theorists may be that they so badly want airpower to be

dominant or decisive that they have made the Desert Storm

air campaign the mechanistic template for all future wars.

This want is a potentially dangerous weakness. Airpower, as

Carl Builder suggests in The Icarus Syndrome, still lacks a

theory . 45 Even so, one must applaud those who search for

one, even while cautioning them that they may not have

found one yet.

143
1 . Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals War: The

Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1994);

and John A. Warden III, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century," in Karl P.

Magyar, ed., Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security

Concerns (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, 1994), 326-329. Warden

asserts that one of the ten concepts that describe "the revolution of the Gulf

War and must be taken into account "as we develop new force levels" is 'The

dominance of airpower." Some disagree regarding airpower's contribution in

the Gulf War. See Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory (Washington, D.C. : US

Government Printing Office, 1993).

2 . "The function of the Army and the Navy in any future war will be to

support the dominant air arm." See James H . Doolittle, speech to the

Georgetown University Alumni Association, 30 April 1949, cited in Robert D.

Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis: United

States Naval Institute, 1966), 6.

3 . Airpower advocates believe airpower was both dominant and decisive

in the Gulf War. In the wake of the war, the principal architect of the Desert

Storm air campaign plan, Col John A. Warden III, emerged as the lead

airpower theorist in the United States Air Force. His prewar book, 77ie Air

Campaign: Planning for Combat, is pirated, translated, and studied abroad.

The Swedish Air Force uses his theories as the model for the most stressful

kind of air attack against which they must be prepared to defend. In

Australia, Warden is ranked along with Douhet and Trenchard as an

important air theorist. Colonel Warden is a former commandant of the Air

Command and Staff College, Air University.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and

Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), bk. one, chap. 1,

79. Emphasis in original.

5. The characteristics of parallel war and the air campaign primarily

are those provided by Colonel Warden. Like Col John R. Boyd before him,

most of Warden's brilliant exposition of parallel air warfare is in the oral

tradition : briefings and briefing slides. Where primary written works are

available, they are cited .

6. Warden, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century," 311-318.

7. Dan Hughes reminded me that in physics, just as in jujitsu, a body

has and can have only one center of gravity. Dr Hughes is a colleague at the

Air War College, Air University.

8 . Warden, "Air Theory," 326-331 . See also John A. Warden III,

"Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in Richard H. Schultz, Jr.,

and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., The FVture of Air Power in the Aftermath

of the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, 1992), 64-69.

9. John R. Pardo, Jr., "Parallel Warfare: Its Nature and Application," in

Karl P. Magyar, ed., Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military

Security Concerns (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, 1994), 277-296.

10. David Deptula, draft, unpublished manuscript, "Firing for EffectChange in the Nature of Warfare," 14 October 1994, 12-21 . The author is

grateful to Col Jeffrey Barnett, OSD/NA, for pointing out this essay.

144
Magazine, August 1994, 37-40. See also George Stein, 

NetWar-CyberWarInformation War," June 1994, forthcoming in Air Power Journal;- John

Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Comingl" Comparative Strategy, 2,

April-June 1993, 141-65; and Norman B. Hutcherson, "Command and

Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighters Data Base"

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press), 5 August 1994.

12. Conversation with Colonel Warden, 10 November 1994. See also

Warden, "Air Theory," 329-330.

13. John Warden sometimes uses the example of 150 tornadoes

simultaneously striking the United States . Such a large number of

tornadoes hitting at the same time would make recovery exceedingly difficult

since recovery resources could not be shared easily.

14. Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs

(Carlisle Barracks, Pa. : US Army War College, 1994), 29-30. Cooper's

insightful conclusions about the constraints on an authentic revolution in

military affairs (RMA) can also be applied to the air campaign theory of

parallel war.

15 . The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report

(European War), 1945; reprinted in The United States Strategic Bombing

Surveys (European War) (Paces War) (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University

Press, 1987) ; and Thomas A. Kearney and Elliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air

Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing

Office, 1993) . The bomber does not "always get through" (sometimes

bombers have difficulty getting through the budget process), nor are

precision weapons of much use unless supported by precise prestrike

information on the target and poststrike damage to it .

16. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory ofPower Control (New

Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1967), 26. Italics added. Wylie

introduced the differentiations of sequential and cumulative in "Reflections

on the War in the Pacific," US Naval Institute Proceedings 78, no. 4, April

1952, 351-361 . See also J . C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of_

Power Control, in Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,

1989), 101 .

17. Desmond Ball, "Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983," in Desmond

Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1986), 80-81 .

18. A historian assigned to the Gulf War Airpower Survey team, speaking

under the promise of nonattribution, pointed out to the Air Force officers

detailed to assist with the study that the targeting logic of the Instant

Thunder air campaign briefing was the same as the SIOP. He was told that

"parallel war" was "an Air Force idea," while the SIOP was a "joint idea."

Parallel war is an old idea. It remains an important one for nuclear

operations, since deterring and fighting a peer may require a return to

dependence on nuclear weapons.

19. Ballistic missile attack options evidenced extraordinary coherence

and simultaneity. Theoretically it was possible, for example, to time

sea-based and land-based ballistic missile launches so that all attacking

warheads arrived at the first possible point of enemy radar detection

145
Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1 December 1994. General Kelley is the commander

of Air University.

20. What may be "new" here may be that some in the tactical air forces

discovered the approach that strategic air and missile forces had long taken

to warfare. The Air Force Directorate of Warfighting Concepts Development

(AF/XOXW) lays claims to the notion of parallel warfare, using the

differences between parallel and serial electrical circuits as the illustrative

model. Admiral Wylie would probably be pleased; imitation is the highest

form of flattery .

21 . CMDR J . M. van Toal, OSD Net Assessment, suggests that the

difference between employing nuclear weapons and nonnuclear weapons

creates distinctions that are "definitive ."

22. A state like Iraq is an even easier target set. A very senior air officer

involved in the Desert Storm air campaign, speaking under the promise of

nonattribution, asserted that achieving air supremacy against Iraq was

about as difficult as "shooting at a tethered goat."

23. Dan Hughes suggests that there are at least two sides to this issue.

Perhaps it was awareness of this likelihood in the leadership of the former

Soviet Union (or the US) that made such a US (or Soviet) attack unnecessary.

24. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of

the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993). Desert Storm was

not third wave warfare. It may, however, have been nearly the epitome of

second wave warfare.

25. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994) ;

Martin van Creveld, 7he 7y-ansformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991);

and Carl Builder, "Guns or Butter: The Twilight of a Tradeoff?" (May 1994), a

presentation to the USAF Air University National Security Forum, Maxwell

AFB, Alabama. Used with permission.

26. Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, former commandant of the Air War

College, points out that the techniques of mobility, deception, disguise,

dispersion, misinformation, and diversion are still useful ways of creating

ninjitsu.

27. The demassification and dehumanization of attack systems could

make the suppression of enemy air defenses a much lower priority. A

strength of the SIOP was the land-launched and sea-launched ballistic

missiles that preceded attacks by manned aircraft. SSBNs are "stealthy" by

virtue of their operations. The five-rings' parallel war air campaign planner

may not have such missiles to employ. Cruise missiles and stealth as a

design feature become the analog of intercontinental ballistic missiles and

were employed- as we would expect them to be if the SIOP and parallel

warfare theories are the same-in advance of manned systems.

28. James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J . Johnson, A

League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif. :

RAND, 1994), 120-121 .

29. Barry R. Schneider points out that "compacted serial warfare may `be

parallel warfare in effect " if the adversary does not have the time to respond

effectively . I would argue that this further illuminates a limitation in the

theory: to produce the "effect" desired in time, we must use Clausewitzian

146
warfare may only be valid if applied against small countries. Dr Schneider is

a colleague at the Air War College, Air University.

30 . Advocates argue that the objective is not annihilation but "control."

The possibility that control actually is secured by annihilating military

capability should not be overlooked.

31 . David Deptula, draft, "Firing for Effect," 20.

32 . Erich Jantsch, The Self-Organizing Universe (Oxford: Pergamon

Press, 1980), 7, quoted in Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New

Science: Learning about Organization from an Orderly Universe (San

Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 1992), 18.

33. Alexander S. Cochran et. al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume I:

Planning (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1993), 103-4.

Dr Cochran is a colleague at the Air War College, Air University.

34. Joseph A. Engelbrecht, "War Termination : Why Does A State Decide

To Stop Fighting?" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Graduate School of

Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, 1992) . Col Engelbrecht is a

colleague at the Air University's Air War College.

35. According to a senior Air Force officer speaking to the Air War College

under the promise of nonattribution, the Army is to blame for its passion for

"deep attack" and the way in which it uses the fire support coordination line

(FSCL) to apportion the battlespace . The Marines are to blame for

withholding sorties from the joint forces air component commander

(JFACC). All of this, the official argued, reduces the power of airpower.

36. The importance of time and opportunity in warfare, dimensions

currently neglected in Army doctrine, is developed in Robert R. Leonhard,

Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War (Westport, Conn. : Praeger

Publishers, 1994) . See the discussion of some of the limits of the ATO

system on page 74.

37. As Gen Al Gray, the former commandant of the Marine Corps, says,

"I've never seen a battlefield too crowded to exclude anyone who wants a

shot at the enemy."

38. The Department of Defense plans to increase investment in nonlethal

technologies significantly . One wonders if unwillingness to kill the enemy or

employ friendly ground forces in mortal combat against an adversary's

homeland forces renders the United States weak to the point of impotence. If

the Army and Marine Corps ground forces are unused in combat, they will

eventually become less useful for and effective in combat.

39. Joseph N. Pelton, Future View: Communications Technology and Society

in the 21st Century (Boulder, Colo. : Baylin Publishing, 1992), 196.

40. V. K. Nair, War In The Gulf. Lessons for the Third World (New Delhi,

India: Lancer International, 1991), 110.

41 . Said another way, information warfare may provide the antidote for

parallel warfare. Eventually, and embellished by technology to intrude into

acoustic, tactile, olfactory, and visual space, information technology may be

the antidote for all warfare . See Marshall and Eric McLuhan, Laws of Media:

The New Science (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); Gregory L.

Ulmer, Heuretics: The Logic of Invention (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1994); and Diane Chotikul, "The Soviet Theory of Reflexive

147
Technical Report NPS55-86-013 (Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate

School, 1986) .

42 . A theory that asserts, for example, that an air force "owns"

responsibility for everything that transits the air is not a warfare theory. A

theory that asserts, for example, that an air force "owns" responsibility for

the "deep battle" or the "high battle" is not a warfare theory. These are roles

and missions, or defense resource appropriation, theories. A theory, on the

other hand, hypothesizes that the battlespace is seamless.

43. Where the maintenance and modernization of large land armies

continue to sap national investments, the required technologies are less

likely to be forthcoming . France, England, and Germany provide good

examples. The "army" structurally and financially dominates the defense

debate and budget. Thus, airpower is foredoomed to structural impotence in

France, Germany, and England.

44 . A senior Air Force officer speaking to the Air War College under the

promise of nonattribution asserted that "without technology, there is no Air

Force ." Technology is a tool, a means to an end. When it becomes an end in

itself, it may serve itself instead ofwarfare .

45. Carl Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in

the Evolution and Fate of U.S. Air Force (New Brunswick, NJ. : Transaction

Publishers, 1994) .
Information warfare is emerging as a potent new element of

strategy. "Info War" is not the same as intelligence operations,

although it is clearly related to intelligence. As it is emerging in

Defense Department thinking, information warfare is an

attack on an adversary's entire information, command and

control, and, indeed, decision-making system .

As Air Force Plans puts it: information warfare is "any action

to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information

and its functions; protecting ourselves against the actions ;

and exploiting our own information operations." Information

warfare is directed at shrinking or interfering with the enemy's

Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop while expanding and

improving our own. Strategists now speak of information as a

"strategic asset," and planners describe the objective of

information war as "information dominance ."

Dr George Stein places emerging thinking on information

warfare into the context of the Tofflers wave theory: "As first

wave wars were fought over land, and `second wave' wars were

fought over physical resources and productive capacity, the

emerging `third wave' wars will be for the access to and control

of knowledge." Related to information war are "net war" and

"cyberwar." Net war is information war waged largely through

communications systems . The 1991 Gulf War exhibited it via

the Coalition's attack on the whole spectrum of Saddam

Hussein's information, propaganda, command and control, etc.

But it is to the realm of "info propaganda" where Dr Stein calls

our particular attention-the emergence of techniques "combining

live actors with computer generated video graphics," and "fictive

simulators," and -other information manipulation which creates

"virtual realties" that could seriously threaten a state's control.

Cyberwar is the operational extension of information war and net

war-the tactical disruption, then domination, and perhaps even

the reordering, of an enemy's decision-cycle . However, Stein

cautions that whether cyberwar can actually "shape" the

battlefield, or merely generate chaos remains to be seen.

All this has obvious implications for command and control

warfare against an adversary. Governments which rely for

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gy g y 

particularly vulnerable to information war. Sound strategy, then,

employs info war as an offensive element of operations, designed

to disrupt or end an adversary's communications and decision

making. Stein cautions, however, that democratic societies may

be particularly vulnerable to attack by adversaries using

information war, especially its components net war and

cyberwar. Their communications infrastructure is wide open to

attack for their "domestic computer, communications, and

information networks . . . are very vulnerable to penetration,

manipulation, or even destruction by determined hackers."

The essay by Col McLendon is built around a critique of the

historical evolution of information war. He uses the allied

deception and crypt analysis during WWII, and the impact of

information technology during the Gulf War, to illustrate the

quantum leap from propaganda and disinformation during

WWII to the systematic application of information warfare in

the post-Cold War age .

The use of allied "Ultra" intercepts of Nazi war plans and

operations was critical to allied success . Indeed, Ultra

intercepts, which were never compromised, "provided the bulk

of intelligence to the Allies during the war." As Supreme Court

Justice Lewis Powell, who had worked with Ultra during WWII

prior to launching his legal career, stated, "In no other war

have commanding generals had the quality and extent of

intelligence provided by Ultra." Ultra gave the British advance

warning of the German attack on England and of U-boat

operations against Atlantic convoys . Indeed, Churchill had to

make numerous painful decisions not to defend Allied assets

he knew were going to be attacked for fear of alerting the

Germans to Allied prior knowledge of their plans . An example

was the Luftwaffe raid on Coventry.

The Gulf War brought the use of information deception and

information war to its zenith . US Army units used the

NAVSTAR GPS at the tactical level to locate Iraqi units even in

the midst of desert sand storms. GPS, writes McClendon, "was

the capability that made possible the [Allies] `left hook' used to

defeat Saddam Hussein's armored divisions ." The sheer

information overload attendant to Coalition operations was

mind boggling: 700,000 phone calls and 150,000 messages

150
communications frequencies; AWACS aircraft controlling

2,240 air sorties per day-more than 90,000 during the war

with no midair collisions.

The Gulf War experience has spurred recognition within the

US Defense Department that an ability to achieve "information

dominance" could represent a new era in strategy formulation.

"Global dominance," writes former Vice Chairman of the JCS,

Adm. David E. Jeremiah, "will be achieved by those that most

clearly understand the role of information and the power of

knowledge that flows from it ."

Information War - Cyberwar - Netwar

George J . Stein

In Arthur Waley's Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China,

Chuang Tzu tells the story of a simple gardener who was

shown a new tool that promised to change gardening. He

laughed scornfully and replied,

I used to be told by my teacher that where there are cunning

contrivances there will be cunning performances, and where

there are cunning performances there will be cunning hearts. He

in whose breast a cunning heart lies has blurred the pristine

purity of his nature; he who has blurred the pristine purity of his

nature has troubled the quiet of his soul, and with one who has

troubled the quiet of his soul Tao will not dwell. It is not that I do

not know about this invention; but that I should be ashamed to

use it . I

Strategy, according to the Department of Defense, is the "art

and science of developing and using political, economic,

psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and

war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to

increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory

and to lessen the chances of defeat." 2 For most people, it is

obvious that the political and economic aspects of the national

security policies of the United States are developed by the

national political authorities (e.g., the president and the

Congress) and, in dealing with foreign states or groups, executed

by the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture, etc.

Policies for developing and using military forces are formulated

by the national political authorities and conveyed to the armed

forces through the secretary of defense. Few, however, have paid

much attention to just how and by whom psychological forces

are to be developed to support national policies . More

importantly: What are psychological forces? By whom will these

forces be used? With what authority? To what ends?

New tools and technologies for communication have created

the potential for a new form of psychological warfare to a

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warfare is known as 

know the Tao of such an invention as information warfare, we

may find that we are ashamed to use it.

The futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler have argued that the

United States armed forces need to develop a "systematic,

capstone concept of military knowledge strategy." Such a

strategy would include clear doctrine, and a policy for how the

armed forces will acquire, process, distribute, and project

knowledge. 3

Quoting from the "Memorandum of Policy No. 30" (6 May

1993) of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Tofflers argue that the

US military is expanding the concept of Information War to

include psychological operations aimed at influencing the

"emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the

behavior" of others . Such an expansion would mirror the

evolution of traditional warfare toward Information War. It

would also mirror the progrssive steps of generating wealth

from agriculture and natural resources in much earlier times,

to the nineteenth and early twentieth century emphasis on

industrial production, to the present emphasis on generating

information products as a major new source of income.

As "first wave" wars were fought for land and "second wave"

wars were fought for control over productive capacity, the

emerging "third wave" wars will be fought for control of

knowledge. And, since "combat form" in any society follows the

"wealth-creation form" of that society, wars of the future will

be increasingly "information wars."

Currently, there is neither formal military doctrine nor

official definitions of information warfare . Despite the

computer jargon involved, the idea of information warfare has

not only captured the attention of military analysts-it also

poses important policy questions. 4

Despite the lack of authoritative definition, "netwar" and

"cyberwar" are emerging as key concepts in discussing

Information War. Originally these ideas seem to have come

from the science fiction community. Consider, for example, the

thought-provoking future war suggested in Bruce Sterling's

Islands in the Nets More recently, the concepts of netwar and

cyberwar have been developed by John Arquilla and David

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Their suggestions provide a thoughtful starting point for

exploring the issues that surround "information war."

Netwar, according to them, is a societal-level ideational conflict

waged in part through internetted modes of communication.

That is, netwar is most likely to be a nation-against-nation

strategic level conflict. Netwar is about ideas and epistemologywhat is known and how it is known. It would be waged largely

through a society's communication systems .

The target of netwar is the human mind. One could argue

that certain aspects of the cold war had the characteristics of a

dress rehearsal for future netwar. Consider, for example,

Radio Free Europe, the Cominform, Agence France Presse, or

the US Information Agency. But netwar may involve more than

traditional state-to-state conflict. The emerging of nonstate

political actors such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International,

as well as survivalist militias or Islamic revivalists, all with easy

access to worldwide computer networks for the exchange of

information or the coordination of political pressure on a

national or global basis, suggests that the governments may not

be the only parties waging Information War.

At first glance, netwar may appear to be a new word for

old-fashioned propaganda. It would be comforting to believe

that the "tried and true" methods (and limitations) of

propaganda still worked. And the Gulf War showed that both

Saddam Hussein and the Alliance were still of the old school.

The war contained many elements of classic propaganda:

accusations of bombed baby-milk factories and stolen baby

incubators, inflated rhetoric and inflated stakes of the conflict;

the future of the new world order and "the mother of battles"

for the future of Islam ; and the classic "us or them"

polarization in which "neutrality" or unenthusiastic support

was decried.

One element of traditional propaganda was absent, however,

while Saddam Hussein became the "new Hitler" and President

Bush was the "Great Satan," there was little demonization or

dehumanization of the opponent. Perhaps the multicultural

nature of the American-led alliance precluded turning the Iraqi

army into something subhuman. Indeed, there may have been

a spark of netwar genius in treating the Islamic Iraqi soldiers

155
leader.Under such conditions, there is no dishonor in

surrendering . And there may have been a glimpse of future

netwar-it is rumored that Baghdad Radio signed on one

morning with "The Star-Spangled Banner."

Traditional propaganda was usually targeted to influence a

mass audience. Contemporary technologies have the potential

to customize propaganda . Anyone who has received

individually targeted advertising from a company specializing

in "niche" marketing has had a momentary shudder upon

realizing that some private companies seem to know

everything about our tastes and buying habits.

Contemporary databases and multiple channels for

information transmission have created the opportunity for

custom-tailored netwar attacks . Computer bulletin boards,

cellular telephones, video cameras tied to fax machines-all

provide entry points and dissemination networks for customized

assault.

A major new factor in information war results directly from

the worldwide infosphere of television and broadcast news .

Many people have begun to realize that governmental

decisions are becoming increasingly reactive to a "fictive"

universe created by, CNN and its various international

competitors . This media-created universe is dubbed "fictive"

rather than "fictional" because while what is shown may be

"true," it is just not the whole, relevant, or contextual truth.

And, of course, the close etymological relationship between

"fictive" and "fictional" suggests how easy it is to manipulate

the message.

Nevertheless, this fictive universe becomes the politically

relevant universe in societies in which the government or its

military is supposed to "do something." Somalia gets in the

news and the United States gets into Somalia despite the

reality of equally disastrous starvation, disorder, and rapine

right next door in Sudan. There were no reporters with

"skylink" in Sudan because the government of Sudan issued

no visas . The potential for governments, parties in a civil war

such as Bosnia, rebels in Chiapis, or even nonstate interests

to manipulate the multimedia, multisource fictive universe to

"wage societal-level ideational conflicts" should be obvious.?

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gg, g, ,

distributed, or broadcast by governments or all sorts of players

through increasingly diversified networks . The nichemanipulation potential available to states or private interests

with access to the universe of internetted communications

such as the networks over which business, commercial, or

banking information are transmitted to suggest that "Mexico"

is about to devalue the peso could easily provoke financial

chaos. The target state would not know what had happened

until too late.$

Direct satellite broadcast to selected cable systems, analogous

to central control of pay-per-view programs, again offers the

potential for people in one province or region of a targeted

state to discover that the maximum leader has decided to

purge their clansmen from the army. To put it in the jargon of

the infowarriors, info-niche attack 'in an increasingly

multisource fictive universe offers unlimited potential for

societal-level netwar.

Pictures Worth A Thousand Tanks

When the new, but already well-understood, simulation

technologies of the Tekwar and MTV generation are added to

the arsenal of netwar, a genuinely revolutionary transformation of propaganda and warfare becomes possible .

Traditional propaganda might have attempted to discredit an

adversary's news media showing, for example, that as the

official casualty figures were demonstrably false, all "news"

from the government was equally false. The credibility of the

opponent was the target and the strategic intention was to

separate the government from the people.

Today, the mastery of the techniques of combining live

actors with computer-generated video graphics can easily

create a "virtual" news conference, summit meeting, or

perhaps even a battle which exists in "effects" though not in

fact. Stored video images can be recombined endlessly to

produce any effect chosen. Now, perhaps, "pictures" will be

worth a thousand tanks.

157
people of the targeted nation discover that the nationwide

broadcast of the conversation between the maximum leader

and "Jimmy Carter" in which all loyal citizens were told to

cease fighting and return to their homes was created in

Hollywood or Langley, the war may be over . Netwar is

beginning to enter the zone of illusion.

This is not science fiction; these are the capabilities of

existing or rapidly emerging technologies. Here's how it might

work: through hitching a ride on an unsuspecting commercial

satellite, a "fictive simulation" is broadcast. Simultaneously,

various "info-niches" in the target state are accessed via "the

net." These info-niche targets, and the information they

receive, are tailored to the strategic needs of the moment:

some receive reinforcement for the fictive simulation; other

receive the "real" truth ; others receive merely slight variations.

What is happening here?

This kind of manipulation elevates the strategic potential of

infopropaganda to new heights . This is not traditional

propaganda in which the target is discredited as a source of

reliable information. Rather, the very possibility of "truth" is

being replaced with "virtual reality"; that is, "information"

which produces effects independent of its physical reality.

What is being attacked in a strategic level netwar are not only

the emotions, or motives, or beliefs of the target population,

but the very power of objective reasoning: this threatens the

very possibility of state control.

Let us return to the previous scenario to play out its effects .

The fictive simulation of the maximum leader's call to stop

fighting would, of course, be followed immediately by a "real"

broadcast in which state "Voice and Vision" exposes the

netwar attack as propaganda invented by "culture destroyers

in Hollywood." "Jimmy Carter" is denounced as a hoax. But

the damage has already been done: it is all but impossible for

the television viewers of the targeted state to tell which

broadcast is true and which fiction, at least in a timely

manner. In a society under assault across its entire

infosphere, it will become increasingly difficult for members of

that society to verify internally the truth or accuracy of

anything. Objective reasoning is threatened .

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contradictory information and data; 

py, 

ability to "orient" is weakened by the assault on the very

possibility of objective reasoning; "decisions" respond

increasingly to a fictive or virtual universe and, of course,

governmental or military "actions" become increasingly chaotic

as there is no "rational" relationship of means to ends.

It would seem, then, that strategic-level netwar or information

war brings us within sight of that elusive "acme of skill"

wherein the enemy is subdued without killing by attacking his

ability to form a coherent strategy. 9

Reality, however, may be far more complex than the

infowarriors yet imagine, and victory not so neat. The idea of

"societal-level ideational conflict" may need to be considered

with all the care given to the conduct of nuclear war, as the

"end state" of netwar may not be bloodless surrender but total

disruption of the targeted society. Victory may be too costly as

the cost may be truth itself.

What Is Truth?

Any discussion of information warfare, netwar, cyberwar, or

even perception manipulation as a component of command

and control warfare by the armed forces of the United States at

the strategic level must occur in the context of the moral

nature of communication in a pluralistic, secular, democratic

society. That is, the question must be raised whether using the

techniques of information warfare at the strategic level is

compatible with American purposes and principles.

Likewise, the question must be raised whether the armed

forces of the United States have either the moral or legal

authority and, more importantly, the practical ability to

develop and deploy the techniques of information warfare at

the strategic level in a prudent and practical manner. There

are good reasons to be skeptical.

According to the philosopher Eric Voegelin, the moral basis

of communication in any society can be discussed in terms of

its substantive, pragmatic, and intoxicant functions . 10 The

substantive purpose of communication is the building or

developing of the individual human personality ; it is

159
y p, developed and

sustained . Simply, it is the glue which binds a society together.

At the most trivial level, the moral purpose of substantive

communication can be seen in contemporary American efforts

to remove sexist or racist language from accepted use. At a

more serious level, the debates in American society about

prayer in the public schools illustrate a recognition of the

substantive and formative nature of communication in society,

as "private religious views," in the view of many, must not

corrupt the public school formation of character for life in

pluralistic, modern America.

Finally, any real world society rests on the substantive

communication and understanding among its members .

Again, in Voegelin's terms, society is no mere external

structure of relationships ; it is a "cosmion," a universe of

meaning "illuminated with meaning from within by the human

beings who continuously create and bear it as the mode and

condition of their self-realization ."' 1

The efforts of several nations such as China, Iran, or Saudi

Arabia to insulate their societies from the effects of the global

communications network illustrate their awareness that their

cultures and societies may depend on a shared, substantive

universe of discourse distinctive to their societies.

Even within the West, the French believe the continued

existence of France as a distinctive society organized for action

in history may require state intervention in the substantive

content of communication within society.

12 That France seeks

to limit the percentage of foreign broadcast material and

American films in Europe illustrates the seriousness with

which they consider the substantive nature of communication.

Voegelin's second construct, identifying the pragmatic

function of communication in society, is reasonably

straightforward. Pragmatic communication is defined by its

goal and consists of the universe of techniques designed to

influence other persons to behave in ways the communicator

wishes . Only behavior matters. Most political and commercial

communication is merely pragmatic . It is usually indifferent

to the substantive moral content of the communication and

intends to mold perception, and consequently behavior, to the

160
course, the central essence of information war. Its use by the

government and the armed forces is, consequently, the real issue.

Finally, the intoxicant function of communication in

American society is equally straightforward . The addiction of a

considerable part of the citizenry to talk shows, soap operas,

romance novels, professional sports broadcasts, high-profile

legal trials and other well-known forms of distraction and

diversion is well catered to by the entertainment industry.

For Voegelin then, civil communication or public discourse in

contemporary American society is dominated almost entirely by

the intoxicant and pragmatic modes. More importantly, the

absence of substantive communication in public life is defended

by much of the secular and liberal political class in the name of

freedom, pluralism, and multiculturalism.

Pluralistic America is supposed to be a society in which the

formation of character or opinion is left, through the use of

various means of communication, to private initiative .

Government attempts at "communication" in an information

war, especially if prosecuted by the armed forces, would raise

serious questions in a pluralistic, multicultural society.

The official military view of strategy, recall, is the "art and

science of developing and using political, economic,

psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace

and war to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to

increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of

victory and to lessen the chances of defeat." 13

Strategy is the means to achieve an end, with military

strategy serving political or policy purposes. A slightly different

view of strategy, however, may highlight a problem of

Information War. If strategy were seen as "a plan of action

designed to achieve some end; a purpose together with a

system of measures for its accomplishment," the limitations of

infowar thinking are obvious .

14

Sound military strategy requires influencing the adversary

decision maker in some way that is not only advantageous but

reasonably predictable. The goal is control, not chaos. A

national security strategy of information war or netwar at the

strategic level-that is, "societal-level ideational conflict waged
py

campaign to decapitate the enemy's command structure from its

body of troops may or may not be "advantageous" but, more

importantly, is unlikely to produce effects that are reasonably

predictable.

Conflict is about a determinate something, not an indeterminate anything. If the goal of influencing the adversary's ability

to "observe" by flooding him with corrupted or contradictory

information and data; disrupting his ability to "orient" by the

elimination of the possibility of objective reasoning; and forcing

his "decisions" to respond to a fictive or virtual universe,

"actions" will, of course, be produced, but they may well be

actions which are chaotic, random, nonlinear and inherently

unpredictable by our side as there is no "rational" relationship of

means to ends.

In the context of military operational-level cyberwar or

command-and-control warfare, this appeals to the infowarrior an

attractive military strategy. The inherently unpredictable nature

of combat, the notorious "fog and friction" of real battle, will be

amplified for the enemy in a successful cyberwar.

A successful cyber-strategy depends on the ability of the local

military commander to deploy his power assets, especially his

combat forces, not merely to dominate the enemy decision cycle

(which, after all, has just been rendered chaotic), but to exploit

opportunities as they evolve unpredictably from the disoriented,

decapitated, or irrational enemy actions . Whether, then,

command-and-control warfare can "shape" the battlefield or will

merely generate chaos remains to be seen.

Cyber-strategy is the control of the evolution of the battlefield

or theater power distribution to impose the allied commander's

"order" on the enemy's "chaos." As Sun-Tzu observed, 'Mose

who are able to adapt to changes in the enemy and achieve

victory are considered supreme." 15 The threat exists, however,

that the destruction of enemy rationality may collapse "battle"

into mere "fighting" with no outcome but surrender or death.

Merely defeating hostile fielded military forces may be

insufficient.

Sun-Tzu also observed that "when battles gain victories and

attacks achieve occupations, yet these successes are not

162
turmoil

.Whether the recent Gulf War was a strategic victory

or mere "battle" remains for historians to ,judge. Operationallevel cyberwar may, then, be that very "acme of skill" which

reduces the enemy will without killing. On the other hand, it

may also be the abolition of strategy as it attacks the very

rationality the enemy requires to decide for war termination.

Strategic Implications

The tools, techniques and strategy for cyberwar will be

developed and, during wartime, should be employed. In many

ways, cyberwar is more demanding than netwar.

But the resources, organization, and training needed for

cyberwar will be provided once its war-winning, and casualtyreducing, potential is grasped by the national political

leadership. Such a development would certainly be prudent.

On the other hand, many of the tools and techniques of

battlefield cyberwar can be applied to netwar or strategic-level

information war. This application may not be prudent,

however, as there are serious reasons to doubt the ability of

the United States to prosecute information war successfully.

One reason is that the United States is an open society; it

may be too vulnerable to engage in netwar with an adversary

prepared to "fight back."I 7 The communications infrastructure,

the "information highway," is "wide open" in our society.

American society may be terribly vulnerable to a strategic

netwar attack; getting us to believe fictive claims appears to be

what commercial and political advertising are all about, and

they seem to be effective . Also we may find physical control

and security to be impossible. The domestic computer,

communication, and information networks essential for the

daily functioning of American society are very vulnerable to

penetration and manipulation-even destruction-by determined

hackers. 18 In the future, these may not be amateurs but

well-paid "network ninjas" inserting the latest French, Iranian,

or Chinese virus into Compuserve or other parts of the

internet. 19

A strategic information warfare attack on America's

communication systems, including our military communication

163
pumping software,and computer

based clock/timing systems,

could result in societal paralysis .

Currently, for example, over 14,000 Internet databases are

being used by over 30 million people in over 90 nations. Over

1,600 software pirates are prowling the Internet, some in the

employ of hostile commercial or intelligence services . The

recent "spy flap" between France and the United States over

alleged US attempts to gather data on French Telecom may be

indicative of the future. 2o

Infosphere dominance-controlling the world of information

exchange-may be as complex and elusive as "escalation

dominance" appeared to be in nuclear strategy. 2 l It will

certainly be expensive: the US business community and the

US armed forces are required to devote ever more resources

and attention to computer, communications, and database

security. The resources and skills required for battlefield

cyberwar are not insignificant, but the resources and skills

required to wage Information War at the national strategic

level would be massive.

The second reason to doubt US ability to prosecute an information war is that the political and legal issues surrounding info

war are murky. What of congressional oversight? Would one

"declare" information war in response, say, to an Iranianoriginated computer virus assault on the FBI's central terrorist

database? And what about preparing for it? How should we

develop and implement a national capability for netwar?

While theoretically a requirement to develop or implement a

national information war strategy, analogous to the nuclearera single integrated operations plan, could be communicated

from the president to the executive branch agencies, it is

unclear whether there would be adequate congressional

oversight. Which committees of the House or Senate would

have control and oversight of policies attendant to information

war, and which would have the power to inquire into the

judgment of a local ambassador or military commander who

wished to use the tools of cyberwar for a perception

manipulation in peacetime that would shape the potential

wartime environment?22

164
strategy-they do not control it . However, they are developing,

quite appropriately, the tools and techniques to execute the

national military strategy for operational-level cyberwar. They

are simultaneously, albeit unintentionally, developing the tools

and capabilities to execute a national strategic information war

strategy. The former is their job under the Constitution; the

latter may not be. Congressional oversight in the development of

a national strategic-level information war capability is even more

essential than oversight of the intelligence community.

The third reason to doubt US capabilities in prosecuting an

effective information war is that such a "societal-level ideational

conflict waged in part through internetted modes of

communication" may simply be beyond the competence of the

executive agencies that would have to determine the substantive

content to be communicated. Pluralism is a great strength of

American society, but perhaps a drawback in waging information

war.

While diversity may make the formation and execution of

domestic and even foreign policy more complex, the lack of a

moral center or public philosophy in American society could

render the political leadership incapable of building a consensus

on strategic-level information war policies. And, since there is no

single view of what is morally acceptable, but simply a host of

contending views, a national security strategy of information war

could be developed by the national security decision makers that

lacked a moral consensus.

The technological wizardry does not change the humanity of

the target. Unless the goal of information war is merely to

unhinge people from their ability to reason objectively, and

thereby create an interesting problem for post-conflict

reconstruction, any strategic-level netwar or information war

would seem to require the ability to communicate a replacement

for the discredited content of the target society.

If, say, an information war were to be mounted against China

to disrupt its drive for regional hegemony, the goal would be to

"withdraw the Mandate of Heaven" from the rulers and

"influence" the Chinese leaders and people to adopt the policies

or behavior we find appropriate.

165
philosophically problematic nature of information war

becomes outrageously obvious. Does anyone really believe that

the US national executive agencies, including the armed forces

and the Central Intelligence Agency, know the substantive

discourse of China sufficiently well to withdraw the Mandate of

Heaven?

The final reason, they{, can be stated in the form of a

question : does anyone really believe that anyone in the US

government has the philosophical sophistication to project an

alternative discourse to replace the emotions, motives,

reasoning, and behavior grounded in the Chinese reality we

propose to influence? Would our "fictive" creation really have

"virtual" effects. We might be able to use the armed forces or

the CIA to destroy China's objective reasoning through a

"successful" information war. Indeed, we might be able to

loose anarchy in a society, but that is not usually the political

goal of war.

Second Thoughts

The techniques being developed by the armed forces for a

more narrowly constrained operational-level cyberwar was

demonstrated in the Gulf War. Translated to the strategic

level, however, netwar or information war is not a prudent

national security or military strategy for the simple reason that

neither the armed forces nor any other instruments of national

power have the ability to exploit an adversary's society in a

way that promises either advantageous or predictable results .

"Societal-level ideational conflict" must be considered with

all the care given to the conduct of nuclear war, as the "end

state" of a netwar may be total disruption of the targeted

society. Conflict resolution, including ending wars this side of

blasting people into unconditional surrender, assumes and

requires some-rationality-even if that rationality is the mere

coordination of ends with means .

Moral reasoning and substantive communication may not

be required; minimal reasoning and pragmatic communication

are required. However, a successful all-out strategic-level

information war may, however, have destroyed the enemy's

166
In some exercises during the cold war "decapitation" of the

Soviet military leadership in a hypothetical nuclear exchange

was intended to defend the United States by preventing an

escalatory or exploitative strike, nuclear or otherwise. Precisely

how war termination would have been accomplished without

an effective leadership will remain, hopefully, one of the great

mysteries . The "decapitation" of the leadership is, however,

often proposed as a key goal of an information war. That is,

the credibility and legitimacy-even the physical ability to

communicate-of the decisionmakers will be compromised or

destroyed relative to their own population and in terms of their

own worldview. And even if we merely "seize" his

communication system electronically and substitute our

"reality" into his society, with whom, then, do we negotiate the

end of the conflict?

What confidence do we have that a call to surrender, even if

communicated to the people by either the enemy leadership or

our "net warriors," would be accepted as "real" and not another

"virtual" event? And, depending on the content, intensity, and

"totality" of a strategic information war, personalities could be

flooded with irrational or unconsciousness factors-the clinical

consequence of which is generally acute psychosis . How do we

accomplish conflict resolution, war termination, or postconflict

reconstruction with a population or leadership whose "objective

reasoning" has been compromised?

Just as the mutually destructive effects of nuclear war

were disproportionate to the goals of almost any imaginable

conflict, so may be the mutually destructive effects of a "total"

information war exchange on the publics exposed and

subsequent rational communication between the sides. And as

the techniques of "cyberstrike" proliferate throughout the world,

enabling small powers, nonstate actors, or even terrorist hackers

to do massive damage to the United States, "mutually assured

cyberdestruction" may result in a kind of infowar deterrence. As

Sun-Tzu advised, "without advantage, do not act; without gain,

do not utilize ; without crises, do not battle."23

Information War, then, may be the central national security

issue of the twenty-first century. Therefore, the United States

167
facilitate this objective, the US armed forces are developing,

under the rubric of command and control warfare, the

technologies and systems that will provide the capability for

"cyberwar."

It may be possible to control and exploit information so as to

purposely generate stochastic chaos, though there are some

doubts. 24 Many of the same technologies and systems can be

used to develop a national-level capability for strategic

"netwar ." Here, however, there are genuine doubts . As

Voegelin feared, it may not be possible to control and exploit

information and information technologies to impose "a form

on the remnants of societies no longer capable of selforganization" because their substantive universe of meaning

has been destroyed or corrupted. 25

Few info-warriors would claim the ability to "reorient" the

former Soviet Union into a liberal society, or to influence the

far more ancient barbarism in that heart of darkness, Rwanda.

Perhaps strategic-level information war is, indeed, like nuclear

war: the capability is required for deterrence; its employment,

the folly of mutually assured destruction. But if the United

States is to develop the capacity for information war, in the

sure and certain knowledge that the technologies have already

"proliferated" to both state and nonstate potential rivals, a

realistic national consensus must be built.

It is useless to pretend that the proliferation of these

technologies will not provide capabilities that can do serious

harm. It is useless to pretend that military-based command

and control warfare capabilities will not be developed, and it is

useless to pretend that cyberwar technologies could not be

turned to netwar applications . It is almost universally agreed

that these capabilities are essential on the contemporary

battlefield .

It is essential, then, that the president and the Congress

give serious and sustained attention to cyberwar, netwar, and

information war.

168
1 . Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (New York:

Doubleday, 1939), 70.

2. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989),

350.

3. Alvin & Heidi Toffler, War and Antiwar: Survival at the Dawn of the

21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993), 141 .

4. The vocabulary of information warfare includes information war,

information-based war, command and control warfare, information

operations, C3I, electronic warfare, and, in Russian usage, sixth-generation

warfare.

5. Bruce Sterling, Islands in the Net (New York: Ace, 1988) .

6. John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Comingl," Comparative

Strategy 12: no.2 (April-June, 1993), 141-165.

7. Historians may record that Ecuador's posting of government

communiques on the internet at the beginning of the recent "war" with Peru

may have been the first "netstrike." "A Borderless Dispute," Newsweek, 20

February 1995, 20.

8. H .D . Arnold et. al, "Targeting Financial Systems as Centers of

Gravity : 'Low Intensity' to 'No Intensity Conflict,' Defense Analysis, 10, no. 2.

August, 1994, 181-208.

9. Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., Sun-tzw The Art of War (New York: Barnes

& Noble, 1994), 177.

10. Eric Voegelin, "Necessary Moral Bases for Communication in a

Democracy," Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society (Milwaukee:

Marquette University Press, 1956), 53-68.

11. Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, (Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press, 1952), 27.

12. John Andrews, "Culture Wars," Wired, May 1995, 130-138.

13. Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory ofPower

Control (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1967), 14.

14. Sun-Tzu, The Art ofWar, trans., J.H. Huang. (New York: Quill, 1993),

68.

15. Ibid, 109.

16. Peter Black, "Soft Kill: fighting infrastructure wars in the 21st

century," Wired, July/August 1993, 49-50.

17. Paul Wallich, "A Rogue's Routing," Scientific American 272, no. 5,

(May 1995), 31 .

18. Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic

Superhighway (New York: Thunders Mountain Press, 1994) .

19. Jean Pichot-Duclos, "Toward a French 'Economic Intelligence'

Model," Defense Nationale, Jan 1994, 73-85, in Federal Broadcast

Information Service - West Europe 25 January 1994, 26-31 .

20 . John Arquilla, "The Strategic Implications of Information

Dominance," Strategic Review, Summer, 1994, 24-30.

21 . Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 30, Command and

Control Warfare, 8 March 1993.

169
y 

(Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 1994) .

24. Eric Voegelin, '"The Ecumenic Age," in Order and History (Baton

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 117.

25. Brig V.K. Nair, War in the Gulf Lessons for the Third World (New

Delhi: Lancer International, 1991) .
Information Warfare:

Impacts and Concerns

Col James W. McLendon, USAF

Information has always been a critical factor in war.

Clausewitz said "imperfect knowledge of the situation . . . can

bring military action to a standstill," and Sun Tzu indicated

information is inherent in war fighting. Information warfare

embodies the impact of information on military operations .

The computer age gives us the capability to absorb, evaluate,

use, transmit, and exchange large volumes of information at

high speeds to multiple recipients simultaneously. Multiple

sources of data can be correlated faster than ever. Thus, the

value of information to the war fighter has been magnified to a

new level.

Churchill used information warfare when he used the

Enigma machine to read German codes during World War

II . He also used information warfare through his elaborate

network emanating from the London Controlling Section,

for its time a very complex intelligence and deception

operation.

Lessons from Desert Storm gave impetus to this fourth

dimension of warfare. It was in this conflict that the computer

came of age, and presented us with new challenges, both

offensively and defensively, that must be faced in the future.

Not only do we have opportunities to enhance our offensive

capabilities manyfold, but we must consider the additional

vulnerabilities to our systems that come with this added

capability . The widespread availability of information

technology dictates that we carefully assess the vulnerabilities

of the systems we employ.

Information warfare adds a fourth dimension of warfare to

those of air, land, and sea . In this new dimension, we must

stay ahead .
Given the wide realm of activities that might be included

under the heading of information warfare, one might conclude

that it is not a new concept but rather one that can be more

aggressively employed today with new technology. Had the

term information warfare existed in Churchill's day, he might

have used it to describe his activities involving Ultra. Given the

availability of communications and computer technology

today, the potential for information warfare seems limitless .

Unlike nuclear weaponry, however, this technology is not

limited to a few nations. It is widespread and available to any

country, and, in most cases, to any individual or group that

wants it. It is for this reason that our pursuit of an offensive

information warfare capability must not overshadow our

appreciation of the need for a defensive capability.

This essay offers evidence of the need for a rigorous defensive

information warfare capability. It includes a case study from

World .War II that demonstrates Churchill's creativity in using

information warfare against the Germans and proposes that

history may not have completely documented his activities in

this endeavor. From World War II, we move to the Persian Gulf

War, where information technology was embedded in virtually

every aspect of Coalition operations. Our dependence on

information media during the Gulf War is evident . This

dependency may also equate to yet unknown vulnerabilities,

thus highlighting the need for the protection of these media.

Information has always been a critical factor in war. According

to Clausewitz, "imperfect knowledge of the situation . . . can bring

military action to a standstill ."' Pick up any book on war, and

the value of information becomes clear. As indicated by Sun Tzu

in 500 B.C., it is inherent in warfighting. 2 It may be obvious that

the more an army knows about itself and its enemy, the stronger

it will be in battle. What is not so obvious are the uses that may

be made of information, and how knowledge can be manipulated

to reinforce the strength of an army many times over.

Information warfare embodies the impact of information, or

knowledge, on military operations. It is defined as "any action to

deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information and

its functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and

172
this context, information warfare 

p

realm and lucrative target."4 While this definition is new, the

concept isn't. It is only as we come to terms with the benefits

of the computer age that we realize the potential in conducting

the operations described above.

The computer age gives us the capability to absorb, evaluate,

use, transmit, and exchange large volumes of information at

high speeds to multiple recipients simultaneously. Multiple

sources of data can be correlated faster than ever. Until recently,

masses of information were transmitted in the literal, or

alphanumeric format, and had to be read and manually

manipulated to be of any use. This made it difficult to sort the

critical from the useful, and much of the information went into

the burn bag. Today, much of that same information is

transmitted to the war fighter digitally and presented graphically.

Little goes to waste. Thus, the value of information, its uses, and

our dependence on it have been magnified to a new level.

Duane Andrews, former assistant secretary of defense for

C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence),

describes information today as a "strategic asset." 5 The

Tofflers go even further. In their discussion on third wave war,

they refer to "knowledge warriors," describing them as

"intellectuals in and out of uniform dedicated to the idea that

knowledge can win, or prevent, wars ." 6

Maj Gen Kenneth Minihan, Air Force assistant chief of staff for

intelligence, describes information warfare in more objective

terms, which he says is really "information dominance. " 7 In

describing information dominance, he puts it this way:

Information dominance is not "my pile of information is bigger

than yours" in some sort of linear sense. It is not just a way to

reduce the fog of war on our side or thicken it on the enemy's

side. It is not analysis of yesterday's events, although proper

application of historical analysis is important to gaining

information dominance. It is something that is battled for, like air

superiority. It is a way of increasing our capabilities by using that

information to make right decisions, (and) apply them faster than

the enemy can. It is a way to alter the enemy's entire perception

of reality . It is a method of using all information at our disposal to

predict (and affect) what happens tomorrow before the enemy

even jumps out ofbed and thinks about what to do today."8

173
forms, is the keystone to success. 

9

The Department of Defense and all of the services are doing

more than paying lip service to this new dimension . In

addition to their attempts to fund extended programs in this

subject, senior military leaders are taking strong positions in

favor of this capability. Unfortunately, while the United States

holds the lead in information technology today, other nations,

including developing nations, are rapidly gaining access to this

capability. This is cause for concern, and the answers are not

simple.

Information Warfare in World War H:

How Far Did Churchill Go?

World War II saw many firsts . Some of the more significant

examples were : large-scale air-to-air combat, strategic

bombing-both daylight and nightthe use of naval carriers

to project airpower, and the first and only uses of atomic

bombs during hostilities. The following case study asserts that

we also saw the first widespread and well-orchestrated use of

information warfare, and presents a hypothetical model for

interaction between deception and cryptanalysis .

Many of us remain intrigued by the clandestine and covert

operations conducted by the Allies in WWII . This study

discusses two of those operations : deception and

cryptanalysis based on radio intercepts . It also, and more

importantly, attempts to build a model for an interactive

relationship between the two that could have synergistically

improved the contributions of these operations to the

successful prosecution of the war. The model, though purely

hypothetical, uses facts to present a case for the potential of

maximizing misinformation through the integration of these

two disciplines. Said another way, this paper suggests that

the Allied leadership, specifically Winston Churchill, found

cryptanalysis necessary but not sufficient for victory .

Cryptanalysis and deception were both necessary and

174
pg

The Logic of the Model

The question posed is whether Prime Minister Churchill

would, or could, have selectively chosen to chance using the

Enigma (the machine used by the Germans to encipher

high-grade wireless traifici°) to encipher notional messages

and intrude on German wireless radio nets to misinform the

Germans on Allied intentions or otherwise disrupt German

military operations.

Churchill's concern for the security of the Enigma, and the

knowledge that it was being used by the Allies, was

considerable, as will be shown later. The risk of compromising

Allied use of the Enigma was colossal, affecting many lives and

the potential outcome of many battles. On the other hand,

successful deception could be equally effective .

For Churchill to have taken this step would have been

boldness from "sheer necessity" in the strictest Clausewitian

terms. 11 The risk in not doing so would have to have been

greater than the risk in doing so. The logic of the model is that

if Churchill directed that messages encrypted using Enigma be

transmitted, he would only have done so out of necessitywhen Britain was in dire straits.

"Deception is as old as war itself." 12 Although this statement

is from WWII, it was clearly not a revelation of fact. Sun Tzu

included deception as one of his tenets of warfare when he

said, "All warfare is based on deception ." 13 The modern

complexities of war and the ensuing technological

advancements enhance the means through which deception

can be employed, and WWII was no exception. The use of

deception during WWII has been widely publicized. At least

one book, The Man Who Never Was, was published and a

movie by the same title was made about a single event.

14

Deception and its implementation occur in both the strategic

and tactical spheres. The example documented above was

strategic in its support of the Normandy invasion. Tactical

deception at that time was thought to fall under three headings,

visual, aural (or sonic), and radio.

15 While aural deception might

175
p

objectives at both the strategic and operational levels.

It is not surprising that most information concerning

deception activities remained classified for many years after

the war and is only now coming to the attention of the public.

It appears that most, if not all, of the information concerning

tactical deception has been declassified . This is not the case

with another stratagem used against the Germans, that of

intercepting radio communications and using the Enigma

machine to decipher the message transmissions . While

previously classified documents concerning Ultra are now

largely available to the public, a review of the primary sources

reveals that many still contain blank pages that are marked

"not releasable" while others contain portions that have been

blanked out with no explanation. Thus, even though we know

much more today than we did 15 years ago about these

activities, public access remains unavailable for much of it .

These continuing restrictions may well be the result of

comments made on 15 April 1943 by Col Alfred McCormack in a

memorandum to Col Carter W. Clarke. McCormack, then "Mr

McCormack," had earlier been appointed as special assistant to

the secretary of war to study the uses of Ultra and establish

procedures for making the best use of this source. At the time of

the memorandum, McCormack was deputy chief of the Special

Branch and worked for its chief, Colonel Clarke. The purpose of

the Special Branch was to handle signals intelligence.

McCormack's memorandum consists of 54 pages on the origin,

functions, and problems of the Special Branch, Military

Intelligence Service (MIS) . In this memorandum, McCormack

describes, in his view, Ultra security requirements as follows:

One lapse of security is all that is necessary to dry up a radio

intercept source. Therefore, both on the officer level and below, only

persons of the greatest good sense and discretion should be

employed on this work. This consideration is basic since intercept

information involves a different kind of secrecy than does most other

classified information. It will make no difference a year from now

how much the enemy knows about our present troop dispositions,

about the whereabouts of our naval forces or about other similar

facts that now are clearly guarded secrets. But it will make a lot of

difference one year from now-and possibly many years from

176
secrecy until the battle is over, but permanent secrecy of this

operation is what we should strive for. i s

This secrecy was maintained throughout the war. Only

carefully selected individuals in Washington and in the field

had access to the information produced through these

intercepts. The procedures for use by field commanders and

their personnel, including controls established to protect the

information and its source were laid out in a letter to General

Eisenhower from General Marshall on 15 March 1944.

17 These

procedures lasted at least through the end of the war.

The Origin of Ultra

Ultra's origin begins with the delivery of a German Enigma

machine to the British by Polish dissidents. The history and

acquisition of the Enigma machine are quite lengthy and

complex. It is sufficient here to reflect that the Poles had

established a successful cryptanalytic effort against the

Germans by the early 1930s, having begun their efforts in the

early 1920s. 18 Using their own copy of the Enigma, they

achieved their first successful break in reading Enigma ciphers

in December 1932 and January 1933. 19 Between 1933 and

1939, successful reading of Enigma traffic was purely a Polish

achievement. 2° Once the Enigma fell into British hands,

however, they took the lead and used it successfully throughout

the war.

Enter Winston Churchill

Winston Churchill had a profound interest in the Ultra traffic

produced from Enigma and required that all important decrypts

be provided to him . 21 His interest in codebreaking is

documented as early as November 1924 when, as the chancellor

of the exchequer, he requested access to intercepts . 22 In his

request, he stated, "I have studied this information over a long

period and more attentively than probably any other Minister

has done. . . I attach more importance to them as a means of

forming a true judgment of public policy in these spheres than to

any other source of knowledge at the disposal of the State." 23

177
minister, he directed he be provided 

y g

messages. -24 When this traffic became overwhelming in volume,

he backed off to receiving several dozen messages a day. 25

During a visit to Bletchley Park, the headquarters for the British

cryptanalytic organization, he spoke to a crowd of the station

managers and referred to them as "the geese that laid the golden

eggs and never cackled. " 26 After the war, Churchill reiterated his

faith in Ultra, describing it as his "secret weapon"27 and stating

his belief that "it had saved England. "28

Churchill's concern for security of Ultra was paramount. He

directed that no action be taken in response to Ultra intercepts

unless cover could be provided,29 and he, in fact, repeatedly

allowed naval convoys to come under U-boat attack rather than

risk compromising Ultra security. 3o

Churchill was also directly involved in the conduct of deception

operations. He established the London Controlling Section (LCS)

in his headquarters specifically to plan those stratagems

necessary "to deceive Hitler and the German General Staff about

Allied operations in the war against the Third Reich. "31

Not only did Churchill establish the LCS but he also

personally conceived the idea for this organization after a series

of successful uses of deception in the Libyan desert led to the

defeat of Italian forces. In one of those instances, a small British

force of 36,000 men defeated an Italian force of 310,000 using

deceptive measures. Realizing he was outnumbered and about to

be overrun, the British commander used inflatable rubber tanks,

field guns, two-ton trucks, and prime movers to present the

image of a larger force. He employed crowds of Arabs with

camels and horses to drag harrow-like equipment to stir up dust

storms, and he used antiaircraft artillery to keep the Italian

reconnaissance aircraft high-precluding them from sorting out

the actual order of battle on the ground.

The Italians perceived a force on their right flank much larger

than theirs and tried to run. Using only two divisions, the British

captured 130,000 prisoners, 400 tanks, and 1,290 guns. Their

losses were minimal for the magnitude of the conflict500 killed

in action, 1,400 wounded, and 55 missing in action. 32 This

impressive event rocked London and gave credence to further

development of this capability. This action, and others similar to

178
it could be applied on a broader scale. Thus, LCS was born.

The LCS was the first bureaucracy designed expressly to

deceive . 33 It was "members of the LCS and those of other

British and American secret bureaus"34 who developed and

executed LCS activities, referring to their weapons as "special

means." 35 In this context, "special means" is "a vaguely

sinister term that included a wide variety of surreptitious,

sometimes murderous, always intricate operations of covert

warfare designed to cloak overt military operations in secrecy

and to mystify Hitler about the real intentions of the allies." 3s

Back to Ultra-Its Contribution

Ultra proved its value as early as mid-July 1940 when it

provided forewarning of German plans to attack England.

Intercepts at that time revealed Hitler's directive outlining the

planned invasion of England. The invasion was to begin with

an air campaign. These intercepts continued, reaching a point

of two-to three-hundred per day-all being read at Bletchley

Park. On 13 August, when the first air raids began, the British

were more informed of the plans than were many of the

Luftwaffe units . 37

Clearly, Ultra intercepts provided the bulk of intelligence to

the Allies during the war. By June 1944, 90 percent of the

European intelligence summaries provided to Washington

were based on Ultra information. 38 Ultra provided information

on force disposition and German intentions at both the

strategic and tactical levels. Ralph Bennett describes Ultra's

contribution succinctly in his preface to Ultra in the West

For by often revealing the enemy's plans to them before they

decided their own, Ultra gave the Allied Commander an

unprecedented advantage in battle: since Ultra was derived from

decodes of the Wehrmacht's wireless communications, there

could be no doubt about its authenticity, and action based upon

it could be taken with the greatest confidence. So prolific was the

source that at many points the Ultra account of the campaign is

almost indistinguishable from the "total" account. 39

Ultra information also has been described as "more precise,

more trustworthy, more voluminous, more continuous, longer

lasting, and available faster, at a higher level, and from more

179
provided information on German intercepts and analysis of

British and American radio networks. 41 Taking advantage of this

latter knowledge, the Allies established an elaborate

communications network designed expressly to transmit bogus

traffic that would misinform the Germans of their intentions and

operations. What would have prevented including encrypted

Enigma messages directly to the Germans in this bogus traffic?

Radio Deception

The British and Americans used manipulation through cover

and deception to target specific sources of enemy information.

For example, they released false information to the world press

and staged activities that "made the news." They deceived enemy

air reconnaissance through the maneuver of real troops, use of

controlled camouflage (both to conceal and intentionally show

indiscretions), dummy equipment, and "Q" lighting (the

positioning of lights to draw bombers to nonexisting airfields) .

Aware that German radio intercept units were targeting their

transmissions, they used a three-pronged strategy against the

German listening stations. First, they prepared notional radio

__traffic to be_ transmitted by sQecial deception troops over nets

established solely for the purpose of deception. Second, they sent

notional radio traffic over authentic operational nets. Finally,

they regulated the genuine traffic passed on authentic

operational nets, creating dead time and peak traffic levels. 42

Signal troops employed in deception activities were specially

trained in these operations43 and thoroughly indoctrinated on

the sensitivities that accompanied their efforts . The following

statement was among the many instructions concerning security

provided to them:

You must realize that the enemy is probably listening to every

message you pass on the air and is well aware that there is a

possibility that he is being bluffed. It is therefore vitally important

that your security is perfect; one careless mistake may disclose

the whole plan. 44

One of the most elaborate schemes employing radio deception

was used in support of the First US Army Group (FUSAG), a

notional, fictive organization headed by Gen George S. Patton,

180
composed of more than fifty divisionslocated in southeast

England. Aware that the Germans anticipated an Allied attack,

the purpose in establishing a nonexistent FUSAG was to persuade

the Germans that the attack would take place at Pas de Calais. 47

The radio net supporting FUSAG represented the following

units: a Canadian army, a US army, a Canadian corps, three US

corps, a Canadian infantry division, a Canadian armored division,

six US infantry divisions, and four US armored divisions. 48

The Case

Enigma traffic provided the tip-offs to the planned German

invasion of Britain well in advance. The speed with which

Bletchley Park was reading the German Enigma permitted the

British cryptanalysts to extract intelligence from several hundred

messages a day, even though the Enigma settings were complex

and changed frequently.

The Enigma used wheels that had to be set in the proper order

for the decryption to take place. These settings were usually

changed every 24 hours with minor settings changed more often.

Other minor settings were made with each message. The tip-off

to the receiver for these latter settings was contained in the

transmission . 49 The speed with which these messages were

deciphered could have provided the essential information

required by the British to use the machine to other advantages.

From the volume of intercept, it is obvious the British knew

their targets' organizations and frequencies. The traffic would

have provided them with information on message originators,

addressees, associated organizations, and formats-allowing

them to reconstruct necessary elements of the German radio

communications network. The German use of "standard

phrases, double encipherment. . . their lack of an effective,

protective monitoring program, and their unshakable-even

arrogant-confidence in Enigma"5U made it unlikely they

would use authentication devices in their messages . The

Germans then clearly were vulnerable to deception efforts

using encrypted Enigma messages broadcast by the nets

serving the London Controlling Section. Would Churchill have

taken the risks associated with exploiting this vulnerability?
The Battle of Britain and the Normandy invasion were two of

the most significant events in WWII . The Battle of Britain,

particularly, represented a critical period for the British. The

defeat of Germany in that battle required the all-out effort by

Britain. The battle began with each side roughly equivalent in

front-line fighters, but it was touch and go until the Luftwaffe

lost its ability to mount sustained attacks . 51 The dangers

facing the British during the massive air raids might have

convinced Churchill at some point that it would be worth the

risk to use the Enigma to intrude on German radio nets.

Perhaps relying on the confusion and disorder he knew existed

among some of the Luftwaffe units,52 his assessment as to the

potential for success could have led to this risky decision.

From 13 August until mid-September, 1940, the Luftwaffe

conducted raids during daylight hours, and Ultra traffic

revealed most, if not all, the targets that were to be hit.

Interestingly, beginning in mid-September and lasting

throughout October, the raids were flown at night, and the

only target references available through Ultra were code

names representing target locations. Had something tipped

the Germans their mail was being read?

On 14 November, Ultra revealed Coventry as a target and at

least one British official believed naming the town instead of

using a code word was a mistake on the part of the

Germans. 53 The use of code words surely made Churchill

nervous, giving him cause to question if British use of Enigma

had been compromised. This concern could account for his

widely reported decision to take no action to evacuate Coventry

other than to alert fire, ambulance, and police units.-'14

The Normandy Invasion was the last critical juncture for the

Allies. A successful invasion would bring Germany and the

Third Reich to their downfall. In preparing for the invasion,

Operation Bodyguard had already been implemented.

The infrastructure for radio deception was in place and in

use. This infrastructure would also have made an excellent

point of origin for intrusion into German radio nets, using the

Enigma to encipher messages for transmission. Schemes

could have been devised using notional traffic sent over the

182
Enigma. Bletchley personnel could prepare the Enigma traffic

and send it to the radio deception units to be transmitted

verbatim on specified frequencies. The personnel employed in

the radio deception were well trained for their purpose and

indoctrinated in the secrecy of their work.

If Churchill saw the invasion as the last big push to defeat

Germany, he may also have viewed selective use of intrusion

as justified and worth the risk. Given the increasing disruption

that occurs with the multiplying intensity of battle, the risk

would have gradually diminished with time during the course

of the fight. As the risk diminished, the opportunities would

have grown. Greater opportunities would have been enticing to

Churchill, especially if there were opportunities to shape the

postwar world.

Much of the history of WWII may need to be rewritten

because of the revelations of Ultra contributions . Revelations

include those already made and those yet to be made .

Considering what we now know about Ultra operations, one

can assume that credit for success in a battle often went to the

wrong party. The men and women at Bletchely Park and other

locations, who were involved in providing advance warning

and other information to Allied forces may never get all the

credit they are due. It is now well known that "Ultra did indeed

shape the character of strategy and operations-particularly

operations. In no other war have commanding generals had

the quality and extent of intelligence provided by Ultra."-9 -9

Whether Churchill actually used the Enigma offensively for

the purposes hypothesized here may never be known. If he

did not, maybe the cause was that it was too risky, or just

too tough to do. Maybe the Allies did not possess enough

information on the keying cycles necessary to exploit that

avenue of deception. Or maybe the Allies just missed a good

opportunity. Absent further declassification, we cannot know

for certain . While logic suggests Churchill would have

exploited Enigma, the facts may prove otherwise .

If he did use it in this manner, it would have been information

warfare at its best. Perhaps it was.

183
Technology on the Gulf War

Although the use and exchange of information have been

critical elements of war since its inception, the Gulf War was

the stage for the most comprehensive use of information, and

information denial, to date. New technologies in this conflict

enhanced the Coalition's ability to exchange and use

information and highlighted the imperative of denying the

adversary his ability to communicate with his forces .

While in large part these technologies were space-dependent,

recent advancements in digital technology permitted the rapid

processing, transmission, and display of information at all

echelons, enabling decision makers to respond rapidly to

developing situations on the battlefield. Some prototype

systems, such as JSTARS, successfully made their trial run

during this conflict, earning their place in history as

contributors to the Coalition success in this war.

Architectures enabling connectivity between these many

systems were nonexistent when Iraq invaded Kuwait; however,

they were put in place during the buildup and supported

Coalition forces for the duration of the war. These

architectures were clearly necessary to effectively control the

myriad activities operating simultaneously in the battlefield.

For example, 11 Airborne Warning and Control System

(AWACS) aircraft controlled 2,240 sorties a day, more than

90,000 during the war, with no midair collisions and no

friendly air engagements. Satellite connectivity permitted this

same air activity to be displayed live in the Pentagon command

center.

JSTARS tracked tanks, trucks, fixed installations, and other

equipment, even though this system had not met operational

capability status. Satellites, microwave, and landlines handled

700,000 phone calls and 152,000 messages a day. Coalition

forces avoided communications interference through

successful deconfliction of more than 35,000 frequencies . Any

attempt to describe the complexities of managing this system

would be an understatement.

184
(JCEOI), which was used to allocate frequencies, call signs,

call words, and suffixes for the Gulf War, was published in

over a dozen copies and weighed 85 tons in paper form. 56 This

system was used for both space and terrestrial communications.

Gulf War Space Contributions

Space assets, both military and commercial, belonging to

the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the USSR

provided the Coalition with communications, navigation,

surveillance, intelligence, and early warning, as well as

offering live television of the war to home viewers around the

world for the first time.

Using some 60 satellites, Coalition forces had access to

secure strategic and tactical communications in-theater and

into and out of the theater of operations. 57 These satellites

bridged the gap for tactical UHF and VHF signals that

heretofore had been limited to terrestrial line of sight. Thus

time-sensitive information could be exchanged between

ground, naval, and air units spread throughout the theater.

Without this capability, the communications required to support

the preparation and distribution of task orders and the

coordinated operations of AWACS, JSTARS, and conventional

intelligence collection in support of force packages in virtual and

near-real-time would have been impossible. Even though there

were still shortfalls at the tactical level in timeliness, precision,

and volume, commanders at all levels had access to

unprecedented communications capabilities .

There are some who credit the capabilities afforded by the

NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) "as making the single

most important contribution to the success of the conflict." 58

Using a constellation of 14 satellites, Coalition forces were able

to locate and designate targets with remarkable precision,

navigate through the naked Iraqi desert better than the Iraqis

themselves, and find troops in distress faster than ever before.

The US Army used the GPS to navigate the Iraqi desert in the

middle of sand storms, surprising even the Iraqis, who

themselves do not venture across it for fear of becoming lost.

185
Saddam Hussein

s armored divisions.

The use of GPS was, in large part, the result of off-the-shelf

purchases acquired by special contract arrangement; these

were the same systems that had been designed and marketed

for recreational boat use-thus, technically available to

anyone. 59 US troops stationed in Saudi Arabia also received

commercially purchased GPS devices from their relatives. 6o

Access to GPS, and its attendant capabilities, added

tremendously to the morale of Coalition forces.

More than 30 military and commercial surveillance satellites

were used for intelligence gathering during the war. 61 These

satellites provided Coalition forces with imagery, electronic

intelligence, and weather data. While these systems provided

precise targeting information on enemy locations, movement,

and capabilities, they were also essential in meeting another

Coalition objective-that of minimizing collateral damage.

Precision targeting combined with the use of precision guided

munitions significantly decreased civilian casualties and left

structures adjacent to targets intact.

Gulf War Intelligence

The rapid deployment of a variety of systems to the Persian

Gulf in response to the crisis there led to a number of

stovepiped organizations, resulting in a voluminous amount of

unfused and uncorrelated information being collected and

disseminated. Also many incompatible systems were deployed.

This lack of integrated, all-source information and the

deficiency in compatibility often placed a burden on recipients

who had neither the personnel nor the skills necessary to put

it all together in one product.

Notwithstanding this limitation, the bulk of which involved

secondary imagery production, the evidence shows that timely,

quality intelligence was available to those units fortunate

enough to have access to the right terminal systems . To a large

degree, the impediment was the result of fielding prototype

systems for which there was little terminal capability.

One of the most prolific producers of information in this

category was the Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS),

186
could have access to this product. Nevertheless, TIBS and its

cousin, Constant Source, provided timely updates of

intelligence information to various echelons, including wings

and squadrons, directly from collectors and associated ground

processing facilities . 62

The RC-135 Rivet Joint, flying in coordination with its sister

ships, the E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS, flew 24 hours a day to

support the war. Referred to as the "ears of the storm" in

contrast to the AWACS role as "eyes of the storm," 63 the RC-135

provided real-time intelligence to theater and tactical

commanders in the desert and Persian Gulf areas. Specially

trained personnel used on-board sensors to identify, locate, and

report Iraqi emitters that might pose a threat to Coalition forces.

These systems are only a sampling of those deployed to the

theater to provide intelligence support. Reviews and action are

ongoing to resolve the problems resulting from stovepiping and

incompatible systems.

Iraqi Command and Control (Or Lack Thereof)

The Coalition not only recognized the value of information to

its efforts, it also saw the benefits of denying the Iraqi

command and control system its ability to function. The

Coalition identified the Iraqi leadership and Iraqi command,

control, and communications (C3) facilities as the key centers

of gravity. 64 While command of the air was the initial key

objective, C3 facilities received priority in targeting.

The Coalition used massive airpower at the onset of

hostilities to accomplish this objective . Targeting strategic

military, leadership, and infrastructure facilities, the Coalition

launched its attack on Iraq on 17 January 1991 . Early

warning sites, airfields, integrated air defense nodes,

communications facilities, known Scud sites, nuclear/

chemical/biological facilities, and electrical power facilities

were attacked by B-52s, Tomahawk land-attack missiles

(TLAMs), F-117s, and helicopter gunships. During the first two

days, the Coalition gave no slack while conducting the most

comprehensive air attack of the war.

187
infrastructure remaining. 65 The Coalition success was so

devastating that, as an Iraqi prisoner reported, "Iraqi intelligence

officers were using Radio Saudi Arabia, Radio Monte Carlo, and

the Voice of America as sources to brief commanders." 66 What

little communications capability Iraqi tactical commanders did

have, they used improperly.

Apparently concerned over Coalition communications

monitoring, the Iraqis practiced strict communications security

through near total emission control (EMCON) . While this did

have a negative effect on Coalition signals collection efforts, it

also blinded Iraqi tactical units. One Iraqi brigade commander,

in reflecting his surprise over the speed with which a US Marine

unit overran his unit in Kuwait, showed he had no idea the

Marines were coming even though another Iraqi unit located

adjacent to him had come under attack two hours before. 67

Although leadership as a target was difficult to locate and

survived the conflict, the successful attacks against Iraqi C3

essentially put her leadership in the position of having no strings

to pull. Trained to operate under centralized control, Iraqi forces

did not know how to function autonomously. Air defense forces

became fearful of emitting because of their vulnerability to

antiradiation missiles. Believing the army, not the air force, was

the determining force in battle, the Iraqis attempted to shield

rather than use their aircraft. The attempts they did make in

defensive counterair proved rather embarrassing.

Gulf War Conclusions

The Gulf War clearly demonstrated the need for accurate

and timely dissemination of information. Information was the

hub of all activity on the Coalition side, and the lack of it

caused the failure of the Iraqi military to employ its force . The

communications enhancements realized with the advent of

new technologies also brought about new vulnerabilities .

Building defenses to these vulnerabilities is considered by

some to be at odds with increasing the capabilities . The

benefits enjoyed by the Coalition's ability to communicate and

the impact of attacks on Iraqi C3 have been widely publicized and

have to be assumed to be well known by every potential

188
different medium, against our own information 

y

future.

What Does the Future Hold?

There is an information glut. There is a proliferation of

modem-equipped personal computers and local area networks

in military organizations, industrial facilities, and private

homes around the globe. And it does not stop there. For

example, Motorola is working on a 77-satellite constellation

that will provide cellular telephone service from any spot on

earth within five years. With fiber optics supporting these

satellites, entire countries are being wired . Turkey, for

example, has moved into the information age in one big leap . 68

As the information glut continues to grow, along with

systems to accommodate it, vulnerabilities to surreptitious

entry are certain to increase. The amount of information being

reported is doubling every 18 months. And this growth is

accelerating. Two years ago, volume was doubling every four

years; three years ago, it took four and a half years. 69 While

our capacity to process information at this growth rate seems

limited, technology has a way of catching up-but not

necessarily in time to help for a given situation . It can be

particularly difficult to process large amounts of information

in a readily useable form during intense, crisis situations.

During the Gulf War, 7,000 personnel worked two days to

produce the air tasking order (ATO) for 2,000 aircraft sorties to

be flown on the third day. The ATO began as a 300-page

document developed for transmission to Air Force, Navy, and

Marine aviation, but difficulties at receiving organizations

forced adjustments.

Even using dedicated communications circuits, it took the

Navy three to four hours to receive the ATO. Early on, there was

a 70,000-message backlog, and flash-precedence messages were

taking four to five days to reach their destination-some never

made it . Additionally, the volume of traffic took an inordinate

amount of time to read, let alone respond to . 7° It seems the

189
information there is to process.

Former vice-chairman of the JCS, Navy Adm David E .

Jeremiah, sees it this way: "Technology has fueled a change in

communication, [ushering in] an era of information dominance.

Global dominance will be achieved by those that most clearly

understand the role of information and the power of knowledge

that flows from it . " 71

The services are recognizing this change in communications,

and reacting to it . In the Air Force, information warfare

techniques are being intensively studied and incorporated at the

Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) . AIA looks at information

dominance in terms of the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA)

loop. The OODA loop represents the decision cycle through

which a warrior at any level must go. As you go from the

strategic level to the tactical level, the time available for making a

decision decreases. At the tip of the spear, it is very short.

According to General Minihan, "As we compare friendly and

adversary OODA loops, it becomes a deadly game of compression

and expansion. We will use information warfare to expand the

adversary's and compress our own action loops. If you can't

think, can't hear, and can't see-and I canyou will lose every

time." 72 This concentration of effort in information technology

will, and should, have an impact on military doctrine.

Admiral Jeremiah has already considered this. He points out

that "it is time to come to grips with a different intersection, an

intersection of technology and strategic thought. . . . I think that

in large measure the product today, technology, drives doctrine

and tactics, and to a major degree drives strategy." 73

We obviously are far from reaching full understanding of the

impact of information warfare on doctrine, tactics, and strategy.

However, the explosion of information on societies around the

world, and the associated technology, dictate that we find a way

to measure the impact, and look for ways to incorporate the right

level of emphasis on this topic into our thinking. One area of

concern is our propensity to stovepipe activities within our

structures, and the negative influences this can have on military

operations.

Army, Navy, and Air Force senior leaders have voiced concern

with these vertical structures . It has become tradition, for

190
intelligence, logistics, and acquisition. 

ppg 

excludes the chain of command from the decision-making

process and impedes synergistic benefits that are available

from integrated operations.

The focus, then, should be on moving from vertical structures,

or stovepipes, to horizontally integrated systems. The expected

result is integrated functional areas, which should provide a

better structure for identifying needs and requirements, and

determining force projection priorities. In the information sphere,

however, this could increase vulnerabilities to unauthorized

access because it disperses the information base on a much

wider scale. Some members of the US military community

recognize that "interdicting, protecting, and exploiting these new

pathways is what RV (information warfare) is all about." 74 As we

place more emphasis on this new dimension, we can expect

other nations to follow. Russia will probably be one of the first .

Russian senior military officials have already recognized that

the integration of information technology "could generate radical

changes in the organizational principles of armed forces ." 75 The

use of "intellectualized" weapons in the Gulf War by the Coalition

apparently sparked a move in the same direction in Russia.

Russian military experts now believe in "a new axiom to the body

of military art: For combatants contending in military conflict

today, `superiority in computers' is of precisely the same

significance as superiority in tube artillery and tanks was to

belligerents in earlier wars." 76

Furthermore, "superiority in the MTR [military-technical

revolution] proceeds from superiority in `information weapons':

1) reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

systems, and 2) `intelligent' command-and-control systems.

^77

Russian military leaders believe the new "formula for success"

is to "First gain superiority on the air waves, then in the air,

and only then by troop operations." 78 As the two former

adversarial world superpowers, who by and large supplied

most of the weapons to other countries around the world,

pursue information warfare as a new realm of combat, it is

almost certain other nations will buy into the trend.

In what is probably only the beginning for nations in conflict,

the Internet has already provided a medium for information
border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, Ecuador used the

Internet to publish government bulletins and excerpts from

local media to tell its side of the conflict. In retaliation, Peru

Internet used a gopher site in an attempt to neutralize

Ecuadorian propaganda. [A gopher is an information system

residing on the Internet that knows where everything is and,

through an arrangement of nested menus, allows a user to

continue choosing menu items until the sought-after subject

is located. 79] The resulting verbal skirmish left both nations

working to set up their own gophers. 8°

Global information systems will enable ordinary users to

access an extraordinary number of databases, far beyond the

Internet capability of today (which is more than a million files at

databases located at universities and corporate research

centers) . New software technologies permit these accesses to be

conducted autonomously, using "self-navigating data drones."

These drones, referred to as "knowbots," are released into the

Internet and search for information on their own. They can roam

from network to network, clone themselves, transmit data back

to their origin, and communicate with other knowbots. 8 l Given

this capability, one has to wonder, and perhaps be concerned,

about the potential for unauthorized, or at least undesirable,

access to certain databases and computer activities .

Hackers routinely attempt to get into US military systems .

During the Gulf War, hackers from Denmark, Moscow, and Iraq

tried to penetrate these systems. 82 Our awareness of these

attempts does not necessarily prove there were no successes of

which we are unaware. And, even if they failed during that

conflict, can we guarantee the security of our systems during the

next war?

These vulnerabilities were revealed recently when a British

teenager using a personal computer at his home hacked his way

into a US military computer network, gained access to files

containing sensitive communications relating to the dispute

with North Korea over international inspections of its nuclear

program, and, after reading them, placed them on the Internet.

His actions made those files available to about 35 million

people. Officials suspect he had access to these computers for

weeks, perhaps even months, before he was caught.

192
y y y

apparent difficulty was in detecting him. Officials added that

he had also breached other defense systems. 83

Paul Evancoe and Mark Bentley, computer virus experts, have

documented their concerns over our vulnerability to computer

virus warfare (CVW) by other nations. They describe in detail the

vulnerability of computer systems to this danger, and claim that

"CVW is a powerful stand-alone member of the non-lethal

disabling technology family and is likely being developed by

several countries."84

They also point out that the intelligence community and policy

makers do not focus on these threats and generally do not

possess enough technical understanding to recognize CVW as a

real national security threat. They believe CVW remains an

abstract, nontangible concept to most intelligence analysts and

policymakers. Furthermore, they call for legislation outlawing

CVW development, classifying CVW as a weapon internationally,

and including it as part of nonproliferation treaties.

It is unrealistic to believe we could achieve the support of the

international community in this regard, and, with our lead in

technology, we probably do not want to do so. Even if we could

acquire this level of cooperation, and wanted to, enforcement

would be next to impossible. CVW development does not leave

traces as does chemical, biological, and nuclear development.

And our efforts to isolate those are not always met with success.

Some Americans believe there will be no big wars in the future

because there is too much destructive power, and nobody wins.

The interdependence of nations would likely result in as much

damage to an aggressor as to its adversary. Whether this is true

or not, the concept of national security is changyng. 85 Among the

threats we face today are terrorism-either state-sponsored or

radical element, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

localized conflicts, and aggressors that upset the world peace

balance, intense economic competition, and availability of food

and water.

The US military may be called upon to react, in one way or

another, to any of these threats . US military operations can

run the gamut, from civil-military affairs assistance to forcible

entry. More reliance is being placed on communications and

193
systems become more interoperable, they may become more

vulnerable . "It is becoming more and more difficult to

distinguish C4 systems from intelligence systems."86 While

sophisticated antijam systems are being developed and

deployed, these systems are still computer based. Disruption in

one would affect others.

For example, for years we have needed a near-real-time

intelligence system capable of providing targetable accuracy

information to "shooters." The Army expects to have an airborne

and ground-based SIGINT/EW system capable of doing that by

the end of the decade .

87

It seems logical that other existing and developmental

systems might also be interconnected . Some of these might

include the Joint Targeting Network (JTN), the Tactical

Information Broadcast Service (TIBS), Tactical Receive

Equipment Related Applications (TRAP), Senior Ruby, Constant

Source, Quick Look, Over-the-Horizon (OTM systems, and air

and ground-based radar systems. The integration and wide

dispersal of these systems increase the number of vulnerability

points where an adversary might intrude.

The GPS may be one of the most revolutionary systems in our

inventory when you consider the difference it can make in

navigation and geo-positioning of assets. It is available to the

public and anyone with a few hundred dollars can buy into the

system. The benefits, then, that we derive from this capability

may be offset somewhat by use of the system by an adversary.

GPS has improved our navigation and geo-positioning accuracy

in multiples, but we are not the only ones who can use it .

Conclusions

Even though the anticipated national security threats of the

coming decades involve less developed countries, the CVW

threat and other methods of intrusion and disruption are not

necessarily beyond their reach.

Opportunities to deceive and confuse through an elaborate

misinformation scheme along a myriad of information paths

are available to anyone . Information warfare provides a new

194
pppp

truth . These activities can put new light on Winston

Churchill's statement at Tehran in November 1943 concerning

Allied deception efforts, "In war-time, truth is so precious that

she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." 88

In this vein, General Minihan proposes the prospect of "an

intelligence analyst manipulating an adversary's command

and control system so that reality is distorted." 89 Consider

Marvin Leibstone's projection, " . . . tomorrow's soldier will

depend more than ever on the very well known and trusted

factors of mobility and C3I . 90 Imagine a scenario depicting a

"left hook" in the Iraqi desert that fails because the systems in

use were successfully attacked by CVW, or some other

intrusion method, with the resulting disruption putting US

troops in a flailing posture-facing the unknown and losing

confidence in their operation . One thing is sure. An Iraqi "left

hook" will be difficult to repeat. We have to assume Iraq, and

others, will exploit the GPS to their own advantage .

Information warfare is coming of agel

World War II set the stage, but only with today's technology

can we expect action in this sphere of warfare on a grand

scale . Fortunately, the US military senior leadership is

becoming involved, and, in many cases, taking the lead on this

perplexing issue . With this emphasis, we must carefully

assess the vulnerabilities of the systems we employ. Systems

proposals must be thoroughly evaluated and prioritized by

highest value payoff. This needs to be accomplished through a

more balanced investment strategy by the US military that

conquers our institutional prejudices that favor "killer

systems" weapons. 91 Offensive systems will be at risk if we do

not apply sufficient defensive considerations in this process.

"Me electromagnetic spectrum will be our `Achilles heel' if

we do not pay sufficient attention to protecting our use of the

spectrum and at the same time recognize that we must take

away the enemy's ability to see us and to control his forces." 92

We must also interdict the opportunities for adversaries to

intrude on our systems. Other nations have realized the value

of offensive applications of information warfare; therefore, we

195
defensively, with almost equal accentuation .

Information warfare adds a fourth dimension of warfare to

those of air, land, and sea. When the Soviets developed a nuclear

program after World War II, the United States was caught by

surprise. In this new dimension, we must stay ahead.

Notes

1 . Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1984), 84.

2 . Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York; Oxford

University Press, 1971), 84.

3. Information Warfare: Pouring the Foundation, Draft, USAF/XO, 19

December 1994, f .

4. Ibid., 3.

5. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War. Survival at the Dawn of

the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1993), 140.

6. Ibid, 139 .

7. Craig L. Johnson, "Information Warfare-Not a Paper War," Journal

ofElectronic Defense 17, no. 8, August 1994, 56.

8. Ibid.

9. John H. Petersen, "Info Wars," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 119,

May 1993, 85.

10. Peter Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra (New York: Pantheon Books,

1980).3.

11 . Clausewitz, 191 .

12 . John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare : Intelligence,

Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War 11 Era 18

(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989), 1 . Note: This book is the last in

a series of 18 volumes on covert warfare edited by Mendelsohn. The content

of the series is primarily composed of declassified documents residing in the

National Archives. These documents included classifications up through

TOP SECRET ULTRA. The quoted material in this paper from this series is

usually taken from the copied material of the original documents.

13. Sun Tzu, 66.

14. See Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was (New York: J.B.

Lippincott Co., 1954).

15. Mendelsohn, chap. 1, 1 .

16. Ibid ., vol. 1, Ultra Magic and the Allies, chap. 8, "Origins, Functions,

and Problems of the Special Branch, MIS," 27.

17. Mendelsohn, vol. 1, chap. 4, "Synthesis of Experiences in the Use of

ULTRA Intelligence by U.S. Army Field Commands in the European Theater

of Operations," 4.

18. Wladyslaw Kozaczuk, ENIGMA (University Publications of America,

Inc., 1984) chapter 2.

19. Ibid., 20-21.

20. Ibid., 95.

196
U-Boat Codes, 1939-1943 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co ., 1991), 184.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid .

27. James L. Gilbert and John P. Ginnegan, eds., U.S. Army Signals

Intelligence in World War IL A Documentpry History, Center of Military

History, United States Army (Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1993), 175.

28 . Ibid., 175 .

29 . Kahn, 276.

30. Gilbert and Ginnegan, 176.

31 . Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York: Harper & Row,

1975),2.

32. Ibid., 50.

33. Ibid., 45.

34. Ibid., 2.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Kozaczuk, 156-66.

38. Mendelsohn, vol. 1, chap. 3, "Use of CX/MSS ULTRA by the U.S. War

Department, 1943-1945," 17.

39. Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign 1944-45

(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979), viii .

40. Kahn, 276.

41 . Bennett, 42.

42. Mendelsohn, vol. 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion,

chap. 4, "Cover and Deception, Definition and Procedure, Exhibit '3' of C&D

Report ETO," 1 and 2.

43. Mendelsohn, vol. 15, chap. 6, "Cover and Deception Recommended

Organization, 8 September 1944, Exhibit '5' of C&D Report ETO," 2 .

44. Ibid., vol. 15, chap. 10, "Operations in Support of Neptune: (B)

FORTITUDE NORTH, 23 February 1944, Exhibit `6' of C&D Report ETO,"

Appendix 'C' to SHAEF/ 18216/ 1 /Ops dated 10th March 1944.

45. Jozef Garlinski, The Enigma War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

1980), 159-160. After twice striking "shell-shocked" soldiers, Patton had

gotten into trouble. General Eisenhower needed a place to put him, and,

knowing the Germans kept track of his finest generals, considered Patton

the perfect choice for this notional outfit . In Eisenhower's mind, placing Patton

in charge would make this concoction more believable to the Germans.

46. Brown, 10. BODYGUARD was the cover name given to the deception

plan developed for NEPTUNE, the cover term for the Normandy invasion. Itwas taken from Churchill's statement at Tehran, "In war time, truth is so

precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."

47. Garlinski, 160.

48. Mendlesohn, vol. 15, chap. 11, "Operations in Support of NEPTUNE:

(C) FORTITUDE SOUTH I, Exhibit '6' of C&D Report ETO," appendix B, pt. I .

49. Bennett, 4.

197
(Washington, D.C. : Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1987),

97.

51. H.P.Willmott The Great Crusade--A New Complete History of the

Second World War, (New York: Free Press, 1989) 108-9.

52. Kozaczuk, 166.

53. Ibid., 167.

54. Ibid., 167.

55. Putney, 35. This statement was made by Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in an interview conducted by Dr

Richard H. Kohn, chief, Office of Air Force History, and Dr. Diane T. Putney,

chief, Air Force Intelligence Service Historical Research Office. During WWII,

Justice Powell was one of a select group of people chosen to integrate Ultra

information into other intelligence. As an intelligence officer in the Army Air

Force, he served with the 319th Bomb Group, Twelfth Air Force, and the

Northwest African Air Forces. He was on General Carl Spaatz's United States

Strategic Air Forces staff as Chief of Operational Intelligence, as well as

being General Spaatz's Ultra officer, towards the end of the war. He made at

least one visit to Bletchely Park where he stayed and worked for several

weeks.

56. David L. Jones and Richard C. Randt, "The Joint CEOI," in The First

Information War. The Story of Communications, Computers and Intelligence

Systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, Va. : AFCEA International Press,

October 1992), 162.

57. Sir Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, "The First Space War: The

Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War," in Alan D. Campen, ed., The First

Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers and Intelligence

Systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, Va. : AFCEA International Press,

October, 1992), 12 1.

58. Ibid., 127.

59. Peterson, 85.

60. Anson and Cummings, 127.

61 . Ibid., 130.

62. James R. Clapper, Jr ., "Desert War: Crucible for Intelligence

Systems," in Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War. The Story of

Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf

War (Fairfax, Va. : AFCEA International Press, October 1992) 82.

63. Robert S. Hopkins III, "Ears of the Storm," in Alan D. Campen, ed.,

The First Information War: 71w Story of Communications, Computers and

Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, Va. : AFCEA

International Press, October 1992) 65.

64. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey

Summary Report (Washington, D.C. : Department of Defense, 1993), 40.

65 . Alan D. Campen, "Iraqi Command and Control: The Information

Differential," in Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War: The Story of

Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf

War (Fairfax, Va. : AFCEA International Press, October 1992), 17 1.

66. Ibid., 172.

67. Ibid., 174.

198
70. Ibid., 86.

71. John G. Roos, "InfoTech InfoPower," Armed Forces Journal International

June 1994, 31 .

72. "Information Dominance Edges Toward New Conflict Frontier," Signal

International Journal 48, no. 12, August 1994, 37.

73. Roos, 31 .

74. Johnson, 55.

75. Mary C. FitzGerald, The Impact of the Military-Technical Revolution on

Russian Military Affairs, vol. 2, Hudson Institute, submitted in partial

fulfillment of Contract #MDA903-91-C-0190, HI-4209, 20 August 1993, 98.

76. Ibid., 100.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Tom Lichty, Ilie Official America Online for Windows Tour GUOP, 2d

ed., ver. 2, 325.

80. Newsweek, 20 February 1995,12.

81. Peterson, 89.

82 . Army Times, 54, no. 43, 23 May 1994, 28.

83. Baltimore Sun, 9 January 1995, 3.

84. Paul Evancoe and Mark Bentley, "CVW-Computer Virus as a

Weapon," Military Technology 18, no. 5, May 1994, 40.

85. Petersen, 90.

86. Darryl Gehly, "Controlling the Battlefield," Journal of Electronic

Defense, 6, no. 6, June 1993, 48.

87. Gen Jimmy D. Ross, "Winning the Information War," Army, February

1994, 32.

88. Brown, 10.

89. "Information Dominance Edges Toward New Conflict Frontier,"

Signal, 48, no. 12, August 1994, 39.

90. Marvin Leibstone, "Next-Generation Soldier: Ditched, or Digitized?,"

Military Technology 18 no. 7, July 1994, 59.

91 . "Army Plan Fosters Dynamic Information War Framework," Signal

International Journal 48, no. 3, November 1993, 56.

92 . Ross, 28.

Biological warfare (BW) is the use of disease to harm or kill

an adversary's military forces, population, food or livestock.

Living organic germs, like anthrax, are a major example of

biological weapons. Another is byproducts of organisms,

known as toxins. An example is botulism. Biological agents are

much deadlier, pound for pound, than chemical agents. It has

been estimated that 10 grams of anthrax could kill as many

people as a ton of the nerve agent Sarin.

Lt Col Terry Mayer traces the history of biological warfare,

including its use during World War II by Japanese forces in

China. During early phases of the Cold War the United States,

as a potential retaliatory measure against the USSR, developed

a BW program. However, in 1969 President Nixon terminated

the program and announced US unilateral disarmament of

offensive BW weapons. A worldwide Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention (BWC) followed, and among the 118

signers are the United States, Russia, and Iraq. However, there

is evidence that Moscow continued to manufacture anthrax at

least into 1992 . Iraq now admits that it, too, had a BW

program until 1991 .

The BW problem was dramatically highlighted during Desert

Storm when Iraq was discovered not only to have a nuclear

weapons program, but also an elaborate chemical and

biological warfare effort. US government analysts are skeptical

about whether or not Iraq actually destroyed its biological

warfare agents and equipment in 1991 as they claim. Some

believe that Baghdad may still have a large BW program

intact. Unclassified information from the Defense Nuclear

Agency documents indicate that numerous rogue statesthose that support state sponsored terrorism like Iran, Iraq,

Libya, and North Korea-have or are pursuing BW programs .

Colonel Mayer indicates that BW agents of other states are

very difficult, if not impossible, for allied intelligence services

to detect in research, production, transit, or employment

phases. In addition to detection shortfalls, Mayer's essay

questions whether the United States is unable to effectively

protect its military forces (medically and nonmedically) from

20 1
strike against enemy BW facilities, or protect the civilian

population against a terrorist BW attack.

Robert Kadlec, M.D ., (Lt Col, USAF) shows that the ongoing

revolution in biotechnology has also made possible medical

products readily transferable to biological warfare applications.

Some vaccines are available, but do not have wide distribution.

He contends that the proliferation of BW weapons provides

less-developed countries capabilities that could be as lethal and

devastating as nuclear weapons. BW weapons are inexpensive,

easy to produce, can be disguised as natural events (for example

as agricultural sprayers), are hard to detect or preempt, and are

hard to defend against once employed.

Dr Kadlec analyzes the current BW threat and cites Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) findings which emphasize

how certain unstable states have governments seeking

WMD, including BW. The OTA analysis suggests that BW

is the cheapest and most easily produced of all the

weapons of mass destruction . Indeed some third world

regimes see BW as a "potential equalizer" to offset

Western conventional or nuclear forces .

In his essay on biological warfare as a possible means of

attacking an adversary's agricultural base, Dr Kadlec shows how

"the existence of natural occurring or endemic agricultural pests

or diseases and outbreaks permits an adversary to use BW with

plausible denial." Dr Kadlec shows instances of how BW could

be used in attacks on livestock and plants including anthrax,

glanders, rinderpest, and wheat rust.

He notes instances of naturally occurring infestations of

agriculture . For example, the whitefly infestations of California

crops in 1981 and 1991 caused $500 million worth of damage.

The Russian wheat aphid cost the United States $600 million.

Similarly, in other cases the Mediterranean fruit fly caused

$900 million in damage and lost revenues to American crops.

To guard against such pests, over $7 billion is spent every year

on pesticides.

Dr Kadlec then provides a series of illustrative and

hypothetical scenarios of how biological warfare could be

waged against certain food suppliers: spraying a corn seed

blight over the Midwestern United States from commercial

202
a rapidly breeding grape louse across California wine country;

deliberately sabotaging Pakistan's cotton crop with insects ;

etc. Thus, while not lethal attacks on human beings, such BW

attacks against a country's food supplies or crops could be

very damaging. Such BW attacks against a competitor's

economic assets could open an unfortunate new chapter in the

history of economic warfare.

The Biological Weapon: A Poor

Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction

Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF

Prologue-4 January

This is a CNN special report. This just in. The Center for

Disease Control hasjust declared that an epidemic is widespread

in Miami, Florida. Doctors have not yet diagnosed the specific

cause of the rampant disease, but the illness initially resembles a

chest cold that progresses into pneumonia-like symptoms. It then

progresses rapidly into fever and shortness of breath What is

especially peculiar about this epidemic is that all the patients who

have sought medical attention attended the Orange Bowl football

game on New Year's Day. Authorities have asked that anyone

who went to that game seek medical care if cold-like symptoms

appear. Stay tuned to CNNforfurther developments on this story.

Elsewhere in the news . . .

The Biological Warfare Contest

This is a notional, yet frightening illustration of what the

first signs of a biological warfare (BNq attack might sound like.

This scenario is a plausible example of an attack a terrorist or

deranged person might conduct using off-the-shelf technology

and readily available biological warfare agents. The "concept of

operations" in this attack consisted of using several insect

bombs (the kind where you push the button, it starts spraying,

and you leave the house for two hours) and modifying them by

filling the canister with anthrax bacteria bought through a

mail order specimen company in the United States. If that

doesn't sound credible, please note that Saddam Hussein

bought his original anthrax culture from a mail order house in

205
just a sample of many plausible scenarios that could employ

biological warfare agents in a terrorist or combat operation.

The spring 1995 chemical warfare attack in the subways of

Tokyo is a glaring example of just how susceptible modern

society is to this kind of insidious attack. It does not take a

great deal of imagination to conceive of other situations and

vulnerabilities that would make very lucrative targets for a

biological weapons strike . If an attacker has access to the

target area, a simple mechanism to aerosolize a substance,

and a basic biology laboratory, the prerequisites are complete.

This is not a high-tech arena that requires specialized

equipment or core material as do nuclear weapons; this is

basic college biology coupled with motivation. While the use of

this weapon has not been prevalent in recent years, the threat

is real, the United States' vulnerability is clear, and the ability

to counter the biological weapon is almost nil.

A study of biological warfare raises some fundamental

questions:

" Just what is biological warfare?

" What is the history of biological warfare and how

important is it today?

" What biological warfare agents are available for use today?

" What is the biological warfare threat?

" How capable are we of coping with the threat?

" What policy should the United States follow to close the

gap between the threat and the capability?

The purpose of this article is to raise the awareness level

about a very real and probable threat that has not been dealt

with effectively . The author hopes to bring the issue to the

front burner for study and to apply resources to resolving the

tough problems. While the paper identifies where precious

resources should be focused, it does not profess to have all the

answers to the very difficult biological warfare dilemma.

First, what is biological warfare in layman's terms? From a

military perspective, it is the intentional use of diseases to affect

an adversary's military force, population, crops, or livestock.

Certainly, a terrorist biological campaign could target those

same kinds of objectives, depending on the perceived purpose of

206
warfare agents. Microorganisms are living organic germs, such

as anthrax (bacillus anthrax) . Second, toxins are the

byproducts of living organisms, or effectively natural poisons,

such as botulism (botulinum toxin) which is a byproduct of

growing the microorganism clostridium botulinum. 2 These are

only two examples of biological warfare agents, although these

are especially prevalent and virulent examples. There are many

other natural and man-made agents that have been used

throughout history.

Historical Perspective

Biological warfare is not a twentieth century development; it

has been an effective combat weapon for centuries. As early as

1346 A.D., Tartars held the walled city of Kaffa under siege and

catapulted plague-infested bodies into the city. 3 Were the

Tartars successful in using disease as a means to break the

siege? Yes. Not only did illness cause Kaffa to capitulate, but

some medical historians speculate this event resulted in the

bubonic plague epidemic that spread across medieval Europe

between 1347 and 1351, killing 25 million people. 4

Three hundred years later, during the French and Indian

War, the English offered blankets to Indians holding Fort

Carillon . The English suspected the Indians were loyal to the

French and exposed the blankets to the smallpox virus before

their apparent altruistic overture. The Indians began to fall ill,

and after an epidemic spread through the fort, the English

attacked, defeating the incapacitated force. The British gained

control of Fort Carillon and renamed it Fort Ticonderoga. 5

Throughout history, many examples may be found illustrating

the use of natural diseases in war to place an adversary in a

position of disadvantage. For example, dumping bodies into

water supplies has been fairly common for centuries. Two

thousand years ago, Romans fouled many of their enemies'

water sources by throwing the corpses of dead animals into the

wells.s During the American Civil War, Confederate soldiers shot

horses and other farm animals in ponds in an effort to

contaminate the water supply of the Union forces. 7

207
War 1 8, the interwar years saw a new interest in the use of

disease as a weapon. Paradoxically, probably the two most

active programs started as a result of an international

initiative to ban biological warfare agents. Both Japan and the

United Kingdom recognized that since biological warfare was

horrifying enough to outlaw, it probably would make an

effective weapon . Both countries had very robust programs as

early as 1932 and 1934, respectively. 9

There is evidence that Japan tested biological warfare

agents on prisoners of war and that they actually used them

on the population of China. 1 ° To spread the plague, they

dropped flea-infested debris over 11 cities in mainland China.

The result was a bubonic plague epidemic in China and

Manchuria." While these attacks caused casualties, the

weapons did not function reliably and ultimately resulted in

very little strategic impact that affected the war.

12

When the Britain learned of the Japanese biological warfare

program, they put significantly more emphasis toward

developing their own BW capability. Most of their testing was

conducted on an island called Gruinard off the northwest

coast of Scotland. They concentrated their development and

testing efforts on the lethal effects of anthrax. Scientists used

sheep as victims to evaluate the effectiveness of the disease,

and they infected literally thousands of animals . As a result of

the huge amount of anthrax agent dispersed on the island and

the large number of sheep infected, the British could not

effectively decontaminate the island after they stopped the

testing program. Consequently, Gruinard is still considered

contaminated and is off limits, demonstrating the persistence

of anthrax as a biological weapon.

13

The British soon combined their biological weapons

development efforts with Canada and the United States. Even

though there were Allied operational plans to employ biological

weapons during World War II, there is no evidence to indicate

they were actually used on a large scale. There is, however,

strong evidence that Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Nazi

security service, was assassinated with a grenade that had been

contaminated with biological warfare agents (typhoid fever).

14

208
After World War II and during the Korean War, the focus, at

least from the United States perspective, was on building a BW

retaliatory capability. The US developed an anticrop bomb and

delivered it to the Air Force in 1951 . It could have been used to

attack North Korean rice fields, reducing a significant source

of nutrition for the population.

15 North Korea accused the

United States of using biological agents during the Korean

War; the United States denied the accusation, and there was

no substantive proof offered in the open literature. i s

Following the Korean War, the United States invigorated the

biological warfare program in 1956 after Marshal Zhukov

announced to the Soviet Congress that chemical and biological

warfare weapons would be used as weapons of mass destruction

in future wars. This was a dramatic shift in Soviet policy and the

cold war philosophy.

17 The fundamental concept of United

States biological warfare operations changed as a result.

During the Korean War, the biological capability was

maintained primarily for retaliation in the event an adversary

employed a biological agent against United States or allied

forces . The prevailing philosophy was that the threat of

retaliation in kind would deter the use of these kinds of

weapons. After the new Soviet pronouncement, the United

States concept changed to employment upon executive order

by the president of the United States . 18 Effectively, this

mimicked the Soviet position, implying that the United States

might use biological weapons in situations other than

straightforward retaliation. This change in policy boosted the

biological warfare research effort in the United States.

The bulk of the research was conducted at Fort Detrick in

Maryland. It was during this "boost phase" that United States

vulnerability was clearly demonstrated with simulated covert

biological warfare attacks on at least three cities subway

systems. Surrogate biological agents were introduced into the

air vents of the underground systems . Samples were then

taken to determine how widespread the dissemination would

be . The results demonstrated that large numbers of the

populace would be exposed to infectious doses under such an

attack. 19 This experiment supported a similar test that took

209
gpy

results showed that nearly 100 percent of the population had

inhaled potentially lethal doses. 2°

In 1969, President Nixon changed the United States policy

on biological warfare. During a visit to Fort Detrick, he

announced that the United States was terminating research

on biological warfare and was unilaterally disarming any

capability to conduct offensive biological warfare. By 1972, the

United States biological weapons stockpile was completely

destroyed. 21 This gesture by the United States was the catalyst

for the world community to embrace the Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention (BWC) . A total of 118 countries (including

the USSR and Iraq) signed up to abide by the BWC, which

directs that the signatories will "never in any circumstances

develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain any

biological weapons."22

During this time, the Second Indochina War was raging.

However, there is no clear evidence that biological warfare

agents were used in this conflict. Agent Orange, a herbicide,

was a chemical-based agent that saw wide use, but biological

weapons per se were not used. 23 While the United States

biological warfare program was flourishing and even after our

unilateral biological warfare disarmament, there is evidence

that the Soviet program was thriving, although they had

signed the BWC in 1972 . In the late 1970s and early 1980s,

there were reports that the Soviets used biological weapons in

Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. While widely reported as

a program called "Yellow Rain," these allegations were never

proven. 24

In 1978, Georgi Markov, a popular writer and Bulgarian

exile, was walking to the BBC in London where he broadcast

to his homeland from Radio Free Europe . As he was walking,

he suddenly felt a sharp pain in his leg. Turning around, he

confronted a man picking up an umbrella. The man apologized

and went on his way. Markov took ill that night and died

several days later. The autopsy found a small metal pellet

coated with ricin, a biological toxic substance derived from the

castor oil plant. 25

210
explosion was reported from a research compound in

Sverdlovsk, USSR. Over the next few days, reports of an

outbreak of anthrax surfaced . The United States claimed that

the outbreak was the result of an accident in a biological

warfare production plant. The USSR vehemently denied the

accusations, claiming it was caused by tainted black market

meat and poor hygiene among the population. In the media

and technical literature before 1992, many Western journalists

and scientists argued that the facts supported the Soviet

claims . 26

However, in 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin admitted

that the Sverdlovsk incident was actually a biological warfare

accident involving anthrax. 27 Thereafter, President Yeltsin

signed a decree that recommitted Russia to the Biological and

Toxin Weapons Convention . But in 1994, three defectors

revealed an ongoing Russian biological warfare program that

concentrates on a "superplague" for which, reportedly, the

West has no antidote. President Yeltsin claimed he didn't know

about any biological warfare programs. The defectors verified

his claim and inferred that the military is running the program

without Yeltsin's knowledge or consent. 28

Biological Terrorism

In 1984, the French authorities made a startling discovery

that demonstrates how vulnerable the world is to biological

terrorism. The Paris Police raided a residence suspected of

being a safe house for the German Red Army Faction. As they

conducted their search, they found documents that revealed a

strong working knowledge of lethal biological agents. As the

police continued the search to the bathroom, they came across

a bathtub containing many flasks filled with what turned out

to be Clostridium Botulinum, the microorganism that

produces botulism, one of the most lethal biological

substances known to man. 29

On 20 March 1995, the Tokyo subway system was attacked

with chemical warfare agents by, allegedly, a cult called the

Aum Shinri Kyo, or the Supreme Truth. This incident killed at
different subway cars were struck simultaneously by

individuals leaving canisters dispersing a Nazi-developed nerve

agent called Sarin. 3l This is an exceptionally significant event

because it strikes at the core of society with furtive lethal

gases, exposing glaring vulnerabilities and fomenting terror

among the population. As one victim of the subway attack

said, "We're just innocent, ordinary people . It frightens me to

think how vulnerable we are."32

On the 28th of March, Tokyo police also found large

quantities of the biological warfare agent Clostridium

Botulinum during one of several raids on Aum Shinri Kyo

facilities. 33 This discovery clearly demonstrates that a terrorist

organization had the resolve, the biological agent, and the

wherewithal to conduct a horrendous biological attack against

an unprotected population. As 7tme magazine said, " . . .

garden-variety madness had got access to weapons of

terror. "34

BW and the 1991 Gulf War

These recent world biological warfare events have been

alarming, but what really brought the biological warfare issue

into the spotlight of the public's eye was the experience in

Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf War. By the time of the Iraqi

invasion into Kuwait, it was widely acknowledged that Iraq

had a biological warfare program, concentrated on very toxic

botulinum toxin and very resilient anthrax. 35 This assessment

was derived from a compilation of several sources and

indicators, the most dramatic being an Iraqi defector who was

a microbiologist. He told a British newspaper correspondent

that as early as 1983 Iraqi scientists were 'developing and

testing biological warfare agents:

There were many strains, botulism, salmonella, and anthrax.

Friends told me they had found a way to make anthrax even

more toxic. I know they experimented on sheep with Clostridium

Botulinum type C (the source of botulinum toxin) . 3s

212
difficult technical problems relating to the

weaponization and deployment of biological warfare agents. 37

This has since been confirmed officially by a representative of

Saddam Hussein's present government. On 2 August 1990,

when Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, the Iraqis had spent close to

$100 million on their offensive biological warfare program and

had a significant stockpile of biological warfare agents. 38

Saddam Hussein announced "loud and clear" that this war

would be the "mother of all wars," implying a no-holds-barred

engagement. 39 This was the first time since World War II that the

United States had faced a military adversary with a highly

probable biological warfare capability and the resolve to use it . 4o

The United States was challenged not only with how to

protect the military forces but how to preempt the use of

Saddam's biological warfare arsenal. Plans for force protection

included protective equipment and vaccinations against

probable biological warfare threats. 41 In addition, planners

were challenged to determine a mechanism to destroy the

biological warfare stockpiles before Saddam could deploy

them . Dropping a precision-guided bomb on the suspected

storage bunkers would have been easy enough. The real

challenge was destroying the viability or utility of the biological

weapons without spreading the agents and causing massive

collateral damage in terms of human lives. The military was

simply not prepared for this eventuality.

Several tests were conducted over a very short time to try to

find the right kind of enhanced munitions or bomb that would

render the biological warfare agent unusable to the Iraqis and

not release lethal agents into the atmosphere. The crash

program was not fruitful. However, in the effort, computer

modeling showed that the design of the suspected biological

weapons storage bunkers offered a bombing approach that

might inhibit the release of the agents. In the eleventh hour,

this concept detailing specific fusing, type of bomb, and angle

of attack was telephoned to the Central Command CENTCOM

planners in Riyadh. 42 All suspected bunkers were attacked,

and there was no confirmed collateral damage as a result of

released biological agent . There was, however, one

unconfirmed news report of several incidents of illness and

213
warfare facility in Baghdad.43

In the end, it appears that Saddam Hussein did not use

biological weapons during Desert Storm. While the Iraqi

rationale may never be known for certain, it is likely that they

were deterred by public signals like the one Secretary of

Defense Dick Cheney announced during a news conference on

23 December 1990. 44. . . Cheney said that "were Saddam

Hussein foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction,

the US response would be absolutely overwhelming and it

would be devastating." 45

In an even more direct and unambiguous message, a 5

January 1991 letter President George Bush said to Saddam

Hussein : "The United States will not tolerate the use of

chemical or biological weapons . . . The American people would

demand the strongest possible response . You and your

country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable

acts of this sort. "4s

After the cease fire, Iraq officialsadmitted having a biological

warfare program that they said had only progressed to the

research stage . Inspectors found evidence of a robust

biological warfare production capability, but could not

specifically link it to the biological warfare program.

However, there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence

that an offensive biological warfare production and

weaponization program did exist. 47 Like the Soviet Union, Iraq

had previously signed the BWC. The bad news is that United

Nations inspectors were not able to locate Saddam's biological

stockpile. 48 Saddam's representatives have since admitted to

the United Nations inspectors that they had a sizable cache of

anthrax and botulism agents, but they claim to have destroyed

it to avoid having germs spread over the Iraqi countryside by

allied bombing attacks.

Having witnessed the bold Iraqi deceptive effort regarding their

nuclear research program, the world has every reason to believe

that Saddam Hussein still has a large amount of biological

warfare agents at his disposal today. 49 On 24 February 1993,

former CIA Director James Woolsey told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee: "Iraq's biological weapons capability

is perhaps of greatest immediate concern. Baghdad had an

21 4
BW Nation States

The Biological Warfare Threat

Biological Warfare Technology

21 5

inspections have seriously degraded this capability . The

dual-use nature of biological weapon equipment and

techniques makes this the easiest program to hide."5°

With the public expose of active Russian and Iraqi biological

warfare programs, the threat of these weapons looms large on

the horizon. There are official, open-source estimates that

between 10 and 20 countries either have, want, or are

thinking about starting a biological weapons capability. 51

However, there is more to the threat than just countries that

have the capability. What types of agents are a threat and how

will they mature given new technology? And, does the

insidious nature of biological agents pose a threat?

Some of the countries suspected in open sources of having

or wanting a biological warfare program include Russia, Syria,

Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Cuba, Taiwan,

China, Romania, Bulgaria, Pakistan, India, and South Africa. 52

There are real concerns with this list. First, some of these

nations have been associated in the past with state-supported

terrorism. This fact raises the probability of a biological warfare

terrorist attack.

Second, many of these countries reside in regions of

historical instability or emerging instability. And third, with

the economic distress in the former Soviet Union, there is a

possibility that its biological warfare weapons experts will look

for more prosperous employment by building biological

warfare programs elsewhere for the highest bidder .

Fortunately, as of early 1994, the CIA had no indication that

this biological warfare brain drain is occurring.

53

The degree of sophistication of each country's research

program will determine how advanced biological agents will be.
g

anthrax (mentioned earlier) are high-probability candidates

that are difficult to reckon with. In addition, the revolution in

biotechnology may produce other agents that are even more

toxic and resilient . Without getting into the technical aspects,

relatively minor molecular adjustments may produce a more

toxic, fast acting, and stable biological agent. 54

There is also a possibility that genetic engineering may

produce a weapon that is unique and can only be protected

against with a unique vaccine . 55 These two examples of

potential developments in biological warfare will give this

weapon a great deal more utility, especially on the battlefield .

A more stable agent that produces an accelerated reaction

would provide the tactical commander with a viable tactical

weapon.

Additionally, if the commander could deploy biological

agents against an enemy while friendly troops remained

invulnerable, the biological option would become much more

attractive as a battlefield weapon . There is also some

speculation that a toxic agent could be produced that would

target only a specific genetic makeup, giving an attacker the

capability to discriminate among age, gender, racial or

behavior groups as target sets . 56 Following the Tokyo subway

attack, it has come to light that the Aum Shinri Kyo had

recently ordered sophisticated molecular design software. The

purpose of this type of software is to reengineer the molecular

structure of chemicals or microorganisms to make them

stronger or more dangerous. 57 Could it be that this fanatic cult

was planning to use this software to genetically reengineer

their biological or chemical agents?

Stealthy BW

Now the really sobering partbiological warfare agents are

very difficult, if not impossible, to detect while they are in the

research, production, transit, or employment phases . Normal

biological warfare research facilities resemble completely

legitimate biotechnical and medical research facilities. The

same production facilities that can produce biological warfare

216
agricultural products. 58 The challenge this presents is in

distinguishing legitimate production plants from illicit ones.

It becomes nearly impossible to identify the locations and

facilities that are actually producing biological warfare

weapons . This needs to be done, obviously, in order to

confidently highlight a violation of the BWC, or, if necessary,

should all peaceful remedies fail, preemptively strike a

biological weapons production or storage facility.

In addition, biological warfare agents are virtually

undetectable while they are in transit. In other words, if a

terrorist wanted to carry the biological agent into the United

States in a carry-on bag or checked luggage, there is no

mechanism using routine customs, immigration, drug scan, or

bomb search procedures to identify the agent. The only way to

find it would be a physical search by a very well trained and very

lucky searcher. 59 Similarly, the threat on the battlefield is almost

as insidious, with very little present detection capability.

Desert Storm represents a recent experience in which the

United States needed the ability to detect biological warfare

agents to give early warning for protective measures. With few

exceptions, the capability was not there . The limited capability

that was deployed was the result of a crash program to

produce a biological detector-it was an experiments° It seems

logical that the inability to detect and thereby protect the

civilian population or military force would significantly add to

the viability of biological weapons as a terrorist or tactical

battlefield threat.

Shortfalls

In addition to the detection shortfall, the United States is

unable to effectively protect the military forces (medically and

nonmedically), conduct an effective preemptive counteroffensive

strike, or protect the population against a terrorist attack. Given

the wide spectrum of kinds of agents that make up the biological

warfare threat, medical prophylactic measures (primarily

vaccinations) are inadequate, and it appears they will be so at

least for the near-term.si Personal protection in a biological

21 7
the chemical warfare suit. In Desert Storm, the chemical warfare

suit was adequate if fitted properly (a frequent problem) but

unsuitable if worn for long durations or while in hot weather. 62

Desert Storm also highlighted the shortfall in the ability to

strike a biological warfare storage facility with confidence that

massive numbers of innocent civilians would not be killed

(collateral damage) as a result. 63 The United States is impotent

to prevent a biological warfare terrorist attack against the

population unless there is specific intelligence to forewarn of

the attack. 64 Additionally, following a biological warfare attack,

there are many agents that medicine can't treat today. 65

Given this discouraging information, the scenario described

in the prologue seems even more plausible . Other "concepts

of operations" are not hard to imagine . Nearly every grocery or

drug store sells small aerosol deodorizers that periodically

spray a fragrant mist. If an adversary wanted to neutralize the

military brainstem of the United States, they might refill these

deodorizers with a biological agent and clandestinely place

one in each restroom in the Pentagon. After a few days, the

entire population of the Department of Defense headquarters

would be incapacitated, causing mass confusion and

widespread terror.

In a combat environment, conventional dispersal with

bombs, artillery, or even a spraying device on an aircraft (like a

crop duster) would not be nearly as effective as a more

surreptitious attack that would infect people before they

donned protective clothing . An infiltration by special

operations forces or undercover operatives to place aerosol

canisters similar to insect bombs or deodorizers might cripple

a force before it knew it was attacked. Like the Indians at Fort

Ticonderoga, the force would fall ill and many would die. The

force's ability to conduct effective combat operations would

certainly be negated . By the time doctors diagnosed the

disease and determined the right antidote, if there were one,

the war could have been lost.

Consider the implications if the Aum Shinri Kyo had used

botulinum toxin or Anthrax instead of the Sarin chemical

agent in their attack on the subway system in Tokyo . The

death count and the magnitude of the terror would have been

21 8
as a 90 percent 

y py

experienced-that could be nearly 5,000 dead innocent

civiliansl And considering that the volume of Sarin to saturate

a given area is approximately equivalent to 10,000 times the

amount of botulinum toxin needed to cause the same effect,

the attack could have been vastly more devastating. 66

In another recent real-world incident, consider how much

more effective the terrorist bombing of the New York World

Trade Center would have been if they had placed a fire

extinguisher filled with a biological agent at the bottom of each

stairwell and rigged them to begin spraying just as the bomb

ignited. In the ensuing panic, thousands of occupants of the

building escaped down the stairs. No one would consider a fire

extinguisher out of the ordinary in a crisis situation after the

bombing. As a result, potentially every occupant in the World

Trade Center could have been infected.

If the intent of the terrorists had been to demonstrate how

vulnerable the population of the United States is, the addition

of biological agents to the conventional attack would really

have terrified leaders and other citizens in the United States .

These incidents of potential biological terrorism must raise

concern and questions about civilized society's ability (or more

accurately, inability) to deal with such an eventuality. As we

enter the twenty-first century, we may well be facing weapons

of mass destruction used, not on the battlefield by warriors

but among dense population centers by deranged non-nation

states-a sobering prospective . Clearly, more has to be done to

overcome this dramatic vulnerability-and soon.

Resolution

Biological terrorism is a challenge for the diplomatic,

technical, military, medical, and intelligence communities, but

the political arena may hold the biggest stick to deter

biological warfare aggression. The BWC is the international

vehicle to prevent biological proliferation. Unfortunately, it

does not provide for verification or punitive measures. 67 With

the blatant violations of Russia and Iraq, much tougher

21 9
py 

gg g

technology that produces biological agents gives the biological

warfare producer an almost built-in plausible deniability .

The technical community has the greatest and most urgent

challenge to develop effective detectors, both on the battlefield

and in biological agent detectors similar to metal detectors.

This effort should be a top priority. There should also be

technological exploration, in concert with the intelligence

community, for means to detect clandestine biological

production facilities. The state-of-the-art must be pushed to

find some means to detect a production facility with certainty,

no matter the size. Both human intelligence and the national

technical means must be greatly improved.

The military challenge is to train and equip to respond to a

detected biological threats. To respond on the battlefield,

militaries must develop effective, comfortable, and

long-wearing protective clothing to replace the existing

ensemble. A self-contained, air conditioned unit would be

ideal. The military must also be capable of responding to a

more strategic biological warfare threat-the production

facilities and stored munitions. Planners must work with the

technology community to develop a capability to bomb a

biological warfare target and destroy the viability of the agents

before they can be brought to bear on friendly forces and

without causing unacceptable levels of collateral damage. For

obvious political reasons, such precision-guided munitions

should, also, be kept non-nuclear. The military also should

hone its special operations, direct action skills for the

biological (as well as chemical and nuclear) mission. The

special operation option may be a more plausible alternative,

depending on the scenario.

The medical community should continue to work on

biological warfare vaccinations that are broad-based, safe, and

in sufficient quantities to inoculate those people most

susceptible to biological warfare attacks. This daunting task

will be even more challenging given the controversy about the

vaccines administered during Desert Storm and their

suspected connection with the Gulf War Syndrome .s8 Doctors

should also strive to improve the post-attack treatment in

220
responsive surge capability to administer 

g

biological warfare-exposed patients.

The intelligence community must be strengthened and

sensitized in its efforts to gather data on the biological warfare

threat. More resources should be directed toward identifying

biological warfare threats by human and national technical

means. This is especially important to deter terrorism in the

interim until human intelligence and national technical means

can provide more definitive answers about who are the haves

and have nots.

Finally, United States and allied political leadership should

articulate a clear retaliatory policy against the use of any

weapon of mass destruction. This was an effective deterrent on

both sides during the cold war, and it appears to have deterred

Saddam Hussein during Desert Storm. Perhaps even more

importantly, this policy must be supported by unrelenting

resolve to actually carry out the retaliation .

Since countering BW is an issue that crosses many

government agency borders, the direction of the effort should

come from a multi-agency steering group . This steering group

initially should include principals or primary deputies from

the Office of the White House, Department of Defense, Federal

Emergency Management Agency, Public Health Service,

Central Intelligence Agency, and Department of Justice. Wellversed technical and operational advisors will be essential to

steer the effort.

Many of these agencies already have ongoing programs, but

there is little senior-level cohesion to these fragmented

endeavors. Additionally, some of these efforts have demonstrated

blatant parochialism. A multi-agency steering group would

overcome these stovepipe attitudes and efforts, placing emphasis

on national interests and prioritizing accordingly.

Conclusions

Biological warfare has been a threat for decades if not

centuries. Yet the United States is ill-prepared to defend against

or counter it-why? One view is that "the United States has a

22 1
too unsavory and too difficult to handle.69 Another skeptic

says, "We don't need it [BW defense] because we have a

treaty." 7° It seems the real issue is the apparent imbalance

between demonstrated threat versus resources expended to

meet that biological warfare threat.

In the case of biological warfare, the fixes are technically

difficult and they will not be low-cost. Weigh this against a

threat that has not yet fully manifested itself. It almost seems

logical that decision makers would be reluctant to spend

scarce resources against a heretofore invisible threat.

However, the United States is moving toward a more

aggressive counter-BW program. In February 1995, the White

House published a national security strategy that said :

U.S. forces must be prepared to deter, prevent and defend

against their use. The United States will retain the capacity to

retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of

weapons of mass destruction, so that the costs of such use will

be seen as outweighing the gains. However, to minimize the

impact of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on our

interests, we will need the capability not only to deter their use

against either ourselves or our allies and friends, but also, where

necessary and feasible, to prevent it . We are placing a high

priority on improving our ability to locate, identify, and disable

arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, production and storage

facilities for such weapons, and their delivery systems. To

minimize the vulnerability of our forces abroad to weapons of

mass destruction, we are placing a high priority on improving our

ability to locate, identify and disable arsenals of weapons of mass

destruction, production and storage facilities for such weapons,

and their delivery systems. 71

This is a step in the right direction, but it needs to be a giant

step . The biological warfare threat looms . The United States

must have the capability to detect, preempt, and protect before

someone strikes us or our allies with a poor man's nuke.

Epilogue-9 January

This is a CNN special report live from the Anthrax Task Force

Center Miami. T9us morning, the fatality count was 16,437. TMs

grim figure was just given to us by doctors here. Unfortunately,

222
so many patients are close to death right now. Doctors are

working frantically to save as many as possible, but they are

running out of antibiotics and facing massive overcrowding . The

halls are crowded with gurneys, and relatives are being asked to

wait outside unless their loved one is critical. And there are many

of those.

The Anthrax Task Force was quickly assembled on the sixth of

January after doctors across the nation diagnosed the horrible

epidemic as pulmonary anthrax. The Federal Emergency

Management Agency heads the team that consists of

representatives from the FBI, the Centerfor Disease Control, the

Armed Forces Military Intelligence Center, and the US Army

Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, to name just a few.

They are warning anyone who attended the Orange Bowl on New

Year's Day to seek medical attention immediately. If you are

experiencing cold-like symptoms, you are probably infected. Do

not hesitate, or it will befatal. The FBI reports that this appears to

be a deliberate act of mass murder. But that is all they have been

able to determine. They are offering a ten million dollar rewardfor

any information about this horrendous crime.

This is all from Miami. Back to CNNNews Headquarters.

Notes

1 Montgomery (Alabama) Advertiser, November 24, 1994, sec. B.

2. Kathleen C. Bailey, ed ., Director's Series on Proliferation (Springfield,

Va. : Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 23, 1994), 2.

3. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New

York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 74.

4. ibid., 9.

5. Bailey, 9-10, and Harris and Paxman, 74.

6. Charles Piller and Keith R. Yamamoto, Gene Wars, Military Control

Over the New Genetic Technologies (New York: Beech Tree Books, 1988), 29.

7. Ernest T. Takafuji, M.D., M.P.H., Col, US Army, "Biological Weapons

and Modern Warfare" (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C ., The Industrial

College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University 1991), 4.

8. Bailey, 10.

9. Harris and Paxman, 75-81.

10. Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death, Japanese Biological Warfare

1932-45 and the American Cover-up (New York: Routledge, 1994), 113-131 .

11 . Bailey, 10-11, and Harris and Paxman, 75-83.

223
(Washington, D.C. : AAAS, 1993), 16.

13. Harris, Factories of Death, 68-74.

14. Ibid., 88-93.

15. Bailey, 15.

16. Harris, Factories ofDeath, 162-63.

17. United States Army, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare

Programs, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C . : US Government Printing Office, 1977),

29.

18. Bailey, 16, and Harris, Factories ofDeath, 164.

19. Ibid, 17.

20. Tucker, 18.

21 . Bailey, 19, and Jeanne McDermott, The Killing Winds, The Menace of

Biological Warfare (New York: Arbor House, 1987), 30-32.

22. Harris, Factories ofDeath, 171-72, and Tucker, 6-7.

23. McDermott, 189-90.

24. Leonard A. Cole, Clouds of Secrecy, The Army's Germ Warfare Tests

over Populated Areas (Landam, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), 107-19,

and Stephen Rose, "The Coming Explosion of Silent Weapons," Naval War

College Review, 42, (Summer 1989) : 26-27.

25. Bailey, 11 ; Harris, Factories ofDeath, 197-98; and McDermott, 156.

26. Cole, 131 ; Harris, Factories of Death, 220-22 ; and McDermott,

37-44.

27. Bailey, 12

28 . "Report: Russia making 'Superplague Germs," The Honolulu

Advertiser, 28 March 1994.

29 . Joseph D. Douglas, America the Vulnerable: The Threat of

Chemical/Biological Warfare, The New Shape of Terrorism and Conflict

(Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, 1987), 29.

30. Montgomery Advertiser, 8 April 1995.

31. David Van Biema, "Prophet of Poison," Tune, 3 April 1995, 28.

32. Ibid., 29.

33 . Mart Yamaguchi, "Japanese Cult Had Bacteria Useful for Germ

Warfare" San Francisco Chronicle, 29 March 1995.

34. Van Biema, 28.

35. United States Department of Defense (DOD), Office of the Secretary

of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, FYnal Report to Congress

(Washington, D.C . : US Government Printing Office, April 1992), 15.

36 . Jonathan B. Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Warfare

Programme" Arms Control, December 1993, 237.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., 240.

39. DOD, 639.

40. Tucker, 2.

41 . Bailey, 27.

42. This is based on the author's experience as chief of the team

chartered with finding the solution to attacking biological warfare storage

and production facilities .

224
44. John M. Broder and David Lamb. "Some Allies Won't Join Offensive,

Cheney Says." Los Angeles 71imes, 24 December 1990.

45. DOD, 639-40.

46. President George Bush, "Crisis in the Gulf," US State Department

Dispatch, II, 2, (14 January 1991): 25.

47. Tucker, 250-59.

48. Bailey, 26-27; and Rose, 11-12.

49 . Defense Nuclear Agency, Biological Weapons Proliferation (Ft .

Detrick, Md. : US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases,

April 1994), 49.

50. Tucker, 259.

51 . Defense Nuclear Agency, 46.

52 . Ibid.

53 . Ibid., 50.

54. Rose, 29.

55. Tucker, 12.

56. John F. Guilmart3n Jr., and Sir Michael Howard, Two Historians in

Technology and War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa. : US Army War College, 20 July

1994), 33.

57. Prodigy Services Company. Software Returned to U.S. Firms, 3 April

1995.

58. Defense Nuclear Agency, 50.

59. Rose, 35-46.

60. Ibid., 82.

61 . Bailey, 67-76.

62. DOD, 639-46.

63. Rose, 85 .

64. Ibid., 35-46.

65. Bailey, 62-63.

66. Ibid., 40-41 .

67. Ibid., 85-90.

68. USA Today, December 8, 1994.

69. Rose, 20.

70. Bailey, 35.

71 . The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement (Washington, D .C. : Government Printing Office, February

1995) .14.

Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare

Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, USAF

The United States military is entering "one of those rare

historical periods when revolutions happen in how wars are

fought. The revolution derives not from any single invention or

idea, but from a range of rapidly developing technologies."i

Some ten military revolutions have occurred since the fourteenth

century. 2

Advances in sensors, communications, stealth technology,

and precision munitions have preoccupied those leaders

planning how the United States will wage future wars. The

revolution in biotechnology, however, has gone relatively

unnoticed . The same technology and expertise which has

brought revolutionary medical therapies and greater agricultural

productivity is readily transferable to the development of

biological weapons.

Many technical barriers that once limited the effective use of

biological warfare (BW) are gone. A country or group with

modest pharmaceutical expertise can develop BW for terrorist

or military use . As the United States prepares itself for the

national security challenges of the twenty-first century, it

must grasp the implications of this silent revolution.

Nature has long waged its own form of biological warfare.

The epidemic of bubonic plague killed an estimated one

quarter of Europe's medieval population (25 million deaths)

between 1347 and 1351 . The introduction of smallpox into the

New World by European explorers decimated the population of

Native Americans. 3 A pandemic of Spanish flu may have killed

50 million people worldwide between 1918 and 1919 . 4 By the

year 2000, 40 million people could be infected by the Human

Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) which causes the Acquired

Immunodeficiency Disease Syndrome (AIDS) . 5

Such events as these undeniably change biologic, economic,

and political systems. Governments, groups, and individuals

227
gy gp

mistakenly

dismiss the military or strategic value of biological weapons.

These weapons represent a credible threat to United States

security and future economic prosperity .

Biological warfare offers an adversary unique and significant

advantages because of its ease of production, potential impact

of use, and the ability to exploit US vulnerabilities. It is the

only weapon of mass destruction which has utility across the

spectrum of conflict. Using biological weapons under the cover

of an endemic or natural disease occurrence provides an

attacker the potential for plausible denial. In this context,

biological weapons offers greater possibilities for use than do

nuclear weapons.

Biological warfare can include the use of bacteria, rickettsia,

viruses, and toxins to induce illness or death in humans,

animals, and plants. In the current public opinion, there is a

significant misperception that clouds BW discussions.

Biological warfare is often lumped together with chemical

weapons. In BW, the types of agents, physiologic effects,

methods of protection and detection, and methods of

application are distinctly different from those of chemical

warfare (CW) .

Chemical Warfare Versus Biological Warfare

Biological agents are many times deadlier, pound-for pound,

than chemical agents. Ten grams of anthrax spores could kill

as many people as a ton of the nerve agent Sarin.s There are

four distinct types of chemical weapons: nerve, blister, blood,

and incapacitating agents. The effects from these chemical

agents can occur within seconds of exposure as in the case of

nerve and blood agents or as long several hours in the

circumstance of low-dose blister agent exposure such as

mustard gas. The physiological and medical effects of CW are

limited to well-defined symptom complexes. The outcome of

each exposure is dose-dependent death or incapacitation .

Of the four general types of biological warfare agents

mentioned, 60 have been identified with potential weapon

228
agents are diverse and are not 

y yp

of agent. Some cause pneumonia. Others can cause

encephalitis or inflammation of the brain. Each one causes a

different complex of symptoms, which can either incapacitate

or kill its victim.

The ineffective dose required to induce illness or death may

be as great as tens of thousand of organisms as in the case of

anthrax, or just a few as with tularemia. With the exception of

exposure to a toxin, a period of several days or even weeks

may pass before the onset of symptoms and the ultimate effect.

This incubation period is the time necessary for the microbe or

viral agent to establish itself in the host and replicate.

Toxins, on the otherhand, are a product of living organisms

and behave similar to chemical agents. Botulinum toxin is the

most toxic substance known to man. Without supportive care,

inhalation of nanograms (10-9 milligrams) of this agent will

cause progressive muscular paralysis leading to asphyxiation

and death.

Hazards and Protection

The risk posed by chemical agents has two components: a

vapor and liquid hazard . An individual is protected from the

vapor and liquid hazard of CW with the combination of a

protective mask and the Mission Oriented Protective Posture

(MOPP) suit. The United States also possesses an array of

chemical point detectors and alarms which provide real time

warning of exposure or attack.

In contrast, the hazard posed by biological agents is

primarily an inhalational one. The most effective means of

delivering a BW agent is via an aerosol in the one to five

micron particle size. Creation of this type of an invisible

aerosol cloud may be efficiently accomplished using an

agricultural sprayer for example.

The current US military protective mask, when properly

fitted and donned, affords virtually 100 percent protection.

Biological agents generally do not pose a cutaneous hazard. A

MOPP suit is not required. When US troops deployed to Saudi

229
operational capability to detect any biological agents .$

During Desert Storm, the United States fielded only a

rudimentary developmental detector system . This system

could detect only two of several possible Iraqi BW threats . In

addition to the limited scope of this detector, it took between

13 and 24 hours after the attack to determine the presence

and identify the BW agent. There was no capability to provide

any real-time or advanced warning of a biological attack. 9

During the Gulf War, the first likely indication of an attack

was ill and dying soldiers.

Biological Warfare Detection

and Medical Protection

Detection of biological agents is a complex problem . Since

World War II, attempts by the United States to develop BW

detection have met with frustration and only limited success .

Given the chemically indistinguishable organic properties of

biological agents, the methodology for detecting chemical

agents is not useful by itself. Each prospective BW agent

requires a specific assay to detect and identify. Advances in

medical diagnostics and biotechnology are allowing science to

overcome these technical obstacles . The number of potential

agents, however, and the demanding technical and developmental requirements make the challenge of BW detection

daunting.

In lieu of detection or advanced warning and the opportunity

to don protective masks, medical products such as vaccines,

immunoglobulins and antibiotics can mitigate the effect of

biological agents and the potential operational impact. All

three types of products can provide both preexposure and

postexposure protection to an infectious disease and therefore

a BW agent.

Vaccines are active immunization measures whereby the host

is intentionally exposed to either an attenuated or inactivated

form of the disease causing agent. Vaccines prompt the body to

produce antibodies which can afford a high level of protection

230
(FDA) approved vaccine against anthrax has been shown to be

protective against inhalational agents in nonhuman primates. to

Like biological weapon detectors, vaccines are highly specific

for a potential threat agent. In addition, the time needed to

develop a safe vaccine product suitable for human use may be

10 to 15 years. While several BW vaccines exist for known

threat agents such as botulinum toxin and tularemia, they

remain in a status short of full FDA approval known as an

investigational new drug (IND).

Full FDA approval may be slow in coming if there is not

sufficient test data on human response to the vaccines or if

there is a lack of commercial demand or no perceived

near-term public requirement for its use . Vaccines against

exotic infectious disease agents associated with offensive BW

fall under the purview of the Department of Defense with the

Army as research and development executive agency.

The ability to provide IND products, which are shown to be

safe in humans and efficacious in animal studies, short of war

or national crisis is limited by the need to satisfy the human

use or informed consent requirements . These requirements

specify the need to inform the prospective recipient of possible

known and theoretical, short-term and long-term effects of the

product. The stigma attached with IND status may have

limited the use of the vaccine during Desert Storm . The

controversy surrounding Persian Gulf Illnes (PGI) further

negatively effects perceptions of IND products used for military

purposes . To date the biological warfare vaccines have not

been associated with PI.

Once a vaccine is given, there is lag time before adequate

protective antibodies develop. The length of time and the

number of doses of vaccine required before protection is

attained and its duration, are unique characteristics of the

specific product. Furthermore, a sufficiently high dose of a BW

or infectious disease agent can overwhelm any vaccine .

Finally, the protective level obtained for a population is not

uniform. There is individual variability .

Immunoglobulins are existing antibodies which can be

harvested from humans or animals. Like vaccines, they are

protective for a specific agent. Unlike vaccines, which

23 1
g

considered passive immunization. When

injected into a host, they provide short-term protection which

usually lasts weeks or months. Immunoglobulins are usually

used to protect viral and toxin agents. The rigorous FDA approval

required for vaccines is also required for immunoglobulins.

A well-known example of an immunoglobulin preparation is

the serum used for Hepatitis A. Immunoglobulins currently

exist for pre-exposure and post-exposure treatment of botulinum

toxin intoxication . Developments in monoclonal antibody

technologies offer the potential for rapid development of

immunoglobulin preparations for use in BW medical defense. 11

Finally, the use of antibiotics for pre-exposure or postexposure treatment of bacterial or rickettsial BW agents offers

the potential for broad spectrum-agent protection. Antibiotics

however do not prevent or treat illness due to viral or toxin

agents. There are further practical theoretic limitations to the

use of antibiotic . Certain microbial infectious diseases and BW

agents have a natural resistance to different antibiotics.

Furthermore, antibiotic resistance among microbes occurs

naturally or can be developed deliberately. Deliberate resistance

can be induced by exposing cultures to serial exposures of

ever-increasing doses of an antibiotic or by transferring a piece

of genetic material which confers antibiotic resistance. 12 It is

possible to purposefully develop a BW agent that is resistant to

a range of different antibiotics.

The duration of protection afforded by antibiotics depends

on the amount of antibiotic available and the compliance of

the individual to take them . For certain bacterial BW

exposures, antibiotics may have to be taken for more than 30

days to prevent illness and possible death. 13 A large enough

infective dose of a bacterial or rickettsial agent could, as in the

case of the vaccine, overwhelm the protection afforded by

antibiotics.

The medical means to mitigate the effects of BW agents and

attack are imperfect. Even with reliable detectors which

provide real time or advanced warning, vaccines, immunoglobulins, and antibiotics play a complementary role in the

passive defense against BW. In the absence of BW detection,

medical products represent the cornerstone of protecting US

232
administration may deter an enemy from using BW.

Role of Intelligence and Medical Defense

The need for a prior knowledge of BW agent threats for both

detectors and medical products has already been suggested. A

great deal is known about US offensive BW agents developed

and produced until 1969 (Table 2).

US OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGENTS PRODUCED

BETWEEN 19541969

Antipersonnel Anticrop

Anthrax Wheat rust

Tularemia Rye rust

Brucellosis Rice blast

Q Fever

Venezuelan Equine

Encephalitis (VEE)

Botulinum Toxin

Staphyloccal

Enterotoxin

Table 2

There are some classical BW agents which Japan, the

United States, and possibly the former Soviet Union and Iraq

have researched and developed as weapons. 14 Anthrax and

botulinum toxin fall into this category. Among the 60 other

potential BW agents, "sound and complete intelligence data"

will play a vital role in ascertaining which ones proliferants

will pursue . 15 Robert Gates, then director of the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), underscored the problem in January

1992, when he cited human intelligence as being critical in

assessing the proliferation of both chemical and biological

weapons in the third world. 16

233
medical efforts be funded and prioritized based on a threat list

developed by the US intelligence community. 17

Two questions emerge from this process. The first is whether

adequate priority and resources have been focused on

collecting and analyzing BW-related intelligence and how

successful these efforts have been. The second is whether the

process of creating a threat list based entirely on intelligence

assessments is adequate . Assessing an adversary's current

BW efforts may ignore developments in biotechnology which

may offer breakthrough capabilities and novel agents.

Weaponizing BW

The final distinction between chemical and biological

weapons involves the methods of dissemination . Weaponizing

of CW and BW implies three essential elements: agent,

munition, and delivery system. Both can be "weaponized" into

conventional munitions such as artillery rounds, cluster

bombs, and missile warheads.

Unlike CW, BW weaponizing implies the efficient aerosolization

of viable agents in a one-to-five micron particle size. Dissemination of BW agents by conventional munitions pose certain

technological difficulties, because they are sensitive to environmental stresses. Excessive heat, ultraviolet light, humidity and

oxidation decrease their potency and persistence. 18 The United

States overcame these difficulties in the late 1960s to produce,

weaponize, and stockpile several BW agents. 19

Weaponizing BW includes some unconventional delivery

systems which may put the United States at risk. 2° In contrast

to chemical agents, biological agents could also be easily

adapted for use with commercially available agricultural

sprayers. This dissemination method lends itself to both covert

and clandestine applications and possible terrorist use . 21

Unmanned remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) with spray tanks

represent another low-observable means of BW delivery. 22

A common characteristic shared by both chemical and

biological agents is their dissemination on ancient meteorological

234
and Saudi Arabia was enormous .

Nowhere in recent history, however, has the use of BW been

similarly documented. The suspicion that "Yellow Rain" or the

mycotoxin tricothecene was used in Indochina has never been

conclusively proven, to the embarrassment of the Reagan

administration. Similar suspicions have proven inconclusive

during the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan. The

former Soviet Union has only recently admitted the truth

about an accident at a biological agent production facility in

Sverdlovosk in 1979. Boris Yeltsin, himself, recently disclosed

Russia's violation of the Biological Weapons Convention in

1992.

During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Iraq was suspected of having

an extensive BW capability, but subsequent UN inspections

failed to find any definitive proof. However, under the pressure

of economic sanctions, Iraq admitted that it had a biological

warfare R&D effort. For example, Iraqi officials have now

disclosed that between 1985 and 1991 Iraq produced two germ

warfare agents, baccilus anthracix and botulinum toxin . 26

In some measure, BW has attained the stature of the "bogey

man of WMD"-terribly feared but never seen. That fear and

the threat, however, are real. According to the commander of

the US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Agency (CBDA),

the biological threat has been recently singled out as the one

major threat that still inflicts catastrophic effects on a theaterdeployed force.

Desert Storm solidified the perception in the United States, in

the Congress, and among our military leadership that biological

weapons were something that third world nations considered a

potential equalizer. 27 Had Iraq used anthrax or botulinum toxin,

enormous casualties would have resulted which would have

overtaxed the Army's theater medical system. 28

Certain findings of the OTA assessment relating to BW are

noteworthy. The ease and cost of developing and producing

BW is much simpler and cheaper than developing nuclear

weapons. Biotechnology allows small facilities to be capable of

producing large amounts of biological agents . Ten million

dollars allows a proliferant to produce a large arsenal. 29 The

236
p

gpg

about their use. Ideal conditions would occur at night, with

favorable mild to moderate winds. The relative coverage of 1,000

kilograms of nerve agent Sarin is 7.8 square kilometers under

these meteorological conditions. Attacking a major metropolitan

city like Washington, D.C., would result in an estimated 3,000

to 8,000 deaths. A similar attack using 100 kilograms of

anthrax under the same conditions would cover 300 square

kilometers and result in 1 to 3 million deaths. 23 Anthrax,

under favorable meteorological conditions, could kill as many

people as a comparably sized nuclear device. 24

The Current Biological Warfare Threat

A recently published Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

document, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Assessing the Risks25 had three major findings.

1 . The states most actively working to develop WMD,

although limited in number, are for the most part located in

unstable parts of the world-the Middle East, South Asia, and

the on Korean Peninsula.

2 . WMD proliferation poses dangers to all nations . It poses

particular problems for the United States.

3 . The breakup of the Soviet Union presents immediate

threats to the global nonproliferation regimes.

The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical

weapons and ballistic missiles creates a pall over the potential

achievement of a stable global environment. It also raises the

risks of escalation of regional conflicts . Proliferants understand

the value of these weapons for deterrence, coercion, and war

fighting.

The consequences of their use have unfortunately been

recorded in recent history. The horrific images of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki leave little to imagination regarding the death

and destruction that occur with a nuclear detonation .

Similarly, the television images of dead Kurdish villagers and

incapacitated Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War reveal

235
and political risks. The 1991 Gulf War highlights this point.

The United States and United Nations claimed after the war

that Iraq had an advanced BW program, although public

proof was lacking and Iraq initially denied this . During the

war, Iraq capitalized on the coalition bombing of a "baby milk

facility" for propaganda purposes . Despite US official claims

that the Abu Gharyb infant formula plant was a dual-use

facility capable of producing biological weapons, CNN's Peter

Arnett's visit to the site and report raised public doubts about

whether this was a legitimate allied target, when, in fact, it

was . Following the war, intrusive on-site visits by UN

inspectors failed to uncover any irrefutable evidence of an

offensive BW program, although the Iraqis later admitted they

had procured large quantities of a biological agents-anthrax

and botulism toxin.

The Iraqi experience shows that biological warfare programs

can exist and be hidden within legitimate facilities. Even with

direct on-site visits the likelihood of discovery may be small

unless the visitors know precisely where to go and are

permitted entry. The existence of such programs can be

enhanced with tight security and deception.

Recent events in the former Soviet Union concerning

possible proliferation of nuclear materials also add greater

uncertainty to the BW proliferation calculus. The potential

impact and availability of scientists and technicians

associated with the former Soviet offensive BW program

should be considered. Aspiring proliferants may see them as

lucrative recruiting targets. Unlike the complex technological

requirements for nuclear weapons, one or two individuals with

experience in BW agent production and weaponization could

provide breakthrough assistance to a fledgling program.

The challenge for the United States is to develop a coherent

and coordinated strategy to limit BW proliferation. If this fails,

the United States must be prepared to deter, preempt, and

defend against it . On the basis of the several incentives

presented earlier, the likelihood of preventing further

proliferation or rolling back existing BW-capable nations

seems unlikely . The simple arithmetic of the number of

238
pggqy

available and relatively unsophisticated. The equipment required

is widely available and is dual-use, having legitimate commercial

applications. Finally, and probably most importantly, the use of

BW could be difficult to prove in some cases since outbreaks of

endemic or naturally occurring disease happen. 3o

Eight nations have been implicated in developing offensive

BW capabilities : Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, China, Libya,

Syria, and Taiwan. 31 A ninth, Russia, admitted to developing

an offensive program in violation of the Biological Weapons

Convention, although it has reportedly ended such activities.

The aforementioned list may not be all inclusive. Given the

ability to produce militarily significant quantities of BW agents

(kilograms) in small legitimate facilities, a committed

proliferant with a "modestly sophisticated pharmaceutical

industry" could develop a credible undetected clandestine

offensive BW capability. 32

Genetic engineering is not expected immediately to herald

the development of new or exotic BW agents. Instead, its

impact may enhance the environmental stability of existing

BW agents. It has also been speculated that cloning DNA

segments from toxin-producing organisms may allow for the

mass production of these agents . Production of protein

molecules such as human insulin has been demonstrated and

is commercially available technology.

Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Policy

The fall of the Soviet Union signaled the end of the superpower

rivalry and created an opportunity to establish an international

system that seeks to ensure political stability, economic

opportunity, and collective methods of conflict resolution. The

United States has prioritized its national security objectives to

enhance economic growth and development; to prevent the

proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and to

resolve regional conflicts .

Nevertheless, among aggressive third world states, WMD

proliferation is occurring, and there are strong incentives to

237
likely to increase by the end of the century

How do we meet the BW threat in the twenty-first century?

What policies will help solve the likely BW challenges? How

should the United States counter-BW programs be prioritized

and integrated?

Intelligence

Recommendations For The Future

Incomplete or absent intelligence about a suspected

proliferant's BW program is a likely source of trouble. Not having

specific information about the status of a BW program, or

locations of production and storage, or methods of delivery, or

the specific agents could result in an incomplete assessment.

This could directly impact the development of United States

strategy, policy, and capabilities to meet the threat.

A comprehensive anti-BW intelligence effort must collect information relating to the basic science, medical, and bioengineering

capabilities of a potential proliferator. Short of having reliable

human intelligence with direct access to an adversary's BW

program, this type of information is required to assess the

biological capability of that nation.

Intelligence collection and analysis are critical for future

United States BW counter-proliferation efforts. Determining

the intent to develop BW, locating suspect facilities, and

assessing the nature of the offensive program are essential

elements of the intelligence effort. The importance of specific

BW agent intelligence for medical and detection capabilities

deserves emphasis. Even if the intelligence community collects

and validates this information, there may be a significant lag

time, years or even decades, before safe, effective countermeasures can be developed and fielded .

Intelligence about the anticipated means of delivery and its

doctrine of use is also important. This information allows

development of US active defense capabilities to interdict and

destroy delivery vehicles . Facility-related intelligence also

239
The ability to identify BW-related organizations and

proliferants is important to optimize the utility of export controls

and the ability to interdict shipments of related equipment

destined for suspected BW countries or organizations. The

ability to focus limited diplomatic and economic resources to

dissuade, pursue arms control, and bring international pressure

on suspected proliferants is, therefore, also intelligencedependent.

The likelihood that national technical means can identify

any or all of the three key BW intelligence componentsintent, location, and nature-is small. Dual-use facilities may

not emit characteristic signatures, but still be capable of

producing military significant quantities of biological agents .

As alluded to earlier, the availability of human-source

intelligence will be a critical element in providing information

related to BW proliferation . Assessment of BW-related

information requires trained personnel experienced in matters

relating to biology, biotechnology, medicine, and agriculture.

Balancing the technical component of the intelligence analysis

process is the need to integrate the expertise and experience

the intelligence system .

Because of the greater relative intelligence challenges and the

myriad of related areas associated with BW versus nuclear

proliferation, adequate resources must be applied to the

problem. Increasing collection priorities should also necessitate

a concomitant increase in the analysis resources devoted to the

problem. There should be an assessment and if necessary a

redistribution of assets to reconcile the disparity between the

effort against nuclear proliferation and that of BW.

Policy and Strategy Development

Beyond the collection and assessment of intelligence, policy

development and integration of the many functions are required

to respond to BW proliferation. The domestic vulnerability to

covert or clandestine acts of BW terror should be assessed. There

must be executive-level interest and involvement to oversee the

development of a crisis response system to domestic BW

240
delineated, the timesensitive health care demands created by

an act of biological terror must be assessed. It is beyond the

scope of the single agency identified in the Federal Emergency

Response Plan, the Department of Health and Human

Services, to mount the necessary reaction to deal with the

health consequences and prevent unnecessary loss of life .

A historical example illustrates the scale of the effort required

to respond to an act of BW terror in a major metropolitan area. In

1947, an American business man traveled to New York City from

Mexico City. During his bus ride, he developed a fever, headache,

and rash. Though ill upon his arrival in New York, he went

sight-seeing. Over a period of several hours, he walked around

the city and through a major department store. His illness,

smallpox, progressed and he died nine days later. As a result of

this single case, 12 other cases of smallpox and two deaths

occurred. Because of smallpox's ability to be transmitted from

person to person, this handful of cases was deemed so serious

by public health officials that 6,350,000 persons in New York

City alone were vaccinated in less than a month. 33

Unlike 1947, Americans have not been routinely vaccinated

against smallpox since 1930. A significant proportion of the

US population is susceptible to this virus. The number of

cases expected to occur as the result of a deliberate act could

be in the thousands or tens of thousands. Even though the

World Health Organization declared smallpox eradicated,

North Korea has been identified as one possible country

retaining cultures of this virus to use as a biological weapon. 34

Even if a noncontagious agent were used, the public health

consequences could be overwhelming. If several kilograms of an

agent like anthrax were disseminated in New York City today,

conservative estimates put the number deaths occurring in the

first few days at 400,000. 35 Thousands of others would be at risk

of dying within several days if proper antibiotics and vaccination

were not started immediately. Millions of others would be fearful

of being exposed and seek or demand medical care as well.

Beyond the immediate health implications of such an act, the

potential panic and civil unrest created would require an equally

large response . Local law enforcement agencies would be

overwhelmed and would need the assistance of state and federal

24 1
p

yppp

terrorists

to attempt the same type of attack for extortion or additional

terror impact.

Prior to a domestic incident such as this, a capable,

practiced, and coordinated response mechanism must be in

place . The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

provides this coordination function, but its actual familiarity

and practice associated with biological terrorism is not known.

The health-related support functions found in the

Departments of Health and Human Services, Veterans Affairs,

and Defense would have to be integrated into a single response

plan .

Stockpiles of necessary antibiotics, immunoglobulins, and

vaccines would have to be procured, maintained, and be readily

available to administer within hours after recognizing an

incident. An additional critical element of this response would be

the management of information to allay fears and avoid

unnecessary panic. The effort required to respond to a biological

act of terror rivals that needed for an accidental or deliberate

detonation of a nuclear device.

Arms Control

The BWC clearly represents the "lock which keeps the

honest man honest." It serves a vital function by establishing

an international norm against BW proliferation. Efforts should

be made to provide both disincentives and incentives for

current states to comply with the BW treaty. Nonsignatories

should be leveraged to participate in the convention .

Strengthening the BWC by enhancing transparency of

biological activities is stated US government policy. Measures

identified in the third review conference are being examined

for use in a possible formal protocol. Like the warning to

consumers--caveat emptor, subscribers to the convention must

understand that complete verification is not just elusive but

impossible .

During the original proposal of the BWC by the United

Kingdom, the Soviet military strongly opposed any limitation

on offensive BW. The Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko

242
weapons would be useful. Without international controls, the

Politburo and the Soviet military both endorsed the "toothless"

convention in 1972 . 36 The Soviet Union was one of the three

depositories of this treaty. Recent disclosures by President

Boris Yeltsin regarding former Soviet and Russian violations of

the Biological Weapons Convention highlight the limits of that

treaty.

The opportunity to strengthen the regime must also be

tempered by events in Iraq since the Gulf War. Despite

intrusive inspections, no concrete evidence of its offensive BW

program has been uncovered, although Iraq has admitted to

an R&D effort prior to the war. The continuation of the US

sanctions is now solely dependent on Iraq's refusal to detail

their BW program. Public statements by senior US intelligence

and government officials indicates that Iraq retains its

offensive BW capability. Indeed, there is a strong suspicion

that Iraq may not have destroyed its BW agents as it has

claimed.

A disturbing prospect for strengthening the BWC is that the

21 measures identified in the third review conference were

utilized in Iraq including such actions as monitoring, sample

collections, short-notice visits, record reviews, and interviewing

of key personnel. These measures have yielded no conclusive

evidence to date about the present Iraqi BW capability or its

past program.

Diplomatic Measures and International Pressure

Current DOD counterproliferation policy emphasizes use of

public diplomacy, positive and negative security assistance,

and identifying the economic, political and military costs of

proliferation. Denial of certain equipment or technologies used

in BW is problematic . Export controls, interdiction, or

disruption of supply networks will have limited impact given

the dual-use legitimate nature of the biological materials and

equipment.

Diplomatic efforts to prevent or control BW proliferation will

have similar limits. States that are parties to the BWC, but are

committed eventually to developing secret offensive biological

243
y

framework. Nations who are not signatories can refuse entry

and pursue offensive programs as well . Given the low

likelihood of detecting violations, nonsignatories could take

advantage of economic incentives or foreign assistance

programs for joining the BWC, yet pursue clandestine

offensive BW programs. There are reasonable indications that

diplomacy alone can do little to prevent BW proliferation.

Nevertheless, diplomatic and economic pressure can serve a

useful purpose in inhibiting a proliferant's activities by

invoking sanctions, export controls, or publicly disclosing

violations. One must realize that invoking these measures

depends on timely and accurate intelligence . Diplomatic

measures which try to control proliferation may, in the short

run, delay a proliferant's efforts. In the long term, they may

motivate determined proliferants to conceal or deceive their

true intent and activities. Of course the perfect solution to

proliferation is correcting the underlying reasons why nations

choose to develop biological or nuclear weapons . Clearly, BW

is a symptom of a deeper security need.

Countermeasures

Once proliferation occurs and an adversary attains an

offensive BW capability, the focus changes to mitigating its

perceived advantage and deterring its use. The range of

counteroffensive capabilities and strategies must include

deterrence, preemption, and destruction. During Desert Storm

speculation occurred regarding the implicit use of nuclear

weapons in response to BW attack. Both President George Bush

and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney publicly stated that

any attack on US forces with chemical or biological weapons

would be met with "massive retaliation." The accuracy and

credibility of this policy option are subject to much debate.

Determining the culpable party after a covert or clandestine

BW attack has occurred may be impossible. The circumstances

following the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 highlight

the potential difficulties of a forensic investigation following an

act of terror. Before implicating Libyan intelligence operatives,

244
suspected. Finding a 

smoking gun

and proving 

responsible for a future covert biological warfare attack could

be difficult or impossible.

There will be times in the future when the US president may

have to consider military preemptive strikes against a terrorist

state or group to protect the United States and allied

governments against BW attacks . Preemptive activities or

anticipatory self-defense can range from efforts that occur

during nonhostilities to open armed conflict. The recent

interception and attempted interdiction of precursor CW

materials bound for Iran from China (Yin He incident) present a

recent example. The 1981 bombing of the Iraqi Orisak nuclear

reactor by Israel is representative of using overt military force

during instances short of open armed conflict. On the other

hand, the US air campaign sought to destroy Saddam Hussein's

WMD capabilities in the opening days of the Gulf War.

Destruction of the means to produce, process and deliver

biological weapons is the final element of the counteroffensive

strategy. There is a potential risk of collateral damage when

striking BW-related facilities or delivery systems . Theoretically,

a downwind hazard could occur if bulk storage of BW agents

were struck when meteorological conditions were favorable to

their dissemination. While no specific confirmed reports of

collateral damage were documented during Desert Storm,

there was one news report that implicated the occurrence of

illness and death in Iraqi guards at an unidentified BW facility

south of Baghdad after coalition bombing. 37

Another partial answer to the BW threat would be to deploy

theater ballistic missile defenses capable of intercepting enemy

BW warheads while enroute to their targets. Ideally, interception

and destruction would occur during early boost phase of the

enemy missile launch to lower the risk of friendly casualties.

Good ballistic missile defenses are not enough, since the United

States and its allies must also respond to the challenge posed by

future enemy cruise missiles equipped with biological weapon

warheads . Of course, such missile defenses are defenses of the

last resort. The greatest probability of minimising collateral

damage would be realized if special forces or other means of

preemption allowed the United States or its allies to destroy the

245
g 

Biological Defense

The last element of the BW counterproliferation strategy is

medical and nonmedical passive defensive measures. The

importance and problems of BW detectors have already been

identified. A priority effort exists to develop and field a BW

detector which can provide stand-off warning and real-time

detection of attack.

Another nonmedical defensive measure that deserves

emphasis is the employment of collective protective systems.

Hardened shelters and work areas for rear-echelon troops as

well as filtered over-pressurized systems for combat vehicles,

ships, and planes could minimize the effects of both chemical

and biological weapons.

Medical measures to protect against biological threats

include short-term and long-term methods of protecting US

military forces. Even when detectors become available, medical

measures will play an important role in both protection and

treatment against BW attack.

Efforts should be focused first on developing, testing, and

producing Food and Drug Administration-approved vaccines

to immunize soldiers against the most likely BW threat agents.

The availability of suitable vaccines and other medical

products must remain a priority.

On 26 November 1993, Undersecretary of Defense William

Perry signed the DOD immunization policy for BW threats. It

establishes the requirement for both peacetime and

contingency use of vaccines against validated BW threats.

Each theater commander-in-chief (CINC) is required to determine the regional threat and provide the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs with requirements . Integral in meeting the regional

CINC's requirements is the development of a DOD-dedicated

vaccine production infrastructure.

The liability concerns of the US pharmaceutical industry

have affected development and production of public health

vaccines . The controversy associated with the liability risk of

immunizing children against Pertussis is illustrative. Congress

246
awarded damages resulting from severe neurologic sequelae

from the Pertussis vaccine . The rationale behind this effort

was to protect the vaccine companies from large cash awards

resulting from litigation, so to preserve their profitable

production of important public health vaccines .

The commercial or public need for vaccines against

biological warfare agents short of an act of terror is virtually

zero. Yet, should a high-confidence warning of an attack on

our population occur, substantial amounts of these products

would be necessary to respond to minimize illness and death .

The peacetime military need exists as result of the DOD

immunization directive.

The ability and desire of the pharmaceutical industry to

commit its facilities for dedicated vaccine development are

questionable in light of profit and liability concerns. A US

government vaccine facility has value for both BW and public

health considerations . Such a facility should remain a high

priority project in developing capability to respond to BW

proliferation.

Besides the actual protective effect gained by BW vaccines,

certain elements of deterrence can be garnered by minimizing

the effect of an adversary's BW agent. Immunizing US forces

and having the ability to protect others will minimize an

enemy's ability to coerce the United States and its allies. They

will also lessen the potential impact of a BW attack on the

United States or its allies.

Therefore, the perceived or actual benefit derived by the BW

proliferant will be lessened. Finally, vaccines and medical

countermeasures can contribute the means to maintain the

war-fighting capability of US military forces as well as

providing for the survival of US citizens.

Conclusions

The proliferation of biological warfare weapons offers less

developed nations a capability as lethal and potentially

devastating as a nuclear device . The ease and relative low cost

of BW production, coupled with spread of dual-use legitimate

247
the shortterm and well into the twentyfirst 

y

Biological weapons can be employed in noncombat settings

under the guise of natural events, during operations other

than war, or can be used in open combat scenarios against

all biological systems-man, animal, or plant. Deliberate

dissemination of BW agents may be afforded possible denial by

naturally occurring diseases and events. The low probability of

detecting the development and production of terrorist and

militarily significant quantities of BW agents lessens the

effectiveness of diplomatic measures such as dissuasion, denial,

and international pressure.

The limitations associated with treaty verification leave little

optimism for the long-term effectiveness of the Biological

Weapons Convention. Ascribing to the BWC may offer further

potential of plausible denial if proliferants sought to use

membership as a cover for their prohibited efforts.

Expectations for preventing BW proliferation must be

grounded in reality. The likelihood of preventing or deterring a

determined proliferant from obtaining biological weapons is

relatively small. The outlook for the future of biological weapons

proliferation is discouraging. "Brain drain" from the former

Soviet Union may create volatile opportunities for breakthrough

proliferants.

Future US policies against BW proliferation need to be based

on integrated government policies and capabilities to deter,

preempt and defend against this threat. No single element of the

program is adequate to deal with the BW problem. Together,

however, these elements can lower the risk and mitigate the

potential impact of BW.

In addition, the problem of biological warfare cannot be

narrowly focused on its ability to kill or render people ill .

Biological warfare's potential to create significant economic loss

and subsequent political instability with plausible denial exceeds

any other known weapon. Germ warfare at the end of the

twentieth and inception of the twenty-first century directly

threatens the security of the United States and the achievement

of a peaceful, prosperous, and stable post-cold war era.

248
1. Bradley Graham, "Battle Plans for a New Century," The Washington

Post, 21 February 1995, Al .

2. Ibid., A4. See also, Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer,

The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National Interest, No. 37, Fall 1994,

30-42. These 10 revolutions in military affairs were identified as the infantry

revolution, the artillery revolution, revolution of sail and shot, the fortress

revolution, the Napoleonic revolution, land war revolution, naval revolution,

mechanization revolution, aviation revolution, information revolution, and

the nuclear revolution.

3. William H. McNeill. Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor Books,

1977).

4. Joseph D. Douglas and Neil C. Livingstone, America the Vulnerable

(Lexington Mass. Lexington Books, 1987),2.

5. "World AIDS Day December 1 1993" Morbidity and Mortality Weekly

Report (Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control, 19 November 1993), 1 .

6. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons

ofMass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1993), 3.

7. Stanley L. Weiner and John Barret, Trauma. Managementfor Civilian.

and Military Physicians (Philadelphia : W.B. Saunders, 1986), 519.

8. General Accounting Office, Chemical & Biological Defense: U.S.

Forces Are Not Adequately Equipped to Detect All Threats (Washington, D.C. :

USGPO, 1993) 1.

9. Ibid., 3.

10. Arthur Friedlander, et al ., Post-exposure Prophylaxis against

Experimental Inhalational Anthrax (Frederick, M.D. : Army Medical Research

Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1990).

11 . Jonathan Lasch, "Human Monoclonal Antibodies for Biological

Warfare Defense," (La Jolla California: The Scripps Research Institute, 19

November 1993), 1 .

12. George F. Brooks, et. al., Medical Microbiology, (Norwalk, N.C. :

Appleton and Lange, 1991), 162-163.

13. Friedlander.

14. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New

York: Noonday Press, 1982), 76. Also Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet

Biological Warfare Threat (Washington, D.C. : USGPO, 1986), 2. Another

good source is Michael R Gordon, "CIA Foresees Iraq Biological-Weapon

Capability in Early '91," New York Tifmes, 20 September 1990, 1 .

15. David L. Huxsoll, "The U.S. Biological Defense Research Program," in

Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future? ed. Brad Roberts (Washington,

D.C. : The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1993), 60.

16. Robert Gates, McNeil and Lehrer News Hour, 20 January 1992.

17. General Accounting Office, Biological Warfare: Better Controls in

DOD's Research Could Prevent Unneeded Expenditures (Washington, D.C. :

USGPO, 1990), 5.

18. Office of Technology Assessment, 39.

19. Army, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare Program, vol. 2

(Washington, D.C. : USGPO, 1977), D 2, 3.

249
and David M. Smith, "Coping With Biological Terrorism," in Roberts, 41 .

22 . Office ofTechnology Assessment, 41.

23 . Ibid., 54.

24. Ibid ., 8.

25. Ibid.

26. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Had Program for Germ Warfare," The

Washington Post, 6 July 1995, 1 .

27. George Friel, quoted in "Chem-Bio Defense Agency Will Tackle Last

Major Threat to a Deployed Force," ArmedForces Journal, 1992, 10.

28. General Accounting Office, 1 .

29. Office ofTechnology Assessment, 11.

30. Ibid., 39.

31 . Ibid., 80.

32. Ibid., 38.

33. Theodore Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence: Biological Warfare and How

to Avoid It (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), 60.

34. John J. Fialka, "CIA Says North Korea Appears Active in Biological,

Nuclear Arms," The Wall Street Journal, 25 February 1993, 16.

35. Kupperman and Smith, 42.

36. Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1985), 174.

37. "Biological Plant Bombed," London: Reuters Wire Service, 3 February

1991 .
Biological Weapons for

Waging Economic Warfare

Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, USAF

The final decade of the twentieth century has positioned the

world at the threshold of tremendous opportunity. The

collapse of the Soviet Union has dissolved the bipolar world

and created the opening to forge a new international security

environment. The preeminence of politico-military competition

is slowly giving way to politico-economic competition. As

Shintaro Ishihara predicts, "The twenty-first century will be a

century of economic warfare."'

While military power remains important, its context and

type are changing. The focus of many developing nations is to

seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-nuclear, biological,

and chemical weapons-to meet regional security concerns.

The parallel emergence of economic competition and its likely

accompanying conflicts with the proliferation of WMD raises

the possibility of a new form of warfare. This includes the

development and use of biological warfare (BW) against

economic targets.

Using BW to attack livestock, crops, or ecosystems offers an

adversary the means to wage a potentially subtle yet

devastating form of warfare, one which would impact the

political, social, and economic sectors of a society and

potentially of national survival itself.

Agriculture

For both developed and developing nations, nonfuel

commodities present an important source of national security

and prosperity. In the United States alone, the agricultural

sector is an $800 billion industry. Besides providing for the

nourishment of the US population and a significant portion of

251
export revenues in 1991 . This revenue represents approximately

15 percent of the total US exports for that particular year. 2

Agricultural exports have been an important source for

redressing the US trade deficit. Moreover, agriculture is now one

of but a handful of sectors that generates a trade surplus for the

US. In 1992 it created an estimated $18-billion surplus. 3

Lesser developed and developing nations and other nations

whose economies are in transition have significant agricultural

sectors that provide important contributions of food and

revenue to their economies . This observation is especially true

of nonoil producing nations . Yet, even with productive

agricultural systems, most if not all nations in the world are

food importers .

Trends in agricultural systems, particularly food production,

indicate that fewer numbers of people and hectares are

involved in agricultural production. In developed market

economies, the percentage of the economically active

population in agriculture declined by 31 .2 percent from 1980

to 1992 . 4 A similar, yet not as dramatic, decline was noted in

developing countries, where the numbers of people involved in

agriculture declined by 11 .3 percent during the same period. 5

Despite that decline, the overall agricultural productivity in

both the developed and developing worlds increased by

45 .3 percent and 25 .2 percent respectively. 6

This increase in productivity has resulted from the spread of

modern farming technology, high-yield crop varieties, and

potent fertilizers and pesticides . The goal of many developing

and developed nations is to become self-sufficient in food and

other agricultural products. 7 Competition has become intense.

Efforts to remove trade-distorting domestic subsidies and

limits to market access to agriculture were objectives of the

Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and

Tariffs. Market access-limitation policies essentially maintain

domestic prices above world prices and isolate domestic

producers from competition and the volatility of the world

market. 8 While included on the Uruguay Round's agenda,

tremendous resistance was encountered from several important

nations. The United States wanted to protect dairy products,

sugar, cotton, and peanuts . Japan wanted to prevent rice

252
market access, internal supports, and export competition,

agreement on many items was not reached.

Biotechnology

Part of the economic revolution in the world today is the

explosion of biotechnology . Biotechnology has been a significant

reason why agricultural systems are much more productive . As

alluded to earlier, the development of higher-yield crops results

partly from genetic recombinant engineering, which takes genes

coded for greater productivity and resistance to disease and

drought and inserts them into a particular species of crop.

Besides enhancing the productivity and heartiness of food or

cash crops, methods of biological control are increasingly relied

upon to provide an environment-friendly means of controlling

economically significant pests and diseases . Bacillus

thuringiensis (B.t .) . is a well-known example of a naturally

occurring sporulated bacteria which effectively controls

caterpillars, particularly tomato worms.

A variant of BA., called B.t. israelensis or B.t .i., has shown its

effectiveness in controlling malaria-bearing mosquitoes and

blackflies which carry the parasite that causes river blindness. 9

Efforts are now under way to insert the gene from B.t . into such

plants as cotton. Initial research indicates that this procedure

enables cotton plants to resist the boll weevil (anthonomus

grandis) . This particular pest caused an estimated $50-billion

loss in US cotton revenues from 1909 to 1949. 10

In California's Imperial Valley the pink bollworm caterpillar

has caused the amount of land planted with cotton to drop from

140,000 acres to only 7,000 during the past 17 years." Today

US cotton farmers spend $500 million on pesticides .

Nature of the Biological Warfare Threat

Harmful bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, or toxins that incapacitate

or kill humans, animals, or plants have an unsettling value in

253
envisioned a context for BW when he wrote about 

pestilences

methodically prepared and deliberately launched upon man

and beast . . . Blight to destroy crops, Anthrax to slay horses

and cattle . . . ." 12 This discussion narrows the definition of

BW to consider only its utility against such economic targets

as animals and plants.

Historical Context and Evolution

Investigators have argued that German agents intentionally

infected horses and cattle with anthrax and glanders before

they were shipped from the United States to Europe during

World War 1 . 13 During World War II, the United States, fearful

of perceived efforts by both Japan and Germany to develop

BW, engaged in a large and ambitious retaliatory offensive and

defensive BW research and development effort. While never

fielding or using a BW weapon, they did develop several BW

agents, including rinderpest, glanders, wheat rust, rye rust,

and rice blast to use against animals and plants.

Anecdotal reports suggest US officials had considered using

rice blast agents to destroy Japan's rice crop during the

closing months of the war to force its surrender. The

realization that the United States would have to supply food to

Japan once the war ended and the availability of the atomic

bomb, dissuaded US officials from, pursuing this option.

In 1972, an international treaty, the Biological Warfare

Convention, specifically prohibited the research, development,

production, or use of biological agents for offensive use . While

162 countries have signed this treaty, no verification means

are available to ensure compliance. Reportedly, up to 20

nations are suspected of pursuing offensive BW capabilities .

Significant on the list are Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Syria,

Israel, North Korea, and Taiwan.

14 No specific mention is made

of any suspect nation seeking development of anti-animal/

anti-crop agents . Note that the United States during its

offensive program first developed and fielded an anti-crop

bomb. The United States discontinued its pursuit of several

anti-agricultural agents in the mid-1950s since they lacked

military utility .

254
Compared to other mass destruction weapons, biological weapons are cheap. A recent Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

report places the cost of a BW large arsenal as low as $10 million.

This estimated cost stands in stark contrast to a low-end

estimate of $200 million for developing a single nuclear weapon.

The high-end cost estimate for a nuclear weapons could be 10 to

50 times higher.

15 Not only is BW more affordable, but militarily

significant quantities of BW agents (kilograms) in legitimate

biological laboratories make BW production easy to accomplish

and conceal. Any nation with a moderately sophisticated

pharmaceutical industry can do so .

Nature at Work: Whiteflflies and Plausibility

Biological economic warfare likely would involve the

intentional dispersion of a harmful agent or pest against a

high-value cash crop or food source. The US Department of

Agriculture recently identified 53 animal diseases which are

nonindigenous or foreign, which, if introduced into this

nation, would adversely impact the livestock industry. 16

Recent naturally occurring events highlight this potential.

The Imperial Valley produces a large variety of food and

produce. In the summer of 1991, an infestation by the sweet

potato fly or whitefly destroyed much of the crops in this area

and caused a $300-million loss. A related but different strain of

whitefly caused $100 million in losses in southeastern California

in 1981 . The US agricultural system is a $800-billion industry.

The Imperial Valley infestation represents a natural event where

a harmful agent (whitefly) encountered a susceptible host (crops)

in a conducive environment (the Imperial Valley) . The

investigation of this natural outbreak, however, reveals just how

a deliberate act of BW economic warfare could be engineered.

17

The poinsettia strain of the whitefly is not found naturally in

California. In the circumstance of this outbreak, the whitefly

could have accompanied a shipment of poinsettia plants from

Florida. While the exact place the poinsettia strain originate

remains a mystery, other similar strains originate in Russia,

mainland Asia, and Africa.

255
existence. Balanced between natural conditions, competitors,

pathogens, and predators, the impact it has on the

environment is usually limited . When this fly or any other pest

is placed in an environment where natural controls are

missing, uncontrolled insect breeding may cause subsequent

crop destruction. In the Imperial Valley circumstance, however,

the culpable insect represented more than simply a pest

translocated to new fertile fields . This particular type of whitefly

was a distinct new strain. Its biological characteristics made it

an effective agent of destruction. Its appetite was voracious.

Unlike other known strains of whiteflies, this one consumed

many times its body weight in vegetation and dined on a great

variety of plants . Second, it had an unusual resistance to

chemical and naturally occurring pesticides. DNA analysis of the

genetic makeup showed a unique strain of this particular insect.

Finally, besides its direct effects, the whitefly carried other

harmful agents like fungus. Thus, it also inflicted disease on

already weakened plants.

Naturally occurring genetic events of mutation and selection

reasonably explain this occurrence . It is also possible that such

insects could be bred for nefarious purposes. In the context of a

deliberate act of BW, a nation could select from several native

occurring or endemic pests. Selective management and breeding

could develop a "super" pest. The selection of this pest could be

highly specific for a particular crop that an economic competitor

or regional adversary relies on for economic prosperity or

national survival. To provide better cover for a clandestine or

covert BW attack, pests endemic to the target nation could be

similarly obtained and could enhance its resistance through

such laboratory manipulation as nonindigenous pesticide

exposure. Infiltrating and disseminating perpetrator insects is

then dependent on the mode of transportation and the level of

plausible denial desired .

United States Vulnerabilities

The threat of this type of insect-borne BW attack on the

United States remains theoretical. A recent OTA report on the

256
'Excludes most agricultural weeds.

nonindigenous species (NIS) . The report indicated that the

intentional (noncriminal) or unintentional importation of plants,

animals, or microbes has major current and future economic

consequences for US agriculture, forestry, fisheries, water use,

utilities, and natural areas.

Importation of harmful nonindigenous species costs the

United States billions of dollars annually.

18 From 1906 to

1991, 79 NIS caused documented losses of $97 billion (Table 3) .

This table detailed only a small percentage of the large number

of economically and environmentally costly agents, so their

true impact is not known .

Source: M. Cochran, "Non-Indigenous Species in the U.S. Economic Consequences," prepared for Office of

Technology Assessment, March 1992.

US losses between 1987 and 1989 to the Russian wheat

aphid (diurahis noxia), for example, exceeded $600 million. 19

The Mediterranean fruit fly caused $897 million in damage

and lost revenue. Each year $7.4 billion is spent on pesticide

applications, with a significant amount spent on controlling

NIS insects. Nonindigenous weeds, with both direct and

indirect effects, caused a loss of somewhere between $3.6 and

$5 .4 billion per year. If herbicides were not used to control

them, weed loss would hover around $19 billion yearly.

Another recent example cited in the OTA report described

how NIS gain entry into the US. The Asian tiger fly (anopheles

257

Estimated Cumulative

Table 3

Losses to the US from

Selected Nonindigenous Species, 1906-1991

Category Species Analyzed Cumulative Losses Species Not

(number) ($ millions, 1991) Analyzed

Plantsa* 15 603 -

Terrestrial 6 225 >39

Vertebrates

Insects 43 92,658 >330

Fish 3 467 >30

Aquatic 3 1,207 >35

Invertebrates

Plant Pathogens 5 867 >44

Other 4 917 -
normally found in Southeast Asia where it is the vector or

carrier for the human diseases dengue and malaria.

In 1985 a freighter carrying containers of old tires imported

this mosquito into the United States via the Port of New

Orleans . This mosquito is an aggressive human biter and a

prolific breeder. Because of its behavior, the Asian tiger fly

poses a greater risk of endemic or naturally occurring

mosquito-borne disease transmission . With no geographic

barriers, the tiger fly has spread to 22 states and is creating a

public health concern because of the increased occurrence of

Western and Eastern equine encephalitis and the reemergence

of dengue fever in the United States.

The impact and magnitude of the tiger fly will not result in

billions or millions of dollars of lost productivity or tens of

thousands or thousands of deaths . Clearly, the United States

has a well-established public health system with surveillance,

rapid identification, and management if an epidemic or

outbreak occurs.

Nations of the third world, however, are not as fortunate and

do not have an existing infrastructure nor adequate resources

to mitigate the impact of similar events. This shortcoming was

recognized in an epidemic of yellow fever in Nigeria in 1991 . A

shipment of used tires from Asia was implicated in the

introduction of this insect. 2° Similar modes of NIS infiltration

have been described as a result of airline travel and flushing

ballast tanks on ships.

A contemporary theoretical example of a third world BW

economic scenario is represented by an actual situation in

Malaysia, the world's third largest producer of rubber behind

Thailand and Indonesia. In 1991, it exported $971 .9 million of

natural rubber. Along with other Southeast Asia nations,

Malaysia is trying to keep the South American leaf blight

(microcyclus ulei) from affecting its rubber tree industry. This

fungus was first detected in Brazil at the turn of the century

and infects the stems of young trees and leaves and

significantly decreases the output of sap.

No known cure for microcyclus exists . This blight is the

main reason a viable rubber industry no longer exists in South

America. The immediacy of airline travel, especially directly

258
entry of this fungus . Estimates by Malaysian Agricultural

Department officials predict that should this fungus enter into

its country's rubber trees, it would decimate the trees within

two years . Fighting off this fungus is considered vital to

sustain Malaysia's economic boom at its projected 7-8 percent

growth rate. 21

In the spring of 1993, an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth

disease occurred in Italy. This contagious virus led to the

destruction of 4,000 head of cattle . After authorities linked the

source of this outbreak to a live cattle shipment from the

former Yugoslavia, the European Community (EC) sparked a

"cow war" when they banned bovine products from all 18

countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Bovine meat exports from eight East Europe countries

(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,

Romania, and a portion of the former Soviet Union) totaled

$103 million in 1991 . Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and

Bulgaria reacted by banning the EC's own meat exports .

Eastern European officials say EC markets remain almost as

closed to them in 1993 as to their former communist regimes. 22

While the governments of Eastern European countries have

large agricultural infrastructures with the potential for large

exports, they lack money and do not conform to the EU's

common agricultural policy. The cow wars restrict their access

to agricultural markets and economic capital which could

finance greater economic and political reforms.

The reappearance of the screwworm along the Mexico-Texas

border has worried US cattlemen . Its return resulted from

importation of an infected herd from Central America in

November 1992 . Infection of US cattle would result in "severe

economic losses." 23 This pest eats the flesh of cows, destroying

their hides, and kills newborn calves. During the past four

decades, over $400 million has been spent on US-Mexican

screwworm eradication programs. A major concern created by

lowering trade barriers during the North American Free Trade

Agreement negotiations was how this treaty would facilitate

the spread of agricultural pests like the screwworm.

259
Thus, naturally occurring events where the agent, the

susceptible host, and the environment converge can result in

disease, economic loss, and national or international

repercussions . No evidence indicates that any nation or group

willfully caused the events cited. However, we may not be so

lucky in the twenty-first century. It is all too possible to

construct a scenario which would offer plausible denial and

possible gain to a potential adversary.

Scenario One: Corn Futures

The US Department of Agriculture estimates that the 1994

corn harvest would plunge 31 .4 percent from record summer

rains and flooding. It was expected the cost of a bushel of corn

would soar to three dollars. The February 1994 price of corn,

the nation's number one crop, was the highest in a decade. 24

The resultant increase in cost increased operating expenses of

companies "that handle[d] everything from corn-based ethanol

fuel to livestock." 25

"We are vulnerable in 1994 . . . right on the edge," said Keith

Collins, acting assistant agriculture secretary for economics .

The fall 1993 harvest was too small to supply both domestic

processors and exporters. US stockpiles are expected to be at

their lowest levels since the food scare of the mid-1970s . A

slight acceleration in food inflation was expected in 1994. Food

inflation in 1994 was estimated at between 3 .3 percent and

3.5 percent, up from 2 .2 percent in 1993 and 1 .2 percent in

1992 . This is the first time in about four years whereas food

prices exceeded the general inflation rate. 26

A corn crop short of the 8 .4-billion-bushel estimate would

signal a 4 percent food inflation rate in 1995 . 27 Some

additional disasters such as a drought or loss of corn to blight,

"would do considerable economic damage to world food

supplies ." 28 A 7 .5-billion-bushel corn crop would push prices

to four dollars a bushel. Such a surge would push inhibited

exports and make hogs and cattle too expensive for many

farmers to feed, eventually driving up meat prices . 29

260
economic warfare by ruining a competitor

s crop 

p

Three more scenarios involving corn, wine, and cotton attacks

can illustrate the potential BW threat.

Scenario Two: Corn Terrorism

A second scenario might go as follows . China is the world's

second largest corn exporter. 3° Recognizing the vulnerable

situation of the United States, China plans an act of agricultural

terrorism. Selecting a corn seed blight, fusarium graminearum,

which grows well at cool temperatures and in wet soil, they

clandestinely spray this hearty spore over the US Midwest from

commercial airliners flying the polar route to Chicago and Saint

Louis. They disseminate the spore in winter and early spring, and

the blight is present in the soil when spring planting occurs.

The United States, despite eliminating the corn set-aside

requirements and planting more than 80 million acres of corn,

suffers from a crop disaster. This unexpected Chinese-induced

corn seed blight decimates the US corn crop . The fall harvest

is a full 30 percent below expected levels . The United States

then imports corn for the first time in its history to meet

domestic needs. Food prices rise sharply and cause higher-thanexpected food prices and inflation. China gains significant

corn market share and tens of billions dollars of additional

profits from their crop.

Scenario Three: That's a "Lousy" Wine

The grape louse (phylloxera vastratrix) is ravaging the

vineyards of Napa and Sonoma counties in Northern California.

It is estimated that 60-70 percent of the 68,000 vine acres are

being destroyed. The louse does not affect the fruit of the vine

but attacks the roots, which slowly kills the plant. It is difficult to

detect, and once in place, it is a prolific breeder. The louse is

carried by wind, water, and mud and, once discovered, is likely

to have spread already to other areas . 31

Infected vines may be treated by removing them and

replanting them with louse-resistant plants . The estimated

cost to the Napa-Sonoma wine industry will be about $1 billion

or more over the next few years . The expected impact will be

26 1
causing the disappearance of some labels .

A hypothetical scenario could consist of a group of

disgruntled European winemakers who are jealous at the

superior quality of Northern Californian wines and desirous of

recapturing the wine market. Traveling as tourists, they slip

into the United States with tins of pate which conceal millions

of the offending louse. Traveling through the California wine

country, they disperse their deadly cargo.

Scenario Four: Sabotaging Pakistan's Cotton Crop

Pakistan is the world's third-largest producer of cotton behind

the United States and China. In 1991 the Pakistanis exported

$420.4 million of raw cotton, some 36 percent of its primary

commodity exports (excluding fuels) in 1991 . 32 If textiles, yarn,

and other by-products are included, almost 60 percent of

Pakistan's exports depend on cotton. 33 Due to an attack caused

by an insect, the 1993 harvest will fall 15 percent below expected

levels.

This crop loss will affect the country's overall economic

performance . Pakistan will produce only 10 million or so bales

of the 12 million bales targeted . In 1993, Ahmed Muktar (the

minister of state for commerce) said, "This definitely would be

detrimental to our economy, because the surplus . . . would

have added to our meager foreign exchange reserves. " 34 The

immediate economic impact of the crop loss, however, may

have longer-lasting effects . Cotton farmers, fearful of

experiencing a similar disaster next year, are considering

planting something else. Rice, wheat, and sugarcane, which

are significantly less profitable (cotton is 43 times more

profitable than all other crops), appear more attractive and

safer than cotton . 35 "Restoring the confidence of farmers, who

doubt their ability to generate profits from cotton, could

become one of Pakistan's toughest challenges ." 3 s

The open hostility between Pakistan and India is not

hypothetical. They are competing against each other in an

arms race involving nuclear and conventional weapons. The

heavy reliance of Pakistan on a single export cash crop is not

unusual in the developing world . The geographic proximity of

262
infiltration and 

p

gg

target like its cotton crop . The ability to inflict economic loss

on Pakistan has repercussions that affect the private and

commercial sectors, the military, and the society.

Implications of Economic Biological Warfare

The current US focus on BW limits consideration to the

human effects of such agents as anthrax, plague, and smallpox.

Little or no effort seems to be devoted in assessing the

vulnerabilities of the United States or any other nation's

agricultural or ecological infrastructures to BW attack. If the

focus of international and regional competition is transitioning to

economic power, it is prudent to assess the potential impact of

this form of economic warfare, develop a comprehensive surveillance or monitoring system, and prepare countermeasures.

Developed countries with adequate economic reserves,

agricultural diversity, and the means to mitigate such

occurrences would be relatively resistant to such attack. Even

developed countries, however, could experience significant

economic losses and political and national security repercussions

if other intervening events could make certain target commodities

more vulnerable or magnify the impact of BW use.

Lesser developed or developing nations are in a much more

precarious position. If the target commodity was a principal cash

crop or food source, using BW may inflict a grave blow to that

nation's economy or society and possibly result in some political

impact. History has recorded the chaos and instability created

by such natural catastrophes as famines and epidemics. Using

BW in this fashion would have applications to waging

low-intensity warfare with strategic outcomes.

Addressing the Problem

Recent public debate about the appropriateness of the US

intelligence community's collecting economically relevant

263
economies . Any opensource discussion about proliferation of

biological weapons does not address its utility in waging

economic warfare.

As in other forms of weapons proliferations, however,

intelligence remains key . The foundation of intelligence

assessment related to BW directed against economic targets is

based on human intelligence . Collection activities must be

focused on research and development efforts of adversarial

nations in areas relating to endemic and nonendemic

nonhuman diseases and pests. The means to assess any

information collected requires a truly multidisciplinary effort

involving veterinarians, ecologists, horticulturists, botanists,

entomologists, and intelligence analysts.

While there is a requirement to assess what potential

adversaries are doing in these areas, vulnerability and potential

impact data must be collected on US systems . This effort

requires a coordinated interagency process involving the

Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, and Treasury

as well as the Environmental Protection Agency. Besides

sensitizing the federal government to the potential problem,

state and local governments should support this effort. State

and local governments should be educated on the importance

of reporting nonhuman outbreaks of disease or pests with

economic significance .

Local and federal agencies should investigate reports of

nonhuman outbreaks which occur in defined high-value

commodities, involve potential BW or nonendemic agents, or

inflict a certain threshold economic loss .

Similarly, some existing integrated governmental mechanism

must be mobilized quickly to contain and mitigate the impact

of a BW attack. The Federal Emergency Response Plan

contains at least a theoretical structure to begin to address

this problem .

The real and hypothetical examples cited highlight the

opportunity offered by BW as a means to attack the agricultural

infrastructure of an adversary. The existence of naturally

occurring or endemic agricultural pests or diseases and

outbreaks as described permit an adversary to use BW with

plausible denial.

264
a nations economy to potentially affecting its national

security. The United States gave up its antiagricultural

biological weapons long before it unilaterally renounced the

use and development of biological warfare in 1969 .

The present concerns about the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction appropriately recognize the threat posed by

BW against our military and citizenry. The question is whether

our government is aware of, or prepared to respond to, acts of

BW? Is our intelligence community sensitized or tracking

proliferant's efforts to develop antiagriculture BW? Is there a

mechanism whereby federal, state, and local agencies report

and respond to acts affecting valuable economic resources or

involving suspicious or nonendemic agents?

In the post-cold war era and as we enter the twenty-first

century, the economy determines superpower status. The threat

posed by biological weapons deserves prudent consideration .

Notes

1 . Shintaro Ishihara cited in C. Fred Bergsten, "Japan and the United

States in the New World Economy," in Theodore Rueter, ed., The United

States in the World Political Economy, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 175.

2. UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook, (New York: United Nations Publication,

1993),2.

3. World Economic Survey 1993: Current Trends & Policies in the World

Economy (New York: United Nations Publications, 1993), 72.

4. Ibid., 155.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid .

7. Ibid., 72.

8 . Ibid., 71 .

9. Thomas Y. Canby, "Bacteria: Teaching Old Bugs New Tricks,"

National Geographic, 184, no.2 (August 1993); 53.

10 . U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Harmful Nonindigenous Species in the United States (Washington, D.C . : US Government

Printing Office, 1993), 65.

11. Jon Thompson, "King of Fibers," National Geographic, 185, no. 6.

(June 1994) : 80.

12. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxirran, A Higher Form of Killing (New

York: Noonday Press, 1982), 70.

13. Rexinond C. Cochrane, "Biological Warfare Research in the United

States," in History of the Chemical Warfare Service in World War It (1 July

1940-15 August 1945) (Washington DC: US Army, 1946), 3.

265
15. Ibid., 11 .

16. Office of Technology Assessment, Harmful Non-indigenous Species in

the United States, 301 .

17. Raymond J. Gill, "The Sweet Potato Whitefly Problem in Southern

California," California Department of Food & Agriculture Report(Sacramento,

Calif. : 1991) .

18. Harmful Non-indigenous Species, 5 .

19. Ibid., 65.

20. "Aedes albopictus Introduction into Continental Africa," Morbidity and

Mortality Weekly Report (Atlanta: Center for Disease Control, 6 December

1991), 836.

21 . "Malaysia Rubber Industry Fears Deadly Latin Fungus," Baltimore

Sun, 18 April 1993 .

22 . Eric Bourne, "Europe's 'Cow War' Shows Persistence of Cold War

Divides," Christian Science Monitor, 20 April 1993. See also, "Epidemic Hits

Italian Livestock," Wall Street Journal, 16 March 1993.

23. David Clark Scott, "Pest Infestation Spurs Doubts Over Standards in

Mexico," Christian Science Monitor, 16 January 1993.

24. "The Outlook: As Food Prices Rise 1994 Crops Hold Key," Wall Street

Journal, 7 March 1994, 1 .

25. Scott Kilman, "Corn Prices Are Expected to Soar After Forecast of

31 .4% Plunge in US Harvest From Last Year," Wall Street Journal, 9

November 1993.

26 . "The Outlook: As Food Prices Rise 1994 Crops Hold Key," 1 .

27 . Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. World Economic Survey 1993.

31 . Kathleen Sharp, 'Me Louse and the Grape," American Way, 15

September 1993 44.

32. UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook, 16.

33 . Farhan Bokhari, "Cotton Farmers Face Big Setback," Christian

Science Monitor, 29 December 1993, 8.

34. Ibid .

35. Ibid .

36. Ibid.
On Twenty-first Century Warfare

Dr. Lawrence E. Grinter and Dr. Barry R. Schneider

Shortly after he became secretary of defense, William S .

Cohen toured US forces in Korea. The briefings he received on

the North Korean chemical and biological warfare threat

caused him to immediately order a billion-dollar increase in

US defense spending on counterproliferation programs: $732

million for passive defenses, $146 million for counterforce

programs, $87 million for special forces improvements, and

$36 million for active defense additions. It is a fact of life that

even poor states such as the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea, if determined, can develop revolutionary weapons that

might offset the conventional firepower of the world's sole

remaining military superpower.

In order to plan for the battlefield of the future, the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently released a report

called Joint Vision 2010. This report offers a broad framework

for understanding joint warfare in the future. It also directs

US armed forces acquisition programs in obtaining the

capabilities to run military operations using precision

engagement, dominant maneuvers, and focused logistics while

providing full dimensional protection of forces and assets in

combat. JV2010 is a reflection of the basic belief that a

revolution in military affairs is occurring, and it assumes that

new capabilities are needed to cope with that RMA.

There have been perhaps a dozen revolutions in military

affairs since the fourteenth century.' One recent one began

when the United States detonated its first atomic bomb in the

early 1945 Trinity test . The Hiroshima and Nagasaki

detonations in August 1945 helped end World War II . In that

same war, the Japanese experimented with germ warfare by

spreading bubonic plague agents on Chinese population

centers via bombing missions . Also in WWII, the Germans

manufactured-but did not use--Sarin and Tabun nerve gases.

267
to make twenty-first-century warfare more costly than

anything seen before .

In 1998 the world has seven acknowledged nuclear weapons

states : the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,

France, China, India, and Pakistan . (India and Pakistan do

not yet admit their nuclear test explosions are for weapons.)

There is at least one undeclared nuclear weapons state, Israel.

Beyond this, there are the near-nuclear states such as North

Korea, Iran, and Iraq. If biological and chemical weapons

arsenals are added to the nuclear club, it is estimated that

between 20 and 30 states possess one or more of the NBC and

missile weapons. Some of these are hostile radical regimes--

rogue states that threaten their neighbors with intervention

and/or state-sponsored terrorism.

Another revolution in military affairs, at least from an

American perspective, has been the spread of WMD to such

NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention (NASTI) .

This will cause considerable change in how the United States

and its allies will have to fight, train, equip, and supply their

forces opposing such foes in future major regional conflicts .

In a conflict against such a heavily armed opponent, will the

United States and its allies be forced toward more dispersed

forces, greater mobility, outranging of the opponent in

disengaged combat, risky reliance on escalation dominance to

deter adversary use of WMD, and/or improved active and

passive defenses? Or can we follow an enhanced version of

Desert Storm where, relying on escalation dominance to deter

enemy intrawar resort to WMD, we emphasize parallel

warfare, hyperwar, information warfare, dominating

maneuver, precision targeting, and/or space technologies to

beat the enemy military and secure our objectives?

Which set of technologies will be used in twenty-firstcentury wars? Which set of strategies best fits those

technologies? Will the technologies of a past RMA, in the

hands of our enemies, neutralize or preclude the utility of the

newer technologies of a more modern RMA? Translation: will

enemy use of NBC and missile systems influence the terms of

battle so as to marginalize our ability to prosecute information

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adversary from initiating WMD strikes against allied forces,

ports, air bases, and cities?

High-altitude nuclear bursts and the resultant electromagnetic pulse (EMP) might render most allied space assets

inert. EMP could burn out the circuitry of most allied radio

systems, computers, transistors, and power grids in the region

of combat, rendering many of the allies' high-tech assets

harmless.

Adversaries could also mount NBC weapons on mobile

missile launchers, camouflaged, constantly moved, and

hidden from sight and easy detection. This would create a

targeting nightmare similar to that the allies faced in the Gulf

War against Iraq's Scud missile launchers.

Countermeasures taken to blind US and allied space assets

may rob war-fighting commanders in chief and their staffs of

the information needed to target enemy forces, especially their

highest-valued mobile military assets. After all, missiles and

smart bombs still need correct coordinates to carry out

precision attacks . Further, if the enemy is not blinded

effectively, the dominating maneuvers of future "left hooks"

may be rudely interrupted by catastrophic encounters with

nuclear attacks and anthrax barrages or a battlefield engulfed

in clouds of poison gases .

Would the NBC and missile revolution in military affairs

trump the Warden RMA of parallel war/hyperwar? Would it

overcome the RMA identified by the analysts from Science

Applications International Corporation (SAIC) which emphasizes

the contributions that may be made by changes in a

combination of precision war, space war, information war, and

dominating maneuver technologies, organizations, and

strategies? Or will theater missile defenses emerge that can

neutralize an adversary armed with 20 to 40 NBC warheads

mounted on ballistic and cruise missiles?

Alternatively, even if effective ballistic and cruise missile

defenses are not developed, will the allies' possession of

overwhelming nuclear weapons preponderance be enough to

deter rogue states from using their more limited WMDs once

war has begun? Will deterrence still suffice to keep the peace

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to 20 years will require highly sophisticated and well-integrated

political-military-technical efforts . Strategy is now being

rethought in the midst of what some believe to be a distinctive

new revolution in military affairs .

As the SAIC team has pointed out, the current RMA is

multifaceted and is demonstrating the simultaneous interplay

and reinforcement of technical, operational, organizational,

and socioeconomic developments. This "integrated system"

RMA is also pushing the reinforcement of technical, organizational, and operational factors across all fighting mediumsair, land, and sea. Within this integrated-system RMA, some

"new" or powerful areas of warfare are emerging-such as

long-range and standoff precision strikes, information warfare,

dominating maneuver emphasizing the strategic positioning of

forces, and space warfare.

John Warden has written that offensive technical and

military advancements, combined with suppression of enemy

defenses, now give the United States the ability to wreak

havoc on an adversary's entire target system . Such a degree of

military shock might be applied so quickly that it could

produce "paralysis." In time, however, adversaries may

develop countermeasures to these US capabilities for parallel

war and hyperwar, and they may discover how to reduce

vulnerabilities of their operational, communications, and

logistics centers of gravity.

Defensive measures are expected, and they usually can be

countered; but if an adversary also is capable of using

weapons of mass destruction, the stakes and the effects on

strategy could shift substantially. WMD threats by radical,

aggressive regimes may well force the United States into very

different kinds of strategies . New modes of combat may have

to emphasize mobile, indirect, dispersed, standoff, and

disengaged operations until forces in the combat area can be

defended against air and missile attacks.

The United States and its allies cannot risk putting large

concentrations of troops and equipment in the way of a WMD

attack. The magnitude of the casualties could exceed anything

experienced by the United States in a single battle . For

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p

area, more US troops might be killed in a single one-day WMD

attack than were lost in all the years of the Vietnam War,

Korean War, or even in World War II .

In such megarisk situations, time-honored principles of war

like "mass" may have to be reinterpreted to emphasize

concentratingfirepower rather than troops. An alternative is to

rely more on constant movement, dispersion, outranging the

enemy, deceiving the adversary about one's own centers of

gravity, blinding enemy reconnaissance, and emphasizing

disengaged "remote" combat until the enemy's WMD and other

"big guns" are silenced. Unless the enemy WMD can be

eliminated in initial counterforce strikes, maintaining the

offensive initiative in combat may have to wait until we can

erect missile and air defenses against them.

When confronting a "Saddam Hussein with WMD," it may

become essential to develop and deploy an airtight air defense

system and an effective multilayered missile defense in the

regions threatened . Theater missile defense is the most

important ingredient needed to cope with radical and wellarmed regimes.

No less than a two-tiered defense system, where each layer

has around a 90 percent probability of kill against an

incoming enemy reentry vehicle, will be adequate to protect

US overseas expeditionary forces, allied capitals, ports, air

bases, naval convoys, and population centers . Anything less

and the problems of dealing with NBC-armed adversaries

begin to swamp the solutions. Without such protection, it

could become suicidal to introduce an army into a port or put

it into a region through local air bases. Absent effective missile

and air defenses, WMD can scare off possible allies from

joining a coalition against our enemy and raise the body count

so high as to make US power projection into the region

politically untenable. It could even threaten the outright

defeat of US and allied forces in the field .

Without effective theater missile defenses, the costs of

engaging such a NASTI may far exceed the gains in defeating

him. Without effective missile defenses, it may even be

27 1
On the other hand, the NASTI may be deterrable by allied

superiority in WMD, or the early deployment of effective active

defenses may help to persuade him not to escalate the conflict

and to abstain from using his nuclear, biological, or chemical

weapons. If such escalation dominance results in intrawar

deterrence of the enemy's use of his worst weapons, then the

United States and its allies may be free to exploit their

technological edge via information warfare, precision strikes

with advanced conventional weapons, space assets, and other

strategies and techniques.

The development and employment of information warfare

against an adversary's command and control systems, or

against its leader's ability to appear legitimate in the eyes of

its population, also looms as a potent new warfare technique.

In 1991 information technology already was changing war

fighting. The global positioning system allowed US and allied

ground units attacking the Iraqi army's flank to maintain their

positions accurately on the Kuwaiti desert even during blinding

sandstorms. Self-navigating data drones can be employed to

search autonomously across numerous information networks.

Belligerents have already used propaganda via the Internet.

Vulnerability to computer virus warfare and other nonlethal

disabling technologies now has the attention of national

security planners .

While the pursuit of nuclear weapons by rogue regimes is

alarming, cheaper and quite lethal biological and chemical

technologies are also being developed. The Iraqi biological

warfare threat greatly concerned coalition military planners

during the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein had large chemical

weapons programs under way, and Iraq had begun to

manufacture sizable quantities of BW agents prior to that war.

As Mayer and Kadlec have written, biological warfare weapons

are easy to produce, and it is estimated that at least two dozen

countries have them. Some of the most dangerous among the

BW resources are anthrax (bacillus anthracis) and the

botulinum toxin.

As Mayer tells us, a cult in Japan spread the Sarin agent in

Tokyo's subways, killing 12 Japanese citizens and harming

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pg g

security forces intervened. They unsuccessfully tried one

biological weapons attack prior to their chemical weapons

attack on the subway system. Biological warfare programs are

hard to detect in the development and production stages, and

biological agents could cause severe casualties if introduced

into the water, air, or food supplies of crowded populations or

unprotected armed forces.

Moreover, as Kadlec writes, biological agents can be easily

adapted for use with commercially available sprayers, thus

lending themselves to covert applications. Biological agents

could be used to conduct economic warfare, and the agricultural

disasters they cause may easily be disguised as natural events.

While the United States currently enjoys a significant

conventional forces technical edge over likely rivals, this edge

can be lost if a future adversary masters the tools of the last

RMA or the next one. Present US and allied advantages will

generate countermeasures by future enemies that neutralize or

leapfrog them. There is little doubt that the continuous game of

measure, countermeasure, counter-countermeasure, and so on,

will continue into the twenty-first century as strategists and

scientists introduce new technologies and applications.

Already, the United States and its allies are encountering

rogue states newly armed with weapons of mass destruction

that were formerly held only by the major powers. This will

affect the ability to project power into those regions and will

require a thorough reexamination of how future major

regional conflicts are to be fought. Soon, too, the United States

and its allies may encounter new modes of warfare-in the

realms of land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace-through the use

of innovations in computer-enhanced information technologies,

digitized battlefields, space-based military systems, precisionguided weapons, theater missile defenses, and nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons.

Future enemies are unlikely to confront the United States in

a straight force-on-force conventional battle. Rather, they

might use asymmetrical strategies and techniques that utilize

NBC weapons, guerrilla warfare techniques, state-sponsored

terrorist attacks, satellite signal jamming, destruction of allied

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field and achieve their aims.

Unfortunately, Joint Vision 2010 gives few answers as to

how the United States and its friends can cope with such

strategies . More hard work and thinking are called for to

inform the strategies and acquisition programs needed to cope

with asymmetrical threats. National security is a continuous

process. Those who rest on their present military advantages

rather than seeking continuous improvements to cope with

future threats and changing conditions will be left behind,

consigned to defeat in the next era.

US and allied strategists, scientists, and operators must

continue peering hard into the future to ensure mastery of these

trends. This will help us stay ahead of diligent competitors and

will give our military forces the highest probability of victory on

the battlefields of the future .

Note

1 . Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military

Revolutions," Th National Interest no. 37 (fall 1994), 30-12. The 12 RMAs the

author identifies since the fourteenth century include: (1) the infantry

revolution in the Hundred Year's War where the six-foot longbow enabled

archers to penetrate the armor of cavalrymen; (2) the artillery revolution which

helped breach the walls of cities and castles; (3) the naval revolution when sails

and cannons made oar-driven ships obsolete ; (4) the sixteenth-century fortress

revolution in which thicker walls and more intricate multilayered construction

allowed static defenses to offset the earlier artillery revolution ; (5) the

Napoleonic revolution that harnessed the joint tools of the mass nationalistic

army and the industrial revolution to a new strategy of independent marches

and concentrations on the battlefield that hitherto had been impossible; (6) the

land warfare revolution brought on by the introduction of railroad networks,

the telegraph, improved range and accuracy of weapons due to rifling, and

rapid-firing weapons of the late nineteenth century; (7) the naval revolution of

the mid-to-late nineteenth century where wooden sailing ships with

short-range cannons were replaced by steam-driven iron ships with long-range

cannons, culminating in the dreadnoughts of the early twentieth century; and

(8-10) the intrawar RMAs due to mechanization, aviation, and information

transmission improvements. At the end of World War II, perhaps the most

significant RMA of all began: (11) the nuclear revolution. This revolution in

military affairs has recently been followed by (12) the information revolution

based on digitization and computer applications .

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James Blackwell is the assistant director, Strategic Assessment Center, SAIL . He was previously the director of political

military studies and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic

and International Studies in Washington, D.C . A retired US

Army officer, he earned his PhD at Tufts University, The

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, taught at West Point,

and is the author of various publications including Thunder in

the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War

(Bantam) .

Richard Blanchfield is a senior analyst, Strategic Assessment

Center, SAIL. He specializes in research on the revolution in

military affairs. In the past he served as a research analyst on

the Gulf War Air Power Survey. A former US Marine Corps

officer, Mr Blanchfield has 28 years' experience as an

educator, administrator, pilot, operator, and planner, including

12 years of first-hand experience as an analyst working on

political-military, national defense, and international relations

issues. He served in his last military assignment as director,

Studies and Analysis Division, USMC Warfighting Center.

Much of his service career was focused on security issues in

the Pacific or Middle East. A graduate of the US Naval War

College (MA, national security and strategic studies), Mr

Blanchfield also has an MA in International Relations from

Salve Regina University.

Lawrence E. Grinter, professor of Asian studies, Air War

College, teaches and writes on Asian and global security issues

including WMD proliferation. He is the co-editor/author of

numerous publications including Security, Strategy and Policy

Responses in the Paces Rim (Rienner), East Asian Conflict

Zones (St. Martin's) and Looking Back on the Vietnam War

(Greenwood), as well as 35 scholarly articles . Dr Grinter earned

his PhD from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Dale Hill is a senior analyst, Strategic Assessment Center,

SAIC. His current work is focused on aerospace warfare in the

study of the revolution in military affairs, where he has

directed seminars, war games, simulations, and research. A

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to the assistant secretary of the Air Force and as a military

planner in Checkmate during Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm. Mr Hill graduated from the Industrial College of

the Armed Forces, the Marine Command and Staff College,

and the Air War College . He has a Master's degree in

international relations from Oklahoma State University.

Charles A. Homer, General, USAF, Retired, left the Air Force

in 1995, after a 37year career. His last position was as

commander in chief, North American Aerospace Defense

Command and the US Space Command. During Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General Horner commanded

all US and allied air operations. A command pilot, he has more

than 5,300 hours in a variety of fighter aircraft, including

F-16s, F-15s, and F-4s. General Horner was commissioned in

1958, and commanded wings, air divisions, the Ninth air

force, and US Central Command Air Forces . General Homer

flew over 130 combat missions in Indochina. He is a graduate

of the University of Iowa, and has professional military

education degrees from the Armed Forces Staff College, the

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the National War

College.

Robert Kadlec, Lt Col, USAF, is a physician assigned to the

Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security

Policy as a senior assistant for counterproliferation . A

specialist in biological warfare issues, he is a distinguished

graduate of the US Air Force Academy. He holds a doctor of

medicine and a master's degree of Tropical Medicine and

Hygiene from the Uniformed Services University of the Health

Sciences . He also holds a master's degree in national security

studies from Georgetown University.

George Kraus is a senior analyst in the Strategic Assessment Center of SAIC . He has an extensive background in

military and naval operational and intelligence analysis and of

comparative analysis, technology assessment, and war gaming

design. He specializes in information war research and has

taught courses in his specialties at NDU and the Naval War

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the Secretary of Defense, and worked in Naval intelligence for

many years. He has provided numerous research papers on

current Russian security issues, submarine issues, command

and control, information war, robot warfare, space military

issues, and military issues relating to the former Soviet Union.

A graduate of the Naval War College, Mr Kraus has an MA in

international relations from Salve Regina College and an

undergraduate degree in political science from MIT.

FYed Littlepage is deputy assistant, Strategic Assessment

Center, SAIC, working on contract research on topics such

as the revolution in military affairs. A former USAF officer,

he has worked as the assistant director of research, Office of

the Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment, served as

assistant air attache to the American Embassy in Moscow, was

director of curriculum of the USAF Soviet Awareness Team,

Directorate of Soviet Affairs, and served as a Minuteman

combat crew commander . He is a Russian language and area

specialist, and earned an MS in strategic intelligence at the

Defense Intelligence College. He has published various articles

that focus on the Soviet Union, the newly independent

states, military tactics, and other intelligence matters .

Terry N. Mayer, Lt Col, USAF, is a master navigator with

over 3,000 hours in HC-130, VC-135, and VC-137 aircraft.

He served staff tours at every echelon from wing to air staff

in various capacities . During the Gulf War, he was initial

cadre on the Checkmate planning cell and later was drafted

by DIA to lead a tiger team charged with finding a method of

conducting a preemptive strike against Iraqi biological

warfare storage and production facilities-a team that was

awarded the National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation

by the director of Central Intelligence . Most recently, Lt Col

Mayer was the commander, 615th Air Mobility Support

Group, Provisional, responsible for restructuring the concept

of air mobility and global reach into the Pacific. He has an

MBA from Chapman College and is a graduate of the Air War

College .

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(SAIC) in McLean, Virginia. Previously, he served as the special

assistant on national security and foreign policy issues to Vice

President Dan Quayle. While on duty as an active duty US Army

officer, he served as military advisor to the vice president; as

the military assistant to the director of net assessments,

Andrew Marshall; and as an assistant professor at the US

Military Academy at West Point, where he taught courses in

international relations, national security, and economics. He

earned master's degrees at both the US Naval Academy and at

the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,

after completing an undergraduate degree at Indiana

University.

James W. McLendon, Colonel, USAF (MS, Troy State

University) is a career intelligence officer. His experience

includes national, ground tactical (mobile), and airborne

operations. His overseas assignments include Taiwan (twice),

Vietnam, Germany (twice), the United Kingdom, and Saudi

Arabia . Stateside, he has served on the staff of Air Force

Intelligence Command (AFIC) (and its predecessors) three

times and was the AFIC Liaison Officer to the Air Force Special

Operations Command prior to attending the Air War College.

Colonel McLendon has commanded three intelligence

squadrons, is a graduate of Squadron Officer School

(residence), Air Command and Staff College (residence), and

Air War College. He is assigned to Headquarters Air Force

Special Operations Command as the director of intelligence.

Barry R. Schneider, professor of international relations, Air

War College, writes and teaches a variety of issues concerning

twenty-first century warfare, conflict and change, WMD

proliferation issues, the revolution in military affairs, and

international flash points. He has previously served as a

college professor, defense analyst, foreign affairs officer

(ACDA), congressional staffer, and active speaker and

editor/writer on national security issues. He is the author and

editor of many publications, including two books : Missiles for

the Nineties: ICBMs and Strategic Policy (Westview) and

Current Issues in U.S. Defense Policy (Praeger) . Currently, he is

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International Relations from Columbia University.

George J. Stein, chairman, Department of Conflict and

Change, Air War College, writes and teaches courses on

information warfare, European security issues, and future

strategies . Before joining the Air War College, Professor Stein

was on the faculty of the School of Interdisciplinary Studies,

Miami University and Miami's European Center in

Luxembourg. He recently published "A Theory of Informaton

Warfare : Preparing for 2020," in Airpower Journal (Spring

1995), and has received the Meritorious Civilian Service Award

for his contribution to the USAF chief of staffs study

Spacecast 2020. Dr Stein received his MA from Penn State and

his PhD from Indiana University.

Richard Szafranski, Colonel, USAF, holds the National

Military Strategy Chair at the Air War College. His BA is from

Florida State University and his MA is from Central Michigan

University. Colonel Szafranski's previous assignments include

command at the squadron, group, and wing levels . Colonel

Szafranski commanded the 7th Bomb Wing during 1991-1993,

and was the commander of Peterson AFB, Colorado, in 1988.

He has served at headquarters Strategic Air Command, the

North American Aerospace Defense Command, US Space

Command, and the Air Force Space Command. He is widely

published in Airpower Journal, Armed Forces Quarterly,

Parameters, Strategic Review, Proceedings, etc.

John A. Warden III, Colonel, USAF, Retired, completed 30

years of active duty in the United States Air Force in July

1995 . He is a command pilot with over 3,000 hours in F-4s,

F-15s, and OV-1 Os. A graduate of the Air Force Academy, the Air

Force Institute of Technology, and the National War College,

Colonel Warden flew 266 combat missions in Southeast Asia.

He also played a leading role in planning and supporting the

air campaign in the 1990-91 Gulf War. His book, The Air

Campaign, is used in military schools around the world . Col

Warden's last active duty assignment was as commandant, Air

Command and Staff College .

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