UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RICHARD L. QUINN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

 Civil Action 2:11-cv-00268

v. Judge James L. Graham 

 Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers

ROBIN KNAB, WARDEN, et al., 

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Richard L. Quinn, Jr., an inmate in the custody of the Chillicothe Correctional

Institution (“CCI”) who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, filed this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, alleging that Defendants impeded his

ability to exercise his religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause.1

 This matter

is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 13.) For the reasons stated below, the

undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s Motion. 

1

Plaintiff names in his Complaint the following Defendants: Robin Knab, CCI Warden;

Mr. Robinson, CCI Deputy Warden Special services; Mr. Free, CCI Institutional Inspector; and

Gary Mohr, CCI Director of Ohio Department of Corrections. 

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I. 

Plaintiff’s claims arise from Defendants’ alleged denial of his requests to practice his

religion. Accordingly to his Complaint, Plaintiff requested a religious Accommodation on

December, 20, 2010. More specifically, he asked to take “a Vow of a Nazarite.” (Compl. ¶ 6,

ECF No. 12.) Defendants denied his requests and his appeals. 

On April 26, 2010, Plaintiff filed the subject Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. 

(ECF No. 13.) In his Motion, Plaintiff states that he is unable to practice his religion, causing

irreparable injury. He asks the Court to “have him removed from the custody of the Defendant.” 

(Id. at 1.) 

II.

Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)

permits a party to seek a restraining order when the party believes it will suffer immediate and

irreparable injury, loss, or damage. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 

A district court considering the extraordinary remedy of a temporary restraining order or

a preliminary injunction must consider and balance the following four factors: 

(1) whether the movant has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued;

(3) whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others;

and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuing the injunction. 

Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov., 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing

Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000)). “These factors are not prerequisites, but

are factors that are to be balanced against each other.” Id. “Although no one factor is

controlling, a finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal.”

Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted);

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see also Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997) (“While, as a

general matter, none of these four factors are given controlling weight, a preliminary injunction

issued where there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits must be reversed.”). 

A movant’s burden is even more difficult to satisfy where, as here, a prison inmate seeks

an injunction to obtain affirmative relief beyond maintenance of the status quo. See 18 U.S.C. §

3626(a)(2) (“In any civil action with respect to prison conditions . . . [p]reliminary injunctive

relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court

finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that

harm.”); Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“The purpose of a preliminary

injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can

be held.”). 

III. 

 After consideration of the four factors, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court

DENY Plaintiff’s Motion. The record fails to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. 

Plaintiff has made no attempt to support his claims with any factual evidence. Instead, he simply

states that he “is unable to practice his religion.” (Pl.’s Mot. 1, ECF No. 13.) Likewise, he has

failed to establish that he will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. Again, he fails to

support his conclusory allegations of irreparable harm with factual evidence. Additionally,

issuance of the requested injunction, which involves removal of Plaintiff from Defendants’

custody, would require CCI and others to take significant affirmative action beyond the

maintenance of the status quo. Finally, given that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood

of success on the merits and granting the injunction would necessarily disrupt CCI’s

administration of prison matters, the undersigned finds that the final factor militates against

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issuing the requested injunctive relief. See Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 286–87 (6th Cir.

1988) (counseling against court intrusion into the affairs of a state penal institution in the

absence of the most compelling situations, such as a showing of a violation of constitutional

rights). 

IV. 

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY

Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 13.) 

V. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate

review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994

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(6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to specify the

issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).

Date: May 2, 2011 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

 United States Magistrate Judge

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