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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 13-3403

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

EDWARD JACKSON,

also known as QUILL

Edward Jackson,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(No. 11-cr-0434-60)

District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 23, 2014

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Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 5, 2014)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:

Edward Jackson was indicted along with more than 60 co-defendants for their 

collective involvement in a scheme to procure fraudulent prescriptions of oxycodone 

using fake patients. Subsequently, Jackson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 

oxycodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C) without a plea 

agreement. The District Court sentenced Jackson to a within Guidelines’ sentence of 240 

months’ imprisonment, the maximum term allowed by the statute. Jackson’s counsel has 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Jackson has filed 

his own pro se brief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the following 

reasons, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw as Jackson’s attorney, affirm the District 

Court’s Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, and dismiss without prejudice Jackson’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Under Anders, a criminal defendant’s appeal may be dismissed on the merits and 

his counsel permitted to withdraw if, after a thorough exploration of possible issues on 

appeal, his attorney “conscientiously concludes, and so advises the appellate court, that 

there are no meritorious grounds of appeal; and provided that the appellate court is 

satisfied from its own review of the record, in light of any points personally raised by the 

defendant, that appointed counsel’s conclusion is correct.” 386 U.S. at 741 n. 2; see also

3d. Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2008); United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). 

If an Anders brief is inadequate in that it does not mention arguments raised in a 

defendant’s pro se brief or otherwise does not satisfy the court that counsel has 
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thoroughly searched the record and the law, we may nevertheless dispose of the appeal if 

it is patently frivolous. United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Our first step, therefore, is to determine whether the brief filed by Jackson’s 

attorney is adequate. See Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. Here, counsel briefed three potential 

issues for appeal: (1) whether the District Court had proper subject matter jurisdiction; 

(2) whether Jackson’s plea was counseled, procedurally valid, and voluntary; and 

(3) whether the sentence imposed was procedurally valid and substantively reasonable. 

Relying on relevant case law, citations to the record, and sound legal analysis, counsel 

argues there are no nonfrivolous appealable issues.

Our independent review of the record confirms counsel’s conclusions. We are 

satisfied that the District Court had jurisdiction, and that it conducted a thorough and 

counseled plea colloquy pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, leaving no 

suggestion that Jackson’s plea was not “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” See United 

States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 236, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2008).

Furthermore, Jackson’s sentencing proceeding was both procedurally and 

substantively adequate.1 Under United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006), a 

sentencing court must follow a three-stop process. First, the Court must calculate the 

Guidelines. Id. at 247. Second, it must rule on any departure motions made by the parties. 

Id. And third, it must exercise its discretion in considering the relevant sentencing factors 

 

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“We review a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the Guidelines de novo, ... its 

application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion, ... and its factual 

findings for clear error[.]” United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2009) 

(internal citations omitted).
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under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. When the District Court calculated Jackson’s Guidelines’ 

range, it first made factual findings concerning the amount of oxycodone that Jackson 

was responsible for. The District Court adopted the findings contained in the PreSentence Report (“PSR”), which attributed to Jackson 4,478 grams of oxycodone, the 

equivalent of 30,000 kg of marijuana under the Guidelines. Jackson’s counsel objected to 

this amount at sentencing, arguing that the District Court should have found instead only 

18 grams were attributable to Jackson. The District Court rejected this argument, stating 

that it “fl[ew] in the face of the evidence.” App. at 212. This evidence included testimony 

from a government agent, which was corroborated by numerous records that included a 

patient list, pharmacy data, and forensic analysis. There is no basis in the record from 

which to conclude that the District Court clearly erred in reaching this factual 

determination. 

The 30,000 kg amount yielded a base offense level of 38. The Court then applied a 

three-point enhancement for Jackson’s role as a manager or supervisor under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1(b). While Jackson’s counsel had initially filed a written objection to this 

enhancement in response to the PSR, his attorney abandoned this objection at the 

sentencing hearing. After adding three levels for his managerial role in the offense, and 

subtracting two for acceptance of responsibility, Jackson’s total offense level was 39. 

This yielded a Guidelines’ range between 292 and 265 months, but because the statutory 

maximum was 240 months, that became his new range. The District Court correctly 

calculated the Guidelines’ range. 
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Finally, the District Court stated that it had considered the sentencing factors 

under § 3553(a), including the nature and circumstances of the offense, specific and 

general deterrence, the relevant policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, 

and Jackson’s criminal history, which included a murder conviction and dozens of 

arrests. Taking into account these factors, there is no way to conclude that “no reasonable 

sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on [Jackson] for the reasons the 

district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009).

For his part, Jackson claims in his pro se brief that his trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel. He faults his attorney first, for abandoning at sentencing 

the argument that Jackson should not be subject to the managerial enhancement under 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b); second, for misinforming Jackson that the same enhancement 

would not apply; and third, for telling Jackson incorrectly that he would surely get a 

lower sentence than 240 months if he pleaded guilty. Appellate counsel did not anticipate 

these arguments in his brief. However, the government is correct that such claims should 

be reserved for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as they require extra-record 

evidence. See United States v. Hankerson, 496 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2007). 

Accordingly, we decline to review Jackson’s claims at this time. 

For the foregoing reasons, we grant defense counsel’s Ander’s motion to 

withdraw, affirm the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence imposed by the District 

Court, and dismiss without prejudice Jackson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.