Risk Analysis: Foot-and-Mouth Disease Risk from 

Importation of Fresh (Chilled or Frozen), Matured, 

Deboned Beef from Northern Argentina into the United 

States

 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Veterinary Services

National Import Export Services

April 2014
2

Table of Contents

List of Figures..................................................................................................................................3

List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................4

List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................................ 6

Executive Summary........................................................................................................................ 7

A. RELEASE ASSESSMENT........................................................................................................ 9

Part I: Eleven factor analysis .......................................................................................................... 9

1. Authority, Organization and Infrastructure............................................................................... 9

2. Disease status: Is the restricted disease agent known to exist in the region? ......................... 20

3. The status of adjacent regions with respect to the agent......................................................... 26

4. The extent of an active disease control program, if any, if the agent is known to exist in the 

region .................................................................................................................................. 29

5. The vaccination status of the region ....................................................................................... 31

6. The degree to which the region is separated from adjacent regions of higher risk through 

physical or other barriers ........................................................................................................ 35

7. The extent to which movement of animals and animal products is controlled from regions of 

higher risk, and the level of biosecurity regarding such movements...................................... 36

8. Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region,............................................ 50

9. THE TYPE AND EXTENT OF DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN ARGENTINA....................... ....61

10. Diagnostic laboratory capacity ............................................................................................... 74

11. Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region....................................... 77

B. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................. 87

C. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT......................................................................................... 88

D. RISK ESTIMATION.............................................................................................................. 91

References..................................................................................................................................... 92

Appendix I (Hazard Identification)................................................................................................98

Appendix II (11 Factor vs. 8 Factor Comparison)................................................................103
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List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Argentina and List of Associated Provincial Acronyms...................................................5

Figure 2: Argentina Regional Units........................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.13

Figure 3: SENASA - Regional Operative Offices...................................................................................... 15

Figure 4: Functional Organization Chart of SENASA as of 2007.............................................................. 16

Figure 5: Tartagal outbreak, 2003...............................................................................................................22

Figure 6: Map of San Luis del Palma, Corrientes 2006.............................................................................. 24

Figure 7: Focal, perifocal, and surveillance area (San Luis del Palmar, 2006) ..........................................25

Figure 8: Rincón Navarro outbreak, San Luis del Palma, 2006..................................................................26

Figure 9: Kilograms of noncommercial animal and vegetable products confiscated in the area north of 

parallel 42nd during 2005...........................................................................................................40

Figure 10: Map of the border area, Frontera Norte A................................................................................. 45

Figure 11: Map of the northeast border, Frontera Norte B .........................................................................46

Figure 12: Argentina’s FMD status as recognized by OIE (May 2013)........................................ 47

Figure 13: Ear tags used by Argentina (pink), Bolivia (white), and Paraguay (yellow) in the border area 48

Figure 14: Bovine distribution in different Argentinean areas ...................................................................51

Figure 15: Description of the digits in the RENSPA number....................................................52

Figure 16: Bovine Identification Example..........................................................................54

Figure 17: Number issued by SENASA after disinfection of trucks..........................................................56

Figure 18: Epidemiological zoning of Argentina for the purpose of serological sampling........................63

Figure 19: Bovine (blue) and Ovine/Caprine (green) premises sampled.......................................71

Figure 20: Organizational chart of the SENASA laboratory.....................................................75
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List of Tables

Table 1: SENASA offices in the provinces of Jujuy, Salta, and Formosa (2005) ......................................18

Table 2: Vaccinated livestock per area during the 2003 outbreak Tartagal, Salta......................................23

Table 3: Vaccination rates (2001- 2004).....................................................................................................33

Table 4: SENASA personnel in the provinces of Jujuy, Salta, and Formosa .............................................38

Table 5: Products confiscated from luggage and/or passengers at airports and terrestrial ports (in kg).....40

Table 6: Number of agents stationed at control points, actions, pertinent information (as of 3/30/2006)..48

Table 7: Emergency active personnel during the 2006 outbreak................................................................49

Table 8: Amount of beef Argentina is considering exporting to the United States ....................................57

Table 9: Livestock figures used to construct sampling lists. ......................................................................66

Table 10: Compliance with sampling for viral activity during 2004 and 2005* ........................................67

Table 11: Results of tests to detect antibodies against NSPs in bovine category .......................................67

Table 12: Sampling to determine viral activity by region, 2007 and 2008.....................................68

Table 13: Interpretation of the LP ELISA according to the percentage protection expectancy .................69

Table 14: ELISA 3ABC and EITB results from cattle in the areas that vaccinate against FMD.............70

Table 15: Sampling Design for 2013 Surveillance Study.........................................................73

Table 16: Diagnostic tests for FMD in 2003...............................................................................................77

Table 17: Number of Diagnostic Tests for Vesicular Disease Suspect Cases................................. 77

Table 18: Vesicular Disease Notifications, 2008-2012............................................................79

Table 19: Reporting source for cases of FMD during the 2000–2001 epidemic in the Northern provinces

.................................................................................................................80

Table 20: Economic impacts of FMD adjusted from 1976 dollars to March 2001 dollars by Consumer 

Price Index

1

.................................................................................................................................89
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Figure 1: Map of Argentina and List of Associated Provincial Acronyms

PROVINCES

BUE Buenos Aires

CAT Catamarca

CBA Córdoba

CHA Chaco

CHU Chubut

CRR Corrientes

DOZ Mendoza

ERI Entre Ríos

FSA Formosa

JUA San Juan

JUJ Jujuy

LAP La Pampa

LAR La Rioja

MNE Misiones

NEU Neuquén

RIN Río Negro

SAL Salta

SCZ Santa Cruz

SDE Santiago del Estero

SFE Santa Fé

TDF Tierra del Fuego

TUC Tucumán

UIS San Luis

Used by permission from

the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.
6

List of Acronyms

APHIS: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

BSL: Biosafety level 

CCFyC: Quarantine, Borders and Certifications Unit

CFR: United States Code of Federal Regulations

CONALFA: National FMD Eradication Committee

COPROSA: Provincial Commission of Animal Health

DILACOT: Laboratories and Technical Control Office

DILAB National Directorate of Laboratories 

DNFA: National Agrifood Inspection Office

DNSA: National Animal Health Office

DT-e: Animal Transport Document

EITB: Enzyme-linked Immunoelectrotransfer Blot

ELISA: Enzyme-linked Immunosorbent Assay

EU: European Union

FMD: Foot-and-Mouth Disease

INTA: National Farming Technology Institute

NESS: National Epidemiological Surveillance System

OIE: World Organization for Animal Health (Office 

International des Epizooties)

PCR: Polymerase Chain Reaction

RENSPA: National Sanitary Registry of Ag-producers

SENASA: National Health and Agrifood Quality Service

USDA: United States Department of Agriculture

VIAA: Virus Infection Associated Antigen

 
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Executive Summary

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has 

identified several World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) listed diseases as the primary hazards 

associated with initiating trade in animals and animal products from foreign regions [1]. Listed foreign 

animal diseases of primary concern are addressed specifically in APHIS regulations (9 CFR 94) [2]. Foot 

and Mouth disease (“FMD”) is one of the diseases recognized in APHIS regulations as such a hazard [3]. 

In this regard, before opening or resuming trade in fresh beef under certain conditions with any region or 

country that is not recognized by APHIS as either free of FMD or as able to export such commodity, 

APHIS routinely conducts an evaluation to support its decision-making (9 CFR 92.2) [4].

Accordingly, Veterinary Services (VS) has conducted this risk analysis as a decision-making tool for a 

proposal to initiate trade in fresh (chilled or frozen) beef from a region in Argentina located north of 

Patagonia South and Patagonia North B referred to as “Northern Argentina” (or the “export region”). 

Historically, rinderpest virus has never established itself in North America, Central America, the 

Caribbean Islands, or South America (and therefore is not addressed further within this document). A 

brief incursion into Brazil occurred in 1921, but was limited in scope and quickly eradicated. Trade in 

fresh beef from Argentina has not been allowed since June 2001 because USDA has considered Argentina 

to be a country affected with foot-and-mouth-disease (FMD). 

This risk assessment is intended to enable APHIS to develop appropriate regulatory conditions with 

mitigations to address potential risks of FMD disease introduction following any initiation of trade in 

fresh beef from the Northern Argentina. It is also an information source for APHIS stakeholders, 

providing justification for the conditions in the rule. The analysis considers the epidemiological 

characteristics of FMD1that are relevant to the risk of introducing FMD virus into the United States 

through trade in fresh (chilled or frozen) beef from Northern Argentina and describes the animal health 

system in Northern Argentina. It identifies potential areas of risk and discusses appropriate mitigations to 

reduce that risk. The mitigations under consideration included restrictions on the origin of animals, 

requirements for maturation and pH testing of carcasses, ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections, and 

verification by Argentinean officials that the various mitigations were applied appropriately.

APHIS evaluated information provided by Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Animal y Calidad 

Agroalimentaria (SENASA) and conducted site visits to northern Argentina in May 2005, September 

2006, and November 2013 in order to substantiate the information reported in the documentation and to 

collect additional data. In addition, APHIS conducted site visits to the south of Argentina in December 

2003 and February 2009, to evaluate the Patagonia region. APHIS also visited the areas near the border 

with Bolivia and Paraguay to evaluate the zone where limited outbreaks occurred in 2003 and 2006. The 

site visits focused on the veterinary and legal infrastructure of SENASA, border control procedures, 

disease control measures, laboratory and diagnostic capabilities, biosecurity procedures on cattle farms 

and in slaughter facilities, animal health recordkeeping systems, movement controls, and disease 

surveillance systems. The visits incorporated an evaluation of outbreaks that had occurred in 2003 and 

2006, and the effectiveness of control measures in these outbreaks. The final analysis was based upon 

information obtained from the site visits, written information provided by SENASA, and published 

information.

 

1 Epidemiological characteristics of the disease agent relevant to the import risk it may pose are described in 

Appendix 1.
8

APHIS acquired no evidence to suggest that FMD is prevalent throughout the export region. Although 

limited outbreaks occurred in both 2003 and 2006, the disease was quickly diagnosed, controlled, and 

eliminated. Observations of these events, taken together with the results of APHIS’ extended evaluation, 

lead APHIS to conclude that Argentina’s legal framework, animal health infrastructure, movement and 

border controls, diagnostic capabilities, surveillance programs and emergency response systems are 

adequate to detect and control any future FMD outbreaks within the national boundaries of the export 

region of consideration. Although consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States are potentially 

substantial, the likelihood of an outbreak occurring via exposure of the domestic livestock population to

fresh or frozen beef processed under certain conditions imported from Northern Argentina is low. 

Therefore, APHIS concludes that fresh (chilled or frozen), matured and deboned beef can be safely 

imported from the Northern Argentina region.
9

A. RELEASE ASSESSMENT

The release assessment is a description of the biological pathway(s) necessary for an importation activity 

to introduce pathogenic agents into a particular environment, with an estimate of the likelihood of that 

complete process. For the purpose of this report, release assessment refers to the evaluation of the 

likelihood that FMD exists in Northern Argentina. If FMD does exist, the assessment evaluates how

likely the disease is to be introduced into the United States through imports of fresh (chilled or frozen), 

maturated, and deboned beef products from Argentina. 

The release assessment is based on documentation provided by SENASA, APHIS site visits to Argentina, 

and other published information. Assessing the likelihood of introducing FMD into the United States 

requires an evaluation of relevant characteristics of the exporting region in relation to the epidemiology of 

the disease. The release assessment consists of an in-depth evaluation of the 11 risk factors identified by 

APHIS in 9 CFR 92.2 (prior to 2012) as factors in assessing the risk of the relevant animal disease posed 

by a region[4]. In 2012, APHIS consolidated the eleven factors listed in 9 C.F.R. § 92.2(b) into eight 

factors. APHIS introduced this simplification in order to facilitate the application process; however, since 

the evaluation of Northern Argentina started before 2012, and the topics addressed by the 11 factors are 

encapsulated in the eight, this report follows the 11 factor format. Appendix II describes the consolidation 

of the 11 factors into eight. The 11 factors are as follows: 

 The authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services organization in the 

region;

 Disease status (Is the restricted disease agent known to exist in the region?);

 The status of adjacent regions with respect to the agent;

 The extent of an active disease control program, if any, if the agent is known to exist in the 

region;

 The vaccination status of the region;

 The degree to which the region is separated from adjacent regions of higher risk through physical 

or other barriers;

 The extent to which movement of animals and animal products is controlled from regions of 

higher risk, and the level of biosecurity regarding such movements;

 Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region;

 The type and extent of disease surveillance in the region;

 Diagnostic laboratory capacity; and

 Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region.

Risk factors are identified from the information gathered on these topics and applicable mitigations are 

discussed. This part describes APHIS’ evaluation of these factors for a designated region in Argentina 

consisting of the region located north of the 42nd parallel. 

1. Authority, organization and infrastructure 

The authority, organization, and infrastructure of veterinary services must be clearly documented to 

provide confidence in the ability of the country to monitor for disease, oversee veterinary activities, and 

implement disease controls in the region (i.e., control risk). This section is designed to provide a 

comprehensive view of the human, financial, physical, and regulatory resources available within 

SENASA. The discussion describes the legal authority for animal health activities in the region, the 
10

organizational structure and function of veterinary services, and available personnel and financial 

resources.

Central authority

All regulations related to the control of FMD are based on the General Animal Health Enforcement Law 

(Law 3959/1903). This law, along with its accompanying regulations of 1906, grants authority to the 

Government to restrict and regulate individual rights to pursue the general welfare and establishes the 

measures necessary to protect safety and health. Legal authority for control relative to Argentina’s FMD 

status is provided by several SENASA resolutions and other decrees, laws, and resolutions. National Law 

24.305/93, along with Decree No. 643/96, establishes the FMD National Eradication Plan and requires 

immediate and mandatory reporting of FMD cases in Argentina. SENASA Resolutions 5/2001, 18/2001, 

and 58/2001 are additional regulations which complement and provide authorization for the FMD 

National Eradication Plan. SENASA Resolution 234/96 implements the National Epidemiological 

Surveillance System (NESS), authorizing the involvement of certain government and private sector 

offices and units to work at local, provincial, and national levels to control reportable animal diseases. 

SENASA Resolutions 478/99, 779/99, 192/2001, 370/2001, 383/2001, 510/2001, and 37/2002 and 

SAGPyA Resolution 378/99 establish measures in controlling FMD outbreaks, including sanitary steps 

with susceptible, ill, and in-contact animals in the region of the outbreaks; notification and operative 

procedures if FMD is detected on a farm; prevention of spread of the disease; and implementation of the 

National Sanitary Emergency System. Also, a large number of resolutions establish procedures and 

conditions for the import of various animals and animal products, disposal of organic wastes from ships 

and airplanes, passenger and luggage control procedures, and movement of animals within the country. 

SENASA Resolutions 495/2001 and 115/2002 establish requirements for shipping FMD-susceptible 

livestock to slaughter for export of meat to the European Union (EU) or from farms approved to export 

meat to the EU or markets with equivalent requirements [5-14].

SENASA is divided into several sections, three of which focus on animal health issues: (1) the National 

Animal Health Office (DNSA); (2) the National Agrifood Inspection Office (DNFA); and (3) the 

Laboratories and Technical Control Office (DILACOT). These offices report directly to the President of 

SENASA. This structure reflects organizational changes made in 2001 and 2002 and 2007 [11, 12, 14] to 

address issues and problems identified during the FMD outbreaks that occurred north of the Patagonia 

Region in 2000/2001.

The DNSA organization and structure is defined in SENASA Resolution No. 274/2002 [14]. The DNSA 

is specifically responsible for border controls, animal health control, and eradication programs, including 

the necessary preventive, control, and eradication actions to ensure compliance with current statutes. The 

actions of this office are currently carried out in the region of Northern Argentina by the 14 regional and 

360 local offices, respectively [82]. The Epidemiology Office of DNSA carries out, coordinates, 

assesses, and oversees the FMD program in Argentina. The DNSA is also responsible for strategic 

prevention activities, risk analysis, and surveillance and assessment of the vaccination programs [11].

Within the DNSA, there is also a department responsible for overall coordination in the area of 

identification and registration of animals, animal movement controls, and traceability.

The General Field Coordination Unit, which reports to the DNSA, implements its responsibilities through 

the local offices and regional supervisors. Its duties include [2]:

 Coordination and management of the prevention, control and eradication actions of animal 

disease control programs;

 Control of compliance of sanitary actions and enforcing the Law of Sanitary Police and pertinent 

regulations; and

 Supervision of livestock movement, premises approval and certification.
11

The responsibilities of the local SENASA veterinarians include:

 Implementation of prevention, control, and eradication actions of the animal control programs in 

their jurisdiction;

 Investigation of notifications, suspicions, and outbreaks; 

 Permanent monitoring of diseases of interest and epidemiological tasks;

 Implementation of sanitary police actions and compliance of the regulations in force;

 Control and supervision of livestock movement and transport and issuance of the pertinent 

certificates; and

 Updating producers’ document registries, establishments, livestock existences, movements, and 

sanitary and administrative controls in their jurisdiction.

The responsibilities of the regional supervisors include:

 Supervision of disease prevention, control, and eradication actions in their jurisdictions and 

epidemiological surveillance actions;

 Supervision of compliance of legal regulations in force;

 Organization and operation of local offices;

 Assessment of the field staff performance; and

 Official representation of SENASA in their zone.

The Directorate of National Quality and Food Safety, under DNFA, is responsible for enforcing hygiene 

and health requirement compliance in slaughtering plants, processing plants, and storage facilities for 

animal and plant products and byproducts (edible or inedible). The Veterinary Inspection Service 

performs these controls at slaughtering plants approved for export [1].

The DILACOT has two units – the Laboratory for Animal Products and Byproducts and the Laboratory 

for Plant Products and Byproducts. This office also operates the National Reference Laboratory for food 

safety and animal and plant health. In addition, the DILACOT has regional laboratories and manages a 

network of laboratories accredited by SENASA (for more information on DILACOT, please refer to 

factor ten). The functions of the DILACOT are as follows [1]:

 Establish the methods and test protocols that are used at the SENASA central laboratory and the 

laboratories that participate in the national network; 

 Intervene in dispute resolution;

 Confirm positive test results issued by the laboratories in the network;

 Carry out and participate in interlaboratory tests;

 Audit the network of laboratories;

 Provide assistance to other SENASA offices to assess analytical results; and

 Participate in reviewing regulations pertinent to its field of action and participate in international 

meetings (e.g. Codex Alimentarius, MERCOSUR, and OIE).

Under the 2013 structure, the Quarantine, Borders, and Certifications Unit (CCFyC) falls under DNSA. 

The CCFyC oversees the Animal and Plant Quarantine Unit, the International Movements Unit, and the 

Borders and Sanitary Barriers Unit. The Borders and Sanitary Barriers Unit operates the control posts at 

the inland sanitary barriers and border crossings (fluvial and marine ports, airports, and border crossings) 

[1, 14].

Fourteen regional Directorates report directly to the SENASA’s General Manager. Support for the animal 

health system comes from a participatory structure based on 360 local animal health offices, 30 of which 

are located in the Patagonia Region. These local offices represent various local organizations and have 
12

technical subcommittees chaired by official or private veterinary physicians that practice in the area that 

work closely with SENASA officials [1]. These offices, as authorized by Law No. 24.305, are part of the 

Epidemiological Surveillance System (NESS) in accordance with the responsibilities and functions 

spelled out in the legal regulations in force. Officials work at the local, provincial, and national levels and 

comply with established methodologies, procedures, and operations [2].

At the regional level, 24 Provincial Animal Health Committees (COPROSAS) participate in the National 

FMD Eradication Committee (CONALFA). CONALFA provides a forum for consensus where the 

provincial governments, SENASA, and representatives of the farmers associations define the operational 

strategies to carry out the zoosanitary policies defined by SENASA [1].

SENASA’s Reorganization

SENASA’s reorganization focused in three major areas [11]:

(1) Structure

(2) Financial resources

(3) Human resources

Structure:

The first important SENASA reorganization was defined by Decree 394/2001 [2]. It was intended to 

increase the efficiency of the existing geopolitical system and address international perception that 

SENASA had not been transparent with its trading partners about its FMD situation. In fact, in 2000, 

SENASA failed to report the first FMD outbreaks for several months after they had been detected [18].

In 2001 SENASA was restructured so that the veterinary units were no longer based on political borders 

and the chain of command was changed to address issues that arose during the 2000/2001 FMD 

outbreaks, including centralization of command and control of the animal health programs. Prior to the 

2006 reorganization, SENASA personnel in each province reported to one of three regional directors, 

each of which administered huge regions. Resources were not allocated to address the regional workload. 

Specifically, regions with high levels of activity (large livestock population and movements) were 

assigned the same number of personnel as regions with lower levels of activity, so the system was 

inefficient. Also, SENASA concluded that there was too much autonomy given to the regional directors.

The regional directors had too much discretion in carrying out the orders from the central office, and the 

field people had such a wide range of duties that they had trouble focusing on animal health. In regard to 

transparency, many of the reorganization elements addressed issues of internal monitoring, accountability, 

and compliance with national policies. The reorganization also addressed international standards, 

certification requirements, and an increased emphasis on border controls [11].

In the 2007 reorganization, boundaries of regional units were redefined so that personnel were assigned at 

a level appropriate to the activity occurring in the region. For example, the province of Buenos Aires, 

which constituted a very busy single region before the reorganization, was broken into six separate units. 

This increased the efficiency of the system by distributing the workload more evenly [11]. Region 21 and 

most of region 22 on the map in Figure 2 make up the Patagonia North B region. Regions 23 and 24 make 

up Patagonia South. 
13

Figure 2. Map of SENASA Regional and Local Units as of 2006

In 2007, SENASA redefined its regional units by issuing Resolutions 225/2006, 335/2007, and 362/2007, 

and created a Regional Operative Unit (Unidad Regional Operative) within the Central Unit (VicePresidential Unit) to coordinate activities of the 14 Regional Operative Offices (ROs – Centros 

Regionales). 
14

The objective of this structure was to facilitate communications between the central and regional levels 

and to improve interactions with the local government (e.g., provincial, municipal) and non-governmental 

authorities. 

The Regional Operative Unit (ROU) represents a liaison between SENASA central and regional levels. 

The regional offices provide the oversight to the local field offices and coordinate regional animal health 

programs. SENASA assigns a budget to each of the regional offices, based on its needs. For instance, the 

Buenos Aires Regional Unit is the largest (comprises 13 percent of the total budget), and oversees 43 

local SENASA offices. Regional Operative Offices are shown in Figure 3.
15

Figure 3. Regional Operative Offices of SENASA

In 2013, SENASA established the direct reporting between Regional Units and the General Manager of 

SENASA by issuing Resolution 354/2013. The 2013 Resolution also assigns to the General Manager 

other responsibilities, such as the coordination and monitoring of the Regional Operative Offices. Further, 

it adds a research component among the SENASA’s functions and responsibilities. The diagram of the 

new structure is represented in Figure 4.
16

Figure 4. SENASA’s Structure 

Financial resources:

SENASA reported that its 2013 budget was 1.3 billion pesos (approximately $200.7 million U.S. dollars). 

SENASA officials described the system as self-sufficient because user fees are required for almost every 

service SENASA provides, including slaughter surveillance, issuances of certificates, and laboratory tests 

[19]. The budget for the laboratory is 60 million pesos (approximately $12 million U.S. dollars) 

Human resources:

In November 2013, SENASA reported a total of over 5,500 employees, which includes both animal and 

plant health personnel. Of these, over 80 percent have a professional degree, of which 1,054 are 

veterinarians. Local and regional offices located in areas with high livestock concentrations have a larger 

number of veterinarians, animal technicians, and administrative staff. Rules are in place for employees to 

address conflict-of-interest issues. For example, slaughter plant and field inspectors are not allowed to 

own livestock or sell beef. 

SENASA can expand its staff, when necessary, by hiring contract personnel, including veterinarians and 

animal health technicians. Contract personnel are hired on the basis of a standardized profile defined by 

SENASA for four month increments and their contracts are renewable. Permanent and contract 

veterinarians have the same authority. 

SENASA can also broaden the scope of its activities through agreements with outside parties. For 

example, it has entered into agreements with some academic institutions to cooperate in activities such as 

conducting risk analyses. Other agreements have been implemented with enforcement agencies like the 

border police, who assist with security at border control points along land or water borders. Border police 

also assist SENASA with enforcement of quarantines. They played a significant role in security during 
17

previous FMD outbreaks. Security forces that work at slaughter facilities also assist in the disease control 

program [11]. SENASA can call upon border police and other security forces to help prevent entry of 

disease into Argentina. 

Veterinarian licensure, training and roles in the animal health programs

Veterinarians in Argentina are licensed after obtaining a veterinary degree authenticated at the Ministry of 

Culture and Education. They must be registered at the National or Provincial Professional Association of 

Veterinary Physicians in the jurisdiction of employment. The respective association issues their license. 

National and provincial licensure is mandatory [2].

The National Private Veterinary Physician Registry, created by SENASA Resolution No. 470/95, 

registers private veterinarians that take part in the NESS. Registered veterinarians must notify the local 

DNSA commission of suspect cases of notifiable diseases, including suspect cases of FMD. In addition, 

SENASA Resolutions Nos. 234/96 and 422/03 incorporate Veterinary Physician Professional 

Associations and Councils into the NESS. Registration must be renewed annually and veterinary 

licensure must be kept up-to-date. SENASA issues the Registry Veterinarian certificate and guarantees 

the necessary training for proper performance of duties. This registry has different sections, according to 

the areas of responsibility of the corresponding office or unit. These veterinarians must comply with a 

continuous training program which includes procedures and standards that are currently in force to control 

reportable diseases [2].

In 2003, SENASA Resolution No. 181 was enacted. It establishes the requirements to accredit private 

veterinarians in the FMD eradication program, including verification that the veterinary license is up-todate and of compliance with scheduled training goals. The 2009 and 2013 site visit team verified that the 

resolution was fully implemented. 

Private veterinarians accredited by SENASA also perform FMD vaccinations in some regions of the 

country and preloading inspection on bovine and ovine animals intended for slaughter to export meat and 

meat products to the EU. They verify the health status of the animals and the accuracy of the premises’

documents. If satisfactory, then a health pre-certificate is issued which is later endorsed by the local 

SENASA veterinarian.

Official SENASA veterinarians and private veterinarians accredited by SENASA both must comply with 

training requirements that are in line with the main strategies in the FMD Eradication Plan. The goal of 

the Plan is to promote measures to strengthen the national and continental structure of FMD surveillance 

programs. These measures include training activities for the different participants of the program 

(technicians and administrative staff) and promotion of the different activities of the Plan. The purpose of 

the Plan is to provide technical resources to the SENASA staff in important subjects such as FMD 

control.

Training of official SENASA employees is part of a central theme in the development of national animal 

health programs. Training programs for all the staff levels are developed within the Bureau of Human 

Resources and Training of SENASA. Staff is responsible for supervising each activity of the FMD 

Eradication Plan and their adequate performance is vital to meet the established goals. The content of 

training courses meets the technical guidelines established by the FMD National Eradication Plan and the 

specific bibliography of the OIE. Veterinarians must also comply with the guidelines of the Training 

Operative Plan established by SENASA and the Civil Service National Institute, which includes training 

on various animal diseases besides FMD. All programs are conducted by experts and teachers from 
18

SENASA and other institutions through agreements with national universities, research institutes such as 

INTA (National Institute for Agricultural Technology), and others (FAO, etc.). Training activities for 

SENASA staff and laboratory were provided during the site visits, including the latest activities in 2013 

[20]. 

Training for staff in the DNFA includes the following subjects: legislation in force (Decree 4238/68 and 

others), approval of establishments producing products intended for domestic consumption and export, 

hazard analysis and critical control point principles, good manufacturing practices, standard operating 

procedures (for establishments treating products and by-products of animal origin of all species, including 

birds and fish), diseases spread by food, animal welfare, traceability, residues, and hygiene control [1].

Provincial veterinarians also take an active role in the sanitary commissions that fight against endemic 

diseases. They work together with SENASA official veterinarians, private veterinarians, cattle farmers, 

and others, along with the respective COPROSAs of each province as part of the Epidemiological 

Surveillance Commissions (Resolution 445/95 – Regional Patagonia Plan) [2].

Field offices

Regional supervisors provide oversight for field offices. Field offices handle local prevention and control 

measures, eradication, compliance, emergency actions, health actions (e.g., vaccination), premises 

identification, movement controls, and recordkeeping. Many of these responsibilities are controlled 

through the registration of and assignment of a unique premises identification number called the Registro 

Nacional Sanitario de Productores Agropecuarios - National Sanitary Registry of Ag-producers

(RENSPA), which, in addition to other information on premises, is maintained in a national database. The 

team that visited Argentina in May 2005 visited regional and/or field offices in the provinces of Salta 

(Salta, Tartagal, and Ingeniero Salvador Mazza), Buenos Aires (Brandsen), and Formosa (Formosa and 

Clorinda). The team that visited Argentina in September 2006 visited two local offices in the province of 

Corrientes (Corrientes and San Luis del Palmar). The team that visited Argentina in 2009 and 2013 

visited regional offices and local offices in the province of Buenos Aires

Additional veterinary infrastructure components in northern Argentina, along the border with Bolivia and 

Paraguay

Veterinary infrastructure in the region was enhanced after the 2003 outbreak to address vulnerabilities 

associated with international borders. Table 1 shows the number of SENASA offices in the area [8].

Table 1: SENASA offices in the provinces of Jujuy, Salta, and Formosa (2013)

Province SENASA Local offices SENASA Regional 

offices

Total

Jujuy 1 1 2

Salta 11 0 11

Formosa 17 1 18

Total 29 2 31

SENASA provided the local offices with equipment such as emergency response equipment, gas-operated 

coolers, refrigeration units, power generators, computers, etc. 
19

In order to implement the FMD National Eradication Plan’s strategies, SENASA established new local 

offices and hired veterinarians, technicians, and administrators in the border departments. These offices 

were equipped with the following:

a. IT equipment to be able to issue movement permits (“DT-e” or Animal Transport Document);

b. Communication equipment including satellite telephones and global positioning system 

(GPS) devices;

c. Emergency equipment such as disinfectant cans, spraying backpacks, Valle medium, tubes, 

needles, syringes, and Manuals of Proceedings;

d. Appropriate vehicles for field tasks, four-wheel-drive vehicles (pick-ups, etc.), and 

motorcycles;

e. Gas-operated refrigerating equipments or others;

f. Electric generator equipment; and

g. Movable pens.

Specific FMD control and surveillance actions recommended by OIE [15]

Following the recommendations of the OIE mission that visited Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in 

December 2006 [16], the heads of the veterinary services and the Pan American Foot-and-Mouth Disease 

Center (PANAFTOSA) defined an area of high-level surveillance within the border regions of Argentina, 

Brazil, Paraguay, and Bolivia. Initially the program was intended to last two years and be subjected to 

periodic reviews and evaluations. During the 2009 and 2013 site visits, SENASA reported that the 

program was still effectively operating, with a redefinition of the high surveillance area in 2013 to include 

the border regions of Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia. Most of the financing has been obtained from the 

World Bank and the Inter-American Development bank. Among others, the general actions include:

 Strengthening infrastructure of the veterinary services;

 Harmonizing procedures for control, prevention, and eradication of FMD;

 Harmonizing vaccination procedures in areas of geographic contiguity; and

 Conducting vaccinations under VS supervision.

Swill feeding

SENASA Resolution 225/95 regulates housing and maintenance of pigs. This Resolution bans feeding 

pigs with raw viscera of any origin, kitchen garbage, hospital, clinic, or nursing home garbage and 

garbage from national or international ports and airports. It authorizes feeding pigs with leftovers of food 

substances of animal origin coming from stores approved by the competent authority to manufacture or 

sell food. Authorization is given after compliance with the following requirements:

 The swill is subjected to a cooking process guaranteeing destruction of pathogenic organisms

(Resolution 3456/2001) [17].

 The existence, on the premises, of equipment necessary to carry out the requirements of the above 

cooking process with an operation capacity allowing treatment of all the leftovers in a period of 

time not longer than eight hours after arrival on the premises. Compliance with the requirements 

is verified through daily veterinary inspections. 

There are no establishments exclusively approved to process swill. Swill treatments are carried out by the 

pig producer in the establishment, or the producer obtains the processed swill from slaughtering 

establishments [18].
20

Compliance is monitored pursuant to regulations that handle other sanitary/hygiene issues. SENASA 

Resolution 350/98 sets up a mechanism by which SENASA veterinarians can more easily confiscate 

animals infected with trichinellosis or that constitute a risk because of inadequate sanitary-hygienic 

conditions, due to failure to comply with SENASA Resolution 225/95. In addition, a regulation combined 

with 350/98 was developed to regulate pig activity and widen the scope of the current regulations to

control trichinellosis infestations. As a consequence, there will be safeguards to grant additional sanitary 

protections against FMD contamination of feed [18].

Conclusions

Argentina has the veterinary and regulatory infrastructure to adequately monitor and control the possible 

incursion of FMD into the country. Based on site visits, observations, and evaluation of documentation 

submitted by SENASA, APHIS concluded that veterinary officials in Argentina are able to quickly 

identify disease events compatible with FMD. SENASA has a strong veterinary infrastructure. 

Local veterinary offices are adequately staffed in Argentina. The local offices that APHIS visited

demonstrated that they had the necessary staffing, training, equipment, and control mechanisms to 

implement and manage a reliable FMD program. During the several site visits to Argentina, APHIS 

received overviews of the activities and structures of the Federal, regional, and local level. APHIS

reviewed premises registration, vaccination records, and movement control documents and visited farms 

to observe farming practices. Observations indicated that the structure, effectiveness and organization of 

SENASA were adequate to perform official animal health functions. 

APHIS considers that the regions along the northern borders with Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay constitute 

a potential source of vulnerability for Argentina where FMD might be introduced from neighboring 

regions. APHIS believes that enhancements in border control activities and infrastructure in the provinces 

of Formosa, Salta, and Jujuy as well as the enhancements in the provinces of Misiones, Chaco, and 

Corrientes provide adequate monitoring of the disease and control in the event of a potential introduction.

2. Disease status: Is the restricted disease agent known to exist in the region?

Gaining a thorough understanding of the history of FMD in the region is essential to assessing the 

existing export risk. Assessment of risk includes a consideration of the effectiveness of control measures 

implemented and revision of those measures as appropriate. Consequently, this section focuses on 

historical outbreaks.

The Argentine National FMD Control Program (1990/1997) led to the control and eradication of the 

disease and the official OIE status of Argentina as FMD-free with vaccination in 1997 (last outbreak 

detected in 1994). In 1999 vaccination was suspended, and in May 2000 the OIE recognized Argentina as 

a country free of FMD without vaccination. In July 2000, 14 months after vaccination was suspended, 

outbreaks of FMD reappeared. The epidemic lasted 18 months, during which more than 2500 premises 

were affected. The disease mainly affected regions of major livestock concentration. Infected animals 

were mostly cattle (96.78 percent) under 2 years of age (80.4 percent), while 2.49 percent were sheep, and 

0.65 percent pigs. Virus serotype O was responsible for only 11 outbreaks at the beginning of the 

epidemic, while serotype A was responsible for 2,552 outbreaks and circulated until January 2002. 

SENASA reported the disease to trade partners, and other international organizations 9 months after the 

first outbreak (April, 2001) [8, 19].

Subsequent epidemiological investigations identified the following factors that contributed to the entrance 

and diffusion of the virus in 2000:
21

 Lack of knowledge of the regional epidemiological situation and absence of a regional approach;

 Insufficient border control and inadequate sanitary infrastructure in the north of the country 

(border with Paraguay and Bolivia);

 Lack of adequate evaluation of risk in relation to movement of animals, production, and other 

factors;

 Late detection of the disease and failures in surveillance; and

 Lack of official declaration of disease with resulting limitations in authority to implement 

adequate control measures.

The initial control measures taken by SENASA included stamping out; ring vaccination; restriction of 

animal and people movements; establishment of disinfection points; and delineation of focal, perifocal,

and surveillance areas. Emergency vaccination in the high-risk areas began long before the FMD 

declaration was official; however, there were limitations in vaccine supply. CONALFA, Provincial 

Commission of Animal Health (COPROSA), and Entes Sanitarios Locales (the Foundation unit 

responsible for vaccine delivery) were not adequately functional, and movement controls were weak. In 

the absence of an official declaration of a disease outbreak, officials had difficulty implementing 

appropriate control measures. Declaration made control measures easier to implement and facilitated 

development of a national plan [8, 19].

Vaccine use was prioritized because there was not enough vaccine for complete coverage of the affected 

area. Dairies and feedlots were assigned the top priority, followed by the surveillance and focal areas. 

Pigs were not vaccinated during this period. In fact, vaccination followed the outbreaks, rather than 

preceding and preventing them [20].

The peak of the first epidemic occurred in May and June 2001. SENASA estimated that the number of 

diseased animals approached 120,000. Emergency vaccination was initially implemented with available 

tetravalent vaccines (O1/Campos, A/Arg/79, A/Arg/87, C3/Arg/85) and trivalent vaccines (strains of 

O1/Campos, A24/Cruzeiro and C3/Indaial). Since January 2001, the virus strain A/Arg/00 was 

incorporated into this vaccine, replacing the C3/Indaial strain [21]. Systematic twice-yearly vaccination 

campaigns started again in April 2001. A tetravalent vaccine was subsequently developed including 

strains O1/Campos and A24/Cruzeiro and the new strains A/Argentina/00 and A/Argentina/01. The 

eradication measures included systematic and strategic vaccination, movement controls, surveillance, and 

cooperation agreements with bordering countries [8]. 

In August 2003, a new FMD outbreak was detected in a local slaughterhouse (subsistence operation) in 

the district of San Martin (Province of Salta), located 10 km from the town of Tartagal and 40 km from 

the Bolivian border (Figure 5). SENASA reported that the affected holding had 37 pigs (16 with chronic 

vesicular lesions and two dead). There were no other susceptible species in the holding [22].
22

Figure 5: Tartagal outbreak, 2003 

Subsequent to the report of clinical suspicion of the disease in pigs on August 28, 2003, and prior to 

confirmation, a number of preliminary FMD control measures were put in place. FMD control measures 

included quarantine, stamping out, and the development of a focal, perifocal, and surveillance area in line 

with OIE guidelines. SENASA reported the suspect case to bordering countries, trade partners, and 

international organizations on August 29. On September 5, the Argentinean authorities notified the OIE 

that the FMD serotype O had been confirmed by laboratory testing. On August 29, strategic vaccination 

in the perifocal area was implemented, including revaccination (within a 30 day interval) of susceptible 

species. The vaccine used contained A24, A2000, A2001, and O1 Campos subtypes. On September 10,

contact animals (58 porcines, 2 ovines, and 3 bovines) were slaughtered [22].
23

Table 2: Vaccinated livestock per area during the 2003 outbreak Tartagal, Salta

Area Producers Bovines* Sheep/Goats Pigs Total

1 2 3 4 5 6

Perifocal 43 485 29 169 201 203 1087 225 820 2132

Surveillance 189 936 59 308 552 586 2441 1304 2158 5903

Total 232 1421 88 477 753 789 3528 1529 2978 8035

* 1= cows, 2=bulls, 3=heifers, 4=steers, 5=calves, 6=total

SENASA estimated that the initial infection took place at least 30 days before the clinical diagnosis in 

pigs was made. 

The APHIS site visit team that visited Argentina in 2005 also visited the slaughterhouse in which the 

2003 outbreak was detected. The team observed the biosecurity measures in place after the detection of 

the case. During 2004 and up to the date of the site visit (May 2005), the region involved in the 2003 

outbreak (North/West of Argentina) reported 16 notifications of vesicular diseases. None of the 

notifications were considered suspect cases for FMD. Therefore, no animal restrictions were enforced 

(e.g., echyma, foot rot, trauma, sarcoptic mange).

Argentina also responded in a timely manner to FMD outbreaks in neighboring countries (Mato Grosso 

do Sul, Brazil in 2005 and Paraguay 2011/2012) by declaring sanitary emergency alerts (Resolutions

SENASA 672, 2005 and 684, 2011) and intensifying biosecurity, control, prevention, and surveillance 

within the high-risk border area.

The last FMD outbreak in Argentina was detected in February 2006 in a farm located in the district of San 

Luis del Palmar in the Province of Corrientes (Figure 6). The outbreak occurred in an area near the border 

with Paraguay considered endemic for FMD. This endemic area appears to have active virus present in 

restricted niches or patches, which could potentially lead to outbreaks in cattle populations with low FMD 

immunity. Before 2006, the last outbreaks reported in the area were registered in 2000 (virus O) and 2001 

(virus A) [19].
24

Figure 6: Map of San Luis del Palmar, Corrientes 2006

On February 4, 2006, a private veterinarian reported suspect cases of vesicular disease in cattle to the 

local office of San Luis del Palmar. The next day, the local SENASA Veterinarian observed the vesicular 

lesions in the mouth and feet of approximately 70 heifers (18 months). The lesions were presumed to be 

about 10 days old. Subsequent to the report of clinical suspicion of the disease in cattle, and prior to 

confirmation, a number of preliminary FMD control measures were put in place by SENASA including 

quarantine, interdiction, and initiation of an epidemiological investigation in accordance with OIE 

guidelines [23].

On February 8, the SENASA central laboratory diagnosed FMD type O virus using the ELISA-S I 

technique to identify the virus. After this confirmation, the following measures were taken:

 The information was officially communicated to the pertinent international organizations (OIE, 

MERCOSUR Permanent Veterinary Committee [Comité Veterinario Permanente del 

MERCOSUR], PANAFTOSA), trading partners, industries, and producers.

 SENASA imposed movement interdictions on all Departments sharing borders with the 

Department of San Luis del Palmar. Only movement of animals to slaughter for local 

consumption was authorized (SENASA Resolution 35/06).

 Control and disinfection posts on National highways and other strategic locations were 

established and checkpoints and disinfection control posts were implemented around restricted 

areas (11 road check points to check products in transit and disinfect vehicles, 1 control post at 

the airport of the city of Corrientes). These posts operated 24 hours a day.

 SENASA conducted stamping out of contact susceptible species (SENASA Resolution 36/2006)

and defined a focal, perifocal, and surveillance area (Figure 7).

 Active surveillance of susceptible animals in an area of 13 km surrounding the affected holdings 

was initiated.

 Ring vaccination was conducted.

 SENASA imposed a ban on the movement of animal products and by-products produced and 

manufactured within the area.

As a result of the emergency, SENASA increased Federal and provincial personnel involved in law 

enforcement and safety. By February 12, SENASA personnel participating in the emergency included 22 
25

veterinarians, 10 administrators, 10 vaccinators, and 72 contract employees. A total of 126 security forces 

(National Border Police, Argentine Navy, and National Aeronautical Police) were also participating by 

providing support during the emergency.

Figure 7: Focal, perifocal, and surveillance area (San Luis del Palmar, 2006)

SENASA reported that the first affected holding housed 4,098 bovines (70 cattle showing clinical signs of 

FMD), 100 ovines, 235 caprines, and 5 porcines. The epidemiological investigation results showed that 

the index farm registered four cattle movements out of the premises during January 2006. The first two 

movements represented cattle sent to two different establishments for slaughter (both located within the 

quarantined area). The remaining movements represented animals sent to other farms, (one within and the 

other bordering the quarantined area). Such movements were registered in the SENASA database. The 

APHIS site visit team that visited Corrientes in 2006 also visited the index farm and interviewed the 

veterinarian and the manager of the establishment. The manager reported that he was able to recognize 

FMD since he had seen animals showing similar clinical signs in the 1980s. The veterinarian and the 

manager did not have enough information to develop a reasonable hypothesis regarding the origin of the 

disease. The SENASA team appeared credible and transparent regarding the outbreak. They hypothesized 

that the most likely explanation was illegal movement of infected cattle exposing a population with a low 

immunity level. Stamping out started on February 8 and concluded on February 21 [23].

Molecular characterization of the virus revealed that the strain was indigenous to the region and shared 

common similarities with all the isolates that caused the typo O outbreak in South America between 2000 

and 2005 [24]. In particular, the studies showed that the virus was Type O, genetically related to regional 

O viruses (homology between 88 percent and 96 percent), presenting high homology (96 percent) with 

virus types isolated in Pozo Hondo (Paraguay) in 2003, Tarija (Bolivia) in 2000 and with virus isolated in 

Mato Grosso do Sul (Brazil) in 2005 (92 percent). Further immunogenic studies showed that the vaccine 

used in Argentina containing the strain O1 Campos offered high level of protection against the strain 

responsible for the 2006 outbreak (O/Corrientes/Arg 06) [25]. Additional population immunity studies 

demonstrate that cattle housed in the index farm that did not show clinical signs at the time of the 

stamping out had adequate level of protection. Therefore, it was concluded that the FMD-positive cattle 

were either unvaccinated or were vaccinated with an adulterated vaccine [23].

On February 20, 2006, another outbreak was detected in a neighborhood farm (Figure 8). The outbreak

involved a single steer lacking ownership brand. According to the SENASA records, the animal was not 

included in vaccination and inspection records of the perifocal area on February 11, 2006. Direct contacts 

Focal Area

Ciudad de

San Luis del

Palmar

Perifocal Area

3 Km.

Surveillance area

10 Km.

Departamento 

ITATI

Departamento 

SAN LUIS DEL PALMAR

Ruta Prov No 5

Delimitation of

Focal, Perifocal and Surveillance areas

Index 

Farm
26

did not show clinical signs of disease and tested negative to FMD nonstructural proteins. On February 24, 

2006, following confirmation, the affected animal as well as its contacts (415 bovine) were destroyed. 

Figure 8: Rincón Navarro outbreak, San Luis del Palmar, 2006

All owners whose animals were destroyed received compensation in accordance with SENASA 

guidelines. The appraisal was performed by a team that consisted of three professional appraisers, one

SENASA representative, one representative of the owners of the animals, one representative of the 

Provincial Farmers’ Association, and one attorney as legal representative of SENASA. Farmers and 

producers interviewed by the APHIS team reported that the compensation was fair and most were 

satisfied with the procedures and the amount of money received [23]. 

Serosurveillance within the area, which includes the province of Corrientes [26, 27] and the perifocal and 

surveillance area [24], showed absence of viral activity. SENASA concluded that the lack of viral activity 

by serology demonstrated that the most likely cause of the 2006 outbreak was the reintroduction of the 

virus through illegal movements of susceptible animals, and/or animal products. Mechanical transmission 

(e.g., trucks) cannot be excluded. 

Conclusions

The last detection of FMD in the export region was in 2006 (8 years ago). APHIS recognizes that there 

were substantial delays (approximately nine months) in reporting the FMD outbreaks in Argentina in 

2000-2001 that raised questions in the international arena regarding SENASA’s transparency with regard 

to disease reporting. For this reason, APHIS has been particularly thorough in its subsequent reviews of 

Argentina’s veterinary infrastructure. APHIS observed during site visits to Argentina, which included the 

regions where isolated outbreaks were detected in 2003 and 2006, that Argentina had made changes to its 

veterinary infrastructure since the 2000-2001 outbreaks. APHIS confirmed that these improvements were 

effectively implemented and maintained in its subsequent visits to Argentina in 2006, 2009 and 2013. 

Based on these observed changes and the responses SENASA personnel provided to the site visit teams’ 

questions, despite the earlier reporting problems, APHIS is confident that, in the event of another 

outbreak, reporting would be prompt and transparent. 

3. The status of adjacent regions with respect to the agent
27

The ability of a region to exclude disease is paramount in the assessment of the risk posed in opening the 

U.S. market. Relevant risk factors include the presence of the disease(s) in adjacent regions or regions 

with epidemiological links with areas reporting outbreaks, and other threats to the biosecurity of the 

exporting region. In this section, we assess the effectiveness of Argentina’s animal health system in 

preventing FMD from entering Argentina from adjacent regions where FMD is known to be endemic.

The region south of the 42nd parallel and an area bordering that region (Patagonia North B) have been 

evaluated by APHIS for FMD-freedom [39, 40, 82, 83] and APHIS’ 2013 risk assessment determined the 

Patagonia region is FMD-free. In addition, APHIS notes that in 2002, 2007, and 2013, the OIE 

recognized (1) the areas south of the 42nd parallel, (2) the region called Patagonia North B, and (3) the 

the summer pasture zone in the Province of San Juan as free of FMD without vaccination, respectively. 

At the time of the 2013 site visit, SENASA was in the process of submitting the FMD dossier to the OIE 

for FMD freedom recognition of Patagonia North A.

Argentina is bordered by Paraguay in the north, Bolivia in the northwest, Uruguay and Brazil in the 

northeast, and Chile in the west. Only Chile and Santa Catarina, Brazil are considered by APHIS to be 

FMD-free [28]. 

Chile is recognized by OIE as FMD-free without vaccination (last outbreak reported in 1987). Uruguay is 

recognized as a FMD-free region with vaccination (last outbreak reported in 2001). Bolivia is classified as 

FMD-free with vaccination in the following regions: Chiquitania, the zone adjacent to the east of 

Chiquitania, a zone consisting of the regions of Chaco and part of Valles, and the Macro-region of the 

Altiplano [13, 14]. Paraguay was listed by OIE as FMD-free zone with vaccination (outbreak reported in 

Pozo Hondo in July 2003, 3 km from the Argentine border) until 2011 when it reported two outbreaks of 

FMD type O in the San Pedro region in cattle approximately 250 miles from the Brazilian border. In 

November 2013, Paraguay was recognized by the OIE as FMD-free with vaccination.

At present, the Brazilian States of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, which border Argentina, are 

recognized as FMD-free regions with and without vaccination, respectively. As of 2007, OIE recognized 

the State of Santa Catarina as an FMD-free zone where vaccination is not practiced. OIE also recognized 

the States of Acre, along with two adjacent municipalities of Amazon State, Rio Grande do Sul, 

Rondonia, and the middle southern part of the State of Para, as an FMD-free zone where vaccination is 

practiced. In May 2008, the OIE recognized the States of Bahia, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de 

Janeiro, Sergipe, Tocantins, Distrito Federal, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Paraná, São Paulo of Brazil as and 

FMD-free zone where vaccination is practiced. [29]

In October 2005, Brazil reported outbreaks of FMD in the States of Mato Grosso do Sul and Parana. The 

areas involved in the outbreak are located approximately 200 km from the Brazil, Paraguay, and 

Argentine triple border. In response to these outbreaks, SENASA implemented preventive measures to 

avoid the introduction of the FMD virus. These measures included:

 Declaring a sanitary alert in the national territory;

 Establishing an import ban on animals, animal products, and equipment from all of Brazil that 

could carry FMD;

 Strengthening epidemiological surveillance;

 Strengthening biosecurity measures;

 Reinforcing and accelerating the FMD vaccination campaign; and

 Increasing the border controls in the Northern region of Argentina.
28

On January 25, 2007, the Bolivian Animal Health Service (SENASAG) reported the first of a total of five 

outbreaks of FMD in farms located near Santa Cruz de la Sierra, about 450 km north of the border with 

Argentina. 

The Hemispheric Program for the Eradication of FMD

Information on the epidemiological situation of the countries in the region around Argentina is acquired 

through data systematically and periodically submitted by each country to PANAFTOSA, and through 

bilateral agreements and joint border programs. Since the regional FMD outbreak in 2001, a program of 

joint actions and adaptation of strategies among the countries of the region was established within the 

action plan of the Hemispheric Program for the Eradication of FMD (PHEFA). This program comprises 

border work subprojects, reimplementation of vaccination against FMD, epidemiological surveillance 

actions, and improvement in the dissemination of information through the Continental System of 

Information.

The Hemispheric Program for the Eradication of FMD (PHEFA) is coordinated by PANAFTOSA. As a 

subprogram of the Hemispheric Plan, the Cuenca del Plata Agreement for the Eradication of FMD 

coordinates common strategies among Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the fight against FMD. The 

initial agreement was signed in 1987 in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The strategic program was developed in 

1988 by technicians of the three countries and was implemented in 1989. Paraguay signed on in 1992 and 

then Bolivia joined the agreement. Chile participates as an observer country. The agreement works 

through an Executive Committee made up of the sanitary authorities of each one of the member countries, 

with a Technical Group advising the Committee. The Technical Group is comprised of five veterinarians 

from each country and two permanent consultants, the coordinator and the epidemiologist, all of which 

advise the member countries. The Group meets four times a year. All of the activities of the Agreement 

are channeled through this Group.

In response to this effort, Argentina incorporated border programs, guaranteeing full notification of the 

epidemiological situation in the country, development of the vaccination campaigns, joint training, and 

reciprocal guarantees strengthening the Regional and National Epidemiological Surveillance Systems 

[14].

Bolivia and Paraguay have signed an agreement to increase technical cooperation to facilitate the control 

and eradication of the disease in border areas. Argentina participated in discussions. Argentina provides 

technical assistance to Bolivia by transferring technology and aiding in technical matters in the fight 

against FMD. The Bureau of Laboratories of SENASA has trained scientists from Bolivia on 

performance and standardization of FMD diagnostic serological tests (VIAA and EITB). Argentina also 

has a bilateral agreement with Paraguay and the Cascos Blancos commission (United Nation program for 

FMD eradication in the border between Argentina and Paraguay) to “agree on a participation and 

cooperation mechanism” of the latter on both sides of the border, within the framework of the PHEFA, 

and supported by the South Farming Council (program information available at 

www.cascosblancos.org.ar/a_inicio/biblioteca/02/index.htm). Representatives of Argentina, Bolivia and 

Paraguay meet regularly in an effort to establish an FMD vaccination and a prevention and 

epidemiological surveillance program in the border area between the three countries. The aim of the 

program is to mitigate the risk of an FMD occurrence in the area. SENASA Resolutions 748/2004 and 

622/2006 (enhancements in the Frontera Norte A and B, the area bordering Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil) 

increase FMD prevention efforts within the border area, which mimic control and prevention efforts by 

neighboring countries. 

Conclusions
29

According to SENASA officials, illegal movement of animals from neighboring countries, as well as 

mechanical transmission of the virus, introduced the FMD virus into Argentina during the 2000/2001, 

2003, and 2006 outbreaks. APHIS does not consider countries of South America to be FMD-free, with the 

exception of Chile and the state of Santa Catarina in Brazil. APHIS has evaluated the Patagonia region 

and has proposed to recognize it as FMD-free. 

APHIS concludes that there is a risk of reintroduction of FMD from adjacent areas into the export region,

as long as the disease is endemic in the overall region in South America. APHIS acknowledges, however,

many enhancements in border control activities along the northern borders with Bolivia, Paraguay, and 

Brazil. In addition, APHIS recognizes that, although there is a potential risk of introduction of FMD from 

Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, local economic conditions often do not favor the movements of animals in 

this direction. It is likely that if FMD were to be introduced into the northwest of Argentina, the 

consequences would not be major (as demonstrated in the Tartagal outbreak, 2003) mainly due to the low 

animal density, low animal movements, and effective veterinary infrastructure in the area. The FMD 

outbreak that occurred in 2006 shows that SENASA is able to immediately notify and contain the disease, 

even before confirming diagnosis. APHIS acknowledges that SENASA has adopted several measures to 

prevent the introduction of the FMD virus from the South of Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay. 

4. The extent of an active disease control program, if any, if the agent is known to exist in 

the region

In this section we review the SENASA resolutions that dictate the requirements for reporting FMD 

outbreaks, establishing vaccination plans and administering vaccinations, and other procedures for 

controlling the disease should an outbreak occur. 

General information

National Law 24.305/93, along with Decree 643/96, establishes the FMD National Eradication Plan and 

requires immediate and mandatory reporting of FMD cases in Argentina. The National plan establishes a 

mechanism for funding the FMD Entes Sanitarios Locales (“local foundations”) at the local level and 

integration by local producers. In addition, the private sector takes part in CONALFA. CONALFA,

through its representatives (e.g., veterinarians, meat processing industry), provides a forum for consensus 

where the provincial governments, national government (SENASA), and private sector define the 

operational strategies to carry out the zoosanitary policies defined by SENASA. These, in turn, work with 

the local animal health bodies, the Entes Sanitarios Locales, which are the unit responsible for vaccine 

delivery. Together the national, provincial, and local units implement the national strategy at the regional 

level [13, 18, 30].

Resolution 181/10 provides for an FMD vaccination strategy following a two-cycle vaccination schedule

where young cattle between six months and two years of age, as well as animals to be moved to a 

different location, are vaccinated during the first cycle, and all adult cattle are vaccinated during the 

second cycle. Each local administrative area establishes its own local vaccination planwhich is developed

by the local foundation and approved by COPROSA. Once the plan is approved, it is sent to CONALFA 

and SENASA for further approval. There are 361 vaccination plans with 5,900 agents responsible for the 

implementation of the vaccination. SENASA Resolution 623/02 established the scope of responsibilities 

and functions for each member. SENASA Resolution 33/02 states the bimonthly audits that SENASA 

local office should carry out on the local plan. 

SENASA Resolutions 478/99, 779/99, 192/2001, 370/2001, 383/2001, 510/2001, and 37/2002 and 

SAGPyA Resolution 378/99 establish measures for controlling FMD outbreaks. These measures include
30

sanitary steps with susceptible, ill, and in-contact animals in the region of the outbreaks; notification and 

operative procedures if FMD is detected on a farm; prevention of spread of the disease; and 

implementation of the National Sanitary Emergency System [6]. There are also a large number of 

resolutions that establish procedures and conditions for the import of various animals and animal 

products, disposal of organic wastes from ships and airplanes, passenger and luggage control procedures, 

and movement of animals within the country. SENASA Resolutions 495/2001 and 115/2002 establish 

requirements for shipping FMD-susceptible livestock to slaughter for export of beef to the EU or from 

farms approved to export to the EU or markets with equivalent requirements [20, 31, 32].

Federal, provincial, and municipal authorities, veterinarians in private practice, and citizens must report 

any signs of disease, the existence of suspect cases of the disease, or positive test results for this disease to 

the local animal health authorities or to the National Animal Health Office of SENASA (Law 3959/1903, 

Law 24.305/93, Decree 643/96). The law also specifies the penalties that individuals could incur due to 

failure to notify animal health authorities of a disease outbreak. No indemnification for destroyed animals 

is paid if the disease is not reported, and the one who fails to report the disease as stated above will be 

fined [18, 20, 32]. Private diagnostic laboratories must also immediately report outbreaks, and are subject 

to severe penalities for failure to comply with statutory requirements [11, 14].

In 2010, Resolution 540.10 updated the requirements for registration and notification of reportable 

diseases, creating a single uniform system for all reportable diseases. Under the amended resolution, the 

local office must send a veterinarian to the premises within twelve hours of receiving notification of a 

suspect case to collect epidemiological data and initiate the reportable disease reporting forms. OIE is 

notified within 24 hours of the suspicion or of an outbreak of FMD.

Main activities of the FMD National Eradication Plan

Educational activities: The plan for control and for eradication of FMD (Law 24.305) incorporates FMD 

awareness into educational and training activities. SENASA provided a list of educational and training 

activities conducted during 2004 and the first semester of 2005 in response to APHIS concerns regarding 

awareness of farmers, farm workers, and private veterinarians in the regions of the North, Northwest, and 

Northeast of Argentina [33]. During the 2013 site visit, SENASA provided updates on the training 

activities conducted in 2013 as well as the outreach and awareness activities related to FMD [82]. FMD 

awareness includes television and radio broadcasts on FMD epidemiological situation, vaccination 

schedules, identification, and reporting of vesicular diseases. 

Field inspections: Cattle are inspected every six months by vaccinators when the animals are gathered in 

corrals for vaccination purposes. In addition, prior to their movement into slaughter, official veterinarians 

inspect animals destined for export to the EU.

Surveillance at abattoirs and meat packing plants: Animals are subjected to ante-mortem inspection by 

SENASA personnel for signs of vesicular disease (e.g., excessive salivation, difficulty walking, etc). 

Other body parts, including the tongue and feet, are examined during post-mortem inspection.

Surveillance at animal gathering places: All animals coming into fairs, auctions, or exhibitions are 

clinically inspected by the official veterinarians.

Surveillance of animals in transit: The clinical inspection of animals in transit is carried out at checkpoints 

and border control points by official personnel. These are strategically located, in accordance with the 

flow, vulnerability of the area, and intensity of animal movement. The conditions under which animals 
31

move are based on the sanitary status of the province of origin or the country sharing borders with the 

export region.

Laboratory diagnosis: The SENASA laboratory is responsible for the screening and confirmatory 

diagnosis of FMD. It is located in the city of Martinez, Buenos Aires. PANAFTOSA, located in Rio de 

Janeiro, is the reference laboratory for FMD used by Argentina and neighboring countries. PANAFTOSA 

is responsible for the molecular characterization of the virus. 

Serological monitoring: FMD epidemiological surveillance implemented by SENASA is in line with OIE 

recommendations [13, 18, 26, 82, 83]. Serological sampling is based on the epidemiological situations of 

each particular area of the country, which take into consideration the following parameters:

 Animal density;

 Composition of cattle population (steer/cow ratio);

 Animal movements (movements in and out);

 Geographical and political-administrative characteristics;

 Effectiveness of vaccination;

 Risk areas (Frontera Norte A and B);

 Surveillance zones (in free areas); and

 Results of previous serological samplings.

SENASA provided the APHIS site visit team with the protocol in place for the 2005 to 2008 serological 

surveillance [27] [34] [35, 36]. During the 2013 site visit, SENASA also provided updates on their 

serological surveillance activities from 2011 to 2013 [91, 92, 93, 94].

Other measures: All cattle are vaccinated every six months with oil-adjuvanted vaccines. Other 

susceptible species are not vaccinated except for the area located 25 km south of the border between 

Argentina/Bolivia and Argentina/Paraguay, where all susceptible species are vaccinated twice a year. 

Conclusions

APHIS believes that Argentina has a control program and a national plan sufficient to respond quickly to 

FMD emergencies through quarantine and testing of suspicious premises. In addition, Argentina

maintains an active surveillance program at the field level in farms, slaughterhouses, and at animal 

gathering locations.

APHIS concluded that the FMD program is effective at the local and national levels. Argentina has a 

structured system of notification and official involvement to investigate any suspect FMD cases. 

5. The vaccination status of the region

Assessment of risk includes a consideration of the effectiveness of control measures implemented and 

revision of those measures as appropriate. In this section we explain how the FMD vaccination program 

in Argentina works and relate this to the effectiveness of the National FMD Eradication Program and 

overall control of disease.

General Information

Vaccination of cattle is mandatory in the area north of the 42nd parallel with the exception of Patagonia 

North B (the area adjacent to Patagonia South, a region without vaccination) and recently, Patagonia 
32

North A. A recent change in Annex I of Resolution 181/10, Resolution 82/13, now bans FMD

vaccination in Patagonia North A, replacing Annex 1 of Resolution 181/10 [82].

SENASA is the enforcement authority and regulating body for planning, implementing, and controlling 

actions to eradicate FMD. SENASA establishes the technical requirements for the vaccination program. 

The epidemiological office of DNSA is responsible for the regulatory aspects and the assessments of the 

recorded information. The general field office, the regional supervisors, and the local SENASA 

veterinarians are responsible for the operations. Responsibility for vaccination delivery lies in the local 

foundation or with the local SENASA office depending on the area, although vaccination practices are 

audited at the National SENASA level. The local foundation is responsible for:

 Purchasing and storage;

 Management;

 Administration and scheduling the vaccination campaign to ensure that all the bovines are 

vaccinated;

 Keeping a vaccine bank for emergencies;

 Collecting and managing the revenues generated for the vaccination;

 Reporting vaccination and non-compliance to SENASA; and

 Assessing the progress of the campaign with SENASA and the vaccination team.

SENASA law 24.305 and SENASA Resolutions 33/02 and 623/02 establish the authority for

administration and distribution of the vaccines as well as the creation of the local foundations (Entes 

Sanitarios Locales) under Resolution Sagpya 108/01. At the time of the November 2013 site visit, there 

were a total of 310 local foundations that employed over 6,000 official coordinators, programmers, and 

vaccinators. There is also an operating group who administers FMD vaccines to any susceptible species in 

an area located along the border of Argentina-Bolivia and Argentina-Paraguay [20]. 

According to the law, local foundation personnel are obligated to vaccinate all the bovines on every 

holding. The vaccinators’ salary depends on the total number of animals vaccinated. Therefore, the 

vaccinators make the maximum effort to vaccinate all bovines. 

 

The FMD National Eradication Plan conducts periodic and systematic vaccination of bovines. The rest of 

the susceptible species are vaccinated only in strategic situations (e.g., emergency situations). Local 

SENASA veterinarians certify, control, and audit the vaccination campaigns. In addition, local, regional,

and central SENASA services are responsible for setting vaccination schedules and the monitoring and 

follow-up of the campaigns. 

Vaccination dates differ to accommodate geographic, epidemiological, and production characteristics 

including animal movements. A regionalization strategy is applied according to the ecological features, 

production types, and movement flow. The vaccination strategies that are implemented according to the

different regions, as amended by Resolution 181/10, are as follows:

 In the provinces of Buenos Aires, Corrientes, Entre Rios, Chaco, Cordoba, Formosa, La Pampa, 

San Luis, Santa Fe, Santiago del Estero, Tucuman, Neuquen, Rio Negro, and Misiones, two 

vaccination campaigns are conducted annually in all bovines. Under Resolution 181/10, in these

areas that vaccinate twice a year, young cattle between 6 months and two years of age, and 

animals to be moved to other facilities, are vaccinated during the first cycle, while all adult cattle 

are vaccinated during the second cycle. For the rest of the provinces in the North (Salta, San Juan, 

Catamarca, La Rioja, Mendoza and Jujuy) one vaccination campaign is carried out during which
33

all the bovines are vaccinated. A second vaccination campaign is held only for bovines in highrisk holdings and bovines which are going to be moved to other premises or livestock market. 

High risk holdings are considered to be holdings located closed to slaughterhouses, holdings with 

a large number of cattle, holdings with an intense dynamic of cattle movements, and holdings for

fattening.

 The exception is the Cordon Fronterizo (the northern borders, “Frontera Norte A” and “Frontera 

Norte B”, bordering Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil) which continues to vaccinate all categories of 

bovine twice annually.

Vaccination can only be performed by authorized personnel who are trained, registered, and 

accredited/audited by SENASA. Resolution 368/11 recently allowed private veterinarians to administer 

FMD vaccinations but they are required to undergo training and be registered with SENASA as official 

vaccinators. All vaccinators must be affiliated with a local SENASA office and are only approved to 

vaccinate within that local office’s jurisdiction.

Before starting the vaccination campaign, each local office establishes the number of animals to be 

vaccinated based on data available in the Sanitary Management System such as data from previous 

vaccination campaigns, registered animal movements, and estimates of newborn calves since the last 

vaccination [13, 18, 20, 32][82].

Data obtained during the vaccinations are entered in a form called the “vaccination act” (acta de 

vacunación), which is completed by the official vaccinators after visiting each holding. Data collected 

throughout and at the end of the vaccination campaign include: (1) daily from each vaccinator, the 

number of animals vaccinated including categories of animals vaccinated, time of vaccination, 

compliance of premises with vaccination schedule, and (2) every two weeks from each local vaccination 

delivery center, the proportion of premises/establishments vaccinated and the proportion of vaccinated 

animals. Vaccination campaigns last for 60 days. Under Resolution 181/10, animals cannot be moved out 

of premises that have not completed the vaccination and registration of animals at the end of a vaccination 

cycle.

Vaccination coverage rates have been over 97 percent in the region above the 42nd parallel (with the 

exception of Patagonia North B, and most recently Patagonia North A, in which vaccination is not 

conducted) since 2001. Table 3 provides statistical information on the vaccination schedule and coverage 

in this region, by campaign, from 2008 until 2012 [95].

Table 3: Vaccination rates from 2008 to 2012

Campaigns Vaccinated 

Bovines

Vaccination rate

(%)1

1

st Cycle 2008 59,261,268 99.34

2

nd Cycle 2008 57,736,145 102.63

1

st Cycle 2009 55,803,147 99.24

2

nd Cycle 2009 51,922,968 99.91
34

1

st Cycle 2010 50,268,465 98.96

2

nd Cycle 2010 37,434,323 103.01

1

st Cycle 2011 42,686,107 100.51

2

nd Cycle 2011 44,486,110 104.50

1

st Cycle 2012 39,790,151 100.62

2

nd Cycle 2012 43,389,492 101.92

 

1 Vaccination rate exceeds 100% in some cases due to vaccination of young bovine (six months to two years)

during the 1st Cycle that were subsequently revaccinated during the 2nd Cycle.

All FMD vaccine used within the territory is produced under SENASA oversight. Production and quality 

control of the vaccine meet the requirements of the OIE Manual’s standard for diagnostic tests and the 

recommendations of the OIE Reference Regional Center, PANAFTOSA. Vaccine production and 

diagnosis comply with biosecurity level NBS-3 OIE Standards. A biosafety committee (SENASA 

Resolutions 104/95-472/95-507/01-117/04) controls the compliance with the standards. 

The tetravalent vaccine in use since 2001 is inactivated and contains an oil-adjuvant that provides 

extended immunity [96, 97]. SENASA uses vaccines containing the following serotypes: O1/Campos, 

A24/Cruzeiro, A/Argentina/2001 and C3/Indaial. All vials are identified with technical and manufacturer 

brand labels, a sequential number, and an official stamp stating the series and the expiration date. 

SENASA conducts audits of the cold chain at all stages. Trucks used for the transportation of the vaccines 

are equipped with temperature sensors to ensure a cold chain during transportation [37].

The vaccine must be tested for quality and safety by the official SENASA laboratory. Quality control 

tests of each batch of the vaccine are conducted and strictly follow international standards, as set by the 

OIE. All series of vaccines are tested for:

 Safety;

 Sterility;

 Physical and chemical stability: viscosity, conductivity, centrifuge, and accelerating aging tests to 

confirm stability of emulsion;

 Purity (Non-structural proteins): vaccines must not interfere with tests that detect antibodies 

against non specific proteins with the 3ABC ELISA + enzyme-linked immunoelectrotransfer blot

(EITB) tests are used for detection; and

 Efficacy or potency: vaccines submitted for registration are tested with direct potency assay 

following the percentage of protection against foot infection (PGP) method [38]. Sixteen 

antibody-free bovines are challenged and tested 90 days after vaccination. The tested vaccines 

must provide protection in 81 percent of the challenge animals for each virus type included in the 

vaccine. 

Conclusions

APHIS concluded that Argentina conducts its FMD vaccine production appropriately and in accordance 

with international standards. There is a system of controls to ensure compliance with vaccination 

calendars through matching vaccination records to movement permits and census data (see section on 
35

disease status) and through field inspections. The structure and application of the vaccination program, in 

conjunction with movement controls, fosters close interaction between veterinary officials and farmers 

and facilitates oversight of animal populations and vaccine coverage in the field. 

6. The degree to which the region is separated from adjacent regions of higher risk through 

physical or other barriers

Geographical barriers, such as mountains or expanses of water and other barriers, impede the natural and 

human-mediated movement of animals and animal products. In this section we look at the geographical 

barriers that could potentially limit the movement of FMD from endemic neighboring areas into 

Argentina.

The geographic description of the Argentine borders follows below [13, 18, 39]:

1. Chile (west and south)

2. Bolivia (north)

3. Paraguay (northeast)

4. Brazil (northeast and east)

5. Uruguay (east)

Chile

Total length of the border: 4,591 km

Inland border: 4,591 km

 The Andean Range makes up a natural border.

Bolivia

Total length of the border: 765 km

River coastline border: 385 km

 Along the Pilcomayo River: 40 km (Province of Salta)

 Along the Grande de Tarija River: 120 km (Province of Salta)

 Along the Bermejo River: 125 km (Province of Salta)

 Along smaller rivers: 100 km (Provinces of Salta and Jujuy).

Inland border: 380 km

 The altitude along the border with Bolivia decreases from west to east (Average of 3000 m in the 

west and 400 m in the east). The climate and topography also change from more mountainous in 

the west to flatter lowlands towards the east.

Paraguay

Total length of border: 1,570 km

River coastline border: 1,570 km

 Along the Paraná River: 630 km (Provinces of Corrientes and Misiones)

 Along the Paraguay River: 290 km (Provinces of Formosa and Chaco)

 Along the Pilcomayo River: 300 km (Province of Formosa)

Inland border, deviated course of the Pilcomayo River: 350 km (La Estrella Lowlands, also known as the 

Pantalón System)
36

 The inland border lies to the west. The flat topography of the Province of Formosa continues into 

Paraguay with no natural barriers.

 The Pilcomayo River enters Argentina again to the east, in the town of Palmar, Salto.

Brazil

Total length of the border: 1,079 km

River coastline border: 1,021 km

 Along the Uruguay River: 695 km (Provinces of Misiones and Corrientes)

 Along the Pepirí-Guazú River: 134 km (Province of Misiones)

 Along the San Antonio River: 94 km (Province of Misiones)

 Along the Iguazú River: 129 km (Province of Misiones)

Inland border: 27 km (Bernardo de Irigoyen area)

 To the north, the border with Brazil runs along the Iguazú River and continues south along the 

Uruguay River.

Uruguay

Total length of the border: 866 km

River coastline border: 866 km

 Along the Uruguay River: 491 km (Provinces of Corrientes and Entre Ríos)

 Along the De la Plata River: 375 km (Province of Buenos Aires)

 The border is clearly defined by the Uruguay River to the north and continues along the De la 

Plata River.

Conclusions

Most of the Argentine border is adequately protected by effective natural barriers to reduce the 

unrestricted flow of animals and animal products from areas of higher risk. Government control measures 

compensate for those areas where natural barriers do not exist.

 

7. The extent to which movement of animals and animal products is controlled from 

regions of higher risk, and the level of biosecurity regarding such movements

Border controls enable a country to monitor the movement of people, animals, and goods into the country. 

Illegal movements of susceptible commodities or people and equipment can spread disease; therefore, a

thorough understanding of the animal movement controls of a country is useful in assessing the risk of 

introduction of the disease. Further, biosecurity measures are critical to minimize the spread of disease

should an outbreak occur. In this section we review Argentina’s border control capabilities in regards to 

monitoring and controlling the movement of FMD susceptible species and products into Argentina.

International and National border controls are administered by SENASA's Quarantine, Borders, and 

Certifications Unit [13, 40]. Importations of live animals, genetic material, animal products, and animal 

by-products are allowed only under permit issued by SENASA. Animals and animal products may enter 

the country legally by means of 45 authorized border stations which include terrestrial, maritime, and 

fluvial ports and airports. International border crossings authorized by SENASA are listed below:
37

Chile

Jama Crossing (Province of Jujuy)

Cristo Redentor Crossing (Province of Mendoza)

Cardenal Samoré Crossing (Province of Neuquén in Patagonia North B)

Huemules Crossing (Province of Chubut in Patagonia South)

Coandhaique Crossing (Province of Chubut in Patagonia South)

Integración Austral Crossing (Province of Santa Cruz in Patagonia South)

Bolivia

Salvador Mazza Bridge (Province of Salta)

Aguas Blancas Bridge (Province of Salta)

Horacio Guzmán Bridge (La Quiaca, Province of Jujuy)

Paraguay

San Ignacio Loyola Crossing (Fraternidad Portal, San Ignacio Loyola Bridge, and ferry, Clorinda, 

Province of Formosa)

San Roque González de la Cruz Bridge (Posadas, Province of Misiones)

Puerto Rico: this crossing is for cross-border traffic only (Province of Misiones)

Brazil

Tancredo Neves Bridge (Port of Iguazú, Province of Misiones)

Bernardo de Irigoyen Crossing (Province of Misiones)

San Javier Bridge (Province of Misiones)

Integración Bridge (Santo Tomé, Province of Corrientes)

Port of Alvear (Province of Corrientes)

Presidente A. Justo Bridge (Paso de los Libres, Province of Corrientes)

Uruguay

Salto Grande Bridge (Concordia, Province of Entre Ríos)

José G. Artigas Bridge (Colón, Province of Entre Ríos)

Libertador San Martín Bridge (Gualeguaychú, Province of Entre Ríos)

Port of Buenos Aires (Ferrylineas and Buquebus)

Jorge Newbery Airport (City of Buenos Aires)

SENASA officials are assisted at border control points by various security forces, including the National 

Border Patrol, the Argentine Coast Guard, and the National Aeronautical Police [89]. National Border 

Control agents assist along international borders and number around 14,000 in the entire country. Coast 

Guard personnel assist at seaports and Aeronautical Police at airports. Permanent SENASA personnel at 

border crossing points number 394, including veterinarians, agricultural engineers, and administrative 

personnel [40]. Cooperation with these groups occurs under the terms of official agreements [40]. Other 

groups assisting with border inspections include the National Customs Bureau and provincial and local 

institutions. SENASA considers agreements with the security forces to be critical to the control program. 

Argentina authorities check and confiscate products prohibited for movement internationally. The number 

of human resources associated with control posts in the border with Paraguay and Bolivia during 2005 

[41] are listed in Table 4. 
38

Table 4: SENASA personnel in the associated with control posts in the border with Paraguay and 

Bolivia (2005)

SENASA Personnel

Province Veterinarians Technicians Administrators

Jujuy 1 2 0

Salta 5 5 5

Formosa 7 5 6

Total 13 12 11

Commercial imports

Before allowing such imports into the exporting region, Argentina requires a risk analysis for all imports 

of live animals and products of animal origin to determine the epidemiological status of the country or 

region of origin, the existence of national or regional programs to control exotic diseases, the specific 

capabilities of the laboratories and quarantine facilities and their staff, and other factors that reduce the 

risk of importing exotic or high risk diseases into the country. SENASA Resolution 1354/94 defines the 

pre-importation procedures and the health certificate requirements for live animals and their reproductive 

material into Northern Argentina. 

Argentina follows OIE guidelines in its importation policy for Northern Argentina regarding products of 

animal origin considered as possible carriers of the FMD virus from countries or regions with a lower 

sanitary status. In certain situations, however, Argentina requires mitigation to minimize the potential 

risks associated with the importation of these products. Resolution 816/02 defines the general preimportation procedures and controls for animal products and byproducts into Northern Argentina[13, 18, 

40].

The procedures and criteria applied by Argentinean officials for imported live animals, animal genetic 

material, and animal products and byproducts are based on the principles of risk analysis, regionalization 

and equivalence in the SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the standards set by 

the OIE. Permits to import such products are required before the goods arrive in the country. The importer 

will be issued an import permit only after all the applicable zoosanitary requirements stated in SENASA 

regulations are met. The import permits must be approved by the SENASA Central Office.

The procedures to assess the risk and approve processing plants and processing procedures in the region 

of origin are stated in Resolution 816/02. Import permits may be issued after Argentina conducts a risk 

analysis of the following [11]: 

 The type of product that will be imported;

 The health status of the exporting region ;

 Approval of the slaughtering or processing plant in the region of origin;

 Type of shipment;

 Transit of the product through other countries;

 Border post at the point of entry into Argentina; and

 Expected used of the product.
39

All products and live animals that require approval from SENASA must meet similar security 

requirements. Import requirements are summarized as follows [11]:

 Pre-importation authorization.

 Verification of the health certificate issued by the country of origin.

 Physical inspection, document control, and verification of the identity of the imported products.

 A restricted transit permit for shipments of animal products to processing plants with official 

SENASA veterinary inspection. Live animals must be placed in quarantine at the official 

quarantine facility. 

 After inspection, the imported products are sampled for the purpose of the National Residue 

Control in Food Products and Hygiene program, and the release document is issued. In the case of 

live animals, the release document is issued at the end of the quarantine period, if no pathology is 

found. Once the importer has this document, the imported goods may be collected.

Imported animals are placed in SENASA’s quarantine facility, “Lazareto Capital” in Buenos Aires. 

Animals that require special conditions or treatment are placed in special quarantine facilities (e.g., zoo 

animals, ornamental birds, and fish). The quarantine period lasts for 15 to 60 days to allow sufficient time 

for completion of all required testing procedures, depending on the species and the place of origin. At the 

end of the quarantine period, the imported animals are placed under observation at the farm of destination 

for a period of 60 days. After this period, the local SENASA veterinarian must issue a report certifying 

that the post-quarantine period has been completed.

Inspections of imports are carried out in all cases, without exemptions, if they are products under 

SENASA jurisdiction. Documents are checked and products or animals are physically inspected and 

identified. All imports have to meet the requirements established by the responsible technical area as set 

by the standards of procedures in SENASA Resolution 816/02. Two inspection modes are used at borders

[42]: 

 Direct inspection: questioning, observation, manual inspection of luggage and vehicles (e.g., 

trunks, rooms, cabins, boxes); and

 Indirect inspection at the most relevant entry points: auxiliary methods used to detect organic 

products that could be potential carriers of pests or diseases (e.g., organic material scanner, dog 

squad).

In case of animal health emergencies in the region or in neighboring countries, additional control 

mechanisms are activated, such as reinforcement of regulations and personnel, increasing vehicular 

disinfection, and strengthening of patrol and control tasks. Security forces (National Border Police, 

Argentine Navy, and National Aeronautical Police) that carry out sanitary supervision tasks at the border 

will be alerted to be more vigilant.

At the inspection posts, shipments into all Argentina are inspected and checked for proper documentation 

and identification. If the shipment has the proper documents and passes inspection, it is authorized to 

continue to its destination after resealing the vehicle and recording that the shipment had passed through 

the check point region [14, 20].

Noncommercial traffic

The proportion of travelers, means of transportation, and types of luggage inspected varies according to 

the risk characteristics of the borders or origin of the incoming vehicle. The risk profile of particular 
40

products is defined according to the recommendations of the procedures manual and regional 

characteristics of each control post. The types of inspection activities that occur depend on the nature of 

the control posts. Direct controls are carried out mainly at terrestrial posts and sea ports while indirect 

methods with detecting scanners are used at the main airports of the region (e.g., Aeroparque Jorge 

Newbery) and some sea ports.

Sanitary barriers were established to prevent unauthorized crossings at points other than border posts. 

Control posts are located in strategic places on the borders. Trained staff is present all day and they 

interact with security forces, through cooperation agreements, to enforce sanitary regulations. It is 

difficult to accurately estimate the amount and frequency of unauthorized crossings, but the measures 

explained above are aimed at minimizing the risk of introduction of animals or products of risk by 

informal methods [42]. Figure 9 shows the amounts (kg) of noncommercial products (animal) confiscated

from 2008 to 2012 by province [43].

Figure 9: Noncommercial animal products confiscated in the terrestrial border posts, by province 

(Salta, Jujuy, Formosa, Corrientes, and Misiones) 2008-2012 (in kg)

Province

Year Misiones Corrientes Salta Jujuy Formosa

2008 57,597 4,919 3,027 140 2,049

2009 30,359 2,497 3,408 106 1,817

2010 119,693 8,133 8,980 2,055 1,095

2011 76,448 8,297 4,397 1,450 2,007

2012 7,096 4,867 4,154 1,809 7,767

Property confiscation and transport infringements

The reports submitted by Argentina show the quantity of products condemned at terrestrial and aerial 

border posts under SENASA control in all of Argentina (2001, 2002) [11, 42]. Controls applied at the 

sanitary barriers follow Federal transit standards by prohibiting entry of forbidden and restricted animals 

and products.

During the period of 2010-2012 at the main international Argentine airport, most of the confiscated 

products were fruits. Table 5 shows the total amount of products confiscated between 2010 and 2012.

Table 5. Products confiscated from luggage or passengers at the Ezeiza airport (main international 

airport) (in kg).

Year Amount (kg)

2010 3,5116.3

2011 42,743.78

2012 36,090.7

Airports [20]
41

During the several visits to Argentina, the site teams visited several airports that act as control points 

mainly for tourist traffic. The Jorge Newberry Airport in Buenos Aires handles a significant level of 

traffic to Argentina in general. The security measures implemented at the Jorge Newberry Airport are

thorough. Aeronautical police assist SENASA in its activities. All carry-on baggage is put through 

scanners that can differentiate organic materials from other substances. All checked baggage and hand 

carried luggage from international flights is examined by scanner. During the 2009 site visit, Jorge 

Newberry Airport officials indicated that approximately 35 kg of plant and animal products are 

confiscated daily during the high tourist season. The average volume of confiscations drops to eight kg 

during the low travel season. This airport employs a staff of ten individuals who work in shifts between 4 

a.m. and 11 p.m. daily.

Passengers are provided with information on prohibited substances and are required to fill out a customs 

declaration form if arriving on an international flight. Passengers carrying food products are given 

information on prohibited material regardless of destination. Any unauthorized cargo is confiscated. In 

2003, a new statement was developed to accompany packages stating that certain products are not being 

shipped in the packages or with a passenger. The statement is used for all airplane and bus travelers. One 

side has the declaration statement and signature stating that no prohibited plant or animal products are 

being carried by the passenger and the other side lists the Resolutions involved and prohibited items. If 

undeclared prohibited items are found on inspection, SENASA conducts a review to determine if a fine 

should be levied. 

Products shipped as cargo directly from plants must be accompanied by relevant documentation. Air 

freight of perishable goods is rare but would be checked at the airport of destination and not released until 

after SENASA approves.

Checked baggage heading for a different destination than Newbery is subject to inspection by the Beagle 

patrol. A beagle dog is used to sniff for prohibited substances in luggage in the baggage claim area. 

Luggage that is suspect is identified, sealed, and inspected at the point of destination. A fax is sent to the 

destination airport to notify them of the suspect package. The luggage can only be opened with the owner 

present. Any confiscated material is denatured and then treated as waste and sent to the landfill. The 

destination airport then sends a report back to the airport office from where the package had been shipped.

Members of the site visit team in 2009 observed a beagle that, in the process of inspecting passenger 

baggage, detected a suspect package. The SENASA official labeled it so officials at the point of 

destination would investigate the package. They do not open these packages at the airport where the dog 

detects something suspicious. The package is flown to its destination, then the owner is notified and 

SENASA opens the package with the owner present.

International land borders

Permanent SENASA personnel are stationed at each international border port; however, SENASA is not 

the only group responsible for biosecurity at borders. The number of personnel available for border 

control is supplemented through agreements with security forces like the gendarmerie. In this regard, 

14,000 officials are stationed along 9,370 miles of border [20, 31]. In addition, several designated security 

forces assist SENASA at import centers. SENASA officials emphasized the importance of the national 

forces (i.e., the land, water and border police) in identification of illegal imports [20, 31, 40]. SENASA 

also has the authority to call upon local police to assist if needed. 

SENASA checkpoint officials are notified approximately 15 days before a shipment arrives. This 

minimizes potential problems with the customs authority and helps facilitate and expedite the process. All 

exporters and importers must be registered with SENASA. The shipment must be accompanied by a 
42

permit and must originate from an approved location. Both the origin and the destination of the product 

appear on the permit. 

Shipments can be rejected if documentation is incomplete or if it appears to be falsified. There are no 

fines for commercial shipments that are rejected because the paperwork is incomplete. However, the 

shipments are denied entry. SENASA may confiscate and destroy the product. In comparison, if 

SENASA detects deliberate falsification of documents, a fine of 800 pesos is levied. This is equivalent to 

a one-month salary [31].

Border patrol police on land, water, and at the ports are the primary personnel responsible for identifying 

illegal shipments. The number of illegal shipments has been reduced significantly since the economic 

collapse in Argentina in 2001. SENASA has monthly meetings with these border patrols to discuss issues 

and procedures.

Border with Chile 

As previously mentioned, Argentina is separated from most of Chile by the Andes Mountains. In 

addition, Argentina is working with Chile on joint surveillance for monitoring movement across the 

border (i.e., monitoring transport of prohibited materials/animals by people crossing the border). Much of 

the movement control focus is directed toward FMD. In this regard, since the OIE recognizes Chile as 

FMD-free without vaccination, SENASA does not consider Chile as a high-risk region. Chile is also 

recognized as FMD-free without vaccination by the United States.

Border with Paraguay and Bolivia

SENASA considers the most vulnerable borders for the potential introduction of FMD to be the 

Paraguayan and Bolivian borders. Animal density is fairly low in the northern region, but history suggests 

that FMD has been introduced to Argentina through some of those borders. Although there are rivers 

along some of these borders, some are navigable, so animals could potentially be brought across in boats. 

Additionally, there are dry river beds along some areas which animals could cross on foot. In fact, some 

farmers own property on both sides of the border. Therefore, there is some potential for animal movement 

across these borders.

The provinces of Formosa and Salta share borders with Paraguay and Bolivia, respectively. The 

vulnerability of these borders has received the attention of SENASA in the form of enhanced support in 

the region for surveillance and border control activities. Currently there are 25 professionals with a total 

workforce in the provinces of 36 distributed among 15 offices. These are strategically located near the 

borders of the provinces, along both the international boundaries and the neighboring provinces of 

Argentina, and in more interior locations. SENASA has provided significant support in terms of 

equipment and facilities, including new offices (trailers in areas where there is no building infrastructure), 

refrigerators, computers, radios, cell phones, and vehicles. As a consequence of the 2006 outbreak, the 

borders of the provinces of Corrientes, Chaco, and Misiones have also received attention from SENASA 

in the form of enhanced control and prevention for FMD (Frontera Norte B). 

Agreements are in place among SENASA and its counterpart veterinary officials in Paraguay and Bolivia 

for coordinated border control activities such as vaccinations, surveillance, animal census, education, and 

animal identification. In 2002, SENASA began holding joint meetings with Paraguay and signed a 

working agreement. The three countries developed a manual of procedures for the movement of animals 

in the border areas [44, 45]. The procedures include quarantine, depopulation, vaccination, disinfection, 

and final disposition of the animal, including sanitary slaughter of suspect animals, animals without ID, or 

animals that do not carry proper identification. SENASA provided the APHIS site visit team with copies 
43

of the paperwork that has to be completed in the event animals are found within the border areas. 

Veterinary officials from the three countries have developed a joint policy to identify the country of origin 

of animals, so that animals that are stolen and imported illegally can be identified. The animals are 

identified by a colored eartag (see Figure 7). From 2002 until June 2005, the province of Formosa 

reported nine sanitary slaughter procedures resulting from animal identification issues [46].

i. Border crossing at Clorinda to Paraguay

In 2005, the APHIS site team visited the border crossing point at Clorinda. This crossing primarily 

handles passenger traffic. It is the only road in the area from Paraguay. Team members observed bus 

passengers going through a clearance process in which bags are scanned and organic material (both plant 

and animal) is removed for destruction. Luggage from cars is also scanned. The initial screening is 

performed by customs officials who call SENASA officials if appropriate. A SENASA office is on site at 

the control point from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. Border control and customs officials are on site for the remainder 

of the 24-hour period.

Confiscated material is separated, sprayed to denature it (phenol, creodine, iodine), and placed into 

containers marked with green for plant materials and red for animal. 

All actions taken are documented and the passenger receives a written notification. There is a single form 

for each confiscation and a separate destruction record. Manual records are maintained in the SENASA 

office and collated monthly for the national SENASA office. Confiscated material is burned in an 

incinerator on site each day.

Roadblocks are common on major roads throughout the country. Although these were established 

primarily for the purpose of inspecting travelers for drugs, they provide a mechanism for inspection for 

animal health purposes, if necessary and appropriate. 

ii. Border crossing at Salvador Mazza to Bolivia

Traffic at Salvador Mazza consists mainly of pedestrians crossing from Bolivia to work in Argentina. 

Most of the passengers traveling into Salta and Jujuy have their carry-on luggage visually inspected at the 

border post. Any prohibited materials found by the inspectors are confiscated and disposed of according 

to the regulations. A very small amount of risk products are seized weekly (during 2003, 200 to 400 kg 

per week). The APHIS team visited the border of Bolivia in 2005. During the site team visit no products 

were seized. 

National Route 34 is the main highway in the area, connecting the city of Salta, Tartagal (2003 outbreak), 

and Ingeniero Maza (border control). Along the route there are several control posts that stop cars and 

trucks to check for possible drug traffic and illegal movements of animals and animal products between 

Bolivia and Argentina. In addition, the route is often blocked by “piqueteros” (group of organized 

unemployed workers) demanding job opportunities. During the site visit, SENASA personnel commented 

that trips on route 34 can take a long time since the blockages by the piqueteros are often unexpected. 

Alternative routes take at least double the time. The APHIS team was told that “piqueteros” usually let 

vaccinators and SENASA veterinarians continue with their activities.

Cooperation with other units and countries

SENASA also has agreements in place with border control officials throughout the provinces. There are 

1800 border control officers cooperating with SENASA. The border control units can make helicopters 

available to SENASA. SENASA and border control officers take joint training courses.
44

Paraguay has assigned additional personnel to the border area. Under the joint agreement, weekly 

epidemiology reports are generated on any animal health event and shared. There is also a regularly 

scheduled monthly meeting. In addition, officials of the two countries also communicate by radio and 

telephone. In some areas there is no electricity, so the far western regions can only communicate by radio.

SENASA provided an example of a cooperative action between Paraguayan and Bolivian officials and 

SENASA in 2005. SENASA located stolen animals that Paraguay reported missing. SENASA corralled

them, took serum for testing, vaccinated them twice, observed for clinical signs, and returned them to 

Paraguay. SENASA then handed the smuggler over to legal authorities. 

Nomads live in the area and are likely to move animals without a DT-e. However, other farmers in the 

area are aware of the need for identification of animals and the DT-e for movement. They are likely to 

report nomads with noncompliant cattle to SENASA because they consider the nomads to be 

“undesirable.” SENASA will follow up on such reports and send the animals back to their origin, if they 

belong to nomads. However, animals that are associated with smugglers are killed.

These cooperative activities also include Bolivian officials. Officials from the three countries have signed 

an agreement that requires a joint response to a suspect FMD case. The cooperative effort began with 

FMD but is being extended to include other diseases.

A survey was conducted to acquire more details on the border region with Boliva and Paraguay to 

identify vulnerabilities. The survey found that some farmers had susceptible small species that were not

cattle. At the time, they were considered sentinels. However, now all susceptible species are vaccinated.

Notices in English, Spanish, and Portuguese are posted at border crossings and other ports of entry to 

inform visitors of biologically hazardous materials and products. 

A standard certificate for export/import must be presented by shippers at the border crossing. SENASA 

must be notified so staff can be present when the shipment arrives at the border. However, staff from the 

Border Patrol can also inspect shipments. The border posts are staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week 

by Border Patrol officials. They check seals and documents but do not open the seals to inspect cargo. 

The seals are inspected to ensure that they have not been broken and that they match the entries on the 

export/import documents.

Customs turns over all contraband products seized to Border Patrol or SENASA officials and makes a

record of all seized products. These products are put in a barrel and sprayed with methylene blue or 

povidine to render them inedible. 

SENASA has developed an intensive border control program (SENASA resolution 748/200)] [47]. The 

program, called “Frontera Norte A,” started officially in 2004 with the objective of maintaining the OIE 

status of FMD free with vaccination for most of the northern region. It established a buffer zone of 

approximately 25 km wide and 1,200 km long with the purpose of stopping the entrance of the virus from 

Paraguay or Bolivia [8, 48]. Figure 10 describes the characteristics of the high surveillance area known as 

“Frontera Norte A.” 
45

Figure 10: Map of the border area, Frontera Norte A

The program includes common strategies at both sides of international borders, exchange of surveys on 

premises and producers, identification of susceptible animals, joint audit visits during vaccination period, 

enhanced surveillance, exchange of sanitary information, and property brand records. Movement controls 

in the region are strict and include the following: 

 For movements out of the area, all susceptible animals must be moved within 30 days of the 

last vaccination or be revaccinated;

 Animals can only be transported in sealed vehicles after authorization by the local SENASA 

office;

 The local office of destination has to authorize the movement;

 Both local offices (origin and destination) have to be notified upon arrival to destination; and

 The animals should remain in the new holding for a minimum of three months.

The APHIS team that visited Argentina in 2006 observed examples of movement permits at the office of 

San Luis del Palmar, province of Corrientes. As a consequence of the 2006 outbreak and as a way to 

prevent further introductions of FMD in the country, SENASA drafted the regulation 622/2006 [49]

proposing to include the provinces of Chaco, Corrientes, and Misiones (“Frontera Norte B”) to the buffer 

area. Figure 11 describes the characteristics of the high surveillance area known as “Frontera Norte B.”
46

Figure 11: Map of the northeast border, Frontera Norte B 

In September 2006, SENASA implemented an intensive border control which included the provinces of 

Jujuy, Salta, and Formosa (SENASA resolution No 748/2004). By October 2006, the Frontera Norte B 

became functional. SENASA pays for the costs associated with vaccination in most of the region, 

although farmers must build and maintain their own confinement pens for vaccine administration.

 When OIE once again recognized Argentina’s status as FMD-free with vaccination 

following the February 2006 outbreak in Corrientes, the high surveillance area was 

excluded from Argentina’s request for recognition. In 2011, SENASA updated legislation 

(SENASA resolution No 44/2011) unifying Frontera Norte A(Salta and Formosa 

provinces) and Frontera Norte B (Chaco, Corrientes and Misiones provinces) into the 

Cordon Fronterizo high surveillance area and subsequently reapplied to OIE for inclusion 

of the Cordon Fronterizo in the FMD-free with vaccination zone of northern Argentina. 

Resolution 44/2011 established animal health measures along the high surveillance area 

that were agreed upon with the Mercosur Program For FMD Freedom (PAMA)

including:

o determination of viral activity/circulation and immunity;

o two annual vaccination cycles in all bovine;

o intensified epidemiological surveillance; and

o strict movement controls such as: 
47

 Animals must not have contact with susceptible species for 21 days prior 

to movement.

 Establishment of origin must not have had any new introductions into the 

herd for 21 days prior to animal movements.

 In the event herd introductions were made, those animals must remain in 

isolation (quarantined) for 21 days prior to animal movement.

Since March 2011, the areas of North Central Argentina, including the Cordon Fronterizo are considered 

by OIE as FMD free with vaccination (see Figure 12) [83] while the areas including Patagonia (North B 

and South) and the summer pastures (zona veranadas) of Calingasta Valleys in the province of San Juan 

are considered by OIE as FMD free without vaccination.

Figure 12. Argentina’s FMD status as recognized by OIE (May 2013)

There are also protocols for movement of semen and embryos into Argentina following OIE guidelines. 

Although a few breeding animals have come from specifically approved premises in Paraguay under 

permit, most come from the Buenos Aires province. SENASA also requires that animals be identified by 

country of origin by eartag. All FMD-susceptible species have to be eartagged in the high surveillance 

area of Frontera Norte A and B. A yellow eartag indicates that the animal originated in Paraguay, a pink 

Zona libre con vacunación 

CENTRO NORTE

Zona libre con vacunación 

CORDÓN FRONTERIZO

Zona libre sin vacunación 

PATAGONIA

Zona libre sin 

vacunación 

VALLES DE 

CALINGASTA
48

eartag identifies an animal from Argentina, and a white tag identifies animals from Bolivia. Eartags 

facilitate identification of smuggled animals, which are either unlikely to carry the tags or have tags 

showing that the animals originated in another country (see Figure 13). The APHIS team that visited the 

border between Bolivia and Argentina in May 2005 observed the movement of FMD-susceptible species 

with identifying eartags. In addition, at the office of Ingeniero Maza, province of Salta, the APHIS team

observed the list of brands belonging to holdings located in Bolivia as well as documentation of 

vaccination campaigns [20, 44].

Figure 13: Ear tags used by Argentina (pink), Bolivia (white), and Paraguay (yellow) in the 

border area

In 2007, SENASA improved the FMD program in the export region by including the following

enhancements:

 Continuation of sanitary measures provided by SENASA Resolution 748/2004 for the 

“Subproject for Northern A Border” area which was extended (25 km) along the provinces of 

Chaco (Department Bermejo), Corrientes, and Misiones;

 Strategic and systematic FMD vaccination, effective control of animal movements, and 

increase epidemiologic surveillance;

 Improve sanitary barriers in areas (specifically at the borders of Paraguay and Bolivia); and

 Improve the structure for the control and inspection of animal production, including transport, 

marketing, and slaughter.

Cooperation during the 2006 outbreak

During the 2006 outbreak, 11 road check points were established for inspection and disinfection of

vehicles. Of these, one control post was established at the airport of the city of Corrientes. These posts 

operated 24 hours a day and are listed on Table 6 [50, 51].

Table 6: Agents stationed at control points and actions taken (February to March 2006) 
49

Post Agents Vehicles inspected and disinfected

Gral. Belgrano Bridge 18 122,500

San Luis del Palmar 7 19.686

Caa Cupe 6 1,118

Laguna Alfonso 4 1,635

Rincón Navarro 2 488

Lomas de Vallejos 6 3,985

Saladas 7 4,994

Santa Rosa 6 3,875

Kilómetro 1111 7 5,897

Tranquera 4 4 389

San Lorenzo 7 1,712

“Camba Punta” International Airport 1 2,000 *

Total 75 168,280 **

* Number of passengers

** Number of vehicles plus passengers at the airport

Table 7 shows the emergency active personnel during the 2006 outbreak. Personnel were distributed into 

three groups: land, strategy and planning, and administrators. 

Table 7: Emergency personnel active during the 2006 outbreak

Veterinarians (SENASA) 22

Technicians (SENASA) 10

Administrators 10

Vaccinators (ENTE) 36

Contract Personal (Movement control) 72

Security Forces 40

Navy 34

Provincial Police 50

Other Police 2

Training of personnel

SENASA personnel conduct training of security and other forces working on border security. A manual 

of procedures applies at a national level for all types of border crossings [13]. The manual includes:

 The legal framework;

 The national and international zoosanitary disease status;

 A glossary of terms;
50

 The list of officials who are authorized to sign the international certificates and a list of 

authorized border control posts throughout the country;

 An epidemiological characterization of the Border Posts (in the process of implementation); and

 Import and export procedures.

In addition to the procedures manual, SENASA has a product manual that lists products allowed to enter 

the country (Resolutions 295/99 and 299/99 list approved plant and animal products). The policies and 

guidelines in these documents are applicable at a national level and define a standardized approach for 

border personnel.

FUNBAPA employees receive a one-day instruction course prior to employment and then are given 

materials to study at home. At the end of ten days they are required to take written and oral examinations 

on the materials. If the scores are satisfactory, they are subjected to an interview before the hiring 

decision is made. They are also trained in various technical duties, including recognition of FMD clinical 

signs and laws and regulations. The probationary period is six months. Employees receive mandatory 

training once a year in a refresher course that covers any new rules or regulations. All posts are audited 

monthly by FUNBAPA and every four months by SENASA.

Conclusions

APHIS concludes that SENASA has adequate controls at ports of entry for legal commercial importation 

of FMD-susceptible species and livestock products. Argentina also has the legal framework, proper 

coverage of borders and emergency areas, and adequate staffing to monitor the influx of animals and 

products via foot or passenger traffic from adjacent areas of higher risk. The land and air border control 

posts visited during the site visits demonstrated adequate staffing levels and knowledge of requirements 

and procedures by employees who exhibited professionalism and efficiency in conducting their duties. 

Staff was well trained and updated on a regular basis, and employed the use of appropriate technology 

when available. SENASA was able to compensate for the effects of the strike that occurred few weeks 

before the 2005 visit and maintain essential services. In addition, SENASA was able to mobilize 

emergency personnel efficiently during the 2006 outbreak, which stopped the spread of the disease into 

other areas. 

8. Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region

Movement of animals to markets and processing could lead to exposure or spread of FMD. Mitigations 

during slaughter allow detection of animals showing clinical signs of disease, removal of bone and lymph 

nodes which could carry the FMD virus, and maturation of the beef to inactivate the FMD virus. In this 

section we explain the livestock demographics in Argentina, the type of production system in different 

regions, and the mitigations that take place during the slaughter process. 

Livestock production systems in Argentina are divided according to geographic, climatic, productive 

conditions, and other economic factors into five agro-economic regions, as follows: 

 The Pampas region, including the provinces of Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Entre Rios, La Pampa 

and Santa Fe;

 The North West Region (NOA) including the provinces of Catamarca, Jujuy, La Rioja, Salta, 

Santiago del Estero, and Tucuman;

 The North East Region (NEA), including the provinces of Corrientes, Chaco, Formosa, and 

Misiones;
51

 The Cuyo Region, including the provinces of Mendoza, San Juan, and San Luis; and

 The Patagonia Region, including the provinces of Neuquen, Rio Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz,

and Tierra del Fuego.

The area north of the 42nd parallel has 55 million head of cattle distributed in 260,000 livestock 

establishments. The Pampas Region is the most developed of the livestock areas, accounting for 76.62

percent of the production, with the remainder composed of 14.4 percent in the NEO Region, 4.1 percent

in the NOA, 3.04 percent in Cuyo, and 1.84 percent in Patagonia [13, 39].

The distribution of bovine production in different provinces is shown on Figure 14.

Figure 14: Bovine distribution in areas of Argentina

Seventy-five percent of cattle production in Argentina is localized in five provinces. Fattening and dairy 

farms are prevalent in the central area of the country. Cattle come from the north to Buenos Aires for 

fattening. The western part of the country primarily contains subsistence farming.

Census information for individual holdings and throughout the country appears to be accurate and up-todate. Prior to each vaccination campaign, a census update is conducted using a quarterly form. The 

number of animals in the previous campaign is corrected for the number of animals shipped, the number 

of animals acquired, and the number of births and deaths. In some local offices (e.g., Brandsen located in 

the province of Buenos Aires), an automatic correction to the census occurs when a DT-e is issued. The 

census information is used to estimate the number of doses of vaccine needed for the premises. A followup form is completed 15 days after vaccination. The foundation (unit conducting the vaccination, in most 
52

parts of the country) informs the local veterinary office of the number of animals contacted during the 

week. There is a monthly report on the number of animals moving to slaughter and fattening. 

The sheep population is 13 million, of which 16.72 percent is in the Pampas Region, 17.23 percent in the 

NEA, 5.89 percent in the NOA, 0.47 percent in Cuyo, and 59.69 percent in Patagonia.

The goat population is 2.3 million, of which 39.68 percent is in Patagonia, 11.72 percent in Cuyo, 29.61 

percent in NOA, 13.12 percent in NEA, and 5.87 percent in La Pampa

The pig population is 2.3 million, of which 78.19 percent is in the Pampas Region, 9.99 percent in the 

NEA, 9.25 percent in the NOA, 1.24 percent in Cuyo, and 1.06 percent in Patagonia.

The livestock establishments are classified according to the production purpose into:

 Dairy establishments located in urban areas;

 Establishments for fattening or wintering, mainly in areas with better farming quality;

 Cow-calf operations, generally located in areas of poor farming quality, where most of the calves 

are moved into fattening or wintering; and

 Subsistence farms.

In Argentina, dairy production is concentrated in the center west of the province of Santa Fe, northeast of 

Cordoba, center south of Cordoba, the Parana area in the province of Entre Rios, the province of Buenos 

Aires, and in La Pampa.

The fattening area includes the provinces of Buenos Aires (northwest), Santa Fe (south), Cordoba (south),

La Pampa (north), and Entre Rios (south). La Pampa region concentrates 97.54 percent of the dairy

industry.

Premises and individual identification

SENASA requires that all premises with agricultural animal production register with SENASA and obtain 

a RENSPA (Registro National Sanitario de Productores Agropecuarios or National Sanitary Registry of 

Agricultural Producers) number. This is an alphanumeric identifier that encodes information about 

individual premises and identifies the province, municipality, the premises, and various aspects 

characterizing particular premises, such as ownership, rental status, or shared occupancy. For example, if 

an individual owns multiple premises or if there are multiple producers owning or sharing a single 

premise, the number code identifies this. The number can also be coded to indicate whether a premises is 

rented, as well as the number of people participating in the ownership or rental [11, 20, 31, 32]. A 

diagram of the digits in the RENSPA number is represented in Figure 15. 

Figure 15. Description of the digits in the RENSPA number.

XX XXX X XXXXX XX

Province District Internal 

Control #

Unique Farm # 

(unique in province)

Possession Type 

Owner (00)

Renter (01)

Etc.

The name of a responsible private veterinarian must be included on the application for a RENSPA 

number and is entered into the database. The veterinarian is held accountable for failing to report 
53

problems that he or she might observe on the premises. Veterinarians named on registration documents 

are required by law to report problems on the premises, such as unusual numbers of sick and dead

livestock. If the veterinarian does not report and there is a disease outbreak, indemnity will not be paid. 

This can be a significant loss, since the indemnity paid is typically the market value of the animal. In 

addition, a fine is levied on the veterinarian, the owner, or both, depending on who fails to notify 

SENASA.

Records of all farms showing ownership, number, types of animals, farm name, location, animal 

movements, and RENSPA number are stored on a computer database. The database is maintained by field 

officials and includes census information on all species on the premises, permit information showing 

animal movements, as well as other pertinent data. The database also records the FMD test status of the 

premises, as defined by the national surveillance program. Monthly statistical reports are generated from 

this database [20, 32].

The database software platform has the ability to search for data by any of the previous mentioned 

parameters. When shipping farm-to-farm, after animals are moved to the point of destination, the animal 

transport document (DT-e) must be turned in to the local SENASA office in the destination department 

within 15 days. That office notifies the local SENASA office of origin that the shipment has arrived. If a 

particular movement record is not closed out (i.e., the animal does not reach its destination), no more 

DT-e’s for that RENSPA number can be issued.

Compliance with the requirement to register premises is controlled by various mechanisms that provide a 

system of checks and balances. First, FMD vaccinators visit all premises in the country (north of the 42nd

parallel) to administer vaccines. Then, the premises must be registered to vaccinate. While on the 

premises for any other purposes, the vaccinator is expected to update a census of all animal species on the 

premises and report the information to the field office [7, 11, 13]. Census information on premises 

containing cattle can be updated twice yearly because FMD vaccines are administered twice yearly. If 

premises do not have cattle or are located in the nonvaccination zone (e.g., region south of the 42nd

parallel), census information comes from a private veterinarian [31]. SENASA considers current 

compliance with this requirement to be good.

In addition to the RENSPA number, livestock owners are assigned a unique identifying code called a 

CUIG number (unique holding identification code), consisting of a series of four digits. The CUIG 

number is shorter and easier to remember than the RENSPA number and is used as a more convenient 

form of premises identification. Farmers must have a RENSPA and a CUIG number in order to purchase 

eartags. Both the RENSPA number and the CUIG must be included on eartags of cattle (CUIG on the 

front and RENSPA on the back), but only the CUIG number is required for sheep tags due to size 

limitations (cattle require both a flap and a button tag whereas sheep only use a button or small flap tag).

The RENSPA and CUIG codes are linked to the integrated management system for animal health 

(Sistema Integrado de Gestión en Sanidad Animal – SIGSA), which ensures prompt access to all

information needed in case of any animal health event, such as the number and individual identification of 

animals (for cattle) present in a particular farm at a certain time, all animal movements in and out and 

detailed geo-referenced data that allow for a quick identification of other farm or geographical areas at 

risk of any possible transmission of a reportable disease. All cattle and sheep movements are individually 

authorized and registered by the SIGSA through the issuing of the electronic animal movement permit 

(Documento de tránsito electrónico or DT-e), which must accompany all cattle and sheep that are moved 

in Argentina. The owner can request a DT-e either electronically or by going to the local office. 

In 2007, Argentina instituted a compulsory cattle identification program, requiring that all calves born 

after September 2007 carry official tags (Resolution 754/2006). Resolution 563/2012 requires that 
54

bovines from the older age groups be individually identified. At the time of the 2013 site visit, SENASA 

reported that the entire Argentine herd was individually identified. Individual identification of bovines is 

unique and permanent. The number of tags needed is requested by the animal owner and is crosschecked 

at the local office to the inventory in the SIGSA. The owner is responsible for applying the tags and then 

notifying the local office as to which tags have been used. The color of tags issued to cattle holders is 

determined by the FMD status of the region in which the cattle reside. Green tags are used in regions that 

are FMD-free without vaccination, yellow for regions that are FMD-free with vaccination, red in buffer 

areas, and blue tags are used for tag replacement purposes only.

Figure 16 shows the IDs used for bovine:

Figure 16. Bovine Identification Example

Left ear Right ear

For sheep, individual identification is not required; however, in the event the farm is approved for export 

to the EU, premises identification is required, either by eartag, which includes the CUIG number of the 

farm, or ear notch. The eartag color and shape may be selected by the farmer (the color is not specific to 

the FMD status of the region as in cattle). Ear notches are controlled by and registered with SENASA to 

ensure that they are unique.

Movement controls within Argentina

A movement permit (DT-e) is required when animals go to slaughter, go to market, cross provincial lines,

are exported internationally, or are moved from one farm to another. These permits are required to 

establish that the farm of origin is registered so that tracing can be conducted quickly if necessary. The 

identification numbers of both the premises of origin and the premises of destination must be recorded on 

the DT-e. Permit applications are checked against farm inventory in the SIGSA database. Thus, if a 

registered farm attempts to ship more animals than are recorded in the inventory, the discrepancy is noted 

and the permit application is denied. The number of animals and species are recorded on the permit, the 

information is entered into the database, and the premises’ inventory is updated. In addition, in order to 

allow the movement of animals, farms must comply with FMD vaccination campaign provisions. In the 

event the farm missed the scheduled vaccination, the local SENASA office will not issue the DT-e for the 

animals from that particular farm. The teams that visited Argentina in 2005 and 2013 verified that the DTe could only be issued if the information regarding FMD vaccinations was recorded in the RENSPA. 
55

The local SENASA office issues a DT-e to keep track of all animal movements off a farm. A separate

movement permit, a provincial transit certificate or guia is issued by the Provincial Authority to validate 

ownership and identification of the animals. There is no charge for work done at the control posts (except 

for the spraying done at points of first entry into Patagonia North A). There are automatic sprayers at all 

commercial entry points and handheld sprayers at others. Currently, there is a charge for the DT-e (one

Argentine peso, which is equivalent to $0.5 U.S. dollars). The province charges for the guia, which 

includes a fee that is then used for agricultural projects in the province (e.g., herd improvement) and 

funding for the guia issuing offices. There is also a fee per kilo of wool shipped that is collected by the 

province and used the same way. It is only the fruit and vegetable industry that funds FUNBAPA via fees 

collected for spraying at the border and for cargo per ton shipped. The animal industry funds go to the 

province, except for the vaccination programs where the farmers must pay for the FMD vaccine and the 

brucellosis vaccine [20].

Movements to slaughter are carried out under the conditions established by SENASA Resolution 178/01. 

This resolution requires that livestock movements be accompanied by a DT-e and the pertinent livestock 

guia, have visible identification marks, and be transported in a vehicle approved by SENASA with a 

certificate accrediting washing and disinfection of the transport vehicle before loading and seals on each 

of the vehicle doors. It also establishes joint liability among the official staff that issues the health 

certificate, the owners or persons responsible for the animals, the shippers, and the slaughter plants [11, 

18, 40][83].

If animals are going to slaughter for domestic consumption, the veterinary inspection is limited to the 

ante-mortem inspection at the slaughter facility. If the carcasses are going to be exported to the EU, the 

local SENASA veterinarian goes to the farm and seals the transportation vehicle, which is later opened by 

the veterinarian responsible for the ante-mortem inspection at the slaughter facility [11, 13, 20, 31, 32].

When animals are shipped from farm-to-farm, the DT-e must be returned within five days to the local 

office of destination, who in turn contacts the local office of origin to notify them of the shipment arrival

(http://www.senasa.gov.ar/Archivos/File/File1528-Anexo%20356-08.pdf). 

All vehicles carrying commercial shipments must also be registered with and approved by SENASA and 

issued a number. Former SENASA Resolution No. 809/81 establishes the mandatory washing and 

disinfection of all livestock vehicles (empty or containing animals) that transport livestock within the 

country. Typically, the number issued by SENASA is painted on the trucks, and the driver must show 

proof of the authenticity and validity of that number (Figure 17). Trucks must be cleaned and disinfected 

before every transportation and must show a proof of truck disinfection in the form of a bill issued by a 

SENASA-approved facility [20]. There is only one bill per movement. No dirty animal trucks are allowed 

on the road or they will be cited. Disinfection is carried out in all freight transports including farm 

machinery and is performed at random in automobiles at all entrance points into the country and into the 

free areas where vaccination is not practiced. These points are approved by SENASA and are located at 

certain risk borders [11, 18, 40].
56

Figure 17. Number issued by SENASA after disinfection of trucks

Transport washers must be approved by SENASA and must use products specific for veterinary use and 

approved by SENASA. The washing and disinfection tasks are performed by official staff or staff hired 

by SENASA using motor-propulsion machinery or sprinkler equipment and products approved for 

vehicular disinfection [18].

Livestock market

The APHIS site visit team visited the Mercado de Liniers in 2005. It is the largest cattle market in Buenos 

Aires. It handles 55 percent of the animals slaughtered in the province and 20 percent of the animals 

slaughtered in the country. Market officials estimated that 48,000 animals are sold per week and 200,000 

per month. The facility handled 2.3 million animals the preceding year. It handles only animals intended 

for domestic consumption and canned products that are not intended for export to the EU. Animals 

slaughtered for consumption in the EU go directly to slaughter.

Four full-time SENASA veterinarians and 13 technicians work at the facility. SENASA personnel work 

in three teams, each of which is headed by a veterinarian. The teams focus on animal/cattle health, horse 

health, and biosecurity. The team for animal health checks and issues DT-es, conducts clinical 

observations and epidemiological investigations, and checks the destination. This information goes with 

the truck to the slaughterhouse. There is a quarantine station on the grounds for animals displaying 

suspicious clinical signs of disease. No animals were in the facility when the APHIS team visited.

The horse health unit is responsible for the status of the 400 horses on the facility. The biosecurity unit 

supervises unloading, seals, cleaning and disinfection of trucks, and approval of trucks. 
57

The facility is owned by the Secretariat of Agriculture. The corporation has a concession, and 

management is privatized. Dealers and stakeholders in the corporation are authorized by the Secretariat 

and meet special requirements to operate.

The auction is held from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. The market has 32 scales that operate simultaneously. 

SENASA and market officials check animal health and the DT-e when trucks arrive. Animals are moved 

into the corral section where the dealers grade and classify the animals. The sale is recorded when animals 

are weighed after the sale. Once the animals are sold, another DT-e is issued. Animals are reloaded on 

trucks that have been cleaned and disinfected on the premises. SENASA officials check the seals on 

incoming and outgoing vehicles. The DT-e for the departing shipments includes slaughterhouse 

identification number, the brands of the animals shipped, and the name of the owner.

A computerized system, in use at the market since 1992, ensures traceability from field to slaughter. It 

contains detailed, up-to-the minute real-time sale records that include the guia (owner identification), 

license number of shipper, number of animals shipped, DT-e information, corral number, RENSPA 

number, lot identification number, scale number, and other information. This information is posted 

automatically and immediately on the Internet at the time of sale (www.mercadodeliniers.com.ar/). The 

information has been available on the Internet since 2001. Records have been maintained since 1995. 

Sales are also broadcast live on television from 6 a.m. to10 a.m.

There is information on file in the computer system on 60,000 brands, although 20,000 to 30,000 of these 

are the most commonly used.

Various types of reports can be extracted from the system, such as the volume of animals shipped from 

each province per day and summaries of the transactions occurring on a daily basis. 

Approximately 55 percent of the slaughterhouses the Mercado de Liniers serves are close to the market. 

Farms providing animals to the market are usually small- and medium-sized premises. 

Beef export process

Domestic consumption of beef is approximately 63 kg per person each year, and it has declined in recent 

years. Amounts of beef that Argentina would like to consider exporting into the United States are shown 

in Table 8 [52].

Table 8: Amount of beef that Argentina is considering for export to the United States

Description Lowest Most likely Highest Source

Bovine meat 

expected to be 

exported into U.S.

16,000 Tn 20,000 Tn 24,000 Tn GRUPO ABC Consorcio. Cámara 

de Exportadores

In addition to requirements for movement to slaughter established by Resolution 178/01 and the National 

mandatory Animal Identification System described on Section I, there is a mandatory system called 

“Identification System for Bovine Cattle intended for Export,” created by SENASA Resolution 15/2003

for bovine species. All the farms registered in the “Registry of Rural Establishments Supplying Livestock 

for Slaughter for Export” use this system. It also applies to establishments registered to fatten bovines that 

are intended for slaughter for export. “Rural Establishments of Origin” are registered as premises that 

produce and raise cattle that eventually go to the Establishments for Slaughter for Export.
58

Animals are transported in special vehicles for transport only. The vehicles must comply with SENASA 

Resolution 97/99, which requires approval of the vehicle by SENASA and compliance with SENASA 

Resolution 809/82 which prescribes hygiene and sanitation requirements.

Farms must be registered and have a RENSPA number to market or move animals. Shipment of animals 

to any destination requires a DT-e and a guia that is issued by provincial authorities. The local SENASA 

offices keep a record of the movements of susceptible animals and report this information on a monthly 

basis to the statistics unit of DNSA, the Technical Management Unit, and the CCFyC.

There are 185 slaughter plants approved by SENASA in the region north of the 42nd parallel that comply 

with the regulations in force established by SENASA. All plants approved by SENASA are federally 

inspected. Fifty-two eligible plants are certified to export meat to the United States [53].

The procedures to approve plants for export are regulated by SAGPyA Resolution 310/04, which updates 

the requirements of Decree 4238/68 and other previously abolished standards. The facility must first be 

registered on a list of establishments authorized to export. Then the Bureau of Supervision of Products of 

Animal Origin has to carry out an assessment of compliance with building, operative and documentary 

requirements, in accordance with a procedures initiative. It must also be verified that the requirements of 

the country of destination and the National Bureau of Agricultural and Livestock Trade Control (an 

agency of the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food) have been met.

The following parameters are taken into account for the evaluation of slaughter plants that wish to export 

their products:

 Capacity of pens at the export area;

 Daily slaughter numbers intended for export;

 Slaughter capacity (animal/hour);

 Capacity of the maturations chambers, if pertinent; and

 Capacity of carcasses that can be introduced into chambers intended for maturation, complying 

with the following items in accordance with Decree 4238/68:

o Prohibition of commingling of carcasses coming from areas of different sanitary 

conditions, and

o Presence of viable technical methods to register environmental temperature in the 

maturation chambers.

The slaughter establishments must be approved for the activity appropriate to the requested destination 

and a predetermined volume of production. The establishment must document procedures to identify and 

trace the products to be exported and provide the Service of Veterinary Inspection an updated list of 

livestock suppliers. They must not have any infringements of the Residues and Food Hygiene Plan and 

must correct any problems that were observed by auditors of foreign sanitary authorities. Documentary 

proof of compliance with all the requirements of the country of destination must be provided.

According to the regulations, by the authority of Decree 4238/68, biosecurity controls in all the slaughter 

facilities approved by SENASA are the following:

 Pens: Animals are kept within pens and cannot go out of the slaughtering plant once they enter 

the premises.
59

 Effluent treatment: All effluents from the coldstore (pens, slaughter yard, and water used in all 

the processes) are treated by separating solids, fats, liquids, and chlorinates out before releasing 

them to the general sewage system.

 Sanitary complex: Effluents from the sanitary complex are individually treated by disinfection 

before dumping them with the rest of the common, treated effluents. Fallen animals are 

slaughtered at the emergency yard and their meat and products are not used for export. Dead 

animals are treated at the necropsy digester after diagnosis, including the skin.

 Raw slaughter wastes: Wastes are sent to processing plants with thermal treatments for nonedible 

uses in closed vehicles approved for the purpose. They may be processed at the same plant in 

melters or digesters with thermal treatment to make nonedible byproducts.

 Slaughter pathology wastes: Wastes are processed in digesters with pressurized steam or in 

melters to obtain by-products.

Two slaughter facilities, visited during the 2005 APHIS site visit to Argentina, buy animals from regional 

farms and the livestock market. One of the plants located in La Plata (50 km from Buenos Aires) 

processes approximately 240,000 head per year (700 to 800 per day). The slaughterhouse was established 

in the 1960s. The plant has 600 employees working in different shifts. The other slaughterhouse visited,

located in Rosario (Santa Fe province), processes over 1,600 animals a day and has 1,000 employees. 

Both plants are approved for export to the EU, Asia, Africa, and the United States. The 2009 site visit 

visited a slaughter facility in Puerto Madryn which has been exporting sheep to MERCOSUR member 

nations and other countries, and since 2004 to the EU. The SENASA official at the plant checks the DT-e, 

guia number, seal integrity, and information; verifies that ear notches match the CUIG on the DT-e; and 

checks transporter information including the truck cleaning and disinfecting certificate. Animals for EU 

export are also eartagged prior to slaughter with a button tag bearing the unique farm ID number. In 

2013, the APHIS team visited two other slaughter facilities located in the province of Buenos Aires. All 

the facilities visited were exporting beef to the EU following EU specific requirments (e.g, pH less than 

6.0 and 24 hours maturation process) 

As observed during the 2005 and 2013 visits, when a shipment arrives, the transport vehicles are washed 

and sanitized. The shipper must produce documents, such as the DT-e and guia, that have to be signed by 

the local official veterinarians, or the shipment is not unloaded. The local SENASA office that issued the 

DT-e is contacted when the animals arrive. At arrival, animals are separated into two different groups, 

depending on whether the shipment originated at the farm or at the livestock market since the EU does not 

allow the export of animals that pass though the livestock market. 

Upon arrival at the plant, each animal lot is given a lot number that is carried through the slaughtering and 

quartering process. Slaughter labels and quartering labels are linked to each other and detail the following 

information: herd number, date of slaughter, weight of cut, type of animal, destination (domestic or 

export) and other details. The tags are prepared after the process and attached to the case and the 

corresponding tag indicating: the date of slaughter, date of preparation, lot number, expiration date, type 

of cut, and weight of the product. A SENASA official does the ante-mortem inspection and any sick 

animals are placed in an isolation pen. Animals from the same ranch are all placed in the same pen. The 

number of animals and other information are recorded on a card which is kept in the office. A postmortem on any animals that die is performed in a nearby necropsy room.

APHIS site visit teams pay particular attention to the following critical control points for FMD: (1) antemortem inspection for clinical signs of FMD, (2) post-mortem inspection for lesions of FMD, (3) 

maturation procedure, (4) deboning, and(5) removal of lymph nodes. 
60

(1) Ante-mortem inspection: The animals receive their first inspection upon arrival by a SENASA 

technician/inspector who checks the paper work (DT-e), unloads the trucks, and performs a physical 

inspection. If a truck arrives with no paperwork, it cannot be unloaded. If anything unusual is noted, the 

animals are moved to the observation corral for the veterinarian to perform a clinical exam.

The Federal veterinarian performs the ante-mortem inspections. Observations are registered on an antemortem inspection card that contains basic information on the animals in each pen. Animals with disease 

symptoms are separated into observation pens for a closer examination. Holding pens contain animals 

from one owner and farm, and multiple pens may contain animals from one owner. The animals are 

grouped into lots.

(2) Post-mortem inspection: After animals are killed, a SENASA inspector examines the carcass and 

organs. Post-mortem inspection includes inspection of the hooves, the head, associated organs, and 

lymph nodes. The slaughter operator’s technicians also perform post-mortem inspections. When a lesion 

is found, the technician at the particular station stops the line. The SENASA field veterinarian then 

investigates more closely. In particular for FMD, the technicians specifically check the feet, muzzle, and 

tongue for vesicular lesions. If the technicians have any doubts, they notify the veterinarian immediately. 

The veterinarians train technicians to perform these inspections. 

(3) Deboning: Deboning consists of removal of bone and blood clots. It is carried out under supervision 

of the quality control personnel. All products must pass through the quality control point where a score of 

acceptability is assigned. 

(4) Maturation and pH testing: The carcasses are matured for a minimum of 24 hours at a temperature of 

2 to 10C. Temperature is measured when the first carcass enters the cooler and again after the last 

carcass enters and doors are closed. After 25 hours, technicians measure the pH of the meat at one point 

in the loin muscles in each half of the carcass. In the event the pH is above 5.9, the carcass is separated 

from the export beef and only used for domestic consumption (as per EU requirement). The facilities 

visited by the APHIS site visit team have the capacity to segregate and test pH to ensure that all carcasses 

that would be destined for exports meet the requirements of the importing country (e.g., less than 6.0 for 

the EU and the United States). 

Conclusions

The livestock industry in Argentina appears to be well organized, committed to the production of quality 

products, and aware of necessary biosecurity precautions. APHIS considers the biosecurity measures and 

controls at major production facilities to be effective in the prevention of FMD outbreaks. There appears 

to be a high level of awareness and compliance with these measures at large livestock producers and

slaughter facilities. Processing facilities are under adequate official control and inspection. 

APHIS concluded that the larger commercial farm-operations are likely to be the source of beef exports 

from the export region. Per APHIS regulations, imported meat or other animal product must have been 

been processed, stored, and transported to the means of conveyance that will bring the article to the 

United States in a manner to preclude its being commingled or otherwise in contact with meat or other 

animal products from regions that have not been authorized by APHIS to export such products to the 

United States. Therefore, cattle could not go directly from Argentina livestock markets (where there 

would be a risk of such commingling) to slaughter, which is the means by which most smaller 

commercial operations in Argentina sell their cattle. In that regard, APHIS considers the livestock market 

system in Argentina to be well organized and tightly controlled by the official service. APHIS further 

concluded that the Argentina animal identification system is operational and adequate.
61

APHIS concluded that adequate controls and inspection measures exist at slaughter facilities. In that 

regard, ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections are carried out satisfactorily. APHIS verified pH 

controls, maturation, and deboning procedures at the plants, which export to the EU and other countries. 

APHIS concluded that after maturation, the facilities have the capacity to segregate and test pH, to ensure 

that all carcasses that would be destined to the United States would have a pH below 6.0. If greater, the 

slaughter facilities are able to divert the carcasses to local consumption. APHIS examined maturation 

records and verified actual rejected and approved seals. 

APHIS concluded that Argentina has adequate control of inspection activities in slaughter plants and can 

certify compliance with USDA import requirements to import matured, deboned beef.

9. The type and extent of disease surveillance in Argentina

Documenting a surveillance system sufficient to ensure early detection of FMD is essential for the 

assessment of risk. Argentina’s surveillance system is a combination of both active surveillance 

(including ongoing laboratory-based testing) and passive surveillance (reporting and/or testing of animals 

with clinical signs of disease). This section explains the characteristics of the FMD surveillance program 

in place in Argentina2. 

Objective of surveillance

The primary objective of all of Argentina’s FMD epidemiological surveillance activities since the July 

2000 epidemic has been to search for and eradicate FMD. This is done in accordance with the country’s 

National FMD Eradication Plan, of which serological sampling has been an integral part [30, 90]. 

SENASA conducted repeated countrywide serological samplings to monitor the disease during the 

2000/2001 outbreaks, and subsequent country wide serological samplings have been conducted to 

measure the progress of the National FMD Eradication Plan[26, 27][88]. In particular, serological 

sampling in Argentina is conducted for the following reasons:

 To detect viral activity (or infection), and

 To estimate population immunity given by vaccination against FMD where vaccination is 

practiced.

FMD surveillance activities in Argentina may be broadly characterized as passive and active surveillance. 

These two methods work in a complementary fashion resulting in efficient and effective surveillance. 

Passive surveillance gathers qualitative information about the disease and active surveillance gathers 

quantitative data. 

Passive surveillance

Passive surveillance is accomplished by a wide variety of activities in Argentina. The most salient feature 

of passive surveillance is the education and involvement of the entire community to be watching for any 

 

2 The Epidemiology and Risk Analysis Unit of SENASA’s National Animal Health Directorate is responsible for 

designing the sampling and evaluating the results. It collaborates with and seeks technical assistance from the 

Epidemiology Advisory Commission, whose members are experts from SENASA, the National Farm Technology 

Institute, the Animal Virology Centre of the National Council for Technical and Scientific Research, and schools of 

veterinary sciences. Samples are collected by local SENASA veterinarians and specimens are processed by the 

Animal Department of the Official Laboratory and Technical Control Directorate of SENASA (Ref: Annex

IV_Muestreo 2004 end.pdf).
62

suspicion of FMD. Observations and qualitative information gathered under the passive surveillance 

effort are an integral part of the overall surveillance efforts in Argentina. Information from passive 

surveillance activities is utilized effectively in the national serological sampling design to help achieve 

better stratification and to concentrate sampling effort where needed the most (i.e., targeted sampling). 

Passive surveillance and follow-up efforts are further described under Factor 11 (Policies and 

infrastructure for animal disease control in the region) below.

Active surveillance

Active surveillance in Argentina primarily constitutes sampling of animals for serological testing. This

sampling is conducted under the National FMD Eradication Plan (see Factor 11—Policies and 

infrastructure for animal disease control in the region). The design consists of a two-stage sampling 

strategy, at the herd level and the individual animal level, within each region (regions are based on the 

number and type of herds and animals and the disease history of each zones).

As mentioned earlier, northern Argentina vaccinates cattle for FMD, and, in addition to the surveillance 

sampling described above, SENASA also conducts annual nation-wide serological samplings to estimate 

the immunity offered by the FMD vaccine. These samplings, together with other surveillance activities, 

serve to assess the epidemiological status of FMD in the country and collect specific indicators on the 

evolution of the disease. 

Argentina has been conducting serological surveillance on a yearly basis since 2001, with a frequency of 

at least once a year. Additionally, other surveillance studies are conducted frequently for various 

purposes. Examples of such studies include assessing immunity levels in the young vaccinated cattle 

population, or in sheep and goats in areas that do not vaccinate for FMD, or for animal movements out of 

the Cordon Fronterizo bordering Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil. During the 2012 FMD outbreak in 

Paraguay, Argentina also conducted intensive surveillance in the six border provinces. These studies are 

detailed below.

Description of the sampling design

The random selection of animals for serological testing is conducted according to a standard stratified 

two-stage probabilistic design. Under this design, the country — which has a surface of 2,780,199 km2

and 270,000 establishments with a population of 52.5 million bovines and 13.8 million sheep — is first 

divided into zones and subzones (i.e., strata) according to several factors such as livestock production 

systems and animal movement patterns, geographical and climatic conditions, and epidemiological 

characteristics with respect to the history of disease in the region and to the vaccination program (see 

Figure 18 below). From each zone, herds (establishments) are randomly selected at the first stage of 

sampling, and animals within herds are then randomly selected at the second stage of sampling. The 

design is flexible enough to permit changes and adjustments to target high-risk areas based on 

epidemiological and other relevant considerations at the time of sampling and the surveillance goals. 

APHIS considers Argentina’s sampling design to be appropriate, efficient, and scientifically sound.
63

Figure 18: Epidemiological zoning of Argentina for the purpose of serological sampling

Determining sample size3

The number of herds to be selected in each region (stratum) at the first stage of sampling is determined 

according to the following standard statistical formula [54]:

 

3 Sample sizerefers to the number of herds nh and the number of animals within herds nw-h to be selected for 

serological sampling in each region in a given sampling year. These are determined according to formulae (1.1) and 

(1.2), respectively.
64

Similarly, the number of animals to be selected from each of the selected herds is determined according to

the following standard statistical formula [81]:

where

Number of animals to be selected from each of the selected herds

Level of confidence for the detection of at least one positive animal

 within the selected herd 

w h h

w h

w

n n

D

g

-

-

Number of infected animals within the selected herd (i.e., within-herd

 prevalence)

Average number of animals within a herd (i.e., average herd size).

h

Nw h

-

-

Changes in serological sampling from year to year

The objectives, approaches, and intensity of serological sampling in Argentina might change slightly from 

year to year but are otherwise the same. In prior years, the main objective of surveillance was to estimate 

the prevalence of the FMD virus in different regions of the country,

4

and to estimate the level of 

immunity in the national bovine population of herds with the application of the systematic vaccination for 

each region.

5 Since the last outbreak occurred in 2006, the surveillance objectives have been modified to 

serve the purpose of early detection of FMDV if it were to be present in the country, and for continuing to 

evaluate population immunity in areas that vaccinate. 

The sampling approach under the current surveillance objectives remains the same. The random selection 

of animals is always conducted in two stages in accordance with the national sampling design described 

above. The country is divided into different regions (strata) from which herds are selected at the first 

sampling stage, after which individual animals from within the selected herds are selected for sampling. 

Both targeted and random samplings may be conducted. 

For early detection of FMDV, a herd prevalence of 5 percent and a statistical confidence level of 95

percent were typically assumed each year through 2010. To determine the population immunity level, a 

prevalence (P) of protected bovines of 75 percent was assumed, with an acceptable error of six percent

and a statistical confidence level of 95 percent. These were the typical assumptions each year in each 

region. Similarly, the number of animals to be selected from within a selected herd was determined for 

each region using formula (2) above. For the purpose of determining the within-herd sample size, the 

 

4 Viral activities were measured in susceptible animals that were recently and/or previously infected with the FMD 

virus, as well as in vaccinated animals. Different species were sampled, including sheep, which were not vaccinated; 

and bovine, stratified in animals from 1 to 2 years old and animals older than 2 years.

5 The samples from the premises that were completely negative to the detection of viral activity were used in order 

to carry out a subsampling to determine seroprotection levels in the population.
65

typical assumptions were two percent within-herd prevalence and a 95 percent statistical confidence. 

Finally, each year’s samples from the premises that were completely negative to the detection of viral 

activity were used to estimate the sero-protection levels in the population. The statistical design typically 

required that at least 80 establishments be sampled in each region and approximately 1200 samples be 

taken. This was done each year (approximately) by analyzing 15 bovine sera from each of the 80 

establishments (960 from bovines aged one to two years and 240 of bovines older than two years). All of 

the sampled farms had complied with both vaccination campaigns corresponding to the current year, 

established by the National FMD Eradication Plan, with at least 30 days from the last vaccination.
66

The list of herds, as well as all livestock census data in Argentina, are compiled and updated by 

RENSPA. Table 13 shows some of the demographic information and livestock figures used to 

construct sampling.

Table 9: Livestock figures used to construct sampling lists.

Province Flocks Total 

Bovine

Total 

Sheep

Total 

Swine

Total 

Goats

BUENOS AIRES 61,742 21,050,731 1,194,435 532,465 9,620

CORDOBA 29,444 6,508,375 98,619 444,343 45,089

ENTRE RIOS 39,572 4,697,308 35,8300 42,155 3,277

LA PAMPA 9,351 3,342,981 12,8724 95,093 25,377

SANTA FE 30,252 6,968,040 55,738 695,451 47,635

CATAMARCA 3,690 154,575 11,388 3,159 54,695

JUJUY 4,032 88,918 473,463 6,518 106,126

LA RIOJA 3,092 278,874 8,209 26,658 142,781

SALTA 3,037 447,933 46,725 34,830 70,899

SANTIAGO DEL 

ESTERO 9,394 1,179,385 99,813 134,939 278,428

TUCUMAN 6,013 125,361 7,009 14,102 7,609

CORRIENTES 10,047 4,480,962 1,540,590 18,956 5,314

CHACO 10,911 1,640,889 284,351 59,811 129,262

FORMOSA 8,945 1,565,381 60,619 83,805 155,562

MISIONES 26,252 315,442 6,792 68,619 2,646

MENDOZA 894 137,378 8,680 4,529 192,020

SAN JUAN 733 30,727 0 2,811 30,639

SAN LUIS 5,747 1,523,289 43,225 21,327 38,940

NEUQUEN 3,757 133,758 194,007 6,039 568,500

RIO NEGRO 5,306 697,501 1,728,045 7,668 176,353

CHUBUT 4,095 188,347 4,633,518 10,818 140,364

SANTA CRUZ 1,567 46,798 2,333,526 1,481 1,250

TIERRA DEL FUEGO 87 30,815 520,403 432 0

Total 276,306 55,556,155 10,982,250 2,314,096 2,231,136

 
67

Serology results

Compliance with sampling

In some regions, the total number of samples may not be collected for the following reasons:

 Problems submitting the samples (e.g., spills, broken tests tubes, storage 

problems, etc), 

and

 Samples not fit for testing (e.g., hemolysis).

Table 10 demonstrates compliance with sampling by region.

Table 10: Compliance with sampling for viral activity during 2004 and 2005*

Region Farm 

Prevalence 

%

Holdings 

required to 

be sampled

Holdings 

sampled

Percent 

sampled

Species

Central –

Mesopotamia

1 372 (313) 381 102.4 Bovine

Fattening 1 335(313) 326 97.3 Bovine

Border 1 459 (313) 456 99.3 Bovine

NOA – Cuyo 1 459 (300) 455 99.1 Bovine

Patagonia 

North A

1 330 (313) 329 99.7 Bovine

Patagonia 

South and 

North B

1 459(313) 459 100 Bovine/sheep/goat

Total 2414(1,865) 2406 99.6

*(2005)

Table 11 shows the results of the tests to detect antibodies against nonstructural proteins in 

bovine category 1 (six to 12 month of age) and category 2 (12 to 24 month of age) per region 

during 2004.

Table 11: Results of tests to detect antibodies against nonstructural proteins in bovines

Region Holdings 

tested

Positive 

holdings 

sampled

Category 1 Category 2

N

N

Positive N

N

Positive

N % N % N %

Central – Mesopotamia 305 10 2.6 2272 2 0.08 1510 11 0.7

Fattening 324 5

1.5 1942 2 0.1 1283 3 0.2

Border 455 8

1.7 2717 15 0.5 1818 3 0.16

NOA – Cuyo 453 5

1.1 2674 2 0.047 1782 3 0.17

North A Patagonia 329 9

2.7 1973 3 0.1 1297 8 0.6
68

Total 1941 37 1.9 11578 24 0.2 7690 23 0.3

All holdings with animals that tested positive in the first sampling were sampled a second time. 

Positive holdings were immediately reported to the Epidemiology Division and the followup was 

based on OIE standards. From each of the holdings with a positive reactor, 60 cattle, and 60 sheep 

or goats were identified by eartags, tested, and retested 21 days later. In addition, other holdings 

within the same area were included in the serological testing. During 2006, there were three

positive bovines aged six to 12 months (two from Central Mesopotamia/Cuyo/NOA and one from 

the fattening area) and seven positive bovines aged 12 to 24 months (three from Central 

Mesopotamia/NOA/Cuyo, three from the fattening area, and one from the border area). Followup 

of the positive cases showed no evidence of clinical disease. In addition, epidemiological surveys 

failed to demonstrate any risk situation that could be associated with FMD. Further, sampling of 

contacts show that from the three cattle that remained reactive, only one maintained the same 

results after the initial sampling. No evidence of viral circulation was found after followup of 

premises with reactive animals. 

Table 12 summarizes the sampling for 2007 to 2008 by region.

Table 12: Sampling to determine viral activity by region, 2007 and 2008.

Zone Year Establishments

Sampled

Bovines

Sampled

Ovines

Sampled

Total Animals 

Sampled

CentralMesopotamia 2007 312 bovine 

222 ovine 8,182 2,183 10,365

2008 300 bovine 

238 ovine 8,028 2,307 10,335

Fattening 2007 281 bovine

148 ovine 5,123 1,218 6,341

2008 338 bovine

144 ovine 8,883 1,398 10,281

Border 2007 290 bovine

23 ovine 7,809 283 8,092

2008 289 bovine

62 ovine 8,530 590 9,120

Frontera 2007 290 bovine

23 ovine 7,811 283 8,094

2008 289 bovine

62 ovine 4,573 590 5,163

Patagonia Norte A 2007 301 bovine

129 ovine 5,471 1,094 6,565

2008 340 bovine

154 ovine 8,688 1,536 10,224

Through 2008, the sample design was determined at the regional level. Beginning in 2009, the 

design is determined at the central SENASA level taking into account regional differences, which 

ensures a more consistent sampling approach. 

In addition to the serological testing, SENASA conducts official inspection of cattle in farms, 

livestock market, and slaughterhouses. The total number of individual bovine and ovine 

inspections reported in 2009 was 31,333,478 [55]. 
69

Population immunity

To evaluate the population immunity, the titre obtained using ELISA LP (ELISA monoclonalbased liquid phase) from each serum sample was classified into low, medium, and high based on 

the percentage protection expectancy (PPE) for each of the serotypes under study. The ranges of 

each category are described in Table 13.

Table 13: Interpretation of the LP ELISA according to percentage protection expectancy

O1 Campos

(titre)

A2001

(titre)

PPE Result

<1.77 <2.1 <75% Low

1.77-1.91 2.1-2.3 75%-85% Medium

>1.91 >2.3 >85% High

Animals with PPE over 75 percent are considered to have adequate protection against FMD.

Results of the 2005 studies showed a PPE with medium-high immunity level for each category, 

zone, and type of virus [27].

Changes in Surveillance Sampling Design, 2011 [91]

In 2011, serological sampling was conducted to demonstrate the absence of disease in the 

Northern region that vaccinates against FMD and the Patagonia region that does not vaccinate. 

The surveillance objectives in the Northern region were to evaluate for presence of antibodies 

against non-structural proteins (NSP) in cattle and against structural proteins (SP) in other FMDsusceptible species, and also to assess the population immunity in the vaccinated region by 

determining presence of antibodies against SP for the types of viruses present in the administered 

vaccines in cattle that had tested negative to NSP. Four zones were established for sampling: 

Zone 1 with the highest bovine population density, Zone 2 which has predominantly extensive 

production systems, Zone 3 which corresponds to Patagonia North A; and Zone 4 which 

comprised the areas without vaccination.

The sampling strategy was designed based on detection of FMD if present at 1% prevalence

among herds and 10% within individuals in the selected herd, with a 95% confidence level. 

Based on the sampling design, a minimum of 313 farms were randomly selected in each zone. In 

Zones 1 to 3, 28 animals were sampled from each farm, 17 of which were from 6-12 months and 

11 were 12-24 months. In addition, samples were collected from 10 sheep and goats between 6-

24 months for each farm that also raised these species. In Zone 4, a total of 28 cattle, sheep or 

goats were sampled from each of 313 farms. 

For Zones 1 to 3, a total of 25,421 cattle (15,360 from 6-12 months old and 10,061 from 12-24 

months) were sampled from 997 farms, while a total of 5,758 sheep and goats were sampled from 

564 farms. No reactors were found among all sheep and goat sampled. Table 14 below shows the 

results for cattle and sheep/goats, respectively. 
70

Table 14. ELISA 3ABC and EITB results from cattle in the areas that vaccinate against 

FMD.

Cattle 6-12 months Cattle 12-24 months

Zone

Number of 

Samples

 

Reactors

Number of 

Samples

Reactors

No.

%

% No.

%

%

1 5794 0

0

0 3743 0

0

0

2 4771 1

0

0.02 3294 4

0

0.12

3 4795 0

0

0 3024 1

0

0.03

Total 15360 1

0

0.01 10061 5

0

0.05

Follow-up activities for all reactors included visits to each of the six premises to collect 

epidemiological information, including animal movements in and out of the farm. 

Complementary serological sampling was conducted on the same animals initially sampled, their 

cohorts, and any unvaccinated sheep or goats if available at the farm or in a neighboring ranch. A 

total of 474 additional samples were collected in the follow-up studies which identified 1 more 

reactor to the ELISA EITB test. Esophageal-pharyngeal fluid (LEP) samples were taken from all 

reactors for Complement Fixation testing (CFT 50 percent) in each of two passages in BHK cell 

culture. Probang sampling was repeated after 21 days. All LEP samples from reactors were 

negative.

Due to the predominance of sheep production operations in Zone 4 (areas that do not vaccinate 

against FMD), the majority of samples were collected from sheep and goats in this area. A total 

of 350 facilities were sampled, 326 of which were primarily sheep/goat operations. Figure 19

shows the geographical distribution of bovine and ovine/caprine farms sampled in Zone 4.
71

Figure 19. Bovine (blue) and Ovine/Caprine (green) premises sampled.

No reactors were found in a total of 9,259 samples tested. 

Other Directed Surveillance Efforts, 2011-2013

In addition to their routine active surveillance, Argentina has conducted additional 

serosurveillance studies to assess viral activity or to estimate herd immunity in different 

subpopulations. 

2012 Studies [92]: Subsequent to the FMD outbreak in Paraguay, an enhanced surveillance effort 

was focused on the Northern provinces with international borders: Salta, Formosa, Corrientes, 

Misiones, Chaco and Jujuy. A two-stage stratified random sampling design was based on a one 

percent prevalence among herds and ten percent prevalence within individual animals in a herd, 

with a 94 percent confidence level. A total of 345 premises were selected and 28 cattle were 

sampled in each premises. Up to ten sheep and goats were also sampled if present on these 

premises. Cattle between 6-12 and 12-24 months of age were sampled, while sheep and goats 

under 24 months were sampled. ELISA 3ABC/EITB was used to detect non-structural proteins in 

cattle, and the liquid-phase ELISA was used to detect antibodies against structural proteins in 

sheep and goats.
72

A total of 8,336 cattle were sampled. Three reactors (0.06 percent) were identified out of the 

4,800 which were in the six to 12 month age grouping; no reactors were found in the 12-24 month 

age group. A total of 1,698 sheep and goats from 183 premises were also sampled with no 

reactors identified. Although the overall percent of reactors (0.03 percent) from all cattle sampled 

was in accordance with the specificity of the diagnostic test used, epidemiological follow-up of 

all reactors and cohorts was conducted, which included serological and LEP (repeated after 21 

days) sampling of all reactors and serological testing of all cohorts. All follow-up tests were 

negative for FMDV.

In a separate enhanced surveillance effort focused on the international border, 100 animal 

movements (transport trucks typically carrying between 40-50 cattle) were sampled to detect viral 

activity and determine the immunity levels for cattle leaving the Cordon Fronterizo. Animals 

moved out of this area are considered high risk and these movements are regulated under 

SENASA Resolution No. 44/11 as described in earlier sections. The objective was to identify 

animals with inadequate protection with 95 percent confidence, so level of protection of animals 

within a single movement grouping was set at 70 percent. Sample size for this objective was set at 

15 animals per transport unit or movement. A second sampling stage was conducted, assuming a 

50 percent protection level. The focus of sampling was young cattle between six to 12 months of 

age destined for slaughter.

A total of 104 transport units of cattle were tested with 1,560 individual animals sampled. Test 

results for FMDV strain immunity showed that 89 percent of the animals tested showed 

protective levels against serotype O (the predominant strain in the Paraguay FMD outbreak), 

while 74 percent and 83 percent were protected against serotype A and C respectively. Five (4.8

percent) out of 104 transport units had insufficient levels of protection. All sera were tested to 

detect circulating virus, with all negative results on ELISA 3ABC/EITB.

Additional immunity studies were also conducted by SENASA in 2012 in the same six provinces. 

A total of 272 farms were randomly selected and a total of 3,521 serum samples from young 

cattle were tested using liquid-phase ELISA for detection of antibodies against structural proteins. 

An Expected Percent of Protection (EPP) of 75 percent was used as a standard for each serotype. 

Cattle in the six to 12 month age category would have likely received only one dose of vaccine, 

while those in the 12-24 month age range would have received more than one dose, resulting in 

higher antibody titers. Results show satisfactory immunity levels conferred by vaccination, 

particularly in the older age grouping.

2013 Serological Survey – Patagonia North A [93]:

This survey was designed to supplement the information needed to apply for recognition of 

Patagonia North A as an FMD free zone without vaccination following the OIE Terrestrial Code

guidelines. Thus the study was designed to demonstrate the absence of FMDV in the provinces of 

Rio Negro, Buenos Aires and Neuquen. Indicators of infection were evaluated by testing for 

presence of antibodies against non-structural proteins in cattle and against structural proteins 

(A24/Cruzeiro and O1/Campos) in pigs. 

The last vaccination campaign in this area was held in late 2012 with a final date for complete 

cessation of vaccination set on March 4, 2013. Subsequently, the surveillance strategy for this 

area, for which annual surveillance has occurred since 2001, was revised to a risk-based sampling 

approach. Factors considered included proximity to waterways, recent herd introductions, and 

proximity to slaughterhouses and landfills. This surveillance effort, designed to detect FMDV if 

present in the Patagonia North A area, focused on young cattle aged six to 12 months. Fifteen 

animals in that age category were sampled in each facility. If the farm did not have fifteen cattle 
73

between six to 12 months of age, cattle up to 24 months were sampled. A total of 247 cattle 

establishments and of 3,674 animals were sampled, the majority (3,228) of which were in the six 

to 12 month age category.

Two complementary studies were conducted involving swine and wild boars. In the serological 

study conducted in swine, a total of 462 samples were collected from 76 establishments in the 

Patagonia North A area. The wildlife surveillance consisted of a total of 21 samples. All porcine 

samples were tested using the LF ELISA test.

All cattle samples were analyzed using the ELISA 3ABC and EITB tests, while all porcine 

samples were tested using LF ELISA. No reactors were identified in any of the samples collected.

2013 Ongoing Surveillance Efforts [94]:

Following an audit by the European Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) conducted 

in 2013, and in collaboration with external animal health experts, Argentina revised its

surveillance sampling design, focusing on the effectiveness of various vaccination campaign 

plans as implemented by the local offices. The surveillance objectives to estimate herd immunity 

of the vaccinated cattle population and to demonstrate the absence of FMDV circulation remain 

basically unchanged from previous recent years. The sampling frame included all regions that 

conduct vaccination campaigns twice annually. Three-stage random sampling consisted of: 

 identifying and selecting the different vaccination campaign plans at the local level; 

 selecting establishments within each of the local units of consideration; and 

 selecting animals to be sampled within each selected establishment. 

Thirty three establishments were randomly selected in 2013 for each type of vaccination plan 

under evaluation. A minimum of 13 samples are to be taken in each establishment, or ten cattle 

between six to 12 months of age and three cattle between 12-24 months of age. A total number of 

429 samples are expected to be collected for each vaccination plan. A total of 85 vaccination 

plans are under evaluation in this study. Table 15 details the number of vaccination plans, farms, 

and samples to be collected in each province under this sampling design.

Table 15. Sampling Design for 2013 Surveillance Study to evaluate implementation 

of the National Vaccination Plan at the local level.1

1The first column represents the coordinating region under which the different vaccination plans are 

implemented. The second column lists the number of operational vaccination plans in that area. The third 

and fourth columns list the number of farms to be sampled and the number of samples to be collected from 

individual animals.

Planes Establecimientos muestras 

Buenos Aires Norte 15 495 6.435 

Buenos Aires Sur 9 297 3.861 

Chaco -Formosa 11 363 4.719 

Cordoba 14 462 6.006 

Corrientes-Misiones 8 264 3.432 

Entre Rios 4 132 1.716 

La Pampa-San Luis 11 363 4.719 

Metropolitana 1 33 429 

Noa Sur 5 165 2.145 

Santa Fe 7 231 3.003 

TOTAL 85 2.805 36.465 

Coordinación Regional 

Tematica de Sanidad 

Animal

cantidad 
74

At the time of APHIS’ November 2013 site visit, over 50 percent of samples had already been 

collected with only two reactors identified. On completion of the study, SENASA expects to be 

able to compare effectiveness of operational implementation of the National Vaccination plan at 

the local level.

Conclusions

APHIS believes that the design under which serological sampling is conducted in Argentina is 

both valid and efficient and the sampling coverage is adequate. APHIS also considers that the 

serological sampling conducted in Argentina under the national serological sampling plan since 

the July 2000 outbreak is adequate to detect disease and identify and measure viral activity (if 

any) in the area. Furthermore, APHIS considers the levels of immunity adequate to stop viral 

circulation if the virus were to be introduced in the susceptible population. 

10. Diagnostic laboratory capacity

A country’s laboratory system, including test procedures for the disease(s) under evaluation, 

quality assurance measures, and procedures for official oversight, must be clearly documented to 

provide confidence in disease surveillance activities and the ability to quickly detect and confirm 

a disease outbreak. This section explains the laboratory capabilities of Argentina in reference to 

the diagnosis and detection of FMD.

In Argentina, SENASA has one diagnostic laboratory in Buenos Aires with a biosafety-level 

(BSL) NBS3 Ag (equivalent to BSL-3) that was approved in 1997. This SENASA central 

laboratory is authorized to manipulate FMD virus and other microorganisms that must be handled 

in BSL-3 facilities or lower status. The laboratory meets SENASA and OIE biosafety 

requirements. There are no other official or private laboratories that are authorized to perform 

FMD diagnostic and surveillance techniques. SENASA Resolution 219/95 does allow 

accreditation of private laboratories by SENASA to produce FMD vaccines [11, 18].

In 2000, the SENASA central laboratory was audited by inspectors from the EU and the Pan 

American FMD Center, among others. The scope of the audits included working procedures, 

quality programs, and biosafety conditions, and the findings were satisfactory. The Argentinian 

biosafety requirements to manipulate the FMD virus are stated in former SENASA Resolution 

219/95.

The staff of the SENASA central laboratory is trained in manipulating and diagnosing the FMD 

virus. Training includes specific laboratory techniques, biosecurity standards and quality, and 

laboratory good practice standards. The Virology Advisory Committee was established in 1992

with membership including professionals from the INTA and the Animal Virology Center 

(CEVAN) of the National Council for Technical and Scientific Research. The Advisory 

Committee provides support to SENASA with the best technical and human resources in the 

country.

The APHIS site visit team met with the director of the DILACOT, Dr. Veronica Leedham;

director of the general department of animal lab, Dr. Osvaldo Periolo; and the head of FMD 

section, Dr. Eduardo Maradei at the SENASA central laboratory in Buenos Aires on 

December 1, 2003. Below are some observations from the visit [31][84,85].
75

I. Laboratory structure and organization

The DILACOT (Figure 20) operates the National Reference Laboratory for food safety and 

animal and plant health. The General Department of Animal Laboratory includes the Department 

of Bacteriology, Department of FMD Virology, Chemistry and Chemical Resources, and 

Department of Food Products and Related Products. The Department of FMD Virology consists 

of Diagnostic Virology, Diagnostic Serology, Seroepidemiology, and Vaccine Control and 

Experimental Farm. The advisory board for Virology includes SENASA, INTA, and CEVAN 

laboratories. The FMD laboratory within the Department of FMD Virology, is staffed with 16 

professionals (12 veterinarians, 11 doctorates or maters in sciences, one biologist, one chemist, 

one geneticist, and one engineer), 13 technicians, five administrative, and three cleaning 

personnel. A list of training activities for DILAB staff has been provided during the site visits, 

including the latest activities in 2013 [84].

The laboratory uses an information management system (LIMS) for recoding samples coming in 

and for typing laboratory results that go out to the epidemiologists. The site review team did not 

see the actual worksheets for every test being run, but the site visit review team in June 2003 saw 

similar worksheets in the poultry laboratory. The system appeared effective and adequate for 

storing data and efficient in retrieval of data. The staff was very capable in managing the system.

Figure 20: Functional organization chart of SENASA laboratory.

II. National Reference Laboratory missions

The main functions of the National Reference Laboratory are to establish protocols and validate 

reference assays for disease control dictated by SENASA, perform quality control testing on 

FMD vaccines produced by the manufacturers, serve as a reference laboratory in confirming 
76

positive cases, apply biosafety standards set by SENASA, and set forth the sampling strategy for 

disease control and surveillance. 

In 2006, the laboratory was accredited by the Argentine Accreditation Organization under 

international standards ISO 17025. The first audit occurred in November 2004. The food safety 

department (residues and food control) as well as the biological departments (analytical methods) 

for the different diseases have also been accredited. 

In addition, DILAB inspects and certifies the biosafety of the FMD vaccine manufacturers in 

Argentina. DILAB personnel perform on-site inspections of biologics manufacturing annually. 

They grant the licenses for the manufacturing of biological products. DILAB tests each serial of 

FMD vaccine for safety, potency and specificity. SENASA issues the Argentinian import and 

export permits for FMD strains and antigens.

III. Diagnostic samples

Epithelial tissue samples are preserved and transported in Vallee medium composed of phosphate 

glycerin (pH 7.2) with phenol red. Diagnostic samples (excluding samples for FMD virus 

isolation) are checked in at the front desk and logged into the database. Each submission is 

barcoded and each specimen is given a serial number within the submission. Sample history is 

kept confidential from the technical staff as part of the laboratory quality control standards. 

Submission for biocontainment is labeled on the package and opened in the BSL-3 lab. 

Epithelial tissues for FMD virus isolation are homogenized and frozen immediately upon arrival. 

Homogenates are thawed out and screened for FMD virus by antigen ELISA. If ELISA results are 

negative, the homogenate is inoculated on to baby hamster kidney (BHK) cells for 48 hours and

then tested by ELISA for the presence of FMD virus. If the ELISA results are negative on the 

first passage, a second passage is carried on for another 48 hours and tested for FMD by ELISA. 

If the ELISA results are negative on the second passage the sample is considered negative. The 

laboratory receives one or two investigation(s) a year for suspect vesicular disease. The primary 

target of these investigations is FMD.

Argentina follows the OIE guidelines for screening and confirmatory testing of serological 

suspect cases as well as for active surveillance samples. For detection of viral activity in 

vaccinated cattle, random serum samples (with no animal IDs) from vaccinated cattle are 

screened for antibodies to nonstructural proteins by the 3ABC ELISA. Positive samples are 

confirmed by EITB tests. A second set of samples is collected from the farm if EITB is confirmed 

positive on the first set of samples. If animals remain positive for antibodies to nonstructural 

proteins, Probang samples are collected from the suspected herd. These samples are not 

necessarily from the same animals tested positive by serology. Probang samples are tested for the 

presence of FMD virus by carrying out virus isolation on BHK cell lines. 

Since 2006, the SENASA FMD laboratory has had the capability to run PCR for FMD.

Consequently, samples submitted for PCR testing are processed in the BSL-3 facility where 

samples containing live FMD virus can be processed. Table 16 summarizes the FMD tests 

conducted in 2008 and Table 17 summarizes the FMD samples analyzed in 2012.
77

Table 16. Diagnostic tests for FMD and VS serology 2008 [56]

Test First Semester Second Semester

VIAA 910 252

3ABC ELISA 30,265 15,214

EITB 1,180 830

Structural ELISA 28,280 5,191

Typing ELISA 50 41

Total 60,685 21,528

Table 17. Number of Diagnostic Tests for Vesicular Disease Suspect Cases, 2012 [19]

Typification

ELISA 

3ABC EITB VIAA Structural ELISA

Vesicular 

suspects

Antigen 

detection 

(vaccinated)

33,560 1,259 2,957 15,574 1 41

IV. Diagnostic tests capability

The following technology is available for FMD diagnosis and for ruling out other vesicular 

diseases:

1. FMD

a. Serology: 3ABC ELISA, EITB, VIAA, and monoclonal-based liquid phase ELISA 

are used for serotyping. 

b. Virus detection: Antigen ELISA using reagents produced by the PANAFTOSA 

laboratory is used. Virus isolation tests are conducted in BHK cells. The complement 

fixation test is used for antigen detection. Reagents for this test are produced inhouse. PCR is conducted at the BSL-3 facility.

2. Vesicular stomatitis

a. Serology: Reagents for the IgG ELISA are purchased from the PANAFTOSA 

laboratory. Virus neutralization test is also available.

b. Agent detection: Ag ELISA and PCR are used in the central laboratory. 

Conclusions

Argentina has the diagnostic capabilities to adequately test samples for the presence of the FMD 

virus. Quality control activities within the laboratories are sufficient, laboratory equipment is 

routinely monitored and calibrated, sufficient staff is available, and there is an effective and 

efficient recordkeeping system for storage and retrieval of data.

11. Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region

Contingency plans of actions to be taken in the event of a disease outbreak should be in place to 

limit the spread of the disease should an outbreak occur. In this section we provide an overview 
78

of the legal authority of SENASA and elements of the emergency plan that would be initiated if 

suspect cases of FMD are identified in Argentina. 

Elements of Argentina’s FMD disease control program are provided in the Foot and Mouth 

Disease: Manual of Procedures for Focus Attention [6, 30]. Law 24.305 requires immediate and 

mandatory reporting of FMD in Argentina. SENASA has legal authority to apply severe penalties 

to any individual or company that fails to report an FMD case. The Animal Health Law 

Enforcement Act (3959/1903) requires all veterinarians in private practice who work in rural 

areas to report epizootic diseases. This law with its amendments specifies the penalties that a 

person could incur in various situations as a consequence of not notifying animal health 

authorities of a disease outbreak so that compliance of the regulations in force can be achieved 

with the purpose of preventing, detecting, or applying the measures laid out in the FMD National 

Eradication Plan. Private diagnostic laboratories must also immediately report epizootic diseases. 

They are also subject to severe penalties for failure to comply with statutory requirements [11, 

18].

In 2010, the registration and notification system for reportable diseases in animals was updated 

and enhanced under Resolution 540/10, creating a single uniform system for all reportable 

diseases. This system includes a standardized protocol and establishes forms of communication 

within and between insitutions to ensure the rapid transmission of consistent, reliable collection 

of epidemiological information and follow-up on suspect cases. Within twelve hours of receiving 

notification of a suspect case, a veterinarian from the local SENASA office must visit the 

involved facility, collect the necessary epidemiological information, and fill out a reportable 

disease form determining the disposition of the suspect case. Necropsy and laboratory samples, 

where applicable, are linked to the original report by a single case number. A final report 

summarizes the particular case/incident, and all incidents are summarized in an annual report.

Routine examinations of livestock occur during industry-related activities and official 

surveillance programs. Animals are also inspected at fairs and before and after slaughter. Many 

private veterinarians sit on the boards of technical subcommittees of the regional and local 

Animal Health Committees, so they are highly motivated, informed, and support the national 

eradication programs.

Identification of outbreaks or suspicious signs of FMD is carried out through passive surveillance. 

Observations by the producers, animal caretakers, transporters, and other individuals who see the 

animals every day are well aware of FMD or other vesicular disease symptoms, reporting 

requirements, and available resources to avoid the disease. Animals are inspected by the 

vaccinators twice a year during the FMD vaccination campaigns. Also, the INTA has a network 

of experimental and extension facilities in rural areas that work with the farmers and receive 

updated information on the health conditions of the herds.

Suspicious cases are reported and investigated. After notification of a suspect case, all actions are 

carried out as if the herd is infected until proven otherwise. Immediately, the suspect holdings are 

isolated, movement of animals prohibited, and samples are collected and sent to a laboratory to 

confirm the diagnosis. Table 18 shows the total number of notifications of suspect vesicular cases 

between 2008 and 2012 [20, 32, 57]. 
79

Table 18. Vesicular Disease Notifications, 2008-2012

PROVINCE Affected Species Diagnosis

2008

SANTA FE Bovine Foot Rot

SANTA FE Bovine Bovine Viral Diarrhea (BVD)

SANTA FE Bovine Trauma

ENTRE RIOS Bovine Trauma

CORRIENTES Bovine Poisoning (Ramaria sp. mushroom)

BUENOS AIRES Equine Negative for Vesicular Stomatitis

SANTA FE Bovine Foot Rot

ENTRE RIOS Bovine Actinomycosis

SANTA FE Bovine Foot Rot

JUJUY Porcine Trauma (nail puncture wound)

2009

SALTA Ovine Toxicity

MISIONES Bovine Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis (IBR)

JUJUY Bovine Foot Rot

JUJUY Porcine Trauma (nail puncture wound)

BUENOS AIRES Bovine Photosensitization

SALTA Ovine Contagious Echthyma

BUENOS AIRES Bovine Photosensitization

2010

BUENOS AIRES Bovine Foot Rot

SALTA Bovine Foot Rot

SALTA Ovine Contagious Echthyma

JUJUY Bovine Babesiosis

SALTA Bovine Toxicity

SALTA Bovine Toxicity

JUJUY Bovine Starvation

SGO DEL ESTERO Caprine Foot Rot

2011

RIO NEGRO Bovine BVD

CORRIENTES Bovine Foot Rot

JUJUY Caprine Contagious Echthyma

CHACO Caprine Contagious Echthyma

ENTRE RIOS Bovine IBR

ENTRE RIOS Bovine IBR

CORRIENTES Bovine Parasitic Infestation

CORRIENTES Bovine Parasitic Infestation

CHACO Caprine Contagious Echthyma

2012

RIO NEGRO Bovine Plant toxicity/Photosensitization

CORRIENTES Bovine Poisoning (Ramaria sp. mushroom)

RIO NEGRO Bovine IBR/BVD
80

ENTRE RIOS Bovine IBR/BVD

BUENOS AIRES Ovine Contagious Echthyma

During the 2000/2001 outbreak, most of the FMD notifications were reported by farmers (Table 

19). In fact, 20 of the 26 diseased premises were identified from reports by farmers. This shows a 

high level of awareness of the disease among farmers in the Northern area of Argentina, which is 

considered an area of high vulnerability to the introduction of FMD. The 2006 outbreak was 

reported by a private veterinarian who was contacted by the manager of the index farm. 

Table 19. Reporting source for cases of FMD during the 2000–2001 epidemic in the

Northern provinces [33]

Province Reporting source for diseased premises

(number of premises)

Veterinary 

Officials

Not reported by farmers Reported by 

farmers

Misiones - - 1

Corrientes 1 - 17

Chaco - - 1

Formosa - 5 1

Total 1 5 20

Percentage 3.85 19.23 76.92

In the event SENASA determines to follow a stamping-out policy for an outbreak of exotic or 

endemic diseases that present a health hazard to the national livestock herd, SENASA’s actions 

and level of involvement are defined in Resolutions 1410/2000 and 488/2002. The actions are 

listed in Resolution 779/1999 through which the National Animal Health Emergency System 

(SINAESA) was created as authorized by Law 24.305, Act 3959/1903 and Decree 1585/1996 and 

643/1996. By Decree 394/2001 that updated Decree No. 1585/1996, the president of SENASA 

has authority to take prompt actions to respond to emergency situations involving animal health. 

SENASA has special policies, logistics, and a budget for zoosanitary and phytosanitary 

emergency situations.

The SENASA defines the responsibilities and functions to control FMD in emergency situations. 

It operates at the central, regional, and local levels. At the central level, the Central Animal 

Health Emergency Committee is responsible for describing the emergency scenario, defining the 

control measures with input of local authorities, financing mechanisms and responsibilities, and 

assigning the human and other resources required for the eradication operations.

At the regional level, the actions required by the SINAESA are carried out by SENASA’s 

regional resources. The Regional Animal Health Emergency Team is the functional unit of the 

system. It is coordinated by the Epidemiology Office of DNSA at SENASA headquarters. The 

team includes SENASA professionals, technicians and administrative staff specialized in 

responding to emergency situations. The members of the team are specifically selected for their 

technical and psychophysical profile because they must be continuously available to respond 
81

immediately in cases of emergency. An alternate is available for each person in case a member is 

unable to respond.

At the local level, the staff of the local SENASA office in the affected area collaborates with the 

field technicians to provide support. The responsibilities of the local office include the following:

 Provide a primary response to suspect cases (collection and remittance of samples, 

description of the operation, and implementation of preliminary measures);

 Notify the Regional Supervisor;

 Submit a status report to the local Animal Health Emergency Committee;

 Carry out the actions defined by the chief of operations;

 Supply updated maps of the local area, including cadastre drawings;

 Keep updated records on the characteristics of the production system in their area, 

including a geographic description;

 Keep updated information on local suppliers and service suppliers, such as mobile 

telephone companies, equipment suppliers, transportation and rental companies of 

equipment, trucks, etc.;

 Keep updated information on the livestock population, inventory of other products, 

shippers of animal products and byproducts, cattle dealers, and other professionals related 

to the farming sector (veterinarians, agronomists, cattle buyers, dairy farm inspectors, 

etc.);

 Keep updated records of the local authorities, such as municipal officials, law 

enforcement authorities, fire brigade, veterinarians in private practice, and others in the 

area; and

 Oversee the surveillance and repopulation of farming operations.

The main control measure in the case of a confirmed FMD outbreak is stamping out, ring 

vaccination, restriction of animal and people movements, establishment of disinfection points, 

and delineation of focal, perifocal, and surveillance areas. The definition of the quarantine areas 

are similar to those used in other countries and in line with international standards. The 

quarantine area is subdivided into two areas: (1) a high-risk zone extending for at least three km 

beyond all known infected herds, and (2) a buffer zone extending from the periphery of the highrisk zone to the outer perimeter of the quarantine area at least ten km from the affected premises. 

In addition, local and central veterinary authorities implement security checkpoints on rural roads 

where vehicles enter the quarantine zone. All vehicles suspected of containing farm-related 

products, materials, or animals are stopped at these checkpoints. Checkpoints are generally 

maintained for 30 days after the last infected animal is depopulated or until the situation indicates 

they are no longer needed. Examples of the types of activity in the outbreak area are discussed in 

the disease status section of this document, beginning on page 26.

At the international level, although it did not do so during the 2000/2001 FMD outbreak, 

Argentina has subsequently given rapid and regular notification of diseases according to the time 

and conditions agreed upon with the world health entities. The Bureau of Epidemiology of 

SENASA develops weekly and monthly reports of animal health news. These reports are written 

using the information collected through the different levels of epidemiological surveillance and 

are submitted through the Coordination of International and Institutional Affairs of SENASA to 

international entities such as the OIE, the European Community, and the OPS/WHO Continental 

System for Vesicular Disease Surveillance. Likewise, a system of reciprocal systematic 

information was established through bilateral agreements with bordering countries. This system 

would allow immediate notification of any reportable disease detected in the country that could 
82

represent a sanitary potential risk for a neighboring country. One such bilateral agreement is the 

Cuenca del Plata Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile.

Emergency Response During 2011 Paraguay Outbreak:

In 2011, upon receiving official communication from the veterinary authority of Paraguay about 

an FMD outbreak in the province of San Pedro, Paraguay, SENASA immediately mobilized into 

action declaring a state of animal health alert throughout the country and strengthening all 

existing measures to prevent the entry of the FMDV into Argentina (Resolution No. 684/11 of 

October 19, 2011). Emergency measures included temporary suspension of imports and transit of 

all commodities from FMD-susceptible species; vehicle disinfection and tighter control of air, 

land, and water transportation inspections; increased staff and control activities at border posts; 

enhanced cooperation between SENASA, Customs and Security Forces (Fuerzas de Seguridad); 

strengthened biosecurity in slaughterhouses, landfills; and increased auditing for compliance with 

swill feeding requirements. The FMD vaccination cycle was also advanced in the provinces of 

Salta, Formosa, Chaco, Corrientes, Misiones, and Entre Rios, and included bovine of all ages. As 

described earlier under Factor 9 (Surveillance), additional active surveillance was also conducted 

to assess viral activity and herd immunity in these six provinces bordering Paraguay, as well as in 

cattle leaving the border area.

Training of Emergency Response Personnel

There is a training and promotion program for the staff of SENASA, including the performance 

of drills. The training is carried out by the Bureau of Epidemiology. In addition, the Field General 

Coordination carries out permanent meetings on updating of information, methodology, and 

standards that the local veterinarians should know.

Training records are maintained by the Bureau of Human Resources and Training, in which 

official agents get credits for the various classes they attend. The credits are added up in a score 

which is used towards promotions in the organization. The Bureau coordinates the training 

activities of each of the National Bureaus through training consultants. In the case of the National 

Bureau of Animal Health, two professionals who work as consultants will lead the 22 training 

delegates of the provinces and will coordinate, audit and guide the process of teaching the official 

veterinarians. This program is under implementation. The training legal framework includes 

SAGPyA Resolutions 51/2003 and 02/2002 and SENASA Resolution 166/2003.

All local offices maintain copies of a SENASA issued manual on procedures related to FMD 

outbreaks (Manual de Procedimientos para la Atencion de un Foco). Additionally, SENASA 

developed a containment plan (plan de contencion) in 2007, a copy of which is maintained at 

each local office. Veterinarians in local offices were well versed in the procedures contained in 

both documents.

Conclusions

Argentina has the infrastructure and legal authority to declare an emergency and take appropriate 

action in case of an FMD outbreak. SENASA has an effective disease control program included

in the Foot and Mouth Disease: Manual of Procedures for Focus Attention. The manual sets forth 

operating standards and is legally authorized by several SENASA Resolutions and Regulations. 

Quarantine and restriction decisions are made by the Central Animal Health Emergency authority
83

with input from the local authorities. Systems for notification and training ensure emergency 

preparedness and response with a legal framework to authorize needed actions.

Release Assessment Conclusions

APHIS identified risk factors that might be associated with importing fresh (chilled or frozen) 

matured, deboned beef from a region of Argentina. APHIS discusses these risk factors in the 

context of the potential for counterbalancing circumstances or by applying appropriate risk 

mitigations to reduce the risk of introducing and establishing FMD in the United States.

I. Likelihood of FMD introduction into the export region

Risk factor: FMD is endemic in few countries in South America. Consequently, there is 

an ongoing risk of reintroduction of FMDV from adjacent affected areas into the export 

region. Therefore, there is a risk that beef destined to the United States could originate 

from or be commingled with animals or animal products from affected neighboring areas. 

 Mitigations: Based on site visit observations, discussions with the SENASA officials, 

and documentary evidence, APHIS believes that veterinary officials in Argentina have 

adequate controls at the ports of entry for commercial and legal importation and 

sufficient controls exist at international airports to mitigate risk. Argentina follows OIE 

standards in its importation policy regarding products of animal origin considered as 

possible carriers of the FMD virus from countries or regions with a lower sanitary status.

In addition, there are also has stringement requirements for animals movements within 

the exporting area. Therefore, APHIS concludes that the likelihood that FMD will be 

introduced via legal importation is low. 

In order to ensure compliance with the appropriate controls, APHIS will propose in its 

rule that SENASA certify that the animals and products originated from the export region 

and were not commingled with animals or products from areas APHIS considers to be 

FMD-affected. Specifically, APHIS will require certifications that beef exported to the 

United States from Northern Argentina meets the foillowing requirements: 

 The beef comes from bovines that have been born, raised, and slaughtered in the 

export region.

 The beef comes from bovines that originated on premises where FMD has not 

been present during the lifetime of any bovines that are slaughtered for export of 

meat to the United States.

 The beef comes from bovines moved directly from the premises of origin to the 

slaughtering establishment without any contact with other animals.

 The beef has not been in contact with meat from regions other than the region of 

origin or those considered as FMD-free by APHIS (listed under 9 CFR 

94.1(a)(2)) [31].

 The beef meets additional certification requirements under 9 CFR 94.11(c) [31]. 

Generally speaking, these restrictions prohibit the export-approved slaughter 

establishment from receiving FMD-susceptible animals or animal products that 

originated, transported, or commingled with animals or animal products from 

regions that APHIS does not consider as FMD-free. 
84

Risk factor: There is a potential risk posed by illegal importations of FMD-affected 

animals or animal products from affected regions. Argentina has several internal and 

external border areas with few or no natural barriers. Even where there are barriers or 

checkpoints, people, cars, and animal products could cross both domestic and 

international borders illegally. Thus, the potential for the FMD virus to transit the border , 

particularly via passenger car or foot traffic, remains.

 Mitigations: SENASA controls, biosecurity procedures, and quarantine operations have 

been successful in mitigating this risk. APHIS evaluated SENASA controls for animals 

moving into export channels and concluded that risk of exporting contaminated fresh beef 

from illegal importations from affected regions to be sufficiently mitigated. The 

certification requirements mentioned above will further ensure that beef derived from 

animals illegally imported into Argentina will not enter U.S. export channels.

II. Likelihood of detection of FMD if reintroduced

Risk factors: Cattle in Argentina are primarily grass-fed, and, depending upon the pasture 

rotation scheme in use, may not be subject to routine supervision. Because some of the 

farms are extremely large, animals are distant from human contact for significant periods 

of time. Therefore, close observation of animals might be infrequent, and clinical signs 

might be missed.

Mitigations: APHIS considers that inspection procedures in Argentinean export channels,

such as ante-mortem examinations, are sufficient to mitigate this risk for animals 

exhibiting FMD clinical signs. 

To ensure that the inspection procedures are followed, APHIS will propose that SENASA 

certify the following: 

 The beef comes from bovines that received both ante-mortem and post-mortem 

veterinary inspections, which include inspection of the head and feet, at the 

slaughtering establishment, with no evidence found of vesicular disease.

 FMD has not been diagnosed in the export region within 12 months prior to 

exportation of the beef.

III. Likelihood of exporting FMD-infected beef to the U.S. 

Risk factors: Cattle could be early in the incubation period and not show clinical signs of 

FMD but still be viremic.

Mitigations: Based on published literature and data provided by SENASA, APHIS 

assessed the effectiveness of maturation, pH testing, deboning of carcasses, and removal 

of lymph nodes.

 The FMD virus is rapidly inactivated at pH 6.0 or lower. At pH 6.0, the 

inactivation rate is 90 percent per minute [58]. 

 Scientific evidence has shown that the virus is totally inactivated at pH 6 or 

below after 24 hours at a temperature of 4C [59]. At higher maturation 

temperatures, the pH drop rate is faster. 

 The pH changes may occur at different rates in different muscles, a measurement 
85

of pH lower than 6.0 in the longissimus dorsi muscle is acceptable as indicating 

nonsurvival of FMDV in the carcass [60].

 Failure with the pH reading is likely to be very low because periodic calibration 

of pH meters is carried out at the slaughter plants. 

 All carcasses intended for export must be deboned and lymph nodes must be 

removed. The deboning process is manually conducted and consists of removing 

all bones, major lymph nodes, and blood clots. 

In accordance with the risk mitigation effects, the processes evaluated in the risk 

assessment will be incorporated into the proposed rule. APHIS will propose to require 

SENASA to certify that: 

 The beef consists of bovine parts from bovine animals that have been born, 

raised, and slaughtered in Northern Argentina.

 Foot-and-mouth disease has not been diagnosed in Northern Argentina within the 

previous 12 months.

 The beef comes from bovines that originate from premises where foot-and-mouth 

disease has not been present during the lifetime of any bovines slaughtered for 

the export of beef to the United States.

 The beef comes from bovines that were moved directly from the premises of 

origin to the slaughtering establishment without any contact with other animals.

 The beef comes from bovines that received ante-mortem and post-mortem 

veterinary inspections, paying particular attention to the head and feet, at the 

slaughtering establishment, with no evidence found of vesicular disease.

 The beef consists only of bovine parts that are, by standard practice, part of the 

animal's carcass that is placed in a chiller for maturation after slaughter. The 

bovine and ovine parts that may not be imported include all parts of the head, 

feet, hump, hooves, and internal organs.

 All bone and visually identifiable blood clots and lymphoid tissue have been 

removed from the meat.

 The beef has not been in contact with meat from regions other than the export 

region or those listed as free of foot-and-mouth disease and rinderpest under § 

94.1(a).

 The beef comes from carcasses that were allowed to maturate at 40 to 50°F (4 to 

10°C) for a minimum of 24 hours after slaughter and that reached a pH below 6.0 

in the loin muscle at the end of the maturation period. Measurements for pH must 

be taken at the middle of both longissimus dorsi muscles. Any carcass in which 

the pH does not reach less than 6.0 may be allowed to maturate an additional 24 

hours and be retested, and, if the carcass still has not reached a pH of less than 

6.0 after 48 hours, the beef from the carcass may not be exported to the United 

States.Show citation box

 The beef meets additional certification requirements under 9 CFR 94.11(c) [31]. 

Generally speaking, these restrictions prohibit the export-approved slaughter 

establishment from receiving FMD-susceptible animals or animal products that 

originated, transported, or commingled with animals or animal products from 

regions that APHIS does not consider as FMD-free.

 An authorized veterinary official of the Government of Argentina certifies on the 

foreign meat inspection certificate that the above conditions have been met.
86

 The establishment in which the bovines are slaughtered allows periodic on-site 

evaluation and subsequent inspection of its facilities, records, and operations by 

an APHIS representative.

Based on its evaluation of the 11 factors and observations from several site visits, APHIS 

considers that Argentina possesses the detection capabilities, reporting systems, and emergency 

response systems that are necessary for combating and controlling FMD in the export region

should it be reintroduced. Furthermore, the region’s veterinary authority is capable of complying 

with the requirements specified in the CFR to prevent the commingling of FMD susceptible 

animals or products from regions with lower FMD status. Moreover, the region’s veterinary 

authority has sufficient oversight of the slaughter mitigations. APHIS also believes that the 

potential of cattle not showing clinical signs and shedding the virus is effectively mitigated 

through appropriate processing procedures. 
87

B. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT

Exposure assessment describes the biological pathway(s) necessary for exposure of animals and 

humans in an importing country to the hazards released from a given risk source, and estimates 

the probability of the exposure(s) occurring, either qualitatively or quantitatively. 

APHIS believes that the most likely pathway of exposure of domestic livestock to FMDV in beef 

is through feeding of contaminated food waste to swine [61]. The likelihood of exposure of FMDsusceptible species to FMD-infected beef was evaluated by reviewing previous VS studies. In 

1995, VS conducted a pathway analysis to estimate the likelihood of exposing swine to infected 

waste [62]. The analysis included two pathways for exposure of swine to contaminated waste:

exposure associated with illegal household imports and exposure associated with legal imports.

With 95 percent confidence, VS estimated that 0.023 percent or less of plate and manufacturing 

waste would be inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine [63]. Based on this fraction, less 

than 1 part in 4,300 of imported beef that are fed to swine as plate or manufacturing waste is 

likely to be inadequately cooked.

In 2001, VS conducted a survey of the U.S. swine waste-feeding sector to update a similar study 

done in 1994 [63]. Based on this survey, VS estimated that the proportion of plate and 

manufacturing waste fed to swine diminished by about 50 percent between 1994 and 2001 due to 

a decrease in the number of waste-feeding premises. The study also found that: 

 The number of waste-feeding premises has decreased significantly since 1994;

 Several states have prohibited feeding food wastes to swine;

 The continental United States saw a 40.5 percent decrease in the number of waste-feeding 

premises, Hawaii a 37.5 percent decrease and Puerto Rico a 52.3 percent decrease; and 

 Institutions and restaurants provide nearly 90 percent of all plate waste fed to swine.

APHIS believes that prohibiting the feeding of unprocessed plate waste to swine has further 

reduced this practice of feeding unprocessed waste to swine. Waste-feeder operations must be 

licensed and inspected regularly by USDA inspectors (9 CFR 166) [31]. The licensing process 

requires that producers adequately cook the waste fed to swine according to methods designed to 

reduce the probability of survival of foreign animal disease agents in the waste. 

Based on the 1995 estimate that a very small proportion of food waste is inadequately processed 

prior to feeding to swine and the substantial reduction in waste-feeding operations in recent years, 

APHIS considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to FMDV through inadequately 

processed food waste to be low. Based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS further 

considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to the FMDV through inadequately 

cooked infected beef imported from the export region to be low.
88

C. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT 

A consequence assessment describes the biologic and economic consequences of FMD 

introduction into the United States. This consequence assessment addresses both direct and 

indirect consequences as recommended by the OIE [39]. 

The magnitude of the biologic and economic consequences following an introduction of FMD 

would depend on the location of the introduction, the serotype introduced, the rate of spread of 

FMD virus, and whether other environmental conditions at the introduction site might facilitate 

the spread, the ability to detect the disease rapidly, livestock demographics and movement 

patterns, and ease of employing eradication procedures [64, 65]. In addition, depending on the 

extent of export of livestock and their products, trade restrictions imposed by trading partners 

often result in severe economic consequences. 

Direct consequences 

Direct consequences include effects of the disease on animal health, the subsequent production 

losses, the total costs of control and eradication, the effect on the environment, and public health 

consequences. 

Effects on animal health and production: FMD causes significant distress and suffering to animals 

regardless of the size and sophistication of their livestock unit. Very high mortality rates in young 

animals can occur, particularly among pigs and sheep. In pigs, Dunn and Donaldson (1997) 

estimated a general mortality rate of 40 percent for two outbreaks in Taiwan in 1997 [65]. 

Geering (1967) cites mortality rates of 40, 45, and 94 percent of lambs in several outbreaks [66]. 

Mortality in older animals occurs less frequently but may be significant with certain virus strains. 

FMD causes significant losses in the production capacity of affected animals. Productivity losses 

of ten to 20 percent are reported in FMD-infected livestock if the disease is allowed to run its 

course [64]. For example, the drop in milk yield of dairy cattle averages approximately 25 

percent per year [67]. In addition, FMD can cause reduction in the growth rate of animals raised 

for meat. According to Doel (2003) [68], estimates vary considerably, but one study has 

indicated that cattle would require approximately ten to 20 percent longer to reach maturity. The 

comparatively greater severity of FMD in pigs would imply at least similar losses to those 

described for cattle. 

Control and eradication costs: The overall cost of control and eradication depends on the 

mitigation or policy option chosen to control and eradicate the disease. Potential costs include 

disease control measures such as imposing quarantine measures and movement controls, direct 

costs related to stamping out of affected and other herds, indemnity payments, vaccination costs, 

surveillance and laboratory testing. 

The preferred option for control and eradication for disease-free countries like the United States 

that have a substantial export market for livestock and livestock products has traditionally been to 

stamp-out infected herds without the use of vaccine. In fact, the U.S. policy for FMD 

emergencies is to follow strict quarantine measures and stamping-out of infected herds and 

contact herds with ongoing assessment of the need for implementation of strategic vaccination. 

Published studies indicate that FMD eradication without vaccination is feasible. It is the least-cost 

policy option, even allowing for the costs of prevention and emergency preparedness, and the risk 

of outbreaks. However, if the extent of the outbreak were large or if the disease were spreading at 

a fast rate, vaccination might be beneficial to protect high-producing livestock [67]. A recent 
89

study using a stochastic simulation model showed that ring vaccination decreased the duration of 

outbreaks. However, depending on the magnitude of the outbreak and the number of herds 

involved, the time and cost needed to dispose of vaccinated animals could be substantial [69]. 

Available data do not allow quantification of the number of herds/farms that would be infected if 

FMD were introduced. Nevertheless, the cost of control, eradication, and compensation is likely 

to be significant. Bates et al (2003) [70] used results from a FMD simulation model to estimate 

the direct costs associated with indemnity, slaughter, cleaning and disinfecting livestock premises 

for various vaccination and eradication strategies to control transmission of FMDV in a cattle 

population of 2,238 herds and five sale yards located in three counties of California. The study 

found that mean herd indemnity payments were $2.6 million and $110,359 for dairy and nondairy 

herds, respectively. Cleaning and disinfection costs ranged from $18,062 to $60,205 per herd. 

The mean vaccination cost was $2,960 per herd and the total eradication cost ranged from $61 

million to $551 million depending on eradication strategy. 

At the national level, McCauley et al. (1979) [64] conducted a comprehensive study to assess the 

potential economic impact of FMD in the whole of the United States. The study estimated the 

direct costs (control and eradication program costs) and increased costs borne by consumers of 

FMD introduction over a 15-year period (1976 to 1990). The study examined several control and 

eradication options. Relevant to this assessment are strategies employed to eradicate the disease 

by stamping out or area vaccination. In the extreme event of endemic FMD in the United States, 

the impact of compulsory or voluntary control programs was also considered. A summary of the 

findings are shown in Table 20. The results were updated using the difference in the Implicit Price 

Deflator (DPI) in 2011[73]. 

Table 20: Economic impacts of FMD

1., Source: 1976: 34.8 IPD, 2011: 111.668 (3.2 = ratio IPD start 1976) 1/IPD = Gross Domestic 

Product Implicit Price Deflator - U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis 

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPDEF.txt

Source: Adapted, McDowell 2011, personal communication.

In a 2008 study modeling the economic impact and disease-spread effects from a 

hypothetical outbreak of FMD arising from feeding garbage in small farrow-to-finish operations, 

McCauley Estimates

Consumer Impacts Program Costs Totals

----------------------------millions of dollars --------------------------

--------

1976 $ 2011 $ 1976 $ 2011 $ 1976 $ 2011 $

Endemic FMD w/ voluntary 

control $11,600 $37,215 Na na

$11,60

0

$37,21

5

Eradication by strict slaughter 

& quarantine $10,600 $34,007 $539 $1,729

$11,13

9

$ 

35,736

Eradication by area vaccination $11,600 $37,215 $690 $2,214

$12,29

0

$ 

39,429

Compulsory vaccination 

program w/

endemic FMD $8,900 $28,553 $4,200 $13,474

$13,10

0

$ 

42,027
90

the total trade losses plus other disease-related costs to capital and management, totaled between 

$2,773 million and $4,062 million compared with the 2001-2004 disease-free baseline [98].

Effect on the environment: Environmental effects have been considered under all applicable 

environmental review laws in force in the United States. These are considered in a separate but 

related environmental assessment (APHIS proposed rule). The environmental assessment 

complies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and implementing regulations 

[72]. 

Effect on public health: Although public health consequences are not issues under APHIS’ 

regulatory authority, we address the issue in this assessment. FMD may affect humans; however, 

its occurrence is quite rare. The number of cases reported is so small when compared with the 

number of persons exposed that FMD is generally not considered a threat to humans. FMDV has 

been isolated and typed in only 40 patients during the last century. Symptoms in humans are 

mostly mild and include fever, and blisters on the hands, feet, mouth, and tongue. Patients usually 

recover within a week after the last blister formation [3]. 

Perhaps more importantly, an FMD outbreak of the magnitude observed in the United Kingdom

can result in severe psychosocial effects on farmers and farming communities. Farmers and their 

families can suffer from grief over losing animals, in some cases blood lines kept over many 

generations, as well as loss of control over their lives due to movement restrictions, disruptions 

in community life, and short- and long-term stress over their financial future. Researchers from 

Lancaster University in the United Kingdom conducted a new study into the social 

consequences of FMD in the Cumbria community and it revealed high rates of depression, 

alcohol consumption, and mortality among farmers during the crisis [73]. 

Indirect consequences

In addition to the direct costs of FMD introduction, impacts on international trade and related 

domestic consequences need to be considered. Export losses due to restrictions imposed by trade 

partners on FMD-susceptible animals and products can run into billions of U.S. dollars. The value 

of U.S. exports of beef products alone, which would be immediately lost, was over $3.98 billion 

in 2014. The impact of an outbreak of FMD on the rural and regional economic viability, 

including businesses reliant on livestock revenue, could also be substantial. 

In 2002, Paarlberg et al. [67] conducted a study to estimate the potential revenue impact of an 

FMD outbreak in the United States similar to the one that occurred in the United Kingdom. The 

study suggested that the greatest impact on farm income would be due to loss of export markets 

and the decrease in demand by consumers. For example, losses of gross revenue for the animal 

sector were as follow: cattle (17 percent), beef (20 percent), milk (16 percent), swine (34 

percent), pork (24 percent), sheep and lambs (14 percent), and sheep and lamb meat (ten

percent). Thompson et al. (2002) [74] estimated the loss of about 20 percent of the estimated 

total income from farming in 2001 because of the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom. 
91

D. RISK ESTIMATION 

Risk estimation consists of integrating the results from the release assessment, exposure 

assessment, and consequence assessment to produce overall measures of risk associated with the 

hazards identified at the outset. Risk estimation takes into account the whole risk pathway from 

hazard identified to the unwanted event [1]. 

APHIS concludes from the assessments that the surveillance, prevention, and control measures 

implemented by Argentina are sufficient to minimize the likelihood of importing FMD into the 

United States, provided that additional mitigation measures are implemented as described 

earlier. Furthermore, APHIS concludes that fresh (chilled or frozen), maturated, and deboned 

beef under consideration in this analysis is of low risk in view of the certification requirements 

that will be implemented. 

The likelihood of exposure of FMD-susceptible species to FMD-infected beef was not evaluated 

quantitatively in this risk assessment. However, as noted above, in a 1995 study [1], VS 

determined that 0.023 percent of plate and manufacturing waste is not adequately processed prior 

to feeding to swine. This is a three orders of magnitude reduction in the risk at the release level. 

Therefore, combining the likelihood of importing FMD-infected beef and exposure of susceptible 

species to uncooked infected beef scraps would result in an estimate that is at least three orders of 

magnitude less than the 95th percentile release rate of 1.73  10-4. 

The consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States would be extremely high. The major 

economic consequence of importing FMD would be export trade losses. The sum of the consumer 

impacts, direct costs and trade losses over a 15-year period would be between US$37 billion to 

US$42 billion (in 2011 dollars) depending on the magnitude of the outbreak and eradication 

strategy. Although such consequences are significant, it is important to note that the results of 

both the release and exposure assessment indicated that the likelihood of introduction and 

establishment of FMD is low. 

In summary, although the consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States would be 

very high, given the findings of the release and exposure assessments, APHIS considers the risk 

of deboned, maturated FMD-infected beef entering the United States from the export region and 

infecting U.S. livestock with FMD through feeding of infected materials to susceptible animals, 

to be low. 
92

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bovine spongiform encephalopathy; prohibited and restricted importations. 2004.

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D.a.B. Morein, Editor. 1990, Elsevier. p. 903-12.

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14. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food. National Animal Health and 

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93

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29. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

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4356. 2001.

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31. Mattion N, K.G., Seki C, Smitsaart E, Maradei E, Robiolo B, Duffy S, Leon E, Piccone 

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characterisation of the isolates and development of tools for the control and eradication 

of the disease. Vaccine, 2004. 22(31-32): p. 4149-62.

32. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Sanitary Emergency in the Province of Salta -

Report on the Sanitary actions taken in response to the Foot and Mouth Disease 

outbreaks in Tartagal, province of Salta. 2003.
94

33. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Epidemiological Report - 2006 Corrientes 

outbreak. 2006.

34. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Anex IV -FMD - Sero Epidemiological 

Surveillance, San Luis del Palmar, Corrientes. 2006.

35. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food. National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service. SENASA., Annex V, Diagnostic Tests performed -

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36. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Sero Epidemiological Surveillance Serological 

Sampling 2004 2005.

37. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Sero Epidemiological Surveillance Serological 

Sampling 2005 2006.

38. Code of Federal Regulations title 9 section 94.1. Region where foot and mouth disease 

exisits; importation prohibited 2004. 2004.

39. USDA APHIS VS, Change in the Status of Patagonia South Region of Argentina with 

Regards to Rinderpest and Foot and Mouth Disease. 2006.

40. Secretariat of Agriculture, L., Fisheries and Food - National Animal Health and Agrifood 

Quality Service (SENASA). , Report on Conformance with Article 2.2.10.4. of the OIE 

Animal Health Code for the territory of Patagonia. . 2007.

41. World Organization for Animal Health, OIE -FMD - Change in status. May 27, 2008 

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42. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

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43. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Answer to USDA - APHIS. 2006.

44. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Notification of vesicular diseases (excel file). 2005.

45. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food. National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service. SENASA.Sero Epidemiological Surveillance Serological 

Sampling 2005. 2006.

46. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food. National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service. SENASA. Epidemiolological Surveillance Serological 

Samppling 2007. 2008.

47. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food. National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service. SENASA. Epidemiological Surveillance Serological Sampling 

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48. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

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before 2005 site visit (Spanish) 2005.

49. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Fiebre Aftosa Republica Argentina (audiovisual -

power point presentation) (Spanish). 2005.

50. World Organization for Animal Health, OIE, New chapter on guidelines for international 

standards for vaccine banks, adopted in May 2005, guidelines for international standards 

for vaccine banks. 2006.

51. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. OIE report to request freedom from FMD. 2004.
95

52. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Programa Frontera Norte "A" (Audiovisual -

power point presentation) (Spanish). 2005.

53. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Spreadsheet amount of animal and vegetable 

products confiscated in 2005. 2006.

54. Voluntarios de las Naciones Unidas, C.B., Cascos Blancos en el Mercosur, Apoyo a la 

lucha contra la Fiebre Aftosa en la Frontera con Argentina y Paraguay (Spanish). 2004.

55. Discussions with SENASA officials and observations during the 2005 site visit. May -

June 2005.

56. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Annex II: Quarantining of the Area and 

Establishment of Control and Disinfection Posts. 2006.

57. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. Aftosa, Emergency, San Luis del Palmar. 2006.

58. USDA APHIS VS. Follow up letter after 2005 site visit. August 2005.

59. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA. SENASA response to the APHIS request (letter 

August 3, 2005) 2005.

60. USDA FSIS. USDA, Food Safety and Inspection Service Argentina - Eligible Plants 

Certified to Export Meat to the United States. 2006.

61. Anonymous. 2004, Lancaster University, United Kingdom.

62. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food. National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service. SENASA. Situation de Aftosa en la Patagonia Argentina.

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63. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food - National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service (SENASA). Additional Information received. 2009.

64. Bachrach HL. Breese SS. Callis JJ. Hess WR. Patty RE, Inactivation of foot-and-mouth 

disease virus by pH and temperature changes and by formaldehyde. Proceedings of the

Society of Experimental Biology and Medicine. 1957. 95: p. 147-152.

65. Pharo H, Foot-and-mouth disease: an assessment of the risks facing New Zealand. New 

Zealand Veterinary Journal. 2002. 50(2): p. 46-55.

66. CEC, investigation on the possible effect of electrical stimulation on pH and survival of 

foot-and-mouth disease virus in meat and offals from experimentally infected animals.

Commission of the European Communities. 1986. 10048: p. 44.

67. USDA APHIS VS CEAH. Pathway assessment of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) risk to 

the United States: an evaluation in response to international FMD outbreaks in 2001.

2001.

68. USDA APHIS VS CEAH. Risk Assessment of the Practice of Feeding Recycled 

Commodities to Domesticated Swine in the U.S. . 1995.

69. USDA APHIS VS CEAH. Waste-feeder survey. 2002.

70. McCauley, E.H., et al., Potential economic impact of foot-and-mouth disease in the 

United States. 1979. St. Paul, Minnesota: U.S. Government Printing Office, Potential 

Economic Impact of foot and mouth disease in the United States US Government Printing 

Office, St Paul, Minesota, 1979.

71. Dunn CS. Donaldson AI, Natural adaption to pigs of a Taiwanese isolate of foot and 

mouth disease virus. Vet Rec. 1997. 141: p. 174-75.

72. Geering, W.A. Foot and mouth disease in sheep. Aust Vet J, 1967(43:): p. 485-89.

73. Paarlberg, P.L., Lee, J.G., and Seitzinger, A.H. Potential revenue impact of an outbreak 

of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States. J Am Vet Med Assoc, 2002. 220(7): p. 

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74. Doel, T.R. FMD Vaccines. Virus Res, 2003. 91(1): p. 81-99.

75. USDA APHIS VS CEAH. Economic impact of alternative management strategies for 

regulating Canadian ruminant/product imports. 2003. 

76. Bates TW, Carpenter TE, and Thurmond MC. Benefit-cost analysis of vaccination and 

preemptive slaughter as a means of eradicating foot-and-mouth disease. Am J Vet Res, 

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77. McDowell, R., Economic impacts of FMD adjusted from 1976 dollars to March 2001 

dollars by Consumer Price Index. 2002.

78. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (40 US 4321 et seq) 

AND regulation of council on environmental Quality for implementing the procedural 

provisions of NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500 - 1508) and USDA regulations implementing 

NEPA (7CFR part 1b) and APHIS NEPA implementing procedures (7CFR part 372) 

1969 1969.

79. Anonymous. Unpublished report. Lancaster University, United Kingdom, 2004.

80. Thomson G. Foot and Mouth Disease. Infectious diseases of livestock, ed. T. Coetzer, 

and Tustin. 1994, Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press 825-52.

81. Cannon RM, and Roe RT. 1982. Livestock Disease Surveys: A Field Manual for 

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82. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food - National Animal Health and 

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observations made during the site visit. November 2013. 

83. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food - National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service (SENASA). Additional information requested by USDAAPHIS. November 2013.

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Agrifood Quality Service (SENASA). Direccion General de Laboratorios y Control 

Tecnico. Control of Vaccinations – APHIS 2013 (Powerpoint Presentation). November 

2013. 

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Agrifood Quality Service (SENASA). Direccion General de Laboratorios y Control 

Tecnico. Institutional Structure of DILAB – APHIS 2013 (Powerpoint Presentation). 

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89. Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food; National Animal Health and 

Agrifood Quality Service - SENASA - Clarification to the information Requested for 

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98

Appendix 1

Hazard identification—Foot and Mouth Disease 

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) lists several animal diseases that are considered 

primary hazards associated with trade of animals and animal products. APHIS regulations 

mitigate the risk of introduction of these foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As such, 

APHIS conducts an import risk analysis addressing hazards of primary concern prior to initiating 

or resuming trade of animal commodities. APHIS considers foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus 

to be a potential hazard associated with trade of live ruminants and swine, as well as certain 

products and by-products derived from these species. FMD virus was eradicated from the United 

States in 1929. 

Causative agent

FMD is a highly communicable disease caused by an Aphthovirus of the family Picornaviridae. 

FMD has seven immunologically distinct serotypes—O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia 1—

which do not confer cross immunity [1]. FMD virus serotype O (PanAsia strain) is the most 

prevalent and widely distributed, causing outbreaks in many parts of Africa, Asia, South 

America, and Europe since 1998 [2-4].

Host range

The range of domestic hosts includes all cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, swine, sheep, 

goats, water buffalo, and yaks [2-5]. All cloven-hoofed wild animals are also susceptible, 

including buffalo, deer, impala, and gazelles; hedgehogs, armadillos, nutrias, elephants, rats, and 

mice are also susceptible. Camels may be affected by some FMD strains whereas llamas, alpacas, 

and vicuñas have low susceptibility [5]. 

Incubation period

The incubation period of the FMD virus is two to 14 days in cattle, depending on the viral strain 

and dose and the level of susceptibility of the animal [6]. The incubation period in pigs also varies 

with the strain, dose, and route of infection [7]. Serotype O—highly virulent in pigs—can 

produce clinical signs within 18 to 24 hours, while pigs with low-level exposures may take up to 

11 days to develop clinical signs.

Morbidity and mortality

Clinical signs in cattle during acute infection include fever, profuse salivation, and mucopurulent 

nasal discharge [6]. The disease is characterized by development of vesicles on the tongue, hard 

palate, dental pad, lips, muzzle, gum, coronary band, and interdigital spaces. Vesicles may 

develop on the teats. Affected animals lose condition rapidly, and there is a dramatic loss of milk 

production. The animal usually recovers by 14 days post infection provided no secondary 

infections occur [8]. Morbidity in unvaccinated herds can be high, but mortality usually does not 

exceed five percent. If an outbreak occurs during the calving season, calf mortality can be 

considerable [9]. Young calves may even die before the development of clinical signs usually 

because the virus attacks the heart muscles [6].

The most consistent clinical signs in pigs are lesions around the coronary bands and lameness; 

fever may be inconsistent [7, 10]. Pigs may develop vesicles on the tongue and snout, but these 

may be less conspicuous than lesions seen in ruminants. The severity of clinical disease depends 
99

on the age of the infected pig. Adult swine may recover or become chronically lame while 

younger pigs, especially those less than eight weeks of age, may die from acute myocarditis 

without developing other clinical signs. 

FMD infection in sheep and goats is often subclinical or produces only mild clinical signs that 

may go unrecognized [11]. Reduced milk production may be seen in milking animals and death 

of young stock may occur without clinical signs. 

Sources of virus and transmission

Sources of FMD virus include (1) incubating and clinically affected animals; (2) breath, saliva, 

feces, and urine; (3) milk and semen (up to four days before clinical signs); and (4) meat and byproducts in which pH has remained above 6.0 [11, 12]. Transmission occurs by direct or indirect 

contact or by aerosol. Fomites such as feed, drinking water, equipment, animal products, as well 

as human clothing, transportation vehicles, rodents, stray dogs, wild animals, and birds can 

transmit FMD over long distances. The five main elements that influence the extent of FMD 

spread are: 

 The quantity of virus released; 

 The means by which the virus enters the environment; 

 The ability of the agent to survive outside the animal body; 

 The quantities of virus required to initiate infection at primary infection sites; and 

 The period of time the virus remains undetected [13, 14]. 

The respiratory tract is the usual route of infection, particularly in environments that are heavily 

contaminated with FMD virus. Infection can also occur through abrasions of the skin or mucous 

membranes. Pigs may become infected through ingestion of FMD virus-contaminated products 

[7, 11]. 

In cattle and sheep, the earliest sites of virus infection and possibly replication appear to be in the 

mucosa and the lymphoid tissues of the pharynx [8, 15-17]. Following initial replication in the 

pharynx, the virus enters the bloodstream. Viremia in cattle lasts for three to five days, during 

which the virus spreads throughout the body and establishes sites of secondary infection, 

localizing in various organs, tissues, body fluids, bone marrow, and lymph nodes. 

Viral replication in cattle may reach peak levels as early as two to three days after exposure [15, 

16]. Recent data indicate that the most viral amplification occurs in the epithelia of the skin and 

mouth, including the tongue [18, 19]. Although some viral replication also occurs in the epithelia 

of the pharynx, the amount of virus produced there is apparently much less than the amount 

produced in the skin and mouth during the acute phase of the disease. By comparison, the amount 

of virus (if any) produced in other organs like salivary glands, kidneys, liver, and lymph nodes is 

negligible. 

Immunity to FMD is primarily mediated by circulating antibodies [17]. The host reaction, 

including antibody production, occurs from three to four days after exposure. In infected pigs, the 

virus is cleared in less than three to four weeks. In contrast, around 50 percent or more of cattle 

will develop a low-level persistent infection, localized to the pharynx [10, 20, 21]. 

Inactivation and survival

FMD virus is a relatively resilient virus. It can survive up to 15 weeks in feed, four weeks on 

cattle hair, and up to 103 days in wastewater. The survival of the virus in animal tissues is closely 

associated with the acidity of that tissue [22, 23]. For example, in muscular tissues the acidity of 
100

rigor mortis, which occurs naturally, inactivates the virus. The production of lactic acid in these 

tissues during maturation is considered the primary factor for inactivation. An acid environment 

where the pH is less than 6.0 will destroy the virus quickly. Several studies showed that in tissues 

where no acidification occurs (e.g., lymph nodes, bone marrow, fat, and blood), the virus may 

survive for extended times in cured, uncured, and frozen meat [16, 22-25]. Heating at 50° C [26]

and up to 155° F [27] will inactivate the virus. 

Vaccination 

Inactivated virus vaccines of varying composition are available commercially [12]. Many FMD 

vaccines are multivalent to provide protection against the different serotypes likely to be 

encountered in a given field situation. The finished vaccine must be shown to be free from 

residual live virus. Live attenuated vaccines are not suitable due to danger of reversion to 

virulence.

Inactivated FMD vaccines may be classified as either standard potency (commercial vaccines) or 

higher potency (emergency vaccines) [12]. Standard potency vaccines are formulated with 

sufficient antigen to have a minimum potency level of 3 PD50 and provide six months of 

immunity after two initial vaccinations given one month apart. Higher potency vaccines are

formulated with sufficient antigen to have a minimum potency level of 6 PD50 to provide for 

more rapid onset and a wider spectrum of immunity against relevant field viruses. 

Laboratory diagnostics

Field diagnosis of FMD relies heavily on recognition of clinical signs, which are similar to those 

seen in other vesicular diseases such as vesicular stomatitis, mucosal disease of cattle, 

bluetongue, and rinderpest. Virus isolation or demonstration of FMD viral antigen or nucleic acid 

in samples of tissue or fluid is therefore necessary for confirmatory diagnosis. 

Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) can be used to detect FMD viral antigens and for 

serotyping [12, 14]. Lateral flow devices can also be used to detect FMD viral antigens. The 

ELISA has replaced complement fixation in most laboratories as it is more specific and sensitive; 

in addition, it is not affected by pro- or anti-complement factors. If the sample is inadequate or 

the diagnosis remains uncertain, sample materials can be tested by reverse transcription 

polymerase chain reaction and/or virus isolation.

Demonstration of specific antibodies to structural proteins in non-vaccinated animals is indicative 

of prior infection with FMD virus [12, 14]. Virus neutralization tests (VNTs) and ELISAs for 

antibodies to structural proteins are used as serotype-specific serological tests. Tests for 

antibodies to some nonstructural proteins (NSPs) of FMD virus are useful in providing evidence 

of previous or current viral replication in the host, irrespective of vaccination status. Unlike 

structural proteins, NSPs are highly conserved and therefore are not serotype specific, so 

detection of antibodies to NSPs is not serotype restricted.

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103

Appendix II.

11 factors described under 9CFR 94.2 

before 2012

8 factors described under 9CFR 94.2 

after 2012

Scope of the evaluation Scope of the evaluation 

The extent of an active disease control program, if 

any, if the agent is known to exist in the region.

Veterinary control and oversight

The authority, organization, and infrastructure of the 

veterinary services organization in the region.

Disease status—i.e., is the restricted disease agent 

known to exist in the region? If “yes,” at what 

prevalence? If “no,” when was the most recent 

diagnosis? Disease history and vaccination practices

The vaccination status of the region. When was the 

last vaccination? What is the extent of vaccination if it 

is currently used, and what vaccine is being used?

The degree to which the region is separated from 

adjacent regions of higher risk through physical or 

other barriers.

Epidemiological separation from potential 

sources of infection

The extent to which movement of animals and animal 

products is controlled from regions of higher risk, and 

the level of biosecurity regarding such movements.

The status of adjacent regions with respect to the 

agent.

Livestock demographics and marketing practices in 

the region. Livestock demographics and traceability

The type and extent of disease surveillance in the 

region—e.g., is it passive and/or active; what is the 

quantity and quality of sampling and testing?

Surveillance practices

Diagnostic laboratory capabilities. Diagnostic laboratory capabilities

Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control 

in the region—i.e., emergency response capacity. Emergency preparedness and response