IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

 EASTERN DIVISION

Evonna Mathis, :

 Plaintiff, :

 v. : Case No. 2:11-cv-271

U.S. Marshal Service, : JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

 Magistrate Judge Kemp

 Defendant. :

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Plaintiff, Evonna Mathis, has submitted a complaint against

the U.S. Marshal Service and has requested leave to proceed in

forma pauperis. She qualifies financially for a waiver of the

filing fee, so the motion for leave to proceed (#1) is granted.

Her case is now before the Court for an initial screening,

required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2), to determine if it is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. For the following reasons, it is recommended

that the case be dismissed. 

I.

28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) provides that in proceedings in forma

pauperis, "[t]he court shall dismiss the case if ... (B) the

action ... is frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim

on which relief can be granted...." The purpose of this section

is to prevent suits which are a waste of judicial resources and

which a paying litigant would not initiate because of the costs

involved. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A

complaint may be dismissed as frivolous only when the plaintiff

fails to present a claim with an arguable or rational basis in

law or fact. See id. at 325. Claims which lack such a basis

include those for which the defendants are clearly entitled to

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immunity and claims of infringement of a legal interest which

does not exist, see id. at 327-28, and “claims describing

fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal

district judges are all too familiar.” Id. at 328; see also

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992). A complaint may not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted if the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570 (2007). Pro se complaints are to be

construed liberally in favor of the pro se party. Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The complaint will be evaluated

under these standards.

II.

Ms. Mathis’ complaint is deficient for a number of different

reasons. In order to explain why, the Court will describe the

complaint in some detail.

The complaint names only one defendant, the United States

Marshals Service. It identifies a number of different legal

provisions which Ms. Mathis claims that the Marshals violated,

including her civil rights, the Bill of Rights, the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the right to

free speech. However, the complaint’s citation to these legal

provisions is not a “factual allegation” and, under Twombly, the

Court does not have to accept at face value Ms. Mathis’ claim

that any of her rights under these various laws have been

violated. Rather, the Court must look closely at the complaint

to see if the facts she has alleged make it plausible that a

violation of her rights has occurred.

The factual portion of her complaint reads in full as

follows: 

Unauthorized recording and video. My civil rights was

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violated by wiretapping without knowledge and using

what I said against me (freedom of speech). There is

no probable cause to search or seize any property of

mine. I am not involved in any illegal activities. No

probable cause to follow me or my family. Violating my

rights to freedom of speech - phone conversations.

The complaint does not identify any particular Marshal by name,

or otherwise, who supposedly did these acts; it does not state

when or where these allegedly unlawful acts occurred; and it does

not describe how any words she might have said have been used

against her. That is so despite the language on the form

complaint she completed which instructed her to “[d]escribe how

each defendant is involved. Include the name of all persons

involved, give dates and places.”

First and foremost, the United States Marshals Service is

not an entity which can be sued. Reading the complaint

liberally, as the Court must do, Ms. Mathis may be asserting that

individual members of the Marshals Service violated her

constitutional rights, and may be bringing her claim directly

under the United States Constitution as authorized by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). However, in

order to do so, she cannot simply sue the Marshals Service. It

is an agency of the United States government and, as such, is

protected by sovereign immunity. See Culliver v. Corrections

Corp. of America, 211 F.3d 1268, *2 (6th Cir. April 28, 2000)

(unpublished) (plaintiff had “sued the United States Marshals

Service [but] [a]s an agency of the United States, [the] suit is

barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity”); see also Hurt v.

U.S. Marshals Service, 210 Fed. Appx. 13, *1 (D.C. Cir. December

22, 2006) (“Sovereign immunity bars suits, such as appellant's,

for money damages against an agency of the Federal Government”). 

Equally importantly, her complaint lacks sufficient facts to

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make it plausible that she could maintain a claim for

constitutional violations against any individual Marshal. There

is simply no detail to her factual allegations. The Marshals do

have power, under some circumstances, to follow citizens or to

videotape their activities, especially if these actions occur

within a facility like the United States Courthouse, where the

Marshals are responsible for maintaining security. Thus, in

order to give the Court at least a plausible basis for concluding

that the Marshals acted in violation of Ms. Mathis’ rights, her

complaint would have to identify where the various actions

occurred and what she believes the “wiretapping” consisted of. 

As the court stated in Floyd v. City of Kenner, La., 351 Fed.

Appx. 890, 897 (5th Cir. October 29, 2009), although a plaintiff

“might not know everything about what occurred ... the bare

allegation does not make it plausible that he knows anything.” 

So, too, Ms. Mathis may not know everything about what she

believes to have been done wrong by the Marshals, but her

complaint does not have enough detail in it to show that she

knows anything, or at least anything that would make it plausible

that she could state a claim against any individual Marshal had

she tried to do so. For these reasons, the complaint cannot

survive the initial review of it that is required by 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2).

III.

For all of these reasons, it is recommended that the

complaint be dismissed because the United States Marshals Service

cannot be sued and because the complaint does not state any

plausible claims for relief. It is further recommended that if

the Court adopts this recommendation, a copy of the complaint,

this Report and Recommendation, and the order of dismissal be

served on the defendant.

IV.

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 PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen days of the date of this Report, file

and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,

together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A judge

of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper

objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify,

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein,

may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).

 The parties are specifically advised that failure to object

to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the

right to have the district judge review the Report and

Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the

right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the

Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).

 /s/ Terence P. Kemp 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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