alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
----

Exhibit 32.1 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code), theundersigned officer of Gryphon Gold Corporation, (the "Company") does herebycertify with respect to the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for theperiod ended December 31, 2008 (the "Report") that: 

    1.     The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and 

    2.     The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company. 

Date: February 13, 2009 

/s/ John L. Key                                 John L. Key Chief Executive Officer and Principal Executive Officer 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solelypursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 ofChapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code) and is not being filed as partof the Report or as a separate disclosure document. 

----
AO 450 (Rev. 5/85) Judgment in a Civil Case

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Eastern Division 

PATRICIA A. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

vs.

J. C. PENNEY CORPORATION, CASE NO. C2-10-1012

INC., et al., JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE TERENCE P. KEMP

Defendants.

Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have

been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

Decision by Court. A decision has been rendered by the Court without a hearing or

trial.

Pursuant to the ORDER filed March 30, 2012, JUDGMENT is hereby entered 

DISMISSING this case WITH PREJUDICE.

Date: March 30, 2012 JAMES BONINI, CLERK

/S/ Andy F. Quisumbing 

(By) Andy F. Quisumbing

 Courtroom Deputy Clerk

Case: 2:10-cv-01012-EAS-TPK Doc #: 30 Filed: 03/30/12 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: <pageID>
July 30, 2015

Mr. Atif R. Aleemi

dba Dulles One Consultants, LLC

44329 Lord Fairfax Place

Ashburn, VA 20147

Dear Mr. Aleemi:

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from 

part 21; §§45.23(b), 91.7(a), 91.109 91.119, 91.121, 91.151(a), 91.203(a) and (b), 91.215,

91.405, 91.407, 91.409, and 91.417 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It 

explains why we cannot process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Cannot Process Your Request

We entered your May 19, 2015, exemption request on behalf of Dulles One Consultants, LLC

into the public docket (No. FAA−2015−1721), but we are unable to process your request any 

further. The information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy 

enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following:

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

For more detailed information relating to submitting petitions for exemption, please visit 

http://aes.faa.gov/petition/index.html. This website helps the petitioner to meet Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements outlines in § 11.81 and helps answer any 

questions you may have.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.
2

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further. 

If you have any questions you may call the 333 Information Line (202) 267-2999.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brittany Newton 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
3
Exhibit 10.2
                                 PROMISSORY NOTE



$6,000.00                                                     Las Vegas, Nevada
                                                              8/31/00


FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Hunapuh, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Maker"), promises
to pay to the order of Putun, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "Holder"), PO Box
50464, Henderson, NV, or at such other address as Holder may designate in
writing, the principal sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500) until
paid, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum.

The principal amount of the note shall be due and payable on or before 8/30/01.

Should the amount owing on this note not be paid when due, the entire unpaid
principal sum evidenced by this Note will, without notice to the Maker, become
due and payable.

Maker hereby waives presentment of payment, protect and demand, notice of
protest, demand and dishonor and nonpayment of this Note, and consents that the
holder may extend the time of payment or otherwise modify the terms of payment
or any part or whole of the indebtedness evidenced by this Note as the request
of any other person liable hereon, and consent shall not alter nor diminish the
liability of any party hereunder.

Maker may repay the indebtedness evidenced hereby in whole or in part from time
to time without premium or penalty.

As used herein, Holder shall include any subsequent holder of this Note. Maker
shall have no right to assign this Note without the consent of Holder, and in no
event shall any assignment of this Note by Maker act to release Maker from any
obligations hereunder unless such release is evidenced in writing by Holder.

This Note shall be governed by the laws of the State of Nevada.

Witness the hand of the undersigned this 31 day of August 2000.


                                                  Hunapu, Inc.

                                                  /s/ John C. Francis, President
                                                  ------------------------------
**Exhibit 31.1****CERTIFICATION**I, Marcus E. Jundt, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Kona Grill, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations, and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; andc) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial information;andb) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.                                                       /s/ MARCUS E. JUNDT   Marcus E. Jundt   *Chief Executive Officer*   Date: May 3, 2007
#### Raymond Lewis HOUSE v. STATE of Arkansas

CA CR 86-74

722 S.W.2d 886

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

Opinion delivered February 4, 1987

*Robert F. Morehead,*for appellant.

No objection.

Per Curiam.

The appellant in this criminal case, Raymond Lewis House, retained attorney Robert F. Morehead to represent *29him on appeal. Mr. Morehead moved to be relieved as counsel, stating that he found the appeal to be without merit. An abstract of the proceedings, a statement of the case, and an affidavit of no merit were filed by Mr. Morehead. However, he has failed to brief matters in the record that might arguably support an appeal, or to list the appellant’s objections and motions that were overruled or denied at trial, as required by the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Office of the Attorney General has supplied a list of the appellant’s objections in a brief for the State concurring in Mr. Morehead’s opinion that the appeal was without merit, and citing authority to support that proposition.

The question which presents itself is whether a no-merit appeal brief written entirely by the State comports with the constitutional requirements of equal protection and due process *set out in Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 739 (1967), and *Evitts v. Lucey,*469 U.S. 387 (1985), as well as the requirements of Rule 11(h). *Anders*involved a no-merit motion filed by appointed counsel in a criminal case. The Supreme Court held that a mere affidavit of no-merit was insufficient, and stressed the importance of the attorney acting in the capacity of an advocate in such cases:

> Hence California’s procedure did not furnish petitioner with counsel acting in the role of an advocate. . . . The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae. The no-merit letter and the procedure it triggers do not reach that dignity.

386 U.S. at 743-744. In a recent case, a Texas appellate court has held that *Evitts*and *Anders,*read together, require that the *Anders*procedure for handling no-merit appeals should apply in the case of retained counsel, as well as appointed counsel. *See Roberts*v. *State,*705 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex. App. 1986). Because it is arguable that affirming a conviction wholly on the strength of a brief drafted by the State would constitute a denial of the due process right to effective assistance of counsel enunciated in *Evitts,*we direct that Mr. Morehead comply with the requirements of *Anders, Evitts,*and Rule 11(h), by filing a proper brief on or before March 4, 1987.
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8662 

AN ACT 

To reduce commuting burdens on Transportation Security 

Administration employees, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 8662 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘TSA Commuting Fair3 ness Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON TSA COMMUTING BENE5 FITS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of 

8 the Transportation Security Administration shall submit 

9 to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 

10 Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 

11 Science, and Transportation and the Committee on Home12 land Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a 

13 study on the feasibility of treating as on-duty hours the 

14 time Transportation Security Administration employees 

15 working at airport locations spend traveling between reg16 ular duty locations and airport parking lots and bus and 

17 transit stops. 

18 (b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the feasibility 

19 study required under subsection (a), the Administrator of 

20 the Transportation Security Administration shall consider 

21 the following with respect to Transportation Security Ad22 ministration employees: 

23 (1) The amount of time needed by such employ24 ees to travel between regular duty locations and air25 port parking lots and bus and transit stops at small 

26 hub airports, medium hub airports, and large hub 
3 

•HR 8662 EH

1 airports (as such terms are defined in section 40102 

2 of title 49, United States Code). 

3 (2) The amount of time such employees spend 

4 commuting, on average, exclusive of the time de5 scribed in paragraph (1). 

6 (3) The potential benefits to such employees 

7 and the Administration of treating as on-duty hours 

8 the time described in such paragraph. 

9 (4) The feasibility of using mobile phones, loca10 tion data, and any other means to allow such em11 ployees to report their arrival to and departure from 

12 the airport parking lots and bus and transit stops 

13 concerned. 

14 (5) The estimated costs of treating as on-duty 

15 hours the time described in such paragraph, includ16 ing by considering such hours creditable as basic pay 

17 for retirement purposes. 

18 (6) Other considerations determined appro19 priate by the Administrator. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 20, 

2024. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8662 

AN ACT 

To reduce commuting burdens on Transportation 

purposes. Security Administration employees, and for other
# C_2007183EN.01000402.xml

| 4.8.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 183/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.8.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 183/4

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 June 2007 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Patent- und Markensenat, Austria) — Armin Häupl v Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG

(Case C-246/05) (1)

1

(Trade mark law - Article 10(1) of Directive 89/104/EEC - Absence of genuine use of a trade mark - Concept of ‘date of the completion of the registration procedure’)

(2007/C 183/06)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Patent- und Markensenat

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Armin Häupl

Applicant:

Defendant: Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG

Defendant:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Oberster Patent- und Markensenat — Interpretation of Articles 10(1) and 12(1) of Directive 89/104/EEC: First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1) — Absence of genuine use of a mark — Reasons outside the control of the undertaking preventing it from opening supermarkets on the national territory, whereas its usual strategy is to market goods bearing that mark only in its own supermarkets — Concept of the date on which the registration procedure finishes

Operative part of the judgment

| 1) | The ‘date of the completion of the registration procedure’ within the meaning of Article 10(1) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks must be determined in each Member State in accordance with the procedural rules on registration in force in that State; |
| --- | --- |

1)

The ‘date of the completion of the registration procedure’ within the meaning of Article 10(1) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks must be determined in each Member State in accordance with the procedural rules on registration in force in that State;

| 2) | Article 12(1) of Directive 89/104 must be interpreted as meaning that obstacles having a direct relationship with a trade mark which make its use impossible or unreasonable and which are independent of the will of the proprietor of that mark constitute ‘proper reasons for non-use’ of the mark. It is for the national court or tribunal to assess the facts in the main proceedings in the light of that guidance. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Article 12(1) of Directive 89/104 must be interpreted as meaning that obstacles having a direct relationship with a trade mark which make its use impossible or unreasonable and which are independent of the will of the proprietor of that mark constitute ‘proper reasons for non-use’ of the mark. It is for the national court or tribunal to assess the facts in the main proceedings in the light of that guidance.

---

(1)  OJ C 193, 16.8.2006.

1

---
March 7, 1957

Reap. Dec. 8764.

#### Arkwright *Accessories, Inc., et al.*v. *United States.*

Entered at New York, N. Y. Decided January 31, 1957. [Not published.] Motion by plaintiffs.
# C_2007183EN.01003202.xml

| 4.8.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 183/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.8.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 183/32

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 27 June 2007 — Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission

(Case T-182/06) (1)

1

(Approximation of laws - Derogating national provisions - Rejection by the Commission of a draft decree advancing the lowering of the Community limit on emissions of particulate matter produced by certain new diesel-powered vehicles - Duty of care and to state reasons - Specificity of the notifying Member State's problem in complying with the Community limits on concentrations of particulate matter in ambient air)

(2007/C 183/63)

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Applicant: Kingdom of the Netherlands (represented by: H. Sevenster and M. de Grave, Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: M. Patakia, A. Alcover San Pedro and H. van Vliet, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Annulment of Commission Decision 2006/372/EC of 3 May 2006 concerning draft national provisions notified by the Kingdom of the Netherlands under Article 95(5) of the EC Treaty laying down limits on the emissions of particulate matter by diesel-powered vehicles (OJ 2006 L 142, p. 16)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 212, 2.9.2006.

1

---
NUMBER 13-14-00386-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

IN RE STATE FARM LLOYDS, RICHARD FREYMANN,

AND SYLVIA GARZA

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Perkes and Longoria

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion1

Relators, State Farm Lloyds, Richard Freymann, and Sylvia Garza, have filed a 

petition for writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct respondent, the Honorable 

Rose Guerra Reyna, Presiding Judge of the 206th District Court of Hidalgo County, 

Texas, to withdraw her order denying relators’ verified plea in abatement and to enter an 

order abating the suit for damages brought against relators by the real party in interest, 

Edi Coronado, until sixty days after she provides relators with a notice letter for her claim 

 

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not 

required to do so.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
2

stating the specific, separate amounts for the claimed damages and attorney’s fees. See

TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.154 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“Prior Notice of 

Action”); id. § 541.155 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“Abatement”); TEX. R. APP.

P. 52.1 (“Commencement” of Original Proceedings). By order previously issued in this 

cause, this Court granted temporary relief and requested that the real party in interest file 

a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a),(b). Such 

response has been duly filed.

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, 

the response, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that the petition for writ of 

mandamus should be denied for the reasons expressed in our opinion in In re State Farm 

Lloyds, Richard Freymann, and Nathan Burris, No. 13-14-00347-CV, 2014 WL _____ 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 27, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.), available at

http://www.search.txcourts.gov/case.aspx?cn=13-14-00348-CV. Accordingly, the Court 

LIFTS the stay previously imposed by this Court and DENIES the petition for writ of 

mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d). 

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the 

2nd day of September, 2014.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO.: 2:11-CR-222 (2)

JUDGE SMITH

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KING

NANCY Y. RAYFUS, 

Defendant.

ORDER

On December 29, 2011, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), recommending that the Court accept Defendant’s guilty plea to Count Five

of the Indictment charging her with engaging in a monetary transaction affecting interstate commerce

involving criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

1957, 2. Defendant, represented by counsel, waived her right to appear on the matter before a

District Judge. The Magistrate Judge conducted the colloquy required by Rule 11 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant’s plea was knowing, voluntary, free from coercion, and had

a basis in fact. 

Defendant was specifically informed of her right to contest the Report and Recommendation

by filing any objections within 14 days of the issuance of the Report and Recommendation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant did

not file any objections. 

Case: 2:11-cr-00222-MHW-NMK Doc #: 42 Filed: 02/01/12 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation and ACCEPTS

Defendant’s plea of guilty to Count Five of the Indictment. Defendant is hereby adjudged guilty of

engaging in a monetary transaction affecting interstate commerce involving criminally derived

property of a value greater than $10,000. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ George C. Smith 

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

-2-

Case: 2:11-cr-00222-MHW-NMK Doc #: 42 Filed: 02/01/12 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>