COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00006-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.C.R. 

AND B.B.N.N., CHILDREN

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FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant R.N.N. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s termination of his 

parental rights to sons J.C.R. and B.B.N.N. He does not challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. Instead, in his sole issue, 

Father contends that “[t]he trial court erred in excluding witness testimony and a 

related document controverting similar lines of question by [Texas Department of 

Family and Protective Services (TDFPS)] and seeking to introduce evidence of 

[Father’s] successful parenting of a child born after the removal of the children at 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

issue.” Father contends that the exclusion of the evidence violated his 

constitutional right to cross-examine “[TDFPS’s] key witness” and also “deprived 

[him] of the benefit of a statutory duty on the part of the court to examine the 

actions of [TDFPS] in regard to [his] later-born child.” Father did not preserve 

any constitutional complaints regarding the exclusion of his proffered evidence.2

Further, even if the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the 

proffered evidence, which we do not hold, to obtain reversal of a judgment based 

upon an error in the trial court, an appellant must show that the error occurred 

and that it probably caused rendition of an improper judgment or probably 

prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to this court.3 We will 

not reverse a trial court’s judgment because of an erroneous evidentiary ruling 

unless the ruling probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.4 The 

complaining party must usually show that the whole case turned on the evidence 

at issue.

5

 If erroneously admitted or excluded evidence was crucial to a key 

 

2See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); see also Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1).

3

Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a); Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 

212, 225 (Tex. 2005).

4Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex. 

2008).

5

Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001); 

City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753–54 (Tex. 1995).
3

issue, the error was likely harmful.6 We examine the entire record in making this 

determination of harm.7

The excluded evidence shows that the testifying CPS caseworker

knew that CPS had received a neglectful supervision referral on Father 

and Mother after Mother delivered another baby, V.N., subsequent to the 

filing of the petition in this case and the removal of J.C.R. and B.B.N.N.; 

believed that she had seen the report of the referral but did not know 

specifically what it alleged;

had no personal knowledge of any act of neglectful supervision committed 

by either parent on the first two days of V.N.’s life;

believed that CPS investigated the report but did not know the specifics of 

the investigation;

knew that CPS had made a home visit;

believed that it was unannounced and that V.N. was present;

did not know the circumstances of the visit;

did not see a child safety evaluation report; and

did not know whether Father and Mother were notified of the cause of the 

investigation, the nature of the referral, or the results of the investigation.

The letter from TDFPS admitted for the record provides that TDFPS had

closed the investigation and ruled it “Unable to Determine.”

The excluded evidence pertains to a referral filed the day after the birth of 

V.N., a child not the subject of this appeal who was born to Father and Mother 

 

6State v. Cent. Expressway Sign Assocs., 302 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 

2009); Reliance Steel, 267 S.W.3d at 873.

7

Interstate Northborough P’ship, 66 S.W.3d at 220.
4

after the petition in this case was filed and to the witness’s ignorance about 

details of the referral, the investigation, and its results. The only key issue to 

which Father attributes the excluded evidence is best interest, but he does not 

contend that the case turned on the excluded evidence. Again, Father does not 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that 

termination of his parental rights to J.C.R. and B.B.N.N. is in their best interest, 

and our review of the record yields an overwhelming amount of evidence 

supporting that finding.

Consequently, we hold that Father has not shown that the trial court’s 

error, if any, in excluding the evidence has probably resulted in an improper 

judgment. We therefore conclude that any error in excluding the evidence was 

harmless, overrule Father’s sole issue, and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

PER CURIAM

DELIVERED: February 24, 2011