McNAIR PAPERS 

NUMBER FOUR 

SDI AND 

ARMS CONTROL 

By _HQ_WARD _G_. _DEWQLE ......

THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC ST

.-. ~L~lL-"u~c'4r, l.~ 

SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 
SDI AND 

ARMS CONTROL 

By HOWARD (3. DEWOLF 

~ RESIDENT REAGAN'S Strategic Defense Initiative, 

or SDI, and the pursuit of defenses to protect against 

ballistic missile attack are issues of significant debate. 

Some praise the proposal, first made in a presidential address 

to the nation on 23 March 1983, as a grand vision that will 

abolish nuclear blackmail by adopting a totally defensive 

posture. Others condemn it as being destabilizing, a Pandora's 

box of strategic transition that could precipitate armed conflict. 

To date, the focus primarily has been on questions of 

technology. Are defenses feasible? Will they work? How effective can they be? In addition, many have addressed the impact 

of defenses on US-Soviet stability. Will SDI defenses seem 

threatening? Will they destabilize the strategic equation? Is a 

shift toward defense necessarily away from offense? Perhaps 

the real questions to ask concern the strategic direction currently being pursued, how strategic defense will or should 

interact with strategic offense, and the relationship of strategic 

defense to arms control. 

The vision of SDI originally portrayed in March 

1983--ultimately eliminating the threat of strategic nuclear 

missiles--is now a longer-term goal. Now deterrence is, as 

before, the byword; perfect defenses are recognized as being 

unattainable, and continued dependence on offensive ballistic 

missiles is envisioned. These considerations, once accepted, may 

precipitate further nuclear arms control agreements--with SDI 

as the catalyst. 

Earlier arms control agreements, although they placed 

modest limitations on nuclear forces, generally did not achieve 

significant reductions. The major exception was the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, which essentially eliminated a class of 

weapons by regulating the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems. In more recent years, however--since 

the SDI program has been in placemprogress on arms control has improved. 
4 HOWARD G. DE WOLF 

I. The Strategic Defense Initiative 

In the crescendo to his 1983 announcement, President Reagan 

touched on some major themes relating to US strategy: 

Since the advent of nuclear weapons, those steps [steps taken 

to counter the Soviet threat] have been directed toward deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation--the notion that no rational nation would launch an attack that would 

inevitably result in unacceptable losses to themselves .... Up 

until now we have increasingly based our strategy of deterrence 

upon the threat of retaliation. But what if... we could intercept 

and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our 

own soil or that of our allies?l 

Was the President proposing a major shift in US national 

strategy or policy? Exactly how did the President envision this 

proposal fitting into the national strategy of the United States? 

Was it a modification of the concept of deterrence--signaling 

a shift from offensive deterrence to defensive deterrence? Or 

was he proposing no more than a new weapon system to be 

added to the inventory of existing systems? 

In addition to raising such questions, the speech also 

alluded to the notion of eventually refuting traditional offensive deterrence. The President noted the importance of ongoing 

arms control efforts to achieve major arms reductions, but went 

on to say, "Nevertheless it will still be necessary to rely on 

the specter of retaliation...and that is a sad commentary." 

He continued by acknowledging, "Defensive systems have 

limitations .... [I]f paired with offensive systems, they can be 

viewed as fostering an aggressive policy and no one wants 

that."2 

Statements such as these did not suggest a long-term commitment to current offensive systems. In fact, the President's 

call to "render these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" 

and to "eliminate the weapons themselves ''3 exhibited his 

frustration with continuing a strategy that ultimately threatened 

mutual annihilation. It would appear that the President was 

calling for a new strategy based on defenses, refuting nuclear 

retaliation. 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 5 

President Reagan had provided' 'top down guidance" by 

directing the SDI program. But after the initial shock of the 

announcement, literature produced within the Department of 

Defense began to change the concept subtly. Those responsible for coming to grips with the policy implications and 

developing the technology, for example, became more and 

more involved and asserted their influence. The President's 

"vision" had been sprung on an unsuspecting bureaucracy--it 

was necessary for the bureaucracy to translate that vision into reality. 

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

requested a Future Security Strategy Study to help assess the 

policy, strategy, and arms control implications of SDI. A team 

of outside experts, under the leadership of Fred S. Hoffman, 

published its report in October 1983. 4 Of interest is the 

fact that while it recognized the President's "ultimate objective of a full, multilayered system that offers nearly leakproof defenses against very large offensive forces, ''5 the 

report still acknowledged a continued reliance on offensive 

forces: 

A satisfactory deterrent requires a combination of more 

discriminating and effective offensive systems to respond to 

enemy attacks plus defensive systems to deny the achievement 

of enemy attack objectives. 6 

Additionally, the study talked in terms of deterrence 

rather than espousing a new defense-oriented strategy. As 

it addressed intermediate levels of capability, the study 

noted, 

Even U.S. defenses of limited capability can deny Soviet planners confidence in their ability to destroy a sufficient set of 

military targets to satisfy enemy attack objectives, thereby 

strengthening deterrence. 7 

So some of the early seeds were sown to link SDI to 

previously established thinking on deterrent philosophy and 

to acknowledge some level of continued offense. From a 

strategic perspective, the study strongly suggests that deterrence was to be the continued byword and that defensive 

strategists were already considering retention of some level of 

offensive capability to support nuclear retaliation. 
6 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

These themes were continued in a March 1984 overview 

of SDI provided in Department of Defense information 

guidance: 

Strategic defenses, when combined with stabilizing offensive 

force modernization and mutual overall nuclear arms reductions, hold the promise of substantially lowering the utility of 

nuclear missiles. 8 

Such guidance thus perpetuated the idea of continuing 

the offensive force modernization effort while lowering, but 

not eliminating, the usefulness of strategic missiles. In terms 

of deterrent thinking, the guidance stated, "Our efforts do not 

seek to replace our proven policies for maintaining peace. ''9 

A Department of Defense publication entitled "Defense 

Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment of Technologies and 

Policy Implications" was published in April 1984. This document appeared to reinforce the findings of the Future Security 

Strategy Study. It addressed the link of both "intermediate" 

and "fully deployed" defenses to deterrence and reiterated the 

common theme found in earlier arguments: 

Effective defenses strengthen deterrence by increasing the attacker's uncertainty and undermining his confidence in his 

ability to achieve a predictable, successful outcome. 10 

Perhaps even more interesting was the subtle way in which 

this document acknowledged the potential for some continued 

level of offensive force structure. Although the President had 

called for a program to "eliminate the threat posed by strategic 

nuclear missiles," this was widely interpreted to mean elimination of the entire class of weapons itself. However, ehminating 

the threat and eliminating all strategic missiles are two different 

objectives. 

Certainly, some level of ballistic missile defense could 

lessen, or eventually eliminate, the threat posed by Soviet 

strategic missiles. But this does not automatically equate to 

the elimination of the missiles themselves--either side might, 

for instance, want to retain some level of its missile forces to 

hedge against a breakthrough in anti-defense technology, as 

a complement to follow up an initial attack in order to defeat 

the enemy's warfighting means, or as a means of coercion to 

be used against third parties not having defenses. The "truths" 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL '7 

of the 1940s through the 1970s were still persuasive---ultimately, 

the offense could always find a way to overcome the defense. 

The policy implications did not directly address 

"eliminating" ballistic missiles. In fact, the wording implied 

some continued level of offensive force structure: 

Advanced ballistic missile defenses have the potential for reducing the military value of ballistic missiles and lessening the importance of their role in the strategic balance.l 1 [emphasis 

added] 

The theme of lessened but continued levels of strategic 

missile forces was reinforced by a concluding thought indicating 

that defenses could also provide "greater safety against accidental use of nuclear weapons or unintended nuclear escalation. ''12 If strategic missiles were totally eliminated there 

would be no need to be concerned with "accidental use" or 

"unintended escalation." Thus, the thought of some level of 

remaining force structure seemed to be firmly embedded. 

January 1985 saw the publication of a pamphlet entitled 

"The President's Strategic Defense Initiative." In his foreword, 

President Reagan reiterated his aim to "move away from.., the 

prospect of rapid and massive nuclear retaliation and toward 

greater reliance on defensive systems," with the goal of 

"eventually eliminating the threat posed by nuclear armed 

ballistic missiles." Interestingly enough, the body of the document acknowledged, 

The Strategic Defense Initiative, by itself, cannot fully realize 

this vision nor solve all the security challenges we and our allies 

will face in the future; for this we will need to seek many 

solutions--political as well as technological .... The Strategic 

Defense Initiative takes a crucial first step. 13 

By 1985 the image that defenses alone could shift our nation's security away from the threat of massive retaliation was 

apparently no longer sacred. Nevertheless, this document provided the first and most direct public acknowledgment that 

SDI might not suffice as the sole solution. 

The "National Security Strategy of the United States" 

published in January 1987 discussed strategic defenses in the 

context of a section entitled "Maintenance of a Strategic Deterrent." The ensuing discussion indicated, 
8 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative offers an opportunity to 

shift deterrence to a safer and more stable basis through greater 

reliance on strategic defenses. 14 

As was the case in the 1985 pamphlet, less than perfect 

defenses were acknowledged as a possibility and described as 

being supportive of deterrence and increased stability. Additionally, the 1987 document recognized, perhaps more directly 

than previous writings, that not all strategic ballistic missiles 

would be eliminated. The same section on deterrence only 

professed that strategic defense, coupled with arms control 

agreements, could provide "a world with fewer ballistic 

missiles. ''15 These themes were reiterated in the January 1988 

version of the document. 

The US nuclear strategy of offensive-based deterrence 

evolved from the national strategy of containment developed 

in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Although defensive systems 

were considered, they were discounted because of two basic 

concerns. First, the technology was not available to produce 

truly effective defensive systems and many observers believed 

the nuclear offense would always be able to dominate. Second, 

the deployment of defensive systems would fuel a spiraling 

defense-offense arms race that would lead to a destabilizing 

situation. 

With the advent of the Strategic Defense Initiative, President Reagan appeared to be creating a new order. This new 

order required the total elimination of ballistic missiles and 

the creation of a new strategy based on defenses alone. As we 

have seen, however, since the President's speech of 1983, a 

number of subtle changes have occurred. 

First, rationale for SDI has been based on its ability to 

enhance deterrence, rather than on an innovative defenseoriented strategy. Second, the total elimination of strategic 

ballistic missiles is no longer addressed; instead, a significant 

reduction in the utility of these missiles is the immediate goal. 

Third, in arguing SDI's deterrent value, it is acknowledged that 

perfect defenses are not necessary--and an SDI deterrent is 

now accepted as providing some level of defense that disrupts 

the enemy's attack planning. 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 9 

In sum, the current shape of the Strategic Defense 

Initiative does not provide a new national strategy as, perhaps, 

President Reagan had envisioned. It does, however, propose 

to modify our existing deterrent posture to make it become 

more--but not totally--defense-oriented. Strategic ballistic 

missiles will not be eliminated and perfectly effective defenses 

of the national population are no longer required. In describing SDI's role in deterrence, a continued, although lesser, role 

for ballistic missiles is now being advocated. Similarly, because 

defenses primarily deter aggression, they do not require 100 

percent effectiveness. 

If. Early Arms Control Agreements 

Of the various elements of national strategy, the one now most 

closely linked with military strategy and SDI is arms control. 

The arms control process has been difficult and tedious. The 

Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, or SALT, resulted in 1972 

and 1979 agreements only after exhausting discussions. They 

essentially established a framework for further meetings and 

set limits to the size of the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals. 

But, with the exception of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 

Treaty, no major steps were taken to significantly reduce either 

side's inventory of nuclear weapons. 

During the late 1960s, both the United States and the 

Soviet Union concluded that constraints on ABM deployments 

would help make possible reductions in strategic offensive 

forces. 16 Unable to reach agreement over offensive systems 

during SALT, the Soviets focused on restricting negotiations 

to ABM systems. Although the United States wasn't opposed 

to discussing ABM restrictions, its position was that efforts 

to limit offensive systcms should begin as well. 

On 20 May 1971, the two governments announced that 

they would concentrate on a permanent treaty to limit ABM 

systems while still working on offensive limitations. A year 

later, on 26 May 1972, President Nixon and General Secretary 

Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement 

on Strategic Offensive arms at a summit meeting in Moscow. 17 
10 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

The ABM Treaty. Initially, the ABM Treaty restricted the 

United States and Soviet Union to two deployment areas 

each--one ABM site to defend the national capital and the 

other to protect an ICBM launch area. According to the agreement, the two defended areas had to be at least 1,300 kilometers 

(about 800 miles) apart in order to prevent the creation of a 

regional defense zone. 18 Each ABM area was limited to a 

radius of 150 kilometers (about 90 miles) and could have no 

more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. The 

number of radars was limited to no more than 6 ABM radar 

complexes in the national capital area and no more than 2 large 

phased-array ABM radars and 18 smaller ones in the area protecting ICBM launchers. 19 

Besides the quantitative limits, qualitative limits also 

applied. Both sides agreed not to develop, test, or deploy ABM 

launchers capable of multiple launch or rapid reload. The 

Agreed Statements accompanying the treaty specified that interceptors with more than one independently guided warhead 

were also prohibited. Additionally, restrictions were outlined 

in the treaty to ensure that other types of missiles and radars 

could not be used or converted to support the ABM mission. 20 

The treaty also limited the deployed ABM systems of each 

side to fixed, land-based types. It specifically prohibited 

development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, 

space-based, or mobile land-based systems or their components. However, an Agreed Statement accompanying the 

treaty noted that newly developed systems based on "other 

physical principles" capable of substituting for existing systems 

would be discussed in accordance with the treaty's provisions 

for consultation and amendment. 21 

The ABM Treaty was modified by a protocol signed by 

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev on 3 July 

1974. The two sides agreed to further limit the number of ABM 

deployment areas to one each. The Soviet Union chose a site 

near Moscow--to protect its national capital--and the United 

States chose a site near Grand Forks, North Dakota--to protect an ICBM launch area. The protocol permits each side to 

reverse this choice once, but only with advance notice and 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 11 

during a review year for the treaty itself. (Reviews occur every 

five years, the first having been in 1977.) 22 

Militarily, the significance of the ABM Treaty stems from 

two related factors. First, it limits deployment of newly developed defensive systems. Second, it virtually eliminates an 

entire class of weapons by regulating their deployment to a 

token number. Although deployed Soviet ABM systems must 

be dealt with in US attack planning today, they aren't considered a substantial threat to offensive success. Similarly, the 

Soviets are not faced with any defenses when planning a potential attack. The US ABM system near Grand Forks was 

dismantled almost as soon as it was completed, perhaps when 

the futility of deploying a lone, limited site was realized. 

In essence, the treaty could be viewed as a milestone 

because of its success in bringing the two Cold War superpowers to agreement. Some analysts also argued that it lowered 

the potential level of confrontation by eliminating defensive 

competition, both in the preconflict arms race and in offensivedefensive interaction if deterrence should fail. 

SALT I: The Interim Offensive Arms Agreement. The 1972 

Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms was intended 

to complement the ABM Treaty by limiting strategic offensive arms competition and providing time for further negotiations. It froze the number of strategic ballistic missile 

launchers, both operational and under construction, at 1,054 

for the United States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union, although 

launchers under construction could be completed. It barred 

construction of additional launchers and the replacement of 

older (pre-1964), lighter missiles with newer, heavier versions. 

Modernization and replacement were permitted as long as silo 

dimensions were not significantly increased. Mobile ICBMs 

were not covered. 23 

The agreement and its protocol also permitted an increase 

in the number of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 

launchers for each side. The United States was permitted to 

reach a ceiling of 710 SLBM launchers on 44 modern ballistic missile submarines; the Soviet Union's ceiling was 950 
12 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

launchers on 62 submarines (see table 1). However, both sides 

worked from established base levels above which any increases toward the ceilings had to be as replacements for older 

launchers, such as newer submarines with more missile tubes 

replacing older versions with fewer tubes. The US base level 

was 656 SLBM launchers and the Soviet Union's was 740. The 

older launchers being replaced had to be dismantled or 

destroyed. 24 

Table 1. SALT I Limits 

Category United States Soviet Union 

ICBM Launchers 1,054 1,618 

SLBM Launchers 710 950 

Essentially, then, this agreement served as a holding action that controlled escalation. It did not address the numbers 

of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which were fixed later 

in SALT II. Also, unlike the ABM Treaty, it didn't lower inventories or severely limit systems. It simply set upper bounds 

for launchers. Although it froze ICBM launcher levels, it permitted submarine missile (SLBM) levels to grow. As its formal name indicates, the interim agreement succeeded partially 

in limiting nuclear arsenals, but the numbers of nuclear 

warheads and delivery vehicles, and the magnitude of a potential nuclear conflict, were allowed to increase. 

SAL TII. Both the United States and the Soviet Union sought 

to continue negotiations on strategic offensive arms and agreed 

to begin the second phase of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, 

SALT II, in November 1972. The primary goal was to agree 

on a long-term, comprehensive replacement of the interim 

agreement. The US objectives were threefold: first, to provide 

for equal numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; second, 

to begin the process of reducing delivery vehicles; and third, 

to impose restraints on qualitative improvements. 25 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 13 

The completed SALT II agreement was signed on 18 June 

1979 by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev in 

Vienna. President Carter forwarded it to the Senate on 22 June 

for ratification. 26 Although the Senate never gave its consent 

to the treaty, the two sides have generally abided by it. 

In general, the treaty calls for equal aggregate limits of 

2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, or SNDVs, which 

include ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and 

air-to-surface ballistic missiles. It also established aggregate 

sublimits, including 1,320 missile launchers equipped with 

multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, 

and long-range bombers carrying cruise missiles, with further 

sublimits of 1,200 MIRVed ballistic missile launchers and 820 

MIRVed ICBM launchers. (See table 2.) The two sides also 

agreed not to increase the number of their warheads and cruise 

missiles above established limits. 

In addition to those quantitative limits, the treaty included 

bans on a number of potential qualitative improvements such 

as construction of new fixed launchers or heavy mobile ICBM 

launchers, flight testing of more than one new type of light 

ICBM, and development of rapid reload ICBM systems. Other 

provisions were included to address verification, consultation, 

and constraints on specific systems. 27 

Table 2. SALT II Limits (equal for US and USSR) 

Category 

Total SNDVs 

MIRVed ballistic missile 

launchers and heavy 

bombers 

MIRVed ballistic missile 

launchers 

MIRVed ICBM launchers 

Limit 

2,250 

1,320 

1,200 

82O 
14 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

The SALT II Treaty did progress a step beyond SALT I, 

not only by including limits on ICBM and SLBM launchers, 

but also by including heavy bombers under its limits. The treaty 

also began to focus on limiting the nuclear weapons themselves 

by imposing limits on the number of warheads deployed on 

each ballistic missile and on the number of cruise missiles 

deployed on bombers. By establishing sublimits on MIRVed 

ballistic missiles and bombers, the treaty further controlled the 

number of deployed weapons. Thus, the treaty attempted to 

avoid a situation in which the number of weapons carried and 

the number of carriers would be increased. 

Basically, the stated objectives going into the talks had 

been fulfilled--equal limits on numbers of delivery vehicles, 

restraints on qualitative improvements, and a process to reduce 

delivery vehicles. However, the treaty still permitted substantial growth in the inventory of deployed weapons. SALT II 

had not restrained the continuing offensive arms buildup. 

IlL INF and START, 1980-83 

The Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 intermediate range 

nuclear missiles in its western region in 1977. In the summer 

of 1979, NATO policy called for complementary programs of 

force modernization and arms control. 28 In December, NATO 

members unanimously adopted the "dual track" strategy to 

counter Soviet SS-20 deployments. Under this strategy, the first 

track called for arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union 

to restore the balance of intermediate range nuclear forces, 

or INF, to the lowest possible level. In the absence of an arms 

control agreement, the second track would then redress the 

INF imbalance through deployment of 464 ground-launched 

cruise missiles, or GLCMs, and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles 

in Western Europe starting in 1983. 29 

New INF Talks. Throughout 1980, the Soviets refused to 

negotiate, claiming that a balance existed in INF missiles. That 

"balance" equated to 200 Soviet SS-20s with 600 deployed 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 15 

warheads and no US INF missiles. But by the end of 1981, 

formal negotiations began. 

The United States proposed the "zero option, ''3° offering to cancel Pershing II and GLCM deployment if the Soviets 

would eliminate their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 INF missiles. In 

essence, the zero option would have both the United States 

and the Soviet Union eliminate an entire class of nuclear 

weapons--long-range INF missiles. 31 This proposal marked 

a shift away from the limitations sought during SALT I and 

SALT I! negotiations. Whereas those treaties envisioned limitations to serve as stepping-stones toward a future proposal that 

would address reductions, the zero option proposed to leap 

forward without the intervening steps. 

Both 1982 and 1983 were marked primarily by disagreement over three basic issues: (1) to what levels INF missiles 

should be lowered, (2) whether third country forces should be 

counted, and (3) whether an agreement should apply globally 

or only to forces in Europe. In the first issue, various force 

level proposals included a limit of 75 GLCM and SS-20 launchers in Europe (as part of the so-called walk in the woods proposal), 140 SS-20s in Western Europe to match French and 

British forces, and a global ceiling of 420 warheads on INF 

missiles. None of these could be agreed on. 32 In the second 

issue, the United States would not agree to the Soviets' insistence on including British and French forces or allowing remaining Soviet levels to equal British and French levels. Those 

forces were considered sovereign, independent, and of a different character than US and Soviet forces. Finally, limiting 

restrictions to Europe alone, as the Soviets proposed, allowing deployment in other geographical areas, was unacceptable 

to the United States because it would permit INF missiles to 

be used as a threat against other regions and also to be 

redeployed within range of Europe. 33 

In November of 1983, the first components of US groundlaunched missiles werc delivered to Great Britain and West 

Germany. 34 Parliamentary votes in Great Britain, Germany, 

and Italy had reaffirmed this dual track approach. As a result, 

the Soviets walked out of the negotiations. 35 
16 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

START. During the same period of the early 1980s, Strategic 

Arms Reduction Talks (START) also were bogged down. 

START negotiations had begun in June 1982. The announced 

goals of the talks were to achieve substantial reductions in 

strategic offensive nuclear systems, to focus on the most 

destabilizing systems--land-based ICBMs--and their warheads 

and throw-weight, to ensure a verifiable agreement, and to provide "equality" between the United States and the Soviet 

Union. 36 SALT II had failed to ensure reductions in strategic 

weapons. Its focus on delivery vehicles had actually permitted arsenals to grow. Thus, the START approach would 

address constraints on the number of ballistic missile warheads. 

The initial US proposal included reductions of ballistic 

missile warheads to 5,000 per side, additional limits on ballistic 

missile throw-weight, equal ceilings on heavy bombers below 

the US level in SALT II, and constraints on other strategic 

systems. 37 On the other hand, the Soviet approach, as in 

SALT II negotiations, focused on delivery vehicles and also 

called for an immediate freeze on launchers with a reduction 

to 1,800 by the year 1990, a ban on all new types of strategic 

weapons, and a limit of four to six Trident or Typhoon submarines per side. 38 

During the course of 1983, both sides added new proposals but they could not agree. The Soviets proposed a threephased plan to reduce forces incrementally in order to arrive 

at an 1,800-launcher goal by 1990. 39 However, this formula 

focused again on launchers and did not address warhead limits. 

Similarly, the United States presented a formula for reduction, 

but its focus was on warheads. This "build down" approach 

proposed to destroy greater numbers of old warheads as new 

ones were deployed and to ensure regular annual warhead 

reductions of at least 5 percent. This proposal also would 

reduce all nuclear weapons (including ballistic missile warheads) 

on each side to 8,500 by 1996. 40 

By the end of the fifth round of negotiations, in December 

1983, the Soviets had refused to set a resumption date for the 

talks. They claimed "a change in the strategic situation" had 

occurred because of the US INF missile deployments in 

Europe. 41 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 17 

Thus, the end of 1983 marked stalemates in both the INF 

and START negotiations. Although both the United States and 

the Soviet Union had made proposals, they could not come 

to agreement within either set of negotiations. NATO resolve 

to deploy INF missiles had been misjudged by the Soviets. With 

missile deployment beginning, the Soviets saw themselves facing a newly developing threat that eventually led to their walkout from both sets of negotiations. Disagreements over the 

counting of missile warheads rather than delivery vehicles, 

whether or not to include cruise missiles, loading limits for 

bombers, and throw-weight imbalances were additional factors that may have influenced the Soviet walk-out from 

START. But another issue influencing both sets of talks may 

have been the Strategic Defense Initiative. 

SDl's Effect. The months immediately following President 

Reagan's 23 March 1983 speech did not produce any changes 

in Soviet behavior in the two major ongoing negotiations, INF 

and START. Perhaps the period between Reagan's SDI speech 

and Soviet withdrawal from negotiations in December 1983 

was short enough that no effect could have been noticed or 

would have been expected. Perhaps during this six-month 

period the Soviets were attempting to discern both US public 

reactions and government commitment to SDI. 

In either case, plans for the US INF missile deployment 

in Europe served as an irritant. Soviet negotiators reacted by 

walking out of both sets of talks. Their walk-out provided them 

with breathing room to reassess their next step in each set of 

talks, and an opportunity to assess the potential impact of the 

new variable in the strategic equation--SDI. 

Neither INF nor START negotiations were held during 

1984. To the Soviets it was apparent that President Reagan 

was firmly committed to pursuing SDI research. Although 

debate was lively in both the United States and Europe, the 

program was gaining momentum. In fact, an office was 

established under the Secretary of Defense solely for the purpose of directing SDI efforts. Related research activities within 

the Department of Defense were consolidated under the new 

office, and funding specifically earmarked for SDI was 

approved in the Defense budget. 
18 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

If the US commitment held and newly developed, effective defensive systems could be deployed, the Soviets would 

face a serious challenge. Could they afford to accept the SDI 

program? If they did, it would threaten their concept of military 

equivalence. Additionally, it could place the United States in 

a position to accomplish a first strike without fear of retaliation. This situation would pose an unacceptable threat to the 

Soviet homeland. 

If the Soviets decided to compete with the program by 

deploying a similar system, they had to be concerned with a 

number of questions. Could they match US technological 

capabilities and develop a similarly effective system? What effect would these expenditures have on other facets of their 

economy? These concerns, among others, were now facing the 

Soviet leadership as they agreed to enter into new negotiations. 

Soviet Tactics. By initially taking a long-term perspective on 

arms control in the 1970s and early 1980s, perhaps the Soviets 

thought they could demonstrate at least some movement in 

order to influence international issues of more significant concern. After 1983, for example, they decided that if they exhibited good faith in dealing with the elimination of INF 

missiles and reducing strategic force inventories, they might 

ultimately forestall or limit the US SDI effort. 

What did the Soviets have to lose? If they agreed to the 

total elimination of INF missiles, they could rid themselves 

of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile threat 

that they had brought upon themselves through SS-20 deployment. Also, by removing US long-range INF missiles, they 

would partially dismantle a rung in NATO's escalation ladder. 

Although nuclear escalation by NATO would still be possible 

through shorter-range weapons, the Alliance's ability to strike 

the Soviet homeland would be lessened. If, on the other hand, 

INF missiles remained in Europe and were used to attack the 

Soviet Union, the Soviets would not have adequate defenscs 

available and deployed to protect all the potential target areas. 

Without INF missiles, NATO would be forced to move 

to the next step--attack by strategic nuclear forces. Thus, 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 19 

the benefit of eliminating INF missiles would be twofold: it 

would reduce the nearby threat to the Soviet homeland, and 

it would force the United States to contemplate an undesirable 

escalation to intercontinental systems. The elimination of 

SS-20s could be rationalized as an insignificant loss; if US INF 

missiles were comparably reduced, Soviet conventional forces 

would still predominate. The elastic linkage between the United 

States and NATO might be further stretched as well because 

fewer nuclear weapons would be available for European 

defense. 

Movement in the START negotiations also could prove 

beneficial. Admittedly, both the Soviet Union and the United 

States had extremely large inventories of nuclear weapons. If 

both sides reduced their inventories, their respective threats 

would be lessened. But balanced strategic force reductions 

would still leave sufficient long-range nuclear forces to accomplish strategic nuclear objectives. It was well worth the 

gamble of reducing strategic forces if SDI deployment--with 

its accompanying technological and economic challenges-- 

could be eliminated or restricted. 

When considering key issues such as the US position on 

SDI, potential Soviet concerns over the SDI program, and the 

progress of INF and START negotiations after they were 

reconvened, a curious relationship becomes apparent: The SDI 

program was the major motivation for the Soviets' return to 

the bargaining table. By showing their willingness to limit or 

eliminate INF missiles and reduce strategic forces, the Soviets 

might compel the United States to show some reciprocal SDI 

movement. 

Iv. A New Round of Talks, 1985-87 

In January 1985, Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister 

Gromyko met in Geneva to set an agenda for a new, comprehensive series of negotiations known as the Nuclear and Space 

Arms Talks (NST). Under the NST umbrella were included 
20 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

INF, START, and Defense and Space negotiations. 42 The two 

sides now appeared ready to resume INF and START talks. 

As far as Defense and Space Talks were concerned, SDI would 

be the central issue. 

The US position on SDI during Defense and Space talks 

had been emphatic since the talks began in March 1985: SDI 

was not negotiable and not available as a so-called bargaining 

chip. 43 However, if technology proved feasible, the United 

States would seek a cooperative transition to defenses with the 

Soviets. This has remained thc US position throughout the 

Defense and Space Talks and during INF and START 

negotiations .44 

INF. The new Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces negotiations 

began in early 1985 where they left off in late 1983. The United 

States reaffirmed its desire to eliminate INF missiles globally, 

with the willingness to accept an interim agreement on equal 

limits at the lowest possible number. In considering any reductions, the Soviets maintained their position, opposing US INF 

deployment and insisting on the linkage of British and French 

forces in the INF balance. 45 By the third round of talks in the 

Fall of 1985, some movement had begun. General Secretary 

Gorbachev called for a freeze on US and Soviet INF missile 

deployments. He announced that Soviet SS-4s were being 

phased out and that some SS-20s were being removed from 

combat status. The United States responded by proposing that 

each side be limited to 140 intermediate range missile launchers in Europe, and that Soviet SS-20s in Asia be reduced proportionately. The Soviets responded in turn by proposing that, 

over the following 18 months, the United States reduce its 

number of ground-launched cruise missiles to 100-120 and 

remove its Pershing IIs. Additionally, the Soviets proposed 

that they would reduce their SS-20 force to equal the number 

of US, British, and French warheads in Europe. 46 

In actuality, both sides maintained their former basic positions. The United States was driving for its zero option, and 

the Soviets were looking to limit US INF deployment and maintain linkage to French and British systems. But the Soviets' 

intent to show movement was now motivated by their concern 

not only over ongoing US INF deployment, but also over continuing SDI research. 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 21 

In the Geneva summit of November 1985, President 

Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to consider 

the "idea of an interim INF agreement." Mr. Gorbachev 

followed up, in January 1986, by proposing that all nuclear 

weapons be eliminated over a 15-year period--by the year 2000. 

As part of this proposal, US and Soviet INF missiles in Europe 

would be eliminated over a 5-8 year period. Although SS-20s 

in Asia would remain at existing levels, they too would be 

eliminated later in the process. This constituted the first Soviet 

offer that would not count British and French forces and did 

not require more remaining Soviet missiles than US missiles 

as compensation for allied weapons. However, the proposal 

did require freezing British and French levels and barring US 

transfers of nuclear systems to third parties. 47 

Until October 1986, proposals and counterproposals 

focused on launcher and warhead limits. The United States 

proposed 140 launchers in Europe for each side and the complete elimination of all INF missiles within three years. The 

Soviets offered a 100-warhead limit in Europe with token 

reductions in Asia. The United States then agreed to a 

100-warhead limit in Europe with the Soviet right to retain 100 

more warheads in Asia--if the United States had the right to 

match that number. 48 

START. As was the case in INF talks, new START sessions 

began again in early 1985. However, the two sides had problems reaching agreement. During the first round in April 1985, 

the United States proposed a reduction to 5,000 ballistic missile 

warheads each, a limit of 850 or more ballistic missile launchers each, and a limit of 400 heavy bombers for the United 

States. The Soviets talked of 25 percent reductions on strategic 

arms and a ban on cruise missiles with ranges of more than 

600 kilometers. 49 Throughout the year, both sides exchanged 

proposals varying the limits on delivery vehicles, warheads, 

and bombers. Not until the Geneva summit in November 1985 

did they reach a basic agreement. As a result of the summit, 

the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to focus on the 

principle of 50 percent reductions as a common ground on 

which to build future proposals. 50 

A major issue during the summit focused on space-based 

defense. A US draft of a joint statement called for a joint 
22 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

program on space-based defense, whereas the Soviet proposal 

called for preventing an arms race in space and ruled out SDI 

type research. The two sides could not come to agreement on 

space-based defenses or SDI and ultimately avoided addressing the issues. 51 The final joint statement did, however, 

acknowledge "preventing an arms race in space.' ,52 It was apparent that the Soviets were serious about limiting the US SDI 

effort. They decided to avoid the issue at the Geneva summit, 

but would raise it again at Reykjavik. 

Until the Reykjavik summit, 1986 saw little progress. The 

General Secretary's 15-year plan to eliminate all nuclear 

weapons was proposed in January. The strategic portion proposed to reduce inventories by 50 percent within the first five 

to eight years, to continue with reductions in the next five to 

seven years, and to eliminate all remaining nuclear weapons 

in the last five years. 53 

But the ensuing negotiations continued to focus on 

launcher and warhead limits, not total elimination. During the 

Summer, the Soviets proposed a limit of 1,600 on delivery 

vehicles (down from 2,250 under SALT II), an 8,000 limit on 

weapons, and limitations on ballistic missile submarines and 

sea-launched cruise missiles. 54 The United States countered 

with a limit of 7,500 ballistic missile and air-launched cruise 

missile weapons, 5,500 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM 

warheads, 1,650 heavy ICBMs, and 350 heavy bombers. 55 

Reykjavik and After. The Reykj avik summit of 11-12 October 

1986 allowed the United States and Soviet Union to break away 

from their deadlocks over INF and START. However, it also 

more clearly showed the Soviets' hand on strategic defenses. 

Their concerns over SDI were such that they wanted to link 

limitations on SDI to both the INF and START negotiations. 

As they discussed INF and START at the summit, the 

two sides continually focused on SDI. The United States 

wanted to pursue SDI research and, if a program were practical, eliminate offensive missiles as the two sides deployed advanced defenses. The Soviets, on the other hand, wanted strict 

adherence to the ABM Treaty with a no-withdrawal pledge for 

ten years. The two could not come to full agreement, eventually agreeing not to agree on the specific nowithdrawal 

period. 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 23 

General Secretary Gorbachev wanted to strengthen the 

ABM Treaty by confining all SDI research to the laboratory 

(the treaty allows field testing) and agreeing not to develop or 

test space weapons. President Reagan strongly objected, insisting that the United States had the right to test SDI technologies 

as required. After a final afternoon of talks, unable to agree 

on SDI, the two leaders broke off their discussions. 56 

Although the two sides could not reach agreement on SDI, 

they did establish limitations on both INF and START 

weapons. Within INF, they agreed to eliminate all of their INF 

missiles in Europe and maintain a global ceiling of 100 

warheads elsewhere. 57 In START, they agreed to reduce the 

total of ballistic missile and air-launched cruise missile 

warheads to 6,000 for each side and limit ballistic missiles and 

bombers to 1,600 for each side. Within this agreement, each 

bomber with bombs and short-range missiles would only count 

as one warhead. 58 However, the Soviets continued to insist 

that both agreements be linked to US constraints on SDI. 

Specifically, they insisted that research and testing be permitted 

only in the laboratory. 59 

As a result of Reykjavik, an apparent dichotomy existed. 

On one hand, the Soviets wanted to limit SDI research to the 

laboratory and link this limitation to both the INF and START 

agreements. On the other hand, the deadlock over specifics 

within INF and START had apparently been broken and the 

two sides appeared ready to address serious reductions. 

A major point to be made about the Reykjavik summit 

is that the INF and START proposals that evolved from the 

meeting actually eliminated some nuclear weapons. The earlier 

SALT treaties had merely placed upper limits on strategic 

forces. If the Reykjavik positions could be agreed upon, the 

precedent established by the ABM Treaty in eliminating or 

significantly reducing weapons could be repeated. The US commitment to SDI and Soviet fears of its potential were starting 

to have an effect on Soviet bargaining positions. 

Debates over SDI continued during the ensuing weeks. 

Immediately following the summit, President Reagan reemphasized his position in a television address on 13 October: "SDI 

is America's insurance policy...the key to a world without 

weapons." During a similar address on 14 October, 
24 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

General Secretary Gorbachev tacitly acknowledged Soviet concern over the potential adverse economic impact of SDI when 

he stated, "The United States wants to economically tire the 

Soviet Union."6° 

When the United States presented its Reykjavik-based 

INF and START proposals in late October, the Soviets insisted 

that SDI remained the obstacle, noting, "This is a very serious 

and fundamental problem. ''61 As would be expected, when 

the Soviets countered with their new proposals in November, 

based on their understanding at Reykjavik, they continued to 

link INF and START with constraints on SDI. 62 These positions did not change significantly until February 1987. At that 

point, General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet 

Union was ready for a separate INF treaty not linked to 

START or antimissile defense. 63 

Perhaps Gorbachev's announcement marked a Soviet 

realization that it was time to begin the final steps of its 

strategy. It was apparent that attempts to change US thinking 

and derail SDI had not succeeded. Despite Soviet offers to 

eliminate all INF missiles in Europe, to fall back from their 

position on linking European reductions to British and French 

forces, and to agree on a global limit, the United States had 

stood firm on SDI. It was time for the Soviets to sacrifice their 

SS-20s, reach an INF agreement, and put pressure on the 

United States to respond with sacrifices of its own. 

By the end of July, the Soviets had agreed to a "global 

double zero" position. Details on treaty verification were 

worked out, and, on 30 October, both sides announced that 

Gorbachev would visit the United States in December to sign 

an INF treaty. 64 

On 8 December 1987, President Reagan and General 

Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty to eliminate a// 

US and Soviet INF missiles. Not since the ABM Treaty was 

signed in 1972 had an agreement been consummated to 

significantly reduce or eliminate an entire class of weapons. 

The fear of SDI deployment had played a significant role in 

leading the Soviets to their position. 

A Stop to START. Meanwhile, START negotiations were moving at a slower pace. Although some accommodation could 

be made to US proposals, the Soviets had to be careful not 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 25 

to acquiesce in the critical area of strategic forces. They had 

toiled long and hard to match US capabilities and wanted to 

ensure any reductions didn't threaten their relative position. 

When the US and Soviet positions were presented in 

Geneva after Reykjavik, SDI remained the stumbling block. 

In addition to the Reykjavik 6,000/1,600 agreement, the US 

proposal established sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile 

warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on "permitted" ICBMs; moreover, all ballistic missiles would be 

eliminated after ten years. By contrast, the Soviet proposal 

called for 50 percent cuts in all strategic forces over a fiveyear period. 65 

During the following year, negotiations dealt with sublimit variations, the possibility of constraining other systems 

such as sea-launched cruise missiles and heavy ICBMs, and, 

of course, defining the limits on strategic defense. The United 

States modified its post-Reykjavik position in May 1987 by 

offering to change the ICBM warhead limit from 3,300 to 3,600 

and to achieve the 50 percent cuts over a seven-year period. 

It also proposed that both sides agree not to withdraw from 

the ABM Treaty through 1994, at which time either side could 

deploy defensive systems unless mutually agreed otherwise. 

Although no breakthrough had occurred so far in 1987, the 

two sides seemed to be making progress in working out detailed 

common language. 66 

The Soviets didn't respond until July. When they did, 

their positions were similar to those previously forwarded. 

Other than reconfirming the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 delivery 

vehicle limits, they addressed no other sub-limits. Nevertheless, 

they did propose to reduce their heavy ICBMs by 50 percent 

as the United States had suggested. Additionally, they proposed 

a limit of 400 sea-launched cruise missiles. Their strongest statement, however, came with regard to strategic defenses, when 

Soviet delegation head Aleksei Obukhov stated at a news conference, "the Soviet draft treaty.., can be achieved only if there 

is an accord that places a barrier against spreading the arms 

race into outer space and guaranteeing effective reinforcement 

of the regime of the ABM Treaty. ''67 

Although differences still existed between the two positions, much common language actually existed between the 
26 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

US draft of May and the Soviet draft of July. 68 Research on 

SDI remained a stumbling block. President Reagan was committed to not limiting SDI technology programs, while the 

Soviets were committed to establishing limits. Statements supporting these views continued from each side right up until 

the December 1987 summit to sign the INF Treaty. After the 

treaty was signed, discussions focused on START and produced 

the same conflicting results: agreements on strategic offense, 

disagreement over strategic defense. 

The Soviets had made their major concession by agreeing to the INF Treaty. Although they certainly could benefit 

from eliminating the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise 

missile threats, they, too, had given up their INF missiles. But 

more importantly, they had fulfilled the first step of their 

strategy. Their major concession to eliminate an entire class 

of weapons should now provide them with greater leverage in 

accomplishing their second step--obtaining concessions from 

the United States to limit its Strategic Defense Initiative. 

During the summit, both sides reached agreements on 

strategic offensive arms. Within the framework of a 6,000 

warhead limit for each side, limits of 4,900 ballistic missile 

warheads, 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBMs, and 1,600 strategic 

offensive delivery systems were established (see table 3). 

Additionally, the aggregate throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs and 

SLBMs would be reduced 50 percent below existing levels. Each 

heavy bomber would count as one strategic nuclear delivery 

vehicle and count as only one warhead if equipped with gravity 

bombs and short-range attack missiles. Also, air-launched 

cruise missile counting rules were established, as was commitment to limit sea-launched cruise missiles in the future. 69 

Table 3. Proposed START Limits (equal for US and USSR) 

Category 

Total warheads 

Ballistic missile warheads 

ICBM warheads 

Warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs 

Strategic offensive delivery systems 

Limit 

6,000 

4,900 

3,000-3,300 

1,540 

1,600 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 27 

General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan could 

not agree, however, on the future of SDI. Neither could those 

attempting to draft the final joint communique. The United 

States had proposed language permitting SDI work to proceed. 

The Soviets proposed that each side observe the ABM Treaty 

"as signed and ratified." Concerned that these words would 

force too restrictive an interpretation, the United States 

negotiators insisted they be changed to simply say "as signed." 

But they did not obtain direct reference to testing in space; 

instead, each side could conduct testing as "required" under 

the terms of the ABM Treaty. Essentially, the public wording 

was left vague, left almost to the interpretation of the reader. 

The SDI issue was far from settled and was left for future 

discussions over treaty interpretation. 70 

The since-reported private negotiating record portrays a 

different story. The chief US negotiator at the Defense and 

Space Talks, Dr. Henry P. Cooper, has indicated that the 

Soviets "accepted U.S. language that they had previously rejected because it meant the sides could test, but not deploy, 

all ABM systems and components based on 'other physical 

principles.'" However, he continued by noting, "the Soviets 

have publicly denied the clear meaning of the private 

negotiating record." So despite apparent private agreement, 

the two sides continued to publicly disagree. 71 

Statements and other reports after the summit highlighted 

the two sides' differing opinions. In his press conference immediately following the summit, Gorbachev said, "If the U.S. 

builds up SDI... strategic stability will be undermined and a 

new sphere will be opened up in the arms race with unpredictable consequences." Reagan responded in his television speech 

after the summit, "I made it clear that our SDI program will 

continue, and that when we have a defense ready to deploy, 

we will do SO. ''72 

A few days later, while addressing his own nation, Gorbachev indicated that important differences over SDI divided 

the United States and Soviet Union, and warned that they could 

derail the nuclear disarmament process. He emphasized that 

differences still existed between the two sides and noted, "We 

have reaffirmed our readiness for a 50 percent cut in the 
28 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

strategic offensive weapons on condition the ABM Treaty be 

preserved in the form it was adopted in 1972. ''73 The next day, 

Reagan acknowledged, "we are in disagreement" over strategic 

defense programs. He went on to explain, "It was a simple 

thing. He took his position, we took ours and it was put that 

way in the communique." Basically, President Reagan 

acknowledged that he and General Secretary Gorbachev had 

agreed to disagree. 74 

Despite having attempted to whet the United States' appetite for more arms control agreements by way of signing an 

INF Treaty, the Soviets had not yet succeeded in restricting 

SDI. But it was obvious that the line had been drawn. Having 

granted concessions for various ICBM sub-limits, the Soviets 

had compromised enough. Final strategic arms reductions 

would be agreed upon only if the United States followed a more 

restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty and SDI deployment were forestalled. 

After the INF Summit. Disagreement between the two sides 

over the limits of SDI testing continued after the December 

1987 summit. The United States began 1988 by proposing a 

new draft treaty on ballistic missile defenses that incorporated 

language from the summit communique and sought a 

cooperative transition to SDI defense. 75 In response, however, 

the Soviets expresssed chagrin that the treaty language showed "disrespect for the summit agreement" to leave the issue 

for later. 76 Although the two sides continued to work details 

on START treaty specifics, SDI and strategic defense testing 

limitations continued to block progress on a final agreement. 

Four areas of substantive disagreement remained between 

the two sides. The first related directly to SDI. The United 

States did not want a link between SDI research, development, 

and testing, whereas the Soviets wanted an agreement that 

would permit suspension of START reductions if the United 

States moved toward deploying strategic defenses. Second, the 

two sides disagreed about what research, development, and 

testing rights are permitted during the ABM Treaty nonwithdrawal period. Third, the Soviets favored a blanket nonwithdrawal commitment for the ABM Treaty, whereas the 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 29 

United States insisted on internationally recognized withdrawal 

rights. Finally, the two sides could not agree on what occurs 

at the end of the nonwithdrawal period. 77 

v. SDI Issues 

As we continue to seek arms control agreements with the 

Soviets and also pursue SDI research, we need to ask, should 

our advocacy of making a transition to SDI-type defenses lead 

our arms control positions? Or should our arms control objectives drive the limitations we place on SDI testing and 

deployment? 

The approach taken by the United States during the postReykjavik period serves as an example of how a positive answer 

to the first question would work. The United States placed 

primary emphasis on being able to attain SDI test objectives 

and, therefore, made arms control secondary. As a result, the 

hard-line US position not to permit limits on SDI testing was, 

until recently, claimed by the Soviets to be an obstacle to 

reaching an arms control agreement. If, on the other hand, 

arms control agreements are paramount, SDI testing would 

have to be limited or prohibited because of Soviet insistence. 

In either case, if the two parties negotiating have firmly 

opposite views of which should lead, the goals of the first side 

will pull against those of the other. In such a situation, can 

a final agreement ever be reached? 

Besides these primary differences, there are secondary 

motivations. In the case of the ongoing arms control-SDI 

debate, both the United States and the Soviet Union have 

similar views on arms control. They desire strategic offensive 

arms control to lessen the threat against themselves and reduce 

the risk of nuclear war. The Soviet Union, however, now has 

another motive. It desires arms control to inhibit the United 

States from developing effective defenses. 

The Soviets' main concern is to prohibit SDI deployment 

so they can avoid entering into a technological race with the 

United States that could derail their economic and military programs. The US goal is to deploy defenses to better deter attack 

and provide some level of protection to the nation should 
30 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

deterrence fail. It is important to understand these underlying motivations. The United States places SDI first, but not 

at the expense of arms control. Its intent is to achieve offensive reductions as defensive systems are deployed. The Soviet 

Union, on the other hand, places arms control first, but explicitly at the expense of future US defenses. 

Which should drive? Although there is no "right" answer, 

extremes may be counterproductive. Certainly, arms control 

for arms control's sake can jeopardize national security by permitting imbalances that favor one's adversary or by forfeiting 

opportunities that would enhance one's own security. Similarly, 

pursuing technology, or new weapons systems, for technology's 

sake can lead to spiralling arms races or cause one side to 

perceive a serious threat from the other. The answer to the 

dilemma, then, should be moderation. Successful negotiations 

result in each side perceiving benefits, yet also having to forfeit 

something to gain those benefits. 

Bargaining Chip or Leverage? The question that keeps coming up in discussions about SDI is, should SDI be a "bargaining chip" or should it provide "leverage"? By definition, a 

bargaining chip is something to be given up to obtain concessions from the other side, while leverage is something you can 

use to convince or coerce the other side to move toward your 

position, either totally or in part. 

So, is SDI a bargaining chip? Not really. To give up SDI 

totally, as the Soviets desire, would not only forfeit an 

important arms control tool but also eliminate the potential 

for increased deterrence and protection. The Soviets' concern 

over SDI has motivated them to take significant steps in the 

arms control arena. The INF Treaty eliminated an entire class 

of weapons, and now the basics for a START treaty are 

generally agreed upon. To give up SDI or recognize it as a 

bargaining chip discards its future potential. 

We should continue to use SDI to provide leverage to 

produce agreement on other issues. This might mean not maintaining the hard-line position of the past, and perhaps permitting some limitations on SDI in order to reach a compromise 

in other areas. Admittedly, such an approach might lengthen 

the time to reach an agreement. But, as our experience in INF 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 31 

negotiations shows us, pursuing a dual-track approach could 

prove beneficial. 

In the situation involving SDI, this approach would call 

for arms control to bridge between the defensive and offensive regimes. The intent would not be to continue with defenses 

in hope of reaching an agreement to eliminate them totally, as 

was the case with INF. Rather, the intent would be to continue 

with defenses in hope of reducing the level of offensive forces. 

This combination would provide two benefits for the survival of the nation. First, significant reductions of offensive 

warheads through arms control would reduce the intensity of 

an overall attack. Second, deployment of a defensive capability 

would complicate and lessen the effectiveness of the attack. 

Thus, continued development and testing of defensive systems 

would apply leverage to achieve reductions in offensive force 

levels. 

Militarizing Space. Defense and Space Talks have focused on 

the ABM Treaty and discussions of how much testing is permitted. Disagreement centers on how restrictively the ABM 

Treaty should be interpreted. Obviously, the United States' 

interpretation is less restrictive than the Soviets'. The United 

States wants to pursue SDI, the Soviets want to prevent deployment of defenses. We should address this issue in an evenhanded manner and be careful to avoid the impression that 

we are "breaking out" of the ABM Treaty. 

An approach taken by the United States that assists in 

this area is the Predictability Protocol proposed during 1988. 

This protocol calls for an annual exchange of programmatic 

data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on respective strategic defense efforts, reciprocal visits to 

associated research facilities, and reciprocal observation of 

strategic defense tests. Although the Soviets have agreed in 

principle to some of these measures, disagreements remain. 

The two sides continue to work on a joint draft text of a protocol addressing these matters. 78 

As we require additional testing to support SDI development, every attempt should be made to negotiate the easing 

of testing restrictions with the Soviets. As a minimum, we 

should provide the Soviets specifics on the nature and scope 
32 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

of planned tests. We should also make it clear where we are 

in development in order not to cause the Soviets to over-react. 

Our intent should be to gradually broaden ABM Treaty interpretation to be supportive of a wider range of tests. We would 

not want to threaten the Soviets into "breaking out" of the 

treaty in fear that we are about to do the same. In short, we 

would want to develop confidence-building measures that 

attempt to assure the Soviets that we are not seeking a first 

strike capability or a posture that would give us a strategic 

advantage. 

As we cooperatively develop and test using agreed upon 

predictability measures, the United States and the Soviet Union 

would announce each test series and indicate exactly what it 

will test and how the test will extend beyond the ABM Treaty's 

traditional interpretation. By openly keeping the other side informed of progress, perhaps confidence could be built that a 

first-strike capability and ABM "breakout" aren't being 

attempted. Essentially, this approach would detail the planned 

and orderly steps to be taken to widen, or in fact abrogate, 

the treaty over time. The intent would be to avoid surprise. 

By observing systems being tested and interpreting 

capabilities, each side could assess what level of deployment 

might provide enough capability to threaten a first strike. If 

both sides were developing defenses concurrently, they could 

pace system deployment to parallel one another so as not to 

be threatening. If only one side were to deploy defenses, 

perhaps it would want to keep to levels that weren't threatening 

to the other side. The so-called transition phase will need close 

coordination and cooperation to avoid a perceived imbalance 

or create an unstable situation. 

As deployment times arrive, weapons will have to be 

emplaced. The final design of the system will dictate their location. One very real future possibility is space deployment. This 

has long been a contentious issue and has fueled concerns over 

an arms race in space. Both the United States and the Soviet 

Union are actively researching SDI-type systems. Additionally, 

the Soviets already have a limited anti-satellite capability that, 

when employed, places weapons in space. It could also be 

argued that the use of communications, navigation, and 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 33 

weather satellites to support our forces has already militarized 

space. The key is not to claim we can keep space demilitarized 

but to limit deployment to defensive systems only. 

Admittedly, a limitation to permit the deployment of only 

defensive weapons in space would be extremely difficult to 

verify. But the confidence building measures previously 

described could assist. As individual weapon systems were 

deployed, their purpose and intent would be explained. Each 

side would have its own observers to assess how much of a 

defensive system the other side would require to stay within 

agreed bounds. Once the necessary assets were deployed, any 

additional deployment would be viewed as excess and a potential offensive threat that would have to be removed. 

If cheating had mixed offensive systems within the 

defensive architecture, then the overall effectiveness of the 

defense would be impaired by not having the required defensive assets deployed. Also, since offensive systems would be 

prohibited, no testing would have been permitted. Offensive 

planners would have little confidence in systems that had never 

been tested in their operational environment. 

New Direction of Negotiations. The arms control agreements 

of the 1960s and 1970s succeeded primarily in establishing limits 

beyond which nuclear arsenals couldn't grow. But in the case 

of the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II, those limits 

had not yet been reached and each side's arsenal was permitted 

to expand. The ABM Treaty (and its protocol) was the significant exception. It essentially eliminated an entire class of 

weapons and avoided a potential arms race by limiting each 

side to one ABM deployment area. A similar feat was not 

accomplished until the INF Treaty was signed, eliminating an 

entire class of nuclear weapons. 

The announcement to pursue strategic defenses, through 

SDI, played a significant part in breaking the logjam in INF 

and START negotiations. By trying to show responsiveness 

in arms control, the Soviets agreed to an INF Treaty in hopes 

of obtaining a trade-off with regard to SDI. They similarly 

reached many agreements over the details of a START treaty. 

In showing movement in these areas, they hoped to stop SDI. 
34 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

Until recently, the Soviets had drawn the line by absolutely 

linking a final START accord to SDI. 

Accordingly, the United States should use SDI defenses 

as leverage to pressure Soviet arms control negotiators to obtain agreements in the offensive arena. In using this approach, 

SDI should not be considered a bargaining chip. Instead, we 

should maintain our commitment to deploy it in order to obtain other concessions. In doing so, our plan would be to 

methodically extend the interpretation of the ABM Treaty and, 

essentially, abrogate it over time. As we reach system deployment, only those weapons systems directly related to the defense 

would be permitted. The Strategic Defense Initiative thus has 

provided the basis for taking great strides in arms control. We 

would be foolish to forfeit its potential. 

vI. A Revised Approach to Arms Control 

What direction should we take with the Strategic Defense 

Initiative and how far should we go with strategic defenses? 

For one thing, we need to acknowledge that the research program, and SDI's potential system deployment, must not be 

an end unto itself. Although President Reagan originally 

proposed a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, the 

direction of the program has changed. SDI is only one piece 

of the overall strategic puzzle. 

If SDI were an end unto itself, intended to create a new 

order or develop a strategy to replace containment, we would 

be pursuing geopolitical and strategic changes even more drastic 

than we are now observing. Essentially, we would be creating 

a world order in which nations didn't threaten one another, 

with defenses deployed merely as insurance in case some 

renegade slipped away from the new order. 

Strategic Direction. Perhaps we are not yet ready, given the 

differing cultural and historical influences of East and West, 

for such a radical revision of relationships. As a result, we still 

contain and we still deter. In this context, SDI has merely the 

potential of enhancing our deterrent posture. No longer does 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 35 

the SDI system promise perfect defenses of our population, 

nor the complete withdrawal of all strategic ballistic missile 

forces. 

In fact, offenses and defenses are now seen to be complementary. Defenses only provide the ability to complicate 

enemy attack planning and raise uncertainties about the suc= 

cess of his assault. The attack planner confronting SDI must 

consider how his offensive forces will contend with new defen= 

sire systems and evaluate the confidence he has in overwhelming them. Additionally, he cannot be assured of which 

segments of his attack will succeed and, more importantly, 

which will fail. Also, the defender has the capability to pro= 

tect critical assets that have no defense today. Whether the final 

decision is to protect offensive forces, critical command and 

control elements, or designated population centers, the fact 

of the matter is that the defender with SDI will be better off 

militarily than he is today. 

Despite these advantages, conflicting views remain over 

what SDI and the future role of defenses are all about. Some 

believe that a perfect shield is the goal; others oppose the pro= 

gram because they criticize such expectations as being incredibly 

naive and unattainable. Some speak of defending our population; others of defending military forces. The original goal of 

rendering ballistic missiles obsolete has been modified 

realistically, in that we now acknowledge reduction of such 

weapons, but not their complete elimination. 

It is time to stop sending conflicting signals and clearly 

articulate the true direction of the Strategic Defense program. 

All levels of government must understand and pursue the same 

strategic goals to ensure that the effort is properly understood 

and supported by the Congress and the American public. 

Basically, our overall stance on strategic defense should be as 

follows: 

• The role of strategic defense is to enhance deterrence, 

not to create a new strategic order. 

• Strategic defenses will significantly complicate enemy 

attack planning and provide some level of protection 

for the United States that is nonexistent today. 
36 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

• Strategic defenses are not an end in themselves but 

are meant to complement our other deterrent forces. 

Military Strategy. President Reagan's original vision could lead 

eventually to a shift in our military strategy. Assuming that 

the Soviets would respond in kind to US deployment of 

defensive systems, we might actually undermine our oversea 

deterrent and the strategy of Flexible Response. Traditional 

deterrence has been based on the threat of credible retaliation. 

Our ability to retaliate not only has deterred nuclear attack 

against the United States, but also has provided the threat of 

escalation to deter conventional attack in Europe and 

elsewhere. If we were to deploy a highly effective defensive 

system, we might significantly, perhaps detrimentally, erode 

our overall deterrent capability because similar Soviet defenses 

would reduce our offensive retaliatory capability. Certainly, 

we would be able to defend against nuclear attack, but we might 

have narrowed our deterrent to focus solely on protection 

against nuclear attack on the United States and, as a result 

of Soviet defenses, lost the capability to escalate in support 

of conventional forces overseas. 

This narrowed deterrent posture would be invaluable in 

limiting nuclear destruction at home but without value in deterring expanded conventional conflict abroad. Although one segment of deterrence would be enhanced, the overall concept of 

extended deterrence would be weakened. As a result, our 

military strategy would have to shift significantly toward a 

greater reliance on conventional force deployment and 

employment. 

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have ongoing 

strategic defense programs, and space has been militarized 

already through the deployment of communications, navigation, and weather satellites that directly support our military 

forces. We aren't about to disinvent these subsidiary defensive aids. To further complicate the enemy's planning and 

lessen his probability of success, some level of strategic defense 

also should be deployed. The question is, how much? 

The answer is to deploy that level of defense which deters, 

but not a level so effective that it forces a Soviet reaction and 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 37 

a significant shift toward a further reliance on conventional 

forces. A system that is 20-30 percent effective probably would 

suffice. It's possible that an effectiveness of 50 percent or more 

might actually precipitate a strategic shift. By remaining at a 

relatively modest level, enough defense would be available to 

disrupt an attack, while lemaining strategic offensive and conventional forces, though somewhat reduced, would provide 

both the real deterrent against attack and the credible warfighting capability should deterrence fail. 

Thus, I propose the following force posture: 

• Deploy strategic defenses, consciously limited to that 

level of capability which deters. 

• Reduce strategic offensive force levels. 

• Maintain existing, or balanced, deployed conventional 

force levels. 

Our military strategy would be similar to today's but 

would accommodate the addition of strategic defenses. Our 

approach in each area would be as follows: 

• Conventional: Forward defense with rapid reinforcement. 

• Strategic defense: Preferential defense of high-value 

assets or areas; attrition of enemy attacking forces 

to complicate his attack. 

• Strategic offense: Early attack against enemy defensive capabilities, with follow-on attack against redefined objectives. 

SDI's Role. To fulfill SDI deployment objectives and achieve 

reductions in offensive forces, SDI should be used as leverage 

to obtain arms control concessions. The United States should 

continue to commit itself to pursuing SDI technology that leads 

to deployment to make certain that our commitment is made 

well known. The Soviets' concern over SDI, and the costs 

associated with it for them, could pressure them into further 

agreements to reduce their offensive forces. 

The Soviets have long been trying to derail SDI. They 

still hope to stop the program. The United States, however, 

has expressed the desire to develop it and deploy a defensive 
38 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

capability. The two sides have opposing motives. Despite recent movement in START, we may again reach an impasse. 

Realizing that the United States is committed to deployment, 

perhaps the Soviets would agree to compromises that could 

at least limit or avoid a defensive deployment race. The United 

States could then agree not to pursue full deployment of 

defenses, while the Soviets could agree to offensive arms reductions. Each side would have something to gain, each something 

to lose. 

Pragmatically, the United States would limit development 

of its defenses in order to achieve Soviet offensive force reductions, while the Soviet Union would agree to offensive reductions in order to limit the US defenses. From the standpoint 

of the defenses alone, the United States would be forfeiting 

its goal of full deployment, but would be gaining some level 

of deployment above the Soviets' desire for none at all. In turn, 

the Soviet Union would be forfeiting its goal of halting SDI 

deployment by gaining some lessened level of deployment 

below the US desire for a full defensive capability. 

Through a "controlled abrogation" of the ABM Treaty, 

defensive systems in space would be tested and deployed over 

time in an orderly manner and with a carefully managed and 

monitored transition. When coupled with offensive arms reductions, the concerns arising in the ABM debate of the 1960s 

and 1970s could be avoided. A major argument used against 

ABM deployment was that the offense could be built up to 

overpower the defense. In the current context, SDI defensive 

deployment and offensive arms control would be integrated. 

Similarly, cooperation and monitoring of system development 

could lead to confidence building measures and avoid the 

danger of a potential arms race in space. 

Thus, the proposed arms control approach for strategic 

defense would do the following: 

• Increase defenses to apply pressure on arms control 

to achieve offensive force reductions. 

• Accept compromises that limit SDI deployment. 

• Limit weapons deployment in space to defensive 

systems only. 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 39 

• Rely on a balanced deterrent consisting of limited 

strategic defenses, reduced offensive forces, and existing or balanced conventional force levels. 

The Strategic Defense Initiative has evolved from the 

vision of perfect defense to the reality of support for deterrence. Although its effect is not widely acknowledged, SDI has 

exerted considerable influence on the arms control process. 

The influence can continue if the United States pursues the 

policies and arms control strategies outlined here. Commitment to a limited defense that enhances deterrence will provide the leverage necessary to achieve the nation's arms control and security objectives. 

NOTES 

1. Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation, 23 March 1983. 

2. Ibid. 

3. Ibid. 

4. Fred S. Hoffman, Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S. National 

Security, Report prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

October 1983, p. iv. 

5. Ibid., p. 7. 

6. Ibid., p. 1. 

7. Ibid., p. 2. 

8. "DoD Information and Guidance on the President's Strategic 

Defense Initiative," March 1984, p. 4. 

9. Ibid., p. 5. 

10. "Defense Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment of 

Technologies and Policy Implications," Department of Defense, GPO, April 

1984, p. 3. 

11. Ibid., p. 5. 

12. Ibid., p. 7. 

13. "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative," GPO, January 

1985, pp. i, 1. 

14. "National Security Strategy of the United States," GPO, January 

1987, p. 22. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, United States Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Government Printing Office 

(GPO), 1982, p. 132. 
40 HOWARD G. DEWOLF 

17. Ibid., p. 135. The formal titles of these agreements are "Treaty 

Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems" and "Interim 

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of 

Strategic Offensive Arms." 

18. Ibid., p. 137. 

19. Ibid. p. 140. 

20. Ibid. p. 137. 

21. Ibid. p. 138. 

22. Ibid. p. 161. 

23. Ibid. p. 148. 

24. Ibid. p. 149. 

25. Ibid. p. 239. 

26. Ibid. p. 241. The formal title of this agreement is "The Treaty 

Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms." 

27. Ibid., pp. 242-243. 

28. "INF Chronology, 1977-1987," ACDA Issues Brief, ACDA Office of Public Affairs, 1987, p. 1. 

29. George Shultz, "Security & Arms Control: The Search for a More 

Stable Peace," Department of State Bulletin, vol. 84, No. 2093, December 

1984, p. 34. 

30. "INF Chronology," p. 2. 

31. Shultz, p. 36. 

32. "INF Chronology," p. 3. 

33. Shultz, pp. 36-37. 

34. "INF Chronology," p. 3. 

35. Shultz, p. 38. 

36. "Strategic Arms (Limitations and) Reduction Talks," The Arms 

Control Reporter, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), 

Brookline, MA, 1984, p. 611.A.I. 

37. Ibid., pp. 611.A.3-4; Shultz, p. 32. 

38. Shultz, p. 33; IDDS, 1984, pp. 611.A.7-8. 

39. IDDS, 1984, p. 611.A.9. 

40. Ibid., p. 611.A.6. 

41. Shultz, p. 33. 

42. "INF Chronology," p. 4; "Strategic Arms (Limitations and) 

Reduction Talks," IDDS, 1984, p. 611.A.1. 

43. "Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space," The Arms Control 

Reporter, IDDS, Brookline, MA, 1985, p. 575.A.5. 

44. "Strategic Arms Reductions Talks," Arms Control Reporter, 

IDDS, Brookline, MA, 1986, p. 611.A.7; "Space Weapons: US/USSR 

Negotiations," The Arms Control Reporter, IDDS, Brookline, MA, 1987, 

pp. 575.A.3-4; "Strategic Arms Reductions Talks," IDDS, 1987, p. 

611.B.427. 
SDI AND ARMS CONTROL 41 

45. "INF Chronology," p. 4. 

46. Ibid.; "Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces," IDDS, 1985, pp. 

403.A.3.1-3. 

47. "Soviet Offer Breaks Logjam on Euromissiles," Congressional 

Quarterly, Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Washington, D.C., 7 March 1987, 

p. 429; "INF Chronology," pp. 4-5. 

48. "Soviet Offer Breaks Logjam on Euromissiles," p. 429; IDDS, 

1985, p. 403.A.4; "INF Chronology," p. 5. 

49. IDDS, 1985, pp. 611.A.3-7. 

50. Ibid, p. 611.B.276; IDDS, 1987, p. 611.A.4. 

51. IDDS, 1985, pp. 611.B.276-277. 

52. Joint Concluding Statement, US-Soviet Summit, Geneva, 

Switzerland, Federal Information Systems, 21 November 1985, p. 2. 

53. IDDS, 1986, pp. 611.B.282. 

54. Ibid., p. 611.B.313. 

55. IDDS, 1987, pp. 611.A.4-5. 

56. IDDS, 1986, pp. 611.B.349-353; IDDS, 1987, p. 575.A.4. 

57. "INF Chronology," p. 5. "Soviet Offer Breaks Logjam on 

Euromissiles," p. 429. 

58. IDDS, 1987, pp. 611.A.5. 

59. Ibid., p. 575.A.4; "INF Chronology," p. 5; "Soviet Offer Breaks 

Logjam on Euromissiles," pp. 427, 429. 

60. IDDS, 1986, p. 611.B.356. 

61. Ibid., p. 611.B.363. 

62. "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces," IDDS, 1986, p. 403.B.410; 

"INF Chronology," p. 5. 

63. "Negotiations on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces," Department of State Bulletin, GPO, Washington, D.C., vol. 87, no. 2126, 

September 1987, p. 27; "Soviet Offer Breaks Logjam on Euromissiles," 

p. 429; "INF Chronology," p. 5. 

64. IDDS, 1987, pp. 403.B.520, 403.B.568; "INF Chronology," 

pp. 6-8. 

65. IDDS, 1986, pp. 603.B.92, 611.B.352-378; IDDS, 1987, p. 

611.A.5. 

66. IDDS, 1987, pp. 611.B.394, 402. 

67. Ibid., pp. 611.B.408-409. 

68. Ibid., p. 611.B.419. 

69. Ibid., p. 611.B.430. "Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet 

Proposals," ACDA Issues Brief, ACDA Office of Public Affairs, 8 

February, 1988. "Strategic Arms Reductions Talks," The Arms Control 

Reporter, IDDS, Brookline, MA, 1988, p. 611.A.4. 

70. IDDS, 1987, pp. 403.B.592-593, 611.B.431; "Space Weapons: 

US/USSR Negotiations," IDDS, 1988, p. 575.A.8. 
42 HOWARD G. I)EWOLF 

71. "Passing the SDI Baton at Geneva," Washington Times, 2 

February 1989, la. F4. 

72. IDDS, 1987, p. 575.B.282. 

73. "Gorbachev Declares SDI Imperils Strategic Cuts," The 

Washington Post, 15 December 1987, pp. AI, A30. 

74. "President: SDI Dispute Remains," The Washington Post, 16 

December 1987, p. A4. 

75. IDDS, 1988, pp. 575.A.8, 575.B.292-294. 

76. Ibid., p. 575.B.296 (Georgi Korniyenko, Senior Deputy to Ambassador Dobrynin, during a news conference). 

77. Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress, GPO, January 

1989, pp. 75-76. 

78. "Nuclear and Space Talks," ACDA Issues Brief, ACDA Office 

of Public Affairs, November 16, 1988, p. 3. 

Colonel Howard G. DeWolf, US Air Force, is a graduate of 

the National War College and a former Senior Fellow of the 

National Defense University. He is currently assigned to 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, in Mons, 

Belgium.