alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Co""", V\<-(..(..\.o\. ;-+-, cp•....•..•.. wt. c..... :tMUSKEGON COUNTY

M c H G A N

BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS

I(enneth Mahoney

Chair, Dislrict 9

Rillastine R. Wilkins

Vice.Chair, Districl 1

Benjamin E. Cross

Districl2

James J. Derezinski

Dislrict7

Marvin R. Engle

District 5

August 19, 2013

Mr. Dennis J. DeVany

Chief, Essential Air Service Division

Office of Aviation Analysis

U.S. Department of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, D.C. 20590

Reference: DOT-OST-2009-0301

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Susie Hughes

Dislrict 3

Charles Nash

District 6

Terry J. Sabo

District 8

Robert Scolnik

District 4

Dear Dennis,

The County of Muskegon, Michigan, herein provides its comments regarding SkyWest's

proposal to provide Muskegon's Essential Air Service (EAS) during the 2014 and 2015

cycle.

Our SkyWest / United Express service to Chicago began in early 2010 and initial traffic

volumes were low, primarily due to the lack of an everyday morning originating flight

and evening return flight. Muskegon has a strong business community for which well

.timed flight schedules are essential. Due to the lack of a morning originating flight and

evening return many of these business travelers have far less occasion to use our

airport.

We have repeatedly asked SkyWest for a schedule pattern similar to that offered by the

carrier at the other three former Delta markets that SkyWest assumed in early 2010.

The carrier has thus far declined to provide us with that type of schedule pattern, a

pattern which would certainly cause our traffic to increase dramatically.

SkyWest has been a reliable provider of air service and has been generally well-received

by the community, We continue to work on issues related to the pricing of our market

by SkyWest's partner, United Airlines, as well as acquiring a daily morning originating

flight. Despite some of the challenges we face, we believe that SkyWest / United Express

offers us the best chance to grow our traffic (hopefully with an improved schedule) to

the point where we can exit the EASprogram in the near future.

m. 99 SINCLAIR DRIVE •

ii'

MUSKEGON COUNTY AIRPORT

MUSKEGON, MICHIGAN 49441 (231) 798-4596' FAX (231) 798-7728

An F.EO/ ADA Emplo)'er

rp.r.vr.lnrl ,,~ntu
. .

Mr. Dennis J. DeVany

August 19, 2013

Page 2

Therefore, we endorse SkyWest's bid to provide our essential air service in 2014 and

2015 for $1;389,952 per year.

The County of Muskegon endorses the proposal of 5kyWest, as their proposal best

meets the needs of the community and the established guidelines of the EASprogram.

Thank you for your consideration of our recommendation.

Marty Piette, A.A.E.

Airport Manager

C: Bob Lukens

H:\Homan\AA\Grants\SCASO\£AS 2014\Oevany, DOTRecommendation letter 081913.docx
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v CHARLES REESE, Seaman Recruit, U. S. Navy, Appellant

9 USCMA 205, 25 CMR 467

No. 10,718

Decided April 18, 1958

*Commander Charles Timblin,*USN, and *Lieutenant (jg) Joseph A. Cdlifano, Jr.,*USNR, were on the brief for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Beale, Jr.,*USMC, was on the brief for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam:

In the course of its opinion in this ease, the board of review reduced the period of confinement and predicated its action upon the youth of the accused — 18 years. Thereupon, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the defense. It was alleged therein that upon enlisting, the accused had misrepresented his age. That he was in fact only 15 years old, and, as such, deserved a greater degree of clemency. The board, making no specific finding as to age, denied the motion. We granted the accused’s petition to ascertain whether or not his enlistment was con*206sented to by his parents or guardian, and, if not, the effect of such lack of consent upon the enlistment, and thus, upon jurisdiction of the court-martial. See United States v Blanton, 7 USCMA 664, 23 CMR 128.

Appellate defense counsel has construed, the enlistment of a minor, without parental consent, as a contract voidable at the option of the parent or guardian. See United States v Reaves, 126 Fed 127 (CA5th Cir) (1903). Consequently, he concedes that the court-martial had jurisdiction. We need not further explore this question, for the parties have submitted evidence establishing the consent of the accused’s guardians to his enlistment. Thus, no jurisdictional question is presented.1

The final issue upon which the petition was granted concerns the adequacy of the staff legal officer’s review. The Government concedes inadequacy. In his review the staff legal officer summarized the charge, pleadings, sentence and evidence. However, no mention of the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence as to the principal question, the guilt of the accused, was made. The review is materially deficient, and prejudice is apparent. United States v Fields, 9 USCMA 70, 25 CMR 332.

The decision of the board of review is reversed. The record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General of the Navy for submission to a competent reviewing authority for further proceedings under Articles 61 and 64, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 861 and 864.

1

 At the time of this enlistment 34 USC § 182 was effective. ■ It provided: “Boys between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years may, under such limitations as are contained in sections 161 and 162, be enlisted to serve in the Navy until they shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years.” Section 161 provides: “No minor under the age of fourteen years shall be enlisted in the naval service; and minors between the age of fourteen and eighteen years shall not be enlisted for the naval service without the consent of their parents or guardians.”
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DMX ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 Civil Action 2:10-cv-992

v. Judge James L. Graham

 Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DRUG 

ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this action on November 5, 2010. To date, Plaintiffs

have not effected service of process as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). On

April 28, 2011, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause within fourteen days why the Court

should not dismiss the action and why the Court should allow an extension of time to effect

service. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiffs have not responded to the Court’s Show Cause Order. The

undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice

pursuant to Rule 4(m) for failure to timely effect service of process. 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Case: 2:10-cv-00992-JLG-EPD Doc #: 5 Filed: 05/23/11 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation

omitted)) 

Date: May 23, 2011 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

 United States Magistrate Judge 

2

Case: 2:10-cv-00992-JLG-EPD Doc #: 5 Filed: 05/23/11 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-40767 USDC No. B-94-CV-289

ROBERT JOE McSPADDEN, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

- - - - - - - - - - July 23, 1999 Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Robert Joe McSpadden, Texas prisoner # 600096, moves this court for a certificate of probable cause (CPC) following the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed in 1994, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A petitioner is required to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right to obtain a CPC. Barefoot v. Estelle , 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983). In order to make a substantial showing, the petitioner “must demonstrate that the issues aredebatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the

issues in a different manner; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Id. McSpadden’s request for a CPC is granted because the district court erred in its sua sponte determination that McSpadden’s trial-court waiver of appeal waived the issues he sought to raise in his § 2254 petition. His waiver in the trial court states only that McSpadden “waives the right to appeal the verdict herein” and states nothing about waiving his right to seek habeas relief. The state habeas court did not rely on the waiver in denying McSpadden’s habeas application. Nor did the respondent plead the procedural bar in federal district court. The district court’s reliance on the waiver in dismissing McSpadden’s § 2254 petition is misplaced. Only when the state habeas court invokes such a procedural default is review of the issues precluded in federal court. Harris v. Reed , 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989) (federal review precluded absent a showing of cause for the procedural default and resulting prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice). The court also erred in not giving McSpadden notice that it was considering procedural default and the opportunity to respond to that notice. Magouirk v. Phillips , 144 F.3d 348, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1998) (district court may raise procedural default in habeas sua sponte but abuses its discretion by not giving petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond). Because the district court erroneously relied upon McSpadden’s waiver of his right to file a direct appeal from his conviction in state court in dismissing McSpadden’s § 2254No. 98-40767 -3- petition, McSpadden’s request for a CPC is GRANTED. No further briefing is necessary, and the district court’s judgment is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED. See Clark v. Williams , 693 F.2d 381, 381-82 (5th Cir. 1982). The motion filed by the Federal Public Defender to represent McSpadden in this appeal is DENIED as unnecessary.
# C_2007199EN.01005001.xml

| 25.8.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 199/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.8.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 199/50

---

Action brought on 11 June 2007 — Joseph v Commission

(Case F-54/07)

(2007/C 199/97)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Anne Joseph (Damascus, Syria) (represented by: N. Lhoëst, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | annul the contract engaging the applicant, signed on 20 July 2006, inasmuch as its length is fixed at 15 months commencing on 16 October 2006 and expiring on 15 January 2008; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contract engaging the applicant, signed on 20 July 2006, inasmuch as its length is fixed at 15 months commencing on 16 October 2006 and expiring on 15 January 2008;

| — | to the extent that it is necessary, annul the Commission's express decision of 13 February 2007, rejecting the applicant's complaint lodged, pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, on 20 October 2006; |
| --- | --- |

—

to the extent that it is necessary, annul the Commission's express decision of 13 February 2007, rejecting the applicant's complaint lodged, pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, on 20 October 2006;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The applicant claims annulment of her contract engaging her as a member of the contract staff under Article 3a of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (CEOS), inasmuch as its length is fixed not at three years but at 15 months, on the basis, first, of the Commission decision related to the maximum duration for the recourse to non-permanent staff in the Commission services and, second, Article 12 of the General Implementing Provisions related to the procedures governing the engagement and employment of members of the temporary staff of the Commission (GIP).

According to the applicant, the decision of 28 April 2004, particularly Article 3 thereof, is unlawful, inasmuch as it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 85(1) of the CEOS. In any event, under Article 1(2) thereof, that decision is not applicable to the present case, in view of the fact that the applicant is engaged in essential tasks.

The applicant alleges, in addition, the unlawfulness of the GIP, in particular Article 12 thereof, which she alleges is contrary to Article 85(1) of the CEOS. In any event, the Commission infringed Article 12(1a) and (1b) of the GIP, which do not allow; for the purposes of calculating the maximum period of employment of a member of the contract staff, the cumulation of the period of a contract under Article 3b of the CEOS with that of a contract under Article 3a of the CEOS.

The applicant relies, in addition, on the infringement of the principles of non-discrimination, sound administration and the interest of the service.

---
1 Emissions Defect Information Report

(EDIR Number: 2011.02.16.02) 1. Manufacturer: Kia Motors Corporation 2. Description of the defect: Kia has received some owner complaints regarding cooling performance on some 2010 model year Forte's equipped 2.0/2.4 liter engines. The main complaint is air-conditioner doesn't get cold enough at idle under certain circumstances. To improve customer satisfaction, Kia will modify the idle rpm from 620rpm to 850rpm in A/CON-on condition to assist the compressor to provide sufficient cooling. Description of vehicles potentially affected by the defect:
Maker Model Model Year Test Group Sales Volume

Kia Forte 2.0L 2010 AKMXV02.0TW5 (ULEV) 23,711 AKMXV02.0TWN (ULEV) 30,965 AKMXV02.0TPC (SULEV) 26,428 AKMXV02.4DW5 (ULEV) 11,229 AKMXV02.4DPC (SULEV) 4,225 Forte 2.4L

The number of vehicles containing the defect and the means by which the number of involved vehicles was determined: Number of involved vehicles: All vehicles could be potentially affected by this problem. Address of involved assembly plant: Hwaseong Assembly Plant, Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-do, Korea 5. Evaluation of the emission and driveability impact of the defect: It is Kia's assessment that while there may be some minor increase in idle emissions due to the increase in rpm at idle, this increase will be negligible compared to overall engine emissions. There is no effect to driveability. 6. Available emission data that relate to the defect: No specific test data is available. Anticipated follow-up by KIA Kia will publish a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) to provide repair information to KIA dealers for this condition, and will reprogram affected powertrain control units as necessary.

2011-02-17 05:20 / This document is the !Merl written permission. Violation of this rule will st roperty of I IA I GI.You may not copy or distribute it without e to criminal and civil liability.
No. 54162.

#### Geo. Wm. Rueff, Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 150236-K/13024 (a) (New Orleans).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protest.
|                                                       |                        |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Subsidiaries                                          | State of Incorporation |
|                                                  |                   |
| LOTS Intermediate Company                             | Delaware               |
|                                                  |                   |
| Life of the South Insurance Company                   | Georgia                |
| Bankers Life of Louisiana                             | Louisana               |
| Insurance Company of the South (30% owned)            | Georgia                |
|                                                  |                   |
| LOTSolutions, Inc.                                    | Georgia                |
| Fortegra Services, LLC                                | Delaware               |
| Creative Investigations Recovery Group, LLC           | New York               |
|                                                  |                   |
| Bliss and Glennon, Inc.                               | California             |
| South Bay Acceptance Corporation                      | California             |
| Continental Car Club, Inc.                            | Tennessee              |
| United Motor Club of America, Inc.                    | Kentucky               |
|                                                  |                   |
| CRC Reassurance Company, Ltd.                         |                   |
| LOTS Reassurance Company                              |                   |
|                                                  |                   |
| Insurance Company of the South (70% owned)            | Georgia                |
| Southern Financial Life Insurance Company (85% owned) | Kentucky               |
| Lyndon Southern Insurance Company                     | Delaware               |
|                                                  |                   |
|                                                  |                   |
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer

Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies to such officers knowledge that:

(i) the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the annual period ended December 31, 2006 (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                     |  |  |  |                                                                                  
|-------------------- |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: March 8, 2007 |  |  |  | /s/ Caroline Beasley                                                             
|                     |  |  |  | Caroline Beasley Vice President, Chief Financial
Officer, Secretary and Treasurer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof,
regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
No. 65629.

#### New York Merchandise Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 58/23446 (Los Angeles).

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that item 37/1811, described as “Funny Face in envelope,” is a manufacture in chief value of metal, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
#### JACOB E. HOGLE, Respondent, *v.*THE NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.

*Negligence*— *duty of a person injured by the negligence of another, to try to diminish the damages.*

This action was brought to recover damages occasioned to the plaintiff’s woods, by a fire alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. Upon the trial the defendant’s counsel requested the court to charge that, when the plaintiff discovered the ñre, if he neglected to use reasonably practicable means to suppress it, he could not recover for subsequent damages. The court refused, holding that as the plaintiff was not at fault in the origin of the Are, he was not bound to make any effort to suppress it.

*Held,*that the court erred in refusing to charge as requested.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the verdict of a jury, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made upon the minutes of the justice before whom the action was tried.

The action was brought to recover damages for injury to the plaintiff’s woods, occasioned by a fire alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the management and construction of its engines.

*S. W.*Jackson, for the appellant.

*D. M.*Chadsey, for the respondent.

By the Court :

The court was requested by the defendant to charge that when the paintiff discovered the fire, if he neglected to use reasonably practicable means to suppress it, he could not recover for subsequent damages. The court refused, holding that as the plaintiff was not at fault in the origin of the fire, he was not bound to make any effort to suppress it. We think that this was erroneous. Let us suppose that the plaintiff has seen a little spark of fire beginning to spread among dry leaves; that he could have put it out with a stamp of his foot; but that he knowingly neglected to do this, and thus permitted the fire to extend until it destroyed several acres of his woods. Would it be just that he should make the defendant *364pay all tbe damages lie had suffered ? Clearly not. It may be that he would not be bound to use every possible effort to suppress the fire. But the language of the request was well chosen. He should do what was reasonably practicable. To say that he need not do what he reasonably could to suppress the fire is not very far from saying that he might do what he could to increase it. The wrong done by the defendant was not intentional. And if it were in the plaintiff’s power, by reasonable efforts, to prevent the increase of the wrong, he should use that power. *(Bevier v. D. cmd H. C. Co.,*13 Hun, 254; *Milton*v. *Hudson R. Steamboat Co.,*37 N. Y., 214)

This is analogous to the rule which requires the innocent party to a broken contract of , hire of services to earn what he can in other ways, and thus dimmish the damages.to be paid by the other party.

The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

Present — Learned, P. J., Bockes and Boardman, JJ.

Judgment and order reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event.