United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1996 WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION

Status of the

Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-222

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-273023 

September 27, 1996

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable John Kasich

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

Since 1992 the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Cooperative Threat

Reduction (CTR) program has sought to help the four newly independent

states (NIS) of Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine control and reduce

threats posed by weapons of mass destruction inherited from the former

Soviet Union (FSU). In response to your requests, we evaluated

• the draft 1996 multiyear CTR program plan in terms of its scope, depiction

of project status and cost estimates, description of changes that occurred

after the 1995 CTR multiyear program plan, and release to Congress and

• the progress, estimated costs, and potential impacts of CTR efforts to help

control nuclear weapons and materials, eliminate strategic delivery

vehicles, and destroy chemical weapons.

Background Upon its breakup in 1991, the Soviet Union bequeathed a vast array of

weapons of mass destruction to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan.

This legacy included about 30,000 nuclear weapons, 2,500 strategic nuclear

delivery systems, and at least 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. In

1991, Congress authorized DOD to establish a CTR program to help these

states (1) destroy weapons of mass destruction, (2) store and transport the

weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) reduce the risk of

proliferation.

Congress has provided about $1.5 billion in fiscal years 1992-96 to address

CTR objectives. As shown in figure 1, DOD has allocated nearly

three-quarters of these funds to delivery vehicle and infrastructure

dismantlement and destruction and to improving nuclear material

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
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controls.1 It has allocated the remainder to demilitarizing defense

activities,2

 destroying chemical weapons, and other efforts. CTR program

officials have significantly increased obligations in recent years. As of

August 5, 1996, the program had obligated over $1 billion and disbursed

$571 million3

 (see app. I for a breakdown of CTR funding notifications,

obligations, and disbursements). The CTR program generally procures

goods and services for CTR recipient countries instead of providing funds

directly to them.

Figure 1: Allocation of CTR 1992-96

Funds as of August 5, 1996

Nuclear controls

Delivery vehicles

Chemical weapons

Demilitarization

Other

28%

45%

5%

15%

7%

Total notifications of fiscal year 1992-96 funds: $1,502,110,000

Note: The percentages depicted above are based on DOD’s notifications to Congress of its plans

to obligate funds for CTR projects. DOD must notify Congress at least 15 days before it may

obligate funds for a project.

Source: GAO.

1

Several CTR nonproliferation projects—including support for peaceful projects for NIS weapons

scientists and controls over nonweaponized nuclear materials—have since been transferred from

DOD.

2

We will be reporting separately on CTR defense conversion efforts.

3

This figure may understate the actual value of CTR work performed to date, due to lags in the CTR

program’s financial reporting process. See our report entitled Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing

the Threat From the Former Soviet Union—An Update (GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995).

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In 1994 we reported that the program’s projects could have widely varying

effects and that DOD had not estimated total requirements for achieving

program objectives.4

 We recommended that the Secretary of Defense

institute a long-term planning process to help allocate CTR funds among

competing demands. Congress subsequently required DOD to submit a

multiyear CTR plan and cost estimate with its annual budget. DOD submitted

the first version of this plan to Congress in 1995. The second plan, now in

draft, is for 1996.

Results in Brief The draft 1996 CTR multiyear plan is a significant improvement over its

predecessor, but it does not adequately reflect uncertainties associated

with some projects and cost estimates and it does not explain significant

changes from the 1995 plan. Moreover, it does not reflect important

developments that have occurred since it was drafted in December 1995.

DOD officials have delayed the plan’s release for several months, in part

because they could not quickly adjust it to address changes in the

President’s budget submission for fiscal year 1997.

In many respects, the CTR program has made important progress over the

past year. CTR officials resolved long-standing delays in designing a facility

that Russia maintains is needed to store nuclear components from

dismantled weapons. CTR officials also began responding to Russian

requests for aid in improving nuclear weapons storage and transportation

security and helped some FSU states dismantle nuclear delivery vehicles.

CTR aid helped Ukraine remove nuclear warheads for shipment back to

Russia and build a facility for neutralizing retired intercontinental ballistic

missiles. In addition, DOD completed most of its dismantlement equipment

deliveries to Russia and began jointly developing technical requirements

with CTR recipients. The CTR chemical weapons destruction project

demonstrated the feasibility of Russia’s previously unvalidated destruction

technology in the laboratory.

Despite such progress, DOD has not yet resolved important issues

concerning the CTR program’s Russian nuclear storage and chemical

weapon destruction facility projects. Although the storage facility—which

will cost the United States at least $185 million—is now under

construction, the United States and Russia have not yet agreed as to how

DOD will be able to observe Russia’s use of the facility to store materials

from dismantled weapons. While CTR officials have capped financial

4

See our report entitled Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet

Union (GAO/NSIAD-95-7, Oct. 6, 1994).

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support for the storage facility at a certain level,5 they do not plan to

similarly cap U.S. support to the planned chemical weapon destruction

facility. As of September 4, 1996, they had yet to determine how much that

facility’s construction would cost the United States. A year-old CTR

estimate of $900 million was based on little design data. DOD may not have

a more reliable estimate before it requests new funds for the destruction

facility.

Concerns regarding the potential high cost of the chemical weapons

destruction facility are compounded by uncertainties regarding its impact

on the Russian chemical weapons threat. DOD officials consider this threat

to be less urgent than the Russian nuclear threat. By itself, the facility

would require over a decade to destroy declared chemical weapons stocks

at one location. Russia would need to construct six more facilities to meet

Chemical Weapons Convention requirements.6

 Other nations’

commitments fall short of the billions of dollars that Russia will need to

comply with the convention.

While CTR projects, if properly executed, should to some degree improve

FSU controls over nuclear materials and augment Russia’s chemical

weapons destruction capabilities, CTR officials lack the data needed to

independently determine the extent of such improvements. In contrast,

CTR delivery vehicle dismantlement activities may yield some quantifiable

measures of impact.

To date, DOD has allocated or requested almost $1.5 billion for chemical

weapon destruction, nuclear security, and delivery vehicle destruction

projects for fiscal years 1992 through 1997. It estimates that the CTR

program will cost a total of $3.2 billion through fiscal year 2001.

This report recommends that the Secretary of Defense make needed

improvements to future CTR multiyear plans and refrain from obligating

funds for constructing a pilot chemical weapon destruction facility until

DOD prepares a more reliable estimate of how much the facility’s

construction will cost the United States. It also suggests that Congress

may wish to consider linking DOD’s authority to obligate CTR funds for the

nuclear storage facility to progress in concluding an agreement on the

facility’s openness to the United States.

5

The specific figure is controlled as “For Official Use Only.”

6

When the convention enters into force (in 1997, as currently projected), it will require parties to

destroy chemical weapons stocks in 10 years, with a 5-year extension if needed.

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CTR Multiyear Plan

Strengths and Weaknesses

of the Draft CTR Plan

The CTR program office used the results of a new and improved bottom-up

planning process in drafting the 1996 multiyear plan. The new process

requires CTR officials to develop a separate, detailed project plan for each

CTR project. The individual project plans use a standardized format that

depicts each project’s long-term funding profile, objectives, acquisition

strategy, schedule, measures of effectiveness, and cost estimate basis. The

CTR program office used the project plans, which are updated

semi-annually, as the basis of its overall plan.

In contrast to the previous CTR multiyear plan, the December 1995 draft

contained more detailed data concerning several CTR projects and was

sometimes more candid in its description of the challenges facing CTR

projects than the preceding plan. The draft plan also detailed, for the first

time, the program’s measures for assessing the effectiveness of CTR efforts.

In its description of these measures, the plan noted that the program lacks

the data and tools needed to independently assess the effectiveness of CTR

chemical weapons and nuclear safety projects in achieving CTR objectives

of reducing the threat from weapons of mass destruction. It indicated that

such projects would instead be assessed in terms of their achievement of

project milestones. The plan also indicated that the success of delivery

vehicle destruction projects will be evaluated by determining the NIS

countries’ progress in meeting Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

drawdown schedules. In doing so, the plan noted that the program will

only be able to link such progress to specific CTR projects by using

recipient-country statements—rather than on any available quantifiable

data.

Despite these improvements over the prior multiyear plan, the

December 1995 draft plan had some deficiencies. We found that it did not

always fully depict known project uncertainties nor did it reveal the wide

variations in certainty of the project cost estimates embedded in its

depictions of program cost. For example, the draft plan did not distinguish

between cost estimates based on contracts that had already been awarded

or completed and estimates based on little or no design data. The draft

plan also did not (1) indicate whether officials had omitted risk and

contingencies from cost estimates or (2) fully identify and explain

significant changes in the depiction of projects included in the previous

plan.

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Delayed Release of the

Plan

Section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1995 (P.L. 103-337, Oct. 5, 1994 ) directs the Secretary of Defense to

submit an annual report on DOD’s plans and funding for the CTR program

with the President’s budget submission. This requirement for a multiyear

CTR plan was intended to provide Congress with greater visibility into DOD’s

long-term CTR strategy and the resources needed to implement that

strategy.7

DOD failed to comply with this requirement in 1996. Although the CTR

program office completed its draft in December 1995, DOD did not

complete action on the plan in time to submit it with the President

budget’s submission in April 1996. According to DOD officials, DOD failed to

issue the plan primarily because the CTR program office could not quickly

revise the draft plan to make it fully consistent with the President’s budget

submission for fiscal year 1997.8

 Such revisions were called for because

the plan’s 1996 spending assumptions had been rendered obsolete by the

Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act—which was not

enacted until February 1996.9

 Officials in the DOD Comptroller’s office did

not want to release the draft plan because it was not consistent with the

President’s budget submission for 1997. After weeks of discussion, DOD

officials agreed to add an explanatory addendum to the plan. However, as

of September 4, 1996, neither the plan nor the addendum had been

submitted to Congress.

DOD officials told us in July 1996 that they hoped to submit the

plan—without updating it—to Congress by the end of September 1996.10

Because DOD will not update the plan before releasing it, the plan will not

reflect significant CTR-related developments that occurred during the first

half of 1996, nor will it reflect current budgets. For example, the plan

would not reflect

7

In our October 1994 report we recommended that DOD institute a proactive, long-term CTR planning

process to help allocate resources among competing demands and that it revise the resulting plan

periodically.

8

Other factors cited by DOD officials included a furlough experienced by DOD staff during a 1995

budget crisis, internal delays in moving the draft through DOD before reaching the Comptroller’s

office, and the need to obtain interagency comments.

9

For example, statutory language barred use of $60 million in fiscal year 1996 funds for Russia because

the President could not certify that Russia was complying with multilateral obligations concerning

biological weapons. The funds were instead made available for use in the other three CTR recipient

states.

10H.R. 3230, (104th Cong.) as passed by the House of Representatives, would prohibit DOD from

obligating any fiscal year 1997 CTR funds until 15 days after DOD has provided the plan and two other

reports.

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• the program’s reallocation of $60 million in fiscal year 1996 funds from

Russian chemical weapons destruction to strategic delivery vehicle

dismantlement work in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan;

• progress made in early 1996 in defining CTR dismantlement projects in

Russia; and

• the U.S. response to Russian requests in March and June 1996 for help in

upgrading as many as 50 nuclear weapons storage sites.

DOD officials informed us that the time-consuming process of updating the

plan to reflect such changes would further delay the plan’s release to

Congress. They said the changes would be reflected in next year’s

multiyear plan.

Securing Nuclear

Weapons and

Materials

Since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the safety and security of FSU

nuclear weapons and their fissile components have been sources of

concern for the United States. The CTR program is seeking to address these

concerns by helping Russia construct a fissile material storage facility and

control its nuclear weapons.

Storage of Fissile Weapons

Components

The CTR program is supporting Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy

(MINATOM) efforts to design and construct a facility at Mayak that will store

50,000 containers of fissionable material from dismantled nuclear

weapons. While Russia has not sought U.S. help in dismantling its nuclear

weapons, it has asserted that it lacks storage space for fissile materials

from dismantled weapons and asked for U.S. help in designing and

constructing such a facility. A key MINATOM official told us in March 1996

that MINATOM needs space for about 100,000 containers of fissile materials.11

Progress on Mayak Design and

Construction

The design of the Mayak facility is nearly 2 years behind schedule, due to a

unilateral Russian design concept change in 1994 that eliminated the

relevance of about a third of the CTR program’s initial $15-million design

project. However, in July 1996, with CTR support, Russian designers

provided a one-third design document to CTR officials. DOD officials

anticipate certifying that the Mayak design is one-third complete in

September 1996.

11Two to five containers could be needed to hold components from a single warhead. CTR program

briefings indicate that 100,000 containers could hold components from approximately 25,000 weapons.

We reported in October 1994 that Russia may have to store components from as many as 24,000

dismantled warheads by 2001.

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Despite some stoppages, Russian construction activity has proceeded over

the past year with CTR-supplied materials. The CTR program recently hired

a U.S. design and construction contractor to help coordinate CTR aid at the

Mayak facility. If construction continues as currently anticipated, the

facility could begin storing its first 25,000 containers in 1999 and be

entirely completed in 2001.12

Lack of Progress on Mayak

Transparency

While the design and construction of the Mayak facility have progressed

over this year, the United States and Russia have yet to finalize

transparency arrangements for the facility. This lack of progress in

obtaining Mayak transparency arrangements is due largely to the failure to

date of talks on a broader range of reciprocal U.S.-Russian transparency

measures to complete an agreement that would have included Mayak and

other facilities.

According to DOD, Mayak transparency should provide the United States

with reasonable assurance that Russia is storing only materials from

dismantled nuclear weapons and that these materials are not being reused

for weapons. Russian officials appear to have agreed to Mayak

transparency in principle. They have indicated that the facility will be

transparent to the United States and stated that it will provide for “joint

accountability and transparency measures permitting confirmation by the

U.S.” In October 1994 Russian officials stated that they were prepared to

pledge that Mayak would contain only materials from dismantled nuclear

weapons and that these materials would not be reused for weapons.13

However, the United States and Russia have yet to conclude an agreement

specifying exactly how Russia’s transparency pledges will be implemented

at Mayak. According to executive branch officials, U.S. efforts to pursue

such an agreement went into a hiatus when the U.S. and Russian

governments launched the broader Safeguards, Transparency, and

Irreversibility (STI) negotiations. STI would have addressed Russian

concerns regarding reciprocity by establishing (1) reciprocal inspections

to confirm each nation’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and

plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons, (2) data exchanges on

12DOD shipped almost 7,000 CTR-funded fissile material containers to Mayak by mid-July 1996 and

plans to deliver another 17,000 containers by September 1997. DOD has obligated most of the

$50 million allocated for these containers and asked for another $38.5 million in fiscal year 1997 funds

for additional containers.

13In doing so, they appeared to link these pledges to reciprocal U.S. pledges. In the past Russian

officials have raised the issue of reciprocity in connection with Mayak. U.S. officials have held that

U.S. transparency rights derive from U.S. funding and would not result in reciprocal Russian access to

U.S. storage facilities. DOD officials told us that Russian officials have not raised the issue since 1994.

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nuclear warhead and fissile material stocks, and (3) cooperative

arrangements to monitor excess warheads awaiting dismantlement.

However, the STI talks ceased in late 1995.

Given recent Mayak design and construction progress, DOD and MINATOM

agreed in early 1996 that Mayak transparency efforts would proceed

regardless of STI’s status. U.S. and Russian technical experts met in

June 1996 to discuss the planned Mayak material control and accounting

process. According to a key DOD official, the talks established that this

process—if supplemented by inspection equipment—would generate the

data needed for transparency.

However, the United States and Russia have not begun discussing the

extent to which the United States will have access to such data at Mayak.

DOD officials have not developed a position concerning the degree of

access DOD requires at Mayak or a timetable for completing transparency

arrangements. Executive branch agencies disagree on whether talks on

Mayak transparency should be pursued in a broader

government-to-government forum or in the narrower DOD-MINATOM forum

that addresses the Mayak project.

Until a detailed transparency arrangement is agreed upon, the United

States does not know exactly how it will be able to insure that Mayak is

being used as intended. A failure to reach such an agreement in the future

would force the United States to choose between curtailing support for the

facility—after investing many tens of millions of dollars—and

compromising on its access rights. However, a key DOD policy official told

us that the details of the Mayak transparency arrangements can be worked

out over time without harm to the project and suggested that even a

partially built facility—if eventually completed by Russia alone—would

help secure Russian fissile materials.14

Mayak Cost Estimates DOD plans to spend at least $185 million on Mayak design and construction.

It has allocated $119 million in fiscal year 1992-96 funds and asked

Congress for another $66 million for fiscal year 1997. As of August 5, 1996,

DOD had obligated about $72 million for Mayak design and construction.

While Mayak’s construction could ultimately cost over $800 million,

according to a 1994 estimate by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the

facility’s cost to the United States should be considerably less. In

14Russian officials have also suggested that they will place the facility under International Atomic

Energy Agency safeguards. DOD officials told us that they have not discussed this possibility with

Russia in detail.

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congressional testimony during 1996, DOD officials stated that the United

States will pay no more than half of the cost of building Mayak. CTR

officials plan to cap the CTR program’s support of Mayak construction at a

certain specific level of effort15 and ask Congress for added funding on an

as-needed annual basis.16 The Corps will complete a more certain cost

estimate—using the recently obtained one-third design data—by

September 1996.

Impact of Mayak on CTR

Objectives

The theft or misuse of uranium and plutonium components from

dismantled nuclear weapons would constitute an enormous security risk

to the United States and other nations. The Mayak project, if properly

executed, would provide Russia with a modern and secure facility for

storing components from thousands of nuclear weapons.17 MINATOM

officials told us in March 1996 that the facility would help alleviate the

build-up of materials from dismantled weapons and greatly improve the

safety and security of the stored materials.18

Nonetheless, assessing the degree to which Mayak will improve Russia’s

existing storage capabilities is difficult. We reported in October 1994 that

U.S. agencies had been unable to confirm a Russian shortage of storage

space. The draft CTR multiyear plan acknowledges that the program cannot

measure the impact of CTR fissile material storage projects—such as

Mayak—on CTR program objectives because DOD lacks (1) direct

knowledge of Russian nuclear warhead dismantlement activities,

(2) control cases, and (3) data and models needed for assessing risk. DOD

instead plans to assess the success of the project in terms of its

achievement of project milestones.

Nuclear Weapons Security

Projects

Statements made by U.S. and Russian officials over the past 2 years

indicate that Russian nuclear weapon security may need to be improved. A

U.S. government expert told a congressional committee in August 1995

that the Russian nuclear weapons security system had not been designed

to counter insiders who might be tempted to steal a nuclear weapon and

15The exact figure is controlled as “For Official Use Only.”

16As a result, the CTR office dropped more than $280 million in risk and contingency funds from the

Corps’ estimate.

17CTR briefings indicate that the facility’s 50,000 containers will hold materials from about 12,500

nuclear weapons.

18MINATOM officials told us in March 1996 that Russia needs a second storage facility (at Tomsk) and

that it would need outside financing. The Tomsk facility would be similar to the Mayak facility in

capacity and cost. The United States and Russia have not yet agreed to cooperate in constructing such

a facility.

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that the system was facing new strains engendered by the Soviet Union’s

collapse. In March 1996, the minority staff of the Senate Committee on

Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Investigations, testified that

“security at some nuclear weapon field sites may be suspect.” Key Russian

Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials have indicated concern about the

possibility that nuclear weapons could be stolen in transit or damaged in

accidents on Russia’s deteriorating rail system. They have also stated that

MOD’s top nonproliferation priority is to improve security at nuclear

weapon storage sites.

Progress Concerning Nuclear

Weapon Security

The CTR program has made progress over the past year in its efforts to

improve Russian security over nuclear weapons slated for dismantlement.

During 1996 the CTR program paid a Russian railyard almost $1 million to

complete the installation of CTR-supplied fire and intrusion detectors on

railcars used to carry nuclear warheads. The program had previously given

MINATOM armored blankets and emergency response equipment to help

protect weapons in transit.

A new set of projects has begun emerging from CTR discussions with MOD

over the past year. For example, the CTR program plans to deliver 150

supercontainers to MOD by early 1997 to help protect warheads in transit

against penetration and fire. It has also begun shipping five rail-mobile

emergency support modules to help respond to rail accidents and terrorist

attacks.

The CTR program has also developed several new projects to help MOD

protect its nuclear weapons in storage. It has agreed to help MOD develop a

prototype automated nuclear weapon inventory system, which Russia

reportedly lacks, and has begun providing needed computers and training.

MOD will use the prototype in developing an operational system for

weapons to be dismantled.

Perhaps most significantly, in 1996 MOD for the first time asked for CTR

assistance in upgrading security at as many as 50 nuclear weapon storage

sites. In response, the CTR program has moved to provide MOD with

computerized site security assessment models and data on personnel

security assessment tools. MOD has proposed that the CTR program

establish a technical training base in Russia to install, test, and evaluate

security technology equipment and procedures. Under such an approach, a

CTR-funded contractor at the training base could support MOD-cleared

Russian subcontractors—possibly by helping them identify security needs

and procuring needed equipment from Russian firms.

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Estimated Cost of Nuclear

Weapon Security

Enhancements

The CTR program has allocated a total of $116 million in fiscal year 1992-96

funds—and has requested another $15 million for fiscal year 1997—to help

improve the security of nuclear weapons in Russia. This $131 million

includes $89.5 million on the new MOD transit and storage projects, of

which $39.5 million is slated for improving MOD storage security.19

However, the costs of the MOD storage security projects—while still

undefined—will almost certainly exceed $39.5 million. The program

manager for these CTR projects told us that each of Russia’s 50 storage

sites might cost about $2 million to upgrade, based on DOD’s current

understanding of requirements.20

Potential Impact of Security

Enhancement Projects

While CTR aid could help improve the security of Russian nuclear weapons

to some degree, assessing the extent of this improvement will be very

difficult.21 The CTR program’s draft 1996 multiyear plan indicates that the

program lacks the data and analytical tools needed to assess the extent to

which its nuclear security projects are achieving CTR objectives.22 Limited

access to the sensitive locations where CTR nuclear weapons security aid is

being used will affect the CTR program’s ability to determine how

effectively the assistance is being used. For example, Russian officials

recently denied a DOD audit team access to MOD sites where CTR-supplied

emergency response equipment was located and instead brought such

equipment to the DOD team.23 Similarly, any DOD integrating contractor for

the nuclear weapons storage site security project would be precluded

from visiting actual weapon storage sites.

19The remaining $41.5 million—$131 million minus $89.5 million—has already been largely obligated

for the railcar, blanket, and emergency response projects.

20However, costs could increase if the as-yet-undefined CTR effort proves to be comparable to the

Department of Energy’s efforts to upgrade MINATOM’s systems for protecting and accounting for

weapons-usable fissile materials. The Department of Energy estimates that upgrading each MINATOM

facility could cost $5 million to $10 million. See our report entitled Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of

U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States

(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89, Mar. 8, 1996).

21In March 1996, MOD officials told us that they had used CTR-provided armored blankets in removing

warheads from Ukraine and CTR-provided railcar upgrades to help secure nuclear warheads in transit.

However, U.S. analysts have previously informed us that such aid would not make Russia’s weapons

transportation system safe by western standards.

22As a result, program officials plan to assess these projects in terms of their achievement of project

milestones.

23According to DOD, this practice is consistent with U.S.-Russia CTR agreements which provide for

access to sites of usage “if possible.” We plan to provide Congress with a separate report on the CTR

program’s audits and examinations after DOD releases its currently overdue report accounting for CTR

assistance.

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Dismantling Nuclear

Delivery Vehicles and

Infrastructure

According to DOD, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan inherited about

2,500 strategic nuclear delivery systems from the FSU, along with an

extensive nuclear weapons-related infrastructure. According to U.S.

estimates, these four states must eliminate over 900 strategic nuclear

delivery vehicles and safely remove over 4,000 nuclear warheads from

deployment by 2001 to comply with START requirements. These estimates

also indicate that if Russia ratifies START II, it must also eliminate another

200 launchers and remove up to 3,000 warheads from deployment.24 Under

the terms of the Lisbon Protocol, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan must

become non-nuclear weapons states by 2001.25

The CTR program has launched a broad array of projects to eliminate or

reduce NIS nuclear delivery vehicles and infrastructure. These projects

have helped Ukraine, Russia, Kazakstan, and Belarus dismantle nuclear

delivery systems.

Dismantlement Progress Over the past year, progress has been made in implementing CTR nuclear

dismantlement projects in the recipient countries. The CTR program has

increased dismantlement-related equipment deliveries and completed

some dismantlement projects. It has evolved from simply providing

dismantlement equipment requested by the recipient countries to jointly

developing technical requirements with them.

According to DOD, Ukraine is proceeding with eliminations of strategic

delivery systems. In Ukraine, the CTR program has completed deliveries of

fuels, cranes, vehicles, and other assistance to facilitate the removal of

nuclear warheads. CTR assistance helped Ukraine complete an SS-19

missile neutralization facility, funded a contractor to destroy SS-19 missile

silos, and provided intermodal tank containers and a storage facility to

safely transport and store nearly 4,000 metric tons of liquid rocket fuel

removed during missile dismantlement.

With CTR assistance, Ukraine will eliminate all of its SS-19 missiles and

silos. The program has made less progress regarding Ukraine’s SS-24

missile systems. Under START, Ukraine plans to destroy its SS-24 silos and

24START I limits the FSU to 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads by no later than 2001. The as

yet unratified START II accord further lowers these limits and bans intercontinental ballistic missiles

that carry multiple re-entry vehicles.

25As legal successors to the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine became parties to START I

through the Lisbon Protocol. In signing the protocol, these countries committed to eliminating

strategic nuclear offensive arms from their respective territories. According to DOD, Ukraine and

Kazakstan are now non-nuclear states and Belarus is scheduled to become so by the end of 1996.

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has already returned SS-24 warheads to Russia. However, it has not yet

decided whether to dismantle its SS-24 missiles or retain them for space

launch purposes.26

Recently, CTR program officials have begun work on defining Ukrainian

nuclear infrastructure elimination projects. According to a Ukrainian

Ministry of Defense official, such projects could include dismantling

missile system fueling and storage sites and destroying nuclear warhead

storage bunkers.

According to DOD, Russia is now ahead of its START I schedules. During the

past year, the CTR program has nearly completed equipment deliveries to

help Russia dismantle heavy bombers, submarine-launched ballistic

missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. For example, CTR

assistance has recently provided intermodal containers and flatbed

railcars to safely transport and store some 100,000 metric tons of liquid

rocket fuel during dismantlement. CTR-provided equipment and services

will also help dispose of this fuel.

Until earlier this year, the Russians had only requested CTR assistance in

the form of equipment procurement and support. Now, however, CTR and

Russian Committee of Defense Industry officials have begun to jointly

develop Russian technical requirements for CTR aid. For example, both CTR

and Russian officials are working together to eliminate over 900 solid

rocket motors and 17,000 metric tons of solid rocket propellant. Also, in

cooperation with the Russians, CTR program officials reviewed Russia’s

SS-18 elimination process and determined that the Surovatikha facility has

reached full capacity and cannot meet START II goals. CTR officials are now

considering a Russian proposal to increase the dismantlement rate at this

facility by over 60 percent. In August 1996, U.S. and Russian officials held

discussions to help improve Russian submarine-launched ballistic missile

dismantlement processes.

In Kazakstan, CTR-provided equipment will help destroy seven heavy

bombers and dispose of 7,800 metric tons of liquid rocket fuel. A

CTR-funded contractor should begin restoring the SS-18 silo sites in

September as Russia completes silo destruction efforts. By early next year,

CTR aid plans to close nearly 60 nuclear weapon test tunnels. Program

officials are also considering a project to dismantle a biological weapon

production facility.

26Under START, Ukraine is not required to eliminate its SS-24 missiles.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

In Belarus, a CTR-funded contractor should begin eliminating SS-25 missile

launch pads by September 1996. A CTR-provided incinerator will help

eliminate about 10,000 metric tons of liquid rocket fuel. In addition, CTR

and Belarusian officials are defining nuclear infrastructure elimination

projects that will help destroy missile storage and command and control

bunkers and safely store radioactive materials.

Dismantlement Costs The CTR program plans to commit about $669 million for NIS dismantlement

efforts through fiscal year 1996—a greater amount than it has invested in

any of its other program areas. In addition, the CTR budget request for

fiscal year 1997 allocates another $47 million for Ukrainian dismantlement

efforts and $52 million more for Russia, including funding for initial 

START II-related efforts. The program has not requested any fiscal 1997

funds for Belarus and Kazakstan.

As of August 5, 1996, DOD had notified Congress of plans to obligate about

$669 million, had obligated nearly $383 million and had disbursed almost

$218 million. Of the dismantlement funds notified to Congress, Ukraine

will receive about $267 million and Russia will receive $236 million. Figure

2 shows the distribution of notified dismantlement funds among the

recipient countries.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

Figure 2: CTR Dismantlement Funds

Notified as of August 5, 1996

 

Russia

Ukraine

Kazakstan

Belarus

35%

40%

16%

9%

Total fiscal year 1992-96 funds notified: $668,600,000

Source: GAO.

Current CTR dismantlement cost estimates appear to be relatively certain

at this point. However, future START II-related costs could increase total

CTR dismantlement costs beyond the amount currently allocated for fiscal

years 1992-97. A Russian official suggested to us that Russia could need

several hundred million dollars to meet its START II requirements. Such an

estimate may include contractor and logistics support for destroying

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, dismantling SS-18s, and funding

solid rocket motor and fuel elimination.27 U.S. and Russian officials

continue to define these efforts.

Potential Impact of

Dismantlement Projects

According to its draft multiyear plan, the program plans to assess the

effectiveness of CTR dismantlement projects by determining how well

recipients meet or exceed anticipated START drawdown rates. The plan

acknowledges that the link between drawdowns and specific projects is

27The CTR program considers aid for Russian solid rocket motor fuel elimination to be a

nonproliferation effort and not one linked to START II compliance.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

generally based on recipient countries’ statements, rather than on

quantifiable data available to the United States.28

However, in contrast to other CTR efforts, U.S. involvement in

dismantlement activities may yield some quantifiable measures of impact.

For example, CTR-funded projects have provided Ukraine with a

capability—otherwise lacking—to dismantle and destroy its SS-19 missile

systems. In Russia, CTR assistance could increase the missiles eliminated

per year at an SS-18 dismantlement facility.

The overall impact of the destruction projects will probably vary from one

CTR recipient to another. Without CTR dismantlement assistance, Ukraine

probably could not meet its START I requirements. CTR assistance enabled

Ukraine to return all of its nuclear warheads to Russia by June 1996. A

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense official told us that with CTR assistance his

country can adhere to START I and honor its treaty obligations.

In contrast, Russia met its START I delivery vehicle limit before significant

amounts of CTR aid were delivered. However, a Russian official told us that

CTR aid has helped Russia maintain its dismantlement efforts. He said that

Russia dismantled more systems in the past year with CTR aid than in all

prior years without it. Specifically, CTR efforts helped to safely store and

transport some 100,000 metric tons of liquid rocket propellant and will

soon help eliminate the fuel.29 U.S. personnel have observed the use of

CTR-provided assistance in dismantling bombers and submarine launchers,

as well as the poor condition of Russian dismantlement equipment.

Russian officials have stated that CTR-provided hardware has been used to

dismantle SS-18 missiles in Kazakstan.30 CTR assistance should help

eliminate Kazakstan’s nuclear infrastructure, including 186 tunnels once

used to test nuclear weapons at Degelen Mountain, and thus reduce the

possibility of resumed nuclear testing at that site. A proposed CTR project

at Kazakstan’s BioMedPreparat biological weapons production plant

would dismantle key components of the facility, rendering it available for

other purposes.

28According to DOD, U.S. willingness to provide CTR aid had an important—if unquantifiable—impact

on NIS decisions to undertake dismantlement efforts.

29Russian officials told us last year that rocket fuel transportation and disposition were the most

crucial bottlenecks in meeting their treaty obligations.

30We noted in our June 1995 report Russian difficulties in transporting and eliminating liquid rocket

fuel from dismantled SS-18s in Kazakstan.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

CTR assistance to Belarus will help destroy concrete SS-25 launch pads in

compliance with START. As in Kazakstan, the CTR program should help

dismantle the remaining nuclear infrastructure. While Belarusian

government officials have approved several projects, CTR officials are still

defining the specific requirements.

Destroying Chemical

Weapons

Russia currently has the world’s largest declared chemical weapon

stockpile. The bulk of this 40,000 metric ton stockpile is comprised of

nerve agents, rather than older mustard or blister agents. Russia has

signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Once it ratifies the convention,

it will be committed to destroying this stockpile within 15 years of the

convention’s entry into force. Russia does not have an operational

capability to destroy large quantities of chemical weapons.

DOD officials have stated that Russian chemical and nuclear weapon

proliferation would pose a major security problem for the United States

and that the eventual destruction of Russia’s huge stockpile would

significantly reduce the chemical weapon threat. However, DOD officials

have also stated that the threat of chemical weapons is less significant and

urgent than that of nuclear weapons.

To help address the threat posed by Russia’s declared stockpile, the CTR

program has adopted a strategy of “jump starting” Russia’s chemical

weapon destruction efforts. Executive branch officials have stated that CTR

project assistance would help encourage Russian ratification of the

Chemical Weapons Convention.

The program has taken the initial steps toward providing Russia assistance

leading to creation of a pilot chemical weapon destruction facility at

Shchuche that will have a destruction capacity of up to 500 metric tons of

nerve agent contained in artillery shells and supporting eventual Russian

establishment of a full-scale facility, capable of eliminating 1,200 metric

tons annually. The purpose of the pilot facility is to gain sufficient design

and operational data to obtain approval to expand the facility’s industrial

capabilities to reach the full-scale capacity. The intent of the U.S. support

program is not to eliminate the entire Russian chemical weapon stockpile,

but rather to provide Russia with a technologically proven starting point.

CTR aid has also begun providing Russia with chemical weapon

destruction-related laboratories.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

Progress in Providing a

Chemical Weapon

Destruction Capability

The CTR program’s chemical weapon destruction project has made some

progress in the past year.31 The CTR program and Russia concluded that

Russia’s previously unproved two-step destruction process is effective and

feasible for destroying Russia’s nerve agent stocks. 32 The United States

and Russia also moved to clarify their plans and working relationship

regarding the destruction facility by signing an implementing arrangement.

The arrangement designated MOD as Russia’s lead agency responsible for

destroying chemical weapons and outlined U.S. and Russian roles in

establishing the destruction facility. CTR and Russian officials also

amended their July 1992 chemical weapons destruction agreement to

increase U.S. funds by $13 million and identify DOD aid to help establish the

pilot facility.

U.S. and Russian representatives also developed a 1996 work plan for the

pilot facility and five joint project plans. The project plans outlined each

nation’s specific tasks and milestones in 1996 to begin the process of

designing and developing a pilot facility using the newly validated Russian

destruction process. CTR program officials plan to award an engineering

services contract in December 1996 for the facility’s design and process

scale-up, construction, and munitions processing equipment. By May 1997,

CTR officials hope to have a preliminary design of the pilot facility and

completed (1) tests on optimizing the Russian destruction technology and

(2) a feasibility study to support Russian decisions on the facility’s

location.

An unexpected development was the project’s loss of $60 million of its

$73 million fiscal year 1996 budget. CTR program officials shifted these

funds because the President could not certify that Russia was complying

with multilateral obligations concerning biological weapons, as required

by law.33 Program officials were then unable to obligate the entire

$13 million during fiscal year 1996 because of Russian delays in signing the

implementing arrangement, according to a CTR official who told us that

Russia held up the arrangement in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a U.S.

commitment to fully fund the entire facility and provide greater

intellectual property rights over the destruction process.

31In March 1996, Russia issued its long-awaited comprehensive implementation plan for managing and

destroying chemical weapons. The plan indicates that Russia will destroy its stockpile within the

Convention’s deadlines but leaves unanswered many questions about how it would do so.

32They also found that the second stage of the neutralization process, while creating a “slightly

dangerous” mass of residue three to seven times as large as the destroyed nerve agent, nevertheless

would be safe and irreversible. As such, the process would appear to comply with convention

standards.

33Section 1208 of Public Law 104-106.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

Program officials also shipped three mobile chemical weapons destruction

labs to Russia and reached agreement with Russian officials on a joint

project plan to establish a central analytical laboratory in Moscow and

begin hiring a contractor to oversee this project. DOD plans to award a

contract by the end of September 1996. The mobile analytical laboratories

are to (1) monitor and analyze environmental and verification samples at

storage and destruction sites to assess the impact of chemical weapons

destruction operations, (2) train personnel to operate destruction site

laboratories and mobile labs, and (3) address public concerns about the

safety of chemical weapons destruction activities. According to program

officials, the mobile labs will cost $3 million, including vehicles, training,

travel, and spare parts.

Estimated Costs of

Chemical Weapon

Destruction

The CTR program’s chemical weapon destruction project costs have been

modest to date, relative to other CTR projects, but could increase greatly in

the future. DOD has allocated $68 million in fiscal year 1992-96 CTR funds

for chemical weapons destruction. DOD has asked Congress for another

$78.5 million in fiscal year 1997 to continue program support. DOD will use

the funds to further develop chemical and munitions processing

equipment and systems and to begin designing the pilot facility. A 1995 CTR

estimate—prepared without site-specific data—indicated that the pilot

facility could ultimately cost as much as $900 million to build.34

To date, the CTR program has not asked for construction funds and has not

committed to provide Russia more than $68 million in chemical

destruction aid. U.S. and Russian experts have agreed to amend their

bilateral assistance agreement annually to reflect yearly funding

requirements—thus limiting the project’s annual financial obligation to the

amount agreed upon in the annual amendment.

Regardless of this arrangement, however, the total cost of the facility—and

the U.S. share of that cost—remains undefined and potentially large. CTR

officials told us that they hope to prepare a more certain cost estimate,

based on a one-third completed design, in 1998. However, this estimate

would not be ready until after DOD will have submitted its request for fiscal

year 1998 funding. CTR officials told us that they do not plan to cap the

program’s total contribution to the project at a certain level, as they have

for the Mayak project. DOD stated that, as with all CTR projects, funds

34Russian officials told us in March 1996 that they estimate that the facility (including its surrounding

infrastructure) would cost less than $200 million to build. CTR officials have not reviewed this

estimate and would not attest to its reliability.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

required for chemical weapon destruction will be assessed and requested

from Congress on an annual basis.

Potential Impact of

Chemical Weapon

Destruction

CTR program officials plan to assess the effectiveness of their chemical

weapons destruction projects only in terms of their success in achieving

project milestones. According to a program document, without direct U.S.

involvement in Russian chemical weapons elimination, the CTR program

lacks the data, control cases, and risk assessment models needed to assess

these projects’ impact on the Russian chemical weapon threat. Moreover,

DOD officials note that they cannot assess the program’s impact because

Russia will not complete the task of destroying chemical weapons until

after the CTR program ends in 2001. Nevertheless, DOD stated that Russian

movement toward that goal will allow DOD to assess progress.

While providing Russia with a proven chemical weapon elimination

technology and a functioning pilot chemical weapon destruction facility

capable of destroying 500 metric tons annually would greatly expand

Russia’s current capabilities, the sheer size of the Russian stockpile will

limit the pilot facility’s direct impact. The pilot would require more than a

decade to destroy the artillery shells that constitute the site’s 14 percent

share of the total Russian stockpile. It would not address Russia’s need to

construct additional facilities at six more sites in time to meet the

Chemical Weapons Convention’s time frames.

CTR officials acknowledge that the pilot facility will not address Russia’s

overall Chemical Weapons Convention requirements and suggest instead

that the U.S-funded pilot facility could help “jump start” the slow-moving

Russian effort to destroy its stockpiles. However, there are few current

indications that Russia will find the needed resources. Russia estimates

that it will need roughly $3.3 billion in January 1995 dollars to destroy the

stockpile, according to its comprehensive plan.35 Russian officials told us

in March 1996 that they lack such resources and are seeking non-Russian

government sources of support.

However, foreign aid for this effort is very limited. Aid being provided by

Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States falls far short of

Russia’s stated requirements.36 In May 1996, the United States and several

other nations began discussing this issue in detail at a multilateral

35The CTR program has not assessed this estimate.

36Germany will have provided about $17 million by the end of 1996. The Netherlands has pledged a

total of about $16 million, and Sweden has provided and promised a total of about $450,000.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

conference in Germany. Only the Netherlands pledged specified financial

support for Russian chemical weapon destruction at the conference.

Recommendations To help clarify the presentation of programmatic and cost issues, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the annual CTR

multiyear program plan submitted to Congress identify and explain

(1) significant cost, schedule, or scope changes from the preceding year’s

plan and (2) known uncertainties affecting project cost estimates and

schedules.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense refrain from obligating

any CTR funds for constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility in

Russia until DOD has completed a construction cost estimate based on a

one-third completed design and specified the U.S. share of the estimated

costs.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

Congress may wish to consider linking DOD’s authority to obligate some or

all of the funds that it may provide for constructing a fissile material

storage facility in Russia to completion of a transparency agreement

regarding the facility’s use.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with our findings and recommendations. DOD stated that it

will incorporate our recommendation regarding the CTR multiyear plan into

subsequent versions. It also agreed not to obligate construction funds for

the chemical weapon destruction facility until a 35-percent design has

been completed and the costs have been better defined. DOD further stated

that it will not completely disburse construction funds for the fissile

material storage facility until transparency measures have been agreed

with Russia. (DOD’s comments are reproduced in app. II.)

CTR officials suggested several technical and editorial revisions. We have

incorporated most of these suggestions into this report.

Scope and

Methodology

This report is the latest of a series of GAO reviews of the CTR program since

1992 and draws upon data developed in the United States, Russia, and

Ukraine. To assess the CTR program’s current planning process, we

reviewed the CTR program’s draft multiyear plan, individual project plans,

and cost estimates. In reviewing the draft plan, we assessed the level of

detail and scope, the depiction of any uncertainties or difficulties

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

concerning projects and cost estimates, and the description of changes

that occurred after the CTR program’s 1995 plan. We decided that, to be

useful, the plan should provide a reasonably complete and candid

depiction of the projects’ status, prognosis, likely cost, and potential

impact; identify any major changes from the preceding year’s plan; and

explain why those changes have come about; and be timely.

To assess the CTR program’s progress, likely cost, and potential impact

regarding controls over FSU nuclear materials, we reviewed reports and

cables detailing discussions with NIS officials; interviewed officials at DOD’s

Threat Reduction Policy Office, CTR program office, Defense Special

Weapons Agency, and Army Corps of Engineers. We also spoke with

officials at the Department of State and the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency concerning the status of transparency discussions.

In addition, we discussed the status and prognosis of the Mayak and

nuclear weapon security projects with high ranking officials from Russia’s

Ministry of Atomic Energy and Ministry of Defense in Moscow in 1995 and

in Washington in 1996. In doing so, we contrasted past and current

depictions of project progress and assessed plans for overcoming current

and foreseeable obstacles. We also reviewed the process used to prepare

DOD’s estimates of the cost of the Mayak facility. Our assessment

concerning the likely impact of these projects was based in large part from

data presented in the CTR program’s draft program plan.

To assess the CTR program’s progress, likely cost, and potential impact

regarding the elimination of FSU delivery vehicles, we reviewed documents

and interviewed officials at DOD’s CTR program office. In addition, we

discussed the status and prognosis of these projects with high ranking

officials from Russia’s Committee for Defense Industry and Ukraine’s

Ministry of Defense in Moscow and Kiev in 1995 and Washington in 1996.

In doing so, we contrasted past and current depictions of project progress

and assessed plans for overcoming current and foreseeable obstacles. Our

assessment concerning the likely impact of these projects was based in

large part from data presented in the CTR program’s draft program plan.

To assess the CTR program’s progress, likely cost, and potential impact

regarding the destruction of Russian chemical weapons, we reviewed

reports and cables detailing discussions with NIS officials; interviewed

officials at DOD’s Threat Reduction Policy Office, CTR program office, and

Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command. We also spoke with an

official at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concerning the

status of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, we discussed the

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-273023 

status and prognosis of the chemical weapons projects with high ranking

officials from the Russian President’s Commission for Chemical Weapons

Destruction and attended an international North Atlantic Treaty

Organization conference in Bonn, Germany, on eliminating weapons of

mass destruction. In doing so, we contrasted past and current depictions

of project progress and assessed plans for overcoming current and

foreseeable obstacles. We also reviewed the process used to prepare DOD’s

estimates of the cost of the pilot chemical weapons destruction facility.

Our assessment concerning the likely impact of these projects was based

in large part from data presented in the CTR program’s draft program plan.

We conducted our review between August 1995 and August 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Secretaries of Defense and State; and other interested

parties. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning the report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix III.

Harold J. Johnson

Associate Director, International

 Relations and Trade Issues

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Funding Status of the

Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program

28

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

32

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

35

Table Table I.1: CTR Funding Status as of August 5, 1996 30

Figures Figure 1: Allocation of CTR 1992-96 Funds as of August 5, 1996 2

Figure 2: CTR Dismantlement Funds Notified as of August 5, 1996 16

Figure I.1: Allocation of CTR Obligations as of August 5, 1996 28

Figure I.2: Allocation of CTR Disbursements as of August 5, 1996 29

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction

FSU former Soviet Union

MINATOM Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy

MOD Russian Ministry of Defense

NIS newly independent states

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

STI Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix I 

Funding Status of the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has made continued

progress in obligating and disbursing funds. In our last report,1

 we noted

that CTR obligations and disbursements had increased sharply to almost

$599 million and $177 million, respectively, as of May 8, 1995. One year

later (May 14, 1996) the program had obligated an additional $411 million

and disbursed another $327 million.

As of August 5, 1996, the program had obligated over $1 billion and

disbursed more than $571 million. Figures I.1 and I.2 depict the allocation

of these amounts among the program’s principal activities. Table I.1 lists

the amounts that the Department of Defense (DOD) has notified, obligated,

and disbursed for each CTR project as of August 5, 1996.

Figure I.1: Allocation of CTR

Obligations as of August 5, 1996

 

Nuclear controls

Delivery vehicles

Chemical weapons Demilitarization

Other

30%

36%

5% 22%

7%

Total obligations of fiscal year 1992-96 funds: $1,049,790,810

Source: GAO.

1

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union—An Update

(GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995).

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix I 

Funding Status of the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program

Figure I.2: Allocation of CTR

Disbursements as of August 5, 1996

 

Nuclear controls

Delivery vehicles

Chemical weapons

Demilitarization

Other

24%

38%

5%

25%

8%

Total disbursements of fiscal year 1992-96 funds: $571,064,508

Source: GAO.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix I 

Funding Status of the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program

Table I.1: CTR Funding Status as of August 5, 1996

Dollars in millions

Projects by

program area

Notification to

Congress Obligation Disbursement

Chain of custody

Armored blankets (Russia) $5.000 $3.244 $2.905

Emergency response training and equipment

Belarus 5.000 4.980 4.147

Kazakstan 5.000 2.793 0.830

Russia 15.000 14.385 12.946

Ukraine 3.400 2.995 1.381

Export controls

Belarus 16.260 9.974 6.531

Kazakstan 7.260 4.200 2.455

Russia 2.260 1.517 0.038

Ukraine 13.260 7.729 5.538

Fissile material containers

(Russia)

50.000 48.379 17.106

Fissile material storage facility design (Russia) 15.000 14.999 14.466

Fissile material storage facility (Russia) 75.000 57.044 12.396

Industrial Partnering Program 10.000 10.000 0.000

Material control and accountability

Belarus 3.000 2.891 0.828

Kazakstan 23.000 7.718 2.364

Russia 45.000 42.817 18.349

Ukraine 22.500 21.522 3.200

Multilateral Nuclear Safety Initiative (Ukraine) 11.000 11.000 8.858

Security enhancements for railcars (Russia) 21.500 21.200 19.282

Weapons security storage

(Russia)

28.000 2.758 0.374

Weapons security transportation (Russia) 46.500 24.764 3.692

Subtotal $422.940 $316.908 $137.736

Demilitarization

Defense Enterprise Fund 7.670 7.670 7.670

Belarus 5.000 5.000 5.000

Kazakstan 7.000 7.000 7.000

Russia 10.000 10.000 10.000

Industrial partnerships

Belarus 20.000 19.697 11.166

Kazakstan 15.000 14.905 6.701

(continued)

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix I 

Funding Status of the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program

Dollars in millions

Projects by

program area

Notification to

Congress Obligation Disbursement

Russia 38.000 37.339 12.358

Ukraine 55.000 54.119 40.816

International Science and Technology Center (Russia) 35.000 34.585 31.914

Research and Development Foundation (Russia) 10.000 10.000 5.000

Science and Technology Center

Belarus 5.000 4.950 0.468

Kazakstan 9.000 8.950 0.640

Ukraine 15.000 14.932 2.374

Subtotal $231.670 $229.246 $141.127

Destruction and dismantlement

Chemical weapons destruction (Russia) 68.000 48.681 28.325

Continuous communications link (Belarus) 2.300 1.158 0.790

Government-to-government communications link

Kazakstan 2.300 1.576 0.670

Ukraine 1.000 0.989 0.464

Nuclear infrastructure elimination

Kazakstan 23.500 7.084 3.170

Ukraine 23.400 0.896 0.296

Site restoration (Belarus) 25.000 19.430 12.174

Strategic nuclear arms elimination (Ukraine) 242.700 182.249 94.527

Strategic offensive arms elimination

Belarus 33.900 2.510 0.082

Kazakstan 78.500 35.174 4.953

Russia 236.000 132.539 100.872

Subtotal $736.600 $431.392 $245.128

Other program support

Arctic nuclear waste (Russia) 30.000 29.950 17.669

Defense and military contacts

Belarus 3.524 0.780 0.366

Kazakstan 1.900 0.516 0.057

Russia 15.548 9.061 4.969

Ukraine 9.028 2.737 1.189

Other assessments and administration costs 50.900 29.203 21.823

Subtotal $110.900 $72.245 $46.073

Total $1,502.110 $1,049.791 $571.065

Note: Figures may not add due to rounding.

Source: DOD.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 23.

Now on p. 23.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 23.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

F. James Shafer

Pierre Toureille

Jo Ann Geoghan

Beth Hoffman León

Rona Mendelsohn

Jeffrey Phillips

Raymond Plunkett

(711215) Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-222 Weapons of Mass Destruction
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