CANCELED DOD 

PROGRAMS

DOD Needs to Better 

Use Available 

Guidance and 

Manage Reusable 

Assets

Report to Congressional Committees

March 2014

GAO-14-77

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-77, a report to 

congressional committees

March 2014

CANCELED DOD PROGRAMS

DOD Needs to Better Use Available Guidance and 

Manage Reusable Assets

Why GAO Did This Study

In the face of increasing budgetary 

pressures, it is important that DOD 

continue to find ways to manage its 

portfolio of major defense acquisition 

programs (MDAP) more efficiently. In 

2008, GAO concluded that program 

cancellations can be a valuable 

portfolio management tool, and found 

that DOD can take various steps to 

retain value from the work completed. 

The Senate report accompanying the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

2013 mandated GAO to review issues 

associated with cancellations of 

MDAPs. This report assesses (1) the 

effects of program cancellation, (2) the 

adequacy of DOD guidance on 

program cancellations, (3) the extent to 

which DOD leveraged or transferred to 

other programs various types of assets 

from canceled programs, and (4) the 

usefulness of contract termination cost 

estimates. To do this work, GAO 

reviewed the cancellation of five major 

DOD programs from across the military 

services; interviewed officials at the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

military services, and others; and 

reviewed current guidance related to 

program cancellation.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD direct 

program officials to refer to Smart 

Shutdown guidance and to provide 

lessons learned, and that DOD 

develop department-wide processes to 

improve tracking and dissemination of 

information about assets available. 

DOD partially concurred with these 

recommendations, but stated use of 

and contribution to Smart Shutdown 

should be encouraged rather than 

directed. GAO maintains direction 

would be more effective.

What GAO Found

Cancellation of a major Department of Defense (DOD) weapon program can 

have broad effects. Cancellation of one program can affect the schedules or 

budgets for related programs as well as the industrial base and local economies. 

For example, the cancellation of one program has impacted the schedule for the 

Army’s network modernization efforts. DOD stakeholders can provide input to 

program officials on the potential effects of a cancellation.

DOD has developed an online resource, Smart Shutdown, to offer tools for 

program managers related to program cancellations. In 2013, a guidebook was 

added that addresses the spectrum of cancellation effects. However, current 

efforts to publicize this online resource may not be sufficient and program 

officials may lack the knowledge necessary to leverage investments as 

effectively as possible. Furthermore, while this resource is designed to allow 

officials to share lessons learned about program cancellation, there have been 

few contributions to date. Without increased sharing of lessons learned, DOD will 

miss opportunities to build and share knowledge on program shutdown.

GAO could not determine the extent to which DOD leveraged the assets in its 

case studies because DOD does not have a way to track all types of assets from 

canceled programs. 

Examples of Weapon Program Assets

DOD relies on a government-wide process for tracking disposal of government 

property, such as computer hardware and equipment, but this process is not 

tailored to weapon systems and was not designed to track other types of assets 

such as rights to technical data and software, or partially-developed 

technologies. Because there is no department-wide process for disseminating 

information about all assets available for reuse, DOD cannot ensure that 

technologies go to parties who can best use or develop them further. 

Estimates of contract termination costs are sometimes perceived as a useful tool 

in managing a portfolio of investments and informing contract termination and 

budgeting decisions. However, the usefulness of these estimates is limited by, 

among other factors, inherent uncertainties about costs that cannot be addressed 

until a program is actually terminated.

View GAO-14-77. For more information, 

contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Letter 1 

Background 4

Effects of Weapon Program Cancellation Extend beyond a 

Program and Its Contractors 8

New Guidance Requires Input and Awareness to Work as 

Intended 13

Information about Whether Assets Are Being Leveraged Is Limited 17

Contract Termination Cost Estimates Have Limitations 26

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 31

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35

Appendix II Plant Clearance Process 40

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 41

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Tables

Table 1: Case Study Program Description 8

Table 2: Examples of Stakeholders and Potential Roles in Major 

Weapon Program Cancellations 13

Table 3: Examples of Property Types Processed Through and 

Outside of the Plant Clearance Process 19

Table 4: Examples of Inventory Schedule Items 20

Table 5: Major Assets Transferred from Canceled Programs 21

Figures

Figure 1: Examples of Weapon Program Assets 7

Figure 2: Areas of Potential Program Cancellation Effects beyond 

the Program Office 9

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Figure 3: Plant Clearance Process 18

Abbreviations

ACS Aerial Common Sensor 

CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

CDRL Contract Data Requirements List

CFSR Contract Funds Status Report

DAU Defense Acquisition University 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement

DOD Department of Defense 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FCS Future Combat System

GSA General Services Administration

MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program

MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PCARSS Plant Clearance Automated Reutilization Screening 

 System 

PLCO Plant Clearance Officer

SOSCOE System of Systems Common Operating Environment

STC Special Termination Cost

TCO Termination Contracting Officer

TSAT Transformational Satellite Communications System

VH-71 VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 27, 2014

Congressional Committees

The federal government has faced increasing budgetary pressures over 

the last few years, and measures like sequestration have forced agencies 

across the government to scale back and reduce spending. To reduce 

costs in the future, it will be important for the Department of Defense 

(DOD) to make difficult trade-off decisions, including whether to continue 

investing in weapon programs when requirements change or programs 

are not meeting goals. Decisions to cancel major programs outright or 

terminate large contracts have not been common in the past. However, in 

recent years, several major defense acquisition programs have been 

canceled—for example, the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement 

Program and the Future Combat System—prompting Congress and the 

public to ask questions about the potential savings and impacts of 

canceling programs relative to continuing to fund troubled or obsolete 

programs. Given that fiscal constraints may require more frequent 

cancellations, having the appropriate tools, guidance, and processes to 

make effective decisions is vital. Moreover, having a sound understanding 

of the costs, benefits, and legal requirements involved in cancellations 

and terminations is important.1

The Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA) mandated GAO to review and report on 

issues associated with contract terminations and program cancellations of 

major defense acquisition programs (MDAP).2 This report examines (1) 

the effects of program cancellation, (2) the adequacy of DOD guidance on 

program cancellations, (3) the extent to which DOD leveraged—by 

transferring for further development or use on other programs—various 

types of assets from canceled programs, and (4) the usefulness of 

contract termination cost estimates.

In order to do our work, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and 

guidance related to contract terminations, financial management, cost 

 

1

Contract termination decisions are separate from but related to program cancellation 

decisions.

2

S. Rep. No. 112-173, at 139 (2012).
 

Page 2 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

estimating, and government property, including rights to technical data. 

We also reviewed our prior reports on contract terminations and program 

cancellations, other related reports, and other literature.3

We interviewed officials at DOD—including former key staff of canceled 

programs—at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Army, Air 

Force, and Navy to discuss contract terminations and program 

cancellations. In addition, we met with Defense Contract Management 

Agency (DCMA) Terminations Center and Plant Clearance officials to 

discuss contract termination procedures, and obtained relevant 

information. We also interviewed officials at the Defense Acquisition 

University (DAU) and the DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) to discuss, respectively, issues to consider in shutting 

down a program and termination cost estimates.

Our work included five non-generalizable case studies of canceled 

programs:

• Aerial Common Sensor (ACS),

• Comanche Helicopter,

• Future Combat System (FCS),

• Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT), and

• VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program (VH-71).

The NDAA Senate report mandated that we review the FCS and VH-71 

cancellations. In addition, we selected FCS and VH-71 for review 

because these were recent cancellations of expensive and complex DOD 

programs, and thus illustrative of current issues faced by program 

managers in cancellation of major defense acquisition programs. To 

select the other cases, we obtained DCMA data on the highest dollar 

contract terminations since those covered in our 2008 report that were 

associated with canceled programs. In addition, we considered 

cancellations reviewed for our 2008 report where there was potential to 

assess additional activity since that report. We then selected cases with 

completed settlements and the potential for follow up on leveraged 

 

3

GAO, NASA Needs to Better Assess Contract Termination Liability Risks and Ensure 

Consistency in Its Practices, GAO-11-609R (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2011); Defense 

Acquisitions: Termination Costs Are Generally Not a Compelling Reason to Continue 

Programs or Contracts That Otherwise Warrant Ending, GAO-08-379 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 14, 2008).
 

Page 3 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

assets, and also included in our total sample at least one case each for 

the Army, Navy, and Air Force. At the time they were active, all of these 

programs met the expected investment threshold to be designated 

Acquisition Category I—the current equivalent of which means the 

program would require more than $480 million in fiscal year 2014 dollars 

to complete development, testing, and evaluation. In several cases, 

investment in these programs had reached into the billions at the time of 

contract termination. Although the results of these case studies cannot be 

generalized, we determined the evidence we obtained from the case 

studies was sufficient to provide illustrative information on cases from 

across the Army, Navy, and Air Force. When feasible, we reviewed prior 

GAO work addressing the canceled programs in our sample to garner any 

insights. The scope of this review did not include interviewing contractors.

In addition, we supplemented our work by incorporating information 

gathered for a recently issued report on DOD estimates of contract 

termination liability.4 Section 812 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that we report to the congressional 

defense committees on the extent to which, among other things, DOD 

considered estimates of potential termination liability as a factor in 

entering into and terminating certain contracts.5 Our work in response to 

that mandate included reviewing a DOD assessment of the extent to 

which the department considers potential termination liability as a factor in 

entering into and terminating contracts. We also selected a nongeneralizable sample of seven current weapon programs in development 

and production and collected information on whether these programs 

have been requiring contract termination liability estimates before award 

and during the course of a contract. These programs were selected to 

represent a range of weapon platforms and military services, and to 

include both development and production programs. Although the 

responses received from these programs cannot be generalized, we 

determined the evidence we obtained from these programs was sufficient 

to provide illustrative information on DOD’s use of termination liability 

estimates.

 

4

GAO, Preliminary Observations on DOD Estimates of Contract Termination Liability, 

GAO-14-107R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2013). See page 1 of this report for more 

information on the scope and methodology of this work.

5

Pub. L. No. 112-239. 
 

Page 4 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to March 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD weapon programs range from highly complex and sophisticated 

aircraft, missile interceptors, submarines, and space-based sensors, to 

new communication and ground control systems that support and 

interconnect this equipment, to smaller, less complex systems that 

support the warfighter. Increasingly, individual weapon system 

investments are getting more complex and more dependent on software. 

Moreover, in many cases, weapon systems are also expected to 

incorporate technologies that push the state-of-the-art while operating in 

harsh and even untested environments—adding daunting technical 

challenges that increase the cost and complexity of development.

DOD typically executes several primary contracts over the life cycle of a 

weapon system program. These contracts generally cover development, 

production, or maintenance efforts.

Although a program and its contracts are related, they are separate, 

distinct efforts that can end separately. For the purposes of this review, 

we refer to the end of a program as a cancellation, and the end of a 

contract as a termination.6 For example, DOD may cancel a program but 

continue a contract related to that program. Alternatively, DOD can 

terminate a contract but continue the program. In some cases, programs 

may not be formally canceled, but instead restructured. For example, 

DOD could continue a program, but change requirements and modify a 

 

6

Generally, parties’ obligations under contracts end when the required performance is 

completed, that is, when the government has accepted the supplies or services and paid 

the contractor in full. However, if a contractor has not performed as agreed, the 

government may choose to end its obligations by terminating the contract for default. In 

other cases, however, even when the contractor is performing acceptably, it may be in the 

interest of the government to end its contractual obligations before the contract is 

completed. To acknowledge the unique position of the federal government in such 

circumstances, a legal right to terminate procurement contracts for the government’s 

convenience has developed. GAO-08-379. 

Background
 

Page 5 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

contract or even change contractors to better align the program with 

available resources.

Cancellation of major programs has not been common in the past, and 

we have noted in prior work that the acquisition of weapon systems 

involves strong incentives to reduce the risk that a program will be 

interrupted or called into question.7 When programs have been canceled, 

cost, schedule, and performance problems have often been cited as 

reasons for this decision, and officials have noted that program 

cancellation is perceived as failure. However, in some circumstances, 

program cancellation may be the best choice. As we reported in March 

2013, DOD’s 2012 portfolio of 86 major defense acquisition programs is 

estimated to cost a total of $1.6 trillion.8 This represents a decrease of 

about $44 billion from the previous year, due primarily to program 

cancellations and restructurings. However, compared to original 

estimates, the total cost of the portfolio has increased by over $400 billion 

with an average delay of 27 months in the delivery of initial operating 

capability, which suggests that opportunities exist to improve efficiencies 

in DOD’s portfolio. In 2008, we concluded that from an investment 

portfolio perspective, cancellation can be a valuable tool in responding to 

long-term fiscal imbalances.9 In 2009, Congress acted to make 

cancellation the default for programs that experience a breach of a critical 

cost growth threshold.10 In recent years, DOD has cited renewed efforts to 

end troubled programs and to achieve a better capabilities balance, and 

to that end DOD’s annual budget submissions in recent years have each 

reflected major program cancellations—at least three per year and as 

many as eight.

In response to potential cancellations, defense stakeholders have 

sometimes expressed concerns that terminating a contract will cost more

than completing it. In our 2008 report, we reviewed DOD’s past 

experience with program cancellations and contract terminations and 

 

7

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Where Should Reform Aim Next? GAO-14-145T

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2013).

8

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,

GAO-13-294SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2013).

9

GAO-08-379. 

10Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 206. 
 

Page 6 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

found that there are limited circumstances in which it could cost the 

government more to terminate a contract than to complete it.11 Of the 

eight contracts we reviewed, we did not find any cases in which the total 

amount paid on a terminated contract exceeded the estimated contract 

price. We recommended DOD review, and as needed amend, termination 

guidance to ensure it consistently identified the conditions under which it 

is appropriate to end programs or contracts, and provided the knowledge 

needed to use terminations as an investment portfolio tool. DOD 

concurred with this recommendation. However, DOD subsequently 

determined that no changes to guidance were needed. We also 

highlighted important lessons for DOD in making decisions to cancel 

individual programs as well as in managing its broader investment 

portfolio. For example, when considering cancellation of individual 

programs, contract termination costs are generally not a compelling 

reason to continue programs or contracts that otherwise warrant ending. 

Moreover, while incurred or “sunk” costs in programs being considered for 

cancellation may be substantial, they must be paid regardless of whether 

or not a contract is terminated. Therefore, the decision to terminate a 

contract or cancel a program should not be driven by sunk costs. In 

addition, when a contract warrants termination, the decision should be 

made as soon as possible because delaying a termination almost always 

results in higher settlement costs to the government. Finally, we noted 

when a program or contract ends, DOD can make choices that would 

allow the government to retain value from the work completed.

Weapon programs acquire various types of assets throughout a 

program’s life cycle; assets that may include

• property, including computer hardware, equipment, material, special 

tooling, facilities, and real property; and

• software and technical data, which can include manuals, engineering 

drawings, specifications, data rights, and data delivery.

When a program ends, activities related to shutting down the program 

include determining how to retain the most value from the government’s 

investment, which, for the purposes of this report, is the government’s 

expenditures on the program up to the date of cancellation. This can 

 

11GAO-08-379. 

Weapon Programs Acquire 

Various Assets That May 

Be Leveraged
 

Page 7 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

include terminating or otherwise restructuring contracts, and assessing 

how best to leverage the program’s assets. For example, program 

officials might identify technologies and facilities that can be realigned for 

use on other programs. Alternately, the government may ultimately sell 

assets or determine that they are not suitable for continued development. 

In some cases, assets that are not reused may be destroyed or 

dismantled. Figure 1 illustrates some examples of program assets.

Figure 1: Examples of Weapon Program Assets

The types of assets a program owns will depend, in part, on the phase of 

the program. A program in production is more likely to own hardware and 

other types of tangible assets than a program in development. For this 

report, our sample included a range of programs in the development 

phase.
 

Page 8 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Table 1: Case Study Program Description

Program Service Description

Year of major

contract termination

Investment at 

termination

Aerial Common 

Sensor

Army lead, Navy 

participation

Piloted jet carrying multiple sensors to collect 

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 

target acquisition information

2006 $186 million

Comanche 

Helicopter

Army Next-generation armed reconnaissance 

helicopter, capable of operating in adverse 

weather conditions across a wide spectrum of 

threat environments

2004 $5.9 billion

Future Combat 

System

Army Transformational force structure consisting of 

18 manned and unmanned systems linked by a 

network

First partial termination in 

2009, final termination in 

2011

Estimated 

$20 billion

Transformational 

Satellite

Communications 

System

Air Force A revolutionary communications satellite 

constellation including satellites, a network 

management architecture, and a ground control 

system

2009 Estimated 

$2.9 billion 

VH-71 Presidential 

Helicopter

Navy Dual-piloted helicopter providing safe, reliable 

transportation for the President, Vice President, 

and heads of state

2009 $3.3 billion

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Program cancellations often result in contract terminations, creating 

immediate impacts on programs and their contractors as program offices 

work with the prime contractor to end work under the contract and 

determine the costs associated with contract termination. However, the 

impact of a weapon program cancellation can extend beyond the 

immediate program and its contractors and ultimately affect a broader 

industrial base and local economies, as well as other programs and 

agencies. Consideration of these various effects and consultation with 

various stakeholders enables officials to have a better understanding of 

the costs, benefits, and legal requirements involved in a particular 

cancellation and to take steps that can help mitigate negative effects. In 

addition, shutdown activities can take years. While the immediate task of 

shutting down the program falls to the program office, there are other 

necessary tasks, such as reallocating program funds, that fall beyond the 

program’s purview. Figure 2 illustrates the potential effects to be 

considered when a program is canceled.

Effects of Weapon 

Program Cancellation 

Extend beyond a 

Program and Its 

Contractors
 

Page 9 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Figure 2: Areas of Potential Program Cancellation Effects beyond the Program 

Office 

A canceled program does not stop incurring costs immediately upon 

cancellation. Once a program has been canceled, the program office 

must undertake shutdown activities, which include determining whether to 

terminate or otherwise restructure contracts and determining how best to 

leverage the program’s assets. Conducting tasks such as negotiating with 

contractors and disposing of inventory requires program staff to remain 

on duty and can incur cost to the government. When cancellation leads to 

the termination of a contract for convenience, the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) directs the contractor to submit a proposal to the 

government for the amount of reimbursement it believes it is entitled to 

within one year of the official date of the termination. This may include 

termination costs, the incurred costs for work already performed by the

Program Costs
 

Page 10 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

contractor, and possibly a reasonable profit or fee on completed work.12

Termination costs, which represent costs that the government would not 

have otherwise incurred if it did not terminate the contract, can include 

expenses such as preparing the settlement proposal, negotiating with 

subcontractors, and disposing of inventory. With assistance from the 

Defense Contracting Audit Agency to audit the settlement proposals, 

DOD then enters into negotiations with the contractor to determine a 

settlement. Ultimately, DOD will likely be required to reimburse the 

contractor for termination costs, which can reach up to the hundreds of 

millions of dollars for a large program, though these costs can be small 

relative to the full cost of the program. The final amount of termination 

cost owed will not be determined until final settlement. For canceled 

programs, the extent of work associated with a shutdown is sometimes 

not immediately clear. One case study program official told us decision 

makers did not initially understand the need to continue to dedicate 

resources to a canceled program to fund shutdown activities.

When DOD cancels a program, it must address not only the costs of 

terminating any related contracts but the broader impact across the 

agency, including deciding on how to reallocate funds originally budgeted 

for the canceled program and determining when those funds will be 

available. This task extends beyond the canceled weapon system’s 

program office. For example, when the Army’s Comanche Helicopter 

program was canceled in 2004, the Army proposed an investment 

strategy that would redistribute $14.6 billion of planned Comanche 

funding through fiscal year 2011 to enhance a broad range of Army 

aviation modernization efforts. After securing approval from the Secretary 

of Defense and the President, the Army briefed Congress on its plan to 

redistribute the remaining Comanche funds within the Army aviation 

portfolio. Based on those discussions, the Army developed a plan to 

redistribute this funding to 30 different projects and other weapon 

programs.

 

12FAR § 31.205-42. 

Agency Budget
 

Page 11 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Cancellation of a program can lead to a delay in providing capabilities to 

the warfighter. As a result, DOD may need to increase funds for other 

programs to extend the life of existing or legacy systems. For example, 

the Navy’s VH-71 program was initiated to build a replacement for the 

current presidential helicopters with improved transportation, 

communication, and security capabilities. The Navy’s original plan was to 

field the first of these new helicopters by 2008. However, after the 

program experienced schedule slips and continued cost increases, the 

program was canceled in 2009. The Navy has since initiated a successor 

VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program, which is still in the 

early stages of development and not expected to have initial operational 

capability until fiscal year 2020. Until that time, the Navy plans to continue 

to maintain the legacy helicopters that it had otherwise planned to replace 

with the VH-71. Additionally, in May 2007, we found that the ACS contract 

termination resulted in about an additional $900 million investment 

beyond what had been previously planned to maintain the legacy 

systems. Another example is the Army’s canceled FCS, a multibillion 

dollar development program originally consisting of 18 manned and 

unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and 

information network. Initiated in 2003, the first Army combat teams were 

planned to be FCS-equipped in 2011, while the rest would be fully 

equipped by 2032. When the Manned Ground Vehicle portion of the 

program was canceled in 2009, the Army altered its modernization 

strategy but continued to develop unmanned vehicles and improved 

network and technology sensors in order to deliver them to selected 

combat teams starting in fiscal year 2011. Faced with disappointing test 

results and high costs, FCS was fully canceled in 2011. The Army has 

since incorporated its FCS efforts into a new acquisition strategy to 

modernize its network, but it does not plan to include the canceled FCS 

components, and other technologies to modernize the network will be 

delivered later than originally planned through FCS.

DOD relies on a broad industrial base that is capable of producing 

complex products that can be unique to defense applications. When a 

major weapon program is canceled, it can impact sectors within the 

industrial base and potentially diminish the capacity to produce key 

capabilities. The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 

mandated that DOD add the impact of the cancellation of major weapon 

Capabilities Delivery

Industrial Base
 

Page 12 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

systems in its assessment of the national technology and industrial base 

that it provides annually to Congress.13 For example, the 2012 

assessment reported on the impact of the 2009 cancellation of the 

Manned Ground Vehicle portion of the Army’s FCS, which was supposed 

to replace current Army vehicles such as the M1 Abrams Tank and M-2 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle. In our prior work, we found that smaller 

companies that rely on government contracts can be particularly affected 

by program cancellations.14 In addition, program cancellation can impact 

a community that is economically dependent on a contractor facility. In 

the example noted above, changes to the Army’s ground vehicle program 

can have an economic impact in cities and towns within the Upper 

Midwest and Great Lakes region of the United States, where a large 

portion of military ground vehicle production is based.

When a program is canceled, personnel working in the program are 

immediately affected. One of the challenges program managers face is 

addressing potential deflated worker morale as well as the logistics of 

transferring personnel while maintaining essential employees to 

effectively shut down the program. DOD officials have noted that their 

goals in addressing personnel issues resulting from canceled programs 

are to maintain open communications and minimize disruptions. For 

example, one senior official suggested that during a shutdown, the 

program office could offer training to remaining program staff in order to 

maintain skills that were lost due to the departure of staff that had already 

left the program.

For some programs, cancellation may impact additional stakeholders. For 

example, the Army’s Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), 

which DOD proposed to no longer fund after fiscal year 2013, was being 

developed by the Army in collaboration with two other countries. DOD’s 

cancellation of MEADS would leave the two partners with considerably 

fewer resources than anticipated to complete development.

 

13Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 303.

14GAO, Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing Technologies Developed 

under the Small Business Innovation Research Program, GAO-11-21 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov., 10, 2010).

Staff and Personnel

Additional Program 

Partners
 

Page 13 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Consulting the broad range of stakeholders who will be affected by, or 

have knowledge of the effects of, a program cancellation, can enable 

officials to be aware of important effects of program cancellation. For 

example, one former Comanche official stated that the Army would have 

had more accurate knowledge of what funds were available for programs 

after cancellation and avoided delays during the contract termination 

process if it had involved legal advisors and the Comptroller’s office 

earlier in the process. As the effects of a major weapon program 

cancellation extend far beyond the program office, there are multiple 

stakeholders representing various interests that can assist in enabling 

program officials to fully assess these effects as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Examples of Stakeholders and Potential Roles in Major Weapon Program Cancellations

Stakeholder Potential Role in Program Cancellation

Contractor The decision to terminate a contract is communicated to the contractor in the form of a termination 

letter. Upon receipt of that letter, the contractor is responsible for ceasing operations in an orderly 

manner and preparing a termination settlement. For seven active weapon programs we reviewed, the 

program offices usually identified the contractor as the primary source for termination costs estimates 

during the execution of a contract.

Comptroller The Comptroller serves as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on all budgetary and fiscal 

matters. The Comptroller’s office also maintains the DOD financial management regulations. It can, for 

example, help determine the financial impact of a program cancellation across DOD, and would be 

involved in reprogramming funds from a canceled program.

Legal Counsel Legal guidance can assist program managers to anticipate and communicate legal obligations and 

responsibilities with the contractor during the termination process. According to program officials, they 

can also help to address which party maintains rights to intellectual property of the program.

Defense Contract 

Management Agency (DCMA) 

Termination Center

DCMA maintains a Termination Center with staff specializing in assisting programs through the 

contract termination process. When a program requests assistance from DCMA, a termination 

contracting officer (TCO) is assigned to assist with the logistics of contract termination and the 

settlement process. TCOs perform specific duties such as negotiating settlements (or making 

determinations in cases where agreement cannot be reached), and executing settlement agreements.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

DOD has recently developed guidance for shutting down canceled 

programs. In the absence of guidance, officials from our case study 

programs reported relying heavily on experienced staff to navigate the 

shutdown process. The new online guidance addresses the spectrum of 

effects of cancellation and offers a variety of tools for program managers. 

However, current plans for notifying program managers of this resource 

may not be sufficient. Furthermore, the guidance was designed to serve 

as a lessons learned mechanism but there have been few actual 

contributions of lessons learned from the acquisition community.

New Guidance 

Requires Input and 

Awareness to Work 

as Intended
 

Page 14 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

The decision to cancel a program is often communicated by an 

acquisition decision memorandum, which documents the decision to 

cancel and provides objectives for program officials to accomplish during 

the shutdown process. However, at the time the programs we selected for 

case study were canceled, DOD did not have department-wide guidance 

on how to achieve those objectives. In 2008 we recommended that DOD 

review, and as needed amend, guidance on terminations across the 

military services and DOD entities to ensure that guidance consistently 

identified the conditions under which it is appropriate to end programs or 

contracts, and that guidance provided the necessary knowledge for using 

terminations as an investment portfolio management tool. Following our 

report, DOD conducted a review and determined that no changes to DOD 

guidance were needed. The FAR and Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation Supplement (DFARS) contain guidance on the process of 

terminating contracts; however, contract termination is only one of several 

aspects of program cancellation that program officials must consider 

when shutting down a program. As discussed earlier, other areas of 

consideration include disposing of program assets and overseeing the 

budget during shutdown of the program. Officials from most of our case 

study programs stated that at the time they were shutting down their 

canceled programs, they were not aware of department-wide or service 

specific guidance addressing these other aspects of program shutdown. 

Army officials were able to identify some Army guidance on shutting down 

programs, although it was unclear whether officials from our Army case 

study programs referred to this guidance during the shutdown process for 

those programs. During the course of this review, Air Force officials 

provided documentation of new draft Air Force guidance, which was not 

yet in effect when the TSAT program was canceled. Navy officials were 

unable to identify Navy guidance on the subject. DOD officials confirmed 

that there was no department-wide guidance on program cancellation and 

shutdown.

Officials from most of our case study programs told us that without 

department-wide guidance, they learned about cancellation and shutdown 

by working with personnel who had been through cancellations before. 

For example, FCS officials told us that a number of their program office 

staff, including those working on disposition of assets, had worked on the 

Crusader cancellation. In addition, the DCMA termination contracting 

officer working on FCS had also handled the Crusader cancellation. 

Similarly, a former VH-71 official told us that he was brought on as 

program manager for VH-71 when officials began to think about 

cancellation, because he had been through cancellation of a major 

program before. The Comanche contracting officer stated that he had 

Without Formal Guidance 

Available, Program 

Officials Have Relied on 

Personnel with 

Cancellation Experience
 

Page 15 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

been through several cancellations before helping to shut down the 

Comanche program. ACS officials reported relying heavily on the DCMA 

termination contracting officer for guidance. This continuity seems to have 

worked well for our case study programs. However, several of the experts 

in this area from our case study programs have retired or will soon be 

eligible to do so, and DOD may not be able to continue to make this 

knowledge accessible to program managers without a more 

institutionalized mechanism for doing so.

Recognizing the need for guidance on shutting down programs, in 2009 

the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) began development of a special 

interest website called Smart Shutdown, which offers a variety of 

resources related to program shutdown. In December 2013, DAU 

finalized a guidebook geared toward program managers which is now 

available through the website. The guidebook is constructed to make 

program officials aware of various areas to be considered in program 

cancellation, and to help them shut down a program as efficiently as 

possible, while maintaining the best value for the government. These 

areas for consideration include

• Personnel,

• Operational Capability/Requirement,

• Technology,

• Facilities/Hardware/Software/Program Security,

• Contracts, and

• Budget.

DAU officials told us that because the specific issues faced by a program 

manager during shutdown will vary substantially by program, the 

guidebook is intended to provide insight on common issues to be 

considered throughout the process, rather than detailed prescriptive 

guidance. Other materials available through the website include a sample 

briefing to leadership, and a database of considerations when disposing 

of certain assets.

This guidance is intended to be advisory in nature. DAU disseminates 

information about this resource through a required program manager 

course; however, program managers are required to take this course 

once before becoming program managers of high value programs. 

Therefore, program managers who have taken the course before this 

resource was developed will not have received this information.

Furthermore, it may be many years between a program manager’s 

Realizing Full Potential of 

New Resource Depends 

on Awareness of This 

Resource and Input from 

Experienced Program 

Officials
 

Page 16 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

completion of this course and the point at which he or she is actually 

faced with the prospect of shutting down a program. Therefore, 

mentioning the Smart Shutdown materials in a one-time program 

manager course does not ensure that a program manager faced with 

cancellation will be aware of this resource. Internal control standards call 

for agencies to undertake control activities, which include mechanisms to 

help ensure that management’s directives are carried out. In several 

cases, acquisition decision memorandums directed program officials to 

retain maximum value from DOD’s investment in canceled programs. 

However, without awareness of DAU’s Smart Shutdown resources, 

program officials may lack the knowledge necessary to leverage 

investments effectively as directed. Inclusion of information on Smart 

Shutdown in an acquisition decision memorandum communicating 

cancellation of the program, for example, would be one mechanism to 

better ensure program managers have information on this resource when 

they need it.

To develop this guidance, DAU interviewed individuals who had 

experienced program cancellation. DAU officials stated that the resource 

will benefit from more input from experienced members of the acquisitions 

community. The website is constructed to allow input from the acquisition 

community in identifying goals, processes, issues, best practices, and 

considerations in all aspects of program cancellation activities. In 

particular, its database is designed to allow officials who have 

experienced program cancellation to share lessons learned. According to 

the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, which provides acquisition best 

practices, program managers can gain insight into risks, uncertainties, 

and opportunities that their programs may encounter by reviewing 

experiences of other programs described in lessons learned. The 

guidebook states that program managers should take advantage of these 

types of resources when available. However, DAU officials told us that 

they have received very few contributions from the acquisition community 

to date. In fact, we found that several of our case study programs had 

written compilations of lessons learned during the cancellation process, 

but DAU officials were not aware of most of these lessons learned 

documents. Without continued contribution of lessons learned from 

program officials with experience shutting down canceled programs, DOD 

will be missing opportunities to build and share knowledge on program 

shutdown.
 

Page 17 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

We could not determine the extent to which DOD leveraged the assets in 

our case studies because DOD does not have a way to track all types of 

assets. DOD uses a basic, federal government-wide process and IT 

system for reutilizing, disposing of, and tracking government property. 

However, both the process and the system are designed to track specific 

pieces of equipment, materials, and tools and are not designed to track

intellectual property, such as rights to technical data and software, 

partially developed technologies, or even other types of assets such as 

real property and hazardous materials. Because there is no departmentwide process or requirement for disseminating information about all 

assets available for reuse, DOD cannot help ensure that technologies, 

hardware, and other potentially useful assets can be delivered to parties 

who can best develop them further. There are inherent difficulties in 

transferring the full range of assets on any program, given the uniqueness 

of a program’s requirements. Nevertheless, given that DOD may spend 

billions of dollars before deciding to cancel a program, it is in the 

government’s interest to ensure these investments are leveraged to the 

maximum extent possible.

The FAR specifies a government-wide process, which DOD refers to as 

plant clearance, for reutilizing and disposing of property no longer 

required for continued performance of a contract.15 Figure 3 illustrates the 

basic process.

 

15FAR Subpart 45.6. The process applies to excess government property both when a 

contract is terminated or completed.

Information about 

Whether Assets Are 

Being Leveraged Is 

Limited

DOD Follows a Federal 

Process to Track Some 

Assets
Figure 3: Plant Clearance Process

Source: GAO analysis of FAR Part 45 and FAR § 49.206-3.

Disposal in 

accordance with

agency procedures

without report 

to General

Services 

Administration

(GSA)

Government

reviews, accepts,

and verifies

schedules

Screening by

contracting

agency

Submit excess

property report

to GSA

Screening by

other federal

agencies, 

and for donations

Inventory 

disposal reports

Abandonment,

destruction, or

sale after

screening

Contractor 

submits

inventory 

schedules

Interactive Graphic Roll over the boxes for more detailed information. Please see Appendix II for the printed version.

Page 18 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs
 

Page 19 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

The plant clearance process applies to property, such as material, 

equipment, special tooling, and special test equipment, which may be 

government-furnished or contractor-acquired in performance of a 

contract. However, the process does not apply to software and technical 

data or types of assets such as real property or partially developed 

technologies. Table 3 provides examples of property processed through 

and outside of the process.

Table 3: Examples of Property Types Processed Through and Outside of the Plant 

Clearance Process

Through process Outside of process

Material

Equipment

Special tooling

Special test equipment

Computer hardware

Real property

Perishables

Hazardous materials

Controlled substances

Property dangerous to public health and safety

Classified or national security-sensitive property

Nuclear materials

Source: GAO analysis of FAR.

The Plant Clearance Automated Reutilization Screening System 

(PCARSS) automates the process for reporting, screening, requisitioning, 

and disposing of excess property. When a contract is terminated or 

completed, contractors are to enter inventories of excess property directly 

into PCARSS. DOD components and federal agencies have access to 

PCARSS, in which they can review available property and requisition that 

in which they are interested. The FAR identifies reutilization priorities for 

plant clearance of property. In descending order, these priorities are 

reuse within the owning agency, transfer of educationally useful 

equipment to schools and nonprofit organizations, and reuse within the 

federal government or donation as surplus property.

Some case study program officials found PCARSS cumbersome. 

According to DCMA plant clearance officials, a contractor may submit 

over 1,000 inventory schedules, including those of subcontractors, for a 

contract termination. These inventory schedules can contain many 

thousands of line items, making it time-consuming and difficult to identify 

property for potential reuse. Also, many of the items listed tend to be 

smaller components, such as cables and screws. Table 4 cites examples 

of items listed in a PCARSS inventory schedule.
 

Page 20 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Table 4: Examples of Inventory Schedule Items

Line item

Acquisition

unit costa

Aircraft, vertical lift $41,000,000.00

Desk (metal grey) $650.00

Fuel injector $5,243.86

Lenovo ThinkPad (Hard drive must be destroyed at time of 

disposition)

$15,000.00

Main rotor blade $100,000.00

Overhead console $200,000.00

Raw material – cable $14.67

Rivet $10.00

Screw $0.05

Seal, O-ring $200.00

Sensor low oil $9,509.38

Shell $491,229.00

Static mockup of VH-71 cabin interior $1,014,522.00

Tank, fuel $171,980.00

Tube nylon type 12 $250.00

Source: GAO analysis of Plant Clearance Automated Reutilization Screening System data

a

Acquisition unit cost is the unadjusted original cost.

For our five case study programs, which were all canceled during 

program development, the most valuable program assets for transfer 

were often partially developed systems or technologies, which can be a 

combination of software, technical data, or property. These types of 

assets were generally not processed through PCARSS nor tracked in any 

other systematic way. Table 5 lists examples of major assets transferred 

from some of our canceled case study programs, but does not represent 

a comprehensive accounting of all major assets for the programs.

Many Assets Are 

Processed Outside of 

PCARSS and Are Not 

Tracked
 

Page 21 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Table 5: Major Assets Transferred from Canceled Programs

Canceled program Examples of assets transferred Recipient program or center

Comanche 2nd Generation Forward Looking Infrared

Radar Electronics Unit

Split Torque Transmission

Covert Lighting

Advanced Processors

Advanced Composite Technology

Open Architecture

Apache Program

FCS System of Systems Common Operating 

Environment

Army Aviation and Missile Research 

Development and Engineering Center 

FCS Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle New production program

FCS Network Integration Kit New production program

TSAT Battery Life Test Wideband Global Satellite

TSAT Dynamic Bandwidth Resource Allocation

Reference Terminal

Testbed for Signal Processing

Optical Links

MIT/Lincoln Laboratory

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data

Former officials of our case study programs were not able to provide 

comprehensive lists of asset disposition because they did not have 

systems to track this information. They tracked transfers of assets 

processed outside of the plant clearance process mostly through 

program-developed spreadsheets. The FCS program also used 

contracting officer letters to document the transfers. When an item was 

transferred for use on another contract, the transfer was documented by 

contract modifications to both the gaining and losing contracts. 
 

Page 22 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Though they could not provide comprehensive lists of asset disposition, 

program officials reported that a substantial amount of assets was 

transferred outside the PCARSS system. The Comanche program, for 

instance, reported reutilizing about two-thirds of its assets; less than 1 

percent was processed through PCARSS. Officials of the VH-71 and ACS 

programs, both of whose acquisition strategies were to integrate existing 

or developing systems onto a base platform, told us they expected that 

program assets would be used on successor or related programs and 

therefore bypassed the plant clearance process. In addition, PCARSS is 

not used for assets that the government allows the contractor to continue 

to use after a program is terminated, or items sold back to the contractor 

or to third parties. For example, the VH-71 program contractor, with 

program office and DCMA termination contracting officer concurrence, 

negotiated a sale to Canada of nine prototype helicopters. This 

transaction did not go through PCARSS.

The acquisition decision memorandums cancelling several of our case 

study programs or terminating related contracts instructed program 

officials to leverage DOD’s investment in the programs. But there is no 

DOD requirement to track all program assets. Moreover, DOD has no 

comprehensive mechanisms in place to facilitate activities, such as 

sharing information on available assets, valuing these assets, and 

tracking transfer, which would help to ensure these assets are effectively 

leveraged as directed. Without systems to track disposition of assets, the 

government may not be able to ensure it is getting the most value for 

assets.
 

Page 23 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Technical data and software, which are also dealt with outside the 

disposition process, present unique challenges to tracking. According to a 

DOD report, information technology represents a considerable proportion 

of defense weapon programs underway—a proportion that is likely to 

increase in the future.16 Some DOD program developments have 

extensively relied on software and technical data. For example, the FCS 

development effort projected that 95 percent of FCS functionality would 

be controlled by software. However, technical data rights are not tracked 

centrally, but rather, according to DOD officials, only as a component of 

contracts that involve such rights.

DOD and its contractors are to follow the FAR and DFARS procedures 

that outline the government’s rights to acquire, use, and disclose 

technical data.

17 Defense procedures require contractors to identify in the 

contract the technical data rights to be granted to the government and 

delivered under the contract. 18 Contractors generally identify the 

government’s rights to technical data at the beginning of the contract 

process and prior to delivery of the technical data using the Contract Data 

Requirements List (CDRL)—an exhibit to the contract that contains the 

technical data deliverables.19 The technical data rights assigned to the 

government can vary depending on the nature of the data, source of the 

funding and negotiated terms of the contract. The standard data rights 

 

16DOD, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Acquisition of 

Information Technology (March 2009).

17FAR Subpart 27.4; DFARS Subpart 227.71. 

18DFARS § 227.7103-1(b)(4). 

19Section 215.470(b) of the DFARS requires the use of the CDRL in solicitations when the 

contract will require delivery of data. The CDRL groups all of the data requirements in a 

single place rather than scattering the items throughout the solicitation or contract. 

Rights to Technical Data 

and Software Present 

Unique Challenges
 

Page 24 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

range from the least restrictive, or unlimited and government purpose 

rights, to more restrictive rights, such as limited or special rights.20

Although rights to data are usually defined when a contract is executed, 

the government may adjust or renegotiate those rights during the life of a 

contract. DOD policy requires that prior to issuing a contract solicitation, 

program managers for major acquisition programs must assess the merits 

of including a priced contract option for the future delivery of technical 

data and intellectual property rights that are not acquired in the initial 

contract.

DOD officials mentioned several reasons the tracking and transfer of data 

rights can be problematic and challenging when a contract is terminated.

Specifically, the following:

• Limited recordkeeping for unrestricted data rights—The CDRL 

does not contain all technical data items delivered to the government. 

The DFARS requires contractors to identify technical data rights with 

restrictions in the contracts.21 According to an Army intellectual 

property attorney, the CDRL generally contains the restricted items 

and not the items that are unrestricted such as those assigned 

government purpose or unlimited rights. Consequently, the 

unrestricted rights are not evident at contract termination and it can be 

difficult to track all technical data rights that should be accounted for 

when a contract is terminated.

• Complications transferring a combination of software under 

contract—When a system under development includes a 

combination of software products, each with different types of rights 

assigned, the government may need to identify all of the software 

 

20See generally, FAR clause 52.227-14. See also, DFARS definition of “Unlimited rights” 

which give the government the right to use, modify, reproduce, perform, display, release, 

or disclose technical data in whole or in part, in any manner and for any purpose 

whatsoever, and to have or authorize others to do so. DFARS also provides that 

government purpose rights give the government the right to use, modify, reproduce, 

release, perform, display, or disclose technical data within the government without 

restriction. Additionally, with these rights, the government can release or disclose 

technical data outside the government and authorize the persons receiving the information 

to use, modify, reproduce, release, perform, display, or disclose that data for United 

States government purposes. DFARS § 252.227.7013.

21DFARS § 227.7103-3.
 

Page 25 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

under the contract and renegotiate the data rights. For example, when 

the FCS program was canceled, the Army planned to transfer the 

System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE) to 

the Army Aviation and Missile Research Development and 

Engineering Center for further development and distribution to 

program offices that had use for it. However, SOSCOE contained a 

combination of software that was DOD-developed, developed by FCS 

subcontractors, developed for commercial purposes, and some that 

was open source. Before transferring SOSCOE, the Army worked with 

the subcontractor to develop a single distribution agreement for the 

government purpose rights and open source software, and a special 

license agreement for the portion of software developed for 

commercial purposes. 

• Difficulty in determining the value of technical data and software 

before transferring data rights—According to an Army intellectual 

property attorney, the assignment of value to technical data and 

software rights is not clearly understood and these values are 

assigned, in most cases, by the contractor. Further, some contractors 

are more sophisticated than others in determining the value of data 

rights and maintaining good documentation. In some cases, the 

government and contractors have had difficulties valuing rights in 

technical data even if line items in the contract identify the technical 

data to be delivered and specify the assigned value for each item. The 

government may need to contest the contractors’ assigned values to 

technical data rights before it can transfer those rights, particularly 

when there are unknowns with a program, such as the case with 

research and development programs where the development 

approach may not be stable and could necessitate changes to the 

contract.22

• Loss of knowledgeable personnel for tracking transfers—

According to DOD officials, staff familiar with the contract and the 

government’s technical data rights would be the best source for 

tracking their transfer. However, when a program is canceled, 

valuable contract knowledge can be lost when staff resign, are 

reassigned, or are transferred to another program.

 

22DOD has the right to challenge asserted restrictions on technical data under certain 

circumstances. The Government must challenge contractor within 3 years after final 

payment under the contract or 3 years after delivery of the data, whichever is later. 

DFARS §§ 227.7102-3, 227.7103-13(d).
 

Page 26 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

The uniqueness of weapon system requirements presents inherent 

challenges to transferring assets. Because technologies meet very 

specific needs and are usually costly to develop, there may be a very 

narrow set of organizations interested and able to afford continuing the 

development effort. Some former program officials told us that 

transferring existing program assets depends on knowledge of other 

programs that might be able to use them, which often happens through 

networking. For example, the Comanche program had staff with aircraft 

technology expertise who helped find appropriate recipients for 

equipment. A former FCS official told us that he tried—by speaking at 

trade shows, trying to publish technical papers, and networking with 

people—to make the user community aware that SOSCOE was available 

for distribution. However, he commented that these efforts were not 

effective, and noted that the lack of an Army infrastructure for sharing 

information hampered the efforts. After spending approximately $900 

million under the FCS contract to develop the SOSCOE, the Army 

transferred it to a research and development center for further 

development. However, while the center initially funded additional 

development, the former FCS official indicated that the SOSCOE will no 

longer be funded.

Additionally, a technology may become irrelevant before it is fully 

developed. For example, a former ACS official told us that technologies 

under development for ACS were of little use to the eventual replacement 

program because it had different requirements. Lastly, while not citing 

specific cases, other program and Office of the Secretary of Defense 

officials commented that it is not unusual to be ultimately unable to 

transfer a technology, given the uniqueness of the technologies being 

developed.

Estimates of contract termination costs are sometimes perceived by 

program officials as a useful tool in managing a portfolio of investments 

and informing contract termination planning and budgeting decisions. 

However, there are some uncertainties about costs that cannot be 

addressed until a program is actually terminated, making estimates less 

useful for the purpose of informing the decision to terminate a contract. 

Thus, while DOD generally has access to contract termination cost 

estimates, they have limitations due to issues such as limited visibility into 

cost assumptions.

Uniqueness of Weapon 

System Requirements 

Makes It Inherently 

Difficult to Transfer All 

Assets

Contract Termination 

Cost Estimates Have 

Limitations
 

Page 27 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

According to DOD officials, estimates of termination costs can be useful 

for contract termination planning and budgeting decisions. However, 

some issues involving termination costs may not be resolved until after 

the termination settlement process begins. Contractors have a year from 

the time of termination to produce a settlement proposal and, according to 

a senior contracting termination official, contractors often request 

extensions of this deadline for large and complex programs. During this 

time, the contractor is to resolve areas of uncertainty and take a position 

as to which costs can be claimed as termination costs. For example, 

former contracting officials for the VH-71 program noted that there was 

uncertainty during contract execution regarding whether the cost of 

certain contractor investments, such as facilities and test vehicles, could 

be claimed by the contractor as termination costs. Contractors and 

program offices must also agree on the price of any contract changes that 

had been unpriced at the time of termination. In the case of FCS, a former 

program official said that a series of partial contract terminations and 

changes to the contract led to frequent fluctuations in cost estimates that 

made it more difficult to make an accurate estimate of the cost of 

terminating the contract. DCMA officials told us final settlement for the 

FCS contract is not expected until 2016. In two of the five canceled 

programs we reviewed, a major obstacle to settling the terminated 

contract was determining the fees due to the contractors for their work. A 

senior contract termination official said that there are a number of other 

termination costs that can be significant but difficult to calculate until after 

the termination process has begun, including the costs of stopping work 

until the contract is terminated and costs associated with the Worker 

Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, which requires contractors to 

provide advance notice in the event of a mass termination or plant 

closure.23 As a result, there will always be a level of uncertainty in cost 

estimates prepared before termination, which limits the utility of those 

estimates.

 

23Pub. L. No. 100-379, § 3 (1988).

Some Elements of 

Termination Costs Are 

Inherently Uncertain
 

Page 28 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Generally, DOD weapon programs receive regular estimates of 

termination costs from their contractors in contract funds status reports 

(CFSR).24 Termination cost estimates are included among other cost data 

in these reports, which contractors are required to regularly provide the 

program office to help forecast and plan funding for the program. The 

CFSRs we reviewed included individual estimates of the cost of 

terminating the contract during each of the immediate months or quarters, 

then estimates for termination costs in subsequent quarterly or annual 

periods thereafter. In response to our survey of seven major weapon 

programs currently in development or production, conducted as part of 

our related work, the five programs that reported a source for information 

used to develop their termination estimates identified their contractor, 

usually through CFSRs. Six of the respondents reported considering 

termination liability estimates during contract execution while one 

reported considering termination liability estimates when awarding the 

contract.25

Some program officials we spoke with were uncertain of how contractors 

arrived at these estimates, and were not aware of any additional 

information provided by contractors to support these estimates. For two of 

the canceled programs we reviewed, estimated termination costs 

provided by the contractor increased as terminations became more likely, 

in one example by almost 50 percent from the previous quarter.26 A 

former program official that we spoke with said that these increases 

suggest that when producing their termination cost estimates, the 

contractors were including all costs that could conceivably be allowable 

under the FAR. In at least one case, uncertainty about costs included in 

the contractor estimate led to considerable uncertainty in the program 

office estimate that was submitted to decision makers.

 

24CFSRs are generally not required for firm fixed price contracts, in which cost visibility 

during the execution of the contract is limited.

25We obtained this information as part of related work in which we and DOD were asked 

to report on the extent to which major DOD weapon programs are collecting estimates of 

termination costs prior to entering into and then terminating contracts. Additional 

information on DOD’s report on this topic is included in GAO-14-107R. 

26The scope of this engagement did not include interviews with contractors. 

Contract Termination Cost 

Estimates Are Generally 

Available to DOD but Have 

Limitations
 

Page 29 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

DOD also has access to its own independent termination cost estimates 

from the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE); 

however, their usefulness to DOD during the consideration or planning of 

a program cancellation is limited because they are usually developed 

before contracts are awarded. At major milestone decisions in which 

weapon programs enter the next acquisition phase, CAPE produces 

independent costs assessments for DOD that include estimated 

termination costs for the program. While these estimates are produced 

independently within DOD, unlike those in the CFSRs, CAPE might not 

provide estimates between milestone reviews, which can be many years 

apart. For example, the VH-71 was canceled in 2009, while its last 

milestone review was in 2005. Furthermore, when CAPE produces 

estimates at the milestone phase, it is generally before a contract is 

awarded, so the estimates do not reflect any data from contract 

execution. According to a CAPE cost assessor, contract termination 

estimates are generally not a major point of consideration during DOD 

milestone reviews.

Though it would not have applied to the canceled programs we reviewed, 

the recently updated weapons acquisition instruction released by DOD in 

November 2013 requires a termination liability estimate for all large 

weapon acquisitions prior to contract award.27 Specifically, the 

instructions require weapon programs for which termination liability can 

be reasonably expected to exceed $100 million to include an estimate of 

the potential termination liability in the program’s acquisition strategy as 

well as how the liability is likely to increase or decrease during execution 

of the contract.

 

27Department of Defense Interim Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 

Acquisition System (Nov. 25, 2013).
 

Page 30 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

In limited instances, contractors may provide estimates of some 

termination costs prior to contract execution. Contracts for weapon 

programs may contain a special termination cost (STC) clause, which 

reflects the program and the contractor’s estimation of certain termination 

costs prior to award of the contract. However, according to officials, these 

clauses are rare and do not necessarily represent all types of allowable 

termination costs. Specifically, these clauses define a maximum amount 

of specific termination costs that will be payable to the contractor if the 

contract is terminated. DFARS states that this clause may be used when 

approved by an agency head, when the contract meets certain duration 

and investment thresholds, and when adequate funds are available to 

cover potential liability.

Although contracts for two of the programs we reviewed contained such 

clauses, FCS and Comanche, a senior DCMA contract termination official 

said that he has rarely encountered these clauses in the terminated 

contracts he has reviewed. For those two programs, termination cost 

uncertainty remained despite the existence of the clause. In the case of 

the Comanche program, the STC clause set the special termination cost 

limit for the contract at $123.2 million for fiscal year 2004, the year in 

which it was canceled. When the Army requested an estimate from the 

contractor for the final termination costs, the contractor responded with a 

rough order of magnitude of $640 million, noting that the estimate 

included other termination costs not covered by the STC clause. The STC 

clause did not provide a basis for the program office to evaluate these 

other potential termination costs included in the contractor’s rough order 

of magnitude termination cost estimate. When the contract termination 

was settled, the final termination costs were around $143 million after 

program officials made efforts to minimize these costs. In the case of 

FCS, officials were unclear how the STC clause in the primary 

development contract would be applied since the program was canceled 

through a series of partial contract terminations, and they thought costs 

for each partial termination were unlikely to reach the limit in the STC 

clause. The government and the prime contractor have not yet reached a 

final termination settlement on that contract.

The magnitude of DOD’s investments in major acquisition programs 

demands good stewardship when it is decided a program should be 

canceled. Though cancellations of major programs to date have been 

relatively rare, a single one may represent a multibillion dollar proposition 

that can have far-reaching effects on DOD, the industrial base, and even 

local economies. DAU has developed guidance that addresses the 

Conclusions
 

Page 31 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

spectrum of issues faced in a cancellation, though current efforts may be 

insufficient to ensure that program managers who are faced with a 

program cancellation will be aware of this guidance. Without this 

awareness, program officials may lack the knowledge necessary to 

manage the shutdown process and leverage related investments as 

effectively as possible. Furthermore, without the continued input of 

lessons learned from past cancellations, DOD will miss opportunities to 

continue to build and share knowledge regarding program shutdown. 

Leveraging investments in canceled programs is complicated because 

there is no DOD process to track all program assets or disseminate 

information about assets available for reuse. DOD uses a process that 

provides visibility over specific tools, materials, and equipment that 

support a program being canceled, but it has little visibility over perhaps 

more valuable, but less tangible, assets such as software or partially 

developed technology, as our case studies demonstrated. Leveraging 

these investments is further complicated by the fact that the technologies 

may be unique and expensive to continue to develop, thereby limiting the 

pool of organizations that want partially developed technologies, 

specialized hardware or other property. Without more comprehensive 

processes to track and disseminate information about all available assets, 

DOD’s efforts to ensure that it gets the most value for its investments will 

continue to be hampered.

To improve DOD’s ability to ensure it is fully leveraging investments made 

in canceled programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Office of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the 

following three actions:

(1) Direct program officials to refer to DAU’s Smart Shutdown guidance 

throughout the process of shutting down the program. This could be 

done, for example, through acquisition decision memorandums.

(2) Direct program officials to provide lessons learned, if applicable, 

related to program cancellation and shut down to DAU to enhance its 

Smart Shutdown toolkit.

(3) Develop department-wide processes to improve tracking of assets, 

including technical data and software, and dissemination of information 

about assets available for reuse after programs are canceled.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 32 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report, which 

are reprinted in appendix III.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to direct program 

officials to refer to DAU’s Smart Shutdown guidance. DOD agreed that 

Smart Shutdown is a beneficial tool, but stated that it planned to highly 

encourage, rather than direct, reference to this resource. While we 

support DAU’s efforts to further promote the toolkit, we question whether 

these efforts will be sufficient to ensure that all program officials faced 

with cancellation have knowledge about cancellation and shutdown 

procedures to leverage investments effectively. Thus, we continue to 

believe that direction to program officials to refer to the Smart Shutdown 

toolkit would be a more effective mechanism to ensure that 

management’s goals for the shutdown would be achieved. As noted in 

this report, officials from most of our case study programs told us that 

without department-wide guidance, they learned about cancellation and 

shutdown by working with personnel who had been through cancellations 

before. However, several of the experts in this area from the case study 

programs have retired or soon will be eligible to do so. When a major 

program is canceled, acquisition decision memorandums which contain 

instructions for the cancellation process are sometimes issued to program 

officials, and these may direct program officials to work to achieve DOD 

goals such as retaining maximum value from DOD’s investment in the 

program. Including direction in this acquisition decision memorandum for 

program officials to refer to the Smart Shutdown resource during this 

process would be one way to ensure program officials are aware of a 

resource that will help them to best achieve management’s objectives. 

DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to direct program 

officials to submit lessons learned after cancellation, again stating that it

would highly encourage, rather than direct, this action. We continue to 

believe that direction to submit lessons learned, where applicable, is the 

most effective way to ensure knowledge about cancellation is captured 

and shared. As discussed in this report, we found that DAU had received 

few contributions of lessons learned. Without such direction, there may be 

little incentive for program officials to take the time to share lessons 

learned before moving on to a new assignment. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop department-wide 

processes to improve tracking of assets, including technical data and 

software, and dissemination of information about assets available for 

reuse after programs are canceled. However, DOD did not provide 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 33 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

information on any specific actions it planned to take to address this 

recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and 

interested congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at 

no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV.

Cristina Chaplain

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
 

Page 34 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Durbin 

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

The Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 20131 mandated GAO to review and report on issues 

associated with contract terminations and program cancellations of major 

defense acquisition programs (MDAP). This report examines (1) the 

effects of program cancellation, (2) the adequacy of current Department 

of Defense (DOD) guidance on program cancellations, (3) the extent to 

which DOD leveraged—by transferring for further development or use on 

other programs—various types of assets from canceled programs, and 

(4) the usefulness of contract termination cost estimates. We reviewed 

relevant laws, regulations, and guidance related to contract terminations, 

financial management, cost estimating, and government property, 

including rights to technical data. We also reviewed our prior reports on 

contract terminations and program cancellations, other related reports, 

and other literature. 2

We interviewed DOD officials—including former key staff of canceled 

programs—at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Air Force, 

Army, and Navy to discuss contract terminations and program 

cancellations. In addition, we met with Defense Contract Management 

Agency (DCMA) Terminations Center and Plant Clearance officials to 

discuss contract termination procedures, and obtained relevant 

information. We also interviewed officials at the Defense Acquisition 

University (DAU) and the DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) to discuss, respectively, issues to consider in shutting 

down a program and termination cost estimates.

Our work included five non-generalizable case studies of programs 

canceled during development:

• Aerial Common Sensor (ACS),

• Comanche Helicopter,

• Future Combat System (FCS),

• Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT), and

• VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program (VH-71).

 

1

S. Rep. No. 112-173 at 139 (2012).

2

GAO, NASA Needs to Better Assess Contract Termination Liability Risks and Ensure 

Consistency in Its Practices, GAO-11-609R (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2011); Defense 

Acquisitions: Termination Costs Are Generally Not a Compelling Reason to Continue 

Programs or Contracts That Otherwise Warrant Ending, GAO-08-379 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 14, 2008). 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

The Senate report mandated that we review the FCS and VH-71 

cancellations. In addition, we selected FCS and VH-71 for review 

because these were recent cancellations of expensive and complex DOD 

programs, and thus illustrative of current issues faced by program 

managers in cancellation of major defense acquisition programs. To 

select the other cases, we obtained DCMA data on the highest dollar 

contract terminations since our 2008 report associated with canceled 

programs. In addition, we considered cancellations reviewed for our 2008 

report where there was potential to assess additional activity since that 

report. We then selected cases with completed settlements and the 

potential for follow-up on leveraged assets, and also included in our total 

sample at least one case each for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. At the 

time they were active, all of these programs met the expected investment 

threshold to be designated Acquisition Category I – the current equivalent 

of which means the program would require more than $480 million in 

fiscal year 2014 dollars to complete development, testing and evaluation. 

In several cases, investment in these programs had reached into the 

billions at the time of contract termination. Although the results of these 

case studies cannot be generalized, we determined the evidence we 

obtained from the case studies was sufficient to provide illustrative 

information on cases from across the Army, Navy and Air Force. We did 

not review any classified aspects of these programs. We also reviewed 

prior GAO work addressing the canceled programs to garner any insights.

To examine the impacts of program cancellation, we reviewed Federal 

Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 

Supplement (DFARS) parts covering contract termination, contract cost 

principles and procedures, and government property3 to identify, 

respectively, what steps to take when a contract is terminated, what 

termination costs are allowable, and what issues arise in disposing of 

program assets. We also looked at specific FAR and DFARS contract 

clauses related to these areas. In addition, we obtained termination 

settlement memorandums for the three of our case study programs for 

which these were available. Settlement memorandums were not yet 

available for FCS or VH-71.

In addition, we discussed potential impacts with DAU staff, who had 

considered the broader effects of program cancellations as part of an 

 

3

FAR Parts 31, 45, 49, and DFARS Parts 231, 245, and 249. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

effort to develop guidance on shutting down program efforts after a 

contract termination or program cancellation. They shared with us the 

results of their data gathering, including comments culled from interviews 

with DOD senior acquisition officials. Lastly, we asked former officials of 

our case study programs about specific impacts of their program 

cancellations.

To determine the adequacy of current DOD guidance on program 

cancellations, we reviewed guidance obtained from our prior work. Then 

we met with OSD, Army, Air Force, and Navy officials to determine 

whether any additional guidance had been issued subsequently, and 

whether they considered available guidance adequate for ending a 

contract or program. We also discussed the availability of guidance with 

DCMA officials, including any changes to the FAR since our prior work. 

We reviewed new resources offered by DAU, including a guidebook 

published in December 2013.

Furthermore, we obtained views about the adequacy of guidance from 

DAU staff, who had identified a need for department-wide guidance for 

program officials, especially program managers, on how to shut down a 

canceled program. Finally, we solicited views on the adequacy of 

available guidance from former case study program officials, though in 

many cases these officials were unable to identify guidance they relied on 

in addition to the FAR, if any.

To look at the extent to which DOD leveraged various types of assets 

from canceled programs, we reviewed FAR and DFARS parts for contract 

termination, government property, patents, data, and copyrights, and their 

associated clauses4 to determine if they specified how the various types 

are to be disposed when they are no longer needed for contract 

performance. We discussed the process for disposing of government 

property with DCMA Plant Clearance and Terminations Center officials, 

and obtained information on property reutilization, when available. We 

also met with an Army intellectual property law attorney to learn about the 

treatment of intellectual property assets.

We specifically discussed transfer and leveraging of various program 

assets with former officials for our case study programs, and obtained 

 

4

FAR Parts 27, 45, 49 and DFARS Parts 227, 245, and 249. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

available documentation. However, officials told us that contract files for 

the Comanche and ACS programs were no longer available because the 

cases had been settled beyond the federal record retention period. For 

these two programs, we had to rely mostly on the memories of former 

program officials for information on leveraged assets. However, for both 

programs we had other documentation available from our prior work.

To consider the usefulness of contract termination cost estimates, we 

primarily asked former program officials whether estimates were 

prepared, by whom, and how they were used. We also obtained 

documentation, when available, of termination cost estimates from 

Contract Funds Status Reports submitted by contractors. These 

estimates were no longer available for ACS or Comanche. In addition, we 

discussed termination cost estimates with an official from the CAPE. The 

scope of this review did not include interviews with contractors.

We supplemented our termination cost estimate work by incorporating 

information gathered for a recently issued report on DOD estimates of 

contract termination liability.5 That work included reviewing a DOD 

assessment of the extent to which the department considers potential 

termination liability as a factor in entering into and terminating contracts. 

We also interviewed DOD officials responsible for conducting the 

assessment. 

In addition to our five case studies of canceled programs, we also 

selected a non-generalizable sample of seven current weapon programs 

in development and production to ask further questions about DOD’s use 

of termination liability estimates. We selected these programs from 

among those participating in our annual assessment of weapon systems, 

and they included Integrated Air and Missile Defense and Excalibur 

Precision 155mm Projectiles (Army), AIM-9X Block II Air-to-Air Missile 

and Ship to Shore Connector (Navy), and Family of Advanced Beyond 

Line-of-Sight Terminals, GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment, and MQ9 Unmanned Aircraft System Reaper (Air Force). These programs were 

selected to represent a range of weapon platforms and military services, 

and to include both development and production programs. We asked 

officials at these programs a standard set of questions to determine how 

 

5

GAO, Preliminary Observations on DOD Estimates of Contract Termination Liability, 

GAO-14-107R (Washington, D.C.:, Nov. 12, 2013).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

DOD officials consider termination liability costs prior to contract award 

and during contract execution, and to identify guidance used in making 

those decisions. Although the responses received from these programs 

cannot be generalized, we determined the evidence we obtained from 

these programs was sufficient to provide illustrative information on DOD’s 

use of termination liability estimates.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to March 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Plant Clearance Process

Page 40 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Summary Description

Contractor submits inventory schedules Within 120 days from effective termination date.

Government reviews, accepts, and verifies 

schedules

Plant Clearance Officer (PLCO) reviews and accepts, or returns for correction, 

within 10 days of receipt from contractor. PLCO verifies within 20 days of 

acceptance.

Screening by contracting agency Standard screening period of 46 days begins upon Plant Clearance Officer’s 

acceptance of inventory schedule. Agency has 20 days to screen property for 

other use within agency, transfer educationally useful equipment to other federal

agencies, and to schools and non-profits. 

Disposal in accordance with agency procedures 

without report to General Services Administration 

(GSA) 

1) property for abandonment or destruction

2) property furnished to nonappropriated fund activities

3) foreign excess personal property

4) scrap, except scrap condition aircraft

5) perishables

6) trading stamps and bonus goods

7) hazardous waste or toxic and hazardous materials

8) controlled substances

9) property dangerous to public health and safety

10) classified items or national security-sensitive property

Also, nuclear materials in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

applicable state licenses, applicable federal regulations, and agency regulations

Submit excess property report to GSA No later than 21st day, Plant Clearance Officer is to submit revised schedules and 

report to General Services Administration for reuse within government or donation 

as surplus property.

Screening by other federal agencies, and for 

donations

21 days concurrent screening plus 5 days donation processing. Transfer requests 

on first-come, first-served basis; General Services Administration (GSA) transmits 

approval to Plant Clearance Officer. Property not available to donees until 

screening completion. Days 42-46 reserved for GSA to make allocation.

Abandonment, destruction, or sale after screening Surplus property having completed screening shall be sold in accordance with 

Federal Management Regulation policy. Agencies may specify implementing 

procedures.

If inventory unsuccessfully screened, has no commercial value, does not require 

demilitarization, and does not constitute a danger to public health or welfare, the 

Plant Clearance Officer can direct the contractor to destroy property, or abandon it 

at the contractor or subcontractor premises (with contractor consent for sensitive 

property).

Inventory disposal reports Plant Clearance Officer shall promptly prepare report following disposition of 

property identified on inventory schedule and crediting of any related proceeds. 

The report is to identify any lost or otherwise unaccounted for property and 

changes in quantity or value made by the contractor after submission of initial 

schedule. The report is to be provided to the termination contracting officer.

Source: GAO analysis of FAR Part 45 and FAR § 49.206-3.

Appendix II: Plant Clearance Process
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 41 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 42 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 43 GAO-14-77 Canceled DOD Programs

Cristina Chaplain, 202-512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Katherine Trimble (Assistant 

Director), Ann Marie Udale (Analyst-in-Charge), Peter Anderson, Virginia 

Chanley, Maria Durant, Kristine Hassinger, John Krump, Carol Petersen, 

Raffaele Roffo, Matthew Shaffer, and Roxanna Sun made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(121097)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.