IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RONALD BLOODWORTH,

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Action 2:10-CV-1121 

 Judge Marbley

Magistrate Judge King

WARDEN DEBORA A. TIMMERMAN-COOPER,

et al.,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated in the Toledo

Correctional Institution [“ToCI”] and formerly incarcerated in the London

Correctional Institution [“LoCI”], brings this action alleging that he

has been retaliated against and denied equal protection. This matter is

now before the Court on plaintiff’s motions for interim injunctive

relief, Doc. Nos. 2, 13.

Plaintiff alleges that, while he was at LoCI, he was charged on a

number of occasions with violating prison rules. Plaintiff claims that

the charges were retaliatory in nature and based on his exercise of his

constitutionally protected rights, in violation of the First Amendment. 

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff also claims that he was denied the equal

protection of the law in that other inmates would not have been charged

under similar circumstances, would not have been subjected to similar

disciplinary procedures or would not have been subjected to similar

punishment. Id. 

It is one incident that gives rise to both of plaintiff’s motions

for interim injunctive relief. In August 2010, plaintiff was directed

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to a particular cell. Plaintiff expressed fear for his safety in that

cell, id., ¶43, 45, and refused to enter the cell. A corrections officer

thereupon forcibly placed plaintiff in the cell. Id., ¶47. Defendant

Jewell, another corrections officer, charged plaintiff with physical

resistance to a direct order in contravention of Rule 20 and disobedience

of a direct order in contravention of Rule 21 in connection with that

incident. Id., ¶48. Plaintiff characterizes the charges as false and

based on the “unprovoked, unjustified and unlawful attack against

plaintiff and because plaintiff expressed his fears of being placed in

a cell with two other inmates.” Id., ¶49. The rules infraction board,

chaired by defendant Carson, found plaintiff guilty of the charges and

recommended plaintiff’s placement in local control. Id., ¶¶ 49-50. In

October 2010, defendant Mason and the local control committee recommended

that plaintiff’s security status be increased to level 3. Id., ¶52. 

According to plaintiff, defendant Mason’s recommendation in this regard

was based, not on the severity of his offense as she stated, but on the

fact that “plaintiff ha[d] filed grievances against defendant Mason on

August 4, 2010 and September 2, 2010.” Id., ¶54. Plaintiff also alleges

that another inmate, otherwise unidentified, had precipitated a scuffle

with corrections officers after resisting an order but did not suffer an

increase in his security status. Id., ¶55.

In his first motion for interim injunctive relief, Doc. No. 2,

plaintiff, who was at the time still incarcerated in LoCI (a level 2

institution), asks the Court to enjoin defendants from pursuing

disciplinary action against plaintiff or transferring him to another

institution as a result of an increase in his security status. Id. In

his supplemental motion for interim injunctive relief, Doc. No. 13,

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plaintiff alleges that, in February 2011, he was transferred to ToCI (a

level 3 institution) as a result of the increase in his security status. 

He characterizes his transfer as violative of the First Amendment and

asks that defendants be enjoined from confining him in a level 3

institution. Id.

Interim injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that should be

granted only after the Court has carefully considered the following four

factors: 

(1) whether the movant has a “strong” likelihood of success on

the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer

irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary

injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4)

whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a

preliminary injunction.

Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing McPherson

v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997)

(en banc), quoting Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d

1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995)). When considering these factors, the

district court should balance each factor against the others to arrive

at its ultimate determination. Id. These factors are not prerequisites

to injunctive relief; rather, they are factors that the Court must

balance. In re Delorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d at 1229; Michigan Bell Tel.

Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2001) (no single factor is

determinative.); Monongahela Power Co. v. Schriber, 322 F. Supp.2d 902,

918 (S.D. Ohio 2004)(same). However, a preliminary injunction should not

issue where there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits. 

Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997).

 Plaintiff alleges that the increase in his security status, and his

ensuing transfer to ToCI, were acts of retaliation for his exercise of

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his First Amendment rights. In order to state a claim for First Amendment

retaliation, an inmate plaintiff must show that he engaged in protected

conduct, that he was subjected to an adverse action, and that there

existed a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse

action. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). 

However, “if a prisoner violates a legitimate prison regulation, he is

not engaged in ‘protected conduct,’ and cannot proceed beyond step one.” 

Id., at 395. Moreover, even where an inmate establishes that his

protected conduct was a motivating factor in the adverse action, a

defendant prison official “may thwart the retaliation claim by showing

that [she] would have taken the same action even without the protected

activity.” Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 441, 442 (6th Cir. 2007)(citing

Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S.

274 91977)). “A finding of guilt on a misconduct charge based on some

evidence of a violation of prison rules ‘essentially checkmates [a]

retaliation claim.’” Jackson v. Madery, 158 Fed. Appx. 656, 662 (6th Cir.

2005)(citing Henderson v. Baird, 23 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994)).

The Amended Complaint and plaintiff’s motions for interim injunctive

relief appear to identify the activity upon which plaintiff’s First

Amendment claims are based as (1) plaintiff’s expression of fear at being

placed in a particular cell, Amended Complaint, ¶ 49, and (2) grievances

filed by him against defendant Mason in August and September 2010, id.,

¶ 54; Doc. No. 2, p. 6; Doc. No. 13, p. 7. However, it is specious to

contend, as plaintiff seems to contend, that the disciplinary charges

against him were based on his protected speech in articulating his fear. 

As plaintiff’s own allegations make clear, he was subjected to force and

charged with rules infractions, not because of his speech, but because

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of his actions in refusing to obey the order to enter the cell. Plaintiff

has not established protected First Amendment activity in this regard. 

It is true that the filing of a grievance against a prison employee

constitutes activity protected under the First Amendment. Herron v.

Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000)(an inmate has an “undisputed

First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his

own behalf”). Evidence that an inmate has been subjected to an adverse

action by a prison official in retaliation for the filing of a grievance

can therefore state a claim under the First Amendment. However, there

is ample evidence in the record that plaintiff was in fact guilty of the

misconduct charges against him: plaintiff’s own allegations in the

verified Amended Complaint provide evidence that he physically resisted

a direct order and disobeyed a direct order. Because plaintiff was in

fact guilty of the disciplinary charges against him, the consequent

increase in his security status and transfer to ToCI cannot form the

basis of a successful claim of retaliation in contravention of his rights

under the First Amendment. See Jackson, 158 Fed. Appx. at 662.

Because plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on the

merits of this claim, then, his requests for interim injunctive relief

are without merit. See Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d at

1249.

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motions for interim

injunctive relief, Doc. Nos. 2, 13, be DENIED. 

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and

Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve

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on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, specifically

designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part thereof in

question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1); F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be filed

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. F.R.

Civ. P. 72(b). 

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the

Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo

review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Federation of Teachers,

Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

 s/Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King

 United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: JULY 18, 2011

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