2023 UT App 95

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF M.M.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

A.M.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20220624-CA

Filed August 24, 2023

Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department

The Honorable Jeffrey J. Noland

No. 1140984

Emily Adams, Sara Pfrommer, and Hannah K. 

Leavitt-Howell, Attorneys for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, 

in which JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 Following a multi-day bench trial, the juvenile court 

entered an order terminating A.M.’s (Mother) parental rights to 

her child, M.M. (Child). Mother contends the court erred in 

denying her reunification services and in concluding termination 

of her parental rights was strictly necessary. Because Mother has 

not persuaded us that the court committed reversible error, we 

affirm its order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
In re M.M.

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BACKGROUND1

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of three children: Child, 

born in 2015; A.M. (Sister), born in 2018; and B.B. (Brother), 

born in 2019. All three children have different biological 

fathers. This appeal concerns only Child. Nevertheless, a 

complete understanding of the events giving rise to this case 

necessitates a recounting of the background as it relates to all 

three children.

¶3 In December 2016, prior to the birth of Sister and Brother, 

Child’s maternal grandmother (Grandmother) and maternal stepgrandfather (Grandfather) noticed “large bruises on [Child’s] hips 

and thighs when they put him into the bath.” The following day, 

a caseworker from the Division of Child and Family Services 

(DCFS) met with Grandmother and Grandfather and examined 

Child. The caseworker observed the same bruising on Child that 

had been seen the day before, as well as a “small bruise in 

[Child’s] hairline above his forehead.” Child was transported to 

the hospital where a doctor observed the bruising and opined that 

“the bruising is concerning for abuse because of its location, linear 

component, the large size, and the lack of history explaining 

them.”

¶4 A few months later, in February 2017, Child was brought

to the hospital for a breathing treatment for his asthma. While 

at the hospital, a doctor again observed “linear bruising on 

[Child’s] buttocks,” which she described as a “classic bruise 

found with spanking or inflicted trauma.” She explained the 

bruising was consistent with “excessive,” “repeated high-force 

spanking.”

1. “We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile 

court findings.” In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, n.2, 521 P.3d 887 

(quotation simplified).
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20220624-CA 3 2023 UT App 95

¶5 During the time of these injuries, Child had been residing 

with Mother, Mother’s husband (Stepfather),2 Grandmother, and 

Grandfather, and he had also attended daycare. Ultimately, no 

one was able to provide an explanation for the bruising. As a 

result, the juvenile court concluded that Child “has been abused 

by an unknown perpetrator” and adjudicated him dependent as 

to Mother. The court allowed Child to remain with Mother, 

contingent on her compliance with a safety plan and completion 

of court-ordered services. In December 2017, after Mother had 

received a year of services, the court terminated its jurisdiction 

and returned permanent custody and guardianship of Child to 

Mother.

¶6 The following month, Sister was born. Brother was born a 

year and a half later.

¶7 In August 2019, Brother suffered a series of abusive 

episodes. First, Mother said she “fell going down some stairs” 

while holding Brother. Thereafter, Brother’s father picked Brother 

up from a babysitter and became concerned that Brother was 

vomiting and appeared dehydrated. Brother was taken to the 

doctor for examination but was sent home with his father because 

the cause of the vomiting was “undetermined.” A few weeks later, 

Brother’s father again observed that Brother had been vomiting

and appeared dehydrated. Brother was taken to the hospital for 

examination.

¶8 Upon examination, Brother’s head appeared “swollen.” A 

subsequent CT scan revealed a “large” brain bleed and a skeletal 

survey revealed “multiple healing rib fractures.” A doctor 

evaluated Brother the following day and expressed that Brother’s 

2. Stepfather and Mother married one day after DCFS made the 

initial home visit to observe Child. Prior to the marriage, 

Stepfather spent “multiple nights in a row” in the home with 

Mother and Child.
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20220624-CA 4 2023 UT App 95

initial vomiting was “consistent with the brain injury” and a 

“sign” that the brain injury had occurred. She noted that

although Brother’s head circumference had not been measured 

during his initial visit to the doctor, by the time of his second 

visit—which occurred approximately two weeks later—Brother 

“had a massive head.” She also opined that Brother’s injuries were 

caused by one of his caregivers and were “consistent with 

inflicted trauma and child abuse.” When questioned, both parents 

denied any involvement or knowledge of injuries to Brother. 

However, based on her conversation with both parents, the doctor 

had “much more concern” that Mother had caused Brother’s 

injuries.

¶9 Based on Brother’s injuries, the State filed a verified 

petition for custody and guardianship on behalf of all three 

children in August 2019. In the petition, the State asked the 

juvenile court to find that “[Brother] is severely abused by 

[Mother]” and that Child and Sister were “siblings at risk” and 

“neglected” as to Mother.

¶10 Over the next several months, the juvenile court 

transferred temporary custody of Sister and Brother to their 

respective fathers. Although the State requested that Child be 

removed from Mother’s custody, the court allowed Child to 

remain home with Mother on the condition that she comply with 

a safety plan. The safety plan required “line of sight supervision” 

by Grandmother and Grandfather for “any contact” between 

Mother and Child. But Mother did not abide by the safety plan,

and in January 2020, after a DCFS caseworker observed a series of 

three events of non-compliance, the court transferred Child to 

DCFS’s custody, finding that Mother had “substantially 

endangered” Child’s welfare. Child was then placed in a foster

care home.
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20220624-CA 5 2023 UT App 95

¶11 In July 2020, Mother appeared before the juvenile court for

adjudication of the State’s verified petition for custody.

3 After 

negotiations with Mother, the State agreed to amend the petition

by removing the allegation that Mother had severely abused

Brother, replacing it with an allegation that Brother suffered 

“severe physical abuse while in the care of [Mother].” Following 

this amendment, Mother proceeded with adjudication and 

entered a plea pursuant to rule 34(e) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile 

Procedure by which she neither admitted nor denied the 

allegations but they were deemed admitted as a matter of law.

¶12 At the close of the hearing, the court found by clear and 

convincing evidence that Brother had suffered “severe physical 

abuse while in the care of [Mother].” Accordingly, the court found 

that “[Sister] and [Child] are siblings at risk” and were 

“neglected” as to Mother. In addition to adjudicating the 

children’s statuses, the court also substantiated the DCFS 

supported finding of severe physical abuse of Brother while in 

Mother’s care. The court ordered that Brother and Sister continue 

in the temporary custody of their respective fathers and that Child 

continue in the custody of DCFS.

¶13 Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court held a disposition 

hearing during which it resolved the custody petition as to 

Brother and Sister by granting custody and guardianship to their 

respective fathers and terminating jurisdiction. The court 

requested briefing on the issue of whether Mother should be 

provided reunification services for Child. Citing the allegations 

that Mother physically abused her children, even after receiving 

3. Although the juvenile court adjudicated Child’s status as to 

Mother in July 2020, the written order was not entered until 

August 2021—approximately one year after the adjudication 

hearing. Mother appealed the written adjudication order, arguing 

that she was deprived of due process by the court’s delay in 

entering the order, but this court affirmed.
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20220624-CA 6 2023 UT App 95

court-ordered services, as well as Child’s success in his current 

foster placement, the State and the guardian ad litem (GAL) 

argued that reunification services were not in Child’s best interest 

and accordingly requested that services not be provided. In 

September 2020, the court entered an order denying reunification 

services to Mother.4 In April 2021, the court set Child’s primary 

permanency goal as adoption with his current foster parents.

¶14 The next month, the State filed a petition to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to Child. The matter proceeded to an 

eight-day bench trial that took place in March and April 2022.

¶15 At trial, several therapists who had provided mental health 

services to Mother testified. All agreed that Mother suffered from 

trauma and that treatment was needed to address it. These 

therapists further testified that while Mother had attended some 

therapy sessions, Mother had either canceled, rescheduled, or 

failed to attend many of the sessions, and that although Mother

had made some progress in therapy, she still had a long way to go 

to process her trauma.

¶16 Child’s therapist and foster parents testified regarding 

Child’s communications with them, as well as Child’s 

4. At the time reunification services for Mother were denied, an 

Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) request 

form had been sent to Child’s biological father (Father), who 

resides in South Carolina. Following denial of services for Mother, 

the juvenile court changed Child’s primary permanency goal 

from reunification with Mother to reunification with Father with 

a concurrent goal of adoption. During a subsequent permanency 

hearing, the court terminated reunification services to Father due 

to his failure to comply with any of the three ICPC requests

initiated by DCFS and changed Child’s primary permanency goal 

to adoption with his current foster parents. Father’s parental 

rights to Child were then terminated in June 2022.
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20220624-CA 7 2023 UT App 95

improvements since his removal from Mother’s custody. Child’s 

therapist explained that Child suffered from “separation anxiety 

disorder and unspecified trauma and stressor-related disorder” 

but that these conditions had greatly improved while Child was 

living with his foster parents. Likewise, Child’s foster mother 

testified that Child had grown emotionally while in her care. She

detailed Child’s emotional bonds with the members of his foster 

family and recounted how it was “an easy decision” to pursue 

adopting Child. Moreover, Child’s therapist and foster mother 

both testified that Child had reported witnessing Mother “hit his 

sibling on the head” and that Child had also reported that Mother 

had hit him.

¶17 Following trial, the juvenile court issued an order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child. The court found the 

testimony and evidence presented to be true, and therefore 

concluded that the State had proved by clear and convincing 

evidence three statutory grounds for termination. The court also 

found that it was in Child’s best interest and strictly necessary to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights. In reaching this conclusion, 

the court noted it had “considered the specific circumstances” of 

the case, including Child’s “wishes to remain in his current foster 

home” and the feasibility of an alternative to termination, such as 

a permanent guardianship.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶18 Mother now appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating 

her parental rights to Child, raising two issues for our review. 

First, Mother argues the court erred when it refused to order 

reunification services to her. We review the juvenile court’s 

interpretation of the law for correctness; however, “[t]he ultimate 

decision whether to provide or deny reunification services is a 

determination that we review for abuse of discretion.” In re Z.G., 

2016 UT App 98, ¶ 4, 376 P.3d 1077.
In re M.M.

20220624-CA 8 2023 UT App 95

¶19 Second, Mother argues the juvenile court erred when it 

concluded that termination of her parental rights was strictly 

necessary. “We review deferentially a lower court’s best-interest 

determination and will overturn it only if it either failed to 

consider all of the facts or considered all of the facts and its 

decision was nonetheless against the clear weight of the 

evidence.” In re J.J.W., 2022 UT App 116, ¶ 18, 520 P.3d 38 

(quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Reunification Services

¶20 Mother first argues the juvenile court erred when it denied 

reunification services to her. Specifically, she contends the court 

misinterpreted the law and abused its discretion when it (1) failed 

to provide the “necessary findings for the presumption against 

reunification services to apply” and (2) improperly weighed the 

statutory factors a court must use when determining whether to 

order reunification services.

¶21 After a juvenile court adjudicates a child as abused, 

neglected, or dependent, the court must conduct a dispositional 

hearing. See Utah Code § 78A-6-311(1) (2020). At that hearing, if 

the court orders that the child continue in the custody of DCFS,

the court shall (1) “establish a primary permanency plan” and 

(2) “determine whether, in view of the primary permanency plan, 

reunification services are appropriate.” Id. § 78A-6-312(2).

¶22 The decision to order reunification services is therefore 

discretionary with the juvenile court, and “parents have no 

constitutional right to receive these services.” In re A.K., 2015 UT 

App 39, ¶ 15, 344 P.3d 1153 (quotation simplified); see also In re

N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955–56 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Utah Code § 78A6-312(20)(a) (2020). Accordingly, we will overturn the court’s 
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20220624-CA 9 2023 UT App 95

decision only if it “either failed to consider all of the facts or 

considered all of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against 

the clear weight of the evidence.” In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 31, 496 

P.3d 58 (quotation simplified).

¶23 In determining whether to order reunification services, the 

child’s “health, safety, and welfare shall be the court’s paramount 

concern.” Utah Code § 78A-6-312(5) (2020). And in making this 

determination, the juvenile court must consider a non-exclusive 

list of statutory factors, including the following:

• “failure of the parent to respond to previous 

services or comply with a previous child and 

family plan;”

• “the fact that the minor was abused while the 

parent was under the influence of drugs or 

alcohol;”

• “any history of violent behavior directed at 

the child or an immediate family member;”

• “whether a parent continues to live with an 

individual who abused the minor;”

• “any patterns of the parent’s behavior that 

have exposed the minor to repeated abuse;”

• “testimony by a competent professional that 

the parent’s behavior is unlikely to be 

successful; and”

• “whether the parent has expressed an 

interest in reunification with the minor.”

Id. § 78A-6-312(23). However, in cases involving “obvious sexual 

abuse, sexual exploitation, abandonment, severe abuse, or severe 
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20220624-CA 10 2023 UT App 95

neglect,” the court has no duty to provide services. Id. § 78A-6-

312(4). And several circumstances—if found by clear and

convincing evidence—create “a presumption that reunification 

services should not be provided to a parent.” Id. § 78A-6-312(21).

¶24 Before the juvenile court, the State and the GAL 

argued that reunification services should not be offered to 

Mother. While only the State argued that the presumption against 

providing services should apply, both parties argued that the 

statutory factors weighed in favor of denying reunification 

services. Ultimately, the court denied services, finding they were 

not “appropriate” “given the fact that [Mother] had services 

before.”

¶25 Mother takes issue with the juvenile court’s determination 

on two grounds. As an initial matter, she asserts the court made 

“no findings in its reunification order, much less findings by clear 

and convincing evidence,” that would allow the court to apply the 

presumption against providing reunification services. But even if 

Mother’s assertion is correct and a presumption against 

reunification services does not apply in this case, Mother ignores 

that the court may still properly deny services regardless of 

whether a presumption exists.5 And on the facts of this case, the 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that denying 

reunification services to Mother was appropriate.

5. Moreover, Mother’s position on this point seems to ignore the 

juvenile court’s own explanation of its reasoning to deny 

reunification services. At the disposition hearing, the court 

explicitly agreed with Mother’s counsel that Child did not qualify 

as a “severely abused child,” which would create a presumption 

against providing services. As a result, the court stated, “I don’t 

really attach the presumption that [Mother] should not receive 

reunification services. I’m kind of looking towards the 

presumption that she should . . . .”
In re M.M.

20220624-CA 11 2023 UT App 95

¶26 Next, Mother asserts the juvenile court improperly 

weighed the statutory factors a court must consider when 

determining whether to provide reunification services. According 

to Mother, “four[6] of the seven factors weigh in favor of granting 

Mother reunification services” and “the remaining three factors 

do not tip the balance towards not offering reunification services.” 

We disagree.

¶27 First, Mother contends the juvenile court improperly

determined she had failed to respond to reunification services in 

the past. See Utah Code § 78A-6-312(23)(a) (2020) (requiring courts 

to consider the “failure of the parent to respond to previous 

services or comply with a previous child and family plan” when 

determining whether to order reunification services). She claims 

that the dismissal of the first protective services case in December 

2017 and the full restoration of custody of Child shows she 

responded to services and complied with her previous family 

plan. But in concluding that this factor weighed against Mother, 

the court considered Mother’s compliance in the first protective 

services case as well as her actions after that case was closed. The 

court explained,

I see that you’ve had services before on [Child]. We 

had a [protective supervision services] case. . . . You 

engage in services. We think things are good. We 

close the case.

6. These factors are (1) “the fact that the minor was abused while 

the parent was under the influence of drugs or alcohol,” 

(2) “whether a parent continues to live with an individual who 

abused the minor,” (3) “testimony by a competent professional 

that the parent’s behavior is unlikely to be successful,” and 

(4) “whether the parent has expressed an interest in reunification 

with the minor.” See Utah Code § 78A-6-312(23)(b), (d), (f), (g)

(2020).
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20220624-CA 12 2023 UT App 95

Then not much longer . . . we have a severe

abuse to [Child]’s younger sibling . . . . We’ve 

already done reunification services or services by 

DCFS for you on [Child] and here we are again with 

a severely abused child.

¶28 This explanation is sufficient to show that the court 

adequately considered whether Mother had failed to respond to 

previous reunification services. The court weighed Mother’s prior 

compliance against her actions following the completion of the 

original services. Because the court’s decision is not “against the 

clear weight of the evidence,” a “measure of deference is owing” 

to the court’s decision. In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 32 (quotation 

simplified). Accordingly, we will not perform an “independent 

‘reweighing’ of the evidence” but will instead “respect[]” the 

court’s decision. Id.

¶29 Second, Mother contends the juvenile court improperly 

weighed against her the factors concerning “any history of violent 

behavior directed at the child or an immediate family member” 

and “any patterns of the parent’s behavior that have exposed the 

minor to repeated abuse.” See Utah Code § 78A-6-312(23)(c), (e) 

(2020). Specifically, Mother asserts these factors do not weigh 

against her because she “was not adjudicated as abusing [Child] 

in 2017,” there are “no other allegations” that Child or Sister have 

been otherwise injured, and it has “never been established that 

Mother harmed [Brother].”

¶30 But Mother’s arguments on this point ignore substantial 

record evidence indicating that Mother did have a history of 

violent behavior directed at Child or Child’s immediate family 

members and that Mother’s behavior exposed Child to repeated 

abuse. While Mother is correct that she was not adjudicated as 

abusing Child in 2017, Child’s statements to his foster mother and 

therapist provide substantial evidence of Mother’s history of 

violent behavior toward Child and other immediate family 
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20220624-CA 13 2023 UT App 95

members. Notably, the juvenile court found that during a therapy 

session, Child credibly reported to his therapist that he had 

witnessed Mother “hit his sibling on the head.” And at trial,

Child’s foster mother testified that on multiple occasions, Child 

told her that Mother had hit him. Further, as the juvenile court 

found, Child, Brother, and Sister were all exposed to repeated 

abuse while in Mother’s care. Indeed, Child and Sister were found 

to be “siblings at risk” and “neglected” based on Mother’s rule 

34(e) plea to the allegation that Brother suffered “severe physical 

abuse while in the care of [Mother].” This exposure occurred 

subsequent to the court’s 2017 determination that Child had been 

“abused by an unknown perpetrator” during a time when Mother 

“was the primary caregiver.”

¶31 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by deciding 

not to order reunification services for Mother. In reaching this 

decision, the court evaluated the evidence before it, and Mother 

has not demonstrated that the court’s decision was against the 

clear weight of the evidence.7

7. Mother challenges the adequacy of the juvenile court’s findings 

in support of its decision not to order reunification services by 

asserting that “the juvenile court made no findings in its 

reunification order.” But Mother’s assertion is overbroad; the 

juvenile court did make explicit factual findings regarding a 

number of the facts we have noted as supportive of its 

determination not to order services. And, while we acknowledge 

that the court did not explicitly disclose all the analytic steps it 

took in deciding not to provide services, this is a case where the 

court’s “unstated findings can be implied” because “it is 

reasonable to assume that the [juvenile] court actually considered 

the controverted evidence and necessarily made . . . finding[s] to 

resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual 

determination[s] made.” Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 22, 379 

(continued...)
In re M.M.

20220624-CA 14 2023 UT App 95

II. Strictly Necessary

¶32 Next, Mother argues the juvenile court erred in 

determining it was strictly necessary to terminate her parental 

rights to Child. In particular, Mother contends the court’s strictly 

necessary analysis was “improperly brief and conclusory.”

¶33 “Because the relationship between parent and child is 

constitutionally protected, a court may only terminate 

parental rights upon a finding that termination is strictly 

necessary to the best interest[] of the child.”8 In re S.T., 2022 UT 

P.3d 882 (quotation simplified). It is not a case “where there is a 

matrix of possible factual findings and we cannot ascertain the 

[juvenile] court’s actual findings.” Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 

1025–26 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation simplified). The evidence 

and arguments presented below, coupled with the juvenile 

court’s decision not to order services, necessarily imply that the 

juvenile court found the factors in Utah Code subsections 78A-6-

312(23)(c) and (e) weigh against the provision of services based on 

the findings and evidence we have outlined above. Although on 

this record the unstated steps of the juvenile court’s analysis can 

be implied, we caution courts to ensure that the analytic steps 

taken in support of such fact-sensitive decisions are fully 

articulated in an oral or written ruling, order, or judgment.

Detailed findings aid appellate review and reduce the likelihood 

of reversal.

8. “To terminate a parent’s rights, Utah law requires that both 

elements of a two-part test are satisfied. First, the court must find 

that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination are 

present. Second, the court must find that termination of the 

parent’s rights is in the best interest[] of the child.” In re S.T., 2022 

UT App 130, ¶ 25 n.5, 521 P.3d 887 (quotation simplified). Here, 

Mother acknowledges the juvenile court properly found at least 

(continued...)
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20220624-CA 15 2023 UT App 95

App 130, ¶ 25, 521 P.3d 887 (quotation simplified). “This analysis 

should be undertaken from the child’s point of view, not the 

parent’s.” In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 63, 472 P.3d 827 (quotation 

simplified).

¶34 When evaluating whether termination is strictly necessary, 

the juvenile court must address whether “the child can be equally 

protected and benefited by an option other than termination.” Id.

¶ 66. This inquiry cannot be satisfied merely by relying on the 

“categorical concern” that adoption offers the highest degree of 

permanency. In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 25, 506 P.3d 606. Instead, 

the court must analyze the “particularized circumstances of the 

case” and “explore whether other feasible options exist that could 

address the specific problems or issues facing the family, short of 

imposing the ultimate remedy of terminating the parent’s rights.” 

In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 26 (quotation simplified). If another 

option exists where “the child can be equally protected and 

benefited,” then “termination is not strictly necessary” and “the 

court cannot order the parent’s rights terminated.” In re B.T.B., 

2020 UT 60, ¶ 66.

¶35 In determining that it was strictly necessary to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights, the juvenile court explicitly stated that it 

“considered whether a placement with Permanent Guardianship 

would equally protect and benefit [Child].” Ultimately, the court 

decided against such an arrangement, finding it was not in Child’s 

best interest “as it does not provide the permanency that he seeks 

and wishes for.” Citing In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, 506 P.3d 606,

Mother contends this conclusion was error because it is based on 

the categorical concern that a permanent guardianship is not as 

one ground to terminate her parental rights. Accordingly, our 

focus is limited to only the court’s best interest determination.
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permanent as an adoption.

9 Mother’s argument is unavailing, 

however, because it selectively focuses on the court’s conclusion 

without considering it in the fuller context.

¶36 Here, the juvenile court was not presented with any 

feasible alternative option for a permanent guardianship 

placement, nor has Mother proposed one on appeal. At the time 

of trial, the only individuals that had previously been involved in 

the case were not feasible placement options. Indeed, Grandfather

had failed to comply with the safety plan by allowing Mother to 

interact with Child outside his “line of sight,” which ultimately 

led to Child’s removal; Grandmother and Mother were estranged;

and the State had initiated termination proceedings for Father.

10

Consequently, there was “no other option, short of termination

9. In a related vein, Mother also asserts the juvenile court’s 

decision was conclusory because the court focused only on 

negative testimony and overlooked the positive testimony of 

several of Mother’s therapists. But this position ignores that “[i]t 

is the role of the juvenile court, not this court, to assess the weight 

and credibility of expert witnesses and to choose among their 

testimonies.” In re G.V., 916 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (per 

curiam). As such, we decline to reweigh the evidence.

10. The lack of alternative options was reiterated through the trial 

testimony of Child’s great-uncle (Uncle). Uncle testified that 

Mother and Grandfather were estranged, largely due to 

Grandfather’s role in having Child removed from Mother’s 

custody, and that Mother and Grandmother were estranged

because Grandmother is “a very toxic individual” and “abusive 

toward” Mother. Uncle also explained that although he wanted to 

be “involved” with Child, he was not in a position for Child to be 

placed with him. Lastly, Uncle noted that his brother had applied 

for Child to be placed with him, but his application was not 

approved.
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20220624-CA 17 2023 UT App 95

and adoption, that would have otherwise been apparent to the

juvenile court.” See In re D.G., 2022 UT App 128, ¶ 8 n.2, 522 P.3d 

39, cert. denied, 527 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2023). And “where only one 

feasible custody option exists, the categorical concern that 

adoption is more stable than a permanent guardianship is not 

implicated.” In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 32 n.6 (quotation 

simplified).

¶37 In sum, given Child’s “strong emotional ties with [his] 

foster parents,” see id., and the lack of “any remotely feasible 

alternatives to termination and adoption,” see In re D.G., 2022 UT 

App 128, ¶ 8 n.2, it was entirely proper for the juvenile court to 

find that it was strictly necessary to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights.11

11. We again caution juvenile courts to “adequately disclose[]”—

either in an oral or written ruling—all the “analytic steps” they 

take when they conduct a best interest analysis. Keiter v. Keiter, 

2010 UT App 169, ¶ 21, 235 P.3d 782 (describing a challenge to the 

adequacy of findings as raising the issue of whether “the findings 

as a whole adequately disclosed the analytic steps taken by the 

trial court”). Here, however, even assuming that the court’s

articulation of its strictly necessary analysis could have or even

should have been more robust, without any feasible alternatives

to termination and adoption, Mother cannot show that the court’s

finding on this point was against the clear weight of the evidence.

See generally In re J.J.W., 2022 UT App 116, ¶ 19, 520 P.3d 38 (“[I]n 

some instances (e.g., where the existence of a particular option 

would not be readily apparent to the court), a parent may need to 

expressly ask a [juvenile] court to consider a specific nontermination option in order to properly preserve the right to 

argue, on appeal, that the court did not adequately consider that 

option.”). But in cases where a feasible alternative placement 

option does exist, a court assessing strict necessity must explain,

(continued...)
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20220624-CA 18 2023 UT App 95

CONCLUSION

¶38 The juvenile court did not err in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to Child. The court’s decision to deny Mother 

reunification services was not an abuse of discretion because the 

court’s decision is well supported by evidence in the record. And 

the court did not err when it found that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights was strictly necessary because there were no 

feasible alternative placement options other than termination and 

adoption. Affirmed.

“on the record,” why adoption and termination of the parent’s

rights would better further the child’s best interest than the 

alternative option. See In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 74, 472 P.3d 827.