FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT FEB RUARY 15, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 07- 1131 7

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 6- 00 07 3- CR-KD UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us JEREM Y LAW RENCE CARLISLE, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e S o u th e rn D i s tr i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (F eb ru ar y 15 , 200 8) Be fo re BL A CK , CA RN E S an d C O X , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:2

Ra isi ng tw o c ont en tio ns, Je re m y Carl isl e ap pe al s th e 135 m onth se nte nc e he re ce ive d a ft er

he ple ad ed

gui lty to co nspi ra cy

to poss es s w ithint en t t o di str ibu te m or e than 50 0 gr am s of

m etham phe tam ine , in vio la tio n of 21 U . S. C. § 84 6. I. Carl isl e’ s f

ir st c ont en tio n is that the G ove rn m en t vi olate d th e te rm s of his ple a barg ai n by

not e va luatin g th e as sis tanc e he ha d r en de re d up to the ti m e of se nte nc ing and d ec idi ng whe the r to m ove a t tha t t im e unde r U . S. S. G . § 5K 1. 1 f or a downward departure based on substant ial assistance. This is not the ident ical is su e th atCarl is le rai se d i n t he di st ric t co ur t. At sentencing, when the district court asked the Governm ent whether it was goin g to m ake a m otion , the AUS A r eplied that a Feder al Rule of Cr im inal Pr oc ed ur e 35 m oti on “ is s til l i n th e w orks, ” but that the G ove rn m en t w as “ not p re p ar edt o m ak e t h at m o t i o n atth i s t i m e. ” H e e x p l ai n edth at “ th i s d ef en d an t ’s co ope ratio n is sti ll ongo ing and an a ppr opr ia te m oti on w oul d be m ad e at the correc t tim e, subsequ ent to this proceeding.” Carlisle cited to the district court United States v. Alvar ez, 115 F.3d 839 (11t h Cir. 1997 ), which he char acter ized as standin g for the propositi on that “ there is a tem poral distin ction between 5(k)1 departures and Rule 35 departures, ” “ [a] nd to th e extent that Mr. Car lisle has co ope rate d to thi s po int

. . . it w oul d be our

obj ec tio n th at

Mr . Carl isl e is d

ue3

co ope ratio n de part

ur e at thi s ti m e fo r w ha t i s —

ha s ha ppe n [ sic ] up t o no wand a Rule 35 for w hat has happened after. ” T he dis tr ic t c ourt r es pond ed that i t ha d “ ab sol ute ly

no j ur isd ic tio n, auth or ity or abil ity to m ak e the m

f ile a5( k) m oti on. ” Ca

rl isl e co nc ed ed

that w as c or

re ct but expla ine d th at

he w an te d to “pr es er

ve it f or the r ec or d” be ca

use the de ci sio n in A lvare z, a s he int er

pr et ed it , m eant tha t the c ourt w oul d no t be able to gr an t a Ru le 35 po st -s en te nc in g m ot io n b as edon co op erat io n t ha t h adpre ced edsen te nc in g. The c ourt disagreed, stating that any cooperation Carlisle had provided before se nte nc ing c oul d be c onsi de re d “ ove ra ll in the 35. ” Whil e Carl isl e “ te nd[ ed ] to ag re e w iththat, ” he w an te d to pr es er ve the poi nt “ in an a

bund an ce of

c au tio n, [because] there are sever al Circ uits th at have followed that rule. ” T he re is a dis put e as to w hic h st an dard of r ev ie ww e shou ld a

ppl y in thi s ca se . A cc or din g to Carl isl e, the appr opr ia te standard is de novo . T he Governm ent, on the other hand, contends we should review only for plain err or, since Carlisle did not specifically claim the Governm ent breached the plea agreem ent in dist rict court. In the end, it does no t m atter which standard of review w e use , a s th e re sul t i s th e sam e unde r both. T he re w as no e rr or , pla in o r otherwise.4

The plea agree m ent could no t be clear er that the decision about whether Carl isl e ha d pr ovi de d a ssi stanc e that w as sub stanti al e noug h to pe rs ua de the G ove rn m en t t o f

ile a§ 5K 1. 1 or

Ru le 35 m oti on w as r es er ve d e xc lus ive ly

to the G ove rn m en t. T he a gr ee m en t e xpr es sly state s th at

w he the r Carl isl e’ s c oope ratio n had been “ com

plete, tr uthful and s ubstant ial” and had resulted in “ subs tantial assistance to the United States in the investig ation or prosecutio n of another cr im ina l of

fe nse , ” is “ a de ci sio n sp ec if ic al ly r es er ve d by the U nit ed

S ta te s inthe exercise of its sole di scretion.” And it reiter ates that: “ The United States spe ci fi ca lly

r es er ve s th e ri ght

to m ak e the de ci sio n r el at ing to the e xte nt o f any suc h de part

ur e re que st m ad e unde r thi s a gr ee m en t ba se d up on i ts e va luatio n of the nature and extent of the defendant’ s cooperation.” Carl isl e’ s po sit ionin the dis tr ic t c ourt and m uc h of his pos iti on b ef

or e us i s ba se d onthe e rr one ous pr em ise that the c oope ratio n he pr ovi de d be fo re se nte nc ing could no t be considered in decidin g whether and to what extent he had provid ed subs tantial assistance for purposes of a post-sentence Rule 35 m otion . That w as the state of the lawwhen the A lvarez c ase w as decided in 199 7, but the law ch an ge d w he n R

ule 35 w as a m en de d in199 8. A s am en de d, the r ule e xpl ic itl y provides th at “ [i] n evaluating whether the defendant has provided su bstantial as sis tanc e, the c ourt m ay c onsi de r the de fe ndant’ s pr es en te nc e as sis tanc e. ” F ed .5

R. Cr im . P . 35( b) (3 ). T o th e ex te nt C ar lis le is ar gui ng, or oth er c ir cu its have he ld, that pr es en te nc e as sis tanc e that i s by it se lf sub stanti al m ay

not be c onsi de re d ina post -s en te nc ing Ru le 35 d ep ar tur e, that i s si m

ply w ro ng. F ed . R. Cr im . P . 35 advis or y c om m itt ee ’ s no te to 1998 a m en dm en t. ( “ T hus, the a m en dm en t pe rm its the c ourt t o c onsi de r, in de te rm ini ng the sub stanti al ity of pos t- se nte nc ing assistance, the def

endant’ s pre-sentencing assistance, irr espective of w hether that as si st an ce, s ta nd in g a lo ne , was s ub st an ti al .”). T o th e ex te nt tha t C ar lis le is ar gui ng tha t the G ove rn m en t w as obl igate d to de ci de one w ay

or the oth er a t the ti m e of

se nte nc ing w he the r his c oope ratio n up to that po int had been su bstantial, there is no err or. The plea agree m ent reser

ved the sub stanti al a ssi stanc e m oti on t o “ the U nit ed S ta te s inthe e xe rc ise of

it s so le dis cr et ion , ” an d do es not pla inl y r equir e it to m ak e that de ci sio n a t se nte nc ing , ins te ad of late r. I n f

ac t, the ple a ag re em en t sp ec if ie s th at if the G ove rn m en t decides Carlisle has re ndered subst antial assistance, it w ill m ove for a downw ard departure either “ in accordance w ith Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines or Rule 35 of the Federa l Rules of Crim inal Procedure, whi ch ev er t he Uni te d S ta te s d eem s ap pl ic ab le .” (em ph as is ad de d) .Th is c a se wa s in iti a lly sc he du le d f

or or a l argume nt, but th e pa ne l un anim ou sly

e le c te d to 1 decide it on the briefs a

nd rec ord. See 11th Cir. R. 34-3(f ). 6 II. T he se co nd c ont en tio n C ar lis le r ai se s is that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in de ny ing him

an a cc ep tanc e of

r es pons ibi lity

r ed uc tio n inthe c al cu la tio n of his advisory guidelin es range. T hat issue is barred from reviewby

the valid appeal w ai ve r that C ar lis le a gr ee d to a s part of the ple a barg ai n. I t i s a lso f ri vol ous in lig ht o f the f

ac t tha t he vio la te d th e te rm s of his pr etri al sup er

vis or y r el ea se by using m etham

phetam ine and by

abscondin g; he had to be apprehended b y law enforcem ent. S ee United States v. H rom ada, 49 F.3d 685, 691 (11th Cir. 1995 ). AFFIRMED. 1