COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Overton 

GREGORY JUDE DeVEAU 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 0915-01-4 PER CURIAM 

 OCTOBER 2, 2001 

MUTSUMI AZEMOTO 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jane Marum Roush, Judge 

 (Ted Kavrukov; Kavrukov & DiJoseph, LLP, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (Timothy J. McGary, on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Gregory Jude DeVeau, father, appeals a decision of the trial 

judge. On appeal, he argues the trial judge erred by: (1) 

denying his motion to transfer jurisdiction of child custody and 

visitation issues to Maryland; (2) denying a rule to show cause 

finding Mutsumi Azemoto, mother, in contempt; and (3) removing the 

requirement of the children's supervised visitation with mother. 

Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

BACKGROUND

 Father and mother were divorced by final decree entered in 

the trial court on August 10, 1995. On May 1, 1995, the trial 
judge entered an order awarding custody of the parties' two 

children to father and reserving supervised visitation with 

mother. Mother had attempted to abduct one of the children to 

Japan. 

 On August 11, 2000, father filed a motion to transfer custody 

and visitation issues to Annapolis, Maryland, where he had been 

residing with the children. Mother opposed the motion, and she 

filed a motion to modify visitation, requesting, among other 

things, that the trial judge terminate the requirement that her 

visitation with the children be supervised. Father also filed a 

petition for a rule to show cause, contending that mother had 

failed to pay court-ordered attorney's fees and that she had 

failed to timely pay court-ordered child support. 

 The trial judge conducted a hearing on January 25, 2001 

concerning all of the motions. On March 9, 2001, the trial judge 

entered an order ruling on the issues. The trial judge lifted the 

restriction of the children's supervised visitation with mother. 

The trial judge also refused to find mother in contempt and denied 

father's motion to transfer the case to Maryland. Father appeals 

these rulings. 

MOTION TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION

 Under the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 

(UCCJA),1 "[a] court which has jurisdiction [to modify a decree] 

 1

 On July 1, 2001, the legislature repealed the UCCJA and 

enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement 

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may decline to exercise its jurisdiction . . . if it finds that it 

is an inconvenient forum . . . and that a court of another state 

is a more appropriate forum." Code § 20-130(A). We will reverse 

a trial court's decision whether to exercise its jurisdiction only 

upon a finding of abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. Johnson, 26 

Va. App. 135, 147, 493 S.E.2d 668, 673 (1997). 

 Father has not demonstrated abuse of discretion on the part 

of the trial judge in exercising jurisdiction over this matter. 

Although father and the children have lived in Maryland since June 

1998, Virginia was the home state of the children at the start of 

the proceedings. In addition, mother continues to be domiciled in 

Virginia. The Virginia courts have ruled on visitation matters 

involving these parties since 1995. Indeed, in her ruling, the 

trial judge commented that the file in this case is the biggest 

file of any case in the Fairfax County Circuit Court. 

 Furthermore, the trial judge indicated that she lacked 

authority to transfer the case to Maryland because there was no 

pending matter concerning these parties in a Maryland court. In 

addition, father's motion requested only that the case be 

transferred to "Annapolis, Maryland" without further 

identification of the appropriate court. "[B]efore the trial 

court should defer jurisdiction to another forum, it should know 

 

Act. Code §§ 20-146.1 through 20-146.38. This case involves 

the former UCCJA as it was in effect at the time of the 

proceeding. 

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the identity of that forum." Mubarak v. Mubarak, 14 Va. App. 616, 

622, 420 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1992). The trial judge further stated 

that if "something" was filed in Maryland, then she would confer 

with a Maryland judge about which state would be the most 

appropriate forum. See Code § 20-130(D). 

 Moreover, information regarding the issues involved in this 

matter, whether mother was in contempt of court and whether mother 

should be allowed unsupervised visitation with the children, was 

more readily available in Virginia, mother's residence. While the 

children's residence in Maryland may merit a future determination 

that Virginia is an inconvenient forum, we cannot say the trial 

judge abused her discretion in this instance by refusing to make 

that determination prior to ruling on father's rule to show cause 

for violations of existing court orders and on mother's motion for 

unsupervised visitation. Therefore, the Virginia trial court had 

jurisdiction under former Code § 20-126(A)(1)(i). 

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE

 By court order entered on June 28, 1995, mother was ordered 

to pay father $47,837 for his attorney's fees. Mother did not pay 

the attorney's fees. Father filed a petition for a rule to show 

cause. On September 18, 2000, another trial judge of the Fairfax 

County Circuit Court issued the rule to show cause. However, 

prior to the hearing on the rule, the trial judge in this matter 

ruled that because there had been a standing order in the case 

that no motions in this case were to be docketed without her prior 

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approval, the previous rule was set aside. The trial judge then 

heard evidence concerning father's rule to show cause at the 

January 25, 2001 hearing. 

 Father contends the trial judge erred in not proceeding on 

the rule to show cause issued by the other trial judge. However, 

a trial court has "inherent authority to administer cases on its 

docket." Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 356, 519 S.E.2d 

602, 605 (1999), aff'd, ___ Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2001). 

Because father's rule was heard by the trial judge who was 

familiar with the case, we cannot say the trial judge erred in 

hearing the evidence on the rule to show cause. 

 Evidence was presented that father discharged his attorney's 

fees in bankruptcy proceedings. Moreover, mother presented 

evidence that she had financial difficulties. The trial judge 

ruled that mother's failure to pay father's attorney's fees was 

not contemptuous. 

 "On appellate review of this issue, we may reverse the ruling 

of the trial court only if we find that it abused its discretion. 

A trial court may hold a[n] . . . obligor in contempt for failure 

to pay where such failure is based on unwillingness, not 

inability, to pay." Barnhill v. Brooks, 15 Va. App. 696, 704, 427 

S.E.2d 209, 215 (1993). We cannot conclude, based on the evidence 

in this record, that the trial judge abused her discretion. 

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UNSUPERVISED VISITATION

A party seeking to modify an existing 

custody order bears the burden of proving 

that a change in circumstances has occurred 

since the last custody determination and 

that the circumstances warrant a change of 

custody to promote the children's best 

interests. In deciding whether to modify a 

custody order, the trial court's paramount 

concern must be the children's best 

interests. However, the trial court has 

broad discretion in determining what 

promotes the children's best interests. 

Brown v. Brown, 30 Va. App. 532, 537-38, 518 S.E.2d 336, 338 

(1999) (citations omitted). 

 The requirement of supervised visitation with mother was 

imposed in June 1995. Thus, the requirement had been in effect 

for almost six years. The trial judge found that since 1995, the 

mother and the children had formed stronger ties to the community. 

After mother attempted to abduct one of the children, the trial 

court required mother to surrender her passport to the court. 

Since that time, mother had twice retrieved her passport from the 

court and traveled to Japan without incident. Upon her return 

from Japan, mother then returned her passport to the trial court. 

Mother is employed in the area and has improved her ability to 

speak English. 

 Father presented testimony from Dr. Victor Elian that mother 

still presented a flight risk. However, Dr. Elian admitted that 

he had had no contact with mother since January 1996, and he met 

with mother once in 1995. The trial judge specifically found that 

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these factors called into question the weight she gave his opinion 

testimony. "In determining the weight to be given the testimony 

of an expert witness, the fact finder may consider the basis for 

the expert's opinion." Street v. Street, 25 Va. App. 380, 387, 

488 S.E.2d 665, 668-69 (1997) (en banc). The trial judge found 

that mother presented no future risk for abducting the children. 

 The trial judge also indicated she accepted the testimony of 

Dr. Verna M. Fields, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who had 

had contact with mother about every ten days from 1995 until the 

date of the hearing. Dr. Fields opined that mother presented no 

flight risk because mother had established "roots" in Virginia and 

had established herself in a professional career. Dr. Fields also 

opined that it is detrimental to the children to have continued 

supervised visitation with mother because it "sets up a very false 

situation" and is a "barrier" to spontaneity between mother and 

the children. 

 The trial judge further found that father had exhibited 

"inappropriate" behavior in front of the children as a result of 

the difficulties of the supervision requirement. In addition, 

mother testified that the few unsupervised visits she had had with 

the children were "more comfortable" and "free," resulting in more 

conversation between her and the children. 

 The trial judge ruled that the supervision requirement had 

"been the source of ongoing difficulties between the parties" and 

had proved to be "very cumbersome, very expensive," and, after six 

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years, "detrimental to the children." The trial judge ordered 

that the visitation schedule would remain unchanged, but the 

requirement for supervision would be lifted for a period of six 

months. After that time, the parties would return for a "status 

review" to determine if changes are necessary. Based on this 

record, we cannot say that the trial judge abused her discretion 

in this ruling. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the trial judge is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

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