Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 

Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 

HUGH LINCOLN CORDON, JR. 

v. Record No. 092592 OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 

 ELIZABETH B. LACY 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA NOVEMBER 4, 2010 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

In this appeal, Hugh Lincoln Cordon, Jr., asks us to 

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming his 

conviction for possession of cocaine, arguing that the evidence 

was insufficient to support his conviction. Because we conclude 

that the evidence was insufficient to establish constructive 

possession of cocaine, we will reverse the judgment of the Court 

of Appeals. 

FACTS 

On November 20, 2007, Detective John Baer of the Hampton 

Police Department executed a search warrant at a house located 

at 169 Finley Square in the City of Hampton. Cordon was not at 

the house, but Donald Whitmeyer, Cordon’s uncle and owner of the 

house, was present during the execution of the warrant. Baer 

found a cooler in one of the bedrooms containing two bags of 

suspected powder cocaine, numerous baggies, and drug 

paraphernalia inside. A Certificate of Analysis subsequently 

showed that one of the bags contained 5.001 grams of powder 

cocaine. 
While in the bedroom Baer also found “some checks and some 

papers and stuff” containing Cordon’s name. In a nightstand in 

the bedroom, Baer found a box of bullets, a digital scale, a bag 

of white powdery substance, a knife, glass “test-tube type 

things,” a wooden crusher, a torch, and a marijuana pipe. The 

nightstand drawer also contained Baer’s business card.

Baer had given Cordon a business card two days prior to 

executing the search warrant while investigating a burglary at 

the house that occurred the previous September. In the course 

of the burglary investigation, Cordon told Baer and another 

investigating officer that his uncle owned the house, but was 

away and Cordon was living at the house. Cordon showed the 

officers “his” bedroom but told him that nothing was missing. 

Cordon later told Baer that a lockbox was taken from underneath 

“his bed.” In his handwritten statement regarding the burglary, 

Cordon listed an address in Newport News as his residence. The 

bedroom Cordon referred to as “his” during the burglary 

investigation was the bedroom containing the cooler and 

nightstand searched by Baer when executing the search warrant. 

On November 27, 2007, Baer interviewed Cordon and told him 

that he found drugs and drug paraphernalia and Baer’s card in 

the bedroom at the Finley Square house that Cordon had 

previously described as “his” bedroom. Cordon denied living at 

the house and terminated the conversation. 

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Cordon was indicted for possession of cocaine in violation 

of Code § 18.2-250 and convicted by the Circuit Court of the 

City of Hampton. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment 

with two years and six months suspended. The Court of Appeals 

affirmed his conviction. Cordon v. Commonwealth, Record No. 

1724-08-1 (Dec. 1, 2009)(unpublished). Cordon filed a timely 

appeal with this Court arguing that the evidence was 

insufficient to establish that he possessed the cocaine found in 

the cooler of a bedroom in the Finley Square house. 

DISCUSSION 

To support a conviction for possession of cocaine in this 

case, the Commonwealth was required to establish that Cordon 

constructively possessed the cocaine. Constructive possession 

of cocaine requires a showing that the presence and character of 

the substance was known to the defendant and that the substance 

was subject to his dominion and control. Lane v. Commonwealth, 

223 Va. 713, 716, 292 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1982). Thus, the 

Commonwealth was required to produce evidence demonstrating 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Cordon knew that cocaine was in 

the cooler in the bedroom and that the cooler was subject to his 

dominion and control. Furthermore, to establish constructive 

possession of cocaine through circumstantial evidence, all 

necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and 

inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable 

3
hypothesis of innocence. Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 

317, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627 (1991) (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 

217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)). Finally, under 

well-established principles, when considering the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support a conviction, we review the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Maxwell v. 

Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008). The 

judgment of conviction will be reversed only when the ruling is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Id.

The Commonwealth, relying on Rawls v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 

334, 634 S.E.2d 697 (2006), asserts that Cordon’s repeated 

references to the bedroom in which the cocaine was found as 

“his” bedroom and subsequent denial that he was living at the 

house when the police told him that drugs were found in the 

room, allowed the trier of fact to conclude that Cordon was 

lying to conceal his guilt and that this conduct tended to show 

Cordon’s knowledge of the presence and character of the cocaine. 

The Commonwealth argues that such conduct, along with Cordon’s 

personal effects and Baer’s business card found in the room, was 

sufficient to support a finding that Cordon knowingly possessed 

cocaine in that bedroom. We disagree. 

This Court has recognized that if a defendant’s denial of 

circumstances relating to an illegal act is inconsistent with 

previous statements or facts, it is fair to infer that such 

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denial was for the purposes of concealing guilt. Covil v. 

Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696, 604 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2004) (“false 

or evasive account is a circumstance, similar to flight from a 

crime scene, that a fact-finder may properly consider as 

evidence of guilty knowledge”). In cases involving possession 

of contraband, such an inference qualifies as evidence that

tends to show that the defendant was aware of the contraband and 

that it was subject to his dominion and control. Rawls, 272 Va. 

at 349-50, 634 S.E.2d at 705; Lane, 223 Va. at 716-17, 292 

S.E.2d at 360. For example, in Rawls the defendant was in a 

bedroom with the door closed when the police arrived to arrest 

him for a probation violation. 272 Va. at 341, 634 S.E.2d at 

700. When Rawls opened the door, he appeared to have been 

sleeping. Id. When told of the warrant for his arrest, Rawls 

“[i]mmediately” denied that the bedroom was his. Id. The 

police searched the room and found a loaded handgun between the 

mattress and box spring. Id. at 342, 634 S.E.2d at 700. The 

facts also showed that articles of clothing found in the room 

belonged to Rawls, Rawls apparently had been sleeping on the bed 

where the handgun was found when the police arrived, he was 

alone in the bedroom with the handgun, and other residents of 

the house testified that the bedroom was Rawls’ bedroom. Id. at 

341-42, 634 S.E.2d at 700. In reciting that Rawls’ denial of 

ownership of the room could support a conclusion that Rawls was 

5
lying to conceal his guilt, the Court observed that this 

conclusion was “[b]ased on the substantial evidence that the 

room in fact did belong to Rawls.” Id. at 350, 634 S.E.2d at 

705. Ultimately, this Court concluded that the Commonwealth met 

its burden of proof “by demonstrating Rawls’ presence in his own 

bedroom and the presence of the firearm at the time, along with 

the other circumstances suggesting his possession of the 

firearm.” Id. at 350-51, 634 S.E.2d at 705. 

In Lane, the defendant owned and occupied the dwelling in 

which the contraband was found. 223 Va. at 715, 292 S.E.2d at 

359. Lane was present during the execution of the search 

warrant and “became ‘fidgetive’” when an officer approached the 

chair in which she was sitting. Id. at 716, 292 S.E.2d at 359. 

When a large amount of methaqualone pills were found in a white 

plastic bag behind the chair, Lane denied any knowledge of the 

contraband. Id. at 716, 292 S.E.2d at 360. Again, the 

inference of guilt based on the defendant’s denial and its 

tendency to show knowledge and control of the contraband was 

accompanied by significant evidence connecting the defendant to 

the contraband. Id. 

In this case, Cordon was not in the house or the bedroom 

when the cooler containing the cocaine was discovered. There 

was no other physical evidence linking Cordon to the cooler or 

the contraband. The record showed that two days had passed 

6
between the time Cordon was known to be at the Finley Square 

house and the seizure of the cooler containing cocaine. While 

he referred to the bedroom as “his” and stated that he was 

staying there while his uncle was away at the time of the 

September burglary, Cordon listed his address as a location in 

Newport News. There was no evidence of ownership of the cooler, 

a very portable item, and no evidence placed Cordon at the house 

at any time between the day he received Baer’s business card and 

the day the search warrant was executed. Although Cordon, like 

Rawls, denied that he “lived” at the Finley Square house when 

informed that cocaine was found in a cooler in “his” bedroom, 

assuming his denial gave rise to an inference that he was lying 

to conceal guilt and thus tended to show his knowledge and 

control of the cocaine, that inference along with the remaining 

evidence falls far short of the evidence considered sufficient

in Rawls or Lane to support the convictions in those cases. 

While the circumstantial evidence in this case may be sufficient 

to raise a suspicion of guilt, it cannot support a conclusion 

beyond a reasonable doubt, by a rational trier of fact, that 

Cordon knew that cocaine was in the cooler in the bedroom and 

that it was subject to his dominion and control. Accordingly, 

we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate 

the conviction. 

Reversed and final judgment. 

7
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE MILLETTE 

join, dissenting. 

In reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 

vacating Cordon's conviction for possession of cocaine, the 

majority holds that "no 'rational trier of fact could have found 

. . . beyond a reasonable doubt' " that Cordon " 'was aware of 

both the presence and character of the substance and that it was 

subject to his dominion and control.' " Maxwell v. 

Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442-43, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502-03 (2008) 

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) and Drew 

v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986), 

respectively). Upon viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, I am persuaded that the evidence 

was not insufficient as a matter of law to establish Cordon's 

guilt of the charged offense. Thus, I respectfully dissent. 

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 

appeal, the issue is "'whether, after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Maxwell, 275 Va. at 442, 657 

S.E.2d at 502 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). This inquiry, 

however, "does not require a court to 'ask itself whether it

believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.' " Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (quoting 

8
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)). On the contrary, 

" '[i]f there is evidence to support the convictions, the 

reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, 

even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by 

the finder of fact at the trial.' " Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 

Va. 636, 641, 691 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2010) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998)). 

When as here, a defendant waives the right to a jury trial 

and is tried in a bench trial, the trial court's "factual 

findings are entitled to the same weight as that accorded a jury 

verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong 

or without evidence to support them." Schneider v. 

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1985). 

"This is so because the credibility of witnesses and the weight 

accorded their testimony are matters solely for the fact[-] 

finder who has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the 

witnesses." Id. at 382, 337 S.E.2d at 736-37; accord Young v. 

Commonwealth, 275 Va. 587, 590, 659 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2008) ("On 

appeal, great deference is given to the fact[-]finder who, 

having seen and heard the witnesses, assesses their credibility 

and weighs their testimony."). And, as this Court reiterates 

today, though not here, "[t]hat deference applies not only to 

findings of fact, but also to any reasonable and justified 

inferences the fact-finder may have drawn from the facts 

9
proved." Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d 

___, ___ (2010) (this day decided). 

As the majority notes, to establish Cordon's guilt of 

cocaine possession, the Commonwealth had to prove "that the 

presence and character of the substance was known to the 

defendant and subject to his dominion and control." (Citing 

Lane v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 716, 292 S.E.2d 358, 360 

(1982).) Knowledge "may be shown by evidence of the acts, 

statements or conduct of the accused." Young, 275 Va. at 591, 

659 S.E.2d at 310. "While the Commonwealth does not meet its 

burden of proof simply by showing the defendant's proximity to 

the [drugs] or ownership or occupancy of the premises where the 

[drugs are] found, these are circumstances probative of 

possession and may be considered as factors in determining 

whether the defendant possessed the [drugs]." Rawls v. 

Commonwealth, 272 Va. 334, 350, 634 S.E.2d 697, 705 (2006). 

The majority further states that when the Commonwealth 

relies on circumstantial evidence to carry its burden of proof, 

the circumstances proved "must be consistent with guilt and 

inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable 

hypothesis of innocence." (Citing Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 

Va. 307, 317, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627 (1991).) "The statement that 

circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable theory of 

innocence is simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth 

10
has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Hudson v. 

Commonwealth, 265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003) 

(citing Cox v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 513, 517, 125 S.E. 139, 141 

(1924)). Thus, in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

circumstantial evidence in this appeal, the issue "is not 

whether 'there is some evidence to support' [Cordon's] 

hypotheses" of innocence. Id. Instead, "[t]he issue is whether 

a reasonable [trier of fact], upon consideration of all the 

evidence, could have rejected [Cordon's] theories in his defense 

and found him guilty of [cocaine possession] beyond a reasonable 

doubt." Id.

In this case, the trier of fact had the following evidence 

to consider. When seeking the assistance of an officer of the 

"Hampton Police Division" regarding a home invasion that 

occurred at 169 Finley Square on September 29, 2007, Cordon 

stated to the responding police officer that the house was his 

"home," where he was residing "at the time." Cordon had also 

told the responding officer that the room in which the cocaine 

was subsequently found "was his room." Later, on November 14, 

2007, during a phone interview with Detective John Baer, Cordon 

again referred to the residence as his "home," and reported that 

"a lock box from underneath his bed had been stolen." (Emphasis 

added.) And again, on November 18, 2007, Cordon reiterated to 

Detective Baer, who was present at the residence, that "a 

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lockbox from underneath his bed" had been stolen, and "advised 

that [the intruders had] pried his bedroom door open," directing 

the detective to the room in which the cocaine was found two 

days later. Before leaving the residence that day, Detective 

Baer gave Cordon his business card. 

As the majority states, the search of the bedroom claimed 

by Cordon as "his room" revealed cocaine, "checks and some 

papers and stuff with [Cordon's] name on it," and numerous items 

of drug paraphernalia. The drug paraphernalia was found in a 

drawer of a nightstand abutting Cordon's bed. In the same 

drawer, Detective Baer's business card was discovered. 

Detective Baer testified that "[w]hen [he] initially opened the 

[nightstand] door, [his] business card was sitting right inside 

the drawer next to all these items" of drug paraphernalia. In a 

subsequent interview with Cordon, only after Detective Baer 

"advised [Cordon] of what items [had been] located in [Cordon's] 

bedroom" did Cordon "den[y] living at 169 Finley Square." 

According to Detective Baer, Cordon ended the interview when 

Detective Baer told him that the business card was found in the 

nightstand drawer with the drug paraphernalia. 

Upon viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial," Rawls, 272 Va. 

at 349, 634 S.E.2d at 704, and deferring to the trial court's 

factual findings and all reasonable inferences drawn from those 

12
facts, Young, 275 Va. at 590, 659 S.E.2d at 310, all of which an 

appellate court must do, I am unable to say that no rational 

trier of fact could have concluded Cordon possessed the cocaine 

recovered from "his room." Moreover, Cordon's denial that he 

lived at 169 Finley Square after being confronted with the items 

seized during the search of "his room" bolsters the inference 

that Cordon " 'intentionally and consciously possessed [the 

cocaine] with knowledge of its nature and character.' " Young, 

275 Va. at 591, 659 S.E.2d at 310 (quoting Burton v. 

Commonwealth, 215 Va. 711, 713, 213 S.E.2d 757, 759 (1975)). As 

the majority acknowledges, "if a defendant's denial of 

circumstances relating to an illegal act is inconsistent with 

previous statements or facts, it is fair to infer that such 

denial was for the purposes of concealing guilt." 

The majority nonetheless concludes, even "assuming 

[Cordon's] denial gave rise to an inference that he was lying to 

conceal . . . his knowledge and control of the cocaine, that 

inference along with the remaining evidence falls far short of 

the evidence considered sufficient in Rawls or Lane." Presuming 

those cases set the evidentiary floor necessary to sustain a 

conviction for possession of an illegal drug, the majority's 

efforts to show that the evidence here "falls far short" of that 

in Rawls, 272 Va. 334, 634 S.E.2d 697 and Lane, 223 Va. 713, 292 

S.E.2d 358, fails. 

13
In discussing both cases, the majority states that the 

"inference of guilt based on the [respective] defendant's denial 

and its tendency to show knowledge and control of the contraband 

was accompanied by significant evidence connecting [that] 

defendant to the contraband." The "significant evidence" in 

Lane was the defendant's ownership and occupancy of the house 

where the drugs were found, coupled with her occupancy of a 

chair behind which the illegal substances were discovered, and 

the fact that she became "nervous and volunteered . . . that 

there was nothing behind the chair." 223 Va. at 716, 292 S.E.2d 

at 360. In Rawls, the "significant evidence" consisted of the 

following facts: the defendant was sleeping alone in a room with 

the door closed when the police arrived to serve a warrant for 

the defendant's arrest; a loaded handgun was found between the 

mattress and box spring; the defendant's roommates testified 

that the bedroom belonged to him; and the defendant's clothes 

were found in the room. Rawls, 272 Va. at 341-42, 350, 634 

S.E.2d at 700, 705. 

The evidence in each case also included a denial by the 

respective defendant. In Lane, the defendant denied any 

knowledge of the illegal drugs when confronted with them. 223 

Va. at 716, 292 S.E.2d at 360. Similarly, in Rawls, the 

defendant "disclaimed ownership" of the bedroom when the police 

14
told him they had an arrest warrant for a probation violation. 

272 Va. at 350, 634 S.E.2d at 705. 

Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the same type of 

evidence is present here. Cordon reported a burglary of the 

house where he acknowledged he was residing; in the process, he 

claimed that nothing was taken from "his room," only to later 

assert that an item was taken from "underneath his bed"; he 

again claimed the bedroom as his own when interviewed by 

Detective Baer at the residence two days prior to execution of 

the search warrant; and the search of the bedroom revealed 

papers bearing Cordon's name, and, in the nightstand, Detective 

Baer's business card alongside drug paraphernalia. These facts 

constitute "substantial evidence that the room in fact did 

belong to" Cordon. Cf. Rawls, 272 Va. at 350, 634 S.E.2d at 

705. And, the cocaine was located inside a cooler that was 

readily observable to anyone entering the bedroom; the cocaine 

as well as the drug paraphernalia were located a short distance 

from where Cordon admitted to sleeping, the paraphernalia being 

found in a drawer with the business card Detective Baer had 

given Cordon two days prior to the search. Finally, Cordon, 

like the defendants in Lane and Rawls, evinced "guilty 

knowledge" by his denial that he resided at 169 Finley Square 

when confronted with the items seized from "his room" during the 

search. 

15
Thus, like the trier of fact in Rawls, the trial court here 

reasonably could have inferred from Cordon's occupancy of the 

bedroom where the contraband was found that Cordon had "dominion 

and control" over the cocaine. 272 Va. at 350, 634 S.E.2d at 

705. Further, the trial court reasonably could have concluded 

from Cordon's denial of occupancy that he "was lying to conceal 

his guilt," thereby demonstrating that he was aware of the 

cocaine's "presence and character." Id. Thus, I conclude that 

the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court's 

conclusion that Cordon "possessed" the cocaine. 

Although Cordon was not present when the search warrant was 

executed, that factor alone does not mean the trial court could 

not reject Cordon's theory of defense. Certainly, one 

hypothesis of innocence is that another individual placed the 

cocaine in Cordon's bedroom without his knowledge. But the same 

possibility existed in Rawls, notwithstanding Rawls' presence in 

the bedroom where the firearm was found. Rawls could not have 

seen the firearm concealed underneath the mattress merely by 

being present in the bedroom. Acknowledging that evidence was 

adduced that "other individuals had unrestricted access to the 

bedroom" where the firearm was found in Rawls, this Court 

nonetheless concluded that there was sufficient evidence of 

possession because "such access is only a single factor to be 

considered among all of the circumstances." Id. As in Rawls, 

16
the Commonwealth was not required to prove that Cordon had 

exclusive access to the bedroom. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

17