ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

BRYAN M. TRUITT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Bertig & Associates Attorney General of Indiana

Valparaiso, Indiana

IAN MCLEAN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JAMES LOHMAN III, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

 vs. ) No. 64A03-1307-CR-258

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE PORTER SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Roger V. Bradford, Judge

Cause No. 64D01-1109-FB-8616

March 31, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MATHIAS, Judge 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
2

James Lohman III (“Lohman”) pleaded guilty in Porter Superior Court to Class B 

felony leaving the scene of an accident causing death and Class C felony operating a 

motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death. Lohman was ordered to serve an 

aggregate twenty-year sentence. Lohman appeals his sentence and argues that his 

aggregate twenty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

the character of the offender.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On September 3, 2011, Lohman and two friends were involved in an altercation at 

a bar in Burns Harbor, Indiana, and they were asked to leave the bar. Lohman and his 

friends left the bar but remained nearby, and shortly thereafter, they were allegedly 

assaulted by unnamed individuals. Lohman and his friends were able to fight their way 

to Lohman’s vehicle in the bar’s parking lot. 

Bystanders witnessed waitress Sheri Jania (“Jania”) standing behind the vehicle 

and shouting at its occupants. Jania shouted at Lohman to stop and recited his license 

plate number to the bartender. Lohman put the vehicle in reverse and backed up toward 

Jania. Jania dodged the vehicle and moved toward the front driver’s side. Lohman then 

put the vehicle in drive, turned the car toward Jania, and accelerated quickly in her 

direction. Lohman then killed Jania by driving over her. Lohman opened his driver’s 

side door, and witnesses shouted that Jania was under the car. Notwithstanding these 

shouts, Lohman accelerated and drove out the parking lot, dragging Jania because of her 

position underneath the car. Jania’s body remained under the vehicle while Lohman 
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proceeded westbound on US Highway 20. Jania’s body was dragged onto Highway 20, 

but eventually dislodged from the vehicle’s undercarriage. 

Police officers stopped Lohman approximately four miles from the bar. Lohman 

submitted to a portable breath test, which registered a blood alcohol content of .106. 

Lohman was charged with Class B felony leaving the scene of an accident causing death, 

Class C felony reckless homicide, Class C felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated 

causing death, and Class A misdemeanor criminal recklessness with a motor vehicle. 

Lohman agreed to plead guilty to Class B felony leaving the scene of an accident causing 

death and Class C felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death in exchange 

for dismissal of the remaining charges.

A sentencing hearing was held on June 10, 2013. During the hearing, Lohman 

told the trial court judge that he deserved whatever sentence the court believed to be 

appropriate. The trial court considered Lohman’s criminal history as an aggravating 

circumstance, and found no mitigating circumstances. The trial court then imposed a 

sentence of twenty years for the Class B felony conviction and an concurrent sentence of 

eight years for the Class C felony conviction. Lohman appeals his sentence. Additional 

facts will be provided as necessary. 

Discussion and Decision

We initially address the State’s claim that Lohman waived appellate review of his 

sentence by indicating to the trial court that he would accept the trial court’s sentencing 

decision. Tr. p. 32. At the sentencing hearing, Lohman stated, “I deserve whatever the 

judge gives me.” Id. However, during argument, Lohman’s counsel asserted that a 
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twelve-year sentence was appropriate. Tr. p. 48. For this reason, and given our 

preference for resolving issues on their merits, we cannot conclude that Lohman agreed 

to an aggregate twenty-year sentence thereby waiving his claim on appeal. We will

therefore address the merits of his argument that his twenty-year sentence is inappropriate. 

Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may “revise a sentence authorized by 

statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” Although we may review and revise a sentence, “[t]he principal role of 

appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding 

principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, 

but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 

N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We must give “deference to a trial court’s sentencing 

decision, both because Rule 7(B) requires us to give due consideration to that decision 

and because we understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its 

sentencing decisions.” Trainor v. State, 950 N.E.2d 352, 355–56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), 

trans. denied (quoting Stewart v. State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

When we review the appropriateness of a sentence, we consider “the culpability of 

the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other 

factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant 

has the “burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is 

inappropriate.” Shell v. State, 927 N.E.2d 413, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). In addition, in 
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Buchanan v. State, our supreme court clarified the rule regarding the imposition of 

maximum sentences as follows:

We have also observed that the maximum possible sentences are generally 

most appropriate for the worst offenders. This is not, however, a guideline 

to determine whether a worse offender could be imagined. Despite the 

nature of any particular offense and offender, it will always be possible to 

identify or hypothesize a significantly more despicable scenario. Although 

maximum sentences are ordinarily appropriate for the worst offenders, we 

refer generally to the class of offenses and offenders that warrant the 

maximum punishment. But such class encompasses a considerable variety 

of offenses and offenders.

767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Lohman was ordered to serve concurrent, albeit maximum terms, for his Class B 

and Class C felony convictions,

1 for an aggregate sentence of twenty years. Whether we 

regard a sentence as appropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, 

the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come 

to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). When 

we review a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), we “focus on the forest–the aggregate 

sentence–rather than the trees–consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of 

the sentence on any individual count.” Id.at 1225.

Lohman argues his twenty-year sentence is inappropriate because “[s]pecific 

inquiry into the elements and circumstances of each crime (individually) do not support 

the maximum punishment nor a designation of ‘the worst of the worst.’” Appellant’s Br. 

 1 Indiana Code section 35-50-2-5 establishes the following sentencing range for a Class B felony: “A 

person who commits a Class B felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) and twenty 

(20) years, with the advisory sentence being ten (10) years.” And Indiana Code section 35-50-2-6 

establishes the following sentencing range for a Class C felony: “A person who commits a Class C felony 

shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence 

being four (4) years.”
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at 6. More specifically, Lohman claims that his crime of leaving the scene of the accident 

was “benign” and was no more egregious than any other offense. He states, “Jania was 

immediately dead. Lohman’s failure to stop did not cause greater injury.” Id. at 8. But 

Lohman admits that “the act of backing up with [Jania] behind the vehicle, then 

accelerating while she was in plain view, hitting her and ignoring the pleas of others at 

the scene is egregious.” Id. at 10. Lohman therefore concedes that the eight year 

sentence for the Class C felony conviction “is intellectually supportable.”

However, as we stated above, we focus on the aggregate sentence and not the 

individual sentences for each crime committed. See Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d 1225. The 

nature of this crime was particularly gruesome and undeniably tragic. Witnesses at the 

scene saw Lohman back his car purposely toward Jania, whom he described as his friend.

Although she was initially able to move out of the vehicle’s path, Lohman put the vehicle 

in drive, deliberately turned the car toward Jania, and accelerated quickly in her direction. 

He ran over Jania pinning her underneath his vehicle. Lohman opened his car door for a 

few seconds, and witnesses in the parking lot shouted at him to stop. But he accelerated 

and drove out the parking lot, dragging Jania because of her position underneath the car 

leaving smeared blood on the ground. Jania was dragged out onto the highway and left in 

the roadway after her body dislodged from Lohman’s vehicle. Jania’s death severely 

impacted her children, and her youngest son testified that his family has fallen apart since 

his mother was killed. Tr. p. 39. 
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Lohman does not focus much attention on the character of the offender portion of 

our inquiry. He does note, as do we, that he pleaded guilty, apologized for causing 

Jania’s death, and expressed remorse at the sentencing hearing. 

But Lohman also has a history of marijuana and alcohol abuse and criminal 

offenses. In 2007, Lohman pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor possession of 

marijuana. In 1991, he pleaded guilty to false informing, and he was convicted of that 

offense for hitting another vehicle, leaving the scene of the accident, and telling the 

police that his mother was driving the car. In 1989, Lohman pleaded guilty to reckless 

driving, but the original charge was Class D felony operating while intoxicated. In 1983, 

Lohman was convicted of Class B misdemeanor battery. His probation was revoked 

twice in that cause. 

Despite his admitted history of alcohol abuse, on the day of the offense, Lohman 

drank three beers before arriving at the bar and shared a pitcher of beer with friends. And 

at sentencing, although he accepted responsibility for Jania’s death, he continued to 

blame the individuals who allegedly attacked him just prior to Jania’s death and

maintains that he did not see Jania before striking her. Tr. p. 25. His statement is less 

than credible in light of the eyewitnesses’ statements to the police as recounted in the 

probable cause affidavit. 

Lohman’s character is, at the very least, unhelpful to him in sentencing, and the 

nature of this offense was particularly horrific. For all of these reasons, we conclude that 

Lohman’s aggregate twenty-year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender. 
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Affirmed.

BRADFORD, J., and PYLE, J., concur.