# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued October 9, 2013

Decided February 5, 2014

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 13

‐ 1249

ROBERT G. HOYT, JR.,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellant

,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social

Security,

Defendant

‐ Appellee. Appeal from the United States Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern

Division.

No. 09 C 7895

Jeffrey T. Gilbert,

Magistrate Judge

.

O R D E R

Robert Hoyt applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income,

claiming to be disabled because of severe pain in his back, neck, and extremities caused

by degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, and obesity. An administrative law judge NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 13

‐ 1249 Page 2

concluded that Hoyt could perform light work and thus was not disabled. But because

the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of Hoyt’s treating physician about his

condition, we vacate the district court ʹ s judgment and remand to the agency, though for

reconsideration only of Hoyt’s SSI claim.

Hoyt, now 40, built house frames for several years in his early twenties before

suffering injuries to his hip and back during two work

‐ related accidents, one in 1996 or

1997 and another in 2000. After his second accident, Hoyt sought treatment for a year

with a rehabilitation physician, who concluded that he was suffering from, among other

things, degenerative disc disease and nerve damage; physical exams, however, revealed

that he still had full range of motion and normal strength in his hip and legs. (Hoyt

testified that he did not seek treatment again until 2007 because he could not afford to

do so.) He continued to engage in part

‐ time carpentry work until 2005, when his back

pain became too severe. He remained active, however, between 2005 and 2007, working

on average twenty hours a week primarily clearing small stones from a 50

‐ acre property

and mowing it with a tractor, and completing a full

‐ time course load at a local

community college. In 2007 Hoyt also spent two months working full

‐ time as a machine

operator.

But Hoyt’s back pain worsened in 2007 and he began experiencing pain in his

right arm, so he again sought treatment. He participated in two physical therapy

sessions, received a cortisone injection, and took pain killers and anti

‐ inflammatory

drugs. He also underwent an x

‐ ray and an MRI of his cervical spine. The MRI revealed

disc bulging and narrowing of his spinal canal and neural foramina (openings in the

spinal canal which transmit nerves out into the rest of the body, see D ORLAND ’ S

I LLUSTRATED M EDICAL D ICTIONARY 722 (30th ed. 2003)).

That year he also applied for DIB and SSI. 1 In connection with those applications,

Hoyt was examined by an internist, Dr. Vinod Motiani, who concluded that Hoyt could

walk, kneel, and squat without difficulty, but also noted that he possibly suffered from

1 To qualify for disability insurance benefits, Hoyt must show that he was

disabled before his date last insured in 2003. See Shideler v. Astrue

, 688 F.3d 306, 312–13

(7th Cir. 2012); Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart

, 409 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2005). But even if he

cannot show that he was disabled by 2003, he may still be entitled to supplemental

security income if he demonstrates that he is presently disabled and of limited means.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381a, 1382; Sienkiewicz

, 409 F.3d at 802; Steed v. Astrue

, 524 F.3d 872,

874 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008).No. 13

‐ 1249 Page 3

“some” degenerative disc disease and nerve damage. Two consulting physicians

reviewed Hoyt’s medical records and concluded that despite the evidence of disc

abnormalities and spinal stenosis, as well as his obesity (he was 5 ʹ 11 ʺ and 288 pounds),

Hoyt’s performance on physical exams reflected that he could still perform “medium

work.”

But Hoyt’s treating physician, Dr. Jennifer Byrd, a family practitioner and

internist who saw Hoyt several times between 2008 and 2009, regarded Hoyt’s

condition as more severe. She noted in a 2008 report that, as the result of nerve damage,

Hoyt suffered from chronic pain in his neck, hip, and back, and that his ability to sit,

bend, push, pull, and use his right hand was below normal. By 2009 she assessed his

condition as having significantly worsened. Relying on the results of a 2008 lumbar MRI

(which showed disc bulging and moderate to severe narrowing of his neural foramina)

and a physical exam (which revealed “severely limited range of motion”), Dr. Byrd

opined that Hoyt could not work “given the need for frequent position changes, the

need to lie down intermittently, and a distractible pain that is easily exacerbated by

simple movements.”

After the state agency denied his claims, Hoyt had a hearing before an ALJ. He

emphasized that, at least since 2007, he spent up to three

‐ quarters of the day lying down

and was not able to sit, walk, or even use the computer without experiencing severe

pain. A vocational expert also testified and concluded that Hoyt could perform

essentially all light work but, even if he were limited to sedentary work, jobs remained

available to him. Given this evidence, the ALJ determined that Hoyt was not disabled

and thus not entitled to either DIB or SSI. Applying the five

‐ step sequential process

detailed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ found that Hoyt had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since the onset of his asserted disability (step one), and that

his degenerative disc disease and obesity were severe impairments (step two), but that

those conditions did not meet the criteria to establish presumptive disability (step

three). The ALJ found that Hoyt’s allegations were not “fully” credible, emphasizing

among other things, his minimal treatment and significant daily activities. The ALJ then

determined that Hoyt could not perform his past work, but his residual functional

capacity allowed him to perform the full range of light work, (step four). See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1567(b). The ALJ concluded, however, that significant jobs remained available to

Hoyt in the regional economy (step five). The Appeals Council denied Hoyt’s request

for review, and a magistrate judge, presiding by consent, upheld the ALJ’s ruling.

On appeal Hoyt’s strongest argument is that the ALJ incorrectly assessed hisNo. 13

‐ 1249 Page 4

residual functional capacity by not appropriately weighing the opinions of his treating

physician, Dr. Byrd. If fully credited, her opinions from 2008 and 2009— that Hoyt’s

conditions necessitated “intermittent periods of recumbent rest” and “frequent position

changes,” and were aggravated by “long term sitting, long term standing, twisting, and

walking” as well as “simple movements,”—suggest that he could not, as of 2009,

perform sedentary work.

An ALJ cannot reject the opinion of a treating physician without explanation,

see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Martinez v. Astrue

, 630 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir.2011), and

here the ALJ failed to support his decision to discount Dr. Byrd’s conclusions. First, the

ALJ inappropriately substituted his own medical judgment in place of Dr. Byrd’s,

see Boiles v. Barnhart

, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Rohan v. Chater

, 98 F.3d 966, 970

(7th Cir. 1996), by interpreting Hoyt’s electromyography exam and lumbar MRI as

inconsistent with his complaints of pain; in contrast, Dr. Byrd cited the lumbar MRI in

support of her diagnosis, and particularly its evidence of “moderate to severe”

narrowing of Hoyt’s neural foramina. See Jeffrey N. Katz & Mitchel B. Harris, Lumbar

Spinal Stenosis

, 358 N EW E NG

. J. M ED

. 818 (2008) (spinal stenosis can be caused by

narrowed spinal canal or narrowed neural foramina). Second, contrary to the

Commissioner’s position, the ALJ could not rely solely on the state

‐ agency physicians,

because those doctors never examined Hoyt or reviewed the results of his

electromyography test or lumbar MRI, and because their dated opinions could not

account for how Hoyt’s condition might have deteriorated. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c)(1)–(3); Roddy v. Astrue

, 705 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2013); Jelinek v. Astrue

,

662 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2011). The ALJ’s failure to appropriately weigh Dr. Byrd’s

opinions is a sufficient ground for remanding Hoyt’s SSI claim. See Scott v. Astrue

, 647

F.3d 734, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2011); Punzio v. Astrue

, 630 F.3d 704, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2011). But

because Dr. Byrd discussed only Hoyt’s functionality as of 2009, her opinions shed no

light on whether Hoyt was disabled by his date last insured in 2003 and so do not

warrant a remand of Hoyt’s DIB claim.

Hoyt also attacks the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination by

challenging the ALJ’s failure to discuss his obesity as well as the ALJ’s adverse

credibility determination. Hoyt contends that the ALJ was required to address how his

obesity might exacerbate his pain, see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 § 1.00(Q),

but the ALJ indirectly accounted for Hoyt’s obesity by relying on the medical opinions

of state

‐ agency physicians who evaluated his height and weight. See Prochaska v.

Barnhart

, 454 F.3d 731, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2006). With regard to credibility, Hoyt argues

that the ALJ should not have relied on his failure to seek treatment between 2001 andNo. 13

‐ 1249 Page 5

2007 without addressing his explanation that he was simply unable to afford medical

care, see SSR 96

‐ 7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *7–*8 (Jul. 2, 1996); Myles v. Astrue

, 582 F.3d 672,

677 (7th Cir. 2009). But even if that omission amounts to error, it does not undercut the

ALJ’s other valid reasons for discounting Hoyt’s testimony—Hoyt’s conservative

treatment and normal physical exams, see Sienkiewicz

, 409 F.3d at 804; Powers v. Apfel

,

207 F.3d 431, 435–36 (7th Cir. 2000), his extensive daily activities (working, driving long

distances, and attending classes), see Filius v. Astrue

, 694 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2012);

Schmidt v. Astrue

, 496 F.3d 833, 843–44 (7th Cir. 2007), and his admission that his most

significant limitations did not begin until long after his date last insured.

Hoyt lastly challenges the ALJ’s reliance on the vocational expert’s conclusions,

arguing that the expert ʹ s raw data was not “available on demand.” See McKinnie v.

Barnhart

, 368 F.3d 907, 910–11 (7th Cir. 2004); Donahue v. Barnhart

, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th

Cir. 2002). But given the ALJ’s determination that Hoyt could still perform light work as

of 2003, the agency’s Medical Vocational Guidelines mandated a finding of “not

disabled,” see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 202.21; SSR 83

‐ 14, 1983 WL 31254, at

*2 (1983); Haynes v. Barnhart

, 416 F.3d 621, 627–628 (7th Cir. 2005), regardless of any

conclusions rendered by the expert.

Accordingly, we V ACATE the judgment and R EMAND the case for the limited

purpose of having the ALJ reexamine the opinions of Hoyt’s treating physician,

Dr. Byrd, and consider the relevance of those opinions for his SSI application.