Page 1 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 30, 2014

Congressional Committees

Missile Defense: DOD’s Report Provides Limited Insight on Testing Options for the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense System

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has sought to rapidly develop and field the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the United States against a limited intermediate 

and intercontinental ballistic missile attack from nations such as North Korea and Iran. The 

GMD system defends against these threats by launching a ground-based interceptor toward the 

enemy ballistic missile, releasing a kill vehicle that detects and destroys the threat. In March 

2013, we found the total cost of the GMD system to be around $41 billion, approximately $4.5

billion of which will be spent between fiscal years 2013 and 2017.

1 Currently, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) has deployed 30 GMD interceptors and it plans to deploy 14 more by the end of 

fiscal year 2017. However, flight testing intended to demonstrate the system’s capabilities and 

limitations is not scheduled to be completed until at least 2022. Since 2003, we have found this 

approach of concurrently manufacturing, deploying, and testing interceptors is high risk because 

tests may uncover issues requiring costly design changes and retrofit programs.2 These risks 

materialized when MDA failed both of its attempts in 2010 to demonstrate the upgraded GMD 

interceptor, called Capability Enhancement (CE)-II, causing MDA to fall several years behind on 

deploying new interceptors. Additionally, the cost to demonstrate, as well as fix, the already 

produced CE-IIs has increased from $236 million to $1.309 billion.3

A second CE-II attempt to intercept a target missile, called Flight Test GMD (FTG)-06a,

occurred in December 2010. According to the Director, MDA, the test failed because of 

excessive vibration in the inertial measurement unit—a component of the kill vehicle’s guidance 

system. As a result, MDA halted deliveries of the remaining CE-IIs until the failure is resolved. 

We reported in April 2012 that the failure investigation for FTG-06a concluded the inertial 

measurement unit required a redesign and additional development.

4

 1

See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 

MDA developed and 

GAO-13-294SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 28, 2013), 51.

2

See GAO, Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but Risks Remain, GAO-03-441

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2003); and more recently, Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition 

Goals and Improving Accountability, GAO-14-351 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2014).

3

In April 2013, we found that MDA initially planned to demonstrate the CE-II capability for an estimated $236.3 million 

but subsequently increased to $1.1739 billion as of August 2012 (see GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus 

on Strengthening Acquisition Management, GAO-13-432 [Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2013], 90). Since then, we 

received updated cost information from MDA in June 2013 and the total cost is now estimated at $1.3091 billion. This 

recent cost increase was largely a result of a $146.5 million cost increase of the test failure review. 

4

GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency, GAO-12-486

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012).
Page 2 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

implemented steps to mitigate the effects on that guidance component and successfully tested 

the mitigation in a non-intercept flight test, called Controlled Test Vehicle-01, in January 2013. 

MDA plans to further demonstrate the mitigation through an intercept flight test called FTG-06b, 

which, if successful, will allow interceptor deliveries to resume. The program experienced a 

setback, though, in July 2013, when the program failed an intercept attempt of the initial fielded 

version of the GMD interceptor, called CE-I, which has subsequently delayed FTG-06b to the 

third quarter of fiscal year 2014.5

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 provided that: MDA’s highest 

priority should be to correct the problem that caused the FTG-06a test failure; MDA should

demonstrate the correction in flight tests before resuming CE-II production; and MDA should 

have a robust, rigorous, and operationally realistic GMD testing program.

 

6 Additionally, the act

required the Secretary of Defense to submit to congressional defense committees a report on 

GMD’s test program that included, among other items: an explanation of GMD test options if 

Controlled Test Vehicle-01 and FTG-06b do not demonstrate the successful correction to the 

problem that caused the FTG-06a failure; and an assessment of the feasibility, advisability, and 

cost effectiveness of accelerating GMD’s flight testing pace.7

In addition, the act required GAO to brief the congressional defense committees on our views of 

DOD’s report and submit a report as soon as practicable. For the briefing, we assessed: (1) the 

extent to which DOD’s report identified testing options and known risks of the GMD system, and 

(2) the extent to which DOD’s report assessed the feasibility and cost effectiveness of 

accelerating GMD flight testing. This report formally transmits the briefing that we provided to 

the congressional defense committees on December 16, 2013, which is attached as an 

enclosure, and meets the reporting requirement.

To assess the extent to which DOD’s report identified testing options, we reviewed DOD’s report 

for testing options if FTG-06b does not demonstrate the successful correction to the problem 

that caused the FTG-06a failure. We then compared those testing options against MDA’s testing

plans. To assess the extent to which DOD’s report assessed the feasibility and cost 

effectiveness of accelerating GMD’s testing plan, we compared information included in DOD’s 

report to a generally accepted definition of the term feasible (the extent to which something is 

both possible and likely to occur) and assessed the support provided in DOD’s report against 

GMD’s testing performance. We also compared information contained in DOD’s report to GAO, 

Office of Management and Budget, and DOD guidance on the elements of a cost effectiveness 

assessment. Due to lack of availability of data, we did not independently assess whether 

accelerating GMD’s testing pace was advisable. Finally, we met with MDA and DOD officials to 

corroborate key acquisition information.

The issuance of this report was delayed by about a month because of delays in the security 

review process performed by DOD. DOD initially identified classified and sensitive information in 

our draft report but subsequently reversed its determination after we referred DOD to several 

publicly released documents that included the same information. We also revised some 

 5

MDA initially planned to conduct FTG-06b in the third quarter of fiscal year 2012 but the test was delayed to the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2014 because of challenges developing the FTG-06a mitigation. The July 2013 CE-I test 

has further delayed FTG-06b to third quarter of fiscal year 2014 in order to implement corrective actions based on an 

ongoing failure review of the CE-I test.

6

Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 228(a)(4), (6).

7

Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 231.
Page 3 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

language in our report, as appropriate, based on DOD's security review. As a result of these

discussions and revisions, DOD confirmed that this report does not contain classified or 

sensitive information.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to April 2014 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Summary

DOD’s report provided decision makers with limited insight on potential testing options if MDA 

does not successfully demonstrate a correction to the problem that caused the December 2010 

FTG-06a failure. First, we found that DOD’s report included one testing option—a development 

effort to redesign and test kill vehicle divert thrusters, which help maneuver the kill vehicle in 

flight. According to the Director, MDA, this effort will address the systemic problem of vibration 

which is currently being addressed by isolating the inertial measurement unit from that 

environment. In our view, it was reasonable for DOD to focus testing options on plans to 

address the vibration problem. However, DOD’s report included few details about that

development effort, such as the cost, schedule, benefits, and risks, leaving decision makers with 

limited insight on this option. Second, we also found that DOD’s testing options were limited 

because of a July 2013 intercept failure of the fielded CE-I interceptor. Until the ongoing CE-I 

failure review is completed and the root cause is determined, it would be premature in our view

for MDA to determine the timing and nature of additional CE-I testing.

DOD’s report provided limited insight into the feasibility and no insight into whether accelerating 

GMD’s testing pace would be cost effective. We found that DOD’s report did not provide a 

complete assessment as to whether it is feasible to increase GMD’s testing pace. Specifically,

the report did not assess whether it was likely MDA could accelerate GMD’s testing pace—

limiting the report’s usefulness for decision makers. We also found that DOD’s report included

some basic cost information but did not provide decision makers with an assessment of whether 

increasing GMD’s testing pace would be cost effective. Further, in our view, it is unlikely that 

DOD can successfully accelerate the pace of GMD’s testing given its testing track record and 

the increasing complexity of planned tests. In addition, the report provided insufficient 

information to assess whether accelerating GMD’s testing pace is prudent because it did not 

address the potential full cost, benefits, and risks of accelerating testing.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. Although DOD provided 

technical comments for our report and we incorporated them as appropriate, DOD did not 

provide written comments to include in this report.

- - - - -

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the 

Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Page 4 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are: David Best, Assistant Director; Carol Petersen; Steven Stern; Robert Swierczek;

Brian Tittle; Hai V. Tran; and Alyssa Weir.

Cristina Chaplain, Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Enclosure
Page 5 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 6 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Enclosure

Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense System Test Plan

DOD’s Report to Congress Provides Limited 

Insight on Testing Options for the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) System

Prepared for a Briefing of the Congressional Defense 

Committees on December 16, 2013.

Page 1
Page 7 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Overview

• Introduction

• Objectives

• Scope and Methodology

• Background

• Objective 1: GMD testing options and known risks

• Objective 2: Feasibility and cost effectiveness of accelerating 

GMD’s testing pace

• Concluding Observations

• Summary of Agency Comments

Page 2
Page 8 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Introduction

• The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing the Groundbased Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the United 

States against a limited intermediate and intercontinental 

ballistic missile attack. 

• The GMD program relies on ground and flight testing to 

assess and demonstrate system capability, but has failed all 

three of its intercept tests since 2010.

• GMD’s 2010 flight test failures have disrupted its broader 

developmental flight test plan and has resulted in cost growth 

of over $1 billion due to, in part, re-conducting flight tests and 

conducting reviews of test failures. 

Page 3
Page 9 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2013 GMD Test Report Requirements

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 112-239, Section 231, required the Secretary of 

Defense to submit to congressional defense committees a report on the GMD testing program and include:

Page 4

Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Part 4 Part 5

An explanation of testing 

options for the groundbased midcourse defense 

system if planned flight 

tests CTV-01 and FTG-06b 

do not demonstrate the 

successful correction to the 

problem that caused the 

failure of the capability 

enhancement-2 kill vehicle 

in flight test FTG-06a in 

December 2010, including 

additional testing of the 

capability enhancement-1 

kill vehicle.

An assessment of the feasibility, 

advisability, and cost effectiveness 

(including the potential benefits, risks, 

and impact on the current test plan and 

integrated master test plan for the 

ground-based midcourse defense 

system) of adjusting the test plan of the 

ground-based midcourse defense 

system to accomplish, at an acceptable 

level of riskIf the Secretary determines 

that either option described

in subparagraph (A) or (B) 

of paragraph (2) 

[accelerating the test date 

for capability ehnancement1 testing and increasing the 

pace of flight testing] would 

be feasible, advisable, and 

cost effective, a discussion 

of whether increased 

funding beyond the funding 

requested in the budget for 

fiscal year 2013 is required 

to carry out such options 

and, if so, what level of 

increased funding would be 

necessary to carry out each 

such option.

Any 

additional 

matters the 

Secretary 

determines 

appropriate.

DOT&E 

[Director, 

Operational 

Test &

Evaluation]

Views.—The 

Secretary shall 

include an 

appendix to 

the report 

under 

subsection (a) 

that contains 

the views of 

the Director of 

Operational 

Test and 

Evaluation 

regarding the 

contents of the 

report.

(A) accelerating to 

fiscal year 2014 the 

date for testing such 

system using a 

capability 

enhancement-1 kill 

vehicle against an 

intercontinental ballistic 

missile-range target; 

and

(B) increasing 

the pace of 

the flight 

testing of 

such system 

to a rate of 

three tests 

every two 

years.
Page 10 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Objectives

The Act further requires the Comptroller General to brief the 

congressional defense committees on his views of DOD’s report. 

Our specific objectives are to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent does DOD’s report identify testing options and 

known risks of the GMD system?

2. To what extent does DOD’s report assess the feasibility and 

cost effectiveness of accelerating GMD flight testing?

Page 5
Page 11 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which DOD’s report identified testing options, we reviewed DOD’s 

report for testing options if Flight Test GMD (FTG)-06b does not demonstrate the 

successful correction to the problem that caused the FTG-06a failure. We then compared 

those testing options against MDA’s current testing plan and baseline report. We also met 

with MDA and DOD officials to corroborate key acquisition information.

To assess the extent to which DOD’s report assessed the feasibility and cost effectiveness 

of accelerating GMD’s testing plan, we compared information included in DOD’s report to a 

generally accepted definition of the term feasible (the extent to which something is both 

possible and likely to occur) and assessed the support provided in DOD’s report against 

the GMD’s testing performance and environment. We also compared information 

contained in DOD’s report to GAO, Office of Management and Budget, and DOD guidance 

on the elements of a cost effectiveness assessment. Due to lack of availability of data, we 

did not independently assess whether accelerating GMD’s testing pace was advisable. We 

also met with MDA and DOD officials to corroborate key acquisition information.

Page 6
Page 12 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Background – GMD System Overview

Components of the GMD System

Component Mission Location

Ground Based 

Interceptor (GBI)

The interceptor consists of a silo-based, three-stage booster stack and a

“hit-to-kill” exoatmospheric kill vehicle. The kill vehicle is the weapon 

component of the interceptor that detects and destroys the threat through 

a hit-to-kill impact.

Missile fields in Ft. 

Greely, Alaska and 

Vandenberg Air 

Force Base, 

California

Fire Control and 

Communications

The fire control (battle management) component is the integrating and 

controlling entity of the GMD element. Its sophisticated software plans 

engagements and tasks GMD components to execute a mission. The inflight interceptor communications system enables the fire control 

component to communicate with the kill vehicle while in flight.

Fire control nodes 

in Ft. Greely, 

Alaska, and 

Shriever Air Force 

Base, Colorado

Page 7

• The GMD program has completed fielding 23 of the original GBI missiles with the Capability 

Enhancement I (CE-I) version of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), one of which was used in 

a flight test.

• The GMD program has also manufactured and delivered 13 of the GBI missile with the Capability 

Enhancement II (CE-II) version of the EKV, three of which have been used in flight tests. 

• On March 15, 2013, the Secretary of Defense announced the U.S. will deploy 14 additional CE-II 

GBIs by fiscal year 2017, increasing the number of deployed GBIs from 30 to 44.
Page 13 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Background – GMD Testing Issues

Page 8

GMD Intercept Flight Test History1

Source: GAO Analysis of MDA Data

1. Includes only intercept tests involving operationally configured interceptors.

2. Although an intercept was not part of the test’s primary objectives, the kill vehicle hit the target. However, DOT&E has reported that the hit would not have 

resulted in a kill.

CE-I Interceptor Tests

Test Name Test Date Test Result

FTG-02 Sep 2006 Success – met primary objectives2

FTG-03 May 2007 Failure – target failed

FTG-03a Sep 2007 Success - intercept

FTG-05 Dec 2008 Success - intercept

FTG-07 Jul 2013 Failure – review ongoing

CE-II Interceptor Tests

Test Name Test Date Test Result

FTG-06 Jan 2010 Failure – EKV failure

FTG-06a Dec 2010 Failure – EKV failure
Page 14 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Background – FTG-06a Failure Cause and 

Resolution Status

Page 9

FTG-06a

•FTG-06a failed in December 2010, according to the Director, MDA, because of excessive vibration in 

the inertial measurement unit (IMU).

oIMU: guidance system sensor that provides flight data to assist EKV navigation.

Controlled Test Vehicle – 01 (CTV-01)

•CTV-01, a non-intercept flight test, was conducted in January 2013 to demonstrate the performance 

of the redesigned guidance system component.

oAccording to DOD budget documents, MDA developed a cradled IMU in response to the FTG06a failure.

•The Director, MDA stated CTV-01 demonstrated the successful dampening of the vibration 

environment that caused the FTG-06a failure.

FTG-06b

•FTG-06b is intended to resolve the FTG-06a failure by demonstrating the cradled IMU and newly 

developed firmware through an intercept test.

oFTG-06b was originally scheduled for 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2012 but has since been 

delayed to at least the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2014.

•According to MDA, interceptor production will restart if FTG-06b is successful. 
Page 15 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Objective 1

Objective 1: To what extent does DOD’s report identify testing 

options and known risks of the GMD system?

Finding 1: DOD’s report included one testing option—the 

development and future testing of alternate divert thrusters—but 

included few details, leaving decision makers with limited insight on 

the testing option.

Finding 2: The recent FTG-07 intercept failure, with an ongoing 

failure review, precluded DOD from developing CE-I testing options.

Page 10
Page 16 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Objective 1 – DOD Reported One Testing 

Option, With Few Details

Page 11

What DOD Reported

•MDA is developing alternate divert thrusters expected to mitigate the vibration problem that was the 

root cause of the FTG-06a failure.

•MDA plans to test the alternate divert thrusters after FTG-06b.

GAO Views

•The report included few details on how or when the alternate divert thrusters would be developed and 

tested, such as: (1) development and testing strategy; (2) cost, schedule, benefits, and risks; and (3) 

impact on new production and fielded interceptors.

oWe requested more information, but did not receive any in time to assess the development and 

testing plans for this option.

•While DOD should pursue efforts to resolve the root cause of recurring issues revealed in flight tests, 

more information is needed about alternate thruster development testing plans.

•It was reasonable for DOD to focus testing options on plans that would address the vibration problem. 

The root cause of any FTG-06b failure would need to be known and addressed before determining 

additional CE-II testing options.
Page 17 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Objective 1 – Latest CE-I Test Failure Precluded 

DOD from Providing Additional Testing Options

Jan 2, 2013 – FY13 NDAA 

enacted July 5, 2013 – FTG-07 failed Oct 18, 2013 – DOD submitted 

GMD test report

Page 12

What DOD Reported

•FTG-07, a CE-I intercept test conducted July 2013, was unsuccessful and the failure 

review is currently ongoing.

•FTG-07 was primarily intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of the CE-I interceptor 

against an intermediate range target using updated software that improves performance.

GAO Views

•At the time the FY13 NDAA was enacted in January 2013, DOD had a variety of testing 

options under consideration, including CE-I tests, to address the FTG-06a failure.

•However, because DOD later added and conducted FTG-07 and it failed, that failure and 

MDA’s ongoing failure review precluded DOD from providing CE-I testing as an option until 

the root cause of that failure is identified and resolved.
Page 18 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Objective 2

Objective 2: To what extent does DOD’s report assess the 

feasibility and cost effectiveness of accelerating GMD flight 

testing? 

Finding 1: DOD’s report did not provide a complete 

assessment as to whether it is feasible to increase GMD’s 

testing pace—limiting the report’s usefulness for decision 

makers.

Finding 2: DOD’s report included some basic cost 

information but did not provide decision makers with an 

assessment of whether increasing GMD’s testing pace is 

cost effective.

Page 13
Page 19 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Objective 2 – DOD Report Did Not Provide a 

Complete Feasibility Assessment

Page 14

What DOD Reported

•With additional funding, it should be possible to accelerate GMD’s testing pace to three flight tests 

every two years beginning in fiscal year 2018. 

•The requirement to meet fielding obligations of 44 GBIs, availability of targets, and the need to 

increase personnel and testing infrastructure limit DOD’s ability to accelerate testing before fiscal year 

2018.

GAO Views

•For our assessment, we defined feasibility as the extent to which something is both possible and 

likely to occur.

•While DOD’s report stated that it should be possible to accelerate the pace of testing, it does not 

address whether it is likely. 

•It is not likely that testing could be accelerated given the program’s track record and the increasingly 

complex developmental tests it will be attempting.

oBecause of a number of flight test delays, anomalies, and failures, the GMD flight test program 

has not been stable since 2005.

oEach successive test explores new areas of performance, increasing in complexity and 

difficulty.
Page 20 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Objective 2 – DOD Report Did Not Include a 

Cost Effectiveness Assessment

Page 15

What DOD Reported

• To increase GMD’s testing pace beginning in fiscal year 2018, additional funding for infrastructure, 

personnel, interceptors, and targets would be needed.

GAO Views

•For this assessment, we defined a cost effectiveness assessment as a comparison of the total costs 

with the projected benefits and risks of the action(s) under consideration.

•DOD’s report did not make a determination as to whether it is cost effective to increase GMD’s 

testing pace beginning in fiscal year 2018.

oDOD’s report included some limited cost information, but it is unclear what the total costs are 

and whether the costs are full and complete because they provided few details.

oDOD did not discuss the benefits and risks of accelerating testing in the body of its report.

•DOT&E identified risks in their appendix of DOD’s report that GMD’s flight tests are becoming more 

complex and therefore, “Rushing to test threatens the adequacy of the analyses of previous test 

results” and “increases the risk MDA will miss or overlook important information that could affect 

subsequent tests”.

•DOD did not address the advisability of adjusting their test plan in their report.
Page 21 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Concluding Observations

• DOD’s report provided decision makers with limited insight on potential testing 

options. While some of the testing option limitations were unavoidable, 

additional information on test plans for the alternate thruster development 

would be beneficial for Congress. In our view, alternate thrusters could be a 

means of resolving the root cause of the failure, but additional information on 

development and testing plans is needed.

• DOD’s report provided limited insight into the feasibility, and no insight into the 

cost effectiveness and advisability of accelerating GMD testing. In our view, it 

is unlikely that DOD could successfully accelerate GMD’s testing given its 

testing track record and the increasing complexity of planned tests. The report 

provided insufficient information to assess whether accelerating GMD’s testing 

pace is prudent because the potential full cost, benefits, and risks are not 

provided in the report. 

Page 16
Page 22 GAO-14-350R Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Enclosure

Summary of Agency Comments

We obtained technical comments from DOD 

and incorporated them as appropriate in the 

briefing.

Page 17

(121128)

(121128)
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