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CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 10, 2013

Serial No. 113–78

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. A ́ lvaro Uribe Ve ́lez, senior fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center, (former President of the Republic of Colombia) ....................................................................... 10

Hector E. Schamis, Ph.D., adjunct professor, Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University ................................................................................. 30

Mr. Carlos Laurı ́a, senior coordinator, Americas Program, Committee to Protect Journalists ..................................................................................................... 37

Cynthia J. Arnson, Ph.D., director, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars ....................................................................... 44

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Albio Sires, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New Jersey: Prepared statement .................................................................... 7

Mr. A ́ lvaro Uribe Ve ́lez: Prepared statement ........................................................ 12

Hector E. Schamis, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 33

Mr. Carlos Laurı ́a: Prepared statement ................................................................ 39

Cynthia J. Arnson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 46

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

(1)

CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN THE 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. This committee meeting is called to order. A 

quorum being present, the subcommittee will come to order. I will 

start by recognizing myself and the ranking member to present our 

opening statements. Without objection, the members of the subcommittee can submit their remarks for the record. 

I am going to actually do something a little bit unusual. I have 

got to defer to my boss on the committee, our chairman. And I am 

going to allow him to make the first opening statement. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also, obviously, want to extend my appreciation for President Uribe of Colombia, the former President of Colombia, for his being with us 

today. 

And I again thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing on the challenges of democracy. And I think it is 

timely, I think it is vital that we have a discussion about the state 

of democratic institutions here in our hemisphere. We are linked 

very, very closely with our neighbors to the north and the south, 

and we all benefit when democratic values are bolstered throughout this hemisphere because those values are the values that help 

ensure peace, they are the values that promote free trade, they are 

the values that guarantee shared prosperity, that really offer people upward mobility when they are deployed, that really offer people opportunity in those types of democratic environments. 

And while there are great examples of healthy democratic developments in Latin America, as of course in the case of Colombia, 

President Uribe, we do have a situation where we have seen the 

unraveling of democratic values in several countries over the last 

decade. And taking cues from Cuba’s dictator, Fidel Castro, the late 

Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, laid the groundwork for the 

emergence of a populist extreme left in Latin America. And as a 

result, time-honored democratic principles like free and transparent elections, and freedom of the press, and freedom of expresVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:54 Nov 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\091013\82761 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

sion, freedom of assembly, all of that has been under assault in 

Venezuela, in Ecuador, in Bolivia, in Nicaragua. 

I have been particularly concerned with the implementation of a 

communications law in Ecuador that serves to stifle the rights of 

freedom of press and expression. Passed this past June by Ecuador’s National Assembly, the law creates regulatory bodies tasked 

with redistributing licenses equally among the private, government, and nonprofit sectors, thus dismantling much of the private 

media ownership in the country. These regulatory bodies will be 

charged with monitoring content and imposing sanctions, or imposing criminal penalties if they assess, subjectively, that published 

information is not precise, contextualized, or if an outlet neglects 

to cover issues deemed to be in the public interest. 

The passage of this law is chilling to those of us who know the 

importance of press freedom and independence from government 

for the proper functioning of a free society. The language of this 

law is open to the whims of President Correa, who has shown himself to be anti-press, anti-free expression. In fact, according to Freedom House’s annual press freedom survey, Ecuador had the world’s 

second largest decline in press freedom over the last 5 years. 

The passage of the law that offers that President the sweeping 

and subjective control of the media will also encourage Bolivian 

President Evo Morales, I suspect, or President Cristina Kirchner of 

Argentina to advance their own attempts at controlling dissent in 

the media. Through populist rhetoric, demonizing private ownership, these governments are seeking to put the executive firmly in 

control of media content. These types of laws do more than challenge democracy, they dismantle democratic institutions right here 

in the Western Hemisphere. And I am looking forward to hearing 

from each of the witnesses and discussing what can be done to discourage these types of abuses, made cynically in the name of democracy. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing today. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will next yield myself such time as I may consume, and then 

I will recognize our ranking member to make his opening statement. Without objection, the members of the subcommittee can 

submit their remarks for the record, or we can have a few opening 

statements as long as we don’t go beyond a minute. 

I would like to thank my colleagues for joining me in convening 

this important hearing, where we have the opportunity to take a 

close look at the challenges to freedom and democracy that exist 

throughout the Western Hemisphere. Since the beginning of this 

Congress, we have focused our attention in this subcommittee on 

the growth and opportunity that exists throughout the region. I 

have long believed that the most effective way for the United 

States to bring freedom and democracy to people around the world 

is to promote principles of economic freedom, entrepreneurship, 

and free trade, a liberalized economic system where citizens are 

empowered to innovate, pursue their dreams, and decide how best 

to provide for their families. That is the best recipe for strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law. 

Unfortunately, the Western Hemisphere is the home to several 

leaders intent on stifling economic growth and freedom, and erodVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:54 Nov 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\091013\82761 HFA PsN: SHIRL
3

ing democratic institutions and values. The erosion of democracy in 

Latin America is best described as authoritarianism masked by 

progressive rhetoric that ironically claims loyalty to democratic values. The late Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, an acolyte of the Cuban 

dictator Fidel Castro, paved the way for the emergence of the populist left brand of authoritarianism we still see today in Venezuela, 

Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and, regrettably, Argentina. By undermining institutions and the rule of law, and threatening their 

opposition and the press, these leftist leaders have consolidated 

power and marginalized the opposition. Media laws in Ecuador, 

Venezuela, Argentina have blatantly stifled the basic democratic 

right to free press and expression. When a communications law 

that gives the government the power to regulate media content was 

passed this summer in Ecuador’s National Assembly, President 

Correa declared that this encroachment on the right to free expression democratizes access to the news media. President Correa, like 

President Kirchner of Argentina and other populist leftist leaders 

in Latin America, have attempted to shield their very undemocratic 

power grabs by labeling them democratic. 

This shameless populist doublespeak has done much to undermine the intrinsic value democratic institutions have had in protecting the rights of individual citizens. These same leaders have 

further used populistic, nationalistic rhetoric to justify the squandering of vast economic resources, stifling free enterprise and free 

trade, to the detriment of their people. Venezuela’s late President 

Hugo Chavez nationalized major segments of industry, from oil to 

agriculture, as part of his socialist agenda, and that included an 

overt hostility to foreign investment. The result has been flagging 

production, record high inflation rates, and scarcity, evidenced still 

today under his dubiously elected successor, fellow populist leftist 

Nicolas Maduro. 

Democracies are almost always some form of market economy, 

and they cannot function without the rule of law. Yet the rule of 

law is literally under siege in many South American countries. In 

2011, Argentina’s President Cristina Kirchner announced the nationalization of the oil company YPF, expropriating 51 percent of 

the shares owned by the Spanish company Repsol. Her populist 

rhetoric declared the takeover as a victory for Argentina’s energy 

sovereignty, but the reality has brought disappointment as Argentina is now a net importer of energy for the first time since 1984. 

Argentina has been plagued by high inflation, which even questionable government figures are forced to acknowledge. Meanwhile, 

Argentina has been a generally inhospitable environment for the 

foreign investment needed to realize its true economic potential. 

For instance, the government consistently refuses to honor awards 

issued by the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement 

of Investment Disputes. Instead, President Kirchner has focused 

agenda on growing the public sector in an effort to further consolidate her own power. She has led the passage of media and judicial 

laws that represent an assault on democratic values, while contemplating reform of the Argentinian Constitution in order to give her 

another term as President. A nation so rich in natural resources 

and human capital is being strangled by authoritarian populism 

that Kirchner has admired in Hugo Chavez. 

4

As I said at the outset, a commitment to the rule of law, coupled 

with free trade and economic liberty, will lead to stronger and more 

vibrant democracies. We should all be encouraged by the exciting 

free trade bloc known as the Pacific Alliance, ongoing negotiations 

for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, as well as the prospect that energy reforms in Mexico could bring about greater North American 

energy independence and security. The Western Hemisphere is 

commercially and culturally vibrant, and the United States should 

do more to encourage the opening of markets and opportunity to 

those nations currently strangled by populism. This will do much 

to empower citizens, make them less dependent on government, 

thereby making governments less powerful and less authoritarian. 

I am so pleased that former Colombian President A ́ lvaro Uribe 

is here to testify on our first panel. 

Mr. President, I consider you to be one of the foremost leaders 

in the entire world of our last century. I know that the great 

strides that have been made in Colombia have been a direct result 

of your leadership and your guts and your willingness to stand up 

and lead. The United States has done a lot of things to try to help 

that happen, but it would have never happened, never, without 

your great leadership. 

As President of Colombia, you tackled a serious threat at the 

hands of narcoterrorists, while bringing security to the people of 

Colombia. You worked to bring greater prosperity to your country, 

including with the signing of a free trade agreement with the 

United States. This subcommittee is eager to hear what you consider to be the major challenges to democracy in our region and 

how we can be a positive force to encourage the protection of democratic rights and institutions all across our hemisphere. 

I also want to thank the second panel of experts, Dr. Hector 

Schamis, Mr. Carlos Laurı ́a, and Dr. Cynthia Arnson for being here 

with us to discuss the state of democracy in our hemisphere. I look 

forward to a productive and informative hearing, and appreciate 

you all taking part today. And I will now recognize the ranking 

member for his opening remarks. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today, 

especially President Uribe, who I have known for many years. 

Colombia wouldn’t be Colombia today if you weren’t around, Mr. 

President. Thank you for being here. 

Across the world, we are witnessing the implosion of anti-democratic regimes. And as a consequence, the lengths that some authoritarian leaders will go to in order to remain in power. As a 

child in Cuba, I witnessed the deterioration of democracy as the 

Castro regime began its decades-long stranglehold on the freedomloving people of Cuba. Today, over 50 years later, the Castro brothers’ dictatorship continues to act with impunity, restricting basic 

human rights, freedoms of expression, and economic opportunity. 

The road to democracy in the hemisphere has long been fraught 

with challenges. The lack of inclusive participation by all members 

of society in the growing economic prosperity of the region has 

made the Americas vulnerable to anti-democratic forces. Additionally, weak state presence and corrupt governance has allowed drug 

traffickers to act with impunity, while economic and fiscal insecuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:54 Nov 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\091013\82761 HFA PsN: SHIRL
5

rity has merely dampened sustainable progress and further encouraged immigration abroad. 

Furthermore, democratic progress has been beset by the inability 

to ensure political accountability, public goods and safety, and uphold the rule of law. For instance, in Mexico and in Central America drug-related crime and violence has set back democracy and 

public security. While in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, elected leaders have abused executive office to consolidate 

power, limit the rights and freedoms of political opponents, and dismantle institutional checks and balances. 

Democracy, however, has shown indications of progress. While 16 

of the region’s countries were ruled by authoritarian regimes in 

1981, today all but Cuba are ruled by elected leaders. Nonetheless, 

elections do not make democracy, nor do they guarantee its depth 

or legitimacy. The elections of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Ecuador’s 

Correa, Bolivia’s Morales, and Nicaragua’s Ortega are products of 

poor governance that failed to address crime and endemic corruption, weak institutions, and social and economic inequalities. Their 

emergence cannot be attributed to a failure of democracy, rather to 

the failure of previous leaders to advance and uphold democratic 

principles. As a result, the disenfranchised and democratically disillusioned citizens turned to their leaders to solve difficult economic 

and social problems through undemocratic and comparatively authoritarian means. 

Moreover, these leaders rationalize the need for themselves to 

stay in office in order to see the social and institutional reforms 

take hold. And they utilize the rents from the state-owned natural 

resources industry to fund their projects and further consolidate 

their rule. Under Chavez’s 14-years rule, power in the executive 

was accumulated as human rights eroded and opposition censorship and intimidation and prosecution escalated. Owners of media 

outlets that refused to play by the rules have been forced to sell 

their assets and leave the country for fear of reprisal. 

We have seen similar trends take hold with respect to freedoms 

of the press in Bolivia, Ecuador, and now Argentina with the intimidation of journalists and media critical of the government. 

Mexico, consumed by the drug-related violence of cartel turf wars, 

is considered to be the most dangerous country in the hemisphere 

for journalists, as they are murdered with impunity by organized 

crime and corrupt officials. Similarly troubling is the deterioration 

of the rule of law as seen with diminished judicial independence 

and the failure to prosecute high level officials deemed above the 

law. 

The May 2013 conviction in Guatemala of former military dictator Efrain Rios Montt for genocide and crimes against humanity 

was deemed a watershed moment against the acts of impunity. 

However, the overturning of the ruling just 10 days later questioned the state of Guatemala’s rule of law and judicial independence. Paramilitary groups, like Peru’s Shining Path and Colombia’s 

FARC, have been significantly diminished. I am closely following 

the peace talk negotiations of President Santos with Colombia’s 

FARC. If successful, Colombia could potentially free itself of a longstanding obstacle to peace and economic prosperity. Nevertheless, 

I am skeptical on the willingness of the FARC leadership to simply 

6

cede control and forego the revenues of drug and criminal activities. And additionally, I find the intermediary role of Cuban officials particularly dubious. 

I look forward to hearing from our panelists regarding their assessment of the hemisphere’s challenges to democracy. Additionally, I look forward to discussing how Congress can work with our 

regional neighbors to respect and advance democratic principles 

like free, clear, and contestable elections, freedoms of assembly and 

press and human rights, and the rule of law. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sires follows:]

7


82761e-1.eps

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Congressman Albia Sires !D-NJ) 

Ranking Member 

Hearing on Challenges to Democracy in the Western Hemisphere 

Tuesday September 10, 2013 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good Afternoon and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. 

Across the world, we are witnessing the implosion of anti-democratic regimes, and as a consequence, the 

lengths that some authoritarian leaders will go to in order to remain in power. As a child in Cuba, I 

witnessed the deterioration of democracy as the Castro regime began its decades-long stranglehold on the 

freedom loving people of Cuba. Today, over fifty years later, the Castro brothers' dictatorship continues to 

act with impunity restricting basic human rights, freedoms of expression, and economic opportunity. 

The road to democracy in the hemisphere has been long and fraught with challenges. The lack of inclusive 

participation by all members of society in the growing economic prosperity of the region has made the 

Americas vulnerable to anti-democratic forces. Additionally, weak state presence and corrupt governance 

has allowed drug traffickers to act with impunity, while economic and fiscal insecurity has merely 

dampened sustainable progress and further encouraged emigration abroad. 

Furthermore, democratic progress has been beset by the inability to ensure political accountability, public 

goods and safety, and uphold the rule of law. For instance, in Mexico and Central America, drug-related 

crime and violence have set back democracy and public security. While in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and 

Nicaragua, elected leaders have abused executive office to consolidate power, limit the rights and 

freedoms of political opponents, and dismantle institutional checks and balances. 

Democracy, however, has shown indications of progress. While 16 ofthe region's countries were ruled by 

authoritarian regimes in 1981; today, all but Cuba are ruled by elected leaders. Nevertheless, elections do 

not make a democracy nor do they guarantee its depth or legitimacy. 

The elections of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Ecuador's Correa, Bolivia's Morales, and Nicaragua's Ortega are 

products of poor governance that failed to address crime and endemic corruption, weak institutions, and 

social and economic inequalities. Their emergence cannot be attributed to a failure of democracy; rather 

to the failure of previous leaders to advance and uphold democratic principles. As a result, a 

disenfranchised and democratically disillusioned citizenry turned to these leaders to solve difficult 

economic and social problems through undemocratic, competitively authoritarian means. Moreover, these 

leaders rationalize the need for themselves to stay in office in order to see their social and institutional 

reforms take hold and utilize the rents from state-owned natural resource industries to fund their projects 

and further consolidate their rule. 

Under Chavez' 14 year rule, power in the executive was accumulated as human rights eroded and 

opposition censorship, intimidation and persecution escalated. Owners of media outlets that refused to 

play by the rules have been forced to sell their assets and leave the country for fear of reprisal. We have 

seen similar trends take hold with respect to freedoms of the press in Bolivia, Ecuador, and now Argentina 

with the intimidation of journalists and media critical of the government. Mexico, consumed by the drugrelated violence of cartel turf wars, is considered to be the most dangerous country in the hemisphere for 

journalists as they are murdered with impunity by organized crime and corrupt officials. 
8


82761e-2.eps

Similarly troubling is the deterioration of the rule of law as seen with diminished judicial independence and 

the failure to prosecute high level officials deemed above the law. The May 2013 conviction in Guatemala 

of former military dictator, Efrain Rios Mont, for genocide and crimes against humanity, was deemed a 

watershed moment against acts of impunity. However, the overturning of the ruling just 10 days later 

questioned the state of Guatemala's rule of law and judicial independence. 

Paramilitary groups like Peru's Shining Path and Colombia's FARC have been significantly diminished. I am 

closely following the peace talk negotiations of President Santos with Colombia's FARe. If successful, 

Colombia could potentially free itself of a longstanding obstacle to peace and economic prosperity. 

Nevertheless, I am skeptical on the willingness of the FARC leadership to simply cede control and forego 

the revenues of drug and criminal activities. Additionally, I find the intermediary role of Cuban officials 

particularly dubious. 

I look forward to hearing from our panelists regarding their assessments of the hemisphere's challenges to 

democracy. Additionally, I look forward to discussing how Congress can work with our regional neighbors 

to respect and advance democratic principles like free, clear and contestable elections, freedom of 

assembly and press, human rights, and the rule of law. 

Thank you. 
9

Mr. SALMON. At 4:15 we have to go vote on the floor, but I do 

want to get to our panel as quickly as possible. I would like to recognize one more opening statement with the gentlewoman from 

Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our great friend, President Uribe. And when talking about 

the theme of today’s hearing, the challenges to democracy in the 

Western Hemisphere, we need only look no further than Cuba, 

where 11 million continue to be oppressed by the brutal Castro regime, activists risk their lives on hunger strikes, dozens of brave 

democracy advocates face intimidation, harassment, and beatings 

by regime thugs. In Venezuela and Nicaragua, millions were deprived of their basic democratic freedoms through fraudulent elections. And the leaders continue to exert control over important institutions such as the courts, the military, and the media. 

And these efforts have been orchestrated by ALBA nations like 

Bolivia and Ecuador, who continue to attempt to undermine and 

weaken the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. There 

have been some reports that Venezuela is pulling out today. And 

that is why I joined with Congressman Sires to introduce the Countering ALBA Act, which would help protect human rights and 

democratic institutions in these countries. And the bill urges the 

President to sanction those individuals who are officials of, or acting on behalf of, ALBA nations who are responsible for the commission of serious human rights against the citizens. And I am interested in hearing President Uribe’s views on the talks, the peace 

talks taking place in a state sponsor of terrorism country in Cuba 

between FARC and Colombia. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I would like to get to our panel of one 

very distinguished leader in the world. We would like to recognize 

former President Uribe. He is a senior fellow now at the Bipartisan 

Policy Center. He did serve as President of Colombia from 2002 to 

2010. During his 8 years in office, he was responsible for the transformation of Colombia from a country with limited territorial control, escalating violence, and considered by many to be a failed 

state, into one of the most thriving, dynamic countries in our hemisphere. 

Congratulations. 

President Uribe studied law at the University of Antioquia. Also, 

he received a certificate of special studies in administration and 

management at Harvard Extension School, and a certificate in negotiation and dispute resolution at Harvard Law School. 

Before I recognize you to provide your testimony, I am going to 

explain the lighting system there in front of you. You will have 5 

minutes to present your oral statement. When you begin, the light 

will turn green. When you have 1 minute left, the light will turn 

yellow. And when your time is expired, the light will turn red, just 

like driving. I ask that you conclude your testimony once the red 

light comes on. 

After our witness has testified, all members will have 5 minutes 

to ask questions. I urge my colleagues to stick to the 5-minute rule 

to ensure that all members get the opportunity to ask questions. 

President Uribe. 

10

STATEMENT OF MR. A ́ LVARO URIBE VE ́ LEZ, SENIOR FELLOW, 

BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, (FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE 

REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA) 

Mr. URIBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires, 

distinguished members of the committee. I am very grateful for 

this invitation. I am not an academic, I am a political fighter, generating controversy almost every time. 

Elections are not enough for democracy. In the region I see two 

sets of countries. One is ALBA. In my opinion, these countries are 

in a regressive path against democracy. To consider which country 

is going on a progressive democracy or on a regressive democracy, 

I have considered five parameters: Security, freedom, freedom of investment, social cohesion, independent institutions, and pluralistic 

people participation. ALBA countries, led by Venezuela, they have 

in oil their main bond. 

Security. Venezuela has passed from more than 4,000 cases of 

homicide per year to more than 21,000, in kidnapping from 63 to 

more than 1,200. At the same time, the government disregards security [inaudible] Violence because the government promotes social 

class hatred. 

Freedom of investment. Expropriations, shortages. Venezuela has 

expropriated more than 4 million hectares and has to import more 

than 17 million tons of food. At the same time, we see problems 

for the freedom of investment in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. 

Ecuador enjoys good economics at this moment, has advanced a lot 

in infrastructure, subsidizes the poorest people, but it lacks investment confidence. Therefore, these policies, the good policies, seem 

not to be sustainable in the longer term. 

Bolivia has a similar situation, with lack of investment confidence. And in Nicaragua, for investors to prosper they need to be 

close friends of the government. These countries have included in 

their agendas social policies, but with the lack of investment these 

social policies are not sustainable. 

Independent institutions. In Venezuela, there was a coup d’etat 

against the Congress elected 2 years ago. Pluralistic people participation. In some of these countries members of the opposition are 

taken to trial or even to jail. The cases more notorious are in Venezuela and Bolivia. Restrictions to free media all across these countries. In Ecuador, I want to say that the restrictions create distrust 

in the business community. 

On the other side, progressive democracies—Mexico, Colombia, 

Chile, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay—with the exception of Uruguay, these 

democracies have some challenges. The youth unemployment is 

very high, between 17 and 23. These same progressive democracies 

have to face this challenge, the aspiration of the middle classes. 

They have to follow the example of Mexico, to aggregate value to 

the commodity-based economy and the free trade agreement with 

the United States. For people to legitimize the free trade agreements, people had to perceive that these free trade agreements are 

convenient for all these countries, not only for industrialized countries. 

And of course in Central America they have made significant 

progress in democratic values, but they, in my opinion, need much 

more help from the international community for them to overcome 

11

violence and the growing trade of illicit drugs. In Venezuela, one 

of the main problems is that they harbor, the government harbors 

terrorists from all over the world and promotes anti-Semitic 

speech. 

For the first time I am on time to finish my introductory remarks. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. President, for your statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Uribe follows:]

12


82761a-1.eps

HII'ART!SAN POl·ICY CENTFR 

STATEMENT OF FORMER COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT ALVARO URIBE 

Senior Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center 

"Challenges to Democracy in the Western Hemisphere" 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

u.s. House of Representatives 

September 10, 2013 

Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity 

to appear before you today. 

Introduction 

Whereas military dictators, brutal Marxist guerrillas, and one-party systems affected much of Latin 

America's democratic progress throughout the 20th century, the current slow pace of democratic 

progress in some Latin American countries is due to the rise of radical populist governments. 

Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and, of course, Cuba, dominate their respective political 

landscapes through abusive speech and media restrictions, as well as laws that limit political 

opposition and give sweeping executive power. 

Because democratic deficiencies vary on a country- by-country basis, this brief testimony will focus 

on discussing the most salient threats to democracy in a handful of countries in the region. 

Furthermore, because celtain nations in the region provide positive examples of strong and vibrant 

democratic institutions, part of this testimony will address those success stories. 

Background: Recent History of Latin American Democracy 

Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, Latin America has had a volatile, yet 

hopeful, history of democratic development. While representative democracies were strong in 

certain countries-including my own Colombia-others have struggled for the better part of the 

century to develop democratic societies. The Cold War presented additional setbacks to regional 

democracy, as oppressive military governments emerged throughout the region to combat the 

perceived threat of violent Marxist guerrillas. 

The thaw of the Cold War marked a cooling of heated regional tensions marked by civil war and 

authoritarian rule. Countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua all adopted democratic 

systems in the early 1990s, and Chile's military dictatorship was pushed out by popular vote in 

1990. 

By the year 2000, much of the region had undergone positive institutional and democratic 

transitions. One would expect, then, that the recent decade would have been marked by a steady 

increase in regional democracy. Sadly, however, uniform democratic progress throughout the 

region has not been the case. While Cuba remains the only country in the hemisphere not operating 

under an electoral democracy, there are profound variations in the quality and performance of the 

democratic institutions in the region. 

1.225 ';.ye NW, SUILG l()OO Wac.l-dngton, DC 200('5 
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ALBA Countries 

The major ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) nations of Venezuela, Bolivia, 

Ecuador, and Nicaragua (along with Cuba) are all governed by leaders who continuously violate 

democratic values. 

Venezuela 

Congress should be very familiar with the Venezuelan government's hostility to democracy. 

Beginning with his landslide presidential victory in 1998, Hugo Chavez transformed the oil-rich 

Venezuela into the hemisphere's neo-Castrist vanguard until his death earlier this year. Chavez's 

first worrisome move in office was in early 1999, when he oversaw the formation of a 165-member, 

Chavez-leaning constituent assembly that would go on to draft a constitution that increased 

executive powers, and created a new, more manipulative national legislature.; Later, in 2004, 

Venezuela's judicial independence-the hallmark of successful democracies-was compromised 

when a new law expanded the number of Supreme Court justices from 20 to 32, allowing his ruling 

coalition to select the majority of justices as well as nUllifY the appointment of sitting justices." 

Chavez's coalition did just that, and Venezuela's highest court to this day remains in their control, 

having in recent years used its authority to further entrench the agenda of Chavez and his 

successor, Nicolas Maduro. 

In September 2010, dismal economic performance and rising crime rates allowed the opposition to 

win enough Congressional seats to deny Chavez's coalition a three-fifths ParliamentalY majority. In 

typical Chavez fashion, the outgoing National Assembly approved a handful of laws limiting civil 

society, democratic governance, and free speech just weeks before they were to lose their threefifths majority. Most alarming was the approval of an "enabling law" that granted the president 18 

months of near-limitless power.;;; Until his death, Chavez used the decree power to further 

debilitate his opposition and silence his critics, all while exploiting his king-like stature to 

misappropriate Venezuela's vast oil wealth to fund his unsustainable welfare system. 

That Chavez's whimsical economic poliCies have placed his country at high economic risk is no 

surprise. Despite benefitting from high global oil prices, Chavez's increasingly centralized economic 

initiatives have destroyed investment climate, threatened foreign investors and blocked private 

initiative, while giving Venezuela one of the world's highest inflation rates (22.8% in 2012)';' Such 

economic turmoil has played no small role in Venezuela's precarious security situation, as the 

national homicide rate in 2011 was 45 per 100,000 people, third in the region only to EI Salvador 

and Honduras. Despite having cut the average poverty rate, Chavez's approach to eliminating 

violence through decreasing inequality has proven to be a complete failure, as homicides have 

jumped during his regime from 5,000 homicides in 1999 to 19,000 in 2011. 

Regardless of the debate surrounding possible electoral fraud, Venezuela's place at 165 out of the 

174 countries ranked in Transparency International's 2012 Conuption Perceptions Index (just 

ahead of Somalia, North Korea, Afghanistan, and Sudan) clearly indicates that Chavismo's 

dominance has been achieved by anything but democratic means. V While nations like the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe are often cited in discussions on the poor state of 

global democracy, the fact that a diplomatically influential nation in our own hemisphere ranks 

even more corrupt is deeply concerning.v; 

Limiting dissident voices has been a hallmark of Chavismo, and the closing of national and local 

media outlets has placed Venezuela in the category of a regime that denies freedom of speech, 
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combats free press, and violates international human right h-eaties_ Chavez's hand-picked 

successor, Nicolas Maduro, has shown no sign of veering from his predecessor's policies and 

rhetoric, as his first major move was to use his party's state funds and institutions to narrowly win 

April's presidential elections,V;; 

According to the Venezuelan Press and SOCiety Institute (IPYS Venezuela) the Chaves-Maduro 

regime has continued to penalize journalists and media organizations that criticize the government, 

violating the principles of free press. Some of those cases include Diario del Caroni and La Manana 

in the States of Bolivar and Falcon, and journalists like Leonardo Leon, Nelson Bocaranda, Enrique 

Otero, and Leocenis Garcia, among others. 

Bolivia 

Bolivia's Evo Morales, in office since 2006, was elected on a platform ideologically similar to that of 

President Chavez. While his policies are less socialist than his rhetoric suggests and are less hostile 

to democratic institutions than those of his late Venezuelan supporters, Bolivia under Morales is far 

from fair and free. A cornerstone of any democratic nation is a sh-ong judicial system, and Bolivia's 

legal institutions suffer numerous deficiencies. A chief concern is the frequent arrest and 

imprisonment of judges, military officials, and other former or current government personnel on 

loose charges. Those who are arrested frequently face unlawful detention, and it is not uncommon 

for a detained individual to exceed the 18-month pretrial detention limit In 2012, the U.S. 

Department of State reported that 84 percent of prisoners in Bolivia were still in pretrial 

detention.vi;; While Bolivian law provides for an independent judiciary, Bolivia's judicialY is weak 

and overburdened. A report from the UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights found 

that in 2012, criminal court judges had a backlog of 129,000 cases, and examples exist of authorities 

pressuring judges to change unfavorable verdicts.;x 

Morales has deepened his hold on power through a relentless attack on free speech. Morales, who 

stated last year that there is "too much freedom of expression" in Bolivia, benefits from Bolivian 

laws that limit free speech, one example being a far-reaching telecommunications law passed in July 

2011.x 

Although the Bolivian economy has experienced positive economic indicators, primarily due to 

commodity prices, the country lacks investment confidence and the private sector operates on 

permanent uncertainty, derived from interventionist government poliCies. The acquisition of media 

corporations by the state, as well as the use of the judicial apparatus to target government 

opponents, such as former President Jorge Quiroga, are vivid demonstrations of Morales' use of 

anti-democratic means to silence any form of opposition 

Ecuador 

In 2008, Ecuador's Rafael Correa co-engineered the removal of over half the members of Congress 

in order to form a constituent assembly, which went on to draft a constitution that gave the 

president greater control over the economy, strategic sectors like oil and mining, and the ability to 

abolish the National Congress once each term.xi Such powers have been used for hostile aggressions 

against the private sector, foreign investors, and entrepreneurs that do not agree with his poliCies. 

Correa's consistent attacks on free speech pose another great threat to Ecuadorian democracy. 

Consistent with Correa's history of hostility toward free speech, independent media is the target of 

a communications law passed by the National Assembly in June 2013. One of numerous stringent 
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features, the law legalizes the use of criminal charges to respond to broadcast and print media 

allegations made against public officials. xii 

Despite the current positive performance of the Ecuadorian economy, triggered by oil prices and 

significant levels of public expenditure, private investment levels remain low due to permanent 

government hostility and lack of long-term investor confidence. 

Nicaragua 

Sandinista (FSLN) President Daniel Ortega assumed office in 2006 and began his first term by 

pushing legislation that consolidated his power over the central bank, the police, and the military. xiii 

Ortega's quest to further consolidate power through anti-democratic means was first observed in 

2008, when independent observers documented fraud by FSLN candidates in 40 of 146 municipal 

elections. 

In 2009, amidst strong opposition from the National Assembly, Ortega and more than 100 FLSN 

mayors successfully petitioned Nicaragua's Supreme Court to lift the constitutional ban on 

consecutive presidential terms. Through his subsequent packing of the Supreme Electoral Council 

(CSE). Ortega was reelected in a landslide victory rife with irregularities that included the poor 

distribution of voting cards, mismanagement of voter registries and polling places, and concerns 

about the composition of electoral boards. In addition to Ortega's victory, the elections-in which 

international observers were not fully involved-gave Ortega's party an overwhelming majority in 

the National Assembly. In the countly's May 2012 municipal elections, the FSLN won 134 of 153 

municipalities, again with alarming irregularities that included outdated voter rosters, repeat 

voters, and voters being turned away at polls. xiv 

The FSLN's ability to consistently dominate national and municipal elections, coupled with a 

judiciary and Supreme Court that has come to be controlled by FSLN appointees and judges, makes 

Ortega, regime a serious threat to foreign investors and private initiative, insuring business climate 

conditions only to business leaders that favor the government policies. 

HI Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 

EI Salvador and Guatemala have undertaken positive democratic transitions since the end of their 

respective civil wars. Solid political parties have emerged, independent institutions have been 

strengthened, and a stable constitutional order has become an asset to attract foreign investors and 

improve the business climate in both countries. Their respective economic policy frameworks have 

allowed both countries to face stable growth and introduce more profound social policies in favor 

of the most vulnerable population. 

Despite their efforts to prevent the expansion of organized crime through hand-in-hand prevention 

and penalization policies, the presence of narco-tJ-afficking networks as well as criminal gangs 

known as maras have become notorious, and their rise has contributed to inter-related factors that 

include operational weaknesses in security and justice systems.= 

Though the ongoing truce established in March 2012 between the two largest maras, the Mara 

Salvatrucha and the 18t!· Street gang, has resulted in a Significant drop in the region's homicide rate, 

these countries require long-term institutional solutions. Security forces and judicial bodies in 

Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras are in need of stronger international cooperation in order to 

improve their training, functional capabilities and rapid response to face security threats. Programs 

4 
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to prevent gang activity through economic and social means entail more support from the 

international community. 

In Honduras, the 2010 elections that followed the 2009 exile of President Manuel Zelaya, which 

resulted in the election of Porfirio Lobo as a Honduras' new president, have allowed the country to 

undergo a reconciliation process among political groups and create a more stable investment 

climate. 

Despite a truce established in June 2013 between the Honduran bases of the Mara Salvatrucha and 

18t], Street gangs, homicides, violent land disputes, and attacks against journalists persist. Because 

of its long Caribbean coastline, organized crime related to cocaine routes through the countlY is an 

issue.'" Although there is an institutional commitment to face the situation weaknesses in its anticrime structure have contributed to Honduras's dire security situation, giving it the current highest 

homicide rate in the world.=ii 

Notwithstanding that the Salvadorian economy has been performing in a positive fashion, it must 

be said that high dependency on remittances from the United States as well as Venezuelan 

government grants through oil price subsidies or rural lending, is not sustainable and allows the 

Chavez-Maduro regime to request political favors in return. 

Other Challenges faced by Democratic States 

Mexico 

Since President Felipe Calderon initiated an open and brave effort to combat Mexico's numerous 

entrenched narco-trafficking organizations immediately following his 2006 election, over 60,000 

Mexicans have lost their lives to the ensuing violence. Though criticized, Calderon was the first 

president to bravely address the growing threat posed to the state by Mexico's drug cartels, who for 

decades have attempted to corrupt portions of Mexico's security forces, judicial officials, and high 

and low-ranking members of local, state, and federal government. Calderon's decisiveness allowed 

the strengthening of Mexican institutions to combat the power of major drug cartels. 

Calderon was succeeded in 2012 by the PRI's Enrique Pena Nieto. To address Mexico's drug-related 

violence, Pena Nieto has promised an approach to combating the influence of the cartels by creating 

a police force stronger by 40,000 men, while strengthening the investigative capabilities of Mexico's 

Federal Police.xviii Among the victims of the drug-related violence are Mexico's journalists. Calderon 

and Pena Nieto's efforts have shown that drug cartels can be effectively confronted as powerful 

kingpins have been arrested and hitmen sh'uctures have been dismantled. 

Colombia 

In 2002, Colombia experienced 28,000 homicides, 2,800 kidnappings, 1,645 attacks by terrorist 

groups, and guerrilla or paramilitary control of over 350 municipalities. Beyond the fact that 

Colombia's geography and climate have made it the world's largest producer of illicit cocaine, weak 

institutions on a local, state, and national level contributed to the violence. 

To restore institutional order and to protect individual liberties my administration developed the 

Democratic Security policy, focused on protecting vulnerable civilian popUlations, strengthening 

local, state, and national governments, and targeting the drug-based revenues of Colombia's 

criminal organizations. Democratic Security was implemented hand-in-hand with strong investor 
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confidence and a strengthening of Colombia's social safety net. Thanks to the execution of these 

three pillars we won back state presence in villages and towns through the combination of military 

operations and then by listening and responding to the needs of citizens at town hall-style 

meetings, 

With the trust and support of a greater number of Colombians, the military successfully forced the 

FARC out of its strongholds and slashed its size by more than half, down to 6,800 members by 2010. 

Colombia's other security threat in 2002 was the country's various violent paramilitary forces. In 

2005, the Justice and Peace Law demobilized over 30,000 members from Colombia's largest 

paramilitary organization, the AUC, while holding responsible those who committed serious crimes 

against Colombian citizens. The same legislation was also applied to F ARC and ELN members, 

demobilizing 18,000 members who now seek an honorable way of living with government and 

private sector support. By the time I left office, Colombia's homicide rate had been reduced by 50 

percent, kidnappings by 80 percent. and terrorist attacks by 90 percent. 

Today, the Colombian Government is involved in peace talks in Cuba with the FARe. Various leaders 

of the terrorist group have openly requested a Constitutional Assembly, widespread impunity, and 

Congressional representation for its members in return for peace. The danger of granting impunity 

has been clearly demonstrated by recent resurgence of terrorism in Colombia. FARC attacks in the 

first half of 2012 rose 52 percent compared to the previous year, including the killing of two and 

wounding of eleven police and military personnel in April. Last year also saw a 173 percent 

increase in oil pipeline bombings. Not only is the FARC unwilling to relinqUish its terrorist tactics, it 

hopes to force the government to compromise through its renewed campaign of terror. 

The kind of peace that my administration promoted with illegal armed groups entailed no impunity 

for crimes against humanity, the obligation to unveil the truth about all of their criminal activities, 

victim reparation, immediate release of kidnapped people, unilateral cessation of criminal 

activities, no policy agenda or Constitutional amendment on the table, and international verification 

of disarmament Those principles were applied within the peace process with the Paramilitary 

Groups and offered to FARC and ELN as well. 

Regional Success Stories 

Chile and Uruguay 

Chile represents one of the most developed democracies in the region. Independent institutions, 

strong rule of law led by an independent judiciary, a business environment favorable to private 

initiative, and a successful social safety net are some of the characteristics of the Chilean order. The 

sound democratic architecture has allowed the counny to attract foreign investors, consolidate 

long term state policies and turn its economy into one of the most stable in the region. Chile boasts 

Latin America's most stable, global-minded economy, while conSistently ranking in the top tier of 

studies measuring institutions, civil liberties, and political rights. 

Like Chile, Uruguay has demonstrated that strong institutions and a vibrant democracy are key 

ingredients for economic and social progress. Uruguay has become a regional star for creative 

industries, high tech, and mobile services. The consolidation of independent institutions and long 

term consensus among private and public sector leaders has allowed Uruguay to expand its 

commodity markets while facilitating the transition to intellectual property aggregated value goods 

and se rvices. 

6 
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Uruguay and Chile have also achieved significant social results. Education, health, and public 

utilities coverage are one of the highest in the region. 

Brazil 

Brazil in the last twenty years has also proven that a country can emerge from authoritarian rule to 

form strong democratic institutions. While large and ambiguously motivated protests in July drew 

much international attention to the Brazilian government, Brazilian economic performance and 

democracy have made important strides since President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (1995-

2003) reformist agenda charted Brazil's present course. 

Peru 

The consistent policy agenda that has evolved from Alejandro Toledo, Alan Garcia and currently 

Ollanta Humala, has made Peru a country with a stable currency, a fast growing export apparatus, 

an attractive place for Foreign Direct Investment and sustainable poverty reduction. 

The consistency of the last three administrations regarding a national security agenda has also 

allowed the Peruvian institutions to effectively dismantle the presence of narco-terrorist cells in 

some areas of the country. Peru currently represents one of the region's more promising societies, 

recognizing that more socially inclusive policies ought to be deepened. 

Triggers of Change 

The potential for positive change in growth in the years ahead is not an accident; it is a consequence 

of the consistency, congruence and sense of urgency that a group of countries have adopted as their 

policy cornerstone. Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay represent 70 per cent of the 

region's population and 75% of the regional GDP. 

This group of countries has common characteristics that explain their outstanding performance: 

The strengthening of Liberal Democracy. 

The adoption of an institutional Framework in favor offoreign and national investment. 

The construction of a sound and sustainable social safety net. 

The expansion of export markets and the commercial integration with the world (through free 

trade agreements). 

A public administration driven by results and the elimination of the byzantine ideological 

debate between left and right. 

A sound macroeconomic administration driven by fiscal and monetary prudence. 

Better regulatory environment. 

Construction of strategic infrastructure. 

The consolidation of an innovation agenda leaded by an improvement in education. 

A well capitalized financial sector and the constant expansion of financial services. 

Today countries like Panama, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, and 

Paraguay, as well as most of the Caribbean States, are following this line of behavior. Because of 

that, the IDB, with Luis Alberto Moreno as its leader, many analysts, statesmen and prestigious 

publications like The Economist, are optimistic and talk about "The Latin American Decade." 
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Countries that opted for a sound evolution of policies have motivated sustainable positive change. 

Countries that have opted for a "Revolution" to accommodate the institutional order in favor of an 

ideology have been shown to be the ones with instability. limitation of individual liberties. 

government intervention. lack of confidence from investors. and a growing social polarization with 

the risks of political turmoil's. 

Opportunities for Improvement 

The Role of Multinational Organizations: The OAS 

Many discussions of the current state of Latin American democracy inevitably turn to discussing to 

what extent the activities of multinational organizations like the Organization of American States or 

special initiatives like the United States' Plan Colombia have positively affected democratic 

institutions throughout the region. With its weighty responsibility to promote regional democracy 

firmly in mind, the OAS in 2001 created the Inter-American Democratic Charter (lADC). The lADC 

was written to ensure "the effective exercise of representative democracy" through a more 

cooperative effort among the 34 member states to defend against any perceived threats to 

democratic stability.xix The lADC will mark its twelfth anniversary this year on September 11, and 

those twelve years have been filled with institutional and regional setbacks that have only rendered 

the OAS more incapable of promoting regional democracy. 

The lADe's current ineffectiveness is due in large part to the fact that in 2001 Latin American 

leaders were much more likely to cooperate with each other. Some analysts and political scientists 

explain the problem, asserting that in 2001 "a broad elite consensus existed across the Americas in 

terms of support for representative democracy and free markets, as well as cordial U.S.-Latin 

American relations." They note, however, that the political climate has changed, that "over the past 

decade, this relative harmony has given way to increasing fragmentation, a decline in U.S.-Latin 

American relations, and a heterogeneity of competing political and economic ideas."~ Such a 

diagnosis is accurate when one observes the ALBA bloc that has in less than ten years emerged as a 

key player in regional policy with a populist ideology completely contrary to democracy. As a result, 

the IADC, or any similar structure, does not enjoy consensus approval and is therefore incapable of 

being fully implemented throughout the region. 

Any positive initiatives the OAS does pursue are extremely limited by the ~AS's small and furtherdiminishing operational budget~i For the 2013 fiscal year, the OAS operates on a budget of $83.1 

million. Though the OAS is not a police force, it would be absurd to assume that this amount can 

sufficiently fund the ~AS's task to promote regional democracy by monitoring elections, improving 

regional security policy, and h'aining scores of judges and government officials. 

The Need to Support institutional Security Efforts in Central America 

In order to prevent drug-related violence from continuing to threaten democratic institutions in 

Central America, stronger support ought to be given by more developed democracies in the 

hemisphere in four priority areas: a) judicial training and technical assistance; b) police and 

military anti-drug capabilities improvement; c) social programs and demobilization agendas for 

gang members; and d) youth unemployment poliCies that prevent recruitment by illegal armed 

groups. 

Such areas of intervention can be successfully implemented through multilateral development 

bodies like the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, and bilateral assistance. 
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Bilateral and Multilateral Actions Must be Implemented to Face Venezuela's Dictatorship in Disguise 

The current suppression of human rights, civil liberties, and democracy in Venezuela must not 

remain without effective denouncement from democratic nations in the hemisphere and the world. 

Bilateral and multilateral pressure to ensure due rights for the opposition as well as the need to 

guarantee free press and free speech must take place in order to prevent the emergence of an 

unsustainable social conflict with unimaginable consequences. 

Regional Anti-Drug Framework 

Drug-related criminal organizations remain one of the major threats to institutional order in many 

Latin American countries. Consumption has also become a regional challenge and micro-trafficking 

in urban areas threatens young populations. Thus the countries in the hemisphere must work 

jointly to build a framework that considers the following seven elements: 

The Colombian Constitution has three main provisions for a lOgical approach against drugs: 1) No 

criminalization of consumers, but instead the introduction of administrative, educational and 

medical treatment mechanisms; 2) education with preventive public health policies; and 3) 

prosecution of narco-traffickers and distributors. The principles that have been incorporated in our 

constitution represent the essence of the kind of anti-drug policy that can guide all institutional 

efforts in the region to dismantle drug cartels and their financial and operational capabilities, while 

introducing policies that can prevent consumption and create a collective action against 

consumption. If we do not sh'engthen regional anti-drug policies, we risk fueling future threats to 

democratic institutions. 

I reiterate my gratitude to all the members of this Committee for allowing me to share some 

thoughts about Latin America. 
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I Kurt Weyland, 'Why Latin America is Becoming Less Democratic, The Atlantic, July 15,2013, 

http://www.theatlantic.com/internationaljarchive/2013/07/why-Iatin-america-is-becoming-Iess-democratic/277803/ 

Ii Daniel Wilkinson, "CoUlt-Packing Law Threatens Venezuelan Democracy." Washington Post, june 22. 2004, 

http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/06/21/court-packmg-law-threatens-venezuelan-democracy 

Iii Mark P. Sullivan, ""\lenezuela: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, January 10,2013, 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row /R40938.pdf 

IV "Venezuela Overview," Warld Bank, 2013. http://www.worldbank..org/en/countly/venezuela/overview 

v "Corruption Perceptions Index 2012," Transparency International, http://cpLtransparency.org/cpi2012/results/ 

~'lbld. 

'I'll Roger F. Noriega, "Venezuela's 'Cubanochavista' electoral machine." Miami Herald. May 5, 2013, 

http://www.aeLorg/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regionaljlabn-america/venezuelas-cubanochavista-electoralmachine/ 

VIII "Bolivia 2012 Human Rights Report," U.S. Department of State, 

http://www.state.gov / documents/ organization/2 04640.pdf 

, IbId. 

xLiliana Hanorato, "Bolivian President Evo Morales says there is 'too much freedom of expression.'" Knight Center for 

Journalism in the Americas, March 15,2012, https:j /knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/00-9324-bolivian-president-evomorales-says-there-too-much-freedom-expression 

Xl joshua Partlow and Stephan Kuffner, "Voters in Ecuador Approve Constitution," Washington Post, September 29, 2008, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/28/AR2008092802644.html 

Xl! "Ecuador: End Assault on Free Speech," Human Rights Watch,june 17,2013, 

http://www.hrw.org/news/20 13 /06/ 17/ ecuad or-end -assault -free-speech 

XIII "Nicaragua," Freedom in the World 2013, Freedom House, http://vv\vw.freedomhouse.orgjreportjfreedomworld/2013jnicaragua 

",v Ibid. 

X\' Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress," Congressional Research Service. 

February 8, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42956.pdf 

xvi Carrie Kahn and Rachel Martin, "Rare Gang Truce Disrupts Violence in Honduras," National Public Radio, june 2, 2013, 

http://www.npr.org/20 13/06/02/188022941/ rare-gang-truce-disru pts-violence-in-honduras 

xvii "Homicide Statistics 2013," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-andanalysis/homicide.html 

X\'ill Randal C. Archibald. "Candidates in Mexico Signal a New Tack in the Drug War," New York Times, June 10, 2012. 

http://www.nytimes.com/20 12/06/11 /world /americas /us-braces-for-mexican-shift -in-d rug-warfocus.html?pagewanted=all 

XIX "Inter-American Democratic Charter," Organization of American States, September 11, 2001, 

http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolutionLen_p4.htm 

xx Thomas Legler. Riyadlnsanally, Santiago Mariani. and Timothy M. Shaw. "The Democratic Chalter: The State of the 

Debate," Latin American Policy vol. 3 no. 1, July 2012, p. 4 

Ibid. 

10 
22

Mr. SALMON. Before I ask questions, I would like to recognize our 

Peruvian Ambassador, Harold Forsyth. 

Thank you for coming today. 

I also would like to do just a little shout-out, our summer intern’s 

last day is today. Thomas Harrigan, thank you for all your hard 

work this last summer. I really appreciate you. 

Mr. President, I am concerned that in many countries respect for 

effective rule of law seems to be weakening. And in some cases it 

is the government itself that is the prime instigator of that shift. 

Do you share this concern? And if so, what countries, and what can 

be done? 

Mr. URIBE. One of the main violation of the rule of law, Mr. 

Chairman, is the gradual elimination of independent institutions. 

In Venezuela, and in some degree in Ecuador and Bolivia and Nicaragua, the executive branches have overtaken the justice administration. And they take advantage of this dominance of the justice 

administration to proceed against dissidents. It is a very grave violation of the rule of law. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. In the aftermath of the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, what are Venezuela’s political 

prospects in terms of restoring checks and balances to this political 

system? And what has been the Maduro government’s track record 

on respect for the rights of the minority or freedom of expression? 

What are the prospects of the December local elections that they 

will be conducted freely and fairly? And how do you characterize 

media freedom in Venezuela now that the last remaining television 

station critical of the government, Globovision, has been sold to a 

group of businessmen with links to the Venezuelan Government? 

Mr. URIBE. Some journalists have fled to foreign countries. Other 

journalists are intimidated, and they cannot openly express their 

opinions. The government has bought media and has promoted the 

purchase of media by its own friends. At the same time, the government has taken advantage of its influence on the justice administration to go after independent journalists. 

Fraud. In past elections, there were rumors of fraud. But in the 

election this year that elected President Maduro there was evidence of fraud, evidence of fraud. The economic situation is very severe because of the shortage and the macroeconomics have [inaudible]. For instance, Venezuela was a country with a public indebtedness that represented no more than 24 percent of the GDP. Now 

it represents in between 70 and 80 percent of the GDP. Therefore, 

the situation is very complicated. The private sector is under permanent threat. The same case is for the freedoms. 

Mr. SALMON. In your testimony you mentioned that Chavez’s economic policies, continued by Nicolas Maduro, have placed Venezuela at high economic risk and clearly undermine democratic 

governance. In your opinion, what countries in Latin America are 

implementing some of the sound policies, economic policies that 

represent democratic governance and contribute to economic prosperity? 

Mr. URIBE. I will mention Mexico, Costa Rica, some other Central American countries, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay. 

And we are very hopeful with Paraguay and of course Brazil. And 

I am very hopeful for what is known as the Pacific Alliance that 

23

included some of these countries. They are working with all the 

democratic values, but they face many challenges. One challenge is 

to make the reduction of poverty quicker. Other challenge is to provide the youth with opportunities because of the high level of youth 

unemployment. And at the same time, to combine the knowledgebased economy with the commodities-based economy. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. President. 

I yield back the balance of my time, and I yield 5 minutes for 

questions to the ranking member, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. President, I would like your view, because I have a very different view of what is going on in Cuba in terms of the changes 

and where you see that leading the Cuban people. Obviously, I feel 

that they are just trying to soften their world, how can I say, the 

world thinks of Cuba. I would just like to hear from you what you 

think this is going to lead in terms of is there really a change or 

is it just a facade? 

Mr. URIBE. Mr. Congressman, Ranking Member, when we compare Cuba with China, China has gone much far in economic openness than Cuba. In my opinion, the economic openness of Cuba is 

only an excuse, is only for appearance, and there is no political 

openness. Therefore, in my opinion, this economic openness in 

Cuba won’t be enough to satisfy the basic needs of the people of 

Cuba. 

Cuba has been a failure. First, Cuba survived because of the subsidy of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the 

Cuban economy dropped by 30 percent. After, Cuba got the Chavez 

government subsidy. And now Cuba has subsidized loans from 

Brazil, for instance to build the Mariel port, and at the same time, 

the growing amount of money that is transferred from the United 

States to the Cuban families. Therefore, I don’t see enough signs 

for the better off of the people of Cuba. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. One of the complaints that I receive in my 

office when I receive people from Central America is the issue of 

corruption. They want to invest more in the region, but they feel 

that the corruption is too risky with the corruption in some of these 

countries. Can you talk a little bit about corruption in the region? 

Mr. URIBE. Of course. The main remedy against corruption is the 

independent institutions and the total openness for people’s participation. For instance, when I was President to assign every contract 

in my government it was necessary to have a public hearing on TV. 

Therefore, all the bidders had the opportunity to discuss their proposals. When a country eliminates the independence of institutions, 

the country is much more willing to have growing corruption. 

Therefore, independent institutions, eliminated gradually in some 

of the countries, are a part to increased corruption. 

Mr. SIRES. Can you talk a little bit about the Merida Initiative? 

I know that is pretty much in the same mold of what we tried to 

do in Colombia. But I don’t know if we have the kind of backing 

from the country that we have in Colombia. Can you talk a little 

bit about that? 

Mr. URIBE. In Mexico? 

Mr. SIRES. In Mexico. 

24

Mr. URIBE. In my opinion, President Calderon did a great job, because in the absence of President Calderon’s fight against the drug 

cartels Mexico was not as it is today. In Mexico there is optimism. 

In my opinion, President Calderon recovered the predominance of 

the institutions over the drug cartels. And this policy has allowed 

President Pena Nieto to promote the new structural reforms that 

the Mexican economy needs. But these structural reforms, in my 

opinion, are going to produce very good output under the condition 

that Mexico never forget that they have to fight drug cartels. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the former—actually, chairman emeritus of this committee, this full committee, the gentlewoman from 

Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. It is a 

delight to have President Uribe with us. 

As Congressman Sires talked about, corruption is such a deep 

problem in our hemisphere, the lack of the rule of law, weak institutions. All of these factors continue to plague many countries in 

Latin America, and this prevents democratic forces from flourishing, from growing. And we continue to see many leaders, more 

in the ALBA nations, manipulate elections, move away from democratic principles. And once they are in power, these rogue leaders 

change the rules of the game. They manipulate the legislative system, the electoral councils, the judicial systems in their favor to 

hold onto power at any cost. 

And at the same time we see countries like Colombia and Chile 

do well economically because of the stability and the implementation of regulations that promote trade and open markets. But these 

democratic advances, as we have seen, continue to be threatened 

by narcoterrorism, by violence, by the lack of political will, by corruption. 

You are a leader who can really speak on the issue of 

narcoterrorism, FARC, because the great progress that you made 

in Colombia in the struggle against this terrorist group during your 

presidency. As we know, peace talks have been underway, sometimes they get halted, between the Colombian Government and the 

FARC. They are being held in a very unlikely place, in Cuba, which 

is a state sponsor of terrorism. I wanted to know your opinion 

about whether Cuba, a state sponsor of terrorism, is a proper 

forum in which to have these peace talks. And do you believe that 

the FARC will dismantle its terrorist network, abandon their efforts on illicit activities as a result of these talks? 

And then also related, Nicolas Maduro remains very much in 

control in Venezuela. Do you think that his control will continue 

or do you see—there is a lot of talk about maybe getting rid of him, 

putting in another stooge who will continue this farce. 

And then in Ecuador, as we talked about here, the manipulation 

of this referendum to eliminate the print media by forcing them to 

go digital. And he is not the only one who has been threatening the 

press. 

And then lastly about the OAS, which has such a lack of leadership, which could be a real institution for democracy and for the 

rule of law. And what reforms do you think are possible in the OAS 

25

so that it can be living up to the principles upon which it was 

founded? 

Thank you, Mr. President. 

Mr. URIBE. Thank you, Mrs. Congresswoman. 

When I was President and my government was inaugurated, my 

predecessor, President Pastrana, had two initiatives for peace, one 

with paramilitary groups through the Catholic Church, and the 

other with the ELN through the Cuban Government. I said we are 

ready to continue these talks under the condition that these criminal groups make the decision to unilaterally cease all their criminal activities. 

And we tried to advance in Cuba with the ELN, but the ELN did 

not accept our claim. And I had the opportunity to talk to President Castro, and he said to me that he no longer had influence on 

FARC. And I believed in what he said to me because FARC is very 

rich and arrogant. With the incursion of FARC in narcotrafficking, 

FARC no longer needs the help of Cuba. 

Therefore, going to the case of Venezuela, I can’t understand why 

from midnight to early morning Venezuela has passed from being 

the promoter, promoter of terrorist groups, and becoming the promoter of peace. I cannot accept this. 

And in the case of Ecuador, when the Government of Ecuador 

says that they are in need of having communitarian social media, 

they are right. But it could not be at the expenses of free, independent media. It could be an excuse to eliminate every expression 

of independent media. 

Going to the Organization of American States, it has been very 

weak. I cannot understand why they adopt one stand in the case 

of Honduras, one stand in the case of Paraguay, and they do not 

say anything against the coup d’etat in Venezuela against the new 

congress 2 years ago. 

And I want to conclude with this. We should not ask for replacing the Organization of American States. The region needs democratic governments in joint action to make all the region to comply 

with the Democratic Charter of the Organization of American 

States. No one could be the police in the region, but we need to reform and to review and to rethink what will be the role of the Organization of American States, because it seems that the Organization of American States depends on the whims of some dictators or 

quasi-dictators and are not ruled by its own charge. 

And finally, Mrs. Congresswoman, I am very critical of some of 

the steps in Colombia at this moment. However, I prefer to say 

what I did, what was, what were my wrongdoings. What Colombia 

needs more at the moment of the end of my terms than here to 

criticize the current government, I am a daily fighter in my country. Therefore, I have to keep the criticism to my country for my 

country. And I accept that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. URIBE. I understand you will accept this excuse. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I sure do. Thank you, Mr. President. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member for convening this hearing. I would also like to extend my perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:54 Nov 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\091013\82761 HFA PsN: SHIRL
26

sonal welcome to his excellency, the Honorable A ́ lvaro Uribe, the 

former President of the Republic of Colombia. 

I am impressed that in less than 25 years, 16 countries in the 

Western Hemisphere have transitioned from authoritarian regimes 

to governments by elected leaders. Such a monumental achievement is a testament to the backbreaking work and tireless dedication of the Canadians and Latin Americans and Caribbean people. 

Yet I am aware and sure that our witnesses will instruct us even 

more in terms of what needs to be done. 

As our Secretary of State Kerry stated, and I quote,

‘‘The Western Hemisphere is our backyard. It is of vital importance to us. Too often many countries in the Western Hemisphere feel that the United States does not—does not give 

them enough attention. And sometimes this is probably true. 

We need to be closer and we plan to do it.’’

And I could not agree more with Secretary Kerry’s observation 

about this in all the years that I have been a member of this subcommittee. 

Mr. President, my question, first question is, what is the role, 

both positive and negative, has the United States played in the development of democracy in this region? What successes and failures 

have we contributed to? 

My second question is that, and correct me if I make this as an 

observation, that maybe one of the serious problems that Latin 

America has always been confronted with is the extreme social and 

economic inequalities existing in the societies of the different Latin 

American countries. And I believe that with this inequality it does 

affect the government institutions, leading to corruption, trafficking, and all these negative aspects of what has been discussed 

earlier this morning. 

One area that I am of particular interest in, would certainly like 

to ask for your comments and your insights, is that of all the testimonies that I have read this morning, not one, not one item ever 

mentions the fact of the plight, the suffering of the indigenous Indian populations that make up practically every one of these Latin 

American countries. I have met with delegations of the various indigenous tribes that have come from Latin America, and it is the 

same story, Your Excellency. They are the West’s not just bottom 

of the barrel, they are below bottom of the barrel when it comes 

to economic, social conditions, educational opportunities. They are 

the worst off. Somewhat very similar to what the American Indians 

are going through right now even in our own country. 

I would just like to start with those two questions, Mr. President, 

if I could. Your response? 

Mr. URIBE. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

Indigenous people in our country are making significant 

progress. During the Barco administration in Colombia between 

1986 and 1990——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. By the way, I am sorry, I didn’t mean to interrupt you. I do want to say my highest commendation for the 

achievements that you made during the time when you served as 

President. You reduced the kidnappings by 80 percent in Colombia, 

and as high as 50 percent reduction in homicides, and as high as 

27

90 percent of terrorist attacks in your country because of your leadership and your commitment to public service. And I want to commend you for that. 

Mr. URIBE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. But we did 

not only work for security, our democratic security policy had other 

two companions: The policy to promote investment and the policy 

to advance in social cohesion. At the same time, we reduced poverty, we reduced unemployment. We began to improve income distribution. 

My country, and before my administration, since many years ago, 

had made some significant progress in dealing with the indigenous 

communities. And in my country many governments have worked 

to assign them land titles, to give them educational possibilities, to 

give their children possibilities for nutrition, to give them access to 

health services, and so on. But I agree with you that we need to 

do much more in order to overcome poverty and in order to eliminate these inequalities. 

But one aspect, distinguished Congressman, it is necessary to 

take hand in hand investment with social cohesion. If you only 

want to create social opportunities, and at the same time you are 

hostile against the private sector you won’t have the necessary resources to sustain social cohesion. 

The role of the United States. I once said, and I apologize for 

this, that Latin America is the back yard. Latin America and the 

Caribbean is the front yard of these North American countries. And 

at this moment we cannot say that we need the United States as 

the police of the region. But we need a set, a group of democratic 

countries, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, 

Uruguay. Uruguay, it has a leftist government, but with all the respect for democratic values. It does not matter that they are center 

left or center right. What matters is that they are progressive 

democratic countries with the rule of law. 

We need this group of countries to review the Organization of 

American States to make that Democratic Charter be complied 

with by all the countries. I remember, and I finish with this, the 

role many democratic countries played for Chile to push out 

Pinochet, for Peru to push out Fujimori. And what is the reason for 

silence in the case of Maduro in Venezuela? I cannot understand. 

Democratic value, the rule of law should prevail over any ideological willingness. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. President. My 

time is way over. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. President, for being here today. I was reading your written testimony. And you point out the regional success 

stories of Chile and Uruguay. And what I was reading there, it 

says Chile represents one of the most developed democracies in the 

region, and Uruguay has demonstrated strong institutions, a vibrant democracy. They are key ingredients for economic and social 

progress. But I can say that Colombia is the epitome of what success looks like in South America. 

28

When we were down there, the ranking member and I, and he 

has left now, but we were down there in Cartagena for the Summit 

of the Americas, and we met with some congressmen from Colombia. And one thing that struck me was three things that they 

talked about. They talked about that Colombia is pursuing low taxation, corporate taxes and individual taxes; a debt-to-GDP ratio of 

4 percent or less; and just enough government to support a free 

market. These are American principles. This is what made this 

country great. And I see Colombia applying those principles. 

And then I see Chile, Uruguay, Peru even, Brazil, Mexico to 

some degree putting the principles in place that made America 

great. And you are seeing a tremendous economic and political 

progress in Latin America. 

I read also that Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay represent 70 percent of the region’s population, 75 percent of 

the regional GDP. That is pretty strong when you compare, well, 

when you factor in Brazil and Argentina and their GDP as well. 

So thank you for that. 

Every instance I have had to go to Colombia I have been impressed. And I think it falls back on your shoulders, the leadership 

that you provided that Chairman Salmon talked about earlier. 

When we were down for seeing the cooperation between the U.S. 

and Colombian military with regard to helicopters and the 10-year, 

$10 billion investment the U.S. made in cooperation with Colombia 

and the effect it has had on pushing back the narcotrafficking, 

pushing back FARC to the borders, that came under your leadership. So I just say thank you for that. 

You speak of the importance of reforming the OAS. How can the 

U.S. affect the reform, and what do you think would be most helpful for the U.S. as far as helping Colombia and other countries reform the OAS? 

Mr. URIBE. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

My main concern is that the Organization of American States 

needs to be much more strict on preserving the Democratic Charter 

than it has been so far. Therefore, I don’t know exactly what are 

the regulations that the organization needs to be introduced. In my 

opinion, it is necessary to have political determination, because it 

seems the Organization of American States fears the Government 

of Venezuela, fears the Government of Ecuador. They are very 

strong against what happened, what did happen in Honduras, very 

strong against what happened in Paraguay. They have been very 

weak in regarding Venezuela and Ecuador and Bolivia. 

Therefore, much more than regulation, it is necessary to adopt 

the political determination to preserve democratic value, the rule 

of law all over the region. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. I believe you are right. And I 

believe Colombia is leading by example with individual freedoms, 

with economic prosperity. Those are the things I think the neighboring countries will notice. I think they do notice. And when you 

see what is going on in Bolivia and Venezuela, Ecuador, the best 

example that those folks can look toward is to Colombia. 

And I just in my limited time I just want to point out that the 

South Carolina National Guard has a sister states relationship in 

the State Partnership Program with the Colombian air helos and 

29

their army. So we are glad to watch from Columbia, South Carolina, to Colombia, South America, the progress and have that sister 

relationship. 

So thank you again. I enjoyed the testimony and the questioning 

today. And I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Radel. 

Mr. RADEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

You know, being Members of Congress, we have a bit of a megaphone here, and in today’s discussion we keep hearing the same 

names, the same countries over and over, and our very serious and 

legitimate concerns with those countries. But with that very same 

megaphone that we have, I would also urge the people of those 

countries to know and to understand that at the end of the day we 

all want the same things for ourselves and for our children: 

Oportunidad y libertad, opportunity and freedom for all. 

And let there be no question that the Honorable Presidente 

Uribe in front of us right now has led the charge in Latin America 

of being able to show and exemplify how, when we as countries 

work together, we create more opportunity in our own country. 

And what has happened in Colombia is nothing short of amazing, 

and that is because of your leadership, and we thank you for that, 

and we cherish the relationship that we have with you. 

One thing, though, that I think also right now is threatening 

parts of Latin America and the opportunity and freedom that we 

are all looking for is organized crime. I think that it could potentially lead to a political backlash of erosion of civil liberties in particular and others. 

That said, let’s take a look at the violence that has plagued Mexico. I would ask you, could we use Colombia as an example of 

where foreign aid and cooperating when it comes to national security, where we can work together. But Mr. President I would also 

ask this: In the context of this, if we are talking about 

narcotraffickers, if we do the same in Mexico, are we simply going 

to end up pushing the problem somewhere else? 

Mr. URIBE. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I want to express my 

gratitude to the comments that some of you have made and I want 

to remember that the United States has been very helpful to my 

country. 

And it is not a question of bilateral relations between Colombia 

and the United States, the fight against organized crime, terrorist 

groups should be a universal fact. And one of the problems I see 

in the region is the penetration of other terrorist groups, different 

than FARC, to the region through the Government of Venezuela. 

This is the case of the connection with Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. 

Mexico, in my opinion, has advanced a lot, but it is necessary 

that every country is ready to support Mexico with whatever Mexico requests, because, you know, we need to respect the sovereignty 

of every country. And at the same time, I am very concerned because of impunity in some countries. This is not the case of Mexico. 

It could be the case with my country, because impunity is the midwife of new violence. Therefore, peace talks should never be at the 

expense of justice. 

30

And the same time, illicit drugs. I want only to bring one example. The constitutional provision of my country enacted in the year 

2009, it states that point, those points. First, addicts, consumers 

may never be taken to jail, always to hospital for rehabilitation. 

Second, there should be prevalent policies on prevention, on education. And third, narcotraffickers and distributors, the street distributors, from national narcotraffickers, all of them should be 

taken to jail. Don’t forget, FARC is the main drug cartel all over 

the world and has all the connections with the Mexican cartels. 

Therefore, it is necessary to have a universal fight. 

You have expressed one concern: What if Mexico succeeds as it 

is going on in this country and at the same time the drug cartels 

flee from Mexico to the Central American countries? Therefore, it 

is necessary to have a universal policy against the drug cartels. 

Mr. RADEL. With 7 seconds left, again, thank you so much for 

being here today. It is a real pleasure to have you here. Gracias 

por venir. 

Mr. URIBE. Muchas gracias. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you so much, Mr. President. We really appreciate your willingness to come. It truly is an honor. And thank 

you for all the great leadership you have provided, not just for Colombia, but for the world. 

Mr. URIBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all of 

you distinguished members of the committee. It has been a great 

honor. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

I move that we install our next panel. And with regard to some 

of the time constraints, I am going to dispense with the introductions. I apologize. You deserve very flowery introductions, but in 

the interests of time, I would like to move quickly. 

Thank you. Again, I apologize for dispensing with introductions, 

but I would really like to get to the meat of the testimony. And we 

will probably be called to vote in about 15 minutes, and so I want 

to make sure we hear from all of you that have waited and been 

patient for so long. 

So I am going to start out with Dr. Schamis. 

STATEMENT OF HECTOR E. SCHAMIS, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. SCHAMIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the invitation. And it is a pleasure to be here sharing this panel with good 

friends, and I appreciate your concern with this important subject. 

I don’t want to speak too long, because time is short and you 

have more important things to do, I guess, today, but I would reiterate something that I put in writing here, which is that the single 

most critical challenge to democracy today in the region, it is in my 

view the impermanency of constitutional rules. 

It has become customary for incumbent Presidents to modify constitutional rules with the immediate goal of getting themselves reelected for another term or for an indefinite number of terms, 

which generates, I would say, a whole set of pathologies of political 

life. And that has happened, as we discussed here, in a variety of 

countries and in much more countries that we don’t remember, perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:54 Nov 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\091013\82761 HFA PsN: SHIRL
31

haps, but it has happened in the Dominican Republican and it has 

happened in Honduras and it has happened even in Brazil, even 

if it didn’t lead to the perpetration of anyone in power. 

And that generates a bad example. That generates this idea that, 

well, rules are flexible and rules can be changed. And indeed, constitutions are somehow flexible, but occasionally, not all the time. 

And also constitutions are not there to be changed for the benefit 

of an incumbent President. That generates, again, a toxic political 

environment. 

When that happens, these constitutional tricks, these quasi-constitutional reelection processes, in Ecuador or in Venezuela or in 

Bolivia and so on and so forth, it generates a dramatic concentration of power in the executive by definition, and that affects also 

some of the fundamental principles of democracy, which is checks 

and balances and separation of powers. 

As a result as well, there is a heightened concentration of authority in the executive, which turns executive branches into legislating executives at the expense of congress, and rule by decree has 

become customary. That has generated a contradiction between the 

majority rule and minority rights. It has become quite frequent the 

case the majority rule is invoked to violate the rights of the minority. Whether those minorities are political parties in the minority 

or ethnic minorities, as the Congressman suggested, is irrelevant 

in the sense that it happens equally to whoever is the minority in 

this context in which majority rule is the pretext for violating those 

rights. 

Judiciaries have been at risk, judges have been intimidated, 

judges have been harassed, supreme courts have been packed, and 

the cases, again, we have discussed them over and over again. 

The most tragic consequence, in my view, of this has been increasing violence and particularly increasing violence to a particular group of people, journalists. And I am sure Carlos Laurı ́a 

here will discuss that issue in detail, but it has become quite frequent. 

A range of state actions on the part of elected governments, that 

somewhere I have called new authoritarianism in the region, but 

it has become frequent for these governments to go from censorship, to mild censorship and intimidation, to harassment, to manipulation of the courts against journalists, all the way to assassination and rape, in the case of—there is documentation in which in 

certain countries where violence against journalists has been diffuse, has been prominent, the case in which, if those journalists 

have been female journalists, rape has also taken place, a particular form of violence. And, therefore, we are in a situation in 

which the mutilation of press freedom, as I call it here, is the single most critical deficit of democracy and political life in the region 

as a whole. 

I want to conclude with two things. One is—or three things, I 

would say. One is President Uribe said that it doesn’t matter very 

much whether right or left, and I agree with him. It doesn’t even 

matter whether they are more or less populist, which is a common 

word that has been pronounced here and is pronounced in debates 

in the press, in the academic and the political debates. It doesn’t 

even matter that. And let me illustrate that with one example. 

32

In 2009, one of those Presidents, at times one of those Presidents 

in Latin America, at times called a populist, certainly a leftist, a 

former labor leader, President Lula of Brazil, in 2009 he was approaching the end of his second term in office. His popularity was 

above 80 percent. A reporter asked him in a press conference why 

wasn’t he going to change the constitution and stay in office. His 

popularity was above 80 percent at the time, his 7th year in office. 

And he said, no, because democracy is about two things: Constitutional rules and alternation in power. 

And here we have someone we have called leftist for sure, a labor 

leader from industrial Sao Paulo, and a populist in some other 

commentary. Well, he rejected that. So ultimately it doesn’t matter 

that much how they call themselves or how we call them, whether 

it is populist, leftist or rightist or et cetera, et cetera. 

The second point I want to make is that a question that has been 

already asked here is, what can we do? What can we do as a community in the hemisphere, I would say, the OAS? I think what we 

can do is highlight and constantly point fingers to these bad practices, at the OAS, but at the summit. There are regional summits 

that go on and on with speeches forever, and the conversation goes 

from trade to infrastructure and integration, very nice things, 

while many of these governments are abusing the rules and abusing their citizens, therefore. 

And it is not that important in the context of Latin America 

today that the U.S. does it, but that the U.S. does it in combination 

with many other quite democratic countries in the region. The puzzle is not so much whether the U.S. is saying something, but why 

isn’t Chile and Brazil and Uruguay saying something to their counterparts in those regional summits? And that is a puzzle that I legitimately present here as an honest puzzle, intellectual puzzle, if 

you want. 

The final point is there is a label by which we have addressed 

these realities of politics, which we owe to a commentator and author, Fareed Zakaria, which is illiberal democracy. Let me say that 

we are getting to a point in which in Latin America illiberalism has 

turned that idea of a liberal democracy into an oxymoron. Without 

liberalism, with that level of illiberalism, there is no democratic 

politics possible. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Dr. Schamis. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schamis follows:]

33


82761b-1.eps

Statetnent o~- Hector F. Schatnis 

-"'\djunct Professor, Center for Latin .. \lnericm Studies, Georgeto"\vn Uniyersity 

Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies 

"Challenges to Democracy in the \'/estenl Hemisphere" 

Subcommittee on the \X:estcrn TTemisphcre 

Comn11ttee on Foreign Affairs 

U.S. 1 louse of Rcprescntati\'cs 

September 10, 2013 

_\1r. ChairnIan, Ranking Nlen1bers, and _\1embers of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to 

testify today; T appreciate your 111terest in this important subject. T also stress that all the ,-iews 

presented here are solely mine, and do not reflect d1e views of the GrlSdnizations 1 ;1111 dftiliated willi. 

Let me stmt by saying that, after a long history of instability !md on-and-otT military rule, Lilin 

Atnerican societies have ovet\vhcln1ingly chosen cornpetitive detnocracy. Since the transitions of the 

1980s, n10st countries of the region h,lve experienced uninterrupted turnovers of po"\ver fronl one 

elected governn1ent to ,mother. TnIly ausricious, in several nations of the region an entire 

generation of their citizens has not spent a day of their lives under any other political order. On thIs 

account alone, den1occlcy"\vould seen1 alive and \vell in Latin -L\merica. 

But, is it) '.;ot quite. Beyond this seemingly bright landscape, the picture is quite gloomy in sevenJ 

of d,ese countries. Political competition is generally meaningful-in d1e sense d1at people vote freely 

and participation is high-but \vhen it comes to constitutional procedures and ciyilliberties the st(lte 

of "deD10cracy" in T . .atin Arnerica is troubling, to say the least. It is probably no exaggeration to say 

that the impermanency of constitutional rules is the single most critical challenge to democracy in 

the region. 

Constitutional Tricks and Perpetuation in Office 

Denl0cracy is ,1 nlethod for choosing government, but it is ,ilso (1 series of institution(J ,lrrangenients 

that deterrnine how that go\,err1tnent has to exercise power. \Xl1ilc the fom1cT \vorks relatively v,lell 

throughout the region, the latter does not, subject to ad)itrary ch,mge f()r the straightfonv;'lrd benetit 

of the president. Incurnbents have often nunipulated constitutional rules with the goal of staying in 

o~lice longer than initially stipulated. To do so) they have concentrated inordinate atnounts o~- po\ver 

in d1e executive branch, altering; checks and balances. When successful, they eliminate d1e \'try norm 

o~- alternation in o~lice, eroding the principle o~- separation of p0"\vers together "\vith basic civil 

liberties, especi!llly press freedom. 

In Venezueh, for exan1ple, Hugo Ch,lvez n1anaged to niodify the constitution ,llld eliminate term 

limits in pursuit of indefinite re-election. Deceased in office after fourteen years, it is no"\v his 

successor Nicolas Maduro who will try to ti.ll~ill that goal. Elected in last '\pril, the contest was 

widely believed to have been rigged bv d1e electoral aud10rities, hardly an independent body, to g;ive 

the oHicial party's candidate the victory against Henrique Capriles. 

Tn Bolivia, Evo Morales had a new constitution approved in 2009, which stipulates in an article and 

accon1p;'-lnying legislation th;'lt rrevious rresidenti{J tern1S count., exrlicitly b{mning fvlorales to run 

for a third consecutive period. Tn 2013. however, the Constitutional Tribunal authorized yet another 
34


82761b-2.eps

candidacy ot- the sitting president. The reasoning invoked was that the new constitution refounded 

the state-the Plltrillalirmal130livian State-thus J\iforales's first tenn happened in "(mother state.?' 

In Ecu,loor, Rlhel Correa ,ilso HlOdified the constitution, "\vhich no\v ,illo\vs nvo consecutive 

presidential terms. His third period, ho\,vever, \vas someho\v resolved froni the beginning, by ,1 

clause specifying that the tenn under the previous constitution did not count. That is, he hlmed the 

clock back to zero in 2009, so that he will be in power untiI2017-for now, at least in terms of his 

intentions, if one read his recent statetnents on the subject carefully. Tn Nicaragua, in contrast, 

Dil11iel Ortega tlvoided to amend the constitution tlltogether, \vhich bans imtnediate re-election. 

Instead, he presented his candidacy for re-election and had the Supreme Court ruled it legal-the 

highest tribun;tl viobting the highest Ll\v to sfltisfy the \vhinlS of the chief executive. 

Tn i\rgentina~ goyemment insiders used to talk, until very recently, about "eten1al Cristina." \\lith 

three terms in office by 2015, two of her own and one of her deceased husband's, it is unclear 

whether Cristina Kirchner will pursue her third consecutive presidency. To that end, she would need 

two thirds of the congressional votes and a constitutional convention to rnake it legal, that after the 

midteml elections next October_ The problem is that recent primary elections throughout the 

country showed her popuhrity in decline. Though herself not in the contest, she still campaigned 

actively, framing the primary contest as an implied plebiscite on her. The idea backtlred, as the ruling 

rarty's S4 rercent of October 2011 decreased to 26 rercent last AUb'Llst, with forecasts of ;111 even 

\veaker perforll1ance next October. 

It renlains to be seen whether in this context---constrained by the constitution, with decreasing 

popularity, and a Supreme Court that has fought hard to maintain its independence-the president 

\vill abandon dre(lms of perpetu;ltion, leave graciously (lnd oversee (1 peaceful transition to ,1 ne\v 

government in 2015. Tf so, a much needed breadth of fresh alr may come in support of democratic 

ide,lls, in Argentina as \vell as else\vhere in Latin -L~rnericl. 

Executive Discretion: Congress Circumvented, Judges at Risk 

It is a fundamental pretnise o~- detnocratic theory that an election, ho\vever ~ree and ~air, does not 

autornatically ensure a dernocratic exercise of power, but in nlLlch of Latin -L'\nlerica the 1\vo appear 

rather incompatible. Tn fact, the former has been the pretext for deviating frorn the latter. Madison's 

tyranny of the majority becomes more than a n1etarhor in countries \vhere constitutionrll 

manipulation is the tool for executiye discretiOn frotn the outset. a setting that crases the very 

rrinciple of seprltation of rowers. 

'\ gro\\-1ng concentration o~- executive po\ver has entailed \vhat sotne experts have dubbed 

"hypcrprcsidential systerns," a polity in which the actions of the executive exceed its constitutional 

boundaries. As in Venezuela's "enabling laws," Ecuador's "urgent bills" and Colombia's 

"extDlOrdinary po"\vers,l1 to n,lD1e three ex,1111ples, the use, rl11d sometin1es abuse, of decrees hrtS 

nonnalized a political system where the exeCUDYC legislates and, riding on electoral majorities, 

legisLttes at will. An exaggerated version of this trend has been observed in Argentina under both 

K1rchners. Tt has been customary since 2003 that the president delivers the equivalent of the state of 

the union every year in Congress and in the same speech where they have boasted of record growth 

rates, they also requested a renewal of the presidential decree authority-often called J7tpelpollm~ 

that the constitution reserves exclusiyely for tilnes of econ01nic emergency. 

Executive discretion has also affected the independence of the judiciary and hlmed the principle of 

checks ,1nd balances into {l hollow notion, rt disturbing trend in the region. This has unequivoGtlly 
35


82761b-3.eps

been the case when the Supreme Court was packed with cromes, as in i\rgentina in the 1990s under 

ClTlos 'v[enem, Ecuador in 200-1 under Lucio C;utierrez, and Venezuela since 200-1 under Ch'''7ez. 

Similarly, in Bolivia, and since his landslide victory in December 2009, President Morales passed a 

law of dubious constitutiomtl status, so-called "Ley Corta," which allowed him to till 20 of 27 posts 

in the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the Judici;J Council. As of that moment, 

court proceedings against fonner gm-emment oHicials increased, all of them his opponents, sending 

Hl<:U1Y into exile and n1any n10re into jail ,,;vithout a sentence. 

In Ecuador, President Correa has managed to subordinate Congress ;md the courts alike. The 2008 

Constitution grants the executive broader legislative prerogatives and veto powers, 1tl turn protected 

by h\vs that em only be reversed by super-nlajorities. The ne\v constitution also deternlined the 

expansion of po\vcrs of the Constitutional Tribunal, and at the expense of the SUprCtllC Court, 

which politicized the judiciary. Last but not least, 19 new judges were selected to sen-e on the 

Constitutional Court through a mechanism that was highly controlled by the executive. '1'he new 

Court will be responsible for the oversight and approval ot- laws, most notably the reFonTIs passed in 

\ilay 2011 dIat gave d,e president more authority to regulate d,e content of information. 

In _Argentina, the executive's ,lttenlpt to curb the independence of the judici,lry (llso hIS to be seen (lS 

a tool aimed at silencing critical media-both instrumental for another reelection. As reported by 

intern,ltion,ll [)tess freedom \vatchdof.:,TS, for rllong tinle n1any ne\vs organizations h,lve suffered fron1 

systematic legal and administrative acts of harassment. lndependent Journalists have been subjected 

to various forms 01' intimidation. i\nd the government has eft-ectively bought itselt- control ot- media 

content through preferential placernent of state advertising, even ignoring a 2007 Suprenle Court 

nIiing that ordered the governtnent to advertise in a nondiscritninatory fashion. 

This case is revealing of the frequent dual attack on judicial independence and press freedom, and it 

goes back to 2009 when a law was passed to diversify media ownership. \Vhile the text of the media 

statute tS strnple and couched tn the language of antitrust la\V, the subtext \vas clearly rnorc 

significant~ as the govenlment sought to stit-le dissent and to create an environtnent o~- ~nendly press. 

This was particularly revealed when new licenses and frequencies were granted to goverrlnlent allies 

in a non-cotnpetitive fashion, and \vhen the break-up and expropriation of the Clarin Group, the 

largest nledia organiL:ation in the country, bccatne the tnain function of a newl~/ created agency in 

charge of overscemg that process. 

\\el,en the case got to the Supreme Court in 2012, which granted a temporary stay in favor of Clarin 

and ordered the lo\ver court to nlle on the constitutionality of the la\V, the ,ldv,lnce on the press 

becatne an explicit attack on the judiciary. '10 this end, the gOYernnlent, in control of Congress since 

2011, passed a law meant "to democrati~e the judiciary," namely, to make the members of the 

COI1"ejO de fa M«~iJtlUtllra, the body dnt appoints judges, nln for ofiice through party lists. When d,e 

Supreme Court mled the law unconstitutional in June 2013, which sparked the support of hundreds 

of thousands of citizens on the streets, a syn1bolic and unprecedented reaffirn1(ltion of liberrtl 

democracy took place in the country. 

The Mutilation of Press Freedom 

If several Latin Atncrican detnocracies are substandard in terrns of their constitutional processes, the 

record is dismal \vhen it C01nes to the infringetnent of basic civil liberties, especially the freedom of 

the press, which in some places has become truly tragic. In 'vlexico and BraLil press organiLations 

have regularly been targeted by narco-traHickers and, in Colombia, also by guerrillas and 

paramilit;!TY. Journalists investigating drug-rehted cormption suffer threats, bdmppings, and 
36


82761b-4.eps

assassinations, generally carried out "\)i,~th gnleSOtne cnlelty, and "\vhen the reporter is a female, rape 

has "Iso t,!ken place. 

Seveed governn1ents in the region h,lYe to be held account,lble for this situ(ttion, as they have t~liled 

to protect the rights of journrtlists, either because they h;-lve fostered ;-1 clin1;-lte of intoleelnce under 

which yiolence thriws, or because they have been the perpetrators themselves. The latter IS 

particularly dle case at the subnationallevel, where local audlorities don't haw enoug;h monetary and 

coercive resources to conFront Illegality, and so they end up colluding with, or captured by, all too 

po"\verful critninal orgrmizations. \\Then the state fades, Ll\vlessness reigns supreme. 

In Hondur(ts ,tttacks (tg(tinst journalists h,lYe been elmprli1t since the 2009 coup. Even under the 

T .obo presidency, pro-Zelaya reporters continued to be gunned down, \vhich has since placed the 

country atnong the top of the "\vodd in per capita assassinations of journalists. There is less violence 

in Ecuador, yet President Correa has re-criminalized defamation, as in me days of military rule, and 

regularly tiles lawsuits against "media excesses." !\s in '\rgentina, the government has ,,~thdra""1 

official advertising frotll criticaltnedia outlets, and regularly places lirnitations on l11edia coverage of 

electoral campaigns. 

Tn Vene/.uela the president's discretion to grant, revoke, and suspend rnedia licenses has been, for 

"\Vrty over a decIde no"\v, the preferred strateh'1l to curb their independence. But censorship rU1d 

intimidation has intensified once the opposition '\IUD (l":nited Opposition Table) beg;an to improve 

its electoral perfonnance. Tn fact, as Freedom House reported, in the 21112 election, incumbent 

president ChaveL: benefited frotll tnassive use of state resources that enabled hitll to dorninate nledia 

time by a tnargin of 25-to-1, and used it to convince tnany voters that the state could punish them if 

they were to cast their b"llot for the ()ppositi()n. 

Conclusion 

T have rd-erred elsB.vhere to this dishlrbing trend in tenns of "a ne\v authoritarianistn in Latin 

Atnenca." '1'0 be sure, long gone are the days of systenlatic torture and forced disappearances in 

Latin !\merica, yet the right to political dissent remains unfllililled. !\ generation after the sweeping 

transitions of the 1<)80s, democracy is cndang;ered today, not because of the threat of military 

takeovers, but at risk of losing its meaning and purpose in the hands of presidents that, while freely 

elected, cnlsh freedom once in office. The result hrtS been the creation of it personrJistic, civili,ln, yet 

undemocratic regitne. 

Curiollsly, the intenlational cotlllnunity has rernained silent on these anti-detllocratic practices. One 

after the other, regional sutntnits go on "\vith long discussions and speeches about a variety o~­

topics-trade, integration, infrastructure, you natnc it. liardly a word has been heard, however, on 

the decay of democracy in the region. These pmto-authorit~rian le~ders have thus walked by with 

not even rt sLtp on the "\vrist. It is tinle to go l);-lck to the 19HOs, perhrtps, "\vhen rtbuse ,vas so 

vigorously condemned, and condemn the violation of rights today, whichever those rights arc and 

wherever that happens. 

:;everal analysts have used the label "Tlliberal Democracy," to caphlre the essence 01- these polities. 

They arc wrong. \Vhile all democracies arc susceptible of some degree of illiberalism, d1ere is a 

funomnent(tl question of proportion. In the end, as in L(ttin Atnerica today, Illiberal Democracy is an 

oxyrnoron. 

4 
37

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Laurı ́a. 

And I would just like to ask the panelists again to watch the 

lighting system. And red means stop. So thank you very much. 

Mr. Laurı ́a. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CARLOS LAURI ́A, SENIOR COORDINATOR, 

AMERICAS PROGRAM, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS 

Mr. LAURI ́A. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend 

you and the members of the House Subcommittee on the Western 

Hemisphere for holding this important hearing and for providing 

the Committee to Protect Journalists with the opportunity to testify before you. 

I am CPJ’s America senior program coordinator. CPJ is an independent nonprofit organization dedicated to defend press freedom 

worldwide. And, Mr. Chairman, my statement today will summarize the issues raised in my written testimony. 

I would like to highlight the threats that journalists face while 

reporting the news and its impact on fundamental human rights. 

In different countries, broad aspects of public discourse are limited 

by the threat of violence, government censorship, restrictive laws, 

and financial pressures. The lack of debate on issues of public interest is creating political instability, reducing government accountability, and compromising economic development. 

With the exception of Cuba, democracy in the Americas has become entrenched. While many countries in the region have great 

investigative journalism, reporters and media outlets are still exposed to both violence and government repression, which are the 

emerging trends that illustrate the major challenges facing the 

press in the hemisphere. 

During the last 20 years, transnational criminal groups have extended their sway and spread a wave of lethal violence in Latin 

America. Scores of reporters have been killed or disappeared with 

impunity, as dysfunctional justice systems have been incapable to 

solve these crimes. With more than 50 journalists killed or disappeared over the last 6 years, Mexico is the deadliest country for 

the press in the Americas and one of the most dangerous worldwide. Terror and censorship have devastated the news media, while 

placing Mexico’s democracy at risk. 

Criminal organizations and impunity have also forced the press 

into silence in some Central American countries, but nowhere more 

so than in Honduras. With the highest homicide rate in the world, 

according to U.N. statistics, a climate of violence and widespread 

impunity have made this country one of the most dangerous in the 

region. 

Even as lethal violence has drastically declined in the last decade, as expressed by former President Uribe here in this panel before, Colombia continues to rank among the most murderous countries for journalists in the world, with 44 journalists killed in direct 

reprisal for their work since 1992. This year, unfortunately, CPJ 

has documented a series of press freedom cases that illustrate the 

serious risks journalists still face when reporting on sensitive 

issues. 

38

Besides the threat of physical violence, the subsequent most 

pressing issue for the regional media is an array of restrictive 

measures imposed by democratically elected governments. Showing 

disdain for the institutions of democracy, several governments are 

seeking to stifle dissent and control the flow of information. 

Venezuela provides the starkest example of the lack of tolerance 

for different views and opinions. In the last 14 years, Venezuela 

has used different laws, regulatory measures, judicial decisions to 

progressively break down the private press. Authorities have closed 

dozens of broadcasters, censored critical coverage, and sued reporters for defamation. Venezuela has served as a model to other leaders in the region who are trying to repress dissent and control information, but perhaps none has learned the lesson better than 

President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, whose policies have transformed the country into one of the hemisphere’s most restrictive 

nations for the press. Ecuador has made use of archaic criminal 

defamation laws to silence critical journalists, and the new Communications Law, which establishes regulation of editorial content 

and gives authority and power to censor the press, represents a severe below to freedom of expression. 

In the last few years, Cuba has projected an image of a nation 

opening up economically, but the government has taken no actions 

to promote freedom of expression and access to information. 

Finally, and being in Washington today, I must mention recent 

developments that have worsened the climate for press freedom in 

the United States. Actions taken by the U.S. Department of Justice 

in seizing journalists’ phone records and emails, the aggressive 

prosecution of whistleblowers who leak information to the press, 

classified information to the press, and massive surveillance of 

communications send a chilling message to journalists and their 

sources, particularly on issues of national security that are vitally 

important to the public. At the same time, just as troubling, these 

actions in the United States set a terrible example to the rest of 

the world, where governments routinely justify intervention in the 

media by citing national security. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this subcommittee, thank you again 

for your invitation. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Laurı ́a. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Laurı ́a follows:]

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Testimony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

United States House of Representatives 

Snbmitted by Carlos Lanria 

Americas Senior Program Coordinator 

Committee to Protect Journalists 

September 10, 2013 

"Challenges to Democracy in the Western Hemisphere" 

I would like to commend Chainnan Salmon and the members of the House Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere for holding this important hearing and for providing the Committee to 

Protect Journalists with the opportunity to testify before you. My name is Carlos Lauria, and I 

am cpr s Americas Senior Program Coordinator. CPJ is an independent, nonprofit organization 

dedicated to defending press freedom and the rights of journalists worldwide. It is an honor to 

speak to you today. 

T will focus my testimony on the threats that journalists face while reporting the news and its 

impact on fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression and access to infonnation. 

Tn different countries throughout the hemisphere, broad aspects of public discourse are limited by 

the threat of physical violence, government censorship, restrictive legislation, and financial 

pressures. The lack of vigorous debates on issues of public interest, which is the cornerstone of 

modem democracies, is creating political instability, reducing government accountability, and 

compromising economic development. 

With the exception of Cuba, democracy in the Americas has become finnly entrenched. While 

many countries in the region have great investigative journalism, editorial independence, and 

critical coverage, reporters and media outlets are still exposed to both violence and government 
40


82761c-2.eps

repression. The role of journalists as democracy's watchdogs has gradually become more 

dangerous. Violence and official legal harassment are the main emerging trends that illustrate the 

major challenges facing the press in the Western hemisphere, according to CPJ research. 

During the last two decades, transnational criminal networks have extended their influence and 

spread a wave of lethal violence across Latin America. Political turmoil and weakened 

institutions have been the consequences of their unlawful behavior. In this context, coverage of 

crime, corruption, human rights abuses, and other sensitive issues made journalism a high-risk 

profession. Scores of journalists have been killed, disappeared, and brutally attacked with total 

impunity as dysfunctional and overburdened judicial systems have been incapable to bring to 

justice those responsible forthese crimes, CPJ research shows. 

With more than 50 journalists killed or disappeared over the last six years, Mexico is the 

deadliest country for the press in the Americas, and one of the most dangerous worldwide. Media 

outlets have seen their offices bombed or fired upon and their websites hacked. Violence linked 

to organized crime and corruption have devastated the news media and stripped citizens of their 

rights to freedom of expression and access to infonnation. Terror and censorship have destroyed 

the ability of the press to report the news while placing Mexico's future as a democracy at risk. 

A climate of widespread impunity exacerbates the problem. Journalists are attacked while 

reporting on complicity between criminals and officials, and they have been targeted while 

pursuing crime or corruption stories. Crimes are almost completely unsolved, not only as a 

product of negligence and incompetence, but of pervasive corruption among law enforcement. 

The lines between political and criminal groups are often unclear, raising the risk for reporters. 

Local reporters pay the highest price, as the global trend shows. Nearly nine out often journalists 

killed worldwide are journalists reporting on issues in their own community, according to CPJ 

research. 

In April, CPJ commended the approval of legislation that implements a constitutional 

amendment giving federal authorities in Mexico broader jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against 

freedom of expression as a step forward in the fight against impunity. The legislation establishes 

accountability at senior levels of the national government, evading the more corrupt and less 

effective state law enforcement officials. The administration of President Enrique Pena Nieto 

must now show full political will to break this terrible cycle of impunity. 

Criminal organizations and impunity have also forced the press into silence in some Central 

American countries, but nowhere more so than in Honduras. With the highest homicide rate in 

the world, according to United Nations statistics, a climate of violence and widespread impunity 

has made this country one of the most dangerous in the region. Rampant gang violence, the 

presence of powerful Mexican drug cartels, and deep societal polarization following the 2009 

coup that ousted Manuel Zelaya are all factors that have made the work of reporters even more 

perilous. A total of 16 journalists have been killed in Honduras since July 2009, at least three in 

direct reprisal for their work, CPJ research shows. Pervasive impunity and negligent and 

incompetent investigative work often make it difficult to detennine motives in murder cases, CPJ 

research shows. Honduran authorities' approach toward the killings of journalists has aggravated 

the problem. Officials have played down the threat, often arguing that the murders are not related 

2 
41


82761c-3.eps

to the work of journalists. But so far they have not presented concrete evidence to make their 

case. 

While investigative journalism is thriving in Brazil, a spike in lethal violence has made this 

country one of the most dangerous for journalists in the world, according to CPJ research. Four 

reporters have been killed so far this year, at least three of them in direct retaliation for their 

journalism. In 2012, the second consecutive year, Brazil appeared on cprs Impunity Index, 

which calls attention to countries where journalists are murdered regularly and the killers go 

unpunished. The country was also named to CPJ's Risk List, which identified 10 places where 

press freedom suffered in 2012. Nine out of ten journalists killed in the past two years had 

reported on official corruption or crime and all but one worked in provincial areas. Reporters are 

more vulnerable to attack in provincial areas where law enforcement is weak. Journalists who 

work in urban centers are not immune to threats and violence. Those who cover organized crime, 

official corruption, and drug trafficking have faced serious risks and, in certain cases, are forced 

into hiding and exile. The case of investigative journalist Mauri Konig, a special reporter with 

the Curitiba-based daily Gazeta do Povo, is striking. In late 20\2, Konig received serious death 

threats after an investigative series on police corruption in the state of Parana. After a follow-up 

story last December, he was warned of a plot to kill him and shoot up his house. Konig went into 

hiding and returned to Brazil several weeks later. 

Even as lethal violence has drastically declined in the last decade, Colombia continues to rank 

among the most murderous countries for journalists worldwide, with 44 journalists killed in 

reprisal for their work since 1992. While authorities have made strides in combating impunity in 

cases of murdered journalists, improvements in the overall security climate have generally 

outpaced judicial gains, CPJ research shows. While the number of killings has decreased, threats 

have been on the rise. This year, CPJ has documented a series of press freedom cases that 

illustrate the serious risks journalists still face when reporting on sensitive issues. Authorities 

recently discovered a plot to kill a prominent journalist and two political analysts who had been 

investigating links between local politicians and organized crime. According to Colombian 

officials, an assassin had been hired and paid to kill Gonzalo Guillen, a freelance investigative 

journalist who has produced documentaries and reported for the Miami newspaper F1 Nuevo 

Herald In May, eight provincial reporters covering land restitution efforts by the government 

were threatened by a group that said they had 24 hours to abandon the northern city of 

Valledupar. Ricardo Calderon, who heads Semana magazine's investigative unit, barely escaped 

an assassination attempt in May, CPJ research shows. 

Besides the threat of physical violence, the subsequent most pressing issue for the regional media 

is an array of restrictive legislative, judicial, and regulatory measures imposed by democratically 

elected governments. Showing disdain for the institutions of democracy, several governments are 

seeking to stifle dissent and control the flow of information. Describing critical journalists as the 

un elected opposition, these governments have become increasingly intolerant to media criticism. 

Venezuela provides the starkest example of the lack of tolerance to different views and opinions. 

As CPJ research shows, in the last 14 years Venezuela has used different laws, regulatory 

measures, and judicial decisions to progressively break down the private press. With majority in 

the National Assembly, and control over the judiciary and government regulators, authorities 

3 
42


82761c-4.eps

have closed dozens of broadcasters, censored critical coverage, sued reporters for defamation, 

excluded those deemed unfriendly from official events, and intimidated critical journalists. 

At the same time, Venezuela has built an unprecedented state media empire that is used to harass 

critics and obscure issues like crime and corruption. During the past decade, Venezuela has 

invested heavily to build a large state press conglomerate to further the government's political 

agenda, CPJ research shows. While state media largely broadcast propaganda at the expense of 

plural viewpoints, it is also used as a platform to launch attacks and smear critical journalists. 

Globovision, the only network critical of the government still on the air until recently, was sold 

in May to businessmen with close ties to the Maduro administration. Since then, the network has 

dramatically toned down its criticism while many of its journalists and hosts have left the station 

with accusations of censorship, according to CPJ research. Globovision was sold after being hit 

with huge fines, an array of regulatory sanctions, and facing the probability that its license would 

not be renewed in 2015. 

Venezuela has served as a model to other leaders in the region who are trying to weaken the 

press, repress dissent, and exert control over information. But perhaps none has learned the 

lesson better than President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, whose policies have transformed the 

country into one of the hemisphere's most restrictive nations for the press, according to CPJ 

research. Ecuador has made use of archaic criminal defamation laws to silence critical 

journalists. A former op-ed editor and three executives with the largest circulation daily FI 

Universo were sentenced to three years in prison and $40 million in fines for allegedly defaming 

the president in an opinion column. President Correa also filed a $10 million civil defamation 

lawsuit against investigative journalists Juan Carlos Calderon and Christian Zurita, authors of a 

book called Gran Hermano (Big Brother) on official corruption. Both journalists were ordered to 

pay $1 million each in damages to Correa. The president later pardoned the journalists and 

executives in both cases. But Correa's statement after the pardon-that he was forgiving, but not 

forgetting-was interpreted as warning to all journalists who report critically on his 

administration. 

The new Communications Law approved in June by the Ecuadoran National Assembly 

represents a severe blow to freedom of expression, according to CPJ and other regional and 

international press freedom organizations. The law establishes regulation of editorial content and 

gives authorities the power to impose arbitrary sanctions and censor the press. The restrictive 

provisions and vague language of this legislation run counter to constitutional guarantees and 

international standards on freedom of expression. The law not only undermines journalists' 

ability to report critically but threatens the right of citizens to be informed about sensitive issues. 

The legislation, which created a state watchdog entity to regulate media content, is filled with 

ambiguous language demanding that journalists provide accurate and balanced information or 

face civil or criminal penalties. Article 26, for instance, prohibits "media lynching" that is 

defined as "the dissemination of concerted and reiterative information ... with the purpose of 

undermining the prestige" of a person or legal entity. Media outlets found violating this 

provision could be ordered to issue public apologies and would be subject to criminal and civil 

sanctions that are not specified in the legislation. 

4 
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82761c-5.eps

In the last few years, Cuba has projected an image of a nation opening up economically, but the 

government of President Raul Castro has taken no important actions to promote freedom of 

expression and access to infonnation. The authorities' decision to eliminate exit visa regulations 

that had long restricted Cuban travel is a positive step that has allowed government critics to 

travel abroad. But harassment and intimidation of independent journalists and political dissidents 

have remained constant. Though the government has almost abandoned its policy of long-term 

detentions, short-tenn detentions and harassment, especially surrounding widely covered events, 

is a common practice. Internet penetration remains low, with existing public connections slow 

and expensive. The installation of a fiber-optic cable project financed by Venezuela was 

completed, but analysts say Internet access is still elusive for most Cubans. The general 

population goes online at hotels or government-controlled Internet cafes by means of expensive 

voucher cards. Defying economic and legal obstacles, a vibrant number of independent bloggers 

detail everyday life and offer criticism of the Cuban government. Their blogs are hosted 

outside the country and are largely blocked on the island. Cuba placed ninth on CPJ's global 

survey of most censored countries. 

Being in Washington today I must also mention recent developments that have worsened the 

climate for press freedom in the United States. Actions taken by the United States' Department 

of Justice in seizing journalists' phone records and emails, the aggressive prosecutions of 

whistleblowers who leak classified information to the press, and massive surveillance of 

communications send an unequivocal chilling message to journalists and their sources, 

particularly on issues of national security that are of vital importance to the public. At the same 

time, just as troubling, these actions in the United States set a terrible example for the rest of the 

world, where governments routinely justify intervention in the media by citing national secUlity. 

5 
44

Mr. SALMON. Dr. Arnson. 

STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, LATIN 

AMERICAN PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL 

CENTER FOR SCHOLARS 

Ms. ARNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify today. 

Tomorrow, September 11th, is not only the anniversary of the 

terrorist attacks against the United States, but also marks the 

40th anniversary of the military coup in Chile. The commemorations that are underway in Santiago and other major cities 

throughout the country show how the reckoning with the legacy of 

those abuses, the search for justice, the search to end impunity 

continues to pose tasks for Chilean society even this many decades 

after the formal transition to democracy. 

In terms of democratic governance, I agree with my colleagues, 

there is much to celebrate since the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s, 

when many countries in the region were in the grip of military dictatorship or civil war. But I would like to refer you to my testimony 

to summarize some of those and rather focus on the setbacks to 

representative democracy in the Andean region, but also broader 

challenges to democratic governance in those countries even where 

liberal democracy is strong. 

First, and despite the significant strides in reducing poverty and 

more limited steps in reducing inequality over the last decade, the 

region as a whole remains the most unequal region in the world. 

Social mobility has improved, millions have entered the middle 

class, but they remain highly vulnerable to falling back into poverty. Frustration with corruption, with the poor quality of services, 

and with the unequal distribution of the fruits of economic growth 

remains high, sparking protests from Chile to Brazil to Colombia, 

as we have seen in these recent weeks. 

Second, in many countries electoral democracy survives amidst 

new threats: The unprecedented increase in the rates of crime and 

violence abetted, but not entirely caused by the growing activities 

and sophistication of transnational organized crime. My colleague, 

Mr. Laurı ́a, has pointed to the attacks on the media in places like 

Honduras and Mexico, including those who have reported on organized crime. 

Latin America as a whole has a homicide rate that is more than 

double the global average. It is second only to parts of sub-Saharan 

Africa, and with the notable exception of Colombia it is increasing 

in most countries, disproportionately affecting young men, particularly in urban areas. And as has been mentioned in earlier remarks, this is an especially grave problem in Central America as 

well as part of the Caribbean. 

In addition to these overall trends that affect many countries of 

the region is the growing authoritarianism of regimes in the Andean region and with echoes in places such as Argentina and Nicaragua. 

In previous testimony, my colleagues have outlined many of the 

difficulties. I will summarize, I think, some of the most egregious. 

Today’s populist regimes in Latin America are focused on transformational or revolutionary projects that concentrate power in the 

45

executive and do not envision ceding power to political opponents. 

Even when leaders enjoy significant popular support, largely as a 

result of social programs that have been supported by the high 

prices of basic commodities, the institutions and legal frameworks 

that constrain power have been systematically eroded. Constitutional reforms have done away with limits on Presidential terms. 

There has been the weakening or elimination of checks and balances through the packing of institutions, such as judiciaries and 

electoral councils. Leaders themselves foster actively the polarization of society from above, and politics is lived not as a process of 

bargaining with accepted rules of the game, but as a full-blown 

confrontation between irreconcilable interests. 

Populism’s authoritarian qualities are most evident and advanced in Venezuela. Since his victory by a razor thin margin in 

April 2013, Nicolas Maduro has struggled to establish his authority. The opposition has refused to recognize the legitimacy of his 

election amidst numerous credible allegations of fraud. The government has failed to thoroughly investigate reliable reports of violence against opponents during the electoral period in April, at the 

same time that it conducts thorough investigations of incidents in 

which the opposition is alleged to be responsible. 

The erosion of media freedoms and of political space for autonomous civil society, the aggressive concentration of power in the 

hands of the Presidency, the destruction of checks and balances, 

the assault on the very notion of political pluralism and alternation 

in power, and the fostering of polarization at all levels of society, 

these characteristics of contemporary populism constitute the new 

face of authoritarianism in Latin America. 

But they are not the only threats to democracy and democratic 

governance in the region. To conclude, efforts to support democracy 

must include policies to improve citizen security, combat organized 

crime and its corruption at all levels of society, and foster 

inclusionary growth and development that benefit the region’s citizens more broadly. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much, Dr. Arnson. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Arnson follows:]

46


82761d-1.eps

Testimony of Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson 

Director, Latin American Program 

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 

U.S. Honse of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

"Challenges to Democracy in the Western Hemisphere" 

September 10, 2013 

Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you very much for this opportunity to testify about the numerous challenges to democracy 

in the Western Hemisphere. 

Tomorrow, September 11, 2013, marks the 40th anniversary of the military coup in Chile. The 

coup ushered in years of cruel dictatorship and the violation of human rights on a massive scale. 

Commemorations of the anniversary in Chile demonstrate how the legacy of these abuses-the 

reckoning with the past and the search for justice-pose ongoing tasks for Chilean society even 

decades after the formal transition to democracy. 

Tn terms of democratic governance, there is much to celebrate since the 1960s, '70s, and '80s, 

when many countries of the region were in the grip of military dictatorships or civil war. l Given 

the diversity of experiences with democratization in Latin America, one must take care to avoid 

broad-brush generalizations. Military coups for the most part have been discredited as a path to 

power, but interruptions of the democratic process-the coup in Honduras in 2009 and the 

removal of Paraguay's president in 20 12-are not totally a thing of the past. An authoritarian 

regime remains finnly entrenched in Cuba. At the same time, in most countries of the region, 

ideological conflicts have dissipated as center-left and center-right regimes have converged on 

the need for a strong state to facilitate both the dynamism of a market economy and the 

enhancement of social welfare. A peace process underway in Colombia holds the promise of 

ending close to fifty years of internal armed confli ct. For the most part, the anned forces have 

gone through serious processes of professionalization and are subject to civilian authority. The 

first decade of the 21 ,[ century has seen historic reductions in poverty and some smaller 

reductions in inequality, the growth of the middle class, and the engagement of vibrant civil 

societies in articulating and solving national problems. Indeed, representative democracy has 

appeared to thrive most fully in some of the countries that experienced the devastation of 

democratic breakdown in the 1960s and 1970s. 

1 This testimony draw's 011 the follmving recently published ,yorks: Cynthia l Arnsol1 and Carlos de 13 Torre. 

"Conclusion: The Meaning and Future of Latin American Populism," in Cmlos de la Torre and Cynthia l Arnsol1, 

cds .. Lafin ~lmer;(;an Populism in the Twen~v-Firsl Century (Baltimore.:rvtD: Woodrovv Wilson Center Press and 

Jolms Hopkins University Press, 2013). 351-76: Cynthia J. Arnson and AbralmIn F. Lowentlml, "Foreword," in 

Guillenno O'DOlmell and Philippe C. Schmitter. lhmsitions!rom ~~uthoritarian Rule: Tentarive Conclusions about 

Uncertain TJemocracies (Baltimore, lV1D: Johns Hopkins University Press, 19&6 and 2013). 
47


82761d-2.eps

Before addressing the major setbacks to representative democracy in several countries of the 

Andean region, 1 would like to indicate several broader challenges to democratic governance 

even in those countries where liberal democracy is strong. 

First, and despite the strides in reducing poverty and inequality since the early 2000s, the region 

as a whole remains the most unequal region in the world. Social mobility has improved and 

millions have entered the middle class, albeit they remain highly vulnerable to falling back into 

poverty. Regressive tax structures help to perpetuate longstanding social inequities. Frustration 

with corruption, with the poor quality of services, and with unequal distribution of the fruits of 

economic growth remains high, sparking protests from Chile to Brazil to Colombia. Racial and 

ethnic minorities, women, and those in rural areas continue to suffer the highest rates of 

marginalization and poverty. 

Second, in the majority of countries it has been difficult to combine the procedural minimum of 

democracy-free and fair elections under conditions of universal suffrage-with more 

substantive dimensions such as adherence to the rule of law, the functioning of robust 

institutions, and the practice of citizenship. Liberal democracy is founded on the separation of 

powers, accountability that is horizontal (within and across government institutions) as well as 

vertical (between governments and voters), and respect for basic civil and human rights and 

liberties. Against this ideal is the fact that all too often, power is hyper-concentrated in the 

executive branch, governance institutions as well as political parties are in disrepute, inequality 

before the law remains high and impunity is rampant. These "deficits" of the democratic system, 

and particularly the weakness of institutions, help explain why political systems have imploded 

in several countries of the region, giving rise to populist regimes. 

Third, in many countries, electoral democracy survives amidst new threats-the unprecedented 

increase in rates of crime and violence abetted but not entirely caused by the growing activities 

and sophistication of transnational organized crime. Latin America as a whole has a homicide 

rate that is more than double the global average, 2 is increasing in most countries (Colombia is an 

important exception), and disproportionately affects young people, especially men, in urban 

areas. This is a grave problem in Central America, particularly the so-called "Northern 

Triangle," as well as some parts of the Caribbean. Rampant citizen insecurity in turn undermines 

support for democratic systems and expands support for hard-line, mallo dura approaches that 

perpetuate patterns of abuse---the disproportionate targeting of marginalized youth, for example, 

and the swelling ofprison populations, in which the majority of those incarcerated in many 

countries have never formally been convicted of a crime.' The expansion of organized crime, 

including but not limited to drug trafficking, has spawned violence as well as the penetration and 

corruption of state institutions and political and economic structures of power. 

'Urllled Nations Office 011 Drugs and Crime, hllp:!!W\V\\.ullodc.orgidocumelllsldala-andanal} sis!slalisticslHonllcide!Globa _ sludy _ on _honllcide _2011_ web.pdf 

~ Carlos Basombrio, Tf71at Have We Accomplished? Public Policies to Address the Increase in VIOlent Crime in 

Tatm America, \Voodrmv \Vilsoll Center Reports on the Americas, No. JO, November 2012 
48


82761d-3.eps

In addition to these overall trends is the growing authoritarianism of regimes in the Andean 

region but with echoes in such places as Argentina and Nicaragua. Political scientists have 

coined the term "competitive authoritarianism" to describe the ways in which leaders combined 

democratic rules with authoritarian governance, winning elections in which the voting was 

technically fair but the electoral playing field was skewed in ways that overwhelmingly and 

systematically favored the incumbent." 

Authoritarian populism in Latin America is not characterized by the repression and massive 

human rights violations of bureaucratic authoritarian military regimes of decades past; rather, it 

is reflected in the ways that power is held and exercised. Most significantly in the Andes, 

today's populist regimes are focused on transformational or revolutionary projects that 

concentrate power in the executive and do not envision ceding power to political opponents. 

Even when leaders enjoy significant popular support (largely as a result of social programs 

financed by the boom in commodity prices), the institutions and legal frameworks that constrain 

the unfettered exercise of power have been systematically eroded. Constitutional reforms that do 

away with limits on presidential terms are one factor in that erosion; the weakening or 

elimination of checks and balances through the packing of institutions such as the judiciary or 

electoral councils, are another. Leaders foster the polarization of society from above; politics are 

lived not as a process of bargaining within shared rules of the game but as a full-blown 

confrontation between irreconcilable interests. The fostering of polarization is not unique to 

populist regimes; indeed, all politics rests to some extent on the confrontation of ideologies and 

personalities and the mobilization of mass followings behind a particular leader. What matters is 

the institutional framework within which power is contested and exercised; whether those 

institutions serve to constrain presidential power and permit or prohibit peaceful alternation; and 

whether a vast array of rights, from media freedoms to individual civil and political rights, are 

upheld by the rule of law 

The profound deficits of representation and consequent collapse of party systems in Venezuela, 

Ecuador, and Bolivia have given rise to new forms of populism that explicitly reject liberal, 

representative democracy in favor of direct and vertical linkages between the leader and "the 

people" and the gutting of checks and balances on executive power. Populist leaders have not 

only skirted or undennined existing institutions; they have also coupled processes of deinstitutionalization with efforts to create new institutions that "re-found" the state based on a new 

constitutional order. This "re-foundational" aspect through constitutional reform is one of the 

defining features of radical populism in contemporary Latin Americas 

4 According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan \Vay_ "competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian re,gimes in 'which 

forl1131 democratic institutions exist and are ,videly vie\ved as the primary means of gaining pO\ver, but in \yhich 

incumbents - abuse of the state places them at a si,g:nificant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents. Such rebrimes are 

competitive inlhat opposition parties usc democratic institutions to contest seriollsly [or power. but they arc not 

democratic because the playing field is heavily ske\ved in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair." 

See Steven Levitsky and Lucan 'Vay, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War 

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5. 

, See Cesar MontiIfar. "Rafael Correa and His Plebiscitary Citizens' Revolution," in de la Torre and Arnson, op. cit.. 

295-321 
49


82761d-4.eps

Populism's authoritarian qualities are most evident and advanced in Venezuela. Before his death 

earlier this year, Hugo Chavez dominated virtually every aspect of political life. Through lavish 

social spending financed by the high price of oil (Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in 

the world), and through the sheer force of his charismatic personality, Chavez assembled a loyal 

base of supporters among those who received concrete material and political benefits. He 

buttressed his dominance by stacking institutions such as the judiciary (in 2004 and again in 

2010) and the electoral council with his political supporters. He ensured the loyalty of the armed 

forces through successive purges and likewise stacked the state oil company, PdVSA, with 

loyalists following a failed strike in 2002. 

Since his victory by a razor-thin margin in April 2013 elections, Chavez's designated successor, 

Nicolas Maduro, has struggled to establish his authority. The opposition has refused to 

recognize the legitimacy of his election amidst numerous credible allegations offraud. The 

government has failed to investigate reliable reports of violence against opposition supporters in 

the April electoral period, at the same time that it conducts thorough investigations of incidents 

in which the government alleges the opposition was responsible. 6 Venezuela's withdrawal from 

the inter-American system of human rights protection, as of today, September 20,2013, deprives 

Venezuelan citizens of one of the few instruments of redress provided by international legal 

norms when abuses are not adequately addressed in the domestic court system. 

The Venezuelan economy continues to be in crisis; expropriations have undennined domestic 

investment, while rampant inflation and shortages of electricity, food, and basic consumer goods 

pose a mounting problem for the government. Attempts to reconcile with the private sector, to 

combat low-level corruption, and to name a moderate as Finance Minister have been touted as 

signs of greater pragmatism. So far, however, these measures remain timid; worse still is the 

way anti-corruption cases unfairly target political opponents of the regime. President Maduro 

routinely blames the opposition for the country's mounting economic difficulties-including a 

blackout in early September and the explosion at the Amuay refinery in August 2012-and 

regularly denounces assassination plots hatched from abroad in an effort to deflect attention from 

the government's responsibility for Venezuela's mounting domestic problems. This provides a 

toxic setting for upcoming municipal elections in December 2013. 

Attacks on the press in Venezuela, Ecuador, and to a lesser extent Argentina, constitute troubling 

indicators of the degradation offundamental freedoms. Conditions for the press have 

deteriorated in many countries of Latin America; from Mexico to Honduras to Brazil, journalists 

covering issues of drug trafficking and organized crime have been threatened, physically 

assaulted, and murdered as a result of their reporting. While these attacks reflect a state failure 

to protect citizens and, more generally, to uphold the rule oflaw and overcome impunity, 

criminal groups, not the state, are for the most part responsible. By contrast, the pressures on 

independent media under contemporary populist regimes are explicit, state-directed policies, 

aimed at harassing and punishing critics and limiting the free flow ofinfonnation. 

A See Human Rights Watcll '"Letterto the UN about post-electoral "iolence in Venezuela.'- July I L 2013; based on 

reports by the Venezuelan human rights NGOs. PROVEA and COFAVIC as well as the HlllmnRights Center of the 

Centra1 University ofVeneZllela 
50


82761d-5.eps

The pressures have been the most severe in Venezuela but Ecuador is not far behind. There the 

Rafael Correa administration has seized private media outlets, sued journalists and editors who 

criticize his policies, and interrupted broadcasts to allow government spokespersons to rebut 

unflattering news reports 7 Since his re-election last February, a legislature dominated by 

Correa's supporters has passed a new communications law that subjects the media to criminal 

and civil sanctions for "undermining the prestige" of an individual or entity. The government 

also issued a presidential decree giving the state broad powers to interfere with the work of civil 

soci ety organ i zati on s. 

In Argentina, the government of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has used tax audits to harass 

critics, including Clarin, the most widely circulated newspaper. In defiance of a Supreme Court 

ruling, the government used the state advertising budget to reward supportive media and punish 

outlets critical of the government; fined economists for publishing inflation statistics at odds with 

the government's figures; and brought the sole newsprint manufacturer under government 

regulation, a company in which the two largest papers sharply critical of the governmentClarin and ht Naciol1-owned a majority stake. S 

The erosion ofmedia freedoms and of political space for autonomous civil society, the 

aggressive concentration of power in the hands of the presidency, the destruction of checks and 

balances, the assault on the notion of political pluralism and alternation in power, and the 

fostering of polarization at all levels of society-these characteristics of contemporary populism 

constitute the face of authoritarianism in Latin America today. But they are not the only threats 

to democratic governance in the region Efforts to support democracy must include policies to 

improve citizen security, combat organized crime and its corruption at all levels of society, and 

foster inclusionary growth and development that benefit the region's citizens more broadly. 

Thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts and concerns about the state of democracy 

in Latin America. 1 look forward to any questions you might have. 

- The most notorious case inyolved an editor and three board members of the largest privately owned ne'\yspapec tJ 

Universo, who "vere convicted of defamation and sentenced to three-year terms for publishing an editorial entitled, 

"No a las mentiras, .. ("No to Lies"); the paper \vas also fined $40 million All fonY of those convicted \vere 

pardoned in early 2012 

x The govenunellt accllsed La Nacion and ('larfn of collusion with the military dictatorship in acquiring mvnership 

of the company. Papel Prensa. Under anti-trust provisions of a controversial 2009 media law the govenunent also 

ordered ('lorEn in late 2012 to sell its e"\.1ensive cable. radio. and television stations 
51

Mr. SALMON. We will now turn to the questioning phase of our 

hearing. And given the time constraints that we have, I will limit 

each member, including myself, to 3 minutes. 

I just have one question, and, Dr. Schamis, I would like to direct 

it to you. While Argentina has high Freedom House ratings for political rights and civil liberties, the government of President 

Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner enacted a controversial media law 

regulating broadcast and print media. How would you characterize 

the current status of media freedom in Argentina and the government’s effort to break up the media concentration? What is your 

view of recent efforts by the Argentine Government to provide for 

the election of magistrates to oversee the judiciary. More broadly, 

how would you assess the current state of democracy in Argentina? 

Mr. SCHAMIS. Mr. Chairman, yes, one could say that the current 

Government of Argentina has conducted a double strategy to try to 

stay in power longer than elected for, control of the media, control 

of information in the form of legislation that, while it was written 

in simple antitrust law, was no more than an attempt to break 

down the main media organization in the country and take away 

different outlets, whether radio or audio-visual or print, and give 

it to friends. And that has already started to happen, and now it 

is up to the Supreme Court to decide on the constitutionality of 

that law. 

The second strategy of the government to stay in office was to 

have control of the so-called magistratura, which is an organ, an 

institution that appoints, nominates judges, and to invoke in the 

name of democratization of justice, make those appointments electable through political party lists. That law would have control of 

the nomination and appointment of judges, including the electoral 

courts, which at a time in which reelection, indefinite reelection 

was in the minds of many people in the government, that would 

have been, you know, extremely convenient. However, the Supreme 

Court in a 6–1 ruling determined the inconstitutionality of that reform, in what introduced, I have to say, a breath of fresh air into 

Argentine society and politics. 

Recently there has been an election. The government didn’t do 

well, and there is all of a sudden a lot less, if any, talk of reelection. And there is an upcoming election in October in which the 

government has gone from 54 percent in 2011 to 26 percent just 

now. And much of that has to do with the, I would say, courageous 

attitude taken by the judiciary and also by Argentine society that 

has expressed in a clear and loud way its rejection of any attempts 

of perpetuity on the part of the government. 

And therefore we will see what happens with the ruling of the 

Supreme Court on the constitutional status of this law, but overall 

the climate in Argentina, both in terms of freedom of expression 

and independence of the courts, has improved dramatically from 

just, I would say, 6 months ago. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I actually had 

100 more questions I wanted to ask our panel. But thank you so 

much for the testimony that you have given. 

52

Let me just ask one question and I would like to ask all three 

of you to comment on it. We have got problems of a permanent constitutional framework of how these governments are lacking and 

then the problem of absolutely no freedom of the press and what 

they are doing to the journalists. And then Dr. Arnson’s observation, the fact that corrupt governments are also a major cause of 

instability that we have in Latin countries. I had asked earlier to 

President Uribe, could you give me, each one of you, what you consider to be the top priority of what we need to do in dealing with 

Latin America. 

Dr. Arnson. 

Ms. ARNSON. I will start. In terms of supporting democratic governance, I think it is obvious that the United States needs to use 

its voice and prestige on behalf of democratic systems and on behalf of those who are struggling to preserve and advance the cause 

of democracy in the region. When I say that, I also note that the 

involvement of the United States, for example in supporting overtly 

the opposition in Venezuela or Bolivia or Ecuador, is not something——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, what about the fact that 85——

Ms. ARNSON [continuing]. That the opposition itself is in favor of, 

and it is often the kiss of death. And so it is very, very complicated 

to find ways concretely to support, other than rhetorically and verbally, to support democracy and civil society. There are restrictions 

on the flow of funds to civil society organizations in virtually every 

country in the Andean populist region. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What about the fact that 85 percent of all 

the small arms that come into Mexico comes from the United 

States causing one of the serious, serious problems. And I am 

sorry. We can get into that discussion, but I need to get to Mr. 

Laurı ́a and Dr. Schamis. 

What do you consider to be the top priority of what we should 

do as a country to deal with Latin America? 

Mr. LAURI ́A. Sure. First of all, I think that, you know, the issue 

of killings and disappearances of journalists should be part of, you 

know, the bilateral agenda of the U.S. in talks with Mexico and 

other countries like Honduras and even Brazil, where journalists 

are killed with total impunity. That is an important point. 

And I think that another point is, and was expressed before, that 

a group of countries of the ALBA bloc are aggressively attacking 

one of the model systems in the protection and promotion of human 

rights in the hemisphere in the world, which is the Inter-American 

System of Human Rights. The U.S. should work with regional 

countries, heavyweights like Mexico and Brazil, to strongly support 

the Inter-American human rights systems. Reforms like the ones 

proposed by the ALBA could really weaken the Inter-American 

human rights system, the Inter-American Commission and its special rapporteur. And this is a last line of defense for citizens in the 

Americas when their human rights are violated. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Radel. 

Mr. RADEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

53

I have worked as a journalist all of my life. Started as an intern 

at CNN. I have worked in radio, print, TV. So this is something 

near and dear to my heart. I firmly believe, for the record, that 

without a free press you are not a free country in any way, shape, 

or form. 

My question, Mr. Laurı ́a, would actually be with respect to Cuba. 

I guess it would be the Cuba question, without Mr. Sires or Ms. 

Ros-Lehtinen here today. We have seen some economic reforms, 

and I put gigantic sarcastic quotation marks around reforms in 

Cuba, but I would ask you, has there been any sort of reform to 

move toward a freer press or even freedom of discussion in the 

country of Cuba? 

Mr. LAURI ́A. Thank you for your question. I think it is a very important one. Unfortunately, despite, you know, the opening up in 

the economic and political aspects, there has been no attempt by 

the Cuban Government to promote freedom of expression and even 

access to information. There is a project recently implemented in 

Cuba, a cable fiber optic project financed by Venezuela that was 

going to provide more Internet infrastructure. That is not available 

for the Cubans. The government has changed its policy of longterm detentions, for short-term detentions, but harassments, intimidation, and beatings of independent journalists and political 

dissidents continue to be widespread. 

Mr. RADEL. And to clarify that, too, then the technology that they 

are putting into the country is simply used for government officials 

and, what, potentially tourists that show up if they want to have 

Internet access? 

Mr. LAURI ́A. Well, it is for government officials or for, you know, 

people that have close ties with the government. 

Mr. RADEL. Sure. 

Mr. LAURI ́A. Common citizens have no access to Internet and 

have to rely on Internet cafes or hotels to get access. 

Mr. RADEL. All right. To all three of you, thank you so much for 

your time today. 

I yield the rest of my time. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you to our distinguished panel. This has 

been a very enlightening hearing today. We are proud of the job 

that most of the countries in the Western Hemisphere have done 

protecting human rights and promoting freedom and democracy, 

but we have some challenges, some bumps in the road that we are 

all going to have to work together to try to overcome. And so I appreciate your testimony in shedding the light on some issues that 

need to be examined and corrected, and we applaud your efforts. 

Thank you very much. 

Without any other business, this committee will now adjourn. 

[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(55)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

56

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82761n.eps

SlIBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Matt Salmon (R-AZ), Chairman 

September 5, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfullJ requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held 

by the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and 

available live 011 the Committee website at \-'.\\\\' foreinJ1Jffairs.hou,;;,e.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday. September 10. 2013 

3:00 p.m. 

Challenges to Democracy in the Western Hemisphere 

Pancll 

Mr. Alvaro Uribe Velez 

Senior Fellmv 

Bipartisan Polie\' Center 

(Former President olthe RepublIc of ColombIa) 

Panel II 

Hector E. Schamis, Ph.D. 

Adjunct Professor 

Center for Latin American Studies 

GcorgctovYll University 

Mr. Carlos Lauria 

Senior Coordinator 

Americas Program 

Committee to Protect J oumalists 

Cynthia I Arnson, Ph.D 

Director 

Latin American Program 

\\Toodrow \\Tilson International Center for Scholars 

By Direction of the Chairman 
57

Æ


82761m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MI:--lUTES OP SUBCOMMITTEE 0:-'; ______ ---"th=e~lcc~e="·:c~J!."''''the'' __ . _____ HEARING 

D"y_~1:0.!1""e",s=.d",aJ,-' __ D.te. __ -"O",9~-1",O,--=.2",Ol",3,--__ Room_--,2",1C-'7."2,",R",H",-"O,,,B,-_ 

Recesses L-to __ l L-to ----> L-to ---.J L-to __ l L-to __ ) L-to __ ) 

Presiding i\'icmb ... (s) 

Chairman .}falt Salmon 

Check all of Ihe jollowing that app(y: 

Open Session 0 .Executive (closed) Session 0 Televised 0 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Rccord£llJt.ped) [Z] 

Stenographic Record [{] 

"Challenges 10 Democracy in the ""estem Hemisphere" 

SUBCOMi\TITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Chairman Malt Salmon, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Rep. leifDuncan, Rep. Trey Rtldel, Ranking ,11ember 

Albit' Sires, Rep. Eni Faleomavuega {I.nll Rep. Theodore Deutch. 

NON,5UBCOM'IUTTEE ~lEMBERS PRESENT: (Marlcwilh an * !fthey are not members oj/ilil committee.) 

Chairman Ed Royce 

HEARING WITNESSES: Sa.me.as mecring lIotiee attached? Yes EJ No 0 

(if "nn ", please list bel~7W and inch.de title, agency, depar'fment, or organization.) 

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TIME ADJOURNED 4131 p.m,