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******************************************************MARK HEINONEN v. WALLACE I. GUPTON ET AL. (AC 38414)
Sheldon, Keller and Prescott, Js. Argued January 13—officially released May 9, 2017 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Danbury, Truglia, J.)
Mark Heinonen, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Leslie A. Link, for the appellees (defendants).Opinion PER CURIAM. The self-represented plaintiff, Mark Heinonen, appeals from thejudgment ofthe trial court dismissing this action alleging fraud on the part of the defendants, Wallace I. Gupton and Roberta S. Douglas, in connection with their purchase of property located in the town of Sherman. The dispositive claim in this appeal is whether the court improperly dismissed this action for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction due to his lack of standing.1 We affirm thejudgment ofthe court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On February 6, 2015, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that in January, 2012, the defendants illegally purchased property located at 138 Rt. 37 South in Sherman (premises) ‘‘without the owners’ knowledge and for a fraction of its real value.’’ In paragraph three of his complaint, he alleged that in October, 2007, he transferred his interest in the premisestohisthreechildrenbymeansofatrustinstrument.2 In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff requested the sum of $3,000,000 to compensate him for the ‘‘agony he has suffered as aresult ofthe defendants’ fraud—cruel and illegal dealings.’’
On March 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismissthis action and an accompanyingmemorandum of law on the ground that the court lacked subject matterjurisdiction. Specifically, the defendants argued that the plaintiff, as a prior owner of the premises, lacked standing to prosecute a claim that he was defrauded as the rightful owner of the property. On April 9, 2015, the plaintiff, by means of a single filing, objected to the motion to dismiss and moved for summaryjudgment in his favor.3 The court heard argument
on the defendants’ motion to dismiss onApril 27, 2015.
In its decision granting the motion to dismiss, the courtfoundinrelevantpart: ‘‘Inthis action, the plaintiff

. . . claims compensatory damages for fraudulent actions allegedly committed by the defendants when theypurchased [thepremises].4Theplaintiffclaimsthat in January of 2012, the defendants illegally purchased the premises ‘without the owner’s knowledge and for
a fraction of its real value.’ The defendants argue in supportoftheirmotionthatitisundisputed (andadmitted in the plaintiff’s complaint) that he no longer owns anyinterestinthepremisesand,therefore, hasnostanding to bring the present suit. In response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has filed a combined objection to the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment5

. . . essentially assertingthatthemannerinwhichthe defendants came into ownership of the premises was tainted by illegality.

. . . ‘‘Afterreviewingthe allegations oftheplaintiff’s complaint and the briefs ofthe parties, the court is satisfiedand agrees with the defendants that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. The record indicates that the plaintiff is not the current owner of the premises which are the subject of this action, had no interest in the premises at the time of conveyance to the defendants, or any time thereafter, and has not owned any interest in the premises since October of 2007.’’ (Footnotes added.)
The court rendered ajudgment of dismissal on May 12, 2016, afterconcludingthattheplaintifflackedstanding to bring this action because he was not the owner of the premises and, therefore, was not an aggrieved party with respect to the subject matter of his complaint. On May 27, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for clarification, articulation, and reargument, which the court denied on June 1, 2015. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. Before we address the merits ofthe plaintiff’s claim,
we first set forth the standard of review. ‘‘The proper procedural vehicle for disputing a party’s standing is a motion to dismiss.’’ D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 615 n.6, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). ‘‘A motion to dismiss

. . . properlyattacksthejurisdictionofthe court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 627, 941 A.2d 266 (2008). ‘‘[O]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [granting] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.

. . . When a

. . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light

. . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those allegedinthe complaint, includingthosefactsnecessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.

. . . The motion to dismiss

. . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 122 Conn. App. 438, 442–43, 998 A.2d 838 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 305 Conn. 523, 46 A.3d 102 (2012). ‘‘Any claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived; and whenever it is found after suggestion of theparties orotherwisethatthe courtlacksjurisdiction ofthesubjectmatter, thejudicialauthorityshalldismiss the action.’’ Practice Book § 10-33. ‘‘Whenever the absence ofjurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996).Inthepresentcase, the defendants’ motionto dismiss
was premised on the plaintiff’s lack of standing. ‘‘If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Because standing implicates the court’s subject matterjurisdiction, theplaintiffbearstheburdenofestablishingstanding. A trial court’s determination ofwhether a plaintiff lacks standing is a conclusion of law that is subject to plenary review on appeal. We conduct that plenary review, however, in light ofthe trial court’s findings of fact, which we will not overturn unless they are clearly
erroneous.

. . . In undertaking this review, we are mindful ofthe well establishednotionthat, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.

. . . This involves a two part function: where the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision; where the factual basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must determinewhetherthefactssetoutinthememorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Success, Inc. v. Curcio, 160 Conn. App. 153, 162–63, 124 A.3d 563, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 952, 125 A.3d 531 (2015). ‘‘Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved.

. . . The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate
a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter ofthe decision, as distinguished from a general interest

. . . . Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that the specific personal and legal interest has been specifically and injuriously affected by the decision.

. . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest

. . . has been adversely affected.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 207, 994 A.2d 106 (2010). ‘‘Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrievedparties out ofcourt; noris itatest ofsubstantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to
ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights ofothers
are forged in hot controversy, with eachview fairly and vigorously represented.

. . . These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim ofdirectinjuryhe has sufferedor is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy

. . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy.

. . . The requirement ofdirectness between the injuries claimed by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also isexpressed, inourstandingjurisprudence, bythefocus
on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert the claim at issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) PNC Bank, N.A. v. Kelepecz, 289 Conn. 692, 705, 960 A.2d 563 (2008).
In his complaint, the plaintiff admitted that he had not possessed any ownership interest in the premises since October, 2007, and that the sale that he alleges
was fraudulent and illegal took place in 2012. Although the plaintiff challenges the legality of the sale of the premises to the defendants, it is undisputed factually that he relinquished any interest, whether legal or equitable in nature, to the premises when he transferred his interest to the trust he created for the benefit of his children.6Afterthoroughlyreviewingthe record, we agree with the court that the plaintiff, in his individual capacity, was not entitled to set the machinery of the court in operation to obtain redress for an injury he claims to have suffered as a result ofan alleged fraudulent transfer ofthe premises. The plaintiff did not hold
an ownership interest, whether legal or equitable in nature, in the premises at the time he filed the complaint—andindeedhadheldnosuchinterestsince2007. The sale occurred in 2012. An ‘‘owner’’ is ‘‘[o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and convey something; a person in whom one or more interests are vested,’’ and ‘‘ownership’’ means ‘‘[t]he bundle ofrights allowing one to use, manage, and enjoy property, including the right to convey it to others.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009). Ifthe plaintiff intended to assert a claim to protect an allegedly fraudulent deprivation of the interest of the children’s trust in the premises, such a claim, if viable, should have been brought by the trustee.7 ‘‘The trustee is the proper person to bring an action against anyone who wrongfully interferes with the interests of
atrust.’’Naierv. Beckenstein, 131 Conn. App. 638, 646, 27 A.3d 104, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 910, 32 A.3d 963 (2011). The court’s conclusion that the plaintiff lacked standingislegallycorrectandwhollysupportedbyfacts that the plaintiff fully admitted.
The judgment is affirmed.

1 Becauseourdecisionontheissueofsubjectmatterjurisdictionisdispositive of this appeal, we need not address the plaintiff’s other four claims, which essentially allege error with respect to the court’s refusal to consider his case on the merits.

2 The plaintiffattachedto his combined objectionto the motionto dismiss and motion for summary judgment a copy of the trust instrument and the probate court decree, dated December 28, 2011, Landgrebe, J., accepting and approving it. Theprobate court decree referencesthe court’s awareness ofboth ‘‘[the plaintiff’s] stated

. . . declination to receive

. . . [his interest inthepremises] and [theplaintiff’s recognition of] the transferofhis interest [in the premises] to his children by way of his described irrevocable trustagreement to the Court

. . . .’’

3 Attached to this filing are ten exhibits comprised ofthe trust instrument, excerpts from legal decisions and treatises, and various other documents, without any accompanying analysis. Exhibit eight is a copy of the contract of sale for the premises, executed by the defendants and Arthur Scott, the executor of the estate of the plaintiff’s mother.

4 ‘‘This action is one of a long line of cases brought by the plaintiff to contest the disposition by the New Fairfield/Sherman Probate Court of the assets of the estate of Barbara H. Scott, the [plaintiff’s] late mother, who died on December 1, 2006. The principal asset ofher estate [was the premises]

. . . . ‘‘TheplaintiffdidattachwhatpurportstobetwodecreesoftheHousatonic Regional Probate Court

. . . . The first is a decree for sale ofthe [premises] in which it was expressly noted that ‘the will of the said deceased (Scott) does not prohibit the sale or mortgage of said property.’ ’’ Heinonen v. Landgrebe, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-12- 5009022-S (January 15, 2014), appeal dismissed, Appellate Court, Docket No. 36860 (July 9, 2014), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 922, 100 A.3d 853 (2014).

5 The court, having found it lacked subject matterjurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing, did not consider his motion for summary judgment.
6 The plaintiff questions the validity of the probate of his mother’s will by asserting that the defendants, along with certain lawyers and relatives of the decedent, illegally participated in the perpetration of a fraud upon the rightful heirs of the estate, which commenced with a redrafting of her will shortly before she died. The defendants purchased the premises from the estate in a sale that was approved by the probate court. Although the plaintiff claims to be seeking to protect his children’s interests, during argument before the trial court, he referred to himselfas the owner ofboth thepremises andthe trust, andhisprayerforreliefseeks only compensation for himself.

7 To the extent that the plaintiff is the trustee, he did not bring his action in that capacity.