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Attachment A 

Unclassified Report to Congress 

on the Acquisition of Technology 

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 

 1 July Through 31 December 2002

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response 

to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence 

Authorization Act, which requires: 

“(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 

months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report 

on 

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use 

and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of 

mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological 

weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and 

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries.” 

At the DCI’s request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms 

Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the 

Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is 

unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of the Intelligence 

Community’s assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional 

munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for the 

Congress. 
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Acquisition by Country 

As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following 

are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and 

deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional 

weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 2002. We have 

excluded countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries 

that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern. 

Iran 

Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce WMD—

nuclear, chemical, and biological—and their delivery systems as well as ACW. To this 

end, Iran continued to seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how. 

During the reporting period, Iran focused particularly on entities in Russia, China, North 

Korea, and Europe. 

Nuclear. The United States remained convinced that Tehran pursued a nuclear 

weapons program, counter to its responsibilities as a party to the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear fuelcycle capabilities, Iran sought technology that can support fissile material production for 

a nuclear weapons program. 

Iran tried to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to 

establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. In 

August 2002, an Iranian opposition group disclosed that Iran was secretly building a 

heavy water production plant and a "nuclear fuel" plant. Press reports later in the year 

confirmed these two facilities using commercial imagery and clarified that the "fuel" 

plant was a large uranium enrichment facility located at Natanz. Imagery showed that 

Iran was burying the enrichment facility presumably to hide it and harden it against 

military attack. Following the press disclosures, Iran announced at the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) September 2002 General Conference that it had 

"ambitious" nuclear fuel cycle plans and intended to develop all aspects of the entire 

fuel cycle. By the end of 2002, the IAEA had requested access to the enrichment 

facility at Natanz, but despite Iran's agreement in principle, the IAEA visit had yet to 

occur. The IAEA planned to investigate the newly disclosed facilities, including a 

verification of whether Iran has violated its NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement in 

developing these facilities and the related technologies. 

Although Iran claimed that its nascent enrichment plant is to produce fuel for 

Bushehr and other future power reactors, we remained convinced that Iran's true 

purpose was to develop fissile material production capabilities for nuclear weapons. 

Even if Iran allowed intrusive IAEA safeguards inspections at Natanz, there is serious 

risk that Iran could use technology developed there to build a separate covert facility. 

Although Iran claimed its heavy water plant was for peaceful purposes, Iran has no 
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large heavy water reactors for which it would need such amounts of heavy water. We 

believe Iran was pursuing the heavy water option in hopes of eventually building a 

heavy water reactor to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. We also suspect that 

Tehran was interested in acquiring fissile material and technology from foreign suppliers 

to support its overall nuclear weapons program. 

Despite Bushehr being put under IAEA safeguards, Russia's provision of 

expertise and manufacturing assistance helped Iran to develop its own nuclear 

technology infrastructure. In addition, facing economic pressures, some Russian 

entities showed a willingness to provide assistance to other nuclear projects within Iran. 

For example, an institute subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy 

(MINATOM) agreed to deliver in late 2000 equipment that was clearly intended for 

atomic vapor laser isotope separation, a technology capable of producing weaponsgrade uranium. As a result of US protests, the Russian Government halted the delivery 

of some of this equipment to Iran. 

Chinese entities continued to assist a zirconium production facility at Esfahan 

that will enable Iran to produce cladding for reactor fuel. As an adherent to the NPT, 

Iran is required to accept IAEA safeguards on its nuclear material. The IAEA’s 

Additional Protocol required states to declare production of zirconium fuel cladding and 

gave the IAEA the right of access to resolve questions or inconsistencies related to the 

declarations, but Iran has made no moves to sign the Additional Protocol. Zirconium 

production was not subject to declaration or inspection. 

Missile. Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet 

Union, North Korea, and China over the years helped Iran move toward its goal of 

becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during 

the second half of 2002 continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise. 

Iran, already producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), was in the late 

stages of developing the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), and 

announced its development of a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-110. In 

addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the 

Shahab-3. It originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable 

ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space launch 

vehicle with no military applications. Iran’s Defense Minister has also publicly 

mentioned a “Shahab-5.” Such statements strongly suggested that Tehran intends to 

develop a longer-range ballistic missile capability. 

Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 

Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek chemicals, production 

technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's 

efforts at achieving an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran already 

stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents—and the bombs and artillery shells to 

deliver them—which it previously had manufactured. It probably also had made some 

nerve agents. 
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Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention 

(BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Foreign dual-use 

biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise--primarily, but not exclusively, from 

entities in Western Europe and Russia--featured prominently in Iran’s procurement 

efforts. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran’s biological warfare (BW) 

program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to 

produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to seek and acquire 

conventional weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and 

North Korea. Since Russia announced in November 2000 that it was abrogating the 

Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, the Russian and Iranian Governments and firms have 

engaged in high-level discussions on a wide variety of military services and equipment--

including air defense, naval, air and ground weapons, and technologies. 

Contract negotiations, which may take years to complete, continued in the 

months after the signing of a military-technical cooperation agreement in October 2001. 

Various Russian officials and academicians suggested that sales under this new 

agreement could, in the next few years, make Iran Russia's third-largest arms customer, 

after China and India. Until that agreement is concluded, Russia will continue to deliver 

on existing contracts. Estimates of conventional arms sales to Iran of $300 million per 

year would put Iran’s share of Russian sales worldwide at roughly 10 percent, 

compared to more than 50 percent going to China and India. 

Iran's search for conventional weapons was global. In particular, Iran capitalized 

on the specialized weapons services and lower prices that China and North Korea have 

offered. Elsewhere, Iran sought out products, particularly weapons components and 

dual-use items, that are superior in quality to those available from Russia or that proved 

difficult to acquire through normal government channels. 

Iraq 

After four years in which it refused UN weapons inspections, on 16 November 

2002, Iraq agreed to inspection by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and 

Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA, and inspections commenced on 27 

November 2002. On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a 12,200-page weapons 

declaration under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. In that declaration, 

Iraq still maintained that it possessed no WMD, including BW or CW. A full assessment 

or verification of that declaration was not completed by the end of 2002, but much of the 

declaration was a repeat of previous submissions, and in some instances disagreed 

with what UNMOVIC already knew. On 5 February 2003, US Secretary of State Powell 

briefed the UN Security Council that US intelligence indicated Iraq actively concealed 

prohibited activities and materials prior to and during UN weapons inspections. 

UNSCR 1441, passed unanimously by the UN Security Council on 8 November 

2002, declared Iraq in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Iraq never gave 

up completely on almost all aspects of its previous WMD and missile programs, and 
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continued to pursue ever more elaborate schemes for denial and deception. Between 

late 1998 and late November 2002, Baghdad denied UN inspectors entry into Iraq, and 

interfered with automated video monitoring systems previously installed by the UN at 

known and suspected WMD facilities in Iraq. Also, in recent years and during this 

reporting period, Baghdad diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for-Food Program 

for military purposes and increased solicitations and dual-use procurements--outside 

the Oil-for-Food process--some of which almost certainly went to prohibited WMD, 

missile, and other weapons programs. Baghdad doubtless also used some of the 

money it gained through its illicit oil sales to support its WMD efforts. 

Nuclear. More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq's 

physical nuclear infrastructure under IAEA oversight have not diminished Saddam's 

interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Iraq's efforts to procure tens of 

thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes were of significant concern. All 

intelligence experts agreed that Iraq remained intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and 

that these tubes, if modified, could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most 

intelligence specialists assessed this to be the intended use, but some believed that 

these tubes were probably intended for use as casings for tactical rockets. 

Before the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development 

program that focused on building an implosion-type weapon using highly enriched 

uranium. Baghdad attempted a variety of uranium enrichment techniques, the most 

successful of which were the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas 

centrifuge programs. After its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a crash program to 

divert IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet- and French-supplied 

reactors, but the onset of hostilities ended this effort. Defector reports provided tipoffs 

and IAEA inspectors (prior to 1998) made significant strides toward dismantling Iraq's 

pre-1991 nuclear weapons program, but Baghdad still has not provided complete 

information on all aspects of its nuclear program. In the absence of inspections from 

1998 to late 2002, however, most analysts assessed that Iraq had reconstituted its 

nuclear program--unraveling the IAEA's hard-earned accomplishments. Since 

inspections restarted in late 2002, IAEA/INVO inspectors had not uncovered evidence 

of a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. 

Iraq withheld significant details relevant to its nuclear program, including 

procurement information, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of 

materials, foreign assistance, and weapons design, and the role of Iraqi security 

services in concealing its nuclear facilities and activities. 

Iraq largely retained its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, its program 

documentation, and sufficient dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a 

reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi media reported numerous meetings 

between Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years, which signaled 

Baghdad's continued interest in reviving a nuclear program. 

During the last half of 2002, Iraq's international trade expanded and provided 

growing access to nuclear-related technology and materials, and potential access to 
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foreign nuclear expertise. An increase in dual-use procurement activity in recent years 

might have supported a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. The acquisition of 

sufficient fissile material remained Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear 

weapon. Iraq was unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for 

a deliverable nuclear device for five to seven years. Baghdad could have produced a 

nuclear weapon within a year if it had procured weapons-grade fissile material abroad. 

Missile. Iraq developed ballistic missiles that have flown beyond the 150- 

kilometer range limitation established under UNSCR 687. During the 1970s and 1980s, 

Iraq purchased 819 Scud B missiles from the USSR. Hundreds of these 300-km range 

missiles were used to attack Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War. Beginning in 1987, 

Iraq converted many of these Soviet Scuds into extended-range variants, some of which 

were fired at Tehran; some were launched during the Gulf war, and others remained in 

Iraq's inventory at war's end. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of its Scud warheads with 

chemical or biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against Coalition 

forces and regional opponents, including Israel in 1991. UNSCOM also discovered that 

some missiles had been armed with biological agents. 

Most of the approximately 90 Scud-variant missiles Saddam fired at Israel, Saudi 

Arabia, and Bahrain during the 1991 Gulf war were al-Husayn variants that the Iraqis 

modified by decreasing the payload weight and lengthening the airframe to increase 

propellant capacity, which extended the range to 650 km. 

Baghdad developed other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, 

including the 900-km al-Abbas. Iraq designed follow-on multi-stage and clustered 

medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000 km. 

Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Badr-2000, using a 

large solid-propellant motor first stage with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km. 

Based on discrepancies in Baghdad's declarations and in numerous intelligence 

reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq, we assessed that Iraq retained a 

small force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles and an undetermined number of 

launchers and warheads. Further, Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced 

missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on 

its own and that would be critical to developmental programs. 

Iraq continued to work on shorter-range ballistic missiles, the liquid-propellant alSamoud-II and the solid-propellant al-Fat'h short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The 

al-Fat'h was formerly known as the Ababil-100. Iraq admitted and we know from 

intelligence that the al-Samoud-II and the al-Fat'h SRBMs both flew beyond the 150-km 

UN limit. Both missiles were tested aggressively and deployed to military units. In 

advance of UN inspections, Iraq moved components and support equipment of the alFat'h missile from the al-Musayyib rocket test facility and from the Ibn al Haytham facility 

in November 2002. 
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Other evidence strongly suggested that Iraq modified missile testing and 

production facilities to produce even longer-range missiles. The Al-Rafah-North Liquid 

Propellant Engine Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Facility 

was Iraq's principal site for the static testing of liquid propellant missile engines. 

Baghdad had been building a new test stand there that was much larger than the test 

stand associated with al-Samoud engine testing and the defunct Scud engine test 

stand. A plausible explanation for this test facility was that Iraq intended to test engines 

for longer-range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687. We also had separate 

information that suggested that Iraq pursued a longer-range liquid-propellant missile 

capable of flying beyond 1,200 km. 

The Al-Mutasim Solid Rocket Motor and Test Facility, previously associated with 

Iraq's Badr-2000 solid-propellant missile program, was rebuilt and expanded in recent 

years. The Al-Mutasim site supported solid-propellant motor assembly, rework, and 

testing for the UN-authorized Ababil-100, but the size of certain facilities there, 

particularly those newly constructed between the assembly rework and static test areas, 

suggested that Baghdad was preparing to develop systems that are prohibited by the 

UN. 

At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT&E Facility, the 

Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, rebuilt structures damaged 

during the Gulf war and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built to 

manufacture solid-propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. UNMOVIC reported 

that this reconstruction included a building and two casting chambers that UNSCOM 

had dismantled because they were used to cast Badr-2000 motors. Also at Al-Mamoun, 

the Iraqis rebuilt two structures used to house the solid- propellant mixers for the Badr2000 missile. 

Iraq managed to rebuild and expand its missile development infrastructure under 

sanctions. Iraqi intermediaries sought production technology, machine tools, and raw 

materials, in violation of the arms embargo. UNMOVIC reported that Iraq illegally 

imported 380 SA-2/Volga engines. These were the same engines used in the alSamoud 2 SRBM, and some were imported as recently as December 2002--when 

UNMOVIC inspectors were already in Iraq. The Iraqis completed a new ammonium 

perchlorate production plant at Al-Mamoun that supported Iraq's solid propellant missile 

program. Ammonium perchlorate is a common oxidizer used in solid-propellant missile 

motors. Baghdad would not have been able to complete this facility without technical 

and material assistance from abroad. In August 1995, Iraq was caught trying to acquire 

sensitive ballistic missile guidance components, including gyroscopes originally used in 

Russian strategic nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which demonstrated 

that Baghdad had pursued proscribed, advanced, long-range missile technology for 

some time. Iraqi officials admitted that, despite international prohibitions, they had 

received a similar shipment earlier that year.

Chemical. Renewed UN inspections in Iraq produced no substantial evidence of 

continued efforts on Iraqi CW during 2002. However, it was likely that Iraq sanitized the 
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ammunition dump at Taji for chemical weapons in November and December 2002, in 

anticipation of UN inspections. Iraq also bulldozed earth from large portions of the alMusayyib chemical complex in July 2002, possibly in order to conceal evidence of CW. 

We believed that, since December 1998, Iraq increased its capability to pursue 

chemical warfare (CW) programs. After both the Gulf war in 1991 and Operation Desert 

Fox in December 1998, Iraq rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure 

for industrial and commercial use, as well as former dual-use CW production facilities 

and missile production facilities. Iraq attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items 

for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. The suspension of UN inspections in 

December 1998 increased the risk of diversion of such equipment. In addition, Iraq 

admitted in December 2002 to repairing and installing equipment that had previously 

been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. The equipment was reinstated at a 

civilian chemical plant and was also used at CW-related facilities, which produced 

chlorine and other chemicals. Some of these facilities could have been converted fairly 

quickly for production of CW agents. 

UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also 

continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For example, an Iraqi Air 

Force document--previously seized from UNSCOM inspectors but subsequently handed 

back over to UNMOVIC--indicated that Iraq had not used as many CW munitions during 

the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. The discrepancy 

indicated that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions. 

Biological. The last part of 2002 that saw UN inspections renewed inside Iraq 

neither proved ongoing Iraqi BW work nor satisfactorily addressed any of the many 

outstanding BW concerns, but Baghdad continued to pursue a BW program during the 

second half of 2002. For example, imagery indicated that Iraq moved material out of 

the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute in November 2002 in anticipation of UN 

inspections. 

Iraq in 1995 admitted to having an offensive BW program, but UNSCOM was 

unable to verify the full scope and nature of Iraq’s efforts. UNSCOM assessed that Iraq 

was maintaining a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to 

produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time. In addition, Iraq continued 

dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities. On 5 February 2003, 

US Secretary of State Powell presented to the UN Security Council information from 

multiple human sources that indicated the existence of mobile biological agent 

production units. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. During the last six months of 2002, Iraq 

aggressively continued to seek advanced conventional warfare (ACW) equipment and 

technology. A thriving gray arms market and porous borders allowed Baghdad to 

acquire smaller arms, combat support equipment, maintenance services, and 

components for larger arms, such as spare parts for aircraft, air defense systems, and 

armored vehicles. Iraq also acquired some dual-use and production items that have 

application in the ACW arena through the Oil-For-Food program. Iraq developed and 
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tested unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) smaller than the full-size jet aircraft it 

previously tried to use. Some of these smaller UAVs were well suited for dispensing 

chemical and biological agents. 

North Korea 

Nuclear. The United States had been suspicious that North Korea has been 

working on uranium enrichment for several years. However, we did not obtain clear 

evidence indicating that North Korea had begun acquiring material and equipment for a 

centrifuge facility until mid-2002. 

In 2001, North Korea began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large 

quantities. It also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal 

systems. North Korea's goal appeared to be a plant that could produce enough 

weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully 

operational. We continued to monitor and assess North Korea's nuclear weapons 

efforts which, given the North's closed society and the obvious covert nature of the 

program, remains a difficult intelligence collection target. 

In December 2002, North Korea announced its intention to resume operation of 

nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, which had been frozen under the terms of the 1994 USNorth Korea Agreed Framework. IAEA seals and monitoring equipment were removed 

and disabled, and IAEA inspectors expelled from the country. 

Missile. North Korea also has continued procurement of raw materials and 

components for its extensive ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources. In 

the second half of 2002, North Korea continued to abide by its voluntary moratorium on 

flight tests, but announced it may reconsider its September offer to extend the 

moratorium beyond 2003. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2—capable of reaching 

parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload—may be ready for 

flight-testing. The North probably also worked on improvements to its current design. 

North Korea was nearly self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles and 

demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that enabled 

other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been 

possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts. 

Chemical. North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention 

(CWC). Pyongyang has acquired dual-use chemicals that could potentially be used to 

support Pyongyang's long-standing chemical warfare program. North Korea's chemical 

warfare capabilities included the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, 

choking and blood agent, using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. During 

the last half of 2002, North Korea possessed a sizeable stockpile of these agents and 

weapons, which it could have employed in a variety of delivery means. 

Biological. North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons 

Convention, but nonetheless has pursued biological warfare (BW) capabilities since the 

1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents 
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that could be used to support North Korea's BW efforts. As of the last half of 2002, 

North Korea was believed to have possessed a munitions production infrastructure that 

would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents, and may have such weapons available 

for use. 

Libya 

Nuclear. An NPT party with full-scope IAEA safeguards, Libya continued to 

develop its nuclear infrastructure. The suspension of UN sanctions provided Libya the 

means to enhance its nuclear infrastructure through foreign cooperation and 

procurement efforts. Tripoli and Moscow continued talks on cooperation at the Tajura 

Nuclear Research Center and a potential power reactor deal. Such civil-sector work 

could have presented Libya with opportunities to pursue technologies also suitable for 

military purposes. In addition, Libya participated in various technical exchanges through 

which it could have tried to obtain dual-use equipment and technology that could have 

enhanced its overall technical capabilities in the nuclear area. Although Libya made 

political overtures to the West in an attempt to strengthen relations, Libya’s continued 

interest--as Qadhafi stated in a televised speech in March 2002--in nuclear weapons 

and nuclear infrastructure upgrades raised concerns. 

Missile. The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 allowed Libya to expand its 

efforts to obtain ballistic missile–related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise 

from foreign sources. Outside assistance—particularly from Serbian, Indian, Iranian, 

North Korean, and Chinese entities—remained critical to its ballistic missile 

development programs. Libya’s capability might still be limited to its Scud-B missiles, 

but we could not have ruled out that Libya might have extended-range Scuds. With 

continued foreign assistance, Libya will likely achieve an MRBM capability—a longdesired goal—possibly through direct purchase from North Korea or Iran. 

Chemical and Biological. Libya also remained heavily dependent on foreign 

suppliers for CW precursor chemicals and other key related equipment. Following the 

suspension of UN sanctions, Tripoli reestablished contacts with sources of expertise, 

parts, and precursor chemicals abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Tripoli still 

appeared to be working toward an offensive CW capability and eventual indigenous 

production. Evidence suggested that Libya also sought the capability to develop and 

produce BW agents. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Following the suspension of UN sanctions, 

Libyan and Russian firms entered into contracts for conventional weapons, munitions, 

and upgrades and refurbishment for Libya’s existing inventory of Soviet-era weapons. 

Syria 

Nuclear. Syria—an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards—has a 

nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their longstanding agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy. In principle, broader 
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access to Russian expertise provided opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous 

capabilities to pursue nuclear weapons. 

Missile. During the second half of 2002, Damascus continued to receive help 

from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production 

capability. Syria’s liquid-propellant missile program had and will continue to depend on 

essential foreign equipment and assistance—primarily from North Korean entities. 

Damascus also continued its efforts to assemble—probably with North Korean 

assistance—liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition, Syria might be developing 

longer-range missile programs such as a Scud D or variants with probable assistance 

from North Korea and Iran. 

Chemical and Biological. Syria sought CW-related expertise from foreign 

sources during the reporting period. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve 

agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. 

Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, 

including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that 

Syria also continued to develop an offensive BW capability. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Syria continued to acquire relatively small 

quantities of ACW—mainly from Russia and other former Soviet-bloc suppliers. But 

Damascus’ outstanding debt to Russia and inability to fund large purchases combined 

to hamper negotiations for the large quantity of equipment Syria needed to revitalize its 

aging defense forces. Damascus wanted Russian SA-10 and SA-11 air defense 

systems, MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, and T-80 or T-90 main battle tanks, as well as 

upgrades for the aircraft, armored vehicles, and air defense systems already in its 

inventory. No breakthroughs in the sales or debt issue were noted, although high-level 

delegations continued to discuss weapons trade. 

Sudan 

Chemical and Biological. Sudan has aspired to develop a chemical warfare 

capability since the 1980s and probably received technical assistance from Iraq. 

Allegations of CW activities in Sudan were not confirmed. Sudan is a party to the CWC, 

but has only declared the possession of riot control agents. Sudan may be interested in 

a BW program as well. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. During the reporting period, Sudan sought 

a variety of military equipment from various sources. In the long-running civil war, as 

well as for a general military modernization campaign, Khartoum is generally sought 

older, less expensive ACW and conventional weapons that nonetheless offered more 

advanced capabilities than the weapons of its opponents and their supporters in 

neighboring countries. We remained concerned that Sudan might seek a ballistic 

missile capability in the future. 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism 
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The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) materials continued to rise—particularly in the aftermath of the attacks on 11 

September 2001. Many of the 33 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other 

nonstate actors worldwide have expressed interest in CBRN. Although terrorist groups 

probably will continue to favor long-proven conventional tactics such as bombings and 

shootings, arrests in Europe during the second half of 2002 indicate that international 

mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting to conduct chemical attacks. 

Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the September 11 

attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian and government targets to CBRN 

attacks. 

 One of our highest concerns is al-Qa'ida's stated readiness to attempt 

unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Usama Bin Ladin publicly 

declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was "a religious duty." 

Terrorist groups worldwide have ready access to information on chemical, 

biological, radiological, and to some extent, even nuclear weapons, via the Internet, 

publicly available scientific literature, and scientific conferences, and we know that alQa’ida was working to acquire some of the most dangerous chemical agents and toxins. 

A senior Bin Ladin associate on trial in Egypt in 1999 claimed his group had chemical 

and biological weapons. Documents and equipment recovered from al-Qa’ida facilities 

in Afghanistan show that Bin Ladin had a more sophisticated unconventional weapons 

research program than was previously known. 

International mujahidin who undertook poison training at al-Qa'ida camps in 

Afghanistan have implemented what they learned. French police seized a chemical 

contamination suit and arrested a terrorist cell in December 2002 that allegedly was 

planning an attack using chemical agents. We know that at least one related group had 

ricin toxin in London at that same time for a future terrorist attack. 

We also know that al-Qa’ida has ambitions to acquire or develop nuclear 

weapons and was receptive to any outside nuclear assistance that might become 

available. In February 2001, during the trial on the al-Qa’ida bombings of the American 

Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, a government witness—Jamal Ahmad Fadl—

testified that al-Qa’ida pursued the sale of a quantity of purported enriched uranium 

(which in fact probably was scam material) in Sudan in the early 1990s. 

We assessed that terrorist groups were capable of conducting attacks using 

radiological dispersal devices, at least in their cruder versions--i.e., ones that would not 

cause large-scale casualties, even though they could have caused tremendous 

psychological effects, particularly on an ill-informed public, and possibly created 

considerable economic disruption as well. This type of threat first appeared in 

November 1995 when Chechen rebels placed a package containing radioactive cesium 

on a bench in Moscow's Izmailovo Park. In addition, we were alert to the very real 

possibility that al-Qa’ida or other terrorist groups might have also tried to launch 
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conventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the 

United States to cause panic and economic disruption. 
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Key Suppliers 

Russia 

Russia’s cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and 

nuclear industries continued to be eager to raise funds via exports and transfers. In 

addition, some Russian universities and scientific institutes showed a willingness to 

earn much-needed funds by providing WMD or missile-related teaching and training for 

foreign students. Given the large potential proliferation impact of such exports, 

transfers, and training, monitoring the activities of specific entities as well as the overall 

effectiveness of the Russian Government’s nonproliferation regime remained a high 

priority. 

Nuclear. During the second half of 2002, Russia continued to play a key role in 

supporting civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant 

project. The ostensible purpose of Russian assistance to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure 

was for civilian applications, but we assessed that such support enhanced Tehran’s 

ability to support a nuclear weapons development effort. 

President Putin in May 2000 amended the presidential decree on nuclear exports 

to allow Russia in exceptional cases to export nuclear materials, technology, and 

equipment to countries that do not have full-scope IAEA safeguards. For example, 

Russia supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear program in 2001. 

Missile. Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a 

variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as 

Iran, India, and China. Iran’s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from 

Russian entities helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and 

continuing Russian entity assistance most likely supported Iranian efforts to develop 

new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production. 

Chemical and Biological. During the second half of 2002, Russian entities 

remained a key source of dual-use biotechnology equipment and expertise for Iran. 

Russia’s biological and chemical expertise made it an attractive target for Iranians who 

sought technical information and training on BW and CW agent production processes. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Russia continued to be a major supplier of 

conventional arms. Following Moscow’s abrogation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin 

agreement in November 2000, Russian officials stated that they saw Iran as a 

significant source of potential revenue from arms sales and believed that Tehran could 

become Russia’s third-largest conventional arms customer after China and India. In 

2001, Russia was the primary source of ACW for China, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, and 

one of the largest sources for India. As an example, Russia actively marketed its 

thermobaric weapons at international arms shows. 
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Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India’s 

and China’s naval nuclear propulsion programs. In addition, Russia discussed leasing 

nuclear-powered attack submarines to India. 

Export Controls. The Duma enacted new export control legislation in 1999, and 

Putin in 2000 and 2001 reorganized the export control bureaucracy to establish an 

interdepartmental export control coordinating body, the Export Control Commission of 

the Russian Federation. This organization was to establish federal oversight over 

export control, including compliance with international export control standards. 

Further, in 2001, Putin signed into effect several of the new law’s implementing decrees, 

which updated export control lists for biological pathogens, chemicals, missiles, and 

related dual-use technologies and equipment. In May 2002, Russia amended its 

criminal code to allow for stricter punishment for violations involving the illegal export of 

material, equipment, and scientific-technical information that may be used in creating 

WMD or military equipment. The Code of Administrative Violations was also updated 

and became law as of July 2002. This enactment provided the Department for Export 

Control (under the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade) with significant 

administrative enforcement authority. 

Despite progress in creating a legal and bureaucratic framework for Russia’s 

export controls, lax enforcement remained a serious concern. To reduce the outward 

flow of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and expertise, top officials must 

make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities—as well as the bureaucracy 

whose job it is to oversee them—that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those 

who violate the law will be prosecuted. 

North Korea 

Missile. Throughout the second half of 2002, North Korea continued to export 

significant ballistic missile–related equipment, components, materials, and technical 

expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Pyongyang attached high 

priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related 

technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology were one of the North’s 

major sources of hard currency, which supported ongoing missile development and 

production. 

China 

 Over the past several years, Beijing improved its nonproliferation posture through 

commitments to multilateral arms control regimes, promulgation of export controls, and 

strengthened oversight mechanisms, but Chinese entities remained key suppliers of 

WMD and missile-related technologies to countries of concern. 

Nuclear. In October 1997, China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on 

supplying a uranium conversion facility (UCF), not to enter into any new nuclear 

cooperation with Iran, and to bring to conclusion within a reasonable period of time the 

two existing projects. We were concerned that some interactions between Chinese and 

Iranian entities ran counter to Beijing’s expressed bilateral commitments to the United 

States. China also made bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 
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NPT commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or development of nuclear 

weapons. For example, in May 1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide 

assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. We cannot rule out, however, some 

continued contacts subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and entities 

associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. 

Missile. In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any 

country in the development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear 

weapons, and in August 2002, as part of its commitment, promulgated a comprehensive 

missile-related export control system, similar in scope to the Missile Technology Control 

Regime (MTCR) Annex. China is not a member of the MTCR, but on several occasions 

has pledged not to sell MTCR Category I systems. 

However, Chinese entities continued to provide Pakistan and Iran with missilerelated technical and material assistance during the reporting period. Pakistan has also 

moved toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs with the help of 

Chinese entities. Pakistan also needed continued Chinese entity assistance to support 

development of solid-propellant MRBMs. Ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran 

move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. In 

addition, firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or 

assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, Libya, and 

North Korea. 

Chemical. Since 1997, the US imposed numerous sanctions against Chinese 

entities for providing material support to the Iranian CW program. Evidence during the 

current reporting period showed that Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related 

production equipment and technology to Iran. In October 2002, China promulgated new 

controls on biological items and updated chemical-related regulations, and now controls 

all major items on the Australia Group lists. 

Advanced Conventional Weapons. China remained a primary supplier of 

advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan and Iran, and other countries. During the 

reporting period, Islamabad continued to negotiate with Beijing for China to build up to four 

frigates for Pakistan's navy. 

Western European Countries 

Iran and Libya continued to approach entities in Western Europe and the US to 

provide needed acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs. Proliferators and 

associated networks continued to seek machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, 

and widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals. Although 

western European countries strove to tighten export control regulations, Iran continued to 

successfully procure dual-use goods and materials from Europe. In addition, several 

Western European countries remained willing to negotiate ACW sales to Libya, India, 

Pakistan, and other countries in order to preserve their domestic defense industries. 
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Western European countries were still an important source for the proliferation of 

WMD- and missile-related information and training. The relatively advanced research of 

European institutes, the availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, the 

enthusiasm of scientists for sharing their research, and the availability of dual-use 

training and education may have shortened development time for some WMD and 

missile programs, including those of terrorist organizations. 

Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers 

As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable technologies 

continued to be more broadly available around the world, new sources of supply 

emerged that made the challenge of stemming WMD and missile proliferation even 

more complex and difficult. Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related technologies have 

spread to the point that, from a technical view, additional states may be able to produce 

sufficient fissile material and to develop the capability to weaponize it. As developing 

countries expanded their chemical industries into pesticide production, they also 

advanced toward at least latent chemical warfare capability. Likewise, additional nonstate actors became more interested in the potential of using biological warfare as a 

relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage. The proliferation of increasingly 

capable ballistic missile designs and technology posed the threat of more countries of 

concern developing longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks to regional 

stability. 

In this context, there was a growing concern that additional states that have 

traditionally been recipients of WMD and missile-related technology might have followed 

North Korea's practice of supplying specific WMD-related technology and expertise to 

other countries or by going one step further to supply such expertise to non-state actors. 

Even in cases where states took action to stem such transfers, there were growing 

numbers of knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD- and missilerelated materials and technology, who were able to act outside government constraints. 

Such non-state actors were increasingly capable of providing technology and equipment 

that previously could only be supplied directly by countries with established capabilities.