COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Clements 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

JOSEPH McDONALD LYNCH 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0512-00-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS 

 MAY 22, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Thomas N. Nance, Judge 

 S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender (Public 

Defender Commission, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Appellant Joseph McDonald Lynch was convicted of assault and 

battery in violation of Code § 18.2-57 and assault and battery of 

a police officer in violation of Code § 18.2-57(C). On appeal, he 

contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to 

withdraw his guilty pleas before sentencing. We disagree and 

affirm the convictions. 

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential 

value, this opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of this appeal. 
 Specifically, Lynch argues he was entitled to withdraw his 

guilty pleas before sentencing because he learned after entering 

the pleas that he had a defense.1 Lynch claims he originally pled 

guilty because inmates who witnessed the alleged assaults were no 

longer at the jail and, thus, were unavailable to testify. 

Without their testimony, he "didn't think [he] had a case." 

However, according to Lynch, he changed his mind when two more 

witnesses told him they "would come forward" and testify on his 

behalf about the alleged assaults. 

 "Code § 19.2-296 allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea 

before sentence is imposed." Jones v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 

503, 511, 513 S.E.2d 431, 435 (1999). "Whether a defendant should 

be permitted to withdraw a guilty plea rests within the sound 

discretion of the trial court to be determined based on the facts 

and circumstances of each case." Hall v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. 

App. 74, 79, 515 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1999). "The court's finding as 

to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence in 

support of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be 

disturbed unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." 

Jones, 29 Va. App. at 512, 513 S.E.2d at 435. 

 1

 Lynch also argues at length on appeal that Code 

§ 19.2-296's post-sentence standard of "manifest injustice" does 

not apply to his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because he 

made his motion before sentence was imposed. Such an argument, 

however, is moot in this case as the trial court did not apply 

the "manifest injustice" standard in determining Lynch's motion 

to withdraw his guilty pleas. 

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"As in other cases of discretionary power, no 

general rule can be laid down as to when a 

defendant will be permitted to withdraw his 

plea. The decision in each case must depend 

to a great extent on the particular attendant 

circumstances. Generally, however, it may be 

said that the withdrawal of a plea of guilty 

should not be denied in any case where it is 

in the least evident that the ends of justice 

will be subserved by permitting not guilty to 

be pleaded in its place. The least surprise 

or influence causing a defendant to plead 

guilty when he has any defense at all should 

be sufficient grounds for permitting a change 

of plea from guilty to not guilty. Leave 

should ordinarily be given to withdraw a plea 

of guilty if it was entered by mistake or 

under a misconception of the nature of the 

charge; through a misunderstanding as to its 

effect; through fear, fraud, or official 

misrepresentation; was made involuntarily for 

any reason; or even where it was entered 

inadvisedly, if any reasonable ground is 

offered for going to the jury." 

Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 325, 52 S.E.2d 872, 874 

(1949) (quoting 14 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 287 (1938)). 

 Determining whether the trial court erred in denying Lynch's 

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas "requires an examination of 

the circumstances confronting [Lynch] immediately prior to and at 

the time he pleaded to the charge[s]." Id. at 322, 52 S.E.2d at 

872. On December 21, 1999, Lynch, who was represented by an 

attorney, was arraigned and tendered pleas of guilty to both the 

charge of assault and battery and the charge of assault and 

battery of a police officer. The trial judge questioned Lynch 

extensively to ensure that he was entering the pleas voluntarily, 

knowingly, and with a clear understanding of their effect. The 

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Commonwealth then proffered its evidence, which was not challenged 

by Lynch. The trial judge found Lynch guilty on both counts and 

continued the case for sentencing. On January 7, 2000, Lynch 

filed a pro se motion for withdrawal of his pleas. Lynch's motion 

was heard on January 13, 2000 prior to sentencing. Lynch was 

represented at that hearing by his attorney. 

 Lynch put on no evidence in support of his motion at the 

hearing. He merely told the trial judge he originally pled guilty 

because he was unable to locate fellow inmates who had witnessed 

the incident and consequently did not think he had a case. He 

added, however, that two inmates who said they saw the assault and 

would testify on his behalf had come forward since then. He did 

not identify those witnesses or proffer what they would say that 

might benefit Lynch. 

 Asked by the trial court if he had ever interviewed the 

possible witnesses, Lynch's attorney told the trial court that 

prior to Lynch's entry of the guilty pleas, Lynch had given him a 

couple of names of witnesses. One of them had been transferred to 

the Department of Corrections, but the other was still in jail and 

Lynch's attorney had been prepared to bring him to trial on the 

trial date. Lynch's attorney also told the trial court that, 

since pleading guilty, Lynch had given him the name of one other 

witness, but provided no other information about that person 

except that Lynch could find him if Lynch was able to get out of 

jail. Likewise, Lynch did not identify at the hearing on his 

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motion any defense he might have as a result of his newly found 

witnesses' testimony. 

 Nor did Lynch establish that he entered the guilty pleas 

involuntarily, by mistake or under a misconception of the nature 

of the charges, through a misunderstanding as to the effect of the 

guilty pleas, or through fear, fraud, or official 

misrepresentation. 

 The trial court chose not to believe or accept Lynch's stated 

reasons for seeking leave to withdraw his guilty pleas. Instead, 

the court made specific findings that Lynch understood the 

situation when he pled guilty and that the pleas were willingly, 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. The court's 

ruling is supported by the record and was not plainly wrong. We 

hold, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion. 

 Accordingly, we affirm appellant's convictions. 

 Affirmed. 

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