IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

RONALD BLOODWORTH, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. Civil Action 2:10-CV-1121 

 Judge Marbley 

 Magistrate Judge King 

WARDEN DEBORA A. TIMMERMAN-COOPER, 

et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting 

Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (“Plaintiff’s Motion”), Doc. 

No. 135. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s Motion on the basis that the 

proposed amendment would be futile. Defendants’ Response in 

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended 

Complaint, Doc. No. 140. Plaintiff has filed a reply. Plaintiff’s 

Reply to Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 149. For the 

reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff is a state inmate currently incarcerated in the Toledo 

Correctional Institution (“ToCI”) and formerly incarcerated in the 

London Correctional Institution (“LoCI”). First Amended Complaint,

Doc. No. 49. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended 

Complaint, Doc. No. 58, was granted in part on February 13, 2012. 

Order, Doc. No. 75. In that Order, the Court dismissed, inter alia, 

Case: 2:10-cv-01121-ALM-NMK Doc #: 156 Filed: 06/17/13 Page: 1 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
2 

plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Mason 

(“Count XVII”). Id. Count XVII had alleged that defendant Mason 

recommended an increase in plaintiff’s security status “as punishment 

in retaliation for plaintiff filing grievances against defendant.” 

First Amended Complaint, ¶ 90. The Court dismissed Count XVII because 

the allegations were insufficient to state a valid claim for relief. 

Report and Recommendation, Doc. No. 72, pp. 7-8; Order, Doc. No. 75. 

Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider that Order, Doc. No. 94, which 

was denied on September 11, 2012. Order, Doc. No. 105. 

 On March 16, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to further 

amend the complaint to reassert, inter alia, Count XVII of the First 

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Leave to File Second 

Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 86. The Court denied that motion as 

futile, reasoning that plaintiff had “merely re-allege[d] that 

defendant Mason recommended an increase in plaintiff’s security status 

‘as punishment in retaliation for plaintiff filing grievances against 

defendant.’” Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 107, p. 5. 

 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, Doc. No. 112, on 

November 27, 2012. Plaintiff filed a response to that motion on April 

4, 2013, Doc. No. 130. Plaintiff’s Motion was filed on April 11, 

2013. The motion seeks leave to file the Proposed Second Amended 

Complaint, Doc. No. 135-1, to reassert Count XVII. Plaintiff’s 

Motion, p. 1. 

II. STANDARD

 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is governed by Rule 15(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a “court should 

Case: 2:10-cv-01121-ALM-NMK Doc #: 156 Filed: 06/17/13 Page: 2 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
3 

freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 15(a)(2). “The thrust of Rule 15 is to reinforce the principle 

that cases should be tried on their merits rather than the 

technicalities of pleadings.” Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th 

Cir. 1982) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)). The 

grant or denial of a request to amend a complaint is left to the broad 

discretion of the trial court. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 

F.2d 1119, 1130 (6th Cir. 1990). In exercising its discretion, the 

trial court may consider such factors as “undue delay, bad faith or 

dilatory motive on the part of a movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment [and] futility 

of the amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

 “A proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not 

withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Rose v. Hartford 

Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 382-83 

(6th Cir. 1993)). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) attacks the 

legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon 

Steel Co., 705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir. 1983). In determining whether 

dismissal on this basis is appropriate, a complaint must be construed 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded 

facts must be accepted as true. See Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 

F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1996); Misch v. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., 896 F. 

Supp. 734, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1994). The United States Supreme Court has 

explained that “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be 

Case: 2:10-cv-01121-ALM-NMK Doc #: 156 Filed: 06/17/13 Page: 3 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
4 

supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations 

in the complaint.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 

(2007). However, a plaintiff’s claim for relief “requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations 

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level . . . .” Id. Accordingly, a complaint must be dismissed – and 

amending a complaint is futile – if the complaint does not plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. at 570. 

III. DISCUSSION

 The Proposed Second Amended Complaint seeks to reassert Count 

XVII of the First Amendment Complaint, a First Amendment retaliation 

claim against defendant Mason. Plaintiff’s Motion, p. 2. A First 

Amendment retaliation claim entails three elements: 

(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an 

adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would 

deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to 

engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal 

connection between elements one and two—that is, the 

adverse action was motivated at least in part by the 

plaintiff’s protected conduct. 

Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Bloch 

v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)). It is not enough to 

state, without supporting factual allegations, that prison officials 

engaged in retaliation. Pack v. Martin, 174 F. App’x 256, 259 (6th 

Cir. 2006). Moreover, a prisoner’s conduct is not protected if he 

“violates a legitimate prison regulation.” Lockett v. Suardini, 526 

F.3d 866, 874 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394). 

Case: 2:10-cv-01121-ALM-NMK Doc #: 156 Filed: 06/17/13 Page: 4 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
5 

 The Proposed Second Amended Complaint contains the following 

allegations, which are incidentally nearly identical to those in the 

original Complaint and in the First Amended Complaint: In August 2010, 

plaintiff was directed to enter a segregation cell occupied by two 

other inmates but he expressed fear for his safety. Proposed Second 

Amended Complaint, ¶ 1. Plaintiff, “extremely terrified, . . . 

instinctively froze up.” Id., ¶ 3. He was thereafter pushed into the 

cell by Corrections Officer Goins, who was assisted by, inter alios, 

Corrections Officer Jewell. Id., ¶¶ 4-5. Jewell thereafter issued a 

conduct report charging plaintiff with physical resistance to a direct 

order in contravention of Rule 20 of the inmate rules of conduct and 

disobedience of a direct order in contravention of Rule 21. Id. at ¶ 

8. Plaintiff characterizes the charges as false and based on the 

“unprovoked, unjustified and unlawful attack against plaintiff and 

because plaintiff expressed his fears of being placed in a cell with 

two other inmates.” Id. at ¶ 9. The rules infraction board, chaired 

by defendant Carson, found plaintiff guilty of the charges and 

recommended plaintiff’s placement in local control. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. 

In October 2010, defendant Mason and the local control committee 

recommended that plaintiff’s security status be increased to level 3. 

Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Mason’s recommendation 

in this regard was based on plaintiff “fil[ing] grievances against 

defendant Mason on August 4, 2010 and September 2, 2010.” Id. at ¶ 

15. 

 The Proposed Second Amended Complaint also contains three new 

allegations related to plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim 

Case: 2:10-cv-01121-ALM-NMK Doc #: 156 Filed: 06/17/13 Page: 5 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
6 

against defendant Mason. See Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 4-5, 7 

(identifying new allegations in the Proposed Second Amended 

Complaint). First, the Proposed Second Amended Complaint alleges that 

the conduct report does not support a rule 20 offense because there 

are no allegations of “overt acts demonstrative of physically refusing 

to obey direct orders to comply with prison rules.” Id. at ¶ 14. 

Second, it alleges that “defendant Mason acted with full knowledge 

during the October 13, 2010 hearing that both the LoCI’s Warden and 

the Director routinely assent and approve its administrations 

disciplinary transfer requests ultimately carried out by the 

Classification Bureau.” Id. at ¶ 15. Finally, the Proposed Second 

Amended Complaint alleges that defendant Mason “was fully aware that 

the conduct report does not allege facts which charge a rule 20 

offense.” Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff argues that the new allegations 

cure “his fatally defective complaint” by showing that defendant 

Mason’s decision to recommend increasing plaintiff’s security status 

“was motivated, at least in part, by [] plaintiff’s protected 

conduct,” i.e., the filing of grievances against defendant Mason. 

Plaintiff’s Motion, p. 6. Specifically, plaintiff argues that 

defendant Mason’s “prior knowledge of deference” and “prior know ledge 

[sic] that the conduct report does not allege facts which charge a 

rule 20 offense” “demonstrate[] a caussal [sic] connection between 

plaintiff’s filing of grievances against defendant Mason and the 

decision to transfer the plaintiff [to a higher security prison].” 

Id. 

Case: 2:10-cv-01121-ALM-NMK Doc #: 156 Filed: 06/17/13 Page: 6 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
7 

 Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the 

Proposed Second Amended Complaint does not cure the deficiencies of 

the First Amended Complaint. Rather, the Proposed Second Amended 

Complaint merely re-alleges the facts that this Court has, on multiple 

prior occasions, determined to be insufficient. This Court 

specifically rejects plaintiff’s contention that the conduct reports 

issued against him by defendant Jewell did not allege facts supporting 

the charged offenses under Rules 20 and 21. Plaintiff argues that the 

allegations contained in the conduct report “do not support a charge 

of a rule 20 offense [because] noticeably absent therefrom are any 

overt acts demonstrative of physically refusing to obey direct orders 

to comply with prison rules.” Id., ¶ 14. To the contrary, even 

plaintiff acknowledges in the Proposed Second Amended Complaint that, 

after having been directed to enter the segregation cell, he “froze 

up” and had to be physically pushed into the cell in order to effect 

the directive. Id., ¶ 3.1

 As noted supra, plaintiff was charged with 

and convicted of physical resistance to a direct order in 

contravention of Rule 20 and of disobedience of a direct order in 

contravention of Rule 21. “A finding of guilt on a misconduct charge 

based on some evidence of a violation of prison rules ‘essentially 

checkmates [a] retaliation claim.’” Jackson v Madery, 158 Fed. Appx. 

656, 662 (6th Cir. 2005)(citing Henderson v. Baird, 23 F.3d 464, 469 

(8th Cir. 1994)). 

Moreover, even crediting plaintiff’s allegation that defendant 

 

1

 The original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint also alleged that 

plaintiff “froze up” and was thereafter “pushed and pulled extremely hard . . 

. until plaintiff was inside the cell.” Complaint, Doc. No. 5, ¶¶ 46-47; 

First Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 49, ¶¶ 46-47. 

Case: 2:10-cv-01121-ALM-NMK Doc #: 156 Filed: 06/17/13 Page: 7 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>
8 

Mason knew of and relied on the routine approval of disciplinary 

transfer recommendations, the Proposed Second Amended Complaint is 

insufficient. That allegation simply does not provide factual support 

for his otherwise conclusory allegation of retaliatory motive on the 

part of defendant Mason. 

Under these circumstances, to permit the filing of the Proposed 

Second Amendment Complaint in order to reassert plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Mason would be futile. 

Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Leave to File Second Amended 

Complaint, Doc. No. 135, is DENIED. 

 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

June 17, 2013 United States Magistrate Judge 

Case: 2:10-cv-01121-ALM-NMK Doc #: 156 Filed: 06/17/13 Page: 8 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>