If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

MOHAMMED HAQUE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

December 14, 2023

v No. 364936

Oakland Circuit Court

TERESA MALARZ SNYDER, LC No. 2021-188925-NI

Defendant,

and

WILLIAM WHITTY WERKMAN,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this third-party automobile negligence action, plaintiff appeals as of right the order 

granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, William Whitty Werkman (“Werkman”), 

under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). Plaintiff also challenges the order 

denying his motion for reconsideration. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves an automobile accident in Troy, Michigan, at the intersection of Square 

Lake Road and John R. Road. Plaintiff was stopped at the intersection, intending to make a right 

turn to travel northbound on John R. Road. Werkman entered the intersection, planning to make 

a left turn to travel eastbound on Square Lake Road. At the same time, defendant, Teresa Malarz 

Snyder (“Snyder”), entered the intersection traveling northbound. Werkman and Snyder’s vehicles 

collided. The impact of the crash caused Snyder’s vehicle to collide with plaintiff’s vehicle. 

Werkman and Snyder both claimed they entered the intersection on a green traffic signal. Plaintiff 

was unable to see the color of the traffic signal.
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Werkman moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing dismissal

was proper because plaintiff could not present evidence of his negligence. In support, Werkman 

cited plaintiff’s deposition testimony, where he testified he could not see the traffic light facing 

John R. Road and did not know if Snyder or Werkman had a green light. Plaintiff opposed the 

motion, arguing a genuine issue of material fact existed. The trial court granted summary 

disposition. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but the court denied the motion. This appeal 

followed.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Plaintiff argues the trial court erred when it granted Werkman’s motion for summary 

disposition. We agree.

A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Decisions on motions for summary disposition are reviewed de novo. Bailey v Antrim Co, 

341 Mich App 411, 421; 990 NW2d 372 (2022). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) . . . tests 

the factual sufficiency of a claim.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 

NW2d 665 (2019) (emphasis omitted). 

In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this subsection, a 

trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other 

evidence submitted by the parties . . . in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine 

issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. [Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999) 

(citation omitted).]

Under the burden-shifting framework of MCR 2.116(C)(10), “the moving party has the 

initial burden of supporting its position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other 

documentary evidence.” Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). 

If the movant meets their burden, 

The burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of 

disputed fact exists. Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests 

on a nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or 

denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts 

showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. If the opposing party fails to 

present documentary evidence establishing the existence of a material factual 

dispute, the motion is properly granted. [Id. at 362-363 (citations omitted).]

B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff filed the complaint alleging negligence against Snyder and Werkman. The 

“traditional elements of a negligence action” are: “(1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and 

(4) damages. . . .” Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 63; 860 NW2d 67 (2014) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Werkman moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff was 
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unable to prove that Werkman negligently caused the accident. In support of this contention, 

Werkman noted that there was no evidence demonstrating his negligence.1

Plaintiff responded, citing MCL 257.650(1), the statute governing left turns. It states:

The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield 

the right of way to a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is 

within the intersection or so close to the intersection as to constitute an immediate 

hazard; but the driver, having so yielded and having given a signal when and as 

required by this chapter, may make the left turn and the drivers of all other vehicles 

approaching the intersection from the opposite direction shall yield the right of way 

to the vehicle making the left turn. At an intersection at which a traffic signal is 

located, a driver intending to make a left turn shall permit vehicles bound straight 

through in the opposite direction which are waiting a go signal to pass through the 

intersection before making the turn.

According to plaintiff, there was a genuine question of fact whether Werkman lawfully turned left 

at the intersection. In support of this contention, plaintiff cited his own testimony in which he 

described his interaction with Werkman after the accident. Plaintiff explained: “[Werkman] came 

to me and then he asked me, ‘Was it not my signal,’ because [Werkman] was not sure.” Viewing 

this evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff shows it is, at best, unclear whether Werkman 

was permitted to travel left through the intersection. 

In granting summary disposition, the trial court opined that, other than the existence of an 

accident, there was no evidence demonstrating any party’s negligence. It is true that “[t]he mere 

occurrence of an accident does not raise a presumption of negligence . . . .” Postal Tel-Cable Co 

v Battle Creek Gas Co, 290 Mich 481, 486; 287 NW 886 (1939) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). But, plaintiff’s evidence went beyond reciting the mere occurrence of an accident.

Although plaintiff’s evidence was not definitive proof Werkman negligently caused the accident, 

it was sufficient to create a question of fact. Accordingly, the jury should be given the opportunity 

to hear Werkman’s testimony and determine whether his actions amounted to negligence. See 

Price v Austin, 509 Mich 938, 938; 972 NW2d 246 (2022) (citing to the premise when the 

credibility of a witness or deponent is crucial to assessing whether there exists a question of fact, 

summary judgment should not be granted). Because there remained a genuine question of fact as 

 

1 Plaintiff argues on appeal that Werkman failed to meet his burden of production in support of his 

motion for summary disposition. This argument is unpreserved because it was not raised in the 

trial court. Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; 

___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 359090); slip op at 2-3 (explaining that Michigan follows the 

“raise or waive” rule with respect to the preservation of issues). Plaintiff offers no explanation 

why this Court should consider this unpreserved argument and we decline to consider it. 
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to Werkman’s negligence, the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition. Given this 

conclusion, we need not consider plaintiff’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Anica Letica 

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron