PERSONNEL SECURITY 

CLEARANCES

Further Actions Needed to 

Improve the Process and 

Realize Efficiencies

Statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on the Efficiency and 

Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the 

Federal Workforce, and on Financial and 

Contracting Oversight, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT

Thursday, June 20, 2013

GAO-13-728T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-728T, a testimony

before congressional Subcommittees, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

June 20, 2013

PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES

Further Actions Needed to Improve the Process and 

Realize Efficiencies

Why GAO Did This Study

Personnel security clearances allow 

government and industry personnel to 

gain access to classified information 

that, through unauthorized disclosure, 

can in some cases cause exceptionally 

grave damage to U.S. national 

security. In 2012, the Director of 

National Intelligence reported that 

more than 4.9 million federal 

government and contractor employees 

held a security clearance. 

Multiple executive-branch agencies are 

responsible for different phases in the 

government-wide personnel security 

clearance process. The Director of 

National Intelligence, as Security 

Executive Agent, is to develop uniform 

and consistent policies and 

procedures. Executive branch 

agencies are to determine which 

positions require access to classified 

information. OPM’s investigators from 

the Federal Investigative Service 

conduct the majority of security 

investigations on personnel holding 

those positions, and adjudicators from 

requesting agencies, such as DOD, 

make the final clearance eligibility 

determination. Reform efforts and 

reporting requirements since 2005 

have focused on expediting the 

processing of clearances. 

This testimony is based on GAO

reports and testimonies issued 

between 2008 and 2013 on DOD’s 

personnel security clearance programs 

and security clearance reform efforts.

This testimony addresses three areas 

for improvement to the governmentwide personnel security clearance 

process: (1) a sound requirements 

determination process, 

(2) performance metrics to measure 

quality, and (3) guidance to enhance 

efficiencies. 

What GAO Found

In July 2012, GAO reported that the Director of National Intelligence, as Security 

Executive Agent, had not provided agencies clearly defined policy and 

procedures to consistently determine whether a civilian position required a 

security clearance. Underdesignating positions can lead to security risks; 

overdesignating positions can result in significant cost implications. Also, GAO 

reported that the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense 

(DOD) components’ officials were aware of the need to keep the number of 

security clearances to a minimum but were not always required to conduct 

periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing 

positions. GAO recommended that, among other things, the Director of National 

Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of Office of Personnel Management 

(OPM) and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined 

policies and procedures to follow when determining if federal civilian positions 

require a security clearance, and also guidance to require executive branch 

agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all 

federal civilian positions. The Director of National Intelligence concurred with 

GAO’s recommendations and identified actions to implement them.

Executive branch agency efforts to improve the personnel security process have 

emphasized timeliness but not quality. In May 2009, GAO reported that with 

respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation 

was incomplete for most of OPM investigative reports. GAO independently 

estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD 

adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing required 

documentation. In May 2009, GAO recommended that the Director of OPM direct 

the Associate Director of OPM’s Federal Investigative Services to measure the 

frequency with which its investigative reports met federal investigative standards 

in order to improve the completeness—that is, quality—of future investigation 

documentation. As of March 2013, however, OPM had not implemented this

recommendation. 

Government-wide personnel security reform efforts have not yet focused on 

potential cost savings, even though the stated mission of these efforts includes 

improving cost savings. For example, OPM’s investigation process—which 

represents a portion of the security clearance process and has significant costs—

has not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February 2012, 

GAO reported that OPM received over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million 

background investigations in fiscal year 2011. GAO raised concerns that OPM 

may be simultaneously investing in process streamlining technology while 

maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. In 2012, GAO

recommended that, to improve the efficiency of suitability and personnel security 

clearance background investigation processes that could lead to cost savings, 

the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of Federal Investigative 

Services to take actions to identify process efficiencies that could lead to cost

savings within its background investigation process. OPM agreed with this 

recommendation and GAO is working with OPM to assess any progress it has 

made in this area. View GAO-13-728T. For more information, 

contact Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604,

farrellb@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-13-728T 

Chairmen Tester and McCaskill, Ranking Members Portman and 

Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittees:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here to participate in the discussion of 

the government-wide personnel security clearance process. As you know, 

we have an extensive body of work on issues related to the security 

clearance process dating back several decades. Since 2008, we have 

focused on the government-wide effort to reform the security clearance 

process.

Personnel security clearances allow government and industry personnel 

to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized 

disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. 

national security. As you know, a high volume of clearances continue to 

be processed. In 2012, the Director of National Intelligence reported1

My testimony today will focus on three areas for improvement to the 

government-wide personnel security clearance process: (1) a sound

requirements determination process, (2) performance metrics to measure 

quality, and (3) guidance to enhance efficiencies.

that 

more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held 

a security clearance, making it a formidable challenge to those 

responsible for deciding who should be granted a clearance. The 

Department of Defense (DOD) accounts for the vast majority of all 

personnel security clearances.

My testimony is based on our reports and testimonies issued between 

2008 and 2013 on DOD’s personnel security clearance program and 

government-wide suitability and security clearance reform efforts.2

 

1

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012 Report on Security Clearance 

Determinations (January 2013).

Our 

reports and testimonies were conducted in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

2

See related GAO products at the end of this statement. More information on our scope 

and methodology is included in each issued report. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-728T 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives.

Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases in 

the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. In 2008, 

the Director of National Intelligence, for example, was designated 

Security Executive Agent by Executive Order 134673 and, in this capacity, 

is responsible for developing uniform and consistent policies and 

procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of 

background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of 

eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a 

sensitive position. In turn, requesting executive branch agencies 

determine which positions—military, civilian, or private-industry 

contractors—require access to classified information and, therefore, 

which people must apply for and undergo a security clearance 

investigation. Investigators—often contractors—from Federal 

Investigative Services within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 

conduct these investigations for most of the federal government using 

federal investigative standards and OPM internal guidance as criteria for 

collecting background information on applicants.4

DOD is OPM’s largest customer, and its Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence (USD(I)) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and 

overseeing the implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance 

for personnel, physical, industrial, information, operations, 

chemical/biological, and DOD Special Access Program security. 

Additionally, the Defense Security Service, under the authority and 

Adjudicators from 

requesting agencies, such as DOD, use the information contained in the 

resulting OPM investigative reports and consider federal adjudicative 

guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a personnel 

security clearance.

 

3

Executive Order No. 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government 

Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified 

National Security Information (June 30, 2008).

4

Agencies without delegated authority rely on OPM to conduct their background 

investigations while agencies with delegated authority—including the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Central 

Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, National Reconnaissance Office, 

and Department of State—have been authorized to conduct their own background 

investigations.

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-728T 

direction and control of USD(I), manages and administers the DOD 

portion of the National Industrial Security Program5

Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004

for the DOD 

components and other federal services by agreement, as well as 

providing security education and training, among other things.

6 prompted government-wide suitability and security clearance 

reform. The act required an annual report of progress and key 

measurements as to the timeliness of initial security clearances in 

February of each year from 2006 through 2011. It specifically required 

those reports to include the periods of time required for conducting 

investigations, adjudicating cases, and granting clearances. However, the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act requirement for the 

executive branch to annually report on its timeliness has expired. More 

recently, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 20107

In 2007, DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

formed the Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team, known as the 

Joint Reform Team, to improve the security clearance process 

government-wide. In a 2008 memorandum, the President called for a 

reform of the security clearance program and subsequently issued 

Executive Order 13467

established a new 

requirement that the President annually report to Congress, among other 

things, the total amount of time required to process certain security 

clearance determinations for the previous fiscal year for each element of 

the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 

additionally requires that those annual reports include the total number of 

active security clearances throughout the United States government, to 

include both government employees and contractors. Unlike the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act reporting requirement, 

the requirement to submit these annual reports does not expire.

8

 

5

The National Industrial Security Program was established by Executive Order 12829 to 

safeguard Federal Government classified information that is released to contractors, 

licensees, and grantees of the United States Government, Executive Order No. 12829, 

National Industrial Security Program (Jan. 6, 1993).

establishing a Performance Accountability 

6

Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004) (relevant sections codified at 50 U.S.C. § 435b).

7

Pub. L. No. 111-259, § 367 (2010) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 415a-10). 

8

Executive Order No. 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government 

Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified 

National Security Information (June 30, 2008). 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-728T 

Council. Under the executive order, this council is accountable to the 

President for driving implementation of the reform effort, including 

ensuring the alignment of security and suitability processes, holding 

agencies accountable for implementation, and establishing goals and 

metrics for progress. The order also appointed the Deputy Director for 

Management at the Office of Management and Budget as the chair of the 

council and designated the Director of National Intelligence as the 

Security Executive Agent and the Director of OPM as the Suitability 

Executive Agent.9

We have previously reported that, to safeguard classified data and 

manage costs, agencies need an effective process to determine whether 

positions require a clearance and, if so, at what level. Last year we found, 

however, that the Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive 

Agent, has not provided agencies clearly defined policies and procedures 

to consistently determine if a civilian position requires a security 

clearance.10

 

9

Determinations of suitability for government employment in positions in the competitive 

service and for career appointment in the Senior Executive Service include consideration 

of aspects of an individual’s character or conduct that may have an effect on the integrity 

or efficiency of their service.

Executive Order 13467 assigns the Director responsibility 

for, among other things, developing uniform and consistent policies and

procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of 

background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of 

eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a 

sensitive position, and gives the Director authority to issue guidance to 

agency heads to ensure uniformity in processes relating to those 

determinations. Further, the Director also has not established guidance to 

require agencies to review and revise or validate existing federal civilian 

10GAO, Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining 

Civilian Position Requirements, GAO-12-800 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012).

Improvements 

Needed to the 

Personnel Security 

Clearance Process

Sound Requirements 

Determination Process
 

Page 5 GAO-13-728T 

position designations. Executive Order 1296811

In our July 2012 report, we found that Department of Homeland Security 

and DOD components’ officials were aware of the need to keep the 

number of security clearances to a minimum, but were not always 

required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security 

clearance needs of existing positions. Overdesignating positions results in 

significant cost implications, given that the fiscal year 2012 base price for

a top secret clearance investigation conducted by OPM was $4,005, while 

the base price of a secret clearance was $260. Conversely, 

underdesignating positions could lead to security risks.

says that, subject to 

certain exceptions, eligibility for access to classified information shall only 

be requested and granted on the basis of a demonstrated, foreseeable 

need for access, and the number of employees that each agency 

determines is eligible for access to classified information shall be kept to 

the minimum required. The order also states that access to classified 

information shall be terminated when an employee no longer has a need 

for access, and prohibits requesting or approving eligibility for access in 

excess of the actual requirements. Without such requirements, executive 

branch agencies may be hiring and budgeting for initial and periodic 

security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security 

clearance requirements that no longer reflect national security needs.

In the absence of guidance to determine if a position requires a security 

clearance, agencies are using a tool that OPM designed to determine the 

sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the 

type of investigation needed. OPM audits, however, found inconsistency 

in these position designations, and some agencies described problems in 

implementing OPM’s tool. In an April 2012 audit, OPM reviewed the 

sensitivity levels of 39 positions in an agency within DOD and reached 

different conclusions than the agency for 26 of them. Problems exist, in 

part, because OPM and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

did not collaborate on the development of the position designation tool, 

and because their roles for suitability—consideration of character and 

conduct for federal employment—and security clearance reform are still 

evolving. In our July 2012 report, we concluded that without guidance 

from the Director of National Intelligence, and without collaboration 

 

11Executive Order No. 12968, Access to Classified Information (Aug. 2, 1995 as 

amended).
 

Page 6 GAO-13-728T 

between the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and OPM in 

future revisions to the tool, executive branch agencies will continue to risk 

making security clearance determinations that are inconsistent or at 

improper levels.

In July 2012, we recommended, among other things, that the Director of 

National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other 

executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy 

and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal 

civilian positions require a security clearance. We also recommended that

the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of 

OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue 

guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and 

revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. The 

Director of National Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and 

has taken steps to implement them.

We have emphasized—since the late 1990s12—a need to build quality 

and quality monitoring throughout the clearance process to promote 

oversight and positive outcomes, such as honoring reciprocity.13

 

12GAO, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National 

Security Risks,

Executive branch efforts have emphasized timeliness, but efforts to 

develop and implement metrics for measuring the quality of investigations 

have not included goals with related outcome focused measures to show 

progress or identify obstacles to progress and possible remedies. 

Furthermore, our recent reviews of OPM’s investigations show reasons 

for continuing concern. For example, in May 2009 we reported that, with 

respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, 

documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We 

independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative 

reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decision were 

missing required documentation. We recommended that the Director of 

OPM direct the Associate Director of OPM’s Federal Investigative 

Services Division to measure the frequency with which its investigative 

GAO/NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).

13Subject to certain exceptions, all agencies shall accept a background investigation or 

clearance determination completed by any other authorized investigative or adjudicative 

agency.

Performance Metrics to 

Measure Quality
 

Page 7 GAO-13-728T 

reports meet federal investigative standards in order to improve the 

completeness—that is, quality—of future investigation documentation.14

As of March 2013, however, OPM had not implemented our 

recommendation to measure how frequently investigative reports meet 

federal investigative standards.15

In February 2011, we noted that one of OPM’s customer agencies, DOD, 

had developed and implemented a tool known as Rapid Assessment of 

Incomplete Security Evaluations to monitor the quality of investigations 

completed by OPM. In that report, we noted that leaders of the reform 

effort had provided congressional members and executive branch 

agencies with metrics assessing quality and other aspects of the 

clearance process. Although the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete 

Security Evaluations was one tool the reform team members planned to 

use for measuring quality, according to an OPM official, OPM chose not 

to use this tool. Instead, OPM opted to develop another tool but has not 

provided details on the tool including estimated timeframes for its 

development and implementation.

Instead, OPM continues to assess the 

quality of investigations based on voluntary reporting from customer 

agencies. Specifically, OPM tracks investigations that are (1) returned for 

rework from the requesting agency, (2) identified as deficient using a 

web-based survey, and (3) identified as deficient through adjudicator calls 

to OPM’s quality hotline. In our past work, we have noted that the number 

of investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator of the 

quality of investigative work because adjudication officials have been 

reluctant to return incomplete investigations in anticipation of delays that 

would impact timeliness. Further, relying on agencies to voluntarily 

provide information on investigation quality may not reflect the quality of 

OPM’s total investigation workload.

Since 2008, we have highlighted the importance of the executive branch 

enhancing efficiency and managing costs related to security clearance 

reform efforts. Government-wide suitability and personnel security 

clearance reform efforts have not yet focused on identifying potential cost 

 

14GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete 

Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further Improve the 

Clearance Process, GAO-09-400 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009).

15GAO, Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals under 

the GPRA Modernization Act, GAO-13-174 (Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2013).

Guidance to Enhance 

Efficiencies
 

Page 8 GAO-13-728T 

savings, even though the stated mission of these efforts includes 

improving cost savings. For example, in 2008, we noted that one of the 

key factors to consider in current and future reform efforts was the longterm funding requirements. Further, in 2009, we found that reform-related 

reports issued in 200816 did not detail which reform objectives require 

funding, how much they will cost, or where funding will come from.17

For example, OPM’s investigation process—which represents just a 

portion of the security clearance process and had significant costs—has 

not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February 

2012, we reported that OPM received over $1 billion to conduct more 

than 2 million background investigations (suitability determinations and 

personnel security clearances) for government employees in fiscal year 

2011. OPM officials explained that, to date, they have chosen to address 

investigation timeliness and investigation backlogs rather than the 

identification of process and workforce efficiencies. To its credit, OPM 

helped reduce the backlog of ongoing background investigations that it 

inherited from DOD at the time of the 2005 transfer. However, only 

recently has OPM started to look at its internal processes for efficiencies. 

Further, while OPM invested in an electronic case-management program, 

it continues to convert submitted electronic files to paper. In November 

2010, the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management 

and Budget testified that OPM receives 98 percent of investigation 

applications electronically, yet we observed that it was continuing to use a 

paper-based investigation processing system and convert electronically 

submitted applications to paper. OPM officials stated that the paperbased process is required because a small portion of their customer 

agencies do not have electronic capabilities. As a result, OPM may be 

Finally, the reports did not estimate potential cost savings resulting from 

these reform efforts. While the Performance Accountability Council has a 

stated goal regarding cost savings, it has not provided the executive 

branch with guidance on opportunities for achieving efficiencies in 

managing personnel security clearances.

 

16Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team, Enterprise Information Technology Strategy 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009) and Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team, 

Security and Suitability Process Reform (Washington, D.C.: April 2008 and updated 

December 2008) 

17GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to 

Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process, GAO-09-488 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 19, 2009).
 

Page 9 GAO-13-728T 

simultaneously investing in process streamlining technology while 

maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. In 2012, 

we recommended that, to improve transparency of costs and the 

efficiency of suitability and personnel security clearance background 

investigation processes that could lead to cost savings, the Director of 

OPM direct the Associate Director of Federal Investigative Services to 

take actions to identify process efficiencies that could lead to cost savings 

within its background investigation process.18

Further, agencies have made potentially duplicative investments in casemanagement and adjudication systems without considering opportunities 

for leveraging existing technologies. In February 2012, as part of our 

annual report on opportunities to reduce duplication, overlap and 

fragmentation, we reported that multiple agencies have invested in or are 

beginning to invest in potentially duplicative, electronic case management 

and adjudication systems despite government-wide reform effort goals 

that agencies leverage existing technologies to reduce duplication and 

enhance reciprocity.

OPM agreed with this 

recommendation and we are working with OPM to assess any progress it 

has made in this area.

19 According to DOD officials, DOD began the 

development of its Case Adjudication Tracking System in 2006 and, as of 

2011, had invested a total of $32 million to deploy the system. The 

system helped DOD achieve efficiencies with case management and an 

electronic adjudication module for secret level cases that did not contain 

issues, given the volume and types of adjudications performed. According 

to DOD officials, after it observed that the Case Adjudication Tracking 

System could easily be deployed to other agencies at a low cost, the 

department intended to share the technology with interested entities 

across the federal government. However, at that time, five other agencies 

were also developing or seeking funds to develop individual systems with 

capabilities similar to DOD’s system.20

 

18GAO, Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to Improve 

Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings, 

With multiple agencies developing 

GAO-12-197 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

28, 2012).

19GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012).

20These agencies are the Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury, 

Department of Justice, Department of Veterans Affairs, and the National Reconnaissance 

Office.
 

Page 10 GAO-13-728T 

individual case-management systems, these agencies may be at risk of 

duplicating efforts and may fail to realize cost savings.

In 2012, we recommended that the Deputy Director for Management at 

OMB, in his capacity as the Chair of the Performance Accountability 

Council, expand and specify reform-related guidance to help ensure that 

reform stakeholders identify opportunities for efficiencies and cost 

savings, such as preventing duplication in the development of electronic 

case management.21

In conclusion, while the executive branch has made strides in improving 

the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process, now is the 

time to focus on making the improvements GAO has recommended. 

Failing to do so increases the risk of damaging unauthorized disclosures 

of classified information. This concludes my prepared statement. I would 

be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.

OMB concurred with our recommendation. As of 

March of this year, however, OMB has not expanded and specified 

reform-related guidance to help ensure that reform stakeholders identify 

opportunities for cost savings. According to OMB officials, they are 

exploring whether and how to develop and implement guidance on 

information technology spending that is minimally disruptive, will not 

compromise agencies’ ability to adjudicate cases, and is implementable 

within budget constraints. While these specific efforts may be notable 

steps in clearance reform, they do not meet the intent of our 

recommendation for OMB to develop overarching guidance that reform 

stakeholders can use to identify opportunities for cost savings.

For further information on this testimony, please contact Brenda S. 

Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, who may be 

reached at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this testimony include David Moser (Assistant Director), Sara Cradic, Mae 

Jones, Erin Preston, Leigh Ann Sennette, and Michael Willems.

 

21GAO-12-197. 
Related GAO Products

Page 11 GAO-13-728T 

Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals 

under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.: 

April 19, 2013.

Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for 

Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington, 

D.C.: July 12, 2012.

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue.

GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to 

Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings.

GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 17, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February 

16, 2011.

Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to 

Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve 

Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum.

GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s 

Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T. 

Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and 

Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide 

Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce 

Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain 

Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 12 GAO-13-728T 

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is 

Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.

GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, 

Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed 

to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, 

D.C.: May 19, 2009.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 

2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint 

Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility 

Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance 

Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.

Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s 

Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement.

GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform 

Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 27, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts 

to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T. 

Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable 

More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.: 

February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation 

Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 

2007.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 

2007.
Related GAO Products

Page 13 GAO-13-728T 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to 

Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, 

D.C.: September 28, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of 

Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments 

Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.

GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.

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