Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, Veterans Affairs,

and International Relations, Committee

on Government Reform, House of

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

October 2002 COMBATING

TERRORISM

Actions Needed to

Improve Force

Protection for DOD

Deployments through

Domestic Seaports

GAO-03-15
Page i GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Current Risk Management Approach Creates Uncertainties about

the Security Environment at Strategic Seaports 6

Weaknesses in DOD Force Protection Process Increase Risks for

Deployments through Domestic Seaports 13

Conclusions 20

Recommendations for Executive Action 21

Agency Comments and Our Review 22

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 26

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 29

Related GAO Products 30

Tables

Table 1: Ownership and Crew for Commercial Ships Used in

Deployments GAO Reviewed from Three Installations in

2001 18

Table 2: Examples of Equipment Carried on Foreign-Owned and

Foreign-Crewed Ships 18

Figures

Figure 1: Reserve Sealift Ships Berthed at a Commercial Seaport 5

Figure 2: A Commercial Container Vessel and Related

Infrastructure at a Seaport 7

Contents
Page ii GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Figure 3: Coast Guard Crew in a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat

Demonstrating Enforcement of a Security Zone at a

Commercial Port 12

Figure 4: The Domestic Phases of the Deployment Process and

Responsible Organizations 15
Page 1 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

October 22, 2002

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,

 and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The October 12, 2000, attack against the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the

port of Aden illustrated the danger of unconventional threats to U.S. ships

in seaports. The September 11 attacks further heightened the need for a

significant change in conventional antiterrorist thinking, particularly

regarding threats to the U.S. homeland. The new security paradigm

assumes that all U.S. forces, be they abroad or at home, are vulnerable to

attack, and that even those infrastructures traditionally considered of little

interest to terrorists, such as commercial seaports in the continental

United States, are now commonly recognized as highly vulnerable to

potential terrorist attack. The Department of Defense (DOD) and all

agencies associated with seaport security recognize this new paradigm

and are taking steps to reduce vulnerabilities and increase security.

Of the more than 300 seaports in the United States, the Departments of

Defense and Transportation have designated 17 as “strategic,” because in

the event of a large-scale military deployment, DOD would transport more

than 95 percent of all equipment and supplies needed for military

operations by sea. These ports are therefore vital to national security. If

the strategic ports (or the ships carrying military supplies) were attacked,

not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained, but DOD could

also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its

overburdened airlift capabilities.

Military commanders are responsible for the protection of personnel,

equipment, and other assets. To achieve this objective, commanders apply

a “risk management” approach, which is a systematic, analytical process to

determine the likelihood that a threat will negatively impact physical

assets, individuals, or operations and identify actions to reduce risk and

mitigate the consequences of an attack. The principles of risk management

acknowledge that although risk generally cannot be eliminated, it can be

significantly reduced by enhancing protection from known or potential

threats.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

You asked us to examine how DOD protects its forces and assets as it

deploys them through strategic commercial seaports. This report focuses

on domestic seaports and analyzes (1) the security environment at

domestic strategic seaports used by DOD for military deployments and (2)

DOD’s process for securing military deployments through those ports.

Overseas seaports will be the focus of a subsequent review.

As part of our evaluation, we examined seaport force protection efforts at

six strategic seaports in the United States. Although the information we

obtained at these locations cannot be generalized to describe DOD’s

overall seaport force protection, it provides insight into how force

protection efforts at strategic seaports were implemented at selected

locations. For security reasons, we do not discuss location-specific

information in this report. Further information on our scope and

methodology appears in appendix I.

The security environment at strategic seaports remains uncertain because

comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical port

infrastructure and functions have not been completed, and no effective

mechanism exists to coordinate and disseminate threat information at the

seaports. These conditions compound the already difficult task of

protecting deploying forces and increase the risk that threats—both

traditional and nontraditional1

 ones—may not be recognized or that threat

information may not be communicated in a timely manner to all relevant

organizations. Recent efforts by the Coast Guard, the Transportation

Security Administration, and other agencies at the ports have begun to

address many of these weaknesses. The Coast Guard initiated vulnerability

assessments of port infrastructure and is deploying additional teams

dedicated to seaport security. Further, if enacted, legislation currently

before the Congress proposes steps that may assist these efforts and

provides additional measures that could improve the coordination and

dissemination of threat information.

We identified two significant weaknesses in DOD’s force protection

process for deployments through domestic seaports. First, DOD lacks a

central authority responsible for overseeing force protection measures of

DOD organizations that move forces from domestic installations through

 1

 Nontraditional threats can include natural or man-made disasters, such as hurricanes,

industrial accidents, and cyber attacks.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

U.S. seaports. As a result, potential force protection gaps and weaknesses

requiring attention and action might be overlooked. DOD has such an

authority for the overseas portions of deployments and is therefore better

able to identify and mitigate force protection gaps there. Second, during

some phases of a deployment, DOD transfers custody of its military

equipment to non-DOD entities, including foreign-owned ships crewed by

non-U.S. citizens. Although consistent with current DOD policies and

procedures, this practice limits DOD’s ability to provide security oversight.

As a result, equipment could fall into the hands of individuals or groups

whose interests are counter to those of the United States.

We are making recommendations to improve (1) threat information

coordination at strategic seaports, (2) DOD’s oversight and coordination of

force protection for deployments through seaports, and (3) DOD’s control

over the in-transit phases of a movement of equipment. In comments on a

draft of this report, the Departments of Defense and Transportation

generally agreed with the contents of this report and its recommendations.

DOD defines force protection as “actions taken to prevent or mitigate

hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family

members), resources, facilities, and critical information.”

2

 Our review

concentrated mostly on the physical security and related aspects of force

protection that include measures to protect personnel and property and

encompass consequence management, intelligence, and critical

infrastructure protection.

We have identified a risk management approach used by DOD to defend

against terrorism that also has relevance for the organizations responsible

for security at commercial seaports. This approach can provide a process

to enhance preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks or other

emergencies, whether natural or man-made (intentional or unintentional).

The approach is based on assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and

criticalities (the importance of critical infrastructure and functions).

Threat assessments identify and evaluate potential threats on the basis of

factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. These

assessments represent a systematic approach to identifying potential

 2

 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms (Apr. 12, 2001, as amended through May 7, 2002).

Background
Page 4 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

threats before they materialize. However, even if updated frequently,

threat assessments may not adequately capture all emerging threats. The

risk management approach therefore uses vulnerability and criticality

assessments as additional input to the decision-making process.

Vulnerability assessments identify weaknesses that may be exploited by

identified threats and suggest options that address those weaknesses. For

example, a vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in a

seaport’s security systems, police force, computer networks, or

unprotected key infrastructure such as water supplies, bridges, and

tunnels. In general, teams of experts skilled in areas such as structural

engineering, physical security, and other disciplines conduct these

assessments.

Criticality assessments evaluate and prioritize important assets and

functions in terms of factors such as mission and significance as a target.

For example, certain power plants, bridges, computer networks, or

population centers might be identified as important to the operation of a

seaport. Criticality assessments provide a basis for identifying which

assets and structures are more important to protect from attack. These

assessments also help determine mission-essential requirements to better

prioritize limited force protection resources while reducing the potential

for expending resources on lower priority assets.

In the event of a major military mobilization and overseas deployment,

such as Operation Desert Shield, a large percentage of U.S. forces

(equipment and other materiel) would be sent by sea through a number of

commercial seaports in the United States to their respective areas of

operations. 3

 To accomplish this, DOD would use several shipping

methods, including government-owned and maintained reserve sealift

ships4

 and ships operated or chartered by the Military Sealift Command.

Figure 1 shows two reserve sealift ships berthed at a commercial seaport.

 3

 Most personnel would be transported by air.

4

 These reserve ships are part of the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force.
Page 5 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Figure 1: Reserve Sealift Ships Berthed at a Commercial Seaport

Source: GAO.

The military also uses commercial seaports for deployments such as those

to operations in the Balkans. The Departments of Defense and

Transportation have identified 17 seaports on the Pacific, Atlantic, and

Gulf Coasts (13 commercial ports, 1 military port, and 3 military

ammunition ports) as “strategic,” meaning that they are necessary for use

by DOD in the event of a large scale military deployment.

Because the security activities that DOD may conduct outside its

installations are limited, it must work closely with a broad range of

federal, state, and local agencies to ensure that adequate force protection

measures exist and are executed during deployments through strategic

seaports. Force protection responsibilities for DOD deployments through

commercial seaports are divided among a number of DOD organizations

including the U.S. Transportation Command and its components

(particularly the Military Traffic Management Command and the Military

Sealift Command), the U.S. Army Forces Command, and individual

deploying units.
Page 6 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Port Readiness Committees5 at each strategic port provide a common

coordination structure for DOD, the Coast Guard, and other federal, state,

and local agencies at the port level and are the principal interface between

DOD and other officials at the ports during the movement of military

equipment. The Port Readiness Committees are focused largely on

preparing for potential military movements through a port and not on dayto-day security concerns at the port.

The issue of security at the nation’s seaports has been the subject of a

recent major study, as has the broader issue of homeland security. In fall

2000, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports

reported that security at seaports needed to be improved in a number of

areas, including

• assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical infrastructure at ports;

• coordination and cooperation among agencies; and

• establishment of guidelines for commercial facilities handling military

cargo.

In February 2001, the Commission on National Security/21st Century

(commonly referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission) reported that

threats such as international terrorism would place the U.S. homeland in

great danger. In addition to recommending national action, the

commission urged DOD to pay closer attention to operations within the

United States.

The security environment at strategic seaports is uncertain because

comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and port

infrastructure and functions have not been completed. Recent efforts by

the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, and other

agencies at the ports have begun to address several important security

issues, and maritime security legislation before the Congress may assist

these efforts. Further, proposed legislation may provide a framework for

seaport organizations to improve the coordination and dissemination of

threat information.

 5

 The Port Readiness Committees are part of the National Port Readiness Network chaired

by the Maritime Administration.

Current Risk

Management

Approach Creates

Uncertainties about

the Security

Environment

at Strategic Seaports
Page 7 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

There is a wide range of vulnerabilities at strategic seaports, including

critical infrastructure such as bridges and refineries in close proximity to

open shoreline, shipping containers with unknown contents, and an

enormous volume of foreign and domestic shipping traffic. Figure 2

illustrates typical commercial port infrastructure and operations.

Figure 2: A Commercial Container Vessel and Related Infrastructure at a Seaport

Source: GAO.

Many of the organizations responsible for seaport security do not have the

resources (such as trained personnel, equipment, and funding) necessary

to mitigate all vulnerabilities. To determine how best to allocate available

resources and address security at seaports, it is vital that responsible

agencies involved follow a risk management approach that includes

assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical infrastructure and

functions. The results of these assessments should then be used to better

conduct risk-based decisions involving security planning and actions.

Since September 11, the organizations responsible for security at strategic

seaports have increased emphasis on security planning. They now

recognize that planning must include the protection of critical seaport

Weaknesses Exist in the

Process to Assess Risk at

Seaports
Page 8 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

infrastructure and assets that have not generally been considered

vulnerable. Port authority officials stated that increased security planning

has led to improvements in physical security, such as higher fences, more

security personnel, and better coordination with local law enforcement

and other agencies. The Coast Guard has taken broad actions forward and

has redirected resources towards security planning improvements.

However, in their planning efforts, the organizations at the ports we visited

applied the elements of risk management differently. At only one of six

ports we visited were the results of threat, vulnerability, and criticality

assessments incorporated into a seaport security plan that included all

relevant agencies. The Port Mobilization Master Plan developed by the

Port Readiness Committee at this port employs a risk-based process and

systematically identifies the mission, responsibilities, and functional

relationships of each activity or agency involved in supporting a military

deployment through the port.6

 Specific weaknesses in the assessment

process used at ports we studied include the following:

• Individual organizations at the seaports conducted separate vulnerability

assessments that were not coordinated with those of other agencies and

were not based on standardized approaches. The Coast Guard has taken

the lead in developing a standard methodology for comprehensive

portwide vulnerability assessments (also called port security assessments)

that it plans to complete at 50 major ports, including all strategic seaports.

• Assessments of the criticality of seaport infrastructure were not done at all

the ports we visited prior to September 11. The Coast Guard has since

addressed this shortcoming by conducting assessments of high-risk

infrastructure at all major ports. It coordinated the assessments with

commercial facilities at the ports. Criticality of seaport assets and

functions will also be incorporated into the port security assessments.

• In some cases, threat assessment information received by agencies at the

ports is based on higher-level regional assessments that do not focus on

the local port facility. These regional assessments, while helpful in

providing a broader view of the security environment, do not provide sitespecific local threat information to the port.

• Agencies involved with seaport security have different concepts of how

threat assessments should be developed and the degree to which threat

information should be shared and disseminated. Some agencies have not

traditionally shared threat information as widely as may be necessary for

 6

 The local Port Readiness Committee is currently revising the master plan.
Page 9 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

comprehensive security measures at seaports.

In addition to these specific weaknesses, we found that there is no single

mechanism (such as a working group or committee) at the seaports we

visited to analyze, coordinate, and disseminate information on a routine

basis on the broad range of threats at each port. Most threat information at

the ports was coordinated on an informal basis, such as through personal

contacts between law enforcement individuals and those at other

agencies. The lack of such a mechanism compounds the already difficult

task of protecting deploying military forces and increases the risk that

threats—both traditional and nontraditional ones—may not be recognized

or that threat information may not be communicated in a timely manner to

all relevant organizations. Currently, interagency bodies at or near the

ports, such as port readiness committees, joint terrorism task forces, or

the newly formed antiterrorism task forces, do not routinely coordinate

threat information focused solely on the ports. The port readiness

committees were designed to prepare commercial ports to conduct

military movements. The task forces were designed to focus on threat

information but on a regional rather than a port level.

The need for efficient coordination of threat information has been amply

documented and recognized, and there are examples of improved

coordination efforts. The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security

in U.S. Seaports noted in 2000 the importance of interagency threat

coordination. The commission said that officials at seaports need a means

to analyze, coordinate, and disseminate information on the broad range of

threats they face. This includes information on ships, crews, and cargo and

information on criminal, terrorist, and other threats with foreign and

domestic origins. Although the commission did not recommend

centralizing threat information distribution into a single agency or

regulating dissemination procedures at seaports, it did recommend

improvements in integrating threat information systems and improved

coordination mechanisms for law enforcement agencies at the seaport

level.

Furthermore, the Coast Guard recognizes that agencies involved with

seaport security are currently unable to adequately analyze, share, and

exploit available threat information, and it also recognizes that
Page 10 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

asymmetric7 military and terrorist threats have a natural gateway into

America via its ports. In response, the Coast Guard has developed a

“maritime domain awareness” concept that emphasizes a risk management

approach for preventing or mitigating both traditional and nontraditional

threats through the analysis and dissemination of threat information. The

concept involves being knowledgeable of all activities and elements in the

maritime domain that could represent threats to the safety, security, or

environment of the United States or its citizens. Through the timely

delivery to the appropriate civilian or military authorities of processed

information, drawn from all available sources, effective actions involving

limited resources can be taken. Additionally, the maritime domain

awareness concept allows the Coast Guard and other relevant agencies to

incorporate nontraditional threat information, such as unintentional

biological hazards in empty cargo containers or impending weather

hazards into actionable intelligence. Both of these issues can constitute

potential threats to a port and its operation.

In commenting on a draft of this report, Transportation Security

Administration officials agreed that the coordination and dissemination of

threat information at the port level is an issue that needs to be addressed.

They noted that the Transportation Security Administration is overseeing

studies (as part of “Operation Safe Commerce”) aimed at identifying

potential threats and risk mitigation techniques that will contribute to

meeting this goal.

Finally, as we have previously reported, DOD uses threat working groups

at its installations as a forum to involve installation force protection

personnel with local, state, and federal law enforcement officials to

identify potential threats to the installation and to improve communication

between these organizations.8

 These working groups help coordinate as

much information as possible on a broad range of potential threats. Given

the limited information available on threats posed by terrorist groups or

individuals, such a mechanism assists the installation commander and

local authorities in gaining a more complete picture of internal and

 7

 Asymmetric threats include unconventional approaches (such as terrorism, the use or

threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, and information warfare) that circumvent

traditional U.S. military strengths.

8

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve

Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management, GAO-01-909 (Washington,

D.C.: Sept. 19, 2001).
Page 11 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

external threats on a more continuous basis over and above what is

provided by an annual threat assessment.

Since the September 11 attacks, the Coast Guard and other agencies at

ports have made efforts to improve risk management and security

measures. The Coast Guard, traditionally a multimission organization, has

made a significant shift in operational focus toward seaport security. In so

doing, the Coast Guard, in the months immediately following September

2001, diverted resources from other missions such as drug interdiction but

has since restored some of its effort in those areas.

Examples of additional recent efforts by the Coast Guard and other

agencies include

• formation of Coast Guard maritime safety and security teams based at

selected ports to assist in providing port security personnel and

equipment;

• Coast Guard escorts or boarding of high-risk ships, including cruise ships,

in ports;

• Coast Guard escorts for naval vessels;

• establishment and enforcement of new security zones and increased

harbor security patrols (figure 3); and

• port authority cost estimates for improving facility security and interim

security improvement measures.

In commenting on a draft of this report, Transportation Security

Administration officials indicated that they are taking initial steps toward

accomplishing seaport security goals by awarding approximately $217

million in grants (funded through both regular and emergency

appropriations) to public and private entities at the ports for initial

security assessments, preliminary security improvements, and port

incident response training.

Recent Efforts and

Proposed Legislation May

Assist Port Security

Improvements
Page 12 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Figure 3: Coast Guard Crew in a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Demonstrating

Enforcement of a Security Zone at a Commercial Port

Source: GAO.

Legislation on maritime security before the Congress (as of October 22,

2002)9

 may promote and enhance these seaport security efforts. Some of

the major provisions include

• vulnerability assessments to be conducted at ports;

• establishment of port security committees at each port, with broad

representation by relevant agencies, to plan and oversee security

measures;

• development of standardized port security plans;

• background checks and access control to sensitive areas for port workers;

and

• federal grants for security improvements.

 9

 S. 1214 passed the Senate on December 20, 2001. The House of Representatives passed an

amendment to S. 1214 on June 4, 2002.
Page 13 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

On the basis of our discussions with agency officials at the ports we

visited, we believe that if enacted and properly implemented, these and

other provisions of the maritime security legislation should assist officials

in addressing many of the weaknesses we have identified. For example,

comprehensive vulnerability assessments and the proposed standardized

security plans could provide a more consistent approach to identifying and

mitigating security weaknesses. In providing for port security committees

and interagency coordination, the legislation would also provide a

framework for organizations at seaports to establish a mechanism to

coordinate, analyze, and disseminate threat information at the port level.

There may be challenges, however, to implementing the maritime security

legislation, including uncertainty about the amount and sources of funds

needed to address security needs at seaports. We recently reported on

these and other challenges to implementing the provisions of this

legislation and the establishment of a new Department of Homeland

Security.10

In commenting on a draft of this report, Coast Guard officials reported

that notwithstanding the status of the proposed legislation, port security

committees have already been established at some major ports and that

the Coast Guard is preparing a nationwide policy to delineate the purpose

and composition of these committees. Coast Guard officials believe that in

addition to consideration of vulnerabilities and security planning, the port

security committees, as currently envisioned, may provide a more

effective mechanism for threat information coordination.

During our review, we identified two significant weaknesses in DOD’s

force protection process. First, DOD lacks a central authority responsible

for overseeing force protection measures of DOD organizations while

carrying out the various domestic phases of military deployments to and

through U.S. seaports. As a result, potential force protection gaps and

weaknesses requiring attention and action might be overlooked. Second,

there are instances during some phases of these deployments when DOD

transfers custody of its military equipment to nongovernment entities. At

these times, the equipment could fall into the hands of individuals or

groups whose interests are counter to those of the United States.

 10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in

Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2002).

Weaknesses in DOD

Force Protection

Process Increase

Risks for

Deployments through

Domestic Seaports
Page 14 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Deploying units traditionally focus their force protection efforts primarily

on their overseas operations. Before they arrive in an overseas region, the

units are required to submit force protection plans to the unified

combatant commanders, who are responsible for force protection of all

military units in their regions, with the exception of DOD personnel

assigned to the Department of State. The tactics, techniques, and

procedures in the units’ plans must match the guidance developed by the

unified commander, who coordinates and approves the individual plans.

This allows the commander to ensure that a unit’s plan takes into account

all current threats that could affect the mission and to accept or mitigate

any security risks that arise.

The situation for the domestic phases of overseas deployments is

different: there is no designated commander with centralized force

protection responsibilities similar to those of the overseas unified

combatant commander. This creates gaps, during the domestic phases of a

deployment, in DOD’s ability to coordinate individual force protection

plans, identify gaps that may exist, and mitigate the identified risk. The

one coordination mechanism that is in place—the Port Readiness

Committee—is focused largely on port operations and at this time does

not coordinate all phases of a deployment from an installation through the

port. Figure 4 illustrates the domestic phases of a deployment and key

organizations responsible for force protection.

DOD Lacks a Central

Authority to Coordinate

and Execute Domestic

Force Protection Measures
Page 15 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Figure 4: The Domestic Phases of the Deployment Process and Responsible Organizations

Source: GAO, based on DOD information.

In the deployments we reviewed, service guidance and DOD antiterrorism

standards, particularly those that emphasize the elements of risk

management (such as Army major command force protection operations

orders), were not always followed in all phases of a deployment from an

installation through a port. For example, the Military Traffic Management

Command’s transportation units recognized the vulnerability of seaport

operations and prepared security plans for deployment operations at the

ports that were based on assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and
Page 16 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

critical infrastructure. The transport of military equipment to the port by

commercial carrier was not always supported by such detailed plans and

assessments. In contrast, we found that when a military unit travels by

road to a seaport in its own convoy, it generally follows exhaustive

planning and risk management measures.

In discussing the absence of a focal point for coordinating and executing

force protection measures for the domestic phases of military

deployments, DOD officials indicated that the recently established U.S.

Northern Command may serve as such a coordinating mechanism.

Additionally, in commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials noted

that the principal defense guidance on military transportation issues11 is in

the process of being revised to incorporate force protection guidance.

During deployments from domestic installations through commercial

seaports, there are three phases in which DOD either transfers custody of

its equipment to nongovernment persons (in some cases foreign nationals)

or does not have adequate information about who is handling its

equipment, as follows:

• Private trucking and railroad carriers transport equipment and cargo from

military installations to seaports.

• Civilian port workers handle and load equipment onto ships.

• Private shipping companies with civilian crews sometimes transport DOD

equipment overseas.

The four deployments we reviewed from three military installations in

2001 involved the use of road and rail contract carriers transporting

equipment from the installation to a port of embarkation. Contract carriers

are required to provide security for the equipment they transport,

including sensitive items. For example, contract carriers are required to

provide their own security at railroad switching yards, rest areas,

overnight stops, and along the entire route whenever they transport

sensitive equipment. Although we did not review the steps taken by DOD

to evaluate the contractors’ security measures, the transfer of

accountability to these nongovernmental agents creates a gap in DOD’s

oversight of its assets between installations and ports.

 11 DOD Directive 4500.9, Transportation and Traffic Management, Jan. 26, 1989.

Military Equipment and

Cargo Are Sometimes Not

under DOD Control
Page 17 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Once equipment arrives at a commercial seaport, it comes under the

control of the military units responsible for managing the loading process.

However, civilian port workers, stevedores, and longshoremen—who

undergo limited screening and background checks by port authorities or

terminal operators—handle military equipment and cargo, as well as the

loading and unloading of ships used to transport the equipment overseas.

This was the case in all the deployments we reviewed. In all cases, the

stevedores or longshoremen were in the same labor pool as the one used

for commercial port operations. While DOD officials have not identified

port workers as a particular threat, they are concerned that lack of

information on the background of individuals handling military equipment

increases potential risk. Organizations at some of the ports we visited are

now implementing or reviewing efforts to increase screening of port

workers. And the maritime security legislation currently before the

Congress includes provisions for background checks and access control

for port workers. These measures, if approved and properly implemented,

may help address this issue. In commenting on a draft of this report,

Transportation Security Administration officials acknowledged the

problems posed by the lack of screening for port workers and indicated

that they plan to study and eventually issue nationwide standards for

credentialing port workers.

DOD also transfers custody of its equipment when the equipment is placed

aboard a commercial ship for transport overseas. We reviewed four major

overseas deployments from three military installations during calendar

year 2001 that involved about 6,550 tons of military equipment and

supplies. Although these four deployments are not representative of all

DOD deployments conducted in 2001, they do illustrate the use of foreignowned commercial vessels by DOD. In commenting on a draft of this

report, DOD officials stated that about 43 percent of cargo shipped

overseas in 2001 as part of deployments involving major equipment in

support of overseas operations was carried on foreign-flagged ships.12 As

indicated in table 1, most of the ships for the deployments we reviewed

were both foreign-owned and foreign-crewed.

 12 DOD further stated that only 18 percent of all cargo (including deployments and general

cargo, such as household goods) shipped by the Military Sealift Command was transported

by foreign-flagged vessels.
Page 18 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Table 1: Ownership and Crew for Commercial Ships Used in Deployments GAO

Reviewed from Three Installations in 2001

Ship U.S. Owned Foreign Owned U.S. Crew Foreign Crew

1 • • 2 • • 3 • • 4 • • 5 • • 6 • • 7 • • 8 • N/A N/A

9 • N/A N/A

N/A: Crew information not available.

Source: DOD.

In addition to transferring custody over its assets to non-DOD personnel,

DOD did not generally provide security forces aboard these vessels.

Several of the ships used in the deployments we reviewed did have DOD

maintenance personnel aboard, but the ship manifests did not indicate that

armed DOD personnel were aboard as a security force. The Military Sealift

Command reviews charter vessel crew lists to determine whether any

crewmembers are known security threats. Some of the materiel

transported by these vessels included sensitive and mission essential

items. Table 2 provides examples of equipment carried aboard foreignowned and foreign-crewed ships for the deployments we reviewed.

Table 2: Examples of Equipment Carried on Foreign-Owned and Foreign-Crewed

Ships

Equipment Category Example

Major weapon system • Bradley fighting vehicles

• 155mm howitzers

• Apache attack helicopters

• Blackhawk helicopters

• Stinger anti-aircraft launchers

• Armored light vehicles

Other weapons • Antitank missile launchers

• .50 caliber machineguns

• 40mm grenade launchers

• 9mm pistols

• M-16A2 rifles

• Squad automatic weapons

• Bayonets
Page 19 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Equipment Category Example

Individual equipment • Night vision goggles

• Minefield marking system

• Chemical agent monitor

• Body armor

• Nuclear, biological, and chemical protective suits and

masks

• Mine detection sets

• Global positioning system receivers

Communications equipment • Radio sets

• Antenna assemblies

• Satellite communications terminals

Source: DOD.

When DOD relinquishes control over its equipment, it relies on

nongovernment third parties to protect its assets. Placing military

equipment outside DOD’s control also complicates the steps needed to

mitigate the higher risk and could disrupt military units from performing

their intended missions. An example of the dangers of such loss of control

occurred in summer 2000. While in the North Atlantic, the captain of a

commercial vessel carrying Canadian military equipment and three

Canadian Forces personnel from the Balkans refused to proceed to the

ship’s destination port in Canada after a dispute over payment to the

vessel’s owner. The vessel, GTS Katie, was owned by a U.S. company but

registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and crewed by non-U.S.

citizens. Alarmed at the loss of control over its equipment, including

sensitive items, the Canadian government was compelled to board the

Katie with a contingent of Canadian Forces naval personnel from a nearby

warship. The vessel was then brought safely into a Canadian port.13

The Canadian Defense Minister explained that the loss of control over

military equipment compromised Canada’s ongoing military operations

and the ability to undertake new ones.14 Similarly, when the third parties to

whom DOD relinquishes control of its equipment include foreign

nationals, there may be an increased risk of the equipment being tampered

with, seized, or destroyed by individuals or groups whose interests run

 13 The Department of Defense had also chartered the same vessel to transport military

equipment from operations in the Balkans.

14 Although he recognized the danger of the Katie incident, the Canadian Defense Minister

also acknowledged that it would still be necessary for Canada to charter nongovernment

vessels for future military movements.
Page 20 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

counter to those of the United States and an increased chance that those

weapons or equipment might be used against military or civilian targets.

During our review, officials from several military commands expressed

concern about placing military equipment aboard ships that are outside

DOD control. DOD officials told us that the reasons for the use of

commercial contract carriers include, among others, economy and

efficiency over using government-owned and -operated vessels and the

adequacy and availability of the U.S.-flagged merchant marine. In

commenting on a draft of this report, Maritime Administration officials

agreed with our concerns related to the use of foreign ships and crews to

transport sensitive military equipment and reiterated their interest in

increasing the number of U.S.-flag vessels appropriate for DOD use. They

indicated that the shortage of appropriate U.S.-flagged ships will be

exacerbated by Military Sealift Command plans to terminate existing

charters for some U.S.-flag vessels.

The events of September 11 highlighted the vulnerability of the U.S.

homeland to unconventional attack, and the resulting new security

environment warrants that more attention be paid to the domestic phases

of military deployments. It is clearly evident that since September 11, DOD

and the organizations responsible for seaport security recognize the need

for increased vigilance at home during the domestic phases of a military

deployment, and this recognition provides an opportunity to improve

seaport security in a systematic and effective manner.

However, the inadequate assessment of threats and vulnerabilities and

lack of comprehensive security plans prevent organizations at seaports

and DOD from thoroughly analyzing the security environment at the ports.

This hampers the identification and prioritization of requirements for the

protection of critical assets. This situation compounds an already difficult

task of protecting deploying DOD forces. However, if enacted and

properly implemented, pending maritime security legislation would

address most of these issues. We are therefore making no

recommendations in this area.

The absence of a mechanism at the strategic seaports for coordinating and

disseminating comprehensive threat information increases the risk that

threats—both traditional and nontraditional—will not be identified and

appropriately communicated to all relevant organizations. If established at

the port level such a mechanism could provide a formal, rather than

informal and ad-hoc, process for coordinating information, and it could

Conclusions
Page 21 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

focus on port-specific threats, rather than a regionwide perspective. A

central coordination mechanism could also provide a means to analyze

threats on a continuous basis.

Without a DOD authority or organization to coordinate force protection

planning and execution for the domestic phases of DOD deployments to

and through strategic seaports, potential gaps in force protection may go

unnoticed, increasing the risk to DOD operations and equipment. Having

such an authority would not only reduce such risks, but would also

provide oversight to ensure that risk management and antiterrorism

standards are consistently applied through all phases of a deployment

from an installation through a port.

When military equipment is entrusted to non-DOD personnel, with limited

DOD control over the equipment, there is a greater risk that it could be

tampered with, seized, or destroyed. While we recognize there are times

during a deployment when DOD will relinquish direct control of its

equipment, the new security environment warrants that DOD re-evaluate

its current policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate security

measures are applied during these times. Weaknesses in DOD’s force

protection approach along with uncertainties in the security environment

at strategic seaports result in increased risks that military operations could

be disrupted, successful terrorist attacks might occur, or sophisticated

military equipment might be seized by individuals or organizations whose

interests run counter to those of the United States.

To improve the information available to develop effective seaport security

measures, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation identify

and direct the appropriate transportation agency to develop a mechanism

at the port level to compile, coordinate, analyze, and disseminate threat

information on a real-time basis to all relevant organizations. Such a

mechanism might be similar to DOD’s threat working groups but with

broader membership or be part of an existing coordinating body (such as

the proposed port security committees or the joint terrorism task forces).

Whether established as a new entity or as a modification of an existing

coordinating body, this mechanism should include representatives from a

broad range of federal, state, and local agencies. It should also include in

its assessment process nontraditional threats such as natural emergencies

and information technology attacks.

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Page 22 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

To improve DOD’s oversight and execution of force protection for

deployments to and through domestic strategic seaports, we recommend

that the Secretary of Defense

• designate a single authority (such as the recently established U.S.

Northern Command) to coordinate and execute force protection planning

for deployments of units from installations in the United States through

seaports and until ships enter the destination areas of operation (this

responsibility would be similar to that of the overseas unified combatant

commands for their respective areas of operation) and

• direct the single coordinating authority (once established), along with the

U.S. Transportation Command, to develop and implement measures to

maintain greater security over equipment transported by non-DOD

carriers.

DOD agreed with the need for a single DOD authority to coordinate and

execute force protection planning for deployments from installations in

the United States through seaports and until ships enter the destination

areas of operation. In commenting on this report, DOD stated that the

recently established U.S. Northern Command will work closely with the

U.S. Transportation Command to examine security for deployments

through domestic seaports.

DOD also agreed with the need for measures to maintain greater security

over equipment transported by non-DOD carriers. In its comments,

however, DOD stated that it has for decades relied on the commercial

sector to provide a large portion of the nation’s strategic sealift

capabilities in both peacetime and during contingencies and that it is not

cost effective to use government-owned sealift vessels for routine cargo

movements or force rotations of the type included in GAO’s analysis.

Nonetheless, DOD stated that the U.S. Transportation Command and the

new U.S. Northern Command will continue to seek ways to improve the

security of DOD cargo transported via commercial carrier, including the

use of satellite tracking of cargo and vessels and placing security

personnel aboard those ships. On those occasions when DOD transfers

custody of its equipment to non-DOD carriers, the kinds of additional

measures DOD discussed should help improve the overall security of

sensitive DOD cargoes.

DOD’s written comments are included in their entirety in appendix II. In

addition, DOD officials suggested a number of technical clarifications and

Agency Comments

and Our Review
Page 23 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

corrections, which we have incorporated into this report where

appropriate.

In oral comments on a draft of this report, Department of Transportation

officials generally agreed with the findings, conclusions, and

recommendations. They also provided additional information and

suggested a number of technical clarifications and corrections, which we

have incorporated into this report where appropriate. Transportation

officials discussed several new and ongoing efforts affecting seaport

security by the newly established Transportation Security Administration.

Among other initiatives, these include measures for seaport security

grants, studies on credentialing port workers, and a study on developing a

threat assessment center. These initiatives are funded through regular and

emergency appropriations for fiscal year 2002. Additionally, proposed

appropriations for fiscal year 2003 would provide further funding if

enacted into law. If properly implemented, these initiatives should

contribute to the goal of improved seaport security.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Defense

and Transportation and interested congressional committees. We will also

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will

be available at no cost on the GAO Web site at http://gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, or wish to

discuss this matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-6020. Key

contributors are acknowledged in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Raymond J. Decker, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 24 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

To analyze the security environment at strategic seaports we reviewed

security planning and procedures during the conduct of site visits at six

selected commercial seaports and two military-owned ammunition ports.

These six commercial ports included ports that regularly support DOD

deployments as well as those that are used less frequently. We selected

ports on the West Coast, East Coast and on the Gulf of Mexico. We visited

two of the three dedicated ammunition ports identified by DOD, one on

each coast. For security reasons, we do not discuss location-specific

information in this report.

At these selected ports we reviewed documents, observed security

measures, and discussed port operations, security planning, coordination

mechanisms, specific vulnerabilities, mitigation plans, and resource issues

with government and nongovernment officials. Among the organizations

we visited during our seaport visits were the Coast Guard, the U.S.

Maritime Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S.

Customs Service, port authorities, and local law enforcement agencies.

Although the information we obtained at these locations could not be

generalized to describe the environment DOD could expect at all seaports,

it provides insight into what DOD could expect to encounter at domestic

seaports. We also discussed these issues with officials at Coast Guard

headquarters and the U.S. Maritime Administration, both in the

Department of Transportation in Washington, D.C.

To analyze DOD’s process for securing deployments of military equipment

through strategic seaports we examined force protection plans,

procedures, and coordination measures for four deployments conducted

in 2001. We selected these deployments based on information provided by

the U.S. Army Forces Command. The command provided a list of

deployments involving units moving from within the continental United

States to an overseas location during calendar year 2001 that required the

use of sealift to transport military equipment. We selected four

deployments originating from three installations in calendar year 2001

because they represented about 65 percent of the total tonnage of

equipment for all deployments to major DOD contingency operations

during that period. An additional factor in our selection was the

geographic dispersion of the domestic seaports used for the deployments.

Our review of force protection procedures included the guidance and

criteria for force protection for deployments, the extent to which these are

clearly defined and carried out, and the extent to which DOD works with

other federal, state, and local agencies to plan and carry out force

protection measures. We also reviewed information from the Military

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Sealift Command and Military Traffic Management Command on the ships

used to transport equipment for these deployments and the equipment

they carried. We interviewed officials from the following organizations:

• Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict in Washington, D.C.

• U.S. Transportation Command at Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

• Military Transportation Management Command in Fort Eustis, Va.

• Military Sealift Command in Washington, D.C.

• U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Fla.

• U.S. Army Forces Command in Atlanta, Ga.

• Army and Navy Force Protection Offices in Washington D.C.

• Transportation and force protection officials at the installation and unit

levels for Army and Marine Corps units

To examine DOD force protection efforts, we conducted site visits at three

military installations that were the origins of the four 2001 deployments in

our review. During these site visits, we reviewed DOD force protection

plans, policies and standards used for the equipment involved in the

deployments and discussed with unit and installation personnel how DOD

addressed security weaknesses identified at the seaports. We also

discussed the experience of past deployments and recent deployments

with DOD officials at installations and the ports.

We also reviewed the findings and recommendations of the Interagency

Commission of Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports and the provisions of

maritime security legislation now before Congress to determine the

potential impact on current and future seaport security efforts. We

analyzed the provisions of both House and Senate versions of the

legislation and discussed key provisions with staff members of cognizant

Congressional committees.

We conducted our review from January through August 2002 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 26 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Appendix II: Comments from the Department

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 27 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 28 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 29 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Ray Decker (202) 512-6020

Bob Repasky (202) 512-9868

In addition to those names above, Willie J. Cheely, Jr., Brian G. Hackett,

Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Jean M. Orland, Stefano Petrucci, Elizabeth G.

Ryan, and Tracy M. Whitaker also made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff

Acknowledgements
Related GAO Products

Page 30 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Homeland Security: Department of Justice's Response to Its

Congressional Mandate to Assess and Report on Chemical Industry

Vulnerabilities. GAO-03-24R. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2002.

Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued

Management Challenges. GAO-02-1122T. Washington, D.C.: October 1,

2002.

Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat

Terrorism Abroad. GAO-02-1021. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.

National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing

Challenges. GAO-02-1048R. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to

Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to

Success. GAO-02-1012T. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to

Success. GAO-02-1011T. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2002.

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in

Force Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports.

GAO-02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.

Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO02-957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.

Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO02-927T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002.

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but

May Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June

28, 2002.

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Page 31 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But

Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington,

D.C.: June 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and

Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy.

GAO-02-811T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.

Homeland Security: Responsibility And Accountability For Achieving

National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private

Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland

Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the

Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local

Preparedness. GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to

Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:

March 25, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T.

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.

Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1,

2002.

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and

Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7,

2001.
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Page 32 GAO-03-15 Combating Terrorism

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Considerations For Investing Resources in

Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.:

October 17, 2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.

GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues.

GAO-01-1158T, September 21, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism

Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington,

D.C.: September 19, 2001.

(350156)
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