[Cite as State v. Brewer, 2013-Ohio-309.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MEIGS COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No: 11CA6 

 : 

 v. : 

 : DECISION AND

TERRI BREWER, : JUDGMENT ENTRY

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : Filed: January 30, 2013 

APPEARANCES:

Timothy Young, Ohio State Public Defender, and Glenn T. Jones, Ohio State Assistant 

Public Defender, Athens, Ohio, for Appellant. 

Colleen Williams, Meigs County Prosecuting Attorney, Pomeroy, Ohio, for Appellee. 

Kline, J.: 

{¶1} Terri L. Brewer (hereinafter “Brewer”) appeals the judgment of the Meigs 

County Municipal Court, which convicted her of violating a protection order. Brewer’s 

appellate counsel has advised this court that, after reviewing the record, he cannot find 

a meritorious claim for appeal. As a result, Brewer’s appellate counsel has moved to 

withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 

(1967). After independently reviewing the record, we agree that Brewer’s appeal is 

wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we (1) grant counsel’s request to withdraw and (2) affirm 

the judgment of the trial court. 

I. 
Meigs App. No. 11CA6 2 

{¶2} On November 12, 2009, a protection order was issued against Brewer. 

Under the protection order, Brewer could not enter the home of Bonnie Lee Coppic 

(hereinafter “Coppic”). (Coppic is Brewer’s mother.) Nevertheless, on December 25, 

2009, Brewer celebrated Christmas in Coppic’s home. 

{¶3} Eventually, Brewer was charged with several crimes, including violating 

the November 12, 2009 protection order. Brewer pled not guilty to the charges, and her 

case proceeded to a bench trial. (Because Brewer was found guilty of just one count -- 

violating a protection order -- we need not discuss the other charges against her.) 

{¶4} At trial, the state introduced photographs that show Brewer and her 

children celebrating Christmas in Coppic’s home. And based on Coppic’s testimony, 

the photographs were most likely taken on December 25, 2009. 

{¶5} At the close of the state’s evidence, Brewer moved for an acquittal under 

Crim.R. 29. The trial court denied Brewer’s motion as to the relevant count and, 

eventually, convicted her of violating a protection order. 

II. 

{¶6} Although Brewer has appealed her conviction, Brewer’s appellate counsel 

has filed both a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief. 

In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held that if 

counsel determines after a conscientious examination of the 

record that the case is wholly frivolous, counsel should so 

advise the court and request permission to withdraw. 

[Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493]. 

Counsel must accompany the request with a brief identifying 
Meigs App. No. 11CA6 3 

anything in the record that could arguably support the 

appeal. Id. Counsel also must furnish the client with a copy 

of the brief and request to withdraw and allow the client 

sufficient time to raise any matters that the client chooses. 

Id. Once these requirements have been satisfied, the 

appellate court must then fully examine the proceedings 

below to determine if meritorious issues exist. Id. If the 

appellate court determines that the appeal is frivolous, it may 

grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal 

without violating constitutional requirements or may proceed 

to a decision on the merits if state law so requires. Id. 

Alternatively, if the appellate court concludes that any of the 

legal points are arguable on their merits, it must afford the 

appellant the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal. Id. 

State v. Wise, 4th Dist. No. 08CA40, 2009-Ohio-5264, ¶ 11. See also State v. Taylor, 

2d Dist. No. 23833, 2010-Ohio-4276, ¶ 2 (stating that an appellant must be afforded 

“time to file a pro se brief”). 

{¶7} Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must “conduct ‘a full examination of all 

the proceeding[s] to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.’” Penson v. Ohio, 488 

U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), quoting Anders at 744. If we find 

only frivolous issues on appeal, we may then proceed to address the case on its merits 

without affording appellant the assistance of counsel. Penson at 80. However, if we 

conclude that there are nonfrivolous issues for appeal, we must afford appellant the 
Meigs App. No. 11CA6 4 

assistance of counsel to address those issues. Anders at 744; Penson at 80; accord

State v. Keller, 4th Dist. No. 10CA39, 2012-Ohio-237, ¶ 5. 

{¶8} Here, Brewer’s counsel has satisfied the requirements of Anders. And 

although Brewer has not filed a pro se brief, Brewer’s counsel has raised the following 

potential assignment of error: “A trial court errs to the substantial prejudice of appellant 

and in violation of her rights to due process of law under the United States and Ohio 

Constitutions by denying appellant[’s Crim.R. 29] motion as to the charge of violating a 

protection order.” 

III. 

{¶9} Brewer’s counsel asserts that the trial court possibly erred when it denied 

Brewer’s Crim.R. 29 motion. We disagree. Here, the state introduced sufficient 

evidence that Brewer entered Coppic’s house in violation of the November 12, 2009 

protection order. 

{¶10} “We review the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for 

acquittal for sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Turner, 4th Dist. No. 08CA3234, 

2009-Ohio-3114, ¶ 17, citing State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261, 381 N.E.2d 184 

(1978), syllabus. When reviewing a case to determine if the record contains sufficient 

evidence to support a criminal conviction, we must 

“examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether 

such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind 

of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
Meigs App. No. 11CA6 5 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Smith, 4th 

Dist. No. 06CA7, 2007-Ohio-502, ¶ 33, quoting State v. 

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. 

See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 

{¶11} The sufficiency-of-the-evidence test “raises a question of law and does not 

allow us to weigh the evidence.” Smith at ¶ 34, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 

172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). Instead, the sufficiency-of-the-evidence test 

“‘gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to 

ultimate facts.’” Smith at ¶ 34, quoting Jackson at 319. This court will “reserve the 

issues of the weight given to the evidence and the credibility of witnesses for the trier of 

fact.” Smith at ¶ 34, citing State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 79-80, 434 N.E.2d 1356 

(1982); State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of 

the syllabus. 

{¶12} Under R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), “No person shall recklessly violate the terms of 

* * * [a] protection order issued or consent agreement approved pursuant to section 

2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code * * *.” And on November 12, 2009, “a 

Protective Order was issued * * *, naming [Coppic], for [Brewer] not to have any contact, 

be around [Coppic], not enter [Coppic’s] residence, school, place of employment, not 

interfere with [Coppic’s] rights, [and] stay away from [Coppic] at least five hundred (500) 

yards * * *.” Transcript at 34-35. 
Meigs App. No. 11CA6 6 

{¶13} The state alleged that Brewer violated the November 12, 2009 protection 

order by entering Coppic’s residence. The state introduced photographs in support of 

this allegation, and Coppic testified about the photographs’ significance. 

Q: * * * [D]o [these photographs] portray your house? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And ma’am, what date do those uh, what date were those 

taken on? 

A: I am assuming December twenty-fifth because uh 

[Brewer’s husband] and [Brewer] were working on 

reconciling. 

Q: Sure. And their children are in that picture? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And those are the children receiving presents that they 

received on [December 25, 2009]? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And that’s at your house, is that correct? 

A: Yes. Transcript at 9-10. 

{¶14} Based on these photographs, any rational trier of fact could have 

reasonably inferred that Brewer was in Coppic’s residence on December 25, 2009. The 

photographs depict Brewer celebrating Christmas inside Coppic’s house. Furthermore, 

the photographs show Brewer’s children opening presents that, according to Coppic, 

the children received on December 25, 2009. Therefore, the state introduced sufficient 

evidence that Brewer had entered Coppic’s house in violation of the November 12, 2009 
Meigs App. No. 11CA6 7 

protection order. (Brewer moved for acquittal at the close of the state’s evidence. 

Therefore, Brewer’s own testimony is irrelevant as to whether the trial court erred in 

denying her Crim.R. 29 motion. Nevertheless, Brewer testified that she was indeed at 

Coppic’s house on December 25, 2009.) 

{¶15} After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we find 

that any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of violating a 

protection order proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the trial court did not 

err in denying Brewer’s Crim.R. 29 motion. 

{¶16} In conclusion, we find no merit in Brewer’s potential assignment of error. 

Furthermore, after fully examining the proceedings below, we have found no other 

potential issues for appeal. Because we agree that Brewer’s appeal is wholly frivolous, 

we (1) grant Brewer’s counsel’s motion to withdraw and (2) affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Meigs App. No. 11CA6 8 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs 

herein taxed. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Meigs County Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. 

McFarland, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion. 

For the Court 

 

 

 BY: ____________________________ 

 Roger L. Kline, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing 

with the clerk.