J-A12037-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

BRANDON ALEXANDER HOLMES 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 572 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 10, 2022 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001076-2020 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

BRANDON ALEXANDER HOLMES 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2210 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 3, 2022 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004371-2020 

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 18, 2024 

Appellant, Brandon Alexander Holmes, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County on 

October 3, 2023. We affirm. 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 
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 The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: 

From December 2018 through September 2019, Defendant 

and several co-conspirators robbed, attempted to rob or staged 

robberies of delivery trucks which were in the process of 

transporting packages of prescription drugs to multiple 

pharmacies. Defendant engaged in these actions on six (6) 

separate occasions in two (2) different counties. 

On December 24, 2018, Defendant's co-defendant, Eugene 

Fortune, a delivery driver for Fard Enterprises, took part in an 

event in which he falsely informed authorities that his delivery 

truck had been robbed. Specifically, Mr. Fortune drove a Fard 

Enterprises truck to the Quick Courier Service headquarters in 

Whitemarsh Townsihp, [sic] Pa in order to pick up packages of 

prescription drugs intended for delivery to local pharmacies. 

Sometime following his departure from this facility, Mr. Fortune 

walked into the Springfield Township Police Department to inform 

authorities that he had been the victim of a carjacking which 

occurred at approximately 7:00 a.m. in the vicinity of Plymouth 

Road and Falcon Way in Plymouth Township, Pa. Mr. Fortune 

stated that a black sedan had followed him on his route when he 

left the Quick Courier Service facility and proceeded to force him 

to pull over. Mr. Fortune further indicated that an individual 

jumped out of the black sedan, pointed a gun at him and forced 

him to move into the passenger seat of the delivery truck while 

the individual holding the gun entered the driver's seat and began 

to drive the truck. Mr. Fortune relayed that this individual drove 

the truck to the area of Stenton Avenue in Springfield Township, 

Pa, at which time Mr. Fortune jumped out of the vehicle and ran 

to the Springfield Township Police Department. Authorities 

eventually found the delivery truck in Philadelphia, Pa. Following 

the recovery of the truck, Quick Courier Service employees 

performed an inventory of the contents and determined that the 

value of the items stolen by the assailants was approximately 

$37,900. 

Authorities later had suspicions that Mr. Fortune was not 

being truthful regarding his description of what occurred with 

respect to the December 24, 2018 robbery. Specifically, while he 

was providing a statement at the Plymouth Township Police 

Department a few days following the robbery, Mr. Fortune was 

asked if he would be willing to consent to a search of his cell 

phone. Mr. Fortune agreed to this request, but indicated that his 

cell phone was in his car. Authorities asked Mr. Fortune to retrieve 
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his phone and were confused when Mr. Fortune had not returned 

after fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed. Authorities went outside 

and noticed that Mr. Fortune's vehicle was no longer in the parking 

lot. Mr. Fortune eventually returned to the police station after 

having been absent for approximately forty (40) minutes. 

When Mr. Fortune returned to give another statement at the 

Plymouth Township Police Department several months later, he 

explained that the reason he left the premises when providing his 

previous statement was due to the fact that he realized he did not 

have his phone in his car and he needed to return to his residence 

in order to retrieve his phone. Authorities, however, had 

performed a cell site analysis of Mr. Fortune's phone which 

revealed that Mr. Fortune actually had his cell phone in the vicinity 

of the Plymouth Township Police Department when he arrived to 

provide his prior statement. The cell site analysis further revealed 

that Mr. Fortune was utilizing the phone when he left during his 

statement to travel back to his residence. Thus, authorities knew 

Mr. Fortune was not being truthful. Authorities had also executed 

a search warrant on call detail records related to Mr. Fortune's cell 

phone and discovered that in the hours leading up to the robbery 

on December 24, 2018, Mr. Fortune's cell phone was 

communicating with a phone number ending in 8528 (the “8528 

Cell Phone”). In fact, from 11 p.m. on December 23, 2018 to the 

time of the robbery on December 24, 2018, the call detail records 

noted forty-four (44) transactions between the 8528 Cell Phone 

and Mr. Fortune's phone. The 8528 Cell Phone was later revealed 

to belong to Defendant. Thus, authorities concluded that Mr. 

Fortune had assisted in staging the December 24, 2018 incident 

to look like a robbery and placed him under arrest. 

On May 14, 2019, Donald Carter, a delivery driver for Quick 

Courier Service, had loaded his van with prescription drugs to 

deliver to local pharmacies and departed from the headquarters 

in Whitemarsh Township at approximately 7:45 a.m. to make his 

deliveries. Mr. Carter turned onto Militia Hill Road and 

subsequently observed a dark colored sedan behind him which 

had illuminated emergency lights on its dashboard. Mr. Carter 

believed the sedan was attempting to perform a traffic stop and 

he pulled over to the side of the road. An individual described as 

a tall, husky African-American male subsequently exited the dark 

colored sedan and approached the driver's side of the van. This 

individual instructed Mr. Carter to turn the car off, give him the 

keys and get out of the van. Mr. Carter complied with these 

instructions and the assailant proceeded to walk him around to 
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the passenger's side of the van, pat him down and place a 

handcuff on his left wrist. The assailant attempted to handcuff 

both of Mr. Carter’s hands, but was unsuccessful due to the 

minimal distance between the two cuff mechanisms. During this 

portion of the encounter, Mr. Carter observed that another 

individual had exited the sedan and was rummaging through the 

pharmaceuticals located inside the delivery van. Mr. Carter noted 

this individual was a slender African-American who possessed a 

light complexion. 

The assailant who handcuffed Mr. Carter began to rummage 

through the pharmaceuticals with the other assailant for 

approximately seven (7) minutes. Eventually, Mr. Carter heard 

the sound of the doors closing and the screeching of the sedan's 

tires as it drove away at a high rate of speed. Mr. Carter proceeded 

to duck behind the delivery van and call Quick Courier Service to 

inform them of what had just transpired. Mr. Carter subsequently 

drove back to headquarters and the authorities were contacted. 

An individual at headquarters who had law enforcement 

experience was able to remove the handcuff from Mr. Carter’s 

wrist and this piece of evidence was supplied to authorities. Quick 

Courier Service employees performed an inventory of the van's 

contents and determined that the value of the items stolen by the 

assailants was approximately $4,900. 

On June 4, 2019, Ilhomjon Mirzoev was driving a truck for 

a courier service named Venskyy Express containing 

pharmaceuticals and supplies from Harrisburg, Pa which were 

intended for delivery to the Quick Courier Service headquarters in 

Whitemarsh Township. When he attempted to turn into the Quick 

Courier Service facility in the early morning hours, Mr. Mirzoev 

missed his entrance and in the process of turning around, 

observed a gold Buick which was blocking his path. A short 

African-American individual emerged from the Buick and 

approached the passenger side window of the truck to ask for 

directions to Allentown, Pa. Mr. Mirzoev responded that he was 

not from the area and, almost immediately, another AfricanAmerican individual emerged from the Buick who was wearing a 

mask and gloves and was also brandishing a firearm. This 

assailant proceeded to strike the back of Mr. Mirzoev’s head with 

the firearm approximately four (4) to five (5) times. Following this 

assault, the assailant with the firearm forced his way into the 

delivery truck and instructed Mr. Mirzoev to sit on a milk crate in 

between the driver’s and front passenger’s seats. The shorter 

assailant also forced his way into the truck and sat down in the 
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front passenger’s seat while the other assailant sat in the driver's 

seat and began to drive the truck. A third assailant operated the 

Buick, which followed behind the delivery truck during this time. 

Mr. Mirzoev did not have a chance to observe the third assailant. 

Mr. Mirzoev had fears he was going to be killed and asked 

the assailants not to harm him since his wife was pregnant. The 

assailants took Mr. Mirzoev's wallet and cell phone and zip tied his 

hands together. The assailants proceeded to drive the truck for 

approximately three (3) miles and later stopped the truck and 

removed items from inside before departing in the Buick. Mr. 

Mirzoev exited the truck after the assailants had fled and began 

to walk along the street until he was able to flag down a detective 

from the Springfield Township Police Department. The detective 

administered aid and was able to locate the delivery truck a few 

blocks away. The detective later received a report that Mr. 

Mirzoev's wallet had been located approximately two hundred 

(200) yards from the location of the truck. When authorities went 

to retrieve the wallet, they located Mr. Mirzoev's cell phone and a 

pair of black latex gloves which were subsequently logged into 

evidence. Quick Courier Service employees later performed an 

inventory of the truck's contents and determined that the value of 

the items stolen by the assailants was approximately $9,600. The 

Pennsylvania State Police performed a DNA analysis on the 

recovered latex gloves and determined that the DNA found on the 

gloves matched either Defendant’s DNA profile or the DNA profile 

of any of his paternal relatives. 

On August 20, 2019, Mr. Mirzoev was again driving a 

Venskyy Express truck containing pharmaceuticals and supplies 

from Harrisburg, Pa which were intended for delivery to the Quick 

Courier Service headquarters in Whitemarsh Township. At 

approximately 3:30 a.m., when Mr. Mirzoev was about to tum into 

the Quick Courier Service facility, he observed orange traffic cones 

blocking the road. Mr. Mirzoev stopped approximately twenty (20) 

feet in front of the cones and subsequently observed the same 

two (2) assailants that he had encountered during the June 4, 

2019 event. The taller assailant approached the driver's side of 

the truck and pointed a firearm at Mr. Mirzoev from a distance of 

ten (10) feet. This firearm was equipped with a laser scope which 

illuminated a red dot onto the area around Mr. Mirzoev’s right 

shoulder. Mr. Mirzoev immediately put the truck into reverse, 

drove away from the scene and contacted the authorities. The 

assailants were not able to steal anything from the truck during 

this encounter. 
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On September 3, 2019, Barry Gobert was driving a truck for 

a courier service named On Time Delivery based out of 

Duncansville in Blair County, Pa. At approximately 4:30 a.m., Mr. 

Gobert arrived at On Time Delivery’s terminal and picked up 

packages for delivery. Mr. Gobert subsequently drove to a facility 

owned by Value Drug in Allegheny Township to pick up sealed 

containers with items for delivery to local pharmacies. Upon 

leaving the Value Drug facility at approximately 5:10 a.m., Mr. 

Gobert observed a black (possibly Dodge) van leaving the parking 

lot of a neighboring business. The van ignored a stop sign and 

pulled in front of Mr. Gobert's truck on Theater Drive. The two 

vehicles proceeded down Theater Drive at approximately ten (10) 

to fifteen (15) miles per hour when the black van suddenly came 

to a stop in the middle of the road. An African-American male 

emerged from the van and approached the passenger side of the 

truck. This individual was about six (6) feet tall, weighed 

approximately one hundred and eighty (180) to two hundred 

(200) pounds and proceeded to ask Mr. Gobert for directions to 

Penn State Altoona. Mr. Gobert provided directions and the 

individual returned to the black van at which time he appeared to 

have a brief discussion with other occupants inside the van. 

The same individual subsequently exited the van with 

another African-American male who was approximately five (5) 

feet, seven (7) inches tall and weighed approximately one 

hundred and fifty (150) to one hundred and sixty (160) pounds. 

These two men positioned themselves at the driver’s and 

passenger’s side of the truck respectively. Mr. Gobert heard a 

noise indicating the individual standing on the passenger’s side 

was attempting to open the door to the truck and simultaneously 

observed the individual at the driver’s side pulling out a firearm. 

This individual instructed Mr. Gobert to get out of the truck. Mr. 

Gobert informed this assailant that he was “the wrong guy” and 

proceeded to attempt to drive his truck away. During this 

sequence, the black van attempted to cut the truck off but Mr. 

Gobert kept driving and was able to escape after striking the van 

with his truck. Mr. Gobert subsequently parked at a nearby 

business and was able to contact the authorities and his 

supervisor. 

On September 9, 2019, Michael Beskid, a delivery driver for 

Quick Courier Service, was in the process of transporting materials 

from Harrisburg, Pa to the Quick Courier Service headquarters in 

Whitemarsh Township. At approximately 3 a.m., Mr. Beskid was 

driving up a hill approximately a half-mile away from the facility 
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when he noticed red and blue lights emanating from a vehicle 

behind him. Mr. Beskid pulled off to a side road and stopped his 

vehicle. Mr. Beskid subsequently observed an individual emerge 

from the vehicle and approach the driver’s side of his truck. This 

individual was a light skinned, thin build African-American male in 

his early twenties and who had a height of between five (5) feet, 

seven (7) inches and six (6) feet. Mr. Beskid noticed that this 

individual did not appear to be a police officer and he immediately 

drove away with his flashers on after saying “no.” No one followed 

Mr. Beskid following this encounter and he proceeded to drive to 

the Quick Courier Service headquarters to contact the authorities. 

The Pennsylvania State Police performed a DNA analysis of 

the handcuffs recovered following the May 14, 2019 robbery and 

discovered that DNA belonging to co-Defendant Malik Fowler was 

present. Authorities were later able to determine Mr. Fowler's cell 

phone number and performed an examination of cell phone 

records associated with this number. These records revealed that 

this cell phone had multiple communications with a cell phone 

number registered to co-Defendant Daniel McLaughlin around the 

time of the May 14, 2019 and June 4, 2019 robberies. Authorities 

proceeded to execute a search warrant on the records associated 

with Mr. McLaughlin's cell phone number and found that it had 

multiple communications with the 8528 Cell Phone registered to 

Defendant around the time of the May 14, 2019 and June 4, 2019 

robberies. Eventually, investigators were able to determine that 

co-Defendants Antonio Brown and Kyshaan Williams were also 

involved in several of these robberies. 

Lieutenant William Mitchell, supervisor of the Major Crimes 

Unit of the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office and an 

expert in historic call detail record analysis, conducted a cell site 

analysis of each co-defendant's cell phone. During this analysis, 

Lieutenant Mitchell found that Defendant's cell phone was 

accessing cell sites in the vicinity of each of the five (5) robberies 

and one (1) staged robbery during the time frame when these 

incidents occurred. This cell site analysis also revealed that one or 

more of Defendant's co-Defendants were also present at the time 

of these incidents. 

On November 7, 2019, authorities took Defendant into 

custody. Following his arrest, Defendant provided a statement in 

which he admitted his role in several of the robberies. On January 

24, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Suppression of Evidence 
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related to this statement. On April 18, 2022, following a hearing, 

the court denied Defendant’s suppression motion. 

From May 31, 2022 to June 3, 2022, the court held a jury 

trial in which the jury found Defendant guilty of the charges 

referenced [below]. On June 6, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a 

notice of intent to seek mandatory sentences with respect to 

Defendant’s three (3) robbery - fear of serious bodily injury 

convictions and one (1) kidnapping conviction pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9714. Specifically, the Commonwealth contended that 

in light of Defendant’s prior 2017 conviction for robbery - fear of 

serious bodily injury, these new convictions constituted a second 

set of convictions involving a crime of violence and were therefore 

each subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of at least ten 

(10) years of total confinement under Section 9714. Defendant 

did not object to the imposition of the mandatory minimum 

sentences. 

Prior to sentencing, Defendant was able to obtain 

documentation indicating that when authorities committed him to 

Montgomery County Correctional Facility (“MCCF”) following his 

arrest and statement on November 7, 2019, prescription 

medications Pyridium and Ciprofloxacin were brought into the 

prison with Defendant upon his admission and forwarded to 

medical personnel at the prison. On September 26, 2022, 

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion 

for New Trial asserting that this supposedly newly discovered 

evidence supported the conclusion that the police coerced an 

involuntary confession from Defendant by giving him access to 

prescription pain medication. Specifically, Defendant alleged that 

authorities knew Defendant was addicted to prescription pain 

medications and provided him with these drugs in an effort to 

overcome his free will. 

At the sentencing hearing on October 3, 2022, the court 

denied Defendant’s motion following argument, without prejudice 

to Defendant's ability to raise the claim again in a post-sentence 

motion. The court subsequently imposed an aggregate sentence 

of three-hundred and ninety-six (396) to seven-hundred and 

ninety-two (792) months of imprisonment (thirty-three (33) to 

sixty-six (66) years). On October 11, 2022, Defendant filed timely 

post-sentence motions in which he again requested dismissal of 

the charges or, in the alternative, a new trial based upon the 

documentation Defendant obtained following trial. On February 3, 
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2023, following a hearing (the January 2023 Evidentiary Hearing), 

the court denied Defendant’s post-sentence motions. 

On March 1, 2023, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

On March 2, 2023, the court issued an Order directing Defendant 

to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (the "Concise Statement") within 

twenty-one (21) days. On March 23, 2023, Defendant filed a 

timely Concise Statement. 

Tr. Ct. Op. at 2-10. 

The trial court filed its 1925(a) opinion on August 29, 2023. This 

appeal followed. Appellant raises eight issues for our review, verbatim: 

1. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or 

about December 24, 2018, Mr. Holmes committed or agreed to 

commit an unlawful taking of movable property of another with 

intent to deprive him thereof, where no witnesses positively 

identified him as a participant in the theft and where there was no 

physical or forensic evidence linking him to the theft? 

2. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or 

about May 14, 2019, in the course committing a theft, Mr. Holmes 

physically took property from the person of another by force, 

impersonated a police officer, and unlawfully restrained the liberty 

of another person, or agreed with another to commit such 

robbery, where no witnesses positively identified him as a 

participant in the alleged robbery and where there was no physical 

or forensic evidence linking him to the robbery? 

3. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or 

about June 4, 2019, in the course committing a theft, Mr. Holmes 

intentionally put someone in fear of immediate serious bodily 

injury, possessed and used a firearm, and unlawfully removed 

another person a substantial distance to facilitate a felony, or 

agreed with another to commit such robbery and kidnapping, 

where the victim failed to positively identify Mr. Holmes as a 

participant in the robbery and kidnapping, where there was no 

physical or forensic evidence linking him to the robbery and 

kidnapping, and where the testimony of Antonio Brown, the 

cooperating witness who actually participated in this robbery and 

who had a strong motive to fabricate his testimony to minimize 

his own criminal conduct and shift blame to Mr. Holmes, lacked 
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credibility and was infected with unfair bias, factual 

inconsistencies, inability to provide details and corroborating 

evidence, and confusing answers? 

4. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or 

about August 20, 2019, in the course committing a theft, Mr. 

Holmes intentionally put someone in fear of immediate serious 

bodily injury and impersonated a police officer, or agreed with 

another to commit such robbery, where no witnesses positively 

identified him as a participant in the robbery and where there was 

no physical or forensic evidence linking him to the robbery? 

5. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or 

about September 9, 2019, Mr. Holmes unlawfully impersonated a 

police officer, where no witnesses positively identified him as a 

participant in the offense and where there was no physical or 

forensic evidence linking him to the offense? 

6. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or 

about September 3, 2019, in the course committing a theft, Mr. 

Holmes intentionally put someone in fear of immediate serious 

bodily injury, or agreed with another to commit such robbery, 

where the victim failed to positively identify him as a participant 

in the robbery, where there was no physical or forensic evidence 

linking him to the robbery, and where the testimony of Antonio 

Brown, the cooperating witness who actually participated in this 

robbery and who had a strong motive to fabricate his testimony 

to minimize his own criminal conduct and shift blame to Mr. 

Holmes, lacked credibility and was infected with unfair bias, 

factual inconsistencies, inability to provide details and 

corroborating evidence, and confusing answers? 

7. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Holmes' Post 

Sentence Motion to Dismiss for Due Process Violation Resulting 

from Outrageous Government Conduct, or in the alternative, Mr. 

Holmes' Post Sentence Motion for New Trial Based on Newly 

Discovered Evidence, where compelling evidence was presented 

at the hearing on the Post Sentence Motions showing the police 

attempted to coerce a confession from Mr. Holmes by providing 

him controlled substances during his custodial interrogation, 

fabricated and forged his signature to an inculpatory statement 

that he did not make, and provided false sworn testimony during 

court proceedings concerning the circumstances of his custodial 

interrogation? 
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8. Whether the imposition of consecutive sentences resulting in 

an aggregate term of imprisonment of 33 years to 66 years was a 

manifest abuse of discretion when there were substantial 

mitigating circumstances? 

Appellant’s Br. at 7-10. 

 Appellant’s first six issues are challenges to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856-57 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citations omitted). 

 Instantly, appellant was convicted of: 

three (3) counts of theft by unlawful taking, four ( 4) counts of 

criminal conspiracy - engaging in theft by unlawful taking, one (1) 

count of attempted theft by unlawful taking, one (1) count of 

receiving stolen property, one (1) count of criminal conspiracy - 

engaging in receipt of stolen property, two (2) counts of robbery 

- physically take by force, two (2) counts of criminal conspiracy - 

engaging in robbery to physically take by force, three (3) counts 
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of robbery- fear of serious bodily injury, three (3) counts of 

criminal conspiracy - engaging in robbery causing fear of serious 

bodily injury, three (3) counts of robbery - infliction of or fear of 

bodily injury, three (3) counts of criminal conspiracy- engaging in 

robbery causing infliction of or fear of bodily injury, two (2) counts 

of possession of an instrument of crime, one ( 1) count of criminal 

conspiracy - possession of an instrument of crime, two (2) counts 

of false imprisonment, two (2) counts of criminal conspiracy to 

commit false imprisonment, three (3) counts of impersonating a 

public servant, two (2) counts of criminal conspiracy- engaging in 

impersonation of a public servant, one (1) count of kidnapping, 

one (1) count of criminal conspiracy to commit kidnapping, one 

(1) count of unlawful restraint, one (1) count of criminal 

conspiracy to commit unlawful restraint, one (1) count of 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one (1) count of 

criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon, three (3) counts of simple assault, three (3) counts of 

conspiracy to commit simple assault, one (1) count of terroristic 

threats, one (1) count of unauthorized use of an automobile, one 

(1) count of criminal conspiracy – engaging in unauthorized use 

of an automobile and one (1) count of possession of a concealed 

weapon. 

Tr. Ct. Op. at 1-2. 

Initially, we note that although Appellant’s concise statement specifies 

the elements for which he thinks there was insufficient evidence, the argument 

section of his brief is deficient. The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 

do not permit conclusory arguments. Each distinct issue in the argument 

section of a brief must, at a minimum, contain “citations of authorities as are 

deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). When a party “cites no pertinent 

authority to substantiate [its] claim . . . appellant’s issue is waived.” 

Commonwealth v. Simmons, 56 A.3d 1280, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2012), 

affirmed, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014). 
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Here, Appellant raises six insufficiency claims. He was convicted of more 

than forty counts stemming from six separate incidents. In the argument 

section of his brief, he combines all six claims for all his convictions into one 

subheading which spans only six pages total. See Appellant’s Br. at 21-27. 

Aside from a citation for his standard of review, Appellant cites no caselaw or 

legal authority whatsoever. See id. at 21. His argument is underdeveloped 

and conclusory. 

Additionally, he conflates the distinct issues of sufficiency and weight of 

the evidence as to the June 4, 2019, and September 3, 2019, convictions. 

See Commonwealth v. Cain, 906 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(“[A]ny uncertainty in an eyewitness’s identification of a defendant is a 

question of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.”). Appellant admits 

that there was testimony from his co-defendant, Antonio Brown, identifying 

Appellant as having participated in the robberies, but essentially argues it 

should not have been believed. Appellant devotes half of the pages of his 

sufficiency argument to discussing how Brown’s testimony was inconsistent, 

biased, and lacked credibility. Appellant’s Br. at 24-26. “[A] true weight of the 

evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the 

verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed[ and] contests the 

weight that is accorded the testimonial evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Appellant originally raised a 

weight of the evidence claim in his concise statement, but he abandoned it in 
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his Appellate brief. Accordingly, we cannot reframe and evaluate his 

sufficiency claims as weight claims in that Appellant failed to preserve the 

weight issue for this Court. 

In any event, Appellant’s sufficiency claims, while underdeveloped, are 

specific in nature as he avers the evidence was insufficient to prove that he 

was, in fact, the person who committed each of the crimes. The consistent 

theme of each of his six sufficiency issues is that there was no positive 

identification that Appellant committed the crimes whether by eyewitness or 

by forensic evidence. As such, since we need not conduct a thorough review 

of the elements of each crime, we decline to find waiver. Rather, we will focus 

on the specific issue suggested by Appellant: whether the evidence was 

sufficient to establish that Appellant was the perpetrator of the crimes. 

This Court has recognized that “evidence of identification need not be 

positive and certain to sustain a conviction.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 954 

A.2d 1194, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2008). In-court testimony identifying the 

defendant as the perpetrator is sufficient by itself to establish the identity 

element of a crime. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 478 

(Pa. Super. 2018) (one witness’s identification is sufficient for conviction and 

appellant’s assertion that his own testimony contradicted the identification is 

irrelevant in a sufficiency analysis). Given additional evidentiary 

circumstances, “any indefiniteness and uncertainty in the identification 
J-A12037-24 

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testimony goes to its weight.” Commonwealth v. Minnis, 458 A.2d 231, 

233, (Pa. Super. 1983). 

In addressing Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, the trial 

court discussed in detail the cumulative evidence presented for each incident. 

Tr. Ct. Op. at 13-30. The trial court cites to the record demonstrating the 

evidence presented to showing how Appellant was involved in each staged, 

completed, or attempted robbery. In addition to witness testimony, the 

Commonwealth presented cell site location data which placed Appellant at the 

site of each incident at the time they occurred. DNA evidence placed appellant 

at the robbery which occurred on June 4, 2019. Additionally, Brown's 

testimony, Appellant’s confessions, and text messages between Appellant and 

his co-defendants revealed his role in several of the incidents. Specifically, the 

trial court indicated the following in its opinion: 

A. DECEMBER 24, 2018 STAGED ROBBERY 

. . . Defendant’s cell phone proceeded to access cell sites towards 

the area of where the delivery truck was recovered by authorities 

in Philadelphia and finally ended up accessing cell sites near coDefendant Antonio Brown’s residence. (Id.). 

In the statement he provided to authorities following his 

arrest on November 7, 2019, Defendant admitted that he took 

part in the staged December 24, 2018 robbery. (N.T. Trial by Jury 

- Volume II, 6/1/22, at 353). Specifically, Defendant indicated 

that his role was “to look out for police so the other person could 

drive the truck and pretend it was a robbery.” (Id.). Defendant 

further stated that he followed the truck to the area near Stenton 

Avenue where Mr. Fortune exited the truck and drove home with 

“the other person.” (Id. at 353-54). Defendant informed 

authorities that “the other person” paid him with opioid pills for 

his role. (Id. at 354). 
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B. MAY 14, 2019 ROBBERY 

. . . During this portion of the encounter, Mr. Carter observed that 

another individual had existed [sic] the sedan and was rummaging 

through the pharmaceuticals contained within the delivery van. 

(Id. at 22). Mr. Carter described this individual as a slender 

African-American who possessed a light complexion. (Id. at 21). 

. . . All three (3) cell phones were accessing cell sites in the 

vicinity of Quick Courier Service at approximately 7:40 a.m., 

which is minutes before the robbery described by Mr. Carter 

occurred. (Id. at 128). At the time of the robbery, all three (3) 

cell phones accessed cell sites in the vicinity of where the robbery 

occurred on Militia Hill Road. (Id. at 129). Following the time of 

the robbery, all three (3) cellphones departed the scene and 

accessed cell sites in the general direction towards Defendant's 

residence. (Id.). 

 In his November 7, 2019 post-arrest statement to 

authorities, Defendant admitted he took part in the May 14, 2019 

robbery. (N.T. Trial by Jury- Volume II, 6/1/22, at 354). 

Specifically, Defendant indicated his role in this robbery was “to 

look out for cops and make sure the truck was there.” (Id.). 

Defendant further stated that the robbery was effectuated by 

utilizing a dark-colored vehicle to pull over the delivery truck. (Id.

at 355). Defendant informed authorities that several other coconspirators took part in this robbery and he was paid with a 

"couple hundred pills" for his role. (Id. at 355-56). 

Co-Defendant Antonio Brown testified that he had grown up 

with Defendant and knew him for about twenty (20) years. (Id.

at 193). Mr. Brown indicated that he would typically communicate 

with Defendant through contact with the 8528 Cell Phone. (Id. at 

195). Mr. Brown testified that he did not take part in the May 14, 

2019 robbery, but Defendant had sent him text messages shortly 

afterwards to let him know that it had occurred. (Id. at 231). . . . 

C. JUNE 4, 2019 ROBBERY 

. . . Co-Defendant Antonio Brown testified that he participated in 

this robbery with Defendant and another individual. (Id. at 196). 

Mr. Brown indicated that Defendant had formulated the plan for 

this robbery and had informed Mr. Brown that he successfully 

performed other robberies of Quick Courier Service trucks in the 

past. (Id. at 198). On the morning of this robbery, Mr. Brown met 

up with Defendant and another individual at Defendant's residence 
J-A12037-24 

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and all three (3) made their way to the Quick Courier Service 

facility. (Id. at 199-200). Upon their arrival, Mr. Brown blocked 

Mr. Mirzoev’s delivery truck with the Buick and Defendant and the 

other individual exited the vehicle to approach the truck. (Id. at 

200). Defendant and the other individual gained control of the 

truck and Mr. Brown drove behind the truck in the Buick. (Id. at 

202). Mr. Brown stated that he followed behind the delivery truck 

for approximately ten (10) minutes and eventually parked behind 

the truck when it pulled over. (Id.). Defendant, Mr. Brown and 

the other individual subsequently removed contents from the 

truck, placed them into the Buick and drove away. (Id. at 202-

03). 

. . . Defendant’s cell phone accessed cell sites in the vicinity of the 

Quick Courier Service headquarters at the same time that the 

robbery occurred and subsequently accessed cell sites in the 

vicinity of where Mr. Mirzoev was let out of the delivery truck. (Id.

at 132, Commonwealth Exhibit C-38 at 35). 

In his November 7, 2019 post-arrest statement to 

authorities, Defendant admitted he took part in the June 4, 2019 

robbery. (N.T. Trial by Jury- Volume II, 6/1/22, at 356). . . . Beth 

Ann Holsopple, a forensic DNA analyst with the Pennsylvania State 

Police, . . . indicated that her analysis of the gloves revealed that 

the DNA on the gloves matched either Defendant's DNA profile or 

the DNA profile of any of his paternal relatives. (Id. at 285-86). 

D. AUGUST 20, 2019 ATTEMPTED ROBBERY 

. . . Defendant and Mr. McLaughlin's cell phones accessed cell sites 

in the vicinity of the Quick Courier Service headquarters around 

2:09 a.m. (Id.). Mr. McLaughlin’s cell phone subsequently 

accessed cell sites in the immediate vicinity of the attempted 

robbery at the time the incident occurred. (Id. at 136). Following 

the incident, between approximately 4:08 a.m. and 4:36 a.m., 

Defendant and Mr. McLaughlin's cell phones accessed cell sites in 

a general direction from the vicinity of the attempted robbery to 

Defendant's residence. (Id. at 137). 

In his November 7, 2019 post-arrest statement to 

authorities, Defendant admitted he took part in the August 20, 

2019 attempted robbery with Mr. McLaughlin. (N.T. Trial by JuryVolume II, 6/1/22, at 358). Text messages retrieved from Mr. 

McLaughlin and Defendant’s cell phones for the period preceding 

August 20, 2019 revealed that both men engaged in a text 

conversation in which Mr. McLaughlin stated, “I got both of them 
J-A12037-24 

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they [t]aking the truck and we going to be in my car” and 

Defendant responded, “Bet, I'm with it bro.” (N.T. Trial by JuryVolume III, 6/2/22, at 63, Commonwealth Exhibit C-34 at 15). . . 

. 

E. SEPTEMBER 3, 2019 ATTEMPTED ROBBERY 

. . . Co-Defendant Antonio Brown testified that he participated in 

this attempted robbery with Defendant and three (3) other 

individuals. (N.T. Trial by Jury- Volume II, 6/1/22, at 216, 218). 

Mr. Brown indicated that Defendant had formulated the plan for 

this robbery based on information he had obtained regarding a 

courier service which had a similar setup to Quick Delivery 

Service. . . . Defendant’s cell phone subsequently accessed cell 

sites in the immediate vicinity of the attempted robbery on 

Theater Drive at the time the incident occurred. (Id. at 142-43). 

Following the incident, between approximately 5:19 a.m. and 9: 

15 a.m., all three (3) cell phones accessed cell sites in a general 

easterly direction across the state from the vicinity of the 

attempted robbery towards Defendant's residence. (Id. at 143-

45). 

F. SEPTEMBER 9, 2019 ATTEMPTED ROBBERY 

. . . Lieutenant Mitchell's cell site analysis and review of the call 

detail records of Defendant's cell phone indicated that beginning 

at approximately 2:30 a.m. on September 9, 2019, Defendant's 

cell phone accessed cell sites in a general direction from 

Defendant's residence towards the location of the attempted 

robbery. (Id. at 146). Defendant's cell phone proceeded accessed 

cell sites in the immediate vicinity of the attempted robbery at the 

same time the incident occurred. (Id. at 146-47). 

Tr. Ct. Op. at 18, 20-30. 

We agree with the trial court’s sound analysis, which is supported by the 

record. As indicated supra, in-court testimony identifying the defendant as 

the perpetrator is sufficient by itself to establish the identity element of a 

crime. Our Supreme Court has also held that “circumstantial evidence is 

sufficient to sustain a conviction so long as the combination of the evidence 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth 
J-A12037-24 

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v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 635 (1991) (quotation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

In the case sub judice, the jury, as the finder of fact, heard the 

testimony of all witnesses, was free to make credibility determinations, and 

determined the evidence linked Appellant to the crimes beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Given our standard of review, we find no error in this regard and 

conclude there is no merit to Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. See 

Brooks, supra (setting forth this Court’s standard of review for sufficiency of 

the evidence claims). 

 Appellant’s seventh issue is that the trial court should have dismissed 

all charges because of his claim of outrageous government conduct, or in the 

alternative, that the trial court should have ordered a new trial based on newly 

discovered evidence. Both claims fail. 

 Appellant first claims that there was outrageous government conduct 

during his custodial interrogation. Specifically, he claims in his brief that 

Detective Stephen Kerns retrieved Appellant’s prescription Oxycodone pills 

from Appellant’s wife to which the detective knew Appellant was addicted, had 

Appellant ingest five pills totaling 150 milligrams, and made Appellant sign 

two blank pieces of paper. Appellant’s Br. at 31-33. Appellant claims in his 

brief that he never provided a written confession. Id. at 33. In Appellant’s 

concise statement, he claimed that the detectives attempted to coerce an 

involuntary confession. See 1925(b) Statement at 3. In his brief, he claims 
J-A12037-24 

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“the police fabricated and forged Appellant’s signature onto an inculpatory 

written statement that the Appellant did not make.” Appellant’s Br. at 40. 

The defense of outrageous government conduct “is based on the theory 

that ‘police involvement in criminal activity may be so outrageous that a 

prosecution will be barred on due process grounds.’” Commonwealth v. Sun 

Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 786-87 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth 

v. Mance, 652 A.2d 299, 303 (Pa. 1995)). In order to prevail on a claim of 

outrageous government conduct, “it must be shown that police conduct was 

so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of 

justice.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Benchino, 582 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Pa. 

Super. 1990)). This generally requires “proof of government overinvolvement

in the charged crime and proof of the defendant’s mere passive connection to 

the government orchestrated and implemented criminal activity.” 

Commonwealth v. Boyle, 733 A.2d 633, 639 (Pa. Super. 1999) (emphasis 

in original). 

“Moreover, for due process to bar a conviction, the government’s 

involvement in the commission of the crime ‘must be malum in se or amount 

to the engineering and direction of the criminal enterprise from beginning to 

end.’” Commonwealth v. Nelson, 666 A.2d 714, 718 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

“The judiciary is extremely hesitant to find law enforcement conduct so 

offensive that it violates the Due Process Clause.” Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 

at 786-87. As this Court held in Commonwealth v. Lindenmuth, 554 A.2d 
J-A12037-24 

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62 (Pa. Super. 1989), a determination of whether police involvement in 

criminal activity is outrageous is a “legal question to be determined by the 

court.” Id. at 64; see also Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d at 786-87. 

We note that Appellant has told multiple versions of the story, raising 

an inconsistent defense as pointed out by the trial court: 

Defendant’s argument concerning what happened at the time he 

gave his statement continued to change throughout the course of 

these proceedings. Specifically, Defendant first asserted that his 

confession was involuntary because he was suffering from 

withdrawal symptoms. Next, Defendant asserted the detectives 

forced him to take the medication in an attempt to coerce him to 

provide a confession. Defendant eventually claimed that he did 

not actually provide a confession and the detectives fabricated a 

false statement and forged his signature. This inability to come to 

a consensus as to what occurred when Defendant provided his 

confession would be fatal to any type of defense. 

Tr. Ct. Op. at 39. Additionally, this claim was not raised before or during trial. 

See Tr. Ct. Op. at 35 (stating “Defendant did not raise this claim once in 

advance of trial and arguably waives the claim”). 

 Even if Appellant’s version of events were consistent and Detective 

Kerns’ decision making could be challenged for its appropriateness under the 

circumstances, his conduct does not rise to the level of outrageous 

government conduct. As this Court held in Commonwealth v. Benchino, 

582 A.2d 1067 (Pa. Super. 1990), “[t]he few appellate decisions in which 

government conduct has been found to violate due process have generally 

involved long term police involvement in the establishment and operation of 

ongoing criminal enterprises.” Id. at 1071. 
J-A12037-24 

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For example, in Commonwealth v. Mathews, 500 A.2d 853 (Pa. 

Super. 1985), this Court found outrageous government conduct when the 

police encouraged and supplied the defendants with the necessary money to 

purchase chemicals and to rent a residence to set up a methamphetamine lab. 

Id. at 856-57. The police further provided step-by-step instructions in the 

manufacturing process and aided in the transportation of the equipment. Id. 

This Court held that the conduct of the police violated due process because 

the police were principal players in the defendants’ criminal act. Id. at 857. 

Conversely, in cases where the police did not exhibit a pervasive involvement 

in the crime at issue, this Court has “generally refused to find due process 

violations, even where the government’s conduct was unseemly.” Benchino, 

582 A.2d at 1071. 

Here, there is no evidence that the police or government orchestrated 

the robberies or had any involvement, let alone “overinvolvement,” in 

Appellant’s criminal enterprise. Boyle, supra (emphasis in original). 

Appellant’s inconsistent claims simply do not meet the standard of outrageous 

government misconduct as outlined by this Court and our Supreme Court. 

Accordingly, his claim fails. 

Appellant next argues that his after-discovered evidence in the form of 

medical documentation warrants a new trial. Specifically, Appellant asserts 

that he received documentation after the trial indicating that he was processed 

into the correctional facility with his pills in his possession which were then 
J-A12037-24 

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forwarded to medical personnel. Appellant’s Br. at 39. He claims that the only 

reason he could have had the pills at that time was if the police gave them to 

him during his interrogation consistent with his version of events, i.e., in order 

to feed his addiction and overcome his free will. Thus, he claims, had he 

received this document before the suppression hearing, he would have 

challenged the credibility of the detectives. Id. at 40-41. 

To be granted a new trial based on the basis of after-discovered 

evidence: 

[Defendant] must demonstrate that the evidence: (1) could not 

have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the 

exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative 

or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility 

of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a 

new trial were granted. 

Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa. 2008), (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1283 (Pa. 2005)). The test is 

conjunctive; the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence 

that each of these factors has been met in order for a new trial to be 

warranted. See Pagan, supra; Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 

359 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 2008). 

Before a court grants a new trial on the basis of after-discovered 

evidence, the defendant must also show the alleged after-discovered evidence 

is not just corroborative or cumulative of the evidence already presented at 

trial. See Pagan, supra. Whether new evidence is corroborative or 

cumulative in this context depends on the strength of the other evidence 
J-A12037-24 

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supporting the conviction. Commonwealth v. McCracken, 659 A.2d 541, 

545 (Pa. 1995). Further, a defendant seeking a new trial must demonstrate 

he will not use the alleged after-discovered evidence solely to impeach the 

credibility of a witness. See Pagan, supra. “Whenever a party offers a 

witness to provide evidence that contradicts other evidence previously given 

by another witness, it constitutes impeachment....” Commonwealth v. Weis, 

611 A.2d 1218, 1229 (Pa. Super. 1992). 

The trial court meticulously analyzed each of the four factors in its 

1925(a) opinion and concluded that Appellant’s claim of after-discovered 

evidence fails. We agree. Relevantly, the trial court stated: 

To the extent the documentation regarding Defendant's 

admission to MCCF with prescription medication constitutes afterdiscovered evidence, Defendant fails to demonstrate how this 

evidence would satisfy any of the factors related to the type of 

after-discovered evidence which would result in a new trial. 

Although the actual documentation was not available prior to the 

trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence, Defendant had the 

ability to testify at the suppression hearing regarding how the 

detectives provided him with the medication in the pill bottle in 

advance of his confession, but he chose not to do so. Having been 

present for these alleged actions, Defendant would have had firsthand knowledge that this event allegedly occurred and could have 

informed the court of the circumstances surrounding his 

statement. Defendant did not require knowledge or possession of 

these documents to know whether or not the detectives forced the 

prescription medication upon him or fabricated his confession 

under a forged signature. Thus, the documentation is merely 

corroborative of what Defendant's testimony would have been had 

he testified at the suppression hearing. 

The crux of Defendant’s argument regarding this 

documentation is that it serves to impeach the credibility of the 

detectives who were present when Defendant provided his 

statement. Specifically, Defendant asserts that it contradicts the 
J-A12037-24 

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testimony of the detectives stating that they did not remember a 

pill bottle being delivered to Defendant in advance of his 

statement and this impeachment could have resulted in a different 

outcome at the suppression hearing or at trial. Considering, by 

Defendant's own admission, that this evidence would be used 

solely to impeach the detectives’ testimony, this evidence fails the 

third factor under the after-discovered evidence test and cannot 

serve as a basis for granting a new trial. 

With respect to the fourth factor, there is no indication that 

this evidence would result in a different verdict if a new trial were 

granted. There was no evidence beyond Defendant’s self-serving 

testimony at the January 2023 Evidentiary Hearing that the 

detectives forced him to take the prescription medication in 

advance of his confession. The only piece of evidence involving 

these drugs was documentation indicating he was admitted to the 

prison with these medications. There were entirely innocuous 

reasons for these pills being brought into the prison with 

Defendant upon his admission, including the likelihood that Ms. 

Holmes was afraid of Defendant possibly suffering withdrawal 

symptoms without access to the medication and the detectives’ 

acceptance of the medication as a courtesy. 

Tr. Ct. Op. at 38-39. 

 Because Appellant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence 

that each of the factors have been met, the trial court did not err in denying 

Appellant’s post sentence motion for a new trial. 

Finally, Appellant raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. We apply the following standard of review: 

The right to appeal the discretionary aspects of the sentence is 

not absolute. Two requirements must be met before a challenge 

to the discretionary aspects of a sentence will be heard on the 

merits. First, the appellant must set forth in his brief a concise 

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f). Second, he must show that there is a substantial question 

that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). The determination of 

whether a particular issue raises a substantial question is to be 
J-A12037-24 

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evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In order to establish a 

substantial question, the appellant must show actions by the 

sentencing court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or 

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing 

process. 

Commonwealth v. Bishop, 831 A.2d 656, 660 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Appellant has complied with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) by including a concise 

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. In his 2119(f) 

statement, Appellant claims that the trial court’s sentence excessively focused 

on the offense and disregarded Appellant’s mitigating circumstances. 

Appellant's Brief at 16. 

Next, we must determine whether Appellant's arguments raise a 

substantial question. Bishop, supra. “An appellant making an excessiveness 

claim raises a substantial question when he sufficiently articulates the manner 

in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing 

scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm 

underlying the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 

1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014) 

(internal citations omitted). A bald allegation of excessiveness will not suffice. 

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2001). 

In the instant matter, Appellant’s claim is premised in part on his belief 

that the consecutive nature of the sentences is unreasonable. Appellant’s Br. 

at 45. We have stated that the imposition of consecutive rather than 
J-A12037-24 

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concurrent sentences lies within the sound discretion of the sentencing court. 

Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 878 A.2d 867, 873 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal 

denied, 887 A.2d 1240 (Pa. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 

1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995)). Appellant further asserts that in crafting his 

sentence, the trial court did not consider any factors other than the crimes of 

which Appellant was convicted and his prior criminal history. Appellant’s Br. 

at 45. “[O]rdinarily, a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider or 

accord proper weight to a specific sentencing factor does not raise a 

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994, 996-97 (Pa. 

Super. 2001) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Specifically, 

[t]here is ample precedent to support a determination that [a 

claim that the trial court failed to consider an appellant's 

rehabilitative needs] fails to raise a substantial 

question.... See Commonwealth v. Cannon, 2008 PA Super 

178, 954 A.2d 1222, 1228-29 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, 

600 Pa. 743, 964 A.2d 893) (claim that the trial court failed to 

consider the defendant's rehabilitative needs, age, and 

educational background did not present a substantial 

question); Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 2001 PA Super 77, 

770 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa.Super.2001) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Mobley, 581 A.2d 949, 952 ([Pa.Super.]1990)) (claim that 

sentence failed to take into consideration the defendant's 

rehabilitative needs and was manifestly excessive did not raise a 

substantial question where sentence was within statutory 

guidelines and within sentencing guidelines); Commonwealth v. 

Coss, 695 A.2d 831, 833 (Pa.Super.1997) (when the sentence 

imposed falls within the statutory limits, an appellant's claim that 

a sentence is manifestly excessive fails to raise a substantial 

question); Commonwealth v. Bershad, 693 A.2d 1303, 1309 

(Pa.Super.1997) (a claim that a trial court failed to appropriately 

consider an appellant's rehabilitative needs does not present a 

substantial question); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 650 A.2d 

876, 881 ([Pa.Super.]1994) (claim of error for failing to consider 

rehabilitative needs does not present substantial question). 
J-A12037-24 

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Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 936-37 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa.2013). 

We note that Appellant does not allege that the trial court was unaware 

of his educational background, community support, substance abuse issues, 

or rehabilitative needs, nor does Appellant contend that the sentencing court 

relied on inadequate or incorrect information. Indeed, the trial court in this 

matter considered a pre-sentence report, therefore, it is presumed that the 

court adequately considered relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. 

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 766 (Pa. Super. 2006). The record 

indicates that the trial court additionally reviewed the sentencing guidelines, 

sentencing memorandums prepared by counsel for the Commonwealth and 

the defense, letters in support of Appellant written by friends and family, and 

the testimony of Appellant’s wife regarding his familial responsibilities and 

drug addiction. Tr. Ct. Op. at 43. The trial court specifically stated on the 

record during sentencing: 

I did take into account the information you provided to me in 

advance of today and the information that was provided today. 

But for that evidence, I would have sentenced you in the 

aggravated range. I am not. 

N.T., 10/3/22, at 108. Thus, not only did Appellant’s mitigating factors receive 

consideration, they had an actual impact on lowering his final sentence. 

Appellant would have us reconsider the weight given to various sentencing 

factors and as such, Appellant is effectively asking this Court to substitute our 

judgment for that of the lower court. Since that is a task beyond our scope, 
J-A12037-24 

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he has failed to present us with a substantial question. See Commonwealth 

v. Rivera, 637 A.2d 1015, 1017 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citing Commonwealth 

v. Williams, 562 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Pa. Super 1989) (en banc)). 

Even if we were to address the merits of the contention, we would find 

that the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. The trial court 

noted: 

Defendant is a violent offender who committed multiple brazen 

robberies upon delivery drivers who were simply trying to do their 

jobs. The level of sophistication inherent in these robberies 

demonstrated a significant amount of planning and premeditation. 

During the robberies, several of the victims were either subjected 

to pistol whipping or had their hands restrained. Several of the 

victims had firearms pointed at their bodies, including one firearm 

which illuminated a laser scope on its potential target. The victims 

experienced incalculable terror as a result of these actions. One of 

the victims, Mr. Mirzoev, indicated that during one of these 

robberies he begged the perpetrators to spare his life out of fear 

that he would never see his pregnant wife again. Quick Courier 

Service also suffered significant financial losses from these 

robberies in the form of the monetary value of the drugs stolen 

and the termination of contracts by vendors who no longer trusted 

Quick Courier Service to deliver their pharmaceutical products. 

(N.T. Sentencing, 10/3/22, at 49). The court referenced these 

details and other factors in its reasoning for the sentence it 

imposed[.] 

Tr. Ct. Op. at 43. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant failed to raise a substantial 

question for our review. To the extent that the sentencing claim before us 

presents a “substantial question” for our review, we conclude that the 

sentencing court did not abuse its sentencing discretion in fashioning 

Appellant's sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Date: 7/18/2024