Filed 8/24/21 City of Claremont v. Sandblossom CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

CITY OF CLAREMONT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SANDBLOSSOM, LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B304298

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19PSCP00027)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Peter A. Hernandez, Judge. Affirmed.

Carlson & Nicholas and Richard A. McDonald for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rutan & Tucker and Noam Duzman for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

_______________________
2

The dispute before us concerns an historic residential 

property (the Property) owned by appellant Sandblossom, LLC 

(Sandblossom) in the City of Claremont (City) which has fallen 

into substantial disrepair. While agreeing that the vacant house 

on the Property must be remediated, the parties dispute the 

extent of the deterioration, the pace of Sandblossom’s 

remediation efforts, as well as the propriety of the trial court’s 

decision to appoint a receiver to carry out remediation.

Although initially denying the City’s receivership petition, 

the trial court monitored the situation closely over the course of 

more than one year, eventually concluding that Sandblossom was 

engaging in a pattern of obstruction and delay. Consequentially,

the trial court appointed a receiver to undertake the major 

construction efforts needed to address the safety violations 

related to the underlying integrity of the house.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a 

receiver to bring the Property up to the City’s code requirements. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Subject Property

The Property is currently owned by Sandblossom, a single 

asset California limited liability company whose sole member is

Alfoncina Sandoval. The Property has historical significance and 

is popularly known as the “Kenneth Baughman House.” Due to 

its historical designation, the Property is subject to a January 19, 

2005 “Historical Covenant and Notice of Restrictions” that is 

enforced by Claremont Heritage (Historical Covenant).1

1 Claremont Heritage is a non-profit organization formed 

by the residents of the City in 1976 with the purpose of ensuring 
3

In December 2013, the City opened a “code case” involving 

the Property’s state of disrepair by sending the first of what 

would ultimately be seven “violation notices” to Sandblossom.

Because the “code case” approach failed to persuade 

Sandblossom to begin remediation, the City elevated its 

investigation by issuing more formal “administrative citations.”

The City issued Sandblossom 11 administrative citations in total.

Initially, the City’s notices referenced only overgrown and

dead vegetation. Beginning in 2015, however, the violation 

notices and administrative citations referenced substandard

conditions relating to rodents and other disease vectors, the 

overall appearance of the Property (including an alleged 

attractive nuisance condition), unsecure structures, and—most 

concerning to the City—safety violations relating to the

structural integrity of the Property itself.

During this same period, the City received complaints from 

the general public about the blight condition of the Property. 

Claremont Heritage also observed the same conditions, and 

contacted the City on June 15, 2016, indicating it was “extremely 

concerned” about the “dire” condition of the Property.

B. Procedural History

On January 4, 2019, after five years of failed efforts to 

obtain voluntary compliance, the City filed a petition in superior 

court for appointment of a receiver (the Petition). The Petition

listed a plethora of violations, many of which were predicated on 

serious structural failures and pervasive dilapidation.

that the City’s historic architectural features are properly 

preserved. The Historical Covenant obligates the owner of the 

Property to preserve and maintain certain historical features.
4

Sandblossom opposed the Petition, claiming it had taken 

steps to address the overgrown vegetation, and had retained a 

construction firm and an engineering firm.

On March 6, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the 

Petition, wherein Sandblossom represented that it would move 

forward with the necessary repairs. The trial court denied the 

Petition without prejudice based upon Sandblossom’s explicit 

representations that it would repair the Property.

In a joint report filed May 10, 2019, Sandblossom 

complained that it could no longer promptly remediate the 

Property because the state had an easement over portions of it. 

In this same report, the City disputed Sandblossom’s claim 

regarding the easement and pointed out Sandblossom’s wholesale 

failure to remediate the Property in the intervening two months. 

The court ordered the parties to provide a compliance schedule. 

The City proposed 90 days, whereas Sandblossom sought more 

than three and one-half years to complete remediation. In a 

declaration attached to the proposed schedule, Sandoval conceded 

the Property required “major construction” in order to address 

the “underlying integrity of the structures underg[oing] extensive 

structural upgrade.”

Agreeing with the City that Sandblossom’s timetable was 

unreasonable, the trial court nevertheless provided Sandblossom 

with more time to propose a more reasonable estimate. In doing 

so, the court warned Sandblossom that “[i]f outstanding issues 

are not [r]esolved, the [c]ourt may appoint a [r]eceiver in this 

matter.”

On August 5, 2019, after further delays purportedly caused 

by the easement, Sandblossom finally admitted there was in fact 

no “cloud [of] title” issue that would prevent it from commencing 
5

work. In this filing, Sandblossom now proposed an 11-month 

timetable.

On August 14, 2019, the trial court again declined to 

appoint a receiver and continued the matter to provide 

Sandblossom with more time “as progress [was] being made with 

the repairs.”

On November 5, 2019, Sandblossom claimed that yet 

another hurdle was now impeding its work, i.e., the Historical 

Covenant overseen by Claremont Heritage. The City argued this 

was another pretext for delay.

On November 14, 2019, the trial court concluded that

Sandblossom’s “problem” with the Historical Covenant was 

pretextual, and it invited the City to renew its Petition by means 

of an “ex parte” application for a receiver, reminding the parties 

that the Petition had been denied “without prejudice.”

On January 24, 2020, the City filed its renewed request for 

appointment of a receiver. Sandblossom filed an opposition. On 

February 10, 2020, the trial court issued an order appointing a 

receiver.

Sandblossom timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the trial court’s order appointing a receiver for 

abuse of discretion. (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 

Cal.4th 905, 931.) A trial court abuses its discretion only if its 

order “ ‘exceeds the bounds of reason.’ ” (Denham v. Superior

Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.)
6

B. The Trial Court Plainly Acted Within Its Discretion 

When Appointing a Receiver

Sandblossom urges that the trial court erred by engaging in 

“unauthorized supervision” of its “historic renovation” of the 

Property, and that it should have instead dismissed the action 

because Sandblossom had already remedied the problems.

The factual assertions underlying Sandblossom’s dismissal 

argument are repeatedly and fundamentally contradicted by the 

record. Notably, Sandoval herself admitted in her June 7, 2019,

declaration that the remediation required “major construction,” 

including construction on the roof requiring that the “underlying 

integrity of the structures undergo extensive structural upgrade.” 

She further stated that the repair work would require demolition 

work to address the structural integrity of the Property, 

including the roof, wood floors, as well as electrical problems.2

Sandblossom next posits that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for an “historic renovation” of a 

property. Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17920.3, a 

property’s “nuisance” condition can be considered in determining 

whether a property is a “substandard building.” (Id., subd. (c).)3

2 Given these admissions, we are troubled by 

Sandblossom’s briefs, which repeatedly mischaracterize the 

record below.

3 Health and Safety Code section 17920.3, entitled 

“Substandard building; conditions,” provides in pertinent part: 

“Any building or portion thereof . . . in which there exists any of 

the following listed conditions to an extent that endangers the 

life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the 

occupants thereof shall be deemed and hereby is declared to be a 
7

Health and Safety Code section 17980.6 authorizes a City to issue 

a notice demanding that the property owner repair or abate any 

condition “that violates any provisions of this part,” of which 

Health and Safety Code section 17920.3 is included.4

Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17980.7, 

subdivision (c), if a property owner does not timely correct 

violations listed in a notice sent pursuant to Health and Safety 

Code section 17980.6, the City may petition the court to appoint a 

receiver to perform the work. (Id., § 17980.7, subd. (c).)5 The 

substandard building.” Subdivision (c) of this section lists “[a]ny 

nuisance” as a basis a city may cite to invoke this code section.

4 Health and Safety Code section 17980.6, entitled 

“Violations; order or notice to repair; failure to correct; remedies 

of [section] 17980.7 applicable,” provides in pertinent part: “If 

any building is maintained in a manner that violates any 

provisions of this part . . . and the violations are so extensive and 

of such a nature that the health and safety of residents or the 

public is substantially endangered, the enforcement agency may 

issue an order or notice to repair or abate pursuant to this part.”

5 Health and Safety Code section 17980.7, entitled “Failure 

of owner to comply within a reasonable time with terms of order 

or notice pursuant to [section] 17980.6,” provides in pertinent 

part: “If the owner fails to comply within a reasonable time with 

the terms of the order or notice issued pursuant to Section 

17980.6, the following provisions shall apply . . . .” Subdivision 

(c) of this section provides, in pertinent part: “The enforcement 

agency, tenant, or tenant association or organization may seek 

and the court may order, the appointment of a receiver for the 

substandard building pursuant to this subdivision.”
8

order appointing a receiver was therefore made under express 

statutory authorization.6

Sandblossom also complains that its procedural due process 

rights were violated after the trial court “[found] the alleged 

violations had been corrected, but then forced the property owner 

to submit status reports and attend status conferences on the 

progress of its construction plans and title issues without any 

statutory authority to do so.” (Italics added.) As we have stated, 

this argument is based upon a false factual premise.

The trial court never concluded that Sandblossom had 

remedied the code violations. To the contrary, the trial court 

invited the City to file a renewed petition ex parte, and granted 

that petition, precisely because Sandblossom had been dragging 

its feet and had not corrected the hazardous conditions over a 

period of more than 11 months.

All told, the City issued seven violation notices, followed by

11 administrative citations, each of which provided an 

opportunity to repair the Property and avoid appointment of a 

receiver. Sandblossom was provided with all the process it was 

due.

Nor did the trial court err by using an expedited ex parte 

procedure to appoint a receiver after giving Sandblossom due 

notice of its intention to do so. The basis for this argument is 

Sandblossom’s contention that “the [s]uperior [c]ourt repeatedly 

found[ ] the Property was secure, not a nuisance, or in violation of 

6 Sandblossom’s assertion that a receivership is a 

provisional remedy and cannot be sought as a stand-alone 

remedy is contradicted by the plain language of Health and 

Safety Code section 17980.7, subdivision (c).
9

the City’s code.” The trial court never made any such finding. 

Indeed, the record citations offered by Sandblossom in its opening 

brief to support this claim are merely citations to its own 

declarations—not any findings by the trial court. Moreover, the 

trial court’s order appointing a receiver is presumed correct 

(Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 267). 

Sandblossom was given notice and an opportunity to respond to 

the City’s renewed petition, which Sandblossom duly opposed by 

memoranda and supporting declarations. Precisely how 

Sandblossom was prejudiced by means of this expedited process 

following 11 months of litigation is not explained. (See Pool v. 

City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069 [the appellant must 

demonstrate prejudice].)

7

Distilled to its essence, Sandblossom takes issue with the 

trial court’s resolution of conflicting evidence in the City’s favor. 

However, we resolve questions of disputed evidence in favor of 

the prevailing party on abuse of discretion review and indulge all 

reasonable inferences in favor of supporting the challenged 

judgment or order. (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 

1131, 1137-1138.)

7 Sandblossom’s argument that a bond was required is 

explicitly contradicted by Code of Civil Procedure section 995.220, 

which provides in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other 

statute, if a statute provides for a bond in an action or 

proceeding, including but not limited to . . . appointment of a

receiver . . . the following public entities and officers are not 

required to give the bond . . . .” Subdivision (b) of this section 

lists “[a] . . . city” as among the public entities and officials 

exempted from the bond requirement.
10

The record before the trial court demonstrates that

Sandblossom took only half-hearted and minor steps (such as 

removing stray vegetation, hiding rotting wood by spray paint, 

and performing flooring work without required permits and 

approvals) to abate what it admitted (and the historical society 

agreed) were “dire” Property conditions, including “major” safety 

problems affecting the “integrity” of the building. Especially in 

light of the snail’s pace of progress, the trial court acted well 

within its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The City shall recover its costs on 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CRANDALL, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.