United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on

National Security, House of

Representatives

August 1996 FOREIGN MISSILE

THREATS

Analytic Soundness of

Certain National

Intelligence Estimates

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-225

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-274120 

August 30, 1996

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman, Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report responds to your letter of February 28, 1996, asking us to

evaluate certain National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) prepared by the U.S.

Intelligence Community (IC) that analyze the threat to the United States

from foreign missile systems. As arranged with your office, our reporting

objectives were to compare the content and conclusions of NIE 95-19,

Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years,

November 1995, with the content and conclusions of two previous NIEs

prepared in 1993; to evaluate whether these three NIEs appear to be

objective and supported by facts; and to describe the conclusions of

recent, unclassified studies on the threat to the United States from foreign

missile systems.

This report supplements our June 12, 1996, briefing to you and is an

unclassified version of our classified report. All of our findings are

contained in this report; the omitted classified information concerned

detailed examples drawn from the NIEs to support our findings and

observations.

Background NIEs analyze issues of major importance and long-term interest to the

United States and are the IC’s most authoritative projection of future

developments in a particular subject area. NIEs are intended to help

policymakers and military leaders think through critical issues by

presenting the relevant key facts, judgments about the likely course of

events in foreign countries, and the implications for the United States. In

this regard, former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Casey

stated: “the highest duty of a Director of Central Intelligence is to produce

solid and perceptive national intelligence estimates relevant to the issues

with which the President and the National Security Council need to

concern themselves.”

NIEs are produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an

organization composed of 12 National Intelligence Officers who report

directly to the DCI. To prepare an NIE, the NIC brings together analysts from

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all the intelligence agencies that have expertise on the issue under review.1

However, in the final analysis, an NIE is the DCI’s assessment with which

the heads of the U.S. intelligence agencies concur, except as noted in the

NIE’s text.

Based on a synthesis of the published views of current and former senior

intelligence officials, the reports of three independent commissions, and a

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) publication that addressed the issue of

national intelligence estimating, an objective NIE should meet the following

standards:

• quantify the certainty level of its key judgments by using percentages or

“bettors’ odds,”2

 where feasible, and avoid overstating the certainty of

judgments;

• identify explicitly its assumptions and judgments;

• develop and explore “alternative futures:” less likely (but not impossible)

scenarios that would dramatically change the estimate if they occurred;

• allow dissenting views on predictions or interpretations; and

• note explicitly what the IC does not know when the information gaps could

have significant consequences for the issues under consideration.

All or part of the three NIEs we reviewed addressed the nature of the

current and future threat to the United States from foreign missiles. 

NIE 95-19 was specifically prepared by the IC to support decisions on

missile defense systems for North America. In the United States, this issue

is a critical one for the Congress and the administration as they debate the

desirability and planned characteristics of a proposed multibillion dollar

national missile defense system. Such a system would aim to protect the

United States from limited ballistic missile attacks, whether accidental,

unauthorized, or deliberate.3

Ballistic missiles are self-propelled missiles guided in the ascent of a

high-arch trajectory and freely falling in the descent. If launched from any

of the 18 countries analyzed in NIE 95-19 (except Cuba), such missiles

would have to travel between 5,000 and 13,000 kilometers (3,100 to 

1

The following organizations may participate in preparing an NIE: the NIC, CIA, Defense Intelligence

Agency, National Security Agency, State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of Treasury and Energy, and

the military services.

2

Bettors’ odds state the chance as, for example, “one out of three.”

3

For more information on national missile defense, see Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and

Current Issues (GAO/NSIAD-93-229, July 16, 1993).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-225 National Intelligence Estimates
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8,100 miles) to reach North America, classifying them as intercontinental

ballistic missiles (ICBM).4

Figure 1: Ranges to the United States and Canada*

* Excludes Hawaii and 

Canada's arctic islands.

South 

Pacific 

Ocean South 

Atlantic 

Ocean

Indian 

Ocean

North 

Pacific 

Ocean

North 

Atlantic 

Ocean

Boundary representation is 

not necessarily authoritative

United 

States

U.S.

Canada

1,000 km

5,000 km

8,000 km

10,000 km

12,000 km

Source: National Intelligence Council.

Results in Brief The main judgment of NIE 95-19—“No country, other than the major

declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic

missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or

Canada.”5

—was worded with clear (100 percent) certainty. We believe this

level of certainty was overstated, based on the caveats and the intelligence

gaps noted in NIE 95-19.

NIE 95-19 had additional analytic shortcomings. It did not (1) quantify the

certainty level of nearly all of its key judgments, (2) identify explicitly its

4

The distance depends on the launch site and the chosen U.S. target. For example, portions of Alaska

are about 5,000 kilometers from North Korea; Honolulu is about 7,000 kilometers from North Korea.

However, with forward-deployed missile launchers, the distance to the United States would be less.

5

The declared nuclear powers are Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

However, U.S. capabilities and intentions are out of the scope of foreign intelligence estimates.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-225 National Intelligence Estimates
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critical assumptions, and (3) develop alternative futures. However, in

accordance with standards for producing objective NIEs, NIE 95-19

acknowledged dissenting views from several agencies and also explicitly

noted what information the IC does not know that bears upon the foreign

missile threat. The 1993 NIEs met more of the standards than NIE 95-19 did.

NIE 95-19 worded its judgments on foreign missile threats very differently

than did the 1993 NIEs, even though the judgments in all three NIEs were

not inconsistent with each other. That is, while the judgments were not

synonymous, upon careful reading they did not contradict each other.

NIE 95-19 Overstated

Certainty of Its Main

Judgment

•The main judgment of NIE 95-19 was worded with clear (100 percent)

certainty. We believe this level of certainty was overstated, based on the

caveats and intelligence gaps noted in NIE 95-19.

On the issue of certainty in judgments, in 1992 then-DCI Robert Gates

opined: “While we strive for sharp and focused judgments for a clear

assessment of likelihood, we must not dismiss alternatives or exaggerate

our certainty under the guise of making the ‘tough calls.’ We are analysts,

not umpires, and the game does not depend on our providing a single

judgment.”

The wording of NIE 95-19’s main judgment implies a 100-percent level of

certainty that the predicted outcome will hold true during the next 

15 years. However, the caveats and intelligence gaps noted in the NIE do

not support this level of certainty. For example, at the beginning of 

NIE 95-19, the estimate notes “as with all projections of long-term

developments, there are substantial uncertainties.” A 1993 NIE stated its

view that substantial uncertainties cloud the IC’s ability to project

developments, especially beyond 10 years. Finally, in NIE 95-19’s

Intelligence Gaps section, it noted several shortcomings in the IC’s

collection of information on foreign plans and capabilities.

NIE 95-19 Had

Additional Analytic

Shortcomings

•NIE 95-19 did not (1) quantify the certainty level of nearly all of its key

judgments, (2) identify explicitly its critical assumptions, and (3) develop

alternative futures. However, in accordance with standards for producing

objective NIEs, NIE 95-19 acknowledged dissenting views from several

agencies and also explicitly noted what information the IC does not know

that bears upon the foreign missile threat.

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Given the important role NIEs play in the national security decision-making

process, U.S. policymakers require, and expect, objective estimates. “The

paramount value [in NIEs] is objectivity,” according to a former NIC Vice

Chairman. Adds the CIA, “dedication to objectivity—tough-minded

evaluation of information, description of sources, and explicit defense of

judgments—provides [an estimate with] credibility on uncertain and often

controversial policy issues.”

We believe that five standards, previously discussed, apply to an objective

NIE. These standards were synthesized from our review of the published

views of nine current or former senior intelligence officials, three

independent commissions, and a CIA publication that addressed the issue

of national intelligence estimating.6

 We were unable to obtain the DCI’s

current, official standards (if any exist) for the essential elements of an

objective NIE, because the DCI refused to grant us access to the NIC. 

(See our Scope and Methodology section for more details on this scope

impairment.)

NIE 95-19 Did Not Quantify

Certainty Levels of Key

Judgments

•NIE 95-19 did not quantify the certainty level associated with its key

judgments, by either using bettors’ odds or percentages.7

 It used

unquantified words or phrases such as “unlikely,” “likely,” “probably,”

“normally,” “sometimes,” “some leakage,” and “feasible, but unlikely.”

The CIA has told its analysts to be precise in conveying the levels of

confidence they have in their conclusions because policymakers and

others rely on these assessments as they define and defend U.S. interests.

Different people can hear very different messages from the same words,

especially about probabilities, and therefore good estimates should use

quantitative measures of confidence, according to a former NIC Vice

Chairman. For example, a “small but significant” chance could mean one

chance in a hundred to one person; for another it may mean one chance in

five. Similarly, a former NIC Chairman wrote that NIEs with only words such

as “possibly” are not of much help to someone trying to make an important

decision. Instead, where feasible, NIEs should use a percentage, a

6

Our sources included the published views of Robert M. Gates, former DCI and Deputy Director for

Intelligence, CIA; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., former Chairman, NIC; Harold P. Ford, former Acting Chairman,

NIC; Gregory F. Treverton, former Vice Chairman, NIC; reports by the Vice President’s National

Performance Review, the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence

Community, and a study group on intelligence sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations; and 

A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes, Vol. I, March 1996, published by the CIA’s Product

Evaluation Staff, Directorate of Intelligence.

7

Except for the 100-percent certainty implied by its main judgment, previously discussed.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-225 National Intelligence Estimates
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percentage range, or bettors’ odds to better serve policymakers—a

controversial, but necessary, approach, according to this former official.

Some intelligence judgments, such as estimating foreign economic

developments well into the future, may not easily lend themselves to

specifying a meaningful level of confidence, using numbers.

NIE 93-17 quantified the certainty of one of its key judgments by estimating

a “small but significant chance (10 to 30 percent)” that an event would

occur. The certainty levels of its other key judgments were not quantified.

NIE 93-19 did not quantify the certainty levels of any of its key judgments.

NIE 95-19’s Critical

Assumptions Not

Explicitly Identified

•NIE 95-19 did not explicitly identify its critical assumptions either by

separately listing them in one place or by introducing them throughout the

text with wording such as “we have assumed . . .”

Critical assumptions, also known as “linchpin assumptions,” are defined

by CIA as analysts’ debatable premises that hold the argument together and

warrant the validity of judgments. Therefore, as previously mentioned,

assumptions should be explicitly distinguished from other information,

including judgments. Estimative judgments are to be defended by fully

laying out the evidence and carefully explaining the analytic logic used,

according to a former Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA.

8

 Writing about

NIEs, a former Vice Chairman of the NIC agreed. As a general rule, the more

complex and controversial an issue, the more analytic effort is required to

ensure that critical assumptions are precisely stated and well defended,

according to the CIA. Good analysis will clearly identify its key

assumptions so that policymakers are aware of the “foundations” of the

estimate and can therefore judge for themselves the appropriateness of the

assumptions and the desirability of initiating actions to hedge against a

failure of one or more assumptions.

From our reading of NIE 95-19, we identified what appear to be its implicit

critical assumptions.9

 Most of these assumptions first appear in the NIE’s

Key Judgments section, leading the reader to believe that the IC considers

these assumptions to be fact-based judgments. However, we did not find a

body of evidence in NIE 95-19 that would allow us to consider these

8

The Tradecraft of Analysis: Challenge and Change in the CIA, Douglas J. MacEachin, 1994,

Consortium for the Study of Intelligence.

9

In our analysis of NIE 95-19’s assumptions, we were assisted by an expert in the missile proliferation

field, Dr. Richard H. Speier, an independent consultant. Previously, Dr. Speier worked in the Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, and in the Non-Proliferation

Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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statements as judgments, rather than assumptions. NIE 95-19 had only one

explicit assumption, which was not a critical one, concerning Iraq.

Some of NIE 95-19’s implicit critical assumptions are listed below. Three

other assumptions that we identified included classified information.

• The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)10 will continue to

significantly limit international transfers of missiles, components, and

related technology, but some leakage of components and critical

technologies will likely continue.

• No country with ICBMs will sell them.

• Three countries—all of which were assessed as being “high” in both

technical ability and economic resources—will not be interested in

developing an ICBM that could reach the United States (and elsewhere).

• A flight test program lasting about 5 years is essential to the development

of an ICBM.

• An attack against the United States from off-shore ships using cruise

missiles, while feasible, is unlikely to occur . . .

In addition, NIE 95-19 did not specify its assumption about the payload

weight or weights the IC used in forecasting the range for North Korea’s

Taepo Dong 2 ballistic missile. Publicly, the NIC’s Chairman has stated that

the Taepo Dong 2 missile could have a range sufficient to reach Alaska,

some U.S. territories in the Pacific, and the far western portion of the 

2,000 km-long Hawaiian Island chain. NIE 95-19 did, however, specify

payload weights for the Taepo Dong 1 missile. NIE 93-19 explicitly analyzed

the effects of changes in payload weight on the estimated range of ballistic

missiles. The payload weight directly affects the range of a missile—that

is, a lighter payload allows any given missile to travel farther. For example,

the IC judges that a certain country could increase the range of its existing

intermediate range ballistic missile by 90 percent, if it decreased its

payload weight by 70 percent.

Like NIE 95-19, the 1993 NIEs did not explicitly identify their critical

assumptions, as a rule. However, in one case, the text of NIE 93-17 prefaced

its judgment with a clear assumption about the current nuclear practices

in one country.

10The MTCR, begun in 1987, is the primary international regime aimed at stemming the proliferation of

unmanned delivery systems (including missiles and space launch vehicles) and related technologies.

The regime is not an international treaty, but rather a set of identical policies announced by member

governments, to be implemented in parallel.

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NIE 95-19 Did Not Develop

Alternative Futures

•NIE 95-19 did not develop alternative futures: less likely (but not

impossible) scenarios that would dramatically change the estimate if they

occurred.

NIEs should “describe the range of possible outcomes, including relatively

unlikely ones that could have major impact on American interests, and

indicate which outcomes they think are most likely and why . . . The job,

after all, is not so much to predict the future as to help policymakers think

about the future,” according to a former NIC Chairman. The CIA, then-DCI

Robert Gates, and other senior NIC officials agree that NIEs should analyze

alternative futures. A senior intelligence official told us that an alternative

future takes a fundamental analytic assumption and varies it to explore

different potential outcomes; for example, “What if countries do not honor

the MTCR?”

Both 1993 NIEs explored alternative futures. NIE 93-19 mentioned them in

the NIE’s text and explored them in detail in a separate annex. NIE 93-17’s

Key Judgments included alternative futures, which were further developed

through detailed scenarios. These alternative futures are classified.

NIE 95-19 disclosed that it did not account for alternative economic and

political futures. NIE 95-19 did address some less likely technical options,

including the characteristics and implications of a potential ICBM program

of one country.

NIE 95-19 Offered

Dissenting Views

•NIE 95-19 had 12 dissents in the estimate.11 NIE 93-19 and NIE 93-17 had 23

and 2 dissents, respectively. There were qualitative differences in the

nature of the dissents in the NIEs.

According to a February 1996 statement by the current Chairman of the

NIC, “The process for producing NIEs is directed particularly at ensuring

presentation of all viewpoints. We do not impose consensus; in fact we

encourage the many agencies that participate in NIEs to state their views

and we display major differences of view in the main text. Lesser

reservations are expressed in footnotes.”

While all three NIEs included dissenting views, the dissents were

qualitatively different among the NIEs. For example, NIE 93-19’s Key

Judgments contained two fundamental disagreements by one department

11In counting dissents, we counted discrete topics of dissent. Sometimes more than one agency would

dissent on a certain topic, and sometimes the dissent would appear multiple times (i.e., in the

executive summary and supporting volumes).

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-225 National Intelligence Estimates
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on the overall potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the

nuclear weapons program of a specific country. Other dissents in the body

of this estimate were also of a fundamental nature. In one instance, one

department took an “alternative view” to NIE 93-19’s forecasts about ICBM

and space launch vehicle development and transfers. This alternative view

from 1993 is very similar to the consensus view of NIE 95-19’s main

judgment.

Both NIE 95-19 and NIE 93-17 had no dissents in their Key Judgments. The

dissents in the body of these NIEs were mostly on technical issues and

contained classified information.

NIE 95-19 Explicitly Noted

Information Gaps

•NIE 95-19 and the 1993 NIEs explicitly noted information gaps at places in

the estimates’ text and in a separate Intelligence Gaps section.

Estimates should reveal what intelligence analysts do not know that could

have significant consequences for the issue under consideration,

according to several sources. This disclosure not only helps alert

policymakers to the limits of the estimate, but also informs intelligence

collectors of needs for further information, according to a former NIC

Chairman.

In their Intelligence Gaps sections, the three NIEs each noted shortfalls in

the IC’s collection of information on the issues they examined.

Differences and

Similarities Between

NIE 95-19 and 1993

NIEs

NIE 95-19 worded its judgments on foreign missile threats very differently

than did the 1993 NIEs, even though the judgments in all three NIEs were

not inconsistent with each other. In addition, the evidence in NIE 95-19 was

qualitatively and quantitatively different compared to the 1993 NIEs. Details

of other differences and the wording of judgments do not appear in this

report because they contain classified information. Finally, the NIEs agreed

on several points.

Judgments on Missile

Threats Worded Very

Differently, but Were Not

Inconsistent

NIE 95-19 worded its judgments on foreign missile threats very differently

than did the 1993 NIEs, even though the judgments in all three NIEs were

not inconsistent with each other. That is, while the judgments were not

synonymous, upon careful reading they did not contradict each other.

Because the DCI denied us access to officials responsible for the NIEs, we

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were unable to obtain their reasons for the different wording chosen in the

three NIEs.

In general, the 1993 NIEs pointed out unfavorable and unlikely outcomes

associated with foreign ICBMs more often than did NIE 95-19. A table that

compares the exact wording of judgments on foreign missile threats in the

three NIEs does not appear in this report because it contains classified

information.

NIE 95-19 Presented Less

Evidence Compared to

1993 NIEs

•The evidence in NIE 95-19 is considerably less than that presented in the

earlier NIEs, in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

Laying out the evidence is important because it allows readers to judge for

themselves how much credence to give the judgments, according to a

former Vice Chairman of the NIC.

In quantitative terms, the earlier NIEs had at least one supporting volume

with additional evidence and judgments. Each of the 1993 NIEs was over

three times as long as NIE 95-19. The 1993 NIEs backed each of their key

judgments with more support than did NIE 95-19. For example, NIE 93-19,

which unlike NIE 95-19, was not focused on foreign missile threats, had

almost twice the supporting evidence on missile threats than NIE 95-19 did

when comparing the same countries.12 In addition, and in contrast to 

NIE 95-19, both of the 1993 NIEs referred readers to other IC studies for

additional evidence or information.

In qualitative terms, we believe the earlier NIEs provided more convincing

support for their key judgments. For example, NIE 95-19 stated that 

“no countries with ICBMs will sell them.” For support, the NIE included one

paragraph that cited a multi-national counter-proliferation policy (MTCR)

and the theory that countries with ICBMs would probably be concerned that

any missiles they sell might be turned against them. The NIE provided very

little evidence to support its position that membership in the MTCR

(or pledges to abide by the MTCR in China’s case) would necessarily

prevent a country from selling missiles. The NIE asserted that the MTCR had

helped terminate missile programs in specific countries, but it provided no

evidence to support its view. The NIE did not cite additional evidence such

as intelligence on whether MTCR members have or have not sold missiles or

missile technology in the past, or whether countries have refrained from

12We compared the treatment of 11 countries that both NIE 95-19 and NIE 93-19 analyzed. In describing

the results of our comparison, we only used NIE 93-19’s volume II (supporting analysis) to avoid

double-counting information contained in NIE 93-19’s volume I.

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selling such technology because of the MTCR. In addition, the NIE provided

no evidence or detailed analysis to support its position that countries will

not sell ICBMs because they would probably fear that the missiles could be

turned against them.

In contrast to NIE 95-19, the earlier NIEs supported their judgments more

thoroughly. Detailed examples contain classified information and do not

appear in this report.

We were unable to identify the reasons why NIE 95-19 presented less

evidence to support its judgments than the 1993 NIEs, because NIC officials

refused to meet with us to discuss the preparation of NIE 95-19. The

reasons could include limitations on NIE 95-19’s length, its

SECRET/Releasable to “Country X” security classification (compared to

the TOP SECRET/Codeword classification of the 1993 NIEs), and/or a

smaller evidentiary base.

NIEs Agreed on Several

Points

In addition to the similarities between the NIEs on some judgments, the

NIEs agreed on several other points, including the impact of foreign

technology assistance on ICBM development, and the capabilities and

intentions of two countries with respect to ICBM development.

Unclassified Studies

on Foreign Missile

Threats to the United

States

The conclusions of unclassified government, or government-sponsored,

studies on foreign missile threats to the United States were generally

consistent with the conclusions of NIE 95-19. However, whereas NIE 95-19’s

main judgment was that there will be no new missile threats to the

contiguous 48 states during the next 15 years, two studies estimated some

possibility—“low” and “quite low”—of such missile threats. The private

studies we reviewed differed significantly from NIE 95-19’s assessment of

threats; these studies raised more immediate concerns about foreign

missile threats to the United States. For example, the Heritage

Foundation’s Missile Defense Study Team concluded that ballistic missiles

pose a clear, present, and growing threat to the United States.

We reviewed several recent unclassified studies on foreign missile threats

to the United States and its interests. We identified these studies through a

literature search of several databases that include defense and intelligence

information. We limited our review to complete studies on this topic, and

we did not include newspaper or journal articles. While we compared the

conclusions of these studies to NIE 95-19, we did not review the quality of

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their evidence or attempt to reconcile any differences they had with 

NIE 95-19.

Government Studies In a November 1993 letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on

Armed Services, the CIA provided the declassified findings of its report

entitled Prospects for the Worldwide Development of Ballistic Missile

Threats to the Continental United States. The study’s scope excluded

countries with a current capability to strike the continental United States

(CONUS)—China and strategic forces in several states of the former Soviet

Union. The study concluded that the “probability is low that any other

country will acquire this capability in the next 15 years.” Also, the study

found that “no evidence exists that any of the countries examined in this

study are developing missiles—especially ICBMs—for the purpose of

attacking CONUS.” There were no recommendations identified in the letter.

In June 1995, the Congressional Research Service issued a report for the

Congress entitled Ballistic and Cruise Missile Forces of Foreign Countries.

The report was written by Robert Shuey, a specialist in U.S. foreign policy

and national defense. The report stated that “Other than the declared

nuclear powers (the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United

Kingdom) few countries have long-range missiles.” It also said that North

Korea is in the process of developing longer range ballistic missiles,

including the Taepo Dong 2. The report concluded that “the production or

international transfer of more and better ballistic and cruise missiles will

potentially have serious negative implications for the security of U.S.

citizens and facilities . . .” The report contained no recommendations.

In April 1996, the Office of the Secretary of Defense released a study

entitled Proliferation: Threat and Response. The key finding in the report

was that the threat was changing from global to regional. The report did

not address the current ballistic missile threat to the United States. The

report did note, however, that “ . . . unlike during the Cold War, those who

possess nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons may actually come to

use them.” The report concluded that “The end of the Cold War has

reduced the threat of a global nuclear war, but today a new threat is rising

from the global spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.” The

report had no recommendations. The report had no indications that there

was an increasing missile threat to the United States itself.

Government-Sponsored

Study

In February 1993, a report commissioned by the Strategic Defense

Initiative Organization of the Department of Defense was released entitled

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The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. The report was

prepared by the Proliferation Study Team, chaired by Lieutenant General

William E. Odom, USA (ret.), Director of National Security Studies at the

Hudson Institute. The report found that at this point there is no indication

that Brazil, India, Italy, Israel, Germany, Japan, and Sweden—countries

that possess the potential to develop ICBMs during the 1990s—have any

intention of initiating an ICBM program. The report estimated that, if

current trends continue, the probability of new ICBM threats during the

1990s or in the very early years of the next decade is quite low. In reaching

its conclusion that “the prospects for an increase in ballistic missile

threats to the United States during this decade are limited,” the study team

identified three uncertainties that affected their ability to forecast

confidently 10 to 20 years into the future. First, intelligence indicators are

often ambiguous. Second, a number of events could alter the capabilities

or intentions of some states to field long-range ballistic missiles. Third,

dramatic and rapid changes in U.S. political relations with states

possessing or capable of fielding long-range missiles could occur. The

report made no recommendations.

Private Studies In July 1991, the Cato Institute published Foreign Policy Briefing No. 10

entitled Countdown to Disaster: The Threat of Ballistic Missile

Proliferation. This study was prepared by Channing R. Lukefahr, an

associate defense policy analyst at the Cato Institute, as part of the

Institute’s regular series evaluating government policies and offering

proposals for reform. The key findings of the study were that “As the

horizontal proliferation of ballistic missile technology continues, the threat

of an accidental launch rises,” and that “while the threat that unstable or

antagonistic regimes will achieve the ability to launch intercontinental

ballistic missiles . . . moves rapidly toward reality, attempts to reverse that

destabilizing trend have been merely exercises in delay.” The study

concluded that “the days when weapons of mass destruction and the

systems to deliver them are possessed by only the two super-powers . . .

are rapidly drawing to a close” and that “although there is no imminent

threat to the United States from any of those [friendly] nations,

continuation of that state of affairs cannot be guaranteed . . . an ally can

become an enemy in a matter of months.” The report cited stronger

secessionist forces in the Soviet Union as undermining the central control

of nuclear weapons and making the accidental launch of a few dozen or

even a few hundred missiles possible as is the possibility of a limited

launch by rogue elements. The report’s sources were congressional

testimony and articles in journals, magazines, and newspapers. The report

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-225 National Intelligence Estimates
B-274120 

recommended the development and deployment of antiballistic missile

systems.

In March 1996, the Heritage Foundation released a document entitled

Defending America: Ending America’s Vulnerability to Ballistic Missiles.

This was an update to a June 1995 report entitled Defending America: 

A Near- and Long-Term Plan to Deploy Missile Defenses. The Missile

Defense Study Team was chaired by Ambassador Henry Cooper, former

Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. The main finding

of the reports was that the United States had no defense against ICBMs. The

initial report said that ICBMs marketed as space launchers could provide

rogue states with the ability to attack the United States. The update cited,

but did not identify, authoritative administration officials as having

testified to the Congress in May 1995, that rogue states could threaten U.S.

cities with long-range missile attacks in 3 to 5 years. The reports

concluded that ballistic missiles pose a clear, present, and growing threat

to America and her allies overseas. The report recommended a decision to

deploy, when technically feasible, the Navy’s Upper Tier interceptor

system and the Brilliant Eyes space-based sensor system.

Agency Comments The NIC did not comment on our draft report. On July 10, 1996, we wrote to

the NIC’s Chairman and requested his views on our draft report. On July 22,

1996, the DCI’s Director of Congressional Affairs replied to us and stated

that they would not comment on the substance or accuracy of our draft

report because these issues “fall under the purview of intelligence

oversight arrangements established by the Congress.” As requested, the

DCI’s staff provided us with a security classification review, which we have

incorporated into our final report.

Scope and

Methodology

Our scope included a detailed review of NIE 95-19, and a comparison of this

NIE to NIE 93-17, NIE 93-19, and recent unclassified studies. We did not

attempt to independently evaluate foreign missile threats to the United

States. To assess the objectivity of the NIEs, we used various IC and other

sources to develop standards for producing objective NIEs. Then we

carefully reviewed NIE 95-19 and the two earlier NIEs to determine whether

they met those standards. To compare NIE 95-19 to the 1993 NIEs, we

conducted detailed comparisons of the judgments, evidence, and structure

of the NIEs. The 1993 NIEs had a different focus than NIE 95-19, so we could

not make direct comparisons in some areas. For example, unlike NIE 95-19,

the earlier NIEs did not address the Third World cruise missile threat.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-225 National Intelligence Estimates
B-274120 

To compare NIE 95-19 to other unclassified studies, we conducted a variety

of literature searches to identify such studies. Where possible, we

identified the sources of data used by these studies; however, we did not

evaluate the quality of their evidence or attempt to reconcile any

differences they had with NIE 95-19.

Our scope was significantly impaired by a lack of cooperation by officials

from the CIA, NIC, and the Departments of Defense and State. The

Departments of Defense and State would not allow us access to their

records. Defense and State spokespersons referred us to the DCI on all

matters concerning NIEs. On March 6, 1996, we wrote to the DCI’s Director

of Congressional Affairs and requested access to CIA and NIC officials and

documents. On June 17, 1996, he replied to us and declined to cooperate

with our review. His letter argued that our review of certain NIEs would be

contrary to oversight arrangements for intelligence that the Congress has

established. Specifically, he stated that “such subjects are under the direct

purview of Congressional entities that have been charged with overseeing

the Intelligence Community.” Therefore, we were unable to discuss

preparation of the NIEs with cognizant officials or review supporting

documentation at the departments and agencies previously mentioned.

Due to this lack of access, we also could not review other NIEs that may

have covered similar topics as NIE 95-19. Except as previously mentioned,

our review was conducted from April to June 1996 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

At your request, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days

after its issue date. At that time, we will provide copies to other

congressional committees; the Chairman, President’s Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board; the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy; Chairman,

NIC; and the Director of Central Intelligence. Copies will also be made

available to others on request.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-225 National Intelligence Estimates
B-274120 

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were 

Gary K. Weeter, Assistant Director; Douglas M. Horner,

Evaluator-in-Charge; Stephen L. Caldwell, Senior Evaluator; and 

James F. Reid, Senior Evaluator.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

(701098) Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-225 National Intelligence Estimates
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