2024 UT App 100

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

TAYLOR JAMES GOODALL,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20210622-CA

Filed July 18, 2024

Seventh District Court, Price Department

The Honorable Don M. Torgerson

No. 191700160

Staci A. Visser and Ann Marie Taliaferro,

Attorneys for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Daniel W. Boyer,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 Taylor James Goodall appeals his convictions for forcible 

sodomy and object rape. He first requests a remand to develop the 

record for a claim of prosecutorial and police misconduct. Goodall

then argues that his Miranda waivers and incriminating 

statements were involuntary and that the trial court erred in 

admitting them. Next, Goodall argues that his attorneys rendered 

ineffective assistance by requesting a jury instruction that he 

claims labeled his incriminating statements as a “confession.” 

Finally, Goodall argues that an officer should not have been 

allowed to testify about the credibility and consistency of some 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 2 2024 UT App 100

witnesses’ statements. Because Goodall has not established any 

claims of error or ineffective assistance, we affirm his convictions.

BACKGROUND1

The Incident

¶2 In March 2019, Jenny2 reported to the police that her 

boyfriend, Goodall, had raped her the previous night. The two

had been dating for nine months and lived together with a friend 

(Roommate) in a small trailer. Jenny had heard rumors that 

Goodall was seeing another woman. One morning, when Jenny

confronted Goodall about the rumors, he became “defensive” and 

“agitated.” They later texted each other about whether they 

should end their relationship. When Jenny got home from work

and called Goodall to see what time he would be back, he sounded 

“really irritable” and “standoffish.” Goodall told Jenny he would 

talk to her “when he felt like it,” so Jenny “just went to bed.”

¶3 Around midnight, Jenny woke up to Goodall saying, 

“You’re going to do what I say or else.” He took the blanket off 

Jenny and told her to take off her clothes. Jenny was “groggy” and 

thought at first they were going to have “make-up sex,” so she 

took off her pants and underwear. Jenny was alarmed, however, 

when Goodall lifted her leg with “his arm on [her] ankle,” put his 

other hand on her throat, and penetrated her anus with his penis, 

“dry.” Jenny “told him to stop because he knew that [she] did not 

like anal” sex, but Goodall continued thrusting “hard” “[a]s far as 

he could go” for a “couple of minutes,” which “felt like forever” 

1. “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most favorable

to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly.” State v. Liti, 

2015 UT App 186, ¶ 3 n.2, 355 P.3d 1078 (cleaned up).

2. A pseudonym.
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 3 2024 UT App 100

to Jenny. Jenny tried to get out from under him, but Goodall 

pushed her legs back and kept his hand around her throat.

¶4 Next, Goodall pulled his penis out and “shoved” four 

fingers into Jenny’s vagina, knuckle-deep. Goodall “curled his 

fingers and twisted them.” Jenny said, “Ow,” and told him to stop 

because it was causing “a lot of pain,” but “he would not stop.”

Then, Goodall took those same fingers and “shoved” them into 

her mouth. It “disgusted” Jenny. She “told him to stop” and that

she needed to use the bathroom. Jenny passed Roommate on her 

way to the bathroom but did not wake him up or call police 

because she “didn’t know what to do.” While Jenny was in the 

bathroom, she and Goodall exchanged the following texts:

Goodall: Get in here

Now

Jenny: I will give me a sec, I’m still trying to 

urinate my bladder is hurting me

Goodall: O well

I’m still mad

Jenny: I know

Goodall: Exactly

And [if you] say it hurts [too] much 

we are over as well

Jenny: Okay

Goodall: Hurry

Jenny: Okay
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 4 2024 UT App 100

Goodall: How much longer

Jenny returned to the bedroom because she “didn’t want any 

conflict.”

¶5 Goodall then demanded oral sex from Jenny. Grabbing her

hair, Goodall shoved Jenny’s face “in front of his penis and started 

to thrust, which made [her] gag.” Jenny did not want his penis in 

her mouth because it had just been in her anus—the act felt 

“disgusting” and “revolting” to her. Goodall ejaculated in Jenny’s 

mouth and told her to swallow it. Jenny instead “spit it out.”

Afterwards, Goodall told Jenny to lie in “bed with him,” which

she did, feeling “scared,” “disgusted,” and “violated.”

¶6 The next morning, when Goodall told Jenny he was 

breaking up with her, she was upset because she loved him and 

wanted to make it work. After Goodall left, Jenny told Roommate 

that Goodall had raped her. Roommate responded that he had 

“heard whimpering in the night in the bedroom” during the “brief 

moments when [he] wasn’t listening to music” with his 

earphones. Jenny also told her work manager and two friends 

about the rape. At the suggestion of one of her friends, Jenny 

contacted the police.

The Investigation

¶7 The Helper City Police Chief (the Chief) responded to 

Jenny’s 911 call and took her statement. Afterward, the Chief 

drove Jenny to the trailer to collect her clothing from the previous

night and then to the hospital, where a sexual assault nurse 

examiner conducted an exam. The exam revealed no visible 

injuries other than a small bruise on Jenny’s right shin.

¶8 That evening, Goodall called the police to ask about why 

they were at the trailer that day. Goodall told the officer that 

answered (Officer) that he was willing to speak with the police, so 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 5 2024 UT App 100

Officer picked him up from the trailer and drove him to the 

Helper Police Station, where Officer informed Goodall that Jenny 

had made “serious allegations” against him. Officer read Goodall 

his Miranda rights, and Goodall filled out a waiver form. 

According to Officer, Goodall “seemed pretty clear about the 

rights” and “wanted to talk.” Goodall confirmed that he and 

Jenny “had sexual intercourse the night before,” and he “believed 

she had been fine with all of it.”

¶9 Officer notified the Chief that he was interviewing 

Goodall, so the Chief drove over and joined Officer.3 Goodall gave 

his account of what happened that night, saying he and Jenny 

“both agreed upon having sex” and had started with vaginal sex 

until she said “ow.” Goodall then claimed he asked Jenny if they 

could have anal sex and she agreed. He related that during the 

anal sex, Jenny “started to wince in pain again.” Goodall also 

admitted he vaginally penetrated Jenny with four fingers.

¶10 The Chief, who knew Goodall’s brother and had 

“interacted with him [and] his family . . . quite regularly,” asked 

Goodall if he would be willing to take a polygraph test. Goodall 

agreed and rode with the Chief to the Carbon County 

Administration Building, approximately ten minutes away. When 

they arrived, the Chief read Goodall his Miranda rights again and 

gave him a waiver form, which Goodall initialed and signed. 

¶11 Goodall also signed a pre-test waiver that advised him that 

he was “free to leave” or end the test whenever he wished and 

that “any and all parts of [the] polygraph examination and 

interview” “will be used for whatever legal purposes the Helper 

City Police Department deems necessary” and the results “will be 

released to [the Chief] or any others required by law.” By signing 

the waiver, Goodall represented that he was “in good mental and 

3. An audio recording was made of this initial interview with 

Goodall, and parts of it were played for the jury.
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 6 2024 UT App 100

physical condition” and did not know of any “mental or physical 

ailment” that would “be impaired by the interview or 

examination.” Goodall also represented that he was taking the test 

“voluntarily, without threats, duress, coercion, force, or promise 

of immunity or reward.” When the Chief asked Goodall how 

much sleep he had gotten the previous night and if he had eaten 

that day, Goodall responded that he had slept “[e]ight, nine 

hours” and had eaten breakfast but not lunch. Goodall stated he 

was in overall good health except for having bipolar disorder,

which caused him “severe anxiety” and “chronic depression.”

¶12 After Goodall took the polygraph test, the Chief reviewed

the results and determined that Goodall was lying. The Chief told 

Goodall he had “failed the test” and then compared a prosecutor 

to a “secondary umpire” in baseball, encouraging Goodall to 

“own up” to his mistake instead of denying it and “bumping 

bellies with the secondary umpire.” Approximately five minutes 

into this post-polygraph interview, Goodall admitted he “did 

make a bad decision” and started sobbing, saying he had “never 

wanted to hurt [Jenny].” The Chief asked what he meant and 

Goodall explained, “I told her to . . . [do] anal . . . and she might 

not have like[d] it. . . . She has expressed to me before she didn’t 

like it.” Goodall admitted that he and Jenny had started with anal 

sex, contrary to what he had told Officer earlier. When asked if

Jenny agreed to the anal sex, Goodall replied, “She didn’t really 

tell me; she did shake her head yes. But I, I really don’t, I swear 

on my mother’s grave.” As for the oral sex that night, Goodall said 

he “might’ve went a little too far” and that he was “the one who 

caused her to gag” when he “pushed her head down.” Goodall 

also admitted he had ejaculated in Jenny’s mouth.

¶13 The State charged Goodall with three first-degree felonies: 

two counts of forcible sodomy and one count of object rape.

Goodall filed a motion to suppress the polygraph test results, 

along with his statements made after the polygraph. The State 

stipulated to excluding the polygraph test results but opposed 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 7 2024 UT App 100

exclusion of Goodall’s post-polygraph statements. The trial court 

accepted the stipulation, held an evidentiary hearing, and heard 

oral argument on whether to exclude Goodall’s post-polygraph 

statements. The court denied the motion, ruling that Goodall 

“voluntarily waived his Miranda rights” and “presented no 

evidence that he was overly compliant or more susceptible to 

coercion” and that no “improper threats, implied promises, false 

friend, or coercive police tactics were present.”

The Trial

¶14 At trial, the jury heard Jenny testify about the assault as 

described above. On cross-examination, Jenny admitted that she 

and Goodall “frequently engaged in rough sex,” which she 

defined as “hair pulling, biting, back clawing, [and] slapping.”

Goodall’s attorneys (Counsel) asked if Jenny had been “preparing 

for today’s testimony.” Jenny replied that her attorney, two

county prosecutors, a detective, the Chief, and a victim’s advocate 

helped her prepare. The State also elicited testimony from Officer, 

the Chief, Roommate, and additional witnesses.

¶15 Goodall’s defense focused on consent and on the Chief, 

portraying him as overly eager to get a conviction. Counsel urged 

the jury to make its decision “based upon the evidence, not based 

upon an officer who has tunnel vision, who wants to go a certain 

direction and clearly creates his investigation to reflect that.”

During cross-examination of the Chief, Counsel sought to 

minimize discrepancies in Goodall’s interviews, to which the 

Chief replied, “It goes back to credibility, I guess, of [Goodall] 

when I was talking to him . . . there [were] a few inconsistencies 

that I noticed . . . .” Counsel also asked the Chief about a recorded 

phone call between Jenny and Goodall’s cousin:

Counsel: Were there any inconsistencies in 

what [Jenny] told [Goodall’s cousin] 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 8 2024 UT App 100

versus what she told you in your 

interview?

The Chief: [Jenny] was very consistent in that 

recorded phone conversation by [the 

cousin].

Counsel: Okay. Was her statements [sic] 

consistent with what the evidence 

showed?

The Chief: All I can say is [Jenny] was consistent 

in the statements she provided me in 

that recorded phone interview.

¶16 The State asked the Chief about his brief interaction with 

Roommate while Jenny was collecting her clothing at the trailer.

When asked what Roommate’s “demeanor was like while [the 

Chief was] speaking with him,” the Chief answered, “He seemed 

articulate. He seemed knowledgeable, I guess.” When the State 

asked if Roommate seemed “questionable in what he was saying

at all,” the Chief replied, “Not at all.”

¶17 At the close of the State’s case, Counsel moved for a 

directed verdict, arguing there was possible witness tampering 

since Jenny testified that her attorney, a victim’s advocate, a 

detective, the Chief, and two county prosecutors had 

been “prepping her for her testimony.” The court denied the 

motion, finding a lack of evidence “beyond just suspicion” to 

support it.

¶18 Counsel recalled the Chief to the witness stand during 

Goodall’s case-in-chief and sought to emphasize alleged 

inconsistencies in Jenny’s statements. The Chief responded that 

during his “three interactions or more with [Jenny], she was 

totally consistent every single time. In her written statement, in 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 9 2024 UT App 100

my official police report that I wrote, in my probabl[e] cause 

statement, she was consistent.”

¶19 Before sending the jury to deliberate, the trial court gave 

the jury instructions, including one requested by Counsel

(Instruction 34). Unlike most of the other jury instructions, 

Instruction 34 did not have a heading, and it stated as follows:

When the Prosecution introduces evidence 

that the defendant confessed, that confession must 

be viewed in light of its overall trustworthiness. 

There are several factors that you may consider 

when deciding whether the statement is sufficiently 

trustworthy:. . . . 

If you find that there is sufficient evidence to 

believe that the defendant’s statement is 

trustworthy, then you may consider it as evidence 

among the other evidence presented. However, if 

you find that there is not sufficient evidence to 

establish that the defendant’s statement is 

trustworthy, you may disregard the statement.

¶20 The jury found Goodall guilty of forcible sodomy (based 

on the anal sex), not guilty of forcible sodomy (based on the oral 

sex), and guilty of object rape (based on the digital penetration).

The trial court later sentenced Goodall to two concurrent terms of 

five years to life in prison.

¶21 After Goodall timely appealed, he filed a motion to stay his 

appeal so he could develop evidence of “misconduct” by the 

prosecution in the trial court. We denied that motion, noting that 

with “the exception of rule 23B [for ineffective assistance of 

counsel], which is not applicable here, the Utah Rules of Appellate 

Procedure do not provide a mechanism to develop evidence for 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 10 2024 UT App 100

an appeal after a notice of appeal has been filed.” Goodall filed a 

motion to reconsider that order, which we also denied. 

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶22 Goodall raises four issues on appeal. First, Goodall 

requests that this court grant him the opportunity to develop a 

record of prosecutorial misconduct “by whatever remedy.”

Because Goodall’s request to develop the record for such a claim 

during the pendency of this appeal “is procedurally improper,” 

we “need not address the standard[] of review applicable” to this 

issue. State v. Robinson, 2023 UT 25, ¶ 11, 540 P.3d 614.

¶23 Second, Goodall asserts that his Miranda waivers and 

incriminating statements were involuntary. “In reviewing a trial 

court’s determination on the voluntariness of a confession, we 

apply a bifurcated standard of review.” State v. Rettenberger, 1999 

UT 80, ¶ 10, 984 P.2d 1009 (cleaned up). “The ultimate 

determination of voluntariness is a legal question” reviewed for 

correctness, and a trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for 

clear error. Id.

¶24 Third, Goodall contends that Counsel rendered 

constitutionally ineffective assistance by requesting a jury 

instruction that, according to Goodall, characterized his 

statements to law enforcement as a “confession.” “When a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on 

appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must 

decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective 

assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Calvert, 2017 UT 

App 212, ¶ 17, 407 P.3d 1098 (cleaned up).

¶25 Finally, Goodall asserts that improper evidence was 

admitted under rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence in 

relation to the Chief’s testimony. Goodall admits he failed to 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 11 2024 UT App 100

preserve this issue by raising it below and asks us to review it 

under “both the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 

exceptions to our preservation requirement.” State v. Popp, 2019 

UT App 173, ¶ 19, 453 P.3d 657. “Plain error is a question of law 

reviewed for correctness.” Id. (cleaned up). And, again, “we must 

decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective 

assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” Id. (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶26 Goodall argues that his state constitutional rights to 

appeal, have counsel, and be afforded due process will be violated 

if he is denied an opportunity to develop a record of alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct during this direct appeal. Goodall 

acknowledges that “the record is insufficient to raise known 

claims of prosecutorial misconduct.” The State points out that this 

is Goodall’s second request for reconsideration of our ruling 

denying his request to stay his appeal so he can develop the 

record on prosecutorial misconduct, and that the appellate rules 

allow the development of evidence outside the record after filing 

a notice of appeal only for a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. We agree with the State.

¶27 The Utah Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a 

number of rights, including the right to appeal, see Utah Const. 

art. 1, § 12, the right to counsel, see id., and the right to due process, 

see id. art. 1, § 7. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outline 

the contours of the right to appeal. Under those rules, parties to 

an appeal may not develop extra-record evidence after filing the 

notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 11(a). Rule 23B is the only 

exception to that rule and allows an appellate court to grant

criminal defendants a limited remand of their case to the trial 

court so the record may be developed on an ineffective assistance 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 12 2024 UT App 100

of counsel claim. See id. R. 23B(a). This procedure is available only 

for findings of fact that are “necessary for the appellate court’s 

determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.

¶28 Goodall invokes our court’s “inherent authority” in 

making his request that, despite the absence of any rule allowing 

it, we create a rule permitting remand for a prosecutorial 

misconduct claim. But our authority does not extend to rulemaking. Utah’s constitution grants our supreme court the 

“primary authority over the adoption of rules of procedure and 

evidence,” but even that court is limited by existing rules when 

reviewing an appeal. See Cougar Canyon Loan, LLC v. Cypress Fund, 

LLC, 2020 UT 28, ¶ 13, 466 P.3d 171 (cleaned up); see also id. (“An 

appeal to this court is not the appropriate means to amend a court 

rule.” (cleaned up)). Indeed, the supreme court stated, “Even

where an appellant presents compelling reasons for a policy shift 

that is not currently supported by the plain language of our rules 

of procedure, we do not rewrite the rule on the fly. Rather, we

refer the issue to the appropriate rules committee for additional 

study, and, if appropriate, we amend the language of the relevant 

rule through our normal rule-making process.” Id. ¶ 15 (cleaned 

up). Accordingly, we reject Goodall’s request that we exercise our 

“inherent authority” to devise a remedy not provided for in the 

current rules. 

¶29 But Goodall is not without a potential avenue for relief. He

may raise this claim in postconviction proceedings, pursuant to 

the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (the PCRA). See Utah Code 

§§ 78B-9-101 to -503; id. § 78B-9-102(1)(a) (establishing the PCRA 

as “the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction 

or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other 

legal remedies, including a direct appeal”). Goodall contends that 

being required to raise his claim in postconviction proceedings 

violates his state constitutional right to appeal because he is not 

guaranteed counsel at that stage. Our supreme court faced a 

similar argument in Gailey v. State, 2016 UT 35, 379 P.3d 1278, and 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 13 2024 UT App 100

acknowledged that although neither “the right to state-paid 

counsel nor the right to effective assistance of counsel is 

constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed in postconviction 

proceedings,” that, “the court may, upon the request of an 

indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis,” id. ¶ 28

(cleaned up). Thus, the supreme court held that the claim was 

unripe because the defendant had not yet sought postconviction 

relief nor been denied postconviction counsel. Id. ¶¶ 28–30. So too 

here. Although Goodall is not guaranteed counsel under the 

PCRA, he may be appointed counsel, making his argument that 

he is being denied the right to counsel unripe at this stage. 

¶30 Because the appellate rules do not allow the development 

of evidence outside the record after filing a notice of appeal unless 

it is for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we deny for a 

third time Goodall’s request to develop the record for his claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct. But we note that he may raise his claim

in postconviction proceedings should he choose to do so. 

II. Goodall’s Statements to Police

¶31 Next, Goodall contends the trial court erred in admitting 

statements he made that “were the product of involuntary . . . 

waivers and coercion.” The Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of 

statements obtained by coercion and guarantees that individuals 

will not be “compelled in any criminal case” to be “a witness 

against” themselves. U.S. Const. amend. V. The “ultimate test” of 

whether this protection has been violated and a defendant’s 

statement is involuntary is whether the defendant’s “will has been 

overborne.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) 

(cleaned up). Courts must “assess[] the totality of all the 

surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the 

accused and the details of the interrogation”—in “determining 

whether a defendant’s will was overborne.” Id. at 226. In other 

words, courts must consider internal factors such “as the 

defendant’s mental health, mental deficiency, emotional 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 14 2024 UT App 100

instability, education, age, and familiarity with the judicial 

system,” as well as “external factors [such] as the duration of the 

interrogation, the persistence of the officers, police trickery, 

absence of family and counsel, and threats and promises made to 

the defendant.” State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶¶ 14–15, 984 

P.2d 1009. 

¶32 First, none of Goodall’s personal characteristics weigh in 

favor of his claim that his statements were involuntary or coerced. 

Goodall received two Miranda warnings in short succession: one 

by Officer at the beginning of his interview at the Helper Police 

Station and another by the Chief before his interview at the 

Carbon County Administration Building. When the Chief asked 

Goodall how much sleep he had gotten the previous night and if 

he had eaten that day, Goodall responded that he had slept 

“[e]ight, nine hours” and had eaten breakfast, but not lunch.

Goodall also confirmed he was in overall good health except for 

having “bipolar” disorder, which caused him “severe anxiety” 

and “chronic depression.” Goodall was familiar with the justice 

system (having been arrested more than once), responded clearly 

to questions, and showed no signs that his “will was overborne,” 

Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 226. 

¶33 Second, none of the external factors support Goodall’s 

claim that his statements were involuntary or coerced. His two 

interviews spanned just over two hours, far shorter than 

interviews where coercion has been found based on the length of 

interviews. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 746–47 

(1966) (holding that sixteen days of interrogation was coercive); 

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 230 (1940) (holding that an “all 

night vigil” at the end of five days’ questioning was coercive). 

The trial court did not err in determining that the officers used 

no “improper threats, implied promises, false friend, or 

coercive police tactics” and were, in fact, “cautious in obtaining 

two Miranda waivers within a short period of time.” The 

recordings of the interviews support the trial court’s finding and 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 15 2024 UT App 100

show not only that Officer’s and the Chief’s actions and 

statements were permissible, but that they also made notable 

efforts to accommodate Goodall and ensure he understood his 

rights. 

¶34 Finally, the Chief’s use of the polygraph test and results as 

an interview technique was not coercive; it was a permissible form 

of interrogation. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 48 (1982) (per 

curiam) (rejecting a lower court’s determination that the use of 

polygraph results in police questioning “is inherently coercive”). 

The record indicates the Chief did not tell Goodall the polygraph 

test results would be used at trial; instead, the waiver simply 

stated that the results of the test “will be released to [the Chief], or 

any others required by law.”

¶35 Under the totality of the circumstances, the police 

employed no coercive tactics and there is no indication on 

the record that Goodall’s two Miranda waivers were 

involuntary. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that 

Goodall’s incriminating statements and Miranda waivers were 

voluntary.

III. Jury Instruction

¶36 Next, Goodall contends Counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in requesting an instruction that, according to Goodall,

labeled his incriminating statements as a “confession.” While 

Goodall concedes it was proper for Counsel to seek “an 

instruction that would allow the jury to consider the 

untrustworthy nature of Goodall’s statements,” he argues the 

wording of Instruction 34 was problematic because it “allowed 

jurors to begin their analysis from the premise that Goodall 

confessed.” The State counters that had the jury viewed 

Instruction 34 as “a judicial pronouncement that Goodall 

confessed,” it would not have reached a mixed verdict. We agree

with the State.
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 16 2024 UT App 100

¶37 An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a 

defendant to “demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable 

professional judgment, and that counsel’s deficient performance 

prejudiced” the defendant. State v. Powell, 2020 UT App 63, ¶ 19, 

463 P.3d 705 (cleaned up). “Both elements must be present, and if 

either is lacking, the claim fails and the court need not address the 

other.” Id. (cleaned up). “If it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, 

that course should be followed.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 670 (1984).

¶38 To prevail on the prejudice prong, Goodall “must 

demonstrate that but for the error, there is a reasonable 

probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to 

him.” State v. Apodaca, 2019 UT 54, ¶ 50, 448 P.3d 1255 (cleaned 

up). “This requirement is a relatively high hurdle to overcome” 

because “the likelihood of a different result must be substantial.” 

Id. (cleaned up). Goodall has not met this burden.

¶39 The jury was given Instruction 34 so it could assess the 

trustworthiness of Goodall’s incriminating statements. The 

instruction had no title and used a version of the word 

“confession” only twice, both times in its opening sentence: 

“When the Prosecution introduces evidence that the defendant 

confessed, that confession must be viewed in light of its overall 

trustworthiness.” This sentence reads more as an abstract “ifthen” statement than as a judicial pronouncement that Goodall 

had confessed. The instruction then ends with emphasis on the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support what it terms as Goodall’s 

“statement,” not confession: 

If you find that there is sufficient evidence to believe 

that the defendant’s statement is trustworthy, then 

you may consider it as evidence among the other 

evidence presented. However, if you find that there 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 17 2024 UT App 100

is not sufficient evidence to establish that the 

defendant’s statement is trustworthy, you may 

disregard the statement.

(Emphases added.) Taken as a whole, Instruction 34 did not 

prejudice Goodall by its inclusion of “confession” at its outset; its 

focus was on whether the evidence presented matched the 

statements made by Goodall, thus framing the idea of Goodall’s 

statements as a “confession” as the State’s theory to prove.

¶40 When we assess whether Goodall was prejudiced by 

Counsel’s actions, we “must consider the totality of the evidence 

before the judge or jury.” State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 42, 424 P.3d 

171 (cleaned up). We are not convinced that without Instruction 

34’s use of the word “confession,” there is a reasonable probability 

that the result of the trial would have been different. The jury 

heard Jenny’s account of the assault, which was corroborated by 

Roommate’s testimony about the “whimpering” he heard that 

night and by Goodall’s callous text messages to Jenny while she 

was in the bathroom. The jury also heard Goodall make 

contradictory statements during his police interviews, such as 

which sexual act he and Jenny started with, whether he ejaculated 

in Jenny’s mouth, and whether Jenny gagged herself or was 

caused to gag by Goodall pushing her head down. Finally, the 

jury heard Goodall remorsefully admit he “might’ve went a little 

too far,” and that Jenny had “expressed to [him] before she didn’t 

like [anal sex].” On this record, it is unlikely that the jury would 

have found Goodall not guilty. Thus, Goodall has not established 

that without this instruction there is a “reasonable probability that 

the verdict would have been more favorable to him.” Apodaca, 

2019 UT 54, ¶ 50 (cleaned up).

IV. Rule 608(a) Evidence

¶41 Finally, Goodall contends that Counsel was ineffective in 

not objecting to the Chief’s comments about the credibility of 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 18 2024 UT App 100

Goodall’s, Jenny’s, and Roommate’s statements to the police.

Goodall also argues the trial court committed plain error when it 

did not sua sponte strike this testimony. Goodall did not raise this 

concern at trial and asks us to review this unpreserved issue 

under the doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel or plain 

error. See generally State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 19, 416 P.3d 443 

(explaining that plain error and ineffective assistance are 

exceptions to the preservation requirement). Because we conclude 

that the evidence did not violate rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of 

Evidence and that Counsel reasonably could have decided to use 

these statements to support the theory that the Chief conducted a 

targeted investigation against Goodall, we conclude that Counsel

was not ineffective in not objecting to it. We also conclude it was 

not plain error for the court to allow it.

¶42 Goodall contends the Chief made three statements on the 

credibility of witnesses that violate rule 608(a):

First Statement

It goes back to credibility, I guess, of [Goodall] when 

I was talking to him. He was—there [were] a few 

inconsistencies that I noticed and that was one of 

them. His initial statement was that she took her 

own clothes off. And then at the end, he told me that 

he told her to take her clothes off.

Second Statement

Counsel: Were there any inconsistencies in 

what [Jenny] told [the cousin] versus 

what she told you in your interview?

The Chief: [Jenny] was very consistent in that 

recorded phone conversation by [the 

cousin].
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 19 2024 UT App 100

Counsel: [Were] her statements consistent with 

what the evidence showed?

The Chief: All I can say is [Jenny] was consistent 

in the statements she provided me in 

that recorded phone interview.

Third Statement

The Chief: [Roommate] seemed articulate. He 

seemed knowledgeable, I guess. 

The State: Did he seem questionable in what he 

was saying at all?

The Chief: Not at all.

Goodall claims that Counsel should have objected to each of these 

statements or the trial court should have intervened sua sponte to 

strike the testimony. We disagree.

¶43 Generally, we “give wide latitude to Counsel to make 

tactical decisions and will not question such decisions unless 

there is no reasonable basis supporting them.” State v. Bedell, 2014 

UT 1, ¶ 23, 322 P.3d 697 (cleaned up). Accordingly, our analysis 

of plain error and ineffective assistance are interwoven

because “plain error does not exist when a conceivable strategic 

purpose exists to support the use of the evidence.” Id. ¶ 26 

(cleaned up). 

¶44 First, one of Counsel’s theories was that the Chief had 

“tunnel vision” during his investigation. Counsel effectively 

demonstrated this theory by his use of the Chief as a witness in 

Goodall’s case-in-chief and by remarks in closing when 

Counsel urged the jury to make its decision “based upon the 

evidence, not based upon an officer who has tunnel vision, who 

wants to go a certain direction and clearly creates his investigation 
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 20 2024 UT App 100

to reflect that.” The Chief’s statement about Goodall’s credibility 

came unsolicited during cross-examination when Counsel was 

seeking to minimize discrepancies in Goodall’s interviews. It was 

sound strategy for Counsel to let that statement go rather than to 

draw unwanted attention to it with an objection. Similarly, the 

Chief’s statements about Jenny’s consistency and Roommate not 

being questionable corroborated the idea that the Chief had 

“tunnel vision” in taking their statements at face value and 

relying too much on their words rather than on actual evidence. 

Counsel therefore had good reason not to object to these 

statements. 

¶45 Second, Counsel could have reasonably decided that the 

statements did not violate rule 608(a). Rule 608(a) “prohibits any 

testimony as to a witness’s truthfulness on a particular occasion.” 

State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, ¶ 11, 5 P.3d 642 (cleaned up). Thus, a 

witness may not “offer a subjective credibility determination that 

[another witness] was telling the truth,” but the rule does not 

prohibit a witness “from giving testimony from which a jury 

could infer the veracity of the [other] witness.” Id. ¶¶ 13–14. Our 

case law distinguishes between statements made about a 

witness’s truthfulness generally and a witness’s statement 

specifically. See, e.g., State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ¶ 47, 275 P.3d 

1050 (determining an officer’s “observation that [a witness’s] trial 

testimony was consistent with the allegations she made” earlier 

did not violate rule 608(a)); State v. Cruz, 2002 UT App 106U, para. 

1, (concluding that testimony “that the victim’s story never 

wavered in its specifics” during her interviews was not an 

impermissible comment on the victim’s credibility). Thus, 

Counsel’s performance was not deficient where there were valid 

strategic reasons not to object to the Chief’s statements.

“Accordingly, it was not plain error for the trial court to refrain 

from interfering with . . . Counsel’s strategic decision-making.”

State v. Gourdin, 2024 UT App 74, ¶ 59 n.13, 549 P.3d 685 (cleaned 

up).
State v. Goodall

20210622-CA 21 2024 UT App 100

CONCLUSION

¶46 In the absence of a rule expressly granting a defendant the 

opportunity to develop the record for a prosecutorial misconduct 

claim during an appeal, we reject Goodall’s request to create such 

a mechanism. The trial court correctly determined that Goodall’s 

incriminating statements and Miranda waivers were voluntary. 

We conclude that Counsel did not render ineffective assistance of 

counsel by introducing Instruction 34. We also conclude Counsel

was not constitutionally ineffective for not objecting to the Chief’s 

testimony, and the trial court did not plainly err when it did not 

sua sponte strike the testimony. We therefore affirm Goodall’s 

convictions.