UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT L. HILLMAN,

Plaintiff,

 Civil Action 2:11-cv-00501

v. Judge George C. Smith

 Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers

WILLIAM JOSEPH EDWARDS,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Magistrate Judge’s July 18, 2011

Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 4) as well as Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 9). 

For the reasons that follow, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED and Plaintiff’s

Objections are OVERRULED.

The Magistrate Judge issued the Report and Recommendation pursuant to an initial screen

of Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis Complaint. She recommended that the Court dismiss this action

without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge specifically

concluded that because Plaintiff was attempting to appeal judicial rulings from his earlier statecourt action, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded jurisdiction.1

Plaintiff objected to the Report and Recommendation on July 27, 2011. With leave from

the Court, he also submitted supplemental briefing in support of his Objections. His primary

contention appears to be that he is not appealing the judgments of the state courts, but has instead

1

 In his underlying state-court case, Plaintiff attempted to bring various claims, including

malpractice, against his former attorney, the named Defendant in this case.

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brought an independent claim against the state courts of Ohio and Defendant.2

 Plaintiff cites case

law, including decisions of this Court, for the general premise that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

does not bar claims that are independent from challenges to a state-court judgment, even if such

claims deny conclusions the state courts reached. See, e.g., Hines v. Franklin Savings & Loan,

No. 1:09-cv-914, 2011 WL 882976, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2011); Smith v. Encore Credit

Corp., 623 F. Supp.2d 910, 916 (N.D. Ohio 2008).

If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court “shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Upon review, the Court

“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from premise that “only the Supreme Court of the

United States has the jurisdiction to review state court decisions.” Coleman v. Governor of

Michigan, 413 F. App’x 866, 870 (6th Cir. 2011). As the United States Supreme Court has held,

the doctrine “is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 

In light of Exxon, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has emphasized

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to attacks on state-court judgments and not

independent claims. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). The Sixth

2

 To the extent Plaintiff contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine itself is

unconstitutional, this objection is without merit.

2

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Circuit set forth the following approach for differentiating between the two scenarios :

The inquiry then is the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal

complaint. If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction.

If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff

asserts an independent claim.

Id.

 The Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the Court from exercising

jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiff is certainly correct that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not

apply to independent claims. Within his Complaint, however, he states no independent claims. 

Even construing plaintiff’s pro se Complaint liberally, as the Court must, the only reasonable way

to interpret it is as a request for review of the state-court judgments in his underlying state-court

case. Plaintiff opens his Complaint by stating, “[t]his is an appeal from the Ohio Supreme Court’s

May 25, 2011 Judgment entered in the above captioned case . . . .” (Compl. 1, ECF No. 3.) He

then lays out seven “Assignments of Error.” (Id. at i–ii.) The concrete actions that form the basis

for these assignments of error are the various procedural and substantive rulings of the trial court,

the appellate court, and the Ohio Supreme Court in Plaintiff’s state-court action. Finally, Plaintiff

concludes his Complaint by attaching an “Appendix” consisting of various documents from the

state-court proceedings including the complaint, two decisions of the state appellate court, and

the entry of the Ohio Supreme Court declining jurisdiction.

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the sources of Plaintiff’s injury, as

laid out in his Complaint, are the state-court decisions themselves. The Court recognizes that

Plaintiff’s underlying state action was based on allegations that the named Defendant engaged in

misconduct. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no attempt to state an independent claim

3

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based on these actions. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s attempt at the objections stage to recast his

allegations as claims for conspiracy against the state courts is insufficient to avoid the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Wallis v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 11–1181, 2011 WL 4396973, at *2 (7th

Cir. Sept. 22, 2011) (“[The plaintiff”] cannot circumvent the Rooker–Feldman doctrine by

recasting a request for the district court to review state-court rulings as a complaint about civil

rights, due process, conspiracy, or RICO violations.”). Once again, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

applies because the actual actions Plaintiff alleges have caused him injury are the state-court

rulings. See Reguli v. Guffee, 371 F. App’x 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that claim that a

juvenile court official “conspired” against plaintiff was insufficient to avoid dismissal under

Rooker-Feldman where “[t]he injury alleged . . . [was] a direct result of the judicial order”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objections (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 9) are OVERRULED and the Report

and Recommendation (ECF No. 4) is ADOPTED. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3

 Additionally, the Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal of this action would not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ George C. Smith 

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3

 Plaintiff implies that it is contradictory to conclude that the Court lacks jurisdiction

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but then dismiss the case without prejudice. Nevertheless,

“[d]ismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should normally be without prejudice, since by

definition the court lacks power to reach the merits of the case.” Revere v. Wilmington Fin., 406

F. App’x 936, 937 (6th Cir. 2011).

4

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