United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

September 1996 ELECTRONIC

WARFARE

Additional Buys of

Sensor System Should

Be Delayed Pending

Satisfactory Testing

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-175

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272289 

September 27, 1996

Congressional Committees

We reviewed the Army’s $1.55 billion program for acquiring the

Intelligence Electronic Warfare Common Sensor (IEWCS) system. Our

review focused on determining whether the Army was taking necessary

measures to ensure that the system demonstrated acceptable performance

before committing to its production. We conducted this review under our

basic legislative responsibilities and are addressing this report to the

committees of jurisdiction. The report identifies problems and calls for

corrective action that the Department of Defense (DOD) has indicated an

unwillingness to take. We are suggesting that Congress may wish to take

the necessary action to ensure that the DOD addresses the problems we

have identified.

Background The IEWCS system is intended to modernize the Army’s signals intelligence

equipment at the division level and includes a common suite of

subsystems for use on three different platforms. The system for the Army’s

light divisions,1

 called Ground Based Common Sensor-Light (GBCS-L), is to

be mounted on high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. For heavy

divisions, the system is called the Ground Based Common Sensor-Heavy

(GBCS-H) and is to be mounted on a derivative of the Bradley Fighting

Vehicle. The airborne version is mounted on the EH-60 Quickfix helicopter

and is called the Advanced Quickfix (AQF). (See figs. 1 through 3.)

1

The Army has light and heavy forces. Light forces include nonmechanized infantry, airborne, and air

assault units. Heavy forces include armor, mechanized infantry, and cavalry units.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
B-272289 

Figure 1: Ground Based Common

Sensor-Light

Source: U. S. Army.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
B-272289 

Figure 2: Ground Based Common

Sensor-Heavy

Source: U. S. Army.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
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Figure 3: Advanced Quickfix

Source: U. S. Army.

IEWCS is expected to be capable of intercepting enemy communications

signals, locating the source of those signals, and jamming them

electronically. It is also expected to be capable of locating enemy radars.

The Army started limited production of the GBCS-L in fiscal year 1995 on an

urgent basis to field a system with a specific capability to counter a

particular type of threat communications system. The Army had originally

planned to upgrade seven EH-60 helicopters to the AQF configuration in 2

years of low-rate initial production (LRIP). It started LRIP of three AQF

systems in fiscal year 1996 and had planned to procure the remaining four

systems in fiscal year 1997.

In our September 1995 report, we indicated that the Army’s fiscal year

1996 budget request to upgrade the EH-60 Quickfix to the AQF

configuration could be reduced because operational testing of the AQF,

needed to prove its effectiveness and suitability, was not scheduled until

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
B-272289 

fiscal year 1997.2 Although the Army’s fiscal year 1996 budget was

approved, the DOD Comptroller considered our findings in evaluating the

Army’s fiscal year 1997 budget request and reduced the Army’s planned

second LRIP procurement of AQF systems from four to one. The Army

justified the additional system as needed to raise the total LRIP quantity to

four systems desired for the AQF’s fiscal year 1997 initial operational test

and evaluation (IOT&E).

Results in Brief The Army has prematurely committed to LRIP of the unproven IEWCS system

and plans an additional LRIP that is not justified. In addition, the Army has

plans to approve additional production of the system and enter full-rate

production without demonstrating that it can meet minimum acceptable

operational performance requirements. Unless the acquisition strategy is

changed, the Army risks becoming committed to procuring an

unsatisfactory system requiring redesign and retrofit to achieve acceptable

system performance.

Premature Low-Rate

Production of IEWCS

The Army decided to enter low-rate production of AQF systems in

November 1995 despite unfavorable user test results. The decision was

linked to a test that was supposed to verify the operational characteristics

of the IEWCS on all three platforms. The test results (details of which are

classified) showed that the system would work occasionally under the

right conditions, but failed to demonstrate that the system was sufficiently

mature to justify production. For example, the system had problems

locating targets. On one occasion, a GBCS-L platform erroneously displayed

a location as being in northern Texas when the actual location was in

southern Arizona. Further, the AQF version’s performance was the poorest

against frequency hopping (low-probability of intercept) signals,

performing at a rate of only one-third that of the other two platforms.

Army program officials stated that the three AQF systems that were

contracted for in January 1996 and the one system to be contracted for in

fiscal year 1997 are necessary for the AQF’s IOT&E. However, the first three

systems are not scheduled to be delivered until June 1998 and the fourth is

not scheduled to be delivered until even later, both long after the

scheduled September 1997 AQF IOT&E.

2

1996 Defense Budget: Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and Restrictions in RDT&E and Procurement

(GAO/NSIAD-95-218BR, Sept. 15, 1995).

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
B-272289 

Unnecessary Risk in

Production Plans

Even though the Army plans to conduct IOT&E on the GBCS-L, AQF, and

GBCS-H systems in stages over the next 3 years, the test results may not

necessarily affect production decisions because the Army has taken the

position that the performance criteria it has set in operational

requirements documents (ORD) for the IEWCS are not absolute pass/fail

measures. Instead, the Army has stated that “...[the criteria] represent

estimates of performance for which a failure to achieve a given criterion

would require a careful management reassessment of cost effectiveness

and program options during the program milestone decision review.”

Consequently, the Army has given itself an option for proceeding into

full-rate production of IEWCS systems that may not meet minimum

acceptable performance requirements.

According to DOD Regulation 5002.R, at each milestone beginning with

program initiation, thresholds and objectives expressed as measures of

effectiveness or performance requirements should be documented in an

ORD. The threshold value is the minimum acceptable performance

requirement that, in the user’s judgement, is necessary to satisfy a need.

The objective value is what is desired by the user and what the user is

attempting to obtain. The ORDs (which are classified) for the IEWCS

platforms have objectives. However, the minimum acceptable

performance requirements (thresholds) have not been specified for most

of the objectives. For example, one AQF ORD objective is that the system

must automatically process signal data at the sensor for threat detection

and identification in near real-time. However, there is no specification for

how often this must happen or how much data is to be processed to

achieve minimum acceptable performance. Likewise, another ORD

objective indicates that the system must locate threat emitters

(communications) to within specified ranges, yet is silent regarding how

often this needs to happen in order to meet the minimum acceptable

performance requirement. Thus, conceivably a system that could intercept

at least 1 out of 100 enemy messages could be considered to have met the

requirements.

Decisions to enter and continue production without ensuring that systems

meet minimum acceptable performance criteria have historically been

made with adverse consequences. As we reported in 1994,3 DOD has

repeatedly committed electronic warfare and other systems to production

without assurance that the systems would perform satisfactorily. Many of

the weapon systems that started production prematurely later experienced

3

Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapon Systems Prematurely

(GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 21, 1994).

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
B-272289 

significant operational effectiveness and/or suitability4 problems. As a

result, major design changes were often needed to correct the problems,

costly retrofits were required for many delivered units, and substandard

systems were sometimes deployed to field units.

For example, the Army began production of its AVR-2 and AVR-2A laser

warning system5

 despite unfavorable test results and without verifying that

design changes to correct performance problems were adequate. In total,

the Army spent as much changing the system’s design as it did on the

system’s original development and procured over half of its total program

quantity without completing operational tests to ensure the system’s

satisfactory performance. On another electronic warfare system, the Army

made design changes to correct a serious shortcoming detected during

operational testing but failed to verify the adequacy of the changes in

further operational testing. Subsequently, during Operation Desert Storm,

the system proved so defective that Army pilots stopped using it.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

• require the Army to cancel the planned fiscal year 1997 procurement of

one AQF system and

• require both that specific, measurable, minimum acceptable performance

requirements be established for the IEWCS system and that the system

demonstrate the capability to meet these requirements before proceeding

with additional procurements.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our

recommendation that the Army cancel its fiscal year 1997 procurement of

one AQF system. DOD stated that while the one AQF system will not be

available to support fiscal year 1997 AQF testing, it is needed to ensure that

sufficient test articles are present to support a multi-year testing program.

DOD also stated that the procurement supports the establishment of an

initial production rate for the system sufficient to lead to full-rate

production upon successful completion of operational testing. We found

no evidence supporting a requirement for the fiscal year 1997 system to

4

Operational effectiveness refers to the ability of a system to accomplish its mission in the planned

operational environment. Operational suitability is the degree to which a system can be placed

satisfactorily in field use considering such factors as reliability and maintainability.

5

The AVR-2 and AVR-2A laser warning system is installed in helicopters to alert pilots to the presence

of laser energy and thereby provide protection against threat weapons that rely on lasers for their

operation.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
B-272289 

support future testing. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) for the

GBCS-L states that only three platforms of each type (GBCS-L, AQF, and

GBCS-H) are required for operational testing. The TEMP for the AQF does not

address the number of test articles required for testing the AQF, and the

Army has not prepared a TEMP for the GBCS-H. Furthermore, the Army could

stretch the production of the three AQF systems ordered last year, thereby

maintaining a stable production line until test results become available.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation requiring both that specific

measurable, minimum acceptable performance requirements be

established for the IEWCS system and that the system demonstrate the

capability to meet those requirements before the Army proceeds with

additional procurements. DOD stated that it saw merit in this

recommendation. It also agreed that the Army should establish key

performance parameters for the IEWCS system before conducting final

systems IOT&Es, but saw no need to require the successful demonstration

of those parameters prior to further procurements. As we reported,

decisions to enter and continue production without assuring that systems

meet minimum performance criteria have historically been made with

adverse consequences. Consequently, we continue to believe that there

should be a requirement that the established key performance parameters

be met prior to the procurement of additional systems.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I, along with

our evaluation.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

In light of DOD’s unwillingness to have the Army revise its IEWCS acquisition

strategy, Congress may wish to take the actions necessary to limit AQF

procurement until AQF systems successfully complete operational testing

and to require IEWCS’ demonstration of established key performance

parameters prior to the procurement of additional systems.

Scope and

Methodology

To address our objectives, we interviewed officials and obtained and

reviewed briefing, budgetary, and planning documents from the office of

the Project Manager, Signals Warfare, Vint Hill Farms Station, Va. We also

visited officials, examined test sites, and obtained explanations of test

procedures and results at the Intelligence Electronic Warfare Test

Directorate, Fort Huachuca, Az. We also obtained, reviewed, and analyzed

test reports prepared by the Intelligence Electronic Warfare Test

Directorate and test plans prepared by IEWCS project office to determine

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
B-272289 

whether the Army was taking necessary measures to ensure that the IEWCS

system demonstrated acceptable performance prior to committing to

production. We conducted our review between September 1995 and

June 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the

Secretaries of Defense and the Army. We will also make copies available

to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this assignment were Jackie

B. Guin, Paul Latta, and Henry Arzadon.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
B-272289 

List of Congressional Committees

Chairman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Chairman

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

Chairman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Chairman

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comments 1 and 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 3.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 3.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated August 12, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. While a set of four Advanced Quickfixes (AQF) for one division may give

the Army flexibility in future tests, we found no evidence that supports a

requirement for this many test platforms. According to the Test and

Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) for the Ground Based Common

Sensor-Light (GBCS-L), only three platforms of each type (GBCS-L, AQF, and

Ground Based Common Sensor-Heavy (GBCS-H)) are required for

operational testing and the Army already has three AQFs under contract,

plus two additional developmental platforms available. The TEMP for the

AQF does not address the number of test articles required for testing the

AQF and the Army has not prepared a TEMP for the GBCS-H. Consequently, we

know of no requirement for four AQFs for testing either now or in the

future.

2. With regard to DOD’s position that the additional procurement of one AQF

in 1997 “permits a more orderly increase in the production rate,” we note

that the DOD Comptroller reviewed the Army’s request to produce four AQFs

in 1997 and cut the request to a single system. Since a reduction in the

production rate from three in fiscal year 1996 to one in fiscal year 1997 is

not an “orderly increase in the production rate,” DOD may find it to be

useful to stretch production of the three AQFs ordered last year. In this

way, a stable production line could be established and test results could be

available before the Army commits to additional production.

3. As we noted in the body of our report, decisions to enter and continue

production without ensuring that systems meet minimum performance

criteria have historically had adverse consequences. Thus, we continue to

believe that there should be a requirement that the established key

performance parameters be met prior to the procurement of additional

systems.

(707129) Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-175 Electronic Warfare
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