### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 760 -CR

Al fre do So to Enr ique z , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 277TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 07- 1580 -K 277 , HO NORAB LE KEN ANDERSO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
On J une 25, 2008, a grand jury returne d an indictment cha rg ing a ppellant Al fr e do Sot o E nr iqu e z wi th t he fe lony of fe ns e s of con ti nuou s se xua l a bu se of a y oungc hil d (count 1), ag g ravated sexual a ssault of a child (counts 2-9) , and indec ency with a child by

contac t (counts 10-11) . Tex. Pena l Code Ann. §§ 21.02, 22.021 (West Supp. 2008), § 21.11 (West 2003). On Oc tob e r 1 0, 20 08 , a

jur y fo un d E nr iqu e z g uil ty

of a ll e le ve n c ounts c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt. The jury assessed punishment a t 50 y ear s for eac h of counts one throug h nine and 20 y ear s for e ach of counts ten a

nd eleve n, and the trial judge enter ed multipl e stackingorder s. I n three points of error , Enriquez argues that the trial c ourt err ed by (1) e x cluding from openingst at em en t s evidenc e of a prior ac cusation of phy sical assa ult made ag ainst him by

his daug hter, D.E., the child complainant in this case, (2) excluding t h at s am e evidence fr om cross-e x amination of D.E., a nd (3) e x cluding
e vid e nc e dur i n g

t h e c r o s s - e xa

m i n a t i on of L .E ., Enri qu e z’s wi fe and D. E. ’s mot

he r, re g ard ingthe c os t of he r b re a st i mpl ants . We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.2 BACK GR OUND C o mp l a i n an t , D
. E
. , l i v e d

w i t h h e r p a r e nt s a n d yo u n g e r b r o t h e r i nW i l l i a m s o nC o u n t y, Texas at the time of the events descr ibed here in. Acc ording to D.E.’s testimony at trial, her

fathe r, appellant Alf

redo Enr iquez, sex ually

abused he r on a f

reque nt basis when she w as in the six th and
se ve nth g ra de s. D. E. te sti fi e d th a t E nr iqu e z fo rc e d h e r t o h a ve va g ina l, a na l, a nd or a l se x with

him in severa l are as of the family ’s home, includingthe master be droom, the living r oom, the study , a stairwell, and he r bedr oom. D.E. testified t hat when her father would abuse her on the f loors of the master be droom or living r oom or on the couch in the l iving room, he would sometimes place g oldcolore d towels underne ath her s o t h at t he ca rpets and c ouch would not be staine d. He would not pla c e do wn

tow e ls w he n a

bu sin g he r i n th e stu dy , w he re he wo uld pe ne tr ate he r o r f

or c e he r t o pe rf or m or a l se x on him

in a de sk c ha ir fa c ingthe fa

mil y c omp ute r. D. E. te sti fi e d th a t E nr iqu e z al so penetr ated he r using sex t oy s and for ced he r t o p en et rate her a nus with a spindle used for holding
c o mp a c td i s c s . E n r i qu e z s o m e t i m e s u s e d c o n d o m s an d

s e x u a l l u b r i c a n t w h e na

b u s i n g D
. E
. In
a dd iti on , h e wo uld

of te n f orce her to watc h p or

no g ra phy on the fa mil y ’s te le vis ion

or ho me computer or

on his cell phone. Acc ording t o testimony at trial, the last instance of abuse occur red on Oc tob e r 2 0, 20 07 , w he n D .E . w a s tw e lve y e ars old . O n th e e ve nin g of Oc tob e r 21, 20 07 , D .E . to ld he r m oth e r, L .E ., tha

t E nr iqu e z ha d b e e n a

bu sin g he r. L .E ., a ft e r a ssu ri ngD. E. that th e a

bu se wo uld
never occur ag ain, aske d her to c alm down so as not to attrac t the attention of Enrique z. As soon as Enri qu e z le ft

fo r w or k the ne xt m or

nin g , L .E
. imm e diate ly so ug ht a ssi sta nc e , e ve ntu a lly

c omi ngin contac t with the W illiamson County Sheriff’ s Depa rtment. As par

t of the depa

rtment’s investig ation of the case , D.E. took the m thr oug h the family house. D.E. showed police the spec ific locations ofThe participants in the calls spoke m ainly in Spanish. The quotes fr om the calls ar e take n 1 from the Eng lish translation made by a license d court tra

nslator. 3 the c on do ms, lub ri c ant, CD sp ind le , an d sex toy s that her fathe r h a d u se d w he n a

bu sin g he r, a s w e ll
a s th e loc a tio n o f a du lt p or no g ra ph ic DV Ds and ma g a zine s. D. E. a lso po int e d o ut a re a s in the ho us e wher e she ha d been a

bused, and police t o o k ca rp et samples of some of those are as, including the master be droom and the study
. I n addition, police recove red gold-c olored towe ls matching D.E.’s descr iption of the towels her fathe r would place under her. The car pet samples and g old towe ls taken by po lic e sh ow e d e vid e nc e of Enri qu e z’s se me n, wh ile the sp ind le ha d D .E .’ s D NAon it. As part of

the investig ation, police also set up controlled c alls from D.E. a nd her
mo th e r to E n r iq u e z. Duri ng the fi rs t c a ll fr om D. E. to E nr iqu e z, D .E . s a id, “ Iwa s li ste nin g to t his 1 radio station last nig ht about like kids who have problems and ar e g etting a bused, and I

just don’t fee l rig ht any

more. I think I ’m g onna tell mom.” Enriquez responde d, “Wait ‘til I g et there .” L ater in the co n v er sation, Enriquez said, “OK, ple ase hold on we ’ll talk, and it’s not g onna be that bad
any mor e any wa y .” Duri ng the se c on d c on ve rs a tio n b e tw e e n D .E . a nd Enri qu e z, w hic h a

pp e ars to have oc curr ed shortly afte r the fir st, D.E. expli citly ref ere nced E nriquez forc ing he r to perf orm oral sex on hi m: “On my

radio I hear d that when you stick y our di ck in m y mouth that it’s oral sex and that’ s th e same thi ngy ou c an g o to ja il e ve n mo re and it’ s ju st, Ic an’ t li e , d a d .
. . Ihave to t e ll mom.” Enriquez responde d, “OK, le t me talk to your mom. Alrig ht? ” L ater in the conver sation, Enriquez asked D .E. to “be strongand ca lm down,” saying, “ ‘Cause this is something that if
. . . the way Iunderstand it—it’s something that I ’ll g o to jail . . . for a longtime.”The re cor d co n t ai n s fewdetails of this prior alleg ation. The re cord shows only that the 2 alleg ation was one of phy sical abuse , and that, acc ording to defe nse counse l, Enriquez was “c lear ed” and the c harg es “r

uled out.” 4 Be fore trial, the trial court g rante d the State’s motion in limine reg ardinga pre vious alleg ati o no f

p h y s ic a l a

b u s e ma d e b y

D
. E
. a g a in s t E n r iq

u e z. A t t

r ia l, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l a s k e d

the 2 trial court’ s permission to discuss t h e prior a lleg ation during openingstatement. The tr ial court denied this reque st. During cross-e x amination of D.E., defe nse counsel approa ched and ag ain aske d to discuss the prior alleg ation. The trial c ourt sustained the St at e’s objec tion to admissi on of the pr ior a lle g a tio n und e r Te xas Rule of Ev ide nc e 60 8( b) , whi c h bars the us e of pr ior un c on vic te d a c ts to impeach a

witness’s cr edibility
. L ater in the trial, during the cr oss-examination of L .E., defe nse counse l asked he r, “How much d i d y our bre ast implants cost? ” The State objected to the r eleva nce of the question. Def ense c ounsel argued that the question would elicit relevant infor mation about L .E.’s “spe nding patter n s ,” as the State had questioned he r about the f amily ’s poor fina

ncial situation during direc t examination. The trial court sustained the State’s objection.

At the c on c lus ion

of the tr ia l, t

he jur y fo un d En ri qu ez g uil ty

of a ll e le ve n c ounts broug ht ag ainst him, and this appeal followe d.
DI SCU SSIO N Opening Stateme nt

I n his first point of error , Enriquez argues th at t h e t ri al cour t erre d in excluding D.E.’s prior

alleg ation of phy sical abuse duri n g t h e defe nse’s ope ning statement. Under the codeEnriquez also argues in this point of error that t h e t ri al cour t erre d in not admitti ng the 3 evidenc e whe n t h e i s sue ca me up duringcross-e x amination of D.E. We will addre ss the issue of admissibili ty of the evidenc e in point of err or two, which conc erns the tr ial court’s e x clusion of the evidenc e duringcross-e x amination. 5 of cr iminal procedur e, def ense c ounsel may addre ss the “natur e of the defe nses re lied upon and the fac ts e x pecte d to be prove d in their support” duringopeningstatement. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.01(a ) (West 2007). Te x as cou rt s have longheld that “ther e re sts in the court the judicial discretion to contro l t h e [opening ] st atement a nd limit it to it s proper

scope.” Du

ga n v . S tate , 19 9 S. W. 6 16 , 6 17 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 17 ); se e als o No rto n v . S tate , 5 6 4 S. W. 2 d

7 1 4 , 7 1 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. [P anel Op.] 1978) (“The char acte r and extent of openingstatement ar e subjec t to the trial court’s discr etion.”). Atrial co u rt abuses its discre tion if its ruli ng falls outside the “zone of
rea sonable disag ree ment.” Mo ntgom e ry v . S tate , 8 10 S.W. 2d

37 2, 39 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ); see als o D on ne ll v . S

tate , 1 9 1 S
. W
. 3 d 864, 867 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.) ( applying a buse of discretion standa

rd to ruling s on opening statement). I n this case, pr ior to opening statement, t he trial court heard a rguments on the State’s motion in l imine conce rning the prior accusation, and gra nted the State’s motion over the argument of defe nse counse l. Whi le a r uling on a

motion in l imine is not a ruling on a dmissibi lity , see Drau gh on v . S tate , 8 31 S.W. 2d

33 1, 33 3 n .1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ) ( e xpla ini ngtha t mo tio n in l i m i n e does not entail adve rse r uling on a dmissibi lity

of evide nce) , th e d is c u s s io no f th e motion indicated that the a dmissibi lity of the e vidence was in question. Consequently , defe nse counse l had no rig ht to raise the issue during opening , as he could not r easona bly have “expected” to pr ove that fa c t du ri ngtr ia l. SeeCar

ra sq uil lo v . S

tate , 742 S.W .2d 104, 113 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1987, 36

no pet.) (f inding no error

when tria l judge instructed def ense c ounsel prior to openingstatement not to “mention to the jury

any thing that a t this point , y ou think mi gh t no t be a dmi ssi ble ” ) ( e mph a sis
a dd e d) ; se e als o M

oo re v . S tate , 868 S.W .2d 787, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“While the ac cused also has the r ight to make an opening statement at the point and on matters pre scribed by the statute, it is not err o r for the trial cour t to preclude him from stating matter inadmissible in evidence and fro m m ak i n g argumentative and pr ejudicial re marks in his favor .”). G iven the cour t’s broad authority over ope ning statements and the questionable admissibili ty of the evidenc e, we cannot sa y that the trial cour

t abused its discretion in disa llowing mention of the prior a lleg ation during opening statement. Ac cording ly , we ove rrule E nriquez’s first point of err or. Cross-Examination of D.E.

I n his second point of e rr or, Enrique z arg ues that the trial judg e er red in e x cluding evidenc e of the prior accusation of phy sical abuse during the cr oss-examination of D.E. Enriquez maintains that the exclusion of the evidenc e violated his constitutional rig ht to confrontation and eff ective a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l u

n d e r th e Si xth A me n dme n t a

n d h is c o n s ti tuti o n a l r igh t t o p r e sent a def ense unde r the Due Process Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt. We employ a bifurc ated revie w when dealing with constituti onal ruling s: “Althoug h we de fer to a trial cour

t’s deter mination of historical fac ts a

nd cre dibilit y , we revie w a constitutional leg al ruling . . . de novo.” W all v . S tate , 184 S.W .3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

First, Enrique z arg ues that the trial c ourt’s exclusion of the prior a lleg ation violated his Confrontation Clause rig hts. The Six th Amendment g uara ntees the r ight of

the a cc used to be confr onted with the witnesses a g ainst him. SeeU. S. Co ns t. A me nd . V I ; Davis v. Alaska , 415 U. S. 308, 315 (197 4 ). Acc ording to the court of c riminal appea ls, a “primar y interest sec ured by

the7

Confrontation Clause is the rig ht of cross- examination.” Lop e z v . S tate , 18 S.W .3d 220, 222 (T e x. Cr im
. App . 200 0) . Wh e n e vid e nti ary ru le s c on fl ic t w iththe de fe nd ant’ s r ig ht o f c ro ssexamination, “the Confrontation Clause will preva il.” Id.

Whil e some states ha

ve cr eate d a spec ial exception for prior f alse a ccusations of abuse in c ases involving sexual offens es , Texas has not done so. See id. at 223-24. Instead, the
co u rt o f c r i m i n a l ap p ea l s co u n s el s co u rt s t o ap p ro ac hs u ch i s s u es o na c as e- b y -c as e b as i s u s i n g a two-prong ed test: the def

endant must prese nt proof that the accusations were fa lse, and the prior a nd
curr ent ac cusations must be of a similar nature. Id. at 226.

Enriquez fails to me et the require ments of the first prong , that of pre senting proof that the prior accusation was false . Whil e def ense c ounsel argued to the trial c ourt that the alleg ations of phy sical abuse “re sulted in an investi g ation in which Mr. Enriquez was subseque ntly clea red,” the
rec ord does not provide any specific information about the ultimate resolution of the investig ation. The fa ct that cha

rg es we re dropped or the investigation suspende d does not amount to a showing that the alleg ations were false for the pur poses of the Lop e

z test. See id. at 226 (holding that fac t that
c a se inv olv ingpr ior a c c us a tio n wa s “ c los e d” wa s no t pr ob a tiv e of fa lse ho od

of a lle g a tio n, a s “ [t]his could simply

indicate a

lack of evid ence to prove the alleg ation at that time, or an a dminist rative decision that, despite the alleg ation’s validity , the parties would be best serve d by closing the ca se”) ;
se e als o Ga rc ia v . S

tate , 228 S.W .3d 703, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, pet. re f’d) (h old ingtha

t “ the fa c t th a t no c ha

rg e s we re fi le d a ft e r a po lic e inv e sti g a tio n” did no t pr ov e fa lsi ty of alleg ations under Lopez ).

Even if Enr iquez had prese nted proof of falsit y , h e never

theless fa ils to satis fy

the second pr ong , that of demonstrating the simil arity of the previous alleg ation to the curr ent alleg ation.Th e ri g ht t o p re se nt a d e fe ns e may be ro ote d in

the Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of the F ourt e e nth 4 Amendment or in the C ompulsory Process or Confrontation clause s of t he Six th Amendment. See United States v. Sc heffer , 523 U.S. 303, 329 n.16 (1998) (Steve ns, J ., dissenting)
. 8 See Lopez , 18 S.W .3d at 226. Enriquez pre sents almost no evidence linking the two a lleg ations. The
re c o r d s h o w s o n ly th a t th e p r io r an d c u r r e n t a ll e g a ti o n s w e r e ma d e b y D
. E
. a g a in s t E n r iq u e z, and that the first alleg ation conce rned phy s i ca l abuse, while the second a lleg ation conce rned se x ual abuse. U nrelated alleg ations of phy sical an d s ex u al abuse do not constitute a pattern of behavior sufficie nt to satisfy

the sec on d p ro n g of the Lop e z test. Id. (holding that complainant’s pr ior
acc usation of phy sical abuse by mother and curr ent allegation of sex ual abuse by defe ndant di d not have r equisite similarity). Ac cording ly , as Enrique z failed to provide adequate proof that the pr ior
a lle g a tio ns we re fa lse or

of a sim ila r n a tur e , h is C on fr on tatio n Cl a us e c ha lle ng e fa ils
. Second, Enrique z arg ues that the trial court’s exclusion of the prior a lleg ation denied him his Si x th Amendment rig ht to effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI . To preva i l o n an ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim, the de fenda nt must first show that counsel’s pe rfor

mance was de ficient. See Strick land v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 66 8 , 6 8 7 (1 9 84). Enri qu e z, h ow e ve r, pr ov ide s n o p ro of that c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e wa s def

ic ie nt, ins te a d b a sin g his argument on the ac tions of the trial court in exclu ding e vidence of the prior alleg ation. As such considerations have no bea ringon the issue of inef

fec tive assistance of counse l, and as Enr iquez offe rs no proof of

defic ient perf

ormanc e by

defe nse co u n sel, Enriquez’s cla im of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l fails under Strickland
.

Third, Enriquez ar g ues that the trial court’s exclusion of the prior a lleg ation denied him due proce ss by

preve nting him from pr esentinga def ense. Whil e the constitut ion gua rante es 4 criminal def

endants the r ight to pre sent a de fense , “state a nd fede ral rule maker s have br oad latitudeEnriquez does not c halleng e Texas Rule of Evidence 608(b), whic h disallows the use of 5 prior unconvic ted ac ts to im peac h the cr edibility of a w itness, as arbitra

ry . 9 under the Constit utio n to establish rules excluding e vidence from cr iminal trials.” United States v. Sche ffer , 5 2 3 U. S
. 3 0 3 , 3 0 8 (1 9 9 8 ). T h e S u p re m e C o u rt h as h el d

t h at s u ch ru l es “d o n o tab ri d ge
an ac cused’ s rig ht to present a de fense so long a s they are not ‘arbitra

ry ’ or ‘ disproportionate to the purp os e s th e y

are de sig ned to ser

ve ,’ ” and that su c h r

ule s r ise to a

c on sti tut ion a lly

imp e rm iss ibl e level only

when they

infring e “upon a

weig hty interest of the acc used.” Id. (qu o t i n g Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)).

I n interpre ting the r ight to pre sent a d ef en s e, the cour

t of criminal appe als has identified “two distinct sce narios” un d er wh i ch the right mig ht be abr idge d. See W ile yv . S tate , 74 S.W .3d 399, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)

. Th e fi rs t sc e na ri o c on c e rn s “ a

state e vid e nti ary

ru le wh ic h c a te g or ic a lly

and arb itr ari ly

pr oh ibi ts the de fe nd ant f

ro m of fe ri ngoth e rw ise re le va

nt, re lia ble evidenc e which is vital to his defe nse.” Id. Th e se c on d sc e na ri o ari se s wh e n “ a tr ia l c ourt ’s c le arl y
err oneous rulingexclud[ es] other wise rele vant, reliable evidenc e which ‘ forms such a vital portion
o f t h e ca s e that exclusion effec tively prec ludes the def

endant f rom prese nting a

defe nse.’” I

d. (q u o t i n g Po tie r v . S

tate , 68 S.W .3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). Under this stan d ard,

“ e rr on e ou s e vid e nti ary

r u l i n g s r a r e l y r i s e to t he le ve l of

de nyingthe fu

nd a me nta l c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts to present a

meaning ful defe nse.” Potier , 68 S.W .3d at 663. Enriquez argues that the c ourt’s er roneous e x clusion of evidenc e of the prior
acc usation preve nted him from pre senting his defense , as the main theor y of his defe nse involved dishonesty

on the part of t he complainant, D.E. Even a ssuming without decidingthat the trial cour t 5
err ed, the e x clusion of evidenc e in this case doe s not r i s e t o t h e l ev el of c onstitut ional err or. Enriquez was not pre cluded f rom prese nting the defe nse as a gene ral matter. For example, he wasI n particula r, Enriquez was able to off er the testimony

of D.E.’ s g randmother , who testified 6 that bo th D .E . a

nd L .E . h ave un tr

uth fu l c ha

ra c te rs . D e fe ns e c ouns e l als o had the op po rt un ity to d i r e c t l y c r o s s - e x am i n e D
. E
. a

b o u t an y p o t e n t i a l i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n h e r a l l e g a t i o nan d t e s t i m o n y . In addition, defe nse counse l was able to c ross-examine the numerous State witnesses who par ticipated in the investigation and spoke with D.E. or obse rved he r beha vior, including detec tives, crime- scene investigators, and medica l professionals. 10 a b l e t o p r e s e n t w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y c h a l l e n g i n g D
. E
. ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y. Fur ther, the prior alleg ation is of 6 dubious probative value . I n the abse nce of evidenc e of the falsity

of D.E.’ s previous alleg ation, the
mere fac t that it did not lead to adver se consequence s for Enriquez does not indicate that D.E. was
nece ssarily

dishonest in making the a lleg ation. Enriquez also argues that the e x clusion of evidenc e preve nted him from explaining the statements he ma de to his daug hter duringthe controlled calls. The inability to bring up the prior alleg ation at trial, Enr i quez maintains, prevente d him from adequately respondingto the State’s questio n s re gardinghis failure to c halleng e D.E.’ s direct state ments detailing Enriquez’s abusive acts, including , “You put y our di ck in my mouth.” He asserts on appea l that his “war iness” of the topic of conve rsation, br o u gh t ab o ut by D.E.’s prior

alleg ation, explains hi s responses to D.E.’ s state me nts . T he re is n o r e a so n to e xpe c t, ho we ve r, that the e xpe ri e nc e of a pr ior a lle g a tio n w ou ld make a person less likely to defe nd himself ag ainst a new alleg ation. I t is difficult, then, to see how evidenc e of D .E.’s prior a lleg ation would be re levant t o ex p lain Enriquez’s statements duringthe
c on tr oll e d c a ll. Fur

ther, Enr iquez was able to off er othe r ex planations to the jury . When questioned during cross-e x amination about what he meant whe n h e s aid that “it wouldn’t happe n any more,” Enri qu e z expl a ine d th a t he tho ug ht D .E . w a s ta lki nga bo ut b e ingte a se d b y

he r c la ssm a te s at sc ho ol. Enriquez was a lso able to make a passing ref

ere nce to the prior alleg ation. When asked if he knew11

whether D.E.’s a lleg ations car

ried ser ious consequenc es, he responde d, “Ye s, beca use she’ s made those claims bef

ore on phy sical abuse .” The jury rec ei v ed no limiting instruction reg ardingthat state me nt, and

we c an o nly

a ssume that the y c on sid e re d th a t f a c t, a lon g wi th a ll o f t

he oth e r f a c ts i n this case, whe n making the dec ision to convict Enriquez
. The re cord shows that Enriquez
was a ble to prese nt his defense , and conse quently En ri q u ez ’s argument fails to meet the constitutional standard.

As we c onclude that the trial court’s rulingdid not deny Enriquez his constituti onal ri g hts to c on fr on t w itn e sse s a g a ins t hi m, r e c e ive the effecti ve a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l, o r p re se nt a defe nse, Enrique z’s second point of er ror is over

ruled. Cross-Examination of L.E.

I n his third point of err or, Enriquez claims that the trial court err ed i n excluding evidenc e of the “spending patterns” of L .E., his w ife and the mother of the complainant. Under the Te xas R ule s o f E vid e nc e , e vid e nc e “ mus t satis fy tw o re qu ir e me nts to b e c on sid e re d r e le va nt: fi rs t, materia lity , and sec ond, probativene ss.” Mill er v. S tate , 36 S.W .3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 01 ); see also Tex. R. Evi d. 401-02. T o b e materia l, evidence must address “a ny fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction. I f the e vidence is offe red to he lp prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the e vidence is imm ater ial.” Miller , 36 S.W .2d at 507 (interna l citations and quotation marks omitted). Tria l court rulings on rele vance are revie wed f or abuse of discretion: “Que stions of releva nce should be left l ar gely to the trial court, r elying on its own observations and experience , and will not be reve rsed a bsent an a buse of discr etion.” Br own v . S tate ,12

96 S.W .3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (quoting Mo re no v . S tate , 858 S.W .2d 453, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)) (interna l quotation marks omitted).

At trial , d ef

ense c ounsel, afte r conf

irming that L .E. had told a de tective that she sta rt e d w or kin g a t a str ip c lub du e to d ebt s th at he r h us ba nd ha d in c ur

re d, a sk e d, “ Ho w muc h d id y our bre ast implants cost? ” The State objected on rele vance g rounds, and the tr ial judge sustained the ob je c tio n, re min din g de fe ns e c ouns e l, “ Th is i s a c hil d mo le sti ngc a se . Okay
. Th is is a c hil d molesting c ase.”

Enri qu e z ar g ue s th a t thi s te sti mony re buts the State ’s po rt ra y a l of him a s a “ re c kle ss sp e nd e r. ” Ev e n in

lig ht o f t his ass ert ion , th e amou

nt o f L .E .’ s e xpe nd iture s f or br e a st i mpl ants is not material, a s such information does not a ddress a ny “matter in issue” in this, a sex ual assault ca se. Th e tr ial c ourt

a c te d w e ll w ith in i ts d isc re tio n in ru lin g that su c h e vid e nc e wa s n ot r e le va nt. Consequently , Enriquez’s third point of err or is overr uled.

CO NC LU SION B e c a us e we fi nd

no re ve rs ibl e e rr or , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Waldrop and He nson Affir med Filed: Oc tober 23, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh