PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

PETER DAUSEN MUNIS, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 12-9593 

 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION FROM 

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 

 

Submitted on the briefs:*

Peter Dausen Munis, Pro Se. 

Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, William C. Peachey, Assistant 

Director, Lindsay Corliss, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil 

Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. 

 

Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and EBEL, Circuit 

Judge. 

 

 

 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 2, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge. 

 

 Petitioner Peter Dausen Munis, who appears in this court pro se, is a native of 

Rwanda and a citizen of Tanzania. He appeals from an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) that dismissed his administrative appeal from an order of 

the immigration judge (IJ) denying his requests for discretionary relief from removal. 

We dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. 

 Petitioner entered the United States as a nonimmigrant student in 1999. He 

stopped attending school and got a job without authorization, which led to the 

initiation of removal proceedings against him in 2006 for failing to maintain his 

nonimmigrant status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). The government presented 

evidence of petitioner’s criminal history, which began in 2000. Petitioner conceded 

the charge of removability but sought discretionary relief from removal. He sought 

adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 based on his 2003 marriage to a United 

States citizen. But because one of his convictions constituted a crime involving 

moral turpitude, making him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), he 

also sought a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B), based on 

alleged extreme hardship to his wife, if he is removed. In the alternative to relief 

from removal, he requested voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. The IJ 

denied petitioner any relief, and the BIA dismissed his administrative appeal. 

 Construing petitioner’s brief broadly in light of his pro se status, see Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), he challenges the agency’s denial of 
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a waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of status, the agency’s hardship 

determination in connection with those denials, and the agency’s denial of voluntary 

departure. All of these decisions are discretionary and generally not subject to 

judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We have jurisdiction to review 

“constitutional claims or questions of law,” see id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), but we take a 

“restrictive view of § 1252(a)(2)(D),” Shepherd v. Holder, 678 F.3d 1171, 1179-80 

(10th Cir. 2012). We have held, for example, that reviewable questions of law 

include the interpretation of treaties and certain issues regarding statutory 

construction. Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1019 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007). 

But we have also held that “a challenge to the agency’s discretionary and fact-finding 

exercises cloaked in constitutional garb . . . remain[s] outside the scope of judicial 

review.” Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 The agency’s discretionary denial of a waiver of inadmissibility or adjustment 

of status is unreviewable in the absence of a legal or constitutional question. 

Schroeck v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 947, 950-51 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the explicit 

jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as qualified by § 1252(a)(2)(D)). 

 We have never held specifically that the hardship determination underlying the 

denial of a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) is an 

unreviewable discretionary decision, although two of our sister circuits have. 

See Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); 
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Rodrígues-Nascimento v. Gonzáles, 485 F.3d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 2007); cf. Bugayong v. 

INS, 442 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting that an IJ’s hardship 

determination, as previously held under circumstances analogous to § 1182(h), “is 

itself a discretionary determination that we have no jurisdiction to review”); 

Camara v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 497 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) 

(reaffirming that the hardship determination for a waiver of inadmissibility under 

§ 1182(i) is an unreviewable discretionary decision). 

 We now hold based on existing Tenth Circuit law that the hardship 

determination required for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 1182(h)(1)(B) is an 

unreviewable discretionary decision. We have previously observed that “8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(h)(2) provides that ‘[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of 

the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver [of inadmissibility] under this 

subsection.’” Schroeck, 429 F.3d at 950 (quoting § 1182(h)(2)). And considering a 

similar hardship issue, we have held that the agency’s hardship determination for 

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b “involved an exercise of discretion 

insulated from our review under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” Alzainati v. Holder, 568 F.3d 

844, 848 (10th Cir. 2009). Sections 1182(h) and 1229b are both listed in the explicit 

jurisdictional bar for the agency’s discretionary decisions in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). In 

addition, this court has noted generally that “challenges directed solely at the 

agency’s discretionary and factual determinations remain outside the scope of 

judicial review.” Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir. 2006) 
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(discussing the exception to the discretionary decision bar in § 1252(a)(2)(B) for 

legal and constitutional questions under § 1252(a)(2)(D)). Accordingly, we may not 

review the agency’s hardship determination in this case. 

 The agency’s decision not to grant voluntary departure is also discretionary 

and outside our jurisdiction in the absence of a constitutional or legal question. 

Kechkar, 500 F.3d at 1083. 

 Petitioner’s brief on appeal cannot be read to raise any discernible legal or 

constitutional question that would fall within this court’s jurisdiction under 

§ 1252(a)(2)(D). As a result, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision. 

 The petition for review is dismissed.