2006 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-12-2006

Koger v. Kaplan Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 05-3375

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Recommended Citation

"Koger v. Kaplan Inc" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 756.

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1

EPS-21 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 05-3375

________________

TODD ELLIOTT KOGER,

 Appellant

vs.

KAPLAN INC., d/b/a KAPLAN UNIVERSITY; KAPLAN COLLEGE; 

KAPLAN COLLEGE .COM, AND/OR; CONCORD UNIVERSITY OF LAW

_____________

On Appeal From the United States District Court

For the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00434)

District Judge: Honorable Judge David S. Cercone

_____________________________________

Submitted For Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

January 25, 2006

Before: FISHER, ALDISERT AND WEIS, Circuit Judges.

Filed: July 12, 2006 

_______________________

 OPINION

_______________________

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Todd Elliot Koger, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing

his pro se civil rights complaint. Upon consideration of the record, we conclude that the

appeal presents no arguable issues of fact or law. Thus, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2

In March 2005, Koger filed the underlying complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

together with a motion seeking a temporary restraining order, alleging that he was

unconstitutionally denied readmission into an online law school program. As noted by

the District Court, Koger’s allegations were essentially predicated on same events and

circumstances underlying a nearly identical action docketed at W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 03-cv01400. That action was dismissed by the District Court with judgment being entered in

favor of the named defendants. We affirmed that judgment. See C.A. No. 05-3702.

As the District Court correctly pointed out, the only new averment of legal

significance is one alleging that defendants have refused to respond to Koger’s numerous

“petitions” for readmission, purportedly on the basis of his failure to comply with an

e:mail directive from Associate Dean Cassandra Colchagoff indicating that appellant

include in his readmission application a statement noting that he “understand[s] the nature

and severity of the actions that led to [his] suspension and what actions [he] will take to

avoid further violations.” Koger alleges that this requirement of readmission is an act of

retaliation for his complaints of race discrimination, and amounts to a violation of

numerous constitutional, statutory and common law rights.

The District Court, however, concluded that Koger’s complaint fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted or is otherwise based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory. We agree. The District Court correctly determined that, because

the record in civil action 03-cv-01400 establishes that Koger could not prevail against
defendants on his claims of discrimination based on the events leading to his suspension,

it follows that they cannot be held to have violated his constitutional or statutory rights by

simply requiring him to seek readmission in accordance with Concord’s applicable school

policies and procedures, which are neutral and rational on their face. We further agree

with the District Court’s determination that the mere repeated denials of readmission

petitions, in and of itself themselves, do not provide a basis for a federal cause of action.

Accordingly, we will dismiss appellant’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B), as it is lacking in legal merit. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).