[Cite as Hall v. Hall, 2017-Ohio-447.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Aimee Hall (n.k.a. Mounts), : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 

v. : 

 No. 16AP-480 

Dennie Hall, Jr., : (C.P.C. No. 12DR-0894)

 Defendant-Appellee, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Joshua Cohill, : 

 

 Third-Party : 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on February 7, 2017 

 

On brief: Don Roberts Law Offices, Donald W. Roberts, 

and David R. Plumb, for appellee Aimee Hall (n.k.a. 

Mounts). 

On brief: Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 

Jacqueline L. Kemp, and Lauren A. Kemp, for appellant. 

Argued: Jacqueline L. Kemp.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. 

{¶ 1} Third-party defendant-appellant, Joshua Cohill, appeals from a judgment of 

the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, granting the 

Civ.R. 60(B) motion of plaintiff-appellee, Aimee Hall (n.k.a. Mounts), and disestablishing 

the father-child relationship between defendant-appellee, Dennie Hall, Jr. ("Hall"), and 

minor child, E.H. For the following reasons, we reverse.
No. 16AP-480 2 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} In November 2003, Mounts gave birth to E.H. Before E.H. was born, in 

utero DNA testing established a zero percent probability that Hall was the natural 

(biological) father of the child. In July 2005, Mounts and Hall married, and two children 

were born as issue of the marriage. The paternity of those two children is not at issue. On 

January 3, 2009, Hall signed an acknowledgment of paternity affirming his status as 

E.H.'s natural father. Ten days later, the acknowledgment was filed with the central 

paternity registry. 

{¶ 3} In March 2012, Mounts filed a complaint for divorce. In July 2012, the trial 

court filed an agreed judgment entry – decree of divorce, which included a finding that 

Hall and Mounts are the parents of E.H. The trial court also filed a shared parenting 

decree, incorporating an agreed shared parenting plan that granted Mounts and Hall 

shared care, custody, and control of E.H. and their other two children. 

{¶ 4} In March 2016, Mounts filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate the divorce 

decree and the shared parenting decree. Mounts alleged that relief was appropriate 

because the trial court had been fraudulently misled regarding the paternity of E.H. In 

April 2016, Hall filed a memorandum in opposition to Mounts' Civ.R. 60(B) motion, 

asserting that relief was inappropriate because Mounts herself engaged in fraudulent 

conduct regarding the paternity of E.H. On May 25, 2016, the trial court filed an agreed 

judgment entry, granting Mounts' Civ.R. 60(B) motion and disestablishing the fatherchild relationship between Hall and E.H. In conjunction with filing the agreed judgment 

entry, the trial court filed amended decrees, which omitted E.H.'s name as one of Mounts 

and Hall's children. 

{¶ 5} On June 15, 2016, Joshua Cohill, whom Mounts has sued in juvenile court 

in an effort to establish his paternity as to E.H., filed a motion to intervene as of right. 

The next day, Cohill filed a motion to set aside the agreed judgment entry. On June 22, 

2016, the trial court granted Cohill's motion to intervene. Two days later, Cohill filed a 

notice of appeal. 

 
No. 16AP-480 3 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 6} Cohill assigns the following errors for our review: 

[1.] The trial court's adoption of the parties' agreed judgment 

entry granting appellees' request for relief and disestablishing 

paternity constitutes an abuse of discretion. 

[2.] The trial court's adoption of the parties' agreed judgment 

entry granting appellees' request for relief and disestablishing 

paternity without considering applicable statutory provisions 

constituted an abuse of discretion. 

[3.] The trial court's adoption of the parties' agreed judgment 

entry granting appellees' request for relief and disestablishing 

paternity without considering the best interests of the minor 

child constituted an abuse of discretion. 

III. Discussion 

A. Cohill's Standing to Appeal 

{¶ 7} Mounts has raised the issue of whether Cohill has standing to appeal the 

trial court's judgment granting Mounts' Civ.R. 60(B) motion and disestablishing Hall's 

paternity of E.H. "Appeal lies only on behalf of a party aggrieved by the final order 

appealed from." Ohio Contract Carriers Assn., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 140 Ohio St. 160 

(1942), syllabus. A party is aggrieved, and thus has standing to appeal, if (1) he has a 

present interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and (2) he has been prejudiced by 

the judgment of the trial court. Willoughby Hills v. C. C. Bar's Sahara, Inc., 64 Ohio 

St.3d 24, 26 (1992); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Jacobs, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-343, 2012-

Ohio-64, ¶ 7. A future, contingent or speculative interest will not confer standing to 

appeal. Ohio Contract Carriers Assn., Inc. at 161; Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. 

Deerfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174 (2001). 

{¶ 8} Cohill, who became a party in this divorce action when the trial court 

granted his motion to intervene, was aggrieved by the trial court's judgment granting 

Mounts' Civ.R. 60(B) motion and disestablishing Hall's paternity of E.H. It is undisputed 

that Mounts has sued Cohill in juvenile court, alleging his paternity of E.H. It is also 

undisputed that Hall's paternity of E.H. became final and enforceable in 2009, based on 

his signing of the acknowledgment of paternity. Thus, the disestablishment of Hall's 
No. 16AP-480 4 

paternity of E.H. precludes Cohill from challenging his alleged paternity of the child in the 

juvenile court case on the basis that Hall was already established as her father. Because 

Cohill is a party aggrieved by the agreed judgment entry, he has standing in this appeal to 

challenge that judgment. 

B. Trial Court's Disestablishment of Hall's Paternity of E.H. 

{¶ 9} We address Cohill's first, second, and third assignments of error together 

because they are interrelated. All three assignments of error allege that the trial court 

erred in disestablishing Hall's paternity of E.H. We agree.

{¶ 10} In Ohio, parentage is primarily governed by statute. S.N. v. M.B., 188 Ohio 

App.3d 324, 2010-Ohio-2479, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). The father-child relationship may be 

legally established in Ohio by an acknowledgment of paternity. See R.C. 3111.20 to 

3111.35. An acknowledgment of paternity occurs when a man affirms under oath, on a 

government prescribed form, that he is the natural father of the named child. See 

R.C. 3111.31. Pursuant to R.C. 3111.25, an acknowledgement of paternity becomes final 

and enforceable without ratification of the court when the acknowledgement has been 

entered into the birth registry and the 60-day time period for rescission under R.C. 

3111.27 has passed. Clark v. Malicote, 12th Dist. No. CA2010-07-049, 2011-Ohio-1874, 

¶ 12, fn. 3. After the acknowledgment of paternity becomes final, the acknowledgment 

may be rescinded pursuant to R.C. 3111.28 on the basis of fraud, duress, or material 

mistake of fact. An action under R.C. 3111.28, however, must be filed within one year of 

the acknowledgment becoming final.

{¶ 11} R.C. 3119.962 provides an additional mechanism to rescind an 

acknowledgment, but unlike R.C. 3111.28, this statute does not contain a temporal filing 

restriction. Pursuant to R.C. 3119.962, a court may grant relief from a final paternity 

determination, in the form of an acknowledgment of paternity that has become final, if 

genetic testing shows no probability that the person who acknowledged paternity is the 

natural father of the child. Angus v. Angus, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-742, 2015-Ohio-2538, 

¶ 20. However, a court may not grant relief pursuant to R.C. 3119.962 when the evidence 

shows that the person knew he was not the natural father at the time he acknowledged 

paternity. Keathley v. Keathley, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-901, 2016-Ohio-5296, ¶ 20, citing 

R.C. 3119.962(B).
No. 16AP-480 5 

{¶ 12} Considering the undisputed facts of this case, we find the trial court erred by 

disestablishing the father-child relationship between Hall and E.H. Hall knew he was not 

the father of E.H. in 2003 when in utero DNA testing demonstrated a zero percent 

probability that he was the child's natural father. Despite this knowledge, Hall signed the 

acknowledgment of paternity in 2009 affirming that he was the child's natural father. 

Hall's acknowledgment of paternity became final and enforceable in 2009, and no action 

was filed under R.C. 3111.28 alleging the acknowledgment of paternity was the result of 

fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. Furthermore, because Hall willingly assumed 

legal paternity of E.H., with knowledge that he was not the child's natural father, the trial 

court was precluded from disestablishing his paternity pursuant to R.C. 3119.962.

{¶ 13} Because the trial court erred in disestablishing Hall's paternity of E.H., we 

sustain Cohill's first, second, and third assignments of error.

IV. Disposition 

{¶ 14} Having sustained Cohill's first, second, and third assignments of error, we 

reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of 

Domestic Relations, and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings in 

accordance with law and consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed; 

cause remanded. 

KLATT and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.