IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON SEPTEMBER 1999 SESSION
AARO N T. JAMES, ) ) NO. W1998-00463-CCA -R3-PC Appellant ) ) SHELBY COUNTY No. P-16158 VS. ) ) HON. W. FRED AXLEY, STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT : LINDA KEND

ALL GA RNER 50 North Front Street, Sui te 780 Memphis, TN 38103-1104 FOR THE APPEL LEE : PAUL G. SUMMERS Attorney General and Repor ter GEORGIA BLY

THE FELNER Assistant Attorney Gener al Cordell Hull Buildi ng, 2nd Floor 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 WILLIAM L. GIBBONS District Attorney General RHEA CLIFT SPEAKE Assistant

District Attorney

General 201 Poplar Ave. Suite 301 Memphis, TN 38103-1947

OPINION FI LED:
AFFIRMED -

RULE 20 ORDER JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE 

# FILED December 28, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk2 O R D E R Appellant, AARON T. JAMES, appeals the de nial of his petition for postconviction relief. On December 15, 1994, appellant pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agree ment , to the Class A felonies of especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping and seco nd degree murder. Appellant received Range I sentences of twenty-five years for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. He received a Range III pers istent offender sentence of fifty y ears for second degree murder. The se ntences were ordered to r un concurrently.
On Decembe r 15, 199

5, appel lant fil ed a peti tion fo r post -convi ction r elief. The petition claimed that his pl ea was involuntary and without understanding of the consequences of such a plea. It also alleged ineffective assistance of counse l. After an evidentiary hear ing, the post-convic

tion court denied relief. One of appellant's co-defendants was tried prior to the ap pellant's guilty plea. Trial counsel testified that she attended each day of the trial and talked with appellant about ea

ch of the witnes

ses pre sented. Appell ant's c o-defe nda nt received a sentence of life for first degree murder, plus fifty years consecutiv

ely on the other charges. Trial c ounsel advised appellant of possible sentences he could receive if convicted at tr ial, as well as the f ull range of punishment based upon the guilty plea. In the presence of his family, she charted the difference in sentences on a piece of paper for t he def endant and explained to him w hen he would be eligible for parole under the sentences offere d versus the se ntenc es he could receive if he proceeded to trial. Appellanttestified that his atto rney never expla ined the ranges of punishment to him, and he did not

understand he was pleading outside of his Range I standard offender status for second degree murder . He claimed that he was a high school drop-out and did not understand the math involv ed in calculating his potential sentence.
How ever, at the guilty plea hear ing, appellant indicated he understood h e was agreeing t o serve fifty years as a persistent offender at forty-fiv e percent for the3

charge of second degree murder. At the post -conviction hearing, when asked w hy he did not ask questions about his sentence when he was giv en the o pportun ity, the appellant replied, “I di dn’t want to be bothered w ith them at the time.”
A review of the record

shows that the

trial judge clearly advised appellant of h i s rights at the guilt

y plea hearing. She specifically asked defendant if he understood the charges against him and the Range III sentence he was receiving for second degree murder. The appell ant had ample opportunity to ask questions or express any dissat isfaction with the plea agreement and its terms. We also note appellant was indicted for first degree murder; therefore, a Range III sentence for second degree murder was pr oper under

the plea agreement. See State v. Mahler
. 735 S.W. 2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987).
The post-conviction judg e conducted a full evidentiary hear ing and entered an excellent writt

en order of findings of fact and conc lusio ns of law. He found appellant's plea to be both kno wing and volu ntary a nd coun sel's representation effective. The evidence does not preponderate against these findings. Appellant's claims are without meri t.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tenness ee Court of Criminal Appeals. It appear ing that the appellant is indigent, costs shall be taxed to the State.
So ordered. Enter:

____________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE

CONCUR:

____________________________ DAVID G. HA

YES, JUDGE

____________________________ THOMAS T. WOOD

ALL, JUDGE