44458 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 143 / Tuesday, July 26, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

fuel after the engines were shut down. 

This release of fuel is caused by 

unexpected elevated fuel manifold 

pressures that result in the release of 

fuel from the fuel nozzles. Under certain 

atmospheric conditions this release of 

fuel results in a visible vapor. This 

event was not observed during the GEnx 

engine’s certification testing under 14 

CFR part 33, but only after it was 

installed and operated on the subject 

airplanes. 

Following these observations, the 

FAA reconsidered how the provisions of 

§ 34.11 should be applied under the 

circumstances of these certifications. A 

review of the history of the section 

found that it was promulgated in 1973 

in response to short-sighted 

environmental practices of the time, 

including the routine dumping of up to 

a gallon of raw fuel onto the ground 

after engines were shut down. The 

general prohibition in § 34.11 is stated 

in the first sentence of that section, that 

‘‘[n]o fuel venting emissions shall be 

discharged into the atmosphere from 

any new or in-use aircraft gas turbine 

engine subject to the subpart.’’ The 

second sentence appears to condition 

this prohibition, stating that ‘‘[t]his 

paragraph is directed at the elimination 

of intentional discharge to the 

atmosphere of fuel drained from fuel 

nozzle manifolds after engines are shut 

down and does not apply to normal fuel 

seepage from shaft seals, joints, and 

fittings.’’ The language of the second 

sentence presents a unique situation in 

aircraft certification by introducing the 

concept of intent, without clearly 

referencing where the intent attaches. 

The second sentence also specifies three 

locations where ‘‘seepage’’ is considered 

normal and acceptable. 

Historically, application of § 34.11 has 

not been an issue. Aircraft engines 

designed since promulgation of the rule 

have not included any means by which 

fuel is collected and dispersed outside 

the engine after shutdown. The GEnx 

engines at issue do not release fuel from 

the three locations noted in the 

regulation—shaft seals, joints, or 

fittings. Nor does the amount of fuel or 

the manner in which it is being released 

rise to the level of historical fuel 

dumping that prompted the adoption of 

the regulation in 1973. Yet, small 

quantities of fuel (up to 5.5 ounces) are 

being released intermittently under 

certain conditions, and the fuel is being 

vaporized on contact with hot surfaces 

inside the engine, resulting in the 

visible fuel vapors that have been 

observed when they emit from either the 

inlet or exit plane of the engine. 

The new engines incorporate 

technological advances and 

environmental performance 

improvements that were never 

envisioned when the original regulation 

was adopted in 1973. These factors have 

made it more difficult to reconcile the 

design and function of these engines in 

a certification context with a 38-year-old 

regulation that was aimed at a different 

set of circumstances. Application of the 

current regulation has become less clear 

in this context. 

With the cooperation of the 

equipment manufacturers, the FAA 

investigated the safety and 

environmental effects of the fuel release 

and vaporization. The FAA consulted 

with the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) on the local air quality 

impacts. While we were satisfied that no 

safety and minimal environmental 

effects are evident, we remain 

concerned about compliance with the 

intent of the current regulation, and the 

inability of the current regulation to be 

unambiguously applied to the 

certification situation. 

The FAA has determined that the best 

course of action is to allow the current 

certification of these engine/airframe 

combinations. The certification basis 

includes requirements that the 

manufacturers develop and install 

modifications that will eliminate these 

intermittent fuel releases and observed 

vapors that have been experienced 

during certification testing. These 

modifications will apply to newly 

manufactured airplanes by December 

31, 2012, and in-use airplanes by 

December 31, 2014. 

The technological advances 

incorporated in these engines allow 

them to more than exceed the separate 

regulatory requirements for emissions 

that are the focus of current 

environmental compliance efforts. The 

FAA will re-examine the language of the 

fuel venting regulation and its 

application during certification to 

determine whether it needs to be 

changed to address issues associated 

with newer technologies. We may 

consult with the EPA on whether to 

propose changes to § 34.11 and its 

companion regulation at 40 CFR 87.11. 

We will also consider whether more 

flexibility in application of the 

regulation is appropriate based on the 

experience gained during this 

certification. The decision to proceed 

with certification of the subject 

airframe/engine combinations is an 

effort to acknowledge the lack of clarity 

in the application of the regulation to 

the specific circumstances encountered. 

The requirement to modify the aircraft 

is intended to prevent any retrenchment 

from the original regulatory intent. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on July 14, 

2011. 

Lourdes Q. Maurice, 

Executive Director, Office of Environment and 

Energy. 

[FR Doc. 2011–18191 Filed 7–25–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0402; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–165–AD; Amendment 

39–16760; AD 2011–16–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Model 747 Airplanes and 

Model 767 Airplanes Equipped With 

General Electric Model CF6–80C2 or 

CF6–80A Series Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD requires 

revising the airplane flight manual 

(AFM) to advise the flightcrew to use 

certain procedures during descent in 

certain icing conditions. This AD was 

prompted by reports of several in-flight 

engine flameouts, including multiple 

dual engine flameout events and one 

total power loss event, in ice-crystal 

icing conditions. We are issuing this AD 

to ensure that the flightcrew has the 

proper procedures to follow in certain 

icing conditions. These certain icing 

conditions could cause a multiple 

engine flameout during flight with the 

potential inability to restart the engines, 

and consequent forced landing of the 

airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective August 30, 

2011. 

ADDRESSES:

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 


wreier-aviles on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 143 / Tuesday, July 26, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 44459 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; phone: 425– 

917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; e-mail: 

rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) to 

amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an 

airworthiness directive (AD) that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

SNPRM published in the Federal 

Register on August 4, 2010 (75 FR 

46868). The original NPRM (73 FR 

18721, April 7, 2008) proposed to 

require revising the airplane flight 

manual (AFM) to advise the flightcrew 

to use certain procedures during descent 

in certain icing conditions. The SNPRM 

proposed to revise the original NPRM by 

revising the text of the proposed AFM 

revision. 

Other Relevant Rulemaking 

Related AD 2010–16–03, Amendment 

39–16379 (75 FR 47203, August 5, 

2010), requires similar actions for Model 

MD–11 and MD–11F airplanes, 

certificated in any category, equipped 

with General Electric (GE) CF6–80C2 

series engines. These airplanes have 

been determined to be subject to the 

identified unsafe condition addressed in 

this AD. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Request To Withdraw SNPRM 

While GE Aviation (GE) recognized 

that the FAA has the ultimate 

responsibility in evaluating and 

declaring the existence of an unsafe 

condition, GE disagreed that an unsafe 

condition is likely to exist and refuted 

the FAA’s basis for its determination. 

GE pointed out that there has never 

been a Model CF6–80C2 engine that has 

failed to relight rapidly, and that this 

fact is significant in that this is different 

from the field experience for some other 

turbofan engines of different design. GE 

pointed out that Note 11 of FAAapproved Type Certificate Data Sheet 

E13NE for Model CF6–80A engines 

includes the following statement: 

‘‘* * * momentary N1 excursions below 

40%, not to exceed 60 seconds 

durations, are permissible for approach 

and landing operation below 10,000 feet 

pressure altitude.’’ For these reasons, GE 

contended that the data prove that a 

forced landing is extremely improbable, 

and, while the proposed changes in the 

SNPRM will provide additional margin 

against rare inclement weather-related 

flameouts, GE did not believe that the 

proposed changes should be mandated. 

GE also agreed that, while there might 

be variation in operational costs among 

operators and a relatively small cost 

impact on an individual per-flight basis, 

there is a cumulative impact when 

applied to the more than 1,000 airplanes 

in the worldwide fleet. GE estimated 

that the proposed procedures would 

result in an environmental burden of 

tens of millions of pounds of carbon 

dioxide per year (estimate assumes an 

additional 50 gallons of fuel per flight 

× 20 pounds of carbon dioxide per 

gallon of fuel × 600,000 flights a year × 

an estimated 10 percent of flight 

descents in visible moisture). So, while 

the bleed does add some projected event 

rate benefit in certain circumstances, GE 

believes the extremely improbable rate 

of dual engine flameouts coupled with 

the adverse environmental impact 

outweigh the benefits of the proposed 

AFM procedure. 

From these statements, we infer that 

GE requests that we withdraw the 

NPRM. We do not agree. We have 

evaluated the unsafe condition and find 

that sufficient data exist to demonstrate 

that certain icing conditions that cause 

the engine flameout could also cause 

engine damage that potentially would 

prevent an engine from relighting. The 

condition could exist on all of an 

airplane’s engines, resulting in a forced 

landing. We have determined that an 

unsafe condition exists, and the 

appropriate vehicle for correcting an 

unsafe condition is an AD. These safety 

concerns must be addressed, even in 

light of the environmental impact. We 

have not changed the AD regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Clarify Additional Flameout 

Event on Model 747 Airplane 

GE referred to the ‘‘Actions Since 

Original NPRM Was Issued’’ section of 

the SNPRM, particularly the report of 

another significant flameout event on a 

Model 747 airplane. GE believes the 

mentioned event was actually a 

temporary power loss event that 

occurred in 2007, and that no more 

recent multi-engine inclement-weatherrelated events have occurred on a CF6- 

powered Model 747 airplane. 

We agree to clarify. Any time a 

transport category airplane experiences 

power loss events resulting from a 

common cause on multiple engines, we 

consider it a significant event. Flameout 

events do cause power loss, but can also 

cause adverse engine operation, which 

can include engine stall and power 

rollback. Certain icing conditions that 

lead to flameouts could also cause 

compressor damage, preventing the 

engine from relighting. Loss of a single 

engine affects other aircraft systems— 

hydraulic, pressurization, and 

electrical—all of which are supplied by 

engine-driven components. There are 

backup systems, but relighting an 

engine in flight can still be difficult 

because of the distracting secondary 

effects of losing power. A multi-engine 

flameout compounds these factors. In 

November 2007, the airplane in the 

subject report sustained three multiengine flameouts, including, at one 

point, a three-engine flameout. This 

multi-engine flameout event developed 

into much more than a simple power 

loss event. We have not changed the AD 

in this regard. 

Request To Allow Use of Automatic 

Activation of Anti-Ice Systems 

UPS asserted that the proposed AFM 

revision does not address airplanes with 

automatic anti-ice systems. UPS 

confirmed that a portion of their fleet is 

equipped with automatic nacelle and 

wing anti-ice systems, and questioned 

whether setting these systems in the 

‘‘auto’’ position will satisfy the 

requirement to have nacelle and wing 

anti-ice systems on during descent. 

From these statements, we infer that 

UPS is requesting that we revise the 

SNPRM to allow operators with 

airplanes equipped with automatic antiice systems to use the ‘‘auto’’ setting in 

lieu of manually activating the anti-ice 

systems. We do not agree. Automatic 

anti-ice systems or primary in-flight ice 

detection systems have been effective in 

detecting typical icing conditions, but 

they do not have the capability to detect 

ice-crystal icing. Therefore, the anti-ice 

systems would not be activated during 

these icing encounters, and would not 

provide an adequate level of safety in 

lieu of manual anti-ice activation in icecrystal icing conditions. We have made 

no change to the final rule in this 

regard. 

Requests To Revise AFM Procedure To 

Qualify Weather Conditions 

Delta Airlines (Delta) requested that 

we revise the proposed AFM procedure 

to add the qualifier, ‘‘when near 

convective weather systems, including 

thunderstorms.’’ Japan Airlines (JAL) 

also requested that we include a similar 

statement. Delta stated that it 


wreier-aviles on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with RULES
44460 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 143 / Tuesday, July 26, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

understands that the risk of flameout 

due to ice-crystal icing occurs only 

when the airplane is near convective 

weather systems, and explained that its 

flightcrews can recognize nearby 

convective weather. Delta contended 

that revising the AFM procedure to 

allow flightcrews to activate nacelle 

anti-ice when convective weather is 

near would prevent the unnecessary 

increase in fuel burn and overuse of 

engine anti-ice when engine flameouts 

due to ice crystals are not factors. JAL 

reasoned that, because operating the 

anti-ice systems increases the crew 

workload and fuel consumption, the 

weather conditions that require use of 

the anti-ice systems should be limited to 

areas where there is technical benefit of 

preventing engine flameout. 

We do not agree. Ice-crystal icing does 

typically occur in or near convective 

weather. However, this type of icing 

does not appear on radar due to its low 

reflectivity, and neither the airplane ice 

detectors nor visual indications indicate 

the presence of this type of icing 

condition. Service experience has 

demonstrated that flightcrews are not 

always able to differentiate between icecrystal icing that causes engine flameout 

and other types of visible moisture that 

typically do not lead to engine 

flameouts. Therefore, relying on 

flightcrews to recognize the necessary 

weather conditions might not provide 

an adequate level of safety. We have not 

changed the final rule in this regard. 

Additionally, in regard to JAL’s 

statement that anti-ice system operation 

increases fuel consumption, we have 

determined that the additional fuel burn 

necessitated by the AFM procedure 

would not be significant enough to 

warrant removal of the requirement to 

use anti-ice under certain conditions. 

However, as we explain under 

‘‘Requests to Allow Deactivation of 

Anti-ice Systems When Icing No Longer 

Exists,’’ we have revised the procedure 

to allow anti-icing systems to be 

deactivated when the subject icing 

conditions no longer exist. This 

allowance will further reduce any 

additional fuel burn caused by the use 

of the anti-ice system. 

Request for Additional Revision of 

AFM Procedure 

JAL further requested that we revise 

the proposed AFM procedure to remove 

‘‘the wing anti-ice operation below 

22,000 ft and above TAT 10 degree C.’’ 

JAL explained that, in Asia, where most 

of the engine flameout events occurred, 

the total air temperature (TAT) at 22,000 

feet is around 8 °Celsius (C) according 

to standard calculations, and that the 

ground temperature in southern Asia is 

estimated to be 32 °C. JAL further 

explained that static air temperature 

(SAT) decreases 2 degrees per every 

1,000 feet; therefore, the SAT at 22,000 

feet is ¥12 °C. Therefore, JAL states 

that, considering +20 °C ram effect in 

descent speed, TAT at 22,000 feet is 

approximately 8 °C. For these reasons, 

and because the flightcrew would be 

required to turn the anti-ice systems on 

and off in a very short time, JAL stated 

it believes that the use of wing anti-ice 

systems should not be included in the 

proposed AFM procedure, especially 

given the additional crew workload and 

the probability of a flameout. 

We agree that clarification is 

necessary. It is not our intent to require 

activation of the wing anti-ice system at 

temperatures above TAT 10 °C. The 

required AFM procedure specified in 

this AD requires use of the anti-ice 

systems only when in visible moisture 

and a TAT of less than 10 °C. As 

explained under ‘‘Requests to Allow 

Deactivation of Anti-ice Systems When 

Icing No Longer Exists,’’ we have 

revised the required AFM procedure to 

allow anti-icing systems to be turned off 

when the specified icing conditions are 

no longer present or anticipated. No 

further change to this AD is necessary 

in this regard. 

Requests To Allow Deactivation of 

Anti-Ice Systems When Icing No Longer 

Exists 

Boeing and GE requested that we 

revise the proposed AFM procedure to 

allow anti-icing systems to be 

deactivated when the subject icing 

conditions no longer exist. Boeing and 

GE contended that this change would 

provide clarity and consistency with 

related rulemaking on Model MD–11 

airplanes. 

We agree. We have determined that 

there is no additional benefit to having 

the nacelle and wing anti-ice switched 

on once icing conditions are no longer 

present or anticipated. Therefore, we 

have revised the AFM text provided in 

paragraph (g) of this final rule 

accordingly. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of the AD. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD interim action. If 

final action is later identified, we might 

consider further rulemaking then. 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 1,064 airplanes of the 

affected design in the worldwide fleet. 

The following table provides the 

estimated costs for U.S. operators to 

comply with this AD. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours 

Average 

labor rate 

per hour 

Parts Cost per 

airplane 

Number 

of U.S.- 

registered 

airplanes 

Fleet cost 

AFM revision .................................................................... 1 $85 $0 $85 340 $28,900 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 


wreier-aviles on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 143 / Tuesday, July 26, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 44461 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2011–16–02 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–16760; Docket No. 

FAA–2008–0402; Directorate Identifier 

2007–NM–165–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD is effective August 30, 2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to The Boeing 

Company Model 747 airplanes and Model 

767 airplanes, certified in any category, 

equipped with General Electric Model CF6– 

80C2 or CF6–80A series engines. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 30: Ice and rain protection. 

Unsafe Condition 

(e) This AD was prompted by reports of 

several in-flight engine flameouts, including 

multiple dual engine flameout events and 

one total power loss event, in ice-crystal 

icing conditions. We are issuing this AD to 

ensure that the flightcrew has the proper 

procedures to follow in certain icing 

conditions. These certain icing conditions 

could cause a multiple engine flameout 

during flight with the potential inability to 

restart the engines, and consequent forced 

landing of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Revision 

(g) Within 14 days after the effective date 

of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of 

the Boeing 747 or 767 AFM, as applicable, to 

include the following statement. This may be 

done by inserting a copy of this AD into the 

AFM. 

‘‘Prior to reducing thrust for descent in 

visible moisture and TAT less than 10 °C, 

including SAT less than ¥40 °C, nacelle 

anti-ice switch must be in the ON position. 

At or below 22,000 ft, wing anti-ice selector 

must be in the ON position. When these icing 

conditions (visible moisture and TAT less 

than 10 °C, including SAT less than ¥40 °C) 

are no longer present or anticipated, place 

the nacelle and wing anti-ice selectors in the 

OFF (or AUTO) position.’’ 

Note 1: When a statement identical to that 

in paragraph (g) of this AD has been included 

in the general revisions of the AFM, the 

general revisions may be inserted into the 

AFM, and the copy of this AD may be 

removed from the AFM. 

Special Flight Permits 

(h) Special flight permits, as described in 

Section 21.197 and Section 21.199 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 

and 21.199), may be issued to operate the 

airplane to a location where the requirements 

of this AD can be accomplished provided the 

operational requirements defined in the 

Limitations Section of the AFM are used if 

icing is encountered. 

Related Information 

(i) For more information about this AD, 

contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917– 

6590; e-mail: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(j) None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 14, 

2011. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–18747 Filed 7–25–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 

SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

14 CFR Part 1209 

[Notice 11–071] 

RIN 2700–AD50 

Boards and Committees 

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration. 

ACTION: Direct final rule. 

SUMMARY: This direct final rule makes 

nonsubstantive organizational changes 

to the NASA Inventions and 

Contributions Board (the Board) and 

removes and replaces obsolete 

references. The National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA) is 

amending its regulations by removing 

the reference to an obsolete NASA 

Management Instruction and to afford 

organizational flexibility to the 

Administrator in the functional 

placement of the Inventions and 

Contributions Board within the Agency 

without the need to amend the Code of 

Federal Regulations. 

DATES: This direct final rule is effective 

September 26, 2011 unless the Agency 

receives significant adverse comments 

by midnight Eastern Standard Time on 

August 25, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: Comments must be 

identified with ‘‘RIN 2700–AD50’’ and 

may be sent to NASA by the following 

method: 

• Federal E-Rulemaking Portal: 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for submitting 

comments. Please note that NASA may 

post all comments on the Internet 

without change, including any personal 

information provided. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Helen M. Galus, Office of the General 

Counsel, NASA Headquarters, 

telephone (202) 358–3437, fax (202) 

358–4341. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Direct Final Rule and Significant 

Adverse Comments 

NASA has determined this 

rulemaking meets the criteria for a 

direct final rule because it involves 

nonsubstantive changes dealing with 

NASA’s management of the Board. 

NASA does not anticipate that this 

direct final rule will result in any 

changes in the functions, authority, or 

membership of the Board. NASA 

expects no opposition to the changes 

and no significant adverse comments. 

However, if NASA receives a significant 

adverse comment, the Agency will 

withdraw this direct final rule by 


wreier-aviles on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with RULES