### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 20, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LA LON R. DAVENPORT

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Rutherford Coun ty

No. 53941 Jam es K . Clayton, Jr., Judge

No. M2003- 02303-CCA -R3-C D - F iled October 8, 2004

The De fenda nt, L alon R. Dave nport, pled g uiltyto one count of violating the Motor V ehicle H abitual Of fe nd e r A c t. P ur su a nt t o T e nn e sse e Rul e of Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 37 , th e De fe nd a nt r e se rv e d a s a
certified question of law the issue of whether the three -y ear time period articulated in the Ha bitual Offe nder A ct bar s prosec ution for violating the Act af ter the time pe riod has expired. We conclude that such prose cuti o n i s n o t b arr ed by the Act, a nd the judg ment of the trial c ourt is theref ore aff irmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J

. , d el ivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Ge ral d L

. Me lto n a ndRus se ll ( “ Rus ty ” ) N . Pe rkins , M ur fr e e sb or o, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, L alon R. Dave nport.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; J. Ros s D y e r, As si st ant Attorne y Ge ne ra l; Wil lia m C

. Wh it e s e ll
, Jr

. , D is tric t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; Jo h n W. Pric e , A s s is tan t D is tric t A ttor ney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION I. F acts

Th is c a se ari se s fr om the De fe nd a nt’ s vio la tio n o f the Mo tor Ve hic le Ha

bitua l O ff e nd e r A c t, codified in Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-10-601 (1998 & Supp. 2003), e t seq. On F ebrua ry 8, 19 99 , th e De fe nd a nt w a s d e c la re d a n h abitua l tr a ff

ic of fe nd e r, a ndhe wa s o rd e re d n ot t o o pe rate

a motor vehicle for three y ear s. The Def endant did not appea l this judgme nt of the trial court, a nd i tb e c a m e f

i n a l t h i r t y d a ys a f

t e r e n tr y. O n D e c e m b e r

2 4
, 2 0 0 2
, t h e D e f

e n d a n tw a s s t o p p e d b y a police off icer for a reg istration violation, and a computer chec k reve aled the Def endant’ s status as a habitual motor ve hicle off ender . The De fenda nt was indicted for driving in violation of the Ha bitua l Mo tor

Ve hic le Of

fe nd e r A c t a nddrivi ng on a su sp e nd e d lic e ns e . T he De fe nd a nt p le d g uil ty-2-

to violating the Ha

bitual Motor Vehicle O ffe nder A ct, re servi n g a ce rtified question of law for appea l. The De fenda nt’s char g e for driving on a suspende d license w as dismissed. I n i t s final jud g me nt, the tr ia l c ou rt

state d th e c e rt if

ie d q ue sti on of

la w, app e a la

ble to this Cou rt , a s:

Does the se tting forth of a spec ific period of time for the ope rati o n of an or der decla ring a person to be a motor vehicle habitual offe nder bar the prosec ution of that person unde r T.C.A. § 55-10- 616 for a n offe nse that occ urs af ter the e x piration of the time period spec ified in such orde r.

II. Ana lys is A. Cer tified Q uestion of Law

Be cause this appeal c omes befor e us as a certified question of law, pur suant to Rule 37(b) of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Proc ed u re , we must first determine whe ther the que stion pr e se nted is di sp os iti ve . T e nn e sse e Rul e of Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 37 (b ) p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art , that:
An appe al lies from an y order or judg ment in a criminal procee ding w here the law provides for

such appe al, and fr o m an y judgme nt of conviction . . . upon a ple a of g uilty

. . . [i f] .

. . [t ]he de fenda nt e ntere d into a plea ag ree ment under Rule 11(e) but exp li c it ly r e s e r v e d w ith th e c o n s e n t o f th e s tate a n d o f

th e c o u r t th e r ig h t t o ap p e al

a ce rtified question of law that is disposi tive of the c ase a nd the foll owing

re qu ir e me nts are me t:

(A) T he judg ment of convic tion, or other docume nt to whic h such judg ment ref ers that is f i l ed b ef o re the notice of a

ppeal, must contain a

statement of the c ertified question of law r eser ved by the def endant f or appe llate re view; (B ) The question of law must be stated in the judg ment or docume nt so as to identify clea rly the scope and limits of the leg al issue re serve d; (C ) Th e jud g me nt or do c ume nt m us t r e fl e c t th a t th e c e rt if ie d q ue sti onwa s e xpre ssl y
rese rved w ith the consent of the sta te and the trial judge ; and (D) T he judg ment or docume nt must ref lect that the defendant, the state, and the tria l judge are of the opinion that the ce rtified question is dispositi ve of the case

. . . .
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)( 2); State v. Preston, 759 S.W .2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988) . The re cord e vinces that all of the require ments of Rule 37 are clea rly met, and the only

issue which re quires discussion is whether the certified question of law is dispositive of the case. We have stated that a dispositive issue is one wher e the a

ppellate c ourt “must either aff irm the judgme nt or reve rse and dismiss

. A question is never dispositive when [the appe llate court] might re verse and re man d fo r trial . . . .” State v. Wil kes, 684 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).

I f we hold that Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 55-10-616 prohibits the prosec ution of the Def endant f o r a violation of that Ac t after the three -y ear

time period expires, the De fenda nt’s-3-

c on vic tio n c a nn ot s ta nd . T he re fo re , th is i ssu e is dis po sit ive on app e a l, an d we no w de c ide the me ri ts of the c e rt if ie d q ue sti on on app e a l.

B. Motor V ehicle Habitual O ff ender Ac t

Th e De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t si nc e the Mo tor Ve hic le Ha

bitua l O ff e nd e r A c t, c od ifie d in Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 5 5- 10 -6 01 , e t se q. , p ro vid e s f or a thr e e -y e ar t ime pe ri odthat a defe ndant is prohibited from driving and, as suc h, a def endant may

not be in violation of the Act when driving more than t hree y ear s afte r t he entry of a judgme nt decla ring him a habitual of

fende r. The State c ounters that, by the lang uag e of the statute, any person f ound to be a h ab i tual offe nder who there afte r is convicted of operating a

motor vehicle in this state while the judg ment or orde r of the court prohibiting such operation is in eff ect c ommits a cla ss E felony . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 55-10-616. We ag ree with the State.

The Te nnessee Supreme Court addr essed the issue of whether the three -y ear

time period articula ted in the Motor Vehic le Habitual Of fende r Act was unconstitut ionally vag ue in State v. Orr, 694 S.W .2d 297
, 2 9 8 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 5 )

. T h e d e f e n d a n t i n th a t c a s e w a s d e c la r e d a h ab itu a l m o tor

ve hic le of fe nd e r on Ma

rc h 25 , 1 97 7, a nd , o n N ov e mbe r 3 , 1 98 3, he wa s in dic te d f or tw o s e pa rate vio la tio ns of

the Ma rc h 2 5, 19 77 ord er. I d. Th e de fe nd a nt p le d g uil ty a ndre se rv e d th e ri g ht t o appea l whether

the three -y ear

time period in the statute wa s unconstitutionallyv agu e. I d . The defe ndan t co n t ended that the leng th of time that he wa s barr ed fr om operating a motor vehicle by the Marc h 25, 1977 order of t he criminal court was vag ue and, by implication, the s tatute was va g ue. I d. I n response , the Supreme Court stated: “ The a djudication of def endant a s an habitual mot or vehicle of

fende r bec ame f

inal thirty day s after

its entry and he did not p er fe ct a t imely appea l there from, and, of

course , cannot be hear d to complain of such a n alleg ed infirmity in the order upon t h i s ap p ea l

. ” Id. T h e C o u rt t h en t u rn ed t o t h e s t at u t e, s t at i n g:

The Act require s that a person adjudicate d to be an habitual of fende r be pr ohibited from driving a motor vehicle for a period of three y ear s from the da te of fina l entry of an or der mak i ng that adjudication, and that reinstatement to driving privileg es
m u s t b e sought by

petition to the court that found him or her to be an ha

bitual offe nder or

to the criminal court in the county wher e such per son then reside s. The fac t that th e L e g is latu r e c h o s e to e xp r e s s th e ti me o f s u s p e n s io n a n d me th o d of reinstateme nt in three sec tio n s o f t h e Act does not re quire that men of common intelligenc e g uess at their me aning or diffe r as to their a pplication.

De fe nd a nt a lso su g g e sts that th e Ac t is v a g ue be c a us e it d oe s n ot a ff ir ma tiv e ly

state what happe ns if an habitual of fende r neve r applies f

or reinstateme nt, pointing to the phrase in T.C.A. § 55-10-615 that, “suc h person may petition the court.”

The fa ct that t h e s t at ute makes it optional whethe r nor not an ha bitual offende r applies for

reinstateme nt has no eff

ect whatever on the clea

r mandate of the Act that the suspension of driving privileg es will remain in effec t until such a petition is filed-4-

and the c ourt ac ts favora

bly there on.

I d. The Court held that the A ct was not unc onstitut ionally vag ue. I d.

I n State v. Carroll, this Court discussed whether the evid ence was suf

ficient to sustain a de fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n f

or dr ivi ng a ve hic le on Janu ary

9, 2002 , in vio la tio n o f a mot or ve hic le habitual offe nder order enter ed on May 13, 1996. State v. Carroll, No. W2003-01182-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 541130, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Ma r. 15, 2004), no perm. app. filed . Be fore the tr ia l c ou rt , th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd e d th a t he tho ug ht his thr e e -y e ar re vo c a tio n pe ri ode xpir e d in May of 1999, and on appea l the defe ndant contende d that the evidenc e wa s insufficient base d upon the def endant’ s belief that the three -y ear period had expired. I d. This Court, citing Or r, stated that the mandate prohibiting the de fenda nt from driving rema ins in effe ct until a petition requesting the

re sto ratio n o f d ri vin g pr ivi le g e s is fi le d a nd the c ou rt a c ts f a vo ra bly the re on . T he Cou rt

the n h e ld that:

[T] he ef

fica cy of the motor vehic le habitual off ender order until the defenda nt files

a re sto ratio n pe tit ion that is fa vo ra bly a c te d upo n, the e vid e nc e in the pr e se nt c a se is clea rly sufficie nt to support the defendant’s conviction. The e vidence showed that the 19 9 6 o r d e r w a s s ti ll in e f f e c t o n Ja n u ar y 9
, 2 0 0 2
, th e d a te th e d e f e n dant was appre hended. T he evide nce show ed that no application for a r estoration of driving privileg es had be en filed.

I d. at *2.
Rely ing on both of

the aforementioned case s, we conclude that the L eg islature’s a rticulation of a spe cific time pe riod for w hich a de fenda nt, who is found to be an habitual offe nder, is prohibited from driving does not mandate that the def endant no long er be subject to the penalties of violating the Motor Vehic le Off

ender Act if a pprehe nded while driving more than three y ear s after the entry of the orde r. The Statute c lear ly require s a def

endant to petition the trial court for re instatement of his or he r lic e ns e a nd a llo ws the tr ia l c ou rt , c on sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e be fo re it, to g rant o r d e ny thi s petition. I f the trial c ourt determines that the petition should be denied, it c an continue to re quire that the def endant be subject to the Ac t. A defe ndant may not , b ymere ly

failing to file a pe tition, circ umvent the re quirement that the tria l court re store his or her driving privileg es. Ac cording ly , we conclude that, when the Def endant in the case under submissi on was found driving on Dec ember 24, 2002, he wa s still subject to the F ebrua ry 8, 1999 order decla

ring him an habitual traffic offe nder. Th e re fo re , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

III. Conclusi on

I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oing r easoning and authorities, we conc lude that the L egi s l at u re’ s articulation of a three -y ear

time period in the Motor Ve hicle Ha bitual Offe nder A ct does not bar prosecution of the Defe ndant, who wa s appre hended f or driving in violation of an order decla ring him an habitual offe nder, e ven thoug h he wa s driving more than thre e y ear s after the entry-5-

of the orde r dec laring him an habitual offe nder. A ccor dingly
, we AF FI RM the Defe ndant’s conviction.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE