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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 16, 2014 

v No. 316583 

Wayne Circuit Court 

WILLIAM ANTHONY CRUMP, LC No. 11-012644-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: DONOFRIO, P.J., and FORT HOOD and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of three counts of third-degree 

criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), MCL 750.520d(1)(a) (victim at least 13 years of age and 

under 16 years of age), three counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV), MCL 

750.520e(1)(a) (victim at least 13 years of age but less than 16 years of age and actor more than 

five years older than victim), and one count of accosting a child for an immoral purpose, MCL 

750.145a. Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent 

sentences of 25 to 42 years’ imprisonment for the CSC-III convictions, one to two years’ 

imprisonment for the CSC-IV convictions, and 2 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the accosting a 

child for immoral purposes conviction. We affirm. 

 Defendant first argues that that the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for 

a new trial because defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in that he failed to inform defendant 

of the prosecution’s final plea offer. As such, the trial court should have allowed defendant to 

accept the previously offered plea deal. We disagree. 

 This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion for a new trial 

for an abuse of discretion. People v Russell, 297 Mich App 707, 715; 825 NW2d 623 (2012). 

This Court reviews “the trial court’s findings of fact at a Ginther[1] hearing for clear error, and 

review[s] questions of constitutional law de novo.” Id. (citation omitted). “Clear error exists 

when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” 

People v McDade, 301 Mich App 343, 356; 836 NW2d 266 (2013). In the application of this 

 

1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
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principle, this Court must give due regard “to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge 

the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 130; 

748 NW2d 859 (2008), amended 481 Mich 1201 (2008), quoting MCR 2.613(C). 

 A defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. 

People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 591-592; 852 NW2d 587 (2014). A defendant must show “(1) 

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“[D]efense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a 

plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused,” and defense counsel does not 

provide effective assistance if he or she does not communicate a formal plea offer to the 

defendant. Missouri v Frye, 566 US ___; 132 S Ct 1399, 1408; 182 L Ed 2d 379, 384 (2012). 

A defendant must also show: 

[T]hat but for the ineffective advice of counsel [1] there is a reasonable 

probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the 

defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have 

withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), [2] that the court would have 

accepted its terms, and [3] that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the 

offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence 

that in fact were imposed. [Douglas, 496 Mich at 592, quoting Lafler v Cooper, 

566 US ___; 132 S Ct 1376, 1385; 182 L Ed 2d 398, 407 (2012) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).] 

 After defendant’s trial, defendant filed a motion for reversal of his convictions and for 

entry of a plea-based conviction, or for a Ginther hearing and a new trial. Defendant argued that 

he was not aware of the final plea offered by the prosecution until he received his trial attorney, 

Robert Slameka’s, response to a grievance filed by defendant. A Ginther hearing was held, and 

the trial court ultimately denied defendant’s motion. The trial court found that Slameka 

informed defendant of the final plea offer. The offer was for one to two years’ imprisonment for 

attempted accosting and soliciting of a minor. Defendant rejected the offer because he wanted an 

offer that included only one year in the Wayne County Jail. Testimony presented at the hearing 

supported the trial court’s findings. Several witnesses, including Slameka, defendant’s former 

attorney Larry Polk, and the prosecutor Kevin Clark, among others, testified that defendant 

refused the final offer because he only wanted to serve time in jail (a maximum of less than two 

years), or “county time.” Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant’s 

requests. 

 Defendant’s primary complaint on appeal is that the trial court erroneously accepted the 

testimony of Slameka, Clark, Polk, and other witnesses presented by the prosecution as opposed 

to defendant’s testimony and evidence. According to defendant, the testimony presented by the 

prosecution at the Ginther hearing was inconsistent. However, all of the witnesses at the Ginther

hearing, other than defendant, testified that Slameka informed defendant of the final plea offer 

and defendant rejected the offer because he wanted a sentence of one year of “county time.” The 

testimony was only inconsistent with regard to when defendant learned of the final plea offer. 

This Court defers to the trial court on matters of witness credibility because the trial court has the 
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ability to observe the witnesses. Dendel, 481 Mich at 130; MCR 2.613(C). Moreover, while 

defendant presented evidence that he claimed contradicted the prosecution’s evidence, we are not 

convinced. Defendant presented evidence that on August 30, 2012, he submitted a telephone 

request to Tameka Lacy, asking that she contact Slameka. “Tell him that if I was offered 1 to 2 

yrs [sic] I want to accept that plea before trial. Tell her to ask him why wouldn’t [sic] he tell me 

this info.” Defendant asserts that his telephone call request would “make no sense” if defense 

counsel had informed him of the final plea offer. However, defendant may have forgotten that 

Slameka informed him of the plea offer or defendant could have changed his mind seeing as it 

had been over a week since August 16, 2012, the date when the prosecutor stated he made the 

final plea offer. Therefore, defendant’s telephone call request is not entirely inconsistent with 

Slameka’s testimony. Defendant also points out that he consistently attempted to accept the final 

plea offer after receiving defense counsel’s response letter to the grievance defendant filed. 

However, defendant’s attempts to accept the offer occurred after the prosecution was able to 

obtain the testimony of key witnesses, and, thus, the offer was no longer available. For these 

reasons, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed clear 

error in its finding of facts. McDade, 301 Mich App at 356. 

 Even assuming the trial court did err, defendant did not show prejudice. See Douglas, 

496 Mich at 592. While defendant may have shown a reasonable probability that he would have 

accepted the plea offer2

 and that the conviction and sentence would have been less severe had he 

accepted the plea, he cannot show a reasonable probability that the trial court would have 

accepted the final plea offer. Id. Judge Callahan, the trial judge, noted at the Ginther hearing 

that he does not accept a plea agreement after the final conference, which took place in this case 

on February 24, 2012, and the final plea offer was made on August 16, 2012. Moreover, even 

assuming the prosecution offered the final plea agreement while Judge Hathaway, who presided 

over the pretrial proceedings, was on the case, defendant does not argue that Judge Hathaway 

would have accepted the terms of the final plea offer. Therefore, defendant fails to show 

prejudice and is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in having and leaving defendant 

handcuffed at trial. We disagree. 

 This Court reviews a preserved claim regarding the trial court’s decision to leave a 

defendant in handcuffs during trial “for an abuse of discretion under the totality of the 

circumstances.” People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 186; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). However, 

because defendant did not raise the issue in the trial court, this Court reviews the unpreserved, 

nonstructural constitutional error for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People 

 

2

 We note that it is questionable whether defendant established by a reasonable probability that 

he would have accepted the final plea offer. While defendant testified that he would have 

accepted the plea, other witnesses testified and the trial court found that defendant rejected the 

plea. Defendant did show that he would have accepted the plea on August 30, 2012; however, 

the plea was no longer available at that time because the prosecution had located key witnesses. 
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v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 

276 Mich App 376, 382; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). 

 “Included within the right to a fair trial, absent extraordinary circumstances, is the right to 

be free of shackles or handcuffs in the courtroom.” Payne, 285 Mich App at 186. A trial court 

may order that a defendant remain handcuffed during trial to “prevent escape, injury to persons 

in the courtroom or to maintain order.” Id. (citation omitted). The phrase “maintain order” 

refers to the trial court’s ability to “maintain a quiet and peaceable trial.” See People v Dunn, 

446 Mich 409, 426; 521 NW2d 255 (1994) (citation omitted). Even if a trial court abuses its 

discretion in requiring a defendant to wear restraints, the defendant must also show that he was 

prejudiced to be entitled to relief. Payne, 285 Mich App at 186. A defendant is not prejudiced if 

the jury could not see the restraints. Id.; see also Dunn, 446 Mich at 411 (holding that where the 

record did not show that the jury could see the defendant’s restraints, there was no basis to find 

that the defendant was denied a fair trial). 

 The trial occurred on September 19, 2012, and September 20, 2012. Before the jury was 

brought into the courtroom, the trial court noted that defendant was in handcuffs because he was 

“being mouthy and giving the deputies trouble.” The jury was then brought into the courtroom. 

Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear 

handcuffs. However, the trial court indicated that defendant was causing trouble for the deputies 

and was “being mouthy.” The trial court directed the court reporter to note the issue on the 

record, which indicates that defendant’s actions toward the deputies were the reason he was 

handcuffed. The trial court sufficiently established that handcuffs were necessary to maintain 

peace and quiet in the courtroom since defendant may have continued to interfere with the 

deputies’ duties and interrupt trial. See Payne, 285 Mich App at 186. 

 Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion, defendant does not show that he was 

prejudiced. There was no evidence that the jury witnessed the handcuffs. A defendant has the 

burden to show that the handcuffs were visible to the jury. See Dunn, 446 Mich at 411; Payne, 

285 Mich App at 186. Defendant notes that he was required to stand when the jury entered and 

exited the courtroom and that the jury could have observed his handcuffs at that time. However, 

the prosecution does not stipulate to the fact that the handcuffs were visible. The record also 

does not indicate whether the jury passed defendant while it was entering and exiting the 

courtroom or whether the handcuffs were visible to the jury. Defendant’s assertion is 

speculative, at best, particularly in light of the fact that his trial attorney did not object. 

Furthermore, even if the jury may have inadvertently seen the handcuffs, defendant did not 

question the jurors regarding whether they had observed defendant in handcuffs. See People v 

Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 37; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). Therefore, defendant fails to show 

prejudice because there is no indication in the record that any member of the jury observed 

defendant in handcuffs. See Dunn, 446 Mich at 411; Payne, 285 Mich App at 186; Horn, 279 

Mich App at 37. 

 We further reject defendant’s assertion that Slameka was ineffective because he failed to 

object to the trial court’s decision to leave defendant handcuffed during trial. First, we note that 

a Ginther hearing was held in this matter, and defendant did not raise this issue at the hearing. 

Therefore, this issue is unpreserved. People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 410; 760 NW2d 882 

(2008). This Court reviews an unpreserved claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
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“mistakes apparent on the record.” Id. at 410. The trial court did not err in deciding to have 

defendant remain in handcuffs during the trial, discussed supra. Thus, Slameka’s objection to 

the trial court’s decision would have been meritless, and defense counsel is not ineffective for 

failure to advocate a meritless position. See Payne, 285 Mich App at 191. Finally, the record 

does not show that the jury observed the handcuffs. See id. (holding that the defense counsel 

was not ineffective for failing to object to the defendant wearing leg shackles during trial 

because the defendant failed to show that the jury observed the shackles). Thus, defendant’s 

claim lacks merit. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Pat M. Donofrio 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro