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THE GROWING CRISIS IN AFRICA’S SAHEL REGION

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 21, 2013

Serial No. 113–72

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, 

Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ....................................... 9

The Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development .......................................................................................... 19

Mr. Rudolph Atallah, senior fellow, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic 

Council .................................................................................................................. 37

Mima S. Nedelcovych, Ph.D., partner, Schaffer Global Group ............................ 57

Mr. Nii Akuetteh (former Georgetown University professor of African

affairs) ................................................................................................................... 65

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto: Prepared statement ................................. 11

The Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg: Prepared statement ..................................... 21

Mr. Rudolph Atallah: Prepared statement ............................................................ 40

Mima S. Nedelcovych, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................... 59

Mr. Nii Akuetteh: Prepared statement .................................................................. 67

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 90

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 91

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: 

Question for the record to the Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg .......................... 92

Summary of recommendations from the Corporate Council on Africa ............ 93

Statement from Shari Berenbach of the U.S. African Development Foundation ..................................................................................................................... 101

(1)

THE GROWING CRISIS IN AFRICA’S SAHEL 

REGION 

TUESDAY, MAY 21, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. This meeting will come to order. And good afternoon 

to everyone. Today’s hearing is intended to examine the challenges 

faced by the nations of Africa’s Sahel region, especially the spread 

of both terrorism and trafficking in the entire area. These problems 

alone impose a danger to the security of both the Sahel and developed countries, not only because of air traffic to West Africa that 

transits northern Mali but also because of the use of the region as 

a base of attacks by Islamic extremists on Western targets. Moreover, the preexisting humanitarian crisis is now worsened and as 

are human rights concerns. The underlying political instability is 

becoming equally serious. 

We are holding this hearing jointly because the threat that we 

face goes beyond the jurisdiction of any one of our subcommittees. 

It involves not only Africa’s Sahel region but also countries in 

north Africa, especially Algeria and Libya. It also involves terrorist 

groups originating from and based in nations outside of the Sahel. 

It is a sign of how seriously the Committee on Foreign Affairs considers this matter that our three subcommittees have come together to consider this today. 

There are various definitions of the Sahel, but for the purposes 

of this hearing, we mean the nations of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, 

Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. 

In early 2012, the Government of Mali was overthrown, as we all 

know, in a military coup and subsequently lost control of the northern area of the country, which constitutes more than half of its 

land area. Mali had long been considered a stable example of African democracy, but, as we learned in our subcommittee’s hearing 

in June 2012, the coup and resulting loss of so much territory revealed the hollowness and rot within the Mali democratic system. 

2

The influx of well-armed terrorist groups, broken promises to neglected ethic groups, lack of adherence to democratic principles, 

and rampant drug smuggling all made the Malian Government vulnerable to breakdown. 

We must ask now whether other countries in Africa’s Sahel region are also more vulnerable than we think. Mali provided a staging ground for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, which 

is daily becoming an ever-greater threat in the region and perhaps 

globally. AQIM is considered the best funded of all al-Qaeda affiliates and, through its ties to other terrorist groups, may be funding 

their activities as well. 

In a July subcommittee hearing last year, we learned that Boko 

Haram, in Nigeria, is not a unified organization but, rather, various factions, some of which are focused on embarrassing the Nigerian Government but others that have a more global jihadist view. 

It is the latter that we have had present in northern Mali and impose a threat to Western interests, not to mention the interests of 

the Mali people. 

Boko Haram attacks lead Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, 

last week, to declare a state of emergency in three northern states 

in his country. A radical Boko Haram splinter group, known as 

Ansaru, may have attacked Nigerian troops en route to a peacekeeping operation in Mali. 

In Mali, three terrorist groups dominate the rebellion that split 

off the north: MUJAO, a splinter group of AQIM; Ansar al-Dine, 

an Islamic Tuareg rebel group; and the MNLA, a more secular 

Tuareg group. These groups have different aims and sometimes 

clash with one another. Nevertheless, they collectively pose and 

continue to pose a threat to the peace of Mali and the region. 

As a result of the rebel actions in northern Mali, there are currently more than 300,000 internally displaced persons in Mali, 

more than 74,000 refugees in Mauritania, 50,000 refugees in Niger, 

and nearly 50,000 refugees in Burkina Faso. The displacement of 

nearly 1⁄2 million Malians strains already scare resources in the 

Sahel, with recipients often in remote areas. 

French forces, as we know, were able to forestall a rebel advance 

in southern Mali earlier this year. And an African military contingent is in the process of being deployed to Mali even now. However, 

chasing rebels out of Mali’s major northern towns will be easier 

than ending ongoing terrorist attacks or reconciling ethnic groups 

whose enmity has grown over the last year. 

We look forward to today’s witnesses. To our two witnesses from 

the administration, thank you for being here. And I will properly 

introduce you in a moment, but thank you for your leadership. It 

is making a huge difference. 

I would like to now yield to my good friend and colleague Ms. 

Bass for an opening statement. 

Ms. BASS. As always, thank you, Chairman Smith, for holding 

this hearing today. 

I was pleased yesterday to see the formal announcement of President Obama’s upcoming visit to the continent next month. 

I know we are here today to discuss the Sahel, a vast region that 

stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. Each of the nations in the region experience a unique set of challenges, which, as 

3

we know, make developing effective and far-reaching programs extraordinarily difficult. While the crisis in Mali was spiraling out of 

control, a humanitarian crisis was underway that affected tens of 

millions of people throughout the region. 

The U.N.’s 2013 Sahel regional strategy amply illustrates the immense challenge experienced by those living in the Sahel and nations like our own, who have the resources and desire to make a 

difference. 

The report notes that some of the key drivers to the humanitarian crisis include food and security, epidemic disease, floods, locust infestation, and the continued crisis in Mali and the displacement of populations, both internally and those who continue to 

seek refuge in Mali’s neighboring countries. With an estimated need of nearly $2 billion, CRS reports that the 

U.N. consolidated appeals process will bring aid organizations together to coordinate a response to major humanitarian crises and 

disasters and appeal for funds through a collaborative and coordinated plan. 

I am pleased that Nancy Lindborg from USAID will be here to 

discuss the administration’s new resilience strategy, which was 

launched late last year and is a promising program that I believe 

will fundamentally change the way we think about development, 

particularly in regions and in countries that endure repeated cycles 

of shock. The resilience strategy makes sense when you consider 

these key drivers to these humanitarian crises. 

While the challenges are great, there is a window of opportunity 

that can be seized upon. If we work within nations and collaborate 

effectively with donors, the resources available can be used to save 

lives and prevent decline in the living conditions of millions of infants, expectant mothers, and those that require assistance of some 

sort. 

Mr. Chairman, today and tomorrow, a delegation from Mali, a 

country that has been the focus of this committee’s attention, will 

visit the Congress. I believe you have already had a chance to meet 

with them. This delegation, led by the Speaker of Mali’s National 

Assembly, is here to discuss their upcoming Presidential election, 

now slated for July 28th, the security challenges that remain in the 

north of the country and opportunities toward economic development, including a focus on expanding the country’s fragile infrastructure. 

As members of the committee are likely aware, yesterday the 

U.N. announced the appointment of a special envoy who will assist 

in helping Mali regain political stability and security in its vast 

north. And last week, the country was able to secure over $4 billion 

in pledges from donor nations to assist in peace and stability efforts and reconstruction of failing infrastructure. With these important announcements and the transition of the African-led international support mission to a U.N. peacekeeping force, I believe 

these are positive steps that will ensure a Malian future that is 

both peaceful and prosperous. 

I want to close by retelling a story. In late February, I traveled 

to Mali to see firsthand the many efforts underway that would return Mali to a model democracy for the region and the continent. 

The CODEL that I was on included Senators Coons and Isakson 

4

as well as Representative Sewell. We had a chance to meet with 

displaced families from Timbuktu who spoke of their desire to return to their homes. They sought to return home, not merely because that was where they were from but because they wanted to 

return home to vote. They wanted to cast their ballots to show the 

world that the people from Mali themselves seek peace, stability, 

and a return to normalcy. Our nation is helping to make this a reality. And we should continue to do so throughout the Sahel, a region that greatly requires our attention and support. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ranking Member. 

I would like to, before I go to Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, just introduce to all assembled, Younoussi Toure ́, who is the Speaker of 

the Malian Assembly. Thank you. You and your delegation are very 

welcome to this hearing. And I appreciated the time earlier that we 

had together. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. 

I would like to now yield to my good friend and colleague, the 

former chair of the full committee, now chair of the Subcommittee 

on the Middle East and North Africa, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And 

thank you for your steadfast leadership for many decades on this 

important topic. 

We have been following the developments in this region closely, 

but the growing crisis in north Africa and the Sahel has been a 

largely underemphasized threat to U.S. national security interests. 

For far too long, U.S. foreign policy has been focused on fighting 

terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Afghanistan in the Middle East. 

Yet, we have looked away from the serious and growing threats 

coming from north Africa and the Sahel. These areas have become 

breeding grounds of extremist activity as these nations face many 

internal struggles, political instability from dangerous droughts 

that are wiping out entire villages to food shortages, human rights 

concerns, and domestic conflicts. This leaves large swaths of land 

ungoverned. And their borders are porous and easy to cross undetected. 

This fragility gives these extremist groups, like al-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, Boko Haram, Ansar al-Dine, and others, 

the ability to roam freely in the most lawless region, setting up 

safe havens for terrorist activities, and doing their dirty work, kidnapping, drug trafficking, arms trafficking. And this became evident in the fallout of the Arab Spring as Ghadafi fell and arms and 

fighters from Libya spread throughout the region. 

As Secretary Clinton said when she testified before us in January, there is no doubt that the Algerian terrorists had weapons 

from Libya. There is no doubt that the remnants of AQIM in Mali 

had weapons from Libya. The weak governments in north Africa 

and the Sahel don’t have the will nor the capacity to confront these 

extremist groups. And that leaves the United States and our interests extremely vulnerable. 

The administration has yet to develop a plan or even recognize 

the severity of the threat. In his push to end the war in Afghanistan, the President justifies a withdrawal because he believes that, 

as he has repeatedly stated, that we are close to our goal of defeating al-Qaeda, that we have decimated al-Qaeda. Yet, al-Qaeda is 

5

still as great a threat as ever and is expanding. We see them in 

north Africa. We see them in the Sahel. They are fighting in Syria. 

I guess they didn’t get the same memo the President received. 

We have seen a disturbing alliance between drug traffickers and 

these terrorist groups in the region, allowing the terrorists to develop new resources to finance their illicit activities while at the 

same time undermining those governments and our U.S. national 

security interests. 

Just last month, we saw a direct narcoterrorism link between African nations and the FARC, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. Several top figures from Guinea-Bissau’s military, including the head of its armed forces and former head of the Navy, 

were arrested on cocaine and weapons trafficking charges. Both 

were accused of agreeing to store tons of cocaine and buying weapons for the FARC. These criminal activities undermine our security 

in our hemisphere and provide the financing capabilities to terrorists. 

The administration needs to come to the realization that we are 

a long way still from defeating al-Qaeda and its influence. To confront these threats, we need a strategy, a strategy that disrupts the 

operations of extremist networks, that denies them safe havens, 

and prevents an escalation of emerging threats by also targeting 

precursor conditions that foment instability. 

I look forward, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Bass, to our 

witnesses today. Thank you so much for convening this timely 

hearing. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the Middle East 

and North Africa Subcommittee, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

on an issue that, while it may not make the top headlines on a regular basis, certainly has significant implications on the security of 

the African continent and implications for stability throughout the 

Middle East. 

Now, the current environment in the Sahel is precarious and 

worrisome. The proliferation of militant groups in the region, many 

of which have ties to al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, pose debilitating 

threats to a region with a history of instability. The partnership 

and coordination of these radical groups can and has turned smaller domestic disputes into full-blown regional crises. 

With service on commercial networks traversing over state lines, 

the porous borders between countries allow for easy and unregulated movement of militant groups, arms, drugs, and other contraband that weaken nations and put populations at risk. The conflict 

in Mali exemplifies the trouble that these non-state armed groups 

can cause, not only to a country’s security and safety of their civilians but to the greater Sahel region as well. 

We are seeing how quickly a previously stable democratic government can deteriorate, heading toward the likes of Somalia. Thus 

far in Mali, our approach has been one of limited engagement, bolstering French and U.N. forces with intelligence and other forms 

of assistance. In the short term, intervention was needed and the 

United States, supported, through the Security Council, authorization of an international peacekeeping force in Mali. 

6

We have taken other steps to strengthen the security infrastructures in the region, including through bilateral agreement with 

Niger in the presence of UAV base in that country, but this should 

only be one step in our development of what I hope is a broader, 

more comprehensive approach to dealing with the instability and 

violent extremism in the region. 

To combat these and other armed groups and to reduce further 

threats to regional and international security, we must join with 

our partners in Maghreb to enhance cooperation and prevent the 

spread of extremism and the flow of arms to the Sahel. We must 

create and implement the comprehensive and a multifaceted plan. 

We must consider what preemptory and preventative steps we can 

take to address the structural issues found across the region. 

Strengthening a country’s essential institutions can help prevent 

any need for future military use. There are a number of regional 

challenges that are widespread and interlinked, from severe institutional underdevelopment, punishing socioeconomic conditions, 

high levels of poverty, and other troubling indicators that I am 

sure will be the focus of today’s testimony. 

The problems we are witnessing are long-term challenges to the 

region. I am concerned that they may only be setting the scene for 

additional crises in the future. There must be greater international 

attention placed on the Sahel. That is what we are doing today. 

I appreciate your holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

I now recognize the chairman of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade Subcommittee, Ted Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Since 2012, a coup in Mali, and the 2011 overthrow of Ghadafi 

in Libya, the security in the Sahel has gotten worse, not better. At 

a time when the United States, as it is said by the administration, 

pivots to the East, we cannot leave behind our obligation to the 

continent of Africa. 

Some might think that this is not a problem for the United 

States, but they are wrong. Most Americans, many Americans, 

shall I say, never heard of Mali until this crisis. They thought it 

was an island in the south Pacific. But what happens in the Sahel 

is directly related to our regional interests and security here at 

home. The prevention of an attack on our homeland and on our 

Western allies by radical Islamic extremists is a challenge and will 

be for the foreseeable future. 

In the Sahel, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, appears to be taking advantage of the chaos. That is what terrorist 

groups do. In January, thousands of French troops, along with local 

allied fighters, had to launch a military offensive because terrorists 

had taken over part of Mali, which is about the size of Texas. I 

want to commend the French for their efficiency and their quick response. 

Recently the French announced that they will keep 1,000 troops 

in Mali for the foreseeable future to consolidate the gains and keep 

al-Qaeda on its back foot. 

Recognizing the scope of this challenge, the United States has 

begun training African forces in neighboring Niger to fight in Mali. 

7

The United States only has about 1,800 troops in all of Africa, but 

4,000 more are on the way to train African forces. 

Due north in Algeria, al-Qaeda has brigades of radical killers 

aided by their brothers in Tunisia. Fortunately, the Algerian National Popular Army is doing its best to fight al-Qaeda. 

The seriousness of the situation in Algeria hit home with us after 

the extremists attacked a gas plant on the border of Algeria and 

Libya. AQIM-linked terrorists wanted to seize the plant in the 

hopes of creating a massive explosion and killing everyone in the 

area. Fortunately, they were unsuccessful but not before gunfights 

and the follow-up rescue mission resulted in the death of plant 

workers from nine different countries. Three of those killed were 

Americans, two of them being Texans. And one of them was my 

constituent, Victor Lovelady from Atascocita, Texas. He was an energy worker, and he was killed, not just because of what he did but 

because of who he was. He was killed because he was an American. 

A radical Islamic al-Qaeda group by the name of the Signatories 

in Blood—what a lovely name that is—claimed responsibility for 

this terrorist attack. They are a spinoff of AQIM. And they seek to 

destroy us and kill us indiscriminately. This is the real world. This 

is not a fiction story. 

We have asked the Algerian Government for Victor Lovelady’s 

personal effects, but we haven’t gotten them back yet. 

We have learned from the past couple of years that we are not 

good at predicting threats. I hope we can better understand today 

the nature of the terrorist threat in the Sahel and policy options 

available to us. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Chairman Poe. 

I now yield to the ranking member, Brad Sherman, from California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Several groups have rebelled against the central Malian Government for independence in northern Mali just in the last 11⁄2 years. 

The Tuareg tribes in northern Mali have had major socioeconomic 

and political grievances against the Bamako government and have 

rebelled in the past. 

Ghadafi supported this movement. And many Tuaregs fought for 

Colonel Ghadafi as he struggled to stay in power. Before returning 

to Mali, Tuaregs took a large amount of sophisticated weapons 

with them, including a huge number of surface-to-air missiles 

looted from Libyan weapons depots. The Libyan weapons reinvigorated a longstanding rebellion and expanded it into a major conflict. 

We should learn from this lesson as we look at Syria. The outcome in Syria is important to us. The outflow of weapons from 

Syria may turn out to be even more important. 

Returning to looking at Mali in the Sahel, we should note that 

the MNLA, the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad, is 

fighting to create an independent country that would have less 

than 1 million people as far as we can tell and would include only 

half Tuaregs in the Sahel region. This seems to be an unrealistic 

objective from so many standpoints, including the world’s general 

consensus that the borders in Africa are inviolate and that messing 

8

around with those borders could only lead to huge numbers of conflicts. 

The MNLA was initially backed by Ansar al-Dine, the extremist 

Islamic group. Then that group and smaller Islamic groups began 

imposing a harsh version of Sharia law in some areas. Many of 

these extremist Islamists are foreign jihadist fighters. By July of 

last year, the MNLA had a falling out with the Islamic groups over 

their vision for the future of northern Mali. Ansar al-Dine and the 

other Islamic groups seemed to have the upper hand. And then 

France intervened, as we all know, in July 2012 to beat back the 

advance on Mali’s central government. And France has deployed 

thousands of troops with the aid of the United States, both in 

terms of aerial refueling missions, drones, other logistical support. 

Among the questions raised there, is the Malian Government capable of defending itself and its territorial integrity? And for how 

long will it need French assistance to do that? 

We are still haunted by Colonel Ghadafi’s legacy. We are facing 

the consequences of the arms leaving Libya. What can be done to 

both continue to contain weapons in Libya, which is still not a stable country, as recent events or relatively recent events in 

Benghazi illustrated? What can we do to make sure that we don’t 

have more outflows of weapons from Libya? 

We need to examine the role of Saudi and Gulf states and wellconnected, wealthy individuals operating with the tacit support of 

their governments in funding Islamic extremists in the Sahel and 

elsewhere. We need to ask what can be done to stop drug smuggling in the Sahel. And how big a problem is that? And who is 

earning the profits? And what are those profits funding? 

And we need to ask whether the Tuareg have legitimate concerns 

and what can be done to meet those legitimate concerns without 

profiting the bad actors that have been operating in northern Mali. 

We have a lot to learn. We have some excellent witnesses. And 

I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

We welcome back Ambassador Yamamoto, Donald Yamamoto, 

who is no stranger to the Africa Subcommittee having testified several times before. He is Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, having served since 2009 as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. His distinguished career has included serving as 

U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia from November 2006 to July 2009 

and as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006. 

We will then hear from Nancy Lindborg, who has testified before 

our subcommittee on the Eastern African famine. She is the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID. She previously spent 14 years as 

President of Mercy Corps, where she focused on international development. 

During her time with Mercy Corps, she also served in a number 

of positions where she worked on issues relating to foreign relations and foreign assistance and, again, like Ambassador 

Yamamoto, has a very distinguished background. 

Ambassador Yamamoto? 

9

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, 

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much for your graciousness. 

And I submit a longer version for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, it will be a part of the record. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you, Chairman Smith, RosLehtinen, and Poe, and Ranking Members Bass, Deutch, Sherman, 

and the other members of this committee, for the opportunity to 

testify to you today. 

The countries of the Sahel face a complex series of interconnected 

and ever-evolving challenges. The 80 million people of the Sahel, 

representing roughly 10 percent of the sub-Saharan Africa’s total 

population live in some of the world’s poorest countries, which consistently rank at the bottom of any human development scale. 

The security vacuum following the Libyan revolution and the crisis in Mali exacerbated the Sahel’s longstanding political, economic 

security and humanitarian vulnerabilities. Instability in Mali and 

increased arms flow from Libya into the region also collided with 

a humanitarian crisis brought on by drought, poor harvests in the 

region already burdened by chronic poverty and food insecurity. 

Addressing the Sahel’s many challenges demands a comprehensive approach. We are working closely with regional countries and 

organizations to improve their capacity to secure porous borders 

and challenge terrorists and transnational criminal networks. 

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, TSCTP, is the 

United States’ primary vehicle to assist countries in the region to 

improve the counterterrorism capacity capability and capacity to 

control border areas. Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Chad 

are currently using training and equipment provided under TSCTP 

to contain the threat of AQIM and other extremist groups. 

Sahel countries have played an active role in supporting the 

French and African-led military intervention that has pushed extremists back into the isolated areas in northern Mali. Chad’s role 

in Mali has been significant. Burkina Faso and Niger have also 

each contributed around 670 soldiers to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, AFISMA. The United States is in the process of providing up to $96 million 

to support AFISMA troop and police-contributing countries, including Niger and Burkina Faso. Improving security in the Sahel, however, requires more than counterterrorism responses. The acute security and humanitarian challenges facing the Sahel today demand 

a robust international response. 

Our short-term successes may be fleeting if we fail to address the 

longstanding political and economic fragility and render the Sahel 

susceptible to crisis and conflict. Poor governance, weak democratic 

institutions, and a lack of development and economic opportunities 

cultivate fertile ground for instability. Improving governance, 

strengthening democratic institutions, and increasing economic opportunities, particularly for the young, therefore, are central to improving Sahel’s prospects for long-term stability and security. This 

is recited in the U.N. Security Council resolution 2100, which articulates a comprehensive approach to addressing the multifaceted 

10

problems facing Mali. And this is also to a conference that my colleague and I attended in Brussels to address this issue. 

While Mali and the Sahel remain extremely vulnerable, there are 

signs of progress. Niger, for instance, has achieved remarkable political and economic reforms since returning to democracy after the 

2010 coup. 

Mali is also moving forward. The United States cosponsored resolution 2100 and joins the international community in supporting 

Mali’s plan to hold Presidential elections in July. The creation of 

a Malian Peace and Reconciliation Commission signifies another 

important step forward. Elections and national reconciliations are 

crucial in setting Mali back on the path toward peace and security. 

And so, with this, I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]

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Testimony by Acting Assistant Secretary Donald Yamamoto 

Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. State Department 

House Subcommittees on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 

International Organizations 

And 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

And 

Middle East and North Africa 

May 21, 2013 

"The Grovv'ing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region" 

Thank you very much Chairn1en Smith, Poe, and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking 

Members Bass, Deutch, and Shennan, and Members of the Committee; for the 

opportunity to testifY before you on this important topic. The countries ofthe 

Sahel face a complex series ofintercOlU1ected and ever-evolving challenges. The 

crisis in Mali, and security vacumn following the Libyan revolution, exacerbated 

the Sal1el's longstanding political, economic and hmnanitarian vulnerabilities. 

Instability in Mali and increased arms t10ws from Libya into the region, collided 

with a hlU11anitarian crisis brought on by drought and poor harvests in a region 

already burdened by chronic poverty and food insecurity. 

Addressing the Sahel's intertwined security and hlU11a11itarian problems 

demands a comprehensive approach. We are working closely with regional 

com1tries a11d organizations to improve their capacity to secure porous borders and 

challenge terrorists and transnational criminal networks. The United States also 

continues to lead the robust international response to meet the needs ofthe Sahel's 
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most vulnerable people. Any short-tenn progress, however, could be jeopardized 

by the region's continued political and economic frailties, including persistently 

poor governance, weak institutions, and the lack of economic opportunities, 

particularly for youth. Building strong democratic institutions and promoting 

inclusive govenm1ent and economic growth are at the center of our approach as we 

attempt to solidify security gains and restore stability to the Sahel and its people. 

Crisis and Conflict in the Sahel 

By extension, security in the Sahel and North Africa are inextricably linked. 

Porous borders and limited govenunent presence and capacities mean that 

insecurity in one part ofthe region can quickly become a security threat in another. 

In 2011, one result ofthe Libyan revolution, among many others, was an increase 

in the flow of dangerous weapons and well-armed, experienced fighters into the 

Sal1e!. The collapse of Libyan security institutions caught the Sal1el at an 

especially vulnerable time. In Mali, a rebellion in the north by heavily armed, 

primarily Tuareg rebel groups, together with weak governance in Bamako, 

corruption, and an ineffectual counterterrorism response, culminated in a March 

2012 coup d'etat. Terrorist and extremist groups, including al-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), exploited the resulting political vaCUlun and seized 

control of the northern two-thirds of Mali. Terrorists enjoyed greater freedom of 

movement and, temporarily, access to a larger pool of potential recruits and 

training opportunities. At the same time, transnational criminal networks used 

well-established smuggling routes to increase their tratlicking in weapons, drugs 

and people. Chad has been a steady route for illicit weapons trafficking out of 

Libya. However, the Chadian government, with State Department support, has 

2 
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significantly increased its etforts to counter the illicit trafficking of advanced 

conventional weapons including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). 

Tn the afiemmth of the terrorist takeover of north em Mali, neighboring 

countries - including Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Niger -intensified their own 

efforts to block violent extremists and criminal networks from expanding their 

operations into other parts of the region. The Trans-Sal1ara Counterterrorism 

Partnership (TSCTP) has been the United States' pril1mry vehicle to assist these 

and other countries in the region to improve their capacity to monitor and control 

border areas and improve their overall counterterrorism capability. TSCTP 

supports a coordinated and comprehensive U.S. govenm1ent approach to building 

long-term security capacity in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, 

Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tm1isia. The program is designed to support 

partner and regional efforts to contain and marginalize terrorist organizations, 

disrupt efforts to recruit and train extremists, com1ter etforts to establish safe 

havens, and disrupt toreign fighter networks. Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, 

and Chad are utilizing the training and equipment provided under TSCTP to 

contain the threat of AQIM and other extremist groups. 

Sal1el cOlmtries have played an active role in supporting the French and 

African-led military intervention that has pushed extremists back into isolated 

areas in northem Mali. Chad's role in Mali has been significant. Chadian troops 

deployed using Chadian assets and have played a central role in counterterrorism 

operations. Both Burkina Faso and Niger have each contributed arom1d 670 

soldiers to the African-led Intemational Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and 

have pledged to increase their troop contributions when appropriately-vetted 

elements of AFISMA transition into a UN peacekeeping operation in July 2013. 

3 
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The United States is in the process of providing up to $96 million to support 

AFISMA troop and police contributing countries, including Niger and Burkina 

Faso. Our support includes training, vehicles, communications equipment, and 

personnel equipment, which will help AFTSMA contingents to transition from a 

regional force into effective UN peacekeepers. 

While the French and African-led intervention successfully wrestled control 

ofthe majority of Malian territory from terrorists and weakened AQIM, continued 

asymmetric attacks against international and Malian forces in and around northern 

population centers illustrate that Mali and the region remain vulnerable to violent 

extremism. A stable and successful future in Mali depends on a coordinated 

approach to security, political, development, and humanitarian challenges. We 

finnly supported the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 

(2013). The Resolution lays out a comprehensive approach to addressing the 

multifaceted crises in Mali - an approach that prioritizes not only the need to 

confront the ilU1llediate security challenges in Mali, but also stresses the need to 

restore democratic governance, implement an inclusive national dialogue, protect 

civilians, promote human rights, reform Mali's security sector, deliver 

humanitarian assistance, and establish effective mechanisms for justice and 

accountability. 

Addressing insecurity in Mali is only one piece of the Sahel's security 

puzzle. Terrorists pushed out of Mali will show up in other lmgoverned spaces. 

Instability in Libya and the lack of govenmlent control over its southern territory 

will continue to post an ever-present threat to the Salle!. Porous borders and 

insufficient reach by security services makes the Mali - Niger - Libya corridor an 

area of concern because it can facilitate the movement of terrorist groups and 

4 
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transnational criminal networks. We will continue to work with regional partners 

and organizations to build their capacity and improve regional cooperation to 

combat this shared threat. 

Humanitarian Challenges 

Responding to the instability in Mali and Libya alone would have presented 

an enonnous challenge. Yet in the midst of the intemational connnunity's 

response to this spike in regional instability, the Sahel faced a serious humanitarian 

crisis in 2012 brought on by a severe drought and failed harvests that put 18.7 

million people at risk for food insecurity, including one million children at risk of 

severe acute malnutrition. Since the beginning of the conflict in Mali, more than 

475,000 Malians have been displaced intemally or across borders, turther straining 

already stretched resources. Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger have generously 

welcomed some 175,000 refugees, despite their own food insecurity. The United 

States continues to lead the intemational response to this humanitarian crisis. 

Since Fiscal Year 2012, we have been providing over $550 million in humanitarian 

assistance across the Sahel to address food insecurity and the needs of cont1ictatlected Malians, including retugees. 

Early waming systems and a robust intemational response helped prevent a 

humanitarian catastrophe; but an estimated 10 million people remain at risk oftood 

insecurity. Sadly, food shortages are nothing new tor the arid Sallel, which has 

experienced debilitating, recurring droughts throughout its history. More attention 

is needed to alleviate chronic tood insecurity and break the cycle of emergency 

assistance. USAID Assistant Administrator Nancy Lindborg will provide details 

on a new U.S. govenmlent initiative to build resilience throughout the Salle!. 

5 
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Consolidating Gains: Building Governance and Inclusive Economic Growth 

While the acute security and humanitarian challenges facing the Sahel today 

demand a robust intemational response, we must remember that our short-term 

successes may be fleeting if we fail to address the longstanding political and 

economic fragility that make the Sahel susceptible to persistent crisis and conflict. 

Poor govemance, weak democratic institutions, and a lack of development and 

economic opportunity cultivate fertile ground for instability. Helping these 

countries to strengthen their institutions and be more responsive and inclusive is 

equally critical to addressing the region's deep-seated security, political and 

development challenges. 

The Sallel remains vulnerable, but we are also seeing signs of progress 

throughout the region to improve govemance, boost transparency and 

accountability, and promote inclusive economic growth. Niger has made 

measurable progress on political and economic refonn since retuming to 

democracy after a 2010 coup. In 2012, Niger achieved eligibility for a Millennium 

Challenge Corporation compact. There are also signs of progress in Burkina Faso, 

which in December 2012 held successful parliamentary elections that were judged 

free and fair by the intemational community. In Mauritania, long-delayed 

parliamentary elections are now scheduled for October 2013. 

Promoting economic growth and development is also critical to putting the 

Sallel on a path to stability. Creating viable economic opportunities and meeting 

the basic needs of its citizens remain a dmmting task for countries that consistently 

rank at the very bottom of any measure of human development. Ensuring 

6 
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women's full participation in the economy is critical for countries to raise 

productivity, generate demand, and pull conununities out of poverty. We are 

working with all our partners in the Sahel on a wide variety of economic, health, 

and education programs. Tn Burkina Faso, a five-year, $481 million Millennium 

Challenge Corporation Compact, which is on track to successfully conclude in 

2014, is reducing poverty through investments in roads, improved agricultural 

productivity, land use rights, and primary education. In Mauritania, the U.S. -

North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity (NAPEO) is building a 

network of U.S. and North African business leaders, entrepreneurs, civil society 

and public sector leaders to taster job creation, regional cooperation, and 

entrepreneurship, with a focus on youth. Assistant Administrator Lindborg will 

have much more to share on our efforts to promote economic growth and 

development. 

Comprehensive Solutions to Complex Problems 

Addressing the complex and evolving security, political and humanitarian 

challenges in the Sallel demands a comprehensive regional and intemational 

approach. Under the leadership of Under Secretary of State tor Political Affairs 

Wendy Sherman, the State Department and USAID have convened a working 

group, chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Africa, Near East, and 

Counter Terrorism bureaus, that is conducting a thorough review of our approach 

to security in the Maghreb and Sahel to ensure that our regional and flUlctional 

bureaus are effectively working together to address the region's interconnected 

challenges. Many of our partners, including the European Union, the United 

Kingdom, and France, are engaging in similar etlorts to create multidimensional, 

Sallel-wide strategies, and we are coordinating closely to ensure a common and 

7 
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complementary approach. The United States is also supporting the ongoing etlorts 

ofthe UN Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, to develop an integrated 

UN strategy for tackling the region's multiple crises. 

In closing, we must continue our efforts to approach the Sal1el and the 

Maghreb's interconnected problems with a comprehensive regional and 

intemational etlort. Such an etlort must address the illli11ediate security threat 

posed by violent extremists and transnational criminal networks, while at the same 

time building the institutional capacity needed to address the Sahel's political 

economic and humanitarian challenges. 

8 
19

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Yamamoto, thank you very much. 

Ms. Lindborg? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NANCY E. LINDBORG, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. LINDBORG. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Smith, 

Ranking Member Bass, and members of the other subcommittee 

leadership: Ros-Lehtinen, Poe, Deutch, and Sherman. Thank you 

for assembling us today for this important topic. 

As Acting Assistant Secretary Yamamoto noted, he and I were at 

a conference in Brussels last week, where 80 nations came together 

to support Mali, which is an important development. During that 

event, President Traore of Mali noted how grateful he was for the 

international support and the fact that terror had abated. And he 

commended us to address the root causes of this crisis, with good 

governance as the priority. And his comments, as many of you understood, really addressed the complex challenges that fact the 

Sahel, where we have insecurity, weak governance, chronic underdevelopment that combine to result in great vulnerabilities to 

drought, to conflict, to terrorism. And these vulnerabilities have 

kept millions in the Sahel in a state of poverty and perpetual humanitarian crisis. 

I have visited four countries in the Sahel since the Fall of 2011. 

Without question, there are bright spots. In Senegal, with the 

peaceful transfer of power in their last elections, women attained 

43 percent of the parliamentary seats. A civilian energetic government in Niger that has withstood the recent pressures, remarkable 

farmer-led regreening efforts in Niger and Burkina Faso. However, 

the challenges in this highly complicated region have humanitarian 

and security implications that, as you have noticed, we absolutely 

must stay focused on. 

So four ways that USAID is tackling these challenges: First, continued humanitarian assistance, life-saving for a region that is buffeted by continual shock. In 2012, the third drought hit the Sahel 

in less than a decade. It affected 18.7 million people, 8 million people were in need of emergency food assistance. 

Thanks to the early warning systems that we have invested in 

for the past several decades, we saw signs of this drought as early 

as the Fall of 2011. We were able to move in prepositioned assistance and I believe forestall a much worse crisis. 

However, as that drought was coming forward, the conflict worsened in northern Mali. Malians fled to the south and across borders 

to communities that were already stretched by drought. 

In 2012 and 2013, we have provided over $550 million in humanitarian assistance to the drought-affected and conflict-affected families. And this brings me to our second area of focus, which is building resilience. 

Even in the best of times, the Sahel has high malnutrition. And 

shock after shock keeps millions in perpetual crisis. We know that 

these will continue to happen. And what used to be 10-year cycles 

of drought are now every other year. Galvanized by the Horn 

20

drought, followed by the Sahel drought, we have launched a resilience agenda, with the goal of reducing chronic crisis because of 

chronic poverty. We are working with international development 

partners to get ahead of the crisis and enable families and communities to weather these shocks more effectively. We have increased 

our team in the Sahel. And we have our development and humanitarian teams working together to design joint programs. 

Our third area of focus is governance. This is fundamental to stability, to sustaining our resilience and our development gains, and 

to withstanding the inevitable shocks. The March 2012 coup in 

Mali vividly illustrates this. 

Going forward, legitimacy will be essential for the sustainability 

of any democratic transition. We are working in Mali to support 

this return to democracy, as we are working to support and consolidate democracies in Niger and Nigeria and elsewhere in the region. 

Assistant Secretary Yamamoto has spoken about our efforts to 

counter violent extremism. And we continue to work as part of the 

interagency on the interagency Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 

Partnership to complement our relief, resilience, and development 

efforts. 

None of these shocks will be defeated overnight. And the heart 

of progress will be legitimate accountable democratic governance. 

This is vital to ensuring that we have an alternative to extremism 

and to protecting precious development gains in the face of inevitable shocks for our own national and economic security and for the 

people of the Sahel who have already endured so much. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]

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WRITTEN STATEMENT 

NANCY LlNDBORG, 

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, & 

HUMANTT ARIAN ASSISTANCE, 

U.S. Agency for Intemational Development 

"The Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region" 

May21,2013 

Thank you Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass and Members of the Subcommittee on 

Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations; the Subcommittee 

on the Middle East and North Atrica; and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade, for the opportunity to speak with you today about the complex set of developments 

affecting the people of the Sahel and USAID' s efforts to date. Thank you also for your continued 

support for our assistance programs that make a difference in the lives of millions every day. 

Introduction 

Last week, along with Acting Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto, I attended a conference in 

Brussels where 80 nations came together to pledge support for Mali as it seeks a pathway back to 

democracy, peace and prosperity. President Traore of Mali began the meeting by thanking the 

international community for its help and expressing his gratitude for the fact that, in the north of 

Mali, people are no longer having their hands and feet cut offby terrorists, women are no longer 

being raped, and Islam is no longer being defamed as a tool of terrorists. In his speech, he 

emphasized that "we must learn our lessons from bad governance and realize that the collapse of 

this house of cards endangered our people as well as the entire region." He commended all of us 

"to address the root causes of this crisis with good governance as the first priority." 

President Traore's comments underscore the complex challenges facing the Sahel, where areas 

of insecurity, weak governance and chronic underdevelopment combine to result in great 

vulnerabilities-to drought, conflict, and terrorism-that have kept millions across the region in 

a state of poverty and perpetual humanitarian crisis 

Since the Fall of2011, I have visited four of the countries that comprise the Sahel. The families I 

met, in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, were experiencing serious crisis for the second or third 

time in a decade. Thanks to your support and to the continued efforts of USAlD, the State 

Department, and our international development partners, many of these families-mothers and 

their children-have been able to endure. 
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There are significant bright spots in the region, including the very encouraging 2012 elections in 

Senegal; the current energetic, democratic government in Niger; the African-led International 

Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA); and the remarkable regreening efforts in Niger and Burkina 

Faso that have created important pockets of resilience to recurrent drought. However, the 

challenges in this highly complex, interwoven region have humanitarian and security 

implications that require our focused and sustained engagement. 

Working closely with our colleagues across the US. government as well as with international 

development and African partners, USAID is responding to these challenges with country and 

regional programs that provide immediate life-saving humanitarian assistance; build resilience so 

households, communities, and systems can better withstand shocks; support the development of 

accountable, legitimate democratic governance; and analyze and address the 'push' and 'pull' 

drivers of violent extremism with development tools. 

Humanitarian Crisis in the Sahel and the U.S. Response 

In the fall of 2011, thanks to mechanisms including the Famine Early Warning System Network 

(FEWSNET), which USAID has supported for 25 years, we saw signs that there would be a 

tough lean season ahead for the Sahel The third drought to hit the region in less than a decade 

would affect 18.7 million people by the height of the crisis in 2012, with more than 8 million 

people in need of emergency food assistance. 

I am confident that taking early action in response to early warnings prevented a bad situation 

from becoming much worse. As early as November 2011, USAID began pre-positioning food 

commodities and, in February 2012, I traveled to Niger and Burkina Faso to assess the 

worsening situation. Since the beginning of 2012 the US government has provided over $550 

million in humanitarian assistance to reach more than three million people across the region. 

This includes more than $181 million for Mali's ongoing complex crisis, of which $32 million 

was announced last week. The US. response provided food, cash and vouchers to those most 

vulnerable across the Sahel; supported protection and emergency assistance to Malian refugees, 

IDPs, and conflict-affected populations and treatment for acutely malnourished children; taught 

pastoralists better ways to produce fodder; and helped farmers who had lost their seed stock plant 

for the next season. 

Our response to the most recent crisis in the Sahel was smarter, more targeted, and more marketsensitive than ever to hel p the communities of the region build resilience to the next, inevitable 

drought. Because food markets were still functioning in most parts of the Sahel, our cash and 

voucher programs allowed vulnerable families and communities to access locally available food 

and basic goods in addition to our in-kind food aid. Coupled with temporary work opportunities, 

these efforts supported local markets and promoted sustainable agriculture practices even while 

responding to acute needs. We focused on strengthening nutrition by providing new, nutrientrich food products and by promoting key nutrition messages. Importantly, for many pastoralist 
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families in the Sahel, cows, sheep, and goats are tantamount to savings accounts; our emergency 

response continues to help families keep livestock healthy and alive. 

Recent reports from the Nigerien government say some 800,000 people in Niger will require 

food assistance in coming months despite above average rainfall and crop production in 2012. 

While still too high, this number is significantly lower than the 64 million Nigeriens in need at 

the peak of the crisis last year. 

Looking ahead, the interrelatedness of West African markets and insecurity will continue to have 

a strong effect on food security. Flooding in the regional breadbasket of Nigeria and conflict in 

Northern Nigeria and Northern Mali are affecting markets and trade flow region wide. Tn 

Nigeria's Borno and Yobe states-the epicenter of the Boko Haram conflict-high staple food 

prices coupled with conflict-related declines in crop production, cash incomes, and market trade 

flows are expected to result in crisis levels offood insecurity. While food prices are likely to 

increase atypically as demand outpaces supply, the good news is that last year's plentiful 

harvests have allowed many across the Sahel to earn more from sales and keep a little for 

themselves. 

Building Resilience to the Region's Recurrent Crisis 

Childhood malnutrition and underdevelopment are endemic in the region under even the best of 

circumstances, so one poor harvest can push millions of the most vulnerable into severe risk. As 

a result of climate change, areas that used to experience severe drought once every ten years are 

now affected every two or three, meaning food prices have been continually high since the food 

crisis of2008 When drought hit its peak in 2012, many families were still struggling to recover 

from food crisis in 2010. The farmers of Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, and their neighbors were 

forced to borrow money to buy food or the seeds to plant during the rainy season saddling them 

with crippling debts and perpetuating a vicious cycle of need. 

Recurrent crises like we have seen in the Sahel erase development gains we cannot afford to 

lose. USAID is detennined to get ahead of these kinds of chronic crises by doing business 

differently. We cannot prevent drought in Niger or flooding in Nigeria, but we can and are 

working to create better solutions and build greater resilience among the most vulnerable. 

In Dakar, Senegal, we have brought our humanitarian and development teams together to fonn a 

regional Joint Planning Cell (JPC) to undertake joint analysis and joint planning for a more 

comprehensive approach to programming in the region. They are working to layer, sequence and 

integrate our relief and development resources and activities for a greater, long-tenn impact. 

With the goal of tackling drivers of vulnerability-poverty, marginalization, weak governance, 

low rainfall, population pressure and high population growth, food price volatility and climate 

variability-our JPC is driving forward a resilience strategy that builds on successful adaptations 

and innovations already underway to reduce risk, build resilience, and facilitate inclusive 
24


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economic growth in targeted areas. The goal is to reduce humanitarian caseloads in the region by 

several hundred thousand while benefiting millions. 

USAID's resilience work in the Sahel is part of a larger, international Resilience Agenda 

galvanized by the 20 II crisis in the Horn of Africa Together with our development partners, we 

committed to the shared goal of building resilience to get ahead of chronic crisis, protect 

development gains, and make populations around the world less vulnerable to inevitable shocks. 

This renewed focus on resilience is vital to building food security-tantamount to human 

security-for so many across the Sahel 

The Vital Role of Transparent, Accountable Governance 

As we have seen in crises around the world, the lack of good governance in the Sahel has been a 

core contributor to the region's instability-and compromised local governments' ability to 

prevent the onset and escalation of crisis. The March 2012 coup in Mali, coinciding with a 

regional food security crisis well under way, reflected the fragility of Mali's democratic 

development and exacerbated humanitarian need region wide. 

Disillusionment with the government's inequitable delivery of basic services and management of 

the Tuareg rebellion in the north made the country vulnerable to political upheaval. Previous 

iterations of the Tuareg rebellion had been handled with limited political concessions and 

promises, while the physical distance between northern and southern Mali enabled Bamako to 

underplay the problems of security and poor governance in the north. 

Ordinarily, frustrations with the incumbent government's perfonnance would have been 

expressed through a change ofleadership and parties. An int1ux of fighters and weapons from 

Libya, among other factors, made this time different Ultimately, the deficits of a government 

that was not inc1usi ve, accountable, or responsive to the needs of its people were laid bare when 

an under-resourced and poorly equipped Malian army illegitimately took power in a coup d'etat, 

disrupting 20 years of democratic rule. 

Going forward, government legitimacy will be essential for the sustainability of any democratic 

transition. USAID supports an inclusive electoral process that includes the participation of all 

Malian citizens. Our partners will provide support for training and technical assistance to 

government institutions for election administration, electoral legal refonn, domestic election 

observation, and ci vic and voter education, with targeted assistance for IDPs and returned 

refugees. In January 2013, USAlD launched a "Mali Transition Initiative," a pilot program to 

support the democratic process and participation in elections. USAlD recently expanded the 

initiative to support peace and reconciliation efforts - consistent with the Section 7008 coup 

restrictions - through activities that facilitate dialogue at the national, regional and community 
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levels, bringing together traditional, non-governmental community leaders, youth, women, and 

religious leaders. 

While we look forward to the restoration of democratic rule following presidential elections 

scheduled for July, Mali's political crisis has left the country unable to deal over the last year 

with the escalating humanitarian and security crisis within and beyond its borders. More than 

300,000 lDPs are reportedly now in the country and 175,000 Malian refugees in Niger, Burkina 

Faso, and Mauritania. While the French intervention has increased humanitarian access to the 

hard-to-reach north, violence by remnants of extremist groups continue to complicate relief 

efforts and pose additional threats to the security of the region. Meanwhile, recent surveys 

indicate that displaced populations still hesitate to return for fear of repri sal s, general insecurity, 

or the lack of basic services like education and health care. With Malians in the north still 

extremel y vulnerable due to limited interventions over the last year, public structures decimated, 

and a host of actors vying for power, Mali's new democracy will face steep challenges indeed. 

As the U.S. commitment to a strong, humanitarian response in the Sahel remains unwavering, 

our continued support for a peaceful democratic transition in Mali and support for stronger, more 

accountable governance across the region will be just as vital. 

111 Niger, liSAlD provided critical support for electoral and constitutional reform to help enable 

a peaceful transition from military to civilian rule 1~)llowing the February 2010 military coup, 

and we continue to support good govemance through support for greater transparency in the 

extractive industries. In Nigeria, USAID prioritizes extensive elections support ongoing civil 

society engagement, capacity building for key government agencies with a focus on 

strengthening fiscal responsibility and improving transparency, and strengthening independence 

of the judiciary. At both the national and local levels, transparent and accountable governance is 

vital for West Africa to endure the range of shocks it is confronting-from climate change to 

conflict to the array of extremist groups now vying for influence. 

Development's Role in Countering Violent Extremism 

While the recent rise of violent extremism in West Africa cannot be directly attributed to 

drought, chronic food insecurity, or weak governance, each of these factors can indirectly 

exacerbate instability in the region. Just as droughts and floods result in crisis because of the 

Sahel's underlying chronic vulnerabilities, structural "push" factors can create the conditions that 

favor the rise of violent extremism. USAID's 2012 policy on countering violent extremism 

(eVE) defines push factors as high levels of social marginalization, poorly governed or 

ungoverned areas, government repression and human rights violations, endemic corruption and 

elite impunity, and cultural threat perceptions. Importantlv, these push factors only contribute to 

violent extremism when combined with 'pull' factors, which often involve rhe appeal of an 

inspirational figure or matelial, emotional, or spiritual benefits timn affiliation with an extremist 

group. 
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81167b-6.eps

Since 2006, tbrough the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Pminership (TSCTP), an integrated 

interagency approach to address violent extremism in the region, USAlD has worked to forge 

partnerships between the U.S. and African governments to empower participants to resist the 

drivers of extremism at the individual and community levels. USAJD's work under TSCTP 

focuses on the four areas where we see the greatest opportunity for local partnerships and 

progress: youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance. 

To ensure that the impact of our development assistance and CVE efforts are not undermined by 

the influence of drug trafficking- a clear contributor to instability in a region that has long been 

home to illicit smuggling networks- -US AID is working with the interagency to mitigate the 

trafficking of narcotics and transnational organized crime and developing a USAlD 

programming guide based on the impact of drug tratTicking on development in the region. The 

incursion of fast drug money into the Sahel's political systems exacerbates existing governance 

challenges, as anned groups in the region exact security fees from drug traffickers in exchange 

for protecti on. 

Conclusion 

To help defeat the range of shocks that has put West Africa on the front pages ofintemational 

newspapers over the last year, we have increased our focus on tackling the region's chronic 

underdevelopment and underlying vulnerabilities. ljSAlD is at the forefront of these efforts, 

working closely with our interagency pm1ners, and doing business dilferently to ensure that each 

investment goes even further. 

At the heart of progress will be legitimate, accountable democratic governance, as we are already 

seeing in countries like Senegal and Niger. This will be vital to ensuring an alternative to 

extremism and to protecting precious development gains in the face of inevitable shocks-for 

our own national and economic security and for the people of the Sahel who have already 

endured so much. 

Thank for your time today, and I look forward to taking your questions. 
27

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Lindborg, thank you very much for your testimony. And, without objection, your full statement will also be made 

a part of the record. 

We do have three votes on the floor. I thought I would ask some 

questions and then we would go into a brief recess. Then we will 

come right back and go to the other members for their questions 

if that is okay. 

Let me just ask first, earlier today, as I mentioned, I had a very 

good meeting with Malian Speaker Toure ́, who is obviously the 

former Prime Minister as well. And we spoke about a number of 

issues, including the challenges of the July election. And I wonder 

if you might just speak to whether or not that election can occur 

in a way that would be free, fair, and inclusive. 

We also talked about malaria. I chaired a hearing just a few days 

ago with Admiral Ziemer. We had Mark Dybul, who now is Executive Director of the Global Fund, who told us that we are at a tipping point. There is a lack of bed nets, despite the best efforts of 

the international community, including the United States, and that 

the nets do not last forever. You know, once they are 2 to 3 years 

old, they have to be replaced. When there is a crisis like we have 

seen in Mali, infectious diseases and parasites are also opportunistic and could gain a foothold. 

I wonder, Ms. Lindborg especially, if you could speak to that? 

You spoke eloquently to the hunger issue. Maybe you could elaborate a bit on what the issues are, the challenges of malaria and 

other infectious diseases. 

We also had just a few days before that with Dr. Frieden, who 

talked about multi-drug resistance and resistance in general. You 

talked about the resiliency efforts. Well, resistance is something we 

are all concerned about when antibiotics fail to do their magic. So 

if you could speak to those issues, I would appreciate it. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Sure. First of all, for the July elections, we are 

working very closely with international partners and certainly with 

the Malians to do two things. First is support a reconciliation approach. One of the issues is addressing the fact that so many 

Malians felt disenfranchised and not a part of the overall conversation. 

We are supporting both that national reconciliation approach as 

well as support for the mechanics of the election. Clearly one of the 

important issues is ensuring that the many refugees and IDPs, internally displaced people, have an opportunity to vote. And UNDP 

along with UNHCR are very much focused on ensuring that there 

are those kinds of more inclusive registration approaches. 

There are two parts to the election. One is the Presidential, 

which is scheduled for July 28th. And it is unclear whether the legislative elections will be able to be held then or scheduled for later 

in the fall. It is critical that Mali have the elections as a means 

of returning to its democratic roots and taking a pathway forward. 

On your second question about malaria, this is critical. You are 

absolutely right in that, even as we look at very high malnutrition 

rates, at the height of the drought, the largest killer of children 

under five in Burkina Faso was malaria. For that reason, as part 

of the resilience agenda—and it is a little bit like your three subcommittees coming together—we have brought together across secVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Nov 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\052113\81167 HFA PsN: SHIRL
28

tors our teams in USAID to put together a more comprehensive, focused approach that includes our efforts to combat malaria and our 

family-planning approaches and our food insecurity approaches together so that we are able to address some of the root causes across 

the sectors and have a more potent and effective approach to, even 

as we save lives, setting the pathway to development. 

Infectious diseases are always of concern when you are moving 

into emergency. And a lot of our efforts, in addition to our health 

programming, are also in water sanitation. 

And the final piece is that, in addition to the bed nets, it is the 

behavioral change that is so important, which is why you want to 

package these together. 

Mr. SMITH. Was the Brussels conference a success? 

Ms. LINDBORG. It was——

Mr. SMITH. Go ahead. Please. I am sorry. 

Ms. LINDBORG. It was very successful in that it both raised a lot 

of money, it kept the attention of the issue with the top of international attention. And there was a combined agreement among 

most of the nations there that it was imperative for Mali to return 

to its democratic roots and to have national reconciliation as key 

to moving forward. 

Mr. SMITH. We are almost out of time, but just if you could spend 

a moment on the State Department-led, pan-Sahel initiative 

charged with detecting and responding to suspicious movement? 

Has it worked? Are we happy with the coordination? 

And the other point, just like these committees coming across 

lines, I know that the State Department is looking to do so because 

there is a split in terms of jurisdiction. Is the coordination much 

improved in your opinion? And what might we expect in terms of 

new initiatives? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes. As far as the coordination between 

not only the interagencies but also with the governments involved 

in the Sahel, it has been very cooperative and focused on really 

clear common agendas and themes. 

And then one last step, going back to the elections in Mali, I 

think the elections in Mali would be critical to establishing and 

moving forward on the whole wide range of issues because by going 

into democracy issues, we can address the other issues; in other 

words, release our funding and assistance which have been held up 

by the sanctions of 7008. 

But more important is that it is part of the linchpin of the other 

crises that we must address, which is the humanitarian crisis, the 

reconciliation in the north, and also the conflict with the extremists. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass? 

Ms. BASS. Yes. I know we are getting ready to break to go to 

votes, but I just wanted to begin my questioning. And I can finish 

it when we come back. 

I wanted to know if you could briefly discuss the role that 

AFRICOM may be planning to secure the areas. And if you don’t 

have time to finish, we can finish when I get back. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. You know, I defer to the DoD colleagues 

on AFRICOM, but, just shortly, in the Mali context, what 

29

AFRICOM and DoD are not only the refueling for French aircraft 

but also intelligence sharing, which we are doing multi-agency. 

And the other issue is providing strategic lift within the region 

to help some of the 15 African countries who are participating in 

AFISMA go into Mali to provide security assistance. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee stands in brief recess, subject to 

the call of the chair. I do apologize to our witnesses for the delay. 

[Brief recess.] 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. And sorry you had to wait, but 

we are through with votes now. We won’t be interrupted again. 

I know as I was running back and forth to my other hearing, 

that you mentioned the conference in Brussels. I wanted to know 

if you could describe the character of the conference and what new 

information may assist our committees. And then I know it was reported that over $4 billion was pledged 

at the conference. I wanted to know how much was the U.S.’s contribution and what stipulations were made to ensure that Mali 

takes appropriate steps to hold elections. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Hi. Thank you. 

You know, it was very important that 80 nations came together 

at that moment to signal support for Mali. The funding that was 

raised is not all new money, I think, as the French noted. It includes money that is already in play. It also includes money that 

will be forthcoming from a variety of countries based on benchmarks achieved by Mali. But what is essential is that it provide 

that immediate assistance right now, especially as Mali moves forward to address national reconciliation in elections. 

We announced $32 million of new money that is primarily for humanitarian assistance and for specifically the refugees. But we also 

noted the funds that we have already put toward Mali, which includes the $550 million of humanitarian assistance regionally and 

of that $7 million of democracy rights and governance support specifically for Mali and our funding for health programs and, specific 

to Mali, humanitarian. 

So I think that it was a very positive conference. We commended 

the French and the Europeans for hosting it. And we look forward 

to working with the international community on what is a very important, and it won’t be easy, road to bring Mali back to democracy. 

Ms. BASS. Well, you know, I wondered when we were there in 

February and had met with the President and asked him how he 

was going to be able to hold elections with a couple of hundred 

thousand people displaced. And maybe you could respond to that, 

you know, whether there is the capacity to do that, how it will be 

done, who will be monitoring. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you. 

Let me just start with a couple of points and turn to my colleague. The issue is that registration in the north, as you know, in 

the last election was about 36–37 percent of the people voting in 

2007. And for credible elections to take place, you really need to 

have the registration of the minority groups, ethnic groups up in 

the north: The Tuaregs, the Songhais, and the Arab groups. 

Nancy Lindborg and I talked to President Issoufou of Niger. And 

we said that we would like to work for it and registering the refugees. There were about 400,000 who are internally displaced or in 

30

refugee camps. And so registering them, we figured that we can 

probably get to those magical numbers and to make it a reasonably 

credible election. 

The French are also working in Kidal. So, therefore, you can 

have registration of groups in that area. 

It is not the cleanest. It is messy. But at least we need to work 

for it. The elections are critical. The elections would be critical in 

holding because from there, we can do the other things that we 

need to do. 

Ms. BASS. And you referred to the internally displaced. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. That is right. 

Ms. BASS. The externally displaced? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Like Tunisia, Mauritania, Chad, to register them as well in the refugee camps. 

Do you want to add? 

Ms. LINDBORG. I would just simply add that USAID with our efforts to provide election support is very focused on ways to include 

the internally displaced populations. There are a number of measures underway, including outreach, information campaigns. There 

will be a need, as you probably heard when you were there, to continue to augment the capacities of the Elections Commission. 

There is a proposal to introduce biometric identification. And all 

of these measures we strongly believe must be accompanied by a 

reconciliation campaign, that there is that opportunity for dialogue 

so that people trust the elections and enable them to feel compelled. So there is both the mechanics of it and then the communications campaign and ways to make it a more inclusive, legitimate process. 

Ms. BASS. And could you speak some about USAID’s humanitarian efforts in the greater Sahel? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Sure. You know, as I noted in my comments, we 

started in 2011, in the fall, with efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the drought and doing so in a way that lay the foundation for greater resilience, even as we saved lives, overlay by all 

this displacement. So we have both the ongoing efforts to address 

the drought. 

And one thing we kept in mind is that in the north, there was 

only ever 10 percent of the population that was in need. And in 

Mali, the greater need always was in the south with the food insecurity just in terms of proportion. 

So the resilience agenda is giving us a way to address that, even 

as we look at ensuring we reach those populations in the north 

that are coming out of, really, a reign of terror over the last year. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Weber, the gentleman from Texas? 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess this question is for Ms. Lindborg. Am I saying that right? 

Are we able to identify a lot of the countries in the Sahel that are 

going to be U.S.-friendly, for example? And if they are coming out 

of a background, terror, for example, how do we identify them and 

get the word out that we want to help them become stable economies, stable governments? Are we able to identify a list and then 

prioritize that list so that we can begin to work in the ones that 

need the most priority firstest? Is that a word? 

31

Ms. LINDBORG. Let me start. And I may ask my colleague if he 

wants to jump in on that. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Ms. LINDBORG. But our humanitarian assistance is provided on 

the basis of need. And we work directly with communities in need, 

not through the governments. Our development assistance is very 

much about working in ways that create more accountable, more 

transparent, and more inclusive democracies, even as we invest 

also in health and agricultural programs. 

In the Sahel, there are a range of governments. And there is a 

range of ways in which we are providing support to strengthen 

both our democracies but also investments in their economic and 

social indicators. 

Mr. WEBER. Without going through the list and counting the 

countries, is it seven, ten, twelve? 

Ms. LINDBORG. We have development programs and development 

missions primarily in Senegal. And of that spine of countries, we 

did in Mali. As Assistant Secretary Yamamoto said, the development activities are suspended until the return to the democratic 

roots of Mali. 

We are increasing our programming in Burkina Faso and in 

Niger. And in Chad, we have primarily just humanitarian assistance, as is the case in Mauritania. 

Mr. WEBER. Is there another country that you will identify that 

is probably going to need our help next; in other words, developing 

events, where you could say, ‘‘On a timeline basis, we are going to 

be here next’’? 

Ms. LINDBORG. You know, one of the problems with the Sahel is 

that it is chronically underdeveloped. And you could argue that it 

could absorb significant new development investments across the 

whole region. That is one of the reasons that we have partnered 

very closely with the European Union in an organization called 

AGIR, the Alliance for Global Investments in Resilience because we 

know that we need to partner to leverage the investments that everybody brings to the table, both to build resilience and improve 

more inclusive governance at all levels, local level, national, and regional. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Did you want to weigh in, Mr. Yamamoto? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I guess just a general comment is that 

not only coordinating with the other organizations because this is 

not only a U.S. issue. It involves the regional states but also the 

diaspora. You know, you were mentioning how many countries are 

like the United States. You know, we did a survey about, you 

know, 70 percent of Africans like the United States. And why is 

that? Because we didn’t have the colonial baggage, but more importantly is you have a large——

Mr. WEBER. You said 70 percent? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. 70 percent. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. You have a large diaspora in the United 

States who provide assistance and support. And that is also another group that we can rely on to help engage and try to resolve 

problems in Africa. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

32

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cotton? 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Yamamoto, I would like to ask a couple of questions about 

Mali and its implications. I am new to Congress, but when I saw 

the news in 2012 the Mali Government was struggling, that it 

might fall and France had to intervene, I found that to be somewhat surprising. I thought Mali was one of the more stable examples of a Sahel country. So I would like to know, one—do you share 

that assessment, first? Second, if so, what do you think we got 

wrong in our assessment? What did we miss in thinking that it 

was one of the better examples of stability in the region? And, 

third, how does that assessment bear on what other countries 

might face similar instability? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Let me take a first crack and then turn 

to my colleague. I think the issue is, you know, you look at these 

democratic countries or democratic-leaning countries. This year it 

is fragility of institutions within these countries. Mali is a very 

democratic country, where the institutions were very fragile. And 

so when you say, ‘‘Where did we fail?’’ I think the issue is not so 

much the failure. I think what you look at is there is a lot of number of issue. In other words, you had the influx of extremists coming into the area. You have the rise of the Tuareg rebellion. You 

have missed cues and missed plays by the government in making 

a military operation in the north, rather than dialogue as some of 

their main input into trying to reach out to these ethnic groups. 

And so there is a combination of problems within these countries. 

What we are trying to do right now is stabilize it to first return 

democratic values and good governance to make the governments 

accountable to the people. And second is to address the terrible humanitarian crisis of 400,000 displaced. The other issue is to promote a dialogue with the government with all of the ethnic groups 

and tribal groups. And the final point is to address the issue of extremism. So that is the kind of thing. 

Do you have anything you want to add? 

Ms. LINDBORG. I would just underscore that any time you have 

marginalized populations, even if you have successful democratic 

elections, if you do not address those grievances, you are setting 

the stage for longer-term problems and the possibility of the kind 

of conflict that broke out. And we see this country after country. 

And it speaks to the importance of having an inclusive and very 

legitimate democracy, not just elections. 

Mr. COTTON. I believe that other countries in the region are expected to contribute peacekeeping forces for Mali. I know that Mali 

right now is the center of counterterrorist operations in the region. 

Is there a concern on your part that the peacekeeping forces from 

those other countries could weaken their defenses and encourage 

Islamic jihadists to move out of Mali and into neighboring countries? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. That is a very good point. They right 

now are speaking with the commander for the AFISMA, the African troops. In AFRICOM, you know, we have 15 countries, which 

speak 3 different foreign languages. And the capacity and capability is very different from each troop but because these countries 

33

are committed to stability in Mali, because it is not only for Mali 

but for the stability of the region. 

So are these countries also facing problems? Of course, they are, 

not only from extremist operations but also internally from weak 

institutions, fragility. And so by them coordinating and developing 

and providing assistance in troops to the Mali operation, that 

speaks volumes of their commitment, not only to Mali but also to 

their own defense as well. 

I think it is going to take time. It is going to take a lot of effort. 

But we wanted to emphasize that this has to really be an Africanled, African-managed operation because ultimately they bear the 

full responsibility for what happens in that area. 

Mr. COTTON. When France intervened, they took the lead, but 

the United States very promptly had to provide assets like strategic airlifts, refueling, intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance. I 

am aware of those things as an ex-soldier. 

Are there other kinds of critical assistance that the United States 

Government provided to either the French or to the Mali Government that we should have in mind as we look at the possibility of 

having to intervene to support counterterrorist operations elsewhere in the region? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I defer to my DoD colleagues, but on the 

French side, of course, we did the presidential draw-down authority. So, in other words, we had the $19 million total for the fuel, 

for the aircraft, and then intelligence we collected. And the other 

thing is to provide lift for the equipment into the area but also for 

helping for lift of some of the African troops into Mali. 

As far as doing military operations or other things for the Malian 

Government, you would have to go to the DoD side, but what we 

are trying to do is make sure that AFISMA and the troops there 

have the equipment they need and the support, logistical support, 

and also we are going to continue to contribute so they can develop 

a command and control center, coordinate and integrate all of these 

troops and have good interoperability. I think that would be critical. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Cotton, thank you very much. 

I just want to observe that Speaker Toure ́ is still here, the 

Speaker of the Malian Parliament, the former Prime Minister. And 

I would just say, Mr. Speaker, Tom Cotton, who just asked the 

questions, one of the greatest things about our committee and, really, our Congress is the diversity of backgrounds. Tom spent 5 years 

on active duty. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School. So he 

combines those disciplines. And he was deployed twice to Afghanistan and to Iraq. So he asks questions that are relative to military 

issues, as do other members, all of whom have come here with a 

great deal of background sometimes. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COTTON. And I did join the Army after having gone to law 

school and practiced law, which may affect the depth of my legal 

skill and knowledge. 

Mr. SMITH. That is great. Thank you, Tom. 

Mr. Cook? 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

34

I have to apologize for my voice. I have laryngitis. I haven’t been 

giving a lot of speeches, obviously. 

But I just wanted to go back to your comment about the popularity of Americans, which I think obviously was a shock to a lot 

of people here. And I appreciate you explaining why. Now, how we 

could take advantage of that—and I think you already answered 

the question in terms of, you know, support those activities, just 

the geography of the region there with so many different countries 

and the different languages and ethnic groups and how some type 

of—whether it is the African Union or some type of loose federation 

of African states, what is the glue, the common denominator? Because I agree with you. I think that is the only way. You know, Africa governed and the chances made by Africa’s outside interlopers 

are not going to do it, but I think we have the opportunity to help 

something like that. 

I think what I am looking for is some kind of common denominator to enable something like that, where it is just very hard for 

me when I look at a map and you look at the different countries 

and just remember some of the countries, Ouagadougou, the capitals. And what was it? Nouakchott that was the capital of Mauritania and very, very difficult. Most Americans don’t understand it 

and particularly looking at a map. 

And then I wonder if you might have any—if you could elaborate 

on what kind of denominators that we think are most successful for 

the Americans to have an impact in that area. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I think each and every day, the United 

States has a tremendous impact, not only from the agencies but 

from American industry. I mean, here today, we have NGO groups, 

faith-based groups doing a lot of work in Africa and doing good 

work. 

I think one of the things that you raise as a very important issue 

is, how do you bring all of these countries together? The African 

Union is one forum. You know, we assigned an American Ambassador to the African Union several years ago. Other countries have 

followed suit. We are trying to build capacity and capability. And 

then we are looking at the subregional groups, such as ECOWAS 

in the West, CEEAC in the central, SADC in the South. You have 

got all of these different organizations and regional groups. 

And I think to build capacity, to build the ability to coordinate, 

and to face challenges on their own, that really is kind of the golden objective we are trying to do. 

And I think the careful coordination between these organizations 

and the good will that we have with these groups, I think we are 

looking at I think successes now. And they can multiply in the future. 

And so I think the—not only American foreign assistance but 

mainly American good will. Look what the United States does 

today. We brought in justices recently to look at the American system. That really helped influence how they view, how justice and 

law and the ability to talk with you, sir, and the chairman on how 

the Parliaments and the Congresses should work and operate. That 

also helps to promote good governance. 

But I will turn to my colleague from USAID. 

35

Ms. LINDBORG. You know, when I was in Senegal shortly after 

their Parliamentary elections, I met with a group of women who 

were ecstatic because 43 percent of the new Parliamentarians were 

women. And I was congratulating them. And one woman looked at 

me and said, ‘‘You know, this didn’t happen overnight. We have 

been working on this for 25 years. And it has been with extraordinary help from the American public.’’

I say that to illustrate two things: 1) that progress is possible; 

and, 2) that it is going to take a while. But it is about helping 

countries, communities, civil society, private sector feel an ownership stake in the future of their country, and supporting their pathway forward. And we are seeing, as I noted, bright spots. Niger has 

an extraordinary program called the Nigerieus Nourish Nigeriens 

that is a very energetic comprehensive look at how to create greater economic opportunities for their people. And it is when people 

feel included in that future and understand the support that the 

United States is providing for that that you work on both of those 

fronts. 

And the U.S. has been a tremendous partner for support for Africa that I think is borne out by these public opinion polls. 

Mr. SMITH. Two very brief questions. One, when it comes to inclusion in partners, are we including the faith-based groups? And 

to what extent? If you could maybe say a word or two and then provide a breakout, if you will, a spreadsheet? 

And, secondly, we have 300,000 IDPs and, of course, what, 

150,000-plus refugees. I know we are working hand in glove with 

the UNHCR and other friends, but what is the unmet need when 

it comes to those IDPs and refugees? Is there a dollar amount that 

could be affixed to what that need is and maybe a breakout as to 

what the commodities are and other kinds of items that are now 

missing? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Well, first of all, we have wonderful faith-based 

partners throughout the region. And the importance of those 

groups is that they have been there through thick and thin working at the community level. And we are honored to have them as 

partners and be delighted to provide you a breakout of who is doing 

what where. It is an impressive list. And we are through that able 

to leverage the generosity of the American public, which provides 

private support through these groups as well so that we are able 

to greatly increase the overall assistance that we provide. It is part 

of the American generosity. 

On the needs of the IDPs and the refugees, there is a new U.N. appeal for 2013 of $410 million. And I am delighted to provide the 

committee a breakout of what that goes to, what has come in, both 

from the U.S. and from other donors. 

Mr. SMITH. What is our contribution to that $410 million appeal? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Our contribution to date just for Mali, refugees 

and IDPs, is $181 million, just over. And so there are both ongoing 

needs for just essential——

Mr. SMITH. Is that the same thing? The $410 million appeal is 

also the Mali aid or is that different? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Right. That is just Mali. 

Mr. SMITH. That is just Mali. 

Ms. LINDBORG. That is just Mali. And so it is both ongoing needs. 

36

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Ms. LINDBORG. It is also we have been very focused on ensuring 

that the impact on drought-affected communities is addressed as 

well because many of them have gone to stay with communities 

that are already deeply stressed from the drought. 

Mr. SMITH. Now, in terms of the assistance, I was part of a 

launch with seven African first ladies 2 years ago. You might recall 

it very well, the First 1,000 Days Initiative, from conception to the 

second birthday. How well are we doing in the Sahel region with 

regards to backing up that unbelievably important first 1,000 days 

of life? Because if you get that right, of course, you are more apt 

to get the rest of it right too. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes. You are absolutely right. That is critical. 

And we have increased our focus on nutrition during those first 

1,000 days. And one of the most important things we have done 

from the emergency side is increased the development of the highly 

digestible therapeutic foods that are so critical for those first 1,000 

days and refocus some of our assistance programs to work both on 

the behavioral changes as well as the more nutritional products 

that can address malnutrition, without which you have impacts for 

the rest of an individual’s life. 

Mr. SMITH. Can I ask you, in terms of probiotics, has USAID integrated a probiotic mindset? Obviously, antibiotics have greatly increased the ability of people in their gut to carry the good flora. 

Where are we in terms of promoting good probiotic efforts, the good 

organisms? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes. There are some interesting new studies out 

that show that clean water can be even more important than antibiotic treatments for addressing some of the gastrointestinal diseases that affect children and create malnutrition. So part of that 

is investment in greater clean water and sanitation approaches. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, my point is—and maybe you can take it back—

is, you know, the whole idea of immunity. And there is a growing 

body of knowledge that immunity is almost exponentially enhanced 

by having the right probiotic mix in a person’s gut, gut flora. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes. We can give you more details on that. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for your testimony. I think we are finished with members. And thank you for your very honorable and 

effective service. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now welcome our second panel to the 

witness table, beginning with Mr. Rudolph Atallah, a 21-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force who retired as a lieutenant colonel. He 

served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as Africa counterterrorism director, where his responsibilities included advising 

the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials on counterterrorism policy, strategy, and serving as an adviser to the State Department numerous Embassies across Africa. 

He has been a featured guest on programs on NPR, CSPAN, and 

the National Geographic Channel, where he has discussed African 

piracy and successful resolution of the 2009 Maersk Alabama incident. 

We will then hear from Dr. Mima Nedelcovych, who is a partner 

in the Schaffer Global Group, a Louisiana-based project development, finance, and implementation company focused on agro-indusVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Nov 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\052113\81167 HFA PsN: SHIRL
37

trial and renewable energy projects in the emerging markets in Africa and Latin America. For the Schaffer Group, he is the lead 

partner in a sugar project in Mali. He recently established an independent consulting practice on trade facilitation, project development, project finance, and public-private partnerships in Africa. 

And then we will hear from Nii Akuetteh, who is an independent 

policy researcher analyst who specializes in U.S. foreign policy, African development, and international relations. He often publishes 

in American and African journals and appears in Aljazeera, Voice 

of America, the BBC, and other TV and radio outlets analyzing African issues. He has been a Georgetown University professor, journal editor, and leader of advocacy organizations working on three 

continents. He created and led two organizations focusing on democracy and conflict in Mali. 

Colonel, if you could begin? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members 

of the subcommittee. 

I submitted a written statement for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, yours and all of the others’ full 

statements will be made a part of the record. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RUDOLPH ATALLAH, SENIOR FELLOW, 

MICHAEL S. ANSARI AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. ATALLAH. Since my testimony on the situation in Mali last 

June, things have escalated dramatically, causing further instability in the Sahara and the Sahel. Many skeptics underestimated 

the Islamist threat and claim that the Saharan branch of AQIM 

was only focused on kidnappings for ransom and illicit trade, rather than jihadist activities. A year later, Mali is faced with a new 

threat: Suicide bombers, a phenomenon never seen in the Sahel before. In fact, since 9 February, Mali has experienced 12 suicide attacks in the cities of Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Me ́neka, and now 

Gossi, which happened on 9 May. These are primarily areas that 

were once under Islamist control after the secular MNLA was elbowed out by AQIM and its allies. I am concerned that in time, 

AQIM’s influence and tactics will grow more sophisticated and violent following a similar evolution seen by the Nigerian jihadist 

group Boko Haram from 2011 to present. 

The root causes of terrorist escalation in Mali and across the region are complex and multi-faceted. Understanding the why of this 

present violence and the logic of its perpetrators requires us to look 

more closely at some of the principal regional issues that contributed to this current crisis. 

First, militants linked to al-Qaeda, hardened by years of survival 

under oppressive regimes, have been revived in this region since 

the start of the Arab Spring. Seasoned fighters from Afghanistan, 

Algeria, Iraq, Syria further bolster their skills and intent, helping 

them to expand their networks, strengthening their fighting capacities and resolve to recruit new militants. 

Terrorist training camps exist in several parts of the region, and 

every state is vulnerable to AQIM, which has been massively bolstered by weapons flow, porous borders, and security vacuums in 

the Sahel, in combination with fragile regional governments. 

38

The recruitment narrative of AQIM has also been given new life 

via Western intervention in Mali and renewed, increasingly severe 

focus on Western targets. The recent Amenas in Algeria; the hostage crisis; and the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate just exemplify some of these patterns. 

Another catalyst for violence, violent extremism in Mali and the 

broader region is the confluence of marginalized peoples, pushed 

into harsh border areas, and violent extremist organizations. Militant Islamists, like AQIM, Boko Haram, MUJAO, Ansar al-Dine, 

and others prove attractive to some within marginalized ethnic 

groups, coerced into a veritable no-man’s land, seeking social justice and political recognition. 

Despite the French intervention in 2013, of this year, designed 

to route out AQIM, the former has most certainly not concluded its 

project in Mali. For the better part of a decade, proselytization, 

intermarriage, a variety of inducements, and alliances with tribes 

have left AQIM with many friends in northern Mali and the region. 

Moreover, AQIM fighters have opted for tactical withdrawal 

versus the supposed strategic defeat that some claim. Some militants clearly remain in the country, evidenced by the increased suicide bombings, while others have merely taken refuge in Libya, Algeria, Sudan, Niger, Mauritania, and elsewhere. 

In sum, the French, Chadian, and Malian efforts in the main 

pushed against AQIM and their allies out of Mali. The network remains resilient and has emerged less effective but more clandestine 

in nature. 

In contrast to Mali, Morocco stands out as a model for a reform 

in progress in the region. It continues to fight terrorism through 

the strengthening of the security and justice systems and emphasizes a preventive dimension against violent extremism and organized crime through reform in the economic, political, social, religious, and educational fields. And they have actually put this all 

in the Amazigh, or the Berber, language. 

Nevertheless, like other countries in the region, Morocco is concerned with the risks of infiltration by terrorists fleeing Mali via 

illegal immigration channels. For example, 2 weeks ago, Moroccan 

authorities dismantled two terror cells that, according to news 

agencies, were believed to be in contact with jihadists in Mali. 

While there are few proverbial silver bullets to solve this complex 

problem set, there are several approaches that could make a difference. And let me provide a few of them. 

The first recommendation is, as we were discussing with the previous panel, to bring USAID back into the fight in the key territories in northern Mali and the surrounding region. Couple that 

with the support of U.S. and allied special forces initiatives. From 

Tindouf, Algeria to the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad, the arc of 

instability, as the U.N. calls it, the populations of this under-governed region receive little support and are left exploited by various 

political actors, including AQIM and its allies. 

The second recommendation pertains to addressing border insecurity in the region. Borders between countries of the Sahara remain porous and open to terrorists and smuggler activity, both of 

which weaken governance and promote corruption, not to mention 

global insecurity. It is time that these countries of the region reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Nov 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\052113\81167 HFA PsN: SHIRL
39

ceive assistance to secure and monitor a movement along their borders. This applies not only to land traffic but also to air. 

Finally to effectively counter the jihadist narrative wielded by 

AQIM, a comprehensive and expertly crafted information operations campaign is necessary for the region. Violent extremists associated with AQIM experience far too much safe haven in social, 

print, and televised media, and this must be rectified. Recently, 

news agencies flocked to write about AQIM’s new Twitter account, 

which gained 5,000 new members in 2 weeks. And it is noteworthy 

that the Syrian terror group Jabhat al-Nusra, Somalia’s alShabaab, and Tunisia’s Ansar al-Sharia are all followed by this 

new AQIM Twitter account. Countering AQIM’s media expansion 

and online havens is crucial to our long-term success against violent extremism in the region. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Atallah follows:]

40


81167c-1.eps

Introduction 

Conflict and Instability in the Sahara and the Sahel: 

Local Dilemmas, Global Implications 

Prepared Statement of 

Rudolph Atallah (Lt Col USAF, ret.) 

Senior Fellow, Michael S. Ansari A/rica Center, 

Atlantic Council 

and 

Chief Executive Officer, 

White Mountain Research LLC 

before the 

:5>UllrDnlllllittee 011 a;:rrl:ori~lll, J)'OIl\lI'olifrt'MtCI1l, 

on 

liThe Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region" 

Tuesday, May 21, 2013, 

2:00 p.m. 

Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2172 

Washington, D.C. 

North Africa and the intertwined Sahel, from Egypt to Mauritania, is a region that has 

undergone profound and destabilizing political and social change in the last several 

years, especially since the "Arab Spring" of 2011. Nascent political systems, newly 

empowered non-state actors, and underlying structural problems in the region 
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Rudolph Atallah Prepared Statement at Hearing on "The Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region" 

May 21, 2013 

contribute to an increasingly volatile mix, the implications of which-especially 

terrorism-are global in scope. 

This statement explores the areas and sources of security and instability in the Sahara 

and Sahel, emphasizing several geographic focal points and specific threats. Terrorist 

networks associated with al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) will receive a great 

deal of attention in this discussion, as will the patterns of radicalization and the illicit 

economies that support them. Left unaddressed, these patterns and nefarious actors 

will increasingly threaten the interests of the United States and her allies, both within 

and without Continental Africa. 

I will conclude with several recommendations to the Congress, the primary one being to 

take the necessary legislative steps to empower and direct the Administration to work 

with the international community to synchronize critical USAID assistance to at-risk 

populations in places like Northern Mali with the efforts of Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) to deny safe haven to terrorist actors, diminish their standing within at-risk 

populations and prevent them from using the area to continue to threaten US and allied 

interests. 

Mali 

Since I last came before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights 

to discuss the situation in Mali in June 2012, things have escalated dramatically in the 

West African country, causing further instability in the Sahara and the Sahel. Many 

skeptics underestimated the Islamist threat and claimed that the Saharan branch of 

AQIM was only focused on kidnappings for ransom and illicit trade, rather than jihadist 

activities. A year later, Mali is faced with a new threat, suicide bombers-a 

phenomenon never seen before in the Sahel. In fact, since 9 February 2013, Mali has 

experienced twelve suicide attacks in the cities of Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Menaka, and 

now Gossi. These are primarily areas that were once under Islamist control after the 

predominantly Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was 

elbowed out of Northern Mali last June by AQIM and its allies. This trend, which speaks 

to the inculcation of the insidious ideology, ethos and means of al-Qa'ida's global jihad, 

is not going to disappear anytime soon. I am concerned that, in time, AQIM's influence 

and tactics will grow more sophisticated and violent in Mali, following a similar 

evolution seen in the Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram from 2011 until present. 1 

The root causes of the terrorist escalation in Mali and across the region are complex and 

multi-faceted. Understanding the "why" of this present violence and the logic of its 

perpetrators requires us to look more closely at some of the principal regional issues 

that contributed to the current crisis. 

1 See J. Peter Pham, Boko Haram's Evolving Threat, Africa Center for Strategic Studies African Security 

Brief No. 20 (April 2012). 

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First, the situation in Northern Mali has recently escalated because jihadists across the 

region have become more proactive and lethal generally-a trend mirrored in Mali. 

Militants linked to al-Qa'ida, hardened by years of survival under oppressive regimes, 

have been revived in this region since the start of the "Arab Spring." Seasoned fighters 

from Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, and Syria further bolster their skills and intent, helping 

them to expand their networks, strengthening their fighting capacity and resolve to 

recruit new militants. 2 Terrorist training camps exist in several parts of the region, 

especially the Egyptian Sinai and Upper Egypt, southern and eastern Libya, northern 

Mali and northern Nigeria. Every state in this region is vulnerable to AQIM, which has 

been massively bolstered by weapons flow, porous borders and security vacuums in the 

Sahel, in combination with fragile regional governments. The recruitment narrative of 

AQIM has also been given new life via Western intervention in Mali and a renewed, 

increasingly severe focus on Western (rather than Muslim government and civilian) 

targets. Beyond the recent In Amenas hostage disaster, the September 11, 2012, attack 

against the US Consulate in Benghazi exemplifies this pattern. Militants like Mokhtar 

Belmokhtar will also look increasingly to establish their bona fides and recruitment 

potential by striking accessible Western targets, including corporations with spectacular 

theatrical impact. Heavy-handed government responses to AQIM, as witnessed in 

Algeria, only raise the bar of lethality.3 

Another catalyst for violent extremism in Mali and the broader region is the confluence 

of marginalized peoples, pushed into harsh border areas, and violent extremist 

organizations. Militant Islamist elements like AQIM, Boko Haram, The Movement for 

Tawheed and Jihad in African (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, and others prove attractive to some 

within marginalized ethnic groups, coerced into veritable no-man's lands, seeking social 

justice and political recognition. Across the Sahel and Sahara, there are numerous 

examples of such marginalized peoples living in (predominantly post-independence) 

areas marked by weak governance, poverty, ethnic tensions and other insecurities that 

develop symbiotic relationships with extremists. This is the situation in Northern Mali 

and Niger with elements of the Tuareg ethnic group; the Toubous in southern Libya, 

northeastern Niger, and northern Chad; and the Sahraoui from Western Sahara. Nigeria, 

the most populated country on the African continent, is also mired in corruption, 

abusive security challenges and strife between the largely Muslim North and the 

predominantly Christian South. In each country, marginalized groups seek haven from 

oppressive regimes in neglected regions, while foreign militants are drawn to the same 

spaces to capitalize on the discontent. This creates a destabilizing conundrum that is 

playing out across the region. 

2 For an overview of the social and operational impact of foreign jihadis! fighters, see Frank J. Cilluffo, 

Jeffrey B. Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp, Western Foreign Fighters: Trends and Implications (Washington, 

DC: George Washington University, October 2010). 

3 Magnus Ranstorp, Rudolph Atallah, and Jeffrey B. Cozzens, "Hva vi blllr laere av In Amen.s" ("After In 

Amenas: Five Lessons for Corporate Security in Africa"), VG Nett, January 29, 2013, 

http://piuss. vg.no/20 13!01(29!1103/vXQCKe. 

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Rudolph Atallah Prepared Statement at Hearing on "The Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region" 

May 21, 2013 

A further reason for escalating destabilization in Mali is central government corruption. 

In Bamako (and elsewhere), the central government embezzled aid money destined for 

the North, leaving its inhabitants, the Tuareg, Songhai, Arabs, and others out to fend for 

themselves. Fifty-three years after independence, and these resourceful peoples 

continue to be deprived of development, leaving the door open for extremist elements 

to exploit their grievances to generate recruits. Tuareg (and others) are at home in the 

desert and know how to make a living there, but the lack of resources prevents them 

from developing a modern economy. While the Tuareg excel at trading (especially 

livestock) and tourism, Bamako refuses to acknowledge that these pastoralists produce 

a significant amount of their milk and meat. If they had good roads and trucks, they 

could capitalize on these primary industries much more efficiently. We should support 

their business efforts instead of stigmatizing them. Bamako needs to acknowledge the 

legitimate input of Tuareg into the national economy and support them through more 

extensive development. Bamako has not been doing this. 

A severe cultural and ethnic divide between northern and southern Mali are the result 

of this central government corruption. From the perspective of many Tuareg (especially 

the older generation), before independence, their social and economic ties were 

historically with people of the North; decades post-independence, the Tuareg and Arabs 

still find it difficult to integrate with the South. Bamako elites jockeying for lucre and 

other civilians scrambling for scarce resources and sparse development money want to 

stigmatize "light-skinned" peoples as a means of excluding them economically and 

politically. These elites exclude whole populations based on arbitrary factors like skin 

color. This creates antagonism between pastoralists and agriculturalists, no matter 

where the Tuareg live. 

The principal antagonists are some of the ethnic Bambara, who are largely in control of 

the government and benefit from the best salaried jobs, nepotism, cronyism, military 

positions, and major corruption. In order to make their government seem like a 

democracy and procure Western aid, they also support a few "clients" in a patron-client 

system. 

A further reason for the violence has to do with the entrenchment of jihadists in Mali. 

When the (primarily Algerian) Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC, the 

precursor to AQIM) first set foot in Northern Mali in 2003, it was careful to integrate 

itself into the local population. Extremists like Belmokhtar and Abdelhamid Abu Zeid 

(recently killed by French forces) married into local tribes, forging ties with and securing 

support from these communities, making it extremely difficult to extricate AQIM 

entirely. Clearly AQIM is not a creation of the "Arab Spring" or even a new threat. It is a 

terrorist group that traces its origins back to the Algerian civil war in the early 1990s. 

While the overthrow of M uammar Gaddafi from power did indeed allow AQIM in Mali 

access to more sophisticated weapons, its threat and presence in Mali pre-dated 

Gaddafi's fall by almost a decade. 

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Rudolph Atallah Prepared Statement at Hearing on "The Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region" 

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AQIM has also been relatively successful in establishing itself in Mali beyond 

intermarriage because of its ability to seize opportunities-a theme promoted by alQa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri himself in a July 2007 message to the group. This 

opportunity came last year, when a confluence of factors-namely, the Malian 

rebellion, the fall of Gaddafi to the northeast and the presence of generally like-minded 

factions like MUJAO and Ansar Dine -coalesced to spark a jihadist insurgency that 

carved out a de facto "jihadist condominium" in Northern Mali. 4 This "condominium" 

will, in theory, allow AQIM to "command the good and forbid the evil" on the ground 

(i.e. apply its understanding of shari'a law) to "reform" local tribes; manage the work of 

local jihadist partners, MUJAO and Ansar Dine; and develop a base to strike both near 

and far enemies-essentially, the pattern proposed by jihadi theorist Abu Bakr Naji in 

Management of Savagery.s 

Despite the French intervention in early 2013 designed to route AQIM, the former has 

most certainly not concluded its project in Mali. For the better part of a decade, 

proselytization, intermarriage, a variety of inducements, and alliances with tribes have 

left AQIM with many friends in northern Mali and the region. Evidence shows that even 

corrupt Malian officials have benefited financially from the jihadists' presence, making it 

all the more difficult to root out the violent extremists. 

Moreover, AQIM fighters have opted for tactical withdrawal, versus the supposed 

strategic defeat that some claim. Some militants clearly remain in the country, 

evidenced by the increase of suicide bombings, while others have merely taken refuge 

nearby in Libya's south, Algeria, Sudan, Mauritania, and elsewhere. Once a strategic 

opening is perceived by AQIM's leadership-and a new racial savagery wrought by 

Malian forces on the Tuareg, Arabs and Peul pushes them even closer to the 'enemy of 

their enemies: the jihadists-re-infiltration and new 'condominiums' will be 

established. 6 

In sum, while French, Chadian, and Malian efforts have in the main pushed AQIM and 

their allies out of Mali, the network remains resilient and has emerged less effective but 

more clandestine and dispersed. The Malian military itself has little support among 

Northern populations, which are needed to deny safe haven to AQ. This makes it 

exceedingly difficult to find and attack the jihadists without significant population 

support-a situation reminiscent of dislodging the Taliban from Afghanistan. Further, 

4 See Fernando Reinares, "AQIM's Existing and Disrupted Plans in and from the Sahel-Analysis," Eurasia 

Review: News and Analysis, May 12, 2013, http://www.€urasiareview.com/12052013-aqirns-existin.-andBakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will 

Pass, trans. William McCants, (Cambridge: John M, Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 

May 23, 2006), http://www, wcfia. ho rvard.edu/olinfimages/Managernent%20of%20Savagery%20-%2005-

See Reinares, "AQIM's Existing And Disrupted Plans In And From The Sahel-Analysis," 

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Rudolph Atallah Prepared Statement at Hearing on "The Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region" 

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the withdrawal of a large portion of French combat forces will almost certainly 

exacerbate friction between secular rebels (MNLA) and the state, with the chance of any 

negotiated solution unlikely and escalation towards active future rebellion probable. 

This distracts both Mali and the MNLA from the fight against AQ, essentially creating the 

instability, time and space needed for the jihadists to reestablish a safe haven in Mali's 

north. 

The Tuareg 

In the cases of Mali and Niger, Tuareg (and to a lesser extent, certain Arab tribes) 

remain marginalized and oppressed by the central governments. In January, after France 

drove jihadists from key cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, an undisciplined and 

unprofessional Malian military took advantage of the victory to beat, torture and kill 

non-combatants (Tuareg and Arabs) who allegedly supported the MNLA. Human Rights 

Watch has documented numerous atrocities against civilian populations, which are 

fueling deep resentment by a suffering population. If left unchecked, terrorist groups 

like AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine will exploit local grievances and young populations 

with no economic opportunities. 

While on trip to Kidal in late 2002, a Tuareg friend named Ibrahim showed me a mosque 

where Tuareg youth were being recruited by missionaries from the Tabligh Jamaat sect 

for indoctrination into a more radical brand of Islam. In our conversation, Ibrahim 

explained that his people and culture would never be radicalized because the youth 

were the backbone of their society. Today, the majority of Tuareg want nothing to do 

with jihadists' version of shari'a law, which also curtails rights for women that are 

upheld by the Tuareg. They prefer to embrace a secular lifestyle, allowing each person 

to follow his/her beliefs. As if to back this statement, on 19 September 2006 and 23 Oct 

2006, three years after GSPC members settled in Northern Mali, Tuareg clashed with the 

Salafist group to push them out of their territory, with no support from the central 

Malian government, which at the time was receiving counter-terrorism military aid and 

training, the Tuareg sustained heavy losses. 

Unfortunately, because of the poor treatment of the Tuareg by Bamako over the years, 

they are caught between a rock and a hard place, and the radicalization of a few is a sad 

testimony to the pressures they face in an isolated and ethnically charged region. 

Indeed, some Tuareg prefer to side with Islamists, not for ideological reasons but to 

keep Bamako and anti-Tuareg violence out of the North. Moreover, a small minority of 

Tuareg are radicalized because of the influence of a charismatic Tuareg leader named 

Iyad Ag Ghaly, who gained notoriety for leading the second Tuareg rebellion in the early 

1990's. Today, Ag Ghaly is the emir of Ansar Dine and his involvement with AQIM landed 

him on the US's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists. 

Libya 

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A weak central government, strong militia groups, and resilient jihadist networks are 

three main factors contributing to an unstable environment in Libya. Local interest 

groups also dominate the political landscape and exercise authority overthe distribution 

of power, federalism, and ethnic minority rights. 

Over the last year and a half, Benghazi in particular has been the epicenter of targeted 

attacks on security forces, Western diplomats and international organizations. Recent 

militancy in and around Benghazi illustrates the broader instability that increasingly 

mars Libya. Following the revolution's end, many attacks in Benghazi (especially against 

police stations) have historically occurred at night, resulting in few casualties. However, 

on May 13, 2013, Benghazi saw a shift in the nature of attacks. A car bomb exploded 

near the Jalaa Hospital resulting for the first time in civilian deaths (no one claimed 

responsibility). The Ministry of Interior, struggling to bring militias under some form of 

centralized control, can do little about such violence-even as it faces increasing 

pressure to reign in the revolutionary brigades. 

The brigades that in large part control security in Libya are divided into two competing 

factions: one focused on local interests and another driven by Isla mist ideology. 

Whether Isla mist or not, the brigades demand sweeping political exclusion of anyone 

once associated with the old regime, primarily the alliance of many independents from 

Libya's south and central regions. Wolfram Lacher explains in his paper "Fault Lines of 

the Revolution" that organized extremist groups are emerging in the country, but they 

typically operate outside the framework of the new official institutions and garner their 

support when needed. 7 This is in keeping with the historic anti-state lineage of antistate jihad ist groups in the region. 

AQIM, which finds refuge primarily in southern Libya (another marginalized region), is 

believed to have growing interest in cementing its presence there since the French-led 

intervention forced them to regroup outside Mali. According to several Libyan security 

personnel interviewed by a trusted contact, during the early part of May 2013, AQIM 

representatives met with local Libyan jihadist groups to refocus attacks on French 

interests in the region. The meeting, which lasted several days, was held at an 

undisclosed location in the mountains of Djabal al Akhdar. 

These developments should come as no surprise. We know that from the spring of 2011, 

AQIM cadres fought in Libya during the Revolution. Moreover, Belmokhtar was kept 

closely informed of the progress of the attack against the US Consulate in Benghazi on 

September 11, 2012. 

'Wolfram Lacher, Fault Lines oj the Revolution: Political Actors, Camps Gild Conflicts in the New Ubya, 

(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2013), 

berl in. org! en l pu bl !catio n s I sw p-rese" rch-pa pe rs/swp-resea rch-pa perdetailjarlicie/libya fault lines of the revolution.l1lm!. 

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Rising Tunisian Extremists 

Overt militancy and attacks are, of course, the most tangible way to chart the evolution 

and reach of AQIM. Beyond Mali, Tunisia is another region of struggle and recruitment 

for AQIM, largely because of its weak Islamist government and the hard-core salafists' 

proficient social media apparatus, preaching and charitable organizations. 8 The Tunisian 

government (or what remains of it) recently conceded that it had struggled against two 

small jihadist groups near the Algerian border led by AQIM-linked veterans of the jihad 

in Mali. 9 According to Tunisian Foreign Minister Othmane Jarandi, some 800 Tunisians 

are fighting in the Isla mist rebel ranks in Syria. 10 If past is precedent, the likelihood of 

them returning to Tunisia or somewhere else in the region to fight for AQIM's cause is 

high, much as Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) veterans did upon their return from 

Afghanistan. Further, 11 of the 32 terrorists who attacked the Algerian gas plant were 

Tunisians, and a Tunisian citizen, Ahmed Abassi, has recently been charged with 

involvement in the plot to derail a passenger train between Toronto and New York 

City. 11 

Former TCG activists, some of whom are linked to the Tunisian Ansar al-Sharia (AST) and 

inspired by jihadist preachers like Kamel Zarouq, fuel the Tunisian reservoir of potential 

AQIM operatives. Zarouq and other extremist preachers are actively engaged in da'wa 

(in this case, proselytizing and social services) in and around the Tunis area. 12 Zarouq's 

own words are instructive and speak to the supranational goals of AQIM and its Tunisian 

supporters: "Our goal is to support the Islamic nation, to support our religion, to elevate 

the shari'a, and to spread the law of Muhammad. Our goal is to pull the nations out of 

darkness and into light. Our goal is to instate the shari'a, and regain Andalusia and 

Jerusalem.,,13 

On May 12, 2013, Abu Yad h, the extremist leader of Tunisian Ansar al-Sharia, said much 

the same in a diatribe that threatened Tunisian authorities bent on cracking down on 

salafi activism. Accusing the authorities of waging "war against Islam"-a common jihadi 

accusation against regional governments-and recalling Tunisian jihadists' participation 

in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia and Syria, Abu Yadh added that "these 

S See Ghassan Ben Khalifa, "The Secret of Salafists' Appeal in Tunisia," AI Monitor, May 1, 2013, 

h!md.Lwww.al-rnaQItor.g:Jm/pulseklllt.!!!./20 13/QK d I sa slY" "taged-t'ill isia n.::'LQ.~th-e lD.P fa ceSee Abou Djaffar, "Papa, Get the Rifle From its Place Above the French Doors! I They're Comin' from the 

Woods!" Le Monde, May 2, 2013, http://aboudjaffaLblog.lemonde.fri2013/05/02/papa-get-the-rifleSee "Tunisia FM: 800 Tunisian Isla mists Fighting in Syria," Naharnet, May 11, 2013, 

See Jessica Murphy, "Via Suspects Discussed Alternative Plans to Poison Air/Water to Kill up to 100,000 

People: Court Docs," Toronto Sun, May 9, 2013, lill1'.iL,!yww,torontosun,com/2013/05i09/third-manKhalifa, "The Secret of Salafis!s' Appeal in Tunisia," 

13 "Tunisian Muslim cleric: 'Our goal is to Instate the Shari'a, and Regain Andalusia and Jerusalem: and 

Conquer Rome," Jillad Watch, May 10, 2013, http://www,jilladwatch.org/2013/05/tunisian-muslim-cieric0 u '-f oe I-i s-to-i nstate-the-sh a ria-a n d-rega i n-a nd a I usia-" n d-jeru sa Ie m-o nd-co n q, hIm I, 

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young people" are ready to give their lives to defend the salafist project in Tunisia, 

saying: "Our lives will not be expensive if paid for our religion is attacked and if our 

preaching is embarrassed.,,14 He also warned against government interference with a 

planned May 19 Ansar al-Sharia conference in the city of Kairouan. 

AI-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 

AI-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb is the most notorious violent extremist network in the 

region and a principal source of terrorist violence. Trends related to AQIM that we are 

witnessing across North Africa and the Sahel should be a cause for concern. The next 

section explores these developments. 

AQIM remains poorly understood and generally underestimated. This could be due to 

the fact that the organization's Shura council and leadership is in Kabylia, in northern 

Algeria, and intelligence sharing from the host country is marginal at best. However, 

AQIM has been forming networks in the Maghreb and the Sahel for many years, and 

developing cells or cooperating in other ways with extremist factions like Boko Haram, 

the Boko Haram splinter group Ansaru, and various Tunisian and Libyan jihadists. The 

recent attack against the Embassy of France in Tripoli and the failed attack against the 

British embassy illustrate that the Algerian iihadists and their local allies are able and 

ready. 

It is noteworthy that the head of AQIM's notables' council, Abu Ubayda Youssef al 

Annabi, recently called for support in attacking France. iS This call echoed a common 

refrain of many other global jihadists-join the fight globally against Islam's 

oppressors-but was very specific for AQIM and representative of its growing vision 

and, likely, reach. Indeed, AQIM's ability to leverage support and increasingly develop its 

narrative is where its strength lies. Speculation over whether the group operates as a 

unified organization, how it is divided into smaller franchises or the count of its 

"members" is basically irrelevant. The important matter is the influence it wields to 

mobilize support from Isla mists across the region, harness discontent and legitimize 

violent jihad against regional states and their Western supporters. This ability lends it an 

increasing global character, which has been especially apparent over the last two years. 

AQIM has been expanding and forging relationships across the Sahara and Sahel for 

years with significant implications for the region. These relationships go beyond North 

and West Africa, as the involvement of Canadians in the In Amenas, Algeria, gas plant 

attack demonstrated. After the gas plant attack in Algeria, Mokhtar Belmokhtar's 

popularity grew among certain youth in North Africa. An example from social media 

1411Abou Iyadh declare officiellement la guerre aux forces de I'ordre Tunisiennes/' Business News, May 5, 

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provides one useful metric. A Facebook page called the "Derna Media Center" (DMC) 

gained 4000 new "likes" in two weeks after the attack when Belmokhtar's photo was 

posted on the site and he was touted a hero (Facebook removed the page). While these 

"likes" could, of course, indicate many different things and do not suggest 4,000 new 

AQIM recruits, they serve as one quantifiable illustration of the attention (and potential 

attraction) AQIM is capable of generating within some regional segments. 

In sum, AQIM is linked to a greater or lesser extent to almost all increasingly active 

jihadist networks across the region, even if by inspiration alone. Indeed, in just the first 

two weeks of May we have witnessed continued suicide attacks in Mali and the 

dismantling of two terror cells in Morocco (the "AI Mouahidoun" and "Attawhid" cells, 

according to news agencies, which had already carried out robberies to fund their 

activities and were believed to be in contact with jihadists in northern Mali).16 Further, 

Egypt claims that it has disrupted a terror plot against one or possibly two foreign 

embassies; Boko Haram has not stopped its relentless attacks in Northern Nigeria; and 

an alleged Tunisian militant was arrested for apparently plotting against US and 

Canadian interests. 17 While some view these events as wholly disconnected, my 

experience on the ground and contacts across North Africa strongly suggest that the 

common denominator tying them together is AQI M and/or its inspiration. 

Boko Haram 

Boko Haram is a terrorist group allied with AQIM that wants to create an Islamic State 

across Nigeria. While some question its links to AQIM, the proof of this relationshipand therefore the threat from Boko Haram to allied interests and US-is growing. 

In August 2011, the group attacked the UN Headquarters with a suicide bomber-an 

innovation that speaks to the group's commitment to tactical progress and jihadist 

modus operandi. It is not a coincidence that the same year a spokesman for the group, 

Abu AI-Qaqa, claimed that Boko Haram had ties with al-Qa'ida. While there is no 

concrete proof to this assertion, the group undoubtedly drinks from the same well, as 

evidenced by its behavior and pronouncements. A well-publicized video on YouTube 

titled "Join the Caravan" shows Nigerians participating in training with AQIM. Further, in 

September 2011, AQIM's media wing released for the first time a 2011 message 

purportedly written by Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram. These events 

highlight the ideological and potentially operational support that permits Boko Haram to 

grow in sophistication (and threat). 

16 "Morocco Dismantles Two Cells That Planned Attacks on its Soil," Middle East Online, May 9, 2013, 

Perry and Yasmine Saleh, "Egypt Says Thwarts Suicide Attack on Foreign Em bassy," Reuters, May 

11,2013, http://www.reuters.com/articie/2013/05/11/us-egypt-algaeda-plot-idUSBRE94A07K2013051l. 

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Since the French intervention in Mali in January of this year, evidence suggests that 

some members of Boko Haram have turned their sights outside of the Nigerian borderanother indicator of affinity for the global jihad. In January, two Nigerian troops were 

killed and five seriously injured after a splinter of Boko Haram, Jama'atu Ansarul 

Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (or, "Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black 

Africa") claimed responsibility. The Nigerian soldiers were deploying to Mali to join West 

African forces. After the attack, in a written statement, Ansaru said: "We are gladly 

informing the general public, especially those in the black Africa, that...with the aid and 

guidance of Allah we have successfully executed our first attempt in griping [sic] the 

Nigerian army troops that aimed to demolish the Islamic empire of Mali.,,18 This attack 

clearly shows solidarity between the Nigerian terrorists and those in Mali and logically 

implies (another) strong link between Boko Haram and AQIM. 

Further, in a video that aired before the release of a kidnapped French family in April, a 

Boko Haram spokesman openly threatened France: "Let the French President know that 

he has launched war against Islam and we are fighting him everywhere. Let him know 

that we are spread everywhere to save our brothers." Filmed in Arabic, this video 

highlights a new approach for the group designed to maximize appeal, which historically 

addressed all videos in a local language called Hausa. 

Also, for the first time, the group took hostages to leverage its own agenda-a page 

from AQIM's playbook. In the video, Boko Haram uses the family as a bargaining chip to 

end Western military action in Somalia and Mali, calls for the release of prisoners from 

Cameroonian and Nigerian jails and asks for a ransom payment. When the hostages 

were released, news sources reported that Boko Haram received a $3 million ransom 

payment and secured the release of some members detained in Cameroon. These 

demands and their global character clearly reflect the growing influence of AQIM in the 

region. 

Organized crime & narco-trafficking 

Organized crime-especially various forms of smuggling and narco-trafficking-is the 

lifeblood of the vast under-governed expanse of the Sahara. It is within this largely 

decentralized and politically corrupt milieu that terrorists and criminals work together 

to access weapons and money to sustain their symbiotic operations. 

Cigarette smuggling 

In 2003, I traveled to Dirkou in the Eastern Niger near the Chadian border. During my 

visit, I witnessed a large convoy of trucks heading north towards the Libyan border. 

When I inquired about the cargo, my guide explained that it was black market tobacco 

destined for the markets in Libya and Europe. He went to say that the cargo received 

18 "Isla mists Kill Nigerian Soldiers Heading to Mali," IRIN News, January 21, 2013, 

http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97301/lslamists-kill-Nigerian-soldiers-headlng-to-Mall. 

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protection from the Nigerien military, which collected a small percentage of the revenue 

because the government was poor and this was a way to compensate. 

The cigarette smuggling business is nothing new in this region. It began two decades ago 

and evolved over time into a lucrative business that has profited government officials, 

military personnel, smugglers and terrorists alike. Extremists like Belmokhtar (a man of 

many nicknames, including "Mr. Marlboro") greatly benefitted from this business. In 

2009, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) wrote an in-depth report 

about the black market tobacco and narco-trafficking trade in North and West Africa."9 

In the report, investigators demonstrated how widespread and lucrative these trades 

were. 

A separate September 2012 report by Wolfram Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict in 

the Sahel Region," referenced the UNODC report but provided further evidence and 

important insights concerning the complexities of cigarette smuggling networks in North 

Africa: 

The key actors in this trade are legal cigarette importers and distributors, who 

import their merchandise from free trade zones such as Dubai. The trade is 

therefore best interpreted as a deliberate strategy by tobacco companies to 

circumvent tax regimes or break North African state monopolies on cigarette 

distribution. 

This system has led to the erosion of the customs services because of 

corruption and collusion between smugglers and state officials. Fa r part of its 

journey, the merchandise is transported in large trucks on the main roads, with 

the connivance of Malian and Nigerian security officials. In Libya, cigarette 

smuggling is controlled by networks in the security apparatus dominated by 

members of the Qadhadfa tribe. In the triangle between Mauritania, Mali, and 

Algeria, Sahrawi networks-often with the direct involvement of officials in the 

Polisario movement, which seeks independence for Western Sahara-trade 

subsidized Algerian goods and humanitarian aid southward and cigarettes 

northward to Algeria and Morocco. Cigarette smuggling has also contributed to 

the emergence of smaller gangs of smugglers charged with transporting the 

merchandise from Mauritania, Mali, and Niger into Algeria. Mokhtar 

Belmokhtar, who later acquired notoriety as one of the leading figures in 

AQIM's Sahel ian operations, is widely reputed to have long run a cigarette 

smuggling racket across the Sahara. 20 

19 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: 

A Threat Assessment, July 2009, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andLacher, Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region (Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, September 2012), http://carnegieendowmentorg(lilesisahei sahara. pdf. 

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Norco-trafficking 

Since 2003, the region has seen a n exponential increase in smuggling of Moroccan 

cannabis resin, cocaine from Latin America and more recently, methamphetamine (i.e. 

over the last four years), which is cheap to produce and distribute locally and 

internationally. Licit and illicit contraband, which developed decades ago, laid the 

foundation for the lucrative narcotics trade. Routes through the Sahara shift regularly 

based on regional threats, tribal fight conflicts or wars. Wealth gained by these groups 

affords them the ability to buy political influence and military power. Mali is a prime 

example. 

In an in-depth report by the International Crisis Group, the researcher notes that the 

governance-if it can be called that-of northern Mali by the administration of deposed 

President Amadou Toumane Toun§'s (An) was based on several corrupt agendas: 

collusion with local rival and opportunist elites, questionable relations with AQIM 

terrorists and the non-transparent and imbalanced use of international aid (especially 

aid provided for counter-terrorism operations) to strengthen control over the region. 21 

The profits he derived from a criminal economy, sustained by trans-border trafficking 

(especially of drugs) and ransoms from Western hostages lined the pockets of northern 

and Bamako elites and officials in the state administration and sustained the economic 

underdevelopment of the region. 22 The balance in the Sahara is delicate; the 

international community should help the region's people find alternatives to narco- and 

weapons trafficking. 

In contrast to Mali, Morocco stands out as a model for reform and progress in the fight 

for equality, counter-terrorism and a counter-narcotics strategy, which is outlined in the 

2012 report by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).23It has achieved 

significant reductions in the cannabis and cannabis resin industry over the years by 

outlining a comprehensive strategy combining law enforcement, crop eradication and 

demand reduction efforts with economic development to erode the "cannabis growing 

culture" in the north of the country.24 It continues to fight terrorism through the 

strengthening of the security and justice systems, and emphasizes a preventive 

dimension against violent extremism and organized crime through reforms in the 

economic, political, social, religious and educational fields, many of which were 

introduced in the Amazigh (Berber) language. These reforms provided a boost in 

International Crisis Group, Mali: Avaiding Escalation, July 18, 2012, 

!illJU!W..\Y.w,G!1'tsEIQldQ,9fllL:Lmed i§/£1I~'!fricaf,!!S}JJ:cilfrica!maUL11.l2::!}l"Jj:il""j9lD~~JjQD:c 

Ibid. 

"I NCB Expresses Appreciation to Morocco for Its Strategy to Fight Drugs, Report" Morocco News, March 

6, 2013, http://www.moroccoworldnews.com!2013/03!81265fincb-expre5Ses-appreciation-to-morocco-

"Morocco 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report," WikiLeaks Cable, October 30, 2009, 

hltp:llwww.cablegatesearch.netfcable.php'?id=09RABAT886. 

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cultivating a culture of democracy, pluralism and equality in Morocco-qualities that fly 

in the face of black market economies .. 

Nevertheless, like other countries in North and West Africa, Morocco is concerned with 

the risks of infiltration by terrorists fleeing Mali via illegal immigration channels. Indeed, 

drugs and human trafficking networks overlap - a cause for concern throughout the 

region (and Europe). For example in 2011, Moroccan authorities dismantled a large local 

drug-trafficking network linked to both Colombian cartels and AQIM. The movement of 

hash to Europe that apparently travels through Morocco also suggests that there 

remains room for improvement. 

A Global Problem Set 

While some suggest the threats in the Sahara and Sahel are local or regional in scope, 

their impact is global. Even a cursory overview of the involvement of North Africans as 

itinerate jihadists linked to al-Qa'ida demonstrates this. 

The Sinjar Records, captured in 2007 on the Syrian/Iraqi border and analyzed by West 

Point's Combating Terrorism Center, provided a unique quantitative perspective on 

North African involvement in global jihad ism. Most observers of international terrorism 

will agree that the same patterns witnessed in these documents are again alive and well 

in different theatres. As observed in Iraq, in Syria, we know that North Africans make up 

a large percentage of the foreign fighters on the rebel side, many of which are aligned 

today with the al-Qa'ida-linked Jabhat al-Nusra. 25 Recently, the Tunisian government 

announced that 800 of its citizens were fighting alongside Isla mist rebels in Syria. 

Further, in a testament to the scope of the problem, the Libyan Foreign Ministry publicly 

announced that it had no control over citizens who were leaving the country to join the 

Syrian uprising. Nevertheless, the flow of African jihadists to fight abroad is, of course, 

nothing new. Indeed, it was two Tunisians that killed Northern Alliance Leader Ahmad 

Shah Massoud as an apparent favor to al-Qa'ida and the Taliban in the run-up to the 

9/11 attacks. 

Yet it is not simply Africans leaving to combat perceived threats to Islam outside of the 

continent that speaks to the global nature of North African militancy: it is also the flow 

of jihadists into Africa. The recent arrest of a French citizen in Mali, Gilles Le Guen (also 

known as "Abdel Jelil") confirms this point, as does the investigation into the January 

2013 attack on the natural gas plant at In Amenas in Algeria. It is becoming increasingly 

evident that the terrorists who perpetrated the attack were able to recruit individuals 

from Canada to join the operation. In sum, for militants that share the worldview of 

AQIM, Africa has many front lines and "occupied territories" that also require the fard 

25 Noman Benalman and Raisin Blake, "Jabhal al-Nusra," (London: Quilliam Foundation, January 2013) 

http://www.guilli a mfou n datio n. org/wp/wp-co "tentl upload stPll bl ications/free Ii" b h at -81-0 llsre -astrategic-briefing. pdf. 

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'ayn (individually obligatory) support of fighters to combat non-Muslim oppressors. This 

was a primary ideological contribution developed by one of global jihad's original 

architects, Abdullah Azzam. 

Viewed slightly differently, the development of extremist states (emirates) in Africa 

matters to jihadists, and when non-Muslim forces threaten them, a global reaction 

ensues. For instance, when France intervened in Mali, threats to France came from alQa'ida in Yemen (AQAP), Jabhat al Nusra in Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and more 

recently, AQIM. 

This legacy of transnational jihad ism and its growing impact on "local" groups like Boko 

Haram is precisely why AQIM is more dangerous than ever before-and is further 

evidence that combating terrorism in Africa should matter very much to the US and her 

allies. 

Conclusions 

The multifaceted threats from terrorism, political violence and criminality in North 

Africa are on the rise. The issue of Mali and the threat from AQIM and associated violent 

extremist networks present particularly vexing dilemmas for the US and its allies to 

address. While there are few proverbial 'silver bullets' to solve this complex problemset, there are several approaches that could make a difference and are therefore worthy 

of consideration by Congress. 

The first recommendation is to get USAI D "back into the fight" to address key 

humanitarian and development dilemmas in Northern Mali and the surrounding areas, 

and couple this with support from US and allied SOF initiatives. From Tindouf, Algeria, to 

the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad (the "arc of instability," according to the UN), the 

populations of this under-governed region receive little support and are left exploited 

by various political actors, including AQIM and its allies. From nareo-trafficking and 

weapons smuggling to terrorism and kidnappings, these issues fester in this region. 

Further, since the four rebellions suffered by Mali since 1960, the people of the Sahara 

like the Tuareg were promised many things in each negotiated peace agreement. These 

agreements included paved roads, hospitals and schools. Sadly, these promises never 

materialized and the northern part of the country is littered with incomplete projects 

and a grieving population that is blamed for the woes of the country. In fact, a halfcentury of disputes between North and South have led to racism and deep resentment 

between various ethnic groups. It is these socio-culture tensions that open the door to 

terrorist exploitation and recruitment, despite the fact that the MNLA remains a secular 

militia. These issues will remain at the core of Mali's problems until they are addressed 

and settled once and for all. This is where USAID can help, provided it can operate. 

Historically, USAID access to areas like northern Mali has always been related to 

security. Therefore USAID and their enabling partners have in the past avoided projects 

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within this area that could actually address the underlying conditions faced by the 

Tuareg and others. This is because of Embassy- and Bamako-imposed access 

restrictions. The result has been almost zero in terms of net USAID impact. DOD 

Humanitarian Assistance and Capacity Development are also limited by security 

restrictions and achieve little effect with the targeted population groups because they 

cannot gain the needed access. Meanwhile, violent extremists have themselves 

provided humanitarian assistance or allowed select Islamic NGOs from Arab countries to 

operate in areas they controlled. This equation has, of course, boosted their access and 

influence among certain populations and further entrenched the extremists within their 

safe haven. 

The international community should focus acutely on these "denied area" populations 

being influenced by violent extremists and develop creative ways to partner SOF 

capability with USAID. This will also serve as a means of reducing the chance of resumed 

active conflict between MNLA and the Malian state. Naturally, this will require some 

nesting of the economic element of national power to incentivize groups towards the 

desired effect of increasing stability and denying safe haven. Further, because of 

security concerns in these areas, this USAID activity should be closely partnered with full 

spectrum SOF operations-especially information operations. Failure to synchronize 

USAID capabilities with SOF in the safe haven denial fight will create more Embassylimited projects in 'safe' areas that achieve no effects towards reducing the safe haven 

enjoyed by violent extremists or their recruitment pool. 

It should be noted here that the secular MNLA, despite all criticism, remains an example 

of an organization that has no interest in militant Islamism or jihadist governance. By 

dealing with basic grievances in Mali's North, the West, in time, can influence local 

people as allies in the fight against AQIM. Further, with proper training and support, the 

international community can convince Bamako and an empowered secular Tuareg 

community to work together against terrorism and nareo-trafficking. However, as 

previously stated, it is important to provide some form of financiai security to bring this 

situation to bear, and NGOs will playa big role in this respect. Moreover, in order for 

any of this to happen, genuine reconciliation and stability needs to be the first order of 

business, as NGOs and peacekeepers cannot operate effectively in a tense and 

dangerous environment. 

The second recommendation pertains to addressing border insecurity in the region. 

Borders between countries of the Sahara remain porous and open to terrorists and 

smuggler activity, both of which weaken governance and promote corruption (not to 

mention global insecurity). It is time that the countries of the region receive assistance 

to secure and monitor movement along their borders. This applies not only to land 

traffic but to the air as well. 

Finally to effectively counter the jihadi narrative wielded by AQIM, a comprehensive and 

expertly crafted information operation campaign is necessary for the region, Violent 

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extremists associated with AQIM experience far too much safe haven in social, print and 

televised media, and this must be rectified. Recently, news agencies flocked to write 

about AQIM's new twitter account-an event AQIM used to appeal to popular North 

African concerns about repression and injustice, and to answer questions by journalists 

and the public, Following the media buzz, AQIM's new twitter account gained over 5000 

new followers two weeks after going live. It is noteworthy that Syrian terror group 

Jabhat al-Nusra, Somalia's al-Shabaab, and Tunisia's Ansar al-Sharia are all followed by 

the new AQIM Twitter account,76 Countering AQIM's media expansion and online 

"havens" is crucial to our long-term success against violent extremism in the region. 

26 Jamal Oumar and Siham Ali, "AQIM Creates Twitter Account," Magharebia, April 4, 2013, 

http://magharebia,CQ mIen G Bfa r!icies(awi/features/2013/04/04!feature-01. 

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimony and concrete recommendations for the committee and for the administration to consider. 

Mr. Nedelcovych? 

STATEMENT OF MIMA S. NEDELCOVYCH, PH.D., PARTNER, 

SCHAFFER GLOBAL GROUP 

Mr. NEDELCOVYCH. Thank you, Chairman Smith and honorable 

members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I was asked to speak from 

a business perspective in dealing in Africa and especially in the 

Sahel. I like the forum. I am new to this, but there is a full statement. So I can just speak off the cuff. 

I have been in Africa pretty much all of my life. You can tell 

from the accent. And thank you for attempting pronouncing 

Nedelcovych. I come out of the Balkans. So we know a little bit 

about tribal warfare. I left Belgrade at 1 year old, grew up in Ethiopia, actually my first 10 years, before coming to the U.S. and making this a home. So I have spent most of my life, one way or another, in Africa. I have been on the public side. I have been on the 

private side. I have been going many moons ago when USAID first 

discovered the private sector, brought in as an adviser to see how 

the private sector could assist, was named to be the U.S. executive 

director of the African Development Bank in the late ’80s under the 

first father Bush administration. 

So I since then have joined Schaffer. Schaffer is in the agro industry. We have been managing developing agro-industrial projects 

throughout the continent. We have also been in very difficult 

places. We did the major sugar state development in Kenana, in 

Sudan, got pulled out of there for various reasons. As you know, 

it happened that we got pulled out on U.S. sanctions. 

Most recently and in the last decade, I would say, we have been 

working a major, major project in the Office du Niger in Mali. Our 

attempts are always bringing in these small farmers to the investments into the schemes that we develop. It is the only way we see 

in the end—and I like this term ‘‘resilience.’’ I have to remember 

that. I always thought of it as economic growth, but I guess it is 

one and the same, the flip side of the same coin. The importance 

in the end is very, very simple for me. I went back. I actually have 

a Ph.D. in political risk. I went back and thought what I wrote 

back in my dissertation. 

There was a sociologist, Maslow, and how theory of the five critical requirements, the pyramid of needs. And the very basic two 

needs at the bottom of the pyramid are your food, the water, the 

survival; and then shelter and employment. And if those needs are 

not met, you will have always the opportunity under whatever 

guise for extremism to come. You will find radical solutions. I 

would call them momentive solutions. 

But it is very easy. People have nothing to lose, have nothing to 

lose. And that is where we come from the business standpoint, Mr. 

Chairman. Looking at difficult areas, I would argue that U.S. business—and we are there in agro industry, certainly. 

There is a huge Niger River coming through that area. There are 

many, many opportunities to develop agro-industrial schemes that 

58

bring in all of the small farmers, but for all of this to happen, you 

have to have security. We put together a program of over $600 million for the Office du Niger near Se ́gou and Markala that basically 

went on hold. We were to go into the major expansion on April 

15th. And something happened in February. So we are on hold. 

Who loses? It is the people there in the end because what we have 

done now? We have concentrated on projects elsewhere. 

I could use an example in Nigeria, where we are up in Sokoto 

in a rice program. Things got heated up, became very difficult work 

while we are not developing the program, the project down in the 

middle states. Who loses? The people in the north. 

So, in the end, my plea is really, to the extent possible—and I 

think USAID has been moving in this direction with my various 

names, global development alliance or other, to bring in the 

corporates, get people in that are in, especially people like us, who 

are in the agro-industrial area. We operate in rural areas. We operate where poverty is. 

And the only way you are going to get out of poverty is to create 

growth, create jobs. Otherwise you are going to have desperate people. And desperate people do desperate acts. So, for me, Mr. Chairman, that is the one take-away I really wanted to pull out of this 

discussion with further questions. 

Also, I will be remiss to not say I sit on the board of the Corporate Council in Africa. I am one of the founding members, among 

the parties to cut hunger and poverty in Africa. So I can sit and 

have the debate on the public policy side or from the straight corporate investment standpoint, but I will argue that it is always 

when those two come together. That is the key. That is where we 

can have the long-term development money coming in with the 

commercial money to make growth happen. 

We have—and I have copies—submitted a couple of months ago 

recommendations to the Obama administration from the Corporate 

Council in Africa on doing business in Africa. And I would also like 

to conclude by saying the continent, by and large, the trend is very, 

very positive. The issue is what happens in difficult places like the 

Sahel and how can public and private interests come together to 

actually really continue on the basis of resilience, but let’s also get 

on. This is one world we must also all grow and people must have 

some reason to not be desperate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nedelcovych follows:]

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Testimony Statement of 

Dr. Mirna S. Nedelcovych 

Partner, Schaffer Global Group 

For 

JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 

Organizations 

Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

lleana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

SUBJECT: The Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region 

Tnesday, May 21, 2013 

1 wish to thank Chairmen Smith, Ros-Lehtinen and Poe, as well as the Honorable 

Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee for the opportunity to testify at this important 

Joint Subcommittee Hearing to discuss our business perspective on "The Growing Crisis in 

Africa's Sahel Region" and to assist the subcommittee in its policy making duties. 

Africa has been very important for me both personally and professionally. As you can 

tell by my name and accent 1 am not originally from the U.S. but from Serbia. My family 

fled communist Yugoslavia while 1 was a baby and we moved to Ethiopia; and when 

trouble started brewing in Ethiopia we left there and ended our migration in the United 

States where we now call this our home. 1 have fond memories living in Ethiopia and the 

African continent and its people will always be with me. 

Africa has been the focus of my professional life, both in my government service and as a 

business executive. I started out with the Peace Corps in Gabon, USAID's Africa 

Bureau, and followed by a position at Arthur Young before being named to be U.S. 

Executive Director to the African Development Bank in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire from 

1989-1993, where again llived in Africa. As a Partner of Schaffer Global Group, 1 

traveled widely throughout the continent, and years later, I returned to live in Liberia in 

2007, where 1 was seconded as the Country Representative for Buchanan Renewables. 
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To elaborate more on my business experience in Africa, my Partners and T at Schaffer 

Global Group of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, have been developing, investing, and 

engineering large-scale agricultural processing facilities, primarily in the sugar and rice 

industries and renewal energy from agriculture wastes. We have been very successful in 

Africa and have really only suffered two set-backs in our African efforts over the firm's 

nearly 50 years on the continent: 

1. Sudan in the 1990's when the USG instituted unilateral sanctions. Schaner had 

developed Kenana Sugar in the 1970s, then largest integrated sugar factory and 

refinery in the world. However, with Sudan's support of radical Islamist factions, 

our group was squeezed out in the diplomatic row between the U.S. and Sudan, 

2. Currently in Mali we have had to stop our efforts on our $600M+ sugar factory, 

refinery, ethanol distillery and power plant in the Markala region of the Office du 

Niger. Even though the fighting and terrorist activity was not directly present in 

our area, the uncertainty and insecurity frightened off key investors and lenders in 

the project and we are waiting for the situation to return to normal before we can 

effectively proceed to tie the pieces back together again. 

1 will elaborate on Mali as this is current and germane to our topic today. Schaffer first 

entered into the Mali market over 10 years ago to fill an important agricultural need for 

Mali in the sugar sector. We first went there at the turn of the century to investigate 

options to develop an integrated sugar plantation and the ability of the Malian 

Government and private sector to work with us on a major agro-industrial effort. After a 

couple of years Schaffer made the business decision to invest in Mali. We had support 

from USTDA in the initial feasibility study and USAlD, through their Global 

Development Alliance, to assist us with our sugar variety trials; this took nearly 5 years 

to experiment and to develop best practices and a nursery and pilot farm. Following this, 

we started our engineering and technical drafts and implemented business plans for 

strategic investor support from numerous multi -lateral financial institutions like the 

African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Korean EXlM Bank, etc. 

and then from our private investors leading up to our strategic investor and lead partner, 

lllovo Sugar of South Africa. Most importantly, we also worked with local farmers to 

integrate their fields into our joint PPP scheme and process the cane in our facility upon 

its completion. The process was beginning to run orderly enough for us to begin the 

effort to start physically grading the land and begin the construction phase last year in 

2012. 

As you can see from the above, this was close to a 10 year process for Schaffer's effort to 

begin to come to fruition. There are many risks in business and Africa is one of the 

riskiest places for business; but believe me, none of us ever contemplated a coup, a 

terrorist takeover of the northern portion of Mali and then finally, a possible attack in the 

south by terrorists legions in any of our risk management plans and scenarios. 1 don't say 

this lightly as the Schaffer Group and I are experienced Africa hands and the events in 

early 2012 in Mali came to a surprise to us and to many governments and people around 

the region and the world. Mali had been a bastion of democratic ideals for the past 20 

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years with an open society and freedoms. 

Although T am not an expert in terrorism activity, the current world-wide terrorism based 

on factions ofIslamic radicalism is violent and uncompromising in its nature towards 

anyone or any belief that is not in-line with their version of beliefs. These groups use 

religion as a stepping stone for their violent and illegal activities and only wish to better 

themselves and not the people of the region. Many of them seem to be criminal and 

intolerant in nature, use religion as a crutch to enter into the local society, and then take 

control at first through religious teachings and civility before turning reactionary to the 

community and converting it to a safe haven for their criminal activities. These criminal 

activities include drug and human trat1lcking, kidnapping, bootlegging products, illegal 

arms dealing and extortion of local communities close to their base of operations. 

As we all know, capital is a coward and only goes where it feels comfortable and safe. 

The recent activities and convulsions in Mali have driven out foreign investments and are 

drawing attention to neighboring countries that are dealing with radical Islamic factions, 

like the northern part of Nigeria where Boko Harem is threatening both domestic and 

foreign interests with their brutal violent campaigns against Christians and Muslims alike. 

This story is unfortunately only just beginning to unfold. 

In addition to Mali, over the many years I have worked in West Africa, I also travelled 

and conducted business extensively in Nigeria. A couple of years ago we were 

investigating developing a rice plantation in the northern part of Nigeria. All was moving 

well, we had found local partners and developers to work with, but then the environment 

turned sour with the ethnic and criminal environment taking hold in the northern regions 

of Nigeria. The uncertainty of northern Nigeria is simply making it unsafe to travel and 

invest there, particularly in agro-industrial proj ects that take large sums of financing and 

many years to come to fruition. We have since had to tum our attention to developing the 

rice project further south in the "Middle Belt" States, to the detriment and investment loss 

for the people in the north. 

Please let me not highlight only what is bad in the region or in Africa as a whole. We all 

know the rapid rate of growth presently being experienced in many countries in Africa, 

and this growth is not restricted to oil and gas, and other natural and mineral wealth. 

There is a growing and consuming middle class, and internal growth that is attracting the 

attention of international investors. There is no question that growth rates and 

investments are closely tied to peace and political stability, so we do see a "patchwork" 

of different levels of development around the continent, but for us in business, the good 

news is that the trend is VERY positive. 

Africa has its risks but the rewards are also profound. There are substantial inflows of 

direct foreign investment going into various parts of Africa from China, the US, Europe, 

India, the Gulf investment houses and other Middle Eastern countries that see great 

returns. The question is what happens to the Sahel region which is experiencing such 

increased levels of turbulence? Will private capital run away or will it remain on standby 

waiting to see the eventual resolution to the uncertainties and dit1lculties? 
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There are considerable opportunities in developing certain mineral resources and 

speaking for my own industry, many opportunities for developing agro-industry in a 

sustainable manner, particularly with the potential of harnessing the Niger River, as it 

winds thru Mali, Niger and Northern Nigeria But to do so requires an extended period of 

political and social stability and strong collaboration between the public and private 

sectors, domestic and international, to develop the necessary physical and social 

infrastructure conducive to investments. And yes, it will take considerable financial 

resources. 

So what are the options; not very easy ones? Many years ago a noted psychologist 

named Abraham Maslow depicted a 5 level "pyramid" of hierarchies that human beings 

required and yearned for. At the bottom of that pyramid were the two foundation levels, 

physiological needs (food, water and sleep) and security needs (safety, shelter and 

employment) that needed to be met before any other desires came into play. For those 

suffering people in the most unstable parts of the Sahel, these basic needs have to be met 

or else there will be no hope for peace and stability. Desperate people with little to lose 

will act desperately and can be easily swayed into "radical" if not "romantic" solutions I 

Experienced investors and developers such as ourselves and others operating in the 

region will need to find a way to closely collaborate with the international "development" 

community to achieve at least a modicum of economic growth in these regions as the 

only solution to maintaining peace and stability that could encourage further investment. 

Without that economic growth, neither the physiological nor the security needs of the 

common person will be met, and as long as hunger and poverty persists, desperation will 

breed radical solutions. 

1 would be remiss to not mention that 1 am one of the founding members of the Corporate 

Council on Africa and presently sit on the Board of the CCA as well as the Board of the 

Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, in addition to being a proud investor 

and businessman in Africa. The CCA has recently prepared policy recommendations 

entitled: Promuting Shared Interests: Pulic:y Rec:ummendatiuns un Afhc:afur the Sec:und 

Term of the Obama Administration. They were prepared April 17,2013 and 1 have 

brought several copies here today for your review and use. There are several 

recommendations that are particularly pertinent to this hearing today and they have been 

submitted in my testimony: 

Finance Recommendations: 

A growing number of African nations are tapping financial markets for the first 

time and need U.S. Treasury Department technical assistance to make this policy 

sustainable. 

Speed up the due diligence process by USG financial agencies. 

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Streamline the number of US. tlnancial agencies and processes required to reduce 

disbursement time. This will increase the US private sector's competitiveness in 

Africa. 

Develop special process vehicles to fund projects in Africa, including regional 

projects. 

Intensify consultations between the private sector that is actively investing in 

Africa and key USG entities involved in financing including project financing 

(i.e., USAID, MCC, IPIC, EX/1M, TDA and State). This channel should provide 

for clear time sensitive communication on major policy and programmatic issues, 

so that the views of the private sector can impact the USG decision making 

process in real-time. 

Remove or reduce obstacles to f1exible and fast USG financing, such as the OPIC 

Carbon Cap, GMO seed restrictions, economic impact tests, use of US. bottoms 

for transportation, and local content requirements. The goal is to make USG 

financing fully competitive with that ofJered by other governments. 

Agriculture Recommendations: 

Coordinate USG support for agriculture development and agribusiness in Africa 

with ongoing efforts under the USAlD Feed the Future/Grow Africa/New 

Alliance initiatives and focus on these initiatives' priority countries and value 

chains, particularly end of value chain activities. 

Continue programs like the USAID Global Development Alliance and 

Development Innovation Ventures that provide direct financial support to private 

sector investments. 

Expand USDA programs that strengthen African agricultural and agribusiness 

institutions through expanded ties to U.S. universities and agricultural research 

institutes, which are well-positioned to help build capacity. Ensure that there is a 

role for the private sector as a partner, including supporting U. S. companies that 

have research collaboration with U.S. colleges and universities. 

Increase investment in existing agribusiness programs in African university 

networks and expand tertiary agribusiness programs in Africa to raise African 

skill levels in agricultural commodity trading, commodity exchange contract 

design, financing, management, equipment operation and maintenance, and 

smallholder business entrepreneurship. 

Encourage African governments to pass and implement land reforms that allow 

smallholder farmers (including women farmers) and cooperatives to hold title to 

land and use it as collateral. 

Security Recommendations: 

Expand, or at least maintain, Government funding to the US. Department of State 

Bureau for African Affairs' Africa Peacekeeping Programming (AFRICAP) and 

the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program 

as these have played a vital role building Africa's capacity and capability to 

ensure its own regional security. 

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Expand support for capacity and capability building programs for African 

militaries, police, and judiciaries critical to creating and sustaining secure 

environments that respect and uphold the rule oflaw. Programs include 

International Military Education and Training (IMET), ACOTA, Global Peace 

Operations Initiative (GPOI), and the Department of Defense's Distinguished 

Visitors Program for the military. Police and judicial programs include the 

Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs, such 

as the International Law Enforcement Academy in Botswana. 

Ensure that security sector reform initiatives are holistic including the military, 

police, judicial, prisons and financial institutions as well as the legal framework of 

the target country. This has not only improved institutional capacity, but 

transparency as well, thus enhancing political, economic and social development 

as well as business investment. 

Lastly, fund AFRlCOM security programs, as these require sustainment and 

expansion, and ensure regional stability. For example, the U.S. Navy and Coast 

Guard Africa Partnership Station provides valuable capacity building assistance, 

in addition to operational and public relations benefits. The USG tends to cut 

Africa programs in times of budget contraction. 

Conclusion: 

All regions of Africa are important for U.S. business investment, although as we have 

experienced, some are more attractive than others. We have seen remarkable business 

investments over the past 15 years in Mrica and growth is skyrocketing. There are more 

international players viewing Africa as a prime destination for their business interests. 

The USG, through its various anTIS and vehicles, should be there to assist U.S. companies 

to compete in this market and to be part of the solution to achieving sustainable growth 

and social and political stability; particularly in those volatile areas like the Sahel, where 

close public-private collaboration is most essential. In conclusion, the best if not only 

way to create sustainable development and counter "radical solutions" is by engendering 

growth, creating jobs, and meeting those very basic needs we all have for food, shelter, 

security and employment. American companies can do this and can work hand-in-hand 

with the USG to improve policy decision-making in order to provide the best returns for 

our Mrican friends and the U.S. business community. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 1 look forward to answering your 

questions. 

### 

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Nedelcovych, thank you so very much for that. 

And your recommendations, I have seen that. I would like to at 

least take some of that and put it into the record. And we will follow up on those recommendations as well, I think. I thank you for 

that. 

Remember, you are not just speaking to the Congress. You are 

speaking to the Speaker of the National Assembly of Mali. So I 

hope he heard your message as well. 

I would like to now ask Mr. Akuetteh if he could proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. NII AKUETTEH (FORMER GEORGETOWN 

UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS) 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Chairman Smith, thank you very much for including me in this hearing this afternoon. And I thank you and the 

other committees for placing so much attention on an important Africa issue. 

Point of personal privilege. Because I am immigrant from Ghana, 

I am an African, I would like to extend to you the appreciation of 

fellow Africans for the attention that you and the committees are 

placing on this very important issue. 

I also have to say that, as was mentioned by Mr. Nedelcovych, 

there is some good news in Africa. The AU is celebrating its 50th 

anniversary. The President is visiting three countries noted for the 

advanced, you know, progress in democracy. There is fast economic 

growth. 

So I think it is appropriate that this hearing is focusing on a 

troubled spot, a big area that is under stress, but it should be 

noted that there is good news on the continent. 

Now, the region that we are talking about and in the invitation 

letter, about nine countries are covered. So we are talking about a 

very big area. I would also even add that there is one area we 

should include, which is the Western Sahara, because some of the 

issues, some of the problems in the Western Sahara are spilling 

over into Mali in terms of fighters with grievances who may be involved in Mali. 

Now, the problems that the Sahel, as defined in this hearing, is 

facing are very serious problems, from terrorism all the way to bad 

governance through lack of democracy. So this is a region in stress. 

And always when I look at U.S. policy, it seems to me that there 

is a very big unspoken question by the American people, what has 

this got to do with me? What has this got to do with us? And I 

think it is great to focus on this problem because it does affect U.S. 

interests. Problems in the Sahel which are stressing the countries 

does affect the U.S. Therefore, it seems to me the imperative is 

very clear for the U.S. to help these countries cope with their problems that they are facing. Otherwise, when the problems get out 

of hand, they spill over into the neighborhood, it will not be just 

one or two African countries if the problems get out of hand. It will 

affect you clearly. 

It might even because—one of the problems that were cited has 

been cited is drug trafficking from Latin America through West Africa. I think research has shown that there is a reverse. There is 

drug money going back into Latin America and even arms. 

66

So this can also affect U.S. interests in its own hemisphere. It 

can affect U.S. interests in Europe. So this is a very important 

issue. And any help that the U.S. gives African countries to cope 

with them is really I think a good investment in its own interests. 

Now, one of the things that strikes me is that I think in the area 

we are talking about, the U.S. interests really picked up after 9/11. 

It has been 10 years. So a key recommendation,a key point in my 

view is that there needs to be a review of U.S. strategy in the region. After 10 years and after the problem in Libya, now we have 

Mali. It seems to me that a thorough review needs to be done so 

that lessons can be learned and a new strategy can be crafted. 

Until that thorough review is done, it seems to me there are 

areas where improvements can be made. I think that terrorism is 

a problem, not just for the U.S. but even for African countries. And 

I think the way to deal with it is to push hard on democracy because it seems to inclusive democratic government goes a long way 

in preventing, at the very least, homegrown terrorism. 

In the region that we are looking at also, Mali is clearly the epicenter. So it seems to me that special attention should be paid to 

Mali. And I would like to see the U.S. play a leading role, not in 

the security area, because, you know, we have AFISMA and the 

U.N., but in the reconstruction of Mali, what just happened in 

Brussels. 

I would like for the U.S. to—it is my recommendation that the 

U.S. play a very strong role in that, particularly in two areas: The 

area of the elections. I have to confess, Mr. Chairman, that I am 

one of the people who is nervous about the elections because the 

recent example in a couple of other African countries, Cote d’Ivoire, 

next door, and Kenya, that we need to make sure that, as important as the Malian elections are, we have to have contingency plans 

and make sure that they happen well. 

And, secondly, I think the Mali’s reconstruction plan, their reconciliation and dialogue committee, I think the U.S., with its history and its diversity and its democracy, can be a special help to 

the U.S. So it is also my recommendation that that should be a big 

focus in the way that the U.S. can help Mali and, therefore, the Saharan region going forward. 

I thank you again for including me. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akuetteh follows:]

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"Reviewing and Improving US Security Strategy in 

Africa's Sahel Region" 

Written Testimony Submitted by Mr. Nii Akuetteh 

Independent Policy Analyst 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Tuesday, May 21, 2013 

Hearing on "The Growing Crises in Africa's Sahel Region" 

Chainnan Smith and Ranking Member Bass; 

Chainnan Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Deutch; 

Chairman Poe and Ranking Member Shennan· 

Good afternoon. T am honored that you have included me among the witnesses testifying here 

this afternoon. More importantly, I am deeply grateful that you are devoting so much of your 

personal, official and institutional resources to critical problems in Mrica. I thank you as an 

African-born immigrant and I believe I speak for my fellow Africans in expressing this gratitude. 

As I am sure you already know, you have some pretty impressive staff. Please know that they 

just went to great lengths to allow me to be at this table today. I appreciate their help very much 

Mr. Chainnan, "Sahel" is a useful, geographic description. It is usually designates the band of 

semi-arid land that marks the southern edge of the Sahara Desert and which runs through African 

countries from the Atlantic ocean to the Red Sea, especially these six West Mrican countriesSenegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. 

However, this hearing must be commended for taking a different, broader, better view. This it 

does by looking as far north as Libya and as far south as Nigeria. This is because geography and 

history have long knitted the Africans living between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic 

together-the Sahara Desert and the rainforest belt notwithstanding. The borders that today 

separate these communities into modem countries are relatively recent and quite porous. 
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There is an even more powerful, more relevant, reason for treating as a unit that huge regional 

chunk of Africa lying between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. (BTW this is a chunk that is 

larger in size than the US) That reason is the focus of this hearing. "The hearing will examine 

terrorism, drug smuggling, humanitarian concerns, human rights problems, and governance in 

Africa's Sahel region." So says the invitation letter. Each one of these five identified problems is 

transnational. To a great degree, then, addressing them must therefore be regional as well. 

Of course there are limits to the usefulness of a transnational, regional approach anywhere. In the 

Sahel, the intensity of each of the five "complex challenges" varies across different countries 

And then, more importantly, there is the difference in responses. Even where a problem has 

afflicted several countries a similar degree, it is almost guaranteed that responses would differ 

from country to country. For example, it has been rightly and widely stressed for 18 months that, 

for whatever reason, the Issouffou government in Niamey responded more effectively than did 

the Toure administration in Bamako to the same dangerous contagion from post-Gaddafi Libya: 

the inflow of dangerous arms and even more dangerous Tuareg fighters and their jihadist allies. 

Despite these limits, for this hearing, the regional cross-country approach remains the better 

choice. It is preferable to the alternative: in-depth, tunnel-vision focus on each individual 

Sahelian country in isolation from its neighbors. 

There is a corresponding choice that I have made by testifying: greater pre-occupation with 

policy implication in general and with US policy options in particular 

Here is another way of putting this choice I have made. In this testimony, it is vital for invited 

witnesses to possess and present good, up-to-date understanding of how the five grave challenges 

are afflicting each country and the Sahel as a whole and of how well local people and leaders are 

responding. The relevant question is, "How hard has each crisis (terrorism, drugs, humanitarian 

problems, human rights abuses and weak government) hit each country and the whole Sahel?" 

However, what is even more relevant in this hearing are the implications for the US-for its 

interests and for its policy options in reaction. This focus on implications for the US comes with 

its own questions as well. On Sunday, May 12, 2013, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates 

succinctly captured one, "If an international crisis has to be solved, why should it be the US?" 

Regarding the crises in the Sahel, related questions arise: What have increasing terrorism, drug 

smuggling, humanitarian catastrophe, human rights abuses, and weak governance in Africa's 

Sahel got to do with us in America? Why should we care? Are our interests affected? Have we 

not helped already? What more can we do? I believe these questions are so justified and so vital 

that it would be irresponsible for any elected official, let alone the US Congress, not to find 

answers. 

Above all else my testimony is an attempt to offer my considered answers for the consideration 

of the three subcommittees. Therefore it is less of a diagnosis of what ails Sahelian countries 

(though that forms the foundation) and more of a recommended therapy-why and how the US 

protects its important interests in the face of the growing crises in the Sahel 
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The rest of this written testimony has these sequential components: 

A sketchy, summarized assessment of each of the 5 challenges across the region (the diagnosis); 

Implications of the crises for American interests; 

Outline of US strategy and activities in the region since 9/11; 

Identification of apparent weaknesses in current US strategy; 

A suggested three-prong strategy going forward; 

Responses to select flawed policy arguments; 

A summary of 10 recommended guidelines for US policy and engagement; and 

Conclusion 

Terrorism: For the international community, especially the US, increasing terrorism is the most 

alarming development across the Sahel. And this growth is real and observablenotwithstanding outright arguments and subtle hints by some analysts that terrorism in Africa is a 

Western pretext. I differ with those analysts and offer as early evidence the bombings of the US 

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed several times more Africans. 

Across the region recently, three countries have been hit hardest by terrorism-Libya, Nigeria 

and Mali. In Libya the regime that succeeded Col Muammar Gaddafi remains extremely weak 

and is being pushed around by armed, extremist militias who perpetrate acts that can only be 

called terrorism. Libya also enjoys the dubious distinction of having inflamed terrorism far 

beyond its borders to a much greater extent than any other country in region. Besides the weak 

state and many strong defiant extremist militias, one other factor caused this to happen: Col 

Gaddafi's huge arsenal was left unsecured and sophisticated and deadly weapons gushed out 

into our region and beyond. 

And then there is Nigeria. Just a week ago, President Jonathan's slapped an on-going state of 

emergency and federal military occupation on three states. This is the latest attempt to control 

Boko Haram terrorists, now into their fourth year of violent militant insurgency, ostensibly to get 

Shari a law imposed across Africa's most populous country. The president's action is the biggest 

domestic security action since the catastrophic Biafran secession war some four decades ago. 

Undoubtedly, Mali has been the epicenter, hammered the worst by terrorism in the region. The 

terrorists in Mali came close to taking over the entire country. But for the French-led 

intervention, they would have grabbed a chance to implement the next phases of their war plans: 

use Mali's territory and state instruments as a base from which to attack the African neighbors, 

then Europe and finally the US. 

Drug smuggling manufacture and growing usage: For a few years now, US anti-drug officials 

have voiced concern about the growth of a drug culture along the West African littoral and 

northwards on to the Sahel, Sahara, and North Africa. Now two other significant institutions 

have added their voices to the warnings One is the UN's Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC. 

The other is the West African Commission on Drugs launched five months ago by Kofi Annan, 

fonner UN Secretary General. The story the three sources tell is alarming: The region has been 

engulfed by gushers of narcotics, especially cocaine (from South America on its way to Europe), 

meth (manufactured locally and smuggled into Asia), and heroin (from Asia being smuggled into 

Europe). 
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The impact has been frightening. Guinea-Bissau has slipped closer toward a narco-state 

according to experts. Critics have accused officials of both the ousted administration of exMalian President Toure and its Tuareg and jihadist nemeses of being implicated. Throughout the 

region, drug money is fueling corruption and therefore wreaking havoc on democracy and n state 

functioning. And the growing consumption of narcotics is producing public health problems. 

Humanitarian problems: In one respect the regional humanitarian pattern is similar to the 

terrorism pattern: While all countries in the Sahel have been affected, Mali, since January 2012, 

has been hit hardest, especially in the northern 60% of the country. There, several reliable 

agencies have all reported the same dismal statistic: At least 50% of the residents have been 

uprooted. A slight majority are in the southern 40% of the country (especially around Bamako, 

the capital), making them TDPs. The rest are mostly in inadequately-resourced refugee camps in 

neighboring Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso. 

Three drivers sequentially forced out the northern Mali population. The first is environmental: 

unusually severe seasonal drought caused severe food insecurity which necessitated mass 

trekking toward areas in better shape. The second driver was war. The third was the brutal reign 

of terror unleashed by the war's jihadist victors 

Though not as severely hit as Mali, the neighbors too are still stressed by the humanitarian crisis 

Chad, reportedly, has scores of thousands at risk of food shortage. And Mauritania, Burkina Faso 

and Niger, the three biggest hosts of Malian refugees, are displaying signs of distress. 

Human rights violations: While such violations are widespread in the Sahel and indeed across 

Africa, the already-noted familiar pattern is repeated: During its 2012 war, Mali experienced 

worst violations than any other of Sahelian country. Corinne Dufka, investigator extraordinaire 

at Human Rights Watch has done an amazing job of meticulously investigating, documenting 

and comprehensively reporting abuses across Mali. From her reports--as well as from other 

sources--three sets of Malian culprits stand out: MNLA, the Tuareg secessionist fighters from 

Libya who started the war in January 2012; the Malian army, especially the faction loyal to 

coup-maker Captain Amadou Sanogo; and the three jihadist fighting groups (AQIM, MUJAO, 

Ansar Dine) who drove out their former ally, the MNLA, and then imposed Sharia law across 

northern Mali. 

As mentioned above in the humanitarian section, the three jihadist victors in Mali's civil war 

exacted severe punishment for any violations of their newly-imposed strict Sharia law. The 

diversity of banned items was startling: cell phone ring tones; popular music; soccer; 

inappropriate dress; interaction of unmarried couples; thievery; and adultery. The punishments 

were even more staggering-floggings, amputations, and at least one stoning execution an 

unmarried couple 

Among several, one bitter irony stands out While harshly brutalizing Malians for violating their 

strict imposed rules, the jihadists ignored their own rules with impunity and behaved 

licentiously. They not only stole residents' property and destroyed ancient cultural heritage but 

they committed sexual crimes. Here is one instance: Tn a single November 2012 night in 
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Timbuktu, six different jihadist fighters serially "married," raped, and then "divorced" the same 

teenage gi r1. 

The jihadists' erstwhile ally, the MNLA, also stands credibly accused of serious human rights 

violations. For example a year ago, reputable global news organization (Reuters, AP, and YOA) 

reported that in Gao, the jihadists had been welcomed because the MNLA were seen as 

intolerably brutal. Still, the most notorious accusation against the MNLA may be what has 

become known as the Aguelhok massacre. According to GenocideWatch, this is what happened: 

On January 24,2012, the NMLA recaptured Aguelhok and executed 82 prisoners 

from the Malian army. Two tactics were used: shooting a single bullet through the 

head or slitting the throat. The hands of the victims were tied. These summary 

executions were war crimes under both the Geneva Conventions and the Statute 

of the International Criminal Court, to which Mali is a State-Party. The ICC has, 

therefore, declared that it will consider claims from several sources in order to 

decide whether or not to open a war crimes investigation into the allegations of 

atrocities committed in Mali since January 

It could be argued that the Aguelhok massacre pushed Mali over the edge Women marched in 

Bamako excoriating President Toure for allowing their husbands and brothers to be slaughters. 

Across southern Mali, especially Bamako, popular anger and reprisals against Tuaregs increased 

so quickly that President Toure gave a nation-wide address urging that they be spared. And, led 

by Captain Sanogo, soldiers in Bamako, enraged at their comrades' gruesome murder, overthrew 

the government, plunging Mali into even worse crisis. 

The third serious violator of human rights in Mali is the army especially the coup-making 

faction. Soldiers loyal to Sanogo have been accused of executing Red Berets loyal to former 

President Toure, of beating up Interim President Traore, of disappearing dozens of civilian 

critics, and of summarily executing on the national highway about a dozen clerics journeying to a 

meeting in Bamako. And the international community has been quite vocal that in the aftermath 

of the French intervention, Malian soldiers have been carrying out revenge attacks against 

civilians, especially Tuaregs. 

Governance: Reflecting much of Africa, the countries in our region of focus have weak 

institutions and are poorly governed, especially when vibrant democracy is the yardstick. Indeed 

the searing irony is that before it imploded, Mali for the last 20 years had been dubbed the most 

exemplary democracy in the Sahel region. With Mali's democracy up in smoke, only Niger, 

Senegal and Nigeria are led today by men who initially took power through free and fair 

elections. 

This quick assessment of the hearing's 5 named threats around the Sahel and neighboring 

countries confirms the assertion that the region has serious growing crises. 

But what does this mean for the US? What implications do these Sahel regional crises carry for 

important American interests? 
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Answer: The Sahelian crises pose significant dangers to American security and economic 

interests. If the identified crises go insufficiently addressed, the Sahel and much of the northern 

half of Africa would become seriously deteriorated 

A deteriorated, crises-ridden Sahel would threaten and negatively impact US interests through 

several parallel channels. First to be jeopardized would be every important US interest and 

relationship in Africa-security, economic, diplomatic, medical and environmental 

There would also be an effect in South America to the detriment of US interests there 

Unchecked drug trafficking through the Sahel will translate into a reverse flow of drug money 

and armaments into South America. This bodes ill for America's backyard 

The third channel of negative consequences from a deteriorated Sahel would empty into Europe, 

the most important of US allies. Narcotics and terrorism are the obvious dangers. 

Finally, no one can guarantee that a Sahel in crisis will not find a way to impact the US directly. 

The example of Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber, a Nigerian whose path of attack on the 

US went through Yemen should serve as a cautionary tale. 

The implication of these dangers posed to the US by a deteriorated Sahel then is clear: The US 

protects important interests by engaging the Sahel and helping the region to squelch its emerging 

crises before they worsen. But such engagement must be built on and learn lessons from previous 

engagement. This makes the case for a quick review of how the US has engaged Africa in the 

security sector since 9111. 

This testimony now sketches the post 9111 American security strategy in Africa by describing 

several of its component elements. They are: The US persuading Libya to abandon its nuclear 

weapons program and then rewarding it with closer, warmer ties; establishing the Combined 

Joint Task Force-Hom of Africa and acquiring Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti; creating 

AFRICOM with the stated purpose of training African armies to become better fighters; 

launching the activities that became the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership; organizing 

the annual Operation Flintlock exercises; and privileging Mali, a Sahelian country, as the star 

pupil of this post 9111 strategy in Africa. 

This testimony believes and argues the following The post 9/11 security strategy in Africa cries 

out for a thorough, top-to-bottom, full-blown review and evaluation. The passage of an entire 

decade is one rationale. Another is a series of important events and occurrences: the North 

African spring; the aftermath and impact of the Libyan intervention; and Mali's implosion 

The findings and lessons learned from the review must then be incorporated to design a new 

improved US security strategy in Africa, if called for. 

However, even prior to that full review and evaluation being done, some improvements can be 

made. For example, over the course of the elapsed 10 years, observers have pinpointed perceived 

weak and undesirable features of the security strategy. As one such observer and as an Africa 

policy analyst, I have compiled my own list of perceived shortcomings of the US post 9111 
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security strategy. They are five. In my opinion, the security strategy: has been too oblivious of 

local concerns, priorities and opinions; has over-relied on security measures to manage terrorism, 

while under-utilizing democracy as a potent terrorism prevention tool; has handled the training 

of African security personnel rather badly; dropped the ball several times after intervening in 

Libya, an intervention that was justified; and downgraded its Mali involvement far too hastily, a 

hasty withdrawal that mimics similar ones in Somalia, DRC and Libya; 

A good way to correct these five weaknesses is to adopt the following new proposed security 

strategy. It has two arms. The much, much bigger arm aims to prevent terrorism democracy, 

inclusiveness, reconciliation and development, or DIRD. The smaller are would use effective 

security measures (intelligence gathering, police action and military force) to defeat violent, 

recal ci trant terrori sts. 

Dear Chairmen, since the Africa embassy bombings, a vigorous debate has long swirled about 

fighting terrorism in Africa. The debate intensifies around each major security event. In my 

opinion the debate is extremely valuable, especially for decision- and policy-makers such as you 

who must sift through the arguments and craft policy erected on the best ideas. To facilitate your 

decision-making, I will now paraphrase a few of the popular arguments that I disagree with and 

then make a counter-argument 

"Stay out of Mali; intervention would ollly make thillgs worse:" This was a popular dominant 

view in the US throughout 2012. Even the State Department espoused this view in House 

Testimony last year. The successful French intervention exposes just how wrong this view was. 

"Terrorism is a made-up pretext, not a real threat" I have come across this assertion frequently 

among friends who unfailingly see every US and European military operation in Africa as being 

motivated by a desire to cordon off African resources from the Chinese. I point out to them the 

many terror attacks which have killed thousands of Africans. 

"Poverty justifies terrorism" Although these precise words are not spoken, this mind-set drives 

the oft-expressed position which argues that Boko Haram's violent campaign will persist until 

poverty in northern Nigeria is eliminated. Pointing out that other zones of Nigeria are also 

extremely poor but do not resort to terrorism is an effective response. 

"Militarism is the entire solution to the Sahel's terrorism prohlem" The failure to embrace and 

use democracy to prevent terrorism suggests that this view holds sway among those in charge of 

C-T strategy. That it is false is suggested by the popular counter which says that we cannot kill 

our way out of the terrorism problem 

"Good governance is the name of the game" Using 'good governance' in place of 'democracy' 

sends the clear message that dictators are acceptable if they make the trains run on time. This 

message must be rejected and "good governance" must be discarded as a term. 

"The US has limited ilifluence and can do little against friendly tyrants" Ever since the height of 

the Cold War, Washington officials have trotted out this excuse whenever criticized for not 
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doing enough to move authoritarian allies toward democracy. The falsity of the excuse becomes 

obvious when the screws are rightly tightened on dictators who are no allies of Washington. 

"MNJA's armed campaign in Mali isjustified" This seems the implied argument of the very 

large global network of governments, institutions, pundits and analysts who talk endlessly about 

grievances and who press Bamako to make concessions, despite the MNLA's heavy baggage. 

These advocates seem oblivious to the dangerous message this sends to other Malian ethnic 

communities to pick up anns to get attention. 

Scattered through the preceding analysis are several recommendations for improving US policy 

and activities in the Sahel region, and even the entire African They are now compiled and listed 

here. 

The US must stay the course especially when providing non-military partnerships will help 

African allies like Mali make it through difficult times. 

The Sahel's "growing crises" must not be wasted. Instead the opportunity should be seized to 

undertake a thorough review and evaluation of US security strategy in Africa since 9/11. 

The review's findings and lessons learned must be woven into an updated strategy. 

Without first completing the exhaustive review called for, quick improvements can and should 

be made to correct obvious weaknesses in the current security strategy in Africa. Highly 

recommended is a revised US strategy that persuades partnering African governments to use 

democracy, inclusion, reconciliation and development (DIRD) to prevent the emergence of 

homegrown terrorism. 

In operations across Africa, US entities must strike a nuanced balance. On the one hand, they 

must insist on adherence to non-negotiable universal norms and values. And on the other, they 

must not dismiss local concerns and customs without first understanding their purposes and 

motivations. 

No authoritarian African ally of the US is indispensable. Learning from the North African 

Spring, especially Egypt, the US must therefore protect its longer term interests in Africa by 

heavily insisting on full commitment to democracy as a universal value (no hiding behind 

watered down "good governance"). 

While not compromising on universal nonns, US entities must embrace working behind the 

leadership of locals during collaboration on African projects and they must be must be good 

guests who respect locals' knowledge of their history, their environment, their problems & their 

aspirations. 

The US must quickly return to its previous top leadership position in Mali, although this time in 

the non-security sector during Mali's reconstruction. 
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Specifically, the US must quickly assist in drawing up a shovel ready contingency plan for 

Mali's July elections which can be speedily implemented to cope with undesirable 

developments. Call this an electoral insurance policy. It has become necessary because in the 

opinion of many observers, this witness included, the international community is rushing an 

unready Mali toward hastily organized elections 

Finally, the US should adopt Mali's Political Dialog and Reconciliation process and draw on its 

rich tradition of democratic diversity and equal rights aspirations to help Mali heal. 

Once again I am grateful to all three subcommittees for the opportunity to share my opinions 

about important issues affecting Africa And T will be glad to answer your questions. Thank you 
76

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

At least let me ask you on that last point about the elections, are 

you concerned about the July elections? Nothing focuses the mind 

like a deadline. And sometimes when deadlines are delayed, it 

leads to a certain ennui and a belief that things can spiral out of 

control again. So it seems to be positive if it is in July, but if you 

could elaborate on your concerns? Are there any other panelists 

who would want to touch on that? 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Yes. And I am particularly grateful for that question, too, because I do see the need for elections. I mean, there is 

a lot of good that elections can do Mali. Even the issue of the 

MNLA and Tuaregs, you need to know who represents whom. Who 

does the MNLA speak for? Who are other people who speak for 

other communities? And elections will help with that. 

You do the research, and you will see that a lot of people say 

that they want a government environment that the people themselves elected. So I am saying, on the one hand, it is important and 

good to have elections. At the same time, because elections are so 

important, we need to make sure that they are done right. And 

that means a lot of preparation from registering people. And the 

fact that you have so many displaced people in Mali causes me 

some nervousness. 

So, thinking about it, I agree with you that there should be a 

deadline to make sure that we move quickly. But I also think we 

need what I will call electoral insurance policy. Given the difficulties that Mali has, it seems to me there should be contingency 

plans to say, what do we do if we run into this particular circle or 

that particular circle? So I think the election should be done. They 

should be done as fast as possible. But we should also be aware of 

the off circles and the dangers that bad elections can lead to. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Nedelcovych? 

Mr. NEDELCOVYCH. Chairman, I would agree that it is essential 

to have a deadline. I will draw from an example next door in Guinea. We are involved in a rice program. There the elections, we are 

halfway through the administration 21⁄2 years later, we haven’t had 

the legislature. 

So I think the most critical thing is you will not have the perfect 

elections, clearly, but one must get on with having as good an election as you can. Is July too soon? One could argue perhaps, that 

it is important, that it is perceived as legitimate, and that people 

can, in fact, vote. But I certainly if it were to be pushed back would 

not push back very far because what is happening is, in essence, 

all of us who are on hold waiting for this to happen—and it is those 

very investments that will in the end stabilize the country and 

bring back the growth to make it go forward. 

So I would argue better and imperfect elections sooner than a 

perfect one later. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Atallah? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Mr. Chairman, just briefly if I may comment? I 

agree with pushing for elections. However, there are some underlying issues in the country that have been festering now since the 

independence of Mali in 1960. And if we don’t address local grievances in the divide between north and south, I think what we reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Nov 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\052113\81167 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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turn to is a forced election and the continued problem sets that remain in the country. Those need to be addressed for fair elections 

going to the future. We have to address those, those internal dynamics. And those need to come right now, before the elections, in 

order to bring everybody together. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Nedelcovych, you mentioned in your written testimony the old saying that capital is a coward and that it goes into 

flight, obviously, when there is a crisis. And, yet, you cite the examples of China, India, and other nations who continue to invest 

in Africa. Why are American companies so reluctant? 

As you might know, I have introduced legislation. It is co-sponsored by my friend and colleague Ms. Bass. And we are building 

a co-sponsor base, hopefully a large group that would put a very 

heavy emphasis on exporting to Africa. Obviously, a rising tide 

raises all of the boats. 

We know that AGOA is working, but it is only one initiative 

among what should be many. Why are we so reluctant? 

Mr. NEDELCOVYCH. Thank you for the questions. I have been living the last 20-plus years since leaving the ADB. 

You know, Mr. Chairman, when you say capital is a coward, it 

needs certainty. Okay? That certainty can be bad. Certainty can be 

good. I need to know what that certainty is so I can mitigate. This 

was actually the irony to some extent that, really, Mali, even we 

that have been operating all over, Angola, Sudan, I mean, you 

name it, we, are a bit surprised. 

If you dig back far, you would say, ‘‘Well, but, in essence, as the 

colleague said, these were discrepancies from the north and the 

south and the country.’’ Maybe why am I surprised that it boiled 

over? It is those uncertainties that are difficult for American companies. Now, at the same time—and I refer the patchwork—if you 

look at 60, 70, 80 percent of the countries, most of them, the trend 

is very positive. 

I look at my own reactions here. At some point, I was about 

ready to hang up the boots. You know, I have been doing this for 

many years. And I said, ‘‘You know what? This is crazy.’’ When the 

continent finally for 30 years—20 years, I have been scratching 

odds and ends sort of deals. 

Now real deals are happening. There are real business deals happening, Mr. Chairman. And it is not just oil and gas. It is the growing middle class. There is a consuming substantive group. When 

you start speaking of Nigeria, you start speaking of Nairobi in 

Kenya, you start speaking of Tanzania, there are so many centers 

now of growth where investment is interesting. 

What I hope the lesson will go back to both the political and society in the unstable areas is, you know what, ladies and gentlemen? 

If you want that capital, that capital needs to have some stability. 

Otherwise, it will very happily go elsewhere. So help us come because then we all win. That I think is the message that needs to 

come out. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Akuetteh. You mentioned that there is a 

great burden and stress being placed on Mali’s neighbors because 

78

of the refugees that are spilling over the border. Could you perhaps 

elaborate on what that burden is? And is there an expectation that 

those individuals will be able to be repatriated back to their 

homes? 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Thank you again. I think it is connected to my 

answer to the elections question because, of course, these people, 

one of their fundamental rights, the displaced people, both in the 

southern part of Mali and in the other regions, is the right to vote. 

So if elections are being held, we have to think about how do we 

allow them to cast a vote? 

In terms of the stress placed on the other countries, I am very 

glad that this hearing is about the region, not just about Mali. 

Mali’s neighbors are also stressed. It just so happens that because 

of the Tuareg problem and the MNLA coming from Libya, Mali imploded. But the other countries are also at risk. And, therefore, it 

is a question of countries that are already at risk that now have 

had to play host to the refugees from Mali. 

It seems to me it is clear that they are industrious in terms of 

food, in terms of water, in terms of the impact on very fragile agricultural communities. 

Now, I am glad for the discussion in the previous panel. I think 

the one area where the U.S. has been doing a pretty good job is 

the humanitarian assistance, especially in the region. But I still 

think that these are countries that really do need help. And it will 

be good to increase that. 

And, if I might, on the question of U.S. companies and their presence in Africa, which is an issue that concerns me, I would just add 

that, you know, Africans are also puzzled. I mean, I would echo 

your questions. We would like to see more involvement from the 

U.S. 

The elephant in the room is the presence of the Chinese. And I 

will actually say that, I mean, I have been in the U.S. for quite a 

while, going into my fourth decade. And what I don’t understand, 

I think that the U.S. has far more positive assets if you look at the 

Chinese versus the U.S. There are people like me, African-born, 

but, of course, there is the African community, the African-American community, here, which is a big asset. 

So, frankly, it puzzles me that with all of those assets, with the 

U.S.’s democracy, as Ambassador Yamamoto said, the U.S. is very 

popular in Africa. So if you look at that, if you look at the experience with capitalism, if you look at the black community in this 

country, it seems to me the U.S. should have a much bigger presence. 

And I, too, like you, don’t understand why U.S. companies 

haven’t made bigger progress into the continent. 

Mr. SMITH. You know, on that point, our legislation would try to 

encourage the diaspora as part of a strategy to be more involved 

with reconnecting and certainly being part of an export strategy. 

So I thank you for your comment. 

Just two final questions and I yield to my friend and colleague 

Ms. Bass. Mr. Akuetteh, you mentioned that in your testimony, the 

Government of Niger has handled the potential Tuareg threat 

much more effectively than the Government of Mali. Could you exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Nov 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\052113\81167 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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plain what they are doing differently and why it has worked better? 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Thank you again. 

A lot of this is from the analysis of experts in the area. What I 

do know for a fact, for instance, is that in the immediate aftermath 

of the Libyan problem and when people moved south into the countries bordering the south of Libya, one of the things that the Nigerian Government did was they said they insisted that everybody 

coming from Libya who wanted to go into Niger had to disarm and 

if they refused to disarm, they cannot get in. 

Now, on the other hand, it is not clear how Mali handled that, 

but all of the experts and, in fact, Nigerian officials say, ‘‘This is 

what we did. We said nobody can come in who had arms. Otherwise, we are not letting them in.’’ It is not clear how that was handled in Mali, but we do know that the MNLA, which was heavily 

armed—and I have seen statistics that say that some say there 

were 800 of them, others like 2,000 of them. One way or another, 

they happened to enter back into Mali and the rebellion started. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Atallah, one final question. You testified that 

there was an underestimation of the jihadist intentions of al-Qaeda 

in the Islamic Maghreb. Could you explain as to why that was the 

case? And are we repeating that mistake in your opinion anywhere 

else in the Sahel? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I think the issue 

has been festering for a very long time; in fact, for two decades. 

Specifically, if I look at northern Mali, GSPC, which is a precursor 

to AQIM, established itself in late 2002, early 2003. In fact, I was 

in the northern parts of Mali. At the time, I was still in uniform 

running around looking at the problem set. 

Since then, they have intermarried within ethnic groups in the 

north. They have done the same thing across the region. And this 

is where AQIM becomes a threat. If you look across the region—

and I am going to include north Africa in it—currently Tunisia, the 

fledgling government in Tunisia, is fighting affiliates of AQIM in 

the western side of their border. Southern Libya has AQIM. AQIM 

has direct connections with Boko Haram. And the current Government of Nigeria is involved in trying to push Boko Haram and 

Ansaru from the north, with a lot of refugees pulling across the 

border. We have AQIM operational in northern Niger and Mauritania and, of course, in Mali. So they are all across the region. 

The problem is and what I find amongst peers, my colleagues is 

we try to quantify AQIM saying, oh, they are about 3,000 strong 

or 2,000 strong or whatnot. That is irrelevant. There can be 10 or 

15. It doesn’t matter. The fact is that every single time the Shura 

council, which exists in the northeastern part of Algeria, when one 

of their members speaks, they are able to incite and bring and leverage people into the fold. And this is where we have the issue. 

Today there are over 800 Tunisians fighting on the militant side 

in Syria. Sooner or later, these guys are going to come back. Many 

of them have connections to AQIM. 

So the problem set is not only within the African context but outside of that as well. And this is where we are literally missing the 

boat. I think we need to do more. 

80

And those are the three small recommendations I made. There 

are several others. But we need to get involved in this issue across 

that region of the Sahara. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much. 

Ms. Bass? 

Ms. BASS. Yes. Just following up on that when you were talking 

about AQIM—and you might have referenced it when I was running back and forth to committee to vote. So excuse me if I am asking stuff you already covered. But do you think that there is a degree of coordination between the different factions or is it similar 

to al-Qaeda, where there are spinoffs but they are not necessarily 

working in coordination? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Thank you very much for your question. 

As far as I understand so far, it depends on where, but there is 

definitely coordination. And it depends also loosely on how we define coordination. For example, there has been a lot of testimony 

on what happened in Benghazi, but it is understood, at least from 

experts, that the Sahara branch of AQIM, one member specifically, 

Mokhtar Belmokhtar, was getting feed of information, what was 

going on in Benghazi. 

Currently what is going on in Tunisia, there are members there 

that are specifically battling Tunisian authorities that have directly 

links to the Shura council or to the emir of AQIM, Droukdel. 

The same thing within Boko Haram. Boko Haram, for example, 

in Nigeria has had connections to AQIM for a very long time. In 

fact, Abubakar Shekau, the emir of Boko Haram, had one of his 

messages pushed on AQIM media back in 2011. It was an audiotape that AQIM kind of facilitated. So there are coordinations here 

and there. And that is part of the issue. 

We know so little about the band of the Sahara Sahel. And some 

of these groups are linked to AQIM not out of ideological, you 

know, views but sometimes out of just necessity of survival because 

AQIM has become the wealthiest affiliate out of all the AQ affiliates around the world. 

Ms. BASS. Wealthiest from drug trafficking? 

Mr. ATALLAH. From kidnap for ransom. And I would say a lot of 

Western countries are to blame for that. You know, over the years, 

2007, 2008, 2009, we see multiple kidnappings and, in return, payments that are provided in return for these. 

The last one was more recently, not even a year ago. You had 

aid workers that were kidnapped from the Tindouf area. And, in 

return, two AQIM affiliates were released from a Mauritanian jail. 

And supposedly AQIM received 15 million euros. 

I was in contact with friends in northern Kidal. They said that 

for the longest time, folks were no longer using the West African 

CFA but they were actually using euros to pay for things. That is 

indicative of how much, how deep-rooted this problem set is. 

Ms. BASS. So you are saying the Western countries are to blame 

because they are paying the ransom? 

Mr. ATALLAH. They are enabling. They are enabling. 

Ms. BASS. What should they do? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Well, again, this is where—and that is a fair question. This is where I think we need to stop enabling and we need 

to really focus on the problem sets. Messaging is important. You 

81

know, the current recruits that AQIM is able to leverage, they have 

built this over time, but 12 suicide bombers never seen in the history of Mali, we are not messaging in these problem set areas. We 

are not dealing with the root causes of the problem. In fact, we just 

put, as I—and pardon the expression—a Band-Aid on a sucking 

chest wound. It just doesn’t work. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

And I am sorry. I am not going to attempt. Would you describe 

a couple of your businesses? Specifically what do you do? And 

where are you working? 

And, actually, let me ask you about Mali because I have a big 

interest, especially as Mr. Akuetteh said, in promoting U.S. businesses and, in particular, you know, African-American businesses, 

their involvement on a continent. And so I am wondering, how you 

do work in Mali? What do you do? 

Mr. NEDELCOVYCH. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

We are in agro industry. We are primarily in the process side. 

So being out of Louisiana, it is sugar cane, cane processing. It is 

rice, rice milling. And it is always the co-generation of electricity 

from the agriwaste. So the Mali project, in fact, I believe Eric had 

a chance to speak with the people out there when you were in 

Bamako. It was to be 200,000 tons of sugar produced, 30 

megawatts of electricity, and 10 million liters of ethanol, actually, 

for a 10 percent gasohol blend in all the gasoline——

Ms. BASS. And it is in Bamako or around Bamako? 

Mr. NEDELCOVYCH. It is in Se ́gou and Markala in the Office du 

Niger. It is using the strength and the value of water. Agriculture 

is water. And this is why I say oftentimes while one looks at the 

Sahel, its very, very desperate region, from an agro-industrial 

standpoint, I would say quite the opposite. You have a major, 

major river that is coming through that needs to be properly harnessed in a sustainable way. 

The key, the key, is absolutely the way you structure it. And this 

comes back to the question of why U.S. investments don’t go in. Investments that are small are just going to be difficult for international investors to come in. So the key becomes sizing the investment. 

For agri industry, if you don’t scale up, you can’t compete. Now, 

that does not mean you dislocate the small farmers. What it does 

mean is literally capture them in the scheme as outgrowers. In our 

case in the 15,000 hectare, 7,000 were going to be independent 

small farmers that are being brought into modern agriculture, if 

you will. The same happens with our rice schemes now in Nigeria. 

The key is always bringing in the community, bringing in the small 

farmer. 

And guess what? In the end, that will be what is putting the 

Band-Aid on whatever——

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. NEDELCOVYCH [continuing]. It that you are placing it because then it is those people that will make sure that this doesn’t 

get undermined. 

Unfortunately, in Mali, we were about to start up the major operation. Had we been there a year or two, I am willing to bet the 

82

region would act differently. Those would be the people protecting 

our aid workers going in there. 

So I would continue to argue for that combination of larger investment, which is interesting foreign national groups, with 

schemes that bring in the smaller. And then there is one very important thing, coming back to what Congressman Smith was asking. That is, if you take out Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, most of 

these economies are just simply too small to be interesting. 

Ms. BASS. Right, which is why——

Mr. NEDELCOVYCH. And I hate to say it, but the ECOWASes and 

the economic committees have all spoken very nicely. But, in reality, those are not functioning as true common markets. And in 

our case, for example, on the sugar, the state and the Mali delegation, the Ambassador knows very well, it is ties to the point where 

now we have taken advantage of being landlocked. The advantage 

is you have got a huge population that grow the national markets. 

We don’t need to export the sugar. It is not even interesting. The 

price is a lot more interesting for sugar and rice in the region. 

Grow it. But what happens then is if those common markets are 

not functioning,——

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. NEDELCOVYCH [continuing]. You begin to have to start subsidizing the small factories that don’t work. The reality of the 

world has to come back in. And that goes also on the African side. 

Ms. BASS. Well, I really appreciate what you are saying. I mean, 

one of our challenges here in trying to work with businesses to go 

to the continent is they are afraid to death—well, I mean, basically, 

it is our own ignorance of the continent. So when we hear a conflict 

in Mali, we think that it is happening all over the place. And we 

have no geographic understanding as to where one country is, you 

know. 

So you have been able to do this in Mali, in the middle of a conflict. And I think that is a really important perspective to bring. 

Even where there is a conflict, you can still successfully od business, let alone all of the nations where there isn’t a current conflict. So I appreciate that. 

And, Mr. Akuetteh, I wanted to ask you about a few things that 

you were saying. You talked about the U.S. playing a stronger role. 

And I wanted to know what your opinion was, how U.S. security 

activities in the region are perceived by the governments and populations in the Sahel. So I always worry about the U.S. playing a 

stronger role, but where is that fine line between playing that 

stronger role and then feeling as though we have overplayed our 

hand? 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Thank you very much. I think it is a great question. And also, especially because you mentioned governments and 

people, sometimes I think that there is a split in how some particular U.S. programs may be looked at. 

But it seems to me that, as I mentioned, the U.S. interests in the 

Sahel, West Africa and North Africa, really picked up, for understandable reasons, after 9/11. So the issue is terrorism and the potential for terrorism. 

And I think it is important to underline that terrorism is a problem for Africans as well. I mean, Boko Haram has been killing NiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Nov 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\052113\81167 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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gerians. The Embassy bombings killed a lot of Africans. So Africans 

welcome the U.S.’s help in dealing with terrorism. I do think there 

should be dialogue about what particular approaches will work. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. I think if there is that dialogue, then we don’t 

overstep and don’t do things that may make Africans nervous. I 

particularly think that a stress on democracy will be a very good 

way. Paradoxical as it may sound, it will be a very good way of 

dealing with terrorism and potential terrorism across Africa. 

So, yes, I want the U.S. to say, ‘‘Look, this is very important to 

us. We want to be engaged,’’ but then have a dialogue with the Africans, whether regionally or in particular countries, as to exactly 

what will work. 

If I might mention one particular example; for instance, training 

African militaries. I think this is part of the strategy for dealing 

with terrorism in Africa, but in my mind, it has to be in three 

stages. I think the first thing that African soldiers need is respect 

for civilian authority to know that an elected President is really 

their Commander in Chief and it has chosen to turn a gun on him. 

I think the second phase for training for African soldiers has to 

be respect for citizens; that is, citizens pay their salaries, pay for 

their uniforms, and it is not their job to abuse them. I think if they 

pass those two phases of tests, then for me, you go to the third 

level, which is how to make them better fighters. 

So I would say again the U.S. needs to be involved with the Africans and particularly on the training of the soldiers. Make sure 

that they respect democracy and they respect civilian authorities. 

Ms. BASS. So taking Mali for an example, do you think that what 

we did didn’t work? I mean, because we trained the military there. 

And that is exactly what the military did. So is it that it didn’t 

work? I mean, that is always the fine line. How do you determine 

when you have moved from one stage to the other? 

Mr. AKUETTEH. I think it is a good question here. Without ducking the question, I need to display some humility, which is why, in 

fact, an important point in my testimony, and even last year when 

I was here, is that I think the U.S. needs to do the most thorough 

of reviews of their strategy over the 10 years and look at everything. Experts will have to do it. I think Congress will have a role. 

Experts in DoD will have a role so they can determine exactly what 

the training went to and what it was meant to achieve, where 

things may have gone wrong, and what lessons can be learned from 

it. 

So in terms of if you look at just the results, of course, I think 

it is disastrous for Mali, but there was the coup and the role of the 

U.S.-trained soldier in that coup. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. It doesn’t make the U.S. look good. Even it is disastrous for Mali. My point is we need to do a very thorough review 

to find out exactly what happened. From this distance, that is all 

I can recommend because there are details I don’t know. 

Ms. BASS. Sure. And, you know, I wanted to know about what 

you thought about the people that are running right now for President. We have actually met a number of them. And I know we have 

a whole Malian delegation here that I look forward to meeting with 

84

as soon as this meeting is over. But how many people were running 

for President? I think I have met two or three Presidential candidates who have come through the Capitol. And what is your opinion of the capacity? 

Mr. AKUETTEH. You know, I think my definitive answer is I have 

heard of 12 running. I know that at least one is a woman, which 

is a good sign. On the other hand, as Chairman Smith had asked 

about the elections, I see the value of the elections. On the other 

hand, I am nervous because between now and July is not a lot of 

time. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. And so the way I am linking this to your question is that there doesn’t seem to be a lot of time to get to know 

the candidates, at least from people like us from the outside. 

Now, the talk inside Mali is that many of the candidates are 

from the old political class. So they may be well-known. But from 

an activist like me, what I know is fairly superficial, which is that 

there are about 12 of them. And they are vying. And I wish there 

was more time to do things right. 

Ms. BASS. Well, and I also think it is going to be interesting. 

And, Mr. Chair, maybe it is something that we could look at because after the election takes place, what is our role going to be 

supporting whoever it is that is elected to help to strengthen their 

capacity? 

A final question for you. When I was making one of my runs 

back to another committee, you were talking about drug trafficking. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Yes. 

Ms. BASS. And I wanted to know if you could expand on that? 

And I wanted to know your thoughts on how you think countries 

in the region can best counter the drug trafficking. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Oh, if I may take the back end of the question 

first? Because in preparing for this testimony and some of the research I was doing, one thing struck me which I think is a good 

sign. And I will underline that. 

Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has actually just in 

January created the West Africa Commission on Drugs. And he is 

bringing a lot of Africans, including former President Obasanjo to 

deal with the drug problem in West Africa. 

Now, what I was saying earlier is that the way I think it affects 

U.S. interests is that these drugs, the experts mentioned that you 

have cocaine, you have meth, and you have heroin. The cocaine is 

coming from Latin America. And, in return, what you are getting 

back into Latin America, of course, is drug money, but you are also 

getting some of the weapons that everyone agrees flowed out of 

Libya. So you are getting weapons going to Latin America. Now, 

I am saying that it seems to me that happening in the U.S. hemisphere should be of concern to the U.S. 

But, apart from cocaine, the research—and the U.N. Office on 

Drugs has also done a lot of work in West Africa. And they are 

finding out that meth is being produced in some West African 

countries and then exported to east Asia. And the heroin is coming 

from Asia through West Africa into Europe. And the big problem 

this is having on the area, West Africa, is three. You have got corVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Nov 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\052113\81167 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ruption. You have got democracy being contaminated. And then 

you have got health problems because people involved in the drug 

trade, locals, sometimes they are being paid with drugs. And so 

consumption is also growing. And it is a health problem for the Africans. And they are very concerned. 

I mean, one thing Kofi Annan said was that we really need the 

help of our friends in Europe and the United States to help us deal 

with the drug problem. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

You have been very patient with your time. If I could just ask 

a few follow-up questions? And anything you want to add, please 

do. In my walk as a lawmaker—and I have been in Congress now 

33 years—I often differentiate between criticism that mocks, belittles, and takes cheap shots, and criticism that is constructive and 

leads to better outcomes. You did listen to the administration witnesses earlier in the first panel. You know and you understand the 

administration’s policies vis-a`-vis the Sahel. I wonder if you could 

offer this panel any constructive criticism that might lead to better 

outcomes. 

Secondly, Mr. Atallah, in your testimony, you heard Nancy 

Lindborg say earlier that while the recent rise of violent extremism 

in West Africa cannot be directly attributed to drought, chronic 

food security, or weak governance, each of these factors can indirectly exacerbate instability in the region. 

And you made three very specific recommendations at the end of 

your testimony. One is that USAID get back into the fight. And you 

pointed out that there are access restrictions which our Embassy 

imposes and others imposed. If you could elaborate on that? 

Thirdly, talk about border security. I wonder if you might tell us, 

to what degree you are talking about. How much? Is it technical 

aid? Is it actual foreign aid that would beef up their ability to have 

a more secure border? 

And, finally, you point out that to effectively counter the jihad 

narrative wielded by AQIM, a comprehensive and expertly crafted 

information operation campaign is necessary for the region. And 

that is, I think, a very profound recommendation, but I wonder if 

you might tell us how that might be done. And others might want 

to speak to that as well. 

The first one would be on constructive criticism and then to 

speak to the three or elaborate on the recommendations that you 

made. 

Mr. ATALLAH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes. Constructive criticism, I think, sir, you asked the question 

as what is AFRICOM doing. A component of AFRICOM is SOCAF. 

I think SOCAF can be deeply rooted in the fight but with restrictions. We are not taking enough steps. 

I know the command is ready. I know the command wants to go 

in. I know they have several plans to go in. However, there are 

some political dynamics that prohibit them from doing so. And my 

first criticism is I think we need to get in there. 

There could be some assistance in targeting key AQIM, MUJAO, 

Ansar al-Dine leaders, Iyad ag Aghali, Mokhtar Belmokhtar. I can 

go on and on. There are several of them that are still floating 

86

around the region. And we have experience in other parts of the 

world that we can bring to bear in this area. That is number one. 

Number two, although USAID is doing some work, a lot more 

can be done. Again, in the band of the Sahara—and when I talk 

about northern Mali, northern Niger, southern Libya, southern Algeria, all the way across the northern Chad, the peoples of this 

part of the world are really marginalized by their host governments. A call from Kidal, for example. A person was telling me that 

there are very little food resources and medical resources. Me ́decins 

du Monde, which is an NGO that provides some medical aid, has 

a couple of workers up in Kidal but not enough to meet all of the 

needs. We need to get those folks up there. In order to do so, it requires, of course, soft elements to provide that security. So that is 

in a sense a criticism of the lack of involvement in the region. 

In answer to the questions you asked specifically to my statement, I have flown across the entire band of the Sahara. I used to 

do that for the Defense Intelligence Agency. I have landed on every 

dirt strip in the northern parts of the Sahara from Mali, Niger, and 

Chad. There is no radar. Movements of aircraft can go back and 

forth. People can land, say, in Kidal. They can land in Tessalit. 

They can land in other parts of the Sahara, literally without anybody knowing about it. 

Number two, the movements across the Sahara in some of these 

areas is difficult because of the geography. If you take the highest 

peaks of the mountains in, say, southern Algeria, the Ahaggar 

Mountains, into the Adrars in Mali and the Iron Mountains in 

Niger, that band over there has some very treacherous terrain. And 

people move very freely within those areas. It is very difficult for 

the host countries to have any visibility or control. So we need to 

do that, in effect. 

In terms of messaging, AQIM is very apt. Like I said, they have 

a Twitter account. And they have used Facebook continuously. 

There was a Facebook page. And I mentioned that in my written 

statement. That popped up after the attack on the gas plant in Algeria. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the guy who crafted the strategy for 

its face, went on Facebook on a site called the Derna Media Center, 

which stands for Derna, Libya. Within a matter of weeks, it was 

taken down. But the number of people that joined that literally in 

a 2-week span was 4,000 basically, counting Mokhtar Belmokhtar 

as a hero of what he did in Algeria. 

It doesn’t mean all of these people are joining AQIM. However, 

it means that they are getting an audience, whether it is through 

Twitter, it is through Facebook, or whatnot. What we need to do 

is counter that in order to prevent additional recruits in the future 

and to prevent things like we are seeing right now in Mali: Suicide 

bombers. 

Ms. BASS. You mentioned Mokhtar Belmokhtar. I thought he was 

killed. 

Mr. ATALLAH. Ma’am, he wasn’t killed. That was a mention from 

the Chadian side. The Chadian President came out and said that 

he was killed, but Mokhtar Belmokhtar is still alive. In fact, jihadi 

forums came out and did say publicly that he is still alive. 

87

The only person who is confirmed killed—and the French had to 

confirm it publicly—was Abou Zeid. There are several others, but 

Mokhtar Belmokhtar is still around. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. ATALLAH. Thank you, ma’am. 

Mr. NEDELCOVYCH. I think we just really have to ask ourselves 

the very basic question. And that is, is it the illness we are going 

after or the symptoms? You know, fighting terrorism, fighting the 

mokhtars by whatever name is a little bit like that game you have, 

the groundhog that comes up. You smash its head here, and it pops 

up here. You smash it here. It pops up there. It is never ending. 

I mean, if one does not get in there and treat that hunger and that 

poverty and that desperation, you just simply cannot win the war. 

You cannot. 

So the question then becomes, why, yes, this has to be done. Can 

we and how do we get to the real root issues so that in the end, 

it is the people living in that area? It is their leaderships that have 

to come back forward and say, ‘‘Okay. What are we going to do? 

We are not going to stabilize. They are going to have to stabilize.’’ 

I mean, let’s be honest in the end. What is the only answer there? 

I was chuckling earlier. I visited my grandmother when I was 

studying political philosophy. And, you know, she was the grandmother from the old society. ‘‘This is very brilliant. You guys are 

all very wise, but can I spread this on bread and eat it? Can I do 

that, that wisdom of yours?’’ And there is too much, at times, focus 

elections. And there is going to be a discussion. 

I mean, I don’t even want to count how many national dialogues 

have gone on in various countries on this continent, but when do 

we get on? When does the civil society and the people all say, 

‘‘What about us? We want to eat. We want to grow up like the rest 

of the world is going forward.’’

But, really, I think that focus has got to come also from the people themselves, their own national leadership to pull out what is 

in the end the absolute necessity. And that is treat the disease, not 

the symptom. It is poverty. It is hunger. It is desperation. And that 

is where if there is a positive criticism, it is a realization from the 

development agency and others. There are no surprises. 

It is about every so many years. There is instability and so many 

years. We could have predicted everything that has been happening. The issue is recognize it and then deal with it with the 

amount of time that is necessary. If it is 20 years, if it is these 

kinds of resources, recognize where it is and do it or say, ‘‘You 

know what? We can’t do it.’’ That is the reality to me. 

Over. Thank you. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. In terms of constructive, if I might, my colleague’s construction suggestion, you 

know, if you look, Mali, Mali was very important in terms of U.S. 

security activities in the region prior to the war and the coup. And 

since then, clearly, the French and the Europeans have a heavy 

presence. 

My suggestion then will be for the U.S. to say, ‘‘Look, we weren’t 

in here just to kill our enemies. And if some other soldiers are 

here, then we are not interested.’’ It should be, actually, I would 

like the U.S. to send a message to the Malians and the regions that 

88

‘‘We want to play a big role in your reconstruction and your recovery.’’ So that will be that the U.S. shall have a bigger presence. 

I did a little calculation of the pledges in Brussels. And from 

what I can tell, based on what the U.S. has already put down in 

their request that they have made to Congress—and I could have 

gotten some things wrong, but it is about a 5-percent contribution 

to what has been pledged for Mali. I wish it was more. 

And, secondly, in terms of specific things, again, I think Mali because it is the test, what the U.S. does with Mali sends a message 

to the rest of the region—and I will say the elections. Again, there 

are already some signs. I don’t think the elections can be stopped 

or rolled back, but I do think that there should be a contingency 

plan for quickly reacting and helping the Malians make sure that 

it goes well. 

And, finally, my big point, which is that we need to do a review, 

to say, ‘‘Over these years and with Libya and Mali having happened, what have we learned? How can we reengage the region to 

have security? Because security comes first and good governance 

comes first and other things will follow.’’

Thank you again. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimonies. Thank 

you for your insights and counsel. It is very helpful to the committees that have met to receive it. And we will follow up on it. So 

I thank you so very much. 

I would also ask unanimous consent that a written testimony 

from Shari Berenbach, President and CEO of the United States African Development Foundation, be made a part of the record. 

I want to thank Speaker Toure ́ for being here for the entire day 

of the hearing. We often have visiting diplomats and even Speakers 

like yourself. This is the first time—and this is about my 400th 

hearing—that we have ever had a Speaker come and stay and listen to the entirety of the proceeding. You do us a great honor by 

doing so. I want you to thank you for your Ambassador, Maamoun 

Keita, who has been a great help over the years and will continue 

to be, I am sure. And again I want to thank our witnesses. Your 

testimonies were extraordinary. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the committees were adjourned.] 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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81167n.eps

JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

u.s. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20SIS-612X 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations 

Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

May 17, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held 

jointly by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation. and Trade in 

Room 2172 of the Ra~ burn House Office Building (and m,ailable live on the Committee \\ebsite at 

,,\v.\\'.foreJ£;1~aff:l1rs,hollSeJW\ ): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday. May 21. 2013 

2:00 p.m. 

The Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region 

Panel I 

111e Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto 

Acting Assistant Secretary of State 

Bureau of Afriean Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

The Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg 

Assistant Administrator 

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance 

U.S. Agency for Inter~1ational Development 

Panel II 

Mr. Rudolph Atallah 

Senior Fellmv 

Michael S. Ansari Africa Center 

Atlantic Council 

Mirna S. Nede1covych. Ph.D. 

Partner 

Schaffer Global Group 

Mr. Nii Akuetteh 

(Former Georgetown Umversrty Professor of Afncan Affmr:,) 

By Direction of the Chairman 
91

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81167m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AI''i''AIRS 

HEARING 

Day_----'T.'-!I.,,'e"'s"-tla"'IL' __ D,atc, __ -,M=aLI' "'2"'I,'-'2'-'O"'I-"3'----_Room 2172 Rm,bl/m HOB 

Stal'ting Time 2·00" tv Ending Time 4:52 p,lIi. 

Recesses ~1 (.lM!Lto.1;JJL) <-to ----.J ( __ to __ ) <-to __ )( __ to __ ) <-to----.J 

Pre~idillg Member(s) 

Rep. Cllds Smith 

Check ,,1/ o/Ilre/ol/owillg Ilral "pply,' 

Opell Session [Z] 

Ilxcclltive (closed) Soss;on D Televise" [Z] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

The Growillg Crisis ill Africa's Sahe! Regioll 

SUBCOMMITTl<:l<: MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Record~taporl) [Z] 

Shmog.oaphic U.ecoJ'd L.iJ 

Rep. Bms, Rep. COllllolly, Rep. Cook, Rep. Del/teh, Rep. {(elllledy, Nep. IUl/zingel; Rep. Lowell/htll, Rep. 

Poe, Rep. Ro.,-reht/llell, Rep. ScllIIeidel; /(ep. Sheruutll, lieI" Wehel; Rep. COItOlI 

NON·SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark witll all • if they are 1/01 members ~r fit/I committee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting 1I0lice aUached? Yes [I] No D 

(If "no ", please list below and inelude fitle, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List aliY statemelils slIbmitted/ortlie record) 

IlIfol'lI/alloll from USAID 011 faith-based programming 

SlImll/mJ' ofRecol1lll1em1t1tiollSji'om/he C0I1)01'tl1e COlllleil Oil AJi'iC(f, ""bmilted hy Cilllirll/(111 Smith 

Sialement oj'Sl/(/l'i Rl'enbtlch of the U.S Aji'iC(f// Development /<'01l1l/Ial;,,,,, suiJmitted hy CIUlil'lII(f1l Smith 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOUHNED 4:52 p.lII. 

~ e. S-w--:e~ SuJJCo11littee Staff Director 
92

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD POSED BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO THE HONORABLE NANCY E. LINDBORG, ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Question: 

Please provide a breakout of the extent that we are partnering with faith-based 

groups in the Sahel. 

Response: 

No response was received prior to printing.

f

93

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


81167f-1.eps
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81167f-2.eps

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS A shm 01 attonUon and resources is urgently needed from olher areas to oxpand support to the U.S. private 

sector's activities In Africa. The shift In focus should Include programs that help build African private sector 

capacity and an enabling business environment. 

Specific actions would include: 

" Expand senior level commercial diplomacy, Including a Presidential trade mission . 

.. Establish a target at the Presldantiallavel for $10 billion In funding for Infrastructure projects, focused on 

areas that promote growth and In which the U.S. prlvale seclor Is competit"e, such as agriCUlture, heallh. 

Infonnatlon and communications technology (ICT), energy, and heavy machinery. 

"Make supporl for U.S. business a oentral element of U.S. foreign and development policy. 

• Expand fonnal and Infonnal consullatlons with the private sector to ensure that pr"ate sector conoerns 

are Incorporated in policy, program, and project planning and execution. 

• In consultation with the private sector, evaluate the current whole of govemment approach to working with 

business, Including PUblic-privata partnerships, and revamp programs and policies to pravde timely and 

Integrated support to the U.S. privale ssctor. 

a Ensure, so far as possible, that official policy positions do not obstruct tndustry efforts to strenglhen 

Africa's role In U.S. and global supply chains and distribution channels. 

a Offer technical asslslanoe for market development policies, including expansion of domestic and regionat 

capital markets. 

• Expand technical assistance In rule of law, anti'COrruption, and transparency actMties, InclUding via 

developmental assistance programs. 

B Support responsible energy development and effective regulation, Indudlng tho multi-stakeholder 

EXlractive tndustries Transparency Initiative (EITO. 

• Orn!;lder modifying the Dodd-Frank legislation and final SEC rule requiring unilateral payment 

disclosures at the project level. since they may hava the effect of weakening the sanctity of existing 

contracts and puUing U.S. finns at a competitive disadvant"lle. 

• Expand the Foreign Commercial SetVIce (FCS) presence In Alrtca and provide more training and support 

to state Department commercial officers wharo FCS Is not present. 

a tntensify support lor Ihe elforts of theAU and the regional economic commissions to Improve their 

Inlrastruell"es and better Integrate their markets. 

PROGRAMMATIC CHANGES We urge a re-deslgn of the USG's Inleragency prooesses and program structures,ln consultation wllh the 

private sector, to panna a more coordinated approach on major pro)ects. Ideally, tillers should be an effective 

"one-stop shop" bringing together relevant agendes In an a~ble and responsive fonnat that provides tIIle 

Information and support that businesses need to compete more effectively. This would entail changes In the way 

that USTR, USAID, MCC, OPIC, Commerce, Export-Import Bank (EXIM), and other agencies conduct 

business, whlcl, places a partnership wIIh the private ssetor at the core of their planning and programs. CCA 

welcomed the June 2012 U.S. strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa and its heightened focus on a whole of 

government approacl, to spurring economic growth, trade and Irwestmant, but more needs to be done. 

INfRASTRUCTURE 

tmprovlng Infrastructure Is cruciat to Africa's growth and is a major priority for Its governments, but Is an area 

In which the U.S. lags behind_I! should be a top priority for U.S. agencies such as EXIM. OPIC, MCC, and 

others to expand support for Infraslructure projects, In tenns of botlll policy advocacy and creat"e, ffexible use 

of existing funding. For example, EXIM should be authorized to devote more funding to offset U.S. 

competitors'tied aid credits. .7· 
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POWER 

Thera are nearly one billion Africans, yet they COrlSume only four percent of the world's electricity. Africa's 

groWlh and hs expanding middle ciass Imply a major shift in new demand for power. Improving health, 

agrlculture,lndustry, and education will require huge Investments In generation, transmission, and distribution 

facilities, Including renewable and off-grid power. Africa's potential for renewable resources and creative 

application Of. technologies Is as great as the shortfall In meeting Africa's demand for power. The pewer sector 

Is ripe for greatly expanded attention from the Administration and the U.S. privale sector as well as from 

Aftican governments and businesses. 

EXPANDED EFFORTS BY ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 

GGA's momborsgreally appreciale the Administration's Increased attention to Aftica's economic and 

commercial potontial through programs like the Nalional Export Inltlalive, the Commerce Department's Doing 

Business In Africa campaign, USAIDs Development Credit Aulhority, USTR's work on Trade and Investment 

Agreements, BiiatorallnvestmentTreaties and the East African CommunllyTrade and Investment 

Pannershlp Inhiativo. We specificalty appreciate the day-ta-day support in Washlnglon and by Embassies In 

the field, as well as a sotios of high-level trade missions. The June 2012 Strategy towards Sub-Sallaran Africa 

and Its heightened focus on a Whole of government approach to growth, trado, and Investment was a superib 

example of the kinds of poIicios CCA favors and hopes to expand. CCA also acknowledges and supports the 

many existing programs and aclMties that are already undelWay that are congruont with or highlighted as 

recommendations In this report. 

CCA equally W<llcomes and applauds tho bipartisan efforts by many Senator. 'and Reprosentatives to expand 

the congressional focus on Africa, especially the renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 

and Its 3ed country fabric proviSion. CCA particularly welcomes efforts In Congress to expand the legal 

framework and provide additional suppon for our economic and commercial Interests In Africa, 

11,ese efforts have laid the foundation for Increased opportunity for economic growth and development on the 

African continent. On behaU of the u.s. pnvale seelor, CCA stands ready to continue its collaboration I'Mh the 

Admlnislration and Congress to build an even stronger U.S.-African partnership In the public and private sectors. 

By working together, our efforts will be a promising Investment In future jobs, economic growth and opportunity for 

both Africa and the Unhed States. 

SECTOIt-SI'ECIFI<: RECOMMENDATIONS: 

NOTE: The Individual chapters In thIs report place thesa recommendations In contald and provide additional 

detaIled recommendatIons. 

, • Promote opan and transparent legal and regulatory frameworks In Africa thai will open markets to U.S. 

exports, protoct Intollectual property, and ensure that local contant requirements are not used to 

discriminate against U.S. companies • 

• While maintaining and enhancing AGOA's duty·free, quota-free preferences, examine ways to develop a 

more comprehetlSlve trade and Investment strategy that will link trade and Investment opportunities, build 

value chains, and strengthen participation in Aflican regional markets • 

• 8. 
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• Renew AGOA expeditiously, with benefits extended to addHional products (the private seclor 

recommends a cOmprehensive ITC study to delenmlne which markets OQuld be developed through 

·enhanced preferences) and secured in place for a period of time long enough to establish meaningful 

investmenlopportunitles. 

• Priori!1zo support for African regional Integration, focus on Inttlatives to facilitate regional customs 

cooperation, establish better standards and encourage regionallnfrastruclure development, which 

Includes methods through the US-EAC Trade and Investl1'!ent Partnership Initiative. 

• Working with USTR, enhance use of TI FAs, which Includes the expar)Sloll of ongoing business dialogues 

and a more formal system for notification and Inpul.·· . 

" Expand use of BITs, with a particular emphasis on key markets (e.g. Nigorla and Angola) and a stronger 

procoss for private seclor Inpul. 

" iNo·rk.cIosely with other lrading partners, Including the European Union Member States through the 

proposed Transatlanlic Trade and Investment partnership, African tnstltutlons and REGs, and illultilateral 

institutions, including thO WTO, to encourage development 01 a coordinated approach to supporting 

development and deeper intagratlon of thaAfrican markel while avoiding Initiatives that hampar this effort. 

II Carefully study any prOposals for reciprocal trade commitments, which must Include private sector Input 

and analysis In order to actively avoid models that could limit economic diverslllcation and regional and 

continental development, such as EPAs. 

a Continue 10 place a pHority on technical assislance and capacltybulldlng, and focus, In particular, on 

activities that will supPOrt private seclor development and Increased Investment and trade. 

II Use technical asslstarice and capacity building to strenglhen value chair)S, and tie this Into private sector 

activities and market demand . 

.. Improve the USG's coordinated syslem of trade finance, advocacy and business support, Including 

approaches through U8AID, OPIC, EX-1M and the Departments of Commerce and TreasUlY, In order to 

meet or exceed similar support offered by other countries, putting U.S. companies at a OQmpetitive 

advantage. 

" Revamp the system of financing for U.S. expOrts so that It competes on an equal basis with other 

counlrles, Is much faster and more flexible, much beUer funded, and Includes an annual targeted 

benchmark 01 deals to be funded In Africa. 

• Expend and better coordinate U.S. governmenl programs that support U.S. private investment in Africa 

.(including human and tinanclal resources). 

• Invest In technology-focused projects where the U.S. has competilive advantage. 

-Expand support to African governments so thai they can more effectivety access Intemallonal financial 

markels and develop their own domestio markets. 

• Incantivlza projects that promote investment across borders and support creation of larger regional 

markets. 

D Enhance cooperation between traditional end new allies fa finance projects In Atrica. U.S. agencies end 

the private seclor shoUld Identily slrategio partnsrs already present or seeking to invest In Afrtca to raise 

and put capital in common, develop projects together, and share the benefits. 

III () • 
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-In close collaboratkm with Afncan Governments, U.S. funding and Investments shouldba made In local 

vocationaUnslitulions and Institutions of higher education . 

.. Promote regulatory frameworks and legal syslenns that ensure the value and prolection of U.S. 

Intellectual property assets. 

R The USG should Incr~asa lis focus on reducing protectionist policies, legislation andlor regulations and 

encourage Afiican governments to promote local economies In a mannor that supports and ensures 

open and pro-market condITions, 

.. Collaborate with Industry and stakeholders to apply Internatlonalo/ recognized privacy priOciples to current 

tectmology and cultural realities. " 

" Create Incimlives for securing private Infrastructure and advanoe Information sharing that Includes 

appropriate liabilITy protection for disclosure of cyber threat Information. 

• Promote an Intemational privacy and security regime that allows tor data transters across borders; 

, allowing countries to recognize one another's data prot~ction laws. 

• Recognize and support the role of multi·stakeholder processes as an alternative to Intergovernmental 

standard se"ing. 

• Coordinate USG support for agricultural devetopment and agrl!)uslness In Africa by on90'In9 efforts under 

the USAID Feed the Future/Grow Afrlca/Naw A«tanoe Initiatives. ' 

• Expand programs that provide direct financial supPort to private sector IovE>Stments, Including lIle USAID 

Global Development Alliance and Developmenf fnnovation Ventures. Link the private sector wITh 

Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CMDP) efforts to advance the most promising 

value chain opportunHies. 

• Expand use at PPPs to drive Innovation In agriculture, with an emphasis on bringing the private sector 

Into project design at the earliest possible stage. 

R Support the Increased 'proviSion of agricultural finance by enwuraglng land ownership reforms and the 

creation of programs that will expand access to collateral for small and medium tarmers. 

• Increase Investment In programs that support capacity building and provide technical assIstanoe, 

Including the White House's Young African Leaders InttiaWe (VAll), USAID'sAfJ1ca LEAD program, and 

USDA's Norman E. Borlaug International Agricultural Sclenoe and Technology Fellowship Program. 

• Cooparate With the private sector and partner governments to convene a ''youlh In agribusiness" forum 

under the ,;usp'loes of YALI. ' , , 

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• A pro·Vade and Intemalionallnvestment agenda Is essenliat to promote energy development by 

encouraging trade !Iows and ensuring Investment rules tllat help manage ~sks. 

• Expand support tor the new Bureau of Energy Resourcos at Slate Department, which Is Important to 

Integrating energy and !orelgn policy and maintaining U.S. leadership in this area. 

-Improve USG support to U.S. companies, which Involves more lIexibilily on terms, (aster tumaround on 

project Issues, and more Integrated, holistic, programmatic approaches that move U.S. companies closer 

to a level pla~ng lield versus !orelgn compe!ttors. 

• P,ioritize power generation and distribution In USAID and MOO assistance both because of tho key role 

power plays In Iong·term eevnomlc growth and to leverege U,S. capacity to provlde this type of 

assistance. . 

• Encourage Afrioan govemments to adopt gradually mal1<et·based pricing to leverage private Investment 

In the power sector and Improve the foundation for long·term economtc growth. Additionally, encourage 

African govemments to ulilize currenlly flared gas for power generation as well as off·grid and distributed 

power mechanisms, when appropriate, 

R Strengthen the ability of African govemments to create cred~·worthy, power·producing enmies that honor 

power purchase agreernents. Help governments establish and maintain a buslness·friendly e~vlronment. 

Both elements are key to mutually beneficlai progress In this sector. 

• Advocate pro-rnal1<et policies that protect private investment and promote U.S. exports, enabling new 

Invostment In health Infrastructure and the Introducllon of new technologies and services (e.9., U,S. 

l3ilatoral.lnveslment Trealy (BIT) program). 

• Work to achieve greater regulatOlY harrnonlzallon across Africa. The conlinent Is a patchwork of 

regulaUons governing the reglstraUon of medicines, vaccines, medical devices and diagnostics, and 

pertormanoe of these systems Is greatiy varied. Establish a publio-private commission to put together an 

action· agenda on specifio ragulatoty botllenacl<s and how they could be eliminated, working together 

with existing Iniliativas by the African Union and regional economio organizations. 

• Encourage procuremenl standards that craate a lovel playing field for companies to invost and increase 

adoption 01 models of standardization at the count", level (as seen at the World Bank), Convene a 

privale sector advlso!)' group to provide clear recommendations to the relevant USG agencies, which 

could serve as the basis for bilateral discussions with the African Union, Alrican regional oconomic 

organizations and individual African governments. 

II Strengthen core capaclty of the health sector to address health system constraints (e.g" adequate 

training, ·standards, regional coilaboratlon and information sharing) by working with local and regional 

partners. These Partners Include health mlnistnes and service providers on the ground, ready to 

slrengthen their capacity to support and tho heaah system. Increase resources for !echnlcal assistance 

to address constraints. 

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" Leverage existing resources In the U.S. to help African govemments Improve the African health 

worl<force. The USG can foster mechanisms to help professional organizalions and universillos In 

partnering with African healih mlnlstIies to address saualions like the lack of qualified personnol, In 

addition to driving standards 01 quality care. There Is also an opportunity to combine United Statos 

GOVemment efforts (e.g" PEPFAR's partnership Initiatives with medical and nursing schools In Africa) 

with the range of privale Initiatives sought to help strengthen human resources for health In Africa. 

" Consult members 01 the private sector, review and revise the process and mechanisms for PPPs and 

develop a simple, transparent, and replicable platrorm and design struclure for PPPs. Build on the leading 

practlc:es of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, PEPFAR, and til. Global Development Allianca 

(USAID) to cteate a harmonized approach to engaging private sector partners 111 addressing development 

cooperation for health In Africa . 

• Invest In Innovative approaches to engage the private sector. For example, USAID Programs like Saving 

lives at Birth, the Development Innovalion Venlures, or Saving MDthers, GMng life, could b() adapted for 

similar Initiatives geared specifically to new models of collaboration to strengthen African health systems . 

• Place greater priority on non·communlcable dlsoasos In tho USG's health and development agendas, 

utilizing the findings of the Global Burden of Dlseaso Study 2010 to understand present and future 

health challenges when shaping and detenmining resource allocations priorities In partnership with 

African countries 

" Establish coordinating mechanism to bring logether publio and private expertise In the U.S. and Africa to 

develop Integrated approaches 10 110allll, nulrlUon, water and sanHation and environmental Issues that 

together affect the heallh and well-being of Africans. 

"strengthen MCC's technical support to African countries for Infrastructure. This can be accomplished by 

Incorporating a technical untt within the various compact oountries, enabling ministries 10 facilitate 

contracUng and prolect development. 

" Create an office within OPIC to coordinate Infrastructure support, staffed by Individuals wah significant 

private sector experlenc:e In emerging markets. 

" Provide U.S. technloai asslstanca to strengthen regulatory frameworks that promote infrastructure 

Investment. 

~ Provide technical support for land and private property rights legislation and tax laws that encourage 

foreign direct Investment (FOI) . 

. " Enco~rag~ the Intemallon<d donor community to prioritize Infrastructure financing, Including rail and 

road transport. 

m Expand support for technloaiexchanges between U.S. and African Infrastructure·focused Institutions to 

Improve tenders and if. cost cycles . 

. " Expand programs to support maritime infrastructure activities, Including safo ports and ships programs. 

Q Continue support and expand funding and scope of the U.S. Department of Transportalion's technical 

assistance and training programs. 

II '12 a 
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• Expand consultation and coordination between the USG and U.S. private sector offIcials on capacity 

buikling to beMr target resources devoted to this effort to promote Africa's sustainable economic 

growth and further Involvement by the U.S. private sector In that growtl) . 

• Expand the public-private partnership (PPP) process so that USG capacity building programs can 

mm; easily and directly support U.S. business priorities, Including programs that promote 

sustainable job creation in Africa - a top priority for U.S. African partners. To the exlent possible, 

PPP's should addre:» isSues germane to the African and U.S. for-profit sectors for sustalnabllity and 

maximum Impact. 

" gxpand and deepen programs that promote good governance and a sound framework for business. 

This Includes promoting accountable fiscal, regulatory, tax, trade, Intellectual property rights (IPRI, and 

govemance policies, as well as sound project management, procurement programs, and anticonuptlon programs In partner nations. 

"Expand long·standing U.S. exchange and educallonal programs and Incorporate U.S. educational and 

vocational training Institutions SO thatthay can establish deeper relationships with African Inslilutions. 

Intemationa[ exchange and broad development assistance programs have played key roles In 

deepening the· U.S. relationship with Aflica. 

• Expend, or at a minimum, maintain government funding to the U.S. Department of state Bureau of 

African Affairs' Africa Pe!lCekeep·lng Program (AFAIGAP) and Africa Contingoncy Operations Train[ng 

and Assistance (ACOTA) Program. These have played a vital role In building Africa's capacity and 

capability to ensure its own reg [anal security. 

• SUstain and Increase funding toAFAIGOM. Security engagement builds Instttulional capability and 

capacity, resulting In Increased stability. . . 

• Work with U.S. security businesses to support U,S, sales of security SGrvices and equipment to African 

governments. TheSG efforts should Include mounting a security trade mission to key African Countries; 

organizing a security roundtable In conJuncllon with GGA trade missions, and coordinating with African 

Ministers to provide opportunities to discuss security projeatslprograms In specina counties. 

• Coordinate with GGA to organize a Security Forum for Incroasod U.s. business engagsmentlnAlriaa. 

• In discussions with African govemment officials, highlight the Interccnneclivity of the training, 

equipping, and other security SGrviC9S U.S. companies have provided In Africa. Mention the security 

gains that have been made and the relevance of U.S. security companies' expertise for the further 

development of African armed forces and police servioos. 

Please note: TIle following pages am chapters composed of Introduction/context statements for etlch 

sector as well as more detailed reoommendations. Please note that each chapter has been wriUen by 

sectoml working g/OUps and will val)' In style accordingly. 

The flill r~porl can be accessed on the Corporate Council on Africa's Web site, http://www.africacncl.org! 
101

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


81167g-1.eps
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Burkina 

Faso 

Mali 

Mauritania 

Niger 

Senegal 

total 

Active Grants 

USD$ tI 

$2.5M 19 

$2.6 M 16 

$2.9 M 20 

$3.3 M 18 

$2.3 M 16 

$13.6 

M 89 

Sahel Projects - U.S African Development Foundation 

New Economic 

Activity 

$7.5 M 

$7.8 M 

$8.7 M 

$9.9 M 

$6.9 M 

$40.8M 

People Impacted 

Indirect -

Direct - members family + dependents 

30,096 150,480 

8,320 41,600 

13,040 65,200 

29,484 147,420 

1,856 9,280 

82,796 413,980 

As of April 2013 

The producer groups funded are comprised of nearly 83,000 people, and the impact ofUSADF's 

project grants at the community level is much higher. Nearly 414,000 people are benefiting from 

the economic activity generated by the USADF project grants that are working to reduce poverty, 

improve food security, increase regional and international trade, create more opportunities for 

women and youth, and build sustainable, resilient business entities. All of these improvements 

contribute directly to peace and security in the region. When people can support themselves and 

their families, they are at less risk to be adversely impacted by destabilizing political forces in 

their countries and across the region. 

The economic reach of these projects also goes beyond the numbers, because USD $1 awarded in 

USADF project grants achieves three (3) times the impact. Current funding in the Sahel is 

generating nearly USD $41 million of new economic activities in local communities. 

USADF's reach extends far beyond the capitol cities to areas where most other government or 

non-governmental organizations have not gone before. This reach is due to USADF's focus on 

marginalized, underserved populations, and its model that relies on African staff and partners. 

Specifically, USADF utilizes African professional staff in country to develop pipelines and 

monitor ongoing projects. In addition, USADF works with African implementing partner 

organizations to conduct due diligence, help develop marketing and business plans, implement 

project goals, mitigate risk, and monitor and oversee the projects. Facile with local languages and 

cultures, these African staff and partners are able to access hard to reach locations and travel to 

communities where access to economic development resources would otherwise not be available 

such as the southern half of Mali, outlying parts of eastern Niger, northern Mauritania, and 

extremely rural areas in Casamance, Senegal. See attached Mapfar USADF's projects ill the 

Sahel. 

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Prolrrammillg in Mali: Following the March 22, 2012 coup in Mali, USADF suspended activities 

in the Timbuktu and Gao Regions. New project development and disbursement oftunds to 

implement ongoing projects ceased. This freeze included three active projects with $159K 

remaining to be disbursed. 

However, because all of U SADF' s assistance bypasses the Government of Mali, and instead goes 

directly to cooperatives, SMEs, and community-based organizations, USADF has continued to 

implement active projects and identify potential new projects focused on food security in the 

southern half of Mali. This work has been carried out in alignment with the U.S. foreign 

assistance policy for Mali, and in dialogue with officials at the Department of State and on the 

National Security Staff 

Tn April 2012, USADF had 10 active projects with less than $500K remaining to be disbursed, 

including three small businesses in the Bamako area employing substantial numbers of people and 

purchasing from hundreds of smallholder farmers. The remaining seven projects in the Kaye, 

Segou, Bankass and Sikasso areas were with Women's groups, Cooperatives of smallholder 

farmers, and a microfinance institution; their work was focused on growing, processing and 

marketing crops to improve their members' food security and increase the sustainability of their 

business activities. 

Project Examples: In Mali, USADF put on hold or closed-down 2012 projects in the northern 

half of the country, given the turmoil and in line with the recommendations of the National 

Security Staff and the Department of State. This included rice expansion projects north of 

Timbuktu, and grain and other projects around Gao. Nevertheless, USADF was allowed to 

continue its programming in the southern half of the country, with a focus on food security 

projects that are directly benefiting thousands of Malians adversely impacted by the unrest and 

uncertainty in their midst. 

Tn April 2012, the Tchiri Rice Growing Cooperative in Bourem Sidi Amar, in the Timbuktu 

region, saw its town fall to rebels. This brought a sudden end to Malian government assistance for 

inputs and access to local technical services and to banks for financing that supported the yearly 

rice crop, an economic lifeline for farmers relying on rice production for consumption and local 

and regional sale. The traditional supply chain was disrupted, which could then bring about food 

shortages and displacement of thousands of villagers. USADF'" ongoing grant llwllrd was 

appfiedto breach the gap. The 260 members of the cooperative had funding to cover only 15 

percent of their productive land. But, USADF worked with them to disburse funds to local 

vendors, pay for short-cycle rice seeds, fertilizer and fuel, and have the inputs to plant and harvest 

a significant rice crop - despite the insecurity and threats brought about by the conflict. 

3 
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81167g-4.eps

ChiefMahamadou Siddeye Toure, who works closed with the Tchiri 's members, said, "My 

villagers and T would have had no choice hut to leave our homes and/lee to refugee camps, 

without supportfrOln USADF's grant. This lIs .• istllnce ensured lIcce.'.' to rice inputs thllt gave 

us the lIbility to grow enough rice to feed everyone in our village." Members were also able to 

plant wheat and other crops for consumption and sale, and have been able to remain at home 

throughout the conflict, not adding to the displaced persons in the region. 

Tn Niger, USADF is supporting market garden projects in several areas, including southwest of 

the capitol Niamey. By directly funding community-based groups and cooperatives to grow and 

sell high value crops such as lettuce, tomatoes, and okra, USADF is providing the catalyst to 

generate income in areas where previously there has been little economic activity. Tn this semiarid region, USADF funding provides for local appropriate technologies and technical assistancesuch as customized drip irrigation systems and improved crop varieties, and soil fertility 

management. This has resulted in increased yields and year-round cultivation, and thus year-round 

reliable income. 

The Yobbi Women's Group six hours southwest of Niamey have said, "We don't wanf to depend 

on aid. With USADF's help, we lire independent." The Y elou Cooperati ve closer to the capital 

have said, "For the first time in our vill/Iges, we can see 'money move' "-which mellns that 

young men can stay home to support theirfamilie." rather than nwve seasonally or permanently 

to major cities outside of Niger." USADF's grassroots economic development projects are 

contributing to social and economic stability in the region. 

North and west of Agadez, amongst Tuareg populations and others, USADF continues to support 

the rehabilitation and utilization of wells projects in the desert that provide water resources to 

herders for themselves and their animals. Pastoralists have been able to maintain their way of life, 

and thousands refugees from across the border in Mali have been able to rely on these known 

sources of fresh water as they deal with displacement from their own communities. 

Future: Going forward, the U.S. African Development Foundation continues to identify the 

economic development needs for cooperatives and community groups who do not otherwise have 

access for financial and technical resources to build up the capacity of and expand their business 

activities. Sectors in demand include irrigated agriculture, high value crop production, sesame 

seed for export, cereal grains, and wells projects. 

In 2013-2014, USADF has designated over $6.3 million of new funding to impact the people of 

the Sahel. This United States Government funding will result in more than 40 economic 

development projects directly impacting over 21,000 people, and ensuring that via the United 

States African Development Foundation, marginalized and underserved communities impacted by 

uncertainty in the region are benefiting and moving to greater income independence and more 

secure lives. 

For further questions and infonnation on USADF's work in the Sahel, I am available. 

4 
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