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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 EASTERN DIVISION 

JOHN BUNDY, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. Civil Action 2:11-CV-0064 

 Judge Sargus 

 Magistrate Judge King 

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of a 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff’s 

application for disability insurance benefits. On January 27, 2012, 

the decision of the Commissioner was reversed and the matter was 

remanded pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further 

proceedings. Judgment, ECF 21. This matter is now before the Court 

on plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). 

ECF 24. The Commissioner has filed no response to the motion. 

Plaintiff seeks an attorney fee of $4,410.00, that amount 

reflecting compensation at a rate of $350.00 per hour for 12.60 

itemized hours of work. Submitted in support of the motion is a copy 

of a fee agreement by which plaintiff agrees that his counsel should 

receive 25% of his retroactive benefits. Exhibit B attached to ECF 24. 

The Notice of Award, Exhibit A attached to ECF 24, indicates that $ 

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26,927.00 (25% of the past due award) has been withheld for payment of 

attorney’s fees. The requested fee is, of course, less than 25% of the 

retroactive benefits. 

By statute, a court must award "a reasonable fee not in excess of 

25 per cent of the total past-due benefit." 42 U.S.C. §406(b). A fee 

award should reflect the purpose of the social security program to 

provide a measure of economic security to the recipient, the extent 

and type of legal services provided, the complexity of the case, the 

level of skill and competence required of the attorney, the amount of 

time spent on the case, the results achieved, and the level at which 

the favorable decision was made. 20 C.F.R. §404.925(b). Moreover, a 

fee agreement between a recipient and his or her counsel “should be 

given the weight ordinarily accorded a rebuttable presumption.” 

Rodriguez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746 (6th Cir. 1989). Deductions are 

permissible when there is improper conduct or ineffectiveness of 

counsel or when counsel would otherwise enjoy a windfall because of 

either an inordinately large benefit award or minimal effort expended 

in the matter. Hayes v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 923 

F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1990). “[A] hypothetical rate that is less than 

twice the standard rate is per se reasonable.” Id. at 422. In the 

final analysis, an award must be “reasonable for the services 

rendered.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 

 Upon consideration of all the appropriate factors, the Court 

concludes that the requested fee is reasonable. It is far less than 

25% of the past-due benefits, plaintiff has signed a contingency fee 

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agreement, the requested fee does not reflect a rate of compensation 

more than twice the standard rate and it cannot be said that 

plaintiff’s counsel was ineffective or expended minimal effort in the 

case. 

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for attorney 

fees, ECF 24, be GRANTED and that plaintiff’s attorney be AWARDED a 

fee of $4,410.00, or 25% of the past-due benefits, whichever is less.

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report 

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file 

and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, 

specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part 

thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 

U.S.C. §636(b)(1); F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be 

filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy 

thereof. F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to 

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to 

de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the 

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. 

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Federation of 

Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States 

v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 

 s/Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

Date April 3, 2014

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