In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-19-00261-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 213th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1477977D

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell

THOMAS ARDARLYN CHANDLER AKA THOMAS ARDALYN CHANDLER,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Thomas Ardarlyn Chandler appeals his convictions for aggravated 

sexual assault and indecency with a child. In three issues, he contests the sufficiency 

of the evidence. We affirm.

In 2016, Chandler’s step-daughter “Lisa” came forward with allegations that 

Chandler had abused her. Chandler was indicted on four counts. A jury found 

Chandler guilty on three of them: two counts of indecency with a child, for each of 

which the jury assessed punishment at ten years, and one count of aggravated sexual 

assault, for which the jury assessed punishment at twenty-five years. The trial court 

rendered judgments in accordance with the jury’s findings, with the sentences to run 

concurrently. On appeal, Chandler complains of deficiencies in the evidence to 

support each of the three convictions.

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found 

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 316, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2787 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to 

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 

2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.
3

The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. We determine whether the 

necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative force when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) 

(“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ 

strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.”). We must 

presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, 

and we must defer to that resolution. Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448–49.

We discuss Chandler’s issues based on the order in which the underlying 

offenses occurred, beginning with his convictions for indecency. A person commits 

the offense of indecency with a child if, with a child younger than 17 years of age, the 

person engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual 

contact. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” means the following 

acts, if committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person: 

(1) any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, 

or any part of the genitals of a child; or (2) any touching of any part of the body of a 

child, including touching through clothing, with the anus, breast, or any part of the 

genitals of a person. Id. § 21.11(c).

As to the conviction that resulted from his first act of indecency, Chandler says 

the evidence is insufficient because Lisa’s testimony was vague and incomplete. This 
4

abuse, Lisa testified, occurred when she was six or seven. According to Lisa, she and 

her mother had recently moved into an apartment complex in Arlington. Her mother 

began dating Chandler, and he moved in soon after. Lisa said that one day around 

that time, Chandler beckoned her into his bedroom. Lisa testified that Chandler was 

lying on the bed, and he picked her up and placed her so that she was “sitting on top 

of” his “private area” “below his stomach”—the body part he used “[t]o have kids.”

On cross-examination, Chandler’s counsel made the matter more explicit. He 

asked Lisa if it was her testimony that Chandler had sat her “on top of him, touching 

his penis to [her] vagina” while she “had clothes on.” Lisa confirmed that this was 

her testimony and that similar incidents had happened “multiple times.”

But Chandler argues that Lisa’s description is insufficient to prove the offense 

of indecency as alleged in the indictment: that Chandler caused his genitals to contact 

Lisa’s body through clothing. According to Chandler, Lisa “simply never stated that 

Appellant’s penis ever contacted her body when she was sitting on Appellant[].” He 

says the evidence is therefore insufficient to sustain the conviction. We disagree.

The testimony of a child victim may be sufficient to establish the elements of 

indecency. See Garcia v. State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1978); Connell v. State, 233 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) 

(mem. op.). “[W]e cannot expect the child victims of violent crimes to testify with the 

same clarity and ability as is expected of mature and capable adults.” Villalon v. State, 

791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Courts give wide latitude to testimony 
5

by a child victim of sexual abuse. Corporon v. State, 586 S.W.3d 550, 562 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2019, no pet.); Thomas v. State, No. 2-08-125-CR, 2009 WL 2356891, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 30, 2009, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication).

Thus, in one case, we found the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for 

aggravated sexual assault based in large part on the child complainant’s testimony that 

when appellant was lying on a bed, he made the complainant “sit on” his penis, such 

that his penis was touching her “butt.” Parker v. State, No. 2-05-265-CR, 2006 WL 

2382901, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 17, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). As the child explained to a child protective services

worker, by this she meant that appellant had “put his ‘private part’ in her ‘bottom.’” 

Id. We held that from the child’s testimony and the adult CPS worker’s clarification, 

the jury could rationally conclude that appellant committed the charged conduct: 

causing the child victim’s anus to contact his sexual organ. See id. at *4–5.

As in Parker, Lisa described on direct how Chandler was lying on his bed, and 

he picked her up and placed her so that she was “sitting on” his “private area.”1

 Also 

1

The term Lisa used—“private area”—is similar to language this court has 

often used to politely refer to genitalia in indecency cases. See, e.g., Villalobos v. State, 

No. 02-12-00192-CR, 2013 WL 1830716, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 2, 2013, 

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (describing appellant’s indecent 

contact with the complainant’s “privates”); Todd v. State, Nos. 02-12-00114-CR, 02-12-

00115-CR, 2013 WL 1457735, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 11, 2013, pet. 

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (similar, “private part”); Neathery v. 

State, Nos. 2-06-082-CR through 2-06-086-CR, 2007 WL 2331004, at *8 (Tex. App.—
6

as in Parker, this testimony was later clarified and made more explicit when, on crossexamination, Lisa agreed that Chandler had sat her “on top of him, touching his penis 

to [her] vagina” with “clothes on.” From this, the jury could have rationally inferred 

that Chandler committed the charged conduct: causing Lisa’s body to contact his 

genitals through clothing. And Chandler’s “intent to arouse or gratify [his] sexual

desire” can be inferred from the “conduct, remarks, [and] all the surrounding 

circumstances.” See Jimenez v. State, 507 S.W.3d 438, 440 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2016, no pet.). The conduct (placing Lisa’s vagina on his penis) and the circumstances 

(doing so while Lisa’s mother was away, on a bed, while lying down) would have 

justified an inference of intent to arouse. See, e.g., Tienda v. State, 479 S.W.3d 863, 870 

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.) (finding evidence sufficient to show intent to 

arouse where appellant touched his penis to complainant’s pelvis on her bed while her 

mother was away, though both complainant and appellant were clothed). We 

therefore hold the evidence sufficient to sustain this conviction for indecency.2

 See 

Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.

Fort Worth Aug. 16, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 

(similar as to appellant’s “private parts”).

2

Chandler does not assert that the evidence is insufficient in light of the fact 

that both he and Lisa were fully clothed during this incident. Nevertheless, we find 

multiple cases in which courts have upheld convictions for indecency even though 

both the complainant and the appellant were fully clothed. Delacruz v. State, No. 05-

14-01013-CR, 2016 WL 1733461, at *2, *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2016, pet. 

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Tienda, 479 S.W.3d at 873–74; Cantu 

v. State, 366 S.W.3d 771, 774, 777 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); Lane v. State, 
7

Next, Chandler challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his second 

indecency conviction. This conviction corresponds with an encounter that allegedly 

occurred after Lisa, her Mother, and Chandler had moved into a duplex elsewhere in 

Arlington. Lisa recalled that Chandler called her into the living room and told her to 

sit down. Lisa explained that Chandler began touching her vagina under her clothes 

with his hands. According to Lisa’s testimony, Chandler eventually put his fingers 

inside her vagina.

However, Chandler says the evidence is insufficient because Lisa’s trial 

testimony varied from the accounts that she initially gave to investigators years before. 

Chandler observes that according to the testimony of multiple investigators, Lisa 

either did not mention that she was digitally penetrated when she first disclosed the 

abuse or, in some cases, denied that this happened. CPS investigator Karen Burkett 

testified that when she spoke with Lisa, she did not mention that Chandler had put his 

fingers inside her. Detective Dara DeWall testified that when Lisa was forensically 

interviewed, she demonstrated the way in which Chandler touched her vagina and, 

according to the demonstration, Chandler’s fingers did not enter her vagina. Stacey 

357 S.W.3d 770, 772, 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see In re 

J.S., 35 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). In Tienda, for 

instance, the appellant argued that the evidence must be insufficient because there 

were multiple layers of fabric between the two. 479 S.W.3d at 873. The court 

disagreed, reasoning that “[t]he statutory definition of sexual contact simply provides 

that it may occur through clothing—without reference to the number of layers of 

clothing or fabric separating the perpetrator and the victim.” Id. Here, Lisa’s 

testimony that Chandler “touch[ed] his penis to [her] vagina” is sufficient to establish 

the requisite contact, regardless of the clothes between them.
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Henley testified that during Lisa’s sexual-assault exam at the hospital, she denied that 

Chandler “put his finger . . . in [her] middle part,” as Lisa described it. Chandler says 

that Lisa’s trial testimony is inherently unreliable because it is inconsistent with her 

initial accounts.

However, each of these witnesses also confirmed that Lisa told them of an 

encounter when Chandler had touched the outside of her vagina with his hands, as 

she also testified at trial. Burkett testified that Lisa reported how Chandler had 

touched the “outside” of her “private parts with his hand.” Henley testified that 

during her sexual-assault exam, Lisa recalled how Chandler used his hand to rub the 

outside of her vagina. Detective DeWall recalled the hand gesture that Lisa used to 

describe what Chandler did “with his hand on her vagina.” And Alexis Harrison of 

Alliance for Children testified that during her forensic interview, Lisa described how 

Chandler used his hands to touch her “middle part” more than one time. This 

conduct would be consistent with the indictment’s allegation that Chandler touched 

Lisa’s genitals, regardless of whether Chandler digitally penetrated Lisa.

Moreover, to the extent that Lisa’s trial testimony was inconsistent with her 

initial accounts, inconsistencies in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the 

verdict. Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Curry v. State, 

30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We have often applied this rule in 

indecency cases when there are inconsistencies between the child complainant’s initial 

reports to investigators and the child’s testimony at trial. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 
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No. 02-15-00301-CR, 2017 WL 710630, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 23, 

2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Suarez v. State, No. 02-10-

00026-CR, 2011 WL 2518792, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2011, no pet.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication); Perez v. State, No. 2-06-225-CR, 2007 WL 

2744914, at *2, *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication); Franklin v. State, 193 S.W.3d 616, 618–19 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). In Thompson, for example, we held that the inconsistencies 

between the complainant’s forensic interview and her trial testimony did not render 

the evidence insufficient. 2017 WL 710630, at *2–3. We reasoned that any 

inconsistencies might fairly be attributed to a number of inoffensive factors, none of 

which would by necessity render the complainant’s testimony wholly incredible: the 

complainant’s tender age; the passage of years between the offense, the outcry, and 

the trial; or the different settings under which each account was given—“being 

interviewed by a friendly social worker in a small room is hardly the same as testifying 

from the witness stand in a courtroom full of people.” Id. at *2.

Similar considerations apply here. Lisa was only six or seven when the abuse 

began; she was eleven when she reported the abuse; and she was fifteen by the time of 

trial. She gave her initial accounts privately and to sympathetic investigators and 

nurses; she gave her trial testimony publicly and subject to vigorous cross-examination 

by Chandler’s counsel. Thus, we resolve in favor of the verdict any inconsistencies in 

the details, chalking them up to her young age, the passage of time, and the change of 
10

setting rather than some more serious problem of truthfulness. Lisa’s testimony 

concerning Chandler’s contact with her vagina—and the intent that may be inferred 

from the act and the circumstances—is sufficient to support this conviction for 

indecency. See Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.

Finally, Chandler challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

conviction for aggravated sexual assault. A person commits the offense of aggravated 

sexual assault if the person causes the sexual organ of a child to contact the sexual 

organ of another person, including the actor, and the complainant is younger than 14 

years of age. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B).

This conviction relates to an incident that, according to Lisa’s trial testimony, 

occurred when she was eight or nine. Lisa testified that Chandler had her come into 

her mother’s bedroom while her mother was at work. Lisa explained that she stood 

by the door, and Chandler said, “Come here.” As Lisa told it, he grabbed her and told 

her to lay down on the bed; she was scared of him and afraid to walk away, so when 

he pushed her onto the bed, she complied. She recalled that as she lay at the edge of 

the bed, Chandler stood beside her and took off her clothes, took down his pants, and 

“rubbed his private part against” the top of her vagina. The State’s other witnesses 

confirmed that Lisa gave similar accounts shortly after she disclosed the abuse.

But Chandler says that this version of events was impossible in light of the 

bed’s dimensions and Chandler’s physical proportions. He refers to testimony by two 

defense witnesses—Chandler and Lisa’s mother—that the top of the bed stood 
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roughly two-and-a-half feet off the ground. It was undisputed that Chandler is six 

feet tall. Chandler testified that based on these figures, it would not have been 

physically possible for him to be standing at the edge of the bed and to place his penis 

on her vagina. Chandler argues that in light of this alleged impossibility, the evidence 

is insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that he caused his penis to contact 

Lisa’s vagina.

A comparable argument was rejected in Aleshire v. State, No. 03-06-00712-CR, 

2008 WL 269435, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 31, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). There, the child complainant testified that the appellant 

placed his mouth on her breast as she lay on the upper level of a bunk bed, which was 

five feet, four inches off the floor. Id. at *2. The appellant, who was six feet, five 

inches tall, argued that the evidence was insufficient because it was “physically 

impossible” for him to have placed his mouth on the complainant’s breast based on 

the height of the bed. Id. at *2–3. The court disagreed, holding that it was the jury’s 

duty to determine the credibility of the complainant’s testimony and its weight relative 

to the evidence concerning the height of the bed. Id. at *4.

For the same reason, we will not disturb the jury’s credibility determination in 

favor of the complainant. See Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. The jury could have 

rationally believed Lisa’s testimony that Chandler placed his penis on her vagina as she 

lay on the edge of the bed, and the jury could have disbelieved Chandler’s testimony 

that a disparity in height somehow rendered this assault impossible. Indeed, the jury 
12

could have rationally inferred that, assuming that Chandler had a normal anatomy, 

with genitals below the midline of his six-foot frame, this would put Chandler’s 

genitalia directly level with Lisa’s. Based on the testimony of Lisa and other witnesses 

who corroborated her telling of the assault, we hold that the cumulative force of the 

evidence is sufficient to support Chandler’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault. 

See Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448.

Having found the evidence sufficient to support all three of Chandler’s 

convictions, we therefore overrule Chandler’s appellate issues and affirm the 

judgments.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 23, 2020