Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1504-PC-147 | November 10, 2015 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

Jay M. Lee

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Donald S. Adcock,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 10, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A03-1504-PC-147

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court

The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20D03-1308-PC-50

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1504-PC-147 | November 10, 2015 Page 2 of 19

Case Summary and Issues

[1] On August 20, 2009, Donald Adcock entered a plea of guilty to two counts of 

child molesting as Class C felonies. The trial court accepted Adcock’s plea, 

entered a judgment of conviction on both counts, and sentenced him to sixteen 

years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Thereafter, Adcock filed a 

petition for post-conviction relief wherein he alleged his counsel was ineffective 

and his guilty plea was involuntary. The post-conviction court denied Adcock’s 

petition. Adcock appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, raising two issues 

for our review, which we restate as: 1) whether the post-conviction court erred 

in concluding trial counsel was not ineffective, and 2) whether the postconviction court erred in concluding his guilty plea was not made involuntarily. 

Concluding counsel was not ineffective and that his guilty plea was not made 

involuntarily, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 7, 2009, twelve-year-old C.S. complained to authorities her stepfather, Adcock, had touched her vagina multiple times over a two-year period

when she was around the age of nine or ten. When interviewed by a forensic 

interviewer, C.S. stated Adcock would come into her room and touch her 

vagina under her clothes and on the skin. When interviewed by police, Adcock 

admitted to rubbing C.S.’s vagina multiple times. 
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[3] On April 9, the State charged Adcock with two counts of Class C felony child 

molesting. On May 19, Susan Snyder, the deputy prosecuting attorney,

tendered a plea offer to Adcock’s counsel, Fay Schwartz:

My review of Mr. Adcock’s criminal history shows that he has 

two prior class D felonies for possession of marijuana. My initial 

thought, after reading the sentencing enhancement statutes, is 

that Mr. Adcock is habitual eligible. In an effort to dispose of 

this case in a manner other than trial, the State is willing to 

extend the following plea agreement in exchange for your client’s 

guilty plea: Any sentence authorized by law but no more than 35 

years to be executed.

Appellant’s Exhibit D. After Schwartz expressed concern as to whether 

Adcock was, in fact, habitual eligible, Snyder discovered Adcock was indeed 

not habitual eligible. As negotiations continued, Snyder indicated to Schwartz 

the State may consider amending the charges to add either, or both, Class A 

felony child molesting and Class A attempted child molesting, but did not do so 

originally because Adcock confessed. 

[4] On June 11, Snyder tendered a final plea offer. According to Schwartz’s notes,1 

the State’s final offer was for sixteen years, and the offer was to remain open for 

one week. Per the note, if the parties could not reach an agreement, Snyder 

would file an “‘A’ and felony enhancement.” Appellant’s Ex. H. Despite the 

note’s ambiguity, Schwartz acted under the impression that, in exchange for a 

 

1 Unlike the first plea offer, there is nothing in the record indicating the precise language of the State’s final 

offer aside from the signed written plea agreement. 
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guilty plea, the State would not charge Adcock with a Class A felony. 

Schwartz relayed the State’s offer to Adcock. Adcock accepted the State’s offer.

[5] On June 18, the trial court convened under the premise an agreement had been 

reached for Adcock to plead guilty and, in exchange, the State would forego the

Class A felony charge. When the trial court asked Adcock whether he 

understood he would be entering a plea of guilty in exchange for the State not 

filing a Class A felony, Adcock responded affirmatively. Due to confusion as to 

whether the sentence was to be capped or fixed at sixteen years, however, the 

trial court found there was no agreement between the parties. The trial court 

continued the hearing for one week.

[6] On June 25, the trial court reconvened, and the parties proposed the same plea 

agreement they attempted to enter a week prior. In exchange for the State 

forgoing the filing of a Class A felony, Adcock entered a plea of guilty on both 

counts of child molesting as Class C felonies and agreed to a fixed sixteen-year 

sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction. Per the agreement, the trial 

court entered a judgment of conviction on both counts and sentenced Adcock to

eight years on each count, to be served consecutively for a total of sixteen years.

[7] On August 5, 2013 Adcock filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. 

Adcock’s petition was later amended by counsel. In his second amended 

petition, Adcock claimed his trial counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea 

was involuntary. Specifically, he argued his guilty plea had been induced by

the State’s threats to add an habitual offender enhancement and/or a Class A
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felony child molesting charge, threats which were illusory because he could not 

be convicted of either. Therefore, he claimed, counsel was deficient in relaying 

the illusory threats to him as viable threats.

[8] On January 6, 2015, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, and

on April 22, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law denying 

Adcock’s petition for post-conviction relief. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. Post-Conviction Standard of Review

[9] Post-conviction procedures create a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral 

challenges to convictions, and those challenges must be based on the grounds 

enumerated in post-conviction rules. Parish v. State, 838 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2005). A post-conviction proceeding is a civil proceeding, and the 

defendant must establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 

[10] A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief “faces a rigorous 

standard of review” on appeal. Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001). 

In reviewing the judgment of a post-conviction court, we consider only the 

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgement. Hall v. State, 849 

N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ind. 2006). “On appeal, we may not reweigh the evidence or 

reassess the credibility of the witnesses.” Rowe v. State, 915 N.E.2d 561, 563 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. The post-conviction court’s denial of postconviction relief will be affirmed unless the evidence leads “unerringly and 
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unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” 

McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 391 (Ind. 2002). Only where the evidence is 

without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court 

reached the opposite conclusion, will the court’s findings or conclusions be 

disturbed as being contrary to law. Hall, 849 N.E.2d at 469. Finally, we do not 

defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions, but do accept its factual 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 

(Ind. 2002) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 830 (2003).

II. Ineffective Counsel

A. Standard of Review

[11] We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test 

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Bieghler v. State, 690 

N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021 (1998). To prevail on a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show 1) his 

counsel’s performance was deficient, and 2) the lack of reasonable 

representation prejudiced him. Randolph v. State, 802 N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. To satisfy the first prong, the petitioner must show 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 

counsel committed errors so serious petitioner did not have the “counsel” 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Reed v. 

State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (Ind. 2006). To satisfy the second prong, the 

petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. “A reasonable 
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probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

[12] The standard for prejudice in a guilty plea setting, however, is stated slightly 

different. When a defendant contests his guilty plea based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel, we apply the same two-part test from Strickland discussed 

above. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). The first part, regarding 

counsel’s performance, is largely the same. Id. The prejudice requirement, 

however, “focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective 

performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words . . . the 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.” Id. at 59.

[13] Under this standard, “[c]ounsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing 

strategy and tactics, and we will accord those decisions deference.” Timberlake 

v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 839 (2002). 

When reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we presume counsel 

rendered adequate legal assistance. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746. To overcome 

this presumption, the defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence. 

Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 

B. Counsel’s Alleged Deficiencies

[14] Adcock contends trial counsel rendered deficient performance when she 

advised him to enter a guilty plea in response to the State’s illusory threats of 
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adding an habitual offender enhancement and filing a Class A felony charge. 

Thus, in order to determine whether counsel was deficient, we must determine 

first whether an habitual offender enhancement and the filing of a Class A 

felony charge were threats, and if so, whether they were illusory.

1. Habitual Offender Enhancement 

[15] Adcock argues the State’s threat of adding an habitual offender enhancement 

was illusory because he was not habitual offender eligible. In support of his 

argument, Adcock raises three points. First, he cites the State’s first plea offer, 

which included an illusory threat of adding an habitual offender enhancement. 

Second, he cites his testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, during 

which he stated he was led to believe if he did not plead guilty, the State would 

add an habitual offender allegation. Third, he cites Schwartz’s note, made one 

week prior to the June 18 plea hearing, which included the phrase “‘A’ and 

felony enhancement.” Petitioners’ Ex. H. This note, he claims, shows the 

illusory threat existed at least one week prior to the June 18 plea hearing.

[16] At the outset, we note the threat was illusory when first stated to Schwartz 

because Adcock indeed was not habitual eligible. But, as the post-conviction 

court found,

26. Ms. Schwartz testified that she recalled receiving a letter

dated May 19, 2009 from Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Susan 

Snyder, and also acknowledged a note in her file dated June 11, 

2009 that contained some reference to a felony enhancement. 

Ms. Schwartz went on to testify that she did not think that the 

Habitual Offender Enhancement was a real consideration; and 
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that she recognized a problem with the sentence initially 

proposed by Ms. Snyder when she received the May 19, 2000 

letter. However, Ms. Schwartz said that she had an obligation to 

tell [Adcock] everything the State proposed even though she 

knew the Habitual Offender Enhancement could not be a 

significant item in the plea negotiations.

27. Ms. Snyder testified that soon after she sent the May 19, 

2009, letter to Ms. Schwartz, and well before the plea of guilty 

was entered, she and Ms. Schwartz realized that the Habitual 

Offender Enhancement was not viable. Ms. Snyder said the 

Habitual Offender Enhancement was not a factor after she reassessed the case, and she changed the offered sentence term 

from thirty-five (35) to sixteen (16) years as soon as she realized 

there was no basis for a sentencing enhancement.

28. Even if Ms. Schwartz did initially convey to [Adcock] that 

the State might file a sentencing enhancement in this case, thereby 

causing [Adcock] to originally form the belief that he was eligible for 

Habitual Offender Enhancement, the testimony of both Ms. Schwartz 

and Ms. Snyder establishes that this possibility as originally 

contemplated was caught early on by counsel as error, and the attendant 

thirty-five (35) year sentence term was withdrawn and was never a part 

of the plea agreement. Nothing about the erroneous Habitual 

Offender Enhancement was ever pursued and was not an issue at 

the time the final written Plea Agreement was tendered to the 

court at the plea hearing. Therefore, the plea was not improperly 

influenced by error on the part of counsel and [Adcock] was 

competently advised as to his penal consequences.

Appellant’s Appendix at 170-71 (emphasis added). Therefore, the postconviction court was presented with the testimony of Adcock, Snyder, and 

Schwartz, and based off their testimony, concluded the threat of an habitual 

offender enhancement ceased to exist by the time Adcock entered his guilty 
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plea. We will not reassess the credibility of witnesses. Rowe, 915 N.E.2d at 

563.

[17] We note the post-conviction court’s conclusions are supported by at least one 

additional point. At the June 18 plea hearing, neither the State, Schwartz, nor 

Adcock noted a threat of an habitual offender enhancement:

[Court:] So the consideration flowing to Mr. Adcock for his plea 

or pleas, is that the state is undertaking not to file those 

additional charges; is that correct?

[Schwartz:] That’s correct.

[Court:] Is that your understanding, Ms. Snyder?

[Snyder:] It is, your Honor.

[Court:] Are those felony charges?

[Snyder:] It would have been – gone up to a Class A, your 

Honor, so, yes.

[Court:] Very well. And that is your understanding of the 

consideration as well, Mr. Adcock?

[Adcock:] Yes, sir, it is.

June 18, 2009, Guilty Plea Hearing Transcript at 5. The plea agreement did not 

change between the June 18 and June 25 hearings. 

[18] We conclude the evidence does not lead “unerringly and unmistakably to a 

decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” McCary, 761 

N.E.2d at 391. Because there was no threat at the time Adcock entered his 

guilty plea, we conclude Schwartz’s representation was not deficient.
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2. Class A Felony 

[19] At the outset, we note the State concedes “[t]he only ‘threat’ that existed at the 

time [Adcock] pled guilty was the State’s intent to file Class A felony charges if 

[Adcock] did not plead guilty.” State’s Brief of Appellee at 10. Adcock argues 

the threat is illusory because the State could not legally support a Class A felony 

allegation—specifically the State could not prove Adcock did, or attempted to, 

penetrate C.S.’s sexual organs—and therefore Schwartz was deficient in failing 

to recognize the illusory nature of the threat. The State argues the facts and 

circumstances create probable cause to support the threat. 

[20] “Generally, ‘a bargained plea, motivated by an improper threat, is to be deemed 

illusory and a denial of substantive rights.’” Springer v. State, 952 N.E.2d 799, 

805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Champion v. State, 478 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ind. 

1985)), trans. denied. “At the moment the plea is entered, the State must possess 

the power to carry out any threat which was a factor in obtaining the plea 

agreement which was accepted.” Id. (citation omitted). “The lack of that real 

power is what makes the threat illusory and causes the representation to take on 

the characteristics of a trick.” Id. (citations omitted). 

[21] As relevant to this case, Class A felony child molesting is defined as engaging in 

sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with a child when the child is 

under the age of fourteen and the perpetrator is over the age of twenty-one. 
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Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2007).2 In addition, a defendant can be convicted 

of a Class A felony for attempted child molesting. See Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1(a) 

(1977). At the time of Adcock’s crime, “deviate sexual conduct” was defined, 

in relevant part, as an act involving the penetration of the sex organ of a person 

by an object. Ind. Code § 35-41-1-9 (1984). We have held a finger is an object 

for purposes of this statute. See Gasper v. State, 833 N.E.2d 1036, 1044 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005), trans. denied. The female sex organ not only encompasses the 

vaginal canal, but also includes external genitalia, such as the vulva or labia. 

Short v. State, 564 N.E.2d 553, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 

[22] Charging decisions are based on probable cause, and Indiana law has “never 

required the State to be able to demonstrate evidence on every element of an 

offense in order to file a charge or utilize a potential charge in plea 

negotiations.” Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 290, 297 (Ind. 2002). A prosecutor 

may properly file any charge supported by probable cause, and threatening to 

file such a charge to induce a plea is constitutionally legitimate. See 

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). “Probable cause exists when 

the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge, which are based 

upon reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a reasonable 

man’s belief that a crime has been or is being committed.” Stosnider v. State, 422 

 

2

Indiana has since amended the statute to replace “deviate sexual conduct” with “other sexual conduct.” See

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a) (2014). 
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N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). Probable cause to charge requires 

more than mere suspicion. Id. 

[23] Adcock’s sole contention on this issue is there was no evidence of penetration,

and therefore the threat to file a Class A felony charge was illusory. 

Specifically, he cites Spurlock v. State, 675 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. 1996), where our 

supreme court held proof of the slightest degree of penetration of a sex organ is 

sufficient to prove penetration, but a showing of mere contact—by itself—

between an object and sex organ is not sufficient to support a conviction. Id. at 

315. As we recently explained,

[Spurlock] clearly establishes that mere contact between a male 

and female sex organ is not by itself sufficient evidence of 

penetration. There, the twelve-year-old victim testified that the 

defendant’s penis touched her vagina. She also said that the 

defendant “tried” to have intercourse with her but she did not 

know whether he had penetrated her vagina, and there was no 

medical evidence of penetration. The court reversed the 

defendant’s conviction for Class A felony child molesting 

because there was insufficient evidence of penetration. The court 

specifically noted . . . it was confronted with a situation where 

the victim herself, who was of an age to understand and respond 

to the questions, did not state that penetration occurred and there 

was no medical or physical evidence of penetration.

Adcock v. State, 22 N.E.3d 720, 728-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citations and some 

internal quotation marks omitted). Similar to Spurlock, Adcock first asserts C.S. 

never stated to the forensic interviewer that penetration occurred. Second, there 

was no physical evidence of penetration. Third, C.S. was of an age to 
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understand and respond to the forensic interviewer’s questions. We, however,

find this case distinguishable from Spurlock.

[24] The defendant in Spurlock challenged the sufficiency of the evidence after being 

convicted of child molesting. The jury concluded the State had met its high 

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Spurlock had penetrated the 

victim’s sexual organ. Here, the State never charged Adcock with a Class A 

felony; the State merely relayed its belief it could add the charge. Thus, the 

State did not need to prove the elements of Class A felony child molesting 

beyond a reasonable doubt before relaying its belief it could add the charge. In 

fact, the State never needs “to demonstrate evidence on every element of an 

offense in order to file a charge or utilize a potential charge in plea 

negotiations.” Smith, 770 N.E.2d at 297. Rather, the State need only have 

probable cause to threaten a defendant with an additional charge to induce a 

plea. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. 

[25] We conclude the post-conviction court did not err in determining the State’s 

threat to file a Class A felony charge was viable. C.S. claimed Adcock would 

often touch her on her vagina under her clothes and on the skin. C.S. told 

Adcock to stop because it made her feel uncomfortable. Although he denied 

ever penetrating C.S., Adcock did admit to rubbing her vagina. 

[26] Additionally, at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Snyder testified she 

had originally contemplated filing a Class A felony because she felt there was 

more than enough probable cause:
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[Snyder:] Based upon the Probable Cause Affidavit, I had been 

considering amending it to, probably I would have gone to the 

completed offense of Class A Child Molest, and then I would 

have the inherently included Attempt, or sometimes if I think my 

Attempt is a stronger case, I will do the completed case of a Class 

A and then do a second count of Attempted to make everybody 

aware of it.

[Adcock’s Counsel:] What in particular in the Probable Cause 

Affidavit led you to suspect that you had an A felony on your 

hands?

[Snyder:] Slight penetration.

[Adcock’s Counsel:] Where does that say that there was slight 

penetration?

[Snyder:] Well, slight penetration is based upon the facts. That 

would be a legal definition. Slight penetration would be any 

penetration of the female sexual organ.

[Adcock’s Counsel:] Okay.

[Snyder:] In my experience . . . with the Child Molest 

prosecution case, slight penetration oftentimes in the rubbing of 

the female sexual organ, which is stimulation of the clitoris, 

which would be the breaching of the labia.

* * *

Basically, Scotty Adcock would come in the room, reach under 

her pants, and pat her private. And then went on to say that he 

indicated that he would rub C.S.’s vaginal area. And that right 

there could be sufficient to get you started on the slight 

penetration or an attempt of slight penetration.

[Adcock’s Counsel:] Okay. So it’s a start there?

[Snyder:] Well, I think that that would more than give you the 

probable cause to go ahead and amend with the rest because you 

are rubbing the vaginal area.

Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 55-57. Further, Snyder 

testified she originally undercharged Adcock because he had confessed and 
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took responsibility for his conduct, but she was prepared to file a Class felony A 

if a plea agreement could not be reached.

[27] Similar to Snyder, Schwartz testified her sole concern in the plea negotiations

was the State amending the charges to include a Class A felony child molesting 

or attempted child molesting charge. Schwartz testified she based this concern 

off her conversations with Snyder and because:

In this particular case . . . he had given a confession as to 

touching the child under her clothes on her bare skin in her 

private area. And I know there was case law that indicated that 

penetration of the vaginal area was not required to prove the A 

[felony]. Deviate sexual conduct could be proved by penetration 

of the outer portions of the female sex organ which would be the 

lips.

Transcript of Evidence at 41. Moreover, Schwartz testified “if Snyder could 

show that he was grooming the child, that he then touched her under the 

clothes multiple times on her genitalia, my concern was that a jury might 

believe that there was that attempt to the deviate sexual conduct.” Id. at 43

(emphasis added). This concern rings especially true considering C.S. requested 

Adcock stop touching her. 

[28] Based on the above facts and testimony, the post-conviction court concluded,

“the State’s threat to amend the C felony charges to A felony charges was not 

illusory. The threat [Adcock] faced at the time of the plea was solidly based on 

the law, and the State was positioned to execute the threat had the case gone to 

trial.” Appellant’s App. at 168-69. We agree; the State had probable cause and 
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its threat of charging Adcock with a Class A felony was not illusory. Because 

of the State’s viable threat, Schwartz acted appropriately in relaying the threat 

to Adcock. Therefore, we conclude the evidence does not lead “unerringly and 

unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” 

McCary, 761 N.E.2d at 391. 

[29] Because we are not persuaded there were any illusory threats, we conclude 

Adcock’s counsel was not deficient. Thus, because Adcock does not succeed 

under the first prong of the Strickland test, we need not examine whether 

Adcock suffered any prejudice.

 III. Involuntary Plea

A. Standard of Review

[30] When reviewing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we look at all the evidence 

before the post-conviction court. Moffitt v. State, 817 N.E.2d 239, 249 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004), trans. denied. If the evidence supports the post-conviction court’s 

determination the guilty plea was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing, we will 

not reverse. Id. 

When a guilty plea is attacked because of alleged misinformation 

concerning sentencing, the issue of the validity of such plea is 

determined by the following two-part test: (1) whether the 

defendant was aware of actual sentencing possibilities; and (2) 

whether the accurate information would have made any 

difference in his decision to enter the plea. 

Id.
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B. Adcock’s Plea

[31] In arguing his plea was involuntary, Adcock incorporates the same arguments

noted above. Specifically, he claims the State’s illusory threats had the effect of 

rendering his plea involuntary. 

Whether viewed as ineffective assistance of counsel or an 

involuntary plea, the postconviction court must resolve the 

factual issue of the materiality of the bad advice in the decision to 

plead, and postconviction relief may be granted if the plea can be 

shown to have been influenced by counsel’s error. 

Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496, 504-05 (Ind. 2001). The post-conviction court 

found Adcock was not faced with an illusory threat at the time he entered a plea 

of guilty and Adcock’s counsel did not provide bad advice. Therefore, the court

found Adcock’s plea was voluntary. As noted above, the post-conviction court 

did not err in finding there was no illusory threat by the State and Adcock’s 

counsel was not deficient. Accordingly, we find Adcock’s guilty plea was 

voluntary. 

Conclusion

[32] Because Adcock did not face an illusory threat at the time he entered a guilty 

plea, we conclude Adcock’s counsel was not deficient and Adcock’s plea was 
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not involuntary. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

[33] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.