NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YIHONG JIN, Petitioner,

v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 18

- 72750 Agency No. A200

- 266

- 237

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted February 4, 2020 * * Honolulu, Hawaii Before: FARRIS, McKEOWN, and BADE, Circuit Judges. YiHong Jin (“Jin”) , a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismiss ing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 12 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

(“CAT”). 1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U. S.C. § 1252 to review final orders of
removal. Huang v. Holder , 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014). We review denials of asylum and withholding of removal for substantial evidence, id. , and we deny the petition.
I. Jin claims persecution on account of her Christian religion. In May 2010,
p olice arrested Jin a s she was leaving a Christian house church service . She was detained overnight at the police station and interrogated

. During the questioning,

o ne of the officers struck Jin on her arms and shoulders with his baton

. Jin
suffered bruises but did not require medical care. Before Jin’s release, her father paid a fine of 2,000 yuan. Jin was also forced to sign a guarantee letter agreeing that she would not attend any house chur ch gatherings and would report regularly to the police.
I I

. Jin argues that her “arrest, detention, assault, and release conditions ” show
that she experienced past persecution and is entitled to relief under asylum

. The totality of the evidence does not compel a finding of past persecution , s ee Korablina v. INS , 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998) , and Jin has not established

1 Jin failed to challenge the IJ’s denial of CAT protection in her appeal to the BIA. The refore, the BIA determined that she had waive d her claim to protection under CAT. Jin does not challenge that determination in this appeal.3

a well

- founde d fear of future persecution

. Jin’s detention , interrogation , and beating closely mirror that suffered by the
p etitioner in Gu v. Gonzales , 454 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2006) , where the court concluded “that the evidence [did] not compel a result contrary to the BIA’s

. ” Id.

at 1021. While Jin ’s statement in her brief is correct that the court has “explicitly rejected the implication

. . . that persecution stems from the severity of the beating, ” incidents suffered by petitioners are considered under the totality of the
circumstances standard. See, e.g. , Gu , 454 F.3d at 1020

– 21. The BIA recognized
that Jin’s detention and beating were “harsh” but concluded that they did “not rise to the level of persecution.” This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
See Prasad v. INS , 47 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1995)

. In addition , unlike the petitioner in Guo v. Sessions , 897 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2018), Jin failed to carry her burden to show that she cannot practice her religion.
T he conditions of her release forbade her from attending church services at an unregistered house chur ch. However, her sole reason for not wanting to attend a
state

- sponsored church is not applicable to the autonomous Korean Christian
Churches she admits she could attend. Thus, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Jin failed to c arry her burden to show that she was unable to practice her religion

. See Singh v INS , 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998).
Jin also failed to establish a well

- founded fear of future perse cution , which4

must be subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. See Montecino v. INS , 915 F.2d 518, 520

– 21 (9th Cir. 1990)

. The objective prong is established by “adducing credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fe ar of persecution.” Ahmed v. Keisler , 504 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). Jin has not shown that her fear was objectively reasonable with credible, direct, and specific evidence. Thus, substantial evidence supports the agenc y’s decision denying Jin a sylum relief.
II I

. To qualify for withholding of removal, Jin must establish that it is “more likely than not” that her life or freedom would be threatened on account of her Christian religion. See INS v. Stevic , 467 U.S. 407, 4 13, 429

– 30 (1984). This

“ clear probability standard is more stringent than the well

- founded fear standard for asylum.” Jiang v. Holder , 754 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). Because Jin has not carried her burden to show a well

- founded fear of future persecution, she cannot establish the higher clear probability standard required for withholding of removal. Thus, the agency’s denial of Jin’s application for withholding of removal is supported by substantial evidence and we deny her petition.
PETITION DENIED.