FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JIM BRUGH GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Logansport, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

NICOLE M. SCHUSTER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ROBERT DOWELL, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 09A05-1201-CR-36

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE CASS SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Douglas B. Morton, Senior Judge

Cause No. 09D02-1103-FA-2

August 27, 2012

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
2

Robert Dowell appeals his conviction of Class A felony robbery resulting in serious 

bodily injury.1 He argues the trial court erred when it gave the jury an additional instruction 

after deliberations began, but did not call the jury back into the courtroom or re-read the rest 

of the instructions. We reverse and remand. 

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged Dowell with robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class A 

felony, after he, his girlfriend Mindy Boehme, and Dustin Rush beat and robbed Roman 

Nusbaum. The three saw Nusbaum in a Logansport tavern. Nusbaum appeared drunk and 

was carrying a large amount of cash. The three went to another bar, where they drank, 

smoked methamphetamine, and developed a plan to rob Nusbaum. Boehme would lure 

Nusbaum from the tavern and take him to an agreed-on location, where the two men would 

rob him. 

Boehme returned to the tavern and found Nusbaum. They left the tavern together, and 

Boehme drove him to the designated location. Dowell and Rush removed Nusbaum from the 

car and beat him. Dowell hit Nusbaum with a baseball bat. Rush took Nusbaum’s money, 

then met Boehme at Rush’s home. There Dowell and Rush helped Boehme remove 

Nusbaum’s blood from her car. Dowell and Rush placed their clothing in a bag for disposal 

and threw away their shoes. 

 

1

 Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. 

2

 We remind the State that a Statement of Facts in an appellate brief “shall describe the facts relevant to the 

issues presented for review.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46 (emphasis added). The State’s Statement of Facts 

describes Dowell’s offense in great detail, but is devoid of any facts relevant to the only issue presented for our 

review. 
3

The trial court instructed the jury as to the elements of robbery, but there was no 

instruction concerning accomplice liability. The robbery instruction read in part:

Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must have proved each of the 

following beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. The Defendant, Robert Dowell

2. knowingly or intentionally

3. took property from Roman Nusbaum

4. by using or threatening the use of force on Roman Nusbaum

5. and the commission of elements 1 through 4 resulted in serious bodily 

injury to Roman Nusbaum.

(App. at 20.) 

After deliberations began, the jury foreman gave the bailiff a handwritten note:

The jurors would like additional definition to know:

To meet the qualifications for element 5, would the defendant have had to 

directly caused [sic] the injuries with the baseball bat or could he have just 

been directly involved in the incident (i.e. holding the victim,, but not striking 

the victim with a weapon.)? [sic]

To meet the qualifications for element 3, would the defendant have had to have 

explicitly taken the property off of the victim’s person or could he have just 

been directly involved in it?

(Id. at 60.)

The trial court responded by returning the note with the handwritten statement 

“Indiana law provides that a person who aids another person to commit an offense commits 

that offense.” (Id.) The judge did not call the jury back into the courtroom, stating that 

procedure would be “unduly cumbersome.” (Id. at 53.) Nor did he re-read all the 

instructions including the new one on accomplice liability. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Ind. Code § 34-36-1-6 provides: 
4

If, after the jury retires for deliberation:

(1) there is a disagreement among the jurors as to any part of the testimony; or

(2) the jury desires to be informed as to any point of law arising in the case;

the jury may request the officer to conduct them into court, where the 

information required shall be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the 

parties or the attorneys representing the parties.

But once deliberations commence, the trial court should not give additional instructions. 

Crowdus v. State, 431 N.E.2d 796, 798 (Ind. 1982). This rule prevents the trial court from 

giving special emphasis, inadvertent or otherwise, to a particular issue in the case, and thus 

avoids the possibility that the additional instruction might tell the jury what it ought to do 

concerning that issue. Id. 

When confronted with a question from a jury that has commenced deliberation, the

trial judge must respond in a manner that accords with the legal requirements for final 

instructions and is fair. Jenkins v. State, 424 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (Ind. 1981). The “path is 

extremely hazardous” for the court that would depart from the body of final instructions and 

do other than reread the final instructions in responding to jury questions. Id. Such a 

departure will be warranted in only the most extreme circumstances. Id. It must serve to

amend the final instructions by adding a necessary one previously omitted or correcting an 

erroneous one, and must be fair to the parties in the sense that it should not reflect the judge’s 

view of factual matters. Id. 

It is only when the jury question coincides with an error or “legal lacuna” in the final 

instructions that a response other than rereading from the body of final instructions is 

permissible. Id. A “lacuna” is an “empty space or missing part; a gap.” Downs v. State, 656 
5

N.E.2d 849, 852 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the 

English Language 732). If the trial court decides to give an additional instruction because the 

question relates to a “legal lacuna,” the trial court must reread all of the instructions so that 

the additional instruction will not be over-emphasized. Graves v. State, 714 N.E.2d 724, 726

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 

In Graves, we addressed a situation almost identical to that in the case before us. 

There, we reversed and remanded for a new trial when the trial court gave the jury an 

accomplice liability instruction after deliberations had begun, but did not re-read all the final 

instructions. The jury sent a note to the court asking: “Did [Graves] have to personally take 

the property to be guilty of robbery?” Id. at 725. Counsel for Graves told the court he 

believed the proper procedure would be to re-read the entire set of final instructions, 

including any additional instructions. Instead, as in the case before us, the court read to the 

jury only an instruction on accomplice liability. Graves was convicted of robbery and other 

offenses. 

In Graves, both parties agreed the jury’s question concerned a point of law and the 

trial court complied with the mandates of Ind. Code § 34-36-1-6. Nevertheless, we noted, 

our Supreme Court has long recognized that once jury deliberations commence, the trial court 

should not give any additional instructions. Id. at 726 (citing Crowdus, 431 N.E.2d at 798).

We further noted the “one limited and narrow exception” to that “strict rule,” id.: that when 

the jury’s question coincides with an error or “legal lacuna” in the final instructions, the trial 

court may respond in a manner other than simply re-reading the entire set of final 
6

instructions. Id. at 726. “This prohibitive rule exists to protect against giving special 

emphasis to a particular issue and to guard against the possibility that the additional 

instruction might suggest to the jury a resolution to an issue.” Id. (citing Crowdus, 431 

N.E.2d at 798). 

In Graves, as in the case before us, the jury sent a note asking specifically about the 

charge of robbery and then, after receiving the additional instruction on accomplice liability, 

returned with a verdict of guilty as to that charge. As we explained in Graves:

In this situation the potential for prejudice is great. The evidence reveals that 

Graves’ companions searched Jones’ house and removed items from the 

residence, but it does not show that Graves actually removed any of the objects 

from the house.3 Therefore, when the trial court instructed the jury on 

accomplice liability, without re-reading the entire set of final instructions, it 

not only placed special significance on the particular issue of Graves’

culpability with regard to the charge of robbery, but also the lone, additional 

instruction suggests a resolution to the jury’s predicament evidenced by their 

note. The jury was instructed as follows: “[A] person who knowingly or 

intentionally aids, induces or causes another person to commit an offense, 

commits that offense.” 

Id. at 726-27 (footnote added). 

We found the Graves procedure gave “the type of improper emphasis that the rule of 

Crowdus aims to alleviate.” Id. at 727. Even though there was a “legal lacuna” in the form 

of the omitted instruction on accomplice liability such that the trial court properly could 

 

3

 Similarly, in the case before us it appears there was no evidence Dowell directly took the money from 

Nusbaum. In its Statement of Facts, the State asserts “The two [Dowell and Rush] took Nusbaum’s money” 

when they beat Nusbaum, (Br. of Appellee at 3), but the pages of the transcript to which the State directs us do 

not support that statement. One reference is to Boehme’s testimony that she was told days after the robbery 

that Rush “ended up with all the money.” (Tr. at 187.) The other reference is to testimony by an acquaintance 

of Rush that Rush showed him the money that had been stolen from Nusbaum. (Id. at 266.) We admonish the 

State to refrain from so misrepresenting the record. 
7

provide the jury with the additional instruction, we held the trial court committed reversible 

error because it did not re-read the entire set of final instructions contemporaneously with the 

giving of the additional instruction.

4

 Id. Cf. Hero v. State, 765 N.E.2d 599, 603 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002), trans. denied, where we noted “[i]t may be true that when the trial court gives a 

special instruction on one particular issue, it tends to emphasize that issue as being of primary

importance and tends to tell the jury what it ought to do.” In Hero, the trial court was aware 

of that danger, and “took all precautions to avoid such an emphasis. When the new 

instruction was added, it was one of nineteen instructions. It was not inserted first or last - a 

position where it would stand out - but fourth, a natural and logical position amongst the 

other instructions.” Id. 

In Brannum v. State, 267 Ind. 51, 57, 366 N.E.2d 1180, 1184 (1977), our Supreme 

Court characterized as a “prejudicial act of the trial court” the “giving of a special instruction 

to the jury in the middle of their deliberations.” After eight and one-half hours of 

deliberation, it appeared the jury was having difficulty arriving at a verdict “because of legal 

questions being discussed among them.” Id., 366 N.E.2d at 1184. The record on appeal did 

not reflect what those questions were. The State and the defense agreed the court would reread the instructions previously given. The trial court then indicated it was going to give to 

 

4

 The State acknowledges Graves, but appears to argue the Graves rule does not apply to the case before us

because of our Supreme Court’s statement in Ronco v. State, 862 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Ind. 2007) that “[u]nder 

our recently adopted jury rules, Indiana trial courts have greater leeway to facilitate and assist jurors in the 

deliberative process, in order to avoid mistrials.” (Internal quotation omitted). We decline to hold that such 

greater “leeway” now permits a trial court to subject a defendant to a “prejudicial act of the trial court” in the 

form of the “giving of a special instruction to the jury in the middle of their deliberations,” Brannum, 267 Ind. 

at 57, 366 N.E.2d at 1184, or to the “great” potential for prejudice we noted in Graves, 714 N.E.2d at 726.
8

the jury a further instruction it had prepared, which instruction addressed a decision 

Brannum’s counsel quoted in final argument. Our Supreme Court held the additional 

instruction was error, not because of its content about the decision counsel quoted, but 

the question, rather, is one of the court’s adding an instruction at this juncture

of the trial in which he commented on final argument of defense counsel, 

emphasizing one aspect of the decision the jury was to make. The court 

apparently emphasized the aspect he felt the jury was troubled about. This 

possibility seems to be borne out by the fact that the jury found the defendant 

guilty of first degree murder in a very short time after the special instruction 

was given, previously having been in deliberation for eight and one-half hours.

Id. at 57-58, 366 N.E.2d at 1184. By giving the special instruction sua sponte, “the court 

emphasized this provision as one of primary importance to the jury, and tended to tell them 

what they ought to do.” Id. at 59, 366 N.E.2d at 1185. 

In the case before us, as in Graves, the jury was apparently not prepared to conclude 

its deliberations until its question was answered. The court gave it the additional instruction 

on accomplice liability without re-reading the rest of the instructions, and the jury then 

returned a guilty verdict. That procedure gave that instruction “the type of improper 

emphasis that the rule of Crowdus aims to alleviate.” Graves, 714 N.E.2d at 727, because the

trial court did not re-read the entire set of final instructions contemporaneously with the 

giving of the additional instruction. Id. As such an additional instruction tended to 

“emphasize that issue as being of primary importance and . . . to tell the jury what it ought to 

do,” Hero, 765 N.E.2d at 603, we must reverse and remand for a new trial. 

Reversed and remanded. 

KIRSCH, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.