FORD-CLASS 

CARRIERS

Lead Ship Testing and 

Reliability Shortfalls 

Will Limit Initial Fleet 

Capabilities

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2013

GAO-13-396

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-396, a report to 

congressional requesters

September 2013

FORD-CLASS CARRIERS

Lead Ship Testing and Reliability Shortfalls Will 

Limit Initial Fleet Capabilities

Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy plans to spend over $43

billion to produce three Ford-class 

aircraft carriers. The lead ship, CVN 

78, is under construction, and 

preparation work is underway for the 

second, CVN 79. These ships will 

feature new technologies designed to 

increase capability and reduce crew 

size. GAO was asked to evaluate the 

progress of the Ford class. This report 

examines (1) technical, design, and 

construction challenges to delivering 

the lead ship within budget and 

schedule estimates; (2) the Navy’s test 

strategy for demonstrating CVN 78’s 

required capabilities; and (3) actions 

the Navy is taking to improve CVN 79

cost outcomes. GAO analyzed 

documents related to mission 

requirements, acquisition plans and 

performance, and testing strategies, 

and interviewed Department of 

Defense (DOD) and contractor 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends the Secretary of 

Defense take several actions aimed at 

ensuring Ford-class carrier acquisitions 

are supported by sound requirements 

and a comprehensive testing strategy, 

including conducting a cost-benefit 

analysis of required capabilities and 

associated costs. GAO is also

recommending actions to improve the 

Navy’s knowledge about CVN 79 

capabilities and costs before beginning

contract negotiations. DOD concurred 

with one recommendation, partially 

concurred with three others, and did 

not concur with the recommendation to 

defer CVN 79’s detail design and 

construction contract award. GAO 

maintains that DOD’s current schedule 

for awarding this contract undermines 

the government’s negotiating position.

What GAO Found

The Navy faces technical, design, and construction challenges to completing 

Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) that have led to significant cost increases and reduced

the likelihood that a fully functional ship will be delivered on time. The Navy has 

achieved mixed progress to date developing CVN 78’s critical technologies, such 

as a system intended to more effectively launch aircraft from the ship. In an effort 

to meet required installation dates aboard CVN 78, the Navy has elected to 

produce some of these systems prior to demonstrating their maturity—a strategy 

that GAO’s previous work has shown introduces risk of late and costly design 

changes and rework, and leaves little margin to incorporate additional weight 

growth in the ship. In addition, progress in constructing CVN 78 has been 

overshadowed by inefficient out-of-sequence work, driven largely by material 

shortfalls, engineering challenges, and delays developing and installing critical 

technology systems. These events are occurring in a constrained budget 

environment, even as lead ship costs have increased by over 22 percent since 

construction authorization in fiscal year 2008—to $12.8 billion. Additional 

increases could follow due to uncertainties facing critical technology systems and 

shipbuilder underperformance.

The Navy’s strategy for providing timely demonstration of CVN 78 capabilities is

hampered by post-delivery test plan deficiencies, Joint Strike Fighter aircraft 

delays, and reliability shortfalls affecting key ship systems. Additional risk is 

introduced due to the Navy’s plan to conduct integration testing of key systems 

with the ship at the same time as initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). 

This strategy will constrain opportunities to implement timely, corrective actions if 

problems are discovered with key ship systems. In addition, significant 

discoveries during IOT&E could delay demonstration of ship capabilities. The

Joint Strike Fighter, intended to operate with the carrier, has faced delays, and 

there is the likelihood of costly retrofits to the ship to accommodate the aircraft 

after CVN 78 is delivered to the Navy. But even after the ship commissions,

several key ship systems will continue to face significant reliability shortfalls that 

will likely increase costs to the government and limit the ship’s mission 

effectiveness. The extent of these limitations will not be known until after IOT&E.

GAO contemplated making a recommendation to delay CVN 78 commissioning 

until the ship successfully completes IOT&E. However, based on additional 

information provided by DOD, GAO decided not to include this recommendation 

in the report.

The Navy and shipbuilder are implementing process improvements aimed at 

reducing the cost of the follow-on ship, John F. Kennedy (CVN 79), ahead of the 

main construction contract award for that ship, currently planned for September

2013. CVN 79 is to be of nearly identical design to CVN 78. The shipbuilder 

plans to employ a new, more efficient build strategy, but remaining technical and 

design risks with the lead ship could interfere with the Navy’s ability to achieve its 

desired cost savings for CVN 79. These uncertainties also affect the soundness 

of the Navy’s current CVN 79 cost estimate, which is optimistic. These factors, 

when coupled with the existing sole source environment for aircraft carrier 

construction, may compromise the government’s negotiating position for CVN 79. View GAO-13-396. For more information, 

contact Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or 

mackinm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Letter 1

Background 2

Technology, Design, and Construction Challenges Pose Risk to 

Lead Ship Cost and Schedule Outcomes 11

Demonstration of Ship Capabilities after Delivery Is Limited by 

Test Plan Deficiencies and Reliability Shortfalls 29

Lead Ship Unknowns Complicate the Navy’s Ability to Determine 

Follow-on Ship Cost Outcomes 41

Conclusions 46

Recommendations for Executive Action 47

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 48

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 54

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 57

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 65

Tables

Table 1: Planned Capabilities and Development Status of Fordclass Critical Technologies 13

Table 2: CVN 78 Procurement Cost Growth Since Fiscal Year 2008 

for Selected Critical Technology Systems 27

Table 3: F-35C Integration Requirements with CVN 78 34

Table 4: Comparison of CVN 79 Procurement Funding Strategies 

Outlined in the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012, 2013, and 2014 

Budget Submissions 42

Figures

Figure 1: Critical Technologies on the Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier 4

Figure 2: Ford Class Budgeting and Contracting Strategies 6

Figure 3: Delays to the CVN 78 Construction Schedule and LandBased Test Programs for Critical Technologies Since 2008 19

Figure 4: CVN 78 Procurement Cost History 25

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Figure 5: CVN 78 Procurement Cost Growth Drivers as of June 

2012 26

Figure 6: CVN 78 Post-Delivery Testing Schedule and Key 

Milestones 31

Figure 7: Advanced Arresting Gear Reliability Performance and 

Growth Projections 37

Figure 8: Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System Reliability 

Performance and Growth Projections 38

Figure 9: Schedule of CVN 78 and CVN 79 Construction Milestones 43

Abbreviations

DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement

DOD Department of Defense

EMALS electromagnetic aircraft launch system

HSLA 65 high strength low alloy steel

HSLA 115 high strength toughness steel

IOT&E initial operational test and evaluation

JPALS joint precision approach and landing system

TRL technology readiness level

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Page 1 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 5, 2013

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Seapower

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Navy is developing the Ford-class nuclear powered aircraft carrier to 

serve as the future centerpiece of the carrier strike group, which 

combines different types of ships together to gain and maintain sea 

control. The Ford class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier 

designed in the 1960s. The Ford class carriers will introduce several 

advanced technologies that are intended to create operational efficiencies 

while enabling higher sortie rates (operational flights by aircraft, such as 

the Joint Strike Fighter) with reduced manpower compared to current 

carriers. The Navy plans to invest over $43 billion to develop, design, 

construct, and test three Ford class carriers. At present, the lead ship, 

Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), is under construction, and initial construction 

activities are underway for the first follow-on ship, John F. Kennedy (CVN 

79).

In 2012, the Navy reported a significant increase in its budget estimate for 

construction of the lead ship. That ship is now expected to cost $12.8 

billion—a $1.3 billion increase since 2011. This cost growth has led to 

concerns about the Navy’s ability to deliver the three Ford-class aircraft 

carriers as planned and with the promised levels of capability.

In light of these developments, you asked us to review the Navy’s 

acquisition of the Ford class. Specifically, we (1) assessed technical, 

design, and construction challenges the Navy faces in delivering the lead 

ship, CVN 78, within current budget and schedule estimates; (2) 

evaluated whether the Navy’s post-delivery test and evaluation strategy 

for CVN 78 will provide timely demonstration of required capabilities; and 

(3) identified actions the Navy is taking to improve cost outcomes for the 

first follow-on ship, CVN 79, ahead of that ship’s upcoming contract 

award for detail design and construction.
Page 2 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

To assess technical, design, and construction challenges the Navy faces 

in delivering CVN 78 within current budget and schedule estimates, we 

reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and contractor documentation to 

identify technology development, design stability, and construction 

activities. This documentation included Navy technology readiness 

assessments and briefings, ship and key subsystem test plans, and 

contract performance reports. To evaluate whether the Navy’s postdelivery test and evaluation strategy for CVN 78 will provide timely 

demonstration of required capabilities, we reviewed the Navy’s draft 

revision to the CVN 78 test and evaluation master plan, Joint Strike 

Fighter performance reports and briefings, and reliability data for key CVN 

78 systems. To identify actions the Navy is taking to improve cost 

outcomes for CVN 79 ahead of that ship’s detail design and construction 

contract award, we reviewed shipbuilder reports on lessons learned 

constructing CVN 78, the Navy’s request for proposals for CVN 79 detail 

design and construction, and CVN 79 construction plans. To corroborate 

information for each of these objectives, we interviewed DOD officials and 

contractor representatives responsible for Ford-class carrier 

requirements, development, acquisition, and testing. A more detailed 

description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to September 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Navy intends for Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to serve 

as premier forward assets for crisis response and provide early striking 

power during major combat operations. The Ford-class is expected to

feature a number of improvements over existing aircraft carriers that the 

Navy believes will improve the combat capability of the carrier fleet while 

simultaneously reducing acquisition and life cycle costs. These 

improvements include the following:

• increased sortie generation rates for the aircraft being deployed from 

the carrier,

• a near threefold increase in electrical generating capability,

Background
Page 3 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

• increased operational availability, and

• increased service life margins for weight and stability to support future 

configuration changes to the ship over its expected 50-year service 

life.

To facilitate these capability and efficiency gains, the Navy is developing 

13 new, critical technologies for installation on Ford-class carriers.1

Aside from their own intrinsic capabilities, these technologies are also 

intended to permit the Navy to implement favorable design features into 

the ship. Key design features include an enlarged flight deck; a smaller, 

aft-positioned island with fewer rotating radars than Nimitz-class carriers; 

and a track-based, flexible infrastructure system that allows ship 

compartments to be easily reconfigured to support changing missions 

over time. The Navy is managing these technology development activities 

across several different program offices and contractors, using quarterly 

integrated product team meetings to track progress. Figure 1 highlights 

the location of the 13 critical technologies on the ship.

For 

example, the ship includes a new electromagnetic aircraft launch system 

(EMALS) to propel aircraft off the ship, an advanced arresting gear to 

recover the aircraft, and an improved anti-aircraft missile system. It also 

includes a new dual band radar, which integrates two radars operating on 

different frequency bands to provide air traffic control, ship self-defense, 

and other capabilities. Other technologies are intended to improve the 

ship’s propulsion, supply (replenishment), water generation, and waste 

disposal systems.

 1

DOD acquisition guidance defines a technology element as “critical” if the system being 

acquired depends on this technology element to meet its operational requirements (within 

acceptable cost and schedule limits) and if the technology element or its application is 

either new or novel or in an area that poses major technological risk during detailed 

design and demonstration.
Page 4 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Figure 1: Critical Technologies on the Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier

The Navy’s strategy for acquiring a new class of carriers has changed 

from its initial concept. Initially, the Navy employed an evolutionary 

acquisition strategy, with technology improvements planned to be 

introduced gradually with each successive carrier. The Navy established 

the CVN(X) program in 1998 in support of this concept. Under the 

CVN(X) program, introduction of new technologies would be spread over 

three ships, beginning with the final Nimitz-class carrier, CVN 77, which 

was authorized in fiscal year 2001 to begin construction, and continuing 

over two, new design CVN(X) class carriers. In 2002, however, DOD

decided to restructure the CVN(X) program (renamed as CVN 21) and 

accelerated plans for introducing new technologies on the first ship of the 

new class. To support this acceleration, in 2004 the Navy increased its 

planned research, development, test, and evaluation funding for the 
Page 5 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

program from $2.3 billion to $4.3 billion.2

Due to their vast size and complexity, aircraft carriers require funding for 

design, long-lead materials (such as nuclear propulsion plant 

components), and construction over many years. To accomplish these 

activities, the Navy awards contracts for two phases of construction—

construction preparation and detail design and construction—

underpinned by advance procurement and procurement funding. 

Additional funding, termed “cost to complete” funding, may be needed to 

cover unexpected cost growth that occurs during construction.

In 2006, the Secretary of the 

Navy named the lead ship of the program (CVN 78) Gerald R. Ford, thus 

initiating the Ford class.

Figure 2 outlines the Navy’s budgeting and contracting strategies for the 

Ford class. As indicated in the figure, construction preparation contracts 

can be awarded several years after advance procurement funds are in 

place, to allow for procurement of long-lead materials.

 2

The Navy further increased this total to $4.4 billion in 2005, which continues to reflect the 

approved funding baseline for research, development, test, and evaluation investments in 

the program. To date, the Navy has received over $3.7 billion to support these activities, 

with remaining funding scheduled through fiscal year 2022.
Page 6 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Figure 2: Ford Class Budgeting and Contracting Strategies

Note: FY = fiscal year; AP = advance procurement. Unlike other ships, for which the Navy typically 

funds detail design and construction over 1 or 2 years, Congress has authorized Ford-class carrier 

constructions to be funded in annual increments lasting up to 6 years. The Navy can vary the amount 

of funds it budgets for each increment on a year-to-year basis to account for evolving work needs and 

cost changes in the program.

In September 2008, the Navy awarded a $4.9 billion cost-reimbursement 

contract for detail design and construction of CVN 78 to Newport News 

Shipbuilding. Cost-reimbursement contracts, also known as cost-plus 

contracts, provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent 

prescribed in the contract. This contract type places most of the risk on 

the government, which may pay more than budgeted should incurred 

costs be more than expected when the contract is signed.

The Navy expects to largely repeat the lead ship design for CVN 79, with 

minor modifications, and to construct that ship under a fixed-price 

incentive contract with the shipbuilder. Fixed-price incentive contracts 

place increased risk on the contractor, which generally bears some 
Page 7 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

responsibility for increased costs of performance, including full 

responsibility once the contract’s ceiling is exceeded. These contracts 

include a negotiated target cost, target profit, and a formula for sharing 

the risk of cost overruns between the buyer and the seller (sometimes 

referred to as a shareline).3

Congress has previously expressed concern about Ford-class carrier 

costs. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2007 included a provision that established (1) a procurement cost 

cap for CVN 78 of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other 

factors, and (2) a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class 

carriers of $8.1 billion each, plus adjustments for inflation and other 

factors.

Upon completion of performance, if the costs 

incurred by the contractor have exceeded the target cost, then application 

of the formula results in the contractor receiving a profit that is less than 

the target profit, and may result in a net loss for the contractor. The Navy 

has not yet determined the design parameters and contract type for CVN 

80.

4

Further, in August 2007, we reported that delays in Ford class technology 

development could increase lead ship construction costs and lead to 

potential reductions in capability at delivery. In addition, we found that 

although the Navy had made considerable progress maturing CVN 78’s 

design, significant schedule pressures in development of the ship’s critical 

technologies could impede completion of the detailed phases of design 

and potentially disrupt construction. We also found that the Navy’s cost 

estimate used to develop the CVN 78 budget was optimistic. We 

recommended actions to improve the realism of the CVN 78 budget 

estimate, improve the Navy’s cost surveillance capability, and schedule 

carrier-specific tests of the dual band radar.5

 3

The target cost is the pre-established cost of the contracted goods/services that is a 

reasonable prediction of the final incurred costs. Target profit is the pre-established profit 

that the contractor will earn if the negotiated final cost of the contracted goods/services is 

the same as the target cost.

The Navy addressed some, 

but not all, of our recommendations.

4

Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 122.

5

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Navy Faces Challenges Constructing the Aircraft Carrier 

Gerald R. Ford within Budget, GAO-07-866 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2007).
Page 8 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

As is typical for all ships, Ford-class carrier construction is conducted 

over several phases:

• Block fabrication: Metal plates are welded together into elements 

called blocks. Blocks are the basic building units for a ship, and when 

completed they will form completed or partial compartments, including 

accommodation spaces, engine rooms, and storage areas.

• Assembly and outfitting of blocks: Blocks are generally outfitted 

with pipes, brackets for machinery or cabling, ladders, and any other 

equipment that may be available for installation at this early stage of 

construction. This allows a block to be installed as a completed unit 

when it is welded to the hull of the ship. Installing equipment at the 

block stage of construction is preferable because access to spaces is 

not limited by doors or machinery, unlike at later phases.

• Block erection: Blocks are welded together to form grand blocks, 

which are then erected with other grand blocks in a drydock.

• Launch: Once the ship is watertight and the decision is made to 

launch—or float the ship in water—the ship is then towed into a quay 

or dock area where final outfitting and testing of machinery and 

equipment such as main engines will occur. Afterwards, the ship 

embarks on sea trials where performance is evaluated against the 

contractually required specifications and overall quality is assessed.

• Delivery: Following sea trials, the shipyard delivers the ship to the 

buyer (Navy).

• Commissioning: Following delivery, the act or ceremony of 

commissioning a ship marks its entry into active service.

DOD acquisition policy requires major defense acquisition programs, 

including shipbuilding programs, to execute and complete developmental 

testing, reliability growth testing, initial operational test and evaluation 

(IOT&E), and live-fire testing activities:

• Developmental testing is intended to assist in the maturation of 

products, product elements, or manufacturing or support processes. 

For ship technologies, developmental testing typically includes robust 

land-based testing activities prior to introducing the technology to a 

maritime environment.
Page 9 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

• Reliability growth testing is an integral part of the systems 

engineering process for a weapon system. Simply stated, reliability is 

the ability of a system and its parts to perform its mission without 

failure, degradation, or demand on the support system under a 

prescribed set of conditions. Program managers are responsible for 

developing reliability growth curves for weapon systems, which outline 

a series of intermediate goals that are tracked through test and 

evaluation events until minimum reliability requirements are satisfied. 

In addition, program managers and operational test agencies are 

responsible for assessing and reporting on the reliability growth 

required for a system to achieve its minimum reliability requirements 

during IOT&E. The Navy measures reliability for key CVN 78 systems 

in terms of mean (average) time between failures and average 

number of cycles between critical mission failures. 6

• IOT&E—a major component of operational testing—is intended to 

assess a weapon system’s capability in a realistic environment when 

maintained and operated by sailors, subjected to routine wear-andtear, and employed in combat conditions against a simulated enemy 

who fights back. During this test phase, the ship is exposed to as 

many actual operational scenarios as possible—a process that 

reveals the weapon system’s capabilities under stress. IOT&E for 

CVN 78 will take place after the shipbuilder completes construction 

and delivers the ship to the Navy.

• Live-fire testing provides timely assessment of the survivability 

and/or lethality of a weapon system as it progresses through its 

design and development. For ships, two major components of this 

testing are the full-ship shock trial and total ship survivability trial. The 

Navy defines a full-ship shock trial as an at-sea trial conducted to 

identify any unknown weakness in the ability of the ship to withstand 

specified levels of shock from underwater explosions. The Navy 

defines a total ship survivability trial as an at-sea, scenario-based 

assessment of the ability of the ship and crew to control damage, 

reconfigure, and attempt to reconstitute mission capability after 

damage.

 6

DOD defines mean time between failures as, for a particular interval, the total functional 

life of a population of an item divided by the total number of failures (requiring corrective 

maintenance actions) within the population. The definition holds for time, rounds, miles, 

events, or other measures of life unit (such as cycles).
Page 10 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

DOD also establishes two key milestones for introducing new weapon 

systems, including ships, to the warfighter: initial operational capability 

and full operational capability.

• Initial operational capability (or initial capability) for a weapon 

system is, in general, attained once some units and/or organizations 

in the force structure scheduled to receive the system have received it 

and have the ability to employ and maintain it. For CVN 78, initial 

capability closely follows the completion of combat system ship 

qualification trials, which are a series of technical and training events 

conducted aboard newly commissioned warships.

• Full operational capability (or full capability) generally represents 

the point when all units and/or organizations in the force structure 

scheduled to receive the system have received it and have the ability 

to employ and maintain it. For CVN 78, full capability closely follows 

the completion of joint task force exercises, which are designed to test 

the carrier’s ability to operate in hostile, complex environments 

alongside other U.S. and coalition forces. The purpose of these 

exercises is to prepare the carrier for an upcoming deployment.

In addition, DOD acquisition policy requires the development of a life 

cycle cost estimate for weapon systems. A cost estimate is a summation 

of individual cost elements—using established methods and valid data—

to estimate the future costs of a program, based on what is known today. 

Cost estimates are necessary for many reasons: to support decisions 

about funding one program over another, to develop annual budget 

requests, to evaluate resource requirements at key decision points, and 

to develop performance measurement baselines. The management of a 

cost estimate involves continually updating the cost estimate with actual 

data as they become available, revising the estimate to reflect changes, 

and analyzing differences between estimated and actual costs. The Navy 

completed its initial life cycle cost estimate for CVN 78 in 2004, which 

largely underpinned initial budget requests for that ship. Since that time, 

the Navy has periodically updated that cost estimate and also recently 

developed a cost estimate for CVN 79 detail design and construction.

Finally, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 

requires certain contracts, to include the Ford class contract, to include a 

clause requiring the contractor to maintain a government-validated 
Page 11 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

earned value management system and to provide monthly contract 

performance reports to the government.7 Earned value management is a 

program management tool for assessing cost and schedule performance. 

It goes beyond simply comparing budgeted costs to actual costs. It 

measures the value of work accomplished in a given period and 

compares it with the planned value of work scheduled for that period and 

with the actual cost of work accomplished. By using the metrics derived 

from these values to understand performance status and to estimate cost 

and time to complete the work, earned value management can alert 

program managers to potential problems sooner than expenditures alone 

can.

While construction of CVN 78 is more than halfway complete, the Navy 

and shipbuilder must still overcome significant technology development, 

design, and construction challenges in order to deliver a fully functional 

ship to the fleet at the currently budgeted cost of $12.8 billion and the 

February 2016 delivery date. However, several critical technologies—

provided to the shipbuilder by the Navy—have encountered 

developmental delays and, subsequently, have not yet reached a level of

maturity that will enable them to be effectively incorporated onto the ship. 

These delays are most evident in the land-based test programs for these 

technologies, which are lagging significantly behind schedule. At the 

same time, the ship’s design stability—a key factor in controlling future 

cost growth—is contingent on critical technologies maturing in the 

configurations currently anticipated. In addition, construction inefficiencies 

at the shipyard have delayed—and threaten additional delays to—ship 

launch and delivery. These combined challenges and uncertainties 

suggest that more cost growth could occur for CVN 78.

 7

DFARS subpart 234.201 and section 252.234-7002. DOD’s earned value management 

implementation policy includes requirements that for cost-reimbursable and/or incentive 

fee contracts valued at or above $50 million, (1) a DOD contracting officer must formally 

validate and accept a contractor’s earned value management system at contract award 

and throughout contract performance and (2) the contractor must provide monthly contract 

performance reports to DOD.

Technology, Design, 

and Construction 

Challenges Pose Risk 

to Lead Ship Cost and 

Schedule Outcomes
Page 12 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

At present, the Navy assesses 7 of CVN 78’s 13 critical technologies as 

mature, meaning that they have been proven in an operational 

environment. The shipbuilder has begun installing the remaining 6 

technologies on the ship even though their capabilities are not yet fully 

proven. This strategy introduces the risk of late and costly design 

changes aboard the ship. Specifically, progress continues to lag for 

several systems that are integral to the ship achieving its intended 

mission capabilities.

Our previous work has shown that good acquisition outcomes are 

achieved through a knowledge-based approach to product development 

that demonstrates high levels of knowledge before significant 

commitments are made.8 In essence, knowledge supplants risk over time. 

In this approach, developers make investment decisions on the basis of 

specific, measurable levels of knowledge at critical junctures before 

investing more money and advancing to the next phase of acquisition. 

Shipbuilding programs are no exception. As we have previously reported, 

leading commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders retire program risks, 

including technology risk, prior to signing a contract.9

DOD uses technology readiness levels (TRL) to describe the maturity of 

critical technologies in programs. Technologies with TRLs below 6 are at 

a stage of development where only components or a basic proof of 

concept of the system have been validated. Technologies developed into 

representative prototypes and successfully tested in a relevant 

environment meet requirements for TRL 6. Technologies developed into 

actual system prototypes (full form, fit, and function) and tested in an 

operational environment meet requirements for TRL 7. We have 

previously reported that TRL 7 constitutes low risk for starting a product 

development and, for shipbuilding programs, should be achieved for 

individual technologies prior to detail design contract award.

Demonstrating the 

maturity of critical technologies—by testing representative prototypes in 

realistic environments—is a key component to reducing these risks.

10

 8

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 

Consequently, our assessment of CVN 78 technologies refers to 

GAO-11-233SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011).

9

GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial 

Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009).

10GAO-09-322.

Some Critical Technologies 

Are Mature, but Others 

Face Significant LandBased Testing Delays
Page 13 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

technologies that have reached TRL 6 and TRL 7 as approaching 

maturity and as mature, respectively. Technologies exceeding TRL 7 

represent actual systems that have been proven to work in final form and 

under expected (TRL 8) or actual (TRL 9) mission conditions. Table 1 

summarizes the planned capabilities and development status of current 

Ford-class technologies and DOD’s assessment of TRLs since contract 

award in 2008.

Table 1: Planned Capabilities and Development Status of Ford-class Critical Technologies

Technology Capability improvement 2008 TRL 2013 TRL Development status

Volume Search Radar 

(part of dual band radar)

Volume search radar includes 

long-range, above-horizon 

surveillance and air traffic control 

capabilities. The dual band radar 

permits reduced manning and 

higher sortie generation rates 

aboard CVN 78 via anticipated 

operational availability increases 

and size reductions to the ship’s 

island.

5 6

Technical deficiencies have slowed 

development, and key functions, 

including air traffic control 

capabilities, remain undemonstrated. 

For land-based testing, the Navy is 

employing a prototype design that 

will not demonstrate the highervoltage output needed to meet ship 

requirements. At present, the first 

test of a fully configured volume 

search radar is scheduled for fiscal 

year 2016 aboard CVN 78. 

Following this testing, the Navy 

expects the radar will reach maturity 

(TRL 7) in fiscal year 2017.

Multifunction Radar (part 

of dual band radar)

Multifunction radar includes 

horizon search, surface search 

and navigation, and missile 

communications. This system 

facilitates reduced manning 

through anticipated 

improvements in operational 

availability. 

6 7

Although the Navy has assessed the 

system as mature since 2010, it 

restarted land-based testing of this 

radar in fiscal year 2013 to 

demonstrate certain CVN 78-specific 

functionalities that the Navy 

previously deferred. New tests have

employed prototype test articles and, 

beginning in fiscal year 2014, will 

employ a production unit system. 

The Navy plans to transition to 

shipboard testing in fiscal year 2014 

to complete requirements 

verifications not addressed at the 

land-based test site and to integrate 

the system with the CVN 78 volume 

search radar.
Page 14 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Technology Capability improvement 2008 TRL 2013 TRL Development status

Advanced Arresting Gear Advanced arresting gear 

recovers current and future 

aircraft and contributes to 

increased sortie generation rate 

and reduced manning. 

5 6

Developmental test failures led to 

system redesigns. Navy is presently 

executing the first phase of landbased testing concurrent with 

system production and installation 

on CVN 78. The system is 

scheduled to arrest its first aircraft in 

June 2014. The Navy anticipates 

system maturity (TRL 7) in fiscal 

year 2015.

Electromagnetic Aircraft 

Launch System (EMALS)

EMALS uses an electrically 

generated moving magnetic field 

to propel aircraft, which places 

less physical stress on aircraft as 

compared to steam catapult 

launchers. The system is a 

contributor to CVN 78’s planned 

sortie generation rate and 

reduced manning, in part 

because of Navy expectations 

about EMALS’s increased 

operational availability.

6 6

EMALS land-based testing is 

proceeding concurrently with system 

production and installation on CVN 

78. To date, EMALS has 

successfully launched a wide range 

of aircraft using a single launcher 

and 4 motor generators. The 

shipboard system will employ a 

more complex configuration of 4 

launchers and 12 generators sharing 

a power interface. EMALS is 

scheduled to mature (TRL 7) in fiscal 

year 2014 following aircraft 

compatibility and environmental 

testing. 

Advanced Weapons 

Elevators

These elevators rely on 

electromagnetic fields to move 

instead of cables. Capability 

improvements include an 

expected 200 percent greater 

load capacity than legacy carrier 

elevators. Advanced weapons 

elevators facilitate reduced 

manning and enable higher 

sortie generation rates.

5 6

Prior to installation on the ship, 

system testing was limited to factory 

tests of the first production unit in a 

configuration that was 

unrepresentative of shipboard doors, 

hatches, and ramps. Planned tests 

aboard CVN 78 will verify system 

performance against load 

requirements and under casualty 

(degraded) conditions. The Navy 

anticipates system maturity (TRL 7) 

in fiscal year 2014.

Evolved Sea Sparrow 

Missile Joint Universal 

Weapons Link 

This system supports anti-air 

warfare. The system provides 

capability to defeat high-density 

raids and facilitates reduced 

manning aboard the ship.

4 6

The Navy expects this technology to 

mature (TRL 7) in fiscal year 2014 

following completion of qualification 

and integration tests, to include 

integration with CVN 78’s 

multifunction radar.
Page 15 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Technology Capability improvement 2008 TRL 2013 TRL Development status

Joint Precision Approach 

and Landing System

(JPALS)

JPALS is a global positioning 

system technology allowing for 

all-weather, day and night 

aircraft landings. JPALS is 

expected to become the primary 

landing system for F-35C Joint 

Strike Fighter aircraft on all 

carriers, including the Ford class. 

JPALS permits reduced 

manning. 6 6

Shore-based flight tests of the 

system are ongoing. Shipboard flight 

testing is scheduled to begin in fiscal 

year 2013, which the Navy expects 

will mature the system to TRL 7. 

Technical risks include operations 

within electronic jamming 

environments.

Heavy Underway 

Replenishment Receiving 

Station

This system provides quicker 

shipboard replenishment 

(supply) than legacy underway 

replenishment systems. The 

system facilitates F-35C power 

module replacement and higher 

sortie generation rates for the 

Ford class.

6 7

In fiscal year 2013, the Navy 

matured the system by completing a 

full-scale transfer of 12,000-pound 

loads to a CVN 78 prototype 

receiving station in accordance with 

required conditions. Although CVN 

78 will have this capability installed, 

the Navy’s plan to install this system 

on supply ships has slipped 8 years.

Plasma Arc Waste 

Destruction System 

This system uses extreme 

temperatures to convert 6,800 

pounds per day of plastic and 

other waste into gaseous 

emissions. It facilitates reduced 

manning aboard the ship. 7 7

System maturity was achieved in 

2007 following engineering 

development model testing that 

satisfied all performance objectives. 

A similar system was tested on a 

cruise ship.

Nuclear propulsion/

electric plant

The system converts energy into 

electricity, providing a nearly

three-fold increase in power 

generation over the Nimitz-class 

plant. The plant design also 

facilitates manning reductions 

and preservation of service life 

weight and stability allowances.

7 8

The Navy matured the system in 

2004 and it is now installed aboard 

CVN 78. Currently, the Navy and 

shipbuilder are conducting 

flushing/hydrostatic testing, control 

system testing, and electric plant 

testing. Plans call for this system to 

demonstrate initial capability in 

December 2014. 

Reverse Osmosis 

Desalinization System

This system desalinates water 

without a steam distribution 

system, facilitating reduced 

manning and improved weight 

and stability allowances.

7 8

System maturity was achieved in 

2003 following over 1,800 hours of 

prototype testing. Following later 

shock, vibration, and maintainability 

tests, first unit qualifications were 

completed in 2010. 

High Strength Toughness 

Steel (HSLA 115)

HSLA 115 is stronger and lighter 

than legacy ship steel types and 

comprises the CVN 78 flight 

deck. HSLA 115 improves weight 

and stability allowances.

7 8

HSLA 115 completed prototype and 

first article qualification testing in 

fiscal years 2007 and 2008, 

respectively. The Navy has 

assessed the system as mature 

since 2007. Since then, the 

shipbuilder has successfully 

constructed CVN 78 flight deck 

sections using HSLA 115.
Page 16 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Technology Capability improvement 2008 TRL 2013 TRL Development status

High Strength Low Alloy 

Steel (HSLA 65)

HSLA 65 is stronger and lighter 

than legacy ship steel types, and 

is used in bulkhead and deck 

constructions. HSLA 65 

improves weight and stability 

allowances. 8 9

HSLA 65 was rated TRL 8 in 2004 

and is currently employed aboard a 

Nimitz class carrier. CVN 78, 

however, represents the first 

widespread application of HSLA 65 

on a Navy ship. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy and contractor documentation.

Note: TRL refers to technology readiness level. The TRLs outlined in the table reflect DOD’s 

estimates of maturity. Additionally, the Navy has removed several systems from the ship that it had 

previously tracked as critical technologies. For example, the Navy deferred CVN 78’s planned 

dynamic armor protection system to future carriers as a cost-savings measure.

As indicated in the table, the Navy has largely retired the risks posed by 

the reverse osmosis desalinization, plasma arc waste destruction, and 

nuclear propulsion/electric plant systems. These technologies are 

currently at TRL 7 or higher and were mature even before the CVN 78 

contract award for detail design and construction. However, other critical 

technologies were immature at contract award and still must undergo 

extensive testing before reaching maturity. These technologies moved 

through development with lower-than-desired levels of knowledge and 

subsequently faced technical, design, and production challenges. For 

example, three systems integral to the ship’s ability to execute its mission 

assignments—the volume search radar, advanced arresting gear, and 

EMALS—were immature at CVN 78 detail design and construction 

contract award in 2008. These systems continue to experience 

disruptions in development and delays in the land-based testing that is 

needed to assess their levels of maturity. In contrast to the knowledgebased approach used by leading commercial ship buyers, the Navy, in an 

effort to meet required installation dates aboard CVN 78, elected to 

produce these systems prior to demonstrating their maturity. More 

information about the status of these three critical technologies follows:

• Volume search radar: Prior to the CVN 78 detail design contract 

award, the Navy had only built, tested, and integrated prototype 

components of the volume search radar in controlled laboratory 

environments. As we previously reported, these tests revealed 

deficiencies related to key components of the radar.11

 11GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Navy Faces Challenges Constructing the Aircraft Carrier 

Gerald R. Ford within Budget, 

Under the 

Navy’s 2008 program schedule, the volume search radar was to be 

developed and tested as part of the Zumwalt-class destroyer program 

GAO-07-866 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2007).
Page 17 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

and was expected to approach maturity following land-based testing 

in fiscal year 2009. The radar would then participate in combat system 

integration testing with the other major component of the dual band 

radar, the multifunction radar, and eventually demonstrate maturity as 

part of Zumwalt-class destroyer at-sea testing in fiscal year 2014. In 

2010, however, to reduce Zumwalt-class construction costs, the Navy 

removed the volume search radar from the destroyer program and 

suspended remaining land-based testing, leaving key Ford-class 

testing requirements unaddressed. The Navy subsequently 

transferred remaining development work to the Ford class program 

and planned to resume land-based testing in fiscal year 2012 using an 

actual production unit of the radar—but contracting delays pushed the 

start of this testing out to fiscal year 2013. As a result of this delay, 

and the Navy’s desire not to slow down the current radar installation 

schedule for CVN 78, remaining land-based testing will be completed 

in fiscal year 2014, 4.5 years later than originally planned, using a less 

capable developmental radar array than the actual production 

configuration that will be installed on CVN 78. The Navy has also 

scheduled shipboard testing beginning in fiscal year 2016 to complete 

additional volume search radar testing not executed on land. This 

testing schedule increases the risk that discovery of problems with the 

system will trigger costly design changes and rework aboard the ship.

• Advanced arresting gear: Prior to CVN 78’s detail design contract 

award, the advanced arresting gear completed early verification tests 

to prove out the system’s concept, along with some component 

testing. Under the Navy’s 2008 program schedule, this system was 

scheduled to execute the following land-based testing program: (1) 

extended reliability testing in fiscal year 2009 to demonstrate 

integration of high risk subcomponents and produce reliability growth 

data; (2) environmental qualification testing between fiscal years 2009 

and 2011, which would verify the system’s suitability; (3) jet car track 

site testing—where the system arrests jet-engine-propelled vehicles 

that travel down a railway with different physical loads and speeds—

between fiscal years 2010 and 2011 to validate the system’s full range 

of performance; and (4) runway arrested landing site testing between 

fiscal years 2011 and 2012, which would verify aircraft compatibility 

and performance with the system. Progress has proven slower than 

anticipated, however. Deficiencies affecting five major components, 

plus software, have contributed to several redesigns of the system 

since 2007. Most recently, the Navy and its contractor redesigned and 
Page 18 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

remanufactured the energy absorbing “water twister” components of 

the system, which turned out to be costly, time consuming processes 

that have delayed installation of these units aboard the ship.12

• EMALS: Unlike the other critical technologies discussed above, this 

system was approaching maturity prior to the CVN 78 detail design 

contract award because the Navy had built and tested competitive 

prototypes of the system as part of the contractor selection process 

for EMALS development in 2004. Under the Navy’s 2008 program 

schedule, land-based testing for the system was scheduled to occur 

between fiscal years 2008 and 2011. However, technical issues 

affecting the EMALS power interface and conversion systems, among 

other deficiencies, have slowed progress. The Navy’s 2012 

development schedule calls for land-based testing to continue into 

fiscal year 2014, which, upon completion, the Navy expects will 

mature the EMALS technology. In the meantime, however, significant 

numbers of EMALS components have already been produced, 

delivered to the shipbuilder, and installed on CVN 78—even though 

the functional requirements, performance, and suitability of the system 

remain unproven.

Consequently, the Navy has delayed the start of runway arrested 

landing site testing—required to mature the advanced arresting gear 

technology—until fiscal year 2014. Under this revised testing 

schedule, the Navy now expects to complete land-based 

developmental testing, 2.5 years later than initially planned, by fiscal 

year 2015—after it has installed the full system aboard CVN 78.

Although the Navy has encountered land-based testing delays totaling 2.5 

to 4.5 years each for the volume search radar, advanced arresting gear, 

and EMALS critical technologies, it has elected to not adjust the CVN 78 

construction schedule to compensate for these delays. As a result, the 

Navy and its shipbuilder are constructing CVN 78 with less knowledge 

about the ship’s critical technologies than it deemed appropriate at 

contract award in 2008. As the disparity between land-based testing and 

construction schedules persists—or worsens—the Navy faces significant 

risk of unbudgeted cost growth arising from technical discoveries late in 

construction. Figure 3 illustrates changes to the CVN 78 construction 

 12Water twisters are energy-absorbing water brakes that convert kinetic energy to heat 

through fluid turbulence. They operate automatically during aircraft arrestment and adjust 

automatically to accommodate aircraft of varying weights, engaging speeds, and offcenter arrestments within the specified performance limits of the system.
Page 19 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

schedule and to land-based testing programs for critical technologies that 

have been incurred since the 2008 detail design and construction contract 

award.

Figure 3: Delays to the CVN 78 Construction Schedule and Land-Based Test Programs for Critical Technologies Since 2008

Note: FY = fiscal year.

Since the CVN 78 contract was awarded in 2008, the Navy and 

shipbuilder have made progress stabilizing and completing the Ford-class 

design. The Ford class represents the first time that the shipbuilder has 

used a 3D, computer-aided design product model to generate the design 

of an entire aircraft carrier. The product model generates a detailed 

design, allowing engineers to visualize the arrangement of spaces and 

systems. The design is also fed into a simulated 3D environment that 

allows engineers, planners, and construction workers to validate the 

design and build strategy by conducting virtual “walkthroughs.” These 

tests validate elements of the design prior to construction, thereby 

avoiding potentially costly rework.

In our work on shipbuilding best practices, we found that achieving design 

stability before start of fabrication is a key step that leading shipbuilders 

Design Stability 

Contingent on 

Technologies Maturing As 

Planned
Page 20 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

and ship buyers follow to ensure their vessels deliver on-time, within 

planned costs, and with planned capabilities.13

The CVN 78 shipbuilder completed its 3D product model in November 

2009—over a year after the construction contract was awarded. At 

contract award, 76 percent of the model was complete and the 

shipbuilder had already begun construction of at least 25 percent of its 

structural units under the previous construction preparation contract. 

While the model is now considered functionally complete, maintaining 

design stability depends on the critical technologies discussed above 

fitting within the space, weight, cooling, and power reservations allotted 

them. To date, evolving information about the attributes of these 

technologies has produced a weight/stability configuration for CVN 78 

that leaves little margin to incorporate additional weight growth high up in 

the ship without making corresponding weight trade-offs elsewhere or 

compromising the future growth potential of the ship.

Leading commercial firms 

assess a ship design as stable once all basic and functional design 

activities have been completed. Basic and functional design refers to twodimensional drawings and 3D computer-aided models (when employed) 

that fix the ship’s hull structure; set the ship’s hydrodynamics; route all 

major distributive systems including electricity, water, and other utilities; 

and identify the exact positioning of piping and other outfitting within each 

block of the ship. At the point of design stability, the shipbuilder has a 

clear understanding of the ship structure as well as electrical, piping, and 

other systems that traverse individual blocks of the ship. To achieve 

design stability, shipbuilders need suppliers (also called vendors) to 

provide complete, accurate system information prior to beginning basic 

design. This vendor-furnished information describes the exact dimensions 

of a system or piece of equipment going into a ship, including space and 

weight requirements, and also requirements for power, water, and other 

utilities that will have to feed the system.

14

 13

Shipbuilder 

representatives have recently expressed concern about this possibility, 

particularly regarding additional design changes to critical technologies 

GAO-09-322.

14In designing and constructing a new ship, the Navy seeks to preserve “service life 

allowances”—room for weight growth after the vessel enters service—in order to provide 

room to take on new, heavier equipment over the ship’s life cycle. The Navy generally sets 

service life allowances for a new ship’s overall weight and for its vertical center of gravity 

(stability). For the Ford class carrier, these minimum margins are 5.0 percent of full load 

displacement in long tons and 1.5 feet, respectively.
Page 21 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

still in development—including the volume search radar, advanced 

arresting gear, and EMALS technologies. According to shipbuilder 

representatives, additional weight growth to the advanced arresting gear 

was of particular concern and could trigger a need for future structural 

and space modifications around the installed system. Further, until the 

advanced weapons elevators, joint precision approach and landing 

system, and evolved sea sparrow missile weapons link each demonstrate 

maturity, the likelihood of additional design changes to CVN 78 persists.

In addition, as construction progresses, the shipbuilder is discovering 

“first-of-class” type design changes, which it will use to update the model 

prior to the follow-on ship construction. To date, several of these design 

changes have related to EMALS configuration changes, which have 

required electrical, wiring, and other changes within the ship. Although the 

Navy reports that these EMALS-related changes are nearing completion, 

it anticipates additional design changes stemming from remaining 

advanced arresting gear development and testing. In total, over 1,200 

anticipated design changes remain to be completed (out of nearly 19,000 

planned changes). According to the Navy, many of these 19,000 changes 

were programmed into the construction schedule early on—a result of the 

government’s decision at contract award to introduce improvements 

during construction to the ship’s warfare systems, which are heavily 

dependent on evolving commercial technologies.

As of April 2013, the shipbuilder had erected 95 percent of the ship’s 

structural units and had achieved a key milestone of installing the ship’s 

island (command tower) onto the flight deck. Nevertheless, the ship was 

only 56 percent complete in April 2013, as compared to the builder’s 

planned 62 percent completion rate at that point in construction. As a 

result of these construction delays, the Navy and shipbuilder recently 

elected to delay CVN 78’s launch and delivery by 4 months each.

Ships are ideally designed and constructed using the most cost efficient 

sequence for construction, called the optimal sequence. Typically, an 

optimal construction sequence includes designing and building the ship 

from the bottom up, maximizing the work completed in shipyard shops, 

and minimizing tasks performed when the ship is already in the water, 

which tend to be costlier than tasks completed on land. As a general 

shipbuilding rule, the earlier a particular task can be performed in the 

production plan, the fewer labor hours it will consume. The sequence is 

outlined in the shipbuilder’s integrated master schedule, which links all of 

the detailed construction tasks based on key event dates.

Construction Progress 

Slowed by Inefficiencies 

that Could Delay Delivery 

of the Ship
Page 22 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

By comparison, progress constructing CVN 78 has been constrained by 

inefficient out-of-sequence work driven largely by material shortfalls, 

engineering challenges, and delays developing and installing certain 

critical technology systems (provided by the Navy to the shipbuilder for 

installation). These outcomes are consistent with those experienced by 

other Navy shipbuilding programs that began lead ship constructions prior 

to maturing critical technologies, stabilizing their designs, or both.15

• Material shortfalls: CVN 78 has experienced significant shortages of 

developmental valves throughout the ship due to delayed vendor 

deliveries. These valves are crucial for installing the ship’s chilled 

water system, which provides air conditioning and cooling for 

electronic systems, as well as other distributive piping systems. To 

mitigate the impact of valve delinquencies, the shipbuilder installed 

temporary metal spool pieces in place of missing valves in order to 

continue construction work for piping systems. Installing the valves 

later, out-of-sequence, required additional labor hours to complete. 

According to shipbuilding representatives, their vendor base for valves 

did not have sufficient experience developing and manufacturing new 

Navy ship system valves, and consequently encountered difficulties 

meeting Navy and shipbuilder specifications. To improve vendor 

performance, the shipbuilder provided on-site engineering and 

procurement assistance. The shipbuilder reports that suppliers have 

now delivered over 90 percent of the required valves and that most of 

the spool piece installations have been replaced with actual valves.

Key 

examples of construction issues with the CVN 78 include the following:

• Engineering challenges: The shipbuilder’s use of HSLA 65 thin steel 

plating for ship decks—intended to reduce weight in the ship’s 

design—excessively warped and flexed during construction, which 

contributed to lower than desired levels of pre-outfitting and additional 

disruption to build processes. In an effort to compensate for the 

warping and flexing, the shipbuilder erected scaffolding around ship 

blocks to secure the assemblies. This scaffolding facilitated some preoutfitting improvements, but produced corresponding cost increases 

and schedule delays. In addition, ship welders experienced 

 15GAO-09-322 and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapons 

Programs, GAO-10-388SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010). Program examples include 

the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer (DDG 1000), America-class 

amphibious assault ship (LHA 6), San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock (LPD 17), 

and Seawolf-class attack submarine (SSN 21). 
Page 23 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

substantial difficulty early on working this new plate steel because it 

was thinner than what had traditionally been used on aircraft carriers.

The Navy and shipbuilder have also experienced other engineering 

challenges, including late delivery of accurate construction drawings and 

instructions to shipworkers. In many instances, the shipbuilder produced 

construction drawings—derived from the ship’s 3D product model—that 

lacked sufficient detail necessary for efficiently installing critical 

components within the ship. This lack of comprehensive, detailed 

construction drawings contributed to inefficient work delays and restarts.

• Critical technology system delays: Advanced arresting gear 

delivery delays to date have caused the shipbuilder to modify the 

planned arresting gear engine room loading sequence. Instead of 

being built in one piece in the yard and hoisted into place as originally 

envisioned, arresting gear components will be installed in sequence, 

including through a hole cut in the flight deck. This strategy has 

caused additional work and interfered with the construction of other 

ship features in some areas, such as duct work and cabling. Further, 

late dual band radar equipment deliveries have required the 

shipbuilder to cut open previously closed areas of the ship to allow 

loading of equipment. Additional delays, as well as rework or retrofits 

on installed components, remain possible as these developmental 

systems continue to progress through testing.

The construction inefficiencies suffered by CVN 78 have only recently 

begun to materialize in the form of schedule delays. Recently revised 

Navy and shipbuilder plans now call for the ship to be launched in 

November 2013 at a 70 percent completion level—a total lower than what 

is found among leading commercial shipbuilding programs, which 

complete as much as 95 percent of the ship before launch.16

 16

Executing 

these plans requires completion of certain shipbuilding activities prior to 

the scheduled launch date. For example, the establishment of the chilled 

water system—necessary to support the ship’s energization of the 

electrical distribution system for launch—is several weeks behind 

schedule. As launch gets delayed, so, too, does the shipbuilder’s postlaunch test program for key systems. Since this testing program is 

synched closely with ship delivery, the 4-month delay to the planned July 

GAO-09-322.
Page 24 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

2013 launch date has produced a corresponding delay in delivering the 

ship to the Navy.

Since CVN 78 construction was authorized with the contract award in 

fiscal year 2008, the Navy has consistently increased its procurement 

budget for the ship to account for cost growth as construction has 

progressed. Budgeted costs have grown to $12.8 billion, compared to the 

Navy’s initial $10.5 billion procurement budget request. This total 

represents an increase of $2.3 billion, or 22.3 percent, and includes 

almost $1.4 billion in future years’ funding (fiscal years 2014 and 2015) to 

cover the anticipated cost growth. It also exceeds the $10.5 billion 

legislative cost cap on the program, which the Navy is currently seeking 

to amend as part of its fiscal year 2014 budget submission.17

Figure 4 outlines the evolution of CVN 78 procurement costs.

 17In 2010, the Secretary of the Navy, using authority granted him by subsection (b) of 

section 122 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 

increased the cost cap for CVN 78 to $11.755 billion. Pub. L. No. 109-364. The Navy’s 

fiscal year 2014 budget proposal seeks to amend the statutory cost cap imposed by 

subsection (a)(1) of that section to the program manager’s current estimate at completion 

of $12.887 billion.

Lead Ship Costs Will Likely 

Exceed Current Budget 

Estimates
Page 25 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Figure 4: CVN 78 Procurement Cost History

As figure 5 highlights, CVN 78 cost growth to date is primarily attributable 

to cost increases with acquiring critical technology systems provided to 

the shipbuilder by the Navy, although the shipbuilder detail design and 

construction inefficiencies discussed above also account for considerable 

growth.
Page 26 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Figure 5: CVN 78 Procurement Cost Growth Drivers as of June 2012

Note: The Navy has identified $141 million in miscellaneous cost reductions for the ship that partially 

offset the cost growth identified in the figure.

We further analyzed the reasons for the 38 percent procurement cost 

growth in the critical technology systems aboard the ship. Table 2 shows 

that the cost growth is largely attributable to the dual band radar (volume 

search and multifunction radars), advanced arresting gear, and EMALS 

acquisitions.
Page 27 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Table 2: CVN 78 Procurement Cost Growth Since Fiscal Year 2008 for Selected Critical Technology Systems

Dollars in millions

System

Fiscal year 

2008 budget

Fiscal year

2014 budget

Difference

in cost

Cost growth as

a percent of

fiscal year 

2008 budget

EMALS $317.7 $742.6 $424.9 133.7%

Dual band radar 201.9 484.0 282.1 139.7

Advanced arresting gear 75.0 168.6 93.6 124.8

Total $594.6 $1395.2 $800.6 134.6%

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation.

The Navy has taken steps to limit cost growth for EMALS and the 

advanced arresting gear, which are being developed and produced under 

contracts separate from the CVN 78 detail design and construction 

contract. Most notably, in 2010, the Navy negotiated firm fixed-price 

contracts for production of these systems for CVN 78.18

Aside from the risk of cost growth stemming from the integration of critical 

technology systems into the ship, the shipbuilder’s cost and schedule 

performance under the detail design and construction contract suggests 

additional overruns are looming. Our review of the contractor’s earned 

value management data for the program indicates that shipbuilder cost 

pressures remain high and additional costs are likely, especially as key 

According to the 

Navy, these contracts have helped cap cost growth for these systems and 

have incentivized more timely deliveries to the shipyard. While EMALS is 

farther along in development than both the dual band radar and advanced 

arresting gear systems, all have experienced significant cost growth, and 

costs are likely to increase, given the remaining work needed to fully 

develop, test, and integrate the systems on CVN 78. This potential for 

additional cost growth is also apparent based on the Navy’s experience 

with the most recent Nimitz-class carrier, CVN 77. That ship experienced 

cost growth during its system integration, even though that effort 

employed mostly nondevelopmental systems.

 18Firm fixed-price contracts provide a firm price to the government. This contract type 

places the risk on the contractor, which generally bears the responsibility of increased 

costs of performance.
Page 28 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

developmental items are integrated onto the ship.19 We reviewed 18 

months of earned value management data for the CVN 78 ship program 

during the period of July 2011 through December 2012. During this time, 

the shipbuilder increased its estimate of the number of labor hours 

required to construct CVN 78 from 44.4 million to 47.3 million. 

Consequently, the shipbuilder’s budgeted cost grew substantially, from 

$4,758 million to $5,266 million (an increase of $508 million).20

Further, the Navy’s current budget estimate of $12.8 billion for completing 

CVN 78 is optimistic because it assumes the shipbuilder will maintain its 

current level of performance throughout the remainder of construction. 

This assumption is inconsistent with historical Navy shipbuilding 

experiences for recent lead ships, which have suffered from performance 

degradation late in construction. Our previous work has shown that the 

full extent of cost growth does not usually manifest itself until after the 

ship is more than 60 percent complete, when key systems are being 

installed and integrated.

Our 

analysis shows that, as of December 2012, the contractor was forecasting 

an overrun at contract completion of over $913 million. This cost growth is 

attributable to the shipbuilder not accomplishing work as planned. The 

Navy has largely, but not fully, funded this cost growth within CVN 78’s 

$12.8 billion procurement budget.

21

Additional CVN 78 cost growth could also place the Navy’s long-term 

shipbuilding plan at risk. Previously, we have reported on this plan, which 

the Navy revises annually, and its significant weaknesses.

In April 2013, the ship was 56 percent 

complete. The Director of DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation office and the Congressional Budget Office—as well as Navy 

cost analysts and a Navy-commissioned expert panel—have also 

projected higher than budgeted procurement costs for CVN 78, with cost 

estimates ranging from $13.0 to $14.2 billion.

22

 19The earned value data we reviewed are limited to the main CVN 78 detail design and 

construction contract and do not fully account for the integration of critical technology 

systems onto the ship platform.

A key tenet 

20Budget at completion is the sum of all estimated budgets, representing the cumulative 

value of the budgeted cost of the work scheduled over the life of the project.

21GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy 

Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-07-943T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2007).

22GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy’s Long-Range 

Shipbuilding Plan, GAO-06-587T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006).
Page 29 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

underpinning this plan is that the Navy will be able to maintain cost 

control over its major shipbuilding acquisition programs. Yet, the budgets 

for many ships, including CVN 78, have already proven inadequate to 

cover the costs required to complete their constructions. To compensate, 

the Navy must shift funds away from other priorities—including future ship 

constructions—or request additional funds from Congress to pay for this 

cost growth. Analysis of the Navy’s fiscal year 2014 long-term 

shipbuilding plan shows that Ford-class procurement costs alone are 

estimated to comprise approximately 14 percent of the Navy’s total new 

ship construction budgets between fiscal years 2014 and 2018. Even a 

small percentage of cost growth on these ships could lead to the need for 

hundreds of millions of dollars in additional funding. Already, the Navy is 

programming $1.3 billion between fiscal years 2014 and 2015 to cover 

CVN 78 cost growth. To the extent that this cost growth continues for 

CVN 78 or follow-on ships, it may result in fewer ships acquired than 

planned in the near term.

Several factors are likely to hamper the Navy’s plans to demonstrate CVN 

78 capabilities after it accepts delivery of the ship. In particular, significant 

risk is introduced due to the Navy’s plan to conduct integration testing of 

critical technologies concurrently with the ship’s IOT&E. This strategy will 

constrain opportunities to implement timely, corrective actions if problems 

are discovered with key ship systems. If significant discoveries are made 

during IOT&E, initial deployment could be delayed. In addition, Joint 

Strike Fighter integration with CVN 78 remains in its infancy, with work to 

date limited to paper-based assessments and a single test with EMALS. 

Further, key ship systems face reliability shortfalls that the Navy does not 

expect to resolve until many years after CVN 78 commissioning, which 

will limit the ship’s mission effectiveness during initial deployments and 

likely increase costs to the government.

Demonstration of 

Ship Capabilities after 

Delivery Is Limited by 

Test Plan Deficiencies 

and Reliability 

Shortfalls
Page 30 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Following ship delivery in February 2016 and a brief maintenance period, 

the Navy plans to embark on two separate developmental and operational 

test phases for CVN 78 intended to demonstrate successful integration of 

key ship systems and overall effectiveness and suitability of the ship 

itself.23 At present, the Navy anticipates requiring 10 months to complete 

the first phase—integration testing—and 32 months to complete the 

second phase—IOT&E. Further, in an effort to meet the lead ship’s 

anticipated deployment schedule, the Navy plans to execute much of its 

integration testing concurrent with IOT&E. This concurrent strategy will 

constrain opportunities for the Navy to implement corrective actions to 

problems discovered in integration testing and risks introducing significant 

discovery during IOT&E—outcomes that could delay demonstration of 

ship capabilities. DOD and Navy operational test officials stated that they 

share these concerns. According to the Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation’s Test and Evaluation Master Plan Guidebook, premature 

commencement of IOT&E can waste scarce resources if testing is 

suspended or terminated early because of technical problems that should 

have been resolved prior to the start of this testing phase. This guidance 

further states that a system should demonstrate acceptable hardware and 

software performance during mission-focused developmental testing 

conducted in operationally realistic environments with the hardware and 

software to be used in IOT&E.

24

Figure 6 illustrates how the Navy has sequenced its test plans for CVN 

78, as outlined in the Navy’s current post-delivery test schedule, and 

where they fall with regard to ship delivery, initial and full capability, and 

the planned initial deployment of the ship.

 23The Navy’s planned maintenance period for CVN 78 will be used to (1) install systems 

and equipment deferred during construction phase or not included in the construction 

contract, (2) install upgrades or improvements to existing systems, (3) correct new or 

previously identified construction deficiencies, and (4) perform maintenance.

24Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, DOT&E TEMP Guidebook (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 27, 2012).

Post-Delivery Test Plans 

Are Unlikely to Provide 

Timely Discovery of 

Deficiencies
Page 31 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Figure 6: CVN 78 Post-Delivery Testing Schedule and Key Milestones

Note: FY = fiscal year.

In 2012, the Navy added the integration testing component to the CVN 78 

post-delivery schedule in recognition of concerns raised by the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation 

and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, that under previous 

testing plans, developmental systems would not be tested with one 

another until IOT&E. Previously, the CVN 78 program office planned to 

rely on developmental testing of individual systems as a means to 

establish confidence in the interoperability of capabilities ahead of 

IOT&E—a strategy assessed as high risk by DOD and Navy operational 

testers. Earlier testing of developmental systems with one another—

above and beyond testing individual systems separately—is beneficial 

and can provide earlier demonstration of interoperability and combined 

capabilities, including measured performance against ship requirements 

ahead of IOT&E. Under the integrated testing approach, for example, the 

dual band radar will be required to conduct near-simultaneous air traffic 

control and self-defense operations, using both the multifunction radar 

and the volume search radar. On CVN 78, these operations will occur in 

an environment where multiple antennas and arrays are emitting and 

receiving transmissions, and multiple loads are placed upon the ship’s 

power and cooling systems. Incompatibility between the dual band radar 
Page 32 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

and other elements of the ship’s combat system could endanger mission 

execution. To date, however, the Navy has not defined the scope or 

activities that will be covered by the new integration testing phase, which 

is planned to begin in February 2017, or the resources required to 

execute this testing. CVN 78 program officials told us they are defining 

these items as part of the updated Ford-class test and evaluation master 

plan, which is scheduled to be approved shortly before CVN 79 detail 

design and construction contract award in September 2013. Until 

integration testing scope and activities are clarified, and resource 

requirements are defined, the sufficiency of this testing and availability of 

necessary schedule and funding remains unknown.

Further, the aforementioned developmental testing delays facing critical 

technology systems also threaten the Navy’s integration testing plans for 

CVN 78. In the draft revision to the Ford class test and evaluation master 

plan, program officials stated a willingness to defer developmental test 

events for critical technologies to the integration testing phase, should 

remaining land-based testing activities not progress at planned rates. 

Already, the program has deferred certain tests of the volume search 

radar from land to sea. To the extent that the Navy defers additional 

critical technology tests planned over the next 4 years, CVN 78’s current 

integration testing schedule will face increased disruption, and the revised 

test and evaluation master plan may prove unexecutable.

In addition, live-fire test and evaluation plans for CVN 78 remain unclear. 

In 2004, the Navy and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 

reached agreement that two major components of live-fire test and 

evaluation—full-ship shock trial and total ship survivability trial—would 

occur as part of CVN 78 post-delivery tests and trials. However, in 2012, 

the Navy modified its live-fire testing plans for the Ford class, citing 

resource constraints facing the lead ship, and deferred this testing to the 

first follow-on ship, CVN 79. The Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation disagreed with this proposed strategy, expressing concern that 

delaying the testing to CVN 79 would cause a 5- to 7-year delay in 

obtaining data critical to evaluating Ford class survivability and would 

preclude timely modification of subsequent ships. On this basis, the 

Director rescinded approval of the Navy’s alternative life-fire test and 

evaluation plan and recommended that the Navy plan and budget for 

adequate live-fire testing on CVN 78. Although the Navy’s draft test and 

evaluation master plan appears to take steps toward addressing the 

Director’s concerns—stating plans to conduct a total ship survivability trial 

following CVN 78 delivery—shock trial plans remain linked to CVN 79. 

According to CVN 78 program officials, the Navy continues to work with 
Page 33 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation to provide a robust 

modeling, simulation, and analysis process to better understand the 

survivability characteristics of the Ford class. However, these program 

officials also state that they expect the Defense Acquisition Board to 

ultimately decide the Ford class’s live-fire test and evaluation strategy as 

part of its planned program review later this year ahead of the detail 

design and construction contract award for CVN 79.25

The Ford-class is designed to accommodate the new Joint Strike Fighter 

carrier variant aircraft (F-35C), but aircraft development and testing 

delays have affected integration activities on CVN 78. These integration 

activities include testing the F-35C with CVN 78’s EMALS and advanced 

arresting gear system and testing the ship’s storage capabilities for the F35C’s lithium-ion batteries (which provide start-up and back-up power), 

tires, and wheels.

While the Navy has engaged in paper-based assessments to define F35C integration requirements—and plans to incorporate necessary design 

changes ahead of scheduled CVN 78 deployment—actual integration 

testing of F-35C and CVN 78 system hardware and software remains in 

its infancy. To date, F-35C aircraft have participated in only one test with 

EMALS, and have not completed any tests with the advanced arresting 

gear system. Joint Strike Fighter program officials state that prior to 

deploying aboard CVN 78, F-35C aircraft will need to complete multiple 

qualification tests, on the order of 60 advanced arresting gear 

arrestments and 80-100 EMALS launches at the Navy’s land-based 

testing site in Lakehurst, New Jersey.

Previously, F-35C initial capability was scheduled to occur prior to the 

shipbuilder’s delivery of CVN 78 to the Navy in 2016. However, as a 

result of F-35C developmental delays, the Navy will not field the aircraft 

until at least 2017—one year after CVN 78 delivery. As a result, the Navy 

has deferred critical F-35C integration activities, which introduces risk of 

system incompatibilities and costly retrofits to the ship after it is delivered 

to the Navy.

 25The Defense Acquisition Board is DOD’s senior-level forum for advising the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on critical decisions 

concerning major defense acquisition programs, such as the Ford-class carrier.

Delayed Availability of 

Joint Strike Fighter 

Aircraft Has Hampered 

Integration Efforts
Page 34 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

As Table 3 illustrates, the CVN 78 design baseline includes several F35C-required accommodations to facilitate integration, and the Navy is 

evaluating modifications to other aspects of the ship design so as to 

better accommodate F-35C aircraft.

Table 3: F-35C Integration Requirements with CVN 78

Requirements incorporated in existing CVN 78 design

Requirements for which design solutions remain under 

development

Aircraft electrical servicing station upgrade Jet blast deflector modifications

Ordnance work center Third deck level noise abatement

Autonomic Logistics Information System Lithium-ion battery handling and stowage facility

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System Pilot equipment and helmet stowage

Heavy underway replenishment system (supports F-35C power 

module)

Seat shop modifications

Modifications to various rooms including ready rooms (areas 

where aircraft pilots mission plan) and a secure tactical briefing 

room

Carrier intelligence center mission planning facility

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation.

Reliability is a key driver of system performance, directly affecting the 

amount of time that individual systems are online and mission capable. 

Reliability also drives life cycle costs related to manning, repairs, and 

sparing. When systems demonstrate low reliability, they can risk costing 

more than planned and not delivering the intended capability to the 

warfighter. DOD acquisition policy requires program managers to 

analyze, plan, track, and report on reliability for their systems—including 

taking steps to improve it, as needed—at intervals throughout the 

acquisition process.26

The Navy’s business case for Ford class carriers hinges on improved 

capabilities—particularly the ship’s increased sortie generation rates—

and reduced manning requirements, as compared to legacy Nimitz-class 

carriers. Together, these requirements are intended to position the Navy 

to field more capability in the fleet at a lower operating cost. At present, 

 26Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Reliability 

Analysis, Planning, Tracking, and Reporting, Directive Type Memorandum 11-003 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2011).

Reliability Shortfalls 

Facing Key Systems Will 

Constrain Ship Capabilities 

during Initial Deployments

Reliability Shortfalls Prevalent 

in Key Ford Class Systems
Page 35 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

however, the Navy projects that the dual band radar, advanced arresting 

gear, EMALS, and advanced weapons elevators will all fall well short of 

their required reliability rates ahead of CVN 78 IOT&E. High reliability is a 

key attribute that underpins the contributions that these systems are 

intended to make toward Ford-class sortie generation rates and manning 

levels.

For the advanced arresting gear and EMALS, the Navy has outlined 

reliability growth curves, which illustrate the anticipated positive 

improvement in system reliability in future years due to implementation of 

corrective actions to system design, operation or maintenance 

procedures, or manufacturing processes. However, developmental testing 

to date has demonstrated that reliability for both of these systems was 

much lower than the Navy initially estimated. This shortfall has 

undermined the effectiveness of the Navy’s initial reliability improvement 

plans. In response to these realities, the Navy crafted new curves for 

each system, which assumed lower reliability at the start. However, these 

more realistic starting points were offset by more optimistic assumptions 

about the pace of reliability gains in coming years. Therefore, the revised 

reliability growth curves project (1) sharp increases in system reliability in 

coming years and (2) achievement of required reliability levels within 

roughly the same amount of time as under initial plans—scenarios that 

may not be underpinned by sound methodologies. According to Navy 

officials, reliability growth projections for the advanced arresting gear and 

EMALS technologies are generated using a DOD growth planning 

methodology—called the Duane methodology—coupled with historical 

aircraft data from relevant points in development. However, DOD’s 

handbook on reliability growth management notes certain drawbacks to 

the Duane methodology, including with how growth curves are calculated 

within that model.27

 27DOD, Handbook: Reliability Growth Management, MIL-HDBK-189C (Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, Md.: Jun. 14, 2011).

Specifically, Duane’s assumptions about the rate of 

reliability growth, which date back to 1981, have since been shown to be 

unrealistic. Further, Duane’s methodology for estimating regression 

makes no allowance for variation. Subsequently, the handbook outlines 

several alternative models to Duane to use when projecting reliability 

growth for a system.

Navy’s Reliability Growth Plans 

Optimistic and Insufficient to 

Meet Operational Testing 

Criteria
Page 36 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

The validity of the Navy’s updated growth curves is further undermined by 

recent reliability data on the advanced arresting gear and EMALS, which 

show continued underperformance against growth estimates. Although 

these technologies are assessed as approaching maturity (TRL 6), as 

discussed above, TRL criteria do not account for reliability performance. 

The Navy measures advanced arresting gear and EMALS reliability in 

terms of the average number of arrestments and launches, respectively, 

that the systems can complete prior to failing. The total number of 

arrestments and launches that these two systems complete over time are 

referred to as cycles. Figures 7 and 8 highlight the Navy’s reliability 

growth projections, and current reliability performance, for the advanced 

arresting gear and EMALS technologies. As the figures show, neither of 

these systems is scheduled to reach its required rate of reliability until 

many years after CVN 78 is scheduled to complete IOT&E.
Page 37 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Figure 7: Advanced Arresting Gear Reliability Performance and Growth Projections
Page 38 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Figure 8: Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System Reliability Performance and Growth Projections

Note: Reliability growth projections and the minimum reliability requirement for the electromagnetic 

aircraft launch system are both based on a single launcher configuration as currently employed at the 

Navy’s land-based test site.

While the Navy also anticipates reliability growth testing for the dual band

radar and advanced weapons elevators, program officials have not yet 

completed plans for demonstrating this growth. Further, Navy officials 

stated that reliability requirements for these two systems continue to 

evolve, noting, in particular, that reliability metrics for the dual band radar 

were recently invalidated based on evolving analysis from their subject 

matter experts. As a result, the planned reliability of each system at key 

points, including CVN 78 IOT&E, is unknown. For the dual band radar, 

however, Navy program officials state that they are collecting reliability 

data during first unit production and factory testing—a phase that typically 

produces high failure rates over limited run times. Additional data 

collection opportunities for dual band radar include land-based testing, 
Page 39 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

shipyard testing, and post-delivery testing and trials for CVN 78. 

According to Navy officials, data collected during shipboard testing will 

support a reliability assessment of the dual band radar.

In addition, the ship itself has operational availability requirements that 

are linked to the reliability performance of its individual systems, such as 

EMALS and the advanced arresting gear. The projected reliability 

shortfalls for these key systems—even under the Navy’s optimistic 

assumptions—could delay CVN 78’s planned entry into IOT&E in 2017. 

The Navy’s draft test and evaluation master plan for the program 

identifies various entrance criteria that it must meet before initiating 

IOT&E. In particular, these criteria include a requirement that testing and 

analysis demonstrate that the ship’s reliability will meet or exceed 

program requirements. The criteria further stipulate that adequate 

reliability data be available (or planned) to enable evaluation of current 

versus predicted reliability growth progress. During land-based and 

shipboard developmental testing, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation will conduct

assessments that consider testing progress to date as well as the risks 

associated with the ship’s capability to meet operational suitability and 

effectiveness goals (including reliability). These assessments will be 

based, in part, on the IOT&E entrance criteria outlined in the program’s 

test and evaluation master plan. Ultimately, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will make the 

determination as to CVN 78’s readiness for IOT&E.

Because of the development and testing delays and reliability deficiencies 

affecting key systems, CVN 78 will likely face operational limitations that 

extend past commissioning and into initial deployments. Thus, the ship 

will likely deploy without meeting its key sortie generation rate and 

reduced manning requirements. In the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2010, Congress gave the Navy a temporary waiver that 

lowered the statutory requirement for the minimum number of operational 

aircraft carriers from 11 to 10 during the period between the then-planned 

inactivation of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) and commissioning into 

Ship Likely to Deploy without 

Required Capabilities
Page 40 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

active service of CVN 78, currently planned for March 2016.28 The 

temporary waiver granted to the Navy on its number of operational aircraft 

carriers ends on the date that CVN 78 is commissioned into the fleet.

However, because of the magnitude of its operational deficiencies, it is 

unlikely that CVN 78 will adequately fill the capability gap created by the 

inactivation of CVN 65 for some time. For example, between February 

and June 2011, CVN 65 aircraft completed flight operations in support of 

Operation Enduring Freedom that totaled 2,970 combat missions and a 

99.1 percent sortie completion rate.29

Until the ship completes IOT&E, the full scope of CVN 78’s operational 

limitations remains unclear. In the interim, the Navy is evaluating adding 

extra spares and maintenance personnel to the ship for initial 

deployments—at a presently unknown, additional cost to the 

government—to help offset some of these reliability shortfalls. The Navy 

also plans to conduct reliability testing for these systems as their 

development progresses to support updated reliability analyses and 

assessments.

Further, of the 112 days that the 

ship was on station for these operations, only 18 days were consumed 

performing maintenance.

In January 2013, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council issued a 

memorandum encouraging program managers and other acquisition 

executives—in coordination with requirements sponsors—to request 

requirements relief when major performance requirements for a system 

appear out of line with an appropriate cost-benefit analysis. According to 

the memo, requirements that do not provide the best return on investment 

for warfighters should be considered for reevaluation. The memorandum 

further highlighted the pressures that DOD faces from increased fiscal 

constraints, noting the importance of providing cost effective capability to 

warfighters, consideration of risk-informed trades throughout the life cycle 

 28Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1023(a). The number of the Navy’s operational carriers has 

changed over time. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 amended 

the U.S. Code to require that the Navy have no fewer than 12 operational aircraft carriers. 

Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 126(a), amending section 5062 of title 10 of the U.S. Code. The 

following year, in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2007, Congress reduced the number of required operational aircraft carriers to 11. Pub. L. 

No. 109-364, § 1011(a).

29Operation Enduring Freedom is the ongoing United States-led operation that conducts 

counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Page 41 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

of programs, and, when needed, revisitation of previously validated 

requirements at the joint and component levels.

DOD last validated CVN 78 requirements in 2007—well before important 

knowledge was gained about the capabilities of key ship technologies. 

These requirements include a 25 percent increase in sortie generation 

rate above Nimitz class capabilities—performance contingent on the 

advanced arresting gear and EMALS maturing as planned. In addition, 

the dual band radar, advanced arresting gear, and EMALS together are 

projected to reduce manning requirements by over 100 people, as 

compared to the Nimitz class. While the Navy continues to assess 

reliability growth for these technologies, it has not yet considered the 

costs and benefits of maintaining current requirements versus modifying 

them. Such analysis could affect the Navy’s investment priorities in the 

program over the long term. For example, trade-off assessments could 

inform decisions about the soundness and effect of less strenuous sortie 

generation rate requirements on the warfighter’s mission versus the costs 

associated with the approximately 15-year effort needed to reach current 

minimum requirements.

The Navy and shipbuilder are implementing changes to the build strategy 

for CVN 79 aimed at reducing that ship’s costs before the construction 

contract is awarded, currently planned for September 2013. These 

changes include increased time allotted to construct the ship and in-yard 

construction process improvements. Remaining technical and design 

risks with CVN 78, however, could interfere with the Navy’s ability to 

achieve its desired cost savings for CVN 79. These uncertainties also 

affect the Navy and contractor’s ability to assess the likely CVN 79 costs 

ahead of contract award and, when coupled with the existing sole source 

environment for aircraft carrier construction, compromise the 

government’s negotiating position for CVN 79.

The Navy and its shipbuilder have learned valuable lessons from CVN 78 

construction that have the potential to improve cost outcomes for the 

construction of the first follow-on ship, CVN 79. The shipbuilder plans to 

employ a new build strategy for CVN 79 that (1) allots more time to fund 

and construct the ship compared to CVN 78 and (2) implements process 

improvements aimed at completing more work earlier in the build 

process—steps that the Navy anticipates will achieve construction 

efficiency improvements as compared to CVN 78. However, remaining 

Lead Ship Unknowns 

Complicate the Navy’s 

Ability to Determine 

Follow-on Ship Cost 

Outcomes

Planned Improvements to 

Follow-on Ship 

Construction Are 

Complicated by Lead Ship 

Uncertainties
Page 42 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

technical and design risks in the program could undermine the Navy’s 

ability to realize cost savings on CVN 79.

In its fiscal year 2012 budget, the Navy programmed CVN 79 construction 

funding over a 4-year period beginning in fiscal year 2013. However, as 

part of its fiscal year 2013 budget, the Navy revisited this strategy and 

requested congressional authority to extend Ford-class construction 

funding, including for CVN 79, across 6 years for each ship. Congress 

approved this strategy change as part of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.30

Table 4: Comparison of CVN 79 Procurement Funding Strategies Outlined in the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012, 2013, and 2014 

Budget Submissions

As table 4 illustrates, this 

strategy allows the Navy to request less funding in the near term for CVN 

79 construction, but also reflects a $1.1 billion increase in cost as 

compared to the fiscal year 2012 budget estimate for the ship. According 

to CVN 78 program officials, roughly half of this increase is a direct result 

of the increased build duration, whereas the remaining half is attributable 

to (1) design, construction, and critical technology system pricing changes

and (2) shipyard and supplier base effects, including growth in overhead 

and inflation estimates.

Then-year dollars in millions

Budget 

Submission 

Prior funding 

received

Fiscal Years

2012 2013 Total a 2014 b 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fiscal year 2012 $2,778.1 $554.8 $1,942.4 $1,920.3 $2,030.9 $1,026.5 - - $10,253.0

Fiscal year 2013 $2,773.1 $554.8 $608.2 $666.1 $2,999.1 $979.4 $1,823.8 $1,006.5 $11,411.0

Fiscal year 2014 $2,773.1 $554.8 $608.2 $944.9 $1,834.1 $1,235.6 $1,496.0 $1,891.8 $11,338.4

Source: GAO analysis of Navy budget documentation.

a

The Navy’s fiscal year 2012 budget provided the final installment of advance procurement funding for 

CVN 79.

b

 30Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 121. Based on the Navy’s existing funding profile for CVN 78, the 

provision, in practice, only applies to CVN 79 and CVN 80. The new 6-year funding 

strategy is the latest in a series of funding plans in the Ford class program. Previously,

Congress authorized the Navy to fund Ford-class carrier constructions over periods of 4 

years each. Pub. L. No. 109–364, § 121. Congress later amended this authorization to 

permit funding periods totaling 5 years for each carrier. Pub. L. 112–81, § 124.

The Navy’s fiscal year 2013 budget provided the first increment of procurement funding for CVN 79.

Changes to Funding Profile and 

Construction Schedule
Page 43 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

The Navy’s decision to fund CVN 79 construction over 6 years was 

coupled with a decision to increase the build time for the ship as 

compared to CVN 78.31

Figure 9: Schedule of CVN 78 and CVN 79 Construction Milestones

According to the Navy, it will use the additional 

time to improve CVN 79’s construction sequence and implement cost 

reduction initiatives. Further, Ford class shipbuilders report that the 

increased time afforded to CVN 79 construction provides additional 

opportunities to apply lessons learned from lead ship construction. The 

Navy expects the combined savings from these actions to more than 

offset the increased costs associated with extending the funding of the 

ship by 2 years. Figure 9 compares CVN 78 and CVN 79 construction 

schedules.

 31The Navy has not yet established a construction schedule for CVN 80.
Page 44 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

As part of CVN 79 construction, the shipbuilder plans to implement 

process improvements aimed at reducing the labor hours—and cost—

required to construct the ship, as compared to CVN 78. The sidebar 

outlines several examples of key improvements planned.

The core of the shipbuilder’s strategy for CVN 79 is moving more planned 

work—including complex ship assemblies—earlier in the build process so 

that it can be completed in shipyard workshops. Generally, the earlier 

work can be sequenced in the build process, the more efficiently it can be 

completed. As we have previously reported, shipbuilders often describe a 

general “1-3-8” rule where work that takes 1 hour to complete in a 

workshop takes 3 hours to complete once the steel panels have been 

welded into blocks, and 8 hours to complete after a block has been 

erected and/or after the ship has been launched.32

Although the Navy and shipbuilder expect CVN 79’s design to be virtually 

the same as that of the lead ship—another step toward improving followon ship outcomes—remaining developmental and design risks in the 

program could undermine the actual realization of cost savings. As 

discussed above, these risks are exemplified by key ship systems not 

progressing through their land-based test programs at the pace the Navy 

anticipated—delays largely attributable to persisting technical 

deficiencies. Navy and shipbuilder efforts to resolve these deficiencies on 

CVN 78—concurrent with follow-on ship construction—are likely to lead to 

redesign and potentially costly out of sequence work or rework for CVN 

79. If these discoveries and fixes disrupt CVN 79 construction and offset 

 32 GAO-09-322.

Process Improvements

Potential Disruptions from Late 

Testing Discoveries
Page 45 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

planned improvements, they could jeopardize the Navy’s ability to 

complete the ship within planned cost and schedule estimates.

The Navy’s cost estimate for CVN 79 detail design and construction is 

closely linked to CVN 78 outcomes and reflects an expectation that the 

shipbuilder will deliver the lead ship within current labor hour estimates. 

One key component of the CVN 79 cost estimate is a Navy assumption 

that 15 percent fewer labor hours will be required to construct the followon ship as compared to the lead ship. This estimate is also underpinned 

by expectations that the shipbuilder’s current level of performance will 

persist between now and lead ship delivery. Further, the Navy’s budget 

for CVN 79 is predicated on even higher performance gains than those 

forecast in the cost estimate—notably, 20 percent fewer labor hours in 

construction as compared to CVN 78. Yet, as we previously detailed, the 

Navy’s understanding of the costs required to construct and deliver CVN 

78 remains incomplete. These knowledge gaps add risk and uncertainty 

to CVN 79 cost and budget estimates.

The Navy plans to award a fixed-price incentive type contract for CVN 79 

detail design and construction, as compared to CVN 78’s cost-plus 

incentive contract.33

Because the Ford-class shipbuilder represents the only domestic entity 

capable of constructing, testing, and delivering nuclear-powered aircraft 

carriers, the government’s contract negotiating position is compromised. 

Contracting in this sole source environment, the government lacks the 

leverage it would have in a competitive environment to negotiate lower 

A fixed-price incentive contract provides for adjusting 

profit and establishment of a final contract price by application of a 

formula (sometimes referred to as a shareline) based on the relationship 

of total final negotiated cost to total target cost. A fixed-price incentive 

contract includes a ceiling (maximum) price that constrains the 

government’s exposure to potential cost growth. For CVN 79, the Navy’s 

request for proposal stipulated a 120 percent (of target cost) ceiling price 

and a 50/50 cost shareline between the government and the contractor 

(shipbuilder) for cost increases above target cost, although final contract 

terms are subject to change pending completion of negotiations between 

the government and shipbuilder.

 33A cost-plus incentive contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for an 

initially negotiated fee to be adjusted by a formula based on the relationship of total 

allowable costs to total target costs.

Lead Ship Uncertainties 

Limit Visibility on Followon Ship Costs in Sole 

Source Environment
Page 46 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

costs or capability enhancements. Similarly, the shipbuilder’s proposed 

price will not be influenced by competition and, as such, is likely to 

account for the remaining technical and design risks facing the Ford class 

program. For example, in a previous solicitation for Littoral Combat Ship 

constructions, potential shipbuilders submitted proposals which were 

priced significantly higher than the Navy’s expectations. Even in light of 

the competition in this case, contractor officials stated that the fixed-price 

terms the Navy sought prompted a forthright assessment of remaining 

program risks—including technical, design, and funding uncertainties—

and subsequent pricing of that risk in their proposals.34 Alternatively, Navy 

officials report that the CVN 79 shipbuilder could propose to remove highrisk items from the contract’s shareline or move to renegotiate the 

planned cost-sharing terms altogether. For example, in Zumwalt-class 

destroyer contract negotiations, the Navy and its shipbuilder reached 

agreement to remove work from the scope of the lead ship’s construction 

contract and to include a special incentive fee associated with 

construction and delivery of the ship’s innovative, composite-material 

deckhouse, which had never before been manufactured.35

The Navy awarded a multibillion dollar contract for detail design and 

construction of CVN 78 in 2008, even in light of substantial technology 

development risks and an overly optimistic budget. Now, nearly 5 years 

later, the cost of the lead ship has increased by more than $2.3 billion and 

many risks still remain which are likely to lead to further cost increases 

before the ship is completed. Although the ship is now more than half 

constructed, and promises significant capability increases over existing 

carriers, it is still grappling with land-based testing delays and system 

reliability deficiencies for critical government-provided technologies, a 

high-risk operational testing strategy, potentially unachievable 

performance requirements, and cost estimating uncertainties. Further 

complicating matters, the Navy is attempting to manage these challenges 

within an operational environment that is pressuring it to deliver CVN 78 

to the fleet with haste.

 34GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral 

Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities, GAO-10-523 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 

31, 2010).

35The Zumwalt-class destroyer’s deckhouse is a structure that integrates the ship’s radar 

and communications systems.

Conclusions
Page 47 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Congress granted the Navy a temporary waiver from the requirement to 

have 11 operational aircraft carriers in the fleet. Under the terms of the 

waiver, the waiver period ends at the planned CVN 78 commissioning in 

March 2016. As it stands, the Navy will not be positioned to deliver a fully 

capable ship at that time. For example, recent Navy decisions to 

introduce shipboard integration testing after lead ship delivery will provide 

valuable insights and facilitate identification of any deficiencies of 

integrated ship systems. However, because of the overlapping timing of 

this testing with IOT&E—as well as with deferred developmental tests for 

ship systems—the Navy will not have time to incorporate potentially 

significant results of the testing before CVN 78 likely deploys. Further, 

reliability shortfalls facing key Ford-class systems cloud the Navy’s ability 

to forecast when, or if, current sortie generation rate and manning 

requirements for the ship will be met—analysis that could inform 

decisions on cost and requirements trade-offs in the program, both within 

DOD and by Congress.

As the Navy looks ahead to its planned detail design and construction 

contract award for CVN 79, it will be important to avoid repeating the 

mistakes of the past. Staying within budget will require the Navy to retire 

significant technical risks mainly by completing land-based testing for 

critical technologies before negotiating a contract with the shipbuilder. 

The results of this important testing will allow the government and 

shipbuilder to gain clearer insights on the capabilities of each system and, 

subsequently, better position the government to avoid paying a costly risk 

premium within the planned, fixed-price incentive contract. Further, the 

Navy’s current CVN 79 cost and budget estimates are overly optimistic in 

that they do not take into account remaining developmental and design 

risks with the lead ship. A more realistic assessment of CVN 79 costs 

would put the government in a better negotiating position, even within the 

existing sole source environment. Until these issues are resolved, the 

Navy cannot be confident that the CVN 79 capabilities it desires can be 

attained at the most advantageous price to the taxpayer.

We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy 

to take the following five actions:

To ensure Ford-class carrier acquisitions are supported by sound 

requirements and a comprehensive testing strategy, and to promote the 

introduction of reliable, warfighting capable ships into the fleet, take the 

following actions prior to accepting delivery of CVN 78:

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 48 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

• Conduct a cost-benefit analysis on (1) currently required capabilities, 

including increased sortie generation rates and reduced manning and 

(2) the time and money needed to field systems to provide these 

capabilities, in light of known and projected reliability shortfalls for 

critical systems. This analysis should be informed by demonstrated 

system performance from land-based testing, including updated 

reliability growth projections, and should identify trade space among 

competing cost, schedule, and performance parameters. The analysis 

should also consider whether the Navy should seek requirements 

relief from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, to the extent 

necessary, to maximize its return on investment to the warfighter. The 

Navy should report the results of this analysis to Congress within 30 

days of CVN 78 commissioning.

• Update the Ford class program’s test and evaluation master plan to 

account for developmental testing outcomes experienced since 2013 

and ensure that sufficient time is allotted post-delivery to complete 

developmental testing activities deferred from land to sea prior to 

initiating integration testing.

• Adjust the planned post-delivery test schedule to ensure that system 

integration testing is completed prior to entering initial operational test 

and evaluation.

To improve the Navy’s ability to manage the costs and schedule of CVN 

79 detail design and construction, take the following actions:

• Defer the CVN 79 detail design and construction contract award until 

land-based testing for critical, developmental ship systems including 

the dual band radar, advanced arresting gear, and EMALS is 

completed.

• During the recommended deferral period, update the Navy’s CVN 79 

cost estimate on the basis of actual costs and labor hours associated 

with CVN 78 construction to determine whether the preliminary 

information and assumptions remain relevant and accurate.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written 

comments, which are reprinted in appendix II, DOD concurred with one of 

our recommendations, partially concurred with three recommendations, 

and did not concur with one recommendation. Additionally, we removed 

one recommendation from our final report based on new information that 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 49 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

DOD provided. DOD also provided technical comments that we 

incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to conduct a costbenefit analysis on Ford-class capability requirements and the time and 

money needed to field systems to provide these capabilities. While DOD 

agreed that seeking requirements relief from the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council is a potential long term solution if certain systems do 

not meet stated capabilities, it disagreed that a cost-benefit analysis is 

needed within 30 days of CVN 78 commissioning. In its comments, DOD 

stated that it does not anticipate major requirements changes for the ship 

and offered that the most cost-effective path forward in the program is to 

complete construction of the existing design. However, DOD noted that 

after measuring CVN 78 warfighting capabilities through planned 

developmental and operational testing and following lead ship delivery, it 

intends to identify mitigations for any systems that do not meet stated 

capabilities, which could include seeking requirements relief from the 

Joint Staff. Under DOD’s proposed approach, the process of 

measurement and mitigation would conceivably extend into 2020, when 

CVN 78 is scheduled to complete IOT&E. This strategy is unnecessarily 

concurrent—particularly since the Navy has already identified several 

significant, long-term limitations that will face the ship. We believe the

knowledge gained from developmental testing—coupled with additional 

study and evaluation leading up to CVN 78 delivery in 2016—would 

provide a strong foundation for conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the 

ship’s current required capabilities. Waiting until IOT&E is completed may 

be too late to make effective tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and 

performance. Further, such analysis could provide a sound basis for 

investment decisions related to CVN 80, prior to that ship’s planned detail 

design and construction contract award in late 2017.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to update the Ford class 

program’s test and evaluation master plan prior to delivery of CVN 78.

DOD cited its current efforts to update the program’s test and evaluation 

master plan as being responsive to our recommendation. According to 

DOD, the revised plan is expected to include three phases of land-based 

developmental testing followed by two phases of integration testing for

shipboard systems. The first integration testing phase is scheduled to 

commence three months prior to CVN 78 delivery, to be followed by the 

second integration testing phase beginning in 2017. Although DOD 

expressed confidence that its planned testing strategy would provide 

ample time for developmental and integration testing prior to operational 

testing, it did not directly address our recommendation related to ensuring 
Page 50 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

that sufficient time is allotted to complete certain land-based testing 

activities that have been deferred to sea prior to beginning integration 

testing. Further, the extent to which additional testing will be deferred to 

sea remains unknown, as it hinges on land-based developmental testing 

outcomes leading up to CVN 78 delivery in 2016. Consequently, DOD’s 

current update of the test and evaluation master plan will be structured 

around assumptions about future land-based testing outcomes that may 

or may not come to fruition.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to adjust the planned 

post-delivery test schedule for CVN 78 to ensure that system integration 

testing is completed prior to entering IOT&E. In its comments, DOD 

presented a plan under which warfare and non-warfare systems will 

separately complete integration testing prior to entering into their 

respective operational testing phases. However, this plan shows that 

when non-warfare system operational testing is scheduled to begin, 

integration testing of the warfare systems will be just past halfway 

complete. As we point out in our report, concurrency in integration and 

operational test schedules will constrain opportunities for the Navy to 

implement any needed corrective actions stemming from problems 

identified in the integration testing. Further, given the strong linkage 

between non-warfare and warfare systems, this overlap poses risk to the 

test program. For instance, ship warfare systems such as the dual band 

radar, EMALS, and advanced arresting gear require cooling and power 

from non-warfare systems aboard the ship. Subsequently, until these 

warfare systems are fully integrated and developmentally tested with the 

non-warfare systems upon which they rely, the Navy cannot be confident 

that the ship is ready to enter IOT&E.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to defer the CVN 79 detail 

design and construction contract award until land-based testing for 

critical, developmental ship systems is completed. In its comments, DOD 

responded as if we had recommended a total work stoppage for CVN 

79—a drastic measure inconsistent with our recommendation. As we 

noted in this report, the Navy has contracted for construction preparation 

activities for this ship since 2009. That ongoing contract provides a 

vehicle for continuing limited CVN 79 construction work into the future—

while allowing time for land-based testing activities to regain traction and 

retire risks—and precludes any need for a detail design and construction 

contract in the near term. In its response, DOD noted that an extension of 

the CVN 79 construction preparation contract would require use of fiscal 

year 2014 funds for additional bid and proposal efforts. In response to our 

further inquiry on this matter, the Navy stated the costs would be on the 
Page 51 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

order of $5-10 million and acknowledged there are no known legal or 

regulatory impediments to a limited extension of the construction 

preparation contract. According to the Navy, under an extension of the 

construction preparation contract, building and outfitting of structural units 

and the procurement of materials could continue. Retiring remaining risks 

in land-based testing will improve the Navy and shipbuilder’s ability to 

assess the likely CVN 79 costs before the planned detail design and 

construction contract is awarded. We continue to believe that, in light of

the existing sole source environment for aircraft carrier construction, a 

delay in awarding the CVN 79 detail design and construction contract—by 

extending the construction preparation contract—would improve the

government’s negotiating position for the ship.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to update the Navy’s 

CVN 79 cost estimate on the basis of actual costs and labor hours 

associated with CVN 78 construction. We recommended that this update 

take place following deferral of the CVN 79 detail design and construction 

contract award—an action DOD did not agree to take, as discussed 

above. Nonetheless, DOD stated that it plans to have an updated 

independent cost estimate prepared by the Office of Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation ahead of the CVN 79 detail design and 

construction contract award. According to DOD, this cost estimate will 

take into account actual costs and labor hours associated with CVN 78 

construction.

DOD did not concur with our recommendation on delaying the 

commissioning of CVN 78 that was included in the draft report that we 

sent to DOD for comment. We made the decision to remove this 

recommendation based on information DOD provided about unintended 

consequences associated with delaying the commissioning of the ship, 

including potential issues related to how a noncommissioned ship would 

operate effectively within the Navy’s chain of command. The intent of the 

draft recommendation was to highlight the operational limitations that will 

be associated with the ship when it is commissioned, but DOD noted in its 

response that the ship will not be designated operationally ready until 

testing and trials are completed—an estimated 34 months after delivery. 

Until the ship is judged operationally ready, it will lack the ability to 

conduct assigned operations for which it is designed.

Further, DOD disagreed with our finding that, when it is commissioned,

CVN 78 will have significant operational limitations due to the expected 

reliability rates of key technologies, including EMALS, advanced arresting 

gear, dual band radar, and advanced weapons elevator systems. DOD 
Page 52 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

stated that these systems are designed and engineered to be highly 

reliable. However, DOD did not address the significant evidence we 

present in this report demonstrating that these systems are projected to 

experience reliability deficiencies well into future years. For instance, the 

Navy now estimates that the advanced arresting gear and EMALS will not 

demonstrate their minimum required reliabilities until 2027 and 2032, 

respectively. High reliability from these and other ship systems is key to 

enabling the Ford class to achieve its planned capabilities. DOD also 

outlined the Navy’s disagreement with our findings related to the effect 

that land-based testing delays have had on the development of certain 

critical technologies within the Ford-class program. The response asserts

that our report overstates the cost, schedule, and technical risks 

associated with these delays. According to the response, the system 

designs for EMALS, advanced arresting gear, and dual band radar have 

progressed to the point where the Navy expects that any future changes 

will be internal to each system and independent of the ship interface. As a 

result, the Navy concludes that the ship’s design is stable. We disagree. 

As we have documented in this report, the Navy’s knowledge deficit about 

these systems is evidenced by the significant land-based testing delays 

that EMALS, advanced arresting gear, and volume search radar (a dual 

band radar component) have encountered. Tests to date have uncovered 

a multitude of deficiencies that the Navy did not anticipate when it 

developed its CVN 78 and CVN 79 construction schedules. These 

outcomes have prompted Navy decisions to produce the systems prior to 

achievement of stable designs—a strategy that risks costly retrofits and 

rework aboard CVN 78 before and after ship delivery. In light of the 

considerable testing scope that remains for each of these developmental 

technologies, we do not share the Navy’s confidence that all future design 

changes to these systems will be independent of the overall ship design.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.
Page 53 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report.

Michele Mackin

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 54 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

This report evaluates the Navy’s acquisition of Ford-class aircraft carriers. 

Specifically, we (1) assessed technical, design, and construction 

challenges the Navy faces in delivering the lead ship, CVN 78, within 

current budget and schedule estimates; (2) evaluated whether the Navy’s 

post-delivery test and evaluation strategy for CVN 78 will provide timely 

demonstration of required capabilities; and (3) identified actions the Navy 

is taking to improve cost outcomes for the first follow-on ship, CVN 79, 

ahead of contract award for detail design and construction.

To assess challenges the Navy faces delivering CVN 78, we reviewed 

Department of Defense (DOD) and contractor documents that address 

technology development efforts including technology readiness 

assessments, test reports, program schedules and briefings, and reports 

to Congress. We also witnessed testing of the electromagnetic aircraft 

launch system (EMALS) and the advanced arresting gear critical 

technologies at the Navy’s land-based test site in Lakehurst, New Jersey, 

and we visited the Nimitz-class carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) to 

improve our understanding of the capability improvements and technical 

innovations planned for introduction aboard CVN 78. In our review, we 

relied on DOD’s selection of critical technologies and its determination of 

the demonstrated levels of maturity. Although we did not validate the 

technology readiness levels (TRL) that DOD assigned to Ford-class 

critical technologies, we did seek to clarify the TRLs in those cases where 

information existed that raised concerns. To identify design changes and 

to understand the impact of these changes to CVN 78 construction, we 

reviewed quarterly ship production progress conference briefings, 

contract performance reports, and program schedules and briefings. We 

also evaluated Navy and contractor documents outlining cost and 

schedule parameters for CVN 78 including budget submissions, 

contracts, contract performance reports, reports to Congress, and 

program schedules and briefings. We also relied on our prior work 

evaluating the Ford-class program and shipbuilding best practices to 

supplement the above analyses.1

 1

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Navy Faces Challenges Constructing the Aircraft Carrier 

Gerald R. Ford within Budget, 

To further corroborate documentary 

evidence and gather additional information in support of our review, we 

conducted interviews with relevant Navy and contractor officials

responsible for managing the technology development, design, and 

GAO-07-866 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2007); and Best 

Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding 

from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 55 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

construction of CVN 78, such as the Program Executive Office, Aircraft 

Carriers; CVN 78 program office; Newport News Shipbuilding (a division 

of Huntington Ingalls Industries) (CVN 78 shipbuilder); Supervisor of 

Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair officials; Aircraft Launch and 

Recovery program office; General Atomics (EMALS and advanced 

arresting gear prime contractor); Program Executive Office, Integrated 

Warfare Systems; Above Water Sensors program office; Integrated 

Combat Systems program office; and Raytheon Integrated Defense 

Systems (dual band radar prime contractor). We also held discussions 

with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and 

Program Evaluation; Office of the Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Developmental Test and Evaluation; Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Ship Programs; Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations’ Air Warfare directorate; Office of the Commander, Navy 

Operational Test and Evaluation Force; Naval Sea Systems Command’s 

Nuclear Propulsion and Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis offices; 

Naval Air Warfare Center—Aircraft Division; and the Defense Contract 

Audit Agency.

To evaluate whether the Navy’s post-delivery test and evaluation strategy 

for CVN 78 will provide timely demonstration of required capabilities, we 

analyzed (1) development schedules and test reports for CVN 78 critical 

technologies; (2) construction, delivery, and testing schedules and reports 

for CVN 78; and (3) the Navy’s December 2012 draft revision to the CVN 

78 test and evaluation master plan to identify concurrency among 

developmental, integration, and operational testing plans. Further, we 

reviewed Joint Strike Fighter reports and program briefings to identify 

plans for integrating that aircraft with CVN 78. We also reviewed the draft 

CVN 78 test and evaluation master plan, reliability data and growth 

curves for key ship systems, program briefings, and DOD guidance to 

identify and assess the impact of reliability shortfalls on CVN 78 

capabilities. To further corroborate documentary evidence and gather 

additional information in support of our review, we held discussions with 

Navy and contractor officials and DOD agencies responsible for 

managing development and reliability growth for key CVN 78 systems, 

ship integration testing, and operational testing, including the Program 

Executive Office, Aircraft Carriers; CVN 78 program office; Newport News 

Shipbuilding; Aircraft Launch and Recovery program office; Program 

Executive Office, Integrated Warfare Systems; Above Water Sensors 

program office; Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 56 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Test and Evaluation; Office of the Commander, Navy Operational Test 

and Evaluation Force; Naval Air Warfare Center—Aircraft Division; and 

the Joint Strike Fighter joint program office.

To identify actions the Navy is taking to improve cost outcomes for CVN 

79 ahead of detail design and construction contract award, we reviewed 

shipbuilder reports detailing lessons learned constructing CVN 78, the 

Navy’s request for proposals for detail design and construction of CVN 

79, CVN 79 construction plans and reports, program briefings, Navy 

budget submissions, and our prior work.2

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to September 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To supplement our analysis and 

gain additional visibility into the Navy’s actions for improving CVN 79 

outcomes, we interviewed officials from the Program Executive Office, 

Aircraft Carriers; CVN 78 program office; CVN 79 and CVN 80 program 

office; Newport News Shipbuilding; Office of the Director, Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation; and Naval Sea Systems 

Command’s Contracting and Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis 

offices.

 2

GAO-07-866 and GAO-09-322.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 57 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 58 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 59 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 60 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 61 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

This recommendation 

was removed from the 

final report. See page 51.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 62 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 63 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 64 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 65 GAO-13-396 Ford-Class Carriers

Michele Mackin, (202) 512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Diana Moldafsky, Assistant Director; John Oppenheim, Assistant 

Director; Greg Campbell; Christopher R. Durbin; Laura Greifner; Kristine 

Hassinger; Karen Richey; W. Kendal Roberts; Charlie Shivers; Roxanna 

Sun; and Holly Williams.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(121076)
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