alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1





Certification of Executive Officer Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d)











I, Ryan C. Farris, certify that:





1I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Ally Master Owner Trust (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);





2Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;





4Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and





5All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.





In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on the information provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: Wells Fargo Bank, National Association and HSBC Bank USA, National Association.





Date: March 28, 2014





/s/ Ryan C. Farris





Ryan C. Farris


President, Ally Wholesale Enterprises LLC, as Depositor


(Senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)





























1
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v. LESTER S. GORDON, Sergeant, U. S. Army, Appellant

5 USCMA 276, 17 CMR 276

No. 4429

Decided December 17, 1954

Lt Col James C. Hamilton, U. S. Army, Capt Glade F. Flake, U. S. Army, and 1st Lt Jack W. Tucker, U. S. Army, for Appellant.

Lt Col Thomas J. Newton, U. S. Army, Lt Col William R. Ward, U. S. Army, and 1st Lt Ezra B. Jones, Jr., U. S. Army, for Appellee.

*277Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam:

Following his plea of guilty, the accused was found guilty of stealing various items of Government property, in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 121, 50 USC § 715. He was sentenced to receive a dishonorable discharge, together with total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for one year. The convening authority approved the sentence, although he suspended the punitive discharge. A board of review in the office of The Judge Advocate General, United States Army, has affirmed the approved findings and sentence. We granted review to determine whether the convening authority had become an accuser through the forwarding over his command line of an indorsement containing certain advice to trial counsel.

In United States v. Haimson, 5 USCMA 208, 17 CMR 208, and United States v. Blau, 5 USCMA 232, 17 CMR 232, we rejected similar defense contentions. Here, as there, the convening authority was the Commanding General, Headquarters, United States Army in Europe. The challenged in-dorsement simply represented a “standing operating procedure” used by this and similar officials. Indeed, the “instructions” to the present trial counsel bear numerous verbal likenesses to those considered by us in Blau and Haimson, supra.

The paper in question contained language which was exceedingly general, save as it summarized the prospective testimony of witnesses. This summary, we discover from allied papers bound with the record of trial, was based on reports of the Criminal Investigation Division and on those of the subsequent Article 32 investigator. From any standpoint “the indorsement contains nothing which suggests that the convening authority, or the members of his staff, had in any way predetermined the issue of the accused’s guilt or innocence, nor does anything appear which reflects a personal interest on the part of the convening authority in the outcome of the impending trial.” See United States v. Blau, supra. Accordingly, the convening authority cannot be deemed an accuser. Similar reasoning negates a defense suggestion that the instant record of trial could not properly be reviewed by persons who had prepared the “instructions” for the trial counsel. See United States v. Haimson, supra.

The accused has also presented a petition for new trial. His statements in support of this petition — apart from their palpable want of substance — are fully refuted by affidavits filed by the Government. Accordingly, this petition is also denied, and the decision of the board of review is affirmed.
#### Charles H. Druckenmiller, App’lt, *v.*Bernard J. Shoninger *et al.,*Resp’ts.

*(New York Common Pleas, General Term,*

*Filed February 3, 1890.)*

1. Jurisdiction—Actions commenced in district court.

If a plaintiff elect to sue mi district court he must he limited as to the amount of his recovery hy the special jurisdiction conferred upon such court, although the case is removed to a court of record.

2. Same.

Plaintiff brought action in a district court, which was removed to the common pleas. He then hied a complaint demanding judgment for $700. Defendants set up want of jurisdiction. *Held,*that a demurrer to this defense was properly overruled.

Appeal from order overruling plaintiff’s demurrer to the first defense in the answer.

This action was originally brought in a district court, and waS afterwards removed to this court. Plaintiff then served a complaint demanding judgment for $700.

The first defense in the answer set up want of jurisdiction on the ground that the action was originally brought in a district court and that a district court had no jurisdiction of an action for that amount.

*John Fennel,*for app’lt; *John B.*Green, for resp’ts.

Larremore, Ch. J.

The order made by Judge Allen, overruling plaintiff’s demurrer to the first defense pleaded in the answer, must be affirmed on the authority of *Smith*v. *White,*23 N. Y., 572; *Salter*v. *Parkhurst,*2 Daly, 240; *Lougrill*v. *Downey,*7 N. Y. Supplement, 503; 27 N. Y. State Rep., 51.

These cases were evidently considered by Judge Allen when he made such order, and they undoubtedly establish the principle that when an action is originally brought in a district court its permanent character must be determined by the declaration and the amount sued for in such court, though subsequently it be removed to this court. •

•It might be said that no meritorious objection could be made to. plaintiff’s serving a written complaint after removal to this *143court, demanding damages for a sum in excess of the amount the district courts could entertain jurisdiction for. But such practice would unsettle all orderly methods of procedure. If a plaintiff has a claim in excess of the amount the statute allows-to be sued for in a district court, he may, of course, bring his action in the first instance in a court of record. But if he elect, to sue in a district court, he must be limited as to the amount of his recovery by the special jurisdiction conferred upon, such court. The action is in all essential respects the same after removal as before.

The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs

Bischoff, J., concurs.
Exhibit 23.1





Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm








We consent to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements:





|    |                                                                                                                       
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(1) | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-170914) pertaining to Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc.'s Directors Stock Plan;

|    |                                                                                                                                                                  
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(2) | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-167847) pertaining to the Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc. and Hudson Pacific Properties, L.P. 2010 Incentive Award Plan;

|    |                                                                                                                                                                  
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(3) | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-185497) pertaining to the Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc. and Hudson Pacific Properties, L.P. 2010 Incentive Award Plan;

|    |                                                                                     
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(4) | Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-175326) of Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc.;

|    |                                                                                     
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(5) | Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-176543) of Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc.;

|    |                                                                                         
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(6) | Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-197526) of Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc.; and

|    |                                                                                    
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(7) | Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-201457) of Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc.




of our reports dated March 2, 2015 , with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc. and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) of Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2014 .








/s/    ERNST & YOUNG LLP








Irvine, California


March 2, 2015
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-6702

DUNCAN VICTOR AYEMERE IDOKOGI,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United

States; JOHN JOSEPH CURRAN, JR.,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge.

(CA-04-230-L)

Submitted: August 12, 2004 Decided: August 19, 2004

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Duncan Victor Ayemere Idokogi, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM: 

Duncan Victor Ayemere Idokogi seeks to appeal the

district court’s order transferring his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000)

petition to the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Louisiana, and to the extent Idokogi’s petition sought

to attack his 1998 state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)

denying his petition as a successive habeas petition. We dismiss

the appeal of the order transferring the case for lack of

jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may

exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291

(2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292 (2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is

neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral

order. See Technosteel, L.L.C. v. Beers Constr. Co., 271 F.3d 151,

153-54 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2001).

We also dismiss the appeal of that part of the district

court’s order that denied Idokogi’s petition as a successive habeas

petition. An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a

§ 2254 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by
- 3 -

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d

676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the

record and conclude that Idokogi has not made the requisite

showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss this portion of the appeal.

We deny Idokogi’s motions for stay pending appeal and to

place the case in abeyance. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 34.1








ATTESTATION REPORT ON ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH


SERVICING CRITERIA FOR ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES





REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM








To the Board of Directors and Shareholders


Entergy Arkansas, Inc.


Little Rock, Arkansas





We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying Report on Assessment of Compliance with Servicing Criteria For Asset-Backed Securities, that Entergy Arkansas, Inc. (the "Company") complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation AB applicable for Entergy Arkansas Restoration Funding, LLC’s Senior Secured Storm Recovery Bonds (the “Securities”) as of and for the year ended December 31, 2015, excluding criteria 1122(d)(1)(ii), (1)(iii), (1)(iv), (2)(iii), (2)(vi), (4)(iii), (4)(v), (4)(ix), (4)(x), (4)(xi), (4)(xii), (4)(xiii), and (4)(xv), which management has determined are not applicable to the activities performed by the Company with respect to the Securities.  Management is responsible for the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria.  Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion about the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria based on our examination.





Our examination was conducted in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the applicable servicing criteria, including tests on a sample basis of the servicing activities related to the Securities, determining whether the Company performed those selected activities in compliance with the servicing criteria during the specified period, and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our procedures were limited to selected servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Further, an examination is not designed to detect noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurred prior to the period specified above that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report.  We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria.





In our opinion, management's assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2015 for Entergy Arkansas Restoration Funding, LLC’s Senior Secured Storm Recovery Bonds is fairly stated, in all material respects.





/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP


New Orleans, Louisiana


March 29, 2016
April 25, 2001

Mr. Henry Val
133 Wyncrest Avenue
Marlboro, New Jersey 07746


     Re:     Agreement between Segway VI Corp. and Henry Val


Dear Mr. Val:

The following sets forth the agreement between Segway VI Corp. ("SEGWAY") and
Henry Val ("VAL"):

     1. VAL agrees to purchase 5,000,000 restricted common shares of SEGWAY at
the value of $.0004 per share for a purchase price of $2,000.00.

     2.  Upon the receipt of $2,000.00, SEGWAY will tender
the shares from treasury to VAL.

     3. VAL represents that he is an "accredited investor" as defined under the
1933 Securities Act. In addition, VAL has been provided with access to all
documents of SEGWAY.

     4. Notice shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, the
date of notice being deemed the date of postmarking. Notices, unless either
party has notified the other party of an alternative address as provided
hereunder, shall be sent to the address set forth herein.

     5. In the event that any term, covenant, condition, or other provision
contained herein is held to be invalid, void or otherwise unenforceable by any
court of competent jurisdiction, the invalidity of any such term, covenant,
condition, provision or Agreement shall in no way affect any other term,
covenant, condition or provision or Agreement contained herein, which shall
remain in full force and effect.

<PAGE>

     6. This Agreement contains all of the terms agreed upon by the parties with
respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement has been entered into after
full investigation.

     7. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the
laws of the State of New Jersey applicable to agreements made and to be
performed within the State of New Jersey without giving the effect to the
conflict of law principals thereof.

     8. No amendments or additions to this Agreement shall be binding unless in
writing, signed by both parties, except as herein otherwise provided.

     9. Neither party may assign nor delegate any of its rights or obligations
hereunder without first obtaining the written consent of the other party.

Very truly yours,

ANSLOW & JACLIN, LLP

By: /s/ Ross A. Goldstein
--------------------------------
        ROSS A. GOLDSTEIN

RAG/tp

ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO BY:  ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO BY:

SEGWAY VI CORP.

By: /s/ Richard I. Anslow     By: /s/ Henry Val
--------------------------    ------------------------------
        RICHARD I. ANSLOW             HENRY VAL
        PRESIDENT
No. 48627.

#### Protests 710459-G, etc., of Rosenblum Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

As to certain cheese stipulated to be similar to that involved in Abstracts 42146 and 48269 and *Scaramelli*v. *United States*(9 Cust. Ct. 270, C. D. 706) it was held that an allowance of *21⁄2*percent in the net weight should have been made, as claimed. As to cheese similar to the Reggiano cheese the subject of *Scaramelli*v. *United States, supra,*the claim for an allowance of 1 percent of the net weight was sustained. Following *Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.*v. *United States*(T. D. 47955) it was held that an allowance for weight of paper or foil, or both, should have been made by the collector in the net weight used in computing the duty on certain other cheese.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

December 28, 2011 

h1219 

Order 

 

December 28, 2011 

143682 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 143682 

 COA: 301285 

Oakland CC: 1990-101264-FH 

CALVIN L. FULBRIGHT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 17, 2011 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s 

motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tessera Technologies, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), on Form 10-Q for the period
ending June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Henry R. Nothhaft, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report
fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/    Henry R. Nothhaft             
|Henry R. Nothhaft                    
|President and Chief Executive Officer
|August 4, 2010                       

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tessera Technologies, Inc, a Delaware corporation (the Company), on Form 10-Q for the period
ending June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Michael Anthofer, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                    
|----------------------------------------------------
|/s/    Michael Anthofer                             
|Michael Anthofer                                    
|Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|August 4, 2010                                      

A signed original of this written statement required by Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350 has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.