GRAND STRATEGY 

AND THE 

PACIFIC REGION 

By JOHN E. ENDICOTT 

THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 
 iiii!i!iii i , i ,i!ii, ii !i!i i! :::~ i i!! ' ~ii I : • i I ~i: i! i 
GRAND STRATEGY 

AND THE 

PACIFIC REGION 
GRAND STRATEGY 

AND THE 

PACIFIC REGION 

By JOHN E. ENDICO'FT 

~ 

HESE ARE EXCITING TIMES is an ageless phrase 

used to introduce countless assessments of the Pacific 

area. As worn as they might be, these words aptly 

captureDin the blink of an eyeDthe dynamism of the Pacific 

region. From north to south, wherever the Pacific Ocean 

caresses its far-reaching shores, we see meaningful and unparalleled change. 

The changes occurring are an interesting mixture of 

political and economic events made possible by the bubbling 

up of the inherent energies of the area itself, by the declining 

regional reach of the two nuclear superpowers, and by the active involvement of Japan~a new kind of economic superpower whose role is only now becoming discernible. Even as 

this paper is being written, events are breaking almost daily: 

in China, massive pro-democracy demonstrations persist; and 

even Burma, the "Rip Van Winkle" of Asia, is showing increasing signs that it too will enter the 21st century in far different form than maintained for the past generation. 

Realizing that the subject chosen is as vast as the Pacific 

itself, I intend to scan the horizon, identify trends, and place 

those trends into some policy perspective for the United States 

itself. Using quick glimpses into the domestic scenes of selected 

states of the Pacific region, I hope to capture some of the 

nature of change in these states. Clearly, opportunities for 

dramatic and positive change exist in this sector of our national global interests. Timely and determined political leadership at this important point by the United States could ensure 

a stable future for the continued mutually beneficial economic 

development of the entire region. 
2 JOHN E. ENDICOTT 

In essence, I am calling for a Grand Strategy for the 

Pacific Rim: A strategy that will catch a new consensus on 

both sides of the Pacific, that will focus on the long-term 

process of creating a security community truly deserving of 

its name, Pacific. 

The Pacific Today 

Let's begin our review of change throughout the Pacific 

Rim with a look at the Philippines. 

The Philippines. Starting with the Philippines only emphasizes 

the point that events of the next few years will have a major 

impact on the shape of democracy in this island republic. Over 

the ncxt decade, one of the most important questions will concern the Land Reform of the Aquino government, and how 

responsive generally that government will be to the needs of 

the Philippine people to deny the New People's Army the 

adherents it needs. The question is, will land reform be executed in a fair and equitable fashion, or will vested interests 

get the upper hand and once again thwart the dream of 

Magsaysay? 

Some major aspects of the program are outlined here. 

Five hectares are reserved for all land owners, and three for 

each child; a 10-year implementation period is established; and, 

25 percent of the land value will be provided to owners in cash 

and 75 percent in government bonds. This last aspect is from 

the more successful historic land reform measures such as the 

Japanese and Taiwanese programs that used these same techniques to continue to tie those who are loosing land to the government through bonds. Other aspects include a 5 percent cash 

incentive for immediate enrollment in the program rather than 

delaying over the 10-year period. Of course, one of the major 

problems is that major incorporated farms are exempt from 

the reform for 10-years; workers, however, are being paid 

a 3 percent profit sharing bonus. Finally, ancestrial lands 

are temporarily excluded from the reform package to lessen 

the problems that might come from some of the minority 
GRAND STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC REGION 3 

communities that seek greater autonomy from central government control. 

Politically, relations between the United States and the 

Philippines have been complicated by several on-going issues 

directly related to regional security. One is the nuclear restriction act that was introduced into the legislature. Another issue 

is the review of the base fights agreements permitting the United 

States to station forces in and operate from the Philippines. 

The anti-nuclear act has already passed the Senate, but will 

probably not pass the House. This act, if it becomes law, would 

prohibit nuclear weapons from Philippine territory to include 

land, sea, and air space. The mere prospect of such a law has 

created an environment useful to the Philippine side in discussing US base rights. One can expect the issue to remain active 

and contribute to things that happen down the road. 

Agreement on the base rights issue--the question of US 

access to its principal bases in Clark and Subic Bay--has been 

reached temporarily through the review of the US presence that 

was conducted in Manila between US and Philippine officials. 

Although this recent review was spirited, and the US payments 

for continued use significantly increased, the issue really 

becomes decisive in 1991, when the United States must depart 

if asked. From the standpoint of the verbal exchanges that took 

place and the ultimate impact such airing of "dirty linen" had 

on the bodies politic of both the United States and the Philippines, the issue is important now. Clearly, some very strong 

indications of Philippine nationalism were evident. 

Of special note was the unique role played in the negotiations by the Philippine Foreign Minister, Raul Mangiapus. He 

brought a dynamism to the negotiations that was reflected in 

the daily press in Manila. He also brought a certain informed 

cynicism to the process that is shown by his personal involvement in a current Manila play--"Yanky Panky"--which he 

scripted and for which he wrote the accompanying music. It 

is a very successful play; an appropriate follow-on to the 

"Marcos Follies," another play he wrote. Unfortunately, 

Americans do not fare too well in his theatrical portrayals. 

The Foreign Minister talked publicly about the need for 

3 billion dollars for Clark and Subic, and broke off talks on 

the 28th of July when it was reported in the press that he 

GRAND STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC REGION 5 

had reduced his demand to 1.2 billion dollars. However, a gap 

remained between 1.2 billion and the lesser amount the United 

States was willing to commit. On 17 October 1988, however, 

an agreement was reached: as reported in Manila, the Americans committed to pay 1.46 billion dollars to "maintain Subic 

Naval Base and Clark Air Base until 1991. 'q 

The logic of the Philippine argument came from a comparison of US aid to Egypt and Israel that amounts to roughly 

3 billion dollars annually. The Philippine Foreign Minister 

asked rhetorically about US bases in these countries: how many 

US personnel, he probed, are stationed there? He drove the 

point home to us about the Pacific Century and American 

dependence on those two bases for carrying out much of our 

strategy for the South Pacific, South Asia, and Southwest Asia. 

The location of the Philippines makes an argument that largely 

speaks for itself. 

This argument for a greater US contribution was made 

even though the American presence brings over $600 million 

per year in salaries and related income, and even in the face 

of US commitment to actively pursue a "mini Marshall Plan." 

Also known as the Multilateral Aid Initiative (MAI) for the 

Philippines, this plan could amount to 10 billion dollars in 

grants and loans from an international consortium. Of course, 

many factors were at play here, not the least of which is the 

"special relationship" America has with its one-time colony. 

As we look toward 1991 and a new administration, the vital 

importance of these bases needs to be better articulated to the 

American public and measures to widen their value to the 

economy of the Philippines generally should be pursued. 

Other challenges to the most recent experiment in Philippine democracy are seen in the continued unease within some 

elements of the Philippine Armed Forces toward the handling 

of the communist insurgency by President Aquino and her 

civilian advisors. Leadership of such opposition is generally 

focused in the person of Gregorio Honason, a charismatic 

colonel who led a coup attempt in August 1987. He was captured, but later escaped with the aid of his navy guards. Rejecting amnesty for this figure who is outspoken in his desire 

to crush the insurgency militarily, Aquino brings her great. 

popularity with the people of the nation into conflict with 
6 JOHN E. ENDICOTT 

a firebrand. In combating this criticism from the right, Mrs. 

Aquino has taken to increasing the number of former or retired 

senior military in her government. While not an overwhelming practice, it will bring the benefits that come with such 

incorporation, but also the dangers. 

The economy shows a resurgence that is evident in a bustling construction program throughout Manila. The problem, 

of course, will be to generalize successful economic recovery 

throughout the island chain including those areas given over 

to a single crop, such as sugar. In this regard, land reform on 

an island-by-island basis might relieve some of the more 

desperate situations. On the whole, it appears that the economic 

community has regained its confidence in the ability of the 

democracy to survive. It will be up to US policy to aid and 

nurture such an outcome in conjunction with the other states 

of the Pacific Rim, especially Japan. 

Vietnam. Events in Vietnam are no less dynamic than those 

just mentioned. What is particularly paradoxical is that we now 

turn to a nation--once the most bitter of foes--that serves as 

one of the classic failures of the communist economic model. 

Vietnam has squandered precious, already limited, resources 

on an imperial adventure in Cambodia, cannot adequately feed 

itself, is in the midst of self-doubt about many of its own party 

cadre, and faces new economic pressures by a possible realignment of Soviet overseas objectives. This situation calls out for 

a US response that is creative, innovative, in our self-interest, 

and productive of regional stability. 

The confluence of a number of political, military, and 

economic factors has led the leadership in Hanoi to announce 

a significant reduction in its military posture in Laos and Cambodia. According to Vietnamese accounts, Vietnam has 

withdrawn 20,000 troops from Laos (practically its entire 

presence) and 50,000 troops from the 125,000 in Cambodia. 

Remaining forces, according to the Vietnamese, will be placed 

under command of a Cambodian general, and troops remaining in Cambodia will be pulled back 30 kilometers from the 

Cambodian-Thai border. 

All these developments come at a time when economic 

needs of Vietnam are increasingly obvious. In an attempt to 

shore up the economy and bring in foreign capital, joint 
GRAND STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC REGION 7 

enterprise opportunities have been forged with Thailand, the 

United Kingdom, and Hong Kong; limited stock companies 

have been established to obtain equipment to replace old and 

inoperable items left from more prosperous times; and even 

a trade delegation from South Korea was invited recently. 

These developmentsmplus some doubt about the continuation 

of the $2 billion annual Soviet subsidy--reveal a domestic situation in a state of flux. 

As if to mirror this dynamism, a new premier, Do Muoi, 

was elected by the National Assembly in an election characterized by a vocal opposition and some emphasis on the process of Peristroika currently underway in the Soviet Union. The 

new leader, known for his conservative communist inclinations, 

was called on to meet the challenges, especially of food shortages, that his predecessor, Vo Van Kiet, failed to resolve. One 

of his principal charges will be to energize the economy, which 

has yet to respond to reforms now a year old. 

The scope of popular dissatisfaction with life in Vietnam 

continues to be seen through the figures of "boat people." 

Since 1981 over 244,000 Vietnamese have voted with their feet 

and fled to neighboring states. Increasingly, the nature of the 

refugees has changed from the original foes of the regime to 

the individuals who see no economic future in Vietnam. 

Basically, they have become "migrants escaping Vietnam's 

economic condition. ''2 

Promising improvements in relations with the United 

States began during the summer of 1987 when Foreign Minister 

Nguyen Co Thach met with retired Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey, Jr., to discuss 

outstanding "humanitarian" issues, principally the resolution 

of the status of 2,400 Americans still characterized as "missing in action (MIA)." As increased cooperation on this issue 

began, there was also mention of release from re-education 

centers and possible resettlement in the United States of some 

10,000 Vietnamese supporters of the old regime. 

Foreign Minister Thach, with reference to Cambodia, 

called for the United States and Vietnam to articulate the 

following common objectives: a withdrawal of Vietnamese 

forces; no return to Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge leader Pol 

Pot; a leading role for Sihanouk; and an overall political 
8 JOHN E. ENDICOTT 

solution. 3 All this came to an abrupt halt during the first week 

in August 1988 when the Vietnamese accused the United States 

of following a "hostile policy. ''4 Continued pressures on Vietnam forced its reversal of this course only weeks later. 

As time passes, it will become clear to the Vietnamese 

leadership, now obviously engaged in a debate of its own, that 

resolution of the the MIA issue and withdrawal from Cambodia are in the interests of their nation, and that the new administration will not offer new opportunities for a better deal. 

In the meantime, "reformists" such as Nguyen Van Linh, 

leader of the Communist Party of Vietnam, will have to seek 

elsewhere for the help necessary to resolve some of Vietnam's 

fundamental and continuing problems. 

People's Republic of China. Vietnam will not be looking to 

China for assistance in resolving some of its economic problems. In fact, Vietnam is still smarting over the sinking of 

several of its patrol boats by ships of the Chinese Navy just 

off the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. China's 

neighbor to the south, however, could certainly spend time profitably by observing the significant changes brought to the 

Chinese economy by Deng Xiao Ping and his immediate successors. Deng retired from most of his major posts in October 

1987 but retained a very important post as Chairman of the 

Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party. From 

that vantage point, he remains available as Li Peng, the new 

Premier, begins to make his own impression. 

China continues to follow Deng's policy of the Four 

Modernizations, hoping to raise China to the status of a major 

power by the middle of the 21st century. This policy emphasizes 

agriculture, the industrial base, and scientific and technical 

capabilities before the military. The fourth modernization, that 

of the military, has placed the military in the interesting position of using its industrial base for civilian-oriented production. It possibly contributed to the increase in weapon sales 

to Middle Eastern states, especially Iran, making China one 

of the the five major exporters of weapons in the world. 5 The 

rapid increase in weapon exports may be the result of trying 

to obtain needed hard currency to carry on other aspects of 

China's modernization program. 
GRAND STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC REGION 9 

It is clear that the military--as a means of social mobility and economic reward--is facing keen competition from sectors such as agriculture and small industry that are producing 

increased profits. Also, military reorganization has reduced 

the overall number of personnel in uniform, creating some 

social disruption as disgruntled former military attempt to transition into the civilian economy. 6 

Clearly, as the Deng reforms continue to fuel annual GNP 

increases of 10 percent or more, disruption and competition 

may become far more common than in the recent past. In the 

process of reducing the military, some of the "iron rice bowls" 

of the past will be broken, complicating a simple guaranteed 

level of living as the economy generally is brought into the 

global arena. 7 

While the economic vitality of the PRC dazzles any 

foreign visitor, and must cause some Chinese to wonder where 

they are, some warning lights have recently flashed. Insignificant considering the relative scale of the Chinese experiment, 

such concerns relate to historic indicators of the health of 

Chinese administrations. For example, local irrigation systems 

are reported as "breaking down all over China. ''g Whether 

this is resort to hyperbole, or, in fact, 90 percent of the reservoirs of Shandong Province have indeed fallen into disrepair, 

the importance of the irrigation system from an historic 

perspective must not be forgotten. The Chinese themselves will 

not overlook it. With emphasis on profits, producers likely 

did not have the collective labor needed to sustain the system 

as the first thing on their mind; on the other hand, a new 

scheme to provide compulsory labor for system maintenance 

was reported in December 1987. 9 

The great release of collective Chinese energies associated 

with the rush to the 21st century creates another concern: increasingly, the Chinese people view their government and party 

bureaucracies as corrupt. This belief was substantiated 

somewhat in a survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of 

Social Sciences, in which 63 percent of cadres interviewed 

admitted some kind of corrupt practice. 10 If true, we can see 

what Mao Tse Tung had in mind when he wished to keep the 

bureaucracy in a state of almost constant ideological turmoil. 

Before we cast any stones, however, we should poll our own 
10 JOHN E. ENDICOTT 

population about similar questions. Perhaps since the yellow 

tape appeared in the halls of the Pentagon, wc have our own 

perception gap. 

One gap that is not a perception but a reality relates to 

higher education and its ability to sustain the Chinese drive 

for technical and scientific competence. During the 10-year 

Cultural Revolution, the system of higher education suffered 

incredible excesses. Today China has 1,054 universities, of 

which approximately 400 are just 5 years old. 11 Creating 

educational systems and universities that are more than just 

physical plants must be one of the greatest challenges facing 

China. And, as those most affected by the Cultural Revolution-people now in the 34-44 age bracket--begin to assume 

the leadership roles expected of them, this issue will create 

challenges and opportunities that may have regional impact. 

Success of the economic reforms will give China a new 

base on which to interact with its immediate neighbors, the 

Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Japan (as well as Hong Kong, 

Taiwan, and India). Foreign Minister Qian Qichen has already 

indicated some flexibility with regard to the Cambodian issue, 

but it is clear that aid to the Khmer Rouge will continue until 

Vietnamese forces withdraw. 12 The Soviet Deputy Foreign 

Minister, Igor Rogachev, visited Beijing to discuss Sino-Soviet 

relations, which seem almost daily to assume a more positive 

stance. 13 Although nearly overshadowed by the popular 

demonstrations for democracy, Gorbachev's own visit to Beijing this May was another step toward improved relations. And 

Sino-Japancse affairs, while not the best when it comes to such 

irritants as the Kyoto dormitory issue and Chinese concerns 

with revanchist militarism, arc robust in the economic sphere. 

Chinese seeking short-term employment crowd visa centers, 

hoping for temporary but high-paying jobs in Japan. 14 

Such events as the Sino-Vietnamese incident over the 

Spratlys, however, clearly show that China will insist on making 

its presence in the region much felt. Further, China will be 

sensitive to criticism such as the US Senate's "Dole Amendment," which China rejected as "unreasonable interference 

in China's internal affairs. ''15 
GRAND STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC REGION 11 

Generally, US-Sino relations reveal a healthy expansion 

of political and economic interaction, and even some useful 

ongoing contacts in the military sphere. China is now the fifteenth largest trading partner with the United States, running 

a surplus of approximately 3.5 billion dollars. 16 The fifth 

round of the US-Chinese talks on disarmament were concluded 

in August 1988, and Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci 

visited in September. These indicators of frequent and meaningful exchange continue and reflect the positive nature of the 

relationship. 

South Korea. Of all the dynamic states and areas of the Pacific 

Rim, perhaps the most active, considering both political and 

economic achievement, would be the f'mger-like Korean Peninsula jutting out into the Po Hal Gulf and the Sea of Japan. 

In South Korea, the Chun Doo Hwan succession to Roh Tae 

Woo of the Democratic Justice Party, while contentious, was 

the fh'st peaceful transfer of power on the Korean Peninsula 

since 1910--a genuinely significant event. The responsible opposition of Roh's principal political adversaries Kim Yong Sam, 

Kim Tae Chung, and Kim Chong Pil, is also important to note. 

The practice of democracy is often not a clear-cut affair, and 

can be extremely dysfunctional to those calling for strong 

leadership and policies of boldness. However, the political 

progress experienced by South Korea in the last year has been 

historic. 

Similarily, the economic achievement has been wellrecorded and recognized worldwide. South Korea is now the 

seventh largest trading partner of the United States and enjoys a surplus of approximately 9 billion dollars. 17 The GNP 

growth rate for 1987 was a fantastic 12.6 percent, but 1988 

has been affected by strikes and some disruptive trade disputes 

with the United States. Korea, as all the newly industrialized 

states of Asia are recognizing, will have difficulty maintaining such dramatic economic growth, especially in light of the 

newly passed US trade legislation which will address issues such 

as market access for US business. 

A major actor in the political and economic sectors has 

been Korean college-age youth. Student unrest that became 

intense with the death of Pak Chong Chol has been an 
12 JOHN E. ENDICOTT 

element that alarms many close observers. Of primary concern is the increasingly anti-American current that can be 

observed among these future leaders of Korea. Extremely 

critical of American policy since the Kwangu Incident of 1978, 

a growing number now believe that the United States has pursued policies first, to divide Korea in 1946, and second, to continue the separation of the two Koreas since then. In a 

remarkable revisionism that captures a certain flavor of the 

state of affairs during Alice's visit to Wonderland, many of 

the young college students firmly, and wrongly, believe that 

the United States is interested only in the continuation of the 

division of the North and South. This has led to a political 

activism on the part of this vocal group that is directed toward 

rapid repair of relations between the North and South. 

The government of Roh Tae Woo takes the firm position that contacts with North Korea will be through official 

channels. This flies in the face of desires by students for informal meetings with counterparts at the demilitarized zone. 

Such pressure, and the overall desire to incorporate North 

Korea into the Olympic Games, have resulted in a level of contacts between the two governments that is unprecedented. 

Perhaps the new policy of South Korea toward the NorthDto 

treat it as a younger brotherDwill change the current state of 

military threat between the two. 

Certainly, the appeal by President Roh Tae Woo at the 

United Nations General Assembly for an international conference "to end the division of the Korean peninsula," 

demonstrates the dramatic turn of events in Korea. 18 

Still, the threat from the North is reportedly seen as so 

severe by the South that it will take until the year 2005 to gain 

a posture of "self-reliance." Until that time, the South will 

seek to retain US forces in Korea. However, action by the US 

Congress in the 1988 defense budget bill will certainly not go 

unnoticed. Although South Korea spends approximately 5 percent of its GNP for defense and contributes some 40 million 

directly to combined defense projects, the draft of the second 

defense budget bill passed in 1988 (after a veto) placed a cap 

on US forces in Korea, and called for greater contributions 

by the Republic of Korea toward defense. 19 While later 

removed in conference session, a message was sent from some 

members of Congress to Korea. 
GRAND STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC REGION 13 

The future, in no uncertain terms, remains tied up in the 

all-important relationship with its "younger brother to the 

north," North Korea. Progress that might be made toward 

reducing tensions, and eventually toward some form of 

reunification, will determine the kind of future for the peninsula and along the Pacific Rim generally. 

North Korea. North Korea, the true "Hermit Kingdom" if 

ever one existed, has followed the leadership of one man since 

the founding of the communist regime after World War II. 

Dedicated to the economic self-reliant concepts of Chuche, this 

Korean version of Marxism and Leninism has been North 

Korea's experience, with only slight moderation. This unique 

socialist road has yielded a strong military and an austere, 

almost Spartan, way of life for those of the North. As mentioned above, this particular feature, a Korea "going it alone" 

and in the face of severe hardship, has captured the imagination of some of the college activists of the South, making for 

an interesting development that cannot be overlooked. 

The North's primary problem, outside the economic 

sphere, is succession. Superficially, the decision has been made 

for Kim Chong II to succeed his father. Whether this will, in 

fact, occur remains to be seen. A recent report out of Tokyo 

shows that Kim Hyong-il, the first son of the "greatest 

leader's" second wife, can also seriously be considered a 

possibility. 20 He now holds the post of Deputy Chief of the 

General Staff Department in the Armed Forces Ministry, and 

is reportedly popular within the military itself. This report, 

however, demonstrates one of the major problems in dealing 

with North Korea: we are dependent on other observers for 

our planning insights. Perhaps as we, in conjunction with the 

South Korean leadership, attempt to bring the North into 

greater contact with the West, this problem will lessen. 

Currently, the North is talking past the South on early 

moves for resolving differences that exist between the two countries. In reply to the United Nations address by President Roh 

Tae Woo, the Northern spokesman, while turning down all 

the proposals, did not resort to the "harsh rhetoric" typical 

of such exchanges. 21 Back home in North Korea, however, 

a similar statement was denounced as "splittist in nature."22 
14 JOHN E. ENDICOTT 

Japan. As has been indicated, by inference or direct reference, 

the role Japan will be expected to play in any regional security 

concept is already significant and getting more so by the day. 

The most recent Defense White Paper reveals a Japan concerned with a continued Soviet military buildup in East Asia 

in the face of a diplomatic offensive that drives at the very 

base of support for any democracy--its popular support. The 

White Paper shows, however, that Japan continues to focus 

on those areas necessary to the defense of Japan. 23 Three 

major areas were emphasized: research and development for 

the defense forces; recruitment of high quality personnel; and 

US-Japan defense cooperation. 

Budget figures for fiscal year 1989 also indicate continued 

hardware modernization and force enhancement. Continued 

acquisition and development of surface-to-surface missiles, aircraft, anti-submarine systems, and other weapons, ensure that 

Japan is heading toward its goal of a competent "defensive 

defense" of the Japanese home islands. By the completion of 

the next mid-term defense plan in 1995, Japan will be able to 

defend the northern approaches to its islands, mine the straits, 

and control 1,000 miles of sea lanes in and around Japan. 

Security is not just defense, however, as the Japanese 

fully recognize. Increasingly, their active involvement in the 

economic assistance area is making the difference in the 

developing world. Prime Minister Takeshita, in carrying out 

the kokusaika policy (or internationalization) first articulated by former Prime Minister Nakasone, has already 

pledged Japan to a 50 billion dollar aid package over the next 

5 years. Also, Takeshita has made some progress in the total 

economic restructuring recommended in the Maekawa Report, 

so that Japan by the next century will be an import-oriented 

society. 24 

All is not quiet on the US-Japan scene, however; problems remain such as the rice question, patent processing, and 

the scale of Japanese investments in certain real estate markets 

in the United States. Despite these nagging problems, and 

despite the recent internal governmental crisis, many of the 

difficult issues are behind us. Japan has responded to the call 

that it act responsibly in light of its economic power. In the 

process, however, there have been some political costs, and 
GRAND STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC REGION 15 

a new sensitivity can be seen in the formation of such organiTations as the Kokka Kihon Mondai Doshi Kai (Society for the 

Study of Basic National Problems). It is in the next decade 

that US policy will have to blend hopes for the future with 

memories of the past, taking into consideration what the rest 

of Asia has in mind for the future of Japan also. 

The United States and the Need for a 

New Strategic Consensus 

At a recent conference on "NATO in the Fifth Decade," 

there was much attention, might I say concern, placed on the 

concept of a Pacific Century. The acceptance of the "reality" 

of the next century belonging to Pacific powers--with, of 

course, the United States numbering itself in such a group-- 

was quite surprising. Here I was among scholars, diplomats, 

and soldiers of the major North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

states who were seemingly ready to accept as an accomplished 

fact, that somehow, someway, the diverse--non-aligned-- 

states of the Pacific Rim would magically turn the economic 

miracle into a security miracle. 

As can be seen from my review of selected states, the current situation is one of remarkable change and transition. In 

the Pacific region, even in the face of this dynamic change, 

almost all the security relations are accomplished through 

bilateral mechanisms. The 16-member NATO community, by 

contrast, is reinforced through trade and political institutions 

that form and reform the various players along meaningful 

relationships. When a security issue confronts the alliance, opportunities such as the NATO Planning Conference abound, 

allowing the members ready forums to sound out others and 

develop some form of consensus on the pressing problems. 

With 1992 just around the corner, we can expect a further 

tightening of the cohesiveness of the European community. 

Such is not the case in the Pacific Rim; unless some organizational security concept is created to fill this void, I believe that 

the "Pacific Century" may well be the 22nd Century, not the 

21st. 
16 JOHN E. ENDICO'I'r 

That, however, is not to say that what can be achieved 

in the Pacific is anything less than forward movement. What 

will be needed, in any event, is leadership. To provide that 

leadership, a road map will be necessary. It will be necessary, 

since today the US national debt stands at 2.8 trillion dollars, 

the budget deficit at 150 billion, and the trade deficit at 170 

billion (three-fifths of which is associated with East Asian nations). Interest payments on the national debt amount to 160 

billion per year, and the defense budget stands at approximately 

300 billion dollars. 25 

While such figures do have shock effect, of even greater 

importance is the fact that this comes at a time when we, as 

Americans and leaders of the Free World, can declare victory 

and claim that containment as a grand strategy for our nation 

has succeeded. What is needed now, and what we are seeking 

during this transition period, is a new grand consensus that 

reflects the changes in the international economic order--in 

both socialist and capitalist camps. Rather than containment 

as our future strategy--what we might be seeing over the next 

few years will be a policy of active engagement. Such a policy 

would not react to Soviet initiatives, but lead the world, and 

especially in this instance, the Pacific Rim. 

Does my call for a new grand strategy mean that I am 

unhappy with current US policy? Not in the least. As one 

surveys the Pacific Basin, it is clear that above all other considerations, active leadership, in the absence of an integrated 

organization, is absolutely essential. The one nation who all 

expect, and most hope, will assume this responsibility is the 

United States. If this is the case, what agenda items will aid 

in securing our regional security over the next forty to fifty 

years? 

A Global Arms Control Regime. To assure continued parity 

between the two nuclear superpowers in an era of mutual reductions, an active continuation of the nuclear arms reduction 

negotiations must be a first priority. However, in terms of 

security and budgetary outlays, remember that forty years of 

Pax Atomica have been purchased at relatively low cost. The 

security interests of both powers must be recognized, and when 

nuclear reductions do reach significant percentages, the involvement of regional nuclear powers must be realized. 
GRAND STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC REGION 17 

While the big news is always made in the reduction of 

nuclear weapons, the big money is to be saved through conventional arms control. This is especially the case in those 

nations that do not rely on a draft to man the bulk of their 

fighting force. Therefore, the reduction of large standing 

military forces should be encouraged in line with measures to 

stabilize regional flash points. In the case of the Pacific Rim, 

the two peninsulas readily come to mind. A word of caution, 

however: Rapid reduction in the armed forces of a nation can 

seriously disrupt the economy if training for such a transition 

does not carefully precede the actual event. Thus, military manpower reductions must be integrated into regional economic 

development packages as part of any peace initiative. 

Regional Communication. We must develop for the Pacific 

Rim better, faster, and more routinized means of regional communication. Such meetings as the annual "Pacific Basin Symposium" conducted by the National Defense University in 

Hawaii and Washington, D.C., could occur on a regular 

basismperhaps every six months--but in different locations 

throughout the region. A community of scholars, diplomats, 

military officers, and policy specialists needs to be developed, 

facilitating frequent and general exchange of information on 

a variety of important subjects. Better, faster communications 

are an essential element in our quest for a regional security 

community. 

Regional Economic Development. Key--absolutely fundamentalmto a strategy of active engagement, will be the support and active advocacy for measures to keep the Pacific 

economic miracle alive. In this regard, a determination to 

"powershare" on the part of the United States, especially with 

Japan, is integral to any long-term effort. As efforts by Japan 

continue, with encouragement by the United States, to increase 

its responsibility for worldwide economic assistance, the United 

States must establish patterns of close cooperation with its 

economic partner. As Japan closes the gap between its current 

1.3 percent contribution to defense and economic assistance 

and the 3.4 percent weighted average for NATO nations (excluding the United States), its role must be recognized with 
18 JOHN E. ENDICOTT 

an appropriate place at the table. The United States will have 

to be willing to deal with the fact that at some tables, Japan 

will be in the principal chair. 

Priorities for regional development must be established 

by the principal economic engines of the region to reduce 

redundancy and waste. As a substantial part of the programs 

to stabilize the two peninsulas, a fairly high emphasis should 

be placed on the economic development aspects of such 

arrangements. 

Regional Security Forces. The United States should, in the process of reaching consensus on its grand strategy for the next 

half century, commit itself to the concept of forward-deployed 

forces. Realizing that not much, if any, saving comes from 

bringing forces back to the continental United States, unless 

deactivated, and that much is gained by a US presence in 

various parts of the region, US forces should remain in strategic 

locations. The host nations and the nations of the region as 

a whole, however, should recognize that these forces are not 

forward deployed to be captive to one scenario or one nation. 

They should be viewed as US Expeditionary Forces available 

for contingencies throughout the region. 

The important US presence on the Korean Peninsula 

comes to mind in this context. As confidence grows between 

North and South Korea, US forces might be drawn back from 

the DMZ, but retained on the peninsula in some mutually 

agreeable site. Later, as the confrontation diminishes further, 

those forces could be relocated to another compatible host 

country or to Hawaii. 

A Strategy of Active Engagement 

Drawing on the basic contradictions that still exist within 

the Soviet Empire, the United States and its Pacific allies should 

actively draw out the Soviet Union to full participation in 

regional affairs. In fact, without the complete cooperation of 

the Soviet Union in stabilizing the two peninsulas, such efforts 

are bound to fail. Soviet military assistance to clients must be 

minimized and it may be possible to do so in a climate of 

mutual trust. 
GRAND STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC REGION 19 

An active endorsement of efforts to involve the Soviet 

Far East in the economic activities of the Pacific Rimmin a 

greater measure of interdependency--will have the result of 

pulling the area west of Lake Baikal more toward Vladivostok 

and less toward Moscow. While not changing the allegiance 

of that area to Moscow, such a shift will create new sensitivities 

and new dependencies. 

In advocating active engagement with the Soviet Union 

in East Asia--and other areas as well--I recognize that the 

policy we followed for the last forty years, containment, has 

succeeded in many ways articulated by its first advocates. We 

must realize that some of the basic realities of the international 

system have changed in the past forty years. The grand consensus upon which containment was built was seriously undermined during the Vietnam war. Since then, changes in 

worldwide economic relationships and changes internal to the 

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe underline the need to alter 

course toward a new grand consensus for the next half century. 

Taking advantage of man's inherent desire for freedom, 

active engagement would bring together the two philosophies 

in an open competition, exposing the remaining contradictions 

of the Soviet Empire to its inhabitants. Such an outcome, I 

contend, would be in the interests of the Pacific Rim and the 

security of the United States. 

Notes 

1 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), FBIS-EAS88-202, 19 October 1988. 

2 Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter cited as FEER), 

23 June 1988, p. 27. 

3 Ibid., 23 June 1988, p. 13. 

4 The Washington Post, 4 August 1988, p. 1. 

5 The Military Balance, 1987-1988 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 145. 

6 See especially, June Teufel Dreyer, "Deng Xiaoping and 

Modernization of the Chinese Military," Armed Forces & Society, 

Winter 1988, pp. 215-231. 
20 JOHN E. ENDICOtt 

7 Don Oberdorfer, "Asia Watch: At the Dawn of the Pacific 

Century," The Washington Post, 31 July 1988, p. C4. 

s FEER, 23 June 1988. 

9 Ibid. 

10 Ibid., 16 June 1988, p. 22. 

11 Ibid., 16 June 1988, p. 31. 

12 The Washington Post, 12 August 1988, p. A20. 

13 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Soviet President 

Gromyko Meets Wu Xiuqian," FBIS-CHI-88-139, 20 July 1988, 

p. 3; and The Washington Post, 5 August 1988, p. A31. 

14 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan), August 1988. 

15 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-CHI-88-151, 

5 August 1988, p. 3. 

16 "The U.S. and Asia: A Statistical Handbook, 1988 Edition," Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, 29 July 1988, p. 21. 

17 Ibid. 

18 New York Times, 19 October 1988, p. 1. 

19 The Washington Post, 12 August 1988. 

20 Sankei Shimbun (Tokyo), 17 September 1988. 

21 The Washington Post, 19 October 1988, p. 1. 

22 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-EAS-88-202, 

19 October 1988, p. 10. 

23 Sankei Shimbun (Tokyo), 24 August 1988, p. 2. 

24 See JEIReport, "Maekawa Report Update," October 1988, 

for an in-depth review of this report's current status. 

25 FEER, 29 September 1988, p. 24. 

Dr. John E. Endicott was Director of the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, National Defense University, in Washington 

DC, from 1986 to 1989. Currently, he is with the Georgia 

Institute of Technology.