2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-9-2014

LPP Mortgage Ltd v. Stephen Carpenter

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 13-1616

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Recommended Citation

"LPP Mortgage Ltd v. Stephen Carpenter" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 547.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 13-1616

_____________

LPP MORTGAGE LTD; f/k/a

LOAN PARTICIPATION PARTNERS, LTD., 

SIWEL, INC, D/B/A CAPITAL MORTGAGE SERVICES

OF TEXAS

v.

STEPHEN CARPENTER; PAMELA CARPENTER; 

UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

 Pamela A. Carpenter,

 Appellant

 

On Appeal from the District Court

of the Virgin Islands 

(District Court No.: 3-09-cv-00015)

District Court Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on May 13, 2014

(Opinion filed: June 9, 2014 )

BEFORE: RENDELL, FUENTES and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
2

O P I N I O N 

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, Pamela F. Carpenter seeks to have us vacate the order entered on 

February 2, 2011, permitting her former counsel, Eszart Wynter, to withdraw from 

representing her. Carpenter also contests the District Court’s orders that granted 

summary judgment in favor of Appellees, and denied reconsideration thereof. The 

underlying litigation in the District Court was a mortgage foreclosure action, originally 

commenced in 2006 in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, and removed to the 

District Court of the Virgin Islands in January 2009. 

In a memorandum opinion issued on December 21, 2012, setting forth the reasons 

why it would not reconsider the summary judgment granted to Appellees, the District 

Court outlined the chronology of events at issue. Of note, in November 2011, 

Carpenter’s attorney, Eszart Wynter, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.1 The motion 

was granted in an order dated February 2, 2012, and Wynter was instructed by the Court 

to send a copy of the order to Carpenter, as well as file a certificate of service on the 

docket. Wynter failed to comply with both directives. However, Carpenter learned of 

Wynter’s withdrawal apparently by late March 2012, as she filed a pro se answer to 

plaintiff Capital’s complaint. 

 

1

The basis for the motion, as averred by Wynter, was an undisclosed breakdown in the 

attorney-client relationship.
3

Appellees moved for summary judgment some six months later, in September, and 

Carpenter was served with the motion and received the District Court’s scheduling order,

which required any opposition to be filed by October 12, 2012. Carpenter filed no 

opposition, and on October 25, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Appellees, and filed a 16-page Memorandum Opinion detailing the allegations and 

concluding that Appellees were entitled to judgment in their favor. 

Later, on October 25, Carpenter filed an “Answer to the Third Scheduling Order” 

in which she noted the difficulty she had obtaining her file from Wynter, and states that a

prior settlement agreement made summary judgment “time consuming, unnecessary, 

unwarranted and wrong.” (App. 152.) On November 8, 2012, Carpenter, then 

represented by new counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to vacate the summary 

judgment order and allow more time for her to respond. She contended, first, that the 

Court should not have granted Wynter’s request to withdraw. Second, Carpenter had 

“attempted in good faith” to request an extension of time to respond to the motion. (App. 

161.) Third, Appellees were not entitled to summary judgment based on “many 

irregularities” in the motion and the “matter should be placed back on the settlement 

track.” (App. 164.)

Appellees filed a Response in Opposition to Carpenter’s motion on November 23, 

noting her inaction for seven months before the summary judgment motion was filed. 

Further, Appellees posited that the mediated settlement was irrelevant since Carpenter 

had not complied with its terms, instead requesting “other viable settlement 

alternatives . . . .” (App. 180.) Finally, Appellees urged that reconsideration was not 
4

available since Carpenter was merely asking the court to rethink what it had done. 

Carpenter filed a Reply on December 10, essentially reinforcing the points made in the 

original Motion.

The District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on December 21, 2012, finding 

no “manifest injustice” that would warrant reconsideration of the grant of summary 

judgment. Specifically, the Court noted that Carpenter had six months after learning of 

Wynter’s withdrawal before the summary judgment motion was filed, and she still failed 

to comply with the relevant scheduling order, filing a response two weeks after her 

opposition was due. The District Court also found that the irregularities referenced by 

Carpenter merely demonstrated that she was seeking to engage in a fishing expedition, 

given that the case had been pending for six years. 

On appeal, Carpenter urges that the District Court: (1) should not have permitted 

Wynter to withdraw, (2) should have allowed her more time to respond, (3) caused her 

manifest injustice, (4) should not have awarded excessive fees and costs to Appellees,

and (5) should have considered the viability of the mediated settlement agreement, or 

referred the matter for further mediation as an equitable alternative, in light of the 

intervention and joinder of additional parties. 

With respect to the first four issues raised, we adopt the reasoning and result of the 

District Court, and affirm its orders. We note that, with respect to costs and fees, 
5

Carpenter never challenged this award before the District Court. We thus review that 

ruling for plain error and find none.2

As to the last issues raised by Carpenter on appeal, we note that her counsel made 

only passing reference to the suggestion that there was a mediated settlement. It seems 

clear that while there was an initial agreement mediated, with the entry of new parties and 

the passage of time, it was essentially nullified; Carpenter herself reneged on it, and 

declared that she was unable to make the payments it required. Having long since

abandoned the prior settlement negotiations, Carpenter now requests that the case should 

be placed back on “the settlement track.” (App. 164.) This is not a remedy that either the 

District Court or we can or would require at this juncture. Accordingly, we affirm the 

District Court on all counts.

 

2

The District Court carefully considered the claimed fees and costs of Appellees, and in 

multiple instances subtracted expenses that were either duplicative or unexplained. (App. 

18-20.)