Contact (/contact­cia)

(/)

Library

Library (/library)

Publications (/library/publications)

Center for the Study of Intelligence (/library/center­for­the­study­of­intelligence)

Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room (/library/foia)

Kent Center Occasional Papers (/library/kent­center­occasional­papers)

Intelligence Literature (/library/intelligence­literature)

Reports (/library/reports)

General Reports (/library/reports/general­reports­1)

Archived Reports (/library/reports/archived­reports­1)

Other Government Reports (/library/reports/related­links.html)

Related Links (/library/related­links.html)

Video Center (/library/video­center)

Unclassified Report to Congress, July ­ December 1999

Unclassified Report to Congress on

the Acquisition of Technology Relating to

Weapons of Mass Destruction and

Advanced Conventional Munitions

1 July Through 30 December 1999

Scope Note

Acquisition by Country:

Iran

Iraq

North Korea

Libya

Syria

Sudan

India

Pakistan

Egypt

Key Suppliers:
Russia

North Korea

China

Western Nations

Trends

Scope Note

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of

the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:

"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence

shall submit to Congress a report on

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual­use and other technology useful for the

development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and

biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."

At the DCI's request, the DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence

Community. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of

the Intelligence Community's assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are

available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.

[Top of page]

Acquisition by Country:

As required by Section 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are summaries by country of acquisition activities

(solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional

weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 1999. We excluded countries that already have substantial WMD

programs, such as China and Russia, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern.

[Top of page]

Iran

Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD and ACW technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is

attempting to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of weapons—nuclear, chemical, and biological—and their

delivery systems. During the reporting period, the evidence indicates increased reflections of Iranian efforts to acquire WMD­ and ACWrelated equipment, materials, and technology primarily on entities in Russia, China, North Korea and Western Europe.

For the second half of 1999, entities in Russia, North Korea, and China continued to supply the largest amount of ballistic missilerelated goods, technology, and expertise to Iran. Tehran is using this assistance to support current production programs and to achieve

its goal of becoming self­sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran already is producing Scud short­range ballistic missiles

(SRBMs) and has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the Shahab­3 medium­range ballistic missile (MRBM), which had its initial

flight test in July 1998. In addition, Iran’s Defense Minister last year publicly acknowledged the development of the Shahab­4, originally

calling it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab­3, but later categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military

applications. Iran’s Defense Minister also has publicly mentioned plans for a "Shahab 5." Such statements, made against the backdrop

of sustained cooperation with Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities, strongly suggest that Tehran intends to develop a longerrange ballistic missile capability in the near future.
For the reporting period, Tehran expanded its efforts to seek considerable dual­use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise

from abroad—primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses. Iran began a biological warfare (BW)

program during the Iran­Iraq war, and it may have some limited capability for BW deployment. Outside assistance is both important and

difficult to prevent, given the dual­use nature of the materials, the equipment being sought, and the many legitimate end uses for these

items.

Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) party, already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister,

blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. During the second half of 1999, Tehran continued to

seek production technology, training, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW)

program from entities in Russia and China. It also acquired or attempted to acquire indirectly through intermediaries in other countries

equipment and material that could be used to create a more advanced and self­sufficient CW infrastructure.

Iran sought nuclear­related equipment, material, and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia, during the

second half of 1999. Work continues on the construction of a 1,000­megawatt nuclear power reactor in Bushehr, Iran, that will be

subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In addition, Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian

research centers on various activities. These projects will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn would

be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development. The expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial

channels and contacts established—even from cooperation that appears strictly civilian in nature—could be used to advance Iran’s

nuclear weapons research and developmental program.

Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a number of steps to increase its oversight of entities involved in dealings

with Iran and other states of proliferation concern. In 1999, it pushed a new export control law through the Duma. Russian firms,

however, faced economic pressures to circumvent these controls and did so in some cases. The Russian Government, moreover, failed

in some cases regarding Iran to enforce its export controls. Following repeated warnings, the US Government in January 1998 and

January 1999 imposed administrative measures against Russian entities that had engaged in nuclear­ and missile­related cooperation

with Iran. The measures imposed on these and other Russian entities (which were penalized in 1998) remain in effect, although

sanctions against two entities—Polyus and Inor—are being lifted.

China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two

ongoing nuclear projects, a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use to produce cladding

for reactor fuel. The pledge appears to be holding. As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to apply

IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or its products.

Iran claims that it is attempting to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain

whole facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility, that, in fact, could be used in any number of ways in support of efforts to produce

fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite international efforts to curtail the flow of critical technologies and equipment,

Tehran continues to seek fissile material and technology for weapons development and has set up an elaborate system of military and

civilian organizations to support its effort.

On the ACW side, Iran (which has acknowledged a need for Western military equipment and spare parts) continues to acquire Western

equipment, such as attack helicopters, but also is developing indigenous production capabilities with assistance from countries such as

Russia, China, and North Korea. Indigenous efforts involve such systems as tanks, TOW missiles, fighter aircraft, Chinese­designed

SAMs and anti­ship missiles, and attack helicopters.

[Top of page]

Iraq

Since Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by

Security Council Resolution 687. Although UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1284, adopted in December 1999, established a

follow­on inspection regime to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in the form of the United Nations Monitoring,

Verification, and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), there have been no UN inspections during this reporting period. Moreover, the

automated video monitoring system installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq has been dismantled by the Iraqis.

Having lost this on­the­ground access, it is difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq’s WMD programs.

Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its

missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual­use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use.

This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN

inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased.

Following Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, to include

several critical missile production complexes and former dual­use CW production facilities. In addition, it appears to be installing or

repairing dual­use equipment at CW­related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW

agents.
UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its CW and BW

programs. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that

Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran­Iraq War in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This

discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have an additional 6,000 CW munitions hidden.

We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its

past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. We assess that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of

1998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months, but without an

inspection monitoring program, it is difficult to determine if Iraq has done so. We know, however, that Iraq has continued to work on its

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L­29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe.

These modified and refurbished L­29s are believed to be intended for delivery of chemical or biological agents.

Iraq continues to pursue development of two SRBM systems which are not prohibited by the United Nations: the liquid­propellant AlSamoud, and the solid­propellant Ababil­100. The Al­Samoud is essentially a scaled­down Scud, and the program allows Baghdad to

develop technological improvements that could be applied to a longer range missile program. We believe that the Al­Samoud missile,

as designed, is capable of exceeding the UN­permitted 150­km­range restriction with a potential operational range of about 180

kilometers. Personnel previously involved with the Condor II/Badr­2000 missile—which was largely destroyed during the Gulf war and

eliminated by UNSCOM—are working on the Ababil­100 program. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably

would attempt to convert these efforts into longer range missile systems, regardless of continuing UN monitoring and continuing

restrictions on WMD and long­range missile programs.

[Top of page]

North Korea

P’yongyang continues to acquire raw materials from out­of­country entities to produce WMD and ballistic missiles. During the reporting

period, there were increased reflections of North Korean procurement of raw materials and components for its ballistic missile programs

from various foreign sources, especially through firms in China. North Korea produces and is capable of using a wide variety of

chemical and possibly biological agents, as well as their delivery means.

During the second half of 1999, Pyongyang sought to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear

program, but we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the nuclear weapons program. We assess that North Korea has

produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. The United States and North Korea are nearing

completion on the joint project of canning spent fuel from the Yongbyon complex for long­term storage and ultimate shipment out of the

North in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework. That reactor fuel contains enough plutonium for several more weapons.

P’yongyang continues to seek conventional weapons via the gray market. In 1999, for example, North Korea acquired MiG­21 fighter

aircraft from Kazakhstan.

[Top of page]

Libya

Libya has continued its efforts to obtain ballistic missile­related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources.

One example is the attempt last year to ship Scud­related parts as "auto parts" from a firm in Taiwan to Libya which were intercepted in

the UK. Outside assistance is critical to its ballistic missile development programs, but Libya’s current capability remains limited to its

aging Scud B missiles. We expect that the suspension of UN sanctions last year will allow Libya to expand its procurement effort.

Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW­related equipment. Following the

suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, it wasted no time in re­establishing contacts with sources of expertise, parts, and precursor

chemicals abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Clearly, Tripoli has not given up its goal of establishing its own offensive CW capability

and continues to pursue an indigenous production capability for the weapons.

Libya continues to develop its nascent and still rudimentary nuclear research and development program but still requires significant

foreign assistance to advance to a nuclear weapons option. In the latter half of 1999, Tripoli and Moscow resumed discussions on

cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center and on a potential power reactor deal. Should this civil­sector work come to fruition,

Libya could gain opportunities to conduct weapons related R&D.

In the past, Libya has sought to obtain major weapon systems, spare parts, and other support for its military forces from traditional

sources in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe, as well as from Iran. During the reporting period, Libya actively

assessed both acquisition and repair/upgrade options not previously available, and ACW supplier countries openly offered to negotiate

arms deals.
[Top of page]

Syria

Syria sought CW­related precursors and expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile

of the nerve agent sarin and apparently is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on

foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment.

During the second half of 1999, Damascus continued work on establishing a solid­propellant rocket motor development and production

capability with help from outside countries. Foreign equipment and assistance to its liquid­propellant missile program, primarily from

North Korean entities, but also from firms in Russia, also have been and will continue to be essential for Syria’s effort. Damascus also

continued its efforts to assemble—probably with considerable North Korean assistance—liquid­fueled Scud C missiles.

As to Syria’s embryonic nuclear research and development program, we will continue to monitor the potential for this program to

expand. Moscow and Damascus agreed in 1999 to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a wide area of disciplines.

In addition, sales of ACW to Syria continued, albeit at a lesser pace, during this reporting period. The vast majority of its arsenal

consists of weapons from the FSU. Russia in particular wants to restore its predominant position as the key supplier of arms to

Damascus. Syria purchased from Russia anti­tank guided munitions, tanks, and missile production capability, according to Russian

and Syrian announcements.

[Top of page]

Sudan

During the reporting period, Sudan sought to acquire a variety of military equipment from various sources. Khartoum is seeking older,

less expensive weapons that nonetheless are advanced compared with the capabilities of the weapons possessed by its opponents

and their supporters in neighboring countries in the long­running civil war.

In the WMD arena, Sudan has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, it has

obtained help from entities in other countries, principally Iraq. Given its history in developing CW and its close relationship with Iraq,

Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well.

[Top of page]

India

While striving to achieve independence from foreign suppliers, India's ballistic missile programs still benefited from the acquisition of

foreign equipment and technology. India sought items for these programs during the reporting period primarily from Russia and

Western Europe. New Delhi successfully flight­tested its newest MRBM, the Agni­2, in April 1999 after months of preparations and

continued apace with its SRBM program.

India continues to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, and its underground nuclear tests in May 1998 were a significant

milestone. The acquisition of foreign equipment could benefit New Delhi in its efforts to develop and produce more sophisticated

nuclear weapons. India obtained some foreign nuclear­related assistance during the second half of 1999 from a variety of sources

worldwide, including in Russia and Western Europe.

India’s ACW acquisition efforts during this reporting period focused on Russian­provided aircraft: Russia was in the process of

upgrading older MiG­21 fighters with more current aircraft capabilities, leased India an AWACS aircraft, and delivered several new SU30 fighters during the reporting period. India and Russia also seriously discussed the leasing of several long­range bombers, which

would provide significantly longer­range aircraft bombing capability.

[Top of page]

Pakistan

Chinese entities provided increased assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program during the second half of 1999. North Korea

continued to provide important assistance as well. Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballistic missiles. In April

1998, for example, Pakistan flight­tested the Ghauri MRBM, which is based on North Korea's No Dong missile. As a result, the US
imposed sanctions against Pakistani and North Korean entities in April 1998 for their role in transferring Missile Technology Control

Regime Category I ballistic missile­related technology. In April 1999, Islamabad flight­tested another Ghauri MRBM and the Shaheen­1

SRBM and can be expected to respond to another successful Indian missile test (e.g., Agni­II or Prithvi­II) with a new test flight of a

Ghauri or Shaheen missile.

Pakistan continued to acquire nuclear­related and dual­use equipment and materials from various sources—principally in Western

Europe—during the second half of 1999. Islamabad has a well­developed nuclear weapons program, as evidenced by its first nuclear

weapons tests in late May 1998. Acquisition of nuclear­related goods from foreign sources will be important if Pakistan chooses to

develop more advanced nuclear weapons. China, which has provided extensive support in the past to Islamabad’s WMD programs, in

May 1996 promised to stop assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities—but we cannot rule out ongoing contacts.

On ACW, Pakistan purchased fighter aircraft and anti­ship missiles from China. France delivered the last two of four submarines

contracted and continued to deliver Mirage aircraft.

[Top of page]

Egypt

Egypt continues its effort to develop and produce ballistic missiles with the assistance of North Korea. This activity is part of a longrunning program of ballistic missile cooperation between these two countries.

[Top of page]

Key Suppliers:

Russia

Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile­related goods and technical know­how to

countries such as Iran, India, and Libya. Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities accelerated

Iranian development of the Shahab­3 MRBM, which was first flight­tested in July 1998. Russian entities during the second six months of

1999 have provided substantial missile­related technology, training, and expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue to

accelerate Iranian efforts to develop new ballistic missile systems.

During the second half of 1999, Russia also remained a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily focused on the

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project. With respect to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance enhances Iran's ability to support

a nuclear weapons development effort. By its very nature, even the transfer of civilian technology may be of use in Iran's nuclear

weapons program. We remain concerned that Tehran is seeking more than a buildup of its civilian infratructure, and the IC will be

closely monitoring the relationship with Moscow for any direct assistance in support of a military program. In addition, Russia supplied

India with material for its civilian nuclear program during this reporting period.

Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and chemicals for Iran. Russia's world­leading expertise in biological and

chemical weapons would make it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and training on BW and CW agent

production processes.

Russia (along with its sister republics in the FSU) also remains an important source of conventional weapons and spare parts for Iran,

which is seeking to upgrade and replace its existing conventional weapons inventories.

Following intense and continuing engagement with the US, Russian officials took some positive steps to strengthen the legal basis of

export controls. President Yel’tsin in July 1999 signed a federal export control law, which formally makes WMD­related transfers a

violation of law and codifies several existing decrees—including catch­all controls—yet may lessen punishment for violators. Russian

export enforcement and prosecution still remains weak, however. The export law is still awaiting completion of implementing decrees

and its legal status is unclear. Public comments by the head of Russia’s security council indicate that Russia obtained only three

convictions for export control violations involving WMD and missile technology during 1998­99.

Nonetheless, the Russian government's commitment, willingness, and ability to curb proliferation­related transfers remain uncertain.

Moreover, economic conditions in Russia continued to deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian entities to circumvent export

controls. Despite some examples of restraint, Russian businesses continue to be major suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and

technology to Iran. Specifically, Russia continues to provide Iran with nuclear technology that could be applied to Iran’s weapons

program. Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior, therefore, will remain a very high priority.

[Top of page]
North Korea

Throughout the second half of 1999, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile­related equipment and missile

components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. P’yongyang attaches a

high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and

related technology are one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development and production.

[Top of page]

China

The Chinese have taken a very narrow interpretation of their nonproliferation commitment and in the case of the MTCR do not accept

the key annex.

Chinese missile­related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during this reporting period. In addition, firms in China provided

missile­related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, North Korea, and

Libya.

Chinese entities have provided extensive support in the past to Pakistan’s nuclear programs. In May 1996, Beijing promised to stop

assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, but we cannot preclude ongoing contacts. China’s involvement with Pakistan will

continue to be monitored closely.

China’s 1997 pledge not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran has apparently held, but work associated with two

remaining nuclear projects—a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility—continues. The Intelligence Community will

continue to monitor carefully Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Prior to the reporting period, Chinese firms had supplied CW­related production equipment and technology to Iran. The US sanctions

imposed in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW program remain in effect.

Evidence during the current reporting period suggests Iran continues to seek such assistance from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to

what extent these efforts have succeeded. In June 1998, China announced that it had expanded its chemical export controls to include

10 of the 20 Australia Group chemicals not listed on the CWC schedules.

[Top of page]

Western Countries

As was the case in 1998, entities in Western countries in 1999 were not as important as sources for WMD­related goods and materials

as in past years —with the exceptions of Iran and Libya, where entities in Western European countries in particular remain significant

suppliers for their WMD programs. Increasingly rigorous and effective export controls and cooperation among supplier countries have

led the other foreign WMD programs to look elsewhere for many controlled dual­use goods. Machine tools, spare parts for dual­use

equipment, and widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals were the most common items sought. In addition,

several Western countries announced their willigness to negotiate ACW sales to Libya.

[Top of page]

Trends

As in previous reports, countries determined to maintain WMD and missile programs over the long term have been placing significant

emphasis on insulating their programs against interdiction and disruption, and trying to reduce their dependence on imports by

developing indigenous production capabilities. Although these capabilities may not always be a good substitute for foreign imports—

particularly for more advanced technologies—in many cases they may prove to be adequate. In addition, as their domestic capabilities

grow, traditional recipients of WMD and missile technology could emerge as new suppliers of technology and expertise. Many of these

countries—such as Iran and Pakistan—do not adhere to the export restraints embodied in supplier groups such as the Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

On the ACW side, notwithstanding a trend toward developing capabilities for indigenous production, many countries are buying both

production rights and after­sale assistance. They also are pursuing upgrades, which tend to be cheaper and often circumvent

Wassenaar Arrangement and/or US legislative constraints. In addition, some countries are acquiring a small number of hightechnology systems for key military units.

[Top of page]
Privacy (/about­cia/site­policies/#privacy­notice) Copyright (/about­cia/site­policies/#copy)

Site Policies (/about­cia/site­policies/) USA.gov (http://www.usa.gov/)

FOIA (http://www.foia.cia.gov/) DNI.gov (http://www.dni.gov/)

NoFEAR Act (/about­cia/no­fear­act/) Inspector General (/offices­of­cia/inspector­general/)

Contact CIA (/contact­cia/) Site Map (/sitemap.html)

Posted: May 02, 2007 11:07 AM

Last Updated: Jan 03, 2012 12:51 PM

(/open/)

CONNECT WITH CIA

TWITTER FEED

CIA #Museum Artifact of the Week:

Digital X‐Ray Detector Panel

1.usa.gov/1GnZioF

pic.twitter.com/8vkE7fb8nb

CIA

@CIA

18h

Tweets Follow

Tweet to @CIA

View @CIA Twitter Feed

(https://twitter.com/CIA)

(/news­information/your­news)

(/contact­cia)