15818 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 63 / Tuesday, April 3, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, 

ANM–116, FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 

227–2677; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using 

any AMOC approved in accordance with 

§ 39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC 

applies, notify the appropriate principal 

inspector in the FAA Flight Standards 

Certificate Holding District Office. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

has approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(h) Refer to MCAI Israeli Airworthiness 

Directive 28–07–02–03, dated February 11, 

2007, and Gulfstream Alert Service Bulletin 

200–28A–315, dated February 5, 2007, for 

related information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use Gulfstream Alert Service 

Bulletin 200–28A–315, dated February 5, 

2007, to do the actions required by this AD, 

unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Gulfstream Aerospace 

Corporation, P.O. Box 2206, Mail Station D–

25, Savannah, Georgia 31402–2206. 

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

(202) 741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

23, 2007. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–5898 Filed 4–2–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–27735; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–027–AD; Amendment 

39–15009; AD 2007–07–12] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Honeywell 

Flight Management Systems (FMSs) 

Served by Honeywell NZ–2000 

Navigation Computers Approved 

Under Technical Standard Order (TSO) 

TSO–C115a, and IC–800 Integrated 

Avionics Computers Approved Under 

TSOs C9c, C52a, and C115a; as 

Installed on Various Transport 

Category Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Honeywell FMSs served by Honeywell 

NZ–2000 navigation computers and IC–

800 integrated avionics computers. This 

AD requires identifying affected 

computers by part number and software 

modification level and revising the 

Limitations section of applicable 

airplane flight manuals to provide 

procedures for retaining optimum 

position determination and intended 

navigation. This AD results from reports 

of in-flight unannunciated shifts of 

computed position in airplanes with the 

subject flight management system (FMS) 

computers. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent a shift in the FMS computed 

position, which could result in 

uncommanded deviations from the 

intended flight path of the airplane and, 

if those deviations are undetected by the 

flight crew, compromised terrain/traffic 

avoidance. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective April 

18, 2007. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of April 18, 2007. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by June 4, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

AD. 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to 

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility; 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Contact Honeywell, P.O. Box 21111, 

Phoenix, AZ 85036–1111, for service 

information identified in this AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe 

Brownlee, Flight Test Pilot, Flight Test 

Branch, ANM–160L, FAA, Los Angeles 

Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 

Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, 

California 90712–4137; telephone (562) 

627–5365; fax (562) 627–5210. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We have received reports of in-flight 

unannunciated shifts of computed 

position in airplanes with Honeywell 

NZ–2000 navigation and IC–800 

integrated avionics computers serving 

Honeywell Flight Management Systems 

(FMSs). The computed position shift, 

attributed to a software design error 

induced during a previous software 

modification, occurs when the number 

of inertial reference units (IRUs) 

supplying data to the FMS degrades 

from 3 to 2 or from 2 to 1, or increases 

from 2 to 3 or from 1 to 2. If the FMS 

system is coupled to an autopilot or 

flight director system, this shift in the 

FMS computed position could result in 

uncommanded deviations from the 

intended flight path of the airplane and, 

if those deviations are undetected by the 

flight crew, compromised terrain/traffic 

avoidance. 

Relevant Service Information 

We have reviewed Honeywell 

Technical Newsletter A23–6111–008, 

Revision 001, dated February 22, 2007. 

This technical newsletter describes 

procedures for determining affected 

FMS computers receiving position 

information from multiple IRUs by 

identifying the part number and 

software modification level of the NZ–

2000 navigation and IC–800 integrated 

avionics computers serving these Flight 

Management Systems. For airplanes 

with affected part numbers and software 

modification levels, the newsletter also 

describes revising the Limitations 

section of the applicable airplane flight 

manuals (AFMs) to provide procedures 

for deselecting all but one IRS to each 

FMS on every power-up cycle. The 


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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 63 / Tuesday, April 3, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 15819 

AFM revision is provided as Appendix 

A in the newsletter. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This AD 

The unsafe condition described 

previously is likely to exist or develop 

on other airplanes of the same type 

design. For this reason, we are issuing 

this AD to prevent errors in airplane 

position displays and consequent 

deviation from the intended flight path. 

This AD requires accomplishing the 

actions specified in the Technical 

Newsletter described previously. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD interim action. 

The manufacturer is currently 

developing a modification that will 

address the unsafe condition identified 

in this AD. Once this modification is 

developed, approved, and available, we 

might consider additional rulemaking. 

FAA’s Determination of the Effective 

Date 

Since an unsafe condition exists that 

requires the immediate adoption of this 

AD, we have found that notice and 

opportunity for public comment before 

issuing this AD are impracticable, and 

that good cause exists to make this AD 

effective in less than 30 days. 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements that affect flight safety and 

was not preceded by notice and an 

opportunity for public comment; 

however, we invite you to submit any 

relevant written data, views, or 

arguments regarding this AD. Send your 

comments to an address listed in the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2007–27735; Directorate Identifier 

2007–NM–027–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of the AD that might suggest a 

need to modify it. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact with FAA 

personnel concerning this AD. Using the 

search function of that web site, anyone 

can find and read the comments in any 

of our dockets, including the name of 

the individual who sent the comment 

(or signed the comment on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

You may review the DOT’s complete 

Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 

Register published on April 11, 2000 

(65 FR 19477–78), or you may visit 

http://dms.dot.gov. 

Examining the Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The Docket 

Management Facility office (telephone 

(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza 

level of the Nassif Building at the DOT 

street address stated in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after the Docket 

Management System receives them. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

Section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that the regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

See the ADDRESSES section for a location 

to examine the regulatory evaluation. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 

by adding the following new 

airworthiness directive (AD): 

2007–07–12 Honeywell, Inc.: Amendment 

39–15009. Docket No. FAA–2007–27735; 

Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–027–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD becomes effective April 18, 

2007. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to all Honeywell NZ–

2000 navigation computers approved under 

Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO–C115a, 

and IC–800 integrated avionics computers 

approved under TSOs C9c, C52a, and C115a; 

as installed on transport category airplanes, 

certificated in any category, including but not 

limited to the airplanes identified in Table 1 

of this AD. 

TABLE 1.—KNOWN AFFECTED AIRPLANES

Manufacturer Model 

Bombardier, Inc ........................................................................................ CL–600–2B16 (CL–601–3A, CL–601–3R, and CL–604) airplanes. 

Dassault Aviation ...................................................................................... Mystere-Falcon 900 airplanes. 

Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation .......................................................... G–1159A, G–IV, and GV airplanes. 

Lockheed .................................................................................................. 382G series airplanes. 


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15820 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 63 / Tuesday, April 3, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

TABLE 1.—KNOWN AFFECTED AIRPLANES—Continued 

Manufacturer Model 

Raytheon Aircraft Company ..................................................................... BAe.125 Series 800A (including C–29A and U–125) airplanes. 

Hawker 800XP and 1000 airplanes. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from reports of in-flight 

unannunciated shifts of computed position 

in airplanes with the subject flight 

management system (FMS) computers 

identified in paragraph (c) of this AD. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent a shift in the FMS 

computed position, which could result in 

uncommanded deviations from the intended 

flight path of the airplane and, if those 

deviations are undetected by the flight crew, 

compromised terrain/traffic avoidance. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Identification of Part Number/Modification 

Level 

(f) Within 14 days after the effective date 

of this AD: Determine if the installed NZ–

2000 navigation computers and IC–800 

integrated avionics computers serving FMSs 

have computer part numbers and software 

modification levels identified in Honeywell 

Technical Newsletter A23–6111–008, 

Revision 001, dated February 22, 2007. For 

purposes of this AD, airplanes with FMS 

computers having a part number and 

software modification level identified in the 

newsletter are ‘‘affected airplanes.’’

Revision of Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) 

(g) For any affected airplane: Within 14 

days after the effective date of this AD, revise 

the Limitations section of the applicable 

AFM to incorporate the information included 

in Appendix A of Honeywell Technical 

Newsletter A23–6111–008, Revision 001, 

dated February 22, 2007. This may be done 

by inserting a copy of Appendix A of the 

newsletter into the AFM. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(h)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested in accordance with the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector 

(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District 

Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 

FSDO. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use Honeywell Technical 

Newsletter A23–6111–008, Revision 001, 

dated February 22, 2007, to perform the 

actions that are required by this AD, unless 

the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of 

the Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference of this document 

in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. Contact Honeywell, P.O. Box 21111, 

Phoenix, AZ 85036–1111, for a copy of this 

service information. You may review copies 

at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington; or at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ 

cfr/ibr-locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

23, 2007. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–5896 Filed 4–2–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–27736; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–001–AD; Amendment 

39–15010; AD 2007–07–05] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 777 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Boeing Model 777 airplanes. This AD 

requires a one-time inspection to 

determine the part number of the left 

and right air supply and cabin pressure 

controllers (ASCPCs) and installation of 

new ASCPC software if necessary. This 

AD results from a report of an ASCPC 

failure during flight. We are issuing this 

AD to prevent an ASCPC failure that 

could stop airflow into the airplane, 

inhibit the cabin altitude warning 

message, and cause an incorrect display 

of cabin altitude. These failures could 

result in depressurization of the 

airplane without warning. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective April 

18, 2007. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of April 18, 2007. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by June 4, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

AD. 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to 

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility; 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street SW., Nassif Building, 

room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. 

Contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 

Washington 98124–2207, for service 

information identified in this AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

David Webber, Aerospace Engineer, 

Cabin Safety and Environmental 

Systems Branch, ANM–150S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 917–6451; fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We have received a report indicating 

that the left air supply and cabin 

pressure controller (ASCPC) incorrectly 

shut off the right air conditioning pack 

and the left bleed, and erratically 

opened and closed the isolation valves, 

on a Model 777 airplane during flight. 

This resulted in periods of loss of 

conditioned inflow to the cabin and 

flight deck. The flightcrew descended 

the airplane to 10,000 feet and returned 

to the airport. Investigation into this 

event revealed that the actions of the 

ASCPC resulted from a solder defect in 

the Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) 

629 hardware that occurred during 

manufacturing. The manufacturing error 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES