### The Honorable Beverly R. Stites, United States Magistrat e 1 

### Judge fo r the Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case wa s referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ___________ No. 95-3592

___________ Phillis Shepherd, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * Western District of Arkansas. Social Security Administration, * * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: April 18, 1996 Filed: May 6, 1996

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
Phyllis Shepherd appeals from the final order entered in the di strict

cour t affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security t o

1 deny S hepherd's application for disability insurance benefits. For th e reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Shepherd was born in 1943, and had worked as, among other things, a stock clerk. In September 1992, she applied for benefits, alleging that lumbar and cervical d egenerative disc disease, arthritis, and pain in her neck, shoulder, arms, hands, hips, and lower back, rendered her disabled as of May 22, 1992.

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Shepherd's application was denied initially and on reconsideration, and sh e req uested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which wa s held in S eptember 1993. Shepherd expressly waived her right t o representation; Sheph erd, her husband, and a vocational expert testified.

Af ter analyzing Shepherd's subjective complaints of pain under th e criteria set forth in Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir

. 1984), the ALJ found her complaints not fully credible. The ALJ determine d that Shepherd's exert ional and non-exertional impairments did not meet or equal any listed impairment, and that--based on the vocational expert' s response to a hypothe tical question--Shepherd had the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work as a stock clerk. Thus, the AL J concluded that Shepherd was not disabled and denied her benefits. After considering new evide nce, the Appeals Council denied further review. The distri ct court concluded there was substantial evidence to support th e Commissioner's decisi on and granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment.

On appeal , Shepherd first argues that she did not knowingly an d int elligently waive representation. We conclude this argument i s meritless, because pr ior to the administrative hearing, Shepherd received

no few er than four notices from the Commissioner, written i n st raightforward, simple terms, informing her of her right t o representation. See Wingert v. Bowen , 894 F.2d 296, 298 (8th Cir. 1990) (claimant properly notified of right to representation when notices clearl y explain claimant's right to counsel).

Second, Shepherd argues the ALJ failed to develop a reasonabl y complete record. Because Shepherd was unrepresented, the ALJ had a duty to "develop a reasonably complete record," but not to act as substitut e counsel. See Clark v. Shalala , 28 F.3d 828, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Highfill v. Bowen , 832 F.2d 112, 115 (8th C ir. 1987) (claimant's lack of counsel enhances "ALJ's duty to bring out

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the relevant facts"). We conclude the ALJ properly performed this tas k becaus e he questioned Shepherd about her impairments and her residua l functional capacity, and offered her an opportunity to add any additional information she felt was relevant to her claim. See Wingert , 894 F.2d at 298 (ALJ adequately d eveloped record regarding claimant's issue on appeal when ALJ "conscientiously elicited the facts" an d asked if claimant wanted to add any other information addressing issue). Moreover, Shepherd failed to assert how any of the alleged deficiencies in the record prejudiced her

. See Highfill , 832 F.2 d at 115 (claimant must show prejudice or unfairness resulting from an incomplete record).

Third, Sh epherd argues the ALJ improperly discounted her subjective compl aints of pain. To determine whether the ALJ properly applied th e Polaski factors, this court must consider whether the ALJ took into accoun t all th e relevant evidence, and whether that evidence contradicted th e claimant's own testim ony so that the ALJ could discount the testimony for lack of credibility. Benskin v. Bowen , 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1987). After reviewing the ALJ's decision and the record, we conclude the AL J considered all the relevant evidence before him and properly discredited Shephe rd's testimony regarding her subjective complaints. See Woolf v

. Shalala , 3 F.3d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 1993) (subjective complaints of pain may be discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole)

. Here, the objective medical evidence failed to support the severity o f Shepherd's complaints and it contradicted her su bjective assessment of her functional capacities. See Barrett v. Shalala , 38 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8t h Cir. 1994) (absence of objective medical evidence supporting claimant' s subj ective complaints of pain is proper factor for ALJ to consider)

. Moreover, Shepherd's usual use of only Tylenol to control her pain, and he r fai lure to seek aggressive treatment are inconsistent with a finding o f disabli ng pain. See Rautio v. Bowen , 862 F.2d 176, 179 (8th Cir. 1988 ) ("failure to seek aggressive treatment is not su ggestive of disabling back pain");

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cf. House v. Shalala , 34 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1994) (pain controlled by Tylenol, minimal medical treatment, and ability to perform variety of dail y activities inconsistent with complaints of disabling pain).

We reject Shepherd's other claims as meritless. The hypothetica l question the ALJ posed to the VE was proper because it set forth all the limi tations which the ALJ accepted as true and were supported by th e record. See Haynes v. Shalala , 26 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1994) (cour t addressed challenge to hypothetical question despite ALJ's finding tha t claimant c ould perform past relevant work). Finally, a review of th e record shows that the ALJ considered all the rel evant evidence and did not

over -emphasize one physician's report over that of Shepherd's treatin g physician; that after determining Shepherd's exe rtional and non-exertional imp airments, the ALJ specifically considered the effects of each , singularly and in com bination; and that even considering the new evidence submitted to the Appe als Council, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to deny Shepherd benefits. See Riley v. Shalala , 18 F.3d 619, 62 3 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of review).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.