Filed 10/31/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TREVAUN IAN FRANCIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

B270470

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA372403

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. 

Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell and Thomas C. 

Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION

The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (the 

STEP Act) imposes an additional penalty on any defendant who 

commits a felony to benefit a criminal street gang. The length of 

the sentence enhancement depends on whether the felony is 

serious, violent, or non-serious and nonviolent. Defendant 

Trevaun Ian Francis1 was convicted of a serious felony with gang

and gun enhancements. Thus, the gang enhancement for serious 

felonies applied. Under the circumstances of this case, however, 

the court could not impose both the gun enhancement and the

serious-felony gang enhancement. (People v. Le (2015) 61 Cal.4th 

416 (Le).) Instead of staying or striking the prohibited 

enhancement, the court imposed the “other felonies” gang 

enhancement. 

We conclude, based on the plain language of the statute, 

that the gang enhancement for “other felonies” cannot be 

appended to a serious or violent felony because serious and 

violent felonies fall within that provision’s excepting clause. We 

therefore modify the judgment to reflect the serious-felony gang 

enhancement, stay the enhancement, and affirm as modified.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 8, 2010, defendant, who had recently turned 18 

years old, drove two fellow members of the Rollin’ 30s Harlem 

Crips to territory claimed by the Fruit Town Brims, a Bloods 

gang. Defendant shot at a cyclist who appeared to belong to the 

rival gang. 

1 In some court documents, defendant is referred to as Trevaun 

Renald Francis.

2

 
By second amended information filed January 14, 2011, 

defendant was charged with assault with a firearm (Pen. Code,2

§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1); shooting from a motor vehicle 

(former § 12034,3 subd. (c); count 3); and assault with a 

semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 4).4 The 

information alleged personal firearm use (§ 12022.5, subd.(a)) 

and serious-felony gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)) 

for each count. The information also alleged that defendant had 

been on bail in two other cases when he committed the charged 

crimes (§ 12022.1).

Defendant pled not guilty and denied the allegations. After 

a bifurcated trial at which he testified in his own defense, a jury 

found defendant guilty of counts 3 and 4 and found the conduct 

enhancements true. Defendant waived his right to a jury 

determination of the truth of the two on-bail allegations, 

admitted one allegation (pertaining to case no. BA369882), and 

denied the other allegation (case no. YJ33464).5

At sentencing, defendant argued—and the prosecution 

conceded—that the serious-felony gang enhancement that had 

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 Effective January 1, 2012, former section 12034 (count 3) was 

recodified without substantive change at section 26100. (Stats. 2010, 

ch. 711, § 4 [repealed]; Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6 [reenacted].)

4 Count 2 only applied to co-defendant Jean Palacios, who is not a 

party to this appeal.

5 Although the on-bail allegation pertaining to case no. YJ33464 

was neither found true nor imposed by the court, the minute orders do 

not reflect that it was dismissed. Upon issuance of our remittitur, the 

trial should correct the minute orders to reflect dismissal of this 

allegation.

3

 
been alleged and proven under section 186.22, subdivision 

(b)(1)(B), was barred by section 1170.1, subdivision (f). (Le, 

supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 425.) The prosecution contended, 

however, that Le allowed the court to impose a gang 

enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A), instead. 

After a contested hearing, the court concluded it had the 

authority to enhance defendant’s sentence under subdivision 

(b)(1)(A).

The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 25 

years in state prison. The court selected count 4 (§ 245, subd. (b)) 

as the base term and sentenced defendant to the upper term of 

nine years. The court imposed the upper term of 10 years for the 

personal-use enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), the upper term 

of four years for the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)), 

and two years for the on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1), to run 

consecutively.6 The court stayed count 3 (former § 12034, 

subd. (c)) and its related enhancements under section 654 and 

dismissed count 1 (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), which was a lesserincluded offense of count 4.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

6 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of two court records 

in superior court case no. BA369882—the abstract of judgment filed on 

May 15, 2017, and the minute order of May 4, 2017. (Evid. Code, 

§§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a).) In light of defendant’s subsequent 

no-contest plea in case no. BA369882, the court’s failure to stay 

execution of the on-bail enhancement in this case was harmless. 

(§ 12022.1, subd. (d) [on-bail enhancement requires conviction of both 

original and new offenses]; People v. Meloney (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1145, 

1162–1163 [where the enhancement case is tried before the bail case, 

court must stay enhancement pending conviction in original case].) 

4

 
DISCUSSION

In People v. Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court held 

that under section 1170.1, subdivision (f), when a crime qualifies 

as a violent felony solely because the defendant personally used a 

firearm in the commission of that felony, the personal use can 

support either a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) or a 

violent-felony gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), but 

not both.7 (People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 509 

(Rodriguez).) In Le, the court extended the rule to serious-felony 

gang enhancements (subd. (b)(1)(B)). (Le, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 

pp. 425, 429.) 

In this case, as in Le, defendant was convicted of assault 

with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)) with personal-use 

(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and gang enhancements (subd. (b)(1)). The 

trial court recognized that under Rodriguez and Le, it could not 

enhance defendant’s sentence under either subdivision (b)(1)(B) 

or (b)(1)(C)—but concluded it could enhance the sentence under 

subdivision (b)(1)(A), the gang enhancement for non-serious, 

nonviolent felonies. 

While the People insist the reasoning of Rodriguez and Le 

does not extend to subdivision (b)(1)(A) enhancements, this case 

does not require us to resolve that question. Instead, the issue 

turns on familiar principles of statutory interpretation and plain 

language. Applying those principles, we hold that because 

subdivision (b)(1)(A) unambiguously excludes serious and violent 

felonies, that enhancement may not be appended to a serious or 

violent felony. 

7 All undesignated subdivision references are to section 186.22. 

5

 
1. Standard of Review

Subdivision (b)(1)(A)’s application to serious or violent 

felonies is an issue of “statutory interpretation that we must 

consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71.) As 

with any case involving statutory interpretation, our primary 

goal is to ascertain and effectuate the lawmakers’ intent. (People 

v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796.) To determine intent, we first 

examine the statutory language and give the words their 

ordinary meaning. (Ibid.) “If the language is unambiguous, 

there is no need for further construction.” (People v. Gonzales

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 868.) 

We adhere to the plain language of the statute “unless 

doing so would lead to absurd results the Legislature could not 

have intended.” (People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 231.) 

But even that exception is exceedingly narrow. We cannot 

“ignore the actual words of the statute in an attempt to vindicate 

our perception of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the law.” 

(Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 

993.) 

2. Plain Meaning

The STEP Act “imposes various punishments on 

individuals who commit gang-related crimes—including a 

sentencing enhancement on those who commit felonies ‘for the 

benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal 

street gang.’ (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b).)” (People v. Prunty, 

supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 67.) Subdivision (b) provides that any 

such defendant:

(b)(1) [e]xcept as provided in paragraphs (4) and 

(5), ... shall, upon conviction of that felony, in 

6
addition and consecutive to the punishment 

prescribed for the felony or attempted felony 

of which he or she has been convicted, be 

punished as follows:

(A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) 

and (C), the person shall be punished by an 

additional term of two, three, or four years at 

the court’s discretion.

(B) If the felony is a serious felony, as defined 

in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, the person 

shall be punished by an additional term of 

five years.

(C) If the felony is a violent felony, as defined 

in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, the person 

shall be punished by an additional term of 10 

years. 

(Emphasis added.) Paragraphs (4) and (5) provide that a 

defendant convicted of certain serious or violent felonies “shall” 

receive an indeterminate life term with a specified minimum 

parole eligibility date. (Subds. (b)(4), (b)(5).)

This series of interlocking provisions is the mechanism by 

which subdivision (b) attaches specific penalties to specific types 

of crimes—two, three, or four years for a basic felony 

(subd. (b)(1)(A)); five years for a serious felony (subd. (b)(1)(B)); 

10 years for a violent felony (subd. (b)(1)(C)); and a life sentence 

with a specified minimum parole term for enumerated serious or 

violent felonies (subds. (b)(4), (b)(5)). Each penalty is mandatory. 

(Le, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 423 [subdivision (b)(1) enhancements 

“are mandatory—all three provisions specify that the additional 

punishment ‘shall’ be imposed.”].) The penalty applicable to a 

7
given felony is not a matter of prosecutorial charging discretion 

or a sentencing choice available to the trial court. In this way, 

subdivision (b) establishes mutually exclusive “methods for 

punishing felons whose crimes were committed for the benefit of 

a criminal street gang.” (People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002, 

1004 (Lopez).) 

The statutory language is clear and unambiguous. 

Accordingly, it requires no interpretation or construction. 

Subdivision (b)(1) applies to every gang crime except those 

designated in subdivisions (b)(4) and (b)(5). Subdivision (b)(1)(A) 

applies to all remaining eligible felonies “[e]xcept as provided in 

subparagraphs (B) and (C).” Subdivision (b)(1)(B) provides that 

“a serious felony ... shall be punished by an additional term of 

five years.” Subdivision (b)(1)(C), in turn, provides that “a violent 

felony ... shall be punished by an additional term of 10 years.” 

While there is discretion embedded within subdivision (b)(1)(A) 

for felonies falling within that provision, a trial court has no 

discretion to impose a term under subdivision (b)(1)(A) for a 

felony that falls under (B) or (C). Here, defendant was convicted 

of a serious felony.8 As such, the STEP Act required the court to 

impose a gang enhancement under subdivision (b)(1)(B)—

regardless of whether section 1170.1, subdivision (f), would 

ultimately limit it. The Act did not authorize the court to impose

an enhancement under subdivision (b)(1)(A). 

In general, a court exceeds its jurisdiction when it imposes 

an unauthorized or legally impossible sentence. (People v. Scott

8 Defendant’s conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm 

(§ 245, subd. (b)) qualified as a serious felony under section 1192.7, 

subdivisions (c)(8), (c)(23), and (c)(31). The jury found the subdivision 

(b)(1)(B) allegation true.

8

 
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [a sentence is unauthorized if “it could 

not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular 

case.”]; see People v. Soriano (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 781, 784–785 

[court lacked jurisdiction to sentence defendant for attempting to 

file a forged instrument where the forgery (a death certificate) 

was not an instrument].) Here, the People acknowledge that

subdivision (b)(1)(A) applies only to non-serious, nonviolent 

felonies. And they concede that defendant was convicted of a 

serious felony. Yet they have offered no legal theory under which 

a court may disregard the statute’s plain language—language 

that explicitly exempts serious, violent crimes from (b)(1)(A)—

and impose an enhancement where none is authorized. Nor have 

the People offered a legal theory under which the court may 

convert a serious, violent felony into a non-serious, nonviolent 

one.9 

“Following the plain language of section 186.22, subdivision 

(b)(1) does not produce an absurd result; the most that can be 

said is that it will not increase the defendant’s actual custody 

time in all cases where a gang allegation is found true.” (People 

v. Johnson (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1238.) As noted above, 

subdivision (b)(1)(B) provides that when a gang allegation has 

been found true, a defendant convicted of a serious felony must 

serve “an additional term of five years.” In many cases, the 

9 Instead, the People observe that unlike a (b)(1)(B) enhancement, 

the (b)(1)(A) enhancement was not predicated on personal firearm use, 

and as such, did not violate the multiple-enhancement prohibition of 

section 1170.1, subdivision (f)—the provision at issue in Rodriguez and 

Le. We offer no opinion of that question. Plainly, it is not enough for 

section 1170.1 to allow the enhancement; the enhancement itself must 

also apply. 

9

 
application of that enhancement will increase the time a 

defendant actually spends in custody. In other cases—such as 

when the court has already imposed 10 additional years for a 

firearm enhancement—it will not necessarily do so. 

This is not an unreasonable result. The Legislature knows 

how to draft statutory exceptions. Indeed, the firearm 

enhancement imposed in this case is itself rooted in an exception

to the general rule barring such enhancements. (Le, supra, 61 

Cal.4th at p. 420, fn. 3 [“Generally, a defendant is exempt from a 

section 12022.5 enhancement if the ‘use of a firearm is an 

element of’ the charged offense. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) But 

section 12022.5 contains an exception if a defendant commits a 

section 245 violation using a firearm. (§ 12022.5, subd. (d).)”].) 

That exception, in turn, is circumscribed by section 1170.1’s 

prohibition on multiple firearm enhancements—and both 

provisions are consistent with section 12022.53. 

Section 12022.53 subjects “offenders who personally 

used ... a firearm in committing a gang-related offense” to both a 

personal-use enhancement and a gang enhancement—but that 

statute only applies to specifically-enumerated serious and 

violent felonies. (People v. Brookfield (2009) 47 Cal.4th 583, 593–

594.) Section 245 is not among them. (§ 12022.53, subd. (a).) If 

the Legislature wishes to reconsider the limits of any of these 

provisions, it may do so. (People v. Harper (2003) 109 

Cal.App.4th 520, 524 [“ ‘Courts may not rewrite statutes to 

supply omitted terms or to conform to an assumed, unexpressed, 

legislative intent. [Citation.] It is, of course, up to the 

Legislature, and not the courts, to rewrite statutes.’ 

[Citations.]”].) Until it does, however, it is not absurd for the 

courts to apply subdivision (b)(1)(A) as written.

10
3. Statutory Consistency

Principles of statutory consistency and stare decisis also 

require us to follow the plain language of subdivision (b)(1)(A). 

(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 

450, 455.) Although we look first at the words of a statute, we do 

not consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we read 

the statute “as a whole, harmonizing the various elements by 

considering each clause and section in the context of the overall 

statutory framework.” (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 

246.) We construe all parts of a statute together, without 

according undue importance to a single or isolated portion. 

(Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228.) Thus, a “ ‘word 

or phrase will be given the same meaning each time it appears in 

a statute.’ ” (Id. at p. 255.) “Significance should be given, if 

possible, to every word of an act.” (Delaney v. Superior Court 

(1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.) “Conversely, a construction that 

renders a word surplusage should be avoided.” (Id. at p. 799.) 

As we have discussed, subdivision (b) contains a series of 

interlocking provisions. The excepting clause in subdivision 

(b)(1)(A) mirrors the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1). 

(Compare subd. (b)(1) [enhancement applies “[e]xcept as provided 

in paragraphs (4) and (5)”] with subd. (b)(1)(A) [subparagraph 

applies “[e]xcept as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C)”].) 

And our interpretation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) is consistent with 

the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the parallel 

language in subdivision (b)(1). (Lopez, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1002.) 

In Lopez, the court addressed whether a gang-related firstdegree murder could be enhanced by 10 years as a violent felony 

under subdivision (b)(l)(C), “or whether such a murder falls 

within that subdivision’s excepting clause and is governed 

11
instead by the 15-year minimum parole eligibility term” of 

subdivision (b)(5). (Lopez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1006.) Because 

a 15-year minimum eligible parole date would have little 

practical effect on a defendant who, because of the murder

conviction, was already parole-ineligible for 25 years (§ 190, 

subd. (a)), the government was understandably interested in 

applying the 10-year subdivision (b)(l)(C) enhancement instead. 

(Lopez, at pp. 1008–1009.)10 The defendant in Lopez argued “that 

the statutory language is plain and its meaning unmistakable.” 

(Id. at p. 1006.) He explained that subdivision (b)(1) authorizes 

additional punishment “ ‘[e]xcept as provided in paragraphs (4) 

and (5) ... .’ ” Paragraph (5) applies when the felony is 

“punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life.” 

(Subd. (b)(5).) “[F]irst degree murder, which is punishable by 

‘imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life’ 

(§ 190, subd. (a)), is such an offense.” (Lopez, at p. 1006.) 

A unanimous court agreed. The court held, based on the 

plain language of section 186.22, that where a gang-related 

felony falls within subdivision (b)(5)’s alternative penalty 

10 The minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) is the earliest date 

on which a life prisoner may legally be released on parole. (§ 3046; 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2000, subd. (b)(67).) An inmate is entitled to 

a parole suitability hearing one year before his MEPD. (§ 3041, 

subd. (a)(2).) While a subdivision (b)(5) enhancement could be a factor 

tending to show a defendant is unsuitable for parole (Cal. Code Regs., 

tit. 15, § 2402; People v. Johnson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238), a 

subdivision (b)(1)(C) enhancement would postpone the inmate’s 

suitability hearing for 10 more years. (§ 669, subd. (a) [term for 

consecutive, determinate enhancement served first and not credited 

toward indeterminate MEPD].) That is, subdivision (b)(1)(C) would 

increase the defendant’s sentence to 35 years to life; subdivision (b)(5) 

would not.

12

 
provision, the trial court must sentence the defendant under 

subdivision (b)(5). It cannot impose a (b)(1)(C) enhancement 

instead. Thus, the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1) barred 

the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement—specifically 

(b)(l)(C)—to maximize the defendant’s overall sentence. (Lopez, 

supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1004, 1006; accord, People v. Johnson, 

supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236–1238; People v. Harper, 

supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 525; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 

Cal.App.4th 480, 485–486.) 

Since Lopez construed subdivision (b)(1) in 2005, the 

Legislature has amended the STEP Act several times. It has 

never changed the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1). “When 

as here ‘ “a statute has been construed by judicial decision, and 

that construction is not altered by subsequent legislation, it must 

be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the judicial 

construction and approves of it.” [Citations.] “There is a strong 

presumption that when the Legislature reenacts a statute which 

has been judicially construed it adopts the construction placed on 

the statute by the courts.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Meloney, 

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1161.) 

4. Remedy

4.1. We may modify the judgment on appeal.

The typical remedy under Rodriguez is to reverse and 

remand for resentencing. (Rodriguez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 

p. 509.) In Rodriguez, however, the trial court had imposed the 

middle term for the three underlying felonies. Resentencing, 

therefore, provided the court with “the opportunity ... to 

restructure its sentence by imposing the upper terms for the base 

felonies, if it was inclined to compensate for the loss of one of the 

13
enhancements.” (Le, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 428.) In this case, by 

contrast, the trial court imposed the maximum possible sentence. 

As there are no sentencing choices to restructure, it is 

appropriate for us to modify the sentence on appeal. (§ 1260 

[appellate court’s power to modify judgments]; People v. Rogers

(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1174.)

We therefore modify the judgment as follows. The gang 

enhancement imposed on count 4 under section 186.22, 

subdivision (b)(1)(A), is modified to an enhancement for 

subdivision (b)(1)(B). The subdivision (b)(1)(B) enhancement is 

stayed. 

4.2. The abstract of judgment in case BA369882 must 

be amended to reflect the modified sentence.

Under California Rules of Court, rule 4.452, when “a 

determinate sentence is imposed under section 1170.1(a) 

consecutive to one or more determinate sentences imposed 

previously in the same court or in other courts, the court in the 

current case must pronounce a single aggregate term, as defined 

in section 1170.1(a), stating the result of combining the previous 

and current sentences.” Though the abstract of judgment in case 

no. BA369882 complies with that rule, it must be amended to 

reflect the modified judgment in this case.

As discussed above, on February 17, 2016, defendant was 

sentenced in the current case (no. BA372403) to an aggregate

term of 25 years in state prison. On May 1, 2017, defendant pled 

no contest in case no. BA369882. On May 4, 2017, he was 

sentenced in that case to an aggregate term of 11 years in state 

prison, to run consecutively to the sentence in this case. The 

court imposed concurrent sentences for the remaining counts and 

enhancements. 

14
The abstract of judgment in case no. BA369882 properly 

includes the sentence imposed in the current case 

(no. BA372403), which it designates as count 4N. Upon issuance 

of remittitur, the incomplete sentence for count 4N and the total 

time imposed on that abstract of judgment must be updated to 

reflect defendant’s modified sentence.11

11 We note that the abstract of judgment in case no. BA369882 

contains a clerical error for count 5. According to the minute order of 

May 4, 2017, the court imposed four years for count 5—the mid-term 

of two years plus two years for the on-bail enhancement, to run 

concurrently to the rest of the sentence. The abstract erroneously 

indicates that the court imposed six years for count 5—the mid-term of 

four years plus two years for the on-bail enhancement. (People v. 

Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [“An abstract of judgment is not 

the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different from the trial 

court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it 

purports to digest or summarize.”].)

15

 
DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified as follows. The gang 

enhancement imposed on count 4 under Penal Code section 

186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A), is modified to an enhancement for 

subdivision (b)(1)(B). The subdivision (b)(1)(B) enhancement is 

stayed. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Upon issuance of our remittitur, the trial court is directed 

to prepare corrected minute orders consistent with the views 

expressed in this opinion, amend the abstract of judgment in this 

case and the abstract of judgment in case no. BA369882 to reflect 

the judgment as modified, and to send certified copies of the 

amended abstracts of judgment to the Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation. The clerk of this court is directed to send a 

copy of the opinion and remittitur to the Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.272(d)(2).)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

DHANIDINA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

16