U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

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19–011 2003

108th Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 108–33

KOSOVO BENCHMARKS

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

A REPORT ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN ACHIEVING THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT BENCHMARKS FOR CONDITIONS THAT 

WOULD ACHIEVE A SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN KOSOVO

FEBRUARY 5, 2003.—Message and accompanying papers referred to the 

Committees on International Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations and ordered to be printed


E:\Seals\Congress.#13
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To the Congress of the United States: 

Pursuant to section 1212 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Public Law 106–398, I hereby submit a 

report, prepared by my Administration, on the progress made in 

achieving the militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that 

would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow 

for the withdrawal of the United States military presence in 

Kosovo. 

The term ‘‘militarily significant’’ relates to tasks and objectives 

significant from a military standpoint that once accomplished, 

would allow for withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo. In the 

establishment of the Kosovo benchmarks, four critical tasks for 

NATO forces were identified: military stability; public security; border/boundary issues; and war crimes/support to the International 

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Objectives for these 

tasks were drawn from United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1244, the NATO Operations Plan, the Military Technical Agreement, and the Kosovo Liberation Army Undertaking. 

I anticipate that Kosovo Force—and U.S. participation in it—will 

gradually reduce in size as public security conditions improve and 

Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their own self-government.

GEORGE W. BUSH. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 31, 2003.

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KOSOVO BENCHMARKS

INTRODUCTION

Section 1212(a) of Public Law 106–398, The Floyd D. Spence, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (the Act), requires that ‘‘The President shall develop militarily significant 

benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace 

in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Kosovo.’’ Pursuant to Section 1212(b) of the Act, 

I am providing a report, prepared by my Administration, to Congress on progress in Kosovo toward achieving such militarily significant benchmarks. The report details developments from June 

15 to December 31, 2002. 

The Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO took important decisions during their Spring 2002 ministerials regarding 

a regional approach in the Balkans, including Kosovo. As a result 

of those decisions, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was scheduled to be 

reduced from 36,000 as of June 2002 to 32,000 by December 2002, 

and 29,400 by June 2003. In fact, KFOR actual troop strength has 

already dropped below the level of committed troop contributions. 

More recently, NATO Heads of State noted the Joint Operations 

Area Implementation Update at the Prague Summit in November 

2002, and called for exploration of options for further rationalization and force restructuring. 

BACKGROUND

The benchmarks measure progress in achieving a sustainable 

peace in Kosovo. The objectives and tasks were drawn from several 

important documents: the NATO Operation Plan for Kosovo 

(OPLAN 10413); United Nations Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 1244 (1999); the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between KFOR and the Governments of the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Serbia; and the Undertaking 

of Demilitarization and Transformation of the Kosovo Liberation 

Army (the Undertaking). 

Significant progress has been made in Kosovo since the establishment of KFOR and the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in 

Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR has completed several military tasks specified in OPLAN 10413 and UNSCR 1244. The remaining tasks are 

of a continuous or recurring nature and provide for the unimpeded 

operation of UNMIK, freedom of movement for minorities, and the 

safe return of displaced persons and refugees. KFOR efforts have 

helped UNMIK to make substantial progress in implementing 

UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well-advanced; free and fair elections held three times; more than 5,200 multi-ethnic Kosovo police 

trained and deployed; and a new constitutional framework for provisional self-government promulgated. 

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Security challenges remain in the form of ethnically oriented, politically extreme, and criminally motivated armed groups who 

threaten to compromise these accomplishments, both through their 

actions in Kosovo and to a lesser extent in southern Serbia and 

Macedonia. Rather than Yugoslav and Serbian forces posing a continued risk, these internal factors are now the primary threat to 

public security within Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK will have to continue to cooperate over the coming months to deter and disrupt the 

activities of these groups, and continue to ensure stability in 

Kosovo and, by extension, the surrounding region. Increased refugee and Internally Displaced Persons returns, problems with the 

continued ethnic division of North Mitrovica, potential International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indictments, arrests of high-profile Kosovar political or criminal figures, demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonia border, and decentralization of political power will present additional challenges. 

Kosovo’s greatest challenge now is the development of governmental, economic, social, and security infrastructures capable of 

providing a safe, secure, and prosperous environment for all its inhabitants. 

PROGRESS REVIEW

The benchmarks depict progress on four overarching tasks and 

related objectives that will allow for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Kosovo. They are: Military Stability; Public Security; Border and Boundary Issues; and War Crimes. 

1. Task: Military stability 

Objectives: 

• Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian Security Forces from 

Kosovo. 

• Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and 

other armed Kosovar-Albanian groups. 

• Deterrence of renewed hostilities, maintenance and, where necessary, enforcement of the cease-fire.

Progress on these objectives and the benchmarks associated with 

them has been very good. FRY forces have withdrawn from Kosovo 

and have adhered to all military agreements, the KLA has been demilitarized and there are no ongoing hostilities in Kosovo. 

Benchmarks: 

a. The cease-fire has been maintained and FRY has adhered to the 

MTA 

The rampant ethnic cleansing and the killing of spring 1999 is 

now history and neither party to the conflict has resumed military 

action. FRY forces left Kosovo as called for in the MTA. In 2001 

and 2002, NATO oversaw reductions in the Air Safety Zone (ASZ); 

in 2001 FRY forces returned to the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) in 

southern Serbia as part of a political agreement to end fighting between government forces and ethnic Albanian groups in southern 

Serbia. This benchmark is essentially accomplished although both 

the ASZ and GSZ remain under KFOR authority. 

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b. KLA has been demilitarized and transformed in compliance with 

the undertaking 

The KLA ceased to exist on September 20, 1999. Many former 

KLA members entered the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), now a 

civil emergency response force, or the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). 

This benchmark is essentially accomplished. 

c. Establishment of the KPC and low incidence of officer non-compliance 

The KPC was created in 1999 out of demobilized KLA troops. 

UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 authorized the KPC to engage in disaster response, search and rescue, and infrastructure rebuilding activities. The KPC is permitted no role in law enforcement, security, 

or defense. KFOR and UNMIK jointly supervise the KPC. Authorized strength is 5,000 members; by the end of 2002 just under 

2,000 had moved from active to reserve status. Ten percent of the 

KPC positions are reserved for ethnic minorities, although to date 

only some 100 Serbs and other minorities have joined. In 2002 

UNMIK budgeted 11.16 million for KPC salaries, operating expenses, and capital outlays. The United States has funded additional training for first aid, land navigation, fire fighting, and other 

activities. A goal of the United States and UNMIK for 2003 is to 

further reform the KPC through functional and structural changes. 

One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the KPC 

was to provide transparency to the process of demilitarizing the 

KLA. While some individual members of the KPC are involved in 

supporting extremism and organized crime, since the KPC was established, documented non-compliance has declined from 35 incidents per month to as few as 4 per month, to include such incidents as illegal possession of weapons and ammunition and 

celebratory gunfire. Though additional work remains to be done to 

further professionalize the KPC as a civilian organization and 

broaden its ethnic and gender base, this benchmark is essentially 

accomplished. 

d. FRY and Kosovars participate in the Joint Implementation Commission 

The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) was established in 

accordance with the MTA and given two key mandates: ensure 

compliance with the MTA; and demilitarize the KLA. JICs have 

been established at two echelons—at KFOR Headquarters and at 

each of the five Multinational Brigades (MNBs). Meetings between 

KFOR, Yugoslav Army (VJ), FRY Ministry of Interior Police 

(MUP), UNMIK CIVPOL, FRY JIC, International Committee for 

the Red Cross and Border Police occur on a regular basis. Agendas 

range from administrative issues such as ID cards to security 

issues such as VJ/MUP manned contact points on/near the administrative boundary. The JICs have facilitated training for the KPC 

in first aid, fire fighting, land navigation, identification of 

unexploded ordnance, construction, and humanitarian relief. This 

benchmark is essentially accomplished. 

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e. End of offensive activities by armed groups 

Large armed groups are no longer active in Kosovo proper, but 

ethnic Albanian armed groups (EAAGs) in southern Serbia and in 

Macedonia have used Kosovo as a supply route and base for recruiting and fundraising. KFOR and UNMIK police have been active in apprehending members of these groups and their supporters, and the United States Government has repeatedly reminded Kosovo’s political leaders and the KPC that any support for 

the insurgents’ activities is not acceptable. This benchmark is essentially accomplished although it requires continued monitoring. 

2. Task: Public security 

Objectives: 

• Establishment and maintenance of a secure environment for 

the operation of UNMIK, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the 

safe return of a considerably increased number of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in 2003. 

• Ensure protection and freedom of movement for KFOR, 

UNMIK, and other International Organizations (IOs). 

• Transfer responsibility for public safety and order when either 

UNMIK or newly elected Kosovar authorities can take responsibility for this function. 

Significant progress has been achieved toward the benchmarks 

related to these objectives, but continued progress in the area of 

public security will require a strong continued commitment by the 

international community to provide resources for rule of law and 

other security programs. 

Benchmarks: 

a. UNMIK safely conducts its mission 

UNMIK has regional administrations in each KFOR MNB, headed by an international administrator and staffed by a mixture of 

international and local staff. Additionally, there are UNMIK offices 

in each of Kosovo’s 30 municipalities. UNMIK success stories include promulgation of the Constitutional Framework, holding of 

municipal elections twice and province-wide elections once, registration of and distribution of ID cards to nearly one million 

Kosovars, and issuance of over 345,000 travel documents recognized in 29 countries. In all UNMIK endeavors (except North 

Mitrovica)—from travel to governance—UNMIK has been able to 

safely conduct its mission. 

b. IOs travel without disruption of their activities 

Travel in Kosovo by IOs is generally unimpeded. Serb residents 

in northern Kosovo sporadically established roadblocks in Serb majority areas, but alternative routes were available to IOs with little 

or no disruption of their activities. This benchmark is essentially 

accomplished. 

C. Humanitarian relief delivered 

Humanitarian relief was one of the original UNMIK pillars, led 

by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but as huVerDate Jan 31 2003 07:22 Feb 06, 2003 Jkt 019011 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HD033.XXX HD033
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manitarian needs abated, the UNMIK humanitarian pillar ceased 

operations in June 2000. UNMIK has institutionalized the delivery 

of goods and services to Kosovo’s neediest populations through a 

system of Centers for Social Work. These centers ensure poor, isolated and/or minority communities have the goods and services 

they require. This benchmark is essentially accomplished. 

d. Initial demining efforts accomplished and responsibility transferred to requisite civilian authorities 

Since June 1999, over 20,000 mines, 13,000 items of unexploded 

ordnance (OXO), and 6,700 cluster bomb units (CBU) have been located and destroyed. Over 25 million square meters of land have 

been cleared and returned to use. There have been 16 different 

international demining organizations involved in mine awareness 

activities; and mine awareness has been incorporated into the 

Kosovo school system curriculum. While KFOR’s mandate is concerned only with minefields that impede its mission, KFOR soldiers 

continue to mark newly discovered minefields for demining by accredited civilian agencies. Also, the KPC has been trained to conduct emergency explosive ordinance disposal services and is primarily responsible for UXO deactivation or destruction. The overall 

result of this concentrated effort has been a drastic reduction in 

mine/UXO/CBU-related casualties although lethal incidents sometimes still occur. In light of these operating procedures, this benchmark is essentially accomplished. 

e. Elections held in secure environment 

Local assemblies and governments have been established in all 

of Kosovo’s 30 municipalities, including most Serb-dominated ones 

in the north. Kosovo municipal elections in 2000 and again in 2002 

were in accordance with international standards as were Kosovowide elections in 2001. Overall voter turnout within Kosovo has 

been high but with a downward trend. The absence of significant 

election-related violence indicates a general stabilization of the political environment in Kosovo. UNMIK Police, KPS, and KFOR 

worked together to help ensure these first-ever democratic provincial elections were not marred by any significant violence. In spring 

2002, the Assembly elected a President and a Prime Minister to 

head Kosovo’s provisional government which will continue until 

new elections in 2004. This benchmark is essentially accomplished. 

f. Parallel institutions dissolved and pose no threat to KFOR and/

or UNMIK authority 

The fledging Kosovo provisional government is working to govern 

the province with less assistance from UNMIK, KFOR, and the 

international community (IC). Programs to train government leaders and bolster efforts at effective administration have helped the 

provisional government to assume increased responsibility and 

demonstrate increasing effectiveness. However, the slow pace of 

legislation to date and remaining international influence in areas 

not reserved to UNMIK remain problematic. Considerably more 

needs to be done to ensure effective self-government at both the 

Kosovo and municipal levels and to achieve UNMIK benchmarks in 

the rule of law, returns, the economy, and other areas. Particularly 

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in North Mitrovica, and elsewhere throughout Kosovo, UNMIK 

needs to implement its plan for decentralization to ensure effective 

administration and rights for Serbs and other minorities at the 

sub-municipal level. At the same time, Serbian parallel institutions 

primarily in the areas of health, education, and judiciary and law 

enforcement, need to cease functioning to allow UNMIK to fully establish their authority under UNSCR 1244. While this is occurring, 

UNMIK acknowledges the continued need for Belgrade to supplement the salaries of health care workers and educators as an incentive for them to remain in Kosovo. 

g. KFOR transfers criminal cases to UNMIK/Kosovo Transitional 

Government for investigation, prosecution, and detention; and 

sufficient civilian prisons and detention facilities are established 

UNMIK judicial officials and UNMIK CIVPOL and KPS, conduct 

all criminal investigations in Kosovo. When KFOR apprehends a 

suspect, he/she can be turned over to UNMIK for action under the 

Special Representative’s ‘‘executive detention’’ authority pending 

UNMIK (or local) criminal charges being filed. Under his own authority, the KFOR Commander can confine individuals on the basis 

that they pose a threat to a safe and secure environment. KFOR 

maintains detention facilities for individuals at Camp Bondsteel. 

UNMIK maintains eight detention facilities Kosovo-wide and one 

prison near Ishtok in northwest Kosovo. 

h. Adequate court system for criminal cases transferred to UNMIK 

Since June 1999, UNMIK has established a Kosovo supreme 

court, five district courts, 18 municipal courts, 23 ‘‘minor offenses 

courts,’’ one ‘‘high court of minor offenses,’’ one commercial court, 

and 13 prosecutor’s offices. While UNMIK has appointed more than 

400 local judges and prosecutors, only 320 are currently working in 

those positions. Additionally, a total of 28 international judges and 

prosecutors are assigned to the district courts and the supreme 

court. Trials are conducted in all five district courts, the supreme 

court, and lower courts. Thus, there is an embryonic court system 

in place; however, concerns continue over the ability of the criminal 

courts to apply the law fairly due to the inexperience of many of 

the judges and prosecutors, suspected intimidation, and the outdated socialist criminal code still applicable in Kosovo. Judicial 

training conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-run Kosovo Judicial Institute is beginning 

to address this problem. Some cases referred by KFOR to UNMIK 

are difficult to prosecute due to evidentiary problems. KFOR soldiers are not trained criminal investigators, and often the information gathered by KFOR is classified. As a result, some criminal 

cases are dismissed by UNMIK due to a lack of prosecutable evidence. UNMIK and KFOR are working together to resolve these 

issues and UNMIK has made many notable arrests and convictions 

in 2002. Adequate witness protection is a problem as well. 

i. Core KPS police training is completed and effective 

The OSCE administers the Kosovo Police Service School, which 

has graduated over 5,200 Kosovar police trainees. Graduate trainVerDate Jan 31 2003 07:22 Feb 06, 2003 Jkt 019011 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HD033.XXX HD033
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ees go on to complete field training and assume independent patrol 

responsibilities (with UNMIK police oversight). The operational 

control of two police stations has been turned over to the KPS. Advanced training phases are being conducted at the KPS School to 

create specialized capacities, including training supervisors, criminal investigators, forensics specialists, traffic officers, and close protection specialists. The United States is initiating further specialized training in areas such as civil disorder management and advanced criminal investigations. Anti-Serb violence has shown an 

overall downward trend, although serious periodic incidents continue to mar progress and freedom of movement remains problematic without KFOR escort. UNMIK police and KPS have assumed 

full responsibility in Pristina, Prizren, Gniljane, and Peja regions 

and share responsibility with KFOR in Mitrovica. This benchmark 

is essentially accomplished although the KPS requires further expansion, experience, and training. 

j. UNMIK and KPS assume primacy for tactical police responsibilities; and, UNMIK Special Police Unit and KPS are capable to 

respond to civil disturbances 

UNMIK Police, working with KPS, has assumed full primacy in 

Pristine, Prizren, Gjilan, and Peja regions; and shares primacy 

with KFOR in Mitrovica, where they have begun to assert more authority to address the remaining challenge from members of violent 

‘‘bridge gangs.’’ UNMIK generally has been able to handle civil disturbances through the use of its Special Police Units (SPUs) that 

react to any civil disturbances throughout Kosovo. KPS has assumed primary responsibility for patrol functions. As part of two 

agreements with KFOR, UNMIK police have taken on greater responsibility for border functions and the roving patrols of patrimonial sites, and other infrastructure sites. 

k. Some displaced persons and refugees able to return home safely 

Displaced Kosovo Albanians began returning to their homes in 

June 1999, concomitant with the entry of NATO forces into Kosovo. 

To date, over one million people have returned and begun rebuilding their lives. By contrast, significant difficulties remain in the 

area of minority returns. More than 200,000 Serbs, Roma, and 

other minorities remain displaced outside of Kosovo, most in Serbia. While modest progress has been made to date, and in 2002 returns outpaced departures for the first time, UNMIK anticipates 

that there will be a significant increase in IC-facilitated returns beginning in spring 2003. Continued KFOR cooperation with UNHCR 

and UNMIK will play a key part in making these returns safe and 

sustainable. Freedom of movement remains a problem for many 

Serbs and Roma who remain in Kosovo, most of whom live in difficult circumstances in isolated enclaves. Most require KFOR escort 

each time they venture out to ensure their safety; however, for others freedom of movement has improved significantly and KFOR has 

removed a number of fixed checkpoints, particularly in the MNB–

E area. 

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3. Task: Border and boundary issues 

Objectives: 

• Monitor international and provincial boundaries. 

• Inhibit traffic of persons or materials supporting insurgency 

and illegal goods. 

• Transfer border responsibilities to local authorities. 

Benchmarks: 

a. The FRY respects the GSZ and ASZ as stipulated in the MTA 

and at the discretion of the KFOR commander 

The GSZ and ASZ, 5- and 25-kilometer ‘‘buffer zones’’ respectively around Kosovo, were established to prevent boundary incidents or reentry into Kosovo by FRY security forces. The FRY has 

respected the zones from their inception. Following the change of 

government in Yugoslavia and a concomitant improvement in the 

relationship with NATO and KFOR, FRY security forces were allowed to reenter the GSZ in the spring of 2001. Reentry was conducted successfully and in a professional manner. Similarly, the 

ASZ was reduced to 10-kilometers and in Fall 2002 to 5-kilometers. 

This benchmark is essentially accomplished. 

b. Illegal border crossings inhibited; and UNMIK or indigenous border service in place to monitor provincial and international 

border crossings 

Kosovo’s boundaries are generally unmarked and in many areas 

lie in rough, mountainous terrain. Attempts to demarcate the 

Kosovo-Macedonia border under the 2001 FRY-Macedonia Border 

Treaty in the near future could be particularly problematic as inhabitants traditionally have crisscrossed the borders freely. 

UNMIK established five official border crossing points, including 

the Pristina airport, where UNMIK police control immigration and 

collect tariffs. KFOR actively supports UNMIK in this role, regularly patrolling borders and employing monitoring technology. Also, 

a border-crossing section of the KPS has been established. Net assessment of combined efforts is that illegal border crossings have 

been significantly reduced, although much remains to be done. The 

installation at the airport and border points of entry of a positive 

identification and tracking system remains a high priority. 

4. Task: War crimes 

Objective: 

• Full cooperation of the international security presence with the 

ICTY. 

The objective of this benchmark is of an ongoing nature for the 

IC, continuing until the work of the ICTY is completed. ICTY chief 

prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has said publicly on several occasions 

that there will be indictments of senior former KLA figures in 

Kosovo. UNMIK is investigating possible prosecutions as well, and 

at the end of 2002 an UNMIK court consisting of three international judges convicted and sentenced five former KLA figures 

for war crimes against other Kosovar Albanians. 

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Benchmark: 

a. KFOR assists and supports ICTY 

KFOR actively supports the collection of evidence by ICTY, and 

provides area security for exhumations. The United States deployed two FBI forensic investigative teams to Kosovo at a cost of 

$5 million, and provided an additional $8.5 million for ICTY investigative costs associated with Kosovo war crimes. In November 

2002, SACEUR noted that NATO remains committed to supporting 

efforts to bring persons indicted for war crimes to justice and has 

stated that the physical presence of NATO in the Balkans is continuing to help deter hostilities. Should the ICTY issue indictments 

for Kosovars, KFOR will be called upon to help manage large and 

possible violent demonstrations that will almost certainly result, 

and might need to assist in the apprehension and transfer of indicted individuals.

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