a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, 

Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Committee 

on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, U.S. Senate

November 2002 COAST GUARD

Strategy Needed for 

Setting and Monitoring 

Levels of Effort for All 

Missions

GAO-03-155
As the Coast Guard adjusts to its new post–September 11th environment, it

will likely take several years to determine how best to balance carrying out

nonsecurity missions alongside new security responsibilities. In recent

months the Coast Guard has increased its level of effort in nonsecurity

activities such as drug interdiction and fisheries patrols, but some of these

activities remain below earlier levels. For example, patrol boats formerly

used for drug interdiction are still being used for harbor security patrols.

Substantial increases in nonsecurity activities are also unlikely in the near

future, because the mission-related initiatives proposed in the fiscal year

2003 budget are directed primarily at security missions. Most notably, most

of the proposed 1,330 new staff would replace reserve staff activated after

September 11th.

The Coast Guard has not yet developed a strategy for showing, even in

general terms, the levels of effort it plans for its various missions in future

years. Understandably, the Coast Guard’s attention has been focused on

assimilating added security responsibilities. However, developing a more

comprehensive strategy is now important, as a way to inform the Congress

about the extent to which the Coast Guard’s use of its resources—cutters,

boats, aircraft, and personnel—will allow it to continue meeting its many

responsibilities. Also important is designing a way to keep the Congress

informed about its progress in achieving this balance. The Coast Guard has

considerable data from which to develop progress reports, but this

information is currently in disparate forms and documents.

.

Coast Guard patrol boats like this one, formerly used mainly in activities such as intercepting drugs

or illegal immigrants, were still being used extensively for harbor security patrols in mid-2002.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

COAST GUARD

Strategy Needed for Setting and

Monitoring Levels of Effort for All

Missions

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-155.

To view the full report, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact JayEtta Hecker

at (202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov.

Highlights of GAO-03-155, a report to

Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere,

and Fisheries, Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation

November 2002

The September 11th attacks

affected the scope of activities of

many federal agencies, including

the Coast Guard. Homeland

security, a long-standing but

relatively small part of the Coast

Guard’s duties, took center stage.

Still, the Coast Guard remains

responsible for many other

missions, such as helping stem the

flow of drugs and illegal migration,

protecting important fishing

grounds, and responding to marine

pollution. GAO was asked to

review the Coast Guard’s current

efforts and future plans for

balancing resource levels among its

many missions.

GAO recommends that the Coast

Guard:

• Develop a longer-term strategy

that outlines how the Coast

Guard sees its resources being

distributed across its various

missions, and a time frame for

achieving this desired balance.

• Develop and implement a useful

reporting format that allows the

Congress to understand and

assess the progress in

implementing this strategy.

• Reexamine recommendations

from past studies of the agency’s

operations as a way to identify

and improve operational

efficiencies and help leverage

resources.

The Coast Guard reviewed a draft

of this report but did not take a

formal position on GAO’s

recommendations.
Page i GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Expanded Security Activities Primarily Affected Law Enforcement 

and Marine Safety Missions 8

Funding Increases Proposed in Fiscal Year 2003 Budget May Not 

Have A Major Effect on Nonsecurity Missions 19

Opportunities for Increased Operational Efficiency Could Help Meet 

Mission Responsibilities 23

Framework for Monitoring Levels of Effort and Results Has Two 

Main Components 28

Conclusions 33

Recommendations 34

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 37

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 39

GAO Contacts 39

Staff Acknowledgments 39

Tables Table 1: Description of Selected Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft 6

Table 2: Allocation of Proposed New Personnel by Program Area, 

Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request 20

Table 3: Examples of Coast Guard Partnering in Individual Ports 25

Table 4: Types of Measures for Monitoring Agency Missions and 

Activities 30

Table 5: Examples of Measures Currently Developed by the Coast 

Guard 31

Figures Figure 1: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard High- and 

Medium-Endurance Cutters before and after September 

11th 12

Figure 2: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard 82-, 87-, and 

110-Foot Patrol Boats before and after September 

11th 14
Page 1 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

November 12, 2002 Letr

The Honorable John F. Kerry

Chairman

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

The aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks affected the scope of 

activities for many federal agencies. This is especially true of the United 

States Coast Guard. The attacks prompted the nation to evaluate its 

vulnerabilities to terrorism, and this evaluation has focused considerable 

attention on the nation’s vast and sprawling network of ports and 

waterways. Ports and waterways are particularly vulnerable because they 

are both a potential target for a terrorist attack and an avenue for tools of 

destruction to make their way into the country. While homeland security 

has long been one of the Coast Guard’s missions, the agency has spent the 

past decade focusing on other major national objectives, such as the 

nation’s attempts to reduce the flow of drugs, monitor and protect 

important fishing grounds, and respond effectively to marine pollution.1

 

September 11th drastically changed the nation’s priorities, but it did so by 

adding to the Coast Guard’s many responsibilities rather than by replacing 

responsibilities that were already in place. 

The impact of these changes on the Coast Guard, and consideration of how 

to manage them, have been a matter of intense congressional attention. For 

example, proposals to move the Coast Guard from its current 

organizational home within the Department of Transportation (DOT) to a 

new Department of Homeland Security have generated questions about the 

Coast Guard’s ability to meet its new security responsibilities while still 

dealing with its other more traditional roles. You asked us to examine how 

the Coast Guard’s various missions have fared since September 11th. As 

agreed with your staff, we focused our work on the following four 

questions: 

1

Throughout this report, we define “nonsecurity” missions as those that fall outside of the 

Coast Guard’s defense readiness and homeland security responsibilities. These mission 

areas include law enforcement (including drug and illegal migrant interdiction), search and 

rescue, aids to navigation, marine environmental protection, marine safety, and ice 

operations.
Page 2 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

• What nonsecurity missions were most affected by the September 11th 

terrorist attacks, and what are the most recent levels of effort for these 

missions? 

• To what extent would proposed funding for new initiatives in the 

President’s fiscal year 2003 budget request allow the Coast Guard to 

increase levels of effort for nonsecurity missions, while addressing 

increased security responsibilities?

• Are there operational efficiencies that the Coast Guard can consider as a 

way to help accomplish all of its missions in 2003 and beyond? 

• What framework would help the Congress monitor levels of effort and 

results attained for all Coast Guard missions?

To answer these questions, we conducted such activities as reviewing 

Coast Guard documents and records and visiting Coast Guard installations 

to determine how activities were being affected. We conducted our work at 

Coast Guard headquarters and at five of the Coast Guard’s nine districts. 

The districts we visited spanned three coasts—East, West, and Gulf. Our 

work, which was conducted from December 2001 through October 2002, 

was done in accordance with generally accepted governmental auditing 

standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology appears in 

appendix I.

Results in Brief The September 11th attacks primarily affected levels of effort in two 

nonsecurity missions: law enforcement (such as drug and migrant 

interdiction and fisheries enforcement) and marine safety (such as 

pollution-related exercises, inspections of certain types of vessels and 

facilities, and boating safety). For law enforcement activities, which are 

carried out extensively with multiple-mission resources such as cutters, 

patrol boats, aircraft, and small boats, the effect can be partly seen in 

shifting usage patterns for these resources. Coast Guard data show that the 

number of hours spent on law enforcement by cutters and patrol boats, 

aircraft, and smaller boats dropped from about 67,000 hours for the quarter 

ending June 30, 2001, to about 39,000 hours for the quarter ending 

December 31, 2001. By the quarter ending September 30, 2002, total hours 

spent for law enforcement by these resources had risen to about 62,500, 

near the pre-September 11th level. Such aggregate data provide a useful 

indication of overall effort, but they do not tell the entire story, particularly 

for individual Coast Guard locations. Our visits to Coast Guard sites turned 
Page 3 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

up examples in which law enforcement activities remained below preSeptember 11th levels. For example, in the Northeast, some patrol boats 

formerly used for fisheries patrols were conducting security patrols, and as 

a result, fisheries patrols were 40–50 percent lower than in previous years. 

The Coast Guard does not have data that provide a similar overview of how 

marine safety activities were affected, but our visits to individual sites 

identified instances in which the level of these activities was reduced after 

September 11th and remained reduced as of mid-2002. At local marine 

safety offices, for example, officials said they had reduced planning and 

outreach functions, pollution and planning exercises, and selected safety 

inspections of fishing and other vessels. 

Proposed funding increases for new mission-related initiatives in the Coast 

Guard’s fiscal year 2003 request submitted as part of the President’s budget 

would likely not have a major effect on the level of effort for nonsecurity 

missions, according to Coast Guard officials. The administration’s fiscal 

year 2003 budget request for the Coast Guard proposes $213 million for 

new initiatives, $188 million of which would be directed at security 

missions; the remaining $25 million is for search and rescue initiatives and 

enhancements to the vessel traffic information system. The proposed 

security initiatives would add 1,330 new staff, many of whom would 

replace reserve personnel activated after September 11th, and acquire 

more than 80 small patrol boats for security patrols. The Coast Guard is 

still working out plans for using new staff, but Coast Guard field personnel 

said that because the positions are largely expected to be replacements for 

reservists who would return to civilian status, opportunities to increase 

security staffing levels and thereby free up other staff for nonsecurity 

missions would be limited. Moreover, the Coast Guard’s preliminary 

allocation of cutter, patrol boat, and aircraft hours for fiscal year 2003 

largely mirrors the allocation for fiscal year 2002—a further indication that 

the Coast Guard does not plan major changes in the level of effort for 

nonsecurity missions in the short term. The Coast Guard, which so far has 

been understandably focused on developing and implementing its 

expanded homeland security missions, has not yet devised a plan for how 

much of its resources will be devoted to security-related and nonsecurityrelated missions in the long term. 

A number of opportunities to improve operational efficiency are potentially 

available for helping the Coast Guard with the challenges it faces in 

accomplishing all its missions and tasks in 2003 and beyond. In the past, we 

and others have made recommendations for improving the Coast Guard’s 

operational efficiency. Many of them—such as examining whether 
Page 4 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

dockside monitoring by other federal or state agencies can substitute for 

part of the Coast Guard’s at-sea boardings of commercial fishing vessels—

still have relevance in the Coast Guard’s new environment. In particular, 

opportunities may exist for enhanced partnering with federal, state, and 

local agencies, as well as private entities, helping all parties to leverage 

limited resources and achieve efficiencies. For example, the Coast Guard is 

successfully partnering with the State of California and the Ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach to operate the area’s vessel traffic–monitoring 

system. Such partnering may be possible in other locations where the 

Coast Guard operates such systems. Although some mechanisms are in 

place to help ports share information about the various kinds of successful 

partnering projects, these mechanisms are not working effectively.

Although the Coast Guard generates considerable information about its 

mission activities, this information in its current form does not provide a 

framework the Congress and the Coast Guard can use to monitor the 

agency’s levels of effort and results attained for security and nonsecurity 

missions. As part of the proposed legislation creating the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Congress is currently considering a requirement for 

periodic reports about the levels of effort being directed at nonsecurity 

missions. Our current review, along with past reviews of other agencies, 

indicates that a useful framework for monitoring these levels involves two 

main components. The first is a strategy that identifies, at least in general 

terms, the levels of effort the Coast Guard projects for its various missions 

in future years, along with a time frame for achieving these planned levels. 

This strategy is not yet in place, and as a result the Congress does not know 

what the Coast Guard believes the appropriate levels of effort should be to 

achieve these missions over the longer term in this new operating 

environment. The second component is having adequate information for 

assessing progress in achieving these levels of effort and the desired 

results. Several kinds of quantitative measures are needed: inputs (such as 

budget allocation by mission); outputs (such as the utilization of Coast 

Guard cutters, or the number of fisheries patrols that are conducted); and 

outcomes (such as the percentage of distress calls that result in a 

successful rescue). To help interpret these measures correctly, it is also 

important for the Coast Guard to provide explanations of changes in its 

strategy and other pertinent developments. For example, a reduction in 

expenditures might occur for different reasons, such as a reduced effort or 

discovery of a way to accomplish the same task with fewer resources. 

We are recommending that the Coast Guard develop (1) a longer-term 

strategy that outlines how the Coast Guard sees its resources—cutters, 
Page 5 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

boats, aircraft, and personnel—being distributed across its various 

missions, as well as a time frame for achieving this desired balance among 

missions; (2) a useful reporting format allowing the Congress to 

understand and assess the Coast Guard’s progress in implementing this 

strategy; and (3) a systematic approach for reviewing past 

recommendations for operational efficiencies and sharing information 

about successful partnering projects. The Coast Guard reviewed a draft of 

this report, but did not take a formal position on GAO’s recommendations.

Background The Coast Guard, a Department of Transportation agency, is involved in 

seven main mission or program areas: (1) enforcement of maritime laws 

and treaties; (2) search and rescue; (3) aids to navigation; (4) marine 

environmental protection; (5) marine safety and security (including 

homeland security);2

 (6) defense readiness; and (7) ice operations. The 

Coast Guard has two major commands that are responsible for the overall 

mission performance in the Pacific and Atlantic areas. These commands 

are further organized into a total of nine districts, which in turn are 

organized into a number of groups, marine safety offices, and air stations. 

Groups provide more localized command and control of field units, such as 

small boat stations, and patrol boats. Marine safety offices are located at 

coastal ports and on inland waterways, and they are responsible for the 

overall safety and security of maritime activities and for environmental 

protection in their geographic areas. To accomplish these varying missions 

and responsibilities, the Coast Guard operates a variety of equipment (see 

table 1), including high- and medium-endurance cutters,3

 patrol boats, and 

aircraft. 

2

Since the events of September 11th, the Coast Guard has created a separate program area, 

called Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security, for homeland security activities.

3

“Cutter” is defined as any Coast Guard vessel 65 feet in length or greater with adequate 

accommodations for the crew to live on board. Besides high- and medium-endurance 

cutters, this definition includes icebreakers, buoy tenders, and patrol boats. In addition, the 

Coast Guard operates a variety of types of smaller boats. All vessels under 65 feet in length 

are classified as boats and usually operate near shore or on inland waterways. Examples 

include motor lifeboats, rigid-hull inflatable boats, and utility boats.
Page 6 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Table 1: Description of Selected Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft

a

Total does not include icebreakers or buoy tenders but does include a 213-foot medium-endurance 

cutter that was commissioned in 1944, a 230-foot medium-endurance cutter that was commissioned in 

1942, and a 282-foot medium-endurance cutter that was commissioned in 1999, following 26 years in 

service with the U.S. Navy. 

b

Total does not include three support aircraft (VC-4, C-20, and C-37) and eight leased MH-68A 

helicopters used in support of the counter-drug mission.

Source: Developed by GAO from data supplied by the Coast Guard.

Type of asset Number Description

Ships

378-foot high-endurance

cutter

12 This is the largest multipurpose cutter in the fleet. It has a planned crew size of 167, a 

speed of 29 knots, and a cruising range of 14,000 nautical miles. The Coast Guard 

operates it for about 185 days a year, and it can support helicopter operations.

270-foot medium-endurance 

cutter

13 This cutter has a planned crew size of 100, a speed of 19.5 knots, and a cruising 

range of 10,250 nautical miles. The Coast Guard operates it for about 185 days a 

year, and it can support helicopter operations.

210-foot medium-endurance 

cutter

14 This cutter has a planned crew size of 75, a speed of 18 knots, and a cruising range 

of 6,100 nautical miles. The Coast Guard operates it for about 185 days a year, and it 

can support operations of short-range recovery helicopters.

110-foot patrol boat 49 This patrol boat has a planned crew size of 16, a speed of 29 knots, and a cruising 

range of 3,928 nautical miles. The Coast Guard operates most of these craft for about 

1,800 hours a year.

87-foot patrol boats 50 This patrol boat has a planned crew size of 10, a speed of 29 knots, and a cruising 

range of 900 nautical miles. The Coast Guard operates most of these craft for about 

1,800 hours a year.

Total 141a

Aircraft

HC-130 long-range 

surveillance airplane

27 This is the largest aircraft in the Coast Guard’s fleet. It has a planned crew size of 

seven, a speed of 290 knots, and an operating range of about 2,600 nautical miles. 

The Coast Guard operates most of these aircraft for about 800 hours every year.

HU-25 medium-range 

surveillance airplane

25 This is the fastest aircraft in the Coast Guard’s fleet. It has a planned crew size of five, 

a speed of 410 knots, and an operating range of 2,045 nautical miles. The Coast 

Guard generally operates these aircraft for about 800 hours a year.

HH-60J medium-range 

recovery helicopter

42 This helicopter is capable of flying 300 miles off shore, remaining on scene for 45 

minutes, hoisting six people on board, and returning to its point of origin. The Coast 

Guard operates most for about 700 hours a year. It has a planned crew size of four, a 

maximum speed of 160 knots, and a maximum range of 700 nautical miles.

HH-65 short-range recovery 

helicopter

95 This helicopter is capable of flying 150 miles off shore. It has a crew allowance of 

three, a maximum speed of 165 knots, a maximum range of 400 nautical miles, and a 

maximum endurance of 3.5 hours. The Coast Guard operates most for about 645 

hours a year.

Total 200b
Page 7 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

A federal agency that is also part of the armed services, the Coast Guard 

has both military and civilian positions. At the end of fiscal year 2001, the 

agency had over 41,000 total full-time positions—about 36,100 military and 

about 5,700 civilians. The Coast Guard also has about 8,000 reservists who 

support the national military strategy and provide additional operational 

support and surge capacity during emergencies, such as natural disasters. 

Also, about 35,000 volunteer auxiliary personnel assist in a wide range of 

activities, ranging from search and rescue to boating safety education.

Added homeland security requirements pose a challenge to the Coast 

Guard as it works to balance all of its missions. While maritime homeland 

security is not necessarily a new mission, the Coast Guard’s level of effort 

in this mission prior to September 11th had been minimal when compared 

with most of its other missions.4

 The events of September 11th caused the 

Coast Guard to direct efforts increasingly into this area, highlighted by the 

Coast Guard’s establishing a new program area: Ports, Waterways, and 

Coastal Security. Additionally, legislation now under consideration by both 

houses of Congress would mandate that the Coast Guard take on even 

greater homeland security responsibilities.5

 For example, some of the 

additional responsibilities the Coast Guard would be required to perform if 

the legislation passes include conducting port vulnerability assessments, 

establishing local port security committees, assessing antiterrorism 

measures at foreign ports, conducting antiterrorism drills, and maintaining 

harbor patrols. 

4

Prior to the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Coast Guard included maritime security 

activities under its marine safety program area.

5

Pending legislation (S.1214 and H.R. 3983) proposes a number of security measures for U.S. 

seaports. Major provisions of these bills would require heavy involvement by the Coast 

Guard in conducting vulnerability assessments at U.S. ports, reviewing port security plans, 

developing seaport security standards, making loan guarantees and authorizing grants for 

port security improvements, and evaluating security at foreign ports that are points of origin 

for ships calling on U.S. ports.
Page 8 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Expanded Security 

Activities Primarily 

Affected Law 

Enforcement and 

Marine Safety Missions 

Taken together, the available data and additional information provided by 

Coast Guard field personnel about levels of effort indicate that activities in 

two nonsecurity missions—law enforcement and marine safety—were the 

most affected by the Coast Guard’s shift of resources to security functions 

after September 11th. For law enforcement, data show that the Coast 

Guard shifted the use of multiple-mission resources like cutters and patrol 

boats to security efforts immediately after September 11th. Specifically, the 

data show a sharp decline in the number of hours these resources spent in 

law enforcement after September 11th, followed by a return to more 

traditional levels, though the results vary by type of resource and continue 

to be affected when the Coast Guard must respond to heightened security 

levels. For marine safety, which is largely carried out without using these 

resources, there are no similar data for making comparisons in the levels of 

effort. However, during our visits at individual Coast Guard sites, we were 

provided many examples showing that as of mid-2002, expanded security 

responsibilities were still affecting levels of effort for both missions. 

Resource levels in two other nonsecurity missions—aids to navigation and 

search and rescue—were also temporarily affected by September 11th, but 

according to Coast Guard personnel, overall effects on mission 

performance from these changes were minimal. 

Initial Effect of September 

11th on Resource 

Deployment Was 

Substantial 

For the Coast Guard, the events of September 11th produced a dramatic 

shift in resources used for certain missions. The Coast Guard responded 

quickly to the attacks with a number of significant steps to ensure that the 

nation’s ports remained open and operating. The Coast Guard relocated 

vessels, aircraft, and personnel—especially those associated with law 

enforcement—to enhance security activities. For example, nearly all 

cutters that were conducting offshore patrols for drug, immigration, and 

fisheries law enforcement were recalled and repositioned at entrances to 

such ports as Boston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and San Francisco. 

Smaller patrol boats and motor lifeboats, which had been used for search 

and rescue, fisheries patrols, and other nonsecurity functions, were used to 

conduct security patrols within port facilities, becoming the port’s “cop on 

the beat,” according to Coast Guard officials. 

This change can be seen in the mission hours logged by multiple-mission 

resources. The Coast Guard does not have an agencywide measure, such as 

a mission-by-mission breakdown of how all employees spend their time, 

that would provide a comprehensive picture of how nonsecurity missions 

were affected throughout the entire organization. The best quantitative 
Page 9 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

picture of how missions were affected can be obtained from data about 

how the Coast Guard’s multi-mission resources, such as cutters, boats, and 

aircraft, were used before and after September 11th. These resources are 

used in a variety of nonsecurity missions, and they figured heavily in the 

Coast Guard’s homeland security response.6

The resource-hour data show a large rise in homeland security activity and 

a drop in several other missions, especially law enforcement. Overall, the 

data for all types of resources (cutters and patrol boats, other boats, and 

aircraft) showed that homeland security activities accounted for 2 percent 

of total hours during the quarter prior to September 11th (April–June 2001). 

For the quarter in which September 11th occurred (July–September), the 

figure for homeland security rose to nearly 16 percent, and in the 

subsequent quarter it more than doubled, to 37 percent. Law enforcement 

was the nonsecurity mission most affected as a consequence of this rapid 

rise in homeland security activities, according to Coast Guard personnel. 

Law enforcement accounted for 28 percent of all mission hours from April 

through June 2001, 26 percent from July through September, and 15 percent 

from October through December. Total law enforcement resource hours 

for the various types of resources declined from about 67,000 from April 

through June 2001 to about 39,000 from October through December. Here 

are resource-by-resource breakdowns:

• For Coast Guard high- and medium-endurance cutters, the months 

immediately before and after September 11th showed a dramatic shift 

toward security-related activities and away from law enforcement. 

Typically, 73 to 88 percent of these cutters’ resource hours have been 

spent on law enforcement activities, compared with less than 3 percent 

on homeland security. In the second quarter of fiscal year 2001 

(January–March 2001), for example, they logged about 25,700 resource 

hours in law enforcement activities, compared with less than 1,000 

hours in security-related activities and about 4,600 hours in all other 

missions, including such activities as search and rescue and marine 

6

The Coast Guard maintains information, on a mission-by-mission basis, about how these 

resources were used. Each hour that these resources are used in a mission is called a 

“resource hour.” These resource hours are logged into employment categories that fall 

under such missions as search and rescue, aids to navigation, defense readiness, 

enforcement of laws and treaties, ice operations, marine environmental protection, ports 

and waterways security, and marine safety. Resource hours do not include such things as 

the time that the resource stands idle or the time that is spent in maintaining it. Coast Guard 

officials told us they estimate that the resource hours we use here would represent the 

employment in which approximately 77 percent of Coast Guard personnel spend their time.
Page 10 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

environmental protection. In the quarter immediately after September 

11th (October–December 2001), law enforcement activities dropped to 

about 13,400 hours, or about 47 percent of their total resources hours; 

efforts devoted to security-related activities increased to more than 

11,000 hours, and other missions were at about 3,800 hours. 

• For the Coast Guard’s 82-, 87-, and 110-foot patrol boats, the shift was 

even greater. Prior to September 11th, these boats were used mainly for 

law enforcement and search and rescue activities in offshore waters, 

with law enforcement activities generally accounting for 68 percent or 

more of their resource hours and homeland security missions for less 

than 5 percent. In the quarter immediately after September 11th 

(October–December 2001), security-related hours increased to the point 

that they greatly exceeded the number of hours spent on law 

enforcement activities (about 20,500 hours for security versus about 

12,000 hours for law enforcement).7

 

These and other changes put a strain on some resources. Local 

commanders reported that to meet new security requirements while still 

being able to meet other essential missions, such as search and rescue 

activities, they have had to operate small boats at 20 to 50 percent above 

normal levels. They reported that hours for patrol boats also increased, and 

that some personnel were working 60 to 100 hours a week.8

 

Although Coast Guard officials indicated that marine safety activities were 

also heavily affected by the need to shift personnel to security activities, 

the Coast Guard does not have data capturing the extent of this shift. To a 

much greater extent than for law enforcement, marine safety activities are 

carried out in ways other than using multiple-mission resources. For 

example, personnel at marine safety offices are extensively involved in 

conducting inspections of ships in port, examining facilities, and carrying 

out a variety of other shoreside activities. The Coast Guard’s current 

information systems do not capture the time devoted to these activities. 

Officials at Coast Guard districts and local offices told us that they had to 

curtail marine safety activities related to recreational boating safety, fishing 

7

Small boats and aircraft resource hours also saw a shift away from law enforcement 

missions and toward homeland security.

8

Coast Guard officials said that there were no significant increases in the resource hours for 

helicopters and fixed wing aircraft because of maintenance requirements and orders to stay 

within budget.
Page 11 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

boat safety, pollution drills, and other activities. However, since these 

activities are not captured in terms of the level of resources expended on 

them, we were unable to quantify the overall extent to which these 

reductions occurred or the impact they had. 

Nonsecurity Activities Have 

Increased, but Missions Are 

Still Affected 

Since the initial response immediately following September 11th, levels of 

effort for nonsecurity missions in general—and for law enforcement in 

particular—have risen. During the first 6 months of 2002, the level of 

resource hours provided for law enforcement activities rose to the point 

that by July–September 2002, total resource hours were above 62,000—or 

within about 5,000 of the level of April–June 2001. The degree to which this 

occurred varied from resource to resource. For medium- and highendurance cutters, for example, the amount of time spent on securityrelated activities dropped substantially in the January–March 2002 and 

April–June 2002 quarters, while the amount of time spent on law 

enforcement activities began to approach levels that existed in January–

March 2001, and before. (See fig. 1.) During the April–June 2002 quarter, 

high- and medium-endurance cutters logged over 27,000 hours for law 

enforcement missions, compared with about 1,100 hours for security 

missions. This is in marked contrast to the quarter immediately following 

September 11th, when hours for the two types of missions were about the 

same. However, security hours rose sharply again in the July–September 

2002 quarter. According to Coast Guard officials, this increase came in 

response to the Office of Homeland Security’s raising the national threat 

level from “elevated” to “high” risk. During this period, which lasted from 

September 10 until September 24, the Coast Guard reassigned its resources 

to respond to the increased threat condition. Such shifts show that even 

relatively short periods of increased security activity can affect other 

missions.
Page 12 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Figure 1: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard High- and Medium-Endurance Cutters before and after September 11th 

The pattern was similar, but not as pronounced, for 82-, 87-, and 110-foot 

patrol boats. (See fig 2.) Compared with hours for high- and 

medium-endurance cutters, patrol boat hours continue to show a more
Page 13 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

lasting effect for expanded security requirements.9 Immediately after 

September 11th, hours logged by these boats on security activities 

outstripped law enforcement hours. By the April–June 2002 quarter, the 

number of hours devoted to law enforcement activities had once again 

increased so that it was more than twice the number spent on security 

activities. However, for the July–September 2002 quarter, patrol boat hours 

for security purposes nearly doubled in response to the heightened threat 

condition, and hours spent on other missions declined as a result.

9

Small boats saw shifts similar to patrol boats—that is, additional hours were spent on law 

enforcement in the most recent quarters—but the return to earlier levels was not as 

complete as it was for cutters.
Page 14 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Figure 2: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard 82-, 87-, and 110-Foot Patrol Boats before and after September 11th

Changes in resource hours provide a useful indicator of the overall level of 

effort for most missions, but these data alone do not tell the entire story. 

There are limitations in using the data, and these limitations make quarterto-quarter comparisons difficult and potentially misleading. For example, 

as we pointed out earlier, the data do not include the activities of about 

one-fourth of the Coast Guard, particularly the personnel assigned to the 
Page 15 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Coast Guard’s 43 marine safety offices spread throughout the country. 

Many of these personnel were and continue to be assigned to security 

functions, according to Coast Guard officials. In addition, the resource 

hour data do not reflect a working environment in which all fluctuations in 

hours over time can be readily attributed to the events of September 11th. 

For example, mission hours can be affected by seasonal fluctuations, such 

as the need for more fisheries patrols during the fishing season and the 

need for more buoy servicing because of weather damage, especially 

during hurricane season. Similarly, fluctuations can result from changes in 

budget levels, as they were in the months immediately preceding 

September 11th. During this period, in response to pending budget cuts, the 

Coast Guard pulled a number of cutters and aircraft out of service, some 

temporarily and others permanently. Finally, the Coast Guard’s operating 

tempo increased sharply after September 11th, and the higher levels of 

resource activity, while feasible temporarily, may not be sustainable in the 

longer term because resources are being used far beyond their normal 

limits. 

To determine whether the situation at specific locations was different from 

the trends shown in the overall data, we visited a number of Coast Guard 

facilities on the East, West, and Gulf coasts. Officials at individual Coast 

Guard districts and offices identified many examples of law enforcement 

and marine safety activities that, as of mid-2002, were still less than existed 

before September 11th. The type and extent of these examples varied from 

location to location, depending on the particular Coast Guard 

responsibilities in that location. For example, districts with large industrial 

ports receiving additional security attention after September 11th reported 

having to shift the most resources to security missions. The following are 

examples, from the five Coast Guard districts we visited, of how the 

districts said they were faring in returning resources to nonsecurity 

missions by June 2002: 

• In the First District,10 officials said that they reassigned patrol boats 

from security to nonsecurity missions because the number of security

10The First District is headquartered in Boston and is responsible for Connecticut, 

Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and parts of New York and 

New Jersey.
Page 16 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

patrols11 was reduced from 48 from October through December 2001 to 

18 from April through June 2002. These reassignments allowed the 

district to increase such activities as fishing boat boardings, which had 

been reduced to 38 during the October–December 2001 period, 

compared with 300 in the same quarter the year before. Still, they said 

the capacity to conduct dockside safety inspections of commercial 

fishing boats had been cut in half from pre-September 11th levels. 

District officials also said that the increased hours of operation brought 

on by the security operations created $400,000 in unforeseen 

maintenance expenditures. 

• Fifth District12 officials said that they once again use three 110-foot 

patrol boats for law enforcement patrols. However, because the 

district’s 87-foot patrol boats are still involved with homeland security 

activities, they said that law enforcement operations conducted by 

patrol boats will likely remain about 40 to 50 percent lower than they 

were before September 11th. Officials said that this reduction in law 

enforcement operations would likely continue for several years. At one 

of the district’s local marine safety offices we visited (Hampton Roads, 

Virginia), officials said that they eliminated or reduced activities in such 

areas as planning and outreach, pollution planning exercises, and 

selected safety inspections of foreign vessels. 

• Eighth District13 officials said that all missions have seen significant 

resource reductions except for homeland security, search and rescue, 

and aids to navigation. For example, during fiscal year 2002, the district 

boarded 1,020 U.S. fishing vessels, compared with 2,701 boardings for 

fiscal year 2001. At one of the local offices we visited 

(Houston/Galveston), officials reported that the requirement for 

providing cruise ship security had a major impact on personnel 

11The district defines security patrols as specific high-interest vessel security escorts or 

nonroutine security patrols.

12The Fifth District is headquartered in Portsmouth, Virginia, and is responsible for North 

Carolina, Virginia, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, and parts of New Jersey 

and Pennsylvania.

13The Eighth District is headquartered in New Orleans and is responsible for Colorado, 

Nebraska, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Texas, Kansas, Wyoming, Louisiana, Arkansas, North 

Dakota, South Dakota, Missouri, Mississippi, Iowa, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, West 

Virginia, and parts of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Georgia, 

and Florida.
Page 17 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

allocations. Local marine safety unit officials said that they currently 

assign at least six marine safety personnel for terminal security sweeps, 

sea marshal operations, and tugboat and bunker barge security 

monitoring; they also dedicate both an aircraft and patrol boats for 

cruise ship escort duty. They said that an expected increase in cruise 

ship activity would add to this workload.

• In the Eleventh District,14 officials said that they were not sending a 110-

foot patrol boat to southern California and northern Mexico to conduct 

counter-drug patrols. Prior to September 11th they had done so, but 

since the terrorist attacks this boat has remained within the district’s 

area of responsibility to conduct security-related activities. Besides 

reductions in counter-drug patrols, district staff indicated that other 

missions were being affected by increased security requirements. For 

example, in San Francisco, officials said that they used patrol and small 

boats to conduct harbor patrols and enforce established security zones. 

The group commander said that since the terrorist attacks he has had to 

eliminate a number of nonsecurity missions for these boats, including 

fishing vessel–safety inspections and fisheries- and other living marine 

resources–enforcement operations. 

• In the Thirteenth District,15 officials said that they had resumed some 

ready cutter patrols,16 which were suspended between September 2001 

and April 2002. Nonetheless, the district is continuing to use one of its 

patrol boats for homeland security patrols on inshore waters and along 

the border. This precludes using this boat for its former duty in fisheries 

enforcement patrols, since these patrols are normally conducted on 

offshore waters.

These examples of local officials’ difficulties in returning nonsecurity 

missions to earlier levels reflect a central issue that Coast Guard officials 

have pointed out: a number of their activities are dependent on cutters, 

patrol boats, and aircraft that are used to meet a variety of missions. If a 

14The Eleventh District is headquartered in Alameda, California, and is responsible for 

Arizona, California, Nevada, and Utah.

15The Thirteenth District is headquartered in Seattle and is responsible for Washington, 

Oregon, Idaho, and Montana.

16The district defines “ready cutter patrols” as having at least one patrol boat assigned to 

conducting full-time law enforcement operations.
Page 18 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

cutter or patrol boat is assigned to conduct security patrols because this 

mission is judged to be a higher priority, it is less available to perform other 

types of missions. Coast Guard officials said that multiple-mission 

resources may be involved in simultaneous missions, such as a cutter’s 

engaging in both fisheries enforcement and marine environmental 

protection tasks while at sea. However, particularly when these resources 

are engaged in close-in security work, they said the resources are less 

available to multitask in this way or less effective in doing so. 

Effects on Other 

Nonsecurity Missions Were 

Not as Great

While other nonsecurity missions besides law enforcement and marine 

safety were affected by the increased emphasis on homeland security, the 

available data and our discussions with Coast Guard officials indicate that 

by comparison, other missions were affected to a much lesser degree than 

law enforcement and marine safety. For example: 

• Although search and rescue resources were used to perform homeland 

security functions, doing so did not materially affect the Coast Guard’s 

ability to respond to search and rescue missions, according to Coast 

Guard officials. Although search and rescue boats were initially 

redeployed for harbor security patrols, they said that any potential 

impact of doing so was tempered by normal changes in workload in the 

season when the attacks occurred. Search and rescue hours normally 

tend to follow a cyclical pattern, with heavier demand in the Aprilthrough-September period, and lower demand in October through 

March. They said that because the attacks occurred at the beginning of 

the low-demand season, resources could be redeployed with little or no 

effect on the mission. Coast Guard officials also emphasized that search 

and rescue is a primary mission that will always receive priority. 

Operational data we reviewed showed that the drop in search and 

rescue hours after September 11th mirrored the normal annual cycle, 

and that since that time, the quarterly fluctuations have continued as 

they have done historically. 

• For aids to navigation, the data showed a drop in cutter resource hours 

after September 11th, when, according to Coast Guard officials, some 

boats that normally operate as buoy tenders were used for security 

purposes instead. However, this drop was not as great as it had been for 

law enforcement and was relatively short-lived. By the April–June 2002 

quarter, the number of cutter resource hours spent on aids to navigation 

had returned to traditional levels. Coast Guard officials said that 
Page 19 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

resources for aids to navigation were among the first to be returned to 

their former missions. 

Funding Increases 

Proposed in Fiscal Year 

2003 Budget May Not 

Have a Major Effect on 

Nonsecurity Missions 

Most of the proposed funding increase for new mission-related initiatives in 

the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2003 budget request is directed at security 

activities and, according to Coast Guard officials, would likely have a 

limited impact on nonsecurity missions. The $213 million proposed for new 

operational initiatives would be directed primarily toward new, permanent, 

security-related personnel positions and new security patrol boats. The 

Coast Guard is still working out plans for how these additional personnel 

would be used and where they would be assigned, but, according to Coast 

Guard personnel in the units we visited, it is unlikely that the additional 

personnel would allow units to shift substantial resources to nonsecurity 

missions. Many of the proposed new positions would replace reservists 

activated on a temporary basis after September 11th. To the degree that the 

proposed positions would replace temporarily activated reservists, they 

would not result in a net addition of staff. 

Proposed Spending for New 

Initiatives Is Focused on 

Expanded Security Role 

The administration’s fiscal year 2003 budget request for the Coast Guard 

includes a total of $213 million for new mission-related initiatives.17 Of this 

amount, $188 million (88 percent) is proposed for security-related 

purposes, such as increased patrols and vessel boardings; the remaining 

$25 million is for enhanced staffing of search and rescue operations, and 

for vessel traffic information system improvements. One of the main 

objectives of the security-related initiatives is to provide permanent staff 

following the Coast Guard’s initial staffing buildup after September 11th, 

which was accomplished largely by temporarily activating reservists. While 

there is variation among the districts, many of the proposed positions 

would be permanent slots that would replace the positions filled by 

17In addition to requesting $213 million for new mission-related initiatives, the Coast Guard 

is also requesting the following other increases: $172 million for pay increases and military 

personnel entitlements; $123 million in various technical adjustments; $49 million in other 

expenditures, such as reserve training; and $14 million for capital expenditures. The budget 

request also includes $1.2 billion in retirement-related costs for current and future retirees, 

according to Coast Guard officials. These retirement-related costs were included in 

response to proposed legislation (Managerial Flexibility Act of 2001 [S.1612]) directing 

agencies to fully fund the future pension and health benefits of their current workforces. 

Although this legislation has not been enacted, the Coast Guard complied with the 

administration’s requirement to include these costs in its fiscal year 2003 budget request.
Page 20 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

reservists. In all, the Coast Guard plans to hire almost 2,200 new personnel 

by the end of fiscal year 2003. Of these positions, 870 were authorized in the 

supplemental appropriation approved for fiscal year 2002, and 1,330 are 

proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget request. The Coast Guard expects 

nearly 90 percent of these 2,200 new positions to be assigned to securityrelated functions. (See table 2.) Coast Guard officials expect that at least 

80 percent of the personnel will be assigned to field units (area commands, 

districts, marine safety offices, marine safety units, air stations, or small 

boat stations).

Table 2: Allocation of Proposed New Personnel by Program Area, Fiscal Year 2003 

Budget Request

Source: Developed by GAO from Coast Guard data.

Program area

Number of

additional

personnel

Security mission

 Maritime domain awareness 316

 High-interest vessel control 268

 Presence and response capabilities 1,062

 Critical infrastructure and force protection 85

 Domestic and international outreach 190

 Homeland Security Liaison Billets 43

 Total for security mission 1,964

Nonsecurity missions

 Commissioning and operation of three seagoing buoy tenders 165

 Maritime search and rescue/Personnel safety 193

 47-foot motor life boat follow-on 36

 Commissioning and operation of three coastal patrol boats 35

 Decommissioning of three seagoing buoy tenders -195

 Total for nonsecurity missions 234

Grand total 2,198
Page 21 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

In addition to the increased numbers of permanent positions, the Coast 

Guard plans to buy 80 homeland security response boats and 4 87-foot 

coastal patrol boats.18 While both types of boats are multi-mission capable, 

officials stated that these new boats are intended mainly for use in 

homeland security missions.

Ability to Shift Resources to 

Nonsecurity Missions May 

Be Limited 

The additional personnel and assets included in the fiscal year 2003 budget 

request may allow field units to free up some resources for nonsecurity 

missions, but for several reasons, the flexibility to do so appears limited. 

One reason is that many of the new positions would replace reservists 

activated at field locations since September 11th, thereby providing these 

units only the resources necessary to maintain operations at current levels. 

The Coast Guard can use reservists for up to 2 years, but from a practical 

standpoint, the agency typically uses them in large numbers only for surge 

capability during emergencies. Moreover, having permanent personnel is 

more cost effective and provides long-term workforce stability, according 

to Coast Guard officials. Our interviews with district staff indicated that 

this would be the case to a greater degree in some locations than in others. 

Coast Guard staff in some districts told us that new personnel would 

largely replace currently activated reservists, and therefore would do little 

more than allow them to maintain the status quo. Some districts also 

reported that because of the large number of reservists called to active 

duty, there would not be enough new active duty personnel to replace 

reservists on a one-to-one basis. As a result, the new authorized personnel 

strength would not match the current personnel numbers at some 

locations, and the impact would actually be a reduction in resources 

allocated to lower-priority missions. 

The second reason why the flexibility to shift additional resources to 

nonsecurity missions may be limited is that the Coast Guard plans to assign 

a number of the new positions to security units that would provide only 

limited replacement of any existing activity. Nearly 430 personnel, or 20 

percent of all new personnel, are expected to be assigned to six maritime

18These figures include boats funded through the fiscal year 2002 supplemental 

appropriations. The supplemental appropriations funded 42 of the 80 homeland security 

response boats, and all 4 of the coastal patrol boats.
Page 22 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

safety and security teams.19 Currently, the Coast Guard has four such 

teams—in Seattle; San Pedro, California; Houston/Galveston, Texas; and 

Hampton Roads, Virginia—and there are plans for two additional teams in 

Jacksonville, Florida, and New York City. Our conversations with Coast 

Guard officials indicated that there are still many unresolved issues 

concerning how these teams will be used. District and headquarters 

officials believed that these teams help meet certain security requirements, 

but individual teams will have to learn how best to use these assets.

The third reason for limited flexibility is the time that will probably elapse 

before many of the people in these new positions could be in place or ready 

to make optimum contributions. Time lags normally occur from when a 

position is authorized to when a person is assigned to fill it. Both 

headquarters and district officials have reported that they do not expect 

some personnel to start filling headquarters and field positions for at least 6 

months, or maybe even longer. In addition, once a number of these 

positions are filled, the effectiveness of the persons in them could be 

decreased by what some Coast Guard personnel refer to as “juniorocity”—

that is, persons at a lower rank or pay grade (in the case of civilians) filling 

positions that call for higher-level candidates. Coast Guard officials said 

that this could potentially occur, and if it does, these people may need 

additional supervision from senior personnel. 

The Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2003 allocation of cutter and patrol boat 

resource hours provides further indication that nonsecurity missions 

would not be greatly increased, because the resource hours allocation is 

relatively the same as it was for fiscal year 2002. The Coast Guard sets this 

allocation for all law enforcement program areas in its annual operational 

and maritime safety mission planning guidance. This guidance shows that 

for fiscal year 2003, the overall number of cutter hours for those activities 

is to rise by about 5,700, a 2 percent increase from the previous year, with 

each of the law enforcement areas seeing small changes from the prior 

year. The planning guidance data support the conclusion that even with 

new security boats funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Coast 

Guard would not be able to redeploy cutters to nonsecurity missions. 

According to the guidance, continued shifting of small boats and 87-foot 

19The maritime safety and security teams are each composed of 71 personnel. They are 

under the administrative and operational control of the area commanders, but the tactical 

control of the local unit. 
Page 23 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

patrol boats to port security activities will leave gaps in inshore fisheries 

enforcement.

Opportunities for 

Increased Operational 

Efficiency Could Help 

Meet Mission 

Responsibilities 

A number of opportunities for improving operational efficiency are 

potentially available to help the Coast Guard accomplish its various 

missions. In recent years, we and others have studied Coast Guard 

operations and made recommendations for more efficient operations, and 

a number of these recommendations have merit in this new operating 

environment. In addition, the Coast Guard has attempted, through local 

port organizations, to develop ways to partner more effectively with local, 

state, and federal agencies, as well as with public and private entities. 

Individual ports have made notable—but isolated—accomplishments in 

this regard. Although some mechanisms are in place to help ports share 

information about these projects, these mechanisms are not working 

effectively. 

Previous Recommendations 

for Improving Operations 

Still Have Merit 

Over the past decade, we and other outside organizations, along with the 

Coast Guard itself, have studied Coast Guard operations to determine 

where greater efficiencies might be found. We consolidated many of these 

recommendations to improve Coast Guard operations in reports issued in 

1997 and 1999.20 As part of previous initiatives aimed at operating more 

efficiently, the Coast Guard has used many such recommendations, 

undertaking such steps as reducing administrative staff, consolidating 

offices, and streamlining operations. However, a number of past 

recommendations that were not adopted still have relevance. For example: 

• Dockside fisheries enforcement by the National Marine Fisheries

Service. Past studies found that the Coast Guard had opportunity to 

replace some of its at-sea boardings for domestic fishing vessels with 

dockside enforcement by the National Marine Fisheries Service (an 

agency of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) and 

by state agencies. Whether this same opportunity still exists in the 

current environment is unknown, but it represents a possible way to 

leverage resources and minimize any overlap that may be occurring. A 

20Coast Guard: Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints (GAO/RCED-97-110, May 14, 

1997) and Coast Guard: Review of Administrative and Support Functions (GAO/RCED-99-

62R, Mar. 10, 1999).
Page 24 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

closer look at potential efficiencies seems particularly warranted given 

the increasingly complex nature of the Coast Guard’s work in fisheries 

enforcement. For example, fishing regulations in the New England 

fisheries have evolved to include 18 fisheries management plans 

involving more than 40 marine species. 

• Privatizing vessel traffic service systems in more ports. Vessel traffic 

service systems, which are responsible for controlling harbor traffic 

operations in a number of the nation’s ports, are operated 

predominantly by Coast Guard personnel. However, two systems—

Delaware Bay and Los Angeles/Long Beach—are either privately 

operated or operated jointly with the Coast Guard, and past studies have 

recommended that the Coast Guard examine the possibility of 

privatizing at least some additional systems. At Los Angeles/Long Beach, 

for example, the system uses Coast Guard and Marine Exchange 

personnel to monitor traffic and provide mariners with information.21

The state of California reimburses the Coast Guard’s personnel costs, 

using fees paid by vessel owners using the system. 

Leveraging Resources 

through Partnerships 

Provides Mission 

Efficiencies to the Coast 

Guard

One area that has come to the forefront since September 11th, given the 

expanded duties that the Coast Guard and other port stakeholders have 

assumed, is the agency’s potential ability to partner with other port 

stakeholders to help accomplish the varied security and nonsecurity goals 

involved in port operations. These stakeholders include state and local 

agencies as well as private-sector interests. As we visited Coast Guard 

locations, we noted many examples in which cooperative arrangements 

had been used to accomplish these varied goals successfully. Table 3 

provides examples of some of the partnerships we found.

21The Marine Exchange of Los Angeles and Long Beach operates the vessel traffic 

information system serving these two ports.
Page 25 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Table 3: Examples of Coast Guard Partnering in Individual Ports

Source: Developed by GAO.

Port Example of partnering

Boston Coast Watch. This program acts in a neighborhood-watch fashion and allows fishermen and other port 

stakeholders to alert the Coast Guard to irregularities that might indicate security threats.

Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) Escorts. In developing its plan for escorting LNG ships, the Coast Guard 

cooperated with other agencies and entities to share the burden. As a result, state and local agencies in the 

Port of Boston assist in escorting LNG ships through the port, providing on-shore security, and coordinating 

bridge closures.

Spill Response. The Coast Guard has turned over responsibility for responding to minor oil spills to the state 

of Massachusetts. 

Hampton Roads Maritime Incident Response Team (MIRT). Local municipalities have created a firefighting cooperative to 

respond to marine fires. In the event of an incident, in addition to deploying as first responder, the team acts 

under the command and control of the captain of the port and liaises with affected municipalities. The MIRT 

trains by conducting field exercises with the Coast Guard. Through this program, the Coast Guard benefits 

from the presence of a marine firefighting resource, while the municipalities involved benefit from coordinated 

federal participation.

Houston/Galveston Mobility Program. The Coast Guard partnered with the Houston/Galveston Navigation Safety Advisory 

Committee on identifying mobility issues associated with both recreational and commercial users of the 

Houston Ship Channel, Galveston Bay, and connecting waters. As a result, the Coast Guard derived lists of 

local waterways needs and their relative importance to the users’ outcomes. 

Ship Rider Information Exchange Program. The Coast Guard entered into agreements that allow vessel 

inspectors to ride on many of the chemical and oil tank ships that frequent Houston, the nation’s largest 

petro-chemical port. The inspectors get to see bridge resource management, cargo operations, tank cleaning 

evolutions, and engine room procedures first hand. The program exposes Coast Guard inspectors to the 

unique aspects of the tank industry, while allowing the ships’ crew to develop insights into Coast Guard 

enforcement and U.S. and international legal requirements.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Vessel Traffic Service. In cooperation with the state of California and local interests, the Coast Guard jointly 

operates a VTS system. State law requires all vessels over a certain size to participate, and operating costs 

are paid from user fees on vessels using the system. Developed under Coast Guard guidance, the system 

operates under many of the same rules and procedures as Coast Guard VTS sites, provides the Coast Guard 

valuable assistance during its search and rescue efforts and law enforcement actions, and aids in the 

dissemination of captain of the port orders.

Puget Sound Harbor Safety Plan. Through the efforts of the Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee, guidelines were 

developed to cover issues such as emergency response, lightering, and pilotage. By working through the 

harbor safety committee, the Coast Guard was able to achieve buy-in from those affected by the plan, thereby 

ensuring greater success. Guidance developed through this process has been incorporated into the charts 

that mariners use when navigating the waters of Puget Sound. 

Ballast Water. The Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee developed voluntary standards of care for 

exchanging ballast water that were eventually used as the basis for new state regulations.

Standards of Care to Prevent Drifting Ships. Through the work of the Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee, 

a mechanical problem was identified that caused seven to eight groundings per year, on average. This 

cooperative effort resulted in a new standard of care that requires ship operators to complete a check of their 

propulsion systems upon checking in with the Vessel Traffic System. The change mitigates groundings that 

could result in spills or loss of life.
Page 26 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

The Coast Guard has recognized possibilities for greater efficiencies 

through partnering and is beginning to implement better guidance and 

procedures in this area. In May 2002, the Commandant stated that the Coast 

Guard intended to build strategic partnerships to enhance its mission 

outcomes, bring clarity to mission planning and execution, and leverage the 

capabilities of Coast Guard forces. Likewise, the Coast Guard’s strategic 

plan declares partnering to be a guiding principle for decisionmaking. To 

help local Coast Guard officials promote these efforts, headquarters has 

issued general guidance to aid in the development of harbor safety 

committees. Although there are other cooperative arrangements in ports, 

including area committees and port security committees, the Coast Guard 

has focused on harbor safety committees or their equivalents22 because it 

believes that such committees, composed of facility operators and port 

users, are often the only local bodies available to meet and discuss mutual 

safety, mobility, and environmental protection issues. 

Harbor safety committees, established largely on an ad hoc basis by the 

Coast Guard or other entities over the years, differ widely in their 

membership and structure. These differences, in part, reflect the 

differences that exist from port to port. The Coast Guard guidance is 

intended to increase harmonization between committees without imposing 

a mandated structure for them. The guidance illustrates the attributes of 

particularly successful committees and focuses on overall organizational 

structure, committee membership, and areas for potential action. The 

guidance also points out that tools are available to assist committees in 

their work, particularly the Coast Guard’s National Harbor Safety 

Committee Web site. Coast Guard officials told us that some recently 

formed committees were established using the guidance, and that some 

existing committees have made changes to come into closer alignment with 

the guidance.

Effectiveness of Some 

Partnerships Is Hampered 

by Limited Scope of Activity 

and Lack of Information 

Sharing 

Although the Coast Guard recognizes the potential offered by partnering 

and has provided guidance toward this end, current efforts are limited by 

two main problems. The first is related to the variations between harbor 

safety committees: some are much narrower in scope and activity than 

others. The second is related to the lack of effective sharing of information 

among harbor safety committees. 

22The Coast Guard uses the term “Harbor Safety Committee” to refer to any port Marine 

Transportation System (MTS) coordinating body or committee in its guidance on the topic. 
Page 27 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

The makeup of harbor safety committees, which varies somewhat from 

port to port, can sometimes affect their ability to tackle new projects. The 

actions the Coast Guard can undertake often reflect the extent of the 

individual committee’s interests. Some committees have broad 

representation among various stakeholder groups. For example, the 

committee in Puget Sound has included a broad mix of shipping industry 

groups, labor organizations, port representatives, environmental agencies, 

and state representatives. Consensus efforts of this committee resulted in 

new state regulations about the dumping of ballast water, for example. By 

contrast, in Philadelphia, when the Coast Guard attempted to carry out a 

safety assessment with the cooperation of the local harbor safety 

committee, the stakeholders perceived the assessment effort as 

threatening the competitiveness of the port and decided not to cooperate. 

Coast Guard officials attributed this lack of interest to the makeup of the 

committee, which did not have representation beyond industry 

representatives. 

More effective information-sharing is another way the Coast Guard could 

better leverage its resources. There currently is no effective way for 

stakeholder groups in the more than 100 locations where such committees 

exist to share information with each other about successful projects or 

about best practices that contribute to these successes. Our discussions 

with Coast Guard and port officials indicated that information between 

committees tends to be exchanged sporadically, by word of mouth or 

happenstance. There currently is no national harbor safety association or 

other umbrella group that can share information, although a few 

committees have recently expressed interest in forming an association. 

Likewise, no formal process exists for sharing best practices and 

information within the Coast Guard. Numerous Coast Guard personnel 

noted that personal relationships and the rotation of personnel currently 

are the best tools available for information-sharing about the operation of 

other ports. 

In the absence of a mechanism or process for effectively sharing 

information, communication within the Coast Guard and among its 

partners could be facilitated by greater use of the Coast Guard’s National 

Harbor Safety Committee Web site, which is currently underutilized. When 

we checked in September 2002, it had just five examples of best 

practices—three from Puget Sound, one from the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, and one from the Coast Guard. By contrast, 

during our field visits we were told about examples of good partnerships in 

each of the ports we visited. 
Page 28 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Framework for 

Monitoring Levels of 

Effort and Results Has 

Two Main Components 

The Congress has expressed great interest in monitoring the Coast Guard’s 

mission resource levels, especially for nonsecurity missions. In particular, 

legislation currently under consideration for establishing a Department of 

Homeland Security includes a requirement for the Coast Guard to report 

regularly on the status of its nonsecurity missions. We think our experience 

in reviewing such information may be helpful in establishing a meaningful 

framework for keeping the Congress informed. In this instance, such a 

framework would involve two main components. The first component is a 

strategy that identifies, at least in general terms, the planned levels of effort 

for these various missions in future years and a time frame for achieving 

these planned levels. The second component is adequate information for 

assessing progress. This information has to capture not only how much the 

Coast Guard is spending on these missions but also what these 

expenditures produce, both in the level of service provided and the results 

achieved. Much of the necessary information may already exist, but not in a 

report that specifically responds to the Congress’s interest in nonsecurity 

missions. 

First Component: 

Establishing Planned 

Resource Levels and a Time 

Frame for Achieving These 

Levels 

In the Coast Guard’s substantial transformation following September 11th, 

it is understandable that the agency’s primary planning focus has been on 

incorporating its expanded security mission. The agency has not yet 

developed a plan for how it intends to balance these various missions over 

the longer term. For its multiple-mission resources such as cutters and 

aircraft, the Coast Guard has established fiscal year 2003 resource levels 

for its various missions, but there is no indication that these levels 

represent planned levels for future years. 

Specifying the proposed resource levels for these missions, as well as 

establishing a strategy for achieving them, is an important first step in the 

Coast Guard’s communication with the Congress and other decisionmakers 

about what it intends to accomplish with its additional resources. This 

information is critical; without it, neither the Coast Guard nor the Congress 

knows what level of activities and services are to be expected. Operating 

without such knowledge for an extended period of time places 

decisionmakers in the position of being asked to decide on funding levels 

without knowing what this funding is likely to produce. 
Page 29 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Second Component: 

Adequate Information for 

Assessing Progress 

Once resource levels are set, it is important to be able to assess progress in 

achieving those levels. An effective reporting mechanism needs a variety of 

measures and a way to set these measures in context. Although the Coast 

Guard may already be collecting this information, it currently does not 

exist in a useful format. 

Measures That Address Both 

Efforts and Accomplishments

Program measures are most useful when, taken together, they can provide 

a picture of both the resources being applied to a mission (inputs) and the 

results of applying these resources (outputs and outcomes). Input 

measures include such things as the amount of money spent on a mission 

or the number of persons assigned to the mission. (See table 4 for other 

examples.) Output measures, such as the number of patrols or inspections 

conducted, describe what is being provided with these resources. Outcome 

measures go further than output measures, in that they address the extent 

to which program goals are accomplished. Together, these different 

measures allow decisionmakers to answer questions about how many 

resources are being applied, how the application of these resources 

translates into specific activities, and what these activities are producing.23

23In addition to these three types of measures, there is a fourth main type—one that relates 

efforts to accomplishments. Efficiency measures, which provide information about the cost 

of providing a certain level of service, are the most common form of effort measure. We 

have omitted this category of measurement here because the category, while important, is 

not as central as the other three for answering questions about returning to previous levels 

of effort and program results. 
Page 30 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Table 4: Types of Measures for Monitoring Agency Missions and Activities

Source: Developed by GAO based on information from the Governmental Accounting Standards 

Board.

Having all three types of measures is important, because exclusive 

dependence on any one type has built-in limitations. For example, a rising 

level of expenditures (an input measure) does not necessarily equate to 

higher levels of effort (outputs). Instead, it may be a reflection only of 

rising personnel costs or increased capital expenditures. Similarly, 

although a rising level of outputs (such as increased numbers of patrols) 

may appear desirable, they tell only a limited story on their own. Increased 

outputs may simply represent inefficiencies—more effort is expended, but 

with little or no increase in the desired outcome. Including outcome 

measures is particularly important because they provide a “so what” tool to 

help assess whether the level of effort is justified and whether it needs to 

be modified in some way. 

The Coast Guard currently has a variety of all three types of measures. (See 

table 5 for examples.) Many of these measures are already reported in 

some context or another. In particular, the Coast Guard currently collects 

and reports a variety of outcome data to comply with the Government 

Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Under GPRA, DOT is required to 

establish annual performance plans that contain annual goals and 

measures to assess progress in reaching these goals, which are linked to 

their long-term strategic goals. The Coast Guard’s current performance 

plan also contains some discussion of how security-related priorities are 

Type (or subtype) of measure Explanation

Measures of effort: inputs

 Financial information These measures are based on information about expenditures. This can include items such 

as salaries, employee benefits, materials, supplies, and equipment.

 Nonfinancial information These measures focus on the number of personnel used in a specific mission or activity. 

Using nonfinancial information in effect removes wage, benefit, and cost-of-living differences 

from resource inputs, making it easier to compare levels of effort over time.

 Other information These measures could include such things as the amount of equipment or assets assigned 

to a specific mission or activity.

Measures of accomplishment: outputs and outcomes

 Outputs These measures focus on the quantity of a service provided to address a specific mission or 

activity, such as the number of inspections conducted.

 Outcomes These measures are used to determine whether the service provided results in an actual 

accomplishment besides the activity itself. These measures are useful in setting goals, 

targets, and standards.
Page 31 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

affecting performance targets for other missions in fiscal years 2002 and 

2003. The plan notes five areas that have been negatively impacted by 

increased security requirements—drug interdiction, foreign fishing vessel 

interdiction, fisheries protection, military readiness, and support for 

military operations. For example, the Coast Guard does not expect to reach 

its fiscal year 2002 cocaine seizure rate goal, because drug interdiction 

resources have been diverted to port security missions.

Table 5: Examples of Measures Currently Developed by the Coast Guard 

Source: Compiled by GAO from Coast Guard reports and information systems.

Additional Information Providing 

Context for Measurement Data

To give context to these various types of measures, it may be necessary to 

report other explanatory information. Such information might be needed to 

explain changes in the way an agency is doing business, or special 

circumstances that had an impact on the agency’s goals or missions. This 

information is of two main types:

• External factors, such as environmental or demographic characteristics, 

that are outside of an organization’s control. Declines in fish stocks, for 

example, can be affected by many things beyond the management of the 

fishery, such as climate or actions by other nations. 

• Internal factors, such as staffing patterns, patrol routes, or any other 

significant developments that the agency has control over. Such 

information is important because data from the measures themselves—

particularly input and output measures—may, in isolation, tell only part 

of the story. For example, the Coast Guard’s marine safety office in New 

Orleans recently curtailed some of its safety-related foreign flag–vessel 

Type of measure Example

Input Dollar expenditures by mission, both planned and actual

Authorized strength levels for specific units or offices

Number of vessels or aircraft assigned to specific program areas or missions

Output Number of hours that assets such as cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft were spent on each mission

Number of fisheries patrols conducted

Number of vessel-safety and -security inspections conducted 

Outcome Percentage of mariners in distress who were saved

Number of foreign fishing vessel incursions detected

Percentage of time that navigation aids were fully operational
Page 32 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

inspections because of reduced staff levels. Any measure related to the 

number of inspections made by Coast Guard personnel would thus 

likely show a decline and lead to a conclusion that the Coast Guard had 

significantly curtailed its safety oversight. However, the Coast Guard 

decided in this instance to rely on Coast Guard-approved maritime 

classification societies for these safety inspections. This additional 

information would be needed to put the data in proper context. 

No Current Report Usefully 

Provides This Information 

Although much potentially useful information exists for explaining and 

analyzing the Coast Guard’s levels of effort in nonsecurity missions, no 

current report assimilates this information and sets it in the context of 

organizational or program developments related to accomplishing 

nonsecurity missions. The Coast Guard’s annual performance plan, while 

acknowledging in several places that nonsecurity performance targets are 

likely to be negatively affected by ongoing security efforts, has a relatively 

limited amount of data, is not intended as a report on increasing resource 

levels for nonsecurity missions, and does not have the level of detail that 

may be desired on this issue. 

Assembling a meaningful report calls for a mix of input, output, and 

outcome measures and a complementary explanation of what difficulties 

the Coast Guard is facing, what externalities have affected the outcome, 

and what plans the Coast Guard is making either to bring more resources to 

bear or to find ways to leverage resources or otherwise operate more 

efficiently. A meaningful report could potentially use many different 

measures. In concept, the best set of measures would be one that allowed 

both the Coast Guard and the Congress, to the degree possible, to link 

resources and activities with results—for example, linking the number and 

types of fisheries patrols with the recovery of fish stocks, or the level of 

drug enforcement patrols with the level of success in preventing drugs 

from entering the country. 

It is important for the Coast Guard to work with the Congress in defining 

what information should be provided, because some information is readily 

available while other information is not. For example, under current 

information systems, it is much easier to determine, on a mission-bymission basis, how personnel aboard ships and aircraft spend their time 

than it is to create a similar mission-by-mission picture of how time is spent
Page 33 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

in headquarters and program offices.24 The value of developing additional 

measures that are not already in place needs to be weighed against the 

possible cost. We did not undertake a detailed evaluation of the Coast 

Guard’s information systems to determine the full range of information 

these systems might be able to supply. It may be that, if the Congress 

decides that certain additional measures are important for reporting 

purposes, Coast Guard information specialists can assemble the data with 

relative ease. However, if the systems do not already collect the 

information, considerable work may be needed, and there may be little 

historical information to provide a benchmark for current data. 

Conclusions The Coast Guard’s adjustment to its new post–September 11th 

environment is still largely in process. Sorting out how traditional missions 

will be fully carried out alongside new security responsibilities will likely 

take several years. The Congress has expressed strong interest in 

monitoring the activity levels for these missions, particularly those 

nonsecurity missions that saw a reduction in activities after September 

11th. The Coast Guard acknowledges that for the foreseeable future, 

absorbing new security activities will continue to affect activity levels for 

some of these other missions. After September 11th, the Coast Guard’s 

attention understandably turned to assimilating added security 

responsibilities, and beyond its short-term plans for fiscal year 2003 it has 

not indicated the levels of effort its various missions are likely to receive. 

However, given the degree of congressional concern, it is important for the 

Coast Guard to develop a framework that will keep the Congress apprised 

of what is happening. It is also important for the Coast Guard to develop 

and share with the Congress a longer-term strategy that identifies, at least 

in general terms, the levels of effort the Coast Guard projects for its various 

missions, along with a time frame for achieving these planned levels. 

Because the Coast Guard must adjust to rapid changes in its multi-mission 

environment, these levels are likely to remain fluid and therefore in need of 

revision as necessary, but the direction they set is nonetheless important. 

Without this sense of direction, decisionmakers are less able to make 

24The Coast Guard collects and reports information about the number of hours that each 

resource, such as a cutter, a patrol boat, or a helicopter, is used for each type of mission. 

However, this asset-based information does not include mission-related time spent by other 

personnel. Coast Guard officials told us that new information systems currently under 

development are expected to provide a variety of information related to the tasks of these 

employees, such as the number of inspections performed or the number of boardings 

conducted.
Page 34 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

spending and other decisions with a clear understanding of how the Coast 

Guard intends to balance its missions. 

It is also important for the Coast Guard to provide decisionmakers with 

information about progress in achieving the intended balance among 

missions. The Coast Guard currently collects and disseminates a wide 

variety of information about its nonsecurity missions and activities, but this 

information is in disparate forms and documents. To make such 

information more useful for the Congress, a better synthesis is needed. In 

short, existing information must be analyzed in the context of the Coast 

Guard’s efforts to address all of its missions as effectively and efficiently as 

possible. In doing so, information regarding agreed-upon performance 

measures also needs to be developed and provided to congressional 

decisionmakers. The absence of such information limits their ability to 

assess current efforts and decide if changes should be made. 

In meeting the challenges involved with its various missions, it is also 

important for the Coast Guard to carefully consider and implement, where 

appropriate, ways of operating more efficiently and effectively. Many past 

suggestions for more efficient operation still appear relevant. These would 

include looking for ways to share monitoring duties with other agencies, 

eliminating possible duplication of effort, and conducting joint operations 

or projects with state and local partners. The Coast Guard’s recent efforts 

to expand partnerships with other maritime stakeholders at individual 

ports offer promising examples of greater leveraging of existing resources. 

However, the processes for sharing information between ports are limited, 

diminishing the potential for replicating a port’s successes in other 

locations. 

Recommendations To provide the Congress with a useful framework for reviewing and 

monitoring Coast Guard activities, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Transportation direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to:

• Develop a longer-term strategy that outlines how the Coast Guard sees 

its resources—cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel—being distributed 

across its various missions, as well as a time frame for achieving this 

desired balance among missions.

• Work with the Congress to develop and implement a useful reporting 

format that provides a full range of input, output, and outcome 
Page 35 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

measures, as well as a means to keep the Congress apprised of ongoing 

developments that have an effect on nonsecurity missions. 

To improve operational efficiencies and help leverage resources, we also 

recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Commandant to 

reexamine past recommendations for operational efficiencies and, in 

particular, to develop an effective way to systematically share information 

on successful partnership efforts. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation and 

the Coast Guard for their review and comment. Coast Guard officials 

provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we incorporated 

to ensure the accuracy of our report. The Coast Guard did not respond in 

writing to our recommendations, but, in oral comments, Coast Guard 

officials expressed a concern that our recommendation about developing a 

longer-term strategy would involve disclosing budgetary information well 

in advance of approval by DOT and Office of Management and Budget 

officials in the normal budget process. We have modified the wording of the 

recommendation to help clarify that it is meant to identify, in more general 

terms, how the Coast Guard envisions distributing its resources to meet its 

many missions.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the Honorable 

Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation, and Admiral Thomas H. 

Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard. We also will make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 36 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at 

heckerj@gao.gov or (202) 512-2834, or Randall Williamson at 

willamsonr@gao.gov or (206) 287-4860. GAO contacts and 

acknowledgments are listed in appendix II.

JayEtta Z. Hecker

Director, Physical Infrastructure
Page 37 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard has restored its 

nonsecurity missions following the September 11th terrorist attacks, we 

reviewed the Coast Guard’s Abstract of Operations. This data, reported by 

crews of cutters, boats, and aircraft, represents the hours that these 

resources spent in each of the Coast Guard’s mission areas. We reviewed 

this data to identify how resources were utilized across missions both 

before and after September 11th. In addition, we also spoke with officials at 

Coast Guard Headquarters and at the Atlantic Area and Pacific Area 

commands in Portsmouth, Virginia, and Alameda, California, respectively, 

regarding restoration of nonsecurity missions. To obtain information on 

how the restoration varied around the country, we visited Coast Guard 

district offices and operational units in Alameda, Boston, New Orleans, 

Portsmouth, and Seattle, as well as personnel at operational commands 

under these district commands.

To assess the impact of the fiscal year 2003 budget request on nonsecurity 

operations, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2002 budget and 

supplemental appropriations, as well as their fiscal year 2003 budget 

request. In addition, we interviewed Coast Guard officials within the Coast 

Guard’s Office of Programs, the Human Resource Directorate, Operations 

Directorate, and the Marine Safety Directorate to identify where budget 

increases would be spent and the impact of the budget increase. To discuss 

the impact of the increase in the budget request, we interviewed staff at 

Coast Guard Headquarters, area commands, and district offices. In 

addition, we also reviewed Coast Guard planning documents to determine 

the extent of changes in planned resource allocations for fiscal year 2003.

To identify types of operational efficiencies the Coast Guard should 

consider to help restore nonsecurity missions, we reviewed previous GAO 

and Department of Transportation Inspector General reports. In addition, 

we discussed options for operational efficiencies and for the development 

of partnerships at district offices we visited, as well as at local Coast Guard 

offices under these districts’ commands. We also reviewed Coast Guard 

guidance for Harbor Safety Committees and Marine Transportation System 

issues.

To identify a framework that would help the Coast Guard report on 

progress toward restoring nonsecurity missions, we reviewed previous 

GAO work on performance management and developing performance 

measures. We reviewed the Coast Guard’s current strategic documents and 

discussed these reports with staff in the Coast Guard’s Office of Programs 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

to determine the extent to which existing data collection activities could 

support a reporting framework.
Page 39 GAO-03-155 Coast Guard Missions

Appendix II

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contacts JayEtta Z. Hecker (202) 512-2834

Randall B. Williamson (206) 287-4860

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, David Hooper, Christopher M. Jones, 

Molly C. Laster, Sara Moessbauer, Tim Schindler, and Stan Stenersen made 

key contributions to this report.

(544022)
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