Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and

Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce,

House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:00 a.m.,

Thursday, October 17, 2002 CUSTOMS SERVICE

Acquisition and

Deployment of Radiation

Detection Equipment

Statement of (Ms.) Gary L. Jones, Director

Natural Resources and Environment

and

Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director

Tax Administration and Justice

GAO-03-235T
Page 1 GAO-03-235T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss our ongoing

work related to Customs’ acquisition and deployment of radiation

detection equipment, and our report related to assistance provided by the

United States to foreign countries to combat nuclear smuggling.1

 As you

know, we have also been doing work for the Committee, including visits to

ports, concerning other aspects of Customs’ inspection of cargo at

seaports. The Customs Service has deemed the information we are

collecting regarding that work as law enforcement sensitive, which

precludes us from discussing it in an open hearing. We understand that a

closed session for questions and answers will follow this open session. We

will be happy to share information about this law enforcement sensitive

work in that setting.

Our testimony focuses on (1) Customs’ acquisition and deployment of

radiation detection equipment on U.S. borders and ports of entry and (2)

U.S. assistance to foreign countries to help them combat nuclear

smuggling. We shared our observations from visits to two major ports with

this Subcommittee during a closed hearing on July 9, 2002, and our

observations on the deployment of radiation detection equipment in a

letter to the full Committee on August 15, 2002. Our statement today

results from interviews with Customs and Department of Energy (DOE)

officials and draws upon our prior work on U.S. efforts to help other

countries combat nuclear smuggling.

Our observations concerning the acquisition of radiation detection

equipment have not changed from what we reported to you in August.

Specifically, the Customs Service’s primary radiation detection

equipment—radiation pagers—have certain limitations and may be

inappropriate for the task. Further, we remain concerned that no

comprehensive plan is in place for installing and using radiation detection

equipment at all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry. Regarding U.S.

efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling, a number of U.S.

agencies, including Customs, have provided assistance to foreign

countries—mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern

Europe. The agencies have provided a range of assistance including

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other

Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning,

GAO-02-426, (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002).
Page 2 GAO-03-235T

radiation detection equipment and training as well as other equipment and

training to generally improve countries’ ability to interdict nuclear

smuggling.

Based on our work with Customs and DOE officials and our review of U.S.

efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling, we have

concerns that Customs has not yet deployed the best available

technologies for detecting radioactive and nuclear materials at U.S. border

crossings and ports of entry. Customs officials told us that its

approximately 7,500 inspectors rely primarily on personal radiation

detection pagers, worn on a belt. Since fiscal year 1998, Customs has

deployed about 4,200 pagers among its inspectors and expects to purchase

over 4,000 additional pagers to complete deployment by September 2003.

At that time, every inspector will have his or her own pager.

However, radiation detection pagers have limitations. DOE officials told us

that they do not view pagers as search instruments, but rather as personal

safety devices to protect against radiation exposure, and that the pagers

have a limited range and are not designed to detect weapons-usable

nuclear material. According to U.S. radiation detection vendors and DOE

laboratory specialists, pagers are more effectively used in conjunction

with other radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors similar

to what DOE is providing to Russia for use at its border crossings.

Customs has deployed over 200 radiation detectors on its x-ray systems

for screening small packages, but it has not deployed the larger portal

monitors for screening pedestrians and entire vehicles. Customs plans to

install portal monitors at every U.S. border crossing and port of entry, but

so far has only deployed them at one border crossing as a pilot project.

Customs has told us that a report on the pilot project would be issued by

the middle of this month, but according to a Customs official we spoke

with the report is not yet available. We will be reviewing, among other

things, the results of this pilot project in response to the Committee’s

recent request to review the Customs Service’s efforts to deploy radiation

detection equipment on U.S. borders and ports of entry. Customs officials

also told us that they plan to purchase up to 400 portal monitors by the

end of fiscal year 2003. While these purchases are a step in the right

direction, Customs officials told us that equipment evaluation and testing

could still take several years, and in the meantime they do not have a time

frame or specific plan for actually deploying portal monitors.

We believe that it is important that Customs develop a comprehensive plan

for installing radiation detection equipment at all U.S. border crossings

Customs’ Acquisition

and Deployment of

Radiation Detection

Equipment
Page 3 GAO-03-235T

and ports of entry, and in the near term, while the plan is being developed,

consider immediate steps to deploy currently available radiation detection

equipment. A comprehensive plan would address, among other things,

vulnerabilities and risks; identify the complement of radiation detection

equipment that should be used at each type of border entry point—air, rail,

land, and sea—and whether equipment could be immediately deployed;

identify longer-term radiation detection needs; and develop measures to

ensure that the equipment is adequately maintained. However, it is not

enough to simply deploy equipment. Customs personnel must be

effectively trained in radiation science, the use of the equipment, and

identifying and responding to alarms. The plan would need to identify

costs, annual budgetary needs, and timeframes for all these activities. The

plan would provide for an integrated, systematic approach to Customs

antiterrorism efforts and provide the basis for setting priorities and for

coordinating efforts with other federal, state, and local agencies that

would be involved with these activities. While Customs officials told us

that they have developed the elements of a plan, including schedules to

purchase equipment and train personnel, these elements have not yet been

integrated into a comprehensive plan.

U.S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six

federal agencies—DOE and the Departments of State and Defense;

Customs; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Coast

Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, the six agencies spent about

$86 million to help about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union

and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling of

nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of mass

destruction. The agencies have provided a range of assistance including

radiation detection equipment and training as well as other equipment and

training to generally improve countries’ ability to interdict nuclear

smuggling. DOE has two programs to combat nuclear smuggling, primarily

focusing on Russia. The State Department has provided radiation

detection portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with radiation detectors,

handheld radiation detectors, and other assistance to about 30 countries

through two separate programs. The Department of Defense has two

programs that have provided radiation detection portal monitors,

handheld detectors, and other assistance to about 20 countries. With

funding provided by the Departments of State and Defense, Customs, the

FBI, and the U.S. Coast Guard have provided a variety of training and

equipment to customs, border guard, and law enforcement officials in

numerous countries.

U.S. International

Assistance to Combat

Nuclear Smuggling
Page 4 GAO-03-235T

As part of U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling, DOE is

implementing the Second Line of Defense program to install radiation

detection portal monitors at Russian border crossings. From fiscal year

1997 through 2001, DOE installed 70 portal monitors at eight border

crossings in Russia—an airport in Moscow, six seaports and one railroad

crossing—at a cost of $11.2 million. The eight border crossings are the first

of close to 60 sites where DOE plans to install portal monitors based on its

assessment of over 300 border crossings in Russia. DOE prioritized the

border crossings based on factors that might increase the risk that

potential smugglers would use particular routes to smuggle nuclear

material out of Russia. According to DOE officials, the portal monitors

they provided to Russia have detected more than 275 cases involving

radioactive material including contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo,

and other radioactive materials that could pose a proliferation concern.

Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment

funded by DOE’s Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate

Russia’s plans to improve border security. According to these officials, as

of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of about 15 percent of

Russia’s 300 portal monitors. The U.S.-funded equipment is manufactured

in Russia to, among other things, facilitate maintenance, and DOE national

laboratory personnel test the portal monitors to ensure that they are

placed in an optimal configuration (to maximize detection capability) and

are being used as intended. According to Russian officials, there is

excellent cooperation with DOE on ways to continually improve the

performance of the equipment, and DOE makes follow-up visits to inspect

the equipment and ensure that it is recalibrated as necessary to meet

performance specifications.

During our visit to Russia, we observed several U.S.-funded pedestrian

portal monitors that were installed at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport as

well as a control room that included video equipment and a computerized

monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was connected to the portal

monitors. Russian officials tested the equipment we saw at the airport on

our behalf. With our knowledge, they “planted” a radioactive source in an

attaché case that we carried past a pedestrian portal monitor, which

activated an alarm. A computer screen in the control room displayed our

movements past the portal monitor.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. We will be happy to

answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may

have at this time.
Page 5 GAO-03-235T

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gary Jones at

(202) 512-3841 or Laurie E. Ekstrand at (202) 512-9110. Gene Aloise, Seto

Bagdoyan, Ryan T. Coles, Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis also made key

contributions to this testimony.

GAO Contact and

Acknowledgments

(360282)