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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ANTHONY T. CAMPBELL, 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 2:10-cv-1129 

 v. JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST 

 Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King 

SCOTT J. NALLY, et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This matter is before this Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration 

(ECF No. 74). For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The facts underlying this action are set forth in the Court’s October 1, 2012 Opinion & 

Order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (“Summary Judgment Order”) (ECF 

No. 69). In the Summary Judgment Order, the Court held, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to set 

forth sufficient evidence in support of his Title VII disparate treatment claim. 

On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff appealed this Court’s decision to the Sixth Circuit Court 

of Appeals. (ECF No. 71.) The Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court’s judgment. Campbell v. 

Hines, Case No. 12-4329 (6th Cir. Aug. 8. 2013). Plaintiff then moved for en banc

reconsideration of the Sixth Circuit’s August 8, 2013 Order; however, that request was denied. 

Campbell v. Hines, Case No. 12-4329 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2013). 

In addition to denying Plaintiff’s petition for rehearing, the Sixth Circuit’s November 5, 

2013 Order also modified a sentence in its August 8, 2013 Order. The Sixth Circuit deleted the 

following phrase from its August 8, 2013 Order: 

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Second, Campbell was the only African American employed by the ER unit, 

and therefore he cannot provide any statistical evidence that requiring him to 

pass the test had an adverse impact on a protected group. 

and replaced it with this phrase: 

Second, Campbell has not provided sufficient statistical evidence to show that 

requiring him to pass the test had an adverse impact on a protected group. 

(Id.) As is clear from a plain reading of the two phrases, the new language merely limits an 

otherwise broad statement to the facts of this case. The change did not affect the Sixth Circuit’s 

ultimate disposition of this case. Indeed, nine days later on November 14, 2013, the Sixth 

Circuit issued a mandate pursuant to its August 8, 2013 Order affirming this Court’s Summary 

Judgment Order. (ECF No. 73.) 

Plaintiff now makes the bizarre argument that this Court should reconsider the same 

Summary Judgment Order that the Sixth Circuit just affirmed. Plaintiff claims that the Sixth 

Circuit’s November 5, 2013 Order denying his petition for rehearing actually “reversed its 

position concerning a Title VII disparate impact claim.” (ECF No. 74, at 5.) In making this 

argument, Plaintiff ignores the fact that the Sixth Circuit did not reverse itself—instead, it denied 

Plaintiff’s petition for rehearing—and that it subsequently issued a mandate pursuant to its 

original opinion. (ECF No. 73.) The mandate clearly affirms this Court’s Summary Judgment 

Order. (Id.) 

Nevertheless, the Court now considers Plaintiff’s request to reconsider the Summary 

Judgment Order. 

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II. ANALYSIS 

A. Rule 59(e)

 Plaintiff purports to bring his motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). But 

under Rule 59(e), a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after 

the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 

Plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration on January 27, 2014. (ECF No. 74.) 

Because Plaintiff asks this Court for reconsideration of its October 1, 2012 Summary Judgment 

Order, Plaintiff’s motion is over a year too late. And even if this Court were inclined to use the 

Sixth Circuit’s November 5, 2013 order denying Plaintiff’s petition for rehearing as the date of 

“final order or judgment,” Plaintiff’s motion was still filed outside of Rule 59(e)’s 28-day 

window. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion is untimely. 

B. Rule 60(b) 

A party seeking post-judgment relief after Rule 59(e)’s 28-day deadline expires must 

proceed under Rule 60. In re Saffady, 524 F.3d 799, 808 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Feathers v. 

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1998)). A Rule 60(b) motion for relief from 

judgment may only be granted for one of six enumerated reasons: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 

(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 

(4) the judgment is void; 

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 

judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 

is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 

or 

(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

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Even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff’s motion as a request for relief from 

judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), such a request is without merit. Plaintiff failed to articulate 

any reason in its motion that would warrant relief under Rule 60(b). 

The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that this Court applied an incorrect legal standard to 

Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim and that, in modifying its August 8, 2013 Order, the Sixth 

Circuit acknowledged the error. But the Sixth Circuit’s November 5, 2013 modification to its 

original Order did not reverse its disposition or reopen this case. Instead, nine days after it 

issued the November 5, 2013 Order, the Sixth Circuit issued a mandate pursuant to its August 8, 

2013 Order affirming this Court’s Summary Judgment Order. There is no merit to Plaintiff’s 

assertion that the Sixth Circuit intended to do anything other than affirm this Court’s judgment. 

If Plaintiff disagrees with the Sixth Circuit’s decision, his recourse lies in the appellate 

process. His motion for reconsideration is improper and does not warrant reexamination of 

issues already decided.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration 

(ECF No. 74). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Gregory L. Frost 

GREGORY L. FROST 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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