[Cite as Feltner v. Whitehouse, 2018-Ohio-2337.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

Richard Feltner Court of Appeals No. L-17-1277 

 

 Appellant Trial Court No. CI0201702389 

v. 

Village of Whitehouse, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellees Decided: June 15, 2018 

* * * * * 

 Michael D. Portnoy, for appellant. 

 Teresa L. Grigsby, for appellees. 

* * * * * 

 SINGER, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Richard Feltner, appeals the October 27, 2017 judgment of the 

Lucas County Court of Common Pleas granting dismissal in favor of appellees, the 

village of Whitehouse, Deputy Chief Todd Kitzler, Chief Mark McDonough, Mayor 

Donald Atkinson, and Administrator Jordan Daugherty. Finding no error, we affirm. 
2.

Assignment of Error 

{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assignment of error: 

 1. The Trial Court committed prejudicial error to Plaintiff-Appellee 

(sic) when dismissing his amended complaint pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 

12 (b) (6) when the amended complaint satisfied the drafting requirements 

of Ohio Civil Rule 8 and is well grounded in fact and law. 

Background

{¶ 3} On April 18, 2017, appellant filed a complaint against appellees. Appellant 

amended the complaint, and it was filed on June 1, 2017. 

{¶ 4} In the amended complaint, appellant asserts he was wrongfully terminated in 

violation of public policy. Appellant attached numerous documents to his complaint to 

help establish his case. On June 7, 2017, appellees moved to dismiss the amended 

complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 

{¶ 5} On June 21, 2017, appellant responded opposing dismissal. Additionally, 

appellant moved the court for summary judgment on August 7, 2017. 

{¶ 6} In the response and motion, appellant argued that his at-will employment 

was terminated in violation of public policy because appellees defamed him, broke an 

implied agreement, and did not follow village of Whitehouse’s procedure when 

terminating him. 
3.

{¶ 7} The trial court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss on October 26, 2017, 

holding that appellant did not state a claim. The judgment was journalized on 

October 27, 2017, and appellant timely appeals. 

Standard of Review 

{¶ 8} To dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 

no set of facts entitling the party to recovery. O’Brien v. University Community Tenants 

Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus. Appellate review of a 

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion is de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 149 Ohio App.3d 645, 

2002-Ohio-5498, 778 N.E.2d 619, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). 

{¶ 9} The court may not consider material outside the complaint and must view all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Pulizzi v. City of Sandusky, 6th Dist. 

Erie No. E-03-002, 2003-Ohio-5853, ¶ 6. The court must also view the factual 

allegations pled as true, and if any facts set forth a viable claim it is improper to dismiss 

the complaint. Caston v. Bailey, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-03-008, 2003-Ohio-4727, ¶ 5. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶ 10} In his assigned error, appellant argues his complaint stated sufficient 

allegations to warrant denial of appellees’ motion to dismiss because appellees allegedly 

terminated his employment in violation of public policy. Appellees contend appellant 

was lawfully terminated as an at-will employee and that he failed to state a claim. 
4.

{¶ 11} In Ohio, employment relationships are governed by the common-law 

doctrine of employment-at-will. See Beckloff v. Amcor Rigid Plastics USA, LLC, 2017-

Ohio-4467, 93 N.E.3d 329, ¶ 35 (6th Dist.), citing Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 130 Ohio 

St.3d 168, 2011-Ohio-4609, 956 N.E.2d 825, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 12} The termination of an at-will employee usually does not give rise to an 

action for damages. (Citations omitted.) Dohme. However, if an employee is discharged 

“in contravention of the Ohio or U.S. Constitution, federal or state statutes, administrative 

rules and regulations, or Ohio common law, ‘a cause of action for wrongful discharge in 

violation of public policy may exist as an exception to the general rule.’” Id., citing 

Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 639 N.E.2d 51 (1994), paragraph three of the 

syllabus; Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 

N.E.2d 981 (1990), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 13} To prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, a 

party must show: 

 1. That clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or 

federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common 

law (the clarity element). 

 2. That dismissing employees under circumstances like those 

involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (the 

jeopardy element). 
5.

 3. The plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the 

public policy (the causation element). 

 4. The employer lacked overriding legitimate business justification 

for the dismissal (the overriding justification element). 

See Beckloff at ¶ 36. 

{¶ 14} “The first and second elements are issues of law to be determined by the 

court; the third and fourth elements are questions of fact to be determined by the factfinder.” Id., citing Dohme at ¶ 17. 

{¶ 15} Here, appellant argues his June 1, 2017 amended complaint states facts 

which support appellees acted contrary to public policy relating to defamation, breach of 

contract, and breach of village of Whitehouse articles of governance. We will address 

each argument in turn. 

Defamation 

{¶ 16} “Defamation, which includes both libel and slander, is a false publication 

causing injury to a person’s reputation, exposing the person to public hatred, contempt, 

ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting the person adversely in his or her trade or 

business.” Tackett v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2006-06604, 2008-Ohio3410, ¶ 19, citing Sweitzer v. Outlet Communications, Inc., 133 Ohio App.3d 102, 726 

N.E.2d 1084 (10th Dist.1999). “The essential elements of a defamation action are that a 

false statement was made, that the false statement was defamatory, that the false 

defamatory statement was published, that plaintiff was injured and that defendant acted 
6.

with the required degree of fault.” Id., citing Celebrezze v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 41 

Ohio App.3d 343, 535 N.E.2d 755 (8th Dist.1988). 

{¶ 17} In this case, appellant argues his amended complaint states facts from 

which relief could be sought for defamation, pointing to the following paragraphs: 

 9. On January 20, 2017, Plaintiff received a written notice of 

suspension from duty, without pay, pending an investigation. (See 

Plaintiff’s Exhibit four (4). The alleged violations the Defendants accused 

Plaintiff of doing occurred between January 11-18, 2017. 

 10. The Defendants provided a written summary and 

recommendation report concerning the alleged violations of Plaintiff with 

references dating to Plaintiff’s alleged behavior from January 11-13, 2017. 

(See Plaintiff’s Exhibit five (5). 

 11. To support Defendants’ written summary and recommendation 

report, Defendants attached an undated copy of statement purportedly 

signed by Amanda M. Crosby, another police officer for the defendant. 

(See Plaintiff’s Exhibit six (6)[.] This statement is libelously false and was 

prepared for the sole intention to justify falsely a “reason” to terminate 

Plaintiff’s employment with the Defendants. * * * 

 25. The statements made by the Defendants, jointly and severally, 

regarding Plaintiff that ultimately led to Plaintiff’s job termination with the 

Village of Whitehouse, were defamatory. 
7.

 26. Defendant’s statements regarding Plaintiff injured Plaintiff’s 

reputation, exposed him to public contempt, ridicule, shame and disgrace 

that adversely affected Plaintiff’s business and profession. * * * 

 27. Defendants’ statements regarding Plaintiff were (a) factually 

false, (b) defamatory, (c) published, (d) resulting in Plaintiff suffering 

injury as a proximate result of the publication and (e) the Defendants acted 

with the requisite degree of fault in publishing the statements. * * * 

 28. Considering the totality of the circumstances in which 

Defendants made these defamatory statements and the context in which 

Defendants made these statements, it would be reasonable for the readers of 

these statements to conclude these statements against Plaintiff are 

defamatory. * * * 

{¶ 18} As indicated in paragraph 11 of the amended complaint, “Exhibit 6” is the 

statement/report on which appellant heavily relies to establish his cause of action for 

defamation. We note that we will consider the documents attached to the amended 

complaint in evaluating the face of the complaint. See, e.g., Adlaka v. Giannini, 7th Dist. 

Mahoning No. 05MA105, 2006-Ohio-4611, ¶ 34 (“If the plaintiff decides to attach 

documents to his complaint, which he claims establish his case, such documents can be 

used to his detriment to dismiss the case if they along with the complaint itself establish a 

failure to state a claim.”). This exhibit No. 6 specifically states as follows: 
8.

 On January 13, 2017 I came in for shift at approximately 0545, Kyle 

McClanahan and Josh Malone were also there at 0600 for shift change. At 

0607, Rich Feltner had not arrived for shift change yet, and I asked Malone 

to send a text to him asking where he was. No response was received and 

so at 0615 I asked Malone what GPS location Feltner was last showing to 

be at, and he said the AW Professional building. I drove to the AW 

Professional building and did not see 906 nor did I see Feltner. I then 

checked the cemetery, and still did not find Feltner. I asked Malone where 

else Feltner sits at, and he suggested that I check Pamela Rose as well as 

the old Dollar General. I checked Shell, as well as the real estate office, 

and did not find 906. I then checked old Dollar General, and still did not 

find him. As I turned north on Providence from Toledo, and saw 906 

heading south on Providence. (Sic). I then followed 906 to the station. 

 When Feltner got out of his car, I asked where he was. He said he 

was driving around and on the phone. Feltner asked if we tried him on the 

radio, and I told him that we had sent him a text. He said something about 

only being ten minutes late, and I said that it was 6:30. He said he sees that 

now. He unloaded his vehicle, and left. 

 Amanda M. Crosby, # 11 

{¶ 19} “The word ‘false’ has two meanings.” State v. Bowers, 8 Ohio Dec. 324, 

325 (C.P.1898). “Primarily it means that which is not true.” Id. “Derivatively it means 
9.

that which is stated to be true, intending to state it as a truth, which is not true, or of the 

truth of which the party stating it has not probable ground.” Id. 

{¶ 20} Here, we cannot say the amended complaint states facts that show or 

provide inference Officer Crosby’s statement was false. 

{¶ 21} The statement referenced in and attached to appellant’s amended complaint 

as “Exhibit 5,” to the contrary, reveals facts that indicate any defamatory statement made 

by Crosby was indeed true. More specifically, exhibit No. 5 is the disciplinary action 

“summary and recommendations” prepared by Deputy Chief Todd Kitzler. It confirms, 

by reporting what appellant said, that appellant was 30 minutes late for shift change, that 

he fell asleep during his shift and while being parked at “Industrial Park,” and that he lied 

about being on the phone during that time. 

{¶ 22} Consequently, and based on our de novo review, we find appellant stated 

no facts in the amended complaint from which we can infer Crosby falsely defamed him. 

Accordingly, we affirm disposition of appellant’s claim for defamation. 

Breach of Contract 

{¶ 23} Generally, a breach of contract occurs when (1) “a party demonstrates the 

existence of a binding contract or agreement”; (2) “the non-breaching party performed its 

contractual obligations”; (3) “the other party failed to fulfill its contractual obligations 

without legal excuse”; and (4) “the non-breaching party suffered damages as a result of 

the breach.” Ngo v. Paramount Care, Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1359, 2006-Ohio3874, ¶ 11. 
10. 

{¶ 24} Here, appellant argues there was an implied employment agreement, and 

that appellees breached the agreement by failing to follow the stated procedure by which 

an employee was to be terminated. Specifically, he points to appellees’ policy manual. 

{¶ 25} Appellees respond arguing this court should not consider the cause of 

action for breach of contract because the theory was not stated in the amended complaint. 

Further, appellees reiterate that appellant was an at-will employee subject to being 

terminated with or without cause, and that the policy manual does not provide otherwise. 

{¶ 26} We initially look to Civ.R. 8(A), which in pertinent part identifies the 

“[g]eneral rules of pleading” as follows: 

 (A) Claims for relief. A pleading that sets forth a claim for relief, 

whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 

shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 

which the party claims to be entitled. * * * 

See, e.g., B&J Jacobs Co. v. Ohio Air, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-020264, 2003-

Ohio-4835, ¶ 11 (exploring how if facts show the required elements, Civ.R. 8(A) is 

satisfied for purposes of establishing a contract despite whether an implied or express 

theory applies). 

{¶ 27} To show the existence of a binding contract, a party’s complaint must show 

“an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for legal benefit 

and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of 
11. 

consideration.” See Ridge Stone Builders & Developers, Ltd. v. Gribbin, 6th Dist. Wood 

No. WD-03-009, 2003-Ohio-5188, ¶ 24, citing Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St. 3d 1, 

2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 16. 

{¶ 28} With respect to the employment agreement claimed here, appellant’s 

amended complaint states as follows: 

 4. On September 2, 2011, Defendant Village of Whitehouse 

(hereinafter Village), through Defendant Daughtery (hereinafter Daughtery) 

mailed a letter to Plaintiff offering him the position of Police Officer for the 

Village of Whitehouse. (See copy of September 2, 2011 letter attached as 

Plaintiff’s Exhibit one (1). Plaintiff accepted this position and was required 

to pass a Village of Whitehouse physical examination, psychological 

examination, alcohol and drug tests as well as a background check. 

 5. Plaintiff successfully passed these examinations and the 

background check and was hired by the Village of Whitehouse as a full 

time police officer. 

 6. As part of the employment agreement among the parties, Plaintiff 

was provided a detailed personnel policy procedure handbook, that 

explained the rights and obligations of the parties, including all disciplinary 

procedures. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit two (2)[.] 
12. 

 7. As a result of the Defendants providing this detailed policy 

procedure handbook to Plaintiff, the employment “at-will” agreement 

among the parties was an implied contract among the parties. * * * 

{¶ 29} Based on these stated facts and review of the attached documents, we 

cannot say appellant failed to show that an employment agreement existed. See, e.g., 

Armstrong v. Feldhaus, 87 Ohio App. 75, 93 N.E.2d 776 (1st Dist.1950), paragraph two 

of the syllabus (stating “[A] plaintiff is required to plead only the facts constituting a 

cause of action. He is not required to plead any theory or classification of the cause of 

action set forth.”). In viewing reasonable inferences favorably toward appellant, we find 

it is reasonable to infer that based on facts pled a contract existed in which appellant 

received compensation for being a police officer. Our determination is despite the legal 

theory not being expressly stated in the amended complaint. Id. 

{¶ 30} Nevertheless, even accepting there was an employment agreement among 

the parties, we cannot say facts show appellees breached that agreement. This is because 

appellant was susceptible to being terminated as an at-will employee, and nothing stated 

in the amended complaint changes that status or the resulting outcome. 

{¶ 31} The policy manual explicitly details appellant’s at-will status. Attached as 

the fifth page of “Exhibit 2” is a document which is signed by appellant and which is 

entitled “Employee Agreement and Handbook Acknowledgement.” It reads as follows: 

 This Personnel Policy Manual highlights the Village of 

Whitehouse’s policies, procedures, and benefits. In all instances the 
13. 

official benefit plan texts, trust agreements and master contracts are the 

governing documents. Your Personnel Policy is not to be interpreted as a 

legal document or an employment contract. Employment with the Village 

of Whitehouse is at the sole discretion of the Village of Whitehouse and 

may be terminated with or without cause at any time and for any reason. 

Nothing in the Personnel Policy Manual constitutes as express or implied 

contract or assurance of continued employment or implies that just cause is 

required for termination. 

{¶ 32} Consequently, our de novo review reveals appellant was subject to being 

terminated with or without cause. Nothing in the policy manual provides otherwise, and 

thus appellant fails to state a cause of action for breach of contract. 

Charter of the village of Whitehouse 

{¶ 33} Section 4.08(C), entitled “Executive Powers,” of the charter of the village 

of Whitehouse, Ohio states as follows: 

 Except as otherwise provided by this Charter, the Mayor shall have 

the power to appoint, promote, transfer, suspend, reduce or remove any 

officer or employee of the Municipality except those required by this 

Charter to be elected or appointed; provided, however that such 

appointment, promotion, reduction or removal of officers provided for by 

this Charter and the heads of departments of divisions established pursuant 
14. 

thereto shall not take effect without the concurrence of a majority of the 

members of Council. 

{¶ 34} Here, appellant asserts that an exception to the general rule governing 

termination of at-will employees exists where an at-will employee is terminated in 

contravention of a procedure set out in the charter of the village of Whitehouse. 

{¶ 35} Nevertheless, we note that this procedure is not imposed by the Ohio or 

U.S. Constitution, federal or state statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or Ohio 

common law. See Beckloff, 2017-Ohio-4467, 93 N.E.3d 329, at ¶ 35. Further, appellant 

has not pointed to persuasive legal authority to support that such local law provides 

exception to the general rule that termination of an at-will employee does not give rise to 

an action for damages. See, e.g., Giannini-Baur v. Schwab Retirement Plan Servs., 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 25172, 2010-Ohio-6424, ¶ 28 (holding that the clarity element cannot 

be established by local law). 

{¶ 36} Accordingly, appellant’s arguments are not well-taken, and his sole 

assignment of error is denied. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 37} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 
15. 

 Feltner v. Whitehouse 

 C.A. No. L-17-1277 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Arlene Singer, J. 

_______________________________ 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.