IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 14–2095

Filed January 29, 2016

REGIONAL UTILITY SERVICE SYSTEMS,

Appellee,

vs. 

CITY OF MOUNT UNION, IOWA,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County, John M. 

Wright, Judge.

A city appeals a district court order finding its bank account was 

not exempt from execution under Iowa Code section 627.18 (2013). 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Steven E. Ort of Bell, Ort & Liechty, New London, for appellant.

Lucas C. Helling and Vanessa M. Young of Foss, Kuiken & 

Cochran, P.C., Fairfield, for appellee.
2

WIGGINS, Justice.

A judgment creditor garnished a city’s bank account when the city 

failed to pay a judgment. The city moved to quash the garnishment on 

the grounds the bank account was exempt from execution under Iowa 

Code section 627.18 (2013). The court denied the motion and found the 

bank account was not exempt. The city appeals. On appeal, we find the 

bank account was exempt from execution. Therefore, we reverse the 

judgment of the district court and remand the case for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On June 18, 2014, the district court entered judgment for 

$27,862.10 against the City of Mount Union in a breach of contract 

action brought by the Regional Utility Service Systems Commission 

(RUSS). The basis of that judgment is not at issue in this appeal. On 

August 21, RUSS filed a praecipe directing the clerk of court to issue a 

writ of general execution against the City. On August 25, the clerk of 

court issued a writ of general execution commanding the county sheriff 

to levy on all bank accounts held by the City at Iowa State Bank in 

Mount Union. On September 1, the sheriff served the City with a notice 

indicating RUSS had garnished its bank account in the amount of 

$25,164.57. On September 3, the City filed a motion to quash the 

garnishment, claiming the garnished funds were exempt from execution

under Iowa Code section 627.18. The district court heard evidence on 

the motion to quash and claim of exemption.

At the hearing before the district court, Mayor John Marek testified 

the garnished bank account was the only account the City had and 

therefore contained both general funds and special funds, administration 
3

and expenditure of which is limited to specific purposes by law.1 He also 

testified at length about the means by which the City generates revenue 

and limitations on how the revenue it generates may be spent. His 

testimony established the City collects only $17,000 to $18,000 per year 

in property tax revenues it may allocate as general funds. Although the 

City collects additional property, sales, and road-use tax revenues, the 

law requires the City to designate those funds as special funds. The City 

spends its general funds on garbage collection, landfill operation, 

building maintenance, vehicle maintenance, streetlight operation, 

elections, legal services, liability insurance, property insurance, fire and 

police services, and compensation for the mayor, members of the city 

council, a part-time clerk, a part-time maintenance person, and 

contractors. Consequently, Mayor Marek testified the City’s general 

funds were necessary for the City to fulfill the purposes for which it was 

incorporated and necessary for it to continue to pay its officials and 

provide basic services not paid for with special funds. Additionally, 

Mayor Marek indicated that approximately $23,000 of the $25,000 in the 

bank account represented special funds and indicated the budget 

submitted by the City in support of its motion to quash the garnishment 

supported this conclusion. 

During the hearing, the district court instructed the parties to 

submit briefs addressing what portion of the comingled funds in the 

bank account were special funds. Relying on Mayor Marek’s testimony 

1Where a special fund is created or set aside by statute for a particular 

purpose or use, it must be administered and expended in accordance 

with the statute, and may be applied only to the purpose for which it was 

created or set aside, and not diverted to any other purpose, or 

transferred from such authorized fund to any other fund.

Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency v. Branstad, 504 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Iowa 

1993) (quoting 81A C.J.S. States § 228 (1977)).

 
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and the budget submitted by the City, RUSS argued the account 

contained $6550 in special funds. The City argued the account 

contained only $1392 in general funds and submitted a supporting 

affidavit signed by Mayor Marek and an exhibit listing the sources of the 

remaining special funds. 

The district court denied the motion to quash and the claim of 

exemption. In its order denying the motion, the court acknowledged the 

City depends on the money in its bank account to carry out the general 

purposes for which the City was organized. In addition, the court 

acknowledged a prior case in which we held public property other than 

buildings owned by a city to be exempt from execution. See City of Fort 

Dodge v. Moore, 37 Iowa 388, 388–90 (1873). However, the court found 

no caselaw directly supporting the argument that general funds held by a 

municipality may constitute public property exempt from execution

under section 627.18. Thus, the court concluded the City stood in the 

same position as any other judgment debtor with nonexempt funds in a 

bank account and denied its motion to quash the garnishment of its 

general funds. Because the court found RUSS’s argument with respect 

to the balance of special funds in the account to be more persuasive, the 

court found the garnished account contained only $6550 in special 

funds. 

The City appeals the district court judgment denying its motion to 

quash the garnishment.

II. Issues.

We must first decide whether the general funds in the City’s bank 

account constitute “other public property” within the meaning of section 

627.18. If they do, we then must decide whether the general funds in 
5

the City’s bank account were “necessary and proper for carrying out the 

general purpose” for which the City was organized.

III. Scope of Review.

We review questions of statutory construction for correction of 

errors at law. Postell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 N.W.2d 35, 41 

(Iowa 2012). A factual finding by the district court is binding on this 

court if substantial evidence supports it. GE Money Bank v. Morales, 773 

N.W.2d 533, 536 (Iowa 2009). Substantial evidence supports a factual 

finding only if the fact finder may reasonably infer the finding from the 

evidence presented. Vaughan v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Iowa 

1996).

IV. Analysis and Discussion.

In its motion to quash the garnishment, the City claimed the 

general funds in its bank account were exempt from execution under the 

Iowa Code. The Code provides:

Public Property. 

Public buildings owned by the state, or any county, 

city, school district, or other municipal corporation, or any 

other public property which is necessary and proper for 

carrying out the general purpose for which such corporation 

is organized, are exempt from execution.

Iowa Code § 627.18. 

A. Whether the General Funds in the City’s Bank Account 

Constitute Other Public Property Within the Meaning of Section 

627.18. We begin our analysis by recounting basic principles of 

statutory interpretation. When we interpret a statute, our goal is to 

determine legislative intent. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 

N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004). “We determine legislative intent from the 

words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have said.” 

Id. When the language in a statute is plain and unambiguous such that 
6

reasonable persons cannot disagree as to its meaning, we need not resort 

to rules of statutory construction. Zimmer v. Vander Waal, 780 N.W.2d 

730, 733 (Iowa 2010). When statutory definitions bearing on the 

meaning of the words in a statute exist, those definitions serve as the 

foundation of our analysis. Id. When the language of a statute has 

changed little over time, we look to its origins to discern legislative intent. 

See Woodbury County v. City of Sioux City, 475 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Iowa 

1991). Thus, when interpreting a statute originating in the early history 

of our state, the common law informs our interpretation. See id. 

Finally, when interpreting a statute, we may not mitigate the 

hardships either party presumes will flow from its enforcement, nor

impose our personal opinions as to its wisdom. Kneppe v. Huismann, 

223 Iowa 569, 571, 272 N.W. 602, 603 (1937). Particularly in the 

context of interpreting grants of powers and rights to public corporations, 

doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms the legislature used must be 

resolved in favor of the public. See Clark, Dodge & Co. v. City of 

Davenport, 14 Iowa 494, 500 (1863). As the Code instructs, it is 

presumed the legislature intended the public interest to be favored over 

any private interest in enacting a statute. See Iowa Code § 4.4(5).

Iowa Code section 4.1 contains three statutory definitions bearing 

on the meaning of the phrase “other public property” in section 627.18. 

These definitions serve as the foundation of our analysis so long as they 

are not “inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or 

repugnant to the context of the statute.” Iowa Code § 4.1. First, section 

4.1(24) defines the term “property” to include both “personal and real 

property.” Id. § 4.1(24). Second, section 4.1(21) defines the phrase 

“personal property” to include “money, goods, chattels, evidences of debt, 

and things in action.” Id. § 4.1(21). Third, section 4.1(13) defines the 
7

phrase “real property” to include “lands . . . and all rights thereto and 

interests therein.” Id. § 4.1(13).

Because the Code includes statutory definitions bearing directly on 

the meaning of the phrase “other public property,” we construe the 

phrase to accommodate these definitions in the absence of contrary 

legislative intent. See Groenendyk v. Fowler, 204 Iowa 598, 601, 215 

N.W. 718, 720 (1927). When interpreted in harmony with these 

statutory definitions, the plain language of section 627.18 creates a 

municipal right to exempt real property and personal property from 

execution, including money held in a bank account. In other words, the 

inclusion of the phrase “other public property” in section 627.18 

indicates municipal corporations may claim as exempt from execution 

virtually any property that is “necessary and proper for carrying out the 

general purpose for which such corporation is organized.” Iowa Code 

§ 627.18.

The legislative history of section 627.18 yields no evidence of 

contrary legislative intent. On the contrary, legislative history supports 

construing section 627.18 in harmony with the statutory definitions 

contained in section 4.1. The statutory provision creating the exemption 

from execution for public property now contained in section 627.18 first 

appeared in the 1851 Code. The language of the statutory exemption 

from execution has changed little over time. In fact, nearly identical 

language to that contained in section 627.18 appeared the 1851 Code, 

which provided in relevant part:

Public property exempt. Public buildings owned by the 

state or any county, city, school district, or other civil 

corporation, and any other public property which is 

necessary and proper for carrying out the general purpose 

for which any such corporation is organized, are exempt 

from execution. 
8

Iowa Code § 1895 (1851).2 The 1851 Code also included definitions of 

the terms “property,” “personal property,” and “real property” identical to 

those appearing in the modern Code. Compare Iowa Code § 26(8)–(10) 

(1851), with Iowa Code § 4.1(13), (21), (24) (2013).3

Likewise, the common law offers no basis for disregarding the 

relevant statutory definitions in interpreting section 627.18. See 

Woodbury County, 475 N.W.2d at 205. For example, the first edition of 

Black’s Law Dictionary acknowledged the term “property” as being “a 

very wide term” that “includes every class of acquisitions which a man 

can own or have an interest in.” Black’s Law Dictionary 953–54 (1st ed. 

1891). In fact, the notion that a person possesses an absolute and 

fundamental right of private property consisting of “the free use, 

enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions” has been a foundational 

premise of the common law since at least the time of Blackstone. See 

Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2133, 192 L. Ed. 2d 183, 

188 (2015) (quoting 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 

England 134 (1769)).

We have never addressed the question of whether general funds in 

a municipal bank account may constitute public property for purposes of 

the exemption from execution contained in section 627.18. However,

nothing in our caselaw suggests the phrase “other public property” 

excludes bank accounts containing general funds. We have previously 

construed the phrase “other public property” to encompass personal 

2Section 1895 of the 1851 Code contained an additional sentence, which 

provided that “property of a private citizen can in no case be levied upon to pay the debt 

of a civil corporation.” Iowa Code § 1895 (1851). The legislature removed the bulk of 

this sentence from the Code in 1981. See 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 182, § 4 (codified at Iowa 

Code § 627.18 (1983)).

3Neither the exemption from execution for public property nor these definitions 

appeared in the Revised Statutes of the Territory of Iowa (1843).

 
9

property. See Moore, 37 Iowa 388–90 (holding lumber, tools, and other 

chattels owned by a municipal corporation were exempt from execution 

under Iowa Code section 3274, now section 627.18). In addition, we 

have long acknowledged the breadth of the term “property.”

The term “property” is said to be nomen generalissimum and 

to include everything which is the subject of ownership, 

corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or 

invisible, real or personal; everything that has an 

exchangeable value, or which goes to make up one’s wealth 

or estate.

Wapsie Power & Light Co. v. City of Tipton, 197 Iowa 996, 1000, 193 N.W. 

643, 645 (1923); see also Reynolds v. Miller, 6 Iowa 459, 461 (1858) 

(explaining the term “property” as defined in Iowa Code section 26(10), 

now section 4.1(24), encompasses “every interest a man may have in any 

property, real or personal” such that it is “equivalent to the word ‘estate,’ 

as used in relation to wills”).

Consequently, we conclude the general funds in a municipal bank 

account constitute “other public property” exempt from execution under 

Iowa Code section 627.18 so long as they are necessary and proper for 

carrying out the general purpose for which the municipality is organized. 

This conclusion accords not only with the statutory definitions in the 

Code and the common law existing when the general assembly enacted 

the statutory exemption from execution for public property, but also with 

our caselaw and the scope of the exemption from execution for public 

property in other jurisdictions. See P.H.V., Annotation, Municipal Funds 

and Credits as Subject to Levy Under Execution or Garnishment on 

Judgment Against Municipality, 89 A.L.R. 863, 864 (1934) (“The courts 

are practically unanimous in holding that the funds or credits of a 

municipality or other public body exercising governmental functions, 

acquired by it in its governmental capacity, may not be reached by its 
10

creditors by execution under a judgment against the municipality, or by 

garnishment served upon the debtor or depository of the municipality.”).

B. Whether the General Funds in the City’s Bank Account 

Were Necessary and Proper for Carrying Out the General Purpose for 

Which the City Was Organized. RUSS argues the general funds were 

not necessary and proper for carrying out the general purpose for which 

the City was organized, urging the City presented no evidence it has been 

unable to fulfill the purposes for which it was incorporated since its 

general funds were garnished. The City argues RUSS failed to preserve 

this issue on appeal by failing to cross-appeal from an adverse ruling by 

the district court. 

Ordinarily a successful party need not cross-appeal on a ground 

presented to but ignored or rejected by the district court to preserve 

error. EnviroGas, L.P. v. Cedar Rapids/Linn Cty. Solid Waste Agency, 641 

N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Johnson Equip. Corp. of Iowa v. 

Indus. Indem., 489 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Iowa 1992)). But this general rule 

applies only when the party received a favorable ruling on the claim at 

issue. See Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 398–99 (Iowa 

2001); Ritz v. Wapello Cty. Bd. of Sup’rs, 595 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 

1999); Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Iowa 1994). “This is 

because a party need not, in fact cannot, appeal from a favorable ruling.” 

Garling Const., Inc. v. City of Shellsburg, 641 N.W.2d 522, 523 (Iowa 

2002) (quoting Johnson Equip., 489 N.W.2d at 16). Our determination as 

to whether RUSS preserved the argument that the general funds were 

not necessary and proper for carrying out the general purpose for which 

the City was organized turns on whether RUSS received an adverse 

ruling from the district court on this issue from which it could have 

appealed.
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The sole issue before the district court was whether the City was 

entitled to the statutory exemption from execution from public property, 

and RUSS received a favorable ruling denying the claim of statutory 

exemption. Although the district court made an adverse finding in 

arriving at that ruling, RUSS could not appeal the ruling in its favor. 

Thus, RUSS preserved its argument that the general funds were not 

necessary to the general purpose for which the City was organized as

there was no adverse ruling from which it could have appealed. 

The district court found the City depends on the general funds in 

its bank account to carry out the general purposes for which the City 

was organized. This finding is binding on appellate review so long as 

substantial evidence actually presented to the district court supports it. 

See Morales, 773 N.W.2d at 536. Of course, in determining whether

substantial evidence supports a district court finding, we do not weigh 

the evidence. See Allison-Kesley Ag Ctr., Inc. v. Hildebrand, 485 N.W.2d 

841, 844 (Iowa 1992). Rather, “we only decide if there is a proper basis 

upon which the trial court could find as it did.” Id. (quoting Arbie Mineral 

Feed Co. v. Nissen, 179 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Iowa 1970))

We have never specified a legal test for determining whether 

property is “necessary and proper for carrying out the general purpose 

for which such corporation is organized” in evaluating claims of 

exemption brought under section 627.18. Nor does either party advance 

a specific legal test for determining whether public property meets this 

prerequisite of the statutory exemption from execution. However, we 

long ago concluded a recitation of statutory language is sufficient to state 

a claim of statutory exemption from execution. Moore, 37 Iowa at 390. 

The City presented ample evidence from which the district court 

could have reasonably inferred the general funds in its bank account 
12

were necessary to the general purposes for which the City was organized. 

Mayor Marek testified the general funds were necessary for the City to 

fulfill the purposes for which it was incorporated because without them 

the City would unable to pay its officials or provide basic services it could 

not pay for with special funds. In addition, the City submitted various 

documents to support its allegation that the general funds were 

necessary and proper to carrying out the general purposes for which it 

was organized, including a copy of its budget for the present fiscal year 

along with schedules summarizing its recent historical revenues and 

expenditures. Consequently, we conclude the district court based its 

finding on substantial evidence. 

Because the determination of whether a finding is supported by 

substantial evidence requires us to consider the evidence actually 

presented to the district court, it is irrelevant that the City presented no 

evidence on appeal suggesting it was unable to fulfill the purposes for 

which it was incorporated after its general funds were garnished. 

Moreover, although RUSS cross-examined Mayor Marek at the hearing 

on the motion to quash, RUSS produced no other evidence tending to 

undermine the conclusion that the general funds were necessary and 

proper to carrying out the general purposes for which the City was 

organized. 

In its order denying the motion to quash the execution, the district 

court found the special funds are dedicated to the purposes set forth by 

the government entities that provide them whereas the use of general 

funds is unrestricted. However, the court made no explicit finding that

the general funds were proper to carrying out the general purposes for 

which the City was organized. Thus, we must determine whether the 

funds were proper for that purpose.
13

The meaning of the word “proper” may depend on context. See 

Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 577 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 

1998). For example, property may be “proper” for carrying out a specific 

purpose in the sense that it is “suitable, right, fit, or correct” to use the 

property in carrying out that purpose. Black’s Law Dictionary, 1410 

(10th ed. 2014). Alternatively, property may be “proper” for carrying out 

a specific purpose in the sense it is “allowable, right, and becoming” to 

use the property for such purposes. Id.

We need not parse the shades of meaning between competing 

definitions of the term “proper” to resolve the question before us, 

however. We conclude that regardless of the precise meaning of the term 

“proper,” it is obvious the general funds were proper to carrying out the 

general purpose for which the City was organized. Notably, neither party 

disputed the propriety of using such funds for carrying out that purpose 

or the propriety of the means by which the City collected the funds. 

More importantly, at the hearing on the motion to quash the execution, 

Mayor Marek testified use of the general funds was unrestricted by law 

and indicated the general funds derived from property taxes assessed at 

a rate allowed by law. 

Therefore, we conclude the general funds qualified as exempt from 

execution under Iowa Code section 627.18.

V. Disposition 

We reverse the judgment of the district court denying the City’s 

motion to quash the garnishment and remand the case to the district 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.