Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 64 / Wednesday, April 4, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 16271 

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA) is amending the 

animal drug regulations to reflect 

approval of an abbreviated new animal 

drug application (ANADA) filed by Ivy 

Laboratories, Div. of Ivy Animal Health, 

Inc. The ANADA provides for use of 

single-ingredient Type A medicated 

articles containing melengestrol and 

lasalocid to make two-way combination 

drug Type B or Type C medicated feeds 

for heifers fed in confinement for 

slaughter. 

DATES: This rule is effective April 4, 

2007. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

K. Harshman, Center for Veterinary 

Medicine (HFV–104), Food and Drug 

Administration, 7500 Standish Pl., 

Rockville, MD 20855, 301–827–0169, email: john.harshman@fda.hhs.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Ivy 

Laboratories, Div. of Ivy Animal Health, 

Inc., 8857 Bond St., Overland Park, KS 

66214, filed ANADA 200–451 for use of 

HEIFERMAX 500 (melengestrol acetate) 

Liquid Premix and BOVATEC (lasalocid 

sodium) single-ingredient Type A 

medicated articles to make dry and 

liquid, two-way combination drug Type 

B or Type C medicated feeds for heifers 

fed in confinement for slaughter. Ivy 

Laboratories’ ANADA 200–451 is 

approved as a generic copy of NADA 

140–288, sponsored by Pharmacia & 

Upjohn Co., a Division of Pfizer, Inc., for 

combination use of MGA 500 and 

BOVATEC. The application is approved 

as of March 12, 2007, and the 

regulations are amended in 21 CFR 

558.342 to reflect the approval. 

In accordance with the freedom of 

information provisions of 21 CFR part 

20 and 21 CFR 514.11(e)(2)(ii), a 

summary of safety and effectiveness 

data and information submitted to 

support approval of this application 

may be seen in the Division of Dockets 

Management (HFA–305), Food and Drug 

Administration, 5630 Fishers Lane, rm. 

1061, Rockville, MD 20852, between 9 

a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through 

Friday. 

The agency has determined under 21 

CFR 25.33(a)(2) that this action is of a 

type that does not individually or 

cumulatively have a significant effect on 

the human environment. Therefore, 

neither an environmental assessment 

nor an environmental impact statement 

is required. 

This rule does not meet the definition 

of ‘‘rule’’ in 5 U.S.C. 804(3)(A) because 

it is a rule of ‘‘particular applicability.’’

Therefore, it is not subject to the 

congressional review requirements in 5 

U.S.C. 801–808. 

List of Subjects in 21 CFR Part 558 

Animal drugs, Animal feeds. 

■ Therefore, under the Federal Food, 

Drug, and Cosmetic Act and under 

authority delegated to the Commissioner 

of Food and Drugs and redelegated to 

the Center for Veterinary Medicine, 21 

CFR part 558 is amended as follows: 

PART 558—NEW ANIMAL DRUGS FOR 

USE IN ANIMAL FEEDS 

■ 1. The authority citation for 21 CFR 

part 558 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 21 U.S.C. 360b, 371. 

§ 558.342 [Amended] 

■ 2. In § 558.342, amend the table in 

paragraph (e)(1)(iii) in the ‘‘Sponsor’’

column by adding in numerical 

sequence ‘‘021641’’. 

Dated: March 26, 2007. 

Stephen F. Sundlof, 

Director, Center for Veterinary Medicine. 

[FR Doc. E7–6180 Filed 4–3–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4160–01–S 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Bureau of Prisons 

28 CFR Parts 500 and 501 

[BOP–1116; AG Order No. 2878–2007] 

RIN 1120–AB08 

National Security; Prevention of Acts 

of Violence and Terrorism 

AGENCY: Bureau of Prisons, Department 

of Justice. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This rule finalizes the interim 

rules on Special Administrative 

Measures that were published on 

October 31, 2001 (66 FR 55062). The 

previously existing regulations 

authorized the Bureau of Prisons 

(Bureau), at the direction of the 

Attorney General, to impose special 

administrative measures with respect to 

specified inmates, based on information 

provided by senior intelligence or law 

enforcement officials, if determined 

necessary to prevent the dissemination 

of either classified information that 

could endanger the national security, or 

of other information that could lead to 

acts of violence and/or terrorism. The 

interim rule extended the period of time 

for which such special administrative 

measures may be imposed from 120 

days to up to one year, and modified the 

standards for approving extensions of 

such special administrative measures. In 

addition, where the Attorney General 

has certified that reasonable suspicion 

exists to believe that an inmate may use 

communications with attorneys (or 

agents traditionally covered by the 

attorney-client privilege) to further or 

facilitate acts of violence and/or 

terrorism, the interim rule amended the 

previously existing regulations to 

provide that the Bureau must provide 

appropriate procedures to monitor or 

review such communications to deter 

such acts, subject to specific procedural 

safeguards, to the extent permitted 

under the Constitution and laws of the 

United States. The interim rule also 

requires the Director of the Bureau of 

Prisons to give written notice to the 

inmate and attorneys and/or agents 

before monitoring or reviewing any 

communications as described in this 

rule. The interim rule also provided that 

the head of each component of the 

Department of Justice that has custody 

of persons for whom special 

administrative measures are determined 

to be necessary may exercise the same 

authority to impose such measures as 

the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 

DATES: Effective date: June 4, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: Rules Unit, Office of the 

General Counsel, Bureau of Prisons, 320 

First Street, NW., Washington, DC 

20534. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Sarah Qureshi, Office of the General 

Counsel, Bureau of Prisons, (202) 307–

2105. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This rule 

finalizes interim rules on Special 

Administrative Measures that were 

published on October 31, 2001 (66 FR 

55062). These rules are codified at 28 

CFR 501.2 (national security) and 501.3 

(violence and terrorism). We received 

approximately 5000 comments in 

opposition to the rule, which we discuss 

below. 

Section 501.2 

Section 501.2 authorizes the Director 

of the Bureau, at the direction of the 

Attorney General, to impose special 

administrative measures with respect to 

a particular inmate that are reasonably 

necessary to prevent disclosure of 

classified information. These 

procedures may be implemented after 

written certification by the head of a 

United States intelligence agency that 

the unauthorized disclosure of such 

information would pose a threat to the 

national security and that there is a 

danger that the inmate will disclose 

such information. These special 

administrative measures ordinarily may 

include housing the inmate in special 

housing units and/or limiting certain 

privileges, including, but not limited to, 


cprice-sewell on PROD1PC61 with RULES
16272 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 64 / Wednesday, April 4, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

correspondence, visiting, interviews 

with representatives of the news media, 

and use of the telephone, as is 

reasonably necessary to prevent the 

disclosure of classified information. 

The interim rule made no change in 

the substantive standards for the 

imposition of special administrative 

measures, but changed the initial period 

of time under § 501.2 from a fixed 120- 

day period to a period of time 

designated by the Director, up to one 

year. The rule also allows the Director 

to extend the period for the special 

administrative measures for additional 

one-year periods, based on subsequent 

certifications from the head of an 

intelligence agency that there is a 

danger that the inmate will disclose 

classified information and that the 

unauthorized disclosure of such 

information would pose a threat to 

national security. In addition, this rule 

provides that the subsequent 

certifications by the head of an 

intelligence agency may be based on the 

information available to the intelligence 

agency. 

Section 501.3 

Section 501.3 also authorizes the 

Director of the Bureau, on direction of 

the Attorney General, to impose similar 

special administrative measures (with 

respect to a particular inmate) that are 

reasonably necessary to protect persons 

against the risk of death or serious 

bodily injury. These procedures may be 

implemented after written notification 

from the Attorney General or, at the 

Attorney General’s discretion, from the 

head of a Federal law enforcement or 

intelligence agency, that there is a 

substantial risk that an inmate’s 

communications or contacts with other 

persons could result in death or serious 

bodily injury to persons, or substantial 

damage to property that would entail 

the risk of death or serious bodily injury 

to persons. 

The interim rule made no change in 

the substantive standards for the 

implementation of special 

administrative measures under 

§ 501.3(a). However, the interim rule 

allows the Director, with the approval of 

the Attorney General, to impose special 

administrative measures for a longer 

period of time, not to exceed one year, 

in cases involving acts of violence and/ 

or terrorism. In addition, the rule 

provides authority for the Director to 

extend the period for the special 

administrative measures for additional 

periods, up to one year, after receipt of 

additional notification from the 

Attorney General or, at the Attorney 

General’s discretion, from the head of a 

Federal law enforcement or intelligence 

agency. 

The interim rule also modified the 

standard for approving extensions of the 

special administrative measures. The 

rule provides that the subsequent 

notifications by the Attorney General, or 

the head of the Federal law enforcement 

or intelligence agency should focus on 

the key factual determination—that is, 

whether the special administrative 

measures continue to be reasonably 

necessary, at the time of each 

determination, because there is a 

substantial risk that an inmate’s 

communications or contacts with 

persons could result in death or serious 

bodily injury to persons, or substantial 

damage to property that would entail 

the risk of death or serious bodily injury 

to persons. 

Where the Attorney General, or the 

head of a Federal law enforcement or 

intelligence agency, initially made such 

a determination, then the determination 

made at each subsequent review should 

not require a de novo review, but only 

a determination that there is a 

continuing need for the imposition of 

special administrative measures in light 

of the circumstances. 

In either case, the affected inmate may 

seek review of any special 

administrative measures imposed 

pursuant to §§ 501.2 or 501.3 in 

accordance with paragraph (a) of this 

section through the Administrative 

Remedy Program, 28 CFR part 542. 

Justification for Special Administrative 

Measures Rules 

Although this rule does not alter the 

substantive standards for the initial 

imposition of special administrative 

measures under §§ 501.2 and 501.3, the 

Bureau’s final rule implementing this 

section in 1997 devoted a substantial 

portion of the supplementary 

information accompanying the rule to a 

discussion of the relevant legal issues. 

62 FR 33730–31. As the U.S. Supreme 

Court noted in Pell v. Procunier, 417 

U.S. 817, 822–23 (1974), ‘‘a prison 

inmate retains those First Amendment 

rights that are not inconsistent with his 

status as an inmate or with the 

legitimate penological objectives of the 

corrections system. * * * An important 

function of the corrections system is the 

deterrence of crime. * * * Finally, 

central to all other corrections goals is 

the institutional consideration of 

internal security within the corrections 

facilities themselves.’’ (Emphasis 

added.) 

This regulation, with its concern for 

security and protection of the public, 

clearly meets this test. The changes 

made by this rule regarding the length 

of time and the standards for extension 

of periods of special administrative 

measures do not alter the fundamental 

basis of the rules that were adopted in 

1997. Instead, they more clearly focus 

the provisions for extensions—both the 

duration of time and the standards—on 

the continuing need for restrictions on 

a particular inmate’s ability to 

communicate with others within or 

outside the detention facility in order to 

avoid threats to national security or 

risks of terrorism and/or violence. 

In every case, the decisions made 

with respect to a particular inmate will 

reflect a consideration of the issues at 

the highest levels of the law 

enforcement and intelligence 

communities. Where the issue is 

protection of national security or 

prevention of acts of violence and/or 

terrorism, it is appropriate for 

government officials, at the highest level 

and acting on the basis of their available 

law enforcement and intelligence 

information, to impose restrictions on 

an inmate’s public contacts that may 

cause or facilitate such acts. 

Comments 

We received approximately 5000 

comments in opposition to the rule. All 

but 44 comments were variations of two 

form letters. We also received one 

comment in support of the rule. Other 

than the single supporting comment, all 

comments expressed identical and/or 

overlapping themes. We discuss the 

comments and our responses below. 

Monitoring of Attorney-Client 

Communications 

Comment: The provision allowing 

monitoring of attorney-client 

communications breaches attorneyclient privilege and deprives inmates of 

the right to effective assistance of 

counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 

Response: We acknowledge that the 

Sixth Amendment limits the 

government’s ability to monitor 

conversations between a detainee and 

his or her attorney. Nonetheless, as we 

noted in the preamble to the interim 

rule, the fact of monitoring by itself does 

not violate the Sixth Amendment right 

to effective assistance of counsel. 

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 

(1977). Rather, the propriety of 

monitoring turns on a number of factors, 

including the purpose for which the 

government undertakes the monitoring, 

the protections afforded to privileged 

communications, and the extent to 

which, if at all, the monitoring results 

in information being communicated to 

prosecutors and used at trial against the 

detainee. 


cprice-sewell on PROD1PC61 with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 64 / Wednesday, April 4, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 16273 

In Weatherford, a government 

informant was present at two meetings 

between a defendant, Bursey, and his 

attorney during which Bursey and the 

attorney discussed preparations for 

Bursey’s criminal trial. To preserve his 

usefulness as an undercover agent, the 

informant could not reveal that he was 

working for the government and thus sat 

through the meetings and heard 

discussions pertaining to Bursey’s 

defense. Bursey later brought a suit 

under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that his 

Sixth Amendment right had been 

violated. The court of appeals found for 

Bursey, holding that the informant’s 

presence during the attorney-client 

meetings necessarily violated Bursey’s 

Sixth Amendment right. The Supreme 

Court reversed, explaining that 

[t]he exact contours of the Court of Appeals’

per se right-to-counsel rule are difficult to 

discern; but as the Court of Appeals applied 

the rule in this case, it would appear that if 

an undercover agent meets with a criminal 

defendant who is awaiting trial and with his 

attorney and if the forthcoming trial is 

discussed without the agent’s revealing his 

identity, a violation of the defendant’s 

constitutional rights has occurred, whatever 

was the purpose of the agent in attending the 

meeting, whether or not he reported on the 

meeting to his superiors, and whether or not 

any specific prejudice to the defendant’s 

preparation for or conduct of the trial is 

demonstrated or otherwise threatened. 

Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 550. 

The Supreme Court expressly rejected 

such a per se rule and denied that 

having a government agent hear 

attorney-client communications results, 

without more, in an automatic violation 

of Sixth Amendment rights. Instead, the 

Court noted that it was significant that 

the government had acted not with the 

purpose of learning Bursey’s defense 

strategy, but rather with the legitimate 

law enforcement purpose of protecting 

its informant’s usefulness. Id. at 557. 

The Court further explained that 

‘‘unless [the informant] communicated 

the substance of the Bursey-Wise 

conversations and thereby created at 

least a realistic possibility of injury to 

Bursey or benefit to the State, there can 

be no Sixth Amendment violation.’’ Id. 

at 557–58. 

Thus, the Court indicated that the 

Sixth Amendment analysis requires 

considering the government’s purpose 

in overhearing attorney-client 

consultations and whether any 

information from overheard 

consultations was communicated to the 

prosecution in a manner that prejudiced 

the defendant. 

Weatherford supports the concept that 

when the government possesses a 

legitimate law enforcement interest in 

monitoring detainee-attorney 

conversations, no Sixth Amendment 

violation occurs so long as privileged 

communications are protected from 

disclosure and no information recovered 

through monitoring is used by the 

government in a way that deprives a 

defendant of a fair trial. This rule 

adheres to these standards by permitting 

monitoring only when the Attorney 

General certifies that reasonable 

suspicion exists to believe that a 

particular detainee may use 

communications with attorneys or their 

agents to further or facilitate acts of 

terrorism, and by establishing a strict 

firewall to ensure that attorney-client 

communications are not revealed to 

prosecutors. 

Of course, if the government detects 

communications intended to further 

acts of terrorism (or other illegal acts), 

those communications do not fall 

within the scope of the attorney-client 

privilege. That privilege affords no 

protection for communications that 

further ongoing or contemplated illegal 

acts, including acts of terrorism. See, 

e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 

15 (1933) (such a client ‘‘will have no 

help from the law’’). The crime-fraud 

exception applies even if the attorney is 

unaware that his professional services 

are being sought in furtherance of an 

illegal purpose, see, e.g., United States 

v. Soudan, 812 F.2d 920, 927 (5th Cir. 

1986), and even if the attorney takes no 

action to assist the client, see, e.g., In re 

Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 

382 (9th Cir. 1996). A detainee’s efforts 

to use his or her lawyer to plan acts of 

terrorism simply are not protected by 

the attorney-client privilege. 

This rule carefully and 

conscientiously balances an inmate’s 

right to effective assistance of counsel 

against the government’s responsibility 

to thwart future acts of violence and/or 

terrorism perpetrated with the 

participation or direction of Federal 

inmates. In those cases where the 

government has substantial reason to 

believe that an inmate may use 

communications with attorneys or their 

agents to further or facilitate acts of 

violence and/or terrorism, the 

government has a responsibility to take 

reasonable and lawful precautions to 

safeguard the public from those acts. 

Comment: The monitoring provision 

of the rule violates the First Amendment 

right to petition the government, which 

includes the right to access courts. The 

commenter argued that the right to 

access courts involves consulting 

lawyers in confidence, which, according 

to the commenters, is infringed upon by 

this rule. Some commenters also argued 

that the provision likewise violates the 

Fifth Amendment by circumventing due 

process, which requires access to courts 

to ‘‘challenge unlawful convictions and 

to seek redress for violations’’ of 

constitutional rights. Procunier v. 

Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974). 

Response: For the reasons set forth 

above in our discussion of the 

monitoring provision and attorneyclient privilege, we disagree that the 

rule infringes upon inmates’ rights to 

consult lawyers in confidence. Inmates 

retain the same ability to access courts 

and consult lawyers as they had before 

the date of the Special Administrative 

Measures interim rule. We therefore do 

not change the rule based on these 

comments. 

Further, no due process rights are 

infringed. An inmate whose 

conversations with his/her attorney are 

monitored will enjoy strict procedural 

protections. First, the inmate and 

attorney will be notified that their 

communications are being monitored 

(§ 501.3(d)(2)). Second, a ‘‘privilege 

team’’ will conduct the monitoring and 

will be separated by a firewall from the 

personnel responsible for prosecuting 

the inmate (§ 501.3 (d)(3)). Third, the 

privilege team may disclose information 

only with the prior approval of a 

Federal judge or where acts of violence 

and/or terrorism are imminent 

(§ 501.3(d)(3)). The rule carefully 

balances inmates’ need to communicate 

with their attorneys against the United 

States’ need to prevent future acts of 

violence and/or terrorism. 

Comment: The monitoring provision 

in the rule violates the Fourth 

Amendment and Federal wiretapping 

statutes (18 U.S.C. 2510–2522). 

Commenters posited that before the 

government can intercept oral 

communications, it must demonstrate to 

a Federal judge probable cause to 

believe both that a particular individual 

is committing a crime, and that the 

individual will be communicating about 

that crime. 18 U.S.C. 2518(3). 

Response: Title 18, § 2518(7) of the 

United States Code allows an exception 

to the court order requirement upon the 

Attorney General’s designee’s 

determination that an emergency 

situation exists that involves immediate 

danger of death or serious physical 

injury to any person, or conspiratorial 

activities threatening the national 

security interest. Section 2518(7), (a)(i) 

and (a)(ii). Therefore, if the Attorney 

General so authorizes, and if, according 

to § 2518(7)(b), there are grounds upon 

which a court order could reasonably 

have been granted to allow interception 

of communications, privilege teams as 

authorized by the Attorney General may 

monitor attorney-client communications 

as provided for in this rule. 


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16274 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 64 / Wednesday, April 4, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

We note that only persons held under 

SAM restrictions for acts of violence or 

terrorism, where lives are directly at 

risk, may potentially be subjected to 

monitoring of their attorney-client 

conversations. Even then, such attorneyclient monitoring will be resorted to 

only after the Attorney General has 

made a specific determination that it is 

likely that attorney-client 

communications will be used to convey 

improper messages to or from the SAM 

restrictee. Since the effective date of the 

interim rule on October 30, 2001, this 

provision has been invoked only once, 

after the government obtained specific 

evidence revealing that the attorney had 

previously misused the attorney-client 

privilege in order to convey improper 

messages to and from her client. In other 

words, the Attorney General determined 

that the situation involved ‘‘immediate 

danger of death or serious physical 

injury to any person, or conspiratorial 

activities threatening the national 

security interest,’’ under 18 U.S.C. 

2518(7). 

As has been recognized by the United 

States Supreme Court (see our response 

to the comment above, regarding the 

Sixth Amendment), the Sixth 

Amendment does not protect an 

attorney’s communications with a client 

that are made to further the client’s 

ongoing or contemplated criminal acts. 

Such communications do not assist in 

the preparation of a client’s defense, 

and, therefore, are not legally privileged. 

Still, before such a SAM restriction 

may be imposed, the Attorney General 

must make a specific determination that 

attorney-client communications will be 

used to circumvent the purpose of the 

SAM, that is, to pass information that 

might reasonably lead to acts of violence 

or terrorism resulting in death or serious 

bodily injury, or cause property damage 

that would lead to the infliction of death 

or serious bodily injury. Even when 

attorney-client communications are to 

be monitored for the purposes of the 

SAM, these communications remain 

subject to the attorney-client privilege to 

the extent recognized under applicable 

law. 

Comment: The monitoring provision 

is too broad in that it applies unjustly 

to pretrial inmates, immigration 

violators, witnesses, and others in 

Federal (both Bureau of Prisons and 

non-Bureau) custody. 

Response: Before this rulemaking, 

§§ 501.2 and 501.3 covered only inmates 

in Bureau of Prisons custody. However, 

there are instances when a person is 

held in the custody of other officials of 

the Department of Justice (for example, 

the Director of the United States 

Marshals Service). To ensure consistent 

application of these provisions relating 

to special administrative measures in 

those circumstances where such 

restrictions are necessary, this rule 

clarifies that the appropriate officials of 

the Department of Justice having 

custody of persons for whom special 

administrative measures are required 

may exercise the same authorities as the 

Director of the Bureau of Prisons and 

the Warden. In such cases, the persons 

upon whom the special administrative 

measures are imposed must fall within 

the regulatory definition of ‘‘inmate’’ at 

§ 500.1. 

Previously, the interim rule 

identified, as an example of an official 

of the Department of Justice who could 

exercise the same authorities as the 

Director of the Bureau of Prisons and 

the Warden, the Commissioner of the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service 

(INS). See 66 FR 55064 (Applicability to 

All Persons in Custody Under the 

Authority of the Attorney General). On 

March 1, 2003, however, the INS ceased 

to exist, and its functions were 

transferred to the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) pursuant to 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

(HSA), Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 

2135. Section 441 of the HSA 

transferred to DHS all functions of the 

detention and removal program 

previously under the INS 

Commissioner. The Secretary of 

Homeland Security, via Delegation No. 

7030, delegated all the authority vested 

in section 441 of the HSA to the 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE), a component of DHS. 

Accordingly, the detention authority 

previously exercised by the INS 

Commissioner now rests with ICE. 

Given that ICE detainees may be housed 

in Bureau facilities or Bureau contract 

facilities, this rule would apply to those 

inmates. 

Inmates convicted of Federal crimes, 

and many others in custody at Bureau 

facilities or Bureau contract facilities, 

such as pretrial inmates, witnesses, and 

immigration violators, have equal 

potential to attempt to perpetrate acts of 

violence and/or terrorism and/or acts 

that threaten national security. As 

discussed above and in the preamble to 

the interim rule (66 FR 55062), neither 

the special administrative measures 

previously authorized by this rule nor 

the monitoring provision currently 

authorized by this rule will be imposed 

arbitrarily. The Attorney General will 

carefully and systematically review each 

case and the potential threats before 

imposing special administrative 

measures or monitoring attorney-client 

communications. 

Regarding ‘‘Vagueness’’ of the Rule 

According to the commenters, the rule 

fails to 

1. Detail the Administrative Remedies 

available if inmates oppose Special 

Administrative Measures (SAM). The 

Administrative Remedies available, 

which are the same for any issue an 

inmate wishes to pursue with the 

Bureau, are discussed in 28 CFR part 

542. 

2. Detail SAM conditions (how long 

confined to cell, program participation, 

exercise, recreation, training, 

association with other inmates). We do 

not detail SAM conditions in this rule 

because each case varies with the 

particular security needs of the inmate 

in question. 

3. Define the ‘‘substantial standards’’

for imposing SAM. 

4. Define what constitutes ‘‘reasonable 

suspicion’’ of terrorist activity which 

will prompt the Attorney General to 

monitor attorney-client 

communications. 

For items 3 and 4, as we note above, 

we do not detail ‘‘substantial standards’’

or what will prompt monitoring of 

attorney-client communications because 

each case varies with the particular 

security concerns raised by each 

situation. In general, however, the 

Attorney General will determine that 

SAMs are necessary in light of clear 

evidence that communication or contact 

with members of the public could result 

in death or serious bodily injury or 

damage to property, as stated in the 

rule. Generally, this will be shown 

through prior acts of violence or 

terrorism and evidence of a continuing 

threat due to contacts with members of 

the public who may contribute to or 

undertake acts of violence or terrorism. 

5. Define ‘‘acts of violence or 

terrorism.’’

The United States Code, Title 18, 

2332b, describes ‘‘[a]cts of terrorism 

transcending national boundaries.’’ In 

particular, the ‘‘Federal crime of 

terrorism’’ is defined at length in 

subsection (g)(5). As such, we need not 

reiterate that definition in the rule text. 

Regulatory Certifications 

The Department has determined that 

this rule is a significant regulatory 

action for the purpose of Executive 

Order 12866, and accordingly this rule 

has been reviewed by the Office of 

Management and Budget. 

The Department certifies, for the 

purpose of the Regulatory Flexibility 

Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), that this rule 

will not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities within the meaning of the Act. 


cprice-sewell on PROD1PC61 with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 64 / Wednesday, April 4, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 16275 

Because this rule pertains to the 

management of offenders committed to 

the custody of the Department of Justice, 

its economic impact is limited to the use 

of appropriated funds. 

This rule will not have substantial 

direct effects on the states, the 

relationship between the national 

government and the states, or the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. Therefore, in 

accordance with Executive Order 13132, 

it is determined that this rule does not 

have sufficient federalism implications 

to warrant the preparation of a 

Federalism Assessment. 

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Parts 500 and 

501 

Prisoners. 

■ Accordingly, under rulemaking 

authority vested in the Attorney General 

in 5 U.S.C. 552(a), we adopt as final the 

interim rule published on October 31, 

2001, at 66 FR 55062, without change. 

Dated: March 29, 2007. 

Alberto R. Gonzales, 

Attorney General. 

[FR Doc. E7–6265 Filed 4–3–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–05–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Coast Guard 

33 CFR Part 165 

[CGD13–07–012] 

RIN 1625–AA00 

Safety Zone; Florence Rhodie Days 

Fireworks Display, Siuslaw River, 

Florence, OR 

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 

ACTION: Temporary final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is 

establishing a temporary safety zone on 

the waters of the Siuslaw River during 

a fireworks display. The Captain of the 

Port, Portland, Oregon is taking this 

action to safeguard watercraft and their 

occupants from safety hazards 

associated with this display. Entry into 

this safety zone is prohibited unless 

authorized by the Captain of the Port. 

DATES: This rule is effective on May 9, 

2007 from 8:30 p.m. until 11:30 p.m. 

(PDT). 

ADDRESSES: Documents indicated in this 

preamble as being available in the 

docket are part of docket (CGD13–07–

012) and are available for inspection or 

copying at U.S. Coast Guard Sector 

Portland, 6767 N. Basin Avenue, 

Portland, Oregon 97217 between 7 a.m. 

and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Petty Officer Lucia Mack, c/o Captain of 

the Port, Portland, 6767 N. Basin 

Avenue, Portland, Oregon 97217 (503–

240–2590). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Regulatory Information 

We did not publish a notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for this 

regulation. Under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the 

Coast Guard finds that good cause exists 

for not publishing an NPRM. If normal 

notice and comment procedures were 

followed, this rule would not become 

effective until after the date of the event. 

Publishing an NPRM would be contrary 

to the public interest because immediate 

action is necessary to ensure the safety 

of vessels and spectators gathering in 

the vicinity of the fireworks launching 

barge. 

Background and Purpose 

The Coast Guard is establishing a 

temporary safety zone to protect against 

the hazards associated with a fireworks 

display. This event occurs on the 

Siuslaw River in Florence, Oregon and 

is scheduled to start at 10 p.m. and end 

at approximately 10:15 p.m. on May 9, 

2007. This event may result in a number 

of vessels congregating near the 

fireworks launching site. The safety 

zone is needed to protect watercraft and 

their occupants from safety hazards 

associated with fireworks displays. 

Discussion of Rule 

This rule establishes a safety zone to 

protect vessels and individuals from the 

hazards associated with a fireworks 

display. The safety zone will be located 

on the waters of the Siuslaw River in 

Florence, Oregon, encompassed by lines 

connecting the following points, 

beginning at 43°28′20′′ N/124°04′46′′ W, 

thence to 43°25′07′′ N/124°04′40′′ W, 

thence to 43°57′48′′ N/124°05′54′′ W, 

thence to 43°28′05′′ N/124°05′54′′ W, 

thence to the beginning point. This 

safety zone will commence prior to the 

launching of the fireworks in order to 

clear boaters out of the area for their 

own protection, and will last longer 

than the scheduled event time in case 

the fireworks display lasts longer than 

anticipated. 

Entry into this zone is prohibited 

unless authorized by the Captain of the 

Port, Portland, or his designated 

representative. The safety zone will be 

enforced by representatives of the 

Captain of the Port, Portland, who may 

be assisted by other Federal, State, and 

local agencies. 

Regulatory Evaluation 

This rule is not a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ under section 3(f) of 

Executive Order 12866, Regulatory 

Planning and Review, and does not 

require an assessment of potential costs 

and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that 

Order. The Office of Management and 

Budget has not reviewed it under that 

Order. The rule is not significant 

because the safety zone will encompass 

a small portion of the river for a short 

duration when the vessel traffic is low. 

Small Entities 

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

(5 U.S.C. 601–612), we have considered 

whether this rule would have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The term ‘‘small entities’’ comprises 

small businesses, not-for-profit 

organizations that are independently 

owned and operated and are not 

dominant in their fields, and 

governmental jurisdictions with 

populations of less than 50,000. 

The Coast Guard certifies under 5 

U.S.C. 605(b) that this rule will not have 

a significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

This rule will affect the following 

entities, some of which may be small 

entities: The owners or operators of 

vessels intending to transit or anchor in 

the affected portion of the Siuslaw River 

from 8:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. on May 9, 

2007. This safety zone will not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities for 

the following reasons. This rule will be 

in effect for only 3 hours late in the day 

when vessel traffic is low. Although the 

safety zone will apply to the entire 

width of the river, traffic will be 

allowed to pass through the zone with 

the permission of the Captain of the 

Port, or his designated representatives 

on scene, if it is safe to do so. Before the 

effective period, the Coast Guard will 

issue maritime advisories widely 

available to users of the river. 

Assistance for Small Entities 

Under section 213(a) of the Small 

Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104–121), 

we want to assist small entities in 

understanding the rule so that they can 

better evaluate its effects on them and 

participate in the rulemaking process. If 

the rule will affect your small business, 

organization, or governmental 

jurisdiction and you have questions 

concerning its provisions or options for 

compliance, please contact the person 


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