UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

MULLIGAN, HERRING, and BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private (E-2) LAWRENCE L. WHALEY, II 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140767 

Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division (Rear) (Provisional) 

Christopher J. Fredrikson, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Susan K. McConnell, Acting Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Lozano, JA; Captain Heather L. 

Tregle, JA; Captain Scott A. Martin (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Major Steven J. Collins, JA; Captain 

Tara E. O’Brien, JA (on brief). 

26 April 2016 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per Curiam: 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, in 

accordance with his pleas, of one specification of absence without leave, two 

specifications of failure to report, six specifications of selling military property, and 

one specification of larceny of military property, in violation of Articles 86, 108, 

and 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 908, 921 (2012) 

[hereinafter UCMJ]. The judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, 

confinement for thirteen months, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening 

authority approved the sentence as adjudged. The military judge credited appellant 

with 146 days toward his confinement. 

This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

raises one allegation of error which merits discussion and relief. Appellant asks this 

court to provide appropriate relief to remedy the dilatory post-trial processing of his 

case. We agree that relief is appropriate in this case and reduce the approved 

sentence to confinement by thirty days in our decretal paragraph. 
WHALEY—ARMY 20140767 

2

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

The convening authority took action 348 days after the conclusion of 

appellant’s court-martial. Of that delay, twenty-six days are attributable to the 

defense, and 322 days are attributable to the government. The initial ten days after 

the government serves the authenticated record of trial are not attributable to the 

defense. See Rule for Courts-Martial 1105. The record in this case consists of two 

volumes, and the trial transcript is 212 pages. Although we find no due process 

violation in the post-trial processing of appellant’s case, we must still review the 

appropriateness of the sentence in light of the unjustified dilatory post-trial 

processing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 (C.A.A.F. 

2002) (“[Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service courts are] required to determine 

what findings and sentence ‘should be approved,’ based on all the facts and 

circumstances reflected in the record, including the unexplained and unreasonable 

post-trial delay.”). See generally United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362-63 

(C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Ney, 68 M.J. 613, 617 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 

2010); United States v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 721, 727 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2000). 

The appellant requested speedy post-trial processing on three occasions. The 

government took 246 days to transcribe the record of trial and to serve the record of 

trial on appellant’s defense counsel, and another forty-two days for the military 

judge to authenticate the record of trial in this case. The delay between 

announcement of sentence and action is simply too long, and could “adversely affect 

the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of military justice system . . . .” 

Ney, 68 M.J. at 617. Thus, we find relief is appropriate under the facts of this case. 

CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the entire record, the findings of guilty are 

AFFIRMED. Given the dilatory post-trial processing, however, we affirm only so 

much of the sentence as provides for a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 

twelve months, and reduction to the grade of E-1. All rights, privileges, and 

property, of which appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of the 

sentence set aside by this decision, are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58a(b), 

58b(c), and 75(a). 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: