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UNITED STATES PRIORITIES IN EUROPE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 13, 2003

Serial No. 108–7

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .............................................. 9

The Honorable J.D. Crouch II, Assistant Secretary, International Security 

Policy, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................................... 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Nebraska, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe: Prepared statement 4

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 7

The Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones: Prepared statement ..................................... 13

The Honorable J.D. Crouch II: Prepared statement ............................................. 25

APPENDIX 

Questions for the Record Submitted to the Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones, 

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, by the Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Nebraska, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Europe, and Responses ........................................................................................ 43

Questions for the Record Submitted to the Honorable J.D. Crouch II, Assistant Secretary, International Security Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, 

by the Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Nebraska, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Followed by 

Responses .............................................................................................................. 50

(1)

UNITED STATES PRIORITIES IN EUROPE 

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter, (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

I understand there is a representative of the Serbia-Montenegro 

government in the room, and I want to express on behalf of the 

Subcommittee, and I am sure the Committee and the Congress our 

deep sadness, our condolences on the tragic death of the prime 

minister. We will try to prevail on the very positive things that he 

was attempting to achieve in his country and in Europe. 

Today the Europe Subcommittee will hear from Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones, and Assistant Secretary of Defense, J.D. Crouch II, on U.S. policy priorities in Europe. 

It is no coincidence that the first hearing of this Subcommittee 

for the new Congress would focus on U.S. foreign policy priorities 

in Europe. It is a good place to start, I think, and integral to that 

subject, the American view regarding Europe and vice-versa. By 

any measure, the relationship between the United States and the 

nations of Europe, ‘‘old or new,’’ is one of the two or three most important foreign relationships we have. 

No two regions in the world share a history, a common set of values and a global vision as much as do the United States and Europe. In Europe our core national interests are fully engaged. Not 

ignoring Australia and Japan, but for the most part our traditional 

and closest allies are in Europe. Our economy, and our systems of 

trade and security are integrally linked with the European continent. With our European partners we share a wider range of interests and a higher level of cooperation on issues ranging, for example, from counter-terrorism, to stability in the Balkans, to peace 

and unity on Cyprus, than with any other region in the world. Between the United States and Europe, we possess the greatest ability anywhere to address solutions to transnational issues such as 

organized crime, drug trafficking, proliferation of WMD, communicable diseases and money-laundering, to name a few. 

Today I must admit that I am very concerned for the state of the 

transatlantic relationship. For example, there is a high level of disagreement between the United States and a few other countries 

that have been in the past or in recent years (especially, France, 

2

Germany and perhaps Belgium) our closest allies in Europe. The 

harsh rhetoric we hear on both sides of the Atlantic in varying degrees has, I think, caused real harm to our overall relationship between America and these countries and could result in long-term 

damage. 

The dispute over Iraq, a major current issue, could result in unintended, but extensive, collateral damage to the overall transatlantic relationship as we have seen in NATO there the good will 

and cooperation which generally prevails in that institution has 

been harmed, and if left unattended, it will damage our trade and 

investment relations, our cultural ties, and the attitudes of our 

general populations. We noted this by observing the anti-American 

undercurrent in the anti-war rallies in Europe and through the 

anti-European or at least anti-France rhetoric here. 

Whether the difficulties we are having with some of our European friends—and again, I must emphasize some of our European 

allies—over Iraq will be simply a ‘‘one-time, one-issue’’ phenomenon is not yet clear. Will the dispute over Iraq somehow basically affect the very structure of the transatlantic relationship, and 

intensify the difficulties we have had all along with Europe? 

Whether it will result in long-lasting consequences is yet to be determined. No doubt we have entered a very difficult period in relations with some European countries like France and Germany. 

In December 2001 at an address I gave on the campus of the National Defense University, I said that:

‘‘For some years now, I have been concerned about a widening perception gap between the United States and our European partners, and about our increasingly divergent views 

about issues and about American’s actions and values. For example, on an increasing number of issues, it seems that in certain areas the European notions of what are legitimate U.S. 

national interest, and our actions to defend them, are fundamentally different than the views of the majority of Americans.’’

That is what I said in December 2001, and I think it is, unfortunately, relevant today. 

In the same month I wrote those words in 2001, there was an 

interesting article in The Washington Post by an American professor serving as a visiting fellow at the Cambridge Centre of International Studies in England. The headlines of the article read: ‘‘Allies in War,’’ he is talking about the war on terrorism, ‘‘Not in Perspective.’’ Dr. Peter Feaver of Duke University in that article 

warns:

‘‘President Bush, and the American public he leads, should not 

assume that our allies see the world in the same way we do.’’

And by the way he places the primary cause of that as the less objective media news coverage in Europe. 

American Stanley Hoffman cogently wrote in The New York Review in October 10 of 1001 that:

‘‘We Americans have tended, in the last 10 years, toward a 

form of self-congratulations that can be grating for others; we 

are the ‘indispensable nation’. . . . benign American hegemVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:54 May 07, 2003 Jkt 085641 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031303\85641 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

ony, we often say, provides a modicum of order without threatening anyone. And yet a powerful country can both attract and 

repel . . . We need not only to protect ourselves better at 

home. . . . , but also to understand why even non-terrorists 

sometimes feel smothers by America’s cultural, economic, political, and military omnipresence.’’

For these reasons and others, I believe that we must examine 

whether fundamental differences have emerged. Most troubling are 

increasingly apparent differences of opinion regarding our global, 

or at least our regional, responsibilities and differences on how 

those responsibilities should be legitimately translated into American foreign policy vis-a-vis the foreign policy of individual European actions and such multinational institutions like the European 

Union. 

In the interest of time, I am going to skip for the moment some 

of the reasons why I think we have the divergent interest, why 

there is a gap in our views, but it has a lot to do with the fact the 

European nations place much more emphasis and confidence in 

multilateral institutions. It has to do with a greater sense of concern in this country about losing our national sovereignty, to mention a couple of the high points. 

I want to now mention that I have some specific concerns regarding Europe which I hope can be addressed here by our two witnesses. I am concerned with the unfortunate breakdown of the negotiations in Cyprus, where I think Kofi Annan was doing a remarkably fine job. I note that Mr. Hogeland in today’s Washington 

Post addressed the issue and responsibility of Mr. Denktash as the 

one person, I think thwarting the will of the Turkish Cypriots. This 

was a great opportunity—I have not given up on it—it is a great 

opportunity finally to have a resolution of the Cyprus problem. 

We have, of course, a need for further progress in the Northern 

Ireland peace process, and in the Ngorno-Karabagh dispute which 

seems to be at a standstill. 

In the Balkans, we have a slow pace in development and in 

Kosovo, the resumption of talks about Kosovo independence is, I 

think, problematic. The assassination yesterday, of course, of the 

Prime Minister in Serbia may raise concerns about the political 

stability and the strength of the rule of law in that nation. 

Furthermore, in the Caucasus region, continued instability in 

Georgia, and the disappointing way recent elections in Armenia 

have been handled present challenges to our policies. 

There are other areas of interest to the Subcommittee which 

hopefully our witnesses will address today. I appreciate very much 

the fact that you got us your statements in advance, and I have 

had a chance to look at them. They are an excellent overview of 

the circumstances we face and the reasons for our current policy 

with respect to Europe, and I look forward to the testimony of the 

witnesses and their informal remarks. 

But first I would like to turn to the distinguished Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, 

for his remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]

4

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

Today the Europe Subcommittee will hear from Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones, and Assistant Secretary of Defense, J.D. Crouch, II, on U.S. policy priorities in Europe. 

It is no coincidence that the first hearing of this Subcommittee for the new Congress would focus on the U.S. priorities in Europe, and integral to that subject, the 

American view regarding Europe and vice versa. By any measure, the relationship 

between the United States and the nations of Europe, ‘‘old or new,’’ is one of the 

two or three most important foreign relationships we have. 

No two regions in the world share a history, a common set of values and a global 

vision as much as do the United States and Europe. In Europe our core national 

interests are fully engaged. Not ignoring Australia and Japan, but for the most part 

our traditional and closest allies are in Europe. Our economy, and our systems of 

trade and security are integrally linked with the European continent. With our European partners we share a wider range of interests and a higher level of cooperation on issues ranging, for example, from counter-terrorism, to stability in the Balkans, to peace and unity on Cyprus, than with any other region in the world. Between the United States and Europe, we possess the greatest ability anywhere to 

address solutions to transnational issues such as organized crime, drug trafficking, 

proliferation of WMD, communicable diseases and money-laundering. 

Today I must admit that I am very concerned for the state of the transatlantic 

relationship. For example, there is a high level of disagreement between the U.S. 

and a few other countries that have been in the past or recent years (especially 

France, Germany, and perhaps Belgium) our closest allies in Europe. The harsh 

rhetoric we hear on both sides of the Atlantic in varying degrees, has poisoned the 

overall relationship between American and these countries and could result in longterm damage. The dispute over Iraq, a major current issue, could result in unintended, but extensive collateral damage to the overall transatlantic relationship as 

we have seen in NATO, there the good will and cooperation which generally prevails 

in that institution has been harmed or as it has been damaged, too, in our trade 

and investment relations, our cultural ties, and the attitudes of our general populations. WE noted this by observing the anti-American undercurrent in the anti-war 

rallies in Europe and through the anti-European (or at least anti-France) rhetoric 

here. 

Whether the difficulties we are having with some of our European friends—and 

again, I must emphasize some of our European allies—over Iraq will be simply a 

‘‘one-time, one-issue’’ phenomenon is not yet clear. Will the dispute over Iraq somehow basically affect the very structure of the transatlantic relationship, and intensify the difficulties we have had all along with Europe? Whether it will result in 

long-lasting consequences is yet to be determined. No doubt we have entered a very 

difficult period in relations with some European countries like France and Germany. 

In December of 2001 at an address I gave on the campus of the National Defense 

University, I said that:

‘‘For some years now, I have been concerned about a widening perception gap 

between the United States and our European partners, and about our increasingly divergent views about issues and about America’s actions and values. For 

example, on an increasing number of issues, it seems that in certain areas the 

European notions of what are legitimate U.S. national interest, and our actions 

to defend them, are fundamentally different than the views of the majority of 

Americans.’’

In the same month I wrote those words in 2001, there was an interesting article 

in the Washington Post by an American professor serving as a visiting fellow at the 

Cambridge Centre of International Studies in England. The headline of the article 

reads: ‘‘Allies in War [on terrorism], Not in Perspective.’’ Dr. Peter Feaver of Duke 

University in that article warns: ‘‘President Bush, and the American public he leads, 

should not assume that our allies see the world in the same way we do.’’ (He places 

the primary cause as the less objective media news coverage in Europe.) (Washington Post of 12/02/01) 

American Stanley Hoffman cogently wrote in the New York Review (October 10, 

2001) that:

‘‘We [Americans] have tended, in the last ten years, toward a form of self-congratulations that can be grating for others: we are the ‘indispensable nation’. . . . 

5

‘benign American hegemony, we often say, provides a modicum of order without threatening anyone. And yet a powerful country can both attract and 

repel. . . . We need not only to protect ourselves better at home. . . . , but 

also to understand why even non-terrorists sometimes feel smothered by America’s cultural, economic, political, and military omnipresence.’’

For these reasons and for others, I believe that we must examine whether fundamental differences have emerged. Most troubling are increasingly apparent differences of opinion regarding our global, or at least regional, responsibilities and differences on how those responsibilities should legitimately translate into American 

foreign policy vis a vis the foreign policy of individual European nations and such 

multinational institutions like the European Union. 

The U.S. is the world’s sole remaining superpower. That is a fact—a fact not to 

be trumpeted proudly; with that status comes responsibilities not to be shirked or 

neglected either. Indeed, throughout our history, Americans as a people have often 

been reluctant to see their country take up the mantle of leadership that circumstances have thrust upon us. Our revered Founding Fathers after all had 

warned us to avoid foreign entanglements, and those words still resonate in parts 

of our electorate—yes, even in this era of globalization. During the last decade our 

Government and people, on occasion, acted as though our superpower status was an 

unwanted and inconvenient burden distracting us and draining our resources from 

domestic priorities. A great many Americans were impatient for ‘‘the peace dividend’’ at the end of the Cold War. But September 11th may well have largely put 

an end to that ambivalence or identity crisis, as well as ending any misbegotten 

sense of homeland invulnerability. 

Our superpower status means that, quite frankly, our world-view is somewhat different than that of many Europeans. We are the force of last resort, drawn upon 

when other avenues of conflict resolution fail. As such, Americans are more suspicious about international efforts that would set limitations on our flexibility in 

using our power. 

The next point I would raise to explain the widening European-American gap is 

the fact that Americans are highly protective of national sovereignty. In part that 

is because of geography and in part it is because of our history (pioneers carving 

a nation out of the frontier). When we deploy forces overseas, we expect that the 

rules of engagement for our military will serve U.S. interests, and will be drafted 

in Washington and not, for example, in the United Nations. 

Americans always have reserved the right to use military force to protect our vital 

national interest and honor our treaty commitments. This is a right, we believe, 

that does not require the prior approval of the United Nations or any other international body. Certainly, when the United States (or any nation) engages in military 

operations, the support of the United Nations in the form of a resolution is highly 

desirable. But still most Americans probably believe and feel quite strongly that the 

absence of such support does not prevent American action to defend our national 

interests, or to meet our treaty obligations (certainly including the NATO Treaty), 

or to roll back an aggressor nation. A Security Council veto will not deter us. Americans tend to believe, if the cause is just and our motives are good or benign we can 

act unilaterally, if we must, to defend the security of our citizens or our allies. 

Also, certainly, American attitudes and policies are influenced by our history and 

culture, and, of course, the same is true for Europe. Because of Europe’s unique history, its geography, and the close proximity of so many strong nationalities—with 

all of their history of bitter wars and changing alliances—Europeans naturally have 

a predisposition today to support multilateral initiatives and institutions that limit 

the unfriendly or detrimental actions of individual nations on their neighbors. 

This gradual embrace of multilateralism in the 20th Century has generally served 

Europe well, resulting gin a level of integration and cooperation that Europeans’ 

forefathers could not have imagined. It has also helped the smaller, less powerful 

European states act collectively to reduce the unilateral options or use of power of 

the larger European states—and to attempt to harness or limit the power of the 

United States as well. Some Americans certainly do see U.S. membership in multilateral institutions or treaties as foreign efforts to put limits on American powers 

to protect our national interest. Of course, such views neglect the full array of positive impacts that American also receives from such memberships or treaties. But 

some Americans’ greater skepticism about multilateralism and the resultant limitation on our ability to effectively pursue our national interests increasingly are a 

major cause of the fundamental differences of opinions between Europeans and 

Americans. This factor, growing in importance, should not be underestimated. 

While Europeans don’t like to hear such words, the nations of the EU have given 

up increasing elements of their national sovereignty on a day-to-day basis and have 

6

accepted a higher level of regulation and standardization than would be acceptable 

to the American public—ever or at least for the foreseeable future. The protection 

of American sovereignty rings strongly in the American consciousness. But as Philip 

Stephens writes in his Financial Times column of November 23, 2001: ‘‘Here [in Europe] governments have few hang-ups about pooling sovereignty in the cause of 

greater security or a cleaner world. They do it every day in the European Union.’’

The difference in attitudes on the importance of national sovereignty and 

multilateralism is a big, big reason for the increasingly divergent attitudes and actions between European nations and the United States. These attitudinal differences are growing every day, too. 

I do have other very specific concerns regarding Europe which I will mention 

briefly in closing, including the very unfortunate recent collapse of the U.N.-sponsored peace negotiations designed to resolve the Cyprus problem. The U.N. Secretary General worked very hard, along with others, to try to bring an end to the 

division of the island. I hope we can somehow salvage that matter where Mr. 

Denktash appears increasingly to be blocking the will of the majority of Turkish 

Cypriots. Also, I am troubled with the inability to make more progress in the Northern Ireland peace process and in the Ngorno-Karabagh dispute which seems to be 

at a standstill. 

In the Balkans, the slow pace of development in Kosovo and the resumption of 

talk about Kosovo independence is problematic. Yesterday’s assassination of the 

Prime Minister in Serbia may raise concerns about the political stability and the 

strength of the rule of law in that nation. 

Furthermore, in the Caucasus, continued instability in Georgia and the disappointing way recent elections in Armenia were handled present challenges to our 

policies. 

There are other areas of interest to this Subcommittee which hopefully our hearing today will address. That will help us to better understand and more precisely 

define our foreign policy goals as they relate to Europe. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first thank 

you for holding today’s Subcommittee on America’s priorities in Europe. I also want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your extraordinary commitment to strengthening and preserving transatlantic 

relations, and especially for your leadership as the President of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentarian Assembly. 

I look forward to working with you in a bipartisan fashion, to 

protect America’s interests and security, to strengthen the historic 

transatlantic bonds, and to preserve common ideals of freedom and 

peace that the United States and Europe mutually embrace. 

I also look forward to working with you on several pressing 

issues in Europe, including U.S./EU relations, European Union enlargement, U.S./Turkish relations, the Northern Ireland peace process, and developments, as you said, on Cyprus and in the Balkans. 

I want to thank Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones 

and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Mr. Crouch, J.D. Crouch, for testifying before our Subcommittee. 

As did Mr. Bereuter, I read both of your statements, and I know 

that you both agree that it is critical for the United States to 

strengthen its relations with our European allies. 

Mr. Chairman, I am deeply, deeply disturbed about the growing 

rift between the United States and many of our European allies. 

It is terribly unfortunate that much of the international good will 

and solidarity directed toward the American people following the 

tragic events of September 11th has been squandered. 

This troubling development in our transatlantic relations threatens our historic partnership with several of our European applies, 

weakens 50 years of NATO cooperation and strains valuable reVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:54 May 07, 2003 Jkt 085641 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031303\85641 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
7

sources and attention away from many of the most dangerous and 

pressing issues facing both Europe and America. 

Undoubtedly, there will be policy differences between the United 

States and our European allies. Today some of our allies in Europe 

have taken an alternative approach to disarming Saddam Hussein. 

Despite differing policies, however, it is critical that the Bush Administration take steps to reverse this dangerous trend and continue to reach out and cooperate with our European allies. 

In particular, I am deeply concerned about our longstanding strategic partnership with the Republic of Turkey. Last week, I traveled to Turkey with Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Rogers from Michigan 

following Turkey’s parliament’s decision not to allow U.S. troops 

deployment on Turkish soil. 

I was disturbed by the vote in Turkey’s parliament and I was 

disturbed what I saw transpiring. Six decades of incredibly strong 

relations from the Korean War through the Cold War through Turkey’s commanding role in the international security assistance 

force in Afghanistan, all of this unraveling before our eyes. 

My visit and the message that we brought with my other colleagues to our Turkish allies is one that I hope the Administration 

is also conveying to Prime Minister Erdogan and the Turkish people that the United States is sensitive to their concerns, appreciates and recognizes how vitally important Turkey and our other 

allies are to the United States’ national interest, and to the future 

of global democracy and stability. 

The rapid disintegration of our historic alliances, including Turkey, but not limited to Turkey, is something that we need to be 

deeply concern about, not just with respect to Iraq, but especially 

with respect to al-Qaeda and dictators such as Saddam Hussein. 

In the case of Iraq, I hope that the Administration appreciate 

that they may not need our allies to win a military battle with Saddam Hussein, but certainly we will need them to win the peace in 

Iraq. 

Mr. Chairman, the testimony provided to the Subcommittee by 

the two assistant secretaries will undoubtedly show in great detail 

the complexity of the challenges the United States and Europe face 

over the next decade. 

I very much look forward to working with the Administration to 

address these critical issues, and to make certain that America’s 

longstanding alliances remain in tact and strong enough to deal 

with mounting economic and security issues. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding today’s subcommittee hearing on 

America’s priorities in Europe. I also want thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your extraordinary commitment to strengthening and preserving transatlantic relations 

and for your leadership as the President of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Parliamentary Assembly. I look forward to working with you in a bipartisan fashion 

to protect America’s interest and security needs during these difficult times, to 

strengthen the historic transatlantic bonds and to preserve common ideals of freedom and peace that the United States and Europe mutually embrace. I also look 

forward to working with you on several pressing issues in Europe, including U.S.-

EU relations, European Union Enlargement, U.S.-Turkish Relations, the Northern 

Ireland Peace Process and developments on Cyprus and in the Balkans. Finally, as 

8

this is our first subcommittee hearing of the 108th Congress, I also want to welcome 

both our Republican and Democratic members. 

I want to thank Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch for testifying before 

our subcommittee. After reading both of your statements, I know you agree that it 

is critical for the United States to strengthen its relations with our European allies. 

Mr. Chairman, I am deeply disturbed about the growing rift between the United 

States and many of our European Allies. It is terribly unfortunate that much of the 

international goodwill and solidarity directed toward the American people following 

the tragic events of September 11 has been squandered. 

This troubling development in our transatlantic relations threatens our historic 

partnership with several of our European Allies, weakens 50 years of NATO cooperation, and strains valuable resources and attention away from the most dangerous and pressing issues facing both Europe and America. Undoubtedly, there will 

be policy differences between the United States and our European partners. Today, 

a few of our allies in Europe have taken an alternative approach to disarming Saddam Hussein than the United States. Despite differing policies, it is critical that the 

Bush Administration take steps to reverse this dangerous trend and continue to 

reach out and cooperate with our European allies, who share a common commitment 

to ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction, removing the scourge of terror 

and advocating democracy, freedom, and justice worldwide. 

In particular, I am deeply concerned about our long-standing strategic partnership 

with the Republic of Turkey. Last week I traveled to Turkey following their parliament’s decision not to allow a U.S. troop deployment on Turkish soil. I was disturbed by the vote in Turkey’s parliament and what I saw transpiring—six decades 

of strong relations from cooperation during the Korean War and Cold War to Turkey’s commanding role in International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan 

unraveling before my own eyes. My visit and the message I brought to our Turkish 

allies is one that I hope the Administration is also conveying to Prime Minister 

Erdogan and the Turkish people that the United States appreciates and recognizes 

how vitally important each of these nations are to America’s national interest and 

to the future of global democracy, stability, and a world free from terror and weapons of mass destruction. The rapid disintegration of our historic international alliances—including, but not limited to, that of Turkey put America in a weaker position when facing common enemies, like Al Qaeda or dictators like Saddam Hussein 

with chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. In the case of Iraq, I hope the Administration understands that they may not need our allies to win a military battle 

with Saddam but will certainly need them to win the peace in Iraq. 

Mr. Chairman, the testimony provided to the subcommittee by the Assistant Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of Defense show in great detail the complexity of the challenges the United States and our European allies will face over 

the next decade. I look forward to working with the Administration to address these 

critical issues and to make certain that America’s long-standing alliances remain intact and strong enough to deal with mounting economic and security issues. I am 

sure that our subcommittee members have many questions regarding these matters 

as well. I welcome both of you to our hearing, and I look forward to discussing these 

most serious matters with you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Wexler. Thank you for your kind 

words. I look forward to a very productive and positive relationship 

with you, and our staffs are going to work well together, I am confident. 

I understand that my two colleagues here have no opening statements; is that correct? But any opening statements of Members of 

the Subcommittee and this Member without objection will be made 

a part of the record. 

And now I would like to introduce our two witnesses today. Our 

first witness today is The Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. 

Ambassador Jones was sworn in as Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs on May 31, 2001. Previously, she served 

as Senior Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, and as 

principal Assistant Secretary to the State Department’s Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs. Secretary Jones has also served as AmbasVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:54 May 07, 2003 Jkt 085641 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031303\85641 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
9

sador to the Republic of Kazakstan, and Deputy Chief of mission 

to our Embassy in Bonn, Germany. 

She has served as a deputy principal officer in the U.S. interestsection in Baghdad. Her first foreign service post was in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

Our second witness is Dr. Jack Dire Crouch II. Dr. Crouch was 

sworn in Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Policy on August 6 of 2001. He is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the formulation and coordination of international security strategy and policy. 

Prior to jointing the Pentagon, Dr. Crouch was associate professor of defense and strategic studies at Southwestern Missouri 

State University in Springfield, Missouri. Dr. Crouch has served as 

the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security policy in the first Bush Administration. Prior to 

that he was a military legislative assistant to the former Senator 

from Wyoming, Malcolm Wallop. 

We look forward to your testimony. Your entire written statements will be made a part of the record. They are very extensive 

and we appreciate them very much. They are going to be very valuable to us in the course of this year and this Congress, undoubtedly. I would like to give each of your about 10 minutes to summarize your statement, if that seems adequate, and we will proceed 

with you, Secretary Jones. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. JONES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

the opportunity to summarize my full statement. 

Mr. Chairman, I agree with you completely that we do have serious differences with some of our Allies in Europe, by no means 

with all of them. I would like to highlight, though, as we begin this 

hearing some of the positive areas where our cooperation continues 

and continues in very gratifying ways, particularly in fighting terrorism. 

We have good cooperation on how to proceed on North Korea. We 

are working very well on a growing danger or growing threat to the 

region of HIV/AIDS. We are working together on new markets for 

exports. We have good cooperation in many, many areas in Afghanistan. We are working well with Russia and with European allies 

and friends to bring Russia into the European community, and we 

are making good progress in the Balkans, despite the serious tragedy yesterday of the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic. 

As we focus on how to resolve the differences we have with some 

of our European allies, we nevertheless believe that the relationship will evolve, particularly as Europe expands, which I will address in a minute. 

One of the areas that we are particularly focused on in our department and this Administration is the importance of enhancing 

our public diplomacy efforts and enhancing our ability to reach out 

to audiences, particularly in the former communist countries of Europe, and to reach the post-World War II generations. 

10

The area where the focus is in terms of the transatlantic difficulties right now, of course, is Iraq. Three of the countries of Europe 

are with us in supporting the Security Council Resolution. The 

U.K. and Spain, of course, are co-sponsors of the Security Council 

Resolution that is on the table, and Bulgaria is in support of it. 

Other countries in Central Europe and Eurasia have pledged political and military support to the growing coalition we have, working to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that it is imperative that 

he disarm or face a military attack. 

Other European countries, France, Germany and Russia in particular, also on the Security Council, favor a longer period of time 

to allow Saddam Hussein to disarm. 

One of the things that I would like to emphasize, however, is no 

member of the Security Council and virtually no country that has 

appeared before the Security Council in the debate in the last couple of days in New York, not one of them has maintained that Saddam is cooperating under 1441. That is not the issue. There is 

broad agreement and firm agreement about the importance of 1441 

and the requirements of 1441. 

Where the difference is is on the length of time that we should 

allow Saddam Hussein to demonstrate cooperation with 1441. The 

United States, Spain, the U.K. and quite a number of other of our 

European friends and Allies believe that the time is up, that Saddam Hussein has had 12 years to cooperate, has had 12 years to 

demonstrate—to make a strategic decision to disarm. He has not 

done that, and we do not think that more time for inspectors is 

going to change that. 

In NATO, may I start, Mr. Chairman, by applauding your deep 

engagement and support for NATO, for the transatlantic relationship in your presidency of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 

It is true that we had a very recent, very difficult time within 

NATO where some of our NATO Allies confused the request before 

it. The request before it was by Turkey for protection of a NATO 

Ally against Iraq should there be—should Turkey experience any 

danger from Iraq. Some of our NATO allies confused that with the 

debate about Iraq. 

When we were able to move that discussion into the defense 

planning committee, the DPC, which works at 18 without France, 

we were able, with Germany’s strong support and assistance, to 

agree at 18 to provide the kind of support for Turkey that Turkey 

had requested. 

We nevertheless believe that NATO remains a strong transatlantic—the strongest transatlantic alliance. It is an alliance that 

we believe very strongly in. It is an alliance that is transforming 

itself to address the threats of the new century, and we are very 

committed to its expansion through the invitations that were 

issued in Prague, and to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and 

Partnership for Peace, which brings closer the nations that are now 

on the edges of the broader Europe, particularly the Caucasus and 

Central Asia, into closer cooperation and collaboration with NATO. 

The United States is equally supportive of EU enlargement. The 

elements that are required of the EU candidate countries for EU 

membership are all elements that the United States strongly supports, particularly in fighting corruption and conforming legislation 

11

and regulation to international laws, conforming to the World 

Trade Organization, and bringing the practices and the legislation 

into conformity with the world community. These are all efforts 

that the United States strongly supports and applauds. 

The European Union is the only other organization besides 

NATO that has the capacity to project the economic, political and 

cultural power that we think is appropriate. We have a tremendous 

amount of—tremendous number of areas in which we cooperative 

very productively, and I count in particular the law enforcement 

area and counter-terrorism efforts. And we believe that this is a relationship and an organization that deserves continued support and 

collaboration. 

With Europe itself, of course, we have over $500 billion in trade 

each year, and we are each other’s largest investors. 

There are a couple of trade issues that I would like to mention 

here as mentioned in my introduction, and the first is the WTO 

ruling against us in the foreign sales corporation case. There, we 

will be working with Congress on compliance to protect U.S. competitiveness and to avoid EU sanctions which could amount to up 

to $4 billion in U.S. trade. 

Similarly, the WTO ruling on the European Union’s challenge to 

the steel safeguard is due on April 14. We believe we have acted 

consistently with WTO rules. But if the WTO rules against us, we 

need to review the WTO decision to decide whether or not we 

would ask for an appeal. 

We are also concerned about the fact that the EU has blocked 

the approval of safe bio-tech foods for more than 4 years. We believe this violates WTO and EU laws, and we are seeking the best 

way to get the EU to lift its moratorium on bio-tech products. 

With regard to Russia, we are very gratified that the Moscow 

Treaty was ratified unanimously by the Senate on March 6. We are 

disappointed by the Russian position so far on Iraq. We are working to try to gain greater cooperation with Russia as far as North 

Korea is concerned. We work with the Russians on money-laundering questions. We think that we have made some progress, but 

corruption is still an issue with Russia. 

In terms of democratic freedoms, there have been advances such 

as jury trials, but freedom of the media and the treatment of foreign clergy remain problems that are on our agenda with Russia. 

Chechnya, of course, is always an issue that is on our agenda 

with Russia. We are hopeful about the upcoming referendum. We 

have just designated three Chechnyan groups as terrorist groups. 

We did that extremely carefully, and with full review of intelligence 

on those groups. 

In Chechnya itself, we still maintain and argue forcefully to the 

Russians on the need for discipline and accountability of their 

forces, particularly on human rights issues. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Excuse me, Madam Secretary. We have a recorded vote in another Committee and will have to leave. I am 

going to ask Mr. Janklow if he will take the chair. I just wanted 

you to know where I am going, and not leaving in the middle of 

your testimony intentionally. 

Ms. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

12

And the last point on Russia I would like to make is that we look 

forward to graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik. 

The Chairman and Congressman Wexler mentioned Turkey. We 

can talk in greater detail about Turkey and where we are at the 

moment. We see Turkey as a strategic partner. The vote in parliament on March 1 was a setback to this partnership. We are 

equally focused on economic matters with Turkey. We look forward 

very much to IMF reform and to Turkey maintaining its adherence 

to the program, and we support the qualified industrial zones that 

Turkey is seeking. 

We have been extremely supportive and active in support of Turkey’s EU membership. On Cyprus, as you mentioned, we suffered 

a severe disappointment this week when Mr. Denktash refused to 

go along with a very extensive, very good proposal for reunification 

of the island. 

In the Balkans, we were very saddened by Djindjic’s assassination, the Prime Minister’s assassination yesterday. We look forward 

very much to a new government forming, and honoring his memory 

by pursuing anti-corruption just as he did, and by pursuing cooperation with the international tribunal in The Hague. 

In the Balkans, we do see progress there in terms of troop levels 

being down, refugee returns being up. There is good economic 

growth and elections are proceeding well, but we nevertheless harp 

on the importance of law enforcement, particularly as it relates to 

fighting corruption and closing down very porous borders. 

The NATO role in the Balkans is a very—it remains an important one. That said, we are shifting focus from stabilization to longterm engagement. In that connection we are very focused on how 

the new European defense and security program can work with 

NATO to develop itself to assure all of the elements of Berlin Plus 

in the event that the EU should take over from NATO, if NATO 

agrees, in Macedonia. 

There are quite a number of global issues on which we are very 

focused. I mentioned the importance of HIV/AIDs in our transatlantic relationship. That is something that we maintain quite a 

bit of focus on. The Holocaust and anti-Semitism is an issue that 

remains on our agenda constantly with our European friends and 

allies, in terms of property restitution. But also I would like to 

focus on the positive elements of the International Task Force on 

Holocaust Education, of which 15 countries are a member, and of 

which the U.S. has just taken over the chair. 

We have also gained agreement from the OSCE to host a specialized meeting on anti-Semitism in Europe sometime this year, 

which we hope will enhance the education elements that we think 

are very important to combating anti-Semitism around the world. 

We continue to focus on the problems with respect to borders. 

That is a big focus in Europe and Eurasia because of the threats 

that we believe the Europeans are just as susceptible to as we are. 

And as I conclude, I do not want to forget the importance of resources for the State Department to do the work that we expect to 

do and you expect us to do in order to be able to promote the 

United States’ interests in all of these countries and to be able to 

combat the threats that are threats to all of us. 

Thank you very much. 

13

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to review with you the Administration’s priorities in Europe, including Russia and the 

Caucasus. At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on becoming 

chairman of this subcommittee. Mr. Gallegly, we appreciate your past work on the 

subcommittee and we look forward to working with you on the Subcommittee on 

International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights. 

As you suggested in your invitation letter, it is a timely moment to assess the 

health of the overall trans-Atlantic relationship. While we are seriously concerned 

by differences between the U.S. and some European countries on the best way to 

achieve our agreed goal of Iraqi disarmament, it is also fair to say there are many 

areas in which the U.S.-European relationship is as strong as ever. 

Our European Allies and friends are vital partners in the campaign against global 

terrorism. We are opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and addressing 

barriers to American exports and investment. We have achieved important milestones in our relationship with Russia. Progress in the Balkans is ongoing. Our efforts continue to promote regional stability in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and 

Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Europe is changing in momentous and important ways. Thus, our relationship 

with Europe will continue to evolve as we adapt to, and in some cases participate 

in, these changes. Both NATO and the EU are expanding eastward, bringing in 

countries that are embracing democracy and market economies. These twin expansions bring us closer to President Bush’s vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. 

The invitees bring a new perspective and a new energy to the EU and NATO. 

These expanded boundaries challenge European nations to build a new concept 

of themselves. They challenge the U.S. to work constructively with this new reality. 

The tensions with some of our traditional Allies are acute, but our longer-term 

common interests remain. Our economic relationship with Europe amounts to about 

$2 trillion in trade and investment. Millions of travelers cross the Atlantic each 

year. We cooperate closely on matters of regional and global significance, from trafficking in persons, to trade liberalization, to terrorism financing. Europe remains 

our most important partner in promoting human rights, Europe joins us in seeking 

peace in the Middle East and supporting development in Africa. 

We recognize that the bonds forged so firmly in the Second World War and the 

Marshall Plan’s reconstruction of Europe are matters of history to the younger generation of Western Europeans. For those in Central Europe, Russia and Eurasia, 

however, Cold War traditions of conflict and confrontation are legacies they would 

like to leave behind. The Secretary, Department Principals, my colleagues in EUR, 

and our Embassies abroad are actively using public diplomacy and other tools to 

reach both of these generations, in order to lay the groundwork for strong and vibrant U.S.-European relations for decades to come. 

IRAQ

The most pressing challenge for U.S.-European relations today is how to ensure 

that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein complies with the requirements of more 

than 17 UN Security Council resolutions and fully disarms. Plainly, there is sharp 

disagreement among European and Eurasian countries about how to enforce compliance with the Security Council. 

Some European countries, especially the United Kingdom, Spain, and Bulgaria, 

agree with us that Saddam Hussein has missed his final opportunity to disarm. 

They and others understand that the international community must be prepared to 

back up its writ with the use of force, as anticipated by UNSCR 1441. A number 

of countries in Central Europe and Eurasia have pledged forces and specialized 

units to the coalition we have assembled. 

At this juncture, however, other European countries—notably UNSC members 

France, Germany, and Russia—favor giving the inspection process more time. These 

countries generally acknowledge that the Iraqis engaged only in limited and truculent compliance, but hope that more time and intensified inspections can achieve results. The German government insists that force should not be used under any circumstances. 

We believe that, in the absence of a genuine commitment by the Iraqi regime to 

disarm, more time for inspections or more inspectors—as proposed recently by 

France—will not solve the fundamental problem of Iraqi non-compliance. 

14

We know what genuine disarmament looks like. We have seen it in Ukraine and 

in Kazakhstan. Governments that accept the priority of disarmament don’t dribble 

out concessions. They take on obligations and make commitments willingly, and 

they list their weapons sites freely. 

We welcome expressions of support for our policy on Iraq from a number of European leaders. This includes the January 30 letter signed by eight European leaders 

(from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and 

the UK) and the February 5 statement by the ‘‘Vilnius 10’’ (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). We 

also appreciate the statement of the EU Summit on Iraq on February 17, emphasizing the focus must be on Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 1441. 

In the United Nations, we are working intensively with the UK and Spain to ensure broad support for our draft resolution. We would like to see the Iraqi threat 

addressed through the Security Council, thus strengthening its credibility. 

Should military action against Iraq take place, we are seeking the broadest possible international coalition. We have held private talks with many European governments about possible coalition action. In a number of cases, acting on a bilateral 

basis, we have requested and obtained base access and overflight and transit clearances. Some countries are already committed to providing military forces to participate. Should military action prove necessary, we would also look to our Allies and 

friends in Europe for post-conflict support, including humanitarian assistance and 

reconstruction. 

NATO

For over fifty years, the United States and its European Allies have been joined 

in a common cause through NATO. We have been working hard since the September 11th attacks to transform the Alliance to address these new security threats. 

The Summit meeting of heads of state and government in Prague last November 

represented an historic milestone in this process. Mr. Chairman, I would like to 

take this opportunity to congratulate you on your chairmanship of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and to thank you for your advocacy of U.S. interests in that 

organization. I also want to applaud your deep engagement at Prague and your continuing support for NATO’s transformation. 

At the Prague Summit, NATO members agreed on an ambitious program proposed by the U.S. to develop ‘‘New Capabilities, New Members and New Relationships’’ to transform the Alliance. Our European Allies agreed to improve their military capabilities, through resource pooling and specialization, helping NATO to undertake collective action against the new threats that we face around the globe. The 

Allies also endorsed a U.S. proposal to establish a NATO Response Force, which will 

give the Alliance a cutting-edge land, air and sea capability. We agreed to streamline the NATO command structure to make it more lean, efficient and responsive 

to today’s threats. Work on implementing our new capabilities initiative is well underway. 

Our decision to invite seven new members to join the Alliance will extend the 

zone of NATO security and stability from the Baltic to the Black Sea, helping to 

further secure a Europe that is whole, free and at peace. We are pleased that each 

of the seven invitees has already made significant military contributions to the war 

on terrorism and we will look to them to provide specialized niche capabilities to 

the Alliance in the future. 

Prague also celebrated the establishment of a new relationship between NATO 

and Russia. NATO states and Russia are working together in the NATO-Russia 

Council as equal partners on selected projects aimed at expanding and deepening 

our mutual cooperation. Current projects are focused on peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, non-proliferation and missile defense. I am pleased to report that 

so far the NATO-Russia Council has been relatively successful. Russian participation has been constructive and cooperative. As this process continues, we will seek 

ways to broaden and deepen the NATO-Russia relationship. The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan agreed at Prague provides a roadmap which, if implemented by Ukraine, 

will draw Ukraine closer to the Alliance and bolster internal reforms. 

It is a source of some regret that last month some Allies chose, at least initially, 

to confuse the obligation of the Alliance to provide purely defensive assistance to 

Turkey with the broader debate over the question of what we should be doing about 

Iraq in the UN and elsewhere. This is not the first time NATO has experienced disagreement on a difficult and important issue. One only has to think back to the debate over the INF deployment in the 1980s. The fact is that NATO remains the fundamental means by which the Allies guarantee their common security and the indispensable defense link that binds North America to Europe. 

15

NATO is also outward looking. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are important tools in enhancing cooperation with the Eurasian 

countries. Given the increased importance of Central Asia and the Caucasus as 

frontline states in the war on terrorism, we would like to see NATO do more to 

reach out to these countries. 

EU

While NATO forms the foundation of the trans-Atlantic security framework, our 

relations with the EU underpin our economic and political relationship with Europe. 

The European Union has become increasingly important to our interests. As the 

only entity on the world stage with an ability similar to ours to project economic, 

political, and cultural power, the EU has an important influence on the environment 

both within and beyond Europe. 

Some observers suggest the gulf dividing the U.S. and EU has never been wider. 

Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian issues, Kyoto, ICC, steel, FSC, beef hormones, and biotech 

are the most contentious issues. Putting the situation into context, we have been 

here before, with the Soviet pipeline, Helms-Burton and ILSA. Our common interests, bonds, and values proved stronger than these divisions. For all the differences, 

our areas of common belief and objectives with the EU remain greater than with 

any other potential partner. A perception of fundamental divergence is neither in 

our interest nor accurate. 

Over $500 billion in trade between the U.S. and EU takes place each year, creating jobs and boosting growth on both sides of the Atlantic. We are also each other’s largest foreign investors, and those flows continue. The vast majority of trade 

and investment occurs without headlines, without rancor, without dispute. At the 

Doha meeting of the WTO, the U.S. and the EU came together to launch a new 

round and provide new momentum for free trade. At the last U.S.-EU Summit, we 

agreed to develop a Positive Economic Agenda. This is a mechanism to find common 

approaches to regulatory issues across a broad range of sectors, and to advance our 

active dialogue on access to financial markets. While these efforts hopefully will 

minimize areas of future trade disputes, where we have disagreements now, such 

as over agricultural biotechnology, we are pressing the EU to open its markets to 

us without delay. We will use all available tools, including where appropriate the 

WTO, to protect our interests. 

Increased U.S.-EU cooperation receives little publicity in non-economic areas. In 

counter-terrorism, we negotiated an agreement that facilitates the exchange of information between EUROPOL and U.S. law enforcement. We have concluded negotiations toward a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty/Extradition Treaty, which must now 

enter the approval process. Coordinated U.S. and EU diplomacy and assistance have 

been key to Balkans stabilization. In Afghanistan, we jointly prevented a humanitarian crisis, and we continue to work together to build democratic government, infrastructure and jobs. Another example of EU–U.S. cooperation is the joint application of visa restrictions on the leadership of the secessionist Transnistria regime in 

Moldova. Together, we are sending a strong signal to the Tiraspol regime that it 

must negotiate seriously to bring this longstanding issue to a rapid settlement. 

The accession of ten new countries to the European Union in 2004 is a significant 

EU achievement. It has also been a longstanding U.S. policy objective. EU enlargement will cement these nations, most of which were members of the former Soviet 

bloc, into the West. The accession process and adherence to the EU’s body of law 

will also improve and standardize regulations, resulting in better business climates, 

improved human rights standards and treatment of minorities, and stronger capacity for law enforcement cooperation. 

We are also working with the EU to encourage more engagement with the nations 

of the Caucasus and Central Asia, all of whom will become Europe’s ‘‘new neighbors’’ after EU enlargement. We are seeking EU political engagement as well financial support for the kinds of reforms that will make these nations stable, democratic 

and prosperous members of Europe. 

Finally, we support the EU’s efforts to establish a European Security and Defense 

Policy that is closely coordinated with NATO, and that would allow the EU to take 

on tasks such as peacekeeping and other humanitarian missions in which NATO decides not to be engaged. We were pleased that in December last year the long-standing impasse over the participation of non-EU NATO Allies in ESDP operations was 

resolved. 

Since that time, NATO and the EU have been working to finalize other elements 

of ‘‘Berlin-plus’’ arrangements that will set out the basic elements of cooperation between NATO and the EU. We expect that the Berlin-plus package will be completed 

in the next few weeks. 

16

Once all arrangements are in place and NATO decides to end Operation ALLIED 

HARMONY, we will welcome the EU’s assumption of that mission at the request 

of the Macedonian government. 

THE OSCE

For the United States, the OSCE serves as an invaluable forum for protecting security, economic well-being, and human rights and democratization throughout Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 

Let me recognize the U.S. members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly from 

this Chamber, who have also used the OSCE with profound impact to advance U.S. 

values and interests. 

The OSCE is engaged in improving the lives of citizens in numerous countries, 

with programs that range from election observation, to police training, to promoting 

civil society. OSCE human rights rapporteurs serve as beacons of credibility and 

frankness. This spring, at our urging, the OSCE will tackle the troubling increase 

in anti-Semitic violence throughout Eurasia with a special meeting on anti-Semitism. 

In the aftermath of September 11, our partners at OSCE have also focused on 

combating terrorism. Through the OSCE we are assisting our most critical partners—the Central Asian and Caucasus nations—in the War Against Terrorism to 

address an entire agenda of measures that will help secure their regions and all of 

Europe against the threat of terror. 

COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

A year and a half after September 11, our European and Eurasian allies continue 

to be strong supporters in the war against terrorism. 

Most European countries, especially our NATO partners, acted quickly to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and the follow-on International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The UK in particular played a central 

role with the U.S. in rooting out the Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan. Although the countries of Central Asia are not part of the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, they are part of my bureau, so I wanted to note their important contribution to OEF as well, both in hosting coalition bases and in working with us 

on infrastructure improvements. 

The nations of Europe and Eurasia continue to play a vital role in rebuilding a 

secure and democratically governed Afghanistan, with contributions of funds, military assets, supplies, humanitarian aid and infrastructure development. 

There are 18 European coalition partners with forces deployed in Afghanistan, 

with either ISAF or in support of OEF. European countries have contributed air, 

sea and land assets, and have placed elite troops on the ground. European units are 

taking part in maritime interdiction operations. All of the countries that have led 

ISAF are from the European region. 

Afghanistan must one day be able to ensure its own security, and to that end, 

European partners are center stage in building the Afghan National Army (ANA). 

The ANA now consists of seven combat battalions, with one more in training. Our 

European partners have trained four of these battalions. A number of European 

countries have provided equipment valued at over $20 million. 

Afghanistan’s shattered infrastructure is another essential element in reconstruction and security. The European Union earmarked $93 million for road reconstruction in Afghanistan for the next two years. European countries both donated and 

transported large amounts of humanitarian relief and reconstruction supplies. It has 

been a united effort in every sense. 

In Georgia, Russian bombings of northern Georgia beginning in 2000 were a clear 

and unacceptable violation of Georgian sovereignty. Russia accused the Georgian 

government of failing to control Georgia’s territory in the Pankisi Gorge and allowing the region to become a safe-haven for criminals, terrorists, and Chechen rebels. 

The Russians were demanding action against terrorism. 

Our immediate response was to draw a clear ‘‘red line’’ against any further violation of Georgian territory. We made clear to the Georgian government that it could 

not allow its territory to act as a safe-haven for terrorists and urged its support for 

the Global War on Terrorism. We made clear to the Russian and Georgian governments that Georgia should be left to resolve the problems within its own territory. 

As part of our effort to help Georgia develop the capabilities necessary to face this 

problem and protect its territory, we developed the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which began in May 2002. GTEP is designed to assist Georgia in border security, anti-terrorism, crisis response and military reform. The goal of the program is to train four Georgian Army light infantry battalions and a mechanized 

17

company team. Selected elements of the Georgian Border Guards and other security 

forces are participating with the goal of providing greater interoperability with 

MOD in time of crisis. In December 2002, the program graduated its first combat 

battalion, which is now ready for deployment against international terrorists on 

Georgian territory. In our view, the program is successfully addressing the need to 

enhance Georgia’s security and guarantee its sovereignty. 

Efforts by coalition partners have helped thwart impending terrorist actions 

against the United States. Our European counterparts are sharing law enforcement 

and intelligence information, conducting investigations into the September 11 attacks, and strengthening laws to aid the fight against terrorism. Additionally, we 

are working with the OSCE to improve the capacity of member states to fight terrorism. 

In Greece, several members of the November 17 terrorist group are now standing 

trial. In February the authorities arrested four suspected members of the Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA), another domestic terrorist group. 

European police and intelligence agencies have also provided unprecedented practical help in investigating and bringing terrorists to justice, denying financing to terrorists and their supporters, and strengthening security against terrorist attacks. 

Many European and Eurasian countries have joined with us to place several individuals/entities on the asset freeze list maintained by the UN’s 1267 Sanctions Committee. 

On the Eurasia front, Russia has been generous in its support for the coalition, 

from OEF planning to intelligence exchanges to support in the UN. It has also 

changed its financial enforcement infrastructure to block terrorist assets. Armenia, 

Azerbaijan and Georgia have also provided vital support in the war against terrorism. They have offered unequivocal political and military support, are playing 

critical roles in OEF, and have provided vital intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and information sharing on terrorist groups and assets. 

Given the importance of European opinion in our counterterrorism efforts, we 

plan to enhance public diplomacy efforts to boost support for our policies and actions. We will reach out to the diverse Muslim communities in both Europe and 

Eurasia in an effort to improve the image of the U.S. 

RUSSIA

Over the past year we continued to develop strong cooperation with Russia. Our 

relationship covers a broad spectrum. On strategic issues, we reached agreement 

with Russia last May on the Moscow Treaty, radically reducing strategic offensive 

weapons. We are pleased that the Senate ratified this treaty last Thursday. 

Russia continues to be a key partner in the global war on terror, and we have 

cooperated in important ways on key regional problems, such as supporting the Middle East Peace Process in the ‘‘Quartet’’ and defusing tensions between India and 

Pakistan. On some other international issues, Russia’s support has not been as 

solid. Thus far they have not been helpful on Iraq in the UN as noted earlier. And 

we are urging Russia to engage more actively on the DPRK nuclear problem. 

In law enforcement matters, new Russian legislation on money laundering helped 

remove it from the Financial Action Task Force’s list of countries of concern. Yet 

corruption remains a serious problem. 

We strongly support democratization and economic reform in Russia, largely 

through U.S. assistance under the FREEDOM Support Act. There have been major 

advances in democratic freedoms in Russia, such as the introduction of jury trials 

and reform of the criminal code. But media freedom continues to be a problem, 

while the freedom of foreign clergy to enter Russia became a problem last year. 

This year we are witnessing what may be the first serious effort at a solution to 

the Chechnya conflict, beginning with a constitutional referendum slated for March 

23. We are concerned over the security and political conditions under which the referendum is being held. However, we hope this can be the basis for a political solution to that tragic conflict. As indicated by our February 28 designation of three 

Chechen organizations as terrorists, there are definitely terrorist elements among 

Chechen fighters. But our broader policy on the Chechnya conflict remains unchanged. In addition to seeking a political solution, the Russian government needs 

to exercise greater discipline over its forces, and there must be meaningful accountability for human rights violations committed by Russian forces against civilians. 

In economic matters, the Russian government has made progress on market reforms. Large Russian companies are adopting more Western practices and becoming 

more transparent. But much remains to be done—the government must provide a 

more welcoming environment for investors, crack down on corruption, continue reforms and enforcement of the rule of law, improve IPR protection, uphold court deciVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:54 May 07, 2003 Jkt 085641 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031303\85641 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
18

sions, support the growth of small and medium enterprises, and pursue the breakup 

of monopolies. WTO accession for Russia remains a priority, as this will be a major 

force for reform. As we move to expand U.S.-Russian economic relations, there is 

a natural fit between Russia’s desire to play a greater role in providing oil and gas 

to global energy markets and our interest in diversifying supply. 

Jackson-Vanik graduation remains an Administration priority. The law has 

achieved its purpose, and we now have other more effective tools to manage the 

U.S.-Russian trade relationship. 

UKRAINE

Our relationship with Ukraine has gone through a difficult period. President 

Kuchma’s authorization of the Kolchuga transfer to Iraq has eroded trust. Yet 

Ukraine remains strategically important; its future will have a significant impact 

on the future of its neighbors and Europe as a whole. Despite the Kolchuga authorization and serious concerns about democracy and human rights, we are convinced 

that we must maintain our broad-based engagement with all segments of Ukrainian 

society, and especially with those promoting political and economic reform. This is 

in our long-term interest—and Ukraine’s. Our agenda supports Ukraine’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Whatever limitations Ukraine’s 

leadership has demonstrated to date in fostering economic and political change, a 

new generation of leaders is waiting in the wings for a chance to give reform new 

impetus. 

Our goal is to confront bilateral problems and find practical solutions that can inject positive momentum into the relationship. We plan to pursue reform of Ukraine’s 

export control regime as a way to prevent future Kolchuga episodes. We have offered U.S. assistance for this purpose. Outstanding questions on Kolchuga remain 

and might never be fully answered. For now, we believe we should concentrate our 

energies in helping to implement reforms that will head off proliferation problems. 

We continue to shift assistance resources from programs benefiting the central 

government to those that more directly support civil society. One of our particular 

areas of focus is media freedom, which we believe has been under attack in Ukraine 

and which will be crucial in helping to ensure free and fair Presidential elections 

in 2004. We will be watching closely the Ukrainian authorities’ treatment of independent journalists and media outlets, particularly as the 2004 elections draw closer. 

We will continue to deepen the good cooperation we have with Ukraine on strategic issues. The Ukrainian authorities have indicated that they are actively considering deploying a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) defense battalion to the 

Gulf, in case frontline states are targets of attack by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Ukraine has also stood shoulder to shoulder with us in the war on terror. 

They have allowed more than 5,000 overflights connected with Operation Enduring 

Freedom, and have fully equipped a battalion in the Afghan National Army. 

We also want Ukraine’s help in solving the Transnistria conflict in Moldova—one 

of Ukraine’s neighbors. Ukraine has an important role to play, both as a constructive mediator in the ongoing Transnistria political settlement talks and as a partner 

for Moldova in increasing security along their common border. 

TURKEY

Among our priorities in Europe is our relationship with Turkey. As a key NATO 

ally located at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, Turkey is always a top priority. We have strongly supported EU membership for Turkey, and have worked 

hard with them in an effort to resolve the Cyprus issue. 

Right now, the focus is on Iraq. We are seeking Turkish cooperation because the 

northern option can help shorten an eventual war, leading to fewer casualties and 

lower economic costs to all. On March 1, the Turkish Parliament did not approve 

permitting U.S. troop deployments to Turkey for a possible conflict with Iraq. This 

can be attributed, in part, to polling data indicating 90–95 percent of the Turkish 

public is opposed to war in Iraq. In addition, there was a lack of unity in the ruling 

party. This is a setback with regard to planning for Iraq, but we are consulting with 

the Turks on next steps in the spirit of the strategic partnership between our countries. 

Both we and the Turks have very serious concerns over economic costs to Turkey 

of a war, as in 1991. Turkey also cites to us concern over northern Iraq, including 

Kurdish ambitions and the status of the oil fields. Turkey feels that ethnic 

Turkomen are not sufficiently represented in the Iraqi opposition leadership and we 

are working to resolve this issue. 

19

We still hope we will be able to stage a Northern Option through Turkey. We are 

discussing options with the Turkish authorities. 

In any case, we are also making clear that Turkey must not move into Iraq unilaterally. 

In addition to ongoing discussions on Iraq, we are working with Turkey and international financial institutions to bolster the Turkish economy. Turkey must take 

adequate measures to get back on track with its IMF reform program. 

THE BALKANS

Our goal and that of the Balkan governments is to promote democracy, market 

orientation, regional stability and peace, and integration into NATO and the European Union. While challenges remain, there is progress. International troop levels 

are down. Refugee returns are up. Zagreb and Belgrade successfully negotiated an 

end to their dispute over the Prevlaka Peninsula without international mediation. 

Economic growth in the region was good at around four percent last year. There 

have been a number of successful elections in the region. The United States’ level 

of involvement is decreasing as our European partners are picking up more diplomatic and military responsibility for the region. 

The overall military presence in the region has been reduced significantly, with 

our European Allies now comprising over 80 percent of the forces there. SFOR has 

declined from its peak strength of approximately 60,000 to 12,000; KFOR from its 

peak strength of approximately 50,000 to 25,000. 

NATO’s presence in the region remains under periodic review to ensure that our 

forces are adequate but not excessive in light of conditions on the ground. The Alliance should continue to play a role in the international community’s efforts in the 

region by gradually shifting its focus from stabilization to long-term engagement 

through institutions like the Partnership for Peace. Meanwhile, we are working 

closely with the EU and with NATO to pursue the European Union’s offer to take 

on the military mission in Macedonia, once the important details, as envisaged in 

the ‘‘Berlin Plus’’ agreement, are worked out and NATO has decided to end its Operation ALLIED HARMONY. 

The democratic process is taking root: elections were held in Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia, and were considered free and fair 

by international observers—although not all ended in a conclusive result. 

Providing real opportunities for refugee and IDP returns is important for longterm stability and European integration. Refugee returns to Bosnia have gained 

their own momentum, and minority returns to Kosovo have outpaced minority departures. Still, refugee returns to Kosovo and Croatia have been disappointing overall, and we need to continue to press for progress. 

Many countries in the region are reliable and vigorous partners in the global war 

on terrorism and have taken close and cooperative steps with us to combat proliferation and the gray arms trade. 

Despite these positive developments, challenges remain. We seek to help resolve 

remaining post-conflict issues—including war criminals and refugee return—while 

we encourage the post-Communist transition through political and economic reform. 

We are focused significantly on building the rule of law through our assistance 

under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act. It is particularly important to address ineffective law enforcement, corruption and porous borders, 

which make the region attractive for organized crime, trafficking, political extremism and terrorist activity, and unattractive for legitimate investment and entrepreneurship. We continue to work closely with the countries of Southeast Europe, 

our European Allies, and the international community as the region moves towards 

European integration. Much progress has been made since Milosevic presided over 

wars, ethnic cleansing, and the forced displacement of approximately four million 

people. But U.S. engagement in the region—in partnership with our European Allies—will be needed for some years to come. 

REGIONAL STABILITY: CYPRUS, NORTHERN IRELAND, CAUCASUS, BALTICS

Outside the Balkans, we are promoting regional stability in other areas. In Cyprus, we have strongly supported the efforts of the UN Secretary General to achieve 

a settlement before Cyprus signs the EU accession treaty April 16 so Greek Cypriots 

and Turkish Cypriots would enjoy the benefits of EU membership. We were deeply 

disappointed that the Secretary General’s talks with the two leaders in The Hague 

did not result in an agreement to put his plan to referenda in both communities. 

We regret in particular that Mr. Denktash refused to allow the Turkish Cypriots 

to decide for themselves on their future. Despite this setback, the U.S. remains committed to seeking a just and durable settlement to the Cyprus problem. 

20

In Northern Ireland, we wholeheartedly support the UK and Ireland in their efforts to push the peace process to a new level of stability. Prime Ministers Blair and 

Ahern have just concluded marathon sessions in this regard with the parties. Northern Ireland Assembly elections have been rescheduled from May 1 to May 29 to give 

time for reflection and discussion within the parties and communities. We urge the 

leaders, communities, and people of Northern Ireland to seize this opportunity to 

build on the success of the Good Friday Agreement. 

In the Caucasus, the United States serves as a Co-Chair along with France and 

Russia of the OSCE Minsk Group. In this role, the U.S. continues to pursue actively 

a comprehensive, mutually acceptable settlement to the conflict between Armenia 

and Azerbaijian over Nagorno-Karabakh. With presidential elections in both countries this year, neither side currently is willing to make the politically difficult compromises necessary to negotiate a peace agreement. However, the Co-Chairs continue their efforts in the hope that the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships can 

find the political will needed to reach a permanent solution to this conflict. 

Regarding the conflict in Abkhazia, the U.S., as a member of the UN Secretary 

General’s Friends of Georgia Group (FOG), continues to work with France, Germany, Russia, and the UK to pursue a comprehensive, negotiated settlement that 

respects Georgia’s territorial integrity. 

At the other corner of Europe, we have been promoting regional cooperation in 

Northern Europe under the Northern Europe Initiative and the U.S. Baltic Charter. 

Active U.S. engagement in Northern Europe will continue as the Baltic States move 

into NATO and the EU and the region becomes more prosperous and secure. We 

are crafting an updated U.S. approach that recognizes much has been achieved in 

the Nordic-Baltic area through multilateral cooperation, and builds on this success. 

We anticipate focussing on three major substantive areas: political security, healthy 

societies/healthy neighborhoods, and our trade, investment, economic and business 

ties. 

GLOBAL ISSUES

As NATO and other European institutions enlarge, we have been acutely aware 

that a Europe whole, free, and at peace can function only if it is truly a community 

of shared values. For that reason, the United States has pressed hard for continuing 

progress on issues left unresolved from the Holocaust, World War II, and the communist era. We have encouraged property restitution, we recently assumed the 

Chair in Office of the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, and we 

have strongly supported the holding this year of an OSCE Specialized Meeting on 

Antisemitism. 

Enhanced defense and security cooperation and intelligence sharing must be buttressed by societies committed to democratic principles such as those in the Final 

Act in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A number of European countries have concluded agreements with us under Article 98 of the International Criminal Court (ICC), ensuring that U.S. citizens would not be surrendered 

to the ICC. Moreover, we are continuing efforts with our trans-Atlantic partners to 

address problems that respect no borders, such as HIV/AIDS and infectious disease, 

narcotics trafficking and environmental degradation. 

We are working with our partners in Europe and Eurasia to combat the growing 

problem of trafficking in persons. This grave, transnational human crime is something we can only eliminate by working together. Governments from Western Europe to Central Asia have passed important legislation to outlaw trafficking and 

have cooperated with each other on the prosecution of these traffickers. We are also 

encouraging prevention of trafficking through public awareness and protection of 

victims, both in destination countries and upon return to home countries. We have 

encouraged governments and NGO’s—both integral partners in this fight—to share 

expertise and resources to respond to the criminal aspect of this tragedy as well as 

the needs of the victims. Most recently, we concluded the congressionally mandated 

international conference on sex trafficking here in Washington, D.C. Over 300 participants from the region attended. 

Success in addressing transnational problems is more important than ever in pursuing America’s trans-Atlantic agenda. Stable countries able to withstand terrorist 

and other threats are based on respect for the rule of law, human rights, religious 

freedom, and open media. Stable countries have vibrant civil societies. They are 

committed to the principles of free market economies. 

RESOURCES

On the management side, we are also addressing the needs of our diplomats who 

represent us overseas. Appropriate and secure facilities are critical to operational 

21

success. We continue our work with the Bureau of Overseas Building Operation to 

press forward with building projects in our region. In FY03 we expect that four New 

Embassy Compounds will be occupied and four new projects initiated. As our nation’s priorities and policies develop and change, it is essential that adequate funding be made available to allow flexibility in our building plans. Rightsizing and controlling growth are an integral part of our facility planning process. 

As we further engage on the war on terrorism and as the number of EU and 

NATO members and aspirants continues to grow, Mission activities and workloads 

increase commensurately. Through the Secretary’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative 

(DRI), additional staff are being deployed to posts throughout the region. In January 

the DRI provided 23 positions for EUR, and we expect to receive additional positions 

when the FY03 phase of the DRI is fully implemented. 

We have a highly dedicated group of people working in our missions. They are 

keenly aware that their contributions to promote U.S. interests are important, particularly during these challenging times. Heightened worldwide tensions have increased the need for contingency planning and actions, taxing already strained resources. Despite facing greater personal security concerns for themselves and their 

families, employee morale overseas is good. It is essential, however, that we continue to support our staff and their families with improved workplaces and housing 

and through incentives and other means of recognition. 

The entire State Department is carrying out this important work around the 

world. To do the job effectively, we need adequate resources. I appreciate your taking the time to listen to my testimony today, and I will be pleased to address your 

questions.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you very much, ma’am, and with your permission, Mr. Wexler, we will go ahead and take Mr. Crouch, and 

the questions when Mr. Bereuter gets back. 

Mr. Crouch, will you please go ahead, sir, Mr. Secretary? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. CROUCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee on Europe. 

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the United States priorities in Europe. I will try to do that, sharing the perspective of the 

Department of Defense. And as Chairman Bereuter noted, I will 

have my longer statement placed in the record if that is okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to congratulate—Chairman Bereuter is not here—for his election last November as president of 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliament Assembly. His 

action participation in that assembly since 1987 has been a very 

powerful reflection of America’s commitment to NATO, and I think 

it is very helpful for us in the Administration. I, for one, have been 

spending a lot of time working with NATO since I was sworn in 

a year and a half ago, and the help of him, the help of other Members of this Committee, we are very grateful for. 

At the outset, let me step back and reaffirm what I think are the 

underlying principles that are the foundation of this Administration’s defense relationship with Europe. 

First, a Europe that is whole, secure, and united in peace, democracy, and common values is in the interest of the United States. 

Both America and Europe need each other. An undivided Europe, 

allied with United States is America’s natural partner in global affairs. 

I realize, of course, that there are differences between the United 

States and a few of our European allies regarding how best to handle Iraq’s persistent defiance of the United Nations resolutions 

22

mandating the disarmament of Iraq. These differences are not to 

be minimized, but they do not define the totality of our relationship, the totality of the relationship between Europe and the 

United States nor, in my view, the strategic imperative that we 

maintain the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North 

Atlantic Alliance. 

Second, the United States and Europe are both confronted by the 

same threats, and we both face the same opportunities in changing 

and in managing the global security environment. The nexus of 

weapons of mass destruction, terrorist organizations, and terrorist 

states present an urgent and lethal danger to both North America 

and Europe. 

Cooperation with Europe is vital to our efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their leadership, communications, and 

sources of financial and material support. 

Third, NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security 

relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for our military cooperation with Europe both in terms of the members, but 

also in terms of people—states that are outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Moreover, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of the 

forward-presence of U.S. military forces. Today, U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are deployed in Europe, enhancing both 

America’s and Europe’s security. 

It is with the foregoing in mind that I wish to briefly update the 

committee on the Department of Defense’s activities in Europe, 

particularly those concerning NATO, the Balkans, and Russia. 

First, NATO: Over its years of existence, NATO has repeatedly 

adapted to changes in the international security environment, and 

it will have an important role to play in the future. This year 

NATO took the historic step to support the lead nations of the 

International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, a step that 

brings the alliance well out of its traditional geographic domain. 

At the Prague Summit last November, allied heads of state responded to the tremendous change we are experiencing in Europe’s 

strategic landscape and the global security environment. They approved an historic agenda featuring the extension of NATO membership to seven central European democracies, a new focused capabilities initiative, and strengthened relations with Russia, 

Ukraine and NATO partners. 

We have been very supportive of the countries—in the department—invited to join the alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Solovenia. Our support is matched 

by their enthusiasm and their willingness to contribute. 

Even prior to their invitation to NATO, these seven countries 

have been acting as de facto allies through their contributions and 

participation in the Balkans, Operation Enduring Freedom and 

ISAF. 

We will work closely with these invitees throughout the accession 

process and beyond to accomplish military reform goals and to develop niche capabilities that we think that they can provide and 

that are sorely needed by the North Atlantic Alliance. 

The next step in the accession process will be the signing of the 

accession protocols on March 26 in Brussels, and we hope that all 

23

seven members will have completed the necessary requirements to 

sign the protocols on that date. 

The door to NATO membership remains open. The three current 

NATO aspirants—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—are continuing through NATO’s membership action plan to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of NATO membership. Through 

NATO programs and bilateral efforts, we will work with Kiev on 

the goal of Ukraine’s integration into Europe, which will not be 

complete as long as Ukraine remains outside its key political, economic and security institutions. 

And I would say on a bilateral level, the department is working 

very closely with all of these aspirants as well as new NATO members and members in the Partnership for Peace to develop bilateral 

security relationships. 

The decision at Prague to establish a NATO response force promises the alliance the ability to deploy a force capable of fulfilling the 

entire spectrum of combat operations. If implemented to the standards proposed by the United States, the NRF will be a lethal, technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on 

a short notice. 

The Secretary of Defense has often said in a changed global security environment, things that take months and years to react or to 

act are not interesting, but the things that take days and months 

to act are very interesting, and we are definitely trying to build 

that kind of capability in the NATO response force. 

Our goal for the NRF is an initial operating capability for training by October 2004, and a full operational capability by October 

2006, and we hope to maybe even best that. We expect the NRF 

to become a focal point also for NATO transformation efforts to 

meet the new threats that the alliance faces. 

Also at the Prague Summit, heads of state and government approved the Prague capabilities commitment, to try to overcome 

longstanding shortfalls in such areas as strategic lift, communications, NBC equipment and precision guided munitions. 

As you know, many of our European allies have consistently 

failed to meet agreed upon NATO defense obligations. If this trend 

continues, and allies fail to fulfill the Prague capabilities commitment, the future success of the NRF would be jeopardized. Allied 

contributions to NRF rotations must possess the critical military 

capabilities targeted by the Prague capabilities commitment in 

order to be effective. 

At Prague, heads of state and government also approved the 

broad outline of a streamlined and more effective NATO command 

structure. Specifically, NATO agreed to establish two new strategic 

level commands; one operational and one functional. 

In the new structure, NATO will reduce the number of second 

level commands from seven to three, and the number of third level 

commands from 11 to 6. 

Also, a senior officials group established by defense ministers, cochaired by myself and my counterpart from The Netherlands, has 

been making good progress in leading the effort to develop recommendations for NATO defense ministers for their approval of 

the final command structure at the upcoming defense ministers 

meeting in June. 

24

September 11th showed us that the United States and Russia 

face threats and have much to gain from bilateral cooperation. We 

are making progress in confronting global challenges together. The 

U.S. seeks a broad relationship with Russia that addresses not only 

issues related to security but economic, political, technical and scientific issues. 

Our new strategic relationship with Russia has shifted away 

from the Cold War era’s focus on reaching agreements or treaties. 

We are now trying to change the way we do business. We are emphasizing openness and cooperation in areas where we share common interests, and honest dialogue even when we disagree. 

We approach this relationship with a realistic assessment of Russia’s policies, some of which are contrary to U.S. interest. For example, we remain very concerned by the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction and technologies and materials associated with 

these weapons. Grey arms activities continue as a result of Russia’s 

weak export control regimes. Of course, we also oppose violations 

of Georgian territorial sovereignty by Russian military, and continue to press for a non-military political solution in Chechnya. 

An important measure of the success of our efforts to build a new 

strategic relationship with Russia will be that Russia ceases developing strategies, plans and capabilities that treat the United States 

as a probable adversary. We think we have made progress in this 

area. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I understand that you have given some 

thought to our future force posture in Europe as well as maybe 

other Members of the Committee. When the President asked Mr. 

Rumsfeld to serve as Secretary of Defense, he also asked him review our entire defense posture around the globe. DoD’s 2001 quadrennial defense review called for reorienting the U.S. global military posture in light of changes in the international security environment, the war on terrorism, DOD’s new strategy, and particularly the imperative to deter forward in critical regions of the 

world. We have been examining our posture and presence broadly 

across the globe, to include Europe, east Asia, central Asia, and 

southwest Asia. This work is ongoing, and I might add a prudent 

responsibility of all administrations is to ensure that our military 

forces are appropriately structure, equipped and deployed. 

Our approach is to establish a presence appropriate to each region; increase our capabilities to act promptly and globally in response to crises; diversify access; provide more flexible expeditionary forces; increase allied contributions; and strengthen the 

command structures that we have to support our national security 

strategy. And you have seen many of these things in the way we 

have changed through the Unified Command Plan and the like. 

Any present changes, obviously, would put a premium on flexibility and forward access, but not new large, permanent bases. We 

recognize the sensitivity of any changes to U.S. force posture and 

of course will consult closely with the Congress, allies, NATO, and 

relevant partners. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am ready to answer any questions you or the Committee might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crouch follows:]

25

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on Europe, thank you for this opportunity to discuss United States priorities in Europe. I will try to do that, sharing 

the perspective of the Department of Defense. 

Mr. Chairman, I would first like to congratulate you on your election as President 

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly. Your 

active participation in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly since 1987 has been a 

powerful reflection of America’s commitment to NATO. Your leadership has catalyzed numerous Assembly policies—many of which have been adopted by NATO. 

NATO enlargement is but one important example. 

At the outset, let me step back and reaffirm the underlying principles that are 

the foundation of this Administration’s defense relationship with Europe. 

First, a Europe that is whole, secure, and at peace is in the interest of the United 

States. Both America and Europe need each other. An undivided Europe, whole and 

free, and allied with the United States is America’s natural partner in global affairs. 

I realize, of course, that there are differences between the United States and a 

few of our European Allies regarding how best to handle Iraq’s persistent defiance 

of United Nations resolutions mandating the disarmament of Iraq. These differences 

are not to be minimized, but they do not define the totality of the relationship between Europe and the United States nor the strategic imperatives of the North Atlantic Alliance. 

Second, the United States and Europe are both confronted by the same threats, 

and they both face the same opportunities in the changing global security environment. The nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorist organizations, 

and terrorist states present an urgent and lethal danger to both North America and 

Europe. Cooperation with Europe is vital to our efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their leadership, communications, and sources of financial and 

material support. Despite differences with some Allies on Iraq, I am pleased to report that all our European Allies and partners are making important contributions 

in our undertaking to take down the scourge of terrorism. 

Third, NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with 

Europe. It is the central framework for our military cooperation with Europe. Moreover, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of a forward presence of United 

States military forces. Today, approximately 100,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines are deployed in Europe, and they enhance both America’s and Europe’s security. 

It is with the foregoing in mind that I wish briefly to update the Committee on 

the Department of Defense’s activities in Europe, particularly those concerning 

NATO, the Balkans, and Russia. 

NATO

Those who have recently questioned America’s commitment to Europe and NATO 

only need to look to the Global War on Terrorism. The relevance of this relationship 

is demonstrated each day by the fact that U.S. and European soldiers are sharing 

dangerous risks together in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. The swiftness with which this coalition brought an end to the Taliban regime and introduced 

freedom back into Afghanistan is rooted in over fifty years of NATO joint planning, 

training, staffing and operations that can be found no where else in the world. 

Over its years of existence, NATO has repeatedly adapted to changes in the international security environment, and it will have an important role to play in the future. This year NATO took the historic step to support the lead nations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a step that brings the Alliance well out of traditional geographic domain. 

At the Prague Summit last November, Allied heads of state responded to the tremendous change we are experiencing in Europe’s strategic landscape and the global 

security environment. They approved an historic agenda featuring the extension of 

NATO membership to seven Central European democracies, a new focused capabilities initiative, and strengthened relations with Russia, Ukraine and NATO Partners. 

NATO Enlargement 

In Warsaw in June 2001, President Bush declared: ‘‘I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings...As we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate 

how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause 

of freedom.’’ The decision by NATO’s Heads of State and Government at Prague to 

26

invite Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to 

begin accession talks with the Alliance is an essential step towards a complete Europe. 

The U.S. has been very supportive of the 7 NATO invitees. Our support is 

matched by their enthusiasm and willingness to contribute. We are asking these 7 

invitees to make difficult decisions regarding defense reform, involving increased defense spending and tough choices on personnel reductions and base closures. We will 

work closely with the invitees throughout the accession process and beyond, to accomplish military reform goals and to develop niche capabilities enabling them to 

become contributors to transatlantic security. 

The next step in the accession process will be the signing of the accession protocols on March 26th in Brussels. We hope that all 7 will have completed the necessary requirements to sign the protocols on that date. 

Even prior to their accession into NATO, these 7 countries have been acting as 

de facto Allies through their contributions and participation in the Balkans, Operation Enduring Freedom, and ISAF. Without being exhaustive, I will give you some 

examples of their important contributions. All 7 have contributed forces to SFOR 

and KFOR. Bulgaria hosted U.S. KC–15 refueling aircraft; Lithuania deployed 37 

Special Operations Forces personnel to Afghanistan; and Romania contributed a 

400-man infantry battalion in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. To assist 

with ISAF, Estonia deployed 2 explosive detection dog teams; Latvia will send medical personnel; Slovakia deployed a 40-man engineering unit; and Slovenia has donated equipment to the Afghan National Army Training Project. 

The door to NATO membership remains open. The three current NATO aspirants—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—are continuing through NATO’s Membership Action Plan to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of NATO membership. Through NATO programs and bilateral efforts, we will work with Kiev on the 

future goal of Ukraine’s complete integration into Europe. We must not allow 

Ukraine to remain outside of Europe’s political, economic, and security institutions. 

Foreign Ministers from NATO and Ukraine met during the Prague Summit and 

agreed to a substantive action plan that includes goals in areas such as political, 

economic, and defense reform. On a bilateral basis, the U.S. continues to assist reform efforts within the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The focus is on developing a professional force that is interoperable with U.S. and NATO forces. 

NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) provides a mechanism to work with Partner 

nations to develop interoperability between their forces ad NATO forces. NATO is 

greatly benefiting from years of PFP programs in the Global War on Terrorism, as 

the Partner nations were already familiar with NATO procedures when called upon 

to support this important effort. 

NATO RESPONSE FORCE

The decision at the Prague Summit to establish a NATO Response Force (NRF) 

will provide the Alliance with both a capability to deploy a force that can address 

the entire spectrum of NATO missions quickly, as well as focus capability improvements. We believe that, for the U.S. and its Allies to fight together effectively in 

NATO, the Alliance has a requirement for a credible force that is lethal, technically 

superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice (5–30 

days). This force should be able to conduct forced entry into a hostile area. It should 

be self-sustaining, capable of fighting alone for 30 days. It should be able to serve 

as a stand-alone force or as an initial entry force that prepares a theater for followon forces. 

Potential missions cover the spectrum of operations and could include: deployment 

as a stand-alone force that is reacting to an immediate crisis; deployment as a 

proactive force package, prepared to accept follow-on NATO forces; peacekeeping or 

peace support missions; or service as an initial entry force for a large-scale deliberate operation that secures lines of communication and points of debarkation and 

prepares a theater for force flow. 

We have agreed to develop and implement the NRF with a view toward an initial 

operational capability for training of October 2004, and full operational capability 

by October 2006. The NRF will be commanded by a Combined Joint Task Force 

(CJTF) Headquarters (HQ) which will be able to draw from a rotational pool of air, 

land, and maritime forces that can be available on short notice, be tailored for specific missions, and be able to deploy anywhere to conduct the full spectrum of operations as decided by the North Atlantic Council. The forces participating in an NRF 

rotation will be on a high state of readiness and will train together under the CJTF 

HQ that will command an actual operation. The forces that participate in the NRF 

rotations will be the first beneficiary of the new capabilities initiative. The NRF will 

27

become the focal point of NATO transformation efforts to meet the new threats we 

face. 

Prague Capabilities Commitment 

At the Prague Summit, Heads of State and Government approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment as part of the Alliance’s continuing effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high-threat environment. Individual Allies made political commitments to improve their capabilities in the areas 

of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control, and 

communications; combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions (PGMs) 

and suppression of enemy air defenses; strategic air and sea lift; and deployable 

combat support and combat service support units. In preparing the Prague Capabilities Commitment, particular attention was devoted to the potential offered by multinational projects and various forms of role sharing and role specialization. These 

mechanisms offer advantages in terms of cost effectiveness (e.g., through economies 

of scale) and also provide a way for smaller countries to make significant contributions in demanding capability areas that might otherwise be unaffordable to them. 

Many of our European Allies have consistently failed to meet agreed upon NATO 

defense obligations. Failure by Allies to fulfill the Prague Capabilities Commitment 

would jeopardize the future success of the NRF. Allied contributions to NRF rotations must possess the critical military capabilities targeted by the Prague Capabilities Commitment in order to be effective. 

Streamlining NATO’s Command Structure 

At Prague, Heads of State and Government approved the broad outline of a 

streamlined and more effective command structure. Specifically, NATO agreed to establish two new strategic-level commands, one operational and one functional. 

The Allied Command for Transformation will be located in Norfolk, Virginia, close 

to U.S. Joint Forces Command so that we can better ensure that U.S. and European 

forces transform together. The Transformation Command will also have a footprint 

in Europe. The strategic commander for transformation should be responsible with 

Allied Command Operations for ensuring that NATO has a pool of forces available 

that is ready, deployable, sustainable and militarily capable to perform the full 

range of missions that may challenge the Alliance. A Senior Officials Group (SOG), 

established by Defense Ministers and co-chaired by myself and my counterpart from 

the Netherlands, has been making good progress in leading the effort to develop recommendations for NATO Defense Ministers approval at their meeting in June. 

In response to the changing global environment, NATO has streamlined the previous ‘‘Cold War’’ command structure by eliminating unnecessary headquarters and 

creating a command structure that is deployable and capable of conducting joint operations. In the new structure, NATO will reduce the number of second level commands from 7 to 3. Third level commands will be reduced from 11 to 6. And the 

number of Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs) will be reduced from 10 to 

4 static and 2 deployable. 

NATO-European Union Relationship 

As the European Union has developed its Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the 

U.S. has worked to ensure it is done in a cooperative way, and results in Europeans 

providing more for Europe’s security, as we have urged for decades. A breakthrough 

for the NATO–EU relationship came last December, when the EU committed to 

terms for ‘‘participation’’ by the non-EU European NATO members in ESDP plans 

and operations. This cleared the way for NATO to finalize its long-proposed arrangements for the EU to use NATO planning, assets and commands. These arrangements, known as ‘‘Berlin-Plus,’’ will serve important U.S. and NATO interests by 

anchoring EU planning and operations in NATO, avoiding wasteful EU duplication 

of NATO assets, and promoting ESDP compatibility with NATO capabilities and 

procedures. 

In this connection, the EU has offered to take over NATO’s small military monitoring mission in Macedonia. Any transfer of NATO’s mission to the EU can only 

occur, however, once the NATO–EU arrangements are in place, to ensure the EU 

operation would be consistent with NATO command and control, and once NATO 

has decided to end this mission. There also needs to be Macedonian support for the 

mission and its objectives. (The current NATO operation does not include U.S. 

forces, although there are 17 U.S. personnel on staff at NATO HQ Skopje.) 

28

BALKANS

U.S. forces have been engaged, together with our NATO Allies, in peacekeeping 

operations in the Balkans since 1995. The U.S. contribution to NATO’s military efforts in the Balkans—SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo—has been 

important. Having gone in together with our Allies, the President has committed 

that we will go out together as well. In this regard we have successfully accomplished most of the original military tasks. The stationing of our forces need not be 

indefinite. We seek to hasten the day when NATO’s remaining forces can be withdrawn, while ensuring that the region does not return to conflict or become a safe 

haven or way station for terrorists. The key will be to provide better support for 

civilian governance and institutions, in particular by promoting the rule of law and 

apprehending persons indicted for war crimes and promoting economic growth. By 

doing so, we will break the cycle of dependency and allow the people of the Balkans 

to take responsibility for their own security. 

In Bosnia, the original force deployed in 1995 consisted of 60,000 troops, with 

20,000 Americans. Today, SFOR consists of roughly 12,000 troops from 36 nations, 

including about 1,800 Americans. 

In Kosovo, the original force deployed in 1999 consisted of 47,000 troops, of whom 

7,000 were American. Today, KFOR consists of roughly 27,000 troops from 34 nations, including about 3,000 Americans. Given the progress that has been made on 

the ground, further reductions in U.S. forces are anticipated this year as conditions 

continue to improve. 

As the situation on the ground further improves, NATO and the U.S. will continue the forward looking transition from force deployments to more normal security 

cooperation activities and initiatives to cement integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures. 

U.S.-Russia Relations 

September 11th showed us that the United States and Russia have common 

threats and that both sides have much to gain from cooperation. We are making 

progress in confronting global challenges together. We now seek a broad relationship 

with Russia—one based not only on security issues, but also on cooperation on economic, political, technical, and scientific issues. 

Our new strategic relationship with Russia is not based on an agreement or treaty, but is a change in the way we do business based on openness, cooperation in 

areas of common interest, and honest dialogue in areas where we disagree. 

We won’t always agree, but this should not provoke a crisis in US-Russia relations. For example, we didn’t agree on our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, but, 

contrary to the predictions of some, after we withdrew our relationship not only survived, but was strengthened by the candor and openness of our approach towards 

Russia. 

There have been other positive developments between our two countries. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions has moved our nations toward a more 

flexible approach to strategic nuclear weapons reductions that is better suited to our 

relations. The U.S.-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Security (CGSS) held its 

first meeting last fall. The meeting was held in Washington, D.C., in September 

2002 between Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell, and the Russian Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. This Group also met with President Bush and National 

Security Adviser Rice. The meeting allowed for high-level consultations on regional 

and security topics. 

During their Summit last summer, President Bush and President Putin also 

agreed to look for ways to cooperate on missile defense. There is an ongoing working 

group on Missile Defense that was established at the CGSS meeting. The working 

group is exploring possible areas for missile defense cooperation as well as an expansion of our existing missile defense exercise program. 

Despite progress in our relationship, Russia continues to pursue some policies contrary to U.S. interests, including: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 

sensitive technologies and ‘‘gray arms’’ activities resulting from a failure to 

strengthen export-control regimes. Furthermore, we are opposed to violations of 

Georgian territorial sovereignty, and we continue to press Russia for a non-military, 

political solution in Chechnya. 

The U.S. must try to reinforce positive developments and influence the strategic 

decisions that Russia will make. Thus, our security cooperation seeks to increase 

Russia’s understanding—particularly within its military—that the United States 

does not pose a threat to its sovereign interests. A clear measure of the success of 

these efforts will be that Russia ceases developing strategies, plans, and capabilities 

that treat the United States as a probable adversary. 

29

We have worked in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), established last May, to improve security cooperation among Russia, our NATO Allies, and ourselves. Through 

the NRC, we seek security cooperation with Russia through practical, concrete 

projects. The NRC is focused on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 

(CBRN) preparedness, combating terrorism, mil-to-mil cooperation, and civil emergency preparedness exercises. 

TURKEY

Turkey’s hesitation to cooperate fully with us as we prepare for possible war 

against Iraq is disappointing, but does not irreparably damage our relationship. The 

U.S. and Turkey have a deep, longstanding relationship—especially in the defense 

area—which we expect will continue both bilaterally and through NATO. Turkey 

has made significant contributions to other aspects of the Global War on Terrorism, 

including leading Phase II of ISAF operations in Afghanistan. The existence of this 

democratic, Islamic state straddling Europe and Asia is important to the security 

of the U.S. and NATO, and we are working with our NATO Allies to provide the 

appropriate defensive measures as requested by Turkey. 

U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN EUROPE

When the President asked Mr. Rumsfeld to serve as Secretary of Defense, he 

asked him to review our defense posture and circumstances around the world. DoD’s 

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for reorienting the U.S. global military 

posture in light of changes in the international security environment, the war on 

terrorism, and DoD’s new strategy, particularly the imperative to deter forward in 

critical regions around the world. We have been examining our posture and presence broadly, across the globe, to include Europe, east Asia, central Asia, and southwest Asia. This work is ongoing. 

While reviews of our defense posture have been part of the normal routine for decades, the security environment has changed—especially in Europe. The nexus of terrorist states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and the 

global reach of terrorist organizations all make it prudent for serious study of the 

best use of our military forces in Europe. 

Our approach is to: establish a presence appropriate to each region; increase capabilities to act promptly and globally in response to crises; and strengthen the command structures to support our strategy. Any presence changes would put a premium on flexibility and forward access, not new, large, permanent bases. We recognize the sensitivity of any changes to U.S. force posture and will consult closely with 

Congress, Allies, NATO, and relevant partners. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am ready to answer any questions you or the 

Committee have.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you very much to both of you for your testimony. If I can, I am going to ask you a couple of questions, and 

then ask Mr. Wexler if he would do his round of questioning. 

Secretary Jones, you and I share somewhat of a common heritage, and that you were born in Germany, and I lived there when 

you were born, in 1948, 1949 and 1950. My father was affiliated 

with the Neuremburg War Trials after the war, and we lived there 

for 3 years. 

I well remember when Germany was divided by the four powers. 

There was a Berlin blockade, and I can remember the American pilots day after day, hour after hour flying supplies into the people 

of Berlin. I can remember stories of airplanes crashing in bad 

weather hauling nothing but coal to heat the people of Berlin. 

I grew up in a wartime era, so I am well familiar. My father was 

a career officer in the service. So I well remember the stories of the 

combat in Europe. 

As we look at the Middle Eastern questions today and the role 

that the European Community, the United States, Soviet Union, 

China play in trying to bring out a resolution, the Quartet, how 

useful are the Europeans really in moving forward given the animosities that several of them have expressed somewhat publicly, 

30

but albeit very privately, with respect to the Country of Israel? 

How useful are they really in helping bring about a solution? 

Ms. JONES. I would suggest that they are very useful. I know 

Secretary Powell feels very strongly that the Quartet is a mechanism that he uses, that he wants to use. It is clear that the United 

States is the country with the greatest influence in Israel, there is 

no question about that. 

But there is also a requirement for influence on the Palestinian, 

on the Palestinians, on the Palestinian Authority, and on Arafat 

himself, and it is there that the Europeans as part of the Quartet 

can be the most useful and are the most useful. It is——

Mr. JANKLOW. Go ahead. 

Ms. JONES. It is very important that the Palestinians and the 

Palestinian Authority understand that they must reform, that they 

must select a prime minister, which they have now done, if they 

are to be a credible partner in trying to discuss and resolve the 

Middle East problems. 

Mr. JANKLOW. And forgetting a lot of the turmoil involving 

France—well, I should not say forgetting it—putting it on the shelf 

for a moment to both of you, let me ask you, if I could, recognizing 

that France’s relationship toward the United States has been somewhat unique ever since de Gaulle first came to power in terms of 

approaches they have taken with the NATO are really approaches 

out of NATO with respect to the way that they did it. The trade 

issues, a lot of which have centered historically around issues that 

emanated with wheat farmers and others in France. 

How do you sense the other European communities look at their 

relationship with France themselves? 

I think the key was the issue involving Turkey recently where 

France actually indicated it may object to assisting Turkey, which 

you have alluded to. But what is the issue, what is it that makes 

France somewhat separate from the rest of the European Community even on European issues? 

Ms. JONES. I think the best way I can explain it is that France 

feels very strongly that it has a unique position in Europe and in 

the world; that as much as it is part of the European Union, part 

of the European common security and defense policy and foreign 

policy, that its views are very weighty. 

What has been interesting to us is to see how differentiated the 

attitudes and positions and policies of so many members of the European Union have been about so many of these issues, including 

Iraq, and how differentiated the attitudes and policies have been 

of the EU candidate countries, and the new NATO invitees about 

Iraq and about many of these issues. 

Mr. JANKLOW. Let me put you on the spot for a second, okay? 

When Mr. Schroeder made those comments that he did, took the 

position he did shortly before the election, was it the sense of our 

government at that point in time that this was true conviction, or 

it was what politicians sometimes do in a very close political race, 

engage in a bit of demagoguery and swing the balance of an election over a little bit, or both? 

Ms. JONES. I believe in the case of Chancellor Schroeder, he was 

in a very tight election campaign, and he found this a very useful, 

a very useful issue around which to coalesce support. 

31

Mr. JANKLOW. And do you think maybe it took on a life of its—

it got legs underneath itself and moved farther than he had anticipated? 

Ms. JONES. I would not want to suggest that there is not extremely strong support for the anti-war movement in Germany, 

there is. 

Mr. JANKLOW. Could you tell me, if you would, ma’am, why do 

we hear so little about Italy’s position? Or why do we hear so little 

about Italy and the positions that they have taken with respect to 

these issues? Do they not also see themselves somewhat as France 

sees itself based on their unique history. 

Ms. JONES. Prime Minister Berlusconi is a very strong supporter 

of the United States. He is a close personal friend and ally of the 

President. Italy is working very closely with us in quite a number 

of ways militarily in Afghanistan. There are a variety of ways that 

they are in support of the coalition. 

Because they do not sit on the Security Council, their voice is not 

heard right now. They do not need to be heard right now. They do 

not need to make statements right now. I think that is probably 

the best way to characterize it. 

Mr. JANKLOW. And I will close with this question to you, Mr. 

Crouch, if I could. The vote in Turkey was decided by four votes 

with a lot of abstentions, I believe. It was thrust on them relatively 

suddenly with a brand new government following elections, while 

they were still sorting out the implementation of their new government. 

Recognizing public opinion sways all politicians, how much do 

you think the suddenness of thrusting the vote upon Turkey had 

with respect to the outcome of that vote? Is that a fair question? 

Mr. CROUCH. It is a fair question. I think it is important to go 

back and look at the fact that we have actually been engaged with 

the Turks and discussions with the Turks for quite some time. But 

clearly there was a timing—a number of problems with the timing 

both in the run-up, you know, we had prior to the election. We did 

not know what the outcome of the election was going to be, and 

there was a period after the election where it was not clear how 

quickly a government would be formed. 

Additionally, you also had the additional complications that the 

leader of the AKP party, Mr. Erdogan, was not actually a member 

of the parliament until very recently and he recently won election. 

So all of these things clearly were complicating factors in terms 

of the timing. 

But I guess I would say that we have worked and our state department colleagues have taken the lead in this in working closely 

with the government in trying to make our position clear on a variety of issues that were sensitive to the Turks, as well as working 

on the economic side, the political side, and the military side of potential cooperation here. 

So I think that while I would not exactly describe it as suddenness, I guess, as I would say, but clearly the fact that the government is new, and that the government is not only new, but it is 

a new party in effect that has never had this kind of position of 

leadership before in the government definitely complicated the 

vote. 

32

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank Mr. Janklow for taking over in my absence. We had a recorded vote in Financial Services Committee. I 

am involved in a markup there. 

And Secretary Crouch, thank you for the kind remarks apparently you made in your oral statement, and I do look forward to 

working with you. 

And I am pleased now to recognize the gentleman from Florida, 

Mr. Wexler, for his time. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to preface my question to Secretary Jones by simply 

saying that I have great admiration for our State Department. I 

think it is the single department that should make every American 

extremely proud, not to the exclusion of the others, from the Secretary on down. And Secretary Powell has brought a degree of 

credibility and integrity to his position that has benefitted America. 

I do not think America could do better than Mark Grossman and 

Bill Burns and yourself. 

I remember very distinctly when Secretary Armitage came back 

after negotiating, mediating, whatever the right word is, between 

India and Pakistan, and he received accolades from both sides of 

the aisle in this Committee, deservingly so. I think it was a high 

moment in American diplomacy in that we assisted or helped divert a nuclear catastrophe. 

As I mentioned earlier, I, along with two of my Republican colleagues, was in Turkey last week. If Mr. Armitage’s mission was 

a high moment in American diplomacy, with all due respect to this 

statement department that I so admire, I think what has transpired in Turkey in the past 2 weeks is a low moment. 

And I say it not from the point of view of blaming the United 

States because certainly there is enough blame to share on both 

sides, but what essentially has occurred from my perspective two 

allies sat down at a negotiation table, two allies who have shared 

6 decades of common experiences and common strategic goals, two 

allies sat down at a negotiation table, and they figured out how 

both could walk away losers. That is not a good example, in my 

view, of diplomatic expertise on either side. 

And I think Secretary Crouch is correct. There are many factors 

on the Turkish side that have nothing to do with the United 

States. They have a new government. We have what was then the 

leader of the party but not a prime minister who to a certain degree has strains with his own military, who was effectively undercut by six of his own ministers in the vote. That has nothing to do 

with the United States. 

But in fairness, what does have to do with the United States was 

the day before the vote we organized a meeting in northern Iraq 

in the Kurdish part of northern Iraq, and apparently we invited 

every representative under the sun, even though they have allegiance to Iran and other countries that we do not necessarily get 

along with, but we forgot the Turkomen representatives, or at least 

they were not there, and it was the Turkish government’s perspective that we essentially excluded them. 

Well, that made them very nervous, nervous that before a vote 

where 94 percent of their population opposes a war, they were 

33

deeply concerned about what, in fact, were our objectives and missions as it relates to northern Iraq. 

Now, there cannot be two sides on this. Either we have been 

talking to them for months and months, which I know we have, or 

we have not been talking to them, and things were rushed. But 

clearly what our congressional delegation learned is Mr. Erdogan 

and the Turkish government does not have comfort with American 

plans post-Iraq. 

Now, I am not casting blame, but if we are going to succeed in 

creating a northern front, should it be necessary, from our longtime ally, we are going to need a much more coherent and cogent 

way to explain to the Turks what our plans are, and I do not, quite 

frankly, understand why it has been so difficult that it has not 

been done at this point. 

I understand at this point we have no commitment from the 

Turkish government in terms of American troops using their soil 

as a base. If you could describe to this Subcommittee what efforts 

are currently being undertaken so as to put American troops, 

should they be needed, in the strongest position possible in terms 

of the northern front, in terms of the diplomatic effort going on. 

And if I could close with this observation. I was reading the history of the Gulf War and the effort that was made by then Secretary Baker and other high level administrative offices. As I understand it personally they went to our several allies on many occasions and used personal diplomacy, they cajoled them with subtleties, with support, and worked out a coalition that was ultimately 

very successful. 

It appears from a distance that that is not occurring now, and 

I would ask why not, if that is a correct assessment. 

Ms. JONES. I will go ahead and start and address some of the 

issues, and ask my colleague, Dr. Crouch, to address the military 

aspects of it. 

It is true exactly as Dr. Crouch said that this is a new government. It is a government that has not had governing experience. 

We have been in lengthy, lengthy discussion with the Turkish government, the prior Turkish government. Many of the people, of 

course, are in the various ministries who remain the same throughout. 

The discussions, the negotiations we had on the documents that 

the Turkish government asked to have for a parliamentary vote 

were lengthy negotiations, detailed negotiations. I participated in 

them. Many others participated in them. Those were negotiations 

that helped both the United States and Turkey understand better 

and to reach agreement on how best to address many of the issues 

or virtually all of the issues that have to do with the future of Iraq 

in terms of our joint understandings, and in particular, the economic issues and financial issues that are so important to Turkey 

and therefore so important to the United States. 

So I would argue there was absolutely no lack of patience, no 

lack of very detailed negotiation and discussion, no lack of effort to 

make sure that every part of the U.S. concerns were completely 

clear in every possible detail. 

We had a disagreement about the importance of Turkey adhering 

to its IMF requirements. We absolutely maintain that that is the 

34

only way and the primary way for Turkey to assure its economic 

stability and its financial future. We maintain that absolutely. And 

it is absolutely in the U.S. interest that Turkey not experience any 

kind of economic downturn. 

In terms of our common vision of the future of Iraq, we felt it 

was very important for Turkey and the United States to come to 

some over-arching agreement about it, but at the same time we 

wanted to be very careful not to dictate to the people of Iraq what 

that future was going to be in more detailed terms than is appropriate. 

At the same time we were very clear with the Turks that, as we 

have been for years, including in my time in the Middle East bureau when I was responsible for this relationship, discussion with 

the Turks about the Kurds, that it is a fundamental U.S. policy 

that the future of Iraq includes the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq in which there would be no separate Kurdish entity of any kind. That is a hard core, firm policy that we have explained to the Turks in every possible way we know how. There 

can be no misunderstanding on the part of any Turkish politician, 

any member of the Turkish government as to the firmness of this 

policy and the firmness of our intention to pursue this policy. 

Mr. WEXLER. If I may, I agree with you. I concur. However, in 

fairness, if you and I were in the Turkish parliament and we 

watched an American organized meeting the day before the vote in 

northern Iraq, and the one party we cared about as Turkish parliamentarians were excluded from that meeting, how would they ever 

be reasonably convinced that that was our view? 

Mr. BEREUTER. I think we had better leave it there. Well, briefly——

Ms. JONES. Maybe I can just say one sentence. 

Mr. WEXLER. I have taken up more than my time. 

Ms. JONES. Zal Khalilzad, my colleague who was the President’s 

representative at that meeting, worked extremely hard to address 

that question. He is still working hard to address it. He is going 

back to Turkey tonight to address that question, and I know he will 

do his best. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

The Chair is going to recognize himself under the 5-minute rule, 

and then I will turn to Mr. McCotter. 

As I have been listening and talking to people who are around 

the North Atlantic Council, the NATO perm reps sitting together, 

for some period of time, and these people are not just Americans, 

these are people, various allies representing various allies at the 

table, they say that what happened with respect to Article 4, Turkey’s request under Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty, is just the 

most visible example of what is constantly going on, and that is, 

impediment after impediment, minor things in many cases, but not 

so minor in other cases, are put into the mix by the French representative there. 

Reluctantly I have reached the conclusion that France, or at least 

President Chirac, wants to marginalize the influence of the United 

States, and wants to marginalize the influence of NATO vis-a-vis 

the EDSP, European Defense and Security Policy, and I think it is 

35

axiomatic that if the French government politically treats as an 

enemy, they cannot be regarded by us as a friendly government. 

Now, I do not expect you to remark about that. This would not 

be politic for you to do that. But I do hope that you think about, 

and that people in our government are recognizing what I believe 

to be a fact, and that you are basing your actions on that premise, 

set of premises. 

And I hope that I am very much wrong about this situation because it will be quite a change, but I have reached that conclusion. 

And of course, what Germany has done is perhaps the most irresponsible of all because they have said regardless of the circumstances, regardless of what is revealed with respect to Iraq, we 

will not engage in military action with any kind of coalition, and 

the kind of anti-American rhetoric that took place before the election, you know, was extremely disappointing to the American people. 

Now, I am not going to ask you for a reaction to that because 

I do not think it is good form or good politics or good government 

for you to reach, but we in the legislative branch can express our 

opinions on these issues. 

I would like to ask you with respect to public diplomacy the following: We have a reduction in the 2004 operating budget for Radio 

Free Europe and Radio Liberty which could, as I understand it, result in elimination of our broadcasting to Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia. Several of these countries have brought 

this issue up, government leaders. They are concerned about that. 

In contrast to what some people might expect, they do not object 

to this broadcast. They regard it as continued interest on the part 

of the United States and their well being, and that it is a compliment to them, they suggest, for Americans to be concerned about 

public opinion in their countries as long as they continue the high 

level of excellence and unbiased kind of news they would like to see 

that continue. 

I would like to get the reaction of you, Secretary Jones, and Secretary Crouch, if you have an opinion from the Defense Department, I would appreciate it too. 

Ms. JONES. We know of their concern of the funding for RFE/RL. 

However, it is our firm view that RFE, Radio Free Europe and 

Radio Liberty were particularly focused on liberating these countries and ensuring that there was free media, ensuring that there 

was access to information that was otherwise not available. 

These countries have all graduated from needing that, and we 

need the funding for countries that are not so fortunate. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Crouch, do you want to offer an opinion? 

Mr. CROUCH. I would just say that I am not obviously familiar. 

It is not in our budget. But I think it is important that we continue 

to have a public diplomacy effort in those countries, I guess, and 

I think we will continue to do that. And one of the way that our 

department can help to contribute in terms of our relationship is 

in these mil-to-mil relationships where we will be hopefully, I 

think, requesting increases in funding for military education, and 

for providing opportunities for exercises between our two militaries. 

And these government have actually told us this also has a very 

positive effect. 

36

So I think in a way what Assistant Secretary Jones is saying is 

that these countries have graduated and they are up to the next 

level. We need to find not only new ways but continue in having 

a broader security relationship with them and we are doing that 

in the department, and I know the state department is doing that 

in other ways as well. 

So again, I cannot comment specifically on the RFE/Radio Liberty issue. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I would just say in conclusion of my time that 

they are very positive about the kind of things that you discuss, the 

mil-to-mil contact, the IMET, they cannot get enough positions as 

far as they are concerned on IMET for education in our military 

institutions for their senior and middle range officers and their 

noncommissioned officers. 

So I think what you are doing in that respect is very good, and 

the Administration is again asking for a significant plus-up in 

IMET funds which happens to be within the jurisdiction of this 

Committee. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. McCotter, is recognized. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for 

being new to the hearing, but probably if it has been asked and you 

have already answered it, please let me know so I do not waste 

your time. 

I was curious, a lot of talk here, especially in this country, about 

the relationship between America and Europe, and about what 

type of long-lasting consequences the current disagreement over 

the situation in the Persian Gulf could cause. There is even talk 

that this could be an irreparable breach. I would just like to put 

out an opinion and then see your response. 

It is always funny to hear things like that. It is because I think 

we are a young country in so many ways, and that when we deal 

with countries that have been around far longer, more established, 

that in many ways there is a natural tension there, especially 

when we share so much in common it seems so obvious that it gets 

overlooked. 

Much of the philosophy that led to the revolution came from 

French philosophics, Rousseau, Voltaire. That thinking went into 

our very constitution. It was the French who helped us in the Revolutionary War. French were our help in War of 1812. In fact, you 

could even add the Louisiana Purchase which made possible Billy 

Tosin, for which I think we are all quite grateful. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Speak for yourself. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. And I think that regarding the rest of Europe 

throughout those times there is a core agreement on the inherent 

dignity of the individual, how every individual is important and 

governments must respect that. We have been through two World 

Wars, European wars, allies were different, but in the end I think 

our relations are better than they were 50 years ago despite what 

is happening because it is so easy to forget that 50 years ago half 

of Europe was covered by communism, and that clearly was not 

good in the interest of this country or in the interest of those countries that were occupied. 

My question to you is, in the historic view, I do not believe it is 

possible to have an irreparable breach with Europe. My question 

37

is, what is the time frame and the extent to which those relations 

will be damaged at the present time, and are there any steps we 

can do to mitigate that because I do agree with our President that 

it is our sovereign right as a country to defend American lives and 

interests, and while we may consult with our European allies, we 

must never abdicate that to an outside entity? 

So given what I believe is going to happen, I would like to know 

what you think the extent is and what steps we can take to mitigate that. 

Ms. JONES. Maybe I can start if that is all right. 

I would argue that the problems between us and Europe are 

quite overstated in the following respect. The majority of European 

countries are very supportive of the United States, are speaking up 

in support of 1441 and the fact that it is time now for Saddam 

Hussein to comply. The new members of NATO, the new candidate 

countries for the European Union are very energetic. They add a 

tremendous amount to the discussion in a very positive way. They 

have a very clear sense of the importance of freedom. They have 

a very clear sense of their new voice in Europe, and we very much 

appreciate that. 

The disagreement tends to be with a couple of countries of Europe whose voice is loud but those are by no means the only voices. 

The intense focus on the disagreement tends to revolve around the 

group of eight who wrote a letter in a newspaper in support of the 

U.S. views in Iraq. It was seconded then by the Vilnius Ten. That 

is a lot of European countries who agree with the United States 

and agree with the importance of the way we are pursuing the 

issue in Iraq. That means that France and Germany are very much 

in the minority. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. If I can on that point, Mr. Chairman, I can understand, I can appreciate that, but as the entire movement in Europe is toward integration amongst themselves to the European 

Union, while we can downplay the importance of France or Germany at the present time to the present situation, maybe you 

would like to limit yourself to that. 

The reality is that Europe is continuing to view itself almost as 

a collection of individual states rather than sovereign nation states 

combined in a collaborative effort. 

So my question is, even if there is a rift and only half of Europe 

is mad at us, how long will they be mad at us and what can we 

do to mitigate that? 

Ms. JONES. I do not know how long that will be the case. There 

certainly is quite a bit of discussion even now about the roles that 

any number of countries might play in reconstruction efforts. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. If I can, I just want to reiterate, I agree with the 

President’s position, and in no way do I want my remarks to be 

seen as disagreeing with that. I agree with the President, and I 

want to understand what the consequences will be and how to mitigate them, and I do appreciate your response about the emerging 

countries, democratic countries, especially in the eastern, especially 

the Baltics, which I think have stepped up and have shown an 

enormous amount of support for which we will always be grateful 

for. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

38

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. McCotter, thank you, and welcome to the 

Subcommittee. Glad to have you as a Member. 

We are going to proceed with another round under the 5-minute 

rule until in fact we have votes which I think are not too far off, 

so the gentleman from South Dakota is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, years ago when I was visiting the Country of Israel 

and talking to Mr. Perez, I told him a statement that he had made 

earlier in the hours he was being somewhat inconsistent and he 

said you must understand in Israel three Jews, five opinions. 

I believe it was Golda Meir that once said that in Israel everybody thinks they are the foreign minister. Well, in America everybody thinks they are the President and the Commander in Chief, 

and we have but one. 

There cannot be any greater responsibility than our President 

has at this time where he has to sit and decide the fate of young 

men and women in America’s armed forces, and those of our 

friends and allies who may be with us. In war, civilians get killed, 

maimed and crippled, and families are destroyed, and there cannot 

be any greater responsibility than he sits with. 

Yet on the other hand this country has been under attack for 

many years as we all know. It is our war. We did not pick it. We 

did not choose it. We did not look for it. Our country has no history 

of conquering a country and staying. It is our friends the Soviets 

that had that kind of history. I believe it our friends the Germans 

that also had that kind of history, and our friends the French. 

But I believe it is our country once we have gone in and freed 

the people in lands, we spend money, we reconstruct, we help build 

factories and schools and agriculture and institutions, and we go 

home. I think that’s what our Marshall Plan did. I think that’s 

what we are doing in Afghanistan today. I think we have a long 

history of that. 

The point that I am trying to make is that it is easy for us to 

all sit and talk about war and peace, but the fact of the matter is 

there can be no greater responsibility than the safety of every man, 

woman and child in this country, and ultimately the President of 

the United States bears that responsibility, and not all of us, but 

there are an awful lot of us in this country and in this Congress 

that support this President and what he is doing, and what he may 

have to do. 

But as we talk about Europe, we always seem to emphasize 

those with which we have disagreements. You talked about the 

eight, you talked about the ten. I think it is ironic that all those 

countries that have recently thrown off their yoke of tyranny and 

oppression, undemocratic governments with a small ‘‘d’’ are the 

government that are supporting our endeavors as we continue to 

move forward. 

I believe no one could have been more eloquent than the President of Czechoslovakia in the way he has spoken out and admonished the premier of France, the President of France I should say, 

in the comments that the President of France had made, and the 

arrogance when Mr. Chirac had spoken down to some of these 

countries that are seeking to join the European Union. 

39

I think the admonishment that he got from them, letting him in 

effect know that there are things more important than joining the 

European Economic Union, were very, very important. 

So I close those comments by asking the question of both of you, 

if I can, what is it, what is it that you think is the most important 

thing that binds together the people of Europe other than a common heritage in a lot of respect, common culture in a lot of respect? 

What is the thing that is going to bring us back—albeit we’re going 

to have disagreements and they will probably be very magnified in 

the future, trade is more and more taking a very significant role 

in the animosities that people have in an economic sense, what is 

it that you think is the mucilage that is really going to hold us together in the future if it is not a threat from another country because there is no recognized super power at this time? 

Ms. JONES. I will make a start if I may. 

I believe that what binds us together is the common understanding of what the fundamental values are that hold us together 

and that we must work toward throughout the world. And there I 

am thinking in particular of human rights, I am thinking in particular of democratic principles, of economic reform, market economies. 

We have found that we are able to work really without questioning the basis of our projects, of our agreements with our European friends and allies on any and all of those questions without 

difficulty. 

Right now we have a huge effort underway also on counter-terrorism. We disagree right now on the threat, with some countries 

on the threat specifically from Saddam Hussein and Iraq, but otherwise there is fundamental agreement about the importance of 

going after terrorist organizations and terrorists. 

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired. I would 

turn to Mr. Wexler. I understand he wants to defer to Mr. Engel, 

which we appreciate. Thank you. 

Mr. Engel, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ENGEL. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the 

Ranking Member for deferring to me. 

Secretary Jones, I am the Chair of the Albanian Issues Caucus 

in the Congress, and one of the things I am concerned about is that 

our focus on the Middle East and Central Asia is diverting attention away from regions like the Balkans where I think America has 

a very important role to play, and we obviously have made significant investments. 

So I would like you to assure me, and I know Iraq is on everyone’s mind, but while what happens in Iraq is going to happen, we 

still obviously have to concentrate on other places in the world. 

Can you assure me that we are going to continue to give a high 

priority to Kosova, to Macedonia and to Albania, which were 

former hot spots that the previous Administration did give priority 

to? 

Ms. JONES. I certainly can assure you of that. We are very focused right this minute, of course, on the tragic assassination of 

Prime Minister Djindjic yesterday, and the implications of that. We 

are very focused on finding ways to maintain his strong work 

40

against organized crime, against corruption, in support of getting 

war criminals to The Hague. 

We are very focused also in Kosovo in support of Michael 

Steiner’s effort to put benchmarks forward and keep working toward the standards that are necessary in order to address the 

question of status in Kosovo. 

In Macedonia, we spoke earlier about the importance of maintaining peace and security there through development of a European security and defense force, using the Berlin Plus requirements, adhering strictly and forcefully to the Berlin Plus requirements to make sure that whatever that force is is knitted up with 

NATO in all the appropriate ways. 

In terms of funding, we look forward to the Europeans taking up 

more of the—taking up more responsibility on supporting some of 

these programs, but we will stay very closely engaged with them 

to ensure that all of the work that we have done there continues. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I hope that we will continue, and you said we 

will, but I want to emphasize the importance of moving forward on 

the final status of Kosova as they meet the standards laid out by 

Mr. Steiner. Up front I have said I favor independence for Kosova 

because I think it is the only viable alternative, having them as 

part of Serbia is no longer viable because of the way they were 

treated, and I do not think that an indefinite stay of troops is viable either. I think independence is the ultimate viability there, and 

it should be the final status, so I thank you for that. 

Secretary Crouch, first, I want to commend you your deputy, 

Mira Baratta, with whom I have worked closely in the past. I want 

to also talk to you about the Albanians. 

The Albanians and the Balkans, whether they are in Albania or 

Kosova or Macedonia, they are certainly, I believe, among the most 

pro-American population certainly in Europe and possibly anywhere. And although the Albanians all identify themselves ethically, they are mostly Moslems, and there are many Orthodox 

Christians and Catholics, but they are mostly Moslems. I would 

urge you to involve members of the Albanian army, the integrated 

Macedonian Security Services, and the Kosova Protection Corps, or 

a Kosova police entity as we conduct military operations in Iraq, 

Afghanistan or other majority Moslem areas. I feel that the Albanians can be of enormous help as pro-American Moslems to show 

the world that what we are doing in Iraq is fighting terrorism, not 

fighting against Islam. 

So I am wondering if you can comment on that. Working with 

the U.S. military would be a great source of pride for the Albanians. Albania has been one of the nations that has shown strong 

support for what the United States is doing in the Gulf, and I 

think it would be a good thing to use this bridging population 

standing with us. 

Mr. CROUCH. Well, as you know, and thank you very much for 

your comments about Ms. Baratta. She actually has been married 

recently so she is now Ms. Ricardel, but she still has the same commitment to the region as she did ahead of time, and she has been 

spending a lot of time in that part of the world as well as the 

Caucasus, in trying to fashion our defense relationships there. 

41

Clearly, our relationship with Albania is growing, and mil-to-mil, 

I have personally met on a number of occasions with key members 

of the government, including the defense minister, and I know that 

she is in regular contact with them. 

And I am well aware of the potentialities that you have talked 

about in terms of the importance of having sort of Muslim states 

involved in this activity and this operation, and it is certainly 

something that we are looking at hard inside the department. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I have a million more questions, Mr. 

Chairman, but I know we are under a time constraint. Thank you. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We all have a million more questions, and I have a number of 

very straightforward information seeking questions for both of you, 

and if we could ask those in writing, they are relatively simple to 

answer, I think, but it would be helpful for our record, and your 

testimony, your written testimony was extremely helpful as well. 

They will provide a good basis for our work for this year and next 

as the Europe Subcommittee. 

So I want to thank all of my colleagues for their interest and participation and preparation for this, and the staff, and to our two 

witnesses, thank you for your information, for your testimony and 

your responses to our questions. We appreciate your help. Thank 

you. 

Ms. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will be happy to answer any further questions. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. And the Subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(43)

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, AND RESPONSES

Question: 

As you know, on February 12, 2003, Belgium’s high court ruled that legal proceedings may be initiated against foreigners in absentia, opening the door for the 

prosecution of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Director General of the Ministry of Defense Major Gen. (Ret.) Amos Yaron for alleged human rights violations 

committed in Lebanon in 1982. 

The Subcommittee is concerned about this highly politicized ruling, which sets a 

dangerous precedent for international prosecution of war-time leaders by granting 

Belgium the authority to try any individual for war crimes—with or without a substantive link to Belgium itself and with or without the presence of the accused. This 

decision deviates from widely recognized tenets of international law, epitomizes a 

larger trend of anti-Israel sentiment growing throughout Europe and potentially 

places American military and government officials in harms way. While today the 

discussion involves Ariel Sharon, however, according to the wide-spread implications 

of this ruling, tomorrow it may be Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, President Bush, 

or quite frankly, any one of us at this hearing.

• What is the Administration doing to exert pressure on Belgian Prime Minister 

Guy Verhofstadt and the Belgian parliament to nullify this ruling, whether by 

repeal or modification of Belgium’s current universal jurisdiction law? 

Answer: 

We have repeatedly expressed our concerns to Prime Minister Verhofstadt and 

other Belgian officials that the legislation as written enables politically-motivated 

charges. This has now happened. On March 18 a criminal proceeding was filed on 

behalf of Iraqi civilians killed during Operation Desert Storm accusing former President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell and General Schwarkopf (ret.) 

of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Since then, we have had further discussions with the Prime Minister and his staff and other senior Belgian officials about 

the need to enact amendments to the legislation that would provide the means to 

dispose of the current case and prevent the filing of new ones like it. The Belgian 

Government is actively considering how the legislation can be revised to meet our 

concerns. 

Question: 

Over the past two years we have witnessed a disturbing rise in anti-Semitism in 

Europe. Can you please tell me if the State Department instructed our Embassies to 

increase their efforts in monitoring the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe? 

Answer: 

In our instructions on preparation of the annual Human Rights Reports, in our 

cables to posts on the work of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, and in other ways, the Department 

steadily instructs and encourages the monitoring of anti-Semitism. This has become 

increasingly important as the number of incidents has increased and the salience 

of the issue has grown. 

44

Question: 

What type of outreach is being done by U.S. Embassy officials in gathering information on anti-Semitism in Europe? 

Answer: 

U.S. Embassies are in frequent contact with Jewish communities, NGOs, a wide 

variety of human rights monitors and advocates, and with governments concerning 

the issue of anti-Semitism. 

Question: 

What does the United States expect to result from the planned OSCE special event 

on anti-Semitism? 

Answer: 

The planned OSCE Specialized Meeting on Anti-Semitism should identify best 

practices for combating anti-Semitism and additional measures which the OSCE 

and its member states can undertake, and its results should be fed into the OSCE’s 

Human Dimension Meeting for implementation review. 

Question: 

What type of consultation has occurred between the State Department and interested NGOs? 

Answer: 

There has been very close and very frequent consultation between Department officials and the interested NGOs regarding both the subject of anti-Semitism and the 

proposed meeting. Our Special Envoy for Holocaust issues, Ambassador Bell, maintains constant and detailed contact with a wide variety of NGO representatives. 

Question: 

Finally, what are the lessons learned from years of fighting anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union and how can this be applied to Western 

Europe? 

Answer: 

While anti-Semitism always arises out of bigotry and prejudice, its manifestations 

are not the same in each case. When the countries of central and eastern Europe 

were under communist rule, state-supported policies and actions were often the primary source of anti-Semitic behavior. Efforts to combat those policies in an earlier 

era bear no direct relationship to the challenges of molding public attitudes and improving and enforcing laws in today’s European democracies. The common thread 

is willingness to confront both the past and the need for action. In the International 

Task Force and via the OSCE Meeting, we are encouraging this approach throughout Europe. 

Question: 

What is the Administration doing to influence Russia so that restrictive religion 

laws, such as the recently drafted laws discriminating against non-Russian Orthodox 

religious denominations, are not passed by the Duma? 

Answer: 

To our knowledge there are no recent draft laws discriminating against non-Orthodox religious denominations.

This question may refer to a draft report by a working group headed by the 

nationalities ministry that came to light last December. The document was 

leaked to the press, and its authenticity as a complete document as not been 

confirmed. As published in the press, the document cited certain non-traditional 

religions in Russia, such as Roman Catholicism and various protestant groups, 

as threats to national security. Judaism was not/not cited in the document as 

such a threat. The document has not led to any draft legislation, nor is there 

evidence that it is on its way to becoming public policy.

Regarding anti-Semitism in Russia, Jewish leaders have stated publicly that the 

State-sponsored anti-Semitism of the Soviet era no longer exists. However, Jews 

continue to face prejudice, social discrimination, and some acts of violence. 

At all levels of our inter-action with the GOR, the USG continues to emphasize 

the importance of religious freedom and non-discrimination on religious and ethnic 

grounds. 

45

Question: 

How are human rights concerns being addressed when considering the proposed 

graduation from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of Russia, Armenia and Moldova? 

Answer: 

Since it was passed in 1974, Jackson-Vanik has been an extraordinary success 

story in securing freedom of emigration in the Soviet Union and its successor states. 

We have also seen improvements in the situations of the Jewish communities in 

these states. It is estimated that the Russian Jewish community numbers over one 

million in both the United States and Israel. 

We raise human rights, including religious freedom, rule of law, and freedom of 

speech issues at all levels with these governments, where appropriate. These efforts 

are reinforced by the State Department’s annual reports on human rights practices. 

Freedom of religion issues will continue to be a prime U.S. focus. We note that 

progress has been made in advancing freedom of religious expression in Russia, 

though more needs to be done and there have been setbacks in some areas (particularly denials of visas to Roman Catholic clergy), about which we continue to engage 

the Russian Government. President Putin and other officials have spoken out forcefully against anti-Semitism. We engage the Government of Russia at the highest 

levels to promote religious freedom for all its citizens. The function of the JacksonVanik amendment with regard to religious freedom has been superseded by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). The IRFA requires preparation of annual reports on religious freedom and authorizes the President to take action 

against countries of particular concern. 

Human rights are integrated into all aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Lifting the application of Jackson-Vanik does not end our dialogue on human rights. 

Question: 

Many in this country see the war on terrorism as one dimensional—that being the 

military fight against terrorists. This view makes it easier for skeptics to criticize the 

Europeans for not being cooperative or not doing enough in this fight against terrorism. However, we know that the largest element of the effort against global terrorism is being conducted on the non-military level such as in the intelligence field, 

law enforcement, financial services, customs and border security and others.

• How would you rate the level of cooperation we are receiving from our European friends and allies in this global war on terrorism?

• Can you give the Subcommittee some very specific examples of the types of cooperation we have received from the Europeans thus far?

• Can the Administration continue to generate broad allied support and cooperation for the non-military war on terrorism? 

Answer: 

Our European and Eurasian allies continue to be strong supporters in the war 

against terrorism. The Administration continues to garner broad allied support and 

cooperation to the non-military war on terrorism. 

We work through a variety of multilateral mechanisms, including NATO; the EU; 

OSCE; UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC), which monitors implementation of 

UNSCR 1373; and UN 1267 Sanctions Committee, which specifically targets sanctions at Usama bin Laden, members of the Taliban and al-Qaida and their associates. 

The EU has worked closely with us in preventing terrorists from exploiting international financial markets. The EU has also designated under its regulations most 

of the individuals and entities designated under our own terrorist financing Executive Order 13224. 

European police and intelligence agencies also provide unprecedented practical 

help in investigating and bringing terrorists to justice, denying financing to terrorists and their supporters, and strengthening security against terrorist attacks. 

Many European and Eurasian countries joined with us to place several individuals/entities on the asset freeze list maintained by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. 

Most European countries, especially NATO members and partners and the EU, 

acted quickly to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In fact, Turkey was the lead nation in 

ISAF from June until December, and Germany and the Netherlands took over in 

February. We also share law enforcement and intelligence information, conduct investigations into the attacks, and strengthen laws to aid the fight against terrorism. 

46

We are also working with the OSCE to improve the capacity of member states 

to fight terrorism. 

We have negotiated new treaties with the EU facilitating law enforcement cooperation. 

We also work bilaterally, including through working groups. A prominent example 

of this is the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism, which held its most 

recent session in January in Moscow. 

Other bilateral cooperation includes: 

The UK remains one of our staunchest allies in the war on terrorism. It played 

a central role with the U.S. in rooting out the Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan, and continues to play a role in reconstruction, training, and capacity building 

there. 

In addition to its contributions to OEF and ISAF, Greece made significant inroads 

against the November 17 (N17) terrorist group. The trial of 19 N17 suspects began 

on March 3 in Athens. Additionally, in February, the GOG arrested four suspected 

members of the ‘‘Revolutionary People’s Struggle’’ (ELA), another Greek domestic 

terrorist group. 

Russia has been unwavering in its support for the coalition, from OEF operations 

planning to intelligence exchange to support in the UN. It has also changed its financial enforcement infrastructure to block terrorist assets. 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have also provided vital support in the war 

against terrorism. They have offered unequivocal political support and have provided vital intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and information sharing on 

terrorist groups and assets. Azerbaijan has also contributed troops to ISAF. Georgia 

has focused internally on removing terrorist cells and enhancing control over its borders and territory through the Train and Equip Program (GTEP). GTEP assists 

Georgia in developing capabilities on border security, anti-terrorism, crisis response, 

while advancing military reform. Several nations have made this program possible 

with their substantial donations of equipment and services. 

The countries of southeast Europe have actively supported the international coalition against terrorism. Albania and Bulgaria have extended blanket landing and 

overflight clearances. Along with Croatia, they have also contributed troops to ISAF 

and weapons and ammunition to the Afghan National Army. Albania and Bosnia 

have shut down NGOs with links to terrorist networks, and the Bosnian government arrested and transferred to U.S. control several terrorist suspects accused of 

planning an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. 

Question: 

One of the keys to implementing a successful foreign policy is the ability of the U.S. 

Missions abroad to carry our their responsibilities in appropriate facilities, with adequate staff and in a secure environment. Some of our Embassies abroad are not in 

the best condition, some are not adequately secure, some need to be replaced. I can 

think of several problems including Belgrade, Sofia, Athens, Tblisi, Yerevan and 

Lubjana just to name a few.

• Can you give us an assessment of the condition of our Missions in Europe in 

general?

• Can you highlight those particularly severe problems areas and what is being 

done to address these shortfalls? 

Answer: 

The European and Eurasian Bureau works closely with the Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations (OBO) to make our vulnerable facilities more secure and to 

address the most serious of our facilities’ issues. We agree that a number of our 

buildings are in poor condition. Age, expansion of missions to support U.S. national 

priorities, and physical security concerns all impact the need for improved facilities. 

Over the past two years this Administration has worked on a vigorous embassy 

replacement and special projects plan. Already, funding has been requested and received for new facilities in Astana, Athens, Dushanbe, Istanbul, Sofia, Tashkent, 

Tbilisi, Tirana, Yerevan, and Zagreb. A number of these new facilities will be ready 

for occupancy this year. Funding for Belgrade and Berlin will be requested in the 

FY2004 budget. 

The Department will shortly present to Congress an updated Long Range Overseas Building Plan for FY 2003-2008, which will include prioritization for additional 

projects in Skopje, Sarajevo, Kiev, Bucharest, St. Petersburg, Riga, Bratislava, 

Valletta, Milan, Baku, Thessaloniki, Ankara, Krakow and Olso. 

47

Question: 

The situation in the Balkans is an unfinished story, and for some, one of mixed 

success.

• What are the Administration’s political, economic and assistance priorities in 

Southeast Europe? 

Answer: 

Our policy in Southeast Europe is to promote democracy, market orientation, regional stability and peace, and integration into NATO and the European Union. 

To this end, we have sought to help the countries of the region address post-conflict issues. We have worked hard to ensure that refugees and internally displaced 

persons have the right to return to their homes. We have focused significant U.S. 

SEED (Support for East European Democracy Act) assistance on helping the region 

build an effective rule-of-law structure to address ineffective law enforcement, corruption and porous borders to combat organized crime, trafficking, political extremism and terrorist activity, thereby promoting legitimate investment and entrepreneurship. The arrest of and transfer to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of indicted war criminals is key to ethnic reconciliation 

and respect for the judicial process, and we have worked hard to encourage cooperation. 

While work remains, there has been progress. The democratic process is taking 

root, and there have been a number of successful elections in the region. Economic 

growth in the region was good at around four percent in 2002. We will continue to 

work closely with the countries of the region and the international community as 

Southeast Europe moves towards Euro-Atlantic integration. 

Question: 

• Are you convinced that the on-going peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions are 

being conducted with the utmost integrity and effectiveness? 

Answer: 

The SFOR and KFOR missions have succeeded in maintaining a safe and secure 

environment and preventing a return to armed conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo. They 

have facilitated the work of the civilian organizations that are building the institutions necessary to maintain the peace and helping these areas move beyond their 

recent conflicts. 

The American servicemembers who are part of SFOR and KFOR have distinguished themselves in their performance of their duties and are well received by the 

local populations. American commanders have instituted a series of standing orders 

to address areas of specific concern in the Balkans. These, combined with the normal provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, provide the tools for appropriate handling of situations should U.S. soldiers become involved in illegal activity 

such as trafficking in persons. 

While discipline is a national responsibility, the commanders of KFOR and SFOR 

have strongly encouraged national contingents to ensure their troops adhere to the 

highest standards of conduct. 

Question: 

• Do continuing pockets of instability and underdevelopment in the Balkans provide 

any prospective avenues of opportunity for terrorist groups or networks? 

Answer: 

An environment born of years of corruption, ineffective law enforcement and porous borders that has been attractive to organized criminals and political extremists 

is also attractive to terrorists. 

Criminal and terrorist networks are often connected and exploit the weaknesses 

of states in the region. Funds generated by criminal networks, which flourished 

within corrupt structures weakened by a decade of war and ethnic cleansing, can 

benefit cells that support terrorism. The U.S., together with other international donors, has provided significant bilateral and multilateral assistance to the countries 

of Southeast Europe to improve their institutional capacity to deal with these problems. A functioning rule-of-law structure is particularly important in fighting organized crime, trafficking, political extremism and terrorist activity. 

Despite resource constraints, the countries of Southeast Europe are actively supporting the international coalition against terrorism and have stepped up their efforts to combat terrorism within their territories. Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia 

have all joined the Coalition of the Willing to Disarm Iraq, have military liaisons 

with CENTCOM, have extended blanket landing, basing and over-flight permission, 

48

and are open to requests for post-conflict support. Along with Croatia, they have 

also contributed troops to ISAF. Albania, Bulgaria and Croatia were able to contribute weapons and ammunition to the Afghan National Army. Albania, Bulgaria, 

Croatia and Macedonia also expressed strong and early political support by signing 

the Vilnius-10 statement in support of enforcing UNSCR 1441 by military means. 

Albania and Bosnia have shut down NGOs with links to terrorist networks, Albania 

has frozen terrorist assets and deported Islamic fundamentalist agitators, and the 

Bosnian government arrested and transferred to U.S. control several terrorist suspects accused of planning an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. 

Question: 

• How important is the economic development of Serbia and Montenegro to the overall development of the region? 

Answer: 

The economic development of Serbia and Montenegro is central to the development of the region as a whole. Not only does Serbia and Montenegro have a highly 

skilled, literate workforce and a pre-Milosevic economy which was one of the most 

dynamic in the region, but its geographic location ensures its status as, potentially, 

one of the key engines of economic activity in Southeast Europe, thus bolstering economic prospects across the region, particularly in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Macedonia. 

Belgrade has made significant strides since the fall of Milosevic by putting in 

place the building blocks of a functioning market economy. The USG has been 

strongly supportive of the government’s efforts to date and, at this crucial time, will 

continue to support those in Serbia and Montenegro who seek to more fully integrate their country into the regional and international economic systems. 

Question: 

• Has the Administration’s position of no independence for Kosovo at this time, 

changed at all? 

Answer: 

The Administration still believes it is premature to begin a process that would determine Kosovo’s final status. We have taken no position on final status as yet and 

believe that it would be harmful to do so at this time. 

According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, which the Administration fully supports, Kosovo’s future status will be addressed in a political process facilitated by the Secretary General’s Special Representative after the development and consolidation of democratic self-government. While Kosovo has made real 

strides since 1999, much more remains to be done including, ensuring the rule-oflaw, supporting returns and guaranteeing freedom of movement and human rights 

for all communities, developing the economy and establishing constructive relations 

with its neighbors. 

To help Kosovo reach these goals, UN Special Representative Michael Steiner laid 

out last year a set of benchmarks intended to guide Kosovo toward democratic selfgovernment. We endorse Mr. Steiner’s approach of ‘‘standards before status,’’ and 

believe that if a process to determine final status were to begin now, attention 

would be diverted away from these important issues before Kosovo’s democratic 

foundation is secure. We believe the time is right to expedite the turnover to the 

provisional government the remaining powers not reserved to the UN Special Representative, and support Mr. Steiner’s plan to do so by the end of this year. 

Question: 

A while back, in a policy memo, Mr. Dimitri Glinski-Vassiliev, of the Institute of 

World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Science, 

wrote a rather scathing assessment of U.S.-Russian relations. He wrote: ‘‘over the 

past year, Russian President Putin initiated a stream of diplomatic overtures to probably the most unresponsive and self-centered of U.S. Administrations since the Roosevelt era.’’

Citing Russia’s outreach to NATO, the closing of Russian military bases in Vietnam and Cuba, accepting a U.S. military presence in Central Asia, conciliatory positions on the ABM Treaty and NATO expansion into the Baltics Glinski, reflecting 

on the perception that Putin has gotten nothing concrete in return, concluded, ‘‘the 

balance sheet of a year of this foreign policy is plainly negative and demeaning for 

Russia.’’

• How would you respond to this assessment? What has the Bush Administration offered President Putin of a substantial nature that he has been able to 

use to continue to put a positive spin on his policy of reaching out to the West 

and especially the U.S.?

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• Does the recent position of Russia at the U.N. reflect a disappointment in Russian-U.S. relations and has the perceived lack of a two-way street with the 

U.S. driven Putin closer to Europe as Russia’s primary benefactor? 

Answer: 

President Putin has drawn closer to the United States because he perceives that 

is in the best interests of Russia. Naturally, some critics of his in Russia disagree. 

But I believe President Putin continues to believe that friendship and cooperation 

with the United States are in Russia’s interest. I don’t think that international relations can be reduced simply to the sum of all transactions any more than domestic 

politics can. However, we do believe our relations with Russia are a two-way street, 

and that President Putin has many positives to point to in the U.S.-Russia relationship:

• the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions will enable both countries to reduce drastically our deployed nuclear stockpiles, reducing the threat 

for both countries.

• Russia and the U.S. share a common interest in the War on Terrorism, where 

the deposing of the Taliban regime removed a source of terrorism that directly threatened Russia and Central Asia. We stood with Russia in condemning the seizure of the Moscow Dubrovka theater by Chechen terrorists 

last October. And we have worked with Russia and Georgia to reduce tension 

between them and to assist Georgia in controlling the Georgian-Russian border, reasserting control over the Pankisi gorge, and eliminating Al Qaidalinked forces operating there.

• Cooperation in law enforcement is helping us confront the shared threat of 

international organized crime and money laundering.

• We share with Russia a strategic interest in global energy security. Last October we held the Houston Energy Summit, which launched the Commercial 

Energy Dialogue and is laying the groundwork for major new U.S. investments in the Russian energy sector.

• Other key developments include the establishment of the new NATO-Russia 

Council, and our granting of Market Economy Status to Russia.

On Iraq, Russia simply has a different view. We nevertheless believe that this difference is outweighed by our continuing shared interests. We are still in an early 

phase in the history of post-Soviet U.S.-Russian relations, and believe there is considerable potential for both countries to gain and prosper from our partnership. 

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QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, BY THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, FOLLOWED BY RESPONSES

Question 1: 

At the Prague Summit, our NATO allies agreed to create a NATO Response Force, 

which would allow our European and Canadian allies to contribute significant land, 

sea and air forces to expeditionary missions. Our allies also agreed to the Prague Capabilities Commitment, through which they pledged to improve needed capabilities 

in areas like secure communications, strategic airlift, precision-guided munitions, 

and WMD defenses.

• Are our European and Canadian allies making sufficient progress toward developing the NATO Response Force and toward implementing the Prague Capabilities Commitment? 

Question 2: 

NATO defense ministers in June are supposed to approve a command restructuring 

plan that will eliminate static sub-regional commands and create a leaner, ore 

deployable set of headquarters.

• Are you finding that some of our allies are fighting this plan in an effort to 

keep open unneeded headquarters that are relocated on their national territory? 

Question 3: 

With NATO and the European Union having reached agreement on EU access to 

NATO capabilities, the EU is planning to undertake its first mission under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), by taking over the 450-strong peace operation in Macedonia from NATO. EU officials have also suggested that in 2004 the 

EU will be able to take over the SFOR peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, with about 

13,000 troops.

• Are you confident that the EU can successfully run the Macedonia operation? 

Is it in U.S. interests for the EU to take over SFOR, and will the EU be capable of doing so? 

Question 4: 

In 2002, Belgium, France and Germany put forth proposals for ESDP to go beyond 

the crisis management tasks for which it was originally created. These ideas have 

been incorporated into the report of the official EU working group on defense. Among 

these ideas are creation of a European Security and Defense Union, or a ‘‘euro zone 

for defense’’ in which those EU countries desiring a collective defense commitment 

could do so ‘‘within the framework of the Union.’’

• If this proposal were adopted by the EU, to what extent would it affect European commitments to collective defense within NATO?

• Given the role of France in advocating these ideas, and given the role of 

France last month in obstructing NATO planning for the defense of Turkey, 

do you see an effort to diminish the role of NATO in European defense and 

shift responsibility to the EU, where the United States does not have a seat? 

Question 5: 

The Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, has suggested that NATO should 

take over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeeping force in Afghanistan when the mandate for German-Dutch leadership of the force ends.

• What does the Administration think of having NATO take over ISAF? 

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RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE J.D. CROUCH II


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