U.S. Department of Justice 

Project Safe Neighborhoods: Strategic Interventions
 

Middle District of Alabama: Case Study 5 

Written by: 

Edmund F. McGarrell
 

Michigan State University
 

Natalie Kroovand Hipple
 

Michigan State University
 

Nicholas Corsaro 


Michigan State University 


With: 

Ed Pappanastos
 

Troy University 


Ed Stevens
 

Troy University 


James Albritton
 

Troy University 


School of Criminal Justice
 

Michigan State University
 

560 Baker Hall
 

East Lansing, MI 48824
 

February 2007
 
U.S. Department of Justice
 

Office of Justice Programs
 

810 Seventh Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20531 

Alberto R. Gonzales 

Attorney General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

This project was supported by Grant #2002-GP-CX-1003 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, 

Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of 

the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department 

of Justice. The Project Safe Neighborhoods series has benefited from the support, assistance, and 

comments of John Irving, Lois Felton Mock, Robyn Thiemann, and members of the Firearms 

Enforcement Assistance Team (FEAT) of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Overview
 

The last decade of the 20th century witnessed significant declines in the rate of crime in the United States. 

This was true for most types of crime, including 

homicide and serious violent crime.1 Despite these 

declines, the level of gun crime in the United States remains 

higher than that experienced in other western democracies 

and is a source of untold tragedy for families and communities.2 Given this context, in 2001 the Bush Administration 

made the reduction of gun crime one of the top priorities 

of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), along with combating terrorism and enhancing homeland security. 

The vehicle for translating this priority into action is Project Safe 

Neighborhoods (PSN). PSN represents a commitment to gun crime 

reduction through a network of local partnerships coordinated 

through the nation’s 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. These local partnerships are supported by a strategy to provide them with the resources 

that they need to be successful. 

The PSN initiative integrates five essential elements from successful 

gun crime reduction programs, such as Richmond’s Project Exile, the 

Boston Operation Ceasefire Program, and DOJ’s Strategic Approaches to 

Community Safety Initiative. Those elements are: partnerships, strategic 

planning, training, outreach, and accountability. The partnership element requires that the local U.S. Attorney create workable and sustainable partnerships with other federal, state, and local law enforcement; 

prosecutors; and the community. Strategic problem-solving involves the 

use of data and research to isolate the key factors driving gun crime at 

the local level, suggest intervention strategies, and provide feedback 

and evaluation to the task force. The outreach component incorporates 

communication strategies geared at both offenders (“focused deterrence”) and the community (“general deterrence”). The training element underscores the importance of ensuring that each person 

involved in the gun crime reduction effort—from the line police 

officer to the prosecutor to the community outreach worker—has the 

skills necessary to be most effective. Finally, the accountability element 

ensures that the task force regularly receives feedback about the impact 

of its interventions so that adjustments can be made if necessary. 

Partnerships 

The PSN program is intended to increase partnerships between 

federal, state, and local agencies through the formation of a local PSN 

task force. Coordinated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the PSN task 

force typically includes both federal and local prosecutors, federal law 

i 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

enforcement agencies, local and state law enforcement agencies, and 

probation and parole. Nearly all PSN task forces also include local government leaders, social service providers, neighborhood leaders, members of the faith community, business leaders, educators, and health 

care providers. 

Strategic Planning 

Recognizing that crime problems, including gun crime, vary from 

community to community across the United States, that state laws 

addressing gun crime vary considerably, and that local and state 

resources vary across the federal judicial districts covered by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, PSN also includes a commitment to strategic planning 

whereby the PSN program is tailored to local context. Specifically, PSN 

provides resources for the inclusion of a local research partner who 

works with the PSN task force to analyze the local gun crime problem 

and to share the findings with the task force for the development of a 

proactive plan for gun crime reduction. The research partners assist 

the task force through analysis of gun crime patterns and trends that 

can help the task force focus resources on the most serious people, 

places, and contexts of gun violence. The research partners can also 

bring evidence-based practice to the task force discussions of gun 

crime reduction strategies.3 The inclusion of the research partner was 

also intended to assist in ongoing assessment in order to provide feedback to the task force. 

Although each district creates strategic interventions that make 

sense in their local context, one strategy shared by all PSN task forces 

is increased federal prosecution of gun crime. PSN is built on the belief 

that the increased federal prosecution of gun offenders will reduce 

gun crime through the incapacitation of gun criminals and the deterrence of potential offenders. This working hypothesis is based on the 

notion that federal sanctions for gun crime are often more severe than 

those either available at the state level or likely to be imposed at the 

state level. Further, federal prosecution may include sanctions unavailable at the local level. The focus on prohibited persons possessing or 

using a firearm is built on the finding that a significant portion of gun 

crime involves offenders and victims with significant criminal histories. Thus, by increasing the certainty that a prohibited person in possession will face strong federal sanctions, the goal is to persuade 

potential offenders not to illegally possess and carry a gun. 

The commitment to increased federal prosecution appears to be 

borne out. Fiscal year 2005 witnessed over 13,000 individuals charged 

with federal gun crimes, the highest number ever recorded by DOJ. 

Since PSN’s inception, the number of federal firearms prosecutions has 

increased 73 percent.4 

ii 
Overview 

Training 

PSN has involved a significant commitment of resources to support 

training. This program has included training provided to law enforcement agencies on topics including gun crime investigations, gun crime 

identification and tracing, and related issues. Training on effective prosecution of gun cases has been provided to state and local prosecutors. 

Additional training has focused on strategic problem-solving and community outreach and engagement. By the end of 2005, DOJ estimates 

that nearly 18,000 individuals had attended a PSN-related training program sponsored by one of the many national PSN training and technical assistance partners.5 

Outreach 

The architects of PSN also recognized that increased sanctions 

would have the most impact if accompanied with a media campaign to 

communicate the message of the likelihood of federal prosecution for 

illegal possession and use of a gun. Consequently, resources were provided to all PSN task forces to work with a media partner to devise 

strategies for communicating this message to both potential offenders 

and to the community at large. This local outreach effort is also supported at the national level by the creation and distribution of Public 

Service Announcements and materials (ads, posters). These materials 

are direct mailed to media outlets and are also available to local PSN 

task forces.6 

The outreach component is also intended to support the development of prevention and intervention components. PSN provided grant 

funding in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to the local PSN partnerships 

that could be used to support a variety of initiatives including prevention and intervention. Many initiatives were built on existing programs 

such as school-based prevention, Weed and Seed, or juvenile court 

intervention programs. 

Accountability 

The leadership of the PSN initiative at DOJ has emphasized that 

PSN would focus on outcomes—i.e., reduced gun crime—as opposed 

to a focus on outputs such as arrests and cases prosecuted. That is, 

PSN’s success is measured by the reduction in gun crime. This 

accountability component was linked to strategic planning whereby 

PSN task forces, working with their local research partner, are asked 

to monitor levels of crime over time within targeted problems and/or 

targeted areas. 

Additional Information 

For more information on Project Safe Neighborhoods, visit 

www.psn.gov. If you are interested in supporting your local Project Safe 

Neighborhoods program, please contact your local U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

iii 
Contents
 

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
 

Middle District Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 

The Development and Initial 


Building Partnerships with Local 


The Nature of the Gun Crime Problem in the 


Middle District of Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 

Implementation of PSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 

A Galvanizing Gun Crime in Montgomery . . . . 5
 

Making the Task Force a Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 

The Structure of PSN in the Middle District . . . . . 7
 

PSN within the U.S. Attorney’s Office . . . . . . . 7
 

Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 

PIRT as the “Glue” to the ICE Task Forces . . . . 8
 

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 

Community Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 

Research Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 

Middle District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 

Gun Crime Reduction Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 

Suppression Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 

Intervention Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 

Prevention Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
 

Evidence of Implementation—Outputs . . . . . 16
 

Evidence of Impact—Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . 16
 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 

Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 

Task Force Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 

Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
 

Regular Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
 

Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
 

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
 

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
 

Technical Appendix: Analysis of Impact,
 

Time Series Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
 

v 
 

Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

List of Figures
 

Figure 1: Middle District of Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 

Figure 2: Aggravated Assault and Murder Rates, 2001 . . 5
 

Figure 3: Summary of Gun Crime Problem in the
 

Middle District of Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 

Figure 4: Alabama ICE Logo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 

Figure 5: Gun Crime Problem and PSN Strategies . . . 15
 

Figure 6: Gun Crime Trend Data—
 

City of Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
 

Figure 7: Time Series Analysis—May 2002 


Intervention Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
 

Figure 8: Summary of Key Components of the Middle 


District of Alabama’s Successful PSN Task Force . . 22
 

vi 
Executive Summary 

Context 

The Middle District of Alabama (Middle District) is one of three 

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices covering the State of Alabama. It is one of the 

smaller districts in the United States. The largest city in the district is 

Montgomery. The initial focus of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) in 

the Middle District was on Montgomery with a simultaneous strategy 

of building relationships with local enforcement agencies and county 

prosecutors. A unique feature of PSN in Alabama is the coordinated 

deterrence-based communication strategy, known as “Alabama ICE,” 

across the three federal judicial districts. 

Task Forces 

Law enforcement officers and local prosecutors from throughout 

the district are assigned to geographically-structured PSN task forces. 

The central coordinating component of PSN is the Prosecution and 

Investigative Review Team (PIRT). PIRT meets weekly to review gun 

crime cases from the PSN task forces for possible federal prosecution. 

PSN in the Middle District has been characterized by exceptional leadership provided by the U.S. Attorney, who has been actively involved 

in PSN and built new relationships between the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

and local law enforcement. 

Problem Analysis 

The problem analysis revealed that gun crime within the Middle 

District was most prevalent in the City of Montgomery, thus the initial 

target area was Montgomery. Crime maps revealed that gun violence in 

Montgomery was not heavily concentrated in particular neighborhoods 

but rather was “braided” throughout the city. Local officials believed 

that gun crime was primarily accounted for by individuals with extensive criminal histories. Analyses of gun offenders prosecuted federally 

under PSN did reveal extensive criminal histories for a variety of 

offenses including personal, property, drug, public order, and juvenile 

offenses. Some offenders had less extensive criminal histories but were 

believed to be at risk for gun crime on the basis of law enforcement 

intelligence. Task force members, supported by analysis of the PSN 

research partners, revealed that prison overcrowding in the state had 

reached such crisis proportions that the threat of sanctions for involvement in gun crime was no longer credible. 

Strategies 

The strategies adopted by the Middle District were roughly modeled on Project Exile in the Eastern District of Virginia, where the 

task force sought to increase the penalties for illegal possession and 

1 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

use of guns, particularly by chronic offenders. Partnerships with local 

law enforcement were established to increase the flow of gun cases 

from local law enforcement to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. A joint gun 

case screening process was established, and federal prosecution 

increased significantly. Indeed, there was an increase from 21 defendants prosecuted in federal court for gun cases in fiscal year 2000 to 

103 in fiscal year 2003. Increased federal prosecution was coupled 

with a communication strategy based on billboards, posters, and radio 

and television advertisements. 

Outcomes 

Time series analyses were conducted to compare the trend in homicide, gun assaults, and armed robberies in Montgomery with the trend 

in property crime during the same time period. The results suggested a 

decrease for gun assaults and homicide but no impact on armed robbery. The data indicate a reduction from approximately 309 gun assaults 

per year to approximately 270, and a reduction from 29.5 homicides 

per year to 22.8. There was no impact on property crime, suggesting 

that it may have been PSN that reduced gun crime as opposed to an 

overall decline in crime affecting both gun and property crime. In addition, interviews conducted with officials throughout the district consistently pointed to PSN’s positive impact on improved coordination and 

communication among federal, state, and local law enforcement. 

2 
Middle District of Alabama
 

The State of Alabama is served by three federal judicial 

districts, with corresponding United States Attorneys’ 

Offices (USAOs): the Northern, Middle, and Southern 

Districts. Alabama is unique because the three districts have 

coordinated a common Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) 

theme, logo, and message. Specifically, Alabama ICE, standing for Isolate the Criminal Element, is the common vehicle 

used across all three districts to communicate a consistent 

theme: Gun Crime = Hard Time. 

Middle District of Alabama 

The Middle District of Alabama (Middle District) is one of the 

nation’s smaller federal judicial districts in population (75th out of the 

90 U.S. districts7) with an aggregate of 1,054,371 total inhabitants.8 

The Middle District encompasses 23 counties. The City of Montgomery, with a population of just over 200,000, is the state capitol and 

constitutes roughly 21 percent of the district’s overall population. 

Montgomery is home to a large percentage of people (36 percent) 

who are non-White (upper quartile), which is high compared to the 

U.S. percentage of non-White residents (24.9 percent). In addition, 

Montgomery ranks in the midrange when comparing population density. Montgomery has just under 69 people per square mile (68.7), 

which is slightly less than the U.S. average of 79.6 people. 

Within the Middle District, additional population concentrations 

are located in Lee and Houston Counties (see figure 1 below). Lee 

County, located on the far east side of the district, shares a border 

with Georgia, and has a population near 120,000, nearly 11 percent 

of the entire district, concentrated mainly in the cities of Auburn and 

Opelika. Houston County, located in the southeast corner of the district, also shares its border with Georgia. Consisting mainly of the City 

of Dothan, Houston County makes up nearly 9 percent of the district 

population, with over 90,000 residents within the county. The remainder of the district consists of small towns and rural areas. 

The Middle District suffers from high violent crime rates, as evidenced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Uniform Crime 

Report data from 2001, the outset of PSN. Specifically, the district 

ranks 21st overall among federal judicial districts (upper quartile) in its 

murder rate, with an average rate of 0.65 murders per 10,000 inhabitants. In addition, it ranks 48th (third quartile) in aggravated assaults 

with 24.31 assaults per 10,000 inhabitants. Figure 2 (below) displays 

the murder and aggravated assault rates for Montgomery County, the 

3 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

Figure 1: Middle District of Alabama 

Randolph 

Chilton Coosa Tallapoosa Chambers 

Lee 

Russell 

Macon 

Bullock 

Barbour 

Pike 

Crenshaw 

Montgomery 

Lowndes 

Autauga 

Elmore 

Butler 

Covington 

Coffee 

Geneva Houston 

Henry Dale 

overall district, comparably sized U.S. counties, and the U.S. county 

average. As the table indicates, Montgomery has a higher than expected 

rate of violent crime ranking in the upper quartile in both murders and 

assaults.9 When compared to the other U.S. 109 counties with a similar 

population,10 Montgomery’s murder rate ranks eighth.11 Montgomery’s 

aggravated assault rank is also above the norm, ranking 33rd.12 

The USAO in the Middle District is one of the smaller offices in the 

country. In 2000, the Middle District employed nine Assistant United 

States’Attorneys (AUSAs) in its Criminal Division plus a Division Chief. 

This number increased to 12, plus a Division Chief, in 2005. Prior to 

the inception of PSN, the Middle District prosecuted 15 gun crime 

cases in 2000 and 20 gun crime cases in 2001. As will be discussed, 

the Middle District has experienced a significant increase in federal 

prosecution of gun crimes over the course of PSN. 

4 
Middle District of Alabama 

Figure 2: Aggravated Assault and Murder Rates, 2001 

Site Aggravated Assault Rate Murder Rate 

(per 10,000) (per 10,000) 

U.S. Average* 30.65 0.65 

Alabama Middle District 24.31 0.73 

U.S. Counties of Comparable Size** 27.10 0.48 

Montgomery County 34.36 1.3 

*90 federal judicial districts. See endnote 7. 

**Ranging from 173,510 to 273,510 population 

The Development and Initial 

Implementation of PSN 

In September 2001, a week before the September 11th attacks, 

Leura Garret Canary was appointed the United States Attorney (USA) 

for the Middle District. Although PSN had officially been “kicked off” 

by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) earlier in 2001, the focus on 

9/11 and the threat of terrorism and related national security concerns 

resulted in PSN being delayed in the Middle District until early 2002. 

In early 2002, the USAO put together the Prosecution and Investigative Review Team (PIRT). Led by an AUSA, PIRT became the vehicle for 

reviewing gun crime cases and deciding whether a case was appropriate for federal prosecution. PIRT began by meeting somewhat irregularly, about once a month. The team faced two challenges. First, there 

was no history of cooperative relationships between local law enforcement agencies and the USAO for the prosecution of gun crime cases. 

Second, the local Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) Office had experienced significant turnover in leadership, did not 

have a mechanism in place for more proactive gun crime investigations, 

and had only six agents to cover the district. Subsequently, few cases 

were making it to PIRT to review for potential federal prosecution. 

A Galvanizing Gun Crime in Montgomery 

In April 2002, a 4-year-old girl and her mother were shopping in a 

Montgomery store when they were caught in the crossfire of a drug 

deal gone bad. The little girl was seriously injured, which led to a public outcry. The shooter was a convicted felon and not allowed under 

federal law to possess a gun—precisely the type of individual PSN is 

intended to address. 

The Montgomery chief of police realized that processing this case 

through the normal state channels was unlikely to bring justice. Even 

if convicted, the suspect would most likely be sentenced to 10 to 15 

5 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

years for assault and serve only 1 to 2 years due to Alabama’s prison 

overcrowding. The chief turned to the USAO and Alabama ICE for help. 

The state prosecutor brought charges of first-degree assault against 

the suspected shooter and a bond was set. As predicted, the defendant 

was let out on bond and released pending trial. However, in contrast 

to usual case processing, the USAO filed a complaint charging him 

with violating Title 18 USC 922 (g) (1) “Felon in Possession of a 

Firearm.” Upon release from state custody he was immediately arrested 

by U.S. Marshals on the federal charge. The USAO then filed a motion 

requesting that the defendant be detained because of his violent acts. 

The motion was granted and the defendant remained in federal custody until he was convicted. The defendant received a sentence of 6 

years and was transferred to the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons. In addition, the state charge of assault was not dismissed, and the 

defendant will be tried for that charge at a later date. Upon indictment 

in federal court, this case became the first Alabama ICE case in the 

Middle District and was announced at a press conference in late May 

2002.13 As the USA said, “We had to show we were serious. We had to 

show the community, both the public and local law enforcement, that 

we were serious.” 

Making the Task Force a Reality 

Following the successful prosecution of the Montgomery gun 

assault case, the Montgomery chief of police assigned a well-respected 

investigator to the Middle District’s ICE task force. Once the task force 

had someone assigned from the Montgomery Police Department 

(MPD), PIRT started to meet weekly rather than monthly. 

Although MPD was now on board, few gun crime cases were making it to PIRT for review. The USA was working with the ATF Special 

Agent in Charge to increase the resources of the Montgomery ATF 

Office. This proved successful when in February 2003 ATF assigned 

five new agents Temporary Duty Station (TDY) to the Montgomery 

office to help catch up on the backlog of cases. In 30 days, these five 

agents wrote more than 30 cases. 

With MPD on board and a group of ATF agents prepared to aggressively enforce federal gun crime laws, PSN was fully operational in the 

Middle District. The Montgomery ICE task force was formalized in 

March 2003. This was followed by PSN/ATF training, sponsored by the 

USAO, for police officers in April 2003. Over the next 11 months, additional ICE task forces were implemented throughout the Middle District (Pike County, July 2003; Houston County, July 2003; Lee County, 

August 2003;Tallapoosa County, January 2004; and Autauga County, 

February 2004). The common link between all the task forces was 

PIRT, which was now meeting weekly and reviewing gun cases 

referred by the various ICE task forces. 

6 
Middle District of Alabama 

The Structure of PSN in the Middle District 

As with all PSN task forces operating across the United States, the 

Middle District has created a unique operating structure that fits the 

needs of the district, including the statewide adoption of Alabama ICE 

as a common theme and logo communicating a deterrence message: 

gun crime will equal hard time. The leadership within the USAO and 

the ICE task forces also has made a series of strategic decisions about 

how PSN would be structured within the district. 

PSN within the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

Particularly striking is the strong and active leadership of the U.S. 

Attorney. Ms. Canary is fully engaged in PSN and makes it clear within 

the USAO and throughout the district that, along with homeland security, PSN and the reduction of gun crime is a major priority. 

Perhaps the greatest challenge for the Middle District is the relative 

lack of resources in terms of ATF agents and AUSAs. In some districts, 

this resource constraint might have resulted in a highly specialized program whereby the PSN Coordinator and perhaps one gun prosecutor 

would be given responsibility for PSN. Ms. Canary rejected this 

approach and decided that if PSN were to be successful everyone 

within the USAO would need to contribute. The PSN Coordinator, who 

also serves as the First Assistant United States Attorney (FAUSA), is 

assisted by the criminal chief, who also is actively engaged in PSN. In 

addition, all the AUSAs in the criminal division are expected to prosecute gun cases. 

The Middle District also relies heavily on its Law Enforcement Community Coordinator (LECC). The LECC, working with the USA and PSN 

Coordinator, largely oversees the day-to-day operations of the PSN program. He coordinates with key players such as the research partners, 

community engagement partners, and local law enforcement agencies. 

The PSN Coordinator oversees media and outreach efforts. Another 

AUSA serves as the PSN Attorney and coordinator of the PIRT task 

force meetings. The PSN Attorney prosecutes gun cases as part of his 

regular caseload and conducts much of the law enforcement training 

related to Alabama ICE (administered jointly with ATF). Administrative 

staff within the USAO also contribute to PSN. Finally, the drug prosecutors and investigators in the USAO have seen the benefit of ICE. Several of these officials mentioned that, oftentimes, defendants will get 

more incarceration time for a gun charge than a drug charge. This has 

led to positive relationships between the ICE task force and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force. 

7 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

Building Partnerships with Local Law Enforcement 

Interviews with law enforcement leaders in the Middle District 

revealed that prior to Alabama ICE, there was minimal interaction 

between the USAO and local police and sheriff departments. The consistent theme was that local law enforcement did not view the USAO 

as a resource for addressing local crime problems. With this as background, the USA recognized early on that for PSN to be successful, significant attention would need to be given to building relationships 

with local law enforcement. 

The USA was fortunate in that her office’s LECC was a highly 

respected law enforcement leader in Alabama. Following a career in 

the Alabama Bureau of Investigation (ABI), the LECC retired as Chief of 

the ABI and took the LECC position within the USAO. The USA and 

LECC decided to actively reach out to the local law enforcement community. Indeed, beginning in early 2002, the newly appointed USA and 

the LECC traveled together to each county in the district to meet local 

officials, seek support for Alabama ICE, and recruit task force members 

from local law enforcement agencies. The USA talked to chiefs of 

police, sheriffs, district attorneys, and judges. Most were supportive of 

the program while somewhat skeptical of the “feds” and leery of “one 

more task force.” 

In response to these concerns, the USA took a different approach 

to the Alabama ICE task force. Recognizing that law enforcement 

resources were sparse, the USA still asked agencies to assign an officer to the ICE task force with the understanding that the officer 

would remain in his or her own agency and community rather than 

being assigned full-time to the task force. In many respects, the task 

force member would serve as the point-of-contact within the local 

agency. This structure has been a key to the success of Alabama ICE 

in the Middle District. 

The initial task force, established in Montgomery in April 2002 and 

formalized in March 2003, included the USAO, ATF, FBI, local prosecutors, and law enforcement from Montgomery and the surrounding 

counties. In the following 11 months, the task force was expanded to 

five additional counties for a total of 28 task force officers trained 

(Montgomery County, 3; Pike County, 3; Houston County, 2; Lee County, 

6; Tallapoosa County, 12; and Autauga County, 2). The task force focused 

on bringing gun cases to the USAO for possible federal prosecution. 

PIRT as the “Glue” to the ICE Task Forces 

Having established relationships with local law enforcement 

through the decentralized task force structure, the USAO’s next 

encouraged them to forward gun crime cases via the PIRT process. 

The local task force member first screens the case to determine if it 

should be brought before the PIRT. Every Wednesday, task force members come from as far as 2 hours away to attend the PIRT meeting. 

8 
Middle District of Alabama 

Following the decentralized task force format, not all members come 

every week. But if they have a case to present or seek updates on 

prior cases, the PIRT meeting provides a venue for local task force 

members to communicate directly with a team of AUSAs, local prosecutors, ATF agents, and other local law enforcement officials. Through 

these meetings, law enforcement officers can receive immediate feedback on the prospects for federal prosecution as well as continual 

feedback on existing cases. This weekly meeting has proven a critical 

component of team building among the local, state, and federal officials involved in the Middle District’s Alabama ICE. 

Training 

In asking local law enforcement agencies to participate in the 

Alabama ICE task force, the USAO realized that local law enforcement 

officers would need to be educated about federal gun laws, how to 

investigate cases and write reports, the elements needed for federal 

prosecution, and case processing. The USAO felt it was important to 

have someone in every local law enforcement agency in the Middle 

District trained on Alabama ICE and responsible for the program and 

officer training. In August 2002, in cooperation with the Northern and 

Southern Districts of Alabama, the LECC conducted training on federal 

gun laws for local law enforcement at its annual statewide law enforcement meeting. 

Within the first year of ICE fully operating in the Middle District, 

the PSN Attorney (i.e., the PIRT Coordinator) and ATF held trainings 

throughout the district for all local law enforcement agencies at no 

cost to the agencies. This two-person team created two different trainings: one a basic training for all law enforcement that can be done at 

roll calls, and another more in-depth for ICE task force members. During these trainings, the national PSN Program and Alabama ICE are 

described and federal laws pertaining to gun crimes and the elements 

needed to prove a case in federal court are reviewed. Specific gun 

cases and the information needed from local law enforcement to effectively prosecute a case federally also are discussed. 

To supplement the training, the USAO created “visor” cards for law 

enforcement officers that list all the federal criminal gun laws. Officers 

carry these cards in their cars and have an immediate reference to the 

federal criminal gun law statutes. The USAO also created a smaller 

“palm” card that has questions for law enforcement to ask when they 

discover someone has a gun illegally. These resources helped enhance 

local investigations, which in turn improved the quality of gun cases 

being brought to the PIRT meetings. Importantly, they also communicated a message that the USAO and ATF were committed to working 

with and supporting local law enforcement in seriously responding to 

gun crime. Finally, the Middle District participated in National District 

9 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

Attorneys Association trainings as well as several ATF-delivered trainings 

(e.g., “Characteristics of Armed Person and Firearms Identification”). 

Community Engagement 

The Middle District selected the River Area United Way to be both 

its fiscal agent and community engagement partner. This was a new 

role for the United Way in that it had never worked as closely with law 

enforcement as it would in ICE. The Executive Director felt, however, 

that PSN fit into the United Way’s role as a community agent. Furthermore, the PSN mission fit the United Way’s mission of public education 

and reaching out to the public to address significant community problems, in this case, the reduction of gun crime. 

From the perspective of the USAO, the United Way offered two 

critical competencies. First, it provided expertise and a long history 

in the fiscal management of externally funded, community-level programs. Second, it provided expertise in community engagement not 

typical of a federal prosecutor’s office. Consequently, the United Way 

was asked to provide fiscal management, implement a media campaign, and help engage community groups and service providers to 

develop a prevention component of PSN. 

Research Partners14 

An additional PSN partnership involves the ICE task force and a 

research team. The Middle District selected a multidisciplinary team of 

faculty from nearby Troy University to be its research partner (RP). The 

RP was asked to conduct analyses of the nature and distribution of gun 

crime across the district. As strategies were developed and implemented, 

the research team modified its plans to conduct analyses that could 

inform the task force of whether PSN strategies were indeed targeted at 

the sources of the gun crime problem. Finally, the research team collaborated with the Michigan State University (MSU) research team to assess 

the impact of the Middle District’s PSN initiative on gun crime. 

Early in the Alabama ICE experience, the RPs explored the possibility of gathering gun crime data from every county in the district. This 

proved to be impracticable, given that most of the involved law 

enforcement departments did not have computerized crime information systems. However, the RPs developed a relationship, facilitated by 

the USAO, with the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center 

(ACJIC). ACJIC was able to provide gun crime data for 11 different key 

jurisdictions within the district. 

10 
Middle District of Alabama 

The Nature of the Gun Crime 

Problem in the Middle District 

The RPs began analyzing gun crime in the Middle District at a fairly 

global level and have since focused more directly on Montgomery, 

which accounts for 50 percent of all gun crime in the district, as well 

as on individual offenders prosecuted under Alabama ICE. 

The RPs began by creating a trend report for Montgomery for the 

years 1998–2002. They analyzed gun cases and looked at demographics 

(e.g., age, race, and gender) of victims. The MPD and prosecution officials believed that crime was evenly distributed throughout Montgomery County. That is, gun crime is “braided” throughout the county 

rather than geographically concentrated in particular areas. The RPs’ 

analyses confirmed these suspicions. 

The perception of local officials was that gun crime in Montgomery largely involved chronic offenders who chose to illegally carry 

and use guns. This was largely supported by analyses of those convicted in federal court under PSN (see discussion below of analyses of 

pre-sentence investigations). This was coupled with the belief that 

overcrowding in the state of Alabama prison system had reached such 

a critical level that convicted felons were unlikely to face prison time, 

or, if sentenced to incarceration, could anticipate significant reductions 

in time served.15 

As summarized in figure 3, the PSN task force viewed the gun 

crime problem as primarily driven by chronic offenders who illegally 

possessed and used guns, largely in Montgomery but of concern 

throughout the district, and who perceived little threat of sanction due 

to the overcrowding crisis in the state prison system. 

As will be discussed, following the initial problem analysis, the 

RPs have continued to monitor and evaluate the PSN Program. This 

has included examining crime trends and, at the request of the USAO, 

Figure 3: Summary of Gun Crime 


Problem in the Middle District of Alabama
 

•	 Chronic offenders illegally carrying and using guns. 

•	 Largest concentration in Montgomery but without clear geographic “hot spots.” 

•	 Lack of credible sanctions at state level due to prison overcrowding. 

•	 Lack of credible sanctions at federal level due to lack of federal prosecution for federal gun crimes. 

11 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

analyzing data from the federal pre-sentence reports to help paint a 

picture of what types of criminals are involved in PSN/ICE cases. 

Gun Crime Reduction Strategies 

On the basis of this problem analysis, the PSN task force developed 

an overall strategy as well as action steps needed to effectively implement the strategy. These steps included suppression, intervention, and 

prevention strategies. 

Suppression Strategy 

The cornerstone of the suppression strategy was to increase federal prosecution in order to incapacitate chronic offenders and deter 

potential offenders from illegally carrying or using guns. Given the situation in the Alabama prison system, both federal and local police and 

prosecutors agreed that federal prosecution was the only available tool 

for increasing prosecution for gun crimes and both removing chronic 

offenders from the community and increasing the credibility of the 

threat of sanction. 

To increase federal prosecution, the USAO was dependent on referral of cases from local police departments. Consequently, a great deal 

of effort initially involved the USA and LECC meeting police, sheriffs, 

and prosecutors to explain PSN/ICE and the commitment of the USAO 

to prosecute gun crime. Early efforts focused on Montgomery and then 

expanded to the remainder of the district. This also involved working 

with ATF to increase their resources and commitment to investigating 

and preparing gun cases for federal prosecution. 

As previously discussed, the major tool for increasing federal prosecution was the establishment of PIRT.16 PIRT’s weekly meetings created a venue to review gun crime cases for potential federal 

prosecution. The routine meetings also created an accountability mechanism to minimize the likelihood of serious gun offenders “slipping 

through the cracks,” thereby incapacitating the most serious offenders 

and increasing the credibility of the threat of sanctions for gun crimes. 

Intervention Strategy 

The increased federal prosecution component was coupled with a 

community-wide intervention strategy of communicating the threat of 

sanctions. This was a core ingredient of the statewide Alabama ICE and 

modeled on Richmond’s Project Exile. The media campaign was 

intended to maximize the impact of federal sanctions by communicating the USAO’s commitment to federal prosecution of illegal gun possession and use. The Middle District PSN task force selected the United 

Way as its community engagement and media partner in part due to its 

experience in community media campaigns. The campaign was 

12 
Middle District of Alabama 

Figure 4: Alabama ICE Logo 

launched in September 2002 with bumper stickers, flyers, and 

posters—bearing the Alabama ICE and PSN logos—at local fairs and 

other large gatherings. It was soon followed with television commercials, radio ads, and billboards located throughout the city. 

The United Way started out by setting some short-term goals: 

1. Get the word out about PSN to the public through a series of 

press conferences. 

2. Facilitate the USA attending at least one meeting at each of the 

41 civic clubs in the area to talk about PSN. 

3. Get the USA and the Chief of MPD on a local television news 

talk show. 

4. Get a local Cops show to do an entire show highlighting
 

Alabama ICE with the USA and the Chief of MPD.
 

The United Way also contracted for some traditional media spots, 

paying for 16 billboards then leveraging this purchase into 54 PSN/ICE 

billboards. In addition, local billboard owners agreed to leave PSN billboards in place after the rental period ended until the space was 

rented to another vendor. Consequently, billboards that would normally have been blank while waiting to be rented instead carried the 

PSN message. 

Applying the approach that worked with billboards, the United 

Way paid $43,000 for media coverage and ended up getting about 

$100,000 of media time across the entire district. In January and February 2004, PSN had 519 television spots on the NBC affiliate, which the 

station now runs pro bono. They continue to run ads from the national 

media campaign as well as radio ads. PSN/ICE bus wraps also have 

been utilized throughout the district. 

The second round of the media campaign expanded to include 

locally produced ads addressing domestic violence. The RP, leveraging 

13 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

the resources of Troy University, helped facilitate the creation of an 

advertisement warning hunters that if they get convicted of a domestic 

violence offense, they will be a prohibited person under federal law 

and will no longer be able to possess a firearm. 

Prevention Strategy 

In addition to the strategies of increased prosecution and mass 

communication of the deterrence message, the task force implemented prevention strategies. The PSN task force utilized DOJ’s block 

grant funds to support prevention efforts. While many prevention programs already existed in the community, they did not have a firearms 

component to them. With the help of PSN funding, these programs 

shifted their focus to include gun crime and safety issues. 

The USA and her PSN leadership team shared with the selection 

committee their vision of what they wanted to fund with the block 

grant money based on their PSN strategic planning. The grants were 

awarded in January 2004, with the grantees having 2 years to complete 

their projects. The United Way assigned one person to work with the 

block grant program, who was responsible for allocating funds to the 

programs and ensuring their operations were consistent with PSN 

strategies. The staff person also monitored the grants line item by line 

item to make sure the program activities conformed to the proposal. 

Among the prevention programs funded by PSN are: 

•	 GRAVE (Get Real About Violence Education), a diversion program for children found with weapons at school, is run by the 

Juvenile Court and the Prosecutor’s Office in Montgomery 

County. The student’s parent(s) must attend the program with 

their child. Program officials report that youth attending the program have had a very low recidivism rate. Other counties in the 

district have reported interest in the program. 

•	 Dothan Police Department summer program for teens is a recreation program intended to provide teenagers with a positive 

experience and attempts to keep youth out of trouble during 

the summer. 

•	 Metro Montgomery Youth Crime Stoppers program is a schoolbased early intervention program that distributes materials such 

as cartoons, pencils, erasers, bookmarks, and anti-violence 

pledges. Over 10,000 comic strips with the theme, “Keeping 

Cool Rules,” have been prepared for distribution in schools as 

well as festivals, fairs, minor league baseball games, “kids and 

cops days,” and similar events. The sheriff’s department has a 

similar puppet program about non-violence. 

•	 Metro Montgomery Youth Crime Stoppers set up an anonymous 

school tip hotline. This program is new (i.e., had not existed 

14 
Middle District of Alabama 

prior to PSN funding). To date, this resulted in the confiscation 

of four guns and several weapons at local area schools. 

In addition, PSN block grant funds were used to support a city 

computer upgrade intended to allow improved record-keeping and 

analysis. In an effort to increase the surveillance of high-risk probationers and parolees, the Pardon and Parole Board received funding to purchase eight vehicles to allow Pardon and Parole agents to conduct 

home visits. 

Although fiscal responsibility is placed with the United Way, the 

USAO maintains close contact with the United Way and the grantees. 

The LECC works regularly with the United Way staff to monitor the 

funded programs, and the FAUSA similarly works with the United Way 

to ensure that the media and public education campaigns are effectively implemented. 

Figure 5 summarizes the Middle District’s gun crime reduction 

strategies. 

Figure 5: Gun Crime Problem and PSN Strategies 

Problem Overall Strategy Specific Components 

Chronic offenders Incapacitate and deter USAO commitment to 

federal prosecution 

All AUSAs expected to 

prosecute gun crime cases 

Lack of credible sanctions 

for gun crime offenses 

Increase federal sanctions PIRT—joint gun crime 

prosecution screening 

Increase flow of cases and 

improve quality 

Increase supervision of 

gun crime offenders 

Pardon and Parole 

Board involvement 

Provide agents vehicles for 

community supervision 

Perception of low certainty 

and severity for illegal gun 

possession and use 

Implement public 

education campaign 

Alabama ICE TV, radio, billboard, 

poster, etc. campaign 

Lack of geographic focus Focus on relationships Build relationships 

throughout district 

USA and LECC meet all law 

enforcement leaders in district 

Sustain relationships 

throughout district 

Locals involved in weekly 

PIRT meetings 

Locals involved in quarterly 

task force meetings 

Feedback to officers 

Lack of gun crime 

prevention efforts 

Prevention of illegal 

possession and use of guns 

PSN funds used to 

support community-based 

prevention strategies 

GRAVE—diversion program 

for youths found with weapons 

School-based gun crime 

tips line 

Anti-violence education 

programs for schools 

and youths 

15 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

Results 

Evidence of Implementation—Outputs 

The data clearly indicate that federal prosecution of gun crime 

offenses has increased in the Middle District. Despite the relatively 

small number of AUSAs (nine in 2000), the number of indictments 

under U.S. Code Title 922 and 924 violations increased from 15 in fiscal year (FY) 2000 and 20 in FY 2001, to 92 in FY 2003, an increase of 

over 500 percent. Similarly, the number of defendants prosecuted in 

federal court increased from 21 in FY 2000 to 103 in FY 2003 and 86 

in FY 2004. This increase in indictments and defendants placed the 

Middle District in the top 7 percent in terms of its percentage-point 

increase in federal prosecution. The numbers are even more telling 

when considered in light of the district’s population. As one of the 

least populous U.S. districts (ranked 19th least populous out of 94), the 

Middle District’s 2003 rate of defendants per 100,000 is 9.7. This federal prosecution rate per 100,000 population is among the top 15 (i.e., 

14th) of the 94 judicial districts. Thus, evidence suggests that the goal 

of accepting all cases (absent evidentiary problems) was achieved. 

One goal of the PIRT meetings was to ensure that individuals with 

extensive criminal histories charged with a gun crime received serious consideration for federal prosecution. A second goal was to identify for potential federal prosecution active offenders believed to be 

at-risk for gun crime involvement. Evidence that PSN/ICE has targeted 

chronic offenders is available through analysis of the prior criminal 

histories of the first 94 federal defendants convicted under PSN, compiled from a review of the federal pre-sentence investigations. These 

94 defendants had accumulated 761 prior convictions, an average of 

8.1 prior convictions per defendant. The prior offenses included personal crimes (20.1 percent), weapons offenses (4.9 percent), property 

crimes (17 percent), public disorder (27.1 percent), drug offenses 

(18.8 percent), and juvenile crimes (12.2 percent). The wide variety 

of offenses is consistent with the second goal of the PIRT meetings, 

federal prosecution of offenders believed at risk for continued gun 

crime, who may not present extensive histories of violent crime. In 

total, these 94 defendants received sentences ranging from 4 months 

to life. Excluding life sentences, the average sentence was 75 months 

(i.e., 6 years and 3 months). 

Evidence of Impact—Outcomes 

Ultimately, the goal of PSN is to reduce gun crime. To assess 

whether the Middle District’s PSN strategies had this impact, the outcome analyses focused on gun crime and homicide trends in the City 

of Montgomery. In addition, to control for “outside factors” that may 

change gun crime rates, property crimes were analyzed to assess if 

there was a simultaneous reduction in overall crime that might 

16 
Middle District of Alabama 

account for the findings. The focus on Montgomery was based on the 

fact that it served as the initial principal target area of the task force. 

Though the task force moved to a district-wide strategy, the early focus 

was on Montgomery and PSN efforts have been sustained in Montgomery through the present.17 

As an initial step in the outcome analysis, researchers reviewed the 

annual trends in homicide, armed robbery, and assault with a firearm. 

Comparing 2002 and 2003 with the previous 2 years provided evidence of a decline in these crimes, particularly for aggravated assaults 

with a firearm (see figure 6). 

Figure 6: Gun Crime Trend Data—City of Montgomery 

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 

Homicide (total) 30 27 30 18 25 

Aggravated Assault with a Firearm 319 293 303 244 283 

Robbery with a Firearm 448 464 543 505 488 

To proceed with a more detailed outcome analysis, researchers 

examined the monthly trend for three categories of offenses: homicide, armed robbery with a firearm, and aggravated assault with a 

firearm.18 Researchers treated the May 2002 date of the first publicly 

announced PSN/ICE conviction as the formal intervention date of 

PSN implementation. 

Although the trend lines are suggestive of a reduction in gun 

crime, to assess the significance of these trends researchers conducted 

a time series analysis, one of the most powerful evaluation tools 

because it can take into account crime trends prior to the intervention 

point and assess the significance of any change in crime levels following the intervention. 

The time series analyses are based on monthly data from January 

2000 through December 2004.19 Figure 7 (below) presents the key 

findings.20 Assaults with a firearm had a statistically significant decline 

(p < .05) suggesting there is a maximum likelihood mean reduction of 

three assaults with firearms per month immediately after the intervention date of May 2002. This translates into a reduction from approximately 309 gun assaults per year to approximately 270. Homicide also 

declined, though its significance level was marginal (alpha .116). This 

translates to a reduction from 29.5 homicides per year to 22.8. The 

analyses do not indicate any effect on armed robbery. 

A possible explanation for this decline in violent crimes could be 

that overall, crime rates were declining at a simultaneous, or similar, 

rate. If this were the case, the above findings would simply be a result 

17 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

of a general decline in crime. In order to control for a possible global 

change in crime independent of firearm offenses (e.g., whether there 

was a regression to the mean in overall crime patterns), researchers 

examined monthly time series analysis of motor vehicle thefts and 

property offenses.21 The authors hypothesize that if such a global 

decline occurred, the time series analysis on property crimes would 

have a similar negative mean difference, and that this difference is not 

due to chance (with the same alpha standard: p < .15). 

When examining the comparison offenses, there was actually a 

slight increase in the average number of motor vehicle thefts and overall property offenses, although this change was not statistically significant. Thus, property offenses remained consistent over the time series 

period. That is, the comparison variables that account for outside factors (global decline in overall crime) did not change during this same 

period. This suggests that the reduction in homicide and assaults with 

firearms may be attributable to the PSN intervention. 

Thus, the results suggest that PSN/ICE contributed to a significant 

reduction in assault committed with a gun and in homicides in the 

period following the first widely-publicized ICE federal prosecution. 

There was no observable effect on robbery. 

The decline in crime is coupled with a belief among law enforcement officials that the perceived costs of illegally carrying or using a 

firearm have changed in the minds of potential offenders. This is 

attributed to the actual increase in federal prosecution as well as the 

public media campaign. Anecdotally, during each visit to Alabama, 

the members of the research team observed ICE billboards and heard 

either television or radio PSN ads. Law enforcement officials provided 

numerous stories of defendants asking upon arrest, “please don’t ICE 

me.” On a flight to Montgomery, a RP had a conversation with a 

Figure 7: Time Series Analysis—May 2002 Intervention Date 

Crime 

PreIntervention 

Mean 

PostIntervention 

Mean 

Mean 

Difference 

(Post-Pre) p 

ARIMA 

Model 

d q 

Intervention 

Coefficient 

pvalue 

(s.e.) 

Target Offenses 

Assault with Firearm 25.78 22.50 -3.28 0 0 0 -3.29 (1.6) .038 

Armed Robbery (Ln) 3.64 3.68 0.04 0 0 1 .049 (.10) .616 

Homicide 2.46 1.90 -0.56 0 0 0 -.558 (.36) .116 

Comparison Offenses 

MV Theft (Ln) 4.67 4.86 0.19 0 1 0 -.017 (.05) .747 

Property (Ln) 7.09 7.15 0.16 1 1 0 -.019 (.021) .787 

(12)22 

18 
Middle District of Alabama 

Montgomery resident who, when asked by the researcher whether he 

had heard of Alabama ICE, immediately responded, “Oh yes, gun 

crime equals hard time.” 

Summary 

Project Safe Neighborhoods in the Middle District of Alabama can 

best be described as a Project Exile-type approach. Confronted with 

research indicating that gun crime was largely committed by chronic 

offenders, concentrated in Montgomery but without readily identifiable geographic concentrations, and convinced that potential offenders no longer feared the threat of state sanctions for illegal gun 

possession and use, the PSN task force decided to focus on increased 

federal prosecution coupled with an aggressive public education media 

campaign. The strategy was largely dependent on establishing new 

partnerships between local, state, and federal law enforcement, as well 

as with research and community engagement partners, to change the 

way business takes place in the prevention of and response to gun 

crime. The findings suggest that indeed the response to gun crime 

changed in the Middle District and that, at least in the principal target 

area of Montgomery, there has been a measurable decline in gun 

assaults and homicides. This section will review the key components 

of the way business changed as well as the lessons learned from the 

Middle District’s experience with PSN. 

Leadership 

A striking finding, consistently expressed by all officials interviewed, was the crucial role of the leadership provided by the U.S. 

Attorney. The USA continually affirmed PSN as a top priority to local, 

state, and federal law enforcement partners and to the community. 

Local law enforcement noted that the USA and her AUSAs followed 

through on their commitments to support local law enforcement 

through increased prosecution of gun offenders and by including local 

law enforcement as equal partners in PSN. As one chief of police 

stated, “The U.S. Attorney is true to her word.” 

In addition to the role of the USA, leadership was provided by the 

ATF Special Agent in Charge, local chiefs and sheriffs, the Law Enforcement Coordinating Council, and the AUSAs involved in PSN. This diffuse leadership appeared to be a product of the task force structure. 

Task Force Structure 

The initial assessment of potential barriers to effective implementation of PSN in the Middle District suggested two major challenges. The 

first was the small size of the USAO coupled with the small number of 

ATF agents at the time PSN was initiated. The second was the lack of a 

19 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

history of federal-state-local law enforcement collaboration. To address 

these challenges several strategic decisions were made. 

First, rather than rely on one person to be the driving force behind 

PSN, numerous resources were devoted to PSN. The USA was personally very active in communicating the PSN message and building relationships with local law enforcement. The criminal chief would be 

responsible for ensuring that federal prosecution of gun crime would 

be a major priority for all AUSAs. Another AUSA was appointed PSN 

Coordinator with overall responsibility for PSN implementation and for 

overseeing the media and community outreach. Another AUSA was 

tasked with leading the Prosecution and Investigative Review Team 

process. The LECC, a well-respected law enforcement official from the 

state, became the U.S. Attorney’s liaison to local and state law enforcement. The United Way was enlisted to serve as fiscal agent and to 

implement the media and community outreach campaign. 

Second, rather than ask local agencies to devote personnel to a 

more traditional multi-jurisdictional task force model, the USA and 

LECC addressed the concerns of local chiefs of police and sheriffs and 

created a task force structure whereby local agencies provided liaison 

officers to the PSN task force who were able to continue serving their 

local agencies. The local liaison officers, coupled with local prosecution counterparts and AUSA gun prosecutors and ATF agents, constituted the PSN task force coordinated through the PIRT process. 

As a result of this structure, PSN was not dependent on any single 

leader but instead relied on multiple leaders playing various roles and 

sharing responsibility and accountability. 

Partnerships 

As noted above, a key dimension of changing the business of the 

criminal justice system response to gun crime in the Middle District 

involved establishing a network of relationships among the USAO and 

federal law enforcement, local law enforcement, prevention-oriented 

social service providers, the media and fiscal partner, and the research 

partners. This was a primary focus of the USA and PSN team within the 

USAO. Evidence of the success of these efforts was clear during site 

visits and interviews with key personnel. Local law enforcement officials from throughout the district spoke of the new-found relationships 

between their agencies, the USAO, and ATF. 

An important ingredient in the federal-local relationship was that 

the local law enforcement executives were able to help shape the structure of the PSN task force. Rather than permanently assign officers to a 

federal multi-jurisdictional task force, where officers might be assigned 

throughout the district, the PSN task force was structured with liaison 

officers who remained within their home agencies but who contributed to the PSN task force through their involvement in PIRT. 

20 
Middle District of Alabama 

Similar relationships were established with local prosecutor’s 

offices. Interviews suggested that prior to PSN, some local prosecutors 

perceived “a wall” between their offices and the USAO. PSN, and the 

efforts of the U.S. Attorney and the PSN team within the USAO, were 

credited with establishing new relationships with the local prosecutors. The result was that the local prosecutors are now actively reviewing gun-related cases to determine which cases can most effectively be 

handled locally and which should be referred to the PIRT for potential 

federal prosecution. 

In addition to the relationship established with the United Way as 

the fiscal agency, other new relationships have emerged as PSN has 

evolved. For example, the USAO is partnering with the Family Justice 

Center in Montgomery in the effort to address domestic violence, and 

the city’s Weed and Seed Program has been linked to PSN. 

And the integration of research was new for all involved. Initially, 

the RPs attempted to collect crime data from all law enforcement agencies in the Middle District. They quickly encountered problems and realized this would not be a beneficial use of their time. Consequently, they 

focused their analysis on gun crime in Montgomery. In addition, the 

RPs would have liked to examine patterns across ICE cases but for various reasons (e.g., security clearance and ongoing case investigations) 

they were unable to access the case files. Instead, the compromise was 

an analysis of federal pre-sentence investigations for all ICE cases. 

Regular Meetings 

Officials at both the federal and local levels credit the PIRT meetings with establishing strong partnerships, addressing case specific and 

broader policy issues, and creating accountability to ensure that gun 

crime cases are addressed effectively. The weekly PIRT meetings were 

very well attended and described as critical for developing and maintaining a focus on gun crime. 

The weekly PIRT meetings are supported by less frequent luncheon briefings. Beginning in 2004, the USA initiated the first of what is 

now three ICE luncheon briefings. All chiefs of police, sheriffs, district 

attorneys, and law enforcement and prosecution personnel assigned to 

the PSN task force are invited. The meetings are considered opportunities for the USAO to update attendees on PSN, to affirm the USAO’s 

commitment to PSN, and to thank local officials for their continued 

involvement and support of PSN. 

Challenges 

As with most PSN task forces, ICE officials describe a series of 

ongoing challenges. Foremost for the Middle District are the number of 

federal gun prosecutors and ATF agents. The USAO PSN team is concerned that their ability to effectively prosecute cases referred to the 

21 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

USAO, given the increased desire of local officials throughout the district to refer cases for federal prosecution, will be constrained by the 

small number of ATF agents and federal prosecutors. 

Another challenge relates to turnover in key personnel. The Montgomery Police Department witnessed the resignation of the chief of 

police, who had been one of the key proponents of ICE. Fortunately, 

the new chief is described as being similarly committed. Similarly, officers assigned to the PSN task force have often been reassigned. The 

district has addressed this issue through a commitment to training, and 

interviews suggest that some turnover is beneficial because the officers assigned to the task force take their knowledge of ICE and federal 

gun crime prosecution to their new assignments. 

Evidence suggests that the USAO has been able to overcome these 

challenges. The task force continues its work, as witnessed by the high 

level of participation in PIRT meetings. Additional evidence is provided 

by the application of the PSN/ICE model to other crime problems. 

Specifically, the PSN approach served as the foundation for a Child 

Pornography Task Force. Similarly, the Montgomery Police Department 

developed an auto theft unit based on the PSN approach of analysis, 

focused response, and assessment. 

Figure 8 summarizes the key components of the PSN task force. 

Figure 8: Summary of Key Components of the Middle 


District of Alabama’s Successful PSN Task Force
 

Key Component 

Leadership 

Description 

Active role of USA; PSN clear priority 

PSN Task Force 

Structure 

Shared responsibility (USA, PSN Coordinator, Criminal 

Division Chief, PIRT Coordinator, LECC) 

All AUSAs expected to prosecute gun crime cases 

Partnerships Active outreach to local law enforcement agencies by 

USA and LECC 

Inclusion of RPs as task force members and 

integration of research into ICE process 

Active involvement of media and community 

engagement partners 

Regular Meetings PIRT meets weekly 

22 
Middle District of Alabama 

Conclusion
 

A key criterion for whether a PSN district would be selected for 

inclusion in the case study series is whether gun crime is being 

addressed in new ways following the implementation of PSN. For the 

Middle District of Alabama, the answer appears to clearly be “yes.” New 

partnerships have been established between federal, state, and local 

law enforcement as well as with research and media and community 

engagement partners. A gun case prosecution review team has been 

established with the goal of identifying cases most appropriate for federal prosecution in the hope of increasing the costs for illegal possession and use of guns and thereby incapacitating chronic offenders and 

deterring potential gun crime. Coupled with this strategy, the district 

has worked with the PSN task forces in the two other USAOs serving 

Alabama to communicate the gun crime deterrence message throughout the state. Finally, gun assaults and homicides appear to have been 

reduced in the target city of Montgomery following the implementation of PSN and in contrast to the trend in property crime.23 

23 
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Bynum, T., et al. 2006. Project Safe Neighborhoods: Strategic Interventions: Chronic Violent Offender Lists (Case Study 4). Washington, 

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Cook, P. and J. Ludwig. 2004. “Principles for Effective Gun Policy.” Fordham Law Review LXXIII,II:589-613. 

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25 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

editors. Committee on Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and 

Social Sciences and Education. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 1999. Promising Strategies to Reduce Gun Violence. Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Justice. 

Sherman, L., H. Strang, and D. Woods. 2000. Recidivism Patterns in the 

Canberra Reintegrative Shaming Experiments (RISE). Canberra, 

Australia: Centre for Restorative Justice, Australian National University. 

26 
Endnotes 

1. Bureau of Justice Statistics: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjc/cvict_c.htm 

(as of 12/28/04). 

2. Levels of property crime and violent crime not involving a gun 

are lower in the United States than many other western democracies, 

but gun crime remains exceptionally high in the United States. See 

Zimring and Hawkins, 1999; Bureau of Justice Statistics: 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ijs.htm (as of 12/28/04). 

3. Reviews of promising gun crime reduction strategies that can assist 

research partners and task forces include Braga, 2004; National Research 

Council, 2005; Ludwig and Cook, 2003; Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention, 1999. See also Dalton, 2003; Decker, 2003. 

4. These data were reported by the U.S. Department of Justice, 

Executive Office for United States Attorneys (10/05). 

5. Data compiled by Professor Joe Trotter and colleagues as part of 

American University’s PSN Technical Assistance Program. 

6. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2004. See also www.psn.gov. 

7. Comparable demographic and crime statistics were unavailable 

for the federal districts of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and 

the Marianas Islands. All comparisons are based on the 90 remaining 

federal districts. 

8. All population data are based on the 2000 U.S. Census. 

9. Montgomery County ranks 203rd in murder rate and 551st in 

aggravated assault rate out of the 3,143 counties (and independent 

cities) in the United States. 

10. The exact population for Montgomery County is 223,510. Thus, 

all counties with a population of +/- 50,000 people (e.g., counties with 

at least 173,510 and at most 273,510) were reviewed. 

11. The mean murder rate for these 109 counties is 0.4756 with a 

standard deviation of 0.5187. Montgomery has a murder rate of 1.30, 

1.5 standard deviations greater than the mean. 

12. The mean aggravated assault rate for these 109 counties is 27.10 

and the standard deviation is 19.1. Montgomery has an aggravated 

assault rate of 34.36 and is within one standard deviation of the mean. 

13. The USAO had prosecuted other gun crime cases that were 

ICE-eligible, but this was the first case announced publicly as an ICE 

prosecution. 

27 
Strategic Interventions: Case Studies 

14. This case study is the product of a collaboration between Troy 

University and Michigan State University. 

15. The belief that overcrowding discredits the threat of sanctions 

was echoed by officials in the Southern and Northern Districts of 

Alabama. 

16. Gun crime prosecution screening teams have proven one of 

the major PSN strategies across the country. For more information, see 

Decker et al., 2006. 

17. It will be interesting to assess the long-term trend in gun crime 

throughout the district. However, insufficient time has passed in terms 

of meaningful implementation of PSN in the other areas of the district 

to allow outcome evaluation. In addition, the relatively low base rates 

of gun crime outside of Montgomery may make it difficult to detect 

significant changes in gun crime. 

18. Researchers used total homicides as opposed to homicides 

with a firearm because of the relatively small number of gun homicides 

in a city the size of Montgomery. 

19. Researchers examined what is known as a distinct zero order, 

or abrupt permanent change, that is designed to test whether the 

trend in crime following the May 2002 intervention date was significantly different than the pre-intervention trend. All of the time series 

conducted adhere to the assumptions of the ARIMA (Autoregressive 

Integrated Moving Average) modeling requirements, specifically 

bounds of stationarity and invertability (details of the analysis are presented in the technical appendix). Following the argument of Sherman 

and colleagues (2000) and Hayes and Daly (2003) in the case of evaluation research, researchers employed the less restrictive significance 

level (p < .15) to assess significance. This means that researchers considered a change to be significant if it would be unlikely to occur by 

chance less than 15 out of 100 times. 

20. For a more detailed discussion, refer to the technical appendix. 

21. Property offenses are operationalized as a combination of burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts. 

22. In the case of property offenses, there was clear monthly mean 

and variance non-stationarity as well as annual seasonality (e.g., spikes 

in the autocorrelation functions (ACFs) every January), which were 

controlled by creating a seasonal and annual differencing component 

in the model. 

23. There was no observable impact on armed robberies. 

28 
Technical Appendix: Analysis of
 

Impact, Time Series Analysis
 

The analyses are based on monthly data from January 2000 through 

December 2004. The research partners (RPs) examined two distinct 

zero order transfer functions, or abrupt permanent change functions, 

time series statistics with intervention dates in May 2002 (media-celebrated case) and February 2003 (five new Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Alcohol and Explosives officers assigned). All of the time series conducted adhere to the assumptions of the ARIMA (Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average) modeling requirements, specifically bounds of 

stationarity and invertability. 

First, the series for each crime type was examined to see if it was 

stationary over time. If so, the raw data was used. If not, logging (natural logarithm) the data addressed the issues of variance non-stationarity. In the case of property offenses and motor vehicle theft, the RPs 

both logged and differenced the series in order to parcel out some of 

the unstable spikes in property offenses that occurred across time. 

After assessment of the stationarity issue, the series was plotted 

and the autocorrelation functions (ACF) and partial autocorrelation 

functions (PACF) were examined to see if key spikes required modeling any moving average (the “q” in the tables) or autoregressive (the “p” 

in the tables) components. Each series modeled the spikes, if necessary, independent of one another (i.e., the best series were identified 

to fit each crime type independent of one another). None of the models has any q-statistics, or white-noise estimates, that are statistically 

significant (which follows another assumption of time-series statistics). 

The series fit the data independent of the intervention component. 

Finally, an intervention component was added to the model. For 

homicide and gun assaults, the coefficients are negative in value, suggesting a reduction in both intervention periods. However, armed robbery, property offenses, and motor vehicle theft rates were relatively 

identical in both pre- and post intervention periods (suggesting there 

is no change in armed robbery or property offenses over this series). 

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